tumeteor/Security-TTP-Mapping · Datasets at Hugging Face

text1 stringlengths 7 2.5k	labels stringlengths 9 100
EKANS uses standard encryption library functions to encrypt files.	['T1486']
Egregor can encrypt all non-system files using a hybrid AES-RSA algorithm prior to displaying a ransom note.	['T1486']
HELLOKITTY can use an embedded RSA-2048 public key to encrypt victim data for ransom.	['T1486']
Indrik Spider has encrypted domain-controlled systems using BitPaymer.	['T1486']
JCry has encrypted files and demanded Bitcoin to decrypt those files.	['T1486']
LockerGoga has encrypted files, including core Windows OS files, using RSA-OAEP MGF1 and then demanded Bitcoin be paid for the decryption key.	['T1486']
Maze has disrupted systems by encrypting files on targeted machines, claiming to decrypt files if a ransom payment is made. Maze has used the ChaCha algorithm, based on Salsa20, and an RSA algorithm to encrypt files.	['T1486']
MegaCortex has used the open-source library, Mbed Crypto, and generated AES keys to carry out the file encryption process.	['T1486']
Netwalker can encrypt files on infected machines to extort victims.	['T1486']
Pay2Key can encrypt data on victim's machines using RSA and AES algorithms in order to extort a ransom payment for decryption.	['T1486']
REvil can encrypt files on victim systems and demands a ransom to decrypt the files.	['T1486']
RobbinHood will search for an RSA encryption key and then perform its encryption process on the system files.	['T1486']
Ryuk has used a combination of symmetric (AES) and asymmetric (RSA) encryption to encrypt files. Files have been encrypted with their own AES key and given a file extension of .RYK. Encrypted directories have had a ransom note of RyukReadMe.txt written to the directory.	['T1486']
SamSam encrypts victim files using RSA-2048 encryption and demands a ransom be paid in Bitcoin to decrypt those files.	['T1486']
Shamoon has an operational mode for encrypting data instead of overwriting it.	['T1486']
SynAck encrypts the victims machine followed by asking the victim to pay a ransom.	['T1486']
TA505 has used a wide variety of ransomware, such as Clop, Locky, Jaff, Bart, Philadelphia, and GlobeImposter, to encrypt victim files and demand a ransom payment.	['T1486']
ThiefQuest encrypts a set of file extensions on a host, deletes the original files, and provides a ransom note with no contact information.	['T1486']
WannaCry encrypts user files and demands that a ransom be paid in Bitcoin to decrypt those files.	['T1486']
XCSSET performs AES-CBC encryption on files under "~/Documents", "~/Downloads", and "~/Desktop" with a fixed key and renames files to give them a ".enc" extension. Only files with sizes less than 500MB are encrypted.	['T1486']
Xbash has maliciously encrypted victim's database systems and demanded a cryptocurrency ransom be paid.	['T1486']
Babuk can stop specific services related to backups.	['T1489']
Conti can stop up to 146 Windows services related to security, backup, database, and email solutions through the use of "net stop".	['T1489']
Diavol will terminate services using the Service Control Manager (SCM) API.	['T1489']
Indrik Spider has used PsExec to stop services prior to the execution of ransomware.	['T1489']
Industroyer’s data wiper module writes zeros into the registry keys in "SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services" to render a system inoperable.	['T1489']
Lazarus Group has stopped the MSExchangeIS service to render Exchange contents inaccessible to users.	['T1489']
LookBack can kill processes and delete services.	['T1489']
Maze has stopped SQL services to ensure it can encrypt any database.	['T1489']
MegaCortex can stop and disable services on the system.	['T1489']
Meteor can disconnect all network adapters on a compromised host using `powershell -Command "Get-WmiObject -class Win32_NetworkAdapter \| ForEach { If ($.NetEnabled) { $.Disable() } }" > NUL`.	['T1489']
Netwalker can terminate system processes and services, some of which relate to backup software.	['T1489']
Olympic Destroyer uses the API call "ChangeServiceConfigW" to disable all services on the affected system.	['T1489']
