func
stringlengths 0
484k
| target
int64 0
1
| cwe
sequencelengths 0
4
| project
stringclasses 799
values | commit_id
stringlengths 40
40
| hash
float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
| size
int64 1
24k
| message
stringlengths 0
13.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
handle_trimrtc(CMD_Request *rx_message, CMD_Reply *tx_message)
{
int status;
status = RTC_Trim();
if (status) {
tx_message->status = htons(STT_SUCCESS);
} else {
tx_message->status = htons(STT_NORTC);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-189"
] | chrony | 7712455d9aa33d0db0945effaa07e900b85987b1 | 193,971,537,155,616,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | Fix buffer overflow when processing crafted command packets
When the length of the REQ_SUBNETS_ACCESSED, REQ_CLIENT_ACCESSES
command requests and the RPY_SUBNETS_ACCESSED, RPY_CLIENT_ACCESSES,
RPY_CLIENT_ACCESSES_BY_INDEX, RPY_MANUAL_LIST command replies is
calculated, the number of items stored in the packet is not validated.
A crafted command request/reply can be used to crash the server/client.
Only clients allowed by cmdallow (by default only localhost) can crash
the server.
With chrony versions 1.25 and 1.26 this bug has a smaller security
impact as the server requires the clients to be authenticated in order
to process the subnet and client accesses commands. In 1.27 and 1.28,
however, the invalid calculated length is included also in the
authentication check which may cause another crash. |
ep_release (struct inode *inode, struct file *fd)
{
struct ep_data *data = fd->private_data;
int value;
value = mutex_lock_interruptible(&data->lock);
if (value < 0)
return value;
/* clean up if this can be reopened */
if (data->state != STATE_EP_UNBOUND) {
data->state = STATE_EP_DISABLED;
data->desc.bDescriptorType = 0;
data->hs_desc.bDescriptorType = 0;
usb_ep_disable(data->ep);
}
mutex_unlock(&data->lock);
put_ep (data);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-763"
] | linux | 501e38a5531efbd77d5c73c0ba838a889bfc1d74 | 188,480,293,560,459,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | usb: gadget: clear related members when goto fail
dev->config and dev->hs_config and dev->dev need to be cleaned if
dev_config fails to avoid UAF.
Acked-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> |
void JOIN::get_prefix_cost_and_fanout(uint n_tables,
double *read_time_arg,
double *record_count_arg)
{
double record_count= 1;
double read_time= 0.0;
for (uint i= const_tables; i < n_tables + const_tables ; i++)
{
if (best_positions[i].records_read)
{
record_count= COST_MULT(record_count, best_positions[i].records_read);
read_time= COST_ADD(read_time, best_positions[i].read_time);
}
}
*read_time_arg= read_time;// + record_count / TIME_FOR_COMPARE;
*record_count_arg= record_count;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-89"
] | server | 5ba77222e9fe7af8ff403816b5338b18b342053c | 234,981,206,087,672,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | MDEV-21028 Server crashes in Query_arena::set_query_arena upon SELECT from view
if the view has algorithm=temptable it is not updatable,
so DEFAULT() for its fields is meaningless,
and thus it's NULL or 0/'' for NOT NULL columns. |
static void sasl_logcommand(sasl_session_t *p, myuser_t *mu, int level, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
char lbuf[BUFSIZE];
va_start(args, fmt);
vsnprintf(lbuf, BUFSIZE, fmt, args);
slog(level, "%s %s:%s %s", service_get_log_target(saslsvs), mu ? entity(mu)->name : "", p->uid, lbuf);
va_end(args);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-288"
] | atheme | de2ba3ca8f6c39b41431d989f3ac66002a487839 | 66,001,776,423,889,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | modules/saslserv/main: backport 7.3 commits for pending EID login
This backports commits 4e664c75d0b280a052eb & ceb0235695e6736ce2ab
from the master branch.
The IRCv3.1 SASL specification contains the following wording:
If the client completes registration (with CAP END, NICK, USER
and any other necessary messages) while the SASL authentication
is still in progress, the server SHOULD abort it and send a 906
numeric, then register the client without authentication.
We were relying on this behaviour (which was our mistake; it's a
SHOULD, not a MUST), which turned out to be implemented in every
IRC server daemon (that supports SASL) that we are aware of. This
means that if someone completes registration without having completed
an SASL negotiation, the SASL session would be aborted before the
client is introduced to the network. At that point, the session would
not exist and the client would not be logged in.
The InspIRCd developers changed this behaviour in the
inspircd/inspircd@407b2e004cf66e442771 commit. It no longer aborts
negotiation when a client prematurely completes registration.
This means that if the client is attempting a multi-step (challenge-
response) authentication mechanism, and that mechanism caches user
credentials at some point before completion, the client can pre-
maturely end negotiation and get logged in as that user.
Worse still, SASL impersonation lets the attacker set the authzid to
their intended victim, allowing them to login as anyone, even if they
don't have a challenge-response authentication credential configured.
This does not exist in version 7.1; the victim's account there has to
have such a credential to be vulnerable to this attack.
Vulnerable configurations are as follows:
- All of:
- InspIRCd 3+
- Any of:
- Atheme 7.1 (any version)
- Atheme 7.2 (any version before 7.2.12; this commit)
- Atheme 7.3 (any version before commit 4e664c75d0b280a052eb)
- Any of:
- The saslserv/scram module is loaded
- The saslserv/ecdh-x25519-challenge module is loaded
- The saslserv/ecdsa-nist256p-challenge module is loaded
This is a fix for a security vulnerability. The master (7.3) branch
was already fixed in 4e664c75d0b280a052eb, but the scope of the
problem was not fully known at that time. The 7.1 branch is no longer
supported, is not receiving security updates, and will not be patched;
users of the 7.1 series (using an IRCd that does not abort the SASL
session when the client prematurely completes registration) must
upgrade, or unload the `saslserv/ecdsa-nist256p-challenge` module.
This problem was discovered by and reported by @edk0. |
X509_EXTENSION *TS_TST_INFO_delete_ext(TS_TST_INFO *a, int loc)
{
return X509v3_delete_ext(a->extensions,loc);
} | 0 | [] | openssl | c7235be6e36c4bef84594aa3b2f0561db84b63d8 | 305,325,535,294,734,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | RFC 3161 compliant time stamp request creation, response generation
and response verification.
Submitted by: Zoltan Glozik <[email protected]>
Reviewed by: Ulf Moeller |
parse_args_recurse (int *argcp,
char ***argvp,
bool in_file,
int *total_parsed_argc_p)
{
SetupOp *op;
int argc = *argcp;
char **argv = *argvp;
/* I can't imagine a case where someone wants more than this.
* If you do...you should be able to pass multiple files
* via a single tmpfs and linking them there, etc.
*
* We're adding this hardening due to precedent from
* http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2014/08/the-poisoned-nul-byte-2014-edition.html
*
* I picked 9000 because the Internet told me to and it was hard to
* resist.
*/
static const uint32_t MAX_ARGS = 9000;
if (*total_parsed_argc_p > MAX_ARGS)
die ("Exceeded maximum number of arguments %u", MAX_ARGS);
while (argc > 0)
{
const char *arg = argv[0];
if (strcmp (arg, "--help") == 0)
{
usage (EXIT_SUCCESS, stdout);
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--version") == 0)
{
printf ("%s\n", PACKAGE_STRING);
exit (0);
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--args") == 0)
{
int the_fd;
char *endptr;
char *data, *p;
char *data_end;
size_t data_len;
cleanup_free char **data_argv = NULL;
char **data_argv_copy;
int data_argc;
int i;
if (in_file)
die ("--args not supported in arguments file");
if (argc < 2)
die ("--args takes an argument");
the_fd = strtol (argv[1], &endptr, 10);
if (argv[1][0] == 0 || endptr[0] != 0 || the_fd < 0)
die ("Invalid fd: %s", argv[1]);
data = load_file_data (the_fd, &data_len);
if (data == NULL)
die_with_error ("Can't read --args data");
data_end = data + data_len;
data_argc = 0;
p = data;
while (p != NULL && p < data_end)
{
data_argc++;
(*total_parsed_argc_p)++;
if (*total_parsed_argc_p > MAX_ARGS)
die ("Exceeded maximum number of arguments %u", MAX_ARGS);
p = memchr (p, 0, data_end - p);
if (p != NULL)
p++;
}
data_argv = xcalloc (sizeof (char *) * (data_argc + 1));
i = 0;
p = data;
while (p != NULL && p < data_end)
{
/* Note: load_file_data always adds a nul terminator, so this is safe
* even for the last string. */
data_argv[i++] = p;
p = memchr (p, 0, data_end - p);
if (p != NULL)
p++;
}
data_argv_copy = data_argv; /* Don't change data_argv, we need to free it */
parse_args_recurse (&data_argc, &data_argv_copy, TRUE, total_parsed_argc_p);
argv += 1;
argc -= 1;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--unshare-user") == 0)
{
opt_unshare_user = TRUE;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--unshare-user-try") == 0)
{
opt_unshare_user_try = TRUE;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--unshare-ipc") == 0)
{
opt_unshare_ipc = TRUE;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--unshare-pid") == 0)
{
opt_unshare_pid = TRUE;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--unshare-net") == 0)
{
opt_unshare_net = TRUE;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--unshare-uts") == 0)
{
opt_unshare_uts = TRUE;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--unshare-cgroup") == 0)
{
opt_unshare_cgroup = TRUE;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--unshare-cgroup-try") == 0)
{
opt_unshare_cgroup_try = TRUE;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--chdir") == 0)
{
if (argc < 2)
die ("--chdir takes one argument");
opt_chdir_path = argv[1];
argv++;
argc--;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--remount-ro") == 0)
{
SetupOp *op = setup_op_new (SETUP_REMOUNT_RO_NO_RECURSIVE);
op->dest = argv[1];
argv++;
argc--;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--bind") == 0)
{
if (argc < 3)
die ("--bind takes two arguments");
op = setup_op_new (SETUP_BIND_MOUNT);
op->source = argv[1];
op->dest = argv[2];
argv += 2;
argc -= 2;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--ro-bind") == 0)
{
if (argc < 3)
die ("--ro-bind takes two arguments");
op = setup_op_new (SETUP_RO_BIND_MOUNT);
op->source = argv[1];
op->dest = argv[2];
argv += 2;
argc -= 2;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--dev-bind") == 0)
{
if (argc < 3)
die ("--dev-bind takes two arguments");
op = setup_op_new (SETUP_DEV_BIND_MOUNT);
op->source = argv[1];
op->dest = argv[2];
argv += 2;
argc -= 2;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--proc") == 0)
{
if (argc < 2)
die ("--proc takes an argument");
op = setup_op_new (SETUP_MOUNT_PROC);
op->dest = argv[1];
argv += 1;
argc -= 1;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--exec-label") == 0)
{
if (argc < 2)
die ("--exec-label takes an argument");
opt_exec_label = argv[1];
die_unless_label_valid (opt_exec_label);
argv += 1;
argc -= 1;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--file-label") == 0)
{
if (argc < 2)
die ("--file-label takes an argument");
opt_file_label = argv[1];
die_unless_label_valid (opt_file_label);
if (label_create_file (opt_file_label))
die_with_error ("--file-label setup failed");
argv += 1;
argc -= 1;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--dev") == 0)
{
if (argc < 2)
die ("--dev takes an argument");
op = setup_op_new (SETUP_MOUNT_DEV);
op->dest = argv[1];
opt_needs_devpts = TRUE;
argv += 1;
argc -= 1;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--tmpfs") == 0)
{
if (argc < 2)
die ("--tmpfs takes an argument");
op = setup_op_new (SETUP_MOUNT_TMPFS);
op->dest = argv[1];
argv += 1;
argc -= 1;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--mqueue") == 0)
{
if (argc < 2)
die ("--mqueue takes an argument");
op = setup_op_new (SETUP_MOUNT_MQUEUE);
op->dest = argv[1];
argv += 1;
argc -= 1;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--dir") == 0)
{
if (argc < 2)
die ("--dir takes an argument");
op = setup_op_new (SETUP_MAKE_DIR);
op->dest = argv[1];
argv += 1;
argc -= 1;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--file") == 0)
{
int file_fd;
char *endptr;
if (argc < 3)
die ("--file takes two arguments");
file_fd = strtol (argv[1], &endptr, 10);
if (argv[1][0] == 0 || endptr[0] != 0 || file_fd < 0)
die ("Invalid fd: %s", argv[1]);
op = setup_op_new (SETUP_MAKE_FILE);
op->fd = file_fd;
op->dest = argv[2];
argv += 2;
argc -= 2;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--bind-data") == 0)
{
int file_fd;
char *endptr;
if (argc < 3)
die ("--bind-data takes two arguments");
file_fd = strtol (argv[1], &endptr, 10);
if (argv[1][0] == 0 || endptr[0] != 0 || file_fd < 0)
die ("Invalid fd: %s", argv[1]);
op = setup_op_new (SETUP_MAKE_BIND_FILE);
op->fd = file_fd;
op->dest = argv[2];
argv += 2;
argc -= 2;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--ro-bind-data") == 0)
{
int file_fd;
char *endptr;
if (argc < 3)
die ("--ro-bind-data takes two arguments");
file_fd = strtol (argv[1], &endptr, 10);
if (argv[1][0] == 0 || endptr[0] != 0 || file_fd < 0)
die ("Invalid fd: %s", argv[1]);
op = setup_op_new (SETUP_MAKE_RO_BIND_FILE);
op->fd = file_fd;
op->dest = argv[2];
argv += 2;
argc -= 2;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--symlink") == 0)
{
if (argc < 3)
die ("--symlink takes two arguments");
op = setup_op_new (SETUP_MAKE_SYMLINK);
op->source = argv[1];
op->dest = argv[2];
argv += 2;
argc -= 2;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--lock-file") == 0)
{
if (argc < 2)
die ("--lock-file takes an argument");
(void) lock_file_new (argv[1]);
argv += 1;
argc -= 1;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--sync-fd") == 0)
{
int the_fd;
char *endptr;
if (argc < 2)
die ("--sync-fd takes an argument");
the_fd = strtol (argv[1], &endptr, 10);
if (argv[1][0] == 0 || endptr[0] != 0 || the_fd < 0)
die ("Invalid fd: %s", argv[1]);
opt_sync_fd = the_fd;
argv += 1;
argc -= 1;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--block-fd") == 0)
{
int the_fd;
char *endptr;
if (argc < 2)
die ("--block-fd takes an argument");
the_fd = strtol (argv[1], &endptr, 10);
if (argv[1][0] == 0 || endptr[0] != 0 || the_fd < 0)
die ("Invalid fd: %s", argv[1]);
opt_block_fd = the_fd;
argv += 1;
argc -= 1;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--info-fd") == 0)
{
int the_fd;
char *endptr;
if (argc < 2)
die ("--info-fd takes an argument");
the_fd = strtol (argv[1], &endptr, 10);
if (argv[1][0] == 0 || endptr[0] != 0 || the_fd < 0)
die ("Invalid fd: %s", argv[1]);
opt_info_fd = the_fd;
argv += 1;
argc -= 1;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--seccomp") == 0)
{
int the_fd;
char *endptr;
if (argc < 2)
die ("--seccomp takes an argument");
the_fd = strtol (argv[1], &endptr, 10);
if (argv[1][0] == 0 || endptr[0] != 0 || the_fd < 0)
die ("Invalid fd: %s", argv[1]);
opt_seccomp_fd = the_fd;
argv += 1;
argc -= 1;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--setenv") == 0)
{
if (argc < 3)
die ("--setenv takes two arguments");
xsetenv (argv[1], argv[2], 1);
argv += 2;
argc -= 2;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--unsetenv") == 0)
{
if (argc < 2)
die ("--unsetenv takes an argument");
xunsetenv (argv[1]);
argv += 1;
argc -= 1;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--uid") == 0)
{
int the_uid;
char *endptr;
if (argc < 2)
die ("--uid takes an argument");
the_uid = strtol (argv[1], &endptr, 10);
if (argv[1][0] == 0 || endptr[0] != 0 || the_uid < 0)
die ("Invalid uid: %s", argv[1]);
opt_sandbox_uid = the_uid;
argv += 1;
argc -= 1;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--gid") == 0)
{
int the_gid;
char *endptr;
if (argc < 2)
die ("--gid takes an argument");
the_gid = strtol (argv[1], &endptr, 10);
if (argv[1][0] == 0 || endptr[0] != 0 || the_gid < 0)
die ("Invalid gid: %s", argv[1]);
opt_sandbox_gid = the_gid;
argv += 1;
argc -= 1;
}
else if (strcmp (arg, "--hostname") == 0)
{
if (argc < 2)
die ("--hostname takes an argument");
op = setup_op_new (SETUP_SET_HOSTNAME);
op->dest = argv[1];
op->flags = NO_CREATE_DEST;
opt_sandbox_hostname = argv[1];
argv += 1;
argc -= 1;
}
else if (*arg == '-')
{
die ("Unknown option %s", arg);
}
else
{
break;
}
argv++;
argc--;
}
*argcp = argc;
*argvp = argv;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-703"
] | bubblewrap | d7fc532c42f0e9bf427923bab85433282b3e5117 | 72,004,916,427,246,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 491 | Call setsid() before executing sandboxed code (CVE-2017-5226)
This prevents the sandboxed code from getting a controlling tty,
which in turn prevents it from accessing the TIOCSTI ioctl and hence
faking terminal input.
Fixes: #142
Closes: #143
Approved by: cgwalters |
GC_INNER void * GC_generic_malloc_ignore_off_page(size_t lb, int k)
{
void *result;
size_t lg;
size_t lb_rounded;
word n_blocks;
GC_bool init;
DCL_LOCK_STATE;
if (SMALL_OBJ(lb))
return(GC_generic_malloc((word)lb, k));
lg = ROUNDED_UP_GRANULES(lb);
lb_rounded = GRANULES_TO_BYTES(lg);
n_blocks = OBJ_SZ_TO_BLOCKS(lb_rounded);
init = GC_obj_kinds[k].ok_init;
if (EXPECT(GC_have_errors, FALSE))
GC_print_all_errors();
GC_INVOKE_FINALIZERS();
LOCK();
result = (ptr_t)GC_alloc_large(ADD_SLOP(lb), k, IGNORE_OFF_PAGE);
if (0 != result) {
if (GC_debugging_started) {
BZERO(result, n_blocks * HBLKSIZE);
} else {
# ifdef THREADS
/* Clear any memory that might be used for GC descriptors */
/* before we release the lock. */
((word *)result)[0] = 0;
((word *)result)[1] = 0;
((word *)result)[GRANULES_TO_WORDS(lg)-1] = 0;
((word *)result)[GRANULES_TO_WORDS(lg)-2] = 0;
# endif
}
}
GC_bytes_allocd += lb_rounded;
if (0 == result) {
GC_oom_func oom_fn = GC_oom_fn;
UNLOCK();
return((*oom_fn)(lb));
} else {
UNLOCK();
if (init && !GC_debugging_started) {
BZERO(result, n_blocks * HBLKSIZE);
}
return(result);
}
} | 1 | [
"CWE-189"
] | bdwgc | be9df82919960214ee4b9d3313523bff44fd99e1 | 258,070,966,497,703,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 47 | Fix allocation size overflows due to rounding.
* malloc.c (GC_generic_malloc): Check if the allocation size is
rounded to a smaller value.
* mallocx.c (GC_generic_malloc_ignore_off_page): Likewise. |
virNodeDeviceGetPCIDynamicCaps(const char *sysfsPath,
virNodeDevCapPCIDevPtr pci_dev)
{
if (virNodeDeviceGetPCISRIOVCaps(sysfsPath, pci_dev) < 0 ||
virNodeDeviceGetPCIIOMMUGroupCaps(pci_dev) < 0)
return -1;
pci_dev->flags &= ~VIR_NODE_DEV_CAP_FLAG_PCI_MDEV;
if (virNodeDeviceGetMdevTypesCaps(sysfsPath,
&pci_dev->mdev_types,
&pci_dev->nmdev_types) < 0)
return -1;
if (pci_dev->nmdev_types > 0)
pci_dev->flags |= VIR_NODE_DEV_CAP_FLAG_PCI_MDEV;
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | libvirt | 4c4d0e2da07b5a035b26a0ff13ec27070f7c7b1a | 192,017,057,483,285,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | conf: Fix segfault when parsing mdev types
Commit f1b0890 introduced a potential crash due to incorrect operator
precedence when accessing an element from a pointer to an array.
