func
stringlengths 0
484k
| target
int64 0
1
| cwe
sequencelengths 0
4
| project
stringclasses 799
values | commit_id
stringlengths 40
40
| hash
float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
| size
int64 1
24k
| message
stringlengths 0
13.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
GBool isReverseVideo() { return reverseVideo; } | 0 | [] | poppler | abf167af8b15e5f3b510275ce619e6fdb42edd40 | 200,308,617,566,846,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 | Implement tiling/patterns in SplashOutputDev
Fixes bug 13518 |
Character(char ch) : ch_(ch) {} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | cpp-peglib | b3b29ce8f3acf3a32733d930105a17d7b0ba347e | 60,461,608,608,223,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 | Fix #122 |
static char *auto_complete(CHANNEL_REC *channel, const char *line)
{
GList *comp;
const char *p;
char *nick, *ret;
p = strstr(line, completion_char);
if (p == NULL)
return NULL;
nick = g_strndup(line, (int) (p-line));
ret = NULL;
if (nicklist_find(channel, nick) == NULL) {
/* not an exact match, use the first possible completion */
comp = completion_channel_nicks(channel, nick, NULL);
if (comp != NULL) {
ret = g_strconcat(comp->data, p, NULL);
g_list_foreach(comp, (GFunc) g_free, NULL);
g_list_free(comp);
}
}
g_free(nick);
return ret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | irssi | 36564717c9f701e3a339da362ab46d220d27e0c1 | 251,556,549,473,699,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 | Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
See merge request irssi/irssi!34
(cherry picked from commit b0d9cb33cd9ef9da7c331409e8b7c57a6f3aef3f) |
static void test23(char const* infile,
char const* password,
char const* outfile,
char const* outfile2)
{
QPDF_ERROR_CODE status = 0;
qpdf_read(qpdf, infile, password);
status = qpdf_check_pdf(qpdf);
printf("status: %d\n", status);
report_errors();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qpdf | d71f05ca07eb5c7cfa4d6d23e5c1f2a800f52e8e | 66,720,826,248,246,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | Fix sign and conversion warnings (major)
This makes all integer type conversions that have potential data loss
explicit with calls that do range checks and raise an exception. After
this commit, qpdf builds with no warnings when -Wsign-conversion
-Wconversion is used with gcc or clang or when -W3 -Wd4800 is used
with MSVC. This significantly reduces the likelihood of potential
crashes from bogus integer values.
There are some parts of the code that take int when they should take
size_t or an offset. Such places would make qpdf not support files
with more than 2^31 of something that usually wouldn't be so large. In
the event that such a file shows up and is valid, at least qpdf would
raise an error in the right spot so the issue could be legitimately
addressed rather than failing in some weird way because of a silent
overflow condition. |
static void register_hooks(apr_pool_t *p)
{
static const char * const cfgPost[]={ "http_core.c", NULL };
static const char * const parsePre[]={ "mod_proxy.c", NULL };
ap_hook_pre_config(pre_init, NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
ap_hook_post_config(initialize_module, NULL, cfgPost, APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
ap_hook_child_init(initialize_child, NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
ap_hook_post_read_request(parse_hdr_and_update_nc, parsePre, NULL, APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
ap_hook_check_authn(authenticate_digest_user, NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_MIDDLE,
AP_AUTH_INTERNAL_PER_CONF);
ap_hook_fixups(add_auth_info, NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
ap_hook_note_auth_failure(hook_note_digest_auth_failure, NULL, NULL,
APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | httpd | 3b6431eb9c9dba603385f70a2131ab4a01bf0d3b | 60,486,314,079,750,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | Merge r1885659 from trunk:
mod_auth_digest: Fast validation of the nonce's base64 to fail early if
the format can't match anyway.
Submitted by: ylavic
Reviewed by: ylavic, covener, jailletc36
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1885666 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68 |
static bool uhid_send_input_report(struct input_device *idev,
const uint8_t *data, size_t size)
{
struct uhid_event ev;
int err;
if (data == NULL)
size = 0;
if (size > sizeof(ev.u.input.data))
size = sizeof(ev.u.input.data);
if (!idev->uhid_created) {
DBG("HID report (%zu bytes) dropped", size);
return false;
}
memset(&ev, 0, sizeof(ev));
ev.type = UHID_INPUT;
ev.u.input.size = size;
if (size > 0)
memcpy(ev.u.input.data, data, size);
err = bt_uhid_send(idev->uhid, &ev);
if (err < 0) {
error("bt_uhid_send: %s (%d)", strerror(-err), -err);
return false;
}
DBG("HID report (%zu bytes)", size);
return true;
} | 0 | [] | bluez | 3cccdbab2324086588df4ccf5f892fb3ce1f1787 | 298,845,394,353,987,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 | HID accepts bonded device connections only.
This change adds a configuration for platforms to choose a more secure
posture for the HID profile. While some older mice are known to not
support pairing or encryption, some platform may choose a more secure
posture by requiring the device to be bonded and require the
connection to be encrypted when bonding is required.
Reference:
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00352.html |
static int inet6_fill_ifinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, struct inet6_dev *idev,
u32 portid, u32 seq, int event, unsigned int flags)
{
struct net_device *dev = idev->dev;
struct ifinfomsg *hdr;
struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
void *protoinfo;
nlh = nlmsg_put(skb, portid, seq, event, sizeof(*hdr), flags);
if (nlh == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
hdr = nlmsg_data(nlh);
hdr->ifi_family = AF_INET6;
hdr->__ifi_pad = 0;
hdr->ifi_type = dev->type;
hdr->ifi_index = dev->ifindex;
hdr->ifi_flags = dev_get_flags(dev);
hdr->ifi_change = 0;
if (nla_put_string(skb, IFLA_IFNAME, dev->name) ||
(dev->addr_len &&
nla_put(skb, IFLA_ADDRESS, dev->addr_len, dev->dev_addr)) ||
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_MTU, dev->mtu) ||
(dev->ifindex != dev->iflink &&
nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_LINK, dev->iflink)))
goto nla_put_failure;
protoinfo = nla_nest_start(skb, IFLA_PROTINFO);
if (protoinfo == NULL)
goto nla_put_failure;
if (inet6_fill_ifla6_attrs(skb, idev) < 0)
goto nla_put_failure;
nla_nest_end(skb, protoinfo);
return nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
nla_put_failure:
nlmsg_cancel(skb, nlh);
return -EMSGSIZE;
} | 0 | [] | net | 4b08a8f1bd8cb4541c93ec170027b4d0782dab52 | 64,392,894,602,204,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 41 | ipv6: remove max_addresses check from ipv6_create_tempaddr
Because of the max_addresses check attackers were able to disable privacy
extensions on an interface by creating enough autoconfigured addresses:
<http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2012/q4/292>
But the check is not actually needed: max_addresses protects the
kernel to install too many ipv6 addresses on an interface and guards
addrconf_prefix_rcv to install further addresses as soon as this limit
is reached. We only generate temporary addresses in direct response of
a new address showing up. As soon as we filled up the maximum number of
addresses of an interface, we stop installing more addresses and thus
also stop generating more temp addresses.
Even if the attacker tries to generate a lot of temporary addresses
by announcing a prefix and removing it again (lifetime == 0) we won't
install more temp addresses, because the temporary addresses do count
to the maximum number of addresses, thus we would stop installing new
autoconfigured addresses when the limit is reached.
This patch fixes CVE-2013-0343 (but other layer-2 attacks are still
possible).
Thanks to Ding Tianhong to bring this topic up again.
Cc: Ding Tianhong <[email protected]>
Cc: George Kargiotakis <[email protected]>
Cc: P J P <[email protected]>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ding Tianhong <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
static int fname_decrypt(struct inode *inode,
const struct fscrypt_str *iname,
struct fscrypt_str *oname)
{
struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
DECLARE_FS_COMPLETION_RESULT(ecr);
struct scatterlist src_sg, dst_sg;
struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info;
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = ci->ci_ctfm;
int res = 0;
char iv[FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE];
unsigned lim;
lim = inode->i_sb->s_cop->max_namelen(inode);
if (iname->len <= 0 || iname->len > lim)
return -EIO;
/* Allocate request */
req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS);
if (!req) {
printk_ratelimited(KERN_ERR
"%s: crypto_request_alloc() failed\n", __func__);
return -ENOMEM;
}
skcipher_request_set_callback(req,
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
fname_crypt_complete, &ecr);
/* Initialize IV */
memset(iv, 0, FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE);
/* Create decryption request */
sg_init_one(&src_sg, iname->name, iname->len);
sg_init_one(&dst_sg, oname->name, oname->len);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, &dst_sg, iname->len, iv);
res = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
if (res == -EINPROGRESS || res == -EBUSY) {
wait_for_completion(&ecr.completion);
res = ecr.res;
}
skcipher_request_free(req);
if (res < 0) {
printk_ratelimited(KERN_ERR
"%s: Error (error code %d)\n", __func__, res);
return res;
}
oname->len = strnlen(oname->name, iname->len);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-476"
] | linux | 1b53cf9815bb4744958d41f3795d5d5a1d365e2d | 208,816,448,682,556,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 50 | fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: [email protected] # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <[email protected]> |
void CLASS Canon_WBpresets(int skip1, int skip2)
{
int c;
FORC4 imgdata.color.WB_Coeffs[LIBRAW_WBI_Daylight][c ^ (c >> 1)] = get2();
if (skip1)
fseek(ifp, skip1, SEEK_CUR);
FORC4 imgdata.color.WB_Coeffs[LIBRAW_WBI_Shade][c ^ (c >> 1)] = get2();
if (skip1)
fseek(ifp, skip1, SEEK_CUR);
FORC4 imgdata.color.WB_Coeffs[LIBRAW_WBI_Cloudy][c ^ (c >> 1)] = get2();
if (skip1)
fseek(ifp, skip1, SEEK_CUR);
FORC4 imgdata.color.WB_Coeffs[LIBRAW_WBI_Tungsten][c ^ (c >> 1)] = get2();
if (skip1)
fseek(ifp, skip1, SEEK_CUR);
FORC4 imgdata.color.WB_Coeffs[LIBRAW_WBI_FL_W][c ^ (c >> 1)] = get2();
if (skip2)
fseek(ifp, skip2, SEEK_CUR);
FORC4 imgdata.color.WB_Coeffs[LIBRAW_WBI_Flash][c ^ (c >> 1)] = get2();
return;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476",
"CWE-119"
] | LibRaw | d7c3d2cb460be10a3ea7b32e9443a83c243b2251 | 125,399,763,498,859,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | Secunia SA75000 advisory: several buffer overruns |
bool stringHasTokenAtIndex(size_t index, const std::string& input, const std::string& token) {
if (token.size() + index > input.size()) {
return false;
}
return input.compare(index, token.size(), token) == 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-835"
] | mongo | 0a076417d1d7fba3632b73349a1fd29a83e68816 | 302,502,622,415,357,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | SERVER-38070 fix infinite loop in agg expression |
symbols_pack (void)
{
symbols = xcalloc (nsyms, sizeof *symbols);
for (int i = 0; symbols_sorted[i]; ++i)
symbol_pack (symbols_sorted[i]);
/* Aliases leave empty slots in symbols, so remove them. */
{
int nsyms_old = nsyms;
for (int writei = 0, readi = 0; readi < nsyms_old; readi += 1)
{
if (symbols[readi] == NULL)
{
nsyms -= 1;
ntokens -= 1;
}
else
{
symbols[writei] = symbols[readi];
symbols[writei]->content->number = writei;
writei += 1;
}
}
}
symbols = xnrealloc (symbols, nsyms, sizeof *symbols);
symbols_token_translations_init ();
if (startsymbol->content->class == unknown_sym)
complain (&startsymbol_loc, fatal,
_("the start symbol %s is undefined"),
startsymbol->tag);
else if (startsymbol->content->class == token_sym)
complain (&startsymbol_loc, fatal,
_("the start symbol %s is a token"),
startsymbol->tag);
// If some user tokens are internationalized, the internal ones
// should be too.
if (has_translations ())
{
const bool eof_is_user_defined
= !eoftoken->alias || STRNEQ (eoftoken->alias->tag, "$end");
if (!eof_is_user_defined)
eoftoken->alias->translatable = true;
undeftoken->alias->translatable = true;
errtoken->alias->translatable = true;
}
} | 0 | [] | bison | b7aab2dbad43aaf14eebe78d54aafa245a000988 | 339,126,648,436,386,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 49 | fix: crash when redefining the EOF token
Reported by Agency for Defense Development.
https://lists.gnu.org/r/bug-bison/2020-08/msg00008.html
On an empty such as
%token FOO
BAR
FOO 0
%%
input: %empty
we crash because when we find FOO 0, we decrement ntokens (since FOO
was discovered to be EOF, which is already known to be a token, so we
increment ntokens for it, and need to cancel this). This "works well"
when EOF is properly defined in one go, but here it is first defined
and later only assign token code 0. In the meanwhile BAR was given
the token number that we just decremented.
To fix this, assign symbol numbers after parsing, not during parsing,
so that we also saw all the explicit token codes. To maintain the
current numbers (I'd like to keep no difference in the output, not
just equivalence), we need to make sure the symbols are numbered in
the same order: that of appearance in the source file. So we need the
locations to be correct, which was almost the case, except for nterms
that appeared several times as LHS (i.e., several times as "foo:
..."). Fixing the use of location_of_lhs sufficed (it appears it was
intended for this use, but its implementation was unfinished: it was
always set to "false" only).
* src/symtab.c (symbol_location_as_lhs_set): Update location_of_lhs.
(symbol_code_set): Remove broken hack that decremented ntokens.
(symbol_class_set, dummy_symbol_get): Don't set number, ntokens and
nnterms.
(symbol_check_defined): Do it.
(symbols): Don't count nsyms here.
Actually, don't count nsyms at all: let it be done in...
* src/reader.c (check_and_convert_grammar): here. Define nsyms from
ntokens and nnterms after parsing.
* tests/input.at (EOF redeclared): New.
* examples/c/bistromathic/bistromathic.test: Adjust the traces: in
"%nterm <double> exp %% input: ...", exp used to be numbered before
input. |
struct io_cancel_data *cd)
__must_hold(&ctx->completion_lock)
{
struct io_kiocb *req;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < (1U << ctx->cancel_hash_bits); i++) {
struct hlist_head *list;
list = &ctx->cancel_hash[i];
hlist_for_each_entry(req, list, hash_node) {
if (!(cd->flags & IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_ANY) &&
req->file != cd->file)
continue;
if (cd->seq == req->work.cancel_seq)
continue;
req->work.cancel_seq = cd->seq;
return req;
}
}
return NULL; | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | 9cae36a094e7e9d6e5fe8b6dcd4642138b3eb0c7 | 131,624,708,677,940,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | io_uring: reinstate the inflight tracking
After some debugging, it was realized that we really do still need the
old inflight tracking for any file type that has io_uring_fops assigned.
If we don't, then trivial circular references will mean that we never get
the ctx cleaned up and hence it'll leak.
Just bring back the inflight tracking, which then also means we can
eliminate the conditional dropping of the file when task_work is queued.
Fixes: d5361233e9ab ("io_uring: drop the old style inflight file tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]> |
static CURLcode bearssl_sha256sum(const unsigned char *input,
size_t inputlen,
unsigned char *sha256sum,
size_t sha256len UNUSED_PARAM)
{
br_sha256_context ctx;
br_sha256_init(&ctx);
br_sha256_update(&ctx, input, inputlen);
br_sha256_out(&ctx, sha256sum);
return CURLE_OK;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-290"
] | curl | b09c8ee15771c614c4bf3ddac893cdb12187c844 | 128,290,714,367,840,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | vtls: add 'isproxy' argument to Curl_ssl_get/addsessionid()
To make sure we set and extract the correct session.