Pay2Key can stop the MS SQL service at the end of the encryption process to release files locked by the service.	['T1489']
REvil has the capability to stop services and kill processes.	['T1489']
Ragnar Locker has attempted to stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted.	['T1489']
RobbinHood stops 181 Windows services on the system before beginning the encryption process.	['T1489']
WannaCry attempts to kill processes associated with Exchange, Microsoft SQL Server, and MySQL to make it possible to encrypt their data stores.	['T1489']
Wizard Spider has used taskkill.exe and net.exe to stop backup, catalog, cloud, and other services prior to network encryption.	['T1489']
Avaddon deletes backups and shadow copies using native system tools.	['T1490']
Babuk has the ability to delete shadow volumes using "vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet".	['T1490']
Conti can delete Windows Volume Shadow Copies using "vssadmin".	['T1490']
DEATHRANSOM can delete volume shadow copies on compromised hosts.	['T1490']
DarkWatchman can delete shadow volumes using "vssadmin.exe".	['T1490']
EKANS removes backups of Volume Shadow Copies to disable any restoration capabilities.	['T1490']
HELLOKITTY can delete volume shadow copies on compromised hosts.	['T1490']
InvisiMole can can remove all system restore points.	['T1490']
JCry has been observed deleting shadow copies to ensure that data cannot be restored easily.	['T1490']
Meteor can use `bcdedit` to delete different boot identifiers on a compromised host; it can also use `vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet` and `C:\\Windows\\system32\\wbem\\wmic.exe shadowcopy delete`.	['T1490']
Netwalker can delete the infected system's Shadow Volumes to prevent recovery.	['T1490']
ProLock can use vssadmin.exe to remove volume shadow copies.	['T1490']
Pysa has the functionality to delete shadow copies.	['T1490']
RobbinHood deletes shadow copies to ensure that all the data cannot be restored easily.	['T1490']
Ryuk has used "vssadmin Delete Shadows /all /quiet" to to delete volume shadow copies and "vssadmin resize shadowstorage" to force deletion of shadow copies created by third-party applications.	['T1490']
WannaCry uses "vssadmin", "wbadmin", "bcdedit", and "wmic" to delete and disable operating system recovery features.	['T1490']
WastedLocker can delete shadow volumes.	['T1490']
After encryption, Diavol will capture the desktop background window, set the background color to black, and change the desktop wallpaper to a newly created bitmap image with the text “All your files are encrypted! For more information see “README-FOR-DECRYPT.txt".	['T1491.001']
Gamaredon Group has left taunting images and messages on the victims' desktops as proof of system access.	['T1491.001']
Sandworm Team defaced approximately 15,000 websites belonging to Georgian government, non-government, and private sector organizations in 2019.	['T1491.002']
Bad Rabbit has used an executable that installs a modified bootloader to prevent normal boot-up.	['T1495']
APT41 deployed a Monero cryptocurrency mining tool in a victim’s environment.	['T1496']
CookieMiner has loaded coinmining software onto systems to mine for Koto cryptocurrency.	['T1496']
Hildegard has used xmrig to mine cryptocurrency.	['T1496']
Imminent Monitor has the capability to run a cryptocurrency miner on the victim machine.	['T1496']
Kinsing has created and run a Bitcoin cryptocurrency miner.	['T1496']
Lazarus Group has subset groups like Bluenoroff who have used cryptocurrency mining software on victim machines.	['T1496']
LoudMiner harvested system resources to mine cryptocurrency, using XMRig to mine Monero.	['T1496']
Lucifer can use system resources to mine cryptocurrency, dropping XMRig to mine Monero.	['T1496']
Rocke has distributed cryptomining malware.	['T1496']
Skidmap is a kernel-mode rootkit used for cryptocurrency mining.	['T1496']
TeamTNT has deployed XMRig Docker images to mine cryptocurrency. TeamTNT has also infected Docker containers and Kubernetes clusters with XMRig, and used RainbowMiner and lolMiner for mining cryptocurrency.	['T1496']
