func
stringlengths 0
484k
| target
int64 0
1
| cwe
sequencelengths 0
4
| project
stringclasses 799
values | commit_id
stringlengths 40
40
| hash
float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
| size
int64 1
24k
| message
stringlengths 0
13.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
sf_write_raw (SNDFILE *sndfile, const void *ptr, sf_count_t len)
{ SF_PRIVATE *psf ;
sf_count_t count ;
int bytewidth, blockwidth ;
VALIDATE_SNDFILE_AND_ASSIGN_PSF (sndfile, psf, 1) ;
bytewidth = (psf->bytewidth > 0) ? psf->bytewidth : 1 ;
blockwidth = (psf->blockwidth > 0) ? psf->blockwidth : 1 ;
if (psf->file.mode == SFM_READ)
{ psf->error = SFE_NOT_WRITEMODE ;
return 0 ;
} ;
if (len % (psf->sf.channels * bytewidth))
{ psf->error = SFE_BAD_WRITE_ALIGN ;
return 0 ;
} ;
if (psf->last_op != SFM_WRITE)
if (psf->seek (psf, SFM_WRITE, psf->write_current) < 0)
return 0 ;
if (psf->have_written == SF_FALSE && psf->write_header != NULL)
psf->write_header (psf, SF_FALSE) ;
psf->have_written = SF_TRUE ;
count = psf_fwrite (ptr, 1, len, psf) ;
psf->write_current += count / blockwidth ;
psf->last_op = SFM_WRITE ;
if (psf->write_current > psf->sf.frames)
{ psf->sf.frames = psf->write_current ;
psf->dataend = 0 ;
} ;
if (psf->auto_header && psf->write_header != NULL)
psf->write_header (psf, SF_TRUE) ;
return count ;
} /* sf_write_raw */ | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | libsndfile | 708e996c87c5fae77b104ccfeb8f6db784c32074 | 167,741,956,976,538,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 44 | src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k. |
int crypto_shash_digest(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len, u8 *out)
{
struct crypto_shash *tfm = desc->tfm;
struct shash_alg *shash = crypto_shash_alg(tfm);
unsigned long alignmask = crypto_shash_alignmask(tfm);
if (((unsigned long)data | (unsigned long)out) & alignmask)
return shash_digest_unaligned(desc, data, len, out);
return shash->digest(desc, data, len, out);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | linux | af3ff8045bbf3e32f1a448542e73abb4c8ceb6f1 | 144,461,915,089,188,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | crypto: hmac - require that the underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed
Because the HMAC template didn't check that its underlying hash
algorithm is unkeyed, trying to use "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))"
through AF_ALG or through KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE resulted in the inner HMAC
being used without having been keyed, resulting in sha3_update() being
called without sha3_init(), causing a stack buffer overflow.
This is a very old bug, but it seems to have only started causing real
problems when SHA-3 support was added (requires CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3)
because the innermost hash's state is ->import()ed from a zeroed buffer,
and it just so happens that other hash algorithms are fine with that,
but SHA-3 is not. However, there could be arch or hardware-dependent
hash algorithms also affected; I couldn't test everything.
Fix the bug by introducing a function crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey()
which tests whether a shash algorithm is keyed. Then update the HMAC
template to require that its underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed.
Here is a reproducer:
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int main()
{
int algfd;
struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
.salg_type = "hash",
.salg_name = "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))",
};
char key[4096] = { 0 };
algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
bind(algfd, (const struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key));
}
Here was the KASAN report from syzbot:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161
Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8801cca07c40 by task syzkaller076574/3044
CPU: 1 PID: 3044 Comm: syzkaller076574 Not tainted 4.14.0-mm1+ #25
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53
print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x25b/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline]
check_memory_region+0x137/0x190 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267
memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303
memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161
crypto_shash_update+0xcb/0x220 crypto/shash.c:109
shash_finup_unaligned+0x2a/0x60 crypto/shash.c:151
crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165
hmac_finup+0x182/0x330 crypto/hmac.c:152
crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165
shash_digest_unaligned+0x9e/0xd0 crypto/shash.c:172
crypto_shash_digest+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:186
hmac_setkey+0x36a/0x690 crypto/hmac.c:66
crypto_shash_setkey+0xad/0x190 crypto/shash.c:64
shash_async_setkey+0x47/0x60 crypto/shash.c:207
crypto_ahash_setkey+0xaf/0x180 crypto/ahash.c:200
hash_setkey+0x40/0x90 crypto/algif_hash.c:446
alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:221 [inline]
alg_setsockopt+0x2a1/0x350 crypto/af_alg.c:254
SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1851 [inline]
SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1830
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> |
decompileIMPLEMENTS(int n, SWF_ACTION *actions, int maxn)
{
struct SWF_ACTIONPUSHPARAM *nparam;
int i;
INDENT;
puts(getName(pop()));
printf(" implements ");
nparam=pop();
for(i=0;i<nparam->p.Integer;i++)
{
puts(getName(pop()));
}
println(" ;");
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-125"
] | libming | da9d86eab55cbf608d5c916b8b690f5b76bca462 | 336,076,716,049,930,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | decompileAction: Prevent heap buffer overflow and underflow with using OpCode |
spell_soundfold_sal(slang_T *slang, char_u *inword, char_u *res)
{
salitem_T *smp;
char_u word[MAXWLEN];
char_u *s = inword;
char_u *t;
char_u *pf;
int i, j, z;
int reslen;
int n, k = 0;
int z0;
int k0;
int n0;
int c;
int pri;
int p0 = -333;
int c0;
// Remove accents, if wanted. We actually remove all non-word characters.
// But keep white space. We need a copy, the word may be changed here.
if (slang->sl_rem_accents)
{
t = word;
while (*s != NUL)
{
if (VIM_ISWHITE(*s))
{
*t++ = ' ';
s = skipwhite(s);
}
else
{
if (spell_iswordp_nmw(s, curwin))
*t++ = *s;
++s;
}
}
*t = NUL;
}
else
vim_strncpy(word, s, MAXWLEN - 1);
smp = (salitem_T *)slang->sl_sal.ga_data;
/*
* This comes from Aspell phonet.cpp. Converted from C++ to C.
* Changed to keep spaces.
*/
i = reslen = z = 0;
while ((c = word[i]) != NUL)
{
// Start with the first rule that has the character in the word.
n = slang->sl_sal_first[c];
z0 = 0;
if (n >= 0)
{
// check all rules for the same letter
for (; (s = smp[n].sm_lead)[0] == c; ++n)
{
// Quickly skip entries that don't match the word. Most
// entries are less than three chars, optimize for that.
k = smp[n].sm_leadlen;
if (k > 1)
{
if (word[i + 1] != s[1])
continue;
if (k > 2)
{
for (j = 2; j < k; ++j)
if (word[i + j] != s[j])
break;
if (j < k)
continue;
}
}
if ((pf = smp[n].sm_oneof) != NULL)
{
// Check for match with one of the chars in "sm_oneof".
while (*pf != NUL && *pf != word[i + k])
++pf;
if (*pf == NUL)
continue;
++k;
}
s = smp[n].sm_rules;
pri = 5; // default priority
p0 = *s;
k0 = k;
while (*s == '-' && k > 1)
{
k--;
s++;
}
if (*s == '<')
s++;
if (VIM_ISDIGIT(*s))
{
// determine priority
pri = *s - '0';
s++;
}
if (*s == '^' && *(s + 1) == '^')
s++;
if (*s == NUL
|| (*s == '^'
&& (i == 0 || !(word[i - 1] == ' '
|| spell_iswordp(word + i - 1, curwin)))
&& (*(s + 1) != '$'
|| (!spell_iswordp(word + i + k0, curwin))))
|| (*s == '$' && i > 0
&& spell_iswordp(word + i - 1, curwin)
&& (!spell_iswordp(word + i + k0, curwin))))
{
// search for followup rules, if:
// followup and k > 1 and NO '-' in searchstring
c0 = word[i + k - 1];
n0 = slang->sl_sal_first[c0];
if (slang->sl_followup && k > 1 && n0 >= 0
&& p0 != '-' && word[i + k] != NUL)
{
// test follow-up rule for "word[i + k]"
for ( ; (s = smp[n0].sm_lead)[0] == c0; ++n0)
{
// Quickly skip entries that don't match the word.
//
k0 = smp[n0].sm_leadlen;
if (k0 > 1)
{
if (word[i + k] != s[1])
continue;
if (k0 > 2)
{
pf = word + i + k + 1;
for (j = 2; j < k0; ++j)
if (*pf++ != s[j])
break;
if (j < k0)
continue;
}
}
k0 += k - 1;
if ((pf = smp[n0].sm_oneof) != NULL)
{
// Check for match with one of the chars in
// "sm_oneof".
while (*pf != NUL && *pf != word[i + k0])
++pf;
if (*pf == NUL)
continue;
++k0;
}
p0 = 5;
s = smp[n0].sm_rules;
while (*s == '-')
{
// "k0" gets NOT reduced because
// "if (k0 == k)"
s++;
}
if (*s == '<')
s++;
if (VIM_ISDIGIT(*s))
{
p0 = *s - '0';
s++;
}
if (*s == NUL
// *s == '^' cuts
|| (*s == '$'
&& !spell_iswordp(word + i + k0,
curwin)))
{
if (k0 == k)
// this is just a piece of the string
continue;
if (p0 < pri)
// priority too low
continue;
// rule fits; stop search
break;
}
}
if (p0 >= pri && smp[n0].sm_lead[0] == c0)
continue;
}
// replace string
s = smp[n].sm_to;
if (s == NULL)
s = (char_u *)"";
pf = smp[n].sm_rules;
p0 = (vim_strchr(pf, '<') != NULL) ? 1 : 0;
if (p0 == 1 && z == 0)
{
// rule with '<' is used
if (reslen > 0 && *s != NUL && (res[reslen - 1] == c
|| res[reslen - 1] == *s))
reslen--;
z0 = 1;
z = 1;
k0 = 0;
while (*s != NUL && word[i + k0] != NUL)
{
word[i + k0] = *s;
k0++;
s++;
}
if (k > k0)
STRMOVE(word + i + k0, word + i + k);
// new "actual letter"
c = word[i];
}
else
{
// no '<' rule used
i += k - 1;
z = 0;
while (*s != NUL && s[1] != NUL && reslen < MAXWLEN)
{
if (reslen == 0 || res[reslen - 1] != *s)
res[reslen++] = *s;
s++;
}
// new "actual letter"
c = *s;
if (strstr((char *)pf, "^^") != NULL)
{
if (c != NUL)
res[reslen++] = c;
STRMOVE(word, word + i + 1);
i = 0;
z0 = 1;
}
}
break;
}
}
}
else if (VIM_ISWHITE(c))
{
c = ' ';
k = 1;
}
if (z0 == 0)
{
if (k && !p0 && reslen < MAXWLEN && c != NUL
&& (!slang->sl_collapse || reslen == 0
|| res[reslen - 1] != c))
// condense only double letters
res[reslen++] = c;
i++;
z = 0;
k = 0;
}
}
res[reslen] = NUL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | vim | 2813f38e021c6e6581c0c88fcf107e41788bc835 | 235,577,834,139,938,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 271 | patch 8.2.5072: using uninitialized value and freed memory in spell command
Problem: Using uninitialized value and freed memory in spell command.
Solution: Initialize "attr". Check for empty line early. |
int enter_svm_guest_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 vmcb12_gpa,
struct vmcb *vmcb12)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
int ret;
trace_kvm_nested_vmrun(svm->vmcb->save.rip, vmcb12_gpa,
vmcb12->save.rip,
vmcb12->control.int_ctl,
vmcb12->control.event_inj,
vmcb12->control.nested_ctl);
trace_kvm_nested_intercepts(vmcb12->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_CR] & 0xffff,
vmcb12->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_CR] >> 16,
vmcb12->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_EXCEPTION],
vmcb12->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_WORD3],
vmcb12->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_WORD4],
vmcb12->control.intercepts[INTERCEPT_WORD5]);
svm->nested.vmcb12_gpa = vmcb12_gpa;
WARN_ON(svm->vmcb == svm->nested.vmcb02.ptr);
nested_svm_copy_common_state(svm->vmcb01.ptr, svm->nested.vmcb02.ptr);
svm_switch_vmcb(svm, &svm->nested.vmcb02);
nested_vmcb02_prepare_control(svm);
nested_vmcb02_prepare_save(svm, vmcb12);
ret = nested_svm_load_cr3(&svm->vcpu, vmcb12->save.cr3,
nested_npt_enabled(svm), true);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (!npt_enabled)
vcpu->arch.mmu->inject_page_fault = svm_inject_page_fault_nested;
svm_set_gif(svm, true);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-862"
] | kvm | 0f923e07124df069ba68d8bb12324398f4b6b709 | 176,703,888,584,966,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 42 | KVM: nSVM: avoid picking up unsupported bits from L2 in int_ctl (CVE-2021-3653)
* Invert the mask of bits that we pick from L2 in
nested_vmcb02_prepare_control
* Invert and explicitly use VIRQ related bits bitmask in svm_clear_vintr
This fixes a security issue that allowed a malicious L1 to run L2 with
AVIC enabled, which allowed the L2 to exploit the uninitialized and enabled
AVIC to read/write the host physical memory at some offsets.
Fixes: 3d6368ef580a ("KVM: SVM: Add VMRUN handler")
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> |
_copyClusterStmt(const ClusterStmt *from)
{
ClusterStmt *newnode = makeNode(ClusterStmt);
COPY_NODE_FIELD(relation);
COPY_STRING_FIELD(indexname);
COPY_SCALAR_FIELD(verbose);
return newnode;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-362"
] | postgres | 5f173040e324f6c2eebb90d86cf1b0cdb5890f0a | 337,212,567,792,424,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | Avoid repeated name lookups during table and index DDL.
If the name lookups come to different conclusions due to concurrent
activity, we might perform some parts of the DDL on a different table
than other parts. At least in the case of CREATE INDEX, this can be
used to cause the permissions checks to be performed against a
different table than the index creation, allowing for a privilege
escalation attack.
This changes the calling convention for DefineIndex, CreateTrigger,
transformIndexStmt, transformAlterTableStmt, CheckIndexCompatible
(in 9.2 and newer), and AlterTable (in 9.1 and older). In addition,
CheckRelationOwnership is removed in 9.2 and newer and the calling
convention is changed in older branches. A field has also been added
to the Constraint node (FkConstraint in 8.4). Third-party code calling
these functions or using the Constraint node will require updating.
Report by Andres Freund. Patch by Robert Haas and Andres Freund,
reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0062 |
static void usbdev_vm_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct usb_memory *usbm = vma->vm_private_data;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&usbm->ps->lock, flags);
++usbm->vma_use_count;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&usbm->ps->lock, flags);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux | 681fef8380eb818c0b845fca5d2ab1dcbab114ee | 319,584,396,976,922,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | USB: usbfs: fix potential infoleak in devio
The stack object “ci” has a total size of 8 bytes. Its last 3 bytes
are padding bytes which are not initialized and leaked to userland
via “copy_to_user”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> |
ssize_t Http2Session::OnCallbackPadding(size_t frameLen,
size_t maxPayloadLen) {
if (frameLen == 0) return 0;
Debug(this, "using callback to determine padding");
Isolate* isolate = env()->isolate();
HandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
Local<Context> context = env()->context();
Context::Scope context_scope(context);
AliasedBuffer<uint32_t, Uint32Array>& buffer =
env()->http2_state()->padding_buffer;
buffer[PADDING_BUF_FRAME_LENGTH] = frameLen;
buffer[PADDING_BUF_MAX_PAYLOAD_LENGTH] = maxPayloadLen;
buffer[PADDING_BUF_RETURN_VALUE] = frameLen;
MakeCallback(env()->ongetpadding_string(), 0, nullptr);
uint32_t retval = buffer[PADDING_BUF_RETURN_VALUE];
retval = std::min(retval, static_cast<uint32_t>(maxPayloadLen));
retval = std::max(retval, static_cast<uint32_t>(frameLen));
Debug(this, "using padding size %d", retval);
return retval;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | node | 7f178663ebffc82c9f8a5a1b6bf2da0c263a30ed | 42,712,218,981,250,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | src: use unique_ptr for WriteWrap
This commit attempts to avoid a use-after-free error by using unqiue_ptr
and passing a reference to it.
CVE-ID: CVE-2020-8265
Fixes: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/issues/227
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/238
Reviewed-By: Michael Dawson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-By: Tobias Nießen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-By: Richard Lau <[email protected]> |
static void mce_enable_ce(void *all)
{
if (!mce_available(raw_cpu_ptr(&cpu_info)))
return;
cmci_reenable();
cmci_recheck();
if (all)
__mcheck_cpu_init_timer();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-362"
] | linux | b3b7c4795ccab5be71f080774c45bbbcc75c2aaf | 96,413,657,676,717,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | x86/MCE: Serialize sysfs changes
The check_interval file in
/sys/devices/system/machinecheck/machinecheck<cpu number>
directory is a global timer value for MCE polling. If it is changed by one
CPU, mce_restart() broadcasts the event to other CPUs to delete and restart
the MCE polling timer and __mcheck_cpu_init_timer() reinitializes the
mce_timer variable.
If more than one CPU writes a specific value to the check_interval file
concurrently, mce_timer is not protected from such concurrent accesses and
all kinds of explosions happen. Since only root can write to those sysfs
variables, the issue is not a big deal security-wise.
However, concurrent writes to these configuration variables is void of
reason so the proper thing to do is to serialize the access with a mutex.
Boris:
- Make store_int_with_restart() use device_store_ulong() to filter out
negative intervals
- Limit min interval to 1 second
- Correct locking
- Massage commit message
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc: Tony Luck <[email protected]>
Cc: linux-edac <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] |
static avifBool avifParseMediaInformationBox(avifTrack * track, const uint8_t * raw, size_t rawLen)
{
BEGIN_STREAM(s, raw, rawLen);
while (avifROStreamHasBytesLeft(&s, 1)) {
avifBoxHeader header;
CHECK(avifROStreamReadBoxHeader(&s, &header));
if (!memcmp(header.type, "stbl", 4)) {
CHECK(avifParseSampleTableBox(track, avifROStreamCurrent(&s), header.size));
}
CHECK(avifROStreamSkip(&s, header.size));
}
return AVIF_TRUE;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-787"
] | libavif | 0a8e7244d494ae98e9756355dfbfb6697ded2ff9 | 13,651,312,183,399,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | Set max image size to 16384 * 16384
Fix https://crbug.com/oss-fuzz/24728 and
https://crbug.com/oss-fuzz/24734. |
PxMDecoder::~PxMDecoder()
{
close();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-399",
"CWE-119"
] | opencv | 7bbe1a53cfc097b82b1589f7915a2120de39274c | 127,434,766,539,471,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | imgcodecs(pxm): fix memcpy size |
parse_DEC_TTL(char *arg, const struct ofpact_parse_params *pp)
{
if (*arg == '\0') {
parse_noargs_dec_ttl(pp);
} else {
struct ofpact_cnt_ids *ids;
char *cntr;
ids = ofpact_put_DEC_TTL(pp->ofpacts);
ids->ofpact.raw = NXAST_RAW_DEC_TTL_CNT_IDS;
for (cntr = strtok_r(arg, ", ", &arg); cntr != NULL;
cntr = strtok_r(NULL, ", ", &arg)) {
uint16_t id = atoi(cntr);
ofpbuf_put(pp->ofpacts, &id, sizeof id);
ids = pp->ofpacts->header;
ids->n_controllers++;
}
if (!ids->n_controllers) {
return xstrdup("dec_ttl_cnt_ids: expected at least one controller "
"id.");
}
ofpact_finish_DEC_TTL(pp->ofpacts, &ids);
}
return NULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | ovs | 65c61b0c23a0d474696d7b1cea522a5016a8aeb3 | 180,953,940,622,400,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 | ofp-actions: Fix use-after-free while decoding RAW_ENCAP.
