func
stringlengths 0
484k
| target
int64 0
1
| cwe
listlengths 0
4
| project
stringclasses 799
values | commit_id
stringlengths 40
40
| hash
float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
| size
int64 1
24k
| message
stringlengths 0
13.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
void dcn10_clock_source_destroy(struct clock_source **clk_src)
{
kfree(TO_DCE110_CLK_SRC(*clk_src));
*clk_src = NULL;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-401"
] |
linux
|
104c307147ad379617472dd91a5bcb368d72bd6d
| 176,085,259,165,528,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
drm/amd/display: prevent memory leak
In dcn*_create_resource_pool the allocated memory should be released if
construct pool fails.
Reviewed-by: Harry Wentland <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
|
void CoreUserInputHandler::issueQuit(const QString &reason)
{
emit putCmd("QUIT", serverEncode(reason));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
quassel
|
b5e38970ffd55e2dd9f706ce75af9a8d7730b1b8
| 240,981,230,194,819,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Improve the message-splitting algorithm for PRIVMSG and CTCP
This introduces a new message splitting algorithm based on
QTextBoundaryFinder. It works by first starting with the entire
message to be sent, encoding it, and checking to see if it is over
the maximum message length. If it is, it uses QTBF to find the
word boundary most immediately preceding the maximum length. If no
suitable boundary can be found, it falls back to searching for
grapheme boundaries. It repeats this process until the entire
message has been sent.
Unlike what it replaces, the new splitting code is not recursive
and cannot cause stack overflows. Additionally, if it is unable
to split a string, it will give up gracefully and not crash the
core or cause a thread to run away.
This patch fixes two bugs. The first is garbage characters caused
by accidentally splitting the string in the middle of a multibyte
character. Since the new code splits at a character level instead
of a byte level, this will no longer be an issue. The second is
the core crash caused by sending an overlength CTCP query ("/me")
containing only multibyte characters. This bug was caused by the
old CTCP splitter using the byte index from lastParamOverrun() as
a character index for a QString.
|
g_file_new_tmp (const char *tmpl,
GFileIOStream **iostream,
GError **error)
{
gint fd;
gchar *path;
GFile *file;
GFileOutputStream *output;
g_return_val_if_fail (iostream != NULL, NULL);
fd = g_file_open_tmp (tmpl, &path, error);
if (fd == -1)
return NULL;
file = g_file_new_for_path (path);
output = _g_local_file_output_stream_new (fd);
*iostream = _g_local_file_io_stream_new (G_LOCAL_FILE_OUTPUT_STREAM (output));
g_object_unref (output);
g_free (path);
return file;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-362"
] |
glib
|
d8f8f4d637ce43f8699ba94c9b7648beda0ca174
| 234,083,301,842,312,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 |
gfile: Limit access to files when copying
file_copy_fallback creates new files with default permissions and
set the correct permissions after the operation is finished. This
might cause that the files can be accessible by more users during
the operation than expected. Use G_FILE_CREATE_PRIVATE for the new
files to limit access to those files.
|
void Magick::Image::adaptiveBlur(const double radius_,const double sigma_)
{
MagickCore::Image
*newImage;
GetPPException;
newImage=AdaptiveBlurImage(constImage(),radius_,sigma_,exceptionInfo);
replaceImage(newImage);
ThrowImageException;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
ImageMagick
|
8c35502217c1879cb8257c617007282eee3fe1cc
| 319,584,976,803,547,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
Added missing return to avoid use after free.
|
static int compat_nfs_svc_trans(struct nfsctl_arg *karg,
struct compat_nfsctl_arg __user *arg)
{
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, &arg->ca32_svc, sizeof(arg->ca32_svc)) ||
get_user(karg->ca_version, &arg->ca32_version) ||
__get_user(karg->ca_svc.svc_port, &arg->ca32_svc.svc32_port) ||
__get_user(karg->ca_svc.svc_nthreads,
&arg->ca32_svc.svc32_nthreads))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux-2.6
|
822191a2fa1584a29c3224ab328507adcaeac1ab
| 137,311,404,663,951,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
[PATCH] skip data conversion in compat_sys_mount when data_page is NULL
OpenVZ Linux kernel team has found a problem with mounting in compat mode.
Simple command "mount -t smbfs ..." on Fedora Core 5 distro in 32-bit mode
leads to oops:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000 RIP: compat_sys_mount+0xd6/0x290
Process mount (pid: 14656, veid=300, threadinfo ffff810034d30000, task ffff810034c86bc0)
Call Trace: ia32_sysret+0x0/0xa
The problem is that data_page pointer can be NULL, so we should skip data
conversion in this case.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Mirkin <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void esp_output_encap_csum(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
/* UDP encap with IPv6 requires a valid checksum */
if (*skb_mac_header(skb) == IPPROTO_UDP) {
struct udphdr *uh = udp_hdr(skb);
struct ipv6hdr *ip6h = ipv6_hdr(skb);
int len = ntohs(uh->len);
unsigned int offset = skb_transport_offset(skb);
__wsum csum = skb_checksum(skb, offset, skb->len - offset, 0);
uh->check = csum_ipv6_magic(&ip6h->saddr, &ip6h->daddr,
len, IPPROTO_UDP, csum);
if (uh->check == 0)
uh->check = CSUM_MANGLED_0;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
ebe48d368e97d007bfeb76fcb065d6cfc4c96645
| 329,324,944,182,528,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
esp: Fix possible buffer overflow in ESP transformation
The maximum message size that can be send is bigger than
the maximum site that skb_page_frag_refill can allocate.
So it is possible to write beyond the allocated buffer.
Fix this by doing a fallback to COW in that case.
v2:
Avoid get get_order() costs as suggested by Linus Torvalds.
Fixes: cac2661c53f3 ("esp4: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible")
Fixes: 03e2a30f6a27 ("esp6: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible")
Reported-by: valis <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
|
MagickExport MagickBooleanType FunctionImage(Image *image,
const MagickFunction function,const size_t number_parameters,
const double *parameters,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define FunctionImageTag "Function/Image "
CacheView
*image_view;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
progress;
ssize_t
y;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENCL_SUPPORT)
if (AccelerateFunctionImage(image,function,number_parameters,parameters,
exception) != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
#endif
if (SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass,exception) == MagickFalse)
return(MagickFalse);
status=MagickTrue;
progress=0;
image_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp parallel for schedule(static) shared(progress,status) \
magick_number_threads(image,image,image->rows,1)
#endif
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
register ssize_t
i;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) GetPixelChannels(image); i++)
{
PixelChannel channel = GetPixelChannelChannel(image,i);
PixelTrait traits = GetPixelChannelTraits(image,channel);
if (traits == UndefinedPixelTrait)
continue;
if ((traits & UpdatePixelTrait) == 0)
continue;
q[i]=ApplyFunction(q[i],function,number_parameters,parameters,
exception);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
if (image->progress_monitor != (MagickProgressMonitor) NULL)
{
MagickBooleanType
proceed;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_OPENMP_SUPPORT)
#pragma omp atomic
#endif
progress++;
proceed=SetImageProgress(image,FunctionImageTag,progress,image->rows);
if (proceed == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
return(status);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
ImageMagick
|
025e77fcb2f45b21689931ba3bf74eac153afa48
| 128,919,894,374,743,970,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 91 |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615
|
void write_events_details(int s) {
int n;
char buff[80];
struct upnp_event_notify * obj;
struct subscriber * sub;
write(s, "Events details :\n", 17);
for(obj = notifylist.lh_first; obj != NULL; obj = obj->entries.le_next) {
n = snprintf(buff, sizeof(buff), " %p sub=%p state=%d s=%d\n",
obj, obj->sub, obj->state, obj->s);
write(s, buff, n);
}
write(s, "Subscribers :\n", 14);
for(sub = subscriberlist.lh_first; sub != NULL; sub = sub->entries.le_next) {
n = snprintf(buff, sizeof(buff), " %p timeout=%d seq=%u service=%d\n",
sub, (int)sub->timeout, sub->seq, sub->service);
write(s, buff, n);
n = snprintf(buff, sizeof(buff), " notify=%p %s\n",
sub->notify, sub->uuid);
write(s, buff, n);
n = snprintf(buff, sizeof(buff), " %s\n",
sub->callback);
write(s, buff, n);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200",
"CWE-252"
] |
miniupnp
|
bec6ccec63cadc95655721bc0e1dd49dac759d94
| 219,963,355,780,761,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 |
upnp_event_prepare(): check the return value of snprintf()
|
_gcry_mpi_ec_set_mpi (const char *name, gcry_mpi_t newvalue,
gcry_ctx_t ctx)
{
mpi_ec_t ec = _gcry_ctx_get_pointer (ctx, CONTEXT_TYPE_EC);
return _gcry_ecc_set_mpi (name, newvalue, ec);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
libgcrypt
|
88e1358962e902ff1cbec8d53ba3eee46407851a
| 52,316,443,464,783,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
ecc: Constant-time multiplication for Weierstrass curve.
* mpi/ec.c (_gcry_mpi_ec_mul_point): Use simple left-to-right binary
method for Weierstrass curve when SCALAR is secure.
|
PHP_FUNCTION(mkdir)
{
char *dir;
int dir_len;
zval *zcontext = NULL;
long mode = 0777;
zend_bool recursive = 0;
php_stream_context *context;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s|lbr", &dir, &dir_len, &mode, &recursive, &zcontext) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
context = php_stream_context_from_zval(zcontext, 0);
RETURN_BOOL(php_stream_mkdir(dir, mode, (recursive ? PHP_STREAM_MKDIR_RECURSIVE : 0) | REPORT_ERRORS, context));
}
| 1 |
[] |
php-src
|
ce96fd6b0761d98353761bf78d5bfb55291179fd
| 74,091,355,230,748,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 |
- fix #39863, do not accept paths with NULL in them. See http://news.php.net/php.internals/50191, trunk will have the patch later (adding a macro and/or changing (some) APIs. Patch by Rasmus
|
int trio_get_quote TRIO_ARGS1((ref), trio_pointer_t ref)
{
return (((trio_reference_t*)ref)->parameter->flags & FLAGS_QUOTE) ? TRUE : FALSE;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190",
"CWE-125"
] |
FreeRDP
|
05cd9ea2290d23931f615c1b004d4b2e69074e27
| 263,598,095,625,701,330,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
Fixed TrioParse and trio_length limts.
CVE-2020-4030 thanks to @antonio-morales for finding this.
|
TEST(ExpressionObjectParse, ShouldAcceptNestedObjects) {
intrusive_ptr<ExpressionContextForTest> expCtx(new ExpressionContextForTest());
VariablesParseState vps = expCtx->variablesParseState;
auto object =
ExpressionObject::parse(expCtx, fromjson("{a: {b: 1}, c: {d: {e: 1, f: 1}}}"), vps);
auto expectedResult =
Value(Document{{"a", Document{{"b", literal(1)}}},
{"c", Document{{"d", Document{{"e", literal(1)}, {"f", literal(1)}}}}}});
ASSERT_VALUE_EQ(expectedResult, object->serialize(false));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-835"
] |
mongo
|
0a076417d1d7fba3632b73349a1fd29a83e68816
| 336,920,502,606,204,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
SERVER-38070 fix infinite loop in agg expression
|
static void *createIntegerObject(const redisReadTask *task, long long value) {
redisReply *r, *parent;
r = createReplyObject(REDIS_REPLY_INTEGER);
if (r == NULL)
return NULL;
r->integer = value;
if (task->parent) {
parent = task->parent->obj;
assert(parent->type == REDIS_REPLY_ARRAY ||
parent->type == REDIS_REPLY_MAP ||
parent->type == REDIS_REPLY_SET ||
parent->type == REDIS_REPLY_PUSH);
parent->element[task->idx] = r;
}
return r;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190",
"CWE-680"
] |
redis
|
0215324a66af949be39b34be2d55143232c1cb71
| 174,767,716,129,759,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
Fix redis-cli / redis-sential overflow on some platforms (CVE-2021-32762) (#9587)
The redis-cli command line tool and redis-sentinel service may be vulnerable
to integer overflow when parsing specially crafted large multi-bulk network
replies. This is a result of a vulnerability in the underlying hiredis
library which does not perform an overflow check before calling the calloc()
heap allocation function.
This issue only impacts systems with heap allocators that do not perform their
own overflow checks. Most modern systems do and are therefore not likely to
be affected. Furthermore, by default redis-sentinel uses the jemalloc allocator
which is also not vulnerable.
Co-authored-by: Yossi Gottlieb <[email protected]>
|
QString Helper::lastWarningString()
{
return m_warningString;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-59",
"CWE-61"
] |
deepin-clone
|
e079f3e2712b4f8c28e3e63e71ba1a1f90fce1ab
| 18,788,203,809,754,967,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
fix: Do not use the "/tmp" directory
https://github.com/linuxdeepin/deepin-clone/issues/16
https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1130388
|
void composite_suspend(struct usb_gadget *gadget)
{
struct usb_composite_dev *cdev = get_gadget_data(gadget);
struct usb_function *f;
/* REVISIT: should we have config level
* suspend/resume callbacks?
*/
DBG(cdev, "suspend\n");
if (cdev->config) {
list_for_each_entry(f, &cdev->config->functions, list) {
if (f->suspend)
f->suspend(f);
}
}
if (cdev->driver->suspend)
cdev->driver->suspend(cdev);
cdev->suspended = 1;
usb_gadget_set_selfpowered(gadget);
usb_gadget_vbus_draw(gadget, 2);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
75e5b4849b81e19e9efe1654b30d7f3151c33c2c
| 85,677,903,715,302,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 |
USB: gadget: validate interface OS descriptor requests
Stall the control endpoint in case provided index exceeds array size of
MAX_CONFIG_INTERFACES or when the retrieved function pointer is null.
Signed-off-by: Szymon Heidrich <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static BOOL gdi_Glyph_BeginDraw(rdpContext* context, INT32 x, INT32 y,
INT32 width, INT32 height, UINT32 bgcolor,
UINT32 fgcolor, BOOL fOpRedundant)
{
rdpGdi* gdi;
if (!context || !context->gdi)
return FALSE;
gdi = context->gdi;
if (!gdi->drawing || !gdi->drawing->hdc)
return FALSE;
if (!fOpRedundant)
{
if (!gdi_decode_color(gdi, bgcolor, &bgcolor, NULL))
return FALSE;
if (!gdi_decode_color(gdi, fgcolor, &fgcolor, NULL))
return FALSE;
gdi_SetClipRgn(gdi->drawing->hdc, x, y, width, height);
gdi_SetTextColor(gdi->drawing->hdc, bgcolor);
gdi_SetBkColor(gdi->drawing->hdc, fgcolor);
if (1)
{
GDI_RECT rect = { 0 };
HGDI_BRUSH brush = gdi_CreateSolidBrush(fgcolor);
if (!brush)
return FALSE;
if (x > 0)
rect.left = x;
if (y > 0)
rect.top = y;
rect.right = x + width - 1;
rect.bottom = y + height - 1;
if ((x + width > rect.left) && (y + height > rect.top))
gdi_FillRect(gdi->drawing->hdc, &rect, brush);
gdi_DeleteObject((HGDIOBJECT)brush);
}
return gdi_SetNullClipRgn(gdi->drawing->hdc);
}
return TRUE;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190",
"CWE-787"
] |
FreeRDP
|
09b9d4f1994a674c4ec85b4947aa656eda1aed8a
| 307,850,853,370,605,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 54 |
Fixed CVE-2018-8787
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
|
Status check_index_ordering(const Tensor& indices) {
auto findices = indices.flat<int>();
for (std::size_t i = 0; i < findices.dimension(0) - 1; ++i) {
if (findices(i) < findices(i + 1)) {
continue;
}
return Status(
errors::InvalidArgument("Indices are not strictly ordered"));
}
return Status::OK();
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-125",
"CWE-824"
] |
tensorflow
|
532f5c5a547126c634fefd43bbad1dc6417678ac
| 300,676,102,485,457,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
Prevent nullptr deref in validation of indexes in map ops.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 387738023
Change-Id: I83d18d36a7b82ffd2a40b5124a4e5b4c72238f27
|
OPJ_BOOL opj_j2k_mct_validation ( opj_j2k_t * p_j2k,
opj_stream_private_t *p_stream,
opj_event_mgr_t * p_manager )
{
OPJ_BOOL l_is_valid = OPJ_TRUE;
OPJ_UINT32 i,j;
/* preconditions */
assert(p_j2k != 00);
assert(p_stream != 00);
assert(p_manager != 00);
if ((p_j2k->m_cp.rsiz & 0x8200) == 0x8200) {
OPJ_UINT32 l_nb_tiles = p_j2k->m_cp.th * p_j2k->m_cp.tw;
opj_tcp_t * l_tcp = p_j2k->m_cp.tcps;
for (i=0;i<l_nb_tiles;++i) {
if (l_tcp->mct == 2) {
opj_tccp_t * l_tccp = l_tcp->tccps;
l_is_valid &= (l_tcp->m_mct_coding_matrix != 00);
for (j=0;j<p_j2k->m_private_image->numcomps;++j) {
l_is_valid &= ! (l_tccp->qmfbid & 1);
++l_tccp;
}
}
++l_tcp;
}
}
return l_is_valid;
}
| 0 |
[] |
openjpeg
|
0fa5a17c98c4b8f9ee2286f4f0a50cf52a5fccb0
| 55,585,248,644,327,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 |
[trunk] Correct potential double free on malloc failure in opj_j2k_copy_default_tcp_and_create_tcp (fixes issue 492)
|
static inline uint64_t vring_desc_addr(hwaddr desc_pa, int i)
{
hwaddr pa;
pa = desc_pa + sizeof(VRingDesc) * i + offsetof(VRingDesc, addr);
return ldq_phys(&address_space_memory, pa);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-94"
] |
qemu
|
cc45995294b92d95319b4782750a3580cabdbc0c
| 30,841,309,910,547,676,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
virtio: out-of-bounds buffer write on invalid state load
CVE-2013-4151 QEMU 1.0 out-of-bounds buffer write in
virtio_load@hw/virtio/virtio.c
So we have this code since way back when:
num = qemu_get_be32(f);
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
vdev->vq[i].vring.num = qemu_get_be32(f);
array of vqs has size VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX, so
on invalid input this will write beyond end of buffer.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Roth <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <[email protected]>
|
static int FVScroll(GGadget *g, GEvent *e) {
FontView *fv = GGadgetGetUserData(g);
int newpos = fv->rowoff;
struct sbevent *sb = &e->u.control.u.sb;
switch( sb->type ) {
case et_sb_top:
newpos = 0;
break;
case et_sb_uppage:
newpos -= fv->rowcnt;
break;
case et_sb_up:
--newpos;
break;
case et_sb_down:
++newpos;
break;
case et_sb_downpage:
newpos += fv->rowcnt;
break;
case et_sb_bottom:
newpos = fv->rowltot-fv->rowcnt;
break;
case et_sb_thumb:
case et_sb_thumbrelease:
newpos = sb->pos;
break;
}
if ( newpos>fv->rowltot-fv->rowcnt )
newpos = fv->rowltot-fv->rowcnt;
if ( newpos<0 ) newpos =0;
if ( newpos!=fv->rowoff ) {
int diff = newpos-fv->rowoff;
fv->rowoff = newpos;
GScrollBarSetPos(fv->vsb,fv->rowoff);
GDrawScroll(fv->v,NULL,0,diff*fv->cbh);
}
return( true );
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
fontforge
|
626f751752875a0ddd74b9e217b6f4828713573c
| 74,585,752,024,013,190,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 40 |
Warn users before discarding their unsaved scripts (#3852)
* Warn users before discarding their unsaved scripts
This closes #3846.
|
void ssl3_free(SSL *s)
{
if(s == NULL)
return;
ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
if (s->s3->wbuf.buf != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->wbuf.buf);
if (s->s3->rrec.comp != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rrec.comp);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
#endif
if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names,X509_NAME_free);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&s->s3->finish_dgst1);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&s->s3->finish_dgst2);
OPENSSL_cleanse(s->s3,sizeof *s->s3);
OPENSSL_free(s->s3);
s->s3=NULL;
}
| 0 |
[] |
openssl
|
36ca4ba63d083da6f9d4598f18f17a8c32c8eca2
| 218,256,156,029,975,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 |
Implement the Supported Point Formats Extension for ECC ciphersuites
Submitted by: Douglas Stebila
|
int git_path_diriter_fullpath(
const char **out,
size_t *out_len,
git_path_diriter *diriter)
{
assert(out && out_len && diriter);
*out = diriter->path.ptr;
*out_len = diriter->path.size;
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-706"
] |
libgit2
|
3f7851eadca36a99627ad78cbe56a40d3776ed01
| 7,792,875,537,539,797,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
Disallow NTFS Alternate Data Stream attacks, even on Linux/macOS
A little-known feature of NTFS is that it offers to store metadata in
so-called "Alternate Data Streams" (inspired by Apple's "resource
forks") that are copied together with the file they are associated with.
These Alternate Data Streams can be accessed via `<file name>:<stream
name>:<stream type>`.
Directories, too, have Alternate Data Streams, and they even have a
default stream type `$INDEX_ALLOCATION`. Which means that `abc/` and
`abc::$INDEX_ALLOCATION/` are actually equivalent.
This is of course another attack vector on the Git directory that we
definitely want to prevent.
On Windows, we already do this incidentally, by disallowing colons in
file/directory names.
While it looks as if files'/directories' Alternate Data Streams are not
accessible in the Windows Subsystem for Linux, and neither via
CIFS/SMB-mounted network shares in Linux, it _is_ possible to access
them on SMB-mounted network shares on macOS.
Therefore, let's go the extra mile and prevent this particular attack
_everywhere_. To keep things simple, let's just disallow *any* Alternate
Data Stream of `.git`.
