func
stringlengths 0
484k
| target
int64 0
1
| cwe
sequencelengths 0
4
| project
stringclasses 799
values | commit_id
stringlengths 40
40
| hash
float64 1,215,700,430,453,689,100,000,000B
340,281,914,521,452,260,000,000,000,000B
| size
int64 1
24k
| message
stringlengths 0
13.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
static __inline__ int isdn_net_device_busy(isdn_net_local *lp)
{
isdn_net_local *nlp;
isdn_net_dev *nd;
unsigned long flags;
if (!isdn_net_lp_busy(lp))
return 0;
if (lp->master)
nd = ISDN_MASTER_PRIV(lp)->netdev;
else
nd = lp->netdev;
spin_lock_irqsave(&nd->queue_lock, flags);
nlp = lp->next;
while (nlp != lp) {
if (!isdn_net_lp_busy(nlp)) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&nd->queue_lock, flags);
return 0;
}
nlp = nlp->next;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&nd->queue_lock, flags);
return 1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | linux | 9f5af546e6acc30f075828cb58c7f09665033967 | 111,784,512,268,787,210,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 | isdn/i4l: fix buffer overflow
This fixes a potential buffer overflow in isdn_net.c caused by an
unbounded strcpy.
[ ISDN seems to be effectively unmaintained, and the I4L driver in
particular is long deprecated, but in case somebody uses this..
- Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Jiten Thakkar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Annie Cherkaev <[email protected]>
Cc: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
nm_gconf_get_stringlist_helper (GConfClient *client,
const char *path,
const char *key,
const char *setting,
GSList **value)
{
char *gc_key;
GConfValue *gc_value;
gboolean success = FALSE;
g_return_val_if_fail (key != NULL, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (setting != NULL, FALSE);
g_return_val_if_fail (value != NULL, FALSE);
gc_key = g_strdup_printf ("%s/%s/%s", path, setting, key);
if (!(gc_value = gconf_client_get (client, gc_key, NULL)))
goto out;
if (gc_value->type == GCONF_VALUE_LIST
&& gconf_value_get_list_type (gc_value) == GCONF_VALUE_STRING)
{
GSList *elt;
for (elt = gconf_value_get_list (gc_value); elt != NULL; elt = g_slist_next (elt))
{
const char *string = gconf_value_get_string ((GConfValue *) elt->data);
*value = g_slist_append (*value, g_strdup (string));
}
success = TRUE;
}
out:
if (gc_value)
gconf_value_free (gc_value);
g_free (gc_key);
return success;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-310"
] | network-manager-applet | 4020594dfbf566f1852f0acb36ad631a9e73a82b | 310,681,619,484,564,530,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 39 | core: fix CA cert mishandling after cert file deletion (deb #560067) (rh #546793)
If a connection was created with a CA certificate, but the user later
moved or deleted that CA certificate, the applet would simply provide the
connection to NetworkManager without any CA certificate. This could cause
NM to connect to the original network (or a network spoofing the original
network) without verifying the identity of the network as the user
expects.
In the future we can/should do better here by (1) alerting the user that
some connection is now no longer complete by flagging it in the connection
editor or notifying the user somehow, and (2) by using a freaking' cert
store already (not that Linux has one yet). |
bgp_attr_unknown (struct bgp_attr_parser_args *args)
{
bgp_size_t total = args->total;
struct transit *transit;
struct attr_extra *attre;
struct peer *const peer = args->peer;
struct attr *const attr = args->attr;
u_char *const startp = args->startp;
const u_char type = args->type;
const u_char flag = args->flags;
const bgp_size_t length = args->length;
if (BGP_DEBUG (normal, NORMAL))
zlog_debug ("%s Unknown attribute is received (type %d, length %d)",
peer->host, type, length);
if (BGP_DEBUG (events, EVENTS))
zlog (peer->log, LOG_DEBUG,
"Unknown attribute type %d length %d is received", type, length);
/* Forward read pointer of input stream. */
stream_forward_getp (peer->ibuf, length);
/* If any of the mandatory well-known attributes are not recognized,
then the Error Subcode is set to Unrecognized Well-known
Attribute. The Data field contains the unrecognized attribute
(type, length and value). */
if (!CHECK_FLAG (flag, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_OPTIONAL))
{
return bgp_attr_malformed (args,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_UNREC_ATTR,
args->total);
}
/* Unrecognized non-transitive optional attributes must be quietly
ignored and not passed along to other BGP peers. */
if (! CHECK_FLAG (flag, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_TRANS))
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_PROCEED;
/* If a path with recognized transitive optional attribute is
accepted and passed along to other BGP peers and the Partial bit
in the Attribute Flags octet is set to 1 by some previous AS, it
is not set back to 0 by the current AS. */
SET_FLAG (*startp, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_PARTIAL);
/* Store transitive attribute to the end of attr->transit. */
if (! ((attre = bgp_attr_extra_get(attr))->transit) )
attre->transit = XCALLOC (MTYPE_TRANSIT, sizeof (struct transit));
transit = attre->transit;
if (transit->val)
transit->val = XREALLOC (MTYPE_TRANSIT_VAL, transit->val,
transit->length + total);
else
transit->val = XMALLOC (MTYPE_TRANSIT_VAL, total);
memcpy (transit->val + transit->length, startp, total);
transit->length += total;
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_PROCEED;
} | 0 | [] | quagga | 8794e8d229dc9fe29ea31424883433d4880ef408 | 123,570,805,515,841,710,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 63 | bgpd: Fix regression in args consolidation, total should be inited from args
* bgp_attr.c: (bgp_attr_unknown) total should be initialised from the args. |
int set_unit_path(const char *p) {
/* This is mostly for debug purposes */
if (setenv("SYSTEMD_UNIT_PATH", p, 1) < 0)
return -errno;
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-269"
] | systemd | bf65b7e0c9fc215897b676ab9a7c9d1c688143ba | 156,325,964,314,063,430,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | core: imply NNP and SUID/SGID restriction for DynamicUser=yes service
Let's be safe, rather than sorry. This way DynamicUser=yes services can
neither take benefit of, nor create SUID/SGID binaries.
Given that DynamicUser= is a recent addition only we should be able to
get away with turning this on, even though this is strictly speaking a
binary compatibility breakage. |
static int lsql_handle_request(struct ldb_module *module, struct ldb_request *req)
{
struct ldb_context *ldb;
struct tevent_context *ev;
struct lsql_context *ac;
struct tevent_timer *te;
struct timeval tv;
if (ldb_check_critical_controls(req->controls)) {
return LDB_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
}
if (req->starttime == 0 || req->timeout == 0) {
ldb_set_errstring(ldb, "Invalid timeout settings");
return LDB_ERR_TIME_LIMIT_EXCEEDED;
}
ldb = ldb_module_get_ctx(module);
ev = ldb_get_event_context(ldb);
ac = talloc_zero(req, struct lsql_context);
if (ac == NULL) {
ldb_set_errstring(ldb, "Out of Memory");
return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
}
ac->module = module;
ac->req = req;
tv.tv_sec = 0;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
te = tevent_add_timer(ev, ac, tv, lsql_callback, ac);
if (NULL == te) {
return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
}
if (req->timeout > 0) {
tv.tv_sec = req->starttime + req->timeout;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
ac->timeout_event = tevent_add_timer(ev, ac, tv, lsql_timeout, ac);
if (NULL == ac->timeout_event) {
return LDB_ERR_OPERATIONS_ERROR;
}
}
return LDB_SUCCESS;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | samba | 3f95957d6de321c803a66f3ec67a8ff09befd16d | 183,004,076,862,395,670,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 47 | CVE-2018-1140 ldb: Check for ldb_dn_get_casefold() failure in ldb_sqlite
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <[email protected]>
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13374 |
quicklistBookmark *_quicklistBookmarkFindByNode(quicklist *ql, quicklistNode *node) {
unsigned i;
for (i=0; i<ql->bookmark_count; i++) {
if (ql->bookmarks[i].node == node) {
return &ql->bookmarks[i];
}
}
return NULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | redis | f6a40570fa63d5afdd596c78083d754081d80ae3 | 94,118,480,846,494,360,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | Fix ziplist and listpack overflows and truncations (CVE-2021-32627, CVE-2021-32628)
- fix possible heap corruption in ziplist and listpack resulting by trying to
allocate more than the maximum size of 4GB.
- prevent ziplist (hash and zset) from reaching size of above 1GB, will be
converted to HT encoding, that's not a useful size.
- prevent listpack (stream) from reaching size of above 1GB.
- XADD will start a new listpack if the new record may cause the previous
listpack to grow over 1GB.
- XADD will respond with an error if a single stream record is over 1GB
- List type (ziplist in quicklist) was truncating strings that were over 4GB,
now it'll respond with an error. |
static int vnc_display_listen(VncDisplay *vd,
SocketAddress **saddr,
size_t nsaddr,
SocketAddress **wsaddr,
size_t nwsaddr,
Error **errp)
{
size_t i;
if (nsaddr) {
vd->listener = qio_net_listener_new();
qio_net_listener_set_name(vd->listener, "vnc-listen");
for (i = 0; i < nsaddr; i++) {
if (qio_net_listener_open_sync(vd->listener,
saddr[i], 1,
errp) < 0) {
return -1;
}
}
qio_net_listener_set_client_func(vd->listener,
vnc_listen_io, vd, NULL);
}
if (nwsaddr) {
vd->wslistener = qio_net_listener_new();
qio_net_listener_set_name(vd->wslistener, "vnc-ws-listen");
for (i = 0; i < nwsaddr; i++) {
if (qio_net_listener_open_sync(vd->wslistener,
wsaddr[i], 1,
errp) < 0) {
return -1;
}
}
qio_net_listener_set_client_func(vd->wslistener,
vnc_listen_io, vd, NULL);
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-401"
] | qemu | 6bf21f3d83e95bcc4ba35a7a07cc6655e8b010b0 | 333,110,236,540,480,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 41 | vnc: fix memory leak when vnc disconnect
Currently when qemu receives a vnc connect, it creates a 'VncState' to
represent this connection. In 'vnc_worker_thread_loop' it creates a
local 'VncState'. The connection 'VcnState' and local 'VncState' exchange
data in 'vnc_async_encoding_start' and 'vnc_async_encoding_end'.
In 'zrle_compress_data' it calls 'deflateInit2' to allocate the libz library
opaque data. The 'VncState' used in 'zrle_compress_data' is the local
'VncState'. In 'vnc_zrle_clear' it calls 'deflateEnd' to free the libz
library opaque data. The 'VncState' used in 'vnc_zrle_clear' is the connection
'VncState'. In currently implementation there will be a memory leak when the
vnc disconnect. Following is the asan output backtrack:
Direct leak of 29760 byte(s) in 5 object(s) allocated from:
0 0xffffa67ef3c3 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.4+0xd33c3)
1 0xffffa65071cb in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x571cb)
2 0xffffa5e968f7 in deflateInit2_ (/lib64/libz.so.1+0x78f7)
3 0xaaaacec58613 in zrle_compress_data ui/vnc-enc-zrle.c:87
4 0xaaaacec58613 in zrle_send_framebuffer_update ui/vnc-enc-zrle.c:344
5 0xaaaacec34e77 in vnc_send_framebuffer_update ui/vnc.c:919
6 0xaaaacec5e023 in vnc_worker_thread_loop ui/vnc-jobs.c:271
7 0xaaaacec5e5e7 in vnc_worker_thread ui/vnc-jobs.c:340
8 0xaaaacee4d3c3 in qemu_thread_start util/qemu-thread-posix.c:502
9 0xffffa544e8bb in start_thread (/lib64/libpthread.so.0+0x78bb)
10 0xffffa53965cb in thread_start (/lib64/libc.so.6+0xd55cb)
This is because the opaque allocated in 'deflateInit2' is not freed in
'deflateEnd'. The reason is that the 'deflateEnd' calls 'deflateStateCheck'
and in the latter will check whether 's->strm != strm'(libz's data structure).
This check will be true so in 'deflateEnd' it just return 'Z_STREAM_ERROR' and
not free the data allocated in 'deflateInit2'.
The reason this happens is that the 'VncState' contains the whole 'VncZrle',
so when calling 'deflateInit2', the 's->strm' will be the local address.
So 's->strm != strm' will be true.
To fix this issue, we need to make 'zrle' of 'VncState' to be a pointer.
Then the connection 'VncState' and local 'VncState' exchange mechanism will
work as expection. The 'tight' of 'VncState' has the same issue, let's also turn
it to a pointer.
Reported-by: Ying Fang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <[email protected]>
Message-id: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]> |
static void ComputeWeightedCovariance(const size_t count,
const DDSVector4 *points, float *covariance)
{
DDSVector3
centroid;
float
total;
size_t
i;
total = 0.0f;
VectorInit3(centroid,0.0f);
for (i=0; i < count; i++)
{
total += points[i].w;
centroid.x += (points[i].x * points[i].w);
centroid.y += (points[i].y * points[i].w);
centroid.z += (points[i].z * points[i].w);
}
if( total > 1.192092896e-07F)
{
centroid.x /= total;
centroid.y /= total;
centroid.z /= total;
}
for (i=0; i < 6; i++)
covariance[i] = 0.0f;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
{
DDSVector3
a,
b;
a.x = points[i].x - centroid.x;
a.y = points[i].y - centroid.y;
a.z = points[i].z - centroid.z;
b.x = points[i].w * a.x;
b.y = points[i].w * a.y;
b.z = points[i].w * a.z;
covariance[0] += a.x*b.x;
covariance[1] += a.x*b.y;
covariance[2] += a.x*b.z;
covariance[3] += a.y*b.y;
covariance[4] += a.y*b.z;
covariance[5] += a.z*b.z;
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-617"
] | ImageMagick | 0c5b1e430a83ef793a7334bbbee408cf3c628699 | 18,010,107,548,755,503,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 55 | Added check to prevent image being 0x0 (reported in #489). |
static int snd_ctl_elem_info(struct snd_ctl_file *ctl,
struct snd_ctl_elem_info *info)
{
struct snd_card *card = ctl->card;
struct snd_kcontrol *kctl;
struct snd_kcontrol_volatile *vd;
unsigned int index_offset;
int result;
down_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
kctl = snd_ctl_find_id(card, &info->id);
if (kctl == NULL) {
up_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
return -ENOENT;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SND_DEBUG
info->access = 0;
#endif
result = kctl->info(kctl, info);
if (result >= 0) {
snd_BUG_ON(info->access);
index_offset = snd_ctl_get_ioff(kctl, &info->id);
vd = &kctl->vd[index_offset];
snd_ctl_build_ioff(&info->id, kctl, index_offset);
info->access = vd->access;
if (vd->owner) {
info->access |= SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_LOCK;
if (vd->owner == ctl)
info->access |= SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_OWNER;
info->owner = pid_vnr(vd->owner->pid);
} else {
info->owner = -1;
}
}
up_read(&card->controls_rwsem);
return result;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190",
"CWE-189"
] | linux | ac902c112d90a89e59916f751c2745f4dbdbb4bd | 336,423,899,676,039,130,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 37 | ALSA: control: Handle numid overflow
Each control gets automatically assigned its numids when the control is created.
The allocation is done by incrementing the numid by the amount of allocated
numids per allocation. This means that excessive creation and destruction of
controls (e.g. via SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_ADD/REMOVE) can cause the id to
eventually overflow. Currently when this happens for the control that caused the
overflow kctl->id.numid + kctl->count will also over flow causing it to be
smaller than kctl->id.numid. Most of the code assumes that this is something
that can not happen, so we need to make sure that it won't happen
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]> |
static void XMLCDECL xmlNoValidityErr(void *ctx ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED,
const char *msg ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED, ...) {
return;
} | 0 | [] | libxml2 | 932cc9896ab41475d4aa429c27d9afd175959d74 | 328,159,744,379,274,340,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Fix buffer size checks in xmlSnprintfElementContent
xmlSnprintfElementContent failed to correctly check the available
buffer space in two locations.
Fixes bug 781333 (CVE-2017-9047) and bug 781701 (CVE-2017-9048).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report. |
static GF_Err do_dump_iod()
{
GF_Err e = GF_OK;
GF_InitialObjectDescriptor *iod = (GF_InitialObjectDescriptor *)gf_isom_get_root_od(file);
if (!iod) {
M4_LOG(GF_LOG_WARNING, ("File %s has no IOD\n", inName));
} else {
char szName[GF_MAX_PATH+10];
FILE *iodf;
sprintf(szName, "%s.iod", outfile);
iodf = gf_fopen(szName, "wb");
if (!iodf) {
M4_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, ("Cannot open destination %s\n", szName));
e = GF_IO_ERR;
} else {
u8 *desc;
u32 size;
GF_BitStream *bs = gf_bs_from_file(iodf, GF_BITSTREAM_WRITE);
if (gf_odf_desc_write((GF_Descriptor *)iod, &desc, &size)==GF_OK) {
gf_fwrite(desc, size, iodf);
gf_free(desc);
} else {
M4_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, ("Error writing IOD %s\n", szName));
e = GF_IO_ERR;
}
gf_bs_del(bs);
gf_fclose(iodf);
}
gf_odf_desc_del((GF_Descriptor*)iod);
}
return e; | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | gpac | 4e56ad72ac1afb4e049a10f2d99e7512d7141f9d | 80,095,396,322,084,310,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 | fixed #2216 |
double Magick::Image::strokeWidth(void) const
{
return(constOptions()->strokeWidth());
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | ImageMagick | 8c35502217c1879cb8257c617007282eee3fe1cc | 10,715,611,914,507,335,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Added missing return to avoid use after free. |
static uint8_t att_ecode_from_error(int err)
{
/*
* If the error fits in a single byte, treat it as an ATT protocol
* error as is. Since "0" is not a valid ATT protocol error code, we map
* that to UNLIKELY below.
*/
if (err > 0 && err < UINT8_MAX)
return err;
/*
* Since we allow UNIX errnos, map them to appropriate ATT protocol
* and "Common Profile and Service" error codes.
*/
switch (err) {
case -ENOENT:
return BT_ATT_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE;
case -ENOMEM:
return BT_ATT_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_RESOURCES;
case -EALREADY:
return BT_ERROR_ALREADY_IN_PROGRESS;
case -EOVERFLOW:
return BT_ERROR_OUT_OF_RANGE;
}
return BT_ATT_ERROR_UNLIKELY;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-415"
] | bluez | 1cd644db8c23a2f530ddb93cebed7dacc5f5721a | 255,105,058,756,210,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 | shared/att: Fix possible crash on disconnect
If there are pending request while disconnecting they would be notified
but clients may endup being freed in the proccess which will then be
calling bt_att_cancel to cancal its requests causing the following
trace:
Invalid read of size 4
at 0x1D894C: enable_ccc_callback (gatt-client.c:1627)
by 0x1D247B: disc_att_send_op (att.c:417)
by 0x1CCC17: queue_remove_all (queue.c:354)
by 0x1D47B7: disconnect_cb (att.c:635)
by 0x1E0707: watch_callback (io-glib.c:170)
by 0x48E963B: g_main_context_dispatch (in /usr/lib/libglib-2.0.so.0.6400.4)
by 0x48E9AC7: ??? (in /usr/lib/libglib-2.0.so.0.6400.4)
by 0x48E9ECF: g_main_loop_run (in /usr/lib/libglib-2.0.so.0.6400.4)
by 0x1E0E97: mainloop_run (mainloop-glib.c:79)
by 0x1E13B3: mainloop_run_with_signal (mainloop-notify.c:201)
by 0x12BC3B: main (main.c:770)
Address 0x7d40a28 is 24 bytes inside a block of size 32 free'd
at 0x484A2E0: free (vg_replace_malloc.c:540)
by 0x1CCC17: queue_remove_all (queue.c:354)
by 0x1CCC83: queue_destroy (queue.c:73)
by 0x1D7DD7: bt_gatt_client_free (gatt-client.c:2209)
by 0x16497B: batt_free (battery.c:77)
by 0x16497B: batt_remove (battery.c:286)
by 0x1A0013: service_remove (service.c:176)
by 0x1A9B7B: device_remove_gatt_service (device.c:3691)
by 0x1A9B7B: gatt_service_removed (device.c:3805)
by 0x1CC90B: queue_foreach (queue.c:220)
by 0x1DE27B: notify_service_changed.isra.0.part.0 (gatt-db.c:369)
by 0x1DE387: notify_service_changed (gatt-db.c:361)
by 0x1DE387: gatt_db_service_destroy (gatt-db.c:385)
by 0x1DE3EF: gatt_db_remove_service (gatt-db.c:519)
by 0x1D674F: discovery_op_complete (gatt-client.c:388)
by 0x1D6877: discover_primary_cb (gatt-client.c:1260)
by 0x1E220B: discovery_op_complete (gatt-helpers.c:628)
by 0x1E249B: read_by_grp_type_cb (gatt-helpers.c:730)
by 0x1D247B: disc_att_send_op (att.c:417)
by 0x1CCC17: queue_remove_all (queue.c:354)
by 0x1D47B7: disconnect_cb (att.c:635) |
TEST(BasicFlatBufferModel, TestWithNumThreads) {
TestErrorReporter reporter;
auto model = FlatBufferModel::BuildFromFile(
"tensorflow/lite/testdata/test_model.bin", &reporter);
ASSERT_TRUE(model);
TrivialResolver resolver(&dummy_reg);
InterpreterBuilder builder(*model, resolver);
std::unique_ptr<Interpreter> interpreter;
ASSERT_EQ(builder(&interpreter, /*num_threads=*/42), kTfLiteOk);
ASSERT_NE(interpreter, nullptr);
ASSERT_EQ(interpreter->subgraph(0)->context()->recommended_num_threads, 42);
interpreter.reset();
ASSERT_EQ(builder(&interpreter, 0), kTfLiteOk);
ASSERT_NE(interpreter, nullptr);
ASSERT_EQ(interpreter->subgraph(0)->context()->recommended_num_threads, 1);
interpreter.reset();
ASSERT_EQ(builder(&interpreter, -1), kTfLiteOk);
ASSERT_NE(interpreter, nullptr);
ASSERT_EQ(interpreter->subgraph(0)->context()->recommended_num_threads, -1);
ASSERT_EQ(reporter.num_calls(), 0);
interpreter.reset(new Interpreter);
ASSERT_EQ(builder(&interpreter, -2), kTfLiteError);
ASSERT_EQ(interpreter, nullptr);
ASSERT_EQ(reporter.num_calls(), 1);
ASSERT_PRED_FORMAT2(testing::IsSubstring,
"num_threads should be >= 0 or just -1",
reporter.error_messages());
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-835"
] | tensorflow | c6173f5fe66cdbab74f4f869311fe6aae2ba35f4 | 147,570,642,751,304,060,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 32 | TFLite: Error out when the graph has a recurion.