Backtrace below:
#0 virNodeDeviceGetMdevTypesCaps (sysfspath=0x7fff801661e0 "/sys/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:02.0", mdev_types=0x7fff801c9b40, nmdev_types=0x7fff801c9b48) at ../src/conf/node_device_conf.c:2676
#1 0x00007ffff7caf53d in virNodeDeviceGetPCIDynamicCaps (sysfsPath=0x7fff801661e0 "/sys/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:02.0", pci_dev=0x7fff801c9ac8) at ../src/conf/node_device_conf.c:2705
#2 0x00007ffff7cae38f in virNodeDeviceUpdateCaps (def=0x7fff80168a10) at ../src/conf/node_device_conf.c:2342
#3 0x00007ffff7cb11c0 in virNodeDeviceObjMatch (obj=0x7fff84002e50, flags=0) at ../src/conf/virnodedeviceobj.c:850
#4 0x00007ffff7cb153d in virNodeDeviceObjListExportCallback (payload=0x7fff84002e50, name=0x7fff801cbc20 "pci_0000_00_02_0", opaque=0x7fffe2ffc6a0) at ../src/conf/virnodedeviceobj.c:909
#5 0x00007ffff7b69146 in virHashForEach (table=0x7fff9814b700 = {...}, iter=0x7ffff7cb149e <virNodeDeviceObjListExportCallback>, opaque=0x7fffe2ffc6a0) at ../src/util/virhash.c:394
#6 0x00007ffff7cb1694 in virNodeDeviceObjListExport (conn=0x7fff98013170, devs=0x7fff98154430, devices=0x7fffe2ffc798, filter=0x7ffff7cf47a1 <virConnectListAllNodeDevicesCheckACL>, flags=0)
at ../src/conf/virnodedeviceobj.c:943
#7 0x00007fffe00694b2 in nodeConnectListAllNodeDevices (conn=0x7fff98013170, devices=0x7fffe2ffc798, flags=0) at ../src/node_device/node_device_driver.c:228
#8 0x00007ffff7e703aa in virConnectListAllNodeDevices (conn=0x7fff98013170, devices=0x7fffe2ffc798, flags=0) at ../src/libvirt-nodedev.c:130
#9 0x000055555557f796 in remoteDispatchConnectListAllNodeDevices (server=0x555555627080, client=0x5555556bf050, msg=0x5555556c0000, rerr=0x7fffe2ffc8a0, args=0x7fffd4008470, ret=0x7fffd40084e0)
at src/remote/remote_daemon_dispatch_stubs.h:1613
#10 0x000055555557f6f9 in remoteDispatchConnectListAllNodeDevicesHelper (server=0x555555627080, client=0x5555556bf050, msg=0x5555556c0000, rerr=0x7fffe2ffc8a0, args=0x7fffd4008470, ret=0x7fffd40084e0)
at src/remote/remote_daemon_dispatch_stubs.h:1591
#11 0x00007ffff7ce9542 in virNetServerProgramDispatchCall (prog=0x555555690c10, server=0x555555627080, client=0x5555556bf050, msg=0x5555556c0000) at ../src/rpc/virnetserverprogram.c:428
#12 0x00007ffff7ce90bd in virNetServerProgramDispatch (prog=0x555555690c10, server=0x555555627080, client=0x5555556bf050, msg=0x5555556c0000) at ../src/rpc/virnetserverprogram.c:302
#13 0x00007ffff7cf042b in virNetServerProcessMsg (srv=0x555555627080, client=0x5555556bf050, prog=0x555555690c10, msg=0x5555556c0000) at ../src/rpc/virnetserver.c:137
#14 0x00007ffff7cf04eb in virNetServerHandleJob (jobOpaque=0x5555556b66b0, opaque=0x555555627080) at ../src/rpc/virnetserver.c:154
#15 0x00007ffff7bd912f in virThreadPoolWorker (opaque=0x55555562bc70) at ../src/util/virthreadpool.c:163
#16 0x00007ffff7bd8645 in virThreadHelper (data=0x55555562bc90) at ../src/util/virthread.c:233
#17 0x00007ffff6d90432 in start_thread () at /lib64/libpthread.so.0
#18 0x00007ffff75c5913 in clone () at /lib64/libc.so.6
Signed-off-by: Jonathon Jongsma <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ján Tomko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ján Tomko <[email protected]> |
static void iwl_fw_dump_rxf(struct iwl_fw_runtime *fwrt,
struct iwl_fw_error_dump_data **dump_data)
{
struct iwl_fwrt_shared_mem_cfg *cfg = &fwrt->smem_cfg;
unsigned long flags;
IWL_DEBUG_INFO(fwrt, "WRT RX FIFO dump\n");
if (!iwl_trans_grab_nic_access(fwrt->trans, &flags))
return;
if (iwl_fw_dbg_type_on(fwrt, IWL_FW_ERROR_DUMP_RXF)) {
/* Pull RXF1 */
iwl_fwrt_dump_rxf(fwrt, dump_data,
cfg->lmac[0].rxfifo1_size, 0, 0);
/* Pull RXF2 */
iwl_fwrt_dump_rxf(fwrt, dump_data, cfg->rxfifo2_size,
RXF_DIFF_FROM_PREV +
fwrt->trans->trans_cfg->umac_prph_offset, 1);
/* Pull LMAC2 RXF1 */
if (fwrt->smem_cfg.num_lmacs > 1)
iwl_fwrt_dump_rxf(fwrt, dump_data,
cfg->lmac[1].rxfifo1_size,
LMAC2_PRPH_OFFSET, 2);
}
iwl_trans_release_nic_access(fwrt->trans, &flags);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-401"
] | linux | b4b814fec1a5a849383f7b3886b654a13abbda7d | 286,905,344,522,986,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 | iwlwifi: dbg_ini: fix memory leak in alloc_sgtable
In alloc_sgtable if alloc_page fails, the alocated table should be
released.
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <[email protected]> |
int imap_path_status(const char *path, bool queue)
{
struct Mailbox *m = mx_mbox_find2(path);
const bool is_temp = !m;
if (is_temp)
{
m = mx_path_resolve(path);
if (!mx_mbox_ac_link(m))
{
mailbox_free(&m);
return 0;
}
}
int rc = imap_mailbox_status(m, queue);
if (is_temp)
{
mx_ac_remove(m);
}
return rc;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-522",
"CWE-287",
"CWE-755"
] | neomutt | 9c36717a3e2af1f2c1b7242035455ec8112b4b06 | 3,344,936,611,163,101,500,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 | imap: close connection on all failures
Thanks to Gabriel Salles-Loustau for spotting the problem.
Co-authored-by: Kevin McCarthy <[email protected]> |
static void xen_load_tls(struct thread_struct *t, unsigned int cpu)
{
/*
* In lazy mode we need to zero %fs, otherwise we may get an
* exception between the new %fs descriptor being loaded and
* %fs being effectively cleared at __switch_to().
*/
if (paravirt_get_lazy_mode() == PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU)
loadsegment(fs, 0);
xen_mc_batch();
load_TLS_descriptor(t, cpu, 0);
load_TLS_descriptor(t, cpu, 1);
load_TLS_descriptor(t, cpu, 2);
xen_mc_issue(PARAVIRT_LAZY_CPU);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | linux | 96e8fc5818686d4a1591bb6907e7fdb64ef29884 | 162,501,614,756,959,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | x86/xen: Use clear_bss() for Xen PV guests
Instead of clearing the bss area in assembly code, use the clear_bss()
function.
This requires to pass the start_info address as parameter to
xen_start_kernel() in order to avoid the xen_start_info being zeroed
again.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] |
void X509Certificate::CheckIP(const FunctionCallbackInfo<Value>& args) {
Environment* env = Environment::GetCurrent(args);
X509Certificate* cert;
ASSIGN_OR_RETURN_UNWRAP(&cert, args.Holder());
CHECK(args[0]->IsString()); // IP
CHECK(args[1]->IsUint32()); // flags
Utf8Value name(env->isolate(), args[0]);
uint32_t flags = args[1].As<Uint32>()->Value();
switch (X509_check_ip_asc(cert->get(), *name, flags)) {
case 1: // Match!
return args.GetReturnValue().Set(args[0]);
case 0: // No Match!
return; // No return value is set
case -2: // Error!
return THROW_ERR_INVALID_ARG_VALUE(env, "Invalid IP");
default: // Error!
return THROW_ERR_CRYPTO_OPERATION_FAILED(env);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-295"
] | node | 466e5415a2b7b3574ab5403acb87e89a94a980d1 | 101,588,073,565,614,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | crypto,tls: implement safe x509 GeneralName format
This change introduces JSON-compatible escaping rules for strings that
include X.509 GeneralName components (see RFC 5280). This non-standard
format avoids ambiguities and prevents injection attacks that could
previously lead to X.509 certificates being accepted even though they
were not valid for the target hostname.
These changes affect the format of subject alternative names and the
format of authority information access. The checkServerIdentity function
has been modified to safely handle the new format, eliminating the
possibility of injecting subject alternative names into the verification
logic.
Because each subject alternative name is only encoded as a JSON string
literal if necessary for security purposes, this change will only be
visible in rare cases.
This addresses CVE-2021-44532.
CVE-ID: CVE-2021-44532
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/300
Reviewed-By: Michael Dawson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-By: Rich Trott <[email protected]> |
NTSTATUS smb_vfs_call_get_dfs_referrals(struct vfs_handle_struct *handle,
struct dfs_GetDFSReferral *r)
{
VFS_FIND(get_dfs_referrals);
return handle->fns->get_dfs_referrals_fn(handle, r);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-264"
] | samba | 4278ef25f64d5fdbf432ff1534e275416ec9561e | 338,562,517,177,365,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | CVE-2015-5252: s3: smbd: Fix symlink verification (file access outside the share).
Ensure matching component ends in '/' or '\0'.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11395
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke <[email protected]> |
static int io_remove_personalities(int id, void *p, void *data)
{
struct io_ring_ctx *ctx = data;
const struct cred *cred;
cred = idr_remove(&ctx->personality_idr, id);
if (cred)
put_cred(cred);
return 0;
} | 0 | [] | linux | ff002b30181d30cdfbca316dadd099c3ca0d739c | 182,576,214,243,739,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | io_uring: grab ->fs as part of async preparation
This passes it in to io-wq, so it assumes the right fs_struct when
executing async work that may need to do lookups.
Cc: [email protected] # 5.3+
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> |
TEST_P(ProxyProtocolTest, V1Basic) {
connect();
write("PROXY TCP4 1.2.3.4 253.253.253.253 65535 1234\r\nmore data");
expectData("more data");
EXPECT_EQ(server_connection_->remoteAddress()->ip()->addressAsString(), "1.2.3.4");
EXPECT_TRUE(server_connection_->localAddressRestored());
disconnect();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400"
] | envoy | dfddb529e914d794ac552e906b13d71233609bf7 | 193,447,458,607,042,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | listener: Add configurable accepted connection limits (#153)
Add support for per-listener limits on accepted connections.
Signed-off-by: Tony Allen <[email protected]> |
unsigned int getByteCounter() const { return byteCounter; } | 0 | [
"CWE-476",
"CWE-190"
] | poppler | 27354e9d9696ee2bc063910a6c9a6b27c5184a52 | 34,995,549,695,803,953,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 | JBIG2Stream: Fix crash on broken file
https://github.com/jeffssh/CVE-2021-30860
Thanks to David Warren for the heads up |
ofputil_decode_group_stats_request(const struct ofp_header *request,
uint32_t *group_id)
{
const struct ofp11_group_stats_request *gsr11 = ofpmsg_body(request);
*group_id = ntohl(gsr11->group_id);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-772"
] | ovs | 77ad4225d125030420d897c873e4734ac708c66b | 298,254,376,666,595,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | ofp-util: Fix memory leaks on error cases in ofputil_decode_group_mod().
Found by libFuzzer.
Reported-by: Bhargava Shastry <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <[email protected]> |
server_paint_rect(struct xrdp_mod* mod, int x, int y, int cx, int cy,
char* data, int width, int height, int srcx, int srcy)
{
struct xrdp_wm* wm;
struct xrdp_bitmap* b;
struct xrdp_painter* p;
p = (struct xrdp_painter*)(mod->painter);
if (p == 0)
{
return 0;
}
wm = (struct xrdp_wm*)(mod->wm);
b = xrdp_bitmap_create_with_data(width, height, wm->screen->bpp, data, wm);
xrdp_painter_copy(p, b, wm->screen, x, y, cx, cy, srcx, srcy);
xrdp_bitmap_delete(b);
return 0;
} | 0 | [] | xrdp | d8f9e8310dac362bb9578763d1024178f94f4ecc | 193,671,814,784,396,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | move temp files from /tmp to /tmp/.xrdp |
\param pos0 Starting index of the sublist.
\param pos1 Ending index of the sublist.
**/
CImgList<T> get_shared_images(const unsigned int pos0, const unsigned int pos1) {
if (pos0>pos1 || pos1>=_width)
throw CImgArgumentException(_cimglist_instance
"get_shared_images(): Specified sub-list indices (%u->%u) are out of bounds.",
cimglist_instance,
pos0,pos1);
CImgList<T> res(pos1 - pos0 + 1); | 0 | [
"CWE-770"
] | cimg | 619cb58dd90b4e03ac68286c70ed98acbefd1c90 | 93,709,601,974,686,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | CImg<>::load_bmp() and CImg<>::load_pandore(): Check that dimensions encoded in file does not exceed file size. |
static bool check_rule(
const char* topic_name,
const Rule& rule,
const std::vector<std::string>& partitions,
const std::vector<Criteria>& criterias,
SecurityException& exception)
{
bool returned_value = false;
if (rule.allow)
{
returned_value = true;
if (partitions.empty())
{
if (!is_partition_in_criterias(std::string(), criterias))
{
returned_value = false;
exception = _SecurityException_(std::string("<empty> partition not found in rule."));
}
}
else
{
// Search partitions
for (auto partition_it = partitions.begin(); returned_value && partition_it != partitions.end();
++partition_it)
{
if (!is_partition_in_criterias(*partition_it, criterias))
{
returned_value = false;
exception = _SecurityException_(*partition_it + std::string(" partition not found in rule."));
}
}
}
}
else
{
exception = _SecurityException_(topic_name + std::string(" topic denied by deny rule."));
}
return returned_value;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-284"
] | Fast-DDS | d2aeab37eb4fad4376b68ea4dfbbf285a2926384 | 280,921,444,372,054,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 42 | check remote permissions (#1387)
* Refs 5346. Blackbox test
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. one-way string compare
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. Do not add partition separator on last partition
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Access control unit testing
It only covers Partition and Topic permissions
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs #3680. Fix partition check on Permissions plugin.
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Fix tests on mac
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Fix windows tests
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Avoid memory leak on test
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Proxy data mocks should not return temporary objects
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* refs 3680. uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Miguel Company <[email protected]> |
TEST_F(QueryPlannerTest, ContainedOrPredicatesAreLeadingFieldsMoveToAnd) {
addIndex(BSON("a" << 1 << "b" << 1 << "c" << 1));
addIndex(BSON("a" << 1 << "d" << 1));
runQuery(fromjson(
"{$and: [{a: {$gte: 0}}, {a: {$lte: 10}}, {$or: [{$and: [{b: 6}, {c: 7}]}, {d: 8}]}]}"));
assertNumSolutions(4);
assertSolutionExists(
"{fetch: {filter: null, node: {or: {nodes: ["
"{ixscan: {pattern: {a: 1, b: 1, c: 1}, bounds: {a: [[0, 10, true, true]], b: [[6, 6, "
"true, true]], c: [[7, 7, true, true]]}}},"
"{ixscan: {pattern: {a: 1, d: 1}, bounds: {a: [[0, 10, true, true]], d: [[8, 8, true, "
"true]]}}}"
"]}}}}");
assertSolutionExists(
"{fetch: {filter: {$or: [{$and: [{b: 6}, {c: 7}]}, {d: 8}]}, node: "
"{ixscan: {pattern: {a: 1, b: 1, c: 1}, bounds: {a: [[0, 10, true, true]], b: [['MinKey', "
"'MaxKey', true, true]], c: [['MinKey', 'MaxKey', true, true]]}}}"
"}}");
assertSolutionExists(
"{fetch: {filter: {$or: [{$and: [{b: 6}, {c: 7}]}, {d: 8}]}, node: "
"{ixscan: {pattern: {a: 1, d: 1}, bounds: {a: [[0, 10, true, true]], d: [['MinKey', "
"'MaxKey', true, true]]}}}"
"}}");
assertSolutionExists("{cscan: {dir: 1}}}}");
} | 0 | [] | mongo | ee97c0699fd55b498310996ee002328e533681a3 | 52,297,236,962,623,610,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 | SERVER-36993 Fix crash due to incorrect $or pushdown for indexed $expr. |
ldns_str2rdf_ipseckey(ldns_rdf **rd, const char *str)
{
uint8_t precedence = 0;
uint8_t gateway_type = 0;
uint8_t algorithm = 0;
char* gateway = NULL;
char* publickey = NULL;
uint8_t *data;
ldns_buffer *str_buf;
char *token;
int token_count = 0;
int ipseckey_len = 0;
ldns_rdf* gateway_rdf = NULL;
ldns_rdf* publickey_rdf = NULL;
ldns_status status = LDNS_STATUS_OK;
if(strlen(str) == 0)
token = LDNS_XMALLOC(char, 256);
else token = LDNS_XMALLOC(char, strlen(str)+2);
if(!token) return LDNS_STATUS_MEM_ERR;
str_buf = LDNS_MALLOC(ldns_buffer);
if(!str_buf) {LDNS_FREE(token); return LDNS_STATUS_MEM_ERR;}
ldns_buffer_new_frm_data(str_buf, (char *)str, strlen(str));
if(ldns_buffer_status(str_buf) != LDNS_STATUS_OK) {
LDNS_FREE(str_buf);
LDNS_FREE(token);
return LDNS_STATUS_MEM_ERR;
}
while(ldns_bget_token(str_buf, token, "\t\n ", strlen(str)) > 0) {
switch (token_count) {
case 0:
precedence = (uint8_t)atoi(token);
break;
case 1:
gateway_type = (uint8_t)atoi(token);
break;
case 2:
algorithm = (uint8_t)atoi(token);
break;
case 3:
gateway = strdup(token);
if (!gateway || (gateway_type == 0 &&
(token[0] != '.' || token[1] != '\0'))) {
LDNS_FREE(gateway);
LDNS_FREE(token);
ldns_buffer_free(str_buf);
return LDNS_STATUS_INVALID_STR;
}
break;
case 4:
publickey = strdup(token);
break;
default:
LDNS_FREE(token);
ldns_buffer_free(str_buf);
return LDNS_STATUS_INVALID_STR;
break;
}
token_count++;
}
if (!gateway || !publickey) {
if (gateway)
LDNS_FREE(gateway);
if (publickey)
LDNS_FREE(publickey);
LDNS_FREE(token);
ldns_buffer_free(str_buf);
return LDNS_STATUS_INVALID_STR;
}
if (gateway_type == 1) {
status = ldns_str2rdf_a(&gateway_rdf, gateway);
} else if (gateway_type == 2) {
status = ldns_str2rdf_aaaa(&gateway_rdf, gateway);
} else if (gateway_type == 3) {
status = ldns_str2rdf_dname(&gateway_rdf, gateway);
}
if (status != LDNS_STATUS_OK) {
if (gateway)
LDNS_FREE(gateway);
if (publickey)
LDNS_FREE(publickey);
LDNS_FREE(token);
ldns_buffer_free(str_buf);
return LDNS_STATUS_INVALID_STR;
}
status = ldns_str2rdf_b64(&publickey_rdf, publickey);
if (status != LDNS_STATUS_OK) {
if (gateway)
LDNS_FREE(gateway);
if (publickey)
LDNS_FREE(publickey);
LDNS_FREE(token);
ldns_buffer_free(str_buf);
if (gateway_rdf) ldns_rdf_free(gateway_rdf);
return LDNS_STATUS_INVALID_STR;
}
/* now copy all into one ipseckey rdf */
if (gateway_type)
ipseckey_len = 3 + (int)ldns_rdf_size(gateway_rdf) + (int)ldns_rdf_size(publickey_rdf);
else
ipseckey_len = 3 + (int)ldns_rdf_size(publickey_rdf);
data = LDNS_XMALLOC(uint8_t, ipseckey_len);
if(!data) {
if (gateway)
LDNS_FREE(gateway);
if (publickey)
LDNS_FREE(publickey);
LDNS_FREE(token);
ldns_buffer_free(str_buf);
if (gateway_rdf) ldns_rdf_free(gateway_rdf);
if (publickey_rdf) ldns_rdf_free(publickey_rdf);
return LDNS_STATUS_MEM_ERR;
}
data[0] = precedence;
data[1] = gateway_type;
data[2] = algorithm;
if (gateway_type) {
memcpy(data + 3,
ldns_rdf_data(gateway_rdf), ldns_rdf_size(gateway_rdf));
memcpy(data + 3 + ldns_rdf_size(gateway_rdf),
ldns_rdf_data(publickey_rdf), ldns_rdf_size(publickey_rdf));
} else {
memcpy(data + 3,
ldns_rdf_data(publickey_rdf), ldns_rdf_size(publickey_rdf));
}
*rd = ldns_rdf_new_frm_data(LDNS_RDF_TYPE_IPSECKEY, (uint16_t) ipseckey_len, data);
if (gateway)
LDNS_FREE(gateway);
if (publickey)
LDNS_FREE(publickey);
LDNS_FREE(token);
ldns_buffer_free(str_buf);
ldns_rdf_free(gateway_rdf);
ldns_rdf_free(publickey_rdf);
LDNS_FREE(data);
if(!*rd) return LDNS_STATUS_MEM_ERR;
return LDNS_STATUS_OK;
} | 0 | [] | ldns | 3bdeed02505c9bbacb3b64a97ddcb1de967153b7 | 292,915,976,195,733,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 150 | bugfix #1257: Free after reallocing to 0 size
Thanks Stephan Zeisberg |
virtual void prepare_to_read_rows() {} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | server | 4681b6f2d8c82b4ec5cf115e83698251963d80d5 | 55,122,132,291,613,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 | MDEV-26281 ASAN use-after-poison when complex conversion is involved in blob
the bug was that in_vector array in Item_func_in was allocated in the
statement arena, not in the table->expr_arena.
revert part of the 5acd391e8b2d. Instead, change the arena correctly
in fix_all_session_vcol_exprs().
Remove TABLE_ARENA, that was introduced in 5acd391e8b2d to force
item tree changes to be rolled back (because they were allocated in the
wrong arena and didn't persist. now they do) |
RZ_API void rz_core_analysis_cc_init(RzCore *core) {
const char *analysis_arch = rz_config_get(core->config, "analysis.arch");
Sdb *cc = core->analysis->sdb_cc;
if (!strcmp(analysis_arch, "null")) {
sdb_reset(cc);
RZ_FREE(cc->path);
return;
}
const char *dir_prefix = rz_config_get(core->config, "dir.prefix");
int bits = core->analysis->bits;
char *dbpath = rz_str_newf(RZ_JOIN_3_PATHS("%s", RZ_SDB_TYPES, "cc-%s-%d.sdb"),
dir_prefix, analysis_arch, bits);
char *dbhomepath = rz_str_newf(RZ_JOIN_3_PATHS("~", RZ_HOME_SDB_TYPES, "cc-%s-%d.sdb"),
analysis_arch, bits);
// Avoid sdb reloading
if (cc->path && (!strcmp(cc->path, dbpath) || !strcmp(cc->path, dbhomepath))) {
free(dbpath);
free(dbhomepath);
return;
}
sdb_reset(cc);
RZ_FREE(cc->path);
if (rz_file_exists(dbpath)) {
sdb_concat_by_path(cc, dbpath);
cc->path = strdup(dbpath);
}
if (rz_file_exists(dbhomepath)) {
sdb_concat_by_path(cc, dbhomepath);
cc->path = strdup(dbhomepath);
}
// same as "tcc `arcc`"
char *s = rz_reg_profile_to_cc(core->analysis->reg);
if (s) {
if (!rz_analysis_cc_set(core->analysis, s)) {
eprintf("Warning: Invalid CC from reg profile.\n");
}
free(s);
} else {
eprintf("Warning: Cannot derive CC from reg profile.\n");
}
if (sdb_isempty(core->analysis->sdb_cc)) {
eprintf("Warning: Missing calling conventions for '%s'. Deriving it from the regprofile.\n", analysis_arch);
}
free(dbpath);
free(dbhomepath);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | rizin | 6ce71d8aa3dafe3cdb52d5d72ae8f4b95916f939 | 112,072,157,012,864,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 47 | Initialize retctx,ctx before freeing the inner elements
In rz_core_analysis_type_match retctx structure was initialized on the
stack only after a "goto out_function", where a field of that structure
was freed. When the goto path is taken, the field is not properly
initialized and it cause cause a crash of Rizin or have other effects.
