func
stringlengths 0
484k
| target
int64 0
1
| cwe
listlengths 0
4
| project
stringclasses 799
values | commit_id
stringlengths 40
40
| hash
float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
| size
int64 1
24k
| message
stringlengths 0
13.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
UINT32_Marshal(UINT32 *source, BYTE **buffer, INT32 *size)
{
if (buffer != NULL) {
if ((size == NULL) || ((UINT32)*size >= sizeof(UINT32))) {
(*buffer)[0] = (BYTE)((*source >> 24) & 0xff);
(*buffer)[1] = (BYTE)((*source >> 16) & 0xff);
(*buffer)[2] = (BYTE)((*source >> 8) & 0xff);
(*buffer)[3] = (BYTE)((*source >> 0) & 0xff);
*buffer += sizeof(UINT32);
if (size != NULL) {
*size -= sizeof(UINT32);
}
}
else {
pAssert(FALSE);
}
}
return sizeof(UINT32);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
libtpms
|
3ef9b26cb9f28bd64d738bff9505a20d4eb56acd
| 285,910,005,728,659,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
tpm2: Add maxSize parameter to TPM2B_Marshal for sanity checks
Add maxSize parameter to TPM2B_Marshal and assert on it checking
the size of the data intended to be marshaled versus the maximum
buffer size.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
|
FLAC__bool write_bitbuffer_(FLAC__StreamEncoder *encoder, uint32_t samples, FLAC__bool is_last_block)
{
const FLAC__byte *buffer;
size_t bytes;
FLAC__ASSERT(FLAC__bitwriter_is_byte_aligned(encoder->private_->frame));
if(!FLAC__bitwriter_get_buffer(encoder->private_->frame, &buffer, &bytes)) {
encoder->protected_->state = FLAC__STREAM_ENCODER_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_ERROR;
return false;
}
if(encoder->protected_->verify) {
encoder->private_->verify.output.data = buffer;
encoder->private_->verify.output.bytes = bytes;
if(encoder->private_->verify.state_hint == ENCODER_IN_MAGIC) {
encoder->private_->verify.needs_magic_hack = true;
}
else {
if(!FLAC__stream_decoder_process_single(encoder->private_->verify.decoder)
|| (!is_last_block
&& (FLAC__stream_encoder_get_verify_decoder_state(encoder) == FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_END_OF_STREAM))) {
FLAC__bitwriter_release_buffer(encoder->private_->frame);
FLAC__bitwriter_clear(encoder->private_->frame);
if(encoder->protected_->state != FLAC__STREAM_ENCODER_VERIFY_MISMATCH_IN_AUDIO_DATA)
encoder->protected_->state = FLAC__STREAM_ENCODER_VERIFY_DECODER_ERROR;
return false;
}
}
}
if(write_frame_(encoder, buffer, bytes, samples, is_last_block) != FLAC__STREAM_ENCODER_WRITE_STATUS_OK) {
FLAC__bitwriter_release_buffer(encoder->private_->frame);
FLAC__bitwriter_clear(encoder->private_->frame);
encoder->protected_->state = FLAC__STREAM_ENCODER_CLIENT_ERROR;
return false;
}
FLAC__bitwriter_release_buffer(encoder->private_->frame);
FLAC__bitwriter_clear(encoder->private_->frame);
if(samples > 0) {
encoder->private_->streaminfo.data.stream_info.min_framesize = flac_min(bytes, encoder->private_->streaminfo.data.stream_info.min_framesize);
encoder->private_->streaminfo.data.stream_info.max_framesize = flac_max(bytes, encoder->private_->streaminfo.data.stream_info.max_framesize);
}
return true;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
flac
|
e1575e4a7c5157cbf4e4a16dbd39b74f7174c7be
| 56,325,365,369,468,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 48 |
libFlac: Exit at EOS in verify mode
When verify mode is enabled, once decoder flags end of stream,
encode processing is considered complete.
CVE-2021-0561
Signed-off-by: Ralph Giles <[email protected]>
|
static void powermate_free_buffers(struct usb_device *udev, struct powermate_device *pm)
{
usb_free_coherent(udev, POWERMATE_PAYLOAD_SIZE_MAX,
pm->data, pm->data_dma);
kfree(pm->configcr);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
9c6ba456711687b794dcf285856fc14e2c76074f
| 143,805,899,120,175,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
Input: powermate - fix oops with malicious USB descriptors
The powermate driver expects at least one valid USB endpoint in its
probe function. If given malicious descriptors that specify 0 for
the number of endpoints, it will crash. Validate the number of
endpoints on the interface before using them.
The full report for this issue can be found here:
http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/85
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
|
TEST_F(ConnectionManagerUtilityTest, MtlsSetForwardClientCert) {
auto ssl = std::make_shared<NiceMock<Ssl::MockConnectionInfo>>();
ON_CALL(*ssl, peerCertificatePresented()).WillByDefault(Return(true));
const std::vector<std::string> local_uri_sans{"test://foo.com/be"};
EXPECT_CALL(*ssl, uriSanLocalCertificate()).WillOnce(Return(local_uri_sans));
std::string expected_sha("abcdefg");
EXPECT_CALL(*ssl, sha256PeerCertificateDigest()).WillOnce(ReturnRef(expected_sha));
const std::vector<std::string> peer_uri_sans{"test://foo.com/fe"};
EXPECT_CALL(*ssl, uriSanPeerCertificate()).WillRepeatedly(Return(peer_uri_sans));
std::string expected_pem("%3D%3Dabc%0Ade%3D");
EXPECT_CALL(*ssl, urlEncodedPemEncodedPeerCertificate()).WillOnce(ReturnRef(expected_pem));
std::string expected_chain_pem(expected_pem + "%3D%3Dlmn%0Aop%3D");
EXPECT_CALL(*ssl, urlEncodedPemEncodedPeerCertificateChain())
.WillOnce(ReturnRef(expected_chain_pem));
std::vector<std::string> expected_dns = {"www.example.com"};
EXPECT_CALL(*ssl, dnsSansPeerCertificate()).WillOnce(Return(expected_dns));
ON_CALL(connection_, ssl()).WillByDefault(Return(ssl));
ON_CALL(config_, forwardClientCert())
.WillByDefault(Return(Http::ForwardClientCertType::AppendForward));
std::vector<Http::ClientCertDetailsType> details = std::vector<Http::ClientCertDetailsType>();
details.push_back(Http::ClientCertDetailsType::URI);
details.push_back(Http::ClientCertDetailsType::Cert);
details.push_back(Http::ClientCertDetailsType::Chain);
details.push_back(Http::ClientCertDetailsType::DNS);
ON_CALL(config_, setCurrentClientCertDetails()).WillByDefault(ReturnRef(details));
TestRequestHeaderMapImpl headers;
EXPECT_EQ((MutateRequestRet{"10.0.0.3:50000", false, Tracing::Reason::NotTraceable}),
callMutateRequestHeaders(headers, Protocol::Http2));
EXPECT_TRUE(headers.has("x-forwarded-client-cert"));
EXPECT_EQ("By=test://foo.com/be;"
"Hash=abcdefg;"
"URI=test://foo.com/fe;"
"Cert=\"%3D%3Dabc%0Ade%3D\";"
"Chain=\"%3D%3Dabc%0Ade%3D%3D%3Dlmn%0Aop%3D\";"
"DNS=www.example.com",
headers.get_("x-forwarded-client-cert"));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-22"
] |
envoy
|
5333b928d8bcffa26ab19bf018369a835f697585
| 213,759,417,632,754,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 38 |
Implement handling of escaped slash characters in URL path
Fixes: CVE-2021-29492
Signed-off-by: Yan Avlasov <[email protected]>
|
void TY_(AddStringLiteral)( Lexer* lexer, ctmbstr str )
{
byte c;
while(0 != (c = *str++) )
TY_(AddCharToLexer)( lexer, c );
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
tidy-html5
|
c18f27a58792f7fbd0b30a0ff50d6b40a82f940d
| 9,222,284,398,788,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
Issue #217 - avoid len going negative, ever...
|
static void TDES_CTR(const BYTE *key, // IN
INT32 keySizeInBits, // IN
INT32 dSize, // IN
const BYTE *dIn, // IN
BYTE *iv, // IN
BYTE *dOut, // OUT
INT16 blockSize // IN
)
{
tpmCryptKeySchedule_t keySchedule;
int i;
BYTE tmp[MAX_SYM_BLOCK_SIZE];
BYTE *pT;
TDES_set_encrypt_key(key, keySizeInBits,
(tpmKeyScheduleTDES *)&keySchedule.TDES);
for(; dSize > 0; dSize -= blockSize)
{
// Encrypt the current value of the IV(counter)
TDES_encrypt(iv, tmp, (tpmKeyScheduleTDES *)&keySchedule.TDES);
//increment the counter (counter is big-endian so start at end)
for(i = blockSize - 1; i >= 0; i--)
if((iv[i] += 1) != 0)
break;
// XOR the encrypted counter value with input and put into output
pT = tmp;
for(i = (dSize < blockSize) ? dSize : blockSize; i > 0; i--)
*dOut++ = *dIn++ ^ *pT++;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-330"
] |
libtpms
|
32c159ab53db703749a8f90430cdc7b20b00975e
| 213,106,295,345,909,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 |
tpm2: CryptSym: fix AES output IV
The TPM is supposed to provide the output IV in the ivInOut parameter in
CryptSymmetricEncrypt. In the case of using the openssl routines, the
output IV is missed, and the resulting output from the TPM is in the
input IV.
OpenSSL unfortunately does not export EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv() until
tags/OpenSSL_1_1_0, so we have to fall back to the reference code for
previous OpenSSL versions.
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <[email protected]>
|
void smtp_server_connection_timeout_reset(struct smtp_server_connection *conn)
{
if (conn->to_idle != NULL)
timeout_reset(conn->to_idle);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-77"
] |
core
|
321c339756f9b2b98fb7326359d1333adebb5295
| 279,731,981,580,565,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
lib-smtp: smtp-server-connection - Fix STARTTLS command injection vulnerability.
The input handler kept reading more commands even though the input was locked by
the STARTTLS command, thereby causing it to read the command pipelined beyond
STARTTLS. This causes a STARTTLS command injection vulerability.
|
xmlPopInputCallbacks(void)
{
if (!xmlInputCallbackInitialized)
return(-1);
if (xmlInputCallbackNr <= 0)
return(-1);
xmlInputCallbackNr--;
xmlInputCallbackTable[xmlInputCallbackNr].matchcallback = NULL;
xmlInputCallbackTable[xmlInputCallbackNr].opencallback = NULL;
xmlInputCallbackTable[xmlInputCallbackNr].readcallback = NULL;
xmlInputCallbackTable[xmlInputCallbackNr].closecallback = NULL;
return(xmlInputCallbackNr);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-134"
] |
libxml2
|
4472c3a5a5b516aaf59b89be602fbce52756c3e9
| 81,383,372,838,899,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
Fix some format string warnings with possible format string vulnerability
For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=761029
Decorate every method in libxml2 with the appropriate
LIBXML_ATTR_FORMAT(fmt,args) macro and add some cleanups
following the reports.
|
void nfs41_shutdown_client(struct nfs_client *clp)
{
if (nfs4_has_session(clp)) {
nfs4_cleanup_callback(clp);
nfs4_shutdown_ds_clients(clp);
nfs4_destroy_session(clp->cl_session);
nfs4_destroy_clientid(clp);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
dd99e9f98fbf423ff6d365b37a98e8879170f17c
| 298,852,868,655,691,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
NFSv4: Initialise connection to the server in nfs4_alloc_client()
Set up the connection to the NFSv4 server in nfs4_alloc_client(), before
we've added the struct nfs_client to the net-namespace's nfs_client_list
so that a downed server won't cause other mounts to hang in the trunking
detection code.
Reported-by: Michael Wakabayashi <[email protected]>
Fixes: 5c6e5b60aae4 ("NFS: Fix an Oops in the pNFS files and flexfiles connection setup to the DS")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
TEST_P(Security, BuiltinAuthenticationAndAccessAndCryptoPlugin_PermissionsDisableDiscoveryDisableAccessNone_validation_ok_disable_discovery_enable_access_none)
// *INDENT-ON*
{
PubSubReader<HelloWorldType> reader(TEST_TOPIC_NAME);
PubSubWriter<HelloWorldType> writer(TEST_TOPIC_NAME);
std::string governance_file("governance_disable_discovery_disable_access_none.smime");
BuiltinAuthenticationAndAccessAndCryptoPlugin_Permissions_validation_ok_common(reader, writer, governance_file);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-284"
] |
Fast-DDS
|
d2aeab37eb4fad4376b68ea4dfbbf285a2926384
| 227,568,209,078,496,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
check remote permissions (#1387)
* Refs 5346. Blackbox test
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. one-way string compare
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. Do not add partition separator on last partition
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 5346. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Access control unit testing
It only covers Partition and Topic permissions
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs #3680. Fix partition check on Permissions plugin.
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Fix tests on mac
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Fix windows tests
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Avoid memory leak on test
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* Refs 3680. Proxy data mocks should not return temporary objects
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
* refs 3680. uncrustify
Signed-off-by: Iker Luengo <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Miguel Company <[email protected]>
|
bool alwaysSetRequestIdInResponse() const override { return always_set_request_id_in_response_; }
| 0 |
[
"CWE-22"
] |
envoy
|
5333b928d8bcffa26ab19bf018369a835f697585
| 230,279,222,708,545,580,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
Implement handling of escaped slash characters in URL path
Fixes: CVE-2021-29492
Signed-off-by: Yan Avlasov <[email protected]>
|
absl::string_view ExtractorImpl::extractJWT(absl::string_view value_str,
absl::string_view::size_type after) const {
const auto starting = value_str.find_first_of(ConstantBase64UrlEncodingCharsPlusDot, after);
if (starting == value_str.npos) {
return value_str;
}
// There should be two dots (periods; 0x2e) inside the string, but we don't verify that here
auto ending = value_str.find_first_not_of(ConstantBase64UrlEncodingCharsPlusDot, starting);
if (ending == value_str.npos) { // Base64Url-encoded string occupies the rest of the line
return value_str.substr(starting);
}
return value_str.substr(starting, ending - starting);
}
| 0 |
[] |
envoy
|
2c60632d41555ec8b3d9ef5246242be637a2db0f
| 45,194,522,056,722,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
http: header map security fixes for duplicate headers (#197)
Previously header matching did not match on all headers for
non-inline headers. This patch changes the default behavior to
always logically match on all headers. Multiple individual
headers will be logically concatenated with ',' similar to what
is done with inline headers. This makes the behavior effectively
consistent. This behavior can be temporary reverted by setting
the runtime value "envoy.reloadable_features.header_match_on_all_headers"
to "false".
Targeted fixes have been additionally performed on the following
extensions which make them consider all duplicate headers by default as
a comma concatenated list:
1) Any extension using CEL matching on headers.
2) The header to metadata filter.
3) The JWT filter.
4) The Lua filter.
Like primary header matching used in routing, RBAC, etc. this behavior
can be disabled by setting the runtime value
"envoy.reloadable_features.header_match_on_all_headers" to false.
Finally, the setCopy() header map API previously only set the first
header in the case of duplicate non-inline headers. setCopy() now
behaves similiarly to the other set*() APIs and replaces all found
headers with a single value. This may have had security implications
in the extauth filter which uses this API. This behavior can be disabled
by setting the runtime value
"envoy.reloadable_features.http_set_copy_replace_all_headers" to false.
Fixes https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy-setec/issues/188
Signed-off-by: Matt Klein <[email protected]>
|
static void controloptions (lua_State *L, int opt, const char **fmt,
Header *h) {
switch (opt) {
case ' ': return; /* ignore white spaces */
case '>': h->endian = BIG; return;
case '<': h->endian = LITTLE; return;
case '!': {
int a = getnum(fmt, MAXALIGN);
if (!isp2(a))
luaL_error(L, "alignment %d is not a power of 2", a);
h->align = a;
return;
}
default: {
const char *msg = lua_pushfstring(L, "invalid format option '%c'", opt);
luaL_argerror(L, 1, msg);
}
}
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-61",
"CWE-190",
"CWE-787"
] |
redis
|
ef764dde1cca2f25d00686673d1bc89448819571
| 328,502,044,187,717,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
[FIX] revisit CVE-2015-8080 vulnerability
|
register_assoc (graphid i, graphid j)
{
if (!used_assoc)
init_assoc ();
used_assoc[i] = true;
used_assoc[j] = true;
}
| 0 |
[] |
bison
|
b7aab2dbad43aaf14eebe78d54aafa245a000988
| 322,774,504,722,624,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
fix: crash when redefining the EOF token
Reported by Agency for Defense Development.
https://lists.gnu.org/r/bug-bison/2020-08/msg00008.html
On an empty such as
%token FOO
BAR
FOO 0
%%
input: %empty
we crash because when we find FOO 0, we decrement ntokens (since FOO
was discovered to be EOF, which is already known to be a token, so we
increment ntokens for it, and need to cancel this). This "works well"
when EOF is properly defined in one go, but here it is first defined
and later only assign token code 0. In the meanwhile BAR was given
the token number that we just decremented.
To fix this, assign symbol numbers after parsing, not during parsing,
so that we also saw all the explicit token codes. To maintain the
current numbers (I'd like to keep no difference in the output, not
just equivalence), we need to make sure the symbols are numbered in
the same order: that of appearance in the source file. So we need the
locations to be correct, which was almost the case, except for nterms
that appeared several times as LHS (i.e., several times as "foo:
..."). Fixing the use of location_of_lhs sufficed (it appears it was
intended for this use, but its implementation was unfinished: it was
always set to "false" only).
* src/symtab.c (symbol_location_as_lhs_set): Update location_of_lhs.
(symbol_code_set): Remove broken hack that decremented ntokens.
(symbol_class_set, dummy_symbol_get): Don't set number, ntokens and
nnterms.
(symbol_check_defined): Do it.
(symbols): Don't count nsyms here.
Actually, don't count nsyms at all: let it be done in...
* src/reader.c (check_and_convert_grammar): here. Define nsyms from
ntokens and nnterms after parsing.
* tests/input.at (EOF redeclared): New.
* examples/c/bistromathic/bistromathic.test: Adjust the traces: in
"%nterm <double> exp %% input: ...", exp used to be numbered before
input.
|
struct vfsmount *lookup_mnt(struct path *path)
{
struct mount *child_mnt;
br_read_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
child_mnt = __lookup_mnt(path->mnt, path->dentry, 1);
if (child_mnt) {
mnt_add_count(child_mnt, 1);
br_read_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
return &child_mnt->mnt;
} else {
br_read_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
return NULL;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] |
linux
|
3151527ee007b73a0ebd296010f1c0454a919c7d
| 3,041,775,296,748,296,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
userns: Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted
Guarantee that the policy of which files may be access that is
established by setting the root directory will not be violated
by user namespaces by verifying that the root directory points
to the root of the mount namespace at the time of user namespace
creation.
Changing the root is a privileged operation, and as a matter of policy
it serves to limit unprivileged processes to files below the current
root directory.
For reasons of simplicity and comprehensibility the privilege to
change the root directory is gated solely on the CAP_SYS_CHROOT
capability in the user namespace. Therefore when creating a user
namespace we must ensure that the policy of which files may be access
can not be violated by changing the root directory.
Anyone who runs a processes in a chroot and would like to use user
namespace can setup the same view of filesystems with a mount
namespace instead. With this result that this is not a practical
limitation for using user namespaces.
Cc: [email protected]
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
|
ExecWithCheckOptions(ResultRelInfo *resultRelInfo,
TupleTableSlot *slot, EState *estate)
{
Relation rel = resultRelInfo->ri_RelationDesc;
TupleDesc tupdesc = RelationGetDescr(rel);
ExprContext *econtext;
ListCell *l1,
*l2;
/*
* We will use the EState's per-tuple context for evaluating constraint
* expressions (creating it if it's not already there).
*/
econtext = GetPerTupleExprContext(estate);
/* Arrange for econtext's scan tuple to be the tuple under test */
econtext->ecxt_scantuple = slot;
/* Check each of the constraints */
forboth(l1, resultRelInfo->ri_WithCheckOptions,
l2, resultRelInfo->ri_WithCheckOptionExprs)
{
WithCheckOption *wco = (WithCheckOption *) lfirst(l1);
ExprState *wcoExpr = (ExprState *) lfirst(l2);
/*
* WITH CHECK OPTION checks are intended to ensure that the new tuple
* is visible (in the case of a view) or that it passes the
* 'with-check' policy (in the case of row security).
* If the qual evaluates to NULL or FALSE, then the new tuple won't be
* included in the view or doesn't pass the 'with-check' policy for the
* table. We need ExecQual to return FALSE for NULL to handle the view
* case (the opposite of what we do above for CHECK constraints).
*/
if (!ExecQual((List *) wcoExpr, econtext, false))
{
char *val_desc;
Bitmapset *modifiedCols;
modifiedCols = GetModifiedColumns(resultRelInfo, estate);
val_desc = ExecBuildSlotValueDescription(RelationGetRelid(rel),
slot,
tupdesc,
modifiedCols,
64);
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_WITH_CHECK_OPTION_VIOLATION),
errmsg("new row violates WITH CHECK OPTION for \"%s\"",
wco->viewname),
val_desc ? errdetail("Failing row contains %s.", val_desc) :
0));
}
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-209"
] |
postgres
|
804b6b6db4dcfc590a468e7be390738f9f7755fb
| 69,281,795,697,146,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 55 |
Fix column-privilege leak in error-message paths
While building error messages to return to the user,
BuildIndexValueDescription, ExecBuildSlotValueDescription and
ri_ReportViolation would happily include the entire key or entire row in
the result returned to the user, even if the user didn't have access to
view all of the columns being included.