Recursion is currently unsupported.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 371708957
Change-Id: I8dfad0d85cbfe08e39ae8ea7bad21254ddee5003 |
static int ZEND_FASTCALL ZEND_EXT_FCALL_END_SPEC_HANDLER(ZEND_OPCODE_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
if (!EG(no_extensions)) {
zend_llist_apply_with_argument(&zend_extensions, (llist_apply_with_arg_func_t) zend_extension_fcall_end_handler, EX(op_array) TSRMLS_CC);
}
ZEND_VM_NEXT_OPCODE();
} | 0 | [] | php-src | ce96fd6b0761d98353761bf78d5bfb55291179fd | 200,691,991,468,112,740,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | - fix #39863, do not accept paths with NULL in them. See http://news.php.net/php.internals/50191, trunk will have the patch later (adding a macro and/or changing (some) APIs. Patch by Rasmus |
bool MainWindow::eventFilter(QObject* target, QEvent* event)
{
if (event->type() == QEvent::DragEnter && target == MLT.videoWidget()) {
dragEnterEvent(static_cast<QDragEnterEvent*>(event));
return true;
} else if (event->type() == QEvent::Drop && target == MLT.videoWidget()) {
dropEvent(static_cast<QDropEvent*>(event));
return true;
} else if (event->type() == QEvent::KeyPress || event->type() == QEvent::KeyRelease) {
if (QEvent::KeyPress == event->type()) {
// Let Shift+Escape be a global hook to defocus a widget (assign global player focus).
auto keyEvent = static_cast<QKeyEvent*>(event);
if (Qt::Key_Escape == keyEvent->key() && Qt::ShiftModifier == keyEvent->modifiers()) {
m_player->setFocus();
return true;
}
}
QQuickWidget * focusedQuickWidget = qobject_cast<QQuickWidget*>(qApp->focusWidget());
if (focusedQuickWidget && focusedQuickWidget->quickWindow()->activeFocusItem()) {
event->accept();
focusedQuickWidget->quickWindow()->sendEvent(focusedQuickWidget->quickWindow()->activeFocusItem(), event);
QWidget * w = focusedQuickWidget->parentWidget();
if (!event->isAccepted())
qApp->sendEvent(w, event);
return true;
}
}
return QMainWindow::eventFilter(target, event);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-89",
"CWE-327",
"CWE-295"
] | shotcut | f008adc039642307f6ee3378d378cdb842e52c1d | 60,473,514,690,351,200,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 29 | fix upgrade check is not using TLS correctly |
static int vmx_vcpu_setup(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
u32 host_sysenter_cs, msr_low, msr_high;
u32 junk;
u64 host_pat, tsc_this, tsc_base;
unsigned long a;
struct desc_ptr dt;
int i;
unsigned long kvm_vmx_return;
u32 exec_control;
/* I/O */
vmcs_write64(IO_BITMAP_A, __pa(vmx_io_bitmap_a));
vmcs_write64(IO_BITMAP_B, __pa(vmx_io_bitmap_b));
if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(vmx_msr_bitmap_legacy));
vmcs_write64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, -1ull); /* 22.3.1.5 */
/* Control */
vmcs_write32(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL,
vmcs_config.pin_based_exec_ctrl);
exec_control = vmcs_config.cpu_based_exec_ctrl;
if (!vm_need_tpr_shadow(vmx->vcpu.kvm)) {
exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
exec_control |= CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING |
CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING;
#endif
}
if (!enable_ept)
exec_control |= CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING |
CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING |
CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING;
vmcs_write32(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, exec_control);
if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls()) {
exec_control = vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl;
if (!vm_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(vmx->vcpu.kvm))
exec_control &=
~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
if (vmx->vpid == 0)
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID;
if (!enable_ept) {
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT;
enable_unrestricted_guest = 0;
}
if (!enable_unrestricted_guest)
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
if (!ple_gap)
exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING;
vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, exec_control);
}
if (ple_gap) {
vmcs_write32(PLE_GAP, ple_gap);
vmcs_write32(PLE_WINDOW, ple_window);
}
vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK, !!bypass_guest_pf);
vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH, !!bypass_guest_pf);
vmcs_write32(CR3_TARGET_COUNT, 0); /* 22.2.1 */
vmcs_writel(HOST_CR0, read_cr0() | X86_CR0_TS); /* 22.2.3 */
vmcs_writel(HOST_CR4, read_cr4()); /* 22.2.3, 22.2.5 */
vmcs_writel(HOST_CR3, read_cr3()); /* 22.2.3 FIXME: shadow tables */
vmcs_write16(HOST_CS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_CS); /* 22.2.4 */
vmcs_write16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS); /* 22.2.4 */
vmcs_write16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS); /* 22.2.4 */
vmcs_write16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, 0); /* 22.2.4 */
vmcs_write16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, 0); /* 22.2.4 */
vmcs_write16(HOST_SS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS); /* 22.2.4 */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
rdmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, a);
vmcs_writel(HOST_FS_BASE, a); /* 22.2.4 */
rdmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, a);
vmcs_writel(HOST_GS_BASE, a); /* 22.2.4 */
#else
vmcs_writel(HOST_FS_BASE, 0); /* 22.2.4 */
vmcs_writel(HOST_GS_BASE, 0); /* 22.2.4 */
#endif
vmcs_write16(HOST_TR_SELECTOR, GDT_ENTRY_TSS*8); /* 22.2.4 */
native_store_idt(&dt);
vmcs_writel(HOST_IDTR_BASE, dt.address); /* 22.2.4 */
asm("mov $.Lkvm_vmx_return, %0" : "=r"(kvm_vmx_return));
vmcs_writel(HOST_RIP, kvm_vmx_return); /* 22.2.5 */
vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_COUNT, 0);
vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, 0);
vmcs_write64(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autoload.host));
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, 0);
vmcs_write64(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autoload.guest));
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, host_sysenter_cs, junk);
vmcs_write32(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, host_sysenter_cs);
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, a);
vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, a); /* 22.2.3 */
rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, a);
vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, a); /* 22.2.3 */
if (vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, msr_low, msr_high);
host_pat = msr_low | ((u64) msr_high << 32);
vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_PAT, host_pat);
}
if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
rdmsr(MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, msr_low, msr_high);
host_pat = msr_low | ((u64) msr_high << 32);
/* Write the default value follow host pat */
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, host_pat);
/* Keep arch.pat sync with GUEST_IA32_PAT */
vmx->vcpu.arch.pat = host_pat;
}
for (i = 0; i < NR_VMX_MSR; ++i) {
u32 index = vmx_msr_index[i];
u32 data_low, data_high;
int j = vmx->nmsrs;
if (rdmsr_safe(index, &data_low, &data_high) < 0)
continue;
if (wrmsr_safe(index, data_low, data_high) < 0)
continue;
vmx->guest_msrs[j].index = i;
vmx->guest_msrs[j].data = 0;
vmx->guest_msrs[j].mask = -1ull;
++vmx->nmsrs;
}
vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_CONTROLS, vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl);
/* 22.2.1, 20.8.1 */
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS, vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl);
vmcs_writel(CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK, ~0UL);
vmx->vcpu.arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits = KVM_CR4_GUEST_OWNED_BITS;
if (enable_ept)
vmx->vcpu.arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits |= X86_CR4_PGE;
vmcs_writel(CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK, ~vmx->vcpu.arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits);
tsc_base = vmx->vcpu.kvm->arch.vm_init_tsc;
rdtscll(tsc_this);
if (tsc_this < vmx->vcpu.kvm->arch.vm_init_tsc)
tsc_base = tsc_this;
guest_write_tsc(0, tsc_base);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400"
] | linux-2.6 | 9581d442b9058d3699b4be568b6e5eae38a41493 | 121,815,912,626,513,040,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 154 | KVM: Fix fs/gs reload oops with invalid ldt
kvm reloads the host's fs and gs blindly, however the underlying segment
descriptors may be invalid due to the user modifying the ldt after loading
them.
Fix by using the safe accessors (loadsegment() and load_gs_index()) instead
of home grown unsafe versions.
This is CVE-2010-3698.
KVM-Stable-Tag.
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]> |
static void rxrpc_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
rxrpc_free_token_list(prep->payload.data[0]);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | linux | 5f2f97656ada8d811d3c1bef503ced266fcd53a0 | 313,809,915,415,046,580,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | rxrpc: Fix several cases where a padded len isn't checked in ticket decode
This fixes CVE-2017-7482.
When a kerberos 5 ticket is being decoded so that it can be loaded into an
rxrpc-type key, there are several places in which the length of a
variable-length field is checked to make sure that it's not going to
overrun the available data - but the data is padded to the nearest
four-byte boundary and the code doesn't check for this extra. This could
lead to the size-remaining variable wrapping and the data pointer going
over the end of the buffer.
Fix this by making the various variable-length data checks use the padded
length.
Reported-by: 石磊 <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
**/
CImg<T>& load_camera(const unsigned int camera_index=0, const unsigned int skip_frames=0,
const bool release_camera=true, const unsigned int capture_width=0,
const unsigned int capture_height=0) {
#ifdef cimg_use_opencv
if (camera_index>99)
throw CImgArgumentException(_cimg_instance
"load_camera(): Invalid request for camera #%u "
"(no more than 100 cameras can be managed simultaneously).",
cimg_instance,
camera_index);
static CvCapture *capture[100] = { 0 };
static unsigned int capture_w[100], capture_h[100];
if (release_camera) {
cimg::mutex(9);
if (capture[camera_index]) cvReleaseCapture(&(capture[camera_index]));
capture[camera_index] = 0;
capture_w[camera_index] = capture_h[camera_index] = 0;
cimg::mutex(9,0);
return *this;
}
if (!capture[camera_index]) {
cimg::mutex(9);
capture[camera_index] = cvCreateCameraCapture(camera_index);
capture_w[camera_index] = 0;
capture_h[camera_index] = 0;
cimg::mutex(9,0);
if (!capture[camera_index]) {
throw CImgIOException(_cimg_instance
"load_camera(): Failed to initialize camera #%u.",
cimg_instance,
camera_index);
}
}
cimg::mutex(9);
if (capture_width!=capture_w[camera_index]) {
cvSetCaptureProperty(capture[camera_index],CV_CAP_PROP_FRAME_WIDTH,capture_width);
capture_w[camera_index] = capture_width;
}
if (capture_height!=capture_h[camera_index]) {
cvSetCaptureProperty(capture[camera_index],CV_CAP_PROP_FRAME_HEIGHT,capture_height);
capture_h[camera_index] = capture_height;
}
const IplImage *img = 0;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i<skip_frames; ++i) img = cvQueryFrame(capture[camera_index]);
img = cvQueryFrame(capture[camera_index]);
if (img) {
const int step = (int)(img->widthStep - 3*img->width);
assign(img->width,img->height,1,3);
const unsigned char* ptrs = (unsigned char*)img->imageData;
T *ptr_r = data(0,0,0,0), *ptr_g = data(0,0,0,1), *ptr_b = data(0,0,0,2);
if (step>0) cimg_forY(*this,y) {
cimg_forX(*this,x) { *(ptr_b++) = (T)*(ptrs++); *(ptr_g++) = (T)*(ptrs++); *(ptr_r++) = (T)*(ptrs++); }
ptrs+=step;
} else for (ulongT siz = (ulongT)img->width*img->height; siz; --siz) {
*(ptr_b++) = (T)*(ptrs++); *(ptr_g++) = (T)*(ptrs++); *(ptr_r++) = (T)*(ptrs++);
}
}
cimg::mutex(9,0);
return *this;
#else
cimg::unused(camera_index,skip_frames,release_camera,capture_width,capture_height);
throw CImgIOException(_cimg_instance
"load_camera(): This function requires the OpenCV library to run "
"(macro 'cimg_use_opencv' must be defined).",
cimg_instance);
#endif | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CImg | 10af1e8c1ad2a58a0a3342a856bae63e8f257abb | 105,139,628,113,721,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 67 | Fix other issues in 'CImg<T>::load_bmp()'. |
PHP_FUNCTION(exif_read_data)
{
char *p_name, *p_sections_needed = NULL;
size_t p_name_len, p_sections_needed_len = 0;
zend_bool sub_arrays=0, read_thumbnail=0, read_all=0;
int i, ret, sections_needed=0;
image_info_type ImageInfo;
char tmp[64], *sections_str, *s;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "p|sbb", &p_name, &p_name_len, &p_sections_needed, &p_sections_needed_len, &sub_arrays, &read_thumbnail) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
memset(&ImageInfo, 0, sizeof(ImageInfo));
if (p_sections_needed) {
spprintf(§ions_str, 0, ",%s,", p_sections_needed);
/* sections_str DOES start with , and SPACES are NOT allowed in names */
s = sections_str;
while (*++s) {
if (*s == ' ') {
*s = ',';
}
}
for (i = 0; i < SECTION_COUNT; i++) {
snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), ",%s,", exif_get_sectionname(i));
if (strstr(sections_str, tmp)) {
sections_needed |= 1<<i;
}
}
EFREE_IF(sections_str);
/* now see what we need */
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
sections_str = exif_get_sectionlist(sections_needed);
if (!sections_str) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, &ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Sections needed: %s", sections_str[0] ? sections_str : "None");
EFREE_IF(sections_str);
#endif
}
ret = exif_read_file(&ImageInfo, p_name, read_thumbnail, read_all);
sections_str = exif_get_sectionlist(ImageInfo.sections_found);
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
if (sections_str)
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, &ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Sections found: %s", sections_str[0] ? sections_str : "None");
#endif
ImageInfo.sections_found |= FOUND_COMPUTED|FOUND_FILE;/* do not inform about in debug*/
if (ret == FALSE || (sections_needed && !(sections_needed&ImageInfo.sections_found))) {
/* array_init must be checked at last! otherwise the array must be freed if a later test fails. */
exif_discard_imageinfo(&ImageInfo);
EFREE_IF(sections_str);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
array_init(return_value);
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, &ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Generate section FILE");
#endif
/* now we can add our information */
exif_iif_add_str(&ImageInfo, SECTION_FILE, "FileName", ImageInfo.FileName);
exif_iif_add_int(&ImageInfo, SECTION_FILE, "FileDateTime", ImageInfo.FileDateTime);
exif_iif_add_int(&ImageInfo, SECTION_FILE, "FileSize", ImageInfo.FileSize);
exif_iif_add_int(&ImageInfo, SECTION_FILE, "FileType", ImageInfo.FileType);
exif_iif_add_str(&ImageInfo, SECTION_FILE, "MimeType", (char*)php_image_type_to_mime_type(ImageInfo.FileType));
exif_iif_add_str(&ImageInfo, SECTION_FILE, "SectionsFound", sections_str ? sections_str : "NONE");
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, &ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Generate section COMPUTED");
#endif
if (ImageInfo.Width>0 && ImageInfo.Height>0) {
exif_iif_add_fmt(&ImageInfo, SECTION_COMPUTED, "html" , "width=\"%d\" height=\"%d\"", ImageInfo.Width, ImageInfo.Height);
exif_iif_add_int(&ImageInfo, SECTION_COMPUTED, "Height", ImageInfo.Height);
exif_iif_add_int(&ImageInfo, SECTION_COMPUTED, "Width", ImageInfo.Width);
}
exif_iif_add_int(&ImageInfo, SECTION_COMPUTED, "IsColor", ImageInfo.IsColor);
if (ImageInfo.motorola_intel != -1) {
exif_iif_add_int(&ImageInfo, SECTION_COMPUTED, "ByteOrderMotorola", ImageInfo.motorola_intel);
}
if (ImageInfo.FocalLength) {
exif_iif_add_fmt(&ImageInfo, SECTION_COMPUTED, "FocalLength", "%4.1Fmm", ImageInfo.FocalLength);
if(ImageInfo.CCDWidth) {
exif_iif_add_fmt(&ImageInfo, SECTION_COMPUTED, "35mmFocalLength", "%dmm", (int)(ImageInfo.FocalLength/ImageInfo.CCDWidth*35+0.5));
}
}
if(ImageInfo.CCDWidth) {
exif_iif_add_fmt(&ImageInfo, SECTION_COMPUTED, "CCDWidth", "%dmm", (int)ImageInfo.CCDWidth);
}
if(ImageInfo.ExposureTime>0) {
if(ImageInfo.ExposureTime <= 0.5) {
exif_iif_add_fmt(&ImageInfo, SECTION_COMPUTED, "ExposureTime", "%0.3F s (1/%d)", ImageInfo.ExposureTime, (int)(0.5 + 1/ImageInfo.ExposureTime));
} else {
exif_iif_add_fmt(&ImageInfo, SECTION_COMPUTED, "ExposureTime", "%0.3F s", ImageInfo.ExposureTime);
}
}
if(ImageInfo.ApertureFNumber) {
exif_iif_add_fmt(&ImageInfo, SECTION_COMPUTED, "ApertureFNumber", "f/%.1F", ImageInfo.ApertureFNumber);
}
if(ImageInfo.Distance) {
if(ImageInfo.Distance<0) {
exif_iif_add_str(&ImageInfo, SECTION_COMPUTED, "FocusDistance", "Infinite");
} else {
exif_iif_add_fmt(&ImageInfo, SECTION_COMPUTED, "FocusDistance", "%0.2Fm", ImageInfo.Distance);
}
}
if (ImageInfo.UserComment) {
exif_iif_add_buffer(&ImageInfo, SECTION_COMPUTED, "UserComment", ImageInfo.UserCommentLength, ImageInfo.UserComment);
if (ImageInfo.UserCommentEncoding && strlen(ImageInfo.UserCommentEncoding)) {
exif_iif_add_str(&ImageInfo, SECTION_COMPUTED, "UserCommentEncoding", ImageInfo.UserCommentEncoding);
}
}
exif_iif_add_str(&ImageInfo, SECTION_COMPUTED, "Copyright", ImageInfo.Copyright);
exif_iif_add_str(&ImageInfo, SECTION_COMPUTED, "Copyright.Photographer", ImageInfo.CopyrightPhotographer);
exif_iif_add_str(&ImageInfo, SECTION_COMPUTED, "Copyright.Editor", ImageInfo.CopyrightEditor);
for (i=0; i<ImageInfo.xp_fields.count; i++) {
exif_iif_add_str(&ImageInfo, SECTION_WINXP, exif_get_tagname(ImageInfo.xp_fields.list[i].tag, NULL, 0, exif_get_tag_table(SECTION_WINXP)), ImageInfo.xp_fields.list[i].value);
}
if (ImageInfo.Thumbnail.size) {
if (read_thumbnail) {
/* not exif_iif_add_str : this is a buffer */
exif_iif_add_tag(&ImageInfo, SECTION_THUMBNAIL, "THUMBNAIL", TAG_NONE, TAG_FMT_UNDEFINED, ImageInfo.Thumbnail.size, ImageInfo.Thumbnail.data);
}
if (!ImageInfo.Thumbnail.width || !ImageInfo.Thumbnail.height) {
/* try to evaluate if thumbnail data is present */
exif_scan_thumbnail(&ImageInfo);
}
exif_iif_add_int(&ImageInfo, SECTION_COMPUTED, "Thumbnail.FileType", ImageInfo.Thumbnail.filetype);
exif_iif_add_str(&ImageInfo, SECTION_COMPUTED, "Thumbnail.MimeType", (char*)php_image_type_to_mime_type(ImageInfo.Thumbnail.filetype));
}
if (ImageInfo.Thumbnail.width && ImageInfo.Thumbnail.height) {
exif_iif_add_int(&ImageInfo, SECTION_COMPUTED, "Thumbnail.Height", ImageInfo.Thumbnail.height);
exif_iif_add_int(&ImageInfo, SECTION_COMPUTED, "Thumbnail.Width", ImageInfo.Thumbnail.width);
}
EFREE_IF(sections_str);
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, &ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Adding image infos");
#endif
add_assoc_image_info(return_value, sub_arrays, &ImageInfo, SECTION_FILE );
add_assoc_image_info(return_value, 1, &ImageInfo, SECTION_COMPUTED );
add_assoc_image_info(return_value, sub_arrays, &ImageInfo, SECTION_ANY_TAG );
add_assoc_image_info(return_value, sub_arrays, &ImageInfo, SECTION_IFD0 );
add_assoc_image_info(return_value, 1, &ImageInfo, SECTION_THUMBNAIL );
add_assoc_image_info(return_value, 1, &ImageInfo, SECTION_COMMENT );
add_assoc_image_info(return_value, sub_arrays, &ImageInfo, SECTION_EXIF );
add_assoc_image_info(return_value, sub_arrays, &ImageInfo, SECTION_GPS );
add_assoc_image_info(return_value, sub_arrays, &ImageInfo, SECTION_INTEROP );
add_assoc_image_info(return_value, sub_arrays, &ImageInfo, SECTION_FPIX );
add_assoc_image_info(return_value, sub_arrays, &ImageInfo, SECTION_APP12 );
add_assoc_image_info(return_value, sub_arrays, &ImageInfo, SECTION_WINXP );
add_assoc_image_info(return_value, sub_arrays, &ImageInfo, SECTION_MAKERNOTE );
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
exif_error_docref(NULL EXIFERR_CC, &ImageInfo, E_NOTICE, "Discarding info");
#endif
exif_discard_imageinfo(&ImageInfo);
#ifdef EXIF_DEBUG
php_error_docref1(NULL, p_name, E_NOTICE, "done");
#endif
} | 1 | [
"CWE-125"
] | php-src | 887a7b571407f7a49a5e7cf1e612d21ef83fedb4 | 309,824,927,946,323,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 174 | Fixed bug #77831 - Heap-buffer-overflow in exif_iif_add_value in EXIF |
static char *strdup(const char *str)
{
size_t len;
char *dup;
len = strlen(str) + 1;
dup = calloc(len, sizeof(char));
if (!dup)
return NULL;
memcpy(dup, str, len);
return dup;
} | 0 | [] | libconfuse | d73777c2c3566fb2647727bb56d9a2295b81669b | 261,133,547,165,674,520,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | Fix #163: unterminated username used with getpwnam()
Signed-off-by: Joachim Wiberg <[email protected]> |
RGWOpType get_type() override { return RGW_OP_PUT_LC; } | 0 | [
"CWE-770"
] | ceph | ab29bed2fc9f961fe895de1086a8208e21ddaddc | 72,034,991,451,829,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 | rgw: fix issues with 'enforce bounds' patch
The patch to enforce bounds on max-keys/max-uploads/max-parts had a few
issues that would prevent us from compiling it. Instead of changing the
code provided by the submitter, we're addressing them in a separate
commit to maintain the DCO.
Signed-off-by: Joao Eduardo Luis <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Abhishek Lekshmanan <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 29bc434a6a81a2e5c5b8cfc4c8d5c82ca5bf538a)
mimic specific fixes:
As the largeish change from master g_conf() isn't in mimic yet, use the g_conf
global structure, also make rgw_op use the value from req_info ceph context as
we do for all the requests |
sockaddr_setport(struct sockaddr *sa, ev_uint16_t port)
{
if (sa->sa_family == AF_INET) {
((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_port = htons(port);
} else if (sa->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa)->sin6_port = htons(port);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | libevent | 96f64a022014a208105ead6c8a7066018449d86d | 49,592,091,596,307,560,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | evdns: name_parse(): fix remote stack overread
@asn-the-goblin-slayer:
"the name_parse() function in libevent's DNS code is vulnerable to a buffer overread.