Fixes: CVE-2021-4022 |
void ip6_route_input(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
const struct ipv6hdr *iph = ipv6_hdr(skb);
struct net *net = dev_net(skb->dev);
int flags = RT6_LOOKUP_F_HAS_SADDR;
struct flowi6 fl6 = {
.flowi6_iif = skb->dev->ifindex,
.daddr = iph->daddr,
.saddr = iph->saddr,
.flowlabel = ip6_flowinfo(iph),
.flowi6_mark = skb->mark,
.flowi6_proto = iph->nexthdr,
};
skb_dst_set(skb, ip6_route_input_lookup(net, skb->dev, &fl6, flags));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | net | c88507fbad8055297c1d1e21e599f46960cbee39 | 85,531,945,819,871,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | ipv6: don't set DST_NOCOUNT for remotely added routes
DST_NOCOUNT should only be used if an authorized user adds routes
locally. In case of routes which are added on behalf of router
advertisments this flag must not get used as it allows an unlimited
number of routes getting added remotely.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_construct(struct net *net,
struct xfrm_usersa_info *p,
struct nlattr **attrs,
int *errp)
{
struct xfrm_state *x = xfrm_state_alloc(net);
int err = -ENOMEM;
if (!x)
goto error_no_put;
copy_from_user_state(x, p);
if ((err = attach_aead(&x->aead, &x->props.ealgo,
attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AEAD])))
goto error;
if ((err = attach_auth_trunc(&x->aalg, &x->props.aalgo,
attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC])))
goto error;
if (!x->props.aalgo) {
if ((err = attach_auth(&x->aalg, &x->props.aalgo,
attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH])))
goto error;
}
if ((err = attach_one_algo(&x->ealg, &x->props.ealgo,
xfrm_ealg_get_byname,
attrs[XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT])))
goto error;
if ((err = attach_one_algo(&x->calg, &x->props.calgo,
xfrm_calg_get_byname,
attrs[XFRMA_ALG_COMP])))
goto error;
if (attrs[XFRMA_ENCAP]) {
x->encap = kmemdup(nla_data(attrs[XFRMA_ENCAP]),
sizeof(*x->encap), GFP_KERNEL);
if (x->encap == NULL)
goto error;
}
if (attrs[XFRMA_TFCPAD])
x->tfcpad = nla_get_u32(attrs[XFRMA_TFCPAD]);
if (attrs[XFRMA_COADDR]) {
x->coaddr = kmemdup(nla_data(attrs[XFRMA_COADDR]),
sizeof(*x->coaddr), GFP_KERNEL);
if (x->coaddr == NULL)
goto error;
}
xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &x->mark);
err = __xfrm_init_state(x, false);
if (err)
goto error;
if (attrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX] &&
security_xfrm_state_alloc(x, nla_data(attrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX])))
goto error;
if ((err = xfrm_alloc_replay_state_esn(&x->replay_esn, &x->preplay_esn,
attrs[XFRMA_REPLAY_ESN_VAL])))
goto error;
x->km.seq = p->seq;
x->replay_maxdiff = net->xfrm.sysctl_aevent_rseqth;
/* sysctl_xfrm_aevent_etime is in 100ms units */
x->replay_maxage = (net->xfrm.sysctl_aevent_etime*HZ)/XFRM_AE_ETH_M;
if ((err = xfrm_init_replay(x)))
goto error;
/* override default values from above */
xfrm_update_ae_params(x, attrs);
return x;
error:
x->km.state = XFRM_STATE_DEAD;
xfrm_state_put(x);
error_no_put:
*errp = err;
return NULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux | 1f86840f897717f86d523a13e99a447e6a5d2fa5 | 313,952,227,259,294,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 84 | xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_tmpl()
The memory used for the template copy is a local stack variable. As
struct xfrm_user_tmpl contains multiple holes added by the compiler for
alignment, not initializing the memory will lead to leaking stack bytes
to userland. Add an explicit memset(0) to avoid the info leak.
Initial version of the patch by Brad Spengler.
Cc: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
sdap_initgr_nested_get_membership_diff(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb,
struct sdap_options *opts,
struct sss_domain_info *dom,
struct sysdb_attrs *group,
struct sysdb_attrs **all_groups,
int groups_count,
struct membership_diff **_mdiff)
{
errno_t ret;
struct membership_diff *mdiff;
const char *group_name;
struct sysdb_attrs **ldap_parentlist;
int parents_count;
char **ldap_parent_names_list = NULL;
char **sysdb_parents_names_list = NULL;
TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
tmp_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
if (!tmp_ctx) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto done;
}
/* Get direct sysdb parents */
ret = sdap_get_group_primary_name(tmp_ctx, opts, group, dom, &group_name);
if (ret != EOK) {
goto done;
}
ret = sysdb_get_direct_parents(tmp_ctx, sysdb, dom,
SYSDB_MEMBER_GROUP,
group_name, &sysdb_parents_names_list);
if (ret) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE,
"Could not get direct sysdb parents for %s: %d [%s]\n",
group_name, ret, strerror(ret));
goto done;
}
/* For each group, filter only parents from full set */
ret = sdap_initgr_nested_get_direct_parents(tmp_ctx,
group,
all_groups,
groups_count,
&ldap_parentlist,
&parents_count);
if (ret != EOK) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Cannot get parent groups for %s [%d]: %s\n",
group_name, ret, strerror(ret));
goto done;
}
DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_LIBS,
"The group %s is a direct member of %d LDAP groups\n",
group_name, parents_count);
if (parents_count > 0) {
ret = sysdb_attrs_primary_name_list(sysdb, tmp_ctx,
ldap_parentlist,
parents_count,
opts->group_map[SDAP_AT_GROUP_NAME].name,
&ldap_parent_names_list);
if (ret != EOK) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE,
"sysdb_attrs_primary_name_list failed [%d]: %s\n",
ret, strerror(ret));
goto done;
}
}
ret = build_membership_diff(tmp_ctx, group_name, ldap_parent_names_list,
sysdb_parents_names_list, &mdiff);
if (ret != EOK) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_MINOR_FAILURE,
"Could not build membership diff for %s [%d]: %s\n",
group_name, ret, strerror(ret));
goto done;
}
ret = EOK;
*_mdiff = talloc_steal(mem_ctx, mdiff);
done:
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
return ret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-264"
] | sssd | 0b6b4b7669b46d3d0b0ebefbc0e1621965444717 | 45,528,926,654,149,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 88 | IPA: process non-posix nested groups
Do not expect objectClass to be posixGroup but rather more general
groupofnames.
Resolves:
https://fedorahosted.org/sssd/ticket/2343
Reviewed-by: Michal Židek <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit bc8c93ffe881271043492c938c626a9be948000e) |
static void php_zip_free_dir(zend_resource *rsrc)
{
zip_rsrc * zip_int = (zip_rsrc *) rsrc->ptr;
if (zip_int) {
if (zip_int->za) {
if (zip_close(zip_int->za) != 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Cannot destroy the zip context");
}
zip_int->za = NULL;
}
efree(rsrc->ptr);
rsrc->ptr = NULL;
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | php-src | 3b8d4de300854b3517c7acb239b84f7726c1353c | 88,471,629,054,226,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | Fix bug #71923 - integer overflow in ZipArchive::getFrom* |
static void mpls_notify_route(struct net *net, unsigned index,
struct mpls_route *old, struct mpls_route *new,
const struct nl_info *info)
{
struct nlmsghdr *nlh = info ? info->nlh : NULL;
unsigned portid = info ? info->portid : 0;
int event = new ? RTM_NEWROUTE : RTM_DELROUTE;
struct mpls_route *rt = new ? new : old;
unsigned nlm_flags = (old && new) ? NLM_F_REPLACE : 0;
/* Ignore reserved labels for now */
if (rt && (index >= MPLS_LABEL_FIRST_UNRESERVED))
rtmsg_lfib(event, index, rt, nlh, net, portid, nlm_flags);
} | 0 | [] | net | 6c8991f41546c3c472503dff1ea9daaddf9331c2 | 84,522,690,181,170,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | net: ipv6_stub: use ip6_dst_lookup_flow instead of ip6_dst_lookup
ipv6_stub uses the ip6_dst_lookup function to allow other modules to
perform IPv6 lookups. However, this function skips the XFRM layer
entirely.
All users of ipv6_stub->ip6_dst_lookup use ip_route_output_flow (via the
ip_route_output_key and ip_route_output helpers) for their IPv4 lookups,
which calls xfrm_lookup_route(). This patch fixes this inconsistent
behavior by switching the stub to ip6_dst_lookup_flow, which also calls
xfrm_lookup_route().
This requires some changes in all the callers, as these two functions
take different arguments and have different return types.
Fixes: 5f81bd2e5d80 ("ipv6: export a stub for IPv6 symbols used by vxlan")
Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
static int mb86a20s_read_signal_strength(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
{
struct mb86a20s_state *state = fe->demodulator_priv;
struct dtv_frontend_properties *c = &fe->dtv_property_cache;
int rc;
unsigned rf_max, rf_min, rf;
if (state->get_strength_time &&
(!time_after(jiffies, state->get_strength_time)))
return c->strength.stat[0].uvalue;
/* Reset its value if an error happen */
c->strength.stat[0].uvalue = 0;
/* Does a binary search to get RF strength */
rf_max = 0xfff;
rf_min = 0;
do {
rf = (rf_max + rf_min) / 2;
rc = mb86a20s_writereg(state, 0x04, 0x1f);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
rc = mb86a20s_writereg(state, 0x05, rf >> 8);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
rc = mb86a20s_writereg(state, 0x04, 0x20);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
rc = mb86a20s_writereg(state, 0x05, rf);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
rc = mb86a20s_readreg(state, 0x02);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
if (rc & 0x08)
rf_min = (rf_max + rf_min) / 2;
else
rf_max = (rf_max + rf_min) / 2;
if (rf_max - rf_min < 4) {
rf = (rf_max + rf_min) / 2;
/* Rescale it from 2^12 (4096) to 2^16 */
rf = rf << (16 - 12);
if (rf)
rf |= (1 << 12) - 1;
dev_dbg(&state->i2c->dev,
"%s: signal strength = %d (%d < RF=%d < %d)\n",
__func__, rf, rf_min, rf >> 4, rf_max);
c->strength.stat[0].uvalue = rf;
state->get_strength_time = jiffies +
msecs_to_jiffies(1000);
return 0;
}
} while (1);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | media_tree | eca2d34b9d2ce70165a50510659838e28ca22742 | 118,673,403,464,301,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 57 | [media] mb86a20s: apply mask to val after checking for read failure
Appling the mask 0x0f to the immediate return of the call to
mb86a20s_readreg will always result in a positive value, meaning that the
check of ret < 0 will never work. Instead, check for a -ve return value
first, and then mask val with 0x0f.
Kudos to Mauro Carvalho Chehab for spotting the mistake in my original fix.
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> |
int v9fs_refresh_inode_dotl(struct p9_fid *fid, struct inode *inode)
{
loff_t i_size;
struct p9_stat_dotl *st;
struct v9fs_session_info *v9ses;
v9ses = v9fs_inode2v9ses(inode);
st = p9_client_getattr_dotl(fid, P9_STATS_ALL);
if (IS_ERR(st))
return PTR_ERR(st);
/*
* Don't update inode if the file type is different
*/
if ((inode->i_mode & S_IFMT) != (st->st_mode & S_IFMT))
goto out;
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
/*
* We don't want to refresh inode->i_size,
* because we may have cached data
*/
i_size = inode->i_size;
v9fs_stat2inode_dotl(st, inode);
if (v9ses->cache == CACHE_LOOSE || v9ses->cache == CACHE_FSCACHE)
inode->i_size = i_size;
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
out:
kfree(st);
return 0;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-835"
] | linux | 5e3cc1ee1405a7eb3487ed24f786dec01b4cbe1f | 175,390,648,764,656,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 | 9p: use inode->i_lock to protect i_size_write() under 32-bit
Use inode->i_lock to protect i_size_write(), else i_size_read() in
generic_fillattr() may loop infinitely in read_seqcount_begin() when
multiple processes invoke v9fs_vfs_getattr() or v9fs_vfs_getattr_dotl()
simultaneously under 32-bit SMP environment, and a soft lockup will be
triggered as show below:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#5 stuck for 22s! [stat:2217]
Modules linked in:
CPU: 5 PID: 2217 Comm: stat Not tainted 5.0.0-rc1-00005-g7f702faf5a9e #4
Hardware name: Generic DT based system
PC is at generic_fillattr+0x104/0x108
LR is at 0xec497f00
pc : [<802b8898>] lr : [<ec497f00>] psr: 200c0013
sp : ec497e20 ip : ed608030 fp : ec497e3c
r10: 00000000 r9 : ec497f00 r8 : ed608030
r7 : ec497ebc r6 : ec497f00 r5 : ee5c1550 r4 : ee005780
r3 : 0000052d r2 : 00000000 r1 : ec497f00 r0 : ed608030
Flags: nzCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none
Control: 10c5387d Table: ac48006a DAC: 00000051
CPU: 5 PID: 2217 Comm: stat Not tainted 5.0.0-rc1-00005-g7f702faf5a9e #4
Hardware name: Generic DT based system
Backtrace:
[<8010d974>] (dump_backtrace) from [<8010dc88>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24)
[<8010dc68>] (show_stack) from [<80a1d194>] (dump_stack+0xb0/0xdc)
[<80a1d0e4>] (dump_stack) from [<80109f34>] (show_regs+0x1c/0x20)
[<80109f18>] (show_regs) from [<801d0a80>] (watchdog_timer_fn+0x280/0x2f8)
[<801d0800>] (watchdog_timer_fn) from [<80198658>] (__hrtimer_run_queues+0x18c/0x380)
[<801984cc>] (__hrtimer_run_queues) from [<80198e60>] (hrtimer_run_queues+0xb8/0xf0)
[<80198da8>] (hrtimer_run_queues) from [<801973e8>] (run_local_timers+0x28/0x64)
[<801973c0>] (run_local_timers) from [<80197460>] (update_process_times+0x3c/0x6c)
[<80197424>] (update_process_times) from [<801ab2b8>] (tick_nohz_handler+0xe0/0x1bc)
[<801ab1d8>] (tick_nohz_handler) from [<80843050>] (arch_timer_handler_virt+0x38/0x48)
[<80843018>] (arch_timer_handler_virt) from [<80180a64>] (handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x8c/0x240)
[<801809d8>] (handle_percpu_devid_irq) from [<8017ac20>] (generic_handle_irq+0x34/0x44)
[<8017abec>] (generic_handle_irq) from [<8017b344>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc4)
[<8017b2d8>] (__handle_domain_irq) from [<801022e0>] (gic_handle_irq+0x4c/0x88)
[<80102294>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<80101a30>] (__irq_svc+0x70/0x98)
[<802b8794>] (generic_fillattr) from [<8056b284>] (v9fs_vfs_getattr_dotl+0x74/0xa4)
[<8056b210>] (v9fs_vfs_getattr_dotl) from [<802b8904>] (vfs_getattr_nosec+0x68/0x7c)
[<802b889c>] (vfs_getattr_nosec) from [<802b895c>] (vfs_getattr+0x44/0x48)
[<802b8918>] (vfs_getattr) from [<802b8a74>] (vfs_statx+0x9c/0xec)
[<802b89d8>] (vfs_statx) from [<802b9428>] (sys_lstat64+0x48/0x78)
[<802b93e0>] (sys_lstat64) from [<80101000>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x28)
[[email protected]: updated comment to not refer to a function
in another subsystem]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 7549ae3e81cc ("9p: Use the i_size_[read, write]() macros instead of using inode->i_size directly.")
Reported-by: Xing Gaopeng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <[email protected]> |
void Item_ref::cleanup()
{
DBUG_ENTER("Item_ref::cleanup");
Item_ident::cleanup();
result_field= 0;
if (reference_trough_name)
{
/* We have to reset the reference as it may been freed */
ref= 0;
}
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
} | 0 | [] | server | b000e169562697aa072600695d4f0c0412f94f4f | 28,457,353,708,353,167,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | Bug#26361149 MYSQL SERVER CRASHES AT: COL IN(IFNULL(CONST, COL), NAME_CONST('NAME', NULL))
based on:
commit f7316aa0c9a
Author: Ajo Robert <[email protected]>
Date: Thu Aug 24 17:03:21 2017 +0530
Bug#26361149 MYSQL SERVER CRASHES AT: COL IN(IFNULL(CONST,
COL), NAME_CONST('NAME', NULL))
Backport of Bug#19143243 fix.
NAME_CONST item can return NULL_ITEM type in case of incorrect arguments.
NULL_ITEM has special processing in Item_func_in function.
In Item_func_in::fix_length_and_dec an array of possible comparators is
created. Since NAME_CONST function has NULL_ITEM type, corresponding
array element is empty. Then NAME_CONST is wrapped to ITEM_CACHE.
ITEM_CACHE can not return proper type(NULL_ITEM) in Item_func_in::val_int(),
so the NULL_ITEM is attempted compared with an empty comparator.
The fix is to disable the caching of Item_name_const item. |
nautilus_file_init (NautilusFile *file)
{
file->details = G_TYPE_INSTANCE_GET_PRIVATE ((file), NAUTILUS_TYPE_FILE, NautilusFileDetails);
nautilus_file_clear_info (file);
nautilus_file_invalidate_extension_info_internal (file);
} | 0 | [] | nautilus | 7632a3e13874a2c5e8988428ca913620a25df983 | 199,885,289,992,824,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | Check for trusted desktop file launchers.
2009-02-24 Alexander Larsson <[email protected]>
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-directory-async.c:
Check for trusted desktop file launchers.
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file-private.h:
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file.c:
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file.h:
Add nautilus_file_is_trusted_link.
Allow unsetting of custom display name.
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-mime-actions.c:
Display dialog when trying to launch a non-trusted desktop file.
svn path=/trunk/; revision=15003 |
void jas_matrix_setall(jas_matrix_t *matrix, jas_seqent_t val)
{
jas_matind_t i;
jas_matind_t j;
jas_seqent_t *rowstart;
jas_matind_t rowstep;
jas_seqent_t *data;
if (jas_matrix_numrows(matrix) > 0 && jas_matrix_numcols(matrix) > 0) {
assert(matrix->rows_);
rowstep = jas_matrix_rowstep(matrix);
for (i = matrix->numrows_, rowstart = matrix->rows_[0]; i > 0; --i,
rowstart += rowstep) {
for (j = matrix->numcols_, data = rowstart; j > 0; --j,
++data) {
*data = val;
}
}
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-190"
] | jasper | d42b2388f7f8e0332c846675133acea151fc557a | 205,668,039,971,614,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now. |
TEST_P(ProtocolIntegrationTest, DrainClose) {
config_helper_.addFilter(ConfigHelper::DEFAULT_HEALTH_CHECK_FILTER);
initialize();
test_server_->drainManager().draining_ = true;
codec_client_ = makeHttpConnection(lookupPort("http"));
auto response = codec_client_->makeHeaderOnlyRequest(default_request_headers_);
response->waitForEndStream();
codec_client_->waitForDisconnect();
EXPECT_TRUE(response->complete());
EXPECT_EQ("200", response->headers().Status()->value().getStringView());
if (downstream_protocol_ == Http::CodecClient::Type::HTTP2) {
EXPECT_TRUE(codec_client_->sawGoAway());
}
test_server_->drainManager().draining_ = false;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] | envoy | afc39bea36fd436e54262f150c009e8d72db5014 | 285,313,001,302,741,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | Track byteSize of HeaderMap internally.
Introduces a cached byte size updated internally in HeaderMap. The value
is stored as an optional, and is cleared whenever a non-const pointer or
reference to a HeaderEntry is accessed. The cached value can be set with
refreshByteSize() which performs an iteration over the HeaderMap to sum
the size of each key and value in the HeaderMap.
Signed-off-by: Asra Ali <[email protected]> |
check_DELETE_FIELD(const struct ofpact_delete_field *odf,
struct ofpact_check_params *cp OVS_UNUSED)
{
if (odf->field->id < MFF_TUN_METADATA0 ||
odf->field->id > MFF_TUN_METADATA63) {
return OFPERR_OFPBAC_BAD_ARGUMENT;
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | ovs | 77cccc74deede443e8b9102299efc869a52b65b2 | 38,595,267,165,011,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | ofp-actions: Fix use-after-free while decoding RAW_ENCAP.
While decoding RAW_ENCAP action, decode_ed_prop() might re-allocate
ofpbuf if there is no enough space left. However, function
'decode_NXAST_RAW_ENCAP' continues to use old pointer to 'encap'
structure leading to write-after-free and incorrect decoding.
==3549105==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address
0x60600000011a at pc 0x0000005f6cc6 bp 0x7ffc3a2d4410 sp 0x7ffc3a2d4408
WRITE of size 2 at 0x60600000011a thread T0
#0 0x5f6cc5 in decode_NXAST_RAW_ENCAP lib/ofp-actions.c:4461:20
#1 0x5f0551 in ofpact_decode ./lib/ofp-actions.inc2:4777:16
#2 0x5ed17c in ofpacts_decode lib/ofp-actions.c:7752:21
#3 0x5eba9a in ofpacts_pull_openflow_actions__ lib/ofp-actions.c:7791:13
#4 0x5eb9fc in ofpacts_pull_openflow_actions lib/ofp-actions.c:7835:12
#5 0x64bb8b in ofputil_decode_packet_out lib/ofp-packet.c:1113:17
#6 0x65b6f4 in ofp_print_packet_out lib/ofp-print.c:148:13
#7 0x659e3f in ofp_to_string__ lib/ofp-print.c:1029:16
#8 0x659b24 in ofp_to_string lib/ofp-print.c:1244:21
#9 0x65a28c in ofp_print lib/ofp-print.c:1288:28
#10 0x540d11 in ofctl_ofp_parse utilities/ovs-ofctl.c:2814:9
#11 0x564228 in ovs_cmdl_run_command__ lib/command-line.c:247:17
#12 0x56408a in ovs_cmdl_run_command lib/command-line.c:278:5
#13 0x5391ae in main utilities/ovs-ofctl.c:179:9
#14 0x7f6911ce9081 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x27081)
#15 0x461fed in _start (utilities/ovs-ofctl+0x461fed)
Fix that by getting a new pointer before using.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz.
