CVE ID
stringlengths 13
43
⌀ | CVE Page
stringlengths 45
48
⌀ | CWE ID
stringclasses 90
values | codeLink
stringlengths 46
139
| commit_id
stringlengths 6
81
| commit_message
stringlengths 3
13.3k
⌀ | func_after
stringlengths 14
241k
| func_before
stringlengths 14
241k
| lang
stringclasses 3
values | project
stringclasses 309
values | vul
int8 0
1
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2012-2875
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2875/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0e9e87823285d504a210dcce2eabdc847f230f09
|
0e9e87823285d504a210dcce2eabdc847f230f09
|
Adds per-provider information to omnibox UMA logs.
Adds a fairly general structure to omnibox logs that can be used to pass information (that's not per-result information) from providers to the UMA logs. Right now it's only used to pass whether the asynchronous pass of a provider has finished, but it will probably be used for other things in the future.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10380007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137288 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void AutocompleteEditModel::StopAutocomplete() {
if (popup_->IsOpen() && !in_revert_) {
InstantController* instant = controller_->GetInstant();
if (instant && !instant->commit_on_mouse_up())
instant->DestroyPreviewContents();
}
autocomplete_controller_->Stop(true);
}
|
void AutocompleteEditModel::StopAutocomplete() {
if (popup_->IsOpen() && !in_revert_) {
InstantController* instant = controller_->GetInstant();
if (instant && !instant->commit_on_mouse_up())
instant->DestroyPreviewContents();
}
autocomplete_controller_->Stop(true);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/59f5e0204cbc0e524b2687fb1beddda82047d16d
|
59f5e0204cbc0e524b2687fb1beddda82047d16d
|
AutoFill: Record whether the user initiated the form submission and don't save form data if the form was not user-submitted.
BUG=48225
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2842062
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@53350 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void AutoFillManager::FormsSeen(const std::vector<FormData>& forms) {
if (!IsAutoFillEnabled())
return;
if (personal_data_->profiles().empty() &&
personal_data_->credit_cards().empty())
return;
ParseForms(forms);
}
|
void AutoFillManager::FormsSeen(const std::vector<FormData>& forms) {
if (!IsAutoFillEnabled())
return;
if (personal_data_->profiles().empty() &&
personal_data_->credit_cards().empty())
return;
ParseForms(forms);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-2669
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2669/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/postgres/postgres/commit/31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a
|
31400a673325147e1205326008e32135a78b4d8a
|
Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
|
dist_ppath(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
Point *pt = PG_GETARG_POINT_P(0);
PATH *path = PG_GETARG_PATH_P(1);
float8 result = 0.0; /* keep compiler quiet */
bool have_min = false;
float8 tmp;
int i;
LSEG lseg;
switch (path->npts)
{
case 0:
/* no points in path? then result is undefined... */
PG_RETURN_NULL();
case 1:
/* one point in path? then get distance between two points... */
result = point_dt(pt, &path->p[0]);
break;
default:
/* make sure the path makes sense... */
Assert(path->npts > 1);
/*
* the distance from a point to a path is the smallest distance
* from the point to any of its constituent segments.
*/
for (i = 0; i < path->npts; i++)
{
int iprev;
if (i > 0)
iprev = i - 1;
else
{
if (!path->closed)
continue;
iprev = path->npts - 1; /* include the closure segment */
}
statlseg_construct(&lseg, &path->p[iprev], &path->p[i]);
tmp = dist_ps_internal(pt, &lseg);
if (!have_min || tmp < result)
{
result = tmp;
have_min = true;
}
}
break;
}
PG_RETURN_FLOAT8(result);
}
|
dist_ppath(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
Point *pt = PG_GETARG_POINT_P(0);
PATH *path = PG_GETARG_PATH_P(1);
float8 result = 0.0; /* keep compiler quiet */
bool have_min = false;
float8 tmp;
int i;
LSEG lseg;
switch (path->npts)
{
case 0:
/* no points in path? then result is undefined... */
PG_RETURN_NULL();
case 1:
/* one point in path? then get distance between two points... */
result = point_dt(pt, &path->p[0]);
break;
default:
/* make sure the path makes sense... */
Assert(path->npts > 1);
/*
* the distance from a point to a path is the smallest distance
* from the point to any of its constituent segments.
*/
for (i = 0; i < path->npts; i++)
{
int iprev;
if (i > 0)
iprev = i - 1;
else
{
if (!path->closed)
continue;
iprev = path->npts - 1; /* include the closure segment */
}
statlseg_construct(&lseg, &path->p[iprev], &path->p[i]);
tmp = dist_ps_internal(pt, &lseg);
if (!have_min || tmp < result)
{
result = tmp;
have_min = true;
}
}
break;
}
PG_RETURN_FLOAT8(result);
}
|
C
|
postgres
| 0 |
CVE-2010-1166
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-1166/
|
CWE-189
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=d2f813f7db
|
d2f813f7db157fc83abc4b3726821c36ee7e40b1
| null |
static void fbFetchSolid(PicturePtr pict, int x, int y, int width, CARD32 *buffer, CARD32 *mask, CARD32 maskBits)
{
FbBits *bits;
FbStride stride;
int bpp;
int xoff, yoff;
CARD32 color;
CARD32 *end;
fetchPixelProc fetch = fetchPixelProcForPicture(pict);
miIndexedPtr indexed = (miIndexedPtr) pict->pFormat->index.devPrivate;
fbGetDrawable (pict->pDrawable, bits, stride, bpp, xoff, yoff);
bits += yoff*stride + (xoff*bpp >> FB_SHIFT);
color = fetch(bits, 0, indexed);
end = buffer + width;
while (buffer < end)
WRITE(buffer++, color);
fbFinishAccess (pict->pDrawable);
}
|
static void fbFetchSolid(PicturePtr pict, int x, int y, int width, CARD32 *buffer, CARD32 *mask, CARD32 maskBits)
{
FbBits *bits;
FbStride stride;
int bpp;
int xoff, yoff;
CARD32 color;
CARD32 *end;
fetchPixelProc fetch = fetchPixelProcForPicture(pict);
miIndexedPtr indexed = (miIndexedPtr) pict->pFormat->index.devPrivate;
fbGetDrawable (pict->pDrawable, bits, stride, bpp, xoff, yoff);
bits += yoff*stride + (xoff*bpp >> FB_SHIFT);
color = fetch(bits, 0, indexed);
end = buffer + width;
while (buffer < end)
WRITE(buffer++, color);
fbFinishAccess (pict->pDrawable);
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1265
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1265/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/04ff52bb66284467ccb43d90800013b89ee8db75
|
04ff52bb66284467ccb43d90800013b89ee8db75
|
Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
|
void AudioRendererHost::AuthorizationCompleted(
int stream_id,
const url::Origin& security_origin,
base::TimeTicks auth_start_time,
media::OutputDeviceStatus status,
bool should_send_id,
const media::AudioParameters& params,
const std::string& raw_device_id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
auto auth_data = authorizations_.find(stream_id);
if (auth_data == authorizations_.end())
return; // Stream was closed before finishing authorization
UMALogDeviceAuthorizationTime(auth_start_time);
if (status == media::OUTPUT_DEVICE_STATUS_OK) {
auth_data->second.first = true;
auth_data->second.second = raw_device_id;
if (should_send_id) {
std::string hashed_id = MediaStreamManager::GetHMACForMediaDeviceID(
salt_, security_origin, raw_device_id);
Send(new AudioMsg_NotifyDeviceAuthorized(stream_id, status, params,
hashed_id));
} else {
Send(new AudioMsg_NotifyDeviceAuthorized(stream_id, status, params,
std::string()));
}
} else {
authorizations_.erase(auth_data);
Send(new AudioMsg_NotifyDeviceAuthorized(
stream_id, status, media::AudioParameters::UnavailableDeviceParams(),
std::string()));
}
}
|
void AudioRendererHost::AuthorizationCompleted(
int stream_id,
const url::Origin& security_origin,
base::TimeTicks auth_start_time,
media::OutputDeviceStatus status,
bool should_send_id,
const media::AudioParameters& params,
const std::string& raw_device_id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
auto auth_data = authorizations_.find(stream_id);
if (auth_data == authorizations_.end())
return; // Stream was closed before finishing authorization
UMALogDeviceAuthorizationTime(auth_start_time);
if (status == media::OUTPUT_DEVICE_STATUS_OK) {
auth_data->second.first = true;
auth_data->second.second = raw_device_id;
if (should_send_id) {
std::string hashed_id = MediaStreamManager::GetHMACForMediaDeviceID(
salt_, security_origin, raw_device_id);
Send(new AudioMsg_NotifyDeviceAuthorized(stream_id, status, params,
hashed_id));
} else {
Send(new AudioMsg_NotifyDeviceAuthorized(stream_id, status, params,
std::string()));
}
} else {
authorizations_.erase(auth_data);
Send(new AudioMsg_NotifyDeviceAuthorized(
stream_id, status, media::AudioParameters::UnavailableDeviceParams(),
std::string()));
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-4356
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-4356/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libksba.git;a=commit;h=243d12fdec66a4360fbb3e307a046b39b5b4ffc3
|
243d12fdec66a4360fbb3e307a046b39b5b4ffc3
| null |
put_stringbuf_mem (struct stringbuf *sb, const char *text, size_t n)
{
if (sb->out_of_core)
return;
if (sb->len + n >= sb->size)
{
char *p;
sb->size += n + 100;
p = xtryrealloc (sb->buf, sb->size);
if ( !p)
{
sb->out_of_core = 1;
return;
}
sb->buf = p;
}
memcpy (sb->buf+sb->len, text, n);
sb->len += n;
}
|
put_stringbuf_mem (struct stringbuf *sb, const char *text, size_t n)
{
if (sb->out_of_core)
return;
if (sb->len + n >= sb->size)
{
char *p;
sb->size += n + 100;
p = xtryrealloc (sb->buf, sb->size);
if ( !p)
{
sb->out_of_core = 1;
return;
}
sb->buf = p;
}
memcpy (sb->buf+sb->len, text, n);
sb->len += n;
}
|
C
|
gnupg
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5061
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5061/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
5d78b84d39bd34bc9fce9d01c0dcd5a22a330d34
|
(Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
[email protected], [email protected]
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
|
bool LayerTreeHost::IsVisible() const {
return visible_;
}
|
bool LayerTreeHost::IsVisible() const {
return visible_;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9059
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9059/
|
CWE-404
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
c70422f760c120480fee4de6c38804c72aa26bc1
|
Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
nfsd4_setclientid_confirm(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,
struct nfsd4_setclientid_confirm *setclientid_confirm)
{
struct nfs4_client *conf, *unconf;
struct nfs4_client *old = NULL;
nfs4_verifier confirm = setclientid_confirm->sc_confirm;
clientid_t * clid = &setclientid_confirm->sc_clientid;
__be32 status;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(SVC_NET(rqstp), nfsd_net_id);
if (STALE_CLIENTID(clid, nn))
return nfserr_stale_clientid;
spin_lock(&nn->client_lock);
conf = find_confirmed_client(clid, false, nn);
unconf = find_unconfirmed_client(clid, false, nn);
/*
* We try hard to give out unique clientid's, so if we get an
* attempt to confirm the same clientid with a different cred,
* the client may be buggy; this should never happen.
*
* Nevertheless, RFC 7530 recommends INUSE for this case:
*/
status = nfserr_clid_inuse;
if (unconf && !same_creds(&unconf->cl_cred, &rqstp->rq_cred))
goto out;
if (conf && !same_creds(&conf->cl_cred, &rqstp->rq_cred))
goto out;
/* cases below refer to rfc 3530 section 14.2.34: */
if (!unconf || !same_verf(&confirm, &unconf->cl_confirm)) {
if (conf && same_verf(&confirm, &conf->cl_confirm)) {
/* case 2: probable retransmit */
status = nfs_ok;
} else /* case 4: client hasn't noticed we rebooted yet? */
status = nfserr_stale_clientid;
goto out;
}
status = nfs_ok;
if (conf) { /* case 1: callback update */
old = unconf;
unhash_client_locked(old);
nfsd4_change_callback(conf, &unconf->cl_cb_conn);
} else { /* case 3: normal case; new or rebooted client */
old = find_confirmed_client_by_name(&unconf->cl_name, nn);
if (old) {
status = nfserr_clid_inuse;
if (client_has_state(old)
&& !same_creds(&unconf->cl_cred,
&old->cl_cred))
goto out;
status = mark_client_expired_locked(old);
if (status) {
old = NULL;
goto out;
}
}
move_to_confirmed(unconf);
conf = unconf;
}
get_client_locked(conf);
spin_unlock(&nn->client_lock);
nfsd4_probe_callback(conf);
spin_lock(&nn->client_lock);
put_client_renew_locked(conf);
out:
spin_unlock(&nn->client_lock);
if (old)
expire_client(old);
return status;
}
|
nfsd4_setclientid_confirm(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,
struct nfsd4_setclientid_confirm *setclientid_confirm)
{
struct nfs4_client *conf, *unconf;
struct nfs4_client *old = NULL;
nfs4_verifier confirm = setclientid_confirm->sc_confirm;
clientid_t * clid = &setclientid_confirm->sc_clientid;
__be32 status;
struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(SVC_NET(rqstp), nfsd_net_id);
if (STALE_CLIENTID(clid, nn))
return nfserr_stale_clientid;
spin_lock(&nn->client_lock);
conf = find_confirmed_client(clid, false, nn);
unconf = find_unconfirmed_client(clid, false, nn);
/*
* We try hard to give out unique clientid's, so if we get an
* attempt to confirm the same clientid with a different cred,
* the client may be buggy; this should never happen.
*
* Nevertheless, RFC 7530 recommends INUSE for this case:
*/
status = nfserr_clid_inuse;
if (unconf && !same_creds(&unconf->cl_cred, &rqstp->rq_cred))
goto out;
if (conf && !same_creds(&conf->cl_cred, &rqstp->rq_cred))
goto out;
/* cases below refer to rfc 3530 section 14.2.34: */
if (!unconf || !same_verf(&confirm, &unconf->cl_confirm)) {
if (conf && same_verf(&confirm, &conf->cl_confirm)) {
/* case 2: probable retransmit */
status = nfs_ok;
} else /* case 4: client hasn't noticed we rebooted yet? */
status = nfserr_stale_clientid;
goto out;
}
status = nfs_ok;
if (conf) { /* case 1: callback update */
old = unconf;
unhash_client_locked(old);
nfsd4_change_callback(conf, &unconf->cl_cb_conn);
} else { /* case 3: normal case; new or rebooted client */
old = find_confirmed_client_by_name(&unconf->cl_name, nn);
if (old) {
status = nfserr_clid_inuse;
if (client_has_state(old)
&& !same_creds(&unconf->cl_cred,
&old->cl_cred))
goto out;
status = mark_client_expired_locked(old);
if (status) {
old = NULL;
goto out;
}
}
move_to_confirmed(unconf);
conf = unconf;
}
get_client_locked(conf);
spin_unlock(&nn->client_lock);
nfsd4_probe_callback(conf);
spin_lock(&nn->client_lock);
put_client_renew_locked(conf);
out:
spin_unlock(&nn->client_lock);
if (old)
expire_client(old);
return status;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
3a353ebdb7753a3fbeb401c4c0e0f3358ccbb90b
|
Support pausing media when a context is frozen.
Media is resumed when the context is unpaused. This feature will be used
for bfcache and pausing iframes feature policy.
BUG=907125
Change-Id: Ic3925ea1a4544242b7bf0b9ad8c9cb9f63976bbd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1410126
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#623319}
|
void HTMLMediaElement::RemotePlaybackStarted() {
if (RemotePlaybackClient())
RemotePlaybackClient()->StateChanged(WebRemotePlaybackState::kConnected);
}
|
void HTMLMediaElement::RemotePlaybackStarted() {
if (RemotePlaybackClient())
RemotePlaybackClient()->StateChanged(WebRemotePlaybackState::kConnected);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4930
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4930/
|
CWE-134
|
https://htcondor-git.cs.wisc.edu/?p=condor.git;a=commitdiff;h=5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
|
5e5571d1a431eb3c61977b6dd6ec90186ef79867
| null |
CronTab::initRegexObject() {
if ( ! CronTab::regex.isInitialized() ) {
const char *errptr;
int erroffset;
MyString pattern( CRONTAB_PARAMETER_PATTERN ) ;
if ( ! CronTab::regex.compile( pattern, &errptr, &erroffset )) {
MyString error = "CronTab: Failed to compile Regex - ";
error += pattern;
EXCEPT( "%s", const_cast<char*>(error.Value()) );
}
}
}
|
CronTab::initRegexObject() {
if ( ! CronTab::regex.isInitialized() ) {
const char *errptr;
int erroffset;
MyString pattern( CRONTAB_PARAMETER_PATTERN ) ;
if ( ! CronTab::regex.compile( pattern, &errptr, &erroffset )) {
MyString error = "CronTab: Failed to compile Regex - ";
error += pattern;
EXCEPT( const_cast<char*>(error.Value()));
}
}
}
|
CPP
|
htcondor
| 1 |
CVE-2017-5120
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5120/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
b7277af490d28ac7f802c015bb0ff31395768556
|
bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
|
void V8TestObject::VoidMethodDictionaryArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_voidMethodDictionaryArg");
test_object_v8_internal::VoidMethodDictionaryArgMethod(info);
}
|
void V8TestObject::VoidMethodDictionaryArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_voidMethodDictionaryArg");
test_object_v8_internal::VoidMethodDictionaryArgMethod(info);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-14604
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-14604/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/GNOME/nautilus/commit/1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0
|
1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0
|
mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
|
extension_info_start (NautilusDirectory *directory,
NautilusFile *file,
gboolean *doing_io)
{
NautilusInfoProvider *provider;
NautilusOperationResult result;
NautilusOperationHandle *handle;
GClosure *update_complete;
if (directory->details->extension_info_in_progress != NULL)
{
*doing_io = TRUE;
return;
}
if (!is_needy (file, lacks_extension_info, REQUEST_EXTENSION_INFO))
{
return;
}
*doing_io = TRUE;
if (!async_job_start (directory, "extension info"))
{
return;
}
provider = file->details->pending_info_providers->data;
update_complete = g_cclosure_new (G_CALLBACK (info_provider_callback),
directory,
NULL);
g_closure_set_marshal (update_complete,
g_cclosure_marshal_generic);
result = nautilus_info_provider_update_file_info
(provider,
NAUTILUS_FILE_INFO (file),
update_complete,
&handle);
g_closure_unref (update_complete);
if (result == NAUTILUS_OPERATION_COMPLETE ||
result == NAUTILUS_OPERATION_FAILED)
{
finish_info_provider (directory, file, provider);
async_job_end (directory, "extension info");
}
else
{
directory->details->extension_info_in_progress = handle;
directory->details->extension_info_provider = provider;
directory->details->extension_info_file = file;
}
}
|
extension_info_start (NautilusDirectory *directory,
NautilusFile *file,
gboolean *doing_io)
{
NautilusInfoProvider *provider;
NautilusOperationResult result;
NautilusOperationHandle *handle;
GClosure *update_complete;
if (directory->details->extension_info_in_progress != NULL)
{
*doing_io = TRUE;
return;
}
if (!is_needy (file, lacks_extension_info, REQUEST_EXTENSION_INFO))
{
return;
}
*doing_io = TRUE;
if (!async_job_start (directory, "extension info"))
{
return;
}
provider = file->details->pending_info_providers->data;
update_complete = g_cclosure_new (G_CALLBACK (info_provider_callback),
directory,
NULL);
g_closure_set_marshal (update_complete,
g_cclosure_marshal_generic);
result = nautilus_info_provider_update_file_info
(provider,
NAUTILUS_FILE_INFO (file),
update_complete,
&handle);
g_closure_unref (update_complete);
if (result == NAUTILUS_OPERATION_COMPLETE ||
result == NAUTILUS_OPERATION_FAILED)
{
finish_info_provider (directory, file, provider);
async_job_end (directory, "extension info");
}
else
{
directory->details->extension_info_in_progress = handle;
directory->details->extension_info_provider = provider;
directory->details->extension_info_file = file;
}
}
|
C
|
nautilus
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3209
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3209/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
|
f8bd2258e2d520dff28c855658bd24bdafb5102d
|
remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <[email protected]>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <[email protected]>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: john stultz <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static struct page *get_object_page(const void *x)
{
struct page *page = virt_to_head_page(x);
if (!PageSlab(page))
return NULL;
return page;
}
|
static struct page *get_object_page(const void *x)
{
struct page *page = virt_to_head_page(x);
if (!PageSlab(page))
return NULL;
return page;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6371
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6371/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/json-c/json-c/commit/64e36901a0614bf64a19bc3396469c66dcd0b015
|
64e36901a0614bf64a19bc3396469c66dcd0b015
|
Patch to address the following issues:
* CVE-2013-6371: hash collision denial of service
* CVE-2013-6370: buffer overflow if size_t is larger than int
|
void lh_abort(const char *msg, ...)
