CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2019-15903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-15903/
|
CWE-611
|
https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/commit/c20b758c332d9a13afbbb276d30db1d183a85d43
|
c20b758c332d9a13afbbb276d30db1d183a85d43
|
xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
|
externalParEntInitProcessor(XML_Parser parser, const char *s, const char *end,
const char **nextPtr) {
enum XML_Error result = initializeEncoding(parser);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
/* we know now that XML_Parse(Buffer) has been called,
so we consider the external parameter entity read */
parser->m_dtd->paramEntityRead = XML_TRUE;
if (parser->m_prologState.inEntityValue) {
parser->m_processor = entityValueInitProcessor;
return entityValueInitProcessor(parser, s, end, nextPtr);
} else {
parser->m_processor = externalParEntProcessor;
return externalParEntProcessor(parser, s, end, nextPtr);
}
}
|
externalParEntInitProcessor(XML_Parser parser, const char *s, const char *end,
const char **nextPtr) {
enum XML_Error result = initializeEncoding(parser);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
/* we know now that XML_Parse(Buffer) has been called,
so we consider the external parameter entity read */
parser->m_dtd->paramEntityRead = XML_TRUE;
if (parser->m_prologState.inEntityValue) {
parser->m_processor = entityValueInitProcessor;
return entityValueInitProcessor(parser, s, end, nextPtr);
} else {
parser->m_processor = externalParEntProcessor;
return externalParEntProcessor(parser, s, end, nextPtr);
}
}
|
C
|
libexpat
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5061
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5061/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
(Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
|
bool LayerTreeHostImpl::AnimateLayers(base::TimeTicks monotonic_time) {
const bool animated = mutator_host_->TickAnimations(monotonic_time);
if (animated)
SetNeedsOneBeginImplFrame();
return animated;
}
|
bool LayerTreeHostImpl::AnimateLayers(base::TimeTicks monotonic_time) {
const bool animated = mutator_host_->TickAnimations(monotonic_time);
if (animated)
SetNeedsOneBeginImplFrame();
return animated;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-5045
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-5045/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/295dc39d941dc2ae53d5c170365af4c9d5c16212
|
295dc39d941dc2ae53d5c170365af4c9d5c16212
|
fs: umount on symlink leaks mnt count
Currently umount on symlink blocks following umount:
/vz is separate mount
# ls /vz/ -al | grep test
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root 4096 Jul 19 01:14 testdir
lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 11 Jul 19 01:16 testlink -> /vz/testdir
# umount -l /vz/testlink
umount: /vz/testlink: not mounted (expected)
# lsof /vz
# umount /vz
umount: /vz: device is busy. (unexpected)
In this case mountpoint_last() gets an extra refcount on path->mnt
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Ian Kent <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
|
static int may_delete(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *victim, bool isdir)
{
struct inode *inode = victim->d_inode;
int error;
if (d_is_negative(victim))
return -ENOENT;
BUG_ON(!inode);
BUG_ON(victim->d_parent->d_inode != dir);
audit_inode_child(dir, victim, AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE);
error = inode_permission(dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
if (error)
return error;
if (IS_APPEND(dir))
return -EPERM;
if (check_sticky(dir, inode) || IS_APPEND(inode) ||
IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_SWAPFILE(inode))
return -EPERM;
if (isdir) {
if (!d_is_dir(victim))
return -ENOTDIR;
if (IS_ROOT(victim))
return -EBUSY;
} else if (d_is_dir(victim))
return -EISDIR;
if (IS_DEADDIR(dir))
return -ENOENT;
if (victim->d_flags & DCACHE_NFSFS_RENAMED)
return -EBUSY;
return 0;
}
|
static int may_delete(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *victim, bool isdir)
{
struct inode *inode = victim->d_inode;
int error;
if (d_is_negative(victim))
return -ENOENT;
BUG_ON(!inode);
BUG_ON(victim->d_parent->d_inode != dir);
audit_inode_child(dir, victim, AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE);
error = inode_permission(dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
if (error)
return error;
if (IS_APPEND(dir))
return -EPERM;
if (check_sticky(dir, inode) || IS_APPEND(inode) ||
IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_SWAPFILE(inode))
return -EPERM;
if (isdir) {
if (!d_is_dir(victim))
return -ENOTDIR;
if (IS_ROOT(victim))
return -EBUSY;
} else if (d_is_dir(victim))
return -EISDIR;
if (IS_DEADDIR(dir))
return -ENOENT;
if (victim->d_flags & DCACHE_NFSFS_RENAMED)
return -EBUSY;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5019
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5019/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
f03ea5a5c2ff26e239dfd23e263b15da2d9cee93
|
Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
|
double RenderFrameImpl::GetZoomLevel() {
return render_view_->page_zoom_level();
}
|
double RenderFrameImpl::GetZoomLevel() {
return render_view_->page_zoom_level();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-8072
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8072/
|
CWE-388
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8e9faa15469ed7c7467423db4c62aeed3ff4cae3
|
8e9faa15469ed7c7467423db4c62aeed3ff4cae3
|
HID: cp2112: fix gpio-callback error handling
In case of a zero-length report, the gpio direction_input callback would
currently return success instead of an errno.
Fixes: 1ffb3c40ffb5 ("HID: cp2112: make transfer buffers DMA capable")
Cc: stable <[email protected]> # 4.9
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
|
static int cp2112_gpio_get_all(struct gpio_chip *chip)
{
struct cp2112_device *dev = gpiochip_get_data(chip);
struct hid_device *hdev = dev->hdev;
u8 *buf = dev->in_out_buffer;
int ret;
mutex_lock(&dev->lock);
ret = hid_hw_raw_request(hdev, CP2112_GPIO_GET, buf,
CP2112_GPIO_GET_LENGTH, HID_FEATURE_REPORT,
HID_REQ_GET_REPORT);
if (ret != CP2112_GPIO_GET_LENGTH) {
hid_err(hdev, "error requesting GPIO values: %d\n", ret);
ret = ret < 0 ? ret : -EIO;
goto exit;
}
ret = buf[1];
exit:
mutex_unlock(&dev->lock);
return ret;
}
|
static int cp2112_gpio_get_all(struct gpio_chip *chip)
{
struct cp2112_device *dev = gpiochip_get_data(chip);
struct hid_device *hdev = dev->hdev;
u8 *buf = dev->in_out_buffer;
int ret;
mutex_lock(&dev->lock);
ret = hid_hw_raw_request(hdev, CP2112_GPIO_GET, buf,
CP2112_GPIO_GET_LENGTH, HID_FEATURE_REPORT,
HID_REQ_GET_REPORT);
if (ret != CP2112_GPIO_GET_LENGTH) {
hid_err(hdev, "error requesting GPIO values: %d\n", ret);
ret = ret < 0 ? ret : -EIO;
goto exit;
}
ret = buf[1];
exit:
mutex_unlock(&dev->lock);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4592
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4592/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/12d6e7538e2d418c08f082b1b44ffa5fb7270ed8
|
12d6e7538e2d418c08f082b1b44ffa5fb7270ed8
|
KVM: perform an invalid memslot step for gpa base change
PPC must flush all translations before the new memory slot
is visible.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
|
static void kvm_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
{
int i;
struct mm_struct *mm = kvm->mm;
kvm_arch_sync_events(kvm);
raw_spin_lock(&kvm_lock);
list_del(&kvm->vm_list);
raw_spin_unlock(&kvm_lock);
kvm_free_irq_routing(kvm);
for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_BUSES; i++)
kvm_io_bus_destroy(kvm->buses[i]);
kvm_coalesced_mmio_free(kvm);
#if defined(CONFIG_MMU_NOTIFIER) && defined(KVM_ARCH_WANT_MMU_NOTIFIER)
mmu_notifier_unregister(&kvm->mmu_notifier, kvm->mm);
#else
kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all(kvm);
#endif
kvm_arch_destroy_vm(kvm);
kvm_free_physmem(kvm);
cleanup_srcu_struct(&kvm->srcu);
kvm_arch_free_vm(kvm);
hardware_disable_all();
mmdrop(mm);
}
|
static void kvm_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
{
int i;
struct mm_struct *mm = kvm->mm;
kvm_arch_sync_events(kvm);
raw_spin_lock(&kvm_lock);
list_del(&kvm->vm_list);
raw_spin_unlock(&kvm_lock);
kvm_free_irq_routing(kvm);
for (i = 0; i < KVM_NR_BUSES; i++)
kvm_io_bus_destroy(kvm->buses[i]);
kvm_coalesced_mmio_free(kvm);
#if defined(CONFIG_MMU_NOTIFIER) && defined(KVM_ARCH_WANT_MMU_NOTIFIER)
mmu_notifier_unregister(&kvm->mmu_notifier, kvm->mm);
#else
kvm_arch_flush_shadow_all(kvm);
#endif
kvm_arch_destroy_vm(kvm);
kvm_free_physmem(kvm);
cleanup_srcu_struct(&kvm->srcu);
kvm_arch_free_vm(kvm);
hardware_disable_all();
mmdrop(mm);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-7822
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-7822/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8d0207652cbe27d1f962050737848e5ad4671958
|
8d0207652cbe27d1f962050737848e5ad4671958
|
->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
void __init bdev_cache_init(void)
{
int err;
static struct vfsmount *bd_mnt;
bdev_cachep = kmem_cache_create("bdev_cache", sizeof(struct bdev_inode),
0, (SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT|
SLAB_MEM_SPREAD|SLAB_PANIC),
init_once);
err = register_filesystem(&bd_type);
if (err)
panic("Cannot register bdev pseudo-fs");
bd_mnt = kern_mount(&bd_type);
if (IS_ERR(bd_mnt))
panic("Cannot create bdev pseudo-fs");
blockdev_superblock = bd_mnt->mnt_sb; /* For writeback */
}
|
void __init bdev_cache_init(void)
{
int err;
static struct vfsmount *bd_mnt;
bdev_cachep = kmem_cache_create("bdev_cache", sizeof(struct bdev_inode),
0, (SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT|
SLAB_MEM_SPREAD|SLAB_PANIC),
init_once);
err = register_filesystem(&bd_type);
if (err)
panic("Cannot register bdev pseudo-fs");
bd_mnt = kern_mount(&bd_type);
if (IS_ERR(bd_mnt))
panic("Cannot create bdev pseudo-fs");
blockdev_superblock = bd_mnt->mnt_sb; /* For writeback */
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-0957
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-0957/
|
CWE-16
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2702b1526c7278c4d65d78de209a465d4de2885e
|
2702b1526c7278c4d65d78de209a465d4de2885e
|
kernel/sys.c: fix stack memory content leak via UNAME26
Calling uname() with the UNAME26 personality set allows a leak of kernel
stack contents. This fixes it by defensively calculating the length of
copy_to_user() call, making the len argument unsigned, and initializing
the stack buffer to zero (now technically unneeded, but hey, overkill).
CVE-2012-0957
Reported-by: PaX Team <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: PaX Team <[email protected]>
Cc: Brad Spengler <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresuid, uid_t __user *, ruidp, uid_t __user *, euidp, uid_t __user *, suidp)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int retval;
uid_t ruid, euid, suid;
ruid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->uid);
euid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->euid);
suid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->suid);
if (!(retval = put_user(ruid, ruidp)) &&
!(retval = put_user(euid, euidp)))
retval = put_user(suid, suidp);
return retval;
}
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getresuid, uid_t __user *, ruidp, uid_t __user *, euidp, uid_t __user *, suidp)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
int retval;
uid_t ruid, euid, suid;
ruid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->uid);
euid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->euid);
suid = from_kuid_munged(cred->user_ns, cred->suid);
if (!(retval = put_user(ruid, ruidp)) &&
!(retval = put_user(euid, euidp)))
retval = put_user(suid, suidp);
return retval;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5218
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5218/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/45d901b56f578a74b19ba0d10fa5c4c467f19303
|
45d901b56f578a74b19ba0d10fa5c4c467f19303
|
Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
|
int TabStyleViews::GetMinimumInactiveWidth() {
constexpr int kInteriorWidth = 16;
return kInteriorWidth - GetSeparatorSize().width() + GetTabOverlap();
}
|
int TabStyleViews::GetMinimumInactiveWidth() {
constexpr int kInteriorWidth = 16;
return kInteriorWidth - GetSeparatorSize().width() + GetTabOverlap();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b9e2ecab97a8a7f3cce06951ab92a3eaef559206
|
b9e2ecab97a8a7f3cce06951ab92a3eaef559206
|
Do not discount a MANUAL_SUBFRAME load just because it involved
some redirects.
R=brettw
BUG=21353
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/246073
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@27887 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void WebFrameLoaderClient::didDisplayInsecureContent() {
if (webframe_->client())
webframe_->client()->didDisplayInsecureContent(webframe_);
}
|
void WebFrameLoaderClient::didDisplayInsecureContent() {
if (webframe_->client())
webframe_->client()->didDisplayInsecureContent(webframe_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3168
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3168/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f592cf6a66b63decc7e7093b36501229a5de1f1d
|
f592cf6a66b63decc7e7093b36501229a5de1f1d
|
SVG: Moving animating <svg> to other iframe should not crash.
Moving SVGSVGElement with its SMILTimeContainer already started caused crash before this patch.
|SVGDocumentExtentions::startAnimations()| calls begin() against all SMILTimeContainers in the document, but the SMILTimeContainer for <svg> moved from other document may be already started.
BUG=369860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/290353002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@174338 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void SVGDocumentExtensions::rebuildAllElementReferencesForTarget(SVGElement* referencedElement)
{
ASSERT(referencedElement);
HashMap<SVGElement*, OwnPtr<HashSet<SVGElement*> > >::iterator it = m_elementDependencies.find(referencedElement);
if (it == m_elementDependencies.end())
return;
ASSERT(it->key == referencedElement);
Vector<SVGElement*> toBeNotified;
HashSet<SVGElement*>* referencingElements = it->value.get();
HashSet<SVGElement*>::iterator setEnd = referencingElements->end();
for (HashSet<SVGElement*>::iterator setIt = referencingElements->begin(); setIt != setEnd; ++setIt)
toBeNotified.append(*setIt);
Vector<SVGElement*>::iterator vectorEnd = toBeNotified.end();
for (Vector<SVGElement*>::iterator vectorIt = toBeNotified.begin(); vectorIt != vectorEnd; ++vectorIt) {
if (HashSet<SVGElement*>* referencingElements = setOfElementsReferencingTarget(referencedElement)) {
if (referencingElements->contains(*vectorIt))
(*vectorIt)->svgAttributeChanged(XLinkNames::hrefAttr);
}
}
}
|
void SVGDocumentExtensions::rebuildAllElementReferencesForTarget(SVGElement* referencedElement)
{
ASSERT(referencedElement);
HashMap<SVGElement*, OwnPtr<HashSet<SVGElement*> > >::iterator it = m_elementDependencies.find(referencedElement);
if (it == m_elementDependencies.end())
return;
ASSERT(it->key == referencedElement);
Vector<SVGElement*> toBeNotified;
HashSet<SVGElement*>* referencingElements = it->value.get();
HashSet<SVGElement*>::iterator setEnd = referencingElements->end();
for (HashSet<SVGElement*>::iterator setIt = referencingElements->begin(); setIt != setEnd; ++setIt)
toBeNotified.append(*setIt);
Vector<SVGElement*>::iterator vectorEnd = toBeNotified.end();
for (Vector<SVGElement*>::iterator vectorIt = toBeNotified.begin(); vectorIt != vectorEnd; ++vectorIt) {
if (HashSet<SVGElement*>* referencingElements = setOfElementsReferencingTarget(referencedElement)) {
if (referencingElements->contains(*vectorIt))
(*vectorIt)->svgAttributeChanged(XLinkNames::hrefAttr);
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-1174
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-1174/
|
CWE-362
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/systemd/systemd/commit/?id=5ebff5337594d690b322078c512eb222d34aaa82
|
5ebff5337594d690b322078c512eb222d34aaa82
| null |
static bool fd_in_set(int fd, const int fdset[], unsigned n_fdset) {
unsigned i;
assert(n_fdset == 0 || fdset);
for (i = 0; i < n_fdset; i++)
if (fdset[i] == fd)
return true;
return false;
}
|
static bool fd_in_set(int fd, const int fdset[], unsigned n_fdset) {
unsigned i;
assert(n_fdset == 0 || fdset);
for (i = 0; i < n_fdset; i++)
if (fdset[i] == fd)
return true;
return false;
}
|
C
|
systemd
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6892
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6892/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/commit/f833c53cb596e9e1792949f762e0b33661822748
|
f833c53cb596e9e1792949f762e0b33661822748
|
src/aiff.c: Fix a buffer read overflow
Secunia Advisory SA76717.
Found by: Laurent Delosieres, Secunia Research at Flexera Software
|
aiff_get_chunk_data (SF_PRIVATE *psf, const SF_CHUNK_ITERATOR * iterator, SF_CHUNK_INFO * chunk_info)
{ sf_count_t pos ;
int indx ;
if ((indx = psf_find_read_chunk_iterator (&psf->rchunks, iterator)) < 0)
return SFE_UNKNOWN_CHUNK ;
if (chunk_info->data == NULL)
return SFE_BAD_CHUNK_DATA_PTR ;
chunk_info->id_size = psf->rchunks.chunks [indx].id_size ;
memcpy (chunk_info->id, psf->rchunks.chunks [indx].id, sizeof (chunk_info->id) / sizeof (*chunk_info->id)) ;
pos = psf_ftell (psf) ;
psf_fseek (psf, psf->rchunks.chunks [indx].offset, SEEK_SET) ;
psf_fread (chunk_info->data, SF_MIN (chunk_info->datalen, psf->rchunks.chunks [indx].len), 1, psf) ;
psf_fseek (psf, pos, SEEK_SET) ;
return SFE_NO_ERROR ;
} /* aiff_get_chunk_data */
|
aiff_get_chunk_data (SF_PRIVATE *psf, const SF_CHUNK_ITERATOR * iterator, SF_CHUNK_INFO * chunk_info)
{ sf_count_t pos ;
int indx ;
if ((indx = psf_find_read_chunk_iterator (&psf->rchunks, iterator)) < 0)
return SFE_UNKNOWN_CHUNK ;
if (chunk_info->data == NULL)
return SFE_BAD_CHUNK_DATA_PTR ;
chunk_info->id_size = psf->rchunks.chunks [indx].id_size ;
memcpy (chunk_info->id, psf->rchunks.chunks [indx].id, sizeof (chunk_info->id) / sizeof (*chunk_info->id)) ;
pos = psf_ftell (psf) ;
psf_fseek (psf, psf->rchunks.chunks [indx].offset, SEEK_SET) ;
psf_fread (chunk_info->data, SF_MIN (chunk_info->datalen, psf->rchunks.chunks [indx].len), 1, psf) ;
psf_fseek (psf, pos, SEEK_SET) ;
return SFE_NO_ERROR ;
} /* aiff_get_chunk_data */
|
C
|
libsndfile
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7471
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7471/
|
CWE-732
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=9c6b899f7a46893ab3b671e341a2234e9c0c060e
|
9c6b899f7a46893ab3b671e341a2234e9c0c060e
| null |
static ssize_t local_preadv(FsContext *ctx, V9fsFidOpenState *fs,
const struct iovec *iov,
int iovcnt, off_t offset)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_PREADV
return preadv(fs->fd, iov, iovcnt, offset);
#else
int err = lseek(fs->fd, offset, SEEK_SET);
if (err == -1) {
return err;
} else {
return readv(fs->fd, iov, iovcnt);
}
#endif
}
|
static ssize_t local_preadv(FsContext *ctx, V9fsFidOpenState *fs,
const struct iovec *iov,
int iovcnt, off_t offset)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_PREADV
return preadv(fs->fd, iov, iovcnt, offset);
#else
int err = lseek(fs->fd, offset, SEEK_SET);
if (err == -1) {
return err;
} else {
return readv(fs->fd, iov, iovcnt);
}
#endif
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7271
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7271/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void netlink_ack(struct sk_buff *in_skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int err)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct nlmsghdr *rep;
struct nlmsgerr *errmsg;
size_t payload = sizeof(*errmsg);
/* error messages get the original request appened */
if (err)
payload += nlmsg_len(nlh);
skb = netlink_alloc_skb(in_skb->sk, nlmsg_total_size(payload),
NETLINK_CB(in_skb).portid, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb) {
struct sock *sk;
sk = netlink_lookup(sock_net(in_skb->sk),
in_skb->sk->sk_protocol,
NETLINK_CB(in_skb).portid);
if (sk) {
sk->sk_err = ENOBUFS;
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
sock_put(sk);
}
return;
}
rep = __nlmsg_put(skb, NETLINK_CB(in_skb).portid, nlh->nlmsg_seq,
NLMSG_ERROR, payload, 0);
errmsg = nlmsg_data(rep);
errmsg->error = err;
memcpy(&errmsg->msg, nlh, err ? nlh->nlmsg_len : sizeof(*nlh));
netlink_unicast(in_skb->sk, skb, NETLINK_CB(in_skb).portid, MSG_DONTWAIT);
}
|
void netlink_ack(struct sk_buff *in_skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, int err)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct nlmsghdr *rep;
struct nlmsgerr *errmsg;
size_t payload = sizeof(*errmsg);
/* error messages get the original request appened */
if (err)
payload += nlmsg_len(nlh);
skb = netlink_alloc_skb(in_skb->sk, nlmsg_total_size(payload),
NETLINK_CB(in_skb).portid, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb) {
struct sock *sk;
sk = netlink_lookup(sock_net(in_skb->sk),
in_skb->sk->sk_protocol,
NETLINK_CB(in_skb).portid);
if (sk) {
sk->sk_err = ENOBUFS;
sk->sk_error_report(sk);
sock_put(sk);
}
return;
}
rep = __nlmsg_put(skb, NETLINK_CB(in_skb).portid, nlh->nlmsg_seq,
NLMSG_ERROR, payload, 0);
errmsg = nlmsg_data(rep);
errmsg->error = err;
memcpy(&errmsg->msg, nlh, err ? nlh->nlmsg_len : sizeof(*nlh));
netlink_unicast(in_skb->sk, skb, NETLINK_CB(in_skb).portid, MSG_DONTWAIT);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16995
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16995/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/95a762e2c8c942780948091f8f2a4f32fce1ac6f
|
95a762e2c8c942780948091f8f2a4f32fce1ac6f
|
bpf: fix incorrect sign extension in check_alu_op()
Distinguish between
BPF_ALU64|BPF_MOV|BPF_K (load 32-bit immediate, sign-extended to 64-bit)
and BPF_ALU|BPF_MOV|BPF_K (load 32-bit immediate, zero-padded to 64-bit);
only perform sign extension in the first case.
Starting with v4.14, this is exploitable by unprivileged users as long as
the unprivileged_bpf_disabled sysctl isn't set.
Debian assigned CVE-2017-16995 for this issue.
v3:
- add CVE number (Ben Hutchings)
Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
|
static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state src_reg)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
bool src_known, dst_known;
s64 smin_val, smax_val;
u64 umin_val, umax_val;
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
/* 32-bit ALU ops are (32,32)->64 */
coerce_reg_to_32(dst_reg);
coerce_reg_to_32(&src_reg);
}
smin_val = src_reg.smin_value;
smax_val = src_reg.smax_value;
umin_val = src_reg.umin_value;
umax_val = src_reg.umax_value;
src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off);
dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_ADD:
if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) ||
signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) {
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value += smin_val;
dst_reg->smax_value += smax_val;
}
if (dst_reg->umin_value + umin_val < umin_val ||
dst_reg->umax_value + umax_val < umax_val) {
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->umin_value += umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value += umax_val;
}
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
break;
case BPF_SUB:
if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) ||
signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value -= smax_val;
dst_reg->smax_value -= smin_val;
}
if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
/* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
dst_reg->umin_value -= umax_val;
dst_reg->umax_value -= umin_val;
}
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
break;
case BPF_MUL:
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->smin_value < 0) {
/* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */
__mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg);
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
}
/* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and
* copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX).
