CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2013-0924
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0924/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e21bdfb9c758ac411012ad84f83d26d3f7dd69fb
|
e21bdfb9c758ac411012ad84f83d26d3f7dd69fb
|
Check prefs before allowing extension file access in the permissions API.
[email protected]
BUG=169632
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11884008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176853 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
ExtensionSystemImpl::Shared::~Shared() {
}
|
ExtensionSystemImpl::Shared::~Shared() {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6196
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6196/
|
CWE-835
|
https://github.com/tats/w3m/commit/8354763b90490d4105695df52674d0fcef823e92
|
8354763b90490d4105695df52674d0fcef823e92
|
Prevent negative indent value in feed_table_block_tag()
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/88
|
get_spec_cell_width(struct table *tbl, int row, int col)
{
int i, w;
w = tbl->tabwidth[col];
for (i = col + 1; i <= tbl->maxcol; i++) {
check_row(tbl, row);
if (tbl->tabattr[row][i] & HTT_X)
w += tbl->tabwidth[i] + tbl->cellspacing;
else
break;
}
return w;
}
|
get_spec_cell_width(struct table *tbl, int row, int col)
{
int i, w;
w = tbl->tabwidth[col];
for (i = col + 1; i <= tbl->maxcol; i++) {
check_row(tbl, row);
if (tbl->tabattr[row][i] & HTT_X)
w += tbl->tabwidth[i] + tbl->cellspacing;
else
break;
}
return w;
}
|
C
|
w3m
| 0 |
CVE-2017-0396
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0396/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/557bd7bfe6c4895faee09e46fc9b5304a956c8b7
|
557bd7bfe6c4895faee09e46fc9b5304a956c8b7
|
Visualizer: Check capture size and latency parameters
Bug: 31781965
Change-Id: I1c439a0d0f6aa0057b3c651499f28426e1e1f5e4
(cherry picked from commit 9a2732ba0a8d609ab040d2c1ddee28577ead9772)
|
int Visualizer_command(effect_handle_t self, uint32_t cmdCode, uint32_t cmdSize,
void *pCmdData, uint32_t *replySize, void *pReplyData) {
VisualizerContext * pContext = (VisualizerContext *)self;
int retsize;
if (pContext == NULL || pContext->mState == VISUALIZER_STATE_UNINITIALIZED) {
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (cmdCode) {
case EFFECT_CMD_INIT:
if (pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *) pReplyData = Visualizer_init(pContext);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_CONFIG:
if (pCmdData == NULL || cmdSize != sizeof(effect_config_t)
|| pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *) pReplyData = Visualizer_setConfig(pContext,
(effect_config_t *) pCmdData);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_GET_CONFIG:
if (pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL ||
*replySize != sizeof(effect_config_t)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
Visualizer_getConfig(pContext, (effect_config_t *)pReplyData);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_RESET:
Visualizer_reset(pContext);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_ENABLE:
if (pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if (pContext->mState != VISUALIZER_STATE_INITIALIZED) {
return -ENOSYS;
}
pContext->mState = VISUALIZER_STATE_ACTIVE;
ALOGV("EFFECT_CMD_ENABLE() OK");
*(int *)pReplyData = 0;
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_DISABLE:
if (pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if (pContext->mState != VISUALIZER_STATE_ACTIVE) {
return -ENOSYS;
}
pContext->mState = VISUALIZER_STATE_INITIALIZED;
ALOGV("EFFECT_CMD_DISABLE() OK");
*(int *)pReplyData = 0;
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM: {
if (pCmdData == NULL ||
cmdSize != (int)(sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(uint32_t)) ||
pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL ||
*replySize < (int)(sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(uint32_t))) {
return -EINVAL;
}
memcpy(pReplyData, pCmdData, sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(uint32_t));
effect_param_t *p = (effect_param_t *)pReplyData;
p->status = 0;
*replySize = sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(uint32_t);
if (p->psize != sizeof(uint32_t)) {
p->status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
switch (*(uint32_t *)p->data) {
case VISUALIZER_PARAM_CAPTURE_SIZE:
ALOGV("get mCaptureSize = %" PRIu32, pContext->mCaptureSize);
*((uint32_t *)p->data + 1) = pContext->mCaptureSize;
p->vsize = sizeof(uint32_t);
*replySize += sizeof(uint32_t);
break;
case VISUALIZER_PARAM_SCALING_MODE:
ALOGV("get mScalingMode = %" PRIu32, pContext->mScalingMode);
*((uint32_t *)p->data + 1) = pContext->mScalingMode;
p->vsize = sizeof(uint32_t);
*replySize += sizeof(uint32_t);
break;
case VISUALIZER_PARAM_MEASUREMENT_MODE:
ALOGV("get mMeasurementMode = %" PRIu32, pContext->mMeasurementMode);
*((uint32_t *)p->data + 1) = pContext->mMeasurementMode;
p->vsize = sizeof(uint32_t);
*replySize += sizeof(uint32_t);
break;
default:
p->status = -EINVAL;
}
} break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM: {
if (pCmdData == NULL ||
cmdSize != (int)(sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(uint32_t)) ||
pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int32_t)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int32_t *)pReplyData = 0;
effect_param_t *p = (effect_param_t *)pCmdData;
if (p->psize != sizeof(uint32_t) || p->vsize != sizeof(uint32_t)) {
*(int32_t *)pReplyData = -EINVAL;
break;
}
switch (*(uint32_t *)p->data) {
case VISUALIZER_PARAM_CAPTURE_SIZE: {
const uint32_t captureSize = *((uint32_t *)p->data + 1);
if (captureSize > VISUALIZER_CAPTURE_SIZE_MAX) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "31781965");
*(int32_t *)pReplyData = -EINVAL;
ALOGW("set mCaptureSize = %u > %u", captureSize, VISUALIZER_CAPTURE_SIZE_MAX);
} else {
pContext->mCaptureSize = captureSize;
ALOGV("set mCaptureSize = %u", captureSize);
}
} break;
case VISUALIZER_PARAM_SCALING_MODE:
pContext->mScalingMode = *((uint32_t *)p->data + 1);
ALOGV("set mScalingMode = %" PRIu32, pContext->mScalingMode);
break;
case VISUALIZER_PARAM_LATENCY: {
uint32_t latency = *((uint32_t *)p->data + 1);
if (latency > MAX_LATENCY_MS) {
latency = MAX_LATENCY_MS; // clamp latency b/31781965
}
pContext->mLatency = latency;
ALOGV("set mLatency = %u", latency);
} break;
case VISUALIZER_PARAM_MEASUREMENT_MODE:
pContext->mMeasurementMode = *((uint32_t *)p->data + 1);
ALOGV("set mMeasurementMode = %" PRIu32, pContext->mMeasurementMode);
break;
default:
*(int32_t *)pReplyData = -EINVAL;
}
} break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE:
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_VOLUME:
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_AUDIO_MODE:
break;
case VISUALIZER_CMD_CAPTURE: {
uint32_t captureSize = pContext->mCaptureSize;
if (pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != captureSize) {
ALOGV("VISUALIZER_CMD_CAPTURE() error *replySize %" PRIu32 " captureSize %" PRIu32,
*replySize, captureSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (pContext->mState == VISUALIZER_STATE_ACTIVE) {
const uint32_t deltaMs = Visualizer_getDeltaTimeMsFromUpdatedTime(pContext);
if ((pContext->mLastCaptureIdx == pContext->mCaptureIdx) &&
(pContext->mBufferUpdateTime.tv_sec != 0) &&
(deltaMs > MAX_STALL_TIME_MS)) {
ALOGV("capture going to idle");
pContext->mBufferUpdateTime.tv_sec = 0;
memset(pReplyData, 0x80, captureSize);
} else {
int32_t latencyMs = pContext->mLatency;
latencyMs -= deltaMs;
if (latencyMs < 0) {
latencyMs = 0;
}
uint32_t deltaSmpl = captureSize
+ pContext->mConfig.inputCfg.samplingRate * latencyMs / 1000;
// large sample rate, latency, or capture size, could cause overflow.
// do not offset more than the size of buffer.
if (deltaSmpl > CAPTURE_BUF_SIZE) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "31781965");
deltaSmpl = CAPTURE_BUF_SIZE;
}
int32_t capturePoint = pContext->mCaptureIdx - deltaSmpl;
// a negative capturePoint means we wrap the buffer.
if (capturePoint < 0) {
uint32_t size = -capturePoint;
if (size > captureSize) {
size = captureSize;
}
memcpy(pReplyData,
pContext->mCaptureBuf + CAPTURE_BUF_SIZE + capturePoint,
size);
pReplyData = (char *)pReplyData + size;
captureSize -= size;
capturePoint = 0;
}
memcpy(pReplyData,
pContext->mCaptureBuf + capturePoint,
captureSize);
}
pContext->mLastCaptureIdx = pContext->mCaptureIdx;
} else {
memset(pReplyData, 0x80, captureSize);
}
} break;
case VISUALIZER_CMD_MEASURE: {
if (pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL ||
*replySize < (sizeof(int32_t) * MEASUREMENT_COUNT)) {
if (replySize == NULL) {
ALOGV("VISUALIZER_CMD_MEASURE() error replySize NULL");
} else {
ALOGV("VISUALIZER_CMD_MEASURE() error *replySize %" PRIu32
" < (sizeof(int32_t) * MEASUREMENT_COUNT) %" PRIu32,
*replySize,
uint32_t(sizeof(int32_t)) * MEASUREMENT_COUNT);
}
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "30229821");
return -EINVAL;
}
uint16_t peakU16 = 0;
float sumRmsSquared = 0.0f;
uint8_t nbValidMeasurements = 0;
const int32_t delayMs = Visualizer_getDeltaTimeMsFromUpdatedTime(pContext);
if (delayMs > DISCARD_MEASUREMENTS_TIME_MS) {
ALOGV("Discarding measurements, last measurement is %" PRId32 "ms old", delayMs);
for (uint32_t i=0 ; i<pContext->mMeasurementWindowSizeInBuffers ; i++) {
pContext->mPastMeasurements[i].mIsValid = false;
pContext->mPastMeasurements[i].mPeakU16 = 0;
pContext->mPastMeasurements[i].mRmsSquared = 0;
}
pContext->mMeasurementBufferIdx = 0;
} else {
for (uint32_t i=0 ; i < pContext->mMeasurementWindowSizeInBuffers ; i++) {
if (pContext->mPastMeasurements[i].mIsValid) {
if (pContext->mPastMeasurements[i].mPeakU16 > peakU16) {
peakU16 = pContext->mPastMeasurements[i].mPeakU16;
}
sumRmsSquared += pContext->mPastMeasurements[i].mRmsSquared;
nbValidMeasurements++;
}
}
}
float rms = nbValidMeasurements == 0 ? 0.0f : sqrtf(sumRmsSquared / nbValidMeasurements);
int32_t* pIntReplyData = (int32_t*)pReplyData;
if (rms < 0.000016f) {
pIntReplyData[MEASUREMENT_IDX_RMS] = -9600; //-96dB
} else {
pIntReplyData[MEASUREMENT_IDX_RMS] = (int32_t) (2000 * log10(rms / 32767.0f));
}
if (peakU16 == 0) {
pIntReplyData[MEASUREMENT_IDX_PEAK] = -9600; //-96dB
} else {
pIntReplyData[MEASUREMENT_IDX_PEAK] = (int32_t) (2000 * log10(peakU16 / 32767.0f));
}
ALOGV("VISUALIZER_CMD_MEASURE peak=%" PRIu16 " (%" PRId32 "mB), rms=%.1f (%" PRId32 "mB)",
peakU16, pIntReplyData[MEASUREMENT_IDX_PEAK],
rms, pIntReplyData[MEASUREMENT_IDX_RMS]);
}
break;
default:
ALOGW("Visualizer_command invalid command %" PRIu32, cmdCode);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
|
int Visualizer_command(effect_handle_t self, uint32_t cmdCode, uint32_t cmdSize,
void *pCmdData, uint32_t *replySize, void *pReplyData) {
VisualizerContext * pContext = (VisualizerContext *)self;
int retsize;
if (pContext == NULL || pContext->mState == VISUALIZER_STATE_UNINITIALIZED) {
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (cmdCode) {
case EFFECT_CMD_INIT:
if (pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *) pReplyData = Visualizer_init(pContext);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_CONFIG:
if (pCmdData == NULL || cmdSize != sizeof(effect_config_t)
|| pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int *) pReplyData = Visualizer_setConfig(pContext,
(effect_config_t *) pCmdData);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_GET_CONFIG:
if (pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL ||
*replySize != sizeof(effect_config_t)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
Visualizer_getConfig(pContext, (effect_config_t *)pReplyData);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_RESET:
Visualizer_reset(pContext);
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_ENABLE:
if (pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if (pContext->mState != VISUALIZER_STATE_INITIALIZED) {
return -ENOSYS;
}
pContext->mState = VISUALIZER_STATE_ACTIVE;
ALOGV("EFFECT_CMD_ENABLE() OK");
*(int *)pReplyData = 0;
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_DISABLE:
if (pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if (pContext->mState != VISUALIZER_STATE_ACTIVE) {
return -ENOSYS;
}
pContext->mState = VISUALIZER_STATE_INITIALIZED;
ALOGV("EFFECT_CMD_DISABLE() OK");
*(int *)pReplyData = 0;
break;
case EFFECT_CMD_GET_PARAM: {
if (pCmdData == NULL ||
cmdSize != (int)(sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(uint32_t)) ||
pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL ||
*replySize < (int)(sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(uint32_t))) {
return -EINVAL;
}
memcpy(pReplyData, pCmdData, sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(uint32_t));
effect_param_t *p = (effect_param_t *)pReplyData;
p->status = 0;
*replySize = sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(uint32_t);
if (p->psize != sizeof(uint32_t)) {
p->status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
switch (*(uint32_t *)p->data) {
case VISUALIZER_PARAM_CAPTURE_SIZE:
ALOGV("get mCaptureSize = %" PRIu32, pContext->mCaptureSize);
*((uint32_t *)p->data + 1) = pContext->mCaptureSize;
p->vsize = sizeof(uint32_t);
*replySize += sizeof(uint32_t);
break;
case VISUALIZER_PARAM_SCALING_MODE:
ALOGV("get mScalingMode = %" PRIu32, pContext->mScalingMode);
*((uint32_t *)p->data + 1) = pContext->mScalingMode;
p->vsize = sizeof(uint32_t);
*replySize += sizeof(uint32_t);
break;
case VISUALIZER_PARAM_MEASUREMENT_MODE:
ALOGV("get mMeasurementMode = %" PRIu32, pContext->mMeasurementMode);
*((uint32_t *)p->data + 1) = pContext->mMeasurementMode;
p->vsize = sizeof(uint32_t);
*replySize += sizeof(uint32_t);
break;
default:
p->status = -EINVAL;
}
} break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_PARAM: {
if (pCmdData == NULL ||
cmdSize != (int)(sizeof(effect_param_t) + sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(uint32_t)) ||
pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != sizeof(int32_t)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
*(int32_t *)pReplyData = 0;
effect_param_t *p = (effect_param_t *)pCmdData;
if (p->psize != sizeof(uint32_t) || p->vsize != sizeof(uint32_t)) {
*(int32_t *)pReplyData = -EINVAL;
break;
}
switch (*(uint32_t *)p->data) {
case VISUALIZER_PARAM_CAPTURE_SIZE:
pContext->mCaptureSize = *((uint32_t *)p->data + 1);
ALOGV("set mCaptureSize = %" PRIu32, pContext->mCaptureSize);
break;
case VISUALIZER_PARAM_SCALING_MODE:
pContext->mScalingMode = *((uint32_t *)p->data + 1);
ALOGV("set mScalingMode = %" PRIu32, pContext->mScalingMode);
break;
case VISUALIZER_PARAM_LATENCY:
pContext->mLatency = *((uint32_t *)p->data + 1);
ALOGV("set mLatency = %" PRIu32, pContext->mLatency);
break;
case VISUALIZER_PARAM_MEASUREMENT_MODE:
pContext->mMeasurementMode = *((uint32_t *)p->data + 1);
ALOGV("set mMeasurementMode = %" PRIu32, pContext->mMeasurementMode);
break;
default:
*(int32_t *)pReplyData = -EINVAL;
}
} break;
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_DEVICE:
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_VOLUME:
case EFFECT_CMD_SET_AUDIO_MODE:
break;
case VISUALIZER_CMD_CAPTURE: {
uint32_t captureSize = pContext->mCaptureSize;
if (pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL || *replySize != captureSize) {
ALOGV("VISUALIZER_CMD_CAPTURE() error *replySize %" PRIu32 " captureSize %" PRIu32,
*replySize, captureSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (pContext->mState == VISUALIZER_STATE_ACTIVE) {
const uint32_t deltaMs = Visualizer_getDeltaTimeMsFromUpdatedTime(pContext);
if ((pContext->mLastCaptureIdx == pContext->mCaptureIdx) &&
(pContext->mBufferUpdateTime.tv_sec != 0) &&
(deltaMs > MAX_STALL_TIME_MS)) {
ALOGV("capture going to idle");
pContext->mBufferUpdateTime.tv_sec = 0;
memset(pReplyData, 0x80, captureSize);
} else {
int32_t latencyMs = pContext->mLatency;
latencyMs -= deltaMs;
if (latencyMs < 0) {
latencyMs = 0;
}
const uint32_t deltaSmpl =
pContext->mConfig.inputCfg.samplingRate * latencyMs / 1000;
int32_t capturePoint = pContext->mCaptureIdx - captureSize - deltaSmpl;
if (capturePoint < 0) {
uint32_t size = -capturePoint;
if (size > captureSize) {
size = captureSize;
}
memcpy(pReplyData,
pContext->mCaptureBuf + CAPTURE_BUF_SIZE + capturePoint,
size);
pReplyData = (char *)pReplyData + size;
captureSize -= size;
capturePoint = 0;
}
memcpy(pReplyData,
pContext->mCaptureBuf + capturePoint,
captureSize);
}
pContext->mLastCaptureIdx = pContext->mCaptureIdx;
} else {
memset(pReplyData, 0x80, captureSize);
}
} break;
case VISUALIZER_CMD_MEASURE: {
if (pReplyData == NULL || replySize == NULL ||
*replySize < (sizeof(int32_t) * MEASUREMENT_COUNT)) {
if (replySize == NULL) {
ALOGV("VISUALIZER_CMD_MEASURE() error replySize NULL");
} else {
ALOGV("VISUALIZER_CMD_MEASURE() error *replySize %" PRIu32
" < (sizeof(int32_t) * MEASUREMENT_COUNT) %" PRIu32,
*replySize,
uint32_t(sizeof(int32_t)) * MEASUREMENT_COUNT);
}
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "30229821");
return -EINVAL;
}
uint16_t peakU16 = 0;
float sumRmsSquared = 0.0f;
uint8_t nbValidMeasurements = 0;
const int32_t delayMs = Visualizer_getDeltaTimeMsFromUpdatedTime(pContext);
if (delayMs > DISCARD_MEASUREMENTS_TIME_MS) {
ALOGV("Discarding measurements, last measurement is %" PRId32 "ms old", delayMs);
for (uint32_t i=0 ; i<pContext->mMeasurementWindowSizeInBuffers ; i++) {
pContext->mPastMeasurements[i].mIsValid = false;
pContext->mPastMeasurements[i].mPeakU16 = 0;
pContext->mPastMeasurements[i].mRmsSquared = 0;
}
pContext->mMeasurementBufferIdx = 0;
} else {
for (uint32_t i=0 ; i < pContext->mMeasurementWindowSizeInBuffers ; i++) {
if (pContext->mPastMeasurements[i].mIsValid) {
if (pContext->mPastMeasurements[i].mPeakU16 > peakU16) {
peakU16 = pContext->mPastMeasurements[i].mPeakU16;
}
sumRmsSquared += pContext->mPastMeasurements[i].mRmsSquared;
nbValidMeasurements++;
}
}
}
float rms = nbValidMeasurements == 0 ? 0.0f : sqrtf(sumRmsSquared / nbValidMeasurements);
int32_t* pIntReplyData = (int32_t*)pReplyData;
if (rms < 0.000016f) {
pIntReplyData[MEASUREMENT_IDX_RMS] = -9600; //-96dB
} else {
pIntReplyData[MEASUREMENT_IDX_RMS] = (int32_t) (2000 * log10(rms / 32767.0f));
}
if (peakU16 == 0) {
pIntReplyData[MEASUREMENT_IDX_PEAK] = -9600; //-96dB
} else {
pIntReplyData[MEASUREMENT_IDX_PEAK] = (int32_t) (2000 * log10(peakU16 / 32767.0f));
}
ALOGV("VISUALIZER_CMD_MEASURE peak=%" PRIu16 " (%" PRId32 "mB), rms=%.1f (%" PRId32 "mB)",
peakU16, pIntReplyData[MEASUREMENT_IDX_PEAK],
rms, pIntReplyData[MEASUREMENT_IDX_RMS]);
}
break;
default:
ALOGW("Visualizer_command invalid command %" PRIu32, cmdCode);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2013-2094
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2094/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8176cced706b5e5d15887584150764894e94e02f
|
8176cced706b5e5d15887584150764894e94e02f
|
perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Paul Mackerras <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static unsigned int perf_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
struct perf_event *event = file->private_data;
struct ring_buffer *rb;
unsigned int events = POLL_HUP;
/*
* Race between perf_event_set_output() and perf_poll(): perf_poll()
* grabs the rb reference but perf_event_set_output() overrides it.
* Here is the timeline for two threads T1, T2:
* t0: T1, rb = rcu_dereference(event->rb)
* t1: T2, old_rb = event->rb
* t2: T2, event->rb = new rb
* t3: T2, ring_buffer_detach(old_rb)
* t4: T1, ring_buffer_attach(rb1)
* t5: T1, poll_wait(event->waitq)
*
* To avoid this problem, we grab mmap_mutex in perf_poll()
* thereby ensuring that the assignment of the new ring buffer
* and the detachment of the old buffer appear atomic to perf_poll()
*/
mutex_lock(&event->mmap_mutex);
rcu_read_lock();
rb = rcu_dereference(event->rb);
if (rb) {
ring_buffer_attach(event, rb);
events = atomic_xchg(&rb->poll, 0);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
mutex_unlock(&event->mmap_mutex);
poll_wait(file, &event->waitq, wait);
return events;
}
|
static unsigned int perf_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
struct perf_event *event = file->private_data;
struct ring_buffer *rb;
unsigned int events = POLL_HUP;
/*
* Race between perf_event_set_output() and perf_poll(): perf_poll()
* grabs the rb reference but perf_event_set_output() overrides it.
* Here is the timeline for two threads T1, T2:
* t0: T1, rb = rcu_dereference(event->rb)
* t1: T2, old_rb = event->rb
* t2: T2, event->rb = new rb
* t3: T2, ring_buffer_detach(old_rb)
* t4: T1, ring_buffer_attach(rb1)
* t5: T1, poll_wait(event->waitq)
*
* To avoid this problem, we grab mmap_mutex in perf_poll()
* thereby ensuring that the assignment of the new ring buffer
* and the detachment of the old buffer appear atomic to perf_poll()
*/
mutex_lock(&event->mmap_mutex);
rcu_read_lock();
rb = rcu_dereference(event->rb);
if (rb) {
ring_buffer_attach(event, rb);
events = atomic_xchg(&rb->poll, 0);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
mutex_unlock(&event->mmap_mutex);
poll_wait(file, &event->waitq, wait);
return events;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2840
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2840/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2db5a2048dfcacfe5ad4311c2b1e435c4c67febc
|
2db5a2048dfcacfe5ad4311c2b1e435c4c67febc
|
chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void Browser::Print() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("PrintPreview"), profile_);
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnablePrintPreview)) {
printing::PrintPreviewTabController::PrintPreview(
GetSelectedTabContents());
} else {
GetSelectedTabContentsWrapper()->print_view_manager()->PrintNow();
}
}
|
void Browser::Print() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("PrintPreview"), profile_);
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnablePrintPreview)) {
printing::PrintPreviewTabController::PrintPreview(
GetSelectedTabContents());
} else {
GetSelectedTabContentsWrapper()->print_view_manager()->PrintNow();
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3837
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3837/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/opt/net/wifi/+/a209ff12ba9617c10550678ff93d01fb72a33399
|
a209ff12ba9617c10550678ff93d01fb72a33399
|
Deal correctly with short strings
The parseMacAddress function anticipates only properly formed
MAC addresses (6 hexadecimal octets separated by ":"). This
change properly deals with situations where the string is
shorter than expected, making sure that the passed in char*
reference in parseHexByte never exceeds the end of the string.