While decoding RAW_ENCAP action, decode_ed_prop() might re-allocate
ofpbuf if there is no enough space left. However, function
'decode_NXAST_RAW_ENCAP' continues to use old pointer to 'encap'
structure leading to write-after-free and incorrect decoding.
==3549105==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address
0x60600000011a at pc 0x0000005f6cc6 bp 0x7ffc3a2d4410 sp 0x7ffc3a2d4408
WRITE of size 2 at 0x60600000011a thread T0
#0 0x5f6cc5 in decode_NXAST_RAW_ENCAP lib/ofp-actions.c:4461:20
#1 0x5f0551 in ofpact_decode ./lib/ofp-actions.inc2:4777:16
#2 0x5ed17c in ofpacts_decode lib/ofp-actions.c:7752:21
#3 0x5eba9a in ofpacts_pull_openflow_actions__ lib/ofp-actions.c:7791:13
#4 0x5eb9fc in ofpacts_pull_openflow_actions lib/ofp-actions.c:7835:12
#5 0x64bb8b in ofputil_decode_packet_out lib/ofp-packet.c:1113:17
#6 0x65b6f4 in ofp_print_packet_out lib/ofp-print.c:148:13
#7 0x659e3f in ofp_to_string__ lib/ofp-print.c:1029:16
#8 0x659b24 in ofp_to_string lib/ofp-print.c:1244:21
#9 0x65a28c in ofp_print lib/ofp-print.c:1288:28
#10 0x540d11 in ofctl_ofp_parse utilities/ovs-ofctl.c:2814:9
#11 0x564228 in ovs_cmdl_run_command__ lib/command-line.c:247:17
#12 0x56408a in ovs_cmdl_run_command lib/command-line.c:278:5
#13 0x5391ae in main utilities/ovs-ofctl.c:179:9
#14 0x7f6911ce9081 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x27081)
#15 0x461fed in _start (utilities/ovs-ofctl+0x461fed)
Fix that by getting a new pointer before using.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz.
Fuzzer regression test will fail only with AddressSanitizer enabled.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=27851
Fixes: f839892a206a ("OF support and translation of generic encap and decap")
Acked-by: William Tu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <[email protected]> |
bool rgw::auth::s3::LDAPEngine::valid() {
std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lck(mtx);
return (!!ldh);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-79"
] | ceph | 8f90658c731499722d5f4393c8ad70b971d05f77 | 32,254,774,517,219,810,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | rgw: reject unauthenticated response-header actions
Signed-off-by: Matt Benjamin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Casey Bodley <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit d8dd5e513c0c62bbd7d3044d7e2eddcd897bd400) |
void startPreloader() {
TRACE_POINT();
this_thread::disable_interruption di;
this_thread::disable_syscall_interruption dsi;
assert(!preloaderStarted());
checkChrootDirectories(options);
shared_array<const char *> args;
vector<string> command = createRealPreloaderCommand(options, args);
SpawnPreparationInfo preparation = prepareSpawn(options);
SocketPair adminSocket = createUnixSocketPair();
Pipe errorPipe = createPipe();
DebugDirPtr debugDir = make_shared<DebugDir>(preparation.uid, preparation.gid);
pid_t pid;
pid = syscalls::fork();
if (pid == 0) {
setenv("PASSENGER_DEBUG_DIR", debugDir->getPath().c_str(), 1);
purgeStdio(stdout);
purgeStdio(stderr);
resetSignalHandlersAndMask();
disableMallocDebugging();
int adminSocketCopy = dup2(adminSocket.first, 3);
int errorPipeCopy = dup2(errorPipe.second, 4);
dup2(adminSocketCopy, 0);
dup2(adminSocketCopy, 1);
dup2(errorPipeCopy, 2);
closeAllFileDescriptors(2);
setChroot(preparation);
switchUser(preparation);
setWorkingDirectory(preparation);
execvp(command[0].c_str(), (char * const *) args.get());
int e = errno;
printf("!> Error\n");
printf("!> \n");
printf("Cannot execute \"%s\": %s (errno=%d)\n", command[0].c_str(),
strerror(e), e);
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot execute \"%s\": %s (errno=%d)\n",
command[0].c_str(), strerror(e), e);
fflush(stdout);
fflush(stderr);
_exit(1);
} else if (pid == -1) {
int e = errno;
throw SystemException("Cannot fork a new process", e);
} else {
ScopeGuard guard(boost::bind(nonInterruptableKillAndWaitpid, pid));
adminSocket.first.close();
errorPipe.second.close();
StartupDetails details;
details.adminSocket = adminSocket.second;
details.io = BufferedIO(adminSocket.second);
details.stderrCapturer =
make_shared<BackgroundIOCapturer>(
errorPipe.first,
config->forwardStderr ? config->forwardStderrTo : -1);
details.stderrCapturer->start();
details.debugDir = debugDir;
details.options = &options;
details.timeout = options.startTimeout * 1000;
details.forwardStderr = config->forwardStderr;
details.forwardStderrTo = config->forwardStderrTo;
{
this_thread::restore_interruption ri(di);
this_thread::restore_syscall_interruption rsi(dsi);
socketAddress = negotiatePreloaderStartup(details);
}
this->adminSocket = adminSocket.second;
{
lock_guard<boost::mutex> l(simpleFieldSyncher);
this->pid = pid;
}
preloaderOutputWatcher.set(adminSocket.second, ev::READ);
libev->start(preloaderOutputWatcher);
setNonBlocking(errorPipe.first);
preloaderErrorWatcher = make_shared<PipeWatcher>(libev,
errorPipe.first,
config->forwardStderr ? config->forwardStderrTo : -1);
preloaderErrorWatcher->start();
preloaderAnnotations = debugDir->readAll();
P_DEBUG("Preloader for " << options.appRoot <<
" started on PID " << pid <<
", listening on " << socketAddress);
guard.clear();
}
} | 1 | [] | passenger | 8c6693e0818772c345c979840d28312c2edd4ba4 | 247,302,189,689,935,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 91 | Security check socket filenames reported by spawned application processes. |
rb_str_init(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE str)
{
VALUE orig;
if (argc > 0 && rb_scan_args(argc, argv, "01", &orig) == 1)
rb_str_replace(str, orig);
return str;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | ruby | 1c2ef610358af33f9ded3086aa2d70aac03dcac5 | 288,794,847,771,808,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | * string.c (rb_str_justify): CVE-2009-4124.
Fixes a bug reported by
Emmanouel Kellinis <Emmanouel.Kellinis AT kpmg.co.uk>, KPMG London;
Patch by nobu.
git-svn-id: svn+ssh://ci.ruby-lang.org/ruby/trunk@26038 b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e |
static char *get_symsel(struct symsel_s *symsel, char *p)
{
char *q;
int tn, td, n;
symsel->bar = strtod(p, &q);
if (*q >= 'a' && *q <= 'z')
symsel->seq = *q++ - 'a';
else
symsel->seq = 0;
if (*q == ':') {
if (sscanf(q + 1, "%d/%d%n", &tn, &td, &n) != 2
|| td <= 0)
return 0;
symsel->time = BASE_LEN * tn / td;
q += 1 + n;
} else {
symsel->time = 0;
}
return q;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | abcm2ps | dc0372993674d0b50fedfbf7b9fad1239b8efc5f | 291,358,531,009,402,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | fix: crash when too many accidentals in K: (signature + explicit)
Issue #17. |
bool response_promise_catch_handler(JSContext *cx, HandleObject event, HandleValue promise_val,
CallArgs args) {
RootedObject promise(cx, &promise_val.toObject());
fprintf(stderr, "Error while running request handler: ");
dump_promise_rejection(cx, args.get(0), promise, stderr);
// TODO: verify that this is the right behavior.
// Steps 9.1-2
return respondWithError(cx, event);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-94"
] | js-compute-runtime | 65524ffc962644e9fc39f4b368a326b6253912a9 | 115,713,152,963,295,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | use rangom_get instead of arc4random as arc4random does not work correctly with wizer
wizer causes the seed in arc4random to be the same between executions which is not random |
void CtcpParser::processIrcEventRawNotice(IrcEventRawMessage *event) {
parse(event, Message::Notice);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-399"
] | quassel | da215fcb9cd3096a3e223c87577d5d4ab8f8518b | 62,621,489,259,833,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | Fix core crash
Some CTCP requests triggered a bug in the parser; this fixes the issue. |
static CImg<T> vector(const T& a0, const T& a1, const T& a2, const T& a3, const T& a4, const T& a5) {
CImg<T> r(1,6);
r[0] = a0; r[1] = a1; r[2] = a2; r[3] = a3; r[4] = a4; r[5] = a5;
return r;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-770"
] | cimg | 619cb58dd90b4e03ac68286c70ed98acbefd1c90 | 125,313,430,881,012,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | CImg<>::load_bmp() and CImg<>::load_pandore(): Check that dimensions encoded in file does not exceed file size. |
size_t length() const { return n_; } | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | cpp-peglib | b3b29ce8f3acf3a32733d930105a17d7b0ba347e | 174,848,838,006,861,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 | Fix #122 |
JANET_CORE_FN(cfun_array_insert,
"(array/insert arr at & xs)",
"Insert all `xs` into array `arr` at index `at`. `at` should be an integer between "
"0 and the length of the array. A negative value for `at` will index backwards from "
"the end of the array, such that inserting at -1 appends to the array. "
"Returns the array.") {
size_t chunksize, restsize;
janet_arity(argc, 2, -1);
JanetArray *array = janet_getarray(argv, 0);
int32_t at = janet_getinteger(argv, 1);
if (at < 0) {
at = array->count + at + 1;
}
if (at < 0 || at > array->count)
janet_panicf("insertion index %d out of range [0,%d]", at, array->count);
chunksize = (argc - 2) * sizeof(Janet);
restsize = (array->count - at) * sizeof(Janet);
if (INT32_MAX - (argc - 2) < array->count) {
janet_panic("array overflow");
}
janet_array_ensure(array, array->count + argc - 2, 2);
if (restsize) {
memmove(array->data + at + argc - 2,
array->data + at,
restsize);
}
safe_memcpy(array->data + at, argv + 2, chunksize);
array->count += (argc - 2);
return argv[0];
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | janet | 7fda7709ff15ab4b4cdea57619365eb2798f15c4 | 311,247,383,581,937,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 | fix negative count passed to cfun_array_new_filled |
int LZ4_compress_limitedOutput_withState (void* state, const char* source, char* dest, int inputSize, int maxOutputSize)
{
if (((size_t)(state)&3) != 0) return 0; /* Error : state is not aligned on 4-bytes boundary */
MEM_INIT(state, 0, LZ4_STREAMSIZE);
if (inputSize < (int)LZ4_64KLIMIT)
return LZ4_compress_generic(state, source, dest, inputSize, maxOutputSize, limitedOutput, byU16, noDict, noDictIssue);
else
return LZ4_compress_generic(state, source, dest, inputSize, maxOutputSize, limitedOutput, (sizeof(void*)==8) ? byU32 : byPtr, noDict, noDictIssue);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | lz4 | da5373197e84ee49d75b8334d4510689731d6e90 | 79,630,962,945,788,190,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | Fixed : issue 52 (reported by Ludwig Strigeus) |
static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_tss_addr(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long addr)
{
int ret;
if (addr > (unsigned int)(-3 * PAGE_SIZE))
return -EINVAL;
ret = static_call(kvm_x86_set_tss_addr)(kvm, addr);
return ret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | linux | 55749769fe608fa3f4a075e42e89d237c8e37637 | 211,867,076,251,533,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | KVM: x86: Fix wall clock writes in Xen shared_info not to mark page dirty
When dirty ring logging is enabled, any dirty logging without an active
vCPU context will cause a kernel oops. But we've already declared that
the shared_info page doesn't get dirty tracking anyway, since it would
be kind of insane to mark it dirty every time we deliver an event channel
interrupt. Userspace is supposed to just assume it's always dirty any
time a vCPU can run or event channels are routed.
So stop using the generic kvm_write_wall_clock() and just write directly
through the gfn_to_pfn_cache that we already have set up.
We can make kvm_write_wall_clock() static in x86.c again now, but let's
not remove the 'sec_hi_ofs' argument even though it's not used yet. At
some point we *will* want to use that for KVM guests too.
Fixes: 629b5348841a ("KVM: x86/xen: update wallclock region")
Reported-by: butt3rflyh4ck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> |
static const char *kallsyms_symbol_name(struct mod_kallsyms *kallsyms, unsigned int symnum)
{
return kallsyms->strtab + kallsyms->symtab[symnum].st_name;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-362",
"CWE-347"
] | linux | 0c18f29aae7ce3dadd26d8ee3505d07cc982df75 | 102,423,753,851,170,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | module: limit enabling module.sig_enforce
Irrespective as to whether CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is configured, specifying
"module.sig_enforce=1" on the boot command line sets "sig_enforce".
Only allow "sig_enforce" to be set when CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is configured.
This patch makes the presence of /sys/module/module/parameters/sig_enforce
dependent on CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=y.
Fixes: fda784e50aac ("module: export module signature enforcement status")
Reported-by: Nayna Jain <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Jessica Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jessica Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
_tiffMapProc(thandle_t hdata, tdata_t *pbase, toff_t *psize) {
TIFFSTATE *state = (TIFFSTATE *)hdata;
TRACE(("_tiffMapProc input size: %u, data: %p\n", (uint)*psize, *pbase));
dump_state(state);
*pbase = state->data;
*psize = state->size;
TRACE(("_tiffMapProc returning size: %u, data: %p\n", (uint)*psize, *pbase));
return (1);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | Pillow | 3fee28eb9479bf7d59e0fa08068f9cc4a6e2f04c | 291,246,407,210,962,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | Incorrect error code checking in TiffDecode.c
* since Pillow 8.1.0
* CVE-2021-25289 |
int hci_disconnect(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 reason)
{
BT_DBG("hcon %p", conn);
/* When we are master of an established connection and it enters
* the disconnect timeout, then go ahead and try to read the
* current clock offset. Processing of the result is done
* within the event handling and hci_clock_offset_evt function.
*/
if (conn->type == ACL_LINK && conn->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER &&
(conn->state == BT_CONNECTED || conn->state == BT_CONFIG)) {
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
struct hci_cp_read_clock_offset clkoff_cp;
clkoff_cp.handle = cpu_to_le16(conn->handle);
hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_READ_CLOCK_OFFSET, sizeof(clkoff_cp),
&clkoff_cp);
}
return hci_abort_conn(conn, reason);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-327"
] | linux | d5bb334a8e171b262e48f378bd2096c0ea458265 | 16,521,179,311,816,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | Bluetooth: Align minimum encryption key size for LE and BR/EDR connections
The minimum encryption key size for LE connections is 56 bits and to
align LE with BR/EDR, enforce 56 bits of minimum encryption key size for
BR/EDR connections as well.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] |
static void dump_data_string(FILE *trace, char *data, u32 dataLength)
{
u32 i;
for (i=0; i<dataLength; i++) {
switch ((unsigned char) data[i]) {
case '\'':
gf_fprintf(trace, "'");
break;
case '\"':
gf_fprintf(trace, """);
break;
case '&':
gf_fprintf(trace, "&");
break;
case '>':
gf_fprintf(trace, ">");
break;
case '<':
gf_fprintf(trace, "<");
break;
default:
gf_fprintf(trace, "%c", (u8) data[i]);
break;
}
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | gpac | ea1eca00fd92fa17f0e25ac25652622924a9a6a0 | 129,393,971,187,973,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 | fixed #2138 |
static void atl2_shutdown(struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
atl2_suspend(pdev, PMSG_SUSPEND);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux | f43bfaeddc79effbf3d0fcb53ca477cca66f3db8 | 302,435,211,734,172,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
HeaderEntryImpl** inlineHeaders() override { return inline_headers_; } | 0 | [] | envoy | 2c60632d41555ec8b3d9ef5246242be637a2db0f | 335,036,611,992,683,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 | http: header map security fixes for duplicate headers (#197)
Previously header matching did not match on all headers for
non-inline headers. This patch changes the default behavior to
always logically match on all headers. Multiple individual
headers will be logically concatenated with ',' similar to what
is done with inline headers. This makes the behavior effectively
consistent. This behavior can be temporary reverted by setting
the runtime value "envoy.reloadable_features.header_match_on_all_headers"
to "false".
Targeted fixes have been additionally performed on the following
extensions which make them consider all duplicate headers by default as
a comma concatenated list:
1) Any extension using CEL matching on headers.
2) The header to metadata filter.
3) The JWT filter.
4) The Lua filter.
Like primary header matching used in routing, RBAC, etc. this behavior
can be disabled by setting the runtime value
"envoy.reloadable_features.header_match_on_all_headers" to false.
Finally, the setCopy() header map API previously only set the first
header in the case of duplicate non-inline headers. setCopy() now
behaves similiarly to the other set*() APIs and replaces all found
headers with a single value. This may have had security implications
in the extauth filter which uses this API. This behavior can be disabled
by setting the runtime value
"envoy.reloadable_features.http_set_copy_replace_all_headers" to false.
Fixes https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy-setec/issues/188
Signed-off-by: Matt Klein <[email protected]> |
static struct vhost_umem *vhost_umem_alloc(void)
{
struct vhost_umem *umem = kvzalloc(sizeof(*umem), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!umem)
return NULL;
umem->umem_tree = RB_ROOT_CACHED;
umem->numem = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&umem->umem_list);
return umem;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-120"
] | linux | 060423bfdee3f8bc6e2c1bac97de24d5415e2bc4 | 110,897,976,955,532,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | vhost: make sure log_num < in_num
The code assumes log_num < in_num everywhere, and that is true as long as
in_num is incremented by descriptor iov count, and log_num by 1. However
this breaks if there's a zero sized descriptor.
As a result, if a malicious guest creates a vring desc with desc.len = 0,
it may cause the host kernel to crash by overflowing the log array. This
bug can be triggered during the VM migration.
There's no need to log when desc.len = 0, so just don't increment log_num
in this case.