Fuzzer regression test will fail only with AddressSanitizer enabled.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=27851
Fixes: f839892a206a ("OF support and translation of generic encap and decap")
Acked-by: William Tu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <[email protected]> |
write_and_read_gimp_2_6_format (gconstpointer data)
{
Gimp *gimp = GIMP (data);
gimp_write_and_read_file (gimp,
FALSE /*with_unusual_stuff*/,
FALSE /*compat_paths*/,
FALSE /*use_gimp_2_8_features*/);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-476"
] | gimp | c21eff4b031acb04fb4dfce8bd5fdfecc2b6524f | 199,028,193,274,288,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | Issue #1689: create unique temporary file with g_file_open_tmp().
Not sure this is really solving the issue reported, which is that
`g_get_tmp_dir()` uses environment variables (yet as g_file_open_tmp()
uses g_get_tmp_dir()…). But at least g_file_open_tmp() should create
unique temporary files, which prevents overriding existing files (which
is most likely the only real attack possible here, or at least the only
one I can think of unless some weird vulnerabilities exist in glib). |
int skb_checksum_help(struct sk_buff *skb, int inward)
{
unsigned int csum;
int ret = 0, offset = skb->h.raw - skb->data;
if (inward) {
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
goto out;
}
if (skb_cloned(skb)) {
ret = pskb_expand_head(skb, 0, 0, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
if (offset > (int)skb->len)
BUG();
csum = skb_checksum(skb, offset, skb->len-offset, 0);
offset = skb->tail - skb->h.raw;
if (offset <= 0)
BUG();
if (skb->csum + 2 > offset)
BUG();
*(u16*)(skb->h.raw + skb->csum) = csum_fold(csum);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
out:
return ret;
} | 0 | [] | linux | e89e9cf539a28df7d0eb1d0a545368e9920b34ac | 92,365,807,957,987,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 | [IPv4/IPv6]: UFO Scatter-gather approach
Attached is kernel patch for UDP Fragmentation Offload (UFO) feature.
1. This patch incorporate the review comments by Jeff Garzik.
2. Renamed USO as UFO (UDP Fragmentation Offload)
3. udp sendfile support with UFO
This patches uses scatter-gather feature of skb to generate large UDP
datagram. Below is a "how-to" on changes required in network device
driver to use the UFO interface.
UDP Fragmentation Offload (UFO) Interface:
-------------------------------------------
UFO is a feature wherein the Linux kernel network stack will offload the
IP fragmentation functionality of large UDP datagram to hardware. This
will reduce the overhead of stack in fragmenting the large UDP datagram to
MTU sized packets
1) Drivers indicate their capability of UFO using
dev->features |= NETIF_F_UFO | NETIF_F_HW_CSUM | NETIF_F_SG
NETIF_F_HW_CSUM is required for UFO over ipv6.
2) UFO packet will be submitted for transmission using driver xmit routine.
UFO packet will have a non-zero value for
"skb_shinfo(skb)->ufo_size"
skb_shinfo(skb)->ufo_size will indicate the length of data part in each IP
fragment going out of the adapter after IP fragmentation by hardware.
skb->data will contain MAC/IP/UDP header and skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[]
contains the data payload. The skb->ip_summed will be set to CHECKSUM_HW
indicating that hardware has to do checksum calculation. Hardware should
compute the UDP checksum of complete datagram and also ip header checksum of
each fragmented IP packet.
For IPV6 the UFO provides the fragment identification-id in
skb_shinfo(skb)->ip6_frag_id. The adapter should use this ID for generating
IPv6 fragments.
Signed-off-by: Ananda Raju <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <[email protected]> (forwarded)
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> |
GF_Err trun_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
u32 i;
GF_TrunEntry *p;
GF_TrackFragmentRunBox *ptr = (GF_TrackFragmentRunBox *)s;
//check this is a good file
if ((ptr->flags & GF_ISOM_TRUN_FIRST_FLAG) && (ptr->flags & GF_ISOM_TRUN_FLAGS))
return GF_ISOM_INVALID_FILE;
ptr->sample_count = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
//The rest depends on the flags
if (ptr->flags & GF_ISOM_TRUN_DATA_OFFSET) {
ptr->data_offset = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(ptr, 4);
}
if (ptr->flags & GF_ISOM_TRUN_FIRST_FLAG) {
ptr->first_sample_flags = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(ptr, 4);
}
//read each entry (even though nothing may be written)
for (i=0; i<ptr->sample_count; i++) {
u32 trun_size = 0;
p = (GF_TrunEntry *) gf_malloc(sizeof(GF_TrunEntry));
if (!p) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
memset(p, 0, sizeof(GF_TrunEntry));
if (ptr->flags & GF_ISOM_TRUN_DURATION) {
p->Duration = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
trun_size += 4;
}
if (ptr->flags & GF_ISOM_TRUN_SIZE) {
p->size = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
trun_size += 4;
}
//SHOULDN'T BE USED IF GF_ISOM_TRUN_FIRST_FLAG IS DEFINED
if (ptr->flags & GF_ISOM_TRUN_FLAGS) {
p->flags = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
trun_size += 4;
}
if (ptr->flags & GF_ISOM_TRUN_CTS_OFFSET) {
if (ptr->version==0) {
p->CTS_Offset = (u32) gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
} else {
p->CTS_Offset = (s32) gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
}
}
gf_list_add(ptr->entries, p);
ISOM_DECREASE_SIZE(ptr, trun_size);
}
return GF_OK;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | gpac | bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86 | 142,433,636,782,079,590,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 54 | fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088) |
vim_str2nr(
char_u *start,
int *prep, // return: type of number 0 = decimal, 'x'
// or 'X' is hex, '0', 'o' or 'O' is octal,
// 'b' or 'B' is bin
int *len, // return: detected length of number
int what, // what numbers to recognize
varnumber_T *nptr, // return: signed result
uvarnumber_T *unptr, // return: unsigned result
int maxlen, // max length of string to check
int strict) // check strictly
{
char_u *ptr = start;
int pre = 0; // default is decimal
int negative = FALSE;
uvarnumber_T un = 0;
int n;
if (len != NULL)
*len = 0;
if (ptr[0] == '-')
{
negative = TRUE;
++ptr;
}
// Recognize hex, octal, and bin.
if (ptr[0] == '0' && ptr[1] != '8' && ptr[1] != '9'
&& (maxlen == 0 || maxlen > 1))
{
pre = ptr[1];
if ((what & STR2NR_HEX)
&& (pre == 'X' || pre == 'x') && vim_isxdigit(ptr[2])
&& (maxlen == 0 || maxlen > 2))
// hexadecimal
ptr += 2;
else if ((what & STR2NR_BIN)
&& (pre == 'B' || pre == 'b') && vim_isbdigit(ptr[2])
&& (maxlen == 0 || maxlen > 2))
// binary
ptr += 2;
else if ((what & STR2NR_OOCT)
&& (pre == 'O' || pre == 'o') && vim_isodigit(ptr[2])
&& (maxlen == 0 || maxlen > 2))
// octal with prefix "0o"
ptr += 2;
else
{
// decimal or octal, default is decimal
pre = 0;
if (what & STR2NR_OCT)
{
// Don't interpret "0", "08" or "0129" as octal.
for (n = 1; n != maxlen && VIM_ISDIGIT(ptr[n]); ++n)
{
if (ptr[n] > '7')
{
pre = 0; // can't be octal
break;
}
pre = '0'; // assume octal
}
}
}
}
// Do the conversion manually to avoid sscanf() quirks.
n = 1;
if (pre == 'B' || pre == 'b'
|| ((what & STR2NR_BIN) && (what & STR2NR_FORCE)))
{
// bin
if (pre != 0)
n += 2; // skip over "0b"
while ('0' <= *ptr && *ptr <= '1')
{
// avoid ubsan error for overflow
if (un <= UVARNUM_MAX / 2)
un = 2 * un + (uvarnumber_T)(*ptr - '0');
else
un = UVARNUM_MAX;
++ptr;
if (n++ == maxlen)
break;
if ((what & STR2NR_QUOTE) && *ptr == '\''
&& '0' <= ptr[1] && ptr[1] <= '1')
{
++ptr;
if (n++ == maxlen)
break;
}
}
}
else if (pre == 'O' || pre == 'o' ||
pre == '0' || ((what & STR2NR_OCT) && (what & STR2NR_FORCE)))
{
// octal
if (pre != 0 && pre != '0')
n += 2; // skip over "0o"
while ('0' <= *ptr && *ptr <= '7')
{
// avoid ubsan error for overflow
if (un <= UVARNUM_MAX / 8)
un = 8 * un + (uvarnumber_T)(*ptr - '0');
else
un = UVARNUM_MAX;
++ptr;
if (n++ == maxlen)
break;
if ((what & STR2NR_QUOTE) && *ptr == '\''
&& '0' <= ptr[1] && ptr[1] <= '7')
{
++ptr;
if (n++ == maxlen)
break;
}
}
}
else if (pre != 0 || ((what & STR2NR_HEX) && (what & STR2NR_FORCE)))
{
// hex
if (pre != 0)
n += 2; // skip over "0x"
while (vim_isxdigit(*ptr))
{
// avoid ubsan error for overflow
if (un <= UVARNUM_MAX / 16)
un = 16 * un + (uvarnumber_T)hex2nr(*ptr);
else
un = UVARNUM_MAX;
++ptr;
if (n++ == maxlen)
break;
if ((what & STR2NR_QUOTE) && *ptr == '\'' && vim_isxdigit(ptr[1]))
{
++ptr;
if (n++ == maxlen)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
// decimal
while (VIM_ISDIGIT(*ptr))
{
uvarnumber_T digit = (uvarnumber_T)(*ptr - '0');
// avoid ubsan error for overflow
if (un < UVARNUM_MAX / 10
|| (un == UVARNUM_MAX / 10 && digit <= UVARNUM_MAX % 10))
un = 10 * un + digit;
else
un = UVARNUM_MAX;
++ptr;
if (n++ == maxlen)
break;
if ((what & STR2NR_QUOTE) && *ptr == '\'' && VIM_ISDIGIT(ptr[1]))
{
++ptr;
if (n++ == maxlen)
break;
}
}
}
// Check for an alphanumeric character immediately following, that is
// most likely a typo.
if (strict && n - 1 != maxlen && ASCII_ISALNUM(*ptr))
return;
if (prep != NULL)
*prep = pre;
if (len != NULL)
*len = (int)(ptr - start);
if (nptr != NULL)
{
if (negative) // account for leading '-' for decimal numbers
{
// avoid ubsan error for overflow
if (un > VARNUM_MAX)
*nptr = VARNUM_MIN;
else
*nptr = -(varnumber_T)un;
}
else
{
if (un > VARNUM_MAX)
un = VARNUM_MAX;
*nptr = (varnumber_T)un;
}
}
if (unptr != NULL)
*unptr = un;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] | vim | 94f3192b03ed27474db80b4d3a409e107140738b | 134,347,579,094,274,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 196 | patch 8.2.3950: going beyond the end of the line with /\%V
Problem: Going beyond the end of the line with /\%V.
Solution: Check for valid column in getvcol(). |
static jas_stream_t *jpc_streamlist_get(jpc_streamlist_t *streamlist, int streamno)
{
assert(streamno < streamlist->numstreams);
return streamlist->streams[streamno];
} | 0 | [
"CWE-617"
] | jasper | 84d00fb29a22e360c2ff91bdc2cd81c288826bfc | 187,478,346,314,288,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | jpc_dec: check for JPC_QCX_EXPN() parameter overflow
Avoid the assertion failure in the JPC_QCX_EXPN() function. While the
"expn" variable cannot be bigger than 0x1f, adding something to it may
exceed that limit.
This condition could be exploited with a malicious JP2 file, allowing
a denial of service attack on processes which parse JP2 files.
Fixes CVE-2016-9399 and CVE-2017-13751
Closes https://github.com/jasper-maint/jasper/issues/1 |
static NTSTATUS dcesrv_lsa_EnumTrustedDomainsEx(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct lsa_EnumTrustedDomainsEx *r)
{
struct dcesrv_handle *policy_handle;
struct lsa_TrustDomainInfoInfoEx *entries;
struct lsa_policy_state *policy_state;
struct ldb_message **domains;
const char *attrs[] = {
"flatname",
"trustPartner",
"securityIdentifier",
"trustDirection",
"trustType",
"trustAttributes",
NULL
};
NTSTATUS nt_status;
int count, i;
*r->out.resume_handle = 0;
r->out.domains->domains = NULL;
r->out.domains->count = 0;
DCESRV_PULL_HANDLE(policy_handle, r->in.handle, LSA_HANDLE_POLICY);
policy_state = policy_handle->data;
/* search for all users in this domain. This could possibly be cached and
resumed based on resume_key */
count = gendb_search(policy_state->sam_ldb, mem_ctx, policy_state->system_dn, &domains, attrs,
"objectclass=trustedDomain");
if (count < 0) {
return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_DB_CORRUPTION;
}
/* convert to lsa_DomainInformation format */
entries = talloc_array(mem_ctx, struct lsa_TrustDomainInfoInfoEx, count);
if (!entries) {
return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
}
for (i=0;i<count;i++) {
nt_status = fill_trust_domain_ex(mem_ctx, domains[i], &entries[i]);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
return nt_status;
}
}
/* sort the results by name */
TYPESAFE_QSORT(entries, count, compare_TrustDomainInfoInfoEx);
if (*r->in.resume_handle >= count) {
*r->out.resume_handle = -1;
return NT_STATUS_NO_MORE_ENTRIES;
}
/* return the rest, limit by max_size. Note that we
use the w2k3 element size value of 60 */
r->out.domains->count = count - *r->in.resume_handle;
r->out.domains->count = MIN(r->out.domains->count,
1+(r->in.max_size/LSA_ENUM_TRUST_DOMAIN_EX_MULTIPLIER));
r->out.domains->domains = entries + *r->in.resume_handle;
if (r->out.domains->count < count - *r->in.resume_handle) {
*r->out.resume_handle = *r->in.resume_handle + r->out.domains->count;
return STATUS_MORE_ENTRIES;
}
*r->out.resume_handle = *r->in.resume_handle + r->out.domains->count;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | samba | 0a3aa5f908e351201dc9c4d4807b09ed9eedff77 | 172,178,607,481,745,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 75 | CVE-2022-32746 ldb: Make use of functions for appending to an ldb_message
This aims to minimise usage of the error-prone pattern of searching for
a just-added message element in order to make modifications to it (and
potentially finding the wrong element).
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15009
Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <[email protected]> |
static int l_channel_exec (lua_State *L) {
return channel_exec(L, 0, 0);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-415"
] | nmap | 350bbe0597d37ad67abe5fef8fba984707b4e9ad | 299,514,459,182,246,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | Avoid a crash (double-free) when SSH connection fails |
handle_action(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *src, const u_char *p, u_int length)
{
if (!ND_TTEST2(*p, 2))
return 0;
if (length < 2)
return 0;
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": "));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (%s): ", etheraddr_string(ndo, src)));
}
switch (p[0]) {
case 0: ND_PRINT((ndo, "Spectrum Management Act#%d", p[1])); break;
case 1: ND_PRINT((ndo, "QoS Act#%d", p[1])); break;
case 2: ND_PRINT((ndo, "DLS Act#%d", p[1])); break;
case 3: ND_PRINT((ndo, "BA ")); PRINT_BA_ACTION(p[1]); break;
case 7: ND_PRINT((ndo, "HT ")); PRINT_HT_ACTION(p[1]); break;
case 13: ND_PRINT((ndo, "MeshAction ")); PRINT_MESH_ACTION(p[1]); break;
case 14:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "MultiohopAction "));
PRINT_MULTIHOP_ACTION(p[1]); break;
case 15:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "SelfprotectAction "));
PRINT_SELFPROT_ACTION(p[1]); break;
case 127: ND_PRINT((ndo, "Vendor Act#%d", p[1])); break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Reserved(%d) Act#%d", p[0], p[1]));
break;
}
return 1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | tcpdump | 4846b3c5d0a850e860baf4f07340495d29837d09 | 292,563,149,120,038,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 | (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16227/IEEE 802.11: add a missing bounds check
ieee802_11_print() tried to access the Mesh Flags subfield of the Mesh
Control field to find the size of the latter and increment the expected
802.11 header length before checking it is fully present in the input
buffer. Add an intermediate bounds check to make it safe.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Ryan Ackroyd.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). |
__i915_mm_struct_free__worker(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct i915_mm_struct *mm = container_of(work, typeof(*mm), work);
i915_mmu_notifier_free(mm->mn, mm->mm);
mmdrop(mm->mm);
kfree(mm);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-362"
] | linux | 17839856fd588f4ab6b789f482ed3ffd7c403e1f | 217,988,891,892,438,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | gup: document and work around "COW can break either way" issue
Doing a "get_user_pages()" on a copy-on-write page for reading can be
ambiguous: the page can be COW'ed at any time afterwards, and the
direction of a COW event isn't defined.
Yes, whoever writes to it will generally do the COW, but if the thread
that did the get_user_pages() unmapped the page before the write (and
that could happen due to memory pressure in addition to any outright
action), the writer could also just take over the old page instead.
End result: the get_user_pages() call might result in a page pointer
that is no longer associated with the original VM, and is associated
with - and controlled by - another VM having taken it over instead.
So when doing a get_user_pages() on a COW mapping, the only really safe
thing to do would be to break the COW when getting the page, even when
only getting it for reading.
At the same time, some users simply don't even care.
For example, the perf code wants to look up the page not because it
cares about the page, but because the code simply wants to look up the
physical address of the access for informational purposes, and doesn't
really care about races when a page might be unmapped and remapped
elsewhere.
This adds logic to force a COW event by setting FOLL_WRITE on any
copy-on-write mapping when FOLL_GET (or FOLL_PIN) is used to get a page
pointer as a result.
The current semantics end up being:
- __get_user_pages_fast(): no change. If you don't ask for a write,
you won't break COW. You'd better know what you're doing.
- get_user_pages_fast(): the fast-case "look it up in the page tables
without anything getting mmap_sem" now refuses to follow a read-only
page, since it might need COW breaking. Which happens in the slow
path - the fast path doesn't know if the memory might be COW or not.
- get_user_pages() (including the slow-path fallback for gup_fast()):
for a COW mapping, turn on FOLL_WRITE for FOLL_GET/FOLL_PIN, with
very similar semantics to FOLL_FORCE.
If it turns out that we want finer granularity (ie "only break COW when
it might actually matter" - things like the zero page are special and
don't need to be broken) we might need to push these semantics deeper
into the lookup fault path. So if people care enough, it's possible
that we might end up adding a new internal FOLL_BREAK_COW flag to go
with the internal FOLL_COW flag we already have for tracking "I had a
COW".
Alternatively, if it turns out that different callers might want to
explicitly control the forced COW break behavior, we might even want to
make such a flag visible to the users of get_user_pages() instead of
using the above default semantics.
But for now, this is mostly commentary on the issue (this commit message
being a lot bigger than the patch, and that patch in turn is almost all
comments), with that minimal "enable COW breaking early" logic using the
existing FOLL_WRITE behavior.
[ It might be worth noting that we've always had this ambiguity, and it
could arguably be seen as a user-space issue.
You only get private COW mappings that could break either way in
situations where user space is doing cooperative things (ie fork()
before an execve() etc), but it _is_ surprising and very subtle, and
fork() is supposed to give you independent address spaces.
So let's treat this as a kernel issue and make the semantics of
get_user_pages() easier to understand. Note that obviously a true
shared mapping will still get a page that can change under us, so this
does _not_ mean that get_user_pages() somehow returns any "stable"
page ]
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kirill Shutemov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
int dd_exist(const struct dump_dir *dd, const char *path)
{
if (!str_is_correct_filename(path))
error_msg_and_die("Cannot test existence. '%s' is not a valid file name", path);
char *full_path = concat_path_file(dd->dd_dirname, path);
int ret = exist_file_dir(full_path);
free(full_path);
return ret;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-20"
] | libreport | 1951e7282043dfe1268d492aea056b554baedb75 | 308,016,644,173,683,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | lib: fix races in dump directory handling code
Florian Weimer <[email protected]>:
dd_opendir() should keep a file handle (opened with O_DIRECTORY) and
use openat() and similar functions to access files in it.
...
The file system manipulation functions should guard against hard
links (check that link count is <= 1, just as in the user coredump
code in abrt-hook-ccpp), possibly after opening the file
with O_PATH first to avoid side effects on open/close.
Related: #1214745
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <[email protected]> |
static int imap_mbox_close(struct Context *ctx)
{
struct ImapData *idata = ctx->data;
/* Check to see if the mailbox is actually open */
if (!idata)
return 0;
/* imap_mbox_open_append() borrows the struct ImapData temporarily,
* just for the connection, but does not set idata->ctx to the
* open-append ctx.
*
* So when these are equal, it means we are actually closing the
* mailbox and should clean up idata. Otherwise, we don't want to
* touch idata - it's still being used.
*/
if (ctx == idata->ctx)
{
if (idata->status != IMAP_FATAL && idata->state >= IMAP_SELECTED)
{
/* mx_mbox_close won't sync if there are no deleted messages
* and the mailbox is unchanged, so we may have to close here */
if (!ctx->deleted)
imap_exec(idata, "CLOSE", IMAP_CMD_QUEUE);
idata->state = IMAP_AUTHENTICATED;
}
idata->reopen &= IMAP_REOPEN_ALLOW;
FREE(&(idata->mailbox));
mutt_list_free(&idata->flags);
idata->ctx = NULL;
mutt_hash_destroy(&idata->uid_hash);
FREE(&idata->msn_index);
idata->msn_index_size = 0;
idata->max_msn = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < IMAP_CACHE_LEN; i++)
{
if (idata->cache[i].path)
{
unlink(idata->cache[i].path);
FREE(&idata->cache[i].path);
}
}
mutt_bcache_close(&idata->bcache);
}
/* free IMAP part of headers */
for (int i = 0; i < ctx->msgcount; i++)
{
/* mailbox may not have fully loaded */
if (ctx->hdrs[i] && ctx->hdrs[i]->data)
imap_free_header_data((struct ImapHeaderData **) &(ctx->hdrs[i]->data));
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-78",
"CWE-77"
] | neomutt | 95e80bf9ff10f68cb6443f760b85df4117cb15eb | 30,506,958,168,108,427,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 58 | Quote path in imap_subscribe |
static void enable_safe_renegotiation(gnutls_priority_t c)
{
c->sr = SR_SAFE;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-310"
] | gnutls | 21f89efad7014a5ee0debd4cd3d59e27774b29e6 | 196,297,470,669,387,580,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | handshake: add FALLBACK_SCSV priority option
This allows clients to enable the TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV mechanism during
the handshake, as defined in RFC7507. |
g_tls_connection_base_ever_handshaked (GTlsConnectionBase *tls)
{
GTlsConnectionBasePrivate *priv = g_tls_connection_base_get_instance_private (tls);
return priv->ever_handshaked;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-295"
] | glib-networking | 29513946809590c4912550f6f8620468f9836d94 | 210,659,716,639,236,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | Return bad identity error if identity is unset
When the server-identity property of GTlsClientConnection is unset, the
documentation sasy we need to fail the certificate verification with
G_TLS_CERTIFICATE_BAD_IDENTITY. This is important because otherwise,
it's easy for applications to fail to specify server identity.