Reported-by: Mingtao Yang
Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2021-22890.html
CVE-2021-22890 |
static GF_Err gf_isom_dump_ttxt_track(GF_ISOFile *the_file, u32 track, FILE *dump, Bool box_dump)
{
u32 i, j, count, di, nb_descs, shift_offset[20], so_count;
u64 last_DTS;
size_t len;
GF_Box *a;
Bool has_scroll;
char szDur[100];
GF_Tx3gSampleEntryBox *txt;
GF_TrackBox *trak = gf_isom_get_track_from_file(the_file, track);
if (!trak) return GF_BAD_PARAM;
switch (trak->Media->handler->handlerType) {
case GF_ISOM_MEDIA_TEXT:
case GF_ISOM_MEDIA_SUBT:
break;
default:
return GF_BAD_PARAM;
}
txt = (GF_Tx3gSampleEntryBox *)gf_list_get(trak->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleDescription->other_boxes, 0);
switch (txt->type) {
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_TX3G:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_TEXT:
break;
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_STPP:
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SBTT:
default:
return GF_BAD_PARAM;
}
if (box_dump) {
fprintf(dump, "<TextTrack trackID=\"%d\" version=\"1.1\">\n", gf_isom_get_track_id(the_file, track) );
} else {
fprintf(dump, "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\" ?>\n");
fprintf(dump, "<!-- GPAC 3GPP Text Stream -->\n");
fprintf(dump, "<TextStream version=\"1.1\">\n");
}
fprintf(dump, "<TextStreamHeader width=\"%d\" height=\"%d\" layer=\"%d\" translation_x=\"%d\" translation_y=\"%d\">\n", trak->Header->width >> 16 , trak->Header->height >> 16, trak->Header->layer, trak->Header->matrix[6] >> 16, trak->Header->matrix[7] >> 16);
nb_descs = gf_list_count(trak->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleDescription->other_boxes);
for (i=0; i<nb_descs; i++) {
GF_Tx3gSampleEntryBox *txt = (GF_Tx3gSampleEntryBox *)gf_list_get(trak->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleDescription->other_boxes, i);
if (box_dump) {
gf_isom_box_dump((GF_Box*) txt, dump);
} else if (txt->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_TX3G) {
fprintf(dump, "<TextSampleDescription horizontalJustification=\"");
switch (txt->horizontal_justification) {
case 1:
fprintf(dump, "center");
break;
case -1:
fprintf(dump, "right");
break;
default:
fprintf(dump, "left");
break;
}
fprintf(dump, "\" verticalJustification=\"");
switch (txt->vertical_justification) {
case 1:
fprintf(dump, "center");
break;
case -1:
fprintf(dump, "bottom");
break;
default:
fprintf(dump, "top");
break;
}
fprintf(dump, "\" ");
tx3g_dump_rgba8(dump, "backColor", txt->back_color);
fprintf(dump, " verticalText=\"%s\"", (txt->displayFlags & GF_TXT_VERTICAL) ? "yes" : "no");
fprintf(dump, " fillTextRegion=\"%s\"", (txt->displayFlags & GF_TXT_FILL_REGION) ? "yes" : "no");
fprintf(dump, " continuousKaraoke=\"%s\"", (txt->displayFlags & GF_TXT_KARAOKE) ? "yes" : "no");
has_scroll = GF_FALSE;
if (txt->displayFlags & GF_TXT_SCROLL_IN) {
has_scroll = GF_TRUE;
if (txt->displayFlags & GF_TXT_SCROLL_OUT) fprintf(dump, " scroll=\"InOut\"");
else fprintf(dump, " scroll=\"In\"");
} else if (txt->displayFlags & GF_TXT_SCROLL_OUT) {
has_scroll = GF_TRUE;
fprintf(dump, " scroll=\"Out\"");
} else {
fprintf(dump, " scroll=\"None\"");
}
if (has_scroll) {
u32 mode = (txt->displayFlags & GF_TXT_SCROLL_DIRECTION)>>7;
switch (mode) {
case GF_TXT_SCROLL_CREDITS:
fprintf(dump, " scrollMode=\"Credits\"");
break;
case GF_TXT_SCROLL_MARQUEE:
fprintf(dump, " scrollMode=\"Marquee\"");
break;
case GF_TXT_SCROLL_DOWN:
fprintf(dump, " scrollMode=\"Down\"");
break;
case GF_TXT_SCROLL_RIGHT:
fprintf(dump, " scrollMode=\"Right\"");
break;
default:
fprintf(dump, " scrollMode=\"Unknown\"");
break;
}
}
fprintf(dump, ">\n");
fprintf(dump, "<FontTable>\n");
if (txt->font_table) {
for (j=0; j<txt->font_table->entry_count; j++) {
fprintf(dump, "<FontTableEntry fontName=\"%s\" fontID=\"%d\"/>\n", txt->font_table->fonts[j].fontName, txt->font_table->fonts[j].fontID);
}
}
fprintf(dump, "</FontTable>\n");
if ((txt->default_box.bottom == txt->default_box.top) || (txt->default_box.right == txt->default_box.left)) {
txt->default_box.top = txt->default_box.left = 0;
txt->default_box.right = trak->Header->width / 65536;
txt->default_box.bottom = trak->Header->height / 65536;
}
tx3g_dump_box_nobox(dump, &txt->default_box);
tx3g_dump_style_nobox(dump, &txt->default_style, NULL, 0);
fprintf(dump, "</TextSampleDescription>\n");
} else {
GF_TextSampleEntryBox *text = (GF_TextSampleEntryBox *)gf_list_get(trak->Media->information->sampleTable->SampleDescription->other_boxes, i);
fprintf(dump, "<TextSampleDescription horizontalJustification=\"");
switch (text->textJustification) {
case 1:
fprintf(dump, "center");
break;
case -1:
fprintf(dump, "right");
break;
default:
fprintf(dump, "left");
break;
}
fprintf(dump, "\"");
tx3g_dump_rgb16(dump, " backColor", text->background_color);
if ((text->default_box.bottom == text->default_box.top) || (text->default_box.right == text->default_box.left)) {
text->default_box.top = text->default_box.left = 0;
text->default_box.right = trak->Header->width / 65536;
text->default_box.bottom = trak->Header->height / 65536;
}
if (text->displayFlags & GF_TXT_SCROLL_IN) {
if (text->displayFlags & GF_TXT_SCROLL_OUT) fprintf(dump, " scroll=\"InOut\"");
else fprintf(dump, " scroll=\"In\"");
} else if (text->displayFlags & GF_TXT_SCROLL_OUT) {
fprintf(dump, " scroll=\"Out\"");
} else {
fprintf(dump, " scroll=\"None\"");
}
fprintf(dump, ">\n");
tx3g_dump_box_nobox(dump, &text->default_box);
fprintf(dump, "</TextSampleDescription>\n");
}
}
fprintf(dump, "</TextStreamHeader>\n");
last_DTS = 0;
count = gf_isom_get_sample_count(the_file, track);
for (i=0; i<count; i++) {
GF_BitStream *bs;
GF_TextSample *txt;
GF_ISOSample *s = gf_isom_get_sample(the_file, track, i+1, &di);
if (!s) continue;
fprintf(dump, "<TextSample sampleTime=\"%s\" sampleDescriptionIndex=\"%d\"", tx3g_format_time(s->DTS, trak->Media->mediaHeader->timeScale, szDur, GF_FALSE), di);
bs = gf_bs_new(s->data, s->dataLength, GF_BITSTREAM_READ);
txt = gf_isom_parse_texte_sample(bs);
gf_bs_del(bs);
if (!box_dump) {
if (txt->highlight_color) {
fprintf(dump, " ");
tx3g_dump_rgba8(dump, "highlightColor", txt->highlight_color->hil_color);
}
if (txt->scroll_delay) {
Double delay = txt->scroll_delay->scroll_delay;
delay /= trak->Media->mediaHeader->timeScale;
fprintf(dump, " scrollDelay=\"%g\"", delay);
}
if (txt->wrap) fprintf(dump, " wrap=\"%s\"", (txt->wrap->wrap_flag==0x01) ? "Automatic" : "None");
}
so_count = 0;
fprintf(dump, " xml:space=\"preserve\">");
if (!txt->len) {
last_DTS = (u32) trak->Media->mediaHeader->duration;
} else {
unsigned short utf16Line[10000];
last_DTS = s->DTS;
/*UTF16*/
if ((txt->len>2) && ((unsigned char) txt->text[0] == (unsigned char) 0xFE) && ((unsigned char) txt->text[1] == (unsigned char) 0xFF)) {
/*copy 2 more chars because the lib always add 2 '0' at the end for UTF16 end of string*/
memcpy((char *) utf16Line, txt->text+2, sizeof(char) * (txt->len));
len = gf_utf8_wcslen((const u16*)utf16Line);
} else {
char *str;
str = txt->text;
len = gf_utf8_mbstowcs((u16*)utf16Line, 10000, (const char **) &str);
}
if (len != (size_t) -1) {
utf16Line[len] = 0;
for (j=0; j<len; j++) {
if ((utf16Line[j]=='\n') || (utf16Line[j]=='\r') || (utf16Line[j]==0x85) || (utf16Line[j]==0x2028) || (utf16Line[j]==0x2029) ) {
fprintf(dump, "\n");
if ((utf16Line[j]=='\r') && (utf16Line[j+1]=='\n')) {
shift_offset[so_count] = j;
so_count++;
j++;
}
}
else {
switch (utf16Line[j]) {
case '\'':
fprintf(dump, "'");
break;
case '\"':
fprintf(dump, """);
break;
case '&':
fprintf(dump, "&");
break;
case '>':
fprintf(dump, ">");
break;
case '<':
fprintf(dump, "<");
break;
default:
if (utf16Line[j] < 128) {
fprintf(dump, "%c", (u8) utf16Line[j]);
} else {
fprintf(dump, "&#%d;", utf16Line[j]);
}
break;
}
}
}
}
}
if (box_dump) {
if (txt->highlight_color)
gf_isom_box_dump((GF_Box*) txt->highlight_color, dump);
if (txt->scroll_delay)
gf_isom_box_dump((GF_Box*) txt->scroll_delay, dump);
if (txt->wrap)
gf_isom_box_dump((GF_Box*) txt->wrap, dump);
if (txt->box)
gf_isom_box_dump((GF_Box*) txt->box, dump);
if (txt->styles)
gf_isom_box_dump((GF_Box*) txt->styles, dump);
} else {
if (txt->box) tx3g_dump_box_nobox(dump, &txt->box->box);
if (txt->styles) {
for (j=0; j<txt->styles->entry_count; j++) {
tx3g_dump_style_nobox(dump, &txt->styles->styles[j], shift_offset, so_count);
}
}
}
j=0;
while ((a = (GF_Box *)gf_list_enum(txt->others, &j))) {
if (box_dump) {
gf_isom_box_dump((GF_Box*) a, dump);
continue;
}
switch (a->type) {
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_HLIT:
fprintf(dump, "<Highlight ");
tx3g_print_char_offsets(dump, ((GF_TextHighlightBox *)a)->startcharoffset, ((GF_TextHighlightBox *)a)->endcharoffset, shift_offset, so_count);
fprintf(dump, "/>\n");
break;
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_HREF:
{
GF_TextHyperTextBox *ht = (GF_TextHyperTextBox *)a;
fprintf(dump, "<HyperLink ");
tx3g_print_char_offsets(dump, ht->startcharoffset, ht->endcharoffset, shift_offset, so_count);
fprintf(dump, "URL=\"%s\" URLToolTip=\"%s\"/>\n", ht->URL ? ht->URL : "", ht->URL_hint ? ht->URL_hint : "");
}
break;
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_BLNK:
fprintf(dump, "<Blinking ");
tx3g_print_char_offsets(dump, ((GF_TextBlinkBox *)a)->startcharoffset, ((GF_TextBlinkBox *)a)->endcharoffset, shift_offset, so_count);
fprintf(dump, "/>\n");
break;
case GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_KROK:
{
u32 k;
Double t;
GF_TextKaraokeBox *krok = (GF_TextKaraokeBox *)a;
t = krok->highlight_starttime;
t /= trak->Media->mediaHeader->timeScale;
fprintf(dump, "<Karaoke startTime=\"%g\">\n", t);
for (k=0; k<krok->nb_entries; k++) {
t = krok->records[k].highlight_endtime;
t /= trak->Media->mediaHeader->timeScale;
fprintf(dump, "<KaraokeRange ");
tx3g_print_char_offsets(dump, krok->records[k].start_charoffset, krok->records[k].end_charoffset, shift_offset, so_count);
fprintf(dump, "endTime=\"%g\"/>\n", t);
}
fprintf(dump, "</Karaoke>\n");
}
break;
}
}
fprintf(dump, "</TextSample>\n");
gf_isom_sample_del(&s);
gf_isom_delete_text_sample(txt);
gf_set_progress("TTXT Extract", i, count);
}
if (last_DTS < trak->Media->mediaHeader->duration) {
fprintf(dump, "<TextSample sampleTime=\"%s\" text=\"\" />\n", tx3g_format_time(trak->Media->mediaHeader->duration, trak->Media->mediaHeader->timeScale, szDur, GF_FALSE));
}
if (box_dump) {
fprintf(dump, "</TextTrack>\n");
} else {
fprintf(dump, "</TextStream>\n");
}
if (count) gf_set_progress("TTXT Extract", count, count);
return GF_OK;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | gpac | bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86 | 26,158,964,388,090,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 335 | fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088) |
int Field_varstring::key_cmp(const uchar *key_ptr, uint max_key_length)
{
uint length= length_bytes == 1 ? (uint) *ptr : uint2korr(ptr);
uint local_char_length= max_key_length / field_charset->mbmaxlen;
local_char_length= my_charpos(field_charset, ptr + length_bytes,
ptr + length_bytes + length, local_char_length);
set_if_smaller(length, local_char_length);
return field_charset->coll->strnncollsp(field_charset,
ptr + length_bytes,
length,
key_ptr+
HA_KEY_BLOB_LENGTH,
uint2korr(key_ptr));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-120"
] | server | eca207c46293bc72dd8d0d5622153fab4d3fccf1 | 63,719,946,544,344,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | MDEV-25317 Assertion `scale <= precision' failed in decimal_bin_size And Assertion `scale >= 0 && precision > 0 && scale <= precision' failed in decimal_bin_size_inline/decimal_bin_size.
Precision should be kept below DECIMAL_MAX_SCALE for computations.
It can be bigger in Item_decimal. I'd fix this too but it changes the
existing behaviour so problemmatic to ix. |
_gnutls_x509_decode_string(unsigned int etype,
const uint8_t * der, size_t der_size,
gnutls_datum_t * output, unsigned allow_ber)
{
int ret;
uint8_t *str;
unsigned int str_size, len;
gnutls_datum_t td;
#ifdef HAVE_ASN1_DECODE_SIMPLE_BER
if (allow_ber)
ret =
asn1_decode_simple_ber(etype, der, der_size, &str, &str_size, NULL);
else
#endif
ret =
asn1_decode_simple_der(etype, der, der_size, (const uint8_t**)&str, &str_size);
if (ret != ASN1_SUCCESS) {
gnutls_assert();
ret = _gnutls_asn2err(ret);
return ret;
}
td.size = str_size;
td.data = gnutls_malloc(str_size + 1);
if (td.data == NULL)
return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_MEMORY_ERROR);
memcpy(td.data, str, str_size);
td.data[str_size] = 0;
#ifdef HAVE_ASN1_DECODE_SIMPLE_BER
if (allow_ber)
free(str);
#endif
ret = make_printable_string(etype, &td, output);
if (ret == GNUTLS_E_INVALID_REQUEST) { /* unsupported etype */
output->data = td.data;
output->size = td.size;
ret = 0;
} else if (ret <= 0) {
_gnutls_free_datum(&td);
}
/* Refuse to deal with strings containing NULs. */
if (etype != ASN1_ETYPE_OCTET_STRING) {
if (output->data)
len = strlen((void *) output->data);
else
len = 0;
if (len != (size_t) output->size) {
_gnutls_free_datum(output);
ret = gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_ASN1_DER_ERROR);
}
}
return ret;
} | 0 | [] | gnutls | 272854367efc130fbd4f1a51840d80c630214e12 | 332,758,606,039,787,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 60 | Reset the output value on error in _gnutls_x509_dn_to_string()
Reported by Kurt Roeckx. |
gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_system(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva,
struct x86_exception *exception)
{
struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
return mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, mmu, gva, 0, exception);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | linux | 55749769fe608fa3f4a075e42e89d237c8e37637 | 220,280,158,132,763,250,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | KVM: x86: Fix wall clock writes in Xen shared_info not to mark page dirty
When dirty ring logging is enabled, any dirty logging without an active
vCPU context will cause a kernel oops. But we've already declared that
the shared_info page doesn't get dirty tracking anyway, since it would
be kind of insane to mark it dirty every time we deliver an event channel
interrupt. Userspace is supposed to just assume it's always dirty any
time a vCPU can run or event channels are routed.
So stop using the generic kvm_write_wall_clock() and just write directly
through the gfn_to_pfn_cache that we already have set up.
We can make kvm_write_wall_clock() static in x86.c again now, but let's
not remove the 'sec_hi_ofs' argument even though it's not used yet. At
some point we *will* want to use that for KVM guests too.
Fixes: 629b5348841a ("KVM: x86/xen: update wallclock region")
Reported-by: butt3rflyh4ck <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> |
void SELECT_LEX::lex_start(LEX *plex)
{
SELECT_LEX_UNIT *unit= &plex->unit;
/* 'parent_lex' is used in init_query() so it must be before it. */
parent_lex= plex;
init_query();
master= unit;
prev= &unit->slave;
link_next= slave= next= 0;
link_prev= (st_select_lex_node**)&(plex->all_selects_list);
DBUG_ASSERT(!group_list_ptrs);
select_number= 1;
in_sum_expr=0;
ftfunc_list_alloc.empty();
ftfunc_list= &ftfunc_list_alloc;
group_list.empty();
order_list.empty();
gorder_list.empty();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | server | 39feab3cd31b5414aa9b428eaba915c251ac34a2 | 147,598,666,820,068,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | MDEV-26412 Server crash in Item_field::fix_outer_field for INSERT SELECT
IF an INSERT/REPLACE SELECT statement contained an ON expression in the top
level select and this expression used a subquery with a column reference
that could not be resolved then an attempt to resolve this reference as
an outer reference caused a crash of the server. This happened because the
outer context field in the Name_resolution_context structure was not set
to NULL for such references. Rather it pointed to the first element in
the select_stack.
Note that starting from 10.4 we cannot use the SELECT_LEX::outer_select()
method when parsing a SELECT construct.
Approved by Oleksandr Byelkin <[email protected]> |
static void do_json_objects(QPDF& pdf, Options& o, JSON& j)
{
// Add all objects. Do this first before other code below modifies
// things by doing stuff like calling
// pushInheritedAttributesToPage.
bool all_objects = o.json_objects.empty();
std::set<QPDFObjGen> wanted_og;
for (std::set<std::string>::iterator iter = o.json_objects.begin();
iter != o.json_objects.end(); ++iter)
{
bool trailer;
int obj = 0;
int gen = 0;
parse_object_id(*iter, trailer, obj, gen);
if (obj)
{
wanted_og.insert(QPDFObjGen(obj, gen));
}
}
JSON j_objects = j.addDictionaryMember("objects", JSON::makeDictionary());
if (all_objects || o.json_objects.count("trailer"))
{
j_objects.addDictionaryMember(
"trailer", pdf.getTrailer().getJSON(true));
}
std::vector<QPDFObjectHandle> objects = pdf.getAllObjects();
for (std::vector<QPDFObjectHandle>::iterator iter = objects.begin();
iter != objects.end(); ++iter)
{
if (all_objects || wanted_og.count((*iter).getObjGen()))
{
j_objects.addDictionaryMember(
(*iter).unparse(), (*iter).getJSON(true));
}
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qpdf | d71f05ca07eb5c7cfa4d6d23e5c1f2a800f52e8e | 67,837,725,085,317,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 36 | Fix sign and conversion warnings (major)
This makes all integer type conversions that have potential data loss
explicit with calls that do range checks and raise an exception. After
this commit, qpdf builds with no warnings when -Wsign-conversion
-Wconversion is used with gcc or clang or when -W3 -Wd4800 is used
with MSVC. This significantly reduces the likelihood of potential
crashes from bogus integer values.
There are some parts of the code that take int when they should take
size_t or an offset. Such places would make qpdf not support files
with more than 2^31 of something that usually wouldn't be so large. In
the event that such a file shows up and is valid, at least qpdf would
raise an error in the right spot so the issue could be legitimately
addressed rather than failing in some weird way because of a silent
overflow condition. |
static void mg_dns_free(struct dns_data *d) {
LIST_DELETE(struct dns_data, &s_reqs, d);
free(d);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-552"
] | mongoose | c65c8fdaaa257e0487ab0aaae9e8f6b439335945 | 291,098,667,406,549,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Protect against the directory traversal in mg_upload() |
qf_get_nth_above_entry(qfline_T *entry, int n, int linewise, int *errornr)
{
while (n-- > 0 && !got_int)
{
if (entry->qf_prev == NULL
|| entry->qf_prev->qf_fnum != entry->qf_fnum)
break;
entry = entry->qf_prev;
--*errornr;
// If multiple entries are on the same line, then use the first entry
if (linewise)
entry = qf_find_first_entry_on_line(entry, errornr);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | vim | 4f1b083be43f351bc107541e7b0c9655a5d2c0bb | 176,962,817,644,785,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | patch 9.0.0322: crash when no errors and 'quickfixtextfunc' is set
Problem: Crash when no errors and 'quickfixtextfunc' is set.
Solution: Do not handle errors if there aren't any. |
int handler::update_auto_increment()
{
ulonglong nr, nb_reserved_values;
bool append= FALSE;
THD *thd= table->in_use;
struct system_variables *variables= &thd->variables;
int result=0, tmp;
DBUG_ENTER("handler::update_auto_increment");
/*
next_insert_id is a "cursor" into the reserved interval, it may go greater
than the interval, but not smaller.
*/
DBUG_ASSERT(next_insert_id >= auto_inc_interval_for_cur_row.minimum());
if ((nr= table->next_number_field->val_int()) != 0 ||
(table->auto_increment_field_not_null &&
thd->variables.sql_mode & MODE_NO_AUTO_VALUE_ON_ZERO))
{
/*
There could be an error reported because value was truncated
when strict mode is enabled.
*/
if (thd->is_error())
DBUG_RETURN(HA_ERR_AUTOINC_ERANGE);
/*
Update next_insert_id if we had already generated a value in this
statement (case of INSERT VALUES(null),(3763),(null):
the last NULL needs to insert 3764, not the value of the first NULL plus
1).
Ignore negative values.
*/
if ((longlong) nr > 0 || (table->next_number_field->flags & UNSIGNED_FLAG))
adjust_next_insert_id_after_explicit_value(nr);
insert_id_for_cur_row= 0; // didn't generate anything
DBUG_RETURN(0);
}
if (table->versioned())
{
Field *end= table->vers_end_field();
DBUG_ASSERT(end);
bitmap_set_bit(table->read_set, end->field_index);
if (!end->is_max())
{
if (thd->lex->sql_command == SQLCOM_ALTER_TABLE)
{
if (!table->next_number_field->real_maybe_null())
DBUG_RETURN(HA_ERR_UNSUPPORTED);
table->next_number_field->set_null();
}
DBUG_RETURN(0);
}
}
// ALTER TABLE ... ADD COLUMN ... AUTO_INCREMENT
if (thd->lex->sql_command == SQLCOM_ALTER_TABLE)
table->next_number_field->set_notnull();
if ((nr= next_insert_id) >= auto_inc_interval_for_cur_row.maximum())
{
/* next_insert_id is beyond what is reserved, so we reserve more. */
const Discrete_interval *forced=
thd->auto_inc_intervals_forced.get_next();
if (forced != NULL)
{
nr= forced->minimum();
nb_reserved_values= forced->values();
}
else
{
/*
handler::estimation_rows_to_insert was set by
handler::ha_start_bulk_insert(); if 0 it means "unknown".
*/
ulonglong nb_desired_values;
/*
If an estimation was given to the engine:
- use it.
- if we already reserved numbers, it means the estimation was
not accurate, then we'll reserve 2*AUTO_INC_DEFAULT_NB_ROWS the 2nd
time, twice that the 3rd time etc.
If no estimation was given, use those increasing defaults from the
start, starting from AUTO_INC_DEFAULT_NB_ROWS.
Don't go beyond a max to not reserve "way too much" (because
reservation means potentially losing unused values).
Note that in prelocked mode no estimation is given.
*/
if ((auto_inc_intervals_count == 0) && (estimation_rows_to_insert > 0))
nb_desired_values= estimation_rows_to_insert;
else if ((auto_inc_intervals_count == 0) &&
(thd->lex->many_values.elements > 0))
{
/*
For multi-row inserts, if the bulk inserts cannot be started, the
handler::estimation_rows_to_insert will not be set. But we still
want to reserve the autoinc values.
*/
nb_desired_values= thd->lex->many_values.elements;
}
else /* go with the increasing defaults */
{
/* avoid overflow in formula, with this if() */
if (auto_inc_intervals_count <= AUTO_INC_DEFAULT_NB_MAX_BITS)
{
nb_desired_values= AUTO_INC_DEFAULT_NB_ROWS *
(1 << auto_inc_intervals_count);
set_if_smaller(nb_desired_values, AUTO_INC_DEFAULT_NB_MAX);
}
else
nb_desired_values= AUTO_INC_DEFAULT_NB_MAX;
}
get_auto_increment(variables->auto_increment_offset,
variables->auto_increment_increment,
nb_desired_values, &nr,
&nb_reserved_values);
if (nr == ULONGLONG_MAX)
DBUG_RETURN(HA_ERR_AUTOINC_READ_FAILED); // Mark failure
/*
That rounding below should not be needed when all engines actually
respect offset and increment in get_auto_increment(). But they don't
so we still do it. Wonder if for the not-first-in-index we should do
it. Hope that this rounding didn't push us out of the interval; even
if it did we cannot do anything about it (calling the engine again
will not help as we inserted no row).
*/
nr= compute_next_insert_id(nr-1, variables);
}
if (table->s->next_number_keypart == 0)
{
/* We must defer the appending until "nr" has been possibly truncated */
append= TRUE;
}
else
{
/*
For such auto_increment there is no notion of interval, just a
singleton. The interval is not even stored in
thd->auto_inc_interval_for_cur_row, so we are sure to call the engine
for next row.
*/
DBUG_PRINT("info",("auto_increment: special not-first-in-index"));
}
}
if (unlikely(nr == ULONGLONG_MAX))
DBUG_RETURN(HA_ERR_AUTOINC_ERANGE);
DBUG_ASSERT(nr != 0);
DBUG_PRINT("info",("auto_increment: %llu nb_reserved_values: %llu",
nr, append ? nb_reserved_values : 0));
/* Store field without warning (Warning will be printed by insert) */
{
Check_level_instant_set check_level_save(thd, CHECK_FIELD_IGNORE);
tmp= table->next_number_field->store((longlong)nr, TRUE);
}
if (unlikely(tmp)) // Out of range value in store
{
/*
First, test if the query was aborted due to strict mode constraints
or new field value greater than maximum integer value:
*/
if (thd->killed == KILL_BAD_DATA ||
nr > table->next_number_field->get_max_int_value())
{
/*
It's better to return an error here than getting a confusing
'duplicate key error' later.
*/
result= HA_ERR_AUTOINC_ERANGE;
}
else
{
/*
Field refused this value (overflow) and truncated it, use the result
of the truncation (which is going to be inserted); however we try to
decrease it to honour auto_increment_* variables.
That will shift the left bound of the reserved interval, we don't
bother shifting the right bound (anyway any other value from this
interval will cause a duplicate key).