Fixes: 3a4d5c94e959 ("vhost_net: a kernel-level virtio server")
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Lidong Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: ruippan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: yongduan <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> |
void remove_server(gpointer s) {
SERVER *server;
server=(SERVER*)s;
g_free(server->exportname);
if(server->authname)
g_free(server->authname);
if(server->listenaddr)
g_free(server->listenaddr);
if(server->prerun)
g_free(server->prerun);
if(server->postrun)
g_free(server->postrun);
g_free(server);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | nbd | 3ef52043861ab16352d49af89e048ba6339d6df8 | 828,116,908,190,791,200,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | Fix buffer size checking
Yes, this means we've re-introduced CVE-2005-3534. Sigh. |
int crypto_register_instance(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
struct crypto_instance *inst)
{
struct crypto_larval *larval;
int err;
err = crypto_check_alg(&inst->alg);
if (err)
goto err;
inst->alg.cra_module = tmpl->module;
inst->alg.cra_flags |= CRYPTO_ALG_INSTANCE;
down_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
larval = __crypto_register_alg(&inst->alg);
if (IS_ERR(larval))
goto unlock;
hlist_add_head(&inst->list, &tmpl->instances);
inst->tmpl = tmpl;
unlock:
up_write(&crypto_alg_sem);
err = PTR_ERR(larval);
if (IS_ERR(larval))
goto err;
crypto_wait_for_test(larval);
err = 0;
err:
return err;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264",
"CWE-269"
] | linux | 4943ba16bbc2db05115707b3ff7b4874e9e3c560 | 191,632,789,167,915,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 | crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> |
int
skip_to_histexp (string, start, delims, flags)
char *string;
int start;
char *delims;
int flags;
{
int i, pass_next, backq, dquote, si, c, oldjmp;
int histexp_comsub, histexp_backq, old_dquote;
size_t slen;
char *temp, open[3];
DECLARE_MBSTATE;
slen = strlen (string + start) + start;
oldjmp = no_longjmp_on_fatal_error;
if (flags & SD_NOJMP)
no_longjmp_on_fatal_error = 1;
histexp_comsub = histexp_backq = old_dquote = 0;
i = start;
pass_next = backq = dquote = 0;
while (c = string[i])
{
if (pass_next)
{
pass_next = 0;
if (c == 0)
CQ_RETURN(i);
ADVANCE_CHAR (string, slen, i);
continue;
}
else if (c == '\\')
{
pass_next = 1;
i++;
continue;
}
else if (backq && c == '`')
{
backq = 0;
histexp_backq--;
dquote = old_dquote;
i++;
continue;
}
else if (c == '`')
{
backq = 1;
histexp_backq++;
old_dquote = dquote; /* simple - one level for now */
dquote = 0;
i++;
continue;
}
/* When in double quotes, act as if the double quote is a member of
history_no_expand_chars, like the history library does */
else if (dquote && c == delims[0] && string[i+1] == '"')
{
i++;
continue;
}
else if (c == delims[0])
break;
/* the usual case is to use skip_xxx_quoted, but we don't skip over double
quoted strings when looking for the history expansion character as a
delimiter. */
else if (dquote && c == '\'')
{
i++;
continue;
}
else if (c == '\'')
i = skip_single_quoted (string, slen, ++i, 0);
/* The posixly_correct test makes posix-mode shells allow double quotes
to quote the history expansion character */
else if (posixly_correct == 0 && c == '"')
{
dquote = 1 - dquote;
i++;
continue;
}
else if (c == '"')
i = skip_double_quoted (string, slen, ++i, 0);
#if defined (PROCESS_SUBSTITUTION)
else if ((c == '$' || c == '<' || c == '>') && string[i+1] == LPAREN && string[i+2] != LPAREN)
#else
else if (c == '$' && string[i+1] == LPAREN && string[i+2] != LPAREN)
#endif
{
if (string[i+2] == '\0')
CQ_RETURN(i+2);
i += 2;
histexp_comsub++;
old_dquote = dquote;
dquote = 0;
}
else if (histexp_comsub && c == RPAREN)
{
histexp_comsub--;
dquote = old_dquote;
i++;
continue;
}
else if (backq) /* placeholder */
{
ADVANCE_CHAR (string, slen, i);
continue;
}
else
ADVANCE_CHAR (string, slen, i);
}
CQ_RETURN(i); | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | bash | 4f747edc625815f449048579f6e65869914dd715 | 138,205,334,187,048,680,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 114 | Bash-4.4 patch 7 |
vte_sequence_handler_restore_mode (VteTerminal *terminal, GValueArray *params)
{
GValue *value;
long setting;
guint i;
if ((params == NULL) || (params->n_values == 0)) {
return;
}
for (i = 0; i < params->n_values; i++) {
value = g_value_array_get_nth(params, i);
if (!G_VALUE_HOLDS_LONG(value)) {
continue;
}
setting = g_value_get_long(value);
vte_sequence_handler_decset_internal(terminal, setting, TRUE, FALSE, FALSE);
}
} | 0 | [] | vte | 58bc3a942f198a1a8788553ca72c19d7c1702b74 | 88,713,744,468,149,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | fix bug #548272
svn path=/trunk/; revision=2365 |
find_word_start(char_u *ptr)
{
if (has_mbyte)
while (*ptr != NUL && *ptr != '\n' && mb_get_class(ptr) <= 1)
ptr += (*mb_ptr2len)(ptr);
else
while (*ptr != NUL && *ptr != '\n' && !vim_iswordc(*ptr))
++ptr;
return ptr;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | vim | f12129f1714f7d2301935bb21d896609bdac221c | 116,779,546,326,179,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | patch 9.0.0020: with some completion reading past end of string
Problem: With some completion reading past end of string.
Solution: Check the length of the string. |
const char *cgi_remote_host(void)
{
if (inetd_server) {
return get_peer_name(1,False);
}
return getenv("REMOTE_HOST");
} | 0 | [] | samba | 91f4275873ebeda8f57684f09df67162ae80515a | 141,830,882,060,009,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | swat: Use additional nonce on XSRF protection
If the user had a weak password on the root account of a machine running
SWAT, there still was a chance of being targetted by an XSRF on a
malicious web site targetting the SWAT setup.
Use a random nonce stored in secrets.tdb to close this possible attack
window. Thanks to Jann Horn for reporting this issue.
Signed-off-by: Kai Blin <[email protected]>
Fix bug #9577: CVE-2013-0214: Potential XSRF in SWAT. |
remove_pid_dir(void)
{
if (rmdir(pid_directory) && errno != ENOTEMPTY && errno != EBUSY)
log_message(LOG_INFO, "unlink of %s failed - error (%d) '%s'", pid_directory, errno, strerror(errno));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-59",
"CWE-61"
] | keepalived | 04f2d32871bb3b11d7dc024039952f2fe2750306 | 183,876,601,725,771,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]> |
static int ceph_aes_encrypt2(const void *key, int key_len, void *dst,
size_t *dst_len,
const void *src1, size_t src1_len,
const void *src2, size_t src2_len)
{
struct scatterlist sg_in[3], prealloc_sg;
struct sg_table sg_out;
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = ceph_crypto_alloc_cipher();
SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, tfm);
int ret;
char iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
size_t zero_padding = (0x10 - ((src1_len + src2_len) & 0x0f));
char pad[16];
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
memset(pad, zero_padding, zero_padding);
*dst_len = src1_len + src2_len + zero_padding;
sg_init_table(sg_in, 3);
sg_set_buf(&sg_in[0], src1, src1_len);
sg_set_buf(&sg_in[1], src2, src2_len);
sg_set_buf(&sg_in[2], pad, zero_padding);
ret = setup_sgtable(&sg_out, &prealloc_sg, dst, *dst_len);
if (ret)
goto out_tfm;
crypto_skcipher_setkey((void *)tfm, key, key_len);
memcpy(iv, aes_iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, tfm);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg_in, sg_out.sgl,
src1_len + src2_len + zero_padding, iv);
/*
print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "enc key: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1,
key, key_len, 1);
print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "enc src1: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1,
src1, src1_len, 1);
print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "enc src2: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1,
src2, src2_len, 1);
print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "enc pad: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1,
pad, zero_padding, 1);
*/
ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
skcipher_request_zero(req);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("ceph_aes_crypt2 failed %d\n", ret);
goto out_sg;
}
/*
print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "enc out: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1,
dst, *dst_len, 1);
*/
out_sg:
teardown_sgtable(&sg_out);
out_tfm:
crypto_free_skcipher(tfm);
return ret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-399"
] | linux | a45f795c65b479b4ba107b6ccde29b896d51ee98 | 200,457,328,784,065,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 64 | libceph: introduce ceph_crypt() for in-place en/decryption
Starting with 4.9, kernel stacks may be vmalloced and therefore not
guaranteed to be physically contiguous; the new CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
option is enabled by default on x86. This makes it invalid to use
on-stack buffers with the crypto scatterlist API, as sg_set_buf()
expects a logical address and won't work with vmalloced addresses.
There isn't a different (e.g. kvec-based) crypto API we could switch
net/ceph/crypto.c to and the current scatterlist.h API isn't getting
updated to accommodate this use case. Allocating a new header and
padding for each operation is a non-starter, so do the en/decryption
in-place on a single pre-assembled (header + data + padding) heap
buffer. This is explicitly supported by the crypto API:
"... the caller may provide the same scatter/gather list for the
plaintext and cipher text. After the completion of the cipher
operation, the plaintext data is replaced with the ciphertext data
in case of an encryption and vice versa for a decryption."
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <[email protected]> |
TEST_P(ProxyProtocolTest, InvalidSrcAddress) {
connect(false);
write("PROXY TCP4 230.0.0.1 10.1.1.3 1234 5678\r\nmore data");
expectProxyProtoError();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400"
] | envoy | dfddb529e914d794ac552e906b13d71233609bf7 | 264,599,984,171,270,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | listener: Add configurable accepted connection limits (#153)
Add support for per-listener limits on accepted connections.
Signed-off-by: Tony Allen <[email protected]> |
ToL (const guchar *puffer)
{
return (puffer[0] | puffer[1] << 8 | puffer[2] << 16 | puffer[3] << 24);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | gimp | e3afc99b2fa7aeddf0dba4778663160a5bc682d3 | 223,609,812,293,590,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Harden the BMP plugin against integer overflows.
Issues discovered by Stefan Cornelius, Secunia Research, advisory SA37232
and CVE identifier CVE-2009-1570. Fixes bug #600484. |
WriteWrap* WriteWrap::FromObject(
const BaseObjectPtrImpl<T, kIsWeak>& base_obj) {
if (!base_obj) return nullptr;
return FromObject(base_obj->object());
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | node | 4f8772f9b731118628256189b73cd202149bbd97 | 153,646,980,014,960,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | src: retain pointers to WriteWrap/ShutdownWrap
Avoids potential use-after-free when wrap req's are synchronously
destroyed.
CVE-ID: CVE-2020-8265
Fixes: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/issues/227
Refs: https://hackerone.com/bugs?subject=nodejs&report_id=988103
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/23
Reviewed-By: Anna Henningsen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-By: Matteo Collina <[email protected]>
Reviewed-By: Rich Trott <[email protected]> |
TRIO_PRIVATE BOOLEAN_T TrioReadWideString TRIO_ARGS4((self, target, flags, width),
trio_class_t* self, trio_wchar_t* target,
trio_flags_t flags, int width)
{
int i;
int size;
assert(VALID(self));
assert(VALID(self->InStream));
TrioSkipWhitespaces(self);
#if defined(TRIO_COMPILER_SUPPORTS_MULTIBYTE)
/* Required by TrioReadWideChar */
(void)mblen(NULL, 0);
#endif
/*
* Continue until end of string is reached, a whitespace is encountered,
* or width is exceeded
*/
for (i = 0; ((width == NO_WIDTH) || (i < width)) &&
(!((self->current == EOF) || isspace(self->current)));)
{
size = TrioReadWideChar(self, &target[i], flags, 1);
if (size == 0)
break; /* for */
i += size;
}
if (target)
target[i] = WCONST('\0');
return TRUE;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190",
"CWE-125"
] | FreeRDP | 05cd9ea2290d23931f615c1b004d4b2e69074e27 | 95,626,238,336,471,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 | Fixed TrioParse and trio_length limts.
CVE-2020-4030 thanks to @antonio-morales for finding this. |
static ssize_t show_cons_active(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct console *cs[16];
int i = 0;
struct console *c;
ssize_t count = 0;
console_lock();
for_each_console(c) {
if (!c->device)
continue;
if (!c->write)
continue;
if ((c->flags & CON_ENABLED) == 0)
continue;
cs[i++] = c;
if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(cs))
break;
}
while (i--) {
int index = cs[i]->index;
struct tty_driver *drv = cs[i]->device(cs[i], &index);
/* don't resolve tty0 as some programs depend on it */
if (drv && (cs[i]->index > 0 || drv->major != TTY_MAJOR))
count += tty_line_name(drv, index, buf + count);
else
count += sprintf(buf + count, "%s%d",
cs[i]->name, cs[i]->index);
count += sprintf(buf + count, "%c", i ? ' ':'\n');
}
console_unlock();
return count;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-362"
] | linux | 5c17c861a357e9458001f021a7afa7aab9937439 | 49,365,584,489,150,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 | tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> |
static status ParseFrameCount (AFfilehandle filehandle, AFvirtualfile *fp,
uint32_t id, size_t size)
{
uint32_t totalFrames;
_Track *track;
track = _af_filehandle_get_track(filehandle, AF_DEFAULT_TRACK);
af_read_uint32_le(&totalFrames, fp);
track->totalfframes = totalFrames;
return AF_SUCCEED;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | audiofile | e8cf0095b3f319739f9aa1ab5a1aa52b76be8cdd | 234,496,714,543,987,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | Fix decoding of multi-channel ADPCM audio files. |
static void btrfs_submit_direct(int rw, struct bio *dio_bio,
struct inode *inode, loff_t file_offset)
{
struct btrfs_dio_private *dip = NULL;
struct bio *io_bio = NULL;
struct btrfs_io_bio *btrfs_bio;
int skip_sum;
int write = rw & REQ_WRITE;
int ret = 0;
skip_sum = BTRFS_I(inode)->flags & BTRFS_INODE_NODATASUM;
io_bio = btrfs_bio_clone(dio_bio, GFP_NOFS);
if (!io_bio) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto free_ordered;
}
dip = kzalloc(sizeof(*dip), GFP_NOFS);
if (!dip) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto free_ordered;
}
dip->private = dio_bio->bi_private;
dip->inode = inode;
dip->logical_offset = file_offset;
dip->bytes = dio_bio->bi_iter.bi_size;
dip->disk_bytenr = (u64)dio_bio->bi_iter.bi_sector << 9;
io_bio->bi_private = dip;
dip->orig_bio = io_bio;
dip->dio_bio = dio_bio;
atomic_set(&dip->pending_bios, 0);
btrfs_bio = btrfs_io_bio(io_bio);
btrfs_bio->logical = file_offset;
if (write) {
io_bio->bi_end_io = btrfs_endio_direct_write;
} else {
io_bio->bi_end_io = btrfs_endio_direct_read;
dip->subio_endio = btrfs_subio_endio_read;
}
ret = btrfs_submit_direct_hook(rw, dip, skip_sum);
if (!ret)
return;
if (btrfs_bio->end_io)
btrfs_bio->end_io(btrfs_bio, ret);
free_ordered:
/*
* If we arrived here it means either we failed to submit the dip
* or we either failed to clone the dio_bio or failed to allocate the
* dip. If we cloned the dio_bio and allocated the dip, we can just
* call bio_endio against our io_bio so that we get proper resource
* cleanup if we fail to submit the dip, otherwise, we must do the
* same as btrfs_endio_direct_[write|read] because we can't call these
* callbacks - they require an allocated dip and a clone of dio_bio.
*/
if (io_bio && dip) {
io_bio->bi_error = -EIO;
bio_endio(io_bio);
/*
* The end io callbacks free our dip, do the final put on io_bio
* and all the cleanup and final put for dio_bio (through
* dio_end_io()).
*/
dip = NULL;
io_bio = NULL;
} else {
if (write) {
struct btrfs_ordered_extent *ordered;
ordered = btrfs_lookup_ordered_extent(inode,
file_offset);
set_bit(BTRFS_ORDERED_IOERR, &ordered->flags);
/*
* Decrements our ref on the ordered extent and removes
* the ordered extent from the inode's ordered tree,
* doing all the proper resource cleanup such as for the
* reserved space and waking up any waiters for this
* ordered extent (through btrfs_remove_ordered_extent).
*/
btrfs_finish_ordered_io(ordered);
} else {
unlock_extent(&BTRFS_I(inode)->io_tree, file_offset,
file_offset + dio_bio->bi_iter.bi_size - 1);
}
dio_bio->bi_error = -EIO;
/*
* Releases and cleans up our dio_bio, no need to bio_put()
* nor bio_endio()/bio_io_error() against dio_bio.
*/
dio_end_io(dio_bio, ret);
}
if (io_bio)
bio_put(io_bio);
kfree(dip);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux | 0305cd5f7fca85dae392b9ba85b116896eb7c1c7 | 203,247,753,419,206,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 100 | Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> |
static int nla_decode_ts_request(rdpNla* nla, wStream* s)
{
WinPrAsn1Decoder dec, dec2, dec3;
BOOL error;
WinPrAsn1_tagId tag;
WinPrAsn1_OctetString octet_string;
WinPrAsn1_INTEGER val;
UINT32 version = 0;
char buffer[1024];
WINPR_ASSERT(nla);
WINPR_ASSERT(s);
WinPrAsn1Decoder_Init(&dec, WINPR_ASN1_DER, s);
WLog_DBG(TAG, "<<----- receiving...");
/* TSRequest */
if (!WinPrAsn1DecReadSequence(&dec, &dec2))
return -1;
dec = dec2;
/* version [0] INTEGER */
if (!WinPrAsn1DecReadContextualInteger(&dec, 0, &error, &val))
return -1;
version = (UINT)val;
WLog_DBG(TAG, " <<----- protocol version %" PRIu32, version);
if (nla->peerVersion == 0)
nla->peerVersion = version;
/* if the peer suddenly changed its version - kick it */
if (nla->peerVersion != version)
{
WLog_ERR(TAG, "CredSSP peer changed protocol version from %" PRIu32 " to %" PRIu32,
nla->peerVersion, version);
return -1;
}
while (WinPrAsn1DecReadContextualTag(&dec, &tag, &dec2))
{
switch (tag)
{
case 1:
WLog_DBG(TAG, " <<----- nego token");
/* negoTokens [1] SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE */
if (!WinPrAsn1DecReadSequence(&dec2, &dec3) ||
!WinPrAsn1DecReadSequence(&dec3, &dec2))
return -1;
/* negoToken [0] OCTET STRING */
if (!WinPrAsn1DecReadContextualOctetString(&dec2, 0, &error, &octet_string,
FALSE) &&
error)
return -1;
if (!nla_sec_buffer_alloc_from_data(&nla->negoToken, octet_string.data, 0,
octet_string.len))
return -1;
break;
case 2:
WLog_DBG(TAG, " <<----- auth info");
/* authInfo [2] OCTET STRING */
if (!WinPrAsn1DecReadOctetString(&dec2, &octet_string, FALSE))
return -1;
if (!nla_sec_buffer_alloc_from_data(&nla->authInfo, octet_string.data, 0,
octet_string.len))
return -1;
break;
case 3:
WLog_DBG(TAG, " <<----- public key info");
/* pubKeyAuth [3] OCTET STRING */
if (!WinPrAsn1DecReadOctetString(&dec2, &octet_string, FALSE))
return -1;
if (!nla_sec_buffer_alloc_from_data(&nla->pubKeyAuth, octet_string.data, 0,
octet_string.len))
return -1;
break;
case 4:
/* errorCode [4] INTEGER */
if (!WinPrAsn1DecReadInteger(&dec2, &val))
return -1;
nla->errorCode = (UINT)val;
WLog_DBG(TAG, " <<----- error code %s 0x%08" PRIx32,
winpr_strerror(nla->errorCode, buffer, sizeof(buffer)), nla->errorCode);
break;
case 5:
WLog_DBG(TAG, " <<----- client nonce");
/* clientNonce [5] OCTET STRING */
if (!WinPrAsn1DecReadOctetString(&dec2, &octet_string, FALSE))
return -1;
if (!nla_sec_buffer_alloc_from_data(&nla->ClientNonce, octet_string.data, 0,
octet_string.len))
return -1;
break;
default:
return -1;
}
}
return 1;
} | 0 | [] | FreeRDP | 479e891545473f01c187daffdfa05fc752b54b72 | 231,868,861,071,991,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 100 | check return values for SetCredentialsAttributes, throw warnings for unsupported attributes |
static inline int mb_buddy_adjust_border(int* bit, void* bitmap, int side)
{
if (mb_test_bit(*bit + side, bitmap)) {
mb_clear_bit(*bit, bitmap);
(*bit) -= side;
return 1;
}
else {
(*bit) += side;
mb_set_bit(*bit, bitmap);
return -1;
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | 8844618d8aa7a9973e7b527d038a2a589665002c | 7,354,805,244,477,119,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | ext4: only look at the bg_flags field if it is valid
The bg_flags field in the block group descripts is only valid if the
uninit_bg or metadata_csum feature is enabled. We were not
consistently looking at this field; fix this.
