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IDENTIFICATIONS
Identifications and the Right to Counsel
In this chapter we begin our three-chapter unit on identification evidence, which generally consists of witness statements about who committed a crime. A victim or other witness can identify a perpetrator in court (saying, in front of the jury, something like, “That’s the one who did it”), and police often ask witnesses to identify suspects out of court. Out-of-court identification procedures include lineups—at which several similar-looking persons are presented to a witness in the hope that the witness will identify the correct person—as well as less elaborate presentations which are essentially lineups with only one suspect, about whom the witness says “yes” or “no.” Further, police can show photos to witnesses, a process much quicker than in-person identification.
This chapter concerns when a suspect has the right to have counsel present during an identification procedure.
Supreme Court of the United States
United States v. Billy Joe Wade
Decided June 12, 1967 – 388 U.S. 218
Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question here is whether courtroom identifications of an accused at trial are to be excluded from evidence because the accused was exhibited to the witnesses before trial at a post-indictment lineup conducted for identification purposes without notice to and in the absence of the accused’s appointed counsel.
The federally insured bank in Eustace, Texas, was robbed on September 21, 1964. A man with a small strip of tape on each side of his face entered the bank, pointed a pistol at the female cashier and the vice president, the only persons in the bank at the time, and forced them to fill a pillowcase with the bank’s money. The man then drove away with an accomplice who had been waiting in a stolen car outside the bank. On March 23, 1965, an indictment was returned against respondent, Wade, and two others for conspiring to rob the bank, and against Wade and the accomplice for the robbery itself. Wade was arrested on April 2, and counsel was appointed to represent him on April 26. Fifteen days later an FBI agent, without notice to Wade’s lawyer, arranged to have the two bank employees observe a lineup made up of Wade and five or six other prisoners and conducted in a courtroom of the local county courthouse. Each person in the line wore strips of tape such as allegedly worn by the robber and upon direction each said something like ‘put the money in the bag,’ the words allegedly uttered by the robber. Both bank employees identified Wade in the lineup as the bank robber.
At trial the two employees, when asked on direct examination if the robber was in the courtroom, pointed to Wade. The prior lineup identification was then elicited from both employees on cross-examination. At the close of testimony, Wade’s counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, to strike the bank officials’ courtroom identifications on the ground that conduct of the lineup, without notice to and in the absence of his appointed counsel, violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. The motion was denied, and Wade was convicted. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial at which the in-court identification evidence was to be excluded. We granted certiorari and set the case for oral argument with [other cases] which present similar questions. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to that court with direction to enter a new judgment vacating the conviction and remanding the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I
Neither the lineup itself nor anything shown by this record that Wade was required to do in the lineup violated his privilege against self-incrimination. We have only recently reaffirmed that the privilege “protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature ….” “[T]he prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.”
We have no doubt that compelling the accused merely to exhibit his person for observation by a prosecution witness prior to trial involves no compulsion of the accused to give evidence having testimonial significance. It is compulsion of the accused to exhibit his physical characteristics, not compulsion to disclose any knowledge he might have. [C]ompelling Wade to speak within hearing distance of the witnesses, even to utter words purportedly uttered by the robber, was not compulsion to utter statements of a “testimonial” nature; he was required to use his voice as an identifying physical characteristic, not to speak his guilt. [T]he distinction to be drawn under the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is one between an accused’s “communications” in whatever form, vocal or physical, and “compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of ‘real or physical evidence.’” “[B]oth federal and state courts have usually held that … [the privilege] offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photography, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture.” None of these activities becomes testimonial within the scope of the privilege because required of the accused in a pretrial lineup.
Moreover, it deserves emphasis that this case presents no question of the admissibility in evidence of anything Wade said or did at the lineup which implicates his privilege. The Government offered no such evidence as part of its case, and what came out about the lineup proceedings on Wade’s cross-examination of the bank employees involved no violation of Wade’s privilege.
II
The fact that the lineup involved no violation of Wade’s privilege against self-incrimination does not, however, dispose of his contention that the courtroom identifications should have been excluded because the lineup was conducted without notice to and in the absence of his counsel. [I]n this case it is urged that the assistance of counsel at the lineup was indispensable to protect Wade’s most basic right as a criminal defendant—his right to a fair trial at which the witnesses against him might be meaningfully cross-examined.
When the Bill of Rights was adopted, there were no organized police forces as we know them today. The accused confronted the prosecutor and the witnesses against him, and the evidence was marshalled, largely at the trial itself. In contrast, today’s law enforcement machinery involves critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well settle the accused’s fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality. In recognition of these realities of modern criminal prosecution, our cases have construed the Sixth Amendment guarantee to apply to “critical” stages of the proceedings. The guarantee reads: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” The plain wording of this guarantee thus encompasses counsel’s assistance whenever necessary to assure a meaningful “defence.”
As early as Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), we recognized that the period from arraignment to trial was “perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings …” during which the accused “requires the guiding hand of counsel …” if the guarantee is not to prove an empty right. That principle has since been applied to require the assistance of counsel at the type of arraignment where certain rights might be sacrificed or lost: “What happens there may affect the whole trial. Available defenses may be irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted ….” The principle was also applied in Massiah v. United States (Chapter 29), where we held that incriminating statements of the defendant should have been excluded from evidence when it appeared that they were overheard by federal agents who, without notice to the defendant’s lawyer, arranged a meeting between the defendant and an accomplice turned informant.
In Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), we [held] that the right to counsel was guaranteed at the point where the accused, prior to arraignment, was subjected to secret interrogation despite repeated requests to see his lawyer.1 We again noted the necessity of counsel’s presence if the accused was to have a fair opportunity to present a defense at the trial itself.
Finally in Miranda v. State of Arizona (Chapter 23), the rules established for custodial interrogation included the right to the presence of counsel. The result was rested on our finding that this and the other rules were necessary to safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination from being jeopardized by such interrogation.
Of course, nothing decided or said in the opinions in the cited cases links the right to counsel only to protection of Fifth Amendment rights. Rather those decisions “no more than [reflect] a constitutional principle established as long ago as Powell v. Alabama ….” It is central to that principle that in addition to counsel’s presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s absence might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial. The security of that right is as much the aim of the right to counsel as it is of the other guarantees of the Sixth Amendment—the right of the accused to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, and his right to be confronted with the witnesses against him and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. The presence of counsel at such critical confrontations, as at the trial itself, operates to assure that the accused’s interests will be protected consistently with our adversary theory of criminal prosecution.
In sum, the principle of Powell v. Alabama and succeeding cases requires that we scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused to determine whether the presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant’s basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself. It calls upon us to analyze whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.
III
The Government characterizes the lineup as a mere preparatory step in the gathering of the prosecution’s evidence, not different—for Sixth Amendment purposes—from various other preparatory steps, such as systematized or scientific analyzing of the accused’s fingerprints, blood sample, clothing, hair, and the like. We think there are differences which preclude such stages being characterized as critical stages at which the accused has the right to the presence of his counsel. Knowledge of the techniques of science and technology is sufficiently available, and the variables in techniques few enough, that the accused has the opportunity for a meaningful confrontation of the Government’s case at trial through the ordinary processes of cross-examination of the Government’s expert witnesses and the presentation of the evidence of his own experts. The denial of a right to have his counsel present at such analyses does not therefore violate the Sixth Amendment; they are not critical stages since there is minimal risk that his counsel’s absence at such stages might derogate from his right to a fair trial.
IV
But the confrontation compelled by the State between the accused and the victim or witnesses to a crime to elicit identification evidence is peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors which might seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair trial. The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification. Mr. Justice Frankfurter once said: “What is the worth of identification testimony even when uncontradicted? The identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards of such testimony are established by a formidable number of instances in the records of English and American trials. These instances are recent—not due to the brutalities of ancient criminal procedure.” A major factor contributing to the high incidence of miscarriage of justice from mistaken identification has been the degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification. Suggestion can be created intentionally or unintentionally in many subtle ways. And the dangers for the suspect are particularly grave when the witness’ opportunity for observation was insubstantial, and thus his susceptibility to suggestion the greatest.
Moreover, “[i]t is a matter of common experience that, once a witness has picked out the accused at the line-up, he is not likely to go back on his word later on, so that in practice the issue of identity may [in the absence of other relevant evidence] for all practical purposes be determined there and then, before the trial.”
The pretrial confrontation for purpose of identification may take the form of a lineup, also known as an “identification parade” or “showup,” as in the present case, or presentation of the suspect alone to the witness. It is obvious that risks of suggestion attend either form of confrontation and increase the dangers inhering in eyewitness identification. But as is the case with secret interrogations, there is serious difficulty in depicting what transpires at lineups and other forms of identification confrontations. “Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on ….” For the same reasons, the defense can seldom reconstruct the manner and mode of lineup identification for judge or jury at trial. Those participating in a lineup with the accused may often be police officers; in any event, the participants’ names are rarely recorded or divulged at trial. The impediments to an objective observation are increased when the victim is the witness. Lineups are prevalent in rape and robbery prosecutions and present a particular hazard that a victim’s understandable outrage may excite vengeful or spiteful motives. In any event, neither witnesses nor lineup participants are apt to be alert for conditions prejudicial to the suspect. And if they were, it would likely be of scant benefit to the suspect since neither witnesses nor lineup participants are likely to be schooled in the detection of suggestive influences. Improper influences may go undetected by a suspect, guilty or not, who experiences the emotional tension which we might expect in one being confronted with potential accusers. Even when he does observe abuse, if he has a criminal record he may be reluctant to take the stand and open up the admission of prior convictions. Moreover any protestations by the suspect of the fairness of the lineup made at trial are likely to be in vain; the jury’s choice is between the accused’s unsupported version and that of the police officers present. In short, the accused’s inability effectively to reconstruct at trial any unfairness that occurred at the lineup may deprive him of his only opportunity meaningfully to attack the credibility of the witness’ courtroom identification.
The potential for improper influence is illustrated by the circumstances, insofar as they appear, surrounding the prior identifications in the three cases we decide today. In the present case, the testimony of the identifying witnesses elicited on cross-examination revealed that those witnesses were taken to the courthouse and seated in the courtroom to await assembly of the lineup. The courtroom faced on a hallway observable to the witnesses through an open door. The cashier testified that she saw Wade “standing in the hall” within sight of an FBI agent. Five or six other prisoners later appeared in the hall. The vice president testified that he saw a person in the hall in the custody of the agent who “resembled the person that we identified as the one that had entered the bank.”
Insofar as the accused’s conviction may rest on a courtroom identification in fact the fruit of a suspect pretrial identification which the accused is helpless to subject to effective scrutiny at trial, the accused is deprived of that right of cross-examination which is an essential safeguard to his right to confront the witnesses against him. And even though cross-examination is a precious safeguard to a fair trial, it cannot be viewed as an absolute assurance of accuracy and reliability. Thus in the present context, where so many variables and pitfalls exist, the first line of defense must be the prevention of unfairness and the lessening of the hazards of eyewitness identification at the lineup itself. The trial which might determine the accused’s fate may well not be that in the courtroom but that at the pretrial confrontation, with the State aligned against the accused, the witness the sole jury, and the accused unprotected against the overreaching, intentional or unintentional, and with little or no effective appeal from the judgment there rendered by the witness—“that’s the man.”
Since it appears that there is grave potential for prejudice, intentional or not, in the pretrial lineup, which may not be capable of reconstruction at trial, and since presence of counsel itself can often avert prejudice and assure a meaningful confrontation at trial, there can be little doubt that for Wade the postindictment lineup was a critical stage of the prosecution at which he was “as much entitled to such aid [of counsel]… as at the trial itself.” Thus both Wade and his counsel should have been notified of the impending lineup, and counsel’s presence should have been a requisite to conduct of the lineup, absent an “intelligent waiver.” [W]e leave open the question whether the presence of substitute counsel might not suffice where notification and presence of the suspect’s own counsel would result in prejudicial delay.
“[A]n attorney is merely exercising the good professional judgment he has been taught. This is not cause for considering the attorney a menace to law enforcement. He is merely carrying out what he is sworn to do under his oath—to protect to the extent of his ability the rights of his client. In fulfilling this responsibility the attorney plays a vital role in the administration of criminal justice under our Constitution.”
In our view counsel can hardly impede legitimate law enforcement; on the contrary, for the reasons expressed, law enforcement may be assisted by preventing the infiltration of taint in the prosecution’s identification evidence. That result cannot help the guilty avoid conviction but can only help assure that the right man has been brought to justice.
Legislative or other regulations, such as those of local police departments, which eliminate the risks of abuse and unintentional suggestion at lineup proceedings and the impediments to meaningful confrontation at trial may also remove the basis for regarding the stage as “critical.” But neither Congress nor the federal authorities have seen fit to provide a solution. What we hold today “in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect.”
V
We come now to the question whether the denial of Wade’s motion to strike the courtroom identification by the bank witnesses at trial because of the absence of his counsel at the lineup required, as the Court of Appeals held, the grant of a new trial at which such evidence is to be excluded. We do not think this disposition can be justified without first giving the Government the opportunity to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identifications were based upon observations of the suspect other than the lineup identification. Where, as here, the admissibility of evidence of the lineup identification itself is not involved, a per se rule of exclusion of courtroom identification would be unjustified. A rule limited solely to the exclusion of testimony concerning identification at the lineup itself, without regard to admissibility of the courtroom identification, would render the right to counsel an empty one. The lineup is most often used, as in the present case, to crystallize the witnesses’ identification of the defendant for future reference. We have already noted that the lineup identification will have that effect. The State may then rest upon the witnesses’ unequivocal courtroom identifications, and not mention the pretrial identification as part of the State’s case at trial. Counsel is then in the predicament in which Wade’s counsel found himself—realizing that possible unfairness at the lineup may be the sole means of attack upon the unequivocal courtroom identification, and having to probe in the dark in an attempt to discover and reveal unfairness, while bolstering the government witness’ courtroom identification by bringing out and dwelling upon his prior identification. Since counsel’s presence at the lineup would equip him to attack not only the lineup identification but the courtroom identification as well, limiting the impact of violation of the right to counsel to exclusion of evidence only of identification at the lineup itself disregards a critical element of that right.
We think it follows that the proper test to be applied in these situations is “[W]hether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Application of this test in the present context requires consideration of various factors; for example, the prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the existence of any discrepancy between any pre-lineup description and the defendant’s actual description, any identification prior to lineup of another person, the identification by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup, failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and the lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup identification. It is also relevant to consider those facts which, despite the absence of counsel, are disclosed concerning the conduct of the lineup.
We doubt that the Court of Appeals applied the proper test for exclusion of the in-court identification of the two witnesses. On the record now before us we cannot make the determination whether the in-court identifications had an independent origin. This was not an issue at trial, although there is some evidence relevant to a determination. That inquiry is most properly made in the District Court. We therefore think the appropriate procedure to be followed is to vacate the conviction pending a hearing to determine whether the in-court identifications had an independent source, or whether, in any event, the introduction of the evidence was harmless error and for the District Court to reinstate the conviction or order a new trial, as may be proper.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded to that court with direction to enter a new judgment vacating the conviction and remanding the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes, Comments, and Questions
In Wade, the FBI held a lineup, and the defendant’s counsel was not notified or present. The Court did not find a Fifth Amendment violation. Why not? Were you persuaded by the potential damages as identified by the majority in Wade? Why or why not?
Our next case, Gilbert v. California, was decided on the same day as Wade and presents similar issues. It also allowed the Court to apply the rule of Wade to handwriting evidence.
After reading Wade and Gilbert, students should note the Court’s two distinct rules governing evidence resulting from a post-indictment lineup conducted without the defendant’s counsel present. One rule concerns in-court identification of a suspect whom a witness previously encountered at a defective lineup (testimony that need not mention the prior lineup), and the other involves in-court testimony about the defective lineup itself.
Supreme Court of the United States
Jesse James Gilbert v. California
Decided June 12, 1967 – 388 U.S. 263
Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case was argued with United States v. Wade and presents the same alleged constitutional error in the admission in evidence of in-court identifications there considered. In addition, petitioner alleges constitutional errors in the admission in evidence of testimony of some of the witnesses that they also identified him at the lineup [and] in the admission of handwriting exemplars taken from him after his arrest.
Petitioner was convicted in the Superior Court of California of the armed robbery of the Mutual Savings and Loan Association of Alhambra and the murder of a police officer who entered during the course of the robbery. There were separate guilt and penalty stages of the trial before the same jury, which rendered a guilty verdict and imposed the death penalty. The California Supreme Court affirmed. We granted certiorari. If our holding today in Wade is applied to this case, the issue whether admission of the in-court and lineup identifications is constitutional error which requires a new trial could be resolved on this record only after further proceedings in the California courts. We must therefore first determine whether petitioner’s other contentions warrant any greater relief.
THE HANDWRITING EXEMPLARS
Petitioner was arrested in Philadelphia by an FBI agent and refused to answer questions about the Alhambra robbery without the advice of counsel. He later did answer questions of another agent about some Philadelphia robberies in which the robber used a handwritten note demanding that money be handed over to him, and during that interrogation gave the agent the handwriting exemplars. They were admitted in evidence at trial over objection that they were obtained in violation of petitioner’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The California Supreme Court upheld admission of the exemplars on the sole ground that petitioner had waived any rights that he might have had not to furnish them. [W]e conclude that the taking of the exemplars violated none of petitioner’s constitutional rights.
First. The taking of the exemplars did not violate petitioner’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Second. The taking of the exemplars was not a “critical” stage of the criminal proceedings entitling petitioner to the assistance of counsel. Putting aside the fact that the exemplars were taken before the indictment and appointment of counsel, there is minimal risk that the absence of counsel might derogate from his right to a fair trial. If, for some reason, an unrepresentative exemplar is taken, this can be brought out and corrected through the adversary process at trial since the accused can make an unlimited number of additional exemplars for analysis and comparison by government and defense handwriting experts. Thus, “the accused has the opportunity for a meaningful confrontation of the [State’s] case at trial through the ordinary processes of cross-examination of the [State’s] expert [handwriting] witnesses and the presentation of the evidence of his own [handwriting] experts.”
[In Parts II and III, the Court briefly discussed issues related to hearsay evidence and Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims.]
THE IN-COURT AND LINEUP IDENTIFICATIONS
Since none of the petitioner’s other contentions warrants relief, the issue becomes what relief is required by application to this case of the principles today announced in United States v. Wade.
Three eyewitnesses to the Alhambra crimes who identified Gilbert at the guilt stage of the trial had observed him at a lineup conducted without notice to his counsel in a Los Angeles auditorium 16 days after his indictment and after appointment of counsel. The manager of the apartment house in which incriminating evidence was found, and in which Gilbert allegedly resided, identified Gilbert in the courtroom and also testified, in substance, to her prior lineup identification on examination by the State. Eight witnesses who identified him in the courtroom at the penalty stage were not eyewitnesses to the Alhambra crimes but to other robberies allegedly committed by him. In addition to their in-court identifications, these witnesses also testified that they identified Gilbert at the same lineup.
The line-up was on a stage behind-bright lights which prevented those in the line from seeing the audience. Upwards of 100 persons were in the audience, each an eyewitness to one of the several robberies charged to Gilbert. The record is otherwise virtually silent as to what occurred at the lineup.
At the guilt stage, after the first witness, a cashier of the savings and loan association, identified Gilbert in the courtroom, defense counsel moved, out of the presence of the jury, to strike her testimony on the ground that she identified Gilbert at the pretrial lineup conducted in the absence of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. He requested a hearing outside the presence of the jury to present evidence supporting his claim that her in-court identification was, and others to be elicited by the State from other eyewitnesses would be, “predicated at least in large part upon their identification or purported identification of Mr. Gilbert at the showup.” The trial judge denied the motion as premature. Defense counsel then elicited the fact of the cashier’s lineup identification on cross-examination and again moved to strike her identification testimony. Without passing on the merits of the Sixth Amendment claim, the trial judge denied the motion on the ground that, assuming a violation, it would not in any event entitle Gilbert to suppression of the in-court identification. Defense counsel thereafter elicited the fact of lineup identifications from two other eyewitnesses who on direct examination identified Gilbert in the courtroom. Defense counsel unsuccessfully objected at the penalty stage, to the testimony of the eight witnesses to the other robberies that they identified Gilbert at the lineup.
The admission of the in-court identifications without first determining that they were not tainted by the illegal lineup but were of independent origin was constitutional error. However, as in Wade, the record does not permit an informed judgment whether the in-court identifications at the two stages of the trial had an independent source. Gilbert is therefore entitled only to a vacation of his conviction pending the holding of such proceedings as the California Supreme Court may deem appropriate to afford the State the opportunity to establish that the in-court identifications had an independent source, or that their introduction in evidence was in any event harmless error.
Quite different considerations are involved as to the admission of the testimony of the manager of the apartment house at the guilt phase and of the eight witnesses at the penalty stage that they identified Gilbert at the lineup. That testimony is the direct result of the illegal lineup “come at by exploitation of [the primary] illegality.” The State is therefore not entitled to an opportunity to show that that testimony had an independent source. Only a per se exclusionary rule as to such testimony can be an effective sanction to assure that law enforcement authorities will respect the accused’s constitutional right to the presence of his counsel at the critical lineup. In the absence of legislative regulations adequate to avoid the hazards to a fair trial which inhere in lineups as presently conducted, the desirability of deterring the constitutionally objectionable practice must prevail over the undesirability of excluding relevant evidence. That conclusion is buttressed by the consideration that the witness’ testimony of his lineup identification will enhance the impact of his in-court identification on the jury and seriously aggravate whatever derogation exists of the accused’s right to a fair trial. Therefore, unless the California Supreme Court is “able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” Gilbert will be entitled on remand to a new trial or, if no prejudicial error is found on the guilt stage but only in the penalty stage, to whatever relief California law affords where the penalty stage must be set aside.
* * *
In the next case, the Court considered whether to apply the holdings of Wade and Gilbert to identification procedures conducted before formal proceedings had begun—that is, before the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached.
Supreme Court of the United States
Thomas Kirby v. Illinois
Decided June 7, 1972 – 406 U.S. 682
Mr. Justice STEWART announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice BLACKMUN, and Mr. Justice REHNQUIST join.
In United States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California this Court held “that a post-indictment pretrial lineup at which the accused is exhibited to identifying witnesses is a critical stage of the criminal prosecution; that police conduct of such a lineup without notice to and in the absence of his counsel denies the accused his Sixth (and Fourteenth) Amendment right to counsel and calls in question the admissibility at trial of the in-court identifications of the accused by witnesses who attended the lineup.” Those cases further held that no “in-court identifications” are admissible in evidence if their “source” is a lineup conducted in violation of this constitutional standard. “Only a per se exclusionary rule as to such testimony can be an effective sanction,” the Court said, “to assure that law enforcement authorities will respect the accused’s constitutional right to the presence of his counsel at the critical lineup.” In the present case we are asked to extend the Wade-Gilbert per se exclusionary rule to identification testimony based upon a police station showup that took place before the defendant had been indicted or otherwise formally charged with any criminal offense.
On February 21, 1968, a man named Willie Shard reported to the Chicago police that the previous day two men had robbed him on a Chicago street of a wallet containing, among other things, traveler’s checks and a Social Security card. On February 22, two police officers stopped the petitioner and a companion, Ralph Bean, on West Madison Street in Chicago. When asked for identification, the petitioner produced a wallet that contained three traveler’s checks and a Social Security card, all bearing the name of Willie Shard. Papers with Shard’s name on them were also found in Bean’s possession. When asked to explain his possession of Shard’s property, the petitioner first said that the traveler’s checks were “play money,” and then told the officers that he had won them in a crap game. The officers then arrested the petitioner and Bean and took them to a police station.
Only after arriving at the police station, and checking the records there, did the arresting officers learn of the Shard robbery. A police car was then dispatched to Shard’s place of employment, where it picked up Shard and brought him to the police station. Immediately upon entering the room in the police station where the petitioner and Bean were seated at a table, Shard positively identified them as the men who had robbed him two days earlier. No lawyer was present in the room, and neither the petitioner nor Bean had asked for legal assistance, or been advised of any right to the presence of counsel.
More than six weeks later, the petitioner and Bean were indicted for the robbery of Willie Shard. Upon arraignment, counsel was appointed to represent them, and they pleaded not guilty. A pretrial motion to suppress Shard’s identification testimony was denied, and at the trial Shard testified as a witness for the prosecution. In his testimony he described his identification of the two men at the police station on February 22, and identified them again in the courtroom as the men who had robbed him on February 20. He was cross-examined at length regarding the circumstances of his identification of the two defendants. The jury found both defendants guilty, and the petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on appeal. The Illinois appellate court held that the admission of Shard’s testimony was not error, relying upon an earlier decision of the Illinois Supreme Court … that [held] the Wade-Gilbert per se exclusionary rule is not applicable to preindictment confrontations. We granted certiorari, limited to this question.
I
We note at the outset that the constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is in no way implicated here. The Court emphatically rejected the claimed applicability of that constitutional guarantee in Wade itself.
It follows that the doctrine of Miranda v. Arizona has no applicability whatever to the issue before us; for the Miranda decision was based exclusively upon the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, upon the theory that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive.
The Wade-Gilbert exclusionary rule, by contrast, stems from a quite different constitutional guarantee—the guarantee of the right to counsel contained in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. [I]t has been firmly established that a person’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him.
This is not to say that a defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to counsel only at the trial itself. But the point is that, while members of the Court have differed as to existence of the right to counsel in the contexts of some of the above cases, all of those cases have involved points of time at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism. It is the starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For it is only then that the government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law. It is this point, therefore, that marks the commencement of the “criminal prosecutions” to which alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applicable.
In this case we are asked to import into a routine police investigation an absolute constitutional guarantee historically and rationally applicable only after the onset of formal prosecutorial proceedings. We decline to do so. Less than a year after Wade and Gilbert were decided, the Court explained the rule of those decisions as follows: “The rationale of those cases was that an accused is entitled to counsel at any ‘critical stage of the prosecution,’ and that a post-indictment lineup is such a ‘critical stage.’” We decline to depart from that rationale today by imposing a per se exclusionary rule upon testimony concerning an identification that took place long before the commencement of any prosecution whatever.
II
What has been said is not to suggest that there may not be occasions during the course of a criminal investigation when the police do abuse identification procedures. Such abuses are not beyond the reach of the Constitution. The judgment is affirmed.
Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS and Mr. Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting.
While it should go without saying, it appears necessary, in view of the plurality opinion today, to re-emphasize that Wade did not require the presence of counsel at pretrial confrontations for identification purposes simply on the basis of an abstract consideration of the words “criminal prosecutions” in the Sixth Amendment. Counsel is required at those confrontations because “the dangers inherent in eyewitness identification and the suggestibility inherent in the context of the pretrial identification” mean that protection must be afforded to the “most basic right [of] a criminal defendant—his right to a fair trial at which the witnesses against him might be meaningfully cross-examined.”
An arrest evidences the belief of the police that the perpetrator of a crime has been caught. A post-arrest confrontation for identification is not “a mere preparatory step in the gathering of the prosecution’s evidence.” A primary, and frequently sole, purpose of the confrontation for identification at that stage is to accumulate proof to buttress the conclusion of the police that they have the offender in hand. The plurality offers no reason, and I can think of none, for concluding that a post-arrest confrontation for identification, unlike a post-charge confrontation, is not among those “critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well settle the accused’s fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.”
The highly suggestive form of confrontation employed in this case underscores the point. This showup was particularly fraught with the peril of mistaken identification. In the setting of a police station squad room where all present except petitioner and Bean were police officers, the danger was quite real that Shard’s understandable resentment might lead him too readily to agree with the police that the pair under arrest, and the only persons exhibited to him, were indeed the robbers. “It is hard to imagine a situation more clearly conveying the suggestion to the witness that the one presented is believed guilty by the police.” The State had no case without Shard’s identification testimony,2 and safeguards against that consequence were therefore of critical importance. Shard’s testimony itself demonstrates the necessity for such safeguards. On direct examination, Shard identified petitioner and Bean not as the alleged robbers on trial in the courtroom, but as the pair he saw at the police station. His testimony thus lends strong support to the observation that “[i]t is a matter of common experience that, once a witness has picked out the accused at the line-up, he is not likely to go back on his word later on, so that in practice the issue of identity may [in the absence of other relevant evidence] for all practical purposes be determined there and then, before the trial.”
Wade and Gilbert, of course, happened to involve post-indictment confrontations. Yet even a cursory perusal of the opinions in those cases reveals that nothing at all turned upon that particular circumstance. For my part, I do not agree that we “extend” Wade and Gilbert by holding that the principles of those cases apply to confrontations for identification conducted after arrest. Because Shard testified at trial about his identification of petitioner at the police station showup, the exclusionary rule of Gilbert requires reversal.
* * *
Wade and Gilbert involved in-person identification of suspects by witnesses. In the next case, the Court considered whether to apply the rules of those cases to identification procedures conducted outside the presence of the suspect, such as a witness review of a photo array.
Supreme Court of the United States
United States v. Charles J. Ash, Jr.
Decided June 21, 1973 – 413 U.S. 300
Mr. Justice BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case the Court is called upon to decide whether the Sixth Amendment grants an accused the right to have counsel present whenever the Government conducts a post-indictment photographic display, containing a picture of the accused, for the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an identification of the offender. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc, held, by a 5-to-4 vote, that the accused possesses this right to counsel. The court’s holding is inconsistent with decisions of the courts of appeals of nine other circuits. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict and to decide this important constitutional question. We reverse and remand.
I
On the morning of August 26, 1965, a man with a stocking mask entered a bank in Washington, D.C., and began waving a pistol. He ordered an employee to hang up the telephone and instructed all others present not to move. Seconds later a second man, also wearing a stocking mask, entered the bank, scooped up money from tellers’ drawers into a bag, and left. The gunman followed, and both men escaped through an alley. The robbery lasted three or four minutes.
A Government informer, Clarence McFarland, told authorities that he had discussed the robbery with Charles J. Ash, Jr., the respondent here. Acting on this information, an FBI agent, in February 1966, showed five black-and-white mug shots of [Black] males of generally the same age, height, and weight, one of which was of Ash, to four witnesses. All four made uncertain identifications of Ash’s picture. At this time Ash was not in custody and had not been charged. On April 1, 1966, an indictment was returned charging Ash and a codefendant, John L. Bailey, in five counts related to this bank robbery.
Trial was finally set for May 1968, almost three years after the crime. In preparing for trial, the prosecutor decided to use a photographic display to determine whether the witnesses he planned to call would be able to make in-court identifications. Shortly before the trial, an FBI agent and the prosecutor showed five color photographs to the four witnesses who previously had tentatively identified the black-and-white photograph of Ash. Three of the witnesses selected the picture of Ash, but one was unable to make any selection. None of the witnesses selected the picture of Bailey which was in the group. This post-indictment identification provides the basis for respondent Ash’s claim that he was denied the right to counsel at a “critical stage” of the prosecution.
No motion for severance was made, and Ash and Bailey were tried jointly. The trial judge held a hearing on the suggestive nature of the pretrial photographic displays. The judge did not make a clear ruling on suggestive nature, but held that the Government had demonstrated by “clear and convincing” evidence that in-court identifications would be “based on observation of the suspect other than the intervening observation.”
At trial, the three witnesses who had been inside the bank identified Ash as the gunman, but they were unwilling to state that they were certain of their identifications. None of these made an in-court identification of Bailey. The fourth witness, who had been in a car outside the bank and who had seen the fleeing robbers after they had removed their masks, made positive in-court identifications of both Ash and Bailey. Bailey’s counsel then sought to impeach this in-court identification by calling the FBI agent who had shown the color photographs to the witnesses immediately before trial. Bailey’s counsel demonstrated that the witness who had identified Bailey in court had failed to identify a color photograph of Bailey. During the course of the examination, Bailey’s counsel also, before the jury, brought out the fact that this witness had selected another man as one of the robbers. At this point the prosecutor became concerned that the jury might believe that the witness had selected a third person when, in fact, the witness had selected a photograph of Ash. After a conference at the bench, the trial judge ruled that all five color photographs would be admitted into evidence. The Court of Appeals held that this constituted the introduction of a post-indictment identification at the prosecutor’s request and over the objection of defense counsel.
McFarland testified as a Government witness. He said he had discussed plans for the robbery with Ash before the event and, later, had discussed the results of the robbery with Ash in the presence of Bailey. McFarland was shown to possess an extensive criminal record and a history as an informer.
The jury convicted Ash on all counts. It was unable to reach a verdict on the charges against Bailey, and his motion for acquittal was granted. Ash received concurrent sentences on the several counts, the two longest being 80 months to 12 years.
The five-member majority of the Court of Appeals held that Ash’s right to counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, was violated when his attorney was not given the opportunity to be present at the photographic displays conducted in May 1968 before the trial.
II
[The Court reviewed the historical significance of the Sixth Amendment.] This historical background suggests that the core purpose of the counsel guarantee was to assure “Assistance” at trial, when the accused was confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor. Later developments have led this Court to recognize that “Assistance” would be less than meaningful if it were limited to the formal trial itself.
This extension of the right to counsel to events before trial has resulted from changing patterns of criminal procedure and investigation that have tended to generate pretrial events that might appropriately be considered to be parts of the trial itself. At these newly emerging and significant events, the accused was confronted, just as at trial, by the procedural system, or by his expert adversary, or by both.
The Court consistently has applied a historical interpretation of the guarantee, and has expanded the constitutional right to counsel only when new contexts appear presenting the same dangers that gave birth initially to the right itself.
Throughout this expansion of the counsel guarantee to trial-like confrontations, the function of the lawyer has remained essentially the same as his function at trial. In all cases considered by the Court, counsel has continued to act as a spokesman for, or advisor to, the accused. The accused’s right to the “Assistance of Counsel” has meant just that, namely, the right of the accused to have counsel acting as his assistant.
This review of the history and expansion of the Sixth Amendment counsel guarantee demonstrates that the test utilized by the Court has called for examination of the event in order to determine whether the accused required aid in coping with legal problems or assistance in meeting his adversary. Against the background of this traditional test, we now consider the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
III
Although the Court of Appeals’ majority recognized the argument that “a major purpose behind the right to counsel is to protect the defendant from errors that he himself might make if he appeared in court alone,” the court concluded that “other forms of prejudice,” mentioned and recognized in Wade, could also give rise to a right to counsel. These forms of prejudice were felt by the court to flow from the possibilities for mistaken identification inherent in the photographic display.
We conclude that the dangers of mistaken identification, mentioned in Wade, were removed from context by the Court of Appeals and were incorrectly utilized as a sufficient basis for requiring counsel. Although Wade did discuss possibilities for suggestion and the difficulty for reconstructing suggestivity, this discussion occurred only after the Court had concluded that the lineup constituted a trial-like confrontation, requiring the “Assistance of Counsel” to preserve the adversary process by compensating for advantages of the prosecuting authorities.
The above discussion of Wade has shown that the traditional Sixth Amendment test easily allowed extension of counsel to a lineup. The similarity to trial was apparent, and counsel was needed to render “Assistance” in counterbalancing any “overreaching” by the prosecution.
The Court of Appeals considered its analysis complete after it decided that a photographic display lacks scientific precision and ease of accurate reconstruction at trial. That analysis, under Wade, however, merely carries one to the point where one must establish that the trial itself can provide no substitute for counsel if a pretrial confrontation is conducted in the absence of counsel.
We now undertake the threshold analysis that must be addressed.
IV
A substantial departure from the historical test would be necessary if the Sixth Amendment were interpreted to give Ash a right to counsel at the photographic identification in this case. Since the accused himself is not present at the time of the photographic display, and asserts no right to be present, no possibility arises that the accused might be misled by his lack of familiarity with the law or overpowered by his professional adversary. Similarly, the counsel guarantee would not be used to produce equality in a trial-like adversary confrontation. Rather, the guarantee was used by the Court of Appeals to produce confrontation at an event that previously was not analogous to an adversary trial.
Even if we were willing to view the counsel guarantee in broad terms as a generalized protection of the adversary process, we would be unwilling to go so far as to extend the right to a portion of the prosecutor’s trial-preparation interviews with witnesses. Although photography is relatively new, the interviewing of witnesses before trial is a procedure that predates the Sixth Amendment. The traditional counterbalance in the American adversary system for these interviews arises from the equal ability of defense counsel to seek and interview witnesses himself.
That adversary mechanism remains as effective for a photographic display as for other parts of pretrial interviews. No greater limitations are placed on defense counsel in constructing displays, seeking witnesses, and conducting photographic identifications than those applicable to the prosecution. Selection of the picture of a person other than the accused, or the inability of a witness to make any selection, will be useful to the defense in precisely the same manner that the selection of a picture of the defendant would be useful to the prosecution. In this very case, for example, the initial tender of the photographic display was by Bailey’s counsel, who sought to demonstrate that the witness had failed to make a photographic identification. Although we do not suggest that equality of access to photographs removes all potential for abuse, it does remove any inequality in the adversary process itself and thereby fully satisfies the historical spirit of the Sixth Amendment’s counsel guarantee.
The argument has been advanced that requiring counsel might compel the police to observe more scientific procedures or might encourage them to utilize corporeal rather than photographic displays. This Court recognized that improved procedures can minimize the dangers of suggestion. Commentators have also proposed more accurate techniques.
Pretrial photographic identifications, however, are hardly unique in offering possibilities for the actions of the prosecutor unfairly to prejudice the accused. Evidence favorable to the accused may be withheld; testimony of witnesses may be manipulated; the results of laboratory tests may be contrived. In many ways the prosecutor, by accident or by design, may improperly subvert the trial. The primary safeguard against abuses of this kind is the ethical responsibility of the prosecutor, who, as so often has been said, may “strike hard blows” but not “foul ones.” If that safeguard fails, review remains available under due process standards. These same safeguards apply to misuse of photographs.
We are not persuaded that the risks inherent in the use of photographic displays are so pernicious that an extraordinary system of safeguards is required.
We hold, then, that the Sixth Amendment does not grant the right to counsel at photographic displays conducted by the Government for the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an identification of the offender. This holding requires reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice DOUGLAS and Mr. Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting.
The Court holds today that a pretrial display of photographs to the witnesses of a crime for the purpose of identifying the accused, unlike a lineup, does not constitute a “critical stage” of the prosecution at which the accused is constitutionally entitled to the presence of counsel. In my view, today’s decision is wholly unsupportable in terms of such considerations as logic, consistency, and, indeed, fairness. As a result, I must reluctantly conclude that today’s decision marks simply another step towards the complete evisceration of the fundamental constitutional principles established by this Court.
As the Court of Appeals recognized, “the dangers of mistaken identification … set forth in Wade are applicable in large measure to photographic as well as corporeal identifications.” To the extent that misidentification may be attributable to a witness’ faulty memory or perception, or inadequate opportunity for detailed observation during the crime, the risks are obviously as great at a photographic display as at a lineup. But “[b]ecause of the inherent limitations of photography, which presents its subject in two dimensions rather than the three dimensions of reality, … a photographic identification, even when properly obtained, is clearly inferior to a properly obtained corporeal identification.”
Moreover, as in the lineup situation, the possibilities for impermissible suggestion in the context of a photographic display are manifold. Such suggestion, intentional or unintentional, may derive from three possible sources. First, the photographs themselves might tend to suggest which of the pictures is that of the suspect. For example, differences in age, pose, or other physical characteristics of the persons represented, and variations in the mounting, background, lighting, or markings of the photographs all might have the effect of singling out the accused.
Second, impermissible suggestion may inhere in the manner in which the photographs are displayed to the witness. The danger of misidentification is, of course, “increased if the police display to the witness … the pictures of several persons among which the photograph of a single such individual recurs or is in some way emphasized.” And, if the photographs are arranged in an asymmetrical pattern, or if they are displayed in a time sequence that tends to emphasize a particular photograph, “any identification of the photograph which stands out from the rest is no more reliable than an identification of a single photograph, exhibited alone.”
Third, gestures or comments of the prosecutor at the time of the display may lead an otherwise uncertain witness to select the “correct” photograph. More subtly, the prosecutor’s inflection, facial expressions, physical motions, and myriad other almost imperceptible means of communication might tend, intentionally or unintentionally, to compromise the witness’ objectivity.
Moreover, as with lineups, the defense can “seldom reconstruct” at trial the mode and manner of photographic identification. Finally, and unlike the lineup situation, the accused himself is not even present at the photographic identification, thereby reducing the likelihood that irregularities in the procedures will ever come to light.
Thus, the difficulties of reconstructing at trial an uncounseled photographic display are at least equal to, and possibly greater than, those involved in reconstructing an uncounseled lineup. As a result, both photographic and corporeal identifications create grave dangers that an innocent defendant might be convicted simply because of his inability to expose a tainted identification. This being so, considerations of logic, consistency, and, indeed, fairness compel the conclusion that a pretrial photographic identification, like a pretrial corporeal identification, is a “critical stage of the prosecution at which [the accused is] ‘as much entitled to such aid (of counsel) … as at the trial itself.’”
Ironically, the Court does not seriously challenge the proposition that presence of counsel at a pretrial photographic display is essential to preserve the accused’s right to a fair trial on the issue of identification. Rather, in what I can only characterize a triumph of form over substance, the Court seeks to justify its result by engrafting a wholly unprecedented—and wholly unsupportable-limitation on the Sixth Amendment right of “the accused … to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” Although apparently conceding that the right to counsel attaches, not only at the trial itself, but at all “critical stages” of the prosecution, the Court holds today that, in order to be deemed “critical,” the particular “stage of the prosecution” under consideration must, at the very least, involve the physical “presence of the accused,” at a “trial-like confrontation” with the Government, at which the accused requires the “guiding hand of counsel.” According to the Court a pretrial photographic identification does not, of course, meet these criteria.
The fundamental premise underlying all of this Court’s decisions holding the right to counsel applicable at “critical” pretrial proceedings, is that a “stage” of the prosecution must be deemed “critical” for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment if it is one at which the presence of counsel is necessary “to protect the fairness of the trial itself.”
This established conception of the Sixth Amendment guarantee is, of course, in no sense dependent upon the physical “presence of the accused,” at a “trial-like confrontation” with the Government, at which the accused requires the “guiding hand of counsel.” On the contrary, in Powell v. Alabama, the seminal decision in this area, we explicitly held the right to counsel applicable at a stage of the pretrial proceedings involving none of the three criteria set forth by the Court today.
Moreover, despite the Court’s efforts to rewrite Wade so as to suggest a precedential basis for its own analysis, the rationale of Wade lends no support whatever to today’s decision.
There is something ironic about the Court’s conclusion today that a pretrial lineup identification is a “critical stage” of the prosecution because counsel’s presence can help to compensate for the accused’s deficiencies as an observer, but that a pretrial photographic identification is not a “critical stage” of the prosecution because the accused is not able to observe at all. In my view, there simply is no meaningful difference, in terms of the need for attendance of counsel, between corporeal and photographic identifications. And applying established and well-reasoned Sixth Amendment principles, I can only conclude that a pretrial photographic display, like a pretrial lineup, is a “critical stage” of the prosecution at which the accused is constitutionally entitled to the presence of counsel.
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In our next two chapters, we examine the Court’s substantive regulation of identification procedures. Specifically, we will identify what methods of witness identification are so unreliable that the Court has found them to violate a defendant’s right to due process of law. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Criminal_Procedure%3A_A_Free_Law_School_Casebook_2e_(Alexander_and_Trachtenberg)/06%3A_Identifications/6.01%3A_Chapter_38_-_Identifications_and_the_Right_to_Counsel.txt |
IDENTIFICATIONS
Identifications and Due Process
Our last chapter covered when suspects have a right to counsel during an identification procedure, which the Court held is sometimes—but not always—a “critical stage” of a prosecution. Here, we begin our review of how the Court has regulated identifications using the Due Process Clauses, holding that some identification evidence is so unreliable that offering it against a defendant violates the minimum standards of a fair criminal trial.
In our first case, Simmons v. United States, the Court considered a due process challenge to the introduction of evidence associated with the allegedly-improper (unduly suggestive) presentation of photographs to witnesses of a bank robbery.
Before turning to Simmons, it is useful to have a bit of background from a prior decision. In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), the Court held that a sufficiently bad identification procedure might violate a defendant’s right to due process. In other words, the procedure could be “so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that he was denied due process of law.” In that case, a suspect was taken by police (with no other suspects) and presented to a witness, who identified him as the man who killed the witness’s husband and stabbed the witness wife eleven times. While the Court held that a due process challenge could work in theory, it held as well that “a claimed violation of due process of law in the conduct of a confrontation depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding it” and that “the record in the present case reveals that the showing of Stovall to Mrs. Behrendt in an immediate hospital confrontation was imperative.” Because police feared the witness could die at any moment, it was reasonable for police to conduct a “show up” procedure that would normally be disfavored because of its highly suggestive nature. Time was of the essence, and police had no other way to learn whether the witness would identify the suspect as the killer.
It is possible that today the analysis of a similar “show up” would be different. Today, police could easily use a tablet to display photographs of a suspect (along with a few other people) to a witness. The array could be arranged on short notice. But in the 1960s, such technology did not exist. In any event, the Court’s decision in Stovall set the stage for subsequent cases in which defendants argued that the particular identification procedures to which they were subjected violated their due process rights.
Supreme Court of the United States
Thomas Earl Simmons v. United States
Decided March 18, 1968 – 390 U.S. 377
Mr. Justice HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents issues arising out of the petitioners’ trial and conviction in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for the armed robbery of a federally insured savings and loan association.
The evidence at trial showed that at about 1:45 p.m. on February 27, 1964, two men entered a Chicago savings and loan association. One of them pointed a gun at a teller and ordered her to put money into a sack which the gunman supplied. The men remained in the bank about five minutes. After they left, a bank employee rushed to the street and saw one of the men sitting on the passenger side of a departing white 1960 Thunderbird automobile with a large scrape on the right door. Within an hour police located in the vicinity a car matching this description. They discovered that it belonged to a Mrs. Rey, sister-in-law of petitioner Simmons. She told the police that she had loaned the car for the afternoon to her brother, William Andrews.
At about 5:15 p.m. the same day, two FBI agents came to the house of Mrs. Mahon, Andrews’ mother, about half a block from the place where the car was then parked. The agents had no warrant, and at trial it was disputed whether Mrs. Mahon gave them permission to search the house. They did search, and in the basement they found two suitcases, of which Mrs. Mahon disclaimed any knowledge. One suitcase contained, among other items, a gun holster, a sack similar to the one used in the robbery, and several coin cards and bill wrappers from the bank which had been robbed.
The following morning the FBI obtained from another of Andrews’ sisters some snapshots of Andrews and of petitioner Simmons, who was said by the sister to have been with Andrews the previous afternoon. These snapshots were shown to the five bank employees who had witnessed the robbery. Each witness identified pictures of Simmons as representing one of the robbers. A week or two later, three of these employees identified photographs of petitioner Garrett as depicting the other robber, the other two witnesses stating that they did not have a clear view of the second robber.
The petitioners, together with William Andrews, subsequently were indicted and tried for the robbery, as indicated. Just prior to the trial, Garrett moved to suppress the Government’s exhibit consisting of the suitcase containing the incriminating items. In order to establish his standing so to move, Garrett testified that, although he could not identify the suitcase with certainty, it was similar to one he had owned, and that he was the owner of clothing found inside the suitcase. The District Court denied the motion to suppress. Garrett’s testimony at the “suppression” hearing was admitted against him at trial.
During the trial, all five bank employee witnesses identified Simmons as one of the robbers. Three of them identified Garrett as the second robber, the other two testifying that they did not get a good look at the second robber. The District Court denied the petitioners’ request [] for production of the photographs which had been shown to the witnesses before trial.
The jury found Simmons and Garrett, as well as Andrews, guilty as charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed as to Simmons and Garrett, but reversed the conviction of Andrews on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to connect him with the robbery.
We granted certiorari as to Simmons to consider the following claim[:] Simmons asserts that his pretrial identification by means of photographs was in the circumstances so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to misidentification as to deny him due process of law, or at least to require reversal of his conviction in the exercise of our supervisory power over the lower federal courts. For reasons which follow, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
The facts as to the identification claim are these. As has been noted previously, FBI agents on the day following the robbery obtained from Andrews’ sister a number of snapshots of Andrews and Simmons. There seem to have been at least six of these pictures, consisting mostly of group photographs of Andrews, Simmons, and others. Later the same day, these were shown to the five bank employees who had witnessed the robbery at their place of work, the photographs being exhibited to each employee separately. Each of the five employees identified Simmons from the photographs. At later dates, some of these witnesses were again interviewed by the FBI and shown indeterminate numbers of pictures. Again, all identified Simmons. At trial, the Government did not introduce any of the photographs, but relied upon in-court identification by the five eyewitnesses, each of whom swore that Simmons was one of the robbers.
In support of his argument, Simmons looks to last Term’s “lineup” decisions—United States v. Wade and Gilbert v. State of California. Simmons [] does not contend that he was entitled to counsel at the time the pictures were shown to the witnesses. Rather, he asserts simply that in the circumstances the identification procedure was so unduly prejudicial as fatally to taint his conviction. This is a claim which must be evaluated in light of the totality of surrounding circumstances. Viewed in that context, we find the claim untenable.
It must be recognized that improper employment of photographs by police may sometimes cause witnesses to err in identifying criminals. A witness may have obtained only a brief glimpse of a criminal, or may have seen him under poor conditions. Even if the police subsequently follow the most correct photographic identification procedures and show him the pictures of a number of individuals without indicating whom they suspect, there is some danger that the witness may make an incorrect identification. This danger will be increased if the police display to the witness only the picture of a single individual who generally resembles the person he saw, or if they show him the pictures of several persons among which the photograph of a single such individual recurs or is in some way emphasized. The chance of misidentification is also heightened if the police indicate to the witness that they have other evidence that one of the persons pictured committed the crime. Regardless of how the initial misidentification comes about, the witness thereafter is apt to retain in his memory the image of the photograph rather than of the person actually seen, reducing the trustworthiness of subsequent lineup or courtroom identification.
Despite the hazards of initial identification by photograph, this procedure has been used widely and effectively in criminal law enforcement, from the standpoint both of apprehending offenders and of sparing innocent suspects the ignominy of arrest by allowing eyewitnesses to exonerate them through scrutiny of photographs. The danger that use of the technique may result in convictions based on misidentification may be substantially lessened by a course of cross-examination at trial which exposes to the jury the method’s potential for error. We are unwilling to prohibit its employment, either in the exercise of our supervisory power or, still less, as a matter of constitutional requirement. Instead, we hold that each case must be considered on its own facts, and that convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.
Applying the standard to this case, we conclude that petitioner Simmons’ claim on this score must fail. In the first place, it is not suggested that it was unnecessary for the FBI to resort to photographic identification in this instance. A serious felony had been committed. The perpetrators were still at large. The inconclusive clues which law enforcement officials possessed led to Andrews and Simmons. It was essential for the FBI agents swiftly to determine whether they were on the right track, so that they could properly deploy their forces in Chicago and, if necessary, alert officials in other cities.
In the second place, there was in the circumstances of this case little chance that the procedure utilized led to misidentification of Simmons. The robbery took place in the afternoon in a well-lighted bank. The robbers wore no masks. Five bank employees had been able to see the robber later identified as Simmons for periods ranging up to five minutes. Those witnesses were shown the photographs only a day later, while their memories were still fresh. At least six photographs were displayed to each witness. Apparently, these consisted primarily of group photographs, with Simmons and Andrews each appearing several times in the series. Each witness was alone when he or she saw the photographs. There is no evidence to indicate that the witnesses were told anything about the progress of the investigation, or that the FBI agents in any other way suggested which persons in the pictures were under suspicion.
Under these conditions, all five eyewitnesses identified Simmons as one of the robbers. None identified Andrews, who apparently was as prominent in the photographs as Simmons. These initial identifications were confirmed by all five witnesses in subsequent viewings of photographs and at trial, where each witness identified Simmons in person. Notwithstanding cross-examination, none of the witnesses displayed any doubt about their respective identifications of Simmons. Taken together, these circumstances leave little room for doubt that the identification of Simmons was correct, even though the identification procedure employed may have in some respects fallen short of the ideal. We hold that in the factual surroundings of this case the identification procedure used was not such as to deny Simmons due process of law or to call for reversal under our supervisory authority.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals so far as it relates to petitioner Simmons.
Mr. Justice BLACK, concurring in part.
I concur in affirmance of the conviction of Simmons.
Simmons’ chief claim is that his “pretrial identification [was] so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification, that he was denied due process of law.” The Court rejects this contention. I agree with the Court but for quite different reasons. The Court’s opinion rests on a lengthy discussion of inferences that the jury could have drawn from the evidence of identifying witnesses. A mere summary reading of the evidence as outlined by this Court shows that its discussion is concerned with the weight of the testimony given by the identifying witnesses. The weight of the evidence, however, is not a question for the Court but for the jury, and does not raise a due process issue. The due process question raised by Simmons is, and should be held to be, frivolous. The identifying witnesses were all present in the bank when it was robbed and all saw the robbers. The due process contention revolves around the circumstances under which these witnesses identified pictures of the robbers shown to them, and these circumstances are relevant only to the weight the identification was entitled to be given. The Court, however, considers Simmons’ contention on the premise that a denial of due process could be found in the “totality of circumstances” of the picture identification. I do not believe the Due Process Clause or any other constitutional provision vests this Court with any such wideranging, uncontrollable power. A trial according to due process of law is a trial according to the “law of the land”—the law as enacted by the Constitution or the Legislative Branch of Government, and not “laws” formulated by the courts according to the “totality of the circumstances.” Simmons’ due process claim here should be denied because it is frivolous. For these reasons I vote to affirm Simmons’ conviction.
* * *
In the next case, Foster v. California, the Court finds an identification procedure so unreasonable that it violated the defendant’s right to due process of law. Foster represents the height of the Court’s willingness to regulate identification procedures, and defendants have not had much success replicating its result.
Supreme Court of the United States
Walter B. Foster v. California
Decided April 1, 1969 – 394 U.S. 440
Mr. Justice FORTAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner was charged by information with the armed robbery of a Western Union office. The day after the robbery one of the robbers, Clay, surrendered to the police and implicated Foster and Grice. Allegedly, Foster and Clay had entered the office while Grice waited in a car. Foster and Grice were tried together. Grice was acquitted. Foster was convicted. The California District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction; the State Supreme Court denied review. We granted certiorari, limited to the question whether the conduct of the police lineup resulted in a violation of petitioner’s constitutional rights.
Except for the robbers themselves, the only witness to the crime was Joseph David, the late-night manager of the Western Union office. After Foster had been arrested, David was called to the police station to view a lineup. There were three men in the lineup. One was petitioner. He is a tall man—close to six feet in height. The other two men were short—five feet, five or six inches. Petitioner wore a leather jacket which David said was similar to the one he had seen underneath the coveralls worn by the robber. After seeing this lineup, David could not positively identify petitioner as the robber. He ‘thought’ he was the man, but he was not sure. David then asked to speak to petitioner, and petitioner was brought into an office and sat across from David at a table. Except for prosecuting officials there was no one else in the room. Even after this one-to-one confrontation David still was uncertain whether petitioner was one of the robbers: “truthfully—I was not sure,” he testified at trial. A week or 10 days later, the police arranged for David to view a second lineup. There were five men in that lineup. Petitioner was the only person in the second lineup who had appeared in the first lineup. This time David was “convinced” petitioner was the man.
At trial, David testified to his identification of petitioner in the lineups, as summarized above. He also repeated his identification of petitioner in the courtroom. The only other evidence against petitioner which concerned the particular robbery with which he was charged was the testimony of the alleged accomplice Clay.
[Because the identifications in this case occurred prior to the Court’s decisions in Wade and Gilbert (Chapter 38), the right to counsel holdings set forth in those cases did not apply to Foster’s case. Instead, the lineup in this case was “judged by the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ [to determine if] the conduct of identification procedures [are] ‘so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification’ as to be a denial of due process of law.”]
Judged by that standard, this case presents a compelling example of unfair lineup procedures. In the first lineup arranged by the police, petitioner stood out from the other two men by the contrast of his height and by the fact that he was wearing a leather jacket similar to that worn by the robber. When this did not lead to positive identification, the police permitted a one-to-one confrontation between petitioner and the witness. “The practice of showing suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identification, and not as part of a lineup, has been widely condemned.” Even after this the witness’ identification of petitioner was tentative. So some days later another lineup was arranged. Petitioner was the only person in this lineup who had also participated in the first lineup. This finally produced a definite identification.
The suggestive elements in this identification procedure made it all but inevitable that David would identify petitioner whether or not he was in fact “the man.” In effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, “This is the man.” This procedure so undermined the reliability of the eyewitness identification as to violate due process.
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice BLACK, dissenting.
[T]he Court looks to the “totality of circumstances” to show “unfair lineup procedures.” This means “unfair” according to the Court’s view of what is unfair. The Constitution, however, does not anywhere prohibit conduct deemed unfair by the courts. “Rules of evidence are designed in the interests of fair trials. But unfairness in result is no sure measure of unconstitutionality.”
The Constitution sets up its own standards of unfairness in criminal trials in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, among other provisions of the Constitution. Many of these provisions relate to evidence and its use in criminal cases. The Constitution provides that the accused shall have the right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. It ordains that evidence shall not be obtained by compulsion of the accused. It ordains that the accused shall have the right to confront the witnesses against him. In these ways the Constitution itself dictates what evidence is to be excluded because it was improperly obtained or because it is not sufficiently reliable. But the Constitution does not give this Court any general authority to require exclusion of all evidence that this Court considers improperly obtained or that this Court considers insufficiently reliable. Hearsay evidence, for example, is in most instances rendered inadmissible by the Confrontation Clause, which reflects a judgment, made by the Framers of the Bill of Rights, that such evidence may be unreliable and cannot be put in proper perspective by cross-examination of the person repeating it in court. Nothing in this constitutional plan suggests that the Framers drew up the Bill of Rights merely in order to mention a few types of evidence “for illustration,” while leaving this Court with full power to hold unconstitutional the use of any other evidence that the Justices of this Court might decide was not sufficiently reliable or was not sufficiently subject to exposure by cross-examination. On the contrary, as we have repeatedly held, the Constitution leaves to the States and to the people all these questions concerning the various advantages and disadvantages of admitting certain types of evidence.
It has become fashionable to talk of the Court’s power to hold governmental laws and practices unconstitutional whenever this Court believes them to be “unfair,” contrary to basic standards of decency, implicit in ordered liberty, or offensive to “those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples ….” All of these different general and indefinable words or phrases are the fruit of the same, what I consider to be poisonous, tree, namely, the doctrine that this Court has power to make its own ideas of fairness, decency, and so forth, enforceable as though they were constitutional precepts. When I consider the incontrovertible fact that our Constitution was written to limit and define the powers of the Federal Government as distinguished from the powers of States, and to divide those powers granted the United States among the separate Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches, I cannot accept the premise that our Constitution grants any powers except those specifically written into it, or absolutely necessary and proper to carry out the powers expressly granted.
I realize that some argue that there is little difference between the two constitutional views expressed below:
One. No law should be held unconstitutional unless its invalidation can be firmly planted on a specific constitutional provision plus the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Two. All laws are unconstitutional that are unfair, shock the conscience of the Court, offend its sense of decency, or violate concepts implicit in ordered liberty.
The first of these two constitutional standards plainly tells judges they have no power to hold laws unconstitutional unless such laws are believed to violate the written Constitution. The second constitutional standard, based on the words “due process,” not only does not require judges to follow the Constitution as written, but actually encourages judges to hold laws unconstitutional on the basis of their own conceptions of fairness and justice. This formula imposes no “restraint” on judges beyond requiring them to follow their own best judgment as to what is wise, just, and best under the circumstances of a particular case. This case well illustrates the extremes to which the formula can take men who are both wise and good. Although due process requires that courts summon witnesses so that juries can determine the guilt or innocence of defendants, the Court, because of its sense of fairness, decides that due process deprives juries of a chance to hear witnesses who the Court holds could not or might not tell the truth.
For the above reasons I dissent from the reversal and remand of this case.
* * *
It is well known that a lineup containing only one suspect, sometimes called a “showup,” is highly suggestive and can cause false identifications. In the next case, the Court considered whether such procedures are so unreliable as to offend the Due Process Clause.
Supreme Court of the United States
William S. Neil v. Archie Nathaniel Biggers
Decided Dec. 6, 1972 – 409 U.S. 188
Mr. Justice POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1965, after a jury trial in a Tennessee court, respondent was convicted of rape and was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. The State’s evidence consisted in part of testimony concerning a station-house identification of respondent by the victim. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed. On certiorari, the judgment of the Tennessee Supreme Court was affirmed by an equally divided Court. Respondent then brought a federal habeas corpus action raising several claims. The District Court [] held in an unreported opinion that the station-house identification procedure was so suggestive as to violate due process. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted certiorari to decide whether the identification procedure violated due process.
II
As the [due process] claim turns upon the facts, we must first review the relevant testimony at the jury trial and at the habeas corpus hearing regarding the rape and the identification. The victim testified at trial that on the evening of January 22, 1965, a youth with a butcher knife grabbed her in the doorway to her kitchen:
“A. [H]e grabbed me from behind, and grappled—twisted me on the floor. Threw me down on the floor.
“Q. And there was no light in that kitchen?
“A. Not in the kitchen.
“Q. So you couldn’t have seen him then?
“A. Yes, I could see him, when I looked up in his face.
“Q. In the dark?
“A. He was right in the doorway—it was enough light from the bedroom shining through. Yes, I could see who he was.
“Q. You could see? No light? And you could see him and know him then?
“A. Yes.”
When the victim screamed, her 12-year-old daughter came out of her bedroom and also began to scream. The assailant directed the victim to “tell her [the daughter] to shut up, or I’ll kill you both.” She did so, and was then walked at knifepoint about two blocks along a railroad track, taken into a woods, and raped there. She testified that “the moon was shining brightly, full moon.” After the rape, the assailant ran off, and she returned home, the whole incident having taken between 15 minutes and half an hour.
She then gave the police what the Federal District Court characterized as “only a very general description,” describing him as “being fat and flabby with smooth skin, bushy hair and a youthful voice.” Additionally, though not mentioned by the District Court, she testified at the habeas corpus hearing that she had described her assailant as being between 16 and 18 years old and between five feet ten inches and six feet, tall, as weighing between 180 and 200 pounds, and as having a dark brown complexion. This testimony was substantially corroborated by that of a police officer who was testifying from his notes.
On several occasions over the course of the next seven months, she viewed suspects in her home or at the police station, some in lineups and others in showups, and was shown between 30 and 40 photographs. She told the police that a man pictured in one of the photographs had features similar to those of her assailant, but identified none of the suspects. On August 17, the police called her to the station to view respondent, who was being detained on another charge. In an effort to construct a suitable lineup, the police checked the city jail and the city juvenile home. Finding no one at either place fitting respondent’s unusual physical description, they conducted a showup instead.
The showup itself consisted of two detectives walking respondent past the victim. At the victim’s request, the police directed respondent to say “shut up or I’ll kill you.” The testimony at trial was not altogether clear as to whether the victim first identified him and then asked that he repeat the words or made her identification after he had spoken. In any event, the victim testified that she had “no doubt” about her identification. At the habeas corpus hearing, she elaborated in response to questioning.
“A. That I have no doubt, I mean that I am sure that when I—see, when I first laid eyes on him, I knew that it was the individual, because his face—well, there was just something that I don’t think I could ever forget. I believe—
“Q. You say when you first laid eyes on him, which time are you referring to?
“A. When I identified him—when I seen him in the courthouse when I was took up to view the suspect.”
We must decide whether, as the courts below held, this identification and the circumstances surrounding it failed to comport with due process requirements.
III
Some general guidelines emerge from the [due process identification] cases as to the relationship between suggestiveness and misidentification. It is, first of all, apparent that the primary evil to be avoided is “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” While the phrase was coined as a standard for determining whether an in-court identification would be admissible in the wake of a suggestive out-of-court identification, with the deletion of “irreparable” it serves equally well as a standard for the admissibility of testimony concerning the out-of-court identification itself. It is the likelihood of misidentification which violates a defendant’s right to due process, and it is this which was the basis of the exclusion of evidence in Foster. Suggestive confrontations are disapproved because they increase the likelihood of misidentification, and unnecessarily suggestive ones are condemned for the further reason that the increased chance of misidentification is gratuitous. But [] the admission of evidence of a showup without more does not violate due process.
What is less clear from our cases is whether [] unnecessary suggestiveness alone requires the exclusion of evidence. While we are inclined to agree with the courts below that the police did not exhaust all possibilities in seeking persons physically comparable to respondent, we do not think that the evidence must therefore be excluded. The purpose of a strict rule barring evidence of unnecessarily suggestive confrontations would be to deter the police from using a less reliable procedure where a more reliable one may be available, and would not be based on the assumption that in every instance the admission of evidence of such a confrontation offends due process.
We turn, then, to the central question, whether under the “totality of the circumstances” the identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive. As indicated by our cases, the factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Applying these factors, we disagree with the District Court’s conclusion.
In part, as discussed above, we think the District Court focused unduly on the relative reliability of a lineup as opposed to a showup, the issue on which expert testimony was taken at the evidentiary hearing. The testimony was addressed to the jury, and the jury apparently found the identification reliable. Some of the State’s testimony at the federal evidentiary hearing may well have been self-serving in that it too neatly fit the case law, but it surely does nothing to undermine the state record, which itself fully corroborated the identification.
We find that the District Court’s conclusions on the critical facts are unsupported by the record and clearly erroneous. The victim spent a considerable period of time with her assailant, up to half an hour. She was with him under adequate artificial light in her house and under a full moon outdoors, and at least twice, once in the house and later in the woods, faced him directly and intimately. She was no casual observer, but rather the victim of one of the most personally humiliating of all crimes. Her description to the police, which included the assailant’s approximate age, height, weight, complexion, skin texture, build, and voice, might not have satisfied Proust but was more than ordinarily thorough. She had “no doubt” that respondent was the person who raped her. In the nature of the crime, there are rarely witnesses to a rape other than the victim, who often has a limited opportunity of observation. The victim here, a practical nurse by profession, had an unusual opportunity to observe and identify her assailant. She testified at the habeas corpus hearing that there was something about his face “I don’t think I could ever forget.”
There was, to be sure, a lapse of seven months between the rape and the confrontation. This would be a seriously negative factor in most cases. Here, however, the testimony is undisputed that the victim made no previous identification at any of the showups, lineups, or photographic showings. Her record for reliability was thus a good one, as she had previously resisted whatever suggestiveness inheres in a showup. Weighing all the factors, we find no substantial likelihood of misidentification. The evidence was properly allowed to go to the jury.
* * *
Our next case concerns the photographic version of a one-suspect “showup”—a photo array containing only a single suspect’s photograph.
Supreme Court of the United States
John R. Manson v. Nowell A. Brathwaite
Decided June 16, 1977 – 432 U.S. 98
Mr. Justice BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the issue as to whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment compels the exclusion, in a state criminal trial, apart from any consideration of reliability, of pretrial identification evidence obtained by a police procedure that was both suggestive and unnecessary. This Court’s decisions in Stovall v. Denno and Neil v. Biggers are particularly implicated.1
I
Jimmy D. Glover, a full-time trooper of the Connecticut State Police, in 1970 was assigned to the Narcotics Division in an undercover capacity. On May 5 of that year, about 7:45 p. m., e.d.t., and while there was still daylight, Glover and Henry Alton Brown, an informant, went to an apartment building at 201 Westland, in Hartford, for the purpose of purchasing narcotics from “Dickie Boy” Cicero, a known narcotics dealer. Cicero, it was thought, lived on the third floor of that apartment building. Glover and Brown entered the building, observed by back-up Officers D’Onofrio and Gaffey, and proceeded by stairs to the third floor. Glover knocked at the door of one of the two apartments served by the stairway. The area was illuminated by natural light from a window in the third floor hallway. The door was opened 12 to 18 inches in response to the knock. Glover observed a man standing at the door and, behind him, a woman. Brown identified himself. Glover then asked for “two things” of narcotics. The man at the door held out his hand, and Glover gave him two \$10 bills. The door closed. Soon the man returned and handed Glover two glassine bags. While the door was open, Glover stood within two feet of the person from whom he made the purchase and observed his face. Five to seven minutes elapsed from the time the door first opened until it closed the second time.
Glover and Brown then left the building. This was about eight minutes after their arrival. Glover drove to headquarters where he described the seller to D’Onofrio and Gaffey. Glover at that time did not know the identity of the seller. He described him as being “a colored man, approximately five feet eleven inches tall, dark complexion, black hair, short Afro style, and having high cheekbones, and of heavy build. He was wearing at the time blue pants and a plaid shirt.” D’Onofrio, suspecting from this description that respondent might be the seller, obtained a photograph of respondent from the Records Division of the Hartford Police Department. He left it at Glover’s office. D’Onofrio was not acquainted with respondent personally but did know him by sight and had seen him “[s]everal times” prior to May 5. Glover, when alone, viewed the photograph for the first time upon his return to headquarters on May 7; he identified the person shown as the one from whom he had purchased the narcotics.
The toxicological report on the contents of the glassine bags revealed the presence of heroin. The report was dated July 16, 1970. Respondent was arrested on July 27 while visiting at the apartment of a Mrs. Ramsey on the third floor of 201 Westland. This was the apartment at which the narcotics sale had taken place on May 5.
Respondent was charged, in a two-count information, with possession and sale of heroin. At his trial in January 1971, the photograph from which Glover had identified respondent was received in evidence without objection on the part of the defense. Glover also testified that, although he had not seen respondent in the eight months that had elapsed since the sale, “there [was] no doubt whatsoever” in his mind that the person shown on the photograph was respondent. Glover also made a positive in-court identification without objection.
No explanation was offered by the prosecution for the failure to utilize a photographic array or to conduct a lineup.
Respondent, who took the stand in his own defense, testified that on May 5, the day in question, he had been ill at his Albany Avenue apartment (“a lot of back pains, muscle spasms … a bad heart … high blood pressure … neuralgia in my face, and sinus”), and that at no time on that particular day had he been at 201 Westland. His wife testified that she recalled, after her husband had refreshed her memory, that he was home all day on May 5. Doctor Wesley M. Vietzke, an internist and assistant professor of medicine at the University of Connecticut, testified that respondent had consulted him on April 15, 1970, and that he took a medical history from him, heard his complaints about his back and facial pain, and discovered that he had high blood pressure. The physician found respondent, subjectively, “in great discomfort.” Respondent in fact underwent surgery for a herniated disc at L5 and S1 on August 17.
The jury found respondent guilty on both counts of the information. He received a sentence of not less than six nor more than nine years. His conviction was affirmed per curiam by the Supreme Court of Connecticut. Fourteen months later, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. He alleged that the admission of the identification testimony at his state trial deprived him of due process of law to which he was entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court, by an unreported written opinion based on the court’s review of the state trial transcript, dismissed respondent’s petition. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, with instructions to issue the writ unless the State gave notice of a desire to retry respondent and the new trial occurred within a reasonable time to be fixed by the District Judge.
In brief summary, the court felt that evidence as to the photograph should have been excluded, regardless of reliability, because the examination of the single photograph was unnecessary and suggestive. And, in the court’s view, the evidence was unreliable in any event. We granted certiorari.
II
Stovall v. Denno decided in 1967, concerned a petitioner who had been convicted in a New York court of murder. He was arrested the day following the crime and was taken by the police to a hospital where the victim’s wife, also wounded in the assault, was a patient. After observing Stovall and hearing him speak, she identified him as the murderer. She later made an in-court identification. On the identification issue, the Court reviewed the practice of showing a suspect singly for purposes of identification, and the claim that this was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that it constituted a denial of due process of law. The Court noted that the practice “has been widely condemned,” but it concluded that “a claimed violation of due process of law in the conduct of a confrontation depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding it.” In that case, showing Stovall to the victim’s spouse “was imperative.” The Court then quoted the observations of the Court of Appeals, to the effect that the spouse was the only person who could possibly exonerate the accused; that the hospital was not far from the courthouse and jail; that no one knew how long she might live; that she was not able to visit the jail; and that taking Stovall to the hospital room was the only feasible procedure, and, under the circumstances, “‘the usual police station line-up … was out of the question.’”
[The Court recounted the facts and holding of Neil v. Biggers.]
Biggers well might be seen to provide an unambiguous answer to the question before us: The admission of testimony concerning a suggestive and unnecessary identification procedure does not violate due process so long as the identification possesses sufficient aspects of reliability. In one passage, however, the Court observed that the challenged procedure occurred pre-Stovall and that a strict rule would make little sense with regard to a confrontation that preceded the Court’s first indication that a suggestive procedure might lead to the exclusion of evidence. One perhaps might argue that, by implication, the Court suggested that a different rule could apply post-Stovall. The question before us, then, is simply whether the Biggers analysis applies to post-Stovall confrontations as well to those pre-Stovall.
III
In the present case the District Court observed that the “sole evidence tying Brathwaite to the possession and sale of the heroin consisted in his identifications by the police undercover agent, Jimmy Glover.” On the constitutional issue, the court stated that the first inquiry was whether the police used an impermissibly suggestive procedure in obtaining the out-of-court identification. If so, the second inquiry is whether, under all the circumstances, that suggestive procedure gave rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.
IV
Petitioner at the outset acknowledges that “the procedure in the instant case was suggestive (because only one photograph was used) and unnecessary” (because there was no emergency or exigent circumstance). The respondent proposes a per se rule of exclusion that he claims is dictated by the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process. He rightly observes that this is the first case in which this Court has had occasion to rule upon strictly post-Stovall out-of-court identification evidence of the challenged kind.
Since the decision in Biggers, the Courts of Appeals appear to have developed at least two approaches to such evidence. The first, or per se approach, employed by the Second Circuit in the present case, focuses on the procedures employed and requires exclusion of the out-of-court identification evidence, without regard to reliability, whenever it has been obtained through unnecessarily suggestive confrontation procedures. The justifications advanced are the elimination of evidence of uncertain reliability, deterrence of the police and prosecutors, and the stated “fair assurance against the awful risks of misidentification.”
The second, or more lenient, approach is one that continues to rely on the totality of the circumstances. It permits the admission of the confrontation evidence if, despite the suggestive aspect, the out-of-court identification possesses certain features of reliability. Its adherents feel that the per se approach is not mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This second approach, in contrast to the other, is ad hoc and serves to limit the societal costs imposed by a sanction that excludes relevant evidence from consideration and evaluation by the trier of fact.
Mr. Justice Stevens, in writing for the Seventh Circuit observed: “There is surprising unanimity among scholars in regarding such a rule (the per se approach) as essential to avoid serious risk of miscarriage of justice.” He pointed out that well-known federal judges have taken the position that “evidence of, or derived from, a showup identification should be inadmissible unless the prosecutor can justify his failure to use a more reliable identification procedure.” Indeed, the ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure §§ 160.1 and 160.2 (1975), frowns upon the use of a showup or the display of only a single photograph.
The respondent here stresses the same theme and the need for deterrence of improper identification practice, a factor he regards as pre-eminent. Photographic identification, it is said, continues to be needlessly employed. He notes that the legislative regulation “the Court had hoped [United States v.] Wade would engender,” has not been forthcoming. He argues that a totality rule cannot be expected to have a significant deterrent impact; only a strict rule of exclusion will have direct and immediate impact on law enforcement agents. Identification evidence is so convincing to the jury that sweeping exclusionary rules are required. Fairness of the trial is threatened by suggestive confrontation evidence, and thus, it is said, an exclusionary rule has an established constitutional predicate.
There are, of course, several interests to be considered and taken into account. The driving force behind United States v. Wade, Gilbert v. California, and Stovall, all decided on the same day, was the Court’s concern with the problems of eyewitness identification. Usually the witness must testify about an encounter with a total stranger under circumstances of emergency or emotional stress. The witness’ recollection of the stranger can be distorted easily by the circumstances or by later actions of the police. Thus, Wade and its companion cases reflect the concern that the jury not hear eyewitness testimony unless that evidence has aspects of reliability. It must be observed that both approaches before us are responsive to this concern. The per se rule, however, goes too far since its application automatically and peremptorily, and without consideration of alleviating factors, keeps evidence from the jury that is reliable and relevant.
The second factor is deterrence. Although the per se approach has the more significant deterrent effect, the totality approach also has an influence on police behavior. The police will guard against unnecessarily suggestive procedures under the totality rule, as well as the per se one, for fear that their actions will lead to the exclusion of identifications as unreliable.
The third factor is the effect on the administration of justice. Here the per se approach suffers serious drawbacks. Since it denies the trier reliable evidence, it may result, on occasion, in the guilty going free. Also, because of its rigidity, the per se approach may make error by the trial judge more likely than the totality approach. And in those cases in which the admission of identification evidence is error under the per se approach but not under the totality approach—cases in which the identification is reliable despite an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure—reversal is a Draconian sanction. Certainly, inflexible rules of exclusion that may frustrate rather than promote justice have not been viewed recently by this Court with unlimited enthusiasm.
We therefore conclude that reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony for both pre- and post-Stovall confrontations. The factors to be considered are set out in Biggers. These include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation. Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself.
V
We turn, then, to the facts of this case and apply the analysis:
1. The opportunity to view. Glover testified that for two to three minutes he stood at the apartment door, within two feet of the respondent. The door opened twice, and each time the man stood at the door. The moments passed, the conversation took place, and payment was made. Glover looked directly at his vendor. It was near sunset, to be sure, but the sun had not yet set, so it was not dark or even dusk or twilight. Natural light from outside entered the hallway through a window. There was natural light, as well, from inside the apartment.
2. The degree of attention. Glover was not a casual or passing observer, as is so often the case with eyewitness identification. Trooper Glover was a trained police officer on duty and specialized and dangerous duty when he called at the third floor of 201 Westland in Hartford on May 5, 1970. Glover himself was [Black] and unlikely to perceive only general features of “hundreds of Hartford black males,” as the Court of Appeals stated. It is true that Glover’s duty was that of ferreting out narcotics offenders and that he would be expected in his work to produce results. But it is also true that, as a specially trained, assigned, and experienced officer, he could be expected to pay scrupulous attention to detail, for he knew that subsequently he would have to find and arrest his vendor. In addition, he knew that his claimed observations would be subject later to close scrutiny and examination at any trial.
3. The accuracy of the description. Glover’s description was given to D’Onofrio within minutes after the transaction. It included the vendor’s race, his height, his build, the color and style of his hair, and the high cheekbone facial feature. It also included clothing the vendor wore. No claim has been made that respondent did not possess the physical characteristics so described. D’Onofrio reacted positively at once. Two days later, when Glover was alone, he viewed the photograph D’Onofrio produced and identified its subject as the narcotics seller.
4. The witness’ level of certainty. There is no dispute that the photograph in question was that of respondent. Glover, in response to a question whether the photograph was that of the person from whom he made the purchase, testified: “There is no question whatsoever.” This positive assurance was repeated.
5. The time between the crime and the confrontation. Glover’s description of his vendor was given to D’Onofrio within minutes of the crime. The photographic identification took place only two days later. We do not have here the passage of weeks or months between the crime and the viewing of the photograph.
These indicators of Glover’s ability to make an accurate identification are hardly outweighed by the corrupting effect of the challenged identification itself. Although identifications arising from single-photograph displays may be viewed in general with suspicion, we find in the instant case little pressure on the witness to acquiesce in the suggestion that such a display entails. D’Onofrio had left the photograph at Glover’s office and was not present when Glover first viewed it two days after the event. There thus was little urgency and Glover could view the photograph at his leisure. And since Glover examined the photograph alone, there was no coercive pressure to make an identification arising from the presence of another. The identification was made in circumstances allowing care and reflection.
Although it plays no part in our analysis, all this assurance as to the reliability of the identification is hardly undermined by the facts that respondent was arrested in the very apartment where the sale had taken place, and that he acknowledged his frequent visits to that apartment.
Surely, we cannot say that under all the circumstances of this case there is “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Short of that point, such evidence is for the jury to weigh. We are content to rely upon the good sense and judgment of American juries, for evidence with some element of untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury mill. Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has some questionable feature.
Of course, it would have been better had D’Onofrio presented Glover with a photographic array including “so far as practicable … a reasonable number of persons similar to any person then suspected whose likeness is included in the array.” The use of that procedure would have enhanced the force of the identification at trial and would have avoided the risk that the evidence would be excluded as unreliable. But we are not disposed to view D’Onofrio’s failure as one of constitutional dimension to be enforced by a rigorous and unbending exclusionary rule. The defect, if there be one, goes to weight and not to substance.
We conclude that the criteria laid down in Biggers are to be applied in determining the admissibility of evidence offered by the prosecution concerning a post-Stovall identification, and that those criteria are satisfactorily met and complied with here.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
Mr. Justice MARSHALL, with whom Mr. Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting.
Today’s decision can come as no surprise to those who have been watching the Court dismantle the protections against mistaken eyewitness testimony erected a decade ago in United States v. Wade; Gilbert v. California; and Stovall v. Denno. But it is still distressing to see the Court virtually ignore the teaching of experience embodied in those decisions and blindly uphold the conviction of a defendant who may well be innocent.
[T]he Court disregards two significant distinctions between the per se rule advocated in this case and the exclusionary remedies for certain other constitutional violations.
First, the per se rule here is not “inflexible.” Where evidence is suppressed, for example, as the fruit of an unlawful search, it may well be forever lost to the prosecution. Identification evidence, however, can by its very nature be readily and effectively reproduced. The in-court identification, permitted under Wade and Simmons if it has a source independent of an uncounseled or suggestive procedure, is one example. Similarly, when a prosecuting attorney learns that there has been a suggestive confrontation, he can easily arrange another lineup conducted under scrupulously fair conditions. Since the same factors are evaluated in applying both the Court’s totality test and the Wade-Simmons independent-source inquiry, any identification which is “reliable” under the Court’s test will support admission of evidence concerning such a fairly conducted lineup. The evidence of an additional, properly conducted confrontation will be more persuasive to a jury, thereby increasing the chance of a justified conviction where a reliable identification was tainted by a suggestive confrontation. At the same time, however, the effect of an unnecessarily suggestive identification which has no value whatsoever in the law enforcement process will be completely eliminated.
Second, other exclusionary rules have been criticized for preventing jury consideration of relevant and usually reliable evidence in order to serve interests unrelated to guilt or innocence, such as discouraging illegal searches or denial of counsel. Suggestively obtained eyewitness testimony is excluded, in contrast, precisely because of its unreliability and concomitant irrelevance. Its exclusion both protects the integrity of the truth-seeking function of the trial and discourages police use of needlessly inaccurate and ineffective investigatory methods.
Indeed, impermissibly suggestive identifications are not merely worthless law enforcement tools. They pose a grave threat to society at large in a more direct way than most governmental disobedience of the law. For if the police and the public erroneously conclude, on the basis of an unnecessarily suggestive confrontation, that the right man has been caught and convicted, the real outlaw must still remain at large. Law enforcement has failed in its primary function and has left society unprotected from the depredations of an active criminal.
For these reasons, I conclude that adoption of the per se rule would enhance, rather than detract from, the effective administration of justice. In my view, the Court’s totality test will allow seriously unreliable and misleading evidence to be put before juries. Equally important, it will allow dangerous criminals to remain on the streets while citizens assume that police action has given them protection. According to my calculus, all three of the factors upon which the Court relies point to acceptance of the per se approach.
Accordingly, I dissent from the Court’s reinstatement of respondent’s conviction.
* * *
In our last case in this chapter, the Court considered how to treat identification evidence made unreliable by someone for whom the state is not responsible. In other words, the question was whether a state actor requirement applies when a defendant challenges unreliable identification evidence on due process grounds or if instead the unreliability itself—regardless of its source—compels exclusion of sufficiently unreliable identification evidence.
Supreme Court of the United States
Barion Perry v. New Hampshire
Decided Jan. 11, 2012 – 565 U.S. 228
Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
In our system of justice, fair trial for persons charged with criminal offenses is secured by the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees to defendants the right to counsel, compulsory process to obtain defense witnesses, and the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses for the prosecution. Those safeguards apart, admission of evidence in state trials is ordinarily governed by state law, and the reliability of relevant testimony typically falls within the province of the jury to determine. This Court has recognized, in addition, a due process check on the admission of eyewitness identification, applicable when the police have arranged suggestive circumstances leading the witness to identify a particular person as the perpetrator of a crime.
An identification infected by improper police influence, our case law holds, is not automatically excluded. Instead, the trial judge must screen the evidence for reliability pretrial. If there is “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification,” the judge must disallow presentation of the evidence at trial. But if the indicia of reliability are strong enough to outweigh the corrupting effect of the police-arranged suggestive circumstances, the identification evidence ordinarily will be admitted, and the jury will ultimately determine its worth.
We have not extended pretrial screening for reliability to cases in which the suggestive circumstances were not arranged by law enforcement officers. Petitioner requests that we do so because of the grave risk that mistaken identification will yield a miscarriage of justice. Our decisions, however, turn on the presence of state action and aim to deter police from rigging identification procedures, for example, at a lineup, showup, or photograph array. When no improper law enforcement activity is involved, we hold, it suffices to test reliability through the rights and opportunities generally designed for that purpose, notably, the presence of counsel at postindictment lineups, vigorous cross-examination, protective rules of evidence, and jury instructions on both the fallibility of eyewitness identification and the requirement that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
A
Around 3 a.m. on August 15, 2008, Joffre Ullon called the Nashua, New Hampshire, Police Department and reported that an African-American male was trying to break into cars parked in the lot of Ullon’s apartment building. Officer Nicole Clay responded to the call. Upon arriving at the parking lot, Clay heard what “sounded like a metal bat hitting the ground.” She then saw petitioner Barion Perry standing between two cars. Perry walked toward Clay, holding two car-stereo amplifiers in his hands. A metal bat lay on the ground behind him. Clay asked Perry where the amplifiers came from. “[I] found them on the ground,” Perry responded.
Meanwhile, Ullon’s wife, Nubia Blandon, woke her neighbor, Alex Clavijo, and told him she had just seen someone break into his car. Clavijo immediately went downstairs to the parking lot to inspect the car. He first observed that one of the rear windows had been shattered. On further inspection, he discovered that the speakers and amplifiers from his car stereo were missing, as were his bat and wrench. Clavijo then approached Clay and told her about Blandon’s alert and his own subsequent observations.
By this time, another officer had arrived at the scene. Clay asked Perry to stay in the parking lot with that officer, while she and Clavijo went to talk to Blandon. Clay and Clavijo then entered the apartment building and took the stairs to the fourth floor, where Blandon’s and Clavijo’s apartments were located. They met Blandon in the hallway just outside the open door to her apartment.
Asked to describe what she had seen, Blandon stated that, around 2:30 a.m., she saw from her kitchen window a tall, African-American man roaming the parking lot and looking into cars. Eventually, the man circled Clavijo’s car, opened the trunk, and removed a large box.
Clay asked Blandon for a more specific description of the man. Blandon pointed to her kitchen window and said the person she saw breaking into Clavijo’s car was standing in the parking lot, next to the police officer. Perry’s arrest followed this identification.
About a month later, the police showed Blandon a photographic array that included a picture of Perry and asked her to point out the man who had broken into Clavijo’s car. Blandon was unable to identify Perry.
B
Perry was charged in New Hampshire state court with one count of theft by unauthorized taking and one count of criminal mischief. Before trial, he moved to suppress Blandon’s identification on the ground that admitting it at trial would violate due process. Blandon witnessed what amounted to a one-person showup in the parking lot, Perry asserted, which all but guaranteed that she would identify him as the culprit.
The New Hampshire Superior Court denied the motion. At the ensuing trial, Blandon and Clay testified to Blandon’s out-of-court identification. The jury found Perry guilty of theft and not guilty of criminal mischief.
On appeal, Perry repeated his challenge to the admissibility of Blandon’s out-of-court identification. The New Hampshire Supreme Court rejected Perry’s argument and affirmed his conviction.
We granted certiorari to resolve a division of opinion on the question whether the Due Process Clause requires a trial judge to conduct a preliminary assessment of the reliability of an eyewitness identification made under suggestive circumstances not arranged by the police.
II
The Constitution, our decisions indicate, protects a defendant against a conviction based on evidence of questionable reliability, not by prohibiting introduction of the evidence, but by affording the defendant means to persuade the jury that the evidence should be discounted as unworthy of credit. Constitutional safeguards available to defendants to counter the State’s evidence include the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, compulsory process, and confrontation plus cross-examination of witnesses. Apart from these guarantees, we have recognized, state and federal statutes and rules ordinarily govern the admissibility of evidence, and juries are assigned the task of determining the reliability of the evidence presented at trial. Only when evidence “is so extremely unfair that its admission violates fundamental conceptions of justice,” have we imposed a constraint tied to the Due Process Clause.
Perry concedes that, in contrast to every case in the Stovall line, law enforcement officials did not arrange the suggestive circumstances surrounding Blandon’s identification. He contends, however, that it was mere happenstance that each of the Stovall cases involved improper police action. The rationale underlying our decisions, Perry asserts, supports a rule requiring trial judges to prescreen eyewitness evidence for reliability any time an identification is made under suggestive circumstances. We disagree.
Perry’s argument depends, in large part, on the Court’s statement in Brathwaite that “reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony.” If reliability is the linchpin of admissibility under the Due Process Clause, Perry maintains, it should make no difference whether law enforcement was responsible for creating the suggestive circumstances that marred the identification.
Perry has removed our statement in Brathwaite from its mooring, and thereby attributes to the statement a meaning a fair reading of our opinion does not bear. [T]he Brathwaite Court’s reference to reliability appears in a portion of the opinion concerning the appropriate remedy when the police use an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure. The Court adopted a judicial screen for reliability as a course preferable to a per se rule requiring exclusion of identification evidence whenever law enforcement officers employ an improper procedure. The due process check for reliability, Brathwaite made plain, comes into play only after the defendant establishes improper police conduct. The very purpose of the check, the Court noted, was to avoid depriving the jury of identification evidence that is reliable, notwithstanding improper police conduct.
[Perry’s] position would open the door to judicial preview, under the banner of due process, of most, if not all, eyewitness identifications. External suggestion is hardly the only factor that casts doubt on the trustworthiness of an eyewitness’ testimony. As one of Perry’s amici points out, many other factors bear on “the likelihood of misidentification”—for example, the passage of time between exposure to and identification of the defendant, whether the witness was under stress when he first encountered the suspect, how much time the witness had to observe the suspect, how far the witness was from the suspect, whether the suspect carried a weapon, and the race of the suspect and the witness. There is no reason why an identification made by an eyewitness with poor vision, for example, or one who harbors a grudge against the defendant, should be regarded as inherently more reliable, less of a “threat to the fairness of trial,” than the identification Blandon made in this case. To embrace Perry’s view would thus entail a vast enlargement of the reach of due process as a constraint on the admission of evidence.
Perry maintains that the Court can limit the due process check he proposes to identifications made under “suggestive circumstances.” Even if we could rationally distinguish suggestiveness from other factors bearing on the reliability of eyewitness evidence, Perry’s limitation would still involve trial courts, routinely, in preliminary examinations. Most eyewitness identifications involve some element of suggestion. Indeed, all in-court identifications do. Out-of-court identifications volunteered by witnesses are also likely to involve suggestive circumstances. For example, suppose a witness identifies the defendant to police officers after seeing a photograph of the defendant in the press captioned “theft suspect,” or hearing a radio report implicating the defendant in the crime. Or suppose the witness knew that the defendant ran with the wrong crowd and saw him on the day and in the vicinity of the crime. Any of these circumstances might have “suggested” to the witness that the defendant was the person the witness observed committing the crime.
In urging a broadly applicable due process check on eyewitness identifications, Perry maintains that eyewitness identifications are a uniquely unreliable form of evidence. We do not doubt either the importance or the fallibility of eyewitness identifications. Indeed, in recognizing that defendants have a constitutional right to counsel at postindictment police lineups, we observed that “the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification.”
We have concluded in other contexts, however, that the potential unreliability of a type of evidence does not alone render its introduction at the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair. We reach a similar conclusion here: The fallibility of eyewitness evidence does not, without the taint of improper state conduct, warrant a due process rule requiring a trial court to screen such evidence for reliability before allowing the jury to assess its creditworthiness.
Our unwillingness to enlarge the domain of due process as Perry and the dissent urge rests, in large part, on our recognition that the jury, not the judge, traditionally determines the reliability of evidence. We also take account of other safeguards built into our adversary system that caution juries against placing undue weight on eyewitness testimony of questionable reliability. These protections include the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the eyewitness. Another is the defendant’s right to the effective assistance of an attorney, who can expose the flaws in the eyewitness’ testimony during cross-examination and focus the jury’s attention on the fallibility of such testimony during opening and closing arguments. Eyewitness-specific jury instructions, which many federal and state courts have adopted, likewise warn the jury to take care in appraising identification evidence. The constitutional requirement that the government prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt also impedes convictions based on dubious identification evidence.
State and federal rules of evidence, moreover, permit trial judges to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact or potential for misleading the jury. In appropriate cases, some States also permit defendants to present expert testimony on the hazards of eyewitness identification evidence.
Finding no convincing reason to alter our precedent, we hold that the Due Process Clause does not require a preliminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness identification when the identification was not procured under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances arranged by law enforcement. Accordingly, the judgment of the New Hampshire Supreme Court is [a]ffirmed.
Justice SOTOMAYOR, dissenting.
This Court has long recognized that eyewitness identifications’ unique confluence of features—their unreliability, susceptibility to suggestion, powerful impact on the jury, and resistance to the ordinary tests of the adversarial process—can undermine the fairness of a trial. Our cases thus establish a clear rule: The admission at trial of out-of-court eyewitness identifications derived from impermissibly suggestive circumstances that pose a very substantial likelihood of misidentification violates due process. The Court today announces that that rule does not even “com[e] into play” unless the suggestive circumstances are improperly “police-arranged.”
Our due process concern, however, arises not from the act of suggestion, but rather from the corrosive effects of suggestion on the reliability of the resulting identification. By rendering protection contingent on improper police arrangement of the suggestive circumstances, the Court effectively grafts a mens rea inquiry onto our rule. The Court’s holding enshrines a murky distinction—between suggestive confrontations intentionally orchestrated by the police and, as here, those inadvertently caused by police actions—that will sow confusion. It ignores our precedents’ acute sensitivity to the hazards of intentional and unintentional suggestion alike and unmoors our rule from the very interest it protects, inviting arbitrary results. And it recasts the driving force of our decisions as an interest in police deterrence, rather than reliability. Because I see no warrant for declining to assess the circumstances of this case under our ordinary approach, I respectfully dissent.
Notes, Comments, and Questions
In our next chapter we will conclude our review of identification evidence, focusing on recent state-court decisions, and will examine best practices suggested by modern research.
Before moving on, students may wish to consider some real-life consequences of unintentional witness misidentification. In one case, Ronald Cotton was identified as the rapist who attacked Jennifer Thompson in 1984 in North Carolina. Police showed Thompson a photo array, and she chose Cotton’s photo. She later identified Cotton at a line up. He was convicted of rape and sentenced to life in prison. Subsequently, DNA evidence proved that a different man—who looked somewhat like Cotton—had committed the rape. Cotton was released from prison in 1995. Cotton and Thompson have since become advocates for criminal justice reform. They give talks and have published a book: Picking Cotton: Our Memoir of Injustice and Redemption
On the book’s website, one can view documents from the case file, as well as photos of Cotton and of Bobby Poole, who committed the rape for which Cotton served more than ten years in prison. A short video (three minutes) about the case is available here: [YouTube].
A longer video (30 minutes), featuring remarks from Thompson and Cotton, is available here: [YouTube]. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Criminal_Procedure%3A_A_Free_Law_School_Casebook_2e_(Alexander_and_Trachtenberg)/06%3A_Identifications/6.02%3A_Chapter_39_-_Identifications_and_Due_Process.txt |
IDENTIFICATIONS
Best Practices and Modern State Court Approaches
The Supreme Court’s eyewitness identification jurisprudence has remained virtually unchanged for the past 40 years.1 In the next two cases, students will observe how two state courts have dealt with eyewitness identification evidence in light of a plethora of scientific research showing how it can be unreliable.
Supreme Court of Connecticut
State of Connecticut v. Brady Guilbert
Decided Sept. 4, 2012 – 49 A.3d 705
PALMER, J.
A jury found the defendant, Brady Guilbert, guilty of capital felony, two counts of murder, and assault in the first degree. The trial court rendered judgments in accordance with the jury verdicts and sentenced the defendant to a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of release, plus twenty years. On appeal, the defendant [] contends that the trial court improperly precluded him from presenting expert testimony on the fallibility of eyewitness identification testimony. The defendant maintains that this court should overrule State v. Kemp, 507 A.2d 1387 (Conn. 1986), and State v. McClendon, 730 A.2d 1107 (Conn. 1999), in which we concluded that the average juror knows about the factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness identification and that expert testimony on the issue is disfavored because it invades the province of the jury to determine what weight to give the evidence. We agree that the time has come to overrule Kemp and McClendon and, further, that testimony by a qualified expert on the fallibility of eyewitness identification is admissible when that testimony would aid the jury in evaluating the state’s identification evidence.
[The court recounted the facts of the case. Cedric Williams, Terry Ross, and William Robinson were all shot. Robinson survived the shooting and identified the defendant as his shooter but denied the identification at trial. Witnesses Lashon Baldwin, Jackie Gomez, and Scott Lang also identified the defendant. Baldwin and Gomez knew the defendant, but Lang did not. These witnesses identified the defendant after seeing his photograph in a newspaper. The trial court granted the prosecution’s motion to preclude expert witness testimony on eyewitness identification. The defendant was convicted of murder, capital felony, and assault.]
I
We [] address the defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly granted the state’s motion to preclude expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications in reliance on our decisions in Kemp and McClendon. We agree that Kemp and McClendon should be overruled and that expert testimony on eyewitness identification is admissible upon a determination by the trial court that the expert is qualified and the proffered testimony is relevant and will aid the jury. We also conclude, however, that the trial court’s exclusion of the proffered expert testimony in the present case did not substantially affect the verdicts.
The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this claim. Before trial, defense counsel indicated that he intended to call Charles A. Morgan III as an expert on eyewitness identifications. The state filed a motion to preclude Morgan’s testimony on the ground that the reliability of eyewitness identifications is within the knowledge of the average juror. The trial court then conducted an evidentiary hearing on the state’s motion at which Morgan proffered testimony that he is a medical doctor with “specialty training” in psychiatry and that, for the last seventeen years, he has spent 50 percent of his time researching how stress affects thought processes and memory. In 1997, Morgan published a study showing that, contrary to common belief, memory of traumatic events changes over time. In 2004, he published a study of military personnel who were subject to harsh interrogation techniques during training. The study showed that the subjects’ identification of an interrogator was much more accurate after low stress interrogations than after high stress ones.
Morgan testified that stress hormones are detrimental to certain aspects of memory. According to his testimony, high levels of stress impair thinking and memory formation. Morgan explained that there are three phases of memory formation—encoding, storage and retrieval—and that stress can disrupt both encoding and storage. When a subject is exposed to information about the remembered event during the storage phase—for example, when, following the event, the subject discusses the observation with someone else or sees a photograph of the person in the newspaper—the subject may incorporate the information into his or her memory and come to believe that the information actually was obtained at an earlier time. This process is known as retrofitting. Furthermore, Morgan testified that the majority of eyewitness identification researchers agree that there is little or no correlation between confidence and accuracy; in other words, an eyewitness’ confidence in the accuracy of an identification is not a reliable indicator of the identification’s true accuracy. Although Morgan observed that, if an eyewitness is familiar with a person, the eyewitness’ identification of that person is likely to be more accurate, he explained that an identification’s accuracy may be adversely affected by such factors as the length of time during which the eyewitness was able to observe the person, lighting, distance, and whether the eyewitness was paying attention.
Morgan testified that the effect of stress on memory is not a matter of common knowledge. Although Morgan was not aware of any scientific public opinion polls on the question, he testified that it was his opinion that most laypeople do not know about the concept of retrofitting. Morgan also testified that studies have shown that most jurors mistakenly believe that the more confident someone is of an identification, the more likely the identification is to be accurate.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the state’s motion to preclude Morgan’s testimony. The court seemed to find that Morgan’s theory had not been sufficiently tested, had no known or potential rate of error, lacked consistent standards, and was not generally accepted in the scientific community. The court also appeared to conclude that Morgan’s general opinions about the effects of stress on memory, the lack of a correlation between confidence and accuracy of identifications, and the risk of retrofitting were all inadmissible because these matters generally were within the common knowledge of jurors.
Although the trial court granted the motion to preclude Morgan’s testimony, the court indicated that it had prepared jury instructions on the reliability of eyewitness identifications and that it would provide a copy of the draft instructions to counsel for their review. Ultimately, the trial court instructed the jury that stress and the receipt of postevent information can reduce the accuracy of an eyewitness identification and that confidence often is not a reliable indicator of accuracy.
We now conclude that Kemp and McClendon are out of step with the widespread judicial recognition that eyewitness identifications are potentially unreliable in a variety of ways unknown to the average juror. This broad based judicial recognition tracks a near perfect scientific consensus. The extensive and comprehensive scientific research, as reflected in hundreds of peer reviewed studies and meta-analyses, convincingly demonstrates the fallibility of eyewitness identification testimony and pinpoints an array of variables that are most likely to lead to a mistaken identification. “[T]he scientific evidence … is both reliable and useful.” “Experimental methods and findings have been tested and retested, subjected to scientific scrutiny through peer-reviewed journals, evaluated through the lens of meta-analyses, and replicated at times in real-world settings…. [C]onsensus exists among the experts … within the … research community.” “[T]he science abundantly demonstrates the many vagaries of memory encoding, storage and retrieval; the malleability of memory; the contaminating effects of extrinsic information; the influence of police interview techniques and identification procedures; and the many other factors that bear on the reliability of eyewitness identifications.”
Courts across the country now accept that (1) there is at best a weak correlation between a witness’ confidence in his or her identification and its accuracy, (2) the reliability of an identification can be diminished by a witness’ focus on a weapon, (3) high stress at the time of observation may render a witness less able to retain an accurate perception and memory of the observed events, (4) cross-racial identifications are considerably less accurate than same race identifications, (5) a person’s memory diminishes rapidly over a period of hours rather than days or weeks, (6) identifications are likely to be less reliable in the absence of a double-blind, sequential identification procedure, (7) witnesses are prone to develop unwarranted confidence in their identifications if they are privy to postevent or postidentification information about the event or the identification, and (8) the accuracy of an eyewitness identification may be undermined by unconscious transference, which occurs when a person seen in one context is confused with a person seen in another. This list is not exhaustive; courts have permitted expert testimony on other factors deemed to affect the accuracy of eyewitness identification testimony.
Although these findings are widely accepted by scientists, they are largely unfamiliar to the average person, and, in fact, many of the findings are counterintuitive. For example, people often believe that the more confident an eyewitness is in an identification, the more likely the identification is to be accurate. Similarly, the average person is likely to believe that eyewitnesses held at gunpoint or otherwise placed in fear are likely to have been acutely observant and therefore more accurate in their identifications. Most people also tend to think that cross-racial identifications are no less likely to be accurate than same race identifications. Yet none of these beliefs is true. Indeed, laypersons commonly are unaware of the effect of the other aforementioned factors, including the rate at which memory fades, the influence of postevent or postidentification information, the phenomenon of unconscious transference, and the risks inherent in the use by police of identification procedures that are not double-blind and sequential. Moreover, although there is little if any correlation between confidence and accuracy, an eyewitness’ confidence “is the most powerful single determinant of whether … observers … will believe that the eyewitness made an accurate identification ….”
As a result of this strong scientific consensus, federal and state courts around the country have recognized that the methods traditionally employed for alerting juries to the fallibility of eyewitness identifications—cross-examination, closing argument and generalized jury instructions on the subject—frequently are not adequate to inform them of the factors affecting the reliability of such identifications.
Cross-examination, the most common method, often is not as effective as expert testimony at identifying the weaknesses of eyewitness identification testimony because cross-examination is far better at exposing lies than at countering sincere but mistaken beliefs. An eyewitness who expresses confidence in the accuracy of his or her identification may of course believe sincerely that the identification is accurate. Furthermore, although cross-examination may expose the existence of factors that undermine the accuracy of eyewitness identifications, it cannot effectively educate the jury about the import of these factors. “Thus, while skillful cross-examination may succeed in exposing obvious inconsistencies in an [eyewitness’] account, because nothing is obvious about the psychology of eyewitness identification and most people’s intuitions on the subject of identification are wrong … some circumstances undoubtedly call for more than mere cross-examination of the eyewitness.”
Defense counsel’s closing argument to the jury that an eyewitness identification is unreliable also is an inadequate substitute for expert testimony. In the absence of evidentiary support, such an argument is likely to be viewed as little more than partisan rhetoric. This is especially true if the argument relates to a factor that is counterintuitive.
Finally, research has revealed that jury instructions that direct jurors in broad terms to exercise caution in evaluating eyewitness identifications are less effective than expert testimony in apprising the jury of the potential unreliability of eyewitness identification testimony. “[Generalized] instructions given at the end of what might be a long and fatiguing trial, and buried in an overall charge by the court, are unlikely to have much effect on the minds of [the jurors]…. [Moreover], instructions may come too late to alter [a juror’s] opinion of a witness whose testimony might have been heard days before. [Perhaps most important], even the best cautionary instructions tend to touch only generally on the empirical evidence. The judge may explain that certain factors are known to influence perception and memory … but will not explain how this occurs or to what extent.”
An expert should not be permitted to give an opinion about the credibility or accuracy of the eyewitness testimony itself; that determination is solely within the province of the jury. Rather, the expert should be permitted to testify only about factors that generally have an adverse effect on the reliability of eyewitness identifications and are relevant to the specific eyewitness identification at issue.
We depart from Kemp and McClendon mindful of recent studies confirming what courts have long suspected, namely, that mistaken eyewitness identification testimony is by far the leading cause of wrongful convictions. A highly effective safeguard against this serious and well documented risk is the admission of expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification.
Of course, a trial court retains broad discretion in ruling on the qualifications of expert witnesses and determining whether their opinions are relevant. We also wish to reiterate that a trial court retains the discretion to decide whether, under the specific facts and circumstances presented, focused and informative jury instructions on the fallibility of eyewitness identification evidence … would alone be adequate to aid the jury in evaluating the eyewitness identification at issue. We emphasize, however, that any such instructions should reflect the findings and conclusions of the relevant scientific literature pertaining to the particular variable or variables at issue in the case; broad, generalized instructions on eyewitness identifications … do not suffice.
[Applying the law to the defendant’s claim, the court held that the “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding [the expert] from testifying on the reliability of the identification testimony” with respect to Baldwin and Gomez because those witnesses knew the defendant. The court “conclude[d] that, with respect to Lang, Morgan’s proposed testimony on the effect of stress on memory, the risk of retrofitting based on postevent information, and the relationship, or lack thereof, between confidence and accuracy, was relevant and would have been helpful to the jury. The trial court therefore abused its discretion in precluding [] expert testimony insofar as it pertained to Lang’s identification of the defendant.”]
Notes, Comments, and Questions
The Supreme Court of Connecticut focused on how a defendant might educate a jury about the unreliability of eyewitness identification, ameliorating the negative consequences of unreliable evidence. Students who have taken Evidence may recognize similarities between this kind of testimony and other forms of hotly-disputed expert testimony. For example, testimony about “battered woman syndrome” and “rape trauma syndrome” may be helpful to the jury in some cases. For example, a woman who kills her abusive boyfriend may wish to offer syndrome evidence in support of a self-defense theory. But such testimony is valuable only to the extent it is based on sound scientific research. Also, when such testimony is admissible, courts normally are careful to limit its scope. For example, in a rape case, the defense might argue that the alleged victim’s behavior is not consistent with that of a “real” rape victim (if, for example, she voluntarily spent time with the defendant after the alleged rape). A prosecution expert might help the jury understand that somewhat counterintuitive behavior is actually within the range of normal behavior observed among victims. The expert normally may not, however, speculate about whether any particular complaining witness was or was not raped.
In our next case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed how to avoid unreliable identifications in the first place.
Supreme Court of New Jersey
State of New Jersey v. Larry R. Henderson
Decided Aug. 24, 2011 – 27 A.3d 872
Chief Justice RABNER delivered the opinion of the Court.
I. Introduction
In the thirty-four years since the United States Supreme Court announced a test for the admission of eyewitness identification evidence, which New Jersey adopted soon after, a vast body of scientific research about human memory has emerged. That body of work casts doubt on some commonly held views relating to memory. It also calls into question the vitality of the current legal framework for analyzing the reliability of eyewitness identifications.
II. Facts and Procedural History
[Rodney Harper was murdered, and his friend James Womble was held at gunpoint. Womble identified the defendant from a photo array. Following a Wade hearing, the trial court allowed admission of the identification. “At the close of trial on July 20, 2004, the court relied on the existing model jury charge on eyewitness identification.” The defendant was convicted and appealed. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded, finding the identification procedure “impermissibly suggestive.” The Supreme Court of New Jersey appointed a Special Master,2 who heard testimony from seven expert witnesses and viewed 360 exhibits, including more than 200 “published scientific studies on human memory and eyewitness identification.”]
III. Proof of Misidentifications
Nationwide, “more than seventy-five percent of convictions overturned due to DNA evidence involved eyewitness misidentification.” In half of the cases, eyewitness testimony was not corroborated by confessions, forensic science, or informants. Thirty-six percent of the defendants convicted were misidentified by more than one eyewitness. “[I]t has been estimated that approximately 7,500 of every 1.5 million annual convictions for serious offenses may be based on misidentifications.”
But DNA exonerations are rare. To determine whether statistics from such cases reflect system-wide flaws, police departments have allowed social scientists to analyze case files and observe and record data from real-world identification procedures.
Four such studies—two from Sacramento, California and two from London, England—produced data from thousands of actual eyewitness identifications. For the larger London study, 39% of eyewitnesses identified the suspect, 20% identified a filler, and 41% made no identification. Thus, about one-third of eyewitnesses who made an identification (20 of 59) in real police investigations wrongly selected an innocent filler. The results were comparable for the Valentine study. Across both Sacramento studies, 51% of eyewitnesses identified the suspect, 16% identified a filler, and 33% identified no one. In other words, nearly 24% of those who made an identification (16 of 67) mistakenly identified an innocent filler.
Although the studies revealed alarming rates at which witnesses chose innocent fillers out of police lineups, the data cannot identify how many of the suspects actually selected were the real culprits. Researchers have conducted field experiments to try to answer that more elusive question: how often are innocent suspects wrongly identified?
Three experiments targeted unassuming convenience store clerks and one focused on bank tellers. Each study unfolded with different variations of the following approach: a customer walked into a store and tried to buy a can of soda with a \$10 traveler’s check; he produced two pieces of identification and chatted with the clerk; and the encounter lasted about three minutes. Two to twenty-four hours later, a different person entered the same store and asked the same clerk to identify the man with the traveler’s check; the clerk was told that the suspect might not be among the six photos presented; and no details of the investigation were given. Only after making a choice was the clerk told that he or she had participated in an experiment.
Across the four experiments, researchers gathered data from more than 500 identifications. Dr. Penrod testified that on average, 42% of clerks made correct identifications, 41% identified photographs of innocent fillers, and 17% chose to identify no one. Those numbers, like the results from the Sacramento and London studies, reveal high levels of misidentifications.
In two of the studies, researchers showed some clerks target-absent arrays—lineups that purposely excluded the perpetrator and contained only fillers. In those experiments, Dr. Penrod testified that 64% of eyewitnesses made no identification, but 36% picked a foil. Those field experiments suggest that when the true perpetrator is not in the lineup, eyewitnesses may nonetheless select an innocent suspect more than one-third of the time.
Without persuasive extrinsic evidence, one cannot know for certain which identifications are accurate and which are false—which are the product of reliable memories and which are distorted by one of a number of factors.
We presume that jurors are able to detect liars from truth tellers.3 But as scholars have cautioned, most eyewitnesses think they are telling the truth even when their testimony is inaccurate, and “[b]ecause the eyewitness is testifying honestly (i.e., sincerely), he or she will not display the demeanor of the dishonest or biased witness.” Instead, some mistaken eyewitnesses, at least by the time they testify at trial, exude supreme confidence in their identifications.
IV. Current Legal Framework
[The court reviewed Supreme Court jurisprudence on the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence, including United States v. Wade and Manson v. Brathwaite. This material is covered in Chapters 38 and 39.]
V. Scope of Scientific Research
Virtually all of the scientific evidence considered on remand emerged after Manson. In fact, the earliest study the State submitted is from 1981, and only a handful of the more than 200 scientific articles in the record pre-date 1970.
VI. How Memory Works
Research contained in the record has refuted the notion that memory is like a video recording, and that a witness need only replay the tape to remember what happened. Human memory is far more complex. The parties agree with the Special Master’s finding that memory is a constructive, dynamic, and selective process.
The process of remembering consists of three stages: acquisition—“the perception of the original event”; retention—“the period of time that passes between the event and the eventual recollection of a particular piece of information”; and retrieval—the “stage during which a person recalls stored information.”
Science has proven that memory is malleable. The body of eyewitness identification research further reveals that an array of variables can affect and dilute memory and lead to misidentifications.
Scientific literature divides those variables into two categories: system and estimator variables. System variables are factors like lineup procedures which are within the control of the criminal justice system. Estimator variables are factors related to the witness, the perpetrator, or the event itself—like distance, lighting, or stress—over which the legal system has no control.
A. System Variables
We begin with variables within the State’s control.
1. Blind Administration
An identification may be unreliable if the lineup procedure is not administered in double-blind or blind fashion. Double-blind administrators do not know who the actual suspect is. Blind administrators are aware of that information but shield themselves from knowing where the suspect is located in the lineup or photo array.
Research has shown that lineup administrators familiar with the suspect may leak that information “by consciously or unconsciously communicating to witnesses which lineup member is the suspect.” Psychologists refer to that phenomenon as the “expectancy effect”: “the tendency for experimenters to obtain results they expect … because they have helped to shape that response.” In a seminal meta-analysis of 345 studies across eight broad categories of behavioral research, researchers found that “[t]he overall probability that there is no such thing as interpersonal expectancy effects is near zero.”
We find that the failure to perform blind lineup procedures can increase the likelihood of misidentification.
2. Pre-identification Instructions
Identification procedures should begin with instructions to the witness that the suspect may or may not be in the lineup or array and that the witness should not feel compelled to make an identification. There is a broad consensus for that conclusion.
Without an appropriate warning, witnesses may misidentify innocent suspects who look more like the perpetrator than other lineup members.
The scientists agree. In two meta-analyses, they found that telling witnesses in advance that the suspect may not be present in the lineup, and that they need not make a choice, led to more reliable identifications in target-absent lineups. In one experiment, 45% more people chose innocent fillers in target-absent lineups when administrators failed to warn that the suspect may not be there.
The failure to give proper pre-lineup instructions can increase the risk of misidentification.
3. Lineup Construction
The way that a live or photo lineup is constructed can also affect the reliability of an identification. Properly constructed lineups test a witness’ memory and decrease the chance that a witness is simply guessing.