*/
nr= prev_insert_id(table->next_number_field->val_int(), variables);
if (unlikely(table->next_number_field->store((longlong)nr, TRUE)))
nr= table->next_number_field->val_int();
}
}
if (append)
{
auto_inc_interval_for_cur_row.replace(nr, nb_reserved_values,
variables->auto_increment_increment);
auto_inc_intervals_count++;
/* Row-based replication does not need to store intervals in binlog */
if (((WSREP(thd) && wsrep_emulate_bin_log ) || mysql_bin_log.is_open())
&& !thd->is_current_stmt_binlog_format_row())
thd->auto_inc_intervals_in_cur_stmt_for_binlog.
append(auto_inc_interval_for_cur_row.minimum(),
auto_inc_interval_for_cur_row.values(),
variables->auto_increment_increment);
}
/*
Record this autogenerated value. If the caller then
succeeds to insert this value, it will call
record_first_successful_insert_id_in_cur_stmt()
which will set first_successful_insert_id_in_cur_stmt if it's not
already set.
*/
insert_id_for_cur_row= nr;
if (result) // overflow
DBUG_RETURN(result);
/*
Set next insert id to point to next auto-increment value to be able to
handle multi-row statements.
*/
set_next_insert_id(compute_next_insert_id(nr, variables));
DBUG_RETURN(0);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | server | af810407f78b7f792a9bb8c47c8c532eb3b3a758 | 258,659,387,207,523,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 226 | MDEV-28098 incorrect key in "dup value" error after long unique
reset errkey after using it, so that it wouldn't affect
the next error message in the next statement |
int vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
struct drm_file *file_priv)
{
struct vmw_private *dev_priv = vmw_priv(dev);
struct vmw_user_surface *user_srf;
struct vmw_surface *srf;
struct vmw_resource *res;
struct vmw_resource *tmp;
union drm_vmw_gb_surface_create_arg *arg =
(union drm_vmw_gb_surface_create_arg *)data;
struct drm_vmw_gb_surface_create_req *req = &arg->req;
struct drm_vmw_gb_surface_create_rep *rep = &arg->rep;
struct ttm_object_file *tfile = vmw_fpriv(file_priv)->tfile;
int ret;
uint32_t size;
uint32_t backup_handle;
if (req->multisample_count != 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (req->mip_levels > DRM_VMW_MAX_MIP_LEVELS)
return -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(vmw_user_surface_size == 0))
vmw_user_surface_size = ttm_round_pot(sizeof(*user_srf)) +
128;
size = vmw_user_surface_size + 128;
/* Define a surface based on the parameters. */
ret = vmw_surface_gb_priv_define(dev,
size,
req->svga3d_flags,
req->format,
req->drm_surface_flags & drm_vmw_surface_flag_scanout,
req->mip_levels,
req->multisample_count,
req->array_size,
req->base_size,
&srf);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
return ret;
user_srf = container_of(srf, struct vmw_user_surface, srf);
if (drm_is_primary_client(file_priv))
user_srf->master = drm_master_get(file_priv->master);
ret = ttm_read_lock(&dev_priv->reservation_sem, true);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
return ret;
res = &user_srf->srf.res;
if (req->buffer_handle != SVGA3D_INVALID_ID) {
ret = vmw_user_dmabuf_lookup(tfile, req->buffer_handle,
&res->backup,
&user_srf->backup_base);
if (ret == 0 && res->backup->base.num_pages * PAGE_SIZE <
res->backup_size) {
DRM_ERROR("Surface backup buffer is too small.\n");
vmw_dmabuf_unreference(&res->backup);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
} else if (req->drm_surface_flags & drm_vmw_surface_flag_create_buffer)
ret = vmw_user_dmabuf_alloc(dev_priv, tfile,
res->backup_size,
req->drm_surface_flags &
drm_vmw_surface_flag_shareable,
&backup_handle,
&res->backup,
&user_srf->backup_base);
if (unlikely(ret != 0)) {
vmw_resource_unreference(&res);
goto out_unlock;
}
tmp = vmw_resource_reference(res);
ret = ttm_prime_object_init(tfile, res->backup_size, &user_srf->prime,
req->drm_surface_flags &
drm_vmw_surface_flag_shareable,
VMW_RES_SURFACE,
&vmw_user_surface_base_release, NULL);
if (unlikely(ret != 0)) {
vmw_resource_unreference(&tmp);
vmw_resource_unreference(&res);
goto out_unlock;
}
rep->handle = user_srf->prime.base.hash.key;
rep->backup_size = res->backup_size;
if (res->backup) {
rep->buffer_map_handle =
drm_vma_node_offset_addr(&res->backup->base.vma_node);
rep->buffer_size = res->backup->base.num_pages * PAGE_SIZE;
rep->buffer_handle = backup_handle;
} else {
rep->buffer_map_handle = 0;
rep->buffer_size = 0;
rep->buffer_handle = SVGA3D_INVALID_ID;
}
vmw_resource_unreference(&res);
out_unlock:
ttm_read_unlock(&dev_priv->reservation_sem);
return ret;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux | 07678eca2cf9c9a18584e546c2b2a0d0c9a3150c | 329,068,265,810,383,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 111 | drm/vmwgfx: Make sure backup_handle is always valid
When vmw_gb_surface_define_ioctl() is called with an existing buffer,
we end up returning an uninitialized variable in the backup_handle.
The fix is to first initialize backup_handle to 0 just to be sure, and
second, when a user-provided buffer is found, we will use the
req->buffer_handle as the backup_handle.
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Murray McAllister <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sinclair Yeh <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Deepak Rawat <[email protected]> |
static int imap_msg_open_new(struct Context *ctx, struct Message *msg, struct Header *hdr)
{
char tmp[PATH_MAX];
mutt_mktemp(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
msg->fp = mutt_file_fopen(tmp, "w");
if (!msg->fp)
{
mutt_perror(tmp);
return -1;
}
msg->path = mutt_str_strdup(tmp);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-78",
"CWE-77"
] | neomutt | 95e80bf9ff10f68cb6443f760b85df4117cb15eb | 208,363,579,858,639,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | Quote path in imap_subscribe |
int get_num_images(char *imgdirpath)
{
DIR *dir;
struct dirent* content;
int num_images = 0;
/*Reading the input images from given input directory*/
dir = opendir(imgdirpath);
if (!dir) {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not open Folder %s\n", imgdirpath);
return 0;
}
while ((content = readdir(dir)) != NULL) {
if (strcmp(".", content->d_name) == 0 || strcmp("..", content->d_name) == 0) {
continue;
}
num_images++;
}
closedir(dir);
return num_images;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-824"
] | openjpeg | 0afbdcf3e6d0d2bd2e16a0c4d513ee3cf86e460d | 273,955,909,069,617,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 | Fix segfault in src/bin/jp2/opj_decompress.c due to uninitialized pointer (fixes #1368) (#1369) |
bool attemptToParseGenericExpression(ParseContext* parseCtx,
const FieldPath& path,
const BSONObj& subObj,
ProjectionPathASTNode* parent) {
if (!Expression::isExpressionName(subObj.firstElementFieldNameStringData())) {
return false;
}
// It must be an expression.
verifyComputedFieldsAllowed(parseCtx->policies);
const bool isMeta = subObj.firstElementFieldNameStringData() == "$meta";
uassert(31252,
"Cannot use expression other than $meta in exclusion projection",
!parseCtx->type || *parseCtx->type == ProjectType::kInclusion || isMeta);
if (!isMeta) {
parseCtx->type = ProjectType::kInclusion;
}
auto expr = Expression::parseExpression(
parseCtx->expCtx.get(), subObj, parseCtx->expCtx->variablesParseState);
addNodeAtPath(parent, path, std::make_unique<ExpressionASTNode>(expr));
parseCtx->hasMeta = parseCtx->hasMeta || isMeta;
return true;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-732"
] | mongo | cd583b6c4d8aa2364f255992708b9bb54e110cf4 | 83,619,272,104,887,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 | SERVER-53929 Add stricter parser checks around positional projection |
vhost_user_check_and_alloc_queue_pair(struct virtio_net *dev,
struct VhostUserMsg *msg)
{
uint16_t vring_idx;
switch (msg->request.master) {
case VHOST_USER_SET_VRING_KICK:
case VHOST_USER_SET_VRING_CALL:
case VHOST_USER_SET_VRING_ERR:
vring_idx = msg->payload.u64 & VHOST_USER_VRING_IDX_MASK;
break;
case VHOST_USER_SET_VRING_NUM:
case VHOST_USER_SET_VRING_BASE:
case VHOST_USER_SET_VRING_ENABLE:
vring_idx = msg->payload.state.index;
break;
case VHOST_USER_SET_VRING_ADDR:
vring_idx = msg->payload.addr.index;
break;
default:
return 0;
}
if (vring_idx >= VHOST_MAX_VRING) {
RTE_LOG(ERR, VHOST_CONFIG,
"invalid vring index: %u\n", vring_idx);
return -1;
}
if (dev->virtqueue[vring_idx])
return 0;
return alloc_vring_queue(dev, vring_idx);
} | 0 | [] | dpdk | 612e17cf6d7b2bf05a687d8a9ba7be582a744e50 | 79,247,182,918,343,010,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 | vhost: fix possible denial of service on SET_VRING_NUM
vhost_user_set_vring_num() performs multiple allocations
without checking whether data were previously allocated.
It may cause a denial of service because of the memory leaks
that happen if a malicious vhost-user master keeps sending
VHOST_USER_SET_VRING_NUM request until the slave runs out
of memory.
This issue has been assigned CVE-2019-14818
Fixes: b0a985d1f340 ("vhost: add dequeue zero copy")
Reported-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Maxime Coquelin <[email protected]> |
bool Aggregator_distinct::unique_walk_function(void *element)
{
memcpy(table->field[0]->ptr, element, tree_key_length);
item_sum->add();
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-120"
] | server | eca207c46293bc72dd8d0d5622153fab4d3fccf1 | 147,894,728,546,462,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | MDEV-25317 Assertion `scale <= precision' failed in decimal_bin_size And Assertion `scale >= 0 && precision > 0 && scale <= precision' failed in decimal_bin_size_inline/decimal_bin_size.
Precision should be kept below DECIMAL_MAX_SCALE for computations.
It can be bigger in Item_decimal. I'd fix this too but it changes the
existing behaviour so problemmatic to ix. |
static int parse_group (BUFFER *buf, BUFFER *s, unsigned long data, BUFFER *err)
{
group_context_t *gc = NULL;
group_state_t state = NONE;
ADDRESS *addr = NULL;
char *estr = NULL;
do
{
mutt_extract_token (buf, s, 0);
if (parse_group_context (&gc, buf, s, data, err) == -1)
goto bail;
if (data == M_UNGROUP && !mutt_strcasecmp (buf->data, "*"))
{
if (mutt_group_context_clear (&gc) < 0)
goto bail;
goto out;
}
if (!mutt_strcasecmp (buf->data, "-rx"))
state = RX;
else if (!mutt_strcasecmp (buf->data, "-addr"))
state = ADDR;
else
{
switch (state)
{
case NONE:
snprintf (err->data, err->dsize, _("%sgroup: missing -rx or -addr."),
data == M_UNGROUP ? "un" : "");
goto bail;
case RX:
if (data == M_GROUP &&
mutt_group_context_add_rx (gc, buf->data, REG_ICASE, err) != 0)
goto bail;
else if (data == M_UNGROUP &&
mutt_group_context_remove_rx (gc, buf->data) < 0)
goto bail;
break;
case ADDR:
if ((addr = mutt_parse_adrlist (NULL, buf->data)) == NULL)
goto bail;
if (mutt_addrlist_to_idna (addr, &estr))
{
snprintf (err->data, err->dsize, _("%sgroup: warning: bad IDN '%s'.\n"),
data == 1 ? "un" : "", estr);
goto bail;
}
if (data == M_GROUP)
mutt_group_context_add_adrlist (gc, addr);
else if (data == M_UNGROUP)
mutt_group_context_remove_adrlist (gc, addr);
rfc822_free_address (&addr);
break;
}
}
} while (MoreArgs (s));
out:
mutt_group_context_destroy (&gc);
return 0;
bail:
mutt_group_context_destroy (&gc);
return -1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-668"
] | mutt | 6d0624411a979e2e1d76af4dd97d03f47679ea4a | 141,544,472,597,941,510,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 69 | use a 64-bit random value in temporary filenames.
closes #3158 |
msdos_type_find (GstTypeFind * tf, gpointer unused)
{
const guint8 *data = gst_type_find_peek (tf, 0, 64);
if (data && data[0] == 'M' && data[1] == 'Z' &&
GST_READ_UINT16_LE (data + 8) == 4) {
guint32 pe_offset = GST_READ_UINT32_LE (data + 60);
data = gst_type_find_peek (tf, pe_offset, 2);
if (data && data[0] == 'P' && data[1] == 'E') {
gst_type_find_suggest (tf, GST_TYPE_FIND_NEARLY_CERTAIN, MSDOS_CAPS);
}
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | gst-plugins-base | 2fdccfd64fc609e44e9c4b8eed5bfdc0ab9c9095 | 149,458,636,014,801,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | typefind: bounds check windows ico detection
Fixes out of bounds read
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=774902 |
CImg<T>& object3dtoCImg3d(const bool full_check=true) {
return get_object3dtoCImg3d(full_check).move_to(*this);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-770"
] | cimg | 619cb58dd90b4e03ac68286c70ed98acbefd1c90 | 286,880,490,153,680,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | CImg<>::load_bmp() and CImg<>::load_pandore(): Check that dimensions encoded in file does not exceed file size. |
static int tar_set(struct task_struct *target,
const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
{
return user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
&target->thread.tar, 0, sizeof(u64));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | linux | c1fa0768a8713b135848f78fd43ffc208d8ded70 | 272,827,821,376,308,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
thread structures. flush_tmregs_to_thread() is indeed guarded by
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM but it might be the case that kernel
was compiled with CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM enabled and ran on
a CPU without TM feature available, thus rendering the execution
of TM instructions that are treated by the CPU as illegal instructions.
The fix is just to add proper checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread()
if CPU has the TM feature before accessing any TM-specific resource,
returning immediately if TM is no available on the CPU. Adding
that checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread() instead of in places
where it is called, like in vsr_get() and vsr_set(), is better because
avoids the same problem cropping up elsewhere.
Cc: [email protected] # v4.13+
Fixes: cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Cyril Bur <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]> |
static void memcpy_to_page(struct page *page, size_t offset, const char *from, size_t len)
{
char *to = kmap_atomic(page);
memcpy(to + offset, from, len);
kunmap_atomic(to);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux | b9dc6f65bc5e232d1c05fe34b5daadc7e8bbf1fb | 76,939,798,761,602,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | fix a fencepost error in pipe_advance()
The logics in pipe_advance() used to release all buffers past the new
position failed in cases when the number of buffers to release was equal
to pipe->buffers. If that happened, none of them had been released,
leaving pipe full. Worse, it was trivial to trigger and we end up with
pipe full of uninitialized pages. IOW, it's an infoleak.
Cc: [email protected] # v4.9
Reported-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <[email protected]>
Tested-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> |
coolkey_v1_get_attribute_record_len(const u8 *attr, size_t buf_len)
{
size_t attribute_len = sizeof(coolkey_attribute_header_t);
size_t len = 0;
int r;
r = coolkey_v1_get_attribute_len(attr, buf_len, &len, 1);
if (r < 0) {
return buf_len; /* skip to the end, ignore the rest of the record */
}
return MIN(buf_len,attribute_len+len);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-415"
] | OpenSC | c246f6f69a749d4f68626b40795a4f69168008f4 | 10,644,714,771,748,371,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | coolkey: Make sure the object ID is unique when filling list
Thanks to oss-fuzz
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=19208 |
void http_msg_analyzer(struct http_msg *msg, struct hdr_idx *idx)
{
unsigned int state; /* updated only when leaving the FSM */
register char *ptr, *end; /* request pointers, to avoid dereferences */
struct buffer *buf;
state = msg->msg_state;
buf = msg->chn->buf;
ptr = buf->p + msg->next;
end = buf->p + buf->i;
if (unlikely(ptr >= end))
goto http_msg_ood;
switch (state) {
/*
* First, states that are specific to the response only.
* We check them first so that request and headers are
* closer to each other (accessed more often).
*/
case HTTP_MSG_RPBEFORE:
http_msg_rpbefore:
if (likely(HTTP_IS_TOKEN(*ptr))) {
/* we have a start of message, but we have to check
* first if we need to remove some CRLF. We can only
* do this when o=0.
*/
if (unlikely(ptr != buf->p)) {
if (buf->o)
goto http_msg_ood;
/* Remove empty leading lines, as recommended by RFC2616. */
bi_fast_delete(buf, ptr - buf->p);
}
msg->sol = 0;
msg->sl.st.l = 0; /* used in debug mode */
hdr_idx_init(idx);
state = HTTP_MSG_RPVER;
goto http_msg_rpver;
}
if (unlikely(!HTTP_IS_CRLF(*ptr)))
goto http_msg_invalid;
if (unlikely(*ptr == '\n'))
EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(http_msg_rpbefore, HTTP_MSG_RPBEFORE);
EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(http_msg_rpbefore_cr, HTTP_MSG_RPBEFORE_CR);
/* stop here */
case HTTP_MSG_RPBEFORE_CR:
http_msg_rpbefore_cr:
EXPECT_LF_HERE(ptr, http_msg_invalid);
EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(http_msg_rpbefore, HTTP_MSG_RPBEFORE);
/* stop here */
case HTTP_MSG_RPVER:
http_msg_rpver:
case HTTP_MSG_RPVER_SP:
case HTTP_MSG_RPCODE:
case HTTP_MSG_RPCODE_SP:
case HTTP_MSG_RPREASON:
ptr = (char *)http_parse_stsline(msg,
state, ptr, end,
&msg->next, &msg->msg_state);
if (unlikely(!ptr))
return;
/* we have a full response and we know that we have either a CR
* or an LF at <ptr>.
*/
hdr_idx_set_start(idx, msg->sl.st.l, *ptr == '\r');
msg->sol = ptr - buf->p;
if (likely(*ptr == '\r'))
EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(http_msg_rpline_end, HTTP_MSG_RPLINE_END);
goto http_msg_rpline_end;
case HTTP_MSG_RPLINE_END:
http_msg_rpline_end:
/* msg->sol must point to the first of CR or LF. */
EXPECT_LF_HERE(ptr, http_msg_invalid);
EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(http_msg_hdr_first, HTTP_MSG_HDR_FIRST);
/* stop here */
/*
* Second, states that are specific to the request only
*/
case HTTP_MSG_RQBEFORE:
http_msg_rqbefore:
if (likely(HTTP_IS_TOKEN(*ptr))) {
/* we have a start of message, but we have to check
* first if we need to remove some CRLF. We can only
* do this when o=0.
*/
if (likely(ptr != buf->p)) {
if (buf->o)
goto http_msg_ood;
/* Remove empty leading lines, as recommended by RFC2616. */
bi_fast_delete(buf, ptr - buf->p);
}
msg->sol = 0;
msg->sl.rq.l = 0; /* used in debug mode */
state = HTTP_MSG_RQMETH;
goto http_msg_rqmeth;
}
if (unlikely(!HTTP_IS_CRLF(*ptr)))
goto http_msg_invalid;
if (unlikely(*ptr == '\n'))
EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(http_msg_rqbefore, HTTP_MSG_RQBEFORE);
EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(http_msg_rqbefore_cr, HTTP_MSG_RQBEFORE_CR);
/* stop here */
case HTTP_MSG_RQBEFORE_CR:
http_msg_rqbefore_cr:
EXPECT_LF_HERE(ptr, http_msg_invalid);
EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(http_msg_rqbefore, HTTP_MSG_RQBEFORE);
/* stop here */
case HTTP_MSG_RQMETH:
http_msg_rqmeth:
case HTTP_MSG_RQMETH_SP:
case HTTP_MSG_RQURI:
case HTTP_MSG_RQURI_SP:
case HTTP_MSG_RQVER:
ptr = (char *)http_parse_reqline(msg,
state, ptr, end,
&msg->next, &msg->msg_state);
if (unlikely(!ptr))
return;
/* we have a full request and we know that we have either a CR
* or an LF at <ptr>.
*/
hdr_idx_set_start(idx, msg->sl.rq.l, *ptr == '\r');
msg->sol = ptr - buf->p;
if (likely(*ptr == '\r'))
EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(http_msg_rqline_end, HTTP_MSG_RQLINE_END);
goto http_msg_rqline_end;
case HTTP_MSG_RQLINE_END:
http_msg_rqline_end:
/* check for HTTP/0.9 request : no version information available.
* msg->sol must point to the first of CR or LF.