Also block group #0 must never have uninitialized allocation bitmaps,
or need to be zeroed, since that's where the root inode, and other
special inodes are set up. Check for these conditions and mark the
file system as corrupted if they are detected.
This addresses CVE-2018-10876.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199403
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] |
static int mov_read_dec3(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
AVStream *st;
enum AVAudioServiceType *ast;
int eac3info, acmod, lfeon, bsmod;
uint64_t mask;
if (c->fc->nb_streams < 1)
return 0;
st = c->fc->streams[c->fc->nb_streams-1];
ast = (enum AVAudioServiceType*)av_stream_new_side_data(st, AV_PKT_DATA_AUDIO_SERVICE_TYPE,
sizeof(*ast));
if (!ast)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
/* No need to parse fields for additional independent substreams and its
* associated dependent substreams since libavcodec's E-AC-3 decoder
* does not support them yet. */
avio_rb16(pb); /* data_rate and num_ind_sub */
eac3info = avio_rb24(pb);
bsmod = (eac3info >> 12) & 0x1f;
acmod = (eac3info >> 9) & 0x7;
lfeon = (eac3info >> 8) & 0x1;
mask = ff_ac3_channel_layout_tab[acmod];
if (lfeon)
mask |= AV_CH_LOW_FREQUENCY;
av_channel_layout_uninit(&st->codecpar->ch_layout);
av_channel_layout_from_mask(&st->codecpar->ch_layout, mask);
*ast = bsmod;
if (st->codecpar->ch_layout.nb_channels > 1 && bsmod == 0x7)
*ast = AV_AUDIO_SERVICE_TYPE_KARAOKE;
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | FFmpeg | c953baa084607dd1d84c3bfcce3cf6a87c3e6e05 | 315,728,584,809,523,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 | avformat/mov: Check count sums in build_open_gop_key_points()
Fixes: ffmpeg.md
Fixes: Out of array access
Fixes: CVE-2022-2566
Found-by: Andy Nguyen <[email protected]>
Found-by: 3pvd <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andy Nguyen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> |
static void set_root_rcu(struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct fs_struct *fs = current->fs;
unsigned seq;
do {
seq = read_seqcount_begin(&fs->seq);
nd->root = fs->root;
nd->root_seq = __read_seqcount_begin(&nd->root.dentry->d_seq);
} while (read_seqcount_retry(&fs->seq, seq));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-254"
] | linux | 397d425dc26da728396e66d392d5dcb8dac30c37 | 191,065,993,642,050,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | vfs: Test for and handle paths that are unreachable from their mnt_root
In rare cases a directory can be renamed out from under a bind mount.
In those cases without special handling it becomes possible to walk up
the directory tree to the root dentry of the filesystem and down
from the root dentry to every other file or directory on the filesystem.
Like division by zero .. from an unconnected path can not be given
a useful semantic as there is no predicting at which path component
the code will realize it is unconnected. We certainly can not match
the current behavior as the current behavior is a security hole.
Therefore when encounting .. when following an unconnected path
return -ENOENT.
- Add a function path_connected to verify path->dentry is reachable
from path->mnt.mnt_root. AKA to validate that rename did not do
something nasty to the bind mount.
To avoid races path_connected must be called after following a path
component to it's next path component.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> |
rb_str_rjust(argc, argv, str)
int argc;
VALUE *argv;
VALUE str;
{
return rb_str_justify(argc, argv, str, 'r');
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | ruby | e926ef5233cc9f1035d3d51068abe9df8b5429da | 175,893,720,047,965,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | * random.c (rb_genrand_int32, rb_genrand_real), intern.h: Export.
* string.c (rb_str_tmp_new), intern.h: New function.
git-svn-id: svn+ssh://ci.ruby-lang.org/ruby/branches/ruby_1_8@16014 b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e |
gdImagePtr gdImageRotateInterpolated(const gdImagePtr src, const float angle, int bgcolor)
{
const int angle_rounded = (int)floor(angle * 100);
if (bgcolor < 0 || bgcolor >= gdMaxColors) {
return NULL;
}
/* impact perf a bit, but not that much. Implementation for palette
images can be done at a later point.
*/
if (src->trueColor == 0) {
if (bgcolor >= 0) {
bgcolor = gdTrueColorAlpha(src->red[bgcolor], src->green[bgcolor], src->blue[bgcolor], src->alpha[bgcolor]);
}
gdImagePaletteToTrueColor(src);
}
/* no interpolation needed here */
switch (angle_rounded) {
case 9000:
return gdImageRotate90(src, 0);
case 18000:
return gdImageRotate180(src, 0);
case 27000:
return gdImageRotate270(src, 0);
}
if (src == NULL || src->interpolation_id < 1 || src->interpolation_id > GD_METHOD_COUNT) {
return NULL;
}
switch (src->interpolation_id) {
case GD_NEAREST_NEIGHBOUR:
return gdImageRotateNearestNeighbour(src, angle, bgcolor);
break;
case GD_BILINEAR_FIXED:
return gdImageRotateBilinear(src, angle, bgcolor);
break;
case GD_BICUBIC_FIXED:
return gdImageRotateBicubicFixed(src, angle, bgcolor);
break;
default:
return gdImageRotateGeneric(src, angle, bgcolor);
}
return NULL;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-119"
] | php-src | 2baeb167a08b0186a885208bdc8b5871f1681dc8 | 53,394,462,158,955,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 50 | Improve fix for bug #70976 |
dns_getserver(u8_t numdns)
{
if (numdns < DNS_MAX_SERVERS) {
return dns_servers[numdns];
} else {
return *IP_ADDR_ANY;
}
} | 0 | [] | lwip | 9fb46e120655ac481b2af8f865d5ae56c39b831a | 1,946,913,949,566,831,200,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | added source port randomization to make the DNS client more robust (see bug #43144) |
FLAC_API FLAC__bool FLAC__stream_encoder_set_qlp_coeff_precision(FLAC__StreamEncoder *encoder, unsigned value)
{
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != encoder);
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != encoder->private_);
FLAC__ASSERT(0 != encoder->protected_);
if(encoder->protected_->state != FLAC__STREAM_ENCODER_UNINITIALIZED)
return false;
encoder->protected_->qlp_coeff_precision = value;
return true;
} | 0 | [] | flac | c06a44969c1145242a22f75fc8fb2e8b54c55303 | 53,910,229,013,868,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | flac : Fix for https://sourceforge.net/p/flac/bugs/425/
* flac/encode.c : Validate num_tracks field of cuesheet.
* libFLAC/stream_encoder.c : Add check for a NULL pointer.
* flac/encode.c : Improve bounds checking.
Closes: https://sourceforge.net/p/flac/bugs/425/ |
static void *get_wqe(struct mlx5_ib_qp *qp, int offset)
{
return mlx5_buf_offset(&qp->buf, offset);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | linux | 0625b4ba1a5d4703c7fb01c497bd6c156908af00 | 113,742,654,208,936,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | IB/mlx5: Fix leaking stack memory to userspace
mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp was never initialized and only the first 4 bytes
were written.
Fixes: 41d902cb7c32 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix definition of mlx5_ib_create_qp_resp")
Cc: <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]> |
asmlinkage long sys_fstatfs64(unsigned int fd, size_t sz, struct statfs64 __user *buf)
{
struct file * file;
struct statfs64 tmp;
int error;
if (sz != sizeof(*buf))
return -EINVAL;
error = -EBADF;
file = fget(fd);
if (!file)
goto out;
error = vfs_statfs64(file->f_path.dentry, &tmp);
if (!error && copy_to_user(buf, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)))
error = -EFAULT;
fput(file);
out:
return error;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-264"
] | linux-2.6 | 7b82dc0e64e93f430182f36b46b79fcee87d3532 | 31,736,854,117,483,010,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | Remove suid/sgid bits on [f]truncate()
.. to match what we do on write(). This way, people who write to files
by using [f]truncate + writable mmap have the same semantics as if they
were using the write() family of system calls.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
date_s__parse(int argc, VALUE *argv, VALUE klass)
{
return date_s__parse_internal(argc, argv, klass);
} | 0 | [] | date | 3959accef8da5c128f8a8e2fd54e932a4fb253b0 | 151,600,433,402,315,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Add length limit option for methods that parses date strings
`Date.parse` now raises an ArgumentError when a given date string is
longer than 128. You can configure the limit by giving `limit` keyword
arguments like `Date.parse(str, limit: 1000)`. If you pass `limit: nil`,
the limit is disabled.
Not only `Date.parse` but also the following methods are changed.
* Date._parse
* Date.parse
* DateTime.parse
* Date._iso8601
* Date.iso8601
* DateTime.iso8601
* Date._rfc3339
* Date.rfc3339
* DateTime.rfc3339
* Date._xmlschema
* Date.xmlschema
* DateTime.xmlschema
* Date._rfc2822
* Date.rfc2822
* DateTime.rfc2822
* Date._rfc822
* Date.rfc822
* DateTime.rfc822
* Date._jisx0301
* Date.jisx0301
* DateTime.jisx0301 |
static void hexprint(FILE *out, const unsigned char *buf, int buflen)
{
int i;
fprintf(out, "\t");
for (i = 0; i < buflen; i++)
fprintf(out, "%02X", buf[i]);
fprintf(out, "\n");
} | 1 | [] | openssl | 200f249b8c3b6439e0200d01caadc24806f1a983 | 133,156,246,302,735,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | Remove Dual EC DRBG from FIPS module. |
xsltIfComp(xsltStylesheetPtr style, xmlNodePtr inst) {
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemIfPtr comp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp;
#endif
if ((style == NULL) || (inst == NULL) || (inst->type != XML_ELEMENT_NODE))
return;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
comp = (xsltStyleItemIfPtr)
xsltNewStylePreComp(style, XSLT_FUNC_IF);
#else
comp = xsltNewStylePreComp(style, XSLT_FUNC_IF);
#endif
if (comp == NULL)
return;
inst->psvi = comp;
comp->inst = inst;
comp->test = xsltGetCNsProp(style, inst, (const xmlChar *)"test", XSLT_NAMESPACE);
if (comp->test == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"xsl:if : test is not defined\n");
if (style != NULL) style->errors++;
return;
}
comp->comp = xsltXPathCompile(style, comp->test);
if (comp->comp == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(NULL, style, inst,
"xsl:if : could not compile test expression '%s'\n",
comp->test);
if (style != NULL) style->errors++;
}
} | 0 | [] | libxslt | 7ca19df892ca22d9314e95d59ce2abdeff46b617 | 281,244,010,015,218,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 | Fix for type confusion in preprocessing attributes
CVE-2015-7995 http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/10/27/10
We need to check that the parent node is an element before dereferencing
its namespace |
MagickExport QuantizeInfo *AcquireQuantizeInfo(const ImageInfo *image_info)
{
QuantizeInfo
*quantize_info;
quantize_info=(QuantizeInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*quantize_info));
if (quantize_info == (QuantizeInfo *) NULL)
ThrowFatalException(ResourceLimitFatalError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
GetQuantizeInfo(quantize_info);
if (image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL)
{
const char
*option;
quantize_info->dither=image_info->dither;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"dither");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
quantize_info->dither_method=(DitherMethod) ParseCommandOption(
MagickDitherOptions,MagickFalse,option);
quantize_info->measure_error=image_info->verbose;
}
return(quantize_info);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | ImageMagick6 | e2a21735e3a3f3930bd431585ec36334c4c2eb77 | 91,517,906,377,392,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1540 |
xfs_queue_eofblocks(
struct xfs_mount *mp)
{
rcu_read_lock();
if (radix_tree_tagged(&mp->m_perag_tree, XFS_ICI_EOFBLOCKS_TAG))
queue_delayed_work(mp->m_eofblocks_workqueue,
&mp->m_eofblocks_work,
msecs_to_jiffies(xfs_eofb_secs * 1000));
rcu_read_unlock();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | linux | afca6c5b2595fc44383919fba740c194b0b76aff | 208,901,666,937,103,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | xfs: validate cached inodes are free when allocated
A recent fuzzed filesystem image cached random dcache corruption
when the reproducer was run. This often showed up as panics in
lookup_slow() on a null inode->i_ops pointer when doing pathwalks.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
....
Call Trace:
lookup_slow+0x44/0x60
walk_component+0x3dd/0x9f0
link_path_walk+0x4a7/0x830
path_lookupat+0xc1/0x470
filename_lookup+0x129/0x270
user_path_at_empty+0x36/0x40
path_listxattr+0x98/0x110
SyS_listxattr+0x13/0x20
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x280
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
but had many different failure modes including deadlocks trying to
lock the inode that was just allocated or KASAN reports of
use-after-free violations.
The cause of the problem was a corrupt INOBT on a v4 fs where the
root inode was marked as free in the inobt record. Hence when we
allocated an inode, it chose the root inode to allocate, found it in
the cache and re-initialised it.
We recently fixed a similar inode allocation issue caused by inobt
record corruption problem in xfs_iget_cache_miss() in commit
ee457001ed6c ("xfs: catch inode allocation state mismatch
corruption"). This change adds similar checks to the cache-hit path
to catch it, and turns the reproducer into a corruption shutdown
situation.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-Off-By: Dave Chinner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]>
[darrick: fix typos in comment]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <[email protected]> |
auth_peer(hbaPort *port)
{
char ident_user[IDENT_USERNAME_MAX + 1];
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
struct passwd *pw;
if (getpeereid(port->sock, &uid, &gid) != 0)
{
/* Provide special error message if getpeereid is a stub */
if (errno == ENOSYS)
ereport(LOG,
(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
errmsg("peer authentication is not supported on this platform")));
else
ereport(LOG,
(errcode_for_socket_access(),
errmsg("could not get peer credentials: %m")));
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
errno = 0; /* clear errno before call */
pw = getpwuid(uid);
if (!pw)
{
ereport(LOG,
(errmsg("could not look up local user ID %ld: %s",
(long) uid,
errno ? strerror(errno) : _("user does not exist"))));
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
strlcpy(ident_user, pw->pw_name, IDENT_USERNAME_MAX + 1);
return check_usermap(port->hba->usermap, port->user_name, ident_user, false);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-89"
] | postgres | 2b3a8b20c2da9f39ffecae25ab7c66974fbc0d3b | 180,197,117,824,894,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 36 | Be more careful to not lose sync in the FE/BE protocol.
If any error occurred while we were in the middle of reading a protocol
message from the client, we could lose sync, and incorrectly try to
interpret a part of another message as a new protocol message. That will
usually lead to an "invalid frontend message" error that terminates the
connection. However, this is a security issue because an attacker might
be able to deliberately cause an error, inject a Query message in what's
supposed to be just user data, and have the server execute it.
We were quite careful to not have CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS() calls or other
operations that could ereport(ERROR) in the middle of processing a message,
but a query cancel interrupt or statement timeout could nevertheless cause
it to happen. Also, the V2 fastpath and COPY handling were not so careful.
It's very difficult to recover in the V2 COPY protocol, so we will just
terminate the connection on error. In practice, that's what happened
previously anyway, as we lost protocol sync.
To fix, add a new variable in pqcomm.c, PqCommReadingMsg, that is set
whenever we're in the middle of reading a message. When it's set, we cannot
safely ERROR out and continue running, because we might've read only part
of a message. PqCommReadingMsg acts somewhat similarly to critical sections
in that if an error occurs while it's set, the error handler will force the
connection to be terminated, as if the error was FATAL. It's not
implemented by promoting ERROR to FATAL in elog.c, like ERROR is promoted
to PANIC in critical sections, because we want to be able to use
PG_TRY/CATCH to recover and regain protocol sync. pq_getmessage() takes
advantage of that to prevent an OOM error from terminating the connection.
To prevent unnecessary connection terminations, add a holdoff mechanism
similar to HOLD/RESUME_INTERRUPTS() that can be used hold off query cancel
interrupts, but still allow die interrupts. The rules on which interrupts
are processed when are now a bit more complicated, so refactor
ProcessInterrupts() and the calls to it in signal handlers so that the
signal handlers always call it if ImmediateInterruptOK is set, and
ProcessInterrupts() can decide to not do anything if the other conditions
are not met.
Reported by Emil Lenngren. Patch reviewed by Noah Misch and Andres Freund.
Backpatch to all supported versions.