Unfortunately, we did not correctly implement the intended, documented
behavior. When server identity is missing, we check the validity of the
TLS certificate, but do not check if it corresponds to the expected
server (since we have no expected server). Then we assume the identity
is good, instead of returning bad identity, as documented. This means,
for example, that evil.com can present a valid certificate issued to
evil.com, and we would happily accept it for paypal.com.
Fixes #135 |
ExprCreateBinary(enum expr_op_type op, ExprDef *left, ExprDef *right)
{
EXPR_CREATE(ExprBinary, expr, op, EXPR_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
if (op == EXPR_ASSIGN || left->expr.value_type == EXPR_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
expr->expr.value_type = right->expr.value_type;
else if (left->expr.value_type == right->expr.value_type ||
right->expr.value_type == EXPR_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
expr->expr.value_type = left->expr.value_type;
expr->binary.left = left;
expr->binary.right = right;
return expr;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | libxkbcommon | e3cacae7b1bfda0d839c280494f23284a1187adf | 55,204,636,818,888,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | xkbcomp: fix crashes in the parser when geometry tokens appear
In the XKB format, floats and various keywords can only be used in the
xkb_geometry section. xkbcommon removed support xkb_geometry, but still
parses it for backward compatibility. As part of ignoring it, the float
AST node and various keywords were removed, and instead NULL was
returned by their parsing actions. However, the rest of the code does
not handle NULLs, and so when they appear crashes usually ensue.
To fix this, restore the float AST node and the ignored keywords. None
of the evaluating code expects them, so nice error are displayed.
Caught with the afl fuzzer.
Signed-off-by: Ran Benita <[email protected]> |
get_original_tty_job_signals ()
{
static int fetched = 0;
if (fetched == 0)
{
if (interactive_shell)
{
set_original_signal (SIGTSTP, SIG_DFL);
set_original_signal (SIGTTIN, SIG_DFL);
set_original_signal (SIGTTOU, SIG_DFL);
}
else
{
get_original_signal (SIGTSTP);
get_original_signal (SIGTTIN);
get_original_signal (SIGTTOU);
}
fetched = 1;
}
} | 0 | [] | bash | 955543877583837c85470f7fb8a97b7aa8d45e6c | 194,871,678,540,212,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | bash-4.4-rc2 release |
con_ready_write(void *ctx) {
agooCon c = (agooCon)ctx;
agooRes res = agoo_con_res_peek(c);
if (NULL != res) {
agooConKind kind = res->con_kind;
if (NULL != c->bind->write) {
if (c->bind->write(c)) {
//if (kind != c->kind && AGOO_CON_ANY != kind) {
if (AGOO_CON_ANY != kind) {
switch (kind) {
case AGOO_CON_WS:
c->bind = &ws_bind;
break;
case AGOO_CON_SSE:
c->bind = &sse_bind;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
return true;
}
}
}
c->dead = true;
return false;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-444",
"CWE-61"
] | agoo | 23d03535cf7b50d679a60a953a0cae9519a4a130 | 253,440,549,872,322,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 | Remote addr (#99)
* REMOTE_ADDR added
* Ready for merge |
static void fdctrl_handle_relative_seek_out(FDCtrl *fdctrl, int direction)
{
FDrive *cur_drv;
SET_CUR_DRV(fdctrl, fdctrl->fifo[1] & FD_DOR_SELMASK);
cur_drv = get_cur_drv(fdctrl);
if (fdctrl->fifo[2] > cur_drv->track) {
fd_seek(cur_drv, cur_drv->head, 0, cur_drv->sect, 1);
} else {
fd_seek(cur_drv, cur_drv->head,
cur_drv->track - fdctrl->fifo[2], cur_drv->sect, 1);
}
fdctrl_reset_fifo(fdctrl);
/* Raise Interrupt */
fdctrl->status0 |= FD_SR0_SEEK;
fdctrl_raise_irq(fdctrl);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | qemu | e907746266721f305d67bc0718795fedee2e824c | 20,740,997,884,001,373,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | fdc: force the fifo access to be in bounds of the allocated buffer
During processing of certain commands such as FD_CMD_READ_ID and
FD_CMD_DRIVE_SPECIFICATION_COMMAND the fifo memory access could
get out of bounds leading to memory corruption with values coming
from the guest.
Fix this by making sure that the index is always bounded by the
allocated memory.
This is CVE-2015-3456.
Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Snow <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John Snow <[email protected]> |
std::function<void(std::function<void()>)>* KernelAndDevice::get_runner()
const {
if (runner_) {
return runner_;
} else {
static auto* default_runner =
new std::function<void(std::function<void()>)>(
[](const std::function<void()>& f) { f(); });
return default_runner;
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476",
"CWE-369"
] | tensorflow | da8558533d925694483d2c136a9220d6d49d843c | 55,546,901,054,031,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | Fix undefined behavior in `tf.raw_ops.Switch` in eager mode.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 332578058
Change-Id: I9727571d2f21476b10d8aa27c1b7176564b76ac9 |
string_to_uint64 (const char *str, guint64 *value)
{
char *endptr;
*value = g_ascii_strtoull (str, &endptr, 10);
return endptr != str;
} | 0 | [] | gvfs | f81ff2108ab3b6e370f20dcadd8708d23f499184 | 46,840,498,853,772,680,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | dav: don't unescape the uri twice
path_equal tries to unescape path before comparing. Unfortunately
this function is used also for already unescaped paths. Therefore
unescaping can fail. This commit reverts changes which was done in
commit 50af53d and unescape just uris, which aren't unescaped yet.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=743298 |
static void ioat1_dma_free_chan_resources(struct dma_chan *c)
{
struct ioat_dma_chan *ioat = to_ioat_chan(c);
struct ioat_chan_common *chan = &ioat->base;
struct ioatdma_device *ioatdma_device = chan->device;
struct ioat_desc_sw *desc, *_desc;
int in_use_descs = 0;
/* Before freeing channel resources first check
* if they have been previously allocated for this channel.
*/
if (ioat->desccount == 0)
return;
ioat_stop(chan);
/* Delay 100ms after reset to allow internal DMA logic to quiesce
* before removing DMA descriptor resources.
*/
writeb(IOAT_CHANCMD_RESET,
chan->reg_base + IOAT_CHANCMD_OFFSET(chan->device->version));
mdelay(100);
spin_lock_bh(&ioat->desc_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(desc, _desc, &ioat->used_desc, node) {
dev_dbg(to_dev(chan), "%s: freeing %d from used list\n",
__func__, desc_id(desc));
dump_desc_dbg(ioat, desc);
in_use_descs++;
list_del(&desc->node);
pci_pool_free(ioatdma_device->dma_pool, desc->hw,
desc->txd.phys);
kfree(desc);
}
list_for_each_entry_safe(desc, _desc,
&ioat->free_desc, node) {
list_del(&desc->node);
pci_pool_free(ioatdma_device->dma_pool, desc->hw,
desc->txd.phys);
kfree(desc);
}
spin_unlock_bh(&ioat->desc_lock);
pci_pool_free(ioatdma_device->completion_pool,
chan->completion,
chan->completion_dma);
/* one is ok since we left it on there on purpose */
if (in_use_descs > 1)
dev_err(to_dev(chan), "Freeing %d in use descriptors!\n",
in_use_descs - 1);
chan->last_completion = 0;
chan->completion_dma = 0;
ioat->pending = 0;
ioat->desccount = 0;
} | 0 | [] | linux | 7bced397510ab569d31de4c70b39e13355046387 | 148,167,881,790,026,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 57 | net_dma: simple removal
Per commit "77873803363c net_dma: mark broken" net_dma is no longer used
and there is no plan to fix it.
This is the mechanical removal of bits in CONFIG_NET_DMA ifdef guards.
Reverting the remainder of the net_dma induced changes is deferred to
subsequent patches.
Marked for stable due to Roman's report of a memory leak in
dma_pin_iovec_pages():
https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/9/3/177
Cc: Dave Jiang <[email protected]>
Cc: Vinod Koul <[email protected]>
Cc: David Whipple <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]> |
int bdrv_parse_cache_flags(const char *mode, int *flags)
{
*flags &= ~BDRV_O_CACHE_MASK;
if (!strcmp(mode, "off") || !strcmp(mode, "none")) {
*flags |= BDRV_O_NOCACHE | BDRV_O_CACHE_WB;
} else if (!strcmp(mode, "directsync")) {
*flags |= BDRV_O_NOCACHE;
} else if (!strcmp(mode, "writeback")) {
*flags |= BDRV_O_CACHE_WB;
} else if (!strcmp(mode, "unsafe")) {
*flags |= BDRV_O_CACHE_WB;
*flags |= BDRV_O_NO_FLUSH;
} else if (!strcmp(mode, "writethrough")) {
/* this is the default */
} else {
return -1;
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | qemu | 8f4754ede56e3f9ea3fd7207f4a7c4453e59285b | 260,947,471,938,521,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | block: Limit request size (CVE-2014-0143)
Limiting the size of a single request to INT_MAX not only fixes a
direct integer overflow in bdrv_check_request() (which would only
trigger bad behaviour with ridiculously huge images, as in close to
2^64 bytes), but can also prevent overflows in all block drivers.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]> |
SECURITY_STATUS ntlm_read_ChallengeMessage(NTLM_CONTEXT* context, PSecBuffer buffer)
{
wStream* s;
int length;
PBYTE StartOffset;
PBYTE PayloadOffset;
NTLM_AV_PAIR* AvTimestamp;
NTLM_CHALLENGE_MESSAGE* message;
ntlm_generate_client_challenge(context);
message = &context->CHALLENGE_MESSAGE;
ZeroMemory(message, sizeof(NTLM_CHALLENGE_MESSAGE));
s = Stream_New((BYTE*)buffer->pvBuffer, buffer->cbBuffer);
if (!s)
return SEC_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
StartOffset = Stream_Pointer(s);
if (ntlm_read_message_header(s, (NTLM_MESSAGE_HEADER*)message) < 0)
{
Stream_Free(s, FALSE);
return SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
}
if (message->MessageType != MESSAGE_TYPE_CHALLENGE)
{
Stream_Free(s, FALSE);
return SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
}
if (ntlm_read_message_fields(s, &(message->TargetName)) < 0) /* TargetNameFields (8 bytes) */
{
Stream_Free(s, FALSE);
return SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
}
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 4)
{
Stream_Free(s, FALSE);
return SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
}
Stream_Read_UINT32(s, message->NegotiateFlags); /* NegotiateFlags (4 bytes) */
context->NegotiateFlags = message->NegotiateFlags;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 8)
{
Stream_Free(s, FALSE);
return SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
}
Stream_Read(s, message->ServerChallenge, 8); /* ServerChallenge (8 bytes) */
CopyMemory(context->ServerChallenge, message->ServerChallenge, 8);
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 8)
{
Stream_Free(s, FALSE);
return SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
}
Stream_Read(s, message->Reserved, 8); /* Reserved (8 bytes), should be ignored */
if (ntlm_read_message_fields(s, &(message->TargetInfo)) < 0) /* TargetInfoFields (8 bytes) */
{
Stream_Free(s, FALSE);
return SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
}
if (context->NegotiateFlags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_VERSION)
{
if (ntlm_read_version_info(s, &(message->Version)) < 0) /* Version (8 bytes) */
{
Stream_Free(s, FALSE);
return SEC_E_INVALID_TOKEN;
}
}
/* Payload (variable) */
PayloadOffset = Stream_Pointer(s);
if (message->TargetName.Len > 0)
{
if (ntlm_read_message_fields_buffer(s, &(message->TargetName)) < 0)
{
Stream_Free(s, FALSE);
return SEC_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
}
if (message->TargetInfo.Len > 0)
{
size_t cbAvTimestamp;
if (ntlm_read_message_fields_buffer(s, &(message->TargetInfo)) < 0)
{
Stream_Free(s, FALSE);
return SEC_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
context->ChallengeTargetInfo.pvBuffer = message->TargetInfo.Buffer;
context->ChallengeTargetInfo.cbBuffer = message->TargetInfo.Len;
AvTimestamp = ntlm_av_pair_get((NTLM_AV_PAIR*)message->TargetInfo.Buffer,
message->TargetInfo.Len, MsvAvTimestamp, &cbAvTimestamp);
if (AvTimestamp)
{
PBYTE ptr = ntlm_av_pair_get_value_pointer(AvTimestamp);
if (!ptr)
return SEC_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (context->NTLMv2)
context->UseMIC = TRUE;
CopyMemory(context->ChallengeTimestamp, ptr, 8);
}
}
length = (PayloadOffset - StartOffset) + message->TargetName.Len + message->TargetInfo.Len;
if (!sspi_SecBufferAlloc(&context->ChallengeMessage, length))
{
Stream_Free(s, FALSE);
return SEC_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
CopyMemory(context->ChallengeMessage.pvBuffer, StartOffset, length);
#ifdef WITH_DEBUG_NTLM
WLog_DBG(TAG, "CHALLENGE_MESSAGE (length = %d)", length);
winpr_HexDump(TAG, WLOG_DEBUG, context->ChallengeMessage.pvBuffer,
context->ChallengeMessage.cbBuffer);
ntlm_print_negotiate_flags(context->NegotiateFlags);
if (context->NegotiateFlags & NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_VERSION)
ntlm_print_version_info(&(message->Version));
ntlm_print_message_fields(&(message->TargetName), "TargetName");
ntlm_print_message_fields(&(message->TargetInfo), "TargetInfo");
if (context->ChallengeTargetInfo.cbBuffer > 0)
{
WLog_DBG(TAG, "ChallengeTargetInfo (%" PRIu32 "):", context->ChallengeTargetInfo.cbBuffer);
ntlm_print_av_pair_list(context->ChallengeTargetInfo.pvBuffer,
context->ChallengeTargetInfo.cbBuffer);
}
#endif
/* AV_PAIRs */
if (context->NTLMv2)
{
if (ntlm_construct_authenticate_target_info(context) < 0)
{
Stream_Free(s, FALSE);
return SEC_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
sspi_SecBufferFree(&context->ChallengeTargetInfo);
context->ChallengeTargetInfo.pvBuffer = context->AuthenticateTargetInfo.pvBuffer;
context->ChallengeTargetInfo.cbBuffer = context->AuthenticateTargetInfo.cbBuffer;
}
ntlm_generate_timestamp(context); /* Timestamp */
if (ntlm_compute_lm_v2_response(context) < 0) /* LmChallengeResponse */
{
Stream_Free(s, FALSE);
return SEC_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (ntlm_compute_ntlm_v2_response(context) < 0) /* NtChallengeResponse */
{
Stream_Free(s, FALSE);
return SEC_E_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
ntlm_generate_key_exchange_key(context); /* KeyExchangeKey */
ntlm_generate_random_session_key(context); /* RandomSessionKey */
ntlm_generate_exported_session_key(context); /* ExportedSessionKey */
ntlm_encrypt_random_session_key(context); /* EncryptedRandomSessionKey */
/* Generate signing keys */
ntlm_generate_client_signing_key(context);
ntlm_generate_server_signing_key(context);
/* Generate sealing keys */
ntlm_generate_client_sealing_key(context);
ntlm_generate_server_sealing_key(context);
/* Initialize RC4 seal state using client sealing key */
ntlm_init_rc4_seal_states(context);
#ifdef WITH_DEBUG_NTLM
WLog_DBG(TAG, "ClientChallenge");
winpr_HexDump(TAG, WLOG_DEBUG, context->ClientChallenge, 8);
WLog_DBG(TAG, "ServerChallenge");
winpr_HexDump(TAG, WLOG_DEBUG, context->ServerChallenge, 8);
WLog_DBG(TAG, "SessionBaseKey");
winpr_HexDump(TAG, WLOG_DEBUG, context->SessionBaseKey, 16);
WLog_DBG(TAG, "KeyExchangeKey");
winpr_HexDump(TAG, WLOG_DEBUG, context->KeyExchangeKey, 16);
WLog_DBG(TAG, "ExportedSessionKey");
winpr_HexDump(TAG, WLOG_DEBUG, context->ExportedSessionKey, 16);
WLog_DBG(TAG, "RandomSessionKey");
winpr_HexDump(TAG, WLOG_DEBUG, context->RandomSessionKey, 16);
WLog_DBG(TAG, "ClientSigningKey");
winpr_HexDump(TAG, WLOG_DEBUG, context->ClientSigningKey, 16);
WLog_DBG(TAG, "ClientSealingKey");
winpr_HexDump(TAG, WLOG_DEBUG, context->ClientSealingKey, 16);
WLog_DBG(TAG, "ServerSigningKey");
winpr_HexDump(TAG, WLOG_DEBUG, context->ServerSigningKey, 16);
WLog_DBG(TAG, "ServerSealingKey");
winpr_HexDump(TAG, WLOG_DEBUG, context->ServerSealingKey, 16);
WLog_DBG(TAG, "Timestamp");
winpr_HexDump(TAG, WLOG_DEBUG, context->Timestamp, 8);
#endif
context->state = NTLM_STATE_AUTHENTICATE;
ntlm_free_message_fields_buffer(&(message->TargetName));
Stream_Free(s, FALSE);
return SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-125"
] | FreeRDP | 48361c411e50826cb602c7aab773a8a20e1da6bc | 312,440,514,072,414,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 217 | Fixed GHSL-2020-100: oob read in ntlm_read_ChallengeMessage
* Added length checks for data read from stream
* Unified function resource cleanup
(cherry picked from commit 8357dedbbf7213b7d0d18f1026145b9a5b92235a) |
static void ttm_pool_kobj_release(struct kobject *kobj)
{
struct ttm_pool_manager *m =
container_of(kobj, struct ttm_pool_manager, kobj);
kfree(m);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | linux | 453393369dc9806d2455151e329c599684762428 | 104,832,472,282,905,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | drm/ttm: fix incrementing the page pointer for huge pages
When we increment the counter we need to increment the pointer as well.
Signed-off-by: Christian König <[email protected]>
Fixes: e16858a7e6e7 drm/ttm: fix start page for huge page check in ttm_put_pages()
Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Huang Rui <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]> |
art_pdf_union_8(byte alpha1, byte alpha2)
{
int tmp;
tmp = (0xff - alpha1) * (0xff - alpha2) + 0x80;
return 0xff - ((tmp + (tmp >> 8)) >> 8);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | ghostpdl | 7870f4951bcc6a153f317e3439e14d0e929fd231 | 185,669,945,290,206,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | Bug 701795: Segv due to image mask issue |
static int ext4_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct vfsmount *vfs)
{
int def_errors;
unsigned long def_mount_opts;
struct super_block *sb = vfs->mnt_sb;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
struct ext4_super_block *es = sbi->s_es;
def_mount_opts = le32_to_cpu(es->s_default_mount_opts);
def_errors = le16_to_cpu(es->s_errors);
if (sbi->s_sb_block != 1)
seq_printf(seq, ",sb=%llu", sbi->s_sb_block);
if (test_opt(sb, MINIX_DF))
seq_puts(seq, ",minixdf");
if (test_opt(sb, GRPID) && !(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BSDGROUPS))
seq_puts(seq, ",grpid");
if (!test_opt(sb, GRPID) && (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_BSDGROUPS))
seq_puts(seq, ",nogrpid");
if (sbi->s_resuid != EXT4_DEF_RESUID ||
le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resuid) != EXT4_DEF_RESUID) {
seq_printf(seq, ",resuid=%u", sbi->s_resuid);
}
if (sbi->s_resgid != EXT4_DEF_RESGID ||
le16_to_cpu(es->s_def_resgid) != EXT4_DEF_RESGID) {
seq_printf(seq, ",resgid=%u", sbi->s_resgid);
}
if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_RO)) {
if (def_errors == EXT4_ERRORS_PANIC ||
def_errors == EXT4_ERRORS_CONTINUE) {
seq_puts(seq, ",errors=remount-ro");
}
}
if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_CONT) && def_errors != EXT4_ERRORS_CONTINUE)
seq_puts(seq, ",errors=continue");
if (test_opt(sb, ERRORS_PANIC) && def_errors != EXT4_ERRORS_PANIC)
seq_puts(seq, ",errors=panic");
if (test_opt(sb, NO_UID32) && !(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_UID16))
seq_puts(seq, ",nouid32");
if (test_opt(sb, DEBUG) && !(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_DEBUG))
seq_puts(seq, ",debug");
if (test_opt(sb, OLDALLOC))
seq_puts(seq, ",oldalloc");
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_XATTR
if (test_opt(sb, XATTR_USER) &&
!(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_XATTR_USER))
seq_puts(seq, ",user_xattr");
if (!test_opt(sb, XATTR_USER) &&
(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_XATTR_USER)) {
seq_puts(seq, ",nouser_xattr");
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL
if (test_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL) && !(def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_ACL))
seq_puts(seq, ",acl");
if (!test_opt(sb, POSIX_ACL) && (def_mount_opts & EXT4_DEFM_ACL))
seq_puts(seq, ",noacl");
#endif
if (sbi->s_commit_interval != JBD2_DEFAULT_MAX_COMMIT_AGE*HZ) {
seq_printf(seq, ",commit=%u",
(unsigned) (sbi->s_commit_interval / HZ));
}
if (sbi->s_min_batch_time != EXT4_DEF_MIN_BATCH_TIME) {
seq_printf(seq, ",min_batch_time=%u",
(unsigned) sbi->s_min_batch_time);
}
if (sbi->s_max_batch_time != EXT4_DEF_MAX_BATCH_TIME) {
seq_printf(seq, ",max_batch_time=%u",
(unsigned) sbi->s_min_batch_time);
}
/*
* We're changing the default of barrier mount option, so
* let's always display its mount state so it's clear what its
* status is.
