CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2017-9330
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9330/
|
CWE-835
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=26f670a244982335cc08943fb1ec099a2c81e42d
|
26f670a244982335cc08943fb1ec099a2c81e42d
| null |
static void ohci_realize_pxa(DeviceState *dev, Error **errp)
{
OHCISysBusState *s = SYSBUS_OHCI(dev);
SysBusDevice *sbd = SYS_BUS_DEVICE(dev);
/* Cannot fail as we pass NULL for masterbus */
usb_ohci_init(&s->ohci, dev, s->num_ports, s->dma_offset, NULL, 0,
&address_space_memory, &error_abort);
sysbus_init_irq(sbd, &s->ohci.irq);
sysbus_init_mmio(sbd, &s->ohci.mem);
}
|
static void ohci_realize_pxa(DeviceState *dev, Error **errp)
{
OHCISysBusState *s = SYSBUS_OHCI(dev);
SysBusDevice *sbd = SYS_BUS_DEVICE(dev);
/* Cannot fail as we pass NULL for masterbus */
usb_ohci_init(&s->ohci, dev, s->num_ports, s->dma_offset, NULL, 0,
&address_space_memory, &error_abort);
sysbus_init_irq(sbd, &s->ohci.irq);
sysbus_init_mmio(sbd, &s->ohci.mem);
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3746
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3746/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/hardware/qcom/media/+/5b82f4f90c3d531313714df4b936f92fb0ff15cf
|
5b82f4f90c3d531313714df4b936f92fb0ff15cf
|
DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: Avoid processing ETBs/FTBs in invalid states
(per the spec) ETB/FTB should not be handled in states other than
Executing, Paused and Idle. This avoids accessing invalid buffers.
Also add a lock to protect the private-buffers from being deleted
while accessing from another thread.
Bug: 27890802
Security Vulnerability - Heap Use-After-Free and Possible LPE in
MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #6)
CRs-Fixed: 1008882
Change-Id: Iaac2e383cd53cf9cf8042c9ed93ddc76dba3907e
|
bool omx_vdec::allocate_done(void)
{
bool bRet = false;
bool bRet_In = false;
bool bRet_Out = false;
bRet_In = allocate_input_done();
bRet_Out = allocate_output_done();
if (bRet_In && bRet_Out) {
bRet = true;
}
return bRet;
}
|
bool omx_vdec::allocate_done(void)
{
bool bRet = false;
bool bRet_In = false;
bool bRet_Out = false;
bRet_In = allocate_input_done();
bRet_Out = allocate_output_done();
if (bRet_In && bRet_Out) {
bRet = true;
}
return bRet;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6117
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6117/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/52f6eb4221430b6248fd5a59bec53bfef9fdd9a7
|
52f6eb4221430b6248fd5a59bec53bfef9fdd9a7
|
[md-settings] Clarify Password Saving and Autofill Toggles
This change clarifies the wording around the password saving and
autofill toggles.
Bug: 822465
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I91b31fe61cd0754239f7908e8c04c7e69b72f670
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/970541
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vaclav Brozek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#544661}
|
void AddSearchEnginesStrings(content::WebUIDataSource* html_source) {
LocalizedString localized_strings[] = {
{"searchEnginesPageTitle", IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES},
{"searchEnginesAddSearchEngine",
IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_ADD_SEARCH_ENGINE},
{"searchEnginesEditSearchEngine",
IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_EDIT_SEARCH_ENGINE},
{"searchEngines", IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES},
{"searchEnginesDefault", IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_DEFAULT_ENGINES},
{"searchEnginesOther", IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_OTHER_ENGINES},
{"searchEnginesNoOtherEngines",
IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_NO_OTHER_ENGINES},
{"searchEnginesExtension", IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_EXTENSION_ENGINES},
{"searchEnginesSearch", IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_SEARCH},
{"searchEnginesSearchEngine", IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_SEARCH_ENGINE},
{"searchEnginesKeyword", IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_KEYWORD},
{"searchEnginesQueryURL", IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_QUERY_URL},
{"searchEnginesQueryURLExplanation",
IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_QUERY_URL_EXPLANATION},
{"searchEnginesMakeDefault", IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_MAKE_DEFAULT},
{"searchEnginesRemoveFromList",
IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_REMOVE_FROM_LIST},
{"searchEnginesManageExtension",
IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_MANAGE_EXTENSION},
};
AddLocalizedStringsBulk(html_source, localized_strings,
arraysize(localized_strings));
}
|
void AddSearchEnginesStrings(content::WebUIDataSource* html_source) {
LocalizedString localized_strings[] = {
{"searchEnginesPageTitle", IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES},
{"searchEnginesAddSearchEngine",
IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_ADD_SEARCH_ENGINE},
{"searchEnginesEditSearchEngine",
IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_EDIT_SEARCH_ENGINE},
{"searchEngines", IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES},
{"searchEnginesDefault", IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_DEFAULT_ENGINES},
{"searchEnginesOther", IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_OTHER_ENGINES},
{"searchEnginesNoOtherEngines",
IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_NO_OTHER_ENGINES},
{"searchEnginesExtension", IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_EXTENSION_ENGINES},
{"searchEnginesSearch", IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_SEARCH},
{"searchEnginesSearchEngine", IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_SEARCH_ENGINE},
{"searchEnginesKeyword", IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_KEYWORD},
{"searchEnginesQueryURL", IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_QUERY_URL},
{"searchEnginesQueryURLExplanation",
IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_QUERY_URL_EXPLANATION},
{"searchEnginesMakeDefault", IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_MAKE_DEFAULT},
{"searchEnginesRemoveFromList",
IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_REMOVE_FROM_LIST},
{"searchEnginesManageExtension",
IDS_SETTINGS_SEARCH_ENGINES_MANAGE_EXTENSION},
};
AddLocalizedStringsBulk(html_source, localized_strings,
arraysize(localized_strings));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16427
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16427/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/pull/1447/commits/8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
8fe377e93b4b56060e5bbfb6f3142ceaeca744fa
|
fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
|
iasecc_qsign_data_sha256(struct sc_context *ctx, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,
struct iasecc_qsign_data *out)
{
SHA256_CTX sha256;
SHA_LONG pre_hash_Nl;
int jj, ii;
int hh_size = sizeof(SHA_LONG), hh_num = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH / sizeof(SHA_LONG);
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
if (!in || !in_len || !out)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
sc_log(ctx,
"sc_pkcs15_get_qsign_data() input data length %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u",
in_len);
memset(out, 0, sizeof(struct iasecc_qsign_data));
SHA256_Init(&sha256);
SHA256_Update(&sha256, in, in_len);
for (jj=0; jj<hh_num; jj++)
for(ii=0; ii<hh_size; ii++)
out->pre_hash[jj*hh_size + ii] = ((sha256.h[jj] >> 8*(hh_size-1-ii)) & 0xFF);
out->pre_hash_size = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
sc_log(ctx, "Pre hash:%s", sc_dump_hex(out->pre_hash, out->pre_hash_size));
pre_hash_Nl = sha256.Nl - (sha256.Nl % (sizeof(sha256.data) * 8));
for (ii=0; ii<hh_size; ii++) {
out->counter[ii] = (sha256.Nh >> 8*(hh_size-1-ii)) &0xFF;
out->counter[hh_size+ii] = (pre_hash_Nl >> 8*(hh_size-1-ii)) &0xFF;
}
for (ii=0, out->counter_long=0; ii<(int)sizeof(out->counter); ii++)
out->counter_long = out->counter_long*0x100 + out->counter[ii];
sc_log(ctx, "Pre counter(%li):%s", out->counter_long, sc_dump_hex(out->counter, sizeof(out->counter)));
if (sha256.num) {
memcpy(out->last_block, in + in_len - sha256.num, sha256.num);
out->last_block_size = sha256.num;
sc_log(ctx, "Last block(%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u):%s",
out->last_block_size,
sc_dump_hex(out->last_block, out->last_block_size));
}
SHA256_Final(out->hash, &sha256);
out->hash_size = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
sc_log(ctx, "Expected digest %s\n", sc_dump_hex(out->hash, out->hash_size));
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
|
iasecc_qsign_data_sha256(struct sc_context *ctx, const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,
struct iasecc_qsign_data *out)
{
SHA256_CTX sha256;
SHA_LONG pre_hash_Nl;
int jj, ii;
int hh_size = sizeof(SHA_LONG), hh_num = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH / sizeof(SHA_LONG);
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(ctx);
if (!in || !in_len || !out)
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS);
sc_log(ctx,
"sc_pkcs15_get_qsign_data() input data length %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u",
in_len);
memset(out, 0, sizeof(struct iasecc_qsign_data));
SHA256_Init(&sha256);
SHA256_Update(&sha256, in, in_len);
for (jj=0; jj<hh_num; jj++)
for(ii=0; ii<hh_size; ii++)
out->pre_hash[jj*hh_size + ii] = ((sha256.h[jj] >> 8*(hh_size-1-ii)) & 0xFF);
out->pre_hash_size = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
sc_log(ctx, "Pre hash:%s", sc_dump_hex(out->pre_hash, out->pre_hash_size));
pre_hash_Nl = sha256.Nl - (sha256.Nl % (sizeof(sha256.data) * 8));
for (ii=0; ii<hh_size; ii++) {
out->counter[ii] = (sha256.Nh >> 8*(hh_size-1-ii)) &0xFF;
out->counter[hh_size+ii] = (pre_hash_Nl >> 8*(hh_size-1-ii)) &0xFF;
}
for (ii=0, out->counter_long=0; ii<(int)sizeof(out->counter); ii++)
out->counter_long = out->counter_long*0x100 + out->counter[ii];
sc_log(ctx, "Pre counter(%li):%s", out->counter_long, sc_dump_hex(out->counter, sizeof(out->counter)));
if (sha256.num) {
memcpy(out->last_block, in + in_len - sha256.num, sha256.num);
out->last_block_size = sha256.num;
sc_log(ctx, "Last block(%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u):%s",
out->last_block_size,
sc_dump_hex(out->last_block, out->last_block_size));
}
SHA256_Final(out->hash, &sha256);
out->hash_size = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
sc_log(ctx, "Expected digest %s\n", sc_dump_hex(out->hash, out->hash_size));
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
|
C
|
OpenSC
| 0 |
CVE-2016-9934
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-9934/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/6045de69c7dedcba3eadf7c4bba424b19c81d00d
|
6045de69c7dedcba3eadf7c4bba424b19c81d00d
|
Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
|
static int register_bound_param(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, pdo_stmt_t *stmt, int is_param) /* {{{ */
{
struct pdo_bound_param_data param = {0};
long param_type = PDO_PARAM_STR;
param.paramno = -1;
if (FAILURE == zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC,
"lz|llz!", ¶m.paramno, ¶m.parameter, ¶m_type, ¶m.max_value_len,
¶m.driver_params)) {
if (FAILURE == zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "sz|llz!", ¶m.name,
¶m.namelen, ¶m.parameter, ¶m_type, ¶m.max_value_len,
¶m.driver_params)) {
return 0;
}
}
param.param_type = (int) param_type;
if (param.paramno > 0) {
--param.paramno; /* make it zero-based internally */
} else if (!param.name) {
pdo_raise_impl_error(stmt->dbh, stmt, "HY093", "Columns/Parameters are 1-based" TSRMLS_CC);
return 0;
}
Z_ADDREF_P(param.parameter);
if (!really_register_bound_param(¶m, stmt, is_param TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (param.parameter) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&(param.parameter));
param.parameter = NULL;
}
return 0;
}
return 1;
} /* }}} */
|
static int register_bound_param(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, pdo_stmt_t *stmt, int is_param) /* {{{ */
{
struct pdo_bound_param_data param = {0};
long param_type = PDO_PARAM_STR;
param.paramno = -1;
if (FAILURE == zend_parse_parameters_ex(ZEND_PARSE_PARAMS_QUIET, ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC,
"lz|llz!", ¶m.paramno, ¶m.parameter, ¶m_type, ¶m.max_value_len,
¶m.driver_params)) {
if (FAILURE == zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "sz|llz!", ¶m.name,
¶m.namelen, ¶m.parameter, ¶m_type, ¶m.max_value_len,
¶m.driver_params)) {
return 0;
}
}
param.param_type = (int) param_type;
if (param.paramno > 0) {
--param.paramno; /* make it zero-based internally */
} else if (!param.name) {
pdo_raise_impl_error(stmt->dbh, stmt, "HY093", "Columns/Parameters are 1-based" TSRMLS_CC);
return 0;
}
Z_ADDREF_P(param.parameter);
if (!really_register_bound_param(¶m, stmt, is_param TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (param.parameter) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&(param.parameter));
param.parameter = NULL;
}
return 0;
}
return 1;
} /* }}} */
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2019-13307
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-13307/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/025e77fcb2f45b21689931ba3bf74eac153afa48
|
025e77fcb2f45b21689931ba3bf74eac153afa48
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615
|
static inline double MagickLog10(const double x)
{
#define Log10Epsilon (1.0e-11)
if (fabs(x) < Log10Epsilon)
return(log10(Log10Epsilon));
return(log10(fabs(x)));
}
|
static inline double MagickLog10(const double x)
{
#define Log10Epsilon (1.0e-11)
if (fabs(x) < Log10Epsilon)
return(log10(Log10Epsilon));
return(log10(fabs(x)));
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick6
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2384
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2384/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/07d86ca93db7e5cdf4743564d98292042ec21af7
|
07d86ca93db7e5cdf4743564d98292042ec21af7
|
ALSA: usb-audio: avoid freeing umidi object twice
The 'umidi' object will be free'd on the error path by snd_usbmidi_free()
when tearing down the rawmidi interface. So we shouldn't try to free it
in snd_usbmidi_create() after having registered the rawmidi interface.
Found by KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Clemens Ladisch <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
|
static void snd_usbmidi_do_output(struct snd_usb_midi_out_endpoint *ep)
{
unsigned int urb_index;
struct urb *urb;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&ep->buffer_lock, flags);
if (ep->umidi->disconnected) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ep->buffer_lock, flags);
return;
}
urb_index = ep->next_urb;
for (;;) {
if (!(ep->active_urbs & (1 << urb_index))) {
urb = ep->urbs[urb_index].urb;
urb->transfer_buffer_length = 0;
ep->umidi->usb_protocol_ops->output(ep, urb);
if (urb->transfer_buffer_length == 0)
break;
dump_urb("sending", urb->transfer_buffer,
urb->transfer_buffer_length);
urb->dev = ep->umidi->dev;
if (snd_usbmidi_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC) < 0)
break;
ep->active_urbs |= 1 << urb_index;
}
if (++urb_index >= OUTPUT_URBS)
urb_index = 0;
if (urb_index == ep->next_urb)
break;
}
ep->next_urb = urb_index;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ep->buffer_lock, flags);
}
|
static void snd_usbmidi_do_output(struct snd_usb_midi_out_endpoint *ep)
{
unsigned int urb_index;
struct urb *urb;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&ep->buffer_lock, flags);
if (ep->umidi->disconnected) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ep->buffer_lock, flags);
return;
}
urb_index = ep->next_urb;
for (;;) {
if (!(ep->active_urbs & (1 << urb_index))) {
urb = ep->urbs[urb_index].urb;
urb->transfer_buffer_length = 0;
ep->umidi->usb_protocol_ops->output(ep, urb);
if (urb->transfer_buffer_length == 0)
break;
dump_urb("sending", urb->transfer_buffer,
urb->transfer_buffer_length);
urb->dev = ep->umidi->dev;
if (snd_usbmidi_submit_urb(urb, GFP_ATOMIC) < 0)
break;
ep->active_urbs |= 1 << urb_index;
}
if (++urb_index >= OUTPUT_URBS)
urb_index = 0;
if (urb_index == ep->next_urb)
break;
}
ep->next_urb = urb_index;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&ep->buffer_lock, flags);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2315
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2315/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/git/git/commit/34fa79a6cde56d6d428ab0d3160cb094ebad3305
|
34fa79a6cde56d6d428ab0d3160cb094ebad3305
|
prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
|
static void dump_tags(void)
{
static const char *msg = "fast-import";
struct tag *t;
struct strbuf ref_name = STRBUF_INIT;
struct strbuf err = STRBUF_INIT;
struct ref_transaction *transaction;
transaction = ref_transaction_begin(&err);
if (!transaction) {
failure |= error("%s", err.buf);
goto cleanup;
}
for (t = first_tag; t; t = t->next_tag) {
strbuf_reset(&ref_name);
strbuf_addf(&ref_name, "refs/tags/%s", t->name);
if (ref_transaction_update(transaction, ref_name.buf,
t->sha1, NULL, 0, msg, &err)) {
failure |= error("%s", err.buf);
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (ref_transaction_commit(transaction, &err))
failure |= error("%s", err.buf);
cleanup:
ref_transaction_free(transaction);
strbuf_release(&ref_name);
strbuf_release(&err);
}
|
static void dump_tags(void)
{
static const char *msg = "fast-import";
struct tag *t;
struct strbuf ref_name = STRBUF_INIT;
struct strbuf err = STRBUF_INIT;
struct ref_transaction *transaction;
transaction = ref_transaction_begin(&err);
if (!transaction) {
failure |= error("%s", err.buf);
goto cleanup;
}
for (t = first_tag; t; t = t->next_tag) {
strbuf_reset(&ref_name);
strbuf_addf(&ref_name, "refs/tags/%s", t->name);
if (ref_transaction_update(transaction, ref_name.buf,
t->sha1, NULL, 0, msg, &err)) {
failure |= error("%s", err.buf);
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (ref_transaction_commit(transaction, &err))
failure |= error("%s", err.buf);
cleanup:
ref_transaction_free(transaction);
strbuf_release(&ref_name);
strbuf_release(&err);
}
|
C
|
git
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1271
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1271/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/74fce5949bdf05a92c2bc0bd98e6e3e977c55376
|
74fce5949bdf05a92c2bc0bd98e6e3e977c55376
|
Fixed volume slider element event handling
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler has making
redundant calls to setVolume() & setMuted() on mouse activity. E.g. if
a mouse click changed the slider position, the above calls were made 4
times, once for each of these events: mousedown, input, mouseup,
DOMActive, click. This crack got exposed when PointerEvents are enabled
by default on M55, adding pointermove, pointerdown & pointerup to the
list.
This CL fixes the code to trigger the calls to setVolume() & setMuted()
only when the slider position is changed. Also added pointer events to
certain lists of mouse events in the code.
BUG=677900
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2622273003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#446032}
|
MediaControlCurrentTimeDisplayElement::create(MediaControls& mediaControls) {
MediaControlCurrentTimeDisplayElement* element =
new MediaControlCurrentTimeDisplayElement(mediaControls);
element->setShadowPseudoId(
AtomicString("-webkit-media-controls-current-time-display"));
return element;
}
|
MediaControlCurrentTimeDisplayElement::create(MediaControls& mediaControls) {
MediaControlCurrentTimeDisplayElement* element =
new MediaControlCurrentTimeDisplayElement(mediaControls);
element->setShadowPseudoId(
AtomicString("-webkit-media-controls-current-time-display"));
return element;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5061
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5061/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
(Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
|
LayerTreeHostTestTreeActivationCallback()
: num_commits_(0), callback_count_(0) {}
|
LayerTreeHostTestTreeActivationCallback()
: num_commits_(0), callback_count_(0) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1078
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1078/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c4c896e1471aec3b004a693c689f60be3b17ac86
|
c4c896e1471aec3b004a693c689f60be3b17ac86
|
Bluetooth: sco: fix information leak to userspace
struct sco_conninfo has one padding byte in the end. Local variable
cinfo of type sco_conninfo is copied to userspace with this uninizialized
one byte, leading to old stack contents leak.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <[email protected]>
|
static inline int sco_chan_add(struct sco_conn *conn, struct sock *sk, struct sock *parent)
{
int err = 0;
sco_conn_lock(conn);
if (conn->sk)
err = -EBUSY;
else
__sco_chan_add(conn, sk, parent);
sco_conn_unlock(conn);
return err;
}
|
static inline int sco_chan_add(struct sco_conn *conn, struct sock *sk, struct sock *parent)
{
int err = 0;
sco_conn_lock(conn);
if (conn->sk)
err = -EBUSY;
else
__sco_chan_add(conn, sk, parent);
sco_conn_unlock(conn);
return err;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3331
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3331/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ccfe8c3f7e52ae83155cb038753f4c75b774ca8a
|
ccfe8c3f7e52ae83155cb038753f4c75b774ca8a
|
crypto: aesni - fix memory usage in GCM decryption
The kernel crypto API logic requires the caller to provide the
length of (ciphertext || authentication tag) as cryptlen for the
AEAD decryption operation. Thus, the cipher implementation must
calculate the size of the plaintext output itself and cannot simply use
cryptlen.
The RFC4106 GCM decryption operation tries to overwrite cryptlen memory
in req->dst. As the destination buffer for decryption only needs to hold
the plaintext memory but cryptlen references the input buffer holding
(ciphertext || authentication tag), the assumption of the destination
buffer length in RFC4106 GCM operation leads to a too large size. This
patch simply uses the already calculated plaintext size.
In addition, this patch fixes the offset calculation of the AAD buffer
pointer: as mentioned before, cryptlen already includes the size of the
tag. Thus, the tag does not need to be added. With the addition, the AAD
will be written beyond the already allocated buffer.
Note, this fixes a kernel crash that can be triggered from user space
via AF_ALG(aead) -- simply use the libkcapi test application
from [1] and update it to use rfc4106-gcm-aes.
Using [1], the changes were tested using CAVS vectors to demonstrate
that the crypto operation still delivers the right results.
[1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html
CC: Tadeusz Struk <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static int rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
{
int ret;
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(tfm);
if (!irq_fpu_usable()) {
struct aead_request *cryptd_req =
(struct aead_request *) aead_request_ctx(req);
memcpy(cryptd_req, req, sizeof(*req));
aead_request_set_tfm(cryptd_req, &ctx->cryptd_tfm->base);
return crypto_aead_encrypt(cryptd_req);
} else {
struct crypto_aead *cryptd_child = cryptd_aead_child(ctx->cryptd_tfm);
kernel_fpu_begin();
ret = cryptd_child->base.crt_aead.encrypt(req);
kernel_fpu_end();
return ret;
}
}
|
static int rfc4106_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
{
int ret;
struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(tfm);
if (!irq_fpu_usable()) {
struct aead_request *cryptd_req =
(struct aead_request *) aead_request_ctx(req);
memcpy(cryptd_req, req, sizeof(*req));
aead_request_set_tfm(cryptd_req, &ctx->cryptd_tfm->base);
return crypto_aead_encrypt(cryptd_req);
} else {
struct crypto_aead *cryptd_child = cryptd_aead_child(ctx->cryptd_tfm);
kernel_fpu_begin();
ret = cryptd_child->base.crt_aead.encrypt(req);
kernel_fpu_end();
return ret;
}
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-8063
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-8063/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/3f190e3aec212fc8c61e202c51400afa7384d4bc
|
3f190e3aec212fc8c61e202c51400afa7384d4bc
|
[media] cxusb: Use a dma capable buffer also for reading
Commit 17ce039b4e54 ("[media] cxusb: don't do DMA on stack")
added a kmalloc'ed bounce buffer for writes, but missed to do the same
for reads. As the read only happens after the write is finished, we can
reuse the same buffer.
As dvb_usb_generic_rw handles a read length of 0 by itself, avoid calling
it using the dvb_usb_generic_read wrapper function.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Brüns <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>
|
static int cxusb_lgz201_tuner_attach(struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap)
{
dvb_attach(dvb_pll_attach, adap->fe_adap[0].fe, 0x61, NULL, DVB_PLL_LG_Z201);
return 0;
}
|
static int cxusb_lgz201_tuner_attach(struct dvb_usb_adapter *adap)
{
dvb_attach(dvb_pll_attach, adap->fe_adap[0].fe, 0x61, NULL, DVB_PLL_LG_Z201);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3839
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3839/
|
CWE-284
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/bt/+/472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
472271b153c5dc53c28beac55480a8d8434b2d5c
|
DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
static int create_server_sdp_record(rfc_slot_t *slot) {
if(slot->scn == 0) {
return false;
}
slot->sdp_handle = add_rfc_sdp_rec(slot->service_name, slot->service_uuid, slot->scn);
return (slot->sdp_handle > 0);
}
|
static int create_server_sdp_record(rfc_slot_t *slot) {
if(slot->scn == 0) {
return false;
}
slot->sdp_handle = add_rfc_sdp_rec(slot->service_name, slot->service_uuid, slot->scn);
return (slot->sdp_handle > 0);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2012-1179
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-1179/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4a1d704194a441bf83c636004a479e01360ec850
|
4a1d704194a441bf83c636004a479e01360ec850
|
mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static inline unsigned long get_vflags(struct kernel_vm86_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long flags = regs->pt.flags & RETURN_MASK;
if (VEFLAGS & X86_EFLAGS_VIF)
flags |= X86_EFLAGS_IF;
flags |= X86_EFLAGS_IOPL;
return flags | (VEFLAGS & current->thread.v86mask);
}
|
static inline unsigned long get_vflags(struct kernel_vm86_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long flags = regs->pt.flags & RETURN_MASK;
if (VEFLAGS & X86_EFLAGS_VIF)
flags |= X86_EFLAGS_IF;
flags |= X86_EFLAGS_IOPL;
return flags | (VEFLAGS & current->thread.v86mask);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3834
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3834/
|
CWE-200
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/1f24c730ab6ca5aff1e3137b340b8aeaeda4bdbc
|
1f24c730ab6ca5aff1e3137b340b8aeaeda4bdbc
|
DO NOT MERGE: Camera: Adjust pointers to ANW buffers to avoid infoleak
Subtract address of a random static object from pointers being routed
through app process.