BUG: 28164077
TEST: Added a main function:
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
unsigned char addr[6];
if (argc > 1) {
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
parseMacAddress(argv[1], addr);
printf("Result: %02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x:%02x\n",
addr[0], addr[1], addr[2], addr[3], addr[4], addr[5]);
}
}
Tested with "", "a" "ab" "ab:c" "abxc".
Change-Id: I0db8d0037e48b62333d475296a45b22ab0efe386
|
static jboolean android_net_wifi_set_log_handler(JNIEnv *env, jclass cls, jint iface, jint id) {
JNIHelper helper(env);
wifi_interface_handle handle = getIfaceHandle(helper, cls, iface);
ALOGD("android_net_wifi_set_log_handler = %p", handle);
wifi_ring_buffer_data_handler handler;
handler.on_ring_buffer_data = &on_ring_buffer_data;
int result = hal_fn.wifi_set_log_handler(id, handle, handler);
if (result != WIFI_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Fail to set logging handler");
return false;
}
wifi_alert_handler alert_handler;
alert_handler.on_alert = &on_alert_data;
result = hal_fn.wifi_set_alert_handler(id, handle, alert_handler);
if (result != WIFI_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE(" Fail to set alert handler");
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
static jboolean android_net_wifi_set_log_handler(JNIEnv *env, jclass cls, jint iface, jint id) {
JNIHelper helper(env);
wifi_interface_handle handle = getIfaceHandle(helper, cls, iface);
ALOGD("android_net_wifi_set_log_handler = %p", handle);
wifi_ring_buffer_data_handler handler;
handler.on_ring_buffer_data = &on_ring_buffer_data;
int result = hal_fn.wifi_set_log_handler(id, handle, handler);
if (result != WIFI_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Fail to set logging handler");
return false;
}
wifi_alert_handler alert_handler;
alert_handler.on_alert = &on_alert_data;
result = hal_fn.wifi_set_alert_handler(id, handle, alert_handler);
if (result != WIFI_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE(" Fail to set alert handler");
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ea3d1d84be3d6f97bf50e76511c9e26af6895533
|
ea3d1d84be3d6f97bf50e76511c9e26af6895533
|
Fix passing pointers between processes.
BUG=31880
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/558036
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@37555 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
std::string WebPluginImpl::GetCookies(const GURL& url,
const GURL& first_party_for_cookies) {
return UTF16ToUTF8(WebKit::webKitClient()->cookies(url,
first_party_for_cookies));
}
|
std::string WebPluginImpl::GetCookies(const GURL& url,
const GURL& first_party_for_cookies) {
return UTF16ToUTF8(WebKit::webKitClient()->cookies(url,
first_party_for_cookies));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11222
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11222/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/gpac/gpac/commit/f36525c5beafb78959c3a07d6622c9028de348da
|
f36525c5beafb78959c3a07d6622c9028de348da
|
fix buffer overrun in gf_bin128_parse
closes #1204
closes #1205
|
char gf_prompt_get_char()
{
char ch;
if (ch_peek != -1) {
ch = ch_peek;
ch_peek = -1;
close_keyboard(1);
return ch;
}
if (0==read(0,&ch,1))
ch = 0;
close_keyboard(1);
return ch;
}
|
char gf_prompt_get_char()
{
char ch;
if (ch_peek != -1) {
ch = ch_peek;
ch_peek = -1;
close_keyboard(1);
return ch;
}
if (0==read(0,&ch,1))
ch = 0;
close_keyboard(1);
return ch;
}
|
C
|
gpac
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/961d0cda4cfc3bcf04aa48ccc32772d63af12d9b
|
961d0cda4cfc3bcf04aa48ccc32772d63af12d9b
|
Extract generation logic from the accessory controller into a separate one
This change adds a controller that is responsible for mediating
communication between ChromePasswordManagerClient and
PasswordAccessoryController for password generation. It is also
responsible for managing the modal dialog used to present the generated
password.
In the future it will make it easier to add manual generation to the
password accessory.
Bug: 845458
Change-Id: I0adbb2de9b9f5012745ae3963154f7d3247b3051
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1448181
Commit-Queue: Ioana Pandele <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Friedrich [CET] <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629542}
|
void ChromePasswordManagerClient::DidFinishNavigation(
content::NavigationHandle* navigation_handle) {
if (!navigation_handle->IsInMainFrame() || !navigation_handle->HasCommitted())
return;
if (!navigation_handle->IsSameDocument()) {
metrics_recorder_.reset();
}
if (!navigation_handle->IsSameDocument())
content_credential_manager_.DisconnectBinding();
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
password_reuse_detection_manager_.DidNavigateMainFrame(GetMainFrameURL());
AddToWidgetInputEventObservers(
web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->GetWidget(), this);
#else // defined(OS_ANDROID)
PasswordAccessoryController* accessory =
PasswordAccessoryController::GetIfExisting(web_contents());
if (accessory)
accessory->DidNavigateMainFrame();
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID)
}
|
void ChromePasswordManagerClient::DidFinishNavigation(
content::NavigationHandle* navigation_handle) {
if (!navigation_handle->IsInMainFrame() || !navigation_handle->HasCommitted())
return;
if (!navigation_handle->IsSameDocument()) {
metrics_recorder_.reset();
}
if (!navigation_handle->IsSameDocument())
content_credential_manager_.DisconnectBinding();
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
password_reuse_detection_manager_.DidNavigateMainFrame(GetMainFrameURL());
AddToWidgetInputEventObservers(
web_contents()->GetRenderViewHost()->GetWidget(), this);
#else // defined(OS_ANDROID)
PasswordAccessoryController* accessory =
PasswordAccessoryController::GetIfExisting(web_contents());
if (accessory)
accessory->DidNavigateMainFrame();
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID)
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5147
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5147/
|
CWE-79
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5472db1c7eca35822219d03be5c817d9a9258c11
|
5472db1c7eca35822219d03be5c817d9a9258c11
|
Always call UpdateCompositedScrollOffset, not just for the root layer
Bug: 927560
Change-Id: I1d5522aae4f11dd3f5b8947bb089bac1bf19bdb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1452701
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mason Freed <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#628942}
|
void PaintLayerScrollableArea::SetVerticalScrollbarVisualRect(
const LayoutRect& rect) {
vertical_scrollbar_visual_rect_ = rect;
if (Scrollbar* scrollbar = VerticalScrollbar())
scrollbar->SetVisualRect(rect);
}
|
void PaintLayerScrollableArea::SetVerticalScrollbarVisualRect(
const LayoutRect& rect) {
vertical_scrollbar_visual_rect_ = rect;
if (Scrollbar* scrollbar = VerticalScrollbar())
scrollbar->SetVisualRect(rect);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7962
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7962/
|
CWE-369
|
https://github.com/jsummers/imageworsener/commit/ca3356eb49fee03e2eaf6b6aff826988c1122d93
|
ca3356eb49fee03e2eaf6b6aff826988c1122d93
|
Fixed a GIF decoding bug (divide by zero)
Fixes issue #15
|
static int iwgif_read_graphic_control_ext(struct iwgifrcontext *rctx)
{
int retval;
if(!iwgif_read(rctx,rctx->rbuf,6)) goto done;
if(rctx->rbuf[0]!=4) goto done;
if(rctx->rbuf[5]!=0) goto done;
rctx->has_transparency = (int)((rctx->rbuf[1])&0x01);
if(rctx->has_transparency) {
rctx->trans_color_index = (int)rctx->rbuf[4];
}
retval=1;
done:
return retval;
}
|
static int iwgif_read_graphic_control_ext(struct iwgifrcontext *rctx)
{
int retval;
if(!iwgif_read(rctx,rctx->rbuf,6)) goto done;
if(rctx->rbuf[0]!=4) goto done;
if(rctx->rbuf[5]!=0) goto done;
rctx->has_transparency = (int)((rctx->rbuf[1])&0x01);
if(rctx->has_transparency) {
rctx->trans_color_index = (int)rctx->rbuf[4];
}
retval=1;
done:
return retval;
}
|
C
|
imageworsener
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0839/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dd3b6fe574edad231c01c78e4647a74c38dc4178
|
dd3b6fe574edad231c01c78e4647a74c38dc4178
|
Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GDataFileSystem::Move(const FilePath& src_file_path,
const FilePath& dest_file_path,
const FileOperationCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI) ||
BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
RunTaskOnUIThread(base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::MoveOnUIThread,
ui_weak_ptr_,
src_file_path,
dest_file_path,
CreateRelayCallback(callback)));
}
|
void GDataFileSystem::Move(const FilePath& src_file_path,
const FilePath& dest_file_path,
const FileOperationCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI) ||
BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
RunTaskOnUIThread(base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::MoveOnUIThread,
ui_weak_ptr_,
src_file_path,
dest_file_path,
CreateRelayCallback(callback)));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8126
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8126/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7f3d85b096f66870a15b37c2f40b219b2e292693
|
7f3d85b096f66870a15b37c2f40b219b2e292693
|
third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
[email protected]
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
|
png_set_asm_flags (png_structp png_ptr, png_uint_32 asm_flags)
{
/* Obsolete as of libpng-1.2.20 and will be removed from libpng-1.4.0 */
if (png_ptr != NULL)
png_ptr->asm_flags = 0;
PNG_UNUSED(asm_flags) /* Quiet the compiler */
}
|
png_set_asm_flags (png_structp png_ptr, png_uint_32 asm_flags)
{
/* Obsolete as of libpng-1.2.20 and will be removed from libpng-1.4.0 */
if (png_ptr != NULL)
png_ptr->asm_flags = 0;
PNG_UNUSED(asm_flags) /* Quiet the compiler */
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2895
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2895/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/baef1ffd73db183ca50c854e1779ed7f6e5100a8
|
baef1ffd73db183ca50c854e1779ed7f6e5100a8
|
Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
[email protected]
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GDataCache::Pin(const std::string& resource_id,
const std::string& md5,
FileOperationType file_operation_type,
base::PlatformFileError* error) {
AssertOnSequencedWorkerPool();
DCHECK(error);
FilePath source_path;
FilePath dest_path;
FilePath symlink_path;
bool create_symlink = true;
int cache_state = CACHE_STATE_PINNED;
CacheSubDirectoryType sub_dir_type = CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT;
scoped_ptr<CacheEntry> cache_entry = GetCacheEntry(resource_id, md5);
if (!cache_entry.get()) { // Entry does not exist in cache.
dest_path = FilePath(kSymLinkToDevNull);
source_path = dest_path;
sub_dir_type = CACHE_TYPE_PINNED;
} else { // File exists in cache, determines destination path.
cache_state |= cache_entry->cache_state;
if (cache_entry->IsDirty() || cache_entry->IsMounted()) {
DCHECK_EQ(CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT, cache_entry->sub_dir_type);
dest_path = GetCacheFilePath(resource_id,
md5,
cache_entry->sub_dir_type,
CACHED_FILE_LOCALLY_MODIFIED);
source_path = dest_path;
} else {
source_path = GetCacheFilePath(resource_id,
md5,
cache_entry->sub_dir_type,
CACHED_FILE_FROM_SERVER);
if (cache_entry->sub_dir_type == CACHE_TYPE_PINNED) {
dest_path = source_path;
create_symlink = false;
} else { // File exists, move it to persistent dir.
dest_path = GetCacheFilePath(resource_id,
md5,
CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT,
CACHED_FILE_FROM_SERVER);
}
}
}
if (create_symlink) {
symlink_path = GetCacheFilePath(resource_id,
std::string(),
CACHE_TYPE_PINNED,
CACHED_FILE_FROM_SERVER);
}
*error = ModifyCacheState(source_path,
dest_path,
file_operation_type,
symlink_path,
create_symlink);
if (*error == base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK) {
metadata_->UpdateCache(resource_id, md5, sub_dir_type, cache_state);
}
}
|
void GDataCache::Pin(const std::string& resource_id,
const std::string& md5,
FileOperationType file_operation_type,
base::PlatformFileError* error) {
AssertOnSequencedWorkerPool();
DCHECK(error);
FilePath source_path;
FilePath dest_path;
FilePath symlink_path;
bool create_symlink = true;
int cache_state = CACHE_STATE_PINNED;
CacheSubDirectoryType sub_dir_type = CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT;
scoped_ptr<CacheEntry> cache_entry = GetCacheEntry(resource_id, md5);
if (!cache_entry.get()) { // Entry does not exist in cache.
dest_path = FilePath::FromUTF8Unsafe(util::kSymLinkToDevNull);
source_path = dest_path;
sub_dir_type = CACHE_TYPE_PINNED;
} else { // File exists in cache, determines destination path.
cache_state |= cache_entry->cache_state;
if (cache_entry->IsDirty() || cache_entry->IsMounted()) {
DCHECK_EQ(CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT, cache_entry->sub_dir_type);
dest_path = GetCacheFilePath(resource_id,
md5,
cache_entry->sub_dir_type,
CACHED_FILE_LOCALLY_MODIFIED);
source_path = dest_path;
} else {
source_path = GetCacheFilePath(resource_id,
md5,
cache_entry->sub_dir_type,
CACHED_FILE_FROM_SERVER);
if (cache_entry->sub_dir_type == CACHE_TYPE_PINNED) {
dest_path = source_path;
create_symlink = false;
} else { // File exists, move it to persistent dir.
dest_path = GetCacheFilePath(resource_id,
md5,
CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT,
CACHED_FILE_FROM_SERVER);
}
}
}
if (create_symlink) {
symlink_path = GetCacheFilePath(resource_id,
std::string(),
CACHE_TYPE_PINNED,
CACHED_FILE_FROM_SERVER);
}
*error = ModifyCacheState(source_path,
dest_path,
file_operation_type,
symlink_path,
create_symlink);
if (*error == base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK) {
metadata_->UpdateCache(resource_id, md5, sub_dir_type, cache_state);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/511d0a0a31a54e0cc0f15cb1b977dc9f9b20f0d3
|
511d0a0a31a54e0cc0f15cb1b977dc9f9b20f0d3
|
Implement new websocket handshake based on draft-hixie-thewebsocketprotocol-76
BUG=none
TEST=net_unittests passes
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/1108002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@42736 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
WebSocketExperimentTask::~WebSocketExperimentTask() {
DCHECK(!websocket_);
}
|
WebSocketExperimentTask::~WebSocketExperimentTask() {
DCHECK(!websocket_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14604
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14604/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/GNOME/nautilus/commit/1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0
|
1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0
|
mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
|
mime_list_cancel (NautilusDirectory *directory)
{
if (directory->details->mime_list_in_progress != NULL)
{
g_cancellable_cancel (directory->details->mime_list_in_progress->cancellable);
}
}
|
mime_list_cancel (NautilusDirectory *directory)
{
if (directory->details->mime_list_in_progress != NULL)
{
g_cancellable_cancel (directory->details->mime_list_in_progress->cancellable);
}
}
|
C
|
nautilus
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6033
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6033/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a8d6ae61d266d8bc44c3dd2d08bda32db701e359
|
a8d6ae61d266d8bc44c3dd2d08bda32db701e359
|
Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
|
std::string DownloadManagerImpl::GetApplicationClientIdForFileScanning() const {
if (delegate_)
return delegate_->ApplicationClientIdForFileScanning();
return std::string();
}
|
std::string DownloadManagerImpl::GetApplicationClientIdForFileScanning() const {
if (delegate_)
return delegate_->ApplicationClientIdForFileScanning();
return std::string();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3132
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3132/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/28a6ed9f9a36b9c517e4a8a429baf4dd382fc5d5?w=1
|
28a6ed9f9a36b9c517e4a8a429baf4dd382fc5d5?w=1
|
Fix bug #71735: Double-free in SplDoublyLinkedList::offsetSet
|
SPL_METHOD(SplDoublyLinkedList, key)
{
spl_dllist_object *intern = Z_SPLDLLIST_P(getThis());
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_LONG(intern->traverse_position);
}
|
SPL_METHOD(SplDoublyLinkedList, key)
{
spl_dllist_object *intern = Z_SPLDLLIST_P(getThis());
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_LONG(intern->traverse_position);
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6171
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6171/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c5c6320f80159dc41dffc3cfbf0298925c7dcf1b
|
c5c6320f80159dc41dffc3cfbf0298925c7dcf1b
|
chrome.bluetoothSocket: Fix regression in send()
In https://crrev.com/c/997098, params_ was changed to a local variable,
but it needs to last longer than that since net::WrappedIOBuffer may use
the data after the local variable goes out of scope.
This CL changed it back to be an instance variable.
Bug: 851799
Change-Id: I392f8acaef4c6473d6ea4fbee7209445aa09112e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1103676
Reviewed-by: Toni Barzic <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Sonny Sasaka <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568137}
|
BluetoothSocketAbstractConnectFunction::Run() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(work_thread_id());
device::BluetoothAdapterFactory::GetAdapter(
base::Bind(&BluetoothSocketAbstractConnectFunction::OnGetAdapter, this));
return did_respond() ? AlreadyResponded() : RespondLater();
}
|
BluetoothSocketAbstractConnectFunction::Run() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(work_thread_id());
device::BluetoothAdapterFactory::GetAdapter(
base::Bind(&BluetoothSocketAbstractConnectFunction::OnGetAdapter, this));
return did_respond() ? AlreadyResponded() : RespondLater();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a44b00c88bc5ea35b5b150217c5fd6e4ce168e58
|
a44b00c88bc5ea35b5b150217c5fd6e4ce168e58
|
Apply behaviour change fix from upstream for previous XPath change.