A number of features affect the construction of a fair lineup. First, the Special Master found that “mistaken identifications are more likely to occur when the suspect stands out from other members of a live or photo lineup.” As a result, a suspect should be included in a lineup comprised of look-alikes. The reason is simple: an array of look-alikes forces witnesses to examine their memory. In addition, a biased lineup may inflate a witness’ confidence in the identification because the selection process seemed easy.
Second, lineups should include a minimum number of fillers. The greater the number of choices, the more likely the procedure will serve as a reliable test of the witness’ ability to distinguish the culprit from an innocent person. As Dr. Wells testified, no magic number exists, but there appears to be general agreement that a minimum of five fillers should be used.
Third, based on the same reasoning, lineups should not feature more than one suspect. As the Special Master found, “if multiple suspects are in the lineup, the reliability of a positive identification is difficult to assess, for the possibility of ‘lucky’ guesses is magnified.”
We find that courts should consider whether a lineup is poorly constructed when evaluating the admissibility of an identification. When appropriate, jurors should be told that poorly constructed or biased lineups can affect the reliability of an identification and enhance a witness’ confidence.
4. Avoiding Feedback and Recording Confidence
Information received by witnesses both before and after an identification can affect their memory. Confirmatory or post-identification feedback presents the same risks. It occurs when police signal to eyewitnesses that they correctly identified the suspect. That confirmation can reduce doubt and engender a false sense of confidence in a witness. Feedback can also falsely enhance a witness’ recollection of the quality of his or her view of an event.
There is substantial research about confirmatory feedback. A meta-analysis of twenty studies encompassing 2,400 identifications found that witnesses who received feedback “expressed significantly more … confidence in their decision compared with participants who received no feedback.” The analysis also revealed that “those who receive a simple post-identification confirmation regarding the accuracy of their identification significantly inflate their reports to suggest better witnessing conditions at the time of the crime, stronger memory at the time of the lineup, and sharper memory abilities in general.”
Confirmatory feedback can distort memory. As a result, to the extent confidence may be relevant in certain circumstances, it must be recorded in the witness’ own words before any possible feedback. To avoid possible distortion, law enforcement officers should make a full record—written or otherwise—of the witness’ statement of confidence once an identification is made. Even then, feedback about the individual selected must be avoided.
[W]e find that feedback affects the reliability of an identification in that it can distort memory, create a false sense of confidence, and alter a witness’ report of how he or she viewed an event.
5. Multiple viewings
Viewing a suspect more than once during an investigation can affect the reliability of the later identification. The problem, as the Special Master found, is that successive views of the same person can make it difficult to know whether the later identification stems from a memory of the original event or a memory of the earlier identification procedure.
Multiple identification procedures that involve more than one viewing of the same suspect [] can create a risk of “mugshot exposure” and “mugshot commitment.” Mugshot exposure is when a witness initially views a set of photos and makes no identification, but then selects someone—who had been depicted in the earlier photos—at a later identification procedure. A meta-analysis of multiple studies revealed that although 15% of witnesses mistakenly identified an innocent person viewed in a lineup for the first time, that percentage increased to 37% if the witness had seen the innocent person in a prior mugshot.
Mugshot commitment occurs when a witness identifies a photo that is then included in a later lineup procedure. Studies have shown that once witnesses identify an innocent person from a mugshot, “a significant number” then “reaffirm[ ] their false identification” in a later lineup—even if the actual target is present.
Thus, both mugshot exposure and mugshot commitment can affect the reliability of the witness’ ultimate identification and create a greater risk of misidentification. As a result, law enforcement officials should attempt to shield witnesses from viewing suspects or fillers more than once.
6. Simultaneous v. Sequential Lineups
Lineups are presented either simultaneously or sequentially. Traditional, simultaneous lineups present all suspects at the same time, allowing for side-by-side comparisons. In sequential lineups, eyewitnesses view suspects one at a time. Because the science supporting one procedure over the other remains inconclusive, we are unable to find a preference for either.
As research in this field continues to develop, a clearer answer may emerge. For now, there is insufficient authoritative evidence accepted by scientific experts for a court to make a finding in favor of either procedure. As a result, we do not limit either one at this time.
7. Composites
When a suspect is unknown, eyewitnesses sometimes work with artists who draw composite sketches. Composites can also be prepared with the aid of computer software or non-computerized “tool kits” that contain picture libraries of facial features.
As the Special Master observed, based on the record, “composites produce poor results.” In one study, college freshmen used computer software to generate composites of students and teachers from their high schools. Different students who had attended the same schools were only able to name 3 of the 500 people depicted in the composites.
Researchers attribute those results to a mismatch between how composites are made and how memory works. Evidence suggests that people perceive and remember faces “holistically” and not “at the level of individual facial features.” Thus, creating a composite feature-by-feature may not comport with the holistic way that memories for faces “are generally processed, stored, and retrieved.”
It is not clear, though, what effect the process of making a composite has on a witness’ memory—that is, whether it contaminates or confuses a witness’ memory of what he or she actually saw.
Without more accepted research, courts cannot make a finding on the effect the process of making a composite has on a witness. We thus do not limit the use of composites in investigations.
8. Showups
Showups are essentially single-person lineups: a single suspect is presented to a witness to make an identification. Showups often occur at the scene of a crime soon after its commission. The Special Master noted that they are a “useful—and necessary—technique when used in appropriate circumstances,” but they carry their “own risks of misidentifications.”
By their nature, showups are suggestive and cannot be performed blind or double-blind. Nonetheless, as the Special Master found, “the risk of misidentification is not heightened if a showup is conducted immediately after the witnessed event, ideally within two hours” because “the benefits of a fresh memory seem to balance the risks of undue suggestion.”
Thus, the record casts doubt on the reliability of showups conducted more than two hours after an event, which present a heightened risk of misidentification. [L]ineups are a preferred identification procedure because we continue to believe that showups, while sometimes necessary, are inherently suggestive.
B. Estimator variables
Unlike system variables, estimator variables are factors beyond the control of the criminal justice system. They can include factors related to the incident, the witness, or the perpetrator. Estimator variables are equally capable of affecting an eyewitness’ ability to perceive and remember an event.
1. Stress
Even under the best viewing conditions, high levels of stress can diminish an eyewitness’ ability to recall and make an accurate identification. The Special Master found that “while moderate levels of stress improve cognitive processing and might improve accuracy, an eyewitness under high stress is less likely to make a reliable identification of the perpetrator.” Scientific research affirms that conclusion. A meta-analysis of sixty-three studies showed “considerable support for the hypothesis that high levels of stress negatively impact both accuracy of eyewitness identification as well as accuracy of recall of crime-related details.”
We find that high levels of stress are likely to affect the reliability of eyewitness identifications. There is no precise measure for what constitutes “high” stress, which must be assessed based on the facts presented in individual cases.
2. Weapon Focus
When a visible weapon is used during a crime, it can distract a witness and draw his or her attention away from the culprit. “Weapon focus” can thus impair a witness’ ability to make a reliable identification and describe what the culprit looks like if the crime is of short duration.
The duration of the crime is also an important consideration. Dr. Steblay concluded that weapon-focus studies speak to real-world “situations in which a witness observes a threatening object … in an event of short duration.” As Dr. Wells testified, the longer the duration, the more time the witness has to adapt to the presence of a weapon and focus on other details.
Thus, when the interaction is brief, the presence of a visible weapon can affect the reliability of an identification and the accuracy of a witness’ description of the perpetrator.
3. Duration
Not surprisingly, the amount of time an eyewitness has to observe an event may affect the reliability of an identification. The Special Master found that “while there is no minimum time required to make an accurate identification, a brief or fleeting contact is less likely to produce an accurate identification than a more prolonged exposure.”
[S]tudies have shown, and the Special Master found, “that witnesses consistently tend to overestimate short durations, particularly where much was going on or the event was particularly stressful.”
4. Distance and Lighting
It is obvious that a person is easier to recognize when close by, and that clarity decreases with distance. We also know that poor lighting makes it harder to see well. Thus, greater distance between a witness and a perpetrator and poor lighting conditions can diminish the reliability of an identification.
Scientists have refined those common-sense notions with further study. Research has also shown that people have difficulty estimating distances.
5. Witness Characteristics
Characteristics like a witness’ age and level of intoxication can affect the reliability of an identification.
The Special Master found that “the effects of alcohol on identification accuracy show that high levels of alcohol promote false identifications” and that “low alcohol intake produces fewer misidentifications than high alcohol intake.”
The Special Master also found that “[a] witness’s age … bears on the reliability of an identification.” A meta-analysis has shown that children between the ages of nine and thirteen who view target-absent lineups are more likely to make incorrect identifications than adults. Showups in particular “are significantly more suggestive or leading with children.”
[T]he data about memory and older witnesses is more nuanced, according to the scientific literature. In addition, there was little other testimony at the hearing on the topic. Based on the record before us, we cannot conclude that a standard jury instruction questioning the reliability of identifications by all older eyewitnesses would be appropriate for use in all cases.
6. Characteristics of Perpetrator
Disguises and changes in facial features can affect a witness’ ability to remember and identify a perpetrator. The Special Master found that “[d]isguises (e.g., hats, sunglasses, masks) are confounding to witnesses and reduce the accuracy of identifications.”
Disguises as simple as hats have been shown to reduce identification accuracy. If facial features are altered between the time of the event and the identification procedure—if, for example, the culprit grows a beard—the accuracy of an identification may decrease.
7. Memory Decay
Memories fade with time. And as the Special Master observed, memory decay “is irreversible”; memories never improve. As a result, delays between the commission of a crime and the time an identification is made can affect reliability.
8. Race-Bias
“A cross-racial identification occurs when an eyewitness is asked to identify a person of another race.” A meta-analysis [] involving thirty-nine studies and nearly 5,000 identifications, confirmed the Court’s prior finding. Cross-racial recognition continues to be a factor that can affect the reliability of an identification.
9. Private Actors
Studies show that witness memories can be altered when co-eyewitnesses share information about what they observed. Those studies bolster the broader finding “that post-identification feedback does not have to be presented by the experimenter or an authoritative figure (e.g., police officer) in order to affect a witness’ subsequent crime-related judgments.” Feedback and suggestiveness can come from co-witnesses and others not connected to the State.
Co-witness feedback may cause a person to form a false memory of details that he or she never actually observed. One of the experiments evaluated the effect of the nature of the witnesses’ relationships with one another and compared co-witnesses who were strangers, friends, and couples. The study found that “witnesses who were previously acquainted with their co-witness (as a friend or romantic partner) were significantly more likely to incorporate information obtained solely from their co-witness into their own accounts.” Private actors can also affect witness confidence.
To uncover relevant information about possible feedback from co-witnesses and other sources, we direct that police officers ask witnesses, as part of the identification process, questions designed to elicit (a) whether the witness has spoken with anyone about the identification and, if so, (b) what was discussed. That information should be recorded and disclosed to defendants.
Based on the record, we find that non-State actors like co-witnesses and other sources of information can affect the independent nature and reliability of identification evidence and inflate witness confidence—in the same way that law enforcement feedback can. As a result, law enforcement officers should instruct witnesses not to discuss the identification process with fellow witnesses or obtain information from other sources.
10. Speed of Identification
The Special Master also noted that the speed with which a witness makes an identification can be a reliable indicator of accuracy. Laboratory studies offer mixed results. Because of the lack of consensus in the scientific community, we make no finding on this issue.
C. Juror Understanding
Some of the findings described above are intuitive. Everyone knows, for instance, that bad lighting conditions make it more difficult to perceive the details of a person’s face. Some findings are less obvious. Although many may believe that witnesses to a highly stressful, threatening event will “never forget a face” because of their intense focus at the time, the research suggests that is not necessarily so.
Neither juror surveys nor mock-jury studies can offer definitive proof of what jurors know or believe about memory. But they reveal generally that people do not intuitively understand all of the relevant scientific findings. As a result, there is a need to promote greater juror understanding of those issues.
D. Consensus Among Experts
The Special Master found broad consensus within the scientific community on the relevant scientific issues. Primarily, he found support in a 2001 survey of sixty-four experts, mostly cognitive and social psychologists. Ninety percent or more of the experts found research on the following topics reliable: suggestive wording; lineup instruction bias; confidence malleability; mugshot bias; post-event information; child suggestivity; alcohol intoxication; and own-race bias. Seventy to 87% found the following research reliable: weapon focus; the accuracy-confidence relationship; memory decay; exposure time; sequential presentation; showups; description-matched foils; child-witness accuracy; and lineup fairness.
VII. Responses to Scientific Studies
Beyond the scientific community, law enforcement and reform agencies across the nation have taken note of the scientific findings. In turn, they have formed task forces and recommended or implemented new procedures to improve the reliability of eyewitness identifications.
A. Scientific Evidence
[The court concludes that the scientific evidence “is both reliable and useful.”]
B. The Manson[] Test Needs to Be Revised
To protect due process concerns, the Manson Court’s two-part test rested on three assumptions: (1) that it would adequately measure the reliability of eyewitness testimony; (2) that the test’s focus on suggestive police procedure would deter improper practices; and (3) that jurors would recognize and discount untrustworthy eyewitness testimony. We conclude [] that [those assumptions] are not [valid].
The hearing revealed that Manson[] does not adequately meet its stated goals: it does not provide a sufficient measure for reliability, it does not deter, and it overstates the jury’s innate ability to evaluate eyewitness testimony. As a result of those concerns, we now revise the State’s framework for evaluating eyewitness identification evidence.
C. Revised Framework
Remedying the problems with the current Manson[] test requires an approach that addresses its shortcomings: one that allows judges to consider all relevant factors that affect reliability in deciding whether an identification is admissible; that is not heavily weighted by factors that can be corrupted by suggestiveness; that promotes deterrence in a meaningful way; and that focuses on helping jurors both understand and evaluate the effects that various factors have on memory—because we recognize that most identifications will be admitted in evidence.
Two principal changes to the current system are needed to accomplish that: first, the revised framework should allow all relevant system and estimator variables to be explored and weighed at pretrial hearings when there is some actual evidence of suggestiveness; and second, courts should develop and use enhanced jury charges to help jurors evaluate eyewitness identification evidence.
The new framework also needs to be flexible enough to serve twin aims: to guarantee fair trials to defendants, who must have the tools necessary to defend themselves, and to protect the State’s interest in presenting critical evidence at trial. With that in mind, we first outline the revised approach for evaluating identification evidence and then explain its details and the reasoning behind it.
First, to obtain a pretrial hearing, a defendant has the initial burden of showing some evidence of suggestiveness that could lead to a mistaken identification. That evidence, in general, must be tied to a system—and not an estimator—variable.
Second, the State must then offer proof to show that the proffered eyewitness identification is reliable—accounting for system and estimator variables—subject to the following: the court can end the hearing at any time if it finds from the testimony that defendant’s threshold allegation of suggestiveness is groundless.
Third, the ultimate burden remains on the defendant to prove a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. To do so, a defendant can cross-examine eyewitnesses and police officials and present witnesses and other relevant evidence linked to system and estimator variables.
Fourth, if after weighing the evidence presented a court finds from the totality of the circumstances that defendant has demonstrated a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, the court should suppress the identification evidence. If the evidence is admitted, the court should provide appropriate, tailored jury instructions, as discussed further below.
To evaluate whether there is evidence of suggestiveness to trigger a hearing, courts should consider the following non-exhaustive list of system variables:
1. Blind Administration. Was the lineup procedure performed double-blind? If double-blind testing was impractical, did the police use a technique like the “envelope method” to ensure that the administrator had no knowledge of where the suspect appeared in the photo array or lineup?
2. Pre-identification Instructions. Did the administrator provide neutral, pre-identification instructions warning that the suspect may not be present in the lineup and that the witness should not feel compelled to make an identification?
3. Lineup Construction. Did the array or lineup contain only one suspect embedded among at least five innocent fillers? Did the suspect stand out from other members of the lineup?
4. Feedback. Did the witness receive any information or feedback, about the suspect or the crime, before, during, or after the identification procedure?
5. Recording Confidence. Did the administrator record the witness’ statement of confidence immediately after the identification, before the possibility of any confirmatory feedback?
6. Multiple Viewings. Did the witness view the suspect more than once as part of multiple identification procedures? Did police use the same fillers more than once?
7. Showups. Did the police perform a showup more than two hours after an event? Did the police warn the witness that the suspect may not be the perpetrator and that the witness should not feel compelled to make an identification?
8. Private Actors. Did law enforcement elicit from the eyewitness whether he or she had spoken with anyone about the identification and, if so, what was discussed?
9. Other Identifications Made. Did the eyewitness initially make no choice or choose a different suspect or filler?
If some actual proof of suggestiveness remains, courts should consider the above system variables as well as the following non-exhaustive list of estimator variables to evaluate the overall reliability of an identification and determine its admissibility:
1. Stress. Did the event involve a high level of stress?
2. Weapon focus. Was a visible weapon used during a crime of short duration?
3. Duration. How much time did the witness have to observe the event?
4. Distance and Lighting. How close were the witness and perpetrator? What were the lighting conditions at the time?
5. Witness Characteristics. Was the witness under the influence of alcohol or drugs? Was age a relevant factor under the circumstances of the case?
6. Characteristics of Perpetrator. Was the culprit wearing a disguise? Did the suspect have different facial features at the time of the identification?
7. Memory decay. How much time elapsed between the crime and the identification?
8. Race-bias. Does the case involve a cross-racial identification?
Some of the above estimator variables overlap with the five reliability factors outlined in Neil v. Biggers which we nonetheless repeat:
9. Opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime.
10. Degree of attention.
11. Accuracy of prior description of the criminal.
12. Level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation.
Did the witness express high confidence at the time of the identification before receiving any feedback or other information?
13. The time between the crime and the confrontation.
The above factors are not exclusive. Nor are they intended to be frozen in time. We recognize that scientific research relating to the reliability of eyewitness evidence is dynamic; the field is very different today than it was in 1977, and it will likely be quite different thirty years from now. By providing the above lists, we do not intend to hamstring police departments or limit them from improving practices. Likewise, we do not limit trial courts from reviewing evolving, substantial, and generally accepted scientific research. But to the extent the police undertake new practices, or courts either consider variables differently or entertain new ones, they must rely on reliable scientific evidence that is generally accepted by experts in the community.
XI. Application
[Under the facts of this case, the court remanded “for an expanded hearing consistent with the principles outlined in this decision.”]
Notes, Comments, and Questions
Connecticut and New Jersey are two examples of states that have endeavored to incorporate evidence-based recommendations into eyewitness identification practices. In 2009, The New York State Justice Task Force was created to “eradicate the systemic and individual harms caused by wrongful convictions, and to promote public safety by examining the causes of wrongful convictions and recommending reforms to safeguard against any such convictions in the future.” In 2011, the task force made the following recommendations:
Recommendations for Improving Eyewitness Identifications
(Excerpt)
I. Instructions to the Witness
Preliminary instructions given to a witness by the administrator of an identification procedure before the procedure begins, should include the following:
a. Instructing the witness orally or in writing about the details of the identification procedure (including that they will be asked about their confidence in the identification if any identification is made).
b. Advising the witness that the person who committed the crime may or may not be in the photo array or lineup.
c. Advising the witness that individuals may not appear exactly as they did on the day of the incident because features such as hair are subject to change.
d. Advising the witness as follows:
i. If an array or lineup is conducted double-blind, the administrator shall inform the witness that he does not know who the suspect is; and
ii. If the array or lineup is not conducted double-blind, the administrator shall inform the witness that he should not assume that the administrator knows who the perpetrator is.
e. Advising the witness that he or she should not feel compelled [or obligated] to make an identification.
After the identification procedure is completed, the administrator of the identification procedure should:
f. Instruct the witness not to discuss what was said, seen or done during the identification procedure with other witnesses involved in the case.
II. Witness Confidence Statements
a. In every case in which an identification is made, the administrator should elicit a statement of the witness’ confidence in the identification, by asking a question to the effect of, “in your own words, how sure are you?” Witnesses should not be asked to rate their confidence in any identification on a numerical scale.
b. All witnesses should be instructed in advance that they will be asked about their confidence in any identification made.
c. Witness confidence statements should be documented before any feedback on the identification is given to the witness by the administrator or others.
III. Documentation of Identification Procedures
Documentation of identification procedures should include:
a. Documentation of all lineups with a color photograph of the lineup as the witness viewed it and preservation of all photo arrays viewed by a witness.
b. Documentation of the logistics of the identification procedure, including date, time, location and people present in the viewing room with the witness and/or the lineup room with the suspect, including anyone who escorted the witness to and/or from the procedure.
c. Documentation of any speech, movement or clothing change the lineup members are asked to perform.
d. Verbatim documentation of all statements and physical reactions made by a witness during an identification procedure.
e. Ensuring that the witness sign and date the written results of the identification procedure, including a photograph of the live lineup if one is available.
IV. Photo Arrays
a. Photo arrays should be conducted double-blind whenever practicable.
b. If a photo array is conducted with a non-blind administrator, the procedure should be conducted blinded (as defined herein), whenever practicable.
c. Photo array administrators must ensure that the photos in the photo array do not contain any writing, stray markings or information about the suspect such as information concerning previous arrests.
d. At least five fillers should be used in each photo array, in addition to the suspect. There should be only one suspect per array.
e. Fillers should be similar in appearance to the suspect in the array. Similarities should include gender, clothing, facial hair, race, age, height, extraordinary physical features or other distinctive characteristics. Fillers should not be known to the witness.
f. If there is more than one suspect, photo array administrators should avoid reusing fillers when showing an array with a new suspect to the same witness.
g. The position of the suspect should be moved or a new photo array (with new fillers) should be created each time an array is shown to a different witness.
V. Live Lineups
a. Lineups may be conducted double-blind and if not, should be conducted in accordance with the procedures outlined by the NYS Identification Procedure Guidelines mentioned above, which include instructions on how to remain neutral and stand out of the witness’ line of sight while the witness is viewing the lineup, and which when coupled with appropriate preliminary instructions are intended to create a neutral environment free of inadvertent cues.
b. There should be five fillers in addition to the suspect, where practicable, but in no case fewer than four fillers. There should be only one suspect per lineup.
c. Fillers should be similar in appearance to the suspect in the lineup. Similarities should include gender, clothing, facial hair, race, age, height, extraordinary physical features or other distinctive characteristics. Fillers should not be known to the witness.
d. If there is more than one suspect, the lineup administrator should avoid reusing fillers when showing a lineup with a new suspect to the same witness.
e. The position of the suspect should be moved each time the lineup is shown to a different witness, assuming the suspect and/or defense counsel agree.
f. If an action is taken or words are spoken by one member of the lineup, all other members of the lineup must take the same action or speak the same words.
g. All members of the lineup should be seated, if necessary, to eliminate any extreme variations in height.
h. Fillers from a photo array previously viewed by the witness should not be used as fillers in the lineup.
i. In those jurisdictions that regularly use live lineup procedures, consideration should be given to running lineups after the first witness makes an identification from the photo array. Where practicable, additional witnesses can view only the lineup and not the photo array.
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In her student note, “The Dangers of Eyewitness Identification: A Call for Greater State Involvement to Ensure Fundamental Fairness,” 54 B.C. L. Rev. 1415 (2013), Dana Walsh articulates the connection between scientific research on identification and due process of law. She argues that because the Supreme Court has focused on the reliability of eyewitness identifications outside the context of scientific research, state courts should “grant greater protections under their own constitutions in the field of eyewitness identification.”
“The right to due process must include an established framework to ensure fundamental fairness. The rules should create a system where only evidence that comports with due process is admitted at trial. The great unreliability of eyewitness identifications, in addition to their great influence on a criminal proceeding, suggest that a defendant’s right to a fundamentally fair proceeding is violated by the admission of unreliable eyewitness testimony at trial. Accurate eyewitness identifications are, however, beneficial crime-fighting and prosecutorial tools. By focusing on reliability, the Court has attempted to find a balance between admitting identifications and preserving due process rights. If reliability is the linchpin of the analysis, then only reliable identifications should be admissible….”
“Substantial amounts of research indicate that eyewitness identifications have serious flaws. In 1995, a judge on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court wrote that scientific studies conducted since 1977 have confirmed that eyewitness identifications are often ‘hopelessly unreliable.’ The malleability and vulnerability of human memory highlight the dangers involved with eyewitness identification. Because of these risks, identifications should be scrutinized closely to avoid miscarriages of justice. The Court in Perry, however, largely ignored the data by barely addressing it and by maintaining the Biggers factors. Such a result seems incompatible under jurisprudence that deems due process a fundamental right.”
In addition to rulings based on state constitutional law, courts can regulate the admission of identification evidence under ordinary evidence law. State evidence codes contain provisions similar (or identical) to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which gives judges discretion to exclude relevant evidence that poses a significant risk of “unfair prejudice.”
* * *
For further information on the problems associated with eyewitness identification evidence (along with other testimony dependent on accurate memory), students should read work by Professor Elizabeth Loftus, a member of the psychology faculty and the law faculty at the University of California-Irvine (along with various collaborators). See, e.g., Steven J. Frenda et al., “False Memories of Fabricated Political Events,” 49 J. Experimental Soc. Psych. 280 (2013) (showing ease with which false memories can be implanted in unwitting subjects); Deborah Davis & Elizabeth F. Loftus, “Remembering Disputed Sexual Encounters: A New Frontier for Witness Memory Research,” 105 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 811 (2015); Charles A. Morgan et al., “Misinformation Can Influence Memory for Recently Experienced, Highly Stressful Events,” 36 Int’l J. L. & Psych. 11 (2013) (examining false memories among participants in military POW interrogation training program). A 2015 lecture delivered by Professor Loftus at Harvard University, titled “The Memory Factory,” is available online.
Consider the practices described in this chapter. Which seem easy to implement? Which seem difficult to implement?
In our next and final chapter, we will consider a few criminal procedure issues that do not fit neatly into any of the categories around which prior chapters of this book have been organized. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Criminal_Procedure%3A_A_Free_Law_School_Casebook_2e_(Alexander_and_Trachtenberg)/06%3A_Identifications/6.03%3A_Chapter_40_-_Best_Practices_and_Modern_State_Court_Approaches.txt |
CONFRONTING NEW CHALLENGES
Electronic Surveillance, Torture, and the “War on Terror”
In this final chapter of the semester, we briefly consider some issues that either have required the Court to apply old law to new problems or have inspired debate about how the Court ought to address a question once it is properly presented. In particular, we review (1) the somewhat novel question of whether the executive may conduct electronic surveillance without a warrant in service of national security, (2) whether the executive may torture prisoners suspected of possessing knowledge of potential terrorist plans and activities—and, if so, how such terrible state actions should be regulated, and (3) other questions presented by the ongoing conflicts often described as the “War on Terror,” along with other modern national security challenges.
Electronic Surveillance
It has been observed that the United States became a different country on September 11, 2001. For example, students too young to remember the attacks of that day may find it hard to believe how comparatively relaxed airports were in the late twentieth century. The desire of government investigators to overhear the electronic communications of suspects is not, however, a phenomenon unique to the twenty-first century. Indeed, Katz v. United States (Chapter 2) presented such a case involving ordinary criminal investigation of unlawful gambling. Further, more than forty years ago, the Court decided a case in which law enforcement sought to conduct warrantless electronic eavesdropping for reasons related to national security.
Supreme Court of the United States
United States v. U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
Decided June 19, 1972 – 407 U.S. 297
Mr. Justice POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue before us is an important one for the people of our country and their Government. It involves the delicate question of the President’s power, acting through the Attorney General, to authorize electronic surveillance in internal security matters without prior judicial approval. Successive Presidents for more than one-quarter of a century have authorized such surveillance in varying degrees, without guidance from the Congress or a definitive decision of this Court. This case brings the issue here for the first time. Its resolution is a matter of national concern, requiring sensitivity both to the Government’s right to protect itself from unlawful subversion and attack and to the citizen’s right to be secure in his privacy against unreasonable Government intrusion.
This case arises from a criminal proceeding in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, in which the United States charged three defendants with conspiracy to destroy Government property. One of the defendants, Plamondon, was charged with the dynamite bombing of an office of the Central Intelligence Agency in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
During pretrial proceedings, the defendants moved to compel the United States to disclose certain electronic surveillance information and to conduct a hearing to determine whether this information “tainted” the evidence on which the indictment was based or which the Government intended to offer at trial. In response, the Government filed an affidavit of the Attorney General, acknowledging that its agents had overheard conversations in which Plamondon had participated. The affidavit also stated that the Attorney General approved the wiretaps “to gather intelligence information deemed necessary to protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure of the Government.” The logs of the surveillance were filed in a sealed exhibit for in camera inspection by the District Court.
On the basis of the Attorney General’s affidavit and the sealed exhibit, the Government asserted that the surveillance was lawful, though conducted without prior judicial approval, as a reasonable exercise of the President’s power (exercised through the Attorney General) to protect the national security. The District Court held that the surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment, and ordered the Government to make full disclosure to Plamondon of his overheard conversations. The Government then filed in the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit a petition for a writ of mandamus to set aside the District Court order, which was stayed pending final disposition of the case. [T]hat court held that the surveillance was unlawful and that the District Court had properly required disclosure of the overheard conversations. We granted certiorari.
I
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510—2520, authorizes the use of electronic surveillance for classes of crimes carefully specified in 18 U.S.C. § 2516. Such surveillance is subject to prior court order. Section 2518 sets forth the detailed and particularized application necessary to obtain such an order as well as carefully circumscribed conditions for its use. The Act represents a comprehensive attempt by Congress to promote more effective control of crime while protecting the privacy of individual thought and expression.
Together with the elaborate surveillance requirements in Title III, there is the following proviso, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3):
“Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government. The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by authority of the President in the exercise of the foregoing powers may be received in evidence in any trial hearing, or other proceeding only where such interception was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise used or disclosed except as is necessary to implement that power.”
The Government [] argues that “in excepting national security surveillances from the Act’s warrant requirement Congress recognized the President’s authority to conduct such surveillances without prior judicial approval.” The section thus is viewed as a recognition or affirmance of a constitutional authority in the President to conduct warrantless domestic security surveillance such as that involved in this case.
We think the language of § 2511(3), as well as the legislative history of the statute, refutes this interpretation. The relevant language is that:
“Nothing contained in this chapter … shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect …” against the dangers specified. At most, this is an implicit recognition that the President does have certain powers in the specified areas. Few would doubt this, as the section refers—among other things—to protection “against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power.” But so far as the use of the President’s electronic surveillance power is concerned, the language is essentially neutral.
Section 2511(3) certainly confers no power, as the language is wholly inappropriate for such a purpose. It merely provides that the Act shall not be interpreted to limit or disturb such power as the President may have under the Constitution. In short, Congress simply left presidential powers where it found them. This view is reinforced by the general context of Title III. Section 2511(1) broadly prohibits the use of electronic surveillance “[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter.” Subsection (2) thereof contains four specific exceptions. In each of the specified exceptions, the statutory language is as follows:
“It shall not be unlawful … to intercept” the particular type of communication described.1
The language of subsection (3), here involved, is to be contrasted with the language of the exceptions set forth in the preceding subsection. Rather than stating that warrantless presidential uses of electronic surveillance “shall not be unlawful” and thus employing the standard language of exception, subsection (3) merely disclaims any intention to “limit the constitutional power of the President.”
The express grant of authority to conduct surveillances is found in § 2516, which authorizes the Attorney General to make application to a federal judge when surveillance may provide evidence of certain offenses. These offenses are described with meticulous care and specificity.
In view of these and other interrelated provisions delineating permissible interceptions of particular criminal activity upon carefully specified conditions, it would have been incongruous for Congress to have legislated with respect to the important and complex area of national security in a single brief and nebulous paragraph. This would not comport with the sensitivity of the problem involved or with the extraordinary care Congress exercised in drafting other sections of the Act. We therefore think the conclusion inescapable that Congress only intended to make clear that the Act simply did not legislate with respect to national security surveillances.
The legislative history of § 2511(3) supports this interpretation. [N]othing in § 2511(3) was intended to expand or to contract or to define whatever presidential surveillance powers existed in matters affecting the national security. [W]e hold that the statute is not the measure of the executive authority asserted in this case. Rather, we must look to the constitutional powers of the President.
II
It is important at the outset to emphasize the limited nature of the question before the Court. This case raises no constitutional challenge to electronic surveillance as specifically authorized by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Nor is there any question or doubt as to the necessity of obtaining a warrant in the surveillance of crimes unrelated to the national security interest. Further, the instant case requires no judgment on the scope of the President’s surveillance power with respect to the activities of foreign powers, within or without this country. The Attorney General’s affidavit in this case states that the surveillances were “deemed necessary to protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to attack and subvert the existing structure of Government.” There is no evidence of any involvement, directly or indirectly, of a foreign power.
Our present inquiry, though important, is therefore a narrow one. It addresses a question left open by Katz:
“Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security ….”
The determination of this question requires the essential Fourth Amendment inquiry into the “reasonableness” of the search and seizure in question, and the way in which that “reasonableness” derives content and meaning through reference to the warrant clause.
We begin the inquiry by noting that the President of the United States has the fundamental duty, under Art. II, § 1, of the Constitution, to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.” Implicit in that duty is the power to protect our Government against those who would subvert or overthrow it by unlawful means. In the discharge of this duty, the President—through the Attorney General—may find it necessary to employ electronic surveillance to obtain intelligence information on the plans of those who plot unlawful acts against the Government. The use of such surveillance in internal security cases has been sanctioned more or less continuously by various Presidents and Attorneys General since July 1946.
It has been said that “[t]he most basic function of any government is to provide for the security of the individual and of his property.” And unless Government safeguards its own capacity to function and to preserve the security of its people, society itself could become so disordered that all rights and liberties would be endangered.
“Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses.”
But a recognition of these elementary truths does not make the employment by Government of electronic surveillance a welcome development—even when employed with restraint and under judicial supervision. There is, understandably, a deep-seated uneasiness and apprehension that this capability will be used to intrude upon cherished privacy of law-abiding citizens. We look to the Bill of Rights to safeguard this privacy. Though physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed, its broader spirit now shields private speech from unreasonable surveillance.
National security cases, moreover, often reflect a convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values not present in cases of “ordinary” crime. Though the investigative duty of the executive may be stronger in such cases, so also is there greater jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech. Fourth Amendment protections become the more necessary when the targets of official surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in their political beliefs. The danger to political dissent is acute where the Government attempts to act under so vague a concept as the power to protect “domestic security.” Given the difficulty of defining the domestic security interest, the danger of abuse in acting to protect that interest becomes apparent. Senator Hart addressed this dilemma in the floor debate on § 2511(3):
“As I read it—and this is my fear—we are saying that the President, on his motion, could declare—name your favorite poison—draft dodgers, Black Muslims, the Ku Klux Klan, or civil rights activists to be a clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government.”
The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to an unchecked surveillance power. Nor must the fear of unauthorized official eavesdropping deter vigorous citizen dissent and discussion of Government action in private conversation. For private dissent, no less than open public discourse, is essential to our free society.
III
As the Fourth Amendment is not absolute in its terms, our task is to examine and balance the basic values at stake in this case: the duty of Government to protect the domestic security, and the potential danger posed by unreasonable surveillance to individual privacy and free expression. If the legitimate need of Government to safeguard domestic security requires the use of electronic surveillance, the question is whether the needs of citizens for privacy and the free expression may not be better protected by requiring a warrant before such surveillance is undertaken. We must also ask whether a warrant requirement would unduly frustrate the efforts of Government to protect itself from acts of subversion and overthrow directed against it.
[T]he very heart of the Fourth Amendment directive [is] that, where practical, a governmental search and seizure should represent both the efforts of the officer to gather evidence of wrongful acts and the judgment of the magistrate that the collected evidence is sufficient to justify invasion of a citizen’s private premises or conversation. Inherent in the concept of a warrant is its issuance by a “neutral and detached magistrate.” The further requirement of “probable cause” instructs the magistrate that baseless searches shall not proceed.
These Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be conducted solely within the discretion of the Executive Branch. The Fourth Amendment does not contemplate the executive officers of Government as neutral and disinterested magistrates. Their duty and responsibility are to enforce the laws, to investigate, and to prosecute. But those charged with this investigative and prosecutorial duty should not be the sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks. The historical judgment, which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected speech.
It may well be that, in the instant case, the Government’s surveillance of Plamondon’s conversations was a reasonable one which readily would have gained prior judicial approval. But this Court “has never sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive means consistent with that end.” The Fourth Amendment contemplates a prior judicial judgment, not the risk that executive discretion may be reasonably exercised. This judicial role accords with our basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved through a separation of powers and division of functions among the different branches and levels of Government. The independent check upon executive discretion is not satisfied, as the Government argues, by “extremely limited” post-surveillance judicial review. Indeed, post-surveillance review would never reach the surveillances which failed to result in prosecutions. Prior review by a neutral and detached magistrate is the time-tested means of effectuating Fourth Amendment rights.
It is true that there have been some exceptions to the warrant requirement. But those exceptions are few in number and carefully delineated. The Government argues that the special circumstances applicable to domestic security surveillances necessitate a further exception to the warrant requirement. It is urged that the requirement of prior judicial review would obstruct the President in the discharge of his constitutional duty to protect domestic security. We are told further that these surveillances are directed primarily to the collecting and maintaining of intelligence with respect to subversive forces, and are not an attempt to gather evidence for specific criminal prosecutions. It is said that this type of surveillance should not be subject to traditional warrant requirements which were established to govern investigation of criminal activity, not ongoing intelligence gathering.
The Government further insists that courts “as a practical matter would have neither the knowledge nor the techniques necessary to determine whether there was probable cause to believe that surveillance was necessary to protect national security.” These security problems, the Government contends, involve “a large number of complex and subtle factors” beyond the competence of courts to evaluate. As a final reason for exemption from a warrant requirement, the Government believes that disclosure to a magistrate of all or even a significant portion of the information involved in domestic security surveillances “would create serious potential dangers to the national security and to the lives of informants and agents ….”
We certainly do not reject [these contentions] lightly, especially at a time of worldwide ferment and when civil disorders in this country are more prevalent than in the less turbulent periods of our history. There is, no doubt, pragmatic force to the Government’s position.
But we do not think a case has been made for the requested departure from Fourth Amendment standards. The circumstances described do not justify complete exemption of domestic security surveillance from prior judicial scrutiny. Official surveillance, whether its purpose be criminal investigation or ongoing intelligence gathering, risks infringement of constitutionally protected privacy of speech. Security surveillances are especially sensitive because of the inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept, the necessarily broad and continuing nature of intelligence gathering, and the temptation to utilize such surveillances to oversee political dissent.
We cannot accept the Government’s argument that internal security matters are too subtle and complex for judicial evaluation. Courts regularly deal with the most difficult issues of our society. There is no reason to believe that federal judges will be insensitive to or uncomprehending of the issues involved in domestic security cases. [] If the threat is too subtle or complex for our senior law enforcement officers to convey its significance to a court, one may question whether there is probable cause for surveillance.
IV
We emphasize, before concluding this opinion, the scope of our decision. As stated at the outset, this case involves only the domestic aspects of national security. We have not addressed, and express no opinion as to, the issues which may be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents. Nor does our decision rest on the language of § 2511(3) or any other section of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. That Act does not attempt to define or delineate the powers of the President to meet domestic threats to the national security.
Moreover, we do not hold that the same type of standards and procedures prescribed by Title III are necessarily applicable to this case. Congress may wish to consider protective standards for the latter which differ from those already prescribed for specified crimes in Title III. We do not attempt to detail the precise standards for domestic security warrants any more than our decision in Katz sought to set the refined requirements for the specified criminal surveillances which now constitute Title III. We do hold, however, that prior judicial approval is required for the type of domestic security surveillance involved in this case and that such approval may be made in accordance with such reasonable standards as the Congress may prescribe.
V
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring.
While I join in the opinion of the Court, I add these words in support of it.
This is an important phase in the campaign of the police and intelligence agencies to obtain exemptions from the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. For, due to the clandestine nature of electronic eavesdropping, the need is acute for placing on the Government the heavy burden to show that “exigencies of the situation [make its] course imperative.” Other abuses, such as the search incident to arrest, have been partly deterred by the threat of damage actions against offending officers, the risk of adverse publicity, or the possibility of reform through the political process. These latter safeguards, however, are ineffective against lawless wiretapping and “bugging” of which their victims are totally unaware. Moreover, even the risk of exclusion of tainted evidence would here appear to be of negligible deterrent value inasmuch as the United States frankly concedes that the primary purpose of these searches is to fortify its intelligence collage rather than to accumulate evidence to support indictments and convictions. If the Warrant Clause were held inapplicable here, then the federal intelligence machine would literally enjoy unchecked discretion.
Here, federal agents wish to rummage for months on end through every conversation, no matter how intimate or personal, carried over selected telephone lines, simply to seize those few utterances which may add to their sense of the pulse of a domestic underground.
We are told that one national security wiretap lasted for 14 months and monitored over 900 conversations. Senator Edward Kennedy found recently that “warrantless devices accounted for an average of 78 to 209 days of listening per device, as compared with a 13-day per device average for those devices installed under court order.” He concluded that the Government’s revelations posed “the frightening possibility that the conversations of untold thousands of citizens of this country are being monitored on secret devices which no judge has authorized and which may remain in operation for months and perhaps years at a time.” Even the most innocent and random caller who uses or telephones into a tapped line can become a flagged number in the Government’s data bank.
Such gross invasions of privacy epitomize the very evil to which the Warrant Clause was directed. That “domestic security” is said to be involved here does not draw this case outside the mainstream of Fourth Amendment law. Rather, the recurring desire of reigning officials to employ dragnet techniques to intimidate their critics lies at the core of that prohibition.
As illustrated by a flood of cases before us this Term, we are currently in the throes of another national seizure of paranoia, resembling the hysteria which surrounded the Alien and Sedition Acts, the Palmer Raids, and the McCarthy era. Those who register dissent or who petition their governments for redress are subjected to scrutiny by grand juries, by the FBI, or even by the military. Their associates are interrogated. Their homes are bugged and their telephones are wiretapped. They are befriended by secret government informers. Their patriotism and loyalty are questioned. Senator Sam Ervin, who has chaired hearings on military surveillance of civilian dissidents, warns that “it is not an exaggeration to talk in terms of hundreds of thousands of … dossiers.”
Senator Kennedy found “the frightening possibility that the conversations of untold thousands are being monitored on secret devices.” More than our privacy is implicated. Also at stake is the reach of the Government’s power to intimidate its critics.
When the Executive attempts to excuse these tactics as essential to its defense against internal subversion, we are obliged to remind it, without apology, of this Court’s long commitment to the preservation of the Bill of Rights from the corrosive environment of precisely such expedients. “Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty.” “[T]his concept of ‘national defense’ cannot be deemed an end in itself, justifying any … power designed to promote such a goal. Implicit in the term ‘national defense’ is the notion of defending those values and ideas which set this Nation apart…. It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would sanction the subversion of … those liberties … which [make] the defense of the Nation worthwhile.”
The Warrant Clause has stood as a barrier against intrusions by officialdom into the privacies of life. But if that barrier were lowered now to permit suspected subversives’ most intimate conversations to be pillaged then why could not their abodes or mail be secretly searched by the same authority? To defeat so terrifying a claim of inherent power we need only stand by the enduring values served by the Fourth Amendment. “In times of unrest, whether caused by crime or racial conflict or fear of internal subversion, this basic law and the values that it represents may appear unrealistic or “extravagant” to some. But the values were those of the authors of our fundamental constitutional concepts. In times not altogether unlike our own they won … a right of personal security against arbitrary intrusions … If times have changed, reducing everyman’s scope to do as he pleases in an urban and industrial world, the changes have made the values served by the Fourth Amendment more, not less, important.” We have as much or more to fear from the erosion of our sense of privacy and independence by the omnipresent electronic ear of the Government as we do from the likelihood that fomenters of domestic upheaval will modify our form of governing.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in the judgment.
[Justice White wrote that he would have avoided the constitutional issue decided by the majority and would have instead held that the evidence was inadmissible because the government had failed to meet its burden under the Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which prohibits certain wiretaps and allows it in certain circumstances. (Title III is discussed further below.) In other words, Justice White would have left open the possibility that the Attorney General could order warrantless phone tapping to protect national security if authorized by Congress—or, perhaps, so long as not prohibited by Congress.]
Notes, Comments, and Questions
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (sometimes known as the “Wiretap Act” or as “Title III”) is an important statute with provisions this book cannot explore. Students should know a few key details. First, the act prohibits most warrantless wiretapping, both by government actors and by private actors. It also includes procedures by which government investigators can obtain judicial approval (in the form of warrants) for certain wiretaps, and it authorizes some wiretapping even without warrants (some of which is discussed in our next case). Further, Title III contains an exclusionary rule, prohibiting evidence collected in violation of the act from being introduced in court.2 The act is among the best examples of how only some of criminal procedure law is distilled by courts from amendments to the Constitution. Recognizing that judicial regulation of electronic communication would be unpredictable and cumbersome, Congress engaged in robust debate and enacted a statute providing detailed rules that apply to law enforcement officers at the federal, state, and municipal levels.
As Justice Douglas noted in his concurring opinion in United States v. U.S. District Court, “the clandestine nature of electronic eavesdropping” can result in “lawless wiretapping and ‘bugging’ of which [] victims are totally unaware.” Justice Douglas thought it especially important that the judiciary enforce the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures in cases of wiretapping, lest “the federal intelligence machine would literally enjoy unchecked discretion.” In Clapper v. Amnesty International, a group of plaintiffs sought a declaration that provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) were unconstitutional, as well as an injunction prohibiting certain surveillance. The government sought summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing under Article III of the Constitution because they could not demonstrate that they personally had been surveilled (or would be surveilled) under the challenged statutory scheme. Under that theory, the plaintiffs would be unable to obtain a ruling on the merits. In essence, the government argued that because the plaintiffs were “totally unaware” of the details of the surveillance program, they could not challenge it.
Supreme Court of the United States
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA
Decided February 26, 2013 – 568 U.S. 398
Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a, allows the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to acquire foreign intelligence information by jointly authorizing the surveillance of individuals who are not “United States persons” and are reasonably believed to be located outside the United States. Before doing so, the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence normally must obtain the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s approval. Respondents are United States persons whose work, they allege, requires them to engage in sensitive international communications with individuals who they believe are likely targets of surveillance under § 1881a. Respondents seek a declaration that § 1881a is unconstitutional, as well as an injunction against § 1881a-authorized surveillance. The question before us is whether respondents have Article III standing to seek this prospective relief.
Respondents assert that they can establish injury in fact because there is an objectively reasonable likelihood that their communications will be acquired under § 1881a at some point in the future. But respondents’ theory of future injury is too speculative to satisfy the well-established requirement that threatened injury must be “certainly impending.” And even if respondents could demonstrate that the threatened injury is certainly impending, they still would not be able to establish that this injury is fairly traceable to § 1881a. As an alternative argument, respondents contend that they are suffering present injury because the risk of § 1881a-authorized surveillance already has forced them to take costly and burdensome measures to protect the confidentiality of their international communications. But respondents cannot manufacture standing by choosing to make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending. We therefore hold that respondents lack Article III standing.
A
In 1978, after years of debate, Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to authorize and regulate certain governmental electronic surveillance of communications for foreign intelligence purposes. In enacting FISA, Congress legislated against the backdrop of our decision in United States v. United States Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of Mich., in which we explained that the standards and procedures that law enforcement officials must follow when conducting “surveillance of ‘ordinary crime’” might not be required in the context of surveillance conducted for domestic national-security purposes.
In constructing such a framework for foreign intelligence surveillance, Congress created two specialized courts. In FISA, Congress authorized judges of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to approve electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes if there is probable cause to believe that “the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power,” and that each of the specific “facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.” Additionally, Congress vested the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review with jurisdiction to review any denials by the FISC of applications for electronic surveillance.
In the wake of the September 11th attacks, President George W. Bush authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to conduct warrantless wiretapping of telephone and e-mail communications where one party to the communication was located outside the United States and a participant in “the call was reasonably believed to be a member or agent of al Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist organization.” In January 2007, the FISC issued orders authorizing the Government to target international communications into or out of the United States where there was probable cause to believe that one participant to the communication was a member or agent of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization. These FISC orders subjected any electronic surveillance that was then occurring under the NSA’s program to the approval of the FISC. After a FISC Judge subsequently narrowed the FISC’s authorization of such surveillance, however, the Executive asked Congress to amend FISA so that it would provide the intelligence community with additional authority to meet the challenges of modern technology and international terrorism.
When Congress enacted the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FISA Amendments Act), it left much of FISA intact, but it “established a new and independent source of intelligence collection authority, beyond that granted in traditional FISA.” As relevant here, § 702 of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a, supplements pre-existing FISA authority by creating a new framework under which the Government may seek the FISC’s authorization of certain foreign intelligence surveillance targeting the communications of non-U.S. persons located abroad. Unlike traditional FISA surveillance, § 1881a does not require the Government to demonstrate probable cause that the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power. And, unlike traditional FISA, § 1881a does not require the Government to specify the nature and location of each of the particular facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance will occur.
The present case involves a constitutional challenge to § 1881a. Surveillance under § 1881a is subject to statutory conditions, judicial authorization, congressional supervision, and compliance with the Fourth Amendment. Section 1881a provides that, upon the issuance of an order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, “the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence may authorize jointly, for a period of up to 1 year …, the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information.” Surveillance under § 1881a may not be intentionally targeted at any person known to be in the United States or any U.S. person reasonably believed to be located abroad. Additionally, acquisitions under § 1881a must comport with the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, surveillance under § 1881a is subject to congressional oversight and several types of Executive Branch review.
B
Respondents are attorneys and human rights, labor, legal, and media organizations whose work allegedly requires them to engage in sensitive and sometimes privileged telephone and e-mail communications with colleagues, clients, sources, and other individuals located abroad. Respondents believe that some of the people with whom they exchange foreign intelligence information are likely targets of surveillance under § 1881a. Specifically, respondents claim that they communicate by telephone and e-mail with people the Government “believes or believed to be associated with terrorist organizations,” “people located in geographic areas that are a special focus” of the Government’s counterterrorism or diplomatic efforts, and activists who oppose governments that are supported by the United States Government.
Respondents claim that § 1881a compromises their ability to locate witnesses, cultivate sources, obtain information, and communicate confidential information to their clients. Respondents also assert that they “have ceased engaging” in certain telephone and e-mail conversations. According to respondents, the threat of surveillance will compel them to travel abroad in order to have in-person conversations. In addition, respondents declare that they have undertaken “costly and burdensome measures” to protect the confidentiality of sensitive communications.
C
On the day when the FISA Amendments Act was enacted, respondents filed this action seeking (1) a declaration that § 1881a, on its face, violates the Fourth Amendment, the First Amendment, Article III, and separation-of-powers principles and (2) a permanent injunction against the use of § 1881a. After both parties moved for summary judgment, the District Court held that respondents do not have standing. On appeal, however, a panel of the Second Circuit reversed. The Second Circuit denied rehearing en banc by an equally divided vote. Because of the importance of the issue and the novel view of standing adopted by the Court of Appeals, we granted certiorari and we now reverse.
II
Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts’ jurisdiction to certain “Cases” and “Controversies.” “One element of the case-or-controversy requirement” is that plaintiffs “must establish that they have standing to sue.”
The law of Article III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles, serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches. In keeping with the purpose of this doctrine, “[o]ur standing inquiry has been especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force us to decide whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional.” “Relaxation of standing requirements is directly related to the expansion of judicial power,” and we have often found a lack of standing in cases in which the Judiciary has been requested to review actions of the political branches in the fields of intelligence gathering and foreign affairs.
To establish Article III standing, an injury must be “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.” “Although imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is certainly impending.” Thus, we have repeatedly reiterated that “threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact,” and that “[a]llegations of possible future injury” are not sufficient.
A
Respondents assert that they can establish injury in fact that is fairly traceable to § 1881a because there is an objectively reasonable likelihood that their communications with their foreign contacts will be intercepted under § 1881a at some point in the future. This argument fails. [R]espondents’ argument rests on their highly speculative fear that: (1) the Government will decide to target the communications of non-U.S. persons with whom they communicate; (2) in doing so, the Government will choose to invoke its authority under § 1881a rather than utilizing another method of surveillance; (3) the Article III judges who serve on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court will conclude that the Government’s proposed surveillance procedures satisfy § 1881a’s many safeguards and are consistent with the Fourth Amendment; (4) the Government will succeed in intercepting the communications of respondents’ contacts; and (5) respondents will be parties to the particular communications that the Government intercepts. [R]espondents’ theory of standing, which relies on a highly attenuated chain of possibilities, does not satisfy the requirement that threatened injury must be certainly impending. Moreover, even if respondents could demonstrate injury in fact, the second link in the above-described chain of contingencies—which amounts to mere speculation about whether surveillance would be under § 1881a or some other authority—shows that respondents cannot satisfy the requirement that any injury in fact must be fairly traceable to § 1881a.
First, it is speculative whether the Government will imminently target communications to which respondents are parties. Section 1881a expressly provides that respondents, who are U.S. persons, cannot be targeted for surveillance under § 1881a. [R]espondents’ theory necessarily rests on their assertion that the Government will target other individuals—namely, their foreign contacts.
Yet respondents have no actual knowledge of the Government’s § 1881a targeting practices. Instead, respondents merely speculate and make assumptions about whether their communications with their foreign contacts will be acquired under § 1881a. Moreover, because § 1881a at most authorizes—but does not mandate or direct—the surveillance that respondents fear, respondents’ allegations are necessarily conjectural.
Second, even if respondents could demonstrate that the targeting of their foreign contacts is imminent, respondents can only speculate as to whether the Government will seek to use § 1881a-authorized surveillance (rather than other methods) to do so. The Government has numerous other methods of conducting surveillance, none of which is challenged here. Even if respondents could demonstrate that their foreign contacts will imminently be targeted—indeed, even if they could show that interception of their own communications will imminently occur—they would still need to show that their injury is fairly traceable to § 1881a. But, because respondents can only speculate as to whether any (asserted) interception would be under § 1881a or some other authority, they cannot satisfy the “fairly traceable” requirement.
Third, even if respondents could show that the Government will seek the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s authorization to acquire the communications of respondents’ foreign contacts under § 1881a, respondents can only speculate as to whether that court will authorize such surveillance. In the past, we have been reluctant to endorse standing theories that require guesswork as to how independent decisionmakers will exercise their judgment.
We decline to abandon our usual reluctance to endorse standing theories that rest on speculation about the decisions of independent actors. Section 1881a mandates that the Government must obtain the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s approval of targeting procedures, minimization procedures, and a governmental certification regarding proposed surveillance. The Court must, for example, determine whether the Government’s procedures are “reasonably designed … to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United States persons.” And, critically, the Court must also assess whether the Government’s targeting and minimization procedures comport with the Fourth Amendment.
In sum, respondents’ speculative chain of possibilities does not establish that injury based on potential future surveillance is certainly impending or is fairly traceable to § 1881a.
B
Respondents’ alternative argument—namely, that they can establish standing based on the measures that they have undertaken to avoid § 1881a-authorized surveillance—fares no better. Respondents assert that they are suffering ongoing injuries that are fairly traceable to § 1881a because the risk of surveillance under § 1881a requires them to take costly and burdensome measures to protect the confidentiality of their communications. Respondents claim, for instance, that the threat of surveillance sometimes compels them to avoid certain e-mail and phone conversations, to “tal[k] in generalities rather than specifics,” or to travel so that they can have in-person conversations.
Respondents’ contention that they have standing because they incurred certain costs as a reasonable reaction to a risk of harm is unavailing—because the harm respondents seek to avoid is not certainly impending. In other words, respondents cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending. Any ongoing injuries that respondents are suffering are not fairly traceable to § 1881a.
If the law were otherwise, an enterprising plaintiff would be able to secure a lower standard for Article III standing simply by making an expenditure based on a nonparanoid fear. Thus, allowing respondents to bring this action based on costs they incurred in response to a speculative threat would be tantamount to accepting a repackaged version of respondents’ first failed theory of standing.
IV
Respondents also suggest that they should be held to have standing because otherwise the constitutionality of § 1881a could not be challenged. It would be wrong, they maintain, to “insulate the government’s surveillance activities from meaningful judicial review.” Respondents’ suggestion is both legally and factually incorrect. First, “‘[t]he assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing.’”
Second, our holding today by no means insulates § 1881a from judicial review. As described above, Congress created a comprehensive scheme in which the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court evaluates the Government’s certifications, targeting procedures, and minimization procedures—including assessing whether the targeting and minimization procedures comport with the Fourth Amendment.
Additionally, if the Government intends to use or disclose information obtained or derived from a § 1881a acquisition in judicial or administrative proceedings, it must provide advance notice of its intent, and the affected person may challenge the lawfulness of the acquisition. Finally, any electronic communications service provider that the Government directs to assist in § 1881a surveillance may challenge the lawfulness of that directive before the FISC.
We hold that respondents lack Article III standing. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Second Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Justice BREYER, with whom Justice GINSBURG, Justice SOTOMAYOR, and Justice KAGAN join, dissenting.
The plaintiffs’ standing depends upon the likelihood that the Government, acting under the authority of 50 U.S.C. § 1881a, will harm them by intercepting at least some of their private, foreign, telephone, or e-mail conversations. In my view, this harm is not “speculative.” Indeed it is as likely to take place as are most future events that commonsense inference and ordinary knowledge of human nature tell us will happen. This Court has often found the occurrence of similar future events sufficiently certain to support standing. I dissent from the Court’s contrary conclusion.
No one here denies that the Government’s interception of a private telephone or e-mail conversation amounts to an injury that is “concrete and particularized.” Moreover, the plaintiffs seek as relief a judgment declaring unconstitutional (and enjoining enforcement of) a statutory provision authorizing those interceptions; and, such a judgment would redress the injury by preventing it. Thus, the basic question is whether the injury, i.e., the interception, is “actual or imminent.”
Several considerations, based upon the record along with commonsense inferences, convince me that there is a very high likelihood that Government, acting under the authority of § 1881a, will intercept at least some of the communications just described. First, the plaintiffs have engaged, and continue to engage, in electronic communications of a kind that the 2008 amendment, but not the prior Act, authorizes the Government to intercept. These communications include discussions with family members of those detained at Guantanamo, friends and acquaintances of those persons, and investigators, experts and others with knowledge of circumstances related to terrorist activities. These persons are foreigners located outside the United States. They are not “foreign power[s]” or “agent[s] of … foreign power[s].” And the plaintiffs state that they exchange with these persons “foreign intelligence information,” defined to include information that “relates to” “international terrorism” and “the national defense or the security of the United States.”
Second, the plaintiffs have a strong motive to engage in, and the Government has a strong motive to listen to, conversations of the kind described. A lawyer representing a client normally seeks to learn the circumstances surrounding the crime (or the civil wrong) of which the client is accused. At the same time, the Government has a strong motive to conduct surveillance of conversations that contain material of this kind. And the Government is motivated to do so, not simply by the desire to help convict those whom the Government believes guilty, but also by the critical, overriding need to protect America from terrorism.
Third, the Government’s past behavior shows that it has sought, and hence will in all likelihood continue to seek, information about alleged terrorists and detainees through means that include surveillance of electronic communications.
Fourth, the Government has the capacity to conduct electronic surveillance of the kind at issue. Of course, to exercise this capacity the Government must have intelligence court authorization. But the Government rarely files requests that fail to meet the statutory criteria. As the intelligence court itself has stated, its review under § 1881a is “narrowly circumscribed.” There is no reason to believe that the communications described would all fail to meet the conditions necessary for approval. Moreover, compared with prior law, § 1881a simplifies and thus expedites the approval process, making it more likely that the Government will use § 1881a to obtain the necessary approval.
The upshot is that (1) similarity of content, (2) strong motives, (3) prior behavior, and (4) capacity all point to a very strong likelihood that the Government will intercept at least some of the plaintiffs’ communications, including some that the 2008 amendment, § 1881a, but not the pre-2008 Act, authorizes the Government to intercept.
At the same time, nothing suggests the presence of some special factor here that might support a contrary conclusion. The Government does not deny that it has both the motive and the capacity to listen to communications of the kind described by plaintiffs. Nor does it describe any system for avoiding the interception of an electronic communication that happens to include a party who is an American lawyer, journalist, or human rights worker. One can, of course, always imagine some special circumstance that negates a virtual likelihood, no matter how strong. But the same is true about most, if not all, ordinary inferences about future events. Perhaps, despite pouring rain, the streets will remain dry (due to the presence of a special chemical). But ordinarily a party that seeks to defeat a strong natural inference must bear the burden of showing that some such special circumstance exists. And no one has suggested any such special circumstance here.
Consequently, we need only assume that the Government is doing its job (to find out about, and combat, terrorism) in order to conclude that there is a high probability that the Government will intercept at least some electronic communication to which at least some of the plaintiffs are parties. The majority is wrong when it describes the harm threatened plaintiffs as “speculative.”
The majority more plausibly says that the plaintiffs have failed to show that the threatened harm is “certainly impending.” But, as the majority appears to concede, certainty is not, and never has been, the touchstone of standing. The future is inherently uncertain. Yet federal courts frequently entertain actions for injunctions and for declaratory relief aimed at preventing future activities that are reasonably likely or highly likely, but not absolutely certain, to take place. And that degree of certainty is all that is needed to support standing here.
The Court’s use of the term “certainly impending” is not to the contrary. Sometimes the Court has used the phrase “certainly impending” as if the phrase described a sufficient, rather than a necessary, condition for jurisdiction. On other occasions, it has used the phrase as if it concerned when, not whether, an alleged injury would occur. On still other occasions, recognizing that “‘imminence’ is concededly a somewhat elastic concept,” the Court has referred to, or used (sometimes along with “certainly impending”) other phrases such as “reasonable probability” that suggest less than absolute, or literal certainty. Taken together the case law uses the word “certainly” as if it emphasizes, rather than literally defines, the immediately following term “impending.”
More important, the Court’s holdings in standing cases show that standing exists here. The Court has often found standing where the occurrence of the relevant injury was far less certain than here. Moreover, courts have often found probabilistic injuries sufficient to support standing.
How could the law be otherwise? Suppose that a federal court faced a claim by homeowners that (allegedly) unlawful dam-building practices created a high risk that their homes would be flooded. Would the court deny them standing on the ground that the risk of flood was only 60, rather than 90, percent?
Would federal courts deny standing to a plaintiff in a diversity action who claims an anticipatory breach of contract where the future breach depends on probabilities? The defendant, say, has threatened to load wheat onto a ship bound for India despite a promise to send the wheat to the United States. No one can know for certain that this will happen. Perhaps the defendant will change his mind; perhaps the ship will turn and head for the United States. Yet, despite the uncertainty, the Constitution does not prohibit a federal court from hearing such a claim.
While I express no view on the merits of the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, I do believe that at least some of the plaintiffs have standing to make those claims. I dissent, with respect, from the majority’s contrary conclusion.
Notes, Comments, and Questions
As the two previous cases indicate, the power of the executive to conduct electronic surveillance increases when the actions are authorized by Congress. While it may be that the President can lawfully order warrantless surveillance in some cases without congressional approval, executive power is more robust when implementing legislative directives, and it is weakest when defying a congressional prohibition. Students interested more generally in the interplay of executive power and legislation should review Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (the “Steel Seizures” case), particularly the concurring opinion of Justice Jackson.
Justice Jackson wrote: “When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum.” “When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.” “When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb.”
Torture
It has long been the position of the United States government that torture is not only unlawful but is among the most terrible of crimes. During the presidency of Ronald Reagan, the U.S. signed the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (commonly known as the “Convention Against Torture”), and Reagan urged the Senate to ratify the treating, writing:
“Ratification of the Convention by the United States will clearly express United States opposition to torture, an abhorrent practice unfortunately still prevalent in the world today.”
The Senate eventually ratified the treaty, to which the United States remains a party. President Reagan did not break new ground for the United States in announcing the government’s opposition to torture. Indeed, the U.S. military convicted several Japanese officials of torturing prisoners during World War II, and some of the convicts were executed. Even earlier, the Eighth Amendment—ratified in 1791—prohibited the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.”
To be sure, agents of the United States have indeed tortured prisoners from time to time. During the Philippine-American War, for example, U.S. torture of Filipino captives was well documented.3 Some of the police interrogations discussed earlier in this book involved torture (see Chapter 22 in particular). Nonetheless, American politicians and judges have widely denounced torture and have described its use by Americans as aberrant, unlawful behavior.
Soon after the attacks of September 11, 2001, however, certain high U.S. officials argued that the President had authority to order torture if—in the president’s judgment—the torture would protect national security. Professor John Yoo of Berkeley Law, who wrote some of the formerly secret memoranda while working at the Department of Justice, is among the lawyers most prominently associated with the arguments. DOJ Office of Legal Counsel attorney Jay Bybee, now a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, issued another memo that defined torture quite narrowly—with the apparent purpose of allowing certain interrogation practices that had been previously barred as being a form of torture that could subject the interrogator to prosecution.
The Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to evaluate the arguments raised in the “torture memos” (or similar arguments raised elsewhere) and thereby to decide if U.S. officials may order the torture of detainees—whether under the authority of legislation enacted pursuant to Article I of the Constitution, under the President’s inherent powers under Article II, or through some other legal theory. Your authors—like President Reagan, Senator McCain, and the judges who tried war crimes cases after World War II—believe that torture always violates the law. We intimate no view, however, on how the Court would decide the matter were it squarely presented during a time of national panic.4
The “War on Terror”
As part of the government’s effort to combat those responsible for the attacks of September 11, 2001—along with various other state actors and non-state actors associated in some way with the “War on Terror”—U.S. officials treated detainees in ways that would not be lawful for purposes of ordinary crime control. For example, José Padilla, an American citizen, was arrested in Illinois in 2002 and imprisoned as an “enemy combatant.” In Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004), the Court considered whether the President has authority to jail Americans indefinitely, with no access to legal review of their detention, after declaring them “enemy combatants.” By a vote of 5-4, the Court avoided deciding the question based on jurisdictional grounds. Padilla was eventually tried in a standard civilian court for crimes, including conspiracy to commit murder. He was convicted and is currently in federal prison.
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), the Court addressed the merits of a similar case when another U.S. citizen, Yaser Esam Hamdi, was accused of fighting in support of the Taliban. In a plurality opinion joined by three other Justices, Justice O’Connor wrote, “We hold that although Congress authorized the detention of combatants in the narrow circumstances alleged here, due process demands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker.” Hamdi was subsequently released after agreeing to renounce his U.S. citizenship, and he was deported to Saudi Arabia.
In Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), the Court held that foreign nationals also had a due process right to contest their indefinite imprisonment in the U.S. detention camp in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The Court reaffirmed this principle in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), holding that Congress could not divest federal courts of jurisdiction to hear such challenges brought by foreign nationals (thereby striking down Section 7 of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-366).
A few other cases have shown a Supreme Court more hesitant to involve itself, and the judiciary more broadly, in the “War on Terror” debate. For example, in Arar v. Ashcroft, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held a rare en banc hearing on whether a civil plaintiff (formerly detained as a suspected Al-Qaeda operative) could obtain relief related to his removal by the United States to Syria, where U.S. officials had reason to expect he would be tortured.5 After the Second Circuit judges—who wrote five separate opinions—held that Arar could not recover, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.6
Along with Clapper v. Amnesty International, the detainee cases illustrate the complicated relationship between Congress, the executive, and the courts in setting national security policy. Executive officials can sometimes avoid judicial review by mooting cases (such as by moving Padilla to a civilian court), and the Court occasionally seems eager to avoid deciding important questions in this area. Sometimes, however, the Court is willing and able to assert its authority.
This book barely offers even a cursory review of this complicated area of law. Students should consider how much the law of ordinary criminal procedure—with its concerns for due process and its prohibitions on things like coerced confessions—can and should be part of the “War on Terror” or other issues of national security.
* * *
One Final Series of Questions
Before putting this book away, please return to the questions posed at the end of Chapter 6. We asked you to consider:
“If Americans better understood Supreme Court doctrine related to the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, do you think they would have more or less faith in the criminal justice system? Why?”
What do you think now?
We also asked:
“If you are unhappy with the state of policing, how might things be improved? If instead you think policing is going fairly well, to what do you attribute the discontent exhibited during the 2020 protests?”
Have your answers to these questions changed as you learned more about criminal procedure law?
A Thank You to Our Students
There is no next chapter for us to summarize here. Thank you for joining us on this tour of American criminal procedure law. We especially appreciate our Fall 2018 students at the University of Missouri School of Law for serving as the initial test subjects for this book. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Criminal_Procedure%3A_A_Free_Law_School_Casebook_2e_(Alexander_and_Trachtenberg)/06%3A_Identifications/6.04%3A_Chapter_41_-_Electronic_Surveillance_Torture_and_the_War_on_Terror.txt |
Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.
- BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, cited in Section 1
Source: Image courtesy of Tara Storm.
1.01: Introduction
Learning Objective
1. Define a crime.
This textbook introduces you to our legal system in the United States, the basic elements of a crime, the specific elements of commonly encountered crimes, and most criminal defenses. Criminal law always involves the government and government action, so you will also review the pertinent sections of the United States Constitution and its principles as they apply to criminal law. By the end of the book, you will be comfortable with the legal framework that governs the careers of criminal justice professionals.
Definition of a Crime
Let’s begin at the beginning by defining a crime. The most basic definition of a crime is “an act committed in violation of a law prohibiting it, or omitted in violation of a law ordering it.”Yourdictionary.com, “Definition of Crime,” accessed August 15, 2010, http://www.yourdictionary.com/crime. You learn about criminal act and omission to act in Chapter 4. For now, it is important to understand that criminal act, omission to act, and criminal intent are elements or parts of every crime. Illegality is also an element of every crime. Generally, the government must enact a criminal law specifying a crime and its elements before it can punish an individual for criminal behavior. Criminal laws are the primary focus of this book. As you slowly start to build your knowledge and understanding of criminal law, you will notice some unique characteristics of the United States’ legal system.
Laws differ significantly from state to state. Throughout the United States, each state and the federal government criminalize different behaviors. Although this plethora of laws makes American legal studies more complicated for teachers and students, the size, cultural makeup, and geographic variety of our country demand this type of legal system.
Laws in a democratic society, unlike laws of nature, are created by people and are founded in religious, cultural, and historical value systems. People from varying backgrounds live in different regions of this country. Thus you will see that different people enact distinct laws that best suit their needs. This book is intended for use in all states. However, the bulk of any criminal law overview is an examination of different crimes and their elements. To be accurate and representative, this book focuses on general principles that many states follow and provides frequent references to specific state laws for illustrative purposes. Always check the most current version of your state’s law because it may vary from the law presented in this book.
Laws are not static. As society changes, so do the laws that govern behavior. Evolving value systems naturally lead to new laws and regulations supporting modern beliefs. Although a certain stability is essential to the enforcement of rules, occasionally the rules must change.
Try to maintain an open mind when reviewing the different and often contradictory laws set forth in this book. Law is not exact, like science or math. Also try to become comfortable with the gray area, rather than viewing situations as black or white.
KEY TAKEAWAY
• A crime is an act committed in violation of a law prohibiting it or omitted in violation of a law ordering it. In general, the criminal law must be enacted before the crime is committed.
EXERCISE
Answer the following question. Check your answer using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Read Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). Did the US Supreme Court preserve Oregon’s right to legalize physician-assisted suicide? The case is available at this link: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/04-623.ZS.html.
1.02: Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure
Learning Objective
1. Compare criminal law and criminal procedure.
This book focuses on criminal law, but it occasionally touches on issues of criminal procedure, so it is important to differentiate between the two.
Criminal law generally defines the rights and obligations of individuals in society. Some common issues in criminal law are the elements of specific crimes and the elements of various criminal defenses. Criminal procedure generally concerns the enforcement of individuals’ rights during the criminal process. Examples of procedural issues are individuals’ rights during law enforcement investigation, arrest, filing of charges, trial, and appeal.
Example of Criminal Law Issues
Clara and Linda go on a shopping spree. Linda insists that they browse an expensive department store. Moments after they enter the lingerie department, Linda surreptitiously places a bra in her purse. Clara watches, horrified, but does not say anything, even though a security guard is standing nearby. This example illustrates two issues of criminal law: (1) Which crime did Linda commit when she shoplifted the bra? (2) Did Clara commit a crime when she failed to alert the security guard to Linda’s shoplifting? You learn the answer to issue (1) in Chapter 11 and issue (2) in Chapter 4 and Chapter 7.
Example of Criminal Procedure Issues
Review the example in Section 1.2.1 "Example of Criminal Law Issues". Assume that Linda and Clara attempt to leave the store and an alarm is activated. Linda begins sprinting down the street. Colin, a police officer, just happens to be driving by with the window of his patrol car open. He hears the store alarm, sees Linda running, and begins shooting at Linda from the car. Linda is shot in the leg and collapses. Linda is treated at the hospital for her injury, and when she is released, Colin arrests her and transports her to the police station. He brings her to an isolated room and leaves her there alone. Twelve hours later, he reenters the room and begins questioning Linda. Linda immediately requests an attorney. Colin ignores this request and continues to question Linda about the reason the department store alarm went off. Whether Colin properly arrested and interrogated Linda are criminal procedure issues beyond the scope of this book. However, this example does illustrate one criminal law issue: did Colin commit a crime when he shot Linda in the leg? You learn the answer to this question in Chapter 5.
KEY TAKEAWAY
• Criminal law generally defines the rights and obligations of individuals in society. Criminal procedure generally concerns the enforcement of individuals’ rights during the criminal process. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/01%3A_Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/1.00%3A_Prelude_to_Introduction_to_Criminal_Law.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Compare civil and criminal law.
2. Ascertain the primary differences between civil litigation and a criminal prosecution.
Law can be classified in a variety of ways. One of the most general classifications divides law into civil and criminal. A basic definition of civil law is “the body of law having to do with the private rights of individuals.”Yourdictionary.com, “Definition of Civil Law,” accessed August 16, 2010, http://www.yourdictionary.com/civil-law. As this definition indicates, civil law is between individuals, not the government. Criminal law involves regulations enacted and enforced by government action, while civil law provides a remedy for individuals who need to enforce private rights against other individuals. Some examples of civil law are family law, wills and trusts, and contract law. If individuals need to resolve a civil dispute, this is called civil litigation, or a civil lawsuit. When the type of civil litigation involves an injury, the injury action is called a tort.
Characteristics of Civil Litigation
It is important to distinguish between civil litigation and criminal prosecution. Civil and criminal cases share the same courts, but they have very different goals, purposes, and results. Sometimes, one set of facts gives way to a civil lawsuit and a criminal prosecution. This does not violate double jeopardy and is actually quite common.
Parties in Civil Litigation
In civil litigation, an injured party sues to receive a court-ordered remedy, such as money, property, or some sort of performance. Anyone who is injured—an individual, corporation, or other business entity—can sue civilly. In a civil litigation matter, the injured party that is suing is called the plaintiff. A plaintiff must hire and pay for an attorney or represent himself or herself. Hiring an attorney is one of the many costs of litigation and should be carefully contemplated before jumping into a lawsuit.
The alleged wrongdoer and the person or entity being sued are called the defendant. While the term plaintiff is always associated with civil litigation, the wrongdoer is called a defendant in both civil litigation and a criminal prosecution, so this can be confusing. The defendant can be any person or thing that has caused harm, including an individual, corporation, or other business entity. A defendant in a civil litigation matter must hire and pay for an attorney even if that defendant did nothing wrong. The right to a free attorney does not apply in civil litigation, so a defendant who cannot afford an attorney must represent himself or herself.
Goal of Civil Litigation
The goal of civil litigation is to compensate the plaintiff for any injuries and to put the plaintiff back in the position that person held before the injury occurred. This goal produces interesting results. It occasionally creates liability or an obligation to pay when there is no fault on behalf of the defendant. The goal is to make the plaintiff whole, not to punish, so fault is not really an issue. If the defendant has the resources to pay, sometimes the law requires the defendant to pay so that society does not bear the cost of the plaintiff’s injury.
A defendant may be liable without fault in two situations. First, the law that the defendant violated may not require fault. Usually, this is referred to as strict liability. Strict liability torts do not require fault because they do not include an intent component. Strict liability and other intent issues are discussed in detail in Chapter 4. Another situation where the defendant may be liable without fault is if the defendant did not actually commit any act but is associated with the acting defendant through a special relationship. The policy of holding a separate entity or individual liable for the defendant’s action is called vicarious liability. An example of vicarious liability is employer-employee liability, also referred to as respondeat superior. If an employee injures a plaintiff while on the job, the employer may be liable for the plaintiff’s injuries, whether or not the employer is at fault. Clearly, between the employer and the employee, the employer generally has the better ability to pay.
Example of Respondeat Superior
Chris begins the first day at his new job as a cashier at a local McDonald’s restaurant. Chris attempts to multitask and pour hot coffee while simultaneously handing out change. He loses his grip on the coffee pot and spills steaming-hot coffee on his customer Geoff’s hand. In this case, Geoff can sue McDonald’s and Chris if he sustains injuries. McDonald’s is not technically at fault, but it may be liable for Geoff’s injuries under a theory of respondeat superior.
Harm Requirement
The goal of civil litigation is to compensate the plaintiff for injuries, so the plaintiff must be a bona fide victim that can prove harm. If there is no evidence of harm, the plaintiff has no basis for the civil litigation matter. An example would be when a defendant rear-ends a plaintiff in an automobile accident without causing damage to the vehicle (property damage) or physical injury. Even if the defendant is at fault for the automobile accident, the plaintiff cannot sue because the plaintiff does not need compensation for any injuries or losses.
Damages
Often the plaintiff sues the defendant for money rather than a different, performance-oriented remedy. In a civil litigation matter, any money the court awards to the plaintiff is called damages. Several kinds of damages may be appropriate. The plaintiff can sue for compensatory damages, which compensate for injuries, costs, which repay the lawsuit expenses, and in some cases, punitive damages. Punitive damages, also referred to as exemplary damages, are not designed to compensate the plaintiff but instead focus on punishing the defendant for causing the injury.BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), accessed February 13, 2010, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/94-896.ZO.html.
Characteristics of a Criminal Prosecution
A criminal prosecution takes place after a defendant violates a federal or state criminal statute, or in some jurisdictions, after a defendant commits a common-law crime. Statutes and common-law crimes are discussed in Section 1.6.
Parties in a Criminal Prosecution
The government institutes the criminal prosecution, rather than an individual plaintiff. If the defendant commits a federal crime, the United States of America pursues the criminal prosecution. If the defendant commits a state crime, the state government, often called the People of the State pursues the criminal prosecution. As in a civil lawsuit, the alleged wrongdoer is called the defendant and can be an individual, corporation, or other business entity.
The attorney who represents the government controls the criminal prosecution. In a federal criminal prosecution, this is the United States Attorney.United States Department of Justice, “United States Attorneys,” accessed February 15, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/usao. In a state criminal prosecution, this is generally a state prosecutor or a district attorney.“United States’ Prosecuting Attorneys,” Galaxy.com website, accessed February 15, 2010, www.galaxy.com/dir968533/United_States.htm. A state prosecutor works for the state but is typically an elected official who represents the county where the defendant allegedly committed the crime.
Applicability of the Constitution in a Criminal Prosecution
The defendant in a criminal prosecution can be represented by a private attorney or a free attorney paid for by the state or federal government if he or she is unable to afford attorney’s fees and facing incarceration.Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002), accessed August 16, 2010, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/00-1214.ZO.html. Attorneys provided by the government are called public defenders.18 U.S.C. § 3006A, accessed February 15, 2010, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/3006A.html. This is a significant difference from a civil litigation matter, where both the plaintiff and the defendant must hire and pay for their own private attorneys. The court appoints a free attorney to represent the defendant in a criminal prosecution because the Constitution is in effect in any criminal proceeding. The Constitution provides for the assistance of counsel in the Sixth Amendment, so every criminal defendant facing incarceration has the right to legal representation, regardless of wealth.
The presence of the Constitution at every phase of a criminal prosecution changes the proceedings significantly from the civil lawsuit. The criminal defendant receives many constitutional protections, including the right to remain silent, the right to due process of law, the freedom from double jeopardy, and the right to a jury trial, among others.
Goal of a Criminal Prosecution
Another substantial difference between civil litigation and criminal prosecution is the goal. Recall that the goal of civil litigation is to compensate the plaintiff for injuries. In contrast, the goal of a criminal prosecution is to punish the defendant.
One consequence of the goal of punishment in a criminal prosecution is that fault is almost always an element in any criminal proceeding. This is unlike civil litigation, where the ability to pay is a priority consideration. Clearly, it is unfair to punish a defendant who did nothing wrong. This makes criminal law justice oriented and very satisfying for most students.
Injury and a victim are not necessary components of a criminal prosecution because punishment is the objective, and there is no plaintiff. Thus behavior can be criminal even if it is essentially harmless. Society does not condone or pardon conduct simply because it fails to produce a tangible loss.
Examples of Victimless and Harmless Crimes
Steven is angry because his friend Bob broke his skateboard. Steven gets his gun, which has a silencer on it, and puts it in the glove compartment of his car. He then begins driving to Bob’s house. While Steven is driving, he exceeds the speed limit on three different occasions. Steven arrives at Bob’s house and then he hides in the bushes by the mailbox and waits. After an hour, Bob opens the front door and walks to the mailbox. Bob gets his mail, turns around, and begins walking back to the house. Steven shoots at Bob three different times but misses, and the bullets end up landing in the dirt. Bob does not notice the shots because of the silencer.
In this example, Steven has committed several crimes: (1) If Steven does not have a special permit to carry a concealed weapon, putting the gun in his glove compartment is probably a crime in most states. (2) If Steven does not have a special permit to own a silencer for his gun, this is probably a crime in most states. (3) If Steven does not put the gun in a locked container when he transports it, this is probably a crime in most states. (4) Steven committed a crime each time he exceeded the speed limit. (5) Each time Steven shot at Bob and missed, he probably committed the crime of attempted murder or assault with a deadly weapon in most states. Notice that none of the crimes Steven committed caused any discernible harm. However, common sense dictates that Steven should be punished so he does not commit a criminal act in the future that may result in harm.
Table 1.1 Comparison of Criminal Prosecution and Civil Litigation
Feature Criminal Prosecution Civil Litigation
Victim No Yes. This is the plaintiff.
Harm No Yes. This is the basis for damages.
Initiator of lawsuit Federal or state government Plaintiff
Attorney for the initiator US Attorney or state prosecutor Private attorney
Attorney for the defendant Private attorney or public defender Private attorney
Constitutional protections Yes No
LAW AND ETHICS: THE O. J. SIMPSON CASE
Two Different Trials—Two Different Results
O. J. Simpson was prosecuted criminally and sued civilly for the murder and wrongful death of victims Ron Goldman and his ex-wife, Nicole Brown Simpson. In the criminal prosecution, which came first, the US Constitution provided O. J. Simpson with the right to a fair trial (due process) and the right to remain silent (privilege against self-incrimination). Thus the burden of proof was beyond a reasonable doubt, and O. J. Simpson did not have to testify. O. J. Simpson was acquitted, or found not guilty, in the criminal trial.Doug Linder, “The Trial of Orenthal James Simpson,” UMKC website, accessed August 18, 2010, www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/Simpson/Simpsonaccount.htm.
In the subsequent civil lawsuit, the burden of proof was preponderance of evidence, which is 51–49 percent, and O. J. Simpson was forced to testify. O. J. Simpson was found liable in the civil lawsuit. The jury awarded \$8.5 million in compensatory damages to Fred Goldman (Ron Goldman’s father) and his ex-wife Sharon Rufo. A few days later, the jury awarded punitive damages of \$25 million to be shared between Nicole Brown Simpson’s children and Fred Goldman.Thomas L. Jones, “Justice for the Dead,” TruTV website, accessed August 18, 2010, www.trutv.com/library/crime/notorious_murders/famous/simpson/dead_16.html.
1. Do you think it is ethical to give criminal defendants more legal protection than civil defendants? Why or why not?
2. Why do you think the criminal trial of O. J. Simpson took place before the civil trial? Check your answers to both questions using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
Johnny Cochran Video
Johnny Cochran: If the Gloves Don’t Fit…
This video presents defense attorney Johnny Cochran’s closing argument in the O. J. Simpson criminal prosecution:
(click to see video)
Exercises
• Civil law regulates the private rights of individuals. Criminal law regulates individuals’ conduct to protect the public.
• Civil litigation is a legal action between individuals to resolve a civil dispute. Criminal prosecution is when the government prosecutes a defendant to punish illegal conduct.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Jerry, a law enforcement officer, pulls Juanita over for speeding. When Jerry begins writing Juanita’s traffic ticket, she starts to berate him and accuse him of racial profiling. Jerry surreptitiously reaches into his pocket and activates a tape recorder. Juanita later calls the highway patrol where Jerry works and files a false complaint against Jerry. Jerry sues Juanita for \$500 in small claims court for filing the false report. He uses the tape recording as evidence. Is this a civil litigation matter or a criminal prosecution?
2. Read Johnson v. Pearce, 148 N.C.App. 199 (2001). In this case, the plaintiff sued the defendant for criminal conversation. Is this a civil litigation matter or a criminal prosecution? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10159013992593966605&q= Johnson+v.+Pearce&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/01%3A_Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/1.03%3A_The_Difference_between_Civil_and_Criminal_Law.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Ascertain the basis for grading.
2. Compare malum in se and malum prohibitum crimes.
3. Compare the punishment options for felonies, misdemeanors, felony-misdemeanors, and infractions.
4. Compare jail and prison.
Crimes can be classified in many ways. Crimes also can be grouped by subject matter. For example, a crime like assault, battery, or rape tends to injure another person’s body, so it can be classified as a “crime against the person.” If a crime tends to injure a person by depriving him or her of property or by damaging property, it can be classified as a “crime against property.” These classifications are basically for convenience and are not imperative to the study of criminal law.
More important and substantive is the classification of crimes according to the severity of punishment. This is called grading. Crimes are generally graded into four categories: felonies, misdemeanors, felony-misdemeanors, and infractions. Often the criminal intent element affects a crime’s grading. Malum in se crimes, murder, for example, are evil in their nature and are generally graded higher than malum prohibitum crimes, which are regulatory, like a failure to pay income taxes.
Felonies
Felonies are the most serious crimes. They are either supported by a heinous intent, like the intent to kill, or accompanied by an extremely serious result, such as loss of life, grievous injury, or destruction of property. Felonies are serious, so they are graded the highest, and all sentencing options are available. Depending on the jurisdiction and the crime, the sentence could be execution, prison time, a fine, or alternative sentencing such as probation, rehabilitation, and home confinement. Potential consequences of a felony conviction also include the inability to vote, own a weapon, or even participate in certain careers.
Misdemeanors
Misdemeanors are less serious than felonies, either because the intent requirement is of a lower level or because the result is less extreme. Misdemeanors are usually punishable by jail time of one year or less per misdemeanor, a fine, or alternative sentencing like probation, rehabilitation, or community service. Note that incarceration for a misdemeanor is in jail rather than prison. The difference between jail and prison is that cities and counties operate jails, and the state or federal government operates prisons, depending on the crime. The restrictive nature of the confinement also differs between jail and prison. Jails are for defendants who have committed less serious offenses, so they are generally less restrictive than prisons.
Felony-Misdemeanors
Felony-misdemeanors are crimes that the government can prosecute and punish as either a felony or a misdemeanor, depending on the particular circumstances accompanying the offense. The discretion whether to prosecute the crime as a felony or misdemeanor usually belongs to the judge, but in some instances the prosecutor can make the decision.
Infractions
Infractions, which can also be called violations, are the least serious crimes and include minor offenses such as jaywalking and motor vehicle offenses that result in a simple traffic ticket. Infractions are generally punishable by a fine or alternative sentencing such as traffic school.
Exercises
• Grading is based on the severity of punishment.
• Malum in se crimes are evil in their nature, like murder. Malum prohibitum crimes are regulatory, like a failure to pay income taxes.
• Felonies are graded the highest. Punishment options for felonies include the following:
• Execution
• Prison time
• Fines
• Alternative sentencing such as probation, rehabilitation, and home confinement
• Misdemeanors are graded lower than felonies. Punishment options for misdemeanors include the following:
• Jail time of one year or less per misdemeanor
• Fines
• Alternative sentencing such as probation, rehabilitation, and community service
• Felony-misdemeanors are punished as either a felony or a misdemeanor.
• Infractions, also called violations, are graded lower than misdemeanors and have less severe punishment options:
• Fines
• Alternative sentencing, such as traffic school
• One difference between jail and prison is that cities and counties operate jails, and the state or federal government operates prisons, depending on the crime. The restrictive nature of the confinement is another difference. Jails are for defendants who have committed less serious offenses, so they are generally less restrictive than prisons.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Harrison kills Calista and is prosecuted and sentenced to one year in jail. Did Harrison commit a felony or a misdemeanor?
2. Read State v. Gillison, 766 N.W. 2d 649 (2009). In Gillison, why did the Iowa Court of Appeals rule that the defendant’s prior convictions were felony convictions? What impact did this ruling have on the defendant’s sentence? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8913791129507413362&q= State+v.+Gillison&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_vis=1. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/01%3A_Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/1.04%3A_Classification_of_Crimes.txt |
Learning Objective
1. Ascertain the effects of specific and general deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, retribution, and restitution.
Punishment has five recognized purposes: deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, retribution, and restitution.
Specific and General Deterrence
Deterrence prevents future crime by frightening the defendant or the public. The two types of deterrence are specific and general deterrence. Specific deterrence applies to an individual defendant. When the government punishes an individual defendant, he or she is theoretically less likely to commit another crime because of fear of another similar or worse punishment. General deterrence applies to the public at large. When the public learns of an individual defendant’s punishment, the public is theoretically less likely to commit a crime because of fear of the punishment the defendant experienced. When the public learns, for example, that an individual defendant was severely punished by a sentence of life in prison or the death penalty, this knowledge can inspire a deep fear of criminal prosecution.
Incapacitation
Incapacitation prevents future crime by removing the defendant from society. Examples of incapacitation are incarceration, house arrest, or execution pursuant to the death penalty.
Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation prevents future crime by altering a defendant’s behavior. Examples of rehabilitation include educational and vocational programs, treatment center placement, and counseling. The court can combine rehabilitation with incarceration or with probation or parole. In some states, for example, nonviolent drug offenders must participate in rehabilitation in combination with probation, rather than submitting to incarceration.Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-901.01, accessed February 15, 2010, http://law.justia.com/arizona/codes/title13/00901-01.html. This lightens the load of jails and prisons while lowering recidivism, which means reoffending.
Retribution
Retribution prevents future crime by removing the desire for personal avengement (in the form of assault, battery, and criminal homicide, for example) against the defendant. When victims or society discover that the defendant has been adequately punished for a crime, they achieve a certain satisfaction that our criminal procedure is working effectively, which enhances faith in law enforcement and our government.
Restitution
Restitution prevents future crime by punishing the defendant financially. Restitution is when the court orders the criminal defendant to pay the victim for any harm and resembles a civil litigation damages award. Restitution can be for physical injuries, loss of property or money, and rarely, emotional distress. It can also be a fine that covers some of the costs of the criminal prosecution and punishment.
Exercises
• Specific deterrence prevents crime by frightening an individual defendant with punishment. General deterrence prevents crime by frightening the public with the punishment of an individual defendant.
• Incapacitation prevents crime by removing a defendant from society.
• Rehabilitation prevents crime by altering a defendant’s behavior.
• Retribution prevents crime by giving victims or society a feeling of avengement.
• Restitution prevents crime by punishing the defendant financially.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. What is one difference between criminal victims’ restitution and civil damages?
2. Read Campbell v. State, 5 S.W.3d 693 (1999). Why did the defendant in this case claim that the restitution award was too high? Did the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals agree with the defendant’s claim? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11316909200521760089&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/01%3A_Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/1.05%3A_The_Purposes_of_Punishment.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Identify the three sources of law.
2. Rank the three sources of law, from highest to lowest.
3. Ascertain the purpose of the US and state constitutions.
4. Ascertain one purpose of statutory law.
5. Ascertain the purpose of case law.
6. Define judicial review.
7. Diagram and explain the components of a case brief.
Law comes from three places, which are referred to as the sources of law.
Constitutional Law
The first source of law is constitutional law. Two constitutions are applicable in every state: the federal or US Constitution, which is in force throughout the United States of America, and the state’s constitution. The US Constitution created our legal system, as is discussed in Chapter 2. States’ constitutions typically focus on issues of local concern.
The purpose of federal and state constitutions is to regulate government action. Private individuals are protected by the Constitution, but they do not have to follow it themselves.
Example of Government and Private Action
Cora stands on a public sidewalk and criticizes President Obama’s health-care plan. Although other individuals may be annoyed by Cora’s words, the government cannot arrest or criminally prosecute Cora for her speech because the First Amendment of the US Constitution guarantees each individual the right to speak freely. On the other hand, if Cora walks into a Macy’s department store and criticizes the owner of Macy’s, Macy’s could eject Cora immediately. Macy’s and its personnel are private, not government, and they do not have to abide by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the Constitution
The federal and state constitutions are both written with words that can be subject to more than one interpretation. Thus there are many exceptions to any constitution’s protections. Constitutional protections and exceptions are discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
For safety and security reasons, we see more exceptions to constitutional protections in public schools and prisons. For example, public schools and prisons can mandate a certain style of dress for the purpose of ensuring safety. Technically, forcing an individual to dress a specific way could violate the right to self-expression, which the First Amendment guarantees. However, if wearing a uniform can lower gang-related conflicts in school and prevent prisoners from successfully escaping, the government can constitutionally suppress free speech in these locations.
Superiority of the Constitution
Of the three sources of law, constitutional law is considered the highest and should not be supplanted by either of the other two sources of law. Pursuant to principles of federal supremacy, the federal or US Constitution is the most preeminent source of law, and state constitutions cannot supersede it. Federal constitutional protections and federal supremacy are discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
Statutory Law
The second source of law is statutory law. While the Constitution applies to government action, statutes apply to and regulate individual or private action. A statute is a written (and published) law that can be enacted in one of two ways. Most statutes are written and voted into law by the legislative branch of government. This is simply a group of individuals elected for this purpose. The US legislative branch is called Congress, and Congress votes federal statutes into law. Every state has a legislative branch as well, called a state legislature, and a state legislature votes state statutes into law. Often, states codify their criminal statutes into a penal code.
State citizens can also vote state statutes into law. Although a state legislature adopts most state statutes, citizens voting on a ballot can enact some very important statutes. For example, a majority of California’s citizens voted to enact California’s medicinal marijuana law.California Compassionate Use Act of 1996, Cal. Health and Safety Code § 11362.5, accessed February 15, 2010, www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/mmp/Pages/Medical%20Marijuana%20Program.aspx. California’s three-strikes law was voted into law by both the state legislature and California’s citizens and actually appears in the California Penal Code in two separate places.Brian Brown and Greg Jolivette, “A Primer: Three Strikes—The Impact after More Than a Decade,” Legislative Analyst’s Office website, accessed February 15, 2010, http://www.lao.ca.gov/2005/3_strikes/3_strikes_102005.htm.
Statutory Law’s Inferiority
Statutory law is inferior to constitutional law, which means that a statute cannot conflict with or attempt to supersede constitutional rights. If a conflict exists between constitutional and statutory law, the courts must resolve the conflict. Courts can invalidate unconstitutional statutes pursuant to their power of judicial review, which is discussed in an upcoming section.
Administrative Laws and Ordinances
Other written and published laws that apply to individuals are administrative laws and ordinances. Administrative laws and ordinances should not supersede or conflict with statutory law.
Administrative laws are enacted by administrative agencies, which are governmental agencies designed to regulate in specific areas. Administrative agencies can be federal or state and contain not only a legislative branch but also an executive (enforcement) branch and judicial (court) branch. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is an example of a federal administrative agency. The FDA regulates any food products or drugs produced and marketed in the United States.
Ordinances are similar to statutes, except that cities and counties vote them into law, rather than a state’s legislature or a state’s citizens. Ordinances usually relate to health, safety, or welfare, and violations of them are typically classified as infractions or misdemeanors, rather than felonies. A written law prohibiting jaywalking within a city’s or county’s limits is an example of an ordinance.
Model Penal Code
State criminal laws differ significantly, so in the early 1960s a group of legal scholars, lawyers, and judges who were members of the American Law Institute drafted a set of suggested criminal statutes called the Model Penal Code. The intent of the Model Penal Code was to provide a standardized set of criminal statutes that all states could adopt, thus simplifying the diversity effect of the United States’ legal system. While the Model Penal Code has not been universally adopted, a majority of the states have incorporated portions of it into their penal codes, and the Model Penal Code survives as a guideline and focal point for discussion when state legislatures modify their criminal statutes.
Case Law
The third source of law is case law. When judges rule on the facts of a particular case, they create case law. Federal case law comes from federal courts, and state case law comes from state courts. Case law has its origins in English common law.
English Common Law
In Old England, before the settlement of the United States, case law was the most prevalent source of law. This was in contrast to countries that followed the Roman Law system, which primarily relied on written codes of conduct enacted by legislature. Case law in England was mired in tradition and local customs. Societal principles of law and equity were the guidelines when courts issued their rulings. In an effort to be consistent, English judges made it a policy to follow previous judicial decisions, thereby creating a uniform system of laws throughout the country for the first time. Case law was named common law because it was common to the entire nation.Lloyd Duhaime, “Common Law Definition,” Duhaime.org website, accessed September 26, 2010, www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/C/CommonLaw.aspx.
The English system of jurisprudence made its way to the United States with the original colonists. Initially, the thirteen colonies unanimously adopted common law as the law of the land. All crimes were common-law crimes, and cases determined criminal elements, defenses, and punishment schemes. Gradually, after the Revolutionary War, hostility toward England and modern reform led to the erosion of common-law crimes and a movement toward codification. States began replacing common-law crimes with statutes enacted by state legislatures. Oxford professor Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Law of England, which interpreted and summarized English common law, became an essential reference as the nation began the process of converting common-law principles into written statutes, ordinances, and penal codes.Lloyd Duhaime, “Common Law Definition,” Duhaime.org website, accessed September 26, 2010, www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/C/CommonLaw.aspx.
Limitations on Common-Law Crimes
In modern society, in many states and the federal government,United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32 (1812), accessed September 24, 2010, http://openjurist.org/11/us/32/the-united-states-v-hudson-and-goodwin. judges cannot create crimes. This violates notions of fairness. Making up a new crime and punishing the defendant for it does not provide consistency or predictability to our legal system. It also violates the principle of legality, a core concept of American criminal justice embodied in this phrase: “Nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine crimen” (No crime without law, no punishment without crime).
In states that do not allow common-law crimes, statutes must define criminal conduct. If no statute exists to criminalize the defendant’s behavior, the defendant cannot be criminally prosecuted, even if the behavior is abhorrent. As the Model Penal Code states, “[n]o conduct constitutes an offense unless it is a crime or violation under this Code or another statute of this State” (Model Penal Code § 1.05(1)).
The common law still plays an important role in criminal lawmaking, even though most crimes are now embodied in statutes. Classification of crimes as felonies and misdemeanors is a reflection of English common law. Legislatures often create statutes out of former common-law crimes. Judges look to the common law when defining statutory terms, establishing criminal procedure, and creating defenses to crimes. The United States is considered a common-law country. Every state except Louisiana, which is based on the French Civil Code, adopts the common law as the law of the state except where a statute provides otherwise.Legal Definition, “Common Law,” Lectlaw.com website, accessed September 26, 2010, www.lectlaw.com/def/c070.htm.
Example of a Court’s Refusal to Create a Common-Law Crime
Read Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (1970). In Keeler, the defendant attacked his pregnant ex-wife, and her baby was thereafter stillborn. The California Supreme Court disallowed a murder charge against Keeler under California Penal Code § 187 because the statute criminalized only the malicious killing of a “human being.” The court reached its decision after examining the common-law definition of human being and determining that the definition did not include a fetus. The court reasoned that it could not create a new crime without violating the due process clause, separation of powers, and California Penal Code § 6, which prohibits the creation of common-law crimes. After the Keeler decision, the California Legislature changed Penal Code § 187 to include a fetus, excepting abortion.Cal. Penal Code § 187, accessed August 23, 2010, http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/cacode/PEN/3/1/8/1/s187.
Powerful Nature of Case Law
Generally, if there is a statute on an issue, the statute is superior to case law, just as the Constitution is superior to statutory law. However, judges interpret constitutional and statutory law, making case law a powerful source of law. A judge can interpret a constitution in a way that adds or creates exceptions to its protections. A judge can also interpret a statute in a way that makes it unconstitutional and unenforceable. This is called the power of judicial review.Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), accessed February 15, 2010, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0005_0137_ZS.html.
Example of Judicial Review
An example of judicial review is set forth in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). In Johnson, the US Supreme Court ruled that burning a flag is protected self-expression under the First Amendment to the US Constitution. Thus the Court reversed the defendant’s conviction under a Texas statute that criminalized the desecration of a venerated object. Note how Johnson not only invalidates a state statute as being inferior to the US Constitution but also changes the US Constitution by adding flag burning to the First Amendment’s protection of speech.
Stare Decisis and Precedent
Cases are diverse, and case law is not really law until the judge rules on the case, so there must be a way to ensure case law’s predictability. It would not be fair to punish someone for conduct that is not yet illegal. Thus judges adhere to a policy called stare decisis. Stare decisis is derived from English common law and compels judges to follow rulings in previous cases. A previous case is called precedent. Once judges have issued a ruling on a particular case, the public can be assured that the resulting precedent will continue to be followed by other judges. Stare decisis is not absolute; judges can deviate from it to update the law to conform to society’s modern expectations.
Rules of Stare Decisis and Use of Precedent
Case precedent is generally an appeal rather than a trial. There is often more than one level of appeal, so some appeals come from higher courts than others. This book discusses the court system, including the appellate courts, in Chapter 2.
Many complex rules govern the use of precedent. Lawyers primarily use precedent in their arguments, rather than statutes or the Constitution, because it is so specific. With proper research, lawyers can usually find precedent that matches or comes very close to matching the facts of any particular case. In the most general sense, judges tend to follow precedent that is newer, from a high court, and from the same court system, either federal or state.
Example of Stare Decisis and Use of Precedent
Geoffrey is a defense attorney for Conrad, who is on trial for first-degree murder. The murder prosecution is taking place in New Mexico. Geoffrey finds case precedent from a New York Court of Appeals, dated 1999, indicating that Conrad should have been prosecuted for voluntary manslaughter, not first-degree murder. Brandon, the prosecuting attorney, finds case precedent from the New Mexico Supreme Court, dated 2008, indicating that a first-degree murder prosecution is appropriate. The trial court will probably follow the precedent submitted by Brandon because it is newer, from a higher court, and from the same court system as the trial.
Case Citation
Cases must be published to become case law. A published case is also called a judicial opinion. This book exposes you to many judicial opinions that you have the option of reading on the Internet. It is essential to understand the meaning of the case citation. The case citation is the series of numbers and letters after the title of the case and it denotes the case’s published location. For example, let’s analyze the case citation for Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (1970).
As you can see from the diagram, the number 470 is the volume number of the book that published the Keeler case. The name of that book is “P.2d” (this is an abbreviation for Pacific Reports, 2d Series). The number 617 is the page number of the Keeler case. The date (1970) is the date the California Supreme Court ruled on the case.
Case Briefing
It is useful to condense judicial opinions into case brief format. The Keeler case brief is shown in Figure 1.7.
Read this case at the following link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2140632244672927312&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
Published judicial opinions are written by judges and can be lengthy. They can also contain more than one case law, depending on the number of issues addressed. Case briefs reduce a judicial opinion to its essentials and can be instrumental in understanding the most important aspects of the case. Standard case brief formats can differ, but one format that attorneys and paralegals commonly use is explained in the following paragraph.
Review the Keeler case brief. The case brief should begin with the title of the case, including the citation. The next component of the case brief should be the procedural facts. The procedural facts should include two pieces of information: who is appealing and which court the case is in. As you can see from the Keeler case brief, Keeler brought an application for a writ of prohibition, and the court is the California Supreme Court. Following the procedural facts are the substantive facts, which should be a short description of the facts that instigated the court trial and appeal. The procedural and substantive facts are followed by the issue. The issue is the question the court is examining, which is usually the grounds for appeal. The case brief should phrase the issue as a question. Cases usually have more than one issue. The case brief can state all the issues or only the issue that is most important. The substantive holding comes after the issue, is actually the case law, and answers the issue question. If more than one issue is presented in the case brief, a substantive holding should address each issue.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0005_0137_ZS.html.
A procedural holding should follow the substantive holding. The procedural holding discusses what the court did procedurally with the case. This could include reversing the lower court’s ruling, affirming the lower court’s ruling, or adjusting a sentence issued by the lower court. This book discusses court procedure in detail in Chapter 2. Last, but still vital to the case brief, is the rationale. The rationale discusses the reasoning of the judges when ruling on the case. Rationales can set policy, which is not technically case law but can still be used as precedent in certain instances.
One judge writes the judicial opinion. Judges vote how to rule, and not all cases are supported by a unanimous ruling. Occasionally, other judges will want to add to the judicial opinion. If a judge agrees with the judicial opinion, the judge could write a concurring opinion, which explains why the judge agrees. If a judge disagrees with the judicial opinion, the judge could write a dissenting opinion explaining why the judge disagrees. The dissenting opinion will not change the judicial opinion, but it may also be used as precedent in a future case if there are grounds for changing the law.
Exercises
• The three sources of law are constitutional, statutory, and case law.
• The sources of law are ranked as follows: first, constitutional; second, statutory; and third, case law. Although it is technically ranked the lowest, judicial review makes case law an extremely powerful source of law.
• The purpose of the US and state constitutions is to regulate government action.
• One purpose of statutory law is to regulate individual or private action.
• The purpose of case law is to supplement the law when there is no statute on point and also to interpret statutes and the constitution(s).
• The court’s power to invalidate statutes as unconstitutional is called judicial review.
• The components of a case brief are the following:
• The title, plus citation. The citation indicates where to find the case.
• The procedural facts of the case. The procedural facts discuss who is appealing and in which court the case is located.
• The substantive facts. The substantive facts discuss what happened to instigate the case.
• The issue. The issue is the question the court is examining.
• The substantive holding. The substantive holding answers the issue question and is the case law.
• The procedural holding. The procedural holding discusses what the court did procedurally with the case.
• The rationale. The rationale is the reason the court held the way it did.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Hal invents a new drug that creates a state of euphoria when ingested. Can Hal be criminally prosecuted for ingesting his new drug?
2. Read Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001). Did the US Supreme Court allow prison inmates the First Amendment right to give other inmates legal advice? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9536800826824133166&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
3. Read Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). What is the primary reason Justice Scalia dissented to the US Supreme Court’s opinion in Lawrence? The dissenting opinion is available at this link: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/02-102.ZD.html. The judicial opinion in Lawrence v. Texas is available at this link: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/02-102.ZS.html. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/01%3A_Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/1.06%3A_Sources_of_Law.txt |
Summary
A crime is action or inaction in violation of a criminal law. Criminal laws vary from state to state and from state to federal.
The study of criminal law defines crimes and defenses to crimes. The study of criminal procedure focuses on the enforcement of rights by individuals while submitting to government investigation, arrest, interrogation, trial, and appeal.
A civil lawsuit or civil litigation matter resolves a dispute between individuals, called a plaintiff (the injured party) and defendant (the alleged wrongdoer). Every civil litigation matter includes a victim (the plaintiff), which has suffered harm. The goal of the civil litigation matter is to compensate the plaintiff for injury. The court can compensate the plaintiff by awarding money, which is called damages. Both parties in a civil litigation matter must represent themselves or hire private attorneys.
A criminal prosecution takes place when the government, represented by a prosecutor, takes legal action against the defendant (the alleged wrongdoer) for committing a crime. Some criminal prosecutions do not include a victim, or harm, because the goal of the criminal prosecution is punishment, not compensation. Every criminal prosecution involves the government, so the US and state constitutions provide the criminal defendant with extra protections not present in a civil lawsuit, such as free counsel when the defendant is indigent and facing incarceration.
Crimes can be classified according to the severity of punishment. The most serious crimes with the entire range of sentencing options available are felonies. Misdemeanors are less serious than felonies and have less severe sentencing options. Felony-misdemeanors can be prosecuted and punished as a felony or a misdemeanor, depending on the circumstances. Infractions, also called violations, are the least serious crimes and generally do not involve incarceration. The purposes of punishing a criminal defendant are both specific and general deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, retribution, and restitution.
Law comes from three sources: the Constitution, a statute, or a case. The Constitution is the highest source of law but is only applicable when there is government action. Statutory law applies to individuals but is inferior to constitutional law. Case law is law made by judges when they rule on the facts of a case. Although case law is technically inferior to statutory law, judges must interpret statutes and the Constitution, so case law can be the most powerful source of law. When a case invalidates a statute as unconstitutional, this action is called judicial review. Case law stays consistent because judges follow previous court decisions, called precedent. This policy, called stare decisis, lends predictability to case law but is not absolute, and courts can deviate from it to update the law.
YOU BE THE LAWYER
Read the prompt, review the case, and then decide whether you would accept or reject the case if you were the lawyer. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. You are an expert in criminal law, not civil litigation. Would you accept or reject this case? Read Cetacean Community v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004). The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14748284771413043760&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
2. You are an expert in criminal law, not criminal procedure. Would you accept or reject this case? Read People v. Wrotten, 2010 N.Y. Slip Op 04501 (2010). The case is available at this link: http://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/appellate-division-first-department/2010/2010-04501.html
3. You are an expert in constitutional law. Would you accept or reject this case? Read Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999). The case is available at this link: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/98-83.ZS.html.
4. Reread question 3. Change your expertise to constitutional law as it applies to criminal prosecutions. Would you accept or reject the Wilson case?
Statistics of Interest
• State prosecutors in the United States: bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbse&sid=9
• Felony convictions in the US state courts: bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2152
• Estimated crime statistics in the United States: www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/State/RunCrimeStatebyState.cfm
Answer to Exercise
From Section 1.1
1. The US Supreme Court held that the attorney general cannot criminalize the use of drugs under Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act by enforcing the Controlled Substances Act. The Controlled Substances Act is targeted at preventing recreational drug use, and, therefore, the Court upheld Oregon’s ability to legalize assisted suicide.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 1.2
1. This is an issue of criminal law. Although Paul is a law enforcement officer, when he shoots Barney while he is facedown in handcuffs, he may be committing a crime. The question in this case is not whether the arrest was executed properly, but whether a crime was committed after the arrest.
2. Payton reviews a New York statute allowing law enforcement to arrest a defendant in the home without a warrant. This case focuses on law enforcement arrest, so it examines an issue of criminal procedure.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 1.3
1. This is a civil litigation matter. Although the incident involves Jerry, who is a law enforcement officer, and it takes place while Jerry is writing a traffic ticket, Jerry is suing Juanita for damages. Thus this is civil litigation, not criminal prosecution. If Juanita is prosecuted for the crime of filing a false police report, then this would be a criminal prosecution.
2. The Johnson case reviews an award of damages and is thus a civil litigation matter. Criminal conversation is the tort of adultery in North Carolina.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 1.4
1. This crime is probably a misdemeanor because Harrison was sentenced to one year in jail, rather than prison. Although the result, Calista’s death, is very serious, the method of killing may have been accidental. Criminal homicide is discussed in Chapter 9.
2. The Iowa Court of Appeals based its ruling on New Jersey law. Although New Jersey named the offenses “high misdemeanors,” New Jersey case law indicates that any offense with a sentence of one year or more incarceration is a common-law felony. This triggered a sentencing enhancement increasing the defendant’s sentence to an indeterminate sentence of incarceration not to exceed fifteen years.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 1.5
1. The court awards criminal restitution to the victim after a state or federal prosecutor is successful in a criminal trial. Thus the victim receives the restitution award without paying for a private attorney. A plaintiff that receives damages has to pay a private attorney to win the civil litigation matter.
2. In Campbell, the defendant entered a plea agreement specifying that he had committed theft in an amount under \$100,000. The trial court determined that the defendant had actually stolen \$100,000 and awarded restitution of \$100,000 to various victims. The defendant claimed that this amount was excessive because it exceeded the parameters of the theft statute he was convicted of violating. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed and held that the discretion of how much restitution to award belongs to the judge. As long as the judge properly ascertained this amount based on the facts, restitution could exceed the amount specified in the criminal statute the defendant was convicted of violating.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 1.6
1. Hal can be prosecuted for ingesting his new drug only if he is in a state that allows for common-law crimes. The drug is new, so the state legislature will probably not have criminalized it by enacting a statute.
2. The US Supreme Court held that inmates do not have the First Amendment right to give other inmates legal advice. The Court based its ruling on the prison’s interest in ensuring prison order, security, and inmate rehabilitation. The Court stated, “We nonetheless have maintained that the constitutional rights that prisoners possess are more limited in scope than the constitutional rights held by individuals in society at large.”Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001), accessed October 4, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9536800826824133166&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
3. Justice Scalia criticized the US Supreme Court majority for not adhering to stare decisis. According to Justice Scalia, the Court did not follow a recent (seventeen-year-old) precedent set in Bowers v. Hardwick.
Answers to Law and Ethics Questions
1. The reason criminal defendants get special protections not extended to civil litigation defendants is the harshness of the punishment and the inequality of the criminal prosecution itself. Criminal defendants may lose their life or their liberty. Civil litigation defendants risk only a loss of money. In addition, criminal defendants face the intimidating prospect of fighting the government and all its vast resources. Civil litigation defendants are squaring off against another individual. As a society, we believe that there is nothing as unjust as punishing an innocent person. Thus we give criminal defendants special protections to level the playing field.
2. The criminal trial took place first because O. J. Simpson was a criminal defendant and therefore had the benefit of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Constitutional protections are discussed in Chapter 3.
Answers to You Be the Lawyer
1. In this case, the plaintiffs are seeking an injunction. The plaintiffs are not the government; they are a group of fish. They are not suing for the goal of punishment, but rather to compel the president of the United States and the secretary of defense to review the use of certain naval equipment. Thus this is a civil litigation matter and you should reject the case.
2. The Court is reviewing the Sixth Amendment right to confront accusers. In this case, a witness who was too ill to travel was permitted to testify via live, two-way video instead of testifying in the courtroom in front of the defendant. The New York Supreme Court held that under the circumstances, this testimony complied with the Sixth Amendment. This case focuses on the defendant’s constitutional rights during his criminal trial, so this is a criminal procedure issue and you should reject the case.
3. The US Supreme Court held that it is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment when law enforcement brings media along while executing a search. Thus this is a federal constitutional issue and you should accept the case.
4. In Wilson, the Court decided that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages when suing law enforcement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus although this case involves the Fourth Amendment, it is essentially a civil litigation matter, and you should reject the case. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/01%3A_Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/1.07%3A_End-of-Chapter_Material.txt |
The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in our criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The accused, during a criminal prosecution, has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction.
- In re: Winship, cited in Section 2
Source: Image courtesy of Tara Storm.
