Cloudflare’s network spans more than 330 cities in over 120 countries, where we interconnect with over 13,000 network providers in order to provide a broad range of services to millions of customers. The breadth of both our network and our customer base provides us with a unique perspective on Internet resilience, enabling us to observe the impact of Internet disruptions. Thanks to __Cloudflare Radar__ functionality released earlier this year, we can explore the impact from a __routing__ perspective, as well as a traffic perspective, at both a __network__ and __location__ level.

As we have noted in the past, this post is intended as a summary overview of observed and confirmed disruptions, and is not an exhaustive or complete list of issues that have occurred during the quarter.

A larger list of detected traffic anomalies is available in the __Cloudflare Radar Outage Center__.

Having said that, the third quarter of 2024 was particularly active, with quite a few significant Internet disruptions. Unfortunately, __governments continued to impose nationwide Internet shutdowns__ intended to prevent cheating on exams. __Damage to both terrestrial and submarine cables__ impacted Internet connectivity across Africa and in other parts of the world. __Damage caused by an active hurricane season__ caused Internet outages across the Caribbean and in multiple parts of the United States. Because Internet connectivity is dependent on reliable electrical power, both __planned and unplanned power outages__ in South America and Africa resulted in multi-hour Internet disruptions. __Military action__ continued to cause Internet outages in affected countries, as did __infrastructure maintenance__, __fire__, and a purported __cyberattack__. The quarter also saw several noteworthy Internet disruptions that __did not have verified causes__.

## Government Directed

Over the past several years, we have seen multiple governments around the world implement Internet shutdowns in response to protests within their countries. Some shutdowns are more targeted, affecting only (a subset of) mobile Internet providers, while others are more aggressive, effectively cutting off Internet connectivity at a national level. In addition, we all too frequently see governments implement nationwide multi-hour Internet shutdowns in an effort to prevent students from cheating on national exams. Unfortunately, governments were active in both respects during the third quarter, as we observed multiple government directed Internet shutdowns. Several were covered in our August 1 blog post, __A recent spate of Internet disruptions__*.*

### Bangladesh

__Violent student protests__ in __Bangladesh__ against quotas in government jobs and rising unemployment rates led the government to order the nationwide shutdown of mobile Internet connectivity on July 18, __reportedly__ to “*ensure the security of citizens.*” This government-directed shutdown ultimately became a near-complete Internet outage for the country, as broadband networks were taken offline as well. At a country level, __Internet traffic in Bangladesh dropped to near zero__ just before 21:00 local time (15:00 UTC). __Announced IP address space from the country dropped to near zero__ at that time as well, meaning that nearly every network in the country was disconnected from the Internet.

Traffic and announced IP address space at a national level began to recover around 18:00 local time (12:00 UTC) on July 23, and continued over the next several days, as __fixed broadband connectivity was restored__, with __mobile connectivity returning on July 28__. The initial restoration was characterized as a “trial run”, prioritizing banking, commercial sectors, technology firms, exporters, outsourcing providers and media outlets, __according to__ the state minister for post, telecommunication and information technology.

Ahead of this nationwide shutdown, we observed outages across several Bangladeshi network providers, perhaps foreshadowing what was to come. At __AS24389 (Grameenphone)__, a complete Internet outage started at 01:30 local time on July 18 (19:30 UTC on July 17), with a total loss of both __Internet traffic__ and __announced IP address space__.

The outage at __AS25245 (Banglalink)__ started at 02:15 local time on July 18 (20:15 UTC on July 17) as both __Internet traffic__ and __announced IP address space__ dropped to zero.

At __AS24432 (Robi Axiata)__, an Internet outage was observed starting around 06:30 local time on July 18 (00:30 UTC), with both __Internet traffic__ and __announced IP address space__ disappearing at that time.

__Internet traffic__ at __AS58715 (Earth Telecommunication)__ began to fall at 18:00 local time on July 18 (12:00 UTC), reaching zero four hours later. __Announced IP address space__ began to fall at 21:00 local time (15:00 UTC), and was completely gone by 21:25 local time (15:25 UTC).