This is libgit2's variant of CVE-2019-1352.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <[email protected]>
|
static bool test_writex(struct torture_context *tctx,
struct smbcli_state *cli)
{
union smb_write io;
NTSTATUS status;
bool ret = true;
int fnum, i;
uint8_t *buf;
const int maxsize = 90000;
const char *fname = BASEDIR "\\test.txt";
unsigned int seed = time(NULL);
union smb_fileinfo finfo;
int max_bits=63;
if (!torture_setting_bool(tctx, "dangerous", false)) {
max_bits=33;
torture_comment(tctx, "dangerous not set - limiting range of test to 2^%d\n", max_bits);
}
buf = talloc_zero_array(tctx, uint8_t, maxsize);
if (!cli->transport->negotiate.lockread_supported) {
torture_comment(tctx, "Server does not support writeunlock - skipping\n");
return true;
}
if (!torture_setup_dir(cli, BASEDIR)) {
torture_fail(tctx, "failed to setup basedir");
}
torture_comment(tctx, "Testing RAW_WRITE_WRITEX\n");
io.generic.level = RAW_WRITE_WRITEX;
fnum = smbcli_open(cli->tree, fname, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, DENY_NONE);
if (fnum == -1) {
ret = false;
torture_fail_goto(tctx, done, talloc_asprintf(tctx, "Failed to create %s - %s\n", fname, smbcli_errstr(cli->tree)));
}
torture_comment(tctx, "Trying zero write\n");
io.writex.in.file.fnum = fnum;
io.writex.in.offset = 0;
io.writex.in.wmode = 0;
io.writex.in.remaining = 0;
io.writex.in.count = 0;
io.writex.in.data = buf;
status = smb_raw_write(cli->tree, &io);
CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
CHECK_VALUE(io.writex.out.nwritten, 0);
setup_buffer(buf, seed, maxsize);
torture_comment(tctx, "Trying small write\n");
io.writex.in.count = 9;
io.writex.in.offset = 4;
io.writex.in.data = buf;
status = smb_raw_write(cli->tree, &io);
CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
CHECK_VALUE(io.writex.out.nwritten, io.writex.in.count);
memset(buf, 0, maxsize);
if (smbcli_read(cli->tree, fnum, buf, 0, 13) != 13) {
ret = false;
torture_fail_goto(tctx, done, talloc_asprintf(tctx, "read failed at %s\n", __location__));
}
CHECK_BUFFER(buf+4, seed, 9);
CHECK_VALUE(IVAL(buf,0), 0);
setup_buffer(buf, seed, maxsize);
torture_comment(tctx, "Trying large write\n");
io.writex.in.count = 4000;
io.writex.in.offset = 0;
io.writex.in.data = buf;
status = smb_raw_write(cli->tree, &io);
CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
CHECK_VALUE(io.writex.out.nwritten, 4000);
memset(buf, 0, maxsize);
if (smbcli_read(cli->tree, fnum, buf, 0, 4000) != 4000) {
ret = false;
torture_fail_goto(tctx, done, talloc_asprintf(tctx, "read failed at %s\n", __location__));
}
CHECK_BUFFER(buf, seed, 4000);
torture_comment(tctx, "Trying bad fnum\n");
io.writex.in.file.fnum = fnum+1;
io.writex.in.count = 4000;
io.writex.in.offset = 0;
io.writex.in.data = buf;
status = smb_raw_write(cli->tree, &io);
CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE);
torture_comment(tctx, "Testing wmode\n");
io.writex.in.file.fnum = fnum;
io.writex.in.count = 1;
io.writex.in.offset = 0;
io.writex.in.wmode = 1;
io.writex.in.data = buf;
status = smb_raw_write(cli->tree, &io);
CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
CHECK_VALUE(io.writex.out.nwritten, io.writex.in.count);
io.writex.in.wmode = 2;
status = smb_raw_write(cli->tree, &io);
CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
CHECK_VALUE(io.writex.out.nwritten, io.writex.in.count);
torture_comment(tctx, "Trying locked region\n");
cli->session->pid++;
if (NT_STATUS_IS_ERR(smbcli_lock(cli->tree, fnum, 3, 1, 0, WRITE_LOCK))) {
ret = false;
torture_fail_goto(tctx, done, talloc_asprintf(tctx, "Failed to lock file at %s\n", __location__));
}
cli->session->pid--;
io.writex.in.wmode = 0;
io.writex.in.count = 4;
io.writex.in.offset = 0;
status = smb_raw_write(cli->tree, &io);
CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_FILE_LOCK_CONFLICT);
torture_comment(tctx, "Setting file as sparse\n");
status = torture_set_sparse(cli->tree, fnum);
CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
if (!(cli->transport->negotiate.capabilities & CAP_LARGE_FILES)) {
torture_skip(tctx, "skipping large file tests - CAP_LARGE_FILES not set\n");
}
torture_comment(tctx, "Trying 2^32 offset\n");
setup_buffer(buf, seed, maxsize);
io.writex.in.file.fnum = fnum;
io.writex.in.count = 4000;
io.writex.in.offset = 0xFFFFFFFF - 2000;
io.writex.in.data = buf;
status = smb_raw_write(cli->tree, &io);
CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
CHECK_VALUE(io.writex.out.nwritten, 4000);
CHECK_ALL_INFO(io.writex.in.count + (uint64_t)io.writex.in.offset, size);
memset(buf, 0, maxsize);
if (smbcli_read(cli->tree, fnum, buf, io.writex.in.offset, 4000) != 4000) {
ret = false;
torture_fail_goto(tctx, done, talloc_asprintf(tctx, "read failed at %s\n", __location__));
}
CHECK_BUFFER(buf, seed, 4000);
for (i=33;i<max_bits;i++) {
torture_comment(tctx, "Trying 2^%d offset\n", i);
setup_buffer(buf, seed+1, maxsize);
io.writex.in.file.fnum = fnum;
io.writex.in.count = 4000;
io.writex.in.offset = ((uint64_t)1) << i;
io.writex.in.data = buf;
status = smb_raw_write(cli->tree, &io);
if (i>33 &&
NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER)) {
break;
}
CHECK_STATUS(status, NT_STATUS_OK);
CHECK_VALUE(io.writex.out.nwritten, 4000);
CHECK_ALL_INFO(io.writex.in.count + (uint64_t)io.writex.in.offset, size);
memset(buf, 0, maxsize);
if (smbcli_read(cli->tree, fnum, buf, io.writex.in.offset, 4000) != 4000) {
ret = false;
torture_fail_goto(tctx, done, talloc_asprintf(tctx, "read failed at %s\n", __location__));
}
CHECK_BUFFER(buf, seed+1, 4000);
}
torture_comment(tctx, "limit is 2^%d\n", i);
setup_buffer(buf, seed, maxsize);
done:
smbcli_close(cli->tree, fnum);
smb_raw_exit(cli->session);
smbcli_deltree(cli->tree, BASEDIR);
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
samba
|
a60863458dc6b60a09aa8d31fada6c36f5043c76
| 25,754,583,055,662,623,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 181 |
CVE-2022-32742: s4: torture: Add raw.write.bad-write test.
Reproduces the test code in:
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15085
Add knownfail.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Disseldorp <[email protected]>
|
void flush_vsx_to_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
if (tsk->thread.regs) {
preempt_disable();
if (tsk->thread.regs->msr & (MSR_VSX|MSR_VEC|MSR_FP)) {
BUG_ON(tsk != current);
giveup_vsx(tsk);
}
preempt_enable();
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-862"
] |
linux
|
8205d5d98ef7f155de211f5e2eb6ca03d95a5a60
| 1,803,254,200,751,538,300,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
powerpc/tm: Fix FP/VMX unavailable exceptions inside a transaction
When we take an FP unavailable exception in a transaction we have to
account for the hardware FP TM checkpointed registers being
incorrect. In this case for this process we know the current and
checkpointed FP registers must be the same (since FP wasn't used
inside the transaction) hence in the thread_struct we copy the current
FP registers to the checkpointed ones.
This copy is done in tm_reclaim_thread(). We use thread->ckpt_regs.msr
to determine if FP was on when in userspace. thread->ckpt_regs.msr
represents the state of the MSR when exiting userspace. This is setup
by check_if_tm_restore_required().
Unfortunatley there is an optimisation in giveup_all() which returns
early if tsk->thread.regs->msr (via local variable `usermsr`) has
FP=VEC=VSX=SPE=0. This optimisation means that
check_if_tm_restore_required() is not called and hence
thread->ckpt_regs.msr is not updated and will contain an old value.
This can happen if due to load_fp=255 we start a userspace process
with MSR FP=1 and then we are context switched out. In this case
thread->ckpt_regs.msr will contain FP=1. If that same process is then
context switched in and load_fp overflows, MSR will have FP=0. If that
process now enters a transaction and does an FP instruction, the FP
unavailable will not update thread->ckpt_regs.msr (the bug) and MSR
FP=1 will be retained in thread->ckpt_regs.msr. tm_reclaim_thread()
will then not perform the required memcpy and the checkpointed FP regs
in the thread struct will contain the wrong values.
The code path for this happening is:
Userspace: Kernel
Start userspace
with MSR FP/VEC/VSX/SPE=0 TM=1
< -----
...
tbegin
bne
fp instruction
FP unavailable
---- >
fp_unavailable_tm()
tm_reclaim_current()
tm_reclaim_thread()
giveup_all()
return early since FP/VMX/VSX=0
/* ckpt MSR not updated (Incorrect) */
tm_reclaim()
/* thread_struct ckpt FP regs contain junk (OK) */
/* Sees ckpt MSR FP=1 (Incorrect) */
no memcpy() performed
/* thread_struct ckpt FP regs not fixed (Incorrect) */
tm_recheckpoint()
/* Put junk in hardware checkpoint FP regs */
....
< -----
Return to userspace
with MSR TM=1 FP=1
with junk in the FP TM checkpoint
TM rollback
reads FP junk
This is a data integrity problem for the current process as the FP
registers are corrupted. It's also a security problem as the FP
registers from one process may be leaked to another.
This patch moves up check_if_tm_restore_required() in giveup_all() to
ensure thread->ckpt_regs.msr is updated correctly.
A simple testcase to replicate this will be posted to
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/tm/tm-poison.c
Similarly for VMX.
This fixes CVE-2019-15030.
Fixes: f48e91e87e67 ("powerpc/tm: Fix FP and VMX register corruption")
Cc: [email protected] # 4.12+
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
|
ssize_t splice_from_pipe(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct file *out,
loff_t *ppos, size_t len, unsigned int flags,
splice_actor *actor)
{
ssize_t ret;
struct inode *inode = out->f_mapping->host;
/*
* The actor worker might be calling ->prepare_write and
* ->commit_write. Most of the time, these expect i_mutex to
* be held. Since this may result in an ABBA deadlock with
* pipe->inode, we have to order lock acquiry here.
*/
inode_double_lock(inode, pipe->inode);
ret = __splice_from_pipe(pipe, out, ppos, len, flags, actor);
inode_double_unlock(inode, pipe->inode);
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264"
] |
linux-2.6
|
8c34e2d63231d4bf4852bac8521883944d770fe3
| 222,298,524,524,505,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 |
[PATCH] Remove SUID when splicing into an inode
Originally from Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
generic_file_splice_write() does not remove S_ISUID or S_ISGID. This is
inconsistent with the way we generally write to files.
Signed-off-by: Mark Fasheh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
|
static int cbs_jpeg_write_unit(CodedBitstreamContext *ctx,
CodedBitstreamUnit *unit)
{
CodedBitstreamJPEGContext *priv = ctx->priv_data;
PutBitContext pbc;
int err;
if (!priv->write_buffer) {
// Initial write buffer size is 1MB.
priv->write_buffer_size = 1024 * 1024;
reallocate_and_try_again:
err = av_reallocp(&priv->write_buffer, priv->write_buffer_size);
if (err < 0) {
av_log(ctx->log_ctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unable to allocate a "
"sufficiently large write buffer (last attempt "
"%"SIZE_SPECIFIER" bytes).\n", priv->write_buffer_size);
return err;
}
}
init_put_bits(&pbc, priv->write_buffer, priv->write_buffer_size);
if (unit->type == JPEG_MARKER_SOS)
err = cbs_jpeg_write_scan(ctx, unit, &pbc);
else
err = cbs_jpeg_write_segment(ctx, unit, &pbc);
if (err == AVERROR(ENOSPC)) {
// Overflow.
priv->write_buffer_size *= 2;
goto reallocate_and_try_again;
}
if (err < 0) {
// Write failed for some other reason.
return err;
}
if (put_bits_count(&pbc) % 8)
unit->data_bit_padding = 8 - put_bits_count(&pbc) % 8;
else
unit->data_bit_padding = 0;
unit->data_size = (put_bits_count(&pbc) + 7) / 8;
flush_put_bits(&pbc);
err = ff_cbs_alloc_unit_data(ctx, unit, unit->data_size);
if (err < 0)
return err;
memcpy(unit->data, priv->write_buffer, unit->data_size);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
FFmpeg
|
a3a3730b5456ca00587455004d40c047f7b20a99
| 172,230,623,366,917,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 54 |
avcodec/cbs_jpeg: Check length for SOS
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 19734/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_BSF_TRACE_HEADERS_fuzzer-5673507031875584
Fixes: 19353/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_BSF_TRACE_HEADERS_fuzzer-5703944462663680
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 1812352d767ccf5431aa440123e2e260a4db2726)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static bool is_inf(const int) { return false; }
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
CImg
|
10af1e8c1ad2a58a0a3342a856bae63e8f257abb
| 22,836,189,748,991,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 |
Fix other issues in 'CImg<T>::load_bmp()'.
|
*/
static inline int ext4_fs_is_busy(struct ext4_sb_info *sbi)
{
return (atomic_read(&sbi->s_lock_busy) > EXT4_CONTENTION_THRESHOLD);
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
c37e9e013469521d9adb932d17a1795c139b36db
| 335,339,299,895,888,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
ext4: add more inode number paranoia checks
If there is a directory entry pointing to a system inode (such as a
journal inode), complain and declare the file system to be corrupted.
Also, if the superblock's first inode number field is too small,
refuse to mount the file system.
This addresses CVE-2018-10882.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200069
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
QPDFObjectHandle::isNull()
{
dereference();
return QPDFObjectTypeAccessor<QPDF_Null>::check(m->obj.getPointer());
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399",
"CWE-674"
] |
qpdf
|
b4d6cf6836ce025ba1811b7bbec52680c7204223
| 310,370,811,573,633,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
Limit depth of nesting in direct objects (fixes #202)
This fixes CVE-2018-9918.
|
static int sony_resume(struct hid_device *hdev)
{
struct sony_sc *sc = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
/*
* The Sixaxis and navigation controllers on USB need to be
* reinitialized on resume or they won't behave properly.
*/
if ((sc->quirks & SIXAXIS_CONTROLLER_USB) ||
(sc->quirks & NAVIGATION_CONTROLLER_USB)) {
sixaxis_set_operational_usb(sc->hdev);
sc->defer_initialization = 1;
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
d9d4b1e46d9543a82c23f6df03f4ad697dab361b
| 188,633,275,805,772,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
HID: Fix assumption that devices have inputs
The syzbot fuzzer found a slab-out-of-bounds write bug in the hid-gaff
driver. The problem is caused by the driver's assumption that the
device must have an input report. While this will be true for all
normal HID input devices, a suitably malicious device can violate the
assumption.
The same assumption is present in over a dozen other HID drivers.
This patch fixes them by checking that the list of hid_inputs for the
hid_device is nonempty before allowing it to be used.
Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
CC: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
|
ZEND_VM_COLD_CONSTCONST_HANDLER(90, ZEND_FETCH_DIM_IS, CONST|TMPVAR|CV, CONST|TMPVAR|CV)
{
USE_OPLINE
zend_free_op free_op1, free_op2;
zval *container;
SAVE_OPLINE();
container = GET_OP1_ZVAL_PTR_UNDEF(BP_VAR_IS);
zend_fetch_dimension_address_read_IS(container, GET_OP2_ZVAL_PTR_UNDEF(BP_VAR_R), OP2_TYPE OPLINE_CC EXECUTE_DATA_CC);
FREE_OP2();
FREE_OP1();
ZEND_VM_NEXT_OPCODE_CHECK_EXCEPTION();
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
php-src
|
f1ce8d5f5839cb2069ea37ff424fb96b8cd6932d
| 173,317,469,688,221,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
Fix #73122: Integer Overflow when concatenating strings
We must avoid integer overflows in memory allocations, so we introduce
an additional check in the VM, and bail out in the rare case of an
overflow. Since the recent fix for bug #74960 still doesn't catch all
possible overflows, we fix that right away.
|
void Item_subselect::get_cache_parameters(List<Item> ¶meters)
{
Collect_deps_prm prm= {¶meters, // parameters
unit->first_select()->nest_level_base, // nest_level_base
0, // count
unit->first_select()->nest_level, // nest_level
TRUE // collect
};
walk(&Item::collect_outer_ref_processor, TRUE, &prm);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-89"
] |
server
|
3c209bfc040ddfc41ece8357d772547432353fd2
| 141,692,558,835,170,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
MDEV-25994: Crash with union of my_decimal type in ORDER BY clause
When single-row subquery fails with "Subquery reutrns more than 1 row"
error, it will raise an error and return NULL.
On the other hand, Item_singlerow_subselect sets item->maybe_null=0
for table-less subqueries like "(SELECT not_null_value)" (*)
This discrepancy (item with maybe_null=0 returning NULL) causes the
code in Type_handler_decimal_result::make_sort_key_part() to crash.
Fixed this by allowing inference (*) only when the subquery is NOT a
UNION.
|
bool MonConnection::have_session() const
{
return state == State::HAVE_SESSION;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-294"
] |
ceph
|
6c14c2fb5650426285428dfe6ca1597e5ea1d07d
| 188,796,876,495,486,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
mon/MonClient: bring back CEPHX_V2 authorizer challenges
Commit c58c5754dfd2 ("msg/async/ProtocolV1: use AuthServer and
AuthClient") introduced a backwards compatibility issue into msgr1.
To fix it, commit 321548010578 ("mon/MonClient: skip CEPHX_V2
challenge if client doesn't support it") set out to skip authorizer
challenges for peers that don't support CEPHX_V2. However, it
made it so that authorizer challenges are skipped for all peers in
both msgr1 and msgr2 cases, effectively disabling the protection
against replay attacks that was put in place in commit f80b848d3f83
("auth/cephx: add authorizer challenge", CVE-2018-1128).
This is because con->get_features() always returns 0 at that
point. In msgr1 case, the peer shares its features along with the
authorizer, but while they are available in connect_msg.features they
aren't assigned to con until ProtocolV1::open(). In msgr2 case, the
peer doesn't share its features until much later (in CLIENT_IDENT
frame, i.e. after the authentication phase). The result is that
!CEPHX_V2 branch is taken in all cases and replay attack protection
is lost.
Only clusters with cephx_service_require_version set to 2 on the
service daemons would not be silently downgraded. But, since the
default is 1 and there are no reports of looping on BADAUTHORIZER
faults, I'm pretty sure that no one has ever done that. Note that
cephx_require_version set to 2 would have no effect even though it
is supposed to be stronger than cephx_service_require_version
because MonClient::handle_auth_request() didn't check it.
To fix:
- for msgr1, check connect_msg.features (as was done before commit
c58c5754dfd2) and challenge if CEPHX_V2 is supported. Together
with two preceding patches that resurrect proper cephx_* option
handling in msgr1, this covers both "I want old clients to work"
and "I wish to require better authentication" use cases.
- for msgr2, don't check anything and always challenge. CEPHX_V2
predates msgr2, anyone speaking msgr2 must support it.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 4a82c72e3bdddcb625933e83af8b50a444b961f1)
|
static void hns_rcb_set_port_desc_cnt(struct rcb_common_cb *rcb_common,
u32 port_idx, u32 desc_cnt)
{
dsaf_write_dev(rcb_common, RCB_CFG_BD_NUM_REG + port_idx * 4,
desc_cnt);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
412b65d15a7f8a93794653968308fc100f2aa87c
| 294,176,648,388,165,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
ccss_unrecoverable_error (CRDocHandler * a_handler)
{
/* yup, like i care about CSS parsing errors ;-)
ignore, chug along */
g_warning (_("CSS unrecoverable error\n"));
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
librsvg
|
d1c9191949747f6dcfd207831d15dd4ba00e31f2
| 83,178,367,463,090,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
state: Store mask as reference
Instead of immediately looking up the mask, store the reference and look
it up on use.
|
static int setcos_list_files(sc_card_t *card, u8 * buf, size_t buflen)
{
sc_apdu_t apdu;
int r;
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT, 0xAA, 0, 0);
if (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_SETCOS_44 ||
card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_SETCOS_NIDEL ||
SETCOS_IS_EID_APPLET(card))
apdu.cla = 0x80;
apdu.resp = buf;
apdu.resplen = buflen;
apdu.le = buflen > 256 ? 256 : buflen;
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
LOG_TEST_RET(card->ctx, r, "APDU transmit failed");
if (card->type == SC_CARD_TYPE_SETCOS_44 && apdu.sw1 == 0x6A && apdu.sw2 == 0x82)
return 0; /* no files found */
if (apdu.resplen == 0)
return sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
return apdu.resplen;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
OpenSC
|
c3f23b836e5a1766c36617fe1da30d22f7b63de2
| 136,171,322,567,121,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
fixed UNKNOWN READ
Reported by OSS-Fuzz
https://oss-fuzz.com/testcase-detail/5681169970757632
|
copy_file_progress_callback (goffset current_num_bytes,
goffset total_num_bytes,
gpointer user_data)
{
ProgressData *pdata;
goffset new_size;
pdata = user_data;
new_size = current_num_bytes - pdata->last_size;
if (new_size > 0)
{
pdata->transfer_info->num_bytes += new_size;
pdata->last_size = current_num_bytes;
report_copy_progress (pdata->job,
pdata->source_info,
pdata->transfer_info);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
nautilus
|
1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0
| 44,518,317,421,695,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 |
mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
|
xmlParseTryOrFinish(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int terminate) {
int ret = 0;
int avail, tlen;
xmlChar cur, next;
const xmlChar *lastlt, *lastgt;
if (ctxt->input == NULL)
return(0);
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
switch (ctxt->instate) {
case XML_PARSER_EOF:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try EOF\n"); break;
case XML_PARSER_START:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try START\n"); break;
case XML_PARSER_MISC:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try MISC\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_COMMENT:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try COMMENT\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_PROLOG:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try PROLOG\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_START_TAG:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try START_TAG\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_CONTENT:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try CONTENT\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_CDATA_SECTION:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try CDATA_SECTION\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_END_TAG:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try END_TAG\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_ENTITY_DECL:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try ENTITY_DECL\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_ENTITY_VALUE:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try ENTITY_VALUE\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try ATTRIBUTE_VALUE\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_DTD:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try DTD\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_EPILOG:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try EPILOG\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_PI:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try PI\n");break;
case XML_PARSER_IGNORE:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: try IGNORE\n");break;
}
#endif
if ((ctxt->input != NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base > 4096)) {
xmlSHRINK(ctxt);
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
}
xmlParseGetLasts(ctxt, &lastlt, &lastgt);
while (1) {
if ((ctxt->errNo != XML_ERR_OK) && (ctxt->disableSAX == 1))
return(0);
/*
* Pop-up of finished entities.
*/
while ((RAW == 0) && (ctxt->inputNr > 1))
xmlPopInput(ctxt);
if (ctxt->input == NULL) break;
if (ctxt->input->buf == NULL)
avail = ctxt->input->length -
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
else {
/*
* If we are operating on converted input, try to flush
* remainng chars to avoid them stalling in the non-converted
* buffer.
*/
if ((ctxt->input->buf->raw != NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->buf->raw->use > 0)) {
int base = ctxt->input->base -
ctxt->input->buf->buffer->content;
int current = ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base;
xmlParserInputBufferPush(ctxt->input->buf, 0, "");
ctxt->input->base = ctxt->input->buf->buffer->content + base;
ctxt->input->cur = ctxt->input->base + current;
ctxt->input->end =
&ctxt->input->buf->buffer->content[
ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use];
}
avail = ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use -
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
}
if (avail < 1)
goto done;
switch (ctxt->instate) {
case XML_PARSER_EOF:
/*
* Document parsing is done !
*/
goto done;
case XML_PARSER_START:
if (ctxt->charset == XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE) {
xmlChar start[4];
xmlCharEncoding enc;
/*
* Very first chars read from the document flow.
*/
if (avail < 4)
goto done;
/*
* Get the 4 first bytes and decode the charset
* if enc != XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE
* plug some encoding conversion routines,
* else xmlSwitchEncoding will set to (default)
* UTF8.
*/
start[0] = RAW;
start[1] = NXT(1);
start[2] = NXT(2);
start[3] = NXT(3);
enc = xmlDetectCharEncoding(start, 4);
xmlSwitchEncoding(ctxt, enc);
break;
}
if (avail < 2)
goto done;
cur = ctxt->input->cur[0];
next = ctxt->input->cur[1];
if (cur == 0) {
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator))
ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator(ctxt->userData,
&xmlDefaultSAXLocator);
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_EMPTY, NULL);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering EOF\n");
#endif
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->endDocument != NULL))
ctxt->sax->endDocument(ctxt->userData);
goto done;
}
if ((cur == '<') && (next == '?')) {
/* PI or XML decl */
if (avail < 5) return(ret);
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '?', '>', 0) < 0))
return(ret);
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator))
ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator(ctxt->userData,
&xmlDefaultSAXLocator);
if ((ctxt->input->cur[2] == 'x') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[3] == 'm') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[4] == 'l') &&
(IS_BLANK_CH(ctxt->input->cur[5]))) {
ret += 5;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing XML Decl\n");
#endif
xmlParseXMLDecl(ctxt);
if (ctxt->errNo == XML_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING) {
/*
* The XML REC instructs us to stop parsing right
* here
*/
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
return(0);
}
ctxt->standalone = ctxt->input->standalone;
if ((ctxt->encoding == NULL) &&
(ctxt->input->encoding != NULL))
ctxt->encoding = xmlStrdup(ctxt->input->encoding);
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->startDocument) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->startDocument(ctxt->userData);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_MISC;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering MISC\n");
#endif
} else {
ctxt->version = xmlCharStrdup(XML_DEFAULT_VERSION);
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->startDocument) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->startDocument(ctxt->userData);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_MISC;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering MISC\n");
#endif
}
} else {
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator))
ctxt->sax->setDocumentLocator(ctxt->userData,
&xmlDefaultSAXLocator);
ctxt->version = xmlCharStrdup(XML_DEFAULT_VERSION);
if (ctxt->version == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
break;
}
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->startDocument) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->startDocument(ctxt->userData);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_MISC;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering MISC\n");
#endif
}
break;
case XML_PARSER_START_TAG: {
const xmlChar *name;
const xmlChar *prefix = NULL;
const xmlChar *URI = NULL;
int nsNr = ctxt->nsNr;
if ((avail < 2) && (ctxt->inputNr == 1))
goto done;
cur = ctxt->input->cur[0];
if (cur != '<') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_EMPTY, NULL);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->endDocument != NULL))
ctxt->sax->endDocument(ctxt->userData);
goto done;
}
if (!terminate) {
if (ctxt->progressive) {
/* > can be found unescaped in attribute values */
if ((lastgt == NULL) || (ctxt->input->cur >= lastgt))
goto done;
} else if (xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '>', 0, 0) < 0) {
goto done;
}
}
if (ctxt->spaceNr == 0)
spacePush(ctxt, -1);
else if (*ctxt->space == -2)
spacePush(ctxt, -1);
else
spacePush(ctxt, *ctxt->space);
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
if (ctxt->sax2)
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
name = xmlParseStartTag2(ctxt, &prefix, &URI, &tlen);
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
else
name = xmlParseStartTag(ctxt);
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
if (name == NULL) {
spacePop(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->endDocument != NULL))
ctxt->sax->endDocument(ctxt->userData);
goto done;
}
#ifdef LIBXML_VALID_ENABLED
/*
* [ VC: Root Element Type ]
* The Name in the document type declaration must match
* the element type of the root element.