Security: CVE-2015-0244 |
static int process_closing_reply_callback(sd_bus *bus, struct reply_callback *c) {
_cleanup_(sd_bus_error_free) sd_bus_error error_buffer = SD_BUS_ERROR_NULL;
_cleanup_(sd_bus_message_unrefp) sd_bus_message *m = NULL;
sd_bus_slot *slot;
int r;
assert(bus);
assert(c);
r = bus_message_new_synthetic_error(
bus,
c->cookie,
&SD_BUS_ERROR_MAKE_CONST(SD_BUS_ERROR_NO_REPLY, "Connection terminated"),
&m);
if (r < 0)
return r;
m->read_counter = ++bus->read_counter;
r = bus_seal_synthetic_message(bus, m);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (c->timeout_usec != 0) {
prioq_remove(bus->reply_callbacks_prioq, c, &c->prioq_idx);
c->timeout_usec = 0;
}
ordered_hashmap_remove(bus->reply_callbacks, &c->cookie);
c->cookie = 0;
slot = container_of(c, sd_bus_slot, reply_callback);
bus->iteration_counter++;
bus->current_message = m;
bus->current_slot = sd_bus_slot_ref(slot);
bus->current_handler = c->callback;
bus->current_userdata = slot->userdata;
r = c->callback(m, slot->userdata, &error_buffer);
bus->current_userdata = NULL;
bus->current_handler = NULL;
bus->current_slot = NULL;
bus->current_message = NULL;
if (slot->floating)
bus_slot_disconnect(slot, true);
sd_bus_slot_unref(slot);
return bus_maybe_reply_error(m, r, &error_buffer);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | systemd | 1068447e6954dc6ce52f099ed174c442cb89ed54 | 56,811,226,179,172,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 52 | sd-bus: introduce API for re-enqueuing incoming messages
When authorizing via PolicyKit we want to process incoming method calls
twice: once to process and figure out that we need PK authentication,
and a second time after we aquired PK authentication to actually execute
the operation. With this new call sd_bus_enqueue_for_read() we have a
way to put an incoming message back into the read queue for this
purpose.
This might have other uses too, for example debugging. |
template<typename t>
CImg<T>& operator^=(const CImg<t>& img) {
const ulongT siz = size(), isiz = img.size();
if (siz && isiz) {
if (is_overlapped(img)) return *this^=+img;
T *ptrd = _data, *const ptre = _data + siz;
if (siz>isiz) for (ulongT n = siz/isiz; n; --n)
for (const t *ptrs = img._data, *ptrs_end = ptrs + isiz; ptrs<ptrs_end; ++ptrd)
*ptrd = (T)((ulongT)*ptrd ^ (ulongT)*(ptrs++));
for (const t *ptrs = img._data; ptrd<ptre; ++ptrd) *ptrd = (T)((ulongT)*ptrd ^ (ulongT)*(ptrs++));
}
return *this; | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CImg | 10af1e8c1ad2a58a0a3342a856bae63e8f257abb | 220,811,813,307,237,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | Fix other issues in 'CImg<T>::load_bmp()'. |
uint32_t tee_mmu_user_get_cache_attr(struct user_ta_ctx *utc, void *va)
{
uint32_t attr;
if (tee_mmu_user_va2pa_attr(utc, va, NULL, &attr) != TEE_SUCCESS)
panic("cannot get attr");
return (attr >> TEE_MATTR_CACHE_SHIFT) & TEE_MATTR_CACHE_MASK;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-787"
] | optee_os | 95f36d661f2b75887772ea28baaad904bde96970 | 336,903,475,500,894,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | core: tee_mmu_check_access_rights() check all pages
Prior to this patch tee_mmu_check_access_rights() checks an address in
each page of a supplied range. If both the start and length of that
range is unaligned the last page in the range is sometimes not checked.
With this patch the first address of each page in the range is checked
to simplify the logic of checking each page and the range and also to
cover the last page under all circumstances.
Fixes: OP-TEE-2018-0005: "tee_mmu_check_access_rights does not check
final page of TA buffer"
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]> (QEMU v7, v8)
Reviewed-by: Joakim Bech <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Riscure <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Alyssa Milburn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <[email protected]> |
png_set_keep_unknown_chunks(png_structrp png_ptr, int keep,
png_const_bytep chunk_list, int num_chunks_in)
{
png_bytep new_list;
unsigned int num_chunks, old_num_chunks;
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return;
if (keep < 0 || keep >= PNG_HANDLE_CHUNK_LAST)
{
png_app_error(png_ptr, "png_set_keep_unknown_chunks: invalid keep");
return;
}
if (num_chunks_in <= 0)
{
png_ptr->unknown_default = keep;
/* '0' means just set the flags, so stop here */
if (num_chunks_in == 0)
return;
}
if (num_chunks_in < 0)
{
/* Ignore all unknown chunks and all chunks recognized by
* libpng except for IHDR, PLTE, tRNS, IDAT, and IEND
*/
static PNG_CONST png_byte chunks_to_ignore[] = {
98, 75, 71, 68, '\0', /* bKGD */
99, 72, 82, 77, '\0', /* cHRM */
103, 65, 77, 65, '\0', /* gAMA */
104, 73, 83, 84, '\0', /* hIST */
105, 67, 67, 80, '\0', /* iCCP */
105, 84, 88, 116, '\0', /* iTXt */
111, 70, 70, 115, '\0', /* oFFs */
112, 67, 65, 76, '\0', /* pCAL */
112, 72, 89, 115, '\0', /* pHYs */
115, 66, 73, 84, '\0', /* sBIT */
115, 67, 65, 76, '\0', /* sCAL */
115, 80, 76, 84, '\0', /* sPLT */
115, 84, 69, 82, '\0', /* sTER */
115, 82, 71, 66, '\0', /* sRGB */
116, 69, 88, 116, '\0', /* tEXt */
116, 73, 77, 69, '\0', /* tIME */
122, 84, 88, 116, '\0' /* zTXt */
};
chunk_list = chunks_to_ignore;
num_chunks = (unsigned int)/*SAFE*/(sizeof chunks_to_ignore)/5U;
}
else /* num_chunks_in > 0 */
{
if (chunk_list == NULL)
{
/* Prior to 1.6.0 this was silently ignored, now it is an app_error
* which can be switched off.
*/
png_app_error(png_ptr, "png_set_keep_unknown_chunks: no chunk list");
return;
}
num_chunks = num_chunks_in;
}
old_num_chunks = png_ptr->num_chunk_list;
if (png_ptr->chunk_list == NULL)
old_num_chunks = 0;
/* Since num_chunks is always restricted to UINT_MAX/5 this can't overflow.
*/
if (num_chunks + old_num_chunks > UINT_MAX/5)
{
png_app_error(png_ptr, "png_set_keep_unknown_chunks: too many chunks");
return;
}
/* If these chunks are being reset to the default then no more memory is
* required because add_one_chunk above doesn't extend the list if the 'keep'
* parameter is the default.
*/
if (keep != 0)
{
new_list = png_voidcast(png_bytep, png_malloc(png_ptr,
5 * (num_chunks + old_num_chunks)));
if (old_num_chunks > 0)
memcpy(new_list, png_ptr->chunk_list, 5*old_num_chunks);
}
else if (old_num_chunks > 0)
new_list = png_ptr->chunk_list;
else
new_list = NULL;
/* Add the new chunks together with each one's handling code. If the chunk
* already exists the code is updated, otherwise the chunk is added to the
* end. (In libpng 1.6.0 order no longer matters because this code enforces
* the earlier convention that the last setting is the one that is used.)
*/
if (new_list != NULL)
{
png_const_bytep inlist;
png_bytep outlist;
unsigned int i;
for (i=0; i<num_chunks; ++i)
{
old_num_chunks = add_one_chunk(new_list, old_num_chunks,
chunk_list+5*i, keep);
}
/* Now remove any spurious 'default' entries. */
num_chunks = 0;
for (i=0, inlist=outlist=new_list; i<old_num_chunks; ++i, inlist += 5)
{
if (inlist[4])
{
if (outlist != inlist)
memcpy(outlist, inlist, 5);
outlist += 5;
++num_chunks;
}
}
/* This means the application has removed all the specialized handling. */
if (num_chunks == 0)
{
if (png_ptr->chunk_list != new_list)
png_free(png_ptr, new_list);
new_list = NULL;
}
}
else
num_chunks = 0;
png_ptr->num_chunk_list = num_chunks;
if (png_ptr->chunk_list != new_list)
{
if (png_ptr->chunk_list != NULL)
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->chunk_list);
png_ptr->chunk_list = new_list;
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-120"
] | libpng | a901eb3ce6087e0afeef988247f1a1aa208cb54d | 85,352,507,003,006,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 154 | [libpng16] Prevent reading over-length PLTE chunk (Cosmin Truta). |
static void nfs4_xdr_enc_open(struct rpc_rqst *req, struct xdr_stream *xdr,
const void *data)
{
const struct nfs_openargs *args = data;
struct compound_hdr hdr = {
.minorversion = nfs4_xdr_minorversion(&args->seq_args),
};
encode_compound_hdr(xdr, req, &hdr);
encode_sequence(xdr, &args->seq_args, &hdr);
encode_putfh(xdr, args->fh, &hdr);
encode_open(xdr, args, &hdr);
encode_getfh(xdr, &hdr);
if (args->access)
encode_access(xdr, args->access, &hdr);
encode_getfattr_open(xdr, args->bitmask, args->open_bitmap, &hdr);
if (args->lg_args) {
encode_layoutget(xdr, args->lg_args, &hdr);
rpc_prepare_reply_pages(req, args->lg_args->layout.pages, 0,
args->lg_args->layout.pglen,
hdr.replen);
}
encode_nops(&hdr);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | linux | b4487b93545214a9db8cbf32e86411677b0cca21 | 54,835,633,142,098,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 | nfs: Fix getxattr kernel panic and memory overflow
Move the buffer size check to decode_attr_security_label() before memcpy()
Only call memcpy() if the buffer is large enough
Fixes: aa9c2669626c ("NFS: Client implementation of Labeled-NFS")
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Mitchell <[email protected]>
[Trond: clean up duplicate test of label->len != 0]
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> |
static struct sk_buff *udp6_ufo_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb, int features)
{
struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
unsigned int mss;
unsigned int unfrag_ip6hlen, unfrag_len;
struct frag_hdr *fptr;
u8 *mac_start, *prevhdr;
u8 nexthdr;
u8 frag_hdr_sz = sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
int offset;
__wsum csum;
mss = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size;
if (unlikely(skb->len <= mss))
goto out;
if (skb_gso_ok(skb, features | NETIF_F_GSO_ROBUST)) {
/* Packet is from an untrusted source, reset gso_segs. */
int type = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type;
if (unlikely(type & ~(SKB_GSO_UDP | SKB_GSO_DODGY) ||
!(type & (SKB_GSO_UDP))))
goto out;
skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len, mss);
segs = NULL;
goto out;
}
/* Do software UFO. Complete and fill in the UDP checksum as HW cannot
* do checksum of UDP packets sent as multiple IP fragments.
*/
offset = skb->csum_start - skb_headroom(skb);
csum = skb_checksum(skb, offset, skb->len- offset, 0);
offset += skb->csum_offset;
*(__sum16 *)(skb->data + offset) = csum_fold(csum);
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
/* Check if there is enough headroom to insert fragment header. */
if ((skb_headroom(skb) < frag_hdr_sz) &&
pskb_expand_head(skb, frag_hdr_sz, 0, GFP_ATOMIC))
goto out;
/* Find the unfragmentable header and shift it left by frag_hdr_sz
* bytes to insert fragment header.
*/
unfrag_ip6hlen = ip6_find_1stfragopt(skb, &prevhdr);
nexthdr = *prevhdr;
*prevhdr = NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT;
unfrag_len = skb_network_header(skb) - skb_mac_header(skb) +
unfrag_ip6hlen;
mac_start = skb_mac_header(skb);
memmove(mac_start-frag_hdr_sz, mac_start, unfrag_len);
skb->mac_header -= frag_hdr_sz;
skb->network_header -= frag_hdr_sz;
fptr = (struct frag_hdr *)(skb_network_header(skb) + unfrag_ip6hlen);
fptr->nexthdr = nexthdr;
fptr->reserved = 0;
ipv6_select_ident(fptr);
/* Fragment the skb. ipv6 header and the remaining fields of the
* fragment header are updated in ipv6_gso_segment()
*/
segs = skb_segment(skb, features);
out:
return segs;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400"
] | linux-2.6 | c377411f2494a931ff7facdbb3a6839b1266bcf6 | 249,388,002,394,214,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 71 | net: sk_add_backlog() take rmem_alloc into account
Current socket backlog limit is not enough to really stop DDOS attacks,
because user thread spend many time to process a full backlog each
round, and user might crazy spin on socket lock.
We should add backlog size and receive_queue size (aka rmem_alloc) to
pace writers, and let user run without being slow down too much.
Introduce a sk_rcvqueues_full() helper, to avoid taking socket lock in
stress situations.
Under huge stress from a multiqueue/RPS enabled NIC, a single flow udp
receiver can now process ~200.000 pps (instead of ~100 pps before the
patch) on a 8 core machine.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
static double mp_isbool(_cimg_math_parser& mp) {
const double val = _mp_arg(2);
return (double)(val==0. || val==1.);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-770"
] | cimg | 619cb58dd90b4e03ac68286c70ed98acbefd1c90 | 47,328,012,737,325,410,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | CImg<>::load_bmp() and CImg<>::load_pandore(): Check that dimensions encoded in file does not exceed file size. |
static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
*issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
if (*issuer) {
CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
return 1;
} else
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | openssl | 370ac320301e28bb615cee80124c042649c95d14 | 312,043,947,223,899,820,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | Fix length checks in X509_cmp_time to avoid out-of-bounds reads.
Also tighten X509_cmp_time to reject more than three fractional
seconds in the time; and to reject trailing garbage after the offset.
CVE-2015-1789
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <[email protected]> |
check_host_cert(const char *host, const Key *host_key)
{
const char *reason;
if (key_cert_check_authority(host_key, 1, 0, host, &reason) != 0) {
error("%s", reason);
return 0;
}
if (buffer_len(&host_key->cert->critical) != 0) {
error("Certificate for %s contains unsupported "
"critical options(s)", host);
return 0;
}
return 1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | openssh-portable | 7d6a9fb660c808882d064e152d6070ffc3844c3f | 58,626,639,658,593,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | - [email protected] 2014/04/01 03:34:10
[sshconnect.c]
When using VerifyHostKeyDNS with a DNSSEC resolver, down-convert any
certificate keys to plain keys and attempt SSHFP resolution.
Prevents a server from skipping SSHFP lookup and forcing a new-hostkey
dialog by offering only certificate keys.
Reported by mcv21 AT cam.ac.uk |
static int tracehook_report_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs,
enum ptrace_syscall_dir dir)
{
unsigned long ip;
/*
* IP is used to denote syscall entry/exit:
* IP = 0 -> entry, =1 -> exit
*/
ip = regs->ARM_ip;
regs->ARM_ip = dir;
if (dir == PTRACE_SYSCALL_EXIT)
tracehook_report_syscall_exit(regs, 0);
else if (tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
current_thread_info()->syscall = -1;
regs->ARM_ip = ip;
return current_thread_info()->syscall;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] | linux | a4780adeefd042482f624f5e0d577bf9cdcbb760 | 85,766,682,679,275,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context switch and fork
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]> |
callbacks_fit_to_window_activate (GtkMenuItem *menuitem,
gpointer user_data)
{
gerbv_render_zoom_to_fit_display (mainProject, &screenRenderInfo);
render_refresh_rendered_image_on_screen();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | gerbv | 319a8af890e4d0a5c38e6d08f510da8eefc42537 | 250,702,277,070,497,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | Remove local alias to parameter array
Normalizing access to `gerbv_simplified_amacro_t::parameter` as a step to fix CVE-2021-40402 |
XLogNeedsFlush(XLogRecPtr record)
{
/*
* During recovery, we don't flush WAL but update minRecoveryPoint
* instead. So "needs flush" is taken to mean whether minRecoveryPoint
* would need to be updated.
*/
if (RecoveryInProgress())
{
/* Quick exit if already known updated */
if (record <= minRecoveryPoint || !updateMinRecoveryPoint)
return false;
/*
* Update local copy of minRecoveryPoint. But if the lock is busy,
* just return a conservative guess.
*/
if (!LWLockConditionalAcquire(ControlFileLock, LW_SHARED))
return true;
minRecoveryPoint = ControlFile->minRecoveryPoint;
minRecoveryPointTLI = ControlFile->minRecoveryPointTLI;
LWLockRelease(ControlFileLock);
/*
* An invalid minRecoveryPoint means that we need to recover all the
* WAL, i.e., we're doing crash recovery. We never modify the control
* file's value in that case, so we can short-circuit future checks
* here too.
*/
if (minRecoveryPoint == 0)
updateMinRecoveryPoint = false;
/* check again */
if (record <= minRecoveryPoint || !updateMinRecoveryPoint)
return false;
else
return true;
}
/* Quick exit if already known flushed */
if (record <= LogwrtResult.Flush)
return false;
/* read LogwrtResult and update local state */
{
/* use volatile pointer to prevent code rearrangement */
volatile XLogCtlData *xlogctl = XLogCtl;
SpinLockAcquire(&xlogctl->info_lck);
LogwrtResult = xlogctl->LogwrtResult;
SpinLockRelease(&xlogctl->info_lck);
}
/* check again */
if (record <= LogwrtResult.Flush)
return false;
return true;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | postgres | 01824385aead50e557ca1af28640460fa9877d51 | 86,975,175,649,900,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 59 | Prevent potential overruns of fixed-size buffers.
Coverity identified a number of places in which it couldn't prove that a
string being copied into a fixed-size buffer would fit. We believe that
most, perhaps all of these are in fact safe, or are copying data that is
coming from a trusted source so that any overrun is not really a security
issue. Nonetheless it seems prudent to forestall any risk by using
strlcpy() and similar functions.
Fixes by Peter Eisentraut and Jozef Mlich based on Coverity reports.
In addition, fix a potential null-pointer-dereference crash in
contrib/chkpass. The crypt(3) function is defined to return NULL on
failure, but chkpass.c didn't check for that before using the result.
The main practical case in which this could be an issue is if libc is
configured to refuse to execute unapproved hashing algorithms (e.g.,
"FIPS mode"). This ideally should've been a separate commit, but
since it touches code adjacent to one of the buffer overrun changes,
I included it in this commit to avoid last-minute merge issues.
This issue was reported by Honza Horak.
