func
stringlengths 0
484k
| target
int64 0
1
| cwe
sequencelengths 0
4
| project
stringclasses 799
values | commit_id
stringlengths 40
40
| hash
float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
| size
int64 1
24k
| message
stringlengths 0
13.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
xmlParseEntityRef(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
const xmlChar *name;
xmlEntityPtr ent = NULL;
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(NULL);
if (RAW != '&')
return(NULL);
NEXT;
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"xmlParseEntityRef: no name\n");
return(NULL);
}
if (RAW != ';') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITYREF_SEMICOL_MISSING, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
NEXT;
/*
* Predefined entities override any extra definition
*/
if ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLDSAX) == 0) {
ent = xmlGetPredefinedEntity(name);
if (ent != NULL)
return(ent);
}
/*
* Increase the number of entity references parsed
*/
ctxt->nbentities++;
/*
* Ask first SAX for entity resolution, otherwise try the
* entities which may have stored in the parser context.
*/
if (ctxt->sax != NULL) {
if (ctxt->sax->getEntity != NULL)
ent = ctxt->sax->getEntity(ctxt->userData, name);
if ((ctxt->wellFormed == 1 ) && (ent == NULL) &&
(ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLDSAX))
ent = xmlGetPredefinedEntity(name);
if ((ctxt->wellFormed == 1 ) && (ent == NULL) &&
(ctxt->userData==ctxt)) {
ent = xmlSAX2GetEntity(ctxt, name);
}
}
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(NULL);
/*
* [ WFC: Entity Declared ]
* In a document without any DTD, a document with only an
* internal DTD subset which contains no parameter entity
* references, or a document with "standalone='yes'", the
* Name given in the entity reference must match that in an
* entity declaration, except that well-formed documents
* need not declare any of the following entities: amp, lt,
* gt, apos, quot.
* The declaration of a parameter entity must precede any
* reference to it.
* Similarly, the declaration of a general entity must
* precede any reference to it which appears in a default
* value in an attribute-list declaration. Note that if
* entities are declared in the external subset or in
* external parameter entities, a non-validating processor
* is not obligated to read and process their declarations;
* for such documents, the rule that an entity must be
* declared is a well-formedness constraint only if
* standalone='yes'.
*/
if (ent == NULL) {
if ((ctxt->standalone == 1) ||
((ctxt->hasExternalSubset == 0) &&
(ctxt->hasPErefs == 0))) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"Entity '%s' not defined\n", name);
} else {
xmlErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"Entity '%s' not defined\n", name);
if ((ctxt->inSubset == 0) &&
(ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->reference != NULL)) {
ctxt->sax->reference(ctxt->userData, name);
}
}
xmlParserEntityCheck(ctxt, 0, ent, 0);
ctxt->valid = 0;
}
/*
* [ WFC: Parsed Entity ]
* An entity reference must not contain the name of an
* unparsed entity
*/
else if (ent->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_UNPARSED_ENTITY) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNPARSED_ENTITY,
"Entity reference to unparsed entity %s\n", name);
}
/*
* [ WFC: No External Entity References ]
* Attribute values cannot contain direct or indirect
* entity references to external entities.
*/
else if ((ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE) &&
(ent->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_PARSED_ENTITY)) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_IS_EXTERNAL,
"Attribute references external entity '%s'\n", name);
}
/*
* [ WFC: No < in Attribute Values ]
* The replacement text of any entity referred to directly or
* indirectly in an attribute value (other than "<") must
* not contain a <.
*/
else if ((ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE) &&
(ent != NULL) &&
(ent->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY)) {
if (((ent->checked & 1) || (ent->checked == 0)) &&
(ent->content != NULL) && (xmlStrchr(ent->content, '<'))) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LT_IN_ATTRIBUTE,
"'<' in entity '%s' is not allowed in attributes values\n", name);
}
}
/*
* Internal check, no parameter entities here ...
*/
else {
switch (ent->etype) {
case XML_INTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY:
case XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY:
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_IS_PARAMETER,
"Attempt to reference the parameter entity '%s'\n",
name);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
/*
* [ WFC: No Recursion ]
* A parsed entity must not contain a recursive reference
* to itself, either directly or indirectly.
* Done somewhere else
*/
return(ent);
} | 0 | [] | libxml2 | be2a7edaf289c5da74a4f9ed3a0b6c733e775230 | 233,102,286,451,847,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 154 | Fix for CVE-2014-3660
Issues related to the billion laugh entity expansion which happened to
escape the initial set of fixes |
void exit_creds(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct cred *cred;
kdebug("exit_creds(%u,%p,%p,{%d,%d})", tsk->pid, tsk->real_cred, tsk->cred,
atomic_read(&tsk->cred->usage),
read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred));
cred = (struct cred *) tsk->real_cred;
tsk->real_cred = NULL;
validate_creds(cred);
alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1);
put_cred(cred);
cred = (struct cred *) tsk->cred;
tsk->cred = NULL;
validate_creds(cred);
alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1);
put_cred(cred);
} | 1 | [] | linux-2.6 | ee18d64c1f632043a02e6f5ba5e045bb26a5465f | 53,911,689,431,677,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | KEYS: Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring on its parent [try #6]
Add a keyctl to install a process's session keyring onto its parent. This
replaces the parent's session keyring. Because the COW credential code does
not permit one process to change another process's credentials directly, the
change is deferred until userspace next starts executing again. Normally this
will be after a wait*() syscall.
To support this, three new security hooks have been provided:
cred_alloc_blank() to allocate unset security creds, cred_transfer() to fill in
the blank security creds and key_session_to_parent() - which asks the LSM if
the process may replace its parent's session keyring.
The replacement may only happen if the process has the same ownership details
as its parent, and the process has LINK permission on the session keyring, and
the session keyring is owned by the process, and the LSM permits it.
Note that this requires alteration to each architecture's notify_resume path.
This has been done for all arches barring blackfin, m68k* and xtensa, all of
which need assembly alteration to support TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME. This allows the
replacement to be performed at the point the parent process resumes userspace
execution.
This allows the userspace AFS pioctl emulation to fully emulate newpag() and
the VIOCSETTOK and VIOCSETTOK2 pioctls, all of which require the ability to
alter the parent process's PAG membership. However, since kAFS doesn't use
PAGs per se, but rather dumps the keys into the session keyring, the session
keyring of the parent must be replaced if, for example, VIOCSETTOK is passed
the newpag flag.
This can be tested with the following program:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
#define KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT 18
#define OSERROR(X, S) do { if ((long)(X) == -1) { perror(S); exit(1); } } while(0)
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
key_serial_t keyring, key;
long ret;
keyring = keyctl_join_session_keyring(argv[1]);
OSERROR(keyring, "keyctl_join_session_keyring");
key = add_key("user", "a", "b", 1, keyring);
OSERROR(key, "add_key");
ret = keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT);
OSERROR(ret, "KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT");
return 0;
}
Compiled and linked with -lkeyutils, you should see something like:
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
355907932 --alswrv 4043 -1 \_ keyring: _uid.4043
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: _ses
1055658746 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ /tmp/newpag hello
[dhowells@andromeda ~]$ keyctl show
Session Keyring
-3 --alswrv 4043 4043 keyring: hello
340417692 --alswrv 4043 4043 \_ user: a
Where the test program creates a new session keyring, sticks a user key named
'a' into it and then installs it on its parent.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]> |
HTTPSession::updateWriteBufSize(int64_t delta) {
// This is the sum of body bytes buffered within transactions_ and in
// the sock_'s write buffer.
delta += pendingWriteSizeDelta_;
pendingWriteSizeDelta_ = 0;
bool wasExceeded = egressLimitExceeded();
updatePendingWriteSize(delta);
if (egressLimitExceeded() && !wasExceeded) {
// Exceeded limit. Pause reading on the incoming stream.
if (inResume_) {
VLOG(3) << "Pausing txn egress for " << *this << " deferred";
pendingPause_ = true;
} else {
VLOG(3) << "Pausing txn egress for " << *this;
invokeOnAllTransactions(&HTTPTransaction::pauseEgress);
}
} else if (!egressLimitExceeded() && wasExceeded) {
// Dropped below limit. Resume reading on the incoming stream if needed.
if (inResume_) {
if (pendingPause_) {
VLOG(3) << "Cancel deferred txn egress pause for " << *this;
pendingPause_ = false;
} else {
VLOG(3) << "Ignoring redundant resume for " << *this;
}
} else {
VLOG(3) << "Resuming txn egress for " << *this;
resumeTransactions();
}
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | proxygen | 0600ebe59c3e82cd012def77ca9ca1918da74a71 | 57,550,332,188,967,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 | Check that a secondary auth manager is set before dereferencing.
Summary: CVE-2018-6343
Reviewed By: mingtaoy
Differential Revision: D12994423
fbshipit-source-id: 9229ec11da8085f1fa153595e8e5353e19d06fb7 |
CURLUcode curl_url_set(CURLU *u, CURLUPart what,
const char *part, unsigned int flags)
{
char **storep = NULL;
long port = 0;
bool urlencode = (flags & CURLU_URLENCODE)? 1 : 0;
bool plusencode = FALSE;
bool urlskipslash = FALSE;
bool appendquery = FALSE;
bool equalsencode = FALSE;
if(!u)
return CURLUE_BAD_HANDLE;
if(!part) {
/* setting a part to NULL clears it */
switch(what) {
case CURLUPART_URL:
break;
case CURLUPART_SCHEME:
storep = &u->scheme;
break;
case CURLUPART_USER:
storep = &u->user;
break;
case CURLUPART_PASSWORD:
storep = &u->password;
break;
case CURLUPART_OPTIONS:
storep = &u->options;
break;
case CURLUPART_HOST:
storep = &u->host;
break;
case CURLUPART_ZONEID:
storep = &u->zoneid;
break;
case CURLUPART_PORT:
u->portnum = 0;
storep = &u->port;
break;
case CURLUPART_PATH:
storep = &u->path;
break;
case CURLUPART_QUERY:
storep = &u->query;
break;
case CURLUPART_FRAGMENT:
storep = &u->fragment;
break;
default:
return CURLUE_UNKNOWN_PART;
}
if(storep && *storep) {
Curl_safefree(*storep);
}
return CURLUE_OK;
}
switch(what) {
case CURLUPART_SCHEME:
if(strlen(part) > MAX_SCHEME_LEN)
/* too long */
return CURLUE_BAD_SCHEME;
if(!(flags & CURLU_NON_SUPPORT_SCHEME) &&
/* verify that it is a fine scheme */
!Curl_builtin_scheme(part))
return CURLUE_UNSUPPORTED_SCHEME;
storep = &u->scheme;
urlencode = FALSE; /* never */
break;
case CURLUPART_USER:
storep = &u->user;
break;
case CURLUPART_PASSWORD:
storep = &u->password;
break;
case CURLUPART_OPTIONS:
storep = &u->options;
break;
case CURLUPART_HOST: {
size_t len = strcspn(part, " \r\n");
if(strlen(part) != len)
/* hostname with bad content */
return CURLUE_BAD_HOSTNAME;
storep = &u->host;
Curl_safefree(u->zoneid);
break;
}
case CURLUPART_ZONEID:
storep = &u->zoneid;
break;
case CURLUPART_PORT:
{
char *endp;
urlencode = FALSE; /* never */
port = strtol(part, &endp, 10); /* Port number must be decimal */
if((port <= 0) || (port > 0xffff))
return CURLUE_BAD_PORT_NUMBER;
if(*endp)
/* weirdly provided number, not good! */
return CURLUE_BAD_PORT_NUMBER;
storep = &u->port;
}
break;
case CURLUPART_PATH:
urlskipslash = TRUE;
storep = &u->path;
break;
case CURLUPART_QUERY:
plusencode = urlencode;
appendquery = (flags & CURLU_APPENDQUERY)?1:0;
equalsencode = appendquery;
storep = &u->query;
break;
case CURLUPART_FRAGMENT:
storep = &u->fragment;
break;
case CURLUPART_URL: {
/*
* Allow a new URL to replace the existing (if any) contents.
*
* If the existing contents is enough for a URL, allow a relative URL to
* replace it.
*/
CURLUcode result;
char *oldurl;
char *redired_url;
/* if the new thing is absolute or the old one is not
* (we could not get an absolute url in 'oldurl'),
* then replace the existing with the new. */
if(Curl_is_absolute_url(part, NULL, 0)
|| curl_url_get(u, CURLUPART_URL, &oldurl, flags)) {
return parseurl_and_replace(part, u, flags);
}
/* apply the relative part to create a new URL
* and replace the existing one with it. */
redired_url = concat_url(oldurl, part);
free(oldurl);
if(!redired_url)
return CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
result = parseurl_and_replace(redired_url, u, flags);
free(redired_url);
return result;
}
default:
return CURLUE_UNKNOWN_PART;
}
DEBUGASSERT(storep);
{
const char *newp = part;
size_t nalloc = strlen(part);
if(nalloc > CURL_MAX_INPUT_LENGTH)
/* excessive input length */
return CURLUE_MALFORMED_INPUT;
if(urlencode) {
const unsigned char *i;
char *o;
char *enc = malloc(nalloc * 3 + 1); /* for worst case! */
if(!enc)
return CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
for(i = (const unsigned char *)part, o = enc; *i; i++) {
if((*i == ' ') && plusencode) {
*o = '+';
o++;
}
else if(Curl_isunreserved(*i) ||
((*i == '/') && urlskipslash) ||
((*i == '=') && equalsencode)) {
if((*i == '=') && equalsencode)
/* only skip the first equals sign */
equalsencode = FALSE;
*o = *i;
o++;
}
else {
msnprintf(o, 4, "%%%02x", *i);
o += 3;
}
}
*o = 0; /* null-terminate */
newp = enc;
}
else {
char *p;
newp = strdup(part);
if(!newp)
return CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
p = (char *)newp;
while(*p) {
/* make sure percent encoded are lower case */
if((*p == '%') && ISXDIGIT(p[1]) && ISXDIGIT(p[2]) &&
(ISUPPER(p[1]) || ISUPPER(p[2]))) {
p[1] = (char)TOLOWER(p[1]);
p[2] = (char)TOLOWER(p[2]);
p += 3;
}
else
p++;
}
}
if(appendquery) {
/* Append the string onto the old query. Add a '&' separator if none is
present at the end of the exsting query already */
size_t querylen = u->query ? strlen(u->query) : 0;
bool addamperand = querylen && (u->query[querylen -1] != '&');
if(querylen) {
size_t newplen = strlen(newp);
char *p = malloc(querylen + addamperand + newplen + 1);
if(!p) {
free((char *)newp);
return CURLUE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
strcpy(p, u->query); /* original query */
if(addamperand)
p[querylen] = '&'; /* ampersand */
strcpy(&p[querylen + addamperand], newp); /* new suffix */
free((char *)newp);
free(*storep);
*storep = p;
return CURLUE_OK;
}
}
if(what == CURLUPART_HOST) {
if(0 == strlen(newp) && (flags & CURLU_NO_AUTHORITY)) {
/* Skip hostname check, it's allowed to be empty. */
}
else {
if(hostname_check(u, (char *)newp)) {
free((char *)newp);
return CURLUE_BAD_HOSTNAME;
}
}
}
free(*storep);
*storep = (char *)newp;
}
/* set after the string, to make it not assigned if the allocation above
fails */
if(port)
u->portnum = port;
return CURLUE_OK;
} | 0 | [] | curl | 914aaab9153764ef8fa4178215b8ad89d3ac263a | 88,939,971,916,910,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 250 | urlapi: reject percent-decoding host name into separator bytes
CVE-2022-27780
Reported-by: Axel Chong
Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-27780.html
Closes #8826 |
static double mp_isint(_cimg_math_parser& mp) {
return (double)(cimg::mod(_mp_arg(2),1.)==0); | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | CImg | ac8003393569aba51048c9d67e1491559877b1d1 | 242,598,447,936,406,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | . |
GF_Err gf_hinter_track_process(GF_RTPHinter *tkHint)
{
GF_Err e;
u32 i, descIndex, duration;
u64 ts;
u8 PadBits;
GF_Fraction ft;
GF_ISOSample *samp;
tkHint->HintSample = tkHint->RTPTime = 0;
tkHint->TotalSample = gf_isom_get_sample_count(tkHint->file, tkHint->TrackNum);
ft.num = tkHint->rtp_p->sl_config.timestampResolution;
ft.den = tkHint->OrigTimeScale;
e = GF_OK;
for (i=0; i<tkHint->TotalSample; i++) {
samp = gf_isom_get_sample(tkHint->file, tkHint->TrackNum, i+1, &descIndex);
if (!samp) return gf_isom_last_error(tkHint->file);
//setup SL
tkHint->CurrentSample = i + 1;
/*keep same AU indicator if sync shadow - TODO FIXME: this assumes shadows are placed interleaved with
the track content which is the case for GPAC scene carousel generation, but may not always be true*/
if (samp->IsRAP==RAP_REDUNDANT) {
tkHint->rtp_p->sl_header.AU_sequenceNumber -= 1;
samp->IsRAP = RAP;
}
ts = ft.num * (samp->DTS+samp->CTS_Offset) / ft.den;
tkHint->rtp_p->sl_header.compositionTimeStamp = ts;
ts = ft.num * samp->DTS / ft.den;
tkHint->rtp_p->sl_header.decodingTimeStamp = ts;
tkHint->rtp_p->sl_header.randomAccessPointFlag = samp->IsRAP;
tkHint->base_offset_in_sample = 0;
/*crypted*/
if (tkHint->rtp_p->slMap.IV_length) {
GF_ISMASample *s = gf_isom_get_ismacryp_sample(tkHint->file, tkHint->TrackNum, samp, descIndex);
/*one byte take for selective_enc flag*/
if (s->flags & GF_ISOM_ISMA_USE_SEL_ENC) tkHint->base_offset_in_sample += 1;
if (s->flags & GF_ISOM_ISMA_IS_ENCRYPTED) tkHint->base_offset_in_sample += s->IV_length + s->KI_length;
gf_free(samp->data);
samp->data = s->data;
samp->dataLength = s->dataLength;
gf_rtp_builder_set_cryp_info(tkHint->rtp_p, s->IV, (char*)s->key_indicator, (s->flags & GF_ISOM_ISMA_IS_ENCRYPTED) ? 1 : 0);
s->data = NULL;
s->dataLength = 0;
gf_isom_ismacryp_delete_sample(s);
}
if (tkHint->rtp_p->sl_config.usePaddingFlag) {
gf_isom_get_sample_padding_bits(tkHint->file, tkHint->TrackNum, i+1, &PadBits);
tkHint->rtp_p->sl_header.paddingBits = PadBits;
} else {
tkHint->rtp_p->sl_header.paddingBits = 0;
}
duration = gf_isom_get_sample_duration(tkHint->file, tkHint->TrackNum, i+1);
// ts = (u32) (ft * (s64) (duration));
/*unpack nal units*/
if (tkHint->avc_nalu_size) {
u32 v, size;
u32 remain = samp->dataLength;
char *ptr = samp->data;
tkHint->rtp_p->sl_header.accessUnitStartFlag = 1;
tkHint->rtp_p->sl_header.accessUnitEndFlag = 0;
while (remain) {
size = 0;
v = tkHint->avc_nalu_size;
if (v>remain) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_RTP, ("[rtp hinter] Broken AVC nalu encapsulation: NALU size length is %d but only %d bytes left in sample %d\n", v, remain, tkHint->CurrentSample));
break;
}
while (v) {
size |= (u8) *ptr;
ptr++;
remain--;
v-=1;
if (v) size<<=8;
}
tkHint->base_offset_in_sample = samp->dataLength-remain;
if (remain < size) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_RTP, ("[rtp hinter] Broken AVC nalu encapsulation: NALU size is %d but only %d bytes left in sample %d\n", size, remain, tkHint->CurrentSample));
break;
}
remain -= size;
tkHint->rtp_p->sl_header.accessUnitEndFlag = remain ? 0 : 1;
if (!size) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_WARNING, GF_LOG_RTP, ("[rtp hinter] Broken AVC nalu encapsulation: NALU size is 0, ignoring it\n", size));
} else {
e = gf_rtp_builder_process(tkHint->rtp_p, ptr, size, (u8) !remain, samp->dataLength, duration, (u8) (descIndex + GF_RTP_TX3G_SIDX_OFFSET) );
ptr += size;
}
tkHint->rtp_p->sl_header.accessUnitStartFlag = 0;
}
} else {
e = gf_rtp_builder_process(tkHint->rtp_p, samp->data, samp->dataLength, 1, samp->dataLength, duration, (u8) (descIndex + GF_RTP_TX3G_SIDX_OFFSET) );
}
tkHint->rtp_p->sl_header.packetSequenceNumber += 1;
//signal some progress
gf_set_progress("Hinting", tkHint->CurrentSample, tkHint->TotalSample);
tkHint->rtp_p->sl_header.AU_sequenceNumber += 1;
gf_isom_sample_del(&samp);
if (e) return e;
}
//flush
gf_rtp_builder_process(tkHint->rtp_p, NULL, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0);
gf_isom_end_hint_sample(tkHint->file, tkHint->HintTrack, (u8) tkHint->SampleIsRAP);
return GF_OK;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | gpac | ebfa346eff05049718f7b80041093b4c5581c24e | 99,378,589,640,604,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 120 | fixed #1706 |
flatpak_dir_config_remove_pattern (FlatpakDir *self,
const char *key,
const char *pattern,
GError **error)
{
g_autoptr(GPtrArray) patterns = flatpak_dir_get_config_patterns (self, key);
g_autofree char *merged_patterns = NULL;
int j;
for (j = 0; j < patterns->len; j++)
{
if (strcmp (g_ptr_array_index (patterns, j), pattern) == 0)
break;
}
if (j == patterns->len)
return flatpak_fail (error, _("No current %s pattern matching %s"), key, pattern);
else
g_ptr_array_remove_index (patterns, j);
g_ptr_array_add (patterns, NULL);
merged_patterns = g_strjoinv (";", (char **)patterns->pdata);
return flatpak_dir_set_config (self, key, merged_patterns, error);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-74"
] | flatpak | fb473cad801c6b61706353256cab32330557374a | 278,047,323,434,824,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | dir: Pass environment via bwrap --setenv when running apply_extra
This means we can systematically pass the environment variables
through bwrap(1), even if it is setuid and thus is filtering out
security-sensitive environment variables. bwrap ends up being
run with an empty environment instead.
As with the previous commit, this regressed while fixing CVE-2021-21261.