__AS63526 (Carnival Internet)__ was one of the last to fall before the complete shutdown, __losing traffic__ at 20:45 local time (14:45 UTC), and seeing all of its __announced IP address space__ withdrawn over the following hour.

These mobile connectivity outages lasted from July 18 through July 28. Just a few days after connectivity was restored, __additional clashes between police and protestors__ drove the government to __order mobile Internet connectivity to be shut down__ again. As shown in the graphs below, traffic on these mobile network providers dropped between 13:30 and 14:15 local time (07:30 to 08:15 UTC) on Sunday, August 4.

These protests ultimately led the government to order a full Internet shutdown in the country, with both traffic and announced IP address space dropping precipitously around 10:30 local time (04:30 UTC) on Monday, August 5. However, the shutdown appeared to be short-lived, as __broadband connectivity__ began to recover around 13:20 local time (07:20 UTC), with __mobile connectivity__ being restored around 14:00 local time (08:00 UTC).

### Iraqi Kurdistan

Both __Iraq__ and Iraqi Kurdistan (the autonomous Kurdistan region in the northern part of the country) regularly implement government directed Internet shutdowns to prevent cheating on secondary and baccalaureate exams. Within Iraqi Kurdistan, we observed two sets of exam-related Internet shutdowns during the third quarter. The impacts of the shutdowns are visible on traffic from networks that operate within the region, as well as on the country-level graphs for Iraq.

The first round of shutdowns occurred in July, impacting __AS59625 (KorekTel)__, __AS21277 (Newroz Telecom)__, __AS48492 (IQ Online)__, and __AS206206 (KNET)__ between 06:00 - 08:00 local time (03:00 - 05:00 UTC) on July 3, 7, 10, and 14. This is consistent with shutdowns observed in the __second quarter__, as well as in __June 2023__. None of the impacted networks experienced a drop in announced IP address space during these shutdowns.

The second set of shutdowns in Iraqi Kurdistan took place across multiple days during the back half of August. On August 17, 19, 21, 24, 26, 28, and 31, all four network providers were again impacted, as seen in the graphs below, with traffic dropping between 06:00 - 08:00 local time (03:00 - 05:00 UTC).

### Iraq

In __Iraq__, a second round of exams for 12th graders resulted in over two weeks of regular Internet shutdowns across the country occurring between 06:00 - 08:00 local time (03:00 - 05:00 UTC) on multiple days between August 29 and September 16, intended to prevent cheating on __second ministerial exams for secondary education__. Both HTTP traffic and announced IP address space from Iraq dropped during these shutdowns, as seen in the graphs below.

(Note that the red annotation bar visible on September 11 & 12 on both the country and network-level graphs below highlights an internal data pipeline issue, and is not associated with an Internet shutdown in Iraq.)

This round of government-directed shutdowns impacted multiple local network providers, including __AS58322 (Halasat)__, __AS51684 (AsiaCell)__, __AS203214 (HulumTele)__, __AS199739 (Earthlink)__, and __AS59588 (ZAINAS)__. In reviewing the distribution of mobile device and desktop traffic at a network level, gaps were observed during the shutdowns on __AS58322__ and __AS199739__, and to a lesser extent, __AS203214__, suggesting that these networks were completely offline, while AS56184 and AS59588 remained at least partially online. (This is also corroborated by complete or partial loss of announced IP address space across these networks during the shutdowns.)

### Syria

A first round of exam-related Internet shutdowns took place in __Syria__ earlier this year, between May 26 and June 13, and were discussed in our __Exam-ining recent Internet shutdowns in Syria, Iraq, and Algeria__ blog post. A second set of exams, and the associated Internet shutdowns requested by the Ministry of Education, began on July 25 and ran through August 8, as specified in the schedule __published by Syrian Telecom on its Facebook page__.

The length of the shutdowns varied by day — they all began at 07:00 local time (04:00 UTC), but the end times ranged between 09:45 -10:30 local time (06:45 - 07:30 UTC). The graphs below show the impact at a country level, as well as to __AS29256 (Syrian Telecom)__, the __primary telecommunications provider within the country__.

