title: UnwantedAdsPinpointingTheSource
emoji: 🏢
colorFrom: yellow
colorTo: blue
sdk: static
pinned: false
license: mit
short_description: 'The Unwanted Ad in Google Messages: Pinpointing the Source'
1. Ads Unwanted in SMS - Adware Defense 101 Sim
2. Adware defense app using Gemini Canvas:
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Unsolicited Ad Intrusion in Google Messages for Web: A Technical Analysis of AdFox and Injection Mechanisms I. Executive Summary: Addressing Your Concerns Head-On The appearance of an unexpected "AdFox / dealsbe.com" advertisement within the Google Messages for web interface on a personal computer is understandably concerning. However, this event is almost certainly not an indication of a virus or adware distributed by Google itself. The most probable cause is the presence of an unwanted browser extension or an adware program installed on the PC. This third-party software likely manipulated the Google Messages webpage content directly within the Chrome browser to display the unsolicited advertisement.
AdFox, the name featured in the advertisement, is a legitimate advertising technology platform. Its presence indicates the ad network or branding used by the advertiser ("dealsbe.com"), but it does not imply malicious intent from AdFox as a platform. The involvement of the Samsung Fold2 Android phone in this scenario is likely limited to the standard synchronization process inherent to Google Messages, where actions on the web client are reflected or routed through the phone. This synchronization activity may have coincidentally triggered the ad display by the malicious software already resident on the PC, rather than the phone being the source of the ad.
This report provides a detailed technical analysis of how such ad injections occur, clarifies the role of entities like AdFox, examines the motivations behind these activities, and offers actionable recommendations for remediation and prevention.
II. Understanding the Players: AdFox and the Advertiser ("dealsbe.com") To comprehend the situation, it is essential to first understand the entities involved in the observed advertisement.
A. What is AdFox? AdFox is an online advertising management service, primarily associated with Yandex, a multinational technology company. Its core function is to provide tools for website owners, mobile application developers, and video resource providers to manage ad impressions effectively. This includes serving direct sales banners, integrating with the Yandex Advertising Network and Yandex Mediation for monetization, collecting detailed statistics on ad performance, and analyzing the overall effectiveness of advertising campaigns. AdFox is designed for web platforms and supports various banner types, including preloader, fullscreen, and sticky banners.
It is crucial to differentiate between AdFox as a legitimate platform and its potential indirect involvement in unwanted ad scenarios. AdFox itself is a tool used by publishers and advertisers for standard advertising operations. However, like any ad network or ad serving technology, its infrastructure can be utilized by various advertisers. If adware or a malicious browser extension is present on a user's system, that unwanted software could potentially fetch and display ads that are served through AdFox's network, or display ad creatives that incorporate "AdFox" branding. The appearance of the AdFox name in an injected ad does not inherently mean AdFox is the source of the malicious delivery method. Instead, the problem lies with the unauthorized software on the PC that chooses to display an ad (which might be served via AdFox or simply branded as such) in an intrusive manner.
This distinction is important because if AdFox were an inherently malicious entity, blocking its domains might seem like a solution. However, given its legitimate status , the underlying adware or malicious extension responsible for the injection could simply switch to sourcing ads from a different network if AdFox were blocked. Therefore, addressing the root cause—the unwanted software on the PC—is the primary objective for remediation. The online advertising ecosystem is a complex web of publishers, networks, exchanges, and technology providers. This complexity can, at times, be exploited by malicious actors to inject ads, making the precise origin of an ad difficult to trace without deep technical investigation of the injecting software itself.
B. The Role of "dealsbe.com" The entity "dealsbe.com" is identified from the screenshot as the advertiser whose message ("Exclusive Software Deals for Developers") was displayed. The advertisement promotes software deals, which, while potentially legitimate in content, becomes problematic due to its unsolicited and intrusive delivery method.
Available information on "dealsbe.com" from the provided research is limited and does not conclusively label the site itself as malicious. One source links "Home Run Deals" to "Be Prepared - Emergency Essentials," which appears unrelated to software deals for developers. Another discusses tool deals and daily deal emails, which is thematically closer but does not directly reference dealsbe.com as the source of those deals.
The nature of "software deals" advertised through unsolicited injection methods warrants caution. Such ads can sometimes serve as gateways to Potentially Unwanted Programs (PUPs) or software bundles that include additional adware. If a user were to click on such an injected ad, they might be directed to a download or offer that, if accepted, installs further unwanted software on their system. This creates a cycle of infection. The critical issue here is not necessarily the legitimacy of the deals offered by dealsbe.com, but the fact that its advertisement was injected into a web application without user consent.