Fixes: 6d1773d2 "run: Convert all environment variables into bwrap arguments"
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <[email protected]> |
static void elo_process_data(struct input_dev *input, const u8 *data, int size)
{
int press;
input_report_abs(input, ABS_X, (data[3] << 8) | data[2]);
input_report_abs(input, ABS_Y, (data[5] << 8) | data[4]);
press = 0;
if (data[1] & 0x80)
press = (data[7] << 8) | data[6];
input_report_abs(input, ABS_PRESSURE, press);
if (data[1] & 0x03) {
input_report_key(input, BTN_TOUCH, 1);
input_sync(input);
}
if (data[1] & 0x04)
input_report_key(input, BTN_TOUCH, 0);
input_sync(input);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-401"
] | linux | 817b8b9c5396d2b2d92311b46719aad5d3339dbe | 125,180,111,504,940,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | HID: elo: fix memory leak in elo_probe
When hid_parse() in elo_probe() fails, it forgets to call usb_put_dev to
decrease the refcount.
Fix this by adding usb_put_dev() in the error handling code of elo_probe().
Fixes: fbf42729d0e9 ("HID: elo: update the reference count of the usb device structure")
Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dongliang Mu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]> |
static bool name_is_device_color( char *cs_name )
{
return( strcmp(cs_name, "DeviceGray") == 0 ||
strcmp(cs_name, "DeviceRGB") == 0 ||
strcmp(cs_name, "DeviceCMYK") == 0);
} | 0 | [] | ghostpdl | b326a71659b7837d3acde954b18bda1a6f5e9498 | 89,477,886,814,210,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | Bug 699655: Properly check the return value....
...when getting a value from a dictionary |
bool RGWHandler_REST_S3Website::web_dir() const {
std::string subdir_name = url_decode(s->object.name);
if (subdir_name.empty()) {
return false;
} else if (subdir_name.back() == '/') {
subdir_name.pop_back();
}
rgw_obj obj(s->bucket, subdir_name);
RGWObjectCtx& obj_ctx = *static_cast<RGWObjectCtx *>(s->obj_ctx);
obj_ctx.set_atomic(obj);
obj_ctx.set_prefetch_data(obj);
RGWObjState* state = nullptr;
if (store->getRados()->get_obj_state(&obj_ctx, s->bucket_info, obj, &state, false, s->yield) < 0) {
return false;
}
if (! state->exists) {
return false;
}
return state->exists;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-79"
] | ceph | 8f90658c731499722d5f4393c8ad70b971d05f77 | 182,904,646,277,010,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 | rgw: reject unauthenticated response-header actions
Signed-off-by: Matt Benjamin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Casey Bodley <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit d8dd5e513c0c62bbd7d3044d7e2eddcd897bd400) |
print_digest_algo_note (digest_algo_t algo)
{
if(algo >= 100 && algo <= 110)
{
static int warn=0;
if(!warn)
{
warn=1;
es_fflush (es_stdout);
log_info (_("WARNING: using experimental digest algorithm %s\n"),
gcry_md_algo_name (algo));
}
}
else if(algo==DIGEST_ALGO_MD5)
{
es_fflush (es_stdout);
log_info (_("WARNING: digest algorithm %s is deprecated\n"),
gcry_md_algo_name (algo));
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | gnupg | 2183683bd633818dd031b090b5530951de76f392 | 268,948,725,754,365,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | Use inline functions to convert buffer data to scalars.
* common/host2net.h (buf16_to_ulong, buf16_to_uint): New.
(buf16_to_ushort, buf16_to_u16): New.
(buf32_to_size_t, buf32_to_ulong, buf32_to_uint, buf32_to_u32): New.
--
Commit 91b826a38880fd8a989318585eb502582636ddd8 was not enough to
avoid all sign extension on shift problems. Hanno Böck found a case
with an invalid read due to this problem. To fix that once and for
all almost all uses of "<< 24" and "<< 8" are changed by this patch to
use an inline function from host2net.h.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]> |
void __weak module_memfree(void *module_region)
{
/*
* This memory may be RO, and freeing RO memory in an interrupt is not
* supported by vmalloc.
*/
WARN_ON(in_interrupt());
vfree(module_region);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-362",
"CWE-347"
] | linux | 0c18f29aae7ce3dadd26d8ee3505d07cc982df75 | 318,658,137,843,322,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | module: limit enabling module.sig_enforce
Irrespective as to whether CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is configured, specifying
"module.sig_enforce=1" on the boot command line sets "sig_enforce".
Only allow "sig_enforce" to be set when CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is configured.
This patch makes the presence of /sys/module/module/parameters/sig_enforce
dependent on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=y.
Fixes: fda784e50aac ("module: export module signature enforcement status")
Reported-by: Nayna Jain <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Jessica Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
static char *psutil_get_drive_type(int type) {
switch (type) {
case DRIVE_FIXED:
return "fixed";
case DRIVE_CDROM:
return "cdrom";
case DRIVE_REMOVABLE:
return "removable";
case DRIVE_UNKNOWN:
return "unknown";
case DRIVE_NO_ROOT_DIR:
return "unmounted";
case DRIVE_REMOTE:
return "remote";
case DRIVE_RAMDISK:
return "ramdisk";
default:
return "?";
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-415"
] | psutil | 7d512c8e4442a896d56505be3e78f1156f443465 | 110,933,753,337,310,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | Use Py_CLEAR instead of Py_DECREF to also set the variable to NULL (#1616)
These files contain loops that convert system data into python objects
and during the process they create objects and dereference their
refcounts after they have been added to the resulting list.
However, in case of errors during the creation of those python objects,
the refcount to previously allocated objects is dropped again with
Py_XDECREF, which should be a no-op in case the paramater is NULL. Even
so, in most of these loops the variables pointing to the objects are
never set to NULL, even after Py_DECREF is called at the end of the loop
iteration. This means, after the first iteration, if an error occurs
those python objects will get their refcount dropped two times,
resulting in a possible double-free. |
static inline void skb_set_tail_pointer(struct sk_buff *skb, const int offset)
{
skb->tail = skb->data + offset; | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | linux | 2b16f048729bf35e6c28a40cbfad07239f9dcd90 | 313,211,463,818,904,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | net: create skb_gso_validate_mac_len()
If you take a GSO skb, and split it into packets, will the MAC
length (L2 + L3 + L4 headers + payload) of those packets be small
enough to fit within a given length?
Move skb_gso_mac_seglen() to skbuff.h with other related functions
like skb_gso_network_seglen() so we can use it, and then create
skb_gso_validate_mac_len to do the full calculation.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
SAPI_API SAPI_POST_HANDLER_FUNC(php_std_post_handler)
{
zval *arr = (zval *) arg;
php_stream *s = SG(request_info).request_body;
post_var_data_t post_data;
if (s && SUCCESS == php_stream_rewind(s)) {
memset(&post_data, 0, sizeof(post_data));
while (!php_stream_eof(s)) {
char buf[SAPI_POST_HANDLER_BUFSIZ] = {0};
size_t len = php_stream_read(s, buf, SAPI_POST_HANDLER_BUFSIZ);
if (len && len != (size_t) -1) {
smart_str_appendl(&post_data.str, buf, len);
if (SUCCESS != add_post_vars(arr, &post_data, 0 TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (post_data.str.c) {
efree(post_data.str.c);
}
return;
}
}
if (len != SAPI_POST_HANDLER_BUFSIZ){
break;
}
}
add_post_vars(arr, &post_data, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
if (post_data.str.c) {
efree(post_data.str.c);
}
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] | php-src | 0f8cf3b8497dc45c010c44ed9e96518e11e19fc3 | 174,010,425,588,122,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 | Fix bug #73807 |
static int check_bpf_snprintf_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_reg_state *regs)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *fmt_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_3];
struct bpf_reg_state *data_len_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_5];
struct bpf_map *fmt_map = fmt_reg->map_ptr;
int err, fmt_map_off, num_args;
u64 fmt_addr;
char *fmt;
/* data must be an array of u64 */
if (data_len_reg->var_off.value % 8)
return -EINVAL;
num_args = data_len_reg->var_off.value / 8;
/* fmt being ARG_PTR_TO_CONST_STR guarantees that var_off is const
* and map_direct_value_addr is set.
*/
fmt_map_off = fmt_reg->off + fmt_reg->var_off.value;
err = fmt_map->ops->map_direct_value_addr(fmt_map, &fmt_addr,
fmt_map_off);
if (err) {
verbose(env, "verifier bug\n");
return -EFAULT;
}
fmt = (char *)(long)fmt_addr + fmt_map_off;
/* We are also guaranteed that fmt+fmt_map_off is NULL terminated, we
* can focus on validating the format specifiers.
*/
err = bpf_printf_prepare(fmt, UINT_MAX, NULL, NULL, NULL, num_args);
if (err < 0)
verbose(env, "Invalid format string\n");
return err;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-682"
] | linux | 10bf4e83167cc68595b85fd73bb91e8f2c086e36 | 240,376,555,427,453,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 36 | bpf: Fix propagation of 32 bit unsigned bounds from 64 bit bounds
Similarly as b02709587ea3 ("bpf: Fix propagation of 32-bit signed bounds
from 64-bit bounds."), we also need to fix the propagation of 32 bit
unsigned bounds from 64 bit counterparts. That is, really only set the
u32_{min,max}_value when /both/ {umin,umax}_value safely fit in 32 bit
space. For example, the register with a umin_value == 1 does /not/ imply
that u32_min_value is also equal to 1, since umax_value could be much
larger than 32 bit subregister can hold, and thus u32_min_value is in
the interval [0,1] instead.
Before fix, invalid tracking result of R2_w=inv1:
[...]
5: R0_w=inv1337 R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R2_w=inv(id=0) R10=fp0
5: (35) if r2 >= 0x1 goto pc+1
[...] // goto path
7: R0=inv1337 R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R2=inv(id=0,umin_value=1) R10=fp0
7: (b6) if w2 <= 0x1 goto pc+1
[...] // goto path
9: R0=inv1337 R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R2=inv(id=0,smin_value=-9223372036854775807,smax_value=9223372032559808513,umin_value=1,umax_value=18446744069414584321,var_off=(0x1; 0xffffffff00000000),s32_min_value=1,s32_max_value=1,u32_max_value=1) R10=fp0
9: (bc) w2 = w2
10: R0=inv1337 R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R2_w=inv1 R10=fp0
[...]
After fix, correct tracking result of R2_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=1,var_off=(0x0; 0x1)):
[...]
5: R0_w=inv1337 R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R2_w=inv(id=0) R10=fp0
5: (35) if r2 >= 0x1 goto pc+1
[...] // goto path
7: R0=inv1337 R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R2=inv(id=0,umin_value=1) R10=fp0
7: (b6) if w2 <= 0x1 goto pc+1
[...] // goto path
9: R0=inv1337 R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R2=inv(id=0,smax_value=9223372032559808513,umax_value=18446744069414584321,var_off=(0x0; 0xffffffff00000001),s32_min_value=0,s32_max_value=1,u32_max_value=1) R10=fp0
9: (bc) w2 = w2
10: R0=inv1337 R1=ctx(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R2_w=inv(id=0,umax_value=1,var_off=(0x0; 0x1)) R10=fp0
[...]
Thus, same issue as in b02709587ea3 holds for unsigned subregister tracking.
Also, align __reg64_bound_u32() similarly to __reg64_bound_s32() as done in
b02709587ea3 to make them uniform again.
Fixes: 3f50f132d840 ("bpf: Verifier, do explicit ALU32 bounds tracking")
Reported-by: Manfred Paul (@_manfp)
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> |
bool ConnectionManagerImpl::ActiveStreamFilterBase::commonHandleAfterHeadersCallback(
FilterHeadersStatus status, bool& headers_only) {
ASSERT(!headers_continued_);
ASSERT(canIterate());
if (status == FilterHeadersStatus::StopIteration) {
iteration_state_ = IterationState::StopSingleIteration;
} else if (status == FilterHeadersStatus::StopAllIterationAndBuffer) {
iteration_state_ = IterationState::StopAllBuffer;
} else if (status == FilterHeadersStatus::StopAllIterationAndWatermark) {
iteration_state_ = IterationState::StopAllWatermark;
} else if (status == FilterHeadersStatus::ContinueAndEndStream) {
// Set headers_only to true so we know to end early if necessary,
// but continue filter iteration so we actually write the headers/run the cleanup code.
headers_only = true;
ENVOY_STREAM_LOG(debug, "converting to headers only", parent_);
} else {
ASSERT(status == FilterHeadersStatus::Continue);
headers_continued_ = true;
}
handleMetadataAfterHeadersCallback();
if (stoppedAll() || status == FilterHeadersStatus::StopIteration) {
return false;
} else {
return true;
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] | envoy | afc39bea36fd436e54262f150c009e8d72db5014 | 152,882,865,130,623,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 | Track byteSize of HeaderMap internally.
Introduces a cached byte size updated internally in HeaderMap. The value
is stored as an optional, and is cleared whenever a non-const pointer or
reference to a HeaderEntry is accessed. The cached value can be set with
refreshByteSize() which performs an iteration over the HeaderMap to sum
the size of each key and value in the HeaderMap.
Signed-off-by: Asra Ali <[email protected]> |
static ssize_t oom_adj_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count,
loff_t *ppos)
{
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file_inode(file));
char buffer[PROC_NUMBUF];
int oom_adj = OOM_ADJUST_MIN;
size_t len;
if (!task)
return -ESRCH;
if (task->signal->oom_score_adj == OOM_SCORE_ADJ_MAX)
oom_adj = OOM_ADJUST_MAX;
else
oom_adj = (task->signal->oom_score_adj * -OOM_DISABLE) /
OOM_SCORE_ADJ_MAX;
put_task_struct(task);
len = snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%d\n", oom_adj);
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, buffer, len);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | linux | 7f7ccc2ccc2e70c6054685f5e3522efa81556830 | 252,594,520,392,549,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | proc: do not access cmdline nor environ from file-backed areas
proc_pid_cmdline_read() and environ_read() directly access the target
process' VM to retrieve the command line and environment. If this
process remaps these areas onto a file via mmap(), the requesting
process may experience various issues such as extra delays if the
underlying device is slow to respond.
Let's simply refuse to access file-backed areas in these functions.
For this we add a new FOLL_ANON gup flag that is passed to all calls
to access_remote_vm(). The code already takes care of such failures
(including unmapped areas). Accesses via /proc/pid/mem were not
changed though.
This was assigned CVE-2018-1120.
Note for stable backports: the patch may apply to kernels prior to 4.11
but silently miss one location; it must be checked that no call to
access_remote_vm() keeps zero as the last argument.
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
static int __init init_pipe_fs(void)
{
int err = register_filesystem(&pipe_fs_type);
if (!err) {
pipe_mnt = kern_mount(&pipe_fs_type);
if (IS_ERR(pipe_mnt)) {
err = PTR_ERR(pipe_mnt);
unregister_filesystem(&pipe_fs_type);
}
}
return err;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-17"
] | linux | f0d1bec9d58d4c038d0ac958c9af82be6eb18045 | 132,708,078,715,506,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | new helper: copy_page_from_iter()
parallel to copy_page_to_iter(). pipe_write() switched to it (and became
->write_iter()).
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> |
static int r_bin_file_object_add(RBinFile *binfile, RBinObject *o) {
if (!o) {
return false;
}
r_list_append (binfile->objs, o);
r_bin_file_set_cur_binfile_obj (binfile->rbin, binfile, o);
return true;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | radare2 | d31c4d3cbdbe01ea3ded16a584de94149ecd31d9 | 1,289,441,139,451,320,500,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | Fix #8748 - Fix oobread on string search |
cmsPipeline* DefaultICCintents(cmsContext ContextID,
cmsUInt32Number nProfiles,
cmsUInt32Number TheIntents[],
cmsHPROFILE hProfiles[],
cmsBool BPC[],
cmsFloat64Number AdaptationStates[],
cmsUInt32Number dwFlags)
{
cmsPipeline* Lut = NULL;
cmsPipeline* Result;
cmsHPROFILE hProfile;
cmsMAT3 m;
cmsVEC3 off;
cmsColorSpaceSignature ColorSpaceIn, ColorSpaceOut, CurrentColorSpace;
cmsProfileClassSignature ClassSig;
cmsUInt32Number i, Intent;
// For safety
if (nProfiles == 0) return NULL;
// Allocate an empty LUT for holding the result. 0 as channel count means 'undefined'
Result = cmsPipelineAlloc(ContextID, 0, 0);
if (Result == NULL) return NULL;
CurrentColorSpace = cmsGetColorSpace(hProfiles[0]);
for (i=0; i < nProfiles; i++) {
cmsBool lIsDeviceLink, lIsInput;
hProfile = hProfiles[i];
ClassSig = cmsGetDeviceClass(hProfile);
lIsDeviceLink = (ClassSig == cmsSigLinkClass || ClassSig == cmsSigAbstractClass );
// First profile is used as input unless devicelink or abstract
if ((i == 0) && !lIsDeviceLink) {
lIsInput = TRUE;
}
else {
// Else use profile in the input direction if current space is not PCS
lIsInput = (CurrentColorSpace != cmsSigXYZData) &&
(CurrentColorSpace != cmsSigLabData);
}
Intent = TheIntents[i];
if (lIsInput || lIsDeviceLink) {
ColorSpaceIn = cmsGetColorSpace(hProfile);
ColorSpaceOut = cmsGetPCS(hProfile);
}
else {
ColorSpaceIn = cmsGetPCS(hProfile);
ColorSpaceOut = cmsGetColorSpace(hProfile);
}
if (!ColorSpaceIsCompatible(ColorSpaceIn, CurrentColorSpace)) {
cmsSignalError(ContextID, cmsERROR_COLORSPACE_CHECK, "ColorSpace mismatch");
goto Error;
}
// If devicelink is found, then no custom intent is allowed and we can
// read the LUT to be applied. Settings don't apply here.
if (lIsDeviceLink || ((ClassSig == cmsSigNamedColorClass) && (nProfiles == 1))) {
// Get the involved LUT from the profile
Lut = _cmsReadDevicelinkLUT(hProfile, Intent);
if (Lut == NULL) goto Error;
// What about abstract profiles?
if (ClassSig == cmsSigAbstractClass && i > 0) {
if (!ComputeConversion(i, hProfiles, Intent, BPC[i], AdaptationStates[i], &m, &off)) goto Error;
}
else {
_cmsMAT3identity(&m);
_cmsVEC3init(&off, 0, 0, 0);
}
if (!AddConversion(Result, CurrentColorSpace, ColorSpaceIn, &m, &off)) goto Error;
}
else {
if (lIsInput) {
// Input direction means non-pcs connection, so proceed like devicelinks
Lut = _cmsReadInputLUT(hProfile, Intent);
if (Lut == NULL) goto Error;
}
else {
// Output direction means PCS connection. Intent may apply here
Lut = _cmsReadOutputLUT(hProfile, Intent);
if (Lut == NULL) goto Error;
if (!ComputeConversion(i, hProfiles, Intent, BPC[i], AdaptationStates[i], &m, &off)) goto Error;
if (!AddConversion(Result, CurrentColorSpace, ColorSpaceIn, &m, &off)) goto Error;
}
}
// Concatenate to the output LUT
if (!cmsPipelineCat(Result, Lut))
goto Error;
cmsPipelineFree(Lut);
// Update current space
CurrentColorSpace = ColorSpaceOut;
}
return Result;
Error:
cmsPipelineFree(Lut);
if (Result != NULL) cmsPipelineFree(Result);
return NULL;
cmsUNUSED_PARAMETER(dwFlags);
} | 1 | [
"CWE-94"
] | Little-CMS | fefaaa43c382eee632ea3ad0cfa915335140e1db | 159,388,555,409,343,010,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 123 | Fix a double free on error recovering |
interactive_getc(void)
{
int c;
prepare_for_client_read();
c = getc(stdin);
client_read_ended();
return c;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-89"
] | postgres | 2b3a8b20c2da9f39ffecae25ab7c66974fbc0d3b | 299,628,418,130,844,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | Be more careful to not lose sync in the FE/BE protocol.
If any error occurred while we were in the middle of reading a protocol
message from the client, we could lose sync, and incorrectly try to
interpret a part of another message as a new protocol message. That will
usually lead to an "invalid frontend message" error that terminates the
connection. However, this is a security issue because an attacker might
be able to deliberately cause an error, inject a Query message in what's
supposed to be just user data, and have the server execute it.
We were quite careful to not have CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS() calls or other
operations that could ereport(ERROR) in the middle of processing a message,
but a query cancel interrupt or statement timeout could nevertheless cause
it to happen. Also, the V2 fastpath and COPY handling were not so careful.
It's very difficult to recover in the V2 COPY protocol, so we will just
terminate the connection on error. In practice, that's what happened
previously anyway, as we lost protocol sync.
To fix, add a new variable in pqcomm.c, PqCommReadingMsg, that is set
whenever we're in the middle of reading a message. When it's set, we cannot
safely ERROR out and continue running, because we might've read only part
of a message. PqCommReadingMsg acts somewhat similarly to critical sections
in that if an error occurs while it's set, the error handler will force the
connection to be terminated, as if the error was FATAL. It's not
implemented by promoting ERROR to FATAL in elog.c, like ERROR is promoted
to PANIC in critical sections, because we want to be able to use
PG_TRY/CATCH to recover and regain protocol sync. pq_getmessage() takes
advantage of that to prevent an OOM error from terminating the connection.
To prevent unnecessary connection terminations, add a holdoff mechanism
similar to HOLD/RESUME_INTERRUPTS() that can be used hold off query cancel
interrupts, but still allow die interrupts. The rules on which interrupts
are processed when are now a bit more complicated, so refactor
ProcessInterrupts() and the calls to it in signal handlers so that the
signal handlers always call it if ImmediateInterruptOK is set, and
ProcessInterrupts() can decide to not do anything if the other conditions
are not met.
Reported by Emil Lenngren. Patch reviewed by Noah Misch and Andres Freund.
Backpatch to all supported versions.