BUG=58731
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/4027006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@63572 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
xmlXPathCompUnaryExpr(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt) {
int minus = 0;
int found = 0;
SKIP_BLANKS;
while (CUR == '-') {
minus = 1 - minus;
found = 1;
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
}
xmlXPathCompUnionExpr(ctxt);
CHECK_ERROR;
if (found) {
if (minus)
PUSH_UNARY_EXPR(XPATH_OP_PLUS, ctxt->comp->last, 2, 0);
else
PUSH_UNARY_EXPR(XPATH_OP_PLUS, ctxt->comp->last, 3, 0);
}
}
|
xmlXPathCompUnaryExpr(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt) {
int minus = 0;
int found = 0;
SKIP_BLANKS;
while (CUR == '-') {
minus = 1 - minus;
found = 1;
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
}
xmlXPathCompUnionExpr(ctxt);
CHECK_ERROR;
if (found) {
if (minus)
PUSH_UNARY_EXPR(XPATH_OP_PLUS, ctxt->comp->last, 2, 0);
else
PUSH_UNARY_EXPR(XPATH_OP_PLUS, ctxt->comp->last, 3, 0);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-11376
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11376/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/radare/radare2/commit/1f37c04f2a762500222dda2459e6a04646feeedf
|
1f37c04f2a762500222dda2459e6a04646feeedf
|
Fix #9904 - crash in r2_hoobr_r_read_le32 (over 9000 entrypoints) and read_le oobread (#9923)
|
static RList* relocs(RBinFile *bf) {
RList *ret = NULL;
RBinReloc *ptr = NULL;
RBinElfReloc *relocs = NULL;
struct Elf_(r_bin_elf_obj_t) *bin = NULL;
ut64 got_addr;
int i;
if (!bf || !bf->o || !bf->o->bin_obj) {
return NULL;
}
bin = bf->o->bin_obj;
if (!(ret = r_list_newf (free))) {
return NULL;
}
/* FIXME: This is a _temporary_ fix/workaround to prevent a use-after-
* free detected by ASan that would corrupt the relocation names */
r_list_free (imports (bf));
if ((got_addr = Elf_(r_bin_elf_get_section_addr) (bin, ".got")) == -1) {
got_addr = Elf_(r_bin_elf_get_section_addr) (bin, ".got.plt");
if (got_addr == -1) {
got_addr = 0;
}
}
if (got_addr < 1 && bin->ehdr.e_type == ET_REL) {
got_addr = Elf_(r_bin_elf_get_section_addr) (bin, ".got.r2");
if (got_addr == -1) {
got_addr = 0;
}
}
if (bf->o) {
if (!(relocs = Elf_(r_bin_elf_get_relocs) (bin))) {
return ret;
}
for (i = 0; !relocs[i].last; i++) {
if (!(ptr = reloc_convert (bin, &relocs[i], got_addr))) {
continue;
}
r_list_append (ret, ptr);
}
free (relocs);
}
return ret;
}
|
static RList* relocs(RBinFile *bf) {
RList *ret = NULL;
RBinReloc *ptr = NULL;
RBinElfReloc *relocs = NULL;
struct Elf_(r_bin_elf_obj_t) *bin = NULL;
ut64 got_addr;
int i;
if (!bf || !bf->o || !bf->o->bin_obj) {
return NULL;
}
bin = bf->o->bin_obj;
if (!(ret = r_list_newf (free))) {
return NULL;
}
/* FIXME: This is a _temporary_ fix/workaround to prevent a use-after-
* free detected by ASan that would corrupt the relocation names */
r_list_free (imports (bf));
if ((got_addr = Elf_(r_bin_elf_get_section_addr) (bin, ".got")) == -1) {
got_addr = Elf_(r_bin_elf_get_section_addr) (bin, ".got.plt");
if (got_addr == -1) {
got_addr = 0;
}
}
if (got_addr < 1 && bin->ehdr.e_type == ET_REL) {
got_addr = Elf_(r_bin_elf_get_section_addr) (bin, ".got.r2");
if (got_addr == -1) {
got_addr = 0;
}
}
if (bf->o) {
if (!(relocs = Elf_(r_bin_elf_get_relocs) (bin))) {
return ret;
}
for (i = 0; !relocs[i].last; i++) {
if (!(ptr = reloc_convert (bin, &relocs[i], got_addr))) {
continue;
}
r_list_append (ret, ptr);
}
free (relocs);
}
return ret;
}
|
C
|
radare2
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5104
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5104/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/libimobiledevice/libimobiledevice/commit/df1f5c4d70d0c19ad40072f5246ca457e7f9849e
|
df1f5c4d70d0c19ad40072f5246ca457e7f9849e
|
common: [security fix] Make sure sockets only listen locally
|
int socket_accept(int fd, uint16_t port)
{
#ifdef WIN32
int addr_len;
#else
socklen_t addr_len;
#endif
int result;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);
addr.sin_port = htons(port);
addr_len = sizeof(addr);
result = accept(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, &addr_len);
return result;
}
|
int socket_accept(int fd, uint16_t port)
{
#ifdef WIN32
int addr_len;
#else
socklen_t addr_len;
#endif
int result;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
addr.sin_port = htons(port);
addr_len = sizeof(addr);
result = accept(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, &addr_len);
return result;
}
|
C
|
libimobiledevice
| 1 |
CVE-2012-5136
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5136/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/401d30ef93030afbf7e81e53a11b68fc36194502
|
401d30ef93030afbf7e81e53a11b68fc36194502
|
Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
[email protected], abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
MouseEventWithHitTestResults Document::prepareMouseEvent(const HitTestRequest& request, const LayoutPoint& documentPoint, const PlatformMouseEvent& event)
{
ASSERT(!renderer() || renderer()->isRenderView());
if (!renderer() || !view() || !view()->didFirstLayout())
return MouseEventWithHitTestResults(event, HitTestResult(LayoutPoint()));
HitTestResult result(documentPoint);
renderView()->hitTest(request, result);
if (!request.readOnly())
updateHoverActiveState(request, result.innerElement(), &event);
return MouseEventWithHitTestResults(event, result);
}
|
MouseEventWithHitTestResults Document::prepareMouseEvent(const HitTestRequest& request, const LayoutPoint& documentPoint, const PlatformMouseEvent& event)
{
ASSERT(!renderer() || renderer()->isRenderView());
if (!renderer() || !view() || !view()->didFirstLayout())
return MouseEventWithHitTestResults(event, HitTestResult(LayoutPoint()));
HitTestResult result(documentPoint);
renderView()->hitTest(request, result);
if (!request.readOnly())
updateHoverActiveState(request, result.innerElement(), &event);
return MouseEventWithHitTestResults(event, result);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void variadicNodeMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::variadicNodeMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
static void variadicNodeMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::variadicNodeMethodMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3084
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3084/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/744c2a2d90c3c9a33c818e1ea4b7ccb5010663a0
|
744c2a2d90c3c9a33c818e1ea4b7ccb5010663a0
|
Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderViewImpl::zoomLevelChanged() {
bool remember = !webview()->mainFrame()->document().isPluginDocument();
float zoom_level = webview()->zoomLevel();
Send(new ViewHostMsg_DidZoomURL(
routing_id_, zoom_level, remember,
GURL(webview()->mainFrame()->document().url())));
}
|
void RenderViewImpl::zoomLevelChanged() {
bool remember = !webview()->mainFrame()->document().isPluginDocument();
float zoom_level = webview()->zoomLevel();
Send(new ViewHostMsg_DidZoomURL(
routing_id_, zoom_level, remember,
GURL(webview()->mainFrame()->document().url())));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1583
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1583/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d
|
f5364c150aa645b3d7daa21b5c0b9feaa1c9cd6d
|
Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <[email protected]>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
|
static inline void init_schedstats(void) {}
|
static inline void init_schedstats(void) {}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3099
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3099/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3bbc818ed1a7b63b8290bbde9ae975956748cb8a
|
3bbc818ed1a7b63b8290bbde9ae975956748cb8a
|
[GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void WebInspectorProxy::platformInspectedURLChanged(const String& url)
{
m_client.inspectedURLChanged(this, url);
if (!m_inspectorWindow)
return;
GOwnPtr<gchar> title(g_strdup_printf("%s - %s", _("Web Inspector"), url.utf8().data()));
gtk_window_set_title(GTK_WINDOW(m_inspectorWindow), title.get());
}
|
void WebInspectorProxy::platformInspectedURLChanged(const String& url)
{
m_client.inspectedURLChanged(this, url);
if (!m_inspectorWindow)
return;
GOwnPtr<gchar> title(g_strdup_printf("%s - %s", _("Web Inspector"), url.utf8().data()));
gtk_window_set_title(GTK_WINDOW(m_inspectorWindow), title.get());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1229
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1229/
|
CWE-19
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7933c117fd16b192e70609c331641e9112af5e42
|
7933c117fd16b192e70609c331641e9112af5e42
|
Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
|
bool CheckNTLMServerAuth(const AuthChallengeInfo* auth_challenge) {
if (!auth_challenge)
return false;
EXPECT_FALSE(auth_challenge->is_proxy);
EXPECT_EQ("172.22.68.17:80", auth_challenge->challenger.ToString());
EXPECT_EQ(std::string(), auth_challenge->realm);
EXPECT_EQ("ntlm", auth_challenge->scheme);
return true;
}
|
bool CheckNTLMServerAuth(const AuthChallengeInfo* auth_challenge) {
if (!auth_challenge)
return false;
EXPECT_FALSE(auth_challenge->is_proxy);
EXPECT_EQ("172.22.68.17:80", auth_challenge->challenger.ToString());
EXPECT_EQ(std::string(), auth_challenge->realm);
EXPECT_EQ("ntlm", auth_challenge->scheme);
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1000524
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000524/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/fatcerberus/minisphere/commit/252c1ca184cb38e1acb917aa0e451c5f08519996
|
252c1ca184cb38e1acb917aa0e451c5f08519996
|
Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
|
trigger_set_script(int trigger_index, script_t* script)
{
script_t* old_script;
struct map_trigger* trigger;
trigger = vector_get(s_map->triggers, trigger_index);
old_script = trigger->script;
trigger->script = script_ref(script);
script_unref(old_script);
}
|
trigger_set_script(int trigger_index, script_t* script)
{
script_t* old_script;
struct map_trigger* trigger;
trigger = vector_get(s_map->triggers, trigger_index);
old_script = trigger->script;
trigger->script = script_ref(script);
script_unref(old_script);
}
|
C
|
minisphere
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1703
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1703/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0ebe983f1cfdd383a4954127f564b83a4fe4992f
|
0ebe983f1cfdd383a4954127f564b83a4fe4992f
|
Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
|
UsbSetInterfaceAlternateSettingFunction::Run() {
scoped_ptr<extensions::core_api::usb::SetInterfaceAlternateSetting::Params>
parameters = SetInterfaceAlternateSetting::Params::Create(*args_);
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(parameters.get());
scoped_refptr<UsbDeviceHandle> device_handle =
GetDeviceHandle(parameters->handle);
if (!device_handle.get()) {
return RespondNow(Error(kErrorNoConnection));
}
device_handle->SetInterfaceAlternateSetting(
parameters->interface_number, parameters->alternate_setting,
base::Bind(&UsbSetInterfaceAlternateSettingFunction::OnComplete, this));
return RespondLater();
}
|
UsbSetInterfaceAlternateSettingFunction::Run() {
scoped_ptr<extensions::core_api::usb::SetInterfaceAlternateSetting::Params>
parameters = SetInterfaceAlternateSetting::Params::Create(*args_);
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(parameters.get());
scoped_refptr<UsbDeviceHandle> device_handle =
GetDeviceHandle(parameters->handle);
if (!device_handle.get()) {
return RespondNow(Error(kErrorNoConnection));
}
device_handle->SetInterfaceAlternateSetting(
parameters->interface_number, parameters->alternate_setting,
base::Bind(&UsbSetInterfaceAlternateSettingFunction::OnComplete, this));
return RespondLater();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16790
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16790/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/mongodb/mongo-c-driver/commit/0d9a4d98bfdf4acd2c0138d4aaeb4e2e0934bd84
|
0d9a4d98bfdf4acd2c0138d4aaeb4e2e0934bd84
|
Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
|
bson_iter_overwrite_double (bson_iter_t *iter, /* IN */
double value) /* IN */
{
BSON_ASSERT (iter);
if (ITER_TYPE (iter) == BSON_TYPE_DOUBLE) {
value = BSON_DOUBLE_TO_LE (value);
memcpy ((void *) (iter->raw + iter->d1), &value, sizeof (value));
}
}
|
bson_iter_overwrite_double (bson_iter_t *iter, /* IN */
double value) /* IN */
{
BSON_ASSERT (iter);
if (ITER_TYPE (iter) == BSON_TYPE_DOUBLE) {
value = BSON_DOUBLE_TO_LE (value);
memcpy ((void *) (iter->raw + iter->d1), &value, sizeof (value));
}
}
|
C
|
mongo-c-driver
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2350/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
[JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec));
b* (tob(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->convert2();
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
|
EncodedJSValue JSC_HOST_CALL jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2(ExecState* exec)
{
JSValue thisValue = exec->hostThisValue();
if (!thisValue.inherits(&JSTestObj::s_info))
return throwVMTypeError(exec);
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(asObject(thisValue));
ASSERT_GC_OBJECT_INHERITS(castedThis, &JSTestObj::s_info);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
if (exec->argumentCount() < 1)
return throwVMError(exec, createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments"));
b* (tob(MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(exec, 0, DefaultIsUndefined)));
if (exec->hadException())
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
impl->convert2();
return JSValue::encode(jsUndefined());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2018-6038
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6038/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9b99a43fc119a2533a87e2357cad8f603779a7b9
|
9b99a43fc119a2533a87e2357cad8f603779a7b9
|
Implement 2D texture uploading from client array with FLIP_Y or PREMULTIPLY_ALPHA.
BUG=774174
TEST=https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2555
[email protected]
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I4f4e7636314502451104730501a5048a5d7b9f3f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/808665
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#522003}
|
void WebGLImageConversion::PackPixels(const uint8_t* source_data,
DataFormat source_data_format,
unsigned pixels_per_row,
uint8_t* destination_data) {
switch (source_data_format) {
case kDataFormatRA8: {
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA8>::Type SrcType;
const SrcType* src_row_start = static_cast<const SrcType*>(source_data);
Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRA8,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoUnmultiply>(
src_row_start, destination_data, pixels_per_row);
} break;
case kDataFormatR8: {
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA8>::Type SrcType;
const SrcType* src_row_start = static_cast<const SrcType*>(source_data);
Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatR8,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoUnmultiply>(
src_row_start, destination_data, pixels_per_row);
} break;
case kDataFormatRGBA8: {
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA8>::Type SrcType;
const SrcType* src_row_start = static_cast<const SrcType*>(source_data);
Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA8,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoUnmultiply>(
src_row_start, destination_data, pixels_per_row);
} break;
case kDataFormatRGBA4444: {
uint16_t* pdst = (uint16_t*)destination_data;
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA8>::Type SrcType;
const SrcType* src_row_start = static_cast<const SrcType*>(source_data);
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA4444>::Type DstType;
DstType* dst_row_start = static_cast<DstType*>(pdst);
Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA4444,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoNothing>(src_row_start, dst_row_start,
pixels_per_row);
} break;
case kDataFormatRGBA5551: {
uint16_t* pdst = (uint16_t*)destination_data;
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA8>::Type SrcType;
const SrcType* src_row_start = static_cast<const SrcType*>(source_data);
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA5551>::Type DstType;
DstType* dst_row_start = static_cast<DstType*>(pdst);
Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA5551,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoNothing>(src_row_start, dst_row_start,
pixels_per_row);
} break;
case kDataFormatRGB565: {
uint16_t* pdst = (uint16_t*)destination_data;
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA8>::Type SrcType;
const SrcType* src_row_start = static_cast<const SrcType*>(source_data);
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGB565>::Type DstType;
DstType* dst_row_start = static_cast<DstType*>(pdst);
Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGB565,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoNothing>(src_row_start, dst_row_start,
pixels_per_row);
} break;
default:
break;
}
}
|
void WebGLImageConversion::PackPixels(const uint8_t* source_data,
DataFormat source_data_format,
unsigned pixels_per_row,
uint8_t* destination_data) {
switch (source_data_format) {
case kDataFormatRA8: {
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA8>::Type SrcType;
const SrcType* src_row_start = static_cast<const SrcType*>(source_data);
Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRA8,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoUnmultiply>(
src_row_start, destination_data, pixels_per_row);
} break;
case kDataFormatR8: {
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA8>::Type SrcType;
const SrcType* src_row_start = static_cast<const SrcType*>(source_data);
Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatR8,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoUnmultiply>(
src_row_start, destination_data, pixels_per_row);
} break;
case kDataFormatRGBA8: {
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA8>::Type SrcType;
const SrcType* src_row_start = static_cast<const SrcType*>(source_data);
Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA8,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoUnmultiply>(
src_row_start, destination_data, pixels_per_row);
} break;
case kDataFormatRGBA4444: {
uint16_t* pdst = (uint16_t*)destination_data;
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA8>::Type SrcType;
const SrcType* src_row_start = static_cast<const SrcType*>(source_data);
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA4444>::Type DstType;
DstType* dst_row_start = static_cast<DstType*>(pdst);
Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA4444,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoNothing>(src_row_start, dst_row_start,
pixels_per_row);
} break;
case kDataFormatRGBA5551: {
uint16_t* pdst = (uint16_t*)destination_data;
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA8>::Type SrcType;
const SrcType* src_row_start = static_cast<const SrcType*>(source_data);
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA5551>::Type DstType;
DstType* dst_row_start = static_cast<DstType*>(pdst);
Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA5551,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoNothing>(src_row_start, dst_row_start,
pixels_per_row);
} break;
case kDataFormatRGB565: {
uint16_t* pdst = (uint16_t*)destination_data;
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGBA8>::Type SrcType;
const SrcType* src_row_start = static_cast<const SrcType*>(source_data);
typedef typename DataTypeForFormat<
WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGB565>::Type DstType;
DstType* dst_row_start = static_cast<DstType*>(pdst);
Pack<WebGLImageConversion::kDataFormatRGB565,
WebGLImageConversion::kAlphaDoNothing>(src_row_start, dst_row_start,
pixels_per_row);
} break;
default:
break;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6636
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6636/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5cfe3023574666663d970ce48cdbc8ed15ce61d9
|
5cfe3023574666663d970ce48cdbc8ed15ce61d9
|
Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
|
void CardUnmaskPromptViews::Layout() {
gfx::Rect contents_bounds = GetContentsBounds();
main_contents_->SetBoundsRect(contents_bounds);
gfx::RectF input_rect = input_row_->GetContentsBounds();
View::ConvertRectToTarget(input_row_, this, &input_rect);
input_rect.set_height(contents_bounds.height());
contents_bounds.Intersect(gfx::ToNearestRect(input_rect));
progress_overlay_->SetBoundsRect(contents_bounds);
}
|
void CardUnmaskPromptViews::Layout() {
gfx::Rect contents_bounds = GetContentsBounds();
main_contents_->SetBoundsRect(contents_bounds);
gfx::RectF input_rect = input_row_->GetContentsBounds();
View::ConvertRectToTarget(input_row_, this, &input_rect);
input_rect.set_height(contents_bounds.height());
contents_bounds.Intersect(gfx::ToNearestRect(input_rect));
progress_overlay_->SetBoundsRect(contents_bounds);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3171
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3171/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d10a8dac48d3a9467e81c62cb45208344f4542db
|
d10a8dac48d3a9467e81c62cb45208344f4542db
|
Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
PassRefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> SerializedScriptValue::create(const String& data)
{
return create(data, v8::Isolate::GetCurrent());
}
|
PassRefPtr<SerializedScriptValue> SerializedScriptValue::create(const String& data)
{
return create(data, v8::Isolate::GetCurrent());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7534
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7534/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/430403b0029b37decf216d57f810899cab2317dd
|
430403b0029b37decf216d57f810899cab2317dd
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/126
|
MagickExport unsigned char *GetQuantumPixels(const QuantumInfo *quantum_info)
{
const int
id = GetOpenMPThreadId();
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
return(quantum_info->pixels[id]);
}
|
MagickExport unsigned char *GetQuantumPixels(const QuantumInfo *quantum_info)
{
const int
id = GetOpenMPThreadId();
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
return(quantum_info->pixels[id]);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
int __ref register_cu2_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
{
return raw_notifier_chain_register(&cu2_chain, nb);
}
|
int __ref register_cu2_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
{
return raw_notifier_chain_register(&cu2_chain, nb);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7026
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7026/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a399b29dfbaaaf91162b2dc5a5875dd51bbfa2a1
|
a399b29dfbaaaf91162b2dc5a5875dd51bbfa2a1
|
ipc,shm: fix shm_file deletion races
When IPC_RMID races with other shm operations there's potential for
use-after-free of the shm object's associated file (shm_file).
Here's the race before this patch:
TASK 1 TASK 2
------ ------
shm_rmid()
ipc_lock_object()
shmctl()
shp = shm_obtain_object_check()
shm_destroy()
shum_unlock()
fput(shp->shm_file)
ipc_lock_object()
shmem_lock(shp->shm_file)
<OOPS>
The oops is caused because shm_destroy() calls fput() after dropping the
ipc_lock. fput() clears the file's f_inode, f_path.dentry, and
f_path.mnt, which causes various NULL pointer references in task 2. I
reliably see the oops in task 2 if with shmlock, shmu
This patch fixes the races by:
1) set shm_file=NULL in shm_destroy() while holding ipc_object_lock().
2) modify at risk operations to check shm_file while holding
ipc_object_lock().
Example workloads, which each trigger oops...
Workload 1:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shm_rmid $id &
shmlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows accessing NULL f_inode due to racing fput:
_raw_spin_lock
shmem_lock
SyS_shmctl
Workload 2:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmat $id 4096 &
shm_rmid $id &
wait
done
The oops stack is similar to workload 1 due to NULL f_inode:
touch_atime
shmem_mmap
shm_mmap
mmap_region
do_mmap_pgoff
do_shmat
SyS_shmat
Workload 3:
while true; do
id=$(shmget 1 4096)
shmlock $id
shm_rmid $id &
shmunlock $id &
wait
done
The oops stack shows second fput tripping on an NULL f_inode. The
first fput() completed via from shm_destroy(), but a racing thread did
a get_file() and queued this fput():
locks_remove_flock
__fput
____fput
task_work_run
do_notify_resume
int_signal
Fixes: c2c737a0461e ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmat")
Fixes: 2caacaa82a51 ("ipc,shm: shorten critical region for shmctl")
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <[email protected]>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <[email protected]>
Cc: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]> # 3.10.17+ 3.11.6+
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(shmat, int, shmid, char __user *, shmaddr, int, shmflg)
{
unsigned long ret;
long err;
err = do_shmat(shmid, shmaddr, shmflg, &ret, SHMLBA);
if (err)
return err;
force_successful_syscall_return();
return (long)ret;
}
|
SYSCALL_DEFINE3(shmat, int, shmid, char __user *, shmaddr, int, shmflg)
{
unsigned long ret;
long err;
err = do_shmat(shmid, shmaddr, shmflg, &ret, SHMLBA);
if (err)
return err;
force_successful_syscall_return();
return (long)ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-1000251
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-1000251/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f2fcfcd670257236ebf2088bbdf26f6a8ef459fe
|
f2fcfcd670257236ebf2088bbdf26f6a8ef459fe
|
Bluetooth: Add configuration support for ERTM and Streaming mode
Add support to config_req and config_rsp to configure ERTM and Streaming
mode. If the remote device specifies ERTM or Streaming mode, then the
same mode is proposed. Otherwise ERTM or Basic mode is used. And in case
of a state 2 device, the remote device should propose the same mode. If
not, then the channel gets disconnected.
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
|
static struct l2cap_conn *l2cap_conn_add(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status)
{
struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
if (conn || status)
return conn;
conn = kzalloc(sizeof(struct l2cap_conn), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!conn)
return NULL;
hcon->l2cap_data = conn;
conn->hcon = hcon;
BT_DBG("hcon %p conn %p", hcon, conn);
conn->mtu = hcon->hdev->acl_mtu;
conn->src = &hcon->hdev->bdaddr;
conn->dst = &hcon->dst;
conn->feat_mask = 0;
setup_timer(&conn->info_timer, l2cap_info_timeout,
(unsigned long) conn);
spin_lock_init(&conn->lock);
rwlock_init(&conn->chan_list.lock);
conn->disc_reason = 0x13;
return conn;
}
|
static struct l2cap_conn *l2cap_conn_add(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status)
{
struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
if (conn || status)
return conn;
conn = kzalloc(sizeof(struct l2cap_conn), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!conn)
return NULL;
hcon->l2cap_data = conn;
conn->hcon = hcon;
BT_DBG("hcon %p conn %p", hcon, conn);
conn->mtu = hcon->hdev->acl_mtu;
conn->src = &hcon->hdev->bdaddr;
conn->dst = &hcon->dst;
conn->feat_mask = 0;
setup_timer(&conn->info_timer, l2cap_info_timeout,
(unsigned long) conn);
spin_lock_init(&conn->lock);
rwlock_init(&conn->chan_list.lock);
conn->disc_reason = 0x13;
return conn;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16077
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16077/
|
CWE-285
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/90f878780cce9c4b0475fcea14d91b8f510cce11
|
90f878780cce9c4b0475fcea14d91b8f510cce11
|
Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
|
Resource* DocumentLoader::StartPreload(Resource::Type type,
FetchParameters& params,
CSSPreloaderResourceClient* client) {
Resource* resource = nullptr;
DCHECK(!client || type == Resource::kCSSStyleSheet);
switch (type) {
case Resource::kImage:
if (frame_)
frame_->MaybeAllowImagePlaceholder(params);
resource = ImageResource::Fetch(params, Fetcher());
break;
case Resource::kScript:
params.SetRequestContext(WebURLRequest::kRequestContextScript);
resource = ScriptResource::Fetch(params, Fetcher(), nullptr);
break;
case Resource::kCSSStyleSheet:
resource = CSSStyleSheetResource::Fetch(params, Fetcher(), client);
break;
case Resource::kFont:
resource = FontResource::Fetch(params, Fetcher(), nullptr);
break;
case Resource::kAudio:
case Resource::kVideo:
resource = RawResource::FetchMedia(params, Fetcher(), nullptr);
break;
case Resource::kTextTrack:
resource = RawResource::FetchTextTrack(params, Fetcher(), nullptr);
break;
case Resource::kImportResource:
resource = RawResource::FetchImport(params, Fetcher(), nullptr);
break;
case Resource::kRaw:
resource = RawResource::Fetch(params, Fetcher(), nullptr);
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
return resource;
}
|
Resource* DocumentLoader::StartPreload(Resource::Type type,
FetchParameters& params,
CSSPreloaderResourceClient* client) {
Resource* resource = nullptr;
DCHECK(!client || type == Resource::kCSSStyleSheet);
switch (type) {
case Resource::kImage:
if (frame_)
frame_->MaybeAllowImagePlaceholder(params);
resource = ImageResource::Fetch(params, Fetcher());
break;
case Resource::kScript:
params.SetRequestContext(WebURLRequest::kRequestContextScript);
resource = ScriptResource::Fetch(params, Fetcher(), nullptr);
break;
case Resource::kCSSStyleSheet:
resource = CSSStyleSheetResource::Fetch(params, Fetcher(), client);
break;
case Resource::kFont:
resource = FontResource::Fetch(params, Fetcher(), nullptr);
break;
case Resource::kAudio:
case Resource::kVideo:
resource = RawResource::FetchMedia(params, Fetcher(), nullptr);
break;
case Resource::kTextTrack:
resource = RawResource::FetchTextTrack(params, Fetcher(), nullptr);
break;
case Resource::kImportResource:
resource = RawResource::FetchImport(params, Fetcher(), nullptr);
break;
case Resource::kRaw:
resource = RawResource::Fetch(params, Fetcher(), nullptr);
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
return resource;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4162
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4162/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8822b64a0fa64a5dd1dfcf837c5b0be83f8c05d1
|
8822b64a0fa64a5dd1dfcf837c5b0be83f8c05d1
|
ipv6: call udp_push_pending_frames when uncorking a socket with AF_INET pending data
We accidentally call down to ip6_push_pending_frames when uncorking
pending AF_INET data on a ipv6 socket. This results in the following
splat (from Dave Jones):
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff816765f6 len:48 put:40 head:ffff88013deb6df0 data:ffff88013deb6dec tail:0x2c end:0xc0 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:126!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Modules linked in: dccp_ipv4 dccp 8021q garp bridge stp dlci mpoa snd_seq_dummy sctp fuse hidp tun bnep nfnetlink scsi_transport_iscsi rfcomm can_raw can_bcm af_802154 appletalk caif_socket can caif ipt_ULOG x25 rose af_key pppoe pppox ipx phonet irda llc2 ppp_generic slhc p8023 psnap p8022 llc crc_ccitt atm bluetooth
+netrom ax25 nfc rfkill rds af_rxrpc coretemp hwmon kvm_intel kvm crc32c_intel snd_hda_codec_realtek ghash_clmulni_intel microcode pcspkr snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec snd_hwdep usb_debug snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm e1000e snd_page_alloc snd_timer ptp snd pps_core soundcore xfs libcrc32c
CPU: 2 PID: 8095 Comm: trinity-child2 Not tainted 3.10.0-rc7+ #37
task: ffff8801f52c2520 ti: ffff8801e6430000 task.ti: ffff8801e6430000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff816e759c>] [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP: 0018:ffff8801e6431de8 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000086 RBX: ffff8802353d3cc0 RCX: 0000000000000006
RDX: 0000000000003b90 RSI: ffff8801f52c2ca0 RDI: ffff8801f52c2520
RBP: ffff8801e6431e08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88022ea0c800
R13: ffff88022ea0cdf8 R14: ffff8802353ecb40 R15: ffffffff81cc7800
FS: 00007f5720a10740(0000) GS:ffff880244c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000005862000 CR3: 000000022843c000 CR4: 00000000001407e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
Stack:
ffff88013deb6dec 000000000000002c 00000000000000c0 ffffffff81a3f6e4
ffff8801e6431e18 ffffffff8159a9aa ffff8801e6431e90 ffffffff816765f6
ffffffff810b756b 0000000700000002 ffff8801e6431e40 0000fea9292aa8c0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8159a9aa>] skb_push+0x3a/0x40
[<ffffffff816765f6>] ip6_push_pending_frames+0x1f6/0x4d0
[<ffffffff810b756b>] ? mark_held_locks+0xbb/0x140
[<ffffffff81694919>] udp_v6_push_pending_frames+0x2b9/0x3d0
[<ffffffff81694660>] ? udplite_getfrag+0x20/0x20
[<ffffffff8162092a>] udp_lib_setsockopt+0x1aa/0x1f0
[<ffffffff811cc5e7>] ? fget_light+0x387/0x4f0
[<ffffffff816958a4>] udpv6_setsockopt+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815949f4>] sock_common_setsockopt+0x14/0x20
[<ffffffff81593c31>] SyS_setsockopt+0x71/0xd0
[<ffffffff816f5d54>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
Code: 00 00 48 89 44 24 10 8b 87 d8 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8b 87 e8 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 c0 04 aa 81 48 89 04 24 31 c0 e8 e1 7e ff ff <0f> 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55 48 89 e5 0f 0b 55
RIP [<ffffffff816e759c>] skb_panic+0x63/0x65
RSP <ffff8801e6431de8>
This patch adds a check if the pending data is of address family AF_INET
and directly calls udp_push_ending_frames from udp_v6_push_pending_frames
if that is the case.