{
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, msg);
vprintf(msg, ap);
va_end(ap);
exit(1);
}
|
void lh_abort(const char *msg, ...)
{
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, msg);
vprintf(msg, ap);
va_end(ap);
exit(1);
}
|
C
|
json-c
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10267
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10267/
|
CWE-369
|
https://github.com/vadz/libtiff/commit/43bc256d8ae44b92d2734a3c5bc73957a4d7c1ec
|
43bc256d8ae44b92d2734a3c5bc73957a4d7c1ec
|
* libtiff/tif_ojpeg.c: make OJPEGDecode() early exit in case of failure in
OJPEGPreDecode(). This will avoid a divide by zero, and potential other issues.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2611
|
OJPEGReadHeaderInfoSecStreamSos(TIFF* tif)
{
/* this marker needs to be checked, and part of its data needs to be saved for regeneration later on */
static const char module[]="OJPEGReadHeaderInfoSecStreamSos";
OJPEGState* sp=(OJPEGState*)tif->tif_data;
uint16 m;
uint8 n;
uint8 o;
assert(sp->subsamplingcorrect==0);
if (sp->sof_log==0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Corrupt SOS marker in JPEG data");
return(0);
}
/* Ls */
if (OJPEGReadWord(sp,&m)==0)
return(0);
if (m!=6+sp->samples_per_pixel_per_plane*2)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Corrupt SOS marker in JPEG data");
return(0);
}
/* Ns */
if (OJPEGReadByte(sp,&n)==0)
return(0);
if (n!=sp->samples_per_pixel_per_plane)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Corrupt SOS marker in JPEG data");
return(0);
}
/* Cs, Td, and Ta */
for (o=0; o<sp->samples_per_pixel_per_plane; o++)
{
/* Cs */
if (OJPEGReadByte(sp,&n)==0)
return(0);
sp->sos_cs[sp->plane_sample_offset+o]=n;
/* Td and Ta */
if (OJPEGReadByte(sp,&n)==0)
return(0);
sp->sos_tda[sp->plane_sample_offset+o]=n;
}
/* skip Ss, Se, Ah, en Al -> no check, as per Tom Lane recommendation, as per LibJpeg source */
OJPEGReadSkip(sp,3);
return(1);
}
|
OJPEGReadHeaderInfoSecStreamSos(TIFF* tif)
{
/* this marker needs to be checked, and part of its data needs to be saved for regeneration later on */
static const char module[]="OJPEGReadHeaderInfoSecStreamSos";
OJPEGState* sp=(OJPEGState*)tif->tif_data;
uint16 m;
uint8 n;
uint8 o;
assert(sp->subsamplingcorrect==0);
if (sp->sof_log==0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Corrupt SOS marker in JPEG data");
return(0);
}
/* Ls */
if (OJPEGReadWord(sp,&m)==0)
return(0);
if (m!=6+sp->samples_per_pixel_per_plane*2)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Corrupt SOS marker in JPEG data");
return(0);
}
/* Ns */
if (OJPEGReadByte(sp,&n)==0)
return(0);
if (n!=sp->samples_per_pixel_per_plane)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata,module,"Corrupt SOS marker in JPEG data");
return(0);
}
/* Cs, Td, and Ta */
for (o=0; o<sp->samples_per_pixel_per_plane; o++)
{
/* Cs */
if (OJPEGReadByte(sp,&n)==0)
return(0);
sp->sos_cs[sp->plane_sample_offset+o]=n;
/* Td and Ta */
if (OJPEGReadByte(sp,&n)==0)
return(0);
sp->sos_tda[sp->plane_sample_offset+o]=n;
}
/* skip Ss, Se, Ah, en Al -> no check, as per Tom Lane recommendation, as per LibJpeg source */
OJPEGReadSkip(sp,3);
return(1);
}
|
C
|
libtiff
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3751
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3751/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libpng/+/9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
void usage()
{
fprintf (stderr, "PNM2PNG\n");
fprintf (stderr, " by Willem van Schaik, 1999\n");
#ifdef __TURBOC__
fprintf (stderr, " for Turbo-C and Borland-C compilers\n");
#else
fprintf (stderr, " for Linux (and Unix) compilers\n");
#endif
fprintf (stderr, "Usage: pnm2png [options] <file>.<pnm> [<file>.png]\n");
fprintf (stderr, " or: ... | pnm2png [options]\n");
fprintf (stderr, "Options:\n");
fprintf (stderr, " -i[nterlace] write png-file with interlacing on\n");
fprintf (stderr,
" -a[lpha] <file>.pgm read PNG alpha channel as pgm-file\n");
fprintf (stderr, " -h | -? print this help-information\n");
}
|
void usage()
{
fprintf (stderr, "PNM2PNG\n");
fprintf (stderr, " by Willem van Schaik, 1999\n");
#ifdef __TURBOC__
fprintf (stderr, " for Turbo-C and Borland-C compilers\n");
#else
fprintf (stderr, " for Linux (and Unix) compilers\n");
#endif
fprintf (stderr, "Usage: pnm2png [options] <file>.<pnm> [<file>.png]\n");
fprintf (stderr, " or: ... | pnm2png [options]\n");
fprintf (stderr, "Options:\n");
fprintf (stderr, " -i[nterlace] write png-file with interlacing on\n");
fprintf (stderr, " -a[lpha] <file>.pgm read PNG alpha channel as pgm-file\n");
fprintf (stderr, " -h | -? print this help-information\n");
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2017-0812
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-0812/
|
CWE-125
|
https://android.googlesource.com/device/google/dragon/+/7df7ec13b1d222ac3a66797fbe432605ea8f973f
|
7df7ec13b1d222ac3a66797fbe432605ea8f973f
|
Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
|
static ssize_t read_bytes_from_dsp(struct stream_in *in, void* buffer,
size_t bytes)
{
struct pcm_device *pcm_device;
struct audio_device *adev = in->dev;
pcm_device = node_to_item(list_head(&in->pcm_dev_list),
struct pcm_device, stream_list_node);
if (pcm_device->sound_trigger_handle > 0)
return adev->sound_trigger_read_samples(
pcm_device->sound_trigger_handle, buffer, bytes);
else
return 0;
}
|
static ssize_t read_bytes_from_dsp(struct stream_in *in, void* buffer,
size_t bytes)
{
struct pcm_device *pcm_device;
struct audio_device *adev = in->dev;
pcm_device = node_to_item(list_head(&in->pcm_dev_list),
struct pcm_device, stream_list_node);
if (pcm_device->sound_trigger_handle > 0)
return adev->sound_trigger_read_samples(
pcm_device->sound_trigger_handle, buffer, bytes);
else
return 0;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2019-3817
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-3817/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/rpm-software-management/libcomps/commit/e3a5d056633677959ad924a51758876d415e7046
|
e3a5d056633677959ad924a51758876d415e7046
|
Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
|
void comps_mrtree_data_destroy(COMPS_MRTreeData * rtd) {
free(rtd->key);
comps_hslist_destroy(&rtd->data);
comps_hslist_destroy(&rtd->subnodes);
free(rtd);
}
|
void comps_mrtree_data_destroy(COMPS_MRTreeData * rtd) {
free(rtd->key);
comps_hslist_destroy(&rtd->data);
comps_hslist_destroy(&rtd->subnodes);
free(rtd);
}
|
C
|
libcomps
| 0 |
CVE-2011-3106
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-3106/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5385c44d9634d00b1cec2abf0fe7290d4205c7b0
|
5385c44d9634d00b1cec2abf0fe7290d4205c7b0
|
Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::StartDeferredRequest(int child_id,
int request_id) {
GlobalRequestID global_id(child_id, request_id);
PendingRequestList::iterator i = pending_requests_.find(global_id);
if (i == pending_requests_.end()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Trying to resume a non-existent request ("
<< child_id << ", " << request_id << ")";
return;
}
StartRequest(i->second);
}
|
void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::StartDeferredRequest(int child_id,
int request_id) {
GlobalRequestID global_id(child_id, request_id);
PendingRequestList::iterator i = pending_requests_.find(global_id);
if (i == pending_requests_.end()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Trying to resume a non-existent request ("
<< child_id << ", " << request_id << ")";
return;
}
StartRequest(i->second);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6621/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/4039d2fcaab746b6c20017ba9bb51c3a2403a76c
|
4039d2fcaab746b6c20017ba9bb51c3a2403a76c
|
Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderFrameImpl::PepperCancelComposition(
PepperPluginInstanceImpl* instance) {
if (instance != render_view_->focused_pepper_plugin())
return;
Send(new ViewHostMsg_ImeCancelComposition(render_view_->GetRoutingID()));;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) || defined(USE_AURA)
GetRenderWidget()->UpdateCompositionInfo(true);
#endif
}
|
void RenderFrameImpl::PepperCancelComposition(
PepperPluginInstanceImpl* instance) {
if (instance != render_view_->focused_pepper_plugin())
return;
Send(new ViewHostMsg_ImeCancelComposition(render_view_->GetRoutingID()));;
#if defined(OS_MACOSX) || defined(USE_AURA)
GetRenderWidget()->UpdateCompositionInfo(true);
#endif
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3074
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3074/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/libgd/libgd/commit/2bb97f407c1145c850416a3bfbcc8cf124e68a19
|
2bb97f407c1145c850416a3bfbcc8cf124e68a19
|
gd2: handle corrupt images better (CVE-2016-3074)
Make sure we do some range checking on corrupted chunks.
Thanks to Hans Jerry Illikainen <[email protected]> for indepth report
and reproducer information. Made for easy test case writing :).
|
static void _noLibzError (void)
{
gd_error("GD2 support is not available - no libz\n");
}
|
static void _noLibzError (void)
{
gd_error("GD2 support is not available - no libz\n");
}
|
C
|
libgd
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/3eb1f512d8646db3a70aaef108a8f5ad8b3f013d
|
3eb1f512d8646db3a70aaef108a8f5ad8b3f013d
|
2010-06-18 Adam Barth <[email protected]>
Reviewed by Darin Adler.
noAccess url schemes block access to inline stylesheets
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32309
Test that data URLs can access their inline style sheets.
* http/tests/security/data-url-inline.css-expected.txt: Added.
* http/tests/security/data-url-inline.css.html: Added.
2010-06-18 Adam Barth <[email protected]>
Reviewed by Darin Adler.
noAccess url schemes block access to inline stylesheets
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32309
Instead of using baseURL() to grab the security context we should just
use finalURL directly. When I wrote the original patch that added this
security check, finalURL didn't exist yet.
If finalURL is an empty URL, that means we generated the style sheet
from text that didn't have a URL. It would be slightly safer to store
a bit on CSSStyleSheet indicating whether it came from an inline style
sheet, but I think this check is fairly accurate.
Test: http/tests/security/data-url-inline.css.html
* css/CSSStyleSheet.cpp:
(WebCore::CSSStyleSheet::cssRules):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@61391 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void CSSStyleSheet::checkLoaded()
{
if (isLoading())
return;
if (parent())
parent()->checkLoaded();
RefPtr<CSSStyleSheet> protector(this);
m_loadCompleted = ownerNode() ? ownerNode()->sheetLoaded() : true;
}
|
void CSSStyleSheet::checkLoaded()
{
if (isLoading())
return;
if (parent())
parent()->checkLoaded();
RefPtr<CSSStyleSheet> protector(this);
m_loadCompleted = ownerNode() ? ownerNode()->sheetLoaded() : true;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-2739
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-2739/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b2853fd6c2d0f383dbdf7427e263eb576a633867
|
b2853fd6c2d0f383dbdf7427e263eb576a633867
|
IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <[email protected]>
|
static int cm_dreq_handler(struct cm_work *work)
{
struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv;
struct cm_dreq_msg *dreq_msg;
struct ib_mad_send_buf *msg = NULL;
int ret;
dreq_msg = (struct cm_dreq_msg *)work->mad_recv_wc->recv_buf.mad;
cm_id_priv = cm_acquire_id(dreq_msg->remote_comm_id,
dreq_msg->local_comm_id);
if (!cm_id_priv) {
atomic_long_inc(&work->port->counter_group[CM_RECV_DUPLICATES].
counter[CM_DREQ_COUNTER]);
cm_issue_drep(work->port, work->mad_recv_wc);
return -EINVAL;
}
work->cm_event.private_data = &dreq_msg->private_data;
spin_lock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
if (cm_id_priv->local_qpn != cm_dreq_get_remote_qpn(dreq_msg))
goto unlock;
switch (cm_id_priv->id.state) {
case IB_CM_REP_SENT:
case IB_CM_DREQ_SENT:
ib_cancel_mad(cm_id_priv->av.port->mad_agent, cm_id_priv->msg);
break;
case IB_CM_ESTABLISHED:
if (cm_id_priv->id.lap_state == IB_CM_LAP_SENT ||
cm_id_priv->id.lap_state == IB_CM_MRA_LAP_RCVD)
ib_cancel_mad(cm_id_priv->av.port->mad_agent, cm_id_priv->msg);
break;
case IB_CM_MRA_REP_RCVD:
break;
case IB_CM_TIMEWAIT:
atomic_long_inc(&work->port->counter_group[CM_RECV_DUPLICATES].
counter[CM_DREQ_COUNTER]);
if (cm_alloc_response_msg(work->port, work->mad_recv_wc, &msg))
goto unlock;
cm_format_drep((struct cm_drep_msg *) msg->mad, cm_id_priv,
cm_id_priv->private_data,
cm_id_priv->private_data_len);
spin_unlock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
if (ib_post_send_mad(msg, NULL))
cm_free_msg(msg);
goto deref;
case IB_CM_DREQ_RCVD:
atomic_long_inc(&work->port->counter_group[CM_RECV_DUPLICATES].
counter[CM_DREQ_COUNTER]);
goto unlock;
default:
goto unlock;
}
cm_id_priv->id.state = IB_CM_DREQ_RCVD;
cm_id_priv->tid = dreq_msg->hdr.tid;
ret = atomic_inc_and_test(&cm_id_priv->work_count);
if (!ret)
list_add_tail(&work->list, &cm_id_priv->work_list);
spin_unlock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
if (ret)
cm_process_work(cm_id_priv, work);
else
cm_deref_id(cm_id_priv);
return 0;
unlock: spin_unlock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
deref: cm_deref_id(cm_id_priv);
return -EINVAL;
}
|
static int cm_dreq_handler(struct cm_work *work)
{
struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv;
struct cm_dreq_msg *dreq_msg;
struct ib_mad_send_buf *msg = NULL;
int ret;
dreq_msg = (struct cm_dreq_msg *)work->mad_recv_wc->recv_buf.mad;
cm_id_priv = cm_acquire_id(dreq_msg->remote_comm_id,
dreq_msg->local_comm_id);
if (!cm_id_priv) {
atomic_long_inc(&work->port->counter_group[CM_RECV_DUPLICATES].
counter[CM_DREQ_COUNTER]);
cm_issue_drep(work->port, work->mad_recv_wc);
return -EINVAL;
}
work->cm_event.private_data = &dreq_msg->private_data;
spin_lock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
if (cm_id_priv->local_qpn != cm_dreq_get_remote_qpn(dreq_msg))
goto unlock;
switch (cm_id_priv->id.state) {
case IB_CM_REP_SENT:
case IB_CM_DREQ_SENT:
ib_cancel_mad(cm_id_priv->av.port->mad_agent, cm_id_priv->msg);
break;
case IB_CM_ESTABLISHED:
if (cm_id_priv->id.lap_state == IB_CM_LAP_SENT ||
cm_id_priv->id.lap_state == IB_CM_MRA_LAP_RCVD)
ib_cancel_mad(cm_id_priv->av.port->mad_agent, cm_id_priv->msg);
break;
case IB_CM_MRA_REP_RCVD:
break;
case IB_CM_TIMEWAIT:
atomic_long_inc(&work->port->counter_group[CM_RECV_DUPLICATES].
counter[CM_DREQ_COUNTER]);
if (cm_alloc_response_msg(work->port, work->mad_recv_wc, &msg))
goto unlock;
cm_format_drep((struct cm_drep_msg *) msg->mad, cm_id_priv,
cm_id_priv->private_data,
cm_id_priv->private_data_len);
spin_unlock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
if (ib_post_send_mad(msg, NULL))
cm_free_msg(msg);
goto deref;
case IB_CM_DREQ_RCVD:
atomic_long_inc(&work->port->counter_group[CM_RECV_DUPLICATES].
counter[CM_DREQ_COUNTER]);
goto unlock;
default:
goto unlock;
}
cm_id_priv->id.state = IB_CM_DREQ_RCVD;
cm_id_priv->tid = dreq_msg->hdr.tid;
ret = atomic_inc_and_test(&cm_id_priv->work_count);
if (!ret)
list_add_tail(&work->list, &cm_id_priv->work_list);
spin_unlock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
if (ret)
cm_process_work(cm_id_priv, work);
else
cm_deref_id(cm_id_priv);
return 0;
unlock: spin_unlock_irq(&cm_id_priv->lock);
deref: cm_deref_id(cm_id_priv);
return -EINVAL;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-15415
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-15415/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/dc5edc9c05901feeac616c075d0337e634f3a02a
|
dc5edc9c05901feeac616c075d0337e634f3a02a
|
Serialize struct tm in a safe way.
BUG=765512
Change-Id: If235b8677eb527be2ac0fe621fc210e4116a7566
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/679441
Commit-Queue: Chris Palmer <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Julien Tinnes <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#503948}
|
void SandboxIPCHandler::SetObserverForTests(
SandboxIPCHandler::TestObserver* observer) {
g_test_observer = observer;
}
|
void SandboxIPCHandler::SetObserverForTests(
SandboxIPCHandler::TestObserver* observer) {
g_test_observer = observer;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6140
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6140/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/2aec794f26098c7a361c27d7c8f57119631cca8a
|
2aec794f26098c7a361c27d7c8f57119631cca8a
|
[DevTools] Do not allow chrome.debugger to attach to web ui pages
If the page navigates to web ui, we force detach the debugger extension.