Bug: 28466701
Change-Id: Idcbfe81e9507433769672f3dc6d67db5eeed4e04
|
status_t CameraSource::init(
const sp<ICamera>& camera,
const sp<ICameraRecordingProxy>& proxy,
int32_t cameraId,
const String16& clientName,
uid_t clientUid,
Size videoSize,
int32_t frameRate,
bool storeMetaDataInVideoBuffers) {
ALOGV("init");
status_t err = OK;
int64_t token = IPCThreadState::self()->clearCallingIdentity();
err = initWithCameraAccess(camera, proxy, cameraId, clientName, clientUid,
videoSize, frameRate,
storeMetaDataInVideoBuffers);
IPCThreadState::self()->restoreCallingIdentity(token);
return err;
}
|
status_t CameraSource::init(
const sp<ICamera>& camera,
const sp<ICameraRecordingProxy>& proxy,
int32_t cameraId,
const String16& clientName,
uid_t clientUid,
Size videoSize,
int32_t frameRate,
bool storeMetaDataInVideoBuffers) {
ALOGV("init");
status_t err = OK;
int64_t token = IPCThreadState::self()->clearCallingIdentity();
err = initWithCameraAccess(camera, proxy, cameraId, clientName, clientUid,
videoSize, frameRate,
storeMetaDataInVideoBuffers);
IPCThreadState::self()->restoreCallingIdentity(token);
return err;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7541
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7541/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8f44c9a41386729fea410e688959ddaa9d51be7c
|
8f44c9a41386729fea410e688959ddaa9d51be7c
|
brcmfmac: fix possible buffer overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_mgmt_tx()
The lower level nl80211 code in cfg80211 ensures that "len" is between
25 and NL80211_ATTR_FRAME (2304). We subtract DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN (24) from
"len" so thats's max of 2280. However, the action_frame->data[] buffer is
only BRCMF_FIL_ACTION_FRAME_SIZE (1800) bytes long so this memcpy() can
overflow.
memcpy(action_frame->data, &buf[DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN],
le16_to_cpu(action_frame->len));
Cc: [email protected] # 3.9.x
Fixes: 18e2f61db3b70 ("brcmfmac: P2P action frame tx.")
Reported-by: "freenerguo(郭大兴)" <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static s32 brcmf_cfg80211_resume(struct wiphy *wiphy)
{
struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg = wiphy_to_cfg(wiphy);
struct net_device *ndev = cfg_to_ndev(cfg);
struct brcmf_if *ifp = netdev_priv(ndev);
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Enter\n");
if (cfg->wowl.active) {
brcmf_report_wowl_wakeind(wiphy, ifp);
brcmf_fil_iovar_int_set(ifp, "wowl_clear", 0);
brcmf_config_wowl_pattern(ifp, "clr", NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
if (!brcmf_feat_is_enabled(ifp, BRCMF_FEAT_WOWL_ARP_ND))
brcmf_configure_arp_nd_offload(ifp, true);
brcmf_fil_cmd_int_set(ifp, BRCMF_C_SET_PM,
cfg->wowl.pre_pmmode);
cfg->wowl.active = false;
if (cfg->wowl.nd_enabled) {
brcmf_cfg80211_sched_scan_stop(cfg->wiphy, ifp->ndev, 0);
brcmf_fweh_unregister(cfg->pub, BRCMF_E_PFN_NET_FOUND);
brcmf_fweh_register(cfg->pub, BRCMF_E_PFN_NET_FOUND,
brcmf_notify_sched_scan_results);
cfg->wowl.nd_enabled = false;
}
}
return 0;
}
|
static s32 brcmf_cfg80211_resume(struct wiphy *wiphy)
{
struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg = wiphy_to_cfg(wiphy);
struct net_device *ndev = cfg_to_ndev(cfg);
struct brcmf_if *ifp = netdev_priv(ndev);
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Enter\n");
if (cfg->wowl.active) {
brcmf_report_wowl_wakeind(wiphy, ifp);
brcmf_fil_iovar_int_set(ifp, "wowl_clear", 0);
brcmf_config_wowl_pattern(ifp, "clr", NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
if (!brcmf_feat_is_enabled(ifp, BRCMF_FEAT_WOWL_ARP_ND))
brcmf_configure_arp_nd_offload(ifp, true);
brcmf_fil_cmd_int_set(ifp, BRCMF_C_SET_PM,
cfg->wowl.pre_pmmode);
cfg->wowl.active = false;
if (cfg->wowl.nd_enabled) {
brcmf_cfg80211_sched_scan_stop(cfg->wiphy, ifp->ndev, 0);
brcmf_fweh_unregister(cfg->pub, BRCMF_E_PFN_NET_FOUND);
brcmf_fweh_register(cfg->pub, BRCMF_E_PFN_NET_FOUND,
brcmf_notify_sched_scan_results);
cfg->wowl.nd_enabled = false;
}
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-1767
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1767/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c2892f02712e9516d72841d5c019ed6916329794
|
c2892f02712e9516d72841d5c019ed6916329794
|
gre: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
GRE protocol receive hook can be called right after protocol addition is done.
If netns stuff is not yet initialized, we're going to oops in
net_generic().
This is remotely oopsable if ip_gre is compiled as module and packet
comes at unfortunate moment of module loading.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void ipgre_netlink_parms(struct nlattr *data[],
struct ip_tunnel_parm *parms)
{
memset(parms, 0, sizeof(*parms));
parms->iph.protocol = IPPROTO_GRE;
if (!data)
return;
if (data[IFLA_GRE_LINK])
parms->link = nla_get_u32(data[IFLA_GRE_LINK]);
if (data[IFLA_GRE_IFLAGS])
parms->i_flags = nla_get_be16(data[IFLA_GRE_IFLAGS]);
if (data[IFLA_GRE_OFLAGS])
parms->o_flags = nla_get_be16(data[IFLA_GRE_OFLAGS]);
if (data[IFLA_GRE_IKEY])
parms->i_key = nla_get_be32(data[IFLA_GRE_IKEY]);
if (data[IFLA_GRE_OKEY])
parms->o_key = nla_get_be32(data[IFLA_GRE_OKEY]);
if (data[IFLA_GRE_LOCAL])
parms->iph.saddr = nla_get_be32(data[IFLA_GRE_LOCAL]);
if (data[IFLA_GRE_REMOTE])
parms->iph.daddr = nla_get_be32(data[IFLA_GRE_REMOTE]);
if (data[IFLA_GRE_TTL])
parms->iph.ttl = nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_GRE_TTL]);
if (data[IFLA_GRE_TOS])
parms->iph.tos = nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_GRE_TOS]);
if (!data[IFLA_GRE_PMTUDISC] || nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_GRE_PMTUDISC]))
parms->iph.frag_off = htons(IP_DF);
}
|
static void ipgre_netlink_parms(struct nlattr *data[],
struct ip_tunnel_parm *parms)
{
memset(parms, 0, sizeof(*parms));
parms->iph.protocol = IPPROTO_GRE;
if (!data)
return;
if (data[IFLA_GRE_LINK])
parms->link = nla_get_u32(data[IFLA_GRE_LINK]);
if (data[IFLA_GRE_IFLAGS])
parms->i_flags = nla_get_be16(data[IFLA_GRE_IFLAGS]);
if (data[IFLA_GRE_OFLAGS])
parms->o_flags = nla_get_be16(data[IFLA_GRE_OFLAGS]);
if (data[IFLA_GRE_IKEY])
parms->i_key = nla_get_be32(data[IFLA_GRE_IKEY]);
if (data[IFLA_GRE_OKEY])
parms->o_key = nla_get_be32(data[IFLA_GRE_OKEY]);
if (data[IFLA_GRE_LOCAL])
parms->iph.saddr = nla_get_be32(data[IFLA_GRE_LOCAL]);
if (data[IFLA_GRE_REMOTE])
parms->iph.daddr = nla_get_be32(data[IFLA_GRE_REMOTE]);
if (data[IFLA_GRE_TTL])
parms->iph.ttl = nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_GRE_TTL]);
if (data[IFLA_GRE_TOS])
parms->iph.tos = nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_GRE_TOS]);
if (!data[IFLA_GRE_PMTUDISC] || nla_get_u8(data[IFLA_GRE_PMTUDISC]))
parms->iph.frag_off = htons(IP_DF);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2350/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
b944f670bb7a8a919daac497a4ea0536c954c201
|
[JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void setJSTestObjUnsignedShortAttr(ExecState* exec, JSObject* thisObject, JSValue value)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(thisObject);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
impl->setUnsignedShortAttr(value.toUInt32(exec));
}
|
void setJSTestObjUnsignedShortAttr(ExecState* exec, JSObject* thisObject, JSValue value)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(thisObject);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
impl->setUnsignedShortAttr(value.toUInt32(exec));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6634
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6634/
|
CWE-287
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/50370b3c98047bdc80184ff87a502edc5c597d3a
|
50370b3c98047bdc80184ff87a502edc5c597d3a
|
During redirects in the one click sign in flow, check the current URL
instead of original URL to validate gaia http headers.
BUG=307159
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/77343002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@236563 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
bool OneClickSigninHelper::CanOffer(content::WebContents* web_contents,
CanOfferFor can_offer_for,
const std::string& email,
std::string* error_message) {
DCHECK(content::BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(content::BrowserThread::UI));
VLOG(1) << "OneClickSigninHelper::CanOffer";
if (error_message)
error_message->clear();
if (!web_contents)
return false;
if (web_contents->GetBrowserContext()->IsOffTheRecord())
return false;
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
if (!profile)
return false;
SigninManager* manager =
SigninManagerFactory::GetForProfile(profile);
if (manager && !manager->IsSigninAllowed())
return false;
if (can_offer_for == CAN_OFFER_FOR_INTERSTITAL_ONLY &&
!profile->GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(prefs::kReverseAutologinEnabled))
return false;
if (!ChromeSigninManagerDelegate::ProfileAllowsSigninCookies(profile))
return false;
if (!email.empty()) {
if (!manager)
return false;
std::string current_email = manager->GetAuthenticatedUsername();
const bool same_email = gaia::AreEmailsSame(current_email, email);
if (!current_email.empty() && !same_email) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Signin.Reauth",
signin::HISTOGRAM_ACCOUNT_MISSMATCH,
signin::HISTOGRAM_MAX);
if (error_message) {
error_message->assign(
l10n_util::GetStringFUTF8(IDS_SYNC_WRONG_EMAIL,
UTF8ToUTF16(current_email)));
}
return false;
}
if (!manager->IsAllowedUsername(email)) {
if (error_message) {
error_message->assign(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF8(IDS_SYNC_LOGIN_NAME_PROHIBITED));
}
return false;
}
if (g_browser_process && !same_email) {
ProfileManager* manager = g_browser_process->profile_manager();
if (manager) {
string16 email16 = UTF8ToUTF16(email);
ProfileInfoCache& cache = manager->GetProfileInfoCache();
for (size_t i = 0; i < cache.GetNumberOfProfiles(); ++i) {
if (email16 == cache.GetUserNameOfProfileAtIndex(i)) {
if (error_message) {
error_message->assign(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF8(IDS_SYNC_USER_NAME_IN_USE_ERROR));
}
return false;
}
}
}
}
if (can_offer_for == CAN_OFFER_FOR_INTERSTITAL_ONLY) {
const ListValue* rejected_emails = profile->GetPrefs()->GetList(
prefs::kReverseAutologinRejectedEmailList);
if (!rejected_emails->empty()) {
base::ListValue::const_iterator iter = rejected_emails->Find(
base::StringValue(email));
if (iter != rejected_emails->end())
return false;
}
}
}
VLOG(1) << "OneClickSigninHelper::CanOffer: yes we can";
return true;
}
|
bool OneClickSigninHelper::CanOffer(content::WebContents* web_contents,
CanOfferFor can_offer_for,
const std::string& email,
std::string* error_message) {
DCHECK(content::BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(content::BrowserThread::UI));
VLOG(1) << "OneClickSigninHelper::CanOffer";
if (error_message)
error_message->clear();
if (!web_contents)
return false;
if (web_contents->GetBrowserContext()->IsOffTheRecord())
return false;
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
if (!profile)
return false;
SigninManager* manager =
SigninManagerFactory::GetForProfile(profile);
if (manager && !manager->IsSigninAllowed())
return false;
if (can_offer_for == CAN_OFFER_FOR_INTERSTITAL_ONLY &&
!profile->GetPrefs()->GetBoolean(prefs::kReverseAutologinEnabled))
return false;
if (!ChromeSigninManagerDelegate::ProfileAllowsSigninCookies(profile))
return false;
if (!email.empty()) {
if (!manager)
return false;
std::string current_email = manager->GetAuthenticatedUsername();
const bool same_email = gaia::AreEmailsSame(current_email, email);
if (!current_email.empty() && !same_email) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Signin.Reauth",
signin::HISTOGRAM_ACCOUNT_MISSMATCH,
signin::HISTOGRAM_MAX);
if (error_message) {
error_message->assign(
l10n_util::GetStringFUTF8(IDS_SYNC_WRONG_EMAIL,
UTF8ToUTF16(current_email)));
}
return false;
}
if (!manager->IsAllowedUsername(email)) {
if (error_message) {
error_message->assign(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF8(IDS_SYNC_LOGIN_NAME_PROHIBITED));
}
return false;
}
if (g_browser_process && !same_email) {
ProfileManager* manager = g_browser_process->profile_manager();
if (manager) {
string16 email16 = UTF8ToUTF16(email);
ProfileInfoCache& cache = manager->GetProfileInfoCache();
for (size_t i = 0; i < cache.GetNumberOfProfiles(); ++i) {
if (email16 == cache.GetUserNameOfProfileAtIndex(i)) {
if (error_message) {
error_message->assign(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF8(IDS_SYNC_USER_NAME_IN_USE_ERROR));
}
return false;
}
}
}
}
if (can_offer_for == CAN_OFFER_FOR_INTERSTITAL_ONLY) {
const ListValue* rejected_emails = profile->GetPrefs()->GetList(
prefs::kReverseAutologinRejectedEmailList);
if (!rejected_emails->empty()) {
base::ListValue::const_iterator iter = rejected_emails->Find(
base::StringValue(email));
if (iter != rejected_emails->end())
return false;
}
}
}
VLOG(1) << "OneClickSigninHelper::CanOffer: yes we can";
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5130
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5130/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ce1446c00f0fd8f5a3b00727421be2124cb7370f
|
ce1446c00f0fd8f5a3b00727421be2124cb7370f
|
Roll libxml to 3939178e4cb797417ff033b1e04ab4b038e224d9
Removes a few patches fixed upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=e26630548e7d138d2c560844c43820b6767251e3
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=94691dc884d1a8ada39f073408b4bb92fe7fe882
Stops using the NOXXE flag which was reverted upstream:
https://git.gnome.org/browse/libxml2/commit/?id=030b1f7a27c22f9237eddca49ec5e620b6258d7d
Changes the patch to uri.c to not add limits.h, which is included
upstream.
Bug: 722079
Change-Id: I4b8449ed33f95de23c54c2cde99970c2df2781ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535233
Reviewed-by: Scott Graham <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Dominic Cooney <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480755}
|
htmlHandleOmittedElem(int val) {
int old = htmlOmittedDefaultValue;
htmlOmittedDefaultValue = val;
return(old);
}
|
htmlHandleOmittedElem(int val) {
int old = htmlOmittedDefaultValue;
htmlOmittedDefaultValue = val;
return(old);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4220
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4220/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/9955ac47f4ba1c95ecb6092aeaefb40a22e99268
|
9955ac47f4ba1c95ecb6092aeaefb40a22e99268
|
arm64: don't kill the kernel on a bad esr from el0
Rather than completely killing the kernel if we receive an esr value we
can't deal with in the el0 handlers, send the process a SIGILL and log
the esr value in the hope that we can debug it. If we receive a bad esr
from el1, we'll die() as before.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
void __pmd_error(const char *file, int line, unsigned long val)
{
printk("%s:%d: bad pmd %016lx.\n", file, line, val);
}
|
void __pmd_error(const char *file, int line, unsigned long val)
{
printk("%s:%d: bad pmd %016lx.\n", file, line, val);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6252
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6252/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/7932c0bd7740f4cd2aa168d3ce0199e7af7d72d5
|
7932c0bd7740f4cd2aa168d3ce0199e7af7d72d5
|
vhost: actually track log eventfd file
While reviewing vhost log code, I found out that log_file is never
set. Note: I haven't tested the change (QEMU doesn't use LOG_FD yet).
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
|
long vhost_vring_ioctl(struct vhost_dev *d, int ioctl, void __user *argp)
{
struct file *eventfp, *filep = NULL;
bool pollstart = false, pollstop = false;
struct eventfd_ctx *ctx = NULL;
u32 __user *idxp = argp;
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq;
struct vhost_vring_state s;
struct vhost_vring_file f;
struct vhost_vring_addr a;
u32 idx;
long r;
r = get_user(idx, idxp);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (idx >= d->nvqs)
return -ENOBUFS;
vq = d->vqs[idx];
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
switch (ioctl) {
case VHOST_SET_VRING_NUM:
/* Resizing ring with an active backend?
* You don't want to do that. */
if (vq->private_data) {
r = -EBUSY;
break;
}
if (copy_from_user(&s, argp, sizeof s)) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (!s.num || s.num > 0xffff || (s.num & (s.num - 1))) {
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
vq->num = s.num;
break;
case VHOST_SET_VRING_BASE:
/* Moving base with an active backend?
* You don't want to do that. */
if (vq->private_data) {
r = -EBUSY;
break;
}
if (copy_from_user(&s, argp, sizeof s)) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (s.num > 0xffff) {
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
vq->last_avail_idx = s.num;
/* Forget the cached index value. */
vq->avail_idx = vq->last_avail_idx;
break;
case VHOST_GET_VRING_BASE:
s.index = idx;
s.num = vq->last_avail_idx;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &s, sizeof s))
r = -EFAULT;
break;
case VHOST_SET_VRING_ADDR:
if (copy_from_user(&a, argp, sizeof a)) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (a.flags & ~(0x1 << VHOST_VRING_F_LOG)) {
r = -EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
}
/* For 32bit, verify that the top 32bits of the user
data are set to zero. */
if ((u64)(unsigned long)a.desc_user_addr != a.desc_user_addr ||
(u64)(unsigned long)a.used_user_addr != a.used_user_addr ||
(u64)(unsigned long)a.avail_user_addr != a.avail_user_addr) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
/* Make sure it's safe to cast pointers to vring types. */
BUILD_BUG_ON(__alignof__ *vq->avail > VRING_AVAIL_ALIGN_SIZE);
BUILD_BUG_ON(__alignof__ *vq->used > VRING_USED_ALIGN_SIZE);
if ((a.avail_user_addr & (VRING_AVAIL_ALIGN_SIZE - 1)) ||
(a.used_user_addr & (VRING_USED_ALIGN_SIZE - 1)) ||
(a.log_guest_addr & (sizeof(u64) - 1))) {
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
/* We only verify access here if backend is configured.
* If it is not, we don't as size might not have been setup.
* We will verify when backend is configured. */
if (vq->private_data) {
if (!vq_access_ok(vq, vq->num,
(void __user *)(unsigned long)a.desc_user_addr,
(void __user *)(unsigned long)a.avail_user_addr,
(void __user *)(unsigned long)a.used_user_addr)) {
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
/* Also validate log access for used ring if enabled. */
if ((a.flags & (0x1 << VHOST_VRING_F_LOG)) &&
!log_access_ok(vq->log_base, a.log_guest_addr,
sizeof *vq->used +
vq->num * sizeof *vq->used->ring)) {
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
}
vq->log_used = !!(a.flags & (0x1 << VHOST_VRING_F_LOG));
vq->desc = (void __user *)(unsigned long)a.desc_user_addr;
vq->avail = (void __user *)(unsigned long)a.avail_user_addr;
vq->log_addr = a.log_guest_addr;
vq->used = (void __user *)(unsigned long)a.used_user_addr;
break;
case VHOST_SET_VRING_KICK:
if (copy_from_user(&f, argp, sizeof f)) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
eventfp = f.fd == -1 ? NULL : eventfd_fget(f.fd);
if (IS_ERR(eventfp)) {
r = PTR_ERR(eventfp);
break;
}
if (eventfp != vq->kick) {
pollstop = (filep = vq->kick) != NULL;
pollstart = (vq->kick = eventfp) != NULL;
} else
filep = eventfp;
break;
case VHOST_SET_VRING_CALL:
if (copy_from_user(&f, argp, sizeof f)) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
eventfp = f.fd == -1 ? NULL : eventfd_fget(f.fd);
if (IS_ERR(eventfp)) {
r = PTR_ERR(eventfp);
break;
}
if (eventfp != vq->call) {
filep = vq->call;
ctx = vq->call_ctx;
vq->call = eventfp;
vq->call_ctx = eventfp ?
eventfd_ctx_fileget(eventfp) : NULL;
} else
filep = eventfp;
break;
case VHOST_SET_VRING_ERR:
if (copy_from_user(&f, argp, sizeof f)) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
eventfp = f.fd == -1 ? NULL : eventfd_fget(f.fd);
if (IS_ERR(eventfp)) {
r = PTR_ERR(eventfp);
break;
}
if (eventfp != vq->error) {
filep = vq->error;
vq->error = eventfp;
ctx = vq->error_ctx;
vq->error_ctx = eventfp ?
eventfd_ctx_fileget(eventfp) : NULL;
} else
filep = eventfp;
break;
case VHOST_SET_VRING_ENDIAN:
r = vhost_set_vring_endian(vq, argp);
break;
case VHOST_GET_VRING_ENDIAN:
r = vhost_get_vring_endian(vq, idx, argp);
break;
default:
r = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
if (pollstop && vq->handle_kick)
vhost_poll_stop(&vq->poll);
if (ctx)
eventfd_ctx_put(ctx);
if (filep)
fput(filep);
if (pollstart && vq->handle_kick)
r = vhost_poll_start(&vq->poll, vq->kick);
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
if (pollstop && vq->handle_kick)
vhost_poll_flush(&vq->poll);
return r;
}
|
long vhost_vring_ioctl(struct vhost_dev *d, int ioctl, void __user *argp)
{
struct file *eventfp, *filep = NULL;
bool pollstart = false, pollstop = false;
struct eventfd_ctx *ctx = NULL;
u32 __user *idxp = argp;
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq;
struct vhost_vring_state s;
struct vhost_vring_file f;
struct vhost_vring_addr a;
u32 idx;
long r;
r = get_user(idx, idxp);
if (r < 0)
return r;
if (idx >= d->nvqs)
return -ENOBUFS;
vq = d->vqs[idx];
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
switch (ioctl) {
case VHOST_SET_VRING_NUM:
/* Resizing ring with an active backend?
* You don't want to do that. */
if (vq->private_data) {
r = -EBUSY;
break;
}
if (copy_from_user(&s, argp, sizeof s)) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (!s.num || s.num > 0xffff || (s.num & (s.num - 1))) {
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
vq->num = s.num;
break;
case VHOST_SET_VRING_BASE:
/* Moving base with an active backend?
* You don't want to do that. */
if (vq->private_data) {
r = -EBUSY;
break;
}
if (copy_from_user(&s, argp, sizeof s)) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (s.num > 0xffff) {
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
vq->last_avail_idx = s.num;
/* Forget the cached index value. */
vq->avail_idx = vq->last_avail_idx;
break;
case VHOST_GET_VRING_BASE:
s.index = idx;
s.num = vq->last_avail_idx;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &s, sizeof s))
r = -EFAULT;
break;
case VHOST_SET_VRING_ADDR:
if (copy_from_user(&a, argp, sizeof a)) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
if (a.flags & ~(0x1 << VHOST_VRING_F_LOG)) {
r = -EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
}
/* For 32bit, verify that the top 32bits of the user
data are set to zero. */
if ((u64)(unsigned long)a.desc_user_addr != a.desc_user_addr ||
(u64)(unsigned long)a.used_user_addr != a.used_user_addr ||
(u64)(unsigned long)a.avail_user_addr != a.avail_user_addr) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
/* Make sure it's safe to cast pointers to vring types. */
BUILD_BUG_ON(__alignof__ *vq->avail > VRING_AVAIL_ALIGN_SIZE);
BUILD_BUG_ON(__alignof__ *vq->used > VRING_USED_ALIGN_SIZE);
if ((a.avail_user_addr & (VRING_AVAIL_ALIGN_SIZE - 1)) ||
(a.used_user_addr & (VRING_USED_ALIGN_SIZE - 1)) ||
(a.log_guest_addr & (sizeof(u64) - 1))) {
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
/* We only verify access here if backend is configured.
* If it is not, we don't as size might not have been setup.