*/
seq_puts(seq, ",barrier=");
seq_puts(seq, test_opt(sb, BARRIER) ? "1" : "0");
if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_ASYNC_COMMIT))
seq_puts(seq, ",journal_async_commit");
if (test_opt(sb, NOBH))
seq_puts(seq, ",nobh");
if (test_opt(sb, I_VERSION))
seq_puts(seq, ",i_version");
if (!test_opt(sb, DELALLOC))
seq_puts(seq, ",nodelalloc");
if (sbi->s_stripe)
seq_printf(seq, ",stripe=%lu", sbi->s_stripe);
/*
* journal mode get enabled in different ways
* So just print the value even if we didn't specify it
*/
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_DATA)
seq_puts(seq, ",data=journal");
else if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_ORDERED_DATA)
seq_puts(seq, ",data=ordered");
else if (test_opt(sb, DATA_FLAGS) == EXT4_MOUNT_WRITEBACK_DATA)
seq_puts(seq, ",data=writeback");
if (sbi->s_inode_readahead_blks != EXT4_DEF_INODE_READAHEAD_BLKS)
seq_printf(seq, ",inode_readahead_blks=%u",
sbi->s_inode_readahead_blks);
if (test_opt(sb, DATA_ERR_ABORT))
seq_puts(seq, ",data_err=abort");
if (test_opt(sb, NO_AUTO_DA_ALLOC))
seq_puts(seq, ",noauto_da_alloc");
if (test_opt(sb, DISCARD))
seq_puts(seq, ",discard");
if (test_opt(sb, NOLOAD))
seq_puts(seq, ",norecovery");
ext4_show_quota_options(seq, sb);
return 0;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-703"
] | linux | 744692dc059845b2a3022119871846e74d4f6e11 | 115,940,446,609,926,410,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 121 | ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]> |
static int cardos_check_sw(sc_card_t *card, unsigned int sw1, unsigned int sw2)
{
const int err_count = sizeof(cardos_errors)/sizeof(cardos_errors[0]);
int i;
for (i = 0; i < err_count; i++) {
if (cardos_errors[i].SWs == ((sw1 << 8) | sw2)) {
if ( cardos_errors[i].errorstr )
sc_log(card->ctx, "%s\n",
cardos_errors[i].errorstr);
return cardos_errors[i].errorno;
}
}
sc_log(card->ctx, "Unknown SWs; SW1=%02X, SW2=%02X\n", sw1, sw2);
return SC_ERROR_CARD_CMD_FAILED;
} | 0 | [] | OpenSC | 1252aca9f10771ef5ba8405e73cf2da50827958f | 229,718,762,183,289,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | cardos: Correctly calculate the left bytes to avoid buffer overrun
Thanks oss-fuzz
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=29912 |
static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
{
if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
return 0;
return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
} | 0 | [] | openssl | 80bd7b41b30af6ee96f519e629463583318de3b0 | 123,013,533,083,928,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | Fix SRP ciphersuite DoS vulnerability.
If a client attempted to use an SRP ciphersuite and it had not been
set up correctly it would crash with a null pointer read. A malicious
server could exploit this in a DoS attack.
Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki from Codenomicon
for reporting this issue.
CVE-2014-2970
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <[email protected]> |
void flxs_box_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_AdobeFlashAccessParamsBox *ptr = (GF_AdobeFlashAccessParamsBox*)s;
if (!ptr) return;
if (ptr->metadata)
gf_free(ptr->metadata);
gf_free(ptr);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | gpac | f19668964bf422cf5a63e4dbe1d3c6c75edadcbb | 302,574,482,434,445,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | fixed #1879 |
minimask_equal(const struct minimask *a, const struct minimask *b)
{
return !memcmp(a, b, sizeof *a
+ MINIFLOW_VALUES_SIZE(miniflow_n_values(&a->masks)));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400"
] | ovs | abd7a457652e6734902720fe6a5dddb3fc0d1e3b | 233,255,251,793,315,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | flow: Support extra padding length.
Although not required, padding can be optionally added until
the packet length is MTU bytes. A packet with extra padding
currently fails sanity checks.
Vulnerability: CVE-2020-35498
Fixes: fa8d9001a624 ("miniflow_extract: Properly handle small IP packets.")
Reported-by: Joakim Hindersson <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ilya Maximets <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Flavio Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <[email protected]> |
const std::string &get_cached_date() {
auto t = ev_now(loop_);
if (t != tstamp_cached_) {
tstamp_cached_ = t;
update_cached_date();
}
return cached_date_;
} | 0 | [] | nghttp2 | 95efb3e19d174354ca50c65d5d7227d92bcd60e1 | 231,668,962,866,776,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | Don't read too greedily |
static int ldb_kv_sub_transaction_commit(struct ldb_kv_private *ldb_kv)
{
int ret = LDB_SUCCESS;
if (ldb_kv->batch_mode) {
return ret;
}
ret = ldb_kv_index_sub_transaction_commit(ldb_kv);
if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
return ret;
}
ret = ldb_kv->kv_ops->finish_nested_write(ldb_kv);
return ret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | samba | 08c9016cb9f25105c39488770113a1b00f8a4223 | 224,551,389,372,311,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | CVE-2021-3670 ldb: Confirm the request has not yet timed out in ldb filter processing
The LDB filter processing is where the time is spent in the LDB stack
but the timeout event will not get run while this is ongoing, so we
must confirm we have not yet timed out manually.
RN: Ensure that the LDB request has not timed out during filter processing
as the LDAP server MaxQueryDuration is otherwise not honoured.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14694
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 1d5b155619bc532c46932965b215bd73a920e56f) |
static bool local_is_mapped_file_metadata(FsContext *fs_ctx, const char *name)
{
return !strcmp(name, VIRTFS_META_DIR);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-732"
] | qemu | 7a95434e0ca8a037fd8aa1a2e2461f92585eb77b | 30,109,847,676,770,520,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | 9pfs: local: forbid client access to metadata (CVE-2017-7493)
When using the mapped-file security mode, we shouldn't let the client mess
with the metadata. The current code already tries to hide the metadata dir
from the client by skipping it in local_readdir(). But the client can still
access or modify it through several other operations. This can be used to
escalate privileges in the guest.
Affected backend operations are:
- local_mknod()
- local_mkdir()
- local_open2()
- local_symlink()
- local_link()
- local_unlinkat()
- local_renameat()
- local_rename()
- local_name_to_path()
Other operations are safe because they are only passed a fid path, which
is computed internally in local_name_to_path().
This patch converts all the functions listed above to fail and return
EINVAL when being passed the name of the metadata dir. This may look
like a poor choice for errno, but there's no such thing as an illegal
path name on Linux and I could not think of anything better.
This fixes CVE-2017-7493.
Reported-by: Leo Gaspard <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <[email protected]> |
static void DrawBoundingRectangles(Image *image,const DrawInfo *draw_info,
const PolygonInfo *polygon_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
DrawInfo
*clone_info;
double
mid;
PointInfo
end,
resolution,
start;
PrimitiveInfo
primitive_info[6];
register ssize_t
i;
SegmentInfo
bounds;
ssize_t
coordinates;
clone_info=CloneDrawInfo((ImageInfo *) NULL,draw_info);
(void) QueryColorCompliance("#0000",AllCompliance,&clone_info->fill,
exception);
resolution.x=DefaultResolution;
resolution.y=DefaultResolution;
if (clone_info->density != (char *) NULL)
{
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
flags=ParseGeometry(clone_info->density,&geometry_info);
resolution.x=geometry_info.rho;
resolution.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == MagickFalse)
resolution.y=resolution.x;
}
mid=(resolution.x/72.0)*ExpandAffine(&clone_info->affine)*
clone_info->stroke_width/2.0;
bounds.x1=0.0;
bounds.y1=0.0;
bounds.x2=0.0;
bounds.y2=0.0;
if (polygon_info != (PolygonInfo *) NULL)
{
bounds=polygon_info->edges[0].bounds;
for (i=1; i < (ssize_t) polygon_info->number_edges; i++)
{
if (polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.x1 < (double) bounds.x1)
bounds.x1=polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.x1;
if (polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.y1 < (double) bounds.y1)
bounds.y1=polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.y1;
if (polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.x2 > (double) bounds.x2)
bounds.x2=polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.x2;
if (polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.y2 > (double) bounds.y2)
bounds.y2=polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.y2;
}
bounds.x1-=mid;
bounds.x1=bounds.x1 < 0.0 ? 0.0 : bounds.x1 >= (double)
image->columns ? (double) image->columns-1 : bounds.x1;
bounds.y1-=mid;
bounds.y1=bounds.y1 < 0.0 ? 0.0 : bounds.y1 >= (double)
image->rows ? (double) image->rows-1 : bounds.y1;
bounds.x2+=mid;
bounds.x2=bounds.x2 < 0.0 ? 0.0 : bounds.x2 >= (double)
image->columns ? (double) image->columns-1 : bounds.x2;
bounds.y2+=mid;
bounds.y2=bounds.y2 < 0.0 ? 0.0 : bounds.y2 >= (double)
image->rows ? (double) image->rows-1 : bounds.y2;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) polygon_info->number_edges; i++)
{
if (polygon_info->edges[i].direction != 0)
(void) QueryColorCompliance("red",AllCompliance,&clone_info->stroke,
exception);
else
(void) QueryColorCompliance("green",AllCompliance,&clone_info->stroke,
exception);
start.x=(double) (polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.x1-mid);
start.y=(double) (polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.y1-mid);
end.x=(double) (polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.x2+mid);
end.y=(double) (polygon_info->edges[i].bounds.y2+mid);
primitive_info[0].primitive=RectanglePrimitive;
TraceRectangle(primitive_info,start,end);
primitive_info[0].method=ReplaceMethod;
coordinates=(ssize_t) primitive_info[0].coordinates;
primitive_info[coordinates].primitive=UndefinedPrimitive;
(void) DrawPrimitive(image,clone_info,primitive_info,exception);
}
}
(void) QueryColorCompliance("blue",AllCompliance,&clone_info->stroke,
exception);
start.x=(double) (bounds.x1-mid);
start.y=(double) (bounds.y1-mid);
end.x=(double) (bounds.x2+mid);
end.y=(double) (bounds.y2+mid);
primitive_info[0].primitive=RectanglePrimitive;
TraceRectangle(primitive_info,start,end);
primitive_info[0].method=ReplaceMethod;
coordinates=(ssize_t) primitive_info[0].coordinates;
primitive_info[coordinates].primitive=UndefinedPrimitive;
(void) DrawPrimitive(image,clone_info,primitive_info,exception);
clone_info=DestroyDrawInfo(clone_info);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-399",
"CWE-119"
] | ImageMagick | 726812fa2fa7ce16bcf58f6e115f65427a1c0950 | 187,387,459,423,253,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 111 | Prevent buffer overflow in magick/draw.c |
static GF_Node *lsr_read_g(GF_LASeRCodec *lsr, Bool is_same)
{
GF_Node *elt = gf_node_new(lsr->sg, TAG_SVG_g);
if (is_same) {
if (lsr->prev_g) {
lsr_restore_base(lsr, (SVG_Element*) elt, lsr->prev_g, 0, 0);
} else {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_WARNING, GF_LOG_CODING, ("[LASeR] sameg coded in bitstream but no g defined !\n"));
}
lsr_read_id(lsr, elt);
} else {
lsr_read_id(lsr, elt);
lsr_read_rare_full(lsr, elt);
lsr_read_fill(lsr, elt);
lsr_read_stroke(lsr, elt);
lsr_read_eRR(lsr, elt);
lsr_read_any_attribute(lsr, elt, 1);
lsr->prev_g = (SVG_Element*)elt;
}
lsr_read_group_content(lsr, elt, is_same);
return elt;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | gpac | faa75edde3dfeba1e2cf6ffa48e45a50f1042096 | 168,645,974,916,556,490,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | fixed #2213 |
xfs_buf_lock(
struct xfs_buf *bp)
{
trace_xfs_buf_lock(bp, _RET_IP_);
if (atomic_read(&bp->b_pin_count) && (bp->b_flags & XBF_STALE))
xfs_log_force(bp->b_target->bt_mount, 0);
down(&bp->b_sema);
XB_SET_OWNER(bp);
trace_xfs_buf_lock_done(bp, _RET_IP_);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-703"
] | linux | eb178619f930fa2ba2348de332a1ff1c66a31424 | 227,435,434,971,277,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | xfs: fix _xfs_buf_find oops on blocks beyond the filesystem end
When _xfs_buf_find is passed an out of range address, it will fail
to find a relevant struct xfs_perag and oops with a null
dereference. This can happen when trying to walk a filesystem with a
metadata inode that has a partially corrupted extent map (i.e. the
block number returned is corrupt, but is otherwise intact) and we
try to read from the corrupted block address.
In this case, just fail the lookup. If it is readahead being issued,
it will simply not be done, but if it is real read that fails we
will get an error being reported. Ideally this case should result
in an EFSCORRUPTED error being reported, but we cannot return an
error through xfs_buf_read() or xfs_buf_get() so this lookup failure
may result in ENOMEM or EIO errors being reported instead.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ben Myers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <[email protected]> |
static void sdl_deserialize_encoder(encodePtr enc, sdlTypePtr *types, char **in)
{
int i;
WSDL_CACHE_GET_INT(enc->details.type, in);
enc->details.type_str = sdl_deserialize_string(in);
enc->details.ns = sdl_deserialize_string(in);
WSDL_CACHE_GET_INT(i, in);
enc->details.sdl_type = types[i];
enc->to_xml = sdl_guess_convert_xml;
enc->to_zval = sdl_guess_convert_zval;
if (enc->details.sdl_type == NULL) {
int ns_len = strlen(enc->details.ns);
int type_len = strlen(enc->details.type_str);
if (((ns_len == sizeof(SOAP_1_1_ENC_NAMESPACE)-1 &&
memcmp(enc->details.ns, SOAP_1_1_ENC_NAMESPACE, sizeof(SOAP_1_1_ENC_NAMESPACE)-1) == 0) ||
(ns_len == sizeof(SOAP_1_2_ENC_NAMESPACE)-1 &&
memcmp(enc->details.ns, SOAP_1_2_ENC_NAMESPACE, sizeof(SOAP_1_2_ENC_NAMESPACE)-1) == 0))) {
char *enc_nscat;
int enc_ns_len;
int enc_len;
encodePtr real_enc;
enc_ns_len = sizeof(XSD_NAMESPACE)-1;
enc_len = enc_ns_len + type_len + 1;
enc_nscat = emalloc(enc_len + 1);
memcpy(enc_nscat, XSD_NAMESPACE, sizeof(XSD_NAMESPACE)-1);
enc_nscat[enc_ns_len] = ':';
memcpy(enc_nscat+enc_ns_len+1, enc->details.type_str, type_len);
enc_nscat[enc_len] = '\0';
real_enc = get_encoder_ex(NULL, enc_nscat, enc_len);
efree(enc_nscat);
if (real_enc) {
enc->to_zval = real_enc->to_zval;
enc->to_xml = real_enc->to_xml;
}
}
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | php-src | 3c939e3f69955d087e0bb671868f7267dfb2a502 | 252,874,689,905,809,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 42 | Fix bug #80672 - Null Dereference in SoapClient |
void CLASS Canon_CameraSettings()
{
fseek(ifp, 10, SEEK_CUR);
imgdata.shootinginfo.DriveMode = get2();
get2();
imgdata.shootinginfo.FocusMode = get2();
fseek(ifp, 18, SEEK_CUR);
imgdata.shootinginfo.MeteringMode = get2();
get2();
imgdata.shootinginfo.AFPoint = get2();
imgdata.shootinginfo.ExposureMode = get2();
get2();
imgdata.lens.makernotes.LensID = get2();
imgdata.lens.makernotes.MaxFocal = get2();
imgdata.lens.makernotes.MinFocal = get2();
imgdata.lens.makernotes.CanonFocalUnits = get2();
if (imgdata.lens.makernotes.CanonFocalUnits > 1) {
imgdata.lens.makernotes.MaxFocal /= (float)imgdata.lens.makernotes.CanonFocalUnits;
imgdata.lens.makernotes.MinFocal /= (float)imgdata.lens.makernotes.CanonFocalUnits;
}
imgdata.lens.makernotes.MaxAp = _CanonConvertAperture(get2());
imgdata.lens.makernotes.MinAp = _CanonConvertAperture(get2());
fseek(ifp, 12, SEEK_CUR);
imgdata.shootinginfo.ImageStabilization = get2();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400"
] | LibRaw | e67a9862d10ebaa97712f532eca1eb5e2e410a22 | 53,928,105,291,800,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | Fixed Secunia Advisory SA86384
- possible infinite loop in unpacked_load_raw()
- possible infinite loop in parse_rollei()
- possible infinite loop in parse_sinar_ia()
Credits: Laurent Delosieres, Secunia Research at Flexera |
int sqlite3SelectWalkNoop(Walker *NotUsed, Select *NotUsed2){
UNUSED_PARAMETER2(NotUsed, NotUsed2);
return WRC_Continue;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | sqlite | e59c562b3f6894f84c715772c4b116d7b5c01348 | 51,353,577,338,637,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Fix a crash that could occur if a sub-select that uses both DISTINCT and window functions also used an ORDER BY that is the same as its select list.
FossilOrigin-Name: bcdd66c1691955c697f3d756c2b035acfe98f6aad72e90b0021bab6e9023b3ba |
bool Url::initializeForConnect(GURL&& url) {
// CONNECT requests can only contain "hostname:port"
// https://github.com/nodejs/http-parser/blob/d9275da4650fd1133ddc96480df32a9efe4b059b/http_parser.c#L2503-L2506.
if (!url.is_valid() || url.IsStandard()) {
return false;
}
const auto& parsed = url.parsed_for_possibly_invalid_spec();
// The parsed.scheme contains the URL's hostname (stored by GURL). While host and port have -1
// as its length.
if (parsed.scheme.len <= 0 || parsed.host.len > 0 || parsed.port.len > 0) {
return false;
}
host_and_port_ = url.possibly_invalid_spec();
const auto& parts = StringUtil::splitToken(host_and_port_, ":", /*keep_empty_string=*/true,
/*trim_whitespace=*/false);
if (parts.size() != 2 || static_cast<size_t>(parsed.scheme.len) != parts.at(0).size() ||
!validPortForConnect(parts.at(1))) {
return false;
}
return true;
} | 1 | [] | envoy | 3b5acb2f43548862dadb243de7cf3994986a8e04 | 293,403,361,851,472,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 | http, url: Bring back chromium_url and http_parser_parse_url (#198)
* Revert GURL as HTTP URL parser utility
This reverts:
1. commit c9c4709c844b90b9bb2935d784a428d667c9df7d
2. commit d828958b591a6d79f4b5fa608ece9962b7afbe32
3. commit 2d69e30c51f2418faf267aaa6c1126fce9948c62
Signed-off-by: Dhi Aurrahman <[email protected]> |
vrrp_no_accept_handler(__attribute__((unused)) vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_t *vrrp = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp);
vrrp->accept = false;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-59",
"CWE-61"
] | keepalived | 04f2d32871bb3b11d7dc024039952f2fe2750306 | 29,586,075,852,654,476,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]> |
xfs_ioc_fsgetxattra(
xfs_inode_t *ip,
void __user *arg)
{
struct fileattr fa;
xfs_ilock(ip, XFS_ILOCK_SHARED);
xfs_fill_fsxattr(ip, XFS_ATTR_FORK, &fa);
xfs_iunlock(ip, XFS_ILOCK_SHARED);
return copy_fsxattr_to_user(&fa, arg);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | linux | 983d8e60f50806f90534cc5373d0ce867e5aaf79 | 244,505,078,848,554,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | xfs: map unwritten blocks in XFS_IOC_{ALLOC,FREE}SP just like fallocate
The old ALLOCSP/FREESP ioctls in XFS can be used to preallocate space at
the end of files, just like fallocate and RESVSP. Make the behavior
consistent with the other ioctls.
Reported-by: Kirill Tkhai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <[email protected]> |
void Pipe::maybe_start_delay_thread()
{
if (!delay_thread) {
auto pos = msgr->cct->_conf->get_val<std::string>("ms_inject_delay_type").find(ceph_entity_type_name(connection_state->peer_type));
if (pos != string::npos) {
lsubdout(msgr->cct, ms, 1) << "setting up a delay queue on Pipe " << this << dendl;
delay_thread = new DelayedDelivery(this);
delay_thread->create("ms_pipe_delay");
}
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-284"
] | ceph | 5ead97120e07054d80623dada90a5cc764c28468 | 268,089,421,539,637,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | auth/cephx: add authorizer challenge
Allow the accepting side of a connection to reject an initial authorizer
with a random challenge. The connecting side then has to respond with an
updated authorizer proving they are able to decrypt the service's challenge
and that the new authorizer was produced for this specific connection
instance.
The accepting side requires this challenge and response unconditionally
if the client side advertises they have the feature bit. Servers wishing
to require this improved level of authentication simply have to require
the appropriate feature.
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit f80b848d3f830eb6dba50123e04385173fa4540b)
# Conflicts:
# src/auth/Auth.h
# src/auth/cephx/CephxProtocol.cc
# src/auth/cephx/CephxProtocol.h
# src/auth/none/AuthNoneProtocol.h
# src/msg/Dispatcher.h
# src/msg/async/AsyncConnection.cc
- const_iterator
- ::decode vs decode
- AsyncConnection ctor arg noise
- get_random_bytes(), not cct->random() |
void nested_load_control_from_vmcb12(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
struct vmcb_control_area *control)
{
copy_vmcb_control_area(&svm->nested.ctl, control);
/* Copy it here because nested_svm_check_controls will check it. */
svm->nested.ctl.asid = control->asid;
svm->nested.ctl.msrpm_base_pa &= ~0x0fffULL;
svm->nested.ctl.iopm_base_pa &= ~0x0fffULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-862"
] | kvm | 0f923e07124df069ba68d8bb12324398f4b6b709 | 61,678,652,960,570,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | KVM: nSVM: avoid picking up unsupported bits from L2 in int_ctl (CVE-2021-3653)
* Invert the mask of bits that we pick from L2 in
nested_vmcb02_prepare_control
* Invert and explicitly use VIRQ related bits bitmask in svm_clear_vintr
This fixes a security issue that allowed a malicious L1 to run L2 with
AVIC enabled, which allowed the L2 to exploit the uninitialized and enabled
AVIC to read/write the host physical memory at some offsets.