Agent Tesla has he ability to perform anti-sandboxing and anti-virtualization checks.	['T1497']
Bumblebee has the ability to perform anti-virtualization checks.	['T1497']
CHOPSTICK includes runtime checks to identify an analysis environment and prevent execution on it.	['T1497']
Carberp has removed various hooks before installing the trojan or bootkit to evade sandbox analysis or other analysis software.	['T1497']
Darkhotel malware has employed just-in-time decryption of strings to evade sandbox detection.	['T1497']
During Operation Spalax, the threat actors used droppers that would run anti-analysis checks before executing malware on a compromised host.	['T1497']
Gelsemium can use junk code to generate random activity to obscure malware behavior.	['T1497']
HAWKBALL has methods to check if the process the malware uses is being debugged.	['T1497']
Kevin can sleep for a time interval between C2 communication attempts.	['T1497']
Lucifer can crash a debugger by passing a format string to "OutputDebugStringA()".	['T1497']
Metamorfo has embedded a "vmdetect.exe" executable to identify virtual machines at the beginning of execution.	['T1497']
Pteranodon has the ability to use anti-detection functions to identify sandbox environments.	['T1497']
Some versions of CozyCar will check to ensure it is not being executed inside a virtual machine or a known malware analysis sandbox environment. If it detects that it is, it will exit.	['T1497']
The White Company has performed anti-analysis checks to determine if its malware was in a debugging environment.	['T1497']
Attor can detect whether it is executed in some virtualized or emulated environment by searching for specific artifacts, such as communication with I/O ports and using VM-specific instructions.	['T1497.001']
BadPatch attempts to detect if it is being run in a Virtual Machine (VM) using a WMI query for disk drive name, BIOS, and motherboard information.	['T1497.001']
Bumblebee has the ability to search for designated file paths and Registry keys that indicate a virtualized environment from multiple products.	['T1497.001']
Darkhotel malware has used a series of checks to determine if it's being analyzed; checks include the length of executable names, if a filename ends with ".Md5.exe", and if the program is executed from the root of the C:\ drive, as well as checks for sandbox-related libraries.	['T1497.001']
Denis ran multiple system checks, looking for processor and register characteristics, to evade emulation and analysis.	['T1497.001']
During Frankenstein, the threat actors used a script that ran WMI queries to check if a VM or sandbox was running, including VMWare and Virtualbox. The script would also call WMI to determine the number of cores allocated to the system; if less than two the script would stop execution.	['T1497.001']
Dyre can detect sandbox analysis environments by inspecting the process list and Registry.	['T1497.001']
EvilBunny's dropper has checked the number of processes and the length and strings of its own file name to identify if the malware is in a sandbox environment.	['T1497.001']
Evilnum has used a component called TerraLoader to check certain hardware and file information to detect sandboxed environments.	['T1497.001']
Ferocious can run anti-sandbox checks using the Microsoft Excel 4.0 function "GET.WORKSPACE" to determine the OS version, if there is a mouse present, and if the host is capable of playing sounds.	['T1497.001']
FinFisher obtains the hardware device list and checks if the MD5 of the vendor ID is equal to a predefined list in order to check for sandbox/virtualized environments.	['T1497.001']
Frankenstein has used WMI queries to check if various security applications were running, including VMWare and Virtualbox.	['T1497.001']
GoldMax will check if it is being run in a virtualized environment by comparing the collected MAC address to "c8:27:cc:c2:37:5a".	['T1497.001']
Grandoreiro can detect VMWare via its I/O port and Virtual PC via the "vpcext" instruction.	['T1497.001']
GuLoader has the ability to perform anti-VM and anti-sandbox checks using string hashing, the API call "EnumWindows", and checking for Qemu guest agent.	['T1497.001']