*/
if (ctxt->validate && ctxt->wellFormed && ctxt->myDoc &&
ctxt->node && (ctxt->node == ctxt->myDoc->children))
ctxt->valid &= xmlValidateRoot(&ctxt->vctxt, ctxt->myDoc);
#endif /* LIBXML_VALID_ENABLED */
/*
* Check for an Empty Element.
*/
if ((RAW == '/') && (NXT(1) == '>')) {
SKIP(2);
if (ctxt->sax2) {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->endElementNs != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->endElementNs(ctxt->userData, name,
prefix, URI);
if (ctxt->nsNr - nsNr > 0)
nsPop(ctxt, ctxt->nsNr - nsNr);
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
} else {
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->endElement != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX))
ctxt->sax->endElement(ctxt->userData, name);
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
}
spacePop(ctxt);
if (ctxt->nameNr == 0) {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EPILOG;
} else {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
}
break;
}
if (RAW == '>') {
NEXT;
} else {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_GT_REQUIRED,
"Couldn't find end of Start Tag %s\n",
name);
nodePop(ctxt);
spacePop(ctxt);
}
if (ctxt->sax2)
nameNsPush(ctxt, name, prefix, URI, ctxt->nsNr - nsNr);
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
else
namePush(ctxt, name);
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
break;
}
case XML_PARSER_CONTENT: {
const xmlChar *test;
unsigned int cons;
if ((avail < 2) && (ctxt->inputNr == 1))
goto done;
cur = ctxt->input->cur[0];
next = ctxt->input->cur[1];
test = CUR_PTR;
cons = ctxt->input->consumed;
if ((cur == '<') && (next == '/')) {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_END_TAG;
break;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '?')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '?', '>', 0) < 0))
goto done;
xmlParsePI(ctxt);
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next != '!')) {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START_TAG;
break;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[2] == '-') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[3] == '-')) {
int term;
if (avail < 4)
goto done;
ctxt->input->cur += 4;
term = xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '-', '-', '>');
ctxt->input->cur -= 4;
if ((!terminate) && (term < 0))
goto done;
xmlParseComment(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (ctxt->input->cur[1] == '!') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[2] == '[') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[3] == 'C') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[4] == 'D') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[5] == 'A') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[6] == 'T') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[7] == 'A') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[8] == '[')) {
SKIP(9);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CDATA_SECTION;
break;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(avail < 9)) {
goto done;
} else if (cur == '&') {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, ';', 0, 0) < 0))
goto done;
xmlParseReference(ctxt);
} else {
/* TODO Avoid the extra copy, handle directly !!! */
/*
* Goal of the following test is:
* - minimize calls to the SAX 'character' callback
* when they are mergeable
* - handle an problem for isBlank when we only parse
* a sequence of blank chars and the next one is
* not available to check against '<' presence.
* - tries to homogenize the differences in SAX
* callbacks between the push and pull versions
* of the parser.
*/
if ((ctxt->inputNr == 1) &&
(avail < XML_PARSER_BIG_BUFFER_SIZE)) {
if (!terminate) {
if (ctxt->progressive) {
if ((lastlt == NULL) ||
(ctxt->input->cur > lastlt))
goto done;
} else if (xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt,
'<', 0, 0) < 0) {
goto done;
}
}
}
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
xmlParseCharData(ctxt, 0);
}
/*
* Pop-up of finished entities.
*/
while ((RAW == 0) && (ctxt->inputNr > 1))
xmlPopInput(ctxt);
if ((cons == ctxt->input->consumed) && (test == CUR_PTR)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"detected an error in element content\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
break;
}
break;
}
case XML_PARSER_END_TAG:
if (avail < 2)
goto done;
if (!terminate) {
if (ctxt->progressive) {
/* > can be found unescaped in attribute values */
if ((lastgt == NULL) || (ctxt->input->cur >= lastgt))
goto done;
} else if (xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '>', 0, 0) < 0) {
goto done;
}
}
if (ctxt->sax2) {
xmlParseEndTag2(ctxt,
(void *) ctxt->pushTab[ctxt->nameNr * 3 - 3],
(void *) ctxt->pushTab[ctxt->nameNr * 3 - 2], 0,
(int) (long) ctxt->pushTab[ctxt->nameNr * 3 - 1], 0);
nameNsPop(ctxt);
}
#ifdef LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED
else
xmlParseEndTag1(ctxt, 0);
#endif /* LIBXML_SAX1_ENABLED */
if (ctxt->nameNr == 0) {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EPILOG;
} else {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
}
break;
case XML_PARSER_CDATA_SECTION: {
/*
* The Push mode need to have the SAX callback for
* cdataBlock merge back contiguous callbacks.
*/
int base;
base = xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, ']', ']', '>');
if (base < 0) {
if (avail >= XML_PARSER_BIG_BUFFER_SIZE + 2) {
int tmp;
tmp = xmlCheckCdataPush(ctxt->input->cur,
XML_PARSER_BIG_BUFFER_SIZE);
if (tmp < 0) {
tmp = -tmp;
ctxt->input->cur += tmp;
goto encoding_error;
}
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
if (ctxt->sax->cdataBlock != NULL)
ctxt->sax->cdataBlock(ctxt->userData,
ctxt->input->cur, tmp);
else if (ctxt->sax->characters != NULL)
ctxt->sax->characters(ctxt->userData,
ctxt->input->cur, tmp);
}
SKIPL(tmp);
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
}
goto done;
} else {
int tmp;
tmp = xmlCheckCdataPush(ctxt->input->cur, base);
if ((tmp < 0) || (tmp != base)) {
tmp = -tmp;
ctxt->input->cur += tmp;
goto encoding_error;
}
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (base == 0) &&
(ctxt->sax->cdataBlock != NULL) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
/*
* Special case to provide identical behaviour
* between pull and push parsers on enpty CDATA
* sections
*/
if ((ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base >= 9) &&
(!strncmp((const char *)&ctxt->input->cur[-9],
"<![CDATA[", 9)))
ctxt->sax->cdataBlock(ctxt->userData,
BAD_CAST "", 0);
} else if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (base > 0) &&
(!ctxt->disableSAX)) {
if (ctxt->sax->cdataBlock != NULL)
ctxt->sax->cdataBlock(ctxt->userData,
ctxt->input->cur, base);
else if (ctxt->sax->characters != NULL)
ctxt->sax->characters(ctxt->userData,
ctxt->input->cur, base);
}
SKIPL(base + 3);
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering CONTENT\n");
#endif
}
break;
}
case XML_PARSER_MISC:
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (ctxt->input->buf == NULL)
avail = ctxt->input->length -
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
else
avail = ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use -
(ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
if (avail < 2)
goto done;
cur = ctxt->input->cur[0];
next = ctxt->input->cur[1];
if ((cur == '<') && (next == '?')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '?', '>', 0) < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing PI\n");
#endif
xmlParsePI(ctxt);
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[2] == '-') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[3] == '-')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '-', '-', '>') < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing Comment\n");
#endif
xmlParseComment(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_MISC;
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[2] == 'D') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[3] == 'O') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[4] == 'C') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[5] == 'T') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[6] == 'Y') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[7] == 'P') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[8] == 'E')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '>', 0, 0) < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing internal subset\n");
#endif
ctxt->inSubset = 1;
xmlParseDocTypeDecl(ctxt);
if (RAW == '[') {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_DTD;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering DTD\n");
#endif
} else {
/*
* Create and update the external subset.
*/
ctxt->inSubset = 2;
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (!ctxt->disableSAX) &&
(ctxt->sax->externalSubset != NULL))
ctxt->sax->externalSubset(ctxt->userData,
ctxt->intSubName, ctxt->extSubSystem,
ctxt->extSubURI);
ctxt->inSubset = 0;
xmlCleanSpecialAttr(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_PROLOG;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering PROLOG\n");
#endif
}
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(avail < 9)) {
goto done;
} else {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START_TAG;
ctxt->progressive = 1;
xmlParseGetLasts(ctxt, &lastlt, &lastgt);
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering START_TAG\n");
#endif
}
break;
case XML_PARSER_PROLOG:
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (ctxt->input->buf == NULL)
avail = ctxt->input->length - (ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
else
avail = ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use - (ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
if (avail < 2)
goto done;
cur = ctxt->input->cur[0];
next = ctxt->input->cur[1];
if ((cur == '<') && (next == '?')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '?', '>', 0) < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing PI\n");
#endif
xmlParsePI(ctxt);
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[2] == '-') && (ctxt->input->cur[3] == '-')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '-', '-', '>') < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing Comment\n");
#endif
xmlParseComment(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_PROLOG;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(avail < 4)) {
goto done;
} else {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START_TAG;
if (ctxt->progressive == 0)
ctxt->progressive = 1;
xmlParseGetLasts(ctxt, &lastlt, &lastgt);
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering START_TAG\n");
#endif
}
break;
case XML_PARSER_EPILOG:
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (ctxt->input->buf == NULL)
avail = ctxt->input->length - (ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
else
avail = ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use - (ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base);
if (avail < 2)
goto done;
cur = ctxt->input->cur[0];
next = ctxt->input->cur[1];
if ((cur == '<') && (next == '?')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '?', '>', 0) < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing PI\n");
#endif
xmlParsePI(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EPILOG;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(ctxt->input->cur[2] == '-') && (ctxt->input->cur[3] == '-')) {
if ((!terminate) &&
(xmlParseLookupSequence(ctxt, '-', '-', '>') < 0))
goto done;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: Parsing Comment\n");
#endif
xmlParseComment(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EPILOG;
} else if ((cur == '<') && (next == '!') &&
(avail < 4)) {
goto done;
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCUMENT_END, NULL);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_EOF;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering EOF\n");
#endif
if ((ctxt->sax) && (ctxt->sax->endDocument != NULL))
ctxt->sax->endDocument(ctxt->userData);
goto done;
}
break;
case XML_PARSER_DTD: {
/*
* Sorry but progressive parsing of the internal subset
* is not expected to be supported. We first check that
* the full content of the internal subset is available and
* the parsing is launched only at that point.
* Internal subset ends up with "']' S? '>'" in an unescaped
* section and not in a ']]>' sequence which are conditional
* sections (whoever argued to keep that crap in XML deserve
* a place in hell !).
*/
int base, i;
xmlChar *buf;
xmlChar quote = 0;
base = ctxt->input->cur - ctxt->input->base;
if (base < 0) return(0);
if (ctxt->checkIndex > base)
base = ctxt->checkIndex;
buf = ctxt->input->buf->buffer->content;
for (;(unsigned int) base < ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use;
base++) {
if (quote != 0) {
if (buf[base] == quote)
quote = 0;
continue;
}
if ((quote == 0) && (buf[base] == '<')) {
int found = 0;
/* special handling of comments */
if (((unsigned int) base + 4 <
ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use) &&
(buf[base + 1] == '!') &&
(buf[base + 2] == '-') &&
(buf[base + 3] == '-')) {
for (;(unsigned int) base + 3 <
ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use; base++) {
if ((buf[base] == '-') &&
(buf[base + 1] == '-') &&
(buf[base + 2] == '>')) {
found = 1;
base += 2;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "unfinished comment\n");
#endif
break; /* for */
}
continue;
}
}
if (buf[base] == '"') {
quote = '"';
continue;
}
if (buf[base] == '\'') {
quote = '\'';
continue;
}
if (buf[base] == ']') {
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "%c%c%c%c: ", buf[base],
buf[base + 1], buf[base + 2], buf[base + 3]);
#endif
if ((unsigned int) base +1 >=
ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use)
break;
if (buf[base + 1] == ']') {
/* conditional crap, skip both ']' ! */
base++;
continue;
}
for (i = 1;
(unsigned int) base + i < ctxt->input->buf->buffer->use;
i++) {
if (buf[base + i] == '>') {
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "found\n");
#endif
goto found_end_int_subset;
}
if (!IS_BLANK_CH(buf[base + i])) {
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "not found\n");
#endif
goto not_end_of_int_subset;
}
}
#if 0
fprintf(stderr, "end of stream\n");
#endif
break;
}
not_end_of_int_subset:
continue; /* for */
}
/*
* We didn't found the end of the Internal subset
*/
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
if (next == 0)
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: lookup of int subset end filed\n");
#endif
goto done;
found_end_int_subset:
xmlParseInternalSubset(ctxt);
ctxt->inSubset = 2;
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (!ctxt->disableSAX) &&
(ctxt->sax->externalSubset != NULL))
ctxt->sax->externalSubset(ctxt->userData, ctxt->intSubName,
ctxt->extSubSystem, ctxt->extSubURI);
ctxt->inSubset = 0;
xmlCleanSpecialAttr(ctxt);
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_PROLOG;
ctxt->checkIndex = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering PROLOG\n");
#endif
break;
}
case XML_PARSER_COMMENT:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == COMMENT\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering CONTENT\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_IGNORE:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == IGNORE");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_DTD;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering DTD\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_PI:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == PI\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering CONTENT\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_ENTITY_DECL:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == ENTITY_DECL\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_DTD;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering DTD\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_ENTITY_VALUE:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == ENTITY_VALUE\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering DTD\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == ATTRIBUTE_VALUE\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START_TAG;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering START_TAG\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_SYSTEM_LITERAL:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == SYSTEM_LITERAL\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START_TAG;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering START_TAG\n");
#endif
break;
case XML_PARSER_PUBLIC_LITERAL:
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: internal error, state == PUBLIC_LITERAL\n");
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_START_TAG;
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PP: entering START_TAG\n");
#endif
break;
}
}
done:
#ifdef DEBUG_PUSH
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext, "PP: done %d\n", ret);
#endif
return(ret);
encoding_error:
{
char buffer[150];
snprintf(buffer, 149, "Bytes: 0x%02X 0x%02X 0x%02X 0x%02X\n",
ctxt->input->cur[0], ctxt->input->cur[1],
ctxt->input->cur[2], ctxt->input->cur[3]);
__xmlErrEncoding(ctxt, XML_ERR_INVALID_CHAR,
"Input is not proper UTF-8, indicate encoding !\n%s",
BAD_CAST buffer, NULL);
}
return(0);
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
libxml2
|
77404b8b69bc122d12231807abf1a837d121b551
| 160,276,695,918,049,420,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 929 |
Make sure the parser returns when getting a Stop order
patch backported from chromiun bug fixes, assuming author is Chris
|
int json_object_set_new_nocheck(json_t *json, const char *key, json_t *value)
{
json_object_t *object;
if(!value)
return -1;
if(!key || !json_is_object(json) || json == value)
{
json_decref(value);
return -1;
}
object = json_to_object(json);
if(hashtable_set(&object->hashtable, key, object->serial++, value))
{
json_decref(value);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-310"
] |
jansson
|
8f80c2d83808150724d31793e6ade92749b1faa4
| 101,425,742,464,190,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 |
CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
|
pdf_close_text_contents(gx_device_pdf *pdev)
{
/*
* Clear the font pointer. This is probably left over from old code,
* but it is appropriate in case we ever choose in the future to write
* out and free font resources before the end of the document.
*/
pdf_text_state_t *pts = pdev->text->text_state;
pts->in.pdfont = pts->out.pdfont = 0;
pts->in.size = pts->out.size = 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
ghostpdl
|
39b1e54b2968620723bf32e96764c88797714879
| 272,120,276,778,814,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
pdfwrite - Guard against trying to output an infinite number
Bug #699255 " Buffer overflow on pprintg1 due to mishandle postscript file data to pdf"
The file uses an enormous parameter to xyxhow, causing an overflow in
the calculation of text positioning (value > 1e39).
Since this is basically a nonsense value, and PostScript only supports
real values up to 1e38, this patch follows the same approach as for
a degenerate CTM, and treats it as 0.
Adobe Acrobat Distiller throws a limitcheck error, so we could do that
instead if this approach proves to be a problem.
|
static int interrupt_window_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
svm_clear_vintr(to_svm(vcpu));
/*
* For AVIC, the only reason to end up here is ExtINTs.
* In this case AVIC was temporarily disabled for
* requesting the IRQ window and we have to re-enable it.
*/
svm_toggle_avic_for_irq_window(vcpu, true);
++vcpu->stat.irq_window_exits;
return 1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-862"
] |
kvm
|
0f923e07124df069ba68d8bb12324398f4b6b709
| 312,577,796,484,467,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 |
KVM: nSVM: avoid picking up unsupported bits from L2 in int_ctl (CVE-2021-3653)
* Invert the mask of bits that we pick from L2 in
nested_vmcb02_prepare_control
* Invert and explicitly use VIRQ related bits bitmask in svm_clear_vintr
This fixes a security issue that allowed a malicious L1 to run L2 with
AVIC enabled, which allowed the L2 to exploit the uninitialized and enabled
AVIC to read/write the host physical memory at some offsets.
Fixes: 3d6368ef580a ("KVM: SVM: Add VMRUN handler")
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
obtain_nonce(unsigned char* nonce)
{
NTSTATUS status;
status = BCryptGenRandom(NULL, nonce, 8,
BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(status))
return (-1);
return (0);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-908",
"CWE-22"
] |
libu2f-host
|
e4bb58cc8b6202a421e65f8230217d8ae6e16eb5
| 142,681,993,372,860,690,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 |
fix filling out of initresp
|
static DWORD WINAPI _events_thread(void* arg) {
CImgDisplay *const disp = (CImgDisplay*)(((void**)arg)[0]);
const char *const title = (const char*)(((void**)arg)[1]);
MSG msg;
delete[] (void**)arg;
disp->_bmi.bmiHeader.biSize = sizeof(BITMAPINFOHEADER);
disp->_bmi.bmiHeader.biWidth = disp->width();
disp->_bmi.bmiHeader.biHeight = -disp->height();
disp->_bmi.bmiHeader.biPlanes = 1;
disp->_bmi.bmiHeader.biBitCount = 32;
disp->_bmi.bmiHeader.biCompression = BI_RGB;
disp->_bmi.bmiHeader.biSizeImage = 0;
disp->_bmi.bmiHeader.biXPelsPerMeter = 1;
disp->_bmi.bmiHeader.biYPelsPerMeter = 1;
disp->_bmi.bmiHeader.biClrUsed = 0;
disp->_bmi.bmiHeader.biClrImportant = 0;
disp->_data = new unsigned int[(size_t)disp->_width*disp->_height];
if (!disp->_is_fullscreen) { // Normal window
RECT rect;
rect.left = rect.top = 0; rect.right = (LONG)disp->_width - 1; rect.bottom = (LONG)disp->_height - 1;
AdjustWindowRect(&rect,WS_CAPTION | WS_SYSMENU | WS_THICKFRAME | WS_MINIMIZEBOX | WS_MAXIMIZEBOX,false);
const int
border1 = (int)((rect.right - rect.left + 1 - disp->_width)/2),
border2 = (int)(rect.bottom - rect.top + 1 - disp->_height - border1),
ww = disp->_width + 2*border1,
wh = disp->_height + border1 + border2,
sw = CImgDisplay::screen_width(),
sh = CImgDisplay::screen_height();
int
wx = (int)cimg::round(cimg::rand(0,sw - ww -1)),
wy = (int)cimg::round(cimg::rand(64,sh - wh - 65));
if (wx + ww>=sw) wx = sw - ww;
if (wy + wh>=sh) wy = sh - wh;
if (wx<0) wx = 0;
if (wy<0) wy = 0;
disp->_window = CreateWindowA("MDICLIENT",title?title:" ",
WS_OVERLAPPEDWINDOW | (disp->_is_closed?0:WS_VISIBLE),
wx,wy,ww,wh,0,0,0,&(disp->_ccs));
if (!disp->_is_closed) {
GetWindowRect(disp->_window,&rect);
disp->_window_x = rect.left + border1;
disp->_window_y = rect.top + border2;
} else disp->_window_x = disp->_window_y = 0;
} else { // Fullscreen window
const unsigned int
sx = (unsigned int)screen_width(),
sy = (unsigned int)screen_height();
disp->_window = CreateWindowA("MDICLIENT",title?title:" ",
WS_POPUP | (disp->_is_closed?0:WS_VISIBLE),
(sx - disp->_width)/2,
(sy - disp->_height)/2,
disp->_width,disp->_height,0,0,0,&(disp->_ccs));
disp->_window_x = disp->_window_y = 0;
}
SetForegroundWindow(disp->_window);
disp->_hdc = GetDC(disp->_window);
disp->_window_width = disp->_width;
disp->_window_height = disp->_height;
disp->flush();
#ifdef _WIN64
SetWindowLongPtr(disp->_window,GWLP_USERDATA,(LONG_PTR)disp);
SetWindowLongPtr(disp->_window,GWLP_WNDPROC,(LONG_PTR)_handle_events);
#else
SetWindowLong(disp->_window,GWL_USERDATA,(LONG)disp);
SetWindowLong(disp->_window,GWL_WNDPROC,(LONG)_handle_events);
#endif
SetEvent(disp->_is_created);
while (GetMessage(&msg,0,0,0)) DispatchMessage(&msg);
return 0;
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
CImg
|
ac8003393569aba51048c9d67e1491559877b1d1
| 135,670,439,347,034,450,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 70 |
.
|
void snd_usbmidi_input_stop(struct list_head *p)
{
struct snd_usb_midi *umidi;
unsigned int i, j;
umidi = list_entry(p, struct snd_usb_midi, list);
if (!umidi->input_running)
return;
for (i = 0; i < MIDI_MAX_ENDPOINTS; ++i) {
struct snd_usb_midi_endpoint *ep = &umidi->endpoints[i];
if (ep->in)
for (j = 0; j < INPUT_URBS; ++j)
usb_kill_urb(ep->in->urbs[j]);
}
umidi->input_running = 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703"
] |
linux
|
07d86ca93db7e5cdf4743564d98292042ec21af7
| 116,004,496,206,395,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
ALSA: usb-audio: avoid freeing umidi object twice
The 'umidi' object will be free'd on the error path by snd_usbmidi_free()
when tearing down the rawmidi interface. So we shouldn't try to free it
in snd_usbmidi_create() after having registered the rawmidi interface.
Found by KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Clemens Ladisch <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
void ConnectionManagerImpl::onIdleTimeout() {
ENVOY_CONN_LOG(debug, "idle timeout", read_callbacks_->connection());
stats_.named_.downstream_cx_idle_timeout_.inc();
if (!codec_) {
// No need to delay close after flushing since an idle timeout has already fired. Attempt to
// write out buffered data one last time and issue a local close if successful.
doConnectionClose(Network::ConnectionCloseType::FlushWrite, absl::nullopt, "");
} else if (drain_state_ == DrainState::NotDraining) {
startDrainSequence();
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-22"
] |
envoy
|
5333b928d8bcffa26ab19bf018369a835f697585
| 40,525,693,797,659,224,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 |
Implement handling of escaped slash characters in URL path
Fixes: CVE-2021-29492
Signed-off-by: Yan Avlasov <[email protected]>
|
static int __init acpi_parse_hpet(unsigned long phys, unsigned long size)
{
struct acpi_table_hpet *hpet_tbl;
struct resource *hpet_res;
resource_size_t res_start;
if (!phys || !size)
return -EINVAL;
hpet_tbl = (struct acpi_table_hpet *)__acpi_map_table(phys, size);
if (!hpet_tbl) {
printk(KERN_WARNING PREFIX "Unable to map HPET\n");
return -ENODEV;
}
if (hpet_tbl->addr.space_id != ACPI_SPACE_MEM) {
printk(KERN_WARNING PREFIX "HPET timers must be located in "
"memory.\n");
return -1;
}
#define HPET_RESOURCE_NAME_SIZE 9
hpet_res = alloc_bootmem(sizeof(*hpet_res) + HPET_RESOURCE_NAME_SIZE);
if (hpet_res) {
memset(hpet_res, 0, sizeof(*hpet_res));
hpet_res->name = (void *)&hpet_res[1];
hpet_res->flags = IORESOURCE_MEM | IORESOURCE_BUSY;
snprintf((char *)hpet_res->name, HPET_RESOURCE_NAME_SIZE,
"HPET %u", hpet_tbl->number);
hpet_res->end = (1 * 1024) - 1;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
vxtime.hpet_address = hpet_tbl->addr.addrl |
((long)hpet_tbl->addr.addrh << 32);
printk(KERN_INFO PREFIX "HPET id: %#x base: %#lx\n",
hpet_tbl->id, vxtime.hpet_address);
res_start = vxtime.hpet_address;
#else /* X86 */
{
extern unsigned long hpet_address;
hpet_address = hpet_tbl->addr.addrl;
printk(KERN_INFO PREFIX "HPET id: %#x base: %#lx\n",
hpet_tbl->id, hpet_address);
res_start = hpet_address;
}
#endif /* X86 */
if (hpet_res) {
hpet_res->start = res_start;
hpet_res->end += res_start;
insert_resource(&iomem_resource, hpet_res);
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux-2.6
|
f0f4c3432e5e1087b3a8c0e6bd4113d3c37497ff
| 73,361,527,373,490,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 60 |
[PATCH] i386: add HPET(s) into resource map
Add HPET(s) into resource map. This will allow for the HPET(s) to be
visibile within /proc/iomem.