971 if (cp != name_out) {
972 if (cp + 1 >= end) return -1;
973 *cp++ = '.';
974 }
975 if (cp + label_len >= end) return -1;
976 memcpy(cp, packet + j, label_len);
977 cp += label_len;
978 j += label_len;
No check is made against length before the memcpy occurs.
This was found through the Tor bug bounty program and the discovery should be credited to 'Guido Vranken'."
Reproducer for gdb (https://gist.github.com/azat/e4fcf540e9b89ab86d02):
set $PROT_NONE=0x0
set $PROT_READ=0x1
set $PROT_WRITE=0x2
set $MAP_ANONYMOUS=0x20
set $MAP_SHARED=0x01
set $MAP_FIXED=0x10
set $MAP_32BIT=0x40
start
set $length=202
# overread
set $length=2
# allocate with mmap to have a seg fault on page boundary
set $l=(1<<20)*2
p mmap(0, $l, $PROT_READ|$PROT_WRITE, $MAP_ANONYMOUS|$MAP_SHARED|$MAP_32BIT, -1, 0)
set $packet=(char *)$1+$l-$length
# hack the packet
set $packet[0]=63
set $packet[1]='/'
p malloc(sizeof(int))
set $idx=(int *)$2
set $idx[0]=0
set $name_out_len=202
p malloc($name_out_len)
set $name_out=$3
# have WRITE only mapping to fail on read
set $end=$1+$l
p (void *)mmap($end, 1<<12, $PROT_NONE, $MAP_ANONYMOUS|$MAP_SHARED|$MAP_FIXED|$MAP_32BIT, -1, 0)
set $m=$4
p name_parse($packet, $length, $idx, $name_out, $name_out_len)
x/2s (char *)$name_out
Before this patch:
$ gdb -ex 'source gdb' dns-example
$1 = 1073741824
$2 = (void *) 0x633010
$3 = (void *) 0x633030
$4 = (void *) 0x40200000
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
__memcpy_sse2_unaligned () at memcpy-sse2-unaligned.S:33
After this patch:
$ gdb -ex 'source gdb' dns-example
$1 = 1073741824
$2 = (void *) 0x633010
$3 = (void *) 0x633030
$4 = (void *) 0x40200000
$5 = -1
0x633030: "/"
0x633032: ""
(gdb) p $m
$6 = (void *) 0x40200000
(gdb) p $1
$7 = 1073741824
(gdb) p/x $1
$8 = 0x40000000
(gdb) quit
P.S. plus drop one condition duplicate.
Fixes: #317 |
static int udf_check_anchor_block(struct super_block *sb, sector_t block,
struct kernel_lb_addr *fileset)
{
struct buffer_head *bh;
uint16_t ident;
int ret;
if (UDF_QUERY_FLAG(sb, UDF_FLAG_VARCONV) &&
udf_fixed_to_variable(block) >=
sb->s_bdev->bd_inode->i_size >> sb->s_blocksize_bits)
return 0;
bh = udf_read_tagged(sb, block, block, &ident);
if (!bh)
return 0;
if (ident != TAG_IDENT_AVDP) {
brelse(bh);
return 0;
}
ret = udf_load_sequence(sb, bh, fileset);
brelse(bh);
return ret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | linux | 1df2ae31c724e57be9d7ac00d78db8a5dabdd050 | 268,115,529,422,204,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 | udf: Fortify loading of sparing table
Add sanity checks when loading sparing table from disk to avoid accessing
unallocated memory or writing to it.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]> |
int ida_pre_get(struct ida *ida, gfp_t gfp_mask)
{
/* allocate idr_layers */
if (!idr_pre_get(&ida->idr, gfp_mask))
return 0;
/* allocate free_bitmap */
if (!ida->free_bitmap) {
struct ida_bitmap *bitmap;
bitmap = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ida_bitmap), gfp_mask);
if (!bitmap)
return 0;
free_bitmap(ida, bitmap);
}
return 1;
} | 0 | [] | linux | 2dcb22b346be7b7b7e630a8970d69cf3f1111ec1 | 297,893,465,646,270,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | idr: fix backtrack logic in idr_remove_all
Currently idr_remove_all will fail with a use after free error if
idr::layers is bigger than 2, which on 32 bit systems corresponds to items
more than 1024. This is due to stepping back too many levels during
backtracking. For simplicity let's assume that IDR_BITS=1 -> we have 2
nodes at each level below the root node and each leaf node stores two IDs.
(In reality for 32 bit systems IDR_BITS=5, with 32 nodes at each sub-root
level and 32 IDs in each leaf node). The sequence of freeing the nodes at
the moment is as follows:
layer
1 -> a(7)
2 -> b(3) c(5)
3 -> d(1) e(2) f(4) g(6)
Until step 4 things go fine, but then node c is freed, whereas node g
should be freed first. Since node c contains the pointer to node g we'll
have a use after free error at step 6.
How many levels we step back after visiting the leaf nodes is currently
determined by the msb of the id we are currently visiting:
Step
1. node d with IDs 0,1 is freed, current ID is advanced to 2.
msb of the current ID bit 1. This means we need to step back
1 level to node b and take the next sibling, node e.
2-3. node e with IDs 2,3 is freed, current ID is 4, msb is bit 2.
This means we need to step back 2 levels to node a, freeing
node b on the way.
4-5. node f with IDs 4,5 is freed, current ID is 6, msb is still
bit 2. This means we again need to step back 2 levels to node
a and free c on the way.
6. We should visit node g, but its pointer is not available as
node c was freed.
The fix changes how we determine the number of levels to step back.
Instead of deducting this merely from the msb of the current ID, we should
really check if advancing the ID causes an overflow to a bit position
corresponding to a given layer. In the above example overflow from bit 0
to bit 1 should mean stepping back 1 level. Overflow from bit 1 to bit 2
should mean stepping back 2 levels and so on.
The fix was tested with IDs up to 1 << 20, which corresponds to 4 layers
on 32 bit systems.
Signed-off-by: Imre Deak <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> [2.6.34.1]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
int kvm_arch_hardware_enable(void)
{
/* every s390 is virtualization enabled ;-) */
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | linux | 0774a964ef561b7170d8d1b1bfe6f88002b6d219 | 143,943,492,953,819,730,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | KVM: Fix out of range accesses to memslots
Reset the LRU slot if it becomes invalid when deleting a memslot to fix
an out-of-bounds/use-after-free access when searching through memslots.
Explicitly check for there being no used slots in search_memslots(), and
in the caller of s390's approximation variant.
Fixes: 36947254e5f9 ("KVM: Dynamically size memslot array based on number of used slots")
Reported-by: Qian Cai <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> |
rdata2sockaddr(const struct packed_rrset_data* rd, uint16_t rtype, size_t i,
struct sockaddr_storage* ss, socklen_t* addrlenp)
{
/* unbound can accept and cache odd-length AAAA/A records, so we have
* to validate the length. */
if(rtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_A && rd->rr_len[i] == 6) {
struct sockaddr_in* sa4 = (struct sockaddr_in*)ss;
memset(sa4, 0, sizeof(*sa4));
sa4->sin_family = AF_INET;
memcpy(&sa4->sin_addr, rd->rr_data[i] + 2,
sizeof(sa4->sin_addr));
*addrlenp = sizeof(*sa4);
return 1;
} else if(rtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_AAAA && rd->rr_len[i] == 18) {
struct sockaddr_in6* sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6*)ss;
memset(sa6, 0, sizeof(*sa6));
sa6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
memcpy(&sa6->sin6_addr, rd->rr_data[i] + 2,
sizeof(sa6->sin6_addr));
*addrlenp = sizeof(*sa6);
return 1;
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | unbound | 02080f6b180232f43b77f403d0c038e9360a460f | 303,698,028,139,607,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 | - Fix Integer Overflows in Size Calculations,
reported by X41 D-Sec. |
ere_char (c)
int c;
{
switch (c)
{
case '.':
case '[':
case '\\':
case '(':
case ')':
case '*':
case '+':
case '?':
case '{':
case '|':
case '^':
case '$':
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
return (0);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-273",
"CWE-787"
] | bash | 951bdaad7a18cc0dc1036bba86b18b90874d39ff | 183,740,538,309,757,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 | commit bash-20190628 snapshot |
xmlSchemaGetFreshElemInfo(xmlSchemaValidCtxtPtr vctxt)
{
xmlSchemaNodeInfoPtr info = NULL;
if (vctxt->depth > vctxt->sizeElemInfos) {
VERROR_INT("xmlSchemaGetFreshElemInfo",
"inconsistent depth encountered");
return (NULL);
}
if (vctxt->elemInfos == NULL) {
vctxt->elemInfos = (xmlSchemaNodeInfoPtr *)
xmlMalloc(10 * sizeof(xmlSchemaNodeInfoPtr));
if (vctxt->elemInfos == NULL) {
xmlSchemaVErrMemory(vctxt,
"allocating the element info array", NULL);
return (NULL);
}
memset(vctxt->elemInfos, 0, 10 * sizeof(xmlSchemaNodeInfoPtr));
vctxt->sizeElemInfos = 10;
} else if (vctxt->sizeElemInfos <= vctxt->depth) {
int i = vctxt->sizeElemInfos;
vctxt->sizeElemInfos *= 2;
vctxt->elemInfos = (xmlSchemaNodeInfoPtr *)
xmlRealloc(vctxt->elemInfos, vctxt->sizeElemInfos *
sizeof(xmlSchemaNodeInfoPtr));
if (vctxt->elemInfos == NULL) {
xmlSchemaVErrMemory(vctxt,
"re-allocating the element info array", NULL);
return (NULL);
}
/*
* We need the new memory to be NULLed.
* TODO: Use memset instead?
*/
for (; i < vctxt->sizeElemInfos; i++)
vctxt->elemInfos[i] = NULL;
} else
info = vctxt->elemInfos[vctxt->depth];
if (info == NULL) {
info = (xmlSchemaNodeInfoPtr)
xmlMalloc(sizeof(xmlSchemaNodeInfo));
if (info == NULL) {
xmlSchemaVErrMemory(vctxt,
"allocating an element info", NULL);
return (NULL);
}
vctxt->elemInfos[vctxt->depth] = info;
} else {
if (info->localName != NULL) {
VERROR_INT("xmlSchemaGetFreshElemInfo",
"elem info has not been cleared");
return (NULL);
}
}
memset(info, 0, sizeof(xmlSchemaNodeInfo));
info->nodeType = XML_ELEMENT_NODE;
info->depth = vctxt->depth;
return (info);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-134"
] | libxml2 | 4472c3a5a5b516aaf59b89be602fbce52756c3e9 | 338,720,293,883,197,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 62 | Fix some format string warnings with possible format string vulnerability
For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=761029
Decorate every method in libxml2 with the appropriate
LIBXML_ATTR_FORMAT(fmt,args) macro and add some cleanups
following the reports. |
static int jpc_dec_process_siz(jpc_dec_t *dec, jpc_ms_t *ms)
{
jpc_siz_t *siz = &ms->parms.siz;
int compno;
int tileno;
jpc_dec_tile_t *tile;
jpc_dec_tcomp_t *tcomp;
int htileno;
int vtileno;
jpc_dec_cmpt_t *cmpt;
dec->xstart = siz->xoff;
dec->ystart = siz->yoff;
dec->xend = siz->width;
dec->yend = siz->height;
dec->tilewidth = siz->tilewidth;
dec->tileheight = siz->tileheight;
dec->tilexoff = siz->tilexoff;
dec->tileyoff = siz->tileyoff;
dec->numcomps = siz->numcomps;
if (!(dec->cp = jpc_dec_cp_create(dec->numcomps))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(dec->cmpts = jas_alloc2(dec->numcomps, sizeof(jpc_dec_cmpt_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (compno = 0, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno < dec->numcomps; ++compno,
++cmpt) {
cmpt->prec = siz->comps[compno].prec;
cmpt->sgnd = siz->comps[compno].sgnd;
cmpt->hstep = siz->comps[compno].hsamp;
cmpt->vstep = siz->comps[compno].vsamp;
cmpt->width = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xend, cmpt->hstep) -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xstart, cmpt->hstep);
cmpt->height = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->yend, cmpt->vstep) -
JPC_CEILDIV(dec->ystart, cmpt->vstep);
cmpt->hsubstep = 0;
cmpt->vsubstep = 0;
}
dec->image = 0;
dec->numhtiles = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->xend - dec->tilexoff, dec->tilewidth);
dec->numvtiles = JPC_CEILDIV(dec->yend - dec->tileyoff, dec->tileheight);
dec->numtiles = dec->numhtiles * dec->numvtiles;
if (!(dec->tiles = jas_alloc2(dec->numtiles, sizeof(jpc_dec_tile_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (tileno = 0, tile = dec->tiles; tileno < dec->numtiles; ++tileno,
++tile) {
htileno = tileno % dec->numhtiles;
vtileno = tileno / dec->numhtiles;
tile->realmode = 0;
tile->state = JPC_TILE_INIT;
tile->xstart = JAS_MAX(dec->tilexoff + htileno * dec->tilewidth,
dec->xstart);
tile->ystart = JAS_MAX(dec->tileyoff + vtileno * dec->tileheight,
dec->ystart);
tile->xend = JAS_MIN(dec->tilexoff + (htileno + 1) *
dec->tilewidth, dec->xend);
tile->yend = JAS_MIN(dec->tileyoff + (vtileno + 1) *
dec->tileheight, dec->yend);
tile->numparts = 0;
tile->partno = 0;
tile->pkthdrstream = 0;
tile->pkthdrstreampos = 0;
tile->pptstab = 0;
tile->cp = 0;
if (!(tile->tcomps = jas_alloc2(dec->numcomps,
sizeof(jpc_dec_tcomp_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (compno = 0, cmpt = dec->cmpts, tcomp = tile->tcomps;
compno < dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++cmpt, ++tcomp) {
tcomp->rlvls = 0;
tcomp->numrlvls = 0;
tcomp->data = 0;
tcomp->xstart = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xstart, cmpt->hstep);
tcomp->ystart = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->ystart, cmpt->vstep);
tcomp->xend = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xend, cmpt->hstep);
tcomp->yend = JPC_CEILDIV(tile->yend, cmpt->vstep);
tcomp->tsfb = 0;
}
}
dec->pkthdrstreams = 0;
/* We should expect to encounter other main header marker segments
or an SOT marker segment next. */
dec->state = JPC_MH;
return 0;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-476"
] | jasper | 69a1439a5381e42b06ec6a06ed2675eb793babee | 234,174,810,931,667,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 96 | The member (pi) in tiles was not properly initialized.
This is now corrected.
Also, each tile is now only cleaned up once. |
fd_ispipe (fd)
int fd;
{
errno = 0;
return ((lseek (fd, 0L, SEEK_CUR) < 0) && (errno == ESPIPE));
} | 0 | [] | bash | 955543877583837c85470f7fb8a97b7aa8d45e6c | 334,518,582,614,410,180,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | bash-4.4-rc2 release |
archive_read_format_rar_bid(struct archive_read *a, int best_bid)
{
const char *p;
/* If there's already a bid > 30, we'll never win. */
if (best_bid > 30)
return (-1);
if ((p = __archive_read_ahead(a, 7, NULL)) == NULL)
return (-1);
if (memcmp(p, RAR_SIGNATURE, 7) == 0)
return (30);
if ((p[0] == 'M' && p[1] == 'Z') || memcmp(p, "\x7F\x45LF", 4) == 0) {
/* This is a PE file */
ssize_t offset = 0x10000;
ssize_t window = 4096;
ssize_t bytes_avail;
while (offset + window <= (1024 * 128)) {
const char *buff = __archive_read_ahead(a, offset + window, &bytes_avail);
if (buff == NULL) {
/* Remaining bytes are less than window. */
window >>= 1;
if (window < 0x40)
return (0);
continue;
}
p = buff + offset;
while (p + 7 < buff + bytes_avail) {
if (memcmp(p, RAR_SIGNATURE, 7) == 0)
return (30);
p += 0x10;
}
offset = p - buff;
}
}
return (0);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | libarchive | 05caadc7eedbef471ac9610809ba683f0c698700 | 325,194,919,359,807,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 39 | Issue 719: Fix for TALOS-CAN-154
A RAR file with an invalid zero dictionary size was not being
rejected, leading to a zero-sized allocation for the dictionary
storage which was then overwritten during the dictionary initialization.
Thanks to the Open Source and Threat Intelligence project at Cisco for
reporting this. |
static u8 dccp_feat_is_valid_nn_val(u8 feat_num, u64 val)
{
switch (feat_num) {
case DCCPF_ACK_RATIO:
return val <= DCCPF_ACK_RATIO_MAX;
case DCCPF_SEQUENCE_WINDOW:
return val >= DCCPF_SEQ_WMIN && val <= DCCPF_SEQ_WMAX;
}
return 0; /* feature unknown - so we can't tell */
} | 0 | [
"CWE-401"
] | linux | 1d3ff0950e2b40dc861b1739029649d03f591820 | 109,978,286,394,121,220,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | dccp: Fix memleak in __feat_register_sp
If dccp_feat_push_change fails, we forget free the mem
which is alloced by kmemdup in dccp_feat_clone_sp_val.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: e8ef967a54f4 ("dccp: Registration routines for changing feature values")
Reviewed-by: Mukesh Ojha <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
virtual bool hash_join_is_possible() { return TRUE; } | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-703"
] | server | 08c7ab404f69d9c4ca6ca7a9cf7eec74c804f917 | 233,125,636,710,575,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 1 | MDEV-24176 Server crashes after insert in the table with virtual
column generated using date_format() and if()
vcol_info->expr is allocated on expr_arena at parsing stage. Since
expr item is allocated on expr_arena all its containee items must be
allocated on expr_arena too. Otherwise fix_session_expr() will
encounter prematurely freed item.
When table is reopened from cache vcol_info contains stale
expression. We refresh expression via TABLE::vcol_fix_exprs() but
first we must prepare a proper context (Vcol_expr_context) which meets
some requirements:
1. As noted above expr update must be done on expr_arena as there may
be new items created. It was a bug in fix_session_expr_for_read() and
was just not reproduced because of no second refix. Now refix is done
for more cases so it does reproduce. Tests affected: vcol.binlog
2. Also name resolution context must be narrowed to the single table.
Tested by: vcol.update main.default vcol.vcol_syntax gcol.gcol_bugfixes
3. sql_mode must be clean and not fail expr update.
sql_mode such as MODE_NO_BACKSLASH_ESCAPES, MODE_NO_ZERO_IN_DATE, etc
must not affect vcol expression update. If the table was created
successfully any further evaluation must not fail. Tests affected:
main.func_like
Reviewed by: Sergei Golubchik <[email protected]> |
Media_Block_Obj Parser::parse_media_block()
{
stack.push_back(Scope::Media);
Media_Block_Obj media_block = SASS_MEMORY_NEW(Media_Block, pstate, {}, {});
media_block->media_queries(parse_media_queries());
Media_Block_Obj prev_media_block = last_media_block;
last_media_block = media_block;
media_block->block(parse_css_block());
last_media_block = prev_media_block;
stack.pop_back();
return media_block.detach();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | libsass | eb15533b07773c30dc03c9d742865604f47120ef | 86,906,958,244,780,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | Fix memory leak in `parse_ie_keyword_arg`
`kwd_arg` would never get freed when there was a parse error in
`parse_ie_keyword_arg`.
Closes #2656 |
m4_dnl (struct obstack *obs, int argc, token_data **argv)
{
if (bad_argc (argv[0], argc, 1, 1))
return;
skip_line ();
} | 0 | [] | m4 | 5345bb49077bfda9fabd048e563f9e7077fe335d | 45,773,817,996,351,510,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | Minor security fix: Quote output of mkstemp.
* src/builtin.c (mkstemp_helper): Produce quoted output.
* doc/m4.texinfo (Mkstemp): Update the documentation and tests.
* NEWS: Document this change.
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit bd9900d65eb9cd5add0f107e94b513fa267495ba) |
maybe_autotrim(void)
{
/* Trim only when in normal mode, the coefficients are fresh, the current
offset is above the threshold and the system clock is synchronized */
if (operating_mode != OM_NORMAL || !coefs_valid || n_samples_since_regression)
return;
if (autotrim_threshold <= 0.0 || fabs(coef_seconds_fast) < autotrim_threshold)
return;
if (REF_GetOurStratum() >= 16)
return;
RTC_Linux_Trim();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-59"
] | chrony | e18903a6b56341481a2e08469c0602010bf7bfe3 | 63,798,458,850,200,890,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | switch to new util file functions
Replace all fopen(), rename(), and unlink() calls with the new util
functions. |
static int ext4_ext_zeroout(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_extent *ex)
{
int ret = -EIO;
struct bio *bio;
int blkbits, blocksize;
sector_t ee_pblock;
struct completion event;
unsigned int ee_len, len, done, offset;
blkbits = inode->i_blkbits;
blocksize = inode->i_sb->s_blocksize;
ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
ee_pblock = ext_pblock(ex);
/* convert ee_pblock to 512 byte sectors */
ee_pblock = ee_pblock << (blkbits - 9);
while (ee_len > 0) {
if (ee_len > BIO_MAX_PAGES)
len = BIO_MAX_PAGES;
else
len = ee_len;
bio = bio_alloc(GFP_NOIO, len);
bio->bi_sector = ee_pblock;
bio->bi_bdev = inode->i_sb->s_bdev;
done = 0;
offset = 0;
while (done < len) {
ret = bio_add_page(bio, ZERO_PAGE(0),
blocksize, offset);
if (ret != blocksize) {
/*
* We can't add any more pages because of
* hardware limitations. Start a new bio.
*/
break;
}
done++;
offset += blocksize;
if (offset >= PAGE_CACHE_SIZE)
offset = 0;
}
init_completion(&event);
bio->bi_private = &event;
bio->bi_end_io = bi_complete;
submit_bio(WRITE, bio);
wait_for_completion(&event);
if (test_bit(BIO_UPTODATE, &bio->bi_flags))
ret = 0;
else {
ret = -EIO;
break;
}
bio_put(bio);
ee_len -= done;
ee_pblock += done << (blkbits - 9);
}
return ret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703"
] | linux | 744692dc059845b2a3022119871846e74d4f6e11 | 209,351,751,417,402,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 65 | ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]> |
static inline int cipso_v4_cache_add(const struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
{
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703"
] | linux | f2e5ddcc0d12f9c4c7b254358ad245c9dddce13b | 197,385,820,593,892,170,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | net: fix cipso packet validation when !NETLABEL
When CONFIG_NETLABEL is disabled, the cipso_v4_validate() function could loop
forever in the main loop if opt[opt_iter +1] == 0, this will causing a kernel
crash in an SMP system, since the CPU executing this function will
stall /not respond to IPIs.