*/
if (unlikely(msg->sl.rq.v_l == 0))
goto http_msg_last_lf;
EXPECT_LF_HERE(ptr, http_msg_invalid);
EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(http_msg_hdr_first, HTTP_MSG_HDR_FIRST);
/* stop here */
/*
* Common states below
*/
case HTTP_MSG_HDR_FIRST:
http_msg_hdr_first:
msg->sol = ptr - buf->p;
if (likely(!HTTP_IS_CRLF(*ptr))) {
goto http_msg_hdr_name;
}
if (likely(*ptr == '\r'))
EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(http_msg_last_lf, HTTP_MSG_LAST_LF);
goto http_msg_last_lf;
case HTTP_MSG_HDR_NAME:
http_msg_hdr_name:
/* assumes msg->sol points to the first char */
if (likely(HTTP_IS_TOKEN(*ptr)))
EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(http_msg_hdr_name, HTTP_MSG_HDR_NAME);
if (likely(*ptr == ':'))
EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(http_msg_hdr_l1_sp, HTTP_MSG_HDR_L1_SP);
if (likely(msg->err_pos < -1) || *ptr == '\n')
goto http_msg_invalid;
if (msg->err_pos == -1) /* capture error pointer */
msg->err_pos = ptr - buf->p; /* >= 0 now */
/* and we still accept this non-token character */
EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(http_msg_hdr_name, HTTP_MSG_HDR_NAME);
case HTTP_MSG_HDR_L1_SP:
http_msg_hdr_l1_sp:
/* assumes msg->sol points to the first char */
if (likely(HTTP_IS_SPHT(*ptr)))
EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(http_msg_hdr_l1_sp, HTTP_MSG_HDR_L1_SP);
/* header value can be basically anything except CR/LF */
msg->sov = ptr - buf->p;
if (likely(!HTTP_IS_CRLF(*ptr))) {
goto http_msg_hdr_val;
}
if (likely(*ptr == '\r'))
EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(http_msg_hdr_l1_lf, HTTP_MSG_HDR_L1_LF);
goto http_msg_hdr_l1_lf;
case HTTP_MSG_HDR_L1_LF:
http_msg_hdr_l1_lf:
EXPECT_LF_HERE(ptr, http_msg_invalid);
EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(http_msg_hdr_l1_lws, HTTP_MSG_HDR_L1_LWS);
case HTTP_MSG_HDR_L1_LWS:
http_msg_hdr_l1_lws:
if (likely(HTTP_IS_SPHT(*ptr))) {
/* replace HT,CR,LF with spaces */
for (; buf->p + msg->sov < ptr; msg->sov++)
buf->p[msg->sov] = ' ';
goto http_msg_hdr_l1_sp;
}
/* we had a header consisting only in spaces ! */
msg->eol = msg->sov;
goto http_msg_complete_header;
case HTTP_MSG_HDR_VAL:
http_msg_hdr_val:
/* assumes msg->sol points to the first char, and msg->sov
* points to the first character of the value.
*/
if (likely(!HTTP_IS_CRLF(*ptr)))
EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(http_msg_hdr_val, HTTP_MSG_HDR_VAL);
msg->eol = ptr - buf->p;
/* Note: we could also copy eol into ->eoh so that we have the
* real header end in case it ends with lots of LWS, but is this
* really needed ?
*/
if (likely(*ptr == '\r'))
EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(http_msg_hdr_l2_lf, HTTP_MSG_HDR_L2_LF);
goto http_msg_hdr_l2_lf;
case HTTP_MSG_HDR_L2_LF:
http_msg_hdr_l2_lf:
EXPECT_LF_HERE(ptr, http_msg_invalid);
EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(http_msg_hdr_l2_lws, HTTP_MSG_HDR_L2_LWS);
case HTTP_MSG_HDR_L2_LWS:
http_msg_hdr_l2_lws:
if (unlikely(HTTP_IS_SPHT(*ptr))) {
/* LWS: replace HT,CR,LF with spaces */
for (; buf->p + msg->eol < ptr; msg->eol++)
buf->p[msg->eol] = ' ';
goto http_msg_hdr_val;
}
http_msg_complete_header:
/*
* It was a new header, so the last one is finished.
* Assumes msg->sol points to the first char, msg->sov points
* to the first character of the value and msg->eol to the
* first CR or LF so we know how the line ends. We insert last
* header into the index.
*/
if (unlikely(hdr_idx_add(msg->eol - msg->sol, buf->p[msg->eol] == '\r',
idx, idx->tail) < 0))
goto http_msg_invalid;
msg->sol = ptr - buf->p;
if (likely(!HTTP_IS_CRLF(*ptr))) {
goto http_msg_hdr_name;
}
if (likely(*ptr == '\r'))
EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(http_msg_last_lf, HTTP_MSG_LAST_LF);
goto http_msg_last_lf;
case HTTP_MSG_LAST_LF:
http_msg_last_lf:
/* Assumes msg->sol points to the first of either CR or LF */
EXPECT_LF_HERE(ptr, http_msg_invalid);
ptr++;
msg->sov = msg->next = ptr - buf->p;
msg->eoh = msg->sol;
msg->sol = 0;
msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_BODY;
return;
case HTTP_MSG_ERROR:
/* this may only happen if we call http_msg_analyser() twice with an error */
break;
#ifdef DEBUG_FULL
default:
fprintf(stderr, "FIXME !!!! impossible state at %s:%d = %d\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, state);
exit(1);
#endif
}
http_msg_ood:
/* out of data */
msg->msg_state = state;
msg->next = ptr - buf->p;
return;
http_msg_invalid:
/* invalid message */
msg->msg_state = HTTP_MSG_ERROR;
msg->next = ptr - buf->p;
return;
} | 0 | [] | haproxy | aae75e3279c6c9bd136413a72dafdcd4986bb89a | 149,236,183,715,031,890,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 303 | BUG/CRITICAL: using HTTP information in tcp-request content may crash the process
During normal HTTP request processing, request buffers are realigned if
there are less than global.maxrewrite bytes available after them, in
order to leave enough room for rewriting headers after the request. This
is done in http_wait_for_request().
However, if some HTTP inspection happens during a "tcp-request content"
rule, this realignment is not performed. In theory this is not a problem
because empty buffers are always aligned and TCP inspection happens at
the beginning of a connection. But with HTTP keep-alive, it also happens
at the beginning of each subsequent request. So if a second request was
pipelined by the client before the first one had a chance to be forwarded,
the second request will not be realigned. Then, http_wait_for_request()
will not perform such a realignment either because the request was
already parsed and marked as such. The consequence of this, is that the
rewrite of a sufficient number of such pipelined, unaligned requests may
leave less room past the request been processed than the configured
reserve, which can lead to a buffer overflow if request processing appends
some data past the end of the buffer.
A number of conditions are required for the bug to be triggered :
- HTTP keep-alive must be enabled ;
- HTTP inspection in TCP rules must be used ;
- some request appending rules are needed (reqadd, x-forwarded-for)
- since empty buffers are always realigned, the client must pipeline
enough requests so that the buffer always contains something till
the point where there is no more room for rewriting.
While such a configuration is quite unlikely to be met (which is
confirmed by the bug's lifetime), a few people do use these features
together for very specific usages. And more importantly, writing such
a configuration and the request to attack it is trivial.
A quick workaround consists in forcing keep-alive off by adding
"option httpclose" or "option forceclose" in the frontend. Alternatively,
disabling HTTP-based TCP inspection rules enough if the application
supports it.
At first glance, this bug does not look like it could lead to remote code
execution, as the overflowing part is controlled by the configuration and
not by the user. But some deeper analysis should be performed to confirm
this. And anyway, corrupting the process' memory and crashing it is quite
trivial.
Special thanks go to Yves Lafon from the W3C who reported this bug and
deployed significant efforts to collect the relevant data needed to
understand it in less than one week.
CVE-2013-1912 was assigned to this issue.
Note that 1.4 is also affected so the fix must be backported. |
static int ip_vs_genl_dump_services(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
int idx = 0, i;
int start = cb->args[0];
struct ip_vs_service *svc;
struct net *net = skb_sknet(skb);
mutex_lock(&__ip_vs_mutex);
for (i = 0; i < IP_VS_SVC_TAB_SIZE; i++) {
list_for_each_entry(svc, &ip_vs_svc_table[i], s_list) {
if (++idx <= start || !net_eq(svc->net, net))
continue;
if (ip_vs_genl_dump_service(skb, svc, cb) < 0) {
idx--;
goto nla_put_failure;
}
}
}
for (i = 0; i < IP_VS_SVC_TAB_SIZE; i++) {
list_for_each_entry(svc, &ip_vs_svc_fwm_table[i], f_list) {
if (++idx <= start || !net_eq(svc->net, net))
continue;
if (ip_vs_genl_dump_service(skb, svc, cb) < 0) {
idx--;
goto nla_put_failure;
}
}
}
nla_put_failure:
mutex_unlock(&__ip_vs_mutex);
cb->args[0] = idx;
return skb->len;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux | 2d8a041b7bfe1097af21441cb77d6af95f4f4680 | 158,883,018,532,649,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 | ipvs: fix info leak in getsockopt(IP_VS_SO_GET_TIMEOUT)
If at least one of CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP or CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP is
not set, __ip_vs_get_timeouts() does not fully initialize the structure
that gets copied to userland and that for leaks up to 12 bytes of kernel
stack. Add an explicit memset(0) before passing the structure to
__ip_vs_get_timeouts() to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Wensong Zhang <[email protected]>
Cc: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Cc: Julian Anastasov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
megasas_check_reset_xscale(struct megasas_instance *instance,
struct megasas_register_set __iomem *regs)
{
if ((atomic_read(&instance->adprecovery) != MEGASAS_HBA_OPERATIONAL) &&
(le32_to_cpu(*instance->consumer) ==
MEGASAS_ADPRESET_INPROG_SIGN))
return 1;
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | linux | bcf3b67d16a4c8ffae0aa79de5853435e683945c | 228,841,022,162,675,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> |
static void auth_server_reconnect_timeout(struct auth_server_connection *conn)
{
(void)auth_server_connection_connect(conn);
} | 0 | [] | core | a9b135760aea6d1790d447d351c56b78889dac22 | 196,873,985,221,575,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | lib-auth: Remove request after abort
Otherwise the request will still stay in hash table
and get dereferenced when all requests are aborted
causing an attempt to access free'd memory.
Found by Apollon Oikonomopoulos <[email protected]>
Broken in 1a29ed2f96da1be22fa5a4d96c7583aa81b8b060 |
inline const char* option(const char *const name, const int argc, const char *const *const argv,
const char *const _default, const char *const usage=0) {
return option(name,argc,argv,_default,usage,false);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-770"
] | cimg | 619cb58dd90b4e03ac68286c70ed98acbefd1c90 | 166,778,377,463,787,140,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | CImg<>::load_bmp() and CImg<>::load_pandore(): Check that dimensions encoded in file does not exceed file size. |
x509::~x509()
{
ysArrayDelete(buffer_);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-254"
] | mysql-server | e7061f7e5a96c66cb2e0bf46bec7f6ff35801a69 | 66,102,226,981,302,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Bug #22738607: YASSL FUNCTION X509_NAME_GET_INDEX_BY_NID IS NOT WORKING AS EXPECTED. |
flatpak_context_load_metadata (FlatpakContext *context,
GKeyFile *metakey,
GError **error)
{
gboolean remove;
g_auto(GStrv) groups = NULL;
gsize i;
if (g_key_file_has_key (metakey, FLATPAK_METADATA_GROUP_CONTEXT, FLATPAK_METADATA_KEY_SHARED, NULL))
{
g_auto(GStrv) shares = g_key_file_get_string_list (metakey, FLATPAK_METADATA_GROUP_CONTEXT,
FLATPAK_METADATA_KEY_SHARED, NULL, error);
if (shares == NULL)
return FALSE;
for (i = 0; shares[i] != NULL; i++)
{
FlatpakContextShares share;
share = flatpak_context_share_from_string (parse_negated (shares[i], &remove), NULL);
if (share == 0)
g_debug ("Unknown share type %s", shares[i]);
else
{
if (remove)
flatpak_context_remove_shares (context, share);
else
flatpak_context_add_shares (context, share);
}
}
}
if (g_key_file_has_key (metakey, FLATPAK_METADATA_GROUP_CONTEXT, FLATPAK_METADATA_KEY_SOCKETS, NULL))
{
g_auto(GStrv) sockets = g_key_file_get_string_list (metakey, FLATPAK_METADATA_GROUP_CONTEXT,
FLATPAK_METADATA_KEY_SOCKETS, NULL, error);
if (sockets == NULL)
return FALSE;
for (i = 0; sockets[i] != NULL; i++)
{
FlatpakContextSockets socket = flatpak_context_socket_from_string (parse_negated (sockets[i], &remove), NULL);
if (socket == 0)
g_debug ("Unknown socket type %s", sockets[i]);
else
{
if (remove)
flatpak_context_remove_sockets (context, socket);
else
flatpak_context_add_sockets (context, socket);
}
}
}
if (g_key_file_has_key (metakey, FLATPAK_METADATA_GROUP_CONTEXT, FLATPAK_METADATA_KEY_DEVICES, NULL))
{
g_auto(GStrv) devices = g_key_file_get_string_list (metakey, FLATPAK_METADATA_GROUP_CONTEXT,
FLATPAK_METADATA_KEY_DEVICES, NULL, error);
if (devices == NULL)
return FALSE;
for (i = 0; devices[i] != NULL; i++)
{
FlatpakContextDevices device = flatpak_context_device_from_string (parse_negated (devices[i], &remove), NULL);
if (device == 0)
g_debug ("Unknown device type %s", devices[i]);
else
{
if (remove)
flatpak_context_remove_devices (context, device);
else
flatpak_context_add_devices (context, device);
}
}
}
if (g_key_file_has_key (metakey, FLATPAK_METADATA_GROUP_CONTEXT, FLATPAK_METADATA_KEY_FEATURES, NULL))
{
g_auto(GStrv) features = g_key_file_get_string_list (metakey, FLATPAK_METADATA_GROUP_CONTEXT,
FLATPAK_METADATA_KEY_FEATURES, NULL, error);
if (features == NULL)
return FALSE;
for (i = 0; features[i] != NULL; i++)
{
FlatpakContextFeatures feature = flatpak_context_feature_from_string (parse_negated (features[i], &remove), NULL);
if (feature == 0)
g_debug ("Unknown feature type %s", features[i]);
else
{
if (remove)
flatpak_context_remove_features (context, feature);
else
flatpak_context_add_features (context, feature);
}
}
}
if (g_key_file_has_key (metakey, FLATPAK_METADATA_GROUP_CONTEXT, FLATPAK_METADATA_KEY_FILESYSTEMS, NULL))
{
g_auto(GStrv) filesystems = g_key_file_get_string_list (metakey, FLATPAK_METADATA_GROUP_CONTEXT,
FLATPAK_METADATA_KEY_FILESYSTEMS, NULL, error);
if (filesystems == NULL)
return FALSE;
for (i = 0; filesystems[i] != NULL; i++)
{
const char *fs = parse_negated (filesystems[i], &remove);
g_autofree char *filesystem = NULL;
FlatpakFilesystemMode mode;
if (!flatpak_context_parse_filesystem (fs, &filesystem, &mode, NULL))
g_debug ("Unknown filesystem type %s", filesystems[i]);
else
{
if (remove)
flatpak_context_take_filesystem (context, g_steal_pointer (&filesystem),
FLATPAK_FILESYSTEM_MODE_NONE);
else
flatpak_context_take_filesystem (context, g_steal_pointer (&filesystem), mode);
}
}
}
if (g_key_file_has_key (metakey, FLATPAK_METADATA_GROUP_CONTEXT, FLATPAK_METADATA_KEY_PERSISTENT, NULL))
{
g_auto(GStrv) persistent = g_key_file_get_string_list (metakey, FLATPAK_METADATA_GROUP_CONTEXT,
FLATPAK_METADATA_KEY_PERSISTENT, NULL, error);
if (persistent == NULL)
return FALSE;
for (i = 0; persistent[i] != NULL; i++)
flatpak_context_set_persistent (context, persistent[i]);
}
if (g_key_file_has_group (metakey, FLATPAK_METADATA_GROUP_SESSION_BUS_POLICY))
{
g_auto(GStrv) keys = NULL;
gsize keys_count;
keys = g_key_file_get_keys (metakey, FLATPAK_METADATA_GROUP_SESSION_BUS_POLICY, &keys_count, NULL);
for (i = 0; i < keys_count; i++)
{
const char *key = keys[i];
g_autofree char *value = g_key_file_get_string (metakey, FLATPAK_METADATA_GROUP_SESSION_BUS_POLICY, key, NULL);
FlatpakPolicy policy;
if (!flatpak_verify_dbus_name (key, error))
return FALSE;
policy = flatpak_policy_from_string (value, NULL);
if ((int) policy != -1)
flatpak_context_set_session_bus_policy (context, key, policy);
}
}
if (g_key_file_has_group (metakey, FLATPAK_METADATA_GROUP_SYSTEM_BUS_POLICY))
{
g_auto(GStrv) keys = NULL;
gsize keys_count;
keys = g_key_file_get_keys (metakey, FLATPAK_METADATA_GROUP_SYSTEM_BUS_POLICY, &keys_count, NULL);
for (i = 0; i < keys_count; i++)
{
const char *key = keys[i];
g_autofree char *value = g_key_file_get_string (metakey, FLATPAK_METADATA_GROUP_SYSTEM_BUS_POLICY, key, NULL);
FlatpakPolicy policy;
if (!flatpak_verify_dbus_name (key, error))
return FALSE;
policy = flatpak_policy_from_string (value, NULL);
if ((int) policy != -1)
flatpak_context_set_system_bus_policy (context, key, policy);
}
}
if (g_key_file_has_group (metakey, FLATPAK_METADATA_GROUP_ENVIRONMENT))
{
g_auto(GStrv) keys = NULL;
gsize keys_count;
keys = g_key_file_get_keys (metakey, FLATPAK_METADATA_GROUP_ENVIRONMENT, &keys_count, NULL);
for (i = 0; i < keys_count; i++)
{
const char *key = keys[i];
g_autofree char *value = g_key_file_get_string (metakey, FLATPAK_METADATA_GROUP_ENVIRONMENT, key, NULL);
flatpak_context_set_env_var (context, key, value);
}
}
/* unset-environment is higher precedence than Environment, so that
* we can put unset keys in both places. Old versions of Flatpak will
* interpret the empty string as unset; new versions will obey
* unset-environment. */
if (g_key_file_has_key (metakey, FLATPAK_METADATA_GROUP_CONTEXT, FLATPAK_METADATA_KEY_UNSET_ENVIRONMENT, NULL))
{
g_auto(GStrv) vars = NULL;
gsize vars_count;
vars = g_key_file_get_string_list (metakey, FLATPAK_METADATA_GROUP_CONTEXT,
FLATPAK_METADATA_KEY_UNSET_ENVIRONMENT,
&vars_count, error);
if (vars == NULL)
return FALSE;
for (i = 0; i < vars_count; i++)
{
const char *var = vars[i];
flatpak_context_set_env_var (context, var, NULL);
}
}
groups = g_key_file_get_groups (metakey, NULL);
for (i = 0; groups[i] != NULL; i++)
{
const char *group = groups[i];
const char *subsystem;
int j;
if (g_str_has_prefix (group, FLATPAK_METADATA_GROUP_PREFIX_POLICY))
{
g_auto(GStrv) keys = NULL;
subsystem = group + strlen (FLATPAK_METADATA_GROUP_PREFIX_POLICY);
keys = g_key_file_get_keys (metakey, group, NULL, NULL);
for (j = 0; keys != NULL && keys[j] != NULL; j++)
{
const char *key = keys[j];
g_autofree char *policy_key = g_strdup_printf ("%s.%s", subsystem, key);
g_auto(GStrv) values = NULL;
int k;
values = g_key_file_get_string_list (metakey, group, key, NULL, NULL);
for (k = 0; values != NULL && values[k] != NULL; k++)
flatpak_context_apply_generic_policy (context, policy_key,
values[k]);
}
}
}
return TRUE;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-74"
] | flatpak | 4108e022452303093d8b90c838695a0476cb09c7 | 204,720,100,094,647,120,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 247 | context: Add --unset-env option and a corresponding override
This follows up from GHSA-4ppf-fxf6-vxg2 to fix missing functionality
that I noticed while resolving that vulnerability, but is not required
for fixing the vulnerability.
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <[email protected]> |
//! Append two images along specified axis \specialization.