2.01: Federalism
Learning Objectives
1. Define federalism.
2. Ascertain the sections of the Constitution that give Congress regulatory authority.
3. Ascertain the basis for Congress’s authority to enact criminal laws.
4. Compare federal regulatory authority with state regulatory authority.
5. Compare federal criminal laws with state criminal laws.
6. Define federal supremacy.
The United States’ system of government is called federalism. Federalism, as set forth in the US Constitution, divides governmental power between the federal government and each of the states. This prevents a concentrated source of governmental power in one individual or small group of individuals. Because of federalism, the United States has one federal legal system, and each state has its own state legal system. Thus in the United States, a plethora of legal systems all operate harmoniously at the same time.
The Scope of Federal Law
The government’s power to regulate comes from the US Constitution. The federal government derives its authority to create law from Article I, § 8, which discusses federal Congress’s exclusive or delegated powers. These include the power to regulate currency and coin, establish a post office, promote science and art by regulating the rights to discoveries and writings, declare war and raise armies, conduct foreign affairs, regulate interstate and foreign commerce, and make laws necessary and proper to execute other powers expressly granted in the Constitution. Courts have interpreted the last two powers mentioned in the commerce clause and the necessary and proper clause to be the broadest sources of federal regulatory authority.
To simplify and summarize precedent defining federal regulatory authority, federal laws are meant to regulate in two areas. First, federal laws regulate issues that concern the country, rather than just one city, county, or state. The federal government regulates in the area of foreign affairs, for example, because this affects the United States of America, not just one particular region. Second, federal laws regulate commerce, which is economic activity, that crosses from state to state. Some common examples are television broadcasts, the Internet, and any form of transportation such as the airlines.
Federal Criminal Laws
The original intent was for the federal government to be a limited government, with the bulk of regulatory authority residing in the states. The only crimes Congress is specifically authorized to punish are piracies and felonies on the high seas, counterfeiting, and treason; however, case precedent has expanded the federal government’s power to enact criminal laws based on the commerce clause and the necessary and proper clause.McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), accessed August 28, 2010, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0017_0316_ZS.html. Still, there must be some connection to an issue of national character and interstate commerce, or the federal government will overstep its authority. In general, federal criminal laws target conduct that occurs on federal property or conduct involving federal employees, currency, coin, treason, national security, rights secured by the Constitution, or commerce that crosses state lines. Currently, over five hundred crimes are listed in Part I, Title 18 of the United States Code, which codifies criminal laws for the federal government.
The Scope of State Law
The US Constitution designates the states as the primary regulatory authority. This is clarified in the Tenth Amendment, which reads, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited to it by the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or the people.” State laws are also supposed to regulate in two areas. First, state laws regulate issues of a local character or concern. A state may regulate, for example, its water ownership and use because water can be scarce and is not generally provided to other states. Second, state laws regulate issues or things that remain within a state’s border. A state generally regulates, for example, the operation of a small business whose products are only sold locally and not shipped out of the state.
Federal laws are the same in every state, but state laws differ from state to state. Something that is legal in one state may be illegal in another state. This inconsistency makes our system of federalism complicated for students (and lawyers). However, with a country as large and varied as the United States, it is sensible to allow each state to choose for itself which laws will be most suitable.
State Criminal Laws
The power to enact criminal laws belongs almost exclusively to the states. This is because of the Tenth Amendment, which vests in states a police power to provide for the health, safety, and welfare of state citizens. Approximately 90 percent of all criminal laws are state, rather than federal. Often, federal crimes are also state crimes and can be prosecuted and punished by both the state and federal government without violating the principle of double jeopardy.
Example of the Diversity of State Laws
In Nevada, prostitution is legal under certain circumstances.N.R.S. § 201.354, accessed September 24, 2010, http://www.leg.state.nv.us/nrs/NRS-201.html#NRS201Sec354. An individual who engages in prostitution inside a licensed “house of prostitution” in Nevada is not exposed to criminal liability. However, if the same individual engages in prostitution in a different state, he or she may be subject to a criminal prosecution. Prostitution will be discussed in detail in Chapter 12.
Federal Supremacy
Our legal system is divided up to conform to the principle of federalism, so a potential exists for conflict between federal law and state law. A federal law may make something illegal; a state law may insist that it is legal. Whenever a conflict occurs between federal and state law, courts must follow the federal law. This is called federal supremacy. As the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the federal Constitution states, “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”
Example of Federal Supremacy
In Washington and several other states, an individual may possess and use marijuana for medicinal purposes with a prescription.Washington State Medicinal Marijuana Act, Chapter 69.51A RCW, accessed August 28, 2010, apps.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=69.51a&full=true; see all states that legalize medicinal marijuana: “16 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC,” ProCon.org website, accessed August 28, 2010, http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881. Federal law prohibits possession and use of marijuana under any circumstances.21 U.S.C. Ch. 13 § 801 et. seq., accessed October 1, 2010, www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/21cfr/21usc/index.html. Technically, this could be a conflict that violates federal supremacy. Until the courts address the federal supremacy issue, however, medical marijuana statutes can continue to stay in effect. Read about a recent ruling regarding the constitutionality of Michigan’s medicinal marijuana law under the Supremacy Clause: www.pressandguide.com/articles/2011/04/09/news/doc4d9f557b8ab37805648033.txt.
LAW AND ETHICS: THE ARIZONA IMMIGRATION LAW
Can a State Regulate Immigration?
Arizona passed a comprehensive immigration law designed to seek out and deport illegal immigrants. This law created a national furor, and its detractors insisted it would lead to unethical racial profiling. The federal government attacked the law in Federal District Court.Randal C. Archibold, “Judge Blocks Arizona’s Immigration Law,” The New York Times website, accessed October 1, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/07/29/us/29arizona.html. Judge Susan Bolton issued a preliminary injunction that stopped enforcement of the sections of the law that required state law enforcement to check an immigrant’s status while enforcing other laws and that required immigrants to prove they were in the country legally or risk state charges.Randal C. Archibold, “Judge Blocks Arizona’s Immigration Law,” The New York Times website, accessed October 1, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/07/29/us/29arizona.html. Read the District Court’s preliminary injunction ruling, which is available at this link: http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20100729_ARIZONA_DOC.pdf.
1. What is the basis for Judge Bolton’s decision? Check your answer using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
Read about the most recent ruling on Arizona’s immigration law by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: http://latindispatch.com/2011/05/10/arizonas-jan-brewer-to-appeal-immigration-law-to-u-s-supreme-court/.
Read about Utah’s immigration law: articles.cnn.com/2011-05-11/politics/utah.immigration.bill_1_utah-law-gary-herbert-utah-gov?_s=PM:POLITICS.
Read about Alabama’s immigration law: www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/10/tagblogsfindlawcom2011-freeenterprise-idUS123058502120110610.
U.S. v. State of Arizona Video
10-16645 U.S. v. State of Arizona
This video is the Arizona governor’s appeal of the district court preliminary injunction:
(click to see video)
Exercises
• Federalism is a system of government in which power is divided between one national, federal government and several independent state governments.
• Congress gets its regulatory authority from Article I § 8 of the federal Constitution. This includes several delegated powers, the commerce clause, and the necessary and proper clause.
• The commerce clause gives Congress the power to regulate commerce that crosses state lines.
• The necessary and proper clause gives Congress the power to regulate if necessary to carry out all other powers listed in the Constitution.
• The Constitution specifically authorizes Congress to punish piracies and felonies on the high seas, counterfeiting, and treason. Case precedent has also expanded the federal government’s power to enact criminal laws based on the commerce clause and the necessary and proper clause.
• The federal government is intended to be limited, with the bulk of regulatory authority residing in the states. The federal government is restricted to regulating in the areas designated in Article I § 8 of the federal Constitution. The states can regulate for the health, safety, and welfare of citizens pursuant to their police power, which is set forth in the Tenth Amendment of the federal Constitution.
• Federal criminal laws criminalize conduct that occurs on federal property or involves federal employees, currency, coin, treason, national security, rights secured by the Constitution, or commerce that crosses state lines. State criminal laws make up 90 percent of all criminal laws, are designed to protect state citizens’ health, safety, and welfare, and often criminalize the same conduct as federal criminal laws.
• Federal supremacy, which is set forth in the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution, requires courts to follow federal laws if there is a conflict between a federal and state law.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Congress passes a law criminalizing the posting of child pornography on the Internet. Where does Congress get the authority to pass this criminal law? If a state has a criminal law criminalizing the same conduct, can both the state and federal government prosecute a defendant for one act of downloading child pornography?
2. Read U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 518 (2000). Which part(s) of the Constitution did the US Supreme Court rely on when it held that 42 U.S.C. § 13981 is unconstitutional? The case is available at this link: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/99-5.ZS.html.
3. Read Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). Why did the US Supreme Court invalidate the Pennsylvania Sedition Act? The case is available at this link: http://supreme.justia.com/us/350/497/case.html. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/02%3A_The_Legal_System_in_the_United_States/2.00%3A_Prelude_to_The_Legal_System_in_the_United_States.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Identify the three branches of government.
2. Ascertain the head of the federal and state legislative branches of government.
3. Compare the Senate and the House of Representatives.
4. Ascertain the head of the federal and state executive branches of government.
5. Ascertain the head of the federal and state judicial branches of government.
The federal Constitution was written to ensure that government power is distributed and never concentrated in one or more areas. This philosophy is served by federalism, where the federal government shares power with the states. It is also further served by dividing the government into three branches, all responsible for different government duties and all checking and balancing each other. The three branches of government are detailed in Articles I–III of the federal Constitution and are the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. While the federal Constitution identifies only the federal branches of government, the principle of checks and balances applies to the states as well. Most states identify the three state branches of government in their state constitution.
Each branch of government has a distinct authority. When one branch encroaches on the duties of another, this is called a violation of separation of powers. The courts decide whether a government branch has overstepped its boundaries because courts interpret the Constitution, which describes each branch’s sphere of influence. Thus the judicial branch, which consists of all the courts, retains the balance of power.
The Legislative Branch
The legislative branch is responsible for creating statutory laws. Citizens of a state can vote for some state statutes by ballot, but the federal legislative branch enacts all federal statutes. In the federal government, the legislative branch is headed by Congress. States’ legislative branches are headed by a state legislature. Congress is bicameral, which means it is made up of two houses. This system provides equal representation among the several states and by citizens of the United States. States are represented by the Senate. Every state, no matter how large or small, gets two senators. Citizens are represented by the House of Representatives. Membership in the House of Representatives is based on population. A heavily populated state, like California, has more representatives than a sparsely populated state, like Alaska. States’ legislatures are generally bicameral and have a similar structure to the federal system.
Examples of Legislative Branch Checks and Balances
The legislative branch can check and balance both the executive branch and the judicial branch. Congress can impeach the president of the United States, which is the first step toward removal from office. Congress can also enact statutes that supersede judicial opinions, as discussed in Chapter 1. Similarly, state legislature can also impeach a governor or enact a state statute that supersedes a state case law.
The Executive Branch
The executive branch is responsible for enforcing the statutes enacted by the legislative branch. In the federal government, the executive branch is headed by the president of the United States. States’ executive branches are headed by the governor of the state.
Examples of Executive Branch Checks and Balances
The executive branch can check and balance both the legislative branch and the judicial branch. The president of the United States can veto statutes proposed by Congress. The president also has the authority to nominate federal justices and judges, who thereafter serve for life. State executive branches have similar check and balancing authority; a governor can generally veto statutes proposed by state legislature and can appoint some state justices and judges.
The Judicial Branch
The judicial branch is responsible for interpreting all laws, including statutes, codes, ordinances, and the federal and state constitutions. This power is all encompassing and is the basis for judicial review, referenced in Chapter 1. It allows the judicial branch to invalidate any unconstitutional law in the statutory source of law and also to change the federal and state constitutions by interpretation. For example, when a court creates an exception to an amendment to the constitution, it has made an informal change without the necessity of a national or state consensus. The federal judicial branch is headed by the US Supreme Court. Each state’s judicial branch is headed by the highest-level state appellate court. Members of the judicial branch include all judges and justices of every federal and state court in the court system, which is discussed shortly.
Examples of Judicial Branch Checks and Balances
The judicial branch can check and balance both the legislative branch and the executive branch. The US Supreme Court can invalidate statutes enacted by Congress if they conflict with the Constitution. The US Supreme Court can also prevent the president from taking action if that action violates separation of powers. The state courts can likewise nullify unconstitutional statutes passed by the state legislature and void other executive branch actions that are unconstitutional.
Table 2.1 The Most Prominent Checks and Balances between the Branches
Government Branch Duty or Authority Check and Balance Government Branch Checking and Balancing
Legislative Create statutes President can veto Executive
Executive Enforce statutes Congress can override presidential veto by 2/3 majority Legislative
Judicial Interpret statutes and Constitution President nominates federal judges and justices Executive
Executive Enforce statutes Senate can confirm or reject presidential nomination of federal judges and justices Legislative
Executive Enforce statutes Congress can impeach the president Legislative
Legislative Create statutes Courts can invalidate unconstitutional statutes Judicial
Executive Enforce statutes Courts can invalidate unconstitutional executive action Judicial
Judicial Interpret statutes and Constitution Statutes can supersede case law Legislative
Exercises
• The three branches of government are the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch.
• The head of the federal legislative branch of government is Congress. The head of the state legislative branch of government is the state legislature.
• The Senate represents every state equally because each state has two senators. The House of Representatives represents each citizen equally because states are assigned representatives based on their population.
• The head of the federal executive branch of government is the president. The head of each state executive branch of government is the governor.
• The head of the federal judicial branch of government is the US Supreme Court. The head of each state judicial branch of government is the highest-level state appellate court.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. A mayor enacts a policy that prohibits police officers in his city from enforcing a state law prohibiting the possession and use of marijuana. The mayor’s policy specifically states that within the city limits, marijuana is legal to possess and use. Which constitutional principle is the mayor violating? Which branch of government should check and balance the mayor’s behavior in this matter?
2. Read Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). In Youngstown, President Truman seized control of steel mills to avert a strike, using his authority as commander in chief of the armed forces. President Truman wanted to ensure steel production during the Korean War. Did the US Supreme Court uphold President Truman’s action? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://supreme.justia.com/us/343/579/.
3. Read Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). In Hamdi, the US Supreme Court reviewed the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s decision prohibiting the release of a US citizen who was held as an enemy combatant in Virginia during the Afghanistan War. The citizen’s detention was based on a federal statute that deprived him of the opportunity to consult with an attorney or have a trial. Did the US Supreme Court defer to the federal statute? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6173897153146757813&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/02%3A_The_Legal_System_in_the_United_States/2.02%3A_The_Branches_of_Government.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Compare federal and state courts.
2. Define jurisdiction.
3. Compare original and appellate jurisdiction.
4. Identify the federal courts and determine each court’s jurisdiction.
5. Identify the state courts and determine each court’s jurisdiction.
Every state has two court systems: the federal court system, which is the same in all fifty states, and the state court system, which varies slightly in each state. Federal courts are fewer in number than state courts. Because of the Tenth Amendment, discussed earlier in Section 2.1.2 "The Scope of State Law", most laws are state laws and therefore most legal disputes go through the state court system.
Federal courts are exclusive; they adjudicate only federal matters. This means that a case can go through the federal court system only if it is based on a federal statute or the federal Constitution. One exception is called diversity of citizenship.28 U.S.C. § 1332, accessed August 30, 2010, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/28/1332.html. If citizens from different states are involved in a civil lawsuit and the amount in controversy exceeds \$75,000, the lawsuit can take place in federal court. All federal criminal prosecutions take place in federal courts.
State courts are nonexclusive; they can adjudicate state or federal matters. Thus an individual who wants to sue civilly for a federal matter has the option of proceeding in state or federal court. In addition, someone involved in a lawsuit based on a federal statute or the federal Constitution can remove a lawsuit filed in state court to federal court.28 U.S.C. § 1441 et. seq., accessed August 30, 2010, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/28/1441.html. All state criminal prosecutions take place in state courts.
Jurisdiction
Determining which court is appropriate for a particular lawsuit depends on the concept of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction has two meanings. A court’s jurisdiction is the power or authority to hear the case in front of it. If a court does not have jurisdiction, it cannot hear the case. Jurisdiction can also be a geographic area over which the court’s authority extends.
There are two prominent types of court jurisdiction. Original jurisdiction means that the court has the power to hear a trial. Usually, only one opportunity exists for a trial, although some actions result in both a criminal and a civil trial, discussed previously in Chapter 1. During the trial, evidence is presented to a trier of fact, which can be either a judge or a jury. The trier of fact determines the facts of a dispute and decides which party prevails at trial by applying the law to those facts. Once the trial has concluded, the next step is an appeal. During an appeal, no evidence is presented; the appellate court simply reviews what took place at trial and determines whether or not any major errors occurred.
The power to hear an appeal is called appellate jurisdiction. Courts that have appellate jurisdiction review the trial record for error. The trial record includes a court reporter’s transcript, which is typed notes of the words spoken during the trial and pretrial hearings. In general, with exceptions, appellate courts cannot review a trial record until the trial has ended with a final judgment. Once the appellate court has made its review, it has the ability to take three actions. If it finds no compelling or prejudicial errors, it can affirm the judgment of the trial court, which means that the judgment remains the same. If it finds a significant error, it can reverse the judgment of the trial court, which means that the judgment becomes the opposite (the winner loses, the loser wins). It can also remand, which means send the case back to the trial court, with instructions. After remand, the trial court can take action that the appellate court cannot, such as adjust a sentence or order a new trial.
Some courts have only original jurisdiction, but most courts have a little of original and appellate jurisdiction. The US Supreme Court, for example, is primarily an appellate court with appellate jurisdiction. However, it also has original jurisdiction in some cases, as stated in the Constitution, Article III, § 2, clause 2: “In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.”
Example of Original and Appellate Jurisdiction
Paulina is prosecuted for the attempted murder of Ariana. Paulina is represented by public defender Pedro. At Paulina’s trial, in spite of Pedro’s objections, the judge rules that Paulina’s polygraph examination results are admissible, but prohibits the admission of certain witness testimony. Paulina is found guilty and appeals, based on the judge’s evidentiary rulings. While Pedro is writing the appellate brief, he discovers case precedent barring the admission of polygraph examination results. Pedro can include the case precedent in his appellate brief but not the prohibited witness testimony. The appellate court has the jurisdiction to hold that the objection was improperly overruled by the trial court, but is limited to reviewing the trial record for error. The appellate court lacks the jurisdiction to admit new evidence not included in the trial record.
The Federal Courts
For the purpose of this book, the focus is the federal trial court and the intermediate and highest level appellate courts because these courts are most frequently encountered in a criminal prosecution. Other federal specialty courts do exist but are not discussed, such as bankruptcy court, tax court, and the court of military appeals.
The federal trial court is called the United States District Court. Large states like California have more than one district court, while smaller states may have only one. District courts hear all the federal trials, including civil and criminal trials. As stated previously, a dispute that involves only state law, or a state criminal trial, cannot proceed in district court. The exception to this rule is the diversity of citizenship exception for civil lawsuits.
After a trial in district court, the loser gets one appeal of right. This means that the intermediate appellate federal court must hear an appeal of the district court trial if there are sufficient grounds. The intermediate appellate court in the federal system is the United States Court of Appeals. There is less federal law than state law, so only thirteen US Courts of Appeals exist for all fifty states. The US Courts of Appeals are spread out over thirteen judicial circuits and are also referred to as Circuit Courts.
Circuit Courts have appellate jurisdiction and can review the district court criminal and civil trials for error. The Circuit Court reviews only trials that are federal in nature, with the exception of civil lawsuits brought to the district court under diversity of citizenship. As noted in Chapter 1, the federal Constitution governs criminal trials, so only a guilty defendant can appeal. In general, with exceptions, appeal of a not-guilty verdict (also called an acquittal) violates a defendant’s double jeopardy protection.
After a Circuit Court appeal, the loser has one more opportunity to appeal to the highest-level federal appellate court, which is the United States Supreme Court. The US Supreme Court is the highest court in the country and is located in Washington, DC, the nation’s capital. The US Supreme Court has eight associate justices and one chief justice: all serve a lifetime appointment.
The US Supreme Court is a discretionary court, meaning it does not have to hear appeals. Unlike the Circuit Courts, the US Supreme Court can pick and choose which appeals it wants to review. The method of applying for review with the US Supreme Court is called filing a petition for a writ of certiorari.
Any case from a Circuit Court, or a case with a federal matter at issue from a state’s highest-level appellate court, can petition for a writ of certiorari. If the writ is granted, the US Supreme Court reviews the appeal. If the writ is denied, which it is the majority of the time, the ruling of the Circuit Court or state high court is the final ruling. For this reason, the US Supreme Court reverses many cases that are accepted for review. If the US Supreme Court wants to “affirm” the intermediate appellate court ruling, all it has to do is deny the petition and let the lower court ruling stand.
The State Courts
For the purpose of this book, a representative state court system is reviewed. Slight variations in this system may occur from state to state.
Most states offer their citizens a “people’s court,” typically called small claims court. Small claims court is a civil court designed to provide state citizens with a low-cost option to resolve disputes where the amount in controversy is minimal. A traditional small claims court only has the jurisdiction to award money damages. This means that it cannot adjudicate criminal matters or family court matters such as granting a petition for divorce. Small claims courts also limit the amount of money damages available, typically less than \$10,000.
Small claims court has special rules that make it amenable to the average individual. Attorneys cannot represent clients in small claims court, although they certainly can represent themselves just like any other individual. Small claims court proceedings are generally informal, and usually no court reporter types what is said. Therefore, no court record exits for appeal. Small claims court appeals are the exception to the general rule and are usually new trials where evidence is accepted.
States generally have a state trial court that can also be the appellate court for small claims court appeals. This trial court is usually called superior court, circuit court, or county court. State trial courts are generally all-purpose and hear civil litigation matters, state criminal trials, and nonlitigation cases including family law, wills and probate, foreclosures, and juvenile adjudications. States can, however, create “specialty courts” to hear special matters and free up the trial courts for basic criminal prosecutions and civil litigation trials. Some states divide their trial courts into lower and higher levels. The lower-level trial court adjudicates infractions and misdemeanors, along with civil lawsuits with a smaller amount in controversy. The higher-level trial court adjudicates felonies and civil lawsuits with a higher amount in controversy.
The intermediate appellate court for the state court system is usually called the state court of appeals, although some smaller or low-population states may have only one appellate court called the state supreme court. The state courts of appeal provide appeals of right, meaning they must hear an appeal coming from the state’s trial court if adequate grounds are present. Appeals can be of any case adjudicated in the state trial court. In state criminal prosecutions, as stated earlier in the discussion of federal appeals, only a guilty defendant can appeal without violating the protection against double jeopardy. At the appellate level, the state court of appeal simply reviews the trial court record for error and does not have the jurisdiction to hear new trials or accept evidence.
The highest appellate court for the state court system is usually called the state supreme court. In states that have both intermediate and high-level appellate courts, the state supreme court is a discretionary court that gets to select the appeals it hears, very similar to the US Supreme Court. The state supreme court generally grants a petition for writ of certiorari, or a petition for review, if it decides to hear a civil or criminal case coming out of the state court of appeal. If review is denied, the state court of appeal ruling is the final ruling on the case. If review is granted and the state supreme court rules on the case, the loser has one more chance to appeal, if there is a federal matter, to the US Supreme Court.
Exercises
• Federal courts are exclusive and hear only federal matters or cases involving diversity of citizenship. State courts are nonexclusive and can hear state and federal matters. All federal criminal prosecutions take place in federal court, and all state criminal prosecutions take place in state court.
• Jurisdiction is either the court’s power to hear a matter or a geographic area over which a court has authority.
• Original jurisdiction is a court’s power to hear a trial and accept evidence. Appellate jurisdiction is a court’s power to hear an appeal and review the trial for error.
• Three federal courts adjudicate criminal matters: the trial court, which is called the United States District Court; the intermediate court of appeal, which is called the United States Court of Appeals or Circuit Court; and the high court of appeal, which is called the United States Supreme Court. The district court has original jurisdiction; the Circuit Court and US Supreme Court have primarily appellate jurisdiction.
• State courts are usually limited to four, and only three adjudicate criminal matters. Small claims court is a “people’s court” and hears only civil matters with a low threshold of damages. The state trial court, often called superior, circuit, or county court, is the trial court for the state system. Some states have an intermediate court of appeal, which is generally called the state court of appeals. Some states have a high court of appeal, which is generally called the state supreme court. The trial court has original jurisdiction; the state court of appeal and state supreme court primarily have appellate jurisdiction.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Jenna sues Max for \$25,000, based on a car accident that occurs in Indiana. Jenna loses at trial and appeals to the highest state appellate court in Indiana, where she loses again. Can Jenna appeal her case to the US Supreme Court? Why or why not?
2. Read United States v. P.H.E., Inc., 965 F.2d 848 (1992). In P.H.E., Inc., the defendant never went to trial but was indicted. The defendant challenged the indictment, which was upheld by the trial court. The government claimed that the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit could not hear an appeal of the trial court’s decision, because there was never a “final judgment.” Did the Circuit Court agree? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16482877108359401771&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
3. Read Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010). How did the US Supreme Court determine citizenship of a corporation for the purpose of diversity jurisdiction? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11481058059843290042&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/02%3A_The_Legal_System_in_the_United_States/2.03%3A_The_Court_System.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Define the burden of proof.
2. Distinguish between the burden of production and the burden of persuasion.
3. Compare the civil and criminal burden of proof.
4. Compare inference and presumption.
5. Compare circumstantial and direct evidence.
The key to the success of a civil or criminal trial is meeting the burden of proof. A failure to meet the burden of proof is also a common ground for appeal. In this section, you learn the burden of proof for the plaintiff, prosecution, and defendant. You also are introduced to different classifications of evidence and evidentiary rules that can change the outcome of the trial.
Definition of the Burden of Proof
The burden of proof is a party’s responsibility to prove a disputed charge, allegation, or defense.Yourdictionary.com, “Definition of Burden of Proof,” accessed September 26, 2010, http://www.yourdictionary.com/burden-of-proof. The burden of proof has two components: the burden of production and the burden of persuasion. The burden of production is the obligation to present evidence to the judge or jury. The burden of persuasion is the duty to convince the judge or jury to a certain standard, such as beyond a reasonable doubt, which is defined shortly. This standard is simply a measuring point and is determined by examining the quantity and quality of the evidence presented. “Meeting the burden of proof” means that a party has introduced enough compelling evidence to reach the standard defined in the burden of persuasion.
The plaintiff or prosecutor generally has the burden of proving the case, including every element of it. The defendant often has the burden of proving any defense. The trier of fact determines whether a party met the burden of proof at trial. The trier of fact would be a judge in a nonjury or bench trial. In a criminal case, the trier of fact is almost always a jury because of the right to a jury trial in the Sixth Amendment. Jurors are not legal experts, so the judge explains the burden of proof in jury instructions, which are a common source of appeal.
Burden of Proof in a Civil Case
Burdens of proof vary, depending on the type of case being tried. The plaintiff’s burden of proof in a civil case is called preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence requires the plaintiff to introduce slightly more or slightly better evidence than the defense. This can be as low as 51 percent plaintiff to 49 percent defendant. When preponderance of evidence is the burden of proof, the judge or jury must be convinced that it is “more likely than not” that the defendant is liable for the plaintiff’s injuries. Preponderance of evidence is a fairly low standard, but the plaintiff must still produce more and better evidence than the defense. If the plaintiff offers evidence of questionable quality, the judge or jury can find that the burden of proof is not met and the plaintiff loses the case.
The defendant’s burden of proof when proving a defense in a civil case is also preponderance of evidence. For example, in the O. J. Simpson civil case discussed in Chapter 1, O. J. Simpson failed to meet the burden of proving the defense of alibi. The defendant does not always have to prove a defense in a civil case. If the plaintiff does not meet the burden of proof, the defendant is victorious without having to present any evidence at all.
Burden of Proof in a Criminal Prosecution
The prosecution’s burden of proof in a criminal case is the most challenging burden of proof in law; it is beyond a reasonable doubt. Judges have struggled with a definition for this burden of proof. As Chief Justice Shaw stated nearly a century ago,
[w]hat is reasonable doubt? It is a term often used, probably pretty well understood, but not easily defined. It is not mere possible doubt; because every thing relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case, which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 320 (1850), accessed September 26, 2010, http://masscases.com/cases/sjc/59/59mass295.html.
In general, the prosecution’s evidence must overcome the defendant’s presumption of innocence, which the Constitution guarantees as due process of law.In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), accessed September 26, 2010, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0397_0358_ZO.html. This fulfills the policy of criminal prosecutions, which is to punish the guilty, not the innocent. If even a slight chance exists that the defendant is innocent, the case most likely lacks convincing and credible evidence, and the trier of fact should acquit the defendant.
States vary as to their requirements for the defendant’s burden of proof when asserting a defense in a criminal prosecution.Findlaw.com, “The Insanity Defense among the States,” findlaw.com website, accessed October 1, 2010, http://criminal.findlaw.com/crimes/more-criminal-topics/insanity-defense/the-insanity-defense-among-the-states.html. Different defenses also have different burdens of proof, as is discussed in detail in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Some states require the defendant to meet the burden of production, but require the prosecution to thereafter meet the burden of persuasion, disproving the defense to a preponderance of evidence or, in some states, beyond a reasonable doubt. Other states require the defendant to meet the burden of production and the burden of persuasion. In these states, the defendant’s standard is typically preponderance of evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant does not always have to prove a defense in a criminal prosecution. If the prosecution does not meet the burden of proof, the defendant is acquitted without having to present any evidence at all.
Example of a Failure to Meet the Burden of Proof
Ann is on trial for first-degree murder. The only key piece of evidence in Ann’s trial is the murder weapon, which was discovered in Ann’s dresser drawer during a law enforcement search. Before Ann’s trial, the defense makes a motion to suppress the murder weapon evidence because the search warrant in Ann’s case was signed by a judge who was inebriated and mentally incompetent. The defense is successful with this motion, and the judge rules that the murder weapon is inadmissible at trial. The prosecution decides to proceed anyway. If there is no other convincing and credible evidence of Ann’s guilt, Ann does not need to put on a defense in this case. The prosecution will fail to meet the burden of proof and Ann will be acquitted.
Inference and Presumption
Parties can use two tools to help meet the burden of proof: inference and presumption. Jury instructions can include inferences and presumptions and are often instrumental in the successful outcome of a case.
An inference is a conclusion that the judge or jury may make under the circumstances. An inference is never mandatory but is a choice. For example, if the prosecution proves that the defendant punched the victim in the face after screaming, “I hate you!” the judge or jury can infer that the punch was thrown intentionally.
A presumption is a conclusion that the judge or jury must make under the circumstances. As stated previously, all criminal defendants are presumed innocent. Thus the judge or jury must begin any criminal trial concluding that the defendant is not guilty.
Presumptions can be rebuttable or irrebuttable. A party can disprove a rebuttable presumption. The prosecution can rebut the presumption of innocence with evidence proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. An irrebuttable presumption is irrefutable and cannot be disproved. In some jurisdictions, it is an irrebuttable presumption that children under the age of seven are incapable of forming criminal intent. Thus in these jurisdictions children under the age of seven cannot be criminally prosecuted (although they may be subject to a juvenile adjudication proceeding).
Circumstantial and Direct Evidence
Two primary classifications are used for evidence: circumstantial evidence or direct evidence.
Circumstantial evidence indirectly proves a fact. Fingerprint evidence is usually circumstantial. A defendant’s fingerprint at the scene of the crime directly proves that the defendant placed a finger at that location. It indirectly proves that because the defendant was present at the scene and placed a finger there, the defendant committed the crime. Common examples of circumstantial evidence are fingerprint evidence, DNA evidence, and blood evidence. Criminal cases relying on circumstantial evidence are more difficult for the prosecution because circumstantial evidence leaves room for doubt in a judge’s or juror’s mind. However, circumstantial evidence such as DNA evidence can be very reliable and compelling, so the prosecution can and often does meet the burden of proof using only circumstantial evidence.
Direct evidence directly proves a fact. For example, eyewitness testimony is often direct evidence. An eyewitness testifying that he or she saw the defendant commit the crime directly proves that the defendant committed the crime. Common examples of direct evidence are eyewitness testimony, a defendant’s confession, or a video or photograph of the defendant committing the crime. Criminal cases relying on direct evidence are easier to prove because there is less potential for reasonable doubt. However, direct evidence can be unreliable and is not necessarily preferable to circumstantial evidence. If an eyewitness is impeached, which means he or she loses credibility, the witness’s testimony lacks the evidentiary value of reliable circumstantial evidence such as DNA evidence.
Table 2.2 Comparison of Circumstantial and Direct Evidence in a Burglary Case
Evidence Circumstantial Direct
Fiber from the defendant’s coat found in a residence that has been burglarized Yes No—directly proves presence at the scene, not that the defendant committed burglary
GPS evidence indicating the defendant drove to the burglarized residence Yes No—same explanation as fiber evidence
Testimony from an eyewitness that she saw the defendant go into the backyard of the burglarized residence Yes No—could prove trespassing because it directly proves presence at the scene, but it does not directly prove burglary
Surveillance camera footage of the defendant purchasing burglar tools Yes No—does not directly prove they were used on the residence
Cell phone photograph of the defendant burglarizing the residence No Yes—directly proves that the defendant committed the crime
Witness testimony that the defendant confessed to burglarizing the residence No Yes—directly proves that the defendant committed the crime
Pawn shop receipt found in the defendant’s pocket for items stolen from the residence Yes No—directly proves that the items were pawned, not stolen
Casey Anthony Trial Video
Casey Anthony Verdict: Found Not Guilty of Murder
In this video, the jury foreperson in the Casey Anthony trial reads the trial verdict. Casey Anthony was acquitted of murder, manslaughter, and child abuse of her daughter, Caylee Anthony. The evidence in the case was all circumstantial, and the coroner did not determine the cause of the victim’s death.David Lohr, “Casey Anthony Verdict: NOT GUILTY of First-Degree Murder,” Huffingtonpost.com website, accessed August 24, 2011, www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/05/casey-anthony-trial-verdict_n_890173.html#s303265&title=Casey_Anthony_Verdict.
(click to see video)
Exercises
• The burden of proof is a party’s obligation to prove a charge, allegation, or defense.
• The burden of production is the duty to present evidence to the trier of fact. The burden of persuasion is the duty to convince the trier of fact to a certain standard, such as preponderance of evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt.
• The civil burden of proof is preponderance of evidence, for both the plaintiff and the defendant. The criminal burden of proof for the prosecution is beyond a reasonable doubt.
• The criminal burden of proof for the defense is generally preponderance of evidence. States vary on whether they require the criminal defendant to meet both the burden of production and persuasion or just the burden of production. Different defenses also require different burdens of proof.
• In states that require the defendant to meet only the burden of production, the prosecution must disprove the defense to a preponderance of evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt, depending on the state and on the defense.
• An inference is a conclusion the trier of fact may make, if it chooses to. A presumption is a conclusion the trier of fact must make. A rebuttable presumption can be disproved; an irrebuttable presumption cannot.
• Circumstantial evidence indirectly proves a fact. A fingerprint at the scene of the crime, for example, indirectly proves that because the defendant was present at the scene, the defendant committed the crime. Direct evidence directly proves a fact. If the defendant confesses to a crime, for example, this is direct evidence that the defendant committed the crime.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Bria is asserting the insanity defense in her criminal prosecution for murder. In Bria’s state, defendants have the burden of production and persuasion to a preponderance of evidence when proving the insanity defense. Bria offers her own testimony that she is insane and incapable of forming criminal intent. Will Bria be successful with her defense? Why or why not?
2. Read Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). In Patterson, the defendant was on trial for murder. New York law reduced murder to manslaughter if the defendant proved extreme emotional disturbance to a preponderance of evidence. Did the US Supreme Court hold that it is constitutional to put this burden on the defense, rather than forcing the prosecution to disprove extreme emotional disturbance beyond a reasonable doubt? Which part of the Constitution did the Court analyze to justify its holding? The case is available at this link: http://supreme.justia.com/us/432/197/case.html.
3. Read Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993). In Sullivan, the jury was given a constitutionally deficient jury instruction on beyond a reasonable doubt. Did the US Supreme Court hold that this was a prejudicial error requiring reversal of the defendant’s conviction for murder? Which part of the Constitution did the Court rely on in its holding? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1069192289025184531&hl=en&as_sdt=2002&as_vis=1. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/02%3A_The_Legal_System_in_the_United_States/2.04%3A_The_Burden_of_Proof.txt |
Summary
The United States’ system of government is called federalism and consists of one federal government regulating issues of a national concern and separate state governments regulating local issues. The bulk of criminal lawmaking resides with the states because of the police power granted to the states in the Tenth Amendment. Ninety percent of all criminal laws are state laws. Many federal crimes are also state crimes, and a defendant can be prosecuted federally and by a state without triggering double jeopardy protection. If a federal statute exists on an issue, a state statute cannot conflict with it because of the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.
The Constitution sets forth three branches of government. The legislative branch consists of Congress and has the authority to create laws. The executive branch is headed by the president of the United States and has the authority to enforce the laws created by the legislative branch. The judicial branch is headed by the US Supreme Court and has the authority to interpret laws and the Constitution. Each branch checks and balances each other, and the judicial branch ensures that no branch oversteps its authority and violates separation of powers. State governments mimic the federal branches of government at the state level and set forth authorities in each state’s constitution.
The federal court system exclusively adjudicates federal matters and consists primarily of the US District Court, the US Court of Appeals or Circuit Court, and the US Supreme Court. Each state has its own court system consisting primarily of a trial court, intermediate court of appeal, and possibly a high court of appeal. Trial courts have original jurisdiction and can accept evidence. Appellate courts have appellate jurisdiction and are limited to reviewing the trial courts’ decisions for error.
Each party in a civil or criminal trial must meet a burden of proof, which consists of a burden of producing evidence and a burden of persuading the trier of fact. The burden of proof for a civil plaintiff or defendant is preponderance of evidence, which means that the trier of fact must be convinced it is more likely than not that a party should prevail. The burden of proof for the prosecution in a criminal case is beyond a reasonable doubt, which is a stricter standard than preponderance of evidence and consists of enough compelling evidence to rebut the defendant’s presumption of innocence. The burden of proof for a criminal defense varies but is often preponderance of evidence. Inferences, which are conclusions the trier of fact may make, and presumptions, which are conclusions the trier of fact must make, can help meet the burden of proof. The evidence presented to meet the burden of proof can be circumstantial, which indirectly proves a fact, or direct, which directly proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence leaves room for reasonable doubt, but it can be reliable and the basis of a successful criminal prosecution.
YOU BE THE JUROR
Read the prompt, review the case, and then decide whether enough evidence exists to meet the burden of proof. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. The defendant was convicted of possession of a handgun with an altered serial number. The defendant contended that he did not know the serial number had been altered. The prosecution offered evidence that the gun was “shiny” in the location of the serial number. The prosecution also proved that the defendant was in possession of the handgun for a week. Is this sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the serial number had been altered? Read Robles v. State, 758 N.E.2d 581 (2001). The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7369971752262973607&q= Indiana+2001+%22Robles+v.+State%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5.
2. The defendant was convicted of attempted first-degree murder of a peace officer when he shot a sheriff. The defendant contended that he did not know the victim was a peace officer. The sheriff was in a vehicle with a whip antenna, was armed, and was well known as a sheriff in Angola Prison, where the defendant was incarcerated previous to the shooting incident. However, the sheriff was in an unmarked car with the red light covered, out of uniform, and his badge was obscured. Is this sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the victim was a peace officer? Read Donahue v. Burl Cain, 231 F.3d 1000 (2000). The case is available at this link: http://openjurist.org/231/f3d/1000/larry-donahue-v-burl-cain.
3. The defendant was convicted of third-degree robbery, which requires a threat of immediate use of physical force. The defendant entered a McDonald’s restaurant twenty minutes before closing dressed in sunglasses, a leather jacket, and a bandana that covered his hair. The defendant beckoned the clerk and thereafter demanded that she put money from different cash register drawers into his bag. The defendant did not appear armed, nor did he raise his voice or verbally threaten the clerk. Is this sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant threatened immediate use of physical force? Read State v. Hall, 966 P.2d 208 (1998). The case is available at this link: www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/S44712.htm.
4. The defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell. The defendant possessed seven individual packages of white powdery substance, but only one package was tested (and it tested positive for cocaine). Is this sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed cocaine with intent to sell? Read Richards v. Florida, No. 4008-4216 (2010). The case is available at this link: http://www.4dca.org/opinions/June%202010/06-09-10/4D08-4216.op.w-dissent.pdf.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 2.1
1. Congress gets the authority to criminalize conduct involving the Internet from the commerce clause because the Internet includes economic activity and crosses state lines. Both the federal and state government can prosecute the defendant under federal and state criminal statutes for one act without violating double jeopardy.
2. The US Supreme Court relied on the commerce clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the Court ruled that gender-motivated crimes of violence are not economic activity and do not have a national effect, so the commerce clause does not support federal legislation in this area. Furthermore, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause is targeted at state government action, not individual defendants, so it is likewise inapplicable.
3. The US Supreme Court held that the Pennsylvania Sedition Act is superseded by the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385. Specifically, the Court referenced the supremacy of federal law on the same topic, thereby preempting the state statute.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 2.2
1. The mayor is violating separation of powers because members of the executive branch cannot invalidate or supersede laws passed by the legislative branch; only the judicial branch is entitled to do this via judicial review. The judicial branch should check and balance this action, if someone attacks the mayor’s policy in court.
2. The US Supreme Court did not uphold President Truman’s action and ruled that he was violating separation of powers. A statute on point already disallowed the president’s action (the Taft-Hartley Act). The president cannot supersede Congress’s authority by ignoring a constitutional statute that Congress enacted, even during wartime.
3. The US Supreme Court reversed the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The Court held that the judicial branch is not required to allow unconstitutional federal statutes to remain in effect during wartime because of separation of powers. The Court determined that the detainee’s constitutional right to due process allowed him access to an attorney and a court trial, in spite of the federal statute.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 2.3
1. Jenna cannot appeal to the US Supreme Court because she does not appear to have a federal issue. Parties can appeal from a state’s highest level appellate court directly into the US Supreme Court, but the US Supreme Court is a federal court and only has the jurisdiction to hear federal matters. Jenna cannot meet the criteria of diversity jurisdiction or diversity of citizenship because even if she and Max are citizens of different states, the amount in controversy is too low (it needs to be at least \$75,000).
2. The US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that there was jurisdiction, in spite of the absence of a trial. The court also held that the extraordinary circumstances compelled a reversal of the district court order denying a motion to dismiss the defendants’ indictment. The court essentially ruled that the defendants had a right not to be tried.
3. The US Supreme Court held that a corporation is a citizen of its state of incorporation and the state in which its principal place of business is located. The principal place of business is the “nerve center state,” which is the state that houses the corporate headquarters.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 2.4
1. Bria will not be successful with the insanity defense because she cannot meet the burden of proof, which is preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence is a fairly low standard, but Bria must still convince the trier of fact that it is more likely than not she is insane. She cannot do this with her testimony, standing alone. Clearly, Bria has an important self-interest in eliminating her criminal responsibility in this case. Thus her subjective testimony regarding her own mental state is not compelling enough to meet the 51 percent to 49 percent standard.
2. The US Supreme Court held that it is constitutional to put the burden of proving extreme emotional disturbance on the defendant, reducing murder to manslaughter. The Court held that this did not relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving every element of murder beyond a reasonable doubt and thus was in compliance with the due process clause of the Constitution.
3. The US Supreme Court held that a constitutionally deficient jury instruction on the definition of beyond a reasonable doubt was a prejudicial error and required a reversal of the defendant’s conviction for murder. The Court determined that the improper jury instruction deprived the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
Answer to Law and Ethics Question
1. The federal judge Susan Bolton based her decision on federal preemption and an impermissible state burden on legal resident aliens. The judge reasoned that federal authority to make law in the area of immigration has been confirmed by the US Supreme Court, based on enumerated and implied powers, and the designated sections of the Arizona law conflicted with this authority and are thus preempted.Order, U.S. v. Arizona, No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB, U.S. District Court, accessed October 1, 2010, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20100729_ARIZONA_DOC.pdf. The judge further held that enforcement of the enjoined sections of the Arizona law would divert federal resourcesOrder, U.S. v. Arizona, No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB, U.S. District Court, accessed October 1, 2010, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20100729_ARIZONA_DOC.pdf. and also impermissibly burden legal resident aliens by restricting their liberty while their status is checked.Order, U.S. v. Arizona, No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB, U.S. District Court, accessed October 1, 2010, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20100729_ARIZONA_DOC.pdf.
Answers to You Be the Juror
1. The Indiana Court of Appeals held that there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the serial numbers on the gun had been altered. The appearance of the gun and the defendant’s week-long possession were enough for a reasonable juror to infer knowledge.
2. The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the victim was a peace officer. The court held that a reasonable juror could not infer knowledge from the whip antennae and the victim’s job at Angola prison.
3. The Supreme Court of Oregon held that there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant threatened immediate use of physical force. The court held that the defendant’s appearance, combined with the lateness of the hour and the demands for money, could be an implicit threat under the circumstances.
4. The District Court of Appeal of Florida held that there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed cocaine with the intent to sell. The court pointed out that the criminal statute at issue did not require a specified quantity of cocaine. The court also reasoned that a jury could infer from the packaging and expert testimony that the other packages also contained cocaine. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/02%3A_The_Legal_System_in_the_United_States/2.05%3A_End-of-Chapter_Material.txt |
Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history and experience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority.
- Duncan v. Louisiana, cited in Section 3.2
Source: Image courtesy of Tara Storm.
3.01: Applicability of the Constitution
Learning Objectives
1. Distinguish between the two types of constitutional protections.
2. Compare unconstitutional on its face with unconstitutional as applied.
3. Distinguish among different standards of judicial review.
4. Compare bill of attainder with ex post facto laws.
5. Ascertain the three types of ex post facto laws.
In addition to statutory and common-law defenses, a criminal defendant has extensive protections that are set forth in the United States Constitution. As stated earlier in this book, the federal Constitution is applicable in all criminal cases because the government is prosecuting. State constitutions typically mirror the federal Constitution because it sets the minimum standard of protection that is guaranteed to all citizens. States can and often do provide more constitutional protections to criminal defendants than the federal Constitution, as long as those state protections do not violate notions of federal supremacy. In this chapter, the federal Constitution is analyzed with reference to state constitutional protections when relevant.
Constitutional Protections
Generally, two types of constitutional protections exist. First, a defendant can challenge the constitutionality of a criminal statute or ordinance (from this point forward, the term statute includes ordinances unless otherwise noted). Recall from Chapter 1 that these codified laws cannot conflict with or attempt to supersede the Constitution. An attack on the constitutionality of a statute can be a claim that the statute is unconstitutional on its face, is unconstitutional as applied, or both. A statute is unconstitutional on its face when its wording is unconstitutional. A statute is unconstitutional as applied when its enforcement is unconstitutional. The difference between the two is significant. If a statute is unconstitutional on its face, it is invalid under any circumstances. If the statute is unconstitutional as applied, it is only unconstitutional under certain circumstances.
A second type of constitutional protection is procedural. The defendant can protest an unconstitutional procedure that occurs during prosecution. Procedure during prosecution includes, but is not limited to, arrest, interrogation, search, filing of charges, trial, and appeal. The defendant can make a motion to dismiss the charges, suppress evidence, or declare a mistrial. The defendant can also appeal and seek to reverse a conviction, among other remedies.
This book concentrates on criminal law rather than criminal procedure, so the bulk of this chapter is devoted to unconstitutional criminal statutes, rather than unconstitutional procedures. The exception is the right to a jury trial, which is discussed shortly.
Example of Constitutional Protections
Bill is on trial for obstructing a public sidewalk. Bill was arrested for standing in front of a restaurant’s entrance with a sign stating “will eat any and all leftovers.” The city ordinance Bill violated makes it a misdemeanor to “stand or sit on a public sidewalk with a sign.” To save money, the judge presiding over Bill’s trial declares that Bill will have a bench trial, rather than a jury trial. In this example, Bill can constitutionally attack the city ordinance for violating his freedom of speech because it prohibits holding a sign. The city ordinance appears unconstitutional on its face and as applied to Bill. Bill can also constitutionally attack his bench trial because he has the right to a jury trial. He could do this by making a motion to declare a mistrial, by petitioning an appellate court to halt the trial, or by appeal after a judgment of conviction.
Judicial Review
As stated previously in this book, courts review statutes to ensure that they conform to the Constitution pursuant to their power of judicial review. Courts generally use different standards of review when constitutional protections are at stake. Typically, a court balances the government’s interest in regulating certain conduct against an individual’s interest in a constitutionally protected right. This balancing of interests varies depending on the right at stake. If a constitutional right is fundamental, the court uses strict scrutiny to analyze the statute at issue. A statute that violates or inhibits fundamental constitutional protections is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only if it uses the least restrictive means possible. The government also must prove the statute is supported by a compelling government interest. When the challenge is based on discrimination under the equal protection clause, the court may use a lower standard, called the rational basis test. The rational basis test allows a statute to discriminate if the statute is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Most constitutional rights are considered fundamental and trigger the strict scrutiny of the courts.
Example of Strict Scrutiny
Review the example regarding Bill, who was arrested essentially for standing and holding a sign. The US Supreme Court has held that freedom of speech is a fundamental right. Thus a court reviewing the ordinance in Bill’s case will hold the ordinance presumptively invalid, unless the government can demonstrate a compelling interest in enacting it, and that it used the least restrictive means possible. The ordinance is broadly written to include all signs, and preventing individuals from holding signs does not serve a compelling government interest, so this difficult standard will probably result in the court holding the ordinance unconstitutional.
The Legislative Branch’s Prohibited Powers
The legislative branch cannot punish defendants without a trial or enact retroactive criminal statutes pursuant to the Constitution’s prohibition against bill of attainder and ex post facto laws. Article 1, § 9, clause 3 states, in pertinent part, “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.” The prohibition on bill of attainder and ex post facto laws is extended to the states in Article 1, § 10, clause 1: “No State shall…pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law.” Many state constitutions also prohibit ex post facto legislative action, mirroring the federal Constitution.Indiana Constitution, art. I, § 24, accessed October 4, 2010, www.law.indiana.edu/uslawdocs/inconst/art-1.html.
Bill of Attainder
Bill of attainder is when the legislative branch of government punishes the defendant without a trial. The drafters of the Constitution wanted to ensure that criminal defendants have a full and fair adjudication of their rights before the government imposes punishment. Bill of attainder is usually accomplished by a statute that targets an individual or group of individuals for some type of government sanction. Bill of attainder protection enforces separation of powers by eliminating the ability of the legislature to impose criminal punishment without a trial conducted by the judicial branch.U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965), accessed October 2, 2010, http://supreme.justia.com/us/381/437/case.html.
Example of Bill of Attainder
Brianne is a member of the Communist party. Brianne applies for a job as a teacher at her local elementary school and is refused, based on this statute: “Members of any subversive group, including the Communist party, cannot hold public office nor teach for a public institution.” Brianne could attack this statute as a bill of attainder. Its provisions, targeting members of the Communist party or any other subversive group, punish by eliminating career opportunities. The members targeted are punished without a trial or any adjudication of their rights. Thus this statute allows the legislature to impose a sanction without a trial in violation of the Constitution’s prohibited powers.
Ex Post Facto
An ex post facto law punishes an individual retroactively, and severely encroaches on notions of fairness. There are three types of ex post facto laws. First, a law is ex post facto if it punishes behavior that occurred before the law was in effect. Second, ex post facto laws may increase the punishment for the offense after the crime occurred. Third, a law can be ex post facto if it increases the possibility of conviction after the crime occurred.
Example of an Ex Post Facto Law Punishing Behavior Retroactively
A state murder statute defines murder as the killing of a human being, born alive. The state legislature amends this statute to include the killing of a fetus, with the exception of abortion. The amendment extends the application of the statute to all criminal fetus killings that occurred before the statute was changed. This language punishes defendants for behavior that was legal when committed. If the state attempts to include this language, a court can strike the statute for violating the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
Example of an Ex Post Facto Law Increasing Punishment Retroactively
In the preceding example about amending the murder statute, the state also amends the statute to increase the penalty for murder to the death penalty. Before the amendment, the penalty for murder was life in prison without the possibility of parole. The state cannot give the death penalty to defendants who committed murder before the statute was amended. This is considered ex post facto because it increases the punishment for the offense after the crime is committed.
Example of an Ex Post Facto Law Increasing the Possibility of Conviction Retroactively
In the preceding example, the state amends the murder statute to remove the statute of limitations, which is the time limit on prosecution. Before the amendment, the statute of limitations was fifty years. The state cannot prosecute defendants who committed murder more than fifty years ago, pursuant to the amendment. This is considered ex post facto because it increases the chance of conviction after the crime is committed.
Changes That Benefit a Defendant Retroactively
Changes that benefit a criminal defendant are not considered ex post facto and may be applied retroactively. In the preceding example, if the state amended the murder statute to shorten the statute of limitations, this change actually benefits defendants by making it more difficult to convict them. Thus this amendment would be constitutional.
Ex Post Facto Applies Only to Criminal Laws
Ex post facto protection applies only to criminal laws. Laws that raise fees or taxes after payment are civil rather than criminal in nature. Thus these retroactive increases do not exceed governmental authority and are constitutional.
Exercises
• The Constitution protects individuals from certain statutes and certain governmental procedures.
• A statute is unconstitutional on its face when its wording is unconstitutional. A statute is unconstitutional as applied when its enforcement is unconstitutional.
• A court reviews a statute for constitutionality using strict scrutiny if the statute inhibits a fundamental constitutional right. Strict scrutiny means that the statute is presumptively invalid, and the government must prove it is supported by a compelling government interest and uses the least restrictive means. Occasionally, a court reviews a statute for constitutionality under the equal protection clause using the rational basis test, which means that the statute is constitutional if rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
• A bill of attainder is when the legislative branch punishes a defendant without a trial. Ex post facto laws punish criminal defendants retroactively.
• Ex post facto laws punish defendants for acts that were not criminal when committed, increase the punishment for a crime retroactively, or increase the chance of criminal conviction retroactively.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. A public university raises tuition in the middle of the semester after students have already paid and sends all registered students a bill for “fees past due.” Does this violate the prohibition on ex post facto laws? Why or why not?
2. Read Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003). Why did the US Supreme Court hold that Alaska’s Megan’s Law is constitutional? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14879258853492825339&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
3. Read Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003). Why did the US Supreme Court hold that California’s Sex Offender statute of limitations was unconstitutional? The case is available at this link: http://supreme.justia.com/us/539/607. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/03%3A_Constitutional_Protections/3.00%3A_Prelude_to_Constitutional_Protections.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Define the Bill of Rights.
2. Define the principle of selective incorporation.
3. Distinguish between substantive and procedural due process.
4. Compare void for vagueness and overbreadth.
5. Ascertain the purpose of the equal protection clause as it applies to criminal laws.
Although the legislative branch’s prohibited powers are in Article I of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights contains most of the constitutional protections afforded to criminal defendants. The Bill of Rights is the first ten amendments to the Constitution. In addition, the Fourteenth Amendment, which was added to the Constitution after the Civil War, has a plethora of protections for criminal defendants in the due process and equal protection clauses.
The Bill of Rights was originally written to apply to the federal government. However, US Supreme Court precedent has held that any constitutional amendment that is implicit to due process’s concept of ordered liberty must be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections and applied to the states.Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), accessed October 20, 2010, http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=391&invol=145. This doctrine is called selective incorporation, and it includes virtually all the constitutional protections in the Bill of Rights. Thus although the original focus of the Bill of Rights may have been limiting the federal government, modern interpretations of the Constitution ensure that its protections also extend to all levels of state and local government.
The Meaning of Due Process of Law
The due process clause states, “No person shall…be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The due process clause in the Fifth Amendment applies to federal crimes and federal criminal prosecutions. The federal due process clause is mirrored in the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees due process of law in state criminal prosecutions. Most states have a similar provision in their constitutions.Missouri Constitution, art. I, § 10, accessed October 10, 2010, www.sos.mo.gov/pubs/missouri_constitution.pdf.
Substantive due process protects individuals from an unreasonable loss of substantive rights, such as the right to speak freely and the right to privacy. Procedural due process protects individuals from being criminally punished without notice and an opportunity to be heard. Both substantive and procedural due processes ensure that individuals are not denied their life (capital punishment), liberty (incarceration), or property (forfeiture) arbitrarily.
Void for Vagueness
Void for vagueness challenges the wording of a statute under the due process clause. A statute is void for vagueness if it uses words that are indefinite or ambiguous. Statutes that are not precisely drafted do not provide notice to the public of exactly what kind of behavior is criminal. In addition, and more important, they give too much discretion to law enforcement and are unevenly enforced.U.S. v. White, 882 F.2d 250 (1989), accessed October 6, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12667022335593752485&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. With a void for vagueness challenge, the statute must be so unclear that “men of common intelligence must guess at its meaning,”Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926), accessed October 3, 2010, http://supreme.justia.com/us/269/385/case.html. which is an objective standard.
Example of a Statute That Is Void for Vagueness
A state legislature enacts a statute that criminalizes “inappropriate attire on public beaches.” Larry, a law enforcement officer, arrests Kathy for wearing a two-piece bathing suit at the beach because in his belief, women should wear one-piece bathing suits. Two days later, Burt, another law enforcement officer, arrests Sarah for wearing a one-piece bathing suit at the beach because in his belief, women should not be seen in public in bathing suits. Kathy and Sarah can attack the statute on its face and as applied as void for vagueness. The term “inappropriate” is unclear and can mean different things to different people. Thus it gives too much discretion to law enforcement, is subject to uneven application, and does not give Kathy, Sarah, or the public adequate notice of what behavior is criminal.
Overbreadth
A statute is overbroad if it criminalizes both constitutionally protected and constitutionally unprotected conduct. This challenge is different from void for vagueness, although certain statutes can be attacked on both grounds. An overbroad statute criminalizes too much and needs to be revised to target only conduct that is outside the Constitution’s parameters.
Example of an Overbroad Statute
A state legislature enacts a statute that makes it criminal to photograph “nude individuals who are under the age of eighteen.” This statute is probably overbroad and violates due process. While it prohibits constitutionally unprotected conduct, such as taking obscene photographs of minors, it also criminalizes First Amendment protected conduct, such as photographing a nude baby.
The Equal Protection Clause
The Fourteenth Amendment states in relevant part, “nor shall any State…deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” The equal protection clause applies to the state government. State constitutions generally have a similar provision.California Constitution, art. I, § 7, accessed October 4, 2010, www.leginfo.ca.gov/.const/.article_1. The equal protection clause prevents the state government from enacting criminal laws that discriminate in an unreasonable and unjustified manner. The Fifth Amendment due process clause prohibits the federal government from discrimination if the discrimination is so unjustifiable that it violates due process of law.Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), accessed October 4, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16234924501041992561&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
The prohibition on governmental discrimination is not absolute; it depends on the class of persons targeted for special treatment. In general, court scrutiny is heightened according to a sliding scale when the subject of discrimination is an arbitrary classification. Arbitrary means random and often includes characteristics an individual is born with, such as race or national origin. The most arbitrary classifications demand strict scrutiny, which means the criminal statute must be supported by a compelling government interest. Statutes containing classifications that are not arbitrary must have a rational basis and be supported by a legitimate government interest.
Criminal statutes that classify individuals based on their race must be given strict scrutiny because race is an arbitrary classification that cannot be justified. Modern courts do not uphold criminal statutes that classify based on race because there is no government interest in treating citizens of a different race more or less harshly.Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), accessed October 4, 2010, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0388_0001_ZO.html.
Criminal statutes that have a rational basis for discrimination and are supported by a legitimate government interest can discriminate, and frequently do. Criminal statutes that punish felons more severely when they have a history of criminal behavior, for example, three-strikes statutes, are supported by the legitimate government interests of specific and general deterrence and incapacitation. Note that the basis of the discrimination, a criminal defendant’s status as a convicted felon, is rational, not arbitrary like race. Thus although these statutes discriminate, they are constitutional pursuant to the equal protection clause.
Exercises
• The Bill of Rights is the first ten amendments to the Constitution and contains many protections for criminal defendants.
• Selective incorporation applies most of the constitutional protections in the Bill of Rights to the states.
• Substantive due process protects criminal defendants from unreasonable government intrusion on their substantive constitutional rights. Procedural due process provides criminal defendants with notice and an opportunity to be heard before imposition of a criminal punishment.
• A statute that is void for vagueness is so imprecisely worded that it gives too much discretion to law enforcement, is unevenly applied, and does not provide notice of what is criminal. A statute that is overbroad includes constitutionally protected conduct and therefore unreasonably encroaches upon individual rights.
• The equal protection clause prevents the state government from enacting criminal laws that arbitrarily discriminate. The Fifth Amendment due process clause extends this prohibition to the federal government if the discrimination violates due process of law.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. A local ordinance makes it a misdemeanor to dress in “gang attire.” Is this ordinance constitutional? Why or why not?
2. Read Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974). Why did the US Supreme Court strike down the Massachusetts flag misuse statute? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14723025391522670978&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
3. Read Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). In Grayned, the US Supreme Court analyzed an ordinance prohibiting individuals from willfully making a noise or disturbance on grounds adjacent to a school building that disturbs the peace or good order of the school session. Did the Court hold that this ordinance was constitutional? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://supreme.justia.com/us/408/104/case.html.
4. Read Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Why did Justice O’Conner feel that Texas’s sodomy law was unconstitutional? The case is available at this link: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/02-102.ZC.html. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/03%3A_Constitutional_Protections/3.02%3A_The_Due_Process_and_Equal_Protection_Clauses.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Define speech under the First Amendment.
2. Identify five types of speech that can be governmentally regulated in spite of the First Amendment.
3. Ascertain the constitutional parameters for statutes that criminalize speech.
The First Amendment states, in relevant part, “Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech.” Although this language specifically targets federal Congress, the First Amendment has been held applicable to the states by virtue of selective incorporation.Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), accessed October 5, 2010, http://supreme.justia.com/us/268/652/case.html. Most state constitutions have a similar provision protecting freedom of speech.Illinois Constitution, art. I, § 4, accessed October 9, 2010, www.ilga.gov/commission/lrb/con1.htm.
Freedom of speech has been the focus of countless judicial opinions. To summarize US Supreme Court precedent, the word speech has been interpreted to cover virtually any form of expression, including verbal and written words, pictures, photographs, videos, and songs. First Amendment speech also includes expressive conduct such as dressing a certain way,Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), accessed October 8, 201, http://supreme.justia.com/us/393/503/case.html. flag burning,Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), accessed October 5, 2010, caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=491&invol=397. and cross burning.R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), accessed October 5, 2010, caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=505&invol=377.
Exceptions to the First Amendment’s Protection of Free Speech
In general, courts have examined the history of the Constitution and the policy supporting freedom of speech when creating exceptions to its coverage. Modern decisions afford freedom of speech the strictest level of scrutiny; only a compelling government interest can justify an exception, which must use the least restrictive means possible.Sable Communis. of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989), accessed October 5, 2010, http://supreme.justia.com/us/492/115/case.html. For the purpose of brevity, this book reviews the constitutional exceptions to free speech in statutes criminalizing fighting words, incitement to riot, hate crimes, and obscenity.
Fighting Words
Although the First Amendment protects peaceful speech and assembly, if speech creates a clear and present danger to the public, it can be regulated.Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919), accessed October 5, 2010, http://supreme.justia.com/us/249/47/case.html. This includes fighting words, “those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), accessed October 6, 2010, caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?friend=wisbar&navby=case&court=us&vol=315&invol=568&pageno=574.
Any criminal statute prohibiting fighting words must be narrowly tailored and focus on imminent rather than future harm. Modern US Supreme Court decisions indicate a tendency to favor freedom of speech over the government’s interest in regulating fighting words, and many fighting words statutes have been deemed unconstitutional under the First Amendment or void for vagueness and overbreadth under the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974), accessed October 7, 2010, caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=415&invol=130.
Example of an Unconstitutional Fighting Words Statute
Georgia enacted the following criminal statute: “Any person who shall, without provocation, use to or of another, and in his presence…opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace…shall be guilty of a misdemeanor” (Ga. Code § 26-6303). The US Supreme Court determined that this statute was overbroad, void for vagueness, and unconstitutional under the First Amendment.Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), accessed October 7, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3138831397470557431&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
The Court held that the dictionary definitions of “opprobrious” and “abusive” give them greater reach than fighting words. Thus the statute is overbroad and does not restrict its prohibition to imminent harm. Opprobrious and abusive have various meanings, so the statute is also subject to uneven enforcement and is void for vagueness. As the Court stated, this language “licenses the jury to create its own standard in each case.”Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972), quoting Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 263 (1937), accessed October 7, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3138831397470557431&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
Incitement to Riot
Incitement to riot can also be regulated under the clear and present danger exception. Similar to fighting words, an incitement to riot statute must prohibit imminent lawless action.Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), accessed October 6, 2010, http://supreme.justia.com/us/395/444/case.html. Statutes that prohibit simple advocacy with no imminent threat or harm cannot withstand the First Amendment’s heightened scrutiny.
Example of an Unconstitutional Incitement to Riot Statute
Ohio enacted a statute that criminalized “advocat[ing]…the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform” and “voluntarily assembl[ing] with any society, group or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism” (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.13). A Ku Klux Klan leader was convicted under the statute after the media broadcast films of him leading a KKK meeting. The US Supreme Court held, “Accordingly, we are here confronted with a statute which, by its own words and as applied, purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate the described type of action. [Footnote 4] Such a statute falls within the condemnation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969), accessed October 6, 2010, http://supreme.justia.com/us/395/444/case.html.
Hate Crimes
Many states and the federal government have enacted hate crimes statutes. When hate crimes statutes criminalize speech, including expressive conduct, a First Amendment analysis is appropriate. When hate crimes statutes enhance a penalty for criminal conduct that is not expressive, the First Amendment is not applicable.Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 47 (1993), accessed October 7, 2010, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/92-515.ZO.html.
Hate crimes statutes punish conduct that is targeted at specific classifications of people. These classifications are listed in the statute and can include race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, or religion. Hate crimes statutes that criminalize speech can be constitutional under the clear and present danger exception if they are tailored to apply only to speech or expressive conduct that is supported by the intent to intimidate.Virginia v. Black, 535 U.S. 343 (2003), accessed October 5, 2010, caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=000&invol=01-1107. This can include speech and expressive conduct such as threats of imminent bodily injury, death, or cross burning. Hate crimes statutes must be narrowly drafted, and cannot be void for vagueness or overbroad.
Hate crimes statutes that criminalize the content of speech, like a prejudicial opinion about a certain race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, or religion are unconstitutional under the First Amendment.R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), accessed October 5, 2010, caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=505&invol=377. Statutes of this nature have been held to have a “chilling effect” on free expression by deterring individuals from expressing unpopular views, which is the essence of free speech protection. Although this type of speech can stir up anger, resentment, and possibly trigger a violent situation, the First Amendment protects content-based speech from governmental regulation without strict scrutiny exposing a compelling government interest.
Example of an Unconstitutional Statute Prohibiting Cross Burning
St. Paul, Minnesota, enacted the Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, which prohibited the display of a symbol that a person knows or has reason to know “arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender” (Ordinance, St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990)). In R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), the US Supreme Court held that this ordinance was unconstitutional on its face because regulation was based on the content of speech, with no additional requirement for imminent lawless action. The Court held that the ordinance did not proscribe the use of fighting words (the display of a symbol) toward specific groups of individuals, which would be an equal protection clause challenge. Instead, the Court determined that the statute prohibited the use of specific types of fighting words, for example, words that promote racial hatred, and this is impermissible as viewpoint-based censorship. As the Court stated, “[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid.”R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992), accessed October 5, 2010, caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=505&invol=377.
Example of a Constitutional Statute Prohibiting Cross Burning
Virginia enacted a statute that makes it criminal “for any person…, with the intent of intimidating any person or group…, to burn…a cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place” (Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-423). The US Supreme Court held this statute constitutional under the First Amendment because it did not single out cross burning indicating racial hatred, as the Minnesota cross-burning ordinance did. The Court stated, “Unlike the statute at issue in R. A. V., the Virginia statute does not single out for opprobrium only that speech directed toward ‘one of the specified disfavored topics.’ Id., at 391.” It does not matter whether an individual burns a cross with intent to intimidate because of the victim’s race, gender, or religion, or because of the victim’s “political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality.”Virginia v. Black, 535 U.S. 343, 359 (2003), accessed October 5, 2010, caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=000&invol=01-1107.
Obscenity
Another exception to free speech is obscenity. Obscenity is usually conveyed by speech, such as words, pictures, photographs, songs, videos, and live performances. However, obscenity is not protected speech under the First Amendment.Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), accessed October 7, 2010, http://supreme.justia.com/us/354/476/case.html.
In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the US Supreme Court devised a three-part test to ascertain if speech is obscene and subject to government regulation. Generally, speech is obscene if (1) the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex; (2) it depicts sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law in a patently offensive way; and (3) it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), accessed October 7, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=287180442152313659&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
Example of Speech That Is Not Obscene
In Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974), the US Supreme Court viewed the film Carnal Knowledge to determine whether the defendant could be constitutionally convicted under an obscenity statute for showing it at a local theater. The Court concluded that most of the film’s sexual content was suggestive rather than explicit, and the only direct portrayal of nudity was a woman’s bare midriff. Thus although a jury convicted the defendant after viewing the film, the Court reversed the conviction, stating that the film does not constitute the hard-core pornography that the three-part test for obscenity isolates from the First Amendment’s protection. The Court stated, “Appellant’s showing of the film ‘Carnal Knowledge’ is simply not the ‘public portrayal of hard core sexual conduct for its own sake, and for the ensuing commercial gain’ which we said was punishable in Miller, Id., at 35.”Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974), accessed October 7, 2010, caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=418&invol=153.
Nude Dancing
Statutes that regulate nude dancing have also been attacked under the First Amendment. Although the US Supreme Court has ruled that nude dancing is constitutionally protected expression, it has also upheld reasonable restrictions on nudity, such as requirements that nude dancers wear pasties and a g-string.City of Erie et al v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000), accessed October 11, 2010, caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=000&invol=98-1161.
Table 3.1 Statutes Prohibiting Speech under a First Amendment Exception
Conduct Prohibited Potential Constitutional Challenge Necessary Statutory Requirements
Fighting words First Amendment, vague, overbreadth Must proscribe imminent lawless action, be narrowly drafted, precise
Incitement to riot First Amendment, vague, overbreadth Must proscribe imminent lawless action, be narrowly drafted, precise; cannot prohibit simple advocacy
Hate speech First Amendment, vague, overbreadth Must be narrowly drafted, precise; must target speech supported by the intent to intimidate; cannot be content based without a compelling government interest
Obscenity First Amendment, vague, overbreadth Must be narrowly drafted, precise; must target speech that appeals to a prurient interest in sex, depicts sex in a patently offensive way, lacks serious social value
Nude dancing First Amendment, vague, overbreadth Can be reasonably restricted
LAW AND ETHICS
Should Depictions of Animal Cruelty Be Protected by the First Amendment?
Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 48, which criminalizes commercial creation, sale, or possession of a visual or auditory depiction in which a living animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed, if that conduct violates federal or state law where the creation, sale, or possession takes place. In United States v. Stevens, 552 U.S. 442 (2010), the US Supreme Court held that this statute is facially overbroad and violative of the First Amendment. Specifically, the Court held that depictions of animal cruelty are entitled to First Amendment protection, and the statute is presumptively invalid because it is content based. In addition, the Court stated that the government’s interest in censoring this type of material is not compelling enough to outweigh the prohibition on protected speech and that the statute on its face included material that may have redeeming social value. The Court’s opinion is available at this link: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/08-769.ZO.html.
1. Do you think the First Amendment should protect material depicting animal cruelty? Why or why not?
2. What are some possible consequences of criminalizing this type of speech?
Check your answers to both questions using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
U.S. v. Stevens Video
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) Explains the U.S. v. Stevens Case
This video of ACLU legal director Steven R. Shapiro analyzes the U.S. v. Stevens case:
(click to see video)
Exercises
• Speech under the First Amendment is any form of expression, such as verbal or written words, pictures, videos, and songs. Expressive conduct, such as dressing a certain way, flag burning, and cross burning, is also considered First Amendment speech.
• Five types of speech that can be governmentally regulated are fighting words, incitement to riot, hate speech, obscenity, and nude dancing.
• Statutes that prohibit fighting words and incitement to riot must be narrowly drafted to include only speech that incites imminent unlawful action, not future harm or general advocacy. Statutes that prohibit hate speech must be narrowly drafted to include only speech that is supported by the intent to intimidate. Statutes that prohibit obscenity must target speech that appeals to a prurient interest in sex, depicts sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and has little or no literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Nude dancing can be regulated as long as the regulation is reasonable, such as requiring dancers to wear pasties and a g-string.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. A state statute enhances the penalty for battery if the crime is committed “because of the victim’s race.” To prove race-biased intent, it is frequently necessary to admit evidence of the defendant’s statements indicating racial hatred and intolerance. Does this statute violate the First Amendment’s free speech protection? Why or why not? Read the case on which this question is based, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 47 (1993). The case is available at this link: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/92-515.ZO.html.
2. Read Reno v. American Civ. Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). This case reviews the constitutionality of a federal statute regulating Internet activity to protect minors. Why did the US Supreme Court hold that certain provisions of the federal Communications Decency Act of 1996 were unconstitutional? The case is available at this link: caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=000&invol=96-511.
3. Read Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). Did the US Supreme Court uphold a federal statute prohibiting aid to terrorist groups? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3116082426854631219&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/03%3A_Constitutional_Protections/3.03%3A_Freedom_of_Speech.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Ascertain the constitutional amendments that support a right to privacy.
2. Ascertain three constitutionally protected individual interests that are included in the right to privacy.
The federal Constitution does not explicitly protect privacy. However, several of the amendments in the Bill of Rights ensure and protect individual decision making and autonomy from governmental intrusion. Thus modern interpretations of the Constitution by the US Supreme Court have created a right to privacy.Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), accessed October 9, 2010, caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=381&invol=479. This right is considered fundamental and subject to strict scrutiny; only a compelling government interest can justify a statute encroaching on its protections. Many states include an explicit right to privacy in their state constitutions.Hawaii Constitution, art. I, § 6, accessed October 9, 2010, hawaii.gov/lrb/con/conart1.html.
The Constitutional Amendments Protecting Privacy
US Supreme Court precedent has held that the right to privacy comes from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The First Amendment protects the right to speak freely, assemble peacefully, and worship according to individual choice. The Third Amendment prohibits the government from forcing individuals to quarter, house, or feed soldiers. The Fourth Amendment prevents the government from unreasonably searching or seizing an individual or an individual’s property. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide due process of law before the government can deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property. The Ninth Amendment states that rights not explicitly set forth in the Constitution may still exist. Taken together, these amendments indicate that the Constitution was written to erect a barrier between individuals and an overly intrusive and regulatory government. In modern society, this right to privacy guarantees the right to use birth control, the right to an abortion, and the right to participate in consensual sexual relations.
The Right to Use Birth Control
The right to privacy was first established in the US Supreme Court case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the defendants, Planned Parenthood employees, were convicted of prescribing birth control as accessories under two Connecticut statutes that criminalized the use of birth control. The Court found the statutes unconstitutional, holding that the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments created a “penumbra” of unenumerated constitutional rights, including zones of privacy.Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965), accessed October 9, 2010, caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=381&invol=479. The Court stated that marital privacy, especially, deserved the utmost protection from governmental intrusion. The Griswold case set the stage for other fundamental privacy rights related to intimacy, including the right to an abortion and the right to consensual sexual relations.
The Right to an Abortion
The right to an abortion was set forth in the seminal US Supreme Court case of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, which examined a Texas statute criminalizing abortion, the Court held that every woman has the right to a legal abortion through the first trimester of pregnancy. In the aftermath of the Roe decision, more than half of the nation’s state laws criminalizing abortion became unconstitutional and unenforceable. The Court held that state government has a legitimate interest in protecting a pregnant woman and her fetus from harm, which becomes a compelling interest when she has reached full term. However, during the first trimester, health concerns from abortion do not justify the erosion of a woman’s right to make the abortion decision.Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973), accessed October 10, 2010, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0410_0113_ZO.html. The Court thereafter struck down the Texas antiabortion statute as overbroad under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. Specifically, the Court held that during the first trimester of pregnancy, the abortion decision must be left to the pregnant woman and her attending physician.Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973), accessed October 10, 2010, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0410_0113_ZO.html. In a recent decision post-Roe, the Court upheld a federal statute criminalizing partial-birth abortion, on the grounds that it was not void for vagueness or overbroad under the Fifth Amendment due process clause.Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007), accessed October 11, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7079370668659431881&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
The Right to Consensual Sexual Relations
Even in the aftermath of Roe v. Wade, courts were reluctant to interfere with states’ interests in enacting and enforcing statutes that criminalized sexual conduct. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the US Supreme Court upheld a Georgia statute that made it a crime to engage in consensual sodomy.Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), accessed October 11, 2010, caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=478&invol=186. The Court stated that there is no fundamental right to engage in sodomy and that the history of protecting marriage and family relationships should not be extended in this fashion.Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194–195 (1986), accessed October 11, 2010, caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=478&invol=186. Many years later, the Court changed its stance and overruled Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). In Lawrence, a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy was attacked on its face and as applied to two men who were discovered engaging in sex in their bedroom during a law enforcement search for weapons. The Lawrence decision rested on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that intimate choices are a form of liberty protected by the due process clause, whether or not consenting individuals are married. The Court thereafter struck down the Texas sodomy statute because it was not justified by a sufficient government interest.Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), accessed October 11, 2010, caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=000&invol=02-102.
Example of a Right to Privacy Analysis
Most states have statutes criminalizing consensual incest, which is sexual intercourse between family members who cannot legally marry. If an individual attacks a consensual incest statute as unconstitutional under the right to privacy, the court will balance the state’s interest in preventing harm to an infant, such as birth defects, with an individual’s interest in having consensual sexual intercourse with a family member, using strict scrutiny. If the court finds that the government interest is compelling, it can uphold the statute as long as it is not vague or overbroad.
Exercises
• The constitutional amendments supporting the right to privacy are the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
• The right to privacy in the Constitution protects an individual’s right to use contraceptives, to receive an abortion through the first trimester, and to engage in consensual sexual relations.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. A state statute prohibits inmates in state prison from engaging in consensual sodomy. An inmate is prosecuted under the statute. How will a court determine whether this statute is constitutional? Read the statute on which this exercise is based: California Penal Code § 286(e), http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/286.html.
2. Read Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In Casey, Pennsylvania modified its abortion statute to include a twenty-four-hour waiting period and informed consent for minors. Did the US Supreme Court uphold the Pennsylvania abortion statute? The case is available at this link: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/91-744.ZS.html. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/03%3A_Constitutional_Protections/3.04%3A_The_Right_to_Privacy.txt |
Learning Objective
1. Ascertain the constitutional parameters of an individual’s right to possess a handgun under the Second Amendment.
Although the federal Constitution specifically references a right to bear arms in the Second Amendment, the US Supreme Court has not interpreted this amendment in a significant fashion until recently. The Second Amendment provides “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” Many state constitutions have a similar provision.Eugene Volokh, “State Constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms Provisions,” UCLA website, accessed October 22, 2010, www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/beararms/statecon.htm. In 2008, the US Supreme Court explored the Second Amendment and its effect on weapons possession in a case attacking Washington, DC, firearms legislation.District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), accessed October 13, 2010, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/07-290.ZO.html.
In District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in striking provisions of the Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975. The Court struck the portions of this act that banned the possession of handguns and mandated that all legal firearms must be kept unloaded and disassembled while in the home. Although the District Court held that the Second Amendment applies only to the militia, the US Supreme Court emphasized that the Second Amendment is exercised individually and belongs to all Americans. The Court also expanded previous interpretations of the Second Amendment to cover an individual’s right to possess a usable handgun in the home for self-defense. The Heller case is unprecedented and is the first to address individual handgun possession under the Second Amendment. However, the Heller ruling is narrow and specifically excludes firearms restrictions on felons, the mentally ill, firearm possession in or near schools or government buildings, and the commercial sale of firearms. The Heller decision also fails to extend the Second Amendment’s protections to the states because Washington, DC, is a federal enclave.
In McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010), the US Supreme Court revisited the gun possession issue by reviewing and rejecting as unconstitutional a handgun ban in the city of Chicago, Illinois. In McDonald, the Court took the extra step of extending the Heller ruling to the states, holding that the Second Amendment applies to the states via its selective incorporation into the due process clause. However, McDonald did not expand the ruling in Heller in other ways and reemphasized the Heller exceptions of firearms restrictions on felons, the mentally ill, firearm possession in or near schools or government buildings, and the commercial sale of firearms.
Example of an Appropriate Restriction on Firearms
Dirk is a public middle-school janitor. Occasionally, with the permission of the principal, Dirk stays overnight in an outbuilding on campus when he works a particularly late shift. Dirk wants to keep a handgun in the outbuilding, for protection. If Dirk’s state has a statute prohibiting the possession of a handgun within one mile of any public school, Dirk cannot keep a handgun in the outbuilding for self-defense. Modern US Supreme Court precedent holds that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess a handgun in the home for self-defense. However, this precedent specifically exempts firearm possession near schools. Unless newer precedent expands the ruling to include firearm possession near schools, the statute in Dirk’s state is constitutional.
KEY TAKEAWAY
• Pursuant to recent US Supreme Court precedent, the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess a usable handgun in the home for self-defense. This protection does not cover felons, the mentally ill, firearm possession near schools and government buildings, or the commercial sale of firearms. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/03%3A_Constitutional_Protections/3.05%3A_The_Right_to_Bear_Arms.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Compare an inhumane procedure with disproportionate punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
2. Identify the most prevalent method of execution pursuant to the death penalty.
3. Ascertain crime(s) that merit capital punishment.
4. Identify three classifications of criminal defendants who cannot be constitutionally punished by execution.
5. Define three-strikes laws, and ascertain if they constitute cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to the Eighth Amendment.
6. Ascertain the constitutionality of sentencing enhancements under the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment comes from the Eighth Amendment, which states, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” State constitutions often have similar provisions.Texas Constitution, art. I, § 13, accessed October 22, 2010, http://www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/SOTWDocs/CN/htm/CN.1.htm. Although the ban on cruel and unusual punishment relates directly to sentencing, which is a criminal procedure issue, criminal statutes mandating various penalties can be held unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment just like statutes offending the due process clause, so a brief discussion is relevant to this chapter. Another facet of excessive punishment is a criminal sentencing enhancement that is based on facts not found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. This has been held to violate the Sixth Amendment, which states, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a…trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”
In this section, three issues are analyzed and discussed: the infliction of cruel punishment, a criminal sentence that is too severe, and a criminal sentence that is invalid under the right to a jury trial.
Infliction of Cruel Punishment
In general, the government must refrain from inflicting cruel or barbaric punishments on criminal defendants in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In particular, cases asserting that a criminal punishment is inhumane often focus on capital punishment, which is the death penalty.
Synopsis of the History of Capital Punishment
The death penalty has been used as a criminal punishment since the eighteenth century BC. American death penalty law is influenced by the British because the colonists brought English common-law principles, including capital punishment, with them to the New World. The first execution in America took place in 1608, for spying.Death Penalty Information Center, “Introduction to the Death Penalty,” deathpenaltyinfo.org website, accessed October 17, 2010, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/part-i-history-death-penalty. Methods of execution and capital crimes varied from colony to colony. In the late 1700s, a movement to abolish the death penalty began, and in 1846 Michigan was the first state to eliminate the death penalty for all crimes except treason.Death Penalty Information Center, “Introduction to the Death Penalty,” deathpenaltyinfo.org website, accessed October 17, 2010, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/part-i-history-death-penalty. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the United States fluctuated in its attitude toward capital punishment. Executions were at an all-time high in the 1930s.Death Penalty Information Center, “Introduction to the Death Penalty,” deathpenaltyinfo.org website, accessed October 17, 2010, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/part-i-history-death-penalty. However, in 1972, in the landmark decision of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the US Supreme Court held that Georgia’s death penalty statute, which gave the jury complete discretion to sentence a criminal defendant to death, was arbitrary and therefore authorized cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. This decision invalidated death penalty statutes in forty states. Later, in 1976, the US Supreme Court case of Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), affirmed the procedure of a bifurcated trial, separating the guilt phase from the penalty phase for death penalty cases. Gregg also affirmed the death penalty’s constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment. Currently, thirty-four states and the federal government authorize the death penalty, while sixteen states and the District of Columbia do not.Death Penalty Information Center, “States with and without the Death Penalty,” deathpenaltyinfo.org website, accessed October 14, 2010, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty.
Inhumane Capital Punishment
A claim that capital punishment is inhumane and therefore unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment focuses on the method of execution. Throughout the history of the death penalty, many methods of execution have been employed, including shooting, hanging, electrocution, the gas chamber, and lethal injection. At the time of this writing, the law is in a state of flux as to which methods of execution are constitutional because many state and federal decisions have stricken virtually every method available. The current focus of the courts is lethal injection because it is one of the few methods that has not been condemned as unconstitutional. Most states that authorize the death penalty use lethal injection as the primary method of execution. In a recent statement on this issue, the US Supreme Court in Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008), held that Kentucky’s four-drug lethal injection procedure was not cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. In other states, including Missouri and Tennessee, federal courts using different facts have ruled the multidrug procedure unconstitutional.Death Penalty Information Center, “Lethal Injection: Constitutional Issue,” deathpenaltyinfo.org website, accessed October 14, 2010, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/lethal-injection-constitutional-issue. It is impossible to predict the future of death penalty methodology under the Eighth Amendment because each case will be decided based on the circumstances presented. However, it is clear that the law in this area is ripe for a definitive statement of constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause.
Disproportionate Punishment
Disproportionate punishment is a different issue than inhumane punishment, but it is still within the parameters of the Eighth Amendment. Disproportionate punishment asserts that a criminal punishment is too severe for the crime. Two criminal punishments garner many disproportionate punishment claims: capital punishment and punishment pursuant to three-strikes statutes.
Capital Punishment as Disproportionate
Capital punishment can be disproportionate because it is too severe for the crime or because it is too severe for the criminal defendant.
Examples of Capital Punishment That Is Disproportionate to the Crime
Death is the ultimate punishment, so it must be equivalent to the crime the defendant committed. Although the states and the federal government have designated many capital crimes that may not result in death, for example, treason that does not lead to death, the US Supreme Court has confirmed that the death penalty is too severe for most crimes. In Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), the Court held that capital punishment is disproportionate for the crime of raping an adult woman. Many years later in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008), the Court extended the disproportionality principle to invalidate the death penalty for child rape. Kennedy maintained the distinction between crimes committed against individuals and crimes committed against the government, like treason. The only crime against an individual that currently merits the death penalty is criminal homicide, which is the unlawful killing of one human being by another. Criminal homicide is discussed in detail in Chapter 9.
Examples of Capital Punishment That Are Disproportionate to the Criminal Defendant
Recent US Supreme Court precedent has targeted specific classifications of criminal defendants for whom capital punishment is overly severe. Recent cases hold that the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment for a criminal defendant who was a juvenile when the crime was committed,Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), accessed October 15, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16987406842050815187&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. who is mentally ill,Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), accessed October 15, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7904262174469084060&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. or has an intellectual disabilityAtkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), accessed October 15, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2043469055777796288&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. at the time of the scheduled execution. Although states vary in their classifications of juveniles (discussed in detail in Chapter 6), the Eighth Amendment prohibits capital punishment for an individual who was under eighteen years of age when he or she committed criminal homicide. Mental illness could cover a variety of disorders, but the US Supreme Court has held that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a determination of sanity before execution.Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 401 (1986), accessed October 15, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7904262174469084060&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. Intellectual disability is distinct from mental illness and is defined by the US Supreme Court as a substantial intellectual impairment that impacts everyday life, and was present at the defendant’s birth or during childhood.Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002), accessed October 15, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2043469055777796288&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. However, this standard is broad, so states vary in their legislative definitions of this classification.Death Penalty Information Center, “State Statutes Prohibiting the Death Penalty for People with Mental Retardation,” deathpenaltyinfo.org website, accessed October 14, 2010, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-statutes-prohibiting-death-penalty-people-mental-retardation.
Example of Capital Punishment That Is Inhumane and Disproportionate to the Crime and the Criminal Defendant
Jerry is sentenced to death for rape. The state death penalty statute specifies death by decapitation. While on death row, Jerry begins to hear voices and is diagnosed as schizophrenic by the prison psychiatrist. The state schedules the execution anyway. In this example, the state death penalty statute is inhumane because death by decapitation is too severe a punishment for any crime. The death penalty statute is also disproportionate to the crime because execution is not a constitutional punishment for the crime of rape. Lastly, the death penalty statute is disproportionate to Jerry, the criminal defendant, because it is cruel and unusual to execute someone who is mentally ill.
Disproportionate Punishment Pursuant to Three-Strikes Laws
California was the first state to enact a “three strikes and you’re out” law.Cal. Penal Code § 667, accessed October 15, 2010, www.threestrikes.org/tslaw.html. Generally, three-strikes statutes punish habitual offenders more harshly when they commit a second or third felony after an initial serious or violent felony.Cal. Penal Code § 667, accessed October 15, 2010, www.threestrikes.org/tslaw.html. To date, California’s three-strikes law is the toughest in the nation; it mandates a minimum twenty-five-year- to life sentence for felons convicted of a third strike. California enacted its three-strikes legislation after the kidnapping, rape, and murder of Polly Klaas by a habitual offender. Twenty-four states followed, indicating public support for the incapacitation of career criminals.Three Strikes and You’re Out, “States That Have Three Strikes Laws,” threestrikes.org website, accessed October 15, 2010, www.threestrikes.org/3strikestates.html.
Three-strikes statutes vary, but those most likely to be attacked as disproportionate count any felony as a strike after an initial serious or violent felony. Counting any felony might levy a sentence of life in prison against a criminal defendant who commits a nonviolent felony. However, the US Supreme Court has upheld lengthy prison sentences under three-strikes statutes for relatively minor second or third offenses, holding that they are not cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003), accessed October 15, 2010, caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=000&invol=01-6978.
Sentencing that Violates the Right to a Jury Trial
Modern US Supreme Court precedent has expanded the jury’s role in sentencing pursuant to the Sixth Amendment. Although a detailed discussion of sentencing procedure is beyond the scope of this book, a brief overview of sentencing and the roles of the judge and jury is necessary to a fundamental understanding of this important trial right, as is set forth in the following section.
The Role of the Judge and Jury in Sentencing Fact-Finding
As stated in Chapter 2, the trier of fact decides the facts and renders a decision on innocence or guilt using beyond a reasonable doubt as the standard for the burden of proof. The trier of fact in a criminal prosecution is almost always a jury because of the right to a jury trial in the Sixth Amendment. Occasionally, the defendant waives the right to a jury trial and has a bench trial with a judge playing the role of trier of fact. Although the jury determines innocence or guilt during a jury trial, the verdict defines the end of their role as the trier of fact, and the judge sets the sentence. The death penalty is an exception to the jury’s limited role in sentencing; a jury must decide whether to sentence the defendant to death at a separate hearing after the trial has concluded.
Generally, criminal sentencing takes place after the trial. Although the sentencing procedure varies from state to state and from state to federal, a sentencing hearing is typically held after guilt has been determined at trial or after a guilty plea. For many years, judges have had almost exclusive control of sentencing. Although judges are restricted by the fact-finding done at trial, they can receive new evidence at sentencing if it is relevant. For example, a judge is bound by a jury determination that the defendant used a weapon when committing an armed robbery. However, the judge can accept new evidence at sentencing that reveals the defendant had two prior convictions for armed robbery and can enhance the sentence under a habitual offender or three-strikes statute.
Sentencing Enhancement by Judges
Until recently, judges could use evidence received at the sentencing hearing to enhance a sentence beyond the statutory maximum by making a determination of the new facts to a preponderance of evidence. However, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the US Supreme Court held that the right to a jury trial prohibits judges from enhancing criminal sentences beyond the statutory maximum based on facts not determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. In Apprendi, the trial court enhanced the defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum for possession of a firearm with an unlawful purpose under New Jersey’s hate crimes statute. Although the jury did not determine that the defendant’s crime was a hate crime, the judge accepted new evidence at sentencing that indicated the defendant’s shooting into a residence was racially motivated. The US Supreme Court reversed the New Jersey Supreme Court, which upheld the sentencing procedure. The Court held that other than evidence of a prior conviction, a judge cannot enhance a defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum unless there has been a factual determination by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the facts supporting the sentencing enhancement. The Court based its holding on the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial as incorporated and applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.
Post-Apprendi, this holding was extended to federal sentencing guidelines in U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). In Booker, a federal judge enhanced a sentence following mandatory US Sentencing Guidelines, which permitted judges to find the sentencing enhancement facts using the preponderance of evidence standard. The US Supreme Court ruled that the enhancement was invalid under the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and held that the US Sentencing Guidelines would be advisory only, never mandatory. Booker was based on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), which invalidated a similar Washington State sentencing procedure.
Pursuant to Apprendi, Booker, and Blakely, a criminal defendant’s sentence is unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial if it is enhanced beyond the statutory maximum by facts that were not determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. This premise applies in federal and state courts and also to guilty pleas rather than jury verdicts.Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), accessed October 18, 2010, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/02-1632.ZO.html.
Example of an Unconstitutional Sentence Enhancement
Ross is tried and convicted by a jury of simple kidnapping. The maximum sentence for simple kidnapping is five years. At Ross’s sentencing hearing, the judge hears testimony from Ross’s kidnapping victim about the physical and mental torture Ross inflicted during the kidnapping. The victim did not testify at trial. The judge finds that the victim’s testimony is credible and rules that Ross used cruelty during the kidnapping by a preponderance of evidence. The judge thereafter enhances Ross’s sentence to eight years, based on a statutory sentencing enhancement of three years for “deliberate cruelty inflicted during the commission of a crime.” The three-year sentencing enhancement is most likely unconstitutional. Under the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, the jury must find deliberate cruelty beyond a reasonable doubt. A court can strike the enhancement of three years on appeal, and on remand, the trial court cannot increase the sentence beyond the five-year maximum.
Exercises
• An inhumane procedure punishes a defendant too severely for any crime. A disproportionate punishment punishes a defendant too severely for the crime he or she committed.
• Lethal injection is the most prevalent method of execution pursuant to the death penalty.
• Criminal homicide is the only crime against an individual that merits capital punishment.
• Criminal defendants who were juveniles when the crime was committed, are mentally incompetent, or have an intellectual disability cannot be subjected to capital punishment.
• Three-strikes laws punish criminal defendants more severely for committing a felony after they have committed one or two serious or violent felonies. Three-strikes laws have been held constitutional under the Eighth Amendment, even when they levy long prison sentences for relatively minor felonies.
• Sentencing enhancements beyond the statutory maximum are unconstitutional unless they are based on facts determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt under the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Andrew is sentenced to death for torture. In Andrew’s state, there is an “eye-for-an-eye” statute that mandates punishment that mimics the crime the defendant committed. Pursuant to this statute, Andrew will be tortured to death. Is the state’s eye-for-an-eye statute constitutional under the Eighth Amendment? Why or why not?
2. Read Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). What was the defendant’s sentence in Lockyer? What was the defendant’s crime? Did the US Supreme Court hold that the defendant’s sentence was constitutional under the Eighth Amendment? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1810564739536423477&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
3. Read Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301 (1996). Did the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit hold that the gas chamber procedure in California was constitutional under the Eighth Amendment? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=26906922262871934&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
4. Read Gall v. U.S., 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007). In Gall, the federal judge departed from the US Sentencing Guidelines and imposed a sentence of probation because the defendant had reformed and rejected his criminal lifestyle. Did the US Supreme Court uphold this sentence? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5158806596650877502&q= Gall+v.+U.S.&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_vis=1. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/03%3A_Constitutional_Protections/3.06%3A_Excessive_Punishment.txt |
Summary
The US Constitution protects criminal defendants from certain statutes and procedures. State constitutions usually mirror the federal and occasionally provide more protection to criminal defendants than the federal Constitution, as long as the state constitutions do not violate federal supremacy. Statutes can be unconstitutional as written or as enforced and must be supported by a sufficient government interest. Statutes that punish without a trial (bills of attainder) or criminal statutes that are applied retroactively (ex post facto) are unconstitutional under Article 1 §§ 9 and 10. Other constitutional protections are in the Bill of Rights, which is the first ten amendments, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which contains the due process clause and the equal protection clause.
The due process clause prohibits the government from taking an individual’s life, liberty, or property arbitrarily, without notice and an opportunity to be heard. Statutes that are vague or criminalize constitutionally protected conduct (overbroad) violate due process. The Fifth Amendment due process clause applies to the federal government, and the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause applies to the states. The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause also selectively incorporates fundamental rights from the Bill of Rights and applies them to the states. Rights incorporated and applied to the states are the right to free speech, the right to privacy, the right to bear arms, the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and the right to a jury trial. The Fourteenth Amendment also contains the equal protection clause, which prevents the government from enacting statutes that discriminate without a sufficient government interest.
The First Amendment protects speech, expression, and expressive conduct from being criminalized without a compelling government interest and a statute that uses the least restrictive means possible. Some exceptions to the First Amendment are precise statutes targeting fighting words, incitement to riot, hate crimes, obscenity, and nude dancing. The First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments also create a right to privacy that prevents the government from criminalizing the use of birth control, abortion, or consensual sexual relations.
The Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess a usable handgun in the home for self-defense. This right is not extended to convicted felons, the mentally ill, commercial sale of firearms, and firearm possession near schools and government buildings. The Eighth Amendment protects criminal defendants from inhumane and excessive punishments. The Sixth Amendment ensures that all facts used to extend a criminal defendant’s sentencing beyond the statutory maximum must be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
YOU BE THE LEGISLATIVE ANALYST
You are an expert on constitutional law. Your state’s legislature has hired you to analyze some proposed statutes to ensure that they are constitutional. Read each proposed statute and determine the following: (1) which part of the constitution is relevant, (2) whether the statute is constitutional, and (3) your reasoning. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. The proposed statute increases penalties for overdue state income tax retroactively. Is the proposed statute constitutional?
2. The proposed statute makes it a misdemeanor to display nude art in a public place. Is the proposed statute constitutional?
3. The proposed statute enhances the sentence for rape by three years of imprisonment if the defendant is infected with AIDS. Is the proposed statute constitutional?
4. The proposed statute prohibits a defendant with a conviction for any crime involving alcohol to possess a handgun in the home. Is the proposed statute constitutional?
5. The proposed statute mandates fifteen years of solitary confinement in prison if the defendant is convicted of forcible rape. Is the proposed statute constitutional?
Websites of Interest
• First Amendment information: www.firstamendmentcenter.org/default.aspx
• Hate crimes: www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/civilrights/hate_crimes/hate_crimes
• Death penalty information: http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org
Answers to Exercises
From Section 3.1
1. The public university can impose a retroactive tuition because this is not a criminal statute or procedure and does not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
2. In Smith, the US Supreme Court held that Alaska’s Megan’s Law statute was not criminal, but part of a civil regulatory scheme, and thus did not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
3. In Stogner, the US Supreme Court held that California cannot eliminate a statute of limitations and thereafter prosecute defendants who would have been time-barred from prosecution because this action violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws. The Court held that this statute increased the chances of conviction retroactively.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 3.2
1. The ordinance is void for vagueness and overbroad, violating the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. The term gang attire is void for vagueness because it is imprecise, can mean different things to different people, fails to give notice of what is criminal, and gives too much discretion to law enforcement. The ordinance is overbroad because prohibiting all individuals from wearing gang attire probably includes First Amendment constitutionally protected conduct, such as wearing a gang-related Halloween costume or wearing a costume to act in a play or movie.
2. In Smith, the US Supreme Court held that the flag misuse statute was void for vagueness. The Court stated,
But there is no comparable reason for committing broad discretion to law enforcement officials in the area of flag contempt. Indeed, because display of the flag is so common and takes so many forms, changing from one generation to another and often difficult to distinguish in principle, a legislature should define with some care the flag behavior it intends to outlaw.Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 582 (1974), accessed October 3, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14723025391522670978&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
3. In Grayned, the US Supreme Court held that the ordinance was not void for vagueness because, with fair warning, it criminalized actual or imminent and willful interference with school activity. The Court also held that the statute was not overbroad because it prohibited only acts that “materially interfered with schoolwork,” which is not protected by the First Amendment.
4. Justice O’Connor said that the Texas sodomy statute was unconstitutional pursuant to the equal protection clause. The statute only criminalized sodomy between persons of the same sex, so it targeted gay couples without a rational basis.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 3.3
1. The statute does not violate the First Amendment’s free speech protection because battery is not speech and is not covered by the First Amendment.
2. The US Supreme Court held that the provisions were unconstitutional under the First Amendment because they were vague and content based. The Act did not specifically define “indecent” communications, or demonstrate that offensive material lacks any value under the three-part test for obscenity set forth in Miller.
3. The US Supreme Court upheld 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (a) (1) as applied. The Court ruled that the federal government can prohibit aid to terrorist groups, even if it consists of training and advice on legal activities, without violating the First Amendment.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 3.4
1. The court will probably analyze whether the statute is constitutional under the right to privacy and the equal protection clause. The right to privacy analysis will use strict scrutiny because the right to privacy is fundamental. The state must demonstrate a compelling state interest in regulating sex in prison. The state’s arguments will probably focus on maintaining integrity, safety, and security in the institution. Under the equal protection clause analysis, the state has to show a legitimate state interest pursuant to the rational basis test because the category targeted—inmates in prison—is rational, not arbitrary.
2. The Court upheld the statute, even though this case was post-Roe v. Wade. The Court reaffirmed Roe, but imposed a new standard for abortion laws. The new standard analyzes whether a state abortion law places an undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion. The Court held that the twenty-four-hour waiting period and informed consent for minors do not place such a burden. The Court did strike a separate requirement, which mandated husband notification before an abortion could take place.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 3.5
1. The court will uphold the order under the Second Amendment if the defendant was convicted of a felony. The recent US Supreme Court precedent in Heller and McDonald both exclude convicted felons from their holdings. However, if the defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor, the court has to determine whether Heller and McDonald extend the Second Amendment’s right to possess a usable handgun in the home for self-defense to a convicted police officer who wants to resume his career.
2. The US Supreme Court upheld the conviction, stating that a defendant convicted unconstitutionally can and should challenge that conviction before owning or possessing a firearm.
3. A state could criminalize firearm possession near schools because two recent US Supreme Court rulings (Heller and McDonald) both exempt firearms near schools from their protection of individual gun ownership and possession.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 3.6
1. The eye-for-an-eye statute is unconstitutional because it mandates an inhumane punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Torture is too severe a punishment for any crime.
2. The defendant’s sentence was two consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life in prison under California’s three-strikes statute. The defendant’s crime(s) were stealing five videotapes from Kmart worth \$84.70 on one occasion and stealing four videotapes from Kmart worth \$68.84 on another, with two previous strikes. The US Supreme Court upheld the sentence and denied the defendant’s petition for habeas corpus.
3. The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the gas chamber under California’s protocol was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
4. The US Supreme Court reversed the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which held that the sentence was unreasonable according to the US Sentencing Guidelines. The Court reaffirmed that the Guidelines were advisory, but stated that the trial court has great discretion in setting the sentence, as long as the basis of the sentence is explained on the record.
Answers to Law and Ethics Questions
1. The categorization of some speech as outside the First Amendment’s protection generally focuses on speech that can produce immediate or imminent harm or lawless action, like fighting words, or speech that is devoid of social value, like obscenity. Depictions of animal cruelty probably fall within the second category. Whether you believe depictions of animal cruelty should be criminalized depends on whether you feel another category should be added to the list. The US Supreme Court was reluctant to expand categorization, indicating that First Amendment protections far exceed government interests in content-based regulations.
2. Some possible consequences of expanding categorization are the increase of government censorship into areas that may have value, either literary, artistic, political, or scientific. Any time case precedent limits the First Amendment, individual rights of expression are likewise inhibited, and the government’s power to regulate and enact laws encroaching upon individual freedoms is enhanced.
Answers to You Be the Legislative Analyst
1. (1) The ex post facto clause is relevant. (2) The statute is most likely constitutional. (3) Even though the statute is retroactive, the statute is not a criminal law, but a tax increase, so there is no violation of the ex post facto clause.
2. (1) The First Amendment and the due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment are relevant. (2) The proposed statute is most likely unconstitutional. (3) The statute is probably void for vagueness and overbroad. The word “art” can be interpreted differently by different people, so it leads to uneven application by law enforcement. The statute also fails to give the public notice of what is criminal. In addition, because the statute criminalizes the display of “art,” it is overbroad and includes expressive works that may have artistic value and are protected under the First Amendment pursuant to the Miller test of obscenity.
3. (1) The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is relevant. (2) The proposed statute is most likely constitutional. (3) The statute discriminates against criminal defendants infected with the AIDS virus. However, this classification has a rational basis and is not arbitrary. The state government has an interest in preventing the spread of AIDS, so the statute will probably be upheld under the equal protection clause, even though it is discriminatory.
4. (1) The Second Amendment and the due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment are relevant. (2) The proposed statute is most likely unconstitutional. (3) The US Supreme Court has held that the Second Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects an individual’s right to possess a usable handgun in the home for self-defense. Although the Court held that an exception could be made for convicted felons, the proposed statute covers any crime that involves alcohol, including misdemeanors (such as misdemeanor DUI). Thus it is overbroad and encroaches on the Second Amendment’s guarantee of the right to bear arms.
5. (1) The Eighth Amendment and the due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment are relevant. (2) The proposed statute is most likely unconstitutional. (3) The proposed statute appears to be inhumane and excessive for the crime, which makes it cruel and unusual punishment. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/03%3A_Constitutional_Protections/3.07%3A_End-of-Chapter_Material.txt |
Thus, an Olympic swimmer may be deemed by the community as a shameful coward, or worse, for not rescuing a drowning child in the neighbor’s pool, but she is not a criminal.
- State ex rel. Kuntz v. Thirteenth Jud. Dist., cited in Section 4
Source: Image courtesy of Tara Storm.
4.01: Criminal Elements
Learning Objectives
1. List the elements of a crime.
2. Define the criminal act element.
3. Identify three requirements of criminal act.
4. Describe an exception to the criminal act element.
5. Ascertain three situations where an omission to act could be criminal.
6. Distinguish between actual and constructive possession.
7. Identify the criminal intent element required when possession is the criminal act.
Crimes can be broken down into elements, which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Criminal elements are set forth in criminal statutes, or cases in jurisdictions that allow for common-law crimes. With exceptions, every crime has at least three elements: a criminal act, also called actus reus; a criminal intent, also called mens rea; and concurrence of the two. The term conduct is often used to reflect the criminal act and intent elements. As the Model Penal Code explains, “‘conduct’ means an action or omission and its accompanying state of mind” (Model Penal Code § 1.13(5)).
Recall from Chapter 1 that not all crimes require a bad result. If a crime does require a bad result, the prosecution must also prove the additional elements of causation and harm.
Another requirement of some crimes is attendant circumstances. Attendant circumstances are specified factors that must be present when the crime is committed. These could include the crime’s methodology, location or setting, and victim characteristics, among others.
This chapter analyzes the elements of every crime. Chapter 7 through Chapter 13 analyze the elements of specific crimes, using a general overview of most states’ laws, the Model Penal Code, and federal law when appropriate.
Example of a Crime That Has Only Three Elements
Janine gets into a fight with her boyfriend Conrad after the senior prom. She grabs Conrad’s car keys out of his hand, jumps into his car, and locks all the doors. When Conrad strides over to the car, she starts the engine, puts the car into drive, and tries to run him down. It is dark and difficult for Janine to see, so Conrad easily gets out of her way and is unharmed. However, Janine is thereafter arrested and charged with attempted murder. In this case, the prosecution has to prove the elements of criminal act, criminal intent, and concurrence for attempted murder. The prosecution does not have to prove causation or that Conrad was harmed because attempt crimes, including attempted murder, do not have a bad result requirement. Attempt and other incomplete or inchoate crimes are discussed in Chapter 8.
Criminal Act
Criminal act, or actus reus, is generally defined as an unlawful bodily movement.N.Y. Penal Law § 15.00, accessed October 25, 2010, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN015.00_15.00.html. The criminal statute, or case in jurisdictions that allow common-law crimes, describes the criminal act element.
The Requirement of Voluntariness
One requirement of criminal act is that the defendant perform it voluntarily. In other words, the defendant must control the act. It would not serve the policy of specific deterrence to punish the defendant for irrepressible acts. The Model Penal Code gives the following examples of acts that are not voluntary and, therefore, not criminal: reflexes, convulsions, bodily movements during unconsciousness or sleep, conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion, or a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual (Model Penal Code § 2.01 (2)). One voluntary act is enough to fulfill the voluntary act requirement. Thus if a voluntary act is followed by an involuntary one, the court may still impose criminal liability depending on the circumstances.Govt. of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 278 F.2d 169 (1960), accessed October 26, 2010, http://openjurist.org/278/f2d/169/government-of-the-virgin-islands-v-smith.
Example of an Involuntary and Noncriminal Act
Perry is hypnotized at the local county fair. The hypnotist directs Perry to smash a banana cream pie into his girlfriend Shelley’s face. Smashing a pie into a person’s face is probably battery in most states, but Perry did not commit the act voluntarily, so he should not be convicted of a crime. Punishing Perry for battery would not specifically deter Perry from performing the act again while hypnotized because he is not in control of his behavior when experiencing this mental state.
Example of a Voluntary Act Followed by a Nonvoluntary Act
Timothy attends a party at a friend’s house and consumes several glasses of red wine. Timothy then attempts to drive his vehicle home. While driving, Timothy passes out at the wheel and hits another vehicle, killing its occupant. Timothy can probably be convicted of one or more crimes in this situation. Timothy’s acts of drinking several glasses of wine and then driving a vehicle are voluntary. Thus even though Timothy got into a car accident while unconscious, his involuntary act was preceded by conscious, controllable, and voluntary action. A punishment in this instance could specifically deter Timothy from drinking and driving on another occasion and is appropriate based on the circumstances.
Status as a Criminal Act
Generally, a defendant’s status in society is not a criminal act. Status is who the defendant is, not what the defendant does. Similar to punishment for an involuntary act, when the government punishes an individual for status, it is essentially targeting that individual for circumstances that are outside his or her control. This punishment may be cruel and unusual pursuant to the Eighth Amendment if it is disproportionate to the defendant’s behavior.
In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the US Supreme Court held that it is unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to the Eighth Amendment to punish an individual for the status of being a drug addict—even if the drugs to which the defendant is addicted are illegal. The Court compared drug addiction to an illness, such as leprosy or venereal disease. Punishing a defendant for being sick not only is inhumane but also does not specifically deter, similar to a punishment for an involuntary act.
If the defendant can control the actions at issue in spite of his or her status, the defendant’s conduct can be constitutionally criminalized and punished pursuant to the Eighth Amendment. In Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), the US Supreme Court upheld the defendant’s conviction for “drunk in public,” in spite of the defendant’s status as an alcoholic. The Court held that it is difficult but not impossible for an alcoholic to resist the urge to drink, so the behavior the statute criminalized was voluntary. Also, the Court ruled that the state has an interest in treating alcoholism and preventing alcohol-related crimes that could injure the defendant and others. Pursuant to Powell, statutes that criminalize voluntary acts that arise from status are constitutional under the Eighth Amendment.
Example of a Constitutional Statute Related to Status
Refer to the example in Section 4, where Timothy drives under the influence of alcohol and kills another. A state statute that criminalizes killing another person while driving under the influence is constitutional as applied to Timothy, even if Timothy is an alcoholic. The state has an interest in treating alcoholism and preventing alcohol-related crimes that could injure or kill Timothy or another person. Timothy’s act of driving while intoxicated is voluntary, even if his status as an alcoholic makes it more difficult for Timothy to control his drinking. Thus Timothy and other alcoholic defendants can be prosecuted and punished for killing another person while driving under the influence without violating the Eighth Amendment.
Thoughts as Criminal Acts
Thoughts are a part of criminal intent, not criminal act. Thoughts cannot be criminalized.
Example of Noncriminal Thoughts
Brianna, a housecleaner, fantasizes about killing her elderly client Phoebe and stealing all her jewelry. Brianna writes her thoughts in a diary, documenting how she intends to rig the gas line so that gas is pumped into the house all night while Phoebe is sleeping. Brianna includes the date that she wants to kill Phoebe in her most recent diary entry. As Brianna leaves Phoebe’s house, her diary accidentally falls out of her purse. Later, Phoebe finds the diary on the floor and reads it. Phoebe calls the police, gives them Brianna’s diary, and insists they arrest Brianna for attempted murder. Although Brianna’s murder plot is sinister and is documented in her diary, an arrest is improper in this case. Brianna cannot be punished for her thoughts alone. If Brianna took substantial steps toward killing Phoebe, an attempted murder charge might be appropriate. However, at this stage, Brianna is only planning a crime, not committing a crime. Phoebe may be able to go to court and get a restraining order against Brianna to prevent her from carrying out her murder plot, but Brianna cannot be incapacitated by arrest and prosecution for attempted murder in this case.
Omission to Act
An exception to the requirement of a criminal act element is omission to act. Criminal prosecution for a failure to act is rare because the government is reluctant to compel individuals to put themselves in harm’s way. However, under certain specific circumstances, omission to act can be criminalized.
An omission to act can only be criminal when the law imposes a duty to act.N.Y. Penal Law § 15.00, accessed October 25, 2010, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN015.00_15.00.html. This legal duty to act becomes an element of the crime, and the prosecution must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, along with proving the defendant’s inaction under the circumstances. Failure or omission to act is only criminal in three situations: (1) when there is a statute that creates a legal duty to act, (2) when there is a contract that creates a legal duty to act, or (3) when there is a special relationship between the parties that creates a legal duty to act. Legal duties to act vary from state to state and from state to federal.
Duty to Act Based on a Statute
When a duty to act is statutory, it usually concerns a government interest that is paramount. Some common examples of statutory duties to act are the duty to file state or federal tax returns,26 U.S.C. § 7203, accessed October 25, 2010, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/26/usc_sec_26_00007203----000-.html. the duty of health-care personnel to report gunshot wounds,Fla. Stat. Ann. § 790.24, accessed October 25, 2010, law.onecle.com/florida/crimes/790.24.html. and the duty to report child abuse.Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 620.030, accessed October 25, 2010, www.lrc.ky.gov/krs/620-00/030.pdf.
At common law, it was not criminal to stand by and refuse to help someone in danger. Some states supersede the common law by enacting Good Samaritan statutes that create a duty to assist those involved in an accident or emergency situation. Good Samaritan statutes typically contain provisions that insulate the actor from liability exposure when providing assistance.Minnesota Code § 604A.01, accessed October 25, 2010, http://law.justia.com/minnesota/codes/2005/595/604a-s01.html.