Security: CVE-2015-0244 |
CURLcode Curl_http_body(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
Curl_HttpReq httpreq, const char **tep)
{
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
const char *ptr;
struct HTTP *http = data->req.p.http;
http->postsize = 0;
switch(httpreq) {
case HTTPREQ_POST_MIME:
http->sendit = &data->set.mimepost;
break;
case HTTPREQ_POST_FORM:
/* Convert the form structure into a mime structure. */
Curl_mime_cleanpart(&http->form);
result = Curl_getformdata(data, &http->form, data->set.httppost,
data->state.fread_func);
if(result)
return result;
http->sendit = &http->form;
break;
default:
http->sendit = NULL;
}
#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_MIME
if(http->sendit) {
const char *cthdr = Curl_checkheaders(data, STRCONST("Content-Type"));
/* Read and seek body only. */
http->sendit->flags |= MIME_BODY_ONLY;
/* Prepare the mime structure headers & set content type. */
if(cthdr)
for(cthdr += 13; *cthdr == ' '; cthdr++)
;
else if(http->sendit->kind == MIMEKIND_MULTIPART)
cthdr = "multipart/form-data";
curl_mime_headers(http->sendit, data->set.headers, 0);
result = Curl_mime_prepare_headers(http->sendit, cthdr,
NULL, MIMESTRATEGY_FORM);
curl_mime_headers(http->sendit, NULL, 0);
if(!result)
result = Curl_mime_rewind(http->sendit);
if(result)
return result;
http->postsize = Curl_mime_size(http->sendit);
}
#endif
ptr = Curl_checkheaders(data, STRCONST("Transfer-Encoding"));
if(ptr) {
/* Some kind of TE is requested, check if 'chunked' is chosen */
data->req.upload_chunky =
Curl_compareheader(ptr,
STRCONST("Transfer-Encoding:"), STRCONST("chunked"));
}
else {
if((conn->handler->protocol & PROTO_FAMILY_HTTP) &&
(((httpreq == HTTPREQ_POST_MIME || httpreq == HTTPREQ_POST_FORM) &&
http->postsize < 0) ||
((data->set.upload || httpreq == HTTPREQ_POST) &&
data->state.infilesize == -1))) {
if(conn->bits.authneg)
/* don't enable chunked during auth neg */
;
else if(Curl_use_http_1_1plus(data, conn)) {
if(conn->httpversion < 20)
/* HTTP, upload, unknown file size and not HTTP 1.0 */
data->req.upload_chunky = TRUE;
}
else {
failf(data, "Chunky upload is not supported by HTTP 1.0");
return CURLE_UPLOAD_FAILED;
}
}
else {
/* else, no chunky upload */
data->req.upload_chunky = FALSE;
}
if(data->req.upload_chunky)
*tep = "Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n";
}
return result;
} | 0 | [] | curl | 48d7064a49148f03942380967da739dcde1cdc24 | 307,045,002,500,276,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 88 | cookie: apply limits
- Send no more than 150 cookies per request
- Cap the max length used for a cookie: header to 8K
- Cap the max number of received Set-Cookie: headers to 50
Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-32205.html
CVE-2022-32205
Reported-by: Harry Sintonen
Closes #9048 |
int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
if( ssl->f_get_timer == NULL )
return( 0 );
if( ssl->f_get_timer( ssl->p_timer ) == 2 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "timer expired" ) );
return( -1 );
}
return( 0 );
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | mbedtls | f333dfab4a6c2d8a604a61558a8f783145161de4 | 193,434,611,302,639,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | More SSL debug messages for ClientHello parsing
In particular, be verbose when checking the ClientHello cookie in a possible
DTLS reconnection.
Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <[email protected]> |
static int fdc_post_load(void *opaque, int version_id)
{
FDCtrl *s = opaque;
SET_CUR_DRV(s, s->dor_vmstate & FD_DOR_SELMASK);
s->dor = s->dor_vmstate & ~FD_DOR_SELMASK;
if (s->phase == FD_PHASE_RECONSTRUCT) {
s->phase = reconstruct_phase(s);
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | defac5e2fbddf8423a354ff0454283a2115e1367 | 208,727,116,062,524,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | hw/block/fdc: Prevent end-of-track overrun (CVE-2021-3507)
Per the 82078 datasheet, if the end-of-track (EOT byte in
the FIFO) is more than the number of sectors per side, the
command is terminated unsuccessfully:
* 5.2.5 DATA TRANSFER TERMINATION
The 82078 supports terminal count explicitly through
the TC pin and implicitly through the underrun/over-
run and end-of-track (EOT) functions. For full sector
transfers, the EOT parameter can define the last
sector to be transferred in a single or multisector
transfer. If the last sector to be transferred is a par-
tial sector, the host can stop transferring the data in
mid-sector, and the 82078 will continue to complete
the sector as if a hardware TC was received. The
only difference between these implicit functions and
TC is that they return "abnormal termination" result
status. Such status indications can be ignored if they
were expected.
* 6.1.3 READ TRACK
This command terminates when the EOT specified
number of sectors have been read. If the 82078
does not find an I D Address Mark on the diskette
after the second· occurrence of a pulse on the
INDX# pin, then it sets the IC code in Status Regis-
ter 0 to "01" (Abnormal termination), sets the MA bit
in Status Register 1 to "1", and terminates the com-
mand.
* 6.1.6 VERIFY
Refer to Table 6-6 and Table 6-7 for information
concerning the values of MT and EC versus SC and
EOT value.
* Table 6·6. Result Phase Table
* Table 6-7. Verify Command Result Phase Table
Fix by aborting the transfer when EOT > # Sectors Per Side.
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Hervé Poussineau <[email protected]>
Fixes: baca51faff0 ("floppy driver: disk geometry auto detect")
Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <[email protected]>
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/339
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hanna Reitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]> |
pkinit_init_certs(pkinit_identity_crypto_context ctx)
{
krb5_error_code retval = ENOMEM;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_CREDS_ALLOWED; i++)
ctx->creds[i] = NULL;
ctx->my_certs = NULL;
ctx->cert_index = 0;
ctx->my_key = NULL;
ctx->trustedCAs = NULL;
ctx->intermediateCAs = NULL;
ctx->revoked = NULL;
retval = 0;
return retval;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | krb5 | f249555301940c6df3a2cdda13b56b5674eebc2e | 67,623,470,536,661,790,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[[email protected]: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved |
read_message_bdat_smtp_wire(FILE *fout)
{
int ch;
/* Remember that this message uses wireformat. */
DEBUG(D_receive) debug_printf("CHUNKING: writing spoolfile in wire format\n");
spool_file_wireformat = TRUE;
for (;;)
{
if (chunking_data_left > 0)
{
unsigned len = MAX(chunking_data_left, thismessage_size_limit - message_size + 1);
uschar * buf = bdat_getbuf(&len);
message_size += len;
if (fout && fwrite(buf, len, 1, fout) != 1) return END_WERROR;
}
else switch (ch = bdat_getc(GETC_BUFFER_UNLIMITED))
{
case EOF: return END_EOF;
case EOD: return END_DOT;
case ERR: return END_PROTOCOL;
default:
message_size++;
/*XXX not done:
linelength
max_received_linelength
body_linecount
body_zerocount
*/
if (fout && fputc(ch, fout) == EOF) return END_WERROR;
break;
}
if (message_size > thismessage_size_limit) return END_SIZE;
}
/*NOTREACHED*/
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | exim | 4e6ae6235c68de243b1c2419027472d7659aa2b4 | 287,848,317,999,532,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 40 | Avoid release of store if there have been later allocations. Bug 2199 |
void LibRaw::setCancelFlag()
{
#ifdef WIN32
InterlockedExchange(&_exitflag,1);
#else
__sync_fetch_and_add(&_exitflag,1);
#endif
#ifdef RAWSPEED_FASTEXIT
if(_rawspeed_decoder)
{
RawDecoder *d = static_cast<RawDecoder*>(_rawspeed_decoder);
d->cancelProcessing();
}
#endif
} | 0 | [
"CWE-129"
] | LibRaw | 89d065424f09b788f443734d44857289489ca9e2 | 321,675,127,633,925,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | fixed two more problems found by fuzzer |
int ethtool_op_set_sg(struct net_device *dev, u32 data)
{
if (data)
dev->features |= NETIF_F_SG;
else
dev->features &= ~NETIF_F_SG;
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | linux-2.6 | db048b69037e7fa6a7d9e95a1271a50dc08ae233 | 100,184,902,977,304,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | ethtool: Fix potential kernel buffer overflow in ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL
On a 32-bit machine, info.rule_cnt >= 0x40000000 leads to integer
overflow and the buffer may be smaller than needed. Since
ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL is unprivileged, this can presumably be used for at
least denial of service.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
xfrm_get_saddr(struct net *net, int oif, xfrm_address_t *local,
xfrm_address_t *remote, unsigned short family)
{
int err;
const struct xfrm_policy_afinfo *afinfo = xfrm_policy_get_afinfo(family);
if (unlikely(afinfo == NULL))
return -EINVAL;
err = afinfo->get_saddr(net, oif, local, remote);
rcu_read_unlock();
return err;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | ipsec | 7bab09631c2a303f87a7eb7e3d69e888673b9b7e | 226,678,974,328,163,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | xfrm: policy: check policy direction value
The 'dir' parameter in xfrm_migrate() is a user-controlled byte which is used
as an array index. This can lead to an out-of-bound access, kernel lockup and
DoS. Add a check for the 'dir' value.
This fixes CVE-2017-11600.
References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1474928
Fixes: 80c9abaabf42 ("[XFRM]: Extension for dynamic update of endpoint address(es)")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v2.6.21-rc1
Reported-by: "bo Zhang" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]> |
read_yin_when(struct lys_module *module, struct lyxml_elem *yin, struct unres_schema *unres)
{
struct ly_ctx *ctx = module->ctx;
struct lys_when *retval = NULL;
struct lyxml_elem *child, *next;
const char *value;
retval = calloc(1, sizeof *retval);
LY_CHECK_ERR_RETURN(!retval, LOGMEM(ctx), NULL);
GETVAL(ctx, value, yin, "condition");
retval->cond = transform_schema2json(module, value);
if (!retval->cond) {
goto error;
}
LY_TREE_FOR_SAFE(yin->child, next, child) {
if (!child->ns) {
/* garbage */
continue;
} else if (strcmp(child->ns->value, LY_NSYIN)) {
/* extensions */
if (lyp_yin_parse_subnode_ext(module, retval, LYEXT_PAR_WHEN, child, LYEXT_SUBSTMT_SELF, 0, unres)) {
goto error;
}
} else if (!strcmp(child->name, "description")) {
if (retval->dsc) {
LOGVAL(ctx, LYE_TOOMANY, LY_VLOG_NONE, NULL, child->name, yin->name);
goto error;
}
if (lyp_yin_parse_subnode_ext(module, retval, LYEXT_PAR_WHEN, child, LYEXT_SUBSTMT_DESCRIPTION, 0, unres)) {
goto error;
}
retval->dsc = read_yin_subnode(ctx, child, "text");
if (!retval->dsc) {
goto error;
}
} else if (!strcmp(child->name, "reference")) {
if (retval->ref) {
LOGVAL(ctx, LYE_TOOMANY, LY_VLOG_NONE, NULL, child->name, yin->name);
goto error;
}
if (lyp_yin_parse_subnode_ext(module, retval, LYEXT_PAR_WHEN, child, LYEXT_SUBSTMT_REFERENCE, 0, unres)) {
goto error;
}
retval->ref = read_yin_subnode(ctx, child, "text");
if (!retval->ref) {
goto error;
}
} else {
LOGVAL(ctx, LYE_INSTMT, LY_VLOG_NONE, NULL, child->name);
goto error;
}
}
return retval;
error:
lys_when_free(ctx, retval, NULL);
return NULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-252"
] | libyang | a3917d95d516e3de267d3cfa5d4d3715a90e8777 | 57,979,620,149,706,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 65 | yin parser BUGFIX invalid memory access
... in case there were some unresolved
extensions.
Fixes #1454
Fixes #1455 |
int nfs4_update_server(struct nfs_server *server, const char *hostname,
struct sockaddr *sap, size_t salen, struct net *net)
{
struct nfs_client *clp = server->nfs_client;
struct rpc_clnt *clnt = server->client;
struct xprt_create xargs = {
.ident = clp->cl_proto,
.net = net,
.dstaddr = sap,
.addrlen = salen,
.servername = hostname,
};
char buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN + 1];
struct sockaddr_storage address;
struct sockaddr *localaddr = (struct sockaddr *)&address;
int error;
error = rpc_switch_client_transport(clnt, &xargs, clnt->cl_timeout);
if (error != 0)
return error;
error = rpc_localaddr(clnt, localaddr, sizeof(address));
if (error != 0)
return error;
if (rpc_ntop(localaddr, buf, sizeof(buf)) == 0)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
nfs_server_remove_lists(server);
set_bit(NFS_MIG_TSM_POSSIBLE, &server->mig_status);
error = nfs4_set_client(server, hostname, sap, salen, buf,
clp->cl_proto, clnt->cl_timeout,
clp->cl_minorversion,
clp->cl_nconnect, net);
clear_bit(NFS_MIG_TSM_POSSIBLE, &server->mig_status);
if (error != 0) {
nfs_server_insert_lists(server);
return error;
}
nfs_put_client(clp);
if (server->nfs_client->cl_hostname == NULL)
server->nfs_client->cl_hostname = kstrdup(hostname, GFP_KERNEL);
nfs_server_insert_lists(server);
return nfs_probe_destination(server);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | linux | dd99e9f98fbf423ff6d365b37a98e8879170f17c | 316,528,436,453,746,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 47 | NFSv4: Initialise connection to the server in nfs4_alloc_client()
Set up the connection to the NFSv4 server in nfs4_alloc_client(), before
we've added the struct nfs_client to the net-namespace's nfs_client_list
so that a downed server won't cause other mounts to hang in the trunking
detection code.
Reported-by: Michael Wakabayashi <[email protected]>
Fixes: 5c6e5b60aae4 ("NFS: Fix an Oops in the pNFS files and flexfiles connection setup to the DS")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> |
xmlCtxtUseOptionsInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int options, const char *encoding)
{
if (ctxt == NULL)
return(-1);
if (encoding != NULL) {
if (ctxt->encoding != NULL)
xmlFree((xmlChar *) ctxt->encoding);
ctxt->encoding = xmlStrdup((const xmlChar *) encoding);
}
if (options & XML_PARSE_RECOVER) {
ctxt->recovery = 1;
options -= XML_PARSE_RECOVER;
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_RECOVER;
} else
ctxt->recovery = 0;
if (options & XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD) {
ctxt->loadsubset = XML_DETECT_IDS;
options -= XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD;
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD;
} else
ctxt->loadsubset = 0;
if (options & XML_PARSE_DTDATTR) {
ctxt->loadsubset |= XML_COMPLETE_ATTRS;
options -= XML_PARSE_DTDATTR;
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_DTDATTR;
}
if (options & XML_PARSE_NOENT) {
ctxt->replaceEntities = 1;
/* ctxt->loadsubset |= XML_DETECT_IDS; */
options -= XML_PARSE_NOENT;
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_NOENT;
} else
ctxt->replaceEntities = 0;
if (options & XML_PARSE_PEDANTIC) {
ctxt->pedantic = 1;
options -= XML_PARSE_PEDANTIC;
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_PEDANTIC;
} else
ctxt->pedantic = 0;
if (options & XML_PARSE_NOBLANKS) {
ctxt->keepBlanks = 0;
ctxt->sax->ignorableWhitespace = xmlSAX2IgnorableWhitespace;
options -= XML_PARSE_NOBLANKS;
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_NOBLANKS;
} else
ctxt->keepBlanks = 1;
if (options & XML_PARSE_DTDVALID) {
ctxt->validate = 1;
if (options & XML_PARSE_NOWARNING)
ctxt->vctxt.warning = NULL;
if (options & XML_PARSE_NOERROR)
ctxt->vctxt.error = NULL;
options -= XML_PARSE_DTDVALID;
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_DTDVALID;
} else
ctxt->validate = 0;
if (options & XML_PARSE_NOWARNING) {
ctxt->sax->warning = NULL;
options -= XML_PARSE_NOWARNING;
}
if (options & XML_PARSE_NOERROR) {
ctxt->sax->error = NULL;
ctxt->sax->fatalError = NULL;
options -= XML_PARSE_NOERROR;
}
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
if (options & XML_PARSE_SAX1) {
ctxt->sax->startElement = xmlSAX2StartElement;
ctxt->sax->endElement = xmlSAX2EndElement;
ctxt->sax->startElementNs = NULL;
ctxt->sax->endElementNs = NULL;
ctxt->sax->initialized = 1;
options -= XML_PARSE_SAX1;
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_SAX1;
}
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
if (options & XML_PARSE_NODICT) {
ctxt->dictNames = 0;
options -= XML_PARSE_NODICT;
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_NODICT;
} else {
ctxt->dictNames = 1;
}
if (options & XML_PARSE_NOCDATA) {
ctxt->sax->cdataBlock = NULL;
options -= XML_PARSE_NOCDATA;
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_NOCDATA;
}
if (options & XML_PARSE_NSCLEAN) {
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_NSCLEAN;
options -= XML_PARSE_NSCLEAN;
}
if (options & XML_PARSE_NONET) {
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_NONET;
options -= XML_PARSE_NONET;
}
if (options & XML_PARSE_COMPACT) {
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_COMPACT;
options -= XML_PARSE_COMPACT;
}
if (options & XML_PARSE_OLD10) {
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_OLD10;
options -= XML_PARSE_OLD10;
}
if (options & XML_PARSE_NOBASEFIX) {
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_NOBASEFIX;
options -= XML_PARSE_NOBASEFIX;
}
if (options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) {
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_HUGE;
options -= XML_PARSE_HUGE;
if (ctxt->dict != NULL)
xmlDictSetLimit(ctxt->dict, 0);
}
if (options & XML_PARSE_OLDSAX) {
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_OLDSAX;
options -= XML_PARSE_OLDSAX;
}
if (options & XML_PARSE_IGNORE_ENC) {
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_IGNORE_ENC;
options -= XML_PARSE_IGNORE_ENC;
}
if (options & XML_PARSE_BIG_LINES) {
ctxt->options |= XML_PARSE_BIG_LINES;
options -= XML_PARSE_BIG_LINES;
}
ctxt->linenumbers = 1;
return (options);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | libxml2 | 6a36fbe3b3e001a8a840b5c1fdd81cefc9947f0d | 231,168,328,346,819,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 129 | Fix potential out of bound access |
static void tcf_block_unbind(struct tcf_block *block,
struct flow_block_offload *bo)
{
struct flow_block_cb *block_cb, *next;
lockdep_assert_held(&block->cb_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(block_cb, next, &bo->cb_list, list) {
tcf_block_playback_offloads(block, block_cb->cb,
block_cb->cb_priv, false,
tcf_block_offload_in_use(block),
NULL);
list_del(&block_cb->list);
flow_block_cb_free(block_cb);
if (!bo->unlocked_driver_cb)
block->lockeddevcnt--;
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | 04c2a47ffb13c29778e2a14e414ad4cb5a5db4b5 | 328,571,511,575,918,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | net: sched: fix use-after-free in tc_new_tfilter()
Whenever tc_new_tfilter() jumps back to replay: label,
we need to make sure @q and @chain local variables are cleared again,
or risk use-after-free as in [1]
For consistency, apply the same fix in tc_ctl_chain()
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mini_qdisc_pair_swap+0x1b9/0x1f0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1581
Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880985c4b08 by task syz-executor.4/1945
CPU: 0 PID: 1945 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc1-syzkaller-00495-gff58831fa02d #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x8d/0x336 mm/kasan/report.c:255
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline]
kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459
mini_qdisc_pair_swap+0x1b9/0x1f0 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1581
tcf_chain_head_change_item net/sched/cls_api.c:372 [inline]
tcf_chain0_head_change.isra.0+0xb9/0x120 net/sched/cls_api.c:386
tcf_chain_tp_insert net/sched/cls_api.c:1657 [inline]
tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique net/sched/cls_api.c:1707 [inline]
tc_new_tfilter+0x1e67/0x2350 net/sched/cls_api.c:2086
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x80d/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5583
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343
netlink_sendmsg+0x904/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:725
____sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x810 net/socket.c:2413
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2467
__sys_sendmmsg+0x195/0x470 net/socket.c:2553
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2579 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x99/0x100 net/socket.c:2579
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f2647172059
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f2645aa5168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f2647285100 RCX: 00007f2647172059
RDX: 040000000000009f RSI: 00000000200002c0 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007f26471cc08d R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 9e00000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fffb3f7f02f R14: 00007f2645aa5300 R15: 0000000000022000
</TASK>
Allocated by task 1944:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline]
set_alloc_info mm/kasan/common.c:436 [inline]
____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:515 [inline]
____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:474 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0xa9/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:524
kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:604 [inline]
kzalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:726 [inline]
qdisc_alloc+0xac/0xa10 net/sched/sch_generic.c:941
qdisc_create.constprop.0+0xce/0x10f0 net/sched/sch_api.c:1211
tc_modify_qdisc+0x4c5/0x1980 net/sched/sch_api.c:1660
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x413/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5592
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343
netlink_sendmsg+0x904/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:725
____sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x810 net/socket.c:2413
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2467
__sys_sendmmsg+0x195/0x470 net/socket.c:2553
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2579 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x99/0x100 net/socket.c:2579
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Freed by task 3609:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:45
kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:370
____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:366 [inline]
____kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x160 mm/kasan/common.c:328
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:236 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1728 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x8b/0x1c0 mm/slub.c:1754
slab_free mm/slub.c:3509 [inline]
kfree+0xcb/0x280 mm/slub.c:4562
rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2527 [inline]
rcu_core+0x7b8/0x1540 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2778
__do_softirq+0x29b/0x9c2 kernel/softirq.c:558
Last potentially related work creation:
kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
__kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbe/0xd0 mm/kasan/generic.c:348
__call_rcu kernel/rcu/tree.c:3026 [inline]
call_rcu+0xb1/0x740 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3106
qdisc_put_unlocked+0x6f/0x90 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1109
tcf_block_release+0x86/0x90 net/sched/cls_api.c:1238
tc_new_tfilter+0xc0d/0x2350 net/sched/cls_api.c:2148
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x80d/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5583
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2494
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x539/0x7e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343
netlink_sendmsg+0x904/0xe00 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1919
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:705 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:725
____sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x810 net/socket.c:2413
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2467
__sys_sendmmsg+0x195/0x470 net/socket.c:2553
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2579 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x99/0x100 net/socket.c:2579
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880985c4800
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 776 bytes inside of
1024-byte region [ffff8880985c4800, ffff8880985c4c00)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0002617000 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x985c0
head:ffffea0002617000 order:3 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
flags: 0xfff00000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
raw: 00fff00000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff888010c41dc0
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x1d20c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC|__GFP_HARDWALL), pid 1941, ts 1038999441284, free_ts 1033444432829
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2434 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0xa72/0x2f50 mm/page_alloc.c:4165
__alloc_pages+0x1b2/0x500 mm/page_alloc.c:5389
alloc_pages+0x1aa/0x310 mm/mempolicy.c:2271
alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:1799 [inline]
allocate_slab mm/slub.c:1944 [inline]
new_slab+0x28a/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:2004
___slab_alloc+0x87c/0xe90 mm/slub.c:3018
__slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x4d/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3105
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3196 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3238 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x2fb/0x340 mm/slub.c:4420
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:586 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:715 [inline]
__register_sysctl_table+0x112/0x1090 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1335
neigh_sysctl_register+0x2c8/0x5e0 net/core/neighbour.c:3787
devinet_sysctl_register+0xb1/0x230 net/ipv4/devinet.c:2618
inetdev_init+0x286/0x580 net/ipv4/devinet.c:278
inetdev_event+0xa8a/0x15d0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1532
notifier_call_chain+0xb5/0x200 kernel/notifier.c:84
call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xb5/0x130 net/core/dev.c:1919
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:1931 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1945 [inline]
register_netdevice+0x1073/0x1500 net/core/dev.c:9698
veth_newlink+0x59c/0xa90 drivers/net/veth.c:1722
page last free stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline]
free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1352 [inline]
free_pcp_prepare+0x374/0x870 mm/page_alloc.c:1404
free_unref_page_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:3325 [inline]
free_unref_page+0x19/0x690 mm/page_alloc.c:3404
release_pages+0x748/0x1220 mm/swap.c:956
tlb_batch_pages_flush mm/mmu_gather.c:50 [inline]
tlb_flush_mmu_free mm/mmu_gather.c:243 [inline]
tlb_flush_mmu+0xe9/0x6b0 mm/mmu_gather.c:250
zap_pte_range mm/memory.c:1441 [inline]
zap_pmd_range mm/memory.c:1490 [inline]
zap_pud_range mm/memory.c:1519 [inline]
zap_p4d_range mm/memory.c:1540 [inline]
unmap_page_range+0x1d1d/0x2a30 mm/memory.c:1561
unmap_single_vma+0x198/0x310 mm/memory.c:1606
unmap_vmas+0x16b/0x2f0 mm/memory.c:1638
exit_mmap+0x201/0x670 mm/mmap.c:3178
__mmput+0x122/0x4b0 kernel/fork.c:1114
mmput+0x56/0x60 kernel/fork.c:1135
exit_mm kernel/exit.c:507 [inline]
do_exit+0xa3c/0x2a30 kernel/exit.c:793
do_group_exit+0xd2/0x2f0 kernel/exit.c:935
__do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:946 [inline]
__se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:944 [inline]
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50 kernel/exit.c:944
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8880985c4a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8880985c4a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8880985c4b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8880985c4b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8880985c4c00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
Fixes: 470502de5bdb ("net: sched: unlock rules update API")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlad Buslov <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]> |
PosibErr<void> open_file_readlock(FStream & in, ParmString file) {
RET_ON_ERR(in.open(file, "r"));
#ifdef USE_FILE_LOCKS
int fd = in.file_no();
struct flock fl;
fl.l_type = F_RDLCK;
fl.l_whence = SEEK_SET;
fl.l_start = 0;
fl.l_len = 0;
fcntl(fd, F_SETLKW, &fl); // ignore errors
#endif
return no_err;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | aspell | 80fa26c74279fced8d778351cff19d1d8f44fe4e | 163,048,001,469,147,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | Fix various bugs found by OSS-Fuze. |
static bool svm_xsaves_supported(void)
{
return false;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-399"
] | linux | cbdb967af3d54993f5814f1cee0ed311a055377d | 265,898,666,196,584,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | KVM: svm: unconditionally intercept #DB
This is needed to avoid the possibility that the guest triggers
an infinite stream of #DB exceptions (CVE-2015-8104).