These shutdowns were also covered in our August 1 blog post, __A recent spate of Internet disruptions__*.*

### Mauritania

On August 12, a round of __baccalaureate exams began__ in __Mauritania__, and in an effort to __prevent student cheating on the exams__, the government instituted multiple Internet shutdowns that impacted several major mobile providers. Two shutdowns were observed on August 12, between 08:00 - 12:00 local time (08:00 - 12:00 UTC) and between 15:00 - 19:00 local time (15:00 - 19:00 UTC), and an additional one was observed on August 13, between 08:00 - 12:30 local time (08:00 - 12:30 UTC). Impacted network providers included __AS37508 (Mattel)__, __AS37541 (Chinguitel)__, and __AS29544 (Mauritel)__. Announced IP address space for these networks remained unchanged during the shutdown periods, suggesting that that mobile subscriber connectivity was disabled, as opposed to the networks effectively being disconnected from the Internet, as we have seen in other countries.

Exam-related Internet shutdowns are, unfortunately, not new to Mauritania, as authorities in the country also implemented them __between 2017 and 2020__.

## Cable cuts

### Eswatini (Swaziland)

On July 14, MTN Eswatini (AS327765) informed customers via __a post on X__ that “*connection to the internet and data services is currently intermittent, because of fiber cable breaks resulting from wildfires.*” This apparent connection disruption was visible in Cloudflare Radar between 19:30 and 20:15 local time (17:30 and 18:15 UTC).

### Cameroon

In __Cameroon__, a fiber cut that occurred on August 4 during sanitation work disrupted mobile connectivity for Cameroon Telecommunications (__AS15964 (Camtel)__) customers for over half a day. According to a (translated) __post on X from Camtel__, “*We inform you that due to the sanitation work carried out in the city of Yaoundé, at the place called Cradat, our Voice and Data services have been temporarily interrupted on the entire mobile network.*” The observed disruption occurred between 03:00 - 16:30 local time (02:00 - 15:30 UTC). Although it initially started during a time when traffic was lower overnight anyway, both __request__ and __bytes__ traffic remained lower than the same time a week prior during the duration of the disruption.

### Liberia

The __Liberia__ Telecommunications Authority __posted an announcement to their Facebook page__ on August 21 noting that “*We have been informed by the CCL that the ACE Cable is experiencing interruptions.*” (The __Africa Coast to Europe (ACE) submarine cable__ connects multiple countries along the West Coast of Africa to Portugal and Europe.) The announcement further noted that the first signs of interruption occurred at 01:00 local time (and UTC), and that __Lonestar Cell MTN (AS37410)__ was among the providers that had been “gravely affected” by the cut.

We observed traffic on Lonestar Cell MTN dropping just after 01:00, in line with the announcement. The network experienced a complete outage lasting over a day and a half, before traffic started to recover at 14:00 local time (and UTC) on August 22. In a __Facebook post__ on August 22, Lonestar Cell MTN confirmed that Internet service had been restored, and that customer accounts would be credited with 500 MB of data for free.

### Niger

A September 7 __post on X from Airtel Niger__ alerted customers to Internet service disruptions caused by cuts on international fiber optic cables. As a land-locked country, __Niger__ is dependent on terrestrial connections to networks in neighboring countries, but it isn’t clear which connection or country Airtel Niger’s post was referencing.

Two significant Internet disruptions were observed around the time of Airtel Niger’s post that we believe are related to the referenced fiber cuts. The first occurred between 18:00 - 21:00 local time (17:00 - 20:00 UTC) on September 6, visible at a country level and at a network level as well on __AS37531 (Airtel Niger)__ and __AS37233 (Orange Niger / Zamani Telecom)__. The second disruption occurred between 10:45 - 12:00 local time (09:45 - 11:00 UTC) on September 7, visible at a country level as well as on those two networks.