Good Samaritan Law Video
Good Samaritan Sued after Rescuing Woman in an Accident
This video is a news story on a California Supreme Court case regarding the civil liability of a Good Samaritan:
(click to see video)
Duty to Act Based on a Contract
A duty to act can be based on a contract between the defendant and another party. The most prevalent examples would be a physician’s contractual duty to help a patient or a lifeguard’s duty to save someone who is drowning. Keep in mind that experts who are not contractually bound can ignore an individual’s pleas for help without committing a crime, no matter how morally abhorrent that may seem. For example, an expert swimmer can watch someone drown if there is no statute, contract, or special relationship that creates a legal duty to act.
Duty to Act Based on a Special Relationship
A special relationship may also be the basis of a legal duty to act. The most common special relationships are parent-child, spouse-spouse, and employer-employee. Often, the rationale for creating a legal duty to act when people are in a special relationship is the dependence of one individual on another. A parent has the obligation by law to provide food, clothing, shelter, and medical care for his or her children, because children are dependent on their parents and do not have the ability to procure these items themselves. In addition, if someone puts another person in peril, there may be a duty to rescue that person.State ex rel. Kuntz v. Thirteenth Jud. Dist., 995 P.2d 951 (2000), accessed October 25, 2010, http://caselaw.findlaw.com/mt-supreme-court/1434948.html. Although this is not exactly a special relationship, the victim may be dependent on the person who created the dangerous situation because he or she may be the only one present and able to render aid. On a related note, some jurisdictions also impose a duty to continue to provide aid, once aid or assistance has started.Jones v. U.S., 308 F.2d 307 (1962), accessed October 25, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14703438613582917232&hl=en&as_sdt=2002&as_vis=1. Similar to the duty to rescue a victim the defendant has put in peril, the duty to continue to provide aid is rooted in the victim’s dependence on the defendant and the unlikely chance that another person may come along to help once the defendant has begun providing assistance.
Example of a Failure to Act That Is Noncriminal
Recall the example from Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1 "Example of Criminal Law Issues", where Clara and Linda are shopping together and Clara stands by and watches as Linda shoplifts a bra. In this example, Clara does not have a duty to report Linda for shoplifting. Clara does not have a contractual duty to report a crime in this situation because she is not a law enforcement officer or security guard obligated by an employment contract. Nor does she have a special relationship with the store mandating such a report. Unless a statute or ordinance exists to force individuals to report crimes committed in their presence, which is extremely unlikely, Clara can legally observe Linda’s shoplifting without reporting it. Of course, if Clara assists Linda with the shoplifting, she has then performed a criminal act or actus reus, and a criminal prosecution is appropriate.
Example of a Failure to Act That Is Criminal
Penelope stands on the shore at a public beach and watches as a child drowns. If Penelope’s state has a Good Samaritan law, she may have a duty to help the child based on a statute. If Penelope is the lifeguard, she may have a duty to save the child based on a contract. If Penelope is the child’s mother, she may have a duty to provide assistance based on their special relationship. If Penelope threw the child in the ocean, she may have a duty to rescue the child she put in peril. If Penelope is just a bystander, and no Good Samaritan law is in force, she has no duty to act and cannot be criminally prosecuted if the child suffers harm or drowns.
Possession as a Criminal Act
Although it is passive rather than active, possession is still considered a criminal act. The most common objects that are criminal to possess are illegal contraband, drugs, and weapons. There are two types of possession: actual possession and constructive possession. Actual possession indicates that the defendant has the item on or very near his or her person. Constructive possession indicates that the item is not on the defendant’s person, but is within the defendant’s area of control, such as inside a house or automobile with the defendant.State v. Davis, 84 Conn. App. 505 (2004), accessed February 13, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12496216636522596448&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. More than one defendant can be in possession of an object, although this would clearly be a constructive possession for at least one of them.
Because it is passive, possession should be knowing, meaning the defendant is aware that he or she possesses the item.Connecticut Jury Instructions No. 2.11-1, accessed February 13, 2011, www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part2/2.11-1.htm. As the Model Penal Code states in § 2.01(4), “[p]ossession is an act, within the meaning of this Section, if the possessor knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate his possession.” In the vast majority of states, a statute permitting a conviction for possession without this knowledge or awareness lacks the criminal intent element and would be unenforceable.
Example of an Unenforceable Possession Statute
A state has a criminal statute that prohibits “being within 100 feet of any quantity of marijuana.” Ricardo sits next to Jean on the subway. A law enforcement officer smells marijuana and does a pat-down search of Jean. He discovers that Jean has a large baggie of marijuana in his jacket pocket and arrests Jean and Ricardo for marijuana possession. Ricardo was within one hundred feet of marijuana as prohibited by the statute, but Ricardo should not be prosecuted for marijuana possession. No evidence exists to indicate that Ricardo knew Jean, or knew that Jean possessed marijuana. Thus Ricardo does not have the criminal intent or mens rea for possession, and the state’s possession statute should not be enforced against him.
Exercises
• The elements of a crime are criminal act, criminal intent, concurrence, causation, harm, and attendant circumstances. Only crimes that specify a bad result have the elements of causation and harm.
• Criminal act is usually an unlawful bodily movement that is defined in a statute, or a case in jurisdictions that allow common-law crimes.
• The criminal act must be voluntary and cannot be based solely on the status of the defendant or the defendant’s thoughts.
• An exception to the criminal act element is omission to act.
• Omission to act could be criminal if there is a statute, contract, or special relationship that creates a legal duty to act in the defendant’s situation.
• Actual possession means that the item is on or very near the defendant’s person. Constructive possession means that the item is within the defendant’s control, such as inside a house or vehicle with the defendant.
• In most states, the defendant must be aware that he or she possesses the item to be convicted of possession.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Jacqueline is diagnosed with epilepsy two years after receiving her driver’s license. While driving to a concert, Jacqueline suffers an epileptic seizure and crashes into another vehicle, injuring both of its occupants. Can Jacqueline be convicted of a crime in this situation? Why or why not?
2. Read Oler v. State, 998 S.W.2d 363 (1999). In Oler, the defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance by misrepresentation. The defendant solicited and received prescriptions for Dilaudid, a controlled substance, from four different physicians without informing them that he already had a prescription for Dilaudid. The defendant appealed, arguing that he had no legal duty to disclose his previous receipt of the drug to the physicians, and was therefore unlawfully punished for an omission to act. Did the Texas Court of Appeals uphold the defendant’s conviction? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=460187562193844690&q= 998+S.W.2d+363&hl=en&as_sdt=10000000000002.
3. Read Staples v. U.S., 511 U.S. 600 (1994). In Staples, the defendant was convicted of possession of an unregistered automatic weapon in violation of the National Firearms Act. The defendant claimed the conviction was improper because the prosecution did not prove that he knew the weapon was automatic, and the prosecution must prove this knowledge to convict under the statute. Did the US Supreme Court reverse the defendant’s conviction? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/92-1441.ZO.html. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/04%3A_The_Elements_of_a_Crime/4.00%3A_Prelude_to_The_Elements_of_a_Crime.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Describe one important function of criminal intent.
2. List the three common-law criminal intents, ranking them in order of culpability.
3. Compare specific and general intent.
4. Describe an inference that makes it easier for the prosecution to prove a general intent crime.
5. Differentiate between motive and criminal intent.
6. List and define the Model Penal Code mental states, ranking them in order of culpability.
7. Identify an exception to the requirement that every crime contain a criminal intent element.
8. Explain how transferred intent promotes justice.
9. Describe the circumstances that give rise to vicarious criminal liability.
10. Define concurrence of criminal act and intent.
Although there are exceptions that are discussed shortly, criminal intent or mens rea is an essential element of most crimes. Under the common law, all crimes consisted of an act carried out with a guilty mind. In modern society, criminal intent can be the basis for fault, and punishment according to intent is a core premise of criminal justice. As stated in Chapter 1, grading is often related to the criminal intent element. Crimes that have an “evil” intent are malum in se and subject the defendant to the most severe punishment. Crimes that lack the intent element are less common and are usually graded lower, as either misdemeanors or infractions.
States and the federal government vary in their approach to defining criminal intent, and each jurisdiction describes the criminal intent element in a criminal statute, or case, in jurisdictions that allow common-law crimes. In this section, common-law definitions of criminal intent are explored, along with definitions of the criminal mental states in the Model Penal Code.
Common-Law Criminal Intent
The common-law criminal intents ranked in order of culpability are malice aforethought, specific intent, and general intent. Statutes and cases use different words to indicate the appropriate level of intent for the criminal offense, so what follows is a basic description of the intent definitions adopted by many jurisdictions.
Malice Aforethought
Malice aforethought is a special common-law intent designated for only one crime: murder. The definition of malice aforethought is “intent to kill.” Society considers intent to kill the most evil of all intents, so malice aforethought crimes such as first- and second-degree murder generally mandate the most severe of punishments, including the death penalty in jurisdictions that allow for it. Malice aforethought and criminal homicide are discussed in detail in Chapter 9.
Specific Intent
Specific intent is the intent with the highest level of culpability for crimes other than murder. Unfortunately, criminal statutes rarely describe their intent element as “specific” or “general,” and a judge may be required to define the level of intent using the common law or a dictionary to explain a word’s ordinary meaning. Typically, specific intent means that the defendant acts with a more sophisticated level of awareness.Connecticut Jury Instructions No. 2.3-1, accessed February 14, 2011, www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part2/2.3-1.htm. Crimes that require specific intent usually fall into one of three categories: either the defendant intends to cause a certain bad result, the defendant intends to do something more than commit the criminal act, or the defendant acts with knowledge that his or her conduct is illegal, which is called scienter.
Example of Specific Intent to Bring about a Bad Result
A state statute defines mayhem as “physical contact with another, inflicted with the intent to maim, disfigure, or scar.” This statute describes a specific intent crime. To be guilty of mayhem under the statute, the defendant must inflict the physical contact with the intent of causing the bad result of maiming, disfigurement, or scarring. If the prosecution cannot prove this high-level intent, the defendant may be acquitted (or charged and convicted of a lower-level intent crime like battery).
So if Pauline says, “It’s time to permanently mess up that pretty face,” and thereafter takes out a razor and slices Peter’s cheek with it, Pauline might be found guilty of mayhem. On the other hand, if Pauline slaps Peter while he is shaving without making the comment, and the razor bites into his cheek, it is more challenging to prove that she intended a scarring, and Pauline might be found guilty only of battery.
Example of Specific Intent to Do More than the Criminal Act
A state statute defines theft as “a permanent taking of property belonging to another.” This statute describes a specific intent crime. To be guilty of theft under the statute, the defendant must intend to do more than “take the property of another,” which is the criminal act. The defendant must also intend to keep the property permanently.
So if Pauline borrows Peter’s razor to shave her legs, she has “taken the property of another,” but she has not committed theft for the simple reason that she intends to return the property after use.
Example of Scienter
Although the terms mens rea and scienter are sometimes used interchangeably, many jurisdictions define scienter as knowledge that an act is illegal. Scienter can be the basis of specific intent in some statutes. So a statute that makes it a crime to “willfully file a false tax return” may require knowledge that the tax return includes false information and that it will be unlawful to file it.U.S. v. Pompanio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976), accessed October 28, 2010, http://supreme.justia.com/us/429/10/case.html. If the prosecution fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew his or her conduct was illegal, this could nullify scienter, and the prosecution cannot prove specific intent.
General Intent
General intent is less sophisticated than specific intent. Thus general intent crimes are easier to prove and can also result in a less severe punishment. A basic definition of general intent is the intent to perform the criminal act or actus reus. If the defendant acts intentionally but without the additional desire to bring about a certain result, or do anything other than the criminal act itself, the defendant has acted with general intent.People v. McDaniel, 597 P.2d 124 (1979), accessed February 14, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8266915507346002022&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
Inference of General Intent
Intent is a notoriously difficult element to prove because it is locked inside the defendant’s mind. Ordinarily, the only direct evidence of intent is a defendant’s confession, which the government cannot forcibly obtain because of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Witnesses who hear the defendant express intent are often unable to testify about it because of evidentiary rules prohibiting hearsay. However, many jurisdictions allow an inference of general intent based on the criminal act.Commonwealth v. Ely, 444 N.E.2d 1276 (1983), accessed February 13, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=369554378994187453&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. In essence, if the jury accepts the inference, the prosecution does not have the burden of proving intent for a general intent crime.
Example of a General Intent Crime and an Inference of Intent
A state statute defines battery as “intentional harmful or offensive physical contact with another.” This statute describes a general intent crime. To be guilty of battery under the statute, the defendant must only intend the harmful or offensive contact. The defendant does not have to desire that the contact produces a specific result, such as scarring, or death; nor does the defendant need scienter, or awareness that the physical contact is illegal.
If Addie balls up her fist and punches Eddie in the jaw after Eddie calls her a “stupid idiot,” Addie has probably committed battery under the statute. A prosecutor could prove that Addie committed the act of harmful or offensive contact using Eddie’s testimony and a physician’s report. The jury could thereafter be instructed to “infer intent from proof of the act.” If the jury accepts the inference and determines that Addie committed the criminal act, the jury could find Addie guilty of battery without additional evidence of intent.
Motive
Intent should not be confused with motive, which is the reason the defendant commits the criminal act or actus reus. Motive can generate intent, support a defense, and be used to determine sentencing. However, motive alone does not constitute mens rea and does not act as a substitute for criminal intent.
Example of Motive
Isabella, a housewife with no criminal record, sits quietly in court waiting to hear the jury verdict in a trial for the rape of her teenage daughter by Ignatius. Ignatius has been convicted of child rape in three previous incidents. The jury foreman announces the decision finding Ignatius not guilty. Ignatius looks over his shoulder at Isabella and smirks. Isabella calmly pulls a loaded revolver out of her purse, and then shoots and kills Ignatius. In this case, Isabella’s motive is revenge for the rape of her teenage daughter, or the desire to protect other women from Ignatius’ conduct. This motive generated Isabella’s criminal intent, which is malice aforethought or intent to kill. In spite of Isabella’s motive, which is probably understandable under the circumstances, Isabella can be found guilty of murder because she acted with the murder mens rea. However, Isabella’s motive may be introduced at sentencing and may result in a reduced sentence such as life in prison rather than the death penalty. In addition, Isabella’s motive may affect a prosecutor’s decision to seek the death penalty at all because this would probably be disfavored by the public.
Model Penal Code Criminal Intent
The Model Penal Code divides criminal intent into four states of mind listed in order of culpability: purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently.
Purposely
A defendant who acts purposely intends to engage in conduct of that nature and intends to cause a certain result.N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 626:2(II)(a), accessed February 14, 2011, http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/LXII/626/626-2.htm. Purposeful criminal intent resembles specific intent to cause harm, which was discussed previously. As the Model Penal Code states, “[a] person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result” (Model Penal Code § 2.02 (2) (a)).
Example of Purposely
Review the example given in Section 4, where Pauline takes out a razor and slices Peter’s cheek. In this example, Pauline is aware of the nature of the act (slicing someone’s cheek with a razor). Pauline also appears to be acting with the intent to cause a specific result, based on her statement to Peter. Thus Pauline is acting with specific intent or purposely and can probably be convicted of some form of aggravated battery or mayhem in most jurisdictions.
Knowingly
Knowingly indicates that the defendant is aware of the nature of the act and its probable consequences.Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(2), accessed February 14, 2011, le.utah.gov/~code/TITLE76/htm/76_02_010300.htm. Knowingly differs from purposely in that the defendant is not acting to cause a certain result but is acting with the awareness that the result is practically certain to occur.State v. Huff, 469 A.2d 1251 (1984), accessed February 14, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4287195880403875631&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. The Model Penal Code describes knowingly as follows: “A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when…he is aware that his conduct is of that nature…if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result” (Model Penal Code in § 2.02(2) (b)).
Example of Knowingly
Victor brags to his girlfriend Tanya that he can shoot into a densely packed crowd of people on the subway train without hitting any of them. Tanya dares Victor to try it. Victor removes a concealed weapon from his waistband and shoots, aiming at a group of people standing with their back to him. The shot kills Monica, who is standing the closest to Victor. In this case, Victor did not intend to shoot Monica. In fact, Victor’s goal was to shoot and miss all the standing subway passengers. However, Victor was aware that he was shooting a loaded gun (the nature of the act) and was also practically certain that shooting into a crowd would result in somebody getting hurt or killed. Thus Victor acted knowingly according to the Model Penal Code. If the state in which Victor shoots Monica defines murder intent as knowingly under the Model Penal Code, then Victor has most likely committed murder in this case.
Recklessly
Recklessly is a lower level of culpability than knowingly, and reckless intent crimes are not as common as offenses criminalizing purposeful, knowing conduct. The degree of risk awareness is key to distinguishing a reckless intent crime from a knowing intent crime. A defendant acts recklessly if he or she consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the bad result or harm will occur.Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-1-501(8), accessed February 14, 2011, www.michie.com/colorado/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&cp=. This is different from a knowing intent crime, where the defendant must be “practically certain” of the bad results. The reckless intent test is two pronged. First, the defendant must consciously disregard a substantial risk of harm. The standard is subjective; the defendant must know of the substantial risk. Second, the defendant must take an unjustifiable risk, meaning that no valid reason exists for the risk. The standard for this prong is objective; if a reasonable person would not take the risk, then the defendant’s action in taking it is reckless. As the Model Penal Code states, “[t]he risk must be of such a nature and degree that…its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation” (Model Penal Code § 2.02(2) (c)).
Example of Recklessly
Review the example in Section 4, where Victor shoots into a crowd of subway travelers and kills Monica. Change the example, and imagine that the subway train has only three passengers. Victor easily shoots in between them, yet the bullet ricochets off one of the seats and strikes Monica, killing her. Victor would be acting with reckless rather than knowing intent in this situation. Victor’s knowledge and awareness of the risk of injury or death when shooting a gun inside a subway car containing three passengers is probably substantial. A reasonable, law-abiding person would probably not take this action under these circumstances. Thus Victor might be charged with a lower-level form of criminal homicide like manslaughter in this case. The difference between murder and manslaughter is discussed in detail in Chapter 9.
Negligently
Negligent intent crimes are less culpable than reckless intent crimes and are also less common. The difference between reckless and negligent intent is the defendant’s lack of awareness. While defendants committing negligent intent crimes are also faced with a substantial and unjustifiable risk, they are unaware of it, even though a reasonable person would be.Idaho Code Ann. § 18-101(2), accessed February 14, 2011, www.legislature.idaho.gov/idstat/Title18/T18CH1SECT18-101.htm. Thus the first prong of the reckless intent test is simply changed from a subjective to objective standard. As the Model Penal Code states, “[a] person acts negligently…when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct”(Model Penal Code § 2.02(2) (d)).
Example of Negligently
Review the example in Section 4, where Victor shoots into a crowd of subway travelers and kills Monica. Change the example, and imagine that the subway train has no passengers. Victor brags to Tanya that he can shoot a crumpled napkin on the floor. Tanya challenges him to try it. Victor shoots at the napkin and misses, and the bullet ricochets three times off three different seats, travels backward, and strikes Tanya in the forehead, killing her instantly. In this case, Victor may be unaware of the bullet’s potential to ricochet several times and actually travel backward. However, the trier of fact can determine that a “reasonable person” would be aware that shooting a gun inside a small subway train could result in injury or death. This would be a finding that Victor acted negligently, under the circumstances. If the state in which Victor shot Tanya criminalizes negligent killings, then Victor could be found guilty of criminal homicide in this case.
Elements and Criminal Intent
Occasionally, different criminal intents support the various elements of an offense. If a crime requires more than one criminal intent, each criminal intent must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt for each element.
Under the common law, every offense had just one criminal intent. In modern society, every offense has one criminal intent unless a statute specifies otherwise. As the Model Penal Code states, “[w]hen the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of an offense, without distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all of the material elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears” (Model Penal Code § 2.02(4)).
Example of a Crime That Requires More Than One Criminal Intent
A state statute defines burglary as “breaking and entering into a residence at nighttime with the intent to commit a felony once inside.” In this statute, the elements are the following: (1) breaking, (2) and entering, (3) into a residence, (4) at nighttime. Breaking and entering are two criminal act elements. They must be committed with the specific intent, or purposely, to commit a felony once inside the residence. The elements of residence and nighttime are two attendant circumstances, which most likely have the lower level of general intent or knowingly. Thus this statute has four separate criminal intents that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt for conviction.
Strict Liability
An exception to the requirement of a criminal intent element is strict liability. Strict liability offenses have no intent element.Ala. Code § 13A-2-3, accessed February 14, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-2-3.html. This is a modern statutory trend, which abrogates the common-law approach that behavior is only criminal when the defendant commits acts with a guilty mind. Sometimes the rationale for strict liability crimes is the protection of the public’s health, safety, and welfare. Thus strict liability offenses are often vehicle code or tax code violations, mandating a less severe punishment.Tex. Penal Code § 49.04, accessed February 14, 2011, law.onecle.com/texas/penal/49.04.00.html. With a strict liability crime, the prosecution has to prove only the criminal act and possibly causation and harm or attendant circumstances, depending on the elements of the offense.
Example of a Strict Liability Offense
A vehicle code provision makes it a crime to “travel in a vehicle over the posted speed limit.” This is a strict liability offense. So if a law enforcement officer captures radar information that indicates Susie was traveling in a vehicle five miles per hour over the posted speed limit, Susie can probably be convicted of speeding under the statute. Susie’s protests that she “didn’t know she was traveling at that speed,” are not a valid defense. Susie’s knowledge of the nature of the act is irrelevant. The prosecution only needs to prove the criminal act to convict Susie because this statute is strict liability and does not require proof of criminal intent.
Transferred Intent
Occasionally, the defendant’s criminal intent is not directed toward the victim. Depending on the jurisdiction, this may result in a transfer of the defendant’s intent from the intended victim to the eventual victim, for the purpose of fairness.N.Y. Penal Law § 125.27(1), accessed February 14, 2011, http://www.nycourts.gov/cji/2-PenalLaw/125/125.27/Capital-Crimes/AC.125.Transferred-Intent.pdf. Although this is a legal fiction, it can be necessary to reach a just result. Transferred intent is only relevant in crimes that require a bad result or victim. In a case where intent is transferred, the defendant could receive more than one criminal charge, such as a charge for “attempting” to commit a crime against the intended victim. Attempt and transferred intent are discussed in detail in Chapter 8.
Example of Transferred Intent
Billy and his brother Ronnie get into an argument at a crowded bar. Billy balls up his fist and swings, aiming for Ronnie’s face. Ronnie ducks and Billy punches Amanda in the face instead. Billy did not intend to batter Amanda. However, it is unjust to allow this protective action of Ronnie’s to excuse Billy’s conduct. Thus Billy’s intent to hit Ronnie transfers in some jurisdictions over to Amanda. Billy can also be charged with attempted battery, which is assault, of Ronnie, resulting in two crimes rather than one under the transferred intent doctrine.
Vicarious Liability
Vicarious liability is similar to respondeat superior, a civil law concept discussed in Chapter 1. Vicarious liability transfers a defendant’s responsibility for the crime to a different defendant, on the basis of a special relationship. Under a theory of vicarious liability, the defendant does not need to commit the criminal act supported by criminal intent. The defendant just has to be involved with the criminal actor in a legally defined relationship. As in civil law, vicarious liability is common between employers and employees.
Corporate liability is a type of vicarious liability that allows a corporation to be prosecuted for a crime apart from its owners, agents, and employees.720 ILCS 5/5-4, accessed February 14, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/illinois/720ilcs5/5-4.html. This is a modern concept that did not exist at early common law. Although corporations cannot be incarcerated, they can be fined. Vicarious liability and corporate liability are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.
Example of Vicarious Liability
Don hires James to work in his liquor store. James is specially trained to ask for the identification of any individual who appears to be under the age of thirty and attempts to buy alcohol. One night, James sells alcohol to Ashley and does not request identification because Ashley is attractive and James wants to ask her out on a date. Unfortunately, Ashley is underage and is participating in a sting operation with local law enforcement. Certain statutes could subject Don to criminal prosecution for selling alcohol to an underage person like Ashley, even though Don did not personally participate in the sale. Because Don is James’s employer, he may be vicariously liable for James’s on-the-job conduct in this instance.
Concurrence of Act and Intent
Another element of most criminal offenses is the requirement that the criminal act and criminal intent exist at the same moment.California Criminal Jury Instructions No. 252, accessed February 14, 2011, http://www.justia.com/criminal/docs/calcrim/200/252.html. This element is called concurrence. Concurrence is rarely an issue in a criminal prosecution because the criminal intent usually generates the bodily response (criminal act). However, in some rare instances, the criminal act and intent are separated by time, in which case concurrence is lacking and the defendant cannot be convicted of a crime.
Example of a Situation Lacking Concurrence
Sherree decides she wants to kill her husband using a handgun. As Sherree is driving to the local gun shop to purchase the handgun, her husband is distracted and steps in front of her car. Sherree slams on the brakes as a reflex, but unfortunately she is unable to avoid striking and killing her husband. Sherree cannot be prosecuted for criminal homicide in this case. Although Sherree had formulated the intent to kill, the intent to kill did not exist at the moment she committed the criminal act of hitting her husband with her vehicle. In fact, Sherree was trying to avoid hitting her husband at the moment he was killed. Thus this case lacks concurrence of act and intent, and Sherree is not guilty of criminal homicide.
Exercises
• One important function of intent is the determination of punishment. In general, the more evil the intent, the more severe the punishment.
• The three common-law intents ranked in order of culpability are malice aforethought, specific intent, and general intent.
• Specific intent is the intent to bring about a certain result, do something other than the criminal act, or scienter. General intent is simply the intent to perform the criminal act.
• With a general intent crime, the trier of fact may infer intent from the criminal act. This alleviates the prosecution’s burden of proving criminal intent.
• Motive is the reason the defendant commits the criminal act. Motive standing alone is not enough to prove criminal intent.
• The Model Penal Code’s criminal states of mind ranked in order of culpability are purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently. Purposely is similar to specific intent to cause a particular result. Knowingly is awareness that results are practically certain to occur. Recklessly is a subjective awareness of a risk of harm, and an objective and unjustified disregard of that risk. Negligently is not being aware of a substantial risk of harm when a reasonable person would be.
• The exception to the requirement that every crime contain a criminal intent element is strict liability.
• Transferred intent promotes justice by holding a defendant responsible for his or her criminal conduct, even though the conduct was intended to harm a different victim.
• Vicarious liability is the transfer of criminal liability from one criminal defendant to another based on a special relationship.
• Concurrence requires that act and intent exist at the same moment.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. As Jordan is driving to school, she takes her eyes off the road for a moment and rummages through her purse for her phone. This causes her to run a stop sign. Jordan is thereafter pulled over by law enforcement and issued a traffic ticket. What is Jordan’s criminal intent in this case? Is Jordan criminally responsible for running the stop sign? Why or why not?
2. Read Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246 (1952). In Morissette, the defendant was convicted of unlawful conversion of federal property for gathering and selling spent bomb casings dropped during US Air Force practice maneuvers. The statute required “knowing” conversion of the property, and the defendant claimed he believed the property was abandoned. Did the US Supreme Court uphold the defendant’s conviction? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=787130527265701764&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
3. Read State v. Crosby, 154 P.3d 97 (2007). In Crosby, the defendant was convicted of manslaughter of a dependent person by neglect. The defendant’s mother died of “sepsis” and was brought to the hospital covered with feces and bedsores. The defendant was her mother’s caregiver. The jury was instructed that the defendant possessed the mental state of “recklessness” under the statute if she disregarded a substantial risk of harm or circumstances. The jury asked the judge if “circumstances” included the bedsores or just death. He responded that the risk could be more than just death and left it up to the jury to decide. Did the Supreme Court of Oregon uphold the defendant’s conviction? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10006178173306648171&q= State+v.+Crosby+S53295&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5.
4. Read State v. Horner, 126 Ohio St. 3d 466 (2010). In Horner, the defendant pleaded no contest to aggravated robbery. The defendant’s pre-plea indictment did not contain a mens rea element for aggravated robbery, just the mens rea for theft. The defendant moved to dismiss the no contest plea, based on the fact that the indictment was defective for lacking the mens rea element. Did the Ohio Supreme Court find the indictment defective? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2010/2010-ohio-3830.pdf.
LAW AND ETHICS: DEAN V. U.S.
Ten Years Imprisonment for an Accident?
“Accidents happen. Sometimes they happen to individuals committing crimes with loaded guns.” Read Dean v. U.S., 129 S. Ct. 1849 (2009)), which is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10945987555184039397&q= Dean+v.+U.S.&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5.
In Dean, the defendant was sentenced to ten years imprisonment under a federal sentencing enhancement for an accidental discharge of his firearm during a bank robbery. The prosecution presented evidence at trial indicating that the defendant went into the bank wearing a mask and carrying a loaded firearm. The defendant told everyone in the bank to “get down,” and then went behind the tellers’ station and began grabbing money with his left hand. The gun in his right hand discharged. The defendant seemed surprised by the discharge, cursed, and ran out of the bank. No one was injured or hurt during the robbery.
The defendant thereafter admitted he committed the robbery. The US Supreme Court upheld the defendant’s sentencing, in spite of the fact that there was no evidence of intent to discharge the firearm. The Court based its holding on the plain meaning of the statute requiring a minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment when a firearm is discharged during a robbery. The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (A), does not expressly state a criminal intent requirement. The Court further held that a presumption of criminal intent was not required. As the Court stated, “[i]t is unusual to impose criminal punishment for the consequences of purely accidental conduct. But it is not unusual to punish individuals for the unintended consequences of their unlawful acts” (Dean v. U.S., 129 S. Ct. 1849, 1855 (2009)).
1. Do you think it is ethical to sentence Dean to ten years’ imprisonment for his accidental conduct in this case? Why or why not?
Check your answer using the answer key at the end of the chapter. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/04%3A_The_Elements_of_a_Crime/4.02%3A_Criminal_Intent.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Distinguish between factual and legal cause.
2. Define intervening superseding cause, and explain the role it plays in the defendant’s criminal liability.
3. Define one and three years and a day rules.
As stated previously, causation and harm can also be elements of a criminal offense if the offense requires a bad result. In essence, if injury is required under the statute, or the case is in a jurisdiction that allows for common-law crimes, the defendant must cause the requisite harm. Many incidents occur when the defendant technically initiates circumstances that result in harm, but it would be unjust to hold the defendant criminally responsible. Thus causation should not be rigidly determined in every instance, and the trier of fact must perform an analysis that promotes fairness. In this section, causation in fact and legal causation are examined as well as situations where the defendant may be insulated from criminal responsibility.
Causation in Fact
Every causation analysis is twofold. First, the defendant must be the factual or but for cause of the victim’s harm. The but for term comes from this phrase: “but for the defendant’s act, the harm would not have occurred.”Del. Code Ann. tit. II, § 261, accessed February 14, 2011, delcode.delaware.gov/title11/c002/index.shtml#261. As the Model Penal Code states, “[c]onduct is the cause of a result when…(a) it is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred” (Model Penal Code § 2.03(1)(a)). Basically, the defendant is the factual or but for cause of the victim’s harm if the defendant’s act starts the chain of events that leads to the eventual result.
Example of Factual Cause
Henry and Mary get into an argument over their child custody agreement. Henry gives Mary a hard shove. Mary staggers backward, is struck by lightning, and dies instantly. In this example, Henry’s act forced Mary to move into the area where the lighting happened to strike. However, it would be unjust to punish Henry for Mary’s death in this case because Henry could not have imagined the eventual result. Thus although Henry is the factual or but for cause of Mary’s death, he is probably not the legal cause.
Legal Causation
It is the second part of the analysis that ensures fairness in the application of the causation element. The defendant must also be the legal or proximate cause of the harm. Proximate means “near,” so the defendant’s conduct must be closely related to the harm it engenders. As the Model Penal Code states, the actual result cannot be “too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a [just] bearing on the actor’s liability” (Model Penal Code § 2.03 (2) (b)).
The test for legal causation is objective foreseeability.California Criminal Jury Instructions No. 520, accessed February 14, 2011, http://www.justia.com/criminal/docs/calcrim/500/520.html. The trier of fact must be convinced that when the defendant acted, a reasonable person could have foreseen or predicted that the end result would occur. In the example given in Section 4, Henry is not the legal cause of Mary’s death because a reasonable person could have neither foreseen nor predicted that a shove would push Mary into a spot where lightning was about to strike.
The Model Penal Code adjusts the legal causation foreseeability requirement depending on whether the defendant acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently. If the defendant’s behavior is reckless or negligent, the legal causation foreseeability requirement is analyzed based on the risk of harm, rather than the purpose of the defendant.
Example of Legal Causation
Imagine that Henry and Mary get into the same argument over their child custody agreement, but this time they are in their garage, which is crowded with furniture. Henry gives Mary a hard shove, even though she is standing directly in front of a large entertainment center filled with books and a heavy thirty-two-inch television set. Mary staggers backward into the entertainment center and it crashes down on top of her, killing her. In this situation, Henry is the factual cause of Mary’s death because he started the chain of events that led to her death with his push. In addition, it is foreseeable that Mary might suffer a serious injury or death when shoved directly into a large and heavy piece of furniture. Thus in this example, Henry could be the factual and legal cause of Mary’s death. It is up to the trier of fact to make this determination based on an assessment of objective foreseeability and the attendant circumstances.
Intervening Superseding Cause
Another situation where the defendant is the factual but not the legal cause of the requisite harm is when something or someone interrupts the chain of events started by the defendant. This is called an intervening superseding cause. Typically, an intervening superseding cause cuts the defendant off from criminal liability because it is much closer, or proximate, to the resulting harm.Connecticut Jury Instructions No. 2.6-1, accessed February 14, 2011, www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part2/2.6-1.htm. If an intervening superseding cause is a different individual acting with criminal intent, the intervening individual is criminally responsible for the harm caused.
Example of an Intervening Superseding Cause
Review the example with Henry and Mary in Section 4. Change the example so that Henry pulls out a knife and chases Mary out of the garage. Mary escapes Henry and hides in an abandoned shed. Half an hour later, Wes, a homeless man living in the shed, returns from a day of panhandling. When he discovers Mary in the shed, he kills her and steals her money and jewelry. In this case, Henry is still the factual cause of Mary’s death, because he chased her into the shed where she was eventually killed. However, Wes is probably the intervening superseding cause of Mary’s death because he interrupted the chain of events started by Henry. Thus Wes is subject to prosecution for Mary’s death, and Henry may be prosecuted only for assault with a deadly weapon.
One and Three Years and a Day Rules
In criminal homicide cases, the causation analysis could be complicated by a victim’s survival for an extended time period. Because of modern technology, victims often stay alive on machines for many years after they have been harmed. However, it may be unreasonable to hold a defendant responsible for a death that occurs several years after the defendant’s criminal act. A few states have rules that solve this dilemma.
Some states have either a one year and a day rule or a three years and a day rule.S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2910, accessed February 15, 2011, www.scstatehouse.gov/code/t56c005.htm. These rules create a timeline for the victim’s death that changes the causation analysis in a criminal homicide case. Under one or three years and a day rules, the victim of a criminal homicide must die within the specified time limits for the defendant to be criminally responsible. If the victim does not die within the time limits, the defendant may be charged with attempted murder, rather than criminal homicide. California makes the timeline a rebuttable presumption that can be overcome with evidence proving that the conduct was criminal and the defendant should still be convicted.Cal. Penal Code § 194, accessed February 14, 2011, http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/cacode/PEN/3/1/8/1/s194.
Death timeline rules are often embodied in a state’s common law and have lost popularity in recent years.Key v. State, 890 So.2d 1043 (2002), accessed February 15, 2011, www.lexisone.com/lx1/caselaw/freecaselaw?action= OCLGetCaseDetail&format=FULL&sourceID=beehed&searchTerm= efiQ.QLea.aadj.eaOS&searchFlag=y&l1loc=FCLOW. Thus many states have abolished arbitrary time limits for the victim’s death in favor of ordinary principles of legal causation.Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 541 (2001), accessed February 14, 2011, http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=000&invol=99-6218. Death timeline rules are not to be confused with the statute of limitations, which is the time limit the government has to prosecute a criminal defendant.
Exercises
• Factual cause means that the defendant starts the chain of events leading to the harm. Legal cause means that the defendant is held criminally responsible for the harm because the harm is a foreseeable result of the defendant’s criminal act.
• An intervening superseding cause breaks the chain of events started by the defendant’s act and cuts the defendant off from criminal responsibility.
• One and three years and a day rules create a timeline for the victim’s death in a criminal homicide.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Phillipa sees Fred picking up trash along the highway and decides she wants to frighten him. She drives a quarter of a mile ahead of Fred and parks her car. She then hides in the bushes and waits for Fred to show up. When Fred gets close enough, she jumps out of the bushes screaming. Frightened, Fred drops his trash bag and runs into the middle of the highway where he is struck by a vehicle and killed. Is Phillipa’s act the legal cause of Fred’s death? Why or why not?
2. Read Bullock v. State, 775 A.2d. 1043 (2001). In Bullock, the defendant was convicted of manslaughter based on a vehicle collision that occurred when his vehicle hit the victim’s vehicle in an intersection. The defendant was under the influence of alcohol and traveling thirty miles per hour over the speed limit. The victim was in the intersection unlawfully because the light was red. The defendant claimed that the victim was the intervening superseding cause of her own death. Did the Supreme Court of Delaware agree? The case is available at this link: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/de-supreme-court/1137701.html.
3. Read Commonwealth v. Casanova, 429 Mass. 293 (1999). In Casanova, the defendant shot the victim in 1991, paralyzing him. The defendant was convicted of assault with intent to murder and two firearms offenses. In 1996, the victim died. The defendant was thereafter indicted for his murder. Massachusetts had abolished the year and a day rule in 1980. Did the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court uphold the indictment, or did the court establish a new death timeline rule? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16055857562232849296&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/04%3A_The_Elements_of_a_Crime/4.03%3A_Causation_and_Harm.txt |
Summary
Crimes are made up of parts, referred to as elements. The criminal elements are criminal act or actus reus, criminal intent or mens rea, concurrence, causation, harm, and attendant circumstances. Only crimes that specify a bad result require the causation and harm elements.
Criminal acts must be voluntary or controllable and cannot consist solely of the defendant’s status or thoughts. Just one voluntary act is needed for a crime, so if a voluntary act is followed by an involuntary act, the defendant can still be criminally responsible. Omission or failure to act can also be criminal if there is a duty to act based on a statute, contract, or special relationship. Possession is passive, but it can still be a criminal act. The most common items that are criminal to possess are illegal contraband, drugs, and weapons. Possession can be actual if the item is on or very near the defendant’s person, or constructive if within an area of the defendant’s control, like inside the defendant’s house or vehicle. More than one defendant can be in possession of one item. Criminal possession should be supported by the intent of awareness because it is passive.
Criminal intent is an important element because it is often one factor considered in the grading of criminal offenses. The three common-law criminal intents are malice aforethought, which is intent to kill, specific intent, and general intent. Specific intent is the intent to bring about a particular result, a higher level of awareness than is required to perform the criminal act, or scienter, which is knowledge that a criminal act is unlawful. General intent is the intent to do the act and can often give rise to an inference of criminal intent from proof of the criminal act. Motive should not be confused with or replace intent. Motive is the reason the defendant develops criminal intent.
The Model Penal Code describes four criminal states of mind, which are purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently. Purposely is similar to specific intent to cause a particular result. Knowingly is awareness that results are practically certain to occur. Recklessly is a subjective awareness of a risk of harm and an objective and unjustified disregard of that risk. Negligently is not being aware of a substantial risk of harm when a reasonable person would be. Offense elements, including specified attendant circumstances, may require different mental states. If so, the prosecution must prove each mental state for every element beyond a reasonable doubt.
Strict liability crimes do not require an intent element and are generally malum prohibitum, with a less severe punishment. Transferred intent is a legal fiction that transfers a defendant’s criminal intent to an unintended victim for the purpose of fairness. Pursuant to transferred intent, the defendant may be responsible for two crimes: attempt and the completed crime, depending on the circumstances. Vicarious liability transfers a defendant’s criminal liability to a different defendant based on a special relationship. Corporate liability is a type of vicarious liability that holds a corporation responsible for crimes apart from its owners, agents, and employees. Concurrence is also a criminal element that requires the criminal act and criminal intent exist at the same moment.
When the crime requires a bad result, the defendant must cause the harm. The defendant must be the factual and legal cause. Factual cause means that the defendant starts the chain of events that leads to the bad result. Legal or proximate cause means that it is objectively foreseeable that the end result will occur when the defendant commits the criminal act. An intervening superseding cause breaks the chain of events started by the defendant’s criminal act and insulates the defendant from criminal liability. When the intervening superseding cause is an individual, the intervening individual is criminally responsible for the crime. Some states have rules that protect the defendant from criminal responsibility for homicide when the victim lives a long time after the criminal act. These death timeline rules require the victim to die within one or three years and a day from the defendant’s criminal act and are becoming increasingly unpopular. Many states have abolished death timeline rules in favor of ordinary principles of legal causation.
YOU BE THE LAW STUDENT
Read the prompt, review the case, and then decide whether the issue is the defendant’s criminal act or criminal intent. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Read State v. Andrews, 572 S.E.2d 798 (2002). In Andrews, the defendant took Prozac and Effexor for one day. The next day, the defendant ran his wife and her friend down with his car. After hitting both victims, the defendant jumped out of the car and stabbed his wife three times. He was convicted of attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon against both victims. He appealed on the grounds that the jury was given an improper instruction as to his criminal responsibility for the crimes committed against his wife’s friend. Did the Court of Appeals of North Carolina hold that this is an issue of criminal act or criminal intent? The case is available at this link: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/nc-court-of-appeals/1197459.html.
2. Read State v. Sowry, 155 Ohio App. 3d 742 (2004). In Sowry, Ohio police arrested the defendant and brought him to jail. Before booking the defendant, the police asked him whether he had any drugs on his person. He responded “no.” The police thereafter searched him and discovered a plastic bag of marijuana in his pocket. The defendant was later convicted of knowingly conveying drugs onto the grounds of a detention facility. The defendant appealed and was successful. Did the Court of Appeals of Ohio hold that this is an issue of criminal act or criminal intent? The case is available at this link: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/2/2004/2004-Ohio-399.pdf.
3. Read Regalado v. U.S., 572 A.2d 416 (1990). In Regalado, the defendant was convicted of animal cruelty for punching a puppy repeatedly in the face. The defendant appealed, claiming that he was merely “disciplining” the puppy. Did the District of Columbia Court of Appeals hold that this is an issue of criminal act or criminal intent? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10084482120424691457&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
4. Read State v. Slayton, 154 P.3d 1057 (2007). In Slayton, the defendant received a hunting permit, hired a guide, and thereafter shot an elk and carried it out of the area. The defendant’s hunting permit was valid in only a limited location, and the defendant shot the elk outside that location. The defendant was convicted of unauthorized hunting and transporting wildlife. The Arizona Superior Court vacated the defendant’s convictions, the state appealed, and the Court of Appeals of Arizona reversed. Did the Court of Appeals of Arizona hold that this is an issue of criminal act or criminal intent? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13377680343653410685&q= State+v.+Slayton&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2006.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 4.1
1. Jacqueline can be convicted of a crime in this situation. Although an epileptic seizure is not a voluntary act, Jacqueline’s conduct in driving while aware that she has epilepsy is. Only one voluntary act is required for a crime, and Jacqueline was able to control her decision making in this instance. Punishing Jacqueline for driving with epilepsy could specifically deter Jacqueline from driving on another occasion and is appropriate under the circumstances.
2. The Texas Court of Appeals upheld the defendant’s indictment and conviction. The court stated that the defendant’s conduct in deliberately seeking out four physicians and presenting his medical problem to them with the intent to gain a prescription for a controlled substance in violation of Texas law is a criminal act, not an omission to act.
3. The US Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction and held that the prosecution must prove that the defendant knew the weapon was automatic to convict him of failure to register an automatic weapon.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 4.2
1. Jordan is acting recklessly or negligently. If Jordan is an experienced driver, then she knows that there is a substantial risk of injury or harm when a driver takes his or her eyes off the road. If Jordan is not an experienced driver, she may not be aware of the risk, but she should be because she has been trained to drive and has passed exams and practical driving tests that emphasize this fact. Whether Jordan’s intent is reckless or negligent is probably irrelevant because most states make running a stop sign a strict liability offense with no criminal intent required.
2. The US Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction. The Court disagreed with the lower court that this was a strict liability public welfare offense and determined that a presumption of intent was inappropriate. The Court held that criminal intent was an element of the offense that the trier of fact needed to find beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. The Oregon Supreme Court reversed and held that the substantial risk applied to the victim’s death (bad result), not the victim’s bedsores (attendant circumstances).
4. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the indictment was valid and that the statute clearly intended for aggravated robbery to be a strict liability offense lacking mens rea.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 4.3
1. Phillipa’s act is the factual and legal cause of Fred’s death. Phillipa’s act in jumping out of the bushes screaming caused Fred to run onto the highway, so Phillipa’s act is the factual cause of Fred’s death. In addition, a reasonable person could foresee that frightening someone next to a major highway might result in them trying to escape onto the highway, where a vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed could hit them. Thus Phillipa’s act is also the legal cause of Fred’s death.
2. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction based on a jury instruction that did not include the victim’s actions. The Delaware Supreme Court held that the defendant’s acts could not be the legal cause of death unless the result of the defendant’s acts was foreseeable. Foreseeability in this case could only be analyzed if the jury instructions address the victim’s behavior.
3. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the defendant’s indictment, and did not create a new death timeline rule.
Answer to Law and Ethics Question
1. Although ten years is a lengthy prison sentence, it may be ethical even for a criminal act committed without criminal intent if there is a potential for harm. In Dean, the defendant may have discharged the firearm unintentionally, but there was a great potential for injury. The defendant was inside a bank filled with employees and customers. Although the defendant’s shot did not cause physical injury to any of the bank’s occupants, this was mere happenstance. The defendant could have shot and killed someone. If a security guard was startled by the gunshot, a shootout may have occurred, injuring many more individuals. Thus punishing a defendant for an act that lacks criminal intent (and harm) could fulfill specific and general deterrence. Criminal intent and harm are only two factors to be considered when grading crimes. If other purposes of punishment are applicable, they can also be considered as factors.
Answers to You Be the Law Student
1. The Court of Appeals of North Carolina held that the defendant was criminally responsible for hitting his wife’s friend under a theory of transferred intent. Thus this is an issue of criminal intent. The Court of Appeals held that transferred intent applies even when the defendant injures the intended victim.
2. The Court of Appeals of Ohio held that the defendant did not choose to bring drugs to the jail; the police forcibly took him there. Thus there was no voluntary criminal act.
3. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction, holding that the animal cruelty statute required proof of general intent plus malice, which the defendant demonstrated with his beating of the puppy. Thus this is an issue of criminal intent.
4. The Court of Appeals of Arizona held that the statutes the defendant violated are strict liability, so the fact that the defendant may have been mistaken as to the limited location authorized by his hunting permit is irrelevant. Thus this is an issue of criminal intent. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/04%3A_The_Elements_of_a_Crime/4.04%3A_End-of-Chapter_Material.txt |
A person who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter a person’s dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle is presumed to be doing so with the intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or violence…
- Fla. Stat. Ann. §776.013(4), cited in Section 5.3.3 "Defense of Habitation"
Source: Image courtesy of Tara Storm.
5.01: Criminal Defenses
Learning Objectives
1. Distinguish between a denial or failure of proof defense and an affirmative defense.
2. Distinguish between imperfect and perfect defenses.
3. Distinguish between factual and legal defenses.
4. Give examples of factual and legal defenses.
5. Distinguish between defenses based on justification and excuse.
A plethora of criminal defenses exist. Defenses may completely exonerate the criminal defendant, resulting in an acquittal, or reduce the severity of the offense. Chapter 3 discussed defenses based on the federal Constitution. This chapter reviews the categorization of nonconstitutional criminal defenses, along with the elements of various defenses sanctioning the use of force.
Categorization of Defenses
Defenses can be categorized as denial or failure of proof, affirmative, imperfect, or perfect. Defenses can also be categorized as factual, legal, based on justification, or excuse. Lastly, defenses can be created by a court (common law), or created by a state or federal legislature (statutory).
Definition of Denial or Failure of Proof and Affirmative Defenses
As stated in Chapter 2, a criminal defendant will be acquitted if the prosecution cannot prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In certain cases, the defendant can either deny that a criminal element(s) exists or simply sit back and wait for the prosecution to fail in meeting its burden of proof. This legal strategy is sometimes referred to as either a denial or failure of proof defense.
An affirmative defense is not connected to the prosecution’s burden of proof. When the defendant asserts an affirmative defense, the defendant raises a new issue that must be proven to a certain evidentiary standard. State statutes often specify whether a defense is affirmative. The Model Penal Code defines an affirmative defense as a defense that is deemed affirmative in the Code or a separate statute, or that “involves a matter of excuse or justification peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant” (Model Penal Code § 1.12 (3) (c)). Procedurally, the defendant must assert any affirmative defense before or during the trial, or the defense cannot be used as grounds for an appeal.
Example of an Affirmative Defense
A fight breaks out at a party, and Juan is severely injured. Jasmine and Jerome are arrested and charged for battering Juan. Jerome claims that he did not touch Juan; someone else battered him. Jasmine claims that she did not batter Juan because she was legally defending herself against Juan’s attack. Jerome’s claim focuses on the elements of battery and asserts that these elements cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Technically, Jerome can do nothing and be acquitted if the prosecution fails to prove that he was the criminal actor. Jasmine’s self-defense claim is an affirmative defense. Jasmine must do something to be acquitted: she must prove that Juan attacked her to a certain evidentiary standard.
Burden of Proof for Affirmative Defenses
As stated in Chapter 2, states vary as to their requirements for the defendant’s burden of proof when asserting an affirmative defense.Findlaw.com, “The Insanity Defense among the States,” findlaw.com website, accessed October 11, 2010, http://criminal.findlaw.com/crimes/more-criminal-topics/insanity-defense/the-insanity-defense-among-the-states.html. Different defenses also have different burdens of proof. Some states require the defendant to meet the burden of production, but require the prosecution to thereafter meet the burden of persuasion, disproving the defense to a preponderance of evidence, or in some states, beyond a reasonable doubt. Other states require the defendant to meet the burden of production and the burden of persuasion. In such states, the defendant’s evidentiary standard is preponderance of evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt. In the example given in Section 5, for Jasmine’s self-defense claim, Jasmine must prove she was defending herself by meeting either the burden of production or the burden of production and persuasion to a preponderance of evidence, depending on the jurisdiction.
Definition of Imperfect and Perfect Defenses
As stated previously, a defense can reduce the severity of the offense, or completely exonerate the defendant from criminal responsibility. If a defense reduces the severity of the offense, it is called an imperfect defense. If a defense results in an acquittal, it is called a perfect defense. The difference between the two is significant. A defendant who is successful with an imperfect defense is still guilty of a crime; a defendant who is successful with a perfect defense is innocent.
Example of Imperfect and Perfect Defenses
LuLu flies into a rage and kills her sister Lola after she catches Lola sleeping with her fiancé. LuLu is thereafter charged with first-degree murder. LuLu decides to pursue two defenses. First, LuLu claims that the killing should be manslaughter rather than first-degree murder because she honestly but unreasonably believed Lola was going to attack her, so she thought she was acting in self-defense. Second, LuLu claims she was insane at the time the killing occurred. The claim of manslaughter is an imperfect defense that will reduce LuLu’s sentence, but will not acquit her of criminal homicide. The claim of insanity is a perfect defense that will result in an acquittal.
Definition of Factual and Legal Defenses
A defense must be based on specific grounds. If a defense is based on an issue of fact, it is a factual defense. If a defense is based on an issue of law, it is a legal defense.
Example of Factual and Legal Defenses
Armando is charged with the burglary of Roman’s residence. Armando decides to pursue two defenses. First, Armando claims that he was with Phil on the date and time of the burglary. This is called an alibi defense. Second, Armando claims that it is too late to prosecute him for burglary because of the expiration of the statute of limitations. Armando’s alibi defense is a factual defense; it is based on the fact that Armando could not have committed the burglary because he was somewhere else at the time it occurred. Armando’s statute of limitations defense is a legal defense because it is based on a statute that limits the amount of time the government has to prosecute Armando for burglary.
Definition of Justification and Excuse
With the exception of alibi, most affirmative defenses are based on either justification or excuse. Typically, justification and excuse defenses admit that the defendant committed the criminal act with the requisite intent, but insist that the conduct should not be criminal.
A defense based on justification focuses on the offense. A justification defense claims that the defendant’s conduct should be legal rather than criminal because it supports a principle valued by society. A defense based on excuse focuses on the defendant. An excuse defense claims that even though the defendant committed the criminal act with criminal intent, the defendant should not be responsible for his or her behavior.
Example of Justification and Excuse
Review the examples of affirmative, imperfect, and perfect defenses given in Section 5.1.1 "Categorization of Defenses". Jasmine’s self-defense claim is based on justification. Society believes that individuals should be able to protect themselves from harm, so actions taken in self-defense are justified and noncriminal. Note that a self-defense claim focuses on the offense (battery) in light of the circumstances (to prevent imminent harm). LuLu’s insanity claim is based on excuse. Although LuLu killed Lola with criminal intent, if LuLu is truly insane it is not be fair or just to punish her for her behavior. Note that an insanity claim focuses on the defendant (a legally insane individual) and whether he or she should be criminally responsible for his or her conduct.
Table 5.1 Categorization of Defenses
Defense Type Characteristics
Common-law Created by a court
Statutory Created by a state or federal legislature
Denial or failure of proof Creates doubt in one or more elements of the offense and prevents the prosecution from meeting its burden of proof
Affirmative Raises an issue separate from the elements of the offense
Imperfect Reduces the severity of the offense
Perfect Results in an acquittal
Factual Based on an issue of fact
Legal Based on an issue of law
Alibi Asserts that the defendant was somewhere else when the crime was committed
Expiration of the statute of limitations Asserts that it is too late for the government to prosecute the defendant for the crime
Justification Claims that the criminal conduct is justified under the circumstances
Excuse Claims that the defendant should be excused for his or her conduct
Exercises
• A denial or failure of proof defense focuses on the elements of the crime and prevents the prosecution from meeting its burden of proof. An affirmative defense is a defense that raises an issue separate from the elements of the crime. Most affirmative defenses are based on justification or excuse and must be raised before or during the trial to preserve the issue for appeal.
• An imperfect defense reduces the severity of the offense; a perfect defense results in an acquittal.
• If the basis for a defense is an issue of fact, it is called a factual defense. If the basis for a defense is an issue of law, it is called a legal defense.
• An example of a factual defense is an alibi defense, which asserts that the defendant could not have committed the crime because he or she was somewhere else when the crime occurred. An example of a legal defense is a claim that the statute of limitations has expired, which asserts that it is too late for the government to prosecute the defendant for the crime.
• An affirmative defense is based on justification when it claims that criminal conduct is justified under the circumstances. An affirmative defense is based on excuse when it claims that the criminal defendant should be excused for his or her conduct.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Carol is on trial for battery, a general intent crime. Carol puts on a defense that proves her conduct was accidental, not intentional. Is this an affirmative defense? Why or why not?
2. Read State v. Burkhart, 565 S.E.2d 298 (2002). In Burkhart, the defendant was convicted of three counts of murder. The defendant claimed he acted in self-defense. The jury instruction given during the defendant’s trial stated that the prosecution had the burden of disproving self-defense. However, the instruction did not state that the prosecution’s burden of disproving self-defense was beyond a reasonable doubt. Did the Supreme Court of South Carolina uphold the defendant’s conviction for the murders? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1066148868024499763&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
3. Read Hoagland v. State, 240 P.3d 1043 (2010). In Hoagland, the defendant wanted to assert a necessity defense to the crime of driving while under the influence. The Nevada Legislature had never addressed or mentioned a necessity defense. Did the Supreme Court of Nevada allow the defendant to present the necessity defense? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8002120339805439441&q= Hoagland+v.+State&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2009. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/05%3A_Criminal_Defenses_Part_1/5.00%3A_Prelude_to_Criminal_Defenses_Part_1.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Define self-defense.
2. Define deadly force.
3. Ascertain the four elements required for self-defense.
4. Ascertain two exceptions to the unprovoked attack requirement.
5. Define the battered wife defense, and explain its justification under the imminence requirement.
6. Analyze when it is appropriate to use deadly force in self-defense.
7. Distinguish between the duty to retreat and stand-your-ground doctrines.
8. Define imperfect self-defense.
As stated previously, self-defense is a defense based on justification. Self-defense can be a defense to assault, battery, and criminal homicide because it always involves the use of force. In the majority of states, self-defense is a statutory defense.Mich. Comp. Laws § 780.972, accessed November 13, 2010, http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(3li5rs55kkzn2pfegtskdunn))/mileg.aspx?page=getObject&objectName=mcl-780-972&highlight=self-defense. However, it can be modified or expanded by courts on a case-by-case basis.
Most states have special requirements when the defendant uses deadly force in self-defense. Deadly force is defined as any force that could potentially kill. An individual does not have to actually die for the force to be considered deadly. Examples of deadly force are the use of a knife, gun, vehicle, or even bare hands when there is a disparity in size between two individuals.
Self-defense can operate as a perfect or imperfect defense, depending on the circumstances. Defendants who commit criminal homicide justified by self-defense can be acquitted, or have a murder charge reduced from first to second or third degree, or have a charge reduced from murder to manslaughter. Criminal homicide is discussed in detail in Chapter 9.
To successfully claim self-defense, the defendant must prove four elements. First, with exceptions, the defendant must prove that he or she was confronted with an unprovoked attack. Second, the defendant must prove that the threat of injury or death was imminent. Third, the defendant must prove that the degree of force used in self-defense was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Fourth, the defendant must prove that he or she had an objectively reasonable fear that he or she was going to be injured or killed unless he or she used self-defense. The Model Penal Code defines self-defense in § 3.04(1) as “justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.”
Provocation
In general, if the defendant initiates an attack against another, the defendant cannot claim self-defense.State v. Williams, 644 P.2d 889 (1982), accessed November 13, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18157916201475630105&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. This rule has two exceptions. The defendant can be the initial aggressor and still raise a self-defense claim if the attacked individual responds with excessive force under the circumstances, or if the defendant withdraws from the attack and the attacked individual persists.
Excessive Force Exception
In some jurisdictions, an individual cannot respond to the defendant’s attack using excessive force under the circumstances.State v. Belgard, 410 So.2d 720 (1982), accessed November 13, 2010, http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?xmldoc=19821130410So2d720_1997.xml&docbase=CSLWAR1-1950-1985. For example, an individual cannot use deadly force when the defendant initiates an attack using nondeadly force. If an individual does resort to deadly force with a nondeadly force attack, the defendant can use reasonable force in self-defense.
Example of the Excessive Force Exception
Patty and Paige get into an argument over a loan Patty made to Paige. Paige calls Patty a spoiled brat who always gets her way. Patty slaps Paige across the face. Paige grabs a carving knife from the kitchen counter and tries to stab Patty. Patty wrestles the knife away and stabs Paige in the chest, killing her. In this example, Patty provoked the attack by slapping Paige across the face. However, the slap is nondeadly force. In many jurisdictions, Paige cannot respond to nondeadly force with deadly force, like a knife. Paige used excessive force in her response to Patty’s slap, so Patty can use deadly force to defend herself and may not be responsible for criminal homicide under these circumstances.
Withdrawal Exception
In some jurisdictions, the defendant can be the initial aggressor and still use force in self-defense if the defendant withdraws from the attack, and communicates this withdrawal to the attacked individual.N.Y. Penal Law § 35.15(1)(b), accessed November 13, 2010, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN035.15_35.15.html. If the attacked individual persists in using force against the defendant after the defendant’s withdrawal, rather than notifying law enforcement or retreating, the defendant is justified in using force under the circumstances.
Example of Withdrawal
Change the excessive force exception example in Section 5. Imagine that after Patty slaps Paige across the face, Paige begins pounding Patty with her fists. Patty manages to escape and runs into the garage. She huddles against the garage wall. Paige chases Patty into the garage. Patty says, “Please, please don’t hurt me. I’m sorry I slapped you.” Paige kicks Patty in the back. Patty turns around and karate chops Paige in the neck, rendering her unconscious. In many jurisdictions, Patty’s karate chop is lawful under a theory of self-defense because she completely withdrew from the attack. Thus Patty is probably not criminally responsible for battery, based on the karate chop to the neck. However, Patty could be criminally responsible for battery based on the slap to Paige’s face because this physical contact was unprovoked and not defensive under the circumstances.
Imminence
The defendant cannot use any degree of force in self-defense unless the defendant is faced with an imminent attack.State v. Taylor, 858 P.2d 1358 (1993), accessed November 13, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1539441759711884447&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. Imminent means the attack is immediate and not something that will occur in the future. If the defendant is threatened with a future attack, the appropriate response is to inform law enforcement, so that they can incapacitate the threatening individual by arrest or prosecution. Another situation where imminence is lacking is when the attack occurred in the past. When the defendant uses force to remedy a previous attack, this is retaliatory, and a self-defense claim is not appropriate. The legal response is to inform law enforcement so that they can incapacitate the attacker by arrest or prosecution.
Some state courts have expanded the imminence requirement to include situations where a husband in a domestic violence situation uses force or violence regularly against the defendant, a battered wife, therefore creating a threat of imminent harm every day.Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1 (1992), accessed November 13, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14171263417876785206&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. If a jurisdiction recognizes the battered wife defense, the defendant—the battered wife—can legally use force against her abusive husband in self-defense in situations where harm is not necessarily immediate.
Example of an Attack That Is Not Imminent
Vinny tells Fiona that if she does not pay him the \$1,000 she owes him, he will put out a contract on her life. Fiona pulls out a loaded gun and shoots Vinny. Fiona cannot successfully argue self-defense in this case. Vinny’s threat was a threat of future harm, not imminent harm. Thus Fiona had plenty of time to contact law enforcement to help protect her safety.
Example of an Attack That Is Retaliatory
Dwight and Abel get into a fist fight. Dwight knocks Abel unconscious. Dwight observes Abel for a few minutes, and then he picks up a large rock and crushes Abel’s skull with it, killing him. Dwight cannot claim self-defense in this situation. Once Dwight realized that Abel was unconscious, he did not need to continue to defend himself against an imminent attack. Dwight’s conduct appears retaliatory and is not justified under these circumstances.
Example of an Imminent Attack under the Battered Wife Defense
Spike severely beats and injures his wife Veronica every couple of days. Spike’s beatings have become more violent, and Veronica starts to fear for her life. One night, Veronica shoots and kills Spike while he is sleeping. In states that have expanded self-defense to include the battered wife defense, Veronica may be successful on a theory of self-defense.
Mary Winkler Defense Video
Dr. Alan J. Lipman Catherine Crier on Winkler Spousal Abuse Murder Trial
Mary Winkler claimed the battered wife defense as an imperfect defense to the murder of her husband, a pastor.Mara Gay, “Abused Wife Who Killed Preacher Husband Speaks Out,” Huffingtonpost.com website, accessed August 25, 2011, www.aolnews.com/2010/11/05/abused-wife-who-killed-preacher-husband-speaks-out.
(click to see video)
Proportionality
The defendant cannot claim self-defense unless the degree of force used is objectively reasonable under the circumstances. This requirement primarily focuses on the use of deadly force and when it is legally justified. In general, deadly force can by employed in self-defense when a reasonable person feels threatened with imminent death, serious bodily injury, and, in some jurisdictions, a serious felony.Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.219, accessed November 13, 2010, www.leg.state.or.us/ors/161.html. Serious bodily injury and serious felony are technical terms that are defined in a statute or case, depending on the jurisdiction. The Model Penal Code states that deadly force is not justifiable “unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily harm, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat” (Model Penal Code § 3.04(2)(b)).
Example of Appropriate Deadly Force
Nicholas, an intruder, pins Wanda to the floor of her garage and begins to forcibly remove her clothing. Wanda feels around the floor with her hand and finds a screwdriver. She plunges the screwdriver into Nicholas’s neck, killing him. Wanda has used appropriate force and can claim self-defense in most jurisdictions. A reasonable person in Wanda’s situation would feel deadly force is necessary to repel Nicholas’s sexual assault. Nicholas’s attack is a serious felony that could result in serious bodily injury or death. Thus the use of deadly force is legally justified under these circumstances.
Duty to Retreat
Early common law stated that the defendant had a duty to retreat to the wall before using deadly force against an attacker. The majority of states have rejected this doctrine and instead allow the defendant to stand his or her ground if the defendant is not the initial aggressor in the confrontation.State v. Sandoval, 130 P.3d 808 (2006), accessed November 13, 2010, www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/S53457.htm. In jurisdictions that still follow the retreat doctrine, the defendant must retreat if there is an objectively reasonable belief that the attacker will cause death or serious bodily injury, and a retreat won’t unreasonably increase the likelihood of death or serious bodily injury.Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions, No. 2.8-3, accessed November 13, 2010, www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part2/2.8-3.htm. The Model Penal Code defines the duty to retreat by stating that the use of deadly force is not justifiable if “the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating” (Model Penal Code § 3.04 (2) (b) (ii)). An established exception to the retreat doctrine in jurisdictions that follow it is the defense of the home, which is called the castle doctrine. The castle doctrine is discussed shortly.
Example of the Duty to Retreat
Sandy and Sue have an argument in the park. Sue pulls a knife out of a sheath that is strapped to her leg and begins to advance toward Sandy. Sandy also has a knife in her pocket. In a state that follows the retreat doctrine, Sandy must attempt to escape, if she can do so safely. In a state that follows the stand-your-ground doctrine, Sandy can defend herself using her own knife and claim lawful self-defense. Note that Sandy was not the initial aggressor in this situation. If Sandy pulled a knife first, she could not use the knife and claim self-defense, whether the state follows the stand-your-ground doctrine or the duty to retreat doctrine.
Objectively Reasonable Fear of Injury or Death
The defendant cannot claim self-defense unless a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would believe that self-defense is necessary to avoid injury or death. If the defendant honestly but unreasonably believes self-defense is necessary under the circumstances, a claim of imperfect self-defense may reduce the severity of the offense.State v. Faulkner, 483 A.2d 759 (1984), accessed November 13, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17158253875987176431&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. However, the defendant is still guilty of a crime, albeit a less serious crime.
Example of Unjustified Conduct
Justin, who weighs over two hundred pounds and is six feet tall, accidentally bumps into Wanda, a slender ten-year-old child. Wanda spins around and shakes her fist at Justin. Justin responds by shoving Wanda so hard that she crashes into a telephone pole and is killed. Justin probably cannot claim self-defense under these circumstances. A reasonable person would not believe Wanda is about to seriously injure or kill Justin. Thus Justin’s response is unnecessary and unjustified in this case.
Example of Imperfect Self-Defense
Change the unjustified conduct example given in Section 5. Imagine that a slender, female ten-year-old severely abused Justin when he was younger. Since the abusive incident, Justin has an unreasonable fear of female children and honestly believes that they can and will hurt him if provoked. If the trier of fact determines that Justin honestly but unreasonably believed that Wanda was about to inflict serious bodily injury or kill him, any charge of murder could be reduced to manslaughter on a theory of imperfect self-defense.
Exercises
• Self-defense is a defense based on justification that allows a defendant to use physical force to protect himself or herself from injury or death.
• Deadly force is any force that can produce death. An individual does not have to die for the force to be deemed deadly.
• Four elements are required for self-defense: (1) an unprovoked attack, (2) which threatens imminent injury or death, and (3) an objectively reasonable degree of force, used in response to (4) an objectively reasonable fear of injury or death.
• Two exceptions to the unprovoked attack rule are an individual’s use of excessive force in response to an initial attack and the defendant’s withdrawal from the initial attack.
• The battered wife defense asserts that a woman who is a victim of spousal abuse may use force in self-defense under certain circumstances, even when the threat of harm is not immediate. The battered wife defense is justified with respect to the imminence requirement: because the abuse is so constant, the battered wife faces an imminent threat every day.
• Deadly force is appropriate in self-defense when the attacker threatens death, serious bodily injury, and, in some jurisdictions, a serious felony.
• The duty to retreat doctrine is a common-law rule requiring a defendant to retreat if it is safe to do so, instead of using deadly force in self-defense. The stand-your-ground doctrine is a rule allowing the defendant to use deadly force if appropriate in self-defense, rather than retreating.
• Imperfect self-defense is a defense available when the defendant has an honest but unreasonable belief that force is necessary to defend against injury or death. Imperfect self-defense reduces the severity of the offense, but does not result in acquittal.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Scott’s wife Diane constantly physically abuses him. One night while Diane is sleeping, Scott places a pillow over her face and smothers her. Can Scott defend against a charge of criminal homicide by claiming self-defense? Why or why not?
2. Read Rodriguez v. State, 212 S.W.3d 819 (2006). In Rodriguez, the defendant was convicted of murder and attempted murder. The defendant appealed his convictions on the ground that the jury did not unanimously reject each element of self-defense. Did the Court of Appeals of Texas uphold the defendant’s convictions? The case is available at this link: www.lexisone.com/lx1/caselaw/freecaselaw?action=OCLGetCaseDetail&format=FULL&sourceID=bcdba&searchTerm= eNjT.TNga.aadj.ecGW&searchFlag=y&l1loc=FCLOW.
3. Read Shuler v. Babbitt, 49 F.Supp.2d 1165 (1998). In Shuler, the defendant shot and killed a grizzly bear that charged him while he checked a sheep pasture to make sure his sheep were safe. The sheep had already been subjected to several bear attacks. The Fish and Wildlife Service thereafter fined the defendant under the Endangered Species Act. The defendant claimed self-defense against the bear. The Fish and Wildlife Service ruled that the defendant provoked the attack and could not claim self-defense. Did the US District Court for the District of Montana uphold the fine? The case is available at this link: www.gilalivestockgrowers.org/documents/ShulerVsBabbitt.pdf.
LAW AND ETHICS: THE MENENDEZ BROTHERS
Were They Entitled to a Jury Instruction on Imperfect Self-Defense?
Read Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012 (2005). The case is available at this link: http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F3/422/1012/569492.
Lyle and Eric Menendez were tried and convicted of murder and conspiracy to commit murder of their parents. There were two series of trials. The first trial, which had two separate juries, resulted in two hung juries. At the first trial, the brothers introduced evidence of sexual abuse by their father, and the court instructed the jury on imperfect self-defense. The imperfect self-defense jury instruction was based on the brothers’ honest but unreasonable fear that their father would hurt or kill them.Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1024 (2005), accessed November 19, 2010, http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F3/422/1012/569492. The second trial took place in front of one jury and resulted in the convictions. During the second trial, some evidence of abuse was excluded, Lyle Menendez refused to testify, and there was no jury instruction on imperfect self-defense. After sentencing, the brothers petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus based on several claims, including the exclusion of the abuse evidence and failure to instruct the jury on imperfect self-defense.Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1016 (2005), accessed November 19, 2010, http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F3/422/1012/569492. The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the petition on grounds that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury instruction on imperfect self-defense and no foundation to support the admissibility of the evidence of abuse. The court held that the evidence confirmed there was no imminent threat of serious bodily injury or death when the brothers killed their parents.
The facts of the case are lurid. Evidence included the sexual abuse of both boys by their father, surreptitiously taped psychotherapy sessions, spending sprees, fabricated mafia hit stories, and alleged will tampering by the brothers after the parents were killed.
1. Do you think the Menendez case should have been treated as a “battered child syndrome” case, easing the requirement of imminence and allowing for a jury instruction on imperfect self-defense?
Check your answer using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
Menendez Brothers Video
Lyle and Erik Menendez News Report
A news story on the conviction of the Menendez brothers is presented in this video:
(click to see video) | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/05%3A_Criminal_Defenses_Part_1/5.02%3A_Self-Defense.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Ascertain the elements required for the defense of others.
2. Define real and personal property.
3. Explain the appropriate circumstances and degree of force a defendant can use when defending property.
4. Ascertain the elements required for the defense of ejection of trespasser.
5. Distinguish defense of property from defense of habitation.
6. Ascertain the three elements required for the use of deadly force in defense of habitation under modern castle laws.
7. Identify three common features of modern castle laws.
8. Ascertain the constitutional parameters of the use of force by law enforcement to arrest or apprehend criminal suspects.
Aside from self-defense, a defendant can legally use force to defend another person, real or personal property, and habitation. In addition, law enforcement can use force to arrest or capture individuals who reasonably appear to be committing crimes. In this section, the elements of several use-of-force defenses will be reviewed. Keep in mind that these defenses can be statutory, common-law, perfect, or imperfect, depending on the facts and the jurisdiction.
Defense of Others
According to early common law, a defendant could use force to defend another only when the defendant and the person defended had a special relationship, such as a family connection. Most jurisdictions now reject this common-law restriction on defense of others and allow a defendant to defend anyone to the same degree that he or she could use self-defense.People v. Kurr, 654 N.W.2d 651 (2002), accessed November 14, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14992698629411781257&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. Thus in a majority of jurisdictions, defense of others requires the same elements as self-defense: the individual defended must be facing an unprovoked, imminent attack, and the defendant must use a reasonable degree of force with a reasonable belief that force is necessary to repel the attack.
Occasionally, a defendant uses force to defend another who has no legal right to use force in self-defense. Under the common law, the defendant could not use force legally if the individual defended could not use force legally in self-defense. However, the majority of states now allow a defendant to use force to defend another person if it reasonably appears that use of force is justified under the circumstances.Commonwealth v. Miranda, No. 08-P-2094 (2010), accessed November 14, 2010, http://www.socialaw.com/slip.htm?cid=19939&sid=119. The Model Penal Code allows the defense of another when “under the circumstances as the actor believes them to be, the person whom he seeks to protect would be justified in using such protective force” (Model Penal Code § 3.05(1) (b)). Thus if the defendant has a subjective belief that the individual defended could use force legally in self-defense, defense of others is appropriate under the Model Penal Code.
Example of Defense of Others
Alex and Shane, aspiring law enforcement officers, are performing a training maneuver in a rural area. Their instructor Devin is watching nearby. Alex pretends to attack Shane. Just as Devin is about to demonstrate a takedown, Timmy, who is jogging in the area, dashes over and begins beating Alex. Under the older common-law rule, Timmy could be successfully prosecuted for battery of Alex. Shane did not have the right to use self-defense during a practice maneuver, so neither did Timmy. In jurisdictions that allow defense of others if it reasonably appears that self-defense is warranted, Timmy could probably use the defense to battery because it reasonably appeared that Alex was about to unlawfully attack Shane. In jurisdictions that follow the Model Penal Code, Timmy can most likely use defense of others as a defense to battery because it is clear Timmy honestly believed Shane had the right to use self-defense in this situation.
Defense of Property
All jurisdictions allow individuals to use force in defense of property under certain specified circumstances. Property can be real or personal. Real property is land and anything permanently attached to it. This includes a home. However, defense of the home is discussed in Section 5.3.3 "Defense of Habitation". Personal property is any movable object.
In the majority of states, the defendant can use force only to defend real or personal property if the defendant has an objectively reasonable belief that an imminent threat of damage, destruction, or theft will occur.California Criminal Jury Instructions No. 3476, accessed November 15, 2010, http://www.justia.com/criminal/docs/calcrim/3400/3476.html. The Model Penal Code provides “the use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary: (a) to prevent or terminate an unlawful entry or other trespass upon land or a trespass against or the unlawful carrying away of tangible, movable property” (Model Penal Code §3.06(1) (a)). Thus if the defendant has a subjective belief that force is immediately necessary to protect real or personal property, force is appropriate under the Model Penal Code.
The amount of force that a defendant may legally use to protect real or personal property is reasonable force, under the circumstances.K.S.A. § 21-3213, accessed November 15, 2010, kansasstatutes.lesterama.org/Chapter_21/Article_32/21-3213.html. The defendant can also chase someone who steals personal property and take the item back.Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-21, accessed November 15, 2010, www.cga.ct.gov/2009/pub/chap951.htm#Sec53a-21.htm. The Model Penal Code provides “the use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary…to retake tangible movable property” (Model Penal Code §3.06(1) (b)). In general, the Model Penal Code and most states do not authorize the use of deadly force to protect property (other than the home) under any circumstances.Fla. Stat. Ann. § 776.031, accessed November 16, 2010, http://law.justia.com/florida/codes/2007/TitleXLVI/chapter776/776_031.html.
Example of Defense of Property
Kelsey sees Keith, her stepbrother, approaching her brand new car with a key in his hand. It appears that Keith is about to scrape the paint on the door of the car with this key. Kelsey tackles Keith to prevent him from vandalizing the car. Kelsey has probably used reasonable force under the circumstances and can claim defense of property as a defense to battery. If Keith testifies that he was simply going to hand Kelsey the key, which she left in the house, the attack could still be justified if the trier of fact determines that it was objectively reasonable for Kelsey to believe Keith was about to damage her property. In jurisdictions that follow the Model Penal Code, Kelsey can probably use defense of property as a defense to battery because it is clear Kelsey believed that force was immediately necessary to protect her personal property in this situation. Of course, if Kelsey pulls out a gun and shoots Keith, she could not claim defense of property because deadly force is never justifiable to protect real or personal property from harm.
Ejection of Trespasser
A simple trespasser is an individual who is present on real property without consent of the owner. Property owners have the legal right to eject trespassers under certain specified circumstances.
Most states authorize the ejection of a trespasser if the trespasser is first asked to leave and fails to comply within a reasonable time.N.J. Stat. § 2C:3-6, accessed November 15, 2010, law.onecle.com/new-jersey/2c-the-new-jersey-code-of-criminal-justice/3-6.html. The degree of force that can be used to eject the trespasser is reasonable force, under the circumstances.Iowa Code § 704.4, accessed November 15, 2010, coolice.legis.state.ia.us/cool-ice/default.asp?category=billinfo&service=iowacode&ga=83&input=704#704.4. Deadly force is never reasonable to eject a trespasser unless the trespasser threatens imminent deadly force against the defendant or another individual.State v. Curley, Docket # 0000011.WA (Wash. App. 2010), accessed November 15, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11648057948374905030&q= State+v.+Curley&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2009. Deadly force under these circumstances is justified by self-defense or defense of others, not ejection of trespasser.
Example of Ejection of Trespasser
Sam sees Burt sitting on his lawn. Sam goes up to Burt and asks him to “move along.” Burt looks up, but does not stand. Sam goes into the house and calls law enforcement, but they inform Sam that there is a local emergency, and they cannot come and eject Burt for at least five hours. Sam goes back outside and sees that Burt is now sprawled out across the lawn. Sam grabs Burt, lifts him to his feet, and pushes him off the lawn and onto the sidewalk. Sam can probably use ejection of trespasser as a defense to battery of Burt. Sam asked Burt the trespasser to leave, and Burt ignored him. Sam’s attempt to rely on law enforcement was likewise unsuccessful. Sam’s use of nondeadly force appears objectively reasonable. Thus Sam’s ejection of a trespasser is most likely appropriate under these circumstances.
Defense of Habitation
Defense of habitation is a defense that applies specifically to the defendant’s residence. At early common law, a person’s home was as sacred as his or her person, and deadly force could be employed to protect it. The majority of states have since enacted modern castle laws that embody this common-law doctrine. Other than the use of deadly force, defense of habitation generally follows the same rules as defense of property, self-defense, and defense of others. Thus this defense of habitation discussion focuses primarily on the use of deadly force.
The first state to expand the defense of habitation to include the use of deadly force was Colorado, with its “make my day” self-defense statute.Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-1-704.5, accessed November 16, 2010, www.co.jefferson.co.us/jeffco/sheriff_uploads/revised_statutes.htm. In 2005, Florida began a wave of castle law modifications that resulted in most states revising their defense of habitation laws.Fla. Stat. Ann. § 776.013, accessed November 16, 2010, law.onecle.com/florida/crimes/776.013.html. Generally, three elements must be present before the use of deadly force is appropriate to defend habitation under modern castle laws. First, the intruder must actually enter or be in the process of entering the residence owned by the defendant.Fla. Stat. Ann. § 776.013, accessed November 16, 2010, law.onecle.com/florida/crimes/776.013.html. This excludes intruders who are outside or in the curtilage, which is the protected area around the home. Second, the residence must be occupied when the entry occurs. This excludes devices like spring-guns that protect unoccupied dwellings with deadly force.People v. Ceballos, 526 P.2d 241 (1974), accessed November 16, 2010, wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/web/calceballos.htm. Third, the defendant must have an objectively reasonable belief that the intruder intends to commit a crime of violence against the occupant(s) after entry.Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.225, accessed November 16, 2010, www.leg.state.or.us/ors/161.html. The Model Penal Code provides “[t]he use of deadly force is not justifiable…unless the actor believes that…the person against whom the force is used is attempting to dispossess him of his dwelling…or…attempting to commit…arson, burglary, robbery or other felonious theft…and either…has employed or threatened deadly force…or…the use of force other than deadly force would expose the actor or another in his presence to substantial danger of serious bodily harm” (Model Penal Code § 3.06 (3)(d)).
The majority of states’ castle laws abolish any duty to retreat when inside the home.Alaska Stat. § 11.81.335(b), accessed November 16, 2010, http://touchngo.com/lglcntr/akstats/Statutes/Title11/Chapter81/Section335.htm. Florida’s castle law creates a presumption that the defendant has a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury when the intruder makes an unlawful or forceful entry.Fla. Stat. Ann. § 776.013, accessed November 16, 2010, law.onecle.com/florida/crimes/776.013.html. This compels the prosecution to disprove the defendant’s reasonable belief of death or great bodily injury beyond a reasonable doubt, which is extremely difficult. Additional features of many castle laws are civil immunity and criminal immunity from prosecution.720 ILCS § 5/7-2 (b), accessed November 16, 2010, www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs4.asp?DocName=072000050HArt.+7&ActID=1876&ChapAct=720. Immunity from prosecution means that a defendant who complies with the castle law requirements cannot be sued for damages or prosecuted for a crime based on injury or death to the intruder.
Example of Defense of Habitation under a Castle Law
Nate, a homeowner with three children, hears the front door open in the middle of the night. Nate removes a handgun from the nightstand and creeps silently down the stairs. He sees Bob tiptoeing toward his daughter’s bedroom. Nate shoots and kills Bob. Unfortunately, Bob is Nate’s daughter’s boyfriend, who was trying to enter her bedroom for a late-night get-together. Nate could probably assert the defense of protection of habitation under modern castle laws in most jurisdictions. Bob made entry into an occupied residence. It is difficult to identify individuals in the dark and to ascertain their motives for entering a residence without the owner’s consent. Thus it was objectively reasonable for Nate to feel threatened by Bob’s presence and to use deadly force to protect his domicile and its residents. If Nate is successful with his defense, he will also be immune from a civil suit for damages if the castle law in his jurisdiction provides this immunity.
Change the example with Nate and Bob so that Bob enters the residence during the day, and Nate identifies him as his daughter’s boyfriend. Under these circumstances, the prosecution could rebut any presumption that Nate’s actions were objectively reasonable. A reasonable person would ask Bob why he was entering the residence before shooting and killing him. The trier of fact might determine that Nate’s intent was not to protect himself and his family, but to kill Bob, which would be malice aforethought. If Nate’s actions are not justifiable by the defense of habitation, he could be charged with and convicted of first-degree murder in this situation.
Use of Force in Arrest and Apprehension of Criminal Suspects
Occasionally, law enforcement must use force to effectuate an arrest or apprehend a criminal suspect. The appropriate use of force during an arrest or apprehension can operate as a defense to assault, battery, false imprisonment, kidnapping, and criminal homicide. At early common law, law enforcement could use reasonable, nondeadly force to arrest an individual for a misdemeanor and reasonable, even deadly force, to arrest an individual for any felony. Modern law enforcement’s ability to use deadly force is governed by the US Constitution.
The US Supreme Court clarified the constitutional standard for law enforcement’s use of deadly force in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). In Garner, the Court invalidated a Tennessee statute that allowed law enforcement to exercise any degree of force to apprehend and arrest a fleeing felon. The law enforcement officer in Garner admitted that he shot and killed a suspect, reasonably believing he was unarmed. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment governed law enforcement’s use of deadly force in this situation because the use of deadly force is a seizure. Thus law enforcement’s use of deadly force must be scrutinized pursuant to the standard of constitutional reasonableness. According to the Court, the only constitutionally reasonable circumstances under which law enforcement can use deadly force to arrest or apprehend a fleeing felon is when law enforcement has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.
Currently, most jurisdictions have statutes protecting law enforcement’s reasonable use of force when effectuating an arrest or apprehending a fleeing suspect. Under Garner, these statutes must restrict the lawful use of deadly force to potentially deadly situations. If a law enforcement officer exceeds the use of force permitted under the circumstances, the law enforcement officer could be prosecuted for a crime or sued for civil damages (or both).
Example of Reasonable Force by Law Enforcement to Arrest
Review the example in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1 "Example of Criminal Law Issues". In that example, Linda puts a bra in her purse without paying for it at an expensive department store. When she attempts to leave the store, an alarm is activated. Linda begins sprinting down the street. Colin, a police officer, just happens to be driving by with the window of his patrol car open. He hears the store alarm, sees Linda running, and begins shooting at Linda from the car. Linda is shot in the leg and collapses. In this example, no facts exist to indicate that Linda poses a potentially deadly threat to Colin or others. The fact that Linda is running down the street and an alarm is going off does not demonstrate that Linda has committed a crime necessitating deadly force to arrest. Thus Colin can use only nondeadly force to arrest Linda, such as his hands, or possibly a stun gun or Taser to subdue her. If Linda is unarmed and Colin uses a firearm to subdue her, the utilization of deadly force is excessive under these circumstances and Colin has no defense to assault with a deadly weapon or to attempted murder.
Change this example and imagine that Colin pulls over and attempts to arrest Linda. Linda removes a gun from her purse. Under most modern statutes, Colin does not have a duty to retreat and can use deadly force to arrest or apprehend Linda. Under Garner, it is reasonable to believe that Linda poses a danger of death or serious bodily injury to Colin or others. Thus Colin can constitutionally use deadly force to protect himself and the public from harm in this situation. Note that Linda’s theft is probably a misdemeanor, not a felony. However, it is Linda’s exhibition of deadly force to resist arrest that triggers Colin’s deadly force response. Under these circumstances, Colin’s use of deadly force is justified and can operate as a legal defense in a criminal prosecution or civil suit for damages.
Exercises
• Defense of others has the same elements as self-defense: the individual defended must be facing an unprovoked, imminent attack, and the defendant must use a reasonable degree of force with a reasonable belief that force is necessary to repel the attack.
• Real property is land and anything permanently attached to it. Personal property is any movable object.
• The defendant can use nondeadly force to defend real or personal property if the defendant has an objectively reasonable belief that an imminent threat of damage, destruction, or theft will occur.
• Property owners can use reasonable nondeadly force to eject a trespasser after first asking the trespasser to leave.
• Only nondeadly force may be used to defend property; deadly force may be used to defend habitation.
• The defendant can use deadly force to defend habitation under modern castle laws if an intruder enters occupied premises, and the defendant has an objectively reasonable belief that the intruder will seriously injure or kill the occupants.
• Modern castle laws abolish the duty to retreat when inside the home, occasionally include a presumption that the defendant has an objectively reasonable belief the intruder is going to seriously injure or kill the occupants, and provide civil and criminal immunity from prosecution.
• Use of deadly force by law enforcement is considered a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, so law enforcement cannot use deadly force to apprehend or arrest a criminal suspect unless there is probable cause to believe the suspect will inflict serious physical injury or death upon the officer or others.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Melanie watches as Betty verbally abuses Colleen. Betty is a known bully who verbally abused Melanie in the past. Betty calls Colleen an expletive and gives her a firm shove. Melanie walks up behind Betty, removes a knife from her pocket, and plunges the knife into Betty’s back. Betty suffers internal injuries and later dies. Can Melanie use defense of others as a defense to criminal homicide? Why or why not?
2. Read Commonwealth v. Alexander, 531 S.E.2d 567 (2000). In Alexander, the defendant was convicted of brandishing a weapon when he pointed an unloaded rifle at an individual who was repossessing his vehicle in an aggressive and belligerent manner. Did the Supreme Court of Virginia uphold the defendant’s conviction? The case is available at this link: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/va-supreme-court/1454888.html.
3. Read Dutton v. Hayes-Pupko, No. 03-06-00438 (2008). In Dutton, a law enforcement officer asked the victim for her name and date of birth after she allegedly sprayed her neighbors with a hose. The victim refused to respond, and the law enforcement officer handcuffed her and forced her into his vehicle, injuring her wrist. The victim sued for use of excessive force in arrest. Did the Texas Court of Appeals hold that the victim had the right to sue the officer for use of excessive force in arrest? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17543977294597089197&q= Dutton+v.+Hayes-Pupko&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_vis=1. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/05%3A_Criminal_Defenses_Part_1/5.03%3A_Other_Use-of-Force_Defenses.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Ascertain the three elements required for the choice of evils defense.
2. Distinguish between the choice of evils defense and the duress defense.
3. Identify one crime that is not justifiable by the choice of evils defense or the duress defense.
Occasionally, the law protects a defendant from criminal responsibility when the defendant has no choice but to commit the crime. In this section, we review the choice of evils and duress defenses.
Choice of Evils Defense
The choice of evils defense (called the necessity defense in some jurisdictions) protects a defendant from criminal responsibility when the defendant commits a crime to avoid a greater, imminent harm. Under the Model Penal Code, “[c]onduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid harm or evil…is justifiable, provided that: (a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged” (Model Penal Code § 3.02(1)(a)). The choice of evils defense can be statutory or common-law, perfect or imperfect, depending on the jurisdiction.
The choice of evils defense generally requires three elements. First, there must be more than one harm that will occur under the circumstances. Usually, the harms are the product of nature, or are circumstances beyond the defendant’s control.State v. Holmes, 129 Ohio Misc. 2d 38 (2004), accessed November 22, 2010, http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/docs/pdf/98/2004/2004-ohio-7334.pdf. Second, the harms must be ranked, with one of the harms ranked more severe than the other. The ranking is generally up to the legislature or common law. In many jurisdictions, the loss of life is never justifiable under this defense and cannot be ranked lower than any other harm.Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 503.030, accessed November 22, 2010, www.lrc.ky.gov/krs/503-00/030.PDF. Third, the defendant must have an objectively reasonable belief that the greater harm is imminent and can only be avoided by committing the crime that results in the lesser harm.Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-609, accessed November 22, 2010, www.michie.com/tennessee/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&cp=tncode.
The choice of evils defense is rarely used and is generally only a defense to the loss or destruction of property. When the defense is perfect, it results in an acquittal. When the defense is imperfect, it results in a reduction in sentence or the defendant’s conviction of a lesser offense.
Example of the Choice of Evils Defense
Tamara gets lost while hiking in a remote, mountainous area. After wandering around for hours with the temperature dropping, Tamara finds a locked cabin. Tamara breaks a window and climbs inside. Once inside, Tamara prepares some canned chili, drinks tap water, and uses the telephone to call law enforcement. Tamara could probably plead and prove choice of evils as a defense to burglary and theft in many jurisdictions. Tamara was confronted with two harms: harm to her personal safety and well-being and harm to the real and personal property of another. The harm to Tamara’s health and safety is ranked more severe than the minimal harm to property. It is objectively reasonable to break into and enter a cabin and use some of the supplies inside to prevent imminent injury or death. Thus although Tamara committed burglary and theft in many jurisdictions, she did so with the reasonable belief that she was saving her own life. A trier of fact could find that the harm avoided by Tamara’s actions was greater than the harm caused by the burglary and theft, and Tamara could be acquitted, or have her sentence or crime reduced, depending on the jurisdiction.
Change the facts in the preceding example, and imagine that Tamara steals money and jewelry in addition to the chili and tap water. Tamara could not successfully prove the defense of choice of evils to this additional theft. No harm was avoided by Tamara’s theft of the money and jewelry. Thus choice of evils cannot justify this crime.
Change the facts in the preceding example, and imagine that Tamara kills the cabin’s owner because he refuses to allow her to enter. Tamara could not successfully prove the defense of choice of evils under these circumstances. Tamara’s life is no more important than the cabin owner’s. Thus Tamara cannot rank the harms, and choice of evils cannot justify criminal homicide in this case.
The Duress Defense
In some jurisdictions, the choice of evils defense is called the duress defense if the choice of evils is deliberately brought on by another individual, rather than by nature, an act of God, or circumstances outside the defendant’s control. The Model Penal Code defines the duress defense as “an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct…because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another” (Model Penal Code § 2.09(1)).
Three elements are required for the duress defense. First, the defendant or another person must face a threat of imminent serious bodily injury or death.Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-14, accessed November 22, 2010, search.cga.state.ct.us/dtsearch_pub_statutes.html. Second, the defendant must have an objectively reasonable belief that the only way to avoid the serious bodily injury or death is to commit the crime at issue.Haw. Rev. Stat. § 702-231, accessed November 22, 2010, http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/histatutes/5/37/702/702-231. Third, in most jurisdictions, the crime committed cannot be criminal homicide.RCW 9A.16.060, accessed November 22, 2010, apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=9A.16&full=true#9A.16.060. Like choice of evils, the duress defense is rarely used and can be statutory or common law, perfect or imperfect, depending on the jurisdiction.
Example of the Duress Defense
Keisha, a bank teller, hands Brian, a bank robber, money out of her drawer after he points a loaded gun at her head. Technically, Keisha embezzled the money from the bank, but she did so based on the objectively reasonable fear that Brian would kill her if she failed to comply with his demands. Keisha can successfully claim duress as a defense to any charge of theft. If Brian had pointed the gun at another client in line at the bank instead of Keisha, Keisha could still prevail using the duress defense because duress also applies when the threat of death or serious bodily injury is to another person.
Change the example with Keisha and Brian, and imagine that Brian’s threat is made in a phone call, rather than in person. Brian threatens to kill Keisha if she doesn’t place thousands of dollars in an envelope and mail it to him at a specified address. If Keisha complies, Keisha cannot prove duress as a defense to theft. Brian’s threat by phone call is not a threat of imminent death. In addition, it is not objectively reasonable to be frightened by a voice on the telephone. Keisha could hang up the phone and contact law enforcement, instead of timidly complying with Brian’s demands.
Change the preceding example with Keisha and Brian, and imagine that Brian orders Keisha to kill his ex-wife Pat, who works at the station next to Keisha. Brian thereafter hands Keisha a switchblade. Keisha cannot kill Pat and claim duress as a defense to murder in most states. Keisha’s life is no more valuable than Pat’s. Therefore, Keisha cannot legally choose to commit the crime of murder and justify the crime with the duress defense.
Exercises
• Three elements are required for the choice of evils defense: the defendant must be faced with two or more evils, the evils must be ranked, and it must be objectively reasonable for the defendant to choose to commit the crime to avoid the imminent evil that is ranked higher.
• Choice of evils is often based on nature or an act of God; duress is generally brought on by another individual.
• Choice of evils and duress are generally not defenses to criminal homicide.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. A fire sweeps through a residential neighborhood. Clark and Manny light their neighbor’s house on fire to create a firebreak. This prevents several houses from burning, including Clark’s and Manny’s. Do Clark and Manny have a defense to arson in this case? Why or why not?
2. Read People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823 (1974). In Lovercamp, the defendants escaped from prison and were immediately captured. The defendants claimed they were forced to escape because a group of prisoners threatened them with sexual assault. The trial court did not allow the defendants to introduce evidence supporting the defense of necessity, and the defendants were convicted of escape. Did the Court of Appeals of California uphold their conviction for escape? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6496346791408865822&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
3. Read State v. Daoud, 141 N.H. 142 (1996). In Daoud, the defendant was convicted of driving while under the influence. The defendant appealed because the trial court did not allow her to present evidence in support of the duress defense. Did the Supreme Court of New Hampshire uphold the defendant’s conviction? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18389754229002463686&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/05%3A_Criminal_Defenses_Part_1/5.04%3A_Defenses_Based_on_Choice.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Ascertain the two elements required for the consent defense.
2. Identify three situations where consent can operate as a legal defense.
Consent by the victim can also form the basis of a justification defense to criminal conduct. Consent is most commonly used as a defense to sex crimes such as rape, and lack of consent is a criminal element of most sexual offenses that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus consent to sexual acts is discussed in Chapter 10. In this section, consent to nonsexual conduct is explored. Consent is a defense that can be statutory or common law, perfect or imperfect, depending on the jurisdiction.
Elements of the Consent Defense
Consent can be a valid defense to a crime only if the victim chooses to render it. Thus it must be proffered knowingly and voluntarily, or it is ineffective. Under the Model Penal Code, consent is ineffective if “it is given by a person who is legally incompetent to authorize the conduct…it is given by a person who by reason of youth, mental disease or defect or intoxication is manifestly unable to make a reasonable judgment…it is induced by force, duress or deception” (Model Penal Code § 2.11(3)). In general, consent is not knowing if it is given by an individual who is too young, mentally incompetent,Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-1-505, accessed November 23, 2010, www.michie.com/colorado/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&cp=. or intoxicated. In general, consent is not voluntary if it is induced by force, threat of force, or trickery.Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 § 453, accessed November 23, 2010, delcode.delaware.gov/title11/c004/index.shtml#451.
Example of Unknowing Consent
Gina drinks six glasses of wine at a party and offers to be the “donkey” in a game of pin the tail on the donkey. Other party members watch as Gina staggers her way to the front of the room and poses in front of the pin the tail on the donkey poster. Geoff walks up to Gina and stabs her several times in the buttocks with a pin. Geoff probably cannot claim consent as a defense to battery in this case. Gina consented to battery while she was intoxicated, and clearly she was unable to make a reasonable judgment. Thus her consent was not given knowingly and was ineffective in this situation.
Example of Involuntary Consent
Change the example with Gina and Geoff. Imagine that Gina just arrived at the party and has not consumed any alcohol. Geoff tells Gina he will poke out her eye with a pin if she does not volunteer to be the donkey in the pin the tail on the donkey game. He exemplifies his threat by making stabbing gestures at Gina’s eye with the pin. Frightened, Gina goes to the front of the room and poses in front of the donkey poster until Geoff stabs her in the buttocks with the pin. Geoff probably cannot claim consent as a defense to battery in this case. Gina consented in response to Geoff’s threat of physical harm. Thus her consent was not given voluntarily and was ineffective in this situation.
Situations Where Consent Can Operate as a Defense
Consent is a defense to only a few crimes. In most jurisdictions, consent can operate only as a defense to sexual conduct, injury that occurs during a sporting event, and crimes that do not result in serious bodily injury or death.Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 17-A § 109, accessed November 23, 2010, http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/statutes/17-A/title17-Asec109.html. As the Model Penal Code states, “[w]hen conduct is charged to constitute an offense because it causes or threatens bodily harm, consent to such conduct or to the infliction of such harm is a defense if: (a) the bodily harm consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious; or (b) the conduct and the harm are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive sport” (Model Penal Code § 2.11(2)).
Example of Legal Consent
Review the examples with Gina and Geoff. Change the examples, and imagine that Gina did not consume any alcohol and was not threatened by Geoff. If Gina offers to be the donkey in the pin the tail on the donkey game and Geoff stabs her in the buttocks with the pin, Geoff may be able to use consent as a defense to battery. Gina’s consent appears to be knowing and voluntary. Gina probably does not suffer serious bodily injury from the pin stab in the buttocks. Thus the elements of legal consent exist, and this situation is appropriate for the consent defense.
Exercises
• Two elements are required for the consent defense: the defendant must consent knowingly (cannot be too young, mentally incompetent, or intoxicated) and voluntarily (cannot be forced, threatened, or tricked).
• Three situations where consent can operate as a defense are sexual offenses, situations that do not result in serious bodily injury or death, and sporting events.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Allen tackles Brett during a high school football game, and Brett is severely injured. Can Allen be criminally prosecuted for battery? Why or why not?
2. Read Donaldson v. Lungren, 2 Cal. App. 4th 1614 (1992). In Donaldson, the defendant sought court permission to be cryogenically frozen because he had a brain tumor and wanted to be frozen until there was a cure. The defendant also sought to protect the individual who was going to help with the process and filed a lawsuit seeking an injunction and immunity from criminal prosecution for assisted suicide. The defendant claimed he had a constitutional right to consent to this procedure. Did the Court of Appeals of California uphold the defendant’s right to be frozen—that is, to commit suicide? The case is available at this link: www.rickross.com/reference/alcor/alcor7.html.
3. Read Ramey v. State, 417 S.E.2d 699 (1992). In Ramey, the defendant, a police officer, was convicted of battery for beating the defendant with a flashlight and burning his nipples. The defendant claimed that the victim, who appeared to have mental problems, consented to this treatment. The trial court refused to instruct the jury on the consent defense. Did the Court of Appeals of Georgia uphold the defendant’s conviction? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10809733884390698075&hl=en&as_sdt=2002&as_vis=1. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/05%3A_Criminal_Defenses_Part_1/5.05%3A_Consent.txt |
Summary
Defenses can be denial or failure of proof, affirmative, imperfect, perfect, factual, legal, common law (created by case law), or statutory (created by a state or federal legislature). A denial or failure of proof defense creates doubt in one or more of the elements of the offense and prevents the prosecution from meeting its burden of proof. An affirmative defense raises an issue separate from the elements of the offense and must be asserted before or during the trial or it cannot serve as the basis for an appeal. Defendants have either the burden of production or the burden of production and persuasion to a preponderance of evidence for an affirmative defense. An imperfect defense reduces the severity of the offense, or sentence. A perfect defense results in an acquittal. A factual defense is grounded in the facts of the case, while a legal defense depends on a statute or common-law principle. An example of a factual defense is an alibi defense, which asserts that the defendant could not have committed the crime because he or she was somewhere else at the time the crime occurred. An example of a legal defense is expiration of the statute of limitations, which means it is too late to prosecute the defendant for the offense.
Defenses can also be based on justification or excuse. A defense based on justification focuses on the offense and deems the conduct worthy of protection from criminal responsibility. A defense based on excuse focuses on the defendant and excuses his or her conduct under the circumstances.
Self-defense justifies the defendant’s conduct in using physical force as protective. Self-defense is legal only when the defendant is faced with an unprovoked, imminent attack, and it is objectively reasonable that the degree of force used in response is necessary to avoid the attack. The defendant can be the initial aggressor and still use self-defense if the attacked individual uses too much force in response to the defendant’s attack or if the defendant withdraws from the attack and is still pursued by the attacked individual. The attack does not necessarily have to be imminent if the defendant is a battered wife. Deadly force is any force that can kill under the circumstances. Deadly force can be used in self-defense only if the defendant is faced with imminent death, serious bodily injury, or the commission of a serious felony. Some jurisdictions require the defendant to retreat before resorting to deadly force, while others allow the defendant to stand his or her ground.
In most states, an individual can defend another to the same extent as self-defense. If a defendant is honestly but unreasonably mistaken about the fact that he or she needs to respond in self-defense or defense of others, imperfect self-defense or defense of others may be appropriate, depending on the jurisdiction. A defendant can also defend property using nondeadly force from an imminent threat of damage, loss, or theft. Real property is land and anything permanently attached to it, while personal property is any movable object. In many jurisdictions, a trespasser may be ejected from real property using nondeadly force after the trespasser has been requested to leave.
Defense of habitation is distinct from defense of real property in most states. Modern laws called castle laws expand the use of force to defend habitation. Castle laws eliminate the duty to retreat when in the home and provide civil and criminal immunity from prosecution for the use of deadly force. Deadly force can be used against a trespasser who enters occupied premises without consent of the owner when there is an objectively reasonable belief that the occupants will be seriously injured or killed.
Law enforcement can also use force to arrest or apprehend a criminal. If the force is deadly, it is considered a seizure under the Fourth Amendment and is scrutinized under an objectively reasonable standard.
The defense of choice of evils (called the necessity defense in some jurisdictions) permits the defendant to commit a crime if the harm caused is less severe than harm that will occur if the crime is not committed. In general, criminal homicide cannot be defended by choice of evils. Duress, a closely related defense, can sanction the use of force when the defendant is imminently threatened with serious bodily injury or death. Like choice of evils, the degree of force used pursuant to duress should be nondeadly.
The victim can also consent to the defendant’s conduct, creating a consent defense, as long as the consent is given knowingly and voluntarily, the conduct is sexual or occurs during a sporting event, and the conduct does not involve serious bodily injury or death.
YOU BE THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY
You are a well-known private defense attorney with a perfect record. Read the prompt, review the case, and then decide whether you would accept or reject it if you want to maintain your level of success. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. The defendant and his wife argued. She raised a knife above her head and stated, “Don’t make me use this.” The defendant took the knife away and thereafter stabbed the victim forty-three times in the head and chest with it. The defendant wants to make an imperfect self-defense argument. Will you accept or reject the case? Read State v. Perez, 840 P.2d 1118 (1992). The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7422940810428798296&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
2. The defendants crossed a police tape and trespassed on a medical clinic’s private property while protesting abortion. The defendants want to make arguments in support of necessity, defense of others, and duress. The basis of the defendants’ claims is that they are protecting the lives of unborn children. Will you accept or reject the case? Read Allison v. Birmingham, 580 So.2d 1377 (1991). The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8254507993974001416&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
3. The defendant, a police officer, shot the victim twice after being summoned to the victim’s home by his wife. The victim was intoxicated and armed with two small steak knives. The defendant shot the victim subsequent to a somewhat lengthy encounter during which the victim lunged at him with the knives. The victim claimed he was putting the knives down or about to put the knives down. The victim is suing the defendant for damages based on use of excessive force in arrest or apprehension. Will you accept or reject the case? Read Roy v. Inhabitants of Lewiston, 42 F.3d 691 (1994). The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8822695050372354696&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
4. The defendant, the Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, distributes marijuana to qualified patients under California’s Compassionate Use Act, which allows the possession and use of marijuana for medical purposes. The US government wants to stop this distribution under the federal Controlled Substances Act, which prohibits possession and use of marijuana under any circumstances. The defendant wants to continue distribution under a claim of medical necessity. Will you accept or reject the case? Read U.S. v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483 (2001). The case is available at this link: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/pdf/00-151P.ZO.
Articles of Interest
• Affirmative defenses: www.fd.org/pdf_lib/Beneman_Affirmative_Defenses_materials.pdf
• Self-defense and martial arts: http://www.ittendojo.org/articles/general-4.htm
• Castle laws: www.harvardjol.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/523-554.pdf
• Necessity and duress defenses: wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/bclrarticles/6/2/westen.pdf
Statistics of Interest
• Violence used during household burglaries in the United States: bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/press/vdhbpr.cfm
• US law enforcement officers killed and assaulted: www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/leoka/2009/leoka-2009
Answers to Exercises
From Section 5.1
1. Carol’s defense creates doubt in the intent element for battery. Thus Carol’s defense is a denial or failure of proof defense, not an affirmative defense.
2. The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the defendant’s conviction because the jury instruction should have explained that the prosecution has the burden of disproving self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. The Supreme Court of Nevada held that necessity was a valid common-law defense to driving while under the influence. However, the court upheld the defendant’s conviction because he did not meet the requirements for necessity under the circumstances.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 5.2
1. Colin cannot claim traditional self-defense because there is no objectively reasonable fear of imminent injury or death while Diane is sleeping. Colin also cannot technically assert the battered wife defense because he is a husband. Courts can expand statutory defenses or create new common-law defenses. However, courts may be reluctant to expand the battered wife defense to spouses of either gender, based on the physical differences between men and women and the lack of empirical evidence documenting battered husband syndrome.
2. The Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the defendant’s convictions, holding that the jury does not have to be unanimous as to each required element of self-defense.
3. The US District Court for the District of Montana reversed the fine and held that the defendant did not provoke the attack and was entitled to shoot the bear in self-defense.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 5.3
1. Melanie cannot use defense of others as a defense to criminal homicide. Melanie can defend Colleen only to the same extent she could defend herself. Nothing in the fact pattern indicates that Colleen could defend herself using deadly force. Thus Melanie could be successfully prosecuted for criminal homicide in this situation.
2. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the defendant could not threaten deadly force to defend personal property and affirmed the conviction.
3. The Court of Appeals of Texas held that the victim had the right to sue for excessive force used to arrest. The evidence did not indicate that the victim posed an immediate danger to the law enforcement officer’s safety, or that she was attempting to resist arrest or flee. Moreover, the offense—failure to identify herself or give her date of birth—was minor. Thus the law enforcement officer was not immune from a lawsuit for damages under the circumstances.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 5.4
1. Clark and Manny can use choice of evils as a defense to arson in many jurisdictions. Clark and Manny were confronted with two harms: the loss of several homes or the loss of their neighbor’s home. Clark and Manny ranked the loss of one home lower than the loss of several homes, which is objectively reasonable. Thus Clark and Manny could be acquitted or have a reduction in sentence or severity of the offense, depending on the jurisdiction.
2. The Court of Appeals of California held that the defendants should have been allowed to present evidence in support of the necessity defense and were entitled to a retrial.
3. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire upheld the defendant’s conviction. The court recognized that a common-law defense of duress exists in some jurisdictions, but held that the facts in the defendant’s case did not indicate that she was under duress. The court stated the defendant had lawful alternatives to driving while under the influence, such as calling a taxi or a friend for a ride or walking.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 5.5
1. In most jurisdictions, Allen cannot be criminally prosecuted because Brett consented to being tackled by choosing to participate in football, a contact sport.
2. The Court of Appeals of California held that the defendant had no constitutional right to be cryogenically frozen and affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of his lawsuit seeking an injunction and immunity from criminal prosecution. The court reasoned that the defendant’s right to refuse medical treatment is different from involving another individual in his death. It thereafter held that the defendant was legally free to commit suicide, but he could not authorize another to kill him.
3. The Court of Appeals of Georgia upheld the defendant’s conviction for battery. The court stated, “It is the act and intent and results of the defendant’s act which constitute the crimes as charged; the attitude of the victim is not called into issue by these elements.”Ramey v. State, 417 S.E.2d 699, 701 (1992), accessed November 23, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10809733884390698075&hl=en&as_sdt=2002&as_vis=1.
Answer to Law and Ethics Question
1. The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit gave great discretion to the state trial court, creating a presumption that the trial court did a proper analysis of the law and evidence when rejecting the imperfect self-defense jury instruction. The court thereafter agreed with the trial court’s findings that the evidence excluded did not support a theory of imminent threat, required under California case law for a theory of imperfect self-defense.Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1029 (2005), accessed November 19, 2010, http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F3/422/1012/569492. The battered wife syndrome or defense was not discussed in detail, although the Menendez brothers’ theory of abuse is similar. This case is a good demonstration of how state case law varies, especially with regard to modern theories of self-defense based on psychological trauma. In a different state, there may have been a different result grounded in state law regarding these innovative defense theories.
Answers to You Be the Defense Attorney
1. In this case, the trial court rejected the imperfect self-defense argument and refused to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter. The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed. The court held that after the defendant took the knife away, the victim was unarmed and no imminent threat of harm remained. Thus you would lose on the imperfect self-defense argument and should reject the case.
2. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama affirmed the trial court’s rejection of the defense arguments based on the fact that abortion is legal. The court reviewed the common law, statutes, and case precedent and concluded that these defenses are not appropriate to protest legal acts. Thus you would lose on the justification defense arguments and should reject the case.
3. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the lawsuit for damages. The court held that the defendant’s use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances and gave broad latitude to officers who are forced to make split-second decisions under dangerous conditions. Thus you would win on the appropriate use of force in arrest argument and should accept the case.
4. The US Supreme Court held that there is no medical necessity exception to the Controlled Substances Act. The Court based its holding on the language of the federal statute, which reflects a determination that marijuana has no medical benefits worthy of an exception. Thus you would lose on the medical necessity argument and should reject the case. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/05%3A_Criminal_Defenses_Part_1/5.06%3A_End-of-Chapter_Material.txt |
The use of drugs or controlled substances, dependence on drugs or controlled substances or voluntary intoxication shall not, as such, constitute a defense to a criminal charge…
- Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.125(1), cited in Section 6.2.2 "Intoxication"
Source: Image courtesy of Tara Storm.
6.01: The Insanity Defense
Learning Objectives
1. Identify four states that do not recognize an insanity defense.
2. Identify four versions of the insanity defense.
3. Ascertain the two elements required for the M’Naghten insanity defense.
4. Ascertain the two elements required for the irresistible impulse insanity defense.
5. Compare the M’Naghten, irresistible impulse, and substantial capacity tests.
6. Ascertain the basis of the Durham insanity defense.
7. Identify the various burdens of proof for the insanity defense.
8. Distinguish between diminished capacity and the insanity defense.
9. Compare the insanity defense with mental competence to stand trial.
10. Compare the insanity defense with the guilty but mentally ill verdict.
11. Compare different commitment procedures for an insane criminal defendant.
12. Distinguish temporary from permanent insanity.
With the exception of alibi and the expiration of the statute of limitations, Chapter 5 explored criminal defenses based on justification. This chapter reviews criminal defenses based on excuse, including the insanity defense. Remember that defenses based on excuse focus on the defendant and claim that the defendant should be excused from criminal responsibility for his or her conduct under the circumstances.
Although controversial, most states and the federal government recognize an insanity defense.18 U.S.C. § 17, accessed November 28, 2010, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/usc_sec_18_00000017----000-.html. Montana, Utah, Kansas, and Idaho are the only states that do not.Findlaw.com, “The Insanity Defense among the States,” findlaw.com website, accessed November 29, 2010, http://criminal.findlaw.com/crimes/more-criminal-topics/insanity-defense/the-insanity-defense-among-the-states.html. The insanity defense is the subject of much debate because it excuses even the most evil and abhorrent conduct, and in many jurisdictions, legal insanity functions as a perfect defense resulting in acquittal. However, the insanity defense is rarely used and hardly ever successful. This is generally because of the difficulty in proving legal insanity.
Many criminal defendants suffer from mental illness and can produce evidence of this illness such as psychiatric or layperson testimony. Often, mental disturbance is apparent from the defendant’s conduct under the circumstances. However, legal insanity differs from medical insanity and is generally much more difficult to establish. The rationale behind creating a different standard for legal insanity is the goal of a criminal prosecution discussed in Chapter 1. Criminal prosecution should deter as well as incapacitate. While the purpose of a medical diagnosis is to eventually cure the defendant’s disorder, the purpose of criminal law is to punish the defendant. Thus the defendant’s conduct is not excused if the defendant or society can benefit from punishment.
The policy supporting the insanity defense is twofold. First, an insane defendant does not have control over his or her conduct. This is similar to a defendant who is hypnotized, or sleepwalking. Second, an insane defendant does not have the ability to form criminal intent. Without the ability to control conduct, or the understanding that conduct is evil or wrong by society’s standards, an insane defendant presumably will commit crimes again and again. Thus no deterrent effect is served by punishment, and treatment for the mental defect is the appropriate remedy.
Four variations of the insanity defense currently exist: M’Naghten, irresistible impulse, substantial capacity, and Durham.