This bug was found by Dave Jones with trinity.
(Also move the initialization of fl6 below the AF_INET check, even if
not strictly necessary.)
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Cc: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void udpv6_encap_enable(void)
{
if (!static_key_enabled(&udpv6_encap_needed))
static_key_slow_inc(&udpv6_encap_needed);
}
|
void udpv6_encap_enable(void)
{
if (!static_key_enabled(&udpv6_encap_needed))
static_key_slow_inc(&udpv6_encap_needed);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16790
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16790/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/mongodb/mongo-c-driver/commit/0d9a4d98bfdf4acd2c0138d4aaeb4e2e0934bd84
|
0d9a4d98bfdf4acd2c0138d4aaeb4e2e0934bd84
|
Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
|
bson_iter_time_t (const bson_iter_t *iter) /* IN */
{
BSON_ASSERT (iter);
if (ITER_TYPE (iter) == BSON_TYPE_DATE_TIME) {
return bson_iter_time_t_unsafe (iter);
}
return 0;
}
|
bson_iter_time_t (const bson_iter_t *iter) /* IN */
{
BSON_ASSERT (iter);
if (ITER_TYPE (iter) == BSON_TYPE_DATE_TIME) {
return bson_iter_time_t_unsafe (iter);
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
mongo-c-driver
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6636
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6636/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5cfe3023574666663d970ce48cdbc8ed15ce61d9
|
5cfe3023574666663d970ce48cdbc8ed15ce61d9
|
Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
|
void CardUnmaskPromptViews::Show() {
constrained_window::ShowWebModalDialogViews(this,
controller_->GetWebContents());
}
|
void CardUnmaskPromptViews::Show() {
constrained_window::ShowWebModalDialogViews(this,
controller_->GetWebContents());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5135
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5135/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b755ebba29dd405d6f1e4cf70f5bc81ffd33b0f6
|
b755ebba29dd405d6f1e4cf70f5bc81ffd33b0f6
|
Guard against the same PrintWebViewHelper being re-entered.
BUG=159165
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367076
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165821 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool PrintWebViewHelper::PrintPreviewContext::CreatePreviewDocument(
const PrintMsg_Print_Params& print_params,
const std::vector<int>& pages,
bool ignore_css_margins) {
DCHECK_EQ(INITIALIZED, state_);
state_ = RENDERING;
metafile_.reset(new printing::PreviewMetafile);
if (!metafile_->Init()) {
set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_METAFILE_INIT_FAILED);
LOG(ERROR) << "PreviewMetafile Init failed";
return false;
}
prep_frame_view_.reset(new PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint(print_params, frame(),
node()));
UpdateFrameAndViewFromCssPageLayout(frame_, node_, prep_frame_view_.get(),
print_params, ignore_css_margins);
total_page_count_ = prep_frame_view_->GetExpectedPageCount();
if (total_page_count_ == 0) {
LOG(ERROR) << "CreatePreviewDocument got 0 page count";
set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_ZERO_PAGES);
return false;
}
int selected_page_count = pages.size();
current_page_index_ = 0;
print_ready_metafile_page_count_ = selected_page_count;
pages_to_render_ = pages;
if (selected_page_count == 0) {
print_ready_metafile_page_count_ = total_page_count_;
for (int i = 0; i < total_page_count_; ++i)
pages_to_render_.push_back(i);
} else if (generate_draft_pages_) {
int pages_index = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < total_page_count_; ++i) {
if (pages_index < selected_page_count && i == pages[pages_index]) {
pages_index++;
continue;
}
pages_to_render_.push_back(i);
}
}
document_render_time_ = base::TimeDelta();
begin_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
return true;
}
|
bool PrintWebViewHelper::PrintPreviewContext::CreatePreviewDocument(
const PrintMsg_Print_Params& print_params,
const std::vector<int>& pages,
bool ignore_css_margins) {
DCHECK_EQ(INITIALIZED, state_);
state_ = RENDERING;
metafile_.reset(new printing::PreviewMetafile);
if (!metafile_->Init()) {
set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_METAFILE_INIT_FAILED);
LOG(ERROR) << "PreviewMetafile Init failed";
return false;
}
prep_frame_view_.reset(new PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint(print_params, frame(),
node()));
UpdateFrameAndViewFromCssPageLayout(frame_, node_, prep_frame_view_.get(),
print_params, ignore_css_margins);
total_page_count_ = prep_frame_view_->GetExpectedPageCount();
if (total_page_count_ == 0) {
LOG(ERROR) << "CreatePreviewDocument got 0 page count";
set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_ZERO_PAGES);
return false;
}
int selected_page_count = pages.size();
current_page_index_ = 0;
print_ready_metafile_page_count_ = selected_page_count;
pages_to_render_ = pages;
if (selected_page_count == 0) {
print_ready_metafile_page_count_ = total_page_count_;
for (int i = 0; i < total_page_count_; ++i)
pages_to_render_.push_back(i);
} else if (generate_draft_pages_) {
int pages_index = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < total_page_count_; ++i) {
if (pages_index < selected_page_count && i == pages[pages_index]) {
pages_index++;
continue;
}
pages_to_render_.push_back(i);
}
}
document_render_time_ = base::TimeDelta();
begin_time_ = base::TimeTicks::Now();
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7339
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7339/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c2349758acf1874e4c2b93fe41d072336f1a31d0
|
c2349758acf1874e4c2b93fe41d072336f1a31d0
|
rds: prevent dereference of a NULL device
Binding might result in a NULL device, which is dereferenced
causing this BUG:
[ 1317.260548] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000000000000097
4
[ 1317.261847] IP: [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+0x82/0x110
[ 1317.263315] PGD 418bcb067 PUD 3ceb21067 PMD 0
[ 1317.263502] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
[ 1317.264179] Dumping ftrace buffer:
[ 1317.264774] (ftrace buffer empty)
[ 1317.265220] Modules linked in:
[ 1317.265824] CPU: 4 PID: 836 Comm: trinity-child46 Tainted: G W 3.13.0-rc4-
next-20131218-sasha-00013-g2cebb9b-dirty #4159
[ 1317.267415] task: ffff8803ddf33000 ti: ffff8803cd31a000 task.ti: ffff8803cd31a000
[ 1317.268399] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff84225f52>] [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+
0x82/0x110
[ 1317.269670] RSP: 0000:ffff8803cd31bdf8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 1317.270230] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88020b0dd388 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] RDX: ffffffff8439822e RSI: 00000000000c000a RDI: 0000000000000286
[ 1317.270230] RBP: ffff8803cd31be38 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] R13: 0000000054086700 R14: 0000000000a25de0 R15: 0000000000000031
[ 1317.270230] FS: 00007ff40251d700(0000) GS:ffff88022e200000(0000) knlGS:000000000000
0000
[ 1317.270230] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 1317.270230] CR2: 0000000000000974 CR3: 00000003cd478000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 1317.270230] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000090602
[ 1317.270230] Stack:
[ 1317.270230] 0000000054086700 5408670000a25de0 5408670000000002 0000000000000000
[ 1317.270230] ffffffff84223542 00000000ea54c767 0000000000000000 ffffffff86d26160
[ 1317.270230] ffff8803cd31be68 ffffffff84223556 ffff8803cd31beb8 ffff8800c6765280
[ 1317.270230] Call Trace:
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff84223542>] ? rds_trans_get_preferred+0x42/0xa0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff84223556>] rds_trans_get_preferred+0x56/0xa0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8421c9c3>] rds_bind+0x73/0xf0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff83e4ce62>] SYSC_bind+0x92/0xf0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff812493f8>] ? context_tracking_user_exit+0xb8/0x1d0
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8119313d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff8107a852>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x32/0x290
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff83e4cece>] SyS_bind+0xe/0x10
[ 1317.270230] [<ffffffff843a6ad0>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
[ 1317.270230] Code: 00 8b 45 cc 48 8d 75 d0 48 c7 45 d8 00 00 00 00 66 c7 45 d0 02 00
89 45 d4 48 89 df e8 78 49 76 ff 41 89 c4 85 c0 75 0c 48 8b 03 <80> b8 74 09 00 00 01 7
4 06 41 bc 9d ff ff ff f6 05 2a b6 c2 02
[ 1317.270230] RIP [<ffffffff84225f52>] rds_ib_laddr_check+0x82/0x110
[ 1317.270230] RSP <ffff8803cd31bdf8>
[ 1317.270230] CR2: 0000000000000974
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int rds_ib_init(void)
{
int ret;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rds_ib_devices);
ret = ib_register_client(&rds_ib_client);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = rds_ib_sysctl_init();
if (ret)
goto out_ibreg;
ret = rds_ib_recv_init();
if (ret)
goto out_sysctl;
ret = rds_trans_register(&rds_ib_transport);
if (ret)
goto out_recv;
rds_info_register_func(RDS_INFO_IB_CONNECTIONS, rds_ib_ic_info);
goto out;
out_recv:
rds_ib_recv_exit();
out_sysctl:
rds_ib_sysctl_exit();
out_ibreg:
rds_ib_unregister_client();
out:
return ret;
}
|
int rds_ib_init(void)
{
int ret;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rds_ib_devices);
ret = ib_register_client(&rds_ib_client);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = rds_ib_sysctl_init();
if (ret)
goto out_ibreg;
ret = rds_ib_recv_init();
if (ret)
goto out_sysctl;
ret = rds_trans_register(&rds_ib_transport);
if (ret)
goto out_recv;
rds_info_register_func(RDS_INFO_IB_CONNECTIONS, rds_ib_ic_info);
goto out;
out_recv:
rds_ib_recv_exit();
out_sysctl:
rds_ib_sysctl_exit();
out_ibreg:
rds_ib_unregister_client();
out:
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fc790462b4f248712bbc8c3734664dd6b05f80f2
|
fc790462b4f248712bbc8c3734664dd6b05f80f2
|
Set the job name for the print job on the Mac.
BUG=http://crbug.com/29188
TEST=as in bug
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/1997016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@47056 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
PrintingContext::~PrintingContext() {
ResetSettings();
}
|
PrintingContext::~PrintingContext() {
ResetSettings();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9903/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4efbc454ba68def5ef285b26ebfcfdb605b52755
|
4efbc454ba68def5ef285b26ebfcfdb605b52755
|
sched: Fix information leak in sys_sched_getattr()
We're copying the on-stack structure to userspace, but forgot to give
the right number of bytes to copy. This allows the calling process to
obtain up to PAGE_SIZE bytes from the stack (and possibly adjacent
kernel memory).
This fix copies only as much as we actually have on the stack
(attr->size defaults to the size of the struct) and leaves the rest of
the userspace-provided buffer untouched.
Found using kmemcheck + trinity.
Fixes: d50dde5a10f30 ("sched: Add new scheduler syscalls to support an extended scheduling parameters ABI")
Cc: Dario Faggioli <[email protected]>
Cc: Juri Lelli <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
|
void scheduler_tick(void)
{
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
struct task_struct *curr = rq->curr;
sched_clock_tick();
raw_spin_lock(&rq->lock);
update_rq_clock(rq);
curr->sched_class->task_tick(rq, curr, 0);
update_cpu_load_active(rq);
raw_spin_unlock(&rq->lock);
perf_event_task_tick();
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
rq->idle_balance = idle_cpu(cpu);
trigger_load_balance(rq);
#endif
rq_last_tick_reset(rq);
}
|
void scheduler_tick(void)
{
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
struct task_struct *curr = rq->curr;
sched_clock_tick();
raw_spin_lock(&rq->lock);
update_rq_clock(rq);
curr->sched_class->task_tick(rq, curr, 0);
update_cpu_load_active(rq);
raw_spin_unlock(&rq->lock);
perf_event_task_tick();
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
rq->idle_balance = idle_cpu(cpu);
trigger_load_balance(rq);
#endif
rq_last_tick_reset(rq);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16427
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16427/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/1447/commits/8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
|
static int piv_match_card_continued(sc_card_t *card)
{
int i;
int type = -1;
piv_private_data_t *priv = NULL;
int saved_type = card->type;
/* Since we send an APDU, the card's logout function may be called...
* however it may be in dirty memory */
card->ops->logout = NULL;
/* piv_match_card may be called with card->type, set by opensc.conf */
/* user provide card type must be one we know */
switch (card->type) {
case -1:
case SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_GENERIC:
case SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_HIST:
case SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_NEO:
case SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_YUBIKEY4:
case SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_GI_DE:
type = card->type;
break;
default:
return 0; /* can not handle the card */
}
if (type == -1) {
/*
*try to identify card by ATR or historical data in ATR
* currently all PIV card will respond to piv_find_aid
* the same. But in future may need to know card type first,
* so do it here.
*/
if (card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes != NULL) {
if (card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes_len == 8 &&
!(memcmp(card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes, "Yubikey4", 8))) {
type = SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_YUBIKEY4;
}
else if (card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes_len >= 7 &&
!(memcmp(card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes, "Yubikey", 7))) {
type = SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_NEO;
}
/*
* https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp1239.pdf
* lists 2 ATRS with historical bytes:
* 73 66 74 65 2D 63 64 30 38 30
* 73 66 74 65 20 63 64 31 34 34
* will check for 73 66 74 65
*/
else if (card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes_len >= 4
&& !(memcmp(card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes, "sfte", 4))) {
type = SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_GI_DE;
}
else if (card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes_len > 0
&& card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes[0] == 0x80u) { /* compact TLV */
size_t datalen;
const u8 *data = sc_compacttlv_find_tag(card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes + 1,
card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes_len - 1,
0xF0, &datalen);
if (data != NULL) {
int k;
for (k = 0; piv_aids[k].len_long != 0; k++) {
if (datalen == piv_aids[k].len_long
&& !memcmp(data, piv_aids[k].value, datalen)) {
type = SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_HIST;
break;
}
}
}
}
}
if (type == -1)
type = SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_GENERIC;
}
/* allocate and init basic fields */
priv = calloc(1, sizeof(piv_private_data_t));
if (!priv)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
if (card->type == -1)
card->type = type;
card->drv_data = priv; /* will free if no match, or pass on to piv_init */
priv->aid_file = sc_file_new();
priv->selected_obj = -1;
priv->pin_preference = 0x80; /* 800-73-3 part 1, table 3 */
priv->logged_in = SC_PIN_STATE_UNKNOWN;
priv->tries_left = 10; /* will assume OK at start */
priv->pstate = PIV_STATE_MATCH;
/* Some objects will only be present if History object says so */
for (i=0; i < PIV_OBJ_LAST_ENUM -1; i++)
if(piv_objects[i].flags & PIV_OBJECT_NOT_PRESENT)
priv->obj_cache[i].flags |= PIV_OBJ_CACHE_NOT_PRESENT;
sc_lock(card);
/*
* detect if active AID is PIV. NIST 800-73 says Only one PIV application per card
* and PIV must be the default application
* This can avoid doing doing a select_aid and losing the login state on some cards
* We may get interference on some cards by other drivers trying SELECT_AID before
* we get to see if PIV application is still active.
* putting PIV driver first might help.
* This may fail if the wrong AID is active
*/
i = piv_find_discovery(card);
if (i < 0) {
/* Detect by selecting applet */
sc_file_t aidfile;
i = piv_find_aid(card, &aidfile);
}
if (i >= 0) {
/*
* We now know PIV AID is active, test DISCOVERY object
* Some CAC cards with PIV don't support DISCOVERY and return
* SC_ERROR_INCORRECT_PARAMETERS. Any error other then
* SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND means we cannot use discovery
* to test for active AID.
*/
int i7e = piv_find_discovery(card);
if (i7e != 0 && i7e != SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND) {
priv->card_issues |= CI_DISCOVERY_USELESS;
priv->obj_cache[PIV_OBJ_DISCOVERY].flags |= PIV_OBJ_CACHE_NOT_PRESENT;
}
}
if (i < 0) {
/* don't match. Does not have a PIV applet. */
sc_unlock(card);
piv_finish(card);
card->type = saved_type;
return 0;
}
/* Matched, caller will use or free priv and sc_lock as needed */
priv->pstate=PIV_STATE_INIT;
return 1; /* match */
}
|
static int piv_match_card_continued(sc_card_t *card)
{
int i;
int type = -1;
piv_private_data_t *priv = NULL;
int saved_type = card->type;
/* Since we send an APDU, the card's logout function may be called...
* however it may be in dirty memory */
card->ops->logout = NULL;
/* piv_match_card may be called with card->type, set by opensc.conf */
/* user provide card type must be one we know */
switch (card->type) {
case -1:
case SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_GENERIC:
case SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_HIST:
case SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_NEO:
case SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_YUBIKEY4:
case SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_GI_DE:
type = card->type;
break;
default:
return 0; /* can not handle the card */
}
if (type == -1) {
/*
*try to identify card by ATR or historical data in ATR
* currently all PIV card will respond to piv_find_aid
* the same. But in future may need to know card type first,
* so do it here.
*/
if (card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes != NULL) {
if (card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes_len == 8 &&
!(memcmp(card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes, "Yubikey4", 8))) {
type = SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_YUBIKEY4;
}
else if (card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes_len >= 7 &&
!(memcmp(card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes, "Yubikey", 7))) {
type = SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_NEO;
}
/*
* https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/documents/security-policies/140sp1239.pdf
* lists 2 ATRS with historical bytes:
* 73 66 74 65 2D 63 64 30 38 30
* 73 66 74 65 20 63 64 31 34 34
* will check for 73 66 74 65
*/
else if (card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes_len >= 4 &&
!(memcmp(card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes, "sfte", 4))) {
type = SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_GI_DE;
}
else if (card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes[0] == 0x80u) { /* compact TLV */
size_t datalen;
const u8 *data = sc_compacttlv_find_tag(card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes + 1,
card->reader->atr_info.hist_bytes_len - 1,
0xF0, &datalen);
if (data != NULL) {
int k;
for (k = 0; piv_aids[k].len_long != 0; k++) {
if (datalen == piv_aids[k].len_long
&& !memcmp(data, piv_aids[k].value, datalen)) {
type = SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_HIST;
break;
}
}
}
}
}
if (type == -1)
type = SC_CARD_TYPE_PIV_II_GENERIC;
}
/* allocate and init basic fields */
priv = calloc(1, sizeof(piv_private_data_t));
if (!priv)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
if (card->type == -1)
card->type = type;
card->drv_data = priv; /* will free if no match, or pass on to piv_init */
priv->aid_file = sc_file_new();
priv->selected_obj = -1;
priv->pin_preference = 0x80; /* 800-73-3 part 1, table 3 */
priv->logged_in = SC_PIN_STATE_UNKNOWN;
priv->tries_left = 10; /* will assume OK at start */
priv->pstate = PIV_STATE_MATCH;
/* Some objects will only be present if History object says so */
for (i=0; i < PIV_OBJ_LAST_ENUM -1; i++)
if(piv_objects[i].flags & PIV_OBJECT_NOT_PRESENT)
priv->obj_cache[i].flags |= PIV_OBJ_CACHE_NOT_PRESENT;
sc_lock(card);
/*
* detect if active AID is PIV. NIST 800-73 says Only one PIV application per card
* and PIV must be the default application
* This can avoid doing doing a select_aid and losing the login state on some cards
* We may get interference on some cards by other drivers trying SELECT_AID before
* we get to see if PIV application is still active.
* putting PIV driver first might help.
* This may fail if the wrong AID is active
*/
i = piv_find_discovery(card);
if (i < 0) {
/* Detect by selecting applet */
sc_file_t aidfile;
i = piv_find_aid(card, &aidfile);
}
if (i >= 0) {
/*
* We now know PIV AID is active, test DISCOVERY object
* Some CAC cards with PIV don't support DISCOVERY and return
* SC_ERROR_INCORRECT_PARAMETERS. Any error other then
* SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND means we cannot use discovery
* to test for active AID.
*/
int i7e = piv_find_discovery(card);
if (i7e != 0 && i7e != SC_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND) {
priv->card_issues |= CI_DISCOVERY_USELESS;
priv->obj_cache[PIV_OBJ_DISCOVERY].flags |= PIV_OBJ_CACHE_NOT_PRESENT;
}
}
if (i < 0) {
/* don't match. Does not have a PIV applet. */
sc_unlock(card);
piv_finish(card);
card->type = saved_type;
return 0;
}
/* Matched, caller will use or free priv and sc_lock as needed */
priv->pstate=PIV_STATE_INIT;
return 1; /* match */
}
|
C
|
OpenSC
| 1 |
CVE-2019-13272
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-13272/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6994eefb0053799d2e07cd140df6c2ea106c41ee
|
6994eefb0053799d2e07cd140df6c2ea106c41ee
|
ptrace: Fix ->ptracer_cred handling for PTRACE_TRACEME
Fix two issues:
When called for PTRACE_TRACEME, ptrace_link() would obtain an RCU
reference to the parent's objective credentials, then give that pointer
to get_cred(). However, the object lifetime rules for things like
struct cred do not permit unconditionally turning an RCU reference into
a stable reference.
PTRACE_TRACEME records the parent's credentials as if the parent was
acting as the subject, but that's not the case. If a malicious
unprivileged child uses PTRACE_TRACEME and the parent is privileged, and
at a later point, the parent process becomes attacker-controlled
(because it drops privileges and calls execve()), the attacker ends up
with control over two processes with a privileged ptrace relationship,
which can be abused to ptrace a suid binary and obtain root privileges.
Fix both of these by always recording the credentials of the process
that is requesting the creation of the ptrace relationship:
current_cred() can't change under us, and current is the proper subject
for access control.
This change is theoretically userspace-visible, but I am not aware of
any code that it will actually break.
Fixes: 64b875f7ac8a ("ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void ptrace_unfreeze_traced(struct task_struct *task)
{
if (task->state != __TASK_TRACED)
return;
WARN_ON(!task->ptrace || task->parent != current);
/*
* PTRACE_LISTEN can allow ptrace_trap_notify to wake us up remotely.
* Recheck state under the lock to close this race.
*/
spin_lock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock);
if (task->state == __TASK_TRACED) {
if (__fatal_signal_pending(task))
wake_up_state(task, __TASK_TRACED);
else
task->state = TASK_TRACED;
}
spin_unlock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock);
}
|
static void ptrace_unfreeze_traced(struct task_struct *task)
{
if (task->state != __TASK_TRACED)
return;
WARN_ON(!task->ptrace || task->parent != current);
/*
* PTRACE_LISTEN can allow ptrace_trap_notify to wake us up remotely.
* Recheck state under the lock to close this race.