### Haiti

Internet disruptions related to submarine cable failures often take a significant amount of time to resolve because of the challenges repair crews face in getting to, and accessing, the damaged portion of the cable, as it is frequently located deep underwater in the middle of an ocean. A September 14 submarine cable failure that impacted __Digicel Haiti (AS27653)__ lasted for over a week for a similar, but slightly different, reason.

A significant loss of traffic on Digicel Haiti was first observed at 08:00 local time (12:00 UTC) on September 14. On September 16, Digicel Haiti __posted a press release__ confirming that since September 14, a failure had been detected on an international submarine cable belonging to Cable and Wireless, and that the cable damage occurred at Kaliko Beach Club (the property is __reportedly__ used as a cable entry point). Digicel noted that their technicians went to the scene of the damage immediately, but were denied access, apparently because of a business dispute dating back to 2021. The release also explained that technical teams had taken temporary steps to ensure the continuity of essential services, which prevented the incident from resulting in a complete loss of connectivity. On September 22, a subsequent __press release__ posted by Digicel Haiti announced the restoration of Internet services as of 02:00 local time (06:00 UTC), and referenced vandalism as the cause of the cable damage.

### Kyrgyzstan

Reported damage to the “__backbone wire__” or “__main cable__” of an __upstream provider__ resulted in a brief Internet outage for __Kyrgyzstan__ Internet provider __Megacom (AS50223)__ of September 25. __AS12389 (Rostelecom)__ is __listed__ as Megacom’s only upstream provider.

The outage lasted for only an hour, between 15:45 and 16:45 local time (09:45 - 10:45 UTC), dropping both traffic and announced IP address space to zero. At a country level, traffic dropped as much as 72% as compared to the previous week. Given the complete loss of both traffic and IP address space, the damage likely occurred on the connection between Megacom and Rostelecom.

## Severe weather

An active hurricane season during July, August, and September resulted in infrastructure damage caused by multiple hurricanes disrupting Internet connectivity in multiple places across the Caribbean and Southeastern United States.

### Grenada & Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

At the start of the third quarter, __Grenada__ and __Saint Vincent and the Grenadines__ both suffered significant damage from Hurricane Beryl, __reportedly__ causing destruction of infrastructure, buildings, agriculture, and the natural environment.

On July 1, traffic from Grenada dropped significantly at 10:00 local time (14:00 UTC), just ahead of __landfall__ on Grenada’s Carriacou Island. The most significant impacts to traffic were seen for approximately the first 24 hours, though traffic did not return to expected pre-storm levels until around 10:00 local time (14:00 UTC) on July 5.

Internet traffic in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines was also disrupted by Hurricane Beryl, also falling at 10:00 local time (14:00 UTC). Similar to Grenada, the most significant impact was seen in the first 24 hours, with consistent gradual recovery seen after that time. However, traffic did not return to expected pre-storm levels until July 11.

### Jamaica

As Hurricane Beryl continued across the Caribbean, it __passed Jamaica on July 3__. The associated damage that it caused impacted Internet connectivity on the island, with traffic dropping significantly around 14:00 local time (19:00 UTC). As the graph below shows, the disruption was preceded by higher than normal traffic volumes, presumably due to residents looking for information about Beryl. The disruption lasted nearly a week, with traffic returning to expected levels on July 10.

### U.S. Virgin Islands

The following month, damage from Tropical Storm Ernesto caused __power outages across the U.S. Virgin Islands__, resulting in disruptions to Internet connectivity. Traffic from the islands dropped precipitously at 22:00 local time on August 13 (02:00 UTC on August 14) and remained lower for over two days, before returning to expected pre-storm levels around 11:00 local time (15:00 UTC) on August 16.

### Bermuda

Over the course of the following few days, Ernesto strengthened from a tropical storm into a hurricane, but had weakened by the time it hit __Bermuda__ on August 16/17. In this case, damage was __reportedly__ limited to power outages, downed trees, and flooding, but even this limited damage disrupted Internet connectivity on the island. As the storm made landfall on the island, traffic levels dropped over 80% at 22:00 local time on August 16 (01:00 UTC on August 17). Traffic levels remained depressed for about two and a half days, recovering to expected levels around 09:00 local time (12:00 UTC) on August 19.