Signed-off-by: Aaron Durbin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
|
void LibRaw::adjust_bl()
{
int clear_repeat=0;
if (O.user_black >= 0)
{
C.black = O.user_black;
clear_repeat = 1;
}
for(int i=0; i<4; i++)
if(O.user_cblack[i]>-1000000)
{
C.cblack[i] = O.user_cblack[i];
clear_repeat = 1;
}
if(clear_repeat)
C.cblack[4]=C.cblack[5]=0;
// Add common part to cblack[] early
if (imgdata.idata.filters > 1000 && (C.cblack[4]+1)/2 == 1 && (C.cblack[5]+1)/2 == 1)
{
int clrs[4];
int lastg = -1, gcnt = 0;
for(int c = 0; c < 4; c++)
{
clrs[c] = FC(c/2,c%2);
if(clrs[c]==1)
{
gcnt++;
lastg = c;
}
}
if(gcnt>1 && lastg>=0)
clrs[lastg] = 3;
for(int c=0; c<4; c++)
C.cblack[clrs[c]] += C.cblack[6 + c/2 % C.cblack[4] * C.cblack[5] + c%2 % C.cblack[5]];
C.cblack[4]=C.cblack[5]=0;
//imgdata.idata.filters = sfilters;
}
else if(imgdata.idata.filters <= 1000 && C.cblack[4]==1 && C.cblack[5]==1) // Fuji RAF dng
{
for(int c=0; c<4; c++)
C.cblack[c] += C.cblack[6];
C.cblack[4]=C.cblack[5]=0;
}
// remove common part from C.cblack[]
int i = C.cblack[3];
int c;
for(c=0;c<3;c++) if (i > C.cblack[c]) i = C.cblack[c];
for(c=0;c<4;c++) C.cblack[c] -= i; // remove common part
C.black += i;
// Now calculate common part for cblack[6+] part and move it to C.black
if(C.cblack[4] && C.cblack[5])
{
i = C.cblack[6];
for(c=1; c<C.cblack[4]*C.cblack[5]; c++)
if(i>C.cblack[6+c]) i = C.cblack[6+c];
// Remove i from cblack[6+]
int nonz=0;
for(c=0; c<C.cblack[4]*C.cblack[5]; c++)
{
C.cblack[6+c]-=i;
if(C.cblack[6+c])nonz++;
}
C.black +=i;
if(!nonz)
C.cblack[4] = C.cblack[5] = 0;
}
for(c=0;c<4;c++) C.cblack[c] += C.black;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
LibRaw
|
8682ad204392b914ab1cc6ebcca9c27c19c1a4b4
| 289,147,711,790,073,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 73 |
0.18.17
|
bool TABLE_LIST::is_with_table()
{
return derived && derived->with_element;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
server
|
c02ebf3510850ba78a106be9974c94c3b97d8585
| 208,420,893,504,354,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
MDEV-24176 Preparations
1. moved fix_vcol_exprs() call to open_table()
mysql_alter_table() doesn't do lock_tables() so it cannot win from
fix_vcol_exprs() from there. Tests affected: main.default_session
2. Vanilla cleanups and comments.
|
static int do_recv_XAnyEvent(rpc_message_t *message, XEvent *xevent)
{
uint32_t serial, send_event, window;
int error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_uint32(message, &serial)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_uint32(message, &send_event)) < 0)
return error;
// display shall be filled in by the plugin
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_uint32(message, &window)) < 0)
return error;
xevent->xany.serial = serial;
xevent->xany.send_event = send_event;
xevent->xany.window = window;
return RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-264"
] |
nspluginwrapper
|
7e4ab8e1189846041f955e6c83f72bc1624e7a98
| 67,145,218,520,058,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 |
Support all the new variables added
|
ttwu_stat(struct task_struct *p, int cpu, int wake_flags)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS
struct rq *rq = this_rq();
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
int this_cpu = smp_processor_id();
if (cpu == this_cpu) {
schedstat_inc(rq, ttwu_local);
schedstat_inc(p, se.statistics.nr_wakeups_local);
} else {
struct sched_domain *sd;
schedstat_inc(p, se.statistics.nr_wakeups_remote);
rcu_read_lock();
for_each_domain(this_cpu, sd) {
if (cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, sched_domain_span(sd))) {
schedstat_inc(sd, ttwu_wake_remote);
break;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
if (wake_flags & WF_MIGRATED)
schedstat_inc(p, se.statistics.nr_wakeups_migrate);
#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
schedstat_inc(rq, ttwu_count);
schedstat_inc(p, se.statistics.nr_wakeups);
if (wake_flags & WF_SYNC)
schedstat_inc(p, se.statistics.nr_wakeups_sync);
#endif /* CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS */
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
linux
|
29d6455178a09e1dc340380c582b13356227e8df
| 33,106,180,351,411,047,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 38 |
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
Until now, hitting this BUG_ON caused a recursive oops (because oops
handling involves do_exit(), which calls into the scheduler, which in
turn raises an oops), which caused stuff below the stack to be
overwritten until a panic happened (e.g. via an oops in interrupt
context, caused by the overwritten CPU index in the thread_info).
Just panic directly.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
zfs_zaccess_aces_check(znode_t *zp, uint32_t *working_mode,
boolean_t anyaccess, cred_t *cr)
{
zfsvfs_t *zfsvfs = zp->z_zfsvfs;
zfs_acl_t *aclp;
int error;
uid_t uid = crgetuid(cr);
uint64_t who;
uint16_t type, iflags;
uint16_t entry_type;
uint32_t access_mask;
uint32_t deny_mask = 0;
zfs_ace_hdr_t *acep = NULL;
boolean_t checkit;
uid_t gowner;
uid_t fowner;
zfs_fuid_map_ids(zp, cr, &fowner, &gowner);
mutex_enter(&zp->z_acl_lock);
if (zp->z_zfsvfs->z_replay == B_FALSE)
ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(ZTOV(zp), __func__);
error = zfs_acl_node_read(zp, B_TRUE, &aclp, B_FALSE);
if (error != 0) {
mutex_exit(&zp->z_acl_lock);
return (error);
}
ASSERT(zp->z_acl_cached);
while ((acep = zfs_acl_next_ace(aclp, acep, &who, &access_mask,
&iflags, &type))) {
uint32_t mask_matched;
if (!zfs_acl_valid_ace_type(type, iflags))
continue;
if (ZTOV(zp)->v_type == VDIR && (iflags & ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE))
continue;
/* Skip ACE if it does not affect any AoI */
mask_matched = (access_mask & *working_mode);
if (!mask_matched)
continue;
entry_type = (iflags & ACE_TYPE_FLAGS);
checkit = B_FALSE;
switch (entry_type) {
case ACE_OWNER:
if (uid == fowner)
checkit = B_TRUE;
break;
case OWNING_GROUP:
who = gowner;
/*FALLTHROUGH*/
case ACE_IDENTIFIER_GROUP:
checkit = zfs_groupmember(zfsvfs, who, cr);
break;
case ACE_EVERYONE:
checkit = B_TRUE;
break;
/* USER Entry */
default:
if (entry_type == 0) {
uid_t newid;
newid = zfs_fuid_map_id(zfsvfs, who, cr,
ZFS_ACE_USER);
if (newid != UID_NOBODY &&
uid == newid)
checkit = B_TRUE;
break;
} else {
mutex_exit(&zp->z_acl_lock);
return (SET_ERROR(EIO));
}
}
if (checkit) {
if (type == DENY) {
DTRACE_PROBE3(zfs__ace__denies,
znode_t *, zp,
zfs_ace_hdr_t *, acep,
uint32_t, mask_matched);
deny_mask |= mask_matched;
} else {
DTRACE_PROBE3(zfs__ace__allows,
znode_t *, zp,
zfs_ace_hdr_t *, acep,
uint32_t, mask_matched);
if (anyaccess) {
mutex_exit(&zp->z_acl_lock);
return (0);
}
}
*working_mode &= ~mask_matched;
}
/* Are we done? */
if (*working_mode == 0)
break;
}
mutex_exit(&zp->z_acl_lock);
/* Put the found 'denies' back on the working mode */
if (deny_mask) {
*working_mode |= deny_mask;
return (SET_ERROR(EACCES));
} else if (*working_mode) {
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200",
"CWE-732"
] |
zfs
|
716b53d0a14c72bda16c0872565dd1909757e73f
| 68,844,068,790,805,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 119 |
FreeBSD: Fix UNIX permissions checking
Reviewed-by: Ryan Moeller <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matt Macy <[email protected]>
Closes #10727
|
bool ClientConnectionImpl::cannotHaveBody() {
if (pending_response_.has_value() && pending_response_.value().encoder_.headRequest()) {
ASSERT(!pending_response_done_);
return true;
} else if (parser_->statusCode() == 204 || parser_->statusCode() == 304 ||
(parser_->statusCode() >= 200 &&
(parser_->contentLength().has_value() && parser_->contentLength().value() == 0) &&
!parser_->isChunked())) {
return true;
} else {
return false;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
envoy
|
fe7c69c248f4fe5a9080c7ccb35275b5218bb5ab
| 22,239,761,353,778,940,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
internal redirect: fix a lifetime bug (#785)
Signed-off-by: Alyssa Wilk <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matt Klein <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pradeep Rao <[email protected]>
|
static void StorePicturePTS( encoder_t *p_enc, uint32_t u_pnum, mtime_t i_pts )
{
encoder_sys_t *p_sys = p_enc->p_sys;
for( int i = 0; i<SCHRO_PTS_TLB_SIZE; i++ )
{
if( p_sys->pts_tlb[i].b_empty )
{
p_sys->pts_tlb[i].u_pnum = u_pnum;
p_sys->pts_tlb[i].i_pts = i_pts;
p_sys->pts_tlb[i].b_empty = false;
return;
}
}
msg_Err( p_enc, "Could not store PTS %"PRId64" for frame %u", i_pts, u_pnum );
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-120",
"CWE-787"
] |
vlc
|
9bb0353a5c63a7f8c6fc853faa3df4b4df1f5eb5
| 24,487,247,931,831,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 |
codec: schroedinger: fix potential buffer overflow.
The variable len is a raw 32 bit value read using GetDWBE. If this
value is larger than UINT32_MAX - sizeof(eos), this will cause an
integer overflow in the subsequent call to malloc, and finally a
buffer overflow when calling memcpy. We fix this by checking len
accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Jean-Baptiste Kempf <[email protected]>
|
static int rtl8150_ioctl(struct net_device *netdev, struct ifreq *rq, int cmd)
{
rtl8150_t *dev = netdev_priv(netdev);
u16 *data = (u16 *) & rq->ifr_ifru;
int res = 0;
switch (cmd) {
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE:
data[0] = dev->phy;
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 1:
read_mii_word(dev, dev->phy, (data[1] & 0x1f), &data[3]);
break;
case SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 2:
if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
write_mii_word(dev, dev->phy, (data[1] & 0x1f), data[2]);
break;
default:
res = -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
return res;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
linux
|
7926aff5c57b577ab0f43364ff0c59d968f6a414
| 175,779,998,620,191,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 |
rtl8150: Use heap buffers for all register access
Allocating USB buffers on the stack is not portable, and no longer
works on x86_64 (with VMAP_STACK enabled as per default).
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int Field_decimal::cmp(const uchar *a_ptr,const uchar *b_ptr)
{
const uchar *end;
int swap=0;
/* First remove prefixes '0', ' ', and '-' */
for (end=a_ptr+field_length;
a_ptr != end &&
(*a_ptr == *b_ptr ||
((my_isspace(&my_charset_bin,*a_ptr) || *a_ptr == '+' ||
*a_ptr == '0') &&
(my_isspace(&my_charset_bin,*b_ptr) || *b_ptr == '+' ||
*b_ptr == '0')));
a_ptr++,b_ptr++)
{
if (*a_ptr == '-') // If both numbers are negative
swap= -1 ^ 1; // Swap result
}
if (a_ptr == end)
return 0;
if (*a_ptr == '-')
return -1;
if (*b_ptr == '-')
return 1;
while (a_ptr != end)
{
if (*a_ptr++ != *b_ptr++)
return swap ^ (a_ptr[-1] < b_ptr[-1] ? -1 : 1); // compare digits
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416",
"CWE-703"
] |
server
|
08c7ab404f69d9c4ca6ca7a9cf7eec74c804f917
| 136,258,429,356,895,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 |
MDEV-24176 Server crashes after insert in the table with virtual
column generated using date_format() and if()
vcol_info->expr is allocated on expr_arena at parsing stage. Since
expr item is allocated on expr_arena all its containee items must be
allocated on expr_arena too. Otherwise fix_session_expr() will
encounter prematurely freed item.
When table is reopened from cache vcol_info contains stale
expression. We refresh expression via TABLE::vcol_fix_exprs() but
first we must prepare a proper context (Vcol_expr_context) which meets
some requirements:
1. As noted above expr update must be done on expr_arena as there may
be new items created. It was a bug in fix_session_expr_for_read() and
was just not reproduced because of no second refix. Now refix is done
for more cases so it does reproduce. Tests affected: vcol.binlog
2. Also name resolution context must be narrowed to the single table.
Tested by: vcol.update main.default vcol.vcol_syntax gcol.gcol_bugfixes
3. sql_mode must be clean and not fail expr update.
sql_mode such as MODE_NO_BACKSLASH_ESCAPES, MODE_NO_ZERO_IN_DATE, etc
must not affect vcol expression update. If the table was created
successfully any further evaluation must not fail. Tests affected:
main.func_like
Reviewed by: Sergei Golubchik <[email protected]>
|
flatpak_bwrap_add_fd (FlatpakBwrap *bwrap,
int fd)
{
g_array_append_val (bwrap->fds, fd);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-94",
"CWE-74"
] |
flatpak
|
6d1773d2a54dde9b099043f07a2094a4f1c2f486
| 62,712,082,992,895,890,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
run: Convert all environment variables into bwrap arguments
This avoids some of them being filtered out by a setuid bwrap. It also
means that if they came from an untrusted source, they cannot be used
to inject arbitrary code into a non-setuid bwrap via mechanisms like
LD_PRELOAD.
Because they get bundled into a memfd or temporary file, they do not
actually appear in argv, ensuring that they remain inaccessible to
processes running under a different uid (which is important if their
values are tokens or other secrets).
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <[email protected]>
Part-of: https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/security/advisories/GHSA-4ppf-fxf6-vxg2
|
regtail(char_u *p, char_u *val)
{
char_u *scan;
char_u *temp;
int offset;
if (p == JUST_CALC_SIZE)
return;
// Find last node.
scan = p;
for (;;)
{
temp = regnext(scan);
if (temp == NULL)
break;
scan = temp;
}
if (OP(scan) == BACK)
offset = (int)(scan - val);
else
offset = (int)(val - scan);
// When the offset uses more than 16 bits it can no longer fit in the two
// bytes available. Use a global flag to avoid having to check return
// values in too many places.
if (offset > 0xffff)
reg_toolong = TRUE;
else
{
*(scan + 1) = (char_u) (((unsigned)offset >> 8) & 0377);
*(scan + 2) = (char_u) (offset & 0377);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-823",
"CWE-703"
] |
vim
|
6456fae9ba8e72c74b2c0c499eaf09974604ff30
| 217,945,398,278,166,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 |
patch 8.2.4440: crash with specific regexp pattern and string
Problem: Crash with specific regexp pattern and string.
Solution: Stop at the start of the string.
|
MemTxResult flatview_read_continue(FlatView *fv, hwaddr addr,
MemTxAttrs attrs, void *ptr,
hwaddr len, hwaddr addr1, hwaddr l,
MemoryRegion *mr)
{
uint8_t *ram_ptr;
uint64_t val;
MemTxResult result = MEMTX_OK;
bool release_lock = false;
uint8_t *buf = ptr;
for (;;) {
if (!memory_access_is_direct(mr, false)) {
/* I/O case */
release_lock |= prepare_mmio_access(mr);
l = memory_access_size(mr, l, addr1);
result |= memory_region_dispatch_read(mr, addr1, &val,
size_memop(l), attrs);
stn_he_p(buf, l, val);
} else {
/* RAM case */
fuzz_dma_read_cb(addr, len, mr, false);
ram_ptr = qemu_ram_ptr_length(mr->ram_block, addr1, &l, false);
memcpy(buf, ram_ptr, l);
}
if (release_lock) {
qemu_mutex_unlock_iothread();
release_lock = false;
}
len -= l;
buf += l;
addr += l;
if (!len) {
break;
}
l = len;
mr = flatview_translate(fv, addr, &addr1, &l, false, attrs);
}
return result;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
qemu
|
4bfb024bc76973d40a359476dc0291f46e435442
| 160,547,188,369,311,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 45 |
memory: clamp cached translation in case it points to an MMIO region
In using the address_space_translate_internal API, address_space_cache_init
forgot one piece of advice that can be found in the code for
address_space_translate_internal:
/* MMIO registers can be expected to perform full-width accesses based only
* on their address, without considering adjacent registers that could
* decode to completely different MemoryRegions. When such registers
* exist (e.g. I/O ports 0xcf8 and 0xcf9 on most PC chipsets), MMIO
* regions overlap wildly. For this reason we cannot clamp the accesses
* here.
*
* If the length is small (as is the case for address_space_ldl/stl),
* everything works fine. If the incoming length is large, however,
* the caller really has to do the clamping through memory_access_size.
*/
address_space_cache_init is exactly one such case where "the incoming length
is large", therefore we need to clamp the resulting length---not to
memory_access_size though, since we are not doing an access yet, but to
the size of the resulting section. This ensures that subsequent accesses
to the cached MemoryRegionSection will be in range.
With this patch, the enclosed testcase notices that the used ring does
not fit into the MSI-X table and prints a "qemu-system-x86_64: Cannot map used"
error.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
double
ruby_strtod(const char *s00, char **se)
{
#ifdef Avoid_Underflow
int scale;
#endif
int bb2, bb5, bbe, bd2, bd5, bbbits, bs2, c, dsign,
e, e1, esign, i, j, k, nd, nd0, nf, nz, nz0, sign;
const char *s, *s0, *s1;
double aadj, adj;
double_u aadj1, rv, rv0;
Long L;
ULong y, z;
Bigint *bb, *bb1, *bd, *bd0, *bs, *delta;
#ifdef SET_INEXACT
int inexact, oldinexact;
#endif
#ifdef Honor_FLT_ROUNDS
int rounding;
#endif
#ifdef USE_LOCALE
const char *s2;
#endif
errno = 0;
sign = nz0 = nz = 0;
dval(rv) = 0.;
for (s = s00;;s++)
switch (*s) {
case '-':
sign = 1;
/* no break */
case '+':
if (*++s)
goto break2;
/* no break */
case 0:
goto ret0;
case '\t':
case '\n':
case '\v':
case '\f':
case '\r':
case ' ':
continue;
default:
goto break2;
}
break2:
if (*s == '0') {
if (s[1] == 'x' || s[1] == 'X') {
static const char hexdigit[] = "0123456789abcdef0123456789ABCDEF";
s0 = ++s;
adj = 0;
aadj = 1.0;
nd0 = -4;
if (!*++s || !(s1 = strchr(hexdigit, *s))) goto ret0;
while (*s == '0') s++;
if ((s1 = strchr(hexdigit, *s)) != NULL) {
do {
adj += aadj * ((s1 - hexdigit) & 15);
nd0 += 4;
aadj /= 16;
} while (*++s && (s1 = strchr(hexdigit, *s)));
}
if (*s == '.') {
dsign = 1;
if (!*++s || !(s1 = strchr(hexdigit, *s))) goto ret0;
if (nd0 < 0) {
while (*s == '0') {
s++;
nd0 -= 4;
}
}
for (; *s && (s1 = strchr(hexdigit, *s)); ++s) {
adj += aadj * ((s1 - hexdigit) & 15);
if ((aadj /= 16) == 0.0) {
while (strchr(hexdigit, *++s));
break;
}
}
}
else {
dsign = 0;
}
if (*s == 'P' || *s == 'p') {
dsign = 0x2C - *++s; /* +: 2B, -: 2D */
if (abs(dsign) == 1) s++;
else dsign = 1;
nd = 0;
c = *s;
if (c < '0' || '9' < c) goto ret0;
do {
nd *= 10;
nd += c;
nd -= '0';
c = *++s;
/* Float("0x0."+("0"*267)+"1fp2095") */
if (nd + dsign * nd0 > 2095) {
while ('0' <= c && c <= '9') c = *++s;
break;
}
} while ('0' <= c && c <= '9');
nd0 += nd * dsign;
}
else {
if (dsign) goto ret0;
}
dval(rv) = ldexp(adj, nd0);
goto ret;
}
nz0 = 1;
while (*++s == '0') ;
if (!*s)
goto ret;
}
s0 = s;
y = z = 0;
for (nd = nf = 0; (c = *s) >= '0' && c <= '9'; nd++, s++)
if (nd < 9)
y = 10*y + c - '0';
else if (nd < 16)
z = 10*z + c - '0';
nd0 = nd;
#ifdef USE_LOCALE
s1 = localeconv()->decimal_point;
if (c == *s1) {
c = '.';
if (*++s1) {
s2 = s;
for (;;) {
if (*++s2 != *s1) {
c = 0;
break;
}
if (!*++s1) {
s = s2;
break;
}
}
}
}
#endif
if (c == '.') {
if (!ISDIGIT(s[1]))
goto dig_done;
c = *++s;
if (!nd) {
for (; c == '0'; c = *++s)
nz++;
if (c > '0' && c <= '9') {
s0 = s;
nf += nz;
nz = 0;
goto have_dig;
}
goto dig_done;
}
for (; c >= '0' && c <= '9'; c = *++s) {
have_dig:
nz++;
if (nf > DBL_DIG * 2) continue;
if (c -= '0') {
nf += nz;
for (i = 1; i < nz; i++)
if (nd++ < 9)
y *= 10;
else if (nd <= DBL_DIG + 1)
z *= 10;
if (nd++ < 9)
y = 10*y + c;
else if (nd <= DBL_DIG + 1)
z = 10*z + c;
nz = 0;
}
}
}
dig_done:
e = 0;
if (c == 'e' || c == 'E') {
if (!nd && !nz && !nz0) {
goto ret0;
}
s00 = s;
esign = 0;
switch (c = *++s) {
case '-':
esign = 1;
case '+':
c = *++s;
}
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
while (c == '0')
c = *++s;
if (c > '0' && c <= '9') {
L = c - '0';
s1 = s;
while ((c = *++s) >= '0' && c <= '9')
L = 10*L + c - '0';
if (s - s1 > 8 || L > 19999)
/* Avoid confusion from exponents
* so large that e might overflow.
*/
e = 19999; /* safe for 16 bit ints */
else
e = (int)L;
if (esign)
e = -e;
}
else
e = 0;
}
else
s = s00;
}
if (!nd) {
if (!nz && !nz0) {
#ifdef INFNAN_CHECK
/* Check for Nan and Infinity */
switch (c) {
case 'i':
case 'I':
if (match(&s,"nf")) {
--s;
if (!match(&s,"inity"))
++s;
word0(rv) = 0x7ff00000;
word1(rv) = 0;
goto ret;
}
break;
case 'n':
case 'N':
if (match(&s, "an")) {
word0(rv) = NAN_WORD0;
word1(rv) = NAN_WORD1;
#ifndef No_Hex_NaN
if (*s == '(') /*)*/
hexnan(&rv, &s);
#endif
goto ret;
}
}
#endif /* INFNAN_CHECK */
ret0:
s = s00;
sign = 0;
}
goto ret;
}
e1 = e -= nf;
/* Now we have nd0 digits, starting at s0, followed by a
* decimal point, followed by nd-nd0 digits. The number we're
* after is the integer represented by those digits times
* 10**e */
if (!nd0)
nd0 = nd;
k = nd < DBL_DIG + 1 ? nd : DBL_DIG + 1;
dval(rv) = y;
if (k > 9) {
#ifdef SET_INEXACT
if (k > DBL_DIG)
oldinexact = get_inexact();
#endif
dval(rv) = tens[k - 9] * dval(rv) + z;
}
bd0 = bb = bd = bs = delta = 0;
if (nd <= DBL_DIG
#ifndef RND_PRODQUOT
#ifndef Honor_FLT_ROUNDS
&& Flt_Rounds == 1
#endif
#endif
) {
if (!e)
goto ret;
if (e > 0) {
if (e <= Ten_pmax) {
#ifdef VAX
goto vax_ovfl_check;
#else
#ifdef Honor_FLT_ROUNDS
/* round correctly FLT_ROUNDS = 2 or 3 */
if (sign) {
dval(rv) = -dval(rv);
sign = 0;
}
#endif
/* rv = */ rounded_product(dval(rv), tens[e]);
goto ret;
#endif
}
i = DBL_DIG - nd;
if (e <= Ten_pmax + i) {
/* A fancier test would sometimes let us do
* this for larger i values.