This problem can be reproduced by running the IP Stack Integrity Checker
(http://isic.sourceforge.net) using the following command on a Linux machine
connected to DUT:
"icmpsic -s rand -d <DUT IP address> -r 123456"
wait (1-2 min)
Signed-off-by: Seif Mazareeb <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
static int thread_cpu_timer_create(struct k_itimer *timer)
{
timer->it_clock = THREAD_CLOCK;
return posix_cpu_timer_create(timer);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-189"
] | linux | f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d | 60,582,985,285,644,390,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
xmlDOMWrapAdoptBranch(xmlDOMWrapCtxtPtr ctxt,
xmlDocPtr sourceDoc,
xmlNodePtr node,
xmlDocPtr destDoc,
xmlNodePtr destParent,
int options ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
{
int ret = 0;
xmlNodePtr cur, curElem = NULL;
xmlNsMapPtr nsMap = NULL;
xmlNsMapItemPtr mi;
xmlNsPtr ns = NULL;
int depth = -1, adoptStr = 1;
/* gather @parent's ns-decls. */
int parnsdone;
/* @ancestorsOnly should be set per option. */
int ancestorsOnly = 0;
/*
* Optimize string adoption for equal or none dicts.
*/
if ((sourceDoc != NULL) &&
(sourceDoc->dict == destDoc->dict))
adoptStr = 0;
else
adoptStr = 1;
/*
* Get the ns-map from the context if available.
*/
if (ctxt)
nsMap = (xmlNsMapPtr) ctxt->namespaceMap;
/*
* Disable search for ns-decls in the parent-axis of the
* destination element, if:
* 1) there's no destination parent
* 2) custom ns-reference handling is used
*/
if ((destParent == NULL) ||
(ctxt && ctxt->getNsForNodeFunc))
{
parnsdone = 1;
} else
parnsdone = 0;
cur = node;
if ((cur != NULL) && (cur->type == XML_NAMESPACE_DECL))
goto internal_error;
while (cur != NULL) {
/*
* Paranoid source-doc sanity check.
*/
if (cur->doc != sourceDoc) {
/*
* We'll assume XIncluded nodes if the doc differs.
* TODO: Do we need to reconciliate XIncluded nodes?
* This here skips XIncluded nodes and tries to handle
* broken sequences.
*/
if (cur->next == NULL)
goto leave_node;
do {
cur = cur->next;
if ((cur->type == XML_XINCLUDE_END) ||
(cur->doc == node->doc))
break;
} while (cur->next != NULL);
if (cur->doc != node->doc)
goto leave_node;
}
cur->doc = destDoc;
switch (cur->type) {
case XML_XINCLUDE_START:
case XML_XINCLUDE_END:
/*
* TODO
*/
return (-1);
case XML_ELEMENT_NODE:
curElem = cur;
depth++;
/*
* Namespace declarations.
* - ns->href and ns->prefix are never in the dict, so
* we need not move the values over to the destination dict.
* - Note that for custom handling of ns-references,
* the ns-decls need not be stored in the ns-map,
* since they won't be referenced by node->ns.
*/
if ((cur->nsDef) &&
((ctxt == NULL) || (ctxt->getNsForNodeFunc == NULL)))
{
if (! parnsdone) {
/*
* Gather @parent's in-scope ns-decls.
*/
if (xmlDOMWrapNSNormGatherInScopeNs(&nsMap,
destParent) == -1)
goto internal_error;
parnsdone = 1;
}
for (ns = cur->nsDef; ns != NULL; ns = ns->next) {
/*
* NOTE: ns->prefix and ns->href are never in the dict.
* XML_TREE_ADOPT_STR(ns->prefix)
* XML_TREE_ADOPT_STR(ns->href)
*/
/*
* Does it shadow any ns-decl?
*/
if (XML_NSMAP_NOTEMPTY(nsMap)) {
XML_NSMAP_FOREACH(nsMap, mi) {
if ((mi->depth >= XML_TREE_NSMAP_PARENT) &&
(mi->shadowDepth == -1) &&
((ns->prefix == mi->newNs->prefix) ||
xmlStrEqual(ns->prefix,
mi->newNs->prefix))) {
mi->shadowDepth = depth;
}
}
}
/*
* Push mapping.
*/
if (xmlDOMWrapNsMapAddItem(&nsMap, -1,
ns, ns, depth) == NULL)
goto internal_error;
}
}
/* Falls through. */
case XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE:
/* No namespace, no fun. */
if (cur->ns == NULL)
goto ns_end;
if (! parnsdone) {
if (xmlDOMWrapNSNormGatherInScopeNs(&nsMap,
destParent) == -1)
goto internal_error;
parnsdone = 1;
}
/*
* Adopt ns-references.
*/
if (XML_NSMAP_NOTEMPTY(nsMap)) {
/*
* Search for a mapping.
*/
XML_NSMAP_FOREACH(nsMap, mi) {
if ((mi->shadowDepth == -1) &&
(cur->ns == mi->oldNs)) {
cur->ns = mi->newNs;
goto ns_end;
}
}
}
/*
* No matching namespace in scope. We need a new one.
*/
if ((ctxt) && (ctxt->getNsForNodeFunc)) {
/*
* User-defined behaviour.
*/
ns = ctxt->getNsForNodeFunc(ctxt, cur,
cur->ns->href, cur->ns->prefix);
/*
* Insert mapping if ns is available; it's the users fault
* if not.
*/
if (xmlDOMWrapNsMapAddItem(&nsMap, -1,
cur->ns, ns, XML_TREE_NSMAP_CUSTOM) == NULL)
goto internal_error;
cur->ns = ns;
} else {
/*
* Acquire a normalized ns-decl and add it to the map.
*/
if (xmlDOMWrapNSNormAcquireNormalizedNs(destDoc,
/* ns-decls on curElem or on destDoc->oldNs */
destParent ? curElem : NULL,
cur->ns, &ns,
&nsMap, depth,
ancestorsOnly,
/* ns-decls must be prefixed for attributes. */
(cur->type == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE) ? 1 : 0) == -1)
goto internal_error;
cur->ns = ns;
}
ns_end:
/*
* Further node properties.
* TODO: Is this all?
*/
XML_TREE_ADOPT_STR(cur->name)
if (cur->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) {
cur->psvi = NULL;
cur->line = 0;
cur->extra = 0;
/*
* Walk attributes.
*/
if (cur->properties != NULL) {
/*
* Process first attribute node.
*/
cur = (xmlNodePtr) cur->properties;
continue;
}
} else {
/*
* Attributes.
*/
if ((sourceDoc != NULL) &&
(((xmlAttrPtr) cur)->atype == XML_ATTRIBUTE_ID))
{
xmlRemoveID(sourceDoc, (xmlAttrPtr) cur);
}
((xmlAttrPtr) cur)->atype = 0;
((xmlAttrPtr) cur)->psvi = NULL;
}
break;
case XML_TEXT_NODE:
case XML_CDATA_SECTION_NODE:
/*
* This puts the content in the dest dict, only if
* it was previously in the source dict.
*/
XML_TREE_ADOPT_STR_2(cur->content)
goto leave_node;
case XML_ENTITY_REF_NODE:
/*
* Remove reference to the entity-node.
*/
cur->content = NULL;
cur->children = NULL;
cur->last = NULL;
if ((destDoc->intSubset) || (destDoc->extSubset)) {
xmlEntityPtr ent;
/*
* Assign new entity-node if available.
*/
ent = xmlGetDocEntity(destDoc, cur->name);
if (ent != NULL) {
cur->content = ent->content;
cur->children = (xmlNodePtr) ent;
cur->last = (xmlNodePtr) ent;
}
}
goto leave_node;
case XML_PI_NODE:
XML_TREE_ADOPT_STR(cur->name)
XML_TREE_ADOPT_STR_2(cur->content)
break;
case XML_COMMENT_NODE:
break;
default:
goto internal_error;
}
/*
* Walk the tree.
*/
if (cur->children != NULL) {
cur = cur->children;
continue;
}
leave_node:
if (cur == node)
break;
if ((cur->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE) ||
(cur->type == XML_XINCLUDE_START) ||
(cur->type == XML_XINCLUDE_END))
{
/*
* TODO: Do we expect nsDefs on XML_XINCLUDE_START?
*/
if (XML_NSMAP_NOTEMPTY(nsMap)) {
/*
* Pop mappings.
*/
while ((nsMap->last != NULL) &&
(nsMap->last->depth >= depth))
{
XML_NSMAP_POP(nsMap, mi)
}
/*
* Unshadow.
*/
XML_NSMAP_FOREACH(nsMap, mi) {
if (mi->shadowDepth >= depth)
mi->shadowDepth = -1;
}
}
depth--;
}
if (cur->next != NULL)
cur = cur->next;
else if ((cur->type == XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE) &&
(cur->parent->children != NULL))
{
cur = cur->parent->children;
} else {
cur = cur->parent;
goto leave_node;
}
}
goto exit;
internal_error:
ret = -1;
exit:
/*
* Cleanup.
*/
if (nsMap != NULL) {
if ((ctxt) && (ctxt->namespaceMap == nsMap)) {
/*
* Just cleanup the map but don't free.
*/
if (nsMap->first) {
if (nsMap->pool)
nsMap->last->next = nsMap->pool;
nsMap->pool = nsMap->first;
nsMap->first = NULL;
}
} else
xmlDOMWrapNsMapFree(nsMap);
}
return(ret);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | libxml2 | 6c283d83eccd940bcde15634ac8c7f100e3caefd | 277,769,405,091,900,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 336 | [CVE-2022-29824] Fix integer overflows in xmlBuf and xmlBuffer
In several places, the code handling string buffers didn't check for
integer overflow or used wrong types for buffer sizes. This could
result in out-of-bounds writes or other memory errors when working on
large, multi-gigabyte buffers.
Thanks to Felix Wilhelm for the report. |
struct yang_data *yang_data_new_enum(const char *xpath, int value)
{
const struct lysc_node *snode;
const struct lysc_node_leaf *sleaf;
const struct lysc_type_enum *type;
const struct lysc_type_bitenum_item *enums;
snode = lys_find_path(ly_native_ctx, NULL, xpath, 0);
if (snode == NULL) {
flog_err(EC_LIB_YANG_UNKNOWN_DATA_PATH,
"%s: unknown data path: %s", __func__, xpath);
zlog_backtrace(LOG_ERR);
abort();
}
assert(snode->nodetype == LYS_LEAF);
sleaf = (const struct lysc_node_leaf *)snode;
type = (const struct lysc_type_enum *)sleaf->type;
assert(type->basetype == LY_TYPE_ENUM);
enums = type->enums;
unsigned int count = LY_ARRAY_COUNT(enums);
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
if (CHECK_FLAG(enums[i].flags, LYS_SET_VALUE)
&& value == enums[i].value)
return yang_data_new(xpath, enums[i].name);
}
flog_err(EC_LIB_YANG_DATA_CONVERT,
"%s: couldn't convert enum to string [xpath %s]", __func__,
xpath);
zlog_backtrace(LOG_ERR);
abort();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | frr | ac3133450de12ba86c051265fc0f1b12bc57b40c | 53,522,425,083,760,420,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 33 | isisd: fix #10505 using base64 encoding
Using base64 instead of the raw string to encode
the binary data.
Signed-off-by: whichbug <[email protected]> |
static void setup_pdev_dma_masks(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
pdev->dev.dma_parms = &pdev->dma_parms;
if (!pdev->dev.coherent_dma_mask)
pdev->dev.coherent_dma_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(32);
if (!pdev->dev.dma_mask) {
pdev->platform_dma_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(32);
pdev->dev.dma_mask = &pdev->platform_dma_mask;
}
}; | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | linux | aa838896d87af561a33ecefea1caa4c15a68bc47 | 80,760,806,944,455,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | drivers core: Use sysfs_emit and sysfs_emit_at for show(device *...) functions
Convert the various sprintf fmaily calls in sysfs device show functions
to sysfs_emit and sysfs_emit_at for PAGE_SIZE buffer safety.
Done with:
$ spatch -sp-file sysfs_emit_dev.cocci --in-place --max-width=80 .
And cocci script:
$ cat sysfs_emit_dev.cocci
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
return
- sprintf(buf,
+ sysfs_emit(buf,
...);
...>
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
return
- snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+ sysfs_emit(buf,
...);
...>
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
return
- scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+ sysfs_emit(buf,
...);
...>
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
expression chr;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
return
- strcpy(buf, chr);
+ sysfs_emit(buf, chr);
...>
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
len =
- sprintf(buf,
+ sysfs_emit(buf,
...);
...>
return len;
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
len =
- snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+ sysfs_emit(buf,
...);
...>
return len;
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
len =
- scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+ sysfs_emit(buf,
...);
...>
return len;
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
identifier len;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
<...
- len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+ len += sysfs_emit_at(buf, len,
...);
...>
return len;
}
@@
identifier d_show;
identifier dev, attr, buf;
expression chr;
@@
ssize_t d_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
...
- strcpy(buf, chr);
- return strlen(buf);
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, chr);
}
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/3d033c33056d88bbe34d4ddb62afd05ee166ab9a.1600285923.git.joe@perches.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> |
void session_set_recv_data_notify(Session *session, RecvDataNotify notify_func,
gpointer data)
{
session->recv_data_notify = notify_func;
session->recv_data_notify_data = data;
} | 0 | [] | claws | fcc25329049b6f9bd8d890f1197ed61eb12e14d5 | 131,937,310,772,790,420,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | fix STARTTLS protocol violation
with thanks to, and patch by Damian Poddebniak and Hanno Böck |
static inline bool proc_inode_is_dead(struct inode *inode)
{
return !proc_pid(inode)->tasks[PIDTYPE_PID].first;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-362"
] | linux | 8148a73c9901a8794a50f950083c00ccf97d43b3 | 46,675,180,788,086,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]>
Cc: Emese Revfy <[email protected]>
Cc: Pax Team <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <[email protected]>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <[email protected]>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
static int cookie_output(struct CookieInfo *c, const char *dumphere)
{
struct Cookie *co;
FILE *out;
bool use_stdout=FALSE;
if((NULL == c) || (0 == c->numcookies))
/* If there are no known cookies, we don't write or even create any
destination file */
return 0;
/* at first, remove expired cookies */
remove_expired(c);
if(strequal("-", dumphere)) {
/* use stdout */
out = stdout;
use_stdout=TRUE;
}
else {
out = fopen(dumphere, "w");
if(!out)
return 1; /* failure */
}
if(c) {
char *format_ptr;
fputs("# Netscape HTTP Cookie File\n"
"# http://curl.haxx.se/docs/http-cookies.html\n"
"# This file was generated by libcurl! Edit at your own risk.\n\n",
out);
co = c->cookies;
while(co) {
format_ptr = get_netscape_format(co);
if(format_ptr == NULL) {
fprintf(out, "#\n# Fatal libcurl error\n");
if(!use_stdout)
fclose(out);
return 1;
}
fprintf(out, "%s\n", format_ptr);
free(format_ptr);
co=co->next;
}
}
if(!use_stdout)
fclose(out);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | curl | b5f947b8ac0e282c61c75b69cd5b9d37dafc6959 | 9,756,049,655,808,969,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 53 | cookie: cookie parser out of boundary memory access
The internal libcurl function called sanitize_cookie_path() that cleans
up the path element as given to it from a remote site or when read from
a file, did not properly validate the input. If given a path that
consisted of a single double-quote, libcurl would index a newly
allocated memory area with index -1 and assign a zero to it, thus
destroying heap memory it wasn't supposed to.
CVE-2015-3145
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20150422C.html
Reported-by: Hanno Böck |
read_string_decrypt(bufinfo_T *bi, int len)
{
char_u *ptr = alloc((unsigned)len + 1);
if (ptr != NULL)
{
if (len > 0 && undo_read(bi, ptr, len) == FAIL)
{
vim_free(ptr);
return NULL;
}
ptr[len] = NUL;
#ifdef FEAT_CRYPT
if (bi->bi_state != NULL && bi->bi_buffer == NULL)
crypt_decode_inplace(bi->bi_state, ptr, len);
#endif
}
return ptr;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | vim | 3eb1637b1bba19519885dd6d377bd5596e91d22c | 179,518,463,830,872,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | patch 8.0.0377: possible overflow when reading corrupted undo file
Problem: Possible overflow when reading corrupted undo file.
Solution: Check if allocated size is not too big. (King) |
static s32 brcmf_inform_single_bss(struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg,
struct brcmf_bss_info_le *bi)
{
struct wiphy *wiphy = cfg_to_wiphy(cfg);
struct ieee80211_channel *notify_channel;
struct cfg80211_bss *bss;
struct ieee80211_supported_band *band;
struct brcmu_chan ch;
u16 channel;
u32 freq;
u16 notify_capability;
u16 notify_interval;
u8 *notify_ie;
size_t notify_ielen;
s32 notify_signal;
if (le32_to_cpu(bi->length) > WL_BSS_INFO_MAX) {
brcmf_err("Bss info is larger than buffer. Discarding\n");
return 0;
}
if (!bi->ctl_ch) {
ch.chspec = le16_to_cpu(bi->chanspec);
cfg->d11inf.decchspec(&ch);
bi->ctl_ch = ch.control_ch_num;
}
channel = bi->ctl_ch;
if (channel <= CH_MAX_2G_CHANNEL)
band = wiphy->bands[NL80211_BAND_2GHZ];
else
band = wiphy->bands[NL80211_BAND_5GHZ];
freq = ieee80211_channel_to_frequency(channel, band->band);
notify_channel = ieee80211_get_channel(wiphy, freq);
notify_capability = le16_to_cpu(bi->capability);
notify_interval = le16_to_cpu(bi->beacon_period);
notify_ie = (u8 *)bi + le16_to_cpu(bi->ie_offset);
notify_ielen = le32_to_cpu(bi->ie_length);
notify_signal = (s16)le16_to_cpu(bi->RSSI) * 100;
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "bssid: %pM\n", bi->BSSID);
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "Channel: %d(%d)\n", channel, freq);
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "Capability: %X\n", notify_capability);
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "Beacon interval: %d\n", notify_interval);
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "Signal: %d\n", notify_signal);
bss = cfg80211_inform_bss(wiphy, notify_channel,
CFG80211_BSS_FTYPE_UNKNOWN,
(const u8 *)bi->BSSID,
0, notify_capability,
notify_interval, notify_ie,
notify_ielen, notify_signal,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!bss)
return -ENOMEM;
cfg80211_put_bss(wiphy, bss);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-703"
] | linux | ded89912156b1a47d940a0c954c43afbabd0c42c | 43,736,178,386,282,590,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 63 | brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: [email protected] # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <[email protected]> |
Field_timestamp_with_dec(uchar *ptr_arg,
uchar *null_ptr_arg, uchar null_bit_arg,
enum utype unireg_check_arg,
const LEX_CSTRING *field_name_arg,
TABLE_SHARE *share, uint dec_arg) :
Field_timestamp(ptr_arg,
MAX_DATETIME_WIDTH + dec_arg + MY_TEST(dec_arg), null_ptr_arg,
null_bit_arg, unireg_check_arg, field_name_arg, share),
dec(dec_arg)
{
DBUG_ASSERT(dec <= TIME_SECOND_PART_DIGITS);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-703"
] | server | 08c7ab404f69d9c4ca6ca7a9cf7eec74c804f917 | 11,225,444,394,341,265,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 12 | MDEV-24176 Server crashes after insert in the table with virtual
column generated using date_format() and if()
vcol_info->expr is allocated on expr_arena at parsing stage. Since
expr item is allocated on expr_arena all its containee items must be
allocated on expr_arena too. Otherwise fix_session_expr() will
encounter prematurely freed item.
When table is reopened from cache vcol_info contains stale
expression. We refresh expression via TABLE::vcol_fix_exprs() but
first we must prepare a proper context (Vcol_expr_context) which meets
some requirements:
1. As noted above expr update must be done on expr_arena as there may
be new items created. It was a bug in fix_session_expr_for_read() and
was just not reproduced because of no second refix. Now refix is done
for more cases so it does reproduce. Tests affected: vcol.binlog
2. Also name resolution context must be narrowed to the single table.
Tested by: vcol.update main.default vcol.vcol_syntax gcol.gcol_bugfixes
3. sql_mode must be clean and not fail expr update.
sql_mode such as MODE_NO_BACKSLASH_ESCAPES, MODE_NO_ZERO_IN_DATE, etc
must not affect vcol expression update. If the table was created
successfully any further evaluation must not fail. Tests affected:
main.func_like
Reviewed by: Sergei Golubchik <[email protected]> |
static int __init fail_page_alloc_debugfs(void)
{
umode_t mode = S_IFREG | S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR;
struct dentry *dir;
dir = fault_create_debugfs_attr("fail_page_alloc", NULL,
&fail_page_alloc.attr);
if (IS_ERR(dir))
return PTR_ERR(dir);
if (!debugfs_create_bool("ignore-gfp-wait", mode, dir,
&fail_page_alloc.ignore_gfp_reclaim))
goto fail;
if (!debugfs_create_bool("ignore-gfp-highmem", mode, dir,
&fail_page_alloc.ignore_gfp_highmem))
goto fail;
if (!debugfs_create_u32("min-order", mode, dir,
&fail_page_alloc.min_order))
goto fail;
return 0;
fail:
debugfs_remove_recursive(dir);
return -ENOMEM;
} | 0 | [] | linux | 400e22499dd92613821374c8c6c88c7225359980 | 267,852,747,163,332,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 | mm: don't warn about allocations which stall for too long
Commit 63f53dea0c98 ("mm: warn about allocations which stall for too
long") was a great step for reducing possibility of silent hang up
problem caused by memory allocation stalls. But this commit reverts it,
for it is possible to trigger OOM lockup and/or soft lockups when many
threads concurrently called warn_alloc() (in order to warn about memory
allocation stalls) due to current implementation of printk(), and it is
difficult to obtain useful information due to limitation of synchronous
warning approach.
Current printk() implementation flushes all pending logs using the
context of a thread which called console_unlock(). printk() should be
able to flush all pending logs eventually unless somebody continues
appending to printk() buffer.
Since warn_alloc() started appending to printk() buffer while waiting
for oom_kill_process() to make forward progress when oom_kill_process()
is processing pending logs, it became possible for warn_alloc() to force
oom_kill_process() loop inside printk(). As a result, warn_alloc()
significantly increased possibility of preventing oom_kill_process()
from making forward progress.
---------- Pseudo code start ----------
Before warn_alloc() was introduced:
retry:
if (mutex_trylock(&oom_lock)) {
while (atomic_read(&printk_pending_logs) > 0) {
atomic_dec(&printk_pending_logs);
print_one_log();
}
// Send SIGKILL here.
mutex_unlock(&oom_lock)
}
goto retry;
After warn_alloc() was introduced:
retry:
if (mutex_trylock(&oom_lock)) {
while (atomic_read(&printk_pending_logs) > 0) {
atomic_dec(&printk_pending_logs);
print_one_log();
}
// Send SIGKILL here.
mutex_unlock(&oom_lock)
} else if (waited_for_10seconds()) {
atomic_inc(&printk_pending_logs);
}
goto retry;
---------- Pseudo code end ----------
Although waited_for_10seconds() becomes true once per 10 seconds,
unbounded number of threads can call waited_for_10seconds() at the same
time. Also, since threads doing waited_for_10seconds() keep doing
almost busy loop, the thread doing print_one_log() can use little CPU
resource. Therefore, this situation can be simplified like
---------- Pseudo code start ----------
retry:
if (mutex_trylock(&oom_lock)) {
while (atomic_read(&printk_pending_logs) > 0) {
atomic_dec(&printk_pending_logs);
print_one_log();
}
// Send SIGKILL here.
mutex_unlock(&oom_lock)
} else {
atomic_inc(&printk_pending_logs);
}
goto retry;
---------- Pseudo code end ----------
when printk() is called faster than print_one_log() can process a log.