### Nepal

__Heavy rains in Nepal__ at the end of September resulted in flooding and landslides across much of the country, which in turn resulted in power outages and Internet disruptions. One such disruption believed to be associated with the impacts of the storm was observed on September 28, when __AS23752 (Nepal Telecom)__, __AS45650 (Vianet)__, __AS139922 (Dishhome)__, and __AS17501 (Worldlink)__ all saw traffic drop 50 - 70% between 14:15 - 16:00 local time (08:30 - 10:15 UTC).

### United States

A disruption to traffic from __AS11427 (Charter Communications/Spectrum)__ in Texas that occurred between 12:30 and 19:30 local time on July 9 (17:30 - 00:30 UTC) was caused by “*a third-party infrastructure issue caused by the impact of Hurricane Beryl*”, according to a July 9 __post on X__ from the provider. Spectrum __acknowledged the issue__ shortly after it began, and __followed up again__ after service had been restored.

Hurricane Helene __made landfall in northern Florida__ as a Category 4 storm late in the evening (local time) on September 26, and over the following hours and days, __continued north__ through Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina, and into Tennessee. Even as it weakened, it caused historic flooding and damage to roads, homes, power lines, and telecommunications infrastructure. Below, we review the traffic impacts observed at a state level in three of the most impacted states, as well as exploring the impact at a network level for selected providers. (Doug Madory at Kentik published an excellent __blog post exploring the impact of Helene__ from the perspective of their data, and the networks referenced below were informed by that post.)

#### Georgia

Helene entered Georgia early morning on Friday, September 27, and by midday (local time), peak traffic was approximately 20% lower than peak levels seen in the days ahead of the storm. (The lower peaks on September 28 & 29 are likely due to it being a weekend.) At a state level, peak traffic remained lower over the following week, with more recovery seen heading into the week of October 6.

One of the most significantly impacted network providers in Georgia was __AS11240 (ATC Broadband)__, which saw traffic start to drop around 22:00 local time on September 26 (02:00 UTC on September 27). Subscribers and customers experienced a near complete outage until around 08:00 local time on September 30 (12:00 UTC), when traffic volumes slowly started to recover. The normal diurnal traffic pattern became more clear in the following days, with peak traffic levels continuing to increase over the next week as well.

Other network providers in Georgia that experienced significant impacts include __AS400511 (Clearwave Fiber)__, __AS394473 (Brantley Telephone Company)__, __AS40285 (Northland Cable Television)__, __AS15313 (Pembroke Telephone Company)__, and __AS397118 (Glenwood Telephone Company)__.

#### South Carolina

The midday traffic peak on September 27 in South Carolina was just 65% of the preceding days, with the peaks remaining lower over the following two weekend days. Traffic remained somewhat lower during the week following Helene, with peak increases becoming more evident the week of October 6.

At __AS19212 (Piedmont Rural Telephone)__ in South Carolina, traffic began to fall rapidly around midnight local time on September 27 (04:00 UTC), reaching a state of near complete outage over the next eight hours. A gradual recovery is visible over the following several days, with a more regular pattern becoming evident on October 1, with rapid growth over the following week, accelerating towards the end of the week.

Other network providers in South Carolina, including __AS397068 (Carolina Connect)__, __AS10279 (West Carolina Communications)__, __AS20222__ & __AS21898 (TruVista)__, and __AS14615 (Rock Hill Telephone)__, also experienced significant disruptions to connectivity in the wake of Helene.

#### North Carolina

Although a drop in traffic is visible in the graph for North Carolina on September 27, it occurs after a midday peak in line with previous days, and the magnitude is not as significant as that seen in South Carolina and Georgia. Traffic peaks over the following week are in line with the week preceding Helene’s arrival, with higher peaks seen the week of October 6.