* We will verify when backend is configured. */
if (vq->private_data) {
if (!vq_access_ok(vq, vq->num,
(void __user *)(unsigned long)a.desc_user_addr,
(void __user *)(unsigned long)a.avail_user_addr,
(void __user *)(unsigned long)a.used_user_addr)) {
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
/* Also validate log access for used ring if enabled. */
if ((a.flags & (0x1 << VHOST_VRING_F_LOG)) &&
!log_access_ok(vq->log_base, a.log_guest_addr,
sizeof *vq->used +
vq->num * sizeof *vq->used->ring)) {
r = -EINVAL;
break;
}
}
vq->log_used = !!(a.flags & (0x1 << VHOST_VRING_F_LOG));
vq->desc = (void __user *)(unsigned long)a.desc_user_addr;
vq->avail = (void __user *)(unsigned long)a.avail_user_addr;
vq->log_addr = a.log_guest_addr;
vq->used = (void __user *)(unsigned long)a.used_user_addr;
break;
case VHOST_SET_VRING_KICK:
if (copy_from_user(&f, argp, sizeof f)) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
eventfp = f.fd == -1 ? NULL : eventfd_fget(f.fd);
if (IS_ERR(eventfp)) {
r = PTR_ERR(eventfp);
break;
}
if (eventfp != vq->kick) {
pollstop = (filep = vq->kick) != NULL;
pollstart = (vq->kick = eventfp) != NULL;
} else
filep = eventfp;
break;
case VHOST_SET_VRING_CALL:
if (copy_from_user(&f, argp, sizeof f)) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
eventfp = f.fd == -1 ? NULL : eventfd_fget(f.fd);
if (IS_ERR(eventfp)) {
r = PTR_ERR(eventfp);
break;
}
if (eventfp != vq->call) {
filep = vq->call;
ctx = vq->call_ctx;
vq->call = eventfp;
vq->call_ctx = eventfp ?
eventfd_ctx_fileget(eventfp) : NULL;
} else
filep = eventfp;
break;
case VHOST_SET_VRING_ERR:
if (copy_from_user(&f, argp, sizeof f)) {
r = -EFAULT;
break;
}
eventfp = f.fd == -1 ? NULL : eventfd_fget(f.fd);
if (IS_ERR(eventfp)) {
r = PTR_ERR(eventfp);
break;
}
if (eventfp != vq->error) {
filep = vq->error;
vq->error = eventfp;
ctx = vq->error_ctx;
vq->error_ctx = eventfp ?
eventfd_ctx_fileget(eventfp) : NULL;
} else
filep = eventfp;
break;
case VHOST_SET_VRING_ENDIAN:
r = vhost_set_vring_endian(vq, argp);
break;
case VHOST_GET_VRING_ENDIAN:
r = vhost_get_vring_endian(vq, idx, argp);
break;
default:
r = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
}
if (pollstop && vq->handle_kick)
vhost_poll_stop(&vq->poll);
if (ctx)
eventfd_ctx_put(ctx);
if (filep)
fput(filep);
if (pollstart && vq->handle_kick)
r = vhost_poll_start(&vq->poll, vq->kick);
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
if (pollstop && vq->handle_kick)
vhost_poll_flush(&vq->poll);
return r;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2010-2498
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-2498/
|
CWE-399
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=8d22746c9e5af80ff4304aef440986403a5072e2
|
8d22746c9e5af80ff4304aef440986403a5072e2
| null |
psh_glyph_find_strong_points( PSH_Glyph glyph,
FT_Int dimension )
{
/* a point is `strong' if it is located on a stem edge and */
/* has an `in' or `out' tangent parallel to the hint's direction */
PSH_Hint_Table table = &glyph->hint_tables[dimension];
PS_Mask mask = table->hint_masks->masks;
FT_UInt num_masks = table->hint_masks->num_masks;
FT_UInt first = 0;
FT_Int major_dir = dimension == 0 ? PSH_DIR_VERTICAL
: PSH_DIR_HORIZONTAL;
PSH_Dimension dim = &glyph->globals->dimension[dimension];
FT_Fixed scale = dim->scale_mult;
FT_Int threshold;
threshold = (FT_Int)FT_DivFix( PSH_STRONG_THRESHOLD, scale );
if ( threshold > PSH_STRONG_THRESHOLD_MAXIMUM )
threshold = PSH_STRONG_THRESHOLD_MAXIMUM;
/* process secondary hints to `selected' points */
/* process secondary hints to `selected' points */
if ( num_masks > 1 && glyph->num_points > 0 )
{
/* the `endchar' op can reduce the number of points */
first = mask->end_point > glyph->num_points
? glyph->num_points
: mask->end_point;
mask++;
for ( ; num_masks > 1; num_masks--, mask++ )
{
next = mask->end_point;
FT_Int count;
next = mask->end_point > glyph->num_points
? glyph->num_points
: mask->end_point;
count = next - first;
if ( count > 0 )
{
threshold, major_dir );
}
first = next;
}
}
/* process primary hints for all points */
if ( num_masks == 1 )
{
FT_UInt count = glyph->num_points;
PSH_Point point = glyph->points;
psh_hint_table_activate_mask( table, table->hint_masks->masks );
psh_hint_table_find_strong_points( table, point, count,
threshold, major_dir );
}
/* now, certain points may have been attached to a hint and */
/* not marked as strong; update their flags then */
{
FT_UInt count = glyph->num_points;
PSH_Point point = glyph->points;
for ( ; count > 0; count--, point++ )
if ( point->hint && !psh_point_is_strong( point ) )
psh_point_set_strong( point );
}
}
|
psh_glyph_find_strong_points( PSH_Glyph glyph,
FT_Int dimension )
{
/* a point is `strong' if it is located on a stem edge and */
/* has an `in' or `out' tangent parallel to the hint's direction */
PSH_Hint_Table table = &glyph->hint_tables[dimension];
PS_Mask mask = table->hint_masks->masks;
FT_UInt num_masks = table->hint_masks->num_masks;
FT_UInt first = 0;
FT_Int major_dir = dimension == 0 ? PSH_DIR_VERTICAL
: PSH_DIR_HORIZONTAL;
PSH_Dimension dim = &glyph->globals->dimension[dimension];
FT_Fixed scale = dim->scale_mult;
FT_Int threshold;
threshold = (FT_Int)FT_DivFix( PSH_STRONG_THRESHOLD, scale );
if ( threshold > PSH_STRONG_THRESHOLD_MAXIMUM )
threshold = PSH_STRONG_THRESHOLD_MAXIMUM;
/* process secondary hints to `selected' points */
/* process secondary hints to `selected' points */
if ( num_masks > 1 && glyph->num_points > 0 )
{
first = mask->end_point;
mask++;
for ( ; num_masks > 1; num_masks--, mask++ )
{
next = mask->end_point;
FT_Int count;
next = mask->end_point;
count = next - first;
if ( count > 0 )
{
threshold, major_dir );
}
first = next;
}
}
/* process primary hints for all points */
if ( num_masks == 1 )
{
FT_UInt count = glyph->num_points;
PSH_Point point = glyph->points;
psh_hint_table_activate_mask( table, table->hint_masks->masks );
psh_hint_table_find_strong_points( table, point, count,
threshold, major_dir );
}
/* now, certain points may have been attached to a hint and */
/* not marked as strong; update their flags then */
{
FT_UInt count = glyph->num_points;
PSH_Point point = glyph->points;
for ( ; count > 0; count--, point++ )
if ( point->hint && !psh_point_is_strong( point ) )
psh_point_set_strong( point );
}
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 1 |
CVE-2016-1691
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1691/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e3aa8a56706c4abe208934d5c294f7b594b8b693
|
e3aa8a56706c4abe208934d5c294f7b594b8b693
|
Enforce the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy
This change modifies UsbChooserContext to use the UsbAllowDevicesForUrls
class to consider devices allowed by the WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls
policy. The WebUsbAllowDevicesForUrls policy overrides the other WebUSB
policies. Unit tests are also added to ensure that the policy is being
enforced correctly.
The design document for this feature is found at:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MPvsrWiVD_jAC8ELyk8njFpy6j1thfVU5aWT3TCWE8w
Bug: 854329
Change-Id: I5f82e662ca9dc544da5918eae766b5535a31296b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1259289
Commit-Queue: Ovidio Henriquez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Julian Pastarmov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597926}
|
static void CheckAllowedDomainsHeader(
const std::string& allowed_domain,
const std::map<GURL, net::HttpRequestHeaders>& urls_requested,
const GURL& url) {
auto iter = urls_requested.find(url);
ASSERT_TRUE(iter != urls_requested.end());
if (allowed_domain.empty()) {
EXPECT_TRUE(
!iter->second.HasHeader(safe_search_util::kGoogleAppsAllowedDomains));
return;
}
std::string header;
iter->second.GetHeader(safe_search_util::kGoogleAppsAllowedDomains,
&header);
EXPECT_EQ(header, allowed_domain);
}
|
static void CheckAllowedDomainsHeader(
const std::string& allowed_domain,
const std::map<GURL, net::HttpRequestHeaders>& urls_requested,
const GURL& url) {
auto iter = urls_requested.find(url);
ASSERT_TRUE(iter != urls_requested.end());
if (allowed_domain.empty()) {
EXPECT_TRUE(
!iter->second.HasHeader(safe_search_util::kGoogleAppsAllowedDomains));
return;
}
std::string header;
iter->second.GetHeader(safe_search_util::kGoogleAppsAllowedDomains,
&header);
EXPECT_EQ(header, allowed_domain);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2909
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2909/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/248a92c21c20c14b5983680c50e1d8b73fc79a2f
|
248a92c21c20c14b5983680c50e1d8b73fc79a2f
|
Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
RenderBlock::RenderTextInfo::~RenderTextInfo()
{
}
|
RenderBlock::RenderTextInfo::~RenderTextInfo()
{
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1278
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1278/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/784f56a9c97a838448dd23f9bdc7c05fe8e639b3
|
784f56a9c97a838448dd23f9bdc7c05fe8e639b3
|
Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
|
void RenderFrameHostImpl::AccessibilityFatalError() {
browser_accessibility_manager_.reset(NULL);
if (accessibility_reset_token_)
return;
accessibility_reset_count_++;
if (accessibility_reset_count_ >= kMaxAccessibilityResets) {
Send(new AccessibilityMsg_FatalError(routing_id_));
} else {
accessibility_reset_token_ = g_next_accessibility_reset_token++;
Send(new AccessibilityMsg_Reset(routing_id_, accessibility_reset_token_));
}
}
|
void RenderFrameHostImpl::AccessibilityFatalError() {
browser_accessibility_manager_.reset(NULL);
if (accessibility_reset_token_)
return;
accessibility_reset_count_++;
if (accessibility_reset_count_ >= kMaxAccessibilityResets) {
Send(new AccessibilityMsg_FatalError(routing_id_));
} else {
accessibility_reset_token_ = g_next_accessibility_reset_token++;
Send(new AccessibilityMsg_Reset(routing_id_, accessibility_reset_token_));
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-7277
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-7277/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8605330aac5a5785630aec8f64378a54891937cc
|
8605330aac5a5785630aec8f64378a54891937cc
|
tcp: fix SCM_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS for normal skbs
__sock_recv_timestamp can be called for both normal skbs (for
receive timestamps) and for skbs on the error queue (for transmit
timestamps).
Commit 1c885808e456
(tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING)
assumes any skb passed to __sock_recv_timestamp are from
the error queue, containing OPT_STATS in the content of the skb.
This results in accessing invalid memory or generating junk
data.
To fix this, set skb->pkt_type to PACKET_OUTGOING for packets
on the error queue. This is safe because on the receive path
on local sockets skb->pkt_type is never set to PACKET_OUTGOING.
With that, copy OPT_STATS from a packet, only if its pkt_type
is PACKET_OUTGOING.
Fixes: 1c885808e456 ("tcp: SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_STATS option for SO_TIMESTAMPING")
Reported-by: JongHwan Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
struct sk_buff *__build_skb(void *data, unsigned int frag_size)
{
struct skb_shared_info *shinfo;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned int size = frag_size ? : ksize(data);
skb = kmem_cache_alloc(skbuff_head_cache, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
return NULL;
size -= SKB_DATA_ALIGN(sizeof(struct skb_shared_info));
memset(skb, 0, offsetof(struct sk_buff, tail));
skb->truesize = SKB_TRUESIZE(size);
atomic_set(&skb->users, 1);
skb->head = data;
skb->data = data;
skb_reset_tail_pointer(skb);
skb->end = skb->tail + size;
skb->mac_header = (typeof(skb->mac_header))~0U;
skb->transport_header = (typeof(skb->transport_header))~0U;
/* make sure we initialize shinfo sequentially */
shinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
memset(shinfo, 0, offsetof(struct skb_shared_info, dataref));
atomic_set(&shinfo->dataref, 1);
kmemcheck_annotate_variable(shinfo->destructor_arg);
return skb;
}
|
struct sk_buff *__build_skb(void *data, unsigned int frag_size)
{
struct skb_shared_info *shinfo;
struct sk_buff *skb;
unsigned int size = frag_size ? : ksize(data);
skb = kmem_cache_alloc(skbuff_head_cache, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!skb)
return NULL;
size -= SKB_DATA_ALIGN(sizeof(struct skb_shared_info));
memset(skb, 0, offsetof(struct sk_buff, tail));
skb->truesize = SKB_TRUESIZE(size);
atomic_set(&skb->users, 1);
skb->head = data;
skb->data = data;
skb_reset_tail_pointer(skb);
skb->end = skb->tail + size;
skb->mac_header = (typeof(skb->mac_header))~0U;
skb->transport_header = (typeof(skb->transport_header))~0U;
/* make sure we initialize shinfo sequentially */
shinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
memset(shinfo, 0, offsetof(struct skb_shared_info, dataref));
atomic_set(&shinfo->dataref, 1);
kmemcheck_annotate_variable(shinfo->destructor_arg);
return skb;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bfa69d49b17f33635c79f79819b90a8d2089c4b3
|
bfa69d49b17f33635c79f79819b90a8d2089c4b3
|
Change notification cmd line enabling to use the new RuntimeEnabledFeatures code.
BUG=25318
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/339093
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@30660 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void BrowserRenderProcessHost::SendUserScriptsUpdate(
base::SharedMemory *shared_memory) {
base::SharedMemoryHandle handle_for_process;
if (!shared_memory->ShareToProcess(GetRendererProcessHandle(),
&handle_for_process)) {
return;
}
if (base::SharedMemory::IsHandleValid(handle_for_process)) {
Send(new ViewMsg_UserScripts_UpdatedScripts(handle_for_process));
}
}
|
void BrowserRenderProcessHost::SendUserScriptsUpdate(
base::SharedMemory *shared_memory) {
base::SharedMemoryHandle handle_for_process;
if (!shared_memory->ShareToProcess(GetRendererProcessHandle(),
&handle_for_process)) {
return;
}
if (base::SharedMemory::IsHandleValid(handle_for_process)) {
Send(new ViewMsg_UserScripts_UpdatedScripts(handle_for_process));
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-5283
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-5283/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8e2d61e0aed2b7c4ecb35844fe07e0b2b762dee4
|
8e2d61e0aed2b7c4ecb35844fe07e0b2b762dee4
|
sctp: fix race on protocol/netns initialization
Consider sctp module is unloaded and is being requested because an user
is creating a sctp socket.
During initialization, sctp will add the new protocol type and then
initialize pernet subsys:
status = sctp_v4_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_protosw_init;
status = sctp_v6_protosw_init();
if (status)
goto err_v6_protosw_init;
status = register_pernet_subsys(&sctp_net_ops);
The problem is that after those calls to sctp_v{4,6}_protosw_init(), it
is possible for userspace to create SCTP sockets like if the module is
already fully loaded. If that happens, one of the possible effects is
that we will have readers for net->sctp.local_addr_list list earlier
than expected and sctp_net_init() does not take precautions while
dealing with that list, leading to a potential panic but not limited to
that, as sctp_sock_init() will copy a bunch of blank/partially
initialized values from net->sctp.
The race happens like this:
CPU 0 | CPU 1
socket() |
__sock_create | socket()
inet_create | __sock_create
list_for_each_entry_rcu( |
answer, &inetsw[sock->type], |
list) { | inet_create
/* no hits */ |
if (unlikely(err)) { |
... |
request_module() |
/* socket creation is blocked |
* the module is fully loaded |
*/ |
sctp_init |
sctp_v4_protosw_init |
inet_register_protosw |
list_add_rcu(&p->list, |
last_perm); |
| list_for_each_entry_rcu(
| answer, &inetsw[sock->type],
sctp_v6_protosw_init | list) {
| /* hit, so assumes protocol
| * is already loaded
| */
| /* socket creation continues
| * before netns is initialized
| */
register_pernet_subsys |
Simply inverting the initialization order between
register_pernet_subsys() and sctp_v4_protosw_init() is not possible
because register_pernet_subsys() will create a control sctp socket, so
the protocol must be already visible by then. Deferring the socket
creation to a work-queue is not good specially because we loose the
ability to handle its errors.
So, as suggested by Vlad, the fix is to split netns initialization in
two moments: defaults and control socket, so that the defaults are
already loaded by when we register the protocol, while control socket
initialization is kept at the same moment it is today.
Fixes: 4db67e808640 ("sctp: Make the address lists per network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static int sctp_v4_add_protocol(void)
{
/* Register notifier for inet address additions/deletions. */
register_inetaddr_notifier(&sctp_inetaddr_notifier);
/* Register SCTP with inet layer. */
if (inet_add_protocol(&sctp_protocol, IPPROTO_SCTP) < 0)
return -EAGAIN;
return 0;
}
|
static int sctp_v4_add_protocol(void)
{
/* Register notifier for inet address additions/deletions. */
register_inetaddr_notifier(&sctp_inetaddr_notifier);
/* Register SCTP with inet layer. */
if (inet_add_protocol(&sctp_protocol, IPPROTO_SCTP) < 0)
return -EAGAIN;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1622
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1622/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/83a4b3aa72d98fe4176b4a54c8cea227ed966570
|
83a4b3aa72d98fe4176b4a54c8cea227ed966570
|
[Extensions] Don't allow built-in extensions code to be overridden
BUG=546677
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417513003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356654}
|
v8::Local<v8::Value> ModuleSystem::RequireForJsInner(
v8::Local<v8::String> module_name) {
v8::EscapableHandleScope handle_scope(GetIsolate());
v8::Local<v8::Context> v8_context = context()->v8_context();
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(v8_context);
v8::Local<v8::Object> global(context()->v8_context()->Global());
v8::Local<v8::Value> modules_value = global->GetHiddenValue(
ToV8StringUnsafe(GetIsolate(), kModulesField));
if (modules_value.IsEmpty() || modules_value->IsUndefined()) {
Warn(GetIsolate(), "Extension view no longer exists");
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
v8::Local<v8::Object> modules(v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(modules_value));
v8::Local<v8::Value> exports;
if (!GetProperty(v8_context, modules, module_name, &exports) ||
!exports->IsUndefined())
return handle_scope.Escape(exports);
exports = LoadModule(*v8::String::Utf8Value(module_name));
SetProperty(v8_context, modules, module_name, exports);
return handle_scope.Escape(exports);
}
|
v8::Local<v8::Value> ModuleSystem::RequireForJsInner(
v8::Local<v8::String> module_name) {
v8::EscapableHandleScope handle_scope(GetIsolate());
v8::Local<v8::Context> v8_context = context()->v8_context();
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(v8_context);
v8::Local<v8::Object> global(context()->v8_context()->Global());
v8::Local<v8::Value> modules_value = global->GetHiddenValue(
ToV8StringUnsafe(GetIsolate(), kModulesField));
if (modules_value.IsEmpty() || modules_value->IsUndefined()) {
Warn(GetIsolate(), "Extension view no longer exists");
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
v8::Local<v8::Object> modules(v8::Local<v8::Object>::Cast(modules_value));
v8::Local<v8::Value> exports;
if (!GetProperty(v8_context, modules, module_name, &exports) ||
!exports->IsUndefined())
return handle_scope.Escape(exports);
exports = LoadModule(*v8::String::Utf8Value(module_name));
SetProperty(v8_context, modules, module_name, exports);
return handle_scope.Escape(exports);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3861
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3861/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/ecf5fd58a8f50362ce9e8d4245a33d56f29f142b
|
ecf5fd58a8f50362ce9e8d4245a33d56f29f142b
|
libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
|
String8::String8()
: mString(getEmptyString())
{
}
|
String8::String8()
: mString(getEmptyString())
{
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4112/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
550fd08c2cebad61c548def135f67aba284c6162
|
net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <[email protected]>
CC: Karsten Keil <[email protected]>
CC: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <[email protected]>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
CC: Patrick McHardy <[email protected]>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <[email protected]>
CC: "John W. Linville" <[email protected]>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
CC: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static u32 bond_fix_features(struct net_device *dev, u32 features)
{
struct slave *slave;
struct bonding *bond = netdev_priv(dev);
u32 mask;
int i;
read_lock(&bond->lock);
if (!bond->first_slave) {
/* Disable adding VLANs to empty bond. But why? --mq */
features |= NETIF_F_VLAN_CHALLENGED;
goto out;
}
mask = features;
features &= ~NETIF_F_ONE_FOR_ALL;
features |= NETIF_F_ALL_FOR_ALL;
bond_for_each_slave(bond, slave, i) {
features = netdev_increment_features(features,
slave->dev->features,
mask);
}
out:
read_unlock(&bond->lock);
return features;
}
|
static u32 bond_fix_features(struct net_device *dev, u32 features)
{
struct slave *slave;
struct bonding *bond = netdev_priv(dev);
u32 mask;
int i;
read_lock(&bond->lock);
if (!bond->first_slave) {
/* Disable adding VLANs to empty bond. But why? --mq */
features |= NETIF_F_VLAN_CHALLENGED;
goto out;
}
mask = features;
features &= ~NETIF_F_ONE_FOR_ALL;
features |= NETIF_F_ALL_FOR_ALL;
bond_for_each_slave(bond, slave, i) {
features = netdev_increment_features(features,
slave->dev->features,
mask);
}
out:
read_unlock(&bond->lock);
return features;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6121
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6121/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7614790c80996d32a28218f4d1605b0908e9ddf6
|
7614790c80996d32a28218f4d1605b0908e9ddf6
|
Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
|
bool TestChildOrGuestAutoresize(bool is_guest,
RenderProcessHost* embedder_rph,
RenderWidgetHost* guest_rwh) {
RenderProcessHostImpl* embedder_rph_impl =
static_cast<RenderProcessHostImpl*>(embedder_rph);
RenderWidgetHostImpl* guest_rwh_impl =
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostImpl*>(guest_rwh);
scoped_refptr<SynchronizeVisualPropertiesMessageFilter> filter(
new SynchronizeVisualPropertiesMessageFilter());
if (is_guest) {
embedder_rph_impl->SetBrowserPluginMessageFilterSubFilterForTesting(
filter.get());
} else {
embedder_rph_impl->AddFilter(filter.get());
}
viz::LocalSurfaceId current_id =
guest_rwh_impl->GetView()->GetLocalSurfaceId();
if (!current_id.is_valid())
current_id = filter->WaitForSurfaceId();
gfx::Size min_size(10, 10);
gfx::Size max_size(100, 100);
guest_rwh_impl->SetAutoResize(true, min_size, max_size);
guest_rwh_impl->GetView()->EnableAutoResize(min_size, max_size);
current_id = filter->WaitForSurfaceId();
int routing_id = guest_rwh_impl->GetRoutingID();
ViewHostMsg_ResizeOrRepaint_ACK_Params params;
params.view_size = gfx::Size(75, 75);
params.flags = 0;
params.child_allocated_local_surface_id = viz::LocalSurfaceId(
current_id.parent_sequence_number(),
current_id.child_sequence_number() + 1, current_id.embed_token());
guest_rwh_impl->OnMessageReceived(
ViewHostMsg_ResizeOrRepaint_ACK(routing_id, params));
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
guest_rwh_impl->GetView()->DisableAutoResize(params.view_size);
return filter->WaitForSurfaceId() ==
viz::LocalSurfaceId(current_id.parent_sequence_number() + 1,
current_id.child_sequence_number() + 1,
current_id.embed_token());
}
|
bool TestChildOrGuestAutoresize(bool is_guest,
RenderProcessHost* embedder_rph,
RenderWidgetHost* guest_rwh) {
RenderProcessHostImpl* embedder_rph_impl =
static_cast<RenderProcessHostImpl*>(embedder_rph);
RenderWidgetHostImpl* guest_rwh_impl =
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostImpl*>(guest_rwh);
scoped_refptr<SynchronizeVisualPropertiesMessageFilter> filter(
new SynchronizeVisualPropertiesMessageFilter());
if (is_guest) {
embedder_rph_impl->SetBrowserPluginMessageFilterSubFilterForTesting(
filter.get());
} else {
embedder_rph_impl->AddFilter(filter.get());
}
viz::LocalSurfaceId current_id =
guest_rwh_impl->GetView()->GetLocalSurfaceId();
if (!current_id.is_valid())
current_id = filter->WaitForSurfaceId();
gfx::Size min_size(10, 10);
gfx::Size max_size(100, 100);
guest_rwh_impl->SetAutoResize(true, min_size, max_size);
guest_rwh_impl->GetView()->EnableAutoResize(min_size, max_size);
current_id = filter->WaitForSurfaceId();
int routing_id = guest_rwh_impl->GetRoutingID();
ViewHostMsg_ResizeOrRepaint_ACK_Params params;
params.view_size = gfx::Size(75, 75);
params.flags = 0;
params.child_allocated_local_surface_id = viz::LocalSurfaceId(
current_id.parent_sequence_number(),
current_id.child_sequence_number() + 1, current_id.embed_token());
guest_rwh_impl->OnMessageReceived(
ViewHostMsg_ResizeOrRepaint_ACK(routing_id, params));
base::RunLoop().RunUntilIdle();
guest_rwh_impl->GetView()->DisableAutoResize(params.view_size);
return filter->WaitForSurfaceId() ==
viz::LocalSurfaceId(current_id.parent_sequence_number() + 1,
current_id.child_sequence_number() + 1,
current_id.embed_token());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/de485eb849be99305925de2257da3b85325df2fd
|
de485eb849be99305925de2257da3b85325df2fd
|
Disable ash configuring display when running mash.