Security: CVE-2014-0065 for buffer overruns, CVE-2014-0066 for crypt() |
static PHP_FUNCTION(xmlwriter_open_uri)
{
char *valid_file = NULL;
xmlwriter_object *intern;
xmlTextWriterPtr ptr;
char *source;
char resolved_path[MAXPATHLEN + 1];
int source_len;
#ifdef ZEND_ENGINE_2
zval *this = getThis();
ze_xmlwriter_object *ze_obj = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef ZEND_ENGINE_2
xmlOutputBufferPtr out_buffer;
void *ioctx;
#endif
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "p", &source, &source_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
#ifdef ZEND_ENGINE_2
if (this) {
/* We do not use XMLWRITER_FROM_OBJECT, xmlwriter init function here */
ze_obj = (ze_xmlwriter_object*) zend_object_store_get_object(this TSRMLS_CC);
}
#endif
if (source_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Empty string as source");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
valid_file = _xmlwriter_get_valid_file_path(source, resolved_path, MAXPATHLEN TSRMLS_CC);
if (!valid_file) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to resolve file path");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* TODO: Fix either the PHP stream or libxml APIs: it can then detect when a given
path is valid and not report out of memory error. Once it is done, remove the
directory check in _xmlwriter_get_valid_file_path */
#ifndef ZEND_ENGINE_2
ioctx = php_xmlwriter_streams_IO_open_write_wrapper(valid_file TSRMLS_CC);
if (ioctx == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
out_buffer = xmlOutputBufferCreateIO(php_xmlwriter_streams_IO_write,
php_xmlwriter_streams_IO_close, ioctx, NULL);
if (out_buffer == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to create output buffer");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ptr = xmlNewTextWriter(out_buffer);
#else
ptr = xmlNewTextWriterFilename(valid_file, 0);
#endif
if (!ptr) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
intern = emalloc(sizeof(xmlwriter_object));
intern->ptr = ptr;
intern->output = NULL;
#ifndef ZEND_ENGINE_2
intern->uri_output = out_buffer;
#else
if (this) {
if (ze_obj->xmlwriter_ptr) {
xmlwriter_free_resource_ptr(ze_obj->xmlwriter_ptr TSRMLS_CC);
}
ze_obj->xmlwriter_ptr = intern;
RETURN_TRUE;
} else
#endif
{
ZEND_REGISTER_RESOURCE(return_value,intern,le_xmlwriter);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | php-src | 52b93f0cfd3cba7ff98cc5198df6ca4f23865f80 | 291,252,650,105,124,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 84 | Fixed bug #69353 (Missing null byte checks for paths in various PHP extensions) |
GF_Err ainf_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_AssetInformationBox *p = (GF_AssetInformationBox *) a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "AssetInformationBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "profile_version=\"%d\" APID=\"%s\">\n", p->profile_version, p->APID);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("AssetInformationBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | gpac | bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86 | 79,321,922,535,544,820,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088) |
int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
QUtil::setLineBuf(stdout);
if ((whoami = strrchr(argv[0], '/')) == NULL)
{
whoami = argv[0];
}
else
{
++whoami;
}
// For libtool's sake....
if (strncmp(whoami, "lt-", 3) == 0)
{
whoami += 3;
}
char const* filename = 0;
size_t max_len = 0;
bool include_ignorable = true;
bool old_ei = false;
for (int i = 1; i < argc; ++i)
{
if (argv[i][0] == '-')
{
if (strcmp(argv[i], "-maxlen") == 0)
{
if (++i >= argc)
{
usage();
}
max_len = QUtil::string_to_uint(argv[i]);
}
else if (strcmp(argv[i], "-no-ignorable") == 0)
{
include_ignorable = false;
}
else if (strcmp(argv[i], "-old-ei") == 0)
{
old_ei = true;
}
else
{
usage();
}
}
else if (filename)
{
usage();
}
else
{
filename = argv[i];
}
}
if (filename == 0)
{
usage();
}
try
{
process(filename, include_ignorable, max_len, old_ei);
}
catch (std::exception& e)
{
std::cerr << whoami << ": exception: " << e.what();
exit(2);
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qpdf | d71f05ca07eb5c7cfa4d6d23e5c1f2a800f52e8e | 314,441,873,654,063,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 71 | Fix sign and conversion warnings (major)
This makes all integer type conversions that have potential data loss
explicit with calls that do range checks and raise an exception. After
this commit, qpdf builds with no warnings when -Wsign-conversion
-Wconversion is used with gcc or clang or when -W3 -Wd4800 is used
with MSVC. This significantly reduces the likelihood of potential
crashes from bogus integer values.
There are some parts of the code that take int when they should take
size_t or an offset. Such places would make qpdf not support files
with more than 2^31 of something that usually wouldn't be so large. In
the event that such a file shows up and is valid, at least qpdf would
raise an error in the right spot so the issue could be legitimately
addressed rather than failing in some weird way because of a silent
overflow condition. |
//! Add random noise to pixel values \newinstance.
CImg<T> get_noise(const double sigma, const unsigned int noise_type=0) const {
return (+*this).noise(sigma,noise_type); | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CImg | 10af1e8c1ad2a58a0a3342a856bae63e8f257abb | 201,594,118,733,916,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | Fix other issues in 'CImg<T>::load_bmp()'. |
void HeaderMapImpl::addCopy(const LowerCaseString& key, absl::string_view value) {
// In the case that the header is appended, we will perform a needless copy of the key and value.
// This is done on purpose to keep the code simple and should be rare.
HeaderString new_key;
new_key.setCopy(key.get());
HeaderString new_value;
new_value.setCopy(value);
insertByKey(std::move(new_key), std::move(new_value));
ASSERT(new_key.empty()); // NOLINT(bugprone-use-after-move)
ASSERT(new_value.empty()); // NOLINT(bugprone-use-after-move)
} | 0 | [] | envoy | 2c60632d41555ec8b3d9ef5246242be637a2db0f | 251,501,720,932,235,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | http: header map security fixes for duplicate headers (#197)
Previously header matching did not match on all headers for
non-inline headers. This patch changes the default behavior to
always logically match on all headers. Multiple individual
headers will be logically concatenated with ',' similar to what
is done with inline headers. This makes the behavior effectively
consistent. This behavior can be temporary reverted by setting
the runtime value "envoy.reloadable_features.header_match_on_all_headers"
to "false".
Targeted fixes have been additionally performed on the following
extensions which make them consider all duplicate headers by default as
a comma concatenated list:
1) Any extension using CEL matching on headers.
2) The header to metadata filter.
3) The JWT filter.
4) The Lua filter.
Like primary header matching used in routing, RBAC, etc. this behavior
can be disabled by setting the runtime value
"envoy.reloadable_features.header_match_on_all_headers" to false.
Finally, the setCopy() header map API previously only set the first
header in the case of duplicate non-inline headers. setCopy() now
behaves similiarly to the other set*() APIs and replaces all found
headers with a single value. This may have had security implications
in the extauth filter which uses this API. This behavior can be disabled
by setting the runtime value
"envoy.reloadable_features.http_set_copy_replace_all_headers" to false.
Fixes https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy-setec/issues/188
Signed-off-by: Matt Klein <[email protected]> |
c_next (struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
++*pos;
return c_start(m, pos);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | linux | 4dcc29e1574d88f4465ba865ed82800032f76418 | 106,939,207,359,854,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | [IA64] Workaround for RSE issue
Problem: An application violating the architectural rules regarding
operation dependencies and having specific Register Stack Engine (RSE)
state at the time of the violation, may result in an illegal operation
fault and invalid RSE state. Such faults may initiate a cascade of
repeated illegal operation faults within OS interruption handlers.
The specific behavior is OS dependent.
Implication: An application causing an illegal operation fault with
specific RSE state may result in a series of illegal operation faults
and an eventual OS stack overflow condition.
Workaround: OS interruption handlers that switch to kernel backing
store implement a check for invalid RSE state to avoid the series
of illegal operation faults.
The core of the workaround is the RSE_WORKAROUND code sequence
inserted into each invocation of the SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER and
SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER_R19 macros. This sequence includes hard-coded
constants that depend on the number of stacked physical registers
being 96. The rest of this patch consists of code to disable this
workaround should this not be the case (with the presumption that
if a future Itanium processor increases the number of registers, it
would also remove the need for this patch).
Move the start of the RBS up to a mod32 boundary to avoid some
corner cases.
The dispatch_illegal_op_fault code outgrew the spot it was
squatting in when built with this patch and CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING=y
Move it out to the end of the ivt.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <[email protected]> |
TRIO_PRIVATE void TrioOutStreamStringMax TRIO_ARGS2((self, output), trio_class_t* self, int output)
{
char** buffer;
assert(VALID(self));
assert(VALID(self->location));
buffer = (char**)self->location;
if (self->processed < self->max)
{
**buffer = (char)output;
(*buffer)++;
self->actually.committed++;
}
self->processed++;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190",
"CWE-125"
] | FreeRDP | 05cd9ea2290d23931f615c1b004d4b2e69074e27 | 177,196,874,307,709,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | Fixed TrioParse and trio_length limts.
CVE-2020-4030 thanks to @antonio-morales for finding this. |
R_API RBinSymbol *r_bin_java_create_new_symbol_from_cp_idx(ut32 cp_idx, ut64 baddr) {
RBinSymbol *sym = NULL;
RBinJavaCPTypeObj *obj = r_bin_java_get_item_from_bin_cp_list (
R_BIN_JAVA_GLOBAL_BIN, cp_idx);
if (obj) {
switch (obj->tag) {
case R_BIN_JAVA_CP_METHODREF:
case R_BIN_JAVA_CP_FIELDREF:
case R_BIN_JAVA_CP_INTERFACEMETHOD_REF:
sym = r_bin_java_create_new_symbol_from_ref (R_BIN_JAVA_GLOBAL_BIN, obj, baddr);
break;
case R_BIN_JAVA_CP_INVOKEDYNAMIC:
sym = r_bin_java_create_new_symbol_from_invoke_dynamic (obj, baddr);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
return sym;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-788"
] | radare2 | 6c4428f018d385fc80a33ecddcb37becea685dd5 | 17,094,306,466,002,615,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | Improve boundary checks to fix oobread segfaults ##crash
* Reported by Cen Zhang via huntr.dev
* Reproducer: bins/fuzzed/javaoob-havoc.class |
static const char *__int_type_from_size(int size) {
switch (size) {
case 1: return "int8_t";
case 2: return "int16_t";
case 4: return "int32_t";
case 8: return "int64_t";
default: return NULL;
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | radare2 | a7ce29647fcb38386d7439696375e16e093d6acb | 48,374,092,094,604,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | Fix UAF in aaaa on arm/thumb switching ##crash
* Reported by @peacock-doris via huntr.dev
* Reproducer tests_65185
* This is a logic fix, but not the fully safe as changes in the code
can result on UAF again, to properly protect r2 from crashing we
need to break the ABI and add refcounting to RRegItem, which can't
happen in 5.6.x because of abi-compat rules |
void ComparisonString(bool (*opname)(const StringRef&, const StringRef&),
const TfLiteTensor* input1, const TfLiteTensor* input2,
TfLiteTensor* output, bool requires_broadcast) {
bool* output_data = GetTensorData<bool>(output);
if (requires_broadcast) {
reference_ops::BroadcastComparison4DSlowStringImpl(
opname, GetTensorShape(input1), input1, GetTensorShape(input2), input2,
GetTensorShape(output), output_data);
} else {
reference_ops::ComparisonStringImpl(opname, GetTensorShape(input1), input1,
GetTensorShape(input2), input2,
GetTensorShape(output), output_data);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] | tensorflow | 1970c2158b1ffa416d159d03c3370b9a462aee35 | 312,147,108,870,318,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | [tflite]: Insert `nullptr` checks when obtaining tensors.
As part of ongoing refactoring, `tflite::GetInput`, `tflite::GetOutput`, `tflite::GetTemporary` and `tflite::GetIntermediates` will return `nullptr` in some cases. Hence, we insert the `nullptr` checks on all usages.
We also insert `nullptr` checks on usages of `tflite::GetVariableInput` and `tflite::GetOptionalInputTensor` but only in the cases where there is no obvious check that `nullptr` is acceptable (that is, we only insert the check for the output of these two functions if the tensor is accessed as if it is always not `nullptr`).
PiperOrigin-RevId: 332521299
Change-Id: I29af455bcb48d0b92e58132d951a3badbd772d56 |
void Compute(OpKernelContext* ctx) override {
const Tensor& in0 = ctx->input(0);
const Tensor& in1 = ctx->input(1);
ValidateInputTensors(ctx, in0, in1);
MatMulBCast bcast(in0.shape().dim_sizes(), in1.shape().dim_sizes());
OP_REQUIRES(
ctx, bcast.IsValid(),
errors::InvalidArgument(
"In[0] and In[1] must have compatible batch dimensions: ",
in0.shape().DebugString(), " vs. ", in1.shape().DebugString()));
TensorShape out_shape = bcast.output_batch_shape();
auto batch_size = bcast.output_batch_size();
auto d0 = in0.dim_size(in0.dims() - 2); // Band size.
auto d1 = in0.dim_size(in0.dims() - 1);
Tensor in0_reshaped;
OP_REQUIRES(
ctx,
in0_reshaped.CopyFrom(in0, TensorShape({bcast.x_batch_size(), d0, d1})),
errors::Internal("Failed to reshape In[0] from ",
in0.shape().DebugString()));
auto d2 = in1.dim_size(in1.dims() - 2);
auto d3 = in1.dim_size(in1.dims() - 1);
Tensor in1_reshaped;
OP_REQUIRES(
ctx,
in1_reshaped.CopyFrom(in1, TensorShape({bcast.y_batch_size(), d2, d3})),
errors::Internal("Failed to reshape In[1] from ",
in1.shape().DebugString()));
OP_REQUIRES(ctx, d1 == d2,
errors::InvalidArgument(
"In[0] mismatch In[1] shape: ", d1, " vs. ", d2, ": ",
in0.shape().DebugString(), " ", in1.shape().DebugString(),
" ", lower_, " ", adjoint_));
out_shape.AddDim(d1);
out_shape.AddDim(d3);
Tensor* out = nullptr;
OP_REQUIRES_OK(ctx, ctx->allocate_output(0, out_shape, &out));
if (out->NumElements() == 0) {
return;
}
Tensor out_reshaped;
OP_REQUIRES(ctx,
out_reshaped.CopyFrom(*out, TensorShape({batch_size, d1, d3})),
errors::Internal("Failed to reshape output from ",
out->shape().DebugString()));
LaunchBatchBandedTriangularSolve<Scalar>::Launch(
ctx, in0_reshaped, in1_reshaped, adjoint_, lower_, bcast,
&out_reshaped);
} | 1 | [
"CWE-120",
"CWE-787"
] | tensorflow | 0ab290774f91a23bebe30a358fde4e53ab4876a0 | 129,370,171,757,238,810,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 52 | Ensure validation sticks in banded_triangular_solve_op
PiperOrigin-RevId: 373275480
Change-Id: Id7717cf275b2d6fdb9441fbbe166d555182d2e79 |
void CWebServer::Cmd_ChangePlanDeviceOrder(WebEmSession & session, const request& req, Json::Value &root)
{
std::string planid = request::findValue(&req, "planid");
std::string idx = request::findValue(&req, "idx");
std::string sway = request::findValue(&req, "way");
if (
(planid.empty()) ||
(idx.empty()) ||
(sway.empty())
)
return;
bool bGoUp = (sway == "0");
std::string aOrder, oID, oOrder;
std::vector<std::vector<std::string> > result;
result = m_sql.safe_query("SELECT [Order] FROM DeviceToPlansMap WHERE ((ID=='%q') AND (PlanID=='%q'))",
idx.c_str(), planid.c_str());
if (result.empty())
return;
aOrder = result[0][0];
if (!bGoUp)
{
//Get next device order
result = m_sql.safe_query("SELECT ID, [Order] FROM DeviceToPlansMap WHERE (([Order]>'%q') AND (PlanID=='%q')) ORDER BY [Order] ASC",
aOrder.c_str(), planid.c_str());
if (result.empty())
return;
oID = result[0][0];
oOrder = result[0][1];
}
else
{
//Get previous device order
result = m_sql.safe_query("SELECT ID, [Order] FROM DeviceToPlansMap WHERE (([Order]<'%q') AND (PlanID=='%q')) ORDER BY [Order] DESC",
aOrder.c_str(), planid.c_str());
if (result.empty())
return;
oID = result[0][0];
oOrder = result[0][1];
}
//Swap them
root["status"] = "OK";
root["title"] = "ChangePlanOrder";
m_sql.safe_query("UPDATE DeviceToPlansMap SET [Order] = '%q' WHERE (ID='%q')",
oOrder.c_str(), idx.c_str());
m_sql.safe_query("UPDATE DeviceToPlansMap SET [Order] = '%q' WHERE (ID='%q')",
aOrder.c_str(), oID.c_str());
} | 0 | [
"CWE-89"
] | domoticz | ee70db46f81afa582c96b887b73bcd2a86feda00 | 117,214,292,105,094,890,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 51 | Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!) |
resolve_base_ident(const struct lys_module *module, struct lys_ident *ident, const char *basename, const char *parent,
struct lys_type *type, struct unres_schema *unres)
{
const char *name;
int mod_name_len = 0, rc;
struct lys_ident *target, **ret;
uint16_t flags;
struct lys_module *mod;
struct ly_ctx *ctx = module->ctx;
assert((ident && !type) || (!ident && type));
if (!type) {
/* have ident to resolve */
ret = ⌖
flags = ident->flags;
mod = ident->module;
} else {
/* have type to fill */
++type->info.ident.count;
type->info.ident.ref = ly_realloc(type->info.ident.ref, type->info.ident.count * sizeof *type->info.ident.ref);
LY_CHECK_ERR_RETURN(!type->info.ident.ref, LOGMEM(ctx), -1);
ret = &type->info.ident.ref[type->info.ident.count - 1];
flags = type->parent->flags;
mod = type->parent->module;
}
*ret = NULL;
/* search for the base identity */
name = strchr(basename, ':');
if (name) {
/* set name to correct position after colon */
mod_name_len = name - basename;
name++;
if (!strncmp(basename, module->name, mod_name_len) && !module->name[mod_name_len]) {
/* prefix refers to the current module, ignore it */
mod_name_len = 0;
}
} else {
name = basename;
}
/* get module where to search */
module = lyp_get_module(module, NULL, 0, mod_name_len ? basename : NULL, mod_name_len, 0);
if (!module) {
/* identity refers unknown data model */
LOGVAL(ctx, LYE_INMOD, LY_VLOG_NONE, NULL, basename);
return -1;
}
/* search in the identified module ... */
rc = resolve_base_ident_sub(module, ident, name, unres, ret);
if (!rc) {
assert(*ret);
/* check status */
if (lyp_check_status(flags, mod, ident ? ident->name : "of type",
(*ret)->flags, (*ret)->module, (*ret)->name, NULL)) {
rc = -1;
} else if (ident) {
ident->base[ident->base_size++] = *ret;
if (lys_main_module(mod)->implemented) {
/* in case of the implemented identity, maintain backlinks to it
* from the base identities to make it available when resolving
* data with the identity values (not implemented identity is not
* allowed as an identityref value). */
resolve_identity_backlink_update(ident, *ret);
}
}
} else if (rc == EXIT_FAILURE) {
LOGVAL(ctx, LYE_INRESOLV, LY_VLOG_NONE, NULL, parent, basename);
if (type) {
--type->info.ident.count;
}
}
return rc;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | libyang | 32fb4993bc8bb49e93e84016af3c10ea53964be5 | 275,051,400,348,805,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 80 | schema tree BUGFIX do not check features while still resolving schema
Fixes #723 |
MagickExport MagickCLDeviceType GetOpenCLDeviceType(
const MagickCLDevice magick_unused(device))
{
magick_unreferenced(device);
return(UndefinedCLDeviceType);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | ImageMagick | cca91aa1861818342e3d072bb0fad7dc4ffac24a | 189,183,359,211,787,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/790 |
int tcf_unregister_action(struct tc_action_ops *act)
{
struct tc_action_ops *a;
int err = -ENOENT;
write_lock(&act_mod_lock);
list_for_each_entry(a, &act_base, head) {
if (a == act) {
list_del(&act->head);
tcf_hashinfo_destroy(act->hinfo);
kfree(act->hinfo);
err = 0;
break;
}
}
write_unlock(&act_mod_lock);
return err;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-264"
] | net | 90f62cf30a78721641e08737bda787552428061e | 162,939,688,327,508,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages
It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged
executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket
data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that
privileged executable did not intend to do.