M’Naghten Insanity Defense
The M’Naghten insanity defense, also called the right-wrong test, is the most common insanity defense in the United States. It is also the oldest and was created in England in 1843. The defense is named after Daniel M’Naghten. M’Naghten was under the paranoid delusion that the Prime Minister of England, Sir Robert Peel, was trying to kill him. When he tried to shoot Sir Peel from behind, he inadvertently shot Sir Peel’s Secretary, Edward Drummond, who thereafter died. M’Naghten was put on trial for murder and, to the shock of the nation, the jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity.Queen v. M’Naghten, 10 Clark & F.200, 2 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843), accessed November 29, 2010, users.phhp.ufl.edu/rbauer/forensic_neuropsychology/mcnaghten.pdf. After a public outcry at this verdict, the British House of Lords developed a test for insanity that remains relatively intact today.
The M’Naghten insanity defense is cognitive and focuses on the defendant’s awareness, rather than the ability to control conduct. The defense requires two elements. First, the defendant must be suffering from a mental defect at the time he or she commits the criminal act. The mental defect can be called a “defect of reason” or a “disease of the mind,” depending on the jurisdiction.Iowa Code § 701.4, accessed November 30, 2010, coolice.legis.state.ia.us/cool-ice/default.asp?category=billinfo&service=iowacode&ga=83&input=701. Second, the trier of fact must find that because of the mental defect, the defendant did not know either the nature and quality of the criminal act or that the act was wrong.
The terms “defect of reason” and “disease of the mind” can be defined in different ways, but in general, the defendant must be cognitively impaired to the level of not knowing the nature and quality of the criminal act, or that the act is wrong. Some common examples of mental defects and diseases are psychosis, schizophrenia, and paranoia.
Jurisdictions vary as to the level of awareness the defendant must possess. Some jurisdictions use the term “know,” or “understand,”Cal. Penal Code § 25, accessed November 30, 2010, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/25.html. while others use the term “appreciate.”Ala. Code § 13A-3-1, accessed November 30, 2010, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-3-1.html. If know or understand is the standard, the trier of fact must ascertain a basic level of awareness under the attendant circumstances. If appreciate is the standard, the trier of fact must analyze the defendant’s emotional state, and evidence of the defendant’s character or personality may be relevant and admissible.
A defendant does not know the nature and quality of a criminal act if the defendant is completely oblivious to what he or she is doing. This is quite rare, so most defendants claiming insanity choose to assert that they did not know their act was wrong. However, jurisdictions differ as to the meaning of “wrong.” Some jurisdictions define wrong as “legally wrong,” meaning the defendant must be unaware that the act is against the law.State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488 (1983), accessed November 30, 2010, lawschool.courtroomview.com/acf_cases/8790-state-v-crenshaw. Others define wrong as “legally and morally wrong,” meaning the defendant must also be unaware that the act is condemned by society.State v. Skaggs, 586 P.2d 1279 (1978), accessed November 30, 2010, http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?xmldoc=1978587120Ariz467_1470.xml&docbase=CSLWAR1-1950-1985. Generally, the only instance where the defendant must be “morally wrong,” standing alone, is when the defendant claims that the conduct was performed at the command of God, which is called the deific defense.State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d 1314 (1990), accessed November 30, 2010, http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?xmldoc=1990713117NJ596_1172.xml&docbase=CSLWAR2-1986-2006. Whether the standard is legally wrong or morally wrong, if there is any evidence of a cover-up or an attempt to hide or escape, it is apparent that the defendant knew the difference between right and wrong, defeating the claim of insanity under M’Naghten.
Example of a Case Inappropriate for the M’Naghten Insanity Defense
Susan wants to marry a single man, but he does not want the responsibility of caring for her children. Susan decides to kill her children. She drives her two sons, aged three and five, out to the lake. She puts the car in park, gets out, and then puts it in gear, watching as it drives into the water. Both of her sons drown. Later that day, Susan files a police report stating that a stranger kidnapped her children at gunpoint. While searching the area for the kidnapper, the police discover the children’s bodies and evidence indicating that Susan killed them.
Susan recants her kidnapping story and admits she killed her children. However, she claims she is not guilty by reason of insanity. Susan’s claim will probably not be successful if she killed her children in a jurisdiction that recognizes the M’Naghten insanity defense. Susan tried to mislead the police, demonstrating her awareness that she had done something wrong. Thus although Susan’s behavior appears mentally imbalanced, she clearly knew the difference between right and wrong, and her conduct is not excusable under M’Naghten’s rigid requirements.
Example of a Case Appropriate for the M’Naghten Insanity Defense
Andrea, a diagnosed schizophrenic, drowns five of her young children in the bathtub. Andrea promptly phones 911 and tells the operator that her children are dead. The operator dispatches an emergency call to law enforcement. When law enforcement officers arrive at Andrea’s house, she informs them that she killed her children so that they could leave this earth and enter heaven.
Andrea thereafter claims she is not guilty for killing her children by reason of insanity. Andrea could be successful if the jurisdiction in which she killed her children recognizes the M’Naghten insanity defense. Andrea suffers from a mental defect, schizophrenia. In addition, there is no evidence indicating Andrea knew her conduct was wrong, such as an attempted escape, or cover-up. In fact, Andrea herself contacted law enforcement and immediately told them about her criminal acts. Thus both of the M’Naghten elements appear to be present, and Andrea’s conduct may be excusable under the circumstances.
Irresistible Impulse Insanity Defense
Another variation of the insanity defense is the irresistible impulse defense. This defense has lost popularity over the years and is rejected by most of the states and the federal government.18 U.S.C. § 17, accessed November 28, 2010, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/usc_sec_18_00000017----000-.html. In some cases, the irresistible impulse insanity defense is easier to prove than the M’Naghten insanity defense, resulting in the acquittal of more mentally disturbed defendants.
The irresistible impulse insanity defense generally supplements M’Naghten, so the focus is on the defendant’s awareness (cognitive) and the defendant’s will (ability to control conduct). In jurisdictions that recognize the irresistible impulse insanity defense, the first element is the same as M’Naghten; the defendant must suffer from a mental defect or disease of the mind. However, the second element adds the concept of volition, or free choice. If the defendant cannot control his or her conduct because of the mental defect or disease, the defendant’s conduct is excused even if the defendant understands that the conduct is wrong.State v. White, 270 P.2d 727 (1954), accessed November 30, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15018626933471947897&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. This is a softer stance than M’Naghten, which does not exonerate a defendant who is aware conduct is wrong. The challenge for the trier of fact in an irresistible impulse jurisdiction is distinguishing between conduct that can be controlled and conduct that cannot.
Example of a Case Inappropriate for the Irresistible Impulse Insanity Defense
Jolene, who has been diagnosed with paranoia, decides she must cut off all her sorority sisters’ hair because they are “out to get her.” She drives to the sorority house with a Taser and scissors in her backpack. Her plan is to subdue each sister with the stun gun and then hack off her hair. As she arrives at the house, she sees Agnes, one of her sorority sisters, trip and fall in the parking lot, ripping her cashmere sweater and scraping her chin. Feeling a stab of pity, Jolene ignores Agnes and walks hurriedly toward the building. As she enters, Ashley, another sorority sister, turns, scowls at Jolene, and barks, “What in the world are you wearing? You look like you just rolled out of bed!” Jolene pulls the stun gun out of her backpack and shoots Ashley. While Ashley is lying on the floor, Jolene takes out the scissors and cuts Ashley’s hair off at the scalp.
Jolene claims she is not guilty for assault and battery of Ashley by reason of insanity. If Jolene attacked Ashley in a jurisdiction that recognizes the irresistible impulse insanity defense, she probably will not be successful with her claim. Jolene has been diagnosed with paranoia, which is a mental defect or disease. However, Jolene seems aware that shooting someone with a stun gun and cutting off her hair is wrong because she spared Agnes based on pity. In addition, Jolene’s choice not to attack Agnes indicates she has control over her conduct. Thus Jolene is cognitive of the difference between right and wrong and has the will to suppress criminal behavior, defeating any claim of insanity under the irresistible impulse insanity defense.
The Substantial Capacity Test
The substantial capacity test is the insanity defense created by the Model Penal Code. The Model Penal Code was completed in 1962. By 1980, approximately half of the states and the federal government adopted the substantial capacity test (also called the Model Penal Code or ALI defense).Carol A. Rolf, “From M’Naghten to Yates—Transformation of the Insanity Defense in the United States—Is It Still Viable?” Rivier College Online Academic Journal 2 (2006), accessed December 1, 2010, www.rivier.edu/journal/ROAJ-2006-Spring/J41-ROLF.pdf. However, in 1982, John Hinckley successfully claimed insanity using the substantial capacity test in his federal trial for the attempted murder of then-President Ronald Reagan. Public indignation at this not-guilty verdict caused many states and the federal government to switch from the substantial capacity test to the more inflexible M’Naghten standard.18 U.S.C. § 17, accessed November 28, 2010, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/usc_sec_18_00000017----000-.html. In addition, jurisdictions that switched to M’Naghten also shifted the burden of proving insanity to the defendant.Carol A. Rolf, “From M’Naghten to Yates—Transformation of the Insanity Defense in the United States—Is It Still Viable?” Rivier College Online Academic Journal 1 (2006), accessed December 1, 2010, www.rivier.edu/journal/ROAJ-2006-Spring/J41-ROLF.pdf. The defendant’s burden of proof for the insanity defense is discussed shortly.
The substantial capacity test is as follows: “A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law” (Model Penal Code § 4.01(1)). The defense has two elements. The first element requires the defendant to have a mental disease or defect, like the M’Naghten and irresistible impulse insanity defenses. The second element combines the cognitive standard with volitional, like the irresistible impulse insanity defense supplementing the M’Naghten insanity defense.
In general, it is easier to establish insanity under the substantial capacity test because both the cognitive and volitional requirements are scaled down to more flexible standards. Unlike the M’Naghten insanity defense, the substantial capacity test relaxes the requirement for complete inability to understand or know the difference between right and wrong. Instead, the defendant must lack substantial, not total, capacity. The “wrong” in the substantial capacity test is “criminality,” which is a legal rather than moral wrong. In addition, unlike the irresistible impulse insanity defense, the defendant must lack substantial, not total, ability to conform conduct to the requirements of the law. Another difference in the substantial capacity test is the use of the word “appreciate” rather than “know.” As stated previously, appreciate incorporates an emotional quality, which means that evidence of the defendant’s character or personality is relevant and most likely admissible to support the defense.
Example of the Substantial Capacity Test
Loreen has been diagnosed with psychosis and spent most of her life in a mental hospital. While at the mental hospital, Loreen made friends with many of the patients and health-care personnel. From time to time, Loreen would play jokes on these friends. Most of these “jokes” consisted of putting her antidepressants into their food. Loreen was always reprimanded and often sternly punished for these escapades. After her release from the mental hospital at age twenty-one, Loreen falls in love with Aidan, a man who works in a bookstore near her apartment. Loreen decides to make Aidan fall in love with her by feeding him a magic potion, which she concocts out of a mixture of her antidepressants. Loreen buys a book from Aidan and casually asks if he would like her to buy him a coffee. Aidan shrugs and says, “Sure, but I don’t have a break for another two hours.” Loreen offers to bring him the coffee. Before bringing the drink to Aidan, she puts her “magic potion” in it. While Aidan is sipping the coffee, Loreen declares her love for him. She then states, “I know I shouldn’t have, but I put a love potion in your coffee. I hope it doesn’t hurt you.” Aidan becomes seriously ill after drinking the coffee and is hospitalized.
Loreen claims she is not guilty for battering Aidan by reason of insanity. If Loreen is in a jurisdiction that recognizes the substantial capacity test, she may be successful with her claim. Loreen has a mental disease or defect, psychosis. Loreen’s statement to Aidan indicates that she lacks the substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of her conduct. Note that if Loreen were in a M’Naghten jurisdiction, her statement “I know I shouldn’t have” could prove her awareness that her conduct was wrong, defeating her claim. In addition, Loreen’s behavior at the mental hospital indicates that she lacks the substantial capacity to conform or control her conduct. Even after a lifetime of being punished over and over for mixing her meds together and putting them in other people’s food or drink, Loreen still does it. Lastly, in a substantial capacity jurisdiction, testimony from Loreen’s friends at the mental hospital may be admissible to support her claim of insanity, and her lack of ability to “appreciate” the criminality of her conduct.
The Durham Insanity Defense
The Durham insanity defense is used only in New Hampshire and has been the established insanity defense in New Hampshire since the late 1800s. The Durham defense, also called the Durham rule or the product test, was adopted by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the case of Durham v. U.S., 214 F.2d 862 (1954). The defense set forth in that case is as follows: “[A]n accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect.”Durham v. U.S., 214 F.2d 862, 875 (1954), accessed December 2, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1244686235948852364&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. However, the court failed to give definitions for product, mental disease, or mental defect. Thus the Durham insanity defense is extremely difficult to apply, and the D.C. Circuit rejected it in 1972 in the case of U.S. v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (1972), which was later superseded by federal statute.18 U.S.C. § 17, accessed November 28, 2010, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/usc_sec_18_00000017----000-.html.
In general, the Durham insanity defense relies on ordinary principles of proximate causation. The defense has two elements. First, the defendant must have a mental disease or defect. Although these terms are not specifically defined in the Durham case, the language of the judicial opinion indicates an attempt to rely more on objective, psychological standards, rather than focusing on the defendant’s subjective cognition. The second element has to do with causation. If the criminal conduct is “caused” by the mental disease or defect, then the conduct should be excused under the circumstances.
Example of the Durham Insanity Defense
Arianna has been diagnosed with paranoia. Most psychiatric experts agree that individuals afflicted with paranoia unreasonably believe that the human population is “out to get them.” Arianna works under the direct supervision of Nora, who has a physical condition called “walleye.” Nora’s walleye makes it appear that she is looking to the side when she addresses people. Arianna gradually becomes convinced that Nora is communicating secret messages to their coworkers when she is speaking to Arianna. Arianna is genuinely frightened that Nora is telling their coworkers to kill her, and she decides she needs to defend herself. Arianna brings a gun to work one day, and when Nora begins talking to her about her tendency to take overlong lunches, Arianna pulls the gun out of her cubicle and shoots and kills Nora.
Arianna claims she is not guilty for killing Nora by reason of insanity. If Arianna killed Nora in New Hampshire, she might be successful with her claim. Arianna has a mental disease or defect, paranoia. Arianna can probably produce evidence, such as psychiatric expert testimony, that her paranoia “caused” or “produced” her criminal conduct, which was shooting Nora. Thus a trier of fact could acquit Arianna on the grounds that her conduct is excusable under these circumstances.
Proving Insanity
There is generally a presumption that criminal defendants are sane, just as there is a presumption that they are innocent. Therefore, at a minimum, a defendant claiming insanity must produce evidence that rebuts this presumption. Some states require the prosecution to thereafter prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt or to a preponderance of evidence.James R. Elkins and students at the West Virginia University College of Law, “Insanity Defense,” West Virginia Homicide Jury Instructions Project, accessed December 2, 2010, myweb.wvnet.edu/~jelkins/adcrimlaw/insanity.html.
Post-Hinckley, many states have converted the insanity defense into an affirmative defense. Thus as discussed in Chapter 5, the defendant may also have the burden of persuading the trier of fact that he or she is insane to a preponderance of evidence.New Jersey Jury Instruction on Insanity, Based on N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C: 4-1, accessed November 30, 2010, www.judiciary.state.nj.us/criminal/charges/respons1.pdf. The federal government and some other states require the defendant to prove insanity by clear and convincing evidence, which is a higher standard than preponderance of evidence.Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-501, accessed December 2, 2010, http://law.justia.com/tennessee/codes/2010/title-39/chapter-11/part-5/39-11-501.
Diminished Capacity
A claim of diminished capacity differs from the insanity defense. Diminished capacity is an imperfect failure of proof defense recognized in a minority of jurisdictions. Diminished capacity could reduce a first-degree murder charge to second-degree murder or manslaughter if the defendant lacks the mental capacity to form the appropriate criminal intent for first-degree murder.
In California, diminished capacity was abolished as an affirmative defense after San Francisco Supervisor Dan White used it successfully in his trial for the murder of fellow Supervisor Harvey Milk. A jury convicted White of voluntary manslaughter rather than first-degree premeditated murder after reviewing evidence that proved his diet of junk food (Twinkies) created a chemical imbalance in his brain. In the aftermath of this highly publicized trial, California passed legislation eliminating the diminished capacity defense and limiting the admissibility of evidence of diminished capacity only to sentencing proceedings.Cal. Penal Code § 25, accessed December 2, 2010, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/25.html.
Similar to diminished capacity is the syndrome defense. A syndrome that negates the requisite intent for the crime could function as a failure of proof defense in a minority of jurisdictions. Some common examples of syndromes the American Psychiatric Association recognizes in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition (DSM-IV), are antisocial personality disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and intermittent explosive disorder. Some common examples of syndromes identified but not recognized in DSM-IV are battered woman or battered wife syndrome (discussed in Chapter 5) and caffeine withdrawal. Although successful use of the syndrome defense is rare, at least one case has excused a defendant’s drunken driving and assault and battery against a police officer because of premenstrual syndrome (PMS).“Successful PMS Defense in Virginia Case Revives Debate,” Baltimore.com website, accessed June 16, 2011, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1991-06-16/news/1991167033_1_pms-richter-defense.
Mental Competence to Stand Trial
The insanity defense is different from mental competence to stand trial. The insanity defense pertains to the defendant’s mental state when he or she commits the crime. If the insanity defense is successful, it exonerates the defendant from guilt. Mental competence to stand trial is analyzed at the time the trial is to take place. If the defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial, the trial is delayed until the defendant regains competency. Although a detailed discussion of mental competence to stand trial is beyond the scope of this book, in general, a criminal defendant must be able to understand the charges against him or her, and be able to assist in his or her defense. As the Model Penal Code provides, “[n]o person who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense shall be tried, convicted or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity endures” (Model Penal Code § 4.04). A defendant who is mentally incompetent at the time of trial is subject to mental health treatment or even involuntary medication until competence is regained.
Guilty but Mentally Ill
Post-Hinckley, some states adopted the guilty but mentally ill verdict. A defendant who is found guilty but mentally ill is not acquitted but punished and treated for mental health simultaneously while in prison. Typically, the guilty but mentally ill verdict is available only when the defendant fails to prove legal insanity, and requires the defendant to prove mental illness at the time of the crime to a preponderance of evidence.725 ILCS § 5/115-4(j), accessed December 3, 2010, http://law.onecle.com/illinois/725ilcs5/115-4.html.
Example of Guilty but Mentally Ill
Review the example with Jolene in Section 6. In this example, Jolene has been diagnosed with paranoia, but shows an ability to control and understand the wrongfulness of her conduct, so she probably will not be successful with an irresistible impulse insanity defense. If Jolene is in a state that offers a guilty but mentally ill verdict, Jolene may be an appropriate candidate because she was mentally ill at the time she assaulted and battered her sorority sister. If Jolene is found guilty but mentally ill, she will be treated for her mental health simultaneously while serving any prison sentence.
Hasan Fort Hood Shooting Video
Does Hasan Have an Insanity Defense? The Judge Rules!
In this news story on the legal implications of the Fort Hood shootings, Judge Napolitano discusses the upcoming prosecution of Nidal Hasan and the possibility of an insanity defense.Angela K. Brown, “Fort Hood Shooting Suspect Major Nidal Hasan to Be Arraigned,” Huffingtonpost.com website, accessed August 26, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/20/fort-hood-shooting-suspect-in-court_n_904274.html.
(click to see video)
Disposition of the Legally Insane
The not guilty by reason of insanity verdict means that the defendant is absolved from criminal responsibility and devoid of any criminal record for the offense. However, it does not mean that the defendant is free to return to society.
In several states and federally, a defendant who is found not guilty by reason of insanity is automatically committed to a treatment facility until there is a determination that mental health has been restored.18 U.S.C. § 4243(a), accessed December 3, 2010, http://law.onecle.com/uscode/18/4243.html. This is also the Model Penal Code approach. As the Model Penal Code states in § 4.08(1), “[w]hen a defendant is acquitted on the ground of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility, the Court shall order him to be committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene [Public Health] to be placed in an appropriate institution for custody, care and treatment.”
Other states have a hearing on sanity after the judgment or verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is returned. If the defendant is deemed mentally competent at the hearing, he or she is released. If the defendant is found mentally ill at the hearing, he or she is committed to the appropriate treatment facility.Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.40, accessed December 3, 2010, http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/2945.40.
Temporary Insanity
Many states also recognize temporary insanity, which does not differ in analysis from permanent insanity except for the duration of the mental illness.Aaron Malo, Matthew P. Barach, and Joseph A. Levin, “The Temporary Insanity Defense in California,” hastings.edu website, accessed December 3, 2010, www.uchastings.edu/public-law/docs/tempinsanity.pdf. In a state that recognizes temporary insanity, the elements of the state’s insanity defense, either M’Naghten, irresistible impulse, substantial capacity, or Durham, must be present at the time the crime was committed. If the defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity for the criminal offense, but regains mental competence at the time of prosecution, the defendant is released after the verdict is rendered. The trial court will order release based on the commitment procedure discussed in Section 6.1.9 "Disposition of the Legally Insane".
Example of Temporary Insanity
In Virginia in 1994, Lorena Bobbitt was tried for the crime of slicing off her husband’s penis. Bobbitt pleaded not guilty to malicious wounding by reason of insanity. Bobbitt successfully established the irresistible impulse insanity defense by presenting evidence of years of spousal abuse, a forced abortion, and rape on the night of the incident.Rachael Bell, “Crimes Below the Belt: Penile Removal and Castration,” TruTV website, accessed December 3, 2010, www.trutv.com/library/crime/criminal_mind/sexual_assault/severed_penis/index.html; “John Wayne and Lorena Bobbitt Trials: 1993 and 1994—Lorena Bobbitt’s Trial Begins,” law.jrank.org website, accessed December 3, 2010, http://law.jrank.org/pages/3594/John-Wayne-Lorena-Bobbitt-Trials-1993-1994-Lorena-Bobbitt-s-Trial-Begins.html. After the jury returned the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, Bobbitt was evaluated, deemed mentally competent, and released.Rachael Bell, “Crimes Below the Belt: Penile Removal and Castration,” TruTV website, accessed December 3, 2010, www.trutv.com/library/crime/criminal_mind/sexual_assault/severed_penis/2.html.
Lorena Bobbitt Trial Video
Lorena Bobbitt Trial, Day One
This news story discusses the first day of the Lorena Bobbitt trial.Roger Simon, “Was Lorena Bobbitt’s Act ‘an Irresistible Impulse?’” Baltimoresun.com website, accessed August 26, 2011, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1994-01-12/news/1994012071_1_lorena-bobbitt-insanity-defense-reason-of-insanity.
(click to see video)
Exercises
• The four states that do not recognize the insanity defense are Montana, Utah, Kansas, and Idaho.
• The four versions of the insanity defense are M’Naghten, irresistible impulse, substantial capacity, and Durham.
• The two elements of the M’Naghten insanity defense are the following:
• The defendant must be suffering from a mental defect or disease at the time of the crime.
• The defendant did not know the nature or quality of the criminal act he or she committed or that the act was wrong because of the mental defect or disease.
• The two elements of the irresistible impulse insanity defense are the following:
• The defendant must be suffering from a mental defect or disease at the time of the crime.
• The defendant could not control his or her criminal conduct because of the mental defect or disease.
• The substantial capacity test softens the second element of the M’Naghten and irresistible impulse insanity defenses. Under the substantial capacity test, the defendant must lack substantial, not total, capacity to appreciate the criminality of conduct or to control or conform conduct to the law.
• The Durham insanity defense excuses criminal conduct when it is caused by a mental disease or defect.
• The criminal defendant pleading not guilty by reason of insanity must produce evidence to rebut the presumption that criminal defendants are sane. Thereafter, either the prosecution has the burden of disproving insanity to a certain evidentiary standard or the defendant has the burden of proving insanity to a preponderance of evidence or clear and convincing evidence.
• The diminished capacity defense is a failure of proof imperfect defense that may reduce a first-degree murder to second-degree murder or manslaughter if the defendant did not have the mental capacity to form first-degree murder criminal intent. The insanity defense is generally a perfect affirmative defense in many jurisdictions.
• The insanity defense exonerates the defendant from criminal responsibility. Mental incompetence to stand trial delays the criminal trial until mental competency is regained.
• The guilty but mentally ill verdict finds the criminal defendant guilty but orders him or her to undergo mental health treatment while incarcerated. The insanity defense is generally a perfect affirmative defense in many jurisdictions.
• The federal government and some states automatically commit a criminal defendant to a mental health facility after an acquittal based on insanity. Other states have a postverdict hearing to rule on commitment.
• A claim of temporary insanity is the same as a claim of insanity except for the duration of the mental illness.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Jeffrey is diagnosed with schizophrenia. For fifteen years, Jeffrey kidnaps, tortures, kills, and eats human victims. Jeffrey avoids detection by hiding his victims’ corpses in various locations throughout the city. If the jurisdiction in which Jeffrey commits these crimes recognizes the M’Naghten insanity defense, can Jeffrey successfully plead and prove insanity? Why or why not?
2. Read State v. Guido, 191 A.2d 45 (1993). In Guido, the defendant killed her husband and claimed insanity in a jurisdiction that recognizes the M’Naghten insanity defense. Psychiatric experts examined the defendant and deemed her legally sane at the time of the killing. The experts thereafter met with the defendant’s attorney and changed their opinion to state that the defendant was legally insane at the time of the killing. The jury found the defendant sane after being made aware of this discrepancy. Did the New Jersey Supreme Court uphold the defendant’s conviction? The case is available at this link: lawschool.courtroomview.com/acf_cases/8791-state-v-guido.
3. Read State v. Hornsby, 484 S.E.2d 869 (1997). In Hornsby, the defendant sought to reverse his convictions for burglary and murder after jury verdicts of guilty but mentally ill. The defendant wanted to invalidate South Carolina’s statute recognizing the verdict of guilty but mentally ill as unconstitutional. The defendant claimed that defendants incarcerated after guilty but mentally ill verdicts receive the same mental health treatment as defendants incarcerated under regular guilty verdicts, violating the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. Did the Supreme Court of South Carolina uphold the statute? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13615864613799310547&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
LAW AND ETHICS: THE ELIZABETH SMART CASE
Two Prosecutions—Two Different Results
In 2002, Brian David Mitchell and his accomplice and wife, Wanda Barzee, kidnapped fourteen-year-old Elizabeth Smart from her home. Mitchell, a so-called street preacher, and Barzee held Smart captive for nine months, tethering her to a metal cable, subjecting her to daily rapes, and forcing her to ingest alcohol and drugs.Jennifer Dobner, “Elizabeth Smart Kidnapper Convicted, Jury Rejects Insanity Defense,” the Christian Science Monitor website, accessed December 11, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/1210/Elizabeth-Smart-kidnapper-convicted-jury-rejects-insanity-defense. At one point, they transported Smart across state lines to California. Mitchell was put on trial for kidnapping and sexual assault in the state of Utah. The trial court found Mitchell incompetent to stand trial, and did not make a ruling forcing him to submit to medication to remedy the incompetency.Jennifer Dobner, “Wanda Barzee, Elizabeth Smart Kidnapper, Gets Fifteen Years, Including Seven Already Served,” the Huffington Post website, accessed December 11, 2010, www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/21/wanda-barzee-elizabeth-smart_n_584787.html. Unlike Mitchell, Barzee was involuntarily medicated pursuant to a state court order (by the same judge that heard Mitchell’s incompetency claim), and pleaded guilty to federal and state kidnapping, sexual assault, and illegal transportation of a minor for sex, receiving two fifteen-year sentences, to be served concurrently.Jennifer Dobner, “Wanda Barzee, Elizabeth Smart Kidnapper, Gets Fifteen Years, Including Seven Already Served,” the Huffington Post website, accessed December 11, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/21/wanda-barzee-elizabeth-smart_n_584787.html. The federal government also instituted a prosecution against Mitchell for kidnapping and taking Smart across state lines for sex. The US District Court judge held a competency hearing and found that Mitchell was competent to stand trial.Ben Winslow, “Mitchell Ruled Competent to Stand Trial for Kidnapping Elizabeth Smart,” Fox13now.com website, accessed December 11, 2010, www.fox13now.com/news/kstu-mitchell-competent-trial-kidnapping-smart,0,4261562.story. Mitchell pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. Throughout the trial, Mitchell was often removed from the courtroom for loudly singing Christmas carols and hymns. A serious of experts testified regarding Mitchell’s psychological ailments, including a rare delusional disorder, schizophrenia, pedophilia, and antisocial personality disorder. Nonetheless, the jury rejected the insanity defense and convicted Mitchell of kidnapping and transporting a minor across state lines for the purpose of illegal sex.Jennifer Dobner, “Elizabeth Smart Kidnapper Convicted, Jury Rejects Insanity Defense,” the Christian Science Monitor website, accessed December 11, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/1210/Elizabeth-Smart-kidnapper-convicted-jury-rejects-insanity-defense.
If Mitchell had not committed federal crimes, he might still be awaiting trial in Utah.
1. What is the purpose of putting Mitchell on trial rather than delaying the trial for mental incompetency? Is this purpose ethical?
Check your answer using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
Read about Mitchell’s sentencing at http://content.usatoday.com/communities/ondeadline/post/2011/05/elizabeth-smarts-kidnapper-sentenced-to-xx-years-in-prison/1.
Brian David Mitchell Video
Suspect Deemed Competent in Elizabeth Smart Case
This video is a news story on the federal court’s ruling that Brian David Mitchell was mentally competent to stand trial in the Elizabeth Smart case:
(click to see video) | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/06%3A_Criminal_Defenses_Part_2/6.00%3A_Prelude_to_Criminal_Defenses_Part_2.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Define the infancy defense.
2. Distinguish a juvenile court adjudication from a criminal prosecution.
3. Ascertain four criteria that could support a juvenile court waiver of jurisdiction.
4. Identify a situation where voluntary intoxication may provide a defense.
5. Define involuntary intoxication.
6. Compare the defenses of voluntary and involuntary intoxication.
7. Identify a situation where mistake of law may provide a defense.
8. Identify a situation where mistake of law is not a valid defense.
9. Identify a situation where mistake of fact may provide a defense.
10. Identify a situation where mistake of fact is not a valid defense.
Infancy
Many states recognize the defense of infancy. Infancy asserts that the defendant is not subject to criminal prosecution because he or she is too young to commit a crime. The policy supporting the infancy defense is the belief that juvenile defendants are too immature to form criminal intent. The infancy defense is typically statutory and can be perfect or imperfect, depending on the jurisdiction.
States divide up the jurisdiction of criminal defendants between juvenile courts and adult courts. Juvenile court systems generally retain jurisdiction over criminal defendants under the age of sixteen, seventeen, or eighteen, with exceptions. The Model Penal Code position is that “[a] person shall not be tried for or convicted of an offense if: (a) at the time of the conduct charged to constitute the offense he was less than sixteen years of age, [in which case the Juvenile Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction]” (Model Penal Code § 4.10(1)(a)).
The primary purpose of a juvenile court adjudication is rehabilitation. The goal is to reform the minor before he or she becomes an adult. In most states, the infancy defense protects a youthful defendant from criminal prosecution as an adult; it does not prohibit a juvenile adjudication. Most minor defendants are adjudicated in juvenile court, so the infancy defense is rarely used.
Juveniles can be prosecuted as adults under certain specified circumstances. At early common law, criminal defendants were divided into three age groups. Those under the age of seven were deemed incapable of forming criminal intent, and could not be criminally prosecuted. Defendants between the ages of seven and fourteen were provided a rebuttable presumption that they lacked the mental capacity to form criminal intent. Once a defendant turned fourteen, he or she was subject to an adult criminal prosecution. Modern statutes codify the adult criminal prosecution standard for different age groups. Some states follow the early common law and set up rebuttable and irrebuttable presumptions based on the defendant’s age.RCW 9A.04.050, accessed December 6, 2010, apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=9A.04.050. Other states set forth a minimum age, such as fourteen or sixteen, and defendants who have reached that age are prosecuted as adults.N.Y. Penal Law § 30.00, accessed December 6, 2010, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN030.00_30.00.html.
When a juvenile court has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction must be forfeited if the juvenile is to be prosecuted as an adult. This process is called waiver. Juvenile courts can have exclusive jurisdiction over minors under eighteen, or concurrent or simultaneous jurisdiction with adult courts, depending on the state.
States vary as to the waiver procedure. Some states allow judges to use discretion in granting the waiver, while others vest this power in the legislature or the prosecutor.Melissa Sickmund, OJJDP National Report Series Bulletin, “Juveniles in Court,” National Center for Juvenile Justice website, accessed December 7, 2010, http://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/195420/page4.html. A few factors serve as criteria supporting the waiver to adult criminal court: the nature of the offense, the sophistication it requires, the defendant’s criminal history, and the threat the defendant poses to public safety.Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), accessed December 7, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5405024647930835755&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
Example of the Infancy Defense
Mario is ten years old. Mario shoplifts some candy from the local market and is arrested. The newly elected district attorney decides to make an example of Mario, and begins an adult criminal prosecution against him for theft. In Mario’s state, the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over individuals under the age of eighteen. Mario can probably claim infancy as a perfect defense to the theft charge. Mario should be adjudicated in juvenile court, not prosecuted as an adult. Therefore, the juvenile court has jurisdiction in this case and Mario’s criminal prosecution should be dismissed.
Intoxication
Intoxication is another defense that focuses on the defendant’s inability to form the requisite criminal intent. In general, intoxication can be based on the defendant’s use of alcohol, legal drugs, or illegal drugs. The Model Penal Code defines intoxication as “a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the body” (Model Penal Code § 2.08(5) (a)). The intoxication defense could be perfect or imperfect, statutory or common law, depending on the jurisdiction.
Intoxication is a state that is achieved either voluntarily or involuntarily. Most states frown on the use of voluntary intoxication as a defense, and allow it only to reduce the severity of the crime charged.N.Y. Penal Law § 15.25, accessed December 7, 2010, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN015.25_15.25.html. Recall from Chapter 4 that if a defendant voluntarily undertakes action, such as drinking or ingesting drugs, the voluntary act requirement is met. Conduct that occurs after the voluntary intoxication probably is not excused unless the intoxication prevents the defendant from forming the criminal intent required for the offense.Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.125, accessed December 7, 2010, https://www.oregonlaws.org/ors/161.125. If the crime charged is a reckless intent crime, voluntary intoxication rarely provides even an imperfect defense.Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-503(b), accessed December 7, 2010, http://www.lawserver.com/law/state/tennessee/tn-code/tennessee_code_39-11-503.
Involuntary intoxication is more likely to provide a defense than voluntary intoxication. Generally, a defendant can claim involuntary intoxication if he or she ingested the drug or alcohol unknowingly or under force, duress, or fraud.California Jury Instructions No. 3427, accessed December 7, 2010, http://www.justia.com/criminal/docs/calcrim/3400/3427.html. Involuntary intoxication could affect the defendant’s ability to form criminal intent, thus negating specific intent, dropping murder a degree, or converting murder to manslaughter. The Model Penal Code equates involuntary intoxication with the substantial capacity test, providing “[i]ntoxication which (a) is not self-induced…is an affirmative defense if by reason of such intoxication the actor at the time of his conduct lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate its criminality [wrongfulness] or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law” (Model Penal Code § 2.08 (4)).
Example of the Intoxication Defense
Clint slips a date rape drug into Delilah’s drink at a fraternity party. Delilah is twenty-one and legally able to consume alcohol. The date rape drug produces a state of unconsciousness during which Delilah severely beats a sorority sister. Delilah can probably claim involuntary intoxication as a defense in this situation. Although Delilah voluntarily drank the alcohol, she became intoxicated from the date rape drug that she ingested unknowingly. Delilah could be acquitted or could have a charge of aggravated battery reduced, depending on the jurisdiction.
Ignorance and Mistake
Occasionally, a defendant’s mistake negates the criminal intent required for an offense. Mistakes can be a mistake of law or a mistake of fact. Mistake of law and fact defenses can be statutory or common law, perfect or imperfect, depending on the jurisdiction.
Mistake of Law
The basis of the mistake of law defense is that the defendant believes his or her criminal conduct is legal. The defense could be a failure of proof defense or an affirmative defense of excuse, depending on the jurisdiction.Tex. Penal Code § 8.03, accessed December 7, 2010, http://www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/docs/PE/htm/Pe.8.htm. The Model Penal Code provides, “Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if: (a) the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness or negligence required to establish a material element of the offense; or (b) the law provides that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense” (Model Penal Code § 2.04(1)).
Most states require that the mistake of law be founded on a statute or judicial decision that is later overturned.La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:17, accessed December 7, 2010, http://law.justia.com/louisiana/codes/2009/rs/title14/rs14-17.html. The Model Penal Code states, “A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a defense to a prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct when…the actor…acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid…contained in…a statute or…judicial decision” (Model Penal Code § 2.04(3) (b)).
Incorrect advice from a licensed attorney cannot form the basis of a mistake of law defense.Hopkins v. State, 69 A.2d 456 (1949), accessed December 9, 2010, http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?xmldoc=1949682193Md489_1637.xml&docbase=CSLWAR1-1950-1985. Nor can mistake of law be rooted in ignorance of the law because all individuals are required to know the criminal laws effective in their jurisdiction. The Model Penal Code provides, “A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a defense to a prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct when: the statute or other enactment defining the offense is not known to the actor and has not been published or otherwise made available prior to the conduct” (Model Penal Code § 2.04(3) (a)).
Example of the Mistake of Law Defense
Shelby, an attorney, researches current case law and determines that it is legal to sell products over the Internet and not charge sales tax. Shelby starts selling designer clothing on eBay and does not charge her customers any sales tax. The case decision that Shelby relied on is overturned by a court of appeals. Shelby can probably assert mistake of law as a defense to the crime of evading payment of sales tax.
Example of a Case That Is Inappropriate for the Mistake of Law Defense
Review the mistake of law defense example given in Section 6. Assume that in Shelby’s state, it is currently illegal to sell products over the Internet without charging sales tax. Jonathan meets with Shelby, and asks her to research whether he needs to charge sales tax when he sells products over the Internet. Shelby agrees to research the matter and get back to Jonathan the next day with an answer. After Jonathan leaves, Shelby is contacted by her friend Margaret, who wants to take an impromptu trip to New York City. Margaret asks Shelby if she would like to come along. Shelby agrees, rushes home, packs for the trip, and leaves with Margaret. The next day while Shelby is watching a Broadway play with Margaret, Jonathan calls Shelby on her cell phone and asks Shelby what her research revealed about the sales tax question. Even though she has not done any research on the matter, Shelby responds, “I just finished the research. You do not need to charges sales tax when you sell products over the Internet.” If Jonathan thereafter relies on Shelby’s incorrect advice, and sells products over the Internet without charging sales tax, he probably will not be able to assert mistake of law as a defense. Incorrect advice from an attorney cannot excuse criminal conduct, even if the crime is committed because of the faulty legal opinion. Therefore, Jonathan could be charged with tax evasion in this situation.
Mistake of Fact
Mistake of fact is more likely to provide a defense than mistake of law. If the facts as the defendant believes them to be negate the requisite intent for the crime at issue, the defendant can assert mistake of fact as a defense.N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 626:3I (a), accessed December 9, 2010, www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/lxii/626/626-mrg.htm. Mistake of fact is generally not a defense to strict liability crimes because intent is not an element of a strict liability offense.People v. Olsen, 685 P.2d 52 (1984), accessed December 9, 2010, lawschool.courtroomview.com/acf_cases/8639-people-v-olsen.
Example of the Mistake of Fact Defense
Mickie sees Rachel, his neighbor, riding his bicycle in her driveway. Mickie walks quickly up to Rachel and demands that she get off the bike and return it to his garage. Frightened, Rachel hops off and runs to her house, leaving the bike behind. Mickie walks the bike over to his garage. Once Mickie reaches the garage, he sees that his bike, which is an exact replica of Rachel’s, is already inside. Mickie may be able to use mistake of fact as a defense to theft. As is discussed in Chapter 11, the intent for theft is the intent to take the property of another person. Mickie believed Rachel’s bike was his. Thus Mickie’s mistake of fact negates the intent required for this offense.
Example of a Case That Is Inappropriate for the Mistake of Fact Defense
Tina is pulled over for speeding. Tina claims her speedometer is broken, so she was mistaken as to her speed. Tina probably cannot assert mistake of fact as a defense in this case. Speeding is generally a strict liability offense. Thus Tina’s mistaken belief as to the facts is not relevant because there is no intent required for this crime.
Exercises
• Infancy is a defense to an adult criminal prosecution if the defendant is too young to form the requisite criminal intent for the offense.
• The purpose of an adult criminal prosecution is punishment; the purpose of a juvenile adjudication is rehabilitation of the minor before he or she becomes an adult.
• Four criteria that could support a juvenile court waiver of jurisdiction are the nature of the offense, the sophistication it requires, the defendant’s criminal history, and the threat the defendant poses to public safety.
• Voluntary intoxication may provide a defense if the intoxication prevents the defendant from forming the requisite criminal intent for the offense.
• Involuntary intoxication is intoxication achieved unknowingly or pursuant to force, duress, or fraud.
• Voluntary intoxication is frowned on as a defense and in many states does not provide a defense to certain crimes, such as reckless intent crimes. Involuntary intoxication is more likely to serve as a defense any time the defendant is incapable of forming the requisite criminal intent for the offense.
• Mistake of law may provide a defense if the defendant believes his or her conduct is legal because of reliance on a statute or judicial opinion that is later overturned.
• Mistake of law is not a defense when the defendant believes his or her conduct is legal because of reliance on the incorrect advice of an attorney.
• If the facts as the defendant believes them to be prevent the defendant from forming the requisite intent for the crime, mistake of fact could be a valid defense.
• Mistake of fact is not a defense to strict liability crimes because intent is not an element.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Burt, a sixteen-year-old, consumes alcohol for the first time at a party. Unaware of alcohol’s effect, Burt drinks too much, attempts to walk home, and is cited for being drunk in public. In Burt’s state, the juvenile court has concurrent jurisdiction over minors ages seventeen and under, with a waiver to adult court available at the judge’s discretion. Burt has not broken any laws before. Is it likely that the judge will waive juvenile court jurisdiction in this case and allow the adult criminal prosecution of Burt? Why or why not?
2. Read People v. Register, 60 N.Y.2d 270 (1983). In Register, the defendant shot and killed an individual in a bar after drinking heavily for many hours. The defendant thereafter sought a jury instruction on the intoxication defense to a charge of depraved mind murder. The trial court refused, and the defendant was convicted. Did the Court of Appeals of the State of New York uphold the conviction? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9019321014077082981&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=.
3. Read Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d 797 (1993). In Garnett, the defendant, an intellectually disabled twenty-year-old, had sexual intercourse with a thirteen-year-old girl whom he believed to be sixteen, and was prosecuted for statutory rape. Did the Court of Appeals of Maryland reverse the trial court and allow the defendant to assert mistake of fact (the victim’s age) as a defense? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9331824442522694687&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/06%3A_Criminal_Defenses_Part_2/6.02%3A_Infancy_Intoxication_Ignorance_and_Mistake.txt |
Learning Objective
1. Compare the subjective and objective entrapment defenses.
Historically, no legal limit was placed on the government’s ability to induce individuals to commit crimes. The Constitution does not expressly prohibit this governmental action. Currently, however, all states and the federal government provide the defense of entrapment. The entrapment defense is based on the government’s use of inappropriately persuasive tactics when apprehending criminals. Entrapment is generally a perfect affirmative statutory or common-law defense.
Entrapment focuses on the origin of criminal intent. If the criminal intent originates with the government or law enforcement, the defendant is entrapped and can assert the defense. If the criminal intent originates with the defendant, then the defendant is acting independently and can be convicted of the offense. The two tests of entrapment are subjective entrapment and objective entrapment. The federal government and the majority of the states recognize the subjective entrapment defense.Connecticut Jury Instruction on Entrapment, Based on Conn. Gen. Stats. Ann. § 53a-15, accessed December 10, 2010, www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part2/2.7-4.htm. Other states and the Model Penal Code have adopted the objective entrapment defense.People v. Barraza, 591 P.2d 947 (1979), accessed December 10, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4472828314482166952&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
Subjective Entrapment
It is entrapment pursuant to the subjective entrapment defense when law enforcement pressures the defendant to commit the crime against his or her will. The subjective entrapment test focuses on the defendant’s individual characteristics more than on law enforcement’s behavior. If the facts indicate that the defendant is predisposed to commit the crime without law enforcement pressure, the defendant will not prevail on the defense.
The defendant’s criminal record is admissible if relevant to prove the defendant’s criminal nature and predisposition. Generally, law enforcement can furnish criminal opportunities and use decoys and feigned accomplices without crossing the line into subjective entrapment. However, if it is clear that the requisite intent for the offense originated with law enforcement, not the defendant, the defendant can assert subjective entrapment as a defense.
Example of Subjective Entrapment
Winifred regularly attends Narcotics Anonymous (NA) for her heroin addiction. All the NA attendees know that Winifred is a dedicated member who has been clean for ten years, Marcus, a law enforcement decoy, meets Winifred at one of the meetings and begs her to “hook him up” with some heroin. Winifred refuses. Marcus attends the next meeting, and follows Winifred out to her car pleading with her to get him some heroin. After listening to Marcus explain his physical symptoms of withdrawal in detail, Winifred feels pity and promises to help Marcus out. She agrees to meet Marcus in two hours with the heroin. When Winifred and Marcus meet at the designated location, Marcus arrests Winifred for sale of narcotics. Winifred may be able to assert entrapment as a defense if her state recognizes the subjective entrapment defense. Winifred has not used drugs for ten years and did not initiate contact with law enforcement. It is unlikely that the intent to sell heroin originated with Winifred because she has been a dedicated member of NA, and she actually met Marcus at an NA meeting while trying to maintain her sobriety. Thus it appears that Marcus pressured Winifred to sell heroin against a natural predisposition, and the entrapment defense may excuse her conduct.
Objective Entrapment
The objective entrapment defense focuses on the behavior of law enforcement, rather than the individual defendant. If law enforcement uses tactics that would induce a reasonable, law-abiding person to commit the crime, the defendant can successfully assert the entrapment defense in an objective entrapment jurisdiction. The objective entrapment defense focuses on a reasonable person, not the actual defendant, so the defendant’s predisposition to commit the crime is not relevant. Thus in states that recognize the objective entrapment defense, the defendant’s criminal record is not admissible to disprove the defense.
Example of Objective Entrapment
Winifred has a criminal record for prostitution. A law enforcement decoy offers Winifred \$10,000 to engage in sexual intercourse. Winifred promptly accepts. If Winifred’s jurisdiction recognizes the objective entrapment defense, Winifred may be able to successfully claim entrapment as a defense to prostitution. A reasonable, law-abiding person could be tempted into committing prostitution for a substantial sum of money like \$10,000. The objective entrapment defense focuses on law enforcement tactics, rather than the predisposition of the defendant, so Winifred’s criminal record is irrelevant and is not admissible as evidence. Thus it appears that law enforcement used an excessive inducement, and entrapment may excuse Winifred’s conduct in this case.
KEY TAKEAWAY
• The subjective entrapment defense focuses on the individual defendant, and provides a defense if law enforcement pressures the defendant to commit the crime against his or her will. If the defendant is predisposed to commit the crime without this pressure, the defendant will not be successful with the defense. Pursuant to the subjective entrapment defense, the defendant’s criminal record is admissible to prove the defendant’s predisposition. The objective entrapment defense focuses on law enforcement behavior, and provides a defense if the tactics law enforcement uses would convince a reasonable, law-abiding person to commit the crime. Under the objective entrapment defense, the defendant’s criminal record is irrelevant and inadmissible. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/06%3A_Criminal_Defenses_Part_2/6.03%3A_Entrapment.txt |
Summary
The federal government and every state except Montana, Utah, Kansas, and Idaho recognize the insanity defense. A not guilty by reason of insanity verdict is an acquittal for the offense. The policy supporting the insanity defense is the lack of deterrent effect when punishing the legally insane. Four insanity defenses are recognized in the United States: M’Naghten, irresistible impulse, substantial capacity, and Durham. The M’Naghten insanity defense is cognitive and excuses criminal conduct when the defendant is suffering from a mental defect or disease that prevents the defendant from knowing the nature or quality of conduct or from knowing that conduct is wrong. The irresistible impulse insanity defense adds a volitional component and excuses conduct the defendant cannot control because of a mental defect or disease. The substantial capacity test was created by the Model Penal Code and softens the requirements to substantial, rather than total, capacity to appreciate the criminality of conduct or to conform conduct to the law. The Durham insanity defense is recognized only in New Hampshire, and excuses conduct that is the product of or caused by a mental disease or defect. Jurisdictions vary as to the burden of proving insanity. All jurisdictions require the defendant to rebut a presumption that he or she is sane; some also require the defendant to persuade the trier of fact that he or she is legally insane to a preponderance of evidence or clear and convincing evidence (which is a higher standard than preponderance of evidence).
A minority of jurisdictions recognizes diminished capacity and the syndrome defense when the defendant cannot form the requisite criminal intent for the offense because of a mental impairment. The criminal defendant must also be mentally competent to stand trial, which means the defendant can understand the charges brought against him or her and can assist in any defense. Some jurisdictions recognize a guilty but mentally ill verdict, which does not exonerate the defendant, but provides for mental health treatment while incarcerated. Temporary insanity is also a defense in some jurisdictions and does not differ from the insanity defense except for the duration of the mental defect or disease.
The infancy defense excuses conduct when the defendant is too young to form criminal intent for the offense. The infancy defense is generally not available in juvenile adjudications, so it is rarely asserted because most youthful defendants are under the jurisdiction of juvenile courts. Juvenile courts can waive this jurisdiction and allow for an adult criminal prosecution under certain circumstances, considering the criteria of the nature of the offense, the sophistication it requires, the defendant’s prior criminal history, and the threat the defendant poses to public safety.
Other excuse defenses are intoxication, ignorance, and mistake. Voluntary intoxication is frowned on as a defense, but will occasionally excuse conduct if it negates certain high-level criminal intent requirements. Involuntary intoxication, which is intoxication achieved unknowingly, or under duress or fraud, is more likely to provide a defense if it affects the defendant’s capacity to form criminal intent. Ignorance of the law is not a defense because individuals are expected to know the laws of their jurisdiction. Mistake of law, which means the defendant does not know conduct is illegal, functions as a defense if the mistake is based on a judicial opinion or statute that is later overturned. Mistake of law is not a defense if the mistake is rooted in incorrect legal advice from an attorney. Mistake of fact is a defense if the facts as the defendant believes them to be negate the intent required for the offense.
Entrapment is also a defense in every jurisdiction. Most states and the federal government recognize the subjective entrapment defense, which focuses on the defendant’s predisposition, and does not excuse conduct if the defendant would have committed the crime without law enforcement pressure. In a subjective entrapment jurisdiction, the defendant’s criminal record is admissible to prove predisposition to commit the crime at issue. Objective entrapment is the Model Penal Code approach and excuses conduct if the pressure by law enforcement would induce a reasonable, law-abiding person to commit the crime. The defendant’s criminal record is not admissible to show predisposition in an objective entrapment jurisdiction because the focus is on law enforcement tactics, not the defendant’s nature.
YOU BE THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY
You are a well-known private defense attorney with a perfect record. Read the prompt, review the case, and then decide whether you would accept or reject it if you want to maintain your level of success. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. The defendant shot and killed a police officer and then escaped on foot. He was thereafter charged with first-degree murder. The defendant wants to claim that his diagnosed paranoid schizophrenia affected his ability to form the intent required for murder. In your state (Arizona), the defendant cannot introduce this argument to negate intent; he can only plead insanity under an abbreviated version of M’Naghten, which requires proof that the defendant did not know his conduct was wrong because of a mental defect or disease. Will you accept or reject the case? Read Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006), which is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5050526068124331217&q= Clark+v.+Arizona&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_vis=1.
2. The defendant, an eleven-year-old boy, had sexual intercourse with a seven-year-old boy and was charged with two counts of first-degree rape of a child. Three experts questioned the defendant, and two concluded he lacked the capacity to form the intent for rape. This conclusion was based on the defendant’s response that the sexual contact was consensual and felt good. The defendant wants to present the infancy defense. Will you accept or reject the case? Read State v. Ramer, 86 P.3d 132 (2004), which is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14834415223416879505&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
3. The defendant, a diabetic, injected an abnormally large dose of insulin before his daughter’s birthday party. He and his estranged wife went to the store to buy party supplies. When they returned to the defendant’s vehicle, he hit her in the head with a hammer. She escaped the vehicle, and he caught up with her and ran her over. The defendant wants to claim involuntary intoxication as a defense to first-degree assault, domestic violence, and attempted first-degree murder. Will you accept or reject the case? Read People v. Garcia, 87 P.3d 159 (2003), which is available at this link: www.lexisone.com/lx1/caselaw/freecaselaw?action=OCLGetCaseDetail&format=FULL&sourceID=bdidhf&searchTerm= ejjH.CGHa.aadj.eeNd&searchFlag=y&l1loc=FCLOW.
4. The defendant and a narcotics decoy have been acquainted for several years. The narcotics decoy set up a sale transaction between the defendant and a police officer, the defendant made the sale, and was thereafter charged with delivery of a controlled substance. The defendant claims that the decoy’s status as his friend, and numerous phone calls to set up the narcotics sale pressured him to commit the crime and he wants to claim entrapment. Your state (Texas) allows the defense of objective entrapment, focusing on law enforcement tactics. Will you accept or reject the case? Read Sebesta v. State, 783 S.W.2d 811 (1990), which is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7939192026130608711&hl=en&as_sdt=2002&as_vis=1.
Articles of Interest
• The insanity defense and recent US Supreme Court decisions: www.law.indiana.edu/ilj/volumes/v81/no4/14_Grachek.pdf
• The insanity defense for Jared Lee Loughner, the shooter of US Representative Gabrielle Giffords (D-AZ): www.nwherald.com/2011/01/10/insanity-defense-difficult-for-loughner/a8b43du
• The ruling that Jared Lee Loughner is incompetent to stand trial for the shooting of Representative Giffords: www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43165830/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/ariz-shooting -spree-suspect-incompetent-trial
• The defense of caffeine overdose: www.aolnews.com/2010/09/20/caffeine-intoxication -insanity-as-legal-defense-strategy
• Entrapment: www.allbusiness.com/legal/laws/885814-1.html
Statistics of Interest
• Juvenile crime in the United States: bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2028
Answers to Exercises
From Section 6.1
1. Jeffrey will not be successful in a jurisdiction that recognizes the M’Naghten insanity defense. Although Jeffrey has a mental defect or disease, schizophrenia, Jeffrey’s behavior in hiding the victims’ corpses indicates that he knows his behavior is wrong. Thus Jeffrey cannot produce evidence establishing the second element of M’Naghten.
2. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction, holding that the experts changed their opinion after being educated as to the meaning of mental defect or disease under M’Naghten. Thus the change by the experts was not fraudulent and the defendant was entitled to a retrial.
3. The Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld the convictions and the statute. The court held that the statute rationally accomplishes its goals, and guilty but mentally ill defendants receive immediate rather than delayed treatment, which complies with due process.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 6.2
1. It is unlikely that the judge will waive juvenile court jurisdiction in this case. Some of the criteria a judge will analyze when waiving jurisdiction are the nature of the offense, the sophistication it requires, the defendant’s criminal history, and the threat the defendant poses to public safety. This is Burt’s first offense, and it did not involve violence or require much sophistication. Thus the judge will probably allow Burt to be adjudicated in juvenile court.
2. The Court of Appeals of the State of New York upheld the defendant’s conviction and the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on intoxication. The court based its holding on the depraved mind murder statute, which requires reckless criminal intent, and the intoxication defense statute, which disallows evidence of intoxication as a defense to a reckless intent crime.
3. The Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld the trial court’s decision to disallow the mistake of age defense. The court based its holding on the plain meaning of the statutory rape statute, which is a strict liability offense.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 6.3
1. Allen’s criminal record for burglary is not admissible to prove his predisposition to commit the crime of purchasing contraband. The fact that Allen committed a burglary in the past does not indicate that he is predisposed to purchase contraband. Thus Allen’s criminal record for burglary is irrelevant and inadmissible, even though he is claiming entrapment in a jurisdiction that recognizes the subjective entrapment defense.
2. The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the petition. The court held that the defendant did not have a constitutional right to assert entrapment and that the rejection of the defendant’s sentencing entrapment claim was appropriate, albeit unfortunate, under the circumstances.
3. The Court of Appeal of Florida reversed the defendant’s conviction under both theories of entrapment. The court based its holding on the defendant’s lack of predisposition to commit the crime and the government’s assurance that there would be no governmental interference, which was false under the circumstances.
Answers to Law and Ethics Question
1. Whether Mitchell is put on trial, or held indefinitely because of his mental incompetency, he is incapacitated and prevented from harming other victims. The difference is retribution. The federal judge permitted Mitchell to be put on trial, which resulted in a conviction providing retribution. Barzee’s sentencing also provided retribution. The state court judge allowed only for the incapacitation of Mitchell, which did not resolve the case for the Smart family or the general public. Whether or not retribution is ethical has been debated for centuries. However, retribution does restore public confidence in the judicial system, which can have a positive deterrent effect.
Answers to You Be the Defense Attorney
1. In this case, the US Supreme Court upheld Arizona’s abbreviated M’Naghten statute, and also confirmed Arizona’s constitutional right to preclude a defense based on the defendant’s inability to form criminal intent because of a mental defect or disease. Thus you would not be able to strike down Arizona’s insanity defense statute, and you could not introduce evidence that the defendant lacked the capacity to form criminal intent, so you should reject the case.
2. The Washington Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s ruling that the defendant was incapable of forming the intent to commit rape of a child, reversing the appellate court. The court based its holding on the Washington infancy statute, which requires the prosecution to rebut a presumption of infancy for defendants under the age of twelve by clear and convincing evidence. Thus you would prevail on the infancy defense, and you should accept the case.
3. In this case, the trial court rejected the defendant’s involuntary intoxication claim, and the defendant had to plead not guilty by reason of insanity. He was thereafter found guilty. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Colorado reversed, holding that the defendant had the right to claim intoxication and present evidence of this claim to the trier of fact. Thus you would be able to assert intoxication as a defense, and should accept the case.
4. The Court of Appeals of Texas upheld the trial court’s rejection of a motion to dismiss the charge based on entrapment. The court held that friendship and numerous phone calls are not enough to pressure an unwilling person to commit a crime. Thus you would lose on the entrapment defense and should reject the case. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/06%3A_Criminal_Defenses_Part_2/6.04%3A_End-of-Chapter_Material.txt |
Congress can impute to a corporation the commission of certain criminal offenses and subject it to criminal prosecution therefor.
- New York Central R. Co. v. U.S., cited in Section 7.2.1 "Corporate Liability"
Source: Image courtesy of Jane F. Kardashian, MD.
7.01: Parties to Crime
Learning Objectives
1. Identify the four parties to crime at early common law.
2. Identify the parties to crime in modern times.
3. Define the criminal act element required for accomplice liability.
4. Define the criminal intent element required for accomplice liability.
5. Define the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
6. Discuss the consequences of accomplice liability.
7. Determine whether an accomplice can be prosecuted when the principal is not prosecuted or acquitted.
Often more than one criminal defendant plays a role in the commission of a crime. Defendants working together with a common criminal purpose or design are acting with complicity. When the participation and criminal conduct varies among the defendants, an issue arises as to who is responsible for which crime and to what degree. This chapter analyzes different parties to crime, along with their accompanying criminal liability. Chapter 8 examines crimes that necessarily involve more than one person such as conspiracy and solicitation, as well as another inchoate or incomplete crime, attempt.
Accomplice Liability
At early common law, parties to crime were divided into four categories. A principal in the first degree actually committed the crime. A principal in the second degree was present at the scene of the crime and assisted in its commission. An accessory before the fact was not present at the scene of the crime, but helped prepare for its commission. An accessory after the fact helped a party to the crime after its commission by providing comfort, aid, and assistance in escaping or avoiding arrest and prosecution or conviction.
In modern times, most states and the federal government divide parties to crime into two categories: principalsCal. Penal Code § 31, accessed December 20, 2010,http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/31.html. and their accomplices, and accessories.Idaho Code Ann. § 18-205, accessed December 20, 2010, www.legislature.idaho.gov/idstat/Title18/T18CH2SECT18-205.htm. The criminal actor is referred to as the principal, although all accomplices have equal criminal responsibility as is discussed in Section 7.1.
Accomplice Elements
An accomplice under most state and federal statutes is responsible for the same crime as the criminal actor or principal.18 U.S.C. § 2, accessed December 20, 2010, http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/uscode/18/I/1/2. However, accomplice liability is derivative; the accomplice does not actually have to commit the crime to be responsible for it. The policy supporting accomplice liability is the idea that an individual who willingly participates in furthering criminal conduct should be accountable for it to the same extent as the criminal actor. The degree of participation is often difficult to quantify, so statutes and cases attempt to segregate blameworthy accomplices based on the criminal act and intent elements, as is discussed in Section 7.1.
Accomplice Act
In the majority of states and federally, an accomplice must voluntarily act in some manner to assist in the commission of the offense. Some common descriptors of the criminal act element required for accomplice liability are aid, abet, assist, counsel, command, induce, or procure.K.S.A. § 21-3205, accessed December 20, 2010, kansasstatutes.lesterama.org/Chapter_21/Article_32/#21-3205. Examples of actions that qualify as the accomplice criminal act are helping plan the crime, driving a getaway vehicle after the crime’s commission, and luring a victim to the scene of the crime. The Model Penal Code defines the accomplice criminal act element as “aids…or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing [the offense]” (Model Penal Code § 2.06(3) (a) (ii)).
In many states, words are enough to constitute the criminal act element required for accomplice liability.N.Y. Penal Law § 20.00, accessed December 26, 2010, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN020.00_20.00.html. On the other hand, mere presence at the scene of the crime, even presence at the scene combined with flight, is not sufficient to convert a bystander into an accomplice.Commonwealth v. Hargrave, 745 A.2d 20 (2000), accessed December 20, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14481330811091769472&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. However, if there is a legal duty to act, a defendant who is present at the scene of a crime without preventing its occurrence could be liable as an accomplice in many jurisdictions.People v. Rolon, 160 Cal. App. 4th 1206 (2008), accessed December 20, 2010, http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-court-of-appeal/1308666.html. As the Model Penal Code provides, “[a] person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if…having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make proper effect so to do” (Model Penal Code § 2.06(3)(a)(iii)).
Example of a Case Lacking Accomplice Act
Review the criminal law issues example in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1 "Example of Criminal Law Issues". In that example, Clara and Linda go on a shopping spree. Linda insists that they browse an expensive department store. After they enter the lingerie department, Linda surreptitiously places a bra into her purse. Clara watches, horrified, but does not say anything, even though a security guard is standing nearby. As Linda and Clara leave the store, an alarm is activated. Linda and Clara run away with the security guard in pursuit. In this case, Clara has probably not committed the criminal act element required for accomplice liability. Although Clara was present at the scene of the crime and did not alert the security guard, mere presence at the scene is not sufficient to constitute the accomplice criminal act. Clara fled the scene when the alarm went off, but presence at the scene of a crime combined with flight is still not enough to comprise the accomplice criminal act. Thus Clara has probably not committed theft as an accomplice, and only Linda is subject to a criminal prosecution for this offense.
Example of Accomplice Act
Phoebe, the parent of a two-year-old named Eliza, watches silently as her live-in boyfriend Ricky beats Eliza. In Phoebe’s state, parents have a duty to come to the aid of their children if their safety is threatened. Ricky severely injures Eliza, and both Phoebe and Ricky are arrested and charged with battery and child endangerment. Phoebe probably has committed the criminal act element required for accomplice liability in many jurisdictions. Phoebe does not personally act to physically harm her child. However, her presence at the scene combined with a legal duty to act could be enough to make her an accomplice. Thus Phoebe has most likely committed battery and child endangerment as an accomplice, and both she and Ricky are subject to a criminal prosecution for these offenses.
Accomplice Intent
The criminal intent element required for accomplice liability varies, depending on the jurisdiction. In many jurisdictions, the accomplice must act with specific intent or purposely when aiding or assisting the principal.Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.155, accessed December 20, 2010, https://www.oregonlaws.org/ors/161.155. Specific intent or purposely means the accomplice desires the principal to commit the crime. The Model Penal Code follows this approach and requires the accomplice to act “with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense” (Model Penal Code § 2.06(3) (a)). In other jurisdictions, if the crime is serious and the accomplice acts with general intent or knowingly or has awareness that the principal will commit the crime with his or her assistance, intent to further the crime’s commission could be inferred.People v. Lauria, 251 Cal. App. 2d 471 (1967), accessed December 21, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=686539897745974621&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. In a minority of jurisdictions, only general intent or acting knowingly that the crime will be promoted or facilitated is required, regardless of the crime’s seriousness.Washington Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.08.020 (3) (a), accessed December 21, 2010, apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=9A.08.020.
Example of Accomplice Intent
Joullian, a hotel owner, rents a hotel room to Winnifred, a prostitute. In a state that requires an accomplice to act with specific intent or purposely, Joullian must desire Winnifred to commit prostitution in the rented room to be Winnifred’s accomplice. Evidence that Joullian stands to benefit from Winnifred’s prostitution, such as evidence that he will receive a portion of the prostitution proceeds, could help prove this intent. If Joullian’s state allows for an inference of specific intent or purposely with serious crimes when an accomplice acts with general intent or knowingly, it is unlikely that prostitution is a felony that would give rise to the inference. If Joullian’s state requires only general intent or knowingly for accomplice liability regardless of the crime’s seriousness, to be deemed an accomplice Joullian must simply be aware that renting Winnifred the room will promote or facilitate the act of prostitution.
The Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine
Accomplice liability should be imputed only to blameworthy, deserving defendants. However, in some jurisdictions, if the crime the defendant intentionally furthers is related to the crime the principal actually commits, the defendant is deemed an accomplice. As with legal causation, discussed in Chapter 4, foreseeability is the standard. Under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, if the defendant assists the principal with the intent to further a specific crime’s commission, and the principal commits a different crime that is foreseeable at the time of the defendant’s assistance, the defendant could be liable as an accomplice.ME Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A § 57 (3) (A), accessed December 21, 2010, http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/statutes/17-a/title17-Asec57.html. Several jurisdictions have rejected this doctrine as an overly harsh extension of accomplice liability.Bogdanov v. People, 941 P.2d 247, 251 n. 8 (1997), accessed December 21, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13910767150180460511&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr#[8].
Example of the Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine
José shows up drunk and unruly at his friend Abel’s house and tells Abel he wants to “beat the hell” out of his girlfriend Maria. José asks Abel to drive him to Maria’s house, and Abel promptly agrees. Abel drives José to Maria’s house and waits in the car with the engine running. José forces his way into Maria’s house and then beats and thereafter rapes her. If José and Abel are in a jurisdiction that recognizes the natural and probable consequences doctrine, the trier of fact could find that Abel is an accomplice to the battery, burglary, and rape of Maria. Abel appears to have the criminal intent required to be an accomplice to battery because he assisted José in his quest to beat Maria. If burglary and rape were foreseeable when Abel drove a drunk and angry José to Maria’s house, the natural and probable consequences doctrine would extend Abel’s accomplice liability to these crimes. If Abel is not in a natural and probable consequences jurisdiction, the trier of fact must separately determine that Abel had the criminal intent required to be an accomplice to battery, burglary, and rape; Abel’s intent will be ascertained according to the jurisdiction’s accomplice intent requirement—either specific intent or purposely or general intent or knowingly.
Consequences of Accomplice Liability
An accomplice is criminally responsible for the crime(s) the principal commits. Although the sentencing may vary based on a defendant-accomplice’s criminal record or other extenuating circumstances related to sentencing, such as prior strikes, in theory, the accomplice is liable to the same degree as the principal. So if accomplice liability is established in the examples given in Section 7.1.2 "Accomplice Elements"; Phoebe is criminally responsible for battery and child endangerment, Joullian is criminally responsible for prostitution, and Abel is criminally responsible for battery and possibly burglary and rape. The principal should also be criminally responsible for his or her own actions. However, occasionally a situation arises where the principal is not prosecuted or acquitted because of a procedural technicality, evidentiary problems, or a plea bargain, as is discussed in Section 7.
Prosecution of an Accomplice When the Principal Is Not Prosecuted or Is Acquitted
Although accomplice liability is derivative, in many jurisdictions the trier of fact can determine that a defendant is an accomplice even if the criminal actor or principal is not prosecuted or has been tried and acquitted for the offense.Standefer v. U.S., 447 U.S. 10 (1980), accessed December 22, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11715693283858901517&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. Thus a defendant can be liable for a crime even though he or she did not commit it and the defendant who did was spared prosecution or found not guilty. While this situation appears anomalous, if a defendant helps another commit a crime with the intent to further the crime’s commission, punishment for the completed crime is appropriate. As the Model Penal Code states, “[a]n accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense…or has been acquitted” (Model Penal Code § 2.06(7)).
Example of Prosecution of an Accomplice When the Principal Is Not Prosecuted
Review the example in Section 7 with José and Abel. Assume that after José burglarizes, beats, and rapes Maria, local police arrest José and Abel. The police transport José and Abel to the police station and take them to separate rooms for interrogation. The police officer who interrogates José is a rookie and forgets to read José his Miranda rights. Thereafter, the police contact Maria, but she refuses to cooperate with the investigation because she fears reprisal from José. The district attorney decides not to prosecute José because of the tainted interrogation. In this case, Abel could still be prosecuted for battery and possibly rape and burglary as an accomplice in some jurisdictions. Although José is the principal and actually committed the crimes, it is not necessary for José to suffer the same criminal prosecution and punishment as Abel. If the elements required for accomplice liability are present, Abel can be fully responsible for the crimes committed by José, whether or not José is prosecuted for or convicted of these offenses.
Garrido Sentencing Video
Attorney: Nancy Garrido in Tears during Sentencing
Phillip Garrido, with his wife Nancy’s help, kidnapped Jaycee Dugard, an eleven-year-old girl, and held her captive for eighteen years. During that time, Dugard was repeatedly raped, became pregnant twice, and gave birth to two children. Phillip Garrido pleaded guilty to multiple charges of rape and kidnapping and received a sentence of four hundred years to life in prison. Nancy was prosecuted as an accomplice, pleaded guilty and received a sentence of thirty-six years to life in prison.Michael Martinez, “Phillip, Nancy Garrido sentenced in Jaycee Dugard Kidnapping,” CNN website, accessed August 15, 2011, articles.cnn.com/2011-06-02/justice/california.garridos.sentencing_1_jaycee-dugard-terry-probyn-phillip-garrido?_s=PM:CRIME. Nancy Garrido’s attorney discusses her sentencing as an accomplice in this video:
(click to see video)
Ghailani Verdict Video
Ghailani Guilty of One Count
Ahmed Ghailani, an alleged terrorist, was transferred from a military prison in Guantanamo Bay and tried as a civilian in a federal district court in New York. Ghailani was indicted for accomplice liability and conspiracy for the deaths of hundreds of citizens killed during Al Qaeda bombings of US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Tanzania. At trial, the prosecution failed to convince the jury that Ghailani had the criminal intent required for accomplice liability. He was acquitted of the murders and attempted murders as an accomplice and convicted of one conspiracy charge. However, he received a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for the conspiracy charge, the same sentence he would have received if convicted of all the murder and attempted murder charges.Benjamin Weiser, “Ex-Detainee Gets Life Sentence in Embassy Blasts,” New York Times website, accessed January 26, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/nyregion/26ghailani.html. A news story on the conviction of Ghailani is shown in this video:
(click to see video)
Exercises
• The four parties to crime at early common law were principals in the first degree, principals in the second degree, accessories before the fact, and accessories after the fact. These designations signified the following:
• Principals in the first degree committed the crime.
• Principals in the second degree were present at the crime scene and assisted in the crime’s commission.
• Accessories before the fact were not present at the crime scene, but assisted in preparing for the crime’s commission.
• Accessories after the fact helped a party to the crime avoid detection and escape prosecution or conviction.
• In modern times, the parties to crime are principals and their accomplices, and accessories.
• The criminal act element required for accomplice liability is aiding, abetting, or assisting in the commission of a crime. In many jurisdictions, words are enough to constitute the accomplice criminal act element, while mere presence at the scene without a legal duty to act is not enough.
• The criminal intent element required for accomplice liability is either specific intent or purposely or general intent or knowingly.
• The natural and probable consequences doctrine holds an accomplice criminally responsible if the crime the principal commits is foreseeable when the accomplice assists the principal.
• The consequences of accomplice liability are that the accomplice is criminally responsible for the crimes the principal commits.
• In many jurisdictions, an accomplice can be prosecuted for an offense even if the principal is not prosecuted or is tried and acquitted.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Justin asks his girlfriend Penelope, a bank teller, to let him know what time the security guard takes his lunch break so that he can successfully rob the bank. Penelope tells Justin the security guard takes his break at 1:00. The next day, which is Penelope’s day off, Justin successfully robs the bank at 1:15. Has Penelope committed robbery? Why or why not?
2. Read State v. Ulvinen, 313 N.W.2d 425 (1981). In Ulvinen, the defendant sat guard and then helped her son clean up and dispose of evidence after he strangled and dismembered his wife. Thereafter, the defendant was convicted of murder as an accomplice. The defendant was asleep when the killing occurred, but before the killing her son told her that he planned to kill the victim. The defendant reacted with passive acquiescence by demurring and expressing disbelief that he would go through with his plans. Did the Supreme Court of Minnesota uphold the defendant’s murder conviction? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5558442148317816782&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
3. Read Joubert v. State, 235 SW 3d 729 (2007). In Joubert, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to death based on his participation in an armed robbery that resulted in the death of a police officer and employee. The jury convicted the defendant after hearing testimony from his accomplice and reviewing a video of the defendant confessing to the offense. The defendant appealed the conviction because in Texas, accomplice testimony must be corroborated by other evidence, and the defendant claimed that the other corroborating evidence was lacking in this case. Did the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas uphold the defendant’s conviction? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10119211983865864217&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/07%3A_Parties_to_Crime/7.00%3A_Prelude_to_Parties_to_Crime.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Distinguish between accomplice liability and vicarious liability.
2. Distinguish between corporate criminal vicarious liability and individual criminal vicarious liability.
Vicarious liability, a concept discussed in Chapter 4, also transfers liability from one defendant to another. However, vicarious liability should not be confused with accomplice liability. Accomplice liability is based on the defendant’s participation in a criminal enterprise and complicity with the criminal actor or principal, but vicarious liability transfers a defendant’s criminal responsibility for the crime to a different defendant because of a special relationship. With vicarious liability, the acting defendant also is criminally responsible for his or her conduct. Similar to the civil law concept of respondeat superior discussed in Chapter 1, vicarious liability in criminal law is common between employers and employees. It is also the basis of corporate liability, which is discussed in Section 7.2.1 "Corporate Liability".
Corporate Liability
At early common law, corporations were not criminally prosecutable as separate entities, which was most likely because in England, corporations were owned and operated by the government. In modern times, American corporations are private enterprises whose actions can seriously injure other individuals and the economy. Thus a corporation can be criminally responsible for conduct apart from its owners, agents, or employees.New York Central R. Co. v. U.S., 212 U.S. 481 (1909), accessed December 21, 2010, http://supreme.justia.com/us/212/481. In general, this is a vicarious liability, transferring criminal responsibility for an offense from an agent or employee of the corporation to the corporation itself, based on the employment relationship. Of course, the agent or employee also is responsible for the crime he or she commits.
A corporation is vicariously liable only if an agent or employee commits a crime during the agent or employee’s scope of employment.720 ILCS § 5/5-4, accessed December 26, 2010, http://law.onecle.com/illinois/720ilcs5/5-4.html. As the Model Penal Code states, “[a] corporation may be convicted of the commission of an offense if…the conduct is performed by an agent of the corporation acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or employment” (Model Penal Code § 2.07(1)(a)). The criminal punishment for a corporation is generally payment of a fine.
Example of Corporate Liability
Harry, an employee of Burger King Corporation, shreds corporate documents in his office when Burger King is sued civilly for sexual harassment in a multimillion-dollar class action suit. Under modern theories of corporate liability, both Harry and Burger King could be criminally prosecuted for obstruction of justice. Note that Burger King’s liability is vicarious and depends on its relationship with Harry as an employer and the fact that Harry is acting within the scope of employment. Vicarious liability is distinguishable from accomplice liability, where the accomplice must be complicit with the criminal actor. The owners of Burger King, who are the corporate shareholders, did not actively participate in Harry’s conduct, although they will share in the punishment if the corporation is fined.
Individual Criminal Vicarious Liability
Generally speaking, criminal law disfavors criminal vicarious liability, the exception being corporate liability discussed in Section 7.2.1 "Corporate Liability". Criminal vicarious liability violates the basic precept that individuals should be criminally accountable for their own conduct, not the conduct of others.State v. Akers, 400 A.2d 38 (1979), accessed December 26, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12639244883487184852&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. Although accomplice liability appears to hold an accomplice responsible for principals’ conduct, in reality the accomplice is committing a criminal act supported by criminal intent and is punished accordingly. In addition, other statutes that appear to impose criminal liability vicariously are actually holding individuals responsible for their own criminal conduct. Some examples are statutes holding parents criminally responsible when their children commit crimes that involve weapons belonging to the parents, and offenses criminalizing contributing to the delinquency of a minor. In both of these examples, the parents are held accountable for their conduct, such as allowing children to access their guns or be truant from school. The law is evolving in this area because the incidence of juveniles committing crimes is becoming increasingly prevalent.
Exercises
• Accomplice liability holds an accomplice accountable when he or she is complicit with the principal; vicarious liability imposes criminal responsibility on a defendant because of a special relationship with the criminal actor.
• In many jurisdictions, corporations are vicariously liable for crimes committed by employees or agents acting within the scope of employment. Individual criminal vicarious liability is frowned on, but the law in this area is evolving as the incidence of juveniles committing crimes increases.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Brad, the president and CEO of ABC Corporation, recklessly hits and kills a pedestrian as he is driving home from work. Could ABC Corporation be held vicariously liable for criminal homicide? Why or why not?
2. Read People v. Premier House, Inc., 662 N.Y.S 2d 1006 (1997). In Premier House, the defendant, a housing cooperative that was incorporated, and members of the housing cooperative board of directors were ordered to stand trial for violating a New York law requiring that window guards be installed on apartment buildings. A child died after falling out of one of the windows. The members of the board of directors appealed on the basis that their positions were merely honorary, and they had no personal involvement in the crime. Did the Criminal Court of the City of New York uphold the order as to the members of the board of directors? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6854365622778516089&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
3. Read Connecticut General Statute § 53a-8(b), which criminalizes the sale or provision of a firearm to another for the purpose of committing a crime. The statute is available at this link: http://law.justia.com/connecticut/codes/2005/title53a/sec53a-8.html. Does this statute create accomplice liability or vicarious liability? Read the Connecticut Criminal Jury Instruction 3.1-4 for an explanation of the statute. The jury instruction is available at this link: www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part3/3.1-4.htm.
LAW AND ETHICS: LIFE CARE CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC.
Is a Corporation Criminally Accountable When Its Employees Are Not?
Read Commonwealth v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., 456 Mass. 826 (2010). The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12168070317136071651&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. In Life Care Centers, a resident of the Life Care Center nursing home died in 2004 from injuries sustained when she fell down the front stairs while attempting to leave the facility in her wheelchair. The resident could try to leave the facility because she was not wearing a prescribed security bracelet that both set off an alarm and temporarily locked the front doors if a resident approached within a certain distance of those doors. The defendant, Life Care Centers of America, Inc., a corporation that operates the nursing home, was indicted for involuntary manslaughter and criminal neglect.Garrett G. Gillespie, Kristen S. Scammon, “SJC Limits Corporate Criminal Liability,” Martindale.com website, accessed January 24, 2011, www.martindale.com/corporate-law/article_Mintz-Levin-Cohn-Ferris-Glovsky-Popeo-PC_1047124.htm. The criminal intent element required for involuntary manslaughter and criminal neglect in Massachusetts is reckless intent. The evidence indicated that the order requiring the victim to wear a security bracelet was negligently edited out of the victim’s treatment sheet, based on the actions of more than one employee. The individual employee who left the victim near the stairs without the security bracelet relied on the orders that did not indicate a need for the bracelet. There was no evidence that any individual employee of Life Care Centers of America, Inc. was reckless. The prosecution introduced a theory of “collective knowledge” of the actions or failure to act of the corporation’s employees. The prosecution’s premise was that the several individual instances of negligent conduct combined to create reckless conduct that could be imputed to the corporation vicariously. The Massachusetts Supreme Court unanimously held that the corporation could not be held criminally responsible unless one individual employee could be held criminally responsible.Commonwealth v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., 456 Mass. 826 (2010), accessed January 24, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12168070317136071651&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
1. Do you think it is ethical to allow a corporation to escape criminal responsibility for reckless involuntary manslaughter and criminal neglect when several employees’ negligent conduct caused the death, rather than one employee’s reckless conduct? Why or why not?
Check your answer using the answer key at the end of the chapter. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/07%3A_Parties_to_Crime/7.02%3A_Vicarious_Liability.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Distinguish between accomplice liability and the crime of accessory.
2. Define the criminal act element required for an accessory.
3. Define the criminal intent element required for an accessory.
4. Compare various approaches to grading the crime of accessory.
As stated in Section 7.1.1 "Accomplice Liability", at early common law, a defendant who helped plan the offense but was not present at the scene when the principal committed the crime was an accessory before the fact. A defendant who helped the principal avoid detection after the principal committed the crime was an accessory after the fact. In modern times, an accessory before the fact is an accomplice, and an accessory after the fact is an accessory, which is a separate and distinct offense. Some states still call the crime of accessory “accessory after the fact”Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 274 § 4, accessed January 16, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/massachusetts/274/4.html. or “hindering prosecution.”Haw. Rev. Stat. § 710-1030, accessed January 26, 2011, http://law.justia.com/codes/hawaii/2009/volume-14/title-37/chapter-710/hrs-0710-1030-htm/.
The difference between an accomplice and an accessory is crucial. An accomplice is responsible for the offense the principal commits. An accessory, on the other hand, is guilty of a separate crime that is almost always a misdemeanor.
Accessory Act
The criminal act element required for an accessory in the majority of jurisdictions is aiding or assisting a principal in escape, concealment, or evasion of arrest and prosecution or conviction after the principal commits a felony.Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-19, accessed December 26, 2010, http://law.onecle.com/virginia/crimes-and-offenses-generally/18.2-19.html. In most states, a defendant cannot be an accessory to a misdemeanor, although in some states a defendant can be an accessory to a high-level or gross misdemeanor.N.R.S. § 195.030, accessed December 26, 2010, http://law.onecle.com/nevada/crimes/195.030.html. In a minority of states, the defendant can be an accessory to any crime.Haw. Rev. Stat. § 710-1030, accessed October 10, 2011, http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/hrscurrent/Vol14_Ch0701-0853/HRS0710/HRS_0710-1030.htm.
In many states, words are enough to constitute the accessory criminal act element.Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.495, accessed December 23, 2010, https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?id=609.495&year=2010. Often special categories of individuals are exempted from liability as an accessory, typically family members by blood or marriage.Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13 § 5, accessed December 23, 2010, www.leg.state.vt.us/statutes/fullchapter.cfm?Title=13&Chapter=001.
Example of Accessory Act
Jim wakes up late at night to the sound of someone pounding on his door. He gets out of bed, walks down the stairs, and opens the door. His father James is on the doorstep. James’s eyes are bloodshot and he is swaying slightly on his feet. He tells Jim that he just got into a car accident and needs to come inside before the police find out about it and begin an investigation. Jim steps aside and lets his father enter the house. The smell of alcohol on his father’s breath is apparent. He thereafter allows his father to spend the night without contacting the police about the accident.
Jim has probably committed the criminal act element required for an accessory in many jurisdictions. Jim allowed his father to escape arrest and evade an alcohol screening after leaving the scene of a car accident, which is most likely felony drunk driving and hit and run. He also sheltered his father for the night, concealing him from law enforcement. If Jim is in a state that exempts family members from accessory liability, he may not be subject to prosecution because the principal to the crime(s) is his father. If Jim is not in a state that relieves family members from accessory liability, he could be fully prosecuted for and convicted of this offense.
Accessory Intent
The criminal intent element required for an accessory has two parts. First, the defendant must act with general intent or knowingly or awareness that the principal committed a crime. Second, the defendant must help or assist the principal escape or evade arrest or prosecution for and conviction of the offense with specific intent or purposely.Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 274 § 4, accessed December 26, 2010, http://law.onecle.com/massachusetts/274/4.html.
Example of Accessory Intent
Review the example with Jim and James given in Section 7. In this case, Jim is aware that James committed a crime because James told Jim he got into an accident and James’s intoxicated condition was apparent. Nonetheless, Jim purposely helped James evade arrest and an alcohol screening by sheltering him in his home while the effects of the alcohol dissipated. Thus Jim probably has the criminal intent required for liability as an accessory in most jurisdictions. If Jim is not in a state that exempts family members from accessory liability, he could be fully subject to prosecution for and conviction of this offense.
Accessory Grading
As stated in Section 7.3, in many jurisdictions accessory is an offense that is graded less severely than the crime committed by the principal. Accessory is typically graded as a misdemeanor,Haw. Rev. Stat. § 710-1030, accessed January 9, 2011, http://law.justia.com/codes/hawaii/2009/volume-14/title-37/chapter-710/hrs-0710-1030-htm/. although in some jurisdictions it is graded as a felony.Idaho Code Ann. § 18-206, accessed January 9, 2011, www.legislature.idaho.gov/idstat/Title18/T18CH2SECT18-206.htm.
Table 7.1 Comparison of Accomplice, Accessory, and Vicarious Liability
Type of Liability Criminal Act Criminal Intent
Accomplice Aid, assist commission of a crime Specific or purposely, or general or knowingly, depending on the jurisdiction
Accessory Aid, assist evasion of prosecution or conviction for a felony, high-level misdemeanor, or any crime General or knowingly (crime committed) plus specific or purposely (principal evades prosecution or conviction)
Vicarious Committed by an individual in a special relationship with the defendant Belongs to an individual in a special relationship with the defendant
Exercises
• Accomplice liability holds a complicit defendant accountable for the crime the principal commits; accessory is a separate crime that is typically a misdemeanor.
• The criminal act element required for an accessory is aiding or assisting the principal escape or evade arrest, prosecution for, or conviction of a felony, high-level misdemeanor, or any crime, depending on the jurisdiction. In many jurisdictions words are enough to constitute the accessory criminal act element.
• The criminal intent element required for an accessory has two parts. The defendant must act
• with general intent or knowingly that the principal committed the crime,
• with specific intent or purposely to help the principal escape or evade arrest, prosecution for, or conviction of the offense.
• In many jurisdictions, the crime of accessory is graded lower than the crime the principal committed; typically, it is graded as a misdemeanor, although in some jurisdictions, it is graded as a felony.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Cory watches as her sister Amanda breaks into a parking meter across the street and starts scooping change into her purse. Amanda thereafter runs into a nearby alley and hides behind a dumpster. A police officer arrives on the scene and asks Cory if she witnessed the crime. Cory responds, “No, I didn’t notice anything.” The police officer does a search, does not find Amanda, and leaves. Has Cory committed a crime? If your answer is yes, which crime has Cory committed, and does Cory have a possible defense?
2. Read U.S. v. Hill, 268 F.3d 1140 (2001). In Hill, the defendant was convicted of harboring a fugitive and being an accessory when she helped her husband escape the country to avoid prosecution for a failure to pay child support. The defendant claimed that her convictions were unconstitutional because they contravened her right to privacy, association, marriage, and due process. Did the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit uphold the defendant’s convictions? The case is available at this link: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-9th-circuit/1215479.html.
3. Read State v. Truesdell, 620 P.2d 427 (1980). In Truesdell, the prosecution appealed the dismissal of the defendant’s case that was a prosecution for accessory to her twelve-year-old son’s felony shooting of her ex-husband. The lower court held that the defendant could not be an accessory to a felony because her son was not an adult who could be charged with a felony. Did the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reverse the lower court and permit the defendant to be tried as an accessory? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14038267185437754114&q= State+v.+Truesdell+620+P.2d+427+%281980%29&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/07%3A_Parties_to_Crime/7.03%3A_Accessory.txt |
Summary
Often more than one criminal defendant participates in the commission of a crime. Defendants working together with a common criminal purpose are acting with complicity and are responsible for the same crimes, to the same degree.
At early common law, there were four parties to a crime. A principal in the first degree actually committed the crime. A principal in the second degree was present at the crime scene and assisted in the crime’s commission. An accessory before the fact was not present at the crime scene but helped prepare for the crime’s commission. An accessory after the fact helped a party after he or she committed a crime by providing aid in escaping or avoiding arrest and prosecution or conviction. In modern times, there are only two parties to a crime: a principal, who is in the same category with his or her accomplice(s), and accessory(ies). Principals actually commit the crime, and they and their accomplices are criminally responsible for it. Accessories play the same role as accessories after the fact at common law.
The criminal act element required to be an accomplice in most jurisdictions is assistance in the commission of a crime. Words are enough to constitute the accomplice criminal act. Mere presence at the scene, even presence at the scene combined with flight after the crime’s commission, is not enough to constitute the accomplice criminal act unless there is a legal duty to act.
The criminal intent element required for accomplice liability in many jurisdictions is specific intent or purposely to commit the crime at issue. In some states, general intent or knowingly that the principal will commit the crime creates an inference of intent if the offense is serious. In a minority of jurisdictions, general intent or knowingly that the principal will commit the crime is sufficient.
The natural and probable consequences doctrine holds accomplices criminally responsible for all crimes the principal commits that are reasonably foreseeable. In many jurisdictions an accomplice can be prosecuted for a crime the principal commits even if the principal is not prosecuted or acquitted.
Vicarious liability transfers criminal responsibility from one party to another because of a special relationship. Vicarious liability is common between employers and employees and is the basis for corporate criminal liability. Pursuant to modern corporate criminal liability, a corporation can be fined for a crime(s) a corporate agent or employee commits during the scope of employment. The corporate agent or employee also is criminally responsible for his or her conduct. In general, the law disfavors individual criminal vicarious liability. The law in this area is evolving as the incidence of juveniles committing crimes increases.
In modern times, an accessory is the equivalent of an accessory after the fact at common law. The criminal act element required for an accessory is providing assistance to a principal in escape, avoiding detection, or arrest and prosecution, or conviction for the commission of a felony, high-level misdemeanor, or any crime, depending on the jurisdiction. Words are enough to constitute the accessory criminal act. Several jurisdictions exempt family members from criminal responsibility for acting as an accessory.
The criminal intent element required for an accessory in most jurisdictions is general intent or knowingly that the principal committed a crime, and specific intent or purposely that the principal escape, avoid detection, or arrest and prosecution, or conviction for the offense. Accessory is a separate crime that is usually graded as a misdemeanor, although some jurisdictions grade accessory as a felony.
YOU BE THE LAW PROFESSOR
You are a law professor searching for cases to illustrate certain legal concepts for your students. Read the prompt, review the case, and then decide which legal concept it represents. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. The defendant’s vehicle matched the description of a vehicle seen in the vicinity of a burglary before the burglary, during the burglary, and after the burglary. The defendant claimed that the evidence was insufficient to prove he was an accomplice to the burglary. Does this case illustrate the legal concept of accomplice act, accomplice intent, or both? Read Collins v. State, 438 So. 2d 1036 (1983). The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8573128029213310764&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_vis=1.
2. The defendants, foster parents, were found guilty as accomplices to the felony murder of their two-year-old foster daughter. Although both defendants testified that the victim died from injuries experienced after a fall from a swing, medical experts reported that the victim’s injuries were inconsistent with that testimony and appeared to be the result of child abuse. The jury convicted the defendants as accomplices to felony murder after a jury instruction stating that an omission to act could constitute the criminal act element for accomplice liability when there is a duty to act, and parents have a legal duty to come to the aid of their children. Does this case illustrate the legal concept of omission to act, statutory interpretation, or both? Read State v. Jackson, 137 Wn. 2d 712 (1999). The case is available at this link: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/wa-supreme-court/1412039.html.
3. The defendant, an electrical contracting company, was found guilty of violating OSHA regulations that led to an employee’s death. The victim, an apprentice in training, touched a live electrical wire and died from electrocution. The OSHA statute in question required “willful” conduct on behalf of the company. The jury instruction on willful stated that a company acted willfully or knowingly if individual employees of that company acted knowingly. The evidence indicated that some employees knew or were aware of live wiring in the vicinity of the accident. The defendant appealed and claimed that the jury instruction should have stated that a company acted willfully or knowingly if individual employees acted knowingly and had a duty to report that knowledge to the company. Does this case illustrate the legal concept of criminal intent, vicarious liability, or both? Read U.S. v. L.E. Meyers Co., 562 F.3d 845 (2009). The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2854285863509787279&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
4. The defendant was convicted of both first-degree murder and accessory after the fact to that murder. The trial court did not instruct the jury that the offenses were mutually exclusive and that they could only convict the defendant of one or the other. The defendant appealed on the basis that he was entitled to a jury instruction that prevented a conviction on both murder and accessory after the fact to murder. Does this case illustrate the legal concept of the criminal elements required for accessory after the fact, the criminal elements required for murder, or both? Read State v. Melvin, No. 382PA09 (North Carolina 2010). The case is available at this link: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/nc-supreme-court/1549865.html.
Articles of Interest
• Spectator liability in gang rape: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1664162
• Corporate criminal liability: www.pointoflaw.com/feature/archives/2009/07/corporate-criminal -liability-s.php
• Criminal vicarious liability in general: www.experiencefestival.com/a/Vicarious_liability _criminal/id/1994611
Statistics of Interest
• FBI statistics on pending corporate and securities fraud cases: www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/financial-crimes-report-2009/financial-crimes-report-2009#corporate
Answers to Exercises
From Section 7.1
1. Penelope could be charged with and convicted of robbery as an accomplice in many jurisdictions. Penelope assisted Justin by telling him what time the security guard took his break. Although Penelope was not present at the scene, if the trier of fact determines that Penelope had the proper criminal intent required for accomplice liability (specific intent or purposely or general intent or knowingly, depending on the jurisdiction) then Penelope can be held accountable for this crime. Note that Penelope assisted Justin with words and that words are enough to constitute the criminal act element required for accomplice liability.
2. The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed the defendant’s murder conviction, holding that the Minnesota Accomplice Liability Statute required more than passive acquiescence as a criminal act element. The court held that evidence of conduct occurring after the crime could raise an inference of participation before or during the crime’s commission, but in this case, the evidence was insufficient to uphold the verdict.
3. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas upheld the defendant’s conviction because the video of the defendant’s confession corroborated the accomplice’s testimony. The court specifically held that corroborating evidence does not have to be enough to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime; it only has to “tend to connect him to the offense.”Joubert v. State, 235 SW3d 729, 731 (2007), accessed January 22, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10119211983865864217&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 7.2
1. ABC Corporation probably is not vicariously liable for criminal homicide because Brad’s reckless conduct did not occur during the scope of employment; the criminal homicide occurred as Brad was driving home. However, if Brad were required to work while driving home (by making work-related phone calls, for example), vicarious liability could be present in this instance.
2. The Criminal Court of the City of New York upheld the order to stand trial, holding that the prosecution was within its rights to charge the members of the board of directors under the statute. The court stated that whether the board of directors could be held vicariously liable was a question of fact to be determined by the judge or jury at trial.
3. The jury instruction explains that the statute criminalizes vicarious liability, not accomplice liability. The defendant could also be charged as a principal or accessory under section (a) of the statute.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 7.3
1. Cory has probably committed the crime of accessory in most jurisdictions. Cory’s response to the police officer’s question was false, and it appears to be made with the intent to help Amanda escape detection. Note that Cory renders assistance using words, but words are enough to constitute the criminal act element required for accessory. Cory is not an accomplice to Amanda’s crime because she did not act to assist Amanda with the parking meter destruction and theft; she only acted after the crime was committed. Her failure to report the crime is probably not an “omission to act” because it is extremely unlikely that a statute exists requiring individuals to report theft committed in their presence, creating a legal duty to act. A potential defense to accessory would be the family relationship, which creates an exemption to accessory in some jurisdictions.
2. The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the defendant’s conviction for harboring a fugitive because the statute at issue was justified by the compelling government interest in apprehending deadbeat parents. The court reversed the accessory conviction on separate grounds (an improperly drafted indictment).
3. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the lower court and allowed the defendant to be prosecuted for accessory. The court held that it is not necessary for the principal to be charged with or convicted of a felony to prosecute another for accessory to that felony, so the child’s age or prosecutability is irrelevant.
Answer to Law and Ethics Question
1. Insisting that at least one individual employee of the corporation commit a crime with the requisite intent before imposing vicarious liability upon the corporation is ethical, and it promotes justice. Aggregating intent could have far-reaching consequences outside the arena of vicarious corporate liability. For example, it could create unfair and overly harsh sentencing if extended to accomplice liability. When accomplices work together, at least one accomplice must possess the intent for the crime to hold other accomplices responsible. Imagine the possibilities if the accomplices’ intent could be aggregated and raised to a more sinister level. Accomplices working together to commit a misdemeanor could be prosecuted for a serious and unforeseeable felony if their intents could be combined and elevated. Vicarious corporate liability is already a legal fiction because it transfers criminal responsibility for conduct from an individual to a business entity. This transfer of liability punishes the owners of the corporation for crimes they did not commit. If prosecutors could stretch the fiction further by combining the intents of various corporate employees and elevating them, this would not comport with notions of fairness.
Answers to You Be the Law Professor
1. In this case, the District Court of Appeal of Florida held that the evidence was insufficient to support either the criminal act element or the criminal intent element required to be an accomplice. First, the court held that the identification of the vehicle proved “mere presence at the scene,” which is not sufficient to constitute the accomplice criminal act. The court thereafter held that an inference of intent to commit burglary was inappropriate when the prosecution did not prove the criminal act that was the basis of the inference. Thus you can use this case to illustrate the legal concepts of accomplice criminal act and intent.
2. In this case, the Supreme Court of Washington reviewed the accomplice liability statute and noted that it did not include omission to act. The statute was predicated on the Model Penal Code § 2.06(3)(a)(iii), which expressly includes omission to act as sufficient for accomplice liability when there is a legal duty to act, so the court held that the Washington State Legislature’s rejection of omission to act in the accomplice liability statute was deliberate. The court reversed the felony murder convictions because the jury instruction did not comport with the statute (RCW 9A.08.020 (3)) as they interpreted it. The court also expressly stated that in Washington, omission to act cannot create accomplice liability. Thus you can use this case to illustrate the legal concepts of statutory interpretation and omission to act.
3. The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the jury instruction should include the individual employee’s duty to report knowledge or awareness of dangerous conditions when defining “willful” conduct under the OSHA statute. The court held that an individual employee’s knowledge or awareness could not be imputed to the company unless the individual employee had a duty to report that knowledge. The court’s holding focused on when a court should impute criminal intent to an employer or company and the definition of criminal intent under the statute. Thus you can use this case to illustrate the legal concepts of vicarious liability and criminal intent.
4. The North Carolina Supreme Court discussed the elements of first-degree murder, aiding and abetting first-degree murder, and accessory after the fact to murder. The court reached the conclusion that first-degree murder and accessory after the fact to that murder are mutually exclusive, based on the criminal elements required for each offense. Thus you can use this case to illustrate the legal concepts of the elements of first-degree murder and the elements of accessory after the fact. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/07%3A_Parties_to_Crime/7.04%3A_End-of-Chapter_Material.txt |
And so long as the partnership in crime continues, the partners act for each other in carrying it forward.
- Pinkerton v. U.S., cited in Section 8.2.4 "Consequences of Conspiracy"
Source: Image courtesy of Jane F. Kardashian, MD.
8.01: Attempt
Learning Objectives
1. Define an inchoate crime.
2. Distinguish between general and specific attempt statutes.
3. Identify and describe the four tests jurisdictions use to ascertain the criminal act element required for attempt.
4. Define preparatory crimes.
5. Define the criminal intent element required for attempt.
6. Identify two potential defenses to attempt.
7. Distinguish between factual and legal impossibility.
8. Define voluntary abandonment.
9. Describe merger and explain the way it affects attempt crimes.
10. Analyze the relationship between transferred intent and attempt.
11. Distinguish between the grading of attempt and the completed crime.
Attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation are considered inchoate crimes. Inchoate means “just begun, incipient, in the early stages.”Yourdictionary.com, accessed December 28, 2010, “Definition of Inchoate,” http://www.yourdictionary.com/inchoate. Inchoate crimes can be left unfinished, or incomplete. Although attempt never results in the finished criminal offense, both conspiracy and solicitation could give rise to separate completed crimes.
The rationale supporting punishment for an inchoate crime is prevention and deterrence. If a defendant could not be apprehended until a crime is finished, law enforcement would not be able to intervene and avert injury to victim(s) or property. In addition, a defendant who is unable to complete a crime would try again and again, free from any criminal consequences.
The difficulty in holding a defendant accountable for an inchoate or incomplete crime is ascertaining the level of progress necessary to impute criminal responsibility, which is especially daunting with attempt, because in every instance the crime is left unfinished, as is discussed in Section 8.1.
Synopsis of the History of Attempt
At early English common law, attempt was not a crime.Stephen J. Schulhofer, Dan M. Kahan, “Attempt,” encyclopedia.com website, accessed December 26, 2010, http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Attempt.aspx. Gradually, the law evolved, and a defendant who committed attempt resulting in severe harm was punished for a minor crime, typically a misdemeanor. One of the first documented cases of attempt was Rex v. Scofield, Cald. 397 (1784).Stephen J. Schulhofer, Dan M. Kahan, “Attempt,” encyclopedia.com website, accessed December 26, 2010, http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Attempt.aspx. In Scofield, a servant was convicted of a misdemeanor for attempting to burn down his master’s house with a lighted candle. A subsequent case, Rex v. Higgins, 102 Eng. Rep. 269 (K.B. 1801), upheld an indictment for attempted theft and firmly established the crime of attempt in English jurisprudence. In modern times, most states criminalize attempt, the majority in statutes, except in some states that permit common-law crimes. However, even in statutes, the word “attempt” is often left undefined, forcing courts to derive the meaning from common-law principles.
Attempt Statutes
In general, there are two types of attempt statutes. Some states have general attempt statutes that set forth attempt elements and apply them to any criminal offense.Tex. Penal Code § 15.01, accessed December 27, 2010, law.onecle.com/texas/penal/15.01.00.html. Other states and the federal government have specific attempt statutes that define attempt according to specified crimes, such as murder, robbery, or rape.18 U.S.C. § 1113, accessed June 28, 2011, www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/718/usc_sec_18_00001113----000-.html. Keep in mind that several states do not criminalize attempt in a statute and consider it a common-law crime.Grill v. State, 337 Md. 91 (1995), accessed December 27, 2010, http://www.leagle.com/xmlResult.aspx?xmldoc=1995428337Md91_1422.xml&docbase=CSLWAR2-1986-2006.
Attempt Act
The criminal act element required for attempt varies, depending on the jurisdiction. As Chapter 4 stated, thoughts are not criminal acts. Thus a defendant does not commit attempt by plotting or planning an offense. An extension of this rule dictates that mere preparation is not enough to constitute the attempt criminal act element.People v. Luna, 170 Cal. App. 4th 535 (2009), accessed December 27, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11148942163253518924&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. However, the crux of any attempt case is how close to completing the offense the defendant must get to fulfill the attempt criminal act requirement. In many statutes and cases, the attempt act is loosely defined to allow the trier of fact the flexibility needed to separate true criminal attempt from noncriminal preparation.
Jurisdictions use four tests to ascertain whether the defendant has committed the attempt criminal act: proximity test, res ipsa loquitur test, probable desistance test, and the Model Penal Code’s substantial steps test.
Proximity Test
The proximity test measures the defendant’s progress by examining how close the defendant is to completing the offense. The distance measured is the distance between preparation for the offense and successful termination. It is the amount left to be done, not what has already been done, that is analyzed.Commonwealth v. Hamel, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 250 (2001), accessed December 29, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3222223363179578849&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. In some jurisdictions, if the defendant’s criminal intent is clear, the defendant does not need to come as close to completion of the offense.People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697 (1983), accessed December 29, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16336126005486548570&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. Generally, the defendant does not have to reach the last step before completion,People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697 (1983), accessed December 29, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16336126005486548570&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. although many defendants do.
Example of the Proximity Test
Melissa and Matthew decide they want to poison their neighbor’s dog because it barks loudly and consistently every night. Melissa buys some rat poison at the local hardware store. Matthew coats a raw filet mignon with the poison and throws it over the fence into the neighbor’s yard. Fortuitously, the neighbors are on an overnight camping trip, and the dog is with them. The next day, after a night of silence, Melissa feels regret and climbs over the fence to see what happened to the dog. When she sees the filet untouched on the ground, she picks it up and takes it back over the fence, later disposing of it in the trash. If Melissa and Matthew are in a jurisdiction that follows the proximity test, Melissa and Matthew have probably committed the criminal act element required for attempt. Melissa and Matthew finished every act necessary to commit the crime of destruction of property or animal cruelty (poisoning the dog). The only reason the crime was not successfully consummated was the absence of the dog, which is a circumstance outside their control. Thus Melissa and Matthew could most likely be charged with and convicted of this offense. If Melissa bought the rat poison but thereafter changed her mind and talked Matthew out of poisoning the dog, her actions would be a preparation, not a positive step toward commission of the crime. If Matthew coated the filet with poison but then changed his mind and threw the filet away, he would still be “too far” away from completing the offense. However, once the filet is thrown over the fence, the crime is proximate to completion; the only step left is the victim’s (dog’s) participation.
Res Ipsa Loquitur Test
Res ipsa loquitur means “the thing speaks for itself.”USLegal.com, “Definition of Res Ipsa Loquitur,” accessed December 29, 2010, http://definitions.uslegal.com/r/res-ipsa-loquitur. The res ipsa loquitur test, also called the unequivocality test, analyzes the facts of each case independently. Under res ipsa loquitur or unequivocality, the trier of fact must determine that at the moment the defendant stopped progressing toward completion of the offense, it was clear that the defendant had no other purpose than commission of the specific crime at issue. This determination is based on the defendant’s act—which manifests the intent to commit the crime.Hamiel v. Wisconsin, 285 N.W.2d 639 (1979), accessed December 30, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3730801887783687670&hl=en&as_sdt=2002&as_vis=1.
Example of the Res Ipsa Loquitur Test
Harry wants to kill his wife Ethel for the proceeds of her life insurance policy. Harry contacts his friend Joe, who is reputed to be a “hit man,” and sets up a meeting for the next day. Harry meets with Joe and asks him if he will murder Ethel for one thousand dollars. Joe agrees, and Harry pulls out a wad of cash and pays him. Unfortunately for Harry, Joe is a law enforcement decoy. If the state in which Harry paid Joe recognizes the res ipsa loquitur or unequivocality test, Harry has most likely committed attempted murder (along with solicitation to commit murder, which is discussed shortly). Harry’s actions in contacting and thereafter hiring and paying Joe to kill Ethel indicate that he has no other purpose than the commission of Ethel’s murder. Hiring and paying a hit man is more than just preparation. Note that evidence of Ethel’s life insurance policy is not needed to prove the attempt act. Harry’s conduct “speaks for itself,” which is the essence of res ipsa loquitur or unequivocality.
Probable Desistance Test
The probable desistance test examines how far the defendant has progressed toward commission of the crime, rather than analyzing how much the defendant has left to accomplish. Pursuant to this test, a defendant commits attempt when he or she has crossed a line beyond which it is probable he or she will not desist unless there is an interruption from some outside source, law enforcement, or circumstances beyond his or her control.See discussion in U.S. v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 373 fn. 5 (1974), accessed December 30, 2010, ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/499/499.F2d.370.74-1445.html.
Example of the Probable Desistance Test
Judy, who works at Zales jewelry store, tells her Facebook friends that she is going to steal a diamond necklace out of the safe that evening. Judy drives to Zales at eleven o’clock after the store has closed. She enters the building using her key and quickly disables the store alarm. She then turns off the store security camera. As she crouches down by the safe and begins to enter the combination, all the lights go on and she blinks, startled by the sight of several police officers pointing their guns at her. If the state in which Judy lives follows the probable desistance test, Judy has most likely committed attempted larceny, along with burglary. Judy informed others of her plan, drove to the crime scene, entered the building unlawfully, disabled the store alarm, and turned off the store security camera. This series of actions indicate that Judy crossed a point of no return. It is unlikely that Judy would have desisted without the law enforcement interruption, which fulfills the attempt act requirement pursuant to the probable desistance test.
Model Penal Code Substantial Steps Test
The Model Penal Code developed the substantial steps test in response to the large variance between different jurisdictions in evaluating the criminal act element required for attempt. The substantial steps test is intended to clarify and simplify the attempt act analysis, to prevent arbitrary application. It is also a test that is more likely to result in a conviction because it classifies as “substantial” those acts the other tests might consider only “preparatory.”People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 720, fn.1 (1983), accessed December 30, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16336126005486548570&hl=en&as_sdt=2002&as_vis=1.
The substantial steps test has two parts. First, the defendant must take substantial steps toward completion of the crime. As the Model Penal Code states, “[a] person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if…he…does…anything which…is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime” (Model Penal Code § 5.01(1)(c)). Second, the defendant’s actions must be “strongly corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose” (Model Penal Code § 5.01(2)). To further elucidate the test, the Model Penal Code provides seven examples of actions that constitute substantial steps, as long as they are corroborative of the defendant’s intent. The seven examples are lying in wait; enticing the victim to go to the scene of the crime; investigating the potential scene of the crime; unlawfully entering a structure or vehicle where the crime is to be committed; possessing materials that are specially designed for unlawful use; possessing, collecting, or fabricating materials to be used in the crime’s commission; and soliciting an innocent agent to commit the crime (Model Penal Code § 5.01(2)).
Example of the Substantial Steps Test
Kevin wants to rob an armored car that delivers cash to the local bank. After casing the bank for two months and determining the date and time that the car makes its delivery, Kevin devises a plan that he types on his computer. On the date of the next delivery, Kevin hides a weapon in his jacket pocket and makes his way on foot to the bank. Thereafter, he hides in an alley and waits for the truck to arrive. When the truck drives up and parks in front of the bank, Kevin walks over to the driver’s door and reaches for his weapon. He is immediately apprehended by a security guard who saw him emerge from the alley. If Kevin is in a substantial steps jurisdiction, he has probably committed the criminal act element required for attempt. Kevin cased the bank, planned the robbery, showed up on the appointed date and time with a concealed weapon, and hid in an alley to wait for the truck to appear. These actions are (1) investigating the potential scene of the crime, (2) possessing materials to be used in the crime’s commission, and (3) lying in wait. Thus Kevin has completed three substantial steps that corroborate his intent as expressed in the plan he typed, which is most likely sufficient to constitute the attempt criminal act element under the Model Penal Code.
Preparatory Crimes
Some states have statutes criminalizing behavior that would be considered preparatory under any of the four attempt act tests. For example, some statutes prohibit the mere possession of burglar’s toolsN.Y. Penal Law § 140.35, accessed December 31, 2010, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN0140.35_140.35.html. or even the manufacture of burglar’s tools.Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-106, accessed December 31, 2010, www.cga.ct.gov/2009/pub/chap952.htm#Sec53a-106.htm. A defendant could be convicted of a preparatory crime and attempt if the criminal act element for both is present under the circumstances.
Example of a Preparatory Crime and Attempt
Hal manufactures a lock pick and takes it to the local coin shop, which is closed. Hal takes the lock pick out and begins to insert it into the coin shop doorknob. A security guard apprehends Hal before he is able to pick the lock. If Hal is in a jurisdiction that prohibits the manufacture of burglar’s tools, he probably could be charged with and convicted of manufacture of burglar’s tools and attempted burglary because he has committed the criminal act element required for both of these offenses.
Attempt Intent
The criminal intent element required for attempt in the majority of jurisdictions is the specific intent or purposely to commit the crime at issue.N. Y. Penal Law § 110.00, accessed December 31, 2010, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN0110.00_110.00.html. Generally, no such thing exists as reckless or negligent attempt. Thus if the prosecution fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted purposefully with intent to commit the crime attempted, this could operate as a failure of proof defense.
Example of a Case Lacking Attempt Intent
Eric is hiking in a jurisdiction that criminalizes reckless burning. Eric pauses in front of a sign that states “Fire Danger Today: High.” Eric reads the sign, pulls out a cigarette, lights it, and throws the lit match into some dry brush near the sign. He starts hiking and when he finishes his cigarette, he tosses the lit cigarette butt into some arid grass. Neither the brush nor the grass burns. Eric probably does not have the requisite criminal intent for attempted reckless burning. Attempt requires purposeful conduct. Eric’s conduct is reckless because he is aware of a risk and disregards it. If Eric takes the match or lit cigarette and tries to ignite a fire with them, it is likely that he has the appropriate criminal intent for attempted arson. However, in this case Eric’s actions demonstrate careless behavior that probably is not sufficient for the crime of attempt.
Defenses to Attempt
Along with failure of proof defenses to the criminal act and criminal intent elements, legal impossibility and voluntary abandonment can also function as affirmative defenses to attempt in many jurisdictions.
Impossibility as a Defense to Attempt
Two types of impossibility defenses exist: legal impossibility, which can function as a defense to attempt, and factual impossibility, which generally cannot. Legal impossibility means that the defendant believes what he or she is attempting to do is illegal, when it is not. Factual impossibility means that the defendant could not complete the crime attempted because the facts are not as he or she believes them to be. The Model Penal Code disallows factual impossibility as a defense by stating that conduct is an attempt when the defendant “purposely engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be” (Model Penal Code § 5.01(1) (a)).
Example of Legal Impossibility
Review the example given in Section 8 with Melissa and Matthew and the attempted poisoning of the neighbor’s dog. Assume that Melissa is eighteen. Melissa believes that an individual must be twenty-one to purchase rat poison because that is the law in the state where she lived five years ago. Actually, the state in which Melissa currently resides allows the purchase of rat poison by those who are eighteen or older. The first store Melissa enters asks for identification when she tries to pay for the rat poison, so Melissa makes an excuse and leaves. The second store Melissa enters does not ask for identification, and she successfully makes the rat poison purchase. Melissa has probably not attempted to purchase rat poison illegally in the first store she entered. Melissa’s act in attempting to purchase the rat poison is legal under the circumstances. Thus her mistaken belief that she is attempting to commit a crime does not transform this legal act into an illegal one.
Example of Factual Impossibility
Recall from the example given in Section 8 that Matthew threw a filet coated with rat poison over the fence into the neighbor’s yard with the intent to poison the neighbor’s dog. Both Melissa and Matthew are under the mistaken belief that the dog is present and will eat the filet. However, the dog is on an overnight camping trip with its owners. This mistake of fact probably will not excuse Melissa and Matthew’s attempt. Melissa and Matthew purposely engaged in conduct that would result in the poisoning of the dog if the facts were as Melissa and Matthew believed them to be. Thus Melissa and Matthew have most likely committed attempted destruction of property or animal cruelty regardless of the fact that their plan could not succeed under the circumstances.