When running ash inside of mash_shell on a device, DisplayConfigurator
will request a NativeDisplayDelegate from Ozone. Ozone is initialized
only in the mus process, not in the ash process, so ash crashes at this
point.
Add accessor for configure_display_ to avoid crashing. The default
display size can be set via command line with --ash-host-window-bounds
flag until a better solution exists.
BUG=590096
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1782093003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#380663}
|
std::vector<aura::Window*> Shell::GetContainersFromAllRootWindows(
int container_id,
aura::Window* priority_root) {
std::vector<aura::Window*> containers;
aura::Window::Windows root_windows = GetAllRootWindows();
for (aura::Window::Windows::const_iterator it = root_windows.begin();
it != root_windows.end(); ++it) {
aura::Window* container = (*it)->GetChildById(container_id);
if (container) {
if (priority_root && priority_root->Contains(container))
containers.insert(containers.begin(), container);
else
containers.push_back(container);
}
}
return containers;
}
|
std::vector<aura::Window*> Shell::GetContainersFromAllRootWindows(
int container_id,
aura::Window* priority_root) {
std::vector<aura::Window*> containers;
aura::Window::Windows root_windows = GetAllRootWindows();
for (aura::Window::Windows::const_iterator it = root_windows.begin();
it != root_windows.end(); ++it) {
aura::Window* container = (*it)->GetChildById(container_id);
if (container) {
if (priority_root && priority_root->Contains(container))
containers.insert(containers.begin(), container);
else
containers.push_back(container);
}
}
return containers;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/27c68f543e5eba779902447445dfb05ec3f5bf75
|
27c68f543e5eba779902447445dfb05ec3f5bf75
|
Revert of Add accelerated VP9 decode infrastructure and an implementation for VA-API. (patchset #7 id:260001 of https://codereview.chromium.org/1318863003/ )
Reason for revert:
I think this patch broke compile step for Chromium Linux ChromeOS MSan Builder.
First failing build:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20Linux%20ChromeOS%20MSan%20Builder/builds/8310
All recent builds:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20Linux%20ChromeOS%20MSan%20Builder?numbuilds=200
Sorry for the revert. I'll re-revert if I'm wrong.
Cheers,
Tommy
Original issue's description:
> Add accelerated VP9 decode infrastructure and an implementation for VA-API.
>
> - Add a hardware/platform-independent VP9Decoder class and related
> infrastructure, implementing AcceleratedVideoDecoder interface. VP9Decoder
> performs the initial stages of the decode process, which are to be done
> on host/in software, such as stream parsing and reference frame management.
>
> - Add a VP9Accelerator interface, used by the VP9Decoder to offload the
> remaining stages of the decode process to hardware. VP9Accelerator
> implementations are platform-specific.
>
> - Add the first implementation of VP9Accelerator - VaapiVP9Accelerator - and
> integrate it with VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator, for devices which provide
> hardware VP9 acceleration through VA-API. Hook it up to the new
> infrastructure and VP9Decoder.
>
> - Extend Vp9Parser to provide functionality required by VP9Decoder and
> VP9Accelerator, including superframe parsing, handling of loop filter
> and segmentation initialization, state persistence across frames and
> resetting when needed. Also add code calculating segmentation dequants
> and loop filter levels.
>
> - Update vp9_parser_unittest to the new Vp9Parser interface and flow.
>
> TEST=vp9_parser_unittest,vda_unittest,Chrome VP9 playback
> BUG=chrome-os-partner:41469,chrome-os-partner:41470,chromium:525331
> [email protected]
>
> Committed: https://crrev.com/e3cc0a661b8abfdc74f569940949bc1f336ece40
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#349312}
[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]
NOPRESUBMIT=true
NOTREECHECKS=true
NOTRY=true
BUG=chrome-os-partner:41469,chrome-os-partner:41470,chromium:525331
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1357513002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#349443}
|
bool Vp9Parser::ParseSuperframe() {
if (!ParseUncompressedHeader(fhdr))
return false;
UpdateSlots(fhdr);
return true;
}
|
bool Vp9Parser::ParseSuperframe() {
const uint8_t* stream = stream_;
off_t bytes_left = bytes_left_;
DCHECK(frames_.empty());
stream_ = nullptr;
bytes_left_ = 0;
if (bytes_left < 1)
return false;
uint8_t marker = *(stream + bytes_left - 1);
if ((marker & 0xe0) != 0xc0) {
frames_.push_back(FrameInfo(stream, bytes_left));
return true;
}
DVLOG(1) << "Parsing a superframe";
size_t num_frames = (marker & 0x7) + 1;
size_t mag = ((marker >> 3) & 0x3) + 1;
off_t index_size = 2 + mag * num_frames;
if (bytes_left < index_size)
return false;
const uint8_t* index_ptr = stream + bytes_left - index_size;
if (marker != *index_ptr)
return false;
++index_ptr;
bytes_left -= index_size;
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_frames; ++i) {
uint32_t size = 0;
for (size_t j = 0; j < mag; ++j) {
size |= *index_ptr << (j * 8);
++index_ptr;
}
if (base::checked_cast<off_t>(size) > bytes_left) {
DVLOG(1) << "Not enough data in the buffer for frame " << i;
return false;
}
frames_.push_back(FrameInfo(stream, size));
stream += size;
bytes_left -= size;
DVLOG(1) << "Frame " << i << ", size: " << size;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2016-7976
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7976/
|
CWE-20
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=user/chrisl/ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=6d444c273da5499a4cd72f21cb6d4c9a5256807d
|
6d444c273da5499a4cd72f21cb6d4c9a5256807d
| null |
static void remove_ctx_pointers(gs_memory_t *mem)
{
mem->gs_lib_ctx = NULL;
if (mem->stable_memory && mem->stable_memory != mem)
remove_ctx_pointers(mem->stable_memory);
if (mem->non_gc_memory && mem->non_gc_memory != mem)
remove_ctx_pointers(mem->non_gc_memory);
if (mem->thread_safe_memory && mem->thread_safe_memory != mem)
remove_ctx_pointers(mem->thread_safe_memory);
}
|
static void remove_ctx_pointers(gs_memory_t *mem)
{
mem->gs_lib_ctx = NULL;
if (mem->stable_memory && mem->stable_memory != mem)
remove_ctx_pointers(mem->stable_memory);
if (mem->non_gc_memory && mem->non_gc_memory != mem)
remove_ctx_pointers(mem->non_gc_memory);
if (mem->thread_safe_memory && mem->thread_safe_memory != mem)
remove_ctx_pointers(mem->thread_safe_memory);
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3331
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3331/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/ccfe8c3f7e52ae83155cb038753f4c75b774ca8a
|
ccfe8c3f7e52ae83155cb038753f4c75b774ca8a
|
crypto: aesni - fix memory usage in GCM decryption
The kernel crypto API logic requires the caller to provide the
length of (ciphertext || authentication tag) as cryptlen for the
AEAD decryption operation. Thus, the cipher implementation must
calculate the size of the plaintext output itself and cannot simply use
cryptlen.
The RFC4106 GCM decryption operation tries to overwrite cryptlen memory
in req->dst. As the destination buffer for decryption only needs to hold
the plaintext memory but cryptlen references the input buffer holding
(ciphertext || authentication tag), the assumption of the destination
buffer length in RFC4106 GCM operation leads to a too large size. This
patch simply uses the already calculated plaintext size.
In addition, this patch fixes the offset calculation of the AAD buffer
pointer: as mentioned before, cryptlen already includes the size of the
tag. Thus, the tag does not need to be added. With the addition, the AAD
will be written beyond the already allocated buffer.
Note, this fixes a kernel crash that can be triggered from user space
via AF_ALG(aead) -- simply use the libkcapi test application
from [1] and update it to use rfc4106-gcm-aes.
Using [1], the changes were tested using CAVS vectors to demonstrate
that the crypto operation still delivers the right results.
[1] http://www.chronox.de/libkcapi.html
CC: Tadeusz Struk <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
|
static int rfc4106_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct cryptd_aead *cryptd_tfm;
struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = (struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *)
PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm), AESNI_ALIGN);
struct crypto_aead *cryptd_child;
struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *child_ctx;
cryptd_tfm = cryptd_alloc_aead("__driver-gcm-aes-aesni", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(cryptd_tfm))
return PTR_ERR(cryptd_tfm);
cryptd_child = cryptd_aead_child(cryptd_tfm);
child_ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(cryptd_child);
memcpy(child_ctx, ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
ctx->cryptd_tfm = cryptd_tfm;
tfm->crt_aead.reqsize = sizeof(struct aead_request)
+ crypto_aead_reqsize(&cryptd_tfm->base);
return 0;
}
|
static int rfc4106_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct cryptd_aead *cryptd_tfm;
struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *ctx = (struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *)
PTR_ALIGN((u8 *)crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm), AESNI_ALIGN);
struct crypto_aead *cryptd_child;
struct aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx *child_ctx;
cryptd_tfm = cryptd_alloc_aead("__driver-gcm-aes-aesni", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(cryptd_tfm))
return PTR_ERR(cryptd_tfm);
cryptd_child = cryptd_aead_child(cryptd_tfm);
child_ctx = aesni_rfc4106_gcm_ctx_get(cryptd_child);
memcpy(child_ctx, ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
ctx->cryptd_tfm = cryptd_tfm;
tfm->crt_aead.reqsize = sizeof(struct aead_request)
+ crypto_aead_reqsize(&cryptd_tfm->base);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2168
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2168/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/commit/?id=954d75b2b64e4799f360d2a6bf9cff6d9fee37e7
|
954d75b2b64e4799f360d2a6bf9cff6d9fee37e7
| null |
_dbus_windows_get_datadir (void)
{
return _dbus_replace_install_prefix(DBUS_DATADIR);
}
|
_dbus_windows_get_datadir (void)
{
return _dbus_replace_install_prefix(DBUS_DATADIR);
}
|
C
|
dbus
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6143
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6143/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/1f35b6980f600ec93e167118c21959d5cbd7c5c4
|
1f35b6980f600ec93e167118c21959d5cbd7c5c4
|
Fix Credential Management API Store() for existing Credentials
This changes fixes the Credential Management API to correctly handle
storing of already existing credentials. In the previous version
`preferred_match()` was updated, which is not necessarily the credential
selected by the user.
Bug: 795878
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: I269f465861f44cdd784f0ce077e755191d3bd7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/843022
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Kolosovskiy <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#526313}
|
GURL CredentialManagerImpl::GetOrigin() const {
return GetLastCommittedURL().GetOrigin();
}
|
GURL CredentialManagerImpl::GetOrigin() const {
return GetLastCommittedURL().GetOrigin();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-16534
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-16534/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2e1c42391ff2556387b3cb6308b24f6f65619feb
|
2e1c42391ff2556387b3cb6308b24f6f65619feb
|
USB: core: harden cdc_parse_cdc_header
Andrey Konovalov reported a possible out-of-bounds problem for the
cdc_parse_cdc_header function. He writes:
It looks like cdc_parse_cdc_header() doesn't validate buflen
before accessing buffer[1], buffer[2] and so on. The only check
present is while (buflen > 0).
So fix this issue up by properly validating the buffer length matches
what the descriptor says it is.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static int create_intf_ep_devs(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev(intf);
struct usb_host_interface *alt = intf->cur_altsetting;
int i;
if (intf->ep_devs_created || intf->unregistering)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < alt->desc.bNumEndpoints; ++i)
(void) usb_create_ep_devs(&intf->dev, &alt->endpoint[i], udev);
intf->ep_devs_created = 1;
return 0;
}
|
static int create_intf_ep_devs(struct usb_interface *intf)
{
struct usb_device *udev = interface_to_usbdev(intf);
struct usb_host_interface *alt = intf->cur_altsetting;
int i;
if (intf->ep_devs_created || intf->unregistering)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < alt->desc.bNumEndpoints; ++i)
(void) usb_create_ep_devs(&intf->dev, &alt->endpoint[i], udev);
intf->ep_devs_created = 1;
return 0;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2019-11487
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-11487/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/6b3a707736301c2128ca85ce85fb13f60b5e350a
|
6b3a707736301c2128ca85ce85fb13f60b5e350a
|
Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
|
int hugetlb_reserve_pages(struct inode *inode,
long from, long to,
struct vm_area_struct *vma,
vm_flags_t vm_flags)
{
long ret, chg;
struct hstate *h = hstate_inode(inode);
struct hugepage_subpool *spool = subpool_inode(inode);
struct resv_map *resv_map;
long gbl_reserve;
/* This should never happen */
if (from > to) {
VM_WARN(1, "%s called with a negative range\n", __func__);
return -EINVAL;
}
/*
* Only apply hugepage reservation if asked. At fault time, an
* attempt will be made for VM_NORESERVE to allocate a page
* without using reserves
*/
if (vm_flags & VM_NORESERVE)
return 0;
/*
* Shared mappings base their reservation on the number of pages that
* are already allocated on behalf of the file. Private mappings need
* to reserve the full area even if read-only as mprotect() may be
* called to make the mapping read-write. Assume !vma is a shm mapping
*/
if (!vma || vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE) {
resv_map = inode_resv_map(inode);
chg = region_chg(resv_map, from, to);
} else {
resv_map = resv_map_alloc();
if (!resv_map)
return -ENOMEM;
chg = to - from;
set_vma_resv_map(vma, resv_map);
set_vma_resv_flags(vma, HPAGE_RESV_OWNER);
}
if (chg < 0) {
ret = chg;
goto out_err;
}
/*
* There must be enough pages in the subpool for the mapping. If
* the subpool has a minimum size, there may be some global
* reservations already in place (gbl_reserve).
*/
gbl_reserve = hugepage_subpool_get_pages(spool, chg);
if (gbl_reserve < 0) {
ret = -ENOSPC;
goto out_err;
}
/*
* Check enough hugepages are available for the reservation.
* Hand the pages back to the subpool if there are not
*/
ret = hugetlb_acct_memory(h, gbl_reserve);
if (ret < 0) {
/* put back original number of pages, chg */
(void)hugepage_subpool_put_pages(spool, chg);
goto out_err;
}
/*
* Account for the reservations made. Shared mappings record regions
* that have reservations as they are shared by multiple VMAs.
* When the last VMA disappears, the region map says how much
* the reservation was and the page cache tells how much of
* the reservation was consumed. Private mappings are per-VMA and
* only the consumed reservations are tracked. When the VMA
* disappears, the original reservation is the VMA size and the
* consumed reservations are stored in the map. Hence, nothing
* else has to be done for private mappings here
*/
if (!vma || vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE) {
long add = region_add(resv_map, from, to);
if (unlikely(chg > add)) {
/*
* pages in this range were added to the reserve
* map between region_chg and region_add. This
* indicates a race with alloc_huge_page. Adjust
* the subpool and reserve counts modified above
* based on the difference.
*/
long rsv_adjust;
rsv_adjust = hugepage_subpool_put_pages(spool,
chg - add);
hugetlb_acct_memory(h, -rsv_adjust);
}
}
return 0;
out_err:
if (!vma || vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE)
/* Don't call region_abort if region_chg failed */
if (chg >= 0)
region_abort(resv_map, from, to);
if (vma && is_vma_resv_set(vma, HPAGE_RESV_OWNER))
kref_put(&resv_map->refs, resv_map_release);
return ret;
}
|
int hugetlb_reserve_pages(struct inode *inode,
long from, long to,
struct vm_area_struct *vma,
vm_flags_t vm_flags)
{
long ret, chg;
struct hstate *h = hstate_inode(inode);
struct hugepage_subpool *spool = subpool_inode(inode);
struct resv_map *resv_map;
long gbl_reserve;
/* This should never happen */
if (from > to) {
VM_WARN(1, "%s called with a negative range\n", __func__);
return -EINVAL;
}
/*
* Only apply hugepage reservation if asked. At fault time, an
* attempt will be made for VM_NORESERVE to allocate a page
* without using reserves
*/
if (vm_flags & VM_NORESERVE)
return 0;
/*
* Shared mappings base their reservation on the number of pages that
* are already allocated on behalf of the file. Private mappings need
* to reserve the full area even if read-only as mprotect() may be
* called to make the mapping read-write. Assume !vma is a shm mapping
*/
if (!vma || vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE) {
resv_map = inode_resv_map(inode);
chg = region_chg(resv_map, from, to);
} else {
resv_map = resv_map_alloc();
if (!resv_map)
return -ENOMEM;
chg = to - from;
set_vma_resv_map(vma, resv_map);
set_vma_resv_flags(vma, HPAGE_RESV_OWNER);
}
if (chg < 0) {
ret = chg;
goto out_err;
}
/*
* There must be enough pages in the subpool for the mapping. If
* the subpool has a minimum size, there may be some global
* reservations already in place (gbl_reserve).
*/
gbl_reserve = hugepage_subpool_get_pages(spool, chg);
if (gbl_reserve < 0) {
ret = -ENOSPC;
goto out_err;
}
/*
* Check enough hugepages are available for the reservation.
* Hand the pages back to the subpool if there are not
*/
ret = hugetlb_acct_memory(h, gbl_reserve);
if (ret < 0) {
/* put back original number of pages, chg */
(void)hugepage_subpool_put_pages(spool, chg);
goto out_err;
}
/*
* Account for the reservations made. Shared mappings record regions
* that have reservations as they are shared by multiple VMAs.
* When the last VMA disappears, the region map says how much
* the reservation was and the page cache tells how much of
* the reservation was consumed. Private mappings are per-VMA and
* only the consumed reservations are tracked. When the VMA
* disappears, the original reservation is the VMA size and the
* consumed reservations are stored in the map. Hence, nothing
* else has to be done for private mappings here
*/
if (!vma || vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE) {
long add = region_add(resv_map, from, to);
if (unlikely(chg > add)) {
/*
* pages in this range were added to the reserve
* map between region_chg and region_add. This
* indicates a race with alloc_huge_page. Adjust
* the subpool and reserve counts modified above
* based on the difference.
*/
long rsv_adjust;
rsv_adjust = hugepage_subpool_put_pages(spool,
chg - add);
hugetlb_acct_memory(h, -rsv_adjust);
}
}
return 0;
out_err:
if (!vma || vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE)
/* Don't call region_abort if region_chg failed */
if (chg >= 0)
region_abort(resv_map, from, to);
if (vma && is_vma_resv_set(vma, HPAGE_RESV_OWNER))
kref_put(&resv_map->refs, resv_map_release);
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-1957
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-1957/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/132c94e31b8bca8ea921f9f96a57d684fa4ae0a9
|
132c94e31b8bca8ea921f9f96a57d684fa4ae0a9
|
vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
As a matter of policy MNT_READONLY should not be changable if the
original mounter had more privileges than creator of the mount
namespace.
Add the flag CL_UNPRIVILEGED to note when we are copying a mount from
a mount namespace that requires more privileges to a mount namespace
that requires fewer privileges.
When the CL_UNPRIVILEGED flag is set cause clone_mnt to set MNT_NO_REMOUNT
if any of the mnt flags that should never be changed are set.
This protects both mount propagation and the initial creation of a less
privileged mount namespace.
Cc: [email protected]
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <[email protected]>
|
int __mnt_want_write(struct vfsmount *m)
{
struct mount *mnt = real_mount(m);
int ret = 0;
preempt_disable();
mnt_inc_writers(mnt);
/*
* The store to mnt_inc_writers must be visible before we pass
* MNT_WRITE_HOLD loop below, so that the slowpath can see our
* incremented count after it has set MNT_WRITE_HOLD.
*/
smp_mb();
while (ACCESS_ONCE(mnt->mnt.mnt_flags) & MNT_WRITE_HOLD)
cpu_relax();
/*
* After the slowpath clears MNT_WRITE_HOLD, mnt_is_readonly will
* be set to match its requirements. So we must not load that until
* MNT_WRITE_HOLD is cleared.
*/
smp_rmb();
if (mnt_is_readonly(m)) {
mnt_dec_writers(mnt);
ret = -EROFS;
}
preempt_enable();
return ret;
}
|
int __mnt_want_write(struct vfsmount *m)
{
struct mount *mnt = real_mount(m);
int ret = 0;
preempt_disable();
mnt_inc_writers(mnt);
/*
* The store to mnt_inc_writers must be visible before we pass
* MNT_WRITE_HOLD loop below, so that the slowpath can see our
* incremented count after it has set MNT_WRITE_HOLD.
*/
smp_mb();
while (ACCESS_ONCE(mnt->mnt.mnt_flags) & MNT_WRITE_HOLD)
cpu_relax();
/*
* After the slowpath clears MNT_WRITE_HOLD, mnt_is_readonly will
* be set to match its requirements. So we must not load that until
* MNT_WRITE_HOLD is cleared.
*/
smp_rmb();
if (mnt_is_readonly(m)) {
mnt_dec_writers(mnt);
ret = -EROFS;
}
preempt_enable();
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d4cd2b2c0953ad7e9fa988c234eb9361be80fe81
|
d4cd2b2c0953ad7e9fa988c234eb9361be80fe81
|
DevTools: 'Overrides' UI overlay obstructs page and element inspector
BUG=302862
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/40233006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160559 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static bool prepareResourceBuffer(Resource* cachedResource, bool* hasZeroSize)
{
*hasZeroSize = false;
if (!cachedResource)
return false;
if (!cachedResource->encodedSize()) {
*hasZeroSize = true;
return true;
}
if (cachedResource->isPurgeable()) {
if (!cachedResource->makePurgeable(false))
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
static bool prepareResourceBuffer(Resource* cachedResource, bool* hasZeroSize)
{
*hasZeroSize = false;
if (!cachedResource)
return false;
if (!cachedResource->encodedSize()) {
*hasZeroSize = true;
return true;
}
if (cachedResource->isPurgeable()) {
if (!cachedResource->makePurgeable(false))
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1065
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1065/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/57ebd808a97d7c5b1e1afb937c2db22beba3c1f8
|
57ebd808a97d7c5b1e1afb937c2db22beba3c1f8
|
netfilter: add back stackpointer size checks
The rationale for removing the check is only correct for rulesets
generated by ip(6)tables.
In iptables, a jump can only occur to a user-defined chain, i.e.
because we size the stack based on number of user-defined chains we
cannot exceed stack size.
However, the underlying binary format has no such restriction,
and the validation step only ensures that the jump target is a
valid rule start point.
IOW, its possible to build a rule blob that has no user-defined
chains but does contain a jump.
If this happens, no jump stack gets allocated and crash occurs
because no jumpstack was allocated.
Fixes: 7814b6ec6d0d6 ("netfilter: xtables: don't save/restore jumpstack offset")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
|
ip6t_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nf_hook_state *state,
struct xt_table *table)
{
unsigned int hook = state->hook;
static const char nulldevname[IFNAMSIZ] __attribute__((aligned(sizeof(long))));
/* Initializing verdict to NF_DROP keeps gcc happy. */
unsigned int verdict = NF_DROP;
const char *indev, *outdev;
const void *table_base;
struct ip6t_entry *e, **jumpstack;
unsigned int stackidx, cpu;
const struct xt_table_info *private;
struct xt_action_param acpar;
unsigned int addend;
/* Initialization */
stackidx = 0;
indev = state->in ? state->in->name : nulldevname;
outdev = state->out ? state->out->name : nulldevname;
/* We handle fragments by dealing with the first fragment as
* if it was a normal packet. All other fragments are treated
* normally, except that they will NEVER match rules that ask
* things we don't know, ie. tcp syn flag or ports). If the
* rule is also a fragment-specific rule, non-fragments won't
* match it. */
acpar.hotdrop = false;
acpar.state = state;
WARN_ON(!(table->valid_hooks & (1 << hook)));
local_bh_disable();
addend = xt_write_recseq_begin();
private = READ_ONCE(table->private); /* Address dependency. */
cpu = smp_processor_id();
table_base = private->entries;
jumpstack = (struct ip6t_entry **)private->jumpstack[cpu];
/* Switch to alternate jumpstack if we're being invoked via TEE.
* TEE issues XT_CONTINUE verdict on original skb so we must not
* clobber the jumpstack.
*
* For recursion via REJECT or SYNPROXY the stack will be clobbered
* but it is no problem since absolute verdict is issued by these.