*/
#ifdef Honor_FLT_ROUNDS
/* round correctly FLT_ROUNDS = 2 or 3 */
if (sign) {
dval(rv) = -dval(rv);
sign = 0;
}
#endif
e -= i;
dval(rv) *= tens[i];
#ifdef VAX
/* VAX exponent range is so narrow we must
* worry about overflow here...
*/
vax_ovfl_check:
word0(rv) -= P*Exp_msk1;
/* rv = */ rounded_product(dval(rv), tens[e]);
if ((word0(rv) & Exp_mask)
> Exp_msk1*(DBL_MAX_EXP+Bias-1-P))
goto ovfl;
word0(rv) += P*Exp_msk1;
#else
/* rv = */ rounded_product(dval(rv), tens[e]);
#endif
goto ret;
}
}
#ifndef Inaccurate_Divide
else if (e >= -Ten_pmax) {
#ifdef Honor_FLT_ROUNDS
/* round correctly FLT_ROUNDS = 2 or 3 */
if (sign) {
dval(rv) = -dval(rv);
sign = 0;
}
#endif
/* rv = */ rounded_quotient(dval(rv), tens[-e]);
goto ret;
}
#endif
}
e1 += nd - k;
#ifdef IEEE_Arith
#ifdef SET_INEXACT
inexact = 1;
if (k <= DBL_DIG)
oldinexact = get_inexact();
#endif
#ifdef Avoid_Underflow
scale = 0;
#endif
#ifdef Honor_FLT_ROUNDS
if ((rounding = Flt_Rounds) >= 2) {
if (sign)
rounding = rounding == 2 ? 0 : 2;
else
if (rounding != 2)
rounding = 0;
}
#endif
#endif /*IEEE_Arith*/
/* Get starting approximation = rv * 10**e1 */
if (e1 > 0) {
if ((i = e1 & 15) != 0)
dval(rv) *= tens[i];
if (e1 &= ~15) {
if (e1 > DBL_MAX_10_EXP) {
ovfl:
#ifndef NO_ERRNO
errno = ERANGE;
#endif
/* Can't trust HUGE_VAL */
#ifdef IEEE_Arith
#ifdef Honor_FLT_ROUNDS
switch (rounding) {
case 0: /* toward 0 */
case 3: /* toward -infinity */
word0(rv) = Big0;
word1(rv) = Big1;
break;
default:
word0(rv) = Exp_mask;
word1(rv) = 0;
}
#else /*Honor_FLT_ROUNDS*/
word0(rv) = Exp_mask;
word1(rv) = 0;
#endif /*Honor_FLT_ROUNDS*/
#ifdef SET_INEXACT
/* set overflow bit */
dval(rv0) = 1e300;
dval(rv0) *= dval(rv0);
#endif
#else /*IEEE_Arith*/
word0(rv) = Big0;
word1(rv) = Big1;
#endif /*IEEE_Arith*/
if (bd0)
goto retfree;
goto ret;
}
e1 >>= 4;
for (j = 0; e1 > 1; j++, e1 >>= 1)
if (e1 & 1)
dval(rv) *= bigtens[j];
/* The last multiplication could overflow. */
word0(rv) -= P*Exp_msk1;
dval(rv) *= bigtens[j];
if ((z = word0(rv) & Exp_mask)
> Exp_msk1*(DBL_MAX_EXP+Bias-P))
goto ovfl;
if (z > Exp_msk1*(DBL_MAX_EXP+Bias-1-P)) {
/* set to largest number */
/* (Can't trust DBL_MAX) */
word0(rv) = Big0;
word1(rv) = Big1;
}
else
word0(rv) += P*Exp_msk1;
}
}
else if (e1 < 0) {
e1 = -e1;
if ((i = e1 & 15) != 0)
dval(rv) /= tens[i];
if (e1 >>= 4) {
if (e1 >= 1 << n_bigtens)
goto undfl;
#ifdef Avoid_Underflow
if (e1 & Scale_Bit)
scale = 2*P;
for (j = 0; e1 > 0; j++, e1 >>= 1)
if (e1 & 1)
dval(rv) *= tinytens[j];
if (scale && (j = 2*P + 1 - ((word0(rv) & Exp_mask)
>> Exp_shift)) > 0) {
/* scaled rv is denormal; zap j low bits */
if (j >= 32) {
word1(rv) = 0;
if (j >= 53)
word0(rv) = (P+2)*Exp_msk1;
else
word0(rv) &= 0xffffffff << (j-32);
}
else
word1(rv) &= 0xffffffff << j;
}
#else
for (j = 0; e1 > 1; j++, e1 >>= 1)
if (e1 & 1)
dval(rv) *= tinytens[j];
/* The last multiplication could underflow. */
dval(rv0) = dval(rv);
dval(rv) *= tinytens[j];
if (!dval(rv)) {
dval(rv) = 2.*dval(rv0);
dval(rv) *= tinytens[j];
#endif
if (!dval(rv)) {
undfl:
dval(rv) = 0.;
#ifndef NO_ERRNO
errno = ERANGE;
#endif
if (bd0)
goto retfree;
goto ret;
}
#ifndef Avoid_Underflow
word0(rv) = Tiny0;
word1(rv) = Tiny1;
/* The refinement below will clean
* this approximation up.
*/
}
#endif
}
}
/* Now the hard part -- adjusting rv to the correct value.*/
/* Put digits into bd: true value = bd * 10^e */
bd0 = s2b(s0, nd0, nd, y);
for (;;) {
bd = Balloc(bd0->k);
Bcopy(bd, bd0);
bb = d2b(dval(rv), &bbe, &bbbits); /* rv = bb * 2^bbe */
bs = i2b(1);
if (e >= 0) {
bb2 = bb5 = 0;
bd2 = bd5 = e;
}
else {
bb2 = bb5 = -e;
bd2 = bd5 = 0;
}
if (bbe >= 0)
bb2 += bbe;
else
bd2 -= bbe;
bs2 = bb2;
#ifdef Honor_FLT_ROUNDS
if (rounding != 1)
bs2++;
#endif
#ifdef Avoid_Underflow
j = bbe - scale;
i = j + bbbits - 1; /* logb(rv) */
if (i < Emin) /* denormal */
j += P - Emin;
else
j = P + 1 - bbbits;
#else /*Avoid_Underflow*/
#ifdef Sudden_Underflow
#ifdef IBM
j = 1 + 4*P - 3 - bbbits + ((bbe + bbbits - 1) & 3);
#else
j = P + 1 - bbbits;
#endif
#else /*Sudden_Underflow*/
j = bbe;
i = j + bbbits - 1; /* logb(rv) */
if (i < Emin) /* denormal */
j += P - Emin;
else
j = P + 1 - bbbits;
#endif /*Sudden_Underflow*/
#endif /*Avoid_Underflow*/
bb2 += j;
bd2 += j;
#ifdef Avoid_Underflow
bd2 += scale;
#endif
i = bb2 < bd2 ? bb2 : bd2;
if (i > bs2)
i = bs2;
if (i > 0) {
bb2 -= i;
bd2 -= i;
bs2 -= i;
}
if (bb5 > 0) {
bs = pow5mult(bs, bb5);
bb1 = mult(bs, bb);
Bfree(bb);
bb = bb1;
}
if (bb2 > 0)
bb = lshift(bb, bb2);
if (bd5 > 0)
bd = pow5mult(bd, bd5);
if (bd2 > 0)
bd = lshift(bd, bd2);
if (bs2 > 0)
bs = lshift(bs, bs2);
delta = diff(bb, bd);
dsign = delta->sign;
delta->sign = 0;
i = cmp(delta, bs);
#ifdef Honor_FLT_ROUNDS
if (rounding != 1) {
if (i < 0) {
/* Error is less than an ulp */
if (!delta->x[0] && delta->wds <= 1) {
/* exact */
#ifdef SET_INEXACT
inexact = 0;
#endif
break;
}
if (rounding) {
if (dsign) {
adj = 1.;
goto apply_adj;
}
}
else if (!dsign) {
adj = -1.;
if (!word1(rv)
&& !(word0(rv) & Frac_mask)) {
y = word0(rv) & Exp_mask;
#ifdef Avoid_Underflow
if (!scale || y > 2*P*Exp_msk1)
#else
if (y)
#endif
{
delta = lshift(delta,Log2P);
if (cmp(delta, bs) <= 0)
adj = -0.5;
}
}
apply_adj:
#ifdef Avoid_Underflow
if (scale && (y = word0(rv) & Exp_mask)
<= 2*P*Exp_msk1)
word0(adj) += (2*P+1)*Exp_msk1 - y;
#else
#ifdef Sudden_Underflow
if ((word0(rv) & Exp_mask) <=
P*Exp_msk1) {
word0(rv) += P*Exp_msk1;
dval(rv) += adj*ulp(dval(rv));
word0(rv) -= P*Exp_msk1;
}
else
#endif /*Sudden_Underflow*/
#endif /*Avoid_Underflow*/
dval(rv) += adj*ulp(dval(rv));
}
break;
}
adj = ratio(delta, bs);
if (adj < 1.)
adj = 1.;
if (adj <= 0x7ffffffe) {
/* adj = rounding ? ceil(adj) : floor(adj); */
y = adj;
if (y != adj) {
if (!((rounding>>1) ^ dsign))
y++;
adj = y;
}
}
#ifdef Avoid_Underflow
if (scale && (y = word0(rv) & Exp_mask) <= 2*P*Exp_msk1)
word0(adj) += (2*P+1)*Exp_msk1 - y;
#else
#ifdef Sudden_Underflow
if ((word0(rv) & Exp_mask) <= P*Exp_msk1) {
word0(rv) += P*Exp_msk1;
adj *= ulp(dval(rv));
if (dsign)
dval(rv) += adj;
else
dval(rv) -= adj;
word0(rv) -= P*Exp_msk1;
goto cont;
}
#endif /*Sudden_Underflow*/
#endif /*Avoid_Underflow*/
adj *= ulp(dval(rv));
if (dsign)
dval(rv) += adj;
else
dval(rv) -= adj;
goto cont;
}
#endif /*Honor_FLT_ROUNDS*/
if (i < 0) {
/* Error is less than half an ulp -- check for
* special case of mantissa a power of two.
*/
if (dsign || word1(rv) || word0(rv) & Bndry_mask
#ifdef IEEE_Arith
#ifdef Avoid_Underflow
|| (word0(rv) & Exp_mask) <= (2*P+1)*Exp_msk1
#else
|| (word0(rv) & Exp_mask) <= Exp_msk1
#endif
#endif
) {
#ifdef SET_INEXACT
if (!delta->x[0] && delta->wds <= 1)
inexact = 0;
#endif
break;
}
if (!delta->x[0] && delta->wds <= 1) {
/* exact result */
#ifdef SET_INEXACT
inexact = 0;
#endif
break;
}
delta = lshift(delta,Log2P);
if (cmp(delta, bs) > 0)
goto drop_down;
break;
}
if (i == 0) {
/* exactly half-way between */
if (dsign) {
if ((word0(rv) & Bndry_mask1) == Bndry_mask1
&& word1(rv) == (
#ifdef Avoid_Underflow
(scale && (y = word0(rv) & Exp_mask) <= 2*P*Exp_msk1)
? (0xffffffff & (0xffffffff << (2*P+1-(y>>Exp_shift)))) :
#endif
0xffffffff)) {
/*boundary case -- increment exponent*/
word0(rv) = (word0(rv) & Exp_mask)
+ Exp_msk1
#ifdef IBM
| Exp_msk1 >> 4
#endif
;
word1(rv) = 0;
#ifdef Avoid_Underflow
dsign = 0;
#endif
break;
}
}
else if (!(word0(rv) & Bndry_mask) && !word1(rv)) {
drop_down:
/* boundary case -- decrement exponent */
#ifdef Sudden_Underflow /*{{*/
L = word0(rv) & Exp_mask;
#ifdef IBM
if (L < Exp_msk1)
#else
#ifdef Avoid_Underflow
if (L <= (scale ? (2*P+1)*Exp_msk1 : Exp_msk1))
#else
if (L <= Exp_msk1)
#endif /*Avoid_Underflow*/
#endif /*IBM*/
goto undfl;
L -= Exp_msk1;
#else /*Sudden_Underflow}{*/
#ifdef Avoid_Underflow
if (scale) {
L = word0(rv) & Exp_mask;
if (L <= (2*P+1)*Exp_msk1) {
if (L > (P+2)*Exp_msk1)
/* round even ==> */
/* accept rv */
break;
/* rv = smallest denormal */
goto undfl;
}
}
#endif /*Avoid_Underflow*/
L = (word0(rv) & Exp_mask) - Exp_msk1;
#endif /*Sudden_Underflow}}*/
word0(rv) = L | Bndry_mask1;
word1(rv) = 0xffffffff;
#ifdef IBM
goto cont;
#else
break;
#endif
}
#ifndef ROUND_BIASED
if (!(word1(rv) & LSB))
break;
#endif
if (dsign)
dval(rv) += ulp(dval(rv));
#ifndef ROUND_BIASED
else {
dval(rv) -= ulp(dval(rv));
#ifndef Sudden_Underflow
if (!dval(rv))
goto undfl;
#endif
}
#ifdef Avoid_Underflow
dsign = 1 - dsign;
#endif
#endif
break;
}
if ((aadj = ratio(delta, bs)) <= 2.) {
if (dsign)
aadj = dval(aadj1) = 1.;
else if (word1(rv) || word0(rv) & Bndry_mask) {
#ifndef Sudden_Underflow
if (word1(rv) == Tiny1 && !word0(rv))
goto undfl;
#endif
aadj = 1.;
dval(aadj1) = -1.;
}
else {
/* special case -- power of FLT_RADIX to be */
/* rounded down... */
if (aadj < 2./FLT_RADIX)
aadj = 1./FLT_RADIX;
else
aadj *= 0.5;
dval(aadj1) = -aadj;
}
}
else {
aadj *= 0.5;
dval(aadj1) = dsign ? aadj : -aadj;
#ifdef Check_FLT_ROUNDS
switch (Rounding) {
case 2: /* towards +infinity */
dval(aadj1) -= 0.5;
break;
case 0: /* towards 0 */
case 3: /* towards -infinity */
dval(aadj1) += 0.5;
}
#else
if (Flt_Rounds == 0)
dval(aadj1) += 0.5;
#endif /*Check_FLT_ROUNDS*/
}
y = word0(rv) & Exp_mask;
/* Check for overflow */
if (y == Exp_msk1*(DBL_MAX_EXP+Bias-1)) {
dval(rv0) = dval(rv);
word0(rv) -= P*Exp_msk1;
adj = dval(aadj1) * ulp(dval(rv));
dval(rv) += adj;
if ((word0(rv) & Exp_mask) >=
Exp_msk1*(DBL_MAX_EXP+Bias-P)) {
if (word0(rv0) == Big0 && word1(rv0) == Big1)
goto ovfl;
word0(rv) = Big0;
word1(rv) = Big1;
goto cont;
}
else
word0(rv) += P*Exp_msk1;
}
else {
#ifdef Avoid_Underflow
if (scale && y <= 2*P*Exp_msk1) {
if (aadj <= 0x7fffffff) {
if ((z = (int)aadj) <= 0)
z = 1;
aadj = z;
dval(aadj1) = dsign ? aadj : -aadj;
}
word0(aadj1) += (2*P+1)*Exp_msk1 - y;
}
adj = dval(aadj1) * ulp(dval(rv));
dval(rv) += adj;
#else
#ifdef Sudden_Underflow
if ((word0(rv) & Exp_mask) <= P*Exp_msk1) {
dval(rv0) = dval(rv);
word0(rv) += P*Exp_msk1;
adj = dval(aadj1) * ulp(dval(rv));
dval(rv) += adj;
#ifdef IBM
if ((word0(rv) & Exp_mask) < P*Exp_msk1)
#else
if ((word0(rv) & Exp_mask) <= P*Exp_msk1)
#endif
{
if (word0(rv0) == Tiny0 && word1(rv0) == Tiny1)
goto undfl;
word0(rv) = Tiny0;
word1(rv) = Tiny1;
goto cont;
}
else
word0(rv) -= P*Exp_msk1;
}
else {
adj = dval(aadj1) * ulp(dval(rv));
dval(rv) += adj;
}
#else /*Sudden_Underflow*/
/* Compute adj so that the IEEE rounding rules will
* correctly round rv + adj in some half-way cases.
* If rv * ulp(rv) is denormalized (i.e.,
* y <= (P-1)*Exp_msk1), we must adjust aadj to avoid
* trouble from bits lost to denormalization;
* example: 1.2e-307 .
*/
if (y <= (P-1)*Exp_msk1 && aadj > 1.) {
dval(aadj1) = (double)(int)(aadj + 0.5);
if (!dsign)
dval(aadj1) = -dval(aadj1);
}
adj = dval(aadj1) * ulp(dval(rv));
dval(rv) += adj;
#endif /*Sudden_Underflow*/
#endif /*Avoid_Underflow*/
}
z = word0(rv) & Exp_mask;
#ifndef SET_INEXACT
#ifdef Avoid_Underflow
if (!scale)
#endif
if (y == z) {
/* Can we stop now? */
L = (Long)aadj;
aadj -= L;
/* The tolerances below are conservative. */
if (dsign || word1(rv) || word0(rv) & Bndry_mask) {
if (aadj < .4999999 || aadj > .5000001)
break;
}
else if (aadj < .4999999/FLT_RADIX)
break;
}
#endif
cont:
Bfree(bb);
Bfree(bd);
Bfree(bs);
Bfree(delta);
}
#ifdef SET_INEXACT
if (inexact) {
if (!oldinexact) {
word0(rv0) = Exp_1 + (70 << Exp_shift);
word1(rv0) = 0;
dval(rv0) += 1.;
}
}
else if (!oldinexact)
clear_inexact();
#endif
#ifdef Avoid_Underflow
if (scale) {
word0(rv0) = Exp_1 - 2*P*Exp_msk1;
word1(rv0) = 0;
dval(rv) *= dval(rv0);
#ifndef NO_ERRNO
/* try to avoid the bug of testing an 8087 register value */
if (word0(rv) == 0 && word1(rv) == 0)
errno = ERANGE;
#endif
}
#endif /* Avoid_Underflow */
#ifdef SET_INEXACT
if (inexact && !(word0(rv) & Exp_mask)) {
/* set underflow bit */
dval(rv0) = 1e-300;
dval(rv0) *= dval(rv0);
}
#endif
retfree:
Bfree(bb);
Bfree(bd);
Bfree(bs);
Bfree(bd0);
Bfree(delta);
ret:
if (se)
*se = (char *)s;
return sign ? -dval(rv) : dval(rv);
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
ruby
|
60c29bbbf6574e0e947c56e71c3c3ca11620ee15
| 307,327,314,971,178,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 953 |
merge revision(s) 43775:
* util.c (ruby_strtod): ignore too long fraction part, which does not
affect the result.
git-svn-id: svn+ssh://ci.ruby-lang.org/ruby/branches/ruby_1_9_3@43776 b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e
|
static void *yam_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
++*pos;
return (*pos < NR_PORTS) ? yam_devs[*pos] : NULL;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-401"
] |
linux
|
29eb31542787e1019208a2e1047bb7c76c069536
| 229,647,459,705,491,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
yam: fix a memory leak in yam_siocdevprivate()
ym needs to be free when ym->cmd != SIOCYAMSMCS.
Fixes: 0781168e23a2 ("yam: fix a missing-check bug")
Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int phar_call_openssl_signverify(int is_sign, php_stream *fp, zend_off_t end, char *key, int key_len, char **signature, int *signature_len) /* {{{ */
{
zend_fcall_info fci;
zend_fcall_info_cache fcc;
zval retval, zp[3], openssl;
zend_string *str;
ZVAL_STRINGL(&openssl, is_sign ? "openssl_sign" : "openssl_verify", is_sign ? sizeof("openssl_sign")-1 : sizeof("openssl_verify")-1);
ZVAL_STRINGL(&zp[1], *signature, *signature_len);
ZVAL_STRINGL(&zp[2], key, key_len);
php_stream_rewind(fp);
str = php_stream_copy_to_mem(fp, (size_t) end, 0);
if (str) {
ZVAL_STR(&zp[0], str);
} else {
ZVAL_EMPTY_STRING(&zp[0]);
}
if (end != Z_STRLEN(zp[0])) {
zval_dtor(&zp[0]);
zval_dtor(&zp[1]);
zval_dtor(&zp[2]);
zval_dtor(&openssl);
return FAILURE;
}
if (FAILURE == zend_fcall_info_init(&openssl, 0, &fci, &fcc, NULL, NULL)) {
zval_dtor(&zp[0]);
zval_dtor(&zp[1]);
zval_dtor(&zp[2]);
zval_dtor(&openssl);
return FAILURE;
}
fci.param_count = 3;
fci.params = zp;
Z_ADDREF(zp[0]);
if (is_sign) {
ZVAL_NEW_REF(&zp[1], &zp[1]);
} else {
Z_ADDREF(zp[1]);
}
Z_ADDREF(zp[2]);
fci.retval = &retval;
if (FAILURE == zend_call_function(&fci, &fcc)) {
zval_dtor(&zp[0]);
zval_dtor(&zp[1]);
zval_dtor(&zp[2]);
zval_dtor(&openssl);
return FAILURE;
}
zval_dtor(&openssl);
Z_DELREF(zp[0]);
if (is_sign) {
ZVAL_UNREF(&zp[1]);
} else {
Z_DELREF(zp[1]);
}
Z_DELREF(zp[2]);
zval_dtor(&zp[0]);
zval_dtor(&zp[2]);
switch (Z_TYPE(retval)) {
default:
case IS_LONG:
zval_dtor(&zp[1]);
if (1 == Z_LVAL(retval)) {
return SUCCESS;
}
return FAILURE;
case IS_TRUE:
*signature = estrndup(Z_STRVAL(zp[1]), Z_STRLEN(zp[1]));
*signature_len = Z_STRLEN(zp[1]);
zval_dtor(&zp[1]);
return SUCCESS;
case IS_FALSE:
zval_dtor(&zp[1]);
return FAILURE;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] |
php-src
|
0bfb970f43acd1e81d11be1154805f86655f15d5
| 268,165,024,685,826,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 85 |
Fix bug #72928 - Out of bound when verify signature of zip phar in phar_parse_zipfile
(cherry picked from commit 19484ab77466f99c78fc0e677f7e03da0584d6a2)
|
static khint_t fix_chromosome(const bcf_hdr_t *h, vdict_t *d, const char *p) {
// Simple error recovery for chromosomes not defined in the header. It will not help when VCF header has
// been already printed, but will enable tools like vcfcheck to proceed.
kstring_t tmp = {0,0,0};
khint_t k;
int l;
ksprintf(&tmp, "##contig=<ID=%s>", p);
bcf_hrec_t *hrec = bcf_hdr_parse_line(h,tmp.s,&l);
free(tmp.s);
int res = hrec ? bcf_hdr_add_hrec((bcf_hdr_t*)h, hrec) : -1;
if (res < 0) bcf_hrec_destroy(hrec);
if (res > 0) res = bcf_hdr_sync((bcf_hdr_t*)h);
k = kh_get(vdict, d, p);
return k;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
htslib
|
dcd4b7304941a8832fba2d0fc4c1e716e7a4e72c
| 270,032,419,084,524,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 |
Fix check for VCF record size
The check for excessive record size in vcf_parse_format() only
looked at individual fields. It was therefore possible to
exceed the limit and overflow fmt_aux_t::offset by having
multiple fields with a combined size that went over INT_MAX.
Fix by including the amount of memory used so far in the check.