CImg<T> get_append(const CImg<T>& img, const char axis='x', const float align=0) const {
if (is_empty()) return +img;
if (!img) return +*this;
return CImgList<T>(*this,img,true).get_append(axis,align); | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CImg | 10af1e8c1ad2a58a0a3342a856bae63e8f257abb | 1,890,860,671,912,762,700,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | Fix other issues in 'CImg<T>::load_bmp()'. |
void mysql_read_default_options(struct st_mysql_options *options,
const char *filename,const char *group)
{
int argc;
char *argv_buff[1],**argv;
const char *groups[5];
DBUG_ENTER("mysql_read_default_options");
DBUG_PRINT("enter",("file: %s group: %s",filename,group ? group :"NULL"));
compile_time_assert(OPT_keep_this_one_last ==
array_elements(default_options));
argc=1; argv=argv_buff; argv_buff[0]= (char*) "client";
groups[0]= (char*) "client";
groups[1]= (char*) "client-server";
groups[2]= (char*) "client-mariadb";
groups[3]= (char*) group;
groups[4]=0;
my_load_defaults(filename, groups, &argc, &argv, NULL);
if (argc != 1) /* If some default option */
{
char **option=argv;
while (*++option)
{
if (my_getopt_is_args_separator(option[0])) /* skip arguments separator */
continue;
/* DBUG_PRINT("info",("option: %s",option[0])); */
if (option[0][0] == '-' && option[0][1] == '-')
{
char *end=strcend(*option,'=');
char *opt_arg=0;
if (*end)
{
opt_arg=end+1;
*end=0; /* Remove '=' */
}
/* Change all '_' in variable name to '-' */
for (end= *option ; *(end= strcend(end,'_')) ; )
*end= '-';
switch (find_type(*option + 2, &option_types, FIND_TYPE_BASIC)) {
case OPT_port:
if (opt_arg)
options->port=atoi(opt_arg);
break;
case OPT_socket:
if (opt_arg)
{
my_free(options->unix_socket);
options->unix_socket=my_strdup(opt_arg,MYF(MY_WME));
}
break;
case OPT_compress:
options->compress=1;
options->client_flag|= CLIENT_COMPRESS;
break;
case OPT_password:
if (opt_arg)
{
my_free(options->password);
options->password=my_strdup(opt_arg,MYF(MY_WME));
}
break;
case OPT_pipe:
options->protocol = MYSQL_PROTOCOL_PIPE;
break;
case OPT_connect_timeout:
case OPT_timeout:
if (opt_arg)
options->connect_timeout=atoi(opt_arg);
break;
case OPT_user:
if (opt_arg)
{
my_free(options->user);
options->user=my_strdup(opt_arg,MYF(MY_WME));
}
break;
case OPT_init_command:
add_init_command(options,opt_arg);
break;
case OPT_host:
if (opt_arg)
{
my_free(options->host);
options->host=my_strdup(opt_arg,MYF(MY_WME));
}
break;
case OPT_database:
if (opt_arg)
{
my_free(options->db);
options->db=my_strdup(opt_arg,MYF(MY_WME));
}
break;
case OPT_debug:
#ifdef MYSQL_CLIENT
mysql_debug(opt_arg ? opt_arg : "d:t:o,/tmp/client.trace");
break;
#endif
case OPT_return_found_rows:
options->client_flag|=CLIENT_FOUND_ROWS;
break;
#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL) && !defined(EMBEDDED_LIBRARY)
case OPT_ssl_key:
my_free(options->ssl_key);
options->ssl_key = my_strdup(opt_arg, MYF(MY_WME));
break;
case OPT_ssl_cert:
my_free(options->ssl_cert);
options->ssl_cert = my_strdup(opt_arg, MYF(MY_WME));
break;
case OPT_ssl_ca:
my_free(options->ssl_ca);
options->ssl_ca = my_strdup(opt_arg, MYF(MY_WME));
break;
case OPT_ssl_capath:
my_free(options->ssl_capath);
options->ssl_capath = my_strdup(opt_arg, MYF(MY_WME));
break;
case OPT_ssl_cipher:
my_free(options->ssl_cipher);
options->ssl_cipher= my_strdup(opt_arg, MYF(MY_WME));
break;
#else
case OPT_ssl_key:
case OPT_ssl_cert:
case OPT_ssl_ca:
case OPT_ssl_capath:
case OPT_ssl_cipher:
break;
#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL && !EMBEDDED_LIBRARY */
case OPT_character_sets_dir:
my_free(options->charset_dir);
options->charset_dir = my_strdup(opt_arg, MYF(MY_WME));
break;
case OPT_default_character_set:
my_free(options->charset_name);
options->charset_name = my_strdup(opt_arg, MYF(MY_WME));
break;
case OPT_interactive_timeout:
options->client_flag|= CLIENT_INTERACTIVE;
break;
case OPT_local_infile:
if (!opt_arg || atoi(opt_arg) != 0)
options->client_flag|= CLIENT_LOCAL_FILES;
else
options->client_flag&= ~CLIENT_LOCAL_FILES;
break;
case OPT_disable_local_infile:
options->client_flag&= ~CLIENT_LOCAL_FILES;
break;
case OPT_max_allowed_packet:
if (opt_arg)
options->max_allowed_packet= atoi(opt_arg);
break;
case OPT_protocol:
if ((options->protocol= find_type(opt_arg, &sql_protocol_typelib,
FIND_TYPE_BASIC)) <= 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown option to protocol: %s\n", opt_arg);
exit(1);
}
break;
case OPT_shared_memory_base_name:
#ifdef HAVE_SMEM
if (options->shared_memory_base_name != def_shared_memory_base_name)
my_free(options->shared_memory_base_name);
options->shared_memory_base_name=my_strdup(opt_arg,MYF(MY_WME));
#endif
break;
case OPT_multi_results:
options->client_flag|= CLIENT_MULTI_RESULTS;
break;
case OPT_multi_statements:
case OPT_multi_queries:
options->client_flag|= CLIENT_MULTI_STATEMENTS | CLIENT_MULTI_RESULTS;
break;
case OPT_secure_auth:
options->secure_auth= TRUE;
break;
case OPT_report_data_truncation:
options->report_data_truncation= opt_arg ? test(atoi(opt_arg)) : 1;
break;
case OPT_plugin_dir:
{
char buff[FN_REFLEN], buff2[FN_REFLEN];
if (strlen(opt_arg) >= FN_REFLEN)
opt_arg[FN_REFLEN]= '\0';
if (my_realpath(buff, opt_arg, 0))
{
DBUG_PRINT("warning",("failed to normalize the plugin path: %s",
opt_arg));
break;
}
convert_dirname(buff2, buff, NULL);
EXTENSION_SET_STRING(options, plugin_dir, buff2);
}
break;
case OPT_default_auth:
EXTENSION_SET_STRING(options, default_auth, opt_arg);
break;
case OPT_enable_cleartext_plugin:
break;
default:
DBUG_PRINT("warning",("unknown option: %s",option[0]));
}
}
}
}
free_defaults(argv);
DBUG_VOID_RETURN;
} | 0 | [] | server | f5369faf5bbfb56b5e945836eb3f7c7ee88b4079 | 50,205,267,544,689,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 213 | don't disable SSL when connecting via libmysqld |
static int crypto_report_one(struct crypto_alg *alg,
struct crypto_user_alg *ualg, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
strlcpy(ualg->cru_name, alg->cra_name, sizeof(ualg->cru_name));
strlcpy(ualg->cru_driver_name, alg->cra_driver_name,
sizeof(ualg->cru_driver_name));
strlcpy(ualg->cru_module_name, module_name(alg->cra_module),
sizeof(ualg->cru_module_name));
ualg->cru_type = 0;
ualg->cru_mask = 0;
ualg->cru_flags = alg->cra_flags;
ualg->cru_refcnt = refcount_read(&alg->cra_refcnt);
if (nla_put_u32(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_PRIORITY_VAL, alg->cra_priority))
goto nla_put_failure;
if (alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_LARVAL) {
struct crypto_report_larval rl;
strlcpy(rl.type, "larval", sizeof(rl.type));
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_LARVAL,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_larval), &rl))
goto nla_put_failure;
goto out;
}
if (alg->cra_type && alg->cra_type->report) {
if (alg->cra_type->report(skb, alg))
goto nla_put_failure;
goto out;
}
switch (alg->cra_flags & (CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK | CRYPTO_ALG_LARVAL)) {
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER:
if (crypto_report_cipher(skb, alg))
goto nla_put_failure;
break;
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_COMPRESS:
if (crypto_report_comp(skb, alg))
goto nla_put_failure;
break;
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_ACOMPRESS:
if (crypto_report_acomp(skb, alg))
goto nla_put_failure;
break;
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AKCIPHER:
if (crypto_report_akcipher(skb, alg))
goto nla_put_failure;
break;
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_KPP:
if (crypto_report_kpp(skb, alg))
goto nla_put_failure;
break;
}
out:
return 0;
nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux | f43f39958beb206b53292801e216d9b8a660f087 | 113,204,639,660,369,490,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 66 | crypto: user - fix leaking uninitialized memory to userspace
All bytes of the NETLINK_CRYPTO report structures must be initialized,
since they are copied to userspace. The change from strncpy() to
strlcpy() broke this. As a minimal fix, change it back.
Fixes: 4473710df1f8 ("crypto: user - Prepare for CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME expansion")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> |
static int parse_CRowSeekByBookmark(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, proto_tree *parent_tree, const char *fmt, ...)
{
proto_tree *tree;
proto_item *item;
guint32 num;
const char *txt;
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
txt = wmem_strdup_vprintf(wmem_packet_scope(), fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
tree = proto_tree_add_subtree(parent_tree, tvb, offset, 0, ett_CRowsSeekByBookmark, &item, txt);
num = tvb_get_letohl(tvb,offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_mswsp_crowseekbybookmark_cbookmarks, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
offset = parse_UInt32Array(tvb, offset, tree, num, "abookmark", "abookmarks");
num = tvb_get_letohl(tvb,offset);
proto_tree_add_item(tree, hf_mswsp_crowseekbybookmark_maxret, tvb, offset, 4, ENC_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
offset += 4;
offset = parse_UInt32Array(tvb, offset, tree, num, "ascret", "ascret");
proto_item_set_end(item, tvb, offset);
return offset;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-770"
] | wireshark | b7a0650e061b5418ab4a8f72c6e4b00317aff623 | 149,401,735,505,829,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 | MS-WSP: Don't allocate huge amounts of memory.
Add a couple of memory allocation sanity checks, one of which
fixes #17331. |
void WebPImage::decodeChunks(uint32_t filesize)
{
DataBuf chunkId(5);
byte size_buff[WEBP_TAG_SIZE];
bool has_canvas_data = false;
#ifdef DEBUG
std::cout << "Reading metadata" << std::endl;
#endif
chunkId.pData_[4] = '\0' ;
while ( !io_->eof() && (uint64_t) io_->tell() < filesize) {
io_->readOrThrow(chunkId.pData_, WEBP_TAG_SIZE, Exiv2::kerCorruptedMetadata);
io_->readOrThrow(size_buff, WEBP_TAG_SIZE, Exiv2::kerCorruptedMetadata);
const uint32_t size = Exiv2::getULong(size_buff, littleEndian);
enforce(io_->tell() <= filesize, Exiv2::kerCorruptedMetadata);
enforce(size <= (filesize - io_->tell()), Exiv2::kerCorruptedMetadata);
DataBuf payload(size);
if (equalsWebPTag(chunkId, WEBP_CHUNK_HEADER_VP8X) && !has_canvas_data) {
enforce(size >= 10, Exiv2::kerCorruptedMetadata);
has_canvas_data = true;
byte size_buf[WEBP_TAG_SIZE];
io_->readOrThrow(payload.pData_, payload.size_, Exiv2::kerCorruptedMetadata);
// Fetch width
memcpy(&size_buf, &payload.pData_[4], 3);
size_buf[3] = 0;
pixelWidth_ = Exiv2::getULong(size_buf, littleEndian) + 1;
// Fetch height
memcpy(&size_buf, &payload.pData_[7], 3);
size_buf[3] = 0;
pixelHeight_ = Exiv2::getULong(size_buf, littleEndian) + 1;
} else if (equalsWebPTag(chunkId, WEBP_CHUNK_HEADER_VP8) && !has_canvas_data) {
enforce(size >= 10, Exiv2::kerCorruptedMetadata);
has_canvas_data = true;
io_->readOrThrow(payload.pData_, payload.size_, Exiv2::kerCorruptedMetadata);
byte size_buf[WEBP_TAG_SIZE];
// Fetch width""
memcpy(&size_buf, &payload.pData_[6], 2);
size_buf[2] = 0;
size_buf[3] = 0;
pixelWidth_ = Exiv2::getULong(size_buf, littleEndian) & 0x3fff;
// Fetch height
memcpy(&size_buf, &payload.pData_[8], 2);
size_buf[2] = 0;
size_buf[3] = 0;
pixelHeight_ = Exiv2::getULong(size_buf, littleEndian) & 0x3fff;
} else if (equalsWebPTag(chunkId, WEBP_CHUNK_HEADER_VP8L) && !has_canvas_data) {
enforce(size >= 5, Exiv2::kerCorruptedMetadata);
has_canvas_data = true;
byte size_buf_w[2];
byte size_buf_h[3];
io_->readOrThrow(payload.pData_, payload.size_, Exiv2::kerCorruptedMetadata);
// Fetch width
memcpy(&size_buf_w, &payload.pData_[1], 2);
size_buf_w[1] &= 0x3F;
pixelWidth_ = Exiv2::getUShort(size_buf_w, littleEndian) + 1;
// Fetch height
memcpy(&size_buf_h, &payload.pData_[2], 3);
size_buf_h[0] = ((size_buf_h[0] >> 6) & 0x3) | ((size_buf_h[1] & 0x3F) << 0x2);
size_buf_h[1] = ((size_buf_h[1] >> 6) & 0x3) | ((size_buf_h[2] & 0xF) << 0x2);
pixelHeight_ = Exiv2::getUShort(size_buf_h, littleEndian) + 1;
} else if (equalsWebPTag(chunkId, WEBP_CHUNK_HEADER_ANMF) && !has_canvas_data) {
enforce(size >= 12, Exiv2::kerCorruptedMetadata);
has_canvas_data = true;
byte size_buf[WEBP_TAG_SIZE];
io_->readOrThrow(payload.pData_, payload.size_, Exiv2::kerCorruptedMetadata);
// Fetch width
memcpy(&size_buf, &payload.pData_[6], 3);
size_buf[3] = 0;
pixelWidth_ = Exiv2::getULong(size_buf, littleEndian) + 1;
// Fetch height
memcpy(&size_buf, &payload.pData_[9], 3);
size_buf[3] = 0;
pixelHeight_ = Exiv2::getULong(size_buf, littleEndian) + 1;
} else if (equalsWebPTag(chunkId, WEBP_CHUNK_HEADER_ICCP)) {
io_->readOrThrow(payload.pData_, payload.size_, Exiv2::kerCorruptedMetadata);
this->setIccProfile(payload);
} else if (equalsWebPTag(chunkId, WEBP_CHUNK_HEADER_EXIF)) {
io_->readOrThrow(payload.pData_, payload.size_, Exiv2::kerCorruptedMetadata);
// 4 meaningful bytes + 2 padding bytes
byte exifLongHeader[] = { 0xFF, 0x01, 0xFF, 0xE1, 0x00, 0x00 };
byte exifShortHeader[] = { 0x45, 0x78, 0x69, 0x66, 0x00, 0x00 };
byte exifTiffLEHeader[] = { 0x49, 0x49, 0x2A }; // "MM*"
byte exifTiffBEHeader[] = { 0x4D, 0x4D, 0x00, 0x2A }; // "II\0*"
byte* rawExifData = nullptr;
long offset = 0;
bool s_header = false;
bool le_header = false;
bool be_header = false;
long pos = getHeaderOffset (payload.pData_, payload.size_, (byte*)&exifLongHeader, 4);
if (pos == -1) {
pos = getHeaderOffset (payload.pData_, payload.size_, (byte*)&exifLongHeader, 6);
if (pos != -1) {
s_header = true;
}
}
if (pos == -1) {
pos = getHeaderOffset (payload.pData_, payload.size_, (byte*)&exifTiffLEHeader, 3);
if (pos != -1) {
le_header = true;
}
}
if (pos == -1) {
pos = getHeaderOffset (payload.pData_, payload.size_, (byte*)&exifTiffBEHeader, 4);
if (pos != -1) {
be_header = true;
}
}
if (s_header) {
offset += 6;
}
if (be_header || le_header) {
offset += 12;
}
const long sizePayload = payload.size_ + offset;
rawExifData = (byte*)malloc(sizePayload);
byte sizeBuff[2];
if (s_header) {
us2Data(sizeBuff, (uint16_t) (sizePayload - 6), bigEndian);
memcpy(rawExifData, (char*)&exifLongHeader, 4);
memcpy(rawExifData + 4, (char*)&sizeBuff, 2);
}
if (be_header || le_header) {
us2Data(sizeBuff, (uint16_t) (sizePayload - 6), bigEndian);
memcpy(rawExifData, (char*)&exifLongHeader, 4);
memcpy(rawExifData + 4, (char*)&sizeBuff, 2);
memcpy(rawExifData + 6, (char*)&exifShortHeader, 6);
}
memcpy(rawExifData + offset, payload.pData_, payload.size_);
#ifdef DEBUG
std::cout << "Display Hex Dump [size:" << (unsigned long)sizePayload << "]" << std::endl;
std::cout << Internal::binaryToHex(rawExifData, sizePayload);
#endif
if (pos != -1) {
XmpData xmpData;
ByteOrder bo = ExifParser::decode(exifData_,
payload.pData_ + pos,
payload.size_ - pos);
setByteOrder(bo);
}
else
{
#ifndef SUPPRESS_WARNINGS
EXV_WARNING << "Failed to decode Exif metadata." << std::endl;
#endif
exifData_.clear();
}
if (rawExifData)
free(rawExifData);
} else if (equalsWebPTag(chunkId, WEBP_CHUNK_HEADER_XMP)) {
io_->readOrThrow(payload.pData_, payload.size_, Exiv2::kerCorruptedMetadata);
xmpPacket_.assign(reinterpret_cast<char*>(payload.pData_), payload.size_);
if (xmpPacket_.size() > 0 && XmpParser::decode(xmpData_, xmpPacket_)) {
#ifndef SUPPRESS_WARNINGS
EXV_WARNING << "Failed to decode XMP metadata." << std::endl;
#endif
} else {
#ifdef DEBUG
std::cout << "Display Hex Dump [size:" << (unsigned long)payload.size_ << "]" << std::endl;
std::cout << Internal::binaryToHex(payload.pData_, payload.size_);
#endif
}
} else {
io_->seek(size, BasicIo::cur);
}
if ( io_->tell() % 2 ) io_->seek(+1, BasicIo::cur);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | exiv2 | c73d1e27198a389ce7caf52ac30f8e2120acdafd | 40,930,305,355,552,487,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 196 | Avoid negative integer overflow when `filesize < io_->tell()`.
This fixes #791. |
static UINT cliprdr_server_receive_format_data_request(CliprdrServerContext* context, wStream* s,
const CLIPRDR_HEADER* header)
{
CLIPRDR_FORMAT_DATA_REQUEST formatDataRequest;
UINT error = CHANNEL_RC_OK;
WLog_DBG(TAG, "CliprdrClientFormatDataRequest");
formatDataRequest.msgType = CB_FORMAT_DATA_REQUEST;
formatDataRequest.msgFlags = header->msgFlags;
formatDataRequest.dataLen = header->dataLen;
if ((error = cliprdr_read_format_data_request(s, &formatDataRequest)))
return error;
context->lastRequestedFormatId = formatDataRequest.requestedFormatId;
IFCALLRET(context->ClientFormatDataRequest, error, context, &formatDataRequest);
if (error)
WLog_ERR(TAG, "ClientFormatDataRequest failed with error %" PRIu32 "!", error);
return error;
} | 0 | [] | FreeRDP | 8e1a1b407565eb0a48923c796f5b1f69167b3c48 | 70,493,072,868,483,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | Fixed cliprdr_server_receive_capabilities
Thanks to hac425 CVE-2020-11017, CVE-2020-11018 |
unsigned char *ndp_msg_opt_tlladdr(struct ndp_msg *msg, int offset)
{
unsigned char *opt_data = ndp_msg_payload_opts_offset(msg, offset);
return &opt_data[2];
} | 0 | [
"CWE-284"
] | libndp | a4892df306e0532487f1634ba6d4c6d4bb381c7f | 301,951,327,038,725,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | libndp: validate the IPv6 hop limit
None of the NDP messages should ever come from a non-local network; as
stated in RFC4861's 6.1.1 (RS), 6.1.2 (RA), 7.1.1 (NS), 7.1.2 (NA),
and 8.1. (redirect):
- The IP Hop Limit field has a value of 255, i.e., the packet
could not possibly have been forwarded by a router.
This fixes CVE-2016-3698.
Reported by: Julien BERNARD <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]> |
TEST_F(HeaderToMetadataTest, RejectBothCookieHeader) {
const std::string config = R"EOF(
request_rules:
- header: x-something
cookie: something-else
on_header_present:
key: something
value: else
type: STRING
remove: false
)EOF";
auto expected = "Cannot specify both header and cookie";
EXPECT_THROW_WITH_MESSAGE(initializeFilter(config), EnvoyException, expected);
} | 0 | [] | envoy | 2c60632d41555ec8b3d9ef5246242be637a2db0f | 195,784,794,716,294,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 15 | http: header map security fixes for duplicate headers (#197)
Previously header matching did not match on all headers for
non-inline headers. This patch changes the default behavior to
always logically match on all headers. Multiple individual
headers will be logically concatenated with ',' similar to what
is done with inline headers. This makes the behavior effectively
consistent. This behavior can be temporary reverted by setting
the runtime value "envoy.reloadable_features.header_match_on_all_headers"
to "false".
Targeted fixes have been additionally performed on the following
extensions which make them consider all duplicate headers by default as
a comma concatenated list:
1) Any extension using CEL matching on headers.
2) The header to metadata filter.
3) The JWT filter.
4) The Lua filter.
Like primary header matching used in routing, RBAC, etc. this behavior
can be disabled by setting the runtime value
"envoy.reloadable_features.header_match_on_all_headers" to false.
Finally, the setCopy() header map API previously only set the first
header in the case of duplicate non-inline headers. setCopy() now
behaves similiarly to the other set*() APIs and replaces all found
headers with a single value. This may have had security implications
in the extauth filter which uses this API. This behavior can be disabled
by setting the runtime value
"envoy.reloadable_features.http_set_copy_replace_all_headers" to false.
Fixes https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy-setec/issues/188
Signed-off-by: Matt Klein <[email protected]> |
static inline void put_tpel_pixels_mc20_c(uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src, int stride, int width, int height){
int i,j;
for (i=0; i < height; i++) {
for (j=0; j < width; j++) {
dst[j] = (683*(src[j] + 2*src[j+1] + 1)) >> 11;
}
src += stride;
dst += stride;
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-189"
] | FFmpeg | 454a11a1c9c686c78aa97954306fb63453299760 | 295,010,812,478,750,270,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> |
static int __init cipso_v4_cache_init(void)
{
u32 iter;
cipso_v4_cache = kcalloc(CIPSO_V4_CACHE_BUCKETS,
sizeof(struct cipso_v4_map_cache_bkt),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cipso_v4_cache)
return -ENOMEM;
for (iter = 0; iter < CIPSO_V4_CACHE_BUCKETS; iter++) {
spin_lock_init(&cipso_v4_cache[iter].lock);
cipso_v4_cache[iter].size = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cipso_v4_cache[iter].list);
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-835"
] | linux | 40413955ee265a5e42f710940ec78f5450d49149 | 334,181,974,906,230,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | Cipso: cipso_v4_optptr enter infinite loop
in for(),if((optlen > 0) && (optptr[1] == 0)), enter infinite loop.