*/
if (static_key_false(&xt_tee_enabled))
jumpstack += private->stacksize * __this_cpu_read(nf_skb_duplicated);
e = get_entry(table_base, private->hook_entry[hook]);
do {
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
const struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
struct xt_counters *counter;
WARN_ON(!e);
acpar.thoff = 0;
if (!ip6_packet_match(skb, indev, outdev, &e->ipv6,
&acpar.thoff, &acpar.fragoff, &acpar.hotdrop)) {
no_match:
e = ip6t_next_entry(e);
continue;
}
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
acpar.match = ematch->u.kernel.match;
acpar.matchinfo = ematch->data;
if (!acpar.match->match(skb, &acpar))
goto no_match;
}
counter = xt_get_this_cpu_counter(&e->counters);
ADD_COUNTER(*counter, skb->len, 1);
t = ip6t_get_target_c(e);
WARN_ON(!t->u.kernel.target);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_TRACE)
/* The packet is traced: log it */
if (unlikely(skb->nf_trace))
trace_packet(state->net, skb, hook, state->in,
state->out, table->name, private, e);
#endif
/* Standard target? */
if (!t->u.kernel.target->target) {
int v;
v = ((struct xt_standard_target *)t)->verdict;
if (v < 0) {
/* Pop from stack? */
if (v != XT_RETURN) {
verdict = (unsigned int)(-v) - 1;
break;
}
if (stackidx == 0)
e = get_entry(table_base,
private->underflow[hook]);
else
e = ip6t_next_entry(jumpstack[--stackidx]);
continue;
}
if (table_base + v != ip6t_next_entry(e) &&
!(e->ipv6.flags & IP6T_F_GOTO)) {
if (unlikely(stackidx >= private->stacksize)) {
verdict = NF_DROP;
break;
}
jumpstack[stackidx++] = e;
}
e = get_entry(table_base, v);
continue;
}
acpar.target = t->u.kernel.target;
acpar.targinfo = t->data;
verdict = t->u.kernel.target->target(skb, &acpar);
if (verdict == XT_CONTINUE)
e = ip6t_next_entry(e);
else
/* Verdict */
break;
} while (!acpar.hotdrop);
xt_write_recseq_end(addend);
local_bh_enable();
if (acpar.hotdrop)
return NF_DROP;
else return verdict;
}
|
ip6t_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nf_hook_state *state,
struct xt_table *table)
{
unsigned int hook = state->hook;
static const char nulldevname[IFNAMSIZ] __attribute__((aligned(sizeof(long))));
/* Initializing verdict to NF_DROP keeps gcc happy. */
unsigned int verdict = NF_DROP;
const char *indev, *outdev;
const void *table_base;
struct ip6t_entry *e, **jumpstack;
unsigned int stackidx, cpu;
const struct xt_table_info *private;
struct xt_action_param acpar;
unsigned int addend;
/* Initialization */
stackidx = 0;
indev = state->in ? state->in->name : nulldevname;
outdev = state->out ? state->out->name : nulldevname;
/* We handle fragments by dealing with the first fragment as
* if it was a normal packet. All other fragments are treated
* normally, except that they will NEVER match rules that ask
* things we don't know, ie. tcp syn flag or ports). If the
* rule is also a fragment-specific rule, non-fragments won't
* match it. */
acpar.hotdrop = false;
acpar.state = state;
WARN_ON(!(table->valid_hooks & (1 << hook)));
local_bh_disable();
addend = xt_write_recseq_begin();
private = READ_ONCE(table->private); /* Address dependency. */
cpu = smp_processor_id();
table_base = private->entries;
jumpstack = (struct ip6t_entry **)private->jumpstack[cpu];
/* Switch to alternate jumpstack if we're being invoked via TEE.
* TEE issues XT_CONTINUE verdict on original skb so we must not
* clobber the jumpstack.
*
* For recursion via REJECT or SYNPROXY the stack will be clobbered
* but it is no problem since absolute verdict is issued by these.
*/
if (static_key_false(&xt_tee_enabled))
jumpstack += private->stacksize * __this_cpu_read(nf_skb_duplicated);
e = get_entry(table_base, private->hook_entry[hook]);
do {
const struct xt_entry_target *t;
const struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
struct xt_counters *counter;
WARN_ON(!e);
acpar.thoff = 0;
if (!ip6_packet_match(skb, indev, outdev, &e->ipv6,
&acpar.thoff, &acpar.fragoff, &acpar.hotdrop)) {
no_match:
e = ip6t_next_entry(e);
continue;
}
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
acpar.match = ematch->u.kernel.match;
acpar.matchinfo = ematch->data;
if (!acpar.match->match(skb, &acpar))
goto no_match;
}
counter = xt_get_this_cpu_counter(&e->counters);
ADD_COUNTER(*counter, skb->len, 1);
t = ip6t_get_target_c(e);
WARN_ON(!t->u.kernel.target);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_TRACE)
/* The packet is traced: log it */
if (unlikely(skb->nf_trace))
trace_packet(state->net, skb, hook, state->in,
state->out, table->name, private, e);
#endif
/* Standard target? */
if (!t->u.kernel.target->target) {
int v;
v = ((struct xt_standard_target *)t)->verdict;
if (v < 0) {
/* Pop from stack? */
if (v != XT_RETURN) {
verdict = (unsigned int)(-v) - 1;
break;
}
if (stackidx == 0)
e = get_entry(table_base,
private->underflow[hook]);
else
e = ip6t_next_entry(jumpstack[--stackidx]);
continue;
}
if (table_base + v != ip6t_next_entry(e) &&
!(e->ipv6.flags & IP6T_F_GOTO)) {
jumpstack[stackidx++] = e;
}
e = get_entry(table_base, v);
continue;
}
acpar.target = t->u.kernel.target;
acpar.targinfo = t->data;
verdict = t->u.kernel.target->target(skb, &acpar);
if (verdict == XT_CONTINUE)
e = ip6t_next_entry(e);
else
/* Verdict */
break;
} while (!acpar.hotdrop);
xt_write_recseq_end(addend);
local_bh_enable();
if (acpar.hotdrop)
return NF_DROP;
else return verdict;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2017-9990
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9990/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/cb243972b121b1ae6b60a78ff55a0506c69f3879
|
cb243972b121b1ae6b60a78ff55a0506c69f3879
|
avcodec/xpmdec: Fix multiple pointer/memory issues
Most of these were found through code review in response to
fixing 1466/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-5961584419536896
There is thus no testcase for most of this.
The initial issue was Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static av_cold int xpm_decode_close(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
XPMDecContext *x = avctx->priv_data;
av_freep(&x->pixels);
av_freep(&x->buf);
x->buf_size = 0;
return 0;
}
|
static av_cold int xpm_decode_close(AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
XPMDecContext *x = avctx->priv_data;
av_freep(&x->pixels);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 1 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/af05a799e3f47331fb27a24a8a56f1b1dd47a9c2
|
af05a799e3f47331fb27a24a8a56f1b1dd47a9c2
|
Clean up windows printing workflow.
BUG=none
TEST=printing works after code change.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6374004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@71960 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void PrintWebViewHelper::PrintNode(WebNode* node,
bool script_initiated,
bool is_preview) {
Print(node->document().frame(), node, script_initiated, is_preview);
}
|
void PrintWebViewHelper::PrintNode(WebNode* node,
bool script_initiated,
bool is_preview) {
Print(node->document().frame(), node, script_initiated, is_preview);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0904
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0904/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
b2b21468c1f7f08b30a7c1755316f6026c50eb2a
|
Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void RenderBox::clearLayoutOverflow()
{
if (!m_overflow)
return;
if (!hasVisualOverflow() && contentsVisualOverflowRect().isEmpty()) {
m_overflow.clear();
return;
}
m_overflow->setLayoutOverflow(noOverflowRect());
}
|
void RenderBox::clearLayoutOverflow()
{
if (!m_overflow)
return;
if (!hasVisualOverflow() && contentsVisualOverflowRect().isEmpty()) {
m_overflow.clear();
return;
}
m_overflow->setLayoutOverflow(noOverflowRect());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1000040
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000040/
|
CWE-20
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=83d4dae44c71816c084a635550acc1a51529b881;hp=f597300439e62f5e921f0d7b1e880b5c1a1f1607
|
83d4dae44c71816c084a635550acc1a51529b881
| null |
int fz_colorspace_is_device_cmyk(fz_context *ctx, const fz_colorspace *cs)
{
return fz_colorspace_is_device(ctx, cs) && fz_colorspace_is_cmyk(ctx, cs);
}
|
int fz_colorspace_is_device_cmyk(fz_context *ctx, const fz_colorspace *cs)
{
return fz_colorspace_is_device(ctx, cs) && fz_colorspace_is_cmyk(ctx, cs);
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6784
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6784/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a81593e7f162428585832ac8f6e71f75592b53e7
|
a81593e7f162428585832ac8f6e71f75592b53e7
|
Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736}
|
PageSerializer::PageSerializer(Vector<SerializedResource>* resources, PassOwnPtr<Delegate> delegate)
: m_resources(resources)
, m_blankFrameCounter(0)
, m_delegate(delegate)
{
}
|
PageSerializer::PageSerializer(Vector<SerializedResource>* resources, PassOwnPtr<Delegate> delegate)
: m_resources(resources)
, m_blankFrameCounter(0)
, m_delegate(delegate)
{
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-13106
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-13106/
|
CWE-787
|
https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/commits/master
|
master
|
Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
|
int mvebu_board_spi_claim_bus(struct udevice *dev)
{
spi_mpp_backup[3] = 0;
/* set new spi mpp config and save current one */
kirkwood_mpp_conf(spi_mpp_config, spi_mpp_backup);
kw_gpio_set_value(KM_FLASH_GPIO_PIN, 0);
return 0;
}
|
int mvebu_board_spi_claim_bus(struct udevice *dev)
{
spi_mpp_backup[3] = 0;
/* set new spi mpp config and save current one */
kirkwood_mpp_conf(spi_mpp_config, spi_mpp_backup);
kw_gpio_set_value(KM_FLASH_GPIO_PIN, 0);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
u-boot
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2895
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2895/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/16dcd30c215801941d9890859fd79a234128fc3e
|
16dcd30c215801941d9890859fd79a234128fc3e
|
Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
MockDownloadFile* MockDownloadFileFactory::GetExistingFile(
const DownloadId& id) {
DCHECK(files_.find(id) != files_.end());
return files_[id];
}
|
MockDownloadFile* MockDownloadFileFactory::GetExistingFile(
const DownloadId& id) {
DCHECK(files_.find(id) != files_.end());
return files_[id];
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/40ed2b7ae4f6f5adb1b0ce9acf9c4dece339c2a6
|
40ed2b7ae4f6f5adb1b0ce9acf9c4dece339c2a6
|
gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
const GDataDirectory* GDataEntry::AsGDataDirectoryConst() const {
return const_cast<GDataEntry*>(this)->AsGDataDirectory();
}
|
const GDataDirectory* GDataEntry::AsGDataDirectoryConst() const {
return const_cast<GDataEntry*>(this)->AsGDataDirectory();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3173
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3173/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
ee7579229ff7e9e5ae28bf53aea069251499d7da
|
Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
[email protected],[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoGetIntegerv(GLenum pname, GLint* params) {
DCHECK(params);
GLsizei num_written;
if (!state_.GetStateAsGLint(pname, params, &num_written) &&
!GetHelper(pname, params, &num_written)) {
pname = AdjustGetPname(pname);
glGetIntegerv(pname, params);
}
}
|
void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoGetIntegerv(GLenum pname, GLint* params) {
DCHECK(params);
GLsizei num_written;
if (!state_.GetStateAsGLint(pname, params, &num_written) &&
!GetHelper(pname, params, &num_written)) {
pname = AdjustGetPname(pname);
glGetIntegerv(pname, params);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2019-5796
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-5796/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5bb223676defeba9c44a5ce42460c86e24561e73
|
5bb223676defeba9c44a5ce42460c86e24561e73
|
[GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
[email protected],[email protected]
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
|
void ChromeContentBrowserClient::RegisterIOThreadServiceHandlers(
content::ServiceManagerConnection* connection) {
connection->AddServiceRequestHandler(
chrome::mojom::kServiceName,
ChromeService::GetInstance()->CreateChromeServiceRequestHandler());
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
connection->AddServiceRequestHandler(
proxy_resolver::mojom::kProxyResolverServiceName,
base::BindRepeating([](service_manager::mojom::ServiceRequest request) {
service_manager::Service::RunAsyncUntilTermination(
std::make_unique<proxy_resolver::ProxyResolverService>(
std::move(request)));
}));
connection->AddServiceRequestHandler(
"download_manager", base::BindRepeating(&StartDownloadManager));
#endif
}
|
void ChromeContentBrowserClient::RegisterIOThreadServiceHandlers(
content::ServiceManagerConnection* connection) {
connection->AddServiceRequestHandler(
chrome::mojom::kServiceName,
ChromeService::GetInstance()->CreateChromeServiceRequestHandler());
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
connection->AddServiceRequestHandler(
proxy_resolver::mojom::kProxyResolverServiceName,
base::BindRepeating([](service_manager::mojom::ServiceRequest request) {
service_manager::Service::RunAsyncUntilTermination(
std::make_unique<proxy_resolver::ProxyResolverService>(
std::move(request)));
}));
connection->AddServiceRequestHandler(
"download_manager", base::BindRepeating(&StartDownloadManager));
#endif
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3690
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3690/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d974baa398f34393db76be45f7d4d04fbdbb4a0a
|
d974baa398f34393db76be45f7d4d04fbdbb4a0a
|
x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Petr Matousek <[email protected]>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
vmcs12_guest_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
{
return
/*1*/ (vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4) & vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits) |
/*2*/ (vmcs12->guest_cr4 & vmcs12->cr4_guest_host_mask) |
/*3*/ (vmcs_readl(CR4_READ_SHADOW) & ~(vmcs12->cr4_guest_host_mask |
vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits));
}
|
vmcs12_guest_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
{
return
/*1*/ (vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4) & vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits) |
/*2*/ (vmcs12->guest_cr4 & vmcs12->cr4_guest_host_mask) |
/*3*/ (vmcs_readl(CR4_READ_SHADOW) & ~(vmcs12->cr4_guest_host_mask |
vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2010-2527
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-2527/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2-demos.git/commit/?id=b995299b73ba4cd259f221f500d4e63095508bec
|
b995299b73ba4cd259f221f500d4e63095508bec
| null |
usage( void )
{
fprintf( stderr,
"ftdiff: a simple program to proof several text hinting modes\n"
"-----------------------------------------------------------\n"
"\n"
"Usage: ftdiff [options] fontfile [fontfile2 ...]\n"
"\n"
" -r R use resolution R dpi (default: 72 dpi)\n"
" -s S set character size to S points (default: 16 pt)\n"
" -f TEXTFILE change displayed text, using text in TEXTFILE\n"
"\n" );
exit( 1 );
}
|
usage( void )
{
fprintf( stderr,
"ftdiff: a simple program to proof several text hinting modes\n"
"-----------------------------------------------------------\n"
"\n"
"Usage: ftdiff [options] fontfile [fontfile2 ...]\n"
"\n"
" -r R use resolution R dpi (default: 72 dpi)\n"
" -s S set character size to S points (default: 16 pt)\n"
" -f TEXTFILE change displayed text, using text in TEXTFILE\n"
"\n" );
exit( 1 );
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4086
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4086/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/15291164b22a357cb211b618adfef4fa82fc0de3
|
15291164b22a357cb211b618adfef4fa82fc0de3
|
jbd2: clear BH_Delay & BH_Unwritten in journal_unmap_buffer
journal_unmap_buffer()'s zap_buffer: code clears a lot of buffer head
state ala discard_buffer(), but does not touch _Delay or _Unwritten as
discard_buffer() does.
This can be problematic in some areas of the ext4 code which assume
that if they have found a buffer marked unwritten or delay, then it's
a live one. Perhaps those spots should check whether it is mapped
as well, but if jbd2 is going to tear down a buffer, let's really
tear it down completely.
Without this I get some fsx failures on sub-page-block filesystems
up until v3.2, at which point 4e96b2dbbf1d7e81f22047a50f862555a6cb87cb
and 189e868fa8fdca702eb9db9d8afc46b5cb9144c9 make the failures go
away, because buried within that large change is some more flag
clearing. I still think it's worth doing in jbd2, since
->invalidatepage leads here directly, and it's the right place
to clear away these flags.
Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
|
void jbd2_journal_unfile_buffer(journal_t *journal, struct journal_head *jh)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = jh2bh(jh);
/* Get reference so that buffer cannot be freed before we unlock it */
get_bh(bh);
jbd_lock_bh_state(bh);
spin_lock(&journal->j_list_lock);
__jbd2_journal_unfile_buffer(jh);
spin_unlock(&journal->j_list_lock);
jbd_unlock_bh_state(bh);
__brelse(bh);
}
|
void jbd2_journal_unfile_buffer(journal_t *journal, struct journal_head *jh)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = jh2bh(jh);
/* Get reference so that buffer cannot be freed before we unlock it */
get_bh(bh);
jbd_lock_bh_state(bh);
spin_lock(&journal->j_list_lock);
__jbd2_journal_unfile_buffer(jh);
spin_unlock(&journal->j_list_lock);
jbd_unlock_bh_state(bh);
__brelse(bh);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-0291
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-0291/
| null |
https://git.openssl.org/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=76343947ada960b6269090638f5391068daee88d
|
76343947ada960b6269090638f5391068daee88d
| null |
static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
size_t *num_formats)
{
/*
* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
*/
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
*pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
*num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
} else {
*pformats = ecformats_default;
/* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
if (tls1_suiteb(s))
*num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
else
*num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
}
}
|
static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
size_t *num_formats)
{
/*
* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
*/
if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
*pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
*num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
} else {
*pformats = ecformats_default;
/* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
if (tls1_suiteb(s))
*num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
else
*num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
}
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d1a59e4e845a01d7d7b80ef184b672752a9eae4d
|
d1a59e4e845a01d7d7b80ef184b672752a9eae4d
|
Fixing cross-process postMessage replies on more than two iterations.
When two frames are replying to each other using event.source across processes,
after the first two replies, things break down. The root cause is that in
RenderViewImpl::GetFrameByMappedID, the lookup was incorrect. It is now
properly searching for the remote frame id and returning the local one.
BUG=153445
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11040015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@159924 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderViewImpl::didChangeIcon(WebFrame* frame, WebIconURL::Type type) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, observers_,
DidChangeIcon(frame, type));
}
|
void RenderViewImpl::didChangeIcon(WebFrame* frame, WebIconURL::Type type) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderViewObserver, observers_,
DidChangeIcon(frame, type));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
int BrowserTabStripController::GetActiveIndex() const {
return model_->active_index();
}
|
int BrowserTabStripController::GetActiveIndex() const {
return model_->active_index();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3e5dae3b38fdb566fb2b7183e810b82eb3ce6f21
|
3e5dae3b38fdb566fb2b7183e810b82eb3ce6f21
|
Use a new field trial group to enable the SWReporter
BUG=533484
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1376803002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351788}
|
static std::string ID() {
update_client::CrxComponent component;
component.version = Version("0.0.0.0");
GetPkHash(&component.pk_hash);
return update_client::GetCrxComponentID(component);
}
|
static std::string ID() {
update_client::CrxComponent component;
component.version = Version("0.0.0.0");
GetPkHash(&component.pk_hash);
return update_client::GetCrxComponentID(component);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/294474c162b13937a6474955c6594b3657379c1e
|
294474c162b13937a6474955c6594b3657379c1e
|
Some Scrollbar functions assume an attached ScrollableArea but can be called without one
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=54262
Reviewed by Dan Bernstein.
Make sure that all calls to the scrollable area are null checked.
* platform/Scrollbar.cpp:
(WebCore::Scrollbar::autoscrollPressedPart):
(WebCore::Scrollbar::moveThumb):
(WebCore::Scrollbar::mouseMoved):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@78431 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static bool thumbUnderMouse(Scrollbar* scrollbar)
{
int thumbPos = scrollbar->theme()->trackPosition(scrollbar) + scrollbar->theme()->thumbPosition(scrollbar);
int thumbLength = scrollbar->theme()->thumbLength(scrollbar);
return scrollbar->pressedPos() >= thumbPos && scrollbar->pressedPos() < thumbPos + thumbLength;
}
|
static bool thumbUnderMouse(Scrollbar* scrollbar)
{
int thumbPos = scrollbar->theme()->trackPosition(scrollbar) + scrollbar->theme()->thumbPosition(scrollbar);
int thumbLength = scrollbar->theme()->thumbLength(scrollbar);
return scrollbar->pressedPos() >= thumbPos && scrollbar->pressedPos() < thumbPos + thumbLength;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-0530
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-0530/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/yoe/nbd/commit/3ef52043861ab16352d49af89e048ba6339d6df8
|
3ef52043861ab16352d49af89e048ba6339d6df8
|
Fix buffer size checking
Yes, this means we've re-introduced CVE-2005-3534. Sigh.
|
int authorized_client(CLIENT *opts) {
const char *ERRMSG="Invalid entry '%s' in authfile '%s', so, refusing all connections.";
FILE *f ;
char line[LINELEN];
char *tmp;
struct in_addr addr;
struct in_addr client;
struct in_addr cltemp;
int len;
if ((f=fopen(opts->server->authname,"r"))==NULL) {
msg4(LOG_INFO,"Can't open authorization file %s (%s).",
opts->server->authname,strerror(errno)) ;
return 1 ;
}
inet_aton(opts->clientname, &client);
while (fgets(line,LINELEN,f)!=NULL) {
if((tmp=index(line, '/'))) {
if(strlen(line)<=tmp-line) {
msg4(LOG_CRIT, ERRMSG, line, opts->server->authname);
return 0;
}
*(tmp++)=0;
if(!inet_aton(line,&addr)) {
msg4(LOG_CRIT, ERRMSG, line, opts->server->authname);
return 0;
}
len=strtol(tmp, NULL, 0);
addr.s_addr>>=32-len;
addr.s_addr<<=32-len;
memcpy(&cltemp,&client,sizeof(client));
cltemp.s_addr>>=32-len;
cltemp.s_addr<<=32-len;
if(addr.s_addr == cltemp.s_addr) {
return 1;
}
}
if (strncmp(line,opts->clientname,strlen(opts->clientname))==0) {
fclose(f);
return 1;
}
}
fclose(f);
return 0;
}
|
int authorized_client(CLIENT *opts) {
const char *ERRMSG="Invalid entry '%s' in authfile '%s', so, refusing all connections.";
FILE *f ;
char line[LINELEN];
char *tmp;
struct in_addr addr;
struct in_addr client;
struct in_addr cltemp;
int len;
if ((f=fopen(opts->server->authname,"r"))==NULL) {
msg4(LOG_INFO,"Can't open authorization file %s (%s).",
opts->server->authname,strerror(errno)) ;
return 1 ;
}
inet_aton(opts->clientname, &client);
while (fgets(line,LINELEN,f)!=NULL) {
if((tmp=index(line, '/'))) {
if(strlen(line)<=tmp-line) {
msg4(LOG_CRIT, ERRMSG, line, opts->server->authname);
return 0;
}
*(tmp++)=0;
if(!inet_aton(line,&addr)) {
msg4(LOG_CRIT, ERRMSG, line, opts->server->authname);
return 0;
}
len=strtol(tmp, NULL, 0);
addr.s_addr>>=32-len;
addr.s_addr<<=32-len;
memcpy(&cltemp,&client,sizeof(client));
cltemp.s_addr>>=32-len;
cltemp.s_addr<<=32-len;
if(addr.s_addr == cltemp.s_addr) {
return 1;
}
}
if (strncmp(line,opts->clientname,strlen(opts->clientname))==0) {
fclose(f);
return 1;
}
}
fclose(f);
return 0;
}
|
C
|
nbd
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10208
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10208/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/3a4b77cd47bb837b8557595ec7425f281f2ca1fe
|
3a4b77cd47bb837b8557595ec7425f281f2ca1fe
|
ext4: validate s_first_meta_bg at mount time
Ralf Spenneberg reported that he hit a kernel crash when mounting a
modified ext4 image. And it turns out that kernel crashed when
calculating fs overhead (ext4_calculate_overhead()), this is because
the image has very large s_first_meta_bg (debug code shows it's
842150400), and ext4 overruns the memory in count_overhead() when
setting bitmap buffer, which is PAGE_SIZE.
ext4_calculate_overhead():
buf = get_zeroed_page(GFP_NOFS); <=== PAGE_SIZE buffer
blks = count_overhead(sb, i, buf);
count_overhead():
for (j = ext4_bg_num_gdb(sb, grp); j > 0; j--) { <=== j = 842150400
ext4_set_bit(EXT4_B2C(sbi, s++), buf); <=== buffer overrun
count++;
}
This can be reproduced easily for me by this script:
#!/bin/bash
rm -f fs.img
mkdir -p /mnt/ext4
fallocate -l 16M fs.img
mke2fs -t ext4 -O bigalloc,meta_bg,^resize_inode -F fs.img
debugfs -w -R "ssv first_meta_bg 842150400" fs.img
mount -o loop fs.img /mnt/ext4
Fix it by validating s_first_meta_bg first at mount time, and
refusing to mount if its value exceeds the largest possible meta_bg
number.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <[email protected]>
|
void ext4_clear_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
invalidate_inode_buffers(inode);
clear_inode(inode);
dquot_drop(inode);
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
ext4_es_remove_extent(inode, 0, EXT_MAX_BLOCKS);
if (EXT4_I(inode)->jinode) {
jbd2_journal_release_jbd_inode(EXT4_JOURNAL(inode),
EXT4_I(inode)->jinode);
jbd2_free_inode(EXT4_I(inode)->jinode);
EXT4_I(inode)->jinode = NULL;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION
fscrypt_put_encryption_info(inode, NULL);
#endif
}
|
void ext4_clear_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
invalidate_inode_buffers(inode);
clear_inode(inode);
dquot_drop(inode);
ext4_discard_preallocations(inode);
ext4_es_remove_extent(inode, 0, EXT_MAX_BLOCKS);
if (EXT4_I(inode)->jinode) {
jbd2_journal_release_jbd_inode(EXT4_JOURNAL(inode),
EXT4_I(inode)->jinode);
jbd2_free_inode(EXT4_I(inode)->jinode);
EXT4_I(inode)->jinode = NULL;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION
fscrypt_put_encryption_info(inode, NULL);
#endif
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2bcaf4649c1d495072967ea454e8c16dce044705
|
2bcaf4649c1d495072967ea454e8c16dce044705
|
Don't interpret embeded NULLs in a response header line as a line terminator.