Instead, include only those columns which the user is providing or which
the user has select rights on. If the user does not have any rights
to view the table or any of the columns involved then no detail is
provided and a NULL value is returned from BuildIndexValueDescription
and ExecBuildSlotValueDescription. Note that, for key cases, the user
must have access to all of the columns for the key to be shown; a
partial key will not be returned.
Further, in master only, do not return any data for cases where row
security is enabled on the relation and row security should be applied
for the user. This required a bit of refactoring and moving of things
around related to RLS- note the addition of utils/misc/rls.c.
Back-patch all the way, as column-level privileges are now in all
supported versions.
This has been assigned CVE-2014-8161, but since the issue and the patch
have already been publicized on pgsql-hackers, there's no point in trying
to hide this commit.
|
int evtchn_get(evtchn_port_t evtchn)
{
int irq;
struct irq_info *info;
int err = -ENOENT;
if (evtchn >= xen_evtchn_max_channels())
return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&irq_mapping_update_lock);
irq = get_evtchn_to_irq(evtchn);
if (irq == -1)
goto done;
info = info_for_irq(irq);
if (!info)
goto done;
err = -EINVAL;
if (info->refcnt <= 0)
goto done;
info->refcnt++;
err = 0;
done:
mutex_unlock(&irq_mapping_update_lock);
return err;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
e99502f76271d6bc4e374fe368c50c67a1fd3070
| 313,042,986,819,520,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 |
xen/events: defer eoi in case of excessive number of events
In case rogue guests are sending events at high frequency it might
happen that xen_evtchn_do_upcall() won't stop processing events in
dom0. As this is done in irq handling a crash might be the result.
In order to avoid that, delay further inter-domain events after some
time in xen_evtchn_do_upcall() by forcing eoi processing into a
worker on the same cpu, thus inhibiting new events coming in.
The time after which eoi processing is to be delayed is configurable
via a new module parameter "event_loop_timeout" which specifies the
maximum event loop time in jiffies (default: 2, the value was chosen
after some tests showing that a value of 2 was the lowest with an
only slight drop of dom0 network throughput while multiple guests
performed an event storm).
How long eoi processing will be delayed can be specified via another
parameter "event_eoi_delay" (again in jiffies, default 10, again the
value was chosen after testing with different delay values).
This is part of XSA-332.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Julien Grall <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <[email protected]>
|
static int __ext4_check_blockref(const char *function, struct inode *inode,
__le32 *p, unsigned int max)
{
__le32 *bref = p;
unsigned int blk;
while (bref < p+max) {
blk = le32_to_cpu(*bref++);
if (blk &&
unlikely(!ext4_data_block_valid(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb),
blk, 1))) {
__ext4_error(inode->i_sb, function,
"invalid block reference %u "
"in inode #%lu", blk, inode->i_ino);
return -EIO;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
744692dc059845b2a3022119871846e74d4f6e11
| 278,641,004,562,202,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
|
GF_Err gf_isom_enum_sample_aux_data(GF_ISOFile *the_file, u32 trackNumber, u32 sample_number, u32 *sai_idx, u32 *sai_type, u32 *sai_parameter, u8 **sai_data, u32 *sai_size)
{
GF_TrackBox *trak;
u32 i, count;
if (!sai_type || !sai_idx || !sai_data || !sai_size) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
if (sai_parameter) *sai_parameter = 0;
*sai_type = 0;
trak = gf_isom_get_track_from_file(the_file, trackNumber);
if (!trak) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
if (!trak->Media->information->sampleTable->sai_sizes) return GF_OK;
if (!trak->Media->information->sampleTable->sai_offsets) return GF_OK;
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_ISOM_FRAGMENTS
if (sample_number <= trak->sample_count_at_seg_start) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
sample_number -= trak->sample_count_at_seg_start;
#endif
count = gf_list_count(trak->Media->information->sampleTable->sai_sizes);
for (i=0; i<count; i++) {
GF_Err e;
GF_SampleAuxiliaryInfoSizeBox *saiz;
GF_SampleAuxiliaryInfoOffsetBox *saio=NULL;
u32 j;
saiz = (GF_SampleAuxiliaryInfoSizeBox*)gf_list_get(trak->Media->information->sampleTable->sai_sizes, i);
switch (saiz->aux_info_type) {
case GF_ISOM_CENC_SCHEME:
case GF_ISOM_CBC_SCHEME:
case GF_ISOM_CENS_SCHEME:
case GF_ISOM_CBCS_SCHEME:
case GF_ISOM_PIFF_SCHEME:
case 0:
continue;
default:
break;
}
if (*sai_idx>i) continue;
for (j=0; j<gf_list_count(trak->Media->information->sampleTable->sai_offsets); j++) {
saio = (GF_SampleAuxiliaryInfoOffsetBox*)gf_list_get(trak->Media->information->sampleTable->sai_offsets, j);
if ((saio->aux_info_type == saiz->aux_info_type) && (saio->aux_info_type_parameter == saiz->aux_info_type_parameter)) break;
saio = NULL;
}
if (!saio) continue;
if (!saio->offsets && !saio->sai_data) continue;
u64 offset = saio->offsets ? saio->offsets[0] : 0;
u32 nb_saio = saio->entry_count;
if ((nb_saio>1) && (saio->entry_count != saiz->sample_count)) continue;
*sai_type = saiz->aux_info_type;
if (sai_parameter) *sai_parameter = saiz->aux_info_type_parameter;
(*sai_idx)++;
if (nb_saio == 1) {
for (j=0; j < sample_number-1; j++) {
u32 size = saiz->default_sample_info_size ? saiz->default_sample_info_size : saiz->sample_info_size[j];
offset += size;
}
} else {
offset = saio->offsets[sample_number-1];
}
*sai_size = saiz->default_sample_info_size ? saiz->default_sample_info_size : saiz->sample_info_size[j];
if (*sai_size) {
*sai_data = gf_malloc( *sai_size);
if (! *sai_data) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
}
e = GF_OK;
if (saio->sai_data) {
if (offset + *sai_size <= saio->sai_data->dataSize) {
memcpy(*sai_data, saio->sai_data->data + offset, *sai_size);
} else {
e = GF_IO_ERR;
}
} else {
u64 cur_position = gf_bs_get_position(the_file->movieFileMap->bs);
gf_bs_seek(the_file->movieFileMap->bs, offset);
u32 nb_read = gf_bs_read_data(the_file->movieFileMap->bs, *sai_data, *sai_size);
if (nb_read != *sai_size) e = GF_IO_ERR;
gf_bs_seek(the_file->movieFileMap->bs, cur_position);
}
if (e) {
gf_free(*sai_data);
*sai_data = NULL;
*sai_size = 0;
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[isobmf] Failed to clone sai data: %s\n", gf_error_to_string(e) ));
}
return e;
}
return GF_OK;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
gpac
|
f0a41d178a2dc5ac185506d9fa0b0a58356b16f7
| 204,210,131,977,082,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 98 |
fixed #2120
|
void vrend_renderer_detach_res_ctx(int ctx_id, int res_handle)
{
struct vrend_context *ctx = vrend_lookup_renderer_ctx(ctx_id);
if (!ctx)
return;
vrend_renderer_detach_res_ctx_p(ctx, res_handle);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
virglrenderer
|
cbc8d8b75be360236cada63784046688aeb6d921
| 181,255,118,765,326,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
vrend: check transfer bounds for negative values too and report error
Closes #138
Signed-off-by: Gert Wollny <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Emil Velikov <[email protected]>
|
static int handle_name_request(enum request_types request_type,
const char *name, const char *domain_name,
struct berval **berval)
{
int ret;
char *fq_name = NULL;
struct passwd pwd;
struct group grp;
char *sid_str = NULL;
enum sss_id_type id_type;
size_t buf_len;
char *buf = NULL;
struct sss_nss_kv *kv_list = NULL;
ret = asprintf(&fq_name, "%s%c%s", name, SSSD_DOMAIN_SEPARATOR,
domain_name);
if (ret == -1) {
ret = LDAP_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
fq_name = NULL; /* content is undefined according to
asprintf(3) */
goto done;
}
if (request_type == REQ_SIMPLE) {
ret = sss_nss_getsidbyname(fq_name, &sid_str, &id_type);
if (ret != 0) {
if (ret == ENOENT) {
ret = LDAP_NO_SUCH_OBJECT;
} else {
ret = LDAP_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
}
goto done;
}
ret = pack_ber_sid(sid_str, berval);
} else {
ret = get_buffer(&buf_len, &buf);
if (ret != LDAP_SUCCESS) {
goto done;
}
ret = getpwnam_r_wrapper(MAX_BUF, fq_name, &pwd, &buf, &buf_len);
if (ret == 0) {
if (request_type == REQ_FULL_WITH_GROUPS) {
ret = sss_nss_getorigbyname(pwd.pw_name, &kv_list, &id_type);
if (ret != 0 || !(id_type == SSS_ID_TYPE_UID
|| id_type == SSS_ID_TYPE_BOTH)) {
if (ret == ENOENT) {
ret = LDAP_NO_SUCH_OBJECT;
} else {
ret = LDAP_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
}
goto done;
}
}
ret = pack_ber_user((request_type == REQ_FULL ? RESP_USER
: RESP_USER_GROUPLIST),
domain_name, pwd.pw_name, pwd.pw_uid,
pwd.pw_gid, pwd.pw_gecos, pwd.pw_dir,
pwd.pw_shell, kv_list, berval);
} else if (ret == ENOMEM || ret == ERANGE) {
ret = LDAP_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
goto done;
} else { /* no user entry found */
/* according to the getpwnam() man page there are a couple of
* error codes which can indicate that the user was not found. To
* be on the safe side we fail back to the group lookup on all
* errors. */
ret = getgrnam_r_wrapper(MAX_BUF, fq_name, &grp, &buf, &buf_len);
if (ret != 0) {
if (ret == ENOMEM || ret == ERANGE) {
ret = LDAP_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
} else {
ret = LDAP_NO_SUCH_OBJECT;
}
goto done;
}
if (request_type == REQ_FULL_WITH_GROUPS) {
ret = sss_nss_getorigbyname(grp.gr_name, &kv_list, &id_type);
if (ret != 0 || !(id_type == SSS_ID_TYPE_GID
|| id_type == SSS_ID_TYPE_BOTH)) {
if (ret == ENOENT) {
ret = LDAP_NO_SUCH_OBJECT;
} else {
ret = LDAP_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
}
goto done;
}
}
ret = pack_ber_group((request_type == REQ_FULL ? RESP_GROUP
: RESP_GROUP_MEMBERS),
domain_name, grp.gr_name, grp.gr_gid,
grp.gr_mem, kv_list, berval);
}
}
done:
sss_nss_free_kv(kv_list);
free(fq_name);
free(sid_str);
free(buf);
return ret;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-19"
] |
freeipa
|
c15a407cbfaed163a933ab137eed16387efe25d2
| 104,569,710,063,349,910,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 106 |
extdom: make nss buffer configurable
The get*_r_wrapper() calls expect a maximum buffer size to avoid memory
shortage if too many threads try to allocate buffers e.g. for large
groups. With this patch this size can be configured by setting
ipaExtdomMaxNssBufSize in the plugin config object
cn=ipa_extdom_extop,cn=plugins,cn=config.
Related to https://fedorahosted.org/freeipa/ticket/4908
Reviewed-By: Alexander Bokovoy <[email protected]>
|
void hci_sock_cleanup(void)
{
if (bt_sock_unregister(BTPROTO_HCI) < 0)
BT_ERR("HCI socket unregistration failed");
proto_unregister(&hci_sk_proto);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux
|
3f68ba07b1da811bf383b4b701b129bfcb2e4988
| 297,389,465,243,242,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
Bluetooth: HCI - Fix info leak via getsockname()
The HCI code fails to initialize the hci_channel member of struct
sockaddr_hci and that for leaks two bytes kernel stack via the
getsockname() syscall. Initialize hci_channel with 0 to avoid the
info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <[email protected]>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
new_cached_dir(char *s, time_t published)
{
cached_dir_t *d = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(cached_dir_t));
d->refcnt = 1;
d->dir = s;
d->dir_len = strlen(s);
d->published = published;
if (tor_gzip_compress(&(d->dir_z), &(d->dir_z_len), d->dir, d->dir_len,
ZLIB_METHOD)) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Error compressing directory");
}
return d;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264"
] |
tor
|
00fffbc1a15e2696a89c721d0c94dc333ff419ef
| 32,244,452,581,394,370,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
Don't give the Guard flag to relays without the CVE-2011-2768 fix
|
void set_block_number(uint64_t block_number) { block_number_ = block_number; }
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
libvpx
|
f00890eecdf8365ea125ac16769a83aa6b68792d
| 157,808,430,453,024,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
update libwebm to libwebm-1.0.0.27-352-g6ab9fcf
https://chromium.googlesource.com/webm/libwebm/+log/af81f26..6ab9fcf
Change-Id: I9d56e1fbaba9b96404b4fbabefddc1a85b79c25d
|
void CairoOutputDev::updateLineWidth(GfxState *state) {
LOG(printf ("line width: %f\n", state->getLineWidth()));
if (state->getLineWidth() == 0.0) {
/* find out how big pixels (device unit) are in the x and y directions
* choose the smaller of the two as our line width */
double x = 1.0, y = 1.0;
cairo_device_to_user_distance(cairo, &x, &y);
cairo_set_line_width (cairo, MIN(fabs(x),fabs(y)));
} else {
cairo_set_line_width (cairo, state->getLineWidth());
}
if (cairo_shape)
cairo_set_line_width (cairo_shape, cairo_get_line_width (cairo));
}
| 0 |
[] |
poppler
|
abf167af8b15e5f3b510275ce619e6fdb42edd40
| 201,179,922,522,010,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
Implement tiling/patterns in SplashOutputDev
Fixes bug 13518
|
term_job_running_check(term_T *term, int check_job_status)
{
/* Also consider the job finished when the channel is closed, to avoid a
* race condition when updating the title. */
if (term != NULL
&& term->tl_job != NULL
&& channel_is_open(term->tl_job->jv_channel))
{
if (check_job_status)
job_status(term->tl_job);
return (term->tl_job->jv_status == JOB_STARTED
|| term->tl_job->jv_channel->ch_keep_open);
}
return FALSE;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
vim
|
cd929f7ba8cc5b6d6dcf35c8b34124e969fed6b8
| 32,944,484,890,436,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
patch 8.1.0633: crash when out of memory while opening a terminal window
Problem: Crash when out of memory while opening a terminal window.
Solution: Handle out-of-memory more gracefully.
|
void SetAttrValue(const NameAttrList& value, AttrValue* out) {
*out->mutable_func() = value;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-369",
"CWE-674"
] |
tensorflow
|
e07e1c3d26492c06f078c7e5bf2d138043e199c1
| 196,226,186,515,969,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
Prevent memory overflow in ParseAttrValue from nested tensors.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 370108442
Change-Id: I84d64a5e8895a6aeffbf4749841b4c54d51b5889
|
void CServer::ProcessClientPacket(CNetChunk *pPacket)
{
int ClientID = pPacket->m_ClientID;
CUnpacker Unpacker;
Unpacker.Reset(pPacket->m_pData, pPacket->m_DataSize);
// unpack msgid and system flag
int Msg = Unpacker.GetInt();
int Sys = Msg&1;
Msg >>= 1;
if(Unpacker.Error())
return;
if(Sys)
{
// system message
if(Msg == NETMSG_INFO)
{
if((pPacket->m_Flags&NET_CHUNKFLAG_VITAL) != 0 && m_aClients[ClientID].m_State == CClient::STATE_AUTH)
{
const char *pVersion = Unpacker.GetString(CUnpacker::SANITIZE_CC);
if(str_comp(pVersion, GameServer()->NetVersion()) != 0)
{
// wrong version
char aReason[256];
str_format(aReason, sizeof(aReason), "Wrong version. Server is running '%s' and client '%s'", GameServer()->NetVersion(), pVersion);
m_NetServer.Drop(ClientID, aReason);
return;
}
const char *pPassword = Unpacker.GetString(CUnpacker::SANITIZE_CC);
if(Config()->m_Password[0] != 0 && str_comp(Config()->m_Password, pPassword) != 0)
{
// wrong password
m_NetServer.Drop(ClientID, "Wrong password");
return;
}
m_aClients[ClientID].m_Version = Unpacker.GetInt();
m_aClients[ClientID].m_State = CClient::STATE_CONNECTING;
SendMap(ClientID);
}
}
else if(Msg == NETMSG_REQUEST_MAP_DATA)
{
if((pPacket->m_Flags&NET_CHUNKFLAG_VITAL) != 0 && (m_aClients[ClientID].m_State == CClient::STATE_CONNECTING || m_aClients[ClientID].m_State == CClient::STATE_CONNECTING_AS_SPEC))
{
int ChunkSize = MAP_CHUNK_SIZE;
// send map chunks
for(int i = 0; i < m_MapChunksPerRequest && m_aClients[ClientID].m_MapChunk >= 0; ++i)
{
int Chunk = m_aClients[ClientID].m_MapChunk;
int Offset = Chunk * ChunkSize;
// check for last part
if(Offset+ChunkSize >= m_CurrentMapSize)
{
ChunkSize = m_CurrentMapSize-Offset;
m_aClients[ClientID].m_MapChunk = -1;
}
else
m_aClients[ClientID].m_MapChunk++;
CMsgPacker Msg(NETMSG_MAP_DATA, true);
Msg.AddRaw(&m_pCurrentMapData[Offset], ChunkSize);
SendMsg(&Msg, MSGFLAG_VITAL|MSGFLAG_FLUSH, ClientID);
if(Config()->m_Debug)
{
char aBuf[64];
str_format(aBuf, sizeof(aBuf), "sending chunk %d with size %d", Chunk, ChunkSize);
Console()->Print(IConsole::OUTPUT_LEVEL_DEBUG, "server", aBuf);
}
}
}
}
else if(Msg == NETMSG_READY)
{
if((pPacket->m_Flags&NET_CHUNKFLAG_VITAL) != 0 && (m_aClients[ClientID].m_State == CClient::STATE_CONNECTING || m_aClients[ClientID].m_State == CClient::STATE_CONNECTING_AS_SPEC))
{
char aAddrStr[NETADDR_MAXSTRSIZE];
net_addr_str(m_NetServer.ClientAddr(ClientID), aAddrStr, sizeof(aAddrStr), true);
char aBuf[256];
str_format(aBuf, sizeof(aBuf), "player is ready. ClientID=%d addr=%s", ClientID, aAddrStr);
Console()->Print(IConsole::OUTPUT_LEVEL_ADDINFO, "server", aBuf);
bool ConnectAsSpec = m_aClients[ClientID].m_State == CClient::STATE_CONNECTING_AS_SPEC;
m_aClients[ClientID].m_State = CClient::STATE_READY;
GameServer()->OnClientConnected(ClientID, ConnectAsSpec);
SendConnectionReady(ClientID);
}
}
else if(Msg == NETMSG_ENTERGAME)
{
if((pPacket->m_Flags&NET_CHUNKFLAG_VITAL) != 0 && m_aClients[ClientID].m_State == CClient::STATE_READY && GameServer()->IsClientReady(ClientID))
{
char aAddrStr[NETADDR_MAXSTRSIZE];
net_addr_str(m_NetServer.ClientAddr(ClientID), aAddrStr, sizeof(aAddrStr), true);
char aBuf[256];
str_format(aBuf, sizeof(aBuf), "player has entered the game. ClientID=%d addr=%s", ClientID, aAddrStr);
Console()->Print(IConsole::OUTPUT_LEVEL_STANDARD, "server", aBuf);
m_aClients[ClientID].m_State = CClient::STATE_INGAME;
SendServerInfo(ClientID);
GameServer()->OnClientEnter(ClientID);
}
}
else if(Msg == NETMSG_INPUT)
{
CClient::CInput *pInput;
int64 TagTime;
int64 Now = time_get();
m_aClients[ClientID].m_LastAckedSnapshot = Unpacker.GetInt();
int IntendedTick = Unpacker.GetInt();
int Size = Unpacker.GetInt();
// check for errors
if(Unpacker.Error() || Size/4 > MAX_INPUT_SIZE)
return;
if(m_aClients[ClientID].m_LastAckedSnapshot > 0)
m_aClients[ClientID].m_SnapRate = CClient::SNAPRATE_FULL;
// add message to report the input timing
// skip packets that are old
if(IntendedTick > m_aClients[ClientID].m_LastInputTick)
{
int TimeLeft = ((TickStartTime(IntendedTick)-Now)*1000) / time_freq();
CMsgPacker Msg(NETMSG_INPUTTIMING, true);
Msg.AddInt(IntendedTick);
Msg.AddInt(TimeLeft);
SendMsg(&Msg, 0, ClientID);
}
m_aClients[ClientID].m_LastInputTick = IntendedTick;
pInput = &m_aClients[ClientID].m_aInputs[m_aClients[ClientID].m_CurrentInput];
if(IntendedTick <= Tick())
IntendedTick = Tick()+1;
pInput->m_GameTick = IntendedTick;
for(int i = 0; i < Size/4; i++)
pInput->m_aData[i] = Unpacker.GetInt();
int PingCorrection = clamp(Unpacker.GetInt(), 0, 50);
if(m_aClients[ClientID].m_Snapshots.Get(m_aClients[ClientID].m_LastAckedSnapshot, &TagTime, 0, 0) >= 0)
{
m_aClients[ClientID].m_Latency = (int)(((Now-TagTime)*1000)/time_freq());
m_aClients[ClientID].m_Latency = max(0, m_aClients[ClientID].m_Latency - PingCorrection);
}
mem_copy(m_aClients[ClientID].m_LatestInput.m_aData, pInput->m_aData, MAX_INPUT_SIZE*sizeof(int));
m_aClients[ClientID].m_CurrentInput++;
m_aClients[ClientID].m_CurrentInput %= 200;
// call the mod with the fresh input data
if(m_aClients[ClientID].m_State == CClient::STATE_INGAME)
GameServer()->OnClientDirectInput(ClientID, m_aClients[ClientID].m_LatestInput.m_aData);
}
else if(Msg == NETMSG_RCON_CMD)
{
const char *pCmd = Unpacker.GetString();
if((pPacket->m_Flags&NET_CHUNKFLAG_VITAL) != 0 && Unpacker.Error() == 0 && m_aClients[ClientID].m_Authed)
{
char aBuf[256];
str_format(aBuf, sizeof(aBuf), "ClientID=%d rcon='%s'", ClientID, pCmd);