*/
if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) {
/* Potential overflow, we know nothing */
__mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg);
/* (except what we can learn from the var_off) */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
}
dst_reg->umin_value *= umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value *= umax_val;
if (dst_reg->umax_value > S64_MAX) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
}
break;
case BPF_AND:
if (src_known && dst_known) {
__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value &
src_reg.var_off.value);
break;
}
/* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently
* bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima.
*/
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value;
dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val);
if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
/* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers,
* ain't nobody got time for that.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
/* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
* cast result into s64.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
}
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
case BPF_OR:
if (src_known && dst_known) {
__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value |
src_reg.var_off.value);
break;
}
/* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the
* maximum of the operands' minima
*/
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val);
dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value |
dst_reg->var_off.mask;
if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
/* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers,
* ain't nobody got time for that.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
/* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
* cast result into s64.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
}
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
case BPF_LSH:
if (umax_val > 63) {
/* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined. This includes
* shifts by a negative number.
*/
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
break;
}
/* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick
* up from var_off)
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
/* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */
if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) {
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val;
}
if (src_known)
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val);
else
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(tnum_unknown, umin_val);
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
case BPF_RSH:
if (umax_val > 63) {
/* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined. This includes
* shifts by a negative number.
*/
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
break;
}
/* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might
* be negative, then either:
* 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is
* unknown, so we lose our signed bounds
* 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the
* signed bounds
* 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing
* about the result
* If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the
* unsigned bounts capture the signed bounds.
* Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds
* and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and
* var_off of the result.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
if (src_known)
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off,
umin_val);
else
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(tnum_unknown, umin_val);
dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val;
dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val;
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
default:
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
break;
}
__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
return 0;
}
|
static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state src_reg)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
bool src_known, dst_known;
s64 smin_val, smax_val;
u64 umin_val, umax_val;
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
/* 32-bit ALU ops are (32,32)->64 */
coerce_reg_to_32(dst_reg);
coerce_reg_to_32(&src_reg);
}
smin_val = src_reg.smin_value;
smax_val = src_reg.smax_value;
umin_val = src_reg.umin_value;
umax_val = src_reg.umax_value;
src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off);
dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_ADD:
if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) ||
signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) {
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value += smin_val;
dst_reg->smax_value += smax_val;
}
if (dst_reg->umin_value + umin_val < umin_val ||
dst_reg->umax_value + umax_val < umax_val) {
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->umin_value += umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value += umax_val;
}
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
break;
case BPF_SUB:
if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) ||
signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value -= smax_val;
dst_reg->smax_value -= smin_val;
}
if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
/* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
dst_reg->umin_value -= umax_val;
dst_reg->umax_value -= umin_val;
}
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
break;
case BPF_MUL:
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->smin_value < 0) {
/* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */
__mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg);
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
}
/* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and
* copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX).
*/
if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) {
/* Potential overflow, we know nothing */
__mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg);
/* (except what we can learn from the var_off) */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
}
dst_reg->umin_value *= umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value *= umax_val;
if (dst_reg->umax_value > S64_MAX) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
}
break;
case BPF_AND:
if (src_known && dst_known) {
__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value &
src_reg.var_off.value);
break;
}
/* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently
* bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima.
*/
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value;
dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val);
if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
/* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers,
* ain't nobody got time for that.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
/* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
* cast result into s64.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
}
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
case BPF_OR:
if (src_known && dst_known) {
__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value |
src_reg.var_off.value);
break;
}
/* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the
* maximum of the operands' minima
*/
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val);
dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value |
dst_reg->var_off.mask;
if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
/* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers,
* ain't nobody got time for that.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
/* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
* cast result into s64.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
}
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
case BPF_LSH:
if (umax_val > 63) {
/* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined. This includes
* shifts by a negative number.
*/
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
break;
}
/* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick
* up from var_off)
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
/* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */
if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) {
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val;
}
if (src_known)
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val);
else
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(tnum_unknown, umin_val);
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
case BPF_RSH:
if (umax_val > 63) {
/* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined. This includes
* shifts by a negative number.
*/
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
break;
}
/* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might
* be negative, then either:
* 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is
* unknown, so we lose our signed bounds
* 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the
* signed bounds
* 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing
* about the result
* If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the
* unsigned bounts capture the signed bounds.
* Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds
* and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and
* var_off of the result.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
if (src_known)
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off,
umin_val);
else
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(tnum_unknown, umin_val);
dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val;
dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val;
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
default:
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
break;
}
__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17204
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17204/
|
CWE-617
|
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/4af6da3b275b764b1afe194df6499b33d2bf4cde
|
4af6da3b275b764b1afe194df6499b33d2bf4cde
|
ofp-group: Don't assert-fail decoding bad OF1.5 group mod type or command.
When decoding a group mod, the current code validates the group type and
command after the whole group mod has been decoded. The OF1.5 decoder,
however, tries to use the type and command earlier, when it might still be
invalid. This caused an assertion failure (via OVS_NOT_REACHED). This
commit fixes the problem.
ovs-vswitchd does not enable support for OpenFlow 1.5 by default.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9249
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yifeng Sun <[email protected]>
|
ofputil_count_port_stats(const struct ofp_header *oh)
{
struct ofpbuf b = ofpbuf_const_initializer(oh, ntohs(oh->length));
ofpraw_pull_assert(&b);
for (size_t n = 0; ; n++) {
struct ofputil_port_stats ps;
if (ofputil_decode_port_stats(&ps, &b)) {
return n;
}
}
}
|
ofputil_count_port_stats(const struct ofp_header *oh)
{
struct ofpbuf b = ofpbuf_const_initializer(oh, ntohs(oh->length));
ofpraw_pull_assert(&b);
for (size_t n = 0; ; n++) {
struct ofputil_port_stats ps;
if (ofputil_decode_port_stats(&ps, &b)) {
return n;
}
}
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5837
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5837/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/04aaacb936a08d70862d6d9d7e8354721ae46be8
|
04aaacb936a08d70862d6d9d7e8354721ae46be8
|
Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <[email protected]>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
|
void BasicFindMainResponseInDatabase() { BasicFindMainResponse(true); }
|
void BasicFindMainResponseInDatabase() { BasicFindMainResponse(true); }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7271
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7271/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
f3d3342602f8bcbf37d7c46641cb9bca7618eb1c
|
net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int ipxitf_demux_socket(struct ipx_interface *intrfc,
struct sk_buff *skb, int copy)
{
struct ipxhdr *ipx = ipx_hdr(skb);
struct sock *sock1 = NULL, *sock2 = NULL;
struct sk_buff *skb1 = NULL, *skb2 = NULL;
int rc;
if (intrfc == ipx_primary_net && ntohs(ipx->ipx_dest.sock) == 0x451)
sock1 = ncp_connection_hack(intrfc, ipx);
if (!sock1)
/* No special socket found, forward the packet the normal way */
sock1 = ipxitf_find_socket(intrfc, ipx->ipx_dest.sock);
/*
* We need to check if there is a primary net and if
* this is addressed to one of the *SPECIAL* sockets because
* these need to be propagated to the primary net.
* The *SPECIAL* socket list contains: 0x452(SAP), 0x453(RIP) and
* 0x456(Diagnostic).
*/
if (ipx_primary_net && intrfc != ipx_primary_net) {
const int dsock = ntohs(ipx->ipx_dest.sock);
if (dsock == 0x452 || dsock == 0x453 || dsock == 0x456)
/* The appropriate thing to do here is to dup the
* packet and route to the primary net interface via
* ipxitf_send; however, we'll cheat and just demux it
* here. */
sock2 = ipxitf_find_socket(ipx_primary_net,
ipx->ipx_dest.sock);
}
/*
* If there is nothing to do return. The kfree will cancel any charging.
*/
rc = 0;
if (!sock1 && !sock2) {
if (!copy)
kfree_skb(skb);
goto out;
}
/*
* This next segment of code is a little awkward, but it sets it up
* so that the appropriate number of copies of the SKB are made and
* that skb1 and skb2 point to it (them) so that it (they) can be
* demuxed to sock1 and/or sock2. If we are unable to make enough
* copies, we do as much as is possible.
*/
if (copy)
skb1 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
else
skb1 = skb;
rc = -ENOMEM;
if (!skb1)
goto out_put;
/* Do we need 2 SKBs? */
if (sock1 && sock2)
skb2 = skb_clone(skb1, GFP_ATOMIC);
else
skb2 = skb1;
if (sock1)
ipxitf_def_skb_handler(sock1, skb1);
if (!skb2)
goto out_put;
if (sock2)
ipxitf_def_skb_handler(sock2, skb2);
rc = 0;
out_put:
if (sock1)
sock_put(sock1);
if (sock2)
sock_put(sock2);
out:
return rc;
}
|
static int ipxitf_demux_socket(struct ipx_interface *intrfc,
struct sk_buff *skb, int copy)
{
struct ipxhdr *ipx = ipx_hdr(skb);
struct sock *sock1 = NULL, *sock2 = NULL;
struct sk_buff *skb1 = NULL, *skb2 = NULL;
int rc;
if (intrfc == ipx_primary_net && ntohs(ipx->ipx_dest.sock) == 0x451)
sock1 = ncp_connection_hack(intrfc, ipx);
if (!sock1)
/* No special socket found, forward the packet the normal way */
sock1 = ipxitf_find_socket(intrfc, ipx->ipx_dest.sock);
/*
* We need to check if there is a primary net and if
* this is addressed to one of the *SPECIAL* sockets because
* these need to be propagated to the primary net.
* The *SPECIAL* socket list contains: 0x452(SAP), 0x453(RIP) and
* 0x456(Diagnostic).
*/
if (ipx_primary_net && intrfc != ipx_primary_net) {
const int dsock = ntohs(ipx->ipx_dest.sock);
if (dsock == 0x452 || dsock == 0x453 || dsock == 0x456)
/* The appropriate thing to do here is to dup the
* packet and route to the primary net interface via
* ipxitf_send; however, we'll cheat and just demux it
* here. */
sock2 = ipxitf_find_socket(ipx_primary_net,
ipx->ipx_dest.sock);
}
/*
* If there is nothing to do return. The kfree will cancel any charging.
*/
rc = 0;
if (!sock1 && !sock2) {
if (!copy)
kfree_skb(skb);
goto out;
}
/*
* This next segment of code is a little awkward, but it sets it up
* so that the appropriate number of copies of the SKB are made and
* that skb1 and skb2 point to it (them) so that it (they) can be
* demuxed to sock1 and/or sock2. If we are unable to make enough
* copies, we do as much as is possible.
*/
if (copy)
skb1 = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
else
skb1 = skb;
rc = -ENOMEM;
if (!skb1)
goto out_put;
/* Do we need 2 SKBs? */
if (sock1 && sock2)
skb2 = skb_clone(skb1, GFP_ATOMIC);
else
skb2 = skb1;
if (sock1)
ipxitf_def_skb_handler(sock1, skb1);
if (!skb2)
goto out_put;
if (sock2)
ipxitf_def_skb_handler(sock2, skb2);
rc = 0;
out_put:
if (sock1)
sock_put(sock1);
if (sock2)
sock_put(sock2);
out:
return rc;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11599
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11599/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/04f5866e41fb70690e28397487d8bd8eea7d712a
|
04f5866e41fb70690e28397487d8bd8eea7d712a
|
coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int do_brk_flags(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len, unsigned long flags, struct list_head *uf)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev;
struct rb_node **rb_link, *rb_parent;
pgoff_t pgoff = addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
int error;
/* Until we need other flags, refuse anything except VM_EXEC. */
if ((flags & (~VM_EXEC)) != 0)
return -EINVAL;
flags |= VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS | VM_ACCOUNT | mm->def_flags;
error = get_unmapped_area(NULL, addr, len, 0, MAP_FIXED);
if (offset_in_page(error))
return error;
error = mlock_future_check(mm, mm->def_flags, len);
if (error)
return error;
/*
* Clear old maps. this also does some error checking for us
*/
while (find_vma_links(mm, addr, addr + len, &prev, &rb_link,
&rb_parent)) {
if (do_munmap(mm, addr, len, uf))
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Check against address space limits *after* clearing old maps... */
if (!may_expand_vm(mm, flags, len >> PAGE_SHIFT))
return -ENOMEM;
if (mm->map_count > sysctl_max_map_count)
return -ENOMEM;
if (security_vm_enough_memory_mm(mm, len >> PAGE_SHIFT))
return -ENOMEM;
/* Can we just expand an old private anonymous mapping? */
vma = vma_merge(mm, prev, addr, addr + len, flags,
NULL, NULL, pgoff, NULL, NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX);
if (vma)
goto out;
/*
* create a vma struct for an anonymous mapping
*/
vma = vm_area_alloc(mm);
if (!vma) {
vm_unacct_memory(len >> PAGE_SHIFT);
return -ENOMEM;
}
vma_set_anonymous(vma);
vma->vm_start = addr;
vma->vm_end = addr + len;
vma->vm_pgoff = pgoff;
vma->vm_flags = flags;
vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(flags);
vma_link(mm, vma, prev, rb_link, rb_parent);
out:
perf_event_mmap(vma);
mm->total_vm += len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
mm->data_vm += len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (flags & VM_LOCKED)
mm->locked_vm += (len >> PAGE_SHIFT);
vma->vm_flags |= VM_SOFTDIRTY;
return 0;
}
|
static int do_brk_flags(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len, unsigned long flags, struct list_head *uf)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma, *prev;
struct rb_node **rb_link, *rb_parent;
pgoff_t pgoff = addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
int error;
/* Until we need other flags, refuse anything except VM_EXEC. */
if ((flags & (~VM_EXEC)) != 0)
return -EINVAL;
flags |= VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS | VM_ACCOUNT | mm->def_flags;
error = get_unmapped_area(NULL, addr, len, 0, MAP_FIXED);
if (offset_in_page(error))
return error;
error = mlock_future_check(mm, mm->def_flags, len);
if (error)
return error;
/*
* Clear old maps. this also does some error checking for us
*/
while (find_vma_links(mm, addr, addr + len, &prev, &rb_link,
&rb_parent)) {
if (do_munmap(mm, addr, len, uf))
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Check against address space limits *after* clearing old maps... */
if (!may_expand_vm(mm, flags, len >> PAGE_SHIFT))
return -ENOMEM;
if (mm->map_count > sysctl_max_map_count)
return -ENOMEM;
if (security_vm_enough_memory_mm(mm, len >> PAGE_SHIFT))
return -ENOMEM;
/* Can we just expand an old private anonymous mapping? */
vma = vma_merge(mm, prev, addr, addr + len, flags,
NULL, NULL, pgoff, NULL, NULL_VM_UFFD_CTX);
if (vma)
goto out;
/*
* create a vma struct for an anonymous mapping
*/
vma = vm_area_alloc(mm);
if (!vma) {
vm_unacct_memory(len >> PAGE_SHIFT);
return -ENOMEM;
}
vma_set_anonymous(vma);
vma->vm_start = addr;
vma->vm_end = addr + len;
vma->vm_pgoff = pgoff;
vma->vm_flags = flags;
vma->vm_page_prot = vm_get_page_prot(flags);
vma_link(mm, vma, prev, rb_link, rb_parent);
out:
perf_event_mmap(vma);
mm->total_vm += len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
mm->data_vm += len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (flags & VM_LOCKED)
mm->locked_vm += (len >> PAGE_SHIFT);
vma->vm_flags |= VM_SOFTDIRTY;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5136
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5136/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/401d30ef93030afbf7e81e53a11b68fc36194502
|
401d30ef93030afbf7e81e53a11b68fc36194502
|
Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
[email protected], abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void Document::processHttpEquivRefresh(const String& content)
{
maybeHandleHttpRefresh(content, HttpRefreshFromMetaTag);
}
|
void Document::processHttpEquivRefresh(const String& content)
{
maybeHandleHttpRefresh(content, HttpRefreshFromMetaTag);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-0798
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-0798/
|
CWE-399
|
https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=259b664f950c2ba66fbf4b0fe5281327904ead21
|
259b664f950c2ba66fbf4b0fe5281327904ead21
| null |
int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file)
{
int error_code;
STACK_OF(SRP_gN) *SRP_gN_tab = sk_SRP_gN_new_null();
char *last_index = NULL;
int i;
char **pp;
SRP_gN *gN = NULL;
SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd = NULL;
TXT_DB *tmpdb = NULL;
BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
error_code = SRP_ERR_OPEN_FILE;
if (in == NULL || BIO_read_filename(in, verifier_file) <= 0)
goto err;
error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_INCOMPLETE_FILE;
if ((tmpdb = TXT_DB_read(in, DB_NUMBER)) == NULL)
goto err;
error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY;
if (vb->seed_key) {
last_index = SRP_get_default_gN(NULL)->id;
}
for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(tmpdb->data); i++) {
pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(tmpdb->data, i);
if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX) {
/*
* we add this couple in the internal Stack
*/
if ((gN = (SRP_gN *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SRP_gN))) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!(gN->id = BUF_strdup(pp[DB_srpid]))
|| !(gN->N =
SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpverifier]))
|| !(gN->g = SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpsalt]))
|| sk_SRP_gN_insert(SRP_gN_tab, gN, 0) == 0)
goto err;
gN = NULL;
if (vb->seed_key != NULL) {
last_index = pp[DB_srpid];
}
} else if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_VALID) {
/* it is a user .... */
SRP_gN *lgN;
if ((lgN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(pp[DB_srpgN], SRP_gN_tab)) != NULL) {
error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY;
if ((user_pwd = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(user_pwd, lgN->g, lgN->N);
if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids
(user_pwd, pp[DB_srpid], pp[DB_srpinfo]))
goto err;
error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_BN_LIB;
if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_sv
(user_pwd, pp[DB_srpsalt], pp[DB_srpverifier]))
goto err;
if (sk_SRP_user_pwd_insert(vb->users_pwd, user_pwd, 0) == 0)
goto err;
user_pwd = NULL; /* abandon responsability */
}
}
}
if (last_index != NULL) {
/* this means that we want to simulate a default user */
if (((gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(last_index, SRP_gN_tab)) == NULL)) {
error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_BN_LIB;
goto err;
}
vb->default_g = gN->g;
vb->default_N = gN->N;
gN = NULL;
}
error_code = SRP_NO_ERROR;
err:
/*
* there may be still some leaks to fix, if this fails, the application
* terminates most likely
*/
if (gN != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(gN->id);
OPENSSL_free(gN);
}
SRP_user_pwd_free(user_pwd);
if (tmpdb)
TXT_DB_free(tmpdb);
if (in)
BIO_free_all(in);
sk_SRP_gN_free(SRP_gN_tab);
return error_code;
}
|
int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file)
{
int error_code;
STACK_OF(SRP_gN) *SRP_gN_tab = sk_SRP_gN_new_null();
char *last_index = NULL;
int i;
char **pp;
SRP_gN *gN = NULL;
SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd = NULL;
TXT_DB *tmpdb = NULL;
BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
error_code = SRP_ERR_OPEN_FILE;
if (in == NULL || BIO_read_filename(in, verifier_file) <= 0)
goto err;
error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_INCOMPLETE_FILE;
if ((tmpdb = TXT_DB_read(in, DB_NUMBER)) == NULL)
goto err;
error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY;
if (vb->seed_key) {
last_index = SRP_get_default_gN(NULL)->id;
}
for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_num(tmpdb->data); i++) {
pp = sk_OPENSSL_PSTRING_value(tmpdb->data, i);
if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_INDEX) {
/*
* we add this couple in the internal Stack
*/
if ((gN = (SRP_gN *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SRP_gN))) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!(gN->id = BUF_strdup(pp[DB_srpid]))
|| !(gN->N =
SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpverifier]))
|| !(gN->g = SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpsalt]))
|| sk_SRP_gN_insert(SRP_gN_tab, gN, 0) == 0)
goto err;
gN = NULL;
if (vb->seed_key != NULL) {
last_index = pp[DB_srpid];
}
} else if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_VALID) {
/* it is a user .... */
SRP_gN *lgN;
if ((lgN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(pp[DB_srpgN], SRP_gN_tab)) != NULL) {
error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY;
if ((user_pwd = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(user_pwd, lgN->g, lgN->N);
if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_ids
(user_pwd, pp[DB_srpid], pp[DB_srpinfo]))
goto err;
error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_BN_LIB;
if (!SRP_user_pwd_set_sv
(user_pwd, pp[DB_srpsalt], pp[DB_srpverifier]))
goto err;
if (sk_SRP_user_pwd_insert(vb->users_pwd, user_pwd, 0) == 0)
goto err;
user_pwd = NULL; /* abandon responsability */
}
}
}
if (last_index != NULL) {
/* this means that we want to simulate a default user */
if (((gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(last_index, SRP_gN_tab)) == NULL)) {
error_code = SRP_ERR_VBASE_BN_LIB;
goto err;
}
vb->default_g = gN->g;
vb->default_N = gN->N;
gN = NULL;
}
error_code = SRP_NO_ERROR;
err:
/*
* there may be still some leaks to fix, if this fails, the application
* terminates most likely
*/
if (gN != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(gN->id);
OPENSSL_free(gN);
}
SRP_user_pwd_free(user_pwd);
if (tmpdb)
TXT_DB_free(tmpdb);
if (in)
BIO_free_all(in);
sk_SRP_gN_free(SRP_gN_tab);
return error_code;
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e93dc535728da259ec16d1c3cc393f80b25f64ae
|
e93dc535728da259ec16d1c3cc393f80b25f64ae
|
Add a unit test that filenames aren't unintentionally converted to URLs.
Also fixes two issues in OSExchangeDataProviderWin:
- It used a disjoint set of clipboard formats when handling
GetUrl(..., true /* filename conversion */) vs GetFilenames(...), so the
actual returned results would vary depending on which one was called.
- It incorrectly used ::DragFinish() instead of ::ReleaseStgMedium().
::DragFinish() is only meant to be used in conjunction with WM_DROPFILES.
BUG=346135
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/380553002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@283226 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
OSExchangeDataProviderWin::OSExchangeDataProviderWin(IDataObject* source)
: data_(new DataObjectImpl()),
source_object_(source) {
}
|
OSExchangeDataProviderWin::OSExchangeDataProviderWin(IDataObject* source)
: data_(new DataObjectImpl()),
source_object_(source) {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-8674
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-8674/
|
CWE-416
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=1e03c06456d997435019fb3526fa2d4be7dbc6ec
|
1e03c06456d997435019fb3526fa2d4be7dbc6ec
| null |
pdf_dict_put_drop(fz_context *ctx, pdf_obj *obj, pdf_obj *key, pdf_obj *val)
{
fz_try(ctx)
}
|
pdf_dict_put_drop(fz_context *ctx, pdf_obj *obj, pdf_obj *key, pdf_obj *val)
{
fz_try(ctx)
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fc790462b4f248712bbc8c3734664dd6b05f80f2
|
fc790462b4f248712bbc8c3734664dd6b05f80f2
|
Set the job name for the print job on the Mac.