BUG=95992
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100863 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
HttpUtil::NameValuePairsIterator::NameValuePairsIterator(
string::const_iterator begin,
string::const_iterator end,
char delimiter)
: props_(begin, end, delimiter),
valid_(true),
begin_(begin),
end_(end),
name_begin_(end),
name_end_(end),
value_begin_(end),
value_end_(end),
value_is_quoted_(false) {
}
|
HttpUtil::NameValuePairsIterator::NameValuePairsIterator(
string::const_iterator begin,
string::const_iterator end,
char delimiter)
: props_(begin, end, delimiter),
valid_(true),
begin_(begin),
end_(end),
name_begin_(end),
name_end_(end),
value_begin_(end),
value_end_(end),
value_is_quoted_(false) {
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-16077
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-16077/
|
CWE-285
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/90f878780cce9c4b0475fcea14d91b8f510cce11
|
90f878780cce9c4b0475fcea14d91b8f510cce11
|
Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
|
bool LocalFrame::CanNavigate(const Frame& target_frame,
const KURL& destination_url) {
String error_reason;
const bool is_allowed_navigation =
CanNavigateWithoutFramebusting(target_frame, error_reason);
const bool sandboxed =
GetSecurityContext()->GetSandboxFlags() != kSandboxNone;
const bool has_user_gesture = HasBeenActivated();
if (target_frame != this && sandboxed && target_frame == Tree().Top()) {
UseCounter::Count(this, WebFeature::kTopNavInSandbox);
if (!has_user_gesture) {
UseCounter::Count(this, WebFeature::kTopNavInSandboxWithoutGesture);
}
}
if (target_frame != this &&
!GetSecurityContext()->IsSandboxed(kSandboxTopNavigation) &&
target_frame == Tree().Top()) {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(EnumerationHistogram, framebust_histogram,
("WebCore.Framebust", 4));
const unsigned kUserGestureBit = 0x1;
const unsigned kAllowedBit = 0x2;
unsigned framebust_params = 0;
if (has_user_gesture)
framebust_params |= kUserGestureBit;
UseCounter::Count(this, WebFeature::kTopNavigationFromSubFrame);
if (sandboxed) { // Sandboxed with 'allow-top-navigation'.
UseCounter::Count(this, WebFeature::kTopNavInSandboxWithPerm);
if (!has_user_gesture) {
UseCounter::Count(this,
WebFeature::kTopNavInSandboxWithPermButNoGesture);
}
}
if (is_allowed_navigation)
framebust_params |= kAllowedBit;
framebust_histogram.Count(framebust_params);
if (has_user_gesture || is_allowed_navigation ||
target_frame.GetSecurityContext()->GetSecurityOrigin()->CanAccess(
SecurityOrigin::Create(destination_url).get())) {
return true;
}
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::
FramebustingNeedsSameOriginOrUserGestureEnabled() ||
Client()->GetContentSettingsClient().AllowPopupsAndRedirects(
false /* default_value */)) {
String target_frame_description =
target_frame.IsLocalFrame() ? "with URL '" +
ToLocalFrame(target_frame)
.GetDocument()
->Url()
.GetString() +
"'"
: "with origin '" +
target_frame.GetSecurityContext()
->GetSecurityOrigin()
->ToString() +
"'";
String message = "Frame with URL '" + GetDocument()->Url().GetString() +
"' attempted to navigate its top-level window " +
target_frame_description +
". Navigating the top-level window from a cross-origin "
"iframe will soon require that the iframe has received "
"a user gesture. See "
"https://www.chromestatus.com/features/"
"5851021045661696.";
PrintNavigationWarning(message);
return true;
}
error_reason =
"The frame attempting navigation is targeting its top-level window, "
"but is neither same-origin with its target nor has it received a "
"user gesture. See "
"https://www.chromestatus.com/features/5851021045661696.";
PrintNavigationErrorMessage(target_frame, error_reason.Latin1().data());
Client()->DidBlockFramebust(destination_url);
return false;
}
if (Client()->Opener() == target_frame &&
!HasTransientUserActivation(this, false /* checkIfMainThread */) &&
!target_frame.GetSecurityContext()->GetSecurityOrigin()->CanAccess(
SecurityOrigin::Create(destination_url).get())) {
UseCounter::Count(this, WebFeature::kOpenerNavigationWithoutGesture);
}
if (!is_allowed_navigation && !error_reason.IsNull())
PrintNavigationErrorMessage(target_frame, error_reason.Latin1().data());
return is_allowed_navigation;
}
|
bool LocalFrame::CanNavigate(const Frame& target_frame,
const KURL& destination_url) {
String error_reason;
const bool is_allowed_navigation =
CanNavigateWithoutFramebusting(target_frame, error_reason);
const bool sandboxed =
GetSecurityContext()->GetSandboxFlags() != kSandboxNone;
const bool has_user_gesture = HasBeenActivated();
if (target_frame != this && sandboxed && target_frame == Tree().Top()) {
UseCounter::Count(this, WebFeature::kTopNavInSandbox);
if (!has_user_gesture) {
UseCounter::Count(this, WebFeature::kTopNavInSandboxWithoutGesture);
}
}
if (target_frame != this &&
!GetSecurityContext()->IsSandboxed(kSandboxTopNavigation) &&
target_frame == Tree().Top()) {
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(EnumerationHistogram, framebust_histogram,
("WebCore.Framebust", 4));
const unsigned kUserGestureBit = 0x1;
const unsigned kAllowedBit = 0x2;
unsigned framebust_params = 0;
if (has_user_gesture)
framebust_params |= kUserGestureBit;
UseCounter::Count(this, WebFeature::kTopNavigationFromSubFrame);
if (sandboxed) { // Sandboxed with 'allow-top-navigation'.
UseCounter::Count(this, WebFeature::kTopNavInSandboxWithPerm);
if (!has_user_gesture) {
UseCounter::Count(this,
WebFeature::kTopNavInSandboxWithPermButNoGesture);
}
}
if (is_allowed_navigation)
framebust_params |= kAllowedBit;
framebust_histogram.Count(framebust_params);
if (has_user_gesture || is_allowed_navigation ||
target_frame.GetSecurityContext()->GetSecurityOrigin()->CanAccess(
SecurityOrigin::Create(destination_url).get())) {
return true;
}
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::
FramebustingNeedsSameOriginOrUserGestureEnabled() ||
Client()->GetContentSettingsClient().AllowPopupsAndRedirects(
false /* default_value */)) {
String target_frame_description =
target_frame.IsLocalFrame() ? "with URL '" +
ToLocalFrame(target_frame)
.GetDocument()
->Url()
.GetString() +
"'"
: "with origin '" +
target_frame.GetSecurityContext()
->GetSecurityOrigin()
->ToString() +
"'";
String message = "Frame with URL '" + GetDocument()->Url().GetString() +
"' attempted to navigate its top-level window " +
target_frame_description +
". Navigating the top-level window from a cross-origin "
"iframe will soon require that the iframe has received "
"a user gesture. See "
"https://www.chromestatus.com/features/"
"5851021045661696.";
PrintNavigationWarning(message);
return true;
}
error_reason =
"The frame attempting navigation is targeting its top-level window, "
"but is neither same-origin with its target nor has it received a "
"user gesture. See "
"https://www.chromestatus.com/features/5851021045661696.";
PrintNavigationErrorMessage(target_frame, error_reason.Latin1().data());
Client()->DidBlockFramebust(destination_url);
return false;
}
if (Client()->Opener() == target_frame &&
!HasTransientUserActivation(this, false /* checkIfMainThread */) &&
!target_frame.GetSecurityContext()->GetSecurityOrigin()->CanAccess(
SecurityOrigin::Create(destination_url).get())) {
UseCounter::Count(this, WebFeature::kOpenerNavigationWithoutGesture);
}
if (!is_allowed_navigation && !error_reason.IsNull())
PrintNavigationErrorMessage(target_frame, error_reason.Latin1().data());
return is_allowed_navigation;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/be655fd4fb9ab3291a855a939496111674037a2f
|
be655fd4fb9ab3291a855a939496111674037a2f
|
Always use FrameNavigationDisabler during DocumentLoader detach.
BUG=617495
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2079473002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400558}
|
void FrameLoader::setOpener(LocalFrame* opener)
{
if (client())
client()->setOpener(opener);
}
|
void FrameLoader::setOpener(LocalFrame* opener)
{
if (client())
client()->setOpener(opener);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6903/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/ioquake/ioq3/commit/376267d534476a875d8b9228149c4ee18b74a4fd
|
376267d534476a875d8b9228149c4ee18b74a4fd
|
Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
|
void FS_ForceFlush( fileHandle_t f ) {
FILE *file;
file = FS_FileForHandle(f);
setvbuf( file, NULL, _IONBF, 0 );
}
|
void FS_ForceFlush( fileHandle_t f ) {
FILE *file;
file = FS_FileForHandle(f);
setvbuf( file, NULL, _IONBF, 0 );
}
|
C
|
OpenJK
| 0 |
CVE-2018-7998
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-7998/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/jcupitt/libvips/commit/20d840e6da15c1574b3ed998bc92f91d1e36c2a5
|
20d840e6da15c1574b3ed998bc92f91d1e36c2a5
|
fix a crash with delayed load
If a delayed load failed, it could leave the pipeline only half-set up.
Sebsequent threads could then segv.
Set a load-has-failed flag and test before generate.
See https://github.com/jcupitt/libvips/issues/893
|
vips_foreign_save_dispose( GObject *gobject )
{
VipsForeignSave *save = VIPS_FOREIGN_SAVE( gobject );
VIPS_UNREF( save->ready );
G_OBJECT_CLASS( vips_foreign_save_parent_class )->dispose( gobject );
}
|
vips_foreign_save_dispose( GObject *gobject )
{
VipsForeignSave *save = VIPS_FOREIGN_SAVE( gobject );
VIPS_UNREF( save->ready );
G_OBJECT_CLASS( vips_foreign_save_parent_class )->dispose( gobject );
}
|
C
|
libvips
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2918
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2918/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
a8b0ca17b80e92faab46ee7179ba9e99ccb61233
|
perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Cree <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <[email protected]>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric B Munson <[email protected]>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Mundt <[email protected]>
Cc: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Jason Wessel <[email protected]>
Cc: Don Zickus <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static inline void update_cgrp_time_from_cpuctx(struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx)
{
}
|
static inline void update_cgrp_time_from_cpuctx(struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx)
{
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d4cd2b2c0953ad7e9fa988c234eb9361be80fe81
|
d4cd2b2c0953ad7e9fa988c234eb9361be80fe81
|
DevTools: 'Overrides' UI overlay obstructs page and element inspector
BUG=302862
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/40233006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@160559 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void InspectorPageAgent::clearFrontend()
{
ErrorString error;
disable(&error);
updateTouchEventEmulationInPage(false);
m_frontend = 0;
}
|
void InspectorPageAgent::clearFrontend()
{
ErrorString error;
disable(&error);
updateTouchEventEmulationInPage(false);
m_frontend = 0;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1705
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1705/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4afb628e068367d5b73440537555902cd12416f8
|
4afb628e068367d5b73440537555902cd12416f8
|
gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
[email protected]
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
|
ui::ResourceManager& CompositorImpl::GetResourceManager() {
return resource_manager_;
}
|
ui::ResourceManager& CompositorImpl::GetResourceManager() {
return resource_manager_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-0203
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-0203/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/86acdca1b63e6890540fa19495cfc708beff3d8b
|
86acdca1b63e6890540fa19495cfc708beff3d8b
|
fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
|
static int mounts_open_common(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
const struct seq_operations *op)
{
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
struct nsproxy *nsp;
struct mnt_namespace *ns = NULL;
struct path root;
struct proc_mounts *p;
int ret = -EINVAL;
if (task) {
rcu_read_lock();
nsp = task_nsproxy(task);
if (nsp) {
ns = nsp->mnt_ns;
if (ns)
get_mnt_ns(ns);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (ns && get_fs_path(task, &root, 1) == 0)
ret = 0;
put_task_struct(task);
}
if (!ns)
goto err;
if (ret)
goto err_put_ns;
ret = -ENOMEM;
p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct proc_mounts), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p)
goto err_put_path;
file->private_data = &p->m;
ret = seq_open(file, op);
if (ret)
goto err_free;
p->m.private = p;
p->ns = ns;
p->root = root;
p->event = ns->event;
return 0;
err_free:
kfree(p);
err_put_path:
path_put(&root);
err_put_ns:
put_mnt_ns(ns);
err:
return ret;
}
|
static int mounts_open_common(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
const struct seq_operations *op)
{
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
struct nsproxy *nsp;
struct mnt_namespace *ns = NULL;
struct path root;
struct proc_mounts *p;
int ret = -EINVAL;
if (task) {
rcu_read_lock();
nsp = task_nsproxy(task);
if (nsp) {
ns = nsp->mnt_ns;
if (ns)
get_mnt_ns(ns);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
if (ns && get_fs_path(task, &root, 1) == 0)
ret = 0;
put_task_struct(task);
}
if (!ns)
goto err;
if (ret)
goto err_put_ns;
ret = -ENOMEM;
p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct proc_mounts), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p)
goto err_put_path;
file->private_data = &p->m;
ret = seq_open(file, op);
if (ret)
goto err_free;
p->m.private = p;
p->ns = ns;
p->root = root;
p->event = ns->event;
return 0;
err_free:
kfree(p);
err_put_path:
path_put(&root);
err_put_ns:
put_mnt_ns(ns);
err:
return ret;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1281
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1281/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dff368031150a1033a1a3c913f8857679a0279be
|
dff368031150a1033a1a3c913f8857679a0279be
|
Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static WeakDocumentSet& liveDocumentSet()
{
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(OwnPtrWillBePersistent<WeakDocumentSet>, set, (adoptPtrWillBeNoop(new WeakDocumentSet())));
return *set;
}
|
static WeakDocumentSet& liveDocumentSet()
{
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(OwnPtrWillBePersistent<WeakDocumentSet>, set, (adoptPtrWillBeNoop(new WeakDocumentSet())));
return *set;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-1179
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-1179/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/4a1d704194a441bf83c636004a479e01360ec850
|
4a1d704194a441bf83c636004a479e01360ec850
|
mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[[email protected]: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Jones <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <[email protected]>
Cc: Mark Salter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
bool mem_cgroup_reclaimable(struct mem_cgroup *memcg, bool noswap)
{
return test_mem_cgroup_node_reclaimable(memcg, 0, noswap);
}
|
bool mem_cgroup_reclaimable(struct mem_cgroup *memcg, bool noswap)
{
return test_mem_cgroup_node_reclaimable(memcg, 0, noswap);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2015-7515
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-7515/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/8e20cf2bce122ce9262d6034ee5d5b76fbb92f96
|
8e20cf2bce122ce9262d6034ee5d5b76fbb92f96
|
Input: aiptek - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The aiptek driver crashes in aiptek_probe() when a specially crafted USB
device without endpoints is detected. This fix adds a check that the device
has proper configuration expected by the driver. Also an error return value
is changed to more matching one in one of the error paths.
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
|
store_tabletPointerMode(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, const char *buf, size_t count)
{
struct aiptek *aiptek = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
int new_mode = map_str_to_val(pointer_mode_map, buf, count);
if (new_mode == AIPTEK_INVALID_VALUE)
return -EINVAL;
aiptek->newSetting.pointerMode = new_mode;
return count;
}
|
store_tabletPointerMode(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, const char *buf, size_t count)
{
struct aiptek *aiptek = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
int new_mode = map_str_to_val(pointer_mode_map, buf, count);
if (new_mode == AIPTEK_INVALID_VALUE)
return -EINVAL;
aiptek->newSetting.pointerMode = new_mode;
return count;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2014-9888
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-9888/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0ea1ec713f04bdfac343c9702b21cd3a7c711826
|
0ea1ec713f04bdfac343c9702b21cd3a7c711826
|
ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <[email protected]>
|
static inline dma_addr_t __alloc_iova(struct dma_iommu_mapping *mapping,
size_t size)
{
unsigned int order = get_order(size);
unsigned int align = 0;
unsigned int count, start;
unsigned long flags;
if (order > CONFIG_ARM_DMA_IOMMU_ALIGNMENT)
order = CONFIG_ARM_DMA_IOMMU_ALIGNMENT;
count = ((PAGE_ALIGN(size) >> PAGE_SHIFT) +
(1 << mapping->order) - 1) >> mapping->order;
if (order > mapping->order)
align = (1 << (order - mapping->order)) - 1;
spin_lock_irqsave(&mapping->lock, flags);
start = bitmap_find_next_zero_area(mapping->bitmap, mapping->bits, 0,
count, align);
if (start > mapping->bits) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mapping->lock, flags);
return DMA_ERROR_CODE;
}
bitmap_set(mapping->bitmap, start, count);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mapping->lock, flags);
return mapping->base + (start << (mapping->order + PAGE_SHIFT));
}
|
static inline dma_addr_t __alloc_iova(struct dma_iommu_mapping *mapping,
size_t size)
{
unsigned int order = get_order(size);
unsigned int align = 0;
unsigned int count, start;
unsigned long flags;
if (order > CONFIG_ARM_DMA_IOMMU_ALIGNMENT)
order = CONFIG_ARM_DMA_IOMMU_ALIGNMENT;
count = ((PAGE_ALIGN(size) >> PAGE_SHIFT) +
(1 << mapping->order) - 1) >> mapping->order;
if (order > mapping->order)
align = (1 << (order - mapping->order)) - 1;
spin_lock_irqsave(&mapping->lock, flags);
start = bitmap_find_next_zero_area(mapping->bitmap, mapping->bits, 0,
count, align);
if (start > mapping->bits) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mapping->lock, flags);
return DMA_ERROR_CODE;
}
bitmap_set(mapping->bitmap, start, count);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mapping->lock, flags);
return mapping->base + (start << (mapping->order + PAGE_SHIFT));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2018-9498
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-9498/
|
CWE-787
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/skia/+/77c955200ddd1761d6ed7a6c1578349fedbb55e4
|
77c955200ddd1761d6ed7a6c1578349fedbb55e4
|
RESTRICT AUTOMERGE: Cherry-pick "begin cleanup of malloc porting layer"
Bug: 78354855
Test: Not feasible
Original description:
========================================================================
1. Merge some of the allocators into sk_malloc_flags by redefining a flag to mean zero-init
2. Add more private helpers to simplify our call-sites (and handle some overflow mul checks)
3. The 2-param helpers rely on the saturating SkSafeMath::Mul to pass max_size_t as the request,
which should always fail.
chromium: 508641
Reviewed-on: https://skia-review.googlesource.com/90940
Commit-Queue: Mike Reed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Robert Phillips <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Stephan Altmueller <[email protected]>
========================================================================
Conflicts:
- include/private/SkMalloc.h
Simply removed the old definitions of SK_MALLOC_TEMP and SK_MALLOC_THROW.
- public.bzl
Copied SK_SUPPORT_LEGACY_MALLOC_PORTING_LAYER into the old defines.
- src/codec/SkIcoCodec.cpp
Drop a change where we were not using malloc yet.
- src/codec/SkBmpBaseCodec.cpp
- src/core/SkBitmapCache.cpp
These files weren't yet using malloc (and SkBmpBaseCodec hadn't been
factored out).
- src/core/SkMallocPixelRef.cpp
These were still using New rather than Make (return raw pointer). Leave
them unchanged, as sk_malloc_flags is still valid.
- src/lazy/SkDiscardableMemoryPool.cpp
Leave this unchanged; sk_malloc_flags is still valid
In addition, pull in SkSafeMath.h, which was originally introduced in
https://skia-review.googlesource.com/c/skia/+/33721. This is required
for the new sk_malloc calls.
Also pull in SkSafeMath::Add and SkSafeMath::Mul, introduced in
https://skia-review.googlesource.com/88581
Also add SK_MaxSizeT, which the above depends on, introduced in
https://skia-review.googlesource.com/57084
Also, modify NewFromStream to use sk_malloc_canfail, matching pi and
avoiding a build break
Change-Id: Ib320484673a865460fc1efb900f611209e088edb
(cherry picked from commit a12cc3e14ea6734c7efe76aa6a19239909830b28)
|
int SkIcoCodec::onGetScanlines(void* dst, int count, size_t rowBytes) {
SkASSERT(fCurrScanlineCodec);
return fCurrScanlineCodec->getScanlines(dst, count, rowBytes);
}
|
int SkIcoCodec::onGetScanlines(void* dst, int count, size_t rowBytes) {
SkASSERT(fCurrScanlineCodec);
return fCurrScanlineCodec->getScanlines(dst, count, rowBytes);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2017-6903
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-6903/
|
CWE-269
|
https://github.com/ioquake/ioq3/commit/376267d534476a875d8b9228149c4ee18b74a4fd
|
376267d534476a875d8b9228149c4ee18b74a4fd
|
Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
|
void CL_ReferencedPK3List_f( void ) {
Com_Printf("Referenced PK3 Names: %s\n", FS_ReferencedPakNames());
}
|
void CL_ReferencedPK3List_f( void ) {
Com_Printf("Referenced PK3 Names: %s\n", FS_ReferencedPakNames());
}
|
C
|
OpenJK
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6187
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6187/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/30a46a4647fd1df9cf52e43bf467f0d9265096ca
|
30a46a4647fd1df9cf52e43bf467f0d9265096ca
|
apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr()
When proc_pid_attr_write() was changed to use memdup_user apparmor's
(interface violating) assumption that the setprocattr buffer was always
a single page was violated.
The size test is not strictly speaking needed as proc_pid_attr_write()
will reject anything larger, but for the sake of robustness we can keep
it in.
SMACK and SELinux look safe to me, but somebody else should probably
have a look just in case.
Based on original patch from Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
modified for the case that apparmor provides null termination.
Fixes: bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a
Reported-by: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Cc: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc: John Johansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <[email protected]>
|
static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
void *value, size_t size)
{
struct common_audit_data sa;
struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value;
size_t arg_size;
int error;
if (size == 0)
return -EINVAL;
/* task can only write its own attributes */
if (current != task)
return -EACCES;
/* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */
if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
/* null terminate */
largs = args = kmalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!args)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(args, value, size);
args[size] = '\0';
}
error = -EINVAL;
args = strim(args);
command = strsep(&args, " ");
if (!args)
goto out;
args = skip_spaces(args);
if (!*args)
goto out;
arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value);
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
!AA_DO_TEST);
} else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
AA_DO_TEST);
} else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
!AA_DO_TEST);
} else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
AA_DO_TEST);
} else
goto fail;
} else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0)
error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
!AA_DO_TEST);
else
goto fail;
} else
/* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
goto fail;
if (!error)
error = size;
out:
kfree(largs);
return error;
fail:
sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
sa.aad = &aad;
aad.profile = aa_current_profile();
aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
aad.info = name;
aad.error = error = -EINVAL;
aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL);
goto out;
}
|
static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
void *value, size_t size)
{
struct common_audit_data sa;
struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
char *command, *args = value;
size_t arg_size;
int error;
if (size == 0)
return -EINVAL;
/* args points to a PAGE_SIZE buffer, AppArmor requires that
* the buffer must be null terminated or have size <= PAGE_SIZE -1
* so that AppArmor can null terminate them
*/
if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
if (size == PAGE_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
args[size] = '\0';
}
/* task can only write its own attributes */
if (current != task)
return -EACCES;
args = value;
args = strim(args);
command = strsep(&args, " ");
if (!args)
return -EINVAL;
args = skip_spaces(args);
if (!*args)
return -EINVAL;
arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value);
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
!AA_DO_TEST);
} else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
AA_DO_TEST);
} else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
!AA_DO_TEST);
} else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
AA_DO_TEST);
} else
goto fail;
} else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0)
error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
!AA_DO_TEST);
else
goto fail;
} else
/* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
return -EINVAL;
if (!error)
error = size;
return error;
fail:
sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
sa.aad = &aad;
aad.profile = aa_current_profile();
aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
aad.info = name;
aad.error = -EINVAL;
aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL);
return -EINVAL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 1 |
CVE-2016-2494
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2494/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/864e2e22fcd0cba3f5e67680ccabd0302dfda45d
|
864e2e22fcd0cba3f5e67680ccabd0302dfda45d
|
Fix overflow in path building
An incorrect size was causing an unsigned value
to wrap, causing it to write past the end of
the buffer.
Bug: 28085658
Change-Id: Ie9625c729cca024d514ba2880ff97209d435a165
|
static int handle_init(struct fuse* fuse, struct fuse_handler* handler,
const struct fuse_in_header* hdr, const struct fuse_init_in* req)
{
struct fuse_init_out out;
size_t fuse_struct_size;
TRACE("[%d] INIT ver=%d.%d maxread=%d flags=%x\n",
handler->token, req->major, req->minor, req->max_readahead, req->flags);
/* Kernel 2.6.16 is the first stable kernel with struct fuse_init_out
* defined (fuse version 7.6). The structure is the same from 7.6 through
* 7.22. Beginning with 7.23, the structure increased in size and added
* new parameters.