Console()->Print(IConsole::OUTPUT_LEVEL_ADDINFO, "server", aBuf);
m_RconClientID = ClientID;
m_RconAuthLevel = m_aClients[ClientID].m_Authed;
Console()->SetAccessLevel(m_aClients[ClientID].m_Authed == AUTHED_ADMIN ? IConsole::ACCESS_LEVEL_ADMIN : IConsole::ACCESS_LEVEL_MOD);
Console()->ExecuteLineFlag(pCmd, CFGFLAG_SERVER);
Console()->SetAccessLevel(IConsole::ACCESS_LEVEL_ADMIN);
m_RconClientID = IServer::RCON_CID_SERV;
m_RconAuthLevel = AUTHED_ADMIN;
}
}
else if(Msg == NETMSG_RCON_AUTH)
{
const char *pPw = Unpacker.GetString(CUnpacker::SANITIZE_CC);
if((pPacket->m_Flags&NET_CHUNKFLAG_VITAL) != 0 && Unpacker.Error() == 0)
{
if(Config()->m_SvRconPassword[0] == 0 && Config()->m_SvRconModPassword[0] == 0)
{
if(!m_aClients[ClientID].m_NoRconNote)
{
SendRconLine(ClientID, "No rcon password set on server. Set sv_rcon_password and/or sv_rcon_mod_password to enable the remote console.");
m_aClients[ClientID].m_NoRconNote = true;
}
}
else if(Config()->m_SvRconPassword[0] && str_comp(pPw, Config()->m_SvRconPassword) == 0)
{
CMsgPacker Msg(NETMSG_RCON_AUTH_ON, true);
SendMsg(&Msg, MSGFLAG_VITAL, ClientID);
m_aClients[ClientID].m_Authed = AUTHED_ADMIN;
m_aClients[ClientID].m_pRconCmdToSend = Console()->FirstCommandInfo(IConsole::ACCESS_LEVEL_ADMIN, CFGFLAG_SERVER);
if(m_aClients[ClientID].m_Version >= MIN_MAPLIST_CLIENTVERSION)
m_aClients[ClientID].m_pMapListEntryToSend = m_pFirstMapEntry;
SendRconLine(ClientID, "Admin authentication successful. Full remote console access granted.");
char aBuf[256];
str_format(aBuf, sizeof(aBuf), "ClientID=%d authed (admin)", ClientID);
Console()->Print(IConsole::OUTPUT_LEVEL_STANDARD, "server", aBuf);
}
else if(Config()->m_SvRconModPassword[0] && str_comp(pPw, Config()->m_SvRconModPassword) == 0)
{
CMsgPacker Msg(NETMSG_RCON_AUTH_ON, true);
SendMsg(&Msg, MSGFLAG_VITAL, ClientID);
m_aClients[ClientID].m_Authed = AUTHED_MOD;
m_aClients[ClientID].m_pRconCmdToSend = Console()->FirstCommandInfo(IConsole::ACCESS_LEVEL_MOD, CFGFLAG_SERVER);
SendRconLine(ClientID, "Moderator authentication successful. Limited remote console access granted.");
const IConsole::CCommandInfo *pInfo = Console()->GetCommandInfo("sv_map", CFGFLAG_SERVER, false);
if(pInfo && pInfo->GetAccessLevel() == IConsole::ACCESS_LEVEL_MOD && m_aClients[ClientID].m_Version >= MIN_MAPLIST_CLIENTVERSION)
m_aClients[ClientID].m_pMapListEntryToSend = m_pFirstMapEntry;
char aBuf[256];
str_format(aBuf, sizeof(aBuf), "ClientID=%d authed (moderator)", ClientID);
Console()->Print(IConsole::OUTPUT_LEVEL_STANDARD, "server", aBuf);
}
else if(Config()->m_SvRconMaxTries && m_ServerBan.IsBannable(m_NetServer.ClientAddr(ClientID)))
{
m_aClients[ClientID].m_AuthTries++;
char aBuf[128];
str_format(aBuf, sizeof(aBuf), "Wrong password %d/%d.", m_aClients[ClientID].m_AuthTries, Config()->m_SvRconMaxTries);
SendRconLine(ClientID, aBuf);
if(m_aClients[ClientID].m_AuthTries >= Config()->m_SvRconMaxTries)
{
if(!Config()->m_SvRconBantime)
m_NetServer.Drop(ClientID, "Too many remote console authentication tries");
else
m_ServerBan.BanAddr(m_NetServer.ClientAddr(ClientID), Config()->m_SvRconBantime*60, "Too many remote console authentication tries");
}
}
else
{
SendRconLine(ClientID, "Wrong password.");
}
}
}
else if(Msg == NETMSG_PING)
{
CMsgPacker Msg(NETMSG_PING_REPLY, true);
SendMsg(&Msg, 0, ClientID);
}
else
{
if(Config()->m_Debug)
{
char aHex[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
char aBuf[512];
for(int b = 0; b < pPacket->m_DataSize && b < 32; b++)
{
aBuf[b*3] = aHex[((const unsigned char *)pPacket->m_pData)[b]>>4];
aBuf[b*3+1] = aHex[((const unsigned char *)pPacket->m_pData)[b]&0xf];
aBuf[b*3+2] = ' ';
aBuf[b*3+3] = 0;
}
char aBufMsg[256];
str_format(aBufMsg, sizeof(aBufMsg), "strange message ClientID=%d msg=%d data_size=%d", ClientID, Msg, pPacket->m_DataSize);
Console()->Print(IConsole::OUTPUT_LEVEL_DEBUG, "server", aBufMsg);
Console()->Print(IConsole::OUTPUT_LEVEL_DEBUG, "server", aBuf);
}
}
}
else
{
// game message
if((pPacket->m_Flags&NET_CHUNKFLAG_VITAL) != 0 && m_aClients[ClientID].m_State >= CClient::STATE_READY)
GameServer()->OnMessage(Msg, &Unpacker, ClientID);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-703",
"CWE-400"
] |
teeworlds
|
c68402fa7e279d42886d5951d1ea8ac2facc1ea5
| 251,902,769,085,037,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 283 |
changed a check
|
static void __io_complete_rw(struct io_kiocb *req, long res, long res2,
unsigned int issue_flags)
{
int cflags = 0;
if (req->rw.kiocb.ki_flags & IOCB_WRITE)
kiocb_end_write(req);
if (res != req->result) {
if ((res == -EAGAIN || res == -EOPNOTSUPP) &&
io_rw_should_reissue(req)) {
req->flags |= REQ_F_REISSUE;
return;
}
req_set_fail(req);
}
if (req->flags & REQ_F_BUFFER_SELECTED)
cflags = io_put_rw_kbuf(req);
__io_req_complete(req, issue_flags, res, cflags);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
linux
|
89c2b3b74918200e46699338d7bcc19b1ea12110
| 6,434,978,445,296,537,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
io_uring: reexpand under-reexpanded iters
[ 74.211232] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in iov_iter_revert+0x809/0x900
[ 74.212778] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888025dc78b8 by task
syz-executor.0/828
[ 74.214756] CPU: 0 PID: 828 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted
5.14.0-rc3-next-20210730 #1
[ 74.216525] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 74.219033] Call Trace:
[ 74.219683] dump_stack_lvl+0x8b/0xb3
[ 74.220706] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x140
[ 74.224226] kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x11b
[ 74.226085] iov_iter_revert+0x809/0x900
[ 74.227960] io_write+0x57d/0xe40
[ 74.232647] io_issue_sqe+0x4da/0x6a80
[ 74.242578] __io_queue_sqe+0x1ac/0xe60
[ 74.245358] io_submit_sqes+0x3f6e/0x76a0
[ 74.248207] __do_sys_io_uring_enter+0x90c/0x1a20
[ 74.257167] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
[ 74.257984] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
old_size = iov_iter_count();
...
iov_iter_revert(old_size - iov_iter_count());
If iov_iter_revert() is done base on the initial size as above, and the
iter is truncated and not reexpanded in the middle, it miscalculates
borders causing problems. This trace is due to no one reexpanding after
generic_write_checks().
Now iters store how many bytes has been truncated, so reexpand them to
the initial state right before reverting.
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Palash Oswal <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sudip Mukherjee <[email protected]>
Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Pavel Begunkov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
static int nfs4_check_lease(struct nfs_client *clp)
{
struct rpc_cred *cred;
int status = -NFS4ERR_EXPIRED;
/* Is the client already known to have an expired lease? */
if (test_bit(NFS4CLNT_LEASE_EXPIRED, &clp->cl_state))
return 0;
cred = nfs4_get_renew_cred(clp);
if (cred == NULL) {
cred = nfs4_get_setclientid_cred(clp);
if (cred == NULL)
goto out;
}
status = nfs4_proc_renew(clp, cred);
put_rpccred(cred);
out:
nfs4_recovery_handle_error(clp, status);
return status;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
dc0b027dfadfcb8a5504f7d8052754bf8d501ab9
| 245,623,559,355,766,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
|
int zmq::stream_engine_t::write_subscription_msg (msg_t *msg_)
{
msg_t subscription;
// Inject the subscription message, so that also
// ZMQ 2.x peers receive published messages.
int rc = subscription.init_size (1);
errno_assert (rc == 0);
*(unsigned char*) subscription.data () = 1;
rc = session->push_msg (&subscription);
if (rc == -1)
return -1;
process_msg = &stream_engine_t::push_msg_to_session;
return push_msg_to_session (msg_);
}
| 0 |
[] |
libzmq
|
77f14aad95cdf0d2a244ae9b4a025e5ba0adf01a
| 290,677,005,048,957,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
Problem: stream_engine.cpp security can be downgraded
Solution: accept only the mechanism defined by the socket options.
I've not tested this yet, so it's a speculative fix.
|
bgp_put_cap_add_path(struct bgp_proto *p, byte *buf)
{
*buf++ = 69; /* Capability 69: Support for ADD-PATH */
*buf++ = 4; /* Capability data length */
*buf++ = 0; /* Appropriate AF */
*buf++ = BGP_AF;
*buf++ = 1; /* SAFI 1 */
*buf++ = p->cf->add_path;
return buf;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
bird
|
1657c41c96b3c07d9265b07dd4912033ead4124b
| 122,709,515,670,293,510,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
BGP: Fix bugs in handling of shutdown messages
There is an improper check for valid message size, which may lead to
stack overflow and buffer leaks to log when a large message is received.
Thanks to Daniel McCarney for bugreport and analysis.
|
xmlNsErr(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlParserErrors error,
const char *msg,
const xmlChar * info1, const xmlChar * info2,
const xmlChar * info3)
{
if ((ctxt != NULL) && (ctxt->disableSAX != 0) &&
(ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF))
return;
if (ctxt != NULL)
ctxt->errNo = error;
__xmlRaiseError(NULL, NULL, NULL, ctxt, NULL, XML_FROM_NAMESPACE, error,
XML_ERR_ERROR, NULL, 0, (const char *) info1,
(const char *) info2, (const char *) info3, 0, 0, msg,
info1, info2, info3);
if (ctxt != NULL)
ctxt->nsWellFormed = 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
libxml2
|
77404b8b69bc122d12231807abf1a837d121b551
| 286,242,552,186,002,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 |
Make sure the parser returns when getting a Stop order
patch backported from chromiun bug fixes, assuming author is Chris
|
static void clamp_pollexp_and_set_MAXSTRAT(void)
{
if (G.poll_exp < MINPOLL)
G.poll_exp = MINPOLL;
if (G.poll_exp > BIGPOLL)
G.poll_exp = BIGPOLL;
G.polladj_count = 0;
G.stratum = MAXSTRAT;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
busybox
|
150dc7a2b483b8338a3e185c478b4b23ee884e71
| 281,588,508,830,511,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
ntpd: respond only to client and symmetric active packets
The busybox NTP implementation doesn't check the NTP mode of packets
received on the server port and responds to any packet with the right
size. This includes responses from another NTP server. An attacker can
send a packet with a spoofed source address in order to create an
infinite loop of responses between two busybox NTP servers. Adding
more packets to the loop increases the traffic between the servers
until one of them has a fully loaded CPU and/or network.
Signed-off-by: Miroslav Lichvar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>
|
napi_status napi_get_prototype(napi_env env,
napi_value object,
napi_value* result) {
NAPI_PREAMBLE(env);
CHECK_ARG(env, result);
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = env->context();
v8::Local<v8::Object> obj;
CHECK_TO_OBJECT(env, context, obj, object);
v8::Local<v8::Value> val = obj->GetPrototype();
*result = v8impl::JsValueFromV8LocalValue(val);
return GET_RETURN_STATUS(env);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-191"
] |
node
|
656260b4b65fec3b10f6da3fdc9f11fb941aafb5
| 208,080,718,081,198,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
napi: fix memory corruption vulnerability
Fixes: https://hackerone.com/reports/784186
CVE-ID: CVE-2020-8174
PR-URL: https://github.com/nodejs-private/node-private/pull/195
Reviewed-By: Anna Henningsen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-By: Gabriel Schulhof <[email protected]>
Reviewed-By: Michael Dawson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-By: Colin Ihrig <[email protected]>
Reviewed-By: Rich Trott <[email protected]>
|
Render_Stroke( int num_indices,
int first_index )
{
int start_x, start_y, step_x, step_y, x, y;
int i;
FT_Size size;
FT_Stroker stroker = NULL;
error = FTDemo_Get_Size( handle, &size );
if ( error )
{
/* probably a non-existent bitmap font size */
return error;
}
INIT_SIZE( size, start_x, start_y, step_x, step_y, x, y );
i = first_index;
error = FT_Stroker_New( handle->library, &stroker );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
FT_Stroker_Set( stroker, 64,
FT_STROKER_LINECAP_ROUND,
FT_STROKER_LINEJOIN_ROUND,
0 );
while ( i < num_indices )
{
int gindex;
FT_GlyphSlot slot;
if ( handle->encoding == FT_ENCODING_NONE )
gindex = i;
else
gindex = FTDemo_Get_Index( handle, i );
error = FT_Load_Glyph( size->face, gindex,
handle->load_flags | FT_LOAD_NO_BITMAP );
slot = size->face->glyph;
if ( !error && slot->format == FT_GLYPH_FORMAT_OUTLINE )
{
FT_Glyph glyph;
error = FT_Get_Glyph( slot, &glyph );
if ( error )
goto Next;
error = FT_Glyph_Stroke( &glyph, stroker, 1 );
if ( error )
{
FT_Done_Glyph( glyph );
goto Next;
}
error = FTDemo_Draw_Glyph( handle, display, glyph, &x, &y );
FT_Done_Glyph( glyph );
if ( error )
status.Fail++;
else if ( X_TOO_LONG( x, size, display ) )
{
x = start_x;
y += step_y;
if ( Y_TOO_LONG( y, size, display ) )
break;
}
}
else
{
Next:
status.Fail++;
}
i++;
}
Exit:
if ( stroker )
FT_Stroker_Done( stroker );
return error;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-120"
] |
freetype2-demos
|
b995299b73ba4cd259f221f500d4e63095508bec
| 170,237,171,338,737,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 90 |
Fix Savannah bug #30054.
* src/ftdiff.c, src/ftgrid.c, src/ftmulti.c, src/ftstring.c,
src/ftview.c: Use precision for `%s' where appropriate to avoid
buffer overflows.
|
void TDStretch::overlapStereo(short *poutput, const short *input) const
{
int i;
short temp;
int cnt2;
for (i = 0; i < overlapLength ; i ++)
{
temp = (short)(overlapLength - i);
cnt2 = 2 * i;
poutput[cnt2] = (input[cnt2] * i + pMidBuffer[cnt2] * temp ) / overlapLength;
poutput[cnt2 + 1] = (input[cnt2 + 1] * i + pMidBuffer[cnt2 + 1] * temp ) / overlapLength;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-617"
] |
soundtouch
|
107f2c5d201a4dfea1b7f15c5957ff2ac9e5f260
| 251,328,148,460,662,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
Replaced illegal-number-of-channel assertions with run-time exception
|
static int collect_expired_timers(struct timer_base *base,
struct hlist_head *heads)
{
unsigned long now = READ_ONCE(jiffies);
/*
* NOHZ optimization. After a long idle sleep we need to forward the
* base to current jiffies. Avoid a loop by searching the bitfield for
* the next expiring timer.
*/
if ((long)(now - base->clk) > 2) {
unsigned long next = __next_timer_interrupt(base);
/*
* If the next timer is ahead of time forward to current
* jiffies, otherwise forward to the next expiry time:
*/
if (time_after(next, now)) {
/*
* The call site will increment base->clk and then
* terminate the expiry loop immediately.
*/
base->clk = now;
return 0;
}
base->clk = next;
}
return __collect_expired_timers(base, heads);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200",
"CWE-330"
] |
linux
|
f227e3ec3b5cad859ad15666874405e8c1bbc1d4
| 152,740,800,052,398,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 |
random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity
This modifies the first 32 bits out of the 128 bits of a random CPU's
net_rand_state on interrupt or CPU activity to complicate remote
observations that could lead to guessing the network RNG's internal
state.
Note that depending on some network devices' interrupt rate moderation
or binding, this re-seeding might happen on every packet or even almost
never.
In addition, with NOHZ some CPUs might not even get timer interrupts,
leaving their local state rarely updated, while they are running
networked processes making use of the random state. For this reason, we
also perform this update in update_process_times() in order to at least
update the state when there is user or system activity, since it's the
only case we care about.
Reported-by: Amit Klein <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
isoent_setup_file_location(struct iso9660 *iso9660, int location)
{
struct isoent *isoent;
struct isoent *np;
struct isofile *file;
size_t size;
int block;
int depth;
int joliet;
int symlocation;
int total_block;
iso9660->total_file_block = 0;
if ((isoent = iso9660->el_torito.catalog) != NULL) {
isoent->file->content.location = location;
block = (int)((archive_entry_size(isoent->file->entry) +
LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE -1) >> LOGICAL_BLOCK_BITS);
location += block;
iso9660->total_file_block += block;
}
if ((isoent = iso9660->el_torito.boot) != NULL) {
isoent->file->content.location = location;
size = fd_boot_image_size(iso9660->el_torito.media_type);
if (size == 0)
size = (size_t)archive_entry_size(isoent->file->entry);
block = ((int)size + LOGICAL_BLOCK_SIZE -1)
>> LOGICAL_BLOCK_BITS;
location += block;
iso9660->total_file_block += block;
isoent->file->content.blocks = block;
}
depth = 0;
symlocation = -16;
if (!iso9660->opt.rr && iso9660->opt.joliet) {
joliet = 1;
np = iso9660->joliet.rootent;
} else {
joliet = 0;
np = iso9660->primary.rootent;
}
do {
_isoent_file_location(iso9660, np, &symlocation);
if (np->subdirs.first != NULL &&
(joliet ||
((iso9660->opt.rr == OPT_RR_DISABLED &&
depth + 2 < iso9660->primary.max_depth) ||
(iso9660->opt.rr &&
depth + 1 < iso9660->primary.max_depth)))) {
/* Enter to sub directories. */
np = np->subdirs.first;
depth++;
continue;
}
while (np != np->parent) {
if (np->drnext == NULL) {
/* Return to the parent directory. */
np = np->parent;
depth--;
} else {
np = np->drnext;
break;
}
}
} while (np != np->parent);
total_block = 0;
for (file = iso9660->data_file_list.first;
file != NULL; file = file->datanext) {
if (!file->write_content)
continue;
file->cur_content = &(file->content);
do {
file->cur_content->location = location;
location += file->cur_content->blocks;
total_block += file->cur_content->blocks;
/* Next fragument */
file->cur_content = file->cur_content->next;
} while (file->cur_content != NULL);
}
iso9660->total_file_block += total_block;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
libarchive
|
3014e19820ea53c15c90f9d447ca3e668a0b76c6
| 190,032,120,284,037,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 85 |
Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
|
Delete(asdl_seq * targets, int lineno, int col_offset, int end_lineno, int
end_col_offset, PyArena *arena)
{
stmt_ty p;
p = (stmt_ty)PyArena_Malloc(arena, sizeof(*p));
if (!p)
return NULL;
p->kind = Delete_kind;
p->v.Delete.targets = targets;
p->lineno = lineno;
p->col_offset = col_offset;
p->end_lineno = end_lineno;
p->end_col_offset = end_col_offset;
return p;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
cpython
|
dcfcd146f8e6fc5c2fc16a4c192a0c5f5ca8c53c
| 311,728,946,706,392,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
bpo-35766: Merge typed_ast back into CPython (GH-11645)
|
absl::optional<uint64_t> toInteger(const Http::RequestHeaderMap&) const override {
return absl::nullopt;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-22"
] |
envoy
|
5333b928d8bcffa26ab19bf018369a835f697585
| 34,860,484,933,759,497,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
Implement handling of escaped slash characters in URL path
Fixes: CVE-2021-29492
Signed-off-by: Yan Avlasov <[email protected]>
|
static inline Quantum GetPixelCyan(const Image *restrict image,
const Quantum *restrict pixel)
{
return(pixel[image->channel_map[CyanPixelChannel].offset]);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
ImageMagick
|
450bd716ed3b9186dd10f9e60f630a3d9eeea2a4
| 70,546,412,762,520,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | |
xmlSchemaCheckRCaseNSRecurseCheckCardinality(xmlSchemaParserCtxtPtr ctxt,
xmlSchemaParticlePtr r,
xmlSchemaParticlePtr b)
{
xmlSchemaParticlePtr part;
/* TODO: Error codes (rcase-NSRecurseCheckCardinality). */
if ((r->children == NULL) || (r->children->children == NULL))
return (-1);
/*
* SPEC "For a group particle to be a `valid restriction` of a
* wildcard particle..."