EKANS uses standard encryption library functions to encrypt files.

['T1486']

Egregor can encrypt all non-system files using a hybrid AES-RSA algorithm prior to displaying a ransom note.

['T1486']

HELLOKITTY can use an embedded RSA-2048 public key to encrypt victim data for ransom.

['T1486']

Indrik Spider has encrypted domain-controlled systems using BitPaymer.

['T1486']

JCry has encrypted files and demanded Bitcoin to decrypt those files.

['T1486']

LockerGoga has encrypted files, including core Windows OS files, using RSA-OAEP MGF1 and then demanded Bitcoin be paid for the decryption key.

['T1486']

Maze has disrupted systems by encrypting files on targeted machines, claiming to decrypt files if a ransom payment is made. Maze has used the ChaCha algorithm, based on Salsa20, and an RSA algorithm to encrypt files.

['T1486']

MegaCortex has used the open-source library, Mbed Crypto, and generated AES keys to carry out the file encryption process.

['T1486']

Netwalker can encrypt files on infected machines to extort victims.

['T1486']

Pay2Key can encrypt data on victim's machines using RSA and AES algorithms in order to extort a ransom payment for decryption.

['T1486']

REvil can encrypt files on victim systems and demands a ransom to decrypt the files.

['T1486']

RobbinHood will search for an RSA encryption key and then perform its encryption process on the system files.

['T1486']

Ryuk has used a combination of symmetric (AES) and asymmetric (RSA) encryption to encrypt files. Files have been encrypted with their own AES key and given a file extension of .RYK. Encrypted directories have had a ransom note of RyukReadMe.txt written to the directory.

['T1486']

SamSam encrypts victim files using RSA-2048 encryption and demands a ransom be paid in Bitcoin to decrypt those files.

['T1486']

Shamoon has an operational mode for encrypting data instead of overwriting it.

['T1486']

SynAck encrypts the victims machine followed by asking the victim to pay a ransom.

['T1486']

TA505 has used a wide variety of ransomware, such as Clop, Locky, Jaff, Bart, Philadelphia, and GlobeImposter, to encrypt victim files and demand a ransom payment.

['T1486']

ThiefQuest encrypts a set of file extensions on a host, deletes the original files, and provides a ransom note with no contact information.

['T1486']

WannaCry encrypts user files and demands that a ransom be paid in Bitcoin to decrypt those files.

['T1486']

XCSSET performs AES-CBC encryption on files under "~/Documents", "~/Downloads", and "~/Desktop" with a fixed key and renames files to give them a ".enc" extension. Only files with sizes less than 500MB are encrypted.

['T1486']

Xbash has maliciously encrypted victim's database systems and demanded a cryptocurrency ransom be paid.

['T1486']

Babuk can stop specific services related to backups.

['T1489']

Conti can stop up to 146 Windows services related to security, backup, database, and email solutions through the use of "net stop".

['T1489']

Diavol will terminate services using the Service Control Manager (SCM) API.

['T1489']

Indrik Spider has used PsExec to stop services prior to the execution of ransomware.

['T1489']

Industroyer’s data wiper module writes zeros into the registry keys in "SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services" to render a system inoperable.

['T1489']

Lazarus Group has stopped the MSExchangeIS service to render Exchange contents inaccessible to users.

['T1489']

LookBack can kill processes and delete services.

['T1489']

Maze has stopped SQL services to ensure it can encrypt any database.

['T1489']

MegaCortex can stop and disable services on the system.

['T1489']

Meteor can disconnect all network adapters on a compromised host using `powershell -Command "Get-WmiObject -class Win32_NetworkAdapter | ForEach { If ($.NetEnabled) { $.Disable() } }" > NUL`.

['T1489']

Netwalker can terminate system processes and services, some of which relate to backup software.

['T1489']

Olympic Destroyer uses the API call "ChangeServiceConfigW" to disable all services on the affected system.