*/
spin_lock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock);
if (task->state == __TASK_TRACED) {
if (__fatal_signal_pending(task))
wake_up_state(task, __TASK_TRACED);
else
task->state = TASK_TRACED;
}
spin_unlock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2237
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2237/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/85dfb745ee40232876663ae206cba35f24ab2a40
|
85dfb745ee40232876663ae206cba35f24ab2a40
|
af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
|
static int set_ipsecrequest(struct sk_buff *skb,
uint8_t proto, uint8_t mode, int level,
uint32_t reqid, uint8_t family,
const xfrm_address_t *src, const xfrm_address_t *dst)
{
struct sadb_x_ipsecrequest *rq;
u8 *sa;
int socklen = pfkey_sockaddr_len(family);
int size_req;
size_req = sizeof(struct sadb_x_ipsecrequest) +
pfkey_sockaddr_pair_size(family);
rq = (struct sadb_x_ipsecrequest *)skb_put(skb, size_req);
memset(rq, 0, size_req);
rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_len = size_req;
rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_proto = proto;
rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_mode = mode;
rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_level = level;
rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_reqid = reqid;
sa = (u8 *) (rq + 1);
if (!pfkey_sockaddr_fill(src, 0, (struct sockaddr *)sa, family) ||
!pfkey_sockaddr_fill(dst, 0, (struct sockaddr *)(sa + socklen), family))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
|
static int set_ipsecrequest(struct sk_buff *skb,
uint8_t proto, uint8_t mode, int level,
uint32_t reqid, uint8_t family,
const xfrm_address_t *src, const xfrm_address_t *dst)
{
struct sadb_x_ipsecrequest *rq;
u8 *sa;
int socklen = pfkey_sockaddr_len(family);
int size_req;
size_req = sizeof(struct sadb_x_ipsecrequest) +
pfkey_sockaddr_pair_size(family);
rq = (struct sadb_x_ipsecrequest *)skb_put(skb, size_req);
memset(rq, 0, size_req);
rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_len = size_req;
rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_proto = proto;
rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_mode = mode;
rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_level = level;
rq->sadb_x_ipsecrequest_reqid = reqid;
sa = (u8 *) (rq + 1);
if (!pfkey_sockaddr_fill(src, 0, (struct sockaddr *)sa, family) ||
!pfkey_sockaddr_fill(dst, 0, (struct sockaddr *)(sa + socklen), family))
return -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20182
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20182/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/rdesktop/rdesktop/commit/4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1
|
4dca546d04321a610c1835010b5dad85163b65e1
|
Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
|
mcs_recv(uint16 * channel, RD_BOOL * is_fastpath, uint8 * fastpath_hdr)
{
uint8 opcode, appid, length;
STREAM s;
s = iso_recv(is_fastpath, fastpath_hdr);
if (s == NULL)
return NULL;
if (*is_fastpath == True)
return s;
in_uint8(s, opcode);
appid = opcode >> 2;
if (appid != MCS_SDIN)
{
if (appid != MCS_DPUM)
{
logger(Protocol, Error, "mcs_recv(), expected data, got %d", opcode);
}
return NULL;
}
in_uint8s(s, 2); /* userid */
in_uint16_be(s, *channel);
in_uint8s(s, 1); /* flags */
in_uint8(s, length);
if (length & 0x80)
in_uint8s(s, 1); /* second byte of length */
return s;
}
|
mcs_recv(uint16 * channel, RD_BOOL * is_fastpath, uint8 * fastpath_hdr)
{
uint8 opcode, appid, length;
STREAM s;
s = iso_recv(is_fastpath, fastpath_hdr);
if (s == NULL)
return NULL;
if (*is_fastpath == True)
return s;
in_uint8(s, opcode);
appid = opcode >> 2;
if (appid != MCS_SDIN)
{
if (appid != MCS_DPUM)
{
logger(Protocol, Error, "mcs_recv(), expected data, got %d", opcode);
}
return NULL;
}
in_uint8s(s, 2); /* userid */
in_uint16_be(s, *channel);
in_uint8s(s, 1); /* flags */
in_uint8(s, length);
if (length & 0x80)
in_uint8s(s, 1); /* second byte of length */
return s;
}
|
C
|
rdesktop
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2100
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2100/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d50f2ab6f050311dbf7b8f5501b25f0bf64a439b
|
d50f2ab6f050311dbf7b8f5501b25f0bf64a439b
|
ext4: fix undefined behavior in ext4_fill_flex_info()
Commit 503358ae01b70ce6909d19dd01287093f6b6271c ("ext4: avoid divide by
zero when trying to mount a corrupted file system") fixes CVE-2009-4307
by performing a sanity check on s_log_groups_per_flex, since it can be
set to a bogus value by an attacker.
sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex = sbi->s_es->s_log_groups_per_flex;
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex < 2) { ... }
This patch fixes two potential issues in the previous commit.
1) The sanity check might only work on architectures like PowerPC.
On x86, 5 bits are used for the shifting amount. That means, given a
large s_log_groups_per_flex value like 36, groups_per_flex = 1 << 36
is essentially 1 << 4 = 16, rather than 0. This will bypass the check,
leaving s_log_groups_per_flex and groups_per_flex inconsistent.
2) The sanity check relies on undefined behavior, i.e., oversized shift.
A standard-confirming C compiler could rewrite the check in unexpected
ways. Consider the following equivalent form, assuming groups_per_flex
is unsigned for simplicity.
groups_per_flex = 1 << sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex;
if (groups_per_flex == 0 || groups_per_flex == 1) {
We compile the code snippet using Clang 3.0 and GCC 4.6. Clang will
completely optimize away the check groups_per_flex == 0, leaving the
patched code as vulnerable as the original. GCC keeps the check, but
there is no guarantee that future versions will do the same.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
static void ext4_destroy_lazyinit_thread(void)
{
/*
* If thread exited earlier
* there's nothing to be done.
*/
if (!ext4_li_info || !ext4_lazyinit_task)
return;
kthread_stop(ext4_lazyinit_task);
}
|
static void ext4_destroy_lazyinit_thread(void)
{
/*
* If thread exited earlier
* there's nothing to be done.
*/
if (!ext4_li_info || !ext4_lazyinit_task)
return;
kthread_stop(ext4_lazyinit_task);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1613
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1613/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7394cf6f43d7a86630d3eb1c728fd63c621b5530
|
7394cf6f43d7a86630d3eb1c728fd63c621b5530
|
Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
|
SiteFeatureUsage LocalSiteCharacteristicsDataImpl::GetFeatureUsage(
const SiteCharacteristicsFeatureProto& feature_proto,
const base::TimeDelta min_obs_time) const {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
if (!feature_proto.IsInitialized())
return SiteFeatureUsage::kSiteFeatureUsageUnknown;
if (!InternalRepresentationToTimeDelta(feature_proto.use_timestamp())
.is_zero()) {
return SiteFeatureUsage::kSiteFeatureInUse;
}
if (FeatureObservationDuration(feature_proto) >= min_obs_time)
return SiteFeatureUsage::kSiteFeatureNotInUse;
return SiteFeatureUsage::kSiteFeatureUsageUnknown;
}
|
SiteFeatureUsage LocalSiteCharacteristicsDataImpl::GetFeatureUsage(
const SiteCharacteristicsFeatureProto& feature_proto,
const base::TimeDelta min_obs_time) const {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
if (!feature_proto.IsInitialized())
return SiteFeatureUsage::kSiteFeatureUsageUnknown;
if (!InternalRepresentationToTimeDelta(feature_proto.use_timestamp())
.is_zero()) {
return SiteFeatureUsage::kSiteFeatureInUse;
}
if (FeatureObservationDuration(feature_proto) >= min_obs_time)
return SiteFeatureUsage::kSiteFeatureNotInUse;
return SiteFeatureUsage::kSiteFeatureUsageUnknown;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18234
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18234/
|
CWE-416
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/exempi/commit/?id=c26d5beb60a5a85f76259f50ed3e08c8169b0a0c
|
c26d5beb60a5a85f76259f50ed3e08c8169b0a0c
| null |
ImportTIFF_GPSCoordinate ( const TIFF_Manager & tiff, const TIFF_Manager::TagInfo & posInfo,
SXMPMeta * xmp, const char * xmpNS, const char * xmpProp )
{
try { // Don't let errors with one stop the others. Tolerate ill-formed values where reasonable.
const bool nativeEndian = tiff.IsNativeEndian();
if ( (posInfo.type != kTIFF_RationalType) || (posInfo.count == 0) ) return;
XMP_Uns16 refID = posInfo.id - 1; // ! The GPS refs and coordinates are all tag n and n+1.
TIFF_Manager::TagInfo refInfo;
bool found = tiff.GetTag ( kTIFF_GPSInfoIFD, refID, &refInfo );
if ( (! found) || (refInfo.count == 0) ) return;
char ref = *((char*)refInfo.dataPtr);
if ( (ref != 'N') && (ref != 'S') && (ref != 'E') && (ref != 'W') ) return;
XMP_Uns32 * binPtr = (XMP_Uns32*)posInfo.dataPtr;
XMP_Uns32 degNum = 0, degDenom = 1; // Defaults for missing parts.
XMP_Uns32 minNum = 0, minDenom = 1;
XMP_Uns32 secNum = 0, secDenom = 1;
if ( ! nativeEndian ) {
degDenom = Flip4 ( degDenom ); // So they can be flipped again below.
minDenom = Flip4 ( minDenom );
secDenom = Flip4 ( secDenom );
}
degNum = GetUns32AsIs ( &binPtr[0] );
degDenom = GetUns32AsIs ( &binPtr[1] );
if ( posInfo.count >= 2 ) {
minNum = GetUns32AsIs ( &binPtr[2] );
minDenom = GetUns32AsIs ( &binPtr[3] );
if ( posInfo.count >= 3 ) {
secNum = GetUns32AsIs ( &binPtr[4] );
secDenom = GetUns32AsIs ( &binPtr[5] );
}
}
if ( ! nativeEndian ) {
degNum = Flip4 ( degNum );
degDenom = Flip4 ( degDenom );
minNum = Flip4 ( minNum );
minDenom = Flip4 ( minDenom );
secNum = Flip4 ( secNum );
secDenom = Flip4 ( secDenom );
}
char buffer[40];
if ( (degDenom == 1) && (minDenom == 1) && (secDenom == 1) ) {
snprintf ( buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%lu,%lu,%lu%c", (unsigned long)degNum, (unsigned long)minNum, (unsigned long)secNum, ref ); // AUDIT: Using sizeof(buffer) is safe.
} else if ( (degDenom == 0 && degNum != 0) || (minDenom == 0 && minNum != 0) || (secDenom == 0 && secNum != 0) ) {
return; // Do not continue with import
} else {
XMP_Uns32 maxDenom = degDenom;
if ( minDenom > maxDenom ) maxDenom = minDenom;
if ( secDenom > maxDenom ) maxDenom = secDenom;
int fracDigits = 1;
while ( maxDenom > 10 ) { ++fracDigits; maxDenom = maxDenom/10; }
double degrees, minutes;
if ( degDenom == 0 && degNum == 0 ) {
degrees = 0;
} else {
degrees = (double)( (XMP_Uns32)((double)degNum / (double)degDenom) ); // Just the integral number of degrees.
}
if ( minDenom == 0 && minNum == 0 ) {
minutes = 0;
} else {
double temp = 0;
if( degrees != 0 ) temp = ((double)degNum / (double)degDenom) - degrees;
minutes = (temp * 60.0) + ((double)minNum / (double)minDenom);
}
if ( secDenom != 0 && secNum != 0 ) {
minutes += ((double)secNum / (double)secDenom) / 60.0;
}
snprintf ( buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%.0f,%.*f%c", degrees, fracDigits, minutes, ref ); // AUDIT: Using sizeof(buffer) is safe.
}
xmp->SetProperty ( xmpNS, xmpProp, buffer );
} catch ( ... ) {
}
} // ImportTIFF_GPSCoordinate
|
ImportTIFF_GPSCoordinate ( const TIFF_Manager & tiff, const TIFF_Manager::TagInfo & posInfo,
SXMPMeta * xmp, const char * xmpNS, const char * xmpProp )
{
try { // Don't let errors with one stop the others. Tolerate ill-formed values where reasonable.
const bool nativeEndian = tiff.IsNativeEndian();
if ( (posInfo.type != kTIFF_RationalType) || (posInfo.count == 0) ) return;
XMP_Uns16 refID = posInfo.id - 1; // ! The GPS refs and coordinates are all tag n and n+1.
TIFF_Manager::TagInfo refInfo;
bool found = tiff.GetTag ( kTIFF_GPSInfoIFD, refID, &refInfo );
if ( (! found) || (refInfo.count == 0) ) return;
char ref = *((char*)refInfo.dataPtr);
if ( (ref != 'N') && (ref != 'S') && (ref != 'E') && (ref != 'W') ) return;
XMP_Uns32 * binPtr = (XMP_Uns32*)posInfo.dataPtr;
XMP_Uns32 degNum = 0, degDenom = 1; // Defaults for missing parts.
XMP_Uns32 minNum = 0, minDenom = 1;
XMP_Uns32 secNum = 0, secDenom = 1;
if ( ! nativeEndian ) {
degDenom = Flip4 ( degDenom ); // So they can be flipped again below.
minDenom = Flip4 ( minDenom );
secDenom = Flip4 ( secDenom );
}
degNum = GetUns32AsIs ( &binPtr[0] );
degDenom = GetUns32AsIs ( &binPtr[1] );
if ( posInfo.count >= 2 ) {
minNum = GetUns32AsIs ( &binPtr[2] );
minDenom = GetUns32AsIs ( &binPtr[3] );
if ( posInfo.count >= 3 ) {
secNum = GetUns32AsIs ( &binPtr[4] );
secDenom = GetUns32AsIs ( &binPtr[5] );
}
}
if ( ! nativeEndian ) {
degNum = Flip4 ( degNum );
degDenom = Flip4 ( degDenom );
minNum = Flip4 ( minNum );
minDenom = Flip4 ( minDenom );
secNum = Flip4 ( secNum );
secDenom = Flip4 ( secDenom );
}
char buffer[40];
if ( (degDenom == 1) && (minDenom == 1) && (secDenom == 1) ) {
snprintf ( buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%lu,%lu,%lu%c", (unsigned long)degNum, (unsigned long)minNum, (unsigned long)secNum, ref ); // AUDIT: Using sizeof(buffer) is safe.
} else if ( (degDenom == 0 && degNum != 0) || (minDenom == 0 && minNum != 0) || (secDenom == 0 && secNum != 0) ) {
return; // Do not continue with import
} else {
XMP_Uns32 maxDenom = degDenom;
if ( minDenom > maxDenom ) maxDenom = minDenom;
if ( secDenom > maxDenom ) maxDenom = secDenom;
int fracDigits = 1;
while ( maxDenom > 10 ) { ++fracDigits; maxDenom = maxDenom/10; }
double degrees, minutes;
if ( degDenom == 0 && degNum == 0 ) {
degrees = 0;
} else {
degrees = (double)( (XMP_Uns32)((double)degNum / (double)degDenom) ); // Just the integral number of degrees.
}
if ( minDenom == 0 && minNum == 0 ) {
minutes = 0;
} else {
double temp = 0;
if( degrees != 0 ) temp = ((double)degNum / (double)degDenom) - degrees;
minutes = (temp * 60.0) + ((double)minNum / (double)minDenom);
}
if ( secDenom != 0 && secNum != 0 ) {
minutes += ((double)secNum / (double)secDenom) / 60.0;
}
snprintf ( buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%.0f,%.*f%c", degrees, fracDigits, minutes, ref ); // AUDIT: Using sizeof(buffer) is safe.
}
xmp->SetProperty ( xmpNS, xmpProp, buffer );
} catch ( ... ) {
}
} // ImportTIFF_GPSCoordinate
|
CPP
|
exempi
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
unsigned long kgdb_arch_pc(int exception, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (exception == 3)
return instruction_pointer(regs) - 1;
return instruction_pointer(regs);
}
|
unsigned long kgdb_arch_pc(int exception, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (exception == 3)
return instruction_pointer(regs) - 1;
return instruction_pointer(regs);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1665
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1665/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/282f53ffdc3b1902da86f6a0791af736837efbf8
|
282f53ffdc3b1902da86f6a0791af736837efbf8
|
[signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
|
void ExpectOneTokenAvailableNotification() {
EXPECT_EQ(1, token_available_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(0, token_revoked_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(0, tokens_loaded_count_);
ResetObserverCounts();
}
|
void ExpectOneTokenAvailableNotification() {
EXPECT_EQ(1, token_available_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(0, token_revoked_count_);
EXPECT_EQ(0, tokens_loaded_count_);
ResetObserverCounts();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1266ba494530a267ec8a21442ea1b5cae94da4fb
|
1266ba494530a267ec8a21442ea1b5cae94da4fb
|
Introduce XGetImage() for GrabWindowSnapshot() in ChromeOS.
BUG=119492
TEST=manually done
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10386124
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137556 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
RootWindow* RootWindow::GetRootWindow() {
return this;
}
|
RootWindow* RootWindow::GetRootWindow() {
return this;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11599
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11599/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/04f5866e41fb70690e28397487d8bd8eea7d712a
|
04f5866e41fb70690e28397487d8bd8eea7d712a
|
coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
unsigned long flags, vm_flags_t vm_flags,
unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long *populate,
struct list_head *uf)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
int pkey = 0;
*populate = 0;
if (!len)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Does the application expect PROT_READ to imply PROT_EXEC?
*
* (the exception is when the underlying filesystem is noexec
* mounted, in which case we dont add PROT_EXEC.)
*/
if ((prot & PROT_READ) && (current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
if (!(file && path_noexec(&file->f_path)))
prot |= PROT_EXEC;
/* force arch specific MAP_FIXED handling in get_unmapped_area */
if (flags & MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE)
flags |= MAP_FIXED;
if (!(flags & MAP_FIXED))
addr = round_hint_to_min(addr);
/* Careful about overflows.. */
len = PAGE_ALIGN(len);
if (!len)
return -ENOMEM;
/* offset overflow? */
if ((pgoff + (len >> PAGE_SHIFT)) < pgoff)
return -EOVERFLOW;
/* Too many mappings? */
if (mm->map_count > sysctl_max_map_count)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Obtain the address to map to. we verify (or select) it and ensure
* that it represents a valid section of the address space.
*/
addr = get_unmapped_area(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags);
if (offset_in_page(addr))
return addr;
if (flags & MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE) {
struct vm_area_struct *vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
if (vma && vma->vm_start < addr + len)
return -EEXIST;
}
if (prot == PROT_EXEC) {
pkey = execute_only_pkey(mm);
if (pkey < 0)
pkey = 0;
}
/* Do simple checking here so the lower-level routines won't have
* to. we assume access permissions have been handled by the open
* of the memory object, so we don't do any here.
*/
vm_flags |= calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) |
mm->def_flags | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC;
if (flags & MAP_LOCKED)
if (!can_do_mlock())
return -EPERM;
if (mlock_future_check(mm, vm_flags, len))
return -EAGAIN;
if (file) {
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
unsigned long flags_mask;
if (!file_mmap_ok(file, inode, pgoff, len))
return -EOVERFLOW;
flags_mask = LEGACY_MAP_MASK | file->f_op->mmap_supported_flags;
switch (flags & MAP_TYPE) {
case MAP_SHARED:
/*
* Force use of MAP_SHARED_VALIDATE with non-legacy
* flags. E.g. MAP_SYNC is dangerous to use with
* MAP_SHARED as you don't know which consistency model
* you will get. We silently ignore unsupported flags
* with MAP_SHARED to preserve backward compatibility.
*/
flags &= LEGACY_MAP_MASK;
/* fall through */
case MAP_SHARED_VALIDATE:
if (flags & ~flags_mask)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if ((prot&PROT_WRITE) && !(file->f_mode&FMODE_WRITE))
return -EACCES;
/*
* Make sure we don't allow writing to an append-only
* file..
*/
if (IS_APPEND(inode) && (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
return -EACCES;
/*
* Make sure there are no mandatory locks on the file.
*/
if (locks_verify_locked(file))
return -EAGAIN;
vm_flags |= VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE;
if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
vm_flags &= ~(VM_MAYWRITE | VM_SHARED);
/* fall through */
case MAP_PRIVATE:
if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ))
return -EACCES;
if (path_noexec(&file->f_path)) {
if (vm_flags & VM_EXEC)
return -EPERM;
vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYEXEC;
}
if (!file->f_op->mmap)
return -ENODEV;
if (vm_flags & (VM_GROWSDOWN|VM_GROWSUP))
return -EINVAL;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
} else {
switch (flags & MAP_TYPE) {
case MAP_SHARED:
if (vm_flags & (VM_GROWSDOWN|VM_GROWSUP))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Ignore pgoff.
*/
pgoff = 0;
vm_flags |= VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE;
break;
case MAP_PRIVATE:
/*
* Set pgoff according to addr for anon_vma.
*/
pgoff = addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/*
* Set 'VM_NORESERVE' if we should not account for the
* memory use of this mapping.
*/
if (flags & MAP_NORESERVE) {
/* We honor MAP_NORESERVE if allowed to overcommit */
if (sysctl_overcommit_memory != OVERCOMMIT_NEVER)
vm_flags |= VM_NORESERVE;
/* hugetlb applies strict overcommit unless MAP_NORESERVE */
if (file && is_file_hugepages(file))
vm_flags |= VM_NORESERVE;
}
addr = mmap_region(file, addr, len, vm_flags, pgoff, uf);
if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(addr) &&
((vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) ||
(flags & (MAP_POPULATE | MAP_NONBLOCK)) == MAP_POPULATE))
*populate = len;
return addr;
}
|
unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long len, unsigned long prot,
unsigned long flags, vm_flags_t vm_flags,
unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long *populate,
struct list_head *uf)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
int pkey = 0;
*populate = 0;
if (!len)
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Does the application expect PROT_READ to imply PROT_EXEC?
*
* (the exception is when the underlying filesystem is noexec
* mounted, in which case we dont add PROT_EXEC.)
*/
if ((prot & PROT_READ) && (current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
if (!(file && path_noexec(&file->f_path)))
prot |= PROT_EXEC;
/* force arch specific MAP_FIXED handling in get_unmapped_area */
if (flags & MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE)
flags |= MAP_FIXED;
if (!(flags & MAP_FIXED))
addr = round_hint_to_min(addr);
/* Careful about overflows.. */
len = PAGE_ALIGN(len);
if (!len)
return -ENOMEM;
/* offset overflow? */
if ((pgoff + (len >> PAGE_SHIFT)) < pgoff)
return -EOVERFLOW;
/* Too many mappings? */
if (mm->map_count > sysctl_max_map_count)
return -ENOMEM;
/* Obtain the address to map to. we verify (or select) it and ensure
* that it represents a valid section of the address space.
*/
addr = get_unmapped_area(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags);
if (offset_in_page(addr))
return addr;
if (flags & MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE) {
struct vm_area_struct *vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
if (vma && vma->vm_start < addr + len)
return -EEXIST;
}
if (prot == PROT_EXEC) {
pkey = execute_only_pkey(mm);
if (pkey < 0)
pkey = 0;
}
/* Do simple checking here so the lower-level routines won't have
* to. we assume access permissions have been handled by the open
* of the memory object, so we don't do any here.
*/
vm_flags |= calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) | calc_vm_flag_bits(flags) |
mm->def_flags | VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC;
if (flags & MAP_LOCKED)
if (!can_do_mlock())
return -EPERM;
if (mlock_future_check(mm, vm_flags, len))
return -EAGAIN;
if (file) {
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
unsigned long flags_mask;
if (!file_mmap_ok(file, inode, pgoff, len))
return -EOVERFLOW;
flags_mask = LEGACY_MAP_MASK | file->f_op->mmap_supported_flags;
switch (flags & MAP_TYPE) {
case MAP_SHARED:
/*
* Force use of MAP_SHARED_VALIDATE with non-legacy
* flags. E.g. MAP_SYNC is dangerous to use with
* MAP_SHARED as you don't know which consistency model
* you will get. We silently ignore unsupported flags
* with MAP_SHARED to preserve backward compatibility.
*/
flags &= LEGACY_MAP_MASK;
/* fall through */
case MAP_SHARED_VALIDATE:
if (flags & ~flags_mask)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if ((prot&PROT_WRITE) && !(file->f_mode&FMODE_WRITE))
return -EACCES;
/*
* Make sure we don't allow writing to an append-only
* file..
*/
if (IS_APPEND(inode) && (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
return -EACCES;
/*
* Make sure there are no mandatory locks on the file.
*/
if (locks_verify_locked(file))
return -EAGAIN;
vm_flags |= VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE;
if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
vm_flags &= ~(VM_MAYWRITE | VM_SHARED);
/* fall through */
case MAP_PRIVATE:
if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ))
return -EACCES;
if (path_noexec(&file->f_path)) {
if (vm_flags & VM_EXEC)
return -EPERM;
vm_flags &= ~VM_MAYEXEC;
}
if (!file->f_op->mmap)
return -ENODEV;
if (vm_flags & (VM_GROWSDOWN|VM_GROWSUP))
return -EINVAL;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
} else {
switch (flags & MAP_TYPE) {
case MAP_SHARED:
if (vm_flags & (VM_GROWSDOWN|VM_GROWSUP))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Ignore pgoff.
*/
pgoff = 0;
vm_flags |= VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE;
break;
case MAP_PRIVATE:
/*
* Set pgoff according to addr for anon_vma.