Voluntary Abandonment as a Defense to Attempt
Many jurisdictions allow a defendant who voluntarily abandons the planned offense to use this abandonment as an affirmative defense to attempt.Fla. Stat. Ann. § 777.04(5) (a), accessed December 31, 2010, http://law.justia.com/florida/codes/2003/TitleXLVI/chapter777/777_04.html. The defense has two parts. First, the defendant must have a change of heart that is not motivated by an increased possibility of detection, or a change in circumstances that make the crime’s commission more difficult. As the Model Penal Code states, “it is an affirmative defense that he abandoned his effort to commit the crime…under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose…[R]enunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary if it is motivated…by circumstances…which increase the probability of detection…or which make more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose” (Model Penal Code § 5.01(4)). Second, the abandonment must be complete and cannot simply be a postponement. Under the Model Penal Code, “[r]enunciation is not complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until a more advantageous time or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar…victim” (Model Penal Code § 5.01(4)). The voluntary abandonment defense gives defendants incentive to stop progressing toward consummation of the offense and prevents the crime from occurring without the need for law enforcement intervention.
Example of Voluntary Abandonment as a Defense to Attempt
Review the example with Melissa and Matthew in Section 8. If Melissa changes her mind after purchasing the rat poison and talks Matthew out of poisoning the neighbor’s dog, Melissa has voluntarily abandoned the crime and cannot be charged with attempt. If Matthew changes his mind after coating the filet with rat poison and throws the filet away, Matthew has voluntarily abandoned the crime and cannot be charged with attempt. Note that both Melissa’s and Matthew’s actions are in the very early stages of the crime of destruction of property or animal cruelty and probably will be considered preparatory, rather than constituting the criminal act element required for attempt. When Melissa climbs over the fence, picks up the filet, and takes it back to her house for disposal, it is most likely too late to voluntarily abandon the crime. At this point, the crime of attempt has already been committed, and neither voluntary abandonment nor factual impossibility can function as defenses.
Merger
Attempt merges into the crime if the crime is completed in many jurisdictions, which means that the defendant cannot be charged with attempt and the completed crime.Ga. Code tit. 16 § 16-4-2, accessed January 28, 2011, law.onecle.com/georgia/16/16-4-2.html.
Example of Merger
Review the example with Melissa and Matthew in Section 8. Change the facts, and assume that the neighbor’s dog eats the poisoned filet and dies. Melissa and Matthew probably cannot be charged with attempted destruction of property or animal cruelty and destruction of property or animal cruelty in many jurisdictions. Once the crime is complete, the attempt crime merges into the consummated offense, and Melissa and Matthew may be charged only with destruction of property or animal cruelty.
Attempt and Transferred Intent
Recall from Chapter 4 that a defendant’s criminal intent can transfer from the intended victim to the actual victim in some jurisdictions. If the intent is transferred, the defendant may be criminally responsible for the consummated offense against the eventual victim and for attempt against the intended victim.
Example of Attempt and Transferred Intent
Review the example with Melissa and Matthew in Section 8. Change the facts, and assume that the neighbor’s cat licks the poison off the filet and thereafter dies. If Melissa and Matthew are in a jurisdiction that recognizes transferred intent, they may be charged with attempted destruction of property or animal cruelty for trying to poison the neighbor’s dog and destruction of property or animal cruelty for actually poisoning and killing the neighbor’s cat.
Attempt Grading
Jurisdictions vary as to how they grade attempt. Some jurisdictions follow the common law and grade attempt lower than the completed offense.Mo. Ann. Stat. § 564.011, accessed December 31, 2010, http://law.justia.com/missouri/codes/2005/t38/5640000011.html. Other jurisdictions punish attempt the same as the attempted offense, with exceptions for certain specified crimes.Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-a-51, accessed December 31, 2010, www.cga.ct.gov/2001/pub/Chap952.htm#sec53a-51.htm.
Exercises
• An inchoate crime is a crime that might not be completed.
• General attempt statutes set forth the elements of attempt and apply them to any crime. Specific attempt statutes define attempt according to specified crimes, such as attempted murder, robbery, or rape.
• The four tests jurisdictions use to ascertain the criminal act element required for attempt are proximity, res ipsa loquitur, probable desistance, and substantial steps.
• The proximity test determines how close the defendant is to committing the crime by analyzing how much is left to accomplish after preparation for the offense.
• The res ipsa loquitur test, also called the unequivocality test, examines the defendant’s actions at a moment in time to determine whether the defendant has no other purpose than committing the crime at issue.
• The probable desistance test analyzes whether the defendant has progressed so far that it is probable he or she will not desist without interruption from law enforcement or other intervening circumstances.
• The substantial steps test is the Model Penal Code test and ascertains whether the defendant has completed substantial steps toward commission of the crime that are corroborative of the defendant’s criminal intent.
• Preparatory crimes criminalize preparing to commit a crime, which would be a stage that is too premature to constitute the criminal act element required for attempt.
• The criminal intent element required for attempt is specific intent or purposely to commit the crime at issue.
• Aside from failure of proof defenses to attempt act and intent, two potential defenses to attempt are legal impossibility and voluntary abandonment.
• Factual impossibility means the defendant cannot complete the crime because the facts are not as the defendant believes them to be. Factual impossibility is generally not a defense to attempt. Legal impossibility means the defendant believes he or she is attempting to commit a crime, but the defendant’s actions are actually legal. Legal impossibility is generally a defense to attempt.
• Voluntary abandonment is when the defendant voluntarily and completely withdraws from commission of the offense before it is consummated.
• In many jurisdictions, attempt merges into the offense if it is completed, which means that a defendant cannot be charged with attempt and the completed crime.
• In a jurisdiction that allows for transferred intent, a defendant’s intent can transfer from the intended victim to the actual victim. The defendant can thereafter be criminally responsible for the completed crime against the actual victim and attempt against the intended victim.
• Some jurisdictions grade attempt lower than the completed offense; others grade attempt the same as the completed offense, with exceptions.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Carol shoots her father Carl with malice aforethought. He thereafter lingers in a coma for two months and then dies. Carol is in a jurisdiction that recognizes merger for attempt and that also requires a victim to die within one year and a day if the defendant is to be charged with murder. Can Carol be charged with attempted murder and murder? Why or why not?
2. Read State v. Withrow, 8 S.W.3d 75 (1999). In Withrow, the defendant made frequent visits to a house that was under law enforcement surveillance. While searching the house pursuant to a search warrant, law enforcement officers saw the defendant emerging from a bedroom that had a locked closet containing a jar with pills dissolving in it, which is the first step of methamphetamine production. The defendant was convicted of attempted methamphetamine production and received a sentence of eighteen years in prison. Did the Supreme Court of Missouri uphold the defendant’s conviction? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17239945130468444353&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
3. Read People v. Strand, 539 N.W.2d 739 (1995). In Strand, the defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit attempted kidnapping. Did the Michigan Court of Appeals uphold this conviction? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1507705469884283003&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/08%3A_Inchoate_Offenses/8.00%3A_Prelude_to_Inchoate_Offenses.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Explain why conspiracy is an inchoate crime.
2. Define the criminal act element required for conspiracy.
3. Compare the conspiracy overt act requirement with the criminal act element required for attempt.
4. Define the criminal intent element required for conspiracy.
5. Ascertain whether a coconspirator can be criminally responsible when another coconspirator is not prosecuted or acquitted.
6. Ascertain whether a coconspirator must know every other coconspirator to be guilty of conspiracy.
7. Distinguish between a wheel and chain conspiracy.
8. Define the Pinkerton rule.
9. Define Wharton’s rule.
10. Identify an affirmative defense to conspiracy.
11. Ascertain whether merger applies to conspiracy.
12. Compare various approaches to conspiracy grading.
13. Define federal RICO.
Conspiracy punishes defendants for agreeing to commit a criminal offense. Conspiracy is an inchoate crime because it is possible that the defendants never will commit the planned offense. However, a conspiracy is complete as soon as the defendants become complicit and commit the conspiracy act with the conspiracy intent. The rationale for punishing defendants for planning activity, which generally is not sufficient to constitute the crime of attempt, is the increased likelihood of success when defendants work together to plot and carry out a criminal offense.Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494 (1951), accessed January 3, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13576454585730441281&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. If the defendants commit the crime that is the object of the conspiracy, the defendants are responsible for the conspiracy and the completed crime, as is discussed in Section 8.2.4 "Consequences of Conspiracy".
Conspiracy Act
In many jurisdictions, the criminal act element required for conspiracy is an agreement to commit any criminal offense.Fla. Stat. Ann. § 777.04(3), accessed January 1, 2011, http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0700-0799/0777/Sections/0777.04.html. The agreement does not need to be formal or in writing.State v. Bond, 49 Conn. App. 183 (1998), accessed January 1, 2011, http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ct-court-of-appeals/1255702.html. Some states also criminalize as conspiracy the agreement to falsely indict another for a crime and the agreement to falsely maintain any lawsuit, even a civil lawsuit.Cal. Penal Code § 182(a) (2), (3), accessed January 2, 2011, http://law.justia.com/california/codes/2009/pen/182-185.html. Other states only criminalize as conspiracy the agreement to commit a felony.Tex. Penal Code § 15.02, accessed January 3, 2011, law.onecle.com/texas/penal/15.02.00.html.
In some states and federally, an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy is also required.18 U.S.C. § 371, accessed January 1, 2011, http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/uscode/18/I/19/371. The Model Penal Code requires an overt act only when the planned crime is “other than a felony of the first or second degree” (Model Penal Code § 5.03(5)). The overt act does not have to be criminal and may be planning or preparatory activity that would be insufficient to constitute the criminal act element required for attempt.State v. Verive, 627 P.2d 721 (1981), accessed January 1, 2011, wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/web/azverive.htm.
Example of Conspiracy Act
Review the example with Melissa and Matthew in Section 8. In this example, Melissa and Matthew agree to poison the neighbor’s dog because it barks every night. After deciding they will poison the dog, Melissa buys rat poison, and Matthew thereafter coats a filet mignon with it and throws it over the fence into the neighbor’s yard. In a jurisdiction that defines the criminal act element for conspiracy as an agreement between two or more to commit a criminal offense, Melissa and Matthew probably committed the conspiracy criminal act as soon as they agreed to poison the dog. Their agreement could be verbal and does not need to be formal or in writing. If Melissa and Matthew are in a jurisdiction that requires an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, Melissa and Matthew probably have not committed the conspiracy criminal act until Melissa buys the rat poison. Note that the purchase of the rat poison is not sufficient to constitute the criminal act element required for attempted destruction of property or animal cruelty, as discussed in Section 8. However, it would likely be enough to support the conspiracy to commit destruction of property or animal cruelty.
Conspiracy Intent
The essence of conspiracy is agreement, which requires two or more parties. However, the modern approach is that a conspiracy may be formed as long as one of the parties has the appropriate intent.Ind. Code § 35-41-5-2(5), accessed January 1, 2011, www.in.gov/legislative/ic/2010/title35/ar41/ch5.html. Pursuant to this unilateral view of conspiracy, a conspiracy may exist between a defendant and a law enforcement decoy who is pretending to agree.
In the majority of jurisdictions, the criminal intent element required for conspiracy is specific intent or purposely to agree with another to commit the crime at issue.Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions 3.3-1, accessed January 1, 2011, www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part3/3.3-1.htm. As the Model Penal Code states, “[a] person is guilty of conspiracy…if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he: (a) agrees with such other person…that they…will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime” (Model Penal Code § 5.03(1) (a)). This intent has two components. The prosecution must prove that the conspirator intended to agree and also intended to commit the underlying offense.State v. Lewis, 220 Conn. 602 (1991), accessed January 2, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6997065715061309373&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
Example of Conspiracy Intent
Shelley and Sam meet at a bar and discuss their lack of finances. Shelley mentions that she and her friend Steffy work at a convenience store. Sam asks Shelley if she would like to help him rob the convenience store when Steffy is working. Shelley agrees. The two plan the robbery. Shelley and Sam agree that Shelley will drive the getaway car on the appointed date and time. Shelley informs Sam that Steffy is extremely meek and fearful and will readily hand over cash out of the cash register if Sam uses a fake handgun. Shelley and Sam probably have the criminal intent element required for conspiracy. Shelley and Sam have the intent to agree to work together because they both need each other to successfully complete the convenience store robbery. In addition, Shelley and Sam have the intent to successfully commit the robbery because they both want the money the robbery will produce. Thus if no overt act is required in their jurisdiction, Shelley and Sam most likely have completed the crime of conspiracy and may be prosecuted for this offense whether or not the robbery actually takes place.
Conspiracy Parties
Similar to accomplice liability, the acquittal of or failure to prosecute one party to the conspiracy does not relieve a coconspirator from criminal responsibility in many states.Tex. Penal Code § 15.02(c), accessed January 3, 2011, law.onecle.com/texas/penal/15.02.00.html. In addition, a coconspirator does not need to know every other coconspirator to be accountable as a member of the conspiracy.Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-202(2), accessed January 3, 2011, http://law.justia.com/nebraska/codes/2006/s28index/s2802002000.html. As long as the conspiracy defendant is aware that other coconspirators exist, the mens rea for conspiracy is present. As the Model Penal Code states, “[i]f a person guilty of conspiracy…knows that a person with whom he conspires to commit a crime has conspired with another person or persons to commit the same crime, he is guilty of conspiring with such other person or persons, whether or not he knows their identity” (Model Penal Code § 5.03(2)). Large-scale conspiracies, such as conspiracies to distribute contraband or illegal firearms, may result in each member sharing criminal responsibility for the conspiracy and every separate conspiracy transaction.
A conspiracy that has more than one criminal objective still can be just one conspiracy. Under the Model Penal Code, “[i]f a person conspires to commit a number of crimes, he is guilty of only one conspiracy so long as such multiple crimes are the object of the same agreement or continuous conspiratorial relationship” (Model Penal Code § 5.03(3)).
It is useful to understand two basic large-scale conspiracy organizational formats: wheel and chain conspiracies. A wheel conspiracy consists of a single conspirator, generally the ringleader who is interconnected to every other coconspirator. The ringleader is the hub; the other coconspirators are the spokes of the wheel. An example of a wheel conspiracy would be a mob boss linked to individual members of the mob following his or her commands. A chain conspiracy consists of coconspirators connected to each other like links in a chain but without a central interconnected ringleader. An example of a chain conspiracy is a conspiracy to manufacture and distribute a controlled substance, with the manufacturer linked to the transporter, who sells to a large-quantity dealer, who thereafter sells to a smaller-quantity dealer, who sells to a customer. Whether the conspiracy is wheel, chain, or otherwise, if the jurisdiction has a statute or common-law rule that each member does not need to personally know every other member as discussed previously, the coconspirators may be criminally responsible for the conspiracy and the crime(s) it furthers.
Consequences of Conspiracy
In some states and federally, individuals who enter into a conspiracy are criminally responsible for every reasonably foreseeable crime committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.U.S. v. Castaneda, 9 F.3d 761 (1993), accessed January 3, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13576116398000833345&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. This rule is called the Pinkerton rule, based on the US Supreme Court case that created it (Pinkerton v. U.S., 328 U.S. 640 (1946).). One factor used to determine foreseeability is the degree of the defendant’s involvement in the conspiracy. A defendant who plays a minor role is less likely to be criminally responsible than a defendant who has a more substantive involvement.U.S. v. Castaneda, 9 F.3d 761 (1993), accessed January 3, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13576116398000833345&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
Example of the Pinkerton Rule
Review the example in Section 8 with Shelley and Sam. Assume that on the night of the convenience store robbery, Lucy, an armed, off-duty police officer, wanders into the store to purchase cigarettes at the moment Sam pulls out his fake handgun. Lucy yanks her concealed handgun out of her waistband and tells Sam to drop the weapon. Jolene, another customer in the store, observes the two pointing guns at each other and suffers a fatal heart attack. In many jurisdictions, both Shelley and Sam probably could be criminally responsible for conspiracy to commit robbery, attempted robbery, and the murder of Jolene. Shelley and Sam attempted to commit the robbery in furtherance of the conspiracy. Both played a major role in the conspiracy and the attempted robbery. Thus both are accountable for the foreseeable consequences. Robbery is a crime of violence, so a death that occurs during a robbery is foreseeable, even though Sam is armed with only a pretend handgun. Thus Shelley and Sam may be charged with and convicted of Jolene’s murder, which is most likely felony murder. Felony murder is discussed in detail in Chapter 9.
Wharton’s Rule
A criminal offense that requires two parties cannot be the object of a conspiracy that consists of two parties. This rule is called Wharton’s rule, or the concert of action rule.USLegal, “Definition of Wharton’s Rule,” USLegal.com website, accessed January 3, 2011, http://definitions.uslegal.com/w/whartons-rule. However, a statute can expressly criminalize a conspiracy to commit any crime, abrogating the rule. Currently, Wharton’s rule can operate as a judicial presumption, to be applied in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary.Ianelli v. U.S., 420 U.S. 770, 785 (1975), accessed January 3, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16942118715212641737&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
Example of a Case Where Wharton’s Rule Is Inapplicable
Joanne and Robert conspire with Don, Joanne’s pimp, to engage in prostitution. Joanne and Robert get caught in the act of engaging in prostitution by Edward, a police officer. Wharton’s rule probably does not apply in this case. Although engaging in prostitution requires two parties, the conspiracy to engage in prostitution has three members—Don, Joanne, and Robert. Thus Wharton’s rule is likely inapplicable, and Don, Joanne, and Robert might have committed conspiracy to engage in prostitution. Note that if only Joanne and Robert conspire to engage in prostitution, Wharton’s rule may act as a judicial presumption that they cannot commit conspiracy and the crime it furthers.
Renunciation as a Defense to Conspiracy
One potential affirmative defense to conspiracy is renunciation. Similar to voluntary abandonment in attempt, renunciation can operate as a defense to conspiracy in some jurisdictions if the defendant completely and voluntarily renounces the conspiracy.N.J. Stat. § 2c: 5-2e, accessed January 4, 2011, law.onecle.com/new-jersey/2c-the-new-jersey-code-of-criminal-justice/5-2.html. The renunciation must also thwart the crime that is the object of the conspiracy. The Model Penal Code allows the defense and provides, “It is an affirmative defense that the actor, after conspiring to commit a crime, thwarted the success of the conspiracy, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose” (Model Penal Code § 5.03(6)).
Example of Renunciation
Review the example with Shelley and Sam in Section 8. In this example, Shelley and Sam agree to commit a robbery at the convenience store where Steffy is a cashier. Adjust the example so that Shelley has a change of heart and contacts law enforcement about the robbery before she drives Sam to the convenience store in the getaway car. Law enforcement officers ask Shelley to help them apprehend Sam, and she agrees. Shelley drives Sam to the convenience store as planned. Two law enforcement officers dress in plainclothes and pretend to be shopping in the convenience store when Sam arrives. As soon as Sam pulls out his fake handgun, they arrest him. If Shelley is in a jurisdiction that recognizes the renunciation defense, she probably will have a valid defense to a charge of conspiracy. Although Shelley committed the criminal act for conspiracy with the requisite criminal intent, she voluntarily and completely renounced the conspiracy and thwarted the crime that was its object. Thus Shelly has likely met the requirements of renunciation, and only Sam may be charged with a crime or crimes in this scenario.
Merger
At early common law, conspiracy, which was a misdemeanor, merged into the completed felony that was its object. The merger was based on the significant procedural differences between misdemeanor and felony trials. As the differences diminished, so did the merger concept. In modern times, conspiracy does not merge into the completed offense.Callanan v. U.S., 364 U.S. 587 (1961), accessed January 4, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10261023883092961366&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. Thus a defendant can be charged with and convicted of conspiracy and any crime the conspiracy furthers, as is discussed more fully in Section 8.2.4 "Consequences of Conspiracy".
Conspiracy Grading
Some states grade conspiracy the same as the most serious offense that is the conspiracy’s object.18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 905, accessed January 4, 2011, law.onecle.com/pennsylvania/crimes-and-offenses/00.009.005.000.html. Others grade conspiracy lower than the most serious conspired offense and do not criminalize the conspiracy to commit a simple, low-level misdemeanor.Tenn. Code Ann. §39-12-107(c), accessed January 4, 2011, http://law.justia.com/tennessee/codes/2010/title-39/chapter-12/part-1/39-12-107. Another view is to set a separate penalty for the conspiracy to commit specific crimes.Cal. Penal Code § 182, accessed January 4, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/182.html. It is not unconstitutional to punish conspiracy more severely than the crime conspired.Clune v. U.S., 159 U.S. 590 (1895), accessed January 4, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14126191414675975192&q= Clune+v.+US&hl=en&as_sdt=2002&as_vis=1.
Federal RICO
In response to an increase in organized crime, the federal government enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) (18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968)). RICO provides extensive criminal penalties and also a civil cause of action for organized crime and includes all offenses that are criminal under state or federal law. Although RICO was originally intended to focus on sophisticated criminal businesses such as loan sharking, mafia, and high-stakes gambling operations,G. Robert Blakey, “RICO: The Genesis of an Idea,” Abstract, Social Science Research Network website, accessed January 4, 2011, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1142930. its modern application is much broader and encompasses many white-collar crimes and small-time conspiracies. A criminal organization always involves more than one member, and at the very least rudimentary planning, so conspiracy is a common RICO charge and is often easier to prove than a completed criminal offense. Recently, RICO has been criticized as being overused and applied in a manner inconsistent with its original purpose, especially when it targets smaller, low-member criminal “organizations.” Some examples of highly publicized RICO defendants are Hell’s Angels,Keith Zimmerman, Kent Zimmerman, “Hell’s Angel: The Life and Times of Sonny Barger and the Hell’s Angels Motorcycle Club,” accessed January 4, 2011, http://www.organized-crime.de/revbar01sonnybarger.htm. Catholic priests in sex abuse cases,Greg Smith, “Courts: Lawsuit Accuses Diocese of Hiding Sex Abuse,” Norwich Bulletin website, accessed January 4, 2011, www.norwichbulletin.com/lifestyles/spirituality/x497774422/Courts-Lawsuit-accuses-diocese-of-hiding-sex-abuse. and Major League Baseball.“Arbitration Ruling Effectively Ends Loria RICO Suit,” Sportsbusinessdaily.com website, accessed June 28, 2011, www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2004/11/Issue-46/Franchises/Arbitration-Ruling-Effectively-Ends-Loria-Rico-Suit.aspx.
Table 8.1 Comparison of Conspiracy and Accomplice Liability
Type of Liability Criminal Act Criminal Intent
Conspiracy Agreement to commit a crime, false criminal indictment, false lawsuit, or felony; some jurisdictions require an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy Specific intent or purposely to agree to commit the specified offense(s)
Accomplice Aid, assist commission of a crime Specific intent or purposely or general intent or knowingly, depending on the jurisdiction
Tom DeLay Convicted of Conspiracy and Money Laundering Video
Judge Sentences Tom DeLay to Three Years in Prison
Tom DeLay, former US House Majority Leader, was convicted of conspiracy and money laundering.Paul Meyer, “Tom DeLay is sentenced to three years,” Los Angeles Times website, accessed August 15, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/11/nation/la-na-tom-delay-20110111. His verdict is shown in this video:
(click to see video)
Exercises
• Conspiracy is an inchoate crime because the defendants might never complete the offense that is the conspiracy’s object.
• The criminal act element required for conspiracy is an agreement to commit any crime, commit a felony, falsely indict another for a crime, or falsely maintain any lawsuit, depending on the jurisdiction.
• The overt act required for conspiracy can be preparatory activity; the criminal act element required for attempt must be more than mere preparation.
• The criminal intent element required for conspiracy is specific intent or purposely to agree to commit the offense that is the conspiracy’s object.
• The acquittal of or failure to prosecute one coconspirator does not prohibit the prosecution of other coconspirators in some jurisdictions.
• A coconspirator does not need to know every other coconspirator; as long as a coconspirator is aware that there are other members, he or she can be criminally responsible for conspiracy.
• A wheel conspiracy connects all members to one central member. A chain conspiracy interconnects the members in a linear fashion.
• The Pinkerton rule holds conspiracy members criminally responsible for every foreseeable crime committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.
• Wharton’s rule could create a judicial presumption that a defendant cannot be criminally responsible for conspiracy and the crime that is its object if the conspiracy has only two members, and the crime that is its object requires two defendants.
• Renunciation is an affirmative defense to conspiracy in some jurisdictions if the defendant voluntarily and completely renounces the conspiracy and thwarts the crime that is its object.
• Generally, conspiracy does not merge like attempt; a defendant can be convicted of conspiracy and the crime conspired.
• Some jurisdictions grade conspiracy the same as the conspired offense; other jurisdictions grade conspiracy lower than the conspired offense. It is not unconstitutional to grade conspiracy higher than the offense that is its object.
• Federal RICO is a statute that is designed to punish organized crime.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Gail and Roger conspire to commit a misdemeanor. In Gail and Roger’s state, conspiracy is punishable as a felony. Can Gail and Roger be convicted of a felony for conspiring to commit a misdemeanor? Why or why not?
2. Read State v. Blackmer, 816 A.2d 1014 (2003). In Blackmer, the defendant appealed his conviction for conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to sell because the individual with whom he was conspiring was a police decoy who did not have conspiracy intent. Did the Supreme Court of New Hampshire uphold the defendant’s conviction? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10340846332108789820&q= State+v.+Blackmer&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5.
3. Read Commonwealth v. Roux, 350 A.2d 867 (1976). In Roux, the defendant was convicted of murder and conspiracy to commit murder after a barroom brawl resulted in a victim’s death. The defendant and others beat the victim with their fists. Thereafter the criminal actor took a knife from a defendant who then walked away. The criminal actor stabbed the victim, who died as a result. The defendant who walked away claimed that he “abandoned” the conspiracy by leaving before the stabbing, and this should be an affirmative defense to the conspiracy and murder charges. Did the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania uphold the defendant’s convictions? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1692554406000599210&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
LAW AND ETHICS: THE HAN MURDER CONSPIRACY
Did the Coconspirators Intend to Commit Murder?
Read People v. Han, 78 Cal. App. 4th 797 (2000). The case is available at this link: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/californiastatecases/g023433.pdf.
In Han, a lurid California case involving twins, three defendants were convicted of burglary, false imprisonment, and conspiracy to commit murder.Beloit Daily News, “‘Evil Twin’ Found Guilty of Plotting to Kill Sister,” Beloit Daily News website, accessed January 28, 2011, www.beloitdailynews.com/articles/1997/11/21/export7262.txt. Two of the codefendants appealed on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict of conspiracy to commit murder. The codefendants claimed that the only direct evidence of intent to commit murder were statements made by the defendant Jeen Han before the conspiracy was formed, and defendant Han could not conspire with herself.
The defendant Jeen Han and her twin sister Sunny had a long history of violence against each other.People v. Han, 78 Cal. App. 4th 797, 802 (2000), accessed January 28, 2011, http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/californiastatecases/g023433.pdf. Defendant Han became enraged when Sunny pressed charges against her for theft. Testimonial evidence presented at trial showed that she expressed the intent to kill her twin before any conspiracy was formed.People v. Han, 78 Cal. App. 4th 797, 803 (2000), accessed January 28, 2011, http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/californiastatecases/g023433.pdf. She actively sought out individuals to help her with her sister’s murder.People v. Han, 78 Cal. App. 4th 797, 803 (2000), accessed January 28, 2011, http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/californiastatecases/g023433.pdf. Thereafter, she met up with her teenaged cousin and a friend, the other two codefendants. The three broke into Sunny Han’s apartment, tied up Sunny and her roommate at gunpoint and placed them in the bathtub, and then ransacked Sunny’s purse. Receipts produced at trial indicated a purchase of garbage bags, twine, utility tape, and Pine Sol previous to the incident. The Court of Appeal of California held that although circumstantial, the evidence supported the verdict. The court reasoned that the purchase of the twine, garbage bags, utility tape, and Pine Sol, combined with the actions of the defendants in breaking into the apartment, tying up the two roommates at gunpoint, and putting them in the bathtub, could be interpreted as circumstantial evidence of intent to kill, and the trier of fact did not err in making that conclusion.People v. Han, 78 Cal. App. 4th 797, 804, 805 (2000), accessed January 28, 2011, http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/californiastatecases/g023433.pdf.
1. Do you think it is ethical to impute Jeen Han’s intent to murder her twin to the two other coconspirators, based on the circumstantial evidence presented at trial?
Check your answer using the answer key at the end of the chapter. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/08%3A_Inchoate_Offenses/8.02%3A_Conspiracy.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Explain why solicitation is an inchoate crime.
2. Define the criminal act element required for solicitation.
3. Define the criminal intent element required for solicitation.
4. Determine whether the defense of renunciation is available for solicitation.
5. Discuss various approaches to solicitation grading.
Solicitation can be a precursor to conspiracy because it criminalizes the instigation of an agreement to commit a criminal offense. Solicitation is an inchoate crime because it is possible that the conspiracy will never be formed, and the crime that is its object will not be committed. Many of the rules that apply to attempt and conspiracy also apply to solicitation, as is discussed in Section 8.3.
Solicitation Act
The criminal act element required for solicitation is generally words that induce another to commit a capital felony, first-degree felony,Tex. Penal Code § 15.03, accessed January 6, 2011, law.onecle.com/texas/penal/15.03.00.html (accessed January 6, 2011). or any crime.N. Y. Penal Law § 100.00, accessed January 6, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN0100.00_100.00.html. Typical words of inducement are request, command, encourage, hire, procure, entice, and advise. The Model Penal Code defines solicitation as follows: “[a] person is guilty of solicitation to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he commands, encourages or requests another person to engage in specific conduct which would constitute such crime” (Model Penal Code § 5.02(1)). However, the Model Penal Code does not require direct communication, if “conduct was designed to effect such communication.” (Model Penal Code § 5.02(2)).
Example of Solicitation Act
Jimmy calls his friend Choo, who is reputed to be a “fence,” and asks Choo to help him sell some stolen designer shoes. If Jimmy is in a jurisdiction that criminalizes the “request” to commit any crime, Jimmy probably has committed the criminal act element required for solicitation. If Jimmy is in a jurisdiction that only criminalizes solicitation to commit a capital felony or first-degree felony, then Jimmy probably has not committed the criminal act element required for solicitation because selling stolen property is not generally graded that severely. If Jimmy is in a jurisdiction that follows the Model Penal Code, and Jimmy and Choo had a long-standing arrangement whereby Jimmy puts stolen items in a storage facility so that Choo can sell them, Jimmy will not have to communicate his request to Choo. He simply will have to place the shoes in the storage facility to commit the criminal act element required for solicitation.
Solicitation Intent
The criminal intent element required for solicitation is specific intent or purposely to promote the crime’s commission in most jurisdictions and under the Model Penal Code, as set forth in Section 8.3.1 "Solicitation Act".Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.435, accessed January 6, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/oregon/161-general-provisions/161.435.html.
Example of Solicitation Intent
Review the solicitation act example in Section 8. In this example, Jimmy desires Choo to commit the crime of selling stolen property so that he can reap a benefit from his stolen designer shoes. Thus Jimmy probably has the criminal intent required for solicitation. If Jimmy is in a jurisdiction that criminalizes solicitation to commit any crime, Jimmy could be charged with and convicted of this offense.
Renunciation as a Defense to Solicitation
Similar to conspiracy, many jurisdictions allow renunciation as an affirmative defense to solicitation.Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1005, accessed January 7, 2011, www.azleg.gov/FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=/ars/13/01005.htm&Title=13&DocType=ARS. The renunciation must be voluntary and complete and must thwart the crime that is solicited. As the Model Penal Code states, “it is an affirmative defense that the actor, after soliciting another person to commit a crime, persuaded him not to do so or otherwise prevented the commission of the crime, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose” (Model Penal Code § 5.02(3)).
Solicitation Grading
Jurisdictions vary as to how they grade solicitation. Some jurisdictions grade solicitation according to the crime solicited, with more serious crimes accorded a more severe solicitation punishment.Ala. Code § 13A-4-1(f), accessed January 7, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-4-1.html. Others grade solicitation the same as the crime solicited, with exceptions.N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 629:2(IV), accessed January 7, 2011, http://law.justia.com/codes/new-hampshire/2009/TITLELXII/CHAPTER629/629-2.html. Some states grade solicitation as a misdemeanor, regardless of the crime solicited.Commonwealth v. Barsell, 424 Mass. 737 (1997), accessed January 7, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8677391463974362410&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr (accessed January 7, 2011).
Exercises
• Solicitation is an inchoate crime because the crime that is solicited may not be completed.
• The criminal act element required for solicitation is words or conduct that induces another to commit any crime, a capital felony, or first-degree felony.
• The criminal intent element required for solicitation is specific intent or purposely to induce another to commit any crime, a capital felony, or first-degree felony.
• Renunciation is an affirmative defense to solicitation if the defendant voluntarily and completely renounces his or her criminal purpose and thwarts the commission of the solicited crime.
• Jurisdictions vary in their approach to grading solicitation. Some jurisdictions grade solicitation on a sliding scale according to the crime solicited, some grade solicitation the same as the crime solicited, and some grade solicitation as a misdemeanor, regardless of the crime solicited.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Nancy asks Jennifer to help her counterfeit twenty-dollar bills. Jennifer refuses. Has a crime been committed in this situation?
2. Read Planter v. State, 9 S.W. 3d 156 (1999). In Planter, the defendant told a former police officer wearing a wire that he would kill his estranged son-in-law for ten thousand dollars. The defendant was convicted of solicitation to commit murder. The defendant appealed on the basis that he did not solicit the former police officer to commit murder; he solicited the former police officer to pay him to commit murder. Did the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas uphold the defendant’s conviction? The case is available at this link: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/tx-court-of-criminal-appeals/1007515.html.
3. Read People v. Dennis, 340 N.W.2d 81 (1983). In Dennis, the defendant was convicted of incitement to murder, which is the Michigan equivalent of solicitation to murder. The defendant appealed based on the fact that she solicited a police officer posing as a hit man, so the police officer did not have the intent to murder, and thus the murder was not possible. Did the Michigan Court of Appeals uphold the defendant’s conviction? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4173359376569096786&hl=en&as_sdt=2002&as_vis=1. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/08%3A_Inchoate_Offenses/8.03%3A_Solicitation.txt |
Summary
An inchoate crime might never be completed. The rationale of punishing a defendant for an inchoate crime is prevention and deterrence. The three inchoate crimes are attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation.
The criminal act element required for attempt must be more than thoughts or mere preparation. Modern jurisdictions use four tests to ascertain attempt. The proximity test analyzes how close the defendant is to completing the offense by examining how much is left to be done. The defendant may have to come dangerously close to completion but generally does not have to reach the last act before completion. The res ipsa loquitur test looks at the moment in time when the defendant stopped progressing toward completion to see if the defendant’s acts indicate that the defendant has no other purpose than commission of the offense. The probable desistance test focuses on how far the defendant has progressed to see if it is probable that the defendant won’t desist until the crime is complete. The Model Penal Code substantial steps test has two parts. First, the defendant must take substantial steps toward completion of the crime. Second, the defendant’s actions must strongly corroborate the defendant’s criminal purpose.
Some jurisdictions also criminalize preparatory crimes such as the manufacture or possession of burglar’s tools. Preparatory crimes can be combined with attempt under the appropriate circumstances.
The criminal intent element required for attempt is the specific intent or purposely to commit the crime attempted. Legal impossibility can be a defense to attempt if the defendant mistakenly believes that a legal act attempted is illegal. Factual impossibility is not a defense to attempt if the crime cannot be completed because the facts are not as the defendant believes them to be. Voluntary abandonment is also a defense to attempt in some jurisdictions if the defendant voluntarily and completely renounces the attempted crime.
If a jurisdiction recognizes transferred intent, a defendant can be criminally responsible for attempt against the intended victim and the completed offense against the actual victim. In many jurisdictions, attempt merges into the crime if the crime is completed. Jurisdictions vary as to how they grade attempt; either attempt is graded the same or lower than the completed offense.
The criminal act element required for conspiracy is an agreement to commit any crime, commit a felony, falsely indict another for a crime, or falsely maintain any lawsuit, depending on the jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions also require an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy that could be a legal or preparatory act.
The criminal intent element required for conspiracy in many jurisdictions is the specific intent or purposely to agree and to commit the crime at issue. In some states, a coconspirator can be prosecuted even if another coconspirator is not prosecuted or acquitted. Coconspirators do not need to know every other coconspirator, as long as they are aware that other coconspirators exist. A wheel conspiracy connects all members to one central member. A chain conspiracy connects members to each other in a linear fashion.
The Pinkerton rule holds coconspirators criminally responsible for every foreseeable crime committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Wharton’s rule creates a judicial presumption that a crime requiring two parties merges into a conspiracy made up of two parties.
Renunciation can be a defense to conspiracy if a coconspirator voluntarily and completely abandons the conspiracy and thwarts the crime that is its object. Conspiracy generally does not merge into the conspired offense. Jurisdictions vary as to how they grade conspiracy. Usually it is graded the same or lower than the crime that is the conspiracy’s object, but it is not unconstitutional to punish conspiracy more severely than the conspired offense. The federal RICO statute is targeted at organized crime, including conspiracy.
Solicitation is the instigation of an agreement to commit any crime or, in some jurisdictions, a capital or first-degree felony. The criminal act element required for solicitation is words or conduct of inducement. The criminal intent element required for solicitation is specific intent or purposely to promote the crime solicited.
Renunciation is a defense to solicitation if it is voluntary and complete and thwarts the solicited offense. Jurisdictions vary as to how they grade solicitation. Some grade solicitation the same as the crime solicited, others vary the grading depending on the crime solicited, and still others grade solicitation as a misdemeanor.
YOU BE THE PROSECUTOR
You are a prosecutor seeking a promotion. You want to win your next case so that you can make a good impression on your superior. Read the prompt, review the case, and then decide whether you would accept or reject it from a pool of cases available to junior prosecutors. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. The defendant is charged with witness tampering by attempting to kill the witness. A witness identified the defendant, a police officer, as someone who sexually assaulted her at gunpoint. The defendant met with two individuals, one of them an FBI informant, and told them that he wanted to kill the witness before trial. He was thereafter apprehended with a gun he had recently test-fired in the vicinity of the witness’s house, which he had located with the FBI informant on a previous occasion. The jurisdiction in which you prosecute cases follows the “substantial steps” test for the attempt act element. Will you accept or reject the case? Read U.S. v. Contreras, 950 F.2d 232 (1991). The case is available at this link: ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/950/950.F2d.232.91-2021.html.
2. The defendant, a substitute teacher, is charged with two counts of attempted child sexual abuse for blocking the door of his residence and refusing to allow his thirteen-year-old student to leave. The defendant also asked the student for a kiss, was told “no,” and moved his face in the proximity of the student’s face. Will you accept or reject the case? Read People v. Miller, 856 N.Y.S. 2d 443 (2008). The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13341924462190148625&q= %22Stan+Miller%22+%22People+v+Miller%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2007&as_vis=1.
3. The defendant is charged with conspiracy to commit manslaughter and various other crimes (including manslaughter). The defendant and an acquaintance agreed to shoot at some individuals near a housing project and walked over carrying guns. The defendant fired shots at a dumpster with people standing nearby, and one of the people was hit and killed. In your state, the criminal intent required for conspiracy is the specific intent or purposely to agree, and the specific intent or purposely to commit the crime that is the conspiracy’s object. Will you accept or reject the case? Read State v. Montgomery, 22 Conn. App. 340 (1990). The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=355479416909506104&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr
4. The defendant is charged with solicitation to traffic narcotics. The defendant was in a vehicle with other individuals, and a drug dealer approached them. The defendant gave the drug dealer twenty dollars to examine the drugs, gave the drugs back, and got his twenty dollars back. Thereafter, a police officer who had witnessed the transaction arrested everyone in the car. Will you accept or reject the case? Read State v. Pinson, 895 P.2d 274 (1995). The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1966550891971070482&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 8.1
1. Carol can be charged with murder because her father died within the jurisdiction’s requisite time limit. If her father did not die within one year and a day, Carol could only be charged with attempted murder. Carol cannot be charged with attempted murder and murder because attempt merges into the offense if it is completed in Carol’s jurisdiction.
2. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the defendant’s conviction. Following a substantial steps analysis, the court determined that in the absence of evidence that the defendant placed the pills inside the jar, the defendant must be in possession of the jar to be guilty of attempted methamphetamine production, and the facts did not indicate that possession.
3. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the defendant’s conviction, reasoning that assault with intent to commit attempted kidnapping is a nonexistent offense because it would require the specific intent to commit an uncompleted crime.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 8.2
1. Gail and Roger can be convicted of felony conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor because it is not unconstitutional to punish conspiracy more severely than the crime that is its object.
2. The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the defendant’s conviction because under New Hampshire law it is not necessary for both parties to the conspiracy to possess conspiracy criminal intent.
3. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the defendant’s convictions, determining that it was too late for him to abandon the conspiracy, and also that the evidence indicated he was holding the knife “at the ready” for the criminal actor to grab and use.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 8.3
1. Nancy has committed solicitation to commit counterfeiting, which is criminal if Nancy’s jurisdiction criminalizes the solicitation to commit this type of offense. It is of no import that Jennifer refuses Nancy’s request because the criminal act element of solicitation is requesting another to commit a crime, not a mutual understanding or agreement (like conspiracy).
2. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reversed the defendant’s conviction, agreeing with the defendant that he solicited a payment, not a murder.
3. The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the defendant’s conviction, based on the plain meaning of the statute that does not require the individual solicited to have the intent to commit the crime solicited.
Answer to Law and Ethics Question
1. One of the biggest concerns about the crime of conspiracy is that it is easier to prove than many substantive crimes. In Chapter 7, an example is given in Section 7.1 where an alleged terrorist was acquitted of over two hundred counts of accomplice to murder, but he was convicted of one count of conspiracy. The Han case also illustrates this principle. The circumstantial evidence presented at trial may not have been enough to prove attempted murder, but it was clearly enough to convince the jury that there was a conspiracy to murder. However, the rationale supporting conspiracy—that it is more likely that a crime will be completed if it is a group effort—is also illustrated by the Han case. A thorough review of the facts as detailed in that case reveals that Jeen Han approached more than one individual about attacking and killing her sister. She seemed unwilling or possibly incapable of committing this crime alone. Once she had the support of the other two codefendants, she was able to move forward with the offense. The circumstantial evidence presented at trial was not overwhelming. However, appellate courts give the trier of fact the benefit of the doubt because the judge or jury views the evidence firsthand—rather than simply reading it in a court transcript. Also, the right to a jury trial must be preserved, regardless of whether the jury follows the law or acts ethically.
Answers to You Be the Defense Prosecutor
1. In this case, the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the defendant’s conviction for witness tampering by attempting to kill a witness. The court specifically held that the defendant’s expressed intent to kill, combined with his efforts to find the witness’s house, and his possession of a gun that had recently been test-fired in the vicinity of the witness’ house was enough to constitute a “substantial step” toward completion of the offense of killing the witness. Thus you would be successful on the witness tampering charge and you should accept the case.
2. The Criminal Court, City of New York held that the criminal complaint for attempted child sexual abuse was sufficient on its face. The court stated that evidence indicating the defendant blocked the door and tried to kiss the student, coupled with physical and verbal coercive conduct, could constitute the criminal act element of attempted child sexual abuse. Thus the attempted child sexual abuse charges are sufficient and you should accept the case.
3. In this case, the Appellate Court of Connecticut held that manslaughter is a reckless intent crime, so there could be no conspiracy to commit it. A defendant cannot have the specific intent to commit a reckless intent crime. Thus you would lose on the conspiracy to commit manslaughter charge and you should reject the case.
4. The Court of Appeals of New Mexico held that solicitation cannot be charged when it is incidental to the crime solicited. The court reasoned that trafficking narcotics criminalizes only the sale (not the purchase) of narcotics, and narcotics cannot be sold without a buyer. Thus you would lose on the solicitation charge and should reject the case. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/08%3A_Inchoate_Offenses/8.04%3A_End-of-Chapter_Material.txt |
[W]hether it is made for the purpose of destroying animal life, or whether it was not made by man at all, or whether it was made by him for some other purpose, if it is a weapon, or if it is a thing with which death can be easily and readily produced, the law recognizes it as a deadly weapon…
- Acers v. U.S., cited in Section 9
Source: Image courtesy of Tara Storm.
9.01: Homicide
Learning Objectives
1. Define homicide.
2. Recognize that all homicides are not criminal.
3. Identify the corpus delicti components in a criminal homicide.
4. Compare the definition of fetus in criminal homicide and feticide statutes.
5. Compare common-law feticide and suicide with modern views.
6. Ascertain whether it is constitutional to criminalize assisted suicide.
In this section, you learn the definition of homicide and the meaning of human being, which vary from state to state. You also learn that suicide is not criminal, but assisted suicide might be, depending on the jurisdiction.
Synopsis of the History of Homicide
Homicide is the killing of one human being by another. Homicide is not always criminal. For example, a lawful execution pursuant to the death penalty is homicide, but it is not criminal homicide.
Homicide law in the United States has its origins in the English common law. Oxford professor Sir William Blackstone defined homicide as justifiable, excusable, or felonious. Justifiable homicides were not criminal because they did not include the concept of guilt. Excusable homicides were not criminal because they included minimal guilt. Felonious homicides were criminal and were considered the most heinous offenses known to man.
Initially at common law, every felonious or criminal homicide was punished by death. Gradually, as the law evolved, unlawful killings were divided into murder and manslaughter based on the defendant’s criminal intent. Murder had the criminal intent element of malice aforethought and remained a capital offense. Manslaughter was an unlawful killing without malice and was punished by incarceration.
In modern times, most states define criminal homicide and its elements in statutes, which often are interpreted by case law. Many jurisdictions continue to follow Blackstone’s philosophy and the common-law division between murder and manslaughter, as is discussed in this chapter.
Corpus Delicti in Criminal Homicide
An essential component of every criminal case, including criminal homicide, is corpus delicti. Corpus delicti is the substance of the crime at issue. The prosecution must prove corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt, with evidence other than a defendant’s confession.People v. Ochoa, 966 P.2d 442 (1998), accessed February 13, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13299597995178567741&q= corpus+delicti+criminal+homicide&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. Although a detailed discussion of corpus delicti is beyond the scope of this text, corpus delicti in a criminal homicide case consists of the death of a victim, caused by the defendant, in an unlawful manner.
Often the victim’s body is never discovered, which could make it more difficult for the prosecution to prove corpus delicti but not impossible. If there is sufficient circumstantial or direct evidence, such as bloodstains, surveillance footage, or witness testimony, the prosecution can prove corpus delicti without the victim’s body and can convict the defendant of criminal homicide.
Feticide
Feticide is the intentional destruction of a fetus. At common law, a human being could not be the victim of criminal homicide unless it was born alive.Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.3d 619 (1970), accessed July 10, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2140632244672927312&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. The Model Penal Code takes this approach and defines human being as “a person who has been born and is alive” (Model Penal Code § 210.0 (1)). The modern trend in many jurisdictions is to include the fetus as a victim in a criminal homicide or feticide statute, excepting abortion. The definition of fetus is either set forth in the criminal homicide or feticide statute or created by case law. Many states and the federal government consider an embryo a fetus from the time of conception.Ala. Code § 13A-6-1, accessed February 13, 2010, www.legislature.state.al.us/codeofalabama/1975/13A-6-1.htm. Other states determine that a fetus is formed when the child has “quickened,” or is able to move within the womb—about four to five months after conception.Fla. Stat. § 782.09, accessed July 10, 2010, http://www.lawserver.com/law/state/florida/statutes/florida_statutes_782-09. A few states do not consider the fetus a victim of criminal homicide or feticide until it is viable and can survive outside the womb.Ind. Code §35-42-1-1(4), accessed July 10, 2010, www.in.gov/legislative/ic/code/title35/ar42/ch1.html.
Suicide
At common law, suicide was a crime. The punishment was forfeiture of the lands owned by the deceased. In modern times, most states do not criminalize suicide. However, almost all jurisdictions make it a crime to assist a suicide, and the US Supreme Court has held these statutes constitutional.Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), accessed July 10, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17920279791882194984&q= Washington+v.+Glucksberg&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. Several states have special statutes that specifically punish assisted suicide less severely than their first- or second-degree murder statutes.Tex. Penal Code § 22.08, accessed July 10, 2010, law.onecle.com/texas/penal/22.08.00.html. A minority of states allow terminally ill patients to end their lives with the assistance of a physician.Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.800 et seq., accessed July 10, 2010, http://law.onecle.com/oregon/127-powers-of-attorney-advance-directives/index.html. The Model Penal Code provides that “[a] person who purposely aids or solicits another to commit suicide is guilty of a felony of the second degree if his conduct causes such suicide or an attempted suicide” (Model Penal Code § 210.5(2)).
Exercises
• Homicide is the killing of one human being by another.
• Homicide is not always criminal. For example, a lawful execution pursuant to the death penalty is homicide, but it is not criminal homicide.
• The corpus delicti components in a criminal homicide are the death of the victim, caused by the defendant, in an unlawful manner.
• States that criminalize feticide consider an embryo a fetus at the moment of conception, when it quickens in the womb, or when it is viable and can survive outside the womb.
• In modern times, in many jurisdictions feticide is a crime (excepting abortion), and suicide is not. At common law, the following applied:
• Feticide was not a crime; only a person “born alive” could be the victim of criminal homicide.
• Suicide was a crime; the punishment was forfeiture of the deceased’s lands.
• The US Supreme Court has held that it is constitutional to criminalize assisted suicide, and most states do. A minority of states allow a physician to legally end the life of a terminally ill patient.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. What is the fundamental difference between homicide and suicide?
2. Read Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). Which part of the Constitution did the US Supreme Court analyze when it held that it is constitutional to criminalize assisted suicide? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17920279791882194984&q= Washington+v.+Glucksberg&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/09%3A_Criminal_Homicide/9.00%3A_Prelude_to_Criminal_Homicide.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Define the criminal act element required for murder.
2. Explain why criminal intent is an important element of murder.
3. Identify, describe, and compare the three types of malice aforethought and the three Model Penal Code murder mental states.
4. Explain the deadly weapon doctrine.
5. Define death.
6. Give examples of justifiable and excusable homicides.
7. Ascertain which type of criminal homicide the defendant commits when deliberately and inadvertently transmitting AIDS.
Murder is a crime that has the elements of criminal act, criminal intent, causation, and harm. In this section, you learn the elements of murder. In upcoming sections, you learn the factors that classify murder as first degree, felony, and second degree.
Murder Act
Most jurisdictions define the criminal act element of murder as conduct that causes the victim’s death.N.Y. Penal Law § 125.27, accessed February 4, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN0125.27_125.27.html. The criminal act could be carried out with a weapon, a vehicle, poison, or the defendant’s bare hands. Like all criminal acts, the conduct must be undertaken voluntarily and cannot be the result of a failure to act unless a duty to act is created by common law or statute.
Murder Intent
It is the criminal intent element that basically separates murder from manslaughter. At common law, the criminal intent element of murder was malice aforethought. In modern times, many states and the federal government retain the malice aforethought criminal intent.Cal. Penal Code § 187, accessed February 4, 2011, http://law.justia.com/california/codes/2009/pen/187-199.html. The Model Penal Code defines murder intent as purposely, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life (Model Penal Code § 210.2).
An exception to the criminal intent element of murder is felony murder. Most jurisdictions criminalize felony murder, which does not require malice aforethought or the Model Penal Code murder mental states. Felony murder is discussed shortly.
The Meaning of Malice
Malice, as used in the term malice aforethought, is not the intent to vex or annoy. Nor is it hatred of the victim. Malice exists when the defendant desires the victim’s death or is indifferent to whether the victim lives or dies. Malice is apparent in three criminal homicide situations: the defendant intends to kill the victim, the defendant intends to cause serious bodily injury to the victim, or the defendant has a depraved heart and does not care if the victim lives or dies.
The specific intent to kill the victim corresponds with the Model Penal Code’s purposely murder mental state and is often referred to as express malice.N.R.S. § 200.020(1), accessed February 13, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/nevada/crimes/200.020.html. The intent to cause serious bodily injury corresponds with the Model Penal Code’s knowingly or recklessly murder mental states and is often referred to as implied malice. Serious bodily injury is a technical term and is generally defined in a state statute or by case law. The Model Penal Code defines serious bodily injury as “bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ” (Model Penal Code § 210.0(3)). The depraved heart intent is also implied maliceN.R.S. § 200.020(2), accessed February 13, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/nevada/crimes/200.020.html. and corresponds with the Model Penal Code’s knowingly or recklessly murder mental states, depending on the attendant circumstances.
Example of Intent to Kill
Jay decides he wants to kill someone to see what it feels like. Jay drives slowly up to a crosswalk, accelerates, and then runs down an elderly lady who is crossing the street. Jay is acting with the intent to kill, which would be express malice or purposely.
Example of Intent to Cause Serious Bodily Injury
Jay wants to injure Robbie, a track teammate, so that he will be the best runner in the high school track meet. Jay waits for Robbie outside the locker room and when Robbie exits, Jay attacks him and stabs him several times in the knee. Unfortunately, one of Jay’s stabbing wounds is in the carotid artery, and Robbie bleeds to death. Jay is acting with the intent to cause serious bodily injury, which would be implied malice, or knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.
Example of Depraved Heart Intent
Jay is angry at Brittany for turning him down when he asks her to the senior prom. Jay decides to teach Brittany a lesson. He knocks her unconscious as she walks home from school and then drives her out to a deserted field and dumps her on the ground. He thereafter leaves, feeling vindicated at the thought of her walking over ten miles to the nearest telephone. Brittany does not regain consciousness and spends the entire night in the field, where temperatures drop to 5°F. Brittany dies of exposure and acute hypothermia. Jay acts with the intent of depraved heart, also called abandoned and malignant heart. This criminal intent is another form of implied malice, or knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.
The Meaning of Aforethought
The term aforethought at common law meant that the defendant planned or premeditated the killing. However, this term has lost its significance in modern times and does not modify the malice element in any way. Premeditation is a factor that can elevate murder to first-degree murder, as is discussed shortly.
Inference of Intent
The deadly weapon doctrine creates an inference of murder intent when the defendant uses a deadly weapon.People v. Carines, 597 N.W. 2d 130 (1999), accessed February 13, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6441565823584670121&q= deadly+weapon+doctrine&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. A judge may instruct the jury that they can infer the defendant intended the natural and probable consequences of the criminal act, which are death when a deadly weapon is utilized. This basically alleviates the burden of having to prove criminal intent for murder.
A deadly weapon is any instrumentality that can kill when used in a manner calculated to cause death or serious bodily injury.Acers v. United States, 164 U.S. 388 (1896), accessed February 13, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16538901276155737856&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. The Model Penal Code defines deadly weapon as “any firearm, or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury” (Model Penal Code § 210.0 (4)). Some examples of deadly weapons are knives, guns, broken bottles, or even bare hands if there is a discrepancy in the size of the attacker and the victim. Aside from creating an inference of intent for murder, use of a deadly weapon may also enhance a sentence for certain crimes.
Causation Issues in Murder
There is always a causation analysis for murder. The defendant must be the factual and legal cause of a very specific harm—the victim’s death. Causation issues in murder are numerous. If a state has a one or three years and a day rule, this could complicate the causation scenario when a victim’s life is artificially extended. One and three years and a day rules are discussed in detail in Chapter 4. In addition, co-felon liability could extend criminal responsibility to defendants that did not actually kill the victim, as is discussed shortly.
Harm Element of Murder
As stated previously, the harm element of murder is a victim’s death. With the advent of life-sustaining machines, jurisdictions have had to develop a definition for the term dead. A victim is legally dead when there is irreversible cessation of the entire brain, including the brain stem.Uniform Determination of Death Act, accessed February 14, 2010, http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/X/141-D/141-D-mrg.htm.
Justification and Excuse
As Blackstone stated, murder cannot be justified or excused. Justifiable and excusable homicides are noncriminal, and thus justification or excuse can operate as an affirmative defense in many jurisdictions. A thorough discussion of defenses based on justification and excuse is in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
A justifiable homicide is a homicide that is warranted under the circumstances. One example of a justifiable homicide is when a law enforcement officer shoots and kills a fleeing felon to prevent imminent great bodily injury or death. This killing is intentional and purposeful with malice aforethought, but it is noncriminal. The justification negates the criminality and the law enforcement officer will not be convicted of murder. A complete discussion of use of deadly force by law enforcement to arrest or apprehend a criminal defendant is in Chapter 5. Other murder defenses based on justification are self-defense, defense of others, and defense of habitation.
An excusable homicide is a homicide that society forgives or pardons. One example of an excusable homicide is a homicide committed by a defendant who is found legally insane. This killing could also be intentional and purposeful with malice aforethought, but it is noncriminal. The excuse negates the criminality and the defendant will not be convicted of murder. A complete discussion of the insanity defense is in Chapter 6.
AIDS and Homicide
The criminal transmission of AIDS is a new and evolving topic with state and federal courts and criminal codes. Many jurisdictions have statutes specifying that death by the deliberate transmission of AIDS is murder because murder intent is present.Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.2241, accessed February 24, 2010, https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?id=609.2241. Death by the inadvertent transmission of AIDS is more likely manslaughter, although modern courts could begin to imply malice or murder intent in this situation. For states that follow the one or three years and a day rule, the time limit could affect any murder or manslaughter charge because medical breakthroughs have extended the life span of AIDS victims significantly.
Good News: The US Murder Rate Is Declining
Table 9.1 Murder Rate in the United States: Percent Change January–December
Years Percent Change/Murder Rate
2006/2005 +1.8
2007/2006 −0.6
2008/2007 −3.9
2009/2008 −7.2
Source: Department of Justice, “Crime in the United States; Preliminary Annual Uniform Crime Report,” accessed July 28, 2010, www.fbi.gov/ucr/prelimsem2009/table_3.html.
Exercises
• The criminal act element required for murder is conduct that causes the victim’s death.
• The criminal intent element of murder is important because it distinguishes murder from manslaughter.
• The three types of malice aforethought are intent to kill, intent to cause serious bodily injury, and depraved heart. The three Model Penal Code murder mental states are purposely, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.
• Express malice is the intent to kill the victim, or purposely, under the Model Penal Code. Implied malice is indifference to whether the victim lives or dies, or knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life under the Model Penal Code. Implied malice, knowingly, and recklessly includes the intent to commit serious bodily injury and depraved heart intent.
• The deadly weapon doctrine creates an inference of murder intent when the defendant uses a deadly weapon. If the trier of fact accepts the inference, the prosecution does not have the burden of proving criminal intent.
• A human being is dead when there is irreversible cessation of the entire brain, including the brain stem.
• An example of a justifiable homicide is a killing by law enforcement to prevent great bodily injury or death. An example of an excusable homicide is a killing perpetrated by a legally insane defendant.
• When a victim dies because of the deliberate transmission of AIDS, the crime is most likely murder because murder intent is present. When a victim dies because of the inadvertent transmission of AIDS, the crime is most likely manslaughter, although modern courts could begin to imply malice or murder intent in this situation.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Jay is angry about the grade he received on his criminal law midterm. Jay pulls a loaded revolver out of his backpack, aims at a tree and fires in an attempt to release his frustrations. Unfortunately, Jay is an inexperienced marksman and the bullet strikes an innocent bystander in the forehead, killing him. What was Jay’s criminal intent when shooting the revolver?
2. A prosecutor reviews the file for Jay’s criminal case. After reading the facts, he chuckles and tells his paralegal, “It won’t be hard to prove criminal intent in this case.” Is this true? Why or why not?
3. Read U.S. v. Moore, 846 F.2d 1163 (1988). Did the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit hold that teeth are a deadly weapon when the defendant is infected with the HIV virus? The case is available at this link: http://openjurist.org/846/f2d/1163. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/09%3A_Criminal_Homicide/9.02%3A_Murder.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Ascertain the three types of murder that are typically first degree.
2. Define premeditated murder.
3. Explain the significance of the criminal act element of murder in premeditated murder.
4. Define murder by a specified means.
5. Give examples of specified means for first-degree murder.
6. Analyze first-degree murder grading.
7. Ascertain the circumstances that merit capital punishment.
In this section, you analyze the factors that classify a murder as first-degree murder. Keep in mind that the criminal act, criminal intent, causation, and harm elements of murder have already been discussed.
Factors Classifying Murder as First Degree
States and the federal government usually include premeditated murder, murder by a specified means, and very serious felony murders in their first-degree murder statutes. Felony murder is discussed shortly.
Premeditated Murder
Premeditated murder was originally and historically the predominant form of murder in any first-degree murder statute. A common statutory definition of first-degree premeditated murder is a willful, deliberate, premeditated killing.Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.316, accessed September 19, 2010, law.onecle.com/michigan/750-michigan-penal-code/mcl-750-316.html.
Definition of Willful, Deliberate, and Premeditated
Most jurisdictions define willful as a specific intent to kill, purposely, or express malice. Jurisdictions differ when interpreting deliberate and premeditated. A minority of jurisdictions equate express malice or purposely with deliberation and premeditation, which means that the prosecution need only prove specific intent to kill for a first-degree premeditated murder conviction.Hawthorne v. State, 835 So. 2d 14 (2003), accessed September 19, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6294577581180338458&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. However, this interpretation could blur the distinction between first and second-degree murder. The majority of jurisdictions have defined deliberate as calm and methodical, without passion or anger.People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942 (1968), accessed February 13, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9215896464929219588&q= definition+of+deliberate+premeditated+murder&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. Premeditated generally means the defendant reflected on the act or planned ahead.People v. Cole, 95 P.3d 811 (2004), accessed February 13, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18037950298665209340&q= definition+of+deliberate+premeditated+murder&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. In other words, if the defendant specifically intends to kill the victim and rationally, purposefully, takes steps that culminate in the victim’s death, the defendant has committed first-degree premeditated murder in many jurisdictions.
Often it is the act itself that proves the killing was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. If the killing is carried out in a manner that indicates a strong and calculated desire to bring about the victim’s death, the trier of fact can and often does conclude that the murder was premeditated.State v. Snowden, 313 P.2d 706 (1957), accessed September 19, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16193283019378884065&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
Most jurisdictions agree that an extended period of time is not a requirement of premeditation.Commonwealth v. Carroll, 412 Pa. 525 (1963), accessed February 18, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13694151174720667465&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. Thus a murder can be premeditated and first degree even if it is conceived only moments before the actual killing.State v. Schrader, 302 SE 2d 70 (1982), accessed September 19, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=287453315188864266&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. Some jurisdictions do not require any appreciable time lapse between the formation of intent and the criminal act.State v. Snowden, 313 P.2d 706 (1957), accessed September 19, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16193283019378884065&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
Example of a Willful, Deliberate, Premeditated Murder
Imagine that Joannie and her husband Tim are in a terrible fight in the kitchen. Tim tells Joannie that he is going to get a divorce and will thereafter seek full custody of their two young children. Joannie states, “Wait here. I need to go to the bathroom. I will be right back.” She walks down the hall, but goes into the bedroom, rather than the bathroom, and removes a handgun from the nightstand drawer. She then walks to the bathroom and flushes the toilet. Hiding the handgun in the pocket of her bathrobe, she walks back into the kitchen, removes it, and shoots Tim four times in the abdomen, killing him.
In this scenario, Joannie probably could be convicted of premeditated murder in most jurisdictions. Joannie shoots and kills Tim in a calm, methodical manner, evidencing deliberation. Her manufactured excuse and flushing of the toilet indicate planning. The act of shooting Tim four times shows that Joannie has a specific intent to kill and a strong and calculated desire to bring about Tim’s death. Note that timing is not an issue here. Even a few minutes are enough to carry out a premeditated murder if the proper facts are present.
Example of a Spontaneous Killing
Compare the previous example with this scenario. Frank, Dillon’s supervisor, calls Dillon into his office and fires him. Enraged, Dillon grabs a heavy brass paperweight from the top of Frank’s desk and strikes him in the forehead, killing him instantly. In this example, Dillon acts in anger, not calm, cool, reflection. The act of grabbing a heavy brass paperweight appears impulsive, not planned. There is no evidence to indicate that Dillon knew he would be fired or knew that there was a brass paperweight on Frank’s desk. In addition, the single blow to the head does not necessarily indicate that Dillon had a strong and calculated desire to kill Frank. Dillon’s conduct may be supported by murder intent (most likely implied malice, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life), but there is no evidence of specific intent to kill, deliberation, or premeditation. Thus Frank’s killing would probably not be first-degree premeditated murder in most jurisdictions.
Murder by a Specified Means
Murder by a specified means is a specific method of killing that is extremely heinous. Most states list the specified means in their first-degree murder statutes. Some examples of commonly included specified means are murder by drive-by shooting, destructive device like a bomb, weapon of mass destruction, ammunition designed to puncture a bulletproof vest, poison, torture, or lying in wait, which is an ambush-style killing.Cal. Penal Code § 189, accessed February 18, 2010, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/189.html. Note that all the aforementioned methods of killing involve premeditation to a certain extent and could also probably qualify as first-degree premeditated murder.
First-Degree Murder Grading
Most states divide murder into first and second degree.N.R.S. § 200.030, accessed February 13, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/nevada/crimes/200.030.html. Some states add a third degree of murder that generally includes less serious sentencing options.Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2502, accessed February 14, 2010, wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/web/pa2501.html. The Model Penal Code classifies all murders as felonies of the first degree (Model Penal Code § 210.2(2)).
First-degree murder is the highest classification of murder and results in the most extreme punishment available in a jurisdiction’s punishment scheme. If the jurisdiction allows for the death penalty, first-degree murder typically is the only crime against an individual that qualifies the defendant for execution.N.R.S. § 200.030(4) (a), accessed February 13, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/nevada/crimes/200.030.html. If the jurisdiction does not allow for the death penalty, first-degree murder often qualifies the defendant for life in prison.Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.316, accessed February 13, 2011, law.onecle.com/michigan/750-michigan-penal-code/mcl-750-316.html.
Capital Punishment
The US Supreme Court has held that criminal homicide is the only crime against an individual that can merit the death penalty.Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008), accessed September 21, 2010, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/07-343.ZO.html. A discussion of crimes against the government (such as treason) that merit the death penalty is in Chapter 13.
In states that allow capital punishment, first-degree murder with one or more aggravating factor(s) is generally a capital offense. Examples of aggravating factors are killing more than one person, killing for financial gain, killing with a particularly heinous method, or killing a peace officer.Death Penalty Information Center, “Aggravating Factors for Capital Punishment by State,” accessed September 23, 2010, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/aggravating-factors-capital-punishment-state. In general, the trier of fact must ensure that the aggravating factor(s) are not outweighed by mitigating factor(s). Examples of mitigating factors are the youth of the defendant, the defendant’s lack of a criminal history, and the fact that the defendant was acting under extreme emotional or mental disturbance.Death Penalty Information Center, “Terry Lenamon’s List of State Death Penalty Mitigation Statutes,” accessed September 23, 2010, http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=d61d8c7b-896b-4c1a-bd87-f86425206b45.
The Peterson Case
A jury convicted Scott Peterson of first-degree premeditated murder for the killing of his pregnant wife Laci Peterson. They also convicted him of second-degree murder for the killing of his unborn son Conner.Charles Montaldo, “Scott Peterson Guilty of first-degree murder,” About.com website, accessed July 15, 2010, crime.about.com/od/news/a/scott_peterson.htm. The governing statute was California Penal Code § 189.Cal. Penal Code § 189, accessed July 15, 2010, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/189.html. After issuing the verdict, the jury sentenced Peterson to death based on the special circumstance of killing more than one person.Charles Montaldo, “The Peterson Verdict: Special Circumstances,” About.com website, accessed July 15, 2010, crime.about.com/od/news/a/scott_verdict.htm.
The prosecution was successful without direct evidence or proof of the cause of death.Charles Montaldo, “Scott Peterson Guilty of first-degree murder,” About.com website, accessed July 15, 2010, crime.about.com/od/news/a/scott_peterson.htm.
Congress was inspired by the Peterson case to pass the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1841,18 U.S.C. § 1841, accessed February 13, 2010, crime.about.com/gi/o.htm?zi=1/XJ&zTi=1&sdn=crime&cdn=newsissues&tm=435&gps=634_398_1276_788&f=10&tt= 2&bt=0&bts=0&zu=http%3A//www.nrlc.org/Unborn_Victims/UVVAEnrolled.html. creating the new federal crime of killing an unborn child.
Exercises
• Most states and the federal government include premeditated murder, murder by a specified means, and felony murder in their first-degree murder statutes.
• Premeditated murder is typically a purposeful killing committed after calm planning and reflection. An extensive length of time between the formation of criminal intent and the criminal act is not generally a requirement of premeditated murder.
• The criminal act can help prove that a murder was premeditated. If the killing is carried out in a manner that indicates a strong and calculated desire to bring about the victim’s death, the trier of fact can conclude that the murder was premeditated.
• When the defendant commits murder with a particularly heinous method, the killing is murder by a specified means.
• First-degree murder statutes often include the following specified means: murder by drive-by shooting, destructive device like a bomb, weapon of mass destruction, ammunition designed to puncture a bulletproof vest, poison, torture, or lying in wait.
• First-degree murder is the highest classification of murder with the most severe sentencing options. If the jurisdiction allows for capital punishment, first-degree murder typically is the only crime against an individual that merits the death penalty. If the jurisdiction does not allow for capital punishment, first-degree murder often qualifies the defendant for life in prison.
• The only crime against an individual that can merit capital punishment is criminal homicide. In most jurisdictions, the defendant must commit first-degree murder combined with one or more aggravating factors that are not outweighed by mitigating factors to receive the death penalty.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Johnnie decides he wants to kill Marcus, the leader of a rival gang. Johnnie knows that Marcus always hangs out in front of the gas station on Friday nights. Johnnie puts his gun in the glove compartment of his car and drives to the gas station on a Friday night. He sees Marcus standing out front. He slowly drives by, takes aim, and shoots Marcus from the car, killing him. Could this be first-degree murder? Explain your answer.
2. Read State v. West, 844 S.W.2d 144 (1992). Did the Supreme Court of Tennessee hold that a defendant’s failure to report a shooting to the police for over an hour and concealment of the murder weapon constitutes sufficient evidence to prove premeditated murder? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3481778471457660977&hl=en&as_sdt=2002&as_vis=1.
3. Read U.S. v. Downs, 56 F.3d 973 (1995). Identify motive, planning, and preconceived design in this case. The case is available at this link: ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/56/56.F3d.973.94-3404.html. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/09%3A_Criminal_Homicide/9.03%3A_First-Degree_Murder.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Define the criminal intent element required for felony murder.
2. Compare the criminal intent element of felony murder to implied malice, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life.
3. Explain the rule of co-felon liability for felony murder.
4. Explain an exception to the rule of co-felon liability for felony murder.
5. Analyze criminal responsibility for felony murder when someone other than a co-felon kills the victim.
6. Analyze criminal responsibility for felony murder when someone other than a co-felon kills a co-felon.
7. Describe concurrence of the felony and the homicide for felony murder.
8. Analyze felony murder grading and ascertain the felonies that typically classify felony murder as first degree.
Felony murder is a criminal homicide that occurs during the commission or attempted commission of a felony. Most states and the federal government include felony murder in their penal codes.18 U.S.C. § 1111, accessed February 4, 2011, http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/uscode/18/I/51/1111. However, it has not been universally adopted. The Model Penal Code does not include felony murder per se. It does suggest a rebuttable presumption that killings that occur during the commission of specified dangerous felonies exhibit recklessness under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life (Model Penal Code § 210.2(1)(b)).
Felony Murder Intent
What distinguishes felony murder from murder is the absence of the typical murder intent. The criminal intent element required for felony murder is the intent required for a felony that causes a victim’s death.
Explanation of Felony Murder Intent
When the defendant commits a felony that is inherently dangerous to life, he or she does so knowing that some innocent victim may die. In essence, this awareness is similar to implied malice, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. What is difficult to justify is a conviction for felony murder when the felony is not inherently dangerous to life. Thus most jurisdictions limit the felony murder doctrine to felonies that create a foreseeable risk of violence or death. States that include nonviolent felonies in their felony murder statutes generally grade them as second- or third-degree felony murder.Fla. Stat. Ann. § 782.04[4], accessed February 18, 2010, law.onecle.com/florida/crimes/782.04.html.
Example of Felony Murder Intent
Joaquin, who has just lost his job, decides to burn down his apartment building because he can’t afford to pay the rent. Joaquin carefully soaks his apartment with lighter fluid, exits into the hallway, and throws a lit, lighter-fluid-soaked towel into the apartment. He then runs outside to watch the entire building burn down. Several tenants die of smoke inhalation because of the fire. In jurisdictions that recognize felony murder, Joaquin can probably be charged with and convicted of murder for every one of these deaths.
In this example, Joaquin did not intend to kill the tenants. However, he did most likely have the criminal intent necessary for arson. Therefore, felony murder convictions are appropriate. Note that Joaquin exhibited extreme indifference to whether the tenants in the building lived or died, which could also constitute the criminal intent of implied malice or depraved heart.
Liability of Co-Felons for Felony Murder
It is common for more than one defendant to cooperate in the commission of a felony. Group participation in criminal conduct could constitute more than one crime—for example, conspiracy—and could also place criminal responsibility squarely on a defendant who did not commit the criminal act. The general rule for felony murder in many jurisdictions is that if one defendant kills a victim during the commission or attempted commission of a specified felony, all defendants involved in the felony are guilty of felony murder.State v. Hoang, 755 P.2d 7 (1988), accessed February 13, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2216953450979337225&q= heart+attack+during+robbery+%22co+felon%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5.
Example of Co-Felon Liability for Felony Murder
Joe and Jane dream up a plan to rob a local bank. Joe is designated as the primary robber and is supposed to enter the bank and hand a note to the teller demanding all the money in her station. Jane’s role in the felony is to drive the getaway vehicle to the bank, wait outside the front door with the motor running, and transport Joe and the money back to their apartment after the bank transaction is completed. Joe takes a handgun hidden beneath his jacket into the bank. He passes the note to the teller, and she frantically summons a security guard. As the security guard starts to approach, Joe pulls out the gun. An elderly lady standing to the left of Joe suffers a heart attack and dies at the sight of the gun. In this case, Joe and Jane can probably be convicted of felony murder. Note that Jane did nothing to directly cause the victim’s death from a heart attack. However, Jane did drive the getaway vehicle with the criminal intent to commit robbery, so Jane is criminally responsible for the consequences in many jurisdictions.
Exception to Co-Felon Liability for Felony Murder
Some jurisdictions provide an exception to co-felon liability for felony murder if the defendant did not actually commit the act that killed the victim and had neither knowledge nor awareness that a death might occur.N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25 (3), accessed February 18, 2010, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN0125.25_125.25.html.
Example of the Exception to Co-Felon Liability for Felony Murder
Review the example with Joe and Jane in Section 9. Change this example so that Jane is a teller at the local bank. Joe and Jane plan the “robbery” so that Jane is to pretend Joe is a customer, and hand Joe all the money in her station after he enters the bank unarmed and passes her a phony check made out to “cash.” Without informing Jane, Joe brings a gun into the bank, “just in case.” The security guard observes Jane handing Joe large amounts of cash. Suspicious, he begins to approach the station. Joe notices and frantically pulls out the gun and points it at the security guard. The elderly lady standing to the left of Joe suffers a heart attack and dies at the sight of the gun. In this example, Jane may have a valid defense to co-felon liability for the elderly lady’s death in some jurisdictions. Although Jane had the intent to commit theft, a trier of fact could determine that Jane had neither the knowledge nor awareness that a death might occur because she believed she was cooperating in a nonviolent offense. Thus it is possible that in certain jurisdictions only Joe is subject to a conviction of felony murder in this case.
Liability When Someone Other than the Defendant Kills the Victim
Generally, if the felony is inherently dangerous to life, and the defendant or defendants intentionally create a situation that is likely to result in death, if death does result, each and every defendant is guilty of felony murder. In some jurisdictions, this criminal liability exists even when someone other than a co-felon kills the victim.People v. Hernandez, 82 N.Y.2d 309 (1993), accessed February 18, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3094702040122584711&q= People+v.+Hernandez+82+N.Y.2d+309&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. Review the bank robbery committed by Joe and Jane, as discussed in Section 9. If the security guard takes a shot at Joe but misses and kills the bank teller instead, both Joe and Jane are guilty of the bank teller’s death pursuant to this interpretation of the felony-murder doctrine.
Some jurisdictions relieve a defendant from criminal liability for felony murder if the death is the death of a co-felon, rather than a completely innocent victim.State v. Canola, 73 N.J. 206 (1977), accessed February 18, 2010, www.audiocasefiles.com/acf_cases/8722-state-v-canola. In the case of Joe and Jane discussed in Section 9, if the security guard shoots and kills Joe in a jurisdiction that recognizes this exception, Jane is not guilty of felony murder.
Concurrence of the Felony and the Death of the Victim
Another important aspect that must be analyzed in any felony murder case is the concurrence of the felony and the death of the victim. The felony and the death must be part and parcel of the same continuous transaction. Therefore, there must be a determination of (1) when the felony begins and (2) when the felony ends. If the death occurs before or after the commission or attempted commission of the felony, the defendant might not be guilty of felony murder.
Example of a Death That Occurs before the Felony Begins
Carlos shoots and kills his drug dealer in a fit of temper because the drugs he bought are placebo. After the killing, it occurs to Carlos that the drug dealer might be carrying significant amounts of cash. Carlos thereafter steals some cash from the drug dealer’s pockets and runs off. Although this killing is probably murder, it is not felony murder. Carlos stole money from his drug dealer, but the theft occurred after the murder. Thus the killing did not happen during a robbery. If premeditation is proven, this could still be first-degree murder, but it is not first-degree felony murder.
Death That Occurs after the Felony Ends
More commonly, the issue is whether the killing occurs after the felony ends. The general rule is that the felony ends when the defendant has reached a place of temporary safety.People v. Young, 105 P.2d 487 (2005), accessed February 18, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5918096649976465300&q= felony+murder+%22temporary+safety%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. This place does not have to be the defendant’s residence; it could simply be a hiding place. Pursuant to this rule, a death that occurs during a car chase as the defendants flee the scene of the crime is considered felony murder.Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11 § 636 (a) (2), accessed February 18, 2010, http://law.justia.com/delaware/codes/title11/c005-sc02.html.
Felony Murder Grading
Felony murder can be first, second, or third degree.Fla. Stat. Ann. § 782.04, accessed February 18, 2010, law.onecle.com/florida/crimes/782.04.html. Some common examples of felonies listed in first-degree murder statutes are arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, and certain forcible sexual felonies.Cal. Penal Code § 189, accessed February 18, 2010, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/189.html.
Exercises
• The criminal intent element required for felony murder is the intent required for the underlying felony, not murder intent.
• If a felony is inherently dangerous to life, the defendant may act with implied malice, knowingly, or recklessly manifesting extreme indifference to human life when committing or attempting to commit the felony.
• If more than one defendant commits or attempts to commit a felony, all defendants are guilty of felony murder if a victim is killed during the commission or attempted commission of the felony.
• Some jurisdictions will not find a co-felon criminally responsible for felony murder if the co-felon did not commit the act of killing and was unaware that there was a risk of death.
• In some jurisdictions, all co-felons are criminally responsible for felony murder when someone other than a co-felon kills a victim during the commission or attempted commission of a felony that is inherently dangerous to life.
• In some jurisdictions, all co-felons are not criminally responsible for felony murder when someone other than a co-felon kills a co-felon during the commission or attempted commission of a felony.
• The killing must take place during the commission or attempted commission of a felony for the felony murder rule to apply.
• Felony murder can be first, second, or third degree. Typical felonies that classify felony murder as first degree are arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, and certain forcible sexual felonies.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Read People v. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696 (2003). Did the Minnesota Supreme Court uphold a charge of second-degree felony murder when the underlying felonies were possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of a stolen firearm? The case is available at this link: www.lexisone.com/lx1/caselaw/freecaselaw?action=OCLGetCaseDetail&format=FULL&sourceID=bdjhdg&searchTerm= ejhU.Iaea.aadj.ebKG&searchFlag=y&l1loc=FCLOW.
2. Kurt robs a convenience store at gunpoint. As the cashier hands him money out of the cash register, Kurt hears a siren and runs outside, stuffing the money in his pockets. He sees a dark alley and dashes into it. While he crouches there waiting for the police to leave, a homeless person living in the alley taps him on the shoulder. Startled, Kurt spins around and shoots and kills the homeless person. Is this felony murder? Explain your answer.
3. Read Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). In Enmund, the US Supreme Court held that the death penalty is unconstitutional in a felony murder case for one who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life. On which part of the Constitution did the Court rely in reaching this holding? The case is available at this link: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0458_0782_ZO.html. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/09%3A_Criminal_Homicide/9.04%3A_Felony_Murder.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Compare statutory definitions of second-degree murder.
2. Ascertain two types of murder that are typically second degree.
3. Analyze second-degree murder grading.
States that classify murder as either first or second degree often define second-degree murder as any murder that is not first-degree murder.Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.317, accessed February 24, 2010, http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(gjc5ys55et3ukfj0uq5uehqm))/mileg.aspx?page=GetObject&objectname=mcl-750-317. This definition excludes murders that are premeditated or committed with a specified means. It includes implied malice murder, such as murder committed with the intent to inflict serious bodily injury and depraved heart murder.
Depraved Heart Murder
Some statutes use the Model Penal Code’s language and define second-degree murder as a killing executed recklessly, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.K.S.A. § 21-3402, accessed September 21, 2010, kansasstatutes.lesterama.org/Chapter_21/Article_34/21-3402.html. This definition embodies the concept, discussed previously, of murders committed with a depraved or abandoned and malignant heart. The facts that give rise to this type of second-degree murder often indicate the mens rea of recklessness, rather than purposeful or knowing intent or express malice. Whether the killing is a second-degree murder or manslaughter is left to the trier of fact and often rests on the degree of recklessness exhibited. If the defendant’s conduct indicates extreme indifference to life, the killing is a depraved heart murder. If the defendant’s conduct is simply reckless, the killing is manslaughter. As the Model Penal Code states in its comments, “[w]hether recklessness is so extreme that it demonstrates similar indifference is not a question, it is submitted, that can be further clarified. It must be left directly to the trier of fact under instructions which make it clear that recklessness that can fairly be assimilated to purpose or knowledge should be treated as murder and that less extreme recklessness should be punished as manslaughter” (A.L.I., Model Penal Code & Commentaries Part II § 210.2, Comment. 4, pp. 21–22 (1980)).
Example of a Depraved Heart Murder
After watching his fifth-grade daughter play softball, Doug attends a party with her team and other parents at the local pizza parlor. Doug’s daughter leaves the party with her mother, Doug’s ex-wife. Doug consumes ten beers and then leaves the party and smokes some crack cocaine in his vehicle. He thereafter begins driving home. As he is driving in a busy section of town, he hears his phone beep, indicating the receipt of a text message. He grabs his phone and starts reading the text. This lapse of attention causes him to run a red light and broadside a vehicle turning left in front of him, killing a child sitting in the passenger seat. Doug puts his vehicle in reverse, drives around the car he hit, and leaves the scene of the accident. These facts could give rise to a conviction for depraved heart second-degree murder. Although Doug did not act with specific intent to kill, his conduct in driving while under the influence of alcohol and crack cocaine, reading a text message while driving impaired in a busy part of town, and leaving the scene of an accident most likely elevate Doug’s intent from ordinary recklessness to recklessness indicating extreme indifference to the value of human life. Thus the trier of fact could find Doug guilty of murder rather than manslaughter in this case.
Second-Degree Murder Grading
Most jurisdictions grade second-degree murder lower than first-degree murder and include less serious sentencing options.N.R.S. § 200.030, accessed February 13, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/nevada/crimes/200.030.html. Most jurisdictions grade second-degree murder higher than manslaughter because it has a more heinous criminal intent.N.R.S. § 200.080, accessed February 13, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/nevada/crimes/200.080.html. Manslaughter is discussed shortly.
Exercises
• Second-degree murder is often defined as any murder that is not first-degree murder. Second-degree murder can also be defined as murder committed recklessly, under circumstances evidencing extreme indifference to life.
• Second-degree murder includes implied malice murder, such as murder with the intent to cause serious bodily injury, and depraved heart murders.
• Second-degree murder is graded lower than first-degree murder but higher than manslaughter.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Reread the second question of the exercises in Section 9.4. When Kurt shoots the homeless person in the alley, is this killing first or second-degree murder? Explain your answer.
2. Read Berry v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 3d 783 (1989). In Berry, the defendant was charged with second-degree murder when his pit bull attacked and killed a young child. The pit bull had never bitten anyone before this incident. Did the California Court of Appeal uphold the defendant’s murder charge on a theory of implied malice? The case is available at this link: lawschool.courtroomview.com/acf_cases/9986-berry-v-superior-court.
3. Read Dowda v. State, 776 So.2d 714 (2000). Why did the Mississippi Court of Appeals hold that this killing was a depraved heart murder? The case is available at this link: www.mssc.state.ms.us/images/Opinions/Conv9328.pdf. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/09%3A_Criminal_Homicide/9.05%3A_Second-Degree_Murder.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Compare murder and manslaughter.
2. Define voluntary manslaughter.
3. Ascertain the basis of an adequate provocation.
4. Explain the concurrence of a voluntary manslaughter killing and the heat of passion.
5. Compare voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.
6. Describe the three types of involuntary manslaughter.
7. Analyze manslaughter grading.
What distinguishes murder from manslaughter is the criminal intent element. Manslaughter is an unlawful killing without malice or murder intent.N.R.S. § 200.040, accessed February 13, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/nevada/crimes/200.040.html. The criminal act, causation, and harm elements of manslaughter and murder are fundamentally the same. Thus criminal intent is the only manslaughter offense element that is discussed in this section.
Voluntary Manslaughter
Manslaughter has two basic classifications: voluntary and involuntary. Voluntary manslaughter has the same criminal intent element as murder. In fact, a voluntary manslaughter killing is typically supported by express malice, specific intent to kill, or purposely. However, in a voluntary manslaughter, an emotional state called a heat of passion negates the murder intent. An adequate provocation from the victim inspires the heat of passion.Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-211, accessed February 24, 2010, http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/tncode. The Model Penal Code does not require adequate provocation from the victim per se, but it does have a similar provision that reduces murder to manslaughter when there is a reasonable explanation or excuse (Model Penal Code § 210.3(1)(b)).
The adequacy requirement is essential to any voluntary manslaughter analysis. Many defendants are provoked and thereafter kill with murder intent. Nonetheless, most provocations are not adequate to drop the crime from murder to manslaughter. The victim’s provocation must be serious enough to goad a reasonable person into killing.People v. Steele, 47 P.2d 225 (2002), accessed February 13, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18208208560981664037&q= voluntary+manslaughter+reasonable+person+adequate+provocation&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. A reasonable person is a fictional and objective standard created by the trier of fact. Of course, the defendant must actually be provoked, which is a subjective standard.People v. Steele, 47 P.2d 225 (2002), accessed February 13, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18208208560981664037&q= voluntary+manslaughter+reasonable+person+adequate+provocation&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5.
Example of Inadequate Provocation
Revisit the situation discussed in Section 9, in which Dillon kills his supervisor Frank with a brass paperweight after Frank fires him. Clearly, Frank’s conduct provokes Dillon into killing Frank. However, getting fired would not provoke a reasonable person into a killing frenzy. In fact, reasonable people are fired all the time and learn to live with it peacefully. Therefore, in this example, Dillon’s crime is most likely murder, not voluntary manslaughter.
Example of Adequate Provocation
A traditional example of provocation that is adequate to reduce a crime from murder to manslaughter is an observation by one spouse of another spouse in the act of adultery.Ohio v. Shane, 63 Ohio St.3d 630 (1992), accessed February 24, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8752055493993855988&q= voluntary+manslaughter+spouse+act+of+adultery&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. For example, José comes home from work early and catches his wife in bed with his best friend. He becomes so enraged that he storms over to the dresser, grabs his handgun, and shoots and kills her. Clearly, José acts with intent to kill. However, the victim provoked this intent with an act that could cause a reasonable person to kill. Thus José has probably committed voluntary manslaughter in this case, not murder.
Other Examples of Adequate Provocation
Other examples of adequate provocation are when the homicide victim batters the defendant and a killing that occurs during a mutual combat.Ohio v. Shane, 63 Ohio St.3d 630 (1992), accessed February 24, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8752055493993855988&q= voluntary+manslaughter+spouse+act+of+adultery&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. Cases have generally held that words alone are not enough to constitute adequate provocation.Girouard v. State, 583 A.2d 718 (1991), accessed February 24, 2011, www.audiocasefiles.com/acf_cases/8711-girouard-v-state. Thus in the adequate provocation example in Section 9, if a friend told José that his wife was committing adultery, and José responded by shooting and killing his wife, this would probably be murder, not voluntary manslaughter.
Concurrence of the Killing and the Heat of Passion
The second requirement of voluntary manslaughter is that the killing occur during a heat of passion. Defendants generally exhibit rage, shock, or fright when experiencing a heat of passion. This emotional state negates the calm, deliberate, intent to kill that supports a charge of murder. However, heat of passion mental states are typically brief in duration. Thus there cannot be a significant time lapse between the victim’s provocation and the killing.State v. Cole, 338 S.C. 97 (2000), accessed March 1, 2010, www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/htmlfiles/SC/25037.htm. Analyze the adequate provocation example discussed in Section 9. If José waits until the next day to shoot and kill his wife, the crime is most likely premeditated first-degree murder, not voluntary manslaughter.
Involuntary Manslaughter
Involuntary manslaughter is an unlawful killing that completely lacks murder intent. Involuntary manslaughter is distinguishable from voluntary manslaughter, which generally includes a murder intent that has been negated. Involuntary manslaughter generally can be classified as misdemeanor manslaughter, reckless or negligent involuntary manslaughter, or vehicular manslaughter.
Misdemeanor Manslaughter
Misdemeanor manslaughter, also called unlawful act manslaughter, is a criminal homicide that occurs during the commission or attempted commission of a misdemeanor. The Model Penal Code completely rejects misdemeanor manslaughter. There is a trend to follow the Model Penal Code’s example and abolish misdemeanor manslaughter. Most states that prohibit misdemeanor manslaughter only include misdemeanors that are inherently dangerous to life in the criminal statute, excluding strict liability misdemeanors or malum prohibitum crimes.K.S.A. § 21-3404 (b), accessed July 28, 2010, kansasstatutes.lesterama.org/Chapter_21/Article_34/21-3404.html. A minority of states and the federal government include strict liability or malum prohibitum crimes in their misdemeanor manslaughter statutes.21 O.S. § 711(1), accessed July 28, 2010, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=69314. In either jurisdiction, the defendant need only possess the criminal intent for the misdemeanor to be guilty of the killing.
Example of Misdemeanor Manslaughter
Roberta points an unloaded gun at Jennifer to scare her into breaking up with Roberta’s ex-boyfriend. This crime is called brandishing a weapon and is often classified as a misdemeanor. At the sight of the gun, Jennifer suffers a heart attack and dies. Roberta has most likely committed misdemeanor manslaughter in this case. Brandishing a weapon is not always inherently dangerous to life. However, if Jennifer has a heart attack and dies because of Roberta’s commission of this misdemeanor offense, Roberta still could be criminally responsible for misdemeanor manslaughter in many jurisdictions.
Reckless or Negligent Involuntary Manslaughter
States and the federal government also criminalize reckless or negligent involuntary manslaughter.Ala. Code § 13A-6-3(a) (1), accessed February 13, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-6-3.html. Reckless or negligent involuntary manslaughter is a more common form of manslaughter than misdemeanor manslaughter. The Model Penal Code defines reckless homicide as manslaughter and a felony of the second degree (Model Penal Code § 210.3). The Model Penal Code defines negligent homicide as a felony of the third degree (Model Penal Code § 210.4).
Reckless involuntary manslaughter is a killing supported by the criminal intent element of recklessness. Recklessness means that the defendant is aware of a risk of death but acts anyway. Negligent involuntary manslaughter is a killing supported by the criminal intent element of negligence. Negligence means that the defendant should be aware of a risk of death, but is not. This category includes many careless or accidental deaths, such as death caused by firearms or explosives, and a parent’s failure to provide medical treatment or necessities for his or her child. Reckless and negligent criminal intent is discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
As stated in Section 9.5.1 "Depraved Heart Murder", reckless or negligent involuntary manslaughter is often similar to second-degree depraved heart murder. If the prosecution charges the defendant with both crimes, the trier of fact determines which crime is appropriate based on the attendant circumstances.
Example of Reckless or Negligent Involuntary Manslaughter
Steven, an off-duty sheriff’s deputy, brings his shotgun into the local rifle shop to be repaired. Steven thinks that the shotgun is unloaded and hands it to the employee with the safety off. Unfortunately, the gun is loaded and discharges, shooting and killing the employee. In this case, Steven should know that at certain times the safety on his shotgun must always be on because he is a registered gun owner and a sheriff’s deputy who has been trained to handle guns. However, Steven is unaware of the risk and believes that the gun is unloaded. If the employee dies, Steven could be convicted of negligent involuntary manslaughter in jurisdictions that recognize this crime. If Steven is in a jurisdiction that only recognizes reckless involuntary manslaughter, the prosecution may have to prove a higher degree of awareness, such as Steven’s knowledge that the shotgun was loaded.
Vehicular Manslaughter
Vehicular manslaughter is typically either the operation of a motor vehicle with recklessness or negligence resulting in death or the operation of a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs resulting in death.N.Y. Penal Law § 125.12, accessed March 5, 2010, wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/web/NewYork/ny3%28a%29%281%29-.htm. Some states have specific vehicular manslaughter statutes.Cal. Penal Code § 191.5, accessed February 7, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/191.5.html. In states that do not, the defendant could be prosecuted under a jurisdiction’s misdemeanor or unlawful act manslaughter statute if the defendant violates a vehicle code section. Vehicular manslaughter can also be prosecuted under a jurisdiction’s reckless or negligent involuntary manslaughter statute, depending on the circumstances. If the defendant uses a motor vehicle as a weapon to kill the victim, the intent to kill is present and the appropriate crime would be murder.
Manslaughter Grading
Voluntary and involuntary manslaughter typically have a more lenient punishment scheme than murder because the criminal intent is less heinous.N.R.S. § 200.080, accessed February 13, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/nevada/crimes/200.080.html. Often manslaughter functions as an imperfect defense to murder, based on the less serious sentencing options. In general, voluntary manslaughter is graded higher than involuntary manslaughter.N.R.S. § 200.090, accessed February 13, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/nevada/crimes/200.090.html. Some states divide manslaughter into degrees, rather than classifying it as voluntary and involuntary, with first-degree manslaughter punished more severely than second-degree manslaughter.N.Y. Penal Law §125.20, accessed February 24, 2011, http://ypdcrime.com/penal.law/article125.htm#125.20. The Model Penal Code grades all manslaughter as a felony of the second degree (Model Penal Code § 210.3(2)) and grades negligent homicide as a felony of the third degree (Model Penal Code § 210.4(2)).
Exercises
• Murder is a killing supported by the criminal intent of malice or purposely, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to life. Manslaughter is a killing supported by malice negated by a heat of passion, reckless, or negligent criminal intent.
• Voluntary manslaughter is a killing that occurs during an adequately provoked heat of passion.
• An adequate provocation is one sufficient to goad a reasonable person into killing and that actually provokes the defendant into killing.
• A killing must occur during a heat of passion to be classified as voluntary manslaughter. If a killing occurs before the heat of passion is provoked or after the heat of passion has cooled, it probably will be classified as murder.
• Voluntary manslaughter is supported by murder intent that has been negated in an adequately provoked heat of passion. Involuntary manslaughter lacks murder intent altogether.
• The three types of involuntary manslaughter are misdemeanor manslaughter, reckless or negligent involuntary manslaughter, and vehicular manslaughter.
• Manslaughter is typically graded lower than murder. Voluntary manslaughter is typically graded higher than involuntary manslaughter. The Model Penal Code grades all manslaughters as felonies of the second degree and grades negligent homicide as a felony of the third degree.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. How does the Model Penal Code classify criminal homicides?
2. Read Stevens v. State, 691 N.E.2d 412 (1997). Why did the Indiana Supreme Court affirm the lower court’s decision to refuse a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter in this case? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1747625552972024733&q= stevens+v.+state+691+ne2d+412&hl=en&as_sdt=2002&as_vis=1.
3. Read Tripp v. State, 374 A.2d 384 (1977). In this case, the defendant killed his ex-girlfriend, her mother, her niece, and her son. Did the Maryland Court of Appeals hold that the victim must be the source of adequate provocation in a voluntary manslaughter case? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17743318345966072534&hl=en&as_sdt=2002&as_vis=1.
4. Read Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal.3d 112 (1988). What was the basis for the involuntary manslaughter charge against the defendant in this case? Did the California Supreme Court uphold this charge? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11713950418773441100&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
LAW AND ETHICS
Should Killing an Abortion Doctor Be Voluntary Manslaughter?
Scott Roeder left his pew during a church service, walked up to a well-known abortion doctor, and deliberately shot him in the head, killing him. During Roeder’s trial for first-degree premeditated murder, the defense asked the court to allow a second charge of voluntary manslaughter. The defense claimed that defendant Roeder was acting in defense of others in the attempt to save the lives of unborn children.“Man Testifies he Killed Kansas Abortion Doctor,” USA Today, accessed July 27, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-01-28-tiller-murder-trial_N.htm.
1. What are some of the consequences of allowing the charge of voluntary manslaughter in this situation?
Check your answer using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
Scott Roeder Verdict Video
Scott Roeder Convicted of Murder
Scott Roeder’s murder verdict is shown in this video:
(click to see video) | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/09%3A_Criminal_Homicide/9.06%3A_Manslaughter.txt |
Summary
Homicide is the killing of one human being by another. Criminal homicide is either murder or manslaughter. Some states and the federal government also criminalize the killing of a fetus. Suicide is usually not criminal, although assisted suicide could be.
Many jurisdictions follow the common law and define murder as the killing of a victim with malice aforethought. Malice can be either a specific intent to kill, which is express malice, or the intent to do serious bodily injury, or depraved heart, which is implied malice. The Model Penal Code defines murder intent as purposely, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances indicating extreme indifference to life. A killing by the transmission of AIDS can either be murder, if the transmission is deliberate, or manslaughter, if the transmission is inadvertent.
Most jurisdictions divide murder into degrees of seriousness. First-degree murder is the most serious, can merit the death penalty in certain jurisdictions, and generally includes premeditated murder, murder by a specified means, and serious felony murders. Premeditated murder is typically a killing supported by specific intent to kill combined with cool reflection and planning. Murder by a specified means is killing with a specific heinous method. Felony murder is a homicide that occurs during the commission or attempted commission of a felony. Felony murder lacks murder intent; the defendant need only possess the intent required for the felony. Felony murder can be graded as first, second, or third degree, depending on the felony. The Model Penal Code classifies all murders as first-degree felonies.
Second-degree murder is often defined as any murder that is not first degree. Typically, second-degree murder intent is the intent to inflict serious bodily injury or a depraved heart intent. Second-degree murder is usually graded lower than first-degree murder but higher than manslaughter.
In many jurisdictions, manslaughter is an unlawful killing without murder intent. Most jurisdictions divide manslaughter into voluntary and involuntary. The Model Penal Code classifies all manslaughters as felonies of the second degree. Voluntary manslaughter is a killing that occurs during a heat of passion inspired by adequate provocation from the victim, negating murder intent. Involuntary manslaughter can be a killing that occurs during the commission or attempted commission of a misdemeanor or a reckless or negligent killing, depending on the jurisdiction. Involuntary manslaughter can also be vehicular manslaughter when the killing occurs while driving a vehicle recklessly, negligently, or under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The Model Penal Code classifies negligent killings as negligent homicide and a felony of the third degree.
YOU BE THE JUDGE
Read the prompt and then decide whether you would affirm or reverse the lower court. Review the case and see how the judges or justices actually ruled. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. The defendant shot and killed his ex-girlfriend, who was pregnant. The defendant did not know she was pregnant, nor was it obvious from her appearance. The lower court reversed a jury verdict of second-degree murder of the fetus, and the prosecution appealed. Would you affirm or reverse? People v. Taylor, 86 P.3d 881 (2004). The case is available at this link: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/californiastatecases/s112443.pdf.
2. The defendant held his wife and two small children hostage at gunpoint in a train compartment for three days. The wife died of a bullet wound and one of the children died of dehydration. The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder for the child’s death, based on the specified means of “starvation.” The defendant appealed because there was no evidence of specific intent to kill the child. Would you affirm or reverse? State v. Evangelista, 353 S.E.2d 375 (1987). The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=587685537389879135&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
3. The defendant was charged with felony murder for the death of his girlfriend’s mother. The underlying felony was cruelty to an elderly person. The defendant and his girlfriend had removed the victim from an assisted living facility so that they could control her Social Security checks. Thereafter, they neglected to care for her and she died from this neglect. The defendant claimed that he had no duty of care for his girlfriend’s mother. The lower court denied his motion for a new trial. Would you affirm or reverse? Wood v. State, 620 S.E.2d 348 (2005). The case is available at this link: www.lexisone.com/lx1/caselaw/freecaselaw?action=OCLGetCaseDetail&format=FULL&sourceID=bdjgjj&searchTerm= eIgi.YXca.aadj.ecDa&searchFlag=y&l1loc=FCLOW.
4. The defendant held the victim, his ex-wife, hostage in her home with a gun. When an oil truck pulled into her driveway, she smirked at the defendant because she knew the confrontation was over. The defendant shot and killed her and claimed that the smirk was adequate provocation. The court held that the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. Would you affirm or reverse? State v. Warmke, 879 A.2d 30 (2005). The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7047276887490940793&q=State+v.+Warmke,+879+A.2d+30+%282005%29.&hl =en&as_sdt=2,6&as_vis=1.
Articles of Interest
• Assisted suicide: phoenixcriminallawnews.com/2011/04/lawrence-egbert-of-final-exit-network -acquitted-of-manslaughter.html
• Utah bill that criminalizes miscarriage: www.parentdish.com/2010/03/04/could-a-reckless -miscarriage-be-murder-utah-bill-might-make-i
• Prosecution of Michael Jackson’s doctor for involuntary manslaughter, www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/01/25/eveningnews/main7282905.shtml
• HIV as a deadly weapon: www.johntfloyd.com/blog/2010/03/30/is-hiv-a-deadly-weapon
Websites of Interest
• Fetal homicide statutes: www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14386
• Information about assisted suicide: http://www.assistedsuicide.org
• State statutes on the criminal transmission of HIV: www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable .jsp?ind=569&cat=11
Statistics of Interest
• Crime, including homicide: www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/law_enforcement_courts _prisons/crimes_and_crime_rates.html
Answers to Exercises
From Section 9.1
1. The fundamental difference between homicide and suicide is the identity of the victim. In a homicide, the victim is another human being. In a suicide, the victim is the perpetrator, which is one of the reasons that homicide is often criminal and suicide is not.
2. The US Supreme Court held that the right to assist a suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 9.2
1. Jay has the criminal intent of depraved heart. Jay’s conduct in shooting at a tree in a public place might cause someone’s death, which indicates that Jay is indifferent to whether he takes a life. This indifference is a form of implied malice, knowingly, or recklessly manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.
2. Yes, this is true. Because Jay used a revolver, the prosecutor has the benefit of the deadly weapon doctrine in many jurisdictions, alleviating his burden of proving criminal intent.
3. The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that teeth can constitute a deadly weapon in any case, whether or not the defendant has contracted the HIV virus. The court thereafter affirmed the defendant’s conviction for assault with a deadly weapon.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 9.3
1. This killing could be first-degree premeditated murder or first-degree murder by a specified means. The facts indicate a willful, deliberate, premeditated killing. Johnnie evidences a specific intent to kill the leader of a rival gang. He indicates planning by putting his gun in the glove compartment of his car and driving to the gas station on Friday night where he suspects Marcus will be present. He kills Marcus by shooting him in a manner calculated to cause death. In addition, first-degree murder by a specified means frequently includes drive-by shooting as a method of killing.
2. The Tennessee Supreme Court held that the defendant’s failure to make a timely police report and concealment of the murder weapon did not prove that the murder was premeditated. The Court stated the following:
One who has recently killed another person recklessly, passionately, or even negligently may be extremely hesitant to reveal the details of the crime, and yet not be guilty of first-degree murder…One who kills another in a passionate rage may dispose of the weapon when reason returns just as readily as the cool, dispassionate killer.State v. West, 844 S.W. 2d 144, 147 (1992), accessed July 30, 2010, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3481778471457660977&hl=en&as_sdt=2002&as_vis=1.
3. The motive was to exact revenge. The defendant and victim had a relationship fraught with abuse, most of it based on the defendant’s desire to control the victim. The planning was as follows: the defendant selected the day of the killing with care, made a copy of the key to his son’s house, rented a minivan with tinted windows and altered the interior, sent four letters to his son that he knew the victim, a postal employee, would deliver, packed the murder weapon and supplies in the minivan, called his son’s house to ensure his son had left, arrived early at his son’s house, and prepared the interior for the killing. Preconceived design is shown by the following actions: The defendant shot the victim several times with the shotgun he brought to his son’s house. He paused to reload and also to retrieve a handgun from the snow in between shots.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 9.4
1. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and held that felon in possession of a firearm and possession of a stolen firearm are not felonies inherently dangerous to life, so they cannot be predicate felonies for a felony murder conviction. The Court stated the following: “Applying the statute as previously interpreted by us to this record, we conclude that the predicate offenses of felon in possession of a firearm and possession of a stolen firearm are not inherently dangerous. While the use of a firearm can pose significant danger to human life, simple possession—standing alone—does not.”People v. Anderson, 666 N.W. 2d 696, 700 (2003), accessed July 30, 2010, www.lexisone.com/lx1/caselaw/freecaselaw?action=OCLGetCaseDetail&format= FULL&sourceID=bdjhdg&searchTerm=ejhU.Iaea.aadj.ebKG&searchFlag=y&l1loc=FCLOW.
2. Kurt did not commit felony murder in this case because he had reached a place of temporary safety, so the felony had ended.
3. The US Supreme Court based its holding on the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments. Primarily, the Court determined that the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment under the circumstances.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 9.5
1. There is no evidence of premeditation, and Kurt did not kill the homeless person using a specified means. This is not a first-degree felony murder (based on the felony of robbery) because the felony had ended when the killing occurred. Thus this is most likely second-degree murder.
2. The California Court of Appeals upheld the defendant’s second-degree murder charge and stated that it was up to the trier of fact to determine the probability of death and the subjective mental state of the defendant.
3. The Mississippi Court of Appeals held that putting a gun to someone’s forehead and pulling the trigger indicates depraved heart intent, even if the defendant believes the gun to be unloaded.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 9.6
1. The Model Penal Code classifies criminal homicides as felonies of the first, second, and third degree, depending on the defendant’s intent. Murder is supported by purposeful, knowing, or extremely reckless intent and is a felony of the first degree. Manslaughter is supported by reckless intent, or is a murder that is committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse, and is a felony of the second degree. Criminal homicide committed with negligent intent is a negligent homicide and is a felony of the third degree.
2. The Indiana Supreme Court held that a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter was inappropriate because a reasonable person would not be provoked by words alone. In this case, a ten-year-old boy threatened to expose sexual molestation by the defendant, who was twenty years old. The Court held that this threat was not adequate provocation.
3. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the victim must be the source of the adequate provocation in a voluntary manslaughter case. Thus the defendant could not claim voluntary manslaughter when he killed his ex-girlfriend’s family members because he was provoked only by her.
4. The defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter because she treated her daughter’s meningitis with prayer, rather than obtaining medical care. The California Supreme Court upheld the involuntary manslaughter charge, in spite of the First Amendment free exercise clause and the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.
Answer to Law and Ethics Question
1. The first problem with extending the defense of voluntary manslaughter to the deliberate killing of an abortion doctor is the fact that the abortion doctor is acting legally. Extending the defense in this manner opens the door to a voluntary manslaughter charge for a defendant who (1) kills an individual authorized to execute prisoners pursuant to the death penalty or (2) is a soldier who is going off to war. Another problem with extending the defense to include Roeder’s conduct is the lack of imminence. As discussed in Chapter 5, defense of others requires an imminent threat. No imminent threat was present when the abortion doctor was in church. Removing the imminence requirement allows defendants to calmly and with deliberation kill victims and thereafter claim voluntary manslaughter—the antithesis of heat of passion. Thus the judge presiding over Roeder’s trial allowed the defense arguments but thereafter precluded the voluntary manslaughter charge.“Man Testifies he Killed Kansas Abortion Doctor,” USA Today, accessed July 27, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-01-28-tiller-murder-trial_N.htm.
Answers to You Be the Judge
1. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that implied malice does not mean that the defendant needs to be aware of the risk to a specific victim.
2. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed because there is no need to prove specific intent to kill when a murder is by a specified means.
3. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed because the defendant voluntarily and knowingly took the victim into his home and agreed to care for her, creating the duty to act.
4. The Supreme Court of Maine affirmed because the defendant initiated the confrontation. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/09%3A_Criminal_Homicide/9.07%3A_End-of-Chapter_Material.txt |
Among the evils that both the common law and later statutory prohibitions against kidnapping sought to address were the isolation of a victim from the protections of society and the law and the special fear and danger inherent in such isolation.
- State v. Salaman, cited in Section 10.4
Source: Image courtesy of Tara Storm.
10.01: Sex Offenses
Learning Objectives
1. Compare common-law rape and sodomy offenses with modern rape and sodomy offenses.
2. Define the criminal act element required for rape.
3. Define the attendant circumstance element required for rape.
4. Ascertain the amount of resistance a victim must demonstrate to evidence lack of consent.
5. Ascertain whether the victim’s testimony must be corroborated to convict a defendant for rape.
6. Define the criminal intent element required for rape.
7. Analyze the relationship between the criminal intent element required for rape and the mistake of fact defense allowed for rape in some jurisdictions.
8. Define the harm element required for rape.
9. Identify the primary components of rape shield laws.
10. Identify the most prevalent issues in acquaintance rape.
11. Compare spousal rape with rape.
12. Identify the elements of statutory rape, and compare statutory rape with rape.
13. Compare sodomy, oral copulation, and incest with rape.
14. Analyze sex offenses grading.
15. Identify the primary components of sex offender registration statutes.
In this section, you learn the elements of rape and related sex offenses and examine defenses based on consent. In upcoming sections, you analyze the elements of other crimes involving force, fear, and physical restraint, including assault, battery, domestic violence, stalking, and kidnapping.
Synopsis of the History of Rape and Sodomy
The word rape has its roots in the Latin word rapere, which means to steal or seize. At early common law, rape was a capital offense. The elements of rape were forcible sexual intercourse, by a man, with a woman not the spouse of the perpetrator, conducted without consent, or with consent obtained by force or threat of force.Donna Macnamara, “History of Sexual Violence,” Interactive theatre.org website, accessed February 8, 2011, www.interactivetheatre.org/resc/history.html. The rape prosecution required evidence of the defendant’s use of force, extreme resistance by the victim, and evidence that corroborated the rape victim’s testimony. The common law also recognized the crime of sodomy. In general, sodomy was the penetration of the male anus by a man. Sodomy was condemned and criminalized even with consent because of religious beliefs deeming it a crime against nature.“Sex Offenses,” Lawbrain.com website, accessed February 8, 2011, http://lawbrain.com/wiki/Sex_Offenses.
In the 1970s, many changes were made to rape statutes, updating the antiquated common-law approach and increasing the chances of conviction. The most prominent changes were eliminating the marital rape exemption and the requirement of evidence to corroborate the rape victim’s testimony, creating rape shield laws to protect the victim, and relaxing the necessity for the defendant’s use of force or resistance by the victim.Matthew R. Lyon, “No means No? Withdrawal of Consent During Intercourse and the Continuing Evolution of the Definition of Rape,” Findarticles.com website, accessed February 8, 2011, findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6700/is_1_95/ai_n29148498/pg_3/?tag=content;col1. Many jurisdictions also changed the name of rape to sexual battery, sexual assault, or unlawful sexual conduct and combined sexual offenses like rape, sodomy, and oral copulation into one statute. Although some states still have statutes that provide the death penalty for rape, the US Supreme Court has held that rape, even child rape, cannot be considered a capital offense without violating the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause, rendering these statutes unenforceable.Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008), accessed February 8, 2011, www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_07_343.
Sodomy law has likewise been updated to make sodomy a gender-neutral offense and preclude the criminalization of consensual sexual conduct between adults. The US Supreme Court has definitively held that consensual sex between adults may be protected by a right of privacy and cannot be criminalized without a sufficient government interest.Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), accessed February 8, 2011, www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_102.
Table 10.1 Comparing Common Law Rape and Sodomy with Modern Statutes
Crime Criminal Act Lack of Victim Consent? Victim Resistance? Other Differences
Common-law rape Penis-vagina penetration Yes Yes, extreme resistance Corroborative evidence required; no spousal rape; capital crime
Modern rape Some states include any sexual penetration Yes Not if force is used, or threat of force that would deter a reasonable person from resisting (See section 10.1.2.2.2.) No corroborative evidence required; spousal rape is a crime in some jurisdictions; rape is not a capital crime.
Common-law sodomy Male penis-male anus penetration No. Even consensual sodomy was criminal. No. Even consensual sodomy was criminal.
Modern sodomy Gender-neutral penis-anus penetration Yes Same as modern rape, above Consensual sodomy in prison or jail is still criminal in some jurisdictions. (See section 10.1.7.)
Rape Elements
In modern times, rape is a crime that has the elements of criminal act, criminal intent, causation, and harm. Rape also has an attendant circumstance element, which is lack of consent by the victim.
Rape Act
The criminal act element required for rape in many states is sexual intercourse, accomplished by force or threat of force.Md. Code Ann. § 3-303, accessed February 8, 2011, law.justia.com/maryland/codes/2005/gcr/3-303.html. Sexual intercourse is typically defined as penetration of a woman’s vagina by a man’s penis and can also be referred to as vaginal intercourse.Md. Code Ann. § 3-301(g), accessed February 8, 2011, law.justia.com/maryland/codes...gcr/3-301.html. Some jurisdictions include the penetration of the woman’s vagina by other body parts, like a finger, as sexual intercourse.K.S.A. § 21-3501(1), accessed February 8, 2011, law.justia.com/kansas/codes/2006/chapter21/statute_11553.html. The Model Penal Code defines the criminal act element required for rape as sexual intercourse that includes “intercourse per os or per anum,” meaning oral and anal intercourse (Model Penal Code § 213.0(2)). In most jurisdictions, a man or a woman can commit rape.K.S.A. § 21-3502, accessed February 8, 2011, law.justia.com/kansas/codes/2006/chapter21/statute_11554.html.