[email protected]
Bug: 798222
Change-Id: Idb46c2f59e839388397a8dfa6ce2e2a897698df3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/935961
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540916}
|
scoped_refptr<DevToolsAgentHost> DevToolsAgentHost::Forward(
const std::string& id,
std::unique_ptr<DevToolsExternalAgentProxyDelegate> delegate) {
scoped_refptr<DevToolsAgentHost> result = DevToolsAgentHost::GetForId(id);
if (result)
return result;
return new ForwardingAgentHost(id, std::move(delegate));
}
|
scoped_refptr<DevToolsAgentHost> DevToolsAgentHost::Forward(
const std::string& id,
std::unique_ptr<DevToolsExternalAgentProxyDelegate> delegate) {
scoped_refptr<DevToolsAgentHost> result = DevToolsAgentHost::GetForId(id);
if (result)
return result;
return new ForwardingAgentHost(id, std::move(delegate));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void Stop() {
animation_.Stop();
}
|
void Stop() {
animation_.Stop();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9501
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9501/
|
CWE-617
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/01843366d6a7b96e22ad7bb67f3df7d9fd4d5d74
|
01843366d6a7b96e22ad7bb67f3df7d9fd4d5d74
|
Fixed incorrect call to DestroyImage reported in #491.
|
MagickExport ImageInfo *DestroyImageInfo(ImageInfo *image_info)
{
assert(image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
if (image_info->size != (char *) NULL)
image_info->size=DestroyString(image_info->size);
if (image_info->extract != (char *) NULL)
image_info->extract=DestroyString(image_info->extract);
if (image_info->scenes != (char *) NULL)
image_info->scenes=DestroyString(image_info->scenes);
if (image_info->page != (char *) NULL)
image_info->page=DestroyString(image_info->page);
if (image_info->sampling_factor != (char *) NULL)
image_info->sampling_factor=DestroyString(
image_info->sampling_factor);
if (image_info->server_name != (char *) NULL)
image_info->server_name=DestroyString(
image_info->server_name);
if (image_info->font != (char *) NULL)
image_info->font=DestroyString(image_info->font);
if (image_info->texture != (char *) NULL)
image_info->texture=DestroyString(image_info->texture);
if (image_info->density != (char *) NULL)
image_info->density=DestroyString(image_info->density);
if (image_info->view != (char *) NULL)
image_info->view=DestroyString(image_info->view);
if (image_info->authenticate != (char *) NULL)
image_info->authenticate=DestroyString(
image_info->authenticate);
DestroyImageOptions(image_info);
if (image_info->cache != (void *) NULL)
image_info->cache=DestroyPixelCache(image_info->cache);
if (image_info->profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
image_info->profile=(void *) DestroyStringInfo((StringInfo *)
image_info->profile);
image_info->signature=(~MagickSignature);
image_info=(ImageInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(image_info);
return(image_info);
}
|
MagickExport ImageInfo *DestroyImageInfo(ImageInfo *image_info)
{
assert(image_info != (ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
if (image_info->size != (char *) NULL)
image_info->size=DestroyString(image_info->size);
if (image_info->extract != (char *) NULL)
image_info->extract=DestroyString(image_info->extract);
if (image_info->scenes != (char *) NULL)
image_info->scenes=DestroyString(image_info->scenes);
if (image_info->page != (char *) NULL)
image_info->page=DestroyString(image_info->page);
if (image_info->sampling_factor != (char *) NULL)
image_info->sampling_factor=DestroyString(
image_info->sampling_factor);
if (image_info->server_name != (char *) NULL)
image_info->server_name=DestroyString(
image_info->server_name);
if (image_info->font != (char *) NULL)
image_info->font=DestroyString(image_info->font);
if (image_info->texture != (char *) NULL)
image_info->texture=DestroyString(image_info->texture);
if (image_info->density != (char *) NULL)
image_info->density=DestroyString(image_info->density);
if (image_info->view != (char *) NULL)
image_info->view=DestroyString(image_info->view);
if (image_info->authenticate != (char *) NULL)
image_info->authenticate=DestroyString(
image_info->authenticate);
DestroyImageOptions(image_info);
if (image_info->cache != (void *) NULL)
image_info->cache=DestroyPixelCache(image_info->cache);
if (image_info->profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
image_info->profile=(void *) DestroyStringInfo((StringInfo *)
image_info->profile);
image_info->signature=(~MagickSignature);
image_info=(ImageInfo *) RelinquishMagickMemory(image_info);
return(image_info);
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5148
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5148/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
e89cfcb9090e8c98129ae9160c513f504db74599
|
Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void TabStripGtk::StartInsertTabAnimation(int index) {
available_width_for_tabs_ = -1;
StopAnimation();
active_animation_.reset(new InsertTabAnimation(this, index));
active_animation_->Start();
}
|
void TabStripGtk::StartInsertTabAnimation(int index) {
available_width_for_tabs_ = -1;
StopAnimation();
active_animation_.reset(new InsertTabAnimation(this, index));
active_animation_->Start();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-7455
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-7455/
| null |
https://github.com/mm2/Little-CMS/commit/fefaaa43c382eee632ea3ad0cfa915335140e1db
|
fefaaa43c382eee632ea3ad0cfa915335140e1db
|
Fix a double free on error recovering
|
void Temp2CHAD(cmsMAT3* Chad, cmsFloat64Number Temp)
{
cmsCIEXYZ White;
cmsCIExyY ChromaticityOfWhite;
cmsWhitePointFromTemp(&ChromaticityOfWhite, Temp);
cmsxyY2XYZ(&White, &ChromaticityOfWhite);
_cmsAdaptationMatrix(Chad, NULL, &White, cmsD50_XYZ());
}
|
void Temp2CHAD(cmsMAT3* Chad, cmsFloat64Number Temp)
{
cmsCIEXYZ White;
cmsCIExyY ChromaticityOfWhite;
cmsWhitePointFromTemp(&ChromaticityOfWhite, Temp);
cmsxyY2XYZ(&White, &ChromaticityOfWhite);
_cmsAdaptationMatrix(Chad, NULL, &White, cmsD50_XYZ());
}
|
C
|
Little-CMS
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1229
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1229/
|
CWE-19
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/7933c117fd16b192e70609c331641e9112af5e42
|
7933c117fd16b192e70609c331641e9112af5e42
|
Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
|
bool HttpProxyClientSocket::WasEverUsed() const {
if (transport_.get() && transport_->socket()) {
return transport_->socket()->WasEverUsed();
}
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
|
bool HttpProxyClientSocket::WasEverUsed() const {
if (transport_.get() && transport_->socket()) {
return transport_->socket()->WasEverUsed();
}
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-9511
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-9511/
|
CWE-909
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/netd/+/931418b16c7197ca2df34c2a5609e49791125abe
|
931418b16c7197ca2df34c2a5609e49791125abe
|
Set optlen for UDP-encap check in XfrmController
When setting the socket owner for an encap socket XfrmController will
first attempt to verify that the socket has the UDP-encap socket option
set. When doing so it would pass in an uninitialized optlen parameter
which could cause the call to not modify the option value if the optlen
happened to be too short. So for example if the stack happened to
contain a zero where optlen was located the check would fail and the
socket owner would not be changed.
Fix this by setting optlen to the size of the option value parameter.
Test: run cts -m CtsNetTestCases
BUG: 111650288
Change-Id: I57b6e9dba09c1acda71e3ec2084652e961667bd9
(cherry picked from commit fc42a105147310bd680952d4b71fe32974bd8506)
|
netdutils::Status XfrmController::allocateSpi(const XfrmSaInfo& record, uint32_t minSpi,
uint32_t maxSpi, uint32_t* outSpi,
const XfrmSocket& sock) {
xfrm_userspi_info spiInfo{};
enum { NLMSG_HDR, USERSAID, USERSAID_PAD };
std::vector<iovec> iov = {
{NULL, 0}, // reserved for the eventual addition of a NLMSG_HDR
{&spiInfo, 0}, // main userspi_info struct
{kPadBytes, 0}, // up to NLMSG_ALIGNTO pad bytes of padding
};
int len;
if (fillUserSaInfo(record, &spiInfo.info) == 0) {
ALOGE("Failed to fill transport SA Info");
}
len = iov[USERSAID].iov_len = sizeof(spiInfo);
iov[USERSAID_PAD].iov_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(len) - len;
RandomSpi spiGen = RandomSpi(minSpi, maxSpi);
int spi;
netdutils::Status ret;
while ((spi = spiGen.next()) != INVALID_SPI) {
spiInfo.min = spi;
spiInfo.max = spi;
ret = sock.sendMessage(XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI, NETLINK_REQUEST_FLAGS, 0, &iov);
/* If the SPI is in use, we'll get ENOENT */
if (netdutils::equalToErrno(ret, ENOENT))
continue;
if (isOk(ret)) {
*outSpi = spi;
ALOGD("Allocated an SPI: %x", *outSpi);
} else {
*outSpi = INVALID_SPI;
ALOGE("SPI Allocation Failed with error %d", ret.code());
}
return ret;
}
return ret;
}
|
netdutils::Status XfrmController::allocateSpi(const XfrmSaInfo& record, uint32_t minSpi,
uint32_t maxSpi, uint32_t* outSpi,
const XfrmSocket& sock) {
xfrm_userspi_info spiInfo{};
enum { NLMSG_HDR, USERSAID, USERSAID_PAD };
std::vector<iovec> iov = {
{NULL, 0}, // reserved for the eventual addition of a NLMSG_HDR
{&spiInfo, 0}, // main userspi_info struct
{kPadBytes, 0}, // up to NLMSG_ALIGNTO pad bytes of padding
};
int len;
if (fillUserSaInfo(record, &spiInfo.info) == 0) {
ALOGE("Failed to fill transport SA Info");
}
len = iov[USERSAID].iov_len = sizeof(spiInfo);
iov[USERSAID_PAD].iov_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(len) - len;
RandomSpi spiGen = RandomSpi(minSpi, maxSpi);
int spi;
netdutils::Status ret;
while ((spi = spiGen.next()) != INVALID_SPI) {
spiInfo.min = spi;
spiInfo.max = spi;
ret = sock.sendMessage(XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI, NETLINK_REQUEST_FLAGS, 0, &iov);
/* If the SPI is in use, we'll get ENOENT */
if (netdutils::equalToErrno(ret, ENOENT))
continue;
if (isOk(ret)) {
*outSpi = spi;
ALOGD("Allocated an SPI: %x", *outSpi);
} else {
*outSpi = INVALID_SPI;
ALOGE("SPI Allocation Failed with error %d", ret.code());
}
return ret;
}
return ret;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-4540
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-4540/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=52f91c3723932f8340fe36c8ec8b18a757c37b2b
|
52f91c3723932f8340fe36c8ec8b18a757c37b2b
| null |
static void scoop_register_types(void)
{
type_register_static(&scoop_sysbus_info);
}
|
static void scoop_register_types(void)
{
type_register_static(&scoop_sysbus_info);
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2018-1000040
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-1000040/
|
CWE-20
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=mupdf.git;a=commitdiff;h=83d4dae44c71816c084a635550acc1a51529b881;hp=f597300439e62f5e921f0d7b1e880b5c1a1f1607
|
83d4dae44c71816c084a635550acc1a51529b881
| null |
std_conv_color(fz_context *ctx, fz_color_converter *cc, float *dstv, const float *srcv)
{
float rgb[3];
int i;
const fz_colorspace *srcs = cc->ss;
const fz_colorspace *dsts = cc->ds;
if (srcs == NULL)
srcs = fz_device_rgb(ctx);
if (dsts == NULL)
dsts = fz_device_rgb(ctx);
if (srcs != dsts)
{
assert(srcs->to_ccs && dsts->from_ccs);
srcs->to_ccs(ctx, srcs, srcv, rgb);
dsts->from_ccs(ctx, dsts, rgb, dstv);
for (i = 0; i < dsts->n; i++)
dstv[i] = fz_clamp(dstv[i], 0, 1);
}
else
{
for (i = 0; i < srcs->n; i++)
dstv[i] = srcv[i];
}
}
|
std_conv_color(fz_context *ctx, fz_color_converter *cc, float *dstv, const float *srcv)
{
float rgb[3];
int i;
const fz_colorspace *srcs = cc->ss;
const fz_colorspace *dsts = cc->ds;
if (srcs == NULL)
srcs = fz_device_rgb(ctx);
if (dsts == NULL)
dsts = fz_device_rgb(ctx);
if (srcs != dsts)
{
assert(srcs->to_ccs && dsts->from_ccs);
srcs->to_ccs(ctx, srcs, srcv, rgb);
dsts->from_ccs(ctx, dsts, rgb, dstv);
for (i = 0; i < dsts->n; i++)
dstv[i] = fz_clamp(dstv[i], 0, 1);
}
else
{
for (i = 0; i < srcs->n; i++)
dstv[i] = srcv[i];
}
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2856
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2856/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/e68fafe04d29810cebe8d25554863b0cae4c1356
|
e68fafe04d29810cebe8d25554863b0cae4c1356
|
Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
int UDPSocketWin::Bind(const IPEndPoint& address) {
DCHECK(!is_connected());
int rv = CreateSocket(address.GetSockAddrFamily());
if (rv < 0)
return rv;
rv = SetSocketOptions();
if (rv < 0) {
Close();
return rv;
}
rv = DoBind(address);
if (rv < 0) {
Close();
return rv;
}
local_address_.reset();
return rv;
}
|
int UDPSocketWin::Bind(const IPEndPoint& address) {
DCHECK(!is_connected());
int rv = CreateSocket(address.GetSockAddrFamily());
if (rv < 0)
return rv;
rv = SetSocketOptions();
if (rv < 0) {
Close();
return rv;
}
rv = DoBind(address);
if (rv < 0) {
Close();
return rv;
}
local_address_.reset();
return rv;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6088
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6088/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/94b3728a2836da335a10085d4089c9d8e1c9d225
|
94b3728a2836da335a10085d4089c9d8e1c9d225
|
Copy visible_pages_ when iterating over it.
On this case, a call inside the loop may cause visible_pages_ to
change.
Bug: 822091
Change-Id: I41b0715faa6fe3e39203cd9142cf5ea38e59aefb
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/964592
Reviewed-by: dsinclair <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Henrique Nakashima <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#543494}
|
bool PDFiumEngine::IsPointInEditableFormTextArea(FPDF_PAGE page,
double page_x,
double page_y,
int form_type) {
#if defined(PDF_ENABLE_XFA)
if (IS_XFA_FORMFIELD(form_type))
return form_type == FPDF_FORMFIELD_XFA_TEXTFIELD ||
form_type == FPDF_FORMFIELD_XFA_COMBOBOX;
#endif // defined(PDF_ENABLE_XFA)
FPDF_ANNOTATION annot =
FPDFAnnot_GetFormFieldAtPoint(form_, page, page_x, page_y);
if (!annot)
return false;
int flags = FPDFAnnot_GetFormFieldFlags(page, annot);
bool is_editable_form_text_area =
CheckIfEditableFormTextArea(flags, form_type);
FPDFPage_CloseAnnot(annot);
return is_editable_form_text_area;
}
|
bool PDFiumEngine::IsPointInEditableFormTextArea(FPDF_PAGE page,
double page_x,
double page_y,
int form_type) {
#if defined(PDF_ENABLE_XFA)
if (IS_XFA_FORMFIELD(form_type))
return form_type == FPDF_FORMFIELD_XFA_TEXTFIELD ||
form_type == FPDF_FORMFIELD_XFA_COMBOBOX;
#endif // defined(PDF_ENABLE_XFA)
FPDF_ANNOTATION annot =
FPDFAnnot_GetFormFieldAtPoint(form_, page, page_x, page_y);
if (!annot)
return false;
int flags = FPDFAnnot_GetFormFieldFlags(page, annot);
bool is_editable_form_text_area =
CheckIfEditableFormTextArea(flags, form_type);
FPDFPage_CloseAnnot(annot);
return is_editable_form_text_area;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-10030
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-10030/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/SchedMD/slurm/commit/92362a92fffe60187df61f99ab11c249d44120ee
|
92362a92fffe60187df61f99ab11c249d44120ee
|
Fix security issue in _prolog_error().
Fix security issue caused by insecure file path handling triggered by
the failure of a Prolog script. To exploit this a user needs to
anticipate or cause the Prolog to fail for their job.
(This commit is slightly different from the fix to the 15.08 branch.)
CVE-2016-10030.
|
_rpc_terminate_tasks(slurm_msg_t *msg)
{
kill_tasks_msg_t *req = (kill_tasks_msg_t *) msg->data;
int rc = SLURM_SUCCESS;
int fd;
uid_t req_uid, uid;
uint16_t protocol_version;
debug3("Entering _rpc_terminate_tasks");
fd = stepd_connect(conf->spooldir, conf->node_name,
req->job_id, req->job_step_id, &protocol_version);
if (fd == -1) {
debug("kill for nonexistent job %u.%u stepd_connect "
"failed: %m", req->job_id, req->job_step_id);
rc = ESLURM_INVALID_JOB_ID;
goto done;
}
if ((int)(uid = stepd_get_uid(fd, protocol_version)) < 0) {
debug("terminate_tasks couldn't read from the step %u.%u: %m",
req->job_id, req->job_step_id);
rc = ESLURM_INVALID_JOB_ID;
goto done2;
}
req_uid = g_slurm_auth_get_uid(msg->auth_cred, conf->auth_info);
if ((req_uid != uid)
&& (!_slurm_authorized_user(req_uid))) {
debug("kill req from uid %ld for job %u.%u owned by uid %ld",
(long) req_uid, req->job_id, req->job_step_id,
(long) uid);
rc = ESLURM_USER_ID_MISSING; /* or bad in this case */
goto done2;
}
rc = stepd_terminate(fd, protocol_version);
if (rc == -1)
rc = ESLURMD_JOB_NOTRUNNING;
done2:
close(fd);
done:
slurm_send_rc_msg(msg, rc);
}
|
_rpc_terminate_tasks(slurm_msg_t *msg)
{
kill_tasks_msg_t *req = (kill_tasks_msg_t *) msg->data;
int rc = SLURM_SUCCESS;
int fd;
uid_t req_uid, uid;
uint16_t protocol_version;
debug3("Entering _rpc_terminate_tasks");
fd = stepd_connect(conf->spooldir, conf->node_name,
req->job_id, req->job_step_id, &protocol_version);
if (fd == -1) {
debug("kill for nonexistent job %u.%u stepd_connect "
"failed: %m", req->job_id, req->job_step_id);
rc = ESLURM_INVALID_JOB_ID;
goto done;
}
if ((int)(uid = stepd_get_uid(fd, protocol_version)) < 0) {
debug("terminate_tasks couldn't read from the step %u.%u: %m",
req->job_id, req->job_step_id);
rc = ESLURM_INVALID_JOB_ID;
goto done2;
}
req_uid = g_slurm_auth_get_uid(msg->auth_cred, conf->auth_info);
if ((req_uid != uid)
&& (!_slurm_authorized_user(req_uid))) {
debug("kill req from uid %ld for job %u.%u owned by uid %ld",
(long) req_uid, req->job_id, req->job_step_id,
(long) uid);
rc = ESLURM_USER_ID_MISSING; /* or bad in this case */
goto done2;
}
rc = stepd_terminate(fd, protocol_version);
if (rc == -1)
rc = ESLURMD_JOB_NOTRUNNING;
done2:
close(fd);
done:
slurm_send_rc_msg(msg, rc);
}
|
C
|
slurm
| 0 |
CVE-2018-9491
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-9491/
|
CWE-190
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/2b4667baa5a2badbdfec1794156ee17d4afef37c
|
2b4667baa5a2badbdfec1794156ee17d4afef37c
|
Check for overflow of crypto size
Bug: 111603051
Test: CTS
Change-Id: Ib5b1802b9b35769a25c16e2b977308cf7a810606
(cherry picked from commit d1fd02761236b35a336434367131f71bef7405c9)
|
virtual ~AMediaCodecPersistentSurface() {
}
|
virtual ~AMediaCodecPersistentSurface() {
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2878
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2878/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/09fbb829eab7ee25e90bb4e9c2f4973c6c62d0f3
|
09fbb829eab7ee25e90bb4e9c2f4973c6c62d0f3
|
Upgrade a TextIterator ASSERT to a RELEASE_ASSERT as a defensive measure.