*
* SPEC (1) "Every member of the {particles} of the group is a `valid
* restriction` of the wildcard as defined by
* Particle Valid (Restriction) ($3.9.6)."
*/
part = (xmlSchemaParticlePtr) r->children->children;
do {
if (xmlSchemaCheckCOSParticleRestrict(ctxt, part, b))
return (1);
part = (xmlSchemaParticlePtr) part->next;
} while (part != NULL);
/*
* SPEC (2) "The effective total range of the group [...] is a
* valid restriction of B's occurrence range as defined by
* Occurrence Range OK ($3.9.6)."
*/
if (xmlSchemaCheckParticleRangeOK(
xmlSchemaGetParticleTotalRangeMin(r),
xmlSchemaGetParticleTotalRangeMax(r),
b->minOccurs, b->maxOccurs) != 0)
return (1);
return (0);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-134"
] |
libxml2
|
4472c3a5a5b516aaf59b89be602fbce52756c3e9
| 133,698,552,973,933,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 |
Fix some format string warnings with possible format string vulnerability
For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=761029
Decorate every method in libxml2 with the appropriate
LIBXML_ATTR_FORMAT(fmt,args) macro and add some cleanups
following the reports.
|
int CLASS foveon_fixed (void *ptr, int size, const char *name)
{
void *dp;
unsigned dim[3];
if (!name) return 0;
dp = foveon_camf_matrix (dim, name);
if (!dp) return 0;
memcpy (ptr, dp, size*4);
free (dp);
return 1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
LibRaw
|
11909cc59e712e09b508dda729b99aeaac2b29ad
| 277,827,628,208,523,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
cumulated data checks patch
|
static MagickBooleanType WriteMSLImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*msl_image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
msl_image=CloneImage(image,0,0,MagickTrue,exception);
status=ProcessMSLScript(image_info,&msl_image,exception);
msl_image=DestroyImageList(msl_image);
return(status);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-772"
] |
ImageMagick
|
c9c4ef4e7ca83d8a00effd16723f37946e89fbad
| 68,756,492,873,778,490,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
Fixed leaking of the image when writing an MSL image (#1360).
|
xmlDocGetRootElement(const xmlDoc *doc) {
xmlNodePtr ret;
if (doc == NULL) return(NULL);
ret = doc->children;
while (ret != NULL) {
if (ret->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE)
return(ret);
ret = ret->next;
}
return(ret);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
libxml2
|
bdd66182ef53fe1f7209ab6535fda56366bd7ac9
| 172,197,858,247,498,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
Avoid building recursive entities
For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=762100
When we detect a recusive entity we should really not
build the associated data, moreover if someone bypass
libxml2 fatal errors and still tries to serialize a broken
entity make sure we don't risk to get ito a recursion
* parser.c: xmlParserEntityCheck() don't build if entity loop
were found and remove the associated text content
* tree.c: xmlStringGetNodeList() avoid a potential recursion
|
GF_Err stbl_AddDTS(GF_SampleTableBox *stbl, u64 DTS, u32 *sampleNumber, u32 LastAUDefDuration, u32 nb_pack)
{
u32 i, j, sampNum;
u64 *DTSs, curDTS;
Bool inserted;
GF_SttsEntry *ent;
GF_TimeToSampleBox *stts = stbl->TimeToSample;
//reset the reading cache when adding a sample
stts->r_FirstSampleInEntry = 0;
*sampleNumber = 0;
CHECK_PACK(GF_BAD_PARAM)
//if we don't have an entry, that's the first one...
if (!stts->nb_entries) {
//assert the first DTS is 0. If not, that will break the whole file
if (DTS) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
stts->alloc_size = 1;
stts->nb_entries = 1;
stts->entries = gf_malloc(sizeof(GF_SttsEntry));
if (!stts->entries) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
stts->entries[0].sampleCount = nb_pack;
stts->entries[0].sampleDelta = (nb_pack>1) ? 0 : LastAUDefDuration;
(*sampleNumber) = 1;
stts->w_currentSampleNum = nb_pack;
return GF_OK;
}
//check the last DTS - we allow 0-duration samples (same DTS)
if (DTS >= stts->w_LastDTS) {
u32 nb_extra = 0;
ent = &stts->entries[stts->nb_entries-1];
if (!ent->sampleDelta && (ent->sampleCount>1)) {
ent->sampleDelta = (u32) ( DTS / ent->sampleCount);
stts->w_LastDTS = DTS - ent->sampleDelta;
}
//OK, we're adding at the end
if ((DTS == stts->w_LastDTS + ent->sampleDelta)
//for raw audio, consider (dts==last_dts) and (dts==last_dts+2*delta) as sample append to cope with
//timescale vs samplerate precision
|| ((nb_pack>1) && ((DTS == stts->w_LastDTS) || (DTS == stts->w_LastDTS + 2*ent->sampleDelta) ))
) {
(*sampleNumber) = stts->w_currentSampleNum + 1;
ent->sampleCount += nb_pack;
stts->w_currentSampleNum += nb_pack;
stts->w_LastDTS = DTS + ent->sampleDelta * (nb_pack-1);
return GF_OK;
}
//we need to split the entry
if (ent->sampleCount == 1) {
//FIXME - we need more tests with timed text
#if 0
if (stts->w_LastDTS)
ent->sampleDelta += (u32) (DTS - stts->w_LastDTS);
else
ent->sampleDelta = (u32) DTS;
#else
//use this one and adjust...
ent->sampleDelta = (u32) (DTS - stts->w_LastDTS);
#endif
ent->sampleCount ++;
//little opt, merge last entry with previous one if same delta
if ((stts->nb_entries>=2) && (ent->sampleDelta== stts->entries[stts->nb_entries-2].sampleDelta)) {
stts->entries[stts->nb_entries-2].sampleCount += ent->sampleCount;
stts->nb_entries--;
}
stts->w_currentSampleNum ++;
stts->w_LastDTS = DTS;
(*sampleNumber) = stts->w_currentSampleNum;
return GF_OK;
}
//we definitely need to split the entry ;)
ent->sampleCount --;
if (nb_pack>1)
nb_extra = 1;
if (stts->alloc_size <= stts->nb_entries + nb_extra) {
ALLOC_INC(stts->alloc_size);
stts->entries = gf_realloc(stts->entries, sizeof(GF_SttsEntry)*stts->alloc_size);
if (!stts->entries) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
memset(&stts->entries[stts->nb_entries], 0, sizeof(GF_SttsEntry)*(stts->alloc_size-stts->nb_entries) );
}
if (nb_extra)
nb_extra = stts->entries[stts->nb_entries-1].sampleDelta;
ent = &stts->entries[stts->nb_entries];
stts->nb_entries++;
if (nb_pack==1) {
ent->sampleCount = 2;
ent->sampleDelta = (u32) (DTS - stts->w_LastDTS);
stts->w_LastDTS = DTS;
(*sampleNumber) = stts->w_currentSampleNum+1;
stts->w_currentSampleNum += 1;
return GF_OK;
}
ent->sampleCount = 1;
ent->sampleDelta = (u32) (DTS - stts->w_LastDTS);
ent = &stts->entries[stts->nb_entries];
stts->nb_entries++;
ent->sampleCount = nb_pack;
ent->sampleDelta = nb_extra;
stts->w_LastDTS = DTS;
(*sampleNumber) = stts->w_currentSampleNum + 1;
stts->w_currentSampleNum += nb_pack;
return GF_OK;
}
//unpack the DTSs and locate new sample...
DTSs = (u64*)gf_malloc(sizeof(u64) * (stbl->SampleSize->sampleCount+2) );
if (!DTSs) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
curDTS = 0;
sampNum = 0;
ent = NULL;
inserted = 0;
for (i=0; i<stts->nb_entries; i++) {
ent = & stts->entries[i];
for (j = 0; j<ent->sampleCount; j++) {
if (!inserted && (curDTS > DTS)) {
DTSs[sampNum] = DTS;
sampNum++;
*sampleNumber = sampNum;
inserted = 1;
}
DTSs[sampNum] = curDTS;
curDTS += ent->sampleDelta;
sampNum ++;
}
}
if (!inserted) {
gf_free(DTSs);
return GF_BAD_PARAM;
}
/*we will at most insert 3 new entries*/
if (stts->nb_entries+3 >= stts->alloc_size) {
stts->alloc_size += 3;
stts->entries = gf_realloc(stts->entries, sizeof(GF_SttsEntry)*stts->alloc_size);
if (!stts->entries) return GF_OUT_OF_MEM;
memset(&stts->entries[stts->nb_entries], 0, sizeof(GF_SttsEntry)*(stts->alloc_size - stts->nb_entries) );
}
/*repack the DTSs*/
j=0;
stts->nb_entries = 1;
stts->entries[0].sampleCount = 1;
stts->entries[0].sampleDelta = (u32) DTSs[1] /* - (DTS[0] which is 0)*/;
for (i=1; i<stbl->SampleSize->sampleCount+1; i++) {
if (i == stbl->SampleSize->sampleCount) {
//and by default, our last sample has the same delta as the prev
stts->entries[j].sampleCount++;
} else if (stts->entries[j].sampleDelta == (u32) ( DTSs[i+1] - DTSs[i]) ) {
stts->entries[j].sampleCount ++;
} else {
stts->nb_entries ++;
j++;
stts->entries[j].sampleCount = 1;
stts->entries[j].sampleDelta = (u32) (DTSs[i+1] - DTSs[i]);
}
}
gf_free(DTSs);
//reset the cache to the end
stts->w_currentSampleNum = stbl->SampleSize->sampleCount + 1;
return GF_OK;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-120",
"CWE-787"
] |
gpac
|
77ed81c069e10b3861d88f72e1c6be1277ee7eae
| 12,676,770,305,267,652,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 176 |
fixed #1774 (fuzz)
|
static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, struct msg_msg *msg,
struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
{
return smk_curacc_msq(isp, MAY_READWRITE);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
a3727a8bac0a9e77c70820655fd8715523ba3db7
| 101,320,284,735,909,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
selinux,smack: fix subjective/objective credential use mixups
Jann Horn reported a problem with commit eb1231f73c4d ("selinux:
clarify task subjective and objective credentials") where some LSM
hooks were attempting to access the subjective credentials of a task
other than the current task. Generally speaking, it is not safe to
access another task's subjective credentials and doing so can cause
a number of problems.
Further, while looking into the problem, I realized that Smack was
suffering from a similar problem brought about by a similar commit
1fb057dcde11 ("smack: differentiate between subjective and objective
task credentials").
This patch addresses this problem by restoring the use of the task's
objective credentials in those cases where the task is other than the
current executing task. Not only does this resolve the problem
reported by Jann, it is arguably the correct thing to do in these
cases.
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: eb1231f73c4d ("selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials")
Fixes: 1fb057dcde11 ("smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
|
static void gf_sg_dom_event_bubble(GF_Node *node, GF_DOM_Event *event, GF_List *use_stack, u32 cur_par_idx)
{
GF_Node *parent;
if (!node || node->sgprivate->scenegraph->abort_bubbling) return;
/*get the node's parent*/
parent = gf_node_get_parent(node, 0);
if (!parent) {
/*top of the graph, use Document*/
if (node->sgprivate->scenegraph->RootNode==node)
gf_sg_fire_dom_event(node->sgprivate->scenegraph->dom_evt, event, node->sgprivate->scenegraph, NULL);
return;
}
if (cur_par_idx) {
GF_Node *used_node = (GF_Node *)gf_list_get(use_stack, cur_par_idx-1);
/*if the node is a used one, switch to the <use> subtree*/
if (used_node==node) {
parent = (GF_Node *)gf_list_get(use_stack, cur_par_idx);
if (cur_par_idx>1) cur_par_idx-=2;
else cur_par_idx = 0;
/*if no events attached,bubble by default*/
if (parent->sgprivate->interact) {
Bool can_bubble = gf_sg_fire_dom_event(parent->sgprivate->interact->dom_evt, event, node->sgprivate->scenegraph, parent);
if (!can_bubble) {
return;
}
}
gf_sg_dom_event_bubble(parent, event, use_stack, cur_par_idx);
return;
}
}
/*if no events attached,bubble by default*/
if (parent->sgprivate->interact) {
Bool can_bubble;
can_bubble = gf_sg_fire_dom_event(parent->sgprivate->interact->dom_evt, event, node->sgprivate->scenegraph, parent);
if(!can_bubble) return;
}
gf_sg_dom_event_bubble(parent, event, use_stack, cur_par_idx);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
gpac
|
9723dd0955894f2cb7be13b94cf7a47f2754b893
| 183,530,452,590,577,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 42 |
fixed #2109
|
void sas_porte_link_reset_err(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct asd_sas_event *ev = to_asd_sas_event(work);
struct asd_sas_phy *phy = ev->phy;
sas_deform_port(phy, 1);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-284"
] |
linux
|
0558f33c06bb910e2879e355192227a8e8f0219d
| 176,852,295,991,652,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
scsi: libsas: direct call probe and destruct
In commit 87c8331fcf72 ("[SCSI] libsas: prevent domain rediscovery
competing with ata error handling") introduced disco mutex to prevent
rediscovery competing with ata error handling and put the whole
revalidation in the mutex. But the rphy add/remove needs to wait for the
error handling which also grabs the disco mutex. This may leads to dead
lock.So the probe and destruct event were introduce to do the rphy
add/remove asynchronously and out of the lock.
The asynchronously processed workers makes the whole discovery process
not atomic, the other events may interrupt the process. For example,
if a loss of signal event inserted before the probe event, the
sas_deform_port() is called and the port will be deleted.
And sas_port_delete() may run before the destruct event, but the
port-x:x is the top parent of end device or expander. This leads to
a kernel WARNING such as:
[ 82.042979] sysfs group 'power' not found for kobject 'phy-1:0:22'
[ 82.042983] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 82.042986] WARNING: CPU: 54 PID: 1714 at fs/sysfs/group.c:237
sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043059] Call trace:
[ 82.043082] [<ffff0000082e7624>] sysfs_remove_group+0x94/0xa0
[ 82.043085] [<ffff00000864e320>] dpm_sysfs_remove+0x60/0x70
[ 82.043086] [<ffff00000863ee10>] device_del+0x138/0x308
[ 82.043089] [<ffff00000869a2d0>] sas_phy_delete+0x38/0x60
[ 82.043091] [<ffff00000869a86c>] do_sas_phy_delete+0x6c/0x80
[ 82.043093] [<ffff00000863dc20>] device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
[ 82.043095] [<ffff000008696f80>] sas_remove_children+0x40/0x50
[ 82.043100] [<ffff00000869d1bc>] sas_destruct_devices+0x64/0xa0
[ 82.043102] [<ffff0000080e93bc>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x4b0
[ 82.043104] [<ffff0000080e96c0>] worker_thread+0x50/0x490
[ 82.043105] [<ffff0000080f0364>] kthread+0xfc/0x128
[ 82.043107] [<ffff0000080836c0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x50
Make probe and destruct a direct call in the disco and revalidate function,
but put them outside the lock. The whole discovery or revalidate won't
be interrupted by other events. And the DISCE_PROBE and DISCE_DESTRUCT
event are deleted as a result of the direct call.
Introduce a new list to destruct the sas_port and put the port delete after
the destruct. This makes sure the right order of destroying the sysfs
kobject and fix the warning above.
In sas_ex_revalidate_domain() have a loop to find all broadcasted
device, and sometimes we have a chance to find the same expander twice.
Because the sas_port will be deleted at the end of the whole revalidate
process, sas_port with the same name cannot be added before this.
Otherwise the sysfs will complain of creating duplicate filename. Since
the LLDD will send broadcast for every device change, we can only
process one expander's revalidation.
[mkp: kbuild test robot warning]
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
CC: John Garry <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
CC: Ewan Milne <[email protected]>
CC: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
CC: Tomas Henzl <[email protected]>
CC: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]>
|
void rose_stop_idletimer(struct sock *sk)
{
del_timer(&rose_sk(sk)->idletimer);
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
9cc02ede696272c5271a401e4f27c262359bc2f6
| 111,486,110,913,219,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
net: rose: fix UAF bugs caused by timer handler
There are UAF bugs in rose_heartbeat_expiry(), rose_timer_expiry()
and rose_idletimer_expiry(). The root cause is that del_timer()
could not stop the timer handler that is running and the refcount
of sock is not managed properly.
One of the UAF bugs is shown below:
(thread 1) | (thread 2)
| rose_bind
| rose_connect
| rose_start_heartbeat
rose_release | (wait a time)
case ROSE_STATE_0 |
rose_destroy_socket | rose_heartbeat_expiry
rose_stop_heartbeat |
sock_put(sk) | ...
sock_put(sk) // FREE |
| bh_lock_sock(sk) // USE
The sock is deallocated by sock_put() in rose_release() and
then used by bh_lock_sock() in rose_heartbeat_expiry().
Although rose_destroy_socket() calls rose_stop_heartbeat(),
it could not stop the timer that is running.
The KASAN report triggered by POC is shown below:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0x5a/0x110
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800ae59098 by task swapper/3/0
...
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0xbf/0xee
print_address_description+0x7b/0x440
print_report+0x101/0x230
? irq_work_single+0xbb/0x140
? _raw_spin_lock+0x5a/0x110
kasan_report+0xed/0x120
? _raw_spin_lock+0x5a/0x110
kasan_check_range+0x2bd/0x2e0
_raw_spin_lock+0x5a/0x110
rose_heartbeat_expiry+0x39/0x370
? rose_start_heartbeat+0xb0/0xb0
call_timer_fn+0x2d/0x1c0
? rose_start_heartbeat+0xb0/0xb0
expire_timers+0x1f3/0x320
__run_timers+0x3ff/0x4d0
run_timer_softirq+0x41/0x80
__do_softirq+0x233/0x544
irq_exit_rcu+0x41/0xa0
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x8c/0xb0
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1b/0x20
RIP: 0010:default_idle+0xb/0x10
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000012fea0 EFLAGS: 00000202
RAX: 000000000000bcae RBX: ffff888006660f00 RCX: 000000000000bcae
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff843a11c0 RDI: ffffffff843a1180
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: dffffc0000000000 R09: ffffed100da36d46
R10: dfffe9100da36d47 R11: ffffffff83cf0950 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 1ffff11000ccc1e0 R14: ffffffff8542af28 R15: dffffc0000000000
...
Allocated by task 146:
__kasan_kmalloc+0xc4/0xf0
sk_prot_alloc+0xdd/0x1a0
sk_alloc+0x2d/0x4e0
rose_create+0x7b/0x330
__sock_create+0x2dd/0x640
__sys_socket+0xc7/0x270
__x64_sys_socket+0x71/0x80
do_syscall_64+0x43/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
Freed by task 152:
kasan_set_track+0x4c/0x70
kasan_set_free_info+0x1f/0x40
____kasan_slab_free+0x124/0x190
kfree+0xd3/0x270
__sk_destruct+0x314/0x460
rose_release+0x2fa/0x3b0
sock_close+0xcb/0x230
__fput+0x2d9/0x650
task_work_run+0xd6/0x160
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xc7/0xd0
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x4e/0x80
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x20/0x40
do_syscall_64+0x4f/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
This patch adds refcount of sock when we use functions
such as rose_start_heartbeat() and so on to start timer,
and decreases the refcount of sock when timer is finished
or deleted by functions such as rose_stop_heartbeat()
and so on. As a result, the UAF bugs could be mitigated.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Duoming Zhou <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
|
void md_rdev_clear(struct md_rdev *rdev)
{
if (rdev->sb_page) {
put_page(rdev->sb_page);
rdev->sb_loaded = 0;
rdev->sb_page = NULL;
rdev->sb_start = 0;
rdev->sectors = 0;
}
if (rdev->bb_page) {
put_page(rdev->bb_page);
rdev->bb_page = NULL;
}
kfree(rdev->badblocks.page);
rdev->badblocks.page = NULL;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux
|
b6878d9e03043695dbf3fa1caa6dfc09db225b16
| 130,547,192,007,932,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
|
void textview_set_position(TextView *textview, gint pos)
{
GtkTextView *text = GTK_TEXT_VIEW(textview->text);
gtkut_text_view_set_position(text, pos);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-601"
] |
claws
|
ac286a71ed78429e16c612161251b9ea90ccd431
| 251,486,796,625,401,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
harden link checker before accepting click
|
Client::handleRequestBodyProducerAborted()
{
if (requestSender != NULL)
debugs(9,3, HERE << "fyi: request body aborted while we were sending");
fwd->dontRetry(true); // the problem is not with the server
stopConsumingFrom(requestBodySource); // requestSender, if any, will notice
// kids extend this
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
squid
|
6c9c44d0e9cf7b72bb233360c5308aa063af3d69
| 286,897,834,303,967,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
Handle more partial responses (#791)
|
ZEND_API int ZEND_FASTCALL zend_binary_zval_strcmp(zval *s1, zval *s2) /* {{{ */
{
return zend_binary_strcmp(Z_STRVAL_P(s1), Z_STRLEN_P(s1), Z_STRVAL_P(s2), Z_STRLEN_P(s2));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
php-src
|
f1ce8d5f5839cb2069ea37ff424fb96b8cd6932d
| 179,897,608,411,664,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Fix #73122: Integer Overflow when concatenating strings
We must avoid integer overflows in memory allocations, so we introduce
an additional check in the VM, and bail out in the rare case of an
overflow. Since the recent fix for bug #74960 still doesn't catch all
possible overflows, we fix that right away.
|
div_sf(VALUE s, VALUE *f)
{
VALUE n = sec_to_ns(s);
if (f)
*f = f_mod(n, INT2FIX(1));
return f_floor(n);
}
| 0 |
[] |
date
|
3959accef8da5c128f8a8e2fd54e932a4fb253b0
| 216,589,023,179,287,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
Add length limit option for methods that parses date strings
`Date.parse` now raises an ArgumentError when a given date string is
longer than 128. You can configure the limit by giving `limit` keyword
arguments like `Date.parse(str, limit: 1000)`. If you pass `limit: nil`,
the limit is disabled.