Test: receive a packet which the ip length > 20 and the first byte of ip option is 0, produce this issue
Signed-off-by: yujuan.qi <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
static void cancel_att_send_op(void *data)
{
struct att_send_op *op = data;
if (op->destroy)
op->destroy(op->user_data);
op->user_data = NULL;
op->callback = NULL;
op->destroy = NULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-415"
] | bluez | 1cd644db8c23a2f530ddb93cebed7dacc5f5721a | 263,389,844,017,891,540,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | shared/att: Fix possible crash on disconnect
If there are pending request while disconnecting they would be notified
but clients may endup being freed in the proccess which will then be
calling bt_att_cancel to cancal its requests causing the following
trace:
Invalid read of size 4
at 0x1D894C: enable_ccc_callback (gatt-client.c:1627)
by 0x1D247B: disc_att_send_op (att.c:417)
by 0x1CCC17: queue_remove_all (queue.c:354)
by 0x1D47B7: disconnect_cb (att.c:635)
by 0x1E0707: watch_callback (io-glib.c:170)
by 0x48E963B: g_main_context_dispatch (in /usr/lib/libglib-2.0.so.0.6400.4)
by 0x48E9AC7: ??? (in /usr/lib/libglib-2.0.so.0.6400.4)
by 0x48E9ECF: g_main_loop_run (in /usr/lib/libglib-2.0.so.0.6400.4)
by 0x1E0E97: mainloop_run (mainloop-glib.c:79)
by 0x1E13B3: mainloop_run_with_signal (mainloop-notify.c:201)
by 0x12BC3B: main (main.c:770)
Address 0x7d40a28 is 24 bytes inside a block of size 32 free'd
at 0x484A2E0: free (vg_replace_malloc.c:540)
by 0x1CCC17: queue_remove_all (queue.c:354)
by 0x1CCC83: queue_destroy (queue.c:73)
by 0x1D7DD7: bt_gatt_client_free (gatt-client.c:2209)
by 0x16497B: batt_free (battery.c:77)
by 0x16497B: batt_remove (battery.c:286)
by 0x1A0013: service_remove (service.c:176)
by 0x1A9B7B: device_remove_gatt_service (device.c:3691)
by 0x1A9B7B: gatt_service_removed (device.c:3805)
by 0x1CC90B: queue_foreach (queue.c:220)
by 0x1DE27B: notify_service_changed.isra.0.part.0 (gatt-db.c:369)
by 0x1DE387: notify_service_changed (gatt-db.c:361)
by 0x1DE387: gatt_db_service_destroy (gatt-db.c:385)
by 0x1DE3EF: gatt_db_remove_service (gatt-db.c:519)
by 0x1D674F: discovery_op_complete (gatt-client.c:388)
by 0x1D6877: discover_primary_cb (gatt-client.c:1260)
by 0x1E220B: discovery_op_complete (gatt-helpers.c:628)
by 0x1E249B: read_by_grp_type_cb (gatt-helpers.c:730)
by 0x1D247B: disc_att_send_op (att.c:417)
by 0x1CCC17: queue_remove_all (queue.c:354)
by 0x1D47B7: disconnect_cb (att.c:635) |
decode_legacy_async_masks(const ovs_be32 masks[2],
enum ofputil_async_msg_type oam,
enum ofp_version version,
struct ofputil_async_cfg *dst)
{
for (int i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
bool master = i == 0;
const struct ofp14_async_prop *ap
= get_ofp14_async_config_prop_by_oam(oam, master);
decode_async_mask(masks[i], ap, version, true, dst);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-772"
] | ovs | 77ad4225d125030420d897c873e4734ac708c66b | 114,716,826,564,664,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | ofp-util: Fix memory leaks on error cases in ofputil_decode_group_mod().
Found by libFuzzer.
Reported-by: Bhargava Shastry <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <[email protected]> |
f_toupper(typval_T *argvars, typval_T *rettv)
{
rettv->v_type = VAR_STRING;
rettv->vval.v_string = strup_save(tv_get_string(&argvars[0]));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-78"
] | vim | 8c62a08faf89663e5633dc5036cd8695c80f1075 | 61,104,048,082,587,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | patch 8.1.0881: can execute shell commands in rvim through interfaces
Problem: Can execute shell commands in rvim through interfaces.
Solution: Disable using interfaces in restricted mode. Allow for writing
file with writefile(), histadd() and a few others. |
static void dwc3_gadget_disconnect_interrupt(struct dwc3 *dwc)
{
int reg;
reg = dwc3_readl(dwc->regs, DWC3_DCTL);
reg &= ~DWC3_DCTL_INITU1ENA;
dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_DCTL, reg);
reg &= ~DWC3_DCTL_INITU2ENA;
dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_DCTL, reg);
dwc3_disconnect_gadget(dwc);
dwc->gadget.speed = USB_SPEED_UNKNOWN;
dwc->setup_packet_pending = false;
usb_gadget_set_state(&dwc->gadget, USB_STATE_NOTATTACHED);
dwc->connected = false;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-667",
"CWE-189"
] | linux | c91815b596245fd7da349ecc43c8def670d2269e | 319,982,004,015,416,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | usb: dwc3: gadget: never call ->complete() from ->ep_queue()
This is a requirement which has always existed but, somehow, wasn't
reflected in the documentation and problems weren't found until now
when Tuba Yavuz found a possible deadlock happening between dwc3 and
f_hid. She described the situation as follows:
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // first acquire
/* we our function has been disabled by host */
if (!hidg->req) {
free_ep_req(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req);
goto try_again;
}
[...]
status = usb_ep_queue(hidg->in_ep, hidg->req, GFP_ATOMIC);
=>
[...]
=> usb_gadget_giveback_request
=>
f_hidg_req_complete
=>
spin_lock_irqsave(&hidg->write_spinlock, flags); // second acquire
Note that this happens because dwc3 would call ->complete() on a
failed usb_ep_queue() due to failed Start Transfer command. This is,
anyway, a theoretical situation because dwc3 currently uses "No
Response Update Transfer" command for Bulk and Interrupt endpoints.
It's still good to make this case impossible to happen even if the "No
Reponse Update Transfer" command is changed.
Reported-by: Tuba Yavuz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> |
static inline void ext4_unlock_group(struct super_block *sb,
ext4_group_t group)
{
spin_unlock(ext4_group_lock_ptr(sb, group)); | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | linux | c37e9e013469521d9adb932d17a1795c139b36db | 285,795,555,242,245,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | ext4: add more inode number paranoia checks
If there is a directory entry pointing to a system inode (such as a
journal inode), complain and declare the file system to be corrupted.
Also, if the superblock's first inode number field is too small,
refuse to mount the file system.
This addresses CVE-2018-10882.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200069
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] |
TEST_P(ProtocolIntegrationTest, HeadersWithUnderscoresDropped) {
config_helper_.addConfigModifier(
[&](envoy::extensions::filters::network::http_connection_manager::v3::HttpConnectionManager&
hcm) -> void {
hcm.mutable_common_http_protocol_options()->set_headers_with_underscores_action(
envoy::config::core::v3::HttpProtocolOptions::DROP_HEADER);
});
initialize();
codec_client_ = makeHttpConnection(lookupPort("http"));
auto response = codec_client_->makeHeaderOnlyRequest(
Http::TestRequestHeaderMapImpl{{":method", "GET"},
{":path", "/test/long/url"},
{":scheme", "http"},
{":authority", "host"},
{"foo_bar", "baz"}});
waitForNextUpstreamRequest();
EXPECT_THAT(upstream_request_->headers(), Not(HeaderHasValueRef("foo_bar", "baz")));
upstream_request_->encodeHeaders(
Http::TestResponseHeaderMapImpl{{":status", "200"}, {"bar_baz", "fooz"}}, true);
response->waitForEndStream();
EXPECT_TRUE(response->complete());
EXPECT_EQ("200", response->headers().getStatusValue());
EXPECT_THAT(response->headers(), HeaderHasValueRef("bar_baz", "fooz"));
Stats::Store& stats = test_server_->server().stats();
std::string stat_name = (downstreamProtocol() == Http::CodecClient::Type::HTTP1)
? "http1.dropped_headers_with_underscores"
: "http2.dropped_headers_with_underscores";
EXPECT_EQ(1L, TestUtility::findCounter(stats, stat_name)->value());
} | 0 | [
"CWE-770"
] | envoy | 7ca28ff7d46454ae930e193d97b7d08156b1ba59 | 77,446,756,714,520,110,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 | [http1] Include request URL in request header size computation, and reject partial headers that exceed configured limits (#145)
Signed-off-by: antonio <[email protected]> |
static int nbd_send_reply(QIOChannel *ioc, NBDReply *reply, Error **errp)
{
uint8_t buf[NBD_REPLY_SIZE];
reply->error = system_errno_to_nbd_errno(reply->error);
trace_nbd_send_reply(reply->error, reply->handle);
/* Reply
[ 0 .. 3] magic (NBD_REPLY_MAGIC)
[ 4 .. 7] error (0 == no error)
[ 7 .. 15] handle
*/
stl_be_p(buf, NBD_REPLY_MAGIC);
stl_be_p(buf + 4, reply->error);
stq_be_p(buf + 8, reply->handle);
return nbd_write(ioc, buf, sizeof(buf), errp);
} | 0 | [] | qemu | f37708f6b8e0bef0dd85c6aad7fc2062071f8227 | 267,559,693,629,674,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | nbd: Implement NBD_OPT_GO on server
NBD_OPT_EXPORT_NAME is lousy: per the NBD protocol, any failure
requires us to close the connection rather than report an error.
Therefore, upstream NBD recently added NBD_OPT_GO as the improved
version of the option that does what we want [1], along with
NBD_OPT_INFO that returns the same information but does not
transition to transmission phase.
[1] https://github.com/NetworkBlockDevice/nbd/blob/extension-info/doc/proto.md
This is a first cut at the information types, and only passes the
same information already available through NBD_OPT_LIST and
NBD_OPT_EXPORT_NAME; items like NBD_INFO_BLOCK_SIZE (and thus any
use of NBD_REP_ERR_BLOCK_SIZE_REQD) are intentionally left for
later patches.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> |
inline bool LowFirstBitReader::FillBuffer(unsigned int length)
{
while (m_bitsBuffered < length)
{
byte b;
if (!m_store.Get(b))
return false;
m_buffer |= (unsigned long)b << m_bitsBuffered;
m_bitsBuffered += 8;
}
CRYPTOPP_ASSERT(m_bitsBuffered <= sizeof(unsigned long)*8);
return true;
}
| 0 | [
"CWE-190",
"CWE-125"
] | cryptopp | 07dbcc3d9644b18e05c1776db2a57fe04d780965 | 226,949,888,515,903,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | Add Inflator::BadDistanceErr exception (Issue 414)
The improved validation and excpetion clears the Address Sanitizer and Undefined Behavior Sanitizer findings |
filter_free (struct backend *b)
{
struct backend_filter *f = container_of (b, struct backend_filter, backend);
f->backend.next->free (f->backend.next);
/* Acquiring this lock prevents any filter callbacks from running
* simultaneously.
*/
lock_unload ();
debug ("%s: unload", f->name);
if (f->filter.unload)
f->filter.unload ();
if (DO_DLCLOSE)
dlclose (f->dl);
free (f->filename);
unlock_unload ();
free (f->name);
free (f);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-406"
] | nbdkit | bf0d61883a2f02f4388ec10dc92d4c61c093679e | 50,599,633,017,311,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 | server: Fix regression for NBD_OPT_INFO before NBD_OPT_GO
Most known NBD clients do not bother with NBD_OPT_INFO (except for
clients like 'qemu-nbd --list' that don't ever intend to connect), but
go straight to NBD_OPT_GO. However, it's not too hard to hack up qemu
to add in an extra client step (whether info on the same name, or more
interestingly, info on a different name), as a patch against qemu
commit 6f214b30445:
| diff --git i/nbd/client.c w/nbd/client.c
| index f6733962b49b..425292ac5ea9 100644
| --- i/nbd/client.c
| +++ w/nbd/client.c
| @@ -1038,6 +1038,14 @@ int nbd_receive_negotiate(AioContext *aio_context, QIOChannel *ioc,
| * TLS). If it is not available, fall back to
| * NBD_OPT_LIST for nicer error messages about a missing
| * export, then use NBD_OPT_EXPORT_NAME. */
| + if (getenv ("HACK"))
| + info->name[0]++;
| + result = nbd_opt_info_or_go(ioc, NBD_OPT_INFO, info, errp);
| + if (getenv ("HACK"))
| + info->name[0]--;
| + if (result < 0) {
| + return -EINVAL;
| + }
| result = nbd_opt_info_or_go(ioc, NBD_OPT_GO, info, errp);
| if (result < 0) {
| return -EINVAL;
This works just fine in 1.14.0, where we call .open only once (so the
INFO and GO repeat calls into the same plugin handle), but in 1.14.1
it regressed into causing an assertion failure: we are now calling
.open a second time on a connection that is already opened:
$ nbdkit -rfv null &
$ hacked-qemu-io -f raw -r nbd://localhost -c quit
...
nbdkit: null[1]: debug: null: open readonly=1
nbdkit: backend.c:179: backend_open: Assertion `h->handle == NULL' failed.
Worse, on the mainline development, we have recently made it possible
for plugins to actively report different information for different
export names; for example, a plugin may choose to report different
answers for .can_write on export A than for export B; but if we share
cached handles, then an NBD_OPT_INFO on one export prevents correct
answers for NBD_OPT_GO on the second export name. (The HACK envvar in
my qemu modifications can be used to demonstrate cross-name requests,
which are even less likely in a real client).
The solution is to call .close after NBD_OPT_INFO, coupled with enough
glue logic to reset cached connection handles back to the state
expected by .open. This in turn means factoring out another backend_*
function, but also gives us an opportunity to change
backend_set_handle to no longer accept NULL.
The assertion failure is, to some extent, a possible denial of service
attack (one client can force nbdkit to exit by merely sending OPT_INFO
before OPT_GO, preventing the next client from connecting), although
this is mitigated by using TLS to weed out untrusted clients. Still,
the fact that we introduced a potential DoS attack while trying to fix
a traffic amplification security bug is not very nice.
Sadly, as there are no known clients that easily trigger this mode of
operation (OPT_INFO before OPT_GO), there is no easy way to cover this
via a testsuite addition. I may end up hacking something into libnbd.
Fixes: c05686f957
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit a6b88b195a959b17524d1c8353fd425d4891dc5f)
Conflicts:
server/backend.c
server/connections.c
server/filters.c
server/internal.h
server/plugins.c
No backend.c in the stable branch, and less things to reset, so instead
ode that logic into filter_close.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <[email protected]> |
static int mcryptd_hash_import(struct ahash_request *req, const void *in)
{
struct mcryptd_hash_request_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
return crypto_ahash_import(&rctx->areq, in);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476",
"CWE-284"
] | linux | 48a992727d82cb7db076fa15d372178743b1f4cd | 293,315,898,233,050,020,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | crypto: mcryptd - Check mcryptd algorithm compatibility
Algorithms not compatible with mcryptd could be spawned by mcryptd
with a direct crypto_alloc_tfm invocation using a "mcryptd(alg)" name
construct. This causes mcryptd to crash the kernel if an arbitrary
"alg" is incompatible and not intended to be used with mcryptd. It is
an issue if AF_ALG tries to spawn mcryptd(alg) to expose it externally.
But such algorithms must be used internally and not be exposed.
We added a check to enforce that only internal algorithms are allowed
with mcryptd at the time mcryptd is spawning an algorithm.
Link: http://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=148063683310477&w=2
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> |
void TinyGLTF::RemoveImageLoader() {
LoadImageData =
#ifndef TINYGLTF_NO_STB_IMAGE
&tinygltf::LoadImageData;
#else
nullptr;
#endif
load_image_user_data_ = nullptr;
user_image_loader_ = false;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | tinygltf | 52ff00a38447f06a17eab1caa2cf0730a119c751 | 213,650,133,023,257,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | Do not expand file path since its not necessary for glTF asset path(URI) and for security reason(`wordexp`). |
void user_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
kfree(prep->payload[0]);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | linux | c06cfb08b88dfbe13be44a69ae2fdc3a7c902d81 | 163,764,149,236,660,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparse
A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is
allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm.
Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of
the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse
to override it as needed.
The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the
user_match() function.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <[email protected]> |
virDomainVsockDefFree(virDomainVsockDefPtr vsock)
{
if (!vsock)
return;
virObjectUnref(vsock->privateData);
virDomainDeviceInfoClear(&vsock->info);
VIR_FREE(vsock);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-212"
] | libvirt | a5b064bf4b17a9884d7d361733737fb614ad8979 | 123,536,726,254,338,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | conf: Don't format http cookies unless VIR_DOMAIN_DEF_FORMAT_SECURE is used
Starting with 3b076391befc3fe72deb0c244ac6c2b4c100b410
(v6.1.0-122-g3b076391be) we support http cookies. Since they may contain
somewhat sensitive information we should not format them into the XML
unless VIR_DOMAIN_DEF_FORMAT_SECURE is asserted.
Reported-by: Han Han <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Krempa <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Erik Skultety <[email protected]> |
static int nested_svm_intercept_ioio(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
unsigned port, size, iopm_len;
u16 val, mask;
u8 start_bit;
u64 gpa;
if (!(svm->nested.intercept & (1ULL << INTERCEPT_IOIO_PROT)))
return NESTED_EXIT_HOST;
port = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 >> 16;
size = (svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1 & SVM_IOIO_SIZE_MASK) >>
SVM_IOIO_SIZE_SHIFT;
gpa = svm->nested.vmcb_iopm + (port / 8);
start_bit = port % 8;
iopm_len = (start_bit + size > 8) ? 2 : 1;
mask = (0xf >> (4 - size)) << start_bit;
val = 0;
if (kvm_read_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm, gpa, &val, iopm_len))
return NESTED_EXIT_DONE;
return (val & mask) ? NESTED_EXIT_DONE : NESTED_EXIT_HOST;
} | 0 | [] | kvm | 854e8bb1aa06c578c2c9145fa6bfe3680ef63b23 | 135,685,562,829,126,550,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 | KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> |
setrl(isc_ratelimiter_t *rl, unsigned int *rate, unsigned int value) {
isc_interval_t interval;
uint32_t s, ns;
uint32_t pertic;
isc_result_t result;
if (value == 0)
value = 1;
if (value == 1) {
s = 1;
ns = 0;
pertic = 1;
} else if (value <= 10) {
s = 0;
ns = 1000000000 / value;
pertic = 1;
} else {
s = 0;
ns = (1000000000 / value) * 10;
pertic = 10;
}
isc_interval_set(&interval, s, ns);
result = isc_ratelimiter_setinterval(rl, &interval);
RUNTIME_CHECK(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS);
isc_ratelimiter_setpertic(rl, pertic);
*rate = value;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-327"
] | bind9 | f09352d20a9d360e50683cd1d2fc52ccedcd77a0 | 206,409,759,059,663,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 31 | Update keyfetch_done compute_tag check
If in keyfetch_done the compute_tag fails (because for example the
algorithm is not supported), don't crash, but instead ignore the
key. |
static void nfs_writeback_done_common(struct rpc_task *task, void *calldata)
{
struct nfs_write_data *data = calldata;
nfs_writeback_done(task, data);
} | 0 | [] | linux | c7559663e42f4294ffe31fe159da6b6a66b35d61 | 190,449,883,768,025,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | NFS: Allow nfs_updatepage to extend a write under additional circumstances
Currently nfs_updatepage allows a write to be extended to cover a full
page only if we don't have a byte range lock lock on the file... but if
we have a write delegation on the file or if we have the whole file
locked for writing then we should be allowed to extend the write as
well.
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <[email protected]>
[Trond: fix up call to nfs_have_delegation()]
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]> |
static void tcp_v6_send_response(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 seq, u32 ack, u32 win,
u32 tsval, u32 tsecr,
struct tcp_md5sig_key *key, int rst, u8 tclass,
u32 label)
{
const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
struct tcphdr *t1;
struct sk_buff *buff;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct net *net = dev_net(skb_dst(skb)->dev);
struct sock *ctl_sk = net->ipv6.tcp_sk;
unsigned int tot_len = sizeof(struct tcphdr);
struct dst_entry *dst;
__be32 *topt;
if (tsecr)
tot_len += TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
if (key)
tot_len += TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED;
#endif
buff = alloc_skb(MAX_HEADER + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + tot_len,
GFP_ATOMIC);
if (buff == NULL)
return;
skb_reserve(buff, MAX_HEADER + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + tot_len);
t1 = (struct tcphdr *) skb_push(buff, tot_len);
skb_reset_transport_header(buff);
/* Swap the send and the receive. */
memset(t1, 0, sizeof(*t1));
t1->dest = th->source;
t1->source = th->dest;
t1->doff = tot_len / 4;
t1->seq = htonl(seq);
t1->ack_seq = htonl(ack);
t1->ack = !rst || !th->ack;
t1->rst = rst;
t1->window = htons(win);
topt = (__be32 *)(t1 + 1);
if (tsecr) {
*topt++ = htonl((TCPOPT_NOP << 24) | (TCPOPT_NOP << 16) |
(TCPOPT_TIMESTAMP << 8) | TCPOLEN_TIMESTAMP);
*topt++ = htonl(tsval);
*topt++ = htonl(tsecr);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
if (key) {
*topt++ = htonl((TCPOPT_NOP << 24) | (TCPOPT_NOP << 16) |
(TCPOPT_MD5SIG << 8) | TCPOLEN_MD5SIG);
tcp_v6_md5_hash_hdr((__u8 *)topt, key,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr,
&ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr, t1);
}
#endif
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.daddr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
fl6.saddr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr;
fl6.flowlabel = label;
buff->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
buff->csum = 0;
__tcp_v6_send_check(buff, &fl6.saddr, &fl6.daddr);
fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_TCP;
if (ipv6_addr_type(&fl6.daddr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)
fl6.flowi6_oif = inet6_iif(skb);
fl6.fl6_dport = t1->dest;
fl6.fl6_sport = t1->source;
security_skb_classify_flow(skb, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
/* Pass a socket to ip6_dst_lookup either it is for RST
* Underlying function will use this to retrieve the network
* namespace
*/
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(ctl_sk, &fl6, NULL);
if (!IS_ERR(dst)) {
skb_dst_set(buff, dst);
ip6_xmit(ctl_sk, buff, &fl6, NULL, tclass);
TCP_INC_STATS_BH(net, TCP_MIB_OUTSEGS);
if (rst)
TCP_INC_STATS_BH(net, TCP_MIB_OUTRSTS);
return;
}
kfree_skb(buff);
} | 0 | [] | linux | 7bced397510ab569d31de4c70b39e13355046387 | 273,601,125,556,727,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 95 | net_dma: simple removal
Per commit "77873803363c net_dma: mark broken" net_dma is no longer used
and there is no plan to fix it.