VMX is not affected: because it does not save DR6 in the VMCS,
it already intercepts #DB unconditionally.
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> |
void CLASS cielab (ushort rgb[3], short lab[3])
{
int c, i, j, k;
float r, xyz[3];
#ifdef LIBRAW_NOTHREADS
static float cbrt[0x10000], xyz_cam[3][4];
#else
#define cbrt tls->ahd_data.cbrt
#define xyz_cam tls->ahd_data.xyz_cam
#endif
if (!rgb) {
#ifndef LIBRAW_NOTHREADS
if(cbrt[0] < -1.0f)
#endif
for (i=0; i < 0x10000; i++) {
r = i / 65535.0;
cbrt[i] = r > 0.008856 ? pow(r,1.f/3.0f) : 7.787f*r + 16.f/116.0f;
}
for (i=0; i < 3; i++)
for (j=0; j < colors; j++)
for (xyz_cam[i][j] = k=0; k < 3; k++)
xyz_cam[i][j] += xyz_rgb[i][k] * rgb_cam[k][j] / d65_white[i];
return;
}
xyz[0] = xyz[1] = xyz[2] = 0.5;
FORCC {
xyz[0] += xyz_cam[0][c] * rgb[c];
xyz[1] += xyz_cam[1][c] * rgb[c];
xyz[2] += xyz_cam[2][c] * rgb[c];
}
xyz[0] = cbrt[CLIP((int) xyz[0])];
xyz[1] = cbrt[CLIP((int) xyz[1])];
xyz[2] = cbrt[CLIP((int) xyz[2])];
lab[0] = 64 * (116 * xyz[1] - 16);
lab[1] = 64 * 500 * (xyz[0] - xyz[1]);
lab[2] = 64 * 200 * (xyz[1] - xyz[2]);
#ifndef LIBRAW_NOTHREADS
#undef cbrt
#undef xyz_cam
#endif
} | 0 | [] | LibRaw | 9ae25d8c3a6bfb40c582538193264f74c9b93bc0 | 90,876,677,515,520,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 42 | backported 0.15.4 datachecks |
static int com_source(String *buffer __attribute__((unused)),
char *line)
{
char source_name[FN_REFLEN], *end, *param;
LINE_BUFFER *line_buff;
int error;
STATUS old_status;
FILE *sql_file;
/* Skip space from file name */
while (my_isspace(charset_info,*line))
line++;
if (!(param = strchr(line, ' '))) // Skip command name
return put_info("Usage: \\. <filename> | source <filename>",
INFO_ERROR, 0);
while (my_isspace(charset_info,*param))
param++;
end=strmake(source_name,param,sizeof(source_name)-1);
while (end > source_name && (my_isspace(charset_info,end[-1]) ||
my_iscntrl(charset_info,end[-1])))
end--;
end[0]=0;
unpack_filename(source_name,source_name);
/* open file name */
if (!(sql_file = my_fopen(source_name, O_RDONLY | O_BINARY,MYF(0))))
{
char buff[FN_REFLEN+60];
sprintf(buff,"Failed to open file '%s', error: %d", source_name,errno);
return put_info(buff, INFO_ERROR, 0);
}
if (!(line_buff= batch_readline_init(MAX_BATCH_BUFFER_SIZE, sql_file)))
{
my_fclose(sql_file,MYF(0));
return put_info("Can't initialize batch_readline", INFO_ERROR, 0);
}
/* Save old status */
old_status=status;
bfill((char*) &status,sizeof(status),(char) 0);
status.batch=old_status.batch; // Run in batch mode
status.line_buff=line_buff;
status.file_name=source_name;
glob_buffer.length(0); // Empty command buffer
error= read_and_execute(false);
status=old_status; // Continue as before
my_fclose(sql_file,MYF(0));
batch_readline_end(line_buff);
return error;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-295"
] | mysql-server | b3e9211e48a3fb586e88b0270a175d2348935424 | 104,973,335,459,286,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 51 | WL#9072: Backport WL#8785 to 5.5 |
static void dump_escape_string(FILE * trace, char *name)
{
u32 i, len = (u32) strlen(name);
for (i=0; i<len; i++) {
if (name[i]=='"') fprintf(trace, """);
else fputc(name[i], trace);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | gpac | bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86 | 172,565,719,259,768,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088) |
static void encode_getfattr_open(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const u32 *bitmask,
const u32 *open_bitmap,
struct compound_hdr *hdr)
{
encode_getattr(xdr, open_bitmap, bitmask, 3, hdr);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | linux | b4487b93545214a9db8cbf32e86411677b0cca21 | 133,101,073,192,433,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | nfs: Fix getxattr kernel panic and memory overflow
Move the buffer size check to decode_attr_security_label() before memcpy()
Only call memcpy() if the buffer is large enough
Fixes: aa9c2669626c ("NFS: Client implementation of Labeled-NFS")
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Mitchell <[email protected]>
[Trond: clean up duplicate test of label->len != 0]
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> |
static int virtio_net_handle_vlan_table(VirtIONet *n, uint8_t cmd,
struct iovec *iov, unsigned int iov_cnt)
{
VirtIODevice *vdev = VIRTIO_DEVICE(n);
uint16_t vid;
size_t s;
NetClientState *nc = qemu_get_queue(n->nic);
s = iov_to_buf(iov, iov_cnt, 0, &vid, sizeof(vid));
vid = virtio_lduw_p(vdev, &vid);
if (s != sizeof(vid)) {
return VIRTIO_NET_ERR;
}
if (vid >= MAX_VLAN)
return VIRTIO_NET_ERR;
if (cmd == VIRTIO_NET_CTRL_VLAN_ADD)
n->vlans[vid >> 5] |= (1U << (vid & 0x1f));
else if (cmd == VIRTIO_NET_CTRL_VLAN_DEL)
n->vlans[vid >> 5] &= ~(1U << (vid & 0x1f));
else
return VIRTIO_NET_ERR;
rxfilter_notify(nc);
return VIRTIO_NET_OK;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | qemu | abe300d9d894f7138e1af7c8e9c88c04bfe98b37 | 275,233,034,947,368,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 | virtio-net: fix map leaking on error during receive
Commit bedd7e93d0196 ("virtio-net: fix use after unmap/free for sg")
tries to fix the use after free of the sg by caching the virtqueue
elements in an array and unmap them at once after receiving the
packets, But it forgot to unmap the cached elements on error which
will lead to leaking of mapping and other unexpected results.
Fixing this by detaching the cached elements on error. This addresses
CVE-2022-26353.
Reported-by: Victor Tom <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: CVE-2022-26353
Fixes: bedd7e93d0196 ("virtio-net: fix use after unmap/free for sg")
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]> |
void rfc2231_decode_parameters (PARAMETER **headp)
{
PARAMETER *head = NULL;
PARAMETER **last;
PARAMETER *p, *q;
struct rfc2231_parameter *conthead = NULL;
struct rfc2231_parameter *conttmp;
char *s, *t;
char charset[STRING];
int encoded;
int index;
short dirty = 0; /* set to 1 when we may have created
* empty parameters.
*/
if (!headp) return;
purge_empty_parameters (headp);
for (last = &head, p = *headp; p; p = q)
{
q = p->next;
if (!(s = strchr (p->attribute, '*')))
{
/*
* Using RFC 2047 encoding in MIME parameters is explicitly
* forbidden by that document. Nevertheless, it's being
* generated by some software, including certain Lotus Notes to
* Internet Gateways. So we actually decode it.
*/
if (option (OPTRFC2047PARAMS) && p->value && strstr (p->value, "=?"))
rfc2047_decode (&p->value);
else if (AssumedCharset && *AssumedCharset)
convert_nonmime_string (&p->value);
*last = p;
last = &p->next;
p->next = NULL;
}
else if (*(s + 1) == '\0')
{
*s = '\0';
s = rfc2231_get_charset (p->value, charset, sizeof (charset));
rfc2231_decode_one (p->value, s);
mutt_convert_string (&p->value, charset, Charset, MUTT_ICONV_HOOK_FROM);
mutt_filter_unprintable (&p->value);
*last = p;
last = &p->next;
p->next = NULL;
dirty = 1;
}
else
{
*s = '\0'; s++; /* let s point to the first character of index. */
for (t = s; *t && isdigit ((unsigned char) *t); t++)
;
encoded = (*t == '*');
*t = '\0';
/* RFC 2231 says that the index starts at 0 and increments by 1,
thus an overflow should never occur in a valid message, thus
the value INT_MAX in case of overflow does not really matter
(the goal is just to avoid undefined behavior). */
if (mutt_atoi (s, &index))
index = INT_MAX;
conttmp = rfc2231_new_parameter ();
conttmp->attribute = p->attribute;
conttmp->value = p->value;
conttmp->encoded = encoded;
conttmp->index = index;
p->attribute = NULL;
p->value = NULL;
FREE (&p);
rfc2231_list_insert (&conthead, conttmp);
}
}
if (conthead)
{
rfc2231_join_continuations (last, conthead);
dirty = 1;
}
*headp = head;
if (dirty)
purge_empty_parameters (headp);
} | 0 | [] | mutt | 3b6f6b829718ec8a7cf3eb6997d86e83e6c38567 | 123,163,267,178,905,680,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 100 | Avoid undefined behavior on huge integer in a RFC 2231 header.
The atoi() function was called on the index, which can potentially
be huge in an invalid message and can yield undefined behavior. The
mutt_atoi() function is now used for error detection. |
static int imap_mbox_check(struct Mailbox *m)
{
imap_allow_reopen(m);
int rc = imap_check_mailbox(m, false);
/* NOTE - ctx might have been changed at this point. In particular,
* m could be NULL. Beware. */
imap_disallow_reopen(m);
return rc;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-522",
"CWE-287",
"CWE-755"
] | neomutt | 9c36717a3e2af1f2c1b7242035455ec8112b4b06 | 113,586,071,897,039,990,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | imap: close connection on all failures
Thanks to Gabriel Salles-Loustau for spotting the problem.
Co-authored-by: Kevin McCarthy <[email protected]> |
rb_buffer_peek(struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer, u64 *ts,
unsigned long *lost_events)
{
struct ring_buffer_event *event;
struct buffer_page *reader;
int nr_loops = 0;
if (ts)
*ts = 0;
again:
/*
* We repeat when a time extend is encountered.
* Since the time extend is always attached to a data event,
* we should never loop more than once.
* (We never hit the following condition more than twice).
*/
if (RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, ++nr_loops > 2))
return NULL;
reader = rb_get_reader_page(cpu_buffer);
if (!reader)
return NULL;
event = rb_reader_event(cpu_buffer);
switch (event->type_len) {
case RINGBUF_TYPE_PADDING:
if (rb_null_event(event))
RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, 1);
/*
* Because the writer could be discarding every
* event it creates (which would probably be bad)
* if we were to go back to "again" then we may never
* catch up, and will trigger the warn on, or lock
* the box. Return the padding, and we will release
* the current locks, and try again.
*/
return event;
case RINGBUF_TYPE_TIME_EXTEND:
/* Internal data, OK to advance */
rb_advance_reader(cpu_buffer);
goto again;
case RINGBUF_TYPE_TIME_STAMP:
if (ts) {
*ts = ring_buffer_event_time_stamp(event);
ring_buffer_normalize_time_stamp(cpu_buffer->buffer,
cpu_buffer->cpu, ts);
}
/* Internal data, OK to advance */
rb_advance_reader(cpu_buffer);
goto again;
case RINGBUF_TYPE_DATA:
if (ts && !(*ts)) {
*ts = cpu_buffer->read_stamp + event->time_delta;
ring_buffer_normalize_time_stamp(cpu_buffer->buffer,
cpu_buffer->cpu, ts);
}
if (lost_events)
*lost_events = rb_lost_events(cpu_buffer);
return event;
default:
RB_WARN_ON(cpu_buffer, 1);
}
return NULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-362"
] | linux | bbeb97464eefc65f506084fd9f18f21653e01137 | 100,532,571,315,280,510,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 70 | tracing: Fix race in trace_open and buffer resize call
Below race can come, if trace_open and resize of
cpu buffer is running parallely on different cpus
CPUX CPUY
ring_buffer_resize
atomic_read(&buffer->resize_disabled)
tracing_open
tracing_reset_online_cpus
ring_buffer_reset_cpu
rb_reset_cpu
rb_update_pages
remove/insert pages
resetting pointer
This race can cause data abort or some times infinte loop in
rb_remove_pages and rb_insert_pages while checking pages
for sanity.
Take buffer lock to fix this.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: b23d7a5f4a07a ("ring-buffer: speed up buffer resets by avoiding synchronize_rcu for each CPU")
Signed-off-by: Gaurav Kohli <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]> |
may_adjust_color_count(int val)
{
if (val != t_colors)
{
// Nr of colors changed, initialize highlighting and
// redraw everything. This causes a redraw, which usually
// clears the message. Try keeping the message if it
// might work.
set_keep_msg_from_hist();
set_color_count(val);
init_highlight(TRUE, FALSE);
# ifdef DEBUG_TERMRESPONSE
{
int r = redraw_asap(CLEAR);
log_tr("Received t_Co, redraw_asap(): %d", r);
}
# else
redraw_asap(CLEAR);
# endif
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] | vim | e178af5a586ea023622d460779fdcabbbfac0908 | 253,417,799,408,447,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | patch 8.2.5160: accessing invalid memory after changing terminal size
Problem: Accessing invalid memory after changing terminal size.
Solution: Adjust cmdline_row and msg_row to the value of Rows. |
unsigned int udp_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, poll_table *wait)
{
unsigned int mask = datagram_poll(file, sock, wait);
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int is_lite = IS_UDPLITE(sk);
/* Check for false positives due to checksum errors */
if ( (mask & POLLRDNORM) &&
!(file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) &&
!(sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)){
struct sk_buff_head *rcvq = &sk->sk_receive_queue;
struct sk_buff *skb;
spin_lock_bh(&rcvq->lock);
while ((skb = skb_peek(rcvq)) != NULL &&
udp_lib_checksum_complete(skb)) {
UDP_INC_STATS_BH(UDP_MIB_INERRORS, is_lite);
__skb_unlink(skb, rcvq);
kfree_skb(skb);
}
spin_unlock_bh(&rcvq->lock);
/* nothing to see, move along */
if (skb == NULL)
mask &= ~(POLLIN | POLLRDNORM);
}
return mask;
} | 0 | [] | linux-2.6 | 32c1da70810017a98aa6c431a5494a302b6b9a30 | 314,247,862,468,881,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 | [UDP]: Randomize port selection.
This patch causes UDP port allocation to be randomized like TCP.
The earlier code would always choose same port (ie first empty list).
Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
FindAffixes(AffixNode *node, const char *word, int wrdlen, int *level, int type)
{
AffixNodeData *StopLow,
*StopHigh,
*StopMiddle;
uint8 symbol;
if (node->isvoid)
{ /* search void affixes */
if (node->data->naff)
return node->data;
node = node->data->node;
}
while (node && *level < wrdlen)
{
StopLow = node->data;
StopHigh = node->data + node->length;
while (StopLow < StopHigh)
{
StopMiddle = StopLow + ((StopHigh - StopLow) >> 1);
symbol = GETWCHAR(word, wrdlen, *level, type);
if (StopMiddle->val == symbol)
{
(*level)++;
if (StopMiddle->naff)
return StopMiddle;
node = StopMiddle->node;
break;
}
else if (StopMiddle->val < symbol)
StopLow = StopMiddle + 1;
else
StopHigh = StopMiddle;
}
if (StopLow >= StopHigh)
break;
}
return NULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | postgres | 01824385aead50e557ca1af28640460fa9877d51 | 65,928,892,856,166,895,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 41 | Prevent potential overruns of fixed-size buffers.
Coverity identified a number of places in which it couldn't prove that a
string being copied into a fixed-size buffer would fit. We believe that
most, perhaps all of these are in fact safe, or are copying data that is
coming from a trusted source so that any overrun is not really a security
issue. Nonetheless it seems prudent to forestall any risk by using
strlcpy() and similar functions.
Fixes by Peter Eisentraut and Jozef Mlich based on Coverity reports.
In addition, fix a potential null-pointer-dereference crash in
contrib/chkpass. The crypt(3) function is defined to return NULL on
failure, but chkpass.c didn't check for that before using the result.
The main practical case in which this could be an issue is if libc is
configured to refuse to execute unapproved hashing algorithms (e.g.,
"FIPS mode"). This ideally should've been a separate commit, but
since it touches code adjacent to one of the buffer overrun changes,
I included it in this commit to avoid last-minute merge issues.
This issue was reported by Honza Horak.