Credit to OSS-Fuzz
Fixes oss-fuzz 24097
|
hasInternalSubsetDebug(void *ctx ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
{
callbacks++;
if (noout)
return(0);
fprintf(stdout, "SAX.hasInternalSubset()\n");
return(0);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
libxml2
|
1358d157d0bd83be1dfe356a69213df9fac0b539
| 306,327,245,536,040,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
Fix use-after-free with `xmllint --html --push`
Call htmlCtxtUseOptions to make sure that names aren't stored in
dictionaries.
Note that this issue only affects xmllint using the HTML push parser.
Fixes #230.
|
static void fdctrl_handle_format_track(FDCtrl *fdctrl, int direction)
{
FDrive *cur_drv;
SET_CUR_DRV(fdctrl, fdctrl->fifo[1] & FD_DOR_SELMASK);
cur_drv = get_cur_drv(fdctrl);
fdctrl->data_state |= FD_STATE_FORMAT;
if (fdctrl->fifo[0] & 0x80)
fdctrl->data_state |= FD_STATE_MULTI;
else
fdctrl->data_state &= ~FD_STATE_MULTI;
cur_drv->bps =
fdctrl->fifo[2] > 7 ? 16384 : 128 << fdctrl->fifo[2];
#if 0
cur_drv->last_sect =
cur_drv->flags & FDISK_DBL_SIDES ? fdctrl->fifo[3] :
fdctrl->fifo[3] / 2;
#else
cur_drv->last_sect = fdctrl->fifo[3];
#endif
/* TODO: implement format using DMA expected by the Bochs BIOS
* and Linux fdformat (read 3 bytes per sector via DMA and fill
* the sector with the specified fill byte
*/
fdctrl->data_state &= ~FD_STATE_FORMAT;
fdctrl_stop_transfer(fdctrl, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-119"
] |
qemu
|
e907746266721f305d67bc0718795fedee2e824c
| 227,374,656,067,745,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 |
fdc: force the fifo access to be in bounds of the allocated buffer
During processing of certain commands such as FD_CMD_READ_ID and
FD_CMD_DRIVE_SPECIFICATION_COMMAND the fifo memory access could
get out of bounds leading to memory corruption with values coming
from the guest.
Fix this by making sure that the index is always bounded by the
allocated memory.
This is CVE-2015-3456.
Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Snow <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: John Snow <[email protected]>
|
static ssize_t iwl_dbgfs_csr_write(struct file *file,
const char __user *user_buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct iwl_trans *trans = file->private_data;
iwl_pcie_dump_csr(trans);
return count;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
linux
|
8188a18ee2e48c9a7461139838048363bfce3fef
| 1,488,879,204,285,607,300,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
iwlwifi: pcie: fix rb_allocator workqueue allocation
We don't handle failures in the rb_allocator workqueue allocation
correctly. To fix that, move the code earlier so the cleanup is
easier and we don't have to undo all the interrupt allocations in
this case.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <[email protected]>
|
AuthAuthorizer* MonClient::build_authorizer(int service_id) const {
std::lock_guard l(monc_lock);
if (auth) {
return auth->build_authorizer(service_id);
} else {
ldout(cct, 0) << __func__ << " for " << ceph_entity_type_name(service_id)
<< ", but no auth is available now" << dendl;
return nullptr;
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-294"
] |
ceph
|
6c14c2fb5650426285428dfe6ca1597e5ea1d07d
| 109,328,438,454,925,980,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
mon/MonClient: bring back CEPHX_V2 authorizer challenges
Commit c58c5754dfd2 ("msg/async/ProtocolV1: use AuthServer and
AuthClient") introduced a backwards compatibility issue into msgr1.
To fix it, commit 321548010578 ("mon/MonClient: skip CEPHX_V2
challenge if client doesn't support it") set out to skip authorizer
challenges for peers that don't support CEPHX_V2. However, it
made it so that authorizer challenges are skipped for all peers in
both msgr1 and msgr2 cases, effectively disabling the protection
against replay attacks that was put in place in commit f80b848d3f83
("auth/cephx: add authorizer challenge", CVE-2018-1128).
This is because con->get_features() always returns 0 at that
point. In msgr1 case, the peer shares its features along with the
authorizer, but while they are available in connect_msg.features they
aren't assigned to con until ProtocolV1::open(). In msgr2 case, the
peer doesn't share its features until much later (in CLIENT_IDENT
frame, i.e. after the authentication phase). The result is that
!CEPHX_V2 branch is taken in all cases and replay attack protection
is lost.
Only clusters with cephx_service_require_version set to 2 on the
service daemons would not be silently downgraded. But, since the
default is 1 and there are no reports of looping on BADAUTHORIZER
faults, I'm pretty sure that no one has ever done that. Note that
cephx_require_version set to 2 would have no effect even though it
is supposed to be stronger than cephx_service_require_version
because MonClient::handle_auth_request() didn't check it.
To fix:
- for msgr1, check connect_msg.features (as was done before commit
c58c5754dfd2) and challenge if CEPHX_V2 is supported. Together
with two preceding patches that resurrect proper cephx_* option
handling in msgr1, this covers both "I want old clients to work"
and "I wish to require better authentication" use cases.
- for msgr2, don't check anything and always challenge. CEPHX_V2
predates msgr2, anyone speaking msgr2 must support it.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 4a82c72e3bdddcb625933e83af8b50a444b961f1)
|
static void rgb_prepare_row(VncState *vs, uint8_t *dst, int x, int y,
int count)
{
if (VNC_SERVER_FB_BYTES == 4) {
if (1) {
rgb_prepare_row24(vs, dst, x, y, count);
} else {
rgb_prepare_row32(vs, dst, x, y, count);
}
} else {
rgb_prepare_row16(vs, dst, x, y, count);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
qemu
|
9f64916da20eea67121d544698676295bbb105a7
| 166,426,197,259,645,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
pixman/vnc: use pixman images in vnc.
The vnc code uses *three* DisplaySurfaces:
First is the surface of the actual QemuConsole, usually the guest
screen, but could also be a text console (monitor/serial reachable via
Ctrl-Alt-<nr> keys). This is left as-is.
Second is the current server's view of the screen content. The vnc code
uses this to figure which parts of the guest screen did _really_ change
to reduce the amount of updates sent to the vnc clients. It is also
used as data source when sending out the updates to the clients. This
surface gets replaced by a pixman image. The format changes too,
instead of using the guest screen format we'll use fixed 32bit rgb
framebuffer and convert the pixels on the fly when comparing and
updating the server framebuffer.
Third surface carries the format expected by the vnc client. That isn't
used to store image data. This surface is switched to PixelFormat and a
boolean for bigendian byte order.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]>
|
fix_bad_direct_key_sigs (kbnode_t keyblock, u32 *keyid)
{
gpg_error_t err;
kbnode_t node;
int count = 0;
for (node = keyblock->next; node; node=node->next)
{
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
break;
if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
&& IS_KEY_SIG (node->pkt->pkt.signature))
{
err = check_key_signature (keyblock, node, NULL);
if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO )
{
/* If we don't know the error, we can't decide; this is
not a problem because cmp_signature can't compare the
signature either. */
log_info ("key %s: invalid direct key signature removed\n",
keystr (keyid));
delete_kbnode (node);
count++;
}
}
}
return count;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
gnupg
|
f0b33b6fb8e0586e9584a7a409dcc31263776a67
| 158,647,443,388,753,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 |
gpg: Import only packets which are allowed in a keyblock.
* g10/import.c (valid_keyblock_packet): New.
(read_block): Store only valid packets.
--
A corrupted key, which for example included a mangled public key
encrypted packet, used to corrupt the keyring. This change skips all
packets which are not allowed in a keyblock.
GnuPG-bug-id: 1455
(cherry-picked from commit f795a0d59e197455f8723c300eebf59e09853efa)
|
inline void BroadcastMul(const float* input1_data, const Dims<4>& input1_dims,
const float* input2_data, const Dims<4>& input2_dims,
float* output_data, const Dims<4>& output_dims) {
tflite::ArithmeticParams op_params;
float float_activation_min;
float float_activation_max;
GetActivationMinMax(Ac, &float_activation_min, &float_activation_max);
SetActivationParams(float_activation_min, float_activation_max, &op_params);
BroadcastMul4DSlow(op_params, DimsToShape(input1_dims), input1_data,
DimsToShape(input2_dims), input2_data,
DimsToShape(output_dims), output_data);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-835"
] |
tensorflow
|
dfa22b348b70bb89d6d6ec0ff53973bacb4f4695
| 240,267,581,484,518,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 |
Prevent a division by 0 in average ops.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 385184660
Change-Id: I7affd4554f9b336fca29ac68f633232c094d0bd3
|
TEST(AsyncSSLSocketTest, UnencryptedTest) {
EventBase base;
auto clientCtx = std::make_shared<folly::SSLContext>();
auto serverCtx = std::make_shared<folly::SSLContext>();
NetworkSocket fds[2];
getfds(fds);
getctx(clientCtx, serverCtx);
auto client =
AsyncSSLSocket::newSocket(clientCtx, &base, fds[0], false, true);
auto server = AsyncSSLSocket::newSocket(serverCtx, &base, fds[1], true, true);
ReadCallbackTerminator readCallback(&base, nullptr);
server->setReadCB(&readCallback);
readCallback.setSocket(server);
uint8_t buf[128];
memset(buf, 'a', sizeof(buf));
client->write(nullptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
// Check that bytes are unencrypted
char c;
EXPECT_EQ(1, netops::recv(fds[1], &c, 1, MSG_PEEK));
EXPECT_EQ('a', c);
EventBaseAborter eba(&base, 3000);
base.loop();
EXPECT_EQ(1, readCallback.buffers.size());
EXPECT_EQ(AsyncSSLSocket::STATE_UNENCRYPTED, client->getSSLState());
server->setReadCB(&readCallback);
// Unencrypted
server->sslAccept(nullptr);
client->sslConn(nullptr);
// Do NOT wait for handshake, writing should be queued and happen after
client->write(nullptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
// Check that bytes are *not* unencrypted
char c2;
EXPECT_EQ(1, netops::recv(fds[1], &c2, 1, MSG_PEEK));
EXPECT_NE('a', c2);
base.loop();
EXPECT_EQ(2, readCallback.buffers.size());
EXPECT_EQ(AsyncSSLSocket::STATE_ESTABLISHED, client->getSSLState());
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
folly
|
c321eb588909646c15aefde035fd3133ba32cdee
| 91,131,984,797,873,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 51 |
Handle close_notify as standard writeErr in AsyncSSLSocket.
Summary: Fixes CVE-2019-11934
Reviewed By: mingtaoy
Differential Revision: D18020613
fbshipit-source-id: db82bb250e53f0d225f1280bd67bc74abd417836
|
void CLASS setSonyBodyFeatures(unsigned id)
{
ushort idx;
static const struct
{
ushort scf[11];
/*
scf[0] camera id
scf[1] camera format
scf[2] camera mount: Minolta A, Sony E, fixed,
scf[3] camera type: DSLR, NEX, SLT, ILCE, ILCA, DSC
scf[4] lens mount
scf[5] tag 0x2010 group (0 if not used)
scf[6] offset of Sony ISO in 0x2010 table, 0xffff if not valid
scf[7] offset of ImageCount3 in 0x9050 table, 0xffff if not valid
scf[8] offset of MeteringMode in 0x2010 table, 0xffff if not valid
scf[9] offset of ExposureProgram in 0x2010 table, 0xffff if not valid
scf[10] offset of ReleaseMode2 in 0x2010 table, 0xffff if not valid
*/
} SonyCamFeatures[] = {
{256, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_DSLR, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{257, LIBRAW_FORMAT_FF, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_DSLR, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{258, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_DSLR, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{259, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_DSLR, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{260, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_DSLR, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{261, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_DSLR, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{262, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_DSLR, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{263, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_DSLR, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{264, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_DSLR, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{265, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_DSLR, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{266, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_DSLR, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{267, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{268, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{269, LIBRAW_FORMAT_FF, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_DSLR, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{270, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_DSLR, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{271, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{272, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{273, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_DSLR, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{274, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_DSLR, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{275, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_DSLR, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{276, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{277, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{278, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_NEX, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{279, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_NEX, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{280, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_SLT, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{281, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_SLT, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{282, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_DSLR, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{283, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_DSLR, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{284, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_NEX, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{285, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_SLT, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{286, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_SLT, 0, 2, 0x1218, 0x01bd, 0x1178, 0x1179, 0x112c},
{287, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_SLT, 0, 2, 0x1218, 0x01bd, 0x1178, 0x1179, 0x112c},
{288, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_NEX, 0, 1, 0x113e, 0x01bd, 0x1174, 0x1175, 0x112c},
{289, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_NEX, 0, 2, 0x1218, 0x01bd, 0x1178, 0x1179, 0x112c},
{290, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_NEX, 0, 2, 0x1218, 0x01bd, 0x1178, 0x1179, 0x112c},
{291, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_SLT, 0, 3, 0x11f4, 0x01bd, 0x1154, 0x1155, 0x1108},
{292, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_SLT, 0, 3, 0x11f4, 0x01bd, 0x1154, 0x1155, 0x1108},
{293, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_NEX, 0, 3, 0x11f4, 0x01bd, 0x1154, 0x1155, 0x1108},
{294, LIBRAW_FORMAT_FF, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_SLT, 0, 5, 0x1254, 0x01aa, 0x11ac, 0x11ad, 0x1160},
{295, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_NEX, 0, 5, 0x1254, 0x01aa, 0x11ac, 0x11ad, 0x1160},
{296, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_NEX, 0, 5, 0x1254, 0x01aa, 0x11ac, 0x11ad, 0x1160},
{297, LIBRAW_FORMAT_1INCH, LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens, LIBRAW_SONY_DSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens, 5, 0x1254, 0xffff, 0x11ac, 0x11ad, 0x1160},
{298, LIBRAW_FORMAT_FF, LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens, LIBRAW_SONY_DSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens, 5, 0x1258, 0xffff, 0x11ac, 0x11ad, 0x1160},
{299, LIBRAW_FORMAT_FF, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_NEX, 0, 5, 0x1254, 0x01aa, 0x11ac, 0x11ad, 0x1160},
{300, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_NEX, 0, 5, 0x1254, 0x01aa, 0x11ac, 0x11ad, 0x1160},
{301, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{302, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_ILCE, 0, 5, 0x1280, 0x01aa, 0x11ac, 0x11ad, 0x1160},
{303, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_SLT, 0, 5, 0x1280, 0x01aa, 0x11ac, 0x11ad, 0x1160},
{304, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{305, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_NEX, 0, 5, 0x1280, 0x01aa, 0x11ac, 0x11ad, 0x1160},
{306, LIBRAW_FORMAT_FF, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_ILCE, 0, 7, 0x0344, 0xffff, 0x025c, 0x025d, 0x0210},
{307, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_NEX, 0, 5, 0x1254, 0x01aa, 0x11ac, 0x11ad, 0x1160},
{308, LIBRAW_FORMAT_1INCH, LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens, LIBRAW_SONY_DSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens, 6, 0x113c, 0xffff, 0x1064, 0x1065, 0x1018},
{309, LIBRAW_FORMAT_1INCH, LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens, LIBRAW_SONY_DSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens, 7, 0x0344, 0xffff, 0x025c, 0x025d, 0x0210},
{310, LIBRAW_FORMAT_FF, LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens, LIBRAW_SONY_DSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens, 5, 0x1258, 0xffff, 0x11ac, 0x11ad, 0x1160},
{311, LIBRAW_FORMAT_FF, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_ILCE, 0, 7, 0x0344, 0xffff, 0x025c, 0x025d, 0x0210},
{312, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_ILCE, 0, 7, 0x0344, 0xffff, 0x025c, 0x025d, 0x0210},
{313, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_ILCE, 0, 7, 0x0344, 0x01aa, 0x025c, 0x025d, 0x0210},
{314, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{315, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{316, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{317, LIBRAW_FORMAT_1INCH, LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens, LIBRAW_SONY_DSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens, 7, 0x0344, 0xffff, 0x025c, 0x025d, 0x0210},
{318, LIBRAW_FORMAT_FF, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_ILCE, 0, 7, 0x0344, 0xffff, 0x025c, 0x025d, 0x0210},
{319, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_ILCA, 0, 7, 0x0344, 0x01a0, 0x025c, 0x025d, 0x0210},
{320, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{321, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{322, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{323, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{324, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{325, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{326, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{327, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{328, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{329, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{330, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{331, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{332, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{333, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{334, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{335, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{336, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{337, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{338, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{339, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_ILCE, 0, 7, 0x0344, 0x01a0, 0x025c, 0x025d, 0x0210},
{340, LIBRAW_FORMAT_FF, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_ILCE, 0, 7, 0x0344, 0xffff, 0x025c, 0x025d, 0x0210},
{341, LIBRAW_FORMAT_1INCH, LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens, LIBRAW_SONY_DSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens, 8, 0x0346, 0xffff, 0x025c, 0x025d, 0x0210},
{342, LIBRAW_FORMAT_1INCH, LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens, LIBRAW_SONY_DSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens, 8, 0x0346, 0xffff, 0x025c, 0x025d, 0x0210},
{343, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{344, LIBRAW_FORMAT_FF, LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens, LIBRAW_SONY_DSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens, 8, 0x0346, 0xffff, 0x025c, 0x025d, 0x0210},
{345, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{346, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_ILCE, 0, 7, 0x0344, 0x01a0, 0x025c, 0x025d, 0x0210},
{347, LIBRAW_FORMAT_FF, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_ILCE, 0, 8, 0x0346, 0x01cb, 0x025c, 0x025d, 0x0210},
{348, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{349, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{350, LIBRAW_FORMAT_FF, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_ILCE, 0, 8, 0x0346, 0x01cb, 0x025c, 0x025d, 0x0210},
{351, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{352, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{353, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_ILCA, 0, 7, 0x0344, 0x01a0, 0x025c, 0x025d, 0x0210},
{354, LIBRAW_FORMAT_FF, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Minolta_A, LIBRAW_SONY_ILCA, 0, 8, 0x0346, 0x01cd, 0x025c, 0x025d, 0x0210},
{355, LIBRAW_FORMAT_1INCH, LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens, LIBRAW_SONY_DSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens, 8, 0x0346, 0xffff, 0x025c, 0x025d, 0x0210},
{356, LIBRAW_FORMAT_1INCH, LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens, LIBRAW_SONY_DSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens, 8, 0x0346, 0xffff, 0x025c, 0x025d, 0x0210},
{357, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_ILCE, 0, 8, 0x0346, 0x01cd, 0x025c, 0x025d, 0x0210},
{358, LIBRAW_FORMAT_FF, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_ILCE, 0, 9, 0x0320, 0x019f, 0x024b, 0x024c, 0x0208},
{359, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{360, LIBRAW_FORMAT_APSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_ILCE, 0, 8, 0x0346, 0x01cd, 0x025c, 0x025d, 0x0210},
{361, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff, 0xffff},
{362, LIBRAW_FORMAT_FF, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_ILCE, 0, 9, 0x0320, 0x019f, 0x024b, 0x024c, 0x0208},
{363, LIBRAW_FORMAT_FF, LIBRAW_MOUNT_Sony_E, LIBRAW_SONY_ILCE, 0, 9, 0x0320, 0x019f, 0x024b, 0x024c, 0x0208},
{364, LIBRAW_FORMAT_1INCH, LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens, LIBRAW_SONY_DSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens, 8, 0x0346, 0xffff, 0x025c, 0x025d, 0x0210},
{365, LIBRAW_FORMAT_1INCH, LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens, LIBRAW_SONY_DSC, LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens, 9, 0x0320, 0xffff, 0x024b, 0x024c, 0x0208},
};
imgdata.lens.makernotes.CamID = id;
if (id == 2)
{
imgdata.lens.makernotes.CameraMount = imgdata.lens.makernotes.LensMount = LIBRAW_MOUNT_FixedLens;
imgdata.makernotes.sony.SonyCameraType = LIBRAW_SONY_DSC;
imgdata.makernotes.sony.group2010 = 0;
imgdata.makernotes.sony.real_iso_offset = 0xffff;
imgdata.makernotes.sony.ImageCount3_offset = 0xffff;
return;
}
else
idx = id - 256;
if ((idx >= 0) && (idx < sizeof SonyCamFeatures / sizeof *SonyCamFeatures))
{
if (!SonyCamFeatures[idx].scf[2])
return;
imgdata.lens.makernotes.CameraFormat = SonyCamFeatures[idx].scf[1];
imgdata.lens.makernotes.CameraMount = SonyCamFeatures[idx].scf[2];
imgdata.makernotes.sony.SonyCameraType = SonyCamFeatures[idx].scf[3];
if (SonyCamFeatures[idx].scf[4])
imgdata.lens.makernotes.LensMount = SonyCamFeatures[idx].scf[4];
imgdata.makernotes.sony.group2010 = SonyCamFeatures[idx].scf[5];
imgdata.makernotes.sony.real_iso_offset = SonyCamFeatures[idx].scf[6];
imgdata.makernotes.sony.ImageCount3_offset = SonyCamFeatures[idx].scf[7];
imgdata.makernotes.sony.MeteringMode_offset = SonyCamFeatures[idx].scf[8];
imgdata.makernotes.sony.ExposureProgram_offset = SonyCamFeatures[idx].scf[9];
imgdata.makernotes.sony.ReleaseMode2_offset = SonyCamFeatures[idx].scf[10];
}
char *sbstr = strstr(software, " v");
if (sbstr != NULL)
{
sbstr += 2;
imgdata.makernotes.sony.firmware = atof(sbstr);
if ((id == 306) || (id == 311))
{
if (imgdata.makernotes.sony.firmware < 1.2f)
imgdata.makernotes.sony.ImageCount3_offset = 0x01aa;
else
imgdata.makernotes.sony.ImageCount3_offset = 0x01c0;
}
else if (id == 312)
{
if (imgdata.makernotes.sony.firmware < 2.0f)
imgdata.makernotes.sony.ImageCount3_offset = 0x01aa;
else
imgdata.makernotes.sony.ImageCount3_offset = 0x01c0;
}
else if ((id == 318) || (id == 340))
{
if (imgdata.makernotes.sony.firmware < 1.2f)
imgdata.makernotes.sony.ImageCount3_offset = 0x01a0;
else
imgdata.makernotes.sony.ImageCount3_offset = 0x01b6;
}
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-835"
] |
LibRaw
|
e47384546b43d0fd536e933249047bc397a4d88b
| 167,469,636,617,158,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 191 |
Secunia Advisory SA83050: possible infinite loop in parse_minolta()
|
long vhost_vring_ioctl(struct vhost_dev *d, int ioctl, void __user *argp)
{
struct file *eventfp, *filep = NULL;
bool pollstart = false, pollstop = false;
struct eventfd_ctx *ctx = NULL;
u32 __user *idxp = argp;
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq;
struct vhost_vring_state s;
struct vhost_vring_file f;
struct vhost_vring_addr a;
u32 idx;
long r;
r = get_user(idx, idxp);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (idx >= d->nvqs)
return -ENOBUFS;
vq = d->vqs[idx];
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
switch (ioctl) {
case VHOST_SET_VRING_NUM:
/* Resizing ring with an active backend?
* You don't want to do that. */
if (vq->private_data) {
r = -EBUSY;
break;
}
if (copy_from_user(&s, argp, sizeof s)) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (!s.num || s.num > 0xffff || (s.num & (s.num - 1))) {
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
vq->num = s.num;
break;
case VHOST_SET_VRING_BASE:
/* Moving base with an active backend?
* You don't want to do that. */
if (vq->private_data) {
r = -EBUSY;
break;
}
if (copy_from_user(&s, argp, sizeof s)) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (s.num > 0xffff) {
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
vq->last_avail_idx = s.num;
/* Forget the cached index value. */
vq->avail_idx = vq->last_avail_idx;
break;
case VHOST_GET_VRING_BASE:
s.index = idx;
s.num = vq->last_avail_idx;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &s, sizeof s))
r = -EFAULT;
break;
case VHOST_SET_VRING_ADDR:
if (copy_from_user(&a, argp, sizeof a)) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (a.flags & ~(0x1 << VHOST_VRING_F_LOG)) {
r = -EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
}
/* For 32bit, verify that the top 32bits of the user
data are set to zero. */
if ((u64)(unsigned long)a.desc_user_addr != a.desc_user_addr ||
(u64)(unsigned long)a.used_user_addr != a.used_user_addr ||
(u64)(unsigned long)a.avail_user_addr != a.avail_user_addr) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
/* Make sure it's safe to cast pointers to vring types. */
BUILD_BUG_ON(__alignof__ *vq->avail > VRING_AVAIL_ALIGN_SIZE);
BUILD_BUG_ON(__alignof__ *vq->used > VRING_USED_ALIGN_SIZE);
if ((a.avail_user_addr & (VRING_AVAIL_ALIGN_SIZE - 1)) ||
(a.used_user_addr & (VRING_USED_ALIGN_SIZE - 1)) ||
(a.log_guest_addr & (sizeof(u64) - 1))) {
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
/* We only verify access here if backend is configured.