['T1489']

Pay2Key can stop the MS SQL service at the end of the encryption process to release files locked by the service.

['T1489']

REvil has the capability to stop services and kill processes.

['T1489']

Ragnar Locker has attempted to stop services associated with business applications and databases to release the lock on files used by these applications so they may be encrypted.

['T1489']

RobbinHood stops 181 Windows services on the system before beginning the encryption process.

['T1489']

WannaCry attempts to kill processes associated with Exchange, Microsoft SQL Server, and MySQL to make it possible to encrypt their data stores.

['T1489']

Wizard Spider has used taskkill.exe and net.exe to stop backup, catalog, cloud, and other services prior to network encryption.

['T1489']

Avaddon deletes backups and shadow copies using native system tools.

['T1490']

Babuk has the ability to delete shadow volumes using "vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet".

['T1490']

Conti can delete Windows Volume Shadow Copies using "vssadmin".

['T1490']

DEATHRANSOM can delete volume shadow copies on compromised hosts.

['T1490']

DarkWatchman can delete shadow volumes using "vssadmin.exe".

['T1490']

EKANS removes backups of Volume Shadow Copies to disable any restoration capabilities.

['T1490']

HELLOKITTY can delete volume shadow copies on compromised hosts.

['T1490']

InvisiMole can can remove all system restore points.

['T1490']

JCry has been observed deleting shadow copies to ensure that data cannot be restored easily.

['T1490']

Meteor can use `bcdedit` to delete different boot identifiers on a compromised host; it can also use `vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet` and `C:\\Windows\\system32\\wbem\\wmic.exe shadowcopy delete`.

['T1490']

Netwalker can delete the infected system's Shadow Volumes to prevent recovery.

['T1490']

ProLock can use vssadmin.exe to remove volume shadow copies.

['T1490']

Pysa has the functionality to delete shadow copies.

['T1490']

RobbinHood deletes shadow copies to ensure that all the data cannot be restored easily.

['T1490']

Ryuk has used "vssadmin Delete Shadows /all /quiet" to to delete volume shadow copies and "vssadmin resize shadowstorage" to force deletion of shadow copies created by third-party applications.

['T1490']

WannaCry uses "vssadmin", "wbadmin", "bcdedit", and "wmic" to delete and disable operating system recovery features.

['T1490']

WastedLocker can delete shadow volumes.

['T1490']

After encryption, Diavol will capture the desktop background window, set the background color to black, and change the desktop wallpaper to a newly created bitmap image with the text “All your files are encrypted! For more information see “README-FOR-DECRYPT.txt".

['T1491.001']

Gamaredon Group has left taunting images and messages on the victims' desktops as proof of system access.

['T1491.001']

Sandworm Team defaced approximately 15,000 websites belonging to Georgian government, non-government, and private sector organizations in 2019.

['T1491.002']

Bad Rabbit has used an executable that installs a modified bootloader to prevent normal boot-up.

['T1495']

APT41 deployed a Monero cryptocurrency mining tool in a victim’s environment.

['T1496']

CookieMiner has loaded coinmining software onto systems to mine for Koto cryptocurrency.

['T1496']

Hildegard has used xmrig to mine cryptocurrency.

['T1496']

Imminent Monitor has the capability to run a cryptocurrency miner on the victim machine.

['T1496']

Kinsing has created and run a Bitcoin cryptocurrency miner.

['T1496']

Lazarus Group has subset groups like Bluenoroff who have used cryptocurrency mining software on victim machines.

['T1496']

LoudMiner harvested system resources to mine cryptocurrency, using XMRig to mine Monero.

['T1496']

Lucifer can use system resources to mine cryptocurrency, dropping XMRig to mine Monero.

['T1496']

Rocke has distributed cryptomining malware.

['T1496']

Skidmap is a kernel-mode rootkit used for cryptocurrency mining.