Fixes: 3d6368ef580a ("KVM: SVM: Add VMRUN handler")
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> |
GF_Box *aeib_box_new()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_AdobeEncryptionInfoBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_AEIB);
tmp->version = 1;
tmp->flags = 0;
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | gpac | f19668964bf422cf5a63e4dbe1d3c6c75edadcbb | 261,112,567,783,392,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | fixed #1879 |
start_monitoring_file_list (NautilusDirectory *directory)
{
DirectoryLoadState *state;
if (!directory->details->file_list_monitored)
{
g_assert (!directory->details->directory_load_in_progress);
directory->details->file_list_monitored = TRUE;
nautilus_file_list_ref (directory->details->file_list);
}
if (directory->details->directory_loaded ||
directory->details->directory_load_in_progress != NULL)
{
return;
}
if (!async_job_start (directory, "file list"))
{
return;
}
mark_all_files_unconfirmed (directory);
state = g_new0 (DirectoryLoadState, 1);
state->directory = directory;
state->cancellable = g_cancellable_new ();
state->load_mime_list_hash = istr_set_new ();
state->load_file_count = 0;
g_assert (directory->details->location != NULL);
state->load_directory_file =
nautilus_directory_get_corresponding_file (directory);
state->load_directory_file->details->loading_directory = TRUE;
#ifdef DEBUG_LOAD_DIRECTORY
g_message ("load_directory called to monitor file list of %p", directory->details->location);
#endif
directory->details->directory_load_in_progress = state;
g_file_enumerate_children_async (directory->details->location,
NAUTILUS_FILE_DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTES,
0, /* flags */
G_PRIORITY_DEFAULT, /* prio */
state->cancellable,
enumerate_children_callback,
state);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | nautilus | 1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0 | 199,486,184,678,489,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 50 | mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991 |
static struct nft_set *nft_set_lookup_byhandle(const struct nft_table *table,
const struct nlattr *nla,
u8 genmask)
{
struct nft_set *set;
list_for_each_entry(set, &table->sets, list) {
if (be64_to_cpu(nla_get_be64(nla)) == set->handle &&
nft_active_genmask(set, genmask))
return set;
}
return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-665"
] | linux | ad9f151e560b016b6ad3280b48e42fa11e1a5440 | 218,755,028,454,080,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | netfilter: nf_tables: initialize set before expression setup
nft_set_elem_expr_alloc() needs an initialized set if expression sets on
the NFT_EXPR_GC flag. Move set fields initialization before expression
setup.
[4512935.019450] ==================================================================
[4512935.019456] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in nft_set_elem_expr_alloc+0x84/0xd0 [nf_tables]
[4512935.019487] Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000070 by task nft/23532
[4512935.019494] CPU: 1 PID: 23532 Comm: nft Not tainted 5.12.0-rc4+ #48
[...]
[4512935.019502] Call Trace:
[4512935.019505] dump_stack+0x89/0xb4
[4512935.019512] ? nft_set_elem_expr_alloc+0x84/0xd0 [nf_tables]
[4512935.019536] ? nft_set_elem_expr_alloc+0x84/0xd0 [nf_tables]
[4512935.019560] kasan_report.cold.12+0x5f/0xd8
[4512935.019566] ? nft_set_elem_expr_alloc+0x84/0xd0 [nf_tables]
[4512935.019590] nft_set_elem_expr_alloc+0x84/0xd0 [nf_tables]
[4512935.019615] nf_tables_newset+0xc7f/0x1460 [nf_tables]
Reported-by: [email protected]
Fixes: 65038428b2c6 ("netfilter: nf_tables: allow to specify stateful expression in set definition")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> |
static int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
u32 exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason;
u32 vectoring_info = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
trace_kvm_exit(exit_reason, vcpu);
/* If guest state is invalid, start emulating */
if (vmx->emulation_required && emulate_invalid_guest_state)
return handle_invalid_guest_state(vcpu);
/* Access CR3 don't cause VMExit in paging mode, so we need
* to sync with guest real CR3. */
if (enable_ept && is_paging(vcpu))
vcpu->arch.cr3 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR3);
if (exit_reason & VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
vcpu->run->fail_entry.hardware_entry_failure_reason
= exit_reason;
return 0;
}
if (unlikely(vmx->fail)) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
vcpu->run->fail_entry.hardware_entry_failure_reason
= vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR);
return 0;
}
if ((vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
(exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI &&
exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION &&
exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH))
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: unexpected, valid vectoring info "
"(0x%x) and exit reason is 0x%x\n",
__func__, vectoring_info, exit_reason);
if (unlikely(!cpu_has_virtual_nmis() && vmx->soft_vnmi_blocked)) {
if (vmx_interrupt_allowed(vcpu)) {
vmx->soft_vnmi_blocked = 0;
} else if (vmx->vnmi_blocked_time > 1000000000LL &&
vcpu->arch.nmi_pending) {
/*
* This CPU don't support us in finding the end of an
* NMI-blocked window if the guest runs with IRQs
* disabled. So we pull the trigger after 1 s of
* futile waiting, but inform the user about this.
*/
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Breaking out of NMI-blocked "
"state on VCPU %d after 1 s timeout\n",
__func__, vcpu->vcpu_id);
vmx->soft_vnmi_blocked = 0;
}
}
if (exit_reason < kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers
&& kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_reason])
return kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_reason](vcpu);
else {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN;
vcpu->run->hw.hardware_exit_reason = exit_reason;
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400"
] | linux-2.6 | 9581d442b9058d3699b4be568b6e5eae38a41493 | 59,761,697,856,661,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 66 | KVM: Fix fs/gs reload oops with invalid ldt
kvm reloads the host's fs and gs blindly, however the underlying segment
descriptors may be invalid due to the user modifying the ldt after loading
them.
Fix by using the safe accessors (loadsegment() and load_gs_index()) instead
of home grown unsafe versions.
This is CVE-2010-3698.
KVM-Stable-Tag.
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]> |
my_decimal *Item_exists_subselect::val_decimal(my_decimal *decimal_value)
{
DBUG_ASSERT(fixed == 1);
if (!forced_const && exec())
reset();
int2my_decimal(E_DEC_FATAL_ERROR, value, 0, decimal_value);
return decimal_value;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-89"
] | server | 3c209bfc040ddfc41ece8357d772547432353fd2 | 193,050,391,931,447,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | MDEV-25994: Crash with union of my_decimal type in ORDER BY clause
When single-row subquery fails with "Subquery reutrns more than 1 row"
error, it will raise an error and return NULL.
On the other hand, Item_singlerow_subselect sets item->maybe_null=0
for table-less subqueries like "(SELECT not_null_value)" (*)
This discrepancy (item with maybe_null=0 returning NULL) causes the
code in Type_handler_decimal_result::make_sort_key_part() to crash.
Fixed this by allowing inference (*) only when the subquery is NOT a
UNION. |
static void free_kmem_cache_nodes(struct kmem_cache *s)
{
int node;
struct kmem_cache_node *n;
for_each_kmem_cache_node(s, node, n) {
s->node[node] = NULL;
kmem_cache_free(kmem_cache_node, n);
}
} | 0 | [] | linux | fd4d9c7d0c71866ec0c2825189ebd2ce35bd95b8 | 204,152,787,817,917,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | mm: slub: add missing TID bump in kmem_cache_alloc_bulk()
When kmem_cache_alloc_bulk() attempts to allocate N objects from a percpu
freelist of length M, and N > M > 0, it will first remove the M elements
from the percpu freelist, then call ___slab_alloc() to allocate the next
element and repopulate the percpu freelist. ___slab_alloc() can re-enable
IRQs via allocate_slab(), so the TID must be bumped before ___slab_alloc()
to properly commit the freelist head change.
Fix it by unconditionally bumping c->tid when entering the slowpath.
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: ebe909e0fdb3 ("slub: improve bulk alloc strategy")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
xmlCopyAttribute(void *payload, const xmlChar *name ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED) {
xmlAttributePtr attr = (xmlAttributePtr) payload;
xmlAttributePtr cur;
cur = (xmlAttributePtr) xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlAttribute));
if (cur == NULL) {
xmlVErrMemory(NULL, "malloc failed");
return(NULL);
}
memset(cur, 0, sizeof(xmlAttribute));
cur->type = XML_ATTRIBUTE_DECL;
cur->atype = attr->atype;
cur->def = attr->def;
cur->tree = xmlCopyEnumeration(attr->tree);
if (attr->elem != NULL)
cur->elem = xmlStrdup(attr->elem);
if (attr->name != NULL)
cur->name = xmlStrdup(attr->name);
if (attr->prefix != NULL)
cur->prefix = xmlStrdup(attr->prefix);
if (attr->defaultValue != NULL)
cur->defaultValue = xmlStrdup(attr->defaultValue);
return(cur);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | libxml2 | 652dd12a858989b14eed4e84e453059cd3ba340e | 25,683,473,925,893,090,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 | [CVE-2022-23308] Use-after-free of ID and IDREF attributes
If a document is parsed with XML_PARSE_DTDVALID and without
XML_PARSE_NOENT, the value of ID attributes has to be normalized after
potentially expanding entities in xmlRemoveID. Otherwise, later calls
to xmlGetID can return a pointer to previously freed memory.
ID attributes which are empty or contain only whitespace after
entity expansion are affected in a similar way. This is fixed by
not storing such attributes in the ID table.
The test to detect streaming mode when validating against a DTD was
broken. In connection with the defects above, this could result in a
use-after-free when using the xmlReader interface with validation.
Fix detection of streaming mode to avoid similar issues. (This changes
the expected result of a test case. But as far as I can tell, using the
XML reader with XIncludes referencing the root document never worked
properly, anyway.)
All of these issues can result in denial of service. Using xmlReader
with validation could result in disclosure of memory via the error
channel, typically stderr. The security impact of xmlGetID returning
a pointer to freed memory depends on the application. The typical use
case of calling xmlGetID on an unmodified document is not affected. |
static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key,
struct seq_file *m)
{
struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0];
seq_puts(m, "key:");
seq_puts(m, key->description);
if (key_is_instantiated(key))
seq_printf(m, " pid:%d ci:%zu", rka->pid, rka->callout_len);
} | 1 | [
"CWE-20"
] | linux | 363b02dab09b3226f3bd1420dad9c72b79a42a76 | 270,968,720,214,612,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
Consolidate KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE and the rejection
error into one field such that:
(1) The instantiation state can be modified/read atomically.
(2) The error can be accessed atomically with the state.
(3) The error isn't stored unioned with the payload pointers.
This deals with the problem that the state is spread over three different
objects (two bits and a separate variable) and reading or updating them
atomically isn't practical, given that not only can uninstantiated keys
change into instantiated or rejected keys, but rejected keys can also turn
into instantiated keys - and someone accessing the key might not be using
any locking.
The main side effect of this problem is that what was held in the payload
may change, depending on the state. For instance, you might observe the
key to be in the rejected state. You then read the cached error, but if
the key semaphore wasn't locked, the key might've become instantiated
between the two reads - and you might now have something in hand that isn't
actually an error code.
The state is now KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED, KEY_IS_POSITIVE or a negative error
code if the key is negatively instantiated. The key_is_instantiated()
function is replaced with key_is_positive() to avoid confusion as negative
keys are also 'instantiated'.
Additionally, barriering is included:
(1) Order payload-set before state-set during instantiation.
(2) Order state-read before payload-read when using the key.
Further separate barriering is necessary if RCU is being used to access the
payload content after reading the payload pointers.
Fixes: 146aa8b1453b ("KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload data")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.4+
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]> |
void setRefused(bool refused) { refused_ = refused; } | 0 | [
"CWE-400"
] | envoy | 542f84c66e9f6479bc31c6f53157c60472b25240 | 338,124,940,408,204,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 | overload: Runtime configurable global connection limits (#147)
Signed-off-by: Tony Allen <[email protected]> |
static bool io_match_link_files(struct io_kiocb *req,
struct files_struct *files)
{
struct io_kiocb *link;
if (io_match_files(req, files))
return true;
if (req->flags & REQ_F_LINK_HEAD) {
list_for_each_entry(link, &req->link_list, link_list) {
if (io_match_files(link, files))
return true;
}
}
return false;
} | 0 | [] | linux | 0f2122045b946241a9e549c2a76cea54fa58a7ff | 149,489,284,480,440,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | io_uring: don't rely on weak ->files references
Grab actual references to the files_struct. To avoid circular references
issues due to this, we add a per-task note that keeps track of what
io_uring contexts a task has used. When the tasks execs or exits its
assigned files, we cancel requests based on this tracking.
With that, we can grab proper references to the files table, and no
longer need to rely on stashing away ring_fd and ring_file to check
if the ring_fd may have been closed.
Cc: [email protected] # v5.5+
Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> |
putpromptchar(int doprint, int endchar, zattr *txtchangep)
{
char *ss, *hostnam;
int t0, arg, test, sep, j, numjobs, len;
zattr atr;
struct tm *tm;
struct timespec ts;
time_t timet;
Nameddir nd;
for (; *bv->fm && *bv->fm != endchar; bv->fm++) {
arg = 0;
if (*bv->fm == '%' && isset(PROMPTPERCENT)) {
int minus = 0;
bv->fm++;
if (*bv->fm == '-') {
minus = 1;
bv->fm++;
}
if (idigit(*bv->fm)) {
arg = zstrtol(bv->fm, &bv->fm, 10);
if (minus)
arg *= -1;
} else if (minus)
arg = -1;
if (*bv->fm == '(') {
int tc, otruncwidth;
if (idigit(*++bv->fm)) {
arg = zstrtol(bv->fm, &bv->fm, 10);
} else if (arg < 0) {
/* negative numbers don't make sense here */
arg *= -1;
}
test = 0;
ss = pwd;
switch (tc = *bv->fm) {
case 'c':
case '.':
case '~':
if ((nd = finddir(ss))) {
arg--;
ss += strlen(nd->dir);
} /*FALLTHROUGH*/
case '/':
case 'C':
/* `/' gives 0, `/any' gives 1, etc. */
if (*ss && *ss++ == '/' && *ss)
arg--;
for (; *ss; ss++)
if (*ss == '/')
arg--;
if (arg <= 0)
test = 1;
break;
case 't':
case 'T':
case 'd':
case 'D':
case 'w':
timet = time(NULL);
tm = localtime(&timet);
switch (tc) {
case 't':
test = (arg == tm->tm_min);
break;
case 'T':
test = (arg == tm->tm_hour);
break;
case 'd':
test = (arg == tm->tm_mday);
break;
case 'D':
test = (arg == tm->tm_mon);
break;
case 'w':
test = (arg == tm->tm_wday);
break;
}
break;
case '?':
if (lastval == arg)
test = 1;
break;
case '#':
if (geteuid() == (uid_t)arg)
test = 1;
break;
case 'g':
if (getegid() == (gid_t)arg)
test = 1;
break;
case 'j':
for (numjobs = 0, j = 1; j <= maxjob; j++)
if (jobtab[j].stat && jobtab[j].procs &&
!(jobtab[j].stat & STAT_NOPRINT)) numjobs++;
if (numjobs >= arg)
test = 1;
break;
case 'l':
*bv->bp = '\0';
countprompt(bv->bufline, &t0, 0, 0);
if (minus)
t0 = zterm_columns - t0;
if (t0 >= arg)
test = 1;
break;
case 'e':
{
Funcstack fsptr = funcstack;
test = arg;
while (fsptr && test > 0) {
test--;
fsptr = fsptr->prev;
}
test = !test;
}
break;
case 'L':
if (shlvl >= arg)
test = 1;
break;
case 'S':
if (time(NULL) - shtimer.tv_sec >= arg)
test = 1;
break;
case 'v':
if (arrlen_ge(psvar, arg))
test = 1;
break;
case 'V':
if (psvar && *psvar && arrlen_ge(psvar, arg)) {
if (*psvar[(arg ? arg : 1) - 1])
test = 1;
}
break;
case '_':
test = (cmdsp >= arg);
break;
case '!':
test = privasserted();
break;
default:
test = -1;
break;
}
if (!*bv->fm || !(sep = *++bv->fm))
return 0;
bv->fm++;
/* Don't do the current truncation until we get back */
otruncwidth = bv->truncwidth;
bv->truncwidth = 0;
if (!putpromptchar(test == 1 && doprint, sep,
txtchangep) || !*++bv->fm ||
!putpromptchar(test == 0 && doprint, ')',
txtchangep)) {
bv->truncwidth = otruncwidth;
return 0;
}
bv->truncwidth = otruncwidth;
continue;
}
if (!doprint)
switch(*bv->fm) {
case '[':
while(idigit(*++bv->fm));
while(*++bv->fm != ']');
continue;
case '<':
while(*++bv->fm != '<');
continue;
case '>':
while(*++bv->fm != '>');
continue;
case 'D':
if(bv->fm[1]=='{')
while(*++bv->fm != '}');
continue;
default:
continue;
}
switch (*bv->fm) {
case '~':
promptpath(pwd, arg, 1);
break;
case 'd':
case '/':
promptpath(pwd, arg, 0);
break;
case 'c':
case '.':
promptpath(pwd, arg ? arg : 1, 1);
break;
case 'C':
promptpath(pwd, arg ? arg : 1, 0);
break;
case 'N':
promptpath(scriptname ? scriptname : argzero, arg, 0);
break;
case 'h':
case '!':
addbufspc(DIGBUFSIZE);
convbase(bv->bp, curhist, 10);
bv->bp += strlen(bv->bp);
break;
case 'j':
for (numjobs = 0, j = 1; j <= maxjob; j++)
if (jobtab[j].stat && jobtab[j].procs &&
!(jobtab[j].stat & STAT_NOPRINT)) numjobs++;
addbufspc(DIGBUFSIZE);
sprintf(bv->bp, "%d", numjobs);
bv->bp += strlen(bv->bp);
break;
case 'M':
queue_signals();
if ((hostnam = getsparam("HOST")))
stradd(hostnam);
unqueue_signals();
break;
case 'm':
if (!arg)
arg++;
queue_signals();
if (!(hostnam = getsparam("HOST"))) {
unqueue_signals();
break;
}
if (arg < 0) {
for (ss = hostnam + strlen(hostnam); ss > hostnam; ss--)
if (ss[-1] == '.' && !++arg)
break;
stradd(ss);
} else {
for (ss = hostnam; *ss; ss++)
if (*ss == '.' && !--arg)
break;
stradd(*ss ? dupstrpfx(hostnam, ss - hostnam) : hostnam);
}
unqueue_signals();
break;
case 'S':
txtchangeset(txtchangep, TXTSTANDOUT, TXTNOSTANDOUT);
txtset(TXTSTANDOUT);
tsetcap(TCSTANDOUTBEG, TSC_PROMPT);
break;
case 's':
txtchangeset(txtchangep, TXTNOSTANDOUT, TXTSTANDOUT);
txtunset(TXTSTANDOUT);
tsetcap(TCSTANDOUTEND, TSC_PROMPT|TSC_DIRTY);
break;
case 'B':
txtchangeset(txtchangep, TXTBOLDFACE, TXTNOBOLDFACE);
txtset(TXTBOLDFACE);
tsetcap(TCBOLDFACEBEG, TSC_PROMPT|TSC_DIRTY);
break;
case 'b':
txtchangeset(txtchangep, TXTNOBOLDFACE, TXTBOLDFACE);
txtunset(TXTBOLDFACE);
tsetcap(TCALLATTRSOFF, TSC_PROMPT|TSC_DIRTY);
break;
case 'U':
txtchangeset(txtchangep, TXTUNDERLINE, TXTNOUNDERLINE);
txtset(TXTUNDERLINE);
tsetcap(TCUNDERLINEBEG, TSC_PROMPT);
break;
case 'u':
txtchangeset(txtchangep, TXTNOUNDERLINE, TXTUNDERLINE);
txtunset(TXTUNDERLINE);
tsetcap(TCUNDERLINEEND, TSC_PROMPT|TSC_DIRTY);
break;
case 'F':
atr = parsecolorchar(arg, 1);
if (!(atr & (TXT_ERROR | TXTNOFGCOLOUR))) {
txtchangeset(txtchangep, atr & TXT_ATTR_FG_ON_MASK,
TXTNOFGCOLOUR | TXT_ATTR_FG_COL_MASK);
txtunset(TXT_ATTR_FG_COL_MASK);
txtset(atr & TXT_ATTR_FG_ON_MASK);
set_colour_attribute(atr, COL_SEQ_FG, TSC_PROMPT);
break;
}
/* else FALLTHROUGH */
case 'f':
txtchangeset(txtchangep, TXTNOFGCOLOUR, TXT_ATTR_FG_ON_MASK);
txtunset(TXT_ATTR_FG_ON_MASK);
set_colour_attribute(TXTNOFGCOLOUR, COL_SEQ_FG, TSC_PROMPT);
break;
case 'K':
atr = parsecolorchar(arg, 0);
if (!(atr & (TXT_ERROR | TXTNOBGCOLOUR))) {
txtchangeset(txtchangep, atr & TXT_ATTR_BG_ON_MASK,
TXTNOBGCOLOUR | TXT_ATTR_BG_COL_MASK);
txtunset(TXT_ATTR_BG_COL_MASK);
txtset(atr & TXT_ATTR_BG_ON_MASK);
set_colour_attribute(atr, COL_SEQ_BG, TSC_PROMPT);
break;
}
/* else FALLTHROUGH */
case 'k':
txtchangeset(txtchangep, TXTNOBGCOLOUR, TXT_ATTR_BG_ON_MASK);
txtunset(TXT_ATTR_BG_ON_MASK);
set_colour_attribute(TXTNOBGCOLOUR, COL_SEQ_BG, TSC_PROMPT);
break;
case '[':
if (idigit(*++bv->fm))
arg = zstrtol(bv->fm, &bv->fm, 10);
if (!prompttrunc(arg, ']', doprint, endchar, txtchangep))
return *bv->fm;
break;
case '<':
case '>':
/* Test (minus) here so -0 means "at the right margin" */
if (minus) {
*bv->bp = '\0';
countprompt(bv->bufline, &t0, 0, 0);
arg = zterm_columns - t0 + arg;
if (arg <= 0)
arg = 1;
}
if (!prompttrunc(arg, *bv->fm, doprint, endchar, txtchangep))
return *bv->fm;
break;
case '{': /*}*/
if (!bv->dontcount++) {
addbufspc(1);
*bv->bp++ = Inpar;
}
if (arg <= 0)
break;
/* else */
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 'G':
if (arg > 0) {
addbufspc(arg);
while (arg--)
*bv->bp++ = Nularg;
} else {
addbufspc(1);
*bv->bp++ = Nularg;
}
break;
case /*{*/ '}':
if (bv->trunccount && bv->trunccount >= bv->dontcount)
return *bv->fm;
if (bv->dontcount && !--bv->dontcount) {
addbufspc(1);
*bv->bp++ = Outpar;
}
break;
case 't':
case '@':
case 'T':
case '*':
case 'w':
case 'W':
case 'D':
{
char *tmfmt, *dd, *tmbuf = NULL;
switch (*bv->fm) {
case 'T':
tmfmt = "%K:%M";
break;
case '*':
tmfmt = "%K:%M:%S";
break;
case 'w':
tmfmt = "%a %f";
break;
case 'W':
tmfmt = "%m/%d/%y";
break;
case 'D':
if (bv->fm[1] == '{' /*}*/) {
for (ss = bv->fm + 2; *ss && *ss != /*{*/ '}'; ss++)
if(*ss == '\\' && ss[1])
ss++;
dd = tmfmt = tmbuf = zalloc(ss - bv->fm);
for (ss = bv->fm + 2; *ss && *ss != /*{*/ '}';
ss++) {
if(*ss == '\\' && ss[1])
ss++;
*dd++ = *ss;
}
*dd = 0;
bv->fm = ss - !*ss;
if (!*tmfmt) {
free(tmbuf);
continue;
}
} else
tmfmt = "%y-%m-%d";
break;
default:
tmfmt = "%l:%M%p";
break;
}
zgettime(&ts);
tm = localtime(&ts.tv_sec);
/*
* Hack because strftime won't say how
* much space it actually needs. Try to add it
* a few times until it works. Some formats don't
* actually have a length, so we could go on for
* ever.