To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls
with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls.
Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the
opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
gdm_session_authorize (GdmSession *self,
const char *service_name)
{
GdmSessionConversation *conversation;
g_return_if_fail (GDM_IS_SESSION (self));
conversation = find_conversation_by_name (self, service_name);
if (conversation != NULL) {
gdm_dbus_worker_call_authorize (conversation->worker_proxy,
conversation->worker_cancellable,
(GAsyncReadyCallback) on_authorize_cb,
conversation);
}
} | 0 | [] | gdm | 05e5fc24b0f803098c1d05dae86f5eb05bd0c2a4 | 275,907,984,010,724,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | session: Cancel worker proxy async ops when freeing conversations
We need to cancel ongoing async ops for worker proxies when freeing
conversations or we'll crash when the completion handler runs and we
access free'd memory.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=758032 |
static int fuse_launder_page(struct page *page)
{
int err = 0;
if (clear_page_dirty_for_io(page)) {
struct inode *inode = page->mapping->host;
err = fuse_writepage_locked(page);
if (!err)
fuse_wait_on_page_writeback(inode, page->index);
}
return err;
} | 0 | [] | linux-2.6 | 0bd87182d3ab18a32a8e9175d3f68754c58e3432 | 180,677,804,646,964,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | fuse: fix kunmap in fuse_ioctl_copy_user
Looks like another victim of the confusing kmap() vs kmap_atomic() API
differences.
Reported-by: Todor Gyumyushev <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] |
bool tmp_table() const { return create_info.tmp_table(); } | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | server | 39feab3cd31b5414aa9b428eaba915c251ac34a2 | 173,611,351,672,459,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 | MDEV-26412 Server crash in Item_field::fix_outer_field for INSERT SELECT
IF an INSERT/REPLACE SELECT statement contained an ON expression in the top
level select and this expression used a subquery with a column reference
that could not be resolved then an attempt to resolve this reference as
an outer reference caused a crash of the server. This happened because the
outer context field in the Name_resolution_context structure was not set
to NULL for such references. Rather it pointed to the first element in
the select_stack.
Note that starting from 10.4 we cannot use the SELECT_LEX::outer_select()
method when parsing a SELECT construct.
Approved by Oleksandr Byelkin <[email protected]> |
static MagickBooleanType WritePSImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define WriteRunlengthPacket(image,pixel,length,p) \
{ \
if ((image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait) && (length != 0) && \
(GetPixelAlpha(image,p) == (Quantum) TransparentAlpha)) \
{ \
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,0xff,q); \
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,0xff,q); \
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,0xff,q); \
} \
else \
{ \
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(pixel.red)),q); \
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(pixel.green)),q); \
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(pixel.blue)),q); \
} \
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,(size_t) MagickMin(length,0xff),q); \
}
static const char
*const hex_digits[] =
{
"00", "01", "02", "03", "04", "05", "06", "07", "08", "09", "0A", "0B",
"0C", "0D", "0E", "0F", "10", "11", "12", "13", "14", "15", "16", "17",
"18", "19", "1A", "1B", "1C", "1D", "1E", "1F", "20", "21", "22", "23",
"24", "25", "26", "27", "28", "29", "2A", "2B", "2C", "2D", "2E", "2F",
"30", "31", "32", "33", "34", "35", "36", "37", "38", "39", "3A", "3B",
"3C", "3D", "3E", "3F", "40", "41", "42", "43", "44", "45", "46", "47",
"48", "49", "4A", "4B", "4C", "4D", "4E", "4F", "50", "51", "52", "53",
"54", "55", "56", "57", "58", "59", "5A", "5B", "5C", "5D", "5E", "5F",
"60", "61", "62", "63", "64", "65", "66", "67", "68", "69", "6A", "6B",
"6C", "6D", "6E", "6F", "70", "71", "72", "73", "74", "75", "76", "77",
"78", "79", "7A", "7B", "7C", "7D", "7E", "7F", "80", "81", "82", "83",
"84", "85", "86", "87", "88", "89", "8A", "8B", "8C", "8D", "8E", "8F",
"90", "91", "92", "93", "94", "95", "96", "97", "98", "99", "9A", "9B",
"9C", "9D", "9E", "9F", "A0", "A1", "A2", "A3", "A4", "A5", "A6", "A7",
"A8", "A9", "AA", "AB", "AC", "AD", "AE", "AF", "B0", "B1", "B2", "B3",
"B4", "B5", "B6", "B7", "B8", "B9", "BA", "BB", "BC", "BD", "BE", "BF",
"C0", "C1", "C2", "C3", "C4", "C5", "C6", "C7", "C8", "C9", "CA", "CB",
"CC", "CD", "CE", "CF", "D0", "D1", "D2", "D3", "D4", "D5", "D6", "D7",
"D8", "D9", "DA", "DB", "DC", "DD", "DE", "DF", "E0", "E1", "E2", "E3",
"E4", "E5", "E6", "E7", "E8", "E9", "EA", "EB", "EC", "ED", "EE", "EF",
"F0", "F1", "F2", "F3", "F4", "F5", "F6", "F7", "F8", "F9", "FA", "FB",
"FC", "FD", "FE", "FF", (const char *) NULL
},
*const PostscriptProlog[]=
{
"%%BeginProlog",
"%",
"% Display a color image. The image is displayed in color on",
"% Postscript viewers or printers that support color, otherwise",
"% it is displayed as grayscale.",
"%",
"/DirectClassPacket",
"{",
" %",
" % Get a DirectClass packet.",
" %",
" % Parameters:",
" % red.",
" % green.",
" % blue.",
" % length: number of pixels minus one of this color (optional).",
" %",
" currentfile color_packet readhexstring pop pop",
" compression 0 eq",
" {",
" /number_pixels 3 def",
" }",
" {",
" currentfile byte readhexstring pop 0 get",
" /number_pixels exch 1 add 3 mul def",
" } ifelse",
" 0 3 number_pixels 1 sub",
" {",
" pixels exch color_packet putinterval",
" } for",
" pixels 0 number_pixels getinterval",
"} bind def",
"",
"/DirectClassImage",
"{",
" %",
" % Display a DirectClass image.",
" %",
" systemdict /colorimage known",
" {",
" columns rows 8",
" [",
" columns 0 0",
" rows neg 0 rows",
" ]",
" { DirectClassPacket } false 3 colorimage",
" }",
" {",
" %",
" % No colorimage operator; convert to grayscale.",
" %",
" columns rows 8",
" [",
" columns 0 0",
" rows neg 0 rows",
" ]",
" { GrayDirectClassPacket } image",
" } ifelse",
"} bind def",
"",
"/GrayDirectClassPacket",
"{",
" %",
" % Get a DirectClass packet; convert to grayscale.",
" %",
" % Parameters:",
" % red",
" % green",
" % blue",
" % length: number of pixels minus one of this color (optional).",
" %",
" currentfile color_packet readhexstring pop pop",
" color_packet 0 get 0.299 mul",
" color_packet 1 get 0.587 mul add",
" color_packet 2 get 0.114 mul add",
" cvi",
" /gray_packet exch def",
" compression 0 eq",
" {",
" /number_pixels 1 def",
" }",
" {",
" currentfile byte readhexstring pop 0 get",
" /number_pixels exch 1 add def",
" } ifelse",
" 0 1 number_pixels 1 sub",
" {",
" pixels exch gray_packet put",
" } for",
" pixels 0 number_pixels getinterval",
"} bind def",
"",
"/GrayPseudoClassPacket",
"{",
" %",
" % Get a PseudoClass packet; convert to grayscale.",
" %",
" % Parameters:",
" % index: index into the colormap.",
" % length: number of pixels minus one of this color (optional).",
" %",
" currentfile byte readhexstring pop 0 get",
" /offset exch 3 mul def",
" /color_packet colormap offset 3 getinterval def",
" color_packet 0 get 0.299 mul",
" color_packet 1 get 0.587 mul add",
" color_packet 2 get 0.114 mul add",
" cvi",
" /gray_packet exch def",
" compression 0 eq",
" {",
" /number_pixels 1 def",
" }",
" {",
" currentfile byte readhexstring pop 0 get",
" /number_pixels exch 1 add def",
" } ifelse",
" 0 1 number_pixels 1 sub",
" {",
" pixels exch gray_packet put",
" } for",
" pixels 0 number_pixels getinterval",
"} bind def",
"",
"/PseudoClassPacket",
"{",
" %",
" % Get a PseudoClass packet.",
" %",
" % Parameters:",
" % index: index into the colormap.",
" % length: number of pixels minus one of this color (optional).",
" %",
" currentfile byte readhexstring pop 0 get",
" /offset exch 3 mul def",
" /color_packet colormap offset 3 getinterval def",
" compression 0 eq",
" {",
" /number_pixels 3 def",
" }",
" {",
" currentfile byte readhexstring pop 0 get",
" /number_pixels exch 1 add 3 mul def",
" } ifelse",
" 0 3 number_pixels 1 sub",
" {",
" pixels exch color_packet putinterval",
" } for",
" pixels 0 number_pixels getinterval",
"} bind def",
"",
"/PseudoClassImage",
"{",
" %",
" % Display a PseudoClass image.",
" %",
" % Parameters:",
" % class: 0-PseudoClass or 1-Grayscale.",
" %",
" currentfile buffer readline pop",
" token pop /class exch def pop",
" class 0 gt",
" {",
" currentfile buffer readline pop",
" token pop /depth exch def pop",
" /grays columns 8 add depth sub depth mul 8 idiv string def",
" columns rows depth",
" [",
" columns 0 0",
" rows neg 0 rows",
" ]",
" { currentfile grays readhexstring pop } image",
" }",
" {",
" %",
" % Parameters:",
" % colors: number of colors in the colormap.",
" % colormap: red, green, blue color packets.",
" %",
" currentfile buffer readline pop",
" token pop /colors exch def pop",
" /colors colors 3 mul def",
" /colormap colors string def",
" currentfile colormap readhexstring pop pop",
" systemdict /colorimage known",
" {",
" columns rows 8",
" [",
" columns 0 0",
" rows neg 0 rows",
" ]",
" { PseudoClassPacket } false 3 colorimage",
" }",
" {",
" %",
" % No colorimage operator; convert to grayscale.",
" %",
" columns rows 8",
" [",
" columns 0 0",
" rows neg 0 rows",
" ]",
" { GrayPseudoClassPacket } image",
" } ifelse",
" } ifelse",
"} bind def",
"",
"/DisplayImage",
"{",
" %",
" % Display a DirectClass or PseudoClass image.",
" %",
" % Parameters:",
" % x & y translation.",
" % x & y scale.",
" % label pointsize.",
" % image label.",
" % image columns & rows.",
" % class: 0-DirectClass or 1-PseudoClass.",
" % compression: 0-none or 1-RunlengthEncoded.",
" % hex color packets.",
" %",
" gsave",
" /buffer 512 string def",
" /byte 1 string def",
" /color_packet 3 string def",
" /pixels 768 string def",
"",
" currentfile buffer readline pop",
" token pop /x exch def",
" token pop /y exch def pop",
" x y translate",
" currentfile buffer readline pop",
" token pop /x exch def",
" token pop /y exch def pop",
" currentfile buffer readline pop",
" token pop /pointsize exch def pop",
(const char *) NULL
},
*const PostscriptEpilog[]=
{
" x y scale",
" currentfile buffer readline pop",
" token pop /columns exch def",
" token pop /rows exch def pop",
" currentfile buffer readline pop",
" token pop /class exch def pop",
" currentfile buffer readline pop",
" token pop /compression exch def pop",
" class 0 gt { PseudoClassImage } { DirectClassImage } ifelse",
" grestore",
(const char *) NULL
};
char
buffer[MagickPathExtent],
date[MagickPathExtent],
**labels,
page_geometry[MagickPathExtent];
CompressionType
compression;
const char
*const *s,
*value;
const StringInfo
*profile;
double
pointsize;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
MagickStatusType
flags;
PixelInfo
pixel;
PointInfo
delta,
resolution,
scale;
Quantum
index;
RectangleInfo
geometry,
media_info,
page_info;
register const Quantum
*p;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*q;
SegmentInfo
bounds;
size_t
bit,
byte,
imageListLength,
length,
page,
text_size;
ssize_t
j,
y;
time_t
timer;
unsigned char
pixels[2048];
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) memset(&bounds,0,sizeof(bounds));
compression=image->compression;
if (image_info->compression != UndefinedCompression)
compression=image_info->compression;
page=1;
scene=0;
imageListLength=GetImageListLength(image);
do
{
/*
Scale relative to dots-per-inch.
*/
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
delta.x=DefaultResolution;
delta.y=DefaultResolution;
resolution.x=image->resolution.x;
resolution.y=image->resolution.y;
if ((resolution.x == 0.0) || (resolution.y == 0.0))
{
flags=ParseGeometry(PSDensityGeometry,&geometry_info);
resolution.x=geometry_info.rho;
resolution.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
resolution.y=resolution.x;
}
if (image_info->density != (char *) NULL)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(image_info->density,&geometry_info);
resolution.x=geometry_info.rho;
resolution.y=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
resolution.y=resolution.x;
}
if (image->units == PixelsPerCentimeterResolution)
{
resolution.x=(double) ((size_t) (100.0*2.54*resolution.x+0.5)/100.0);
resolution.y=(double) ((size_t) (100.0*2.54*resolution.y+0.5)/100.0);
}
SetGeometry(image,&geometry);
(void) FormatLocaleString(page_geometry,MagickPathExtent,"%.20gx%.20g",
(double) image->columns,(double) image->rows);
if (image_info->page != (char *) NULL)
(void) CopyMagickString(page_geometry,image_info->page,MagickPathExtent);
else
if ((image->page.width != 0) && (image->page.height != 0))
(void) FormatLocaleString(page_geometry,MagickPathExtent,
"%.20gx%.20g%+.20g%+.20g",(double) image->page.width,(double)
image->page.height,(double) image->page.x,(double) image->page.y);
else
if ((image->gravity != UndefinedGravity) &&
(LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PS") == 0))
(void) CopyMagickString(page_geometry,PSPageGeometry,MagickPathExtent);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(page_geometry,">",MagickPathExtent);
(void) ParseMetaGeometry(page_geometry,&geometry.x,&geometry.y,
&geometry.width,&geometry.height);
scale.x=(double) (geometry.width*delta.x)/resolution.x;
geometry.width=(size_t) floor(scale.x+0.5);
scale.y=(double) (geometry.height*delta.y)/resolution.y;
geometry.height=(size_t) floor(scale.y+0.5);
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(page_geometry,&media_info);
(void) ParseGravityGeometry(image,page_geometry,&page_info,exception);
if (image->gravity != UndefinedGravity)
{
geometry.x=(-page_info.x);
geometry.y=(ssize_t) (media_info.height+page_info.y-image->rows);
}
pointsize=12.0;
if (image_info->pointsize != 0.0)
pointsize=image_info->pointsize;
text_size=0;
value=GetImageProperty(image,"label",exception);
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
text_size=(size_t) (MultilineCensus(value)*pointsize+12);
if (page == 1)
{
/*
Output Postscript header.
*/
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PS") == 0)
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"%!PS-Adobe-3.0\n",MagickPathExtent);
else
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"%!PS-Adobe-3.0 EPSF-3.0\n",
MagickPathExtent);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%Creator: (ImageMagick)\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%%%%Title: (%s)\n",
image->filename);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
timer=time((time_t *) NULL);
(void) FormatMagickTime(timer,MagickPathExtent,date);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%%%%CreationDate: (%s)\n",date);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
bounds.x1=(double) geometry.x;
bounds.y1=(double) geometry.y;
bounds.x2=(double) geometry.x+scale.x;
bounds.y2=(double) geometry.y+(geometry.height+text_size);
if ((image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse) &&
(GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL))
(void) CopyMagickString(buffer,"%%%%BoundingBox: (atend)\n",
MagickPathExtent);
else
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%%%%BoundingBox: %.20g %.20g %.20g %.20g\n",ceil(bounds.x1-0.5),
ceil(bounds.y1-0.5),floor(bounds.x2+0.5),floor(bounds.y2+0.5));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%%%%HiResBoundingBox: %g %g %g %g\n",bounds.x1,
bounds.y1,bounds.x2,bounds.y2);
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"8bim");
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
/*
Embed Photoshop profile.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%%BeginPhotoshop: %.20g",(double) GetStringInfoLength(profile));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(profile); i++)
{
if ((i % 32) == 0)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\n% ");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%02X",
(unsigned int) (GetStringInfoDatum(profile)[i] & 0xff));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\n%EndPhotoshop\n");
}
profile=GetImageProfile(image,"xmp");
DisableMSCWarning(4127)
if (0 && (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL))
RestoreMSCWarning
{
/*
Embed XML profile.
*/
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\n%begin_xml_code\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"\n%%begin_xml_packet: %.20g\n",(double)
GetStringInfoLength(profile));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(profile); i++)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,GetStringInfoDatum(profile)[i]);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\n%end_xml_packet\n%end_xml_code\n");
}
value=GetImageProperty(image,"label",exception);
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,
"%%DocumentNeededResources: font Times-Roman\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%DocumentData: Clean7Bit\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%LanguageLevel: 1\n");
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PS") != 0)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%Pages: 1\n");
else
{
/*
Compute the number of pages.
*/
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%Orientation: Portrait\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%PageOrder: Ascend\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%%%%Pages: %.20g\n",image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse ?
(double) imageListLength : 1.0);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%EndComments\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\n%%BeginDefaults\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%EndDefaults\n\n");
if ((LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"EPI") == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"EPSI") == 0) ||
(LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"EPT") == 0))
{
Image
*preview_image;
Quantum
pixel;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Create preview image.
*/
preview_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
if (preview_image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Dump image as bitmap.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%%%%BeginPreview: %.20g %.20g %.20g %.20g\n%% ",(double)
preview_image->columns,(double) preview_image->rows,1.0,
(double) ((((preview_image->columns+7) >> 3)*preview_image->rows+
35)/36));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(preview_image,0,y,preview_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) preview_image->columns; x++)
{
byte<<=1;
pixel=ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(preview_image,p));
if (pixel >= (Quantum) (QuantumRange/2))
byte|=0x01;
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
{
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,byte,q);
if ((q-pixels+8) >= 80)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"% ");
};
bit=0;
byte=0;
}
}
if (bit != 0)
{
byte<<=(8-bit);
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,byte,q);
if ((q-pixels+8) >= 80)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"% ");
};
};
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"\n%%EndPreview\n");
preview_image=DestroyImage(preview_image);
}
/*
Output Postscript commands.