Not only `Date.parse` but also the following methods are changed.
* Date._parse
* Date.parse
* DateTime.parse
* Date._iso8601
* Date.iso8601
* DateTime.iso8601
* Date._rfc3339
* Date.rfc3339
* DateTime.rfc3339
* Date._xmlschema
* Date.xmlschema
* DateTime.xmlschema
* Date._rfc2822
* Date.rfc2822
* DateTime.rfc2822
* Date._rfc822
* Date.rfc822
* DateTime.rfc822
* Date._jisx0301
* Date.jisx0301
* DateTime.jisx0301
|
irc_nick_color_for_msg (struct t_irc_server *server, int server_message,
struct t_irc_nick *nick, const char *nickname)
{
static char color[16][64];
static int index_color = 0;
char *color_found;
if (server_message
&& !weechat_config_boolean (irc_config_look_color_nicks_in_server_messages))
{
return IRC_COLOR_CHAT_NICK;
}
if (nick)
return nick->color;
if (nickname)
{
if (server
&& (irc_server_strcasecmp (server, nickname, server->nick) == 0))
{
return IRC_COLOR_CHAT_NICK_SELF;
}
color_found = irc_nick_find_color (nickname);
index_color = (index_color + 1) % 16;
snprintf (color[index_color], sizeof (color[index_color]),
"%s",
color_found);
if (color_found)
free (color_found);
return color[index_color];
}
return IRC_COLOR_CHAT_NICK;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-120",
"CWE-787"
] |
weechat
|
40ccacb4330a64802b1f1e28ed9a6b6d3ca9197f
| 236,335,659,829,761,900,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 |
irc: fix crash when a new message 005 is received with longer nick prefixes
Thanks to Stuart Nevans Locke for reporting the issue.
|
int SWFShape_getFlags(SWFShape shape)
{
if(shape->useVersion == SWF_SHAPE4)
return shape->flags;
else
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-476"
] |
libming
|
6e76e8c71cb51c8ba0aa9737a636b9ac3029887f
| 333,504,991,753,184,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle: prevent fill overflow
|
static int nci_open_device(struct nci_dev *ndev)
{
int rc = 0;
mutex_lock(&ndev->req_lock);
if (test_bit(NCI_UNREG, &ndev->flags)) {
rc = -ENODEV;
goto done;
}
if (test_bit(NCI_UP, &ndev->flags)) {
rc = -EALREADY;
goto done;
}
if (ndev->ops->open(ndev)) {
rc = -EIO;
goto done;
}
atomic_set(&ndev->cmd_cnt, 1);
set_bit(NCI_INIT, &ndev->flags);
if (ndev->ops->init)
rc = ndev->ops->init(ndev);
if (!rc) {
rc = __nci_request(ndev, nci_reset_req, (void *)0,
msecs_to_jiffies(NCI_RESET_TIMEOUT));
}
if (!rc && ndev->ops->setup) {
rc = ndev->ops->setup(ndev);
}
if (!rc) {
struct nci_core_init_v2_cmd nci_init_v2_cmd = {
.feature1 = NCI_FEATURE_DISABLE,
.feature2 = NCI_FEATURE_DISABLE
};
const void *opt = NULL;
if (ndev->nci_ver & NCI_VER_2_MASK)
opt = &nci_init_v2_cmd;
rc = __nci_request(ndev, nci_init_req, opt,
msecs_to_jiffies(NCI_INIT_TIMEOUT));
}
if (!rc && ndev->ops->post_setup)
rc = ndev->ops->post_setup(ndev);
if (!rc) {
rc = __nci_request(ndev, nci_init_complete_req, (void *)0,
msecs_to_jiffies(NCI_INIT_TIMEOUT));
}
clear_bit(NCI_INIT, &ndev->flags);
if (!rc) {
set_bit(NCI_UP, &ndev->flags);
nci_clear_target_list(ndev);
atomic_set(&ndev->state, NCI_IDLE);
} else {
/* Init failed, cleanup */
skb_queue_purge(&ndev->cmd_q);
skb_queue_purge(&ndev->rx_q);
skb_queue_purge(&ndev->tx_q);
ndev->ops->close(ndev);
ndev->flags = 0;
}
done:
mutex_unlock(&ndev->req_lock);
return rc;
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux
|
48b71a9e66c2eab60564b1b1c85f4928ed04e406
| 54,831,679,667,944,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 79 |
NFC: add NCI_UNREG flag to eliminate the race
There are two sites that calls queue_work() after the
destroy_workqueue() and lead to possible UAF.
The first site is nci_send_cmd(), which can happen after the
nci_close_device as below
nfcmrvl_nci_unregister_dev | nfc_genl_dev_up
nci_close_device |
flush_workqueue |
del_timer_sync |
nci_unregister_device | nfc_get_device
destroy_workqueue | nfc_dev_up
nfc_unregister_device | nci_dev_up
device_del | nci_open_device
| __nci_request
| nci_send_cmd
| queue_work !!!
Another site is nci_cmd_timer, awaked by the nci_cmd_work from the
nci_send_cmd.
... | ...
nci_unregister_device | queue_work
destroy_workqueue |
nfc_unregister_device | ...
device_del | nci_cmd_work
| mod_timer
| ...
| nci_cmd_timer
| queue_work !!!
For the above two UAF, the root cause is that the nfc_dev_up can race
between the nci_unregister_device routine. Therefore, this patch
introduce NCI_UNREG flag to easily eliminate the possible race. In
addition, the mutex_lock in nci_close_device can act as a barrier.
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <[email protected]>
Fixes: 6a2968aaf50c ("NFC: basic NCI protocol implementation")
Reviewed-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
|
bool Item_direct_view_ref::excl_dep_on_grouping_fields(st_select_lex *sel)
{
if (item_equal)
{
DBUG_ASSERT(real_item()->type() == Item::FIELD_ITEM);
return find_matching_grouping_field(this, sel) != NULL;
}
return (*ref)->excl_dep_on_grouping_fields(sel);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
server
|
c02ebf3510850ba78a106be9974c94c3b97d8585
| 21,907,464,686,110,724,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
MDEV-24176 Preparations
1. moved fix_vcol_exprs() call to open_table()
mysql_alter_table() doesn't do lock_tables() so it cannot win from
fix_vcol_exprs() from there. Tests affected: main.default_session
2. Vanilla cleanups and comments.
|
dns_cache_lookup(struct module_env* env,
uint8_t* qname, size_t qnamelen, uint16_t qtype, uint16_t qclass,
uint16_t flags, struct regional* region, struct regional* scratch,
int no_partial, uint8_t* dpname, size_t dpnamelen)
{
struct lruhash_entry* e;
struct query_info k;
hashvalue_type h;
time_t now = *env->now;
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* rrset;
/* lookup first, this has both NXdomains and ANSWER responses */
k.qname = qname;
k.qname_len = qnamelen;
k.qtype = qtype;
k.qclass = qclass;
k.local_alias = NULL;
h = query_info_hash(&k, flags);
e = slabhash_lookup(env->msg_cache, h, &k, 0);
if(e) {
struct msgreply_entry* key = (struct msgreply_entry*)e->key;
struct reply_info* data = (struct reply_info*)e->data;
struct dns_msg* msg = tomsg(env, &key->key, data, region, now, 0,
scratch);
if(msg) {
lock_rw_unlock(&e->lock);
return msg;
}
/* could be msg==NULL; due to TTL or not all rrsets available */
lock_rw_unlock(&e->lock);
}
/* see if a DNAME exists. Checked for first, to enforce that DNAMEs
* are more important, the CNAME is resynthesized and thus
* consistent with the DNAME */
if(!no_partial &&
(rrset=find_closest_of_type(env, qname, qnamelen, qclass, now,
LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME, 1, 0, NULL, 0))) {
/* synthesize a DNAME+CNAME message based on this */
enum sec_status sec_status = sec_status_unchecked;
struct dns_msg* msg = synth_dname_msg(rrset, region, now, &k,
&sec_status);
if(msg) {
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* cname_rrset;
lock_rw_unlock(&rrset->entry.lock);
/* now, after unlocking the DNAME rrset lock,
* check the sec_status, and see if we need to look
* up the CNAME record associated before it can
* be used */
/* normally, only secure DNAMEs allowed from cache*/
if(sec_status == sec_status_secure)
return msg;
/* but if we have a CNAME cached with this name, then we
* have previously already allowed this name to pass.
* the next cache lookup is going to fetch that CNAME itself,
* but it is better to have the (unsigned)DNAME + CNAME in
* that case */
cname_rrset = rrset_cache_lookup(
env->rrset_cache, qname, qnamelen,
LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME, qclass, 0, now, 0);
if(cname_rrset) {
/* CNAME already synthesized by
* synth_dname_msg routine, so we can
* straight up return the msg */
lock_rw_unlock(&cname_rrset->entry.lock);
return msg;
}
} else {
lock_rw_unlock(&rrset->entry.lock);
}
}
/* see if we have CNAME for this domain,
* but not for DS records (which are part of the parent) */
if(!no_partial && qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS &&
(rrset=rrset_cache_lookup(env->rrset_cache, qname, qnamelen,
LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME, qclass, 0, now, 0))) {
uint8_t* wc = NULL;
size_t wl;
/* if the rrset is not a wildcard expansion, with wcname */
/* because, if we return that CNAME rrset on its own, it is
* missing the NSEC or NSEC3 proof */
if(!(val_rrset_wildcard(rrset, &wc, &wl) && wc != NULL)) {
struct dns_msg* msg = rrset_msg(rrset, region, now, &k);
if(msg) {
lock_rw_unlock(&rrset->entry.lock);
return msg;
}
}
lock_rw_unlock(&rrset->entry.lock);
}
/* construct DS, DNSKEY messages from rrset cache. */
if((qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS || qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY) &&
(rrset=rrset_cache_lookup(env->rrset_cache, qname, qnamelen,
qtype, qclass, 0, now, 0))) {
/* if the rrset is from the additional section, and the
* signatures have fallen off, then do not synthesize a msg
* instead, allow a full query for signed results to happen.
* Forego all rrset data from additional section, because
* some signatures may not be present and cause validation
* failure.
*/
struct packed_rrset_data *d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
rrset->entry.data;
if(d->trust != rrset_trust_add_noAA &&
d->trust != rrset_trust_add_AA &&
(qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS ||
(d->trust != rrset_trust_auth_noAA
&& d->trust != rrset_trust_auth_AA) )) {
struct dns_msg* msg = rrset_msg(rrset, region, now, &k);
if(msg) {
lock_rw_unlock(&rrset->entry.lock);
return msg;
}
}
lock_rw_unlock(&rrset->entry.lock);
}
/* stop downwards cache search on NXDOMAIN.
* Empty nonterminals are NOERROR, so an NXDOMAIN for foo
* means bla.foo also does not exist. The DNSSEC proofs are
* the same. We search upwards for NXDOMAINs. */
if(env->cfg->harden_below_nxdomain) {
while(!dname_is_root(k.qname)) {
if(dpname && dpnamelen
&& !dname_subdomain_c(k.qname, dpname))
break; /* no synth nxdomain above the stub */
dname_remove_label(&k.qname, &k.qname_len);
h = query_info_hash(&k, flags);
e = slabhash_lookup(env->msg_cache, h, &k, 0);
if(!e && k.qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_A &&
env->cfg->qname_minimisation) {
k.qtype = LDNS_RR_TYPE_A;
h = query_info_hash(&k, flags);
e = slabhash_lookup(env->msg_cache, h, &k, 0);
}
if(e) {
struct reply_info* data = (struct reply_info*)e->data;
struct dns_msg* msg;
if(FLAGS_GET_RCODE(data->flags) == LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN
&& data->security == sec_status_secure
&& (data->an_numrrsets == 0 ||
ntohs(data->rrsets[0]->rk.type) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME)
&& (msg=tomsg(env, &k, data, region, now, 0, scratch))) {
lock_rw_unlock(&e->lock);
msg->qinfo.qname=qname;
msg->qinfo.qname_len=qnamelen;
/* check that DNSSEC really works out */
msg->rep->security = sec_status_unchecked;
iter_scrub_nxdomain(msg);
return msg;
}
lock_rw_unlock(&e->lock);
}
k.qtype = qtype;
}
}
/* fill common RR types for ANY response to avoid requery */
if(qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_ANY) {
return fill_any(env, qname, qnamelen, qtype, qclass, region);
}
return NULL;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-613",
"CWE-703"
] |
unbound
|
f6753a0f1018133df552347a199e0362fc1dac68
| 297,972,438,308,458,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 166 |
- Fix the novel ghost domain issues CVE-2022-30698 and CVE-2022-30699.
|
QUtil::tell(FILE* stream)
{
#if HAVE_FSEEKO
return static_cast<qpdf_offset_t>(ftello(stream));
#elif HAVE_FSEEKO64
return static_cast<qpdf_offset_t>(ftello64(stream));
#else
# if defined _MSC_VER || defined __BORLANDC__
return _ftelli64(stream);
# else
return static_cast<qpdf_offset_t>(ftell(stream));
# endif
#endif
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
qpdf
|
6d46346eb93d5032c08cf1e39023b5d57260a766
| 335,932,067,563,811,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
Detect integer overflow/underflow
|
static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdirty(pmd_t pmd)
{
return pmd_set_flags(pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
027ef6c87853b0a9df53175063028edb4950d476
| 222,320,194,844,218,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
mm: thp: fix pmd_present for split_huge_page and PROT_NONE with THP
In many places !pmd_present has been converted to pmd_none. For pmds
that's equivalent and pmd_none is quicker so using pmd_none is better.
However (unless we delete pmd_present) we should provide an accurate
pmd_present too. This will avoid the risk of code thinking the pmd is non
present because it's under __split_huge_page_map, see the pmd_mknotpresent
there and the comment above it.
If the page has been mprotected as PROT_NONE, it would also lead to a
pmd_present false negative in the same way as the race with
split_huge_page.
Because the PSE bit stays on at all times (both during split_huge_page and
when the _PAGE_PROTNONE bit get set), we could only check for the PSE bit,
but checking the PROTNONE bit too is still good to remember pmd_present
must always keep PROT_NONE into account.
This explains a not reproducible BUG_ON that was seldom reported on the
lists.
The same issue is in pmd_large, it would go wrong with both PROT_NONE and
if it races with split_huge_page.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static av_always_inline void dnxhd_encode_dc(DNXHDEncContext *ctx, int diff)
{
int nbits;
if (diff < 0) {
nbits = av_log2_16bit(-2*diff);
diff--;
} else {
nbits = av_log2_16bit(2*diff);
}
put_bits(&ctx->m.pb, ctx->cid_table->dc_bits[nbits] + nbits,
(ctx->cid_table->dc_codes[nbits]<<nbits) + (diff & ((1 << nbits) - 1)));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
FFmpeg
|
f1caaa1c61310beba705957e6366f0392a0b005b
| 157,431,565,134,511,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
dnxhdenc: fix mb_rc size
Fixes out of array access with RC_VARIANCE set to 0
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static void
yydestruct (const char *yymsg, int yytype, YYSTYPE *yyvaluep, void *yyscanner, RE_LEX_ENVIRONMENT *lex_env)
{
YYUSE (yyvaluep);
YYUSE (yyscanner);
YYUSE (lex_env);
if (!yymsg)
yymsg = "Deleting";
YY_SYMBOL_PRINT (yymsg, yytype, yyvaluep, yylocationp);
YY_IGNORE_MAYBE_UNINITIALIZED_BEGIN
switch (yytype)
{
case 6: /* _CLASS_ */
#line 96 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_free(((*yyvaluep).class_vector)); }
#line 1045 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 26: /* alternative */
#line 97 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1051 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 27: /* concatenation */
#line 98 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1057 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 28: /* repeat */
#line 99 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1063 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
case 29: /* single */
#line 100 "re_grammar.y" /* yacc.c:1257 */
{ yr_re_node_destroy(((*yyvaluep).re_node)); }
#line 1069 "re_grammar.c" /* yacc.c:1257 */
break;
default:
break;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-674",
"CWE-787"
] |
yara
|
925bcf3c3b0a28b5b78e25d9efda5c0bf27ae699
| 171,859,271,658,806,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 48 |
Fix issue #674. Move regexp limits to limits.h.
|
static int tc_ctl_tclass(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *n, void *arg)
{
struct tcmsg *tcm = NLMSG_DATA(n);
struct rtattr **tca = arg;
struct net_device *dev;
struct Qdisc *q = NULL;
struct Qdisc_class_ops *cops;
unsigned long cl = 0;
unsigned long new_cl;
u32 pid = tcm->tcm_parent;
u32 clid = tcm->tcm_handle;
u32 qid = TC_H_MAJ(clid);
int err;
if ((dev = __dev_get_by_index(tcm->tcm_ifindex)) == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
/*
parent == TC_H_UNSPEC - unspecified parent.
parent == TC_H_ROOT - class is root, which has no parent.
parent == X:0 - parent is root class.
parent == X:Y - parent is a node in hierarchy.
parent == 0:Y - parent is X:Y, where X:0 is qdisc.
handle == 0:0 - generate handle from kernel pool.
handle == 0:Y - class is X:Y, where X:0 is qdisc.
handle == X:Y - clear.
handle == X:0 - root class.
*/
/* Step 1. Determine qdisc handle X:0 */
if (pid != TC_H_ROOT) {
u32 qid1 = TC_H_MAJ(pid);
if (qid && qid1) {
/* If both majors are known, they must be identical. */
if (qid != qid1)
return -EINVAL;
} else if (qid1) {
qid = qid1;
} else if (qid == 0)
qid = dev->qdisc_sleeping->handle;
/* Now qid is genuine qdisc handle consistent
both with parent and child.
TC_H_MAJ(pid) still may be unspecified, complete it now.
*/
if (pid)
pid = TC_H_MAKE(qid, pid);
} else {
if (qid == 0)
qid = dev->qdisc_sleeping->handle;
}
/* OK. Locate qdisc */
if ((q = qdisc_lookup(dev, qid)) == NULL)
return -ENOENT;
/* An check that it supports classes */
cops = q->ops->cl_ops;
if (cops == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
/* Now try to get class */
if (clid == 0) {
if (pid == TC_H_ROOT)
clid = qid;
} else
clid = TC_H_MAKE(qid, clid);
if (clid)
cl = cops->get(q, clid);
if (cl == 0) {
err = -ENOENT;
if (n->nlmsg_type != RTM_NEWTCLASS || !(n->nlmsg_flags&NLM_F_CREATE))
goto out;
} else {
switch (n->nlmsg_type) {
case RTM_NEWTCLASS:
err = -EEXIST;
if (n->nlmsg_flags&NLM_F_EXCL)
goto out;
break;
case RTM_DELTCLASS:
err = cops->delete(q, cl);
if (err == 0)
tclass_notify(skb, n, q, cl, RTM_DELTCLASS);
goto out;
case RTM_GETTCLASS:
err = tclass_notify(skb, n, q, cl, RTM_NEWTCLASS);
goto out;
default:
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
}
new_cl = cl;
err = cops->change(q, clid, pid, tca, &new_cl);
if (err == 0)
tclass_notify(skb, n, q, new_cl, RTM_NEWTCLASS);
out:
if (cl)
cops->put(q, cl);
return err;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux-2.6
|
9ef1d4c7c7aca1cd436612b6ca785b726ffb8ed8
| 170,481,033,093,087,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 111 |
[NETLINK]: Missing initializations in dumped data
Mostly missing initialization of padding fields of 1 or 2 bytes length,
two instances of uninitialized nlmsgerr->msg of 16 bytes length.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
enc_succ_char(char *p, long len, rb_encoding *enc)
{
long i;
int l;
while (1) {
for (i = len-1; 0 <= i && (unsigned char)p[i] == 0xff; i--)
p[i] = '\0';
if (i < 0)
return NEIGHBOR_WRAPPED;
++((unsigned char*)p)[i];
l = rb_enc_precise_mbclen(p, p+len, enc);
if (MBCLEN_CHARFOUND_P(l)) {
l = MBCLEN_CHARFOUND_LEN(l);
if (l == len) {
return NEIGHBOR_FOUND;
}
else {
memset(p+l, 0xff, len-l);
}
}
if (MBCLEN_INVALID_P(l) && i < len-1) {
long len2;
int l2;
for (len2 = len-1; 0 < len2; len2--) {
l2 = rb_enc_precise_mbclen(p, p+len2, enc);
if (!MBCLEN_INVALID_P(l2))
break;
}
memset(p+len2+1, 0xff, len-(len2+1));
}
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
ruby
|
1c2ef610358af33f9ded3086aa2d70aac03dcac5
| 208,945,030,465,569,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 |
* string.c (rb_str_justify): CVE-2009-4124.