BUG=http://crbug.com/29188
TEST=as in bug
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/1997016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@47056 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
PrintingContext::Result PrintingContext::AskUserForSettings(
HWND view,
int max_pages,
bool has_selection) {
DCHECK(!in_print_job_);
dialog_box_dismissed_ = false;
HWND window;
if (!view || !IsWindow(view)) {
// TODO(maruel): bug 1214347 Get the right browser window instead.
window = GetDesktopWindow();
} else {
window = GetAncestor(view, GA_ROOTOWNER);
}
DCHECK(window);
PRINTDLGEX dialog_options = { sizeof(PRINTDLGEX) };
dialog_options.hwndOwner = window;
dialog_options.Flags = PD_RETURNDC | PD_USEDEVMODECOPIESANDCOLLATE |
PD_NOCURRENTPAGE | PD_HIDEPRINTTOFILE;
if (!has_selection)
dialog_options.Flags |= PD_NOSELECTION;
PRINTPAGERANGE ranges[32];
dialog_options.nStartPage = START_PAGE_GENERAL;
if (max_pages) {
memset(ranges, 0, sizeof(ranges));
ranges[0].nFromPage = 1;
ranges[0].nToPage = max_pages;
dialog_options.nPageRanges = 1;
dialog_options.nMaxPageRanges = arraysize(ranges);
dialog_options.nMinPage = 1;
dialog_options.nMaxPage = max_pages;
dialog_options.lpPageRanges = ranges;
} else {
dialog_options.Flags |= PD_NOPAGENUMS;
}
{
if (PrintDlgEx(&dialog_options) != S_OK) {
ResetSettings();
return FAILED;
}
}
return ParseDialogResultEx(dialog_options);
}
|
PrintingContext::Result PrintingContext::AskUserForSettings(
HWND window,
int max_pages,
bool has_selection) {
DCHECK(window);
DCHECK(!in_print_job_);
dialog_box_dismissed_ = false;
PRINTDLGEX dialog_options = { sizeof(PRINTDLGEX) };
dialog_options.hwndOwner = window;
dialog_options.Flags = PD_RETURNDC | PD_USEDEVMODECOPIESANDCOLLATE |
PD_NOCURRENTPAGE | PD_HIDEPRINTTOFILE;
if (!has_selection)
dialog_options.Flags |= PD_NOSELECTION;
PRINTPAGERANGE ranges[32];
dialog_options.nStartPage = START_PAGE_GENERAL;
if (max_pages) {
memset(ranges, 0, sizeof(ranges));
ranges[0].nFromPage = 1;
ranges[0].nToPage = max_pages;
dialog_options.nPageRanges = 1;
dialog_options.nMaxPageRanges = arraysize(ranges);
dialog_options.nMinPage = 1;
dialog_options.nMaxPage = max_pages;
dialog_options.lpPageRanges = ranges;
} else {
dialog_options.Flags |= PD_NOPAGENUMS;
}
{
if (PrintDlgEx(&dialog_options) != S_OK) {
ResetSettings();
return FAILED;
}
}
return ParseDialogResultEx(dialog_options);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2012-2888
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2888/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3b0d77670a0613f409110817455d2137576b485a
|
3b0d77670a0613f409110817455d2137576b485a
|
Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void StopFind() {
if (ppp_find_ != NULL)
ppp_find_->StopFind(plugin_->pp_instance());
}
|
void StopFind() {
if (ppp_find_ != NULL)
ppp_find_->StopFind(plugin_->pp_instance());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1300
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1300/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9c391ac04f9ac478c8b0e43b359c2b43a6c892ab
|
9c391ac04f9ac478c8b0e43b359c2b43a6c892ab
|
Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
[email protected]
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
|
void HeadlessWebContentsImpl::PendingFrameReadbackComplete(
HeadlessWebContentsImpl::PendingFrame* pending_frame,
const SkBitmap& bitmap,
content::ReadbackResponse response) {
TRACE_EVENT2(
"headless", "HeadlessWebContentsImpl::PendingFrameReadbackComplete",
"sequence_number", pending_frame->sequence_number, "response", response);
if (response == content::READBACK_SUCCESS) {
pending_frame->bitmap = base::MakeUnique<SkBitmap>(bitmap);
} else {
LOG(WARNING) << "Readback from surface failed with response " << response;
}
pending_frame->wait_for_copy_result = false;
if (pending_frame->MaybeRunCallback()) {
base::EraseIf(pending_frames_,
[pending_frame](const std::unique_ptr<PendingFrame>& frame) {
return frame.get() == pending_frame;
});
}
}
|
void HeadlessWebContentsImpl::PendingFrameReadbackComplete(
HeadlessWebContentsImpl::PendingFrame* pending_frame,
const SkBitmap& bitmap,
content::ReadbackResponse response) {
TRACE_EVENT2(
"headless", "HeadlessWebContentsImpl::PendingFrameReadbackComplete",
"sequence_number", pending_frame->sequence_number, "response", response);
if (response == content::READBACK_SUCCESS) {
pending_frame->bitmap = base::MakeUnique<SkBitmap>(bitmap);
} else {
LOG(WARNING) << "Readback from surface failed with response " << response;
}
pending_frame->wait_for_copy_result = false;
if (pending_frame->MaybeRunCallback()) {
base::EraseIf(pending_frames_,
[pending_frame](const std::unique_ptr<PendingFrame>& frame) {
return frame.get() == pending_frame;
});
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5219
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5219/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
a4150b688a754d3d10d2ca385155b1c95d77d6ae
|
Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
|
GLuint GLES2Implementation::GetLastFlushIdCHROMIUM() {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glGetLastFlushIdCHROMIUM()");
return flush_id_;
}
|
GLuint GLES2Implementation::GetLastFlushIdCHROMIUM() {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glGetLastFlushIdCHROMIUM()");
return flush_id_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-15903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-15903/
|
CWE-611
|
https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/commit/c20b758c332d9a13afbbb276d30db1d183a85d43
|
c20b758c332d9a13afbbb276d30db1d183a85d43
|
xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
|
doContent(XML_Parser parser, int startTagLevel, const ENCODING *enc,
const char *s, const char *end, const char **nextPtr,
XML_Bool haveMore) {
/* save one level of indirection */
DTD *const dtd = parser->m_dtd;
const char **eventPP;
const char **eventEndPP;
if (enc == parser->m_encoding) {
eventPP = &parser->m_eventPtr;
eventEndPP = &parser->m_eventEndPtr;
} else {
eventPP = &(parser->m_openInternalEntities->internalEventPtr);
eventEndPP = &(parser->m_openInternalEntities->internalEventEndPtr);
}
*eventPP = s;
for (;;) {
const char *next = s; /* XmlContentTok doesn't always set the last arg */
int tok = XmlContentTok(enc, s, end, &next);
*eventEndPP = next;
switch (tok) {
case XML_TOK_TRAILING_CR:
if (haveMore) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
*eventEndPP = end;
if (parser->m_characterDataHandler) {
XML_Char c = 0xA;
parser->m_characterDataHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, &c, 1);
} else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, end);
/* We are at the end of the final buffer, should we check for
XML_SUSPENDED, XML_FINISHED?
*/
if (startTagLevel == 0)
return XML_ERROR_NO_ELEMENTS;
if (parser->m_tagLevel != startTagLevel)
return XML_ERROR_ASYNC_ENTITY;
*nextPtr = end;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
case XML_TOK_NONE:
if (haveMore) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
if (startTagLevel > 0) {
if (parser->m_tagLevel != startTagLevel)
return XML_ERROR_ASYNC_ENTITY;
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
return XML_ERROR_NO_ELEMENTS;
case XML_TOK_INVALID:
*eventPP = next;
return XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL:
if (haveMore) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
return XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR:
if (haveMore) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
return XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR;
case XML_TOK_ENTITY_REF: {
const XML_Char *name;
ENTITY *entity;
XML_Char ch = (XML_Char)XmlPredefinedEntityName(
enc, s + enc->minBytesPerChar, next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (ch) {
if (parser->m_characterDataHandler)
parser->m_characterDataHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, &ch, 1);
else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
break;
}
name = poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! name)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
entity = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->generalEntities, name, 0);
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
/* First, determine if a check for an existing declaration is needed;
if yes, check that the entity exists, and that it is internal,
otherwise call the skipped entity or default handler.
*/
if (! dtd->hasParamEntityRefs || dtd->standalone) {
if (! entity)
return XML_ERROR_UNDEFINED_ENTITY;
else if (! entity->is_internal)
return XML_ERROR_ENTITY_DECLARED_IN_PE;
} else if (! entity) {
if (parser->m_skippedEntityHandler)
parser->m_skippedEntityHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, name, 0);
else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
break;
}
if (entity->open)
return XML_ERROR_RECURSIVE_ENTITY_REF;
if (entity->notation)
return XML_ERROR_BINARY_ENTITY_REF;
if (entity->textPtr) {
enum XML_Error result;
if (! parser->m_defaultExpandInternalEntities) {
if (parser->m_skippedEntityHandler)
parser->m_skippedEntityHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, entity->name,
0);
else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
break;
}
result = processInternalEntity(parser, entity, XML_FALSE);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
} else if (parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler) {
const XML_Char *context;
entity->open = XML_TRUE;
context = getContext(parser);
entity->open = XML_FALSE;
if (! context)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
if (! parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler(
parser->m_externalEntityRefHandlerArg, context, entity->base,
entity->systemId, entity->publicId))
return XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING;
poolDiscard(&parser->m_tempPool);
} else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
break;
}
case XML_TOK_START_TAG_NO_ATTS:
/* fall through */
case XML_TOK_START_TAG_WITH_ATTS: {
TAG *tag;
enum XML_Error result;
XML_Char *toPtr;
if (parser->m_freeTagList) {
tag = parser->m_freeTagList;
parser->m_freeTagList = parser->m_freeTagList->parent;
} else {
tag = (TAG *)MALLOC(parser, sizeof(TAG));
if (! tag)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
tag->buf = (char *)MALLOC(parser, INIT_TAG_BUF_SIZE);
if (! tag->buf) {
FREE(parser, tag);
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
tag->bufEnd = tag->buf + INIT_TAG_BUF_SIZE;
}
tag->bindings = NULL;
tag->parent = parser->m_tagStack;
parser->m_tagStack = tag;
tag->name.localPart = NULL;
tag->name.prefix = NULL;
tag->rawName = s + enc->minBytesPerChar;
tag->rawNameLength = XmlNameLength(enc, tag->rawName);
++parser->m_tagLevel;
{
const char *rawNameEnd = tag->rawName + tag->rawNameLength;
const char *fromPtr = tag->rawName;
toPtr = (XML_Char *)tag->buf;
for (;;) {
int bufSize;
int convLen;
const enum XML_Convert_Result convert_res
= XmlConvert(enc, &fromPtr, rawNameEnd, (ICHAR **)&toPtr,
(ICHAR *)tag->bufEnd - 1);
convLen = (int)(toPtr - (XML_Char *)tag->buf);
if ((fromPtr >= rawNameEnd)
|| (convert_res == XML_CONVERT_INPUT_INCOMPLETE)) {
tag->name.strLen = convLen;
break;
}
bufSize = (int)(tag->bufEnd - tag->buf) << 1;
{
char *temp = (char *)REALLOC(parser, tag->buf, bufSize);
if (temp == NULL)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
tag->buf = temp;
tag->bufEnd = temp + bufSize;
toPtr = (XML_Char *)temp + convLen;
}
}
}
tag->name.str = (XML_Char *)tag->buf;
*toPtr = XML_T('\0');
result = storeAtts(parser, enc, s, &(tag->name), &(tag->bindings));
if (result)
return result;
if (parser->m_startElementHandler)
parser->m_startElementHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, tag->name.str,
(const XML_Char **)parser->m_atts);
else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
break;
}
case XML_TOK_EMPTY_ELEMENT_NO_ATTS:
/* fall through */
case XML_TOK_EMPTY_ELEMENT_WITH_ATTS: {
const char *rawName = s + enc->minBytesPerChar;
enum XML_Error result;
BINDING *bindings = NULL;
XML_Bool noElmHandlers = XML_TRUE;
TAG_NAME name;
name.str = poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc, rawName,
rawName + XmlNameLength(enc, rawName));
if (! name.str)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
result = storeAtts(parser, enc, s, &name, &bindings);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE) {
freeBindings(parser, bindings);
return result;
}
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
if (parser->m_startElementHandler) {
parser->m_startElementHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, name.str,
(const XML_Char **)parser->m_atts);
noElmHandlers = XML_FALSE;
}
if (parser->m_endElementHandler) {
if (parser->m_startElementHandler)
*eventPP = *eventEndPP;
parser->m_endElementHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, name.str);
noElmHandlers = XML_FALSE;
}
if (noElmHandlers && parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
freeBindings(parser, bindings);
}
if ((parser->m_tagLevel == 0)
&& (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing != XML_FINISHED)) {
if (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing == XML_SUSPENDED)
parser->m_processor = epilogProcessor;
else
return epilogProcessor(parser, next, end, nextPtr);
}
break;
case XML_TOK_END_TAG:
if (parser->m_tagLevel == startTagLevel)
return XML_ERROR_ASYNC_ENTITY;
else {
int len;
const char *rawName;
TAG *tag = parser->m_tagStack;
parser->m_tagStack = tag->parent;
tag->parent = parser->m_freeTagList;
parser->m_freeTagList = tag;
rawName = s + enc->minBytesPerChar * 2;
len = XmlNameLength(enc, rawName);
if (len != tag->rawNameLength
|| memcmp(tag->rawName, rawName, len) != 0) {
*eventPP = rawName;
return XML_ERROR_TAG_MISMATCH;
}
--parser->m_tagLevel;
if (parser->m_endElementHandler) {
const XML_Char *localPart;
const XML_Char *prefix;
XML_Char *uri;
localPart = tag->name.localPart;
if (parser->m_ns && localPart) {
/* localPart and prefix may have been overwritten in
tag->name.str, since this points to the binding->uri
buffer which gets re-used; so we have to add them again
*/
uri = (XML_Char *)tag->name.str + tag->name.uriLen;
/* don't need to check for space - already done in storeAtts() */
while (*localPart)
*uri++ = *localPart++;
prefix = (XML_Char *)tag->name.prefix;
if (parser->m_ns_triplets && prefix) {
*uri++ = parser->m_namespaceSeparator;
while (*prefix)
*uri++ = *prefix++;
}
*uri = XML_T('\0');
}
parser->m_endElementHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, tag->name.str);
} else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
while (tag->bindings) {
BINDING *b = tag->bindings;
if (parser->m_endNamespaceDeclHandler)
parser->m_endNamespaceDeclHandler(parser->m_handlerArg,
b->prefix->name);
tag->bindings = tag->bindings->nextTagBinding;
b->nextTagBinding = parser->m_freeBindingList;
parser->m_freeBindingList = b;
b->prefix->binding = b->prevPrefixBinding;
}
if ((parser->m_tagLevel == 0)
&& (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing != XML_FINISHED)) {
if (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing == XML_SUSPENDED)
parser->m_processor = epilogProcessor;
else
return epilogProcessor(parser, next, end, nextPtr);
}
}
break;
case XML_TOK_CHAR_REF: {
int n = XmlCharRefNumber(enc, s);
if (n < 0)
return XML_ERROR_BAD_CHAR_REF;
if (parser->m_characterDataHandler) {
XML_Char buf[XML_ENCODE_MAX];
parser->m_characterDataHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, buf,
XmlEncode(n, (ICHAR *)buf));
} else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
} break;
case XML_TOK_XML_DECL:
return XML_ERROR_MISPLACED_XML_PI;
case XML_TOK_DATA_NEWLINE:
if (parser->m_characterDataHandler) {
XML_Char c = 0xA;
parser->m_characterDataHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, &c, 1);
} else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
break;
case XML_TOK_CDATA_SECT_OPEN: {
enum XML_Error result;
if (parser->m_startCdataSectionHandler)
parser->m_startCdataSectionHandler(parser->m_handlerArg);
/* BEGIN disabled code */
/* Suppose you doing a transformation on a document that involves
changing only the character data. You set up a defaultHandler
and a characterDataHandler. The defaultHandler simply copies
characters through. The characterDataHandler does the
transformation and writes the characters out escaping them as
necessary. This case will fail to work if we leave out the
following two lines (because & and < inside CDATA sections will
be incorrectly escaped).
However, now we have a start/endCdataSectionHandler, so it seems
easier to let the user deal with this.
*/
else if (0 && parser->m_characterDataHandler)
parser->m_characterDataHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_dataBuf,
0);
/* END disabled code */
else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
result = doCdataSection(parser, enc, &next, end, nextPtr, haveMore);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
else if (! next) {
parser->m_processor = cdataSectionProcessor;
return result;
}
} break;
case XML_TOK_TRAILING_RSQB:
if (haveMore) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
if (parser->m_characterDataHandler) {
if (MUST_CONVERT(enc, s)) {
ICHAR *dataPtr = (ICHAR *)parser->m_dataBuf;
XmlConvert(enc, &s, end, &dataPtr, (ICHAR *)parser->m_dataBufEnd);
parser->m_characterDataHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_dataBuf,
(int)(dataPtr - (ICHAR *)parser->m_dataBuf));
} else
parser->m_characterDataHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, (XML_Char *)s,
(int)((XML_Char *)end - (XML_Char *)s));
} else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, end);
/* We are at the end of the final buffer, should we check for
XML_SUSPENDED, XML_FINISHED?
*/
if (startTagLevel == 0) {
*eventPP = end;
return XML_ERROR_NO_ELEMENTS;
}
if (parser->m_tagLevel != startTagLevel) {
*eventPP = end;
return XML_ERROR_ASYNC_ENTITY;
}
*nextPtr = end;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
case XML_TOK_DATA_CHARS: {
XML_CharacterDataHandler charDataHandler = parser->m_characterDataHandler;
if (charDataHandler) {
if (MUST_CONVERT(enc, s)) {
for (;;) {
ICHAR *dataPtr = (ICHAR *)parser->m_dataBuf;
const enum XML_Convert_Result convert_res = XmlConvert(
enc, &s, next, &dataPtr, (ICHAR *)parser->m_dataBufEnd);
*eventEndPP = s;
charDataHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_dataBuf,
(int)(dataPtr - (ICHAR *)parser->m_dataBuf));
if ((convert_res == XML_CONVERT_COMPLETED)
|| (convert_res == XML_CONVERT_INPUT_INCOMPLETE))
break;
*eventPP = s;
}
} else
charDataHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, (XML_Char *)s,
(int)((XML_Char *)next - (XML_Char *)s));
} else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
} break;
case XML_TOK_PI:
if (! reportProcessingInstruction(parser, enc, s, next))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
break;
case XML_TOK_COMMENT:
if (! reportComment(parser, enc, s, next))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
break;
default:
/* All of the tokens produced by XmlContentTok() have their own
* explicit cases, so this default is not strictly necessary.
* However it is a useful safety net, so we retain the code and
* simply exclude it from the coverage tests.
*
* LCOV_EXCL_START
*/
if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
break;
/* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
}
*eventPP = s = next;
switch (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing) {
case XML_SUSPENDED:
*nextPtr = next;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
case XML_FINISHED:
return XML_ERROR_ABORTED;
default:;
}
}
/* not reached */
}
|
doContent(XML_Parser parser, int startTagLevel, const ENCODING *enc,
const char *s, const char *end, const char **nextPtr,
XML_Bool haveMore) {
/* save one level of indirection */
DTD *const dtd = parser->m_dtd;
const char **eventPP;
const char **eventEndPP;
if (enc == parser->m_encoding) {
eventPP = &parser->m_eventPtr;
eventEndPP = &parser->m_eventEndPtr;
} else {
eventPP = &(parser->m_openInternalEntities->internalEventPtr);
eventEndPP = &(parser->m_openInternalEntities->internalEventEndPtr);
}
*eventPP = s;
for (;;) {
const char *next = s; /* XmlContentTok doesn't always set the last arg */
int tok = XmlContentTok(enc, s, end, &next);
*eventEndPP = next;
switch (tok) {
case XML_TOK_TRAILING_CR:
if (haveMore) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
*eventEndPP = end;
if (parser->m_characterDataHandler) {
XML_Char c = 0xA;
parser->m_characterDataHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, &c, 1);
} else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, end);
/* We are at the end of the final buffer, should we check for
XML_SUSPENDED, XML_FINISHED?
*/
if (startTagLevel == 0)
return XML_ERROR_NO_ELEMENTS;
if (parser->m_tagLevel != startTagLevel)
return XML_ERROR_ASYNC_ENTITY;
*nextPtr = end;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
case XML_TOK_NONE:
if (haveMore) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
if (startTagLevel > 0) {
if (parser->m_tagLevel != startTagLevel)
return XML_ERROR_ASYNC_ENTITY;
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
return XML_ERROR_NO_ELEMENTS;
case XML_TOK_INVALID:
*eventPP = next;
return XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL:
if (haveMore) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
return XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_TOKEN;
case XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR:
if (haveMore) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
return XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR;
case XML_TOK_ENTITY_REF: {
const XML_Char *name;
ENTITY *entity;
XML_Char ch = (XML_Char)XmlPredefinedEntityName(
enc, s + enc->minBytesPerChar, next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (ch) {
if (parser->m_characterDataHandler)
parser->m_characterDataHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, &ch, 1);
else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
break;
}
name = poolStoreString(&dtd->pool, enc, s + enc->minBytesPerChar,
next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
if (! name)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
entity = (ENTITY *)lookup(parser, &dtd->generalEntities, name, 0);
poolDiscard(&dtd->pool);
/* First, determine if a check for an existing declaration is needed;
if yes, check that the entity exists, and that it is internal,
otherwise call the skipped entity or default handler.