Although it is common to include force or threat of force as an indispensible part of the rape criminal act, some modern statutes expand the crime of rape to include situations where the defendant does not use force or threat, but the victim is extremely vulnerable, such as an intoxicated victim, an unconscious victim, or a victim who is of tender years.K.S.A. § 21-3502, accessed February 8, 2011, law.justia.com/kansas/codes/2006/chapter21/statute_11554.html. The Model Penal Code includes force, threat of force, and situations where the defendant has impaired the victim’s power to control conduct by administering intoxicants or drugs without the victim’s knowledge or sexual intercourse with an unconscious female or a female who is fewer than ten years old (Model Penal Code § 213.1(1)). Other statutes may criminalize unforced nonconsensual sexual intercourse or other forms of unforced nonconsensual sexual contact as less serious forms of rape with reduced sentencing options.N.Y. Penal Law § 130.25(3), accessed February 10, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN0130.25_130.25.html.
Example of Rape Act
Alex and Brad play video games while Brad’s sister Brandy watches. Brad tells Alex he is going to go the store and purchase some beer. While Brad is gone, Alex turns to Brandy, pulls a knife out of his pocket, and tells her to take off her pants and lie down. Brandy tells Alex, “No, I don’t want to,” but thereafter acquiesces, and Alex puts his penis into Brandy’s vagina. Alex has probably committed the criminal act element required for rape in most jurisdictions. Although Alex did not use physical force to accomplish sexual intercourse, his threat of force by display of the knife is sufficient. If the situation is reversed, and Brandy pulls out the knife and orders Alex to put his penis in her vagina, many jurisdictions would also criminalize Brandy’s criminal act as rape. If Alex does not use force or a threat of force, but Brandy is only nine years old, some jurisdictions still criminalize Alex’s act as rape, as would the Model Penal Code.
Rape Attendant Circumstance
In many jurisdictions, the attendant circumstance element required for rape is the victim’s lack of consent to the defendant’s act.Md. Code Ann. § 3-304, accessed February 8, 2011, law.justia.com/maryland/codes/gcr/3-304.html. Thus victim’s consent could operate as a failure of proof or affirmative defense.
Proving Lack of Consent as an Attendant Circumstance
Proving lack of consent has two components. First, the victim must be legally capable of giving consent. If the victim is under the age of consent or is mentally or intellectually impaired because of a permanent condition, intoxication, or drugs, the prosecution does not have to prove lack of consent in many jurisdictions.K.S.A. § 21-3502, accessed February 8, 2011, http://law.justia.com/kansas/codes/2006/chapter21/statute_11554.html. Sexual intercourse with a victim under the age of consent is a separate crime, statutory rape, which is discussed shortly.
The second component to proving lack of consent is separating true consent from consent rendered involuntarily. Involuntary consent is present in two situations. First, if the victim consents to the defendant’s act because of fraud or trickery—for example, when the victim is unaware of the nature of the act of sexual intercourse—the consent is involuntary. A victim is generally unaware of the nature of the act of sexual intercourse when a doctor shams a medical procedure.Iowa v. Vander Esch, 662 N.W. 2d 689 (2002), accessed February 10, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4906781834239023314&q= rape+%22fraud+in+the+inducement%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2002. This is called fraud in the factum. Fraud in the inducement, which is a fraudulent representation as to the circumstances accompanying the sexual conduct, does not render the consent involuntary in many jurisdictions. An example of fraud in the inducement is a defendant’s false statement that the sexual intercourse will cure a medical condition.Boro v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 1224 (1985), accessed February 17, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8450241145233624189&q= Boro+v.+Superior+Court&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5.
A more common example of involuntary consent is when the victim consents to the defendant’s act because of force or threat of force. The prosecution generally proves this type of consent is involuntary by introducing evidence of the victim’s resistance.
Proving Involuntary Consent by the Victim’s Resistance
Under the common law, the victim had to manifest extreme resistance to indicate lack of consent. In modern times, the victim does not have to fight back or otherwise endanger his or her life if it would be futile to do so. In most jurisdictions, the victim only needs to resist to the same extent as a reasonable person under similar circumstances, which is an objective standard.Del. Code Ann. tit. II, § 761(j) (1), accessed February 9, 2011, delcode.delaware.gov/title11/c005/sc02/index.shtml#761.
The use of force by the defendant could eliminate any requirement of victim resistance to prove lack of consent.N.Y. Penal Law § 130.05, accessed February 9, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN0130.05_130.05.html. If the defendant obtains consent using a threat of force, rather than force, the victim may not have to resist if the victim experiences subjective fear of serious bodily injury, and a reasonable person under similar circumstances would not resist, which is an objective standard.Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.343(c), accessed February 10, 2011, https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?id=609.343. Threat of force can be accomplished by words, weapons, or gestures. It can also be present when there is a discrepancy in size or age between the defendant and the victim or if the sexual encounter takes place in an isolated location. The Model Penal Code considers it a felony of the third degree and gross sexual imposition when a male has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife by compelling “her to submit by any threat that would prevent resistance by a woman of ordinary resolution” (Model Penal Code § 213.1(2)(a)). Note that the Model Penal Code’s position does not require the threat to be a threat of force; it can be any type of threat that prevents physical resistance.
If the victim does not physically resist the criminal act, the prosecution must prove that the victim affirmatively indicated lack of consent in some other manner. This could be a verbal response, such as saying, “No,” but the verbal response must be unequivocal. In the most extreme case, at least one court has held that a verbal “No” during the act of sexual intercourse is sufficient, and the defendant who continues with sexual intercourse after being told “No” is committing the criminal act of rape.In re John Z., 29 Cal. 4th 756 (2003), accessed February 10, 2011, http://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/re-john-z-32309.
The Requirement of Corroborative Evidence
At early common law, a victim’s testimony was insufficient evidence to meet the burden of proving the elements of rape, including lack of consent. The victim’s testimony had to be supported by additional corroborative evidence. Modern jurisdictions have done away with the corroborative evidence requirement and allow the trier of fact to determine the elements of rape or lack of consent based on the victim’s testimony alone.State v. Borthwick, 880 P.2d 1261 (1994), accessed February 10, 2011, http://www1.law.umkc.edu/suni/CrimLaw/calendar/Class_24_borthwick_case.htm. However, statistics indicate that rape prosecutions often result in acquittal. Thus although technically the victim’s testimony need not be corroborated, it is paramount that the victim promptly report the rape to the appropriate authorities and submit to testing and interrogation to preserve any and all forms of relevant rape evidence.
Example of Rape Attendant Circumstance
Review the example with Brandy and Alex in Section 10. In this example, after an initial protest, Brandy lies down, takes off her pants, and allows Alex to put his penis in her vagina when he pulls out a knife. It is likely that the trier of fact will find the rape attendant circumstance in this case. Although Brandy acquiesced to Alex’s demands without resisting, she did so after Alex took a knife out of his pocket, which is a threat of force. In addition, Brandy expressed her lack of consent verbally before submitting to Alex’s demand. A trier of fact could determine that Brandy experienced a fear of serious bodily injury from Alex’s display of the knife, and that a reasonable person under similar circumstances would give in to Alex’s demands without physical resistance.
Change this example and assume that after Brad leaves, Alex asks Brandy to have sexual intercourse with him. Brandy responds, “No,” but allows Alex to remove her pants and put his penis in her vagina without physically resisting. The trier of fact must make the determination of whether Alex accomplished the sexual act by force or threat of force and without Brandy’s consent. If Brandy testifies that she said “No” and did not consent to Alex’s act, and Alex testifies that Brandy’s verbal response was insufficient to indicate lack of consent, the trier of fact must resolve this issue of fact, and it can do so based on Brandy’s testimony, uncorroborated, in many jurisdictions. The trier of fact can use the criteria of the difference in age and size between Brandy and Alex, any gestures or words indicating force or threat, and the location and isolation of the incident, among other factors.
Rape Intent
The criminal intent element required for rape in most jurisdictions is the general intent or knowingly to perform the rape criminal act.State v. Lile, 699 P.2d 456 (1985), accessed February 8, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5958820374035014869&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. This may include the intent to use force to accomplish the objective if the state’s rape statute includes force or threat of force as a component of the criminal act.
As Chapter 4 stated, occasionally, a different criminal intent supports the other elements of an offense. In some states, negligent intent supports the rape attendant circumstance of lack of victim consent. This creates a viable mistake of fact defense if the defendant has an incorrect perception as to the victim’s consent. To be successful with this defense, the facts must indicate that the defendant honestly and reasonably believed that the victim consented to the rape criminal act.People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337 (1975), accessed February 11, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6471351898025391619&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. Many jurisdictions expressly disallow the defense, requiring strict liability intent for the lack of consent attendant circumstance.State v. Plunkett, 934 P.2d 113 (1997), accessed February 11, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17940293485668190575&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr.
Example of Rape Intent
Review the example with Alex and Brandy in Section 10. Change the example so that Alex does not display a knife and simply asks Brandy if she would like to have sex with him. Brandy does not respond. Alex walks over to Brandy and removes her pants. Brandy does not protest or physically resist. Thereafter, Alex asks Brandy if she “likes it rough.” Brandy remains silent. Alex physically and forcibly puts his penis in Brandy’s vagina. In states that allow a negligent intent to support the attendant circumstance of rape, Alex may be able to successfully assert mistake of fact as a defense. It appears that Alex has with general intent or knowingly committed forcible sexual intercourse, based on his actions. In most jurisdictions, the jury could be instructed on an inference of this intent from Alex’s behavior under the circumstances. However, if negligent intent is required to support the attendant circumstance of the victim’s lack of consent, the trier of fact may find that Alex’s mistake as to Brandy’s consent was honest and reasonable, based on her lack of response or physical resistance. If Alex is in a jurisdiction that requires strict liability intent to support the attendant circumstance element, Alex cannot raise the defense because Alex’s belief as to Brandy’s consent would be irrelevant.
Rape Causation
The defendant’s criminal act must be the factual and legal cause of the harm, which is defined in Section 10.
Rape Harm
The harm element of rape in most jurisdictions is penetration, no matter how slight.Idaho Code Ann. § 18-6101, accessed February 10, 2011, www.legislature.idaho.gov/idstat/Title18/T18CH61SECT18-6101.htm. This precludes virginity as a defense. In addition, modern statutes do not require male ejaculation, which precludes lack of semen as a defense.Ala. Code § 13A-6-60, accessed February 11, 2011, http://law.justia.com/alabama/codes/2009/Title13A/Chapter6/13A-6-60.html.
Example of Rape Harm
Review the example with Alex and Brandy in Section 10. Assume that Brad walks into the room while Alex and Brandy are engaging in sexual intercourse. Brad tackles Alex and pulls him off Brandy. Alex may be charged with rape, not attempted rape, in most jurisdictions. The fact that Alex did not ejaculate does not affect the rape analysis in any way because most jurisdictions do not require ejaculation as a component of the harm element of rape.
Rape Shield Laws
Rape prosecutions can be extremely stressful for the victim, especially when the defendant pursues a consent defense. Before the comprehensive rape reforms of the 1970s, rape defendants would proffer any evidence they could find to indicate that the victim was sexually promiscuous and prone to consenting to sexual intercourse. Fearing humiliation, many rape victims kept their rape a secret, not reporting it to law enforcement. This allowed serial rapists to escape punishment and did not serve our criminal justice goal of deterrence.
In modern times, most states protect rape victims with rape shield laws. Rape shield laws prohibit the admission of evidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct to prove consent in a rape trial, unless the judge allows it in a pretrial in camera hearing, outside the presence of the jury. Rape shield laws could include the additional protections of the exclusion of evidence relating to the victim’s style of dress to prove consent, the exclusion of evidence that the victim requested the defendant to wear a condom to prove consent, and the affirmation that a victim’s testimony in a rape trial need not be corroborated by other evidence.Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794.022, accessed February 11, 2011, http://law.justia.com/florida/codes/2010/TitleXLVI/chapter794/794_022.html. Most courts permit the admission of evidence proving the victim’s previous consensual sex with the defendant because this evidence is particularly relevant to any consent defense.Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-407(1) (a), accessed February 14, 2011, www.michie.com/colorado/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&cp=.
Example of the Effect of a Rape Shield Law
Review the example with Alex and Brandy in Section 10. Assume that the jurisdiction in which the example takes place has a rape shield law. If Alex is put on trial for the rape of Brandy and he decides to pursue a consent defense, Alex would not be able to introduce evidence of Brandy’s sexual history with other men unless he receives approval from a judge in an in camera hearing before the trial.
LAW AND ETHICS
Should the Media Be Permitted to Publish Negative Information about a Rape Victim?
In 2003, Kobe Bryant, a professional basketball player, was indicted for sexually assaulting a nineteen-year-old hotel desk clerk. A mistake by a court reporter listed the accuser’s name on a court website.“Rape Case against Bryant Dismissed,” MSNBC.com website, accessed February 27, 2011, http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/5861379. The court removed the victim’s name after discovery of the mistake, but the damage was done. Thereafter, in spite of a court order prohibiting the publication of the accuser’s name, the media, including radio, newspaper, Internet, and television, published the accuser’s name, phone number, address, and e-mail address.Tom Kenworty, Patrick O’Driscoll, “Judge Dismisses Bryant Rape Case,” USAtoday.com website, accessed February 27, 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/nba/2004-09-01-kobe-bryant-case_x.htm. Products like underwear, t-shirts, and coffee mugs with pictures of the accuser and Bryant in sexual positions were widely available for sale, and the accuser received constant harassment, including death threats.Richard Haddad, “Shield or Sieve? People v. Bryant and the Rape Shield Law in High-Profile Cases,” Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems, accessed February 27, 2011, www.columbia.edu/cu/jlsp/pdf/Spring2%202006/Haddad10.pdf. Although the Colorado Supreme Court ordered pretrial in camera transcripts of hearings pursuant to Colorado’s rape shield law to remain confidential, an order that was confirmed by the US Supreme Court,Associated Press et. al. v. District Court for the Fifth Judicial District of Colorado, 542 U.S. 1301 (2004), accessed February 27, 2011, ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/US/542/542.US.1301.04.73.html. the accuser was subjected to so much negative publicity that she eventually refused to cooperate and the prosecution dropped the charges in 2004.
1. Do you think rape shield laws should include prohibitions against negative publicity? What are the constitutional ramifications of this particular type of statutory protection?
Check your answer using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
Kobe Bryant Video
Kobe Claims Innocence to Sexual Assault Charges
Kobe Bryant and his attorney discuss the charge of rape filed against Kobe in this video:
(click to see video)
Acquaintance Rape
In modern times, rape defendants are frequently known to the victim, which may change the factual situation significantly from stranger rape. Acquaintance rape, also called date rape, is a phenomenon that could increase a victim’s reluctance to report the crime and could also affect the defendant’s need to use force and the victim’s propensity to physically resist.The National Center for Victims of Crime, “Acquaintance Rape,” Ncvc.org website, accessed February 14, 2011, www.ncvc.org/ncvc/main.aspx?dbName=DocumentViewer&DocumentID=32306. Although studies indicate that acquaintance rape is on the rise,The National Center for Victims of Crime, “Acquaintance Rape,” Ncvc.org website, accessed February 14, 2011, www.ncvc.org/ncvc/main.aspx?dbName=DocumentViewer&DocumentID=32306. statutes have not entirely addressed the issues presented in an acquaintance rape fact pattern. To adequately punish and deter acquaintance or date rape, rape statutes should punish nonforcible, nonconsensual sexual conduct as severely as forcible rape. Although the majority of states still require forcible sexual intercourse as the rape criminal act element, at least one modern court has rejected the necessity of any force other than what is required to accomplish the sexual intercourse.State of New Jersey in the Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (1992), accessed February 14, 2011, www.4lawnotes.com/showthread.php?t=1886. Some rape statutes have also eliminated the requirement that the defendant use force and punish any sexual intercourse without consent as rape.Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402(1), accessed February 14, 2011, le.utah.gov/~code/TITLE76/htm/76_05_040200.htm.
Spousal Rape
As stated previously, at early common law, a man could not rape his spouse. The policy supporting this exemption can be traced to a famous seventeenth-century jurist, Matthew Hale, who wrote, “[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract” (Hale, History of Pleas of the Crown, p. 629). During the rape reforms of the 1970s, many states eliminated the marital or spousal rape exemption, in spite of the fact that the Model Penal Code does not recognize spousal rape. At least one court has held that the spousal rape exemption violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it discriminates against single men without a sufficient government interest.People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y. 2d 152 (1984), accessed February 14, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1399209540378549726&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. In several states that criminalize spousal rape, the criminal act, criminal intent, attendant circumstance, causation, and harm elements are exactly the same as the elements of forcible rape.N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 632-A: 5, accessed February 14, 2011, http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/LXII/632-A/632-A-5.htm. Many states also grade spousal rape the same as forcible rape—as a serious felony.Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402(2), accessed February 14, 2011, le.utah.gov/~code/TITLE76/htm/76_05_040200.htm. Grading of sex offenses is discussed shortly.
Statutory Rape
Statutory rape, also called unlawful sexual intercourse, criminalizes sexual intercourse with a victim who is under the age of legal consent. The age of legal consent varies from state to state and is most commonly sixteen, seventeen, or eighteen.Age of Consent Chart for the U.S.-2010, Ageofconsent.us website, accessed February 14, 2011, http://www.ageofconsent.us.
The criminal act element required for statutory rape in many jurisdictions is sexual intercourse, although other types of sexual conduct with a victim below the age of consent are also criminal.US Department of Health and Human Services, “Statutory Rape: A Guide to State Laws and Reporting Requirements,” ASPE.hhs.gov website, accessed February 16, 2011, http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/08/SR/StateLaws/statelaws.shtml. The harm element of statutory rape also varies, although many jurisdictions mirror the harm element required for rape.US Department of Health and Human Services, “Statutory Rape: A Guide to State Laws and Reporting Requirements,” ASPE.hhs.gov website, accessed February 16, 2011, http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/08/SR/StateLaws/statelaws.shtml. The attendant circumstance element required for statutory rape is an underage victim.Cal. Penal Code § 261.5, accessed February 15, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/261.5.html. There is no requirement for force by the defendant. Nor is there an attendant circumstance element of lack of consent because the victim is incapable of legally consenting.
In the majority of states, the criminal intent element of statutory rape is strict liability.La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-80, accessed February 15, 2011, http://law.justia.com/louisiana/codes/2009/rs/title14/rs14-80.html. However, a minority of states require reckless or negligent criminal intent, allowing for the defense of mistake of fact as to the victim’s age. If the jurisdiction recognizes mistake of age as a defense, the mistake must be made reasonably, and the defendant must take reasonable measures to verify the victim’s age.Alaska Stat. § 11.41.445(b), accessed February 15, 2011, http://law.justia.com/alaska/codes/2009/title-11/chapter-11-41/article-04/sec-11-41-445. The mistake of age defense can be proven by evidence of a falsified identification, witness testimony that the victim lied about his or her age to the defendant, or even the appearance of the victim.
It is much more common to prosecute males for statutory rape than females. The historical reason for this selective prosecution is the policy of preventing teenage pregnancy.Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981), accessed February 15, 2011, http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1980/1980_79_1344. However, modern statutory rape statutes are gender-neutral.N.Y. Penal Law § 130.30, accessed February 15, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN0130.30_130.30.html. This ensures that women, especially women who are older than their sexual partner, are equally subject to prosecution.
Example of Statutory Rape
Gary meets Michelle in a nightclub that only allows entrance to patrons eighteen and over. Gary and Michelle end up spending the evening together, and later they go to Gary’s apartment where they have consensual sexual intercourse. In reality, Michelle is actually fifteen and was using false identification to enter the nightclub. If Gary and Michelle are in a state that requires strict liability for the criminal intent element of statutory rape, Gary can be subject to prosecution for and conviction of this offense if fifteen is under the age of legal consent. If Gary and Michelle are in a state that allows for mistake of age as a defense, Gary could use Michelle’s presence in the nightclub as evidence that he acted reasonably in believing that Michelle was capable of rendering legal consent. If both Gary and Michelle used false identification to enter the nightclub, and both Gary and Michelle are under the age of legal consent, both could be prosecuted for and convicted of statutory rape in most jurisdictions because modern statutory rape statutes are gender-neutral.
Sodomy and Oral Copulation
As stated previously, some states include rape, sodomy, and oral copulation in a sexual assault or sexual conduct statute that criminalizes a variety of sexual acts involving penetration.Alaska Stat. § 11.41.410, accessed February 15, 2011, http://law.justia.com/alaska/codes/2009/title-11/chapter-11-41/article-04/sec-11-41-410. In states that distinguish between rape and sodomy, the criminal act element of sodomy is often defined as forcible penis to anus penetration.Cal. Penal Code § 286(a), accessed February 15, 2011, http://law.justia.com/california/codes/2009/pen/281-289.6.html. Typically, the other sodomy elements, including the lack of consent attendant circumstance, criminal intent, causation, and harm, are the same as the elements of rape. Many jurisdictions also grade sodomy the same as rape. Grading is discussed shortly.
Sodomy that is nonforcible but committed with an individual below the age of legal consent is also criminal.Cal. Penal Code § 286(b), accessed February 15, 2011, http://law.justia.com/california/codes/2009/pen/281-289.6.html. As stated previously, the US Supreme Court has held that statutes criminalizing sodomy between consenting adults unreasonably encroach on a right to privacy without a sufficient government interest.Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), accessed February 15, 2011, http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_02_102. In some states, consensual nonforcible sodomy is criminal if it is committed in a state penitentiary or local detention facility or jail.Cal. Penal Code § 286(c) (3) (e), accessed February 15, 2011, http://law.justia.com/california/codes/2009/pen/281-289.6.html.
In states that distinguish between rape, sodomy, and oral copulation, the criminal act element of oral copulation is forcible mouth to sexual organ or anus penetration.Cal. Penal Code § 288a, accessed February 15, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/288a.html. Typically, the other oral copulation elements, including the lack of consent attendant circumstance, criminal intent, causation, and harm, are the same as the elements of rape. Many jurisdictions also grade oral copulation the same as rape. Grading is discussed shortly.
A few states still criminalize oral copulation with consent.Ala. Code § 13A-6-65, accessed February 15, 2011, www.legislature.state.al.us/CodeofAlabama/1975/13A-6-65.htm. Based on the US Supreme Court precedent relating to sodomy, these statutes may be unenforceable and unconstitutional.
Incest
Incest is also criminal in many jurisdictions. The criminal act element required for incest is typically sexual intercourse.Fla. Stat. Ann. § 826.04, accessed February 15, 2011, law.onecle.com/florida/crimes/826.04.html. The attendant circumstance element required for incest is a victim the defendant cannot legally marry because of a family relationship.Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11, § 766, accessed February 15, 2011, http://law.justia.com/delaware/codes/2010/title11/c005-sc02.html. In the majority of jurisdictions, force is not required, and consent is not an attendant circumstance element of incest.Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11, § 766, accessed February 15, 2011, http://law.justia.com/delaware/codes/2010/title11/c005-sc02.html. Thus consent by the victim cannot operate as a defense. If the sexual intercourse with a family member is forcible and nonconsensual, the defendant could be charged with and convicted of rape. The criminal intent element required for incest is typically general intent or knowingly.Fla. Stat. Ann. § 826.04, accessed February 15, 2011, law.onecle.com/florida/crimes/826.04.html. The causation and harm elements of incest are generally the same as the causation and harm elements of rape.Fla. Stat. Ann. § 826.04, accessed February 15, 2011, law.onecle.com/florida/crimes/826.04.html. However, incest is generally graded lower than forcible rape or sexual assault because force and lack of consent are not required.Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11, § 766, accessed February 15, 2011, http://law.justia.com/delaware/codes/2010/title11/c005-sc02.html.
Example of Incest
Hal and Harriet, brother and sister, have consensual sexual intercourse. Both Hal and Harriet are above the age of legal consent. In spite of the fact that there was no force, threat of force, or fraud, and both parties consented to the sexual act, Hal and Harriet could be charged with and convicted of incest in many jurisdictions, based on their family relationship.
Sex Offenses Grading
Jurisdictions vary when it comes to grading sex offenses. In general, forcible sex crimes involving penetration are graded as serious felonies. Factors that could aggravate grading are gang rape,Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794.023, accessed February 15, 2011, law.onecle.com/florida/crimes/794.023.html. the infliction of bodily injury, the use of a weapon, a youthful victim, the commission of other crimes in concert with the sexual offense, or a victim who has mental or intellectual disabilities or who has been compromised by intoxicants.Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11, § 773, accessed February 15, 2011, http://law.justia.com/delaware/codes/2010/title11/c005-sc02.html. The Model Penal Code grades rape as a felony of the second degree unless the actor inflicts serious bodily injury on the victim or another, or the defendant is a stranger to the victim, in which case the grading is elevated to a felony of the first degree (Model Penal Code § 213.1 (1)).
Sexual offenses that do not include penetration are graded lower,N.Y. Penal Law § 130.52, accessed February 15, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN0130.52_130.52.html. along with offenses that could be consensual.Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11, § 766, accessed February 15, 2011, http://law.justia.com/delaware/codes/2010/title11/c005-sc02.html. Sex offense statutes that criminalize sexual conduct with a victim below the age of legal consent often grade the offense more severely when there is a large age difference between the defendant and the victim, when the defendant is an adult, or the victim is of tender years.Cal. Penal Code § 261.5, accessed February 15, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/261.5.html.
Sex Offender Registration Statutes
Based on a public awareness that sex offenders often reoffend, many states have enacted some form of Megan’s law or Jessica’s law, which provide for registration, monitoring, control, and elevated sentencing for sex offenders, including those that harm children. Both laws were written and enacted after high-profile cases with child victims became the subject of enormous media attention. Megan’s and Jessica’s law statutes enhance previously enacted statutes that require the registration of sex offenders with local law enforcement agencies.
Typically, a Megan’s law statute provides for registration and notification to the public that a convicted sex offender lives in their area.42 Pa. C. S. § 9799.1, accessed February 15, 2011, http://www.pameganslaw.state.pa.us. A Jessica’s law statute often includes a stay-away order, mandating that a sex offender cannot live within a certain distance from areas such as a school or park where children tend to congregate. Jessica’s law statutes also provide for GPS monitoring and extend the sentencing and parole terms of child sex offenders.Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-295.2:1, accessed February 15, 2011, http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?000+cod+19.2-295.2C1.
Exercises
• Common-law rape was a capital offense, did not include rape of a spouse, required extreme resistance by the victim, and required evidence to corroborate a victim’s testimony. Modern statutes do not make rape a capital offense, often criminalize spousal rape, and do not require extreme resistance by the victim or evidence to corroborate the victim’s testimony. At early common law, sodomy was the anal penetration of a man, by a man. Modern statutes make sodomy gender-neutral and only criminalize sodomy without consent.
• The criminal act element required for rape is sexual penetration accomplished with force or threat of force in many jurisdictions.
• The attendant circumstance element required for rape is lack of consent by the victim.
• In many jurisdictions, the victim does not need to resist if the defendant uses force. If the victim is faced with a threat of force rather than force, the victim need not resist if he or she has a subjective fear of serious bodily injury, and this fear is reasonable under the circumstances.
• In modern times, a victim’s testimony does not need to be corroborated by other evidence to convict a defendant of rape.
• The criminal intent element required for rape is general intent or knowingly to commit the criminal act.
• In some jurisdictions, the criminal intent element required for the rape attendant circumstance is negligent intent—providing for a defense of mistake of fact as to the victim’s consent. In other jurisdictions, the criminal intent element required for the rape attendant circumstance is strict liability, which does not allow for the mistake of fact defense.
• The harm element required for rape is penetration, no matter how slight. Ejaculation is not a requirement for rape in most jurisdictions.
• Rape shield laws generally preclude the admission of evidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct in a rape trial, unless it is allowed by a judge at an in camera hearing. Rape shield laws also preclude the admission of evidence of the victim’s style of dress and the victim’s request that the defendant wear a condom to prove victim consent. Some rape shield laws provide that the victim’s testimony need not be corroborated by other evidence to convict the defendant of rape.
• Acquaintance rape often goes unreported and does not necessarily include use of force by the defendant or resistance by the victim.
• States that criminalize spousal rape generally require the same elements for spousal rape as for rape and grade spousal rape the same as rape.
• Statutory rape is generally sexual intercourse with a victim who is under the age of legal consent. Statutory rape does not have the requirement that the intercourse be forcible and does not require the attendant circumstance of the victim’s lack of consent because the victim is incapable of rendering legal consent. In the majority of jurisdictions, the criminal intent element required for statutory rape is strict liability. In a minority of jurisdictions, the criminal intent element required for statutory rape is negligent or reckless intent, providing for a defense of mistake of fact as to the victim’s age.
• Sodomy has the same elements as rape except for the criminal act element, which is often defined as forcible penis to anus penetration, rather than penis to vagina penetration. In addition, in some states sodomy is criminal with consent when it occurs in a state prison or a local detention facility or jail. Oral copulation also has the same elements as rape, except for the criminal act element, which is forcible mouth to sexual organ or anus penetration. Incest is sexual intercourse between family members who cannot legally marry.
• Generally, rape, sodomy, and oral copulation are graded as serious felonies. Factors that enhance grading of sex offenses are penetration, gang rape, bodily injury, the use of a weapon, a victim who has intellectual or mental disabilities or is youthful or intoxicated, and the commission of other crimes in concert with the sex offense. Sex offenses committed with the victim’s consent and without penetration are typically graded lower. If the victim is below the age of consent, a large age difference exists between the defendant and the victim, the defendant is an adult, or the victim is of tender years, grading typically is enhanced.
• Typically, a Megan’s law statute provides for sex offender registration and notification to the public that a convicted sex offender lives in their area. A Jessica’s law statute often includes a stay-away order mandating that a sex offender cannot live within a certain distance from areas such as a school or park where children tend to congregate. Jessica’s law statutes also provide for GPS monitoring and extend the sentencing and parole terms of child sex offenders.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Jorge and Christina have consensual sexual intercourse. Could this consensual sexual intercourse be criminal? Which crime(s), if any, could exist in this fact pattern?
2. Read Toomer v. State, 529 SE 2d 719 (2000). In Toomer, the defendant was convicted of rape after having sexual intercourse with his daughter, who was under the age of fourteen. The jury instruction did not include any requirement for the defendant’s use of force or victim resistance. The defendant appealed and claimed that the prosecution should have proven he used force and the victim’s resistance because the charge was rape, not statutory rape. Did the Supreme Court of South Carolina uphold the defendant’s conviction? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3593808516097562509&q= Toomer+v.+State&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5.
3. Read Fleming v. State, 323 SW 3d 540 (2010). In Fleming, the defendant appealed his conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child under fourteen because he was not allowed to present a mistake of age defense. The defendant claimed that the requirement of strict liability intent as to the age of the victim deprived him of due process of law. Did the Court of Appeals of Texas agree with the defendant? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12908572719333538188&q= %22Scott+v.+State+36+SW+3d+240%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/10%3A_Sex_Offenses_and_Crimes_Involving_Force_Fear_and_Physical_Restraint/10.00%3A_Prelude_to_Sex_Offenses_and_Crimes_Involving_Force_Fear_and_Physical_Restraint.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Define the criminal act element required for battery.
2. Define the criminal intent element required for battery.
3. Define the attendant circumstance element required for battery.
4. Define the harm element required for battery.
5. Analyze battery grading.
6. Distinguish between attempted battery and threatened battery assault.
7. Define the elements of attempted battery assault.
8. Define the elements of threatened battery assault.
9. Analyze assault grading.
Assault and battery are two crimes that are often prosecuted together, yet they are separate offenses with different elements. Although modern jurisdictions frequently combine assault and battery into one statute called assault, the offenses are still distinct and are often graded differently. The Model Penal Code calls both crimes assault, simple and aggravated (Model Penal Code § 211.1). However, the Model Penal Code does not distinguish between assault and battery for grading purposes. This section reviews the elements of both crimes, including potential defenses.
Battery Elements
Battery is a crime that has the elements of criminal act, criminal intent, attendant circumstance, causation, and harm as is discussed in the subsections that follow.
Battery Act
The criminal act element required for battery in most jurisdictions is an unlawful touching, often described as physical contact.720 ILCS § 12-3, accessed February 18, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/illinois/720ilcs5/12-3.html. This criminal act element is what distinguishes assault from battery, although an individual can be convicted of both crimes if he or she commits separate acts supported by the appropriate intent. The defendant can touch the victim with an instrumentality, like shooting the victim with a gun, or can hit the victim with a thrown object, such as rocks or a bottle. The defendant can also touch the victim with a vehicle, knife, or a substance, such as spitting on the victim or spraying the victim with a hose.
Example of Battery Act
Recall from Chapter 1 an example where Chris, a newly hired employee at McDonald’s, spills steaming-hot coffee on his customer Geoff’s hand. Although Chris did not touch Geoff with any part of his body, he did pour a substance that unlawfully touched Geoff’s body, which could be sufficient to constitute the criminal act element for battery in most jurisdictions.
Battery Intent
The criminal intent element required for battery varies, depending on the jurisdiction. At early common law, battery was a purposeful or knowing touching. Many states follow the common-law approach and require specific intent or purposely, or general intent or knowingly.Fla. Stat. Ann. § 784.03, accessed February 18, 2011, law.onecle.com/florida/crimes/784.03.html. Others include reckless intent,K.S.A. § 21-3412, accessed February 18, 2011, kansasstatutes.lesterama.org/Chapter_21/Article_34/21-3412.html. or negligent intent.R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-2.2, accessed February 18, 2011, law.justia.com/rhodeisland/codes/title11/11-5-2.2.html. Jurisdictions that include reckless or negligent intent generally require actual injury, serious bodily injury, or the use of a deadly weapon. The Model Penal Code requires purposely, knowingly, or recklessly causing bodily injury to another, or negligently causing “bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon” (Model Penal Code § 211.1(1) (b)). If negligent intent is not included in the battery statute, certain conduct that causes injury to the victim may not be criminal.
Example of Battery Intent
Review the example with Chris and Geoff in Section 10. Assume that Chris’s act of pouring hot coffee on Geoff’s hand occurred when Chris attempted to multitask and hand out change at the same moment he was pouring the coffee. Chris’s act of physically touching Geoff with the hot coffee may be supported by negligent intent because Chris is a new employee and is probably not aware of the risk of spilling coffee when multitasking. If the state in which Chris’s spill occurs does not include negligent intent in its battery statute, Chris probably will not be subject to prosecution for this offense. If Chris’s state only criminalizes negligent battery when serious bodily injury occurs, or when causing bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon, Chris will not be subject to prosecution for battery unless the coffee caused a severe burning of Geoff’s hand; hot coffee cannot kill and would probably not be considered a deadly weapon.
Battery Attendant Circumstance
The attendant circumstance element required for battery in most jurisdictions is that the touching occur without the victim’s consent. Thus victim’s consent can operate as a failure of proof or affirmative defense in some factual situations.
Example of Battery Consent Defense
Recall from Chapter 5 the example where Allen tackles Brett during a high school football game, causing Brett to suffer a severe injury. Although Allen intentionally touched Brett, and the result is serious bodily injury, Brett consented to the touching by voluntarily participating in a sporting event where physical contact is frequent. Thus the attendant circumstance element for battery is absent and Allen is probably not subject to prosecution for this offense.
Justification and Excuse Defenses to Battery
In addition to consent, there are also justification and excuse defenses to battery that Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 discuss in detail. To summarize and review, the justification defenses to battery are self-defense, defense of property and habitation, and the lawful apprehension of criminals. An excuse defense to battery that Chapter 6 explores is the insanity defense. One other excuse defense to battery is the reasonable discipline of a child by a parent that is generally regulated by statute and varies from state to state.“United States statutes pertaining to spanking,” Kidjacked.com website, accessed February 18, 2011, kidjacked.com/legal/spanking_law.asp.
Battery Causation
The defendant’s criminal act must be the factual and legal cause of the harm, which is defined in Section 10.
Battery Harm
The harm requirement for battery varies, depending on the jurisdiction. Many jurisdictions allow for harmful or offensive contact.720 ILCS § 12-3, accessed February 18, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/illinois/720ilcs5/12-3.html. Some jurisdictions require an actual injury to the victim.Ala. Code § 13A-6-21, accessed February 18, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-6-21.html. The severity of the injury can elevate grading, as is discussed in Section 10.
Example of Battery Harm
Review the example in Section 10.
Battery Grading
At early common law, battery was a misdemeanor. The Model Penal Code grades battery (called simple assault) as a misdemeanor unless “committed in a fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent, in which case it is a petty misdemeanor” (Model Penal Code § 211.1(1)). The Model Penal Code grades aggravated battery (called aggravated assault), which is battery that causes serious bodily injury or bodily injury caused by a deadly weapon, as a felony of the second or third degree (Model Penal Code § 211.1(2)). Many states follow the Model Penal Code approach by grading battery that causes offense or emotional injury as a misdemeanor720 ILCS § 12-3, accessed February 18, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/illinois/720ilcs5/12-3.html. and battery that causes bodily injury as a gross misdemeanor or a felony.720 ILCS § 12-4, accessed February 18, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/illinois/720ilcs5/12-4.html. In addition, battery supported by a higher level of intent—such as intent to cause serious bodily injury or intent to maim or disfigure—is often graded higher.Ala. Code § 13A-6-20, accessed February 18, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-6-20.html. Other factors that can aggravate battery grading are the use of a weapon,R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-2, accessed February 18, 2011, law.justia.com/rhodeisland/codes/2005/title11/11-5-2.html. the commission of battery during the commission or attempted commission of a serious or violent felony,Ala. Code § 13A-6-20(4), accessed February 18, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-6-20.html. the helplessness of the victim,Wis. Stat. §§ 940.19(6) (a), 940.19(6) (b), accessed February 18, 2011, nxt.legis.state.wi.us/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm&d=stats&jd=ch.%20940. and battery against a teacherWis. Stat. § 940.20(5), accessed February 18, 2011, nxt.legis.state.wi.us/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm&d=stats&jd=ch.%20940. or law enforcement officer.Wis. Stat. § 940.20(2), accessed February 18, 2011, nxt.legis.state.wi.us/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm&d=stats&jd=ch.%20940.
Assault Elements
Assault is a crime that has the elements of criminal act and intent. A certain type of assault also has a causation and harm element, as is discussed in Section 10.
Attempted Battery and Threatened Battery Assault
Two types of assault are recognized. In some jurisdictions, assault is an attempted battery. In other jurisdictions, assault is a threatened battery. The Model Penal Code criminalizes both attempted battery and threatened battery assault (Model Penal Code § 211.1). The elements of both types of assault are discussed in Section 10.
Attempted Battery Assault
Attempted battery assault is an assault that has every element of battery except for the physical contact. The elements of attempted battery assault are criminal act supported by criminal intent. There is no requirement of causation or harm because attempt crimes do not have a harm requirement. Although attempted battery assault should allow for the same defense of consent as battery, this is not as common with assault as it is with battery, so most statutes do not have the attendant circumstance element of lack of consent by the victim.
Attempted Battery Assault Act
The criminal act element required for attempted battery assault is an act that attempts to make physical contact with the victim but falls short for some reason. This could be a thrown object that never hits its target, a gunshot that misses, or a punch that doesn’t connect. In some states, the defendant must have the present ability to cause harmful or offensive physical contact, even though the contact never takes place.Cal. Penal Code § 240, accessed February 19, 2011, http://law.justia.com/california/codes/2009/pen/240-248.html. The present ability requirement is simply an extension of the rule that attempt crimes must progress beyond mere preparation. In the majority of jurisdictions, the criminal act element is measured by the Model Penal Code’s substantial steps test described in detail in Chapter 7.Commonwealth v. Matthews, 205 PA Super 92 (2005), accessed February 19, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16367791555829234654&q= %22assault%22+%2B+%22conditional+threat%22+%2B+%22not+enough%22&hl= en&as_sdt=2,5. To summarize, the substantial steps test requires the defendant to take substantial steps toward completion of the battery, and the defendant’s actions must be strongly corroborative of the defendant’s criminal purpose (Model Penal Code § 5.01).
Example of Attempted Battery Assault Act
Diana points a loaded pistol at her ex-boyfriend Dan, says, “Prepare to die, Dan,” and pulls the trigger. Fortunately for Dan, the gun malfunctions and does not fire. Diana has probably committed attempted battery assault. Diana took every step necessary toward completion of battery, and her conduct of aiming a pistol at Dan and pulling the trigger was strongly corroborative of her criminal purpose. In addition, it appears that Diana had the present ability to shoot Dan because her gun was loaded. Thus Diana may be charged with and convicted of the offense of attempted battery assault with a deadly weapon. Note that Diana may also be charged with or convicted of attempted murder because it appears that murder intent is present.
Attempted Battery Assault Intent
The criminal intent element required for attempted battery assault is the specific intent or purposely to cause harmful or offensive contact.People v. Nickens, 685 NW 2d 657 (2004), accessed February 19, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16424953435525763156&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. Like all attempt crimes, attempted battery assault cannot be supported by reckless or negligent intent.
Example of Attempted Battery Assault Intent
Change the example in Section 10 so that Dan hands Diana a pistol and comments that it is unloaded. Diana says, “Really? Well, then, I can do this!” She thereafter points the gun at Dan and playfully pulls the trigger. The gun malfunctions and does not shoot, although it is loaded. Diana probably cannot be charged with or convicted of attempted battery assault in this case. Although Diana took every step necessary toward making harmful physical contact with Dan, she was acting with negligent, not specific or purposeful, intent. Thus the criminal intent element for attempted battery assault is absent, and Diana could only be charged with a lesser offense such as negligent handling of firearms.
Threatened Battery Assault
Threatened battery assault differs from attempted battery assault in that the intent is not to cause physical contact with the victim; the intent is to cause the victim to fear physical contact. Thus threatened battery assault is not an attempt crime and has the additional requirement of causation and harm offense elements.
Threatened Battery Assault Act
The criminal act element required for threatened battery assault is conduct that causes the victim apprehension of immediate harmful or offensive physical contact. In general, words are not enough to constitute the criminal act element required for threatened battery assault.Clark v. Commonwealth, 676 S.E.2d 332 (2009), accessed February 19, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12317437845803464805&q= %22assault%22+%2B+%22words+are+not+enough%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. The words must be accompanied by threatening gestures. In addition, a threat of future harm or a conditional threat is not sufficient.Clark v. Commonwealth, 676 S.E.2d 332 (2009), accessed February 19, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12317437845803464805&q= %22assault%22+%2B+%22words+are+not+enough%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. The physical contact threatened must be unequivocal and immediate. Some jurisdictions still require present ability for threatened battery assault. In others, only apparent ability is necessary; this means the victim must reasonably believe that the defendant can effectuate the physical contact.Fla. Stat. Ann. § 784.011, accessed February 19, 2011, law.onecle.com/florida/crimes/784.011.html.
Example of Threatened Battery Assault Act
Change the example given in Section 10 so that Dan’s pistol is lying on a table. Diana says to Dan, “If you don’t take me back, I am going to shoot you with your own gun!” At this point, Diana has probably not committed the criminal act element required for threatened battery assault. Diana has only used words to threaten Dan, and words are generally not enough to constitute the threatened battery assault act. In addition, Diana’s threat was conditional, not immediate. If Dan agrees to get back together with Diana, no physical contact would occur. Add to the example, and assume that Dan responds, “Go ahead, shoot me. I would rather die than take you back!” Diana thereafter grabs the gun, points it at Dan, and cocks it. At this point, Diana may have committed the criminal act element required for threatened battery assault. Diana’s threat is accompanied by a serious gesture: cocking a pistol. If the state in which Dan and Diana’s example occurs requires present ability, then the gun must be loaded. If the state requires apparent ability, then Dan must believe the gun is loaded—and if he is wrong, Diana could still have committed the criminal act element required for threatened battery assault.
Threatened Battery Assault Intent
The criminal intent element required for threatened battery assault is the specific intent or purposely to cause fear of harmful or offensive contact.Commonwealth v. Porro, 458 Mass. 526 (2010), accessed February 20, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13033264667355058927&q= Commonwealth+v.+Porro&hl=en&as_sdt=4,22. This is different from the criminal intent element required for attempted battery assault, which is the specific intent or purposely to cause harmful or offensive contact.
Example of Threatened Battery Assault Intent
Review the example in Section 10. Change the example so that the gun that Diana grabs is Diana’s gun, and it is unloaded. Diana is aware that the gun is unloaded, but Dan is not. In this example, Diana probably has the intent required for threatened battery assault. Diana’s act of pointing the gun at Dan and cocking it, after making a verbal threat, indicates that she has the specific intent or purposely to cause apprehension in Dan of imminent harmful physical contact. If Diana is in a state that only requires apparent ability to effectuate the contact, Diana has committed the criminal act supported by criminal intent for threatened battery assault. Note that Diana does not have the proper criminal intent for attempted battery assault if the gun is unloaded. This is because the intent required for attempted battery assault is the intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, which Diana clearly cannot intend to do with an unloaded gun.
Threatened Battery Assault Causation
The defendant’s criminal act must be the factual and legal cause of the harm that is defined in Section 10.
Threatened Battery Assault Harm
The harm element required for threatened battery assault is the victim’s reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact.Commonwealth v. Porro, 458 Mass. 526 (2010), accessed February 20, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13033264667355058927&q= Commonwealth+v.+Porro&hl=en&as_sdt=4,22. Thus the victim’s lack of awareness of the defendant’s criminal act could operate as a failure of proof or affirmative defense in many jurisdictions.
Example of Threatened Battery Assault Harm
Review the example in Section 10. Change the example so that after Diana verbally threatens Dan, he shrugs, turns around, and begins to walk away. Frustrated, Diana grabs the gun off of the table and waves it menacingly at Dan’s back. Dan is unaware of this behavior and continues walking out the door. Diana has probably not committed threatened battery assault in this situation. A key component of threatened battery assault is victim apprehension or fear. If Diana silently waves a gun at Dan’s back, it does not appear that she has the specific intent or purposely to inspire fear in Dan of harmful physical contact. In addition, Dan was not cognizant of Diana’s action and did not experience the fear, which is the threatened battery assault harm element. Thus Diana may not be convicted of assault with a deadly weapon in states that criminalize only threatened battery assault. Note that if the gun is loaded, Diana may have committed attempted battery assault in many jurisdictions. Attempted battery assault requires neither intent to inspire fear in the victim nor victim awareness of the defendant’s criminal act. A trier of fact could find that Diana took substantial steps toward committing harmful physical contact when she picked up a loaded gun and waved it at Dan’s back after making a verbal threat. Attempted battery assault has no harm element, so the crime is complete as soon as Diana commits the criminal act supported by criminal intent.
Assault Grading
Assault grading is very similar to battery grading in many jurisdictions. As stated previously, many modern statutes follow the Model Penal Code approach and combine assault and battery into one statute, typically called “assault.”Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1203, accessed February 20, 2011, law.onecle.com/arizona/criminal-code/13-1203.html. Simple assault is generally a misdemeanor.Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1203, accessed February 20, 2011, law.onecle.com/arizona/criminal-code/13-1203.html. Aggravated assault is generally a felony.Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1204, accessed February 20, 2011, law.onecle.com/arizona/criminal-code/13-1204.html. Factors that could enhance grading of assault are the use of a deadly weapon and assault against a law enforcement officer, teacher, or helpless individual.Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1204, accessed February 20, 2011, law.onecle.com/arizona/criminal-code/13-1204.html.
Table 10.2 Comparing Battery, Attempted Battery, and Threatened Battery Assault
Crime Criminal Act Criminal Intent Harm Grading
Battery Unlawful touching Specific or purposely, general or knowingly, reckless, or negligent Harmful or offensive physical contact Simple: misdemeanor Aggravated: felony
Attempted battery assault Substantial steps toward a battery plus present ability Specific or purposely to commit battery None required Simple: misdemeanor Aggravated: felony
Threatened battery assault Conduct that inspires fear of physical contact; words are not enough; may require apparent rather than present ability Specific or purposely to inspire fear of physical contact Victim’s reasonable fear of imminent physical contact Simple: misdemeanor Aggravated: felony
Note: Battery could also include the attendant circumstance element of lack of consent by the victim.
Exercises
• The criminal act element required for battery is an unlawful touching.
• The criminal intent element required for battery can be specific intent or purposely, general intent or knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, depending on the circumstances and the jurisdiction. Jurisdictions that criminalize reckless or negligent battery generally require actual injury, serious bodily injury, or the use of a deadly weapon.
• The attendant circumstance element required for battery is lack of consent by the victim.
• The harm element of battery is physical contact. Jurisdictions vary as to whether the physical contact must be harmful or if it can be harmful or offensive.
• Battery that causes offense or emotional injury is typically graded as a misdemeanor, and battery that causes physical injury is typically graded as a gross misdemeanor or a felony. Factors that can aggravate grading are a higher level of intent, such as intent to maim or disfigure, use of a weapon, committing battery in concert with other serious or violent felonies, and battery against a helpless victim, teacher, or law enforcement officer.
• Attempted battery assault is an attempt crime that does not require the elements of causation or harm. Threatened battery assault requires causation and harm; the victim must experience reasonable fear of imminent physical contact.
• Attempted battery assault requires the criminal act of substantial steps toward commission of a battery and the criminal intent of specific intent or purposely to commit a battery. Because attempted battery assault is an attempt crime, it also generally requires present ability to commit the battery.
• The criminal act element required for threatened battery assault is conduct that inspires reasonable fear in the victim of imminent harmful or offensive physical contact. Words generally are not enough to constitute the criminal act element, nor are conditional threats. However, because the act need only inspire the fear, rather than culminate in a battery, apparent ability to commit the battery is sufficient in many jurisdictions. The criminal intent element required for threatened battery assault is specific intent or purposely to inspire the victim’s reasonable fear. The defendant must also be the factual and legal cause of the harm, which is the victim’s reasonable fear of imminent harmful or offensive physical contact.
• Simple assault is generally graded as a misdemeanor; aggravated assault is generally graded as a felony. Factors that can aggravate grading are the use of a weapon or assault against a law enforcement officer, teacher, or helpless victim.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Bob and Rick get into an argument after drinking a few beers. Bob swings at Rick with his fist, but Rick ducks and Bob does not hit Rick. Bob swings again with the other hand, and this time he manages to punch Rick in the stomach. Identify the crimes committed in this situation. If Bob only swings once and misses, which crime(s) have been committed?
2. Read State v. Higgs, 601 N.W.2d 653 (1999). What criminal act did the defendant commit that resulted in a conviction for battery? Did the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin uphold the defendant’s conviction? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10727852975973050662&q= State+v.+Higgs+601+N.W.2d+653&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5.
3. Read Commonwealth v. Henson, 259 N.E.2d 769 (1970). In Henson, the defendant fired blanks at a police officer and was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon. The defendant appealed, claiming that he had no present ability to shoot the police officer because the gun was not loaded with bullets. Did the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts uphold the defendant’s conviction? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11962310018051202223&hl=en&as_sdt=2002&as_vis=1. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/10%3A_Sex_Offenses_and_Crimes_Involving_Force_Fear_and_Physical_Restraint/10.02%3A_Assault_and_Battery.txt |
EARNING OBJECTIVES
1. Identify the individuals covered by domestic violence statutes.
2. Identify some of the special features of domestic violence statutes.
3. Define the criminal act element required for stalking.
4. Define the criminal intent element required for stalking, and compare various statutory approaches to stalking criminal intent.
5. Define the harm element required for stalking, and compare various statutory approaches to ascertaining harm.
6. Analyze stalking grading.
Domestic violence and stalking are modern crimes that respond to societal problems that have escalated in recent years. Domestic violence statutes are drafted to address issues that are prevalent in crimes between family members or individuals living in the same household. Stalking generally punishes conduct that is a precursor to assault, battery, or other crimes against the person, as is explored in Section 10.3.
Domestic Violence
Domestic violence statutes generally focus on criminal conduct that occurs between family members. Although family cruelty or interfamily criminal behavior is not a new phenomenon, enforcement of criminal statutes against family members can be challenging because of dependence, fear, and other issues that are particular to the family unit. In addition, historical evidence indicates that law enforcement can be reluctant to get involved in family disputes and often fails to adequately protect victims who are trapped in the same residence as the defendant. Specific enforcement measures that are crafted to apply to defendants and victims who are family members are an innovative statutory approach that many jurisdictions are beginning to adopt. In general, domestic violence statutes target crimes against the person, for example, assault, battery, sex offenses, kidnapping, and criminal homicide.
Domestic Violence Statutes’ Characteristics
The purpose of many domestic violence statutes is equal enforcement and treatment of crimes between family members and maximum protection for the domestic violence victim.RCW § 10.99.010, accessed February 21, 2011, apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=10.99.010. Domestic violence statutes focus on individuals related by blood or marriage, individuals who share a child, ex-spouses and ex-lovers, and individuals who reside together.Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3601(A), accessed February 21, 2011, www.azleg.state.az.us/ars/13/03601.htm. Domestic violence statutes commonly contain the following provisions:
• Special training for law enforcement in domestic issuesRCW § 10.99.030, accessed February 21, 2011, apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=10.99.030.
• Protection of the victim by no-contact orders and nondisclosure of the victim’s residence addressRCW § 10.99.040, accessed February 21, 2011, apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=10.99.040.
• Duty of law enforcement or prosecutors to inform the victim of the decision of whether to prosecute and the duty to inform the victim of special procedures available to protect domestic violence victimsRCW § 10.99.060, accessed February 21, 2011, apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=10.99.060, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3601(J), accessed February 21, 2011, www.azleg.state.az.us/ars/13/03601.htm.
• Ability to arrest domestic violence offenders with or without a warrantAriz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3601(B), accessed February 21, 2011, www.azleg.state.az.us/ars/13/03601.htm.
• Special factors to consider in the sentencing of domestic violence defendantsRCW § 10.99.100, accessed February 21, 2011, apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=10.99.100.
• Peace officer immunity for enforcement of domestic violence provisionsAriz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3601(G), accessed February 21, 2011, www.azleg.state.az.us/ars/13/03601.htm.
Stalking
California was the first state to enact a stalking law in 1990, in response to the high-profile murder of a young actress named Rebecca Schaeffer whose attacker stalked her for two years. Now all states and the federal government have stalking laws.18 U.S.C. § 2261A, accessed February 22, 2011, www.ncvc.org/src/main.aspx?dbID=DB_Federal_Interstate_Stalking_Institute163#61a. Although statutes criminalizing stalking are gender-neutral, in reality, most stalking victims are women, and most stalking defendants are men.
Before the states enacted stalking laws, a victim who was threatened and harassed but not assaulted had no remedy except to go to court and obtain a restraining order. A restraining order is a court order mandating that the defendant neither contact nor come within a certain distance of the victim. If the defendant violated the restraining order, law enforcement could arrest him or her. Until a restraining order was in place, however, the defendant was free to continue frightening the victim. Restraining orders typically take some time to obtain. The victim must contact and employ an attorney and also set up a court hearing. For this reason, the restraining order method of preventing a defendant from stalking was cumbersome, ineffective, and frequently resulted in force or violence against the stalking victim.
The modern crime of stalking allows law enforcement to arrest and incapacitate defendants before they complete an assault, battery, or other violent crime against a victim. Like all crimes, stalking requires the defendant to commit a voluntary act supported by criminal intent. In many jurisdictions, stalking also has the elements of causation and harm, as is discussed in Section 10.3.2 "Stalking".
Stalking Act
Various approaches have been made to criminalize stalking, and a plethora of descriptors now identify the stalking criminal act. In the majority of jurisdictions, the criminal act element required for stalking includes any course of conduct that credibly threatens the victim’s safety, including following,Tex. Penal Code § 42.072, accessed February 22, 2011, www.ncvc.org/src/main.aspx?dbID=DB_Texas176. harassing,Cal. Penal Code § 646.9, accessed February 22, 2011, www.ncvc.org/src/main.aspx?dbID=DB_California176 (accessed February 22, 1022). approaching,Md. Code Ann. § 3-802, accessed February 22, 2011, www.ncvc.org/src/main.aspx?dbID=DB_Maryland678. pursuing, or making an express or implied threat to injure the victim, the victim’s family member,Ala. Code § 13A-6-90, accessed February 22, 2011, www.ncvc.org/src/main.aspx?dbID=DB_Alabama390. or the victim’s property.Tex. Penal Code § 42.072(a) (1) (c), accessed February 22, 2011, www.ncvc.org/src/main.aspx?dbID=DB_Texas176. In general, credible threat means the defendant has the apparent ability to effectuate the harm threatened.S. D. Codified Laws § 22-19A-6, accessed February 22, 2011, www.ncvc.org/src/main.aspx?dbID=DB_SouthDakota123. The stalking criminal act is unique among criminal acts in that it must occur on more than one occasion or repeatedly.Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-602, accessed February 22, 2011, www.ncvc.org/src/main.aspx?dbID=DB_Colorado285. The popularity of social networking sites and the frequency with which defendants use the Internet to stalk their victims inspired many states to specifically criminalize cyberstalking, which is the use of the Internet or e-mail to commit the criminal act of stalking.Alaska Stat. § 11.41.270 (b) (3) (F), accessed February 22, 2011, www.ncvc.org/src/main.aspx?dbID=DB_Alaska803.
Example of a Case Lacking Stalking Act
Elliot tells Lisa on two separate occasions that he loves her. Lisa intensely dislikes Elliot and wants nothing to do with him. Although Elliot’s proclamations of love are unwelcome, Elliot probably has not committed the criminal act element required for stalking. Elliot’s behavior does not threaten Lisa’s safety or the safety of her family members or property. Thus Elliot may not be charged with and convicted of stalking in most jurisdictions.
Example of Stalking Act
Change the example in Section 10 so that Elliot tells Lisa he loves her on one occasion. Lisa frowns and walks away. Elliot then follows Lisa and tells her that he will “make her pay” for not loving him. Lisa ignores Elliot’s statement, climbs into her car, and drives away. Later that evening, Elliot rings Lisa’s doorbell. Lisa does not answer the door but yells at Elliot, telling him to leave. Disgruntled and angry, Elliot carves, “you will die for not loving me” into Lisa’s front door with his pocketknife.
Elliot’s conduct could constitute the criminal act element required for stalking in most jurisdictions. In this example, Elliot has followed Lisa and approached her, which is a repeated course of conduct. On two occasions Elliot threatened Lisa: once by telling her he will “make her pay” and again by carving a death threat into her front door. Keep in mind that Elliot’s threat to Lisa’s safety must be credible in many jurisdictions. Thus if Elliot is unable to actually harm Lisa for any reason, the trier of fact could find that he does not have the apparent ability to carry out his threat, and he could not be convicted of stalking.
Stalking Intent
The criminal intent element required for stalking also varies, depending on the jurisdiction. In most states, the defendant must commit the criminal act willfully or maliciously.Cal. Penal Code § 646.9, accessed February 22, 2011, www.ncvc.org/src/main.aspx?dbID=DB_California176 (accessed February 22, 1022). This indicates a specific intent or purposeful conduct. However, in states that require the victim to experience harm, a different criminal intent could support the harm offense element. States that include bad results or harm in their stalking statutes require either specific intent or purposely, general intent or knowingly, reckless intent, negligent intent, or strict liability (no intent) to cause the harm, depending on the state.“Criminal Stalking Laws,” Ncvc.org website, accessed February 22, 2011, www.ncvc.org/src/main.aspx?dbID=DB_State-byState_Statutes117.
Example of Stalking Intent
Review the stalking act example in Section 10. In the majority of states, Elliot must make the threatening statement and carve the threatening message into Lisa’s front door willfully or maliciously. However, the requirement that Elliot act with the intent to cause Lisa’s reaction to this conduct varies, depending on the jurisdiction. In some jurisdictions, Elliot must act with the specific intent or purposely to cause Lisa to suffer the stalking harm, which is generally fear for bodily safety, the safety of family members, or fear of damage to Lisa’s property. In others, Elliot can act to cause Lisa’s fear with general intent or knowingly, reckless intent, or negligent intent. In some jurisdictions, Elliot’s purpose or awareness as to Lisa’s feeling of fear is irrelevant because strict liability is the intent supporting the harm or bad results requirement.
Stalking Causation
In jurisdictions that require harm for stalking, the defendant’s criminal act must be the factual and legal cause of the harm, which is defined in Section 10.
Stalking Harm
As stated previously, some states require a specific harm element in their stalking statutes. This element is defined differently depending on the state but generally amounts to victim fear. The fear is typically fear of bodily injury or death of the victimAla. Code § 13A-6-90, accessed February 22, 2011, www.ncvc.org/src/main.aspx?dbID=DB_Alabama390. or of the victim’s family member,Alaska Stat. § 11.41.270 (a), www.ncvc.org/src/main.aspx?dbID=DB_Alaska803. or damage to the victim’s property.Tex. Penal Code § 42.072(a) (1) (C), accessed February 22, 2011, www.ncvc.org/src/main.aspx?dbID=DB_Texas176. States also employ different tests to ascertain the harm element. States can require subjective and objective fear,Tex. Penal Code § 42.072, accessed February 22, 2011, www.ncvc.org/src/main.aspx?dbID=DB_Texas176. just subjective fear,Alaska Stat. § 11.41.270 (a), accessed February 22, 2011, www.ncvc.org/src/main.aspx?dbID=DB_Alaska803. or just objective fear.Md. Code Ann. § 3-802, accessed February 22, 2011, www.ncvc.org/src/main.aspx?dbID=DB_Maryland678. Subjective fear means the victim must actually experience fear. Objective fear means a reasonable victim under similar circumstances would experience fear.
Example of Stalking Harm
Review the stalking act example in Section 10. In jurisdictions that require subjective and objective victim fear as the harm element for stalking, Elliot must cause Lisa to experience fear that is reasonable under the circumstances. In a jurisdiction that requires only subjective victim fear, Elliot must cause Lisa to feel fear, either reasonably or unreasonably. In a jurisdiction that requires only objective fear, Elliot must act in a manner that would cause a reasonable victim under similar circumstances to experience fear. Keep in mind that if Lisa is aware of a circumstance that makes it unlikely that Elliot can carry out his threat, Elliot could not be convicted of stalking in a jurisdiction that requires Lisa to experience subjective fear.
Stalking Grading
Jurisdictions vary as to how they grade stalking. Many states divide stalking into degrees or grade it as simple and aggravated. First-degree or aggravated stalking is generally graded as a felony, and second-degree or simple stalking is generally graded as a misdemeanor.Alaska Stat. §§ 11.41.260, 11.41.270, accessed February 22, 2011, www.ncvc.org/src/main.aspx?dbID=DB_Alaska803. Factors that could enhance grading are the violation of a restraining or protective order, the use of a weapon, a youthful victim, or previous convictions for stalking.Alaska Stat. § 11.41.260, accessed February 24, 2011, www.ncvc.org/src/main.aspx?dbID=DB_Alaska803.
Exercises
• Individuals covered by domestic violence statutes are relatives by blood or marriage, individuals who share a child, ex-spouses and ex-lovers, and individuals who reside together.
• Some special features of domestic violence statutes are special training for law enforcement in domestic issues, protection of the victim by no-contact orders and nondisclosure of the victim’s residence address, the duty of law enforcement or prosecutors to inform the victim of the decision of whether to prosecute and the duty to inform the victim of special procedures available to protect domestic violence victims, the ability to arrest domestic violence offenders with or without a warrant, special factors to consider in the sentencing of domestic violence defendants, and peace officer immunity for enforcement of domestic violence provisions.
• The criminal act element required for stalking varies, but in general it is repeatedly engaging in a course of conduct that poses a credible threat to the victim’s safety, including following, harassing, approaching, or pursuing the victim.
• The criminal intent supporting the stalking criminal act is specific intent or purposely in most jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions require a different criminal intent to support the harm requirement: either specific intent or purposely, general intent or knowingly, reckless intent, negligent intent, or strict liability.
• Some jurisdictions require the defendant to cause harm, which is victim fear of serious bodily injury, fear of death of the victim or the victim’s family member, or damage to the victim’s property. The test for victim fear varies and could be either subjective and objective fear, just subjective fear, or just objective fear.
• It is common to divide stalking into degrees or grade it as simple and aggravated. First-degree or aggravated stalking is generally graded as a felony, and second-degree or simple stalking is generally graded as a misdemeanor. Factors that can aggravate grading are the violation of a restraining or protective order, the use of a weapon, a youthful victim, or previous convictions for stalking.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Chris punches and slaps Rhianna, his roommate and girlfriend. Could this be considered domestic violence?
2. Read State v. Holbach, 2009 ND 37 (2009). In Holbach, the defendant appealed a conviction for stalking based on his constitutionally protected right to travel around town and do errands. The defendant was on probation for stalking the victim and subject to conditions of probation, including a stay-away order. However, the victim claimed that she saw the defendant following her around town on many occasions. Did the Supreme Court of North Dakota uphold the defendant’s stalking conviction? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14788412528928431856&q= stalking&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2009.
3. Read Burke v. State, 676 S.E.2d 766 (2009). Why did the Court of Appeals of Georgia reverse the defendant’s conviction for aggravated stalking in this case? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14247986447862424093&q= stalking&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2009. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/10%3A_Sex_Offenses_and_Crimes_Involving_Force_Fear_and_Physical_Restraint/10.03%3A_Domestic_Violence_and_Stalking.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Define the criminal act element required for kidnapping.
2. Define the criminal intent element required for kidnapping.
3. Define the harm element required for kidnapping.
4. Define the attendant circumstance element required for kidnapping.
5. Analyze kidnapping grading.
6. Compare false imprisonment with kidnapping.
7. Identify two potential defenses to kidnapping and false imprisonment.
8. Identify two special features of interference with custody statutes.
Kidnapping and false imprisonment are crimes that involve physical restraint and intrude on the liberty interests of victims. In ancient times, kidnapping was used to remove members of royalty from the kingdom for ransom or to implement the overthrow of the existing monarchy. In the United States, high-profile kidnapping cases, such as the Lindbergh baby kidnapping in the 1930s, and the frequency with which organized crime participated in kidnapping led many states to impose the harshest penalties for this offense: the death penalty or life in prison without the possibility of parole.
In modern times, kidnapping is still a serious felony, although the US Supreme Court has held that capital punishment for any crime against an individual other than criminal homicide is unconstitutional. False imprisonment is generally a lesser included offense of kidnapping and is graded lower, as is discussed in Section 10.4.2 "False Imprisonment".
Kidnapping Elements
In most jurisdictions, kidnapping has the elements of criminal act, criminal intent, causation, harm, and an attendant circumstance.
Kidnapping Act
The criminal act element required for kidnapping is twofold. First, the defendant must confine the victim.720 ILCS § 5/10-1, law.onecle.com/illinois/720ilcs5/10-1.html. Second, in many states, the defendant must move the victim, which is called asportation. One common issue with the kidnapping criminal act is how far the victim must be moved. In the majority of states, the movement can be slight, as long as it is not incidental to the commission of a separate offense.People v. Dominguez, 140 P.2d 866 (2006), accessed February 24, 2011, scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3515612573668484000&q= People+v.+Dominguez&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. Other states do not require asportation when the kidnapping is for ransom.N.R.S. § 200.310, accessed February 24, 2011, law.onecle.com/nevada/crimes/200.310.html. Some states have done away with the asportation requirement altogether.N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-39(a), accessed February 24, 2011, law.onecle.com/north-carolina/14-criminal-law/14-39.html. The Model Penal Code requires the movement to be from the victim’s residence, place of business, or “a substantial distance from the vicinity where he is found” (Model Penal Code § 212.1). However, when the kidnapping is for ransom, for the purpose of committing a felony, to inflict bodily injury or terrorize the victim or another, or to interfere with the performance of a governmental or political function, the Model Penal Code does not require asportation, although it does require confinement for a “substantial period in a place of isolation” (Model Penal Code § 212.1).
Example of a Case Lacking Kidnapping Act
Joseph breaks into Abby’s home and sees Abby sitting on the couch. A picture window in front of the couch puts Abby in full view of the street and sidewalk. To avoid detection, Joseph grabs Abby off the living room couch and drags her into the bedroom to rape her. Joseph has probably not committed the criminal act element required for kidnapping if the kidnapping statute in Joseph’s state requires asportation. Joseph forcibly confined Abby when he grabbed her. However, his movement of Abby from the couch to the bedroom appears incidental to the crime of rape, which is not sufficient to constitute kidnapping asportation in most jurisdictions.
Kidnapping Intent
The criminal intent element required for kidnapping in many jurisdictions is specific intent or purposely to commit the criminal act in order to harm or injure the victim or another, confine or hold the victim in secret,N.R.S. § 200.310(2), accessed February 24, 2011, law.onecle.com/nevada/crimes/200.310.html. receive a ransom, commit a separate offense, subject the victim to involuntary servitude, or interfere with the purpose of the government or some political function.Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1304, accessed February 24, 2011, law.onecle.com/arizona/criminal-code/13-1304.html.
Example of Kidnapping Intent
Review the example in Section 10 with Joseph and Abby. Change this example so that Joseph drags Abby to his car, stuffs her into the trunk, and then drives fifteen miles to a deserted field where he thereafter removes her from the trunk and rapes her. Joseph probably has the criminal intent required for kidnapping in most jurisdictions. Joseph committed the criminal act of forcible confinement and asportation with the purpose of raping Abby, which is specific intent or purposely to “commit a separate offense.” Thus if the other elements of kidnapping are present, Joseph can most likely be charged with and convicted of kidnapping, along with the crime of rape.
Kidnapping Causation
In jurisdictions that require harm for kidnapping, the defendant’s criminal act must be the factual and legal cause of the harm, which is defined in Section 10.
Kidnapping Harm
The harm element required for kidnapping in most jurisdictions is confinement and asportation. As stated previously, some jurisdictions have done away with the asportation requirement or do not require asportation when the kidnapping is for ransom.
Kidnapping Attendant Circumstance
In many jurisdictions, the attendant circumstance element required for kidnapping is that the confinement or asportation occur against the victim’s will or without the victim’s consent.N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-39, accessed February 24, 2011, law.onecle.com/north-carolina/14-criminal-law/14-39.html. Thus consent could function as a failure of proof or affirmative defense to kidnapping.
Example of a Case Lacking Kidnapping Attendant Circumstance
Thomas sees Shawna hitchhiking on the side of a busy freeway at night. Thomas pulls over, rolls down the window, and asks Shawna if she wants a ride. Shawna says, “sure,” and climbs into Thomas’s vehicle. Thomas drives away with Shawna in the front seat. Thomas has not committed kidnapping in this case. Although Thomas confined and moved Shawna in his vehicle, the facts do not indicate that he has the specific intent to harm her, obtain a ransom, confine her in secret, or commit a separate offense. In addition, Shawna consented to the confinement and asportation. Thus the attendant circumstance element for kidnapping is also absent and Thomas’s conduct may be perfectly legal (unless engaging in hitchhiking is illegal in Thomas’s state).
Example of Kidnapping Attendant Circumstance
Change the example given in Section 10 so that after fifty miles of driving, Shawna asks Thomas to pull over and let her out. Thomas refuses, threatens to harm Shawna if she tries to escape, and continues to drive another twenty miles with Shawna in the front seat. If Thomas acted with the proper kidnapping intent, Thomas might have committed kidnapping in this case. Although Shawna’s original entrance into Thomas’s vehicle and her asportation for the first fifty miles was consensual, once Shawna requested that Thomas pull over and let her out, the confinement or asportation was against Shawna’s will and without her consent. If the trier of fact determines that twenty miles is far enough to constitute sufficient asportation for kidnapping, Thomas could be charged with or convicted of this offense.
Kidnapping Grading
Jurisdictions vary as to how they grade kidnapping. The Model Penal Code grades kidnapping as a felony of the first or second degree (Model Penal Code § 212.1). Many states divide kidnapping into degrees or grade it as simple and aggravated.N.R.S. § 200.310, accessed February 24, 2011, law.onecle.com/nevada/crimes/200.310.html. First-degree or aggravated kidnapping is generally graded as a serious felony, and second-degree or simple kidnapping is generally graded as a lower-level felony.N.R.S. § 200.310, accessed February 24, 2011, law.onecle.com/nevada/crimes/200.310.html. One factor that could mitigate or reduce grading is the defendant’s release of the victim unharmed in a safe place.Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1304(B), accessed February 24, 2011, law.onecle.com/arizona/criminal-code/13-1304.html. Factors that could enhance grading are the youth of the victimAriz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1304, accessed February 24, 2011, law.onecle.com/arizona/criminal-code/13-1304.html. or the infliction of serious bodily injury.N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-39, accessed February 24, 2011, law.onecle.com/north-carolina/14-criminal-law/14-39.html. When kidnapping takes a victim across state lines, the defendant can also be prosecuted for the additional offense of federal kidnapping.18 U.S.C. § 1201, accessed February 27, 2011, www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/usc_sec_18_00001201----000-.html.
False Imprisonment
In many jurisdictions, false imprisonment, also called felonious restraint, is a lesser included offense of kidnapping. This means that the crime of false imprisonment is missing one or two of the kidnapping elements and is graded lower than kidnapping. Often, false imprisonment functions as a partial defense to kidnapping because of the less serious sentencing options. In general, false imprisonment and felonious restraint under the Model Penal Code require confinement but not asportation (Model Penal Code §212.2).18 Pa. C. S. § 2903, accessed February 25, 2011, law.onecle.com/pennsylvania/crimes-and-offenses/00.029.003.000.html. In some jurisdictions, false imprisonment requires only general intent or knowingly to commit the criminal act, rather than the specific intent or purposely to commit other crimes, harm the victim, or receive a ransom.720 ILCS § 5/10-3, accessed February 25, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/illinois/720ilcs5/10-3.html. False imprisonment does not require movement and has a lower level of intent, so it is generally graded as a gross misdemeanor or a low-level felony.18 Pa. C. S. § 2903, accessed February 25, 2011, law.onecle.com/pennsylvania/crimes-and-offenses/00.029.003.000.html. The Model Penal Code grades felonious restraint as a felony of the third degree (Model Penal Code § 212.2). Factors that can aggravate grading of false imprisonment are the youth of the victim18 Pa. C. S. § 2903, accessed February 25, 2011, law.onecle.com/pennsylvania/crimes-and-offenses/00.029.003.000.html. or the use of force or violence to carry out the criminal act.Cal. Penal Code § 237, accessed February 25, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/237.html.
Example of False Imprisonment
Review the case example given in Section 10. Change the facts so that after fifty miles of driving, Shawna asks Thomas to pull over and let her out. Thomas pulls over but thereafter locks all the doors and refuses to let Shawna out for twenty minutes, in spite of her begging and pleading for him to unlock the doors. In this case, Thomas might have committed false imprisonment. Although Shawna’s entrance into Thomas’s vehicle was consensual, when Thomas confined Shawna to his vehicle by locking the doors, he deprived her of her liberty against her will. Thomas did not move Shawna without her consent because he pulled over and stopped the vehicle at her request. However, asportation is not required for false imprisonment. Although Thomas’s actions do not indicate specific intent or purposely to injure Shawna, commit a separate offense, or seek ransom, often general intent or knowingly to commit the criminal act is sufficient for false imprisonment. Thus these facts indicate the lower-level crime of false imprisonment rather than kidnapping, and Thomas may be charged with and convicted of this offense.
Potential Defenses to Kidnapping and False Imprisonment
As stated previously, consent is a potential failure of proof or affirmative defense to kidnapping and false imprisonment in some jurisdictions. Another potential defense is lawful authority to execute the kidnapping or false imprisonment. Thus when a law enforcement officer or a citizen lawfully arrests a defendant, he or she is not committing kidnapping or false imprisonment. By the same token, if an arrest is executed unlawfully, it might be kidnapping, false imprisonment, or another related offense.N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-43.1, accessed February 25, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/north-carolina/14-criminal-law/14-43.1.html.
Interference with Custody
Because of a dramatic increase in the abduction of children by their estranged parents and parental interference with child custody and visitation agreements, almost all states have specifically criminalized interference with the custody of children18 Pa. C. S. § 2904, accessed February 25, 2011, law.onecle.com/pennsylvania/crimes-and-offenses/00.029.004.000.html. or unlawful visitation.720 ILCS § 5/10-5.5, accessed February 25, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/illinois/720ilcs5/10-5.5.html. The significant features of these modern offenses are their specific applicability to parents as defendants and various defenses based on the good faith belief that the child would be in danger without the allegedly criminal conduct.18 Pa. C. S. § 2904, accessed February 25, 2011, law.onecle.com/pennsylvania/crimes-and-offenses/00.029.004.000.html. Grading of these offenses varies, with some states grading nonforcible parental interference with custody as a misdemeanor720 ILCS § 5/10-5.5, accessed February 25, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/illinois/720ilcs5/10-5.5.html. and others as a low-level felony.18 Pa. C. S. § 2904, accessed February 25, 2011, law.onecle.com/pennsylvania/crimes-and-offenses/00.029.004.000.html.
Table 10.3 Comparing Kidnapping and False Imprisonment
Crime Criminal Act Criminal Intent Harm Circumstance Grading
Kidnapping Confinement plus asportation Specific or purposely Confinement plus asportation Lack of consent Felony
False imprisonment Confinement General or knowingly in some jurisdictions Confinement Lack of consent Gross misdemeanor or low-level felony
Exercises
• The criminal act element required for kidnapping in many jurisdictions is confinement and asportation of the victim. Some states do not require asportation when the kidnapping is for ransom, and others have done away with the asportation requirement altogether.
• The criminal intent element required for kidnapping in many jurisdictions is the specific intent or purposely to commit the criminal act in order to harm or injure the victim or another, confine or hold the victim in secret, receive a ransom, commit a separate offense, subject the victim to involuntary servitude, or interfere with the purpose of the government or some political function.
• The harm element required for kidnapping in many jurisdictions is confinement and asportation of the victim.
• The attendant circumstance element required for kidnapping is lack of victim consent.
• Kidnapping is generally graded as first degree or aggravated or as second degree or simple. First-degree or aggravated kidnapping is typically a serious felony, while second-degree or simple kidnapping is typically a low-level felony. One factor that could mitigate or reduce grading is the release of the victim unharmed in a safe place. Factors that could aggravate grading are the youth of the victim or the infliction of serious bodily injury.
• False imprisonment is often a lesser included offense of kidnapping, missing the asportation element, and requiring general intent or knowing commission of the criminal act. False imprisonment is also graded lower than kidnapping as either a gross misdemeanor or a low-level felony.
• Two potential defenses to kidnapping and false imprisonment are victim consent and a lawful arrest by a law enforcement officer or citizen.
• Interference with custody statutes specifically include parents as defendants and allow for a good faith defense that a child would suffer injury if not for the allegedly criminal conduct.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Coby is in the process of robbing a bank. When a security guard threatens to shoot Coby, he grabs a customer in the bank and holds a knife to her throat. Coby thereafter demands a getaway vehicle and fifty thousand dollars in cash in exchange for the hostage’s release. Has Coby committed kidnapping in this case? Why or why not?
2. Read State v. Salaman, 949 A.2d 1092 (2008). In Salaman, the defendant grabbed the victim, pinned her to the stairs for five minutes, punched her in the face, and violently stuck his fingers down her throat. He was thereafter convicted of second-degree kidnapping and appealed, claiming his restraint of the victim was merely incidental to the crime of assault. In Connecticut, the state where the offense occurred, the kidnapping criminal act is restraint with the specific intent to prevent the victim’s liberation. Connecticut also had case precedent holding that restraint that is incidental to the commission of a separate offense is still kidnapping. Did the Supreme Court of Connecticut uphold the defendant’s conviction? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13933358391504195031&q= kidnapping&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2008.
3. Read Commonwealth v. Rivera, 828 A.2d 1094 (2003). In Rivera, the defendant, who had a court order depriving him of custody, forcibly removed his daughter from her day care and drove around with her in his car, frequently calling and terrorizing the child’s mother. The defendant’s daughter disappeared, and the defendant was later convicted of felony murder, kidnapping, and other offenses. The underlying felony for the felony murder was kidnapping, and the defendant appealed claiming he could not legally kidnap his own biological child. Did the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirm the defendant’s felony murder and kidnapping convictions? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6955582630525573237&q= %22interference+with+the+custody+of+children%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/10%3A_Sex_Offenses_and_Crimes_Involving_Force_Fear_and_Physical_Restraint/10.04%3A_Kidnapping_and_False_Imprisonment.txt |
Summary
States vary as to how they categorize and grade sex offenses. In general, rape is knowing, forcible sexual intercourse without consent or with consent obtained involuntarily. Although the victim had to resist to indicate lack of consent at early common law, in modern times the victim need not resist if it would be futile to do so. Another modernization from common-law rape is the elimination of an exemption for spousal rape and the elimination of the requirement that victim testimony in a rape case be corroborated. Most states have rape shield laws that govern the admissibility of evidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct at a trial for rape. Sodomy and oral copulation are sometimes combined and included with rape in one statute called sexual assault. If sodomy and oral copulation are the subject of separate statutes, sodomy is typically knowing forcible penis to anus penetration, and oral copulation is typically knowing forcible mouth to sexual organ or anus penetration. Statutory rape is generally sexual intercourse with an underage victim either recklessly, negligently, or with strict liability depending on the jurisdiction, and incest is generally knowing sexual intercourse between family members who cannot marry. States vary as to how they grade sex offenses, with force and penetration enhancing the grading to a felony in most jurisdictions.
Assault and battery are often included in the same statute (called assault) but are actually separate offenses with distinct elements. Battery is generally a purposeful, knowing, reckless, or negligent (depending on the jurisdiction) unlawful harmful or offensive touching without victim consent. Assault can be attempted battery, in which case all the elements of battery except the physical contact are present, or threatened battery, which is a purposeful act that causes apprehension of harmful or offensive physical contact in the victim. Simple battery and simple assault are typically misdemeanors, while aggravated versions of these offenses are often felonies. Factors that can aggravate the grading of assault and battery are the use of a weapon or serious injury.
Domestic violence statutes criminalize conduct such as assault, battery, sex offenses, or criminal homicide between family members and have special provisions that pertain to interfamily violence. Stalking criminalizes a purposeful course of conduct that poses a credible threat to the victim’s safety. Cyberstalking is the use of the Internet or e-mail to commit stalking. Simple stalking is generally a misdemeanor, while aggravated stalking, which is stalking that causes injury or violates a restraining order, is generally a felony.
Kidnapping is the purposeful confinement and asportation (movement) of a victim for the purpose of injuring or harming the victim or another, hiding the victim in secret, obtaining a ransom, committing a separate offense, subjecting the victim to involuntary servitude, or interfering with the purpose of government or political function. False imprisonment is a lesser included offense of kidnapping that does not include asportation or specific intent. Interference with custody is parental kidnapping or violation of a child custody or visitation agreement. While kidnapping is typically a felony, false imprisonment and interference with custody are generally graded lower, as either a gross misdemeanor or low-level felony.
YOU BE THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER
You are a newly hired law enforcement officer starting out in the file room. You have been given five case files. To properly file them, first read over the facts of each case, determine which crime has been committed, and determine whether the crime is a misdemeanor or felony. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. The defendant was on a date with the victim. After a few drinks, the victim became extremely intoxicated, and the defendant had to have help carrying him to her vehicle. The defendant thereafter drove to a secluded area where she had sexual intercourse with the victim. The victim was unconscious and did not discover the act of sexual intercourse until two months later when the defendant told him she was pregnant. Which crime has been committed? Is the crime a misdemeanor or a felony?
2. The defendant, a security guard, forced the victim, a shopper in the store, to kiss him by threatening to falsely arrest her for shoplifting if she refused. Which crime is this? Is this a misdemeanor or a felony?
3. The defendant chased the victim with a knife for two miles. After the defendant was arrested, law enforcement determined that the “knife” was made of rubber and could not cause injury. Which crime has been committed? Is the crime a misdemeanor or a felony?
4. The defendant grabbed a law enforcement officer’s gun and pointed it at him while the law enforcement officer was having coffee in a local restaurant. Which crime has been committed? Is the crime a misdemeanor or a felony?
5. The defendant, a jilted lover, picked up her ex-boyfriend’s child from school and took her to an amusement park where they spent the afternoon going on rides and eating junk food. Which crime has been committed? Is the crime a misdemeanor or a felony?
Cases of Interest
• U.S. v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997), discusses sexual assault by a judge as the subject of a federal criminal action: http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/95-1717.ZS.html
• Oregon v. Rangel, 934 P.2d 1128 (1997), discusses the constitutionality of Oregon’s stalking statute under the First Amendment: www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/S44151.htm.
• Chatwin v. U.S., 326 U.S. 455 (1946), discusses federal kidnapping in the context of joining a religious cult: http://supreme.justia.com/us/326/455/case.html.
Articles of Interest
• High-profile criminal cases, including rape criminal cases: lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2240&context=bclr
• The sexual assault case of former IMF chief, Dominique Strauss-Kahn: www.nytimes.com/2011/05/26/nyregion/strauss-kahns-lead-prosecutor-is-said-to-be-replaced.html
• Cyberstalking among college students: btci.stanford.clockss.org/cgi/reprint/5/3/279
• Parental kidnapping and domestic violence: www.vaw.umn.edu/documents/pkreport/pkreport.html
Answers to Exercises
From Section 10.1
1. The sexual intercourse could be rape or statutory rape if either Jorge or Christina (or both) are incapable of rendering legal consent because they are below the age of consent, have mental or intellectual disabilities, or are intoxicated. If Jorge and Christina are incapable of marrying because of a family relationship, their sexual intercourse could be incest.
2. The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the defendant’s conviction on the grounds that force and victim resistance are not required when a victim is under the age of legal consent. The court specifically stated that the victim’s inability to legally consent vitiates the need to prove the defendant’s use of force for rape.
3. The Court of Appeals of Texas held that state legislatures have broad powers to define crimes and criminal intent requirements, including the power to eliminate a culpable mental state. Thus the court upheld the defendant’s conviction and did not strike the strict liability aggravated sexual assault statute. The court reviewed significant state and federal precedent to determine that the majority of states disallow the mistake of age defense, and that this does not violate federal or Texas state due process because it is supported by the legitimate government interest of protecting children.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 10.2
1. In the first scenario where Bob swings once and misses, then swings again and connects, two crimes have been committed: assault and battery. The first swing that misses is an assault. The swing that punches Rick in the stomach is a battery. In the second scenario, where Bob only swings and misses, only an assault has been committed.
2. The defendant threw a cup of urine in the victim’s face. Although the battery statute in Wisconsin requires bodily harm, the court held that the stinging sensation in the victim’s eyes was sufficient and upheld the defendant’s conviction.
3. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld the defendant’s conviction, reasoning that the defendant’s apparent ability to consummate the shooting is what is essential to the crime of assault with a deadly weapon, not the secret fact that the gun is loaded with blanks rather than bullets.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 10.3
1. Most domestic violence statutes include individuals residing together, so this could be domestic violence battery or assault.
2. The Supreme Court of North Dakota upheld the defendant’s conviction, stating that the constitutional right to travel is not absolute and can be restricted to protect a victim from harm, as in this case.
3. The Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed the defendant’s conviction because aggravated stalking in Georgia requires a course of conduct violating a protective order. In this case, the prosecution only proved that the defendant committed one act violating the protective order.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 10.4
1. If Coby’s state does not require asportation for kidnapping when the kidnapping is for ransom, then Coby has probably committed kidnapping. He confined a victim against her will with the purpose of committing another offense (theft) and demanded a ransom, which are all the elements of kidnapping.
2. The Connecticut Supreme Court rejected precedent and changed the rule that an act of kidnapping could be incidental to the commission of a separate offense. Thereafter, the court ordered a new trial on the kidnapping charge, although it surmised that a jury could reasonably find the defendant guilty of kidnapping separate from the assault.
3. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the defendant’s convictions, holding that the kidnapping statute applied to any individual—including a parent.
Answer to Law and Ethics Question
1. Rape shield laws focus on the protection of the victim at trial and preclude the admission of evidence of the victim’s sexual history (other than a sexual history with the defendant). They do not necessarily prevent the media from publishing information about the victim or from taunting the victim. Of course, in the Bryant case, this publication ended up badly demoralizing and frightening the victim, leading to the eventual demise of the rape case against Bryant. However, blanket prohibitions against publication of information by the media would be overbroad and would violate the First Amendment. A balance must be present between protection of the victim, preservation of the right to a fair trial, and freedom of speech. This case illustrates the damage the media can do to a fair trial, unprejudiced jury, and a willing and cooperative victim. However, the public’s right to know is also paramount and cannot be sublimated without narrow tailoring and a compelling government interest.
Answers to You Be the Law Enforcement Officer
1. The crime is rape. Although nonforcible, sexual intercourse with an inebriated or unconscious victim is still rape. Rape can be committed by a woman in most jurisdictions. Rape is a felony.
2. The crime is simple battery, as long as your jurisdiction criminalizes “offensive” physical contact. Simple battery is a misdemeanor.
3. The crime is threatened battery assault. Threatened battery assault typically requires apparent, rather than present, ability. Threatened battery assault that does not involve a deadly weapon is a misdemeanor.
4. The crime is assault with a deadly weapon. The defendant committed the assault with a deadly weapon and inflicted it against a law enforcement officer, so the assault is a felony.
5. The crime is kidnapping. Although the child was unharmed, children cannot give legal consent, so the crime was complete once there was confinement and asportation with the proper criminal intent (most likely the intent to “confine the child in secret”). Kidnapping is a felony. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/10%3A_Sex_Offenses_and_Crimes_Involving_Force_Fear_and_Physical_Restraint/10.05%3A_End-of-Chapter_Material.txt |
Arson is one of the easiest crimes to commit on the spur of the moment…it takes only seconds to light a match to a pile of clothes or a curtain…
- People v. Atkins, cited in Section 11
Source: Image courtesy of Jane F. Kardashian, MD.
11.01: Nonviolent Theft Crimes
Learning Objectives
1. Define the criminal act element required for consolidated theft statutes.
2. Define the criminal intent element required for consolidated theft statutes.
3. Define the attendant circumstances required for consolidated theft statutes.
4. Define the harm element required for consolidated theft statutes, and distinguish the harm required for larceny theft from the harm required for false pretenses theft.
5. Analyze consolidated theft grading.
6. Define the elements required for federal mail fraud, and analyze federal mail fraud grading.
Although crimes against the person such as murder and rape are considered extremely heinous, crimes against property can cause enormous loss, suffering, and even personal injury or death. In this section, you review different classifications of nonviolent theft crimes that are called white-collar crimes when they involve commercial theft. Upcoming sections analyze theft crimes that involve force or threat, receiving stolen property, and crimes that invade or damage property, such as burglary and arson. Computer crimes including hacking, identity theft, and intellectual property infringement are explored in an exercise at the end of the chapter.
Consolidated Theft Statutes
Historically, nonviolent theft was broken down into three categories: larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses. The categories differ in the type of property that can be stolen and the method of stealing. Modern jurisdictions combine all three categories of nonviolent theft into one consolidated theft statute, with a uniform grading system largely dependent on the value of the stolen property. The Model Penal Code consolidates all nonviolent theft offenses, including receiving stolen property and extortion, under one grading system (Model Penal Code § 223.1). What follows is a discussion of theft as defined in modern consolidated theft statutes, making note of the traditional distinctions among the various theft categories when appropriate. Theft has the elements of criminal act, criminal intent, attendant circumstances, causation, and harm, as is discussed in this chapter.
Consolidated Theft Act
The criminal act element required under consolidated theft statutes is stealing real property, personal property, or services. Real property is land and anything permanently attached to land, like a building. Personal property is any movable item. Personal property can be tangible property, like money, jewelry, vehicles, electronics, cellular telephones, and clothing. Personal property can also be intangible property, which means it has value, but it cannot be touched or held, like stocks and bonds. The Model Penal Code criminalizes theft by unlawful taking of movable property, theft by deception, theft of services, and theft by failure to make required disposition of funds received under one consolidated grading provision (Model Penal Code §§ 223.1, 223.2, 223.3, 223.7, 223.8).
The act of stealing can be carried out in more than one way. When the defendant steals by a physical taking, the theft is generally a larceny theft. The act of taking is twofold. First, the defendant must gain control over the item. Then the defendant must move the item, which is called asportation, as it is with kidnapping.Britt v. Commonwealth, 667 S.E.2d 763 (2008), accessed March 8, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2834311189194937383&q= larceny+asportation&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=1999. Although asportation for kidnapping must be a certain distance in many jurisdictions, the asportation for larceny can be any distance—even the slightest motion is sufficient.Britt v. Commonwealth, 667 S.E.2d 763 (2008), accessed March 8, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2834311189194937383&q= larceny+asportation&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=1999. Control plus asportation can be accomplished by the defendant’s physical act or by deceiving the victim into transferring the property with a false representation of fact. This is called larceny by trick. Because larceny requires a physical taking, it generally only pertains to personal property.
Another way for a defendant to steal property is to convert it to the defendant’s use or ownership. Conversion generally occurs when the victim transfers possession of the property to the defendant, and the defendant thereafter appropriates the property transferred. When the defendant steals by conversion, the theft is generally an embezzlement theft.Commonwealth v. Mills, 436 Mass. 387 (2002), accessed March 7, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14428947695245966729&q= larceny+false+pretenses+embezzlement&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=1997. Embezzlement could occur when the defendant gains possession of property from a friendship or a family relationship or from a paid relationship such as employer-employee or attorney-client. Embezzlement does not require a physical taking, so it can pertain to real or personal property.
When the defendant steals by a false representation of fact, and the subject of the theft is a service, the theft is generally a false pretenses theft.Cal. Penal Code § 484(a), accessed March 8, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/484.html. False pretenses can also be used to steal personal or real property and is very similar to larceny by trick in this regard. What differentiates false pretenses from larceny by trick is the status of the property after it is stolen, which is discussed under the harm element of consolidated theft statutes.
To summarize, whether the defendant steals by a physical taking, a conversion, or a false representation of fact, and whether the defendant steals real or personal property or a service, the crime is theft under modern consolidated theft statutes and is graded primarily on the value of the property or service stolen.
Example of Consolidated Theft Act
Jeremy stops by the local convenience store on his way to work and buys some cigarettes. Before paying for the cigarettes, Jeremy slips a package of chewing gum into his pocket and does not pay for it. Jeremy continues walking to his job at a local gas station. When one of the customers buys gas, Jeremy only rings him up for half of the amount purchased. Once the gas station closes, Jeremy takes the other half out of the cash register and puts it in his pocket with the chewing gum. After work, Jeremy decides to have a drink at a nearby bar. While enjoying his drink, he meets a patron named Chuck, who is a taxi driver. Chuck mentions that his taxi needs a tune-up. Jeremy offers to take Chuck back to the gas station and do the tune-up in exchange for a taxi ride home. Chuck eagerly agrees. The two drive to the gas station, and Jeremy suggests that Chuck take a walk around the block while he performs the tune-up. While Chuck is gone, Jeremy lifts the hood of the taxi and then proceeds to read a magazine. When Chuck returns twenty-five minutes later, Jeremy tells him the tune-up is complete. Chuck thereafter drives Jeremy home for free.
In this scenario, Jeremy has performed three separate acts of theft. When Jeremy slips the package of chewing gum into his pocket without paying for it, he has physically taken personal property, which is a larceny theft. When Jeremy fails to ring up the entire sale for a customer and pockets the rest from the cash register, he has converted the owner of the gas station’s cash for his own use, which is an embezzlement theft. When Jeremy falsely represents to Chuck that he has performed a tune-up of Chuck’s taxi and receives a free taxi ride in payment, he has falsely represented a fact in exchange for a service, which is a false pretenses theft. All three of these acts of theft could be prosecuted under one consolidated theft statute. The three stolen items have a relatively low value, so these crimes would probably be graded as a misdemeanor. Grading of theft under consolidated theft statutes is discussed shortly.
Consolidated Theft Intent
The criminal intent element required under consolidated theft statutes is either specific intent or purposely, or general intent or knowingly to perform the criminal act, depending on the jurisdiction. The Model Penal Code requires purposeful intent for theft by unlawful taking, deception, theft of services, and theft by failure to make required disposition of funds received (Model Penal Code §§ 223.2, 223.3, 223.7, 223.8).
When the criminal intent is specific or purposely, the defendant must intend the criminal act of stealing and must also intend to keep the stolen property.Itin v. Ungar, 17 P.3d 129 (2000), accessed March 8, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12387802565107699365&q=theft+requires+ specific+intent+to+permanently+deprive&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=1999. This could create a potential failure of proof or affirmative defense that the defendant was only “borrowing” property and intended to return it after use. In some jurisdictions, specific or purposeful intent to keep the property does not apply to embezzlement theft under the traditional definition.In the Matter of Schwimmer, 108 P.3d 761 (2005), accessed March 8, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=637183228950627584&q= embezzlement+borrowing+%22no+intent+to+permanently+deprive%22&hl= en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=1999. Thus in these jurisdictions, a defendant who embezzles property and later replaces it cannot use this replacement as a defense.
Example of a Case Lacking Consolidated Theft Intent
Jorge goes to the nursery and spends hundreds of dollars on plants for his garden. Some of the plants are delicate and must be put into the ground immediately after purchase. When Jorge gets home, he discovers that he has no shovel because he loaned it to his brother-in-law a few weeks ago. He notices that his neighbor’s shovel is leaning against his neighbor’s garage. If Jorge borrows his neighbor’s shovel so that he can get his expensive plants into the ground, this appropriation would probably not constitute the crime of theft under a consolidated theft statute in certain jurisdictions. Jorge had the intent to perform the theft act of taking personal property. However, Jorge did not have the specific or purposeful intent to deprive his neighbor of the shovel permanently, which is often required for larceny theft. Thus in this scenario, Jorge may not be charged with and convicted of a consolidated theft offense.
Example of Consolidated Theft Intent
Review the example with Jeremy given in Section 11. Change this example and assume when Jeremy charged his customer for half of the sale and later pocketed fifty dollars from the cash register, his intent was to borrow this fifty dollars to drink at the bar and replace the fifty dollars the next day when he got paid. Jeremy probably has the criminal intent required for theft under a consolidated theft statute in many jurisdictions. Although Jeremy did not have the specific or purposeful intent to permanently deprive the gas station owner of fifty dollars, this is not generally required with embezzlement theft, which is the type of theft Jeremy committed. Jeremy had the intent to convert the fifty dollars to his own use, so the fact that the conversion was only a temporary deprivation may not operate as a defense, and Jeremy may be charged with and convicted of theft under a consolidated theft statute.
Larceny or False Pretenses Intent as to the False Statement of Fact
As stated previously, the taking in both larceny by trick and false pretenses occurs when the defendant makes a false representation of fact that induces the victim to transfer the property or services. In many jurisdictions, the defendant must have general intent or knowledge that the representation of fact is false and must make the false representation with the specific intent or purposely to deceive.People v. Lueth, 660 N.W.2d 322 (2002), accessed March 9, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16580779180424536816&q= false+pretenses+knowledge+statement+is+false+intent+to+deceive&hl= en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=1999. The Model Penal Code criminalizes theft by deception when a defendant purposely “creates or reinforces a false impression, including false impressions as to law, value, intention or other state of mind” (Model Penal Code § 223.3(1)).
Example of Larceny or False Pretenses Intent as to the False Representation of Fact
Review the example with Jeremy in Section 11. In this example, Jeremy told Chuck that he performed a tune-up of Chuck’s taxi, when actually he just lifted the hood of the taxi and read a magazine. Because Jeremy knew the representation was false, and made the representation with the intent to deceive Chuck into providing him with a free taxi ride home, Jeremy probably has the appropriate intent for theft of a service by false pretenses, and he may be subject to prosecution for and conviction of this offense under a consolidated theft statute.
Consolidated Theft Attendant Circumstance of Victim Ownership
All theft requires the attendant circumstance that the property stolen is the property of another.Alaska Stat. § 11.46.100, accessed March 8, 2011, http://law.justia.com/codes/alaska/2009/title-11/chapter-11-46/article-01/sec-11-46-100. The criminal intent element for theft must support this attendant circumstance element. Thus mistake of fact or law as to the ownership of the property stolen could operate as a failure of proof or affirmative defense to theft under consolidated theft statutes in many jurisdictions.Haw. Rev. Stat. § 708-834, accessed March 8, 2011, http://law.justia.com/codes/hawaii/2009/volume-14/title-37/chapter-708/hrs-0708-0834-htm. The Model Penal Code provides an affirmative defense to prosecution for theft when the defendant “is unaware that the property or service was that of another” (Model Penal Code § 223.1(3) (a)).
Example of Mistake of Fact as a Defense to Consolidated Theft
Review the example of a case lacking consolidated theft intent given in Section 11. Change this example so that Jorge arrives home from the nursery and begins frantically searching for his shovel in his toolshed. When he fails to locate it, he emerges from the shed and notices the shovel leaning against his neighbor’s garage. Jorge retrieves the shovel, uses it to put his plants into the ground, and then puts it into his toolshed and locks the door. If the shovel Jorge appropriated is actually his neighbor’s shovel, which is an exact replica of Jorge’s, Jorge may be able to use mistake of fact as a defense to theft under a consolidated theft statute. Jorge took the shovel, but he mistakenly believed that it was his, not the property of another. Thus the criminal intent for the attendant circumstance of victim ownership is lacking, and Jorge probably will not be charged with and convicted of theft under a consolidated theft statute.
Consolidated Theft Attendant Circumstance of Lack of Consent
Theft under a consolidated theft statute also typically requires the attendant circumstance element of lack of victim consent.Tex. Penal Code § 31.03(b) (1), accessed March 8, 2011, http://law.justia.com/codes/texas/2009/penal-code/title-7-offenses-against-property/chapter-31-theft. Thus victim consent to the taking or conversion may operate as a failure of proof or affirmative defense in many jurisdictions. Keep in mind that all the rules of consent discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 10 apply. Thus consent obtained fraudulently, as in larceny by trick or false pretenses, is not valid and effective and cannot form the basis of a consent defense.
Example of a Consensual Conversion That Is Noncriminal
Review the example given in Section 11 with Jeremy. Change the example so that the owner of the gas station is Jeremy’s best friend Cody. Cody tells Jeremy several times that if he is ever short of cash, he can simply take some cash from the register, as long as it is not more than fifty dollars. Assume that on the date in question, Jeremy did not ring up half of a sale but simply took fifty dollars from the register because he was short on cash, and he needed money to order drinks at the bar. In this case, Jeremy may have a valid defense of victim’s consent to any charge of theft under a consolidated theft statute.
Embezzlement Attendant Circumstance of a Relationship of Trust and Confidence
In many jurisdictions, embezzlement theft under a consolidated theft statute requires the attendant circumstance element of a relationship of trust and confidence between the victim and the defendant.Commonwealth v. Mills, 436 Mass. 387 (2002), accessed March 7, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14428947695245966729&q= larceny+false+pretenses+embezzlement&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=1997. This relationship is generally present in an employer-employee relationship, a friendship, or a relationship where the defendant is paid to care for the victim’s property. However, if the attendant circumstance element of trust and confidence is lacking, the defendant will not be subject to prosecution for embezzlement under a consolidated theft statute in many jurisdictions.
Example of a Case Lacking Embezzlement Attendant Circumstance
Tran sells an automobile to Lee. Tran’s automobile has personalized license plates, so he offers to apply for new license plates and thereafter send them to Lee. Lee agrees and pays Tran for half of the automobile, the second payment to be made in a week. Lee is allowed to take possession of the automobile and drives it to her home that is over one hundred miles away. Tran never receives the second payment from Lee. When the new license plates arrive, Tran phones Lee and tells her he is going to keep them until Lee makes her second payment. In some jurisdictions, Tran has not embezzled the license plates. Although Tran and Lee have a relationship, it is not a relationship based on trust or confidence. Tran and Lee have what is called a debtor-creditor relationship (Lee is the debtor and Tran is the creditor). Thus if the jurisdiction in which Tran sold the car requires a special confidential relationship for embezzlement, Tran may not be subject to prosecution for this offense.
Attendant Circumstance of Victim Reliance Required for False Pretenses or Larceny by Trick
A false pretenses or larceny by trick theft under a consolidated theft statute requires the additional attendant circumstance element of victim reliance on the false representation of fact made by the defendant.People v. Lueth, 660 N.W.2d 332 (2002), accessed March 9, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16580779180424536816&q= false+pretenses+knowledge+statement+is+false+intent+to+deceive&hl= en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=1999. Thus a victim’s knowledge that the statement is false could operate as a failure of proof or affirmative defense in many jurisdictions.
Example of a Case Lacking the Attendant Circumstance of Victim Reliance Required for False Pretenses
Review the example with Jeremy and Chuck in Section 11. Change the example so that Chuck does not walk around the block as Jeremy asked him to do. Instead, Chuck walks around the corner and then spies on Jeremy while he reads a magazine with the hood open. Chuck takes out his phone and makes a videotape of Jeremy. After twenty-five minutes, Chuck walks back over to Jeremy and thereafter gives Jeremy the free taxi ride home. When they arrive at Jeremy’s house, Chuck shows Jeremy the videotape and threatens to turn it over to the district attorney if Jeremy does not pay him two hundred dollars. In this case, Jeremy probably has a valid defense to false pretenses theft. Chuck, the “victim,” did not rely on Jeremy’s false representation of fact. Thus the attendant circumstance element of false pretenses is lacking and Jeremy may not be subject to prosecution for and conviction of this offense. Keep in mind that this is a false pretenses scenario because Chuck gave Jeremy a service, and larceny by trick only applies to personal property. Also note that Chuck’s action in threatening Jeremy so that Jeremy will pay him two hundred dollars may be the criminal act element of extortion, which is discussed shortly.
Consolidated Theft Causation
The criminal act must be the factual and legal cause of the consolidated theft harm, which is defined in Section 11.
Consolidated Theft Harm
Consolidated theft is a crime that always includes bad results or harm, which is the victim’s temporary or permanent loss of property or services, no matter how slight the value. In the case of theft by false pretenses and larceny by trick, in some jurisdictions, the status of the property after it has been stolen determines which crime was committed. If the defendant becomes the owner of the stolen property, the crime is a false pretenses theft.People v. Curtin, 22 Cal. App. 4th 528 (1994), accessed March 10, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3765672039191216315&q= false+pretenses+theft+of+a+service&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=1999. If the defendant is merely in possession of the stolen property, the crime is larceny by trick.People v. Beaver, 186 Cal. App. 4th 107 (2010), accessed March 10, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12194560873043980150&q= false+pretenses+theft+of+a+service&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=1999. When the stolen property is money, the crime is false pretenses theft because the possessor of money is generally the owner.People v. Curtin, 22 Cal. App. 4th 528 (1994), accessed March 10, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3765672039191216315&q= false+pretenses+theft+of+a+service&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=1999.
Example of False Pretenses Theft Harm
Review the example given in Section 11 with Tran and Lee. In this example, Lee paid Tran half of the money she owed him for his vehicle, with a promise to pay the remainder in one week. Assume that Lee never intended to pay the second installment when she made the deal with Tran. Tran signs the ownership documents over to Lee, promises to send Lee the license plates when they arrive, and watches as Lee drives off, never to be seen again. In this example, Lee has most likely committed false pretenses theft, rather than larceny by trick. Lee made a false representation of fact with the intent to deceive and received a vehicle for half price in exchange. The vehicle belongs to Lee, and the ownership documents are in her name. Thus Lee has ownership of the stolen vehicle rather than possession, and the appropriate offense is false pretenses theft.
Example of Larceny by Trick Harm
Jacob, a car thief, runs up to Nanette, who is sitting in her Mercedes with the engine running. Jacob tells Nanette he is a law enforcement officer and needs to take control of her vehicle to pursue a fleeing felon. Nanette skeptically asks Jacob for identification. Jacob pulls out a phony police badge and says, “Madam, I hate to be rude, but if you don’t let me drive your vehicle, a serial killer will be roaming the streets looking for victims!” Nanette grudgingly gets out of the car and lets Jacob drive off, never to be seen again. In this example, Jacob has obtained the Mercedes, but the ownership documents are still in Nanette’s name. Thus Jacob has possession of the stolen vehicle rather than ownership, and the appropriate offense is larceny by trick.
Consolidated Theft Grading
Grading under consolidated theft statutes depends primarily on the value of the stolen property. Theft can be graded by degreesConnecticut Jury Instructions §§ 53a-119, 53a-122 through 53a-125b, accessed March 10, 2011, www.jud.ct.gov/JI/criminal/part9/9.1-1.htm. or as petty theft, which is theft of property with low value, and grand theft, which is theft of property with significant value.Cal. Penal Code § 486, accessed March 10, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/486.html. Petty theft or theft of the second or third degree is generally a misdemeanor, while grand theft or theft of the first degree is generally a felony, felony-misdemeanor, or gross misdemeanor, depending on the amount stolen or whether the item stolen is a firearm.Cal. Penal Code § 489, accessed March 10, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/489.html. The Model Penal Code grades theft as a felony of the third degree if the amount stolen exceeds five hundred dollars or if the property stolen is a firearm, automobile, airplane, motorcycle, or other motor-propelled vehicle (Model Penal Code § 223.1(2)). The Model Penal Code grades all other theft as a misdemeanor or petty misdemeanor (Model Penal Code § 223.1(2)). When determining the value of property for theft, in many jurisdictions, the value is market value, and items can be aggregated if they were stolen as part of a single course of conduct.Connecticut Jury Instructions §§ 53a-119, 53a-122 through 53a-125b, accessed March 10, 2011, www.jud.ct.gov/JI/criminal/part9/9.1-1.htm. The Model Penal Code provides that “[t]he amount involved in a theft shall be deemed to be the highest value, by any reasonable standard…[a]mounts involved in thefts committed pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct, whether from the same person or several persons, may be aggregated in determining the grade or the offense” (Model Penal Code § 223.1(2) (c)).
Table 11.1 Comparing Larceny, Larceny by Trick, False Pretenses, and Embezzlement
Crime Criminal Act Type of Property Criminal Intent Attendant Circumstance Harm
Larceny Taking control plus asportation Personal Specific or purposely to deprive victim permanently* Victim’s property (applies to all four theft crimes), lack of victim consent Property loss
Larceny by trick Taking by a false representation of fact Personal Specific or purposely to deceive* Victim reliance on false representation Victim loses possession of property
False pretenses Taking by a false representation of fact Personal, real, services Specific or purposely to deceive* Victim reliance on false representation Victim loses ownership of property
Embezzlement Conversion Personal, real Specific or purposely to deprive victim temporarily or permanently* Relationship of trust and confidence between defendant and victim (some jurisdictions) Property loss either temporary or permanent
*Some jurisdictions include general intent or knowingly to commit the criminal act.
Note: Grading under consolidated theft statutes is based primarily on property value; market value is the standard, and property can be aggregated if stolen in a single course of conduct.
Federal Mail Fraud
The federal government criminalizes theft by use of the federal postal service as federal mail fraud, a felony.18 U.S.C. § 1341, accessed March 18, 2011, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/usc_sec_18_00001341----000-.html. Like every federal offense, federal mail fraud is criminal in all fifty states. In addition, a defendant can be prosecuted by the federal and state government for one act of theft without violating the double jeopardy protection in the Fifth Amendment of the federal Constitution.
The criminal act element required for federal mail fraud is perpetrating a “scheme to defraud” using the US mail.18 U.S.C. § 1341, accessed March 18, 2011, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/usc_sec_18_00001341----000-.html. Scheme has been given a broad interpretation and includes “everything designed to defraud by representations as to the past or present, or suggestions and promises as to the future.”Durland v. U.S., 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896), http://supreme.justia.com/us/161/306. Even one act of mailing is sufficient to subject the defendant to a criminal prosecution for this offense.U.S. v. McClelland, 868 F.2d 704 (1989), accessed March 18, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8428034080210339517&q= federal+mail+fraud+%22one+letter%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2000. In addition, the defendant does not need to actually mail anything himself or herself.U.S. v. McClelland, 868 F.2d 704 (1989), accessed March 18, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8428034080210339517&q= federal+mail+fraud+%22one+letter%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2000. The criminal intent element required for federal mail fraud is general intent or knowingly or awareness that the mail will be used to further the scheme.U.S. v. McClelland, 868 F.2d 704 (1989), accessed March 18, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8428034080210339517&q= federal+mail+fraud+%22one+letter%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2000. The defendant does not have to intend that the US Mail will be used to commit the theft, as long as use of the postal service is reasonably foreseeable in the ordinary course of business.U.S. v. McClelland, 868 F.2d 704 (1989), accessed March 18, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8428034080210339517&q= federal+mail+fraud+%22one+letter%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2000. The defendant’s criminal act, supported by the appropriate intent, must be the factual and legal cause of the harm, which is the placement of anything in any post office or depository to be sent by the US Postal Service in furtherance of the scheme to defraud.18 U.S.C. § 1341, accessed March 18, 2011, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/usc_sec_18_00001341----000-.html.
The Mail Fraud Act has been used to punish a wide variety of schemes, including Ponzi schemes, like the recent high-profile Bernie Madoff case.Constance Parten, “After Madoff: Notable Ponzi Schemes,” CNBC website, accessed March 11, 2011, www.cnbc.com/id/41722418/After_Madoff_Most_Notable_Ponzi_Scams. In a Ponzi scheme, the defendant informs investors that their investment is being used to purchase real estate, stocks, or bonds, when, in actuality, the money is appropriated by the defendant and used to pay earlier investors. Eventually this leads to a collapse that divests all investors of their investment.
Federal statutes also punish bank fraud,18 U.S.C. § 1344, accessed March 11, 2011, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/usc_sec_18_00001344----000-.html. health care fraud,18 U.S.C. § 1347, accessed March 11, 2011, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/usc_sec_18_00001347----000-.html. securities fraud,18 U.S.C. § 1348, accessed March 11, 2011, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/usc_sec_18_00001348----000-.html. and fraud in foreign labor contracting.18 U.S.C. § 1351, accessed March 11, 2011, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/usc_sec_18_00001351----000-.html. Fraud committed by wire, television, and radio also is federally criminalized.18 U.S.C. § 1343, accessed March 11, 2011, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/usc_sec_18_00001343----000-.html.
Bernard Madoff Video
Bernard Madoff \$50 Billion Ponzi Scheme: How Did He Do It?
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Exercises
• The criminal act element required for consolidated theft statutes is stealing real or personal property or services. The defendant can commit the theft by a physical taking (larceny), conversion of property in the defendant’s possession (embezzlement), or a false representation of fact (false pretenses or larceny by trick).
• The criminal intent element required for consolidated theft statutes is either specific intent or purposely, or general intent or knowingly to perform the criminal act, depending on the jurisdiction. When the criminal intent is specific or purposely, the defendant must intend the criminal act of stealing and must also intend to keep the stolen property. For false pretenses or larceny by trick theft, in many jurisdictions the defendant must have general intent or knowledge that the representation of fact is false and must make the false representation with the specific intent or purposely to deceive.
• All theft generally requires the attendant circumstances that the property stolen is the property of another, and victim consent to the taking, conversion, or transfer of ownership is lacking.
• In many jurisdictions, embezzlement theft under a consolidated theft statute requires the attendant circumstance element of a relationship of trust and confidence between the victim and the defendant.
• A false pretenses or larceny by trick theft under a consolidated theft statute requires the additional attendant circumstance element of victim reliance on the false representation of fact made by the defendant.
• The harm element required for consolidated theft statutes is the victim’s temporary or permanent loss of property or services, no matter how slight the value. When the defendant gains possession of personal property by a false representation of fact, the theft is larceny by trick theft. When the defendant gains ownership of personal property or possession of money, the theft is false pretenses theft.