This is the mechanical removal of bits in CONFIG_NET_DMA ifdef guards.
Reverting the remainder of the net_dma induced changes is deferred to
subsequent patches.
Marked for stable due to Roman's report of a memory leak in
dma_pin_iovec_pages():
https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/9/3/177
Cc: Dave Jiang <[email protected]>
Cc: Vinod Koul <[email protected]>
Cc: David Whipple <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]> |
static int slab_pad_check(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page)
{
u8 *start;
u8 *fault;
u8 *end;
u8 *pad;
int length;
int remainder;
if (!(s->flags & SLAB_POISON))
return 1;
start = page_address(page);
length = page_size(page);
end = start + length;
remainder = length % s->size;
if (!remainder)
return 1;
pad = end - remainder;
metadata_access_enable();
fault = memchr_inv(pad, POISON_INUSE, remainder);
metadata_access_disable();
if (!fault)
return 1;
while (end > fault && end[-1] == POISON_INUSE)
end--;
slab_err(s, page, "Padding overwritten. 0x%p-0x%p @offset=%tu",
fault, end - 1, fault - start);
print_section(KERN_ERR, "Padding ", pad, remainder);
restore_bytes(s, "slab padding", POISON_INUSE, fault, end);
return 0;
} | 0 | [] | linux | fd4d9c7d0c71866ec0c2825189ebd2ce35bd95b8 | 167,592,776,743,216,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 | mm: slub: add missing TID bump in kmem_cache_alloc_bulk()
When kmem_cache_alloc_bulk() attempts to allocate N objects from a percpu
freelist of length M, and N > M > 0, it will first remove the M elements
from the percpu freelist, then call ___slab_alloc() to allocate the next
element and repopulate the percpu freelist. ___slab_alloc() can re-enable
IRQs via allocate_slab(), so the TID must be bumped before ___slab_alloc()
to properly commit the freelist head change.
Fix it by unconditionally bumping c->tid when entering the slowpath.
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: ebe909e0fdb3 ("slub: improve bulk alloc strategy")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
Item *Item_field::derived_field_transformer_for_where(THD *thd, uchar *arg)
{
st_select_lex *sel= (st_select_lex *)arg;
Item *producing_item= find_producing_item(this, sel);
if (producing_item)
{
Item *producing_clone= producing_item->build_clone(thd);
if (producing_clone)
producing_clone->marker|= SUBSTITUTION_FL;
return producing_clone;
}
return this;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | server | c02ebf3510850ba78a106be9974c94c3b97d8585 | 211,760,866,956,483,650,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | MDEV-24176 Preparations
1. moved fix_vcol_exprs() call to open_table()
mysql_alter_table() doesn't do lock_tables() so it cannot win from
fix_vcol_exprs() from there. Tests affected: main.default_session
2. Vanilla cleanups and comments. |
//! Load a list from a file.
/**
\param filename Filename to read data from.
**/
CImgList<T>& load(const char *const filename) {
if (!filename)
throw CImgArgumentException(_cimglist_instance
"load(): Specified filename is (null).",
cimglist_instance);
if (!cimg::strncasecmp(filename,"http://",7) || !cimg::strncasecmp(filename,"https://",8)) {
CImg<charT> filename_local(256);
load(cimg::load_network(filename,filename_local));
std::remove(filename_local);
return *this;
}
const bool is_stdin = *filename=='-' && (!filename[1] || filename[1]=='.');
const char *const ext = cimg::split_filename(filename);
const unsigned int omode = cimg::exception_mode();
cimg::exception_mode(0);
bool is_loaded = true;
try {
#ifdef cimglist_load_plugin
cimglist_load_plugin(filename);
#endif
#ifdef cimglist_load_plugin1
cimglist_load_plugin1(filename);
#endif
#ifdef cimglist_load_plugin2
cimglist_load_plugin2(filename);
#endif
#ifdef cimglist_load_plugin3
cimglist_load_plugin3(filename);
#endif
#ifdef cimglist_load_plugin4
cimglist_load_plugin4(filename);
#endif
#ifdef cimglist_load_plugin5
cimglist_load_plugin5(filename);
#endif
#ifdef cimglist_load_plugin6
cimglist_load_plugin6(filename);
#endif
#ifdef cimglist_load_plugin7
cimglist_load_plugin7(filename);
#endif
#ifdef cimglist_load_plugin8
cimglist_load_plugin8(filename);
#endif
if (!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"tif") ||
!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"tiff")) load_tiff(filename);
else if (!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"gif")) load_gif_external(filename);
else if (!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"cimg") ||
!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"cimgz") ||
!*ext) load_cimg(filename);
else if (!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"rec") ||
!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"par")) load_parrec(filename);
else if (!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"avi") ||
!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"mov") ||
!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"asf") ||
!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"divx") ||
!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"flv") ||
!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"mpg") ||
!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"m1v") ||
!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"m2v") ||
!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"m4v") ||
!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"mjp") ||
!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"mp4") ||
!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"mkv") ||
!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"mpe") ||
!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"movie") ||
!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"ogm") ||
!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"ogg") ||
!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"ogv") ||
!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"qt") ||
!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"rm") ||
!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"vob") ||
!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"wmv") ||
!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"xvid") ||
!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"mpeg")) load_video(filename);
else if (!cimg::strcasecmp(ext,"gz")) load_gzip_external(filename);
else is_loaded = false;
} catch (CImgIOException&) { is_loaded = false; }
// If nothing loaded, try to guess file format from magic number in file.
if (!is_loaded && !is_stdin) {
std::FILE *const file = cimg::std_fopen(filename,"rb");
if (!file) {
cimg::exception_mode(omode);
throw CImgIOException(_cimglist_instance
"load(): Failed to open file '%s'.",
cimglist_instance,
filename);
}
const char *const f_type = cimg::ftype(file,filename);
cimg::fclose(file);
is_loaded = true;
try {
if (!cimg::strcasecmp(f_type,"gif")) load_gif_external(filename);
else if (!cimg::strcasecmp(f_type,"tif")) load_tiff(filename);
else is_loaded = false;
} catch (CImgIOException&) { is_loaded = false; }
}
// If nothing loaded, try to load file as a single image.
if (!is_loaded) {
assign(1);
try {
_data->load(filename);
} catch (CImgIOException&) {
cimg::exception_mode(omode);
throw CImgIOException(_cimglist_instance
"load(): Failed to recognize format of file '%s'.",
cimglist_instance,
filename);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | CImg | ac8003393569aba51048c9d67e1491559877b1d1 | 102,610,450,481,663,050,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 118 | . |
type_column_sort_func (GtkTreeModel *model,
GtkTreeIter *a,
GtkTreeIter *b,
gpointer user_data)
{
FileData *fdata1;
FileData *fdata2;
GtkSortType sort_order;
int result;
gtk_tree_sortable_get_sort_column_id (GTK_TREE_SORTABLE (model), NULL, &sort_order);
gtk_tree_model_get (model, a, COLUMN_FILE_DATA, &fdata1, -1);
gtk_tree_model_get (model, b, COLUMN_FILE_DATA, &fdata2, -1);
if (file_data_is_dir (fdata1) == file_data_is_dir (fdata2)) {
if (file_data_is_dir (fdata1)) {
result = strcmp (fdata1->sort_key, fdata2->sort_key);
if (sort_order == GTK_SORT_DESCENDING)
result = -1 * result;
}
else {
const char *desc1, *desc2;
desc1 = g_content_type_get_description (fdata1->content_type);
desc2 = g_content_type_get_description (fdata2->content_type);
result = strcasecmp (desc1, desc2);
if (result == 0)
result = strcmp (fdata1->sort_key, fdata2->sort_key);
}
}
else {
result = file_data_is_dir (fdata1) ? -1 : 1;
if (sort_order == GTK_SORT_DESCENDING)
result = -1 * result;
}
return result;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-22"
] | file-roller | b147281293a8307808475e102a14857055f81631 | 164,247,607,846,060,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 39 | libarchive: sanitize filenames before extracting |
psutil_users(PyObject *self, PyObject *args) {
struct utmpx *ut;
PyObject *py_retlist = PyList_New(0);
PyObject *py_tuple = NULL;
PyObject *py_username = NULL;
PyObject *py_tty = NULL;
PyObject *py_hostname = NULL;
PyObject *py_user_proc = NULL;
if (py_retlist == NULL)
return NULL;
setutxent();
while (NULL != (ut = getutxent())) {
if (ut->ut_type == USER_PROCESS)
py_user_proc = Py_True;
else
py_user_proc = Py_False;
py_username = PyUnicode_DecodeFSDefault(ut->ut_user);
if (! py_username)
goto error;
py_tty = PyUnicode_DecodeFSDefault(ut->ut_line);
if (! py_tty)
goto error;
py_hostname = PyUnicode_DecodeFSDefault(ut->ut_host);
if (! py_hostname)
goto error;
py_tuple = Py_BuildValue(
"(OOOfOi)",
py_username, // username
py_tty, // tty
py_hostname, // hostname
(float)ut->ut_tv.tv_sec, // tstamp
py_user_proc, // (bool) user process
ut->ut_pid // process id
);
if (py_tuple == NULL)
goto error;
if (PyList_Append(py_retlist, py_tuple))
goto error;
Py_CLEAR(py_username);
Py_CLEAR(py_tty);
Py_CLEAR(py_hostname);
Py_CLEAR(py_tuple);
}
endutxent();
return py_retlist;
error:
Py_XDECREF(py_username);
Py_XDECREF(py_tty);
Py_XDECREF(py_hostname);
Py_XDECREF(py_tuple);
Py_DECREF(py_retlist);
if (ut != NULL)
endutxent();
return NULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-415"
] | psutil | 7d512c8e4442a896d56505be3e78f1156f443465 | 145,212,562,570,391,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 59 | Use Py_CLEAR instead of Py_DECREF to also set the variable to NULL (#1616)
These files contain loops that convert system data into python objects
and during the process they create objects and dereference their
refcounts after they have been added to the resulting list.
However, in case of errors during the creation of those python objects,
the refcount to previously allocated objects is dropped again with
Py_XDECREF, which should be a no-op in case the paramater is NULL. Even
so, in most of these loops the variables pointing to the objects are
never set to NULL, even after Py_DECREF is called at the end of the loop
iteration. This means, after the first iteration, if an error occurs
those python objects will get their refcount dropped two times,
resulting in a possible double-free. |
QPDF::getTrailer()
{
return this->trailer;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-399",
"CWE-835"
] | qpdf | 701b518d5c56a1449825a3a37a716c58e05e1c3e | 189,994,187,751,056,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Detect recursion loops resolving objects (fixes #51)
During parsing of an object, sometimes parts of the object have to be
resolved. An example is stream lengths. If such an object directly or
indirectly points to the object being parsed, it can cause an infinite
loop. Guard against all cases of re-entrant resolution of objects. |
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(fchmodat, int, dfd, const char __user *, filename, umode_t, mode)
{
struct path path;
int error;
unsigned int lookup_flags = LOOKUP_FOLLOW;
retry:
error = user_path_at(dfd, filename, lookup_flags, &path);
if (!error) {
error = chmod_common(&path, mode);
path_put(&path);
if (retry_estale(error, lookup_flags)) {
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_REVAL;
goto retry;
}
}
return error;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-17"
] | linux | eee5cc2702929fd41cce28058dc6d6717f723f87 | 140,735,655,341,633,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 17 | get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> |
const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_aes_128_wrap_pad(void)
{
return &aes_128_wrap_pad;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | openssl | 2198b3a55de681e1f3c23edb0586afe13f438051 | 158,986,163,617,956,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | crypto/evp: harden AEAD ciphers.
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305
cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result
of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory. Since hash
operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable
beyond a DoS condition. Other ciphers were hardened.
Thanks to Robert Święcki for report.
CVE-2017-3731
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]> |
nautilus_file_mark_desktop_file_trusted (GFile *file,
GtkWindow *parent_window,
NautilusOpCallback done_callback,
gpointer done_callback_data)
{
MarkTrustedJob *job;
job = op_job_new (MarkTrustedJob, parent_window);
job->file = g_object_ref (file);
job->done_callback = done_callback;
job->done_callback_data = done_callback_data;
g_io_scheduler_push_job (mark_trusted_job,
job,
NULL,
0,
NULL);
} | 0 | [] | nautilus | ca2fd475297946f163c32dcea897f25da892b89d | 245,062,640,522,095,870,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | Add nautilus_file_mark_desktop_file_trusted(), this now adds a #! line if
2009-02-24 Alexander Larsson <[email protected]>
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file-operations.c:
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file-operations.h:
Add nautilus_file_mark_desktop_file_trusted(), this now
adds a #! line if there is none as well as makes the file
executable.
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-mime-actions.c:
Use nautilus_file_mark_desktop_file_trusted() instead of
just setting the permissions.
svn path=/trunk/; revision=15006 |
fetch_name(OnigCodePoint start_code, UChar** src, UChar* end,
UChar** rname_end, ScanEnv* env, int* rback_num,
enum REF_NUM* num_type, int is_ref)
{
int r, sign;
int digit_count;
OnigCodePoint end_code;
OnigCodePoint c = 0;
OnigEncoding enc = env->enc;
UChar *name_end;
UChar *pnum_head;
UChar *p = *src;
*rback_num = 0;
end_code = get_name_end_code_point(start_code);
digit_count = 0;
name_end = end;
pnum_head = *src;
r = 0;
*num_type = IS_NOT_NUM;
sign = 1;
if (PEND) {
return ONIGERR_EMPTY_GROUP_NAME;
}
else {
PFETCH_S(c);
if (c == end_code)
return ONIGERR_EMPTY_GROUP_NAME;
if (IS_CODE_DIGIT_ASCII(enc, c)) {
if (is_ref == TRUE)
*num_type = IS_ABS_NUM;
else {
r = ONIGERR_INVALID_GROUP_NAME;
}
digit_count++;
}
else if (c == '-') {
if (is_ref == TRUE) {
*num_type = IS_REL_NUM;
sign = -1;
pnum_head = p;
}
else {
r = ONIGERR_INVALID_GROUP_NAME;
}
}
else if (c == '+') {
if (is_ref == TRUE) {
*num_type = IS_REL_NUM;
sign = 1;
pnum_head = p;
}
else {
r = ONIGERR_INVALID_GROUP_NAME;
}
}
else if (!ONIGENC_IS_CODE_WORD(enc, c)) {
r = ONIGERR_INVALID_CHAR_IN_GROUP_NAME;
}
}
if (r == 0) {
while (!PEND) {
name_end = p;
PFETCH_S(c);
if (c == end_code || c == ')') {
if (*num_type != IS_NOT_NUM && digit_count == 0)
r = ONIGERR_INVALID_GROUP_NAME;
break;
}
if (*num_type != IS_NOT_NUM) {
if (IS_CODE_DIGIT_ASCII(enc, c)) {
digit_count++;
}
else {
if (!ONIGENC_IS_CODE_WORD(enc, c))
r = ONIGERR_INVALID_CHAR_IN_GROUP_NAME;
else
r = ONIGERR_INVALID_GROUP_NAME;
*num_type = IS_NOT_NUM;
}
}
else {
if (!ONIGENC_IS_CODE_WORD(enc, c)) {
r = ONIGERR_INVALID_CHAR_IN_GROUP_NAME;
}
}
}
if (c != end_code) {
r = ONIGERR_INVALID_GROUP_NAME;
goto err;
}
if (*num_type != IS_NOT_NUM) {
*rback_num = scan_number(&pnum_head, name_end, enc);
if (*rback_num < 0) return ONIGERR_TOO_BIG_NUMBER;
else if (*rback_num == 0) {
if (*num_type == IS_REL_NUM) {
r = ONIGERR_INVALID_GROUP_NAME;
goto err;
}
}
*rback_num *= sign;
}
*rname_end = name_end;
*src = p;
return 0;
}
else {
while (!PEND) {
name_end = p;
PFETCH_S(c);
if (c == end_code || c == ')')
break;
}
if (PEND)
name_end = end;
err:
onig_scan_env_set_error_string(env, r, *src, name_end);
return r;
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | oniguruma | aa0188eaedc056dca8374ac03d0177429b495515 | 129,586,619,532,779,240,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 131 | fix #163: heap-buffer-overflow in gb18030_mbc_enc_len |
static inline void aio_poll_complete(struct aio_kiocb *iocb, __poll_t mask)
{
struct file *file = iocb->poll.file;
aio_complete(iocb, mangle_poll(mask), 0);
fput(file);
} | 1 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | 84c4e1f89fefe70554da0ab33be72c9be7994379 | 322,014,618,578,786,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | aio: simplify - and fix - fget/fput for io_submit()
Al Viro root-caused a race where the IOCB_CMD_POLL handling of
fget/fput() could cause us to access the file pointer after it had
already been freed:
"In more details - normally IOCB_CMD_POLL handling looks so:
1) io_submit(2) allocates aio_kiocb instance and passes it to
aio_poll()
2) aio_poll() resolves the descriptor to struct file by req->file =
fget(iocb->aio_fildes)
3) aio_poll() sets ->woken to false and raises ->ki_refcnt of that
aio_kiocb to 2 (bumps by 1, that is).
4) aio_poll() calls vfs_poll(). After sanity checks (basically,
"poll_wait() had been called and only once") it locks the queue.
That's what the extra reference to iocb had been for - we know we
can safely access it.
5) With queue locked, we check if ->woken has already been set to
true (by aio_poll_wake()) and, if it had been, we unlock the
queue, drop a reference to aio_kiocb and bugger off - at that
point it's a responsibility to aio_poll_wake() and the stuff
called/scheduled by it. That code will drop the reference to file
in req->file, along with the other reference to our aio_kiocb.
6) otherwise, we see whether we need to wait. If we do, we unlock the
queue, drop one reference to aio_kiocb and go away - eventual
wakeup (or cancel) will deal with the reference to file and with
the other reference to aio_kiocb
7) otherwise we remove ourselves from waitqueue (still under the
queue lock), so that wakeup won't get us. No async activity will
be happening, so we can safely drop req->file and iocb ourselves.
If wakeup happens while we are in vfs_poll(), we are fine - aio_kiocb
won't get freed under us, so we can do all the checks and locking
safely. And we don't touch ->file if we detect that case.
However, vfs_poll() most certainly *does* touch the file it had been
given. So wakeup coming while we are still in ->poll() might end up
doing fput() on that file. That case is not too rare, and usually we
are saved by the still present reference from descriptor table - that
fput() is not the final one.
But if another thread closes that descriptor right after our fget()
and wakeup does happen before ->poll() returns, we are in trouble -
final fput() done while we are in the middle of a method:
Al also wrote a patch to take an extra reference to the file descriptor
to fix this, but I instead suggested we just streamline the whole file
pointer handling by submit_io() so that the generic aio submission code
simply keeps the file pointer around until the aio has completed.
Fixes: bfe4037e722e ("aio: implement IOCB_CMD_POLL")
Acked-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
static void nodeDestruct(struct SaveNode* node)
{
TR_ASSERT(node != NULL);
if (node->sorted != NULL)
{
tr_free(node->sorted->val.l.vals);
tr_free(node->sorted);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-284"
] | transmission | 2123adf8e5e1c2b48791f9d22fc8c747e974180e | 16,756,064,529,771,620,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | CVE-2018-10756: Fix heap-use-after-free in tr_variantWalk
In libtransmission/variant.c, function tr_variantWalk, when the variant
stack is reallocated, a pointer to the previously allocated memory
region is kept. This address is later accessed (heap use-after-free)
while walking back down the stack, causing the application to crash.
The application can be any application which uses libtransmission, such
as transmission-daemon, transmission-gtk, transmission-show, etc.
Reported-by: Tom Richards <[email protected]> |
qf_entry_on_or_before_pos(qfline_T *qfp, pos_T *pos, int linewise)
{
if (linewise)
return qfp->qf_lnum <= pos->lnum;
else
return (qfp->qf_lnum < pos->lnum ||
(qfp->qf_lnum == pos->lnum && qfp->qf_col <= pos->col));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | vim | 4f1b083be43f351bc107541e7b0c9655a5d2c0bb | 241,560,439,186,835,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | patch 9.0.0322: crash when no errors and 'quickfixtextfunc' is set
Problem: Crash when no errors and 'quickfixtextfunc' is set.