Fixes a bug reported by
Emmanouel Kellinis <Emmanouel.Kellinis AT kpmg.co.uk>, KPMG London;
Patch by nobu.
git-svn-id: svn+ssh://ci.ruby-lang.org/ruby/trunk@26038 b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e
|
static void nhmldump_send_header(GF_NHMLDumpCtx *ctx)
{
GF_FilterPacket *dst_pck;
char nhml[1024];
u32 size;
u8 *output;
const GF_PropertyValue *p;
ctx->szRootName = "NHNTStream";
if (ctx->dims) {
ctx->szRootName = "DIMSStream";
}
if (!ctx->filep) {
sprintf(nhml, "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\" ?>\n");
gf_bs_write_data(ctx->bs_w, nhml, (u32) strlen(nhml));
}
/*write header*/
sprintf(nhml, "<%s version=\"1.0\" ", ctx->szRootName);
gf_bs_write_data(ctx->bs_w, nhml, (u32) strlen(nhml));
NHML_PRINT_UINT(GF_PROP_PID_ID, NULL, "trackID")
NHML_PRINT_UINT(GF_PROP_PID_TIMESCALE, NULL, "timeScale")
p = gf_filter_pid_get_property(ctx->ipid, GF_PROP_PID_IN_IOD);
if (p && p->value.boolean) {
sprintf(nhml, "inRootOD=\"yes\" ");
gf_bs_write_data(ctx->bs_w, nhml, (u32) strlen(nhml));
}
if (ctx->oti && (ctx->oti<GF_CODECID_LAST_MPEG4_MAPPING)) {
sprintf(nhml, "streamType=\"%d\" objectTypeIndication=\"%d\" ", ctx->streamtype, ctx->oti);
gf_bs_write_data(ctx->bs_w, nhml, (u32)strlen(nhml));
} else {
p = gf_filter_pid_get_property(ctx->ipid, GF_PROP_PID_SUBTYPE);
if (p) {
sprintf(nhml, "%s=\"%s\" ", "mediaType", gf_4cc_to_str(p->value.uint));
gf_bs_write_data(ctx->bs_w, nhml, (u32) strlen(nhml));
NHML_PRINT_4CC(GF_PROP_PID_ISOM_SUBTYPE, "mediaSubType", "mediaSubType")
} else {
NHML_PRINT_4CC(GF_PROP_PID_CODECID, NULL, "codecID")
}
}
if (ctx->w && ctx->h) {
//compatibility with old arch, we might want to remove this
switch (ctx->streamtype) {
case GF_STREAM_VISUAL:
case GF_STREAM_SCENE:
sprintf(nhml, "width=\"%d\" height=\"%d\" ", ctx->w, ctx->h);
gf_bs_write_data(ctx->bs_w, nhml, (u32) strlen(nhml));
break;
default:
break;
}
}
else if (ctx->sr && ctx->chan) {
sprintf(nhml, "sampleRate=\"%d\" numChannels=\"%d\" ", ctx->sr, ctx->chan);
gf_bs_write_data(ctx->bs_w, nhml, (u32) strlen(nhml));
sprintf(nhml, "sampleRate=\"%d\" numChannels=\"%d\" ", ctx->sr, ctx->chan);
gf_bs_write_data(ctx->bs_w, nhml, (u32) strlen(nhml));
p = gf_filter_pid_get_property(ctx->ipid, GF_PROP_PID_AUDIO_FORMAT);
sprintf(nhml, "bitsPerSample=\"%d\" ", gf_audio_fmt_bit_depth(p->value.uint));
gf_bs_write_data(ctx->bs_w, nhml, (u32) strlen(nhml));
}
NHML_PRINT_4CC(0, "codec_vendor", "codecVendor")
NHML_PRINT_UINT(0, "codec_version", "codecVersion")
NHML_PRINT_UINT(0, "codec_revision", "codecRevision")
NHML_PRINT_STRING(0, "compressor_name", "compressorName")
NHML_PRINT_UINT(0, "temporal_quality", "temporalQuality")
NHML_PRINT_UINT(0, "spatial_quality", "spatialQuality")
NHML_PRINT_UINT(0, "hres", "horizontalResolution")
NHML_PRINT_UINT(0, "vres", "verticalResolution")
NHML_PRINT_UINT(GF_PROP_PID_BIT_DEPTH_Y, NULL, "bitDepth")
NHML_PRINT_STRING(0, "meta:xmlns", "xml_namespace")
NHML_PRINT_STRING(0, "meta:schemaloc", "xml_schema_location")
NHML_PRINT_STRING(0, "meta:mime", "mime_type")
NHML_PRINT_STRING(0, "meta:config", "config")
NHML_PRINT_STRING(0, "meta:aux_mimes", "aux_mime_type")
if (ctx->codecid == GF_CODECID_DIMS) {
if (gf_filter_pid_get_property_str(ctx->ipid, "meta:xmlns")==NULL) {
sprintf(nhml, "xmlns=\"http://www.3gpp.org/richmedia\" ");
gf_bs_write_data(ctx->bs_w, nhml, (u32) strlen(nhml));
}
NHML_PRINT_UINT(0, "dims:profile", "profile")
NHML_PRINT_UINT(0, "dims:level", "level")
NHML_PRINT_UINT(0, "dims:pathComponents", "pathComponents")
p = gf_filter_pid_get_property_str(ctx->ipid, "dims:fullRequestHost");
if (p) {
sprintf(nhml, "useFullRequestHost=\"%s\" ", p->value.boolean ? "yes" : "no");
gf_bs_write_data(ctx->bs_w, nhml, (u32) strlen(nhml));
}
p = gf_filter_pid_get_property_str(ctx->ipid, "dims:streamType");
if (p) {
sprintf(nhml, "stream_type=\"%s\" ", p->value.boolean ? "primary" : "secondary");
gf_bs_write_data(ctx->bs_w, nhml, (u32) strlen(nhml));
}
p = gf_filter_pid_get_property_str(ctx->ipid, "dims:redundant");
if (p) {
sprintf(nhml, "contains_redundant=\"%s\" ", (p->value.uint==1) ? "main" : ((p->value.uint==1) ? "redundant" : "main+redundant") );
gf_bs_write_data(ctx->bs_w, nhml, (u32) strlen(nhml));
}
NHML_PRINT_UINT(0, "dims:scriptTypes", "scriptTypes")
}
//send DCD
if (ctx->opid_info) {
sprintf(nhml, "specificInfoFile=\"%s\" ", gf_file_basename(ctx->info_file) );
gf_bs_write_data(ctx->bs_w, nhml, (u32) strlen(nhml));
dst_pck = gf_filter_pck_new_shared(ctx->opid_info, ctx->dcfg, ctx->dcfg_size, NULL);
gf_filter_pck_set_framing(dst_pck, GF_TRUE, GF_TRUE);
gf_filter_pck_set_readonly(dst_pck);
gf_filter_pck_send(dst_pck);
}
NHML_PRINT_STRING(0, "meta:encoding", "encoding")
NHML_PRINT_STRING(0, "meta:contentEncoding", "content_encoding")
ctx->uncompress = GF_FALSE;
if (p) {
if (!strcmp(p->value.string, "deflate")) ctx->uncompress = GF_TRUE;
else {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_AUTHOR, ("[NHMLMx] content_encoding %s not supported\n", p->value.string ));
}
}
if (ctx->opid_mdia) {
sprintf(nhml, "baseMediaFile=\"%s\" ", gf_file_basename(ctx->media_file) );
gf_bs_write_data(ctx->bs_w, nhml, (u32) strlen(nhml));
}
sprintf(nhml, ">\n");
gf_bs_write_data(ctx->bs_w, nhml, (u32) strlen(nhml));
gf_bs_get_content_no_truncate(ctx->bs_w, &ctx->nhml_buffer, &size, &ctx->nhml_buffer_size);
if (ctx->filep) {
gf_fwrite(ctx->nhml_buffer, size, ctx->filep);
return;
}
dst_pck = gf_filter_pck_new_alloc(ctx->opid_nhml, size, &output);
memcpy(output, ctx->nhml_buffer, size);
gf_filter_pck_set_framing(dst_pck, GF_TRUE, GF_FALSE);
gf_filter_pck_send(dst_pck);
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
gpac
|
9eeac00b38348c664dfeae2525bba0cf1bc32349
| 171,851,966,591,827,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 154 |
fixed #1565
|
static void dn_dev_set_timer(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct dn_dev *dn_db = rcu_dereference_raw(dev->dn_ptr);
if (dn_db->parms.t2 > dn_db->parms.t3)
dn_db->parms.t2 = dn_db->parms.t3;
dn_db->timer.data = (unsigned long)dev;
dn_db->timer.function = dn_dev_timer_func;
dn_db->timer.expires = jiffies + (dn_db->parms.t2 * HZ);
add_timer(&dn_db->timer);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264"
] |
net
|
90f62cf30a78721641e08737bda787552428061e
| 38,954,200,005,281,676,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages
It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged
executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket
data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that
privileged executable did not intend to do.
To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls
with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls.
Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the
opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void lsr_read_gradient_units(GF_LASeRCodec *lsr, GF_Node *elt)
{
u32 flag;
GF_FieldInfo info;
GF_LSR_READ_INT(lsr, flag, 1, "hasGradientUnits");
if (flag) {
lsr->last_error = gf_node_get_attribute_by_tag(elt, TAG_SVG_ATT_gradientUnits, 1, 0, &info);
GF_LSR_READ_INT(lsr, *(SVG_GradientUnit*)info.far_ptr, 1, "gradientUnits");
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
gpac
|
faa75edde3dfeba1e2cf6ffa48e45a50f1042096
| 83,288,946,498,841,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
fixed #2213
|
void Gfx::doFunctionShFill(GfxFunctionShading *shading) {
double x0, y0, x1, y1;
GfxColor colors[4];
if (out->useShadedFills( shading->getType() ) &&
out->functionShadedFill(state, shading)) {
return;
}
shading->getDomain(&x0, &y0, &x1, &y1);
shading->getColor(x0, y0, &colors[0]);
shading->getColor(x0, y1, &colors[1]);
shading->getColor(x1, y0, &colors[2]);
shading->getColor(x1, y1, &colors[3]);
doFunctionShFill1(shading, x0, y0, x1, y1, colors, 0);
}
| 0 |
[] |
poppler
|
abf167af8b15e5f3b510275ce619e6fdb42edd40
| 52,244,014,207,018,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
Implement tiling/patterns in SplashOutputDev
Fixes bug 13518
|
static void __net_init ipip6_fb_tunnel_init(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct ip_tunnel *tunnel = netdev_priv(dev);
struct iphdr *iph = &tunnel->parms.iph;
struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
struct sit_net *sitn = net_generic(net, sit_net_id);
tunnel->dev = dev;
strcpy(tunnel->parms.name, dev->name);
iph->version = 4;
iph->protocol = IPPROTO_IPV6;
iph->ihl = 5;
iph->ttl = 64;
dev_hold(dev);
sitn->tunnels_wc[0] = tunnel;
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux-2.6
|
d5aa407f59f5b83d2c50ec88f5bf56d40f1f8978
| 32,724,894,684,568,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
Value ExpressionAbs::evaluateNumericArg(const Value& numericArg) const {
BSONType type = numericArg.getType();
if (type == NumberDouble) {
return Value(std::abs(numericArg.getDouble()));
} else if (type == NumberDecimal) {
return Value(numericArg.getDecimal().toAbs());
} else {
long long num = numericArg.getLong();
uassert(28680,
"can't take $abs of long long min",
num != std::numeric_limits<long long>::min());
long long absVal = std::abs(num);
return type == NumberLong ? Value(absVal) : Value::createIntOrLong(absVal);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-835"
] |
mongo
|
0a076417d1d7fba3632b73349a1fd29a83e68816
| 167,855,117,807,469,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
SERVER-38070 fix infinite loop in agg expression
|
R_API RSocket *r_socket_new_from_fd(int fd) {
RSocket *s = R_NEW0 (RSocket);
if (s) {
s->fd = fd;
}
return s;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-78"
] |
radare2
|
04edfa82c1f3fa2bc3621ccdad2f93bdbf00e4f9
| 219,215,983,276,245,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
Fix command injection on PDB download (#16966)
* Fix r_sys_mkdirp with absolute path on Windows
* Fix build with --with-openssl
* Use RBuffer in r_socket_http_answer()
* r_socket_http_answer: Fix read for big responses
* Implement r_str_escape_sh()
* Cleanup r_socket_connect() on Windows
* Fix socket being created without a protocol
* Fix socket connect with SSL ##socket
* Use select() in r_socket_ready()
* Fix read failing if received only protocol answer
* Fix double-free
* r_socket_http_get: Fail if req. SSL with no support
* Follow redirects in r_socket_http_answer()
* Fix r_socket_http_get result length with R2_CURL=1
* Also follow redirects
* Avoid using curl for downloading PDBs
* Use r_socket_http_get() on UNIXs
* Use WinINet API on Windows for r_socket_http_get()
* Fix command injection
* Fix r_sys_cmd_str_full output for binary data
* Validate GUID on PDB download
* Pass depth to socket_http_get_recursive()
* Remove 'r_' and '__' from static function names
* Fix is_valid_guid
* Fix for comments
|
THD::binlog_start_trans_and_stmt()
{
binlog_cache_mngr *cache_mngr= (binlog_cache_mngr*) thd_get_ha_data(this, binlog_hton);
DBUG_ENTER("binlog_start_trans_and_stmt");
DBUG_PRINT("enter", ("cache_mngr: %p cache_mngr->trx_cache.get_prev_position(): %lu",
cache_mngr,
(cache_mngr ? (ulong) cache_mngr->trx_cache.get_prev_position() :
(ulong) 0)));
if (cache_mngr == NULL ||
cache_mngr->trx_cache.get_prev_position() == MY_OFF_T_UNDEF)
{
this->binlog_set_stmt_begin();
if (in_multi_stmt_transaction_mode())
trans_register_ha(this, TRUE, binlog_hton);
trans_register_ha(this, FALSE, binlog_hton);
/*
Mark statement transaction as read/write. We never start
a binary log transaction and keep it read-only,
therefore it's best to mark the transaction read/write just
at the same time we start it.
Not necessary to mark the normal transaction read/write
since the statement-level flag will be propagated automatically
inside ha_commit_trans.
*/
ha_data[binlog_hton->slot].ha_info[0].set_trx_read_write();
}
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264"
] |
mysql-server
|
48bd8b16fe382be302c6f0b45931be5aa6f29a0e
| 161,741,210,890,686,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 |
Bug#24388753: PRIVILEGE ESCALATION USING MYSQLD_SAFE
[This is the 5.5/5.6 version of the bugfix].
The problem was that it was possible to write log files ending
in .ini/.cnf that later could be parsed as an options file.
This made it possible for users to specify startup options
without the permissions to do so.
This patch fixes the problem by disallowing general query log
and slow query log to be written to files ending in .ini and .cnf.
|
static void free_huge_page(struct page *page)
{
/*
* Can't pass hstate in here because it is called from the
* compound page destructor.
*/
struct hstate *h = page_hstate(page);
int nid = page_to_nid(page);
struct hugepage_subpool *spool =
(struct hugepage_subpool *)page_private(page);
set_page_private(page, 0);
page->mapping = NULL;
BUG_ON(page_count(page));
BUG_ON(page_mapcount(page));
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&page->lru);
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
if (h->surplus_huge_pages_node[nid] && huge_page_order(h) < MAX_ORDER) {
update_and_free_page(h, page);
h->surplus_huge_pages--;
h->surplus_huge_pages_node[nid]--;
} else {
enqueue_huge_page(h, page);
}
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
hugepage_subpool_put_pages(spool, 1);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
linux
|
90481622d75715bfcb68501280a917dbfe516029
| 133,759,679,817,792,480,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 28 |
hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Minchan Kim <[email protected]>
Cc: Hillf Danton <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
xps_moveto(gx_device_vector *vdev, double x0, double y0,
double x, double y, gx_path_type_t type)
{
gx_device_xps *xps = (gx_device_xps *)vdev;
char line[300];
if_debug2m('_', xps->memory, "xps_moveto %g %g\n", x, y);
/* skip non-drawing paths for now */
if (!drawing_path(type, xps->filltype)) {
if_debug1m('_', xps->memory, "xps_moveto: type not supported %x\n", type);
return 0;
}
gs_sprintf(line, " M %g,%g", x, y);
write_str_to_current_page(xps, line);
if_debug1m('_', xps->memory, "xps_moveto %s", line);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
ghostpdl
|
94d8955cb7725eb5f3557ddc02310c76124fdd1a
| 240,221,743,689,131,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
Bug 701818: better handling of error during PS/PDF image
In the xps device, if an error occurred after xps_begin_image() but before
xps_image_end_image(), *if* the Postscript had called 'restore' as part of the
error handling, the image enumerator would have been freed (by the restore)
despite the xps device still holding a reference to it.
Simply changing to an allocator unaffected save/restore doesn't work because
the enumerator holds references to other objects (graphics state, color space,
possibly others) whose lifespans are inherently controlled by save/restore.
So, add a finalize method for the XPS device's image enumerator
(xps_image_enum_finalize()) which takes over cleaning up the memory it allocates
and also deals with cleaning up references from the device to the enumerator
and from the enumerator to the device.
|
static double mp_cbrt(_cimg_math_parser& mp) {
return cimg::cbrt(_mp_arg(2));
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
CImg
|
10af1e8c1ad2a58a0a3342a856bae63e8f257abb
| 204,933,964,827,555,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
Fix other issues in 'CImg<T>::load_bmp()'.
|
int ext4_ext_map_blocks(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_map_blocks *map, int flags)
{
struct ext4_ext_path *path = NULL;
struct ext4_extent newex, *ex, *ex2;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
ext4_fsblk_t newblock = 0;
int free_on_err = 0, err = 0, depth, ret;
unsigned int allocated = 0, offset = 0;
unsigned int allocated_clusters = 0;
struct ext4_allocation_request ar;
ext4_lblk_t cluster_offset;
bool map_from_cluster = false;
ext_debug("blocks %u/%u requested for inode %lu\n",
map->m_lblk, map->m_len, inode->i_ino);
trace_ext4_ext_map_blocks_enter(inode, map->m_lblk, map->m_len, flags);
/* find extent for this block */
path = ext4_find_extent(inode, map->m_lblk, NULL, 0);
if (IS_ERR(path)) {
err = PTR_ERR(path);
path = NULL;
goto out2;
}
depth = ext_depth(inode);
/*
* consistent leaf must not be empty;
* this situation is possible, though, _during_ tree modification;
* this is why assert can't be put in ext4_find_extent()
*/
if (unlikely(path[depth].p_ext == NULL && depth != 0)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "bad extent address "
"lblock: %lu, depth: %d pblock %lld",
(unsigned long) map->m_lblk, depth,
path[depth].p_block);
err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto out2;
}
ex = path[depth].p_ext;
if (ex) {
ext4_lblk_t ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ext4_fsblk_t ee_start = ext4_ext_pblock(ex);
unsigned short ee_len;
/*
* unwritten extents are treated as holes, except that
* we split out initialized portions during a write.
*/
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
trace_ext4_ext_show_extent(inode, ee_block, ee_start, ee_len);
/* if found extent covers block, simply return it */
if (in_range(map->m_lblk, ee_block, ee_len)) {
newblock = map->m_lblk - ee_block + ee_start;
/* number of remaining blocks in the extent */
allocated = ee_len - (map->m_lblk - ee_block);
ext_debug("%u fit into %u:%d -> %llu\n", map->m_lblk,
ee_block, ee_len, newblock);
/*
* If the extent is initialized check whether the
* caller wants to convert it to unwritten.
*/
if ((!ext4_ext_is_unwritten(ex)) &&
(flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CONVERT_UNWRITTEN)) {
allocated = convert_initialized_extent(
handle, inode, map, &path,
allocated);
goto out2;
} else if (!ext4_ext_is_unwritten(ex))
goto out;
ret = ext4_ext_handle_unwritten_extents(
handle, inode, map, &path, flags,
allocated, newblock);
if (ret < 0)
err = ret;
else
allocated = ret;
goto out2;
}
}
/*
* requested block isn't allocated yet;
* we couldn't try to create block if create flag is zero
*/
if ((flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE) == 0) {
ext4_lblk_t hole_start, hole_len;
hole_start = map->m_lblk;
hole_len = ext4_ext_determine_hole(inode, path, &hole_start);
/*
* put just found gap into cache to speed up
* subsequent requests
*/
ext4_ext_put_gap_in_cache(inode, hole_start, hole_len);
/* Update hole_len to reflect hole size after map->m_lblk */
if (hole_start != map->m_lblk)
hole_len -= map->m_lblk - hole_start;
map->m_pblk = 0;
map->m_len = min_t(unsigned int, map->m_len, hole_len);
goto out2;
}
/*
* Okay, we need to do block allocation.