To further clarify AdFox's role, the following table distinguishes its intended purpose from its potential involvement in unwanted ad scenarios:
Table 1: AdFox - Legitimate Platform vs. Misuse Potential
Feature/Aspect Legitimate Use by Advertisers/Publishers How it Can Be Involved in Unwanted Ad Scenarios Ad Serving Displaying contracted ads on their own websites/apps. Adware on a user's PC requests and displays ads sourced from various networks, potentially including those managed via AdFox-like platforms. Campaign Management Tracking ad performance for Return on Investment (ROI), optimizing campaigns. Not directly involved in campaign management for adware, but adware might pull ads that are part of legitimate campaigns running on platforms like AdFox. Monetization Tool Generating revenue from legitimate ad space on owned digital properties. Adware illegitimately monetizes user browsing sessions by forcing ads, some of which might originate from or be branded by advertisers using platforms like AdFox. Branding in Ad Creative Advertisers may use the AdFox logo if they utilize the platform for their ads. Ad creatives displayed by adware might contain "AdFox" branding, either because the ad is genuinely served through AdFox or because the adware distributor uses the branding.
Export to Sheets III. The Unwanted Ad in Google Messages: Pinpointing the Source The appearance of an unsolicited advertisement within a trusted application like Google Messages for web naturally raises questions about the security of the application itself.
A. Why Google is Unlikely the Culprit Google dedicates substantial resources to securing its platforms and services, including Google Messages. It is highly improbable that Google would intentionally embed adware or viruses within its own communication applications. Such an action would severely undermine user trust and contradict Google's business model, which, despite its advertising components, relies on maintaining a certain level of data privacy and security as per its stated policies.
The characteristics of the observed ad—its content, presentation, and intrusive nature—are typical of third-party ad injections rather than first-party advertisements that Google might place within its services. Google's own advertisements are generally clearly demarcated and integrated in a less disruptive manner. Furthermore, Google's policies often prohibit the distribution of even its own ads through certain software applications like toolbars or browser extensions, indicating a stance against such ad injection practices.
B. The PC (Chrome Browser) as the Locus of Injection The most common vectors for the injection of unauthorized advertisements into web pages viewed on a PC are malicious browser extensions and adware/PUPs installed on the system.
Malicious Browser Extensions: These are add-ons for web browsers like Chrome that, once installed, can gain extensive permissions. These permissions may allow them to read and modify the content of any webpage visited, including messages.google.com. Attackers can develop extensions with ad-injecting capabilities or compromise existing legitimate extensions by purchasing them from original developers or hacking developer accounts, then updating them with malicious code. These extensions then inject JavaScript code to display ads.
Adware or Potentially Unwanted Programs (PUPs) on the PC: This category includes software that is often bundled with free application downloads or installed via deceptive means. Once on a system, adware can operate in the background to inject advertisements into browser sessions, modify browser settings, or track user activity.
Both malicious extensions and adware typically use JavaScript to dynamically alter the Document Object Model (DOM) of the target webpage. The DOM is the structured representation of the HTML content of a page. By manipulating the DOM, these programs can insert new HTML elements (like
C. Clarifying Your Samsung Fold2's Role The Samsung Fold2 Android phone plays a role in the Google Messages ecosystem, particularly when using Google Messages for web for SMS/RCS messaging. The web client on the PC synchronizes with the Messages app on the phone. When text is submitted via the web interface, the communication is typically routed through Google's servers and then via the phone's mobile carrier connection to deliver the SMS/RCS message. The phone then confirms the message status back to the web client.
The observation that the ad "appeared after I submitted text and it contacted my Samsung phone" describes this normal operational flow. The act of sending a message and the subsequent update of the webpage content (e.g., the new message appearing in the chat flow) could have served as a trigger for the adware or malicious extension already present on the PC to execute its ad-injection payload. This does not imply that the Samsung Fold2 injected the ad into the PC's browser, nor does it suggest that the phone itself is compromised with PC-specific adware. The ad appeared within the Chrome browser on the PC, pointing to a PC-local issue. The phone's interaction was likely a coincidental part of the normal message sending process that caused a state change on the webpage, which the malicious PC software was programmed to detect and react to.
The following table compares common ad injection vectors on a PC, highlighting why a browser extension or system-level adware is the most probable cause for the observed ad.
Table 2: Comparison of Common Ad Injection Vectors on a PC
Feature Malicious Browser Extension Adware/PUP on PC Compromised Website Script (Very Unlikely for Google Messages) Primary Infection Method Deceptive downloads from unofficial stores; bundled with free software; legitimate extension later compromised. Bundled with free software; drive-by downloads from malicious sites; deceptive installers. Website's own code is hacked to include malicious scripts. Mechanism of Ad Injection Uses granted browser permissions (e.g., to read/modify page data) to inject JavaScript/HTML into the page's DOM. System-level processes may hook into browser traffic or directly manipulate browser processes to inject ads. Malicious script already part of the website's code. Key Indicators Unfamiliar extensions listed in browser settings; ads appear on many different websites; specific permissions requested. Slow PC performance; general ad pop-ups beyond the browser; unwanted programs installed. Specific site shows ads consistently for all users (if widespread) or only for users visiting a compromised version. Scope of Impact Primarily within the affected browser. Can affect multiple browsers or even display ads outside of browser context. Affects users visiting the specific compromised website. IV. Architectural Breakdown: The 10 Steps of Ad Injection into Google Messages Web 🛠️ The following 10-step architectural breakdown illustrates a common scenario of how a malicious Chrome browser extension installed on a PC could inject an advertisement like the "AdFox / dealsbe.com" ad into the Google Messages for web interface. This process occurs on the PC and within its Chrome browser environment.