BUG=156930,177197
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/15057010
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150123 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
WordAwareIterator::WordAwareIterator(const Range* r)
: m_previousText(0)
, m_didLookAhead(true) // so we consider the first chunk from the text iterator
, m_textIterator(r)
{
advance(); // get in position over the first chunk of text
}
|
WordAwareIterator::WordAwareIterator(const Range* r)
: m_previousText(0)
, m_didLookAhead(true) // so we consider the first chunk from the text iterator
, m_textIterator(r)
{
advance(); // get in position over the first chunk of text
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2015-3412
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-3412/
|
CWE-254
|
https://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commit;h=4435b9142ff9813845d5c97ab29a5d637bedb257
|
4435b9142ff9813845d5c97ab29a5d637bedb257
| null |
static void php_pgsql_fetch_hash(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, long result_type, int into_object)
{
zval *result, *zrow = NULL;
PGresult *pgsql_result;
pgsql_result_handle *pg_result;
int i, num_fields, pgsql_row, use_row;
long row = -1;
char *field_name;
zval *ctor_params = NULL;
zend_class_entry *ce = NULL;
if (into_object) {
char *class_name = NULL;
int class_name_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r|z!sz", &result, &zrow, &class_name, &class_name_len, &ctor_params) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!class_name) {
ce = zend_standard_class_def;
} else {
ce = zend_fetch_class(class_name, class_name_len, ZEND_FETCH_CLASS_AUTO TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (!ce) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Could not find class '%s'", class_name);
return;
}
result_type = PGSQL_ASSOC;
} else {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r|z!l", &result, &zrow, &result_type) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
}
if (zrow == NULL) {
row = -1;
} else {
convert_to_long(zrow);
row = Z_LVAL_P(zrow);
if (row < 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The row parameter must be greater or equal to zero");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
use_row = ZEND_NUM_ARGS() > 1 && row != -1;
if (!(result_type & PGSQL_BOTH)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid result type");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(pg_result, pgsql_result_handle *, &result, -1, "PostgreSQL result", le_result);
pgsql_result = pg_result->result;
if (use_row) {
pgsql_row = row;
pg_result->row = pgsql_row;
if (pgsql_row < 0 || pgsql_row >= PQntuples(pgsql_result)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to jump to row %ld on PostgreSQL result index %ld",
row, Z_LVAL_P(result));
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else {
/* If 2nd param is NULL, use internal row counter to access next row */
pgsql_row = pg_result->row;
if (pgsql_row < 0 || pgsql_row >= PQntuples(pgsql_result)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
pg_result->row++;
}
array_init(return_value);
for (i = 0, num_fields = PQnfields(pgsql_result); i < num_fields; i++) {
if (PQgetisnull(pgsql_result, pgsql_row, i)) {
if (result_type & PGSQL_NUM) {
add_index_null(return_value, i);
}
if (result_type & PGSQL_ASSOC) {
field_name = PQfname(pgsql_result, i);
add_assoc_null(return_value, field_name);
}
} else {
char *element = PQgetvalue(pgsql_result, pgsql_row, i);
if (element) {
char *data;
int data_len;
int should_copy=0;
const uint element_len = strlen(element);
data = safe_estrndup(element, element_len);
data_len = element_len;
if (result_type & PGSQL_NUM) {
add_index_stringl(return_value, i, data, data_len, should_copy);
should_copy=1;
}
if (result_type & PGSQL_ASSOC) {
field_name = PQfname(pgsql_result, i);
add_assoc_stringl(return_value, field_name, data, data_len, should_copy);
}
}
}
}
if (into_object) {
zval dataset = *return_value;
zend_fcall_info fci;
zend_fcall_info_cache fcc;
zval *retval_ptr;
object_and_properties_init(return_value, ce, NULL);
zend_merge_properties(return_value, Z_ARRVAL(dataset), 1 TSRMLS_CC);
if (ce->constructor) {
fci.size = sizeof(fci);
fci.function_table = &ce->function_table;
fci.function_name = NULL;
fci.symbol_table = NULL;
fci.object_ptr = return_value;
fci.retval_ptr_ptr = &retval_ptr;
if (ctor_params && Z_TYPE_P(ctor_params) != IS_NULL) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(ctor_params) == IS_ARRAY) {
HashTable *ht = Z_ARRVAL_P(ctor_params);
Bucket *p;
fci.param_count = 0;
fci.params = safe_emalloc(sizeof(zval***), ht->nNumOfElements, 0);
p = ht->pListHead;
while (p != NULL) {
fci.params[fci.param_count++] = (zval**)p->pData;
p = p->pListNext;
}
} else {
/* Two problems why we throw exceptions here: PHP is typeless
* and hence passing one argument that's not an array could be
* by mistake and the other way round is possible, too. The
* single value is an array. Also we'd have to make that one
* argument passed by reference.
*/
zend_throw_exception(zend_exception_get_default(TSRMLS_C), "Parameter ctor_params must be an array", 0 TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
} else {
fci.param_count = 0;
fci.params = NULL;
}
fci.no_separation = 1;
fcc.initialized = 1;
fcc.function_handler = ce->constructor;
fcc.calling_scope = EG(scope);
fcc.called_scope = Z_OBJCE_P(return_value);
fcc.object_ptr = return_value;
if (zend_call_function(&fci, &fcc TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(zend_exception_get_default(TSRMLS_C), 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Could not execute %s::%s()", ce->name, ce->constructor->common.function_name);
} else {
if (retval_ptr) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval_ptr);
}
}
if (fci.params) {
efree(fci.params);
}
} else if (ctor_params) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(zend_exception_get_default(TSRMLS_C), 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Class %s does not have a constructor hence you cannot use ctor_params", ce->name);
}
}
}
|
static void php_pgsql_fetch_hash(INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAMETERS, long result_type, int into_object)
{
zval *result, *zrow = NULL;
PGresult *pgsql_result;
pgsql_result_handle *pg_result;
int i, num_fields, pgsql_row, use_row;
long row = -1;
char *field_name;
zval *ctor_params = NULL;
zend_class_entry *ce = NULL;
if (into_object) {
char *class_name = NULL;
int class_name_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r|z!sz", &result, &zrow, &class_name, &class_name_len, &ctor_params) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!class_name) {
ce = zend_standard_class_def;
} else {
ce = zend_fetch_class(class_name, class_name_len, ZEND_FETCH_CLASS_AUTO TSRMLS_CC);
}
if (!ce) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Could not find class '%s'", class_name);
return;
}
result_type = PGSQL_ASSOC;
} else {
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "r|z!l", &result, &zrow, &result_type) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
}
if (zrow == NULL) {
row = -1;
} else {
convert_to_long(zrow);
row = Z_LVAL_P(zrow);
if (row < 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "The row parameter must be greater or equal to zero");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
use_row = ZEND_NUM_ARGS() > 1 && row != -1;
if (!(result_type & PGSQL_BOTH)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Invalid result type");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(pg_result, pgsql_result_handle *, &result, -1, "PostgreSQL result", le_result);
pgsql_result = pg_result->result;
if (use_row) {
pgsql_row = row;
pg_result->row = pgsql_row;
if (pgsql_row < 0 || pgsql_row >= PQntuples(pgsql_result)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to jump to row %ld on PostgreSQL result index %ld",
row, Z_LVAL_P(result));
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else {
/* If 2nd param is NULL, use internal row counter to access next row */
pgsql_row = pg_result->row;
if (pgsql_row < 0 || pgsql_row >= PQntuples(pgsql_result)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
pg_result->row++;
}
array_init(return_value);
for (i = 0, num_fields = PQnfields(pgsql_result); i < num_fields; i++) {
if (PQgetisnull(pgsql_result, pgsql_row, i)) {
if (result_type & PGSQL_NUM) {
add_index_null(return_value, i);
}
if (result_type & PGSQL_ASSOC) {
field_name = PQfname(pgsql_result, i);
add_assoc_null(return_value, field_name);
}
} else {
char *element = PQgetvalue(pgsql_result, pgsql_row, i);
if (element) {
char *data;
int data_len;
int should_copy=0;
const uint element_len = strlen(element);
data = safe_estrndup(element, element_len);
data_len = element_len;
if (result_type & PGSQL_NUM) {
add_index_stringl(return_value, i, data, data_len, should_copy);
should_copy=1;
}
if (result_type & PGSQL_ASSOC) {
field_name = PQfname(pgsql_result, i);
add_assoc_stringl(return_value, field_name, data, data_len, should_copy);
}
}
}
}
if (into_object) {
zval dataset = *return_value;
zend_fcall_info fci;
zend_fcall_info_cache fcc;
zval *retval_ptr;
object_and_properties_init(return_value, ce, NULL);
zend_merge_properties(return_value, Z_ARRVAL(dataset), 1 TSRMLS_CC);
if (ce->constructor) {
fci.size = sizeof(fci);
fci.function_table = &ce->function_table;
fci.function_name = NULL;
fci.symbol_table = NULL;
fci.object_ptr = return_value;
fci.retval_ptr_ptr = &retval_ptr;
if (ctor_params && Z_TYPE_P(ctor_params) != IS_NULL) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(ctor_params) == IS_ARRAY) {
HashTable *ht = Z_ARRVAL_P(ctor_params);
Bucket *p;
fci.param_count = 0;
fci.params = safe_emalloc(sizeof(zval***), ht->nNumOfElements, 0);
p = ht->pListHead;
while (p != NULL) {
fci.params[fci.param_count++] = (zval**)p->pData;
p = p->pListNext;
}
} else {
/* Two problems why we throw exceptions here: PHP is typeless
* and hence passing one argument that's not an array could be
* by mistake and the other way round is possible, too. The
* single value is an array. Also we'd have to make that one
* argument passed by reference.
*/
zend_throw_exception(zend_exception_get_default(TSRMLS_C), "Parameter ctor_params must be an array", 0 TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
} else {
fci.param_count = 0;
fci.params = NULL;
}
fci.no_separation = 1;
fcc.initialized = 1;
fcc.function_handler = ce->constructor;
fcc.calling_scope = EG(scope);
fcc.called_scope = Z_OBJCE_P(return_value);
fcc.object_ptr = return_value;
if (zend_call_function(&fci, &fcc TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(zend_exception_get_default(TSRMLS_C), 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Could not execute %s::%s()", ce->name, ce->constructor->common.function_name);
} else {
if (retval_ptr) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval_ptr);
}
}
if (fci.params) {
efree(fci.params);
}
} else if (ctor_params) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(zend_exception_get_default(TSRMLS_C), 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Class %s does not have a constructor hence you cannot use ctor_params", ce->name);
}
}
}
|
C
|
php
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/bfa69d49b17f33635c79f79819b90a8d2089c4b3
|
bfa69d49b17f33635c79f79819b90a8d2089c4b3
|
Change notification cmd line enabling to use the new RuntimeEnabledFeatures code.
BUG=25318
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/339093
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@30660 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderThread::OnSetExtensionFunctionNames(
const std::vector<std::string>& names) {
ExtensionProcessBindings::SetFunctionNames(names);
}
|
void RenderThread::OnSetExtensionFunctionNames(
const std::vector<std::string>& names) {
ExtensionProcessBindings::SetFunctionNames(names);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2324
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2324/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/git/git/commit/de1e67d0703894cb6ea782e36abb63976ab07e60
|
de1e67d0703894cb6ea782e36abb63976ab07e60
|
list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <[email protected]>
|
static unsigned long do_compress(void **pptr, unsigned long size)
{
git_zstream stream;
void *in, *out;
unsigned long maxsize;
git_deflate_init(&stream, pack_compression_level);
maxsize = git_deflate_bound(&stream, size);
in = *pptr;
out = xmalloc(maxsize);
*pptr = out;
stream.next_in = in;
stream.avail_in = size;
stream.next_out = out;
stream.avail_out = maxsize;
while (git_deflate(&stream, Z_FINISH) == Z_OK)
; /* nothing */
git_deflate_end(&stream);
free(in);
return stream.total_out;
}
|
static unsigned long do_compress(void **pptr, unsigned long size)
{
git_zstream stream;
void *in, *out;
unsigned long maxsize;
git_deflate_init(&stream, pack_compression_level);
maxsize = git_deflate_bound(&stream, size);
in = *pptr;
out = xmalloc(maxsize);
*pptr = out;
stream.next_in = in;
stream.avail_in = size;
stream.next_out = out;
stream.avail_out = maxsize;
while (git_deflate(&stream, Z_FINISH) == Z_OK)
; /* nothing */
git_deflate_end(&stream);
free(in);
return stream.total_out;
}
|
C
|
git
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5767
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5767/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/c395c6e5d7e8df37a21265ff76e48fe75ceb5ae6?w=1
|
c395c6e5d7e8df37a21265ff76e48fe75ceb5ae6?w=1
|
iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
|
int gdImageColorExactAlpha (gdImagePtr im, int r, int g, int b, int a)
{
int i;
if (im->trueColor) {
return gdTrueColorAlpha(r, g, b, a);
}
for (i = 0; i < im->colorsTotal; i++) {
if (im->open[i]) {
continue;
}
if ((im->red[i] == r) && (im->green[i] == g) && (im->blue[i] == b) && (im->alpha[i] == a)) {
return i;
}
}
return -1;
}
|
int gdImageColorExactAlpha (gdImagePtr im, int r, int g, int b, int a)
{
int i;
if (im->trueColor) {
return gdTrueColorAlpha(r, g, b, a);
}
for (i = 0; i < im->colorsTotal; i++) {
if (im->open[i]) {
continue;
}
if ((im->red[i] == r) && (im->green[i] == g) && (im->blue[i] == b) && (im->alpha[i] == a)) {
return i;
}
}
return -1;
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85716d839636e0814d3309ce1d8f8a2cd1fb9a8
|
f85716d839636e0814d3309ce1d8f8a2cd1fb9a8
|
[LayoutNG] Take overflow into account when column-balancing.
I didn't check why one test started to pass (it's not a very interesting
test for overflow).