*/
if (! dtd->hasParamEntityRefs || dtd->standalone) {
if (! entity)
return XML_ERROR_UNDEFINED_ENTITY;
else if (! entity->is_internal)
return XML_ERROR_ENTITY_DECLARED_IN_PE;
} else if (! entity) {
if (parser->m_skippedEntityHandler)
parser->m_skippedEntityHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, name, 0);
else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
break;
}
if (entity->open)
return XML_ERROR_RECURSIVE_ENTITY_REF;
if (entity->notation)
return XML_ERROR_BINARY_ENTITY_REF;
if (entity->textPtr) {
enum XML_Error result;
if (! parser->m_defaultExpandInternalEntities) {
if (parser->m_skippedEntityHandler)
parser->m_skippedEntityHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, entity->name,
0);
else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
break;
}
result = processInternalEntity(parser, entity, XML_FALSE);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
} else if (parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler) {
const XML_Char *context;
entity->open = XML_TRUE;
context = getContext(parser);
entity->open = XML_FALSE;
if (! context)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
if (! parser->m_externalEntityRefHandler(
parser->m_externalEntityRefHandlerArg, context, entity->base,
entity->systemId, entity->publicId))
return XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING;
poolDiscard(&parser->m_tempPool);
} else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
break;
}
case XML_TOK_START_TAG_NO_ATTS:
/* fall through */
case XML_TOK_START_TAG_WITH_ATTS: {
TAG *tag;
enum XML_Error result;
XML_Char *toPtr;
if (parser->m_freeTagList) {
tag = parser->m_freeTagList;
parser->m_freeTagList = parser->m_freeTagList->parent;
} else {
tag = (TAG *)MALLOC(parser, sizeof(TAG));
if (! tag)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
tag->buf = (char *)MALLOC(parser, INIT_TAG_BUF_SIZE);
if (! tag->buf) {
FREE(parser, tag);
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
}
tag->bufEnd = tag->buf + INIT_TAG_BUF_SIZE;
}
tag->bindings = NULL;
tag->parent = parser->m_tagStack;
parser->m_tagStack = tag;
tag->name.localPart = NULL;
tag->name.prefix = NULL;
tag->rawName = s + enc->minBytesPerChar;
tag->rawNameLength = XmlNameLength(enc, tag->rawName);
++parser->m_tagLevel;
{
const char *rawNameEnd = tag->rawName + tag->rawNameLength;
const char *fromPtr = tag->rawName;
toPtr = (XML_Char *)tag->buf;
for (;;) {
int bufSize;
int convLen;
const enum XML_Convert_Result convert_res
= XmlConvert(enc, &fromPtr, rawNameEnd, (ICHAR **)&toPtr,
(ICHAR *)tag->bufEnd - 1);
convLen = (int)(toPtr - (XML_Char *)tag->buf);
if ((fromPtr >= rawNameEnd)
|| (convert_res == XML_CONVERT_INPUT_INCOMPLETE)) {
tag->name.strLen = convLen;
break;
}
bufSize = (int)(tag->bufEnd - tag->buf) << 1;
{
char *temp = (char *)REALLOC(parser, tag->buf, bufSize);
if (temp == NULL)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
tag->buf = temp;
tag->bufEnd = temp + bufSize;
toPtr = (XML_Char *)temp + convLen;
}
}
}
tag->name.str = (XML_Char *)tag->buf;
*toPtr = XML_T('\0');
result = storeAtts(parser, enc, s, &(tag->name), &(tag->bindings));
if (result)
return result;
if (parser->m_startElementHandler)
parser->m_startElementHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, tag->name.str,
(const XML_Char **)parser->m_atts);
else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
break;
}
case XML_TOK_EMPTY_ELEMENT_NO_ATTS:
/* fall through */
case XML_TOK_EMPTY_ELEMENT_WITH_ATTS: {
const char *rawName = s + enc->minBytesPerChar;
enum XML_Error result;
BINDING *bindings = NULL;
XML_Bool noElmHandlers = XML_TRUE;
TAG_NAME name;
name.str = poolStoreString(&parser->m_tempPool, enc, rawName,
rawName + XmlNameLength(enc, rawName));
if (! name.str)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
result = storeAtts(parser, enc, s, &name, &bindings);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE) {
freeBindings(parser, bindings);
return result;
}
poolFinish(&parser->m_tempPool);
if (parser->m_startElementHandler) {
parser->m_startElementHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, name.str,
(const XML_Char **)parser->m_atts);
noElmHandlers = XML_FALSE;
}
if (parser->m_endElementHandler) {
if (parser->m_startElementHandler)
*eventPP = *eventEndPP;
parser->m_endElementHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, name.str);
noElmHandlers = XML_FALSE;
}
if (noElmHandlers && parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
poolClear(&parser->m_tempPool);
freeBindings(parser, bindings);
}
if ((parser->m_tagLevel == 0)
&& (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing != XML_FINISHED)) {
if (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing == XML_SUSPENDED)
parser->m_processor = epilogProcessor;
else
return epilogProcessor(parser, next, end, nextPtr);
}
break;
case XML_TOK_END_TAG:
if (parser->m_tagLevel == startTagLevel)
return XML_ERROR_ASYNC_ENTITY;
else {
int len;
const char *rawName;
TAG *tag = parser->m_tagStack;
parser->m_tagStack = tag->parent;
tag->parent = parser->m_freeTagList;
parser->m_freeTagList = tag;
rawName = s + enc->minBytesPerChar * 2;
len = XmlNameLength(enc, rawName);
if (len != tag->rawNameLength
|| memcmp(tag->rawName, rawName, len) != 0) {
*eventPP = rawName;
return XML_ERROR_TAG_MISMATCH;
}
--parser->m_tagLevel;
if (parser->m_endElementHandler) {
const XML_Char *localPart;
const XML_Char *prefix;
XML_Char *uri;
localPart = tag->name.localPart;
if (parser->m_ns && localPart) {
/* localPart and prefix may have been overwritten in
tag->name.str, since this points to the binding->uri
buffer which gets re-used; so we have to add them again
*/
uri = (XML_Char *)tag->name.str + tag->name.uriLen;
/* don't need to check for space - already done in storeAtts() */
while (*localPart)
*uri++ = *localPart++;
prefix = (XML_Char *)tag->name.prefix;
if (parser->m_ns_triplets && prefix) {
*uri++ = parser->m_namespaceSeparator;
while (*prefix)
*uri++ = *prefix++;
}
*uri = XML_T('\0');
}
parser->m_endElementHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, tag->name.str);
} else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
while (tag->bindings) {
BINDING *b = tag->bindings;
if (parser->m_endNamespaceDeclHandler)
parser->m_endNamespaceDeclHandler(parser->m_handlerArg,
b->prefix->name);
tag->bindings = tag->bindings->nextTagBinding;
b->nextTagBinding = parser->m_freeBindingList;
parser->m_freeBindingList = b;
b->prefix->binding = b->prevPrefixBinding;
}
if ((parser->m_tagLevel == 0)
&& (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing != XML_FINISHED)) {
if (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing == XML_SUSPENDED)
parser->m_processor = epilogProcessor;
else
return epilogProcessor(parser, next, end, nextPtr);
}
}
break;
case XML_TOK_CHAR_REF: {
int n = XmlCharRefNumber(enc, s);
if (n < 0)
return XML_ERROR_BAD_CHAR_REF;
if (parser->m_characterDataHandler) {
XML_Char buf[XML_ENCODE_MAX];
parser->m_characterDataHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, buf,
XmlEncode(n, (ICHAR *)buf));
} else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
} break;
case XML_TOK_XML_DECL:
return XML_ERROR_MISPLACED_XML_PI;
case XML_TOK_DATA_NEWLINE:
if (parser->m_characterDataHandler) {
XML_Char c = 0xA;
parser->m_characterDataHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, &c, 1);
} else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
break;
case XML_TOK_CDATA_SECT_OPEN: {
enum XML_Error result;
if (parser->m_startCdataSectionHandler)
parser->m_startCdataSectionHandler(parser->m_handlerArg);
/* BEGIN disabled code */
/* Suppose you doing a transformation on a document that involves
changing only the character data. You set up a defaultHandler
and a characterDataHandler. The defaultHandler simply copies
characters through. The characterDataHandler does the
transformation and writes the characters out escaping them as
necessary. This case will fail to work if we leave out the
following two lines (because & and < inside CDATA sections will
be incorrectly escaped).
However, now we have a start/endCdataSectionHandler, so it seems
easier to let the user deal with this.
*/
else if (0 && parser->m_characterDataHandler)
parser->m_characterDataHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_dataBuf,
0);
/* END disabled code */
else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
result = doCdataSection(parser, enc, &next, end, nextPtr, haveMore);
if (result != XML_ERROR_NONE)
return result;
else if (! next) {
parser->m_processor = cdataSectionProcessor;
return result;
}
} break;
case XML_TOK_TRAILING_RSQB:
if (haveMore) {
*nextPtr = s;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
if (parser->m_characterDataHandler) {
if (MUST_CONVERT(enc, s)) {
ICHAR *dataPtr = (ICHAR *)parser->m_dataBuf;
XmlConvert(enc, &s, end, &dataPtr, (ICHAR *)parser->m_dataBufEnd);
parser->m_characterDataHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_dataBuf,
(int)(dataPtr - (ICHAR *)parser->m_dataBuf));
} else
parser->m_characterDataHandler(
parser->m_handlerArg, (XML_Char *)s,
(int)((XML_Char *)end - (XML_Char *)s));
} else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, end);
/* We are at the end of the final buffer, should we check for
XML_SUSPENDED, XML_FINISHED?
*/
if (startTagLevel == 0) {
*eventPP = end;
return XML_ERROR_NO_ELEMENTS;
}
if (parser->m_tagLevel != startTagLevel) {
*eventPP = end;
return XML_ERROR_ASYNC_ENTITY;
}
*nextPtr = end;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
case XML_TOK_DATA_CHARS: {
XML_CharacterDataHandler charDataHandler = parser->m_characterDataHandler;
if (charDataHandler) {
if (MUST_CONVERT(enc, s)) {
for (;;) {
ICHAR *dataPtr = (ICHAR *)parser->m_dataBuf;
const enum XML_Convert_Result convert_res = XmlConvert(
enc, &s, next, &dataPtr, (ICHAR *)parser->m_dataBufEnd);
*eventEndPP = s;
charDataHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, parser->m_dataBuf,
(int)(dataPtr - (ICHAR *)parser->m_dataBuf));
if ((convert_res == XML_CONVERT_COMPLETED)
|| (convert_res == XML_CONVERT_INPUT_INCOMPLETE))
break;
*eventPP = s;
}
} else
charDataHandler(parser->m_handlerArg, (XML_Char *)s,
(int)((XML_Char *)next - (XML_Char *)s));
} else if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
} break;
case XML_TOK_PI:
if (! reportProcessingInstruction(parser, enc, s, next))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
break;
case XML_TOK_COMMENT:
if (! reportComment(parser, enc, s, next))
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
break;
default:
/* All of the tokens produced by XmlContentTok() have their own
* explicit cases, so this default is not strictly necessary.
* However it is a useful safety net, so we retain the code and
* simply exclude it from the coverage tests.
*
* LCOV_EXCL_START
*/
if (parser->m_defaultHandler)
reportDefault(parser, enc, s, next);
break;
/* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
}
*eventPP = s = next;
switch (parser->m_parsingStatus.parsing) {
case XML_SUSPENDED:
*nextPtr = next;
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
case XML_FINISHED:
return XML_ERROR_ABORTED;
default:;
}
}
/* not reached */
}
|
C
|
libexpat
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7586
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7586/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/commit/708e996c87c5fae77b104ccfeb8f6db784c32074
|
708e996c87c5fae77b104ccfeb8f6db784c32074
|
src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
|
sf_strerror (SNDFILE *sndfile)
{ SF_PRIVATE *psf = NULL ;
int errnum ;
if (sndfile == NULL)
{ errnum = sf_errno ;
if (errnum == SFE_SYSTEM && sf_syserr [0])
return sf_syserr ;
}
else
{ psf = (SF_PRIVATE *) sndfile ;
if (psf->Magick != SNDFILE_MAGICK)
return "sf_strerror : Bad magic number." ;
errnum = psf->error ;
if (errnum == SFE_SYSTEM && psf->syserr [0])
return psf->syserr ;
} ;
return sf_error_number (errnum) ;
} /* sf_strerror */
|
sf_strerror (SNDFILE *sndfile)
{ SF_PRIVATE *psf = NULL ;
int errnum ;
if (sndfile == NULL)
{ errnum = sf_errno ;
if (errnum == SFE_SYSTEM && sf_syserr [0])
return sf_syserr ;
}
else
{ psf = (SF_PRIVATE *) sndfile ;
if (psf->Magick != SNDFILE_MAGICK)
return "sf_strerror : Bad magic number." ;
errnum = psf->error ;
if (errnum == SFE_SYSTEM && psf->syserr [0])
return psf->syserr ;
} ;
return sf_error_number (errnum) ;
} /* sf_strerror */
|
C
|
libsndfile
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4621/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static int tg_nop(struct task_group *tg, void *data)
{
return 0;
}
|
static int tg_nop(struct task_group *tg, void *data)
{
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5838
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5838/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0660e08731fd42076d7242068e9eaed1482b14d5
|
0660e08731fd42076d7242068e9eaed1482b14d5
|
Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
|
ExtensionFunction::ResponseAction TabsSetZoomSettingsFunction::Run() {
using api::tabs::ZoomSettings;
std::unique_ptr<tabs::SetZoomSettings::Params> params(
tabs::SetZoomSettings::Params::Create(*args_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params);
int tab_id = params->tab_id ? *params->tab_id : -1;
std::string error;
WebContents* web_contents =
GetTabsAPIDefaultWebContents(this, tab_id, &error);
if (!web_contents)
return RespondNow(Error(error));
GURL url(web_contents->GetVisibleURL());
if (extension()->permissions_data()->IsRestrictedUrl(url, &error))
return RespondNow(Error(error));
if (params->zoom_settings.scope == tabs::ZOOM_SETTINGS_SCOPE_PER_ORIGIN &&
params->zoom_settings.mode != tabs::ZOOM_SETTINGS_MODE_AUTOMATIC &&
params->zoom_settings.mode != tabs::ZOOM_SETTINGS_MODE_NONE) {
return RespondNow(Error(tabs_constants::kPerOriginOnlyInAutomaticError));
}
ZoomController::ZoomMode zoom_mode = ZoomController::ZOOM_MODE_DEFAULT;
switch (params->zoom_settings.mode) {
case tabs::ZOOM_SETTINGS_MODE_NONE:
case tabs::ZOOM_SETTINGS_MODE_AUTOMATIC:
switch (params->zoom_settings.scope) {
case tabs::ZOOM_SETTINGS_SCOPE_NONE:
case tabs::ZOOM_SETTINGS_SCOPE_PER_ORIGIN:
zoom_mode = ZoomController::ZOOM_MODE_DEFAULT;
break;
case tabs::ZOOM_SETTINGS_SCOPE_PER_TAB:
zoom_mode = ZoomController::ZOOM_MODE_ISOLATED;
}
break;
case tabs::ZOOM_SETTINGS_MODE_MANUAL:
zoom_mode = ZoomController::ZOOM_MODE_MANUAL;
break;
case tabs::ZOOM_SETTINGS_MODE_DISABLED:
zoom_mode = ZoomController::ZOOM_MODE_DISABLED;
}
ZoomController::FromWebContents(web_contents)->SetZoomMode(zoom_mode);
return RespondNow(NoArguments());
}
|
ExtensionFunction::ResponseAction TabsSetZoomSettingsFunction::Run() {
using api::tabs::ZoomSettings;
std::unique_ptr<tabs::SetZoomSettings::Params> params(
tabs::SetZoomSettings::Params::Create(*args_));
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(params);
int tab_id = params->tab_id ? *params->tab_id : -1;
std::string error;
WebContents* web_contents =
GetTabsAPIDefaultWebContents(this, tab_id, &error);
if (!web_contents)
return RespondNow(Error(error));
GURL url(web_contents->GetVisibleURL());
if (extension()->permissions_data()->IsRestrictedUrl(url, &error))
return RespondNow(Error(error));
if (params->zoom_settings.scope == tabs::ZOOM_SETTINGS_SCOPE_PER_ORIGIN &&
params->zoom_settings.mode != tabs::ZOOM_SETTINGS_MODE_AUTOMATIC &&
params->zoom_settings.mode != tabs::ZOOM_SETTINGS_MODE_NONE) {
return RespondNow(Error(tabs_constants::kPerOriginOnlyInAutomaticError));
}
ZoomController::ZoomMode zoom_mode = ZoomController::ZOOM_MODE_DEFAULT;
switch (params->zoom_settings.mode) {
case tabs::ZOOM_SETTINGS_MODE_NONE:
case tabs::ZOOM_SETTINGS_MODE_AUTOMATIC:
switch (params->zoom_settings.scope) {
case tabs::ZOOM_SETTINGS_SCOPE_NONE:
case tabs::ZOOM_SETTINGS_SCOPE_PER_ORIGIN:
zoom_mode = ZoomController::ZOOM_MODE_DEFAULT;
break;
case tabs::ZOOM_SETTINGS_SCOPE_PER_TAB:
zoom_mode = ZoomController::ZOOM_MODE_ISOLATED;
}
break;
case tabs::ZOOM_SETTINGS_MODE_MANUAL:
zoom_mode = ZoomController::ZOOM_MODE_MANUAL;
break;
case tabs::ZOOM_SETTINGS_MODE_DISABLED:
zoom_mode = ZoomController::ZOOM_MODE_DISABLED;
}
ZoomController::FromWebContents(web_contents)->SetZoomMode(zoom_mode);
return RespondNow(NoArguments());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3751
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3751/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libpng/+/9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
set_store_for_write(png_store *ps, png_infopp ppi,
set_store_for_write(png_store *ps, png_infopp ppi, const char *name)
{
anon_context(ps);
Try
{
if (ps->pwrite != NULL)
png_error(ps->pwrite, "write store already in use");
store_write_reset(ps);
safecat(ps->wname, sizeof ps->wname, 0, name);
/* Don't do the slow memory checks if doing a speed test, also if user
* memory is not supported we can't do it anyway.
*/
# ifdef PNG_USER_MEM_SUPPORTED
if (!ps->speed)
ps->pwrite = png_create_write_struct_2(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,
ps, store_error, store_warning, &ps->write_memory_pool,
store_malloc, store_free);
else
# endif
ps->pwrite = png_create_write_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,
ps, store_error, store_warning);
png_set_write_fn(ps->pwrite, ps, store_write, store_flush);
# ifdef PNG_SET_OPTION_SUPPORTED
{
int opt;
for (opt=0; opt<ps->noptions; ++opt)
if (png_set_option(ps->pwrite, ps->options[opt].option,
ps->options[opt].setting) == PNG_OPTION_INVALID)
png_error(ps->pwrite, "png option invalid");
}
# endif
if (ppi != NULL)
*ppi = ps->piwrite = png_create_info_struct(ps->pwrite);
}
Catch_anonymous
return NULL;
return ps->pwrite;
}
|
set_store_for_write(png_store *ps, png_infopp ppi,
PNG_CONST char * volatile name)
{
anon_context(ps);
Try
{
if (ps->pwrite != NULL)
png_error(ps->pwrite, "write store already in use");
store_write_reset(ps);
safecat(ps->wname, sizeof ps->wname, 0, name);
/* Don't do the slow memory checks if doing a speed test, also if user
* memory is not supported we can't do it anyway.
*/
# ifdef PNG_USER_MEM_SUPPORTED
if (!ps->speed)
ps->pwrite = png_create_write_struct_2(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,
ps, store_error, store_warning, &ps->write_memory_pool,
store_malloc, store_free);
else
# endif
ps->pwrite = png_create_write_struct(PNG_LIBPNG_VER_STRING,
ps, store_error, store_warning);
png_set_write_fn(ps->pwrite, ps, store_write, store_flush);
# ifdef PNG_SET_OPTION_SUPPORTED
{
int opt;
for (opt=0; opt<ps->noptions; ++opt)
if (png_set_option(ps->pwrite, ps->options[opt].option,
ps->options[opt].setting) == PNG_OPTION_INVALID)
png_error(ps->pwrite, "png option invalid");
}
# endif
if (ppi != NULL)
*ppi = ps->piwrite = png_create_info_struct(ps->pwrite);
}
Catch_anonymous
return NULL;
return ps->pwrite;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2019-9923
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-9923/
|
CWE-476
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/tar.git/commit/?id=cb07844454d8cc9fb21f53ace75975f91185a120
|
cb07844454d8cc9fb21f53ace75975f91185a120
| null |
star_fixup_header (struct tar_sparse_file *file)
{
/* NOTE! st_size was initialized from the header
which actually contains archived size. The following fixes it */
off_t realsize = OFF_FROM_HEADER (current_header->star_in_header.realsize);
file->stat_info->archive_file_size = file->stat_info->stat.st_size;
file->stat_info->stat.st_size = max (0, realsize);
return 0 <= realsize;
}
|
star_fixup_header (struct tar_sparse_file *file)
{
/* NOTE! st_size was initialized from the header
which actually contains archived size. The following fixes it */
off_t realsize = OFF_FROM_HEADER (current_header->star_in_header.realsize);
file->stat_info->archive_file_size = file->stat_info->stat.st_size;
file->stat_info->stat.st_size = max (0, realsize);
return 0 <= realsize;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1696
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1696/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c0569cc04741cccf6548c2169fcc1609d958523f
|
c0569cc04741cccf6548c2169fcc1609d958523f
|
[Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
|
void Dispatcher::DispatchEvent(const std::string& extension_id,
const std::string& event_name) const {
base::ListValue args;
args.Set(0, new base::StringValue(event_name));
args.Set(1, new base::ListValue());
const char* local_event_bindings = kEventBindings;
script_context_set_->ForEach(
extension_id, base::Bind(&CallModuleMethod, local_event_bindings,
kEventDispatchFunction, &args));
}
|
void Dispatcher::DispatchEvent(const std::string& extension_id,
const std::string& event_name) const {
base::ListValue args;
args.Set(0, new base::StringValue(event_name));
args.Set(1, new base::ListValue());
const char* local_event_bindings = kEventBindings;
script_context_set_->ForEach(
extension_id, base::Bind(&CallModuleMethod, local_event_bindings,
kEventDispatchFunction, &args));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6144
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6144/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9f6510f20ccd794c4a71d5779ae802241e6e3f9b
|
9f6510f20ccd794c4a71d5779ae802241e6e3f9b
|
Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
|
void OfflinePageModelTaskified::OnTaskQueueIsIdle() {}
|
void OfflinePageModelTaskified::OnTaskQueueIsIdle() {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2449
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2449/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/b04aee833c5cfb6b31b8558350feb14bb1a0f353
|
b04aee833c5cfb6b31b8558350feb14bb1a0f353
|
Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
|
Camera3Device::PreparerThread::PreparerThread() :
Thread(/*canCallJava*/false), mActive(false), mCancelNow(false) {
}
|
Camera3Device::PreparerThread::PreparerThread() :
Thread(/*canCallJava*/false), mActive(false), mCancelNow(false) {
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6198
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6198/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/tats/w3m/commit/18dcbadf2771cdb0c18509b14e4e73505b242753
|
18dcbadf2771cdb0c18509b14e4e73505b242753
|
Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
|
follow_map(struct parsed_tagarg *arg)
{
char *name = tag_get_value(arg, "link");
#if defined(MENU_MAP) || defined(USE_IMAGE)
Anchor *an;
MapArea *a;
int x, y;
ParsedURL p_url;
an = retrieveCurrentImg(Currentbuf);
x = Currentbuf->cursorX + Currentbuf->rootX;
y = Currentbuf->cursorY + Currentbuf->rootY;
a = follow_map_menu(Currentbuf, name, an, x, y);
if (a == NULL || a->url == NULL || *(a->url) == '\0') {
#endif
#ifndef MENU_MAP
Buffer *buf = follow_map_panel(Currentbuf, name);
if (buf != NULL)
cmd_loadBuffer(buf, BP_NORMAL, LB_NOLINK);
#endif
#if defined(MENU_MAP) || defined(USE_IMAGE)
return;
}
if (*(a->url) == '#') {
gotoLabel(a->url + 1);
return;
}
parseURL2(a->url, &p_url, baseURL(Currentbuf));
pushHashHist(URLHist, parsedURL2Str(&p_url)->ptr);
if (check_target && open_tab_blank && a->target &&
(!strcasecmp(a->target, "_new") || !strcasecmp(a->target, "_blank"))) {
Buffer *buf;
_newT();
buf = Currentbuf;
cmd_loadURL(a->url, baseURL(Currentbuf),
parsedURL2Str(&Currentbuf->currentURL)->ptr, NULL);
if (buf != Currentbuf)
delBuffer(buf);
else
deleteTab(CurrentTab);
displayBuffer(Currentbuf, B_FORCE_REDRAW);
return;
}
cmd_loadURL(a->url, baseURL(Currentbuf),
parsedURL2Str(&Currentbuf->currentURL)->ptr, NULL);
#endif
}
|
follow_map(struct parsed_tagarg *arg)
{
char *name = tag_get_value(arg, "link");
#if defined(MENU_MAP) || defined(USE_IMAGE)
Anchor *an;
MapArea *a;
int x, y;
ParsedURL p_url;
an = retrieveCurrentImg(Currentbuf);
x = Currentbuf->cursorX + Currentbuf->rootX;
y = Currentbuf->cursorY + Currentbuf->rootY;
a = follow_map_menu(Currentbuf, name, an, x, y);
if (a == NULL || a->url == NULL || *(a->url) == '\0') {
#endif
#ifndef MENU_MAP
Buffer *buf = follow_map_panel(Currentbuf, name);
if (buf != NULL)
cmd_loadBuffer(buf, BP_NORMAL, LB_NOLINK);
#endif
#if defined(MENU_MAP) || defined(USE_IMAGE)
return;
}
if (*(a->url) == '#') {
gotoLabel(a->url + 1);
return;
}
parseURL2(a->url, &p_url, baseURL(Currentbuf));
pushHashHist(URLHist, parsedURL2Str(&p_url)->ptr);
if (check_target && open_tab_blank && a->target &&
(!strcasecmp(a->target, "_new") || !strcasecmp(a->target, "_blank"))) {
Buffer *buf;
_newT();
buf = Currentbuf;
cmd_loadURL(a->url, baseURL(Currentbuf),
parsedURL2Str(&Currentbuf->currentURL)->ptr, NULL);
if (buf != Currentbuf)
delBuffer(buf);
else
deleteTab(CurrentTab);
displayBuffer(Currentbuf, B_FORCE_REDRAW);
return;
}
cmd_loadURL(a->url, baseURL(Currentbuf),
parsedURL2Str(&Currentbuf->currentURL)->ptr, NULL);
#endif
}
|
C
|
w3m
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5200
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5200/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2f19869af13bbfdcfd682a55c0d2c61c6e102475
|
2f19869af13bbfdcfd682a55c0d2c61c6e102475
|
chrome/browser/ui/webauthn: long domains may cause a line break.
As requested by UX in [1], allow long host names to split a title into
two lines. This allows us to show more of the name before eliding,
although sufficiently long names will still trigger elision.
Screenshot at
https://drive.google.com/open?id=1_V6t2CeZDAVazy3Px-OET2LnB__aEW1r.