['T1496']

TeamTNT has deployed XMRig Docker images to mine cryptocurrency. TeamTNT has also infected Docker containers and Kubernetes clusters with XMRig, and used RainbowMiner and lolMiner for mining cryptocurrency.

['T1496']

Agent Tesla has he ability to perform anti-sandboxing and anti-virtualization checks.

['T1497']

Bumblebee has the ability to perform anti-virtualization checks.

['T1497']

CHOPSTICK includes runtime checks to identify an analysis environment and prevent execution on it.

['T1497']

Carberp has removed various hooks before installing the trojan or bootkit to evade sandbox analysis or other analysis software.

['T1497']

Darkhotel malware has employed just-in-time decryption of strings to evade sandbox detection.

['T1497']

During Operation Spalax, the threat actors used droppers that would run anti-analysis checks before executing malware on a compromised host.

['T1497']

Gelsemium can use junk code to generate random activity to obscure malware behavior.

['T1497']

HAWKBALL has methods to check if the process the malware uses is being debugged.

['T1497']

Kevin can sleep for a time interval between C2 communication attempts.

['T1497']

Lucifer can crash a debugger by passing a format string to "OutputDebugStringA()".

['T1497']

Metamorfo has embedded a "vmdetect.exe" executable to identify virtual machines at the beginning of execution.

['T1497']

Pteranodon has the ability to use anti-detection functions to identify sandbox environments.

['T1497']

Some versions of CozyCar will check to ensure it is not being executed inside a virtual machine or a known malware analysis sandbox environment. If it detects that it is, it will exit.

['T1497']

The White Company has performed anti-analysis checks to determine if its malware was in a debugging environment.

['T1497']

Attor can detect whether it is executed in some virtualized or emulated environment by searching for specific artifacts, such as communication with I/O ports and using VM-specific instructions.

['T1497.001']

BadPatch attempts to detect if it is being run in a Virtual Machine (VM) using a WMI query for disk drive name, BIOS, and motherboard information.

['T1497.001']

Bumblebee has the ability to search for designated file paths and Registry keys that indicate a virtualized environment from multiple products.

['T1497.001']

Darkhotel malware has used a series of checks to determine if it's being analyzed; checks include the length of executable names, if a filename ends with ".Md5.exe", and if the program is executed from the root of the C:\ drive, as well as checks for sandbox-related libraries.

['T1497.001']

Denis ran multiple system checks, looking for processor and register characteristics, to evade emulation and analysis.

['T1497.001']

During Frankenstein, the threat actors used a script that ran WMI queries to check if a VM or sandbox was running, including VMWare and Virtualbox. The script would also call WMI to determine the number of cores allocated to the system; if less than two the script would stop execution.

['T1497.001']

Dyre can detect sandbox analysis environments by inspecting the process list and Registry.

['T1497.001']

EvilBunny's dropper has checked the number of processes and the length and strings of its own file name to identify if the malware is in a sandbox environment.

['T1497.001']

Evilnum has used a component called TerraLoader to check certain hardware and file information to detect sandboxed environments.

['T1497.001']

Ferocious can run anti-sandbox checks using the Microsoft Excel 4.0 function "GET.WORKSPACE" to determine the OS version, if there is a mouse present, and if the host is capable of playing sounds.

['T1497.001']

FinFisher obtains the hardware device list and checks if the MD5 of the vendor ID is equal to a predefined list in order to check for sandbox/virtualized environments.

['T1497.001']

Frankenstein has used WMI queries to check if various security applications were running, including VMWare and Virtualbox.

['T1497.001']

GoldMax will check if it is being run in a virtualized environment by comparing the collected MAC address to "c8:27:cc:c2:37:5a".

['T1497.001']

Grandoreiro can detect VMWare via its I/O port and Virtual PC via the "vpcext" instruction.

['T1497.001']

GuLoader has the ability to perform anti-VM and anti-sandbox checks using string hashing, the API call "EnumWindows", and checking for Qemu guest agent.

['T1497.001']