*/
if (req->major != FUSE_KERNEL_VERSION || req->minor < 6) {
ERROR("Fuse kernel version mismatch: Kernel version %d.%d, Expected at least %d.6",
req->major, req->minor, FUSE_KERNEL_VERSION);
return -1;
}
/* We limit ourselves to 15 because we don't handle BATCH_FORGET yet */
out.minor = MIN(req->minor, 15);
fuse_struct_size = sizeof(out);
#if defined(FUSE_COMPAT_22_INIT_OUT_SIZE)
/* FUSE_KERNEL_VERSION >= 23. */
/* If the kernel only works on minor revs older than or equal to 22,
* then use the older structure size since this code only uses the 7.22
* version of the structure. */
if (req->minor <= 22) {
fuse_struct_size = FUSE_COMPAT_22_INIT_OUT_SIZE;
}
#endif
out.major = FUSE_KERNEL_VERSION;
out.max_readahead = req->max_readahead;
out.flags = FUSE_ATOMIC_O_TRUNC | FUSE_BIG_WRITES;
out.max_background = 32;
out.congestion_threshold = 32;
out.max_write = MAX_WRITE;
fuse_reply(fuse, hdr->unique, &out, fuse_struct_size);
return NO_STATUS;
}
|
static int handle_init(struct fuse* fuse, struct fuse_handler* handler,
const struct fuse_in_header* hdr, const struct fuse_init_in* req)
{
struct fuse_init_out out;
size_t fuse_struct_size;
TRACE("[%d] INIT ver=%d.%d maxread=%d flags=%x\n",
handler->token, req->major, req->minor, req->max_readahead, req->flags);
/* Kernel 2.6.16 is the first stable kernel with struct fuse_init_out
* defined (fuse version 7.6). The structure is the same from 7.6 through
* 7.22. Beginning with 7.23, the structure increased in size and added
* new parameters.
*/
if (req->major != FUSE_KERNEL_VERSION || req->minor < 6) {
ERROR("Fuse kernel version mismatch: Kernel version %d.%d, Expected at least %d.6",
req->major, req->minor, FUSE_KERNEL_VERSION);
return -1;
}
/* We limit ourselves to 15 because we don't handle BATCH_FORGET yet */
out.minor = MIN(req->minor, 15);
fuse_struct_size = sizeof(out);
#if defined(FUSE_COMPAT_22_INIT_OUT_SIZE)
/* FUSE_KERNEL_VERSION >= 23. */
/* If the kernel only works on minor revs older than or equal to 22,
* then use the older structure size since this code only uses the 7.22
* version of the structure. */
if (req->minor <= 22) {
fuse_struct_size = FUSE_COMPAT_22_INIT_OUT_SIZE;
}
#endif
out.major = FUSE_KERNEL_VERSION;
out.max_readahead = req->max_readahead;
out.flags = FUSE_ATOMIC_O_TRUNC | FUSE_BIG_WRITES;
out.max_background = 32;
out.congestion_threshold = 32;
out.max_write = MAX_WRITE;
fuse_reply(fuse, hdr->unique, &out, fuse_struct_size);
return NO_STATUS;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1285
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1285/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/39595f8d4dffcb644d438106dcb64a30c139ff0e
|
39595f8d4dffcb644d438106dcb64a30c139ff0e
|
[reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
[email protected], [email protected]
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <[email protected]>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
|
void WallpaperManagerBase::TestApi::SetWallpaperCache(
const AccountId& account_id,
const base::FilePath& path,
const gfx::ImageSkia& image) {
DCHECK(!image.isNull());
wallpaper_manager_->wallpaper_cache_[account_id] =
CustomWallpaperElement(path, image);
}
|
void WallpaperManagerBase::TestApi::SetWallpaperCache(
const AccountId& account_id,
const base::FilePath& path,
const gfx::ImageSkia& image) {
DCHECK(!image.isNull());
wallpaper_manager_->wallpaper_cache_[account_id] =
CustomWallpaperElement(path, image);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1867
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1867/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/ClusterLabs/pacemaker/commit/84ac07c
|
84ac07c
|
Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
|
save_xml_to_file(xmlNode * xml, const char *desc, const char *filename)
{
char *f = NULL;
if (filename == NULL) {
char *uuid = crm_generate_uuid();
f = crm_strdup_printf("/tmp/%s", uuid);
filename = f;
free(uuid);
}
crm_info("Saving %s to %s", desc, filename);
write_xml_file(xml, filename, FALSE);
free(f);
}
|
save_xml_to_file(xmlNode * xml, const char *desc, const char *filename)
{
char *f = NULL;
if (filename == NULL) {
char *uuid = crm_generate_uuid();
f = crm_strdup_printf("/tmp/%s", uuid);
filename = f;
free(uuid);
}
crm_info("Saving %s to %s", desc, filename);
write_xml_file(xml, filename, FALSE);
free(f);
}
|
C
|
pacemaker
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dc3857aac17be72c96f28d860d875235b3be349a
|
dc3857aac17be72c96f28d860d875235b3be349a
|
Unreviewed, rolling out r142736.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/142736
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=109716
Broke ABI, nightly builds crash on launch (Requested by ap on
#webkit).
Patch by Sheriff Bot <[email protected]> on 2013-02-13
Source/WebKit2:
* Shared/APIClientTraits.cpp:
(WebKit):
* Shared/APIClientTraits.h:
* UIProcess/API/C/WKPage.h:
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitLoaderClient.cpp:
(attachLoaderClientToView):
* WebProcess/InjectedBundle/API/c/WKBundlePage.h:
* WebProcess/qt/QtBuiltinBundlePage.cpp:
(WebKit::QtBuiltinBundlePage::QtBuiltinBundlePage):
Tools:
* MiniBrowser/mac/WK2BrowserWindowController.m:
(-[WK2BrowserWindowController awakeFromNib]):
* WebKitTestRunner/InjectedBundle/InjectedBundlePage.cpp:
(WTR::InjectedBundlePage::InjectedBundlePage):
* WebKitTestRunner/TestController.cpp:
(WTR::TestController::createWebViewWithOptions):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@142762 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool InjectedBundlePage::shouldEndEditing(WKBundleRangeHandleRef range)
{
if (!InjectedBundle::shared().isTestRunning())
return true;
if (InjectedBundle::shared().testRunner()->shouldDumpEditingCallbacks()) {
StringBuilder stringBuilder;
stringBuilder.appendLiteral("EDITING DELEGATE: shouldEndEditingInDOMRange:");
stringBuilder.append(rangeToStr(m_page, m_world.get(), range));
stringBuilder.append('\n');
InjectedBundle::shared().outputText(stringBuilder.toString());
}
return InjectedBundle::shared().testRunner()->shouldAllowEditing();
}
|
bool InjectedBundlePage::shouldEndEditing(WKBundleRangeHandleRef range)
{
if (!InjectedBundle::shared().isTestRunning())
return true;
if (InjectedBundle::shared().testRunner()->shouldDumpEditingCallbacks()) {
StringBuilder stringBuilder;
stringBuilder.appendLiteral("EDITING DELEGATE: shouldEndEditingInDOMRange:");
stringBuilder.append(rangeToStr(m_page, m_world.get(), range));
stringBuilder.append('\n');
InjectedBundle::shared().outputText(stringBuilder.toString());
}
return InjectedBundle::shared().testRunner()->shouldAllowEditing();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-1149
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-1149/
|
CWE-200
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/udisks/commit/?id=0fcc7cb3b66f23fac53ae08647aa0007a2bd56c4
|
0fcc7cb3b66f23fac53ae08647aa0007a2bd56c4
| null |
device_luks_unlock (Device *device,
const char *secret,
char **options,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context)
{
if (device->priv->id_usage == NULL || strcmp (device->priv->id_usage, "crypto") != 0)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "Not a LUKS device");
goto out;
}
daemon_local_check_auth (device->priv->daemon,
device,
"org.freedesktop.udisks.luks-unlock",
"LuksUnlock",
TRUE,
device_luks_unlock_authorized_cb,
context,
2,
g_strdup (secret),
g_free,
g_strdupv (options),
g_strfreev);
out:
return TRUE;
}
|
device_luks_unlock (Device *device,
const char *secret,
char **options,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context)
{
if (device->priv->id_usage == NULL || strcmp (device->priv->id_usage, "crypto") != 0)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "Not a LUKS device");
goto out;
}
daemon_local_check_auth (device->priv->daemon,
device,
"org.freedesktop.udisks.luks-unlock",
"LuksUnlock",
TRUE,
device_luks_unlock_authorized_cb,
context,
2,
g_strdup (secret),
g_free,
g_strdupv (options),
g_strfreev);
out:
return TRUE;
}
|
C
|
udisks
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2896
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2896/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3aad1a37affb1ab70d1897f2b03eb8c077264984
|
3aad1a37affb1ab70d1897f2b03eb8c077264984
|
Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
static inline GLenum GetTexInternalFormat(GLenum internal_format) {
if (gfx::GetGLImplementation() != gfx::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2) {
if (internal_format == GL_BGRA_EXT || internal_format == GL_BGRA8_EXT)
return GL_RGBA8;
}
return internal_format;
}
|
static inline GLenum GetTexInternalFormat(GLenum internal_format) {
if (gfx::GetGLImplementation() != gfx::kGLImplementationEGLGLES2) {
if (internal_format == GL_BGRA_EXT || internal_format == GL_BGRA8_EXT)
return GL_RGBA8;
}
return internal_format;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7281
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7281/
|
CWE-200
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/bceaa90240b6019ed73b49965eac7d167610be69
|
bceaa90240b6019ed73b49965eac7d167610be69
|
inet: prevent leakage of uninitialized memory to user in recv syscalls
Only update *addr_len when we actually fill in sockaddr, otherwise we
can return uninitialized memory from the stack to the caller in the
recvfrom, recvmmsg and recvmsg syscalls. Drop the the (addr_len == NULL)
checks because we only get called with a valid addr_len pointer either
from sock_common_recvmsg or inet_recvmsg.
If a blocking read waits on a socket which is concurrently shut down we
now return zero and set msg_msgnamelen to 0.
Reported-by: mpb <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static unsigned int udp_ehashfn(struct net *net, const __be32 laddr,
const __u16 lport, const __be32 faddr,
const __be16 fport)
{
static u32 udp_ehash_secret __read_mostly;
net_get_random_once(&udp_ehash_secret, sizeof(udp_ehash_secret));
return __inet_ehashfn(laddr, lport, faddr, fport,
udp_ehash_secret + net_hash_mix(net));
}
|
static unsigned int udp_ehashfn(struct net *net, const __be32 laddr,
const __u16 lport, const __be32 faddr,
const __be16 fport)
{
static u32 udp_ehash_secret __read_mostly;
net_get_random_once(&udp_ehash_secret, sizeof(udp_ehash_secret));
return __inet_ehashfn(laddr, lport, faddr, fport,
udp_ehash_secret + net_hash_mix(net));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9374
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9374/
|
CWE-772
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=d710e1e7bd3d5bfc26b631f02ae87901ebe646b0
|
d710e1e7bd3d5bfc26b631f02ae87901ebe646b0
| null |
static int ehci_cancel_queue(EHCIQueue *q)
{
EHCIPacket *p;
int packets = 0;
p = QTAILQ_FIRST(&q->packets);
if (p == NULL) {
goto leave;
}
trace_usb_ehci_queue_action(q, "cancel");
do {
ehci_free_packet(p);
packets++;
} while ((p = QTAILQ_FIRST(&q->packets)) != NULL);
leave:
ehci_queue_stopped(q);
return packets;
}
|
static int ehci_cancel_queue(EHCIQueue *q)
{
EHCIPacket *p;
int packets = 0;
p = QTAILQ_FIRST(&q->packets);
if (p == NULL) {
goto leave;
}
trace_usb_ehci_queue_action(q, "cancel");
do {
ehci_free_packet(p);
packets++;
} while ((p = QTAILQ_FIRST(&q->packets)) != NULL);
leave:
ehci_queue_stopped(q);
return packets;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2016-7798
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-7798/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/ruby/openssl/commit/8108e0a6db133f3375608303fdd2083eb5115062
|
8108e0a6db133f3375608303fdd2083eb5115062
|
cipher: don't set dummy encryption key in Cipher#initialize
Remove the encryption key initialization from Cipher#initialize. This
is effectively a revert of r32723 ("Avoid possible SEGV from AES
encryption/decryption", 2011-07-28).
r32723, which added the key initialization, was a workaround for
Ruby Bug #2768. For some certain ciphers, calling EVP_CipherUpdate()
before setting an encryption key caused segfault. It was not a problem
until OpenSSL implemented GCM mode - the encryption key could be
overridden by repeated calls of EVP_CipherInit_ex(). But, it is not the
case for AES-GCM ciphers. Setting a key, an IV, a key, in this order
causes the IV to be reset to an all-zero IV.
The problem of Bug #2768 persists on the current versions of OpenSSL.
So, make Cipher#update raise an exception if a key is not yet set by the
user. Since encrypting or decrypting without key does not make any
sense, this should not break existing applications.
Users can still call Cipher#key= and Cipher#iv= multiple times with
their own responsibility.
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/2768
Reference: https://bugs.ruby-lang.org/issues/8221
Reference: https://github.com/ruby/openssl/issues/49
|
ossl_cipher_final(VALUE self)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
int out_len;
VALUE str;
GetCipher(self, ctx);
str = rb_str_new(0, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx));
if (!EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(str), &out_len))
ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
assert(out_len <= RSTRING_LEN(str));
rb_str_set_len(str, out_len);
return str;
}
|
ossl_cipher_final(VALUE self)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
int out_len;
VALUE str;
GetCipher(self, ctx);
str = rb_str_new(0, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx));
if (!EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx, (unsigned char *)RSTRING_PTR(str), &out_len))
ossl_raise(eCipherError, NULL);
assert(out_len <= RSTRING_LEN(str));
rb_str_set_len(str, out_len);
return str;
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7449
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7449/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/hexchat/hexchat/commit/c9b63f7f9be01692b03fa15275135a4910a7e02d
|
c9b63f7f9be01692b03fa15275135a4910a7e02d
|
ssl: Validate hostnames
Closes #524
|
ASN1_TIME_snprintf (char *buf, int buf_len, ASN1_TIME * tm)
{
char *expires = NULL;
BIO *inMem = BIO_new (BIO_s_mem ());
ASN1_TIME_print (inMem, tm);
BIO_get_mem_data (inMem, &expires);
buf[0] = 0;
if (expires != NULL)
{
/* expires is not \0 terminated */
safe_strcpy (buf, expires, MIN(24, buf_len));
}
BIO_free (inMem);
}
|
ASN1_TIME_snprintf (char *buf, int buf_len, ASN1_TIME * tm)
{
char *expires = NULL;
BIO *inMem = BIO_new (BIO_s_mem ());
ASN1_TIME_print (inMem, tm);
BIO_get_mem_data (inMem, &expires);
buf[0] = 0;
if (expires != NULL)
{
/* expires is not \0 terminated */
safe_strcpy (buf, expires, MIN(24, buf_len));
}
BIO_free (inMem);
}
|
C
|
hexchat
| 0 |
CVE-2015-6763
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-6763/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
f1574f25e1402e748bf2bd7e28ce3dd96ceb1ca4
|
MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
|
void HTMLInputElement::setValue(const String& value,
TextFieldEventBehavior event_behavior,
TextControlSetValueSelection selection) {
input_type_->WarnIfValueIsInvalidAndElementIsVisible(value);
if (!input_type_->CanSetValue(value))
return;
TextControlElement::SetSuggestedValue(String());
EventQueueScope scope;
String sanitized_value = SanitizeValue(value);
bool value_changed = sanitized_value != this->value();
SetLastChangeWasNotUserEdit();
needs_to_update_view_value_ = true;
input_type_->SetValue(sanitized_value, value_changed, event_behavior,
selection);
input_type_view_->DidSetValue(sanitized_value, value_changed);
if (value_changed)
NotifyFormStateChanged();
}
|
void HTMLInputElement::setValue(const String& value,
TextFieldEventBehavior event_behavior,
TextControlSetValueSelection selection) {
input_type_->WarnIfValueIsInvalidAndElementIsVisible(value);
if (!input_type_->CanSetValue(value))
return;
TextControlElement::SetSuggestedValue(String());
EventQueueScope scope;
String sanitized_value = SanitizeValue(value);
bool value_changed = sanitized_value != this->value();
SetLastChangeWasNotUserEdit();
needs_to_update_view_value_ = true;
input_type_->SetValue(sanitized_value, value_changed, event_behavior,
selection);
input_type_view_->DidSetValue(sanitized_value, value_changed);
if (value_changed)
NotifyFormStateChanged();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/04cca6c05e4923f1b91e0dddf053e088456d8645
|
04cca6c05e4923f1b91e0dddf053e088456d8645
|
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=45164
Reviewed by Dan Bernstein.
REGRESSION: <a><img align=top></a> Clickable area too large
Make sure to clamp hit testing of quirky inline flow boxes the same way we already clamped
painting.
Source/WebCore:
* rendering/InlineFlowBox.cpp:
(WebCore::InlineFlowBox::nodeAtPoint):
LayoutTests:
* fast/inline/inline-position-top-align-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/inline/inline-position-top-align.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@81055 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInBlockDirection(int top, int maxHeight, int maxAscent, bool strictMode, int& lineTop, int& lineBottom, bool& setLineTop,
int& lineTopIncludingMargins, int& lineBottomIncludingMargins, bool& hasAnnotationsBefore, bool& hasAnnotationsAfter, FontBaseline baselineType)
{
if (isRootInlineBox())
setLogicalTop(top + maxAscent - baselinePosition(baselineType)); // Place our root box.
for (InlineBox* curr = firstChild(); curr; curr = curr->nextOnLine()) {
if (curr->renderer()->isPositioned())
continue; // Positioned placeholders don't affect calculations.
bool isInlineFlow = curr->isInlineFlowBox();
if (isInlineFlow)
static_cast<InlineFlowBox*>(curr)->placeBoxesInBlockDirection(top, maxHeight, maxAscent, strictMode, lineTop, lineBottom, setLineTop,
lineTopIncludingMargins, lineBottomIncludingMargins, hasAnnotationsBefore, hasAnnotationsAfter, baselineType);
bool childAffectsTopBottomPos = true;
if (curr->verticalAlign() == TOP)
curr->setLogicalTop(top);
else if (curr->verticalAlign() == BOTTOM)
curr->setLogicalTop(top + maxHeight - curr->lineHeight());
else {
if ((isInlineFlow && !static_cast<InlineFlowBox*>(curr)->hasTextChildren()) && !curr->boxModelObject()->hasInlineDirectionBordersOrPadding() && !strictMode)
childAffectsTopBottomPos = false;
int posAdjust = maxAscent - curr->baselinePosition(baselineType);
curr->setLogicalTop(curr->logicalTop() + top + posAdjust);
}
int newLogicalTop = curr->logicalTop();
int newLogicalTopIncludingMargins = newLogicalTop;
int boxHeight = curr->logicalHeight();
int boxHeightIncludingMargins = boxHeight;
if (curr->isText() || curr->isInlineFlowBox()) {
const FontMetrics& fontMetrics = curr->renderer()->style(m_firstLine)->fontMetrics();
newLogicalTop += curr->baselinePosition(baselineType) - fontMetrics.ascent(baselineType);
if (curr->isInlineFlowBox()) {
RenderBoxModelObject* boxObject = toRenderBoxModelObject(curr->renderer());
newLogicalTop -= boxObject->style(m_firstLine)->isHorizontalWritingMode() ? boxObject->borderTop() + boxObject->paddingTop() :
boxObject->borderRight() + boxObject->paddingRight();
}
newLogicalTopIncludingMargins = newLogicalTop;
} else if (!curr->renderer()->isBR()) {
RenderBox* box = toRenderBox(curr->renderer());
newLogicalTopIncludingMargins = newLogicalTop;
int overSideMargin = curr->isHorizontal() ? box->marginTop() : box->marginRight();
int underSideMargin = curr->isHorizontal() ? box->marginBottom() : box->marginLeft();
newLogicalTop += overSideMargin;
boxHeightIncludingMargins += overSideMargin + underSideMargin;
}
curr->setLogicalTop(newLogicalTop);
if (childAffectsTopBottomPos) {
if (curr->renderer()->isRubyRun()) {
if (!renderer()->style()->isFlippedLinesWritingMode())
hasAnnotationsBefore = true;
else
hasAnnotationsAfter = true;
RenderRubyRun* rubyRun = static_cast<RenderRubyRun*>(curr->renderer());
if (RenderRubyBase* rubyBase = rubyRun->rubyBase()) {
int bottomRubyBaseLeading = (curr->logicalHeight() - rubyBase->logicalBottom()) + rubyBase->logicalHeight() - (rubyBase->lastRootBox() ? rubyBase->lastRootBox()->lineBottom() : 0);
int topRubyBaseLeading = rubyBase->logicalTop() + (rubyBase->firstRootBox() ? rubyBase->firstRootBox()->lineTop() : 0);
newLogicalTop += !renderer()->style()->isFlippedLinesWritingMode() ? topRubyBaseLeading : bottomRubyBaseLeading;
boxHeight -= (topRubyBaseLeading + bottomRubyBaseLeading);
}
}
if (curr->isInlineTextBox()) {
TextEmphasisPosition emphasisMarkPosition;
if (static_cast<InlineTextBox*>(curr)->getEmphasisMarkPosition(curr->renderer()->style(m_firstLine), emphasisMarkPosition)) {
bool emphasisMarkIsOver = emphasisMarkPosition == TextEmphasisPositionOver;
if (emphasisMarkIsOver != curr->renderer()->style(m_firstLine)->isFlippedLinesWritingMode())
hasAnnotationsBefore = true;
else
hasAnnotationsAfter = true;
}
}
if (!setLineTop) {
setLineTop = true;
lineTop = newLogicalTop;
lineTopIncludingMargins = min(lineTop, newLogicalTopIncludingMargins);
} else {
lineTop = min(lineTop, newLogicalTop);
lineTopIncludingMargins = min(lineTop, min(lineTopIncludingMargins, newLogicalTopIncludingMargins));
}
lineBottom = max(lineBottom, newLogicalTop + boxHeight);
lineBottomIncludingMargins = max(lineBottom, max(lineBottomIncludingMargins, newLogicalTopIncludingMargins + boxHeightIncludingMargins));
}
}
if (isRootInlineBox()) {
const FontMetrics& fontMetrics = renderer()->style(m_firstLine)->fontMetrics();
setLogicalTop(logicalTop() + baselinePosition(baselineType) - fontMetrics.ascent(baselineType));
if (hasTextChildren() || strictMode) {
if (!setLineTop) {
setLineTop = true;
lineTop = logicalTop();
lineTopIncludingMargins = lineTop;
} else {
lineTop = min(lineTop, logicalTop());
lineTopIncludingMargins = min(lineTop, lineTopIncludingMargins);
}
lineBottom = max(lineBottom, logicalTop() + logicalHeight());
lineBottomIncludingMargins = max(lineBottom, lineBottomIncludingMargins);
}
if (renderer()->style()->isFlippedLinesWritingMode())
flipLinesInBlockDirection(lineTopIncludingMargins, lineBottomIncludingMargins);
}
}
|
void InlineFlowBox::placeBoxesInBlockDirection(int top, int maxHeight, int maxAscent, bool strictMode, int& lineTop, int& lineBottom, bool& setLineTop,
int& lineTopIncludingMargins, int& lineBottomIncludingMargins, bool& hasAnnotationsBefore, bool& hasAnnotationsAfter, FontBaseline baselineType)
{
if (isRootInlineBox())
setLogicalTop(top + maxAscent - baselinePosition(baselineType)); // Place our root box.
for (InlineBox* curr = firstChild(); curr; curr = curr->nextOnLine()) {
if (curr->renderer()->isPositioned())
continue; // Positioned placeholders don't affect calculations.
bool isInlineFlow = curr->isInlineFlowBox();
if (isInlineFlow)
static_cast<InlineFlowBox*>(curr)->placeBoxesInBlockDirection(top, maxHeight, maxAscent, strictMode, lineTop, lineBottom, setLineTop,
lineTopIncludingMargins, lineBottomIncludingMargins, hasAnnotationsBefore, hasAnnotationsAfter, baselineType);
bool childAffectsTopBottomPos = true;
if (curr->verticalAlign() == TOP)
curr->setLogicalTop(top);
else if (curr->verticalAlign() == BOTTOM)
curr->setLogicalTop(top + maxHeight - curr->lineHeight());
else {
if ((isInlineFlow && !static_cast<InlineFlowBox*>(curr)->hasTextChildren()) && !curr->boxModelObject()->hasInlineDirectionBordersOrPadding() && !strictMode)
childAffectsTopBottomPos = false;
int posAdjust = maxAscent - curr->baselinePosition(baselineType);
curr->setLogicalTop(curr->logicalTop() + top + posAdjust);
}
int newLogicalTop = curr->logicalTop();
int newLogicalTopIncludingMargins = newLogicalTop;
int boxHeight = curr->logicalHeight();
int boxHeightIncludingMargins = boxHeight;
if (curr->isText() || curr->isInlineFlowBox()) {
const FontMetrics& fontMetrics = curr->renderer()->style(m_firstLine)->fontMetrics();
newLogicalTop += curr->baselinePosition(baselineType) - fontMetrics.ascent(baselineType);
if (curr->isInlineFlowBox()) {
RenderBoxModelObject* boxObject = toRenderBoxModelObject(curr->renderer());
newLogicalTop -= boxObject->style(m_firstLine)->isHorizontalWritingMode() ? boxObject->borderTop() + boxObject->paddingTop() :
boxObject->borderRight() + boxObject->paddingRight();
}
newLogicalTopIncludingMargins = newLogicalTop;
} else if (!curr->renderer()->isBR()) {
RenderBox* box = toRenderBox(curr->renderer());
newLogicalTopIncludingMargins = newLogicalTop;
int overSideMargin = curr->isHorizontal() ? box->marginTop() : box->marginRight();
int underSideMargin = curr->isHorizontal() ? box->marginBottom() : box->marginLeft();
newLogicalTop += overSideMargin;
boxHeightIncludingMargins += overSideMargin + underSideMargin;
}
curr->setLogicalTop(newLogicalTop);
if (childAffectsTopBottomPos) {
if (curr->renderer()->isRubyRun()) {
if (!renderer()->style()->isFlippedLinesWritingMode())
hasAnnotationsBefore = true;
else
hasAnnotationsAfter = true;
RenderRubyRun* rubyRun = static_cast<RenderRubyRun*>(curr->renderer());
if (RenderRubyBase* rubyBase = rubyRun->rubyBase()) {
int bottomRubyBaseLeading = (curr->logicalHeight() - rubyBase->logicalBottom()) + rubyBase->logicalHeight() - (rubyBase->lastRootBox() ? rubyBase->lastRootBox()->lineBottom() : 0);
int topRubyBaseLeading = rubyBase->logicalTop() + (rubyBase->firstRootBox() ? rubyBase->firstRootBox()->lineTop() : 0);
newLogicalTop += !renderer()->style()->isFlippedLinesWritingMode() ? topRubyBaseLeading : bottomRubyBaseLeading;
boxHeight -= (topRubyBaseLeading + bottomRubyBaseLeading);
}
}
if (curr->isInlineTextBox()) {
TextEmphasisPosition emphasisMarkPosition;
if (static_cast<InlineTextBox*>(curr)->getEmphasisMarkPosition(curr->renderer()->style(m_firstLine), emphasisMarkPosition)) {
bool emphasisMarkIsOver = emphasisMarkPosition == TextEmphasisPositionOver;
if (emphasisMarkIsOver != curr->renderer()->style(m_firstLine)->isFlippedLinesWritingMode())
hasAnnotationsBefore = true;
else
hasAnnotationsAfter = true;
}
}
if (!setLineTop) {
setLineTop = true;
lineTop = newLogicalTop;
lineTopIncludingMargins = min(lineTop, newLogicalTopIncludingMargins);
} else {
lineTop = min(lineTop, newLogicalTop);
lineTopIncludingMargins = min(lineTop, min(lineTopIncludingMargins, newLogicalTopIncludingMargins));
}
lineBottom = max(lineBottom, newLogicalTop + boxHeight);
lineBottomIncludingMargins = max(lineBottom, max(lineBottomIncludingMargins, newLogicalTopIncludingMargins + boxHeightIncludingMargins));
}
}
if (isRootInlineBox()) {
const FontMetrics& fontMetrics = renderer()->style(m_firstLine)->fontMetrics();
setLogicalTop(logicalTop() + baselinePosition(baselineType) - fontMetrics.ascent(baselineType));
if (hasTextChildren() || strictMode) {
if (!setLineTop) {
setLineTop = true;
lineTop = logicalTop();
lineTopIncludingMargins = lineTop;
} else {
lineTop = min(lineTop, logicalTop());
lineTopIncludingMargins = min(lineTop, lineTopIncludingMargins);
}
lineBottom = max(lineBottom, logicalTop() + logicalHeight());
lineBottomIncludingMargins = max(lineBottom, lineBottomIncludingMargins);
}
if (renderer()->style()->isFlippedLinesWritingMode())
flipLinesInBlockDirection(lineTopIncludingMargins, lineBottomIncludingMargins);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0840
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0840/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7f48b71cb22bb2fc9fcec2013e9eaff55381a43d
|
7f48b71cb22bb2fc9fcec2013e9eaff55381a43d
|
Filter more incoming URLs in the CreateWindow path.