[1] https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1TtxkPUchyVZulqgdMcfui-68B0W-DWaFFVJEffGIbLA/edit#slide=id.g5913c4105f_1_12
Change-Id: I70f6541e0db3e9942239304de43b487a7561ca34
Bug: 870892
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1601812
Auto-Submit: Adam Langley <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Nina Satragno <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nina Satragno <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#658114}
|
base::string16 AuthenticatorClientPinEntrySheetModel::GetStepTitle() const {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBAUTHN_PIN_ENTRY_TITLE);
}
|
base::string16 AuthenticatorClientPinEntrySheetModel::GetStepTitle() const {
return l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_WEBAUTHN_PIN_ENTRY_TITLE);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2806
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2806/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/01e4ee2fda0a5e57a8d0c8cb829022eb84fdff12
|
01e4ee2fda0a5e57a8d0c8cb829022eb84fdff12
|
Rename isPositioned to isOutOfFlowPositioned for clarity
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=89836
Reviewed by Antti Koivisto.
RenderObject and RenderStyle had an isPositioned() method that was
confusing, because it excluded relative positioning. Rename to
isOutOfFlowPositioned(), which makes it clearer that it only applies
to absolute and fixed positioning.
Simple rename; no behavior change.
Source/WebCore:
* css/CSSComputedStyleDeclaration.cpp:
(WebCore::getPositionOffsetValue):
* css/StyleResolver.cpp:
(WebCore::StyleResolver::collectMatchingRulesForList):
* dom/Text.cpp:
(WebCore::Text::rendererIsNeeded):
* editing/DeleteButtonController.cpp:
(WebCore::isDeletableElement):
* editing/TextIterator.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldEmitNewlinesBeforeAndAfterNode):
* rendering/AutoTableLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::shouldScaleColumns):
* rendering/InlineFlowBox.cpp:
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::addToLine):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInInlineDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::requiresIdeographicBaseline):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::adjustMaxAscentAndDescent):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeLogicalBoxHeights):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::flipLinesInBlockDirection):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverflow):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeOverAnnotationAdjustment):
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::computeUnderAnnotationAdjustment):
* rendering/InlineIterator.h:
(WebCore::isIteratorTarget):
* rendering/LayoutState.cpp:
(WebCore::LayoutState::LayoutState):
* rendering/RenderBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::MarginInfo::MarginInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildToAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::containingColumnsBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::columnsBlockForSpanningElement):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addChildIgnoringAnonymousColumnBlocks):
(WebCore::getInlineRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelfCollapsingBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::addOverflowFromBlockChildren):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::expandsToEncloseOverhangingFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::handlePositionedChild):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::moveRunInUnderSiblingBlockIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::collapseMargins):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloatsIfNeeded):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::simplifiedNormalFlowLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::isSelectionRoot):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::blockSelectionGaps):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::clearFloats):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markAllDescendantsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::markSiblingsWithFloatsForLayout):
(WebCore::isChildHitTestCandidate):
(WebCore::InlineMinMaxIterator::next):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::firstLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::lastLineBoxBaseline):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::updateFirstLetter):
(WebCore::shouldCheckLines):
(WebCore::getHeightForLineCount):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustForBorderFit):
(WebCore::inNormalFlow):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustLinePositionForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::adjustBlockChildForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderBlock.h:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::shouldSkipCreatingRunsForObject):
* rendering/RenderBlockLineLayout.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBlock::setMarginsForRubyRun):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeInlineDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::computeBlockDirectionPositionsForLine):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::layoutInlineChildren):
(WebCore::requiresLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipTrailingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::skipLeadingWhitespace):
(WebCore::RenderBlock::LineBreaker::nextLineBreak):
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::removeFloatingOrPositionedChildFromBlockLists):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::styleDidChange):
(WebCore::RenderBox::updateBoxModelInfoFromStyle):
(WebCore::RenderBox::offsetFromContainer):
(WebCore::RenderBox::positionLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalWidthInRegion):
(WebCore::RenderBox::renderBoxRegionInfo):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computePercentageLogicalHeight):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalWidthUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::computeReplacedLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
(WebCore::percentageLogicalHeightIsResolvable):
* rendering/RenderBox.h:
(WebCore::RenderBox::stretchesToViewport):
(WebCore::RenderBox::isDeprecatedFlexItem):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::adjustedPositionRelativeToOffsetParent):
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::mapAbsoluteToLocalPoint):
* rendering/RenderBoxModelObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderBoxModelObject::requiresLayer):
* rendering/RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::childDoesNotAffectWidthOrFlexing):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutBlock):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutHorizontalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::layoutVerticalBox):
(WebCore::RenderDeprecatedFlexibleBox::renderName):
* rendering/RenderFieldset.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFieldset::findLegend):
* rendering/RenderFlexibleBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computePreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::autoMarginOffsetInMainAxis):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::availableAlignmentSpaceForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeMainAxisPreferredSizes):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::computeNextFlexLine):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::resolveFlexibleLengths):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::prepareChildForPositionedLayout):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutAndPlaceChildren):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::layoutColumnReverse):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::adjustAlignmentForChild):
(WebCore::RenderFlexibleBox::flipForRightToLeftColumn):
* rendering/RenderGrid.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderGrid::renderName):
* rendering/RenderImage.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderImage::computeIntrinsicRatioInformation):
* rendering/RenderInline.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildIgnoringContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::addChildToContinuation):
(WebCore::RenderInline::generateCulledLineBoxRects):
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineFirstLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineLastLineBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::culledInlineVisualOverflowBoundingBox):
(WebCore::RenderInline::computeRectForRepaint):
(WebCore::RenderInline::dirtyLineBoxes):
* rendering/RenderLayer.cpp:
(WebCore::checkContainingBlockChainForPagination):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::updateLayerPosition):
(WebCore::isPositionedContainer):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::calculateClipRects):
(WebCore::RenderLayer::shouldBeNormalFlowOnly):
* rendering/RenderLayerCompositor.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLayerCompositor::requiresCompositingForPosition):
* rendering/RenderLineBoxList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderLineBoxList::dirtyLinesFromChangedChild):
* rendering/RenderListItem.cpp:
(WebCore::getParentOfFirstLineBox):
* rendering/RenderMultiColumnBlock.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMultiColumnBlock::renderName):
* rendering/RenderObject.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObject::markContainingBlocksForLayout):
(WebCore::RenderObject::setPreferredLogicalWidthsDirty):
(WebCore::RenderObject::invalidateContainerPreferredLogicalWidths):
(WebCore::RenderObject::styleWillChange):
(WebCore::RenderObject::offsetParent):
* rendering/RenderObject.h:
(WebCore::RenderObject::isOutOfFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isInFlowPositioned):
(WebCore::RenderObject::hasClip):
(WebCore::RenderObject::isFloatingOrOutOfFlowPositioned):
* rendering/RenderObjectChildList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderObjectChildList::removeChildNode):
* rendering/RenderReplaced.cpp:
(WebCore::hasAutoHeightOrContainingBlockWithAutoHeight):
* rendering/RenderRubyRun.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderRubyRun::rubyText):
* rendering/RenderTable.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderTable::addChild):
(WebCore::RenderTable::computeLogicalWidth):
(WebCore::RenderTable::layout):
* rendering/style/RenderStyle.h:
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isNonRenderViewFixedPositionedContainer):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::isFixedPositionedContainer):
Source/WebKit2:
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::updateOffsetFromViewportForSelf):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@121123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
PassRefPtr<StylePropertySet> CSSComputedStyleDeclaration::copyPropertiesInSet(const CSSPropertyID* set, unsigned length) const
{
Vector<CSSProperty, 256> list;
list.reserveInitialCapacity(length);
for (unsigned i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
RefPtr<CSSValue> value = getPropertyCSSValue(set[i]);
if (value)
list.append(CSSProperty(set[i], value.release(), false));
}
return StylePropertySet::create(list.data(), list.size());
}
|
PassRefPtr<StylePropertySet> CSSComputedStyleDeclaration::copyPropertiesInSet(const CSSPropertyID* set, unsigned length) const
{
Vector<CSSProperty, 256> list;
list.reserveInitialCapacity(length);
for (unsigned i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
RefPtr<CSSValue> value = getPropertyCSSValue(set[i]);
if (value)
list.append(CSSProperty(set[i], value.release(), false));
}
return StylePropertySet::create(list.data(), list.size());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6780
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6780/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f2cba0d13b3a6d76dedede66731e5ca253d3b2af
|
f2cba0d13b3a6d76dedede66731e5ca253d3b2af
|
Fix UAF in Origin Info Bubble and permission settings UI.
In addition to fixing the UAF, will this also fix the problem of the bubble
showing over the previous tab (if the bubble is open when the tab it was opened
for closes).
BUG=490492
TBR=tedchoc
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1317443002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#346023}
|
MockCertStore* cert_store() { return &cert_store_; }
|
MockCertStore* cert_store() { return &cert_store_; }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10150
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10150/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a0f1d21c1ccb1da66629627a74059dd7f5ac9c61
|
a0f1d21c1ccb1da66629627a74059dd7f5ac9c61
|
KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>
|
static int vm_stat_get_per_vm_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
__simple_attr_check_format("%llu\n", 0ull);
return kvm_debugfs_open(inode, file, vm_stat_get_per_vm,
NULL, "%llu\n");
}
|
static int vm_stat_get_per_vm_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
__simple_attr_check_format("%llu\n", 0ull);
return kvm_debugfs_open(inode, file, vm_stat_get_per_vm,
NULL, "%llu\n");
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-13006
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-13006/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
bceb03fd2be95097a7b409ea59914f332fb6bc86
|
fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
|
GF_Err tmin_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_TMINBox *ptr = (GF_TMINBox *)s;
ptr->minTime = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
return GF_OK;
}
|
GF_Err tmin_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_TMINBox *ptr = (GF_TMINBox *)s;
ptr->minTime = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
return GF_OK;
}
|
C
|
gpac
| 0 |
CVE-2019-6978
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-6978/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/089f7c0bc28d399b0420aa6ef058e4c1c120b2ae
|
089f7c0bc28d399b0420aa6ef058e4c1c120b2ae
|
Sync with upstream
Even though libgd/libgd#492 is not a relevant bug fix for PHP, since
the binding doesn't use the `gdImage*Ptr()` functions at all, we're
porting the fix to stay in sync here.
|
void init_destination (j_compress_ptr cinfo)
{
my_dest_ptr dest = (my_dest_ptr) cinfo->dest;
/* Allocate the output buffer --- it will be released when done with image */
dest->buffer = (unsigned char *) (*cinfo->mem->alloc_small) ((j_common_ptr) cinfo, JPOOL_IMAGE, OUTPUT_BUF_SIZE * sizeof (unsigned char));
dest->pub.next_output_byte = dest->buffer;
dest->pub.free_in_buffer = OUTPUT_BUF_SIZE;
}
|
void init_destination (j_compress_ptr cinfo)
{
my_dest_ptr dest = (my_dest_ptr) cinfo->dest;
/* Allocate the output buffer --- it will be released when done with image */
dest->buffer = (unsigned char *) (*cinfo->mem->alloc_small) ((j_common_ptr) cinfo, JPOOL_IMAGE, OUTPUT_BUF_SIZE * sizeof (unsigned char));
dest->pub.next_output_byte = dest->buffer;
dest->pub.free_in_buffer = OUTPUT_BUF_SIZE;
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5194
| null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d4e0a7273cd8d7a9ee667ad5b5c8aad0f5f59251
|
d4e0a7273cd8d7a9ee667ad5b5c8aad0f5f59251
|
Clear Shill stub config in offline file manager tests
The Shill stub client fakes ethernet and wifi connections during
testing. Clear its config during offline tests to simulate a lack of
network connectivity.
As a side effect, fileManagerPrivate.getDriveConnectionState will no
longer need to be stubbed out, as it will now think the device is
offline and return the appropriate result.
Bug: 925272
Change-Id: Idd6cb44325cfde4991d3b1e64185a28e8655c733
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578149
Commit-Queue: Austin Tankiang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sam McNally <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654782}
|
base::FilePath FileManagerBrowserTestBase::MaybeMountCrostini(
const std::string& source_path,
const std::vector<std::string>& mount_options) {
GURL source_url(source_path);
DCHECK(source_url.is_valid());
if (source_url.scheme() != "sshfs") {
return {};
}
CHECK(crostini_volume_->Mount(profile()));
return crostini_volume_->mount_path();
}
|
base::FilePath FileManagerBrowserTestBase::MaybeMountCrostini(
const std::string& source_path,
const std::vector<std::string>& mount_options) {
GURL source_url(source_path);
DCHECK(source_url.is_valid());
if (source_url.scheme() != "sshfs") {
return {};
}
CHECK(crostini_volume_->Mount(profile()));
return crostini_volume_->mount_path();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-14934
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-14934/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/enferex/pdfresurrect/commit/0c4120fffa3dffe97b95c486a120eded82afe8a6
|
0c4120fffa3dffe97b95c486a120eded82afe8a6
|
Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf
|
static void load_kids(FILE *fp, int pages_id, xref_t *xref)
{
int dummy, buf_idx, kid_id;
char *data, *c, buf[32];
/* Get kids */
data = get_object(fp, pages_id, xref, NULL, &dummy);
if (!data || !(c = strstr(data, "/Kids")))
{
free(data);
return;
}
c = strchr(c, '[');
buf_idx = 0;
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
while (*(++c) != ']')
{
if (isdigit(*c) || (*c == ' '))
buf[buf_idx++] = *c;
else if (isalpha(*c))
{
kid_id = atoi(buf);
add_kid(kid_id, xref);
buf_idx = 0;
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
/* Check kids of kid */
load_kids(fp, kid_id, xref);
}
else if (*c == ']')
break;
}
free(data);
}
|
static void load_kids(FILE *fp, int pages_id, xref_t *xref)
{
int dummy, buf_idx, kid_id;
char *data, *c, buf[32];
/* Get kids */
data = get_object(fp, pages_id, xref, NULL, &dummy);
if (!data || !(c = strstr(data, "/Kids")))
{
free(data);
return;
}
c = strchr(c, '[');
buf_idx = 0;
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
while (*(++c) != ']')
{
if (isdigit(*c) || (*c == ' '))
buf[buf_idx++] = *c;
else if (isalpha(*c))
{
kid_id = atoi(buf);
add_kid(kid_id, xref);
buf_idx = 0;
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
/* Check kids of kid */
load_kids(fp, kid_id, xref);
}
else if (*c == ']')
break;
}
free(data);
}
|
C
|
pdfresurrect
| 0 |
CVE-2012-0044
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-0044/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a5cd335165e31db9dbab636fd29895d41da55dd2
|
a5cd335165e31db9dbab636fd29895d41da55dd2
|
drm: integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
There is a potential integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
if userspace passes in a large num_clips. The call to kmalloc would
allocate a small buffer, and the call to fb->funcs->dirty may result
in a memory corruption.
Reported-by: Haogang Chen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <[email protected]>
|
int drm_mode_getblob_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev,
void *data, struct drm_file *file_priv)
{
struct drm_mode_object *obj;
struct drm_mode_get_blob *out_resp = data;
struct drm_property_blob *blob;
int ret = 0;
void *blob_ptr;
if (!drm_core_check_feature(dev, DRIVER_MODESET))
return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
obj = drm_mode_object_find(dev, out_resp->blob_id, DRM_MODE_OBJECT_BLOB);
if (!obj) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
blob = obj_to_blob(obj);
if (out_resp->length == blob->length) {
blob_ptr = (void *)(unsigned long)out_resp->data;
if (copy_to_user(blob_ptr, blob->data, blob->length)){
ret = -EFAULT;
goto done;
}
}
out_resp->length = blob->length;
done:
mutex_unlock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
return ret;
}
|
int drm_mode_getblob_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev,
void *data, struct drm_file *file_priv)
{
struct drm_mode_object *obj;
struct drm_mode_get_blob *out_resp = data;
struct drm_property_blob *blob;
int ret = 0;
void *blob_ptr;
if (!drm_core_check_feature(dev, DRIVER_MODESET))
return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
obj = drm_mode_object_find(dev, out_resp->blob_id, DRM_MODE_OBJECT_BLOB);
if (!obj) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
blob = obj_to_blob(obj);
if (out_resp->length == blob->length) {
blob_ptr = (void *)(unsigned long)out_resp->data;
if (copy_to_user(blob_ptr, blob->data, blob->length)){
ret = -EFAULT;
goto done;
}
}
out_resp->length = blob->length;
done:
mutex_unlock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11487
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11487/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6b3a707736301c2128ca85ce85fb13f60b5e350a
|
6b3a707736301c2128ca85ce85fb13f60b5e350a
|
Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
|
void trace_buffered_event_disable(void)
{
int cpu;
WARN_ON_ONCE(!mutex_is_locked(&event_mutex));
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!trace_buffered_event_ref))
return;
if (--trace_buffered_event_ref)
return;
preempt_disable();
/* For each CPU, set the buffer as used. */
smp_call_function_many(tracing_buffer_mask,
disable_trace_buffered_event, NULL, 1);
preempt_enable();
/* Wait for all current users to finish */
synchronize_rcu();
for_each_tracing_cpu(cpu) {
free_page((unsigned long)per_cpu(trace_buffered_event, cpu));
per_cpu(trace_buffered_event, cpu) = NULL;
}
/*
* Make sure trace_buffered_event is NULL before clearing
* trace_buffered_event_cnt.
*/
smp_wmb();
preempt_disable();
/* Do the work on each cpu */
smp_call_function_many(tracing_buffer_mask,
enable_trace_buffered_event, NULL, 1);
preempt_enable();
}
|
void trace_buffered_event_disable(void)
{
int cpu;
WARN_ON_ONCE(!mutex_is_locked(&event_mutex));
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!trace_buffered_event_ref))
return;
if (--trace_buffered_event_ref)
return;
preempt_disable();
/* For each CPU, set the buffer as used. */
smp_call_function_many(tracing_buffer_mask,
disable_trace_buffered_event, NULL, 1);
preempt_enable();
/* Wait for all current users to finish */
synchronize_rcu();
for_each_tracing_cpu(cpu) {
free_page((unsigned long)per_cpu(trace_buffered_event, cpu));
per_cpu(trace_buffered_event, cpu) = NULL;
}
/*
* Make sure trace_buffered_event is NULL before clearing
* trace_buffered_event_cnt.
*/
smp_wmb();
preempt_disable();
/* Do the work on each cpu */
smp_call_function_many(tracing_buffer_mask,
enable_trace_buffered_event, NULL, 1);
preempt_enable();
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2890
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2890/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a6f7726de20450074a01493e4e85409ce3f2595a
|
a6f7726de20450074a01493e4e85409ce3f2595a
|
Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
String Document::lastModified() const
{
DateComponents date;
bool foundDate = false;
if (m_frame) {
String httpLastModified;
if (DocumentLoader* documentLoader = loader())
httpLastModified = documentLoader->response().httpHeaderField("Last-Modified");
if (!httpLastModified.isEmpty()) {
date.setMillisecondsSinceEpochForDateTime(parseDate(httpLastModified));
foundDate = true;
}
}
if (!foundDate)
date.setMillisecondsSinceEpochForDateTime(currentTimeMS());
return String::format("%02d/%02d/%04d %02d:%02d:%02d", date.month() + 1, date.monthDay(), date.fullYear(), date.hour(), date.minute(), date.second());
}
|
String Document::lastModified() const
{
DateComponents date;
bool foundDate = false;
if (m_frame) {
String httpLastModified;
if (DocumentLoader* documentLoader = loader())
httpLastModified = documentLoader->response().httpHeaderField("Last-Modified");
if (!httpLastModified.isEmpty()) {
date.setMillisecondsSinceEpochForDateTime(parseDate(httpLastModified));
foundDate = true;
}
}
if (!foundDate)
date.setMillisecondsSinceEpochForDateTime(currentTimeMS());
return String::format("%02d/%02d/%04d %02d:%02d:%02d", date.month() + 1, date.monthDay(), date.fullYear(), date.hour(), date.minute(), date.second());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6381
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6381/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6fb392b1a63ae36c31f62bc3fc8630b49d602b62
|
6fb392b1a63ae36c31f62bc3fc8630b49d602b62
|
qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void qeth_qdio_output_handler(struct ccw_device *ccwdev,
unsigned int qdio_error, int __queue, int first_element,
int count, unsigned long card_ptr)
{
struct qeth_card *card = (struct qeth_card *) card_ptr;
struct qeth_qdio_out_q *queue = card->qdio.out_qs[__queue];
struct qeth_qdio_out_buffer *buffer;
int i;
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 6, "qdouhdl");
if (qdio_error & QDIO_ERROR_FATAL) {
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 2, "achkcond");
netif_stop_queue(card->dev);
qeth_schedule_recovery(card);
return;
}
if (card->options.performance_stats) {
card->perf_stats.outbound_handler_cnt++;
card->perf_stats.outbound_handler_start_time =
qeth_get_micros();
}
for (i = first_element; i < (first_element + count); ++i) {
int bidx = i % QDIO_MAX_BUFFERS_PER_Q;
buffer = queue->bufs[bidx];
qeth_handle_send_error(card, buffer, qdio_error);
if (queue->bufstates &&
(queue->bufstates[bidx].flags &
QDIO_OUTBUF_STATE_FLAG_PENDING) != 0) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(card->options.cq != QETH_CQ_ENABLED);
if (atomic_cmpxchg(&buffer->state,
QETH_QDIO_BUF_PRIMED,
QETH_QDIO_BUF_PENDING) ==
QETH_QDIO_BUF_PRIMED) {
qeth_notify_skbs(queue, buffer,
TX_NOTIFY_PENDING);
}
buffer->aob = queue->bufstates[bidx].aob;
QETH_CARD_TEXT_(queue->card, 5, "pel%d", bidx);
QETH_CARD_TEXT(queue->card, 5, "aob");
QETH_CARD_TEXT_(queue->card, 5, "%lx",
virt_to_phys(buffer->aob));
if (qeth_init_qdio_out_buf(queue, bidx)) {
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 2, "outofbuf");
qeth_schedule_recovery(card);
}
} else {
if (card->options.cq == QETH_CQ_ENABLED) {
enum iucv_tx_notify n;
n = qeth_compute_cq_notification(
buffer->buffer->element[15].sflags, 0);
qeth_notify_skbs(queue, buffer, n);
}
qeth_clear_output_buffer(queue, buffer,
QETH_QDIO_BUF_EMPTY);
}
qeth_cleanup_handled_pending(queue, bidx, 0);
}
atomic_sub(count, &queue->used_buffers);
/* check if we need to do something on this outbound queue */
if (card->info.type != QETH_CARD_TYPE_IQD)
qeth_check_outbound_queue(queue);
netif_wake_queue(queue->card->dev);
if (card->options.performance_stats)
card->perf_stats.outbound_handler_time += qeth_get_micros() -
card->perf_stats.outbound_handler_start_time;
}
|
void qeth_qdio_output_handler(struct ccw_device *ccwdev,
unsigned int qdio_error, int __queue, int first_element,
int count, unsigned long card_ptr)
{
struct qeth_card *card = (struct qeth_card *) card_ptr;
struct qeth_qdio_out_q *queue = card->qdio.out_qs[__queue];
struct qeth_qdio_out_buffer *buffer;
int i;
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 6, "qdouhdl");
if (qdio_error & QDIO_ERROR_FATAL) {
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 2, "achkcond");
netif_stop_queue(card->dev);
qeth_schedule_recovery(card);
return;
}
if (card->options.performance_stats) {
card->perf_stats.outbound_handler_cnt++;
card->perf_stats.outbound_handler_start_time =
qeth_get_micros();
}
for (i = first_element; i < (first_element + count); ++i) {
int bidx = i % QDIO_MAX_BUFFERS_PER_Q;
buffer = queue->bufs[bidx];
qeth_handle_send_error(card, buffer, qdio_error);
if (queue->bufstates &&
(queue->bufstates[bidx].flags &
QDIO_OUTBUF_STATE_FLAG_PENDING) != 0) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(card->options.cq != QETH_CQ_ENABLED);
if (atomic_cmpxchg(&buffer->state,
QETH_QDIO_BUF_PRIMED,
QETH_QDIO_BUF_PENDING) ==
QETH_QDIO_BUF_PRIMED) {
qeth_notify_skbs(queue, buffer,
TX_NOTIFY_PENDING);
}
buffer->aob = queue->bufstates[bidx].aob;
QETH_CARD_TEXT_(queue->card, 5, "pel%d", bidx);
QETH_CARD_TEXT(queue->card, 5, "aob");
QETH_CARD_TEXT_(queue->card, 5, "%lx",
virt_to_phys(buffer->aob));
if (qeth_init_qdio_out_buf(queue, bidx)) {
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 2, "outofbuf");
qeth_schedule_recovery(card);
}
} else {
if (card->options.cq == QETH_CQ_ENABLED) {
enum iucv_tx_notify n;
n = qeth_compute_cq_notification(
buffer->buffer->element[15].sflags, 0);
qeth_notify_skbs(queue, buffer, n);
}
qeth_clear_output_buffer(queue, buffer,
QETH_QDIO_BUF_EMPTY);
}
qeth_cleanup_handled_pending(queue, bidx, 0);
}
atomic_sub(count, &queue->used_buffers);
/* check if we need to do something on this outbound queue */
if (card->info.type != QETH_CARD_TYPE_IQD)
qeth_check_outbound_queue(queue);
netif_wake_queue(queue->card->dev);
if (card->options.performance_stats)
card->perf_stats.outbound_handler_time += qeth_get_micros() -
card->perf_stats.outbound_handler_start_time;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
handle_associated_event(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc,
int idx, struct perf_sample_data *data, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct perf_event *event = cpuc->events[idx];
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
mipspmu_event_update(event, hwc, idx);
data->period = event->hw.last_period;
if (!mipspmu_event_set_period(event, hwc, idx))
return;
if (perf_event_overflow(event, data, regs))
mipspmu->disable_event(idx);
}
|
handle_associated_event(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc,
int idx, struct perf_sample_data *data, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct perf_event *event = cpuc->events[idx];
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
mipspmu_event_update(event, hwc, idx);
data->period = event->hw.last_period;
if (!mipspmu_event_set_period(event, hwc, idx))
return;
if (perf_event_overflow(event, 0, data, regs))
mipspmu->disable_event(idx);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2012-3412
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3412/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/68cb695ccecf949d48949e72f8ce591fdaaa325c
|
68cb695ccecf949d48949e72f8ce591fdaaa325c
|
sfc: Fix maximum number of TSO segments and minimum TX queue size
[ Upstream commit 7e6d06f0de3f74ca929441add094518ae332257c ]
Currently an skb requiring TSO may not fit within a minimum-size TX
queue. The TX queue selected for the skb may stall and trigger the TX
watchdog repeatedly (since the problem skb will be retried after the
TX reset). This issue is designated as CVE-2012-3412.