⓪ ⚙️ Pre-computation/Setup: The Attacker's Preparation
Malicious actors develop a browser extension designed to inject ads or acquire an existing extension and modify it. This involves embedding scripts capable of fetching and displaying ads, along with logic to target specific websites (like messages.google.com) or user behaviors. The extension is then packaged and prepared for distribution, often through deceptive channels or by bundling it with seemingly legitimate free software. Configuration for connecting to Command & Control (C&C) servers or ad networks is also embedded.
- 📥 Initial Compromise: How Ad-Injecting Software Lands on Your PC
Action: The user unknowingly installs a malicious browser extension into the Chrome browser on their PC. Mechanism: This installation can occur through various deceptive means: Downloading the extension from an unofficial or third-party website that hosts unvetted software. Installing an extension that initially appears legitimate but is later sold to a malicious developer who updates it with ad-injecting code, or whose developer account is compromised. Downloading and installing a free software program (e.g., a PDF converter, video downloader, system utility) that bundles the malicious extension as an "optional" add-on, often with pre-checked installation boxes that are easily overlooked by the user. Clicking on a misleading advertisement (malvertising) or a phishing link that directly prompts the installation of the malicious extension. Products Involved: 🖥️ PC, 🌐 Chrome Browser, 🧩 Malicious Browser Extension. 2. 🤫 Stealthy Activation & Permission Granting
Action: Once installed in Chrome on the PC, the malicious extension activates, typically automatically when the browser starts. Mechanism: During the installation process (or via a subsequent update), the extension requests certain permissions from the user. For ad injection to be effective, these permissions are often broad and powerful, such as the ability to "read and change all your data on websites you visit" (often corresponding to the host permission), access to storage for saving configuration or stolen data, scripting capabilities to execute arbitrary JavaScript on pages, and webRequest APIs to intercept or modify network traffic. Users may grant these permissions without fully understanding their implications. Products Involved: 🌐 Chrome Browser, 🧩 Malicious Browser Extension. 3. 📡 Establishing Command & Control (C&C) Communication
Action: The malicious extension on the PC may initiate communication with a remote Command & Control (C&C) server operated by the attackers. Mechanism: This connection allows the attackers to dynamically manage the extension's behavior. The C&C server can provide updated lists of target websites, new ad sources or campaign IDs, modified JavaScript payloads for injection, or instructions to exfiltrate collected user data. This makes the malicious operation flexible and adaptable without requiring a full update of the extension through an official store. Products Involved: 🖥️ PC (Chrome, Extension), 🔗 Internet Connection, ☁️ Attacker's C&C Server. 4. 🧐 Monitoring Web Activity: Targeting Google Messages
Action: The extension's background scripts, running within the Chrome browser on the PC, actively monitor the user's browsing activity. Mechanism: The extension is programmed to identify when the user navigates to specific URLs, such as messages.google.com. It might check the current URL against a list of targets (potentially updated by the C&C server) or look for specific HTML structures, JavaScript variables, or keywords present on the Google Messages page to confirm it is the intended target. Products Involved: 🌐 Chrome Browser, 🧩 Malicious Browser Extension, 💬 Google Messages web application. 5. ⚡ Trigger Event: Action in Google Messages (e.g., sending text, page load)
Action: A specific event occurs within the Google Messages web interface that the malicious extension is programmed to recognize and react to. Mechanism: This trigger could be one of several actions: The initial loading and rendering of the messages.google.com page. A significant DOM update, such as when a user sends a message (as described in the initial query: "It appeared after I submitted text"). This action involves client-server communication (potentially involving the Samsung Fold2 for SMS/RCS relay via Google's servers) and results in the webpage updating to display the newly sent message. The arrival of a new incoming message, which also updates the page's DOM. Specific JavaScript events firing on the page, or timers elapsing. Products Involved: 🖥️ PC (Chrome, Extension), 💬 Google Messages web application, (Indirectly: 📱 Samsung Fold2 via message synchronization causing web UI update). 6. 💻 Dynamic Code Injection: Altering the Google Messages Web Page
Action: Upon detecting the trigger event, the malicious browser extension leverages its granted permissions to inject custom JavaScript code directly into the live Document Object Model (DOM) of the Google Messages web page running in the user's browser. Mechanism: The extension's content scripts or background scripts execute functions that dynamically create