Bug: 829028
Change-Id: I2c2d5fe3ea8c6a87f00df47f81d4158936d8a1bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1742162
Reviewed-by: Ian Kilpatrick <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Morten Stenshorne <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#685349}
|
String DumpFragmentTree(const NGPhysicalBoxFragment* fragment) {
NGPhysicalFragment::DumpFlags flags =
NGPhysicalFragment::DumpHeaderText | NGPhysicalFragment::DumpSubtree |
NGPhysicalFragment::DumpIndentation | NGPhysicalFragment::DumpOffset |
NGPhysicalFragment::DumpSize;
return fragment->DumpFragmentTree(flags);
}
|
String DumpFragmentTree(const NGPhysicalBoxFragment* fragment) {
NGPhysicalFragment::DumpFlags flags =
NGPhysicalFragment::DumpHeaderText | NGPhysicalFragment::DumpSubtree |
NGPhysicalFragment::DumpIndentation | NGPhysicalFragment::DumpOffset |
NGPhysicalFragment::DumpSize;
return fragment->DumpFragmentTree(flags);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0910
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0910/
|
CWE-287
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/ac8bd041b81e46e4e4fcd5021aaa5499703952e6
|
ac8bd041b81e46e4e4fcd5021aaa5499703952e6
|
Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
ChromePluginServiceFilter::GetOrRegisterProcess(
int render_process_id) {
return &plugin_details_[render_process_id];
}
|
ChromePluginServiceFilter::GetOrRegisterProcess(
int render_process_id) {
return &plugin_details_[render_process_id];
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void limitedToOnlyOneAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
imp->setAttribute(HTMLNames::limitedtoonlyoneattributeAttr, cppValue);
}
|
static void limitedToOnlyOneAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
imp->setAttribute(HTMLNames::limitedtoonlyoneattributeAttr, cppValue);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2464
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2464/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/cc274e2abe8b2a6698a5c47d8aa4bb45f1f9538d
|
cc274e2abe8b2a6698a5c47d8aa4bb45f1f9538d
|
external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
|
long long Cluster::GetFirstTime() const {
const BlockEntry* pEntry;
const long status = GetFirst(pEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (pEntry == NULL) // empty cluster
return GetTime();
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
return pBlock->GetTime(this);
}
|
long long Cluster::GetFirstTime() const {
const BlockEntry* pEntry;
const long status = GetFirst(pEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (pEntry == NULL) // empty cluster
return GetTime();
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
return pBlock->GetTime(this);
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2014-3191
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-3191/
|
CWE-416
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/11a4cc4a6d6e665d9a118fada4b7c658d6f70d95
|
11a4cc4a6d6e665d9a118fada4b7c658d6f70d95
|
Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
PassRefPtr<FrameView> FrameView::create(LocalFrame* frame, const IntSize& initialSize)
{
RefPtr<FrameView> view = adoptRef(new FrameView(frame));
view->Widget::setFrameRect(IntRect(view->location(), initialSize));
view->setLayoutSizeInternal(initialSize);
view->show();
return view.release();
}
|
PassRefPtr<FrameView> FrameView::create(LocalFrame* frame, const IntSize& initialSize)
{
RefPtr<FrameView> view = adoptRef(new FrameView(frame));
view->Widget::setFrameRect(IntRect(view->location(), initialSize));
view->setLayoutSizeInternal(initialSize);
view->show();
return view.release();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5350
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5350/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/wireshark/wireshark/commit/b4d16b4495b732888e12baf5b8a7e9bf2665e22b
|
b4d16b4495b732888e12baf5b8a7e9bf2665e22b
|
SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <[email protected]>
|
SpoolssEnumPrinterData_q(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset,
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep _U_)
{
guint32 ndx;
proto_item *hidden_item;
hidden_item = proto_tree_add_uint(
tree, hf_printerdata, tvb, offset, 0, 1);
PROTO_ITEM_SET_HIDDEN(hidden_item);
/* Parse packet */
offset = dissect_nt_policy_hnd(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_hnd, NULL, NULL,
FALSE, FALSE);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_enumprinterdata_enumindex, &ndx);
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", index %d", ndx);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_enumprinterdata_value_offered, NULL);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_enumprinterdata_data_offered, NULL);
return offset;
}
|
SpoolssEnumPrinterData_q(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset,
packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree,
dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep _U_)
{
guint32 ndx;
proto_item *hidden_item;
hidden_item = proto_tree_add_uint(
tree, hf_printerdata, tvb, offset, 0, 1);
PROTO_ITEM_SET_HIDDEN(hidden_item);
/* Parse packet */
offset = dissect_nt_policy_hnd(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_hnd, NULL, NULL,
FALSE, FALSE);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_enumprinterdata_enumindex, &ndx);
col_append_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ", index %d", ndx);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_enumprinterdata_value_offered, NULL);
offset = dissect_ndr_uint32(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep,
hf_enumprinterdata_data_offered, NULL);
return offset;
}
|
C
|
wireshark
| 0 |
CVE-2018-6154
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-6154/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/98095c718d7580b5d6715e5bfd8698234ecb4470
|
98095c718d7580b5d6715e5bfd8698234ecb4470
|
Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
|
void WebGLRenderingContextBase::hint(GLenum target, GLenum mode) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
bool is_valid = false;
switch (target) {
case GL_GENERATE_MIPMAP_HINT:
is_valid = true;
break;
case GL_FRAGMENT_SHADER_DERIVATIVE_HINT_OES: // OES_standard_derivatives
if (ExtensionEnabled(kOESStandardDerivativesName) || IsWebGL2OrHigher())
is_valid = true;
break;
}
if (!is_valid) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "hint", "invalid target");
return;
}
ContextGL()->Hint(target, mode);
}
|
void WebGLRenderingContextBase::hint(GLenum target, GLenum mode) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
bool is_valid = false;
switch (target) {
case GL_GENERATE_MIPMAP_HINT:
is_valid = true;
break;
case GL_FRAGMENT_SHADER_DERIVATIVE_HINT_OES: // OES_standard_derivatives
if (ExtensionEnabled(kOESStandardDerivativesName) || IsWebGL2OrHigher())
is_valid = true;
break;
}
if (!is_valid) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "hint", "invalid target");
return;
}
ContextGL()->Hint(target, mode);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-11522
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-11522/
|
CWE-476
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/816ecab6c532ae086ff4186b3eaf4aa7092d536f
|
816ecab6c532ae086ff4186b3eaf4aa7092d536f
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/58
|
static void read_tIME_chunk(Image *image,png_struct *ping,png_info *info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
png_timep
time;
if (png_get_tIME(ping,info,&time))
{
char
timestamp[21];
FormatLocaleString(timestamp,21,"%04d-%02d-%02dT%02d:%02d:%02dZ",
time->year,time->month,time->day,time->hour,time->minute,time->second);
SetImageProperty(image,"png:tIME",timestamp,exception);
}
}
|
static void read_tIME_chunk(Image *image,png_struct *ping,png_info *info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
png_timep
time;
if (png_get_tIME(ping,info,&time))
{
char
timestamp[21];
FormatLocaleString(timestamp,21,"%04d-%02d-%02dT%02d:%02d:%02dZ",
time->year,time->month,time->day,time->hour,time->minute,time->second);
SetImageProperty(image,"png:tIME",timestamp,exception);
}
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2017-12187
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-12187/
|
CWE-20
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=cad5a1050b7184d828aef9c1dd151c3ab649d37e
|
cad5a1050b7184d828aef9c1dd151c3ab649d37e
| null |
dmxBECreateGlyphSet(int idx, GlyphSetPtr glyphSet)
{
XRenderPictFormat *pFormat;
DMXScreenInfo *dmxScreen = &dmxScreens[idx];
dmxGlyphPrivPtr glyphPriv = DMX_GET_GLYPH_PRIV(glyphSet);
PictFormatPtr pFmt = glyphSet->format;
int (*oldErrorHandler) (Display *, XErrorEvent *);
pFormat = dmxFindFormat(dmxScreen, pFmt);
if (!pFormat) {
return BadMatch;
}
dmxGlyphLastError = 0;
oldErrorHandler = XSetErrorHandler(dmxGlyphErrorHandler);
/* Catch when this fails */
glyphPriv->glyphSets[idx]
= XRenderCreateGlyphSet(dmxScreen->beDisplay, pFormat);
XSetErrorHandler(oldErrorHandler);
if (dmxGlyphLastError) {
return dmxGlyphLastError;
}
return Success;
}
|
dmxBECreateGlyphSet(int idx, GlyphSetPtr glyphSet)
{
XRenderPictFormat *pFormat;
DMXScreenInfo *dmxScreen = &dmxScreens[idx];
dmxGlyphPrivPtr glyphPriv = DMX_GET_GLYPH_PRIV(glyphSet);
PictFormatPtr pFmt = glyphSet->format;
int (*oldErrorHandler) (Display *, XErrorEvent *);
pFormat = dmxFindFormat(dmxScreen, pFmt);
if (!pFormat) {
return BadMatch;
}
dmxGlyphLastError = 0;
oldErrorHandler = XSetErrorHandler(dmxGlyphErrorHandler);
/* Catch when this fails */
glyphPriv->glyphSets[idx]
= XRenderCreateGlyphSet(dmxScreen->beDisplay, pFormat);
XSetErrorHandler(oldErrorHandler);
if (dmxGlyphLastError) {
return dmxGlyphLastError;
}
return Success;
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2012-5136
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-5136/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/401d30ef93030afbf7e81e53a11b68fc36194502
|
401d30ef93030afbf7e81e53a11b68fc36194502
|
Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
[email protected], abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
EventQueue* Document::eventQueue() const
{
return m_eventQueue.get();
}
|
EventQueue* Document::eventQueue() const
{
return m_eventQueue.get();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9739
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9739/
|
CWE-125
|
http://git.ghostscript.com/?p=ghostpdl.git;a=commit;h=c501a58f8d5650c8ba21d447c0d6f07eafcb0f15
|
c501a58f8d5650c8ba21d447c0d6f07eafcb0f15
| null |
static void Ins_FDEF( INS_ARG )
{
PDefRecord pRec;
if ( BOUNDS( args[0], CUR.numFDefs ) )
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
return;
}
pRec = &CUR.FDefs[args[0]];
pRec->Range = CUR.curRange;
pRec->Opc = (Byte)(args[0]);
pRec->Start = CUR.IP + 1;
pRec->Active = TRUE;
skip_FDEF(EXEC_ARG);
}
|
static void Ins_FDEF( INS_ARG )
{
PDefRecord pRec;
if ( BOUNDS( args[0], CUR.numFDefs ) )
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
return;
}
pRec = &CUR.FDefs[args[0]];
pRec->Range = CUR.curRange;
pRec->Opc = (Byte)(args[0]);
pRec->Start = CUR.IP + 1;
pRec->Active = TRUE;
skip_FDEF(EXEC_ARG);
}
|
C
|
ghostscript
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9310
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9310/
|
CWE-835
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=4154c7e03fa55b4cf52509a83d50d6c09d743b7
|
4154c7e03fa55b4cf52509a83d50d6c09d743b77
| null |
e1000e_core_write(E1000ECore *core, hwaddr addr, uint64_t val, unsigned size)
{
uint16_t index = e1000e_get_reg_index_with_offset(mac_reg_access, addr);
if (index < E1000E_NWRITEOPS && e1000e_macreg_writeops[index]) {
if (mac_reg_access[index] & MAC_ACCESS_PARTIAL) {
trace_e1000e_wrn_regs_write_trivial(index << 2);
}
trace_e1000e_core_write(index << 2, size, val);
e1000e_macreg_writeops[index](core, index, val);
} else if (index < E1000E_NREADOPS && e1000e_macreg_readops[index]) {
trace_e1000e_wrn_regs_write_ro(index << 2, size, val);
} else {
trace_e1000e_wrn_regs_write_unknown(index << 2, size, val);
}
}
|
e1000e_core_write(E1000ECore *core, hwaddr addr, uint64_t val, unsigned size)
{
uint16_t index = e1000e_get_reg_index_with_offset(mac_reg_access, addr);
if (index < E1000E_NWRITEOPS && e1000e_macreg_writeops[index]) {
if (mac_reg_access[index] & MAC_ACCESS_PARTIAL) {
trace_e1000e_wrn_regs_write_trivial(index << 2);
}
trace_e1000e_core_write(index << 2, size, val);
e1000e_macreg_writeops[index](core, index, val);
} else if (index < E1000E_NREADOPS && e1000e_macreg_readops[index]) {
trace_e1000e_wrn_regs_write_ro(index << 2, size, val);
} else {
trace_e1000e_wrn_regs_write_unknown(index << 2, size, val);
}
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2183
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2183/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/2b472611a32a72f4a118c069c2d62a1a3f087afd
|
2b472611a32a72f4a118c069c2d62a1a3f087afd
|
ksm: fix NULL pointer dereference in scan_get_next_rmap_item()
Andrea Righi reported a case where an exiting task can race against
ksmd::scan_get_next_rmap_item (http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/6/1/742) easily
triggering a NULL pointer dereference in ksmd.
ksm_scan.mm_slot == &ksm_mm_head with only one registered mm
CPU 1 (__ksm_exit) CPU 2 (scan_get_next_rmap_item)
list_empty() is false
lock slot == &ksm_mm_head
list_del(slot->mm_list)
(list now empty)
unlock
lock
slot = list_entry(slot->mm_list.next)
(list is empty, so slot is still ksm_mm_head)
unlock
slot->mm == NULL ... Oops
Close this race by revalidating that the new slot is not simply the list
head again.
Andrea's test case:
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#define BUFSIZE getpagesize()
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
void *ptr;
if (posix_memalign(&ptr, getpagesize(), BUFSIZE) < 0) {
perror("posix_memalign");
exit(1);
}
if (madvise(ptr, BUFSIZE, MADV_MERGEABLE) < 0) {
perror("madvise");
exit(1);
}
*(char *)NULL = 0;
return 0;
}
Reported-by: Andrea Righi <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Andrea Righi <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
|
static void insert_to_mm_slots_hash(struct mm_struct *mm,
struct mm_slot *mm_slot)
{
struct hlist_head *bucket;
bucket = &mm_slots_hash[hash_ptr(mm, MM_SLOTS_HASH_SHIFT)];
mm_slot->mm = mm;
hlist_add_head(&mm_slot->link, bucket);
}
|
static void insert_to_mm_slots_hash(struct mm_struct *mm,
struct mm_slot *mm_slot)
{
struct hlist_head *bucket;
bucket = &mm_slots_hash[hash_ptr(mm, MM_SLOTS_HASH_SHIFT)];
mm_slot->mm = mm;
hlist_add_head(&mm_slot->link, bucket);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2017-9330
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-9330/
|
CWE-835
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=26f670a244982335cc08943fb1ec099a2c81e42d
|
26f670a244982335cc08943fb1ec099a2c81e42d
| null |
static void ohci_td_pkt(const char *msg, const uint8_t *buf, size_t len)
{
bool print16 = !!trace_event_get_state(TRACE_USB_OHCI_TD_PKT_SHORT);
bool printall = !!trace_event_get_state(TRACE_USB_OHCI_TD_PKT_FULL);
const int width = 16;
int i;
char tmp[3 * width + 1];
char *p = tmp;
if (!printall && !print16) {
return;
}
for (i = 0; ; i++) {
if (i && (!(i % width) || (i == len))) {
if (!printall) {
trace_usb_ohci_td_pkt_short(msg, tmp);
break;
}
trace_usb_ohci_td_pkt_full(msg, tmp);
p = tmp;
*p = 0;
}
if (i == len) {
break;
}
p += sprintf(p, " %.2x", buf[i]);
}
}
|
static void ohci_td_pkt(const char *msg, const uint8_t *buf, size_t len)
{
bool print16 = !!trace_event_get_state(TRACE_USB_OHCI_TD_PKT_SHORT);
bool printall = !!trace_event_get_state(TRACE_USB_OHCI_TD_PKT_FULL);
const int width = 16;
int i;
char tmp[3 * width + 1];
char *p = tmp;
if (!printall && !print16) {
return;
}
for (i = 0; ; i++) {
if (i && (!(i % width) || (i == len))) {
if (!printall) {
trace_usb_ohci_td_pkt_short(msg, tmp);
break;
}
trace_usb_ohci_td_pkt_full(msg, tmp);
p = tmp;
*p = 0;
}
if (i == len) {
break;
}
p += sprintf(p, " %.2x", buf[i]);
}
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2013-0882
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-0882/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/25f9415f43d607d3d01f542f067e3cc471983e6b
|
25f9415f43d607d3d01f542f067e3cc471983e6b
|
Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
void HTMLInputElement::updateType()
{
const AtomicString& newTypeName = InputType::normalizeTypeName(fastGetAttribute(typeAttr));
bool hadType = m_hasType;
m_hasType = true;
if (m_inputType->formControlType() == newTypeName)
return;
if (hadType && !InputType::canChangeFromAnotherType(newTypeName)) {
setAttribute(typeAttr, type());
return;
}
RefPtr<InputType> newType = InputType::create(*this, newTypeName);
removeFromRadioButtonGroup();
bool didStoreValue = m_inputType->storesValueSeparateFromAttribute();
bool didRespectHeightAndWidth = m_inputType->shouldRespectHeightAndWidthAttributes();
m_inputTypeView->destroyShadowSubtree();
lazyReattachIfAttached();
m_inputType = newType.release();
if (hasAuthorShadowRoot())
m_inputTypeView = InputTypeView::create(*this);
else
m_inputTypeView = m_inputType;
m_inputTypeView->createShadowSubtree();
bool hasTouchEventHandler = m_inputTypeView->hasTouchEventHandler();
if (hasTouchEventHandler != m_hasTouchEventHandler) {
if (hasTouchEventHandler)
document().didAddTouchEventHandler(this);
else
document().didRemoveTouchEventHandler(this);
m_hasTouchEventHandler = hasTouchEventHandler;
}
setNeedsWillValidateCheck();
bool willStoreValue = m_inputType->storesValueSeparateFromAttribute();
if (didStoreValue && !willStoreValue && hasDirtyValue()) {
setAttribute(valueAttr, AtomicString(m_valueIfDirty));
m_valueIfDirty = String();
}
if (!didStoreValue && willStoreValue) {
AtomicString valueString = fastGetAttribute(valueAttr);
m_valueIfDirty = sanitizeValue(valueString);
} else
updateValueIfNeeded();
setFormControlValueMatchesRenderer(false);
m_inputTypeView->updateView();
if (didRespectHeightAndWidth != m_inputType->shouldRespectHeightAndWidthAttributes()) {
ASSERT(elementData());
if (const Attribute* height = getAttributeItem(heightAttr))
attributeChanged(heightAttr, height->value());
if (const Attribute* width = getAttributeItem(widthAttr))
attributeChanged(widthAttr, width->value());
if (const Attribute* align = getAttributeItem(alignAttr))
attributeChanged(alignAttr, align->value());
}
if (document().focusedElement() == this)
document().updateFocusAppearanceSoon(true /* restore selection */);
setChangedSinceLastFormControlChangeEvent(false);
addToRadioButtonGroup();
setNeedsValidityCheck();
notifyFormStateChanged();
}
|
void HTMLInputElement::updateType()
{
const AtomicString& newTypeName = InputType::normalizeTypeName(fastGetAttribute(typeAttr));
bool hadType = m_hasType;
m_hasType = true;
if (m_inputType->formControlType() == newTypeName)
return;
if (hadType && !InputType::canChangeFromAnotherType(newTypeName)) {
setAttribute(typeAttr, type());
return;
}
RefPtr<InputType> newType = InputType::create(*this, newTypeName);
removeFromRadioButtonGroup();
bool didStoreValue = m_inputType->storesValueSeparateFromAttribute();
bool didRespectHeightAndWidth = m_inputType->shouldRespectHeightAndWidthAttributes();
m_inputTypeView->destroyShadowSubtree();
lazyReattachIfAttached();
m_inputType = newType.release();
if (hasAuthorShadowRoot())
m_inputTypeView = InputTypeView::create(*this);
else
m_inputTypeView = m_inputType;
m_inputTypeView->createShadowSubtree();
bool hasTouchEventHandler = m_inputTypeView->hasTouchEventHandler();
if (hasTouchEventHandler != m_hasTouchEventHandler) {
if (hasTouchEventHandler)
document().didAddTouchEventHandler(this);
else
document().didRemoveTouchEventHandler(this);
m_hasTouchEventHandler = hasTouchEventHandler;
}
setNeedsWillValidateCheck();
bool willStoreValue = m_inputType->storesValueSeparateFromAttribute();
if (didStoreValue && !willStoreValue && hasDirtyValue()) {
setAttribute(valueAttr, AtomicString(m_valueIfDirty));
m_valueIfDirty = String();
}
if (!didStoreValue && willStoreValue) {
AtomicString valueString = fastGetAttribute(valueAttr);
m_valueIfDirty = sanitizeValue(valueString);
} else
updateValueIfNeeded();
setFormControlValueMatchesRenderer(false);
m_inputTypeView->updateView();
if (didRespectHeightAndWidth != m_inputType->shouldRespectHeightAndWidthAttributes()) {
ASSERT(elementData());
if (const Attribute* height = getAttributeItem(heightAttr))
attributeChanged(heightAttr, height->value());
if (const Attribute* width = getAttributeItem(widthAttr))
attributeChanged(widthAttr, width->value());
if (const Attribute* align = getAttributeItem(alignAttr))
attributeChanged(alignAttr, align->value());
}
if (document().focusedElement() == this)
document().updateFocusAppearanceSoon(true /* restore selection */);
setChangedSinceLastFormControlChangeEvent(false);
addToRadioButtonGroup();
setNeedsValidityCheck();
notifyFormStateChanged();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/75f1a0ebf09d110642f19dd4e389004e949a7828
|
75f1a0ebf09d110642f19dd4e389004e949a7828
|
Web Animations: Temporary fix for performance regression in transition tests
This patch adds a flag to Player::setStartTime to permit it to only call
update() instead of serviceAnimations() (as per previous behaviour). We
intend to in the near future replace the serviceAnimations calls with a
deferred timing update system. Note that update() here is not correct in
general as we may need to ask the timeline to request frame callbacks.
BUG=340511
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/155303002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@166473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
PassRefPtr<Player> Player::create(DocumentTimeline& timeline, TimedItem* content)
{
return adoptRef(new Player(timeline, content));
}
|
PassRefPtr<Player> Player::create(DocumentTimeline& timeline, TimedItem* content)
{
return adoptRef(new Player(timeline, content));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/df831400bcb63db4259b5858281b1727ba972a2a
|
df831400bcb63db4259b5858281b1727ba972a2a
|
WebKit2: Support window bounce when panning.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=58065
<rdar://problem/9244367>
Reviewed by Adam Roben.
Make gestureDidScroll synchronous, as once we scroll, we need to know
whether or not we are at the beginning or end of the scrollable document.
If we are at either end of the scrollable document, we call the Windows 7
API to bounce the window to give an indication that you are past an end
of the document.
* UIProcess/WebPageProxy.cpp:
(WebKit::WebPageProxy::gestureDidScroll): Pass a boolean for the reply, and return it.
* UIProcess/WebPageProxy.h:
* UIProcess/win/WebView.cpp:
(WebKit::WebView::WebView): Inititalize a new variable.
(WebKit::WebView::onGesture): Once we send the message to scroll, check if have gone to
an end of the document, and if we have, bounce the window.
* UIProcess/win/WebView.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebPage.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/WebPage.messages.in: GestureDidScroll is now sync.
* WebProcess/WebPage/win/WebPageWin.cpp:
(WebKit::WebPage::gestureDidScroll): When we are done scrolling, check if we have a vertical
scrollbar and if we are at the beginning or the end of the scrollable document.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@83197 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
IntSize WebPageProxy::viewSize() const
{
return m_pageClient->viewSize();
}
|
IntSize WebPageProxy::viewSize() const
{
return m_pageClient->viewSize();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-6269
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-6269/
|
CWE-189
|
https://git.haproxy.org/?p=haproxy-1.5.git;a=commitdiff;h=b4d05093bc89f71377230228007e69a1434c1a0c
|
b4d05093bc89f71377230228007e69a1434c1a0c
| null |
smp_fetch_fhdr_cnt(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
struct http_txn *txn = l7;
struct hdr_idx *idx = &txn->hdr_idx;
struct hdr_ctx ctx;
const struct http_msg *msg = ((opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ) ? &txn->req : &txn->rsp;
int cnt;
if (!args || args->type != ARGT_STR)
return 0;
CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST();
ctx.idx = 0;
cnt = 0;
while (http_find_full_header2(args->data.str.str, args->data.str.len, msg->chn->buf->p, idx, &ctx))
cnt++;
smp->type = SMP_T_UINT;
smp->data.uint = cnt;
smp->flags = SMP_F_VOL_HDR;
return 1;
}
|
smp_fetch_fhdr_cnt(struct proxy *px, struct session *l4, void *l7, unsigned int opt,
const struct arg *args, struct sample *smp, const char *kw)
{
struct http_txn *txn = l7;
struct hdr_idx *idx = &txn->hdr_idx;
struct hdr_ctx ctx;
const struct http_msg *msg = ((opt & SMP_OPT_DIR) == SMP_OPT_DIR_REQ) ? &txn->req : &txn->rsp;
int cnt;
if (!args || args->type != ARGT_STR)
return 0;
CHECK_HTTP_MESSAGE_FIRST();
ctx.idx = 0;
cnt = 0;
while (http_find_full_header2(args->data.str.str, args->data.str.len, msg->chn->buf->p, idx, &ctx))
cnt++;
smp->type = SMP_T_UINT;
smp->data.uint = cnt;
smp->flags = SMP_F_VOL_HDR;
return 1;
}
|
C
|
haproxy
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a0af50481db56aa780942e8595a20c36b2c34f5c
|
a0af50481db56aa780942e8595a20c36b2c34f5c
|
Build fix following bug #30696.