*/
for(j = 0, t0 = strlen(tmfmt)*8; j < 3; j++, t0*=2) {
addbufspc(t0);
if ((len = ztrftime(bv->bp, t0, tmfmt, tm, ts.tv_nsec))
>= 0)
break;
}
/* There is enough room for this because addbufspc(t0)
* allocates room for t0 * 2 bytes. */
if (len >= 0)
metafy(bv->bp, len, META_NOALLOC);
bv->bp += strlen(bv->bp);
zsfree(tmbuf);
break;
}
case 'n':
stradd(get_username());
break;
case 'l':
if (*ttystrname) {
ss = (strncmp(ttystrname, "/dev/tty", 8) ?
ttystrname + 5 : ttystrname + 8);
stradd(ss);
} else
stradd("()");
break;
case 'y':
if (*ttystrname) {
ss = (strncmp(ttystrname, "/dev/", 5) ?
ttystrname : ttystrname + 5);
stradd(ss);
} else
stradd("()");
break;
case 'L':
addbufspc(DIGBUFSIZE);
#if defined(ZLONG_IS_LONG_LONG) && defined(PRINTF_HAS_LLD)
sprintf(bv->bp, "%lld", shlvl);
#else
sprintf(bv->bp, "%ld", (long)shlvl);
#endif
bv->bp += strlen(bv->bp);
break;
case '?':
addbufspc(DIGBUFSIZE);
#if defined(ZLONG_IS_LONG_LONG) && defined(PRINTF_HAS_LLD)
sprintf(bv->bp, "%lld", lastval);
#else
sprintf(bv->bp, "%ld", (long)lastval);
#endif
bv->bp += strlen(bv->bp);
break;
case '%':
case ')':
addbufspc(1);
*bv->bp++ = *bv->fm;
break;
case '#':
addbufspc(1);
*bv->bp++ = privasserted() ? '#' : '%';
break;
case 'v':
if (!arg)
arg = 1;
else if (arg < 0)
arg += arrlen(psvar) + 1;
if (arg > 0 && arrlen_ge(psvar, arg))
stradd(psvar[arg - 1]);
break;
case 'E':
tsetcap(TCCLEAREOL, TSC_PROMPT);
break;
case '^':
if (cmdsp) {
if (arg >= 0) {
if (arg > cmdsp || arg == 0)
arg = cmdsp;
for (t0 = cmdsp - 1; arg--; t0--) {
stradd(cmdnames[cmdstack[t0]]);
if (arg) {
addbufspc(1);
*bv->bp++=' ';
}
}
} else {
arg = -arg;
if (arg > cmdsp)
arg = cmdsp;
for (t0 = arg - 1; arg--; t0--) {
stradd(cmdnames[cmdstack[t0]]);
if (arg) {
addbufspc(1);
*bv->bp++=' ';
}
}
}
}
break;
case '_':
if (cmdsp) {
if (arg >= 0) {
if (arg > cmdsp || arg == 0)
arg = cmdsp;
for (t0 = cmdsp - arg; arg--; t0++) {
stradd(cmdnames[cmdstack[t0]]);
if (arg) {
addbufspc(1);
*bv->bp++=' ';
}
}
} else {
arg = -arg;
if (arg > cmdsp)
arg = cmdsp;
for (t0 = 0; arg--; t0++) {
stradd(cmdnames[cmdstack[t0]]);
if (arg) {
addbufspc(1);
*bv->bp++=' ';
}
}
}
}
break;
case 'r':
if(bv->rstring)
stradd(bv->rstring);
break;
case 'R':
if(bv->Rstring)
stradd(bv->Rstring);
break;
case 'e':
{
int depth = 0;
Funcstack fsptr = funcstack;
while (fsptr) {
depth++;
fsptr = fsptr->prev;
}
addbufspc(DIGBUFSIZE);
sprintf(bv->bp, "%d", depth);
bv->bp += strlen(bv->bp);
break;
}
case 'I':
if (funcstack && funcstack->tp != FS_SOURCE &&
!IN_EVAL_TRAP()) {
/*
* We're in a function or an eval with
* EVALLINENO. Calculate the line number in
* the file.
*/
zlong flineno = lineno + funcstack->flineno;
/* take account of eval line nos. starting at 1 */
if (funcstack->tp == FS_EVAL)
lineno--;
addbufspc(DIGBUFSIZE);
#if defined(ZLONG_IS_LONG_LONG) && defined(PRINTF_HAS_LLD)
sprintf(bv->bp, "%lld", flineno);
#else
sprintf(bv->bp, "%ld", (long)flineno);
#endif
bv->bp += strlen(bv->bp);
break;
}
/* else we're in a file and lineno is already correct */
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 'i':
addbufspc(DIGBUFSIZE);
#if defined(ZLONG_IS_LONG_LONG) && defined(PRINTF_HAS_LLD)
sprintf(bv->bp, "%lld", lineno);
#else
sprintf(bv->bp, "%ld", (long)lineno);
#endif
bv->bp += strlen(bv->bp);
break;
case 'x':
if (funcstack && funcstack->tp != FS_SOURCE &&
!IN_EVAL_TRAP())
promptpath(funcstack->filename ? funcstack->filename : "",
arg, 0);
else
promptpath(scriptfilename ? scriptfilename : argzero,
arg, 0);
break;
case '\0':
return 0;
case Meta:
bv->fm++;
break;
}
} else if(*bv->fm == '!' && isset(PROMPTBANG)) {
if(doprint) {
if(bv->fm[1] == '!') {
bv->fm++;
addbufspc(1);
pputc('!');
} else {
addbufspc(DIGBUFSIZE);
convbase(bv->bp, curhist, 10);
bv->bp += strlen(bv->bp);
}
}
} else {
char c = *bv->fm == Meta ? *++bv->fm ^ 32 : *bv->fm;
if (doprint) {
addbufspc(1);
pputc(c);
}
}
}
return *bv->fm;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | zsh | c187154f47697cdbf822c2f9d714d570ed4a0fd1 | 198,088,730,967,499,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 620 | security/41: Don't perform PROMPT_SUBST evaluation on %F/%K arguments
Mitigates CVE-2021-45444 |
String *Field_varstring_compressed::val_str(String *val_buffer, String *val_ptr)
{
ASSERT_COLUMN_MARKED_FOR_READ;
return uncompress(val_buffer, val_ptr, get_data(), get_length());
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-703"
] | server | 08c7ab404f69d9c4ca6ca7a9cf7eec74c804f917 | 82,903,476,524,987,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | MDEV-24176 Server crashes after insert in the table with virtual
column generated using date_format() and if()
vcol_info->expr is allocated on expr_arena at parsing stage. Since
expr item is allocated on expr_arena all its containee items must be
allocated on expr_arena too. Otherwise fix_session_expr() will
encounter prematurely freed item.
When table is reopened from cache vcol_info contains stale
expression. We refresh expression via TABLE::vcol_fix_exprs() but
first we must prepare a proper context (Vcol_expr_context) which meets
some requirements:
1. As noted above expr update must be done on expr_arena as there may
be new items created. It was a bug in fix_session_expr_for_read() and
was just not reproduced because of no second refix. Now refix is done
for more cases so it does reproduce. Tests affected: vcol.binlog
2. Also name resolution context must be narrowed to the single table.
Tested by: vcol.update main.default vcol.vcol_syntax gcol.gcol_bugfixes
3. sql_mode must be clean and not fail expr update.
sql_mode such as MODE_NO_BACKSLASH_ESCAPES, MODE_NO_ZERO_IN_DATE, etc
must not affect vcol expression update. If the table was created
successfully any further evaluation must not fail. Tests affected:
main.func_like
Reviewed by: Sergei Golubchik <[email protected]> |
tiff_warning_handler (const char *mod, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
{
/* Don't print anything; we should not be dumping junk to
* stderr, since that may be bad for some apps.
*/
} | 0 | [] | gdk-pixbuf | 31a6cff3dfc6944aad4612a9668b8ad39122e48b | 61,744,223,791,742,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | tiff: Check for integer overflows in multiplication
The checks currently in use are not sufficient, because they depend on
undefined behaviour:
rowstride = width * 4;
if (rowstride / 4 != width) { /* overflow */
If the multiplication has already overflowed, the compiler may decide
to optimize the if out and thus we do not handle the erroneous case.
Rearrange the checks to avoid the undefined behaviour.
Note that gcc doesn't seem to be impacted, though a defined behaviour is
obviously preferred.
CVE-2017-2870
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780269 |
static __inline__ void ax25_cb_put(ax25_cb *ax25)
{
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&ax25->refcount)) {
kfree(ax25->digipeat);
kfree(ax25);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | d01ffb9eee4af165d83b08dd73ebdf9fe94a519b | 188,564,080,230,361,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | ax25: add refcount in ax25_dev to avoid UAF bugs
If we dereference ax25_dev after we call kfree(ax25_dev) in
ax25_dev_device_down(), it will lead to concurrency UAF bugs.
There are eight syscall functions suffer from UAF bugs, include
ax25_bind(), ax25_release(), ax25_connect(), ax25_ioctl(),
ax25_getname(), ax25_sendmsg(), ax25_getsockopt() and
ax25_info_show().
One of the concurrency UAF can be shown as below:
(USE) | (FREE)
| ax25_device_event
| ax25_dev_device_down
ax25_bind | ...
... | kfree(ax25_dev)
ax25_fillin_cb() | ...
ax25_fillin_cb_from_dev() |
... |
The root cause of UAF bugs is that kfree(ax25_dev) in
ax25_dev_device_down() is not protected by any locks.
When ax25_dev, which there are still pointers point to,
is released, the concurrency UAF bug will happen.
This patch introduces refcount into ax25_dev in order to
guarantee that there are no pointers point to it when ax25_dev
is released.
Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
void st_select_lex::set_explain_type(bool on_the_fly)
{
bool is_primary= FALSE;
if (next_select())
is_primary= TRUE;
if (!is_primary && first_inner_unit())
{
/*
If there is at least one materialized derived|view then it's a PRIMARY select.
Otherwise, all derived tables/views were merged and this select is a SIMPLE one.
*/
for (SELECT_LEX_UNIT *un= first_inner_unit(); un; un= un->next_unit())
{
if ((!un->derived || un->derived->is_materialized_derived()))
{
is_primary= TRUE;
break;
}
}
}
if (on_the_fly && !is_primary && have_merged_subqueries)
is_primary= TRUE;
SELECT_LEX *first= master_unit()->first_select();
/* drop UNCACHEABLE_EXPLAIN, because it is for internal usage only */
uint8 is_uncacheable= (uncacheable & ~UNCACHEABLE_EXPLAIN);
bool using_materialization= FALSE;
Item_subselect *parent_item;
if ((parent_item= master_unit()->item) &&
parent_item->substype() == Item_subselect::IN_SUBS)
{
Item_in_subselect *in_subs= (Item_in_subselect*)parent_item;
/*
Surprisingly, in_subs->is_set_strategy() can return FALSE here,
even for the last invocation of this function for the select.
*/
if (in_subs->test_strategy(SUBS_MATERIALIZATION))
using_materialization= TRUE;
}
if (&master_unit()->thd->lex->select_lex == this)
{
type= is_primary ? "PRIMARY" : "SIMPLE";
}
else
{
if (this == first)
{
/* If we're a direct child of a UNION, we're the first sibling there */
if (linkage == DERIVED_TABLE_TYPE)
type= "DERIVED";
else if (using_materialization)
type= "MATERIALIZED";
else
{
if (is_uncacheable & UNCACHEABLE_DEPENDENT)
type= "DEPENDENT SUBQUERY";
else
{
type= is_uncacheable? "UNCACHEABLE SUBQUERY" :
"SUBQUERY";
}
}
}
else
{
/* This a non-first sibling in UNION */
if (is_uncacheable & UNCACHEABLE_DEPENDENT)
type= "DEPENDENT UNION";
else if (using_materialization)
type= "MATERIALIZED UNION";
else
{
type= is_uncacheable ? "UNCACHEABLE UNION": "UNION";
if (this == master_unit()->fake_select_lex)
type= "UNION RESULT";
/*
join below may be =NULL when this functions is called at an early
stage. It will be later called again and we will set the correct
value.
*/
if (join)
{
bool uses_cte= false;
for (JOIN_TAB *tab= first_linear_tab(join, WITHOUT_BUSH_ROOTS,
WITH_CONST_TABLES);
tab;
tab= next_linear_tab(join, tab, WITHOUT_BUSH_ROOTS))
{
/*
pos_in_table_list=NULL for e.g. post-join aggregation JOIN_TABs.
*/
if (!(tab->table && tab->table->pos_in_table_list))
continue;
TABLE_LIST *tbl= tab->table->pos_in_table_list;
if (tbl->with && tbl->with->is_recursive &&
tbl->is_with_table_recursive_reference())
{
uses_cte= true;
break;
}
}
if (uses_cte)
type= "RECURSIVE UNION";
}
}
}
}
if (!on_the_fly)
options|= SELECT_DESCRIBE;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | server | 3a52569499e2f0c4d1f25db1e81617a9d9755400 | 160,453,084,443,340,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 115 | MDEV-25636: Bug report: abortion in sql/sql_parse.cc:6294
The asserion failure was caused by this query
select /*id=1*/ from t1
where
col= ( select /*id=2*/ from ... where corr_cond1
union
select /*id=4*/ from ... where corr_cond2)
Here,
- select with id=2 was correlated due to corr_cond1.
- select with id=4 was initially correlated due to corr_cond2, but then
the optimizer optimized away the correlation, making the select with id=4
uncorrelated.
However, since select with id=2 remained correlated, the execution had to
re-compute the whole UNION. When it tried to execute select with id=4, it
hit an assertion (join buffer already free'd).
This is because select with id=4 has freed its execution structures after
it has been executed once. The select is uncorrelated, so it did not expect
it would need to be executed for the second time.
Fixed this by adding this logic in
st_select_lex::optimize_unflattened_subqueries():
If a member of a UNION is correlated, mark all its members as
correlated, so that they are prepared to be executed multiple times. |
nv_csearch(cmdarg_T *cap)
{
int t_cmd;
if (cap->cmdchar == 't' || cap->cmdchar == 'T')
t_cmd = TRUE;
else
t_cmd = FALSE;
cap->oap->motion_type = MCHAR;
if (IS_SPECIAL(cap->nchar) || searchc(cap, t_cmd) == FAIL)
clearopbeep(cap->oap);
else
{
curwin->w_set_curswant = TRUE;
// Include a Tab for "tx" and for "dfx".
if (gchar_cursor() == TAB && virtual_active() && cap->arg == FORWARD
&& (t_cmd || cap->oap->op_type != OP_NOP))
{
colnr_T scol, ecol;
getvcol(curwin, &curwin->w_cursor, &scol, NULL, &ecol);
curwin->w_cursor.coladd = ecol - scol;
}
else
curwin->w_cursor.coladd = 0;
adjust_for_sel(cap);
#ifdef FEAT_FOLDING
if ((fdo_flags & FDO_HOR) && KeyTyped && cap->oap->op_type == OP_NOP)
foldOpenCursor();
#endif
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | vim | 35a9a00afcb20897d462a766793ff45534810dc3 | 44,583,512,551,313,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 | patch 8.2.3428: using freed memory when replacing
Problem: Using freed memory when replacing. (Dhiraj Mishra)
Solution: Get the line pointer after calling ins_copychar(). |
static inline long parse_iv2(const unsigned char *p, const unsigned char **q)
{
char cursor;
long result = 0;
int neg = 0;
switch (*p) {
case '-':
neg++;
/* fall-through */
case '+':
p++;
}
while (1) {
cursor = (char)*p;
if (cursor >= '0' && cursor <= '9') {
result = result * 10 + (size_t)(cursor - (unsigned char)'0');
} else {
break;
}
p++;
}
if (q) *q = p;
if (neg) return -result;
return result;
} | 1 | [] | php-src | df4bf28f9f104ca3ef78ed94b497859f15b004e5 | 126,450,070,956,390,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 | Fix bug #70219 (Use after free vulnerability in session deserializer) |
compare_by_emblems (NautilusFile *file_1, NautilusFile *file_2)
{
const char *keyword_cache_1, *keyword_cache_2;
size_t length;
int compare_result;
fill_emblem_cache_if_needed (file_1);
fill_emblem_cache_if_needed (file_2);
/* We ignore automatic emblems, and only sort by user-added keywords. */
compare_result = 0;
keyword_cache_1 = file_1->details->compare_by_emblem_cache->emblem_keywords;
keyword_cache_2 = file_2->details->compare_by_emblem_cache->emblem_keywords;
for (; *keyword_cache_1 != '\0' && *keyword_cache_2 != '\0';) {
compare_result = g_utf8_collate (keyword_cache_1, keyword_cache_2);
if (compare_result != 0) {
return compare_result;
}
/* Advance to the next keyword */
length = strlen (keyword_cache_1);
keyword_cache_1 += length + 1;
keyword_cache_2 += length + 1;
}
/* One or both is now NULL. */
if (*keyword_cache_1 != '\0') {
g_assert (*keyword_cache_2 == '\0');
return -1;
} else if (*keyword_cache_2 != '\0') {
return +1;
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [] | nautilus | 7632a3e13874a2c5e8988428ca913620a25df983 | 50,231,581,654,715,190,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 36 | Check for trusted desktop file launchers.
2009-02-24 Alexander Larsson <[email protected]>
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-directory-async.c:
Check for trusted desktop file launchers.
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file-private.h:
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file.c:
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file.h:
Add nautilus_file_is_trusted_link.
Allow unsetting of custom display name.
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-mime-actions.c:
Display dialog when trying to launch a non-trusted desktop file.
svn path=/trunk/; revision=15003 |
static pj_status_t delay_send (pj_ssl_sock_t *ssock,
pj_ioqueue_op_key_t *send_key,
const void *data,
pj_ssize_t size,
unsigned flags)
{
write_data_t *wp;
pj_lock_acquire(ssock->write_mutex);
/* Init write pending instance */
if (!pj_list_empty(&ssock->write_pending_empty)) {
wp = ssock->write_pending_empty.next;
pj_list_erase(wp);
} else {
wp = PJ_POOL_ZALLOC_T(ssock->pool, write_data_t);
}
wp->app_key = send_key;
wp->plain_data_len = size;
wp->data.ptr = data;
wp->flags = flags;
pj_list_push_back(&ssock->write_pending, wp);
pj_lock_release(ssock->write_mutex);
/* Must return PJ_EPENDING */
return PJ_EPENDING;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-362",
"CWE-703"
] | pjproject | d5f95aa066f878b0aef6a64e60b61e8626e664cd | 95,795,353,564,940,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 | Merge pull request from GHSA-cv8x-p47p-99wr
* - Avoid SSL socket parent/listener getting destroyed during handshake by increasing parent's reference count.
- Add missing SSL socket close when the newly accepted SSL socket is discarded in SIP TLS transport.
* - Fix silly mistake: accepted active socket created without group lock in SSL socket.
- Replace assertion with normal validation check of SSL socket instance in OpenSSL verification callback (verify_cb()) to avoid crash, e.g: if somehow race condition with SSL socket destroy happens or OpenSSL application data index somehow gets corrupted. |
pango_ot_info_list_languages (PangoOTInfo *info,
PangoOTTableType table_type,
guint script_index,
PangoOTTag language_tag G_GNUC_UNUSED)
{
hb_ot_layout_table_type_t tt = get_hb_table_type (table_type);
PangoOTTag *result;
unsigned int count, i;
count = hb_ot_layout_script_get_language_count (info->layout, tt,
script_index);
result = g_new (PangoOTTag, count + 1);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
result[i] = hb_ot_layout_script_get_language_tag (info->layout, tt,
script_index,
i);
result[i] = 0;
return result;
} | 0 | [] | pango | 336bb3201096bdd0494d29926dd44e8cca8bed26 | 209,727,624,765,272,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 | [HB] Remove all references to the old code! |
isec_to_ns(int s)
{
return sec_to_ns(INT2FIX(s));
} | 0 | [] | date | 3959accef8da5c128f8a8e2fd54e932a4fb253b0 | 218,134,262,209,968,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Add length limit option for methods that parses date strings
`Date.parse` now raises an ArgumentError when a given date string is
longer than 128. You can configure the limit by giving `limit` keyword
arguments like `Date.parse(str, limit: 1000)`. If you pass `limit: nil`,
the limit is disabled.
Not only `Date.parse` but also the following methods are changed.
* Date._parse
* Date.parse
* DateTime.parse
* Date._iso8601
* Date.iso8601
* DateTime.iso8601
* Date._rfc3339
* Date.rfc3339
* DateTime.rfc3339
* Date._xmlschema
* Date.xmlschema
* DateTime.xmlschema
* Date._rfc2822
* Date.rfc2822
* DateTime.rfc2822
* Date._rfc822
* Date.rfc822
* DateTime.rfc822
* Date._jisx0301
* Date.jisx0301
* DateTime.jisx0301 |
Subsets and Splits