* If it is not, we don't as size might not have been setup.
* We will verify when backend is configured. */
if (vq->private_data) {
if (!vq_access_ok(vq, vq->num,
(void __user *)(unsigned long)a.desc_user_addr,
(void __user *)(unsigned long)a.avail_user_addr,
(void __user *)(unsigned long)a.used_user_addr)) {
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
/* Also validate log access for used ring if enabled. */
if ((a.flags & (0x1 << VHOST_VRING_F_LOG)) &&
!log_access_ok(vq->log_base, a.log_guest_addr,
sizeof *vq->used +
vq->num * sizeof *vq->used->ring)) {
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
}
vq->log_used = !!(a.flags & (0x1 << VHOST_VRING_F_LOG));
vq->desc = (void __user *)(unsigned long)a.desc_user_addr;
vq->avail = (void __user *)(unsigned long)a.avail_user_addr;
vq->log_addr = a.log_guest_addr;
vq->used = (void __user *)(unsigned long)a.used_user_addr;
break;
case VHOST_SET_VRING_KICK:
if (copy_from_user(&f, argp, sizeof f)) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
eventfp = f.fd == -1 ? NULL : eventfd_fget(f.fd);
if (IS_ERR(eventfp)) {
r = PTR_ERR(eventfp);
break;
}
if (eventfp != vq->kick) {
pollstop = (filep = vq->kick) != NULL;
pollstart = (vq->kick = eventfp) != NULL;
} else
filep = eventfp;
break;
case VHOST_SET_VRING_CALL:
if (copy_from_user(&f, argp, sizeof f)) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
eventfp = f.fd == -1 ? NULL : eventfd_fget(f.fd);
if (IS_ERR(eventfp)) {
r = PTR_ERR(eventfp);
break;
}
if (eventfp != vq->call) {
filep = vq->call;
ctx = vq->call_ctx;
vq->call = eventfp;
vq->call_ctx = eventfp ?
eventfd_ctx_fileget(eventfp) : NULL;
} else
filep = eventfp;
break;
case VHOST_SET_VRING_ERR:
if (copy_from_user(&f, argp, sizeof f)) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
eventfp = f.fd == -1 ? NULL : eventfd_fget(f.fd);
if (IS_ERR(eventfp)) {
r = PTR_ERR(eventfp);
break;
}
if (eventfp != vq->error) {
filep = vq->error;
vq->error = eventfp;
ctx = vq->error_ctx;
vq->error_ctx = eventfp ?
eventfd_ctx_fileget(eventfp) : NULL;
} else
filep = eventfp;
break;
case VHOST_SET_VRING_ENDIAN:
r = vhost_set_vring_endian(vq, argp);
break;
case VHOST_GET_VRING_ENDIAN:
r = vhost_get_vring_endian(vq, idx, argp);
break;
default:
r = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
if (pollstop && vq->handle_kick)
vhost_poll_stop(&vq->poll);
if (ctx)
eventfd_ctx_put(ctx);
if (filep)
fput(filep);
if (pollstart && vq->handle_kick)
r = vhost_poll_start(&vq->poll, vq->kick);
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
if (pollstop && vq->handle_kick)
vhost_poll_flush(&vq->poll);
return r;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-399"
] |
linux
|
7932c0bd7740f4cd2aa168d3ce0199e7af7d72d5
| 289,784,275,872,476,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 203 |
vhost: actually track log eventfd file
While reviewing vhost log code, I found out that log_file is never
set. Note: I haven't tested the change (QEMU doesn't use LOG_FD yet).
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
|
void luaSetGlobalArray(lua_State *lua, char *var, robj **elev, int elec) {
int j;
lua_newtable(lua);
for (j = 0; j < elec; j++) {
lua_pushlstring(lua,(char*)elev[j]->ptr,sdslen(elev[j]->ptr));
lua_rawseti(lua,-2,j+1);
}
lua_setglobal(lua,var);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-125"
] |
redis
|
6ac3c0b7abd35f37201ed2d6298ecef4ea1ae1dd
| 131,583,892,426,084,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 |
Fix protocol parsing on 'ldbReplParseCommand' (CVE-2021-32672)
The protocol parsing on 'ldbReplParseCommand' (LUA debugging)
Assumed protocol correctness. This means that if the following
is given:
*1
$100
test
The parser will try to read additional 94 unallocated bytes after
the client buffer.
This commit fixes this issue by validating that there are actually enough
bytes to read. It also limits the amount of data that can be sent by
the debugger client to 1M so the client will not be able to explode
the memory.
|
calc_response (const guchar *key, const guchar *plaintext, guchar *results)
{
DES_KS ks;
memcpy (results, plaintext, 8);
memcpy (results + 8, plaintext, 8);
memcpy (results + 16, plaintext, 8);
setup_schedule (key, ks);
des (ks, results);
setup_schedule (key + 7, ks);
des (ks, results + 8);
setup_schedule (key + 14, ks);
des (ks, results + 16);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125"
] |
libsoup
|
f8a54ac85eec2008c85393f331cdd251af8266ad
| 214,408,416,555,412,630,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 |
NTLM: Avoid a potential heap buffer overflow in v2 authentication
Check the length of the decoded v2 challenge before attempting to
parse it, to avoid reading past it.
Fixes #173
|
long ext4_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
loff_t new_size = 0;
unsigned int max_blocks;
int ret = 0;
int flags;
ext4_lblk_t lblk;
unsigned int blkbits = inode->i_blkbits;
/*
* Encrypted inodes can't handle collapse range or insert
* range since we would need to re-encrypt blocks with a
* different IV or XTS tweak (which are based on the logical
* block number).
*
* XXX It's not clear why zero range isn't working, but we'll
* leave it disabled for encrypted inodes for now. This is a
* bug we should fix....
*/
if (ext4_encrypted_inode(inode) &&
(mode & (FALLOC_FL_COLLAPSE_RANGE | FALLOC_FL_INSERT_RANGE |
FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE)))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/* Return error if mode is not supported */
if (mode & ~(FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE | FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE |
FALLOC_FL_COLLAPSE_RANGE | FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE |
FALLOC_FL_INSERT_RANGE))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (mode & FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE)
return ext4_punch_hole(inode, offset, len);
ret = ext4_convert_inline_data(inode);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (mode & FALLOC_FL_COLLAPSE_RANGE)
return ext4_collapse_range(inode, offset, len);
if (mode & FALLOC_FL_INSERT_RANGE)
return ext4_insert_range(inode, offset, len);
if (mode & FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE)
return ext4_zero_range(file, offset, len, mode);
trace_ext4_fallocate_enter(inode, offset, len, mode);
lblk = offset >> blkbits;
/*
* We can't just convert len to max_blocks because
* If blocksize = 4096 offset = 3072 and len = 2048
*/
max_blocks = (EXT4_BLOCK_ALIGN(len + offset, blkbits) >> blkbits)
- lblk;
flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE_UNWRIT_EXT;
if (mode & FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE)
flags |= EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_KEEP_SIZE;
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
/*
* We only support preallocation for extent-based files only
*/
if (!(ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out;
}
if (!(mode & FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE) &&
offset + len > i_size_read(inode)) {
new_size = offset + len;
ret = inode_newsize_ok(inode, new_size);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
ret = ext4_alloc_file_blocks(file, lblk, max_blocks, new_size,
flags, mode);
if (ret)
goto out;
if (file->f_flags & O_SYNC && EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_journal) {
ret = jbd2_complete_transaction(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_journal,
EXT4_I(inode)->i_sync_tid);
}
out:
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
trace_ext4_fallocate_exit(inode, offset, max_blocks, ret);
return ret;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-362"
] |
linux
|
17048e8a083fec7ad841d88ef0812707fbc7e39f
| 248,762,583,025,960,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 92 |
ext4: move unlocked dio protection from ext4_alloc_file_blocks()
Currently ext4_alloc_file_blocks() was handling protection against
unlocked DIO. However we now need to sometimes call it under i_mmap_sem
and sometimes not and DIO protection ranks above it (although strictly
speaking this cannot currently create any deadlocks). Also
ext4_zero_range() was actually getting & releasing unlocked DIO
protection twice in some cases. Luckily it didn't introduce any real bug
but it was a land mine waiting to be stepped on. So move DIO protection
out from ext4_alloc_file_blocks() into the two callsites.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
|
MagickPrivate double GenerateDifferentialNoise(RandomInfo *random_info,
const Quantum pixel,const NoiseType noise_type,const double attenuate)
{
#define SigmaUniform (attenuate*0.015625)
#define SigmaGaussian (attenuate*0.015625)
#define SigmaImpulse (attenuate*0.1)
#define SigmaLaplacian (attenuate*0.0390625)
#define SigmaMultiplicativeGaussian (attenuate*0.5)
#define SigmaPoisson (attenuate*12.5)
#define SigmaRandom (attenuate)
#define TauGaussian (attenuate*0.078125)
double
alpha,
beta,
noise,
sigma;
alpha=GetPseudoRandomValue(random_info);
switch (noise_type)
{
case UniformNoise:
default:
{
noise=(double) (pixel+QuantumRange*SigmaUniform*(alpha-0.5));
break;
}
case GaussianNoise:
{
double
gamma,
tau;
if (fabs(alpha) < MagickEpsilon)
alpha=1.0;
beta=GetPseudoRandomValue(random_info);
gamma=sqrt(-2.0*log(alpha));
sigma=gamma*cos((double) (2.0*MagickPI*beta));
tau=gamma*sin((double) (2.0*MagickPI*beta));
noise=(double) (pixel+sqrt((double) pixel)*SigmaGaussian*sigma+
QuantumRange*TauGaussian*tau);
break;
}
case ImpulseNoise:
{
if (alpha < (SigmaImpulse/2.0))
noise=0.0;
else
if (alpha >= (1.0-(SigmaImpulse/2.0)))
noise=(double) QuantumRange;
else
noise=(double) pixel;
break;
}
case LaplacianNoise:
{
if (alpha <= 0.5)
{
if (alpha <= MagickEpsilon)
noise=(double) (pixel-QuantumRange);
else
noise=(double) (pixel+QuantumRange*SigmaLaplacian*log(2.0*alpha)+
0.5);
break;
}
beta=1.0-alpha;
if (beta <= (0.5*MagickEpsilon))
noise=(double) (pixel+QuantumRange);
else
noise=(double) (pixel-QuantumRange*SigmaLaplacian*log(2.0*beta)+0.5);
break;
}
case MultiplicativeGaussianNoise:
{
sigma=1.0;
if (alpha > MagickEpsilon)
sigma=sqrt(-2.0*log(alpha));
beta=GetPseudoRandomValue(random_info);
noise=(double) (pixel+pixel*SigmaMultiplicativeGaussian*sigma*
cos((double) (2.0*MagickPI*beta))/2.0);
break;
}
case PoissonNoise:
{
double
poisson;
ssize_t
i;
poisson=exp(-SigmaPoisson*QuantumScale*pixel);
for (i=0; alpha > poisson; i++)
{
beta=GetPseudoRandomValue(random_info);
alpha*=beta;
}
noise=(double) (QuantumRange*i/SigmaPoisson);
break;
}
case RandomNoise:
{
noise=(double) (QuantumRange*SigmaRandom*alpha);
break;
}
}
return(noise);
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-369"
] |
ImageMagick
|
fbd9a963db1ae5551c45dc8af57db0abd7695774
| 38,171,120,366,055,484,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 107 |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/3077
|
printablesStringValidate(
Syntax *syntax,
struct berval *val )
{
ber_len_t i, len;
if( BER_BVISEMPTY( val ) ) return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
for(i=0,len=0; i < val->bv_len; i++) {
int c = val->bv_val[i];
if( c == '$' ) {
if( len == 0 ) {
return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
}
len = 0;
} else if ( SLAP_PRINTABLE(c) ) {
len++;
} else {
return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
}
}
if( len == 0 ) {
return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX;
}
return LDAP_SUCCESS;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-617"
] |
openldap
|
67670f4544e28fb09eb7319c39f404e1d3229e65
| 196,440,944,612,378,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 |
ITS#9383 remove assert in certificateListValidate
|
R_API RRBTree *r_crbtree_new(RRBFree freefn) {
RRBTree *tree = R_NEW0 (RRBTree);
if (tree) {
tree->free = freefn;
}
return tree;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
radare2
|
b5cb90b28ec71fda3504da04e3cc94a362807f5e
| 100,307,224,719,567,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
Prefer memleak over usaf in io.bank's rbtree bug ##crash
* That's a workaround, proper fix will come later
* Reproducer: bins/fuzzed/iobank-crash
* Reported by Akyne Choi via huntr.dev
|
static void vmxnet3_net_uninit(VMXNET3State *s)
{
g_free(s->mcast_list);
vmxnet_tx_pkt_reset(s->tx_pkt);
vmxnet_tx_pkt_uninit(s->tx_pkt);
vmxnet_rx_pkt_uninit(s->rx_pkt);
qemu_del_nic(s->nic);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
qemu
|
a7278b36fcab9af469563bd7b9dadebe2ae25e48
| 316,552,901,784,358,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
net/vmxnet3: Refine l2 header validation
Validation of l2 header length assumed minimal packet size as
eth_header + 2 * vlan_header regardless of the actual protocol.
This caused crash for valid non-IP packets shorter than 22 bytes, as
'tx_pkt->packet_type' hasn't been assigned for such packets, and
'vmxnet3_on_tx_done_update_stats()' expects it to be properly set.
Refine header length validation in 'vmxnet_tx_pkt_parse_headers'.
Check its return value during packet processing flow.
As a side effect, in case IPv4 and IPv6 header validation failure,
corrupt packets will be dropped.
Signed-off-by: Dana Rubin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Shmulik Ladkani <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
|
static void usbredir_vm_state_change(void *priv, bool running, RunState state)
{
USBRedirDevice *dev = priv;
if (state == RUN_STATE_RUNNING && dev->parser != NULL) {
usbredirparser_do_write(dev->parser); /* Flush any pending writes */
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-770"
] |
qemu
|
7ec54f9eb62b5d177e30eb8b1cad795a5f8d8986
| 225,398,704,214,005,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 |
usb/redir: avoid dynamic stack allocation (CVE-2021-3527)
Use autofree heap allocation instead.
Fixes: 4f4321c11ff ("usb: use iovecs in USBPacket")
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
|
static void load_config(struct btd_adapter *adapter)
{
GKeyFile *key_file;
char filename[PATH_MAX];
struct stat st;
GError *gerr = NULL;
key_file = g_key_file_new();
snprintf(filename, PATH_MAX, STORAGEDIR "/%s/settings",
btd_adapter_get_storage_dir(adapter));
if (stat(filename, &st) < 0) {
convert_config(adapter, filename, key_file);
convert_device_storage(adapter);
}
g_key_file_load_from_file(key_file, filename, 0, NULL);
/* Get alias */
adapter->stored_alias = g_key_file_get_string(key_file, "General",
"Alias", NULL);
if (!adapter->stored_alias) {
/* fallback */
adapter->stored_alias = g_key_file_get_string(key_file,
"General", "Name", NULL);
}
/* Get pairable timeout */
adapter->pairable_timeout = g_key_file_get_integer(key_file, "General",
"PairableTimeout", &gerr);
if (gerr) {
adapter->pairable_timeout = btd_opts.pairto;
g_error_free(gerr);
gerr = NULL;
}
/* Get discoverable mode */
adapter->stored_discoverable = g_key_file_get_boolean(key_file,
"General", "Discoverable", &gerr);
if (gerr) {
adapter->stored_discoverable = false;
g_error_free(gerr);
gerr = NULL;
}
/* Get discoverable timeout */
adapter->discoverable_timeout = g_key_file_get_integer(key_file,
"General", "DiscoverableTimeout", &gerr);
if (gerr) {
adapter->discoverable_timeout = btd_opts.discovto;
g_error_free(gerr);
gerr = NULL;
}
g_key_file_free(key_file);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-862",
"CWE-863"
] |
bluez
|
b497b5942a8beb8f89ca1c359c54ad67ec843055
| 76,143,272,859,286,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 57 |
adapter: Fix storing discoverable setting
discoverable setting shall only be store when changed via Discoverable
property and not when discovery client set it as that be considered
temporary just for the lifetime of the discovery.
|
static avifBool avifFileTypeIsCompatible(avifFileType * ftyp)
{
avifBool avifCompatible = (memcmp(ftyp->majorBrand, "avif", 4) == 0 || memcmp(ftyp->majorBrand, "avis", 4) == 0);
if (!avifCompatible) {
for (int compatibleBrandIndex = 0; compatibleBrandIndex < ftyp->compatibleBrandsCount; ++compatibleBrandIndex) {
const uint8_t * compatibleBrand = &ftyp->compatibleBrands[4 * compatibleBrandIndex];
if (!memcmp(compatibleBrand, "avif", 4) || !memcmp(compatibleBrand, "avis", 4)) {
avifCompatible = AVIF_TRUE;
break;
}
}
}
return avifCompatible;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-787"
] |
libavif
|
0a8e7244d494ae98e9756355dfbfb6697ded2ff9
| 104,751,247,564,580,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
Set max image size to 16384 * 16384
Fix https://crbug.com/oss-fuzz/24728 and
https://crbug.com/oss-fuzz/24734.
|
static MagickBooleanType GetMagickModulePath(const char *filename,
MagickModuleType module_type,char *path,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
*module_path;
assert(filename != (const char *) NULL);
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",filename);
assert(path != (char *) NULL);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
if (strchr(filename,'/') != (char *) NULL)
return(MagickFalse);
(void) CopyMagickString(path,filename,MagickPathExtent);
module_path=(char *) NULL;
switch (module_type)
{
case MagickImageCoderModule:
default:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(ModuleEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Searching for coder module file \"%s\" ...",filename);
module_path=GetEnvironmentValue("MAGICK_CODER_MODULE_PATH");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_CODER_PATH)
if (module_path == (char *) NULL)
module_path=AcquireString(MAGICKCORE_CODER_PATH);
#endif
break;
}
case MagickImageFilterModule:
{
(void) LogMagickEvent(ModuleEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Searching for filter module file \"%s\" ...",filename);
module_path=GetEnvironmentValue("MAGICK_CODER_FILTER_PATH");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_FILTER_PATH)
if (module_path == (char *) NULL)
module_path=AcquireString(MAGICKCORE_FILTER_PATH);
#endif
break;
}
}
if (module_path != (char *) NULL)
{
char
*p,
*q;
for (p=module_path-1; p != (char *) NULL; )
{
(void) CopyMagickString(path,p+1,MagickPathExtent);
q=strchr(path,DirectoryListSeparator);
if (q != (char *) NULL)
*q='\0';
q=path+strlen(path)-1;
if ((q >= path) && (*q != *DirectorySeparator))
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(path,DirectorySeparator,
MagickPathExtent);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(path,filename,MagickPathExtent);
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_HAVE_REALPATH)
{
char
resolved_path[PATH_MAX+1];
if (realpath(path,resolved_path) != (char *) NULL)
(void) CopyMagickString(path,resolved_path,MagickPathExtent);
}
#endif
if (IsPathAccessible(path) != MagickFalse)
{
module_path=DestroyString(module_path);
return(MagickTrue);
}
p=strchr(p+1,DirectoryListSeparator);
}
module_path=DestroyString(module_path);
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_INSTALLED_SUPPORT)
else
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_CODER_PATH)
{
const char
*directory;
/*
Search hard coded paths.
*/
switch (module_type)
{
case MagickImageCoderModule:
default:
{
directory=MAGICKCORE_CODER_PATH;
break;
}
case MagickImageFilterModule:
{
directory=MAGICKCORE_FILTER_PATH;
break;
}
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(path,MagickPathExtent,"%s%s",directory,
filename);
if (IsPathAccessible(path) == MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,ConfigureWarning,
"UnableToOpenModuleFile",path);
return(MagickFalse);
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
#else
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_WINDOWS_SUPPORT)
{
const char
*registery_key;
unsigned char
*key_value;
/*
Locate path via registry key.
*/
switch (module_type)
{
case MagickImageCoderModule:
default:
{
registery_key="CoderModulesPath";
break;
}
case MagickImageFilterModule:
{
registery_key="FilterModulesPath";
break;
}
}
key_value=NTRegistryKeyLookup(registery_key);
if (key_value == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),ConfigureError,
"RegistryKeyLookupFailed","`%s'",registery_key);
return(MagickFalse);
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(path,MagickPathExtent,"%s%s%s",(char *)
key_value,DirectorySeparator,filename);
key_value=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(key_value);
if (IsPathAccessible(path) == MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,ConfigureWarning,
"UnableToOpenModuleFile",path);
return(MagickFalse);
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
#endif
#endif
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_CODER_PATH) && !defined(MAGICKCORE_WINDOWS_SUPPORT)
# error MAGICKCORE_CODER_PATH or MAGICKCORE_WINDOWS_SUPPORT must be defined when MAGICKCORE_INSTALLED_SUPPORT is defined
#endif
#else
{
char
*home;
home=GetEnvironmentValue("MAGICK_HOME");
if (home != (char *) NULL)
{
/*
Search MAGICK_HOME.
*/
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_POSIX_SUPPORT)
(void) FormatLocaleString(path,MagickPathExtent,"%s%s%s",home,
DirectorySeparator,filename);
#else
const char
*directory;
switch (module_type)
{
case MagickImageCoderModule:
default:
{
directory=MAGICKCORE_CODER_RELATIVE_PATH;
break;
}
case MagickImageFilterModule:
{
directory=MAGICKCORE_FILTER_RELATIVE_PATH;
break;
}
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(path,MagickPathExtent,"%s/lib/%s/%s",home,
directory,filename);
#endif
home=DestroyString(home);
if (IsPathAccessible(path) != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
}
}
if (*GetClientPath() != '\0')
{
/*
Search based on executable directory.
*/
#if !defined(MAGICKCORE_POSIX_SUPPORT)
(void) FormatLocaleString(path,MagickPathExtent,"%s%s%s",GetClientPath(),
DirectorySeparator,filename);
#else
char
prefix[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*directory;
switch (module_type)
{
case MagickImageCoderModule:
default:
{
directory="coders";
break;
}
case MagickImageFilterModule:
{
directory="filters";
break;
}
}
(void) CopyMagickString(prefix,GetClientPath(),MagickPathExtent);
ChopPathComponents(prefix,1);
(void) FormatLocaleString(path,MagickPathExtent,"%s/lib/%s/%s/%s",prefix,
MAGICKCORE_MODULES_RELATIVE_PATH,directory,filename);
#endif
if (IsPathAccessible(path) != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
}
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_WINDOWS_SUPPORT)
{
/*
Search module path.
*/
if ((NTGetModulePath("CORE_RL_MagickCore_.dll",path) != MagickFalse) ||
(NTGetModulePath("CORE_DB_MagickCore_.dll",path) != MagickFalse))
{
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(path,DirectorySeparator,
MagickPathExtent);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(path,filename,MagickPathExtent);
if (IsPathAccessible(path) != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
}
}
#endif
{
char
*home;
home=GetEnvironmentValue("XDG_CONFIG_HOME");
if (home == (char *) NULL)
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_WINDOWS_SUPPORT) || defined(__MINGW32__)
home=GetEnvironmentValue("LOCALAPPDATA");
if (home == (char *) NULL)
home=GetEnvironmentValue("APPDATA");
if (home == (char *) NULL)
home=GetEnvironmentValue("USERPROFILE");
#endif
if (home != (char *) NULL)
{
/*
Search $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/ImageMagick.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(path,MagickPathExtent,"%s%sImageMagick%s%s",
home,DirectorySeparator,DirectorySeparator,filename);
home=DestroyString(home);
if (IsPathAccessible(path) != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
}
home=GetEnvironmentValue("HOME");
if (home != (char *) NULL)
{
/*
Search $HOME/.config/ImageMagick.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(path,MagickPathExtent,
"%s%s.config%sImageMagick%s%s",home,DirectorySeparator,
DirectorySeparator,DirectorySeparator,filename);
home=DestroyString(home);
if (IsPathAccessible(path) != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
}
}
/*
Search current directory.