*/
newex.ee_block = cpu_to_le32(map->m_lblk);
cluster_offset = EXT4_LBLK_COFF(sbi, map->m_lblk);
/*
* If we are doing bigalloc, check to see if the extent returned
* by ext4_find_extent() implies a cluster we can use.
*/
if (cluster_offset && ex &&
get_implied_cluster_alloc(inode->i_sb, map, ex, path)) {
ar.len = allocated = map->m_len;
newblock = map->m_pblk;
map_from_cluster = true;
goto got_allocated_blocks;
}
/* find neighbour allocated blocks */
ar.lleft = map->m_lblk;
err = ext4_ext_search_left(inode, path, &ar.lleft, &ar.pleft);
if (err)
goto out2;
ar.lright = map->m_lblk;
ex2 = NULL;
err = ext4_ext_search_right(inode, path, &ar.lright, &ar.pright, &ex2);
if (err)
goto out2;
/* Check if the extent after searching to the right implies a
* cluster we can use. */
if ((sbi->s_cluster_ratio > 1) && ex2 &&
get_implied_cluster_alloc(inode->i_sb, map, ex2, path)) {
ar.len = allocated = map->m_len;
newblock = map->m_pblk;
map_from_cluster = true;
goto got_allocated_blocks;
}
/*
* See if request is beyond maximum number of blocks we can have in
* a single extent. For an initialized extent this limit is
* EXT_INIT_MAX_LEN and for an unwritten extent this limit is
* EXT_UNWRITTEN_MAX_LEN.
*/
if (map->m_len > EXT_INIT_MAX_LEN &&
!(flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNWRIT_EXT))
map->m_len = EXT_INIT_MAX_LEN;
else if (map->m_len > EXT_UNWRITTEN_MAX_LEN &&
(flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNWRIT_EXT))
map->m_len = EXT_UNWRITTEN_MAX_LEN;
/* Check if we can really insert (m_lblk)::(m_lblk + m_len) extent */
newex.ee_len = cpu_to_le16(map->m_len);
err = ext4_ext_check_overlap(sbi, inode, &newex, path);
if (err)
allocated = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(&newex);
else
allocated = map->m_len;
/* allocate new block */
ar.inode = inode;
ar.goal = ext4_ext_find_goal(inode, path, map->m_lblk);
ar.logical = map->m_lblk;
/*
* We calculate the offset from the beginning of the cluster
* for the logical block number, since when we allocate a
* physical cluster, the physical block should start at the
* same offset from the beginning of the cluster. This is
* needed so that future calls to get_implied_cluster_alloc()
* work correctly.
*/
offset = EXT4_LBLK_COFF(sbi, map->m_lblk);
ar.len = EXT4_NUM_B2C(sbi, offset+allocated);
ar.goal -= offset;
ar.logical -= offset;
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
ar.flags = EXT4_MB_HINT_DATA;
else
/* disable in-core preallocation for non-regular files */
ar.flags = 0;
if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_NO_NORMALIZE)
ar.flags |= EXT4_MB_HINT_NOPREALLOC;
if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_DELALLOC_RESERVE)
ar.flags |= EXT4_MB_DELALLOC_RESERVED;
if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_METADATA_NOFAIL)
ar.flags |= EXT4_MB_USE_RESERVED;
newblock = ext4_mb_new_blocks(handle, &ar, &err);
if (!newblock)
goto out2;
ext_debug("allocate new block: goal %llu, found %llu/%u\n",
ar.goal, newblock, allocated);
free_on_err = 1;
allocated_clusters = ar.len;
ar.len = EXT4_C2B(sbi, ar.len) - offset;
if (ar.len > allocated)
ar.len = allocated;
got_allocated_blocks:
/* try to insert new extent into found leaf and return */
ext4_ext_store_pblock(&newex, newblock + offset);
newex.ee_len = cpu_to_le16(ar.len);
/* Mark unwritten */
if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNWRIT_EXT){
ext4_ext_mark_unwritten(&newex);
map->m_flags |= EXT4_MAP_UNWRITTEN;
}
err = 0;
if ((flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_KEEP_SIZE) == 0)
err = check_eofblocks_fl(handle, inode, map->m_lblk,
path, ar.len);
if (!err)
err = ext4_ext_insert_extent(handle, inode, &path,
&newex, flags);
if (err && free_on_err) {
int fb_flags = flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_DELALLOC_RESERVE ?
EXT4_FREE_BLOCKS_NO_QUOT_UPDATE : 0;
/* free data blocks we just allocated */
/* not a good idea to call discard here directly,
* but otherwise we'd need to call it every free() */
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
ext4_free_blocks(handle, inode, NULL, newblock,
EXT4_C2B(sbi, allocated_clusters), fb_flags);
goto out2;
}
/* previous routine could use block we allocated */
newblock = ext4_ext_pblock(&newex);
allocated = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(&newex);
if (allocated > map->m_len)
allocated = map->m_len;
map->m_flags |= EXT4_MAP_NEW;
/*
* Update reserved blocks/metadata blocks after successful
* block allocation which had been deferred till now.
*/
if (flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_DELALLOC_RESERVE) {
unsigned int reserved_clusters;
/*
* Check how many clusters we had reserved this allocated range
*/
reserved_clusters = get_reserved_cluster_alloc(inode,
map->m_lblk, allocated);
if (!map_from_cluster) {
BUG_ON(allocated_clusters < reserved_clusters);
if (reserved_clusters < allocated_clusters) {
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
int reservation = allocated_clusters -
reserved_clusters;
/*
* It seems we claimed few clusters outside of
* the range of this allocation. We should give
* it back to the reservation pool. This can
* happen in the following case:
*
* * Suppose s_cluster_ratio is 4 (i.e., each
* cluster has 4 blocks. Thus, the clusters
* are [0-3],[4-7],[8-11]...
* * First comes delayed allocation write for
* logical blocks 10 & 11. Since there were no
* previous delayed allocated blocks in the
* range [8-11], we would reserve 1 cluster
* for this write.
* * Next comes write for logical blocks 3 to 8.
* In this case, we will reserve 2 clusters
* (for [0-3] and [4-7]; and not for [8-11] as
* that range has a delayed allocated blocks.
* Thus total reserved clusters now becomes 3.
* * Now, during the delayed allocation writeout
* time, we will first write blocks [3-8] and
* allocate 3 clusters for writing these
* blocks. Also, we would claim all these
* three clusters above.
* * Now when we come here to writeout the
* blocks [10-11], we would expect to claim
* the reservation of 1 cluster we had made
* (and we would claim it since there are no
* more delayed allocated blocks in the range
* [8-11]. But our reserved cluster count had
* already gone to 0.
*
* Thus, at the step 4 above when we determine
* that there are still some unwritten delayed
* allocated blocks outside of our current
* block range, we should increment the
* reserved clusters count so that when the
* remaining blocks finally gets written, we
* could claim them.
*/
dquot_reserve_block(inode,
EXT4_C2B(sbi, reservation));
spin_lock(&ei->i_block_reservation_lock);
ei->i_reserved_data_blocks += reservation;
spin_unlock(&ei->i_block_reservation_lock);
}
/*
* We will claim quota for all newly allocated blocks.
* We're updating the reserved space *after* the
* correction above so we do not accidentally free
* all the metadata reservation because we might
* actually need it later on.
*/
ext4_da_update_reserve_space(inode, allocated_clusters,
1);
}
}
/*
* Cache the extent and update transaction to commit on fdatasync only
* when it is _not_ an unwritten extent.
*/
if ((flags & EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_UNWRIT_EXT) == 0)
ext4_update_inode_fsync_trans(handle, inode, 1);
else
ext4_update_inode_fsync_trans(handle, inode, 0);
out:
if (allocated > map->m_len)
allocated = map->m_len;
ext4_ext_show_leaf(inode, path);
map->m_flags |= EXT4_MAP_MAPPED;
map->m_pblk = newblock;
map->m_len = allocated;
out2:
ext4_ext_drop_refs(path);
kfree(path);
trace_ext4_ext_map_blocks_exit(inode, flags, map,
err ? err : allocated);
return err ? err : allocated;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
linux
|
bc890a60247171294acc0bd67d211fa4b88d40ba
| 141,350,352,748,685,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 346 |
ext4: verify the depth of extent tree in ext4_find_extent()
If there is a corupted file system where the claimed depth of the
extent tree is -1, this can cause a massive buffer overrun leading to
sadness.
This addresses CVE-2018-10877.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199417
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
save_dead_message_env (compose_env_t *env)
{
if (mailvar_is_true (mailvar_name_save))
{
mu_stream_t dead_letter, str;
int rc;
time_t t;
struct tm *tm;
const char *name = getenv ("DEAD");
char *sender;
/* FIXME: Use MU_STREAM_APPEND if appenddeadletter, instead of the
stream manipulations below */
rc = mu_file_stream_create (&dead_letter, name,
MU_STREAM_CREAT|MU_STREAM_WRITE);
if (rc)
{
mu_error (_("Cannot open file %s: %s"), name, strerror (rc));
return 1;
}
if (mailvar_is_true (mailvar_name_appenddeadletter))
mu_stream_seek (dead_letter, 0, MU_SEEK_END, NULL);
else
mu_stream_truncate (dead_letter, 0);
time (&t);
tm = gmtime (&t);
sender = mu_get_user_email (NULL);
if (!sender)
sender = mu_strdup ("UNKNOWN");
mu_stream_printf (dead_letter, "From %s ", sender);
free (sender);
mu_c_streamftime (dead_letter, "%c%n", tm, NULL);
if (mu_header_get_streamref (env->header, &str) == 0)
{
mu_stream_copy (dead_letter, str, 0, NULL);
mu_stream_unref (str);
}
else
mu_stream_write (dead_letter, "\n", 1, NULL);
mu_stream_seek (env->compstr, 0, MU_SEEK_SET, NULL);
mu_stream_copy (dead_letter, env->compstr, 0, NULL);
mu_stream_write (dead_letter, "\n", 1, NULL);
mu_stream_destroy (&dead_letter);
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
mailutils
|
4befcfd015256c568121653038accbd84820198f
| 85,445,495,618,501,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 49 |
mail: disable compose escapes in non-interctive mode.
* NEWS: Document changes.
* doc/texinfo/programs/mail.texi: Document changes.
* mail/send.c (mail_compose_send): Recognize escapes only in
interactive mode.
|
void Chapter::Clear() {
StrCpy(NULL, &id_);
while (displays_count_ > 0) {
Display& d = displays_[--displays_count_];
d.Clear();
}
delete[] displays_;
displays_ = NULL;
displays_size_ = 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
libvpx
|
f00890eecdf8365ea125ac16769a83aa6b68792d
| 9,486,336,427,931,897,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
update libwebm to libwebm-1.0.0.27-352-g6ab9fcf
https://chromium.googlesource.com/webm/libwebm/+log/af81f26..6ab9fcf
Change-Id: I9d56e1fbaba9b96404b4fbabefddc1a85b79c25d
|
struct r_bin_mdmp_obj *r_bin_mdmp_new_buf(RBuffer *buf) {
bool fail = false;
struct r_bin_mdmp_obj *obj = R_NEW0 (struct r_bin_mdmp_obj);
if (!obj) {
return NULL;
}
obj->kv = sdb_new0 ();
obj->size = (ut32) r_buf_size (buf);
fail |= (!(obj->streams.ex_threads = r_list_new ()));
fail |= (!(obj->streams.memories = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free)));
fail |= (!(obj->streams.memories64.memories = r_list_new ()));
fail |= (!(obj->streams.memory_infos = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free)));
fail |= (!(obj->streams.modules = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free)));
fail |= (!(obj->streams.operations = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free)));
fail |= (!(obj->streams.thread_infos = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free)));
fail |= (!(obj->streams.token_infos = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free)));
fail |= (!(obj->streams.threads = r_list_new ()));
fail |= (!(obj->streams.unloaded_modules = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free)));
fail |= (!(obj->pe32_bins = r_list_newf (r_bin_mdmp_free_pe32_bin)));
fail |= (!(obj->pe64_bins = r_list_newf (r_bin_mdmp_free_pe64_bin)));
if (fail) {
r_bin_mdmp_free (obj);
return NULL;
}
obj->b = r_buf_ref (buf);
if (!r_bin_mdmp_init (obj)) {
r_bin_mdmp_free (obj);
return NULL;
}
return obj;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] |
radare2
|
27fe8031782d3a06c3998eaa94354867864f9f1b
| 193,537,887,345,113,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 36 |
Fix DoS in the minidump parser ##crash
* Reported by lazymio via huntr.dev
* Reproducer: mdmp-dos
|
static int __follow_pte(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address,
pte_t **ptepp, spinlock_t **ptlp)
{
pgd_t *pgd;
pud_t *pud;
pmd_t *pmd;
pte_t *ptep;
pgd = pgd_offset(mm, address);
if (pgd_none(*pgd) || unlikely(pgd_bad(*pgd)))
goto out;
pud = pud_offset(pgd, address);
if (pud_none(*pud) || unlikely(pud_bad(*pud)))
goto out;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
VM_BUG_ON(pmd_trans_huge(*pmd));
if (pmd_none(*pmd) || unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
goto out;
/* We cannot handle huge page PFN maps. Luckily they don't exist. */
if (pmd_huge(*pmd))
goto out;
ptep = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmd, address, ptlp);
if (!ptep)
goto out;
if (!pte_present(*ptep))
goto unlock;
*ptepp = ptep;
return 0;
unlock:
pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, *ptlp);
out:
return -EINVAL;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264"
] |
linux-2.6
|
1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25
| 308,076,509,738,393,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 |
mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> [2.6.38+]
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
int MP4_ReadBoxContainerChildren( stream_t *p_stream, MP4_Box_t *p_container,
uint32_t i_last_child )
{
return MP4_ReadBoxContainerChildrenIndexed( p_stream, p_container,
i_last_child, false );
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-120",
"CWE-191",
"CWE-787"
] |
vlc
|
2e7c7091a61aa5d07e7997b393d821e91f593c39
| 17,228,442,671,218,225,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
demux: mp4: fix buffer overflow in parsing of string boxes.
We ensure that pbox->i_size is never smaller than 8 to avoid an
integer underflow in the third argument of the subsequent call to
memcpy. We also make sure no truncation occurs when passing values
derived from the 64 bit integer p_box->i_size to arguments of malloc
and memcpy that may be 32 bit integers on 32 bit platforms.
Signed-off-by: Jean-Baptiste Kempf <[email protected]>
|
e_ews_connection_create_items_finish (EEwsConnection *cnc,
GAsyncResult *result,
GSList **ids,
GError **error)
{
GSimpleAsyncResult *simple;
EwsAsyncData *async_data;
g_return_val_if_fail (cnc != NULL, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (
g_simple_async_result_is_valid (
result, G_OBJECT (cnc), e_ews_connection_create_items),
FALSE);
simple = G_SIMPLE_ASYNC_RESULT (result);
async_data = g_simple_async_result_get_op_res_gpointer (simple);
if (g_simple_async_result_propagate_error (simple, error))
return FALSE;
/* if there is only one item, then check whether it's an error */
if (async_data->items && !async_data->items->next) {
EEwsItem *item = async_data->items->data;
if (item && e_ews_item_get_item_type (item) == E_EWS_ITEM_TYPE_ERROR) {
if (error)
*error = g_error_copy (e_ews_item_get_error (item));
g_slist_free_full (async_data->items, g_object_unref);
async_data->items = NULL;
return FALSE;
}
}
*ids = async_data->items;
return TRUE;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-295"
] |
evolution-ews
|
915226eca9454b8b3e5adb6f2fff9698451778de
| 310,579,394,826,716,320,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 39 |
I#27 - SSL Certificates are not validated
This depends on https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution-data-server/commit/6672b8236139bd6ef41ecb915f4c72e2a052dba5 too.
Closes https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution-ews/issues/27
|
PJ_DEF(pj_status_t) pjmedia_sdp_neg_modify_local_offer2(
pj_pool_t *pool,
pjmedia_sdp_neg *neg,
unsigned flags,
const pjmedia_sdp_session *local)
{
pjmedia_sdp_session *new_offer;
pjmedia_sdp_session *old_offer;
char media_used[PJMEDIA_MAX_SDP_MEDIA];
unsigned oi; /* old offer media index */
pj_status_t status;
/* Check arguments are valid. */
PJ_ASSERT_RETURN(pool && neg && local, PJ_EINVAL);
/* Can only do this in STATE_DONE. */
PJ_ASSERT_RETURN(neg->state == PJMEDIA_SDP_NEG_STATE_DONE,
PJMEDIA_SDPNEG_EINSTATE);
/* Validate the new offer */
status = pjmedia_sdp_validate(local);
if (status != PJ_SUCCESS)
return status;
/* Change state to STATE_LOCAL_OFFER */
neg->state = PJMEDIA_SDP_NEG_STATE_LOCAL_OFFER;
/* Init vars */
pj_bzero(media_used, sizeof(media_used));
old_offer = neg->active_local_sdp;
new_offer = pjmedia_sdp_session_clone(pool, local);
/* RFC 3264 Section 8: When issuing an offer that modifies the session,
* the "o=" line of the new SDP MUST be identical to that in the
* previous SDP, except that the version in the origin field MUST
* increment by one from the previous SDP.
*/
pj_strdup(pool, &new_offer->origin.user, &old_offer->origin.user);
new_offer->origin.id = old_offer->origin.id;
pj_strdup(pool, &new_offer->origin.net_type, &old_offer->origin.net_type);
pj_strdup(pool, &new_offer->origin.addr_type,&old_offer->origin.addr_type);
pj_strdup(pool, &new_offer->origin.addr, &old_offer->origin.addr);
if ((flags & PJMEDIA_SDP_NEG_ALLOW_MEDIA_CHANGE) == 0) {
/* Generating the new offer, in the case media lines doesn't match the
* active SDP (e.g. current/active SDP's have m=audio and m=video lines,
* and the new offer only has m=audio line), the negotiator will fix
* the new offer by reordering and adding the missing media line with
* port number set to zero.
*/
for (oi = 0; oi < old_offer->media_count; ++oi) {
pjmedia_sdp_media *om;
pjmedia_sdp_media *nm;
unsigned ni; /* new offer media index */
pj_bool_t found = PJ_FALSE;
om = old_offer->media[oi];
for (ni = oi; ni < new_offer->media_count; ++ni) {
nm = new_offer->media[ni];
if (pj_strcmp(&nm->desc.media, &om->desc.media) == 0) {
if (ni != oi) {
/* The same media found but the position unmatched to
* the old offer, so let's put this media in the right
* place, and keep the order of the rest.
*/
pj_array_insert(
new_offer->media, /* array */
sizeof(new_offer->media[0]), /* elmt size*/
ni, /* count */
oi, /* pos */
&nm); /* new elmt */
}
found = PJ_TRUE;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
pjmedia_sdp_media *m;
m = sdp_media_clone_deactivate(pool, om, om, local);
pj_array_insert(new_offer->media, sizeof(new_offer->media[0]),
new_offer->media_count++, oi, &m);
}
}
} else {
/* If media type change is allowed, the negotiator only needs to fix
* the new offer by adding the missing media line(s) with port number
* set to zero.