One of possible mitigation would be to introduce a new lock in order to
make sure that no other series of printk() (either oom_kill_process() or
warn_alloc()) can append to printk() buffer when one series of printk()
(either oom_kill_process() or warn_alloc()) is already in progress.
Such serialization will also help obtaining kernel messages in readable
form.
---------- Pseudo code start ----------
retry:
if (mutex_trylock(&oom_lock)) {
mutex_lock(&oom_printk_lock);
while (atomic_read(&printk_pending_logs) > 0) {
atomic_dec(&printk_pending_logs);
print_one_log();
}
// Send SIGKILL here.
mutex_unlock(&oom_printk_lock);
mutex_unlock(&oom_lock)
} else {
if (mutex_trylock(&oom_printk_lock)) {
atomic_inc(&printk_pending_logs);
mutex_unlock(&oom_printk_lock);
}
}
goto retry;
---------- Pseudo code end ----------
But this commit does not go that direction, for we don't want to
introduce a new lock dependency, and we unlikely be able to obtain
useful information even if we serialized oom_kill_process() and
warn_alloc().
Synchronous approach is prone to unexpected results (e.g. too late [1],
too frequent [2], overlooked [3]). As far as I know, warn_alloc() never
helped with providing information other than "something is going wrong".
I want to consider asynchronous approach which can obtain information
during stalls with possibly relevant threads (e.g. the owner of
oom_lock and kswapd-like threads) and serve as a trigger for actions
(e.g. turn on/off tracepoints, ask libvirt daemon to take a memory dump
of stalling KVM guest for diagnostic purpose).
This commit temporarily loses ability to report e.g. OOM lockup due to
unable to invoke the OOM killer due to !__GFP_FS allocation request.
But asynchronous approach will be able to detect such situation and emit
warning. Thus, let's remove warn_alloc().
[1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=192981
[2] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAM_iQpWuPVGc2ky8M-9yukECtS+zKjiDasNymX7rMcBjBFyM_A@mail.gmail.com
[3] commit db73ee0d46379922 ("mm, vmscan: do not loop on too_many_isolated for ever"))
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509017339-4802-1-git-send-email-penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: yuwang.yuwang <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]>
Cc: Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
TEST_F(QueryPlannerTest, AndWithUnindexedOrChild) {
addIndex(BSON("a" << 1));
runQuery(fromjson("{a:20, $or: [{b:1}, {c:7}]}"));
ASSERT_EQUALS(getNumSolutions(), 2U);
assertSolutionExists("{cscan: {dir: 1}}");
// Logical rewrite means we could get one of these two outcomes:
size_t matches = 0;
matches += numSolutionMatches(
"{fetch: {filter: {$or: [{b: 1}, {c: 7}]}, node: "
"{ixscan: {filter: null, pattern: {a: 1}}}}}");
matches += numSolutionMatches(
"{or: {filter: null, nodes: ["
"{fetch: {filter: {b:1}, node: {"
"ixscan: {filter: null, pattern: {a:1}}}}},"
"{fetch: {filter: {c:7}, node: {"
"ixscan: {filter: null, pattern: {a:1}}}}}]}}");
ASSERT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUALS(matches, 1U);
} | 0 | [] | mongo | ee97c0699fd55b498310996ee002328e533681a3 | 217,071,064,264,483,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 20 | SERVER-36993 Fix crash due to incorrect $or pushdown for indexed $expr. |
int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
char *username,
u32 **sids,
u32 *nel)
{
struct context *fromcon, usercon;
u32 *mysids = NULL, *mysids2, sid;
u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
struct user_datum *user;
struct role_datum *role;
struct ebitmap_node *rnode, *tnode;
int rc = 0, i, j;
*sids = NULL;
*nel = 0;
if (!ss_initialized)
goto out;
read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
context_init(&usercon);
rc = -EINVAL;
fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid);
if (!fromcon)
goto out_unlock;
rc = -EINVAL;
user = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, username);
if (!user)
goto out_unlock;
usercon.user = user->value;
rc = -ENOMEM;
mysids = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!mysids)
goto out_unlock;
ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
usercon.role = i + 1;
ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
usercon.type = j + 1;
if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
continue;
rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
if (rc)
goto out_unlock;
if (mynel < maxnel) {
mysids[mynel++] = sid;
} else {
rc = -ENOMEM;
maxnel += SIDS_NEL;
mysids2 = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!mysids2)
goto out_unlock;
memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
kfree(mysids);
mysids = mysids2;
mysids[mynel++] = sid;
}
}
}
rc = 0;
out_unlock:
read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
if (rc || !mynel) {
kfree(mysids);
goto out;
}
rc = -ENOMEM;
mysids2 = kcalloc(mynel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!mysids2) {
kfree(mysids);
goto out;
}
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) {
struct av_decision dummy_avd;
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(fromsid, mysids[i],
SECCLASS_PROCESS, /* kernel value */
PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT,
&dummy_avd);
if (!rc)
mysids2[j++] = mysids[i];
cond_resched();
}
rc = 0;
kfree(mysids);
*sids = mysids2;
*nel = j;
out:
return rc;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | linux | 2172fa709ab32ca60e86179dc67d0857be8e2c98 | 333,744,064,539,753,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 98 | SELinux: Fix kernel BUG on empty security contexts.
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]> |
format_defaults(struct format_tree *ft, struct client *c, struct session *s,
struct winlink *wl, struct window_pane *wp)
{
if (c != NULL && s != NULL && c->session != s)
log_debug("%s: session does not match", __func__);
format_add(ft, "session_format", "%d", s != NULL);
format_add(ft, "window_format", "%d", wl != NULL);
format_add(ft, "pane_format", "%d", wp != NULL);
if (s == NULL && c != NULL)
s = c->session;
if (wl == NULL && s != NULL)
wl = s->curw;
if (wp == NULL && wl != NULL)
wp = wl->window->active;
if (c != NULL)
format_defaults_client(ft, c);
if (s != NULL)
format_defaults_session(ft, s);
if (wl != NULL)
format_defaults_winlink(ft, wl);
if (wp != NULL)
format_defaults_pane(ft, wp);
} | 0 | [] | src | b32e1d34e10a0da806823f57f02a4ae6e93d756e | 208,576,814,512,764,900,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 26 | evbuffer_new and bufferevent_new can both fail (when malloc fails) and
return NULL. GitHub issue 1547. |
CImgDisplay& resize(const int nwidth, const int nheight, const bool force_redraw=true) {
if (!nwidth || !nheight || (is_empty() && (nwidth<0 || nheight<0))) return assign();
if (is_empty()) return assign(nwidth,nheight);
Display *const dpy = cimg::X11_attr().display;
const unsigned int
tmpdimx = (nwidth>0)?nwidth:(-nwidth*width()/100),
tmpdimy = (nheight>0)?nheight:(-nheight*height()/100),
dimx = tmpdimx?tmpdimx:1,
dimy = tmpdimy?tmpdimy:1;
if (_width!=dimx || _height!=dimy || _window_width!=dimx || _window_height!=dimy) {
show();
cimg_lock_display();
if (_window_width!=dimx || _window_height!=dimy) {
XWindowAttributes attr;
for (unsigned int i = 0; i<10; ++i) {
XResizeWindow(dpy,_window,dimx,dimy);
XGetWindowAttributes(dpy,_window,&attr);
if (attr.width==(int)dimx && attr.height==(int)dimy) break;
cimg::wait(5);
}
}
if (_width!=dimx || _height!=dimy) switch (cimg::X11_attr().nb_bits) {
case 8 : { unsigned char pixel_type = 0; _resize(pixel_type,dimx,dimy,force_redraw); } break;
case 16 : { unsigned short pixel_type = 0; _resize(pixel_type,dimx,dimy,force_redraw); } break;
default : { unsigned int pixel_type = 0; _resize(pixel_type,dimx,dimy,force_redraw); }
}
_window_width = _width = dimx; _window_height = _height = dimy;
cimg_unlock_display();
}
_is_resized = false;
if (_is_fullscreen) move((screen_width() - _width)/2,(screen_height() - _height)/2);
if (force_redraw) return paint();
return *this; | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CImg | 10af1e8c1ad2a58a0a3342a856bae63e8f257abb | 37,753,063,558,683,190,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 34 | Fix other issues in 'CImg<T>::load_bmp()'. |
lacks_top_left (NautilusFile *file)
{
return file->details->file_info_is_up_to_date &&
!file->details->top_left_text_is_up_to_date
&& nautilus_file_should_get_top_left_text (file);
} | 0 | [] | nautilus | 7632a3e13874a2c5e8988428ca913620a25df983 | 287,148,820,882,153,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | Check for trusted desktop file launchers.
2009-02-24 Alexander Larsson <[email protected]>
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-directory-async.c:
Check for trusted desktop file launchers.
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file-private.h:
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file.c:
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-file.h:
Add nautilus_file_is_trusted_link.
Allow unsetting of custom display name.
* libnautilus-private/nautilus-mime-actions.c:
Display dialog when trying to launch a non-trusted desktop file.
svn path=/trunk/; revision=15003 |
static void hrtimer_force_reprogram(struct hrtimer_cpu_base *cpu_base)
{
int i;
struct hrtimer_clock_base *base = cpu_base->clock_base;
ktime_t expires;
cpu_base->expires_next.tv64 = KTIME_MAX;
for (i = 0; i < HRTIMER_MAX_CLOCK_BASES; i++, base++) {
struct hrtimer *timer;
if (!base->first)
continue;
timer = rb_entry(base->first, struct hrtimer, node);
expires = ktime_sub(timer->expires, base->offset);
if (expires.tv64 < cpu_base->expires_next.tv64)
cpu_base->expires_next = expires;
}
if (cpu_base->expires_next.tv64 != KTIME_MAX)
tick_program_event(cpu_base->expires_next, 1);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-189"
] | linux-2.6 | 13788ccc41ceea5893f9c747c59bc0b28f2416c2 | 269,429,321,497,458,460,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | [PATCH] hrtimer: prevent overrun DoS in hrtimer_forward()
hrtimer_forward() does not check for the possible overflow of
timer->expires. This can happen on 64 bit machines with large interval
values and results currently in an endless loop in the softirq because the
expiry value becomes negative and therefor the timer is expired all the
time.
Check for this condition and set the expiry value to the max. expiry time
in the future. The fix should be applied to stable kernel series as well.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
{
return X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | openssl | 8130d654d1de922ea224fa18ee3bc7262edc39c0 | 232,088,158,901,127,230,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Fix Null pointer deref in X509_issuer_and_serial_hash()
The OpenSSL public API function X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() attempts
to create a unique hash value based on the issuer and serial number data
contained within an X509 certificate. However it fails to correctly
handle any errors that may occur while parsing the issuer field (which
might occur if the issuer field is maliciously constructed). This may
subsequently result in a NULL pointer deref and a crash leading to a
potential denial of service attack.
The function X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() is never directly called by
OpenSSL itself so applications are only vulnerable if they use this
function directly and they use it on certificates that may have been
obtained from untrusted sources.
CVE-2021-23841
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <[email protected]> |
mrb_mod_module_function(mrb_state *mrb, mrb_value mod)
{
mrb_value *argv;
mrb_int argc, i;
mrb_sym mid;
mrb_method_t m;
struct RClass *rclass;
int ai;
mrb_check_type(mrb, mod, MRB_TT_MODULE);
mrb_get_args(mrb, "*", &argv, &argc);
if (argc == 0) {
/* set MODFUNC SCOPE if implemented */
return mod;
}
/* set PRIVATE method visibility if implemented */
/* mrb_mod_dummy_visibility(mrb, mod); */
for (i=0; i<argc; i++) {
mrb_check_type(mrb, argv[i], MRB_TT_SYMBOL);
mid = mrb_symbol(argv[i]);
rclass = mrb_class_ptr(mod);
m = mrb_method_search(mrb, rclass, mid);
prepare_singleton_class(mrb, (struct RBasic*)rclass);
ai = mrb_gc_arena_save(mrb);
mrb_define_method_raw(mrb, rclass->c, mid, m);
mrb_gc_arena_restore(mrb, ai);
}
return mod;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476",
"CWE-415"
] | mruby | faa4eaf6803bd11669bc324b4c34e7162286bfa3 | 10,014,386,302,644,207,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 35 | `mrb_class_real()` did not work for `BasicObject`; fix #4037 |
static void write_bin_miss_response(conn *c, char *key, size_t nkey) {
if (nkey) {
char *ofs = c->wbuf + sizeof(protocol_binary_response_header);
add_bin_header(c, PROTOCOL_BINARY_RESPONSE_KEY_ENOENT,
0, nkey, nkey);
memcpy(ofs, key, nkey);
add_iov(c, ofs, nkey);
conn_set_state(c, conn_mwrite);
c->write_and_go = conn_new_cmd;
} else {
write_bin_error(c, PROTOCOL_BINARY_RESPONSE_KEY_ENOENT,
NULL, 0);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-703",
"CWE-400"
] | memcached | dbb7a8af90054bf4ef51f5814ef7ceb17d83d974 | 319,244,128,557,796,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 14 | disable UDP port by default
As reported, UDP amplification attacks have started to use insecure
internet-exposed memcached instances. UDP used to be a lot more popular as a
transport for memcached many years ago, but I'm not aware of many recent
users.
Ten years ago, the TCP connection overhead from many clients was relatively
high (dozens or hundreds per client server), but these days many clients are
batched, or user fewer processes, or simply anre't worried about it.
While changing the default to listen on localhost only would also help, the
true culprit is UDP. There are many more use cases for using memcached over
the network than there are for using the UDP protocol. |
tsize_t t2p_readwrite_pdf_image(T2P* t2p, TIFF* input, TIFF* output){
tsize_t written=0;
unsigned char* buffer=NULL;
unsigned char* samplebuffer=NULL;
tsize_t bufferoffset=0;
tsize_t samplebufferoffset=0;
tsize_t read=0;
tstrip_t i=0;
tstrip_t j=0;
tstrip_t stripcount=0;
tsize_t stripsize=0;
tsize_t sepstripcount=0;
tsize_t sepstripsize=0;
#ifdef OJPEG_SUPPORT
toff_t inputoffset=0;
uint16 h_samp=1;
uint16 v_samp=1;
uint16 ri=1;
uint32 rows=0;
#endif /* ifdef OJPEG_SUPPORT */
#ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT
unsigned char* jpt;
float* xfloatp;
uint64* sbc;
unsigned char* stripbuffer;
tsize_t striplength=0;
uint32 max_striplength=0;
#endif /* ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT */
/* Fail if prior error (in particular, can't trust tiff_datasize) */
if (t2p->t2p_error != T2P_ERR_OK)
return(0);
if(t2p->pdf_transcode == T2P_TRANSCODE_RAW){
#ifdef CCITT_SUPPORT
if(t2p->pdf_compression == T2P_COMPRESS_G4){
buffer = (unsigned char*)
_TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if (buffer == NULL) {
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for "
"t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
memset(buffer, 0, t2p->tiff_datasize);
if (TIFFReadRawStrip(input, 0, (tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize) < 0) {
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"TIFFReadRawStrip() failed");
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(0);
}
if (t2p->tiff_fillorder==FILLORDER_LSB2MSB){
/*
* make sure is lsb-to-msb
* bit-endianness fill order
*/
TIFFReverseBits(buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
#endif /* ifdef CCITT_SUPPORT */
#ifdef ZIP_SUPPORT
if (t2p->pdf_compression == T2P_COMPRESS_ZIP) {
buffer = (unsigned char*)
_TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer == NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
memset(buffer, 0, t2p->tiff_datasize);
if (TIFFReadRawStrip(input, 0, (tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize) < 0) {
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"TIFFReadRawStrip() failed");
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(0);
}
if (t2p->tiff_fillorder==FILLORDER_LSB2MSB) {
TIFFReverseBits(buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
#endif /* ifdef ZIP_SUPPORT */
#ifdef OJPEG_SUPPORT
if(t2p->tiff_compression == COMPRESSION_OJPEG) {
if(t2p->tiff_dataoffset != 0) {
buffer = (unsigned char*)
_TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer == NULL) {
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
memset(buffer, 0, t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(t2p->pdf_ojpegiflength==0){
inputoffset=t2pSeekFile(input, 0,
SEEK_CUR);
t2pSeekFile(input,
t2p->tiff_dataoffset,
SEEK_SET);
t2pReadFile(input, (tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize);
t2pSeekFile(input, inputoffset,
SEEK_SET);
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(t2p->tiff_datasize);
} else {
inputoffset=t2pSeekFile(input, 0,
SEEK_CUR);
t2pSeekFile(input,
t2p->tiff_dataoffset,
SEEK_SET);
bufferoffset = t2pReadFile(input,
(tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->pdf_ojpegiflength);
t2p->pdf_ojpegiflength = 0;
t2pSeekFile(input, inputoffset,
SEEK_SET);
TIFFGetField(input,
TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING,
&h_samp, &v_samp);
buffer[bufferoffset++]= 0xff;
buffer[bufferoffset++]= 0xdd;
buffer[bufferoffset++]= 0x00;
buffer[bufferoffset++]= 0x04;
h_samp*=8;
v_samp*=8;
ri=(t2p->tiff_width+h_samp-1) / h_samp;
TIFFGetField(input,
TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP,
&rows);
ri*=(rows+v_samp-1)/v_samp;
buffer[bufferoffset++]= (ri>>8) & 0xff;
buffer[bufferoffset++]= ri & 0xff;
stripcount=TIFFNumberOfStrips(input);
for(i=0;i<stripcount;i++){
if(i != 0 ){
buffer[bufferoffset++]=0xff;
buffer[bufferoffset++]=(0xd0 | ((i-1)%8));
}
bufferoffset+=TIFFReadRawStrip(input,
i,
(tdata_t) &(((unsigned char*)buffer)[bufferoffset]),
-1);
}
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer, bufferoffset);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(bufferoffset);
}
} else {
if(! t2p->pdf_ojpegdata){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"No support for OJPEG image %s with bad tables",
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
buffer = (unsigned char*)
_TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
memset(buffer, 0, t2p->tiff_datasize);
_TIFFmemcpy(buffer, t2p->pdf_ojpegdata, t2p->pdf_ojpegdatalength);
bufferoffset=t2p->pdf_ojpegdatalength;
stripcount=TIFFNumberOfStrips(input);
for(i=0;i<stripcount;i++){
tsize_t retTIFFReadRawStrip;
if(i != 0){
buffer[bufferoffset++]=0xff;
buffer[bufferoffset++]=(0xd0 | ((i-1)%8));
}
retTIFFReadRawStrip = TIFFReadRawStrip(input,
i,
(tdata_t) &(((unsigned char*)buffer)[bufferoffset]),
-1);
if (retTIFFReadRawStrip < 0) {
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE, "TIFFReadRawStrip()");
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
bufferoffset += retTIFFReadRawStrip;
}
if( ! ( (buffer[bufferoffset-1]==0xd9) && (buffer[bufferoffset-2]==0xff) ) ){
buffer[bufferoffset++]=0xff;
buffer[bufferoffset++]=0xd9;
}
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer, bufferoffset);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(bufferoffset);
#if 0
/*
This hunk of code removed code is clearly
mis-placed and we are not sure where it
should be (if anywhere)
*/
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"No support for OJPEG image %s with no JPEG File Interchange offset",
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
#endif
}
}
#endif /* ifdef OJPEG_SUPPORT */
#ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT
if(t2p->tiff_compression == COMPRESSION_JPEG) {
uint32 count = 0;
buffer = (unsigned char*)
_TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
memset(buffer, 0, t2p->tiff_datasize);
if (TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_JPEGTABLES, &count, &jpt) != 0) {
if(count > 4) {
_TIFFmemcpy(buffer, jpt, count);
bufferoffset += count - 2;
}
}
stripcount=TIFFNumberOfStrips(input);
TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_STRIPBYTECOUNTS, &sbc);
for(i=0;i<stripcount;i++){
if(sbc[i]>max_striplength) max_striplength=sbc[i];
}
stripbuffer = (unsigned char*)
_TIFFmalloc(max_striplength);
if(stripbuffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %u bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
max_striplength,
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
memset(stripbuffer, 0, max_striplength);
for(i=0;i<stripcount;i++){
striplength=TIFFReadRawStrip(input, i, (tdata_t) stripbuffer, -1);
if (striplength < 0) {
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE, "TIFFReadRawStrip() failed");
_TIFFfree(samplebuffer);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
if(!t2p_process_jpeg_strip(
stripbuffer,
&striplength,
buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize,
&bufferoffset,
i,
t2p->tiff_length)){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't process JPEG data in input file %s",
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(samplebuffer);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
}
buffer[bufferoffset++]=0xff;
buffer[bufferoffset++]=0xd9;
t2pWriteFile(output, (tdata_t) buffer, bufferoffset);
_TIFFfree(stripbuffer);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(bufferoffset);
}
#endif /* ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT */
(void)0;
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample==T2P_SAMPLE_NOTHING){
buffer = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
memset(buffer, 0, t2p->tiff_datasize);
stripsize=TIFFStripSize(input);
stripcount=TIFFNumberOfStrips(input);
for(i=0;i<stripcount;i++){
read =
TIFFReadEncodedStrip(input,
i,
(tdata_t) &buffer[bufferoffset],
TIFFmin(stripsize, t2p->tiff_datasize - bufferoffset));
if(read==-1){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Error on decoding strip %u of %s",
i,
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error=T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
bufferoffset+=read;
}
} else {
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_PLANAR_SEPARATE_TO_CONTIG){
sepstripsize=TIFFStripSize(input);
sepstripcount=TIFFNumberOfStrips(input);
stripsize=sepstripsize*t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel;
stripcount=sepstripcount/t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel;
buffer = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
memset(buffer, 0, t2p->tiff_datasize);
samplebuffer = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(stripsize);
if(samplebuffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(0);
}
for(i=0;i<stripcount;i++){
samplebufferoffset=0;
for(j=0;j<t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel;j++){
read =
TIFFReadEncodedStrip(input,
i + j*stripcount,
(tdata_t) &(samplebuffer[samplebufferoffset]),
TIFFmin(sepstripsize, stripsize - samplebufferoffset));
if(read==-1){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Error on decoding strip %u of %s",
i + j*stripcount,
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error=T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
samplebufferoffset+=read;
}
t2p_sample_planar_separate_to_contig(
t2p,
&(buffer[bufferoffset]),
samplebuffer,
samplebufferoffset);
bufferoffset+=samplebufferoffset;
}
_TIFFfree(samplebuffer);
goto dataready;
}
buffer = (unsigned char*) _TIFFmalloc(t2p->tiff_datasize);
if(buffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
memset(buffer, 0, t2p->tiff_datasize);
stripsize=TIFFStripSize(input);
stripcount=TIFFNumberOfStrips(input);
for(i=0;i<stripcount;i++){
read =
TIFFReadEncodedStrip(input,
i,
(tdata_t) &buffer[bufferoffset],
TIFFmin(stripsize, t2p->tiff_datasize - bufferoffset));
if(read==-1){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Error on decoding strip %u of %s",
i,
TIFFFileName(input));
_TIFFfree(samplebuffer);
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error=T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
bufferoffset+=read;
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_REALIZE_PALETTE){
// FIXME: overflow?