Security: CVE-2014-0065 for buffer overruns, CVE-2014-0066 for crypt() |
NTSTATUS tstream_tls_params_server(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *dns_host_name,
bool enabled,
const char *key_file,
const char *cert_file,
const char *ca_file,
const char *crl_file,
const char *dhp_file,
struct tstream_tls_params **_tlsp)
{
struct tstream_tls_params *tlsp;
#if ENABLE_GNUTLS
int ret;
struct stat st;
if (!enabled || key_file == NULL || *key_file == 0) {
tlsp = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct tstream_tls_params);
NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(tlsp);
talloc_set_destructor(tlsp, tstream_tls_params_destructor);
tlsp->tls_enabled = false;
*_tlsp = tlsp;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
ret = gnutls_global_init();
if (ret != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(0,("TLS %s - %s\n", __location__, gnutls_strerror(ret)));
return NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED;
}
tlsp = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct tstream_tls_params);
NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(tlsp);
talloc_set_destructor(tlsp, tstream_tls_params_destructor);
if (!file_exist(ca_file)) {
tls_cert_generate(tlsp, dns_host_name,
key_file, cert_file, ca_file);
}
if (file_exist(key_file) &&
!file_check_permissions(key_file, geteuid(), 0600, &st))
{
DEBUG(0, ("Invalid permissions on TLS private key file '%s':\n"
"owner uid %u should be %u, mode 0%o should be 0%o\n"
"This is known as CVE-2013-4476.\n"
"Removing all tls .pem files will cause an "
"auto-regeneration with the correct permissions.\n",
key_file,
(unsigned int)st.st_uid, geteuid(),
(unsigned int)(st.st_mode & 0777), 0600));
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
ret = gnutls_certificate_allocate_credentials(&tlsp->x509_cred);
if (ret != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(0,("TLS %s - %s\n", __location__, gnutls_strerror(ret)));
talloc_free(tlsp);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (ca_file && *ca_file) {
ret = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_trust_file(tlsp->x509_cred,
ca_file,
GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
if (ret < 0) {
DEBUG(0,("TLS failed to initialise cafile %s - %s\n",
ca_file, gnutls_strerror(ret)));
talloc_free(tlsp);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
}
if (crl_file && *crl_file) {
ret = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_crl_file(tlsp->x509_cred,
crl_file,
GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
if (ret < 0) {
DEBUG(0,("TLS failed to initialise crlfile %s - %s\n",
crl_file, gnutls_strerror(ret)));
talloc_free(tlsp);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
}
ret = gnutls_certificate_set_x509_key_file(tlsp->x509_cred,
cert_file, key_file,
GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
if (ret != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(0,("TLS failed to initialise certfile %s and keyfile %s - %s\n",
cert_file, key_file, gnutls_strerror(ret)));
talloc_free(tlsp);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
ret = gnutls_dh_params_init(&tlsp->dh_params);
if (ret != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(0,("TLS %s - %s\n", __location__, gnutls_strerror(ret)));
talloc_free(tlsp);
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (dhp_file && *dhp_file) {
gnutls_datum_t dhparms;
size_t size;
dhparms.data = (uint8_t *)file_load(dhp_file, &size, 0, tlsp);
if (!dhparms.data) {
DEBUG(0,("TLS failed to read DH Parms from %s - %d:%s\n",
dhp_file, errno, strerror(errno)));
talloc_free(tlsp);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
dhparms.size = size;
ret = gnutls_dh_params_import_pkcs3(tlsp->dh_params,
&dhparms,
GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
if (ret != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(0,("TLS failed to import pkcs3 %s - %s\n",
dhp_file, gnutls_strerror(ret)));
talloc_free(tlsp);
return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
}
} else {
ret = gnutls_dh_params_generate2(tlsp->dh_params, DH_BITS);
if (ret != GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS) {
DEBUG(0,("TLS failed to generate dh_params - %s\n",
gnutls_strerror(ret)));
talloc_free(tlsp);
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
}
gnutls_certificate_set_dh_params(tlsp->x509_cred, tlsp->dh_params);
tlsp->tls_enabled = true;
#else /* ENABLE_GNUTLS */
tlsp = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct tstream_tls_params);
NT_STATUS_HAVE_NO_MEMORY(tlsp);
talloc_set_destructor(tlsp, tstream_tls_params_destructor);
tlsp->tls_enabled = false;
#endif /* ENABLE_GNUTLS */
*_tlsp = tlsp;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
} | 0 | [] | samba | 22af043d2f20760f27150d7d469c7c7b944c6b55 | 250,842,549,061,191,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 150 | CVE-2013-4476: s4:libtls: check for safe permissions of tls private key file (key.pem)
If the tls key is not owned by root or has not mode 0600 samba will not
start up.
Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10234
Pair-Programmed-With: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Björn Baumbach <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]>
Autobuild-User(master): Karolin Seeger <[email protected]>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Nov 11 13:07:16 CET 2013 on sn-devel-104 |
static int btrfs_free_dev_extent(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
struct btrfs_device *device,
u64 start, u64 *dev_extent_len)
{
struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = device->fs_info;
struct btrfs_root *root = fs_info->dev_root;
int ret;
struct btrfs_path *path;
struct btrfs_key key;
struct btrfs_key found_key;
struct extent_buffer *leaf = NULL;
struct btrfs_dev_extent *extent = NULL;
path = btrfs_alloc_path();
if (!path)
return -ENOMEM;
key.objectid = device->devid;
key.offset = start;
key.type = BTRFS_DEV_EXTENT_KEY;
again:
ret = btrfs_search_slot(trans, root, &key, path, -1, 1);
if (ret > 0) {
ret = btrfs_previous_item(root, path, key.objectid,
BTRFS_DEV_EXTENT_KEY);
if (ret)
goto out;
leaf = path->nodes[0];
btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, &found_key, path->slots[0]);
extent = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, path->slots[0],
struct btrfs_dev_extent);
BUG_ON(found_key.offset > start || found_key.offset +
btrfs_dev_extent_length(leaf, extent) < start);
key = found_key;
btrfs_release_path(path);
goto again;
} else if (ret == 0) {
leaf = path->nodes[0];
extent = btrfs_item_ptr(leaf, path->slots[0],
struct btrfs_dev_extent);
} else {
btrfs_handle_fs_error(fs_info, ret, "Slot search failed");
goto out;
}
*dev_extent_len = btrfs_dev_extent_length(leaf, extent);
ret = btrfs_del_item(trans, root, path);
if (ret) {
btrfs_handle_fs_error(fs_info, ret,
"Failed to remove dev extent item");
} else {
set_bit(BTRFS_TRANS_HAVE_FREE_BGS, &trans->transaction->flags);
}
out:
btrfs_free_path(path);
return ret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476",
"CWE-284"
] | linux | 09ba3bc9dd150457c506e4661380a6183af651c1 | 32,708,183,819,004,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 58 | btrfs: merge btrfs_find_device and find_device
Both btrfs_find_device() and find_device() does the same thing except
that the latter does not take the seed device onto account in the device
scanning context. We can merge them.
Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]> |
R_API void r_bin_java_print_constant_value_attr_summary(RBinJavaAttrInfo *attr) {
if (!attr) {
eprintf ("Attempting to print an invalid RBinJavaAttrInfo *ConstantValue.\n");
return;
}
Eprintf ("Constant Value Attribute Information:\n");
Eprintf (" Attribute Offset: 0x%08"PFMT64x "\n", attr->file_offset);
Eprintf (" Attribute Name Index: %d (%s)\n", attr->name_idx, attr->name);
Eprintf (" Attribute Length: %d\n", attr->length);
Eprintf (" ConstantValue Index: %d\n", attr->info.constant_value_attr.constantvalue_idx);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | radare2 | 9650e3c352f675687bf6c6f65ff2c4a3d0e288fa | 259,672,593,599,596,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | Fix oobread segfault in java arith8.class ##crash
* Reported by Cen Zhang via huntr.dev |
int RGWInitMultipart::verify_permission()
{
if (s->iam_policy) {
auto e = s->iam_policy->eval(s->env, *s->auth.identity,
rgw::IAM::s3PutObject,
rgw_obj(s->bucket, s->object));
if (e == Effect::Allow) {
return 0;
} else if (e == Effect::Deny) {
return -EACCES;
}
}
if (!verify_bucket_permission_no_policy(s, RGW_PERM_WRITE)) {
return -EACCES;
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-770"
] | ceph | ab29bed2fc9f961fe895de1086a8208e21ddaddc | 320,902,098,358,019,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | rgw: fix issues with 'enforce bounds' patch
The patch to enforce bounds on max-keys/max-uploads/max-parts had a few
issues that would prevent us from compiling it. Instead of changing the
code provided by the submitter, we're addressing them in a separate
commit to maintain the DCO.
Signed-off-by: Joao Eduardo Luis <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Abhishek Lekshmanan <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 29bc434a6a81a2e5c5b8cfc4c8d5c82ca5bf538a)
mimic specific fixes:
As the largeish change from master g_conf() isn't in mimic yet, use the g_conf
global structure, also make rgw_op use the value from req_info ceph context as
we do for all the requests |
explicit FormatInt(unsigned value) : str_(format_decimal(value)) {} | 0 | [
"CWE-134",
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | fmt | 8cf30aa2be256eba07bb1cefb998c52326e846e7 | 48,619,091,138,554,590,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 | Fix segfault on complex pointer formatting (#642) |
compare_method_imap (const void *key, const void *elem)
{
const char* method_name = (const char*)&icall_names_str + (*(guint16*)elem);
return strcmp (key, method_name);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-264"
] | mono | 035c8587c0d8d307e45f1b7171a0d337bb451f1e | 48,306,227,131,511,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | Allow only primitive types/enums in RuntimeHelpers.InitializeArray (). |
plperl_call_perl_func(plperl_proc_desc *desc, FunctionCallInfo fcinfo)
{
dSP;
SV *retval;
int i;
int count;
ENTER;
SAVETMPS;
PUSHMARK(SP);
EXTEND(sp, desc->nargs);
for (i = 0; i < desc->nargs; i++)
{
if (fcinfo->argnull[i])
PUSHs(&PL_sv_undef);
else if (desc->arg_is_rowtype[i])
{
SV *sv = plperl_hash_from_datum(fcinfo->arg[i]);
PUSHs(sv_2mortal(sv));
}
else
{
SV *sv;
if (OidIsValid(desc->arg_arraytype[i]))
sv = plperl_ref_from_pg_array(fcinfo->arg[i], desc->arg_arraytype[i]);
else
{
char *tmp;
tmp = OutputFunctionCall(&(desc->arg_out_func[i]),
fcinfo->arg[i]);
sv = cstr2sv(tmp);
pfree(tmp);
}
PUSHs(sv_2mortal(sv));
}
}
PUTBACK;
/* Do NOT use G_KEEPERR here */
count = perl_call_sv(desc->reference, G_SCALAR | G_EVAL);
SPAGAIN;
if (count != 1)
{
PUTBACK;
FREETMPS;
LEAVE;
elog(ERROR, "didn't get a return item from function");
}
if (SvTRUE(ERRSV))
{
(void) POPs;
PUTBACK;
FREETMPS;
LEAVE;
/* XXX need to find a way to assign an errcode here */
ereport(ERROR,
(errmsg("%s", strip_trailing_ws(sv2cstr(ERRSV)))));
}
retval = newSVsv(POPs);
PUTBACK;
FREETMPS;
LEAVE;
return retval;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-264"
] | postgres | 537cbd35c893e67a63c59bc636c3e888bd228bc7 | 74,603,415,615,081,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 76 | Prevent privilege escalation in explicit calls to PL validators.
The primary role of PL validators is to be called implicitly during
CREATE FUNCTION, but they are also normal functions that a user can call
explicitly. Add a permissions check to each validator to ensure that a
user cannot use explicit validator calls to achieve things he could not
otherwise achieve. Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions).
Non-core procedural language extensions ought to make the same two-line
change to their own validators.
Andres Freund, reviewed by Tom Lane and Noah Misch.
Security: CVE-2014-0061 |
TEST_P(DownstreamProtocolIntegrationTest, TestPreconnect) {
config_helper_.addConfigModifier([](envoy::config::bootstrap::v3::Bootstrap& bootstrap) {
auto* cluster = bootstrap.mutable_static_resources()->mutable_clusters(0);
cluster->mutable_preconnect_policy()->mutable_per_upstream_preconnect_ratio()->set_value(1.5);
});
initialize();
codec_client_ = makeHttpConnection(lookupPort("http"));
auto response =
sendRequestAndWaitForResponse(default_request_headers_, 0, default_response_headers_, 0);
FakeHttpConnectionPtr fake_upstream_connection_two;
if (upstreamProtocol() == Http::CodecType::HTTP1) {
// For HTTP/1.1 there should be a preconnected connection.
ASSERT_TRUE(
fake_upstreams_[0]->waitForHttpConnection(*dispatcher_, fake_upstream_connection_two));
} else {
// For HTTP/2, the original connection can accommodate two requests.
ASSERT_FALSE(fake_upstreams_[0]->waitForHttpConnection(
*dispatcher_, fake_upstream_connection_two, std::chrono::milliseconds(5)));
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | envoy | 148de954ed3585d8b4298b424aa24916d0de6136 | 241,028,045,853,658,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | CVE-2021-43825
Response filter manager crash
Signed-off-by: Yan Avlasov <[email protected]> |
static void packet_mm_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
struct socket *sock = file->private_data;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
if (sk)
atomic_inc(&pkt_sk(sk)->mapped);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-909"
] | linux-2.6 | 67286640f638f5ad41a946b9a3dc75327950248f | 144,058,101,357,193,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | net: packet: fix information leak to userland
packet_getname_spkt() doesn't initialize all members of sa_data field of
sockaddr struct if strlen(dev->name) < 13. This structure is then copied
to userland. It leads to leaking of contents of kernel stack memory.
We have to fully fill sa_data with strncpy() instead of strlcpy().
The same with packet_getname(): it doesn't initialize sll_pkttype field of
sockaddr_ll. Set it to zero.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
static OPJ_BOOL opj_j2k_setup_header_writing(opj_j2k_t *p_j2k,
opj_event_mgr_t * p_manager)
{
/* preconditions */
assert(p_j2k != 00);
assert(p_manager != 00);
if (! opj_procedure_list_add_procedure(p_j2k->m_procedure_list,
(opj_procedure)opj_j2k_init_info, p_manager)) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (! opj_procedure_list_add_procedure(p_j2k->m_procedure_list,
(opj_procedure)opj_j2k_write_soc, p_manager)) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (! opj_procedure_list_add_procedure(p_j2k->m_procedure_list,
(opj_procedure)opj_j2k_write_siz, p_manager)) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (! opj_procedure_list_add_procedure(p_j2k->m_procedure_list,
(opj_procedure)opj_j2k_write_cod, p_manager)) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (! opj_procedure_list_add_procedure(p_j2k->m_procedure_list,
(opj_procedure)opj_j2k_write_qcd, p_manager)) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (! opj_procedure_list_add_procedure(p_j2k->m_procedure_list,
(opj_procedure)opj_j2k_write_all_coc, p_manager)) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (! opj_procedure_list_add_procedure(p_j2k->m_procedure_list,
(opj_procedure)opj_j2k_write_all_qcc, p_manager)) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (OPJ_IS_CINEMA(p_j2k->m_cp.rsiz)) {
if (! opj_procedure_list_add_procedure(p_j2k->m_procedure_list,
(opj_procedure)opj_j2k_write_tlm, p_manager)) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (p_j2k->m_cp.rsiz == OPJ_PROFILE_CINEMA_4K) {
if (! opj_procedure_list_add_procedure(p_j2k->m_procedure_list,
(opj_procedure)opj_j2k_write_poc, p_manager)) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
}
}
if (! opj_procedure_list_add_procedure(p_j2k->m_procedure_list,
(opj_procedure)opj_j2k_write_regions, p_manager)) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (p_j2k->m_cp.comment != 00) {
if (! opj_procedure_list_add_procedure(p_j2k->m_procedure_list,
(opj_procedure)opj_j2k_write_com, p_manager)) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
}
/* DEVELOPER CORNER, insert your custom procedures */
if (p_j2k->m_cp.rsiz & OPJ_EXTENSION_MCT) {
if (! opj_procedure_list_add_procedure(p_j2k->m_procedure_list,
(opj_procedure)opj_j2k_write_mct_data_group, p_manager)) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
}
/* End of Developer Corner */
if (p_j2k->cstr_index) {
if (! opj_procedure_list_add_procedure(p_j2k->m_procedure_list,
(opj_procedure)opj_j2k_get_end_header, p_manager)) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
}
if (! opj_procedure_list_add_procedure(p_j2k->m_procedure_list,
(opj_procedure)opj_j2k_create_tcd, p_manager)) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
if (! opj_procedure_list_add_procedure(p_j2k->m_procedure_list,
(opj_procedure)opj_j2k_update_rates, p_manager)) {
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
return OPJ_TRUE;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-787"
] | openjpeg | 4241ae6fbbf1de9658764a80944dc8108f2b4154 | 60,254,898,787,925,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 89 | Fix assertion in debug mode / heap-based buffer overflow in opj_write_bytes_LE for Cinema profiles with numresolutions = 1 (#985) |
static pj_status_t encode_empty_attr(const void *a, pj_uint8_t *buf,
unsigned len,
const pj_stun_msg_hdr *msghdr,
unsigned *printed)
{
const pj_stun_empty_attr *ca = (pj_stun_empty_attr*)a;
PJ_UNUSED_ARG(msghdr);
if (len < ATTR_HDR_LEN)
return PJ_ETOOSMALL;
PUTVAL16H(buf, 0, ca->hdr.type);
PUTVAL16H(buf, 2, 0);
/* Done */
*printed = ATTR_HDR_LEN;
return PJ_SUCCESS;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-191"
] | pjproject | 15663e3f37091069b8c98a7fce680dc04bc8e865 | 240,019,409,779,165,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | Merge pull request from GHSA-2qpg-f6wf-w984 |
size_t ad_getentryoff(const struct adouble *ad, int eid)
{
return ad->ad_eid[eid].ade_off;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | samba | 0e2b3fb982d1f53d111e10d9197ed2ec2e13712c | 42,767,733,014,264,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | CVE-2021-44142: libadouble: harden parsing code
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14914
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <[email protected]> |
snd_pcm_stream_group_ref(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream)
{
bool nonatomic = substream->pcm->nonatomic;
struct snd_pcm_group *group;
bool trylock;
for (;;) {
if (!snd_pcm_stream_linked(substream))
return NULL;
group = substream->group;
/* block freeing the group object */
refcount_inc(&group->refs);
trylock = nonatomic ? mutex_trylock(&group->mutex) :
spin_trylock(&group->lock);
if (trylock)
break; /* OK */
/* re-lock for avoiding ABBA deadlock */
snd_pcm_stream_unlock(substream);
snd_pcm_group_lock(group, nonatomic);
snd_pcm_stream_lock(substream);
/* check the group again; the above opens a small race window */
if (substream->group == group)
break; /* OK */
/* group changed, try again */
snd_pcm_group_unref(group, substream);
}
return group;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | linux | 92ee3c60ec9fe64404dc035e7c41277d74aa26cb | 138,701,631,677,056,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 | ALSA: pcm: Fix races among concurrent hw_params and hw_free calls
Currently we have neither proper check nor protection against the
concurrent calls of PCM hw_params and hw_free ioctls, which may result
in a UAF. Since the existing PCM stream lock can't be used for
protecting the whole ioctl operations, we need a new mutex to protect
those racy calls.
This patch introduced a new mutex, runtime->buffer_mutex, and applies
it to both hw_params and hw_free ioctl code paths. Along with it, the
both functions are slightly modified (the mmap_count check is moved
into the state-check block) for code simplicity.
Reported-by: Hu Jiahui <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jaroslav Kysela <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> |
int parse_CColumnGroupArray(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, proto_tree *parent_tree, proto_tree *pad_tree, const char *fmt, ...)
{
proto_tree *tree;
proto_item *item;
va_list ap;
const char *txt;
guint32 count, i;
va_start(ap, fmt);
txt = wmem_strdup_vprintf(wmem_packet_scope(), fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(parent_tree, tvb, offset, 0, ett_CColumnGroupArray, &item, txt);
count = tvb_get_letohl(tvb, offset);
proto_tree_add_uint(tree, hf_mswsp_ccolumngrouparray_count, tvb, offset, 4, count);
offset += 4;
for (i=0; i<count; i++) {
offset = parse_padding(tvb, offset, 4, pad_tree, "aGroupArray[%u]", i);
offset = parse_CColumnGroup(tvb, offset, tree, pad_tree, "aGroupArray[%u]", i);
}
proto_item_set_end(item, tvb, offset);
return offset;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-770"
] | wireshark | b7a0650e061b5418ab4a8f72c6e4b00317aff623 | 14,221,946,267,364,672,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 | MS-WSP: Don't allocate huge amounts of memory.
Add a couple of memory allocation sanity checks, one of which
fixes #17331. |
static int nfs4_xdr_enc_setattr(struct rpc_rqst *req, __be32 *p, struct nfs_setattrargs *args)
{
struct xdr_stream xdr;
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.nops = 3,
};
int status;
xdr_init_encode(&xdr, &req->rq_snd_buf, p);
encode_compound_hdr(&xdr, &hdr);
status = encode_putfh(&xdr, args->fh);
if(status)
goto out;
status = encode_setattr(&xdr, args, args->server);
if(status)
goto out;
status = encode_getfattr(&xdr, args->bitmask);
out:
return status;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | linux | dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9 | 237,294,653,073,251,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> |
void WebContents::DecrementCapturerCount(gin_helper::Arguments* args) {
bool stay_hidden = false;
// get stayHidden arguments if they exist
args->GetNext(&stay_hidden);
web_contents()->DecrementCapturerCount(stay_hidden);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-693"
] | electron | 18613925610ba319da7f497b6deed85ad712c59b | 286,620,990,850,998,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | refactor: wire will-navigate up to a navigation throttle instead of OpenURL (#25108)
* refactor: wire will-navigate up to a navigation throttle instead of OpenURL (#25065)
* refactor: wire will-navigate up to a navigation throttle instead of OpenURL
* spec: add test for x-site _top navigation
* chore: old code be old |
getdecchrs(void)
{
long_u nr = 0;
int c;
int i;
for (i = 0; ; ++i)
{
c = regparse[0];
if (c < '0' || c > '9')
break;
nr *= 10;
nr += c - '0';
++regparse;
curchr = -1; // no longer valid
}
if (i == 0)
return -1;
return (long)nr;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | vim | 4c13e5e6763c6eb36a343a2b8235ea227202e952 | 197,235,835,451,121,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | patch 8.2.3949: using freed memory with /\%V
Problem: Using freed memory with /\%V.
Solution: Get the line again after getvvcol(). |
static void node_remove_accesses(struct node *node)
{
struct node_access_nodes *c, *cnext;
list_for_each_entry_safe(c, cnext, &node->access_list, list_node) {
list_del(&c->list_node);
device_unregister(&c->dev);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | linux | aa838896d87af561a33ecefea1caa4c15a68bc47 | 157,930,658,993,132,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | drivers core: Use sysfs_emit and sysfs_emit_at for show(device *...) functions
Convert the various sprintf fmaily calls in sysfs device show functions
to sysfs_emit and sysfs_emit_at for PAGE_SIZE buffer safety.
Done with:
$ spatch -sp-file sysfs_emit_dev.cocci --in-place --max-width=80 .
And cocci script:
$ cat sysfs_emit_dev.cocci
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
return
- sprintf(buf,
+ sysfs_emit(buf,
...);
...>
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
return
- snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+ sysfs_emit(buf,
...);
...>
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
return
- scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+ sysfs_emit(buf,
...);
...>
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
expression chr;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
return
- strcpy(buf, chr);
+ sysfs_emit(buf, chr);
...>
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
len =
- sprintf(buf,
+ sysfs_emit(buf,
...);
...>
return len;
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
len =
- snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+ sysfs_emit(buf,
...);
...>
return len;
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
len =
- scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+ sysfs_emit(buf,
...);
...>
return len;
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
- len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+ len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len,
...);
...>
return len;
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
expression chr;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
...