North Carolina providers __AS53488 (Morris Broadband)__ and __AS53274 (Skyrunner)__ both experienced multi-day disruptions, likely related to damage from Helene. However, these disruptions took Morris Broadband completely offline several times over the course of a week — the announced IP address space graph below shows three distinct drops to zero, aligning with outages visible in the traffic graph, when the network was effectively disconnected from the Internet. A similar but less severe pattern was seen at Skyrunner, which lost 75-80% of announced IP address space for a two-day period covering September 27-29, aligning with an outage visible in the associated traffic graph.

Other impacted network providers in North Carolina included __AS22191 (Wilkes Communications)__ and __AS23118 (Skyline Telephone)__.

## Power outages

### Venezuela

A nationwide power outage in __Venezuela__ on August 30 was, __according to President Nicolás Maduro__, the result of an attack on the Guri Reservoir, Venezuela's largest hydroelectric project. A __published report__ indicated that all 24 of the country's states reported a total or partial loss of electricity supply. The loss of power unsurprisingly caused an Internet disruption, with country-level traffic dropping 82%, starting around 04:45 local time (08:45 UTC). Traffic began to increase as electricity returned to various parts of the country throughout the day, and returned to expected levels just after midnight local time on August 31 (04:00 UTC).

### Kenya

On August 30, Kenya Power Care __posted a Customer Alert on its Facebook page__, issued at 21:57 local time (18:57 UTC), stating that “*We have lost power supply to various parts of the country except North Rift region and sections of Western region.*” Approximately a half hour before that alert, Kenya’s Internet traffic began to drop, falling as much as 61%. Just two hours later, Kenya Power Care __posted a follow up__, stating “*Following the partial outage affecting several parts of the country this evening, we are pleased to report that power supply has now been restored to the entire Western region, as well as parts of Central Rift, South Nyanza, and Nairobi regions.*” However, traffic did not return to expected levels for several more hours, taking until 06:00 local time (03:00 UTC).

A week later, on September 6, Kenya Power Care __posted another similar Customer Alert__, noting that “*We are experiencing a power outage affecting several parts of the country, except sections of North Rift and Western regions.*” This alert was issued at 09:20 local time (06:20 UTC), and follows a drop in Internet traffic that started around 09:00 local time (06:00 UTC). Traffic dropped approximately 45% during this power outage, and returned to expected levels around 16:00 local time (13:00 UTC). Traffic recovery aligns with a __subsequent Customer Alert posted on Facebook__, where Kenya Power Care stated “*We are glad to report that normal electricity supply was restored across the country as at 3:49pm”.*

A statement from Energy and Petroleum Cabinet Secretary Opiyo Wandayi, __shared on Facebook by Kenya Power Care__, explained the cause of the power outage: “*Today, Friday 6th September 2024 at 8.56 am, the 220kV High Voltage Loiyangalani transmission line tripped at Suswa substation while evacuating 288MW from Lake Turkana Wind Power (LTWP) plant. This was followed by a trip on the Ethiopia – Kenya 500kV DC interconnector that was then carrying 200MW, resulting to a total loss of 488MW…*”

### Ecuador

According to a (translated) September 7 __post on X from CENACE__, the national electricity operator in __Ecuador__, “*We inform the public that due to a fault in the Molino substation bar, which is connected to the Paute generation, there has been a power outage in some provinces of the country. Cenace's technical team, in coordination with the distribution companies, is working to gradually restore electrical service. It is estimated that it will take 3 to 4 hours maximum for the supply to return to normal.*” The post was published at 09:53 local time (14:53 UTC), approximately an hour after Internet traffic from the country began to drop. Traffic returned to expected levels just under four hours later, at around 12:30 local time (17:30 UTC), in line with CENACE’s predicted time for power to be fully restored.

On September 18/19, the first of several planned nightly power outages to enable needed grid maintenance in Ecuador disrupted Internet connectivity. Traffic dropped by over 60% as compared to the same time the prior week starting around 21:30 local (02:30 UTC), with the power outages __reportedly__ scheduled for 22:00 - 06:00 local time. Internet traffic recovered to expected levels around 06:00 local time (11:00 UTC) as power was restored. Similar power cuts were __reportedly planned from September 23 to September 27__, but these power outages did not appear to impact __traffic levels in Ecuador as compared to the previous week__.