*/
if (IsPathAccessible(path) != MagickFalse)
return(MagickTrue);
if (exception->severity < ConfigureError)
ThrowFileException(exception,ConfigureWarning,"UnableToOpenModuleFile",
path);
#endif
return(MagickFalse);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200",
"CWE-362"
] |
ImageMagick
|
01faddbe2711a4156180c4a92837e2f23683cc68
| 195,746,321,003,362,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 300 |
Use the correct rights.
|
ar6000_get_driver_cfg(struct net_device *dev,
u16 cfgParam,
void *result)
{
int ret = 0;
switch(cfgParam)
{
case AR6000_DRIVER_CFG_GET_WLANNODECACHING:
*((u32 *)result) = wlanNodeCaching;
break;
case AR6000_DRIVER_CFG_LOG_RAW_WMI_MSGS:
*((u32 *)result) = logWmiRawMsgs;
break;
default:
ret = EINVAL;
break;
}
return ret;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-703",
"CWE-264"
] |
linux
|
550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
| 307,918,199,422,457,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 |
net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
lock_mtab (void) {
int i;
struct timespec waittime;
struct timeval maxtime;
char linktargetfile[MOUNTLOCK_LINKTARGET_LTH];
if (!signals_have_been_setup) {
int sig = 0;
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_handler = handler;
sa.sa_flags = 0;
sigfillset (&sa.sa_mask);
while (sigismember (&sa.sa_mask, ++sig) != -1
&& sig != SIGCHLD) {
if (sig == SIGALRM)
sa.sa_handler = setlkw_timeout;
else
sa.sa_handler = handler;
sigaction (sig, &sa, (struct sigaction *) 0);
}
signals_have_been_setup = 1;
}
sprintf(linktargetfile, MOUNTLOCK_LINKTARGET, getpid ());
i = open (linktargetfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR);
if (i < 0) {
/* linktargetfile does not exist (as a file)
and we cannot create it. Read-only filesystem?
Too many files open in the system?
Filesystem full? */
return EX_FILEIO;
}
close(i);
maxtime = mono_time();
maxtime.tv_sec += MOUNTLOCK_MAXTIME;
waittime.tv_sec = 0;
waittime.tv_nsec = (1000 * MOUNTLOCK_WAITTIME);
/* Repeat until it was us who made the link */
while (!we_created_lockfile) {
struct timeval now;
struct flock flock;
int errsv, j;
j = link(linktargetfile, _PATH_MOUNTED_LOCK);
errsv = errno;
if (j == 0)
we_created_lockfile = 1;
if (j < 0 && errsv != EEXIST) {
(void) unlink(linktargetfile);
return EX_FILEIO;
}
lockfile_fd = open (_PATH_MOUNTED_LOCK, O_WRONLY);
if (lockfile_fd < 0) {
/* Strange... Maybe the file was just deleted? */
now = mono_time();
if (errno == ENOENT && now.tv_sec < maxtime.tv_sec) {
we_created_lockfile = 0;
continue;
}
(void) unlink(linktargetfile);
return EX_FILEIO;
}
flock.l_type = F_WRLCK;
flock.l_whence = SEEK_SET;
flock.l_start = 0;
flock.l_len = 0;
if (j == 0) {
/* We made the link. Now claim the lock. If we can't
* get it, continue anyway
*/
fcntl (lockfile_fd, F_SETLK, &flock);
(void) unlink(linktargetfile);
} else {
/* Someone else made the link. Wait. */
now = mono_time();
if (now.tv_sec < maxtime.tv_sec) {
alarm(maxtime.tv_sec - now.tv_sec);
if (fcntl (lockfile_fd, F_SETLKW, &flock) == -1) {
(void) unlink(linktargetfile);
return EX_FILEIO;
}
alarm(0);
nanosleep(&waittime, NULL);
} else {
(void) unlink(linktargetfile);
return EX_FILEIO;
}
close(lockfile_fd);
}
}
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
cifs-utils
|
f6eae44a3d05b6515a59651e6bed8b6dde689aec
| 286,307,769,234,689,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 104 |
mtab: handle ENOSPC/EFBIG condition properly when altering mtab
It's possible that when mount.cifs goes to append the mtab that there
won't be enough space to do so, and the mntent won't be appended to the
file in its entirety.
Add a my_endmntent routine that will fflush and then fsync the FILE if
that succeeds. If either fails then it will truncate the file back to
its provided size. It will then call endmntent unconditionally.
Have add_mtab call fstat on the opened mtab file in order to get the
size of the file before it has been appended. Assuming that that
succeeds, use my_endmntent to ensure that the file is not corrupted
before closing it. It's possible that we'll have a small race window
where the mtab is incorrect, but it should be quickly corrected.
This was reported some time ago as CVE-2011-1678:
http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/03/04/9
...and it seems to fix the reproducer that I was able to come up with.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Suresh Jayaraman <[email protected]>
|
void ClearCache(v8::Isolate* isolate) {
isolate->IdleNotificationDeadline(0.5);
blink::WebCache::Clear();
base::MemoryPressureListener::NotifyMemoryPressure(
base::MemoryPressureListener::MEMORY_PRESSURE_LEVEL_CRITICAL);
}
| 0 |
[] |
electron
|
e9fa834757f41c0b9fe44a4dffe3d7d437f52d34
| 320,041,550,635,730,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
fix: ensure ElectronBrowser mojo service is only bound to appropriate render frames (#33344)
* fix: ensure ElectronBrowser mojo service is only bound to authorized render frames
Notes: no-notes
* refactor: extract electron API IPC to its own mojo interface
* fix: just check main frame not primary main frame
Co-authored-by: Samuel Attard <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Samuel Attard <[email protected]>
|
DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
{
int dh_secbits = 80;
if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
return DH_get_1024_160();
if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
dh_secbits = 128;
else
dh_secbits = 80;
} else {
if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
return NULL;
dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
}
if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
DH *dhp = DH_new();
BIGNUM *p, *g;
if (dhp == NULL)
return NULL;
g = BN_new();
if (g == NULL || !BN_set_word(g, 2)) {
DH_free(dhp);
BN_free(g);
return NULL;
}
if (dh_secbits >= 192)
p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
else
p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
if (p == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
DH_free(dhp);
BN_free(p);
BN_free(g);
return NULL;
}
return dhp;
}
if (dh_secbits >= 112)
return DH_get_2048_224();
return DH_get_1024_160();
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-476"
] |
openssl
|
5235ef44b93306a14d0b6c695b13c64b16e1fdec
| 55,288,582,241,462,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 43 |
Fix SSL_check_chain()
The function SSL_check_chain() can be used by applications to check that
a cert and chain is compatible with the negotiated parameters. This could
be useful (for example) from the certificate callback. Unfortunately this
function was applying TLSv1.2 sig algs rules and did not work correctly if
TLSv1.3 was negotiated.
We refactor tls_choose_sigalg to split it up and create a new function
find_sig_alg which can (optionally) take a certificate and key as
parameters and find an appropriate sig alg if one exists. If the cert and
key are not supplied then we try to find a cert and key from the ones we
have available that matches the shared sig algs.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9442)
|
static void r_coresym_cache_element_segment_fini(RCoreSymCacheElementSegment *seg) {
if (seg) {
free (seg->name);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-125",
"CWE-787"
] |
radare2
|
a35f89f86ed12161af09330e92e5a213014e46a1
| 146,528,031,178,088,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 |
Fix oobread in macho core symbolication ##crash
* Reported by @cnitlrt via huntr.dev
|
static int stbi__psd_decode_rle(stbi__context *s, stbi_uc *p, int pixelCount)
{
int count, nleft, len;
count = 0;
while ((nleft = pixelCount - count) > 0) {
len = stbi__get8(s);
if (len == 128) {
// No-op.
} else if (len < 128) {
// Copy next len+1 bytes literally.
len++;
if (len > nleft) return 0; // corrupt data
count += len;
while (len) {
*p = stbi__get8(s);
p += 4;
len--;
}
} else if (len > 128) {
stbi_uc val;
// Next -len+1 bytes in the dest are replicated from next source byte.
// (Interpret len as a negative 8-bit int.)
len = 257 - len;
if (len > nleft) return 0; // corrupt data
val = stbi__get8(s);
count += len;
while (len) {
*p = val;
p += 4;
len--;
}
}
}
return 1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-787"
] |
stb
|
5ba0baaa269b3fd681828e0e3b3ac0f1472eaf40
| 250,793,289,273,817,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 |
stb_image: Reject fractional JPEG component subsampling ratios
The component resamplers are not written to support this and I've
never seen it happen in a real (non-crafted) JPEG file so I'm
fine rejecting this as outright corrupt.
Fixes issue #1178.
|
static inline void fsnotify_access(struct file *file)
{
const struct path *path = &file->f_path;
struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
__u32 mask = FS_ACCESS;
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
mask |= FS_ISDIR;
if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_NONOTIFY)) {
fsnotify_parent(path, NULL, mask);
fsnotify(inode, mask, path, FSNOTIFY_EVENT_PATH, NULL, 0);
}
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-362",
"CWE-399"
] |
linux
|
49d31c2f389acfe83417083e1208422b4091cd9e
| 329,913,824,275,503,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
static inline void eventpoll_release(struct file *file)
{
/*
* Fast check to avoid the get/release of the semaphore. Since
* we're doing this outside the semaphore lock, it might return
* false negatives, but we don't care. It'll help in 99.99% of cases
* to avoid the semaphore lock. False positives simply cannot happen
* because the file in on the way to be removed and nobody ( but
* eventpoll ) has still a reference to this file.
*/
if (likely(list_empty(&file->f_ep_links)))
return;
/*
* The file is being closed while it is still linked to an epoll
* descriptor. We need to handle this by correctly unlinking it
* from its containers.
*/
eventpoll_release_file(file);
}
| 0 |
[] |
linux-2.6
|
28d82dc1c4edbc352129f97f4ca22624d1fe61de
| 323,369,668,746,961,860,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 |
epoll: limit paths
The current epoll code can be tickled to run basically indefinitely in
both loop detection path check (on ep_insert()), and in the wakeup paths.
The programs that tickle this behavior set up deeply linked networks of
epoll file descriptors that cause the epoll algorithms to traverse them
indefinitely. A couple of these sample programs have been previously
posted in this thread: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/25/297.
To fix the loop detection path check algorithms, I simply keep track of
the epoll nodes that have been already visited. Thus, the loop detection
becomes proportional to the number of epoll file descriptor and links.
This dramatically decreases the run-time of the loop check algorithm. In
one diabolical case I tried it reduced the run-time from 15 mintues (all
in kernel time) to .3 seconds.
Fixing the wakeup paths could be done at wakeup time in a similar manner
by keeping track of nodes that have already been visited, but the
complexity is harder, since there can be multiple wakeups on different
cpus...Thus, I've opted to limit the number of possible wakeup paths when
the paths are created.
This is accomplished, by noting that the end file descriptor points that
are found during the loop detection pass (from the newly added link), are
actually the sources for wakeup events. I keep a list of these file
descriptors and limit the number and length of these paths that emanate
from these 'source file descriptors'. In the current implemetation I
allow 1000 paths of length 1, 500 of length 2, 100 of length 3, 50 of
length 4 and 10 of length 5. Note that it is sufficient to check the
'source file descriptors' reachable from the newly added link, since no
other 'source file descriptors' will have newly added links. This allows
us to check only the wakeup paths that may have gotten too long, and not
re-check all possible wakeup paths on the system.
In terms of the path limit selection, I think its first worth noting that
the most common case for epoll, is probably the model where you have 1
epoll file descriptor that is monitoring n number of 'source file
descriptors'. In this case, each 'source file descriptor' has a 1 path of
length 1. Thus, I believe that the limits I'm proposing are quite
reasonable and in fact may be too generous. Thus, I'm hoping that the
proposed limits will not prevent any workloads that currently work to
fail.
In terms of locking, I have extended the use of the 'epmutex' to all
epoll_ctl add and remove operations. Currently its only used in a subset
of the add paths. I need to hold the epmutex, so that we can correctly
traverse a coherent graph, to check the number of paths. I believe that
this additional locking is probably ok, since its in the setup/teardown
paths, and doesn't affect the running paths, but it certainly is going to
add some extra overhead. Also, worth noting is that the epmuex was
recently added to the ep_ctl add operations in the initial path loop
detection code using the argument that it was not on a critical path.
Another thing to note here, is the length of epoll chains that is allowed.
Currently, eventpoll.c defines:
/* Maximum number of nesting allowed inside epoll sets */
#define EP_MAX_NESTS 4
This basically means that I am limited to a graph depth of 5 (EP_MAX_NESTS
+ 1). However, this limit is currently only enforced during the loop
check detection code, and only when the epoll file descriptors are added
in a certain order. Thus, this limit is currently easily bypassed. The
newly added check for wakeup paths, stricly limits the wakeup paths to a
length of 5, regardless of the order in which ep's are linked together.
Thus, a side-effect of the new code is a more consistent enforcement of
the graph depth.
Thus far, I've tested this, using the sample programs previously
mentioned, which now either return quickly or return -EINVAL. I've also
testing using the piptest.c epoll tester, which showed no difference in
performance. I've also created a number of different epoll networks and
tested that they behave as expectded.
I believe this solves the original diabolical test cases, while still
preserving the sane epoll nesting.
Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <[email protected]>
Cc: Nelson Elhage <[email protected]>
Cc: Davide Libenzi <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
bool Value::operator==(const Value &other) const {
return Equals(*this, other);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
tinygltf
|
52ff00a38447f06a17eab1caa2cf0730a119c751
| 195,249,196,853,980,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 |
Do not expand file path since its not necessary for glTF asset path(URI) and for security reason(`wordexp`).
|
suspend_hi_show(struct mddev *mddev, char *page)
{
return sprintf(page, "%llu\n", (unsigned long long)mddev->suspend_hi);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-200"
] |
linux
|
b6878d9e03043695dbf3fa1caa6dfc09db225b16
| 315,751,046,509,951,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <[email protected]>
|
static bool timerfd_canceled(struct timerfd_ctx *ctx)
{
if (!ctx->might_cancel || ctx->moffs != KTIME_MAX)
return false;
ctx->moffs = ktime_mono_to_real(0);
return true;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-416"
] |
linux
|
1e38da300e1e395a15048b0af1e5305bd91402f6
| 69,535,935,907,680,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 |
timerfd: Protect the might cancel mechanism proper
The handling of the might_cancel queueing is not properly protected, so
parallel operations on the file descriptor can race with each other and
lead to list corruptions or use after free.
Protect the context for these operations with a seperate lock.
The wait queue lock cannot be reused for this because that would create a
lock inversion scenario vs. the cancel lock. Replacing might_cancel with an
atomic (atomic_t or atomic bit) does not help either because it still can
race vs. the actual list operation.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: "[email protected]"
Cc: syzkaller <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1701311521430.3457@nanos
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
|
xps_beginpath(gx_device_vector *vdev, gx_path_type_t type)
{
char line[300];
gx_device_xps *xps = (gx_device_xps *)vdev;
uint32_t c;
const char *fmt;
(void)gdev_vector_stream((gx_device_vector*)xps);
/* skip non-drawing paths for now */
if (!drawing_path(type, xps->filltype)) {
if_debug1m('_', xps->memory, "xps_beginpath: type not supported %x\n", type);
return 0;
}
if (!xps->can_stroke) {
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
}
c = type & gx_path_type_fill ? xps->fillcolor : xps->strokecolor;
c &= 0xffffffL;
if (!image_brush_fill(type, xps->filltype)) {
write_str_to_current_page(xps, "<Path ");
if (type & gx_path_type_fill)
fmt = "Fill=\"#%06X\" Data=\"";
else
fmt = "Stroke=\"#%06X\" Data=\"";
gs_sprintf(line, fmt, c);
write_str_to_current_page(xps, line);
}
else {
write_str_to_current_page(xps, "<Path Data=\"");
}
if_debug1m('_', xps->memory, "xps_beginpath %s\n", line);
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[] |
ghostpdl
|
94d8955cb7725eb5f3557ddc02310c76124fdd1a
| 210,181,615,575,027,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 39 |
Bug 701818: better handling of error during PS/PDF image
In the xps device, if an error occurred after xps_begin_image() but before
xps_image_end_image(), *if* the Postscript had called 'restore' as part of the
error handling, the image enumerator would have been freed (by the restore)
despite the xps device still holding a reference to it.
Simply changing to an allocator unaffected save/restore doesn't work because
the enumerator holds references to other objects (graphics state, color space,
possibly others) whose lifespans are inherently controlled by save/restore.
So, add a finalize method for the XPS device's image enumerator
(xps_image_enum_finalize()) which takes over cleaning up the memory it allocates
and also deals with cleaning up references from the device to the enumerator
and from the enumerator to the device.
|
static int jas_iccgetuint(jas_stream_t *in, int n, jas_ulonglong *val)
{
int i;
int c;
jas_ulonglong v;
v = 0;
for (i = n; i > 0; --i) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(in)) == EOF)
return -1;
v = (v << 8) | c;
}
*val = v;
return 0;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20",
"CWE-190"
] |
jasper
|
d42b2388f7f8e0332c846675133acea151fc557a
| 176,384,424,711,369,260,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 |
The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
void *ring_buffer_event_data(struct ring_buffer_event *event)
{
return rb_event_data(event);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-190"
] |
linux-stable
|
59643d1535eb220668692a5359de22545af579f6
| 210,562,806,405,508,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 |
ring-buffer: Prevent overflow of size in ring_buffer_resize()
If the size passed to ring_buffer_resize() is greater than MAX_LONG - BUF_PAGE_SIZE
then the DIV_ROUND_UP() will return zero.
Here's the details:
# echo 18014398509481980 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/buffer_size_kb
tracing_entries_write() processes this and converts kb to bytes.
18014398509481980 << 10 = 18446744073709547520
and this is passed to ring_buffer_resize() as unsigned long size.
size = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE);
Where DIV_ROUND_UP(a, b) is (a + b - 1)/b
BUF_PAGE_SIZE is 4080 and here
18446744073709547520 + 4080 - 1 = 18446744073709551599
where 18446744073709551599 is still smaller than 2^64
2^64 - 18446744073709551599 = 17
But now 18446744073709551599 / 4080 = 4521260802379792
and size = size * 4080 = 18446744073709551360
This is checked to make sure its still greater than 2 * 4080,
which it is.
Then we convert to the number of buffer pages needed.
nr_page = DIV_ROUND_UP(size, BUF_PAGE_SIZE)
but this time size is 18446744073709551360 and
2^64 - (18446744073709551360 + 4080 - 1) = -3823
Thus it overflows and the resulting number is less than 4080, which makes
3823 / 4080 = 0
an nr_pages is set to this. As we already checked against the minimum that
nr_pages may be, this causes the logic to fail as well, and we crash the
kernel.
There's no reason to have the two DIV_ROUND_UP() (that's just result of
historical code changes), clean up the code and fix this bug.
Cc: [email protected] # 3.5+
Fixes: 83f40318dab00 ("ring-buffer: Make removal of ring buffer pages atomic")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
|
static int lex_scan_number(lex_t *lex, int c, json_error_t *error)
{
const char *saved_text;
char *end;
double doubleval;
lex->token = TOKEN_INVALID;
if(c == '-')
c = lex_get_save(lex, error);
if(c == '0') {
c = lex_get_save(lex, error);
if(l_isdigit(c)) {
lex_unget_unsave(lex, c);
goto out;
}
}
else if(l_isdigit(c)) {
do
c = lex_get_save(lex, error);
while(l_isdigit(c));
}
else {
lex_unget_unsave(lex, c);
goto out;
}
if(!(lex->flags & JSON_DECODE_INT_AS_REAL) &&
c != '.' && c != 'E' && c != 'e')
{
json_int_t intval;
lex_unget_unsave(lex, c);
saved_text = strbuffer_value(&lex->saved_text);
errno = 0;
intval = json_strtoint(saved_text, &end, 10);
if(errno == ERANGE) {
if(intval < 0)
error_set(error, lex, "too big negative integer");
else
error_set(error, lex, "too big integer");
goto out;
}
assert(end == saved_text + lex->saved_text.length);
lex->token = TOKEN_INTEGER;
lex->value.integer = intval;
return 0;
}
if(c == '.') {
c = lex_get(lex, error);
if(!l_isdigit(c)) {
lex_unget(lex, c);
goto out;
}
lex_save(lex, c);
do
c = lex_get_save(lex, error);
while(l_isdigit(c));
}
if(c == 'E' || c == 'e') {
c = lex_get_save(lex, error);
if(c == '+' || c == '-')
c = lex_get_save(lex, error);
if(!l_isdigit(c)) {
lex_unget_unsave(lex, c);
goto out;
}
do
c = lex_get_save(lex, error);
while(l_isdigit(c));
}
lex_unget_unsave(lex, c);
if(jsonp_strtod(&lex->saved_text, &doubleval)) {
error_set(error, lex, "real number overflow");
goto out;
}
lex->token = TOKEN_REAL;
lex->value.real = doubleval;
return 0;
out:
return -1;
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-20"
] |
jansson
|
64ce0ad3731ebd77e02897b07920eadd0e2cc318
| 6,524,997,922,160,353,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 96 |
Fix for issue #282
The fix limits recursion depths when parsing arrays and objects.
The limit is configurable via the `JSON_PARSER_MAX_DEPTH` setting
within `jansson_config.h` and is set by default to 2048.
Update the RFC conformance document to note the limit; the RFC
allows limits to be set by the implementation so nothing has
actually changed w.r.t. conformance state.
Reported by Gustavo Grieco.
|
static inline unsigned int clock_divider_to_freq(unsigned int divider,
unsigned int rollovers)
{
return DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(CX23888_IR_REFCLK_FREQ,
(divider + 1) * rollovers);
}
| 0 |
[
"CWE-400",
"CWE-401"
] |
linux
|
a7b2df76b42bdd026e3106cf2ba97db41345a177
| 240,606,853,312,702,520,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 |
media: rc: prevent memory leak in cx23888_ir_probe
In cx23888_ir_probe if kfifo_alloc fails the allocated memory for state
should be released.
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sean Young <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
|
psutil_proc_open_files(PyObject *self, PyObject *args) {
long pid;
int i;
int cnt;
int regular;
int fd;
char *path;
struct kinfo_file *freep = NULL;
struct kinfo_file *kif;
kinfo_proc kipp;
PyObject *py_tuple = NULL;
PyObject *py_path = NULL;
PyObject *py_retlist = PyList_New(0);
if (py_retlist == NULL)
return NULL;
if (! PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "l", &pid))
goto error;
if (psutil_kinfo_proc(pid, &kipp) == -1)
goto error;
errno = 0;
freep = kinfo_getfile(pid, &cnt);
if (freep == NULL) {
psutil_raise_for_pid(pid, "kinfo_getfile()");
goto error;
}
for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
kif = &freep[i];
#ifdef PSUTIL_FREEBSD
regular = (kif->kf_type == KF_TYPE_VNODE) && \
(kif->kf_vnode_type == KF_VTYPE_VREG);
fd = kif->kf_fd;
path = kif->kf_path;
#elif PSUTIL_OPENBSD
regular = (kif->f_type == DTYPE_VNODE) && (kif->v_type == VREG);
fd = kif->fd_fd;
// XXX - it appears path is not exposed in the kinfo_file struct.
path = "";
#elif PSUTIL_NETBSD
regular = (kif->ki_ftype == DTYPE_VNODE) && (kif->ki_vtype == VREG);
fd = kif->ki_fd;
// XXX - it appears path is not exposed in the kinfo_file struct.
path = "";
#endif
if (regular == 1) {
py_path = PyUnicode_DecodeFSDefault(path);
if (! py_path)
goto error;
py_tuple = Py_BuildValue("(Oi)", py_path, fd);
if (py_tuple == NULL)
goto error;
if (PyList_Append(py_retlist, py_tuple))
goto error;
Py_DECREF(py_path);
Py_DECREF(py_tuple);
}
}
free(freep);
return py_retlist;
error:
Py_XDECREF(py_tuple);
Py_DECREF(py_retlist);
if (freep != NULL)
free(freep);
return NULL;
}
| 1 |
[
"CWE-415"
] |
psutil
|
7d512c8e4442a896d56505be3e78f1156f443465
| 147,626,897,996,933,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 70 |
Use Py_CLEAR instead of Py_DECREF to also set the variable to NULL (#1616)
These files contain loops that convert system data into python objects
and during the process they create objects and dereference their
refcounts after they have been added to the resulting list.
However, in case of errors during the creation of those python objects,
the refcount to previously allocated objects is dropped again with
Py_XDECREF, which should be a no-op in case the paramater is NULL. Even
so, in most of these loops the variables pointing to the objects are
never set to NULL, even after Py_DECREF is called at the end of the loop
iteration. This means, after the first iteration, if an error occurs
those python objects will get their refcount dropped two times,
resulting in a possible double-free.
|
Subsets and Splits
CWE 416 & 19
The query filters records related to specific CWEs (Common Weakness Enumerations), providing a basic overview of entries with these vulnerabilities but without deeper analysis.
CWE Frequency in Train Set
Counts the occurrences of each CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) in the dataset, providing a basic distribution but limited insight.