- strcpy(buf, chr);
- return strlen(buf);
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, chr);
}
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3d033c33056d88bbe34d4ddb62afd05ee166ab9a.1600285923.git.joe@perches.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> |
int xt_check_table_hooks(const struct xt_table_info *info, unsigned int valid_hooks)
{
const char *err = "unsorted underflow";
unsigned int i, max_uflow, max_entry;
bool check_hooks = false;
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(info->hook_entry) != ARRAY_SIZE(info->underflow));
max_entry = 0;
max_uflow = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(info->hook_entry); i++) {
if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << i)))
continue;
if (info->hook_entry[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF)
return -EINVAL;
if (info->underflow[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF)
return -EINVAL;
if (check_hooks) {
if (max_uflow > info->underflow[i])
goto error;
if (max_uflow == info->underflow[i]) {
err = "duplicate underflow";
goto error;
}
if (max_entry > info->hook_entry[i]) {
err = "unsorted entry";
goto error;
}
if (max_entry == info->hook_entry[i]) {
err = "duplicate entry";
goto error;
}
}
max_entry = info->hook_entry[i];
max_uflow = info->underflow[i];
check_hooks = true;
}
return 0;
error:
pr_err_ratelimited("%s at hook %d\n", err, i);
return -EINVAL;
} | 0 | [] | linux | 175e476b8cdf2a4de7432583b49c871345e4f8a1 | 186,714,575,984,964,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 47 | netfilter: x_tables: Use correct memory barriers.
When a new table value was assigned, it was followed by a write memory
barrier. This ensured that all writes before this point would complete
before any writes after this point. However, to determine whether the
rules are unused, the sequence counter is read. To ensure that all
writes have been done before these reads, a full memory barrier is
needed, not just a write memory barrier. The same argument applies when
incrementing the counter, before the rules are read.
Changing to using smp_mb() instead of smp_wmb() fixes the kernel panic
reported in cc00bcaa5899 (which is still present), while still
maintaining the same speed of replacing tables.
The smb_mb() barriers potentially slow the packet path, however testing
has shown no measurable change in performance on a 4-core MIPS64
platform.
Fixes: 7f5c6d4f665b ("netfilter: get rid of atomic ops in fast path")
Signed-off-by: Mark Tomlinson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> |
ves_icall_System_Threading_Events_CloseEvent_internal (HANDLE handle) {
MONO_ARCH_SAVE_REGS;
CloseHandle (handle);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-399",
"CWE-264"
] | mono | 722f9890f09aadfc37ae479e7d946d5fc5ef7b91 | 221,185,532,006,666,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | Fix access to freed members of a dead thread
* threads.c: Fix access to freed members of a dead thread. Found
and fixed by Rodrigo Kumpera <[email protected]>
Ref: CVE-2011-0992 |
msnprintf(
char * buf,
size_t bufsiz,
const char * fmt,
...
)
{
va_list ap;
size_t rc;
va_start(ap, fmt);
rc = mvsnprintf(buf, bufsiz, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
return rc;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-835"
] | ntp | bb928ef08eec020ef6008f3a140702ccc0536b8e | 295,506,024,453,932,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | [TALOS-CAN-0055] Infinite loop if extended logging enabled and the logfile and keyfile are the same |
zcurrenttextknockout(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
push(1);
make_bool(op, gs_currenttextknockout(igs));
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-704"
] | ghostpdl | 548bb434e81dadcc9f71adf891a3ef5bea8e2b4e | 279,714,561,682,398,720,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | PS interpreter - add some type checking
These were 'probably' safe anyway, since they mostly treat the objects
as integers without checking, which at least can't result in a crash.
Nevertheless, we ought to check.
The return from comparedictkeys could be wrong if one of the keys had
a value which was not an array, it could incorrectly decide the two
were in fact the same. |
xmlSchemaCheckSTPropsCorrect(xmlSchemaParserCtxtPtr ctxt,
xmlSchemaTypePtr type)
{
xmlSchemaTypePtr baseType = type->baseType;
xmlChar *str = NULL;
/* STATE: error funcs converted. */
/*
* Schema Component Constraint: Simple Type Definition Properties Correct
*
* NOTE: This is somehow redundant, since we actually built a simple type
* to have all the needed information; this acts as an self test.
*/
/* Base type: If the datatype has been `derived` by `restriction`
* then the Simple Type Definition component from which it is `derived`,
* otherwise the Simple Type Definition for anySimpleType ($4.1.6).
*/
if (baseType == NULL) {
/*
* TODO: Think about: "modulo the impact of Missing
* Sub-components ($5.3)."
*/
xmlSchemaPCustomErr(ctxt,
XML_SCHEMAP_ST_PROPS_CORRECT_1,
WXS_BASIC_CAST type, NULL,
"No base type existent", NULL);
return (XML_SCHEMAP_ST_PROPS_CORRECT_1);
}
if (! WXS_IS_SIMPLE(baseType)) {
xmlSchemaPCustomErr(ctxt,
XML_SCHEMAP_ST_PROPS_CORRECT_1,
WXS_BASIC_CAST type, NULL,
"The base type '%s' is not a simple type",
xmlSchemaGetComponentQName(&str, baseType));
FREE_AND_NULL(str)
return (XML_SCHEMAP_ST_PROPS_CORRECT_1);
}
if ((WXS_IS_LIST(type) || WXS_IS_UNION(type)) &&
(WXS_IS_RESTRICTION(type) == 0) &&
((! WXS_IS_ANY_SIMPLE_TYPE(baseType)) &&
(baseType->type != XML_SCHEMA_TYPE_SIMPLE))) {
xmlSchemaPCustomErr(ctxt,
XML_SCHEMAP_ST_PROPS_CORRECT_1,
WXS_BASIC_CAST type, NULL,
"A type, derived by list or union, must have "
"the simple ur-type definition as base type, not '%s'",
xmlSchemaGetComponentQName(&str, baseType));
FREE_AND_NULL(str)
return (XML_SCHEMAP_ST_PROPS_CORRECT_1);
}
/*
* Variety: One of {atomic, list, union}.
*/
if ((! WXS_IS_ATOMIC(type)) && (! WXS_IS_UNION(type)) &&
(! WXS_IS_LIST(type))) {
xmlSchemaPCustomErr(ctxt,
XML_SCHEMAP_ST_PROPS_CORRECT_1,
WXS_BASIC_CAST type, NULL,
"The variety is absent", NULL);
return (XML_SCHEMAP_ST_PROPS_CORRECT_1);
}
/* TODO: Finish this. Hmm, is this finished? */
/*
* 3 The {final} of the {base type definition} must not contain restriction.
*/
if (xmlSchemaTypeFinalContains(baseType,
XML_SCHEMAS_TYPE_FINAL_RESTRICTION)) {
xmlSchemaPCustomErr(ctxt,
XML_SCHEMAP_ST_PROPS_CORRECT_3,
WXS_BASIC_CAST type, NULL,
"The 'final' of its base type '%s' must not contain "
"'restriction'",
xmlSchemaGetComponentQName(&str, baseType));
FREE_AND_NULL(str)
return (XML_SCHEMAP_ST_PROPS_CORRECT_3);
}
/*
* 2 All simple type definitions must be derived ultimately from the `simple
* ur-type definition` (so circular definitions are disallowed). That is, it
* must be possible to reach a built-in primitive datatype or the `simple
* ur-type definition` by repeatedly following the {base type definition}.
*
* NOTE: this is done in xmlSchemaCheckTypeDefCircular().
*/
return (0);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-134"
] | libxml2 | 4472c3a5a5b516aaf59b89be602fbce52756c3e9 | 143,372,721,190,960,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 89 | Fix some format string warnings with possible format string vulnerability
For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=761029
Decorate every method in libxml2 with the appropriate
LIBXML_ATTR_FORMAT(fmt,args) macro and add some cleanups
following the reports. |
static int copy_files(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct files_struct *oldf, *newf;
int error = 0;
/*
* A background process may not have any files ...
*/
oldf = current->files;
if (!oldf)
goto out;
if (clone_flags & CLONE_FILES) {
atomic_inc(&oldf->count);
goto out;
}
newf = dup_fd(oldf, &error);
if (!newf)
goto out;
tsk->files = newf;
error = 0;
out:
return error;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-703"
] | linux | 2b7e8665b4ff51c034c55df3cff76518d1a9ee3a | 28,013,377,613,571,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 | fork: fix incorrect fput of ->exe_file causing use-after-free
Commit 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for
write killable") made it possible to kill a forking task while it is
waiting to acquire its ->mmap_sem for write, in dup_mmap().
However, it was overlooked that this introduced an new error path before
a reference is taken on the mm_struct's ->exe_file. Since the
->exe_file of the new mm_struct was already set to the old ->exe_file by
the memcpy() in dup_mm(), it was possible for the mmput() in the error
path of dup_mm() to drop a reference to ->exe_file which was never
taken.
This caused the struct file to later be freed prematurely.
Fix it by updating mm_init() to NULL out the ->exe_file, in the same
place it clears other things like the list of mmaps.
This bug was found by syzkaller. It can be reproduced using the
following C program:
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static void *mmap_thread(void *_arg)
{
for (;;) {
mmap(NULL, 0x1000000, PROT_READ,
MAP_POPULATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
}
}
static void *fork_thread(void *_arg)
{
usleep(rand() % 10000);
fork();
}
int main(void)
{
fork();
fork();
fork();
for (;;) {
if (fork() == 0) {
pthread_t t;
pthread_create(&t, NULL, mmap_thread, NULL);
pthread_create(&t, NULL, fork_thread, NULL);
usleep(rand() % 10000);
syscall(__NR_exit_group, 0);
}
wait(NULL);
}
}
No special kernel config options are needed. It usually causes a NULL
pointer dereference in __remove_shared_vm_struct() during exit, or in
dup_mmap() (which is usually inlined into copy_process()) during fork.
Both are due to a vm_area_struct's ->vm_file being used after it's
already been freed.
Google Bug Id: 64772007
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 7c051267931a ("mm, fork: make dup_mmap wait for mmap_sem for write killable")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Konstantin Khlebnikov <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> [v4.7+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
void lsetCommand(client *c) {
robj *o = lookupKeyWriteOrReply(c,c->argv[1],shared.nokeyerr);
if (o == NULL || checkType(c,o,OBJ_LIST)) return;
long index;
robj *value = c->argv[3];
if ((getLongFromObjectOrReply(c, c->argv[2], &index, NULL) != C_OK))
return;
if (o->encoding == OBJ_ENCODING_QUICKLIST) {
quicklist *ql = o->ptr;
int replaced = quicklistReplaceAtIndex(ql, index,
value->ptr, sdslen(value->ptr));
if (!replaced) {
addReply(c,shared.outofrangeerr);
} else {
addReply(c,shared.ok);
signalModifiedKey(c,c->db,c->argv[1]);
notifyKeyspaceEvent(NOTIFY_LIST,"lset",c->argv[1],c->db->id);
server.dirty++;
}
} else {
serverPanic("Unknown list encoding");
}
} | 1 | [
"CWE-190"
] | redis | f6a40570fa63d5afdd596c78083d754081d80ae3 | 337,462,189,578,650,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | Fix ziplist and listpack overflows and truncations (CVE-2021-32627, CVE-2021-32628)
- fix possible heap corruption in ziplist and listpack resulting by trying to
allocate more than the maximum size of 4GB.
- prevent ziplist (hash and zset) from reaching size of above 1GB, will be
converted to HT encoding, that's not a useful size.
- prevent listpack (stream) from reaching size of above 1GB.
- XADD will start a new listpack if the new record may cause the previous
listpack to grow over 1GB.
- XADD will respond with an error if a single stream record is over 1GB
- List type (ziplist in quicklist) was truncating strings that were over 4GB,
now it'll respond with an error. |
static int storageConnectIsAlive(virConnectPtr conn G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
return 1;
} | 0 | [] | libvirt | 447f69dec47e1b0bd15ecd7cd49a9fd3b050fb87 | 164,136,038,456,390,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | storage_driver: Unlock object on ACL fail in storagePoolLookupByTargetPath
'virStoragePoolObjListSearch' returns a locked and refed object, thus we
must release it on ACL permission failure.
Fixes: 7aa0e8c0cb8
Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1984318
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michal Privoznik <[email protected]> |
void TABLE_LIST::print(THD *thd, table_map eliminated_tables, String *str,
enum_query_type query_type)
{
if (nested_join)
{
str->append('(');
print_join(thd, eliminated_tables, str, &nested_join->join_list, query_type);
str->append(')');
}
else if (jtbm_subselect)
{
if (jtbm_subselect->engine->engine_type() ==
subselect_engine::SINGLE_SELECT_ENGINE)
{
/*
We get here when conversion into materialization didn't finish (this
happens when
- The subquery is a degenerate case which produces 0 or 1 record
- subquery's optimization didn't finish because of @@max_join_size
limits
- ... maybe some other cases like this
*/
str->append(STRING_WITH_LEN(" <materialize> ("));
jtbm_subselect->engine->print(str, query_type);
str->append(')');
}
else
{
str->append(STRING_WITH_LEN(" <materialize> ("));
subselect_hash_sj_engine *hash_engine;
hash_engine= (subselect_hash_sj_engine*)jtbm_subselect->engine;
hash_engine->materialize_engine->print(str, query_type);
str->append(')');
}
}
else
{
const char *cmp_name; // Name to compare with alias
if (view_name.str)
{
// A view
if (!(belong_to_view &&
belong_to_view->compact_view_format))
{
append_identifier(thd, str, view_db.str, view_db.length);
str->append('.');
}
append_identifier(thd, str, view_name.str, view_name.length);
cmp_name= view_name.str;
}
else if (derived)
{
if (!is_with_table())
{
// A derived table
str->append('(');
derived->print(str, query_type);
str->append(')');
cmp_name= ""; // Force printing of alias
}
else
{
append_identifier(thd, str, table_name, table_name_length);
cmp_name= table_name;
}
}
else
{
// A normal table
if (!(belong_to_view &&
belong_to_view->compact_view_format))
{
append_identifier(thd, str, db, db_length);
str->append('.');
}
if (schema_table)
{
append_identifier(thd, str, schema_table_name,
strlen(schema_table_name));
cmp_name= schema_table_name;
}
else
{
append_identifier(thd, str, table_name, table_name_length);
cmp_name= table_name;
}
#ifdef WITH_PARTITION_STORAGE_ENGINE
if (partition_names && partition_names->elements)
{
int i, num_parts= partition_names->elements;
List_iterator<String> name_it(*(partition_names));
str->append(STRING_WITH_LEN(" PARTITION ("));
for (i= 1; i <= num_parts; i++)
{
String *name= name_it++;
append_identifier(thd, str, name->c_ptr(), name->length());
if (i != num_parts)
str->append(',');
}
str->append(')');
}
#endif /* WITH_PARTITION_STORAGE_ENGINE */
}
if (my_strcasecmp(table_alias_charset, cmp_name, alias))
{
char t_alias_buff[MAX_ALIAS_NAME];
const char *t_alias= alias;
str->append(' ');
if (lower_case_table_names == 1)
{
if (alias && alias[0])
{
strmov(t_alias_buff, alias);
my_casedn_str(files_charset_info, t_alias_buff);
t_alias= t_alias_buff;
}
}
append_identifier(thd, str, t_alias, strlen(t_alias));
}
if (index_hints)
{
List_iterator<Index_hint> it(*index_hints);
Index_hint *hint;
while ((hint= it++))
{
str->append (STRING_WITH_LEN(" "));
hint->print (thd, str);
}
}
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-89"
] | server | 5ba77222e9fe7af8ff403816b5338b18b342053c | 212,009,088,107,155,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 137 | MDEV-21028 Server crashes in Query_arena::set_query_arena upon SELECT from view
if the view has algorithm=temptable it is not updatable,
so DEFAULT() for its fields is meaningless,
and thus it's NULL or 0/'' for NOT NULL columns. |
drill_parse_T_code(gerb_file_t *fd, drill_state_t *state,
gerbv_image_t *image, ssize_t file_line)
{
int tool_num;
gboolean done = FALSE;
int temp;
double size;
gerbv_drill_stats_t *stats = image->drill_stats;
gerbv_aperture_t *apert;
gchar *tmps;
gchar *string;
dprintf("---> entering %s()...\n", __FUNCTION__);
/* Sneak a peek at what's hiding after the 'T'. Ugly fix for
broken headers from Orcad, which is crap */
temp = gerb_fgetc(fd);
dprintf(" Found a char '%s' (0x%02x) after the T\n",
gerbv_escape_char(temp), temp);
/* might be a tool tool change stop switch on/off*/
if((temp == 'C') && ((fd->ptr + 2) < fd->datalen)){
if(gerb_fgetc(fd) == 'S'){
if (gerb_fgetc(fd) == 'T' ){
fd->ptr -= 4;
tmps = get_line(fd++);
gerbv_stats_printf(stats->error_list, GERBV_MESSAGE_NOTE, -1,
_("Tool change stop switch found \"%s\" "
"at line %ld in file \"%s\""),
tmps, file_line, fd->filename);
g_free (tmps);
return -1;
}
gerb_ungetc(fd);
}
gerb_ungetc(fd);
}
if( !(isdigit(temp) != 0 || temp == '+' || temp =='-') ) {
if(temp != EOF) {
gerbv_stats_printf(stats->error_list, GERBV_MESSAGE_ERROR, -1,
_("OrCAD bug: Junk text found in place of tool definition"));
tmps = get_line(fd);
gerbv_stats_printf(stats->error_list, GERBV_MESSAGE_WARNING, -1,
_("Junk text \"%s\" "
"at line %ld in file \"%s\""),
tmps, file_line, fd->filename);
g_free (tmps);
gerbv_stats_printf(stats->error_list, GERBV_MESSAGE_WARNING, -1,
_("Ignoring junk text"));
}
return -1;
}
gerb_ungetc(fd);
tool_num = (int) gerb_fgetint(fd, NULL);
dprintf (" Handling tool T%d at line %ld\n", tool_num, file_line);
if (tool_num == 0)
return tool_num; /* T00 is a command to unload the drill */
if (tool_num < TOOL_MIN || tool_num >= TOOL_MAX) {
gerbv_stats_printf(stats->error_list, GERBV_MESSAGE_ERROR, -1,
_("Out of bounds drill number %d "
"at line %ld in file \"%s\""),
tool_num, file_line, fd->filename);
}
/* Set the current tool to the correct one */
state->current_tool = tool_num;
apert = image->aperture[tool_num];
/* Check for a size definition */
temp = gerb_fgetc(fd);
/* This bit of code looks for a tool definition by scanning for strings
* of form TxxC, TxxF, TxxS. */
while (!done) {
switch((char)temp) {
case 'C':
size = read_double(fd, state->header_number_format, GERBV_OMIT_ZEROS_TRAILING, state->decimals);
dprintf (" Read a size of %g\n", size);
if (state->unit == GERBV_UNIT_MM) {
size /= 25.4;
} else if(size >= 4.0) {
/* If the drill size is >= 4 inches, assume that this
must be wrong and that the units are mils.
The limit being 4 inches is because the smallest drill
I've ever seen used is 0,3mm(about 12mil). Half of that
seemed a bit too small a margin, so a third it is */
gerbv_stats_printf(stats->error_list, GERBV_MESSAGE_ERROR, -1,
_("Read a drill of diameter %g inches "
"at line %ld in file \"%s\""),
size, file_line, fd->filename);
gerbv_stats_printf(stats->error_list, GERBV_MESSAGE_WARNING, -1,
_("Assuming units are mils"));
size /= 1000.0;
}
if (size <= 0. || size >= 10000.) {
gerbv_stats_printf(stats->error_list, GERBV_MESSAGE_ERROR, -1,
_("Unreasonable drill size %g found for drill %d "
"at line %ld in file \"%s\""),
size, tool_num, file_line, fd->filename);
} else {
if (apert != NULL) {
/* allow a redefine of a tool only if the new definition is exactly the same.
* This avoid lots of spurious complaints with the output of some cad
* tools while keeping complaints if there is a true problem
*/
if (apert->parameter[0] != size
|| apert->type != GERBV_APTYPE_CIRCLE
|| apert->nuf_parameters != 1
|| apert->unit != GERBV_UNIT_INCH) {
gerbv_stats_printf(stats->error_list,
GERBV_MESSAGE_ERROR, -1,
_("Found redefinition of drill %d "
"at line %ld in file \"%s\""),
tool_num, file_line, fd->filename);
}
} else {
apert = image->aperture[tool_num] =
g_new0(gerbv_aperture_t, 1);
if (apert == NULL)
GERB_FATAL_ERROR("malloc tool failed in %s()",
__FUNCTION__);
/* There's really no way of knowing what unit the tools
are defined in without sneaking a peek in the rest of
the file first. That's done in drill_guess_format() */
apert->parameter[0] = size;
apert->type = GERBV_APTYPE_CIRCLE;
apert->nuf_parameters = 1;
apert->unit = GERBV_UNIT_INCH;
}
}
/* Add the tool whose definition we just found into the list
* of tools for this layer used to generate statistics. */
stats = image->drill_stats;
string = g_strdup_printf("%s", (state->unit == GERBV_UNIT_MM ? _("mm") : _("inch")));
drill_stats_add_to_drill_list(stats->drill_list,
tool_num,
state->unit == GERBV_UNIT_MM ? size*25.4 : size,
string);
g_free(string);
break;
case 'F':
case 'S' :
/* Silently ignored. They're not important. */
gerb_fgetint(fd, NULL);
break;
default:
/* Stop when finding anything but what's expected
(and put it back) */
gerb_ungetc(fd);
done = TRUE;
break;
} /* switch((char)temp) */
temp = gerb_fgetc(fd);
if (EOF == temp) {
gerbv_stats_printf(stats->error_list, GERBV_MESSAGE_ERROR, -1,
_("Unexpected EOF encountered in header of "
"drill file \"%s\""), fd->filename);
/* Restore new line character for processing */
if ('\n' == temp || '\r' == temp)
gerb_ungetc(fd);
}
} /* while(!done) */ /* Done looking at tool definitions */
/* Catch the tools that aren't defined.
This isn't strictly a good thing, but at least something is shown */
if (apert == NULL) {
double dia;
apert = image->aperture[tool_num] = g_new0(gerbv_aperture_t, 1);
if (apert == NULL)
GERB_FATAL_ERROR("malloc tool failed in %s()", __FUNCTION__);
/* See if we have the tool table */
dia = gerbv_get_tool_diameter(tool_num);
if (dia <= 0) {
/*
* There is no tool. So go out and make some.
* This size calculation is, of course, totally bogus.
*/
dia = (double)(16 + 8 * tool_num) / 1000;
/*
* Oooh, this is sooo ugly. But some CAD systems seem to always
* use T00 at the end of the file while others that don't have
* tool definitions inside the file never seem to use T00 at all.