### Senegal

__Senegal’s__ power company, Senelec, __posted a communiqué on X__ on September 12 that stated (translated) “*Senelec informs its valued customers that an incident that occurred this morning at the Hann substation resulted in the loss of the OMVS interconnected network and disruptions to electricity distribution.*” This disruption to electricity distribution also resulted in a disruption to Internet traffic, which dropped sharply at 13:00 local time (13:00 UTC), falling as much as 80%. Traffic recovered to expected levels by 20:00 local time (20:00 UTC) around the same time that Senelec __posted a followup about the incident__ that stated (translated) “*Effective restoration of electricity supply in all localities.*”

## Maintenance

### Syria

As we discussed above, Internet users in __Syria__ were impacted by an exam-related Internet shutdown from 07:00 - 10:15 local time (04:00 - 07:15 UTC) on July 30. However, just an hour after connectivity was restored, another disruption occurred, as seen in both the traffic and announced IP address space graphs below. According to a (translated) __Facebook post from Syrian Telecom__, “...*during the periodic maintenance of one of the air conditioners in one of the technical halls, an explosion occurred, which caused the internet circuits to be temporarily out of service.*” Traffic remained depressed for approximately eight hours, recovering to expected levels around 19:00 local time (16:00 UTC).

## Cyberattack

### Russia

Roskomnadzor, Russia’s Internet regulate, __blamed__ a brief disruption in traffic observed in __Russia__ and on __AS12389 (Rostelecom)__ on August 21 on a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack that targeted Russian telecommunications operators. The disruption was brief, lasting from around 13:45 until 14:30 Moscow time (10:45 - 11:30 UTC). Roskomnadzor __subsequently stated__ "*As of 3 PM Moscow time, the attack has been repelled, and services are operating normally.*" The disruption __reportedly__ impacted messaging services Telegram and WhatsApp, __as well as__ Wikipedia, Yandex, VKontakte, telecom support services, and mobile banking apps. Some experts __questioned the official explanation__, suggesting instead that the disruption was due to __centralized interference from Roskomnadzor__.

## Military action

### Palestine

We have covered Internet disruptions related to the ongoing conflict in Gaza multiple times since October 2023, both on __Cloudflare Radar’s presence on X__, and on the Cloudflare blog (__1__, __2__, __3__). In many of these cases, Paltel (AS12975) has posted notices on social media regarding service disruptions and outages. On September 8, __Paltel posted a message on its Facebook page__, stating (translated) “*We regret to announce the suspension of home internet services in the central and southern areas of the Gaza Strip, due to the ongoing aggression.*”

Within the Gaza, Rafah, Deir al-Balah Governorates, we observed a sharp drop in traffic at 18:00 local time (16:00 UTC). The impact appeared to be most significant in Rafah and Deir al-Balah. Traffic returned to expected levels around 23:00 local time (21:00 UTC), and Paltel __confirmed the service restoration in a subsequent Facebook post__, stating (translated) “*We would like to announce the return of home Internet services in central and southern Gaza Strip to the way it was before it was interrupted hours ago.*”

### Lebanon

__Israeli airstrikes targeting the Lebanese capital of Beirut__ on September 28 likely knocked local network provider __Solidere (AS42852)__ offline for several hours. The graph below shows a loss of traffic starting around 12:15 local time (10:15 UTC), at the same time a complete loss of announced IP address space occurred. Most of Solidere’s IP address space started to get announced again at 14:45 local time (12:45 UTC), and a slight increase in traffic was seen at that time as well. Traffic levels fully recovered just after 18:00 local time (16:00 UTC), and announced IP address space had stabilized by that time as well.