*/
pgoff = addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
}
/*
* Set 'VM_NORESERVE' if we should not account for the
* memory use of this mapping.
*/
if (flags & MAP_NORESERVE) {
/* We honor MAP_NORESERVE if allowed to overcommit */
if (sysctl_overcommit_memory != OVERCOMMIT_NEVER)
vm_flags |= VM_NORESERVE;
/* hugetlb applies strict overcommit unless MAP_NORESERVE */
if (file && is_file_hugepages(file))
vm_flags |= VM_NORESERVE;
}
addr = mmap_region(file, addr, len, vm_flags, pgoff, uf);
if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(addr) &&
((vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) ||
(flags & (MAP_POPULATE | MAP_NONBLOCK)) == MAP_POPULATE))
*populate = len;
return addr;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2009-3605
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2009-3605/
|
CWE-189
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=284a92899602daa4a7f429e61849e794569310b5
|
284a92899602daa4a7f429e61849e794569310b5
| null |
void SplashOutputDev::endTextObject(GfxState *state) {
if (textClipPath) {
splash->clipToPath(textClipPath, gFalse);
delete textClipPath;
textClipPath = NULL;
}
}
|
void SplashOutputDev::endTextObject(GfxState *state) {
if (textClipPath) {
splash->clipToPath(textClipPath, gFalse);
delete textClipPath;
textClipPath = NULL;
}
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4486
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4486/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/5f8e44741f9f216e33736ea4ec65ca9ac03036e6
|
5f8e44741f9f216e33736ea4ec65ca9ac03036e6
|
net: fix infoleak in rtnetlink
The stack object “map” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its last 4
bytes are padding generated by compiler. These padding bytes are
not initialized and sent out via “nla_put”.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
int rtnl_nla_parse_ifla(struct nlattr **tb, const struct nlattr *head, int len)
{
return nla_parse(tb, IFLA_MAX, head, len, ifla_policy);
}
|
int rtnl_nla_parse_ifla(struct nlattr **tb, const struct nlattr *head, int len)
{
return nla_parse(tb, IFLA_MAX, head, len, ifla_policy);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/74c1ec481b33194dc7a428f2d58fc89640b313ae
|
74c1ec481b33194dc7a428f2d58fc89640b313ae
|
Fix glGetFramebufferAttachmentParameteriv so it returns
current names for buffers.
TEST=unit_tests and conformance tests
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/3135003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@55831 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
GLenum type() const {
return type_;
}
|
GLenum type() const {
return type_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/610f904d8215075c4681be4eb413f4348860bf9f
|
610f904d8215075c4681be4eb413f4348860bf9f
|
Retrieve per host storage usage from QuotaManager.
[email protected]
BUG=none
TEST=QuotaManagerTest.GetUsage
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8079004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@103921 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GetUsageAndQuota(const GURL& origin, StorageType type) {
quota_status_ = kQuotaStatusUnknown;
usage_ = -1;
quota_ = -1;
quota_manager_->GetUsageAndQuota(origin, type,
callback_factory_.NewCallback(
&QuotaManagerTest::DidGetUsageAndQuota));
}
|
void GetUsageAndQuota(const GURL& origin, StorageType type) {
quota_status_ = kQuotaStatusUnknown;
usage_ = -1;
quota_ = -1;
quota_manager_->GetUsageAndQuota(origin, type,
callback_factory_.NewCallback(
&QuotaManagerTest::DidGetUsageAndQuota));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6254
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6254/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/collectd/collectd/commit/b589096f907052b3a4da2b9ccc9b0e2e888dfc18
|
b589096f907052b3a4da2b9ccc9b0e2e888dfc18
|
network plugin: Fix heap overflow in parse_packet().
Emilien Gaspar has identified a heap overflow in parse_packet(), the
function used by the network plugin to parse incoming network packets.
This is a vulnerability in collectd, though the scope is not clear at
this point. At the very least specially crafted network packets can be
used to crash the daemon. We can't rule out a potential remote code
execution though.
Fixes: CVE-2016-6254
|
static int network_config_set_ttl (const oconfig_item_t *ci) /* {{{ */
{
int tmp;
if ((ci->values_num != 1)
|| (ci->values[0].type != OCONFIG_TYPE_NUMBER))
{
WARNING ("network plugin: The `TimeToLive' config option needs exactly "
"one numeric argument.");
return (-1);
}
tmp = (int) ci->values[0].value.number;
if ((tmp > 0) && (tmp <= 255))
network_config_ttl = tmp;
else {
WARNING ("network plugin: The `TimeToLive' must be between 1 and 255.");
return (-1);
}
return (0);
} /* }}} int network_config_set_ttl */
|
static int network_config_set_ttl (const oconfig_item_t *ci) /* {{{ */
{
int tmp;
if ((ci->values_num != 1)
|| (ci->values[0].type != OCONFIG_TYPE_NUMBER))
{
WARNING ("network plugin: The `TimeToLive' config option needs exactly "
"one numeric argument.");
return (-1);
}
tmp = (int) ci->values[0].value.number;
if ((tmp > 0) && (tmp <= 255))
network_config_ttl = tmp;
else {
WARNING ("network plugin: The `TimeToLive' must be between 1 and 255.");
return (-1);
}
return (0);
} /* }}} int network_config_set_ttl */
|
C
|
collectd
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1019
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1019/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8909c9ad8ff03611c9c96c9a92656213e4bb495b
|
8909c9ad8ff03611c9c96c9a92656213e4bb495b
|
net: don't allow CAP_NET_ADMIN to load non-netdev kernel modules
Since a8f80e8ff94ecba629542d9b4b5f5a8ee3eb565c any process with
CAP_NET_ADMIN may load any module from /lib/modules/. This doesn't mean
that CAP_NET_ADMIN is a superset of CAP_SYS_MODULE as modules are
limited to /lib/modules/**. However, CAP_NET_ADMIN capability shouldn't
allow anybody load any module not related to networking.
This patch restricts an ability of autoloading modules to netdev modules
with explicit aliases. This fixes CVE-2011-1019.
Arnd Bergmann suggested to leave untouched the old pre-v2.6.32 behavior
of loading netdev modules by name (without any prefix) for processes
with CAP_SYS_MODULE to maintain the compatibility with network scripts
that use autoloading netdev modules by aliases like "eth0", "wlan0".
Currently there are only three users of the feature in the upstream
kernel: ipip, ip_gre and sit.
root@albatros:~# capsh --drop=$(seq -s, 0 11),$(seq -s, 13 34) --
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: fffffff800001000
CapEff: fffffff800001000
CapBnd: fffffff800001000
root@albatros:~# modprobe xfs
FATAL: Error inserting xfs
(/lib/modules/2.6.38-rc6-00001-g2bf4ca3/kernel/fs/xfs/xfs.ko): Operation not permitted
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit
sit: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
root@albatros:~# ifconfig sit0
sit0 Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4
NOARP MTU:1480 Metric:1
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep sit
sit 10457 0
tunnel4 2957 1 sit
For CAP_SYS_MODULE module loading is still relaxed:
root@albatros:~# grep Cap /proc/$$/status
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: ffffffffffffffff
CapEff: ffffffffffffffff
CapBnd: ffffffffffffffff
root@albatros:~# ifconfig xfs
xfs: error fetching interface information: Device not found
root@albatros:~# lsmod | grep xfs
xfs 745319 0
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/2/24/203
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
|
static int ipip_tunnel_init(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct ip_tunnel *tunnel = netdev_priv(dev);
tunnel->dev = dev;
strcpy(tunnel->parms.name, dev->name);
memcpy(dev->dev_addr, &tunnel->parms.iph.saddr, 4);
memcpy(dev->broadcast, &tunnel->parms.iph.daddr, 4);
ipip_tunnel_bind_dev(dev);
dev->tstats = alloc_percpu(struct pcpu_tstats);
if (!dev->tstats)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
|
static int ipip_tunnel_init(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct ip_tunnel *tunnel = netdev_priv(dev);
tunnel->dev = dev;
strcpy(tunnel->parms.name, dev->name);
memcpy(dev->dev_addr, &tunnel->parms.iph.saddr, 4);
memcpy(dev->broadcast, &tunnel->parms.iph.daddr, 4);
ipip_tunnel_bind_dev(dev);
dev->tstats = alloc_percpu(struct pcpu_tstats);
if (!dev->tstats)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2010-4819
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-4819/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/render/render.c?id=5725849a1b427cd4a72b84e57f211edb35838718
|
5725849a1b427cd4a72b84e57f211edb35838718
| null |
PanoramiXRenderCompositeGlyphs (ClientPtr client)
{
PanoramiXRes *src, *dst;
int result = Success, j;
REQUEST(xRenderCompositeGlyphsReq);
xGlyphElt origElt, *elt;
INT16 xSrc, ySrc;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderCompositeGlyphsReq);
VERIFY_XIN_PICTURE (src, stuff->src, client, DixReadAccess);
VERIFY_XIN_PICTURE (dst, stuff->dst, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (client->req_len << 2 >= (sizeof (xRenderCompositeGlyphsReq) +
sizeof (xGlyphElt)))
{
elt = (xGlyphElt *) (stuff + 1);
origElt = *elt;
xSrc = stuff->xSrc;
ySrc = stuff->ySrc;
FOR_NSCREENS_FORWARD(j) {
stuff->src = src->info[j].id;
if (src->u.pict.root)
{
stuff->xSrc = xSrc - screenInfo.screens[j]->x;
stuff->ySrc = ySrc - screenInfo.screens[j]->y;
}
stuff->dst = dst->info[j].id;
if (dst->u.pict.root)
{
elt->deltax = origElt.deltax - screenInfo.screens[j]->x;
elt->deltay = origElt.deltay - screenInfo.screens[j]->y;
}
result = (*PanoramiXSaveRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client);
if(result != Success) break;
}
}
return result;
}
|
PanoramiXRenderCompositeGlyphs (ClientPtr client)
{
PanoramiXRes *src, *dst;
int result = Success, j;
REQUEST(xRenderCompositeGlyphsReq);
xGlyphElt origElt, *elt;
INT16 xSrc, ySrc;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderCompositeGlyphsReq);
VERIFY_XIN_PICTURE (src, stuff->src, client, DixReadAccess);
VERIFY_XIN_PICTURE (dst, stuff->dst, client, DixWriteAccess);
if (client->req_len << 2 >= (sizeof (xRenderCompositeGlyphsReq) +
sizeof (xGlyphElt)))
{
elt = (xGlyphElt *) (stuff + 1);
origElt = *elt;
xSrc = stuff->xSrc;
ySrc = stuff->ySrc;
FOR_NSCREENS_FORWARD(j) {
stuff->src = src->info[j].id;
if (src->u.pict.root)
{
stuff->xSrc = xSrc - screenInfo.screens[j]->x;
stuff->ySrc = ySrc - screenInfo.screens[j]->y;
}
stuff->dst = dst->info[j].id;
if (dst->u.pict.root)
{
elt->deltax = origElt.deltax - screenInfo.screens[j]->x;
elt->deltay = origElt.deltay - screenInfo.screens[j]->y;
}
result = (*PanoramiXSaveRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client);
if(result != Success) break;
}
}
return result;
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7889
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7889/
|
CWE-732
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a4866aa812518ed1a37d8ea0c881dc946409de94
|
a4866aa812518ed1a37d8ea0c881dc946409de94
|
mm: Tighten x86 /dev/mem with zeroing reads
Under CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM, reading System RAM through /dev/mem is
disallowed. However, on x86, the first 1MB was always allowed for BIOS
and similar things, regardless of it actually being System RAM. It was
possible for heap to end up getting allocated in low 1MB RAM, and then
read by things like x86info or dd, which would trip hardened usercopy:
usercopy: kernel memory exposure attempt detected from ffff880000090000 (dma-kmalloc-256) (4096 bytes)
This changes the x86 exception for the low 1MB by reading back zeros for
System RAM areas instead of blindly allowing them. More work is needed to
extend this to mmap, but currently mmap doesn't go through usercopy, so
hardened usercopy won't Oops the kernel.
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Tommi Rantala <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
|
static void add_pfn_range_mapped(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long end_pfn)
{
nr_pfn_mapped = add_range_with_merge(pfn_mapped, E820_X_MAX,
nr_pfn_mapped, start_pfn, end_pfn);
nr_pfn_mapped = clean_sort_range(pfn_mapped, E820_X_MAX);
max_pfn_mapped = max(max_pfn_mapped, end_pfn);
if (start_pfn < (1UL<<(32-PAGE_SHIFT)))
max_low_pfn_mapped = max(max_low_pfn_mapped,
min(end_pfn, 1UL<<(32-PAGE_SHIFT)));
}
|
static void add_pfn_range_mapped(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long end_pfn)
{
nr_pfn_mapped = add_range_with_merge(pfn_mapped, E820_X_MAX,
nr_pfn_mapped, start_pfn, end_pfn);
nr_pfn_mapped = clean_sort_range(pfn_mapped, E820_X_MAX);
max_pfn_mapped = max(max_pfn_mapped, end_pfn);
if (start_pfn < (1UL<<(32-PAGE_SHIFT)))
max_low_pfn_mapped = max(max_low_pfn_mapped,
min(end_pfn, 1UL<<(32-PAGE_SHIFT)));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dc3857aac17be72c96f28d860d875235b3be349a
|
dc3857aac17be72c96f28d860d875235b3be349a
|
Unreviewed, rolling out r142736.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/142736
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=109716
Broke ABI, nightly builds crash on launch (Requested by ap on
#webkit).
Patch by Sheriff Bot <[email protected]> on 2013-02-13
Source/WebKit2:
* Shared/APIClientTraits.cpp:
(WebKit):
* Shared/APIClientTraits.h:
* UIProcess/API/C/WKPage.h:
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitLoaderClient.cpp:
(attachLoaderClientToView):
* WebProcess/InjectedBundle/API/c/WKBundlePage.h:
* WebProcess/qt/QtBuiltinBundlePage.cpp:
(WebKit::QtBuiltinBundlePage::QtBuiltinBundlePage):
Tools:
* MiniBrowser/mac/WK2BrowserWindowController.m:
(-[WK2BrowserWindowController awakeFromNib]):
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/InjectedBundlePage.cpp:
(WTR::InjectedBundlePage::InjectedBundlePage):
* WebKitTestRunner/TestController.cpp:
(WTR::TestController::createWebViewWithOptions):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@142762 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void didReceiveTitleForFrame(WKPageRef page, WKStringRef titleRef, WKFrameRef frameRef, WKTypeRef, const void* clientInfo)
{
if (!WKFrameIsMainFrame(frameRef))
return;
webkitWebViewSetTitle(WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW(clientInfo), toImpl(titleRef)->string().utf8());
}
|
static void didReceiveTitleForFrame(WKPageRef page, WKStringRef titleRef, WKFrameRef frameRef, WKTypeRef, const void* clientInfo)
{
if (!WKFrameIsMainFrame(frameRef))
return;
webkitWebViewSetTitle(WEBKIT_WEB_VIEW(clientInfo), toImpl(titleRef)->string().utf8());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-1166
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-1166/
|
CWE-189
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=d2f813f7db
|
d2f813f7db157fc83abc4b3726821c36ee7e40b1
| null |
fbCombineOverReverseU (CARD32 *dest, const CARD32 *src, int width)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < width; ++i) {
CARD32 s = READ(src + i);
CARD32 d = READ(dest + i);
CARD32 ia = Alpha(~READ(dest + i));
FbByteMulAdd(s, ia, d);
WRITE(dest + i, s);
}
}
|
fbCombineOverReverseU (CARD32 *dest, const CARD32 *src, int width)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < width; ++i) {
CARD32 s = READ(src + i);
CARD32 d = READ(dest + i);
CARD32 ia = Alpha(~READ(dest + i));
FbByteMulAdd(s, ia, d);
WRITE(dest + i, s);
}
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3215
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3215/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/YanVugenfirer/kvm-guest-drivers-windows/commit/723416fa4210b7464b28eab89cc76252e6193ac1
|
723416fa4210b7464b28eab89cc76252e6193ac1
|
NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <[email protected]>
|
CNBL::~CNBL()
{
CDpcIrqlRaiser OnDpc;
m_MappedBuffers.ForEachDetached([this](CNB *NB)
{ CNB::Destroy(NB, m_Context->MiniportHandle); });
m_Buffers.ForEachDetached([this](CNB *NB)
{ CNB::Destroy(NB, m_Context->MiniportHandle); });
if(m_NBL)
{
auto NBL = DetachInternalObject();
NET_BUFFER_LIST_NEXT_NBL(NBL) = nullptr;
NdisMSendNetBufferListsComplete(m_Context->MiniportHandle, NBL, 0);
}
}
|
CNBL::~CNBL()
{
CDpcIrqlRaiser OnDpc;
m_MappedBuffers.ForEachDetached([this](CNB *NB)
{ CNB::Destroy(NB, m_Context->MiniportHandle); });
m_Buffers.ForEachDetached([this](CNB *NB)
{ CNB::Destroy(NB, m_Context->MiniportHandle); });
if(m_NBL)
{
auto NBL = DetachInternalObject();
NET_BUFFER_LIST_NEXT_NBL(NBL) = nullptr;
NdisMSendNetBufferListsComplete(m_Context->MiniportHandle, NBL, 0);
}
}
|
C
|
kvm-guest-drivers-windows
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6763/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
ui::TextEditCommand GetCommandForKeyEvent(const ui::KeyEvent& event) {
if (event.type() != ui::ET_KEY_PRESSED || event.IsUnicodeKeyCode())
return ui::TextEditCommand::INVALID_COMMAND;
const bool shift = event.IsShiftDown();
const bool control = event.IsControlDown() || event.IsCommandDown();
const bool alt = event.IsAltDown() || event.IsAltGrDown();
switch (event.key_code()) {
case ui::VKEY_Z:
if (control && !shift && !alt)
return ui::TextEditCommand::UNDO;
return (control && shift && !alt) ? ui::TextEditCommand::REDO
: ui::TextEditCommand::INVALID_COMMAND;
case ui::VKEY_Y:
return (control && !alt) ? ui::TextEditCommand::REDO
: ui::TextEditCommand::INVALID_COMMAND;
case ui::VKEY_A:
return (control && !alt) ? ui::TextEditCommand::SELECT_ALL
: ui::TextEditCommand::INVALID_COMMAND;
case ui::VKEY_X:
return (control && !alt) ? ui::TextEditCommand::CUT
: ui::TextEditCommand::INVALID_COMMAND;
case ui::VKEY_C:
return (control && !alt) ? ui::TextEditCommand::COPY
: ui::TextEditCommand::INVALID_COMMAND;
case ui::VKEY_V:
return (control && !alt) ? ui::TextEditCommand::PASTE
: ui::TextEditCommand::INVALID_COMMAND;
case ui::VKEY_RIGHT:
if (alt)
return ui::TextEditCommand::INVALID_COMMAND;
if (!shift) {
return control ? ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_WORD_RIGHT
: ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_RIGHT;
}
return control ? ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_WORD_RIGHT_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION
: ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_RIGHT_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION;
case ui::VKEY_LEFT:
if (alt)
return ui::TextEditCommand::INVALID_COMMAND;
if (!shift) {
return control ? ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_WORD_LEFT
: ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_LEFT;
}
return control ? ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_WORD_LEFT_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION
: ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_LEFT_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION;
case ui::VKEY_HOME:
return shift ? ui::TextEditCommand::
MOVE_TO_BEGINNING_OF_LINE_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION
: ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_TO_BEGINNING_OF_LINE;
case ui::VKEY_END:
return shift
? ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_TO_END_OF_LINE_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION
: ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_TO_END_OF_LINE;
case ui::VKEY_BACK:
if (!control)
return ui::TextEditCommand::DELETE_BACKWARD;
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
if (shift)
return ui::TextEditCommand::DELETE_TO_BEGINNING_OF_LINE;
#endif
return ui::TextEditCommand::DELETE_WORD_BACKWARD;
case ui::VKEY_DELETE:
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
if (shift && control)
return ui::TextEditCommand::DELETE_TO_END_OF_LINE;
#endif
if (control)
return ui::TextEditCommand::DELETE_WORD_FORWARD;
return shift ? ui::TextEditCommand::CUT
: ui::TextEditCommand::DELETE_FORWARD;
case ui::VKEY_INSERT:
if (control && !shift)
return ui::TextEditCommand::COPY;
return (shift && !control) ? ui::TextEditCommand::PASTE
: ui::TextEditCommand::INVALID_COMMAND;
default:
return ui::TextEditCommand::INVALID_COMMAND;
}
}
|
ui::TextEditCommand GetCommandForKeyEvent(const ui::KeyEvent& event) {
if (event.type() != ui::ET_KEY_PRESSED || event.IsUnicodeKeyCode())
return ui::TextEditCommand::INVALID_COMMAND;
const bool shift = event.IsShiftDown();
const bool control = event.IsControlDown() || event.IsCommandDown();
const bool alt = event.IsAltDown() || event.IsAltGrDown();
switch (event.key_code()) {
case ui::VKEY_Z:
if (control && !shift && !alt)
return ui::TextEditCommand::UNDO;
return (control && shift && !alt) ? ui::TextEditCommand::REDO
: ui::TextEditCommand::INVALID_COMMAND;
case ui::VKEY_Y:
return (control && !alt) ? ui::TextEditCommand::REDO
: ui::TextEditCommand::INVALID_COMMAND;
case ui::VKEY_A:
return (control && !alt) ? ui::TextEditCommand::SELECT_ALL
: ui::TextEditCommand::INVALID_COMMAND;
case ui::VKEY_X:
return (control && !alt) ? ui::TextEditCommand::CUT
: ui::TextEditCommand::INVALID_COMMAND;
case ui::VKEY_C:
return (control && !alt) ? ui::TextEditCommand::COPY
: ui::TextEditCommand::INVALID_COMMAND;
case ui::VKEY_V:
return (control && !alt) ? ui::TextEditCommand::PASTE
: ui::TextEditCommand::INVALID_COMMAND;
case ui::VKEY_RIGHT:
if (alt)
return ui::TextEditCommand::INVALID_COMMAND;
if (!shift) {
return control ? ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_WORD_RIGHT
: ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_RIGHT;
}
return control ? ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_WORD_RIGHT_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION
: ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_RIGHT_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION;
case ui::VKEY_LEFT:
if (alt)
return ui::TextEditCommand::INVALID_COMMAND;
if (!shift) {
return control ? ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_WORD_LEFT
: ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_LEFT;
}
return control ? ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_WORD_LEFT_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION
: ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_LEFT_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION;
case ui::VKEY_HOME:
return shift ? ui::TextEditCommand::
MOVE_TO_BEGINNING_OF_LINE_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION
: ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_TO_BEGINNING_OF_LINE;
case ui::VKEY_END:
return shift
? ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_TO_END_OF_LINE_AND_MODIFY_SELECTION
: ui::TextEditCommand::MOVE_TO_END_OF_LINE;
case ui::VKEY_BACK:
if (!control)
return ui::TextEditCommand::DELETE_BACKWARD;
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
if (shift)
return ui::TextEditCommand::DELETE_TO_BEGINNING_OF_LINE;
#endif
return ui::TextEditCommand::DELETE_WORD_BACKWARD;
case ui::VKEY_DELETE:
#if defined(OS_LINUX)
if (shift && control)
return ui::TextEditCommand::DELETE_TO_END_OF_LINE;
#endif
if (control)
return ui::TextEditCommand::DELETE_WORD_FORWARD;
return shift ? ui::TextEditCommand::CUT
: ui::TextEditCommand::DELETE_FORWARD;
case ui::VKEY_INSERT:
if (control && !shift)
return ui::TextEditCommand::COPY;
return (shift && !control) ? ui::TextEditCommand::PASTE
: ui::TextEditCommand::INVALID_COMMAND;
default:
return ui::TextEditCommand::INVALID_COMMAND;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2017
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2017/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6ec82562ffc6f297d0de36d65776cff8e5704867
|
6ec82562ffc6f297d0de36d65776cff8e5704867
|
veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void dev_disable_lro(struct net_device *dev)
{
if (dev->ethtool_ops && dev->ethtool_ops->get_flags &&
dev->ethtool_ops->set_flags) {
u32 flags = dev->ethtool_ops->get_flags(dev);
if (flags & ETH_FLAG_LRO) {
flags &= ~ETH_FLAG_LRO;
dev->ethtool_ops->set_flags(dev, flags);
}
}
WARN_ON(dev->features & NETIF_F_LRO);
}
|
void dev_disable_lro(struct net_device *dev)
{
if (dev->ethtool_ops && dev->ethtool_ops->get_flags &&
dev->ethtool_ops->set_flags) {
u32 flags = dev->ethtool_ops->get_flags(dev);
if (flags & ETH_FLAG_LRO) {
flags &= ~ETH_FLAG_LRO;
dev->ethtool_ops->set_flags(dev, flags);
}
}
WARN_ON(dev->features & NETIF_F_LRO);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-3733
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-3733/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4ad93618d26a3ea23d36ad5498ff4f59eff3a4d2
|
4ad93618d26a3ea23d36ad5498ff4f59eff3a4d2
|
Don't change the state of the ETM flags until CCS processing
Changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash
leading to a DoS attack. ETM has not been implemented in 1.1.0 for DTLS
so this is TLS only.