*/
if (tool_num != 0) {
gerbv_stats_printf(stats->error_list, GERBV_MESSAGE_ERROR, -1,
_("Tool %02d used without being defined "
"at line %ld in file \"%s\""),
tool_num, file_line, fd->filename);
gerbv_stats_printf(stats->error_list, GERBV_MESSAGE_WARNING, -1,
_("Setting a default size of %g\""), dia);
}
}
apert->type = GERBV_APTYPE_CIRCLE;
apert->nuf_parameters = 1;
apert->parameter[0] = dia;
/* Add the tool whose definition we just found into the list
* of tools for this layer used to generate statistics. */
if (tool_num != 0) { /* Only add non-zero tool nums.
* Zero = unload command. */
stats = image->drill_stats;
string = g_strdup_printf("%s",
(state->unit == GERBV_UNIT_MM ? _("mm") : _("inch")));
drill_stats_add_to_drill_list(stats->drill_list,
tool_num,
state->unit == GERBV_UNIT_MM ? dia*25.4 : dia,
string);
g_free(string);
}
} /* if(image->aperture[tool_num] == NULL) */
dprintf("<---- ...leaving %s()\n", __FUNCTION__);
return tool_num;
} /* drill_parse_T_code() */ | 1 | [
"CWE-787"
] | gerbv | 672214abb47a802fc000125996e6e0a46c623a4e | 112,903,329,744,372,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 233 | Add test to demonstrate buffer overrun |
static int get_options(int *argc, char ***argv)
{
int ho_error;
if (*argc == 1)
{
usage();
exit(0);
}
my_getopt_use_args_separator= TRUE;
if ((ho_error= load_defaults("my", load_default_groups, argc, argv)) ||
(ho_error=handle_options(argc, argv, my_long_options, get_one_option)))
exit(ho_error);
my_getopt_use_args_separator= FALSE;
if (!what_to_do)
{
size_t pnlen= strlen(my_progname);
if (pnlen < 6) /* name too short */
what_to_do = DO_CHECK;
else if (!strcmp("repair", my_progname + pnlen - 6))
what_to_do = DO_REPAIR;
else if (!strcmp("analyze", my_progname + pnlen - 7))
what_to_do = DO_ANALYZE;
else if (!strcmp("optimize", my_progname + pnlen - 8))
what_to_do = DO_OPTIMIZE;
else
what_to_do = DO_CHECK;
}
/*
If there's no --default-character-set option given with
--fix-table-name or --fix-db-name set the default character set to "utf8".
*/
if (!default_charset)
{
if (opt_fix_db_names || opt_fix_table_names)
default_charset= (char*) "utf8";
else
default_charset= (char*) MYSQL_AUTODETECT_CHARSET_NAME;
}
if (strcmp(default_charset, MYSQL_AUTODETECT_CHARSET_NAME) &&
!get_charset_by_csname(default_charset, MY_CS_PRIMARY, MYF(MY_WME)))
{
printf("Unsupported character set: %s\n", default_charset);
return 1;
}
if (*argc > 0 && opt_alldbs)
{
printf("You should give only options, no arguments at all, with option\n");
printf("--all-databases. Please see %s --help for more information.\n",
my_progname);
return 1;
}
if (*argc < 1 && !opt_alldbs)
{
printf("You forgot to give the arguments! Please see %s --help\n",
my_progname);
printf("for more information.\n");
return 1;
}
if (tty_password)
opt_password = get_tty_password(NullS);
if (debug_info_flag)
my_end_arg= MY_CHECK_ERROR | MY_GIVE_INFO;
if (debug_check_flag)
my_end_arg= MY_CHECK_ERROR;
return(0);
} /* get_options */ | 0 | [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-295"
] | mysql-server | 3bd5589e1a5a93f9c224badf983cd65c45215390 | 231,791,522,841,906,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 72 | WL#6791 : Redefine client --ssl option to imply enforced encryption
# Changed the meaning of the --ssl=1 option of all client binaries
to mean force ssl, not try ssl and fail over to eunecrypted
# Added a new MYSQL_OPT_SSL_ENFORCE mysql_options()
option to specify that an ssl connection is required.
# Added a new macro SSL_SET_OPTIONS() to the client
SSL handling headers that sets all the relevant SSL options at
once.
# Revamped all of the current native clients to use the new macro
# Removed some Windows line endings.
# Added proper handling of the new option into the ssl helper
headers.
# If SSL is mandatory assume that the media is secure enough
for the sha256 plugin to do unencrypted password exchange even
before establishing a connection.
# Set the default ssl cipher to DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA if none is
specified.
# updated test cases that require a non-default cipher to spawn
a mysql command line tool binary since mysqltest has no support
for specifying ciphers.
# updated the replication slave connection code to always enforce
SSL if any of the SSL config options is present.
# test cases added and updated.
# added a mysql_get_option() API to return mysql_options()
values. Used the new API inside the sha256 plugin.
# Fixed compilation warnings because of unused variables.
# Fixed test failures (mysql_ssl and bug13115401)
# Fixed whitespace issues.
# Fully implemented the mysql_get_option() function.
# Added a test case for mysql_get_option()
# fixed some trailing whitespace issues
# fixed some uint/int warnings in mysql_client_test.c
# removed shared memory option from non-windows get_options
tests
# moved MYSQL_OPT_LOCAL_INFILE to the uint options |
static void store_irk(struct btd_adapter *adapter, const bdaddr_t *peer,
uint8_t bdaddr_type, const unsigned char *key)
{
char device_addr[18];
char filename[PATH_MAX];
GKeyFile *key_file;
char *store_data;
char str[33];
size_t length = 0;
int i;
ba2str(peer, device_addr);
snprintf(filename, PATH_MAX, STORAGEDIR "/%s/%s/info",
btd_adapter_get_storage_dir(adapter), device_addr);
key_file = g_key_file_new();
g_key_file_load_from_file(key_file, filename, 0, NULL);
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
sprintf(str + (i * 2), "%2.2X", key[i]);
g_key_file_set_string(key_file, "IdentityResolvingKey", "Key", str);
create_file(filename, 0600);
store_data = g_key_file_to_data(key_file, &length, NULL);
g_file_set_contents(filename, store_data, length, NULL);
g_free(store_data);
g_key_file_free(key_file);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-862",
"CWE-863"
] | bluez | b497b5942a8beb8f89ca1c359c54ad67ec843055 | 274,120,895,621,971,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 | adapter: Fix storing discoverable setting
discoverable setting shall only be store when changed via Discoverable
property and not when discovery client set it as that be considered
temporary just for the lifetime of the discovery. |
static void fuse_retrieve_end(struct fuse_conn *fc, struct fuse_req *req)
{
release_pages(req->pages, req->num_pages);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | 15fab63e1e57be9fdb5eec1bbc5916e9825e9acb | 324,542,562,474,302,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
Change pipe_buf_get() to return a bool indicating whether it succeeded
in raising the refcount of the page (if the thing in the pipe is a page).
This removes another mechanism for overflowing the page refcount. All
callers converted to handle a failure.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
reexec_in_user_namespace_wait (int pid, int options)
{
pid_t p;
int status;
p = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY (waitpid (pid, &status, 0));
if (p < 0)
return -1;
if (WIFEXITED (status))
return WEXITSTATUS (status);
if (WIFSIGNALED (status))
return 128 + WTERMSIG (status);
return -1;
} | 0 | [] | libpod | d400f0b5b2d68c4148a7c173e7fbbfd9b377a660 | 205,324,524,304,058,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | rootless: fix segfault when open fd >= FD_SETSIZE
if there are more than FD_SETSIZE open fds passed down to the Podman
process, the initialization code could crash as it attempts to store
them into a fd_set. Use an array of fd_set structs, each of them
holding only FD_SETSIZE file descriptors.
Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <[email protected]> |
static bool io_kill_timeouts(struct io_ring_ctx *ctx, struct task_struct *tsk,
struct files_struct *files)
{
struct io_kiocb *req, *tmp;
int canceled = 0;
spin_lock_irq(&ctx->completion_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(req, tmp, &ctx->timeout_list, timeout.list) {
if (io_match_task(req, tsk, files)) {
io_kill_timeout(req);
canceled++;
}
}
spin_unlock_irq(&ctx->completion_lock);
return canceled != 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-667"
] | linux | 3ebba796fa251d042be42b929a2d916ee5c34a49 | 107,457,227,321,676,520,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | io_uring: ensure that SQPOLL thread is started for exit
If we create it in a disabled state because IORING_SETUP_R_DISABLED is
set on ring creation, we need to ensure that we've kicked the thread if
we're exiting before it's been explicitly disabled. Otherwise we can run
into a deadlock where exit is waiting go park the SQPOLL thread, but the
SQPOLL thread itself is waiting to get a signal to start.
That results in the below trace of both tasks hung, waiting on each other:
INFO: task syz-executor458:8401 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Not tainted 5.11.0-next-20210226-syzkaller #0
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:syz-executor458 state:D stack:27536 pid: 8401 ppid: 8400 flags:0x00004004
Call Trace:
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:4324 [inline]
__schedule+0x90c/0x21a0 kernel/sched/core.c:5075
schedule+0xcf/0x270 kernel/sched/core.c:5154
schedule_timeout+0x1db/0x250 kernel/time/timer.c:1868
do_wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:85 [inline]
__wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:106 [inline]
wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:117 [inline]
wait_for_completion+0x168/0x270 kernel/sched/completion.c:138
io_sq_thread_park fs/io_uring.c:7115 [inline]
io_sq_thread_park+0xd5/0x130 fs/io_uring.c:7103
io_uring_cancel_task_requests+0x24c/0xd90 fs/io_uring.c:8745
__io_uring_files_cancel+0x110/0x230 fs/io_uring.c:8840
io_uring_files_cancel include/linux/io_uring.h:47 [inline]
do_exit+0x299/0x2a60 kernel/exit.c:780
do_group_exit+0x125/0x310 kernel/exit.c:922
__do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:933 [inline]
__se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:931 [inline]
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50 kernel/exit.c:931
do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x43e899
RSP: 002b:00007ffe89376d48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004af2f0 RCX: 000000000043e899
RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 00000000000000e7 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffffffffffc0 R09: 0000000010000000
R10: 0000000000008011 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004af2f0
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
INFO: task iou-sqp-8401:8402 can't die for more than 143 seconds.
task:iou-sqp-8401 state:D stack:30272 pid: 8402 ppid: 8400 flags:0x00004004
Call Trace:
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:4324 [inline]
__schedule+0x90c/0x21a0 kernel/sched/core.c:5075
schedule+0xcf/0x270 kernel/sched/core.c:5154
schedule_timeout+0x1db/0x250 kernel/time/timer.c:1868
do_wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:85 [inline]
__wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:106 [inline]
wait_for_common kernel/sched/completion.c:117 [inline]
wait_for_completion+0x168/0x270 kernel/sched/completion.c:138
io_sq_thread+0x27d/0x1ae0 fs/io_uring.c:6717
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:294
INFO: task iou-sqp-8401:8402 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> |
static inline void l2cap_state_change_and_error(struct l2cap_chan *chan,
int state, int err)
{
chan->state = state;
chan->ops->state_change(chan, chan->state, err);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | linux | e860d2c904d1a9f38a24eb44c9f34b8f915a6ea3 | 87,484,841,557,505,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | Bluetooth: Properly check L2CAP config option output buffer length
Validate the output buffer length for L2CAP config requests and responses
to avoid overflowing the stack buffer used for building the option blocks.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ben Seri <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
inline size_t ReducedOutputOffset(const int num_dims, const int* dims,
const int* index, const int num_axis,
const int* axis) {
if (num_dims == 0) {
return 0;
}
TFLITE_DCHECK(dims != nullptr);
TFLITE_DCHECK(index != nullptr);
size_t offset = 0;
for (int idx = 0; idx < num_dims; ++idx) {
// if we need to skip this axis
bool is_axis = false;
if (axis != nullptr) {
for (int axis_idx = 0; axis_idx < num_axis; ++axis_idx) {
if (idx == axis[axis_idx]) {
is_axis = true;
break;
}
}
}
if (!is_axis) {
offset = offset * static_cast<size_t>(dims[idx]) +
static_cast<size_t>(index[idx]);
}
}
return offset;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] | tensorflow | 8ee24e7949a203d234489f9da2c5bf45a7d5157d | 22,720,827,580,861,310,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 | [tflite] Ensure `MatchingDim` does not allow buffer overflow.
We check in `MatchingDim` that both arguments have the same dimensionality, however that is a `DCHECK` only enabled if building in debug mode. Hence, it could be possible to cause buffer overflows by passing in a tensor with larger dimensions as the second argument. To fix, we now make `MatchingDim` return the minimum of the two sizes.
A much better fix would be to return a status object but that requires refactoring a large part of the codebase for minor benefits.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 332526127
Change-Id: If627d0d2c80a685217b6e0d1e64b0872dbf1c5e4 |
u8 ath6kl_wmi_determine_user_priority(u8 *pkt, u32 layer2_pri)
{
struct iphdr *ip_hdr = (struct iphdr *) pkt;
u8 ip_pri;
/*
* Determine IPTOS priority
*
* IP-TOS - 8bits
* : DSCP(6-bits) ECN(2-bits)
* : DSCP - P2 P1 P0 X X X
* where (P2 P1 P0) form 802.1D
*/
ip_pri = ip_hdr->tos >> 5;
ip_pri &= 0x7;
if ((layer2_pri & 0x7) > ip_pri)
return (u8) layer2_pri & 0x7;
else
return ip_pri;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | linux | 5d6751eaff672ea77642e74e92e6c0ac7f9709ab | 273,674,522,667,875,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | ath6kl: add some bounds checking
The "ev->traffic_class" and "reply->ac" variables come from the network
and they're used as an offset into the wmi->stream_exist_for_ac[] array.
Those variables are u8 so they can be 0-255 but the stream_exist_for_ac[]
array only has WMM_NUM_AC (4) elements. We need to add a couple bounds
checks to prevent array overflows.
I also modified one existing check from "if (traffic_class > 3) {" to
"if (traffic_class >= WMM_NUM_AC) {" just to make them all consistent.
Fixes: bdcd81707973 (" Add ath6kl cleaned up driver")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> |
int crypt_set_data_offset(struct crypt_device *cd, uint64_t data_offset)
{
if (!cd)
return -EINVAL;
if (data_offset % (MAX_SECTOR_SIZE >> SECTOR_SHIFT)) {
log_err(cd, _("Data offset is not multiple of %u bytes."), MAX_SECTOR_SIZE);
return -EINVAL;
}
cd->data_offset = data_offset;
log_dbg(cd, "Data offset set to %" PRIu64 " (512-byte) sectors.", data_offset);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-345"
] | cryptsetup | 0113ac2d889c5322659ad0596d4cfc6da53e356c | 337,475,867,576,331,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | Fix CVE-2021-4122 - LUKS2 reencryption crash recovery attack
Fix possible attacks against data confidentiality through LUKS2 online
reencryption extension crash recovery.
An attacker can modify on-disk metadata to simulate decryption in
progress with crashed (unfinished) reencryption step and persistently
decrypt part of the LUKS device.
This attack requires repeated physical access to the LUKS device but
no knowledge of user passphrases.
The decryption step is performed after a valid user activates
the device with a correct passphrase and modified metadata.
There are no visible warnings for the user that such recovery happened
(except using the luksDump command). The attack can also be reversed
afterward (simulating crashed encryption from a plaintext) with
possible modification of revealed plaintext.
The problem was caused by reusing a mechanism designed for actual
reencryption operation without reassessing the security impact for new
encryption and decryption operations. While the reencryption requires
calculating and verifying both key digests, no digest was needed to
initiate decryption recovery if the destination is plaintext (no
encryption key). Also, some metadata (like encryption cipher) is not
protected, and an attacker could change it. Note that LUKS2 protects
visible metadata only when a random change occurs. It does not protect
against intentional modification but such modification must not cause
a violation of data confidentiality.
The fix introduces additional digest protection of reencryption
metadata. The digest is calculated from known keys and critical
reencryption metadata. Now an attacker cannot create correct metadata
digest without knowledge of a passphrase for used keyslots.
For more details, see LUKS2 On-Disk Format Specification version 1.1.0. |
static void svm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if (vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LME) {
if (!is_paging(vcpu) && (cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)) {
vcpu->arch.efer |= EFER_LMA;
svm->vmcb->save.efer |= EFER_LMA | EFER_LME;
}
if (is_paging(vcpu) && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)) {
vcpu->arch.efer &= ~EFER_LMA;
svm->vmcb->save.efer &= ~(EFER_LMA | EFER_LME);
}
}
#endif
vcpu->arch.cr0 = cr0;
if (!npt_enabled)
cr0 |= X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_WP;
/*
* re-enable caching here because the QEMU bios
* does not do it - this results in some delay at
* reboot
*/
if (kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED))
cr0 &= ~(X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_NW);
svm->vmcb->save.cr0 = cr0;
mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_CR);
update_cr0_intercept(svm);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-401"
] | linux | d80b64ff297e40c2b6f7d7abc1b3eba70d22a068 | 152,841,346,834,112,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 | KVM: SVM: Fix potential memory leak in svm_cpu_init()
When kmalloc memory for sd->sev_vmcbs failed, we forget to free the page
held by sd->save_area. Also get rid of the var r as '-ENOMEM' is actually
the only possible outcome here.
Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> |
int do_show(FILE *stream, const char *path_p, const struct stat *st,
acl_t acl, acl_t dacl)
{
struct name_list *acl_names = get_list(st, acl),
*first_acl_name = acl_names;
struct name_list *dacl_names = get_list(st, dacl),
*first_dacl_name = dacl_names;
int acl_names_width = max_name_length(acl_names);
int dacl_names_width = max_name_length(dacl_names);
acl_entry_t acl_ent;
acl_entry_t dacl_ent;
char acl_mask[ACL_PERMS+1], dacl_mask[ACL_PERMS+1];
int ret;
names_width = 8;
if (acl_names_width > names_width)
names_width = acl_names_width;
if (dacl_names_width > names_width)
names_width = dacl_names_width;
acl_mask[0] = '\0';
if (acl) {
acl_mask_perm_str(acl, acl_mask);
ret = acl_get_entry(acl, ACL_FIRST_ENTRY, &acl_ent);
if (ret == 0)
acl = NULL;
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
dacl_mask[0] = '\0';
if (dacl) {
acl_mask_perm_str(dacl, dacl_mask);
ret = acl_get_entry(dacl, ACL_FIRST_ENTRY, &dacl_ent);
if (ret == 0)
dacl = NULL;
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
}
fprintf(stream, "# file: %s\n", xquote(path_p, "\n\r"));
while (acl_names != NULL || dacl_names != NULL) {
acl_tag_t acl_tag, dacl_tag;
if (acl)
acl_get_tag_type(acl_ent, &acl_tag);
if (dacl)
acl_get_tag_type(dacl_ent, &dacl_tag);
if (acl && (!dacl || acl_tag < dacl_tag)) {
show_line(stream, &acl_names, acl, &acl_ent, acl_mask,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
continue;
} else if (dacl && (!acl || dacl_tag < acl_tag)) {
show_line(stream, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
&dacl_names, dacl, &dacl_ent, dacl_mask);
continue;
} else {
if (acl_tag == ACL_USER || acl_tag == ACL_GROUP) {
id_t *acl_id_p = NULL, *dacl_id_p = NULL;
if (acl_ent)
acl_id_p = acl_get_qualifier(acl_ent);
if (dacl_ent)
dacl_id_p = acl_get_qualifier(dacl_ent);
if (acl && (!dacl || *acl_id_p < *dacl_id_p)) {
show_line(stream, &acl_names, acl,
&acl_ent, acl_mask,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
continue;
} else if (dacl &&
(!acl || *dacl_id_p < *acl_id_p)) {
show_line(stream, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, &dacl_names, dacl,
&dacl_ent, dacl_mask);
continue;
}
}
show_line(stream, &acl_names, acl, &acl_ent, acl_mask,
&dacl_names, dacl, &dacl_ent, dacl_mask);
}
}
free_list(first_acl_name);
free_list(first_dacl_name);
return 0;
} | 0 | [] | acl | 63451a06b7484d220750ed8574d3ee84e156daf5 | 148,979,610,646,046,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 87 | Make sure that getfacl -R only calls stat(2) on symlinks when it needs to
This fixes http://oss.sgi.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=790
"getfacl follows symlinks, even without -L". |
httpLocalRequest(ObjectPtr object, int method, int from, int to,
HTTPRequestPtr requestor, void *closure)
{
if(object->requestor == NULL)
object->requestor = requestor;
if(!disableLocalInterface && urlIsSpecial(object->key, object->key_size))
return httpSpecialRequest(object, method, from, to,
requestor, closure);
if(method >= METHOD_POST) {
httpClientDiscardBody(requestor->connection);
httpClientError(requestor, 405, internAtom("Method not allowed"));
return 1;
}
/* objectFillFromDisk already did the real work but we have to
make sure we don't get into an infinite loop. */
if(object->flags & OBJECT_INITIAL) {
abortObject(object, 404, internAtom("Not found"));
}
object->age = current_time.tv_sec;
object->date = current_time.tv_sec;
object->flags &= ~OBJECT_VALIDATING;
notifyObject(object);
return 1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-617"
] | polipo | 0e2b44af619e46e365971ea52b97457bc0778cd3 | 103,354,406,527,151,680,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 | Try to read POST requests to local configuration interface correctly. |
PosibErr<void> Convert::init_norm_to(const Config & c, ParmStr in, ParmStr out)
{
String norm_form = c.retrieve("norm-form");
if ((!c.retrieve_bool("normalize") || norm_form == "none")
&& !c.retrieve_bool("norm-required"))
return init(c,in,out);
if (norm_form == "none" && c.retrieve_bool("norm-required"))
norm_form = "nfc";
RET_ON_ERR(setup(norm_tables_, &norm_tables_cache, &c, in));
RET_ON_ERR(setup(encode_c, &encode_cache, &c, out));
encode_ = encode_c.get();
NormTables::ToUni::const_iterator i = norm_tables_->to_uni.begin();
for (; i != norm_tables_->to_uni.end() && i->name != norm_form; ++i);
if (i == norm_tables_->to_uni.end())
return make_err(aerror_bad_value, "norm-form", norm_form, "one of none, nfd, nfc, or comp");
decode_s = new DecodeNormLookup(i->ptr);
decode_ = decode_s;
decode_->key = in;
decode_->key += ':';
decode_->key += i->name;
conv_ = 0;
return no_err;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | aspell | de29341638833ba7717bd6b5e6850998454b044b | 160,900,272,220,046,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 | Don't allow null-terminated UCS-2/4 strings using the original API.