samplebuffer=(unsigned char*)_TIFFrealloc(
(tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize * t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel);
if(samplebuffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(0);
} else {
buffer=samplebuffer;
t2p->tiff_datasize *= t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel;
}
t2p_sample_realize_palette(t2p, buffer);
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_RGBA_TO_RGB){
t2p->tiff_datasize=t2p_sample_rgba_to_rgb(
(tdata_t)buffer,
t2p->tiff_width*t2p->tiff_length);
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_RGBAA_TO_RGB){
t2p->tiff_datasize=t2p_sample_rgbaa_to_rgb(
(tdata_t)buffer,
t2p->tiff_width*t2p->tiff_length);
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_YCBCR_TO_RGB){
samplebuffer=(unsigned char*)_TIFFrealloc(
(tdata_t)buffer,
t2p->tiff_width*t2p->tiff_length*4);
if(samplebuffer==NULL){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't allocate %lu bytes of memory for t2p_readwrite_pdf_image, %s",
(unsigned long) t2p->tiff_datasize,
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
_TIFFfree(buffer);
return(0);
} else {
buffer=samplebuffer;
}
if(!TIFFReadRGBAImageOriented(
input,
t2p->tiff_width,
t2p->tiff_length,
(uint32*)buffer,
ORIENTATION_TOPLEFT,
0)){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Can't use TIFFReadRGBAImageOriented to extract RGB image from %s",
TIFFFileName(input));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
t2p->tiff_datasize=t2p_sample_abgr_to_rgb(
(tdata_t) buffer,
t2p->tiff_width*t2p->tiff_length);
}
if(t2p->pdf_sample & T2P_SAMPLE_LAB_SIGNED_TO_UNSIGNED){
t2p->tiff_datasize=t2p_sample_lab_signed_to_unsigned(
(tdata_t)buffer,
t2p->tiff_width*t2p->tiff_length);
}
}
dataready:
t2p_disable(output);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, t2p->tiff_photometric);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_BITSPERSAMPLE, t2p->tiff_bitspersample);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_SAMPLESPERPIXEL, t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_IMAGEWIDTH, t2p->tiff_width);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_IMAGELENGTH, t2p->tiff_length);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_ROWSPERSTRIP, t2p->tiff_length);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_PLANARCONFIG, PLANARCONFIG_CONTIG);
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_FILLORDER, FILLORDER_MSB2LSB);
switch(t2p->pdf_compression){
case T2P_COMPRESS_NONE:
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, COMPRESSION_NONE);
break;
#ifdef CCITT_SUPPORT
case T2P_COMPRESS_G4:
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, COMPRESSION_CCITTFAX4);
break;
#endif /* ifdef CCITT_SUPPORT */
#ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT
case T2P_COMPRESS_JPEG:
if(t2p->tiff_photometric==PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR) {
uint16 hor = 0, ver = 0;
if (TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING, &hor, &ver) !=0 ) {
if(hor != 0 && ver != 0){
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_YCBCRSUBSAMPLING, hor, ver);
}
}
if(TIFFGetField(input, TIFFTAG_REFERENCEBLACKWHITE, &xfloatp)!=0){
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_REFERENCEBLACKWHITE, xfloatp);
}
}
if(TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, COMPRESSION_JPEG)==0){
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Unable to use JPEG compression for input %s and output %s",
TIFFFileName(input),
TIFFFileName(output));
_TIFFfree(buffer);
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_JPEGTABLESMODE, 0);
if(t2p->pdf_colorspace & (T2P_CS_RGB | T2P_CS_LAB)){
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_PHOTOMETRIC, PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR);
if(t2p->tiff_photometric != PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR){
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_JPEGCOLORMODE, JPEGCOLORMODE_RGB);
} else {
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_JPEGCOLORMODE, JPEGCOLORMODE_RAW);
}
}
if(t2p->pdf_colorspace & T2P_CS_GRAY){
(void)0;
}
if(t2p->pdf_colorspace & T2P_CS_CMYK){
(void)0;
}
if(t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality != 0){
TIFFSetField(output,
TIFFTAG_JPEGQUALITY,
t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality);
}
break;
#endif /* ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT */
#ifdef ZIP_SUPPORT
case T2P_COMPRESS_ZIP:
TIFFSetField(output, TIFFTAG_COMPRESSION, COMPRESSION_DEFLATE);
if(t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality%100 != 0){
TIFFSetField(output,
TIFFTAG_PREDICTOR,
t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality % 100);
}
if(t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality/100 != 0){
TIFFSetField(output,
TIFFTAG_ZIPQUALITY,
(t2p->pdf_defaultcompressionquality / 100));
}
break;
#endif /* ifdef ZIP_SUPPORT */
default:
break;
}
t2p_enable(output);
t2p->outputwritten = 0;
#ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT
if(t2p->pdf_compression == T2P_COMPRESS_JPEG
&& t2p->tiff_photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_YCBCR){
bufferoffset = TIFFWriteEncodedStrip(output, (tstrip_t)0,
buffer,
stripsize * stripcount);
} else
#endif /* ifdef JPEG_SUPPORT */
{
bufferoffset = TIFFWriteEncodedStrip(output, (tstrip_t)0,
buffer,
t2p->tiff_datasize);
}
if (buffer != NULL) {
_TIFFfree(buffer);
buffer=NULL;
}
if (bufferoffset == (tsize_t)-1) {
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE,
"Error writing encoded strip to output PDF %s",
TIFFFileName(output));
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return(0);
}
written = t2p->outputwritten;
return(written);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | libtiff | 7be2e452ddcf6d7abca88f41d3761e6edab72b22 | 84,052,621,455,541,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 618 | tiff2pdf.c: properly calculate datasize when saving to JPEG YCbCr
fixes #220 |
static int rawv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct ipv6_txoptions opt_space;
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_in6 *, sin6, msg->msg_name);
struct in6_addr *daddr, *final_p, final;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct raw6_sock *rp = raw6_sk(sk);
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
struct ip6_flowlabel *flowlabel = NULL;
struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
struct raw6_frag_vec rfv;
struct flowi6 fl6;
int addr_len = msg->msg_namelen;
int hlimit = -1;
int tclass = -1;
int dontfrag = -1;
u16 proto;
int err;
/* Rough check on arithmetic overflow,
better check is made in ip6_append_data().
*/
if (len > INT_MAX)
return -EMSGSIZE;
/* Mirror BSD error message compatibility */
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
/*
* Get and verify the address.
*/
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
if (sin6) {
if (addr_len < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
if (sin6->sin6_family && sin6->sin6_family != AF_INET6)
return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
/* port is the proto value [0..255] carried in nexthdr */
proto = ntohs(sin6->sin6_port);
if (!proto)
proto = inet->inet_num;
else if (proto != inet->inet_num)
return -EINVAL;
if (proto > 255)
return -EINVAL;
daddr = &sin6->sin6_addr;
if (np->sndflow) {
fl6.flowlabel = sin6->sin6_flowinfo&IPV6_FLOWINFO_MASK;
if (fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (!flowlabel)
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/*
* Otherwise it will be difficult to maintain
* sk->sk_dst_cache.
*/
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED &&
ipv6_addr_equal(daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr))
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
if (addr_len >= sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) &&
sin6->sin6_scope_id &&
__ipv6_addr_needs_scope_id(__ipv6_addr_type(daddr)))
fl6.flowi6_oif = sin6->sin6_scope_id;
} else {
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
return -EDESTADDRREQ;
proto = inet->inet_num;
daddr = &sk->sk_v6_daddr;
fl6.flowlabel = np->flow_label;
}
if (fl6.flowi6_oif == 0)
fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
if (msg->msg_controllen) {
opt = &opt_space;
memset(opt, 0, sizeof(struct ipv6_txoptions));
opt->tot_len = sizeof(struct ipv6_txoptions);
err = ip6_datagram_send_ctl(sock_net(sk), sk, msg, &fl6, opt,
&hlimit, &tclass, &dontfrag);
if (err < 0) {
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
return err;
}
if ((fl6.flowlabel&IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK) && !flowlabel) {
flowlabel = fl6_sock_lookup(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
if (!flowlabel)
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!(opt->opt_nflen|opt->opt_flen))
opt = NULL;
}
if (!opt)
opt = np->opt;
if (flowlabel)
opt = fl6_merge_options(&opt_space, flowlabel, opt);
opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
fl6.flowi6_proto = proto;
rfv.msg = msg;
rfv.hlen = 0;
err = rawv6_probe_proto_opt(&rfv, &fl6);
if (err)
goto out;
if (!ipv6_addr_any(daddr))
fl6.daddr = *daddr;
else
fl6.daddr.s6_addr[15] = 0x1; /* :: means loopback (BSD'ism) */
if (ipv6_addr_any(&fl6.saddr) && !ipv6_addr_any(&np->saddr))
fl6.saddr = np->saddr;
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
if (!fl6.flowi6_oif && ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&fl6.daddr))
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->mcast_oif;
else if (!fl6.flowi6_oif)
fl6.flowi6_oif = np->ucast_oif;
security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
if (inet->hdrincl)
fl6.flowi6_flags |= FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH;
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
goto out;
}
if (hlimit < 0)
hlimit = ip6_sk_dst_hoplimit(np, &fl6, dst);
if (tclass < 0)
tclass = np->tclass;
if (dontfrag < 0)
dontfrag = np->dontfrag;
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_CONFIRM)
goto do_confirm;
back_from_confirm:
if (inet->hdrincl)
err = rawv6_send_hdrinc(sk, msg, len, &fl6, &dst, msg->msg_flags);
else {
lock_sock(sk);
err = ip6_append_data(sk, raw6_getfrag, &rfv,
len, 0, hlimit, tclass, opt, &fl6, (struct rt6_info *)dst,
msg->msg_flags, dontfrag);
if (err)
ip6_flush_pending_frames(sk);
else if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE))
err = rawv6_push_pending_frames(sk, &fl6, rp);
release_sock(sk);
}
done:
dst_release(dst);
out:
fl6_sock_release(flowlabel);
return err < 0 ? err : len;
do_confirm:
dst_confirm(dst);
if (!(msg->msg_flags & MSG_PROBE) || len)
goto back_from_confirm;
err = 0;
goto done;
} | 1 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-284",
"CWE-264"
] | linux | 45f6fad84cc305103b28d73482b344d7f5b76f39 | 62,975,981,226,886,950,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 183 | ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
rb_str_free(VALUE str)
{
if (!STR_EMBED_P(str) && !STR_SHARED_P(str)) {
xfree(RSTRING(str)->as.heap.ptr);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119"
] | ruby | 1c2ef610358af33f9ded3086aa2d70aac03dcac5 | 303,421,660,796,663,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | * string.c (rb_str_justify): CVE-2009-4124.
Fixes a bug reported by
Emmanouel Kellinis <Emmanouel.Kellinis AT kpmg.co.uk>, KPMG London;
Patch by nobu.
git-svn-id: svn+ssh://ci.ruby-lang.org/ruby/trunk@26038 b2dd03c8-39d4-4d8f-98ff-823fe69b080e |
void perf_event_output(struct perf_event *event,
struct perf_sample_data *data,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct perf_output_handle handle;
struct perf_event_header header;
/* protect the callchain buffers */
rcu_read_lock();
perf_prepare_sample(&header, data, event, regs);
if (perf_output_begin(&handle, event, header.size))
goto exit;
perf_output_sample(&handle, &header, data, event);
perf_output_end(&handle);
exit:
rcu_read_unlock();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-362"
] | linux | 12ca6ad2e3a896256f086497a7c7406a547ee373 | 338,122,020,030,358,080,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 22 | perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vince Weaver <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> |
void lua_text_pattern::pre_pattern(string &pat, string &fn) const
{
// Trim trailing spaces
pat.erase(pat.find_last_not_of(" \t\n\r") + 1);
fn += " pmatch([[";
fn += pat;
fn += "]], text, false) ";
pat.clear();
} | 0 | [
"CWE-434"
] | crawl | fc522ff6eb1bbb85e3de60c60a45762571e48c28 | 37,986,387,477,684,810,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 11 | Disable lua load(), loadstring() bytcode loading |
void Compute(OpKernelContext* const context) override {
core::RefCountPtr<BoostedTreesEnsembleResource> resource;
// Get the resource.
OP_REQUIRES_OK(context, LookupResource(context, HandleFromInput(context, 0),
&resource));
// Get the inputs.
OpInputList bucketized_features_list;
OP_REQUIRES_OK(context, context->input_list("bucketized_features",
&bucketized_features_list));
std::vector<tensorflow::TTypes<int32>::ConstMatrix> bucketized_features;
bucketized_features.reserve(bucketized_features_list.size());
ConvertVectorsToMatrices(bucketized_features_list, bucketized_features);
const int batch_size = bucketized_features[0].dimension(0);
// We need to get the feature ids used for splitting and the logits after
// each split. We will use these to calculate the changes in the prediction
// (contributions) for an arbitrary activation function (done in Python) and
// attribute them to the associated feature ids. We will store these in
// a proto below.
Tensor* output_debug_info_t = nullptr;
OP_REQUIRES_OK(
context, context->allocate_output("examples_debug_outputs_serialized",
{batch_size}, &output_debug_info_t));
// Will contain serialized protos, per example.
auto output_debug_info = output_debug_info_t->flat<tstring>();
const int32 last_tree = resource->num_trees() - 1;
// For each given example, traverse through all trees keeping track of the
// features used to split and the associated logits at each point along the
// path. Note: feature_ids has one less value than logits_path because the
// first value of each logit path will be the bias.
auto do_work = [&resource, &bucketized_features, &output_debug_info,
last_tree](int32 start, int32 end) {
for (int32 i = start; i < end; ++i) {
// Proto to store debug outputs, per example.
boosted_trees::DebugOutput example_debug_info;
// Initial bias prediction. E.g., prediction based off training mean.
const auto& tree_logits = resource->node_value(0, 0);
DCHECK_EQ(tree_logits.size(), 1);
float tree_logit = resource->GetTreeWeight(0) * tree_logits[0];
example_debug_info.add_logits_path(tree_logit);
int32 node_id = 0;
int32 tree_id = 0;
int32 feature_id;
float past_trees_logit = 0; // Sum of leaf logits from prior trees.
// Go through each tree and populate proto.
while (tree_id <= last_tree) {
if (resource->is_leaf(tree_id, node_id)) { // Move onto other trees.
// Accumulate tree_logits only if the leaf is non-root, but do so
// for bias tree.
if (tree_id == 0 || node_id > 0) {
past_trees_logit += tree_logit;
}
++tree_id;
node_id = 0;
} else { // Add to proto.
// Feature id used to split.
feature_id = resource->feature_id(tree_id, node_id);
example_debug_info.add_feature_ids(feature_id);
// Get logit after split.
node_id =
resource->next_node(tree_id, node_id, i, bucketized_features);
const auto& tree_logits = resource->node_value(tree_id, node_id);
DCHECK_EQ(tree_logits.size(), 1);
tree_logit = resource->GetTreeWeight(tree_id) * tree_logits[0];
// Output logit incorporates sum of leaf logits from prior trees.
example_debug_info.add_logits_path(tree_logit + past_trees_logit);
}
}
// Set output as serialized proto containing debug info.
string serialized = example_debug_info.SerializeAsString();
output_debug_info(i) = serialized;
}
};
// 10 is the magic number. The actual number might depend on (the number of
// layers in the trees) and (cpu cycles spent on each layer), but this
// value would work for many cases. May be tuned later.
const int64 cost = (last_tree + 1) * 10;
thread::ThreadPool* const worker_threads =
context->device()->tensorflow_cpu_worker_threads()->workers;
Shard(worker_threads->NumThreads(), worker_threads, batch_size,
/*cost_per_unit=*/cost, do_work);
} | 1 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-197"
] | tensorflow | ca8c013b5e97b1373b3bb1c97ea655e69f31a575 | 237,230,056,782,568,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 85 | Prevent integer truncation from 64 to 32 bits.
The `tensorflow::Shard` functions last argument must be a 2 argument function where both arguments are `int64` (`long long`, 64 bits). However, there are usages where code passes in a function where arguments are `int` or `int32` (32 bits). In these cases, it is possible that the integer truncation would later cause a segfault or other unexpected behavior.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 332560414
Change-Id: Ief649406babc8d4f60b3e7a9d573cbcc5ce5b767 |
MagickExport MagickBooleanType WhiteThresholdImage(Image *image,
const char *threshold)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
status=WhiteThresholdImageChannel(image,DefaultChannels,threshold,
&image->exception);
return(status);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | ImageMagick6 | 35c7032723d85eee7318ff6c82f031fa2666b773 | 51,040,632,848,233,640,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 10 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1609 |
static double Bohman(const double x,
const ResizeFilter *magick_unused(resize_filter))
{
/*
Bohman: 2rd Order cosine windowing function:
(1-x) cos(pi x) + sin(pi x) / pi.
Refactored by Nicolas Robidoux to one trig call, one sqrt call, and 7 flops,
taking advantage of the fact that the support of Bohman is 1.0 (so that we
know that sin(pi x) >= 0).
*/
const double cosine=cos((double) (MagickPI*x));
const double sine=sqrt(1.0-cosine*cosine);
magick_unreferenced(resize_filter);
return((1.0-x)*cosine+(1.0/MagickPI)*sine);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | ImageMagick | c5402b6e0fcf8b694ae2af6a6652ebb8ce0ccf46 | 155,879,351,359,528,500,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/717 |
ActiveUdpListener::ActiveUdpListener(Network::ConnectionHandler& parent,
Event::Dispatcher& dispatcher, Network::ListenerConfig& config)
: ActiveUdpListener(parent, dispatcher.createUdpListener(config.socket(), *this), config) {} | 0 | [
"CWE-835"
] | envoy | c8de199e2971f79cbcbc6b5eadc8c566b28705d1 | 81,639,348,146,584,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | listener: clean up accept filter before creating connection (#8922)
Signed-off-by: Yuchen Dai <[email protected]> |
static void coroutine_fn mirror_iteration_done(MirrorOp *op, int ret)
{
MirrorBlockJob *s = op->s;
struct iovec *iov;
int64_t chunk_num;
int i, nb_chunks;
trace_mirror_iteration_done(s, op->offset, op->bytes, ret);
s->in_flight--;
s->bytes_in_flight -= op->bytes;
iov = op->qiov.iov;
for (i = 0; i < op->qiov.niov; i++) {
MirrorBuffer *buf = (MirrorBuffer *) iov[i].iov_base;
QSIMPLEQ_INSERT_TAIL(&s->buf_free, buf, next);
s->buf_free_count++;
}
chunk_num = op->offset / s->granularity;
nb_chunks = DIV_ROUND_UP(op->bytes, s->granularity);
bitmap_clear(s->in_flight_bitmap, chunk_num, nb_chunks);
QTAILQ_REMOVE(&s->ops_in_flight, op, next);
if (ret >= 0) {
if (s->cow_bitmap) {
bitmap_set(s->cow_bitmap, chunk_num, nb_chunks);
}
if (!s->initial_zeroing_ongoing) {
job_progress_update(&s->common.job, op->bytes);
}
}
qemu_iovec_destroy(&op->qiov);
qemu_co_queue_restart_all(&op->waiting_requests);
g_free(op);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | qemu | 66fed30c9cd11854fc878a4eceb507e915d7c9cd | 57,058,758,342,823,880,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 36 | block/mirror: fix NULL pointer dereference in mirror_wait_on_conflicts()
In mirror_iteration() we call mirror_wait_on_conflicts() with
`self` parameter set to NULL.
Starting from commit d44dae1a7c we dereference `self` pointer in
mirror_wait_on_conflicts() without checks if it is not NULL.
Backtrace:
Program terminated with signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
#0 mirror_wait_on_conflicts (self=0x0, s=<optimized out>, offset=<optimized out>, bytes=<optimized out>)
at ../block/mirror.c:172
172 self->waiting_for_op = op;
[Current thread is 1 (Thread 0x7f0908931ec0 (LWP 380249))]
(gdb) bt
#0 mirror_wait_on_conflicts (self=0x0, s=<optimized out>, offset=<optimized out>, bytes=<optimized out>)
at ../block/mirror.c:172
#1 0x00005610c5d9d631 in mirror_run (job=0x5610c76a2c00, errp=<optimized out>) at ../block/mirror.c:491
#2 0x00005610c5d58726 in job_co_entry (opaque=0x5610c76a2c00) at ../job.c:917
#3 0x00005610c5f046c6 in coroutine_trampoline (i0=<optimized out>, i1=<optimized out>)
at ../util/coroutine-ucontext.c:173
#4 0x00007f0909975820 in ?? () at ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/__start_context.S:91
from /usr/lib64/libc.so.6
Buglink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2001404
Fixes: d44dae1a7c ("block/mirror: fix active mirror dead-lock in mirror_wait_on_conflicts")
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hanna Reitz <[email protected]> |
MagickExport MagickRealType DecodePixelGamma(const MagickRealType pixel)
{
if (pixel <= (0.0404482362771076*QuantumRange))
return(pixel/12.92f);
return((MagickRealType) (QuantumRange*DecodeGamma((double) (QuantumScale*
pixel+0.055)/1.055)));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-190"
] | ImageMagick | 406da3af9e09649cda152663c179902edf5ab3ac | 32,686,613,171,207,920,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 7 | https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1732 |
status WAVEFile::parseList(const Tag &id, uint32_t size)
{
Tag typeID;
readTag(&typeID);
size-=4;
if (typeID == "adtl")
{
/* Handle adtl sub-chunks. */
return parseADTLSubChunk(typeID, size);
}
else if (typeID == "INFO")
{
/* Handle INFO sub-chunks. */
return parseINFOSubChunk(typeID, size);
}
else
{
/* Skip unhandled sub-chunks. */
m_fh->seek(size, File::SeekFromCurrent);
return AF_SUCCEED;
}
return AF_SUCCEED;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-284"
] | audiofile | a2e9eab8ea87c4ffc494d839ebb4ea145eb9f2e6 | 101,892,721,401,770,390,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 24 | Actually fail when error occurs in parseFormat
When there's an unsupported number of bits per sample or an invalid
number of samples per block, don't only print an error message using
the error handler, but actually stop parsing the file.