Set the maximum number of TSO segments for our devices to 100. This
should make no difference to behaviour unless the actual MSS is less
than about 700. Increase the minimum TX queue size accordingly to
allow for 2 worst-case skbs, so that there will definitely be space
to add an skb after we wake a queue.
To avoid invalidating existing configurations, change
efx_ethtool_set_ringparam() to fix up values that are too small rather
than returning -EINVAL.
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
|
static int efx_change_mtu(struct net_device *net_dev, int new_mtu)
{
struct efx_nic *efx = netdev_priv(net_dev);
int rc = 0;
EFX_ASSERT_RESET_SERIALISED(efx);
if (new_mtu > EFX_MAX_MTU)
return -EINVAL;
efx_stop_all(efx);
netif_dbg(efx, drv, efx->net_dev, "changing MTU to %d\n", new_mtu);
efx_fini_channels(efx);
mutex_lock(&efx->mac_lock);
/* Reconfigure the MAC before enabling the dma queues so that
* the RX buffers don't overflow */
net_dev->mtu = new_mtu;
efx->mac_op->reconfigure(efx);
mutex_unlock(&efx->mac_lock);
efx_init_channels(efx);
efx_start_all(efx);
return rc;
}
|
static int efx_change_mtu(struct net_device *net_dev, int new_mtu)
{
struct efx_nic *efx = netdev_priv(net_dev);
int rc = 0;
EFX_ASSERT_RESET_SERIALISED(efx);
if (new_mtu > EFX_MAX_MTU)
return -EINVAL;
efx_stop_all(efx);
netif_dbg(efx, drv, efx->net_dev, "changing MTU to %d\n", new_mtu);
efx_fini_channels(efx);
mutex_lock(&efx->mac_lock);
/* Reconfigure the MAC before enabling the dma queues so that
* the RX buffers don't overflow */
net_dev->mtu = new_mtu;
efx->mac_op->reconfigure(efx);
mutex_unlock(&efx->mac_lock);
efx_init_channels(efx);
efx_start_all(efx);
return rc;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2836
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2836/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d662b905d30cec7899bbb15140dcfacd73506167
|
d662b905d30cec7899bbb15140dcfacd73506167
|
Infobar Windows Media Player plug-in by default.
BUG=51464
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7080048
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87500 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool OutdatedPluginInfoBarDelegate::Accept() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("OutdatedPluginInfobar.Update"));
tab_contents_->OpenURL(update_url_, GURL(), NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB,
PageTransition::LINK);
return false;
}
|
bool OutdatedPluginInfoBarDelegate::Accept() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("OutdatedPluginInfobar.Update"));
tab_contents_->OpenURL(update_url_, GURL(), NEW_FOREGROUND_TAB,
PageTransition::LINK);
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2888
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2888/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3b0d77670a0613f409110817455d2137576b485a
|
3b0d77670a0613f409110817455d2137576b485a
|
Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
PP_Time GetTime() {
return TimeToPPTime(base::Time::Now());
}
|
PP_Time GetTime() {
return TimeToPPTime(base::Time::Now());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0921
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0921/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9841fbdaf41b4a2baaa413f94d5c0197f9261f4
|
e9841fbdaf41b4a2baaa413f94d5c0197f9261f4
|
Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool ContentBrowserClient::AllowSetCookie(const GURL& url,
const GURL& first_party,
const std::string& cookie_line,
ResourceContext* context,
int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
net::CookieOptions* options) {
return true;
}
|
bool ContentBrowserClient::AllowSetCookie(const GURL& url,
const GURL& first_party,
const std::string& cookie_line,
ResourceContext* context,
int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
net::CookieOptions* options) {
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6661
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6661/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/23cbfc1d685fa7389e88588584e02786820d4d26
|
23cbfc1d685fa7389e88588584e02786820d4d26
|
Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
|
bool Send(IPC::Message* message) {
return content::UtilityThread::Get()->Send(message);
}
|
bool Send(IPC::Message* message) {
return content::UtilityThread::Get()->Send(message);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1285
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1285/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/39595f8d4dffcb644d438106dcb64a30c139ff0e
|
39595f8d4dffcb644d438106dcb64a30c139ff0e
|
[reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <[email protected]>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
|
void WallpaperManager::RemovePendingWallpaperFromList(
PendingWallpaper* pending) {
DCHECK(loading_.size() > 0);
for (WallpaperManager::PendingList::iterator i = loading_.begin();
i != loading_.end();
++i) {
if (i->get() == pending) {
loading_.erase(i);
break;
}
}
if (loading_.empty()) {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.OnPendingListEmptyForTesting();
}
}
|
void WallpaperManager::RemovePendingWallpaperFromList(
PendingWallpaper* pending) {
DCHECK(loading_.size() > 0);
for (WallpaperManager::PendingList::iterator i = loading_.begin();
i != loading_.end();
++i) {
if (i->get() == pending) {
loading_.erase(i);
break;
}
}
if (loading_.empty()) {
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.OnPendingListEmptyForTesting();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0886
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0886/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::SetBounds(const gfx::Rect& rect) {
if (window_->bounds().size() != rect.size() &&
host_->is_accelerated_compositing_active()) {
aura::RootWindow* root_window = window_->GetRootWindow();
ui::Compositor* compositor = root_window ?
root_window->compositor() : NULL;
if (root_window && compositor) {
if (!compositor->HasObserver(this))
compositor->AddObserver(this);
bool defer_compositor_lock =
can_lock_compositor_ == NO_PENDING_RENDERER_FRAME ||
can_lock_compositor_ == NO_PENDING_COMMIT;
if (can_lock_compositor_ == YES)
can_lock_compositor_ = YES_DID_LOCK;
resize_locks_.push_back(make_linked_ptr(
new ResizeLock(root_window, rect.size(), defer_compositor_lock)));
}
}
window_->SetBounds(rect);
host_->WasResized();
}
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::SetBounds(const gfx::Rect& rect) {
if (window_->bounds().size() != rect.size() &&
host_->is_accelerated_compositing_active()) {
aura::RootWindow* root_window = window_->GetRootWindow();
ui::Compositor* compositor = root_window ?
root_window->compositor() : NULL;
if (root_window && compositor) {
if (!compositor->HasObserver(this))
compositor->AddObserver(this);
bool defer_compositor_lock =
can_lock_compositor_ == NO_PENDING_RENDERER_FRAME ||
can_lock_compositor_ == NO_PENDING_COMMIT;
if (can_lock_compositor_ == YES)
can_lock_compositor_ = YES_DID_LOCK;
resize_locks_.push_back(make_linked_ptr(
new ResizeLock(root_window, rect.size(), defer_compositor_lock)));
}
}
window_->SetBounds(rect);
host_->WasResized();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a0fe4d88137213aa24fbb16fd7eec34533345c9b
|
a0fe4d88137213aa24fbb16fd7eec34533345c9b
|
Move supports-high-dpi flag into registry.
Calls to SetProcessDpiAwareness need to happen immediately when the app starts. Specifically, before user profile settings have been initialized.
This patch moves the --supports-high-dpi into the registry.
BUG=339152, 149881, 160457
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/153403003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@256811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
virtual bool ShouldContinueAfterTestURLLoad() {
return true;
}
|
virtual bool ShouldContinueAfterTestURLLoad() {
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-9016
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-9016/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0048b4837affd153897ed1222283492070027aa9
|
0048b4837affd153897ed1222283492070027aa9
|
blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
|
static inline bool hctx_allow_merges(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx)
{
return (hctx->flags & BLK_MQ_F_SHOULD_MERGE) &&
!blk_queue_nomerges(hctx->queue);
}
|
static inline bool hctx_allow_merges(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx)
{
return (hctx->flags & BLK_MQ_F_SHOULD_MERGE) &&
!blk_queue_nomerges(hctx->queue);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1295
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1295/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8fa5a358cb32085b51daf92df8fd4a79b3931f81
|
8fa5a358cb32085b51daf92df8fd4a79b3931f81
|
Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
|
FrameReference::FrameReference(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame) {
Reset(frame);
}
|
FrameReference::FrameReference(blink::WebLocalFrame* frame) {
Reset(frame);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3839/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
bt_status_t btsock_l2cap_cleanup()
{
pthread_mutex_lock(&state_lock);
pth = -1;
while (socks)
btsock_l2cap_free_l(socks);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&state_lock);
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
|
bt_status_t btsock_l2cap_cleanup()
{
pthread_mutex_lock(&state_lock);
pth = -1;
while (socks)
btsock_l2cap_free_l(socks);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&state_lock);
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5307
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5307/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/54a20552e1eae07aa240fa370a0293e006b5faed
|
54a20552e1eae07aa240fa370a0293e006b5faed
|
KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
|
static void setup_msrs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
int save_nmsrs, index;
save_nmsrs = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if (is_long_mode(&vmx->vcpu)) {
index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_SYSCALL_MASK);
if (index >= 0)
move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_LSTAR);
if (index >= 0)
move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_CSTAR);
if (index >= 0)
move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_TSC_AUX);
if (index >= 0 && guest_cpuid_has_rdtscp(&vmx->vcpu))
move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
/*
* MSR_STAR is only needed on long mode guests, and only
* if efer.sce is enabled.
*/
index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_STAR);
if ((index >= 0) && (vmx->vcpu.arch.efer & EFER_SCE))
move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
}
#endif
index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_EFER);
if (index >= 0 && update_transition_efer(vmx, index))
move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
vmx->save_nmsrs = save_nmsrs;
if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
vmx_set_msr_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu);
}
|
static void setup_msrs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
int save_nmsrs, index;
save_nmsrs = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if (is_long_mode(&vmx->vcpu)) {
index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_SYSCALL_MASK);
if (index >= 0)
move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_LSTAR);
if (index >= 0)
move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_CSTAR);
if (index >= 0)
move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_TSC_AUX);
if (index >= 0 && guest_cpuid_has_rdtscp(&vmx->vcpu))
move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
/*
* MSR_STAR is only needed on long mode guests, and only
* if efer.sce is enabled.
*/
index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_STAR);
if ((index >= 0) && (vmx->vcpu.arch.efer & EFER_SCE))
move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
}
#endif
index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_EFER);
if (index >= 0 && update_transition_efer(vmx, index))
move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
vmx->save_nmsrs = save_nmsrs;
if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
vmx_set_msr_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void htmlCollectionAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, WTF::getPtr(imp->htmlCollectionAttribute()), imp);
}
|
static void htmlCollectionAttributeAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueFast(info, WTF::getPtr(imp->htmlCollectionAttribute()), imp);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-2669
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2669/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/postgres/postgres/commit/31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a
|
31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a
|
Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
|
path_n_ge(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
PATH *p1 = PG_GETARG_PATH_P(0);
PATH *p2 = PG_GETARG_PATH_P(1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(p1->npts >= p2->npts);
}
|
path_n_ge(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
PATH *p1 = PG_GETARG_PATH_P(0);
PATH *p2 = PG_GETARG_PATH_P(1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(p1->npts >= p2->npts);
}
|
C
|
postgres
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0882
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0882/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/25f9415f43d607d3d01f542f067e3cc471983e6b
|
25f9415f43d607d3d01f542f067e3cc471983e6b
|
Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void HTMLInputElement::stepDown(int n, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
m_inputType->stepUp(-n, exceptionState);
}
|
void HTMLInputElement::stepDown(int n, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
m_inputType->stepUp(-n, exceptionState);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-3552
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3552/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int ip_push_pending_frames(struct sock *sk)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
skb = ip_finish_skb(sk);
if (!skb)
return 0;
/* Netfilter gets whole the not fragmented skb. */
return ip_send_skb(skb);
}
|
int ip_push_pending_frames(struct sock *sk)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
skb = ip_finish_skb(sk);
if (!skb)
return 0;
/* Netfilter gets whole the not fragmented skb. */
return ip_send_skb(skb);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6643
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6643/
|
CWE-287
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fc343fd48badc0158dc2bb763e9a8b9342f3cb6f
|
fc343fd48badc0158dc2bb763e9a8b9342f3cb6f
|
Fix a crash when a form control is in a past naems map of a demoted form element.
Note that we wanted to add the protector in FormAssociatedElement::setForm(),
but we couldn't do it because it is called from the constructor.
BUG=326854
TEST=automated.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/105693013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@163680 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
PassOwnPtr<FormAttributeTargetObserver> FormAttributeTargetObserver::create(const AtomicString& id, FormAssociatedElement* element)
{
return adoptPtr(new FormAttributeTargetObserver(id, element));
}
|
PassOwnPtr<FormAttributeTargetObserver> FormAttributeTargetObserver::create(const AtomicString& id, FormAssociatedElement* element)
{
return adoptPtr(new FormAttributeTargetObserver(id, element));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4127
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4127/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ec8013beddd717d1740cfefb1a9b900deef85462
|
ec8013beddd717d1740cfefb1a9b900deef85462
|
dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device
A logical volume can map to just part of underlying physical volume.
In this case, it must be treated like a partition.
Based on a patch from Alasdair G Kergon.
Cc: Alasdair G Kergon <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int flakey_status(struct dm_target *ti, status_type_t type,
char *result, unsigned int maxlen)
{
unsigned sz = 0;
struct flakey_c *fc = ti->private;
unsigned drop_writes;
switch (type) {
case STATUSTYPE_INFO:
result[0] = '\0';
break;
case STATUSTYPE_TABLE:
DMEMIT("%s %llu %u %u ", fc->dev->name,
(unsigned long long)fc->start, fc->up_interval,
fc->down_interval);
drop_writes = test_bit(DROP_WRITES, &fc->flags);
DMEMIT("%u ", drop_writes + (fc->corrupt_bio_byte > 0) * 5);
if (drop_writes)
DMEMIT("drop_writes ");
if (fc->corrupt_bio_byte)
DMEMIT("corrupt_bio_byte %u %c %u %u ",
fc->corrupt_bio_byte,
(fc->corrupt_bio_rw == WRITE) ? 'w' : 'r',
fc->corrupt_bio_value, fc->corrupt_bio_flags);
break;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int flakey_status(struct dm_target *ti, status_type_t type,
char *result, unsigned int maxlen)
{
unsigned sz = 0;
struct flakey_c *fc = ti->private;
unsigned drop_writes;
switch (type) {
case STATUSTYPE_INFO:
result[0] = '\0';
break;
case STATUSTYPE_TABLE:
DMEMIT("%s %llu %u %u ", fc->dev->name,
(unsigned long long)fc->start, fc->up_interval,
fc->down_interval);
drop_writes = test_bit(DROP_WRITES, &fc->flags);
DMEMIT("%u ", drop_writes + (fc->corrupt_bio_byte > 0) * 5);
if (drop_writes)
DMEMIT("drop_writes ");
if (fc->corrupt_bio_byte)
DMEMIT("corrupt_bio_byte %u %c %u %u ",
fc->corrupt_bio_byte,
(fc->corrupt_bio_rw == WRITE) ? 'w' : 'r',
fc->corrupt_bio_value, fc->corrupt_bio_flags);
break;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-19854
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-19854/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f43f39958beb206b53292801e216d9b8a660f087
|
f43f39958beb206b53292801e216d9b8a660f087
|
crypto: user - fix leaking uninitialized memory to userspace
All bytes of the NETLINK_CRYPTO report structures must be initialized,
since they are copied to userspace. The change from strncpy() to
strlcpy() broke this. As a minimal fix, change it back.
Fixes: 4473710df1f8 ("crypto: user - Prepare for CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME expansion")
Cc: <[email protected]> # v4.12+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
struct crypto_alg *crypto_alg_match(struct crypto_user_alg *p, int exact)
{
struct crypto_alg *q, *alg = NULL;
down_read(&crypto_alg_sem);
list_for_each_entry(q, &crypto_alg_list, cra_list) {
int match = 0;
if ((q->cra_flags ^ p->cru_type) & p->cru_mask)
continue;
if (strlen(p->cru_driver_name))
match = !strcmp(q->cra_driver_name,
p->cru_driver_name);
else if (!exact)
match = !strcmp(q->cra_name, p->cru_name);
if (!match)
continue;
if (unlikely(!crypto_mod_get(q)))
continue;
alg = q;
break;
}
up_read(&crypto_alg_sem);
return alg;
}
|
struct crypto_alg *crypto_alg_match(struct crypto_user_alg *p, int exact)
{
struct crypto_alg *q, *alg = NULL;
down_read(&crypto_alg_sem);
list_for_each_entry(q, &crypto_alg_list, cra_list) {
int match = 0;
if ((q->cra_flags ^ p->cru_type) & p->cru_mask)
continue;
if (strlen(p->cru_driver_name))
match = !strcmp(q->cra_driver_name,
p->cru_driver_name);
else if (!exact)
match = !strcmp(q->cra_name, p->cru_name);
if (!match)
continue;
if (unlikely(!crypto_mod_get(q)))
continue;
alg = q;
break;
}
up_read(&crypto_alg_sem);
return alg;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3053
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3053/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c442b3eda2f1fdd4d1d4864c34c43cbaf223acae
|
c442b3eda2f1fdd4d1d4864c34c43cbaf223acae
|
chromeos: Move audio, power, and UI files into subdirs.
This moves more files from chrome/browser/chromeos/ into
subdirectories.
BUG=chromium-os:22896
TEST=did chrome os builds both with and without aura
TBR=sky
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9125006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@116746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
SettingLevelBubbleView* view() { return view_; }
|
SettingLevelBubbleView* view() { return view_; }
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-1601
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-1601/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9c895160d25a76c21b65bad141b08e8d4f99afef
|
9c895160d25a76c21b65bad141b08e8d4f99afef
|
KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static int vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int r;
long psr;
local_irq_save(psr);
r = kvm_insert_vmm_mapping(vcpu);
local_irq_restore(psr);
if (r)
goto fail;
vcpu->arch.launched = 0;
kvm_arch_vcpu_uninit(vcpu);
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_init(vcpu);
if (r)
goto fail;
kvm_purge_vmm_mapping(vcpu);
r = 0;
fail:
return r;
}
|
static int vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int r;
long psr;
local_irq_save(psr);
r = kvm_insert_vmm_mapping(vcpu);
local_irq_restore(psr);
if (r)
goto fail;
vcpu->arch.launched = 0;
kvm_arch_vcpu_uninit(vcpu);
r = kvm_arch_vcpu_init(vcpu);
if (r)
goto fail;
kvm_purge_vmm_mapping(vcpu);
r = 0;
fail:
return r;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
1161a49d663dd395bd639549c2dfe7324f847938
|
Don't populate URL data in WebDropData when dragging files.
This is considered a potential security issue as well, since it leaks
filesystem paths.
BUG=332579
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/135633002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@244538 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool TabStrip::IsPositionInWindowCaption(const gfx::Point& point) {
return IsRectInWindowCaption(gfx::Rect(point, gfx::Size(1, 1)));
}
|
bool TabStrip::IsPositionInWindowCaption(const gfx::Point& point) {
return IsRectInWindowCaption(gfx::Rect(point, gfx::Size(1, 1)));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1999014
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1999014/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/bab0716c7f4793ec42e05a5aa7e80d82a0dd4e75
|
bab0716c7f4793ec42e05a5aa7e80d82a0dd4e75
|
avformat/mxfdec: Fix av_log context
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: mxf-crash-1c2e59bf07a34675bfb3ada5e1ec22fa9f38f923
Found-by: Paul Ch <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static int mxf_read_content_storage(void *arg, AVIOContext *pb, int tag, int size, UID uid, int64_t klv_offset)
{
MXFContext *mxf = arg;
switch (tag) {
case 0x1901:
if (mxf->packages_refs)
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "Multiple packages_refs\n");
av_free(mxf->packages_refs);
return mxf_read_strong_ref_array(pb, &mxf->packages_refs, &mxf->packages_count);
case 0x1902:
av_free(mxf->essence_container_data_refs);
return mxf_read_strong_ref_array(pb, &mxf->essence_container_data_refs, &mxf->essence_container_data_count);
}
return 0;
}
|
static int mxf_read_content_storage(void *arg, AVIOContext *pb, int tag, int size, UID uid, int64_t klv_offset)
{
MXFContext *mxf = arg;
switch (tag) {
case 0x1901:
if (mxf->packages_refs)
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "Multiple packages_refs\n");
av_free(mxf->packages_refs);
return mxf_read_strong_ref_array(pb, &mxf->packages_refs, &mxf->packages_count);
case 0x1902:
av_free(mxf->essence_container_data_refs);
return mxf_read_strong_ref_array(pb, &mxf->essence_container_data_refs, &mxf->essence_container_data_count);
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17205
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17205/
|
CWE-617
|
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/0befd1f3745055c32940f5faf9559be6a14395e6
|
0befd1f3745055c32940f5faf9559be6a14395e6
|
ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
|
update_mtu_ofproto(struct ofproto *p)
{
struct ofport *ofport;
int old_min = p->min_mtu;
p->min_mtu = find_min_mtu(p);
if (p->min_mtu == old_min) {
return;
}
HMAP_FOR_EACH (ofport, hmap_node, &p->ports) {
struct netdev *netdev = ofport->netdev;
if (ofport_is_mtu_overridden(p, ofport)) {
if (!netdev_set_mtu(netdev, p->min_mtu)) {
ofport->mtu = p->min_mtu;
}
}
}
}
|
update_mtu_ofproto(struct ofproto *p)
{
struct ofport *ofport;
int old_min = p->min_mtu;
p->min_mtu = find_min_mtu(p);
if (p->min_mtu == old_min) {
return;
}
HMAP_FOR_EACH (ofport, hmap_node, &p->ports) {
struct netdev *netdev = ofport->netdev;
if (ofport_is_mtu_overridden(p, ofport)) {
if (!netdev_set_mtu(netdev, p->min_mtu)) {
ofport->mtu = p->min_mtu;
}
}
}
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16931
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16931/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/GNOME/libxml2/commit/e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
|
e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
|
Fix handling of parameter-entity references
There were two bugs where parameter-entity references could lead to an
unexpected change of the input buffer in xmlParseNameComplex and
xmlDictLookup being called with an invalid pointer.