Detect if the encoding is UCS-2/4 and the length is -1 in affected API
functions and refuse to convert the string. If the string ends up
being converted somehow, abort with an error message in DecodeDirect
and ConvDirect. To convert a null terminated string in
Decode/ConvDirect, a negative number corresponding to the width of the
underlying character type for the encoding is expected; for example,
if the encoding is "ucs-2" then a the size is expected to be -2.
Also fix a 1-3 byte over-read in DecodeDirect when reading UCS-2/4
strings when a size is provided (found by OSS-Fuzz).
Also fix a bug in DecodeDirect that caused DocumentChecker to return
the wrong offsets when working with UCS-2/4 strings. |
static int decode_locku(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct nfs_locku_res *res)
{
__be32 *p;
int status;
status = decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_LOCKU);
if (status != -EIO)
nfs_increment_lock_seqid(status, res->seqid);
if (status == 0) {
READ_BUF(NFS4_STATEID_SIZE);
COPYMEM(res->stateid.data, NFS4_STATEID_SIZE);
}
return status;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | linux | dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9 | 55,428,662,353,788,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> |
static CURLcode hsts_pull(struct Curl_easy *data, struct hsts *h)
{
/* if the HSTS read callback is set, use it */
if(data->set.hsts_read) {
CURLSTScode sc;
DEBUGASSERT(h);
do {
char buffer[MAX_HSTS_HOSTLEN + 1];
struct curl_hstsentry e;
e.name = buffer;
e.namelen = sizeof(buffer)-1;
e.includeSubDomains = FALSE; /* default */
e.expire[0] = 0;
e.name[0] = 0; /* just to make it clean */
sc = data->set.hsts_read(data, &e, data->set.hsts_read_userp);
if(sc == CURLSTS_OK) {
time_t expires;
CURLcode result;
if(!e.name[0])
/* bail out if no name was stored */
return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
if(e.expire[0])
expires = Curl_getdate_capped(e.expire);
else
expires = TIME_T_MAX; /* the end of time */
result = hsts_create(h, e.name,
/* bitfield to bool conversion: */
e.includeSubDomains ? TRUE : FALSE,
expires);
if(result)
return result;
}
else if(sc == CURLSTS_FAIL)
return CURLE_ABORTED_BY_CALLBACK;
} while(sc == CURLSTS_OK);
}
return CURLE_OK;
} | 0 | [] | curl | fae6fea209a2d4db1582f608bd8cc8000721733a | 270,234,893,250,522,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 38 | hsts: ignore trailing dots when comparing hosts names
CVE-2022-30115
Reported-by: Axel Chong
Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-30115.html
Closes #8821 |
bracketed_paste(paste_mode_T mode, int drop, garray_T *gap)
{
int c;
char_u buf[NUMBUFLEN + MB_MAXBYTES];
int idx = 0;
char_u *end = find_termcode((char_u *)"PE");
int ret_char = -1;
int save_allow_keys = allow_keys;
int save_paste = p_paste;
// If the end code is too long we can't detect it, read everything.
if (end != NULL && STRLEN(end) >= NUMBUFLEN)
end = NULL;
++no_mapping;
allow_keys = 0;
if (!p_paste)
// Also have the side effects of setting 'paste' to make it work much
// faster.
set_option_value((char_u *)"paste", TRUE, NULL, 0);
for (;;)
{
// When the end is not defined read everything there is.
if (end == NULL && vpeekc() == NUL)
break;
do
c = vgetc();
while (c == K_IGNORE || c == K_VER_SCROLLBAR || c == K_HOR_SCROLLBAR);
if (c == NUL || got_int || (ex_normal_busy > 0 && c == Ctrl_C))
// When CTRL-C was encountered the typeahead will be flushed and we
// won't get the end sequence. Except when using ":normal".
break;
if (has_mbyte)
idx += (*mb_char2bytes)(c, buf + idx);
else
buf[idx++] = c;
buf[idx] = NUL;
if (end != NULL && STRNCMP(buf, end, idx) == 0)
{
if (end[idx] == NUL)
break; // Found the end of paste code.
continue;
}
if (!drop)
{
switch (mode)
{
case PASTE_CMDLINE:
put_on_cmdline(buf, idx, TRUE);
break;
case PASTE_EX:
if (gap != NULL && ga_grow(gap, idx) == OK)
{
mch_memmove((char *)gap->ga_data + gap->ga_len,
buf, (size_t)idx);
gap->ga_len += idx;
}
break;
case PASTE_INSERT:
if (stop_arrow() == OK)
{
c = buf[0];
if (idx == 1 && (c == CAR || c == K_KENTER || c == NL))
ins_eol(c);
else
{
ins_char_bytes(buf, idx);
AppendToRedobuffLit(buf, idx);
}
}
break;
case PASTE_ONE_CHAR:
if (ret_char == -1)
{
if (has_mbyte)
ret_char = (*mb_ptr2char)(buf);
else
ret_char = buf[0];
}
break;
}
}
idx = 0;
}
--no_mapping;
allow_keys = save_allow_keys;
if (!save_paste)
set_option_value((char_u *)"paste", FALSE, NULL, 0);
return ret_char;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-122",
"CWE-787"
] | vim | 806d037671e133bd28a7864248763f643967973a | 254,669,502,955,167,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 96 | patch 8.2.4218: illegal memory access with bracketed paste in Ex mode
Problem: Illegal memory access with bracketed paste in Ex mode.
Solution: Reserve space for the trailing NUL. |
alloc_free_clump(clump_t * cp, gs_ref_memory_t * mem)
{
gs_memory_t *parent = mem->non_gc_memory;
byte *cdata = (byte *)cp->chead;
ulong csize = (byte *)cp->cend - cdata;
alloc_unlink_clump(cp, mem);
mem->allocated -= st_clump.ssize;
if (mem->cfreed.cp == cp)
mem->cfreed.cp = 0;
if (cp->outer == 0) {
mem->allocated -= csize;
gs_free_object(parent, cdata, "alloc_free_clump(data)");
} else {
cp->outer->inner_count--;
gs_alloc_fill(cdata, gs_alloc_fill_free, csize);
}
gs_free_object(parent, cp, "alloc_free_clump(clump struct)");
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | ghostpdl | cfde94be1d4286bc47633c6e6eaf4e659bd78066 | 315,583,272,103,765,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | Bug 697985: bounds check the array allocations methods
The clump allocator has four allocation functions that use 'number of elements'
and 'size of elements' parameters (rather than a simple 'number of bytes').
Those need specific bounds checking. |
static int on_fcn_delete (RAnal *_anal, void* _user, RAnalFunction *fcn) {
RCore *core = (RCore*)_user;
const char *cmd = r_config_get (core->config, "cmd.fcn.delete");
if (cmd && *cmd) {
ut64 oaddr = core->offset;
ut64 addr = fcn->addr;
r_core_seek (core, addr, 1);
r_core_cmd0 (core, cmd);
r_core_seek (core, oaddr, 1);
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-415",
"CWE-703"
] | radare2 | cb8b683758edddae2d2f62e8e63a738c39f92683 | 281,843,144,130,837,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | Fix #16303 - c->table_query double free (#16318) |
cifs_sync_mid_result(struct mid_q_entry *mid, struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
{
int rc = 0;
cFYI(1, "%s: cmd=%d mid=%llu state=%d", __func__,
le16_to_cpu(mid->command), mid->mid, mid->mid_state);
spin_lock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
switch (mid->mid_state) {
case MID_RESPONSE_RECEIVED:
spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
return rc;
case MID_RETRY_NEEDED:
rc = -EAGAIN;
break;
case MID_RESPONSE_MALFORMED:
rc = -EIO;
break;
case MID_SHUTDOWN:
rc = -EHOSTDOWN;
break;
default:
list_del_init(&mid->qhead);
cERROR(1, "%s: invalid mid state mid=%llu state=%d", __func__,
mid->mid, mid->mid_state);
rc = -EIO;
}
spin_unlock(&GlobalMid_Lock);
DeleteMidQEntry(mid);
return rc;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-362"
] | linux | ea702b80e0bbb2448e201472127288beb82ca2fe | 27,841,985,122,826,427,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 | cifs: move check for NULL socket into smb_send_rqst
Cai reported this oops:
[90701.616664] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000028
[90701.625438] IP: [<ffffffff814a343e>] kernel_setsockopt+0x2e/0x60
[90701.632167] PGD fea319067 PUD 103fda4067 PMD 0
[90701.637255] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[90701.640878] Modules linked in: des_generic md4 nls_utf8 cifs dns_resolver binfmt_misc tun sg igb iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support lpc_ich pcspkr i2c_i801 i2c_core i7core_edac edac_core ioatdma dca mfd_core coretemp kvm_intel kvm crc32c_intel microcode sr_mod cdrom ata_generic sd_mod pata_acpi crc_t10dif ata_piix libata megaraid_sas dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[90701.677655] CPU 10
[90701.679808] Pid: 9627, comm: ls Tainted: G W 3.7.1+ #10 QCI QSSC-S4R/QSSC-S4R
[90701.688950] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814a343e>] [<ffffffff814a343e>] kernel_setsockopt+0x2e/0x60
[90701.698383] RSP: 0018:ffff88177b431bb8 EFLAGS: 00010206
[90701.704309] RAX: ffff88177b431fd8 RBX: 00007ffffffff000 RCX: ffff88177b431bec
[90701.712271] RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000006 RDI: 0000000000000000
[90701.720223] RBP: ffff88177b431bc8 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000000
[90701.728185] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001
[90701.736147] R13: ffff88184ef92000 R14: 0000000000000023 R15: ffff88177b431c88
[90701.744109] FS: 00007fd56a1a47c0(0000) GS:ffff88105fc40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[90701.753137] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[90701.759550] CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 000000104f15f000 CR4: 00000000000007e0
[90701.767512] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[90701.775465] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[90701.783428] Process ls (pid: 9627, threadinfo ffff88177b430000, task ffff88185ca4cb60)
[90701.792261] Stack:
[90701.794505] 0000000000000023 ffff88177b431c50 ffff88177b431c38 ffffffffa014fcb1
[90701.802809] ffff88184ef921bc 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff ffff88184ef921c0
[90701.811123] ffff88177b431c08 ffffffff815ca3d9 ffff88177b431c18 ffff880857758000
[90701.819433] Call Trace:
[90701.822183] [<ffffffffa014fcb1>] smb_send_rqst+0x71/0x1f0 [cifs]
[90701.828991] [<ffffffff815ca3d9>] ? schedule+0x29/0x70
[90701.834736] [<ffffffffa014fe6d>] smb_sendv+0x3d/0x40 [cifs]
[90701.841062] [<ffffffffa014fe96>] smb_send+0x26/0x30 [cifs]
[90701.847291] [<ffffffffa015801f>] send_nt_cancel+0x6f/0xd0 [cifs]
[90701.854102] [<ffffffffa015075e>] SendReceive+0x18e/0x360 [cifs]
[90701.860814] [<ffffffffa0134a78>] CIFSFindFirst+0x1a8/0x3f0 [cifs]
[90701.867724] [<ffffffffa013f731>] ? build_path_from_dentry+0xf1/0x260 [cifs]
[90701.875601] [<ffffffffa013f731>] ? build_path_from_dentry+0xf1/0x260 [cifs]
[90701.883477] [<ffffffffa01578e6>] cifs_query_dir_first+0x26/0x30 [cifs]
[90701.890869] [<ffffffffa015480d>] initiate_cifs_search+0xed/0x250 [cifs]
[90701.898354] [<ffffffff81195970>] ? fillonedir+0x100/0x100
[90701.904486] [<ffffffffa01554cb>] cifs_readdir+0x45b/0x8f0 [cifs]
[90701.911288] [<ffffffff81195970>] ? fillonedir+0x100/0x100
[90701.917410] [<ffffffff81195970>] ? fillonedir+0x100/0x100
[90701.923533] [<ffffffff81195970>] ? fillonedir+0x100/0x100
[90701.929657] [<ffffffff81195848>] vfs_readdir+0xb8/0xe0
[90701.935490] [<ffffffff81195b9f>] sys_getdents+0x8f/0x110
[90701.941521] [<ffffffff815d3b99>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[90701.948222] Code: 66 90 55 65 48 8b 04 25 f0 c6 00 00 48 89 e5 53 48 83 ec 08 83 fe 01 48 8b 98 48 e0 ff ff 48 c7 80 48 e0 ff ff ff ff ff ff 74 22 <48> 8b 47 28 ff 50 68 65 48 8b 14 25 f0 c6 00 00 48 89 9a 48 e0
[90701.970313] RIP [<ffffffff814a343e>] kernel_setsockopt+0x2e/0x60
[90701.977125] RSP <ffff88177b431bb8>
[90701.981018] CR2: 0000000000000028
[90701.984809] ---[ end trace 24bd602971110a43 ]---
This is likely due to a race vs. a reconnection event.
The current code checks for a NULL socket in smb_send_kvec, but that's
too late. By the time that check is done, the socket will already have
been passed to kernel_setsockopt. Move the check into smb_send_rqst, so
that it's checked earlier.
In truth, this is a bit of a half-assed fix. The -ENOTSOCK error
return here looks like it could bubble back up to userspace. The locking
rules around the ssocket pointer are really unclear as well. There are
cases where the ssocket pointer is changed without holding the srv_mutex,
but I'm not clear whether there's a potential race here yet or not.
This code seems like it could benefit from some fundamental re-think of
how the socket handling should behave. Until then though, this patch
should at least fix the above oops in most cases.
Cc: <[email protected]> # 3.7+
Reported-and-Tested-by: CAI Qian <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <[email protected]> |
static void qeth_check_outbound_queue(struct qeth_qdio_out_q *queue)
{
int index;
int flush_cnt = 0;
int q_was_packing = 0;
/*
* check if weed have to switch to non-packing mode or if
* we have to get a pci flag out on the queue
*/
if ((atomic_read(&queue->used_buffers) <= QETH_LOW_WATERMARK_PACK) ||
!atomic_read(&queue->set_pci_flags_count)) {
if (atomic_xchg(&queue->state, QETH_OUT_Q_LOCKED_FLUSH) ==
QETH_OUT_Q_UNLOCKED) {
/*
* If we get in here, there was no action in
* do_send_packet. So, we check if there is a
* packing buffer to be flushed here.
*/
netif_stop_queue(queue->card->dev);
index = queue->next_buf_to_fill;
q_was_packing = queue->do_pack;
/* queue->do_pack may change */
barrier();
flush_cnt += qeth_switch_to_nonpacking_if_needed(queue);
if (!flush_cnt &&
!atomic_read(&queue->set_pci_flags_count))
flush_cnt +=
qeth_flush_buffers_on_no_pci(queue);
if (queue->card->options.performance_stats &&
q_was_packing)
queue->card->perf_stats.bufs_sent_pack +=
flush_cnt;
if (flush_cnt)
qeth_flush_buffers(queue, index, flush_cnt);
atomic_set(&queue->state, QETH_OUT_Q_UNLOCKED);
}
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-119"
] | linux | 6fb392b1a63ae36c31f62bc3fc8630b49d602b62 | 90,764,526,753,879,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 39 | qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
static int kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_pit_state *ps)
{
int r = 0;
memcpy(ps, &kvm->arch.vpit->pit_state, sizeof(struct kvm_pit_state));
return r;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | linux-2.6 | 59839dfff5eabca01cc4e20b45797a60a80af8cb | 81,269,471,559,339,290,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | KVM: x86: check for cr3 validity in ioctl_set_sregs
Matt T. Yourst notes that kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs lacks validity
checking for the new cr3 value:
"Userspace callers of KVM_SET_SREGS can pass a bogus value of cr3 to
the kernel. This will trigger a NULL pointer access in gfn_to_rmap()
when userspace next tries to call KVM_RUN on the affected VCPU and kvm
attempts to activate the new non-existent page table root.
This happens since kvm only validates that cr3 points to a valid guest
physical memory page when code *inside* the guest sets cr3. However, kvm
currently trusts the userspace caller (e.g. QEMU) on the host machine to
always supply a valid page table root, rather than properly validating
it along with the rest of the reloaded guest state."
http://sourceforge.net/tracker/?func=detail&atid=893831&aid=2687641&group_id=180599
Check for a valid cr3 address in kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs, triple
fault in case of failure.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]> |
XML_GetErrorCode(XML_Parser parser)
{
return errorCode;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | libexpat | ba0f9c3b40c264b8dd392e02a7a060a8fa54f032 | 256,605,997,451,954,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | CVE-2015-1283 Sanity check size calculations. r=peterv, a=abillings
https://sourceforge.net/p/expat/bugs/528/ |
static inline struct ucma_context *_ucma_find_context(int id,
struct ucma_file *file)
{
struct ucma_context *ctx;
ctx = idr_find(&ctx_idr, id);
if (!ctx)
ctx = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
else if (ctx->file != file)
ctx = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
return ctx;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] | linux | e6bd18f57aad1a2d1ef40e646d03ed0f2515c9e3 | 261,237,508,373,173,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | IB/security: Restrict use of the write() interface
The drivers/infiniband stack uses write() as a replacement for
bi-directional ioctl(). This is not safe. There are ways to
trigger write calls that result in the return structure that
is normally written to user space being shunted off to user
specified kernel memory instead.
For the immediate repair, detect and deny suspicious accesses to
the write API.
For long term, update the user space libraries and the kernel API
to something that doesn't present the same security vulnerabilities
(likely a structured ioctl() interface).
The impacted uAPI interfaces are generally only available if
hardware from drivers/infiniband is installed in the system.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
[ Expanded check to all known write() entry points ]
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <[email protected]> |
static int map_vdso(const struct vdso_image *image, bool calculate_addr)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
unsigned long addr, text_start;
int ret = 0;
static struct page *no_pages[] = {NULL};
static struct vm_special_mapping vvar_mapping = {
.name = "[vvar]",
.pages = no_pages,
};
if (calculate_addr) {
addr = vdso_addr(current->mm->start_stack,
image->size - image->sym_vvar_start);
} else {
addr = 0;
}
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
addr = get_unmapped_area(NULL, addr,
image->size - image->sym_vvar_start, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr)) {
ret = addr;
goto up_fail;
}
text_start = addr - image->sym_vvar_start;
current->mm->context.vdso = (void __user *)text_start;
/*
* MAYWRITE to allow gdb to COW and set breakpoints
*/
vma = _install_special_mapping(mm,
text_start,
image->size,
VM_READ|VM_EXEC|
VM_MAYREAD|VM_MAYWRITE|VM_MAYEXEC,
&image->text_mapping);
if (IS_ERR(vma)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(vma);
goto up_fail;
}
vma = _install_special_mapping(mm,
addr,
-image->sym_vvar_start,
VM_READ|VM_MAYREAD,
&vvar_mapping);
if (IS_ERR(vma)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(vma);
goto up_fail;
}
if (image->sym_vvar_page)
ret = remap_pfn_range(vma,
text_start + image->sym_vvar_page,
__pa_symbol(&__vvar_page) >> PAGE_SHIFT,
PAGE_SIZE,
PAGE_READONLY);
if (ret)
goto up_fail;
#ifdef CONFIG_HPET_TIMER
if (hpet_address && image->sym_hpet_page) {
ret = io_remap_pfn_range(vma,
text_start + image->sym_hpet_page,
hpet_address >> PAGE_SHIFT,
PAGE_SIZE,
pgprot_noncached(PAGE_READONLY));
if (ret)
goto up_fail;
}
#endif
up_fail:
if (ret)
current->mm->context.vdso = NULL;
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
return ret;
} | 0 | [] | linux | 394f56fe480140877304d342dec46d50dc823d46 | 262,147,911,809,404,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 87 | x86_64, vdso: Fix the vdso address randomization algorithm
The theory behind vdso randomization is that it's mapped at a random
offset above the top of the stack. To avoid wasting a page of
memory for an extra page table, the vdso isn't supposed to extend
past the lowest PMD into which it can fit. Other than that, the
address should be a uniformly distributed address that meets all of
the alignment requirements.
The current algorithm is buggy: the vdso has about a 50% probability
of being at the very end of a PMD. The current algorithm also has a
decent chance of failing outright due to incorrect handling of the
case where the top of the stack is near the top of its PMD.
This fixes the implementation. The paxtest estimate of vdso
"randomisation" improves from 11 bits to 18 bits. (Disclaimer: I
don't know what the paxtest code is actually calculating.)
It's worth noting that this algorithm is inherently biased: the vdso
is more likely to end up near the end of its PMD than near the
beginning. Ideally we would either nix the PMD sharing requirement
or jointly randomize the vdso and the stack to reduce the bias.
In the mean time, this is a considerable improvement with basically
no risk of compatibility issues, since the allowed outputs of the
algorithm are unchanged.
As an easy test, doing this:
for i in `seq 10000`
do grep -P vdso /proc/self/maps |cut -d- -f1
done |sort |uniq -d
used to produce lots of output (1445 lines on my most recent run).
A tiny subset looks like this:
7fffdfffe000
7fffe01fe000
7fffe05fe000
7fffe07fe000
7fffe09fe000
7fffe0bfe000
7fffe0dfe000
Note the suspicious fe000 endings. With the fix, I get a much more
palatable 76 repeated addresses.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]> |
static void jpeg2000_dec_cleanup(Jpeg2000DecoderContext *s)
{
int tileno, compno;
for (tileno = 0; tileno < s->numXtiles * s->numYtiles; tileno++) {
if (s->tile[tileno].comp) {
for (compno = 0; compno < s->ncomponents; compno++) {
Jpeg2000Component *comp = s->tile[tileno].comp + compno;
Jpeg2000CodingStyle *codsty = s->tile[tileno].codsty + compno;
ff_jpeg2000_cleanup(comp, codsty);
}
av_freep(&s->tile[tileno].comp);
}
}
av_freep(&s->tile);
s->numXtiles = s->numYtiles = 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | FFmpeg | 9a271a9368eaabf99e6c2046103acb33957e63b7 | 153,580,574,984,432,580,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | jpeg2000: check log2_cblk dimensions
Fixes out of array access
Fixes Ticket2895
Found-by: Piotr Bandurski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> |
Subsets and Splits