This fixes #35 (also reported at
https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1026983 and
https://blogs.gentoo.org/ago/2017/02/20/audiofile-heap-based-buffer-overflow-in-imadecodeblockwave-ima-cpp/
) |
INST_HANDLER (nop) { // NOP
ESIL_A (",,");
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | radare2 | 041e53cab7ca33481ae45ecd65ad596976d78e68 | 147,993,186,058,158,830,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | Fix crash in anal.avr |
ssize_t qemu_sendv_packet_async(NetClientState *sender,
const struct iovec *iov, int iovcnt,
NetPacketSent *sent_cb)
{
NetQueue *queue;
int ret;
if (sender->link_down || !sender->peer) {
return iov_size(iov, iovcnt);
}
/* Let filters handle the packet first */
ret = filter_receive_iov(sender, NET_FILTER_DIRECTION_TX, sender,
QEMU_NET_PACKET_FLAG_NONE, iov, iovcnt, sent_cb);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
ret = filter_receive_iov(sender->peer, NET_FILTER_DIRECTION_RX, sender,
QEMU_NET_PACKET_FLAG_NONE, iov, iovcnt, sent_cb);
if (ret) {
return ret;
}
queue = sender->peer->incoming_queue;
return qemu_net_queue_send_iov(queue, sender,
QEMU_NET_PACKET_FLAG_NONE,
iov, iovcnt, sent_cb);
} | 1 | [
"CWE-190"
] | qemu | 25c01bd19d0e4b66f357618aeefda1ef7a41e21a | 131,551,872,594,448,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 30 | net: drop too large packet early
We try to detect and drop too large packet (>INT_MAX) in 1592a9947036
("net: ignore packet size greater than INT_MAX") during packet
delivering. Unfortunately, this is not sufficient as we may hit
another integer overflow when trying to queue such large packet in
qemu_net_queue_append_iov():
- size of the allocation may overflow on 32bit
- packet->size is integer which may overflow even on 64bit
Fixing this by moving the check to qemu_sendv_packet_async() which is
the entrance of all networking codes and reduce the limit to
NET_BUFSIZE to be more conservative. This works since:
- For the callers that call qemu_sendv_packet_async() directly, they
only care about if zero is returned to determine whether to prevent
the source from producing more packets. A callback will be triggered
if peer can accept more then source could be enabled. This is
usually used by high speed networking implementation like virtio-net
or netmap.
- For the callers that call qemu_sendv_packet() that calls
qemu_sendv_packet_async() indirectly, they often ignore the return
value. In this case qemu will just the drop packets if peer can't
receive.
Qemu will copy the packet if it was queued. So it was safe for both
kinds of the callers to assume the packet was sent.
Since we move the check from qemu_deliver_packet_iov() to
qemu_sendv_packet_async(), it would be safer to make
qemu_deliver_packet_iov() static to prevent any external user in the
future.
This is a revised patch of CVE-2018-17963.
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Li Qiang <[email protected]>
Fixes: 1592a9947036 ("net: ignore packet size greater than INT_MAX")
Reported-by: Li Qiang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Li Qiang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
Message-id: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> |
static int ntop_interface_host_disable_alerts(lua_State* vm) {
return ntop_interface_host_trigger_alerts(vm, false);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | ntopng | 01f47e04fd7c8d54399c9e465f823f0017069f8f | 170,859,749,144,007,800,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | Security fix: prevents empty host from being used |
static inline void list_del_leaf_cfs_rq(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq)
{
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-703",
"CWE-835"
] | linux | c40f7d74c741a907cfaeb73a7697081881c497d0 | 309,134,663,043,767,840,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> |
AnyP::Uri::authority(bool requirePort) const
{
if (authorityHttp_.isEmpty()) {
// both formats contain Host/IP
authorityWithPort_.append(host());
authorityHttp_ = authorityWithPort_;
// authorityForm_ only has :port if it is non-default
authorityWithPort_.appendf(":%u",port());
if (port() != getScheme().defaultPort())
authorityHttp_ = authorityWithPort_;
}
return requirePort ? authorityWithPort_ : authorityHttp_;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | squid | dfd818595b54942cb1adc45f6aed95c9b706e3a8 | 18,009,694,788,378,307,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 16 | Merge pull request from GHSA-jvf6-h9gj-pmj6
* Add slash prefix to path-rootless or path-noscheme URLs
* Update src/anyp/Uri.cc
Co-authored-by: Alex Rousskov <[email protected]>
* restore file trailer GH auto-removes
* Remove redundant path-empty check
* Removed stale comment left behind by b2ab59a
Many things imply a leading `/` in a URI. Their enumeration is likely to
(and did) become stale, misleading the reader.
* fixup: Remind that the `src` iterator may be at its end
We are dereferencing `src` without comparing it to `\0`.
To many readers that (incorrectly) implies that we are not done iterating yet.
Also fixed branch-added comment indentation.
Co-authored-by: Alex Rousskov <[email protected]> |
static double mp_log(_cimg_math_parser& mp) {
return std::log(_mp_arg(2)); | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | CImg | 10af1e8c1ad2a58a0a3342a856bae63e8f257abb | 293,787,921,317,984,100,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 3 | Fix other issues in 'CImg<T>::load_bmp()'. |
void j2k_destroy_cstr_index (opj_codestream_index_t *p_cstr_ind)
{
if (p_cstr_ind) {
if (p_cstr_ind->marker) {
opj_free(p_cstr_ind->marker);
p_cstr_ind->marker = NULL;
}
if (p_cstr_ind->tile_index) {
OPJ_UINT32 it_tile = 0;
for (it_tile=0; it_tile < p_cstr_ind->nb_of_tiles; it_tile++) {
if(p_cstr_ind->tile_index[it_tile].packet_index) {
opj_free(p_cstr_ind->tile_index[it_tile].packet_index);
p_cstr_ind->tile_index[it_tile].packet_index = NULL;
}
if(p_cstr_ind->tile_index[it_tile].tp_index){
opj_free(p_cstr_ind->tile_index[it_tile].tp_index);
p_cstr_ind->tile_index[it_tile].tp_index = NULL;
}
if(p_cstr_ind->tile_index[it_tile].marker){
opj_free(p_cstr_ind->tile_index[it_tile].marker);
p_cstr_ind->tile_index[it_tile].marker = NULL;
}
}
opj_free( p_cstr_ind->tile_index);
p_cstr_ind->tile_index = NULL;
}
opj_free(p_cstr_ind);
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416"
] | openjpeg | 940100c28ae28931722290794889cf84a92c5f6f | 48,347,480,743,119,770,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 38 | Fix potential use-after-free in opj_j2k_write_mco function
Fixes #563 |
TIFFWriteDirectoryTagCheckedRational(TIFF* tif, uint32* ndir, TIFFDirEntry* dir, uint16 tag, double value)
{
static const char module[] = "TIFFWriteDirectoryTagCheckedRational";
uint32 m[2];
assert(sizeof(uint32)==4);
if( value < 0 )
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Negative value is illegal");
return 0;
}
else if( value != value )
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Not-a-number value is illegal");
return 0;
}
else if (value==0.0)
{
m[0]=0;
m[1]=1;
}
else if (value <= 0xFFFFFFFFU && value==(double)(uint32)value)
{
m[0]=(uint32)value;
m[1]=1;
}
else if (value<1.0)
{
m[0]=(uint32)(value*0xFFFFFFFF);
m[1]=0xFFFFFFFF;
}
else
{
m[0]=0xFFFFFFFF;
m[1]=(uint32)(0xFFFFFFFF/value);
}
if (tif->tif_flags&TIFF_SWAB)
{
TIFFSwabLong(&m[0]);
TIFFSwabLong(&m[1]);
}
return(TIFFWriteDirectoryTagData(tif,ndir,dir,tag,TIFF_RATIONAL,1,8,&m[0]));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-617"
] | libtiff | de144fd228e4be8aa484c3caf3d814b6fa88c6d9 | 126,887,220,786,262,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 42 | TIFFWriteDirectorySec: avoid assertion. Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2795. CVE-2018-10963 |
static inline bool tcp_checksum_complete_user(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return !skb_csum_unnecessary(skb) &&
__tcp_checksum_complete_user(sk, skb);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-703",
"CWE-189"
] | linux | 8b8a321ff72c785ed5e8b4cf6eda20b35d427390 | 3,222,312,604,093,309,600,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | tcp: fix zero cwnd in tcp_cwnd_reduction
Patch 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode
conditionally") introduced a bug that cwnd may become 0 when both
inflight and sndcnt are 0 (cwnd = inflight + sndcnt). This may lead
to a div-by-zero if the connection starts another cwnd reduction
phase by setting tp->prior_cwnd to the current cwnd (0) in
tcp_init_cwnd_reduction().
To prevent this we skip PRR operation when nothing is acked or
sacked. Then cwnd must be positive in all cases as long as ssthresh
is positive:
1) The proportional reduction mode
inflight > ssthresh > 0
2) The reduction bound mode
a) inflight == ssthresh > 0
b) inflight < ssthresh
sndcnt > 0 since newly_acked_sacked > 0 and inflight < ssthresh
Therefore in all cases inflight and sndcnt can not both be 0.
We check invalid tp->prior_cwnd to avoid potential div0 bugs.
In reality this bug is triggered only with a sequence of less common
events. For example, the connection is terminating an ECN-triggered
cwnd reduction with an inflight 0, then it receives reordered/old
ACKs or DSACKs from prior transmission (which acks nothing). Or the
connection is in fast recovery stage that marks everything lost,
but fails to retransmit due to local issues, then receives data
packets from other end which acks nothing.
Fixes: 3759824da87b ("tcp: PRR uses CRB mode by default and SS mode conditionally")
Reported-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> |
gst_qtdemux_check_seekability (GstQTDemux * demux)
{
GstQuery *query;
gboolean seekable = FALSE;
gint64 start = -1, stop = -1;
if (demux->upstream_size)
return;
query = gst_query_new_seeking (GST_FORMAT_BYTES);
if (!gst_pad_peer_query (demux->sinkpad, query)) {
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "seeking query failed");
goto done;
}
gst_query_parse_seeking (query, NULL, &seekable, &start, &stop);
/* try harder to query upstream size if we didn't get it the first time */
if (seekable && stop == -1) {
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "doing duration query to fix up unset stop");
gst_pad_peer_query_duration (demux->sinkpad, GST_FORMAT_BYTES, &stop);
}
/* if upstream doesn't know the size, it's likely that it's not seekable in
* practice even if it technically may be seekable */
if (seekable && (start != 0 || stop <= start)) {
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "seekable but unknown start/stop -> disable");
seekable = FALSE;
}
done:
gst_query_unref (query);
GST_DEBUG_OBJECT (demux, "seekable: %d (%" G_GUINT64_FORMAT " - %"
G_GUINT64_FORMAT ")", seekable, start, stop);
demux->upstream_seekable = seekable;
demux->upstream_size = seekable ? stop : -1;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-125"
] | gst-plugins-good | d0949baf3dadea6021d54abef6802fed5a06af75 | 18,780,583,147,319,070,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 38 | qtdemux: Fix out of bounds read in tag parsing code
We can't simply assume that the length of the tag value as given
inside the stream is correct but should also check against the amount of
data we have actually available.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=775451 |
rfbReleaseClientIterator(rfbClientIteratorPtr iterator)
{
IF_PTHREADS(if(iterator->next) rfbDecrClientRef(iterator->next));
free(iterator);
} | 0 | [] | libvncserver | 804335f9d296440bb708ca844f5d89b58b50b0c6 | 93,815,069,329,153,030,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | Thread safety for zrle, zlib, tight.
Proposed tight security type fix for debian bug 517422. |
RegexMatchExpression::RegexMatchExpression(StringData path, const BSONElement& e)
: LeafMatchExpression(REGEX, path),
_regex(e.regex()),
_flags(e.regexFlags()),
_re(new pcrecpp::RE(_regex.c_str(), flags2options(_flags.c_str()))) {
uassert(ErrorCodes::BadValue, "regex not a regex", e.type() == RegEx);
_init();
} | 0 | [] | mongo | 64095239f41e9f3841d8be9088347db56d35c891 | 70,858,585,662,722,590,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 8 | SERVER-51083 Reject invalid UTF-8 from $regex match expressions |
void tr_variantDictReserve(tr_variant* dict, size_t reserve_count)
{
TR_ASSERT(tr_variantIsDict(dict));
containerReserve(dict, reserve_count);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-416",
"CWE-284"
] | transmission | 2123adf8e5e1c2b48791f9d22fc8c747e974180e | 202,267,512,580,951,760,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 6 | CVE-2018-10756: Fix heap-use-after-free in tr_variantWalk
In libtransmission/variant.c, function tr_variantWalk, when the variant
stack is reallocated, a pointer to the previously allocated memory
region is kept. This address is later accessed (heap use-after-free)
while walking back down the stack, causing the application to crash.
The application can be any application which uses libtransmission, such
as transmission-daemon, transmission-gtk, transmission-show, etc.
Reported-by: Tom Richards <[email protected]> |
static int cit_init_model0(struct gspca_dev *gspca_dev)
{
cit_write_reg(gspca_dev, 0x0000, 0x0100); /* turn on led */
cit_write_reg(gspca_dev, 0x0001, 0x0112); /* turn on autogain ? */
cit_write_reg(gspca_dev, 0x0000, 0x0400);
cit_write_reg(gspca_dev, 0x0001, 0x0400);
cit_write_reg(gspca_dev, 0x0000, 0x0420);
cit_write_reg(gspca_dev, 0x0001, 0x0420);
cit_write_reg(gspca_dev, 0x000d, 0x0409);
cit_write_reg(gspca_dev, 0x0002, 0x040a);
cit_write_reg(gspca_dev, 0x0018, 0x0405);
cit_write_reg(gspca_dev, 0x0008, 0x0435);
cit_write_reg(gspca_dev, 0x0026, 0x040b);
cit_write_reg(gspca_dev, 0x0007, 0x0437);
cit_write_reg(gspca_dev, 0x0015, 0x042f);
cit_write_reg(gspca_dev, 0x002b, 0x0439);
cit_write_reg(gspca_dev, 0x0026, 0x043a);
cit_write_reg(gspca_dev, 0x0008, 0x0438);
cit_write_reg(gspca_dev, 0x001e, 0x042b);
cit_write_reg(gspca_dev, 0x0041, 0x042c);
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | linux | a246b4d547708f33ff4d4b9a7a5dbac741dc89d8 | 130,520,637,817,376,440,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 23 | media: xirlink_cit: add missing descriptor sanity checks
Make sure to check that we have two alternate settings and at least one
endpoint before accessing the second altsetting structure and
dereferencing the endpoint arrays.
This specifically avoids dereferencing NULL-pointers or corrupting
memory when a device does not have the expected descriptors.
Note that the sanity check in cit_get_packet_size() is not redundant as
the driver is mixing looking up altsettings by index and by number,
which may not coincide.
Fixes: 659fefa0eb17 ("V4L/DVB: gspca_xirlink_cit: Add support for camera with a bcd version of 0.01")
Fixes: 59f8b0bf3c12 ("V4L/DVB: gspca_xirlink_cit: support bandwidth changing for devices with 1 alt setting")
Cc: stable <[email protected]> # 2.6.37
Cc: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]> |
static int lock_extent_direct(struct inode *inode, u64 lockstart, u64 lockend,
struct extent_state **cached_state, int writing)
{
struct btrfs_ordered_extent *ordered;
int ret = 0;
while (1) {
lock_extent_bits(&BTRFS_I(inode)->io_tree, lockstart, lockend,
0, cached_state);
/*
* We're concerned with the entire range that we're going to be
* doing DIO to, so we need to make sure theres no ordered
* extents in this range.
*/
ordered = btrfs_lookup_ordered_range(inode, lockstart,
lockend - lockstart + 1);
/*
* We need to make sure there are no buffered pages in this
* range either, we could have raced between the invalidate in
* generic_file_direct_write and locking the extent. The
* invalidate needs to happen so that reads after a write do not
* get stale data.
*/
if (!ordered &&
(!writing ||
!btrfs_page_exists_in_range(inode, lockstart, lockend)))
break;
unlock_extent_cached(&BTRFS_I(inode)->io_tree, lockstart, lockend,
cached_state, GFP_NOFS);
if (ordered) {
btrfs_start_ordered_extent(inode, ordered, 1);
btrfs_put_ordered_extent(ordered);
} else {
/* Screw you mmap */
ret = btrfs_fdatawrite_range(inode, lockstart, lockend);
if (ret)
break;
ret = filemap_fdatawait_range(inode->i_mapping,
lockstart,
lockend);
if (ret)
break;
/*
* If we found a page that couldn't be invalidated just
* fall back to buffered.
*/
ret = invalidate_inode_pages2_range(inode->i_mapping,
lockstart >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT,
lockend >> PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT);
if (ret)
break;
}
cond_resched();
}
return ret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-200"
] | linux | 0305cd5f7fca85dae392b9ba85b116896eb7c1c7 | 143,499,239,910,932,380,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 62 | Btrfs: fix truncation of compressed and inlined extents
When truncating a file to a smaller size which consists of an inline
extent that is compressed, we did not discard (or made unusable) the
data between the new file size and the old file size, wasting metadata
space and allowing for the truncated data to be leaked and the data
corruption/loss mentioned below.
We were also not correctly decrementing the number of bytes used by the
inode, we were setting it to zero, giving a wrong report for callers of
the stat(2) syscall. The fsck tool also reported an error about a mismatch
between the nbytes of the file versus the real space used by the file.
Now because we weren't discarding the truncated region of the file, it
was possible for a caller of the clone ioctl to actually read the data
that was truncated, allowing for a security breach without requiring root
access to the system, using only standard filesystem operations. The
scenario is the following:
1) User A creates a file which consists of an inline and compressed
extent with a size of 2000 bytes - the file is not accessible to
any other users (no read, write or execution permission for anyone
else);
2) The user truncates the file to a size of 1000 bytes;
3) User A makes the file world readable;
4) User B creates a file consisting of an inline extent of 2000 bytes;
5) User B issues a clone operation from user A's file into its own
file (using a length argument of 0, clone the whole range);
6) User B now gets to see the 1000 bytes that user A truncated from
its file before it made its file world readbale. User B also lost
the bytes in the range [1000, 2000[ bytes from its own file, but
that might be ok if his/her intention was reading stale data from
user A that was never supposed to be public.
Note that this contrasts with the case where we truncate a file from 2000
bytes to 1000 bytes and then truncate it back from 1000 to 2000 bytes. In
this case reading any byte from the range [1000, 2000[ will return a value
of 0x00, instead of the original data.
This problem exists since the clone ioctl was added and happens both with
and without my recent data loss and file corruption fixes for the clone
ioctl (patch "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents").
So fix this by truncating the compressed inline extents as we do for the
non-compressed case, which involves decompressing, if the data isn't already
in the page cache, compressing the truncated version of the extent, writing
the compressed content into the inline extent and then truncate it.
The following test case for fstests reproduces the problem. In order for
the test to pass both this fix and my previous fix for the clone ioctl
that forbids cloning a smaller inline extent into a larger one,
which is titled "Btrfs: fix file corruption and data loss after cloning
inline extents", are needed. Without that other fix the test fails in a
different way that does not leak the truncated data, instead part of
destination file gets replaced with zeroes (because the destination file
has a larger inline extent than the source).
seq=`basename $0`
seqres=$RESULT_DIR/$seq
echo "QA output created by $seq"
tmp=/tmp/$$
status=1 # failure is the default!
trap "_cleanup; exit \$status" 0 1 2 3 15
_cleanup()
{
rm -f $tmp.*
}
# get standard environment, filters and checks
. ./common/rc
. ./common/filter
# real QA test starts here
_need_to_be_root
_supported_fs btrfs
_supported_os Linux
_require_scratch
_require_cloner
rm -f $seqres.full
_scratch_mkfs >>$seqres.full 2>&1
_scratch_mount "-o compress"
# Create our test files. File foo is going to be the source of a clone operation
# and consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of 512 bytes,
# while file bar consists of a single inline extent with an uncompressed size of
# 256 bytes. For our test's purpose, it's important that file bar has an inline
# extent with a size smaller than foo's inline extent.
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa1 0 128" \
-c "pwrite -S 0x2a 128 384" \
$SCRATCH_MNT/foo | _filter_xfs_io
$XFS_IO_PROG -f -c "pwrite -S 0xbb 0 256" $SCRATCH_MNT/bar | _filter_xfs_io
# Now durably persist all metadata and data. We do this to make sure that we get
# on disk an inline extent with a size of 512 bytes for file foo.
sync
# Now truncate our file foo to a smaller size. Because it consists of a
# compressed and inline extent, btrfs did not shrink the inline extent to the
# new size (if the extent was not compressed, btrfs would shrink it to 128
# bytes), it only updates the inode's i_size to 128 bytes.
$XFS_IO_PROG -c "truncate 128" $SCRATCH_MNT/foo
# Now clone foo's inline extent into bar.
# This clone operation should fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP because the source
# file consists only of an inline extent and the file's size is smaller than
# the inline extent of the destination (128 bytes < 256 bytes). However the
# clone ioctl was not prepared to deal with a file that has a size smaller
# than the size of its inline extent (something that happens only for compressed
# inline extents), resulting in copying the full inline extent from the source
# file into the destination file.
#
# Note that btrfs' clone operation for inline extents consists of removing the
# inline extent from the destination inode and copy the inline extent from the
# source inode into the destination inode, meaning that if the destination
# inode's inline extent is larger (N bytes) than the source inode's inline
# extent (M bytes), some bytes (N - M bytes) will be lost from the destination
# file. Btrfs could copy the source inline extent's data into the destination's
# inline extent so that we would not lose any data, but that's currently not
# done due to the complexity that would be needed to deal with such cases
# (specially when one or both extents are compressed), returning EOPNOTSUPP, as
# it's normally not a very common case to clone very small files (only case
# where we get inline extents) and copying inline extents does not save any
# space (unlike for normal, non-inlined extents).
$CLONER_PROG -s 0 -d 0 -l 0 $SCRATCH_MNT/foo $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Now because the above clone operation used to succeed, and due to foo's inline
# extent not being shinked by the truncate operation, our file bar got the whole
# inline extent copied from foo, making us lose the last 128 bytes from bar
# which got replaced by the bytes in range [128, 256[ from foo before foo was
# truncated - in other words, data loss from bar and being able to read old and
# stale data from foo that should not be possible to read anymore through normal
# filesystem operations. Contrast with the case where we truncate a file from a
# size N to a smaller size M, truncate it back to size N and then read the range
# [M, N[, we should always get the value 0x00 for all the bytes in that range.
# We expected the clone operation to fail with errno EOPNOTSUPP and therefore
# not modify our file's bar data/metadata. So its content should be 256 bytes
# long with all bytes having the value 0xbb.
#
# Without the btrfs bug fix, the clone operation succeeded and resulted in
# leaking truncated data from foo, the bytes that belonged to its range
# [128, 256[, and losing data from bar in that same range. So reading the
# file gave us the following content:
#
# 0000000 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1 a1
# *
# 0000200 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a 2a
# *
# 0000400
echo "File bar's content after the clone operation:"
od -t x1 $SCRATCH_MNT/bar
# Also because the foo's inline extent was not shrunk by the truncate
# operation, btrfs' fsck, which is run by the fstests framework everytime a
# test completes, failed reporting the following error:
#
# root 5 inode 257 errors 400, nbytes wrong
status=0
exit
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <[email protected]> |
static inline bool gic_irq_signaling_enabled(GICState *s, int cpu, bool virt,
int group_mask)
{
int cpu_iface = virt ? (cpu + GIC_NCPU) : cpu;
if (!virt && !(s->ctlr & group_mask)) {
return false;
}
if (virt && !(s->h_hcr[cpu] & R_GICH_HCR_EN_MASK)) {
return false;
}
if (!(s->cpu_ctlr[cpu_iface] & group_mask)) {
return false;
}
return true;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qemu | edfe2eb4360cde4ed5d95bda7777edcb3510f76a | 116,769,049,765,328,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 19 | hw/intc/arm_gic: Fix interrupt ID in GICD_SGIR register
Per the ARM Generic Interrupt Controller Architecture specification
(document "ARM IHI 0048B.b (ID072613)"), the SGIINTID field is 4 bit,
not 10:
- 4.3 Distributor register descriptions
- 4.3.15 Software Generated Interrupt Register, GICD_SG
- Table 4-21 GICD_SGIR bit assignments
The Interrupt ID of the SGI to forward to the specified CPU
interfaces. The value of this field is the Interrupt ID, in
the range 0-15, for example a value of 0b0011 specifies
Interrupt ID 3.