Percent sign in DTD Names
=========================
The NEXTL macro used to call xmlParserHandlePEReference. When parsing
"complex" names inside the DTD, this could result in entity expansion
which created a new input buffer. The fix is to simply remove the call
to xmlParserHandlePEReference from the NEXTL macro. This is safe because
no users of the macro require expansion of parameter entities.
- xmlParseNameComplex
- xmlParseNCNameComplex
- xmlParseNmtoken
The percent sign is not allowed in names, which are grammatical tokens.
- xmlParseEntityValue
Parameter-entity references in entity values are expanded but this
happens in a separate step in this function.
- xmlParseSystemLiteral
Parameter-entity references are ignored in the system literal.
- xmlParseAttValueComplex
- xmlParseCharDataComplex
- xmlParseCommentComplex
- xmlParsePI
- xmlParseCDSect
Parameter-entity references are ignored outside the DTD.
- xmlLoadEntityContent
This function is only called from xmlStringLenDecodeEntities and
entities are replaced in a separate step immediately after the function
call.
This bug could also be triggered with an internal subset and double
entity expansion.
This fixes bug 766956 initially reported by Wei Lei and independently by
Chromium's ClusterFuzz, Hanno Böck, and Marco Grassi. Thanks to everyone
involved.
xmlParseNameComplex with XML_PARSE_OLD10
========================================
When parsing Names inside an expanded parameter entity with the
XML_PARSE_OLD10 option, xmlParseNameComplex would call xmlGROW via the
GROW macro if the input buffer was exhausted. At the end of the
parameter entity's replacement text, this function would then call
xmlPopInput which invalidated the input buffer.
There should be no need to invoke GROW in this situation because the
buffer is grown periodically every XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE characters and,
at least for UTF-8, in xmlCurrentChar. This also matches the code path
executed when XML_PARSE_OLD10 is not set.
This fixes bugs 781205 (CVE-2017-9049) and 781361 (CVE-2017-9050).
Thanks to Marcel Böhme and Thuan Pham for the report.
Additional hardening
====================
A separate check was added in xmlParseNameComplex to validate the
buffer size.
|
static void globfree(glob_t *pglob) {
unsigned int i;
if (pglob == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0;i < pglob->gl_pathc;i++) {
if (pglob->gl_pathv[i] != NULL)
free(pglob->gl_pathv[i]);
}
}
|
static void globfree(glob_t *pglob) {
unsigned int i;
if (pglob == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0;i < pglob->gl_pathc;i++) {
if (pglob->gl_pathv[i] != NULL)
free(pglob->gl_pathv[i]);
}
}
|
C
|
libxml2
| 0 |
CVE-2019-16910
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-16910/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/commit/298a43a77ec0ed2c19a8c924ddd8571ef3e65dfd
|
298a43a77ec0ed2c19a8c924ddd8571ef3e65dfd
|
Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/549' into mbedtls-2.7-restricted
|
static int ecp_check_pubkey_sw( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_mpi YY, RHS;
/* pt coordinates must be normalized for our checks */
if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->X, 0 ) < 0 ||
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Y, 0 ) < 0 ||
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pt->X, &grp->P ) >= 0 ||
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pt->Y, &grp->P ) >= 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &YY ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &RHS );
/*
* YY = Y^2
* RHS = X (X^2 + A) + B = X^3 + A X + B
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &YY, &pt->Y, &pt->Y ) ); MOD_MUL( YY );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &RHS, &pt->X, &pt->X ) ); MOD_MUL( RHS );
/* Special case for A = -3 */
if( grp->A.p == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &RHS, &RHS, 3 ) ); MOD_SUB( RHS );
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &RHS, &RHS, &grp->A ) ); MOD_ADD( RHS );
}
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &RHS, &RHS, &pt->X ) ); MOD_MUL( RHS );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &RHS, &RHS, &grp->B ) ); MOD_ADD( RHS );
if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &YY, &RHS ) != 0 )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY;
cleanup:
mbedtls_mpi_free( &YY ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &RHS );
return( ret );
}
|
static int ecp_check_pubkey_sw( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_mpi YY, RHS;
/* pt coordinates must be normalized for our checks */
if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->X, 0 ) < 0 ||
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &pt->Y, 0 ) < 0 ||
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pt->X, &grp->P ) >= 0 ||
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pt->Y, &grp->P ) >= 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &YY ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &RHS );
/*
* YY = Y^2
* RHS = X (X^2 + A) + B = X^3 + A X + B
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &YY, &pt->Y, &pt->Y ) ); MOD_MUL( YY );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &RHS, &pt->X, &pt->X ) ); MOD_MUL( RHS );
/* Special case for A = -3 */
if( grp->A.p == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &RHS, &RHS, 3 ) ); MOD_SUB( RHS );
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &RHS, &RHS, &grp->A ) ); MOD_ADD( RHS );
}
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &RHS, &RHS, &pt->X ) ); MOD_MUL( RHS );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &RHS, &RHS, &grp->B ) ); MOD_ADD( RHS );
if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &YY, &RHS ) != 0 )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY;
cleanup:
mbedtls_mpi_free( &YY ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &RHS );
return( ret );
}
|
C
|
mbedtls
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16540
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16540/
|
CWE-416
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=c432131c3fdb2143e148e8ba88555f7f7a63b25e
|
c432131c3fdb2143e148e8ba88555f7f7a63b25e
| null |
pdf14_set_marking_params(gx_device *dev, const gs_gstate *pgs)
{
pdf14_device * pdev = (pdf14_device *)dev;
pdev->opacity = pgs->opacity.alpha;
pdev->shape = pgs->shape.alpha;
pdev->alpha = pgs->opacity.alpha * pgs->shape.alpha;
pdev->blend_mode = pgs->blend_mode;
pdev->overprint = pgs->overprint;
pdev->overprint_mode = pgs->overprint_mode;
if_debug3m('v', dev->memory,
"[v]set_marking_params, opacity = %g, shape = %g, bm = %d\n",
pdev->opacity, pdev->shape, pgs->blend_mode);
}
|
pdf14_set_marking_params(gx_device *dev, const gs_gstate *pgs)
{
pdf14_device * pdev = (pdf14_device *)dev;
pdev->opacity = pgs->opacity.alpha;
pdev->shape = pgs->shape.alpha;
pdev->alpha = pgs->opacity.alpha * pgs->shape.alpha;
pdev->blend_mode = pgs->blend_mode;
pdev->overprint = pgs->overprint;
pdev->overprint_mode = pgs->overprint_mode;
if_debug3m('v', dev->memory,
"[v]set_marking_params, opacity = %g, shape = %g, bm = %d\n",
pdev->opacity, pdev->shape, pgs->blend_mode);
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2010-4818
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-4818/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit?id=6c69235a9dfc52e4b4e47630ff4bab1a820eb543
|
6c69235a9dfc52e4b4e47630ff4bab1a820eb543
| null |
int __glXDispSwap_CreateContext(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
{
ClientPtr client = cl->client;
xGLXCreateContextReq *req = (xGLXCreateContextReq *) pc;
__GLX_DECLARE_SWAP_VARIABLES;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xGLXCreateContextReq);
__GLX_SWAP_SHORT(&req->length);
__GLX_SWAP_INT(&req->context);
__GLX_SWAP_INT(&req->visual);
return __glXDisp_CreateContext(cl, pc);
}
|
int __glXDispSwap_CreateContext(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
{
xGLXCreateContextReq *req = (xGLXCreateContextReq *) pc;
__GLX_DECLARE_SWAP_VARIABLES;
__GLX_SWAP_SHORT(&req->length);
__GLX_SWAP_INT(&req->context);
__GLX_SWAP_INT(&req->visual);
return __glXDisp_CreateContext(cl, pc);
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 1 |
CVE-2018-17205
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17205/
|
CWE-617
|
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/0befd1f3745055c32940f5faf9559be6a14395e6
|
0befd1f3745055c32940f5faf9559be6a14395e6
|
ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
|
ofproto_port_unregister(struct ofproto *ofproto, ofp_port_t ofp_port)
{
struct ofport *port = ofproto_get_port(ofproto, ofp_port);
if (port) {
if (port->ofproto->ofproto_class->set_stp_port) {
port->ofproto->ofproto_class->set_stp_port(port, NULL);
}
if (port->ofproto->ofproto_class->set_rstp_port) {
port->ofproto->ofproto_class->set_rstp_port(port, NULL);
}
if (port->ofproto->ofproto_class->set_cfm) {
port->ofproto->ofproto_class->set_cfm(port, NULL);
}
if (port->ofproto->ofproto_class->bundle_remove) {
port->ofproto->ofproto_class->bundle_remove(port);
}
}
}
|
ofproto_port_unregister(struct ofproto *ofproto, ofp_port_t ofp_port)
{
struct ofport *port = ofproto_get_port(ofproto, ofp_port);
if (port) {
if (port->ofproto->ofproto_class->set_stp_port) {
port->ofproto->ofproto_class->set_stp_port(port, NULL);
}
if (port->ofproto->ofproto_class->set_rstp_port) {
port->ofproto->ofproto_class->set_rstp_port(port, NULL);
}
if (port->ofproto->ofproto_class->set_cfm) {
port->ofproto->ofproto_class->set_cfm(port, NULL);
}
if (port->ofproto->ofproto_class->bundle_remove) {
port->ofproto->ofproto_class->bundle_remove(port);
}
}
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5157
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5157/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7f0126ff011142c8619b10a6e64d04d1745c503a
|
7f0126ff011142c8619b10a6e64d04d1745c503a
|
Revert 162155 "This review merges the two existing page serializ..."
Change r162155 broke the world even though it was landed using the CQ.
> This review merges the two existing page serializers, WebPageSerializerImpl and
> PageSerializer, into one, PageSerializer. In addition to this it moves all
> the old tests from WebPageNewSerializerTest and WebPageSerializerTest to the
> PageSerializerTest structure and splits out one test for MHTML into a new
> MHTMLTest file.
>
> Saving as 'Webpage, Complete', 'Webpage, HTML Only' and as MHTML when the
> 'Save Page as MHTML' flag is enabled now uses the same code, and should thus
> have the same feature set. Meaning that both modes now should be a bit better.
>
> Detailed list of changes:
>
> - PageSerializerTest: Prepare for more DTD test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove now unneccesary input image test
> - PageSerializerTest: Remove unused WebPageSerializer/Impl code
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI morph test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move data URI test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move namespace test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move SVG Image test
> - MHTMLTest: Move MHTML specific test to own test file
> - PageSerializerTest: Delete duplicate XML header test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move blank frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move CSS test
> - PageSerializerTest: Add frameset/frame test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old iframe test
> - PageSerializerTest: Move old elements test
> - Use PageSerizer for saving web pages
> - PageSerializerTest: Test for rewriting links
> - PageSerializer: Add rewrite link accumulator
> - PageSerializer: Serialize images in iframes/frames src
> - PageSerializer: XHTML fix for meta tags
> - PageSerializer: Add presentation CSS
> - PageSerializer: Rename out parameter
>
> BUG=
> [email protected]
>
> Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/68613003
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73673003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162156 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void addTestResources()
{
addResource("http://www.test.com", "text/html", "css_test_page.html");
addResource("http://www.test.com/link_styles.css", "text/css", "link_styles.css");
addResource("http://www.test.com/import_style_from_link.css", "text/css", "import_style_from_link.css");
addResource("http://www.test.com/import_styles.css", "text/css", "import_styles.css");
addResource("http://www.test.com/red_background.png", "image/png", "red_background.png");
addResource("http://www.test.com/orange_background.png", "image/png", "orange_background.png");
addResource("http://www.test.com/yellow_background.png", "image/png", "yellow_background.png");
addResource("http://www.test.com/green_background.png", "image/png", "green_background.png");
addResource("http://www.test.com/blue_background.png", "image/png", "blue_background.png");
addResource("http://www.test.com/purple_background.png", "image/png", "purple_background.png");
addResource("http://www.test.com/ul-dot.png", "image/png", "ul-dot.png");
addResource("http://www.test.com/ol-dot.png", "image/png", "ol-dot.png");
}
|
void addTestResources()
{
addResource("http://www.test.com", "text/html", "css_test_page.html");
addResource("http://www.test.com/link_styles.css", "text/css", "link_styles.css");
addResource("http://www.test.com/import_style_from_link.css", "text/css", "import_style_from_link.css");
addResource("http://www.test.com/import_styles.css", "text/css", "import_styles.css");
addResource("http://www.test.com/red_background.png", "image/png", "red_background.png");
addResource("http://www.test.com/orange_background.png", "image/png", "orange_background.png");
addResource("http://www.test.com/yellow_background.png", "image/png", "yellow_background.png");
addResource("http://www.test.com/green_background.png", "image/png", "green_background.png");
addResource("http://www.test.com/blue_background.png", "image/png", "blue_background.png");
addResource("http://www.test.com/purple_background.png", "image/png", "purple_background.png");
addResource("http://www.test.com/ul-dot.png", "image/png", "ul-dot.png");
addResource("http://www.test.com/ol-dot.png", "image/png", "ol-dot.png");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3839/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
static l2cap_socket *btsock_l2cap_alloc(const char *name, const bt_bdaddr_t *addr,
char is_server, int flags)
{
l2cap_socket *ret;
pthread_mutex_lock(&state_lock);
ret = btsock_l2cap_alloc_l(name, addr, is_server, flags);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&state_lock);
return ret;
}
|
static l2cap_socket *btsock_l2cap_alloc(const char *name, const bt_bdaddr_t *addr,
char is_server, int flags)
{
l2cap_socket *ret;
pthread_mutex_lock(&state_lock);
ret = btsock_l2cap_alloc_l(name, addr, is_server, flags);
pthread_mutex_unlock(&state_lock);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3135
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3135/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d157bd761585605b7882935ffb86286919f62ea1
|
d157bd761585605b7882935ffb86286919f62ea1
|
netfilter: x_tables: check for size overflow
Ben Hawkes says:
integer overflow in xt_alloc_table_info, which on 32-bit systems can
lead to small structure allocation and a copy_from_user based heap
corruption.
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
|
struct xt_table_info *xt_alloc_table_info(unsigned int size)
{
struct xt_table_info *info = NULL;
size_t sz = sizeof(*info) + size;
if (sz < sizeof(*info))
return NULL;
/* Pedantry: prevent them from hitting BUG() in vmalloc.c --RR */
if ((SMP_ALIGN(size) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 2 > totalram_pages)
return NULL;
if (sz <= (PAGE_SIZE << PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER))
info = kmalloc(sz, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_NORETRY);
if (!info) {
info = vmalloc(sz);
if (!info)
return NULL;
}
memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
info->size = size;
return info;
}
|
struct xt_table_info *xt_alloc_table_info(unsigned int size)
{
struct xt_table_info *info = NULL;
size_t sz = sizeof(*info) + size;
/* Pedantry: prevent them from hitting BUG() in vmalloc.c --RR */
if ((SMP_ALIGN(size) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 2 > totalram_pages)
return NULL;
if (sz <= (PAGE_SIZE << PAGE_ALLOC_COSTLY_ORDER))
info = kmalloc(sz, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_NORETRY);
if (!info) {
info = vmalloc(sz);
if (!info)
return NULL;
}
memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
info->size = size;
return info;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2016-7133
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7133/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/c2a13ced4272f2e65d2773e2ea6ca11c1ce4a911?w=1
|
c2a13ced4272f2e65d2773e2ea6ca11c1ce4a911?w=1
|
Fix bug #72742 - memory allocator fails to realloc small block to large one
|
ZEND_API size_t zend_memory_usage(int real_usage)
{
#if ZEND_MM_STAT
if (real_usage) {
return AG(mm_heap)->real_size;
} else {
size_t usage = AG(mm_heap)->size;
return usage;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
|
ZEND_API size_t zend_memory_usage(int real_usage)
{
#if ZEND_MM_STAT
if (real_usage) {
return AG(mm_heap)->real_size;
} else {
size_t usage = AG(mm_heap)->size;
return usage;
}
#endif
return 0;
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10066
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10066/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
|
f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
| null |
static MagickBooleanType EncodeLabImage(Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheView
*image_view;
MagickBooleanType
status;
ssize_t
y;
status=MagickTrue;
image_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
double
a,
b;
a=QuantumScale*GetPixela(q)-0.5;
if (a < 0.0)
a+=1.0;
b=QuantumScale*GetPixelb(q)-0.5;
if (b < 0.0)
b+=1.0;
SetPixela(q,QuantumRange*a);
SetPixelb(q,QuantumRange*b);
q++;
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
return(status);
}
|
static MagickBooleanType EncodeLabImage(Image *image,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
CacheView
*image_view;
MagickBooleanType
status;
ssize_t
y;
status=MagickTrue;
image_view=AcquireAuthenticCacheView(image,exception);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (status == MagickFalse)
continue;
q=GetCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
{
status=MagickFalse;
continue;
}
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
double
a,
b;
a=QuantumScale*GetPixela(q)-0.5;
if (a < 0.0)
a+=1.0;
b=QuantumScale*GetPixelb(q)-0.5;
if (b < 0.0)
b+=1.0;
SetPixela(q,QuantumRange*a);
SetPixelb(q,QuantumRange*b);
q++;
}
if (SyncCacheViewAuthenticPixels(image_view,exception) == MagickFalse)
status=MagickFalse;
}
image_view=DestroyCacheView(image_view);
return(status);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10517
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10517/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/antirez/redis/commit/874804da0c014a7d704b3d285aa500098a931f50
|
874804da0c014a7d704b3d285aa500098a931f50
|
Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
|
void activeExpireCycle(int type) {
/* This function has some global state in order to continue the work
* incrementally across calls. */
static unsigned int current_db = 0; /* Last DB tested. */
static int timelimit_exit = 0; /* Time limit hit in previous call? */
static long long last_fast_cycle = 0; /* When last fast cycle ran. */
int j, iteration = 0;
int dbs_per_call = CRON_DBS_PER_CALL;
long long start = ustime(), timelimit;
if (type == ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_FAST) {
/* Don't start a fast cycle if the previous cycle did not exited
* for time limt. Also don't repeat a fast cycle for the same period
* as the fast cycle total duration itself. */
if (!timelimit_exit) return;
if (start < last_fast_cycle + ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_FAST_DURATION*2) return;
last_fast_cycle = start;
}
/* We usually should test CRON_DBS_PER_CALL per iteration, with
* two exceptions:
*
* 1) Don't test more DBs than we have.
* 2) If last time we hit the time limit, we want to scan all DBs
* in this iteration, as there is work to do in some DB and we don't want
* expired keys to use memory for too much time. */
if (dbs_per_call > server.dbnum || timelimit_exit)
dbs_per_call = server.dbnum;
/* We can use at max ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_SLOW_TIME_PERC percentage of CPU time
* per iteration. Since this function gets called with a frequency of
* server.hz times per second, the following is the max amount of
* microseconds we can spend in this function. */
timelimit = 1000000*ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_SLOW_TIME_PERC/server.hz/100;
timelimit_exit = 0;
if (timelimit <= 0) timelimit = 1;
if (type == ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_FAST)
timelimit = ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_FAST_DURATION; /* in microseconds. */
for (j = 0; j < dbs_per_call; j++) {
int expired;
redisDb *db = server.db+(current_db % server.dbnum);
/* Increment the DB now so we are sure if we run out of time
* in the current DB we'll restart from the next. This allows to
* distribute the time evenly across DBs. */
current_db++;
/* Continue to expire if at the end of the cycle more than 25%
* of the keys were expired. */
do {
unsigned long num, slots;
long long now, ttl_sum;
int ttl_samples;
/* If there is nothing to expire try next DB ASAP. */
if ((num = dictSize(db->expires)) == 0) {
db->avg_ttl = 0;
break;
}
slots = dictSlots(db->expires);
now = mstime();
/* When there are less than 1% filled slots getting random
* keys is expensive, so stop here waiting for better times...
* The dictionary will be resized asap. */
if (num && slots > DICT_HT_INITIAL_SIZE &&
(num*100/slots < 1)) break;
/* The main collection cycle. Sample random keys among keys
* with an expire set, checking for expired ones. */
expired = 0;
ttl_sum = 0;
ttl_samples = 0;
if (num > ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_LOOKUPS_PER_LOOP)
num = ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_LOOKUPS_PER_LOOP;
while (num--) {
dictEntry *de;
long long ttl;
if ((de = dictGetRandomKey(db->expires)) == NULL) break;
ttl = dictGetSignedIntegerVal(de)-now;
if (activeExpireCycleTryExpire(db,de,now)) expired++;
if (ttl > 0) {
/* We want the average TTL of keys yet not expired. */
ttl_sum += ttl;
ttl_samples++;
}
}
/* Update the average TTL stats for this database. */
if (ttl_samples) {
long long avg_ttl = ttl_sum/ttl_samples;
/* Do a simple running average with a few samples.
* We just use the current estimate with a weight of 2%
* and the previous estimate with a weight of 98%. */
if (db->avg_ttl == 0) db->avg_ttl = avg_ttl;
db->avg_ttl = (db->avg_ttl/50)*49 + (avg_ttl/50);
}
/* We can't block forever here even if there are many keys to
* expire. So after a given amount of milliseconds return to the
* caller waiting for the other active expire cycle. */
iteration++;
if ((iteration & 0xf) == 0) { /* check once every 16 iterations. */
long long elapsed = ustime()-start;
latencyAddSampleIfNeeded("expire-cycle",elapsed/1000);
if (elapsed > timelimit) timelimit_exit = 1;
}
if (timelimit_exit) return;
/* We don't repeat the cycle if there are less than 25% of keys
* found expired in the current DB. */
} while (expired > ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_LOOKUPS_PER_LOOP/4);
}
}
|
void activeExpireCycle(int type) {
/* This function has some global state in order to continue the work
* incrementally across calls. */
static unsigned int current_db = 0; /* Last DB tested. */
static int timelimit_exit = 0; /* Time limit hit in previous call? */
static long long last_fast_cycle = 0; /* When last fast cycle ran. */
int j, iteration = 0;
int dbs_per_call = CRON_DBS_PER_CALL;
long long start = ustime(), timelimit;
if (type == ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_FAST) {
/* Don't start a fast cycle if the previous cycle did not exited
* for time limt. Also don't repeat a fast cycle for the same period
* as the fast cycle total duration itself. */
if (!timelimit_exit) return;
if (start < last_fast_cycle + ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_FAST_DURATION*2) return;
last_fast_cycle = start;
}
/* We usually should test CRON_DBS_PER_CALL per iteration, with
* two exceptions:
*
* 1) Don't test more DBs than we have.
* 2) If last time we hit the time limit, we want to scan all DBs
* in this iteration, as there is work to do in some DB and we don't want
* expired keys to use memory for too much time. */
if (dbs_per_call > server.dbnum || timelimit_exit)
dbs_per_call = server.dbnum;
/* We can use at max ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_SLOW_TIME_PERC percentage of CPU time
* per iteration. Since this function gets called with a frequency of
* server.hz times per second, the following is the max amount of
* microseconds we can spend in this function. */
timelimit = 1000000*ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_SLOW_TIME_PERC/server.hz/100;
timelimit_exit = 0;
if (timelimit <= 0) timelimit = 1;
if (type == ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_FAST)
timelimit = ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_FAST_DURATION; /* in microseconds. */
for (j = 0; j < dbs_per_call; j++) {
int expired;
redisDb *db = server.db+(current_db % server.dbnum);
/* Increment the DB now so we are sure if we run out of time
* in the current DB we'll restart from the next. This allows to
* distribute the time evenly across DBs. */
current_db++;
/* Continue to expire if at the end of the cycle more than 25%
* of the keys were expired. */
do {
unsigned long num, slots;
long long now, ttl_sum;
int ttl_samples;
/* If there is nothing to expire try next DB ASAP. */
if ((num = dictSize(db->expires)) == 0) {
db->avg_ttl = 0;
break;
}
slots = dictSlots(db->expires);
now = mstime();
/* When there are less than 1% filled slots getting random
* keys is expensive, so stop here waiting for better times...