BUG=170532
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12036002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@178728 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
RenderViewImpl::RenderViewImpl(RenderViewImplParams* params)
: RenderWidget(WebKit::WebPopupTypeNone,
params->screen_info,
params->swapped_out),
webkit_preferences_(params->webkit_prefs),
send_content_state_immediately_(false),
enabled_bindings_(0),
send_preferred_size_changes_(false),
is_loading_(false),
navigation_gesture_(NavigationGestureUnknown),
opened_by_user_gesture_(true),
opener_suppressed_(false),
page_id_(-1),
last_page_id_sent_to_browser_(-1),
next_page_id_(params->next_page_id),
history_list_offset_(-1),
history_list_length_(0),
target_url_status_(TARGET_NONE),
selection_text_offset_(0),
cached_is_main_frame_pinned_to_left_(false),
cached_is_main_frame_pinned_to_right_(false),
cached_has_main_frame_horizontal_scrollbar_(false),
cached_has_main_frame_vertical_scrollbar_(false),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(cookie_jar_(this)),
geolocation_dispatcher_(NULL),
input_tag_speech_dispatcher_(NULL),
speech_recognition_dispatcher_(NULL),
device_orientation_dispatcher_(NULL),
media_stream_dispatcher_(NULL),
browser_plugin_manager_(NULL),
media_stream_impl_(NULL),
devtools_agent_(NULL),
accessibility_mode_(AccessibilityModeOff),
renderer_accessibility_(NULL),
java_bridge_dispatcher_(NULL),
mouse_lock_dispatcher_(NULL),
favicon_helper_(NULL),
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
body_background_color_(SK_ColorWHITE),
update_frame_info_scheduled_(false),
expected_content_intent_id_(0),
media_player_proxy_(NULL),
synchronous_find_active_match_ordinal_(-1),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(
load_progress_tracker_(new LoadProgressTracker(this))),
#endif
session_storage_namespace_id_(params->session_storage_namespace_id),
handling_select_range_(false),
next_snapshot_id_(0),
#if defined(OS_WIN)
focused_plugin_id_(-1),
#endif
updating_frame_tree_(false),
pending_frame_tree_update_(false),
target_process_id_(0),
target_routing_id_(0) {
#if defined(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
pepper_helper_.reset(new PepperPluginDelegateImpl(this));
#else
pepper_helper_.reset(new RenderViewPepperHelper());
#endif
set_throttle_input_events(params->renderer_prefs.throttle_input_events);
routing_id_ = params->routing_id;
surface_id_ = params->surface_id;
if (params->opener_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE && params->is_renderer_created)
opener_id_ = params->opener_id;
DCHECK_GE(next_page_id_, 0);
#if defined(ENABLE_NOTIFICATIONS)
notification_provider_ = new NotificationProvider(this);
#else
notification_provider_ = NULL;
#endif
webwidget_ = WebView::create(this);
webwidget_mouse_lock_target_.reset(new WebWidgetLockTarget(webwidget_));
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
content::DeviceTelephonyInfo device_info;
const std::string region_code =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNetworkCountryIso)
? command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kNetworkCountryIso)
: device_info.GetNetworkCountryIso();
content_detectors_.push_back(linked_ptr<ContentDetector>(
new AddressDetector()));
content_detectors_.push_back(linked_ptr<ContentDetector>(
new PhoneNumberDetector(region_code)));
content_detectors_.push_back(linked_ptr<ContentDetector>(
new EmailDetector()));
#endif
if (params->counter) {
shared_popup_counter_ = params->counter;
if (!params->swapped_out)
shared_popup_counter_->data++;
decrement_shared_popup_at_destruction_ = true;
} else {
shared_popup_counter_ = new SharedRenderViewCounter(0);
decrement_shared_popup_at_destruction_ = false;
}
RenderThread::Get()->AddRoute(routing_id_, this);
AddRef();
if (opener_id_ == MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
did_show_ = true;
CompleteInit();
}
g_view_map.Get().insert(std::make_pair(webview(), this));
g_routing_id_view_map.Get().insert(std::make_pair(routing_id_, this));
webview()->setDeviceScaleFactor(device_scale_factor_);
webkit_preferences_.Apply(webview());
webview()->initializeMainFrame(this);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableTouchDragDrop))
webview()->settings()->setTouchDragDropEnabled(true);
if (!params->frame_name.empty())
webview()->mainFrame()->setName(params->frame_name);
webview()->settings()->setMinimumTimerInterval(
is_hidden() ? webkit_glue::kBackgroundTabTimerInterval :
webkit_glue::kForegroundTabTimerInterval);
OnSetRendererPrefs(params->renderer_prefs);
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
if (!media_stream_dispatcher_)
media_stream_dispatcher_ = new MediaStreamDispatcher(this);
#endif
new MHTMLGenerator(this);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
new TextInputClientObserver(this);
#endif // defined(OS_MACOSX)
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
media_player_manager_.reset(
new webkit_media::WebMediaPlayerManagerAndroid());
#endif
devtools_agent_ = new DevToolsAgent(this);
mouse_lock_dispatcher_ = new RenderViewMouseLockDispatcher(this);
intents_host_ = new WebIntentsHost(this);
favicon_helper_ = new FaviconHelper(this);
OnSetAccessibilityMode(params->accessibility_mode);
new IdleUserDetector(this);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDomAutomationController))
enabled_bindings_ |= BINDINGS_POLICY_DOM_AUTOMATION;
ProcessViewLayoutFlags(command_line);
GetContentClient()->renderer()->RenderViewCreated(this);
if (params->opener_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE && !params->is_renderer_created) {
RenderViewImpl* opener_view = FromRoutingID(params->opener_id);
if (opener_view)
webview()->mainFrame()->setOpener(opener_view->webview()->mainFrame());
}
if (is_swapped_out_)
NavigateToSwappedOutURL(webview()->mainFrame());
}
|
RenderViewImpl::RenderViewImpl(RenderViewImplParams* params)
: RenderWidget(WebKit::WebPopupTypeNone,
params->screen_info,
params->swapped_out),
webkit_preferences_(params->webkit_prefs),
send_content_state_immediately_(false),
enabled_bindings_(0),
send_preferred_size_changes_(false),
is_loading_(false),
navigation_gesture_(NavigationGestureUnknown),
opened_by_user_gesture_(true),
opener_suppressed_(false),
page_id_(-1),
last_page_id_sent_to_browser_(-1),
next_page_id_(params->next_page_id),
history_list_offset_(-1),
history_list_length_(0),
target_url_status_(TARGET_NONE),
selection_text_offset_(0),
cached_is_main_frame_pinned_to_left_(false),
cached_is_main_frame_pinned_to_right_(false),
cached_has_main_frame_horizontal_scrollbar_(false),
cached_has_main_frame_vertical_scrollbar_(false),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(cookie_jar_(this)),
geolocation_dispatcher_(NULL),
input_tag_speech_dispatcher_(NULL),
speech_recognition_dispatcher_(NULL),
device_orientation_dispatcher_(NULL),
media_stream_dispatcher_(NULL),
browser_plugin_manager_(NULL),
media_stream_impl_(NULL),
devtools_agent_(NULL),
accessibility_mode_(AccessibilityModeOff),
renderer_accessibility_(NULL),
java_bridge_dispatcher_(NULL),
mouse_lock_dispatcher_(NULL),
favicon_helper_(NULL),
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
body_background_color_(SK_ColorWHITE),
update_frame_info_scheduled_(false),
expected_content_intent_id_(0),
media_player_proxy_(NULL),
synchronous_find_active_match_ordinal_(-1),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(
load_progress_tracker_(new LoadProgressTracker(this))),
#endif
session_storage_namespace_id_(params->session_storage_namespace_id),
handling_select_range_(false),
next_snapshot_id_(0),
#if defined(OS_WIN)
focused_plugin_id_(-1),
#endif
updating_frame_tree_(false),
pending_frame_tree_update_(false),
target_process_id_(0),
target_routing_id_(0) {
#if defined(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
pepper_helper_.reset(new PepperPluginDelegateImpl(this));
#else
pepper_helper_.reset(new RenderViewPepperHelper());
#endif
set_throttle_input_events(params->renderer_prefs.throttle_input_events);
routing_id_ = params->routing_id;
surface_id_ = params->surface_id;
if (params->opener_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE && params->is_renderer_created)
opener_id_ = params->opener_id;
DCHECK_GE(next_page_id_, 0);
#if defined(ENABLE_NOTIFICATIONS)
notification_provider_ = new NotificationProvider(this);
#else
notification_provider_ = NULL;
#endif
webwidget_ = WebView::create(this);
webwidget_mouse_lock_target_.reset(new WebWidgetLockTarget(webwidget_));
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
content::DeviceTelephonyInfo device_info;
const std::string region_code =
command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kNetworkCountryIso)
? command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kNetworkCountryIso)
: device_info.GetNetworkCountryIso();
content_detectors_.push_back(linked_ptr<ContentDetector>(
new AddressDetector()));
content_detectors_.push_back(linked_ptr<ContentDetector>(
new PhoneNumberDetector(region_code)));
content_detectors_.push_back(linked_ptr<ContentDetector>(
new EmailDetector()));
#endif
if (params->counter) {
shared_popup_counter_ = params->counter;
if (!params->swapped_out)
shared_popup_counter_->data++;
decrement_shared_popup_at_destruction_ = true;
} else {
shared_popup_counter_ = new SharedRenderViewCounter(0);
decrement_shared_popup_at_destruction_ = false;
}
RenderThread::Get()->AddRoute(routing_id_, this);
AddRef();
if (opener_id_ == MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
did_show_ = true;
CompleteInit();
}
g_view_map.Get().insert(std::make_pair(webview(), this));
g_routing_id_view_map.Get().insert(std::make_pair(routing_id_, this));
webview()->setDeviceScaleFactor(device_scale_factor_);
webkit_preferences_.Apply(webview());
webview()->initializeMainFrame(this);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableTouchDragDrop))
webview()->settings()->setTouchDragDropEnabled(true);
if (!params->frame_name.empty())
webview()->mainFrame()->setName(params->frame_name);
webview()->settings()->setMinimumTimerInterval(
is_hidden() ? webkit_glue::kBackgroundTabTimerInterval :
webkit_glue::kForegroundTabTimerInterval);
OnSetRendererPrefs(params->renderer_prefs);
#if defined(ENABLE_WEBRTC)
if (!media_stream_dispatcher_)
media_stream_dispatcher_ = new MediaStreamDispatcher(this);
#endif
new MHTMLGenerator(this);
#if defined(OS_MACOSX)
new TextInputClientObserver(this);
#endif // defined(OS_MACOSX)
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
media_player_manager_.reset(
new webkit_media::WebMediaPlayerManagerAndroid());
#endif
devtools_agent_ = new DevToolsAgent(this);
mouse_lock_dispatcher_ = new RenderViewMouseLockDispatcher(this);
intents_host_ = new WebIntentsHost(this);
favicon_helper_ = new FaviconHelper(this);
OnSetAccessibilityMode(params->accessibility_mode);
new IdleUserDetector(this);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDomAutomationController))
enabled_bindings_ |= BINDINGS_POLICY_DOM_AUTOMATION;
ProcessViewLayoutFlags(command_line);
GetContentClient()->renderer()->RenderViewCreated(this);
if (params->opener_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE && !params->is_renderer_created) {
RenderViewImpl* opener_view = FromRoutingID(params->opener_id);
if (opener_view)
webview()->mainFrame()->setOpener(opener_view->webview()->mainFrame());
}
if (is_swapped_out_)
NavigateToSwappedOutURL(webview()->mainFrame());
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/19190765882e272a6a2162c89acdb29110f7e3cf
|
19190765882e272a6a2162c89acdb29110f7e3cf
|
Revert 102184 - [Sync] use base::Time in sync
Make EntryKernel/Entry/BaseNode use base::Time instead of int64s.
Add sync/util/time.h, with utility functions to manage the sync proto
time format.
Store times on disk in proto format instead of the local system.
This requires a database version bump (to 77).
Update SessionChangeProcessor/SessionModelAssociator
to use base::Time, too.
Remove hackish Now() function.
Remove ZeroFields() function, and instead zero-initialize in EntryKernel::EntryKernel() directly.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7981006
[email protected]
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7977034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102186 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
SyncerPositionTiebreakingTest()
: low_id_(Id::CreateFromServerId("A")),
mid_id_(Id::CreateFromServerId("M")),
high_id_(Id::CreateFromServerId("Z")),
next_revision_(1) {
DCHECK(low_id_ < mid_id_);
DCHECK(mid_id_ < high_id_);
DCHECK(low_id_ < high_id_);
}
|
SyncerPositionTiebreakingTest()
: low_id_(Id::CreateFromServerId("A")),
mid_id_(Id::CreateFromServerId("M")),
high_id_(Id::CreateFromServerId("Z")),
next_revision_(1) {
DCHECK(low_id_ < mid_id_);
DCHECK(mid_id_ < high_id_);
DCHECK(low_id_ < high_id_);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5112
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5112/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
f6ac1dba5e36f338a490752a2cbef3339096d9fe
|
Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
[email protected],[email protected]
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
|
void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::uniform4uiv(
const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
Vector<GLuint>& value,
GLuint src_offset,
GLuint src_length) {
if (isContextLost() ||
!ValidateUniformParameters("uniform4uiv", location, value.data(),
value.size(), 4, src_offset, src_length))
return;
ContextGL()->Uniform4uiv(
location->Location(),
(src_length ? src_length : (value.size() - src_offset)) >> 2,
value.data() + src_offset);
}
|
void WebGL2RenderingContextBase::uniform4uiv(
const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
Vector<GLuint>& value,
GLuint src_offset,
GLuint src_length) {
if (isContextLost() ||
!ValidateUniformParameters("uniform4uiv", location, value.data(),
value.size(), 4, src_offset, src_length))
return;
ContextGL()->Uniform4uiv(
location->Location(),
(src_length ? src_length : (value.size() - src_offset)) >> 2,
value.data() + src_offset);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-8952
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-8952/
|
CWE-19
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/82939d7999dfc1f1998c4b1c12e2f19edbdff272
|
82939d7999dfc1f1998c4b1c12e2f19edbdff272
|
ext4: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. The only tricky part is
that xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed
before we get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether
the entry is still valid after getting buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
|
ext4_xattr_delete_inode(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
if (!EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl)
goto cleanup;
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
if (!bh) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "block %llu read error",
EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
goto cleanup;
}
if (BHDR(bh)->h_magic != cpu_to_le32(EXT4_XATTR_MAGIC) ||
BHDR(bh)->h_blocks != cpu_to_le32(1)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "bad block %llu",
EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
goto cleanup;
}
ext4_xattr_release_block(handle, inode, bh);
EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl = 0;
cleanup:
brelse(bh);
}
|
ext4_xattr_delete_inode(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode)
{
struct buffer_head *bh = NULL;
if (!EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl)
goto cleanup;
bh = sb_bread(inode->i_sb, EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
if (!bh) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "block %llu read error",
EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
goto cleanup;
}
if (BHDR(bh)->h_magic != cpu_to_le32(EXT4_XATTR_MAGIC) ||
BHDR(bh)->h_blocks != cpu_to_le32(1)) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "bad block %llu",
EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl);
goto cleanup;
}
ext4_xattr_release_block(handle, inode, bh);
EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl = 0;
cleanup:
brelse(bh);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5061
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5061/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
(Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
|
bool LayerTreeHostImpl::IsElementInList(ElementId element_id,
ElementListType list_type) const {
if (list_type == ElementListType::ACTIVE) {
return active_tree()
? active_tree()->LayerByElementId(element_id) != nullptr
: false;
} else {
if (pending_tree() && pending_tree()->LayerByElementId(element_id))
return true;
if (recycle_tree() && recycle_tree()->LayerByElementId(element_id))
return true;
return false;
}
}
|
bool LayerTreeHostImpl::IsElementInList(ElementId element_id,
ElementListType list_type) const {
if (list_type == ElementListType::ACTIVE) {
return active_tree()
? active_tree()->LayerByElementId(element_id) != nullptr
: false;
} else {
if (pending_tree() && pending_tree()->LayerByElementId(element_id))
return true;
if (recycle_tree() && recycle_tree()->LayerByElementId(element_id))
return true;
return false;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10506
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10506/
|
CWE-369
|
https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/commit/d27ccf01c68a31ad62b33d2dc1ba2bb1eeaafe7b
|
d27ccf01c68a31ad62b33d2dc1ba2bb1eeaafe7b
|
Avoid division by zero in opj_pi_next_rpcl, opj_pi_next_pcrl and opj_pi_next_cprl (#938)
Fixes issues with id:000026,sig:08,src:002419,op:int32,pos:60,val:+32 and
id:000019,sig:08,src:001098,op:flip1,pos:49
|
static void opj_pi_update_decode_not_poc(opj_pi_iterator_t * p_pi,
opj_tcp_t * p_tcp,
OPJ_UINT32 p_max_precision,
OPJ_UINT32 p_max_res)
{
/* loop*/
OPJ_UINT32 pino;
/* encoding prameters to set*/
OPJ_UINT32 l_bound;
opj_pi_iterator_t * l_current_pi = 00;
/* preconditions in debug*/
assert(p_tcp != 00);
assert(p_pi != 00);
/* initializations*/
l_bound = p_tcp->numpocs + 1;
l_current_pi = p_pi;
for (pino = 0; pino < l_bound; ++pino) {
l_current_pi->poc.prg = p_tcp->prg;
l_current_pi->first = 1;
l_current_pi->poc.resno0 = 0;
l_current_pi->poc.compno0 = 0;
l_current_pi->poc.layno0 = 0;
l_current_pi->poc.precno0 = 0;
l_current_pi->poc.resno1 = p_max_res;
l_current_pi->poc.compno1 = l_current_pi->numcomps;
l_current_pi->poc.layno1 = p_tcp->numlayers;
l_current_pi->poc.precno1 = p_max_precision;
++l_current_pi;
}
}
|
static void opj_pi_update_decode_not_poc(opj_pi_iterator_t * p_pi,
opj_tcp_t * p_tcp,
OPJ_UINT32 p_max_precision,
OPJ_UINT32 p_max_res)
{
/* loop*/
OPJ_UINT32 pino;
/* encoding prameters to set*/
OPJ_UINT32 l_bound;
opj_pi_iterator_t * l_current_pi = 00;
/* preconditions in debug*/
assert(p_tcp != 00);
assert(p_pi != 00);
/* initializations*/
l_bound = p_tcp->numpocs + 1;
l_current_pi = p_pi;
for (pino = 0; pino < l_bound; ++pino) {
l_current_pi->poc.prg = p_tcp->prg;
l_current_pi->first = 1;
l_current_pi->poc.resno0 = 0;
l_current_pi->poc.compno0 = 0;
l_current_pi->poc.layno0 = 0;
l_current_pi->poc.precno0 = 0;
l_current_pi->poc.resno1 = p_max_res;
l_current_pi->poc.compno1 = l_current_pi->numcomps;
l_current_pi->poc.layno1 = p_tcp->numlayers;
l_current_pi->poc.precno1 = p_max_precision;
++l_current_pi;
}
}
|
C
|
openjpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5357
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5357/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/wireshark/wireshark/commit/11edc83b98a61e890d7bb01855389d40e984ea82
|
11edc83b98a61e890d7bb01855389d40e984ea82
|
Don't treat the packet length as unsigned.
The scanf family of functions are as annoyingly bad at handling unsigned
numbers as strtoul() is - both of them are perfectly willing to accept a
value beginning with a negative sign as an unsigned value. When using
strtoul(), you can compensate for this by explicitly checking for a '-'
as the first character of the string, but you can't do that with
sscanf().
So revert to having pkt_len be signed, and scanning it with %d, but
check for a negative value and fail if we see a negative value.
Bug: 12396
Change-Id: I54fe8f61f42c32b5ef33da633ece51bbcda8c95f
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15220
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <[email protected]>
|
static gboolean netscreen_read(wtap *wth, int *err, gchar **err_info,
gint64 *data_offset)
{
gint64 offset;
char line[NETSCREEN_LINE_LENGTH];
/* Find the next packet */
offset = netscreen_seek_next_packet(wth, err, err_info, line);
if (offset < 0)
return FALSE;
/* Parse the header and convert the ASCII hex dump to binary data */
if (!parse_netscreen_packet(wth->fh, &wth->phdr,
wth->frame_buffer, line, err, err_info))
return FALSE;
/*
* If the per-file encapsulation isn't known, set it to this
* packet's encapsulation.
*
* If it *is* known, and it isn't this packet's encapsulation,
* set it to WTAP_ENCAP_PER_PACKET, as this file doesn't
* have a single encapsulation for all packets in the file.
*/
if (wth->file_encap == WTAP_ENCAP_UNKNOWN)
wth->file_encap = wth->phdr.pkt_encap;
else {
if (wth->file_encap != wth->phdr.pkt_encap)
wth->file_encap = WTAP_ENCAP_PER_PACKET;
}
*data_offset = offset;
return TRUE;
}
|
static gboolean netscreen_read(wtap *wth, int *err, gchar **err_info,
gint64 *data_offset)
{
gint64 offset;
char line[NETSCREEN_LINE_LENGTH];
/* Find the next packet */
offset = netscreen_seek_next_packet(wth, err, err_info, line);
if (offset < 0)
return FALSE;
/* Parse the header and convert the ASCII hex dump to binary data */
if (!parse_netscreen_packet(wth->fh, &wth->phdr,
wth->frame_buffer, line, err, err_info))
return FALSE;
/*
* If the per-file encapsulation isn't known, set it to this
* packet's encapsulation.
*
* If it *is* known, and it isn't this packet's encapsulation,
* set it to WTAP_ENCAP_PER_PACKET, as this file doesn't
* have a single encapsulation for all packets in the file.
*/
if (wth->file_encap == WTAP_ENCAP_UNKNOWN)
wth->file_encap = wth->phdr.pkt_encap;
else {
if (wth->file_encap != wth->phdr.pkt_encap)
wth->file_encap = WTAP_ENCAP_PER_PACKET;
}
*data_offset = offset;
return TRUE;
}
|
C
|
wireshark
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
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This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
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