Correct the irq mask to fix an undefined behavior (which eventually
lead to a heap-buffer-overflow, see [Buglink]):
$ echo 'writel 0x8000f00 0xff4affb0' | qemu-system-aarch64 -M virt,accel=qtest -qtest stdio
[I 1612088147.116987] OPENED
[R +0.278293] writel 0x8000f00 0xff4affb0
../hw/intc/arm_gic.c:1498:13: runtime error: index 944 out of bounds for type 'uint8_t [16][8]'
SUMMARY: UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer: undefined-behavior ../hw/intc/arm_gic.c:1498:13
This fixes a security issue when running with KVM on Arm with
kernel-irqchip=off. (The default is kernel-irqchip=on, which is
unaffected, and which is also the correct choice for performance.)
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: CVE-2021-20221
Fixes: 9ee6e8bb853 ("ARMv7 support.")
Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1913916
Buglink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1913917
Reported-by: Alexander Bulekov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
Message-id: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> |
archive_acl_types(struct archive_acl *acl)
{
return (acl->acl_types);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-476"
] | libarchive | 15bf44fd2c1ad0e3fd87048b3fcc90c4dcff1175 | 227,188,760,898,172,750,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | Skip 0-length ACL fields
Currently, it is possible to create an archive that crashes bsdtar
with a malformed ACL:
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
archive_acl_from_text_l (acl=<optimised out>, text=0x7e2e92 "", want_type=<optimised out>, sc=<optimised out>) at libarchive/archive_acl.c:1726
1726 switch (*s) {
(gdb) p n
$1 = 1
(gdb) p field[n]
$2 = {start = 0x0, end = 0x0}
Stop this by checking that the length is not zero before beginning
the switch statement.
I am pretty sure this is the bug mentioned in the qsym paper [1],
and I was able to replicate it with a qsym + AFL + afl-rb setup.
[1] https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/yun |
_lookup_passwd_info (const char *username,
uid_t *uidp,
gid_t *gidp,
char **homep,
char **shellp)
{
gboolean ret;
struct passwd *passwd_entry;
struct passwd passwd_buffer;
char *aux_buffer;
long required_aux_buffer_size;
gsize aux_buffer_size;
ret = FALSE;
aux_buffer = NULL;
aux_buffer_size = 0;
required_aux_buffer_size = sysconf (_SC_GETPW_R_SIZE_MAX);
if (required_aux_buffer_size < 0) {
aux_buffer_size = GDM_PASSWD_AUXILLARY_BUFFER_SIZE;
} else {
aux_buffer_size = (gsize) required_aux_buffer_size;
}
aux_buffer = g_slice_alloc0 (aux_buffer_size);
/* we use the _r variant of getpwnam()
* (with its weird semantics) so that the
* passwd_entry doesn't potentially get stomped on
* by a PAM module
*/
again:
passwd_entry = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_POSIX_GETPWNAM_R
errno = getpwnam_r (username,
&passwd_buffer,
aux_buffer,
(size_t) aux_buffer_size,
&passwd_entry);
#else
passwd_entry = getpwnam_r (username,
&passwd_buffer,
aux_buffer,
(size_t) aux_buffer_size);
errno = 0;
#endif /* !HAVE_POSIX_GETPWNAM_R */
if (errno == EINTR) {
g_debug ("%s", g_strerror (errno));
goto again;
} else if (errno != 0) {
g_warning ("%s", g_strerror (errno));
goto out;
}
if (passwd_entry == NULL) {
goto out;
}
if (uidp != NULL) {
*uidp = passwd_entry->pw_uid;
}
if (gidp != NULL) {
*gidp = passwd_entry->pw_gid;
}
if (homep != NULL) {
if (passwd_entry->pw_dir != NULL && passwd_entry->pw_dir[0] != '\0') {
*homep = g_strdup (passwd_entry->pw_dir);
} else {
*homep = g_strdup ("/");
}
}
if (shellp != NULL) {
if (passwd_entry->pw_shell != NULL && passwd_entry->pw_shell[0] != '\0') {
*shellp = g_strdup (passwd_entry->pw_shell);
} else {
*shellp = g_strdup ("/bin/bash");
}
}
ret = TRUE;
out:
if (aux_buffer != NULL) {
g_assert (aux_buffer_size > 0);
g_slice_free1 (aux_buffer_size, aux_buffer);
}
return ret;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-362"
] | gdm | dcdbaaa04012541ad2813cf83559d91d52f208b9 | 229,408,553,744,642,930,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 88 | session-worker: Don't switch back VTs until session is fully exited
There's a race condition on shutdown where the session worker is
switching VTs back to the initial VT at the same time as the session
exit is being processed.
This means that manager may try to start a login screen (because of
the VT switch) when autologin is enabled when there shouldn't be a
login screen.
This commit makes sure both the PostSession script, and session-exited
signal emission are complete before initiating the VT switch back
to the initial VT.
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gdm/-/issues/660 |
Uz_Globs *globalsCtor()
{
#ifdef REENTRANT
Uz_Globs *pG = (Uz_Globs *)malloc(sizeof(Uz_Globs));
if (!pG)
return (Uz_Globs *)NULL;
#endif /* REENTRANT */
/* for REENTRANT version, G is defined as (*pG) */
memzero(&G, sizeof(Uz_Globs));
#ifndef FUNZIP
#ifdef CMS_MVS
uO.aflag=1;
uO.C_flag=1;
#endif
#ifdef TANDEM
uO.aflag=1; /* default to '-a' auto create Text Files as type 101 */
#endif
#ifdef VMS
# if (!defined(NO_TIMESTAMPS))
uO.D_flag=1; /* default to '-D', no restoration of dir timestamps */
# endif
G.cover = NULL; /* not allocated yet */
#endif
uO.lflag=(-1);
G.wildzipfn = "";
G.pfnames = (char **)fnames;
G.pxnames = (char **)&fnames[1];
G.pInfo = G.info;
G.sol = TRUE; /* at start of line */
G.message = UzpMessagePrnt;
G.input = UzpInput; /* not used by anyone at the moment... */
#if defined(WINDLL) || defined(MACOS)
G.mpause = NULL; /* has scrollbars: no need for pausing */
#else
G.mpause = UzpMorePause;
#endif
G.decr_passwd = UzpPassword;
#endif /* !FUNZIP */
#if (!defined(DOS_FLX_H68_NLM_OS2_W32) && !defined(AMIGA) && !defined(RISCOS))
#if (!defined(MACOS) && !defined(ATARI) && !defined(VMS))
G.echofd = -1;
#endif /* !(MACOS || ATARI || VMS) */
#endif /* !(DOS_FLX_H68_NLM_OS2_W32 || AMIGA || RISCOS) */
#ifdef SYSTEM_SPECIFIC_CTOR
SYSTEM_SPECIFIC_CTOR(__G);
#endif
#ifdef REENTRANT
#ifdef USETHREADID
registerGlobalPointer(__G);
#else
GG = &G;
#endif /* ?USETHREADID */
#endif /* REENTRANT */
return &G;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-400"
] | unzip | 47b3ceae397d21bf822bc2ac73052a4b1daf8e1c | 16,443,669,056,023,774,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 65 | Detect and reject a zip bomb using overlapped entries.
This detects an invalid zip file that has at least one entry that
overlaps with another entry or with the central directory to the
end of the file. A Fifield zip bomb uses overlapped local entries
to vastly increase the potential inflation ratio. Such an invalid
zip file is rejected.
See https://www.bamsoftware.com/hacks/zipbomb/ for David Fifield's
analysis, construction, and examples of such zip bombs.
The detection maintains a list of covered spans of the zip files
so far, where the central directory to the end of the file and any
bytes preceding the first entry at zip file offset zero are
considered covered initially. Then as each entry is decompressed
or tested, it is considered covered. When a new entry is about to
be processed, its initial offset is checked to see if it is
contained by a covered span. If so, the zip file is rejected as
invalid.
This commit depends on a preceding commit: "Fix bug in
undefer_input() that misplaced the input state." |
static int insn_def_regno(const struct bpf_insn *insn)
{
switch (BPF_CLASS(insn->code)) {
case BPF_JMP:
case BPF_JMP32:
case BPF_ST:
return -1;
case BPF_STX:
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_ATOMIC &&
(insn->imm & BPF_FETCH)) {
if (insn->imm == BPF_CMPXCHG)
return BPF_REG_0;
else
return insn->src_reg;
} else {
return -1;
}
default:
return insn->dst_reg;
}
} | 0 | [
"CWE-307"
] | linux | 350a5c4dd2452ea999cc5e1d4a8dbf12de2f97ef | 26,704,950,220,146,160,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 21 | bpf: Dont allow vmlinux BTF to be used in map_create and prog_load.
The syzbot got FD of vmlinux BTF and passed it into map_create which caused
crash in btf_type_id_size() when it tried to access resolved_ids. The vmlinux
BTF doesn't have 'resolved_ids' and 'resolved_sizes' initialized to save
memory. To avoid such issues disallow using vmlinux BTF in prog_load and
map_create commands.
Fixes: 5329722057d4 ("bpf: Assign ID to vmlinux BTF and return extra info for BTF in GET_OBJ_INFO")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected] |
QUtil::is_utf16(std::string const& val)
{
return ((val.length() >= 2) &&
(val.at(0) == '\xfe') && (val.at(1) == '\xff'));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-787"
] | qpdf | d71f05ca07eb5c7cfa4d6d23e5c1f2a800f52e8e | 193,833,783,349,485,300,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | Fix sign and conversion warnings (major)
This makes all integer type conversions that have potential data loss
explicit with calls that do range checks and raise an exception. After
this commit, qpdf builds with no warnings when -Wsign-conversion
-Wconversion is used with gcc or clang or when -W3 -Wd4800 is used
with MSVC. This significantly reduces the likelihood of potential
crashes from bogus integer values.
There are some parts of the code that take int when they should take
size_t or an offset. Such places would make qpdf not support files
with more than 2^31 of something that usually wouldn't be so large. In
the event that such a file shows up and is valid, at least qpdf would
raise an error in the right spot so the issue could be legitimately
addressed rather than failing in some weird way because of a silent
overflow condition. |
char *keychain_delete(struct Server *server) {
SecKeychainItemRef item;
OSStatus status = SecKeychainFindInternetPassword(
NULL,
strlen(server->host), server->host,
0, NULL,
0, NULL,
strlen(server->path), server->path,
server->port,
server->proto,
kSecAuthenticationTypeDefault,
0, NULL,
&item);
if (status) {
return get_error(status);
}
status = SecKeychainItemDelete(item);
if (status) {
return get_error(status);
}
return NULL;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-415"
] | docker-credential-helpers | 87c80bfba583eadc087810d17aa631ef4e405efc | 101,721,586,400,521,400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 25 | Fix a double free in the List functions
The code was set up so that it would free the individual items and the data
in `freeListData`, but there was already a Go `defer` to free the data item,
resulting in a double free.
Remove the `free` in `freeListData` and leave the original one.
In addition, move the `defer` for freeing the list data before the error
check, so that the data is also free in the error case. This just removes
a minor leak.
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jasiel Spelman of Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative and Trend Micro Team Nebula
Signed-off-by: Justin Cormack <[email protected]> |
SpoolssGetForm_q(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep _U_)
{
dcerpc_call_value *dcv = (dcerpc_call_value *)di->call_data;
proto_item *hidden_item;
guint32 level;
char *name;
hidden_item = proto_tree_add_uint(
tree, hf_form, tvb, offset, 0, 1);
PROTO_ITEM_SET_HIDDEN(hidden_item);
/* Parse packet */
offset = dissect_nt_policy_hnd(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_hnd, NULL, NULL,
FALSE, FALSE);
offset = dissect_ndr_cvstring(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
sizeof(guint16), hf_form_name, TRUE, &name);
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", %s", name);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_form_level, &level);
/* GetForm() stores the level in se_data */
if(!pinfo->fd->flags.visited){
dcv->se_data = GUINT_TO_POINTER((int)level);
}
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", level %d",
level);
offset = dissect_spoolss_buffer(tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, NULL);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_offered, NULL);
return offset;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-399"
] | wireshark | b4d16b4495b732888e12baf5b8a7e9bf2665e22b | 85,908,087,045,116,590,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 42 | SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <[email protected]> |
convert_to_decimal (mpn_t a, size_t extra_zeroes)
{
mp_limb_t *a_ptr = a.limbs;
size_t a_len = a.nlimbs;
/* 0.03345 is slightly larger than log(2)/(9*log(10)). */
size_t c_len = 9 * ((size_t)(a_len * (GMP_LIMB_BITS * 0.03345f)) + 1);
/* We need extra_zeroes bytes for zeroes, followed by c_len bytes for the
digits of a, followed by 1 byte for the terminating NUL. */
char *c_ptr = (char *) malloc (xsum (xsum (extra_zeroes, c_len), 1));
if (c_ptr != NULL)
{
char *d_ptr = c_ptr;
for (; extra_zeroes > 0; extra_zeroes--)
*d_ptr++ = '0';
while (a_len > 0)
{
/* Divide a by 10^9, in-place. */
mp_limb_t remainder = 0;
mp_limb_t *ptr = a_ptr + a_len;
size_t count;
for (count = a_len; count > 0; count--)
{
mp_twolimb_t num =
((mp_twolimb_t) remainder << GMP_LIMB_BITS) | *--ptr;
*ptr = num / 1000000000;
remainder = num % 1000000000;
}
/* Store the remainder as 9 decimal digits. */
for (count = 9; count > 0; count--)
{
*d_ptr++ = '0' + (remainder % 10);
remainder = remainder / 10;
}
/* Normalize a. */
if (a_ptr[a_len - 1] == 0)
a_len--;
}
/* Remove leading zeroes. */
while (d_ptr > c_ptr && d_ptr[-1] == '0')
d_ptr--;
/* But keep at least one zero. */
if (d_ptr == c_ptr)
*d_ptr++ = '0';
/* Terminate the string. */
*d_ptr = '\0';
}
return c_ptr;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-119",
"CWE-787"
] | gnulib | 278b4175c9d7dd47c1a3071554aac02add3b3c35 | 77,915,899,001,834,150,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 48 | vasnprintf: Fix heap memory overrun bug.
Reported by Ben Pfaff <[email protected]> in
<https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-gnulib/2018-09/msg00107.html>.
* lib/vasnprintf.c (convert_to_decimal): Allocate one more byte of
memory.
* tests/test-vasnprintf.c (test_function): Add another test. |
static NTSTATUS cli_ulogoff_recv(struct tevent_req *req)
{
return tevent_req_simple_recv_ntstatus(req);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-94"
] | samba | 94295b7aa22d2544af5323bca70d3dcb97fd7c64 | 294,873,634,133,569,600,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 4 | CVE-2016-2019: s3:libsmb: add comment regarding smbXcli_session_is_guest() with mandatory signing
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11860
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <[email protected]> |
static void *reloc_iomap(struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj,
struct reloc_cache *cache,
unsigned long page)
{
struct i915_ggtt *ggtt = cache_to_ggtt(cache);
unsigned long offset;
void *vaddr;
if (cache->vaddr) {
io_mapping_unmap_atomic((void __force __iomem *) unmask_page(cache->vaddr));
} else {
struct i915_vma *vma;
int err;
if (use_cpu_reloc(cache, obj))
return NULL;
err = i915_gem_object_set_to_gtt_domain(obj, true);
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
vma = i915_gem_object_ggtt_pin(obj, NULL, 0, 0,
PIN_MAPPABLE |
PIN_NONBLOCK |
PIN_NONFAULT);
if (IS_ERR(vma)) {
memset(&cache->node, 0, sizeof(cache->node));
err = drm_mm_insert_node_in_range
(&ggtt->vm.mm, &cache->node,
PAGE_SIZE, 0, I915_COLOR_UNEVICTABLE,
0, ggtt->mappable_end,
DRM_MM_INSERT_LOW);
if (err) /* no inactive aperture space, use cpu reloc */
return NULL;
} else {
err = i915_vma_put_fence(vma);
if (err) {
i915_vma_unpin(vma);
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
cache->node.start = vma->node.start;
cache->node.mm = (void *)vma;
}
}
offset = cache->node.start;
if (cache->node.allocated) {
wmb();
ggtt->vm.insert_page(&ggtt->vm,
i915_gem_object_get_dma_address(obj, page),
offset, I915_CACHE_NONE, 0);
} else {
offset += page << PAGE_SHIFT;
}
vaddr = (void __force *)io_mapping_map_atomic_wc(&ggtt->iomap,
offset);
cache->page = page;
cache->vaddr = (unsigned long)vaddr;
return vaddr;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-20"
] | linux | 594cc251fdd0d231d342d88b2fdff4bc42fb0690 | 143,926,763,958,505,960,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 63 | make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()'
Originally, the rule used to be that you'd have to do access_ok()
separately, and then user_access_begin() before actually doing the
direct (optimized) user access.
But experience has shown that people then decide not to do access_ok()
at all, and instead rely on it being implied by other operations or
similar. Which makes it very hard to verify that the access has
actually been range-checked.
If you use the unsafe direct user accesses, hardware features (either
SMAP - Supervisor Mode Access Protection - on x86, or PAN - Privileged
Access Never - on ARM) do force you to use user_access_begin(). But
nothing really forces the range check.
By putting the range check into user_access_begin(), we actually force
people to do the right thing (tm), and the range check vill be visible
near the actual accesses. We have way too long a history of people
trying to avoid them.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> |
TEST_F(ConnectionManagerUtilityTest, MtlsSanitizeSetClientCertPeerSanEmpty) {
auto ssl = std::make_shared<NiceMock<Ssl::MockConnectionInfo>>();
ON_CALL(*ssl, peerCertificatePresented()).WillByDefault(Return(true));
const std::vector<std::string> local_uri_sans{"test://foo.com/be"};
EXPECT_CALL(*ssl, uriSanLocalCertificate()).WillOnce(Return(local_uri_sans));
std::string expected_sha("abcdefg");
EXPECT_CALL(*ssl, sha256PeerCertificateDigest()).WillOnce(ReturnRef(expected_sha));
std::string peer_subject = "/C=US/ST=CA/L=San Francisco/OU=Lyft/CN=test.lyft.com";
EXPECT_CALL(*ssl, subjectPeerCertificate()).WillOnce(ReturnRef(peer_subject));
EXPECT_CALL(*ssl, uriSanPeerCertificate()).WillRepeatedly(Return(std::vector<std::string>()));
ON_CALL(connection_, ssl()).WillByDefault(Return(ssl));
ON_CALL(config_, forwardClientCert())
.WillByDefault(Return(Http::ForwardClientCertType::SanitizeSet));
std::vector<Http::ClientCertDetailsType> details = std::vector<Http::ClientCertDetailsType>();
details.push_back(Http::ClientCertDetailsType::Subject);
details.push_back(Http::ClientCertDetailsType::URI);
ON_CALL(config_, setCurrentClientCertDetails()).WillByDefault(ReturnRef(details));
TestRequestHeaderMapImpl headers{
{"x-forwarded-client-cert", "By=test://foo.com/fe;URI=test://bar.com/be"}};
EXPECT_EQ((MutateRequestRet{"10.0.0.3:50000", false, Tracing::Reason::NotTraceable}),
callMutateRequestHeaders(headers, Protocol::Http2));
EXPECT_TRUE(headers.has("x-forwarded-client-cert"));
EXPECT_EQ("By=test://foo.com/be;Hash=abcdefg;Subject=\"/C=US/ST=CA/L=San "
"Francisco/OU=Lyft/CN=test.lyft.com\";URI=",
headers.get_("x-forwarded-client-cert"));
} | 0 | [
"CWE-22"
] | envoy | 5333b928d8bcffa26ab19bf018369a835f697585 | 172,506,146,545,528,350,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 27 | Implement handling of escaped slash characters in URL path
Fixes: CVE-2021-29492
Signed-off-by: Yan Avlasov <[email protected]> |
static inline void kvm_vcpu_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
++vcpu->stat.tlb_flush;
static_call(kvm_x86_flush_tlb_current)(vcpu);
} | 0 | [
"CWE-459"
] | linux | 683412ccf61294d727ead4a73d97397396e69a6b | 137,159,493,833,856,570,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 5 | KVM: SEV: add cache flush to solve SEV cache incoherency issues
Flush the CPU caches when memory is reclaimed from an SEV guest (where
reclaim also includes it being unmapped from KVM's memslots). Due to lack
of coherency for SEV encrypted memory, failure to flush results in silent
data corruption if userspace is malicious/broken and doesn't ensure SEV
guest memory is properly pinned and unpinned.
Cache coherency is not enforced across the VM boundary in SEV (AMD APM
vol.2 Section 15.34.7). Confidential cachelines, generated by confidential
VM guests have to be explicitly flushed on the host side. If a memory page
containing dirty confidential cachelines was released by VM and reallocated
to another user, the cachelines may corrupt the new user at a later time.
KVM takes a shortcut by assuming all confidential memory remain pinned
until the end of VM lifetime. Therefore, KVM does not flush cache at
mmu_notifier invalidation events. Because of this incorrect assumption and
the lack of cache flushing, malicous userspace can crash the host kernel:
creating a malicious VM and continuously allocates/releases unpinned
confidential memory pages when the VM is running.
Add cache flush operations to mmu_notifier operations to ensure that any
physical memory leaving the guest VM get flushed. In particular, hook
mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start and mmu_notifier_release events and
flush cache accordingly. The hook after releasing the mmu lock to avoid
contention with other vCPUs.
Cc: [email protected]
Suggested-by: Sean Christpherson <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Mingwei Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mingwei Zhang <[email protected]>
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> |
static int robots_fsio_access(pr_fs_t *fs, const char *path, int mode,
uid_t uid, gid_t gid, array_header *suppl_gids) {
if (mode != R_OK) {
errno = EACCES;
return -1;
}
return 0;
} | 0 | [
"CWE-59",
"CWE-295"
] | proftpd | 349addc3be4fcdad9bd4ec01ad1ccd916c898ed8 | 51,684,855,670,653,690,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 | 9 | Walk the entire DefaultRoot path, checking for symlinks of any component,
when AllowChrootSymlinks is disabled. |
Subsets and Splits