*/
for (oi = new_offer->media_count; oi < old_offer->media_count; ++oi) {
pjmedia_sdp_media *m;
m = sdp_media_clone_deactivate(pool, old_offer->media[oi],
old_offer->media[oi], local);
pj_array_insert(new_offer->media, sizeof(new_offer->media[0]),
new_offer->media_count++, oi, &m);
}
}
/* New_offer fixed */
#if PJMEDIA_SDP_NEG_COMPARE_BEFORE_INC_VERSION
new_offer->origin.version = old_offer->origin.version;
if (pjmedia_sdp_session_cmp(new_offer, neg->initial_sdp, 0) != PJ_SUCCESS)
{
++new_offer->origin.version;
}
#else
new_offer->origin.version = old_offer->origin.version + 1;
#endif
neg->initial_sdp_tmp = neg->initial_sdp;
neg->initial_sdp = new_offer;
neg->neg_local_sdp = pjmedia_sdp_session_clone(pool, new_offer);
return PJ_SUCCESS;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-200",
"CWE-754"
] |
pjproject
|
97b3d7addbaa720b7ddb0af9bf6f3e443e664365
| 197,312,442,692,241,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 121 |
Merge pull request from GHSA-hvq6-f89p-frvp
|
Error HeifContext::get_id_of_non_virtual_child_image(heif_item_id id, heif_item_id& out) const
{
std::string image_type = m_heif_file->get_item_type(id);
if (image_type=="grid" ||
image_type=="iden" ||
image_type=="iovl") {
auto iref_box = m_heif_file->get_iref_box();
std::vector<heif_item_id> image_references = iref_box->get_references(id, fourcc("dimg"));
// TODO: check whether this really can be recursive (e.g. overlay of grid images)
if (image_references.empty()) {
return Error(heif_error_Invalid_input,
heif_suberror_No_item_data,
"Derived image does not reference any other image items");
}
else {
return get_id_of_non_virtual_child_image(image_references[0], out);
}
}
else {
out = id;
return Error::Ok;
}
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
libheif
|
f7399b62d7fbc596f1b2871578c1d2053bedf1dd
| 339,461,888,669,115,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 |
Handle case where referenced "iref" box doesn't exist (fixes #138).
|
end_write_group(JOIN *join, JOIN_TAB *join_tab __attribute__((unused)),
bool end_of_records)
{
TABLE *table= join_tab->table;
int idx= -1;
DBUG_ENTER("end_write_group");
if (!join->first_record || end_of_records ||
(idx=test_if_group_changed(join->group_fields)) >= 0)
{
if (join->first_record || (end_of_records && !join->group))
{
if (join->procedure)
join->procedure->end_group();
int send_group_parts= join->send_group_parts;
if (idx < send_group_parts)
{
if (!join->first_record)
{
/* No matching rows for group function */
join->clear();
}
copy_sum_funcs(join->sum_funcs,
join->sum_funcs_end[send_group_parts]);
if (!join_tab->having || join_tab->having->val_int())
{
int error= table->file->ha_write_tmp_row(table->record[0]);
if (unlikely(error) &&
create_internal_tmp_table_from_heap(join->thd, table,
join_tab->tmp_table_param->start_recinfo,
&join_tab->tmp_table_param->recinfo,
error, 0, NULL))
DBUG_RETURN(NESTED_LOOP_ERROR);
}
if (unlikely(join->rollup.state != ROLLUP::STATE_NONE))
{
if (unlikely(join->rollup_write_data((uint) (idx+1),
join_tab->tmp_table_param,
table)))
{
DBUG_RETURN(NESTED_LOOP_ERROR);
}
}
if (end_of_records)
goto end;
}
}
else
{
if (end_of_records)
goto end;
join->first_record=1;
(void) test_if_group_changed(join->group_fields);
}
if (idx < (int) join->send_group_parts)
{
copy_fields(join_tab->tmp_table_param);
if (unlikely(copy_funcs(join_tab->tmp_table_param->items_to_copy,
join->thd)))
DBUG_RETURN(NESTED_LOOP_ERROR);
if (unlikely(init_sum_functions(join->sum_funcs,
join->sum_funcs_end[idx+1])))
DBUG_RETURN(NESTED_LOOP_ERROR);
if (unlikely(join->procedure))
join->procedure->add();
goto end;
}
}
if (unlikely(update_sum_func(join->sum_funcs)))
DBUG_RETURN(NESTED_LOOP_ERROR);
if (unlikely(join->procedure))
join->procedure->add();
end:
if (unlikely(join->thd->check_killed()))
{
DBUG_RETURN(NESTED_LOOP_KILLED); /* purecov: inspected */
}
DBUG_RETURN(NESTED_LOOP_OK);
}
| 0 |
[] |
server
|
ff77a09bda884fe6bf3917eb29b9d3a2f53f919b
| 8,039,926,638,485,735,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 79 |
MDEV-22464 Server crash on UPDATE with nested subquery
Uninitialized ref_pointer_array[] because setup_fields() got empty
fields list. mysql_multi_update() for some reason does that by
substituting the fields list with empty total_list for the
mysql_select() call (looks like wrong merge since total_list is not
used anywhere else and is always empty). The fix would be to return
back the original fields list. But this fails update_use_source.test
case:
--error ER_BAD_FIELD_ERROR
update v1 set t1c1=2 order by 1;
Actually not failing the above seems to be ok.
The other fix would be to keep resolve_in_select_list false (and that
keeps outer context from being resolved in
Item_ref::fix_fields()). This fix is more consistent with how SELECT
behaves:
--error ER_SUBQUERY_NO_1_ROW
select a from t1 where a= (select 2 from t1 having (a = 3));
So this patch implements this fix.
|
cmd_http_sendhex(CMD_ARGS)
{
struct http *hp;
char buf[3], *q;
uint8_t *p;
int i, j, l;
(void)cmd;
(void)vl;
CAST_OBJ_NOTNULL(hp, priv, HTTP_MAGIC);
AN(av[1]);
AZ(av[2]);
l = strlen(av[1]) / 2;
p = malloc(l);
AN(p);
q = av[1];
for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
while (vct_issp(*q))
q++;
if (*q == '\0')
break;
memcpy(buf, q, 2);
q += 2;
buf[2] = '\0';
if (!vct_ishex(buf[0]) || !vct_ishex(buf[1]))
vtc_log(hp->vl, 0, "Illegal Hex char \"%c%c\"",
buf[0], buf[1]);
p[i] = (uint8_t)strtoul(buf, NULL, 16);
}
vtc_hexdump(hp->vl, 4, "sendhex", (void*)p, i);
j = write(hp->fd, p, i);
assert(j == i);
free(p);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-269"
] |
Varnish-Cache
|
85e8468bec9416bd7e16b0d80cb820ecd2b330c3
| 256,516,207,942,745,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 |
Do not consider a CR by itself as a valid line terminator
Varnish (prior to version 4.0) was not following the standard with
regard to line separator.
Spotted and analyzed by: Régis Leroy [regilero] [email protected]
|
void swoole_serialize_init(int module_number TSRMLS_DC)
{
SWOOLE_INIT_CLASS_ENTRY(swoole_serialize_ce, "swoole_serialize", "Swoole\\Serialize", swoole_serialize_methods);
swoole_serialize_class_entry_ptr = zend_register_internal_class(&swoole_serialize_ce TSRMLS_CC);
SWOOLE_CLASS_ALIAS(swoole_serialize, "Swoole\\Serialize");
// ZVAL_STRING(&swSeriaG.sleep_fname, "__sleep");
zend_string *zstr_sleep = zend_string_init("__sleep", sizeof ("__sleep") - 1, 1);
zend_string *zstr_weekup = zend_string_init("__weekup", sizeof ("__weekup") - 1, 1);
ZVAL_STR(&swSeriaG.sleep_fname, zstr_sleep);
ZVAL_STR(&swSeriaG.weekup_fname, zstr_weekup);
// ZVAL_STRING(&swSeriaG.weekup_fname, "__weekup");
memset(&swSeriaG.filter, 0, sizeof (swSeriaG.filter));
memset(&mini_filter, 0, sizeof (mini_filter));
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("SWOOLE_FAST_PACK", SW_FAST_PACK, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("UNSERIALIZE_OBJECT_TO_ARRAY", UNSERIALIZE_OBJECT_TO_ARRAY, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("UNSERIALIZE_OBJECT_TO_STDCLASS", UNSERIALIZE_OBJECT_TO_STDCLASS, CONST_CS | CONST_PERSISTENT);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200",
"CWE-502"
] |
swoole-src
|
4cdbce5d9bf2fe596bb6acd7d6611f9e8c253a76
| 119,155,685,754,960,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
add buffer end check
|
char *convert_query_hexchar(char *txt)
{
int d1, d2;
if (strlen(txt) < 3) {
*txt = '\0';
return txt-1;
}
d1 = hextoint(*(txt+1));
d2 = hextoint(*(txt+2));
if (d1<0 || d2<0) {
strcpy(txt, txt+3);
return txt-1;
} else {
*txt = d1 * 16 + d2;
strcpy(txt+1, txt+3);
return txt;
}
}
| 0 |
[] |
cgit
|
02a545e63454530c1639014d3239c14ced2022c6
| 10,782,252,576,671,145,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
Add support for cloning over http
This patch implements basic support for cloning over http, based on the
work on git-http-backend by Shawn O. Pearce.
Signed-off-by: Lars Hjemli <[email protected]>
|
bool Aggregator_distinct::unique_walk_function_for_count(void *element)
{
Item_sum_count *sum= (Item_sum_count *)item_sum;
sum->count++;
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-120"
] |
server
|
eca207c46293bc72dd8d0d5622153fab4d3fccf1
| 62,167,815,905,399,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
MDEV-25317 Assertion `scale <= precision' failed in decimal_bin_size And Assertion `scale >= 0 && precision > 0 && scale <= precision' failed in decimal_bin_size_inline/decimal_bin_size.
Precision should be kept below DECIMAL_MAX_SCALE for computations.
It can be bigger in Item_decimal. I'd fix this too but it changes the
existing behaviour so problemmatic to ix.
|
void xt_compat_target_from_user(struct xt_entry_target *t, void **dstptr,
unsigned int *size)
{
const struct xt_target *target = t->u.kernel.target;
struct compat_xt_entry_target *ct = (struct compat_xt_entry_target *)t;
int off = xt_compat_target_offset(target);
u_int16_t tsize = ct->u.user.target_size;
char name[sizeof(t->u.user.name)];
t = *dstptr;
memcpy(t, ct, sizeof(*ct));
if (target->compat_from_user)
target->compat_from_user(t->data, ct->data);
else
memcpy(t->data, ct->data, tsize - sizeof(*ct));
tsize += off;
t->u.user.target_size = tsize;
strlcpy(name, target->name, sizeof(name));
module_put(target->me);
strncpy(t->u.user.name, name, sizeof(t->u.user.name));
*size += off;
*dstptr += tsize;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
b29c457a6511435960115c0f548c4360d5f4801d
| 325,466,358,307,912,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 |
netfilter: x_tables: fix compat match/target pad out-of-bound write
xt_compat_match/target_from_user doesn't check that zeroing the area
to start of next rule won't write past end of allocated ruleset blob.
Remove this code and zero the entire blob beforehand.
Reported-by: [email protected]
Reported-by: Andy Nguyen <[email protected]>
Fixes: 9fa492cdc160c ("[NETFILTER]: x_tables: simplify compat API")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
|
int nfc_activate_target(struct nfc_dev *dev, u32 target_idx, u32 protocol)
{
int rc;
struct nfc_target *target;
pr_debug("dev_name=%s target_idx=%u protocol=%u\n",
dev_name(&dev->dev), target_idx, protocol);
device_lock(&dev->dev);
if (!device_is_registered(&dev->dev)) {
rc = -ENODEV;
goto error;
}
if (dev->active_target) {
rc = -EBUSY;
goto error;
}
target = nfc_find_target(dev, target_idx);
if (target == NULL) {
rc = -ENOTCONN;
goto error;
}
rc = dev->ops->activate_target(dev, target, protocol);
if (!rc) {
dev->active_target = target;
dev->rf_mode = NFC_RF_INITIATOR;
if (dev->ops->check_presence && !dev->shutting_down)
mod_timer(&dev->check_pres_timer, jiffies +
msecs_to_jiffies(NFC_CHECK_PRES_FREQ_MS));
}
error:
device_unlock(&dev->dev);
return rc;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
da5c0f119203ad9728920456a0f52a6d850c01cd
| 92,770,391,428,014,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 40 |
nfc: replace improper check device_is_registered() in netlink related functions
The device_is_registered() in nfc core is used to check whether
nfc device is registered in netlink related functions such as
nfc_fw_download(), nfc_dev_up() and so on. Although device_is_registered()
is protected by device_lock, there is still a race condition between
device_del() and device_is_registered(). The root cause is that
kobject_del() in device_del() is not protected by device_lock.
(cleanup task) | (netlink task)
|
nfc_unregister_device | nfc_fw_download
device_del | device_lock
... | if (!device_is_registered)//(1)
kobject_del//(2) | ...
... | device_unlock
The device_is_registered() returns the value of state_in_sysfs and
the state_in_sysfs is set to zero in kobject_del(). If we pass check in
position (1), then set zero in position (2). As a result, the check
in position (1) is useless.
This patch uses bool variable instead of device_is_registered() to judge
whether the nfc device is registered, which is well synchronized.
Fixes: 3e256b8f8dfa ("NFC: add nfc subsystem core")
Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
encode_SET_IP_TTL(const struct ofpact_ip_ttl *ttl,
enum ofp_version ofp_version, struct ofpbuf *out)
{
if (ofp_version >= OFP11_VERSION) {
put_OFPAT11_SET_NW_TTL(out, ttl->ttl);
} else {
struct mf_subfield dst = { .field = mf_from_id(MFF_IP_TTL),
.ofs = 0, .n_bits = 8 };
put_reg_load(out, &dst, ttl->ttl);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
ovs
|
9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
| 316,686,485,532,347,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <[email protected]>
|
static int manager_setup_signals(Manager *m) {
struct sigaction sa = {
.sa_handler = SIG_DFL,
.sa_flags = SA_NOCLDSTOP|SA_RESTART,
};
sigset_t mask;
int r;
assert(m);
assert_se(sigaction(SIGCHLD, &sa, NULL) == 0);
/* We make liberal use of realtime signals here. On
* Linux/glibc we have 30 of them (with the exception of Linux
* on hppa, see below), between SIGRTMIN+0 ... SIGRTMIN+30
* (aka SIGRTMAX). */
assert_se(sigemptyset(&mask) == 0);
sigset_add_many(&mask,
SIGCHLD, /* Child died */
SIGTERM, /* Reexecute daemon */
SIGHUP, /* Reload configuration */
SIGUSR1, /* systemd/upstart: reconnect to D-Bus */
SIGUSR2, /* systemd: dump status */
SIGINT, /* Kernel sends us this on control-alt-del */
SIGWINCH, /* Kernel sends us this on kbrequest (alt-arrowup) */
SIGPWR, /* Some kernel drivers and upsd send us this on power failure */
SIGRTMIN+0, /* systemd: start default.target */
SIGRTMIN+1, /* systemd: isolate rescue.target */
SIGRTMIN+2, /* systemd: isolate emergency.target */
SIGRTMIN+3, /* systemd: start halt.target */
SIGRTMIN+4, /* systemd: start poweroff.target */
SIGRTMIN+5, /* systemd: start reboot.target */
SIGRTMIN+6, /* systemd: start kexec.target */
/* ... space for more special targets ... */
SIGRTMIN+13, /* systemd: Immediate halt */
SIGRTMIN+14, /* systemd: Immediate poweroff */
SIGRTMIN+15, /* systemd: Immediate reboot */
SIGRTMIN+16, /* systemd: Immediate kexec */
/* ... space for more immediate system state changes ... */
SIGRTMIN+20, /* systemd: enable status messages */
SIGRTMIN+21, /* systemd: disable status messages */
SIGRTMIN+22, /* systemd: set log level to LOG_DEBUG */
SIGRTMIN+23, /* systemd: set log level to LOG_INFO */
SIGRTMIN+24, /* systemd: Immediate exit (--user only) */
/* .. one free signal here ... */
#if !defined(__hppa64__) && !defined(__hppa__)
/* Apparently Linux on hppa has fewer RT
* signals (SIGRTMAX is SIGRTMIN+25 there),
* hence let's not try to make use of them
* here. Since these commands are accessible
* by different means and only really a safety
* net, the missing functionality on hppa
* shouldn't matter. */
SIGRTMIN+26, /* systemd: set log target to journal-or-kmsg */
SIGRTMIN+27, /* systemd: set log target to console */
SIGRTMIN+28, /* systemd: set log target to kmsg */
SIGRTMIN+29, /* systemd: set log target to syslog-or-kmsg (obsolete) */
/* ... one free signal here SIGRTMIN+30 ... */
#endif
-1);
assert_se(sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &mask, NULL) == 0);
m->signal_fd = signalfd(-1, &mask, SFD_NONBLOCK|SFD_CLOEXEC);
if (m->signal_fd < 0)
return -errno;
r = sd_event_add_io(m->event, &m->signal_event_source, m->signal_fd, EPOLLIN, manager_dispatch_signal_fd, m);
if (r < 0)
return r;
(void) sd_event_source_set_description(m->signal_event_source, "manager-signal");
/* Process signals a bit earlier than the rest of things, but later than notify_fd processing, so that the
* notify processing can still figure out to which process/service a message belongs, before we reap the
* process. Also, process this before handling cgroup notifications, so that we always collect child exit
* status information before detecting that there's no process in a cgroup. */
r = sd_event_source_set_priority(m->signal_event_source, SD_EVENT_PRIORITY_NORMAL-6);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (MANAGER_IS_SYSTEM(m))
return enable_special_signals(m);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
systemd
|
531ac2b2349da02acc9c382849758e07eb92b020
| 34,214,659,108,187,805,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 95 |
If the notification message length is 0, ignore the message (#4237)
Fixes #4234.
Signed-off-by: Jorge Niedbalski <[email protected]>
|
static struct smp_ltk_info *get_ltk(GKeyFile *key_file, const char *peer,
uint8_t peer_type, const char *group)
{
struct smp_ltk_info *ltk = NULL;
GError *gerr = NULL;
bool master;
char *key;
char *rand = NULL;
key = g_key_file_get_string(key_file, group, "Key", NULL);
if (!key || strlen(key) < 32)
goto failed;
rand = g_key_file_get_string(key_file, group, "Rand", NULL);
if (!rand)
goto failed;
ltk = g_new0(struct smp_ltk_info, 1);
/* Default to assuming a master key */
ltk->master = true;
str2ba(peer, <k->bdaddr);
ltk->bdaddr_type = peer_type;
/*
* Long term keys should respond to an identity address which can
* either be a public address or a random static address. Keys
* stored for resolvable random and unresolvable random addresses
* are ignored.
*
* This is an extra sanity check for older kernel versions or older
* daemons that might have been instructed to store long term keys
* for these temporary addresses.
*/
if (ltk->bdaddr_type == BDADDR_LE_RANDOM &&
(ltk->bdaddr.b[5] & 0xc0) != 0xc0) {
g_free(ltk);
ltk = NULL;
goto failed;
}
if (!strncmp(key, "0x", 2))
str2buf(&key[2], ltk->val, sizeof(ltk->val));
else
str2buf(&key[0], ltk->val, sizeof(ltk->val));
if (!strncmp(rand, "0x", 2)) {
uint64_t rand_le;
str2buf(&rand[2], (uint8_t *) &rand_le, sizeof(rand_le));
ltk->rand = le64_to_cpu(rand_le);
} else {
sscanf(rand, "%" PRIu64, <k->rand);
}
ltk->authenticated = g_key_file_get_integer(key_file, group,
"Authenticated", NULL);
ltk->enc_size = g_key_file_get_integer(key_file, group, "EncSize",
NULL);
ltk->ediv = g_key_file_get_integer(key_file, group, "EDiv", NULL);
master = g_key_file_get_boolean(key_file, group, "Master", &gerr);
if (gerr)
g_error_free(gerr);
else
ltk->master = master;
ltk->is_blocked = is_blocked_key(HCI_BLOCKED_KEY_TYPE_LTK,
ltk->val);
failed:
g_free(key);
g_free(rand);
return ltk;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-862",
"CWE-863"
] |
bluez
|
b497b5942a8beb8f89ca1c359c54ad67ec843055
| 122,422,596,497,648,280,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 76 |
adapter: Fix storing discoverable setting
discoverable setting shall only be store when changed via Discoverable
property and not when discovery client set it as that be considered
temporary just for the lifetime of the discovery.
|
getCharacters (FileInfo * nested, CharsString * characters)
{
/*Get ruleChars string */
CharsString token;
if (getToken (nested, &token, "characters"))
if (parseChars (nested, characters, &token))
return 1;
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
liblouis
|
dc97ef791a4fae9da11592c79f9f79e010596e0c
| 233,518,646,446,890,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 |
Merge branch 'table_resolver'
|
static int sctp_setsockopt_peer_primary_addr(struct sock *sk, char __user *optval,
unsigned int optlen)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
struct sctp_sock *sp;
struct sctp_association *asoc = NULL;
struct sctp_setpeerprim prim;
struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
struct sctp_af *af;
int err;
sp = sctp_sk(sk);
if (!net->sctp.addip_enable)
return -EPERM;
if (optlen != sizeof(struct sctp_setpeerprim))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&prim, optval, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, prim.sspp_assoc_id);
if (!asoc)
return -EINVAL;
if (!asoc->peer.asconf_capable)
return -EPERM;
if (asoc->peer.addip_disabled_mask & SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY)
return -EPERM;
if (!sctp_state(asoc, ESTABLISHED))
return -ENOTCONN;
af = sctp_get_af_specific(prim.sspp_addr.ss_family);
if (!af)
return -EINVAL;
if (!af->addr_valid((union sctp_addr *)&prim.sspp_addr, sp, NULL))
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (!sctp_assoc_lookup_laddr(asoc, (union sctp_addr *)&prim.sspp_addr))
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
/* Create an ASCONF chunk with SET_PRIMARY parameter */
chunk = sctp_make_asconf_set_prim(asoc,
(union sctp_addr *)&prim.sspp_addr);
if (!chunk)
return -ENOMEM;
err = sctp_send_asconf(asoc, chunk);
SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("We set peer primary addr primitively.\n");
return err;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
linux
|
726bc6b092da4c093eb74d13c07184b18c1af0f1
| 242,212,455,796,043,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 57 |
net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
bool PrimaryChromaticity::Parse(IMkvReader* reader, long long read_pos,
long long value_size, bool is_x,
PrimaryChromaticity** chromaticity) {
if (!reader)
return false;
if (!*chromaticity)
*chromaticity = new PrimaryChromaticity();
if (!*chromaticity)
return false;
PrimaryChromaticity* pc = *chromaticity;
float* value = is_x ? &pc->x : &pc->y;
double parser_value = 0;
const long long parse_status =
UnserializeFloat(reader, read_pos, value_size, parser_value);
// Valid range is [0, 1]. Make sure the double is representable as a float
// before casting.
if (parse_status < 0 || parser_value < 0.0 || parser_value > 1.0 ||
(parser_value > 0.0 && parser_value < FLT_MIN))
return false;
*value = static_cast<float>(parser_value);
return true;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
libvpx
|
34d54b04e98dd0bac32e9aab0fbda0bf501bc742
| 54,373,388,115,559,910,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 |
update libwebm to libwebm-1.0.0.27-358-gdbf1d10
changelog:
https://chromium.googlesource.com/webm/libwebm/+log/libwebm-1.0.0.27-351-g9f23fbc..libwebm-1.0.0.27-358-gdbf1d10
Change-Id: I28a6b3ae02a53fb1f2029eee11e9449afb94c8e3
|
Subsets and Splits
CWE 416 & 19
The query filters records related to specific CWEs (Common Weakness Enumerations), providing a basic overview of entries with these vulnerabilities but without deeper analysis.
CWE Frequency in Train Set
Counts the occurrences of each CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) in the dataset, providing a basic distribution but limited insight.