Patch by Gavin Barraclough <[email protected]> on 2009-10-22
Reviewed by NOBODY (build fix).
* WebCoreSupport/FrameLoaderClientGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::FrameLoaderClient::windowObjectCleared):
* webkit/webkitwebframe.cpp:
(webkit_web_frame_get_global_context):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@49964 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
bool FrameLoaderClient::shouldGoToHistoryItem(HistoryItem* item) const
{
return item != 0;
}
|
bool FrameLoaderClient::shouldGoToHistoryItem(HistoryItem* item) const
{
return item != 0;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1621/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/04839626ed859623901ebd3a5fd483982186b59d
|
04839626ed859623901ebd3a5fd483982186b59d
|
libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
|
void Chapters::Atom::Clear()
|
void Chapters::Atom::Clear()
{
delete[] m_string_uid;
m_string_uid = NULL;
while (m_displays_count > 0)
{
Display& d = m_displays[--m_displays_count];
d.Clear();
}
delete[] m_displays;
m_displays = NULL;
m_displays_size = 0;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 1 |
CVE-2016-2476
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2476/
|
CWE-119
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/0bb5ced60304da7f61478ffd359e7ba65d72f181
|
0bb5ced60304da7f61478ffd359e7ba65d72f181
|
Fix size check for OMX_IndexParamConsumerUsageBits
since it doesn't follow the OMX convention. And remove support
for the kClientNeedsFrameBuffer flag.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: Ia2c119e2456ebf9e2f4e1de5104ef9032a212255
|
virtual status_t fillBuffer(node_id node, buffer_id buffer, int fenceFd) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IOMX::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32((int32_t)node);
data.writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
data.writeInt32(fenceFd >= 0);
if (fenceFd >= 0) {
data.writeFileDescriptor(fenceFd, true /* takeOwnership */);
}
remote()->transact(FILL_BUFFER, data, &reply);
return reply.readInt32();
}
|
virtual status_t fillBuffer(node_id node, buffer_id buffer, int fenceFd) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IOMX::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeInt32((int32_t)node);
data.writeInt32((int32_t)buffer);
data.writeInt32(fenceFd >= 0);
if (fenceFd >= 0) {
data.writeFileDescriptor(fenceFd, true /* takeOwnership */);
}
remote()->transact(FILL_BUFFER, data, &reply);
return reply.readInt32();
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2419
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2419/
|
CWE-264
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/av/+/5a856f2092f7086aa0fea9ae06b9255befcdcd34
|
5a856f2092f7086aa0fea9ae06b9255befcdcd34
|
Fix info leak vulnerability of IDrm
bug: 26323455
Change-Id: I25bb30d3666ab38d5150496375ed2f55ecb23ba8
|
virtual status_t getProvisionRequest(String8 const &certType,
String8 const &certAuthority,
Vector<uint8_t> &request,
String8 &defaultUrl) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IDrm::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeString8(certType);
data.writeString8(certAuthority);
status_t status = remote()->transact(GET_PROVISION_REQUEST, data, &reply);
if (status != OK) {
return status;
}
readVector(reply, request);
defaultUrl = reply.readString8();
return reply.readInt32();
}
|
virtual status_t getProvisionRequest(String8 const &certType,
String8 const &certAuthority,
Vector<uint8_t> &request,
String8 &defaultUrl) {
Parcel data, reply;
data.writeInterfaceToken(IDrm::getInterfaceDescriptor());
data.writeString8(certType);
data.writeString8(certAuthority);
status_t status = remote()->transact(GET_PROVISION_REQUEST, data, &reply);
if (status != OK) {
return status;
}
readVector(reply, request);
defaultUrl = reply.readString8();
return reply.readInt32();
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void methodWithOptionalStringMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() <= 0)) {
imp->methodWithOptionalString();
return;
}
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, str, info[0]);
imp->methodWithOptionalString(str);
}
|
static void methodWithOptionalStringMethod(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObject* imp = V8TestObject::toNative(info.Holder());
if (UNLIKELY(info.Length() <= 0)) {
imp->methodWithOptionalString();
return;
}
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, str, info[0]);
imp->methodWithOptionalString(str);
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-2909
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-2909/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/248a92c21c20c14b5983680c50e1d8b73fc79a2f
|
248a92c21c20c14b5983680c50e1d8b73fc79a2f
|
Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static inline void constructBidiRunsForSegment(InlineBidiResolver& topResolver, BidiRunList<BidiRun>& bidiRuns, const InlineIterator& endOfRuns, VisualDirectionOverride override, bool previousLineBrokeCleanly)
{
ASSERT(&topResolver.runs() == &bidiRuns);
ASSERT(topResolver.position() != endOfRuns);
RenderObject* currentRoot = topResolver.position().root();
topResolver.createBidiRunsForLine(endOfRuns, override, previousLineBrokeCleanly);
while (!topResolver.isolatedRuns().isEmpty()) {
BidiRun* isolatedRun = topResolver.isolatedRuns().last();
topResolver.isolatedRuns().removeLast();
RenderObject* startObj = isolatedRun->object();
RenderInline* isolatedInline = toRenderInline(highestContainingIsolateWithinRoot(startObj, currentRoot));
ASSERT(isolatedInline);
InlineBidiResolver isolatedResolver;
EUnicodeBidi unicodeBidi = isolatedInline->style()->unicodeBidi();
TextDirection direction = isolatedInline->style()->direction();
if (unicodeBidi == Plaintext)
direction = determinePlaintextDirectionality(isolatedInline, startObj);
else {
ASSERT(unicodeBidi == Isolate || unicodeBidi == IsolateOverride);
direction = isolatedInline->style()->direction();
}
isolatedResolver.setStatus(statusWithDirection(direction, isOverride(unicodeBidi)));
setupResolverToResumeInIsolate(isolatedResolver, isolatedInline, startObj);
InlineIterator iter = InlineIterator(isolatedInline, startObj, isolatedRun->m_start);
isolatedResolver.setPositionIgnoringNestedIsolates(iter);
isolatedResolver.createBidiRunsForLine(endOfRuns, NoVisualOverride, previousLineBrokeCleanly);
if (isolatedResolver.runs().runCount())
bidiRuns.replaceRunWithRuns(isolatedRun, isolatedResolver.runs());
if (!isolatedResolver.isolatedRuns().isEmpty()) {
topResolver.isolatedRuns().append(isolatedResolver.isolatedRuns());
isolatedResolver.isolatedRuns().clear();
currentRoot = isolatedInline;
}
}
}
|
static inline void constructBidiRunsForSegment(InlineBidiResolver& topResolver, BidiRunList<BidiRun>& bidiRuns, const InlineIterator& endOfRuns, VisualDirectionOverride override, bool previousLineBrokeCleanly)
{
ASSERT(&topResolver.runs() == &bidiRuns);
ASSERT(topResolver.position() != endOfRuns);
RenderObject* currentRoot = topResolver.position().root();
topResolver.createBidiRunsForLine(endOfRuns, override, previousLineBrokeCleanly);
while (!topResolver.isolatedRuns().isEmpty()) {
BidiRun* isolatedRun = topResolver.isolatedRuns().last();
topResolver.isolatedRuns().removeLast();
RenderObject* startObj = isolatedRun->object();
RenderInline* isolatedInline = toRenderInline(containingIsolate(startObj, currentRoot));
InlineBidiResolver isolatedResolver;
EUnicodeBidi unicodeBidi = isolatedInline->style()->unicodeBidi();
TextDirection direction = isolatedInline->style()->direction();
if (unicodeBidi == Plaintext)
direction = determinePlaintextDirectionality(isolatedInline, startObj);
else {
ASSERT(unicodeBidi == Isolate || unicodeBidi == IsolateOverride);
direction = isolatedInline->style()->direction();
}
isolatedResolver.setStatus(statusWithDirection(direction, isOverride(unicodeBidi)));
setupResolverToResumeInIsolate(isolatedResolver, isolatedInline, startObj);
InlineIterator iter = InlineIterator(isolatedInline, startObj, isolatedRun->m_start);
isolatedResolver.setPositionIgnoringNestedIsolates(iter);
isolatedResolver.createBidiRunsForLine(endOfRuns, NoVisualOverride, previousLineBrokeCleanly);
if (isolatedResolver.runs().runCount())
bidiRuns.replaceRunWithRuns(isolatedRun, isolatedResolver.runs());
if (!isolatedResolver.isolatedRuns().isEmpty()) {
topResolver.isolatedRuns().append(isolatedResolver.isolatedRuns());
isolatedResolver.isolatedRuns().clear();
currentRoot = isolatedInline;
}
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 1 |
CVE-2019-13136
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2019-13136/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/fe5f4b85e6b1b54d3b4588a77133c06ade46d891
|
fe5f4b85e6b1b54d3b4588a77133c06ade46d891
|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1602
|
static void InitPSDInfo(const Image *image,PSDInfo *info)
{
info->version=1;
info->columns=image->columns;
info->rows=image->rows;
info->mode=10; /* Set the mode to a value that won't change the colorspace */
info->channels=1U;
info->min_channels=1U;
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
info->mode=2; /* indexed mode */
else
{
info->channels=(unsigned short) image->number_channels;
info->min_channels=info->channels;
if (image->alpha_trait == BlendPixelTrait)
info->min_channels--;
}
}
|
static void InitPSDInfo(const Image *image,PSDInfo *info)
{
info->version=1;
info->columns=image->columns;
info->rows=image->rows;
info->mode=10; /* Set the mode to a value that won't change the colorspace */
info->channels=1U;
info->min_channels=1U;
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
info->mode=2; /* indexed mode */
else
{
info->channels=(unsigned short) image->number_channels;
info->min_channels=info->channels;
if (image->alpha_trait == BlendPixelTrait)
info->min_channels--;
}
}
|
C
|
ImageMagick
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5093
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5093/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0720b02e4f303ea6b114d4ae9453e3a7ff55f8dc
|
0720b02e4f303ea6b114d4ae9453e3a7ff55f8dc
|
If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
|
void WebContentsImpl::Copy() {
RenderFrameHost* focused_frame = GetFocusedFrame();
if (!focused_frame)
return;
focused_frame->GetFrameInputHandler()->Copy();
RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Copy"));
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::Copy() {
RenderFrameHost* focused_frame = GetFocusedFrame();
if (!focused_frame)
return;
focused_frame->GetFrameInputHandler()->Copy();
RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Copy"));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-11232
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-11232/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f09444639099584bc4784dfcd85ada67c6f33e0f
|
f09444639099584bc4784dfcd85ada67c6f33e0f
|
coresight: fix kernel panic caused by invalid CPU
Commit d52c9750f150 ("coresight: reset "enable_sink" flag when need be")
caused a kernel panic because of the using of an invalid value: after
'for_each_cpu(cpu, mask)', value of local variable 'cpu' become invalid,
causes following 'cpu_to_node' access invalid memory area.
This patch brings the deleted 'cpu = cpumask_first(mask)' back.
Panic log:
$ perf record -e cs_etm// ls
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffe801804af4f10
pgd = ffff8017ce031600
[fffe801804af4f10] *pgd=0000000000000000, *pud=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 33 PID: 1619 Comm: perf Not tainted 4.7.1+ #16
Hardware name: Huawei Taishan 2280 /CH05TEVBA, BIOS 1.10 11/24/2016
task: ffff8017cb0c8400 ti: ffff8017cb154000 task.ti: ffff8017cb154000
PC is at tmc_alloc_etf_buffer+0x60/0xd4
LR is at tmc_alloc_etf_buffer+0x44/0xd4
pc : [<ffff000008633df8>] lr : [<ffff000008633ddc>] pstate: 60000145
sp : ffff8017cb157b40
x29: ffff8017cb157b40 x28: 0000000000000000
...skip...
7a60: ffff000008c64dc8 0000000000000006 0000000000000253 ffffffffffffffff
7a80: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff0000080872cc 0000000000000001
[<ffff000008633df8>] tmc_alloc_etf_buffer+0x60/0xd4
[<ffff000008632b9c>] etm_setup_aux+0x1dc/0x1e8
[<ffff00000816eed4>] rb_alloc_aux+0x2b0/0x338
[<ffff00000816a5e4>] perf_mmap+0x414/0x568
[<ffff0000081ab694>] mmap_region+0x324/0x544
[<ffff0000081abbe8>] do_mmap+0x334/0x3e0
[<ffff000008191150>] vm_mmap_pgoff+0xa4/0xc8
[<ffff0000081a9a30>] SyS_mmap_pgoff+0xb0/0x22c
[<ffff0000080872e4>] sys_mmap+0x18/0x28
[<ffff0000080843f0>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28
Code: 912040a5 d0001c00 f873d821 911c6000 (b8656822)
---[ end trace 98933da8f92b0c9a ]---
Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <[email protected]>
Cc: Xia Kaixu <[email protected]>
Cc: Li Zefan <[email protected]>
Cc: Mathieu Poirier <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: d52c9750f150 ("coresight: reset "enable_sink" flag when need be")
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier <[email protected]>
Cc: stable <[email protected]> # 4.10
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
static void *alloc_event_data(int cpu)
{
int size;
cpumask_t *mask;
struct etm_event_data *event_data;
/* First get memory for the session's data */
event_data = kzalloc(sizeof(struct etm_event_data), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!event_data)
return NULL;
/* Make sure nothing disappears under us */
get_online_cpus();
size = num_online_cpus();
mask = &event_data->mask;
if (cpu != -1)
cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, mask);
else
cpumask_copy(mask, cpu_online_mask);
put_online_cpus();
/*
* Each CPU has a single path between source and destination. As such
* allocate an array using CPU numbers as indexes. That way a path
* for any CPU can easily be accessed at any given time. We proceed
* the same way for sessions involving a single CPU. The cost of
* unused memory when dealing with single CPU trace scenarios is small
* compared to the cost of searching through an optimized array.
*/
event_data->path = kcalloc(size,
sizeof(struct list_head *), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!event_data->path) {
kfree(event_data);
return NULL;
}
return event_data;
}
|
static void *alloc_event_data(int cpu)
{
int size;
cpumask_t *mask;
struct etm_event_data *event_data;
/* First get memory for the session's data */
event_data = kzalloc(sizeof(struct etm_event_data), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!event_data)
return NULL;
/* Make sure nothing disappears under us */
get_online_cpus();
size = num_online_cpus();
mask = &event_data->mask;
if (cpu != -1)
cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, mask);
else
cpumask_copy(mask, cpu_online_mask);
put_online_cpus();
/*
* Each CPU has a single path between source and destination. As such
* allocate an array using CPU numbers as indexes. That way a path
* for any CPU can easily be accessed at any given time. We proceed
* the same way for sessions involving a single CPU. The cost of
* unused memory when dealing with single CPU trace scenarios is small
* compared to the cost of searching through an optimized array.
*/
event_data->path = kcalloc(size,
sizeof(struct list_head *), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!event_data->path) {
kfree(event_data);
return NULL;
}
return event_data;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3955
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3955/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/b348d7dddb6c4fbfc810b7a0626e8ec9e29f7cbb
|
b348d7dddb6c4fbfc810b7a0626e8ec9e29f7cbb
|
USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write
Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer
usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a
packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As
part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the input for
urb->actual_length comes from the network, it should be treated as untrusted.
Any entity controlling the network may put any value in the input and the
preallocated urb->transfer_buffer may not be large enough to hold the data.
Thus, the malicious entity is able to write arbitrary data to kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
|
void usbip_dump_urb(struct urb *urb)
{
struct device *dev;
if (!urb) {
pr_debug("urb: null pointer!!\n");
return;
}
if (!urb->dev) {
pr_debug("urb->dev: null pointer!!\n");
return;
}
dev = &urb->dev->dev;
dev_dbg(dev, " urb :%p\n", urb);
dev_dbg(dev, " dev :%p\n", urb->dev);
usbip_dump_usb_device(urb->dev);
dev_dbg(dev, " pipe :%08x ", urb->pipe);
usbip_dump_pipe(urb->pipe);
dev_dbg(dev, " status :%d\n", urb->status);
dev_dbg(dev, " transfer_flags :%08X\n", urb->transfer_flags);
dev_dbg(dev, " transfer_buffer :%p\n", urb->transfer_buffer);
dev_dbg(dev, " transfer_buffer_length:%d\n",
urb->transfer_buffer_length);
dev_dbg(dev, " actual_length :%d\n", urb->actual_length);
dev_dbg(dev, " setup_packet :%p\n", urb->setup_packet);
if (urb->setup_packet && usb_pipetype(urb->pipe) == PIPE_CONTROL)
usbip_dump_usb_ctrlrequest(
(struct usb_ctrlrequest *)urb->setup_packet);
dev_dbg(dev, " start_frame :%d\n", urb->start_frame);
dev_dbg(dev, " number_of_packets :%d\n", urb->number_of_packets);
dev_dbg(dev, " interval :%d\n", urb->interval);
dev_dbg(dev, " error_count :%d\n", urb->error_count);
dev_dbg(dev, " context :%p\n", urb->context);
dev_dbg(dev, " complete :%p\n", urb->complete);
}
|
void usbip_dump_urb(struct urb *urb)
{
struct device *dev;
if (!urb) {
pr_debug("urb: null pointer!!\n");
return;
}
if (!urb->dev) {
pr_debug("urb->dev: null pointer!!\n");
return;
}
dev = &urb->dev->dev;
dev_dbg(dev, " urb :%p\n", urb);
dev_dbg(dev, " dev :%p\n", urb->dev);
usbip_dump_usb_device(urb->dev);
dev_dbg(dev, " pipe :%08x ", urb->pipe);
usbip_dump_pipe(urb->pipe);
dev_dbg(dev, " status :%d\n", urb->status);
dev_dbg(dev, " transfer_flags :%08X\n", urb->transfer_flags);
dev_dbg(dev, " transfer_buffer :%p\n", urb->transfer_buffer);
dev_dbg(dev, " transfer_buffer_length:%d\n",
urb->transfer_buffer_length);
dev_dbg(dev, " actual_length :%d\n", urb->actual_length);
dev_dbg(dev, " setup_packet :%p\n", urb->setup_packet);
if (urb->setup_packet && usb_pipetype(urb->pipe) == PIPE_CONTROL)
usbip_dump_usb_ctrlrequest(
(struct usb_ctrlrequest *)urb->setup_packet);
dev_dbg(dev, " start_frame :%d\n", urb->start_frame);
dev_dbg(dev, " number_of_packets :%d\n", urb->number_of_packets);
dev_dbg(dev, " interval :%d\n", urb->interval);
dev_dbg(dev, " error_count :%d\n", urb->error_count);
dev_dbg(dev, " context :%p\n", urb->context);
dev_dbg(dev, " complete :%p\n", urb->complete);
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5766
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5766/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/php/php-src/commit/7722455726bec8c53458a32851d2a87982cf0eac?w=1
|
7722455726bec8c53458a32851d2a87982cf0eac?w=1
|
Fixed #72339 Integer Overflow in _gd2GetHeader() resulting in heap overflow
|
static void _gd2PutHeader (gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtx * out, int cs, int fmt, int cx, int cy)
{
int i;
/* Send the gd2 id, to verify file format. */
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
gdPutC((unsigned char) (GD2_ID[i]), out);
}
/* We put the version info first, so future versions can easily change header info. */
gdPutWord(GD2_VERS, out);
gdPutWord(im->sx, out);
gdPutWord(im->sy, out);
gdPutWord(cs, out);
gdPutWord(fmt, out);
gdPutWord(cx, out);
gdPutWord(cy, out);
}
|
static void _gd2PutHeader (gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtx * out, int cs, int fmt, int cx, int cy)
{
int i;
/* Send the gd2 id, to verify file format. */
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
gdPutC((unsigned char) (GD2_ID[i]), out);
}
/* We put the version info first, so future versions can easily change header info. */
gdPutWord(GD2_VERS, out);
gdPutWord(im->sx, out);
gdPutWord(im->sy, out);
gdPutWord(cs, out);
gdPutWord(fmt, out);
gdPutWord(cx, out);
gdPutWord(cy, out);
}
|
C
|
php-src
| 0 |
CVE-2009-3605
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2009-3605/
|
CWE-189
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/poppler/poppler/commit/?id=9cf2325fb22f812b31858e519411f57747d39bd8
|
9cf2325fb22f812b31858e519411f57747d39bd8
| null |
void Splash::setLineCap(int lineCap) {
state->lineCap = lineCap;
}
|
void Splash::setLineCap(int lineCap) {
state->lineCap = lineCap;
}
|
CPP
|
poppler
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5093
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5093/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0720b02e4f303ea6b114d4ae9453e3a7ff55f8dc
|
0720b02e4f303ea6b114d4ae9453e3a7ff55f8dc
|
If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
|
void WebContentsImpl::UpdateOverridingUserAgent() {
NotifyPreferencesChanged();
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::UpdateOverridingUserAgent() {
NotifyPreferencesChanged();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-3751
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-3751/
| null |
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libpng/+/9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
9d4853418ab2f754c2b63e091c29c5529b8b86ca
|
DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
buffer_read(struct display *dp, struct buffer *bp, png_bytep data,
png_size_t size)
{
struct buffer_list *last = bp->current;
size_t read_count = bp->read_count;
while (size > 0)
{
size_t avail;
if (last == NULL ||
(last == bp->last && read_count >= bp->end_count))
{
display_log(dp, USER_ERROR, "file truncated (%lu bytes)",
(unsigned long)size);
/*NOTREACHED*/
break;
}
else if (read_count >= sizeof last->buffer)
{
/* Move to the next buffer: */
last = last->next;
read_count = 0;
bp->current = last; /* Avoid update outside the loop */
/* And do a sanity check (the EOF case is caught above) */
if (last == NULL)
{
display_log(dp, INTERNAL_ERROR, "damaged buffer list");
/*NOTREACHED*/
break;
}
}
avail = (sizeof last->buffer) - read_count;
if (avail > size)
avail = size;
memcpy(data, last->buffer + read_count, avail);
read_count += avail;
size -= avail;
data += avail;
}
bp->read_count = read_count;
}
|
buffer_read(struct display *dp, struct buffer *bp, png_bytep data,
png_size_t size)
{
struct buffer_list *last = bp->current;
size_t read_count = bp->read_count;
while (size > 0)
{
size_t avail;
if (last == NULL ||
(last == bp->last && read_count >= bp->end_count))
{
display_log(dp, USER_ERROR, "file truncated (%lu bytes)",
(unsigned long)size);
/*NOTREACHED*/
break;
}
else if (read_count >= sizeof last->buffer)
{
/* Move to the next buffer: */
last = last->next;
read_count = 0;
bp->current = last; /* Avoid update outside the loop */
/* And do a sanity check (the EOF case is caught above) */
if (last == NULL)
{
display_log(dp, INTERNAL_ERROR, "damaged buffer list");
/*NOTREACHED*/
break;
}
}
avail = (sizeof last->buffer) - read_count;
if (avail > size)
avail = size;
memcpy(data, last->buffer + read_count, avail);
read_count += avail;
size -= avail;
data += avail;
}
bp->read_count = read_count;
}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/8c3278613079f1c6d858f2b2deb95d8b95dd1789
|
8c3278613079f1c6d858f2b2deb95d8b95dd1789
|
Enable ManifestTest.AppLaunchContainer as it should be passing now.