*/
for (s=PostscriptProlog; *s != (char *) NULL; s++)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%s\n",*s);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
value=GetImageProperty(image,"label",exception);
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
{
(void) WriteBlobString(image,
" /Times-Roman findfont pointsize scalefont setfont\n");
for (j=(ssize_t) MultilineCensus(value)-1; j >= 0; j--)
{
(void) WriteBlobString(image," /label 512 string def\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,
" currentfile label readline pop\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
" 0 y %g add moveto label show pop\n",j*pointsize+12);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
}
for (s=PostscriptEpilog; *s != (char *) NULL; s++)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%s\n",*s);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PS") == 0)
(void) WriteBlobString(image," showpage\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"} bind def\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%EndProlog\n");
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%%%%Page: 1 %.20g\n",
(double) (page++));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%%%%PageBoundingBox: %.20g %.20g %.20g %.20g\n",(double) geometry.x,
(double) geometry.y,geometry.x+(double) geometry.width,geometry.y+(double)
(geometry.height+text_size));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
if ((double) geometry.x < bounds.x1)
bounds.x1=(double) geometry.x;
if ((double) geometry.y < bounds.y1)
bounds.y1=(double) geometry.y;
if ((double) (geometry.x+geometry.width-1) > bounds.x2)
bounds.x2=(double) geometry.x+geometry.width-1;
if ((double) (geometry.y+(geometry.height+text_size)-1) > bounds.y2)
bounds.y2=(double) geometry.y+(geometry.height+text_size)-1;
value=GetImageProperty(image,"label",exception);
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%%%PageResources: font Times-Roman\n");
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PS") != 0)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"userdict begin\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"DisplayImage\n");
/*
Output image data.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g %.20g\n%g %g\n%g\n",
(double) geometry.x,(double) geometry.y,scale.x,scale.y,pointsize);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
labels=(char **) NULL;
value=GetImageProperty(image,"label",exception);
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
labels=StringToList(value);
if (labels != (char **) NULL)
{
for (i=0; labels[i] != (char *) NULL; i++)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%s \n",
labels[i]);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
labels[i]=DestroyString(labels[i]);
}
labels=(char **) RelinquishMagickMemory(labels);
}
(void) memset(&pixel,0,sizeof(pixel));
pixel.alpha=(MagickRealType) TransparentAlpha;
index=0;
x=0;
if ((image_info->type != TrueColorType) &&
(SetImageGray(image,exception) != MagickFalse))
{
if (SetImageMonochrome(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
Quantum
pixel;
/*
Dump image as grayscale.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%.20g %.20g\n1\n1\n1\n8\n",(double) image->columns,(double)
image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
pixel=(Quantum) ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(
image,p)));
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,(size_t) pixel,q);
if ((q-pixels+8) >= 80)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
}
else
{
ssize_t
y;
Quantum
pixel;
/*
Dump image as bitmap.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%.20g %.20g\n1\n1\n1\n1\n",(double) image->columns,(double)
image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
byte<<=1;
pixel=ClampToQuantum(GetPixelLuma(image,p));
if (pixel >= (Quantum) (QuantumRange/2))
byte|=0x01;
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
{
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,byte,q);
if ((q-pixels+2) >= 80)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
};
bit=0;
byte=0;
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (bit != 0)
{
byte<<=(8-bit);
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,byte,q);
if ((q-pixels+2) >= 80)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
};
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType)
y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
}
}
else
if ((image->storage_class == DirectClass) ||
(image->colors > 256) || (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait))
{
/*
Dump DirectClass image.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%.20g %.20g\n0\n%d\n",(double) image->columns,(double) image->rows,
compression == RLECompression ? 1 : 0);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
switch (compression)
{
case RLECompression:
{
/*
Dump runlength-encoded DirectColor packets.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
GetPixelInfoPixel(image,p,&pixel);
length=255;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if ((GetPixelRed(image,p) == ClampToQuantum(pixel.red)) &&
(GetPixelGreen(image,p) == ClampToQuantum(pixel.green)) &&
(GetPixelBlue(image,p) == ClampToQuantum(pixel.blue)) &&
(GetPixelAlpha(image,p) == ClampToQuantum(pixel.alpha)) &&
(length < 255) && (x < (ssize_t) (image->columns-1)))
length++;
else
{
if (x > 0)
{
WriteRunlengthPacket(image,pixel,length,p);
if ((q-pixels+10) >= 80)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
}
length=0;
}
GetPixelInfoPixel(image,p,&pixel);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
WriteRunlengthPacket(image,pixel,length,p);
if ((q-pixels+10) >= 80)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,
(MagickOffsetType) y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
break;
}
case NoCompression:
default:
{
/*
Dump uncompressed DirectColor packets.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if ((image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait) &&
(GetPixelAlpha(image,p) == (Quantum) TransparentAlpha))
{
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,0xff,q);
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,0xff,q);
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,0xff,q);
}
else
{
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,ScaleQuantumToChar(
GetPixelRed(image,p)),q);
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,ScaleQuantumToChar(
GetPixelGreen(image,p)),q);
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,ScaleQuantumToChar(
GetPixelBlue(image,p)),q);
}
if ((q-pixels+6) >= 80)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,
(MagickOffsetType) y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
break;
}
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\n');
}
else
{
/*
Dump PseudoClass image.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%.20g %.20g\n%d\n%d\n0\n",(double) image->columns,(double)
image->rows,image->storage_class == PseudoClass ? 1 : 0,
compression == RLECompression ? 1 : 0);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
/*
Dump number of colors and colormap.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g\n",(double)
image->colors);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%02X%02X%02X\n",
ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[i].red)),
ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[i].green)),
ScaleQuantumToChar(ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[i].blue)));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
switch (compression)
{
case RLECompression:
{
/*
Dump runlength-encoded PseudoColor packets.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
index=GetPixelIndex(image,p);
length=255;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if ((index == GetPixelIndex(image,p)) &&
(length < 255) && (x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1)))
length++;
else
{
if (x > 0)
{
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,(size_t) index,q);
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,(size_t)
MagickMin(length,0xff),q);
i++;
if ((q-pixels+6) >= 80)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
}
length=0;
}
index=GetPixelIndex(image,p);
pixel.red=(MagickRealType) GetPixelRed(image,p);
pixel.green=(MagickRealType) GetPixelGreen(image,p);
pixel.blue=(MagickRealType) GetPixelBlue(image,p);
pixel.alpha=(MagickRealType) GetPixelAlpha(image,p);
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,(size_t) index,q);
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,(size_t) MagickMin(length,0xff),q);
if ((q-pixels+6) >= 80)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,
(MagickOffsetType) y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
break;
}
case NoCompression:
default:
{
/*
Dump uncompressed PseudoColor packets.
*/
q=pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
q=PopHexPixel(hex_digits,(size_t) GetPixelIndex(image,p),q);
if ((q-pixels+4) >= 80)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
q=pixels;
}
p+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,
(MagickOffsetType) y,image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (q != pixels)
{
*q++='\n';
(void) WriteBlob(image,q-pixels,pixels);
}
break;
}
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\n');
}
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"PS") != 0)
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"end\n");
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%PageTrailer\n");
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene++,imageListLength);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%Trailer\n");
if (page > 2)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%%%%BoundingBox: %.20g %.20g %.20g %.20g\n",ceil(bounds.x1-0.5),
ceil(bounds.y1-0.5),floor(bounds.x2-0.5),floor(bounds.y2-0.5));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"%%%%HiResBoundingBox: %g %g %g %g\n",bounds.x1,bounds.y1,bounds.x2,
bounds.y2);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"%%EOF\n");
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | ImageMagick | 34a6a5a45e83a4af852090b4e43f168a380df979 | 37,722,524,395,679,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1,133 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1523 |
int http_find_header(const char *name,
char *sol, struct hdr_idx *idx,
struct hdr_ctx *ctx)
{
return http_find_header2(name, strlen(name), sol, idx, ctx);
} | 0 | [] | haproxy-1.4 | dc80672211e085c211f1fc47e15cfe57ab587d38 | 70,547,757,056,257,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | BUG/CRITICAL: using HTTP information in tcp-request content may crash the process
During normal HTTP request processing, request buffers are realigned if
there are less than global.maxrewrite bytes available after them, in
order to leave enough room for rewriting headers after the request. This
is done in http_wait_for_request().
However, if some HTTP inspection happens during a "tcp-request content"
rule, this realignment is not performed. In theory this is not a problem
because empty buffers are always aligned and TCP inspection happens at
the beginning of a connection. But with HTTP keep-alive, it also happens
at the beginning of each subsequent request. So if a second request was
pipelined by the client before the first one had a chance to be forwarded,
the second request will not be realigned. Then, http_wait_for_request()
will not perform such a realignment either because the request was
already parsed and marked as such. The consequence of this, is that the
rewrite of a sufficient number of such pipelined, unaligned requests may
leave less room past the request been processed than the configured
reserve, which can lead to a buffer overflow if request processing appends
some data past the end of the buffer.
A number of conditions are required for the bug to be triggered :
- HTTP keep-alive must be enabled ;
- HTTP inspection in TCP rules must be used ;
- some request appending rules are needed (reqadd, x-forwarded-for)
- since empty buffers are always realigned, the client must pipeline
enough requests so that the buffer always contains something till
the point where there is no more room for rewriting.
While such a configuration is quite unlikely to be met (which is
confirmed by the bug's lifetime), a few people do use these features
together for very specific usages. And more importantly, writing such
a configuration and the request to attack it is trivial.
A quick workaround consists in forcing keep-alive off by adding
"option httpclose" or "option forceclose" in the frontend. Alternatively,
disabling HTTP-based TCP inspection rules enough if the application
supports it.
At first glance, this bug does not look like it could lead to remote code
execution, as the overflowing part is controlled by the configuration and
not by the user. But some deeper analysis should be performed to confirm
this. And anyway, corrupting the process' memory and crashing it is quite
trivial.
Special thanks go to Yves Lafon from the W3C who reported this bug and
deployed significant efforts to collect the relevant data needed to
understand it in less than one week.
CVE-2013-1912 was assigned to this issue.
Note that 1.4 is also affected so the fix must be backported.
(cherry picked from commit aae75e3279c6c9bd136413a72dafdcd4986bb89a) |
void jpc_qmfb_join_row(jpc_fix_t *a, int numcols, int parity)
{
int bufsize = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(numcols, 1);
jpc_fix_t joinbuf[QMFB_JOINBUFSIZE];
jpc_fix_t *buf = joinbuf;
register jpc_fix_t *srcptr;
register jpc_fix_t *dstptr;
register int n;
int hstartcol;
/* Allocate memory for the join buffer from the heap. */
if (bufsize > QMFB_JOINBUFSIZE) {
if (!(buf = jas_alloc2(bufsize, sizeof(jpc_fix_t)))) {
/* We have no choice but to commit suicide. */
abort();
}
}
hstartcol = (numcols + 1 - parity) >> 1;
/* Save the samples from the lowpass channel. */
n = hstartcol;
srcptr = &a[0];
dstptr = buf;
while (n-- > 0) {
*dstptr = *srcptr;
++srcptr;
++dstptr;
}
/* Copy the samples from the highpass channel into place. */
srcptr = &a[hstartcol];
dstptr = &a[1 - parity];
n = numcols - hstartcol;
while (n-- > 0) {
*dstptr = *srcptr;
dstptr += 2;
++srcptr;
}
/* Copy the samples from the lowpass channel into place. */
srcptr = buf;
dstptr = &a[parity];
n = hstartcol;
while (n-- > 0) {
*dstptr = *srcptr;
dstptr += 2;
++srcptr;
}
/* If the join buffer was allocated on the heap, free this memory. */
if (buf != joinbuf) {
jas_free(buf);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-189"
] | jasper | 3c55b399c36ef46befcb21e4ebc4799367f89684 | 191,589,419,219,237,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 55 | At many places in the code, jas_malloc or jas_recalloc was being
invoked with the size argument being computed in a manner that would not
allow integer overflow to be detected. Now, these places in the code
have been modified to use special-purpose memory allocation functions
(e.g., jas_alloc2, jas_alloc3, jas_realloc2) that check for overflow.
This should fix many security problems. |
int PKCS7_signatureVerify(BIO *bio, PKCS7 *p7, PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO *si,
X509 *x509)
{
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
EVP_MD_CTX mdc_tmp, *mdc;
int ret = 0, i;
int md_type;
STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk;
BIO *btmp;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mdc_tmp);
if (!PKCS7_type_is_signed(p7) && !PKCS7_type_is_signedAndEnveloped(p7)) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, PKCS7_R_WRONG_PKCS7_TYPE);
goto err;
}
md_type = OBJ_obj2nid(si->digest_alg->algorithm);
btmp = bio;
for (;;) {
if ((btmp == NULL) ||
((btmp = BIO_find_type(btmp, BIO_TYPE_MD)) == NULL)) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY,
PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
goto err;
}
BIO_get_md_ctx(btmp, &mdc);
if (mdc == NULL) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_MD_CTX_type(mdc) == md_type)
break;
/*
* Workaround for some broken clients that put the signature OID
* instead of the digest OID in digest_alg->algorithm
*/
if (EVP_MD_pkey_type(EVP_MD_CTX_md(mdc)) == md_type)
break;
btmp = BIO_next(btmp);
}
/*
* mdc is the digest ctx that we want, unless there are attributes, in
* which case the digest is the signed attributes
*/
if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&mdc_tmp, mdc))
goto err;
sk = si->auth_attr;
if ((sk != NULL) && (sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_num(sk) != 0)) {
unsigned char md_dat[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *abuf = NULL;
unsigned int md_len;
int alen;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *message_digest;
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&mdc_tmp, md_dat, &md_len))
goto err;
message_digest = PKCS7_digest_from_attributes(sk);
if (!message_digest) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY,
PKCS7_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
goto err;
}
if ((message_digest->length != (int)md_len) ||
(memcmp(message_digest->data, md_dat, md_len))) {
#if 0
{
int ii;
for (ii = 0; ii < message_digest->length; ii++)
printf("%02X", message_digest->data[ii]);
printf(" sent\n");
for (ii = 0; ii < md_len; ii++)
printf("%02X", md_dat[ii]);
printf(" calc\n");
}
#endif
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, PKCS7_R_DIGEST_FAILURE);
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mdc_tmp, EVP_get_digestbynid(md_type), NULL))
goto err;
alen = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)sk, &abuf,
ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY));
if (alen <= 0) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mdc_tmp, abuf, alen))
goto err;
OPENSSL_free(abuf);
}
os = si->enc_digest;
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x509);
if (!pkey) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
i = EVP_VerifyFinal(&mdc_tmp, os->data, os->length, pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (i <= 0) {
PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_SIGNATUREVERIFY, PKCS7_R_SIGNATURE_FAILURE);
ret = -1;
goto err;
} else
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mdc_tmp);
return (ret);
} | 0 | [] | openssl | c0334c2c92dd1bc3ad8138ba6e74006c3631b0f9 | 248,204,674,950,525,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 119 | PKCS#7: avoid NULL pointer dereferences with missing content
In PKCS#7, the ASN.1 content component is optional.
This typically applies to inner content (detached signatures),
however we must also handle unexpected missing outer content
correctly.
This patch only addresses functions reachable from parsing,
decryption and verification, and functions otherwise associated
with reading potentially untrusted data.
Correcting all low-level API calls requires further work.
CVE-2015-0289
Thanks to Michal Zalewski (Google) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Steve Henson <[email protected]> |
int inet_csk_compat_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, unsigned int optlen)
{
const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
if (icsk->icsk_af_ops->compat_setsockopt != NULL)
return icsk->icsk_af_ops->compat_setsockopt(sk, level, optname,
optval, optlen);
return icsk->icsk_af_ops->setsockopt(sk, level, optname,
optval, optlen);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-362"
] | linux-2.6 | f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259 | 110,685,493,766,558,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
dns_zone_setfile(dns_zone_t *zone, const char *file,
dns_masterformat_t format,
const dns_master_style_t *style)
{
isc_result_t result = ISC_R_SUCCESS;
REQUIRE(DNS_ZONE_VALID(zone));
LOCK_ZONE(zone);
result = dns_zone_setstring(zone, &zone->masterfile, file);
if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
zone->masterformat = format;
if (format == dns_masterformat_text)
zone->masterstyle = style;
result = default_journal(zone);
}
UNLOCK_ZONE(zone);
return (result);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-327"
] | bind9 | f09352d20a9d360e50683cd1d2fc52ccedcd77a0 | 241,532,386,247,747,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | Update keyfetch_done compute_tag check
If in keyfetch_done the compute_tag fails (because for example the
algorithm is not supported), don't crash, but instead ignore the
key. |
static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
{
size_t pcurveslen = 0;
if (sess) {
*pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
} else {
/* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
*pcurves = suiteb_curves;
pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
break;
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
*pcurves = suiteb_curves;
pcurveslen = 2;
break;
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
*pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
pcurveslen = 2;
break;
default:
*pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
}
if (!*pcurves) {
*pcurves = eccurves_default;
pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
}
}
/* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
if (pcurveslen & 1) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*num_curves = 0;
return 0;
}
*num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
return 1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | openssl | 4ad93618d26a3ea23d36ad5498ff4f59eff3a4d2 | 231,326,712,145,985,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 44 | Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <[email protected]> |
static int sctp_process_missing_param(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
sctp_param_t paramtype,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
struct sctp_chunk **errp)
{
struct __sctp_missing report;
__u16 len;
len = WORD_ROUND(sizeof(report));
/* Make an ERROR chunk, preparing enough room for
* returning multiple unknown parameters.
*/
if (!*errp)
*errp = sctp_make_op_error_space(asoc, chunk, len);
if (*errp) {
report.num_missing = htonl(1);
report.type = paramtype;
sctp_init_cause(*errp, SCTP_ERROR_MISS_PARAM,
sizeof(report));
sctp_addto_chunk(*errp, sizeof(report), &report);
}
/* Stop processing this chunk. */
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | linux-2.6 | ba0166708ef4da7eeb61dd92bbba4d5a749d6561 | 133,903,559,036,119,990,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 | sctp: Fix kernel panic while process protocol violation parameter
Since call to function sctp_sf_abort_violation() need paramter 'arg' with
'struct sctp_chunk' type, it will read the chunk type and chunk length from
the chunk_hdr member of chunk. But call to sctp_sf_violation_paramlen()
always with 'struct sctp_paramhdr' type's parameter, it will be passed to
sctp_sf_abort_violation(). This may cause kernel panic.
sctp_sf_violation_paramlen()
|-- sctp_sf_abort_violation()
|-- sctp_make_abort_violation()
This patch fixed this problem. This patch also fix two place which called
sctp_sf_violation_paramlen() with wrong paramter type.
Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
Payload FormBody::NextPayload(bool free_previous) {
Payload payload;
// Free previous payload.
if (free_previous) {
if (index_ > 0) {
Free(index_ - 1);
}
}
if (index_ < parts_.size()) {
AddBoundary(&payload);
parts_[index_]->Prepare(&payload);
if (index_ + 1 == parts_.size()) {
AddBoundaryEnd(&payload);
}
}
++index_;
return payload;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-22"
] | webcc | 55a45fd5039061d5cc62e9f1b9d1f7e97a15143f | 103,711,685,610,363,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 | fix static file serving security issue; fix url path encoding issue |
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