* The dictionary will be resized asap. */
if (num && slots > DICT_HT_INITIAL_SIZE &&
(num*100/slots < 1)) break;
/* The main collection cycle. Sample random keys among keys
* with an expire set, checking for expired ones. */
expired = 0;
ttl_sum = 0;
ttl_samples = 0;
if (num > ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_LOOKUPS_PER_LOOP)
num = ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_LOOKUPS_PER_LOOP;
while (num--) {
dictEntry *de;
long long ttl;
if ((de = dictGetRandomKey(db->expires)) == NULL) break;
ttl = dictGetSignedIntegerVal(de)-now;
if (activeExpireCycleTryExpire(db,de,now)) expired++;
if (ttl > 0) {
/* We want the average TTL of keys yet not expired. */
ttl_sum += ttl;
ttl_samples++;
}
}
/* Update the average TTL stats for this database. */
if (ttl_samples) {
long long avg_ttl = ttl_sum/ttl_samples;
/* Do a simple running average with a few samples.
* We just use the current estimate with a weight of 2%
* and the previous estimate with a weight of 98%. */
if (db->avg_ttl == 0) db->avg_ttl = avg_ttl;
db->avg_ttl = (db->avg_ttl/50)*49 + (avg_ttl/50);
}
/* We can't block forever here even if there are many keys to
* expire. So after a given amount of milliseconds return to the
* caller waiting for the other active expire cycle. */
iteration++;
if ((iteration & 0xf) == 0) { /* check once every 16 iterations. */
long long elapsed = ustime()-start;
latencyAddSampleIfNeeded("expire-cycle",elapsed/1000);
if (elapsed > timelimit) timelimit_exit = 1;
}
if (timelimit_exit) return;
/* We don't repeat the cycle if there are less than 25% of keys
* found expired in the current DB. */
} while (expired > ACTIVE_EXPIRE_CYCLE_LOOKUPS_PER_LOOP/4);
}
}
|
C
|
redis
| 0 |
CVE-2011-0006
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-0006/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/867c20265459d30a01b021a9c1e81fb4c5832aa9
|
867c20265459d30a01b021a9c1e81fb4c5832aa9
|
ima: fix add LSM rule bug
If security_filter_rule_init() doesn't return a rule, then not everything
is as fine as the return code implies.
This bug only occurs when the LSM (eg. SELinux) is disabled at runtime.
Adding an empty LSM rule causes ima_match_rules() to always succeed,
ignoring any remaining rules.
default IMA TCB policy:
# PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
# SYSFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
# DEBUGFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
# TMPFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
< LSM specific rule >
dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t
measure func=BPRM_CHECK
measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
Thus without the patch, with the boot parameters 'tcb selinux=0', adding
the above 'dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t' rule to the default IMA TCB
measurement policy, would result in nothing being measured. The patch
prevents the default TCB policy from being replaced.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Cc: James Morris <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Cc: David Safford <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
{
audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key);
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, value);
audit_log_format(ab, " ");
}
|
static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
{
audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key);
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, value);
audit_log_format(ab, " ");
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4347
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4347/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c4e7f9022e506c6635a5037713c37118e23193e4
|
c4e7f9022e506c6635a5037713c37118e23193e4
|
KVM: Device assignment permission checks
(cherry picked from commit 3d27e23b17010c668db311140b17bbbb70c78fb9)
Only allow KVM device assignment to attach to devices which:
- Are not bridges
- Have BAR resources (assume others are special devices)
- The user has permissions to use
Assigning a bridge is a configuration error, it's not supported, and
typically doesn't result in the behavior the user is expecting anyway.
Devices without BAR resources are typically chipset components that
also don't have host drivers. We don't want users to hold such devices
captive or cause system problems by fencing them off into an iommu
domain. We determine "permission to use" by testing whether the user
has access to the PCI sysfs resource files. By default a normal user
will not have access to these files, so it provides a good indication
that an administration agent has granted the user access to the device.
[Yang Bai: add missing #include]
[avi: fix comment style]
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Bai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static int kvm_vm_ioctl_assign_device(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_assigned_pci_dev *assigned_dev)
{
int r = 0, idx;
struct kvm_assigned_dev_kernel *match;
struct pci_dev *dev;
u8 header_type;
if (!(assigned_dev->flags & KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU))
return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
match = kvm_find_assigned_dev(&kvm->arch.assigned_dev_head,
assigned_dev->assigned_dev_id);
if (match) {
/* device already assigned */
r = -EEXIST;
goto out;
}
match = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_assigned_dev_kernel), GFP_KERNEL);
if (match == NULL) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Couldn't allocate memory\n",
__func__);
r = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
dev = pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot(assigned_dev->segnr,
assigned_dev->busnr,
assigned_dev->devfn);
if (!dev) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: host device not found\n", __func__);
r = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
/* Don't allow bridges to be assigned */
pci_read_config_byte(dev, PCI_HEADER_TYPE, &header_type);
if ((header_type & PCI_HEADER_TYPE) != PCI_HEADER_TYPE_NORMAL) {
r = -EPERM;
goto out_put;
}
r = probe_sysfs_permissions(dev);
if (r)
goto out_put;
if (pci_enable_device(dev)) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Could not enable PCI device\n", __func__);
r = -EBUSY;
goto out_put;
}
r = pci_request_regions(dev, "kvm_assigned_device");
if (r) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Could not get access to device regions\n",
__func__);
goto out_disable;
}
pci_reset_function(dev);
pci_save_state(dev);
match->pci_saved_state = pci_store_saved_state(dev);
if (!match->pci_saved_state)
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Couldn't store %s saved state\n",
__func__, dev_name(&dev->dev));
match->assigned_dev_id = assigned_dev->assigned_dev_id;
match->host_segnr = assigned_dev->segnr;
match->host_busnr = assigned_dev->busnr;
match->host_devfn = assigned_dev->devfn;
match->flags = assigned_dev->flags;
match->dev = dev;
spin_lock_init(&match->intx_lock);
match->irq_source_id = -1;
match->kvm = kvm;
match->ack_notifier.irq_acked = kvm_assigned_dev_ack_irq;
list_add(&match->list, &kvm->arch.assigned_dev_head);
if (!kvm->arch.iommu_domain) {
r = kvm_iommu_map_guest(kvm);
if (r)
goto out_list_del;
}
r = kvm_assign_device(kvm, match);
if (r)
goto out_list_del;
out:
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
return r;
out_list_del:
if (pci_load_and_free_saved_state(dev, &match->pci_saved_state))
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Couldn't reload %s saved state\n",
__func__, dev_name(&dev->dev));
list_del(&match->list);
pci_release_regions(dev);
out_disable:
pci_disable_device(dev);
out_put:
pci_dev_put(dev);
out_free:
kfree(match);
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
return r;
}
|
static int kvm_vm_ioctl_assign_device(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_assigned_pci_dev *assigned_dev)
{
int r = 0, idx;
struct kvm_assigned_dev_kernel *match;
struct pci_dev *dev;
if (!(assigned_dev->flags & KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU))
return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
match = kvm_find_assigned_dev(&kvm->arch.assigned_dev_head,
assigned_dev->assigned_dev_id);
if (match) {
/* device already assigned */
r = -EEXIST;
goto out;
}
match = kzalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_assigned_dev_kernel), GFP_KERNEL);
if (match == NULL) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Couldn't allocate memory\n",
__func__);
r = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
dev = pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot(assigned_dev->segnr,
assigned_dev->busnr,
assigned_dev->devfn);
if (!dev) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: host device not found\n", __func__);
r = -EINVAL;
goto out_free;
}
if (pci_enable_device(dev)) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Could not enable PCI device\n", __func__);
r = -EBUSY;
goto out_put;
}
r = pci_request_regions(dev, "kvm_assigned_device");
if (r) {
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Could not get access to device regions\n",
__func__);
goto out_disable;
}
pci_reset_function(dev);
pci_save_state(dev);
match->pci_saved_state = pci_store_saved_state(dev);
if (!match->pci_saved_state)
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Couldn't store %s saved state\n",
__func__, dev_name(&dev->dev));
match->assigned_dev_id = assigned_dev->assigned_dev_id;
match->host_segnr = assigned_dev->segnr;
match->host_busnr = assigned_dev->busnr;
match->host_devfn = assigned_dev->devfn;
match->flags = assigned_dev->flags;
match->dev = dev;
spin_lock_init(&match->intx_lock);
match->irq_source_id = -1;
match->kvm = kvm;
match->ack_notifier.irq_acked = kvm_assigned_dev_ack_irq;
list_add(&match->list, &kvm->arch.assigned_dev_head);
if (!kvm->arch.iommu_domain) {
r = kvm_iommu_map_guest(kvm);
if (r)
goto out_list_del;
}
r = kvm_assign_device(kvm, match);
if (r)
goto out_list_del;
out:
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
return r;
out_list_del:
if (pci_load_and_free_saved_state(dev, &match->pci_saved_state))
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Couldn't reload %s saved state\n",
__func__, dev_name(&dev->dev));
list_del(&match->list);
pci_release_regions(dev);
out_disable:
pci_disable_device(dev);
out_put:
pci_dev_put(dev);
out_free:
kfree(match);
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
return r;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2011-3055
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3055/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
e9372a1bfd3588a80fcf49aa07321f0971dd6091
|
[V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static v8::Handle<v8::Value> serializedValueCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.serializedValue");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError(args.GetIsolate());
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
bool serializedArgDidThrow = false;
RefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> serializedArg = SerializedScriptValue::create(args[0], 0, 0, serializedArgDidThrow, args.GetIsolate());
if (serializedArgDidThrow)
return v8::Undefined();
imp->serializedValue(serializedArg);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
|
static v8::Handle<v8::Value> serializedValueCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.serializedValue");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
bool serializedArgDidThrow = false;
RefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> serializedArg = SerializedScriptValue::create(args[0], 0, 0, serializedArgDidThrow, args.GetIsolate());
if (serializedArgDidThrow)
return v8::Undefined();
imp->serializedValue(serializedArg);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2018-6057
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6057/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c0c8978849ac57e4ecd613ddc8ff7852a2054734
|
c0c8978849ac57e4ecd613ddc8ff7852a2054734
|
android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
|
void PlatformSensor::NotifySensorError() {
for (auto& client : clients_)
client.OnSensorError();
}
|
void PlatformSensor::NotifySensorError() {
for (auto& client : clients_)
client.OnSensorError();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8324
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8324/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/744692dc059845b2a3022119871846e74d4f6e11
|
744692dc059845b2a3022119871846e74d4f6e11
|
ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
|
void ext4_ext_truncate(struct inode *inode)
{
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
ext4_lblk_t last_block;
handle_t *handle;
int err = 0;
/*
* probably first extent we're gonna free will be last in block
*/
err = ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, err);
if (IS_ERR(handle))
return;
if (inode->i_size & (sb->s_blocksize - 1))
ext4_block_truncate_page(handle, mapping, inode->i_size);
if (ext4_orphan_add(handle, inode))
goto out_stop;
down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
ext4_ext_invalidate_cache(inode);
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
/*
* TODO: optimization is possible here.
* Probably we need not scan at all,
* because page truncation is enough.
*/
/* we have to know where to truncate from in crash case */
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize = inode->i_size;
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
last_block = (inode->i_size + sb->s_blocksize - 1)
>> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
err = ext4_ext_remove_space(inode, last_block);
/* In a multi-transaction truncate, we only make the final
* transaction synchronous.
*/
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
out_stop:
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
/*
* If this was a simple ftruncate() and the file will remain alive,
* then we need to clear up the orphan record which we created above.
* However, if this was a real unlink then we were called by
* ext4_delete_inode(), and we allow that function to clean up the
* orphan info for us.
*/
if (inode->i_nlink)
ext4_orphan_del(handle, inode);
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
}
|
void ext4_ext_truncate(struct inode *inode)
{
struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
ext4_lblk_t last_block;
handle_t *handle;
int err = 0;
/*
* probably first extent we're gonna free will be last in block
*/
err = ext4_writepage_trans_blocks(inode);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, err);
if (IS_ERR(handle))
return;
if (inode->i_size & (sb->s_blocksize - 1))
ext4_block_truncate_page(handle, mapping, inode->i_size);
if (ext4_orphan_add(handle, inode))
goto out_stop;
down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
ext4_ext_invalidate_cache(inode);
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
/*
* TODO: optimization is possible here.
* Probably we need not scan at all,
* because page truncation is enough.
*/
/* we have to know where to truncate from in crash case */
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize = inode->i_size;
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
last_block = (inode->i_size + sb->s_blocksize - 1)
>> EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE_BITS(sb);
err = ext4_ext_remove_space(inode, last_block);
/* In a multi-transaction truncate, we only make the final
* transaction synchronous.
*/
if (IS_SYNC(inode))
ext4_handle_sync(handle);
out_stop:
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
/*
* If this was a simple ftruncate() and the file will remain alive,
* then we need to clear up the orphan record which we created above.
* However, if this was a real unlink then we were called by
* ext4_delete_inode(), and we allow that function to clean up the
* orphan info for us.
*/
if (inode->i_nlink)
ext4_orphan_del(handle, inode);
inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = ext4_current_time(inode);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2315
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2315/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/git/git/commit/34fa79a6cde56d6d428ab0d3160cb094ebad3305
|
34fa79a6cde56d6d428ab0d3160cb094ebad3305
|
prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
|
static int parse_one_feature(const char *feature, int from_stream)
{
const char *arg;
if (skip_prefix(feature, "date-format=", &arg)) {
option_date_format(arg);
} else if (skip_prefix(feature, "import-marks=", &arg)) {
option_import_marks(arg, from_stream, 0);
} else if (skip_prefix(feature, "import-marks-if-exists=", &arg)) {
option_import_marks(arg, from_stream, 1);
} else if (skip_prefix(feature, "export-marks=", &arg)) {
option_export_marks(arg);
} else if (!strcmp(feature, "get-mark")) {
; /* Don't die - this feature is supported */
} else if (!strcmp(feature, "cat-blob")) {
; /* Don't die - this feature is supported */
} else if (!strcmp(feature, "relative-marks")) {
relative_marks_paths = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(feature, "no-relative-marks")) {
relative_marks_paths = 0;
} else if (!strcmp(feature, "done")) {
require_explicit_termination = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(feature, "force")) {
force_update = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(feature, "notes") || !strcmp(feature, "ls")) {
; /* do nothing; we have the feature */
} else {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
|
static int parse_one_feature(const char *feature, int from_stream)
{
const char *arg;
if (skip_prefix(feature, "date-format=", &arg)) {
option_date_format(arg);
} else if (skip_prefix(feature, "import-marks=", &arg)) {
option_import_marks(arg, from_stream, 0);
} else if (skip_prefix(feature, "import-marks-if-exists=", &arg)) {
option_import_marks(arg, from_stream, 1);
} else if (skip_prefix(feature, "export-marks=", &arg)) {
option_export_marks(arg);
} else if (!strcmp(feature, "get-mark")) {
; /* Don't die - this feature is supported */
} else if (!strcmp(feature, "cat-blob")) {
; /* Don't die - this feature is supported */
} else if (!strcmp(feature, "relative-marks")) {
relative_marks_paths = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(feature, "no-relative-marks")) {
relative_marks_paths = 0;
} else if (!strcmp(feature, "done")) {
require_explicit_termination = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(feature, "force")) {
force_update = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(feature, "notes") || !strcmp(feature, "ls")) {
; /* do nothing; we have the feature */
} else {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
|
C
|
git
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d1a59e4e845a01d7d7b80ef184b672752a9eae4d
|
d1a59e4e845a01d7d7b80ef184b672752a9eae4d
|
Fixing cross-process postMessage replies on more than two iterations.
When two frames are replying to each other using event.source across processes,
after the first two replies, things break down. The root cause is that in
RenderViewImpl::GetFrameByMappedID, the lookup was incorrect. It is now
properly searching for the remote frame id and returning the local one.
BUG=153445
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11040015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@159924 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool RenderViewImpl::WillHandleMouseEvent(const WebKit::WebMouseEvent& event) {
pepper_delegate_.WillHandleMouseEvent();
return mouse_lock_dispatcher_->WillHandleMouseEvent(event);
}
|
bool RenderViewImpl::WillHandleMouseEvent(const WebKit::WebMouseEvent& event) {
pepper_delegate_.WillHandleMouseEvent();
return mouse_lock_dispatcher_->WillHandleMouseEvent(event);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1615
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1615/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b399a05453d7b3e2dfdec67865fefe6953bcc59e
|
b399a05453d7b3e2dfdec67865fefe6953bcc59e
|
Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
[email protected]
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::SnapToPhysicalPixelBoundary() {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
aura::Window* snapped = window_->GetToplevelWindow();
#else
aura::Window* snapped = window_->GetRootWindow();
#endif
if (snapped && snapped != window_)
ui::SnapLayerToPhysicalPixelBoundary(snapped->layer(), window_->layer());
has_snapped_to_boundary_ = true;
}
|
void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::SnapToPhysicalPixelBoundary() {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
aura::Window* snapped = window_->GetToplevelWindow();
#else
aura::Window* snapped = window_->GetRootWindow();
#endif
if (snapped && snapped != window_)
ui::SnapLayerToPhysicalPixelBoundary(snapped->layer(), window_->layer());
has_snapped_to_boundary_ = true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5061
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5061/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
(Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
|
void LayerTreeHost::SetPageScaleFromImplSide(float page_scale) {
DCHECK(CommitRequested());
page_scale_factor_ = page_scale;
SetPropertyTreesNeedRebuild();
}
|
void LayerTreeHost::SetPageScaleFromImplSide(float page_scale) {
DCHECK(CommitRequested());
page_scale_factor_ = page_scale;
SetPropertyTreesNeedRebuild();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b82e700d70fd2309708673196eb60e1266721e2f
|
b82e700d70fd2309708673196eb60e1266721e2f
|
Prevent HTMLPreloadScanner from fetching resources inside <template>
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=106687
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
Source/WebCore:
This patch adds a simple counter to the preload scanner which increments on template start
tag and decrements on template element. It only fetchs resources when the counter is at zero
(i.e. for elements not contained by a template element).
Test re-enabled within fast/dom/HTMLTemplateElement/inertContents.html
* html/parser/HTMLPreloadScanner.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLPreloadScanner::HTMLPreloadScanner):
(WebCore::HTMLPreloadScanner::processToken):
* html/parser/HTMLPreloadScanner.h:
(HTMLPreloadScanner):
LayoutTests:
* fast/dom/HTMLTemplateElement/inertContents-expected.txt:
* fast/dom/HTMLTemplateElement/inertContents.html:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@139502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void HTMLPreloadScanner::scan()
{
m_predictedBaseElementURL = m_document->baseElementURL();
while (m_tokenizer->nextToken(m_source, m_token)) {
processToken();
m_token.clear();
}
}
|
void HTMLPreloadScanner::scan()
{
m_predictedBaseElementURL = m_document->baseElementURL();
while (m_tokenizer->nextToken(m_source, m_token)) {
processToken();
m_token.clear();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7a3439b3d169047c1c07f28a6f9cda341328980b
|
7a3439b3d169047c1c07f28a6f9cda341328980b
|
[Print Preview]: Added code to support pdf fit to page functionality.
BUG=85132
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10083060
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137498 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void PrintPreviewUI::ClearAllPreviewData() {
print_preview_data_service()->RemoveEntry(preview_ui_addr_str_);
}
|
void PrintPreviewUI::ClearAllPreviewData() {
print_preview_data_service()->RemoveEntry(preview_ui_addr_str_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6431
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6431/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ae7b4e1f213aa659aedf9c6ecad0bf5f0476e1e2
|
ae7b4e1f213aa659aedf9c6ecad0bf5f0476e1e2
|
net: fib: fib6_add: fix potential NULL pointer dereference
When the kernel is compiled with CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES, and we return
with an error in fn = fib6_add_1(), then error codes are encoded into
the return pointer e.g. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT). In such an error case, we
write the error code into err and jump to out, hence enter the if(err)
condition. Now, if CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES is enabled, we check for:
if (pn != fn && pn->leaf == rt)
...
if (pn != fn && !pn->leaf && !(pn->fn_flags & RTN_RTINFO))
...
Since pn is NULL and fn is f.e. ERR_PTR(-ENOENT), then pn != fn
evaluates to true and causes a NULL-pointer dereference on further
checks on pn. Fix it, by setting both NULL in error case, so that
pn != fn already evaluates to false and no further dereference
takes place.
This was first correctly implemented in 4a287eba2 ("IPv6 routing,
NLM_F_* flag support: REPLACE and EXCL flags support, warn about
missing CREATE flag"), but the bug got later on introduced by
188c517a0 ("ipv6: return errno pointers consistently for fib6_add_1()").
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Cc: Lin Ming <[email protected]>
Cc: Matti Vaittinen <[email protected]>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Matti Vaittinen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static __inline__ void fib6_start_gc(struct net *net, struct rt6_info *rt)
{
if (!timer_pending(&net->ipv6.ip6_fib_timer) &&
(rt->rt6i_flags & (RTF_EXPIRES | RTF_CACHE)))
mod_timer(&net->ipv6.ip6_fib_timer,
jiffies + net->ipv6.sysctl.ip6_rt_gc_interval);
}
|
static __inline__ void fib6_start_gc(struct net *net, struct rt6_info *rt)
{
if (!timer_pending(&net->ipv6.ip6_fib_timer) &&
(rt->rt6i_flags & (RTF_EXPIRES | RTF_CACHE)))
mod_timer(&net->ipv6.ip6_fib_timer,
jiffies + net->ipv6.sysctl.ip6_rt_gc_interval);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2324
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2324/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/git/git/commit/de1e67d0703894cb6ea782e36abb63976ab07e60
|
de1e67d0703894cb6ea782e36abb63976ab07e60
|
list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
|
static void add_header_grep(struct rev_info *revs, enum grep_header_field field, const char *pattern)
{
append_header_grep_pattern(&revs->grep_filter, field, pattern);
}
|
static void add_header_grep(struct rev_info *revs, enum grep_header_field field, const char *pattern)
{
append_header_grep_pattern(&revs->grep_filter, field, pattern);
}
|
C
|
git
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a3e2afaedd8190398ae45ccef34fcdee00fb19aa
|
a3e2afaedd8190398ae45ccef34fcdee00fb19aa
|
Fixed crash related to cellular network payment plan retreival.
BUG=chromium-os:8864
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/4690002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@65405 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void NotifyNetworkChanged(Network* network) {
DCHECK(network);
NetworkObserverMap::const_iterator iter = network_observers_.find(
network->service_path());
if (iter != network_observers_.end()) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(NetworkObserver,
*(iter->second),
OnNetworkChanged(this, network));
} else {
NOTREACHED() <<
"There weren't supposed to be any property change observers of " <<
network->service_path();
}
}
|
void NotifyNetworkChanged(Network* network) {
DCHECK(network);
NetworkObserverMap::const_iterator iter = network_observers_.find(
network->service_path());
if (iter != network_observers_.end()) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(NetworkObserver,
*(iter->second),
OnNetworkChanged(this, network));
} else {
NOTREACHED() <<
"There weren't supposed to be any property change observers of " <<
network->service_path();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
The query filters and combines records from multiple datasets to list specific vulnerability details, providing a basic overview of vulnerable functions but lacking deeper insights.
Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
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Vulnerable Code Functions
This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
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