BUG=47230
TEST=test passes
TBR=robertshield
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/2844016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@50553 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Extension* LoadAndExpectSuccess(const std::string& name) {
std::string error;
Extension* extension = LoadExtension(name, &error);
EXPECT_TRUE(extension);
EXPECT_EQ("", error);
return extension;
}
|
Extension* LoadAndExpectSuccess(const std::string& name) {
std::string error;
Extension* extension = LoadExtension(name, &error);
EXPECT_TRUE(extension);
EXPECT_EQ("", error);
return extension;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2895
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2895/
|
CWE-119
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/16dcd30c215801941d9890859fd79a234128fc3e
|
16dcd30c215801941d9890859fd79a234128fc3e
|
Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
content::MockDownloadItem& AddItemToManager() {
DownloadCreateInfo info;
static const char* kDownloadIdDomain = "Test download id domain";
int id = next_download_id_;
++next_download_id_;
info.download_id = content::DownloadId(kDownloadIdDomain, id);
info.request_handle = DownloadRequestHandle();
download_manager_->CreateDownloadItem(&info);
DCHECK(mock_download_item_factory_->GetItem(id));
content::MockDownloadItem& item(*mock_download_item_factory_->GetItem(id));
ON_CALL(item, GetId())
.WillByDefault(Return(id));
return item;
}
|
content::MockDownloadItem& AddItemToManager() {
DownloadCreateInfo info;
static const char* kDownloadIdDomain = "Test download id domain";
int id = next_download_id_;
++next_download_id_;
info.download_id = content::DownloadId(kDownloadIdDomain, id);
info.request_handle = DownloadRequestHandle();
download_manager_->CreateDownloadItem(&info);
DCHECK(mock_download_item_factory_->GetItem(id));
content::MockDownloadItem& item(*mock_download_item_factory_->GetItem(id));
ON_CALL(item, GetId())
.WillByDefault(Return(id));
return item;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6787
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6787/
|
CWE-264
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f63a8daa5812afef4f06c962351687e1ff9ccb2b
|
f63a8daa5812afef4f06c962351687e1ff9ccb2b
|
perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
unclone_ctx(struct perf_event_context *ctx)
{
struct perf_event_context *parent_ctx = ctx->parent_ctx;
lockdep_assert_held(&ctx->lock);
if (parent_ctx)
ctx->parent_ctx = NULL;
ctx->generation++;
return parent_ctx;
}
|
unclone_ctx(struct perf_event_context *ctx)
{
struct perf_event_context *parent_ctx = ctx->parent_ctx;
lockdep_assert_held(&ctx->lock);
if (parent_ctx)
ctx->parent_ctx = NULL;
ctx->generation++;
return parent_ctx;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2011-2799
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-2799/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/5a2de6455f565783c73e53eae2c8b953e7d48520
|
5a2de6455f565783c73e53eae2c8b953e7d48520
|
2011-06-02 Joone Hur <[email protected]>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
gboolean webkit_web_view_can_cut_clipboard(WebKitWebView* webView)
{
g_return_val_if_fail(WEBKIT_IS_WEB_VIEW(webView), FALSE);
Frame* frame = core(webView)->focusController()->focusedOrMainFrame();
return frame->editor()->canCut() || frame->editor()->canDHTMLCut();
}
|
gboolean webkit_web_view_can_cut_clipboard(WebKitWebView* webView)
{
g_return_val_if_fail(WEBKIT_IS_WEB_VIEW(webView), FALSE);
Frame* frame = core(webView)->focusController()->focusedOrMainFrame();
return frame->editor()->canCut() || frame->editor()->canDHTMLCut();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-2519
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-2519/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=5ef20c8c1d4de12a84b50ba497c2a358c90ec44b
|
5ef20c8c1d4de12a84b50ba497c2a358c90ec44b
| null |
find_variant_selector_charmap( FT_Face face )
{
FT_CharMap* first;
FT_CharMap* end;
FT_CharMap* cur;
/* caller should have already checked that `face' is valid */
FT_ASSERT( face );
first = face->charmaps;
if ( !first )
return NULL;
end = first + face->num_charmaps; /* points after the last one */
for ( cur = first; cur < end; ++cur )
{
if ( cur[0]->platform_id == TT_PLATFORM_APPLE_UNICODE &&
cur[0]->encoding_id == TT_APPLE_ID_VARIANT_SELECTOR &&
FT_Get_CMap_Format( cur[0] ) == 14 )
return cur[0];
}
return NULL;
}
|
find_variant_selector_charmap( FT_Face face )
{
FT_CharMap* first;
FT_CharMap* end;
FT_CharMap* cur;
/* caller should have already checked that `face' is valid */
FT_ASSERT( face );
first = face->charmaps;
if ( !first )
return NULL;
end = first + face->num_charmaps; /* points after the last one */
for ( cur = first; cur < end; ++cur )
{
if ( cur[0]->platform_id == TT_PLATFORM_APPLE_UNICODE &&
cur[0]->encoding_id == TT_APPLE_ID_VARIANT_SELECTOR &&
FT_Get_CMap_Format( cur[0] ) == 14 )
return cur[0];
}
return NULL;
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6836
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6836/
|
CWE-200
|
https://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=fdda170e50b8af062cf5741e12c4fb5e57a2eacf
|
fdda170e50b8af062cf5741e12c4fb5e57a2eacf
| null |
vmxnet3_setup_tx_offloads(VMXNET3State *s)
{
switch (s->offload_mode) {
case VMXNET3_OM_NONE:
net_tx_pkt_build_vheader(s->tx_pkt, false, false, 0);
break;
case VMXNET3_OM_CSUM:
net_tx_pkt_build_vheader(s->tx_pkt, false, true, 0);
VMW_PKPRN("L4 CSO requested\n");
break;
case VMXNET3_OM_TSO:
net_tx_pkt_build_vheader(s->tx_pkt, true, true,
s->cso_or_gso_size);
net_tx_pkt_update_ip_checksums(s->tx_pkt);
VMW_PKPRN("GSO offload requested.");
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached();
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
vmxnet3_setup_tx_offloads(VMXNET3State *s)
{
switch (s->offload_mode) {
case VMXNET3_OM_NONE:
net_tx_pkt_build_vheader(s->tx_pkt, false, false, 0);
break;
case VMXNET3_OM_CSUM:
net_tx_pkt_build_vheader(s->tx_pkt, false, true, 0);
VMW_PKPRN("L4 CSO requested\n");
break;
case VMXNET3_OM_TSO:
net_tx_pkt_build_vheader(s->tx_pkt, true, true,
s->cso_or_gso_size);
net_tx_pkt_update_ip_checksums(s->tx_pkt);
VMW_PKPRN("GSO offload requested.");
break;
default:
g_assert_not_reached();
return false;
}
return true;
}
|
C
|
qemu
| 0 |
CVE-2016-5217
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-5217/
|
CWE-284
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/0d68cbd77addd38909101f76847deea56de00524
|
0d68cbd77addd38909101f76847deea56de00524
|
Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: enne <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
|
int XI2ModeToXMode(int xi2_mode) {
switch (xi2_mode) {
case XINotifyNormal:
return NotifyNormal;
case XINotifyGrab:
case XINotifyPassiveGrab:
return NotifyGrab;
case XINotifyUngrab:
case XINotifyPassiveUngrab:
return NotifyUngrab;
case XINotifyWhileGrabbed:
return NotifyWhileGrabbed;
default:
NOTREACHED();
return NotifyNormal;
}
}
|
int XI2ModeToXMode(int xi2_mode) {
switch (xi2_mode) {
case XINotifyNormal:
return NotifyNormal;
case XINotifyGrab:
case XINotifyPassiveGrab:
return NotifyGrab;
case XINotifyUngrab:
case XINotifyPassiveUngrab:
return NotifyUngrab;
case XINotifyWhileGrabbed:
return NotifyWhileGrabbed;
default:
NOTREACHED();
return NotifyNormal;
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2014-8275
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-8275/
|
CWE-310
|
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/684400ce192dac51df3d3e92b61830a6ef90be3e
|
684400ce192dac51df3d3e92b61830a6ef90be3e
|
Fix various certificate fingerprint issues.
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.
3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).
CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <[email protected]>
|
int X509_CRL_digest(const X509_CRL *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md,
unsigned int *len)
{
return(ASN1_item_digest(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL),type,(char *)data,md,len));
}
|
int X509_CRL_digest(const X509_CRL *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md,
unsigned int *len)
{
return(ASN1_item_digest(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL),type,(char *)data,md,len));
}
|
C
|
openssl
| 0 |
null | null | null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/d1a59e4e845a01d7d7b80ef184b672752a9eae4d
|
d1a59e4e845a01d7d7b80ef184b672752a9eae4d
|
Fixing cross-process postMessage replies on more than two iterations.
When two frames are replying to each other using event.source across processes,
after the first two replies, things break down. The root cause is that in
RenderViewImpl::GetFrameByMappedID, the lookup was incorrect. It is now
properly searching for the remote frame id and returning the local one.
BUG=153445
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11040015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@159924 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
void RenderViewImpl::dispatchIntent(
WebFrame* frame, const WebIntentRequest& intentRequest) {
webkit_glue::WebIntentData intent_data(intentRequest.intent());
WebKit::WebMessagePortChannelArray* channels =
intentRequest.intent().messagePortChannelsRelease();
if (channels) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < channels->size(); ++i) {
WebMessagePortChannelImpl* webchannel =
static_cast<WebMessagePortChannelImpl*>((*channels)[i]);
intent_data.message_port_ids.push_back(webchannel->message_port_id());
DCHECK(intent_data.message_port_ids[i] != MSG_ROUTING_NONE);
}
delete channels;
}
int id = intents_host_->RegisterWebIntent(intentRequest);
Send(new IntentsHostMsg_WebIntentDispatch(
routing_id_, intent_data, id));
}
|
void RenderViewImpl::dispatchIntent(
WebFrame* frame, const WebIntentRequest& intentRequest) {
webkit_glue::WebIntentData intent_data(intentRequest.intent());
WebKit::WebMessagePortChannelArray* channels =
intentRequest.intent().messagePortChannelsRelease();
if (channels) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < channels->size(); ++i) {
WebMessagePortChannelImpl* webchannel =
static_cast<WebMessagePortChannelImpl*>((*channels)[i]);
intent_data.message_port_ids.push_back(webchannel->message_port_id());
DCHECK(intent_data.message_port_ids[i] != MSG_ROUTING_NONE);
}
delete channels;
}
int id = intents_host_->RegisterWebIntent(intentRequest);
Send(new IntentsHostMsg_WebIntentDispatch(
routing_id_, intent_data, id));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2011-4621
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-4621/
| null |
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
f26f9aff6aaf67e9a430d16c266f91b13a5bff64
|
Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
LKML-Reference: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
|
static int get_update_sysctl_factor(void)
{
unsigned int cpus = min_t(int, num_online_cpus(), 8);
unsigned int factor;
switch (sysctl_sched_tunable_scaling) {
case SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_NONE:
factor = 1;
break;
case SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_LINEAR:
factor = cpus;
break;
case SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_LOG:
default:
factor = 1 + ilog2(cpus);
break;
}
return factor;
}
|
static int get_update_sysctl_factor(void)
{
unsigned int cpus = min_t(int, num_online_cpus(), 8);
unsigned int factor;
switch (sysctl_sched_tunable_scaling) {
case SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_NONE:
factor = 1;
break;
case SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_LINEAR:
factor = cpus;
break;
case SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_LOG:
default:
factor = 1 + ilog2(cpus);
break;
}
return factor;
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-6250
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-6250/
|
CWE-190
|
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/3014e198
|
3014e198
|
Issue 711: Be more careful about verifying filename lengths when writing ISO9660 archives
* Don't cast size_t to int, since this can lead to overflow
on machines where sizeof(int) < sizeof(size_t)
* Check a + b > limit by writing it as
a > limit || b > limit || a + b > limit
to avoid problems when a + b wraps around.
|
set_str_utf16be(struct archive_write *a, unsigned char *p, const char *s,
size_t l, uint16_t uf, enum vdc vdc)
{
size_t size, i;
int onepad;
if (s == NULL)
s = "";
if (l & 0x01) {
onepad = 1;
l &= ~1;
} else
onepad = 0;
if (vdc == VDC_UCS2) {
struct iso9660 *iso9660 = a->format_data;
if (archive_strncpy_l(&iso9660->utf16be, s, strlen(s),
iso9660->sconv_to_utf16be) != 0 && errno == ENOMEM) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate memory for UTF-16BE");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
size = iso9660->utf16be.length;
if (size > l)
size = l;
memcpy(p, iso9660->utf16be.s, size);
} else {
const uint16_t *u16 = (const uint16_t *)s;
size = 0;
while (*u16++)
size += 2;
if (size > l)
size = l;
memcpy(p, s, size);
}
for (i = 0; i < size; i += 2, p += 2) {
if (!joliet_allowed_char(p[0], p[1]))
archive_be16enc(p, 0x005F);/* '_' */
}
l -= size;
while (l > 0) {
archive_be16enc(p, uf);
p += 2;
l -= 2;
}
if (onepad)
*p = 0;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
|
set_str_utf16be(struct archive_write *a, unsigned char *p, const char *s,
size_t l, uint16_t uf, enum vdc vdc)
{
size_t size, i;
int onepad;
if (s == NULL)
s = "";
if (l & 0x01) {
onepad = 1;
l &= ~1;
} else
onepad = 0;
if (vdc == VDC_UCS2) {
struct iso9660 *iso9660 = a->format_data;
if (archive_strncpy_l(&iso9660->utf16be, s, strlen(s),
iso9660->sconv_to_utf16be) != 0 && errno == ENOMEM) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate memory for UTF-16BE");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
size = iso9660->utf16be.length;
if (size > l)
size = l;
memcpy(p, iso9660->utf16be.s, size);
} else {
const uint16_t *u16 = (const uint16_t *)s;
size = 0;
while (*u16++)
size += 2;
if (size > l)
size = l;
memcpy(p, s, size);
}
for (i = 0; i < size; i += 2, p += 2) {
if (!joliet_allowed_char(p[0], p[1]))
archive_be16enc(p, 0x005F);/* '_' */
}
l -= size;
while (l > 0) {
archive_be16enc(p, uf);
p += 2;
l -= 2;
}
if (onepad)
*p = 0;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
|
C
|
libarchive
| 0 |
CVE-2014-1713
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2014-1713/
|
CWE-399
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
f85a87ec670ad0fce9d98d90c9a705b72a288154
|
document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
[email protected]
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
static void attrWithJSGetterAndSetterAttributeSetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue = info[0];
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::attrWithJSGetterAndSetterAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
static void attrWithJSGetterAndSetterAttributeSetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue = info[0];
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::attrWithJSGetterAndSetterAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2018-20067
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-20067/
|
CWE-254
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044
|
a7d715ae5b654d1f98669fd979a00282a7229044
|
Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
|
void WebContentsImpl::AddDestructionObserver(WebContentsImpl* web_contents) {
if (!ContainsKey(destruction_observers_, web_contents)) {
destruction_observers_[web_contents] =
std::make_unique<DestructionObserver>(this, web_contents);
}
}
|
void WebContentsImpl::AddDestructionObserver(WebContentsImpl* web_contents) {
if (!ContainsKey(destruction_observers_, web_contents)) {
destruction_observers_[web_contents] =
std::make_unique<DestructionObserver>(this, web_contents);
}
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2013-6630
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2013-6630/
|
CWE-189
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/805eabb91d386c86bd64336c7643f6dfa864151d
|
805eabb91d386c86bd64336c7643f6dfa864151d
|
Convert ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE -> arraysize in base/.