The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.
Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.
CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <[email protected]>
|
int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
{
int ssl_major, ssl_minor;
int i, n;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
unsigned short version;
DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
unsigned int is_next_epoch;
rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
again:
/*
* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records.
* This is a non-blocking operation.
*/
if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s))
return -1;
/* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
return 1;
/* get something from the wire */
/* check if we have the header */
if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0, 1);
/* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
if (n <= 0)
return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) !=
DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
goto again;
}
RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY);
p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
/* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
rr->type = *(p++);
ssl_major = *(p++);
ssl_minor = *(p++);
version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
/* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
n2s(p, rr->epoch);
memcpy(&(RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer)[2]), p, 6);
p += 6;
n2s(p, rr->length);
/* Lets check version */
if (!s->first_packet) {
if (version != s->version) {
/* unexpected version, silently discard */
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
goto again;
}
}
if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) {
/* wrong version, silently discard record */
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
goto again;
}
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
/* record too long, silently discard it */
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
goto again;
}
/* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
}
/* s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
if (rr->length >
RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
/* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
i = rr->length;
n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1, 1);
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if (n != i) {
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
goto again;
}
/*
* now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length ==
* DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length
*/
}
/* set state for later operations */
RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER);
/* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
if (bitmap == NULL) {
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
#endif
/* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. */
/*
* TODO: Does it make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0 where
* we have no integrity negotiated yet?
*/
if (!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) {
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
}
#endif
/* just read a 0 length packet */
if (rr->length == 0)
goto again;
/*
* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a
* handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be
* processed at this time.
*/
if (is_next_epoch) {
if ((SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))) {
if (dtls1_buffer_record
(s, &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(&s->rlayer)),
rr->seq_num) < 0)
return -1;
}
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
goto again;
}
if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) {
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
return (1);
}
|
int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
{
int ssl_major, ssl_minor;
int i, n;
SSL3_RECORD *rr;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
unsigned short version;
DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
unsigned int is_next_epoch;
rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
again:
/*
* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records.
* This is a non-blocking operation.
*/
if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s))
return -1;
/* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
return 1;
/* get something from the wire */
/* check if we have the header */
if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0, 1);
/* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
if (n <= 0)
return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) !=
DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
goto again;
}
RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY);
p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
/* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
rr->type = *(p++);
ssl_major = *(p++);
ssl_minor = *(p++);
version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
/* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
n2s(p, rr->epoch);
memcpy(&(RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer)[2]), p, 6);
p += 6;
n2s(p, rr->length);
/* Lets check version */
if (!s->first_packet) {
if (version != s->version) {
/* unexpected version, silently discard */
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
goto again;
}
}
if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) {
/* wrong version, silently discard record */
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
goto again;
}
if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
/* record too long, silently discard it */
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
goto again;
}
/* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
}
/* s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
if (rr->length >
RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
/* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
i = rr->length;
n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1, 1);
/* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
if (n != i) {
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
goto again;
}
/*
* now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length ==
* DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length
*/
}
/* set state for later operations */
RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER);
/* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
if (bitmap == NULL) {
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
#endif
/* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. */
/*
* TODO: Does it make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0 where
* we have no integrity negotiated yet?
*/
if (!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) {
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
}
#endif
/* just read a 0 length packet */
if (rr->length == 0)
goto again;
/*
* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a
* handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be
* processed at this time.
*/
if (is_next_epoch) {
if ((SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))) {
if (dtls1_buffer_record
(s, &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(&s->rlayer)),
rr->seq_num) < 0)
return -1;
}
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
goto again;
}
if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) {
rr->length = 0;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */
goto again; /* get another record */
}
return (1);
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6542
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6542/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.tartarus.org/?p=simon/putty.git;a=commitdiff;h=4ff22863d895cb7ebfced4cf923a012a614adaa8
|
4ff22863d895cb7ebfced4cf923a012a614adaa8
| null |
static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char byte)
{
ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &byte, 1);
}
|
static void ssh_pkt_addbyte(struct Packet *pkt, unsigned char byte)
{
ssh_pkt_adddata(pkt, &byte, 1);
}
|
C
|
tartarus
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5796
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5796/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5bb223676defeba9c44a5ce42460c86e24561e73
|
5bb223676defeba9c44a5ce42460c86e24561e73
|
[GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
[email protected],[email protected]
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
|
ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetOriginPolicyErrorPage(
content::OriginPolicyErrorReason error_reason,
const url::Origin& origin,
const GURL& url) {
return security_interstitials::OriginPolicyUI::GetErrorPage(error_reason,
origin, url);
}
|
ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetOriginPolicyErrorPage(
content::OriginPolicyErrorReason error_reason,
const url::Origin& origin,
const GURL& url) {
return security_interstitials::OriginPolicyUI::GetErrorPage(error_reason,
origin, url);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6791
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6791/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7e995b26a5a503adefc0ad40435f7e16a45434c2
|
7e995b26a5a503adefc0ad40435f7e16a45434c2
|
Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
|
void FakeCrosDisksClient::Init(dbus::Bus* bus) {
}
|
void FakeCrosDisksClient::Init(dbus::Bus* bus) {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/6a13a6c2fbae0b3269743e6a141fdfe0d9ec9793
|
6a13a6c2fbae0b3269743e6a141fdfe0d9ec9793
|
Don't delete the current NavigationEntry when leaving an interstitial page.
BUG=107182
TEST=See bug
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8976014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@115189 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void NavigationController::GoForward() {
if (!CanGoForward()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
bool transient = (transient_entry_index_ != -1);
int current_index = GetCurrentEntryIndex();
DiscardNonCommittedEntries();
pending_entry_index_ = current_index;
if (!transient)
pending_entry_index_++;
entries_[pending_entry_index_]->set_transition_type(
content::PageTransitionFromInt(
entries_[pending_entry_index_]->transition_type() |
content::PAGE_TRANSITION_FORWARD_BACK));
NavigateToPendingEntry(NO_RELOAD);
}
|
void NavigationController::GoForward() {
if (!CanGoForward()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
if (tab_contents_->interstitial_page()) {
tab_contents_->interstitial_page()->CancelForNavigation();
}
bool transient = (transient_entry_index_ != -1);
int current_index = GetCurrentEntryIndex();
DiscardNonCommittedEntries();
pending_entry_index_ = current_index;
if (!transient)
pending_entry_index_++;
entries_[pending_entry_index_]->set_transition_type(
content::PageTransitionFromInt(
entries_[pending_entry_index_]->transition_type() |
content::PAGE_TRANSITION_FORWARD_BACK));
NavigateToPendingEntry(NO_RELOAD);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-3878
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3878/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libavc/+/7109ce3f8f90a28ca9f0ee6e14f6ac5e414c62cf
|
7109ce3f8f90a28ca9f0ee6e14f6ac5e414c62cf
|
Fixed error concealment when no MBs are decoded in the current pic
Bug: 29493002
Change-Id: I3fae547ddb0616b4e6579580985232bd3d65881e
|
WORD32 ih264d_delete(iv_obj_t *dec_hdl, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
dec_struct_t *ps_dec;
ih264d_delete_ip_t *ps_ip = (ih264d_delete_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ih264d_delete_op_t *ps_op = (ih264d_delete_op_t *)pv_api_op;
ps_dec = (dec_struct_t *)(dec_hdl->pv_codec_handle);
UNUSED(ps_ip);
ps_op->s_ivd_delete_op_t.u4_error_code = 0;
ih264d_free_dynamic_bufs(ps_dec);
ih264d_free_static_bufs(dec_hdl);
return IV_SUCCESS;
}
|
WORD32 ih264d_delete(iv_obj_t *dec_hdl, void *pv_api_ip, void *pv_api_op)
{
dec_struct_t *ps_dec;
ih264d_delete_ip_t *ps_ip = (ih264d_delete_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ih264d_delete_op_t *ps_op = (ih264d_delete_op_t *)pv_api_op;
ps_dec = (dec_struct_t *)(dec_hdl->pv_codec_handle);
UNUSED(ps_ip);
ps_op->s_ivd_delete_op_t.u4_error_code = 0;
ih264d_free_dynamic_bufs(ps_dec);
ih264d_free_static_bufs(dec_hdl);
return IV_SUCCESS;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5094
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5094/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/0da8b8b801f9276359262f1ef8274c7812d3dfda?w=1
|
0da8b8b801f9276359262f1ef8274c7812d3dfda?w=1
|
Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
|
void register_html_constants(INIT_FUNC_ARGS)
{
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("HTML_SPECIALCHARS", HTML_SPECIALCHARS, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("HTML_ENTITIES", HTML_ENTITIES, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_COMPAT", ENT_COMPAT, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_QUOTES", ENT_QUOTES, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_NOQUOTES", ENT_NOQUOTES, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_IGNORE", ENT_IGNORE, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_SUBSTITUTE", ENT_SUBSTITUTE, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_DISALLOWED", ENT_DISALLOWED, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_HTML401", ENT_HTML401, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_XML1", ENT_XML1, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_XHTML", ENT_XHTML, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_HTML5", ENT_HTML5, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
}
|
void register_html_constants(INIT_FUNC_ARGS)
{
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("HTML_SPECIALCHARS", HTML_SPECIALCHARS, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("HTML_ENTITIES", HTML_ENTITIES, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_COMPAT", ENT_COMPAT, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_QUOTES", ENT_QUOTES, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_NOQUOTES", ENT_NOQUOTES, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_IGNORE", ENT_IGNORE, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_SUBSTITUTE", ENT_SUBSTITUTE, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_DISALLOWED", ENT_DISALLOWED, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_HTML401", ENT_HTML401, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_XML1", ENT_XML1, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_XHTML", ENT_XHTML, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_HTML5", ENT_HTML5, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2929
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2929/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d049f74f2dbe71354d43d393ac3a188947811348
|
d049f74f2dbe71354d43d393ac3a188947811348
|
exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <[email protected]>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static int ptrace_traceme(void)
{
int ret = -EPERM;
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
/* Are we already being traced? */
if (!current->ptrace) {
ret = security_ptrace_traceme(current->parent);
/*
* Check PF_EXITING to ensure ->real_parent has not passed
* exit_ptrace(). Otherwise we don't report the error but
* pretend ->real_parent untraces us right after return.
*/
if (!ret && !(current->real_parent->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
current->ptrace = PT_PTRACED;
__ptrace_link(current, current->real_parent);
}
}
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
return ret;
}
|
static int ptrace_traceme(void)
{
int ret = -EPERM;
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
/* Are we already being traced? */
if (!current->ptrace) {
ret = security_ptrace_traceme(current->parent);
/*
* Check PF_EXITING to ensure ->real_parent has not passed
* exit_ptrace(). Otherwise we don't report the error but
* pretend ->real_parent untraces us right after return.
*/
if (!ret && !(current->real_parent->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
current->ptrace = PT_PTRACED;
__ptrace_link(current, current->real_parent);
}
}
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9557
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9557/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/mdadams/jasper/commit/d42b2388f7f8e0332c846675133acea151fc557a
|
d42b2388f7f8e0332c846675133acea151fc557a
|
The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
static void jpc_qcx_destroycompparms(jpc_qcxcp_t *compparms)
{
if (compparms->stepsizes) {
jas_free(compparms->stepsizes);
}
}
|
static void jpc_qcx_destroycompparms(jpc_qcxcp_t *compparms)
{
if (compparms->stepsizes) {
jas_free(compparms->stepsizes);
}
}
|
C
|
jasper
| 0 |
CVE-2017-18120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-18120/
|
CWE-415
|
https://github.com/kohler/gifsicle/commit/118a46090c50829dc543179019e6140e1235f909
|
118a46090c50829dc543179019e6140e1235f909
|
gif_read: Set last_name = NULL unconditionally.
With a non-malicious GIF, last_name is set to NULL when a name
extension is followed by an image. Reported in #117, via
Debian, via a KAIST fuzzing program.
|
read_gif(Gif_Reader *grr, int read_flags,
const char* landmark, Gif_ReadErrorHandler handler)
{
Gif_Stream *gfs;
Gif_Image *gfi;
Gif_Context gfc;
int unknown_block_type = 0;
if (gifgetc(grr) != 'G' ||
gifgetc(grr) != 'I' ||
gifgetc(grr) != 'F')
return 0;
(void)gifgetc(grr);
(void)gifgetc(grr);
(void)gifgetc(grr);
gfs = Gif_NewStream();
gfi = Gif_NewImage();
gfc.stream = gfs;
gfc.prefix = Gif_NewArray(Gif_Code, GIF_MAX_CODE);
gfc.suffix = Gif_NewArray(uint8_t, GIF_MAX_CODE);
gfc.length = Gif_NewArray(uint16_t, GIF_MAX_CODE);
gfc.handler = handler;
gfc.gfi = gfi;
gfc.errors[0] = gfc.errors[1] = 0;
if (!gfs || !gfi || !gfc.prefix || !gfc.suffix || !gfc.length)
goto done;
gfs->landmark = landmark;
GIF_DEBUG(("\nGIF "));
if (!read_logical_screen_descriptor(gfs, grr))
goto done;
GIF_DEBUG(("logscrdesc "));
while (!gifeof(grr)) {
uint8_t block = gifgetbyte(grr);
switch (block) {
case ',': /* image block */
GIF_DEBUG(("imageread %d ", gfs->nimages));
gfi->identifier = last_name;
last_name = 0;
if (!Gif_AddImage(gfs, gfi))
goto done;
else if (!read_image(grr, &gfc, gfi, read_flags)) {
Gif_RemoveImage(gfs, gfs->nimages - 1);
gfi = 0;
goto done;
}
gfc.gfi = gfi = Gif_NewImage();
if (!gfi)
goto done;
break;
case ';': /* terminator */
GIF_DEBUG(("term\n"));
goto done;
case '!': /* extension */
block = gifgetbyte(grr);
GIF_DEBUG(("ext(0x%02X) ", block));
switch (block) {
case 0xF9:
read_graphic_control_extension(&gfc, gfi, grr);
break;
case 0xCE:
last_name = suck_data(last_name, 0, grr);
break;
case 0xFE:
if (!read_comment_extension(gfi, grr)) goto done;
break;
case 0xFF:
read_application_extension(&gfc, grr);
break;
default:
read_unknown_extension(&gfc, grr, block, 0, 0);
break;
}
break;
default:
if (!unknown_block_type) {
char buf[256];
sprintf(buf, "unknown block type %d at file offset %u", block, grr->pos - 1);
gif_read_error(&gfc, 1, buf);
unknown_block_type = 1;
}
break;
}
}
done:
/* Move comments and extensions after last image into stream. */
if (gfs && gfi) {
Gif_Extension* gfex;
gfs->end_comment = gfi->comment;
gfi->comment = 0;
gfs->end_extension_list = gfi->extension_list;
gfi->extension_list = 0;
for (gfex = gfs->end_extension_list; gfex; gfex = gfex->next)
gfex->image = NULL;
}
Gif_DeleteImage(gfi);
Gif_DeleteArray(last_name);
Gif_DeleteArray(gfc.prefix);
Gif_DeleteArray(gfc.suffix);
Gif_DeleteArray(gfc.length);
gfc.gfi = 0;
last_name = 0;
if (gfs)
gfs->errors = gfc.errors[1];
if (gfs && gfc.errors[1] == 0
&& !(read_flags & GIF_READ_TRAILING_GARBAGE_OK)
&& !grr->eofer(grr))
gif_read_error(&gfc, 0, "trailing garbage after GIF ignored");
/* finally, export last message */
gif_read_error(&gfc, -1, 0);
return gfs;
}
|
read_gif(Gif_Reader *grr, int read_flags,
const char* landmark, Gif_ReadErrorHandler handler)
{
Gif_Stream *gfs;
Gif_Image *gfi;
Gif_Context gfc;
int unknown_block_type = 0;
if (gifgetc(grr) != 'G' ||
gifgetc(grr) != 'I' ||
gifgetc(grr) != 'F')
return 0;
(void)gifgetc(grr);
(void)gifgetc(grr);
(void)gifgetc(grr);
gfs = Gif_NewStream();
gfi = Gif_NewImage();
gfc.stream = gfs;
gfc.prefix = Gif_NewArray(Gif_Code, GIF_MAX_CODE);
gfc.suffix = Gif_NewArray(uint8_t, GIF_MAX_CODE);
gfc.length = Gif_NewArray(uint16_t, GIF_MAX_CODE);
gfc.handler = handler;
gfc.gfi = gfi;
gfc.errors[0] = gfc.errors[1] = 0;
if (!gfs || !gfi || !gfc.prefix || !gfc.suffix || !gfc.length)
goto done;
gfs->landmark = landmark;
GIF_DEBUG(("\nGIF "));
if (!read_logical_screen_descriptor(gfs, grr))
goto done;
GIF_DEBUG(("logscrdesc "));
while (!gifeof(grr)) {
uint8_t block = gifgetbyte(grr);
switch (block) {
case ',': /* image block */
GIF_DEBUG(("imageread %d ", gfs->nimages));
gfi->identifier = last_name;
last_name = 0;
if (!Gif_AddImage(gfs, gfi))
goto done;
else if (!read_image(grr, &gfc, gfi, read_flags)) {
Gif_RemoveImage(gfs, gfs->nimages - 1);
gfi = 0;
goto done;
}
gfc.gfi = gfi = Gif_NewImage();
if (!gfi)
goto done;
break;
case ';': /* terminator */
GIF_DEBUG(("term\n"));
goto done;
case '!': /* extension */
block = gifgetbyte(grr);
GIF_DEBUG(("ext(0x%02X) ", block));
switch (block) {
case 0xF9:
read_graphic_control_extension(&gfc, gfi, grr);
break;
case 0xCE:
last_name = suck_data(last_name, 0, grr);
break;
case 0xFE:
if (!read_comment_extension(gfi, grr)) goto done;
break;
case 0xFF:
read_application_extension(&gfc, grr);
break;
default:
read_unknown_extension(&gfc, grr, block, 0, 0);
break;
}
break;
default:
if (!unknown_block_type) {
char buf[256];
sprintf(buf, "unknown block type %d at file offset %u", block, grr->pos - 1);
gif_read_error(&gfc, 1, buf);
unknown_block_type = 1;
}
break;
}
}
done:
/* Move comments and extensions after last image into stream. */
if (gfs && gfi) {
Gif_Extension* gfex;
gfs->end_comment = gfi->comment;
gfi->comment = 0;
gfs->end_extension_list = gfi->extension_list;
gfi->extension_list = 0;
for (gfex = gfs->end_extension_list; gfex; gfex = gfex->next)
gfex->image = NULL;
}
Gif_DeleteImage(gfi);
Gif_DeleteArray(last_name);
Gif_DeleteArray(gfc.prefix);
Gif_DeleteArray(gfc.suffix);
Gif_DeleteArray(gfc.length);
gfc.gfi = 0;
if (gfs)
gfs->errors = gfc.errors[1];
if (gfs && gfc.errors[1] == 0
&& !(read_flags & GIF_READ_TRAILING_GARBAGE_OK)
&& !grr->eofer(grr))
gif_read_error(&gfc, 0, "trailing garbage after GIF ignored");
/* finally, export last message */
gif_read_error(&gfc, -1, 0);
return gfs;
}
|
C
|
gifsicle
| 1 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/c975c78878fff68e82333f599882a7f73cb721ea
|
c975c78878fff68e82333f599882a7f73cb721ea
|
Initialize renderer color preferences to reasonable defaults.