## Fire

### Algeria

A fire near a data center in Blida Province, __Algeria__ disrupted connectivity on AS327931 (Djezzy) at 13:00 and local time (12:00 UTC) on July 24. According to a (translated) __X post from Djezzy__, “*Djezzy announced fluctuations in its services in some areas of the country, as it was a victim of a fire that broke out on Wednesday, July 24, 2024, in a warehouse of one of the companies located near its technical center in the state of Blida.*” The post from Djezzy predicted that “*97% of the sites will be restored by around 3 am [July 25]*”, but traffic did not return to expected levels until the end of the day on July 25.

## Unknown

### United States

On Monday, September 30, customers on Verizon’s mobile network in multiple cities across the United States __reported__ experiencing a loss of connectivity. Impacted phones showed “SOS” instead of the usual bar-based signal strength indicator, and customers complained of an inability to make or receive calls on their mobile devices. Although initial reports of connectivity problems started around 09:00 ET (13:00 UTC), we didn’t see a noticeable change in request volume at an ASN level until about two hours later. __AS6167 (CELLCO)__ is the __autonomous system__ used by Verizon for its mobile network.

Just before 12:00 ET (16:00 UTC), Verizon __published a social media post acknowledging the problem__, stating “We are aware of an issue impacting service for some customers. Our engineers are engaged, and we are working quickly to identify and solve the issue.” As the __graph__ below shows, a slight decline (-5%) in HTTP traffic as compared to traffic at the same time a week prior is first visible around 11:00 ET (15:00 UTC), and request volume fell as much as 9% below expected levels at 13:45 ET (17:45 UTC).

Media reports listed cities including Chicago, Indianapolis, New York City, Atlanta, Cincinnati, Omaha, Phoenix, Denver, Minneapolis, Seattle, Los Angeles, and Las Vegas as being most impacted. Traffic graphs illustrating the impacts seen in these cities can be found in our * Impact of Verizon’s September 30 outage on Internet traffic* blog post.

Traffic appeared to return to expected levels around 17:15 ET (21:15 UTC). At 19:18 ET (23:18 UTC), a __social media post__ from Verizon noted “*Verizon engineers have fully restored today's network disruption that impacted some customers. Service has returned to normal levels.*”

### Pakistan

On July 31, __Pakistan__ experienced a wide-scale Internet disruption that lasted approximately two hours, between 13:30 - 15:30 local time (08:30 - 10:30 UTC). Traffic only dropped ~45% at a country level, but __AS17557 (PTCL)__ experienced a near complete loss of traffic, while traffic at __AS24499 (Telenor Pakistan)__ dropped nearly 90%. Together, the two network providers serve an estimated nine million users, and are among the top five Internet service providers in the country.

The actual cause of the disruption is disputed. It was __reported__ that the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) attributed the disruptions to a technical glitch in the international submarine cable affecting the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL) network. However, another __published report__ noted “According to our sources, the government’s latest firewall edition to block the content was misconfigured, resulting in Internet connectivity disruption.” Additional details can be found in our August 1 blog post, __A recent spate of Internet disruptions__*.*

### United Kingdom

On August 14, subscribers of __UK__ service provider __Vodafone (AS25135)__ __reported problems__ accessing both mobile and landline Internet connections. Starting around 11:00 local time (10:00 UTC), we observed traffic starting to drop, ultimately falling 43% below the same time the prior week. The disruption was fairly short-lived, as traffic returned to expected levels by 13:30 local time (12:30 UTC). Vodafone did not acknowledge the issue on social media, nor did it provide a public explanation for what caused the disruption.

## Conclusion

Although Internet disruptions observed during the third quarter had a variety of underlying causes, those caused by power outages due to aging or insufficiently maintained electrical infrastructure are worth highlighting. Of course, widespread power outages always create a massive inconvenience for impacted populations, but over the last several years, as communication, entertainment, commerce, and more have become increasingly reliant on the Internet, the impact of these outages has become even more significant, because losing electrical power largely means losing Internet connectivity. Although mobile connectivity may still be available in some cases, it is decidedly not a complete replacement, not to mention that mobile devices will eventually need to be recharged. While addressing the underlying infrastructure issues require non-trivial amounts of time, resources, and money, governments appear to be taking steps towards doing so.

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