Solution: Do not handle errors if there aren't any. |
ExpressionConstant::ExpressionConstant(ExpressionContext* const expCtx, const Value& value)
: Expression(expCtx), _value(value) {} | 0 | [] | mongo | 1772b9a0393b55e6a280a35e8f0a1f75c014f301 | 151,230,381,282,102,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 2 | SERVER-49404 Enforce additional checks in $arrayToObject |
R_API char *cmd_syscall_dostr(RCore *core, st64 n, ut64 addr) {
int i;
char str[64];
st64 N = n;
int defVector = r_syscall_get_swi (core->anal->syscall);
if (defVector > 0) {
n = -1;
}
if (n == -1 || defVector > 0) {
n = (int)r_debug_reg_get (core->dbg, "oeax");
if (!n || n == -1) {
const char *a0 = r_reg_get_name (core->anal->reg, R_REG_NAME_SN);
n = (a0 == NULL)? -1: (int)r_debug_reg_get (core->dbg, a0);
}
}
RSyscallItem *item = r_syscall_get (core->anal->syscall, n, defVector);
if (!item) {
item = r_syscall_get (core->anal->syscall, N, -1);
}
if (!item) {
return r_str_newf ("%s = unknown ()", syscallNumber (n));
}
char *res = r_str_newf ("%s = %s (", syscallNumber (item->num), item->name);
// TODO: move this to r_syscall
//TODO replace the hardcoded CC with the sdb ones
for (i = 0; i < item->args; i++) {
// XXX this is a hack to make syscall args work on x86-32 and x86-64
// we need to shift sn first.. which is bad, but needs to be redesigned
int regidx = i;
if (core->assembler->bits == 32) {
regidx++;
}
ut64 arg = r_debug_arg_get (core->dbg, R_ANAL_CC_TYPE_FASTCALL, regidx);
//r_cons_printf ("(%d:0x%"PFMT64x")\n", i, arg);
if (item->sargs) {
switch (item->sargs[i]) {
case 'p': // pointer
res = r_str_appendf (res, "0x%08" PFMT64x "", arg);
break;
case 'i':
res = r_str_appendf (res, "%" PFMT64u "", arg);
break;
case 'z':
memset (str, 0, sizeof (str));
r_io_read_at (core->io, arg, (ut8 *)str, sizeof (str) - 1);
r_str_filter (str, strlen (str));
res = r_str_appendf (res, "\"%s\"", str);
break;
case 'Z': {
//TODO replace the hardcoded CC with the sdb ones
ut64 len = r_debug_arg_get (core->dbg, R_ANAL_CC_TYPE_FASTCALL, i + 2);
len = R_MIN (len + 1, sizeof (str) - 1);
if (len == 0) {
len = 16; // override default
}
(void)r_io_read_at (core->io, arg, (ut8 *)str, len);
str[len] = 0;
r_str_filter (str, -1);
res = r_str_appendf (res, "\"%s\"", str);
} break;
default:
res = r_str_appendf (res, "0x%08" PFMT64x "", arg);
break;
}
} else {
res = r_str_appendf (res, "0x%08" PFMT64x "", arg);
}
if (i + 1 < item->args) {
res = r_str_appendf (res, ", ");
}
}
r_syscall_item_free (item);
return r_str_appendf (res, ")");
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-908"
] | radare2 | 4d3811681a80f92a53e795f6a64c4b0fc2c8dd22 | 161,154,302,779,748,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 74 | Fix segfault in adf (#16230) |
init_seconds_var ()
{
SHELL_VAR *v;
v = find_variable ("SECONDS");
if (v)
{
if (legal_number (value_cell(v), &seconds_value_assigned) == 0)
seconds_value_assigned = 0;
}
INIT_DYNAMIC_VAR ("SECONDS", (v ? value_cell (v) : (char *)NULL), get_seconds, assign_seconds);
return v;
} | 0 | [] | bash | 863d31ae775d56b785dc5b0105b6d251515d81d5 | 241,643,709,104,589,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 13 | commit bash-20120224 snapshot |
long vt_compat_ioctl(struct tty_struct *tty,
unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct vc_data *vc = tty->driver_data;
struct console_font_op op; /* used in multiple places here */
void __user *up = compat_ptr(arg);
int perm;
/*
* To have permissions to do most of the vt ioctls, we either have
* to be the owner of the tty, or have CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG.
*/
perm = 0;
if (current->signal->tty == tty || capable(CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG))
perm = 1;
switch (cmd) {
/*
* these need special handlers for incompatible data structures
*/
case PIO_FONTX:
case GIO_FONTX:
return compat_fontx_ioctl(cmd, up, perm, &op);
case KDFONTOP:
return compat_kdfontop_ioctl(up, perm, &op, vc);
case PIO_UNIMAP:
case GIO_UNIMAP:
return compat_unimap_ioctl(cmd, up, perm, vc);
/*
* all these treat 'arg' as an integer
*/
case KIOCSOUND:
case KDMKTONE:
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
case KDADDIO:
case KDDELIO:
#endif
case KDSETMODE:
case KDMAPDISP:
case KDUNMAPDISP:
case KDSKBMODE:
case KDSKBMETA:
case KDSKBLED:
case KDSETLED:
case KDSIGACCEPT:
case VT_ACTIVATE:
case VT_WAITACTIVE:
case VT_RELDISP:
case VT_DISALLOCATE:
case VT_RESIZE:
case VT_RESIZEX:
return vt_ioctl(tty, cmd, arg);
/*
* the rest has a compatible data structure behind arg,
* but we have to convert it to a proper 64 bit pointer.
*/
default:
return vt_ioctl(tty, cmd, (unsigned long)up);
}
} | 1 | [
"CWE-662"
] | linux | 90bfdeef83f1d6c696039b6a917190dcbbad3220 | 233,679,579,024,077,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 64 | tty: make FONTX ioctl use the tty pointer they were actually passed
Some of the font tty ioctl's always used the current foreground VC for
their operations. Don't do that then.
This fixes a data race on fg_console.
Side note: both Michael Ellerman and Jiri Slaby point out that all these
ioctls are deprecated, and should probably have been removed long ago,
and everything seems to be using the KDFONTOP ioctl instead.
In fact, Michael points out that it looks like busybox's loadfont
program seems to have switched over to using KDFONTOP exactly _because_
of this bug (ahem.. 12 years ago ;-).
Reported-by: Minh Yuan <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg KH <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
void Ogg::XiphComment::setTitle(const String &s)
{
addField("TITLE", s);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | taglib | ab8a0ee8937256311e649a88e8ddd7c7f870ad59 | 93,927,347,279,499,470,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Don't store the output of ByteVector::toUInt() in int, use uint instead |
static void blkif_notify_work(struct xen_blkif *blkif)
{
blkif->waiting_reqs = 1;
wake_up(&blkif->wq);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | linux-2.6 | 604c499cbbcc3d5fe5fb8d53306aa0fae1990109 | 269,281,090,711,466,660,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | xen/blkback: Check device permissions before allowing OP_DISCARD
We need to make sure that the device is not RO or that
the request is not past the number of sectors we want to
issue the DISCARD operation for.
This fixes CVE-2013-2140.
Cc: [email protected]
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <[email protected]>
[v1: Made it pr_warn instead of pr_debug]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]> |
static int wcd9335_power_on_reset(struct wcd9335_codec *wcd)
{
struct device *dev = wcd->dev;
int ret;
ret = regulator_bulk_enable(WCD9335_MAX_SUPPLY, wcd->supplies);
if (ret) {
dev_err(dev, "Failed to get supplies: err = %d\n", ret);
return ret;
}
/*
* For WCD9335, it takes about 600us for the Vout_A and
* Vout_D to be ready after BUCK_SIDO is powered up.
* SYS_RST_N shouldn't be pulled high during this time
* Toggle the reset line to make sure the reset pulse is
* correctly applied
*/
usleep_range(600, 650);
gpio_direction_output(wcd->reset_gpio, 0);
msleep(20);
gpio_set_value(wcd->reset_gpio, 1);
msleep(20);
return 0;
} | 0 | [] | sound | a54988113985ca22e414e132054f234fc8a92604 | 168,387,294,240,835,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 | wcd9335: fix a incorrect use of kstrndup()
In wcd9335_codec_enable_dec(), 'widget_name' is allocated by kstrndup().
However, according to doc: "Note: Use kmemdup_nul() instead if the size
is known exactly." So we should use kmemdup_nul() here instead of
kstrndup().
Signed-off-by: Gen Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]> |
routerid_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
FREE_PTR(global_data->router_id);
global_data->router_id = set_value(strvec);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | keepalived | c6247a9ef2c7b33244ab1d3aa5d629ec49f0a067 | 12,361,284,622,102,704,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <[email protected]> |
void BrotliContext::finalizeOutput(Buffer::Instance& output_buffer) {
const size_t n_output = chunk_size_ - avail_out_;
if (n_output > 0) {
output_buffer.add(static_cast<void*>(chunk_ptr_.get()), n_output);
}
} | 0 | [] | envoy | cb4ef0b09200c720dfdb07e097092dd105450343 | 205,759,119,083,072,850,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | decompressors: stop decompressing upon excessive compression ratio (#733)
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Rozhkov <[email protected]>
Co-authored-by: Ryan Hamilton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matt Klein <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pradeep Rao <[email protected]> |
dict_continue(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
es_ptr obj = esp - 2;
int index = esp->value.intval;
push(2); /* make room for key and value */
if ((index = dict_next(obj, index, op - 1)) >= 0) { /* continue */
esp->value.intval = index;
esp += 2;
*esp = obj[1];
return o_push_estack;
} else { /* done */
pop(2); /* undo push */
esp -= 4; /* pop mark, object, proc, index */
return o_pop_estack;
}
} | 0 | [] | ghostpdl | d683d1e6450d74619e6277efeebfc222d9a5cb91 | 149,028,499,025,906,720,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 18 | Bug 700585: Obliterate "superexec". We don't need it, nor do any known apps.
We were under the impression that the Windows driver 'PScript5.dll' used
superexec, but after testing with our extensive suite of PostScript file,
and analysis of the PScript5 "Adobe CoolType ProcSet, it does not appear
that this operator is needed anymore. Get rid of superexec and all of the
references to it, since it is a potential security hole. |
void write( const char* key, double value )
{
char buf[128];
writeScalar( key, fs::doubleToString( buf, value, true ));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | opencv | f42d5399aac80d371b17d689851406669c9b9111 | 208,864,686,175,284,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | core(persistence): add more checks for implementation limitations |
archive_read_format_zip_seekable_bid(struct archive_read *a, int best_bid)
{
struct zip *zip = (struct zip *)a->format->data;
int64_t file_size, current_offset;
const char *p;
int i, tail;
/* If someone has already bid more than 32, then avoid
trashing the look-ahead buffers with a seek. */
if (best_bid > 32)
return (-1);
file_size = __archive_read_seek(a, 0, SEEK_END);
if (file_size <= 0)
return 0;
/* Search last 16k of file for end-of-central-directory
* record (which starts with PK\005\006) */
tail = (int)zipmin(1024 * 16, file_size);
current_offset = __archive_read_seek(a, -tail, SEEK_END);
if (current_offset < 0)
return 0;
if ((p = __archive_read_ahead(a, (size_t)tail, NULL)) == NULL)
return 0;
/* Boyer-Moore search backwards from the end, since we want
* to match the last EOCD in the file (there can be more than
* one if there is an uncompressed Zip archive as a member
* within this Zip archive). */
for (i = tail - 22; i > 0;) {
switch (p[i]) {
case 'P':
if (memcmp(p + i, "PK\005\006", 4) == 0) {
int ret = read_eocd(zip, p + i,
current_offset + i);
/* Zip64 EOCD locator precedes
* regular EOCD if present. */
if (i >= 20 && memcmp(p + i - 20, "PK\006\007", 4) == 0) {
int ret_zip64 = read_zip64_eocd(a, zip, p + i - 20);
if (ret_zip64 > ret)
ret = ret_zip64;
}
return (ret);
}
i -= 4;
break;
case 'K': i -= 1; break;
case 005: i -= 2; break;
case 006: i -= 3; break;
default: i -= 4; break;
}
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-399",
"CWE-401"
] | libarchive | ba641f73f3d758d9032b3f0e5597a9c6e593a505 | 263,956,172,867,565,700,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 53 | Fix typo in preprocessor macro in archive_read_format_zip_cleanup()
Frees lzma_stream on cleanup()
Fixes #1165 |
QString Utils::String::fromStdString(const std::string &str)
{
return QString::fromUtf8(str.c_str());
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-79"
] | qBittorrent | 6ca3e4f094da0a0017cb2d483ec1db6176bb0b16 | 331,742,689,370,953,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Add Utils::String::toHtmlEscaped |
CNF_AddSources(void)
{
NTP_Source *source;
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARR_GetSize(ntp_sources); i++) {
source = (NTP_Source *)ARR_GetElement(ntp_sources, i);
NSR_AddSourceByName(source->params.name, source->params.port,
source->pool, source->type, &source->params.params);
Free(source->params.name);
}
ARR_SetSize(ntp_sources, 0);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-59"
] | chrony | e18903a6b56341481a2e08469c0602010bf7bfe3 | 328,444,299,528,211,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | switch to new util file functions
Replace all fopen(), rename(), and unlink() calls with the new util
functions. |
static void cqspi_configure_cs_and_sizes(struct spi_nor *nor)
{
struct cqspi_flash_pdata *f_pdata = nor->priv;
struct cqspi_st *cqspi = f_pdata->cqspi;
void __iomem *iobase = cqspi->iobase;
unsigned int reg;
/* configure page size and block size. */
reg = readl(iobase + CQSPI_REG_SIZE);
reg &= ~(CQSPI_REG_SIZE_PAGE_MASK << CQSPI_REG_SIZE_PAGE_LSB);
reg &= ~(CQSPI_REG_SIZE_BLOCK_MASK << CQSPI_REG_SIZE_BLOCK_LSB);
reg &= ~CQSPI_REG_SIZE_ADDRESS_MASK;
reg |= (nor->page_size << CQSPI_REG_SIZE_PAGE_LSB);
reg |= (ilog2(nor->mtd.erasesize) << CQSPI_REG_SIZE_BLOCK_LSB);
reg |= (nor->addr_width - 1);
writel(reg, iobase + CQSPI_REG_SIZE);
/* configure the chip select */
cqspi_chipselect(nor);
/* Store the new configuration of the controller */
cqspi->current_page_size = nor->page_size;
cqspi->current_erase_size = nor->mtd.erasesize;
cqspi->current_addr_width = nor->addr_width;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | linux | 193e87143c290ec16838f5368adc0e0bc94eb931 | 10,595,996,626,378,274,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | mtd: spi-nor: Off by one in cqspi_setup_flash()
There are CQSPI_MAX_CHIPSELECT elements in the ->f_pdata array so the >
should be >=.
Fixes: 140623410536 ('mtd: spi-nor: Add driver for Cadence Quad SPI Flash Controller')
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Marek Vasut <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Cyrille Pitchen <[email protected]> |
static struct nft_rule_blob *nf_tables_chain_alloc_rules(unsigned int size)
{
struct nft_rule_blob *blob;
/* size must include room for the last rule */
if (size < offsetof(struct nft_rule_dp, data))
return NULL;
size += sizeof(struct nft_rule_blob) + sizeof(struct nft_rules_old);
if (size > INT_MAX)
return NULL;
blob = kvmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
if (!blob)
return NULL;
blob->size = 0;
nft_last_rule(blob, blob->data);
return blob;
} | 0 | [] | net | 520778042ccca019f3ffa136dd0ca565c486cedd | 218,585,782,921,130,780,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | netfilter: nf_tables: disallow non-stateful expression in sets earlier
Since 3e135cd499bf ("netfilter: nft_dynset: dynamic stateful expression
instantiation"), it is possible to attach stateful expressions to set
elements.
cd5125d8f518 ("netfilter: nf_tables: split set destruction in deactivate
and destroy phase") introduces conditional destruction on the object to
accomodate transaction semantics.
nft_expr_init() calls expr->ops->init() first, then check for
NFT_STATEFUL_EXPR, this stills allows to initialize a non-stateful
lookup expressions which points to a set, which might lead to UAF since
the set is not properly detached from the set->binding for this case.
Anyway, this combination is non-sense from nf_tables perspective.
This patch fixes this problem by checking for NFT_STATEFUL_EXPR before
expr->ops->init() is called.
The reporter provides a KASAN splat and a poc reproducer (similar to
those autogenerated by syzbot to report use-after-free errors). It is
unknown to me if they are using syzbot or if they use similar automated
tool to locate the bug that they are reporting.
For the record, this is the KASAN splat.
[ 85.431824] ==================================================================
[ 85.432901] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in nf_tables_bind_set+0x81b/0xa20
[ 85.433825] Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880286f0e98 by task poc/776
[ 85.434756]
[ 85.434999] CPU: 1 PID: 776 Comm: poc Tainted: G W 5.18.0+ #2
[ 85.436023] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014
Fixes: 0b2d8a7b638b ("netfilter: nf_tables: add helper functions for expression handling")
Reported-and-tested-by: Aaron Adams <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> |
static void rfx_write_message_channels(RFX_CONTEXT* context, wStream* s)
{
Stream_Write_UINT16(s, WBT_CHANNELS); /* BlockT.blockType (2 bytes) */
Stream_Write_UINT32(s, 12); /* BlockT.blockLen (4 bytes) */
Stream_Write_UINT8(s, 1); /* numChannels (1 byte) */
Stream_Write_UINT8(s, 0); /* Channel.channelId (1 byte) */
Stream_Write_UINT16(s, context->width); /* Channel.width (2 bytes) */
Stream_Write_UINT16(s, context->height); /* Channel.height (2 bytes) */
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | FreeRDP | 3a06ce058f690b7fc1edad2f352c453376c2ebfe | 205,057,604,651,420,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | Fixed oob read in rfx_process_message_tileset
Check input data length
Thanks to hac425 CVE-2020-11043 |
void sqlite3WindowFunctions(void){
static FuncDef aWindowFuncs[] = {
WINDOWFUNCX(row_number, 0, 0),
WINDOWFUNCX(dense_rank, 0, 0),
WINDOWFUNCX(rank, 0, 0),
WINDOWFUNCALL(percent_rank, 0, 0),
WINDOWFUNCALL(cume_dist, 0, 0),
WINDOWFUNCALL(ntile, 1, 0),
WINDOWFUNCALL(last_value, 1, 0),
WINDOWFUNCALL(nth_value, 2, 0),
WINDOWFUNCALL(first_value, 1, 0),
WINDOWFUNCNOOP(lead, 1, 0),
WINDOWFUNCNOOP(lead, 2, 0),
WINDOWFUNCNOOP(lead, 3, 0),
WINDOWFUNCNOOP(lag, 1, 0),
WINDOWFUNCNOOP(lag, 2, 0),
WINDOWFUNCNOOP(lag, 3, 0),
};
sqlite3InsertBuiltinFuncs(aWindowFuncs, ArraySize(aWindowFuncs));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | sqlite | 75e95e1fcd52d3ec8282edb75ac8cd0814095d54 | 298,507,056,624,946,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | When processing constant integer values in ORDER BY clauses of window
definitions (see check-in [7e4809eadfe99ebf]) be sure to fully disable
the constant value to avoid an invalid pointer dereference if the expression
is ever duplicated. This fixes a crash report from Yongheng and Rui.
FossilOrigin-Name: 1ca0bd982ab1183bbafce0d260e4dceda5eb766ed2e7793374a88d1ae0bdd2ca |
void sort_directory(struct dir *dir)
{
struct dir_ent *cur, *l1, *l2, *next;
int len1, len2, stride = 1;
if(dir->dir_count < 2)
return;
/*
* We can consider our linked-list to be made up of stride length
* sublists. Eacn iteration around this loop merges adjacent
* stride length sublists into larger 2*stride sublists. We stop
* when stride becomes equal to the entire list.
*
* Initially stride = 1 (by definition a sublist of 1 is sorted), and
* these 1 element sublists are merged into 2 element sublists, which
* are then merged into 4 element sublists and so on.
*/
do {
l2 = dir->dirs; /* head of current linked list */
cur = NULL; /* empty output list */
/*
* Iterate through the linked list, merging adjacent sublists.
* On each interation l2 points to the next sublist pair to be
* merged (if there's only one sublist left this is simply added
* to the output list)
*/
while(l2) {
l1 = l2;
for(len1 = 0; l2 && len1 < stride; len1 ++, l2 = l2->next);
len2 = stride;
/*
* l1 points to first sublist.
* l2 points to second sublist.
* Merge them onto the output list
*/
while(len1 && l2 && len2) {
if(strcmp(l1->name, l2->name) <= 0) {
next = l1;
l1 = l1->next;
len1 --;
} else {
next = l2;
l2 = l2->next;
len2 --;
}
if(cur) {
cur->next = next;
cur = next;
} else
dir->dirs = cur = next;
}
/*
* One sublist is now empty, copy the other one onto the
* output list
*/
for(; len1; len1 --, l1 = l1->next) {
if(cur) {
cur->next = l1;
cur = l1;
} else
dir->dirs = cur = l1;
}
for(; l2 && len2; len2 --, l2 = l2->next) {
if(cur) {
cur->next = l2;
cur = l2;
} else
dir->dirs = cur = l2;
}
}
cur->next = NULL;
stride = stride << 1;
} while(stride < dir->dir_count);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-59",
"CWE-22"
] | squashfs-tools | e0485802ec72996c20026da320650d8362f555bd | 195,677,670,004,602,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 78 | Unsquashfs: additional write outside destination directory exploit fix
An issue on github (https://github.com/plougher/squashfs-tools/issues/72)
showed how some specially crafted Squashfs filesystems containing
invalid file names (with '/' and '..') can cause Unsquashfs to write
files outside of the destination directory.
Since then it has been shown that specially crafted Squashfs filesystems
that contain a symbolic link pointing outside of the destination directory,
coupled with an identically named file within the same directory, can
cause Unsquashfs to write files outside of the destination directory.
Specifically the symbolic link produces a pathname pointing outside
of the destination directory, which is then followed when writing the
duplicate identically named file within the directory.
This commit fixes this exploit by explictly checking for duplicate
filenames within a directory. As directories in v2.1, v3.x, and v4.0
filesystems are sorted, this is achieved by checking for consecutively
identical filenames. Additionally directories are checked to
ensure they are sorted, to avoid attempts to evade the duplicate
check.
Version 1.x and 2.0 filesystems (where the directories were unsorted)
are sorted and then the above duplicate filename check is applied.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <[email protected]> |
Subsets and Splits