BUG=158422
TEST=as in bug
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11365096
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@166146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void Shell::PlatformResizeSubViews() {
SizeTo(content_width_, content_height_);
}
|
void Shell::PlatformResizeSubViews() {
SizeTo(content_width_, content_height_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4282
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4282/
|
CWE-119
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/spice/spice/commit/?id=8af619009660b24e0b41ad26b30289eea288fcc2
|
8af619009660b24e0b41ad26b30289eea288fcc2
| null |
static SpiceCharDeviceState *attach_to_red_agent(SpiceCharDeviceInstance *sin)
{
VDIPortState *state = &reds->agent_state;
SpiceCharDeviceInterface *sif;
SpiceCharDeviceCallbacks char_dev_state_cbs;
if (!state->base) {
char_dev_state_cbs.read_one_msg_from_device = vdi_port_read_one_msg_from_device;
char_dev_state_cbs.ref_msg_to_client = vdi_port_ref_msg_to_client;
char_dev_state_cbs.unref_msg_to_client = vdi_port_unref_msg_to_client;
char_dev_state_cbs.send_msg_to_client = vdi_port_send_msg_to_client;
char_dev_state_cbs.send_tokens_to_client = vdi_port_send_tokens_to_client;
char_dev_state_cbs.remove_client = vdi_port_remove_client;
char_dev_state_cbs.on_free_self_token = vdi_port_on_free_self_token;
state->base = spice_char_device_state_create(sin,
REDS_TOKENS_TO_SEND,
REDS_NUM_INTERNAL_AGENT_MESSAGES,
&char_dev_state_cbs,
NULL);
} else {
spice_char_device_state_reset_dev_instance(state->base, sin);
}
vdagent = sin;
reds_update_mouse_mode();
sif = SPICE_CONTAINEROF(vdagent->base.sif, SpiceCharDeviceInterface, base);
if (sif->state) {
sif->state(vdagent, 1);
}
if (!reds_main_channel_connected()) {
return state->base;
}
state->read_filter.discard_all = FALSE;
reds->agent_state.plug_generation++;
if (reds->agent_state.mig_data) {
spice_assert(reds->agent_state.plug_generation == 1);
reds_agent_state_restore(reds->agent_state.mig_data);
free(reds->agent_state.mig_data);
reds->agent_state.mig_data = NULL;
} else if (!red_channel_waits_for_migrate_data(&reds->main_channel->base)) {
/* we will assoicate the client with the char device, upon reds_on_main_agent_start,
* in response to MSGC_AGENT_START */
main_channel_push_agent_connected(reds->main_channel);
} else {
spice_debug("waiting for migration data");
if (!spice_char_device_client_exists(reds->agent_state.base, reds_get_client())) {
int client_added;
client_added = spice_char_device_client_add(reds->agent_state.base,
reds_get_client(),
TRUE, /* flow control */
REDS_VDI_PORT_NUM_RECEIVE_BUFFS,
REDS_AGENT_WINDOW_SIZE,
~0,
TRUE);
if (!client_added) {
spice_warning("failed to add client to agent");
reds_disconnect();
}
}
}
return state->base;
}
|
static SpiceCharDeviceState *attach_to_red_agent(SpiceCharDeviceInstance *sin)
{
VDIPortState *state = &reds->agent_state;
SpiceCharDeviceInterface *sif;
SpiceCharDeviceCallbacks char_dev_state_cbs;
if (!state->base) {
char_dev_state_cbs.read_one_msg_from_device = vdi_port_read_one_msg_from_device;
char_dev_state_cbs.ref_msg_to_client = vdi_port_ref_msg_to_client;
char_dev_state_cbs.unref_msg_to_client = vdi_port_unref_msg_to_client;
char_dev_state_cbs.send_msg_to_client = vdi_port_send_msg_to_client;
char_dev_state_cbs.send_tokens_to_client = vdi_port_send_tokens_to_client;
char_dev_state_cbs.remove_client = vdi_port_remove_client;
char_dev_state_cbs.on_free_self_token = vdi_port_on_free_self_token;
state->base = spice_char_device_state_create(sin,
REDS_TOKENS_TO_SEND,
REDS_NUM_INTERNAL_AGENT_MESSAGES,
&char_dev_state_cbs,
NULL);
} else {
spice_char_device_state_reset_dev_instance(state->base, sin);
}
vdagent = sin;
reds_update_mouse_mode();
sif = SPICE_CONTAINEROF(vdagent->base.sif, SpiceCharDeviceInterface, base);
if (sif->state) {
sif->state(vdagent, 1);
}
if (!reds_main_channel_connected()) {
return state->base;
}
state->read_filter.discard_all = FALSE;
reds->agent_state.plug_generation++;
if (reds->agent_state.mig_data) {
spice_assert(reds->agent_state.plug_generation == 1);
reds_agent_state_restore(reds->agent_state.mig_data);
free(reds->agent_state.mig_data);
reds->agent_state.mig_data = NULL;
} else if (!red_channel_waits_for_migrate_data(&reds->main_channel->base)) {
/* we will assoicate the client with the char device, upon reds_on_main_agent_start,
* in response to MSGC_AGENT_START */
main_channel_push_agent_connected(reds->main_channel);
} else {
spice_debug("waiting for migration data");
if (!spice_char_device_client_exists(reds->agent_state.base, reds_get_client())) {
int client_added;
client_added = spice_char_device_client_add(reds->agent_state.base,
reds_get_client(),
TRUE, /* flow control */
REDS_VDI_PORT_NUM_RECEIVE_BUFFS,
REDS_AGENT_WINDOW_SIZE,
~0,
TRUE);
if (!client_added) {
spice_warning("failed to add client to agent");
reds_disconnect();
}
}
}
return state->base;
}
|
C
|
spice
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0886
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0886/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
18d67244984a574ba2dd8779faabc0e3e34f4b76
|
Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool RenderProcessHost::run_renderer_in_process() {
return g_run_renderer_in_process_;
}
|
bool RenderProcessHost::run_renderer_in_process() {
return g_run_renderer_in_process_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-17206
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-17206/
| null |
https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/commit/9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
9237a63c47bd314b807cda0bd2216264e82edbe8
|
ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <[email protected]>
|
ofpact_finish(struct ofpbuf *ofpacts, struct ofpact *ofpact)
{
ptrdiff_t len;
ovs_assert(ofpact == ofpacts->header);
len = (char *) ofpbuf_tail(ofpacts) - (char *) ofpact;
ovs_assert(len > 0 && len <= UINT16_MAX);
ofpact->len = len;
ofpbuf_padto(ofpacts, OFPACT_ALIGN(ofpacts->size));
return ofpacts->header;
}
|
ofpact_finish(struct ofpbuf *ofpacts, struct ofpact *ofpact)
{
ptrdiff_t len;
ovs_assert(ofpact == ofpacts->header);
len = (char *) ofpbuf_tail(ofpacts) - (char *) ofpact;
ovs_assert(len > 0 && len <= UINT16_MAX);
ofpact->len = len;
ofpbuf_padto(ofpacts, OFPACT_ALIGN(ofpacts->size));
return ofpacts->header;
}
|
C
|
ovs
| 0 |
CVE-2018-18445
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-18445/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b799207e1e1816b09e7a5920fbb2d5fcf6edd681
|
b799207e1e1816b09e7a5920fbb2d5fcf6edd681
|
bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
|
static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state,
const struct bpf_verifier_state *src)
{
struct bpf_func_state *dst;
int i, err;
/* if dst has more stack frames then src frame, free them */
for (i = src->curframe + 1; i <= dst_state->curframe; i++) {
free_func_state(dst_state->frame[i]);
dst_state->frame[i] = NULL;
}
dst_state->curframe = src->curframe;
dst_state->parent = src->parent;
for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) {
dst = dst_state->frame[i];
if (!dst) {
dst = kzalloc(sizeof(*dst), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dst)
return -ENOMEM;
dst_state->frame[i] = dst;
}
err = copy_func_state(dst, src->frame[i]);
if (err)
return err;
}
return 0;
}
|
static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state,
const struct bpf_verifier_state *src)
{
struct bpf_func_state *dst;
int i, err;
/* if dst has more stack frames then src frame, free them */
for (i = src->curframe + 1; i <= dst_state->curframe; i++) {
free_func_state(dst_state->frame[i]);
dst_state->frame[i] = NULL;
}
dst_state->curframe = src->curframe;
dst_state->parent = src->parent;
for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) {
dst = dst_state->frame[i];
if (!dst) {
dst = kzalloc(sizeof(*dst), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dst)
return -ENOMEM;
dst_state->frame[i] = dst;
}
err = copy_func_state(dst, src->frame[i]);
if (err)
return err;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6773
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6773/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/33827275411b33371e7bb750cce20f11de85002d
|
33827275411b33371e7bb750cce20f11de85002d
|
Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
|
const VisibleSelectionInFlatTree& FrameSelection::GetSelectionInFlatTree()
const {
return ComputeVisibleSelectionInFlatTree();
}
|
const VisibleSelectionInFlatTree& FrameSelection::GetSelectionInFlatTree()
const {
return ComputeVisibleSelectionInFlatTree();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6626
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6626/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/90fb08ed0146c9beacfd4dde98a20fc45419fff3
|
90fb08ed0146c9beacfd4dde98a20fc45419fff3
|
Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void WebContentsImpl::OnDidProgrammaticallyScroll(
const gfx::Vector2d& scroll_point) {
if (delegate_)
delegate_->DidProgrammaticallyScroll(this, scroll_point);
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::OnDidProgrammaticallyScroll(
const gfx::Vector2d& scroll_point) {
if (delegate_)
delegate_->DidProgrammaticallyScroll(this, scroll_point);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1621/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/5a9753fca56f0eeb9f61e342b2fccffc364f9426
|
5a9753fca56f0eeb9f61e342b2fccffc364f9426
|
Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(::libvpx_test::VideoSource *video,
::libvpx_test::Encoder *encoder) {
if (video->frame() == 1) {
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_CPUUSED, set_cpu_used_);
encoder->Control(VP9E_SET_AQ_MODE, aq_mode_);
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_MAX_INTRA_BITRATE_PCT, 100);
}
}
|
virtual void PreEncodeFrameHook(::libvpx_test::VideoSource *video,
::libvpx_test::Encoder *encoder) {
if (video->frame() == 1) {
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_CPUUSED, set_cpu_used_);
encoder->Control(VP9E_SET_AQ_MODE, aq_mode_);
encoder->Control(VP8E_SET_MAX_INTRA_BITRATE_PCT, 100);
}
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6643
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6643/
|
CWE-287
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fc343fd48badc0158dc2bb763e9a8b9342f3cb6f
|
fc343fd48badc0158dc2bb763e9a8b9342f3cb6f
|
Fix a crash when a form control is in a past naems map of a demoted form element.
Note that we wanted to add the protector in FormAssociatedElement::setForm(),
but we couldn't do it because it is called from the constructor.
BUG=326854
TEST=automated.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/105693013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@163680 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool FormAssociatedElement::rangeUnderflow() const
{
return false;
}
|
bool FormAssociatedElement::rangeUnderflow() const
{
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2117
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2117/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f43bfaeddc79effbf3d0fcb53ca477cca66f3db8
|
f43bfaeddc79effbf3d0fcb53ca477cca66f3db8
|
atl2: Disable unimplemented scatter/gather feature
atl2 includes NETIF_F_SG in hw_features even though it has no support
for non-linear skbs. This bug was originally harmless since the
driver does not claim to implement checksum offload and that used to
be a requirement for SG.
Now that SG and checksum offload are independent features, if you
explicitly enable SG *and* use one of the rare protocols that can use
SG without checkusm offload, this potentially leaks sensitive
information (before you notice that it just isn't working). Therefore
this obscure bug has been designated CVE-2016-2117.
Reported-by: Justin Yackoski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
Fixes: ec5f06156423 ("net: Kill link between CSUM and SG features.")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int atl2_set_mac(struct net_device *netdev, void *p)
{
struct atl2_adapter *adapter = netdev_priv(netdev);
struct sockaddr *addr = p;
if (!is_valid_ether_addr(addr->sa_data))
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (netif_running(netdev))
return -EBUSY;
memcpy(netdev->dev_addr, addr->sa_data, netdev->addr_len);
memcpy(adapter->hw.mac_addr, addr->sa_data, netdev->addr_len);
atl2_set_mac_addr(&adapter->hw);
return 0;
}
|
static int atl2_set_mac(struct net_device *netdev, void *p)
{
struct atl2_adapter *adapter = netdev_priv(netdev);
struct sockaddr *addr = p;
if (!is_valid_ether_addr(addr->sa_data))
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
if (netif_running(netdev))
return -EBUSY;
memcpy(netdev->dev_addr, addr->sa_data, netdev->addr_len);
memcpy(adapter->hw.mac_addr, addr->sa_data, netdev->addr_len);
atl2_set_mac_addr(&adapter->hw);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/76f36a8362a3e817cc3ec721d591f2f8878dc0c7
|
76f36a8362a3e817cc3ec721d591f2f8878dc0c7
|
Scheduler/child/TimeSource could be replaced with base/time/DefaultTickClock.
They both are totally same and TimeSource is removed.
BUG=494892
[email protected], [email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1163143002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333035}
|
bool TaskQueueManager::UpdateWorkQueues(
bool should_trigger_wakeup,
const base::PendingTask* previous_task) {
DCHECK(main_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
internal::LazyNow lazy_now(this);
bool has_work = false;
for (auto& queue : queues_) {
has_work |=
queue->UpdateWorkQueue(&lazy_now, should_trigger_wakeup, previous_task);
if (!queue->work_queue().empty()) {
DCHECK(queue->work_queue().front().delayed_run_time.is_null());
}
}
return has_work;
}
|
bool TaskQueueManager::UpdateWorkQueues(
bool should_trigger_wakeup,
const base::PendingTask* previous_task) {
DCHECK(main_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
internal::LazyNow lazy_now(this);
bool has_work = false;
for (auto& queue : queues_) {
has_work |=
queue->UpdateWorkQueue(&lazy_now, should_trigger_wakeup, previous_task);
if (!queue->work_queue().empty()) {
DCHECK(queue->work_queue().front().delayed_run_time.is_null());
}
}
return has_work;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10066
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10066/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
|
f6e9d0d9955e85bdd7540b251cd50d598dacc5e6
| null |
static MagickBooleanType PingGIFImage(Image *image)
{
unsigned char
buffer[256],
length,
data_size;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if (ReadBlob(image,1,&data_size) != 1)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage",image->filename);
if (data_size > MaximumLZWBits)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage",image->filename);
if (ReadBlob(image,1,&length) != 1)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage",image->filename);
while (length != 0)
{
if (ReadBlob(image,length,buffer) != (ssize_t) length)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage",image->filename);
if (ReadBlob(image,1,&length) != 1)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage",image->filename);
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
|
static MagickBooleanType PingGIFImage(Image *image)
{
unsigned char
buffer[256],
length,
data_size;
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
if (ReadBlob(image,1,&data_size) != 1)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage",image->filename);
if (data_size > MaximumLZWBits)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage",image->filename);
if (ReadBlob(image,1,&length) != 1)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage",image->filename);
while (length != 0)
{
if (ReadBlob(image,length,buffer) != (ssize_t) length)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage",image->filename);
if (ReadBlob(image,1,&length) != 1)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageError,"CorruptImage",image->filename);
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1683
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1683/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab
|
96dbafe288dbe2f0cc45fa3c39daf6d0c37acbab
|
Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
exsltCryptoRc4DecryptFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs) {
int key_len = 0;
int str_len = 0, bin_len = 0, ret_len = 0;
xmlChar *key = NULL, *str = NULL, *padkey = NULL, *bin =
NULL, *ret = NULL;
xsltTransformContextPtr tctxt = NULL;
if (nargs != 2) {
xmlXPathSetArityError (ctxt);
return;
}
tctxt = xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt);
str = xmlXPathPopString (ctxt);
str_len = xmlStrlen (str);
if (str_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
xmlFree (str);
return;
}
key = xmlXPathPopString (ctxt);
key_len = xmlStrlen (key);
if (key_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
xmlFree (key);
xmlFree (str);
return;
}
padkey = xmlMallocAtomic (RC4_KEY_LENGTH + 1);
if (padkey == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate padkey\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
memset(padkey, 0, RC4_KEY_LENGTH + 1);
if ((key_len > RC4_KEY_LENGTH) || (key_len < 0)) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: key size too long or key broken\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
memcpy (padkey, key, key_len);
/* decode hex to binary */
bin_len = str_len;
bin = xmlMallocAtomic (bin_len);
if (bin == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate string\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
ret_len = exsltCryptoHex2Bin (str, str_len, bin, bin_len);
/* decrypt the binary blob */
ret = xmlMallocAtomic (ret_len + 1);
if (ret == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate result\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
PLATFORM_RC4_DECRYPT (ctxt, padkey, bin, ret_len, ret, ret_len);
ret[ret_len] = 0;
xmlXPathReturnString (ctxt, ret);
done:
if (key != NULL)
xmlFree (key);
if (str != NULL)
xmlFree (str);
if (padkey != NULL)
xmlFree (padkey);
if (bin != NULL)
xmlFree (bin);
}
|
exsltCryptoRc4DecryptFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs) {
int key_len = 0, key_size = 0;
int str_len = 0, bin_len = 0, ret_len = 0;
xmlChar *key = NULL, *str = NULL, *padkey = NULL, *bin =
NULL, *ret = NULL;
xsltTransformContextPtr tctxt = NULL;
if (nargs != 2) {
xmlXPathSetArityError (ctxt);
return;
}
tctxt = xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt);
str = xmlXPathPopString (ctxt);
str_len = xmlUTF8Strlen (str);
if (str_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
xmlFree (str);
return;
}
key = xmlXPathPopString (ctxt);
key_len = xmlUTF8Strlen (key);
if (key_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
xmlFree (key);
xmlFree (str);
return;
}
padkey = xmlMallocAtomic (RC4_KEY_LENGTH + 1);
if (padkey == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate padkey\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
memset(padkey, 0, RC4_KEY_LENGTH + 1);
key_size = xmlUTF8Strsize (key, key_len);
if ((key_size > RC4_KEY_LENGTH) || (key_size < 0)) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: key size too long or key broken\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
memcpy (padkey, key, key_size);
/* decode hex to binary */
bin_len = str_len;
bin = xmlMallocAtomic (bin_len);
if (bin == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate string\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
ret_len = exsltCryptoHex2Bin (str, str_len, bin, bin_len);
/* decrypt the binary blob */
ret = xmlMallocAtomic (ret_len + 1);
if (ret == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate result\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
PLATFORM_RC4_DECRYPT (ctxt, padkey, bin, ret_len, ret, ret_len);
ret[ret_len] = 0;
xmlXPathReturnString (ctxt, ret);
done:
if (key != NULL)
xmlFree (key);
if (str != NULL)
xmlFree (str);
if (padkey != NULL)
xmlFree (padkey);
if (bin != NULL)
xmlFree (bin);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-10150
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10150/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a0f1d21c1ccb1da66629627a74059dd7f5ac9c61
|
a0f1d21c1ccb1da66629627a74059dd7f5ac9c61
|
KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <[email protected]>
|
kvm_pfn_t kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn)
{
return gfn_to_pfn_memslot(kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, gfn), gfn);
}
|
kvm_pfn_t kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn)
{
return gfn_to_pfn_memslot(kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, gfn), gfn);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2686
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2686/
|
CWE-310
|
https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=125093b59f3c2a2d33785b5563d929d0472f1721
|
125093b59f3c2a2d33785b5563d929d0472f1721
| null |
int SSL_library_init(void)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3_cbc());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_idea_cbc());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc4());
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD5) && (defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__))
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc4_hmac_md5());
#endif
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_cbc());
/* Not actually used for SSL/TLS but this makes PKCS#12 work
* if an application only calls SSL_library_init().
*/
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_40_cbc());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_gcm());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_gcm());
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA1)
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1());
#endif
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_cbc());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_seed_cbc());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
EVP_add_digest(EVP_md5());
EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_md5,"ssl2-md5");
EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_md5,"ssl3-md5");
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha1()); /* RSA with sha1 */
EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_sha1,"ssl3-sha1");
EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_sha1WithRSAEncryption,SN_sha1WithRSA);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha224());
EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha384());
EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha512());
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
EVP_add_digest(EVP_dss1()); /* DSA with sha1 */
EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_dsaWithSHA1,SN_dsaWithSHA1_2);
EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_dsaWithSHA1,"DSS1");
EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_dsaWithSHA1,"dss1");
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
EVP_add_digest(EVP_ecdsa());
#endif
/* If you want support for phased out ciphers, add the following */
#if 0
EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha());
EVP_add_digest(EVP_dss());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
/* This will initialise the built-in compression algorithms.
The value returned is a STACK_OF(SSL_COMP), but that can
be discarded safely */
(void)SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
#endif
/* initialize cipher/digest methods table */
ssl_load_ciphers();
return(1);
}
|
int SSL_library_init(void)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_des_ede3_cbc());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_idea_cbc());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc4());
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD5) && (defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__))
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc4_hmac_md5());
#endif
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_cbc());
/* Not actually used for SSL/TLS but this makes PKCS#12 work
* if an application only calls SSL_library_init().
*/
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_rc2_40_cbc());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_192_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_gcm());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_gcm());
#if 0 /* Disabled because of timing side-channel leaks. */
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA1)
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1());
#endif
#endif
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_128_cbc());
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_camellia_256_cbc());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED
EVP_add_cipher(EVP_seed_cbc());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
EVP_add_digest(EVP_md5());
EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_md5,"ssl2-md5");
EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_md5,"ssl3-md5");
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha1()); /* RSA with sha1 */
EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_sha1,"ssl3-sha1");
EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_sha1WithRSAEncryption,SN_sha1WithRSA);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha224());
EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha384());
EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha512());
#endif
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
EVP_add_digest(EVP_dss1()); /* DSA with sha1 */
EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_dsaWithSHA1,SN_dsaWithSHA1_2);
EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_dsaWithSHA1,"DSS1");
EVP_add_digest_alias(SN_dsaWithSHA1,"dss1");
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
EVP_add_digest(EVP_ecdsa());
#endif
/* If you want support for phased out ciphers, add the following */
#if 0
EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha());
EVP_add_digest(EVP_dss());
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
/* This will initialise the built-in compression algorithms.
The value returned is a STACK_OF(SSL_COMP), but that can
be discarded safely */
(void)SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
#endif
/* initialize cipher/digest methods table */
ssl_load_ciphers();
return(1);
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 1 |
CVE-2019-16995
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-16995/
|
CWE-772
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6caabe7f197d3466d238f70915d65301f1716626
|
6caabe7f197d3466d238f70915d65301f1716626
|
net: hsr: fix memory leak in hsr_dev_finalize()
If hsr_add_port(hsr, hsr_dev, HSR_PT_MASTER) failed to
add port, it directly returns res and forgets to free the node
that allocated in hsr_create_self_node(), and forgets to delete
the node->mac_list linked in hsr->self_node_db.
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8881cfa0c780 (size 64):
comm "syz-executor.0", pid 2077, jiffies 4294717969 (age 2415.377s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
e0 c7 a0 cf 81 88 ff ff 00 02 00 00 00 00 ad de ................
00 e6 49 cd 81 88 ff ff c0 9b 87 d0 81 88 ff ff ..I.............
backtrace:
[<00000000e2ff5070>] hsr_dev_finalize+0x736/0x960 [hsr]
[<000000003ed2e597>] hsr_newlink+0x2b2/0x3e0 [hsr]
[<000000003fa8c6b6>] __rtnl_newlink+0xf1f/0x1600 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3182
[<000000001247a7ad>] rtnl_newlink+0x66/0x90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3240
[<00000000e7d1b61d>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x54e/0xb90 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5130
[<000000005556bd3a>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x129/0x340 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
[<00000000741d5ee6>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
[<00000000741d5ee6>] netlink_unicast+0x49a/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
[<000000009d56f9b7>] netlink_sendmsg+0x88b/0xdf0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
[<0000000046b35c59>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
[<0000000046b35c59>] sock_sendmsg+0xc3/0x100 net/socket.c:631
[<00000000d208adc9>] __sys_sendto+0x33e/0x560 net/socket.c:1786
[<00000000b582837a>] __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1798 [inline]
[<00000000b582837a>] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1794 [inline]
[<00000000b582837a>] __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1794
[<00000000c866801d>] do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
[<00000000fea382d9>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[<00000000e01dacb3>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Fixes: c5a759117210 ("net/hsr: Use list_head (and rcu) instead of array for slave devices.")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
void hsr_addr_subst_source(struct hsr_node *node, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (!skb_mac_header_was_set(skb)) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "%s: Mac header not set\n", __func__);
return;
}
memcpy(ð_hdr(skb)->h_source, node->MacAddressA, ETH_ALEN);
}
|
void hsr_addr_subst_source(struct hsr_node *node, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
if (!skb_mac_header_was_set(skb)) {
WARN_ONCE(1, "%s: Mac header not set\n", __func__);
return;
}
memcpy(ð_hdr(skb)->h_source, node->MacAddressA, ETH_ALEN);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6096
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6096/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
36f801fdbec07d116a6f4f07bb363f10897d6a51
|
If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
|
bool RenderFrameImpl::IsPasting() const {
return is_pasting_;
}
|
bool RenderFrameImpl::IsPasting() const {
return is_pasting_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1791
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1791/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/98ece4eebfb6cd45cc8d550c6ac0022965071afc
|
98ece4eebfb6cd45cc8d550c6ac0022965071afc
|
Fix race condition in NewSessionTicket
If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when
attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur
potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data.
CVE-2015-1791
This also fixes RT#3808 where a session ID is changed for a session already
in the client session cache. Since the session ID is the key to the cache
this breaks the cache access.
Parts of this patch were inspired by this Akamai change:
https://github.com/akamai/openssl/commit/c0bf69a791239ceec64509f9f19fcafb2461b0d3
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <[email protected]>
|
int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(SSL *s, void *ext_data, int ext_len)
{
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
s->tlsext_session_ticket = NULL;
s->tlsext_session_ticket =
OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT) + ext_len);
if (!s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (ext_data) {
s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = ext_len;
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = s->tlsext_session_ticket + 1;
memcpy(s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ext_data, ext_len);
} else {
s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = 0;
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = NULL;
}
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
|
int SSL_set_session_ticket_ext(SSL *s, void *ext_data, int ext_len)
{
if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
s->tlsext_session_ticket = NULL;
s->tlsext_session_ticket =
OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT) + ext_len);
if (!s->tlsext_session_ticket) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_TICKET_EXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (ext_data) {
s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = ext_len;
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = s->tlsext_session_ticket + 1;
memcpy(s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ext_data, ext_len);
} else {
s->tlsext_session_ticket->length = 0;
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data = NULL;
}
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4621/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static void init_tg_cfs_entry(struct task_group *tg, struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq,
struct sched_entity *se, int cpu, int add,
struct sched_entity *parent)
{
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
tg->cfs_rq[cpu] = cfs_rq;
init_cfs_rq(cfs_rq, rq);
cfs_rq->tg = tg;
if (add)
list_add(&cfs_rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list, &rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list);
tg->se[cpu] = se;
/* se could be NULL for init_task_group */
if (!se)
return;
if (!parent)
se->cfs_rq = &rq->cfs;
else
se->cfs_rq = parent->my_q;
se->my_q = cfs_rq;
se->load.weight = tg->shares;
se->load.inv_weight = 0;
se->parent = parent;
}
|
static void init_tg_cfs_entry(struct task_group *tg, struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq,
struct sched_entity *se, int cpu, int add,
struct sched_entity *parent)
{
struct rq *rq = cpu_rq(cpu);
tg->cfs_rq[cpu] = cfs_rq;
init_cfs_rq(cfs_rq, rq);
cfs_rq->tg = tg;
if (add)
list_add(&cfs_rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list, &rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list);
tg->se[cpu] = se;
/* se could be NULL for init_task_group */
if (!se)
return;
if (!parent)
se->cfs_rq = &rq->cfs;
else
se->cfs_rq = parent->my_q;
se->my_q = cfs_rq;
se->load.weight = tg->shares;
se->load.inv_weight = 0;
se->parent = parent;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
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Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
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This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
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