[email protected]
BUG=423134
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/656033009
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299835}
|
static int OpenObjectFileContainingPc(uint64_t pc, uint64_t& start_address,
uint64_t& base_address, char* file_path,
int file_path_size) {
SandboxSymbolizeHelper* instance = GetInstance();
std::vector<MappedMemoryRegion>::const_iterator it;
bool is_first = true;
for (it = instance->regions_.begin(); it != instance->regions_.end();
++it, is_first = false) {
const MappedMemoryRegion& region = *it;
if (region.start <= pc && pc < region.end) {
start_address = region.start;
base_address = (is_first ? 0U : start_address) - region.offset;
if (file_path && file_path_size > 0) {
strncpy(file_path, region.path.c_str(), file_path_size);
file_path[file_path_size - 1] = '\0';
}
return instance->GetFileDescriptor(region.path.c_str());
}
}
return -1;
}
|
static int OpenObjectFileContainingPc(uint64_t pc, uint64_t& start_address,
uint64_t& base_address, char* file_path,
int file_path_size) {
SandboxSymbolizeHelper* instance = GetInstance();
std::vector<MappedMemoryRegion>::const_iterator it;
bool is_first = true;
for (it = instance->regions_.begin(); it != instance->regions_.end();
++it, is_first = false) {
const MappedMemoryRegion& region = *it;
if (region.start <= pc && pc < region.end) {
start_address = region.start;
base_address = (is_first ? 0U : start_address) - region.offset;
if (file_path && file_path_size > 0) {
strncpy(file_path, region.path.c_str(), file_path_size);
file_path[file_path_size - 1] = '\0';
}
return instance->GetFileDescriptor(region.path.c_str());
}
}
return -1;
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-11399
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-11399/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/FFmpeg/FFmpeg/commit/ba4beaf6149f7241c8bd85fe853318c2f6837ad0
|
ba4beaf6149f7241c8bd85fe853318c2f6837ad0
|
avcodec/apedec: Fix integer overflow
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: PoC.ape and others
Found-by: Bingchang, Liu@VARAS of IIE
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]>
|
static void entropy_decode_mono_3860(APEContext *ctx, int blockstodecode)
{
int32_t *decoded0 = ctx->decoded[0];
while (blockstodecode--)
*decoded0++ = ape_decode_value_3860(ctx, &ctx->gb, &ctx->riceY);
}
|
static void entropy_decode_mono_3860(APEContext *ctx, int blockstodecode)
{
int32_t *decoded0 = ctx->decoded[0];
while (blockstodecode--)
*decoded0++ = ape_decode_value_3860(ctx, &ctx->gb, &ctx->riceY);
}
|
C
|
FFmpeg
| 0 |
CVE-2017-10971
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-10971/
|
CWE-119
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/commit/?id=215f894965df5fb0bb45b107d84524e700d2073c
|
215f894965df5fb0bb45b107d84524e700d2073c
| null |
XineramaSetCursorPosition(DeviceIntPtr pDev, int x, int y, Bool generateEvent)
{
ScreenPtr pScreen;
int i;
SpritePtr pSprite = pDev->spriteInfo->sprite;
/* x,y are in Screen 0 coordinates. We need to decide what Screen
to send the message too and what the coordinates relative to
that screen are. */
pScreen = pSprite->screen;
x += screenInfo.screens[0]->x;
y += screenInfo.screens[0]->y;
if (!point_on_screen(pScreen, x, y)) {
FOR_NSCREENS(i) {
if (i == pScreen->myNum)
continue;
if (point_on_screen(screenInfo.screens[i], x, y)) {
pScreen = screenInfo.screens[i];
break;
}
}
}
pSprite->screen = pScreen;
pSprite->hotPhys.x = x - screenInfo.screens[0]->x;
pSprite->hotPhys.y = y - screenInfo.screens[0]->y;
x -= pScreen->x;
y -= pScreen->y;
return (*pScreen->SetCursorPosition) (pDev, pScreen, x, y, generateEvent);
}
|
XineramaSetCursorPosition(DeviceIntPtr pDev, int x, int y, Bool generateEvent)
{
ScreenPtr pScreen;
int i;
SpritePtr pSprite = pDev->spriteInfo->sprite;
/* x,y are in Screen 0 coordinates. We need to decide what Screen
to send the message too and what the coordinates relative to
that screen are. */
pScreen = pSprite->screen;
x += screenInfo.screens[0]->x;
y += screenInfo.screens[0]->y;
if (!point_on_screen(pScreen, x, y)) {
FOR_NSCREENS(i) {
if (i == pScreen->myNum)
continue;
if (point_on_screen(screenInfo.screens[i], x, y)) {
pScreen = screenInfo.screens[i];
break;
}
}
}
pSprite->screen = pScreen;
pSprite->hotPhys.x = x - screenInfo.screens[0]->x;
pSprite->hotPhys.y = y - screenInfo.screens[0]->y;
x -= pScreen->x;
y -= pScreen->y;
return (*pScreen->SetCursorPosition) (pDev, pScreen, x, y, generateEvent);
}
|
C
|
xserver
| 0 |
CVE-2017-13054
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-13054/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/e6511cc1a950fe1566b2236329d6b4bd0826cc7a
|
e6511cc1a950fe1566b2236329d6b4bd0826cc7a
|
CVE-2017-13054/LLDP: add a missing length check
In lldp_private_8023_print() the case block for subtype 4 (Maximum Frame
Size TLV, IEEE 802.3bc-2009 Section 79.3.4) did not include the length
check and could over-read the input buffer, put it right.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
|
lldp_private_8023_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *tptr, u_int tlv_len)
{
int subtype, hexdump = FALSE;
if (tlv_len < 4) {
return hexdump;
}
subtype = *(tptr+3);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Subtype (%u)",
tok2str(lldp_8023_subtype_values, "unknown", subtype),
subtype));
switch (subtype) {
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8023_SUBTYPE_MACPHY:
if (tlv_len < 9) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t autonegotiation [%s] (0x%02x)",
bittok2str(lldp_8023_autonegotiation_values, "none", *(tptr+4)),
*(tptr + 4)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t PMD autoneg capability [%s] (0x%04x)",
bittok2str(lldp_pmd_capability_values,"unknown", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+5)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + 5)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MAU type %s (0x%04x)",
tok2str(lldp_mau_types_values, "unknown", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+7)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + 7)));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8023_SUBTYPE_MDIPOWER:
if (tlv_len < 7) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MDI power support [%s], power pair %s, power class %s",
bittok2str(lldp_mdi_values, "none", *(tptr+4)),
tok2str(lldp_mdi_power_pairs_values, "unknown", *(tptr+5)),
tok2str(lldp_mdi_power_class_values, "unknown", *(tptr + 6))));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8023_SUBTYPE_LINKAGGR:
if (tlv_len < 9) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t aggregation status [%s], aggregation port ID %u",
bittok2str(lldp_aggregation_values, "none", *(tptr+4)),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 5)));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8023_SUBTYPE_MTU:
if (tlv_len < 6) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MTU size %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + 4)));
break;
default:
hexdump = TRUE;
break;
}
return hexdump;
}
|
lldp_private_8023_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *tptr, u_int tlv_len)
{
int subtype, hexdump = FALSE;
if (tlv_len < 4) {
return hexdump;
}
subtype = *(tptr+3);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Subtype (%u)",
tok2str(lldp_8023_subtype_values, "unknown", subtype),
subtype));
switch (subtype) {
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8023_SUBTYPE_MACPHY:
if (tlv_len < 9) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t autonegotiation [%s] (0x%02x)",
bittok2str(lldp_8023_autonegotiation_values, "none", *(tptr+4)),
*(tptr + 4)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t PMD autoneg capability [%s] (0x%04x)",
bittok2str(lldp_pmd_capability_values,"unknown", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+5)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + 5)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MAU type %s (0x%04x)",
tok2str(lldp_mau_types_values, "unknown", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+7)),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + 7)));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8023_SUBTYPE_MDIPOWER:
if (tlv_len < 7) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MDI power support [%s], power pair %s, power class %s",
bittok2str(lldp_mdi_values, "none", *(tptr+4)),
tok2str(lldp_mdi_power_pairs_values, "unknown", *(tptr+5)),
tok2str(lldp_mdi_power_class_values, "unknown", *(tptr + 6))));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8023_SUBTYPE_LINKAGGR:
if (tlv_len < 9) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t aggregation status [%s], aggregation port ID %u",
bittok2str(lldp_aggregation_values, "none", *(tptr+4)),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 5)));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8023_SUBTYPE_MTU:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t MTU size %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + 4)));
break;
default:
hexdump = TRUE;
break;
}
return hexdump;
}
|
C
|
tcpdump
| 1 |
CVE-2012-3552
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-3552/
|
CWE-362
|
https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
f6d8bd051c391c1c0458a30b2a7abcd939329259
|
inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Cc: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
|
static void tcp_v6_reqsk_send_ack(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req)
{
tcp_v6_send_ack(skb, tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn + 1, tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_isn + 1, req->rcv_wnd, req->ts_recent,
tcp_v6_md5_do_lookup(sk, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr));
}
|
static void tcp_v6_reqsk_send_ack(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req)
{
tcp_v6_send_ack(skb, tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn + 1, tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_isn + 1, req->rcv_wnd, req->ts_recent,
tcp_v6_md5_do_lookup(sk, &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr));
}
|
C
|
linux
| 0 |
CVE-2016-2464
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-2464/
|
CWE-20
|
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/libvpx/+/65c49d5b382de4085ee5668732bcb0f6ecaf7148
|
65c49d5b382de4085ee5668732bcb0f6ecaf7148
|
Fix ParseElementHeader to support 0 payload elements
Cherry-pick'ing Change 5c83bbec9a5f6f00a349674ddad85b753d2ea219
from upstream. This fixes regression in some edge cases for mkv
playback.
BUG=26499283
Change-Id: I88de03219a3d941b6b2f251d384e29c36bdd4d9b
|
Tags::Tag::~Tag() {}
|
Tags::Tag::~Tag() {}
|
C
|
Android
| 0 |
CVE-2010-2520
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-2520/
|
CWE-119
|
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/freetype/freetype2.git/commit/?id=888cd1843e935fe675cf2ac303116d4ed5b9d54b
|
888cd1843e935fe675cf2ac303116d4ed5b9d54b
| null |
Ins_ROUND( INS_ARG )
{
DO_ROUND
}
|
Ins_ROUND( INS_ARG )
{
DO_ROUND
}
|
C
|
savannah
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5077
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5077/
|
CWE-125
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/fec26ff33bf372476a70326f3669a35f34a9d474
|
fec26ff33bf372476a70326f3669a35f34a9d474
|
Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
|
void ReportPreconnectPredictionAccuracy(const PreconnectPrediction& prediction,
const PageRequestSummary& summary) {
if (prediction.requests.empty() || summary.origins.empty())
return;
const auto& actual_origins = summary.origins;
size_t correctly_predicted_count = std::count_if(
prediction.requests.begin(), prediction.requests.end(),
[&actual_origins](const PreconnectRequest& request) {
return actual_origins.find(request.origin) != actual_origins.end();
});
size_t precision_percentage =
(100 * correctly_predicted_count) / prediction.requests.size();
size_t recall_percentage =
(100 * correctly_predicted_count) / actual_origins.size();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE(
internal::kLoadingPredictorPreconnectLearningPrecision,
precision_percentage);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE(internal::kLoadingPredictorPreconnectLearningRecall,
recall_percentage);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS_100(internal::kLoadingPredictorPreconnectLearningCount,
prediction.requests.size());
RedirectStatus redirect_status = GetPredictionRedirectStatus(
summary.initial_url, summary.main_frame_url, prediction.host,
prediction.is_redirected, true /* is_host */);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(
internal::kLoadingPredictorPreconnectLearningRedirectStatus,
static_cast<int>(redirect_status), static_cast<int>(RedirectStatus::MAX));
}
|
void ReportPreconnectPredictionAccuracy(const PreconnectPrediction& prediction,
const PageRequestSummary& summary) {
if (prediction.requests.empty() || summary.origins.empty())
return;
const auto& actual_origins = summary.origins;
size_t correctly_predicted_count = std::count_if(
prediction.requests.begin(), prediction.requests.end(),
[&actual_origins](const PreconnectRequest& request) {
return actual_origins.find(request.origin) != actual_origins.end();
});
size_t precision_percentage =
(100 * correctly_predicted_count) / prediction.requests.size();
size_t recall_percentage =
(100 * correctly_predicted_count) / actual_origins.size();
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE(
internal::kLoadingPredictorPreconnectLearningPrecision,
precision_percentage);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE(internal::kLoadingPredictorPreconnectLearningRecall,
recall_percentage);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS_100(internal::kLoadingPredictorPreconnectLearningCount,
prediction.requests.size());
RedirectStatus redirect_status = GetPredictionRedirectStatus(
summary.initial_url, summary.main_frame_url, prediction.host,
prediction.is_redirected, true /* is_host */);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(
internal::kLoadingPredictorPreconnectLearningRedirectStatus,
static_cast<int>(redirect_status), static_cast<int>(RedirectStatus::MAX));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2016-1665
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2016-1665/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/282f53ffdc3b1902da86f6a0791af736837efbf8
|
282f53ffdc3b1902da86f6a0791af736837efbf8
|
[signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <[email protected]>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
|
void SupervisedUserService::AddExtensionInstallRequest(
const std::string& extension_id,
const base::Version& version) {
std::string id = GetExtensionRequestId(extension_id, version);
AddExtensionInstallRequest(extension_id, version,
base::BindOnce(ExtensionInstallRequestSent, id));
}
|
void SupervisedUserService::AddExtensionInstallRequest(
const std::string& extension_id,
const base::Version& version) {
std::string id = GetExtensionRequestId(extension_id, version);
AddExtensionInstallRequest(extension_id, version,
base::BindOnce(ExtensionInstallRequestSent, id));
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2012-2900
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2012-2900/
| null |
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/9597042cad54926f50d58f5ada39205eb734d7be
|
9597042cad54926f50d58f5ada39205eb734d7be
|
Revert 137988 - VAVDA is the hardware video decode accelerator for Chrome on Linux and ChromeOS for Intel CPUs (Sandy Bridge and newer).
This CL enables VAVDA acceleration for ChromeOS, both for HTML5 video and Flash.
The feature is currently hidden behind a command line flag and can be enabled by adding the --enable-vaapi parameter to command line.
BUG=117062
TEST=Manual runs of test streams.
Change-Id: I386e16739e2ef2230f52a0a434971b33d8654699
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9814001
This is causing crbug.com/129103
[email protected]
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10411066
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@138208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
~GpuMainThread() {
Stop();
}
|
~GpuMainThread() {
Stop();
}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2017-5092
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2017-5092/
|
CWE-20
|
https://github.com/chromium/chromium/commit/66b99f3fe60dce77f079cc9c07164f6a34dbea37
|
66b99f3fe60dce77f079cc9c07164f6a34dbea37
|
Validate in-process plugin instance messages.
Bug: 733548, 733549
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Ie5572c7bcafa05399b09c44425ddd5ce9b9e4cba
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/538908
Commit-Queue: Bill Budge <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <[email protected]>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480696}
|
BrowserPpapiHostImpl::HostMessageFilter::HostMessageFilter(
ppapi::host::PpapiHost* ppapi_host,
BrowserPpapiHostImpl* browser_ppapi_host_impl)
: ppapi_host_(ppapi_host),
browser_ppapi_host_impl_(browser_ppapi_host_impl) {}
|
BrowserPpapiHostImpl::HostMessageFilter::HostMessageFilter(
ppapi::host::PpapiHost* ppapi_host,
BrowserPpapiHostImpl* browser_ppapi_host_impl)
: ppapi_host_(ppapi_host),
browser_ppapi_host_impl_(browser_ppapi_host_impl) {}
|
C
|
Chrome
| 0 |
CVE-2010-1149
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2010-1149/
|
CWE-200
|
https://cgit.freedesktop.org/udisks/commit/?id=0fcc7cb3b66f23fac53ae08647aa0007a2bd56c4
|
0fcc7cb3b66f23fac53ae08647aa0007a2bd56c4
| null |
daemon_linux_lvm2_lv_stop_authorized_cb (Daemon *daemon,
Device *device,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
const gchar *action_id,
guint num_user_data,
gpointer *user_data_elements)
{
gchar *name;
/* TODO: use options */
guint n;
gchar *argv[10];
name = NULL;
if (!device->priv->device_is_linux_lvm2_lv)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "Device is not a Linux LVM2 Logical Volume");
goto out;
}
/* Unfortunately lvchange does not (yet - file a bug) accept UUIDs
*/
name = g_strdup_printf ("%s/%s", device->priv->linux_lvm2_lv_group_name, device->priv->linux_lvm2_lv_name);
n = 0;
argv[n++] = "lvchange";
argv[n++] = "-an";
argv[n++] = name;
argv[n++] = NULL;
if (!job_new (context, "LinuxLvm2LVStop", TRUE, NULL, argv, NULL, linux_lvm2_lv_stop_completed_cb, FALSE, NULL, NULL))
{
goto out;
}
out:
g_free (name);
}
|
daemon_linux_lvm2_lv_stop_authorized_cb (Daemon *daemon,
Device *device,
DBusGMethodInvocation *context,
const gchar *action_id,
guint num_user_data,
gpointer *user_data_elements)
{
gchar *name;
/* TODO: use options */
guint n;
gchar *argv[10];
name = NULL;
if (!device->priv->device_is_linux_lvm2_lv)
{
throw_error (context, ERROR_FAILED, "Device is not a Linux LVM2 Logical Volume");
goto out;
}
/* Unfortunately lvchange does not (yet - file a bug) accept UUIDs
*/
name = g_strdup_printf ("%s/%s", device->priv->linux_lvm2_lv_group_name, device->priv->linux_lvm2_lv_name);
n = 0;
argv[n++] = "lvchange";
argv[n++] = "-an";
argv[n++] = name;
argv[n++] = NULL;
if (!job_new (context, "LinuxLvm2LVStop", TRUE, NULL, argv, NULL, linux_lvm2_lv_stop_completed_cb, FALSE, NULL, NULL))
{
goto out;
}
out:
g_free (name);
}
|
C
|
udisks
| 0 |
CVE-2015-1331
|
https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2015-1331/
|
CWE-59
|
https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/72cf81f6a3404e35028567db2c99a90406e9c6e6
|
72cf81f6a3404e35028567db2c99a90406e9c6e6
|
CVE-2015-1331: lxclock: use /run/lxc/lock rather than /run/lock/lxc
This prevents an unprivileged user to use LXC to create arbitrary file
on the filesystem.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <[email protected]>
|
int container_disk_lock(struct lxc_container *c)
{
int ret;
if ((ret = lxclock(c->privlock, 0)))
return ret;
if ((ret = lxclock(c->slock, 0))) {
lxcunlock(c->privlock);
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
|
int container_disk_lock(struct lxc_container *c)
{
int ret;
if ((ret = lxclock(c->privlock, 0)))
return ret;
if ((ret = lxclock(c->slock, 0))) {
lxcunlock(c->privlock);
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
|
C
|
lxc
| 0 |
Subsets and Splits
CWE-119 Function Changes
This query retrieves specific examples (before and after code changes) of vulnerabilities with CWE-119, providing basic filtering but limited insight.
Vulnerable Code with CWE IDs
The query filters and combines records from multiple datasets to list specific vulnerability details, providing a basic overview of vulnerable functions but lacking deeper insights.
Vulnerable Functions in BigVul
Retrieves details of vulnerable functions from both validation and test datasets where vulnerabilities are present, providing a basic set of data points for further analysis.
Vulnerable Code Functions
This query filters and shows raw data for vulnerable functions, which provides basic insight into specific vulnerabilities but lacks broader analytical value.
Top 100 Vulnerable Functions
Retrieves 100 samples of vulnerabilities from the training dataset, showing the CVE ID, CWE ID, and code changes before and after the vulnerability, which is a basic filtering of vulnerability data.