• Theft can be graded by degrees or as petty theft, which is theft of property with low value, and grand theft, which is theft of property with significant value. Petty theft or theft of the second or third degree is generally a misdemeanor, while grand theft or theft of the first degree is generally a felony, felony-misdemeanor, or gross misdemeanor, depending on the amount stolen or whether the item stolen is a firearm.
• The criminal act element required for federal mail fraud is the use of the federal postal service to further any scheme to defraud. The criminal intent element required for this offense is general intent, knowingly, or awareness that the postal service will be used. The criminal act supported by the criminal intent must be the factual and legal cause of the harm, which is the placement of anything in a depository or postal office that furthers the scheme to defraud. Federal mail fraud is a felony.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Recall a scenario in Chapter 1 where Linda and Clara browse an expensive department store’s lingerie department and Linda surreptitiously places a bra in her purse and leaves the store without paying for it. What type of theft did Linda commit in this scenario?
2. Ellen goes to the fine jewelry department at Macy’s and asks the clerk if she can see a Rolex watch, valued at ten thousand dollars. The clerk takes the watch out of the case and lays it on the counter. Ellen tells the clerk that her manager is signaling. When the clerk turns around, Ellen puts her hand over the watch and begins to slide it across the counter and into her open purse. Before the watch slides off the counter, the clerk turns back around and pins Ellen’s hand to the counter, shouting for a security guard. Has Ellen committed a crime in this scenario? If your answer is yes, which crime?
3. Read State v. Larson, 605 N.W. 2d 706 (2000). In Larson, the defendant, the owner of an automobile leasing company, was convicted of theft by temporary taking under a consolidated theft statute for failing to return security deposits to customers pursuant to their automobile lease contracts. The defendant appealed, claiming that the lease deposits were not the “property of another.” Did the Supreme Court of Minnesota uphold the defendant’s conviction? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18374046737925458759&q= embezzlement+%22temporary+taking%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5.
4. Read People v. Traster, 111 Cal. App. 4th 1377 (2003). In Traster, the defendant told his employer that it was necessary to purchase computer-licensing agreements, and he was given the employer credit card to purchase them. The defendant thereafter appropriated the money, never purchased the licenses, and quit his job a few days later. The defendant was convicted of theft by false pretenses under a consolidated theft statute. Did the Court of Appeal of California uphold the defendant’s conviction? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14111729725043843748&q= larceny+false+pretenses+possession+ownership&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2000.
5. Read U.S. v. Ingles, 445 F.3d 830 (2006). In Ingles, the defendant was convicted of federal mail fraud when his son’s cabin was burned by arson and his son made a claim for homeowner’s insurance. The evidence indicated that the defendant was involved in the arson. The defendant’s son was acquitted of the arson, and only the insurance company, which sent several letters to the defendant’s son, did the acts of mailing. Did the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit uphold the defendant’s conviction? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6621847677802005327&q= federal+mail+fraud+%22one+letter%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2000. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/11%3A_Crimes_against_Property/11.00%3A_Prelude_to_Crimes_against_Property.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Define the criminal act element required for extortion.
2. Define the criminal intent element required for extortion.
3. Identify a potential defense to extortion.
4. Define the attendant circumstances required for extortion.
5. Define the harm element required for extortion.
6. Analyze extortion grading.
7. Identify the differences between robbery, larceny, and extortion.
8. Analyze robbery grading.
9. Define the criminal act element required for receiving stolen property.
10. Define the criminal intent element required for receiving stolen property.
11. Identify a failure of proof or affirmative defense to receiving stolen property in some jurisdictions.
12. Define the attendant circumstances and harm element required for receiving stolen property.
13. Analyze receiving stolen property grading.
Extortion
All states and the federal government criminalize extortion, which is also called blackmail.K.S.A. § 21-3428, accessed March 18, 2011, kansasstatutes.lesterama.org/Chapter_21/Article_34/21-3428.html. As stated previously, the Model Penal Code criminalizes theft by extortion and grades it the same as all other nonforcible theft offenses (Model Penal Code § 223.4). Extortion is typically nonviolent, but the elements of extortion are very similar to robbery, which is considered a forcible theft offense. Robbery is discussed shortly.
Extortion has the elements of criminal act, criminal intent, attendant circumstances, causation, and harm, as is explored in Section 11.2.1 "Extortion".
Extortion Act
The criminal act element required for extortion is typically the theft of property accomplished by a threat to cause future harm to the victim, including the threat to inflict bodily injury, accuse anyone of committing a crime, or reveal a secret that would expose the victim to hatred, contempt, or ridicule.Ga. Code § 16-8-16, accessed March 11, 2011, law.onecle.com/georgia/16/16-8-16.html. The Model Penal Code criminalizes theft by extortion when the defendant obtains property of another by threatening to inflict bodily injury on anyone, commit any criminal offense, accuse anyone of a criminal offense, expose any secret tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule or impair his credit and business repute, take or withhold action as an official, bring about a strike or boycott, testify with respect to another’s legal claim, or inflict any other harm that would not benefit the actor (Model Penal Code § 223.4). Note that some of these acts could be legal, as long as they are not performed with the unlawful intent to steal.
Example of Extortion Act
Rodney tells Lindsey that he will report her illegal drug trafficking to local law enforcement if she does not pay him fifteen thousand dollars. Rodney has probably committed the criminal act element required for extortion in most jurisdictions. Note that Rodney’s threat to expose Lindsey’s illegal activities is actually desirable behavior when performed with the intent to eliminate or reduce crime. However, under these circumstances, Rodney’s act is most likely criminal because it is supported by the intent to steal fifteen thousand dollars from Lindsey.
Extortion Intent
The criminal intent element required for extortion is typically the specific intent or purposely to commit the criminal act and to unlawfully deprive the victim of property permanently.Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions §§53a-119(5) and 53a-122(a) (1), accessed March 12, 2011, www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part9/9.1-11.htm. This intent requirement is similar to the criminal intent element required for larceny and false pretenses theft, as discussed in Section 11. Some jurisdictions only require general intent or knowingly to perform the criminal act.Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1804, law.onecle.com/arizona/criminal-code/13-1804.html.
Example of a Case Lacking Extortion Intent
Review the example with Rodney and Lindsey in Section 11. Change the example and assume that Rodney asks Lindsey to loan him the fifteen thousand dollars so that he can make a balloon payment due on his mortgage. Lindsey refuses. Rodney thereafter threatens to expose Lindsey’s drug trafficking if she doesn’t loan him the money. In many jurisdictions, Rodney may not have the criminal intent element required for extortion. Although Rodney performed the criminal act of threatening to report Lindsey for a crime, he did so with the intent to borrow money from Lindsey. Thus Rodney did not act with the specific intent or purposely to permanently deprive Lindsey of property, which could operate as a failure of proof or affirmative defense to extortion in many jurisdictions.
Extortion Attendant Circumstance
Extortion is a form of theft, so it has the same attendant circumstance required in consolidated theft statutes—the property stolen belongs to another. In many jurisdictions, it is an affirmative defense to extortion that the property taken by threat to expose a secret or accuse anyone of a criminal offense is taken honestly, as compensation for property, or restitution or indemnification for harm done by the secret or crime.Ga. Code § 16-8-16, accessed March 11, 2011, law.onecle.com/georgia/16/16-8-16.html. The Model Penal Code provides an affirmative defense to extortion by threat of accusation of a criminal offense, exposure of a secret, or threat to take or withhold action as an official if the property obtained was “honestly claimed as restitution or indemnification for harm done in the circumstances to which such accusation, exposure, lawsuit or other official action relates, or as compensation for property or lawful services” (Model Penal Code § 223.4).
Example of Extortion Affirmative Defense
Tara, a real estate broker, hires Trent to be a real estate sales agent in her small realty office. Tara decides she wants to get the property listing of a competitor by using Trent to obtain information. Tara tells Trent to pretend he is a buyer interested in the property. She asks him to make an appointment with the competitor, ask a lot of questions about the owner of the property, and thereafter bring Tara the information. Tara promises to pay Trent one thousand dollars for his time and effort. Trent spends several hours performing this task and thereafter demands his one thousand dollars payment. Tara tells Trent she is experiencing “tough times” and can’t afford to pay him. Trent threatens to tell Tara’s competitor what she is up to if she doesn’t pay him the one thousand dollars. Trent has probably not committed extortion in many jurisdictions. Although Trent threatened to expose Tara’s secret if she didn’t pay him one thousand dollars, Trent honestly believed he was owed this money for a job he performed that was directly related to the secret. Thus in many jurisdictions, Trent has an affirmative defense that the money demanded was compensation for services and not the subject of unlawful theft by extortion.
Attendant Circumstance of Victim Consent
Extortion also requires the attendant circumstance of victim consent. With extortion, the victim consensually transfers the property based on fear inspired by the defendant’s threat.Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions No. CR 5-34, accessed March 12, 2011, http://www.okcca.net/online/oujis/oujisrvr.jsp?oc=OUJI-CR%205-34.
Example of Attendant Circumstance of Victim Consent for Extortion
Review the example with Rodney and Lindsey in Section 11. Assume that Lindsey grudgingly gives Rodney the fifteen thousand dollars so that he will not report her drug trafficking. In this example, Lindsey is consensually transferring the money to Rodney to prevent him from making good on his threat. Thus the attendant circumstance of victim consent based on fear is most likely present, and Rodney could be subject to prosecution for and conviction of extortion in most jurisdictions.
Extortion Causation
The criminal act must be the factual and legal cause of extortion harm, which is defined in Section 11.
Extortion Harm
The defendant must obtain property belonging to another for the completed crime of extortion in most jurisdictions.Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions No. CR 5-34, accessed March 12, 2011, http://www.okcca.net/online/oujis/oujisrvr.jsp?oc=OUJI-CR%205-34. If the defendant commits the criminal act of threatening the victim with the appropriate criminal intent, but the victim does not actually transfer the property to the defendant, the defendant can only be charged with attempted extortion.Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions No. CR 5-32, accessed March 12, 2011, http://www.okcca.net/online/oujis/oujisrvr.jsp?oc=OUJI-CR%205-32.
Example of a Case Lacking Extortion Harm
Review the example with Rodney and Lindsey in Section 11. Assume that after Rodney threatens to report Lindsey’s drug trafficking to local law enforcement, Lindsey calls local law enforcement, turns herself in for drug trafficking, and also reports Rodney for making the threat. In this case, because Rodney did not “obtain” property by threat, the crime of extortion is not complete, and attempted extortion would be the appropriate charge in most jurisdictions.
Extortion Grading
Extortion is generally graded as a felony in most jurisdictions.Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.075, accessed March 12, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/oregon/164-offenses-against-property/164.075.html. As stated previously, the Model Penal Code grades extortion under its consolidated theft offense.
Robbery
Robbery was the first common-law theft crime. The criminalization of robbery was a natural progression from other common-law crimes against the person because robbery always involves force, violence, or threat and could pose a risk of injury or death to the robbery victim, defendant, or other innocent bystanders. Recall from Chapter 9 that robbery is generally a serious felony that is included in most felony murder statutes as a predicate felony for first-degree felony murder. When robbery does not result in death, it is typically graded more severely than theft under a consolidated theft statute. Robbery grading is discussed shortly.
The elements of robbery are very similar to the elements of larceny and extortion. For the purpose of brevity, only the elements of robbery that are distinguishable from larceny and extortion are analyzed in depth. Robbery has the elements of criminal act, attendant circumstances, criminal intent, causation, and harm, as is explored in Section 11.2.
Robbery Act
It is the criminal act element that primarily distinguishes robbery from larceny and extortion. The criminal act element required for robbery is a taking of personal property by force or threat of force.Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1, accessed March 18, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/indiana/35/35-42-5-1.html. Force is generally physical force. The force can be slight, but it must be more than what is required to gain control over and move the property.S.W. v. State, 513 So. 2d 1088 (1987), accessed March 18, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8956843531832075141&q= robbery+%22slight+force%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. Many jurisdictions require force during the taking, which includes the use of force to prevent the victim from reclaiming the property, or during escape.State v. Handburgh, 830 P.2d 641 (1992), accessed March 18, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2186457002998894202&q= State+v.+Handburgh&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. The Model Penal Code requires force or threat “in the course of committing a theft” and defines this as occurring in “an attempt to commit theft or in flight after the attempt or commission” (Model Penal Code § 222.1(1)). Threat for robbery is a threat to inflict imminent force.Ala. Code § 13A-8-43, accessed March 18, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-8-43.html.
While larceny and extortion also require a taking, the defendant typically accomplishes the larceny taking by stealth, or a false representation of fact. In extortion, the defendant accomplishes the taking by a threat of future harm that may or may not involve force.
Example of Robbery Act
Review the example given in Section 11 with Rodney and Lindsey. In this example, Rodney threatened to expose Lindsey’s drug trafficking if she didn’t pay him fifteen thousand dollars. Change the example so that Rodney tells Lindsey he will kill her if she doesn’t write him a check for fifteen thousand dollars. Rodney exemplifies his threat by pointing to a bulge in his front jacket pocket that appears to be a weapon. In this scenario, Rodney has most likely committed the criminal act element required for robbery, not extortion. Rodney’s threat is a threat of immediate force. Compare this threat to Rodney’s threat to expose Lindsey’s drug trafficking, which is a threat of future harm that relates to Lindsey’s arrest for a crime, rather than force.
Example of a Case Lacking Robbery Act
Peter, a jewelry thief, notices that Cheryl is wearing a diamond ring. Peter walks up to Cheryl and asks her if she wants him to read her palm. Cheryl shrugs her shoulders and says, “Sure! What have I got to lose?” While Peter does an elaborate palm reading, he surreptitiously slips Cheryl’s diamond ring off her finger and into his pocket. Peter has probably not committed the criminal act element required for robbery in this case. Although Peter used a certain amount of physical force to remove Cheryl’s ring, he did not use any force beyond what was required to gain control over Cheryl’s property and move it into his possession. Thus Peter has probably committed the criminal act element required for larceny theft, not robbery, and is subject to less severe sentencing for this lower-level offense.
Robbery Attendant Circumstances
Another difference between robbery and larceny or extortion is the attendant circumstances requirement(s). Robbery requires the same attendant circumstance required for both larceny and extortion—that the property taken belongs to another. It also has the same attendant circumstance as larceny—that the defendant accomplish the taking against the victim’s will and without consent. However, robbery has one additional attendant circumstance, which is that the property be taken from the victim’s person or presence.Cal. Penal Code § 211, accessed March 19, 2011, http://codes.lp.findlaw.com/cacode/PEN/3/1/8/4/s211. The property does not need to be in the actual physical possession of the victim, as long as it is under the victim’s control.Jones v. State, 652 So. 2d 346 (1995), accessed March 19, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11856873917512077763&q= robbery+%22from+the+victim%27s+person%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2000. Thus if the victim could have prevented the taking if not for the force, violence, or threat posed by the defendant, this attendant circumstance is present.Jones v. State, 652 So. 2d 346 (1995), accessed March 19, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11856873917512077763&q= robbery+%22from+the+victim%27s+person%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2000.
Example of Robbery Attendant Circumstances
Review the example given in Section 11 with Rodney and Lindsey. In this example, Rodney tells Lindsey he will kill her if she doesn’t write him a check for fifteen thousand dollars. Change this example so that Rodney knows Lindsey has recently withdrawn fifteen thousand dollars in cash from the bank. Rodney demands the cash, tells Lindsey he will kill her if she doesn’t give it to him, and gestures toward a bulge in his front jacket pocket that appears to be a weapon. Lindsey tells Rodney, “The money is in my purse, but if you take it, you will be ruining my life!” and points to her purse, which is on the kitchen table a few feet away. Rodney walks over to the table, opens Lindsey’s purse, and removes a large envelope stuffed with bills. In this scenario, the attendant circumstances for robbery appear to be present. Rodney took the property of another without consent. Although the money was not on Lindsey’s person, it was in her presence and subject to her control. If Rodney had not threatened Lindsey’s life, she could have prevented the taking. Thus Rodney has most likely committed robbery and is subject to prosecution for and conviction of this offense.
Robbery Intent
The criminal intent element required for robbery is the same as the criminal intent element required for larceny and extortion in many jurisdictions. The defendant must have the specific intent or purposely to commit the criminal act and to deprive the victim of the property permanently.Metheny v. State, 755 A.2d 1088 (2000), accessed March 19, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10315203348655203542&q= robbery+%22deprive+permanently%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. Some jurisdictions do not require the intent to permanently deprive the victim of property and include temporary takings in the robbery statute.Fla. Stat. Ann. § 812.13, accessed March 19, 2011, law.onecle.com/florida/crimes/812.13.html.
Example of Robbery Intent
Review the example with Rodney and Lindsey in Section 11. In this example, Rodney demands a loan from Lindsey in the amount of fifteen thousand dollars and threatens to expose her drug trafficking activities if she doesn’t comply. Change this example so that Rodney tells Lindsey to loan him fifteen thousand dollars or he will kill her, gesturing at a bulge in his front jacket pocket that appears to be a weapon. In a jurisdiction that requires the criminal intent to permanently deprive the victim of property for robbery, Rodney does not have the appropriate criminal intent. In a jurisdiction that allows for the intent to temporarily deprive the victim of property for robbery, Rodney has the appropriate criminal intent and may be charged with and convicted of this offense.
Robbery Causation and Harm
The criminal act supported by the criminal intent must be the factual and legal cause of the robbery harm, which is the same as the harm requirement for larceny and extortion: the property must be transferred to the defendant.Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions No. CR 4-141, accessed March 19, 2011, http://www.okcca.net/online/oujis/oujisrvr.jsp?o=248. In some jurisdictions, no transfer of property needs to take place, and the crime is complete when the defendant employs the force or threat with the appropriate criminal intent.Williams v. State, 91 S.W. 3d 54 (2002), accessed March 19, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9518129765374420507&q= robbery+%22transfer+of+property%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2000.
Example of Robbery Harm
Review the example with Rodney and Lindsey in Section 11. In this example, Rodney threatens to kill Lindsey if she does not give him fifteen thousand dollars out of her purse and gestures to a bulge in his front jacket pocket that appears to be a weapon. Change this example so that Lindsey leaps off of the couch and tackles Rodney after his threat. She reaches into his pocket and determines that Rodney’s “gun” is a plastic water pistol. Rodney manages to get out from under Lindsey and escapes. If Rodney and Lindsey are in a jurisdiction that requires a transfer of property for the harm element of robbery, Rodney has probably only committed attempted robbery because Rodney did not get the chance to take the money out of Lindsey’s purse. If Rodney and Lindsey are in a jurisdiction that does not require a transfer of property for the harm element of robbery, Rodney may be subject to prosecution for and conviction of this offense.
Robbery Grading
As stated previously, robbery is generally graded as a serious felony that can serve as the predicate felony for first-degree felony murderCal. Penal Code § 189, accessed March 19, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/189.html. and a strike in states that have three strikes statutes.Cal. Penal Code § 1192.7, accessed March 19, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/1192.7.html. Robbery grading is aggravated by the use of a weapon or when the defendant inflicts serious bodily injury.Tex. Penal Code § 29.03, accessed March 12, 2011, law.onecle.com/texas/penal/29.03.00.html. The Model Penal Code grades robbery as a felony of the second degree, unless the actor attempts to kill anyone or purposely inflicts or attempts to inflict serious bodily injury, in which case it is graded as a felony of the first degree (Model Penal Code § 222.1(2)).
Table 11.2 Comparing Larceny, Extortion, and Robbery
Crime Criminal Act Criminal Intent Attendant Circumstance Harm
Larceny Taking by stealth or false representation of fact Specific or purposely to deprive the victim of property permanently* Victim’s property, lack of victim consent Property transfer
Extortion Taking by threat of future harm; not necessarily physical Specific or purposely to deprive the victim of property permanently* Victim’s property; the victim consents based on fear Property transfer
Robbery Taking by force or threat of imminent force Specific or purposely to deprive the victim of property permanently* Victim’s property, lack of victim consent, property is taken from the victim’s person or presence Property transfer**
*In some jurisdictions, the defendant can intend a temporary taking.
**In some jurisdictions, the victim does not need to transfer the property to the defendant.
Receiving Stolen Property
All jurisdictions criminalize receiving stolen property, to deter theft and to break up organized criminal enterprises that benefit from stealing and selling stolen goods. Receiving stolen property criminal statutes often are targeted at pawnbrokers or fences who regularly buy and sell property that is the subject of one of the theft crimes discussed in the preceding sections. As stated, the Model Penal Code includes receiving stolen property in its consolidated theft offense (Model Penal Code §§ 223.1, 223.6). Receiving stolen property has the elements of criminal act, criminal intent, attendant circumstances, causation, and harm, as is explored in Section 11.2.3 "Receiving Stolen Property".
Receiving Stolen Property Act
The criminal act element required for receiving stolen property in many jurisdictions is receiving, retaining, disposing of,Ala. Code § 13A-8-16, accessed March 12, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-8-16.html. selling,Cal. Penal Code § 496, accessed March 12, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/496.html. trafficking in,Fla. Stat. Ann. § 812.019, accessed March 12, 2011, law.onecle.com/florida/crimes/812.019.html. buying, or aiding in concealmentMass. Gen. Laws ch. 266 § 60, http://law.onecle.com/massachusetts/266/60.html. of stolen personal property. The Model Penal Code defines the criminal act element as receiving, retaining, or disposing of stolen movable property (Model Penal Code § 223.6(1)). The criminal act does not generally require the defendant to be in actual physical possession of the property, as long as the defendant retains control over the item(s).Ga. Code § 16-8-7, accessed March 12, 2011, law.onecle.com/georgia/16/16-8-7.html. This would be a constructive possession. The Model Penal Code defines receiving as “acquiring possession, control or title, or lending on the security of the property” (Model Penal Code § 223.6(1)). Note that the criminal act element of receiving stolen property includes both buying and selling. Thus dealers that regularly purchase and then sell stolen items can be prosecuted for both of these acts under the same statute.
Example of Receiving Stolen Property Act
Chanel, a fence who deals in stolen designer perfume, arranges a sale between one of her thieves, Burt, and a regular customer, Sandra. Chanel directs Burt to drop off a shipment of one crate of the stolen perfume at Chanel’s storage facility and gives Burt the key. Chanel pays Burt five thousand dollars for the perfume delivery. Chanel thereafter accepts a payment of ten thousand dollars from Sandra and gives Sandra another key with instructions to pick up the perfume the next day after it has been delivered. Chanel could probably be charged with and convicted of receiving stolen property in most jurisdictions. Although Chanel did not ever acquire actual possession of the stolen designer perfume, Chanel had control over the property or constructive possession through her storage facility. Chanel’s acts of buying the perfume for five thousand dollars and then selling it for ten thousand dollars both would be criminalized under one statute in many jurisdictions. Thus Chanel could be prosecuted for both acts as separate charges of receiving stolen property.
Receiving Stolen Property Intent
The criminal intent element required for receiving stolen property has two parts. First, the defendant must have the intent to commit the criminal act, which could be specific intent or purposely, general intent or knowingly, recklessly, or negligently to either buy-receive or sell-dispose of stolen personal property, depending on the jurisdiction. This means that the defendant must have actual knowledge that the property is stolen,Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266 § 60, accessed March 13, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/massachusetts/266/60.html. or the defendant must be aware or should be aware of a risk that the property is stolen.Ala. Code § 13A-8-16(a), accessed March 12, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-8-16.html. The Model Penal Code requires the defendant to purposely commit the act knowing that the property is stolen or believing that the property has probably been stolen (Model Penal Code § 223.6(1)). The Model Penal Code also provides a presumption of knowledge or belief when the defendant is a dealer, which is defined as a “person in the business of buying or selling goods including a pawnbroker,” and has been found in possession or control of property stolen from two or more persons on more than one occasion, or has received stolen property in another transaction within the year preceding the transaction charged, or acquires the property for consideration far below its reasonable value (Model Penal Code § 223.6(2)). Many state statutes have a similar provision.Ala. Code § 13A-8-16, accessed March 13, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-8-16.html.
The second aspect of criminal intent for receiving stolen property is the defendant’s specific intent or purposeful desire to deprive the victim of the property permanently, which is required in some jurisdictions.Hawaii Criminal Jury Instructions No. 10.00, 10.20, accessed March 13, 2011, http://www.courts.state.hi.us/docs/docs4/crimjuryinstruct.pdf. This creates a failure of proof or affirmative defense that the defendant received and retained the stolen property with the intent to return it to the true owner.Ga. Code § 16-8-7(a), accessed March 12, 2011, law.onecle.com/georgia/16/16-8-7.html. The Model Penal Code also provides a defense if “the property is received, retained, or disposed of with purpose to restore it to the owner” (Model Penal Code § 223.6(1)).
Example of Receiving Stolen Property Intent
Chip’s iPod breaks, so he decides to go to the local electronics store and buy a new one. As he is approaching the store, Heather saunters over from a nearby alley and asks him if he wants to buy a brand new iPod for ten dollars. Suspicious of the price, Chip asks Heather to see the iPod. She hands it to him, and he notices that the box looks like it has been tampered with and a price tag removed. He shrugs, takes ten dollars out of his wallet, and hands it to Heather in exchange for the iPod. In jurisdictions that require actual knowledge that the property is stolen, Chip probably does not have the appropriate criminal intent for receiving stolen property because he did not know Heather and had no way of knowing if Heather was selling him stolen property. In jurisdictions that require awareness of a risk that the property is stolen, Chip may have the appropriate criminal intent because he knew the price was too low and noticed that the box had been tampered with to remove evidence of an actual price or vendor.
Change the example so that Chip is a pawnshop broker, and Heather brings the iPod into his shop to pawn for the price of ten dollars. In many jurisdictions, if Chip accepts the iPod to pawn, this creates a presumption of receiving stolen property criminal intent. Chip is considered a dealer, and in many jurisdictions, dealers who acquire property for consideration that they know is far below the reasonable value are subject to this type of presumption.
Change the example again so that Chip notices the following message written on the back of the iPod box: “This iPod is the property of Eugene Schumaker.” Chip is Eugene Schumaker’s friend, so he pays Heather the ten dollars to purchase the iPod so he can return it to Eugene. In many jurisdictions and under the Model Penal Code, Chip can use his intent to return the stolen property to its true owner as a failure of proof or affirmative defense to receiving stolen property.
Retaining Stolen Property
If retaining is the criminal act element described in the receiving stolen property statute, a defendant can still be convicted of receiving stolen property if he or she originally receives the property without the appropriate criminal intent, but later keeps the property after discovering it is stolen.Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions §§53a-119(8) and 53a-122 through 53a-125b, accessed March 13, 2011, www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part9/9.1-15.htm.
Example of Retaining Stolen Property
Review the example with Chip and Heather in Section 11. Change this example so that Chip is not a dealer and is offered the iPod for one hundred dollars, which is fairly close to its actual value. Chip purchases the iPod from Heather and thereafter drives home. When he gets home, he begins to open the box and notices the message stating that the iPod is the property of Eugene Schumaker. Chip thinks about it for a minute, continues to open the box, and then retains the iPod for the next six months. If Chip is in a state that defines the criminal act element for receiving stolen property as retains, then Chip most likely committed the criminal act with the appropriate criminal intent (knowledge that the property is stolen) and may be subject to prosecution for and conviction of this offense.
Receiving Stolen Property Attendant Circumstances
The property must be stolen for this crime, so the prosecution must prove the attendant circumstances that the property belongs to another and lack of victim consent.
Receiving Stolen Property Causation
The criminal act must be the factual and legal cause of receiving stolen property harm, which is defined in Section 11.
Receiving Stolen Property Harm
The defendant must buy, receive, retain, sell, or dispose of stolen property for the completed crime of receiving stolen property in most jurisdictions.Ala. Code § 13A-8-16, accessed March 13, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-8-16.html. If the defendant does not actually gain or transfer control of the property, only attempted receiving stolen property can be charged.
Receiving Stolen Property Grading
Receiving stolen property is graded as a felony-misdemeanorCal. Penal Code § 496, accessed March 13, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/496.html. or as a misdemeanor if the stolen property is of low value and a felony if the stolen property is of high value.Ga. Code § 16-8-12, accessed March 13, 2011, law.onecle.com/georgia/16/16-8-12.html.
Exercises
• The criminal act element required for extortion is typically a theft of property accomplished by a threat to cause future harm to the victim.
• The criminal intent element required for extortion is typically the specific intent or purposely to unlawfully deprive the victim of property permanently. However, in some jurisdictions, it is the general intent or knowingly to perform the criminal act.
• In many jurisdictions, it is an affirmative defense to extortion that the property taken by threat to expose a secret or accuse anyone of a criminal offense is taken honestly, as compensation for property, or as restitution or indemnification for harm done by the secret or crime.
• The attendant circumstances of extortion are that the property belongs to another and that the victim consents to transferring the property to the defendant based on fear inspired by the defendant’s threat.
• The harm element required for extortion is that the defendant obtains the property of another.
• Extortion is graded as a felony in most jurisdictions.
• Robbery requires a taking accomplished by force or threat of imminent force. Extortion requires a taking by threat of future harm that is not necessarily force, and larceny generally requires a taking by stealth or a false representation of fact. Robbery also requires the attendant circumstance that the property be taken from the victim’s person or presence and is generally graded more severely than larceny or extortion.
• Robbery is typically graded as a serious felony, which is a strike in jurisdictions that have three strikes statutes, and a predicate felony for first-degree felony murder.
• The criminal act element required for receiving stolen property is typically buying-receiving, retaining, and selling-disposing of stolen personal property.
• The defendant must have the intent to commit the criminal act of receiving stolen property, which could be specific intent or purposely, general intent or knowingly, recklessly, or negligently to either buy-receive or sell-dispose of stolen personal property, depending on the jurisdiction. If “retain” is the criminal act element specified in the receiving stolen property statute, a defendant who obtains property without knowledge that it is stolen commits the offense if he or she thereafter keeps property after discovering that it is stolen. The defendant must also have the specific intent or purposeful desire to deprive the victim of the property permanently in some jurisdictions.
• A failure of proof or affirmative defense to receiving stolen property in some jurisdictions is that the defendant received and retained the stolen property with the intent to return it to the true owner.
• The attendant circumstances for receiving stolen property are that the property belongs to another and lack of victim consent. The harm element of receiving stolen property is that the defendant buy-receive, retain, or sell-dispose of stolen personal property.
• Receiving stolen property is graded as a felony-misdemeanor or a misdemeanor if the stolen property is of low value and a felony if the stolen property is of high value.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Review the example given in Section 11 with Jeremy and Chuck. In this example, Chuck shows Jeremy a video he made of Jeremy reading a magazine instead of tuning up Chuck’s taxi. Chuck thereafter threatens to show this video to the district attorney if Jeremy does not pay him two hundred dollars. Has Chuck committed a crime in this scenario? If your answer is yes, which crime?
2. Read State v. Robertson, 531 S. E. 2d 490 (2000). In Robertson, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina reversed the defendant’s conviction for robbery of the victim’s purse. What was the basis of the court’s reversal of conviction? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10266690205116389671&q= robbery+%22purse+snatching%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2000.
3. Read People v. Pratt, 656 N.W.2d 866 (2002). In Pratt, the defendant was convicted of receiving stolen property for taking and concealing his girlfriend’s vehicle. The defendant appealed, claiming that there was no evidence to indicate that he intended to permanently deprive his girlfriend of the vehicle, and thus it was not “stolen.” Did the Court of Appeals of Michigan uphold the defendant’s conviction? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9260508991670862336&q= actual+knowledge+%22receiving+stolen+property%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2000. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/11%3A_Crimes_against_Property/11.02%3A_Extortion_Robbery_and_Receiving_Stolen_Property.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Define the criminal act element required for burglary.
2. Define the criminal intent element required for burglary.
3. Define the attendant circumstances required for burglary.
4. Analyze burglary grading.
5. Define the elements of criminal trespass, and analyze criminal trespass grading.
6. Define the criminal act element required for arson.
7. Define the criminal intent element required for arson.
8. Define the attendant circumstances required for arson.
9. Define the harm element required for arson.
10. Analyze arson grading.
11. Define the elements of criminal mischief, and analyze criminal mischief grading.
Burglary
Although burglary is often associated with theft, it is actually an enhanced form of trespassing. At early common law, burglary was the invasion of a man’s castle at nighttime, with a sinister purpose. Modern jurisdictions have done away with the common-law attendant circumstances and criminalize the unlawful entry into almost any structure or vehicle, at any time of day. Burglary has the elements of criminal act, criminal intent, and attendant circumstances, as is explored in Section 11.3.1 "Burglary".
Burglary Act
The criminal act element required for burglary varies, depending on the jurisdiction. Many jurisdictions require breaking and entering into the area described in the burglary statute.Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266 § 14, accessed March 20, 2011, http://law.justia.com/codes/massachusetts/2009/PARTIV/TITLEI/CHAPTER266/Section14.html. Some jurisdictions and the Model Penal Code only require entering (Model Penal Code § 221.1). Other jurisdictions include remaining in the criminal act element.Fla. Stat. Ann. § 810.02(b) (2), http://law.justia.com/codes/florida/2010/TitleXLVI/chapter810/810_02.html.
When criminal breaking is required, generally any physical force used to enter the burglarized area is sufficient—even pushing open a closed door.Commonwealth v. Hallums, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 50 (2004), accessed March 20, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5153605963860010581&q= burglary+%22breaking+requirement%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2000. Entry is generally partial or complete intrusion of either the defendant, the defendant’s body part, or a tool or instrument.People v. Nible, 200 Cal. App. 3d 838 (1988), accessed March 20, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2854983864809427191&q= burglary+%22partial+entry%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2000. In some jurisdictions, the entry must be unauthorized,State v. Hall, 3 P.3d 582 (2000), accessed March 20, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14296917791490578337&q= burglary+%22shoplifting%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2000. while in others, it could be lawful.People v. Nunley, 168 Cal. App. 3d 225 (1985), accessed March 20, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13700546275600703774&q= burglary+%22shoplifting%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2000. The Model Penal Code makes an exception for “premises…open to the public” or when the defendant is “licensed or privileged to enter” (Model Penal Code § 221.1(1)). Remaining means that the defendant lingers in the burglarized area after an initial lawful or unlawful entry.State v. Allen, 110 P. 3d 849 (2005), accessed March 20, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=837948213995751444&q= burglary+%22remaining+means%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2000.
Example of Burglary Act
Jed uses a burglar tool to remove the window screen of a residence. The window is open, so once Jed removes the screen, he places both hands on the sill, and begins to launch himself upward. The occupant of the residence, who was watching Jed from inside, slams the window down on Jed’s hands. Jed has probably committed the criminal act element required for burglary in many jurisdictions. When Jed removed the window screen, he committed a breaking. When Jed placed his hands on the windowsill, his fingers intruded into the residence, which satisfies the entry requirement. Thus Jed may be subject to a prosecution for burglary rather than attempted burglary, even though he never actually damaged or broke the barrier of the residence or managed to gain complete access to the interior.
Burglary Intent
Depending on the jurisdiction, the criminal intent element required for burglary is typically the general intent or knowingly to commit the criminal act, with the specific intent or purposely to commit a felony,Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266 § 14, accessed March 20, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/massachusetts/266/14.html. any crime,Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions §53a-102, accessed March 20, 2011, www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part9/9.2-3.htm. or a felony, grand, or petty theft once inside the burglarized area.Cal. Penal Code § 459, accessed March 20, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/459.html. The Model Penal Code describes the criminal intent element as “purpose to commit a crime therein” (Model Penal Code § 221.1(1)).
Example of a Case Lacking Burglary Intent
Hans dares Christian to break into a house in their neighborhood that is reputed to be “haunted.” Christian goes up to the front door of the house, shoves it open, steps inside the front hallway, and then hurriedly dashes back outside. Christian probably does not have the criminal intent element required for burglary in this scenario. Although Christian committed the criminal act of breaking and entering, Christian did not have the intent to commit a crime once inside. Christian’s conduct is probably criminal, but it is most likely a criminal trespass, not burglary. Criminal trespass is discussed in Section 11.3.2 "Criminal Trespass".
Burglary Attendant Circumstances
Depending on the jurisdiction, burglary often includes the attendant circumstance that the area entered is a structure, building, or vehicle belonging to another.Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions No. CR 5-13, accessed March 20, 2011, http://www.okcca.net/online/oujis/oujisrvr.jsp?oc=OUJI-CR%205-13. However, modern jurisdictions have eliminated the requirement that the property belong to anotherCal. Penal Code § 459, accessed March 20, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/459.html. and prohibit burglarizing property owned by the defendant, such as a landlord burglarizing a tenant’s apartment. Some jurisdictions require a structure or building to be occupied,Iowa Code § 713.1, accessed March 20, 2011, coolice.legis.state.ia.us/cool-ice/default.asp?category=billinfo&service=iowacode&ga=83&input=713. or require it to be a dwelling,Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions §53a-102, accessed March 20, 2011, www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part9/9.2-3.htm. and require a vehicle to be locked.Cal. Penal Code § 459, accessed March 20, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/459.html. A few jurisdictions also retain the common-law attendant circumstance that the burglary take place at nighttime.Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266 § 15, accessed March 20, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/massachusetts/266/15.html.
Structure or building generally includes a house, room, apartment, shop, barn, or even a tent.Cal. Penal Code § 459, accessed March 20, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/459.html. The Model Penal Code expressly excludes abandoned structures or buildings (Model Penal Code § 221.1(1)). A dwelling is a building used for lodging at night.Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions §53a-102, accessed March 20, 2011, www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part9/9.2-3.htm. Occupied means that the structure or building can be used for business or for lodging at night and does not necessarily require the actual presence of a person or victim when the criminal act takes place.Iowa Code § 702.12, http://search.legis.state.ia.us/nxt/gateway.dll/ic?f=templates&fn=default.htm. Nighttime means the time after sunset and before sunrise when it is too dark to clearly see a defendant’s face.State v. Reavis, 700 S.E.2d 33 (2010), accessed March 20, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10817450688281022337&q= burglary+%22definition+of+nighttime%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2000.
Example of Burglary Attendant Circumstances
Susan breaks down a door and steps inside a building with the intent to commit arson, a felony, once inside. If the building is an empty child’s tiny plastic playhouse, the attendant circumstance that the structure be occupied or a dwelling is lacking. If it is twelve noon, the attendant circumstance that the criminal act takes place at nighttime is lacking. If it is pitch black outside and 10 p.m. and the building is Susan’s ex-boyfriend’s residence, then Susan has most likely committed burglary and may be subject to prosecution for and conviction of this offense.
Burglary Grading
Burglary is typically divided into degrees.Iowa Code §§ 713.3, 713.5, 713.6A, accessed March 20, 2011, coolice.legis.state.ia.us/cool-ice/default.asp?category=billinfo&service=iowacode&ga=83&input=713. First-degree burglary is generally a serious felony that can serve as the predicate felony for first-degree felony murderCal. Penal Code § 189, accessed March 20, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/189.html. and a strike in states that have three strikes statutes.Cal. Penal Code § 1192.7, accessed March 21, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/1192.7.html. Factors that can elevate burglary grading are the use or possession of a weapon, the entry into a residence, dwelling, or building where people are present, the commission of burglary at nighttime, or the infliction of injury or death.Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266 § 14, accessed March 20, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/massachusetts/266/14.html. Second- and third-degree burglary generally are still felonies, although less serious than first-degree burglary.Ala. Code § 13A-7-7, accessed March 20, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-7-7.html. The Model Penal Code grades burglary as a felony of the second degree if perpetrated in the dwelling of another at night, or if the actor purposely, knowingly, or recklessly inflicts or attempts to inflict bodily injury or is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon. Otherwise, the Model Penal Code grades burglary as a felony of the third degree (Model Penal Code § 221.1(2)).
Keep in mind that a defendant can be prosecuted for burglary even if the felony or crime intended after entry never takes place. In addition, if the defendant actually commits the felony or crime after entry, the defendant can be prosecuted for both burglary and the completed crime without violating the protection against double jeopardy in the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution. The Model Penal Code states that a “person may not be convicted both for burglary and for the offense which it was his purpose to commit after the burglarious entry…unless the additional offense constitutes a felony of the first or second degree” (Model Penal Code § 221.1(3)).
Criminal Trespass
As stated previously, criminal trespass is generally charged when one or more of the attendant circumstances of burglary are lacking or when the criminal intent is less heinous. Typically, criminal trespass is an unauthorized (attendant circumstance) entry or remaining (criminal act) into a building, occupied structure, or place as to which notice against trespassing is given, owned by another (attendant circumstance), with general intent or knowingly that the entry was unauthorized (criminal intent).18 Pa. C.S. § 3503, accessed March 20, 2011, law.onecle.com/pennsylvania/crimes-and-offenses/00.035.003.000.html. The Model Penal Code states that it is criminal trespass when the defendant “knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so…enters or surreptitiously remains in any building or occupied structure…or any place as to which notice against trespass is given” (Model Penal Code § 221.2). Criminal trespass is generally graded as a less serious felony than burglary or is graded as a misdemeanor if the trespass is into a place, rather than a building or occupied structure.18 Pa. C.S. § 3503, accessed March 20, 2011, law.onecle.com/pennsylvania/crimes-and-offenses/00.035.003.000.html. The Model Penal Code grades criminal trespass as a misdemeanor if it is committed in a dwelling at night; otherwise, it is graded as a petty misdemeanor or a violation (Model Penal Code § 221.2).
Arson
Arson is one of the most destructive crimes in the United States, costing billions of dollars per year in lost or damaged homes, businesses, and real property. Many jurisdictions punish arson as a high-level felony that could merit a punishment of life in prison and mandatory registration requirements similar to serious sex offenses.730 ILCS 148 § 10, accessed March 21, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/illinois/730ilcs148/10.html.
At early common law, arson was primarily a crime against habitation, rather than a crime against property. The elements of arson at common law were the malicious or intentional burning of a dwelling owned by another. Modern statutes criminalize burning almost anything, including the defendant’s own property in many instances.
Arson is a crime that has the elements of criminal act, criminal intent, attendant circumstances, causation, and harm, as is explored in Section 11.3.3 "Arson".
Arson Act
The criminal act element required for arson is typically setting fire to or burning real or personal property specified in the arson statute.Cal. Penal Code § 451, accessed March 21, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/451.html. This could include buildings, structures, land, and vehicles.Tex. Penal Code § 28.02, accessed March 22, 2011, law.onecle.com/texas/penal/28.02.00.html. Some states define the criminal act element as “damaging” the specified property by fire or explosives.Ga. Code tit. 16 § 16-7-60, accessed March 21, 2011, law.onecle.com/georgia/16/16-7-60.html. The Model Penal Code describes the criminal act element as starting a fire or causing an explosion (Model Penal Code § 220.1(1). The type or value of the property the defendant burns or damages can enhance grading. Grading is discussed shortly.
Example of Arson Act
Clark and Manny are bored and decide to light a fire in the woods near their houses. The grass is damp from a recent rain, so the fire does not spread and burns only a small circle of grass. Clark and Manny give up and walk home. Clark and Manny have probably committed the criminal act element required for arson in most jurisdictions. Although a large destructive fire was not set by Clark and Manny, the two did burn or damage real property and start a fire, which satisfies the criminal act requirement in most jurisdictions and under the Model Penal Code.
Arson Intent
The criminal intent element required for arson in many jurisdictions is the general intent or knowingly to commit the criminal act.Ga. Code tit. 16 § 16-7-60, law.onecle.com/georgia/16/16-7-60.html. Thus the defendant only needs the intent to burn or damage property specified in the arson statute; the defendant does not have to intend to burn a specific structure or personal property, even if that is the end result.People v. Atkins, 25 Cal. 4th 76 (2001), accessed March 22, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=959832986872752180&q= %22mens+rea+for+arson%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. The Model Penal Code requires starting a fire or causing an explosion “with the purpose of destroying a building or occupied structure of another; or destroying or damaging any property…to collect insurance for such loss” (Model Penal Code § 220.1(1)).
Example of Arson Intent
Review the example with Clark and Manny in Section 11. Change this example so that Clark and Manny leave the area and a tiny spark from the fire they set begins to ignite. After a few hours, a large and powerful fire starts and burns thousands of acres in the forest. Clark and Manny most likely have the criminal intent element required for arson in many jurisdictions. Although Clark and Manny did not necessarily want to burn thousands of acres of forest land, they did intentionally or knowingly start a fire in the forest, which is all that many modern arson statutes require. Thus even though Clark and Manny did not intend the end result, Clark and Manny are probably subject to prosecution for and conviction of arson for their conduct.
Arson Attendant Circumstances
In most jurisdictions, arson must burn a specific type of property. Although this can be interpreted as an attendant circumstance, it is also a function of grading. Thus first-degree arson may focus on arson of a dwelling,Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13 § 502, accessed March 22, 2011, http://law.justia.com/codes/vermont/2009/title-13/chapter-11/502. while second-degree arson focuses on arson of other property.Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13 § 503, accessed March 22, 2011, http://law.justia.com/codes/vermont/2009/title-13/chapter-11/503. Many jurisdictions do not require the attendant circumstance that property “belongs to another,” and therefore the defendant can burn his or her own property and still be guilty of arson. However, the defendant must generally burn his or her property with the specific intent or purposely to defraud for the burning to constitute arson.Ga. Code tit. 16 § 16-7-62, accessed March 22, 2011, law.onecle.com/georgia/16/16-7-62.html. The Model Penal Code requires “destroying or damaging any property, whether his own or another’s, to collect insurance for such loss” (Model Penal Code § 220.1(b)).
Example of a Case Lacking Arson Intent for Burning the Defendant’s Property
Tim decides he wants to get rid of all the reminders of his ex-girlfriend. Tim piles all the photographs, gifts, and clothing items that are connected to his relationship with his ex into his fireplace and burns them. In this scenario, Tim probably does not have the criminal intent element required for arson in most jurisdictions. Although Tim burned or damaged property, the property belongs to Tim, not another. Thus Tim must burn the property with the specific intent or purposely to defraud—most likely an insurance carrier. Tim burned his own property with only general intent or knowingly, so Tim may not be charged with and convicted of arson in most jurisdictions.
Arson Causation
The criminal act must be the factual and legal cause of arson harm, which Section 11 defines. As stated previously, the defendant does not have to intend to burn a specific structure or personal property, even if that is the end result in many jurisdictions. However, there must be a causation analysis in every arson case because arson is a crime that requires a bad result or harm. Thus the arson harm must be reasonably foreseeable at the time the defendant commits the criminal act with the accompanying criminal intent.
Example of Arson Causation
Review the example with Clark and Manny in Section 11. In this example, Clark and Manny try to light a fire in the forest, but the grass is too damp, so they give up and leave the area. Hours later, a spark from their fire ignites, burning thousands of acres. Clark and Manny could be the factual and legal cause of this harm in many jurisdictions. Even though the grass was damp and difficult to burn, a trier of fact could find that it is reasonably foreseeable when lighting a fire in the forest that the fire could turn into a massive and destructive blaze. Thus Clark and Manny’s act accompanied by the general intent or knowingly to burn caused significant harm, and Clark and Manny may be subject to prosecution for arson in this case.
Arson Harm
The harm element required for arson is burning, charring, or damage to the property specified in the arson statute. Damage could be damage to even a small part,California Criminal Jury Instructions No. 1515, accessed March 22, 2011, http://www.justia.com/criminal/docs/calcrim/1500/1515.html. and in the most extreme cases, even smoke damage without burning or charring is sufficient.Ursulita v. State, 706 S.E.2d 123 (2011), accessed March 22, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8922319356856476558&q= Ursulita+v.+State&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2000. The Model Penal Code only requires starting a fire or causing an explosion with the appropriate criminal intent, regardless of whether damage to real or personal property ensues (Model Penal Code § 220.1(1)). Some states follow the Model Penal Code approach.Tex. Penal Code § 28.02, accessed March 22, 2011, law.onecle.com/texas/penal/28.02.00.html.
Example of Arson Harm
Review the example with Clark and Manny in Section 11. In this example, Clark and Manny started a fire in the woods that burned a small circle of dead grass. This damage is probably sufficient to constitute the harm for arson in most jurisdictions. Although the value of the damaged forest land is not excessive, excessive damage is not typically a requirement under modern arson statutes—any damage is enough. Thus Clark and Manny may be subject to a prosecution for and conviction of this offense in most jurisdictions.
Arson Grading
Arson is typically divided into degrees,Ga. Code tit. 16 § 16-7-60, accessed March 21, 2011, law.onecle.com/georgia/16/16-7-60.html. or simple and aggravated.Cal. Penal Code § 451.5, accessed March 22, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/451.5.html. Factors that can elevate grading are the burning or damage of another’s dwelling,Ga. Code tit. 16 § 16-7-60, accessed March 21, 2011, law.onecle.com/georgia/16/16-7-60.html. bodily injury or death,Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions § 53a-111, accessed March 22, 2011, www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part9/9.3-1.htm. extensive property damage, or damage to property of high value.Cal. Penal Code § 451.5, accessed March 21, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/451.5.html. As stated previously, arson is a serious felony that can result in a sentence of life in prison and mandatory registration requirements similar to serious sex offenses.730 ILCS § 10, accessed March 21, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/illinois/730ilcs148/10.html. Arson is also generally a strike in states that have three strikes statutesCal. Penal Code § 1192.7, accessed March 21, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/1192.7.html. and a predicate felony for first-degree felony murder.Cal. Penal Code § 189, accessed July 15, 2010, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/189.html (accessed July 15, 2010). Many jurisdictions grade even simple arson or second or third-degree arson as a felony.Cal. Penal Code § 451, accessed March 22, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/451.html. The Model Penal Code grades arson as a felony of the second degree (Model Penal Code § 220.1).
Criminal Mischief
Criminal mischief prohibits damaging or destroying property, tampering with property, or deception or threat that leads to a loss of property. Although criminal mischief may be a felony in many jurisdictions, it is generally a less serious felony than arson, either because the defendant inflicts damage to property in a safer manner or because the criminal intent is less heinous. The criminal act element required for criminal mischief is damaging,Ala. Code § 13A-7-21, accessed March 24, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-7-21.html. destroying, interfering with,Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.365, accessed March 24, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/oregon/164-offenses-against-property/164.365.html. or tampering withAlaska Stat. § 11.46.480, accessed March 24, 2011, http://law.justia.com/codes/alaska/2009/title-11/chapter-11-46/article-04/sec-11-46-480. property. The criminal intent element required for criminal mischief varies, depending on the jurisdiction and the degree of the offense. The criminal intent could be specific intent or purposely, general intent or knowingly, reckless, or negligent.18 Pa.C.S. § 3304, accessed March 24, 2011, law.onecle.com/pennsylvania/crimes-and-offenses/00.033.004.000.html. The attendant circumstances required for criminal mischief are typically committing the criminal act against the property of another (or property that is government owned) without victim consent or with no right or authorization.Alaska Stat. § 11.46.475, accessed March 24, 2011, http://law.justia.com/codes/alaska/2009/title-11/chapter-11-46/article-04/sec-11-46-475. The harm element required for criminal mischief is damage, destruction, or interference to property by fire, explosive, flood, or some other method, or interference with electricity, water, oil or gas,Alaska Stat. § 11.46.475, accessed March 24, 2011, http://law.justia.com/codes/alaska/2009/title-11/chapter-11-46/article-04/sec-11-46-475. or loss of property or money by deception such as causing the victim to purchase a worthless product.18 Pa.C.S. § 3304, accessed March 24, 2011, law.onecle.com/pennsylvania/crimes-and-offenses/00.033.004.000.html. As stated previously, criminal mischief is often a less serious felony than arson and could also be graded as a gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor.18 Pa.C.S. § 3304, accessed March 24, 2011, law.onecle.com/pennsylvania/crimes-and-offenses/00.033.004.000.html. Factors that could elevate grading of criminal mischief are the extent of the property damage and the severity of the defendant’s criminal intent.18 Pa.C.S. § 3304, accessed March 24, 2011, law.onecle.com/pennsylvania/crimes-and-offenses/00.033.004.000.html. The Model Penal Code criminalizes criminal mischief when the defendant purposely, recklessly, or negligently damages tangible property of another by fire, explosives, or other dangerous means, purposely or recklessly tampers with tangible property of another so as to endanger person or property, or purposely or recklessly causes another to suffer pecuniary loss by deception or threat. The Model Penal Code grades criminal mischief as a felony of the third degree, misdemeanor, petty misdemeanor, or violation, depending on the extent of the damage or the criminal intent (Model Penal Code § 220.3).
Exercises
• The criminal act element required for burglary is breaking and entering, just entering, or remaining.
• The criminal intent element required for burglary is typically the general intent or knowingly to commit the criminal act and the specific intent or purposely to commit a felony, any crime, or a felony, petty, or grand theft once inside the burglarized area.
• Burglary generally includes the attendant circumstances that the area entered is a structure, building, or vehicle belonging to another, or an occupied building or structure, or a dwelling. Modern jurisdictions have eliminated the requirement that the property belong to another and prohibit the defendant from burglarizing his or her own property. Some jurisdictions require a vehicle to be locked, and a few jurisdictions require the burglary to take place at nighttime.
• Burglary is typically graded as a felony that is divided into degrees. First-degree burglary is often a strike in jurisdictions that have three strikes statutes and a predicate felony for first-degree felony murder.
• Typically, criminal trespass is an unauthorized (attendant circumstance) entry or remaining (criminal act) into a building, occupied structure, or place as to which notice against trespassing is given, owned by another (attendant circumstance) with general intent or knowingly that the entry was unauthorized (criminal intent). Criminal trespass is generally graded as a felony, albeit a less serious felony than burglary, or a misdemeanor if the area trespassed is a place rather than an occupied building or structure.
• The criminal act element required for arson is starting a fire, burning, or damaging with fire or explosives specified real or personal property.
• The criminal intent element required for arson is the general intent or knowingly to commit the criminal act in many jurisdictions.
• Arson statutes can specify the attendant circumstance that the defendant burns a specific type of property, such as a dwelling or other real or personal property. In most jurisdictions, if the defendant burns his or her own property, the defendant must act with the specific intent or purposely to defraud, typically an insurance carrier.
• The harm element required for arson is burning, charring, damage, or, in the most extreme cases, smoke damage.
• Arson is typically graded as a felony that is divided into degrees. First-degree arson is often a strike in jurisdictions that have three strikes statutes and a predicate felony for first-degree felony murder. Arson could also carry a registration requirement like serious sex offenses.
• The elements of criminal mischief are damaging or destroying property, tampering with property, or deception or threat that leads to a loss of property (criminal act and harm) with specific intent or purposely, general intent or knowingly, recklessly, or negligently. Although criminal mischief may be a felony in many jurisdictions, it is generally a less serious felony than arson and in some jurisdictions it is graded as a gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Why is burglary of a dwelling at nighttime generally graded higher than other burglaries?
2. Read Butler v. Florida, No. 1D08-0958 (Fla: Dist. Court of Appeals, 2009). In Butler, the defendant appealed his convictions for trespass and criminal mischief, based on the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity. The defendant claimed he broke into a residence because he was being chased and feared for his safety. Did the Court of Appeal of Florida reverse the defendant’s convictions? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1710354491441564352&q= burglary+%22necessity+defense%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2000.
3. Read In the Matter of V.V.C., No. 04-07-00166 CV (Tex.: Court of Appeals, 2008). In V.V.C., the Court of Appeals of Texas dismissed a minor’s adjudication for arson when he started a fire in the boy’s restroom of a middle school. What was the basis for the court’s dismissal? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1784800980619654964&q= arson+%22smoke+damage%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2000.
LAW AND ETHICS
WikiLeaks: Should Exposure of Information Be Criminal?
Julian Assange, famous for his computer hacking skills, is the editor in chief of WikiLeaks, a whistleblower website. WikiLeaks has exposed documents and videos detailing the corruption in Kenya, Guantanamo Bay procedures, and the American involvement in the Afghan and Iraq wars, portions of which were classified confidential and secret.Raffi Khatchadourian, “No Secrets,” New Yorker website, accessed March 29, 2011, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/06/07/100607fa_fact_khatchadourian?printable=true. The New York Times published some of this information.Charlie Savage, “U.S. Prosecutors Study WikiLeaks Prosecution,” New York Times website, accessed March 29, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2010/12/08/world/08leak.html?_r=2&partner=rss&emc=rss. Although WikiLeaks did not actually “leak” classified material (some of it was allegedly passed to WikiLeaks by a low-level US Army intelligence analyst), the US Department of Justice has launched a criminal investigation regarding the release, and US prosecutors are reportedly considering charges against Assange.Charlie Savage, “U.S. Prosecutors Study WikiLeaks Prosecution,” New York Times website, accessed March 29, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2010/12/08/world/08leak.html?_r=2&partner=rss&emc=rss.
1. Do you think it is ethical to expose or publish “leaked” confidential and secret government information?
2. What is the difficulty in prosecuting a defendant for this type of publication?
Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
WikiLeaks Video
60 Minutes Interviews Julian Assange
Julian Assange’s interview with 60 Minutes is shown in the following video:
(click to see video) | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/11%3A_Crimes_against_Property/11.03%3A_Crimes_That_Invade_or_Damage_Property.txt |
Summary
Crimes against property include theft, crimes connected to theft, and crimes that invade or damage property. Modern jurisdictions criminalize several forms of theft under consolidated theft statutes that grade theft primarily on the value of the property stolen. Larceny under a consolidated theft statute in many jurisdictions is the physical taking or gaining possession of a victim’s personal property by control and asportation, or a false representation of fact, with the intent to keep the property. Embezzlement under a consolidated theft statute is the conversion of a victim’s real or personal property entrusted to the defendant. False pretenses under a consolidated theft statute is the permanent transfer of ownership of real or personal property or services from the victim to the defendant, based on a false representation of fact. The theft of property of low value is typically a misdemeanor (petty theft), while the theft of property of high value (grand theft) is a felony, felony-misdemeanor, or a gross misdemeanor, depending on the circumstances and the jurisdiction. Federal mail fraud, a felony, is the knowing use of the mail to perpetrate a scheme to defraud.
Extortion is the purposeful theft of property by a threat of future harm such as bodily injury or exposure of the victim’s crime or secret that subjects the victim to hatred, contempt, or ridicule. Extortion is typically graded as a felony. Robbery is the purposeful theft of property from the victim’s person or presence by force or threat of imminent physical harm. Robbery is typically graded as a serious felony. Receiving stolen property is receiving, buying, selling, disposing of, or retaining stolen property with either knowledge or awareness that the property is stolen or knowledge or awareness of a risk that the property is stolen. Receiving stolen property is typically graded as a felony-misdemeanor or a misdemeanor if the property is of low value and a felony if the property is of significant value.
Burglary is either breaking and entering, entering, or remaining on another’s property with the intent to commit a felony, any crime, grand theft, or petty theft once inside. In some jurisdictions, the defendant can burglarize his or her own property. Burglary is typically graded as a serious felony. Criminal trespass is a knowing unauthorized entry onto the property of another. Criminal trespass is typically graded as a less serious felony than burglary, or a misdemeanor if the trespass is into a place, rather than an occupied building or structure. Arson is knowingly burning or damaging by fire property described in the arson statute. Arson is typically graded as a serious felony. Criminal mischief is damaging, destroying, or interfering with property with specific intent or purposely, general intent or knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, depending on the jurisdiction and the degree of the offense. Criminal mischief is typically graded as a less serious felony than arson, a gross misdemeanor, or a misdemeanor.
YOU BE THE LEGAL TEXTBOOK AUTHOR
Read the statute, and then describe the elements of each of the following crimes. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Offenses against computer users: Fla. Stat. Ann. § 815.06. The statute is available at this link: law.onecle.com/florida/crimes/815.06.html. Identify the criminal act (seven possible), criminal intent, attendant circumstance, and harm. How is this crime graded?
2. Identity theft: 18 Pa. C.S. § 4120. The statute is available at this link: law.onecle.com/pennsylvania/crimes-and-offenses/00.041.020.000.html. Identify the criminal act (two possible), criminal intent, attendant circumstance, and harm. How is this crime graded?
3. Unlawful duplication of computer-related material in the first degree: N.Y. Penal Law § 156.30. The statute is available at this link: http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN0156.30_156.30.html. Identify the criminal act (three possible), criminal intent, attendant circumstance, and harm. How is this crime graded?
Statistics of Interest
• Burglary: bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=321
• Identity theft: bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=42
Answers to Exercises
From Section 11.1
1. Linda has committed larceny because she took personal property belonging to another without consent and with what appears to be the intent to keep it permanently. Shoplifting is typically larceny. A bra is not a high-value item (even in an expensive department store), so Linda’s larceny is probably petty, second-, or third-degree theft under a consolidated theft statute.
2. Ellen has committed larceny because she took personal property belonging to another without consent and with what appears to be the intent to keep it permanently. When Ellen put her hand over the Rolex watch, she gained control of it. When she slid it across the counter, this was sufficient asportation of the property because asportation for larceny can generally be any distance—no matter how slight. The Rolex is valued at ten thousand dollars, so Ellen’s larceny is probably grand or first-degree theft under a consolidated theft statute.
3. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the lease deposits were held in trust and belonged to the defendant, not the lessees. The court also held that the prosecution failed to prove a relationship of trust and confidence between the defendant and the lessees, which is required in Minnesota for embezzlement theft under the consolidated theft statute.
4. The Court of Appeal of California modified the defendant’s conviction under a consolidated theft statute. The court held that the defendant actually committed attempted larceny by trick, not false pretenses, because he was directed to purchase licensing agreements with the money, which put him in possession of it rather than ownership.
5. The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the defendant’s conviction. The court held that the defendant did not have to use the mails or intend that the mails be used by another to be convicted of federal mail fraud. However, because all the mailings involved the defendant’s son, who was acquitted of the arson and therefore not involved in a scheme to defraud the insurance company, the defendant’s mail fraud conviction had no basis.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 11.2
1. Chuck has committed the crime of attempted extortion. Although Chuck threatened to expose Jeremy’s crime of false pretenses with the intent to force Jeremy to pay him two hundred dollars, Jeremy did not pay Chuck. Thus the harm element of extortion is lacking, and Chuck’s conduct is only attempted extortion.
2. The Court of Appeals of North Carolina reversed the defendant’s robbery conviction because he snatched the purse, using only the force required to take it from the victim’s possession. Thus the crime was most likely larceny rather than robbery.
3. The Court of Appeals of Michigan upheld the defendant’s conviction. Although the court conceded that a theft by larceny requires the intent to permanently deprive the owner of personal property, the court held that the term “stolen” in the receiving stolen property statute encompasses more than larceny theft, and thus it includes any taking of personal property without permission of the owner.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 11.3
1. Burglary of a dwelling is graded higher than burglary of a structure or vehicle because it is likely that the owners of a dwelling might be inside and might employ protective actions that could lead to injury or death. Burglary at nighttime enhances the probability that the dwelling owners will be home and makes it more difficult to identify the defendant. This could also enhance the probability of injury or death and reduce the chances of conviction, which does not serve deterrence.
2. The Court of Appeal of Florida held that the evidence was insufficient to warrant the necessity jury instruction. Although a neighbor to the burglarized residence testified that the defendant rang her doorbell and asked to come in while looking around in a scared manner, and a guest at a party testified that the defendant was slapped by an individual claiming the defendant owed him money, the court held that this evidence did not establish the defendant’s reasonable belief that he was at risk for immediate serious bodily injury.
3. The Court of Appeals of Texas dismissed the minor’s judgment of adjudication because the middle school was not located in “the incorporated city limits,” as was alleged in the State’s petition for adjudication.
Answers to Law and Ethics Questions
1. Whether it is ethical to publish classified information depends on the content of the published material, and requires a balancing of the public’s right to know and the safety risk posed by the publication. If the publication exposes government corruption or another topic that could lead to government reform and the risk of harm is minimal, then many would feel the exposure is of high value and ethical.
2. The First Amendment complicates the prosecution of WikiLeaks for simply publishing information provided by an informant. Without evidence that WikiLeaks participated or assisted the government informant, a prosecution of WikiLeaks is a prosecution for speech, and this requires a compelling government interest and a narrowly tailored statute. Of course the government has a strong interest in protecting those involved in national defense; however, government speech has traditionally been accorded the highest form of protection from censorship. An additional problem is the Constitution’s prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto laws because it does not appear that there is a statute addressing WikiLeaks’ behavior (government property cannot be copyrighted, trademarked, or patented, so there was no intellectual property infringement).
Answers to You Be the Legal Textbook Author
1. Criminal act: access, disrupt, damage, destroy, take, injure, introduce computer contaminant to any computer, computer system, or network. Criminal intent: general intent or knowingly. Attendant circumstance: without authorization. Harm: disruption, damage, destruction, or use of the computer to commit a scheme to defraud. Grading: a felony or a first-degree misdemeanor. Also provides a civil action for damages.
2. Criminal act: possess or use the identifying information of another person. Criminal intent: specific intent or purposely to further an unlawful purpose. Attendant circumstance: lack of victim consent. Harm: identifying information of another is possessed or used to further any unlawful purpose. Grading: a felony or misdemeanor, depending on the value of property obtained, the prior record of the defendant, and whether the unlawful purpose is a conspiracy or dependent abuse.
3. Criminal act: copy, reproduce, or duplicate any computer data or program. Criminal intent: general intent or knowingly to deprive the owner of property valued in excess of \$2,500, or specific intent or purposely to commit or attempt to commit any felony. Attendant circumstance: with no right to do so. Harm: computer data or program is copied, reproduced, or duplicated. Grading: felony. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/11%3A_Crimes_against_Property/11.04%3A_End-of-Chapter_Material.txt |
The state has not only a right to “maintain a decent society” but an obligation to do so. In the public nuisance context, the community’s right to security and protection must be reconciled with the individual’s right to expressive and associative freedom. Reconciliation begins with the acknowledgment that the interests of the community are not invariably less important than the freedom of individuals.
- People v. Acuna, cited in Section 12
Source: Image courtesy of Tara Storm.
12.01: Quality-of-Life Crimes
Learning Objectives
1. Define the criminal act element required for disorderly conduct.
2. Define the criminal intent element required for disorderly conduct.
3. Define the attendant circumstance required for disorderly conduct.
4. Identify potential constitutional challenges to disorderly conduct statutes.
5. Analyze disorderly conduct grading.
6. Identify potential constitutional challenges to vagrancy statutes.
7. Identify potential constitutional challenges to loitering statutes.
8. Define the elements of loitering, and analyze loitering grading.
9. Compare sit-lie laws to loitering statutes.
Crimes against the public include offenses that affect the quality of life, group violence such as gang activity, and vice crimes. Because quality-of-life crimes are often based on moral or value judgments, these offenses tend to target the poor and downtrodden. If the conduct prohibited involves an individual’s status in society, assembling, or speech, the First and Fourteenth Amendments require a narrowly tailored statute supported by a compelling government interest. This creates a conflict between legislators trying to ensure peace and tranquility for citizens and judges upholding the many individual protections included in the Bill of Rights.
The quality-of-life offenses discussed are disorderly conduct, vagrancy, and loitering. Upcoming sections analyze crimes involving group activity, such as unlawful assembly and riot, along with the ever-growing problem of criminal gangs, and novel criminal and civil responses. The final section of this chapter discusses common vice crimes, including possession, sale, and use of controlled substances and prostitution.
Disorderly Conduct
Disorderly conduct, also called disturbing the peace, criminalizes conduct that negatively impacts the quality of life for citizens in any given city, county, or state. Although disorderly conduct is typically a low-level offense, the enforcement of disorderly conduct statutes is important to preserve citizens’ ability to live, work, and travel in safety and comfort. Disorderly conduct has the elements of criminal act, criminal intent, and an attendant circumstance, as is explored in Section 12.1.1 "Disorderly Conduct".
Disorderly Conduct Act
Three criminal acts generally are identified in any disorderly conduct statute. The defendant must either (1) make a loud and unreasonable noise, obscene utterance, or gesture, (2) engage in fighting or threatening, or state fighting words, or (3) create a hazardous condition by an act that does not serve a legitimate purpose.18 Pa. C. S. § 5503, accessed April 2, 2011, law.onecle.com/pennsylvania/crimes-and-offenses/00.055.003.000.html. The Model Penal Code defines disorderly conduct as engaging in fighting or threatening or violent tumultuous behavior, making unreasonable noise or an offensively course utterance, gesture, or display, addressing abusive language to any person present, or creating a hazardous or physically offensive condition by an act that serves no legitimate purpose (Model Penal Code § 250.2). When the criminal act is a loud and unreasonable noise, the quality of the noise is judged in the setting where the noise occurred. A noise made in an extremely quiet area can be softer than a noise made in a loud and busy area like a city street during peak hours.Haw. Rev. Stat. § 711-1101(2), accessed April 2, 2011, http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/hrscurrent/vol14_Ch0701-0853/HRS0711/HRS_0711-1101.htm. The term “hazardous condition” generally refers to a situation that is dangerous and poses a risk of injury to others in the vicinity of the defendant’s conduct.Wolfe v. State, 24 P.3d 1252 (2001), accessed April 2, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8611678948602739716&q= disorderly+conduct+%22hazardous+condition%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2000.
Example of Disorderly Conduct Act
David and Daniel leave a party in a quiet neighborhood at three in the morning. Both are inebriated. After walking a couple of blocks and telling stories, they begin singing loudly with their arms wrapped around each other. David stumbles and trips Daniel, who falls heavily to the sidewalk. Daniel gets up and starts screaming and swearing at David, challenging him to fight. David yells back, “Bring it on!” David pushes Daniel, he pushes back, and they begin punching and kicking. In this instance, David and Daniel have probably committed three separate disorderly conduct offenses. When David and Daniel began singing at three in the morning on a quiet street, they made a loud and unreasonable noise. When they challenged each other to fight, they uttered threats or stated fighting words. When they engaged in a fistfight, they committed fighting, or created a hazardous condition. Thus David and Daniel are most likely subject to a prosecution for and conviction of three counts of disorderly conduct in many jurisdictions.
Disorderly Conduct Intent
The criminal intent element required for disorderly conduct in many jurisdictions is the specific intent or purposely to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or the reckless intent to cause a risk thereof.Ala. Code § 13A-11-7, accessed April 3, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-11-7.html. The Model Penal Code has the same criminal intent requirement (Model Penal Code § 250.2(1)).
Example of Disorderly Conduct Intent
Review the example given in Section 12 with David and Daniel. David and Daniel may not have had the specific intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm; however, their behavior in a quiet neighborhood late at night displays the reckless intent to cause a risk of such inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm. Although David and Daniel are inebriated, recall from Chapter 6 that intoxication is not generally a defense to a reckless intent crime. Thus a trier of fact could find that David and Daniel have the appropriate criminal intent for disorderly conduct, and they may both be subject to conviction of this offense.
Disorderly Conduct Attendant Circumstance
In many jurisdictions, disorderly conduct requires the attendant circumstance that the conduct occur in a public place.Tex. Penal Code § 42.01, accessed April 2, 2011, law.onecle.com/texas/penal/42.01.00.html. This goes along with the purposeful or reckless intent to inconvenience, annoy, or alarm the public, or create a risk thereof. The Model Penal Code defines public as “affecting or likely to affect persons in a place to which the public or a substantial group has access…highways, transport facilities, schools, prisons, apartment houses, places of business or amusement, or any neighborhood” (Model Penal Code § 250.2).
Example of Disorderly Conduct Attendant Circumstance
Review the example in Section 12 with David and Daniel. David and Daniel commit their acts of loud and unreasonable noise, threats, fighting words, fighting, and creating a hazardous condition on a sidewalk in a neighborhood. Thus in jurisdictions that require the disorderly conduct attendant circumstance of a public place, David and Daniel may be subject to prosecution for and conviction of this offense. If David and Daniel committed exactly the same acts in a private residence located on fifty acres with no neighbors for miles, the attendant circumstance for disorderly conduct would be lacking, along with the criminal intent to annoy, inconvenience, or alarm the public.
Potential Constitutional Challenges to Disorderly Conduct Statutes
Because disorderly conduct statutes often criminalize obscene gestures and words, threats, and fighting words, they are subject to constitutional challenges under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. However, not all speech is protected under the First Amendment. As Chapter 3 discusses in detail, it is constitutional to regulate obscenity, true threats, and fighting words. Nonetheless, any statute criminalizing speech or expression is subject to strict scrutiny, must be narrowly drafted, and supported by a compelling government interest. Thus two common grounds for challenging disorderly conduct statutes are void for vagueness and overbreadth.Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972), accessed April 3, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7926620308068158831&q= Colten+v.+Kentucky&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5.
Example of a Disorderly Conduct Statute That Is Unconstitutional
A state legislature enacts a disorderly conduct statute that prohibits “making rude and annoying comments to another.” This statute is most unlikely unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The words rude and annoying are ambiguous, which could lead to uneven application by law enforcement and a failure to provide adequate notice to the public of what is criminal. Therefore, the statute can be stricken as void for vagueness. In addition, rude and annoying comments are not necessarily fighting words, true threats, or obscenity, so they could be protected under the First Amendment. This means that the statute could also be stricken as overbroad because it includes protected and unprotected conduct within its parameters. For a fuller and more detailed description of void for vagueness and overbreadth constitutional challenges, please refer to Chapter 3.
Disorderly Conduct Grading
As stated previously, disorderly conduct is a low-level offense that is typically graded as a misdemeanor.N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-132, http://law.onecle.com/north-carolina/14-criminal-law/14-132.html. The Model Penal Code grades disorderly conduct as a petty misdemeanor if the defendant’s purpose is to cause substantial harm or serious inconvenience or if the defendant persists with his or her conduct after a warning. Otherwise, the Model Penal Code grades disorderly conduct as a violation (Model Penal Code § 250.2(2)).
Vagrancy and Loitering
Although the government technically does not have an interest in punishing individuals for who they are, such as an impoverished person or a transient, the public perception of law enforcement is often affected by the presence of so-called vagrants and panhandlers in any given area. Thus virtually every jurisdiction has statutes punishing either vagrancy or loitering. However, these statutes are subject to constitutional attack if they are void for vagueness, overbroad, or target status.
Historically, vagrancy statutes were broadly drafted to allow law enforcement considerable discretion in arresting the unemployed, gamblers, drug addicts, alcoholics, and those who frequented houses of prostitution or other locations of ill repute. In a sense, vagrancy statutes attempted to incapacitate individuals before they engaged in criminal activity, to ensure the safety and security of any given area.
In 1972, the US Supreme Court struck down a Florida vagrancy statute in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). The Court held that the statute, which prohibited night walking, living off one’s spouse, and frequenting bars or liquor stores was void for vagueness and violated the due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment. Thereafter, many states repealed or modified vagrancy statutes in lieu of more precisely drafted statutes prohibiting specific criminal conduct such as loitering. The Model Penal Code prohibits public drunkenness and drug incapacitation (Model Penal Code § 250.5) and loitering or prowling (Model Penal Code § 250.6). To summarize US Supreme Court precedent refining loitering statutes: it is unconstitutional to target those who are unemployedEdwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941), accessed April 5, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6778891532287614638&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. or to enact a statute that is vague, such as a statute that criminalizes loitering in an area “with no apparent purpose,”City of Chicago v. Morales, accessed April 5, 2011, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), http://supreme.justia.com/us/527/41/case.html. or without the ability to provide law enforcement with “credible and reliable identification.”Kolender v. Lawson, accessed April 5, 2011, 461 U.S. 352 (1983), http://supreme.justia.com/us/461/352.
In a jurisdiction that criminalizes loitering, the criminal act element is typically loitering, wandering, or remaining, with the specific intent or purposely to gamble, beg, or engage in prostitution.Ala. Code § 13A-11-9, accessed April 5, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-11-9.html. An attendant circumstance could specify the location where the conduct takes place, such as a school or transportation facility.Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2905, accessed April 5, 2011, law.onecle.com/arizona/criminal-code/13-2905.html. Another common attendant circumstance is being masked in a public place while loitering, with an exception for defendants going to a masquerade party or participating in a public parade.Ala. Code § 13A-11-9, accessed April 5, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-11-9.html. The Model Penal Code prohibits loitering or prowling in a place, at a time, or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity (Model Penal Code § 250.6). Loitering is generally graded as a misdemeanorAriz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2905, accessed April 5, 2011, law.onecle.com/arizona/criminal-code/13-2905.html. or a violation.Ala. Code § 13A-11-9, accessed April 5, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-11-9.html. The Model Penal Code grades loitering as a violation (Model Penal Code § 250.6).
Many jurisdictions also criminalize panhandling or begging. Panhandling statutes essentially criminalize speech, so they must be narrowly tailored to avoid successful constitutional challenges based on the First Amendment, void for vagueness, or overbreadth. Constitutional panhandling statutes generally proscribe aggressive conductGresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899 (2000), accessed April 5, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12046859312956994237&q= %22Gresham+v.+Peterson%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. or conduct that blocks public access or the normal flow of traffic.
Sit-Lie Laws
One modern statutory approach to preventing homeless individuals and transients from congregating in cities and affecting the quality of life or the prosperity of businesses and tourism are sit-lie laws. Sit-lie laws prohibit sitting or lying on public streets and sidewalks and thereby encourage individuals to move about, rather than block access to businesses, roadways, or transportation facilities. If precisely drafted, sit-lie laws could resemble constitutional loitering statutes, substituting sitting or lying down for the criminal act of loitering, wandering, or remaining. However, these statutes are susceptible to the same constitutional challenges as vagrancy and loitering statutes because they target the impoverished, addicts, and the unemployed.
Seattle was the first city in the United States to enact a sit-lie ordinance in 1993 that prohibited sitting or lying on a public sidewalk between the hours of 7 a.m. and 9 p.m. in Seattle’s downtown area. The ordinance was attacked and ultimately upheld by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 1996.Heather Knight, “San Francisco Looks to Seattle: Did Sidewalk Sitting Ban Help?” seattlepi.com website, accessed April 5, 2011, http://www.seattlepi.com/default/article/San-Francisco-looks-to-Seattle-Did-sidewalk-888774.php. Los Angeles thereafter enacted a more comprehensive ordinance that banned sitting, lying, or sleeping on public streets and sidewalks at all times and in all places within Los Angeles city limits. This ordinance was stricken by the same court as unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to the Eighth Amendment.Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (2006), accessed April 5, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4259488333208893136&q= Jones+v.+City+of+Los+Angeles+2005&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2004. The court held that the homeless in Los Angeles far outnumbered the amount of space available in homeless shelters, and therefore the ordinance punished defendants for conduct that was involuntary. Portland followed Los Angeles with a sidewalk-obstruction ordinance, requiring individuals to keep their personal belongings within two feet of their bodies. This ordinance was stricken as void for vagueness in 2009.Matt Davis, “Sit/Lie Law Unconstitutional,” Portland Mercury website, accessed April 5, 2011, http://blogtown.portlandmercury.com/BlogtownPDX/archives/2009/02/19/judge_rules_sit_lie_law_uncons.
The most recent enactment of a sit-lie ordinance took place in San Francisco in 2010. The San Francisco ordinance is modeled after the Seattle ordinance and prohibits sitting or lying on a public sidewalk in the city limits between 7 a.m. and 9 p.m., with exceptions for medical emergencies, protests, or those who have disabilities.San Francisco Police Code § 16.8, accessed April 5, 2011, www.sfgov2.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/elections/candidates/Nov2010_CivilSidewalks.pdf. The first offense is an infraction, and the second offense is a misdemeanor.San Francisco Police Code § 16.8, accessed April 5, 2011, www.sfgov2.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/elections/candidates/Nov2010_CivilSidewalks.pdf. If the San Francisco ordinance successfully reduces the presence of transients and is upheld as constitutional, other cities that desire the same results could soon follow suit.
Table 12.1 Comparing Disorderly Conduct, Loitering, and Sit-Lie Laws
Crime Criminal Act Criminal Intent Attendant Circumstance
Disorderly conduct Unreasonable noise, obscene utterance or gesture, fighting, threats, fighting words, creating a hazardous condition Specific or purposely or recklessly to disturb the public or create a risk thereof Act takes place in public
Loitering Loitering, wandering, remaining Specific or purposely to beg, gamble, solicit prostitution Act takes place near a school, transportation facility: the defendant is masked
Sit-lie law Sitting or lying down Strict liability* Act takes place between certain times of day, in public, on a sidewalk, or on a street
*Exceptions for medical emergencies, people who have disabilities, protests
Exercises
• The criminal act element required for disorderly conduct is either when the defendant (1) makes a loud and unreasonable noise, obscene utterance, or gesture, (2) engages in fighting or threatening, or states fighting words, or (3) creates a hazardous condition by an act that does not serve a legitimate purpose.
• The criminal intent element required for disorderly conduct in many jurisdictions is the specific intent or purposely to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or the reckless intent to cause a risk thereof.
• The disorderly conduct attendant circumstance is that the conduct occurs in a public place.
• Disorderly conduct statutes can be constitutionally challenged under the First or Fourteenth Amendments as void for vagueness or overbroad.
• Disorderly conduct is typically graded as a misdemeanor.
• Vagrancy statutes are subject to constitutional challenges if they are void for vagueness, overbroad, or target status.
• Loitering statutes are subject to constitutional challenges if they target the unemployed or are void for vagueness.
• The loitering criminal act element is typically loitering, wandering, or remaining, with the specific intent or purposely to gamble, beg, or engage in prostitution. An attendant circumstance could specify the location the conduct takes place, such as a school or transportation facility. Another common attendant circumstance is being masked in a public place while loitering, with an exception for defendants going to a masquerade party or participating in a public parade. Loitering is typically graded as a misdemeanor or a violation.
• Sit-lie laws typically prohibit sitting or lying on a public sidewalk or street, instead of loitering, wandering, or remaining like loitering statutes.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. A city enacts an ordinance that prohibits standing or remaining in a crosswalk for an extended period with a sign. What are three potential constitutional challenges to this ordinance? Can you identify a government interest supporting it?
2. Read State v. Russell, 890 A.2d 453 (2006). Why did the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reinstate a complaint against the defendant for disorderly conduct in this case? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15220603438033851670&q= State+v+Russell&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5.
3. Read People v. Hoffstead, 905 N.Y.S.2d 736 (2010). Why did the New York Supreme Court overturn the defendant’s conviction for loitering in this case? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16147172189959232373&q= People+v.+Hoffstead&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/12%3A_Crimes_against_the_Public/12.00%3A_Prelude_to_Crimes_against_the_Public.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Define the elements of unlawful assembly and failure to disperse.
2. Identify potential constitutional challenges to unlawful assembly and failure to disperse statutes.
3. Analyze unlawful assembly and failure to disperse grading.
4. Define the elements of riot, and analyze riot grading and the potential for constitutional challenges to riot statutes.
5. Define criminal gang and criminal gang member.
6. Compare gang participation and gang-enhancement statutes.
7. Analyze two civil responses to the criminal gang problem.
8. Identify potential constitutional challenges to gang activity statutes.
Group conduct, if criminal, can enhance the potential for violence and injury and is punishable as the crimes of unlawful assembly, riot, or criminal gangs. However, the right to peacefully assemble is guaranteed in the First Amendment, so statutes codifying these offenses can be subject to constitutional attack similar to disorderly conduct, vagrancy, and loitering statutes. In addition, the problem of criminal gangs has proven to be so stubborn that it has produced some novel criminal and civil responses. The following sections discuss group activity offenses as well as their potential constitutional defenses.
Unlawful Assembly and Failure to Disperse
Unlawful assembly can be the predicate offense to riot, which is discussed shortly. The elements required for unlawful assembly are the assemblingAla. Code § 13A-11-5, accessed April 9, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-11-5.html. or meetingFla. Stat. Ann. § 870.02, accessed April 9, 2011, law.onecle.com/florida/crimes/870.02.html. (criminal act) of a group, with the specific intent or purposely to commit a breach of the peace, some other unlawful act,Fla. Stat. Ann. § 870.02, accessed April 9, 2011, law.onecle.com/florida/crimes/870.02.html. or riot.Ala. Code § 13A-11-5, accessed April 9, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-11-5.html. Some jurisdictions and the Model Penal Code punish the failure to disperse (criminal act) when a peace officer or public servant orders a group participating in disorderly conduct likely to cause substantial harm, serious annoyance, or alarm to do soMass. Gen. Laws ch. 269 § 1, accessed April 9, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/massachusetts/269/1.html. (Model Penal Code § 250.1(2)). The criminal intent element for failure to disperse is general intent or knowinglyN.J. Stat. § 2C:33-1, accessed April 9, 2011, law.onecle.com/new-jersey/2c-the-new-jersey-code-of-criminal-justice/33-1.html. (Model Penal Code § 250.1(2)).
Jurisdictions vary as to the attendant circumstance for unlawful assembly and failure to disperse, which is the size of the group. Some common group minimums are two,Cal. Penal Code § 407, accessed April 9, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/407.html. three,Fla. Stat. Ann. § 870.02, accessed April 9, 2011, law.onecle.com/florida/crimes/870.02.html. or five.N.J. Stat. § 2C:33-1, accessed April 9, 2011, law.onecle.com/new-jersey/2c-the-new-jersey-code-of-criminal-justice/33-1.html. The Model Penal Code requires three or more persons (Model Penal Code § 250.1(2)).
Example of Unlawful Assembly and Failure to Disperse
Six neighbors are sitting on their porches, peacefully chatting. One of the neighbors, Buck, notices a pro-choice group with signs in the park across the street. Annoyed, Buck tells the group, “Let’s go show those losers what it’s like to fear for your life!” He marches angrily over to the park, and the other neighbors follow. Buck begins chanting, “How would you like to be aborted?” and the other neighbors join in. The individuals in the pro-choice group stand their ground, and the decibel of the chanting increases. Buck and his neighbors form a ring around the group and move in closer, almost touching the individuals and their signs. A park ranger hears the noise, walks over to Buck and his neighbors, and tells them to “move along.” Buck spits at the ranger’s feet and starts up the chant again. The other neighbors laugh and join him.
In this scenario, Buck and his neighbors have most likely committed unlawful assembly and failure to disperse in many jurisdictions. Buck and his neighbors number six, which generally meets the minimum unlawful assembly and failure to disperse attendant circumstance requirement. When Buck and his neighbors go to the park in a group, they are assembling. Their chant, “How would you like to be aborted?” is directed at a pro-choice group, so it is evident that Buck and his neighbors have the specific intent or purposely to cause a breach of the peace. In addition, the increasing decibel of the chanting and the neighbors’ close proximity to the pro-choice group indicates an intent to intimidate, threaten, and possibly commit an unlawful act such as false imprisonment, assault, battery, or riot. When the park ranger, who is most likely a peace officer, tells Buck and his neighbors to “move along,” he is ordering them to disperse. Buck’s response in spitting at the ranger’s feet and starting up the chant again is probably a failure to disperse committed with general intent or knowingly. Thus Buck and his neighbors may be subject to prosecution for and conviction of both of these offenses in many jurisdictions.
Potential Constitutional Challenges to Unlawful Assembly and Failure to Disperse Statutes
The offenses of unlawful assembly and failure to disperse target conduct that, if peaceful, is protected by the First Amendment. Therefore, similar to disorderly conduct offenses, statutes proscribing this type of conduct are subject to strict scrutiny, must be narrowly tailored, and must be supported by a compelling government interest, or they are vulnerable to attack under the First AmendmentPeople v. Sanchez, 888 N.Y.S. 2d 352 (2009), accessed April 9, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15178974598569042123&q= unconstitutional+%22unlawful+assembly+statute%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=1992. or as void for vagueness and overbroad.
Unlawful Assembly and Failure to Disperse Grading
Unlawful assembly and failure to disperse are generally graded as misdemeanors.Ala. Code § 13A-11-5, accessed April 9, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-11-5.html. The Model Penal Code grades failure to disperse as a misdemeanor (Model Penal Code § 250.1(2)).
Riot
Riot can be the result of an unlawful assembly that escalates, an incitement to riot (discussed in Chapter 3), or can occur spontaneously without any planning or predicate activity. The criminal act element required for riot in many jurisdictions is group commission of an unlawful act of violence or a lawful act in a violent and tumultuous manner.Ga. Code tit. 16 § 16-11-30, accessed April 9, 2011, law.onecle.com/georgia/16/16-11-30.html. The Model Penal Code criminalizes riot when a group participates in a course of disorderly conduct (Model Penal Code § 250.1). The criminal intent element for riot varies, depending on the jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions and the Model Penal Code require specific intent or purposely to commit or facilitate a felony or misdemeanor, or to prevent or coerce official action, or general intent or knowledge that anyone plans to use a firearm or deadly weaponN.J. Stat. § 2C:33-1, accessed April 9, 2011, law.onecle.com/new-jersey/2c-the-new-jersey-code-of-criminal-justice/33-1.html. (Model Penal Code § 250.1). Others make riot a strict liability offense.Cal. Penal Code § 404, accessed April 9, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/404.html; Ga. Code tit. 16 § 16-11-30, law.onecle.com/georgia/16/16-11-30.html. In many jurisdictions, riot also has the requirement that the defendant(s) be the factual and legal cause of harm, which is public terror and alarm or a risk thereof.Ala. Code § 13A-11-3, accessed April 9, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-11-3.html.
Jurisdictions vary as to the attendant circumstance for riot, which is the size of the group. Some common group minimums are two,Ga. Code tit. 16 § 16-11-30, accessed April 9, 2011, law.onecle.com/georgia/16/16-11-30.html. five,N.J. Stat. § 2C:33-1, accessed April 9, 2011, law.onecle.com/new-jersey/2c-the-new-jersey-code-of-criminal-justice/33-1.html. and six.Ala. Code § 13A-11-3, accessed April 9, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-11-3.html. The Model Penal Code requires three or more persons (Model Penal Code § 250.1). Riot is graded as a misdemeanor,Ala. Code § 13A-11-3, accessed April 9, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-11-3.html. or a felony if a firearm is usedVa. Code Ann. § 18.2-405, accessed April 9, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/virginia/crimes-and-offenses-generally/18.2-405.html. or there is property damage or physical injury to an individual other than the defendants.N.Y. Penal § 240.06, accessed April 9, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN0240.06_240.06.html. The Model Penal Code grades riot as a felony of the third degree (Model Penal Code § 250.1).
Example of Riot
Review the example with Buck and his neighbors in Section 12. Assume that after the park ranger orders Buck and his neighbors to disperse, Buck spits at the ranger’s feet, continues chanting, and thereafter becomes so enraged that he grabs a sign out of one of the pro-choice individual’s hands and begins beating him over the head with it. The other neighbors follow suit and within minutes they are all wielding signs and hitting the pro-choice individuals with them. In this scenario, Buck and his neighbors have most likely committed riot. Buck and his neighbors number six, which meets the minimum group requirement in many riot statutes. Buck and his neighbors have also assaulted and battered some of the pro-choice individuals, which are unlawful acts of violence. The statement made by Buck about showing the pro-choice group what it means to fear for your life indicates a specific intent or purposely to commit a felony or misdemeanor, which is the intent requirement in many jurisdictions. If the riot statute in Buck’s state requires factual and legal causation and the harm of public terror and alarm, the beating constitutes the causation and harm requirement. Thus Buck and his neighbors’ conduct probably falls within the parameters of most riot statutes, and Buck and his neighbors may be subject to prosecution for and conviction of this offense in many jurisdictions.
Potential Constitutional Challenges to Riot Statutes
Because statutes criminalizing riot include the requirement of force or violence, they do not target protected conduct under the First Amendment and are not as prone to a constitutional challenge. Of course, any criminal statute must be precisely drafted so that it is not void for vagueness. However, riot statutes are not generally subject to strict scrutiny because the First Amendment does not include forceful or violent expression within the definition of speech.
Rodney King Riots Video
KTLA News, April 30, 1992, 6:50 p.m., King Riots
News clips of the riots that occurred subsequent to the Rodney King trial are shown in this video:
(click to see video)
Criminal Gangs
Many jurisdictions have statutes, both criminal and civil, that address the ongoing dilemma of criminal gangs. However, gang activity remains a problem in major cities and even smaller, rural areas. Criminal gangs can create a stigma that attaches to a location, affecting property values and residents’ attitudes about the effectiveness of law enforcement and the justice system in general. Commentators and legislators differ as to the most effective remedies for the gang problem, leading to a plethora of diverse statutory responses.
What follows is a discussion of modern statutes targeting gang activity and the potential constitutional challenges.
Criminal Gang Definitions
It is important for a jurisdiction’s gang statute to define criminal gang and criminal gang member precisely, to avoid constitutional challenges under the First Amendment or void for vagueness and overbreadth. This is because gang membership involves assembly, which, if peaceful, is protected under the First Amendment.
Federal law defines a criminal street gang as an ongoing group, club, organization, or association of five or more that has as one of its primary purposes the commission of specific criminal offenses or activities that affect interstate or foreign commerce.18 U.S.C. 521(a), accessed April 12, 2011, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/usc_sec_18_00000521----000-.html. Federal law defines a gang member as someone who participates in a criminal street gang with the general intent or knowledge that its members engage in a continuing series of specified crimes, or an individual who intends to promote or further the felonious activities of the criminal street gang.18 U.S.C. 521(d), accessed April 12, 2011, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/usc_sec_18_00000521----000-.html. One representative state statutory definition of criminal gang is a group of three or more persons who have in common a name, identifying sign, symbol, tattoo, style of dress, or use of hand signs and who have committed or attempted to commit specified crimes for the benefit of the group.Alaska Stat. § 11.81.900 (13), accessed April 12, 2011, http://law.justia.com/codes/alaska/2009/title-11/chapter-11-81/article-07/sec-11-81-900. Criminal gang member could be statutorily defined as any person who engages in a pattern of criminal gang activity and who meets two or more of the following criteria: (1) admits to gang membership; (2) is identified as a gang member; (3) resides in or frequents a particular gang’s area and adopts its style of dress, use of hand signs, or tattoos; (3) associates with known gang members; or (4) has been arrested more than once in the company of identified gang members for offenses consistent with gang activity.Idaho Code Ann. § 18-8502(2), accessed April 12, 2011, http://law.justia.com/codes/idaho/2010/title18/t18ch85sect18-8502.html.
Example of Criminal Gang Definitions
The North Side Boys are a group of fifty-five members who have a special tattoo, wear the colors black and white daily, and pride themselves on their illegal controlled substances distribution. Mike decides he wants to be a North Side Boy. Mike participates in a special initiation process that includes selling a specified quantity of an illegal controlled substance in a certain location over a period of two weeks. After Mike completes the initiation, he gets the North Side Boys’ tattoo, wears the North Side Boys’ colors daily, and spends all his time with the North Side Boys, hanging out and also contributing to their illegal activities. The North Side Boys probably meets the criteria for a criminal gang, and Mike is most likely a criminal gang member under many modern statutes. The North Side Boys has an identifiable tattoo and style of dress and furthers a criminal activity, which is the distribution of illegal controlled substances. Mike can be identified as a gang member by other North Side Boys members, frequents the North Side Boys’ gang area, and adopts the gang’s style of dress and tattoos along with furthering its criminal enterprise. Thus the North Side Boys and Mike fit the definition of criminal gang and gang member in many jurisdictions, and Mike may be subject to prosecution for and conviction of criminal gang activity if he commits crimes at the direction of or in furtherance of the gang, as is analyzed in Section 12.
Criminal Gang Activity
States generally criminalize gang participation,Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.42, accessed April 14, 2011, http://law.justia.com/codes/ohio/2010/title29/chapter2923/2923_42.html. enhance the penalty for a crime when it is committed in furtherance of a gang,Fla. Stat. Ann. § 874.04, accessed April 14, 2011, law.onecle.com/florida/crimes/874.04.html. or both.Cal. Penal Code § 186.22, http://law.justia.com/codes/california/2010/pen/186.20-186.33.html. If a state enacts a gang participation statute, the criminal act element is generally described as actively participating in a criminal gang and promoting, furthering, or assisting in any felony, with the general intent or knowingly that members of the gang engage in a pattern of criminal gang activity.Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 § 616 (2)(b), accessed April 13, 2011, http://law.justia.com/codes/delaware/2010/title11/c005-sc02.html. Gang participation is generally graded as a felony.Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 § 616 (2)(b), accessed April 13, 2011, http://law.justia.com/codes/delaware/2010/title11/c005-sc02.html. Gang enhancement statutes enhance the defendant’s sentence for actually committing a misdemeanor or felony with the specific intent or purposely to benefit, promote, or further the interests of the criminal gang.Fla. Stat. Ann. § 874.04, accessed April 14, 2011, law.onecle.com/florida/crimes/874.04.html. Some jurisdictions only provide gang enhancement for the commission of a felony.Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 § 616 (2)(c), accessed April 13, 2011, http://law.justia.com/codes/delaware/2010/title11/c005-sc02.html.
Example of Criminal Gang Activity
Review the example with Mike and the North Side Boys given in Section 12. Assume that Mike resumes selling illegal controlled substances at the behest of the North Side Boys after his initiation and is arrested. If the state where Mike sells illegal controlled substances has a gang participation statute and grades the crime of sale of illegal controlled substances as a felony, Mike could be prosecuted for and convicted of this crime. He furthered and assisted in the North Side Boys’ sale of illegal controlled substances with the general intent or knowingly that members of the North Side Boys engaged in this pattern of criminal gang activity. If the state also has a gang enhancement statute, Mike could have his sentence for sale of illegal controlled substances enhanced because he committed the sale of illegal controlled substances in furtherance of the criminal gang. In either situation, Mike will be punished more severely for the sale of illegal controlled substances than an individual defendant who sells illegal controlled substances on his or her own, rather than at the direction or in furtherance of a criminal gang.
Civil Responses to Gang Activity
As stated previously, the problem of criminal gangs is challenging and has proven resistant to criminal remedies. Thus many jurisdictions have also enacted civil gang control statutes, along with resorting to the remedy of civil gang injunctions to try to curb the multitude of harms that gangs inflict.
Civil gang control statutes generally provide for damages, often enhanced, for coercion, intimidation, threats, or other harm caused by a gang or gang member.Fla. Stat. Ann. § 874.06, accessed April 14, 2011, law.onecle.com/florida/crimes/874.06.html. A common provision of civil gang control statutes is the ability of a resident or state agency to sue as a plaintiff.Fla. Stat. Ann. § 874.06, accessed April 14, 2011, law.onecle.com/florida/crimes/874.06.html.
Civil gang injunctions (CGIs) are precisely drafted orders prohibiting gang members from associating with other gang members or entering certain areas known for gang activity.Tex. Penal Code § 125.065, accessed April 14, 2011, law.onecle.com/texas/civil/125.065.00.html. A state agency or an individual resident can typically make a motion requesting a CGI.Tex. Penal Code § 125.064, accessed April 14, 2011, law.onecle.com/texas/civil/125.064.00.html. The basis for a CGI motion is the tort of public nuisance, which requires proof that the gang is disturbing the enjoyment of life and property for those living in the community.People v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090 (1997), accessed April 14, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10825872110148502169&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr (accessed April 15, 2011). Common provisions of CGIs are a prohibition on associating with known gang members, wearing gang colors, flashing gang hand signs, or loitering in areas known for gang activity.Max Shiner, “Civil Gang Injunctions a Guide for Prosecutors,” Ndaa.org website, accessed April 14, 2011, www.ndaa.org/pdf/Civil_Gang_Injunctions_09.pdf. Violation of a CGI could constitute the crime of contempt, resulting in fines or incarceration.Tex. Penal Code § 125.066, accessed April 14, 2011, law.onecle.com/texas/civil/125.066.00.html.
Example of Civil Responses to Gang Activity
Review the example with Mike and the North Side Boys in Section 12. Mike and the North Side Boys are subject to a criminal prosecution for gang participation for their sale of illegal controlled substances. They also are subject to gang enhancements for any felony committed at the direction or in furtherance of the North Side Boys. In addition, if the state where Mike and the North Side Boys are located has statutes providing civil remedies and CGIs, both Mike and the North Side Boys members are subject to a civil suit for damages if they coerce, intimidate, or injure another. They also are subject to an injunction constraining their ability to meet, associate, wear black and white, flash gang hand signs, or loiter in certain areas. If a CGI is in place, and Mike or the North Side Boys violate it, a potential exists for criminal charges of contempt, leading to fines or incarceration.
Colton Gang Injunction
News Story of the Colton Civil Gang Injunction
The civil gang injunction in Colton, California, is discussed in this video:
(click to see video)
Potential Constitutional Challenges to Gang Statutes
Gang activity and gang association require assembly, which, if peaceful, is protected by the First Amendment. Thus statutes proscribing gang conduct are subject to attack under the First Amendment or void for vagueness and overbreadth. CGIs have the same constitutional concerns as criminal gang activity statutes because their violation can lead to a criminal prosecution for contempt.People v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090 (1997), http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10825872110148502169&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr (accessed April 15, 2011).
In City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), the US Supreme Court struck down Chicago’s Gang Congregation Ordinance as void for vagueness. The ordinance prohibited criminal street gang members from “loitering in public.” The term loitering was defined as remaining in any one place with no apparent purpose. When a Chicago law enforcement officer observed a gang member loitering, he was obligated to order the gang member to disperse, and if the gang member refused, the gang member was subject to arrest for violating the ordinance. The Court held that the ordinance did not give the public notice of what was criminal, as required by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and allowed too much discretion to law enforcement to unevenly enforce its provisions.
Under Morales, modern statutes targeting gang activity and association must precisely define criminal conduct, avoid vague terms such as “no apparent purpose,” and ensure that First Amendment protected activity is not included within the statute’s reach. CGIs should support a significant government interest, be narrowly tailored to avoid constitutionally protected activity, and be buttressed by evidence that the CGI is the least restrictive means to carry out the interest stated.Max Shiner, “Civil Gang Injunctions a Guide for Prosecutors,” Ndaa.org website, accessed April 14, 2011, www.ndaa.org/pdf/Civil_Gang_Injunctions_09.pdf.
Exercises
• The elements of unlawful assembly are the assembling or meeting of a group (criminal act) with the specific intent or purposely to commit breach of the peace, some other unlawful act, or riot. Some jurisdictions punish the failure to disperse (criminal act) with general intent or knowingly when a peace officer or public servant orders a group likely to cause substantial harm, serious annoyance, or alarm to do so. Jurisdictions vary as to the attendant circumstance, which is the group minimum, identifying two, three, five, or some similar number, depending on the statute.
• Unlawful assembly and failure to disperse statutes can be constitutionally challenged under the First Amendment, as void for vagueness, or overbroad.
• Unlawful assembly and failure to disperse are typically graded as misdemeanors.
• Riot is group commission of an unlawful violent act or a lawful act in a violent manner (criminal act) with either the specific intent or purposely to commit a felony or misdemeanor or prevent official action, or the general intent or knowingly that someone in the group possesses a firearm, or with strict liability intent. Some jurisdictions require the criminal act and intent to be the factual and legal cause of harm, which is public terror, alarm, or a risk thereof. The attendant circumstance, which is the group minimum, could be two, five, six, or some similar number, depending on the statute. Riot is often graded as a misdemeanor, or a felony if a firearm is used or there is property damage or physical injury to someone other than a defendant. Because riot statutes criminalize conduct involving force or violence, riot statutes are not as prone to constitutional challenges as disorderly conduct, vagrancy, loitering, and unlawful assembly statutes.
• Criminal gang could be defined as a group of a statutorily specified number that engages in a pattern of criminal activity and has in common hand signs, tattoos, and style of dress. Criminal gang member could be defined as someone who is identified as a gang member, admits to gang membership, associates with gang members, adopts the hand signs, tattoos, and style of dress of gang members, and commits crimes at the behest of the gang.
• Gang participation statutes criminalize actively participating in a criminal gang and promoting, furthering, or assisting (criminal act) the commission of a felony on behalf of a criminal gang with the general intent or knowingly that the gang participates in a pattern of criminal activity. Gang participation is typically graded as a felony. Gang enhancement statutes enhance a sentence for a misdemeanor or felony committed with the specific intent or purposely to promote or further a criminal gang. Some states only provide gang enhancement statutes for the commission of a felony.
• Civil responses to the gang problem include civil gang control statutes that allow plaintiffs, including state agencies, to sue for enhanced damages for threats, intimidation, or physical injury caused by a gang or gang member and civil gang injunctions (CGIs) that prohibit gang members from associating or congregating in certain areas frequented by criminal gangs.
• Statutes targeting gangs can be constitutionally challenged under the First Amendment or as void for vagueness or overbroad.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. A law enforcement officer arrests a group of individuals for standing outside a Jewish temple with signs that indicate a disbelief in the holocaust. The officer tells the individuals that he is arresting them for unlawful assembly. What are some potential constitutional problems with this arrest?
2. Read Ortiz v. NYS Parole in Bronx, 586 F.3d 149 (2009). In Ortiz, the defendant was found guilty of several counts of riot under New York’s first-degree riot statute for conduct that occurred after he left the scene of the riot. Did the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit uphold the defendant’s conviction? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2710893752280724993&q= %22riot+statute%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2002.
3. Read People v. Englebrecht, 88 Cal. App. 4th 1236 (2001). Did the California Court of Appeal hold that the defendant, an alleged gang member, had the right to a jury trial on the issue of his gang membership for the purpose of a civil gang injunction? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=449430704300565285&q= unconstitutional+%22civil+gang+injunction%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=1997. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/12%3A_Crimes_against_the_Public/12.02%3A_Crimes_Targeting_Group_Conduct.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Identify the sources of federal and state drug laws.
2. Describe a drug schedule.
3. Analyze various drug crimes and their grading.
4. Identify two modern trends in state drug crimes statutes.
5. Identify a potential constitutional challenge to a state’s medical marijuana statute.
6. Analyze prostitution, pimping, and pandering and their grading.
Vice crimes offend the sensibilities, yet are often victimless and harmless, other than harm done to the defendant or society in general. Section 12.3.1 "Drug Crimes" explores drug crimes, including manufacture or cultivation, possession, sale, and under the influence offenses. Upcoming sections analyze prostitution, pimping, and pandering. In the final section, various vice statutes are available for review, including statutes criminalizing gambling and conduct involving alcohol.
Drug Crimes
All states and the federal government criminalize the manufacture or cultivation, possession, sale, and use of specified drugs. Many modern statutes focus on rehabilitation for nonviolent drug offenders, rather than incarceration, because this has proven effective in reducing recidivism and freeing up jails and prisons for defendants who pose a greater security risk to society. In addition, marijuana, a drug that has demonstrated valid therapeutic qualities, has been legalized by many states for medicinal purposes, which poses interesting constitutional questions, as is discussed in Section 12.
Federal and State Drug Schedules
Federal criminal statutes targeting illegal drugs are part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, commonly known as the Controlled Substances Act.21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq., accessed April 17, 2011, www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/21cfr/21usc/index.html. The states follow one of the three versions of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act,Uniform Controlled Substances Act (1994), accessed April 17, 2011, www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ucsa94.pdf. which was drafted by a commission striving for uniformity in state and federal laws. For the purpose of drug crimes, the states and the federal government categorize illegal drugs in drug schedules.21 U.S.C. § 812, accessed April 17, 2011, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/21/usc_sec_21_00000812----000-.html. The schedules generally focus on the harmful or addictive qualities of the drug, with Schedule I drugs being the most harmful or addictive; the remaining schedules reflect less harmful or addictive drugs, including drugs that are legal with a prescription.Minn. Stat. Ann. § 152.02, accessed April 17, 2011, https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/?id=152.02 (accessed April 17, 2011).
Example of a Drug Schedule
The North Carolina drug schedule is located in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-89-90-94.N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-89-90-94, accessed April 17, 2011, http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML/ByArticle/Chapter_90/Article_5.html. Review the schedule and note that heroin, a highly addictive drug that can cause death if a user ingests too much, is listed in Schedule I, while marijuana, a less addictive drug that is generally not as harmful as heroin, is listed in Schedule VI.
Federal and State Drug Crimes
The federal government and all fifty states criminalize the manufacture and cultivation, possession, sale, and use of drugs categorized in a jurisdiction’s drug schedule, with exceptions for validly prescribed drugs and drugs involved in scientific or medical research. As discussed in Chapter 4, the government cannot criminalize the status of being a drug addict.Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), accessed April 18, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3358010003227436496&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. However, there is no constitutional impediment to punishing criminal acts involving controlled substances, even though it may be more difficult for an addict to control drug-related criminal behavior.
In most jurisdictions, the manufacture of scheduled drugs is a felony,Ala. Code § 13A-12-217, accessed April 17, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-12-217.html. with a more severe penalty for the accompanying use of a firearm or the furtherance of a clandestine laboratory operation.Ala. Code § 13A-12-218, accessed April 17, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-12-218.html. Cultivation of marijuana, which must be done with general intent or knowingly, can be a misdemeanor or a felony, depending on the quantity cultivated.Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2925.04, accessed April 17, 2011, http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/2925.04.
Possession of scheduled drugs is typically graded based on the quantity possessed, the drug’s classification in the schedule, and whether or not the possession is for the purpose of distribution, with the penalties ranging from a misdemeanor for simple possession to a serious felony for possession with intent to sell.Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2925.11, accessed April 17, 2011, http://codes.ohio.gov/orc/2925. As is discussed more fully in Chapter 4, possession can be actual, meaning the drug is located on or very near the defendant’s person, or constructive, meaning the drug is within the defendant’s control.Connecticut Jury Instructions No. 2.11-1, www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part2/2.11-1.htm (accessed February 13, 2010). Constructive possession can be joint, meaning between two or more.Connecticut Jury Instructions No. 2.11-1, www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part2/2.11-1.htm (accessed February 13, 2010). Simple possession typically must be with general intent or knowingly, while possession for the purpose of distribution or sale must be with specific intent or purposely.People v. Parra, 70 Cal. App. 4th 222 (1999), accessed April 17, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5809016451778310933&q= People+v.+Parra+70+Cal.+App.+4th+222&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. In many states, possession of marijuana is graded lower than possession of other scheduled drugs—even as low as an infraction if the quantity is less than one ounce.Cal. Health and Safety Code § 11357(b), accessed April 18, 2011, http://www.canorml.org/laws/hsc11357.html#b.
The sale, distribution, or trafficking of scheduled drugs is generally a felony, with more severe penalties for drugs in a higher schedule,N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95, accessed April 17, 2011, http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML/ByArticle/Chapter_90/Article_5.html. the sale of larger quantities,Ala. Code § 13A-12-231, accessed April 17, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-12-231.html. a sale by an adult to a minor,Ala. Code § 13A-12-215, accessed April 17, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-12-215.html. or a sale near school grounds.Ala. Code § 13A-12-250, accessed April 17, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-12-250.html
Scheduled drug use, also designated as being under the influence of a controlled substance, is typically a misdemeanor with more severe penalties for habitual offenders.Cal. Health and Safety Code § 11550, accessed April 17, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/health/11550.html.
Example of Drug Crimes
Charlene decides she wants to make some extra money by growing and selling marijuana. Charlene acquires some marijuana seeds and plants a marijuana garden in her backyard. Once her plants are ready for harvest, Charlene harvests some buds, weighs and packages them, and then puts some of the packages into her backpack and walks to a street corner known for drug sales. After she arrives at the street corner, Rick drives up, rolls down his window, and asks Charlene if she knows where he can “score.” Charlene replies, “I have some pot if that is what you are looking for.” Rick responds affirmatively, so Charlene gets into Rick’s car and they drive to a local park. Rick insists on trying the marijuana before he buys it. Charlene takes out a joint, and Rick and Charlene smoke it. Thereafter, Rick buys one of Charlene’s packages that weighs half an ounce and drops Charlene off back at the street corner.
In this example, Charlene has probably committed every drug crime discussed in Section 12. When Charlene planted the marijuana garden, she committed cultivation of a scheduled drug. Harvesting and packaging the marijuana is possession for sale. Smoking the marijuana with Rick is use, or under the influence of a controlled substance. Selling Rick a half-ounce of marijuana is drug sale, distribution, or trafficking. Rick has also probably committed two drug offenses. Smoking the marijuana with Charlene is use, or under the influence of a controlled substance. When Rick took the package of marijuana from Charlene, he committed possession (which may be an infraction in some states because he bought less than an ounce). Thus, in this example, Charlene and Rick may be subject to prosecution for and conviction of the stated drug offenses in most jurisdictions.
Modernization of Drug Crimes Statutes
Two new trends in state drug crimes statutes are the emphasis on rehabilitation for nonviolent drug offenders and the legalization of marijuana for medical use.
Modern statutes allow nonviolent drug offenders to go through a specialized drug court that typically sentences the offenders to probation and rehabilitation, rather than incarceration.Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3422, accessed April 17, 2011, law.onecle.com/arizona/criminal-code/13-3422.html. Common offenses for drug courts are simple possession and use of drugs listed in a jurisdiction’s drug schedule.Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3422, accessed April 17, 2011, law.onecle.com/arizona/criminal-code/13-3422.html. Typically, the drug court offender must participate in a rehabilitation program that includes counseling and detoxification within a specified time period.Tex. Penal Code § 469.001, accessed April 17, 2011, codes.lp.findlaw.com/txstatutes/HS/6/B/469/469.001. During the rehabilitation, the offender is frequently drug tested to ensure compliance. If the drug offender tests positive, reoffends, or does not complete the program within the specified time limits, the offender will be found guilty of the original nonviolent drug offense and sentenced accordingly.Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3422, accessed April 17, 2011, law.onecle.com/arizona/criminal-code/13-3422.html.
Legalization of marijuana for medical use is another modern statutory trend among the states. Currently, sixteen states and the District of Columbia legalize medical marijuana.“Medical Marijuana Summary Chart,” Procon.org website, accessed April 17, 2011, http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881. The criteria under these statutes vary, but in general a qualified individual can gain a prescription for marijuana from a caregiver, usually a physician, and thereafter obtain, possess, and use a specified quantity of marijuana.Alaska Stat. §§ 17.37.010-17.37.070, accessed April 17, 2011, medicalmarijuana.procon.org/sourcefiles/alaska-ballot-measure-8.pdf. In some states, limited cultivation is also permissible.Cal. Health and Safety Code §§ 11362.7-11362.83, accessed April 17, 2011, http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881#California.
The legalization of marijuana for medical use presents an interesting constitutional dilemma because federal law lists marijuana as a Schedule 1 drug and does not permit its possession, use, or sale for medicinal purposes.21 U.S.C. § 812, accessed April 17, 2011, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/21/usc_sec_21_00000812----000-.html. Technically, the legalization of marijuana for medical use violates the Supremacy Clause in the federal Constitution, which Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 discuss in detail. However, the US Supreme Court has not invalidated any state’s medical marijuana statutory scheme on this basis, although the Court has upheld federal Congress’s authority to prohibit the possession and use of small quantities of marijuana under the Federal Controlled Substances ActGonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), accessed April 17, 2011, http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2004/2004_03_1454. and has rejected a medical necessity exception for the possession and use of marijuana.U.S. v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483 (2001), accessed April 17, 2011, http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_151.
Example of the Modernization of Drug Crimes Statutes
Remy lives in a state that legalizes marijuana for medical use and also has a drug court program. Remy obtains a prescription from an authorized caregiver and then buys the maximum amount of marijuana permitted under her state’s medical marijuana statute at a medical marijuana distribution center. As Remy leaves the distribution center, Donny, a drug dealer standing nearby, asks Remy if she would like to buy some cocaine. Remy agrees and buys a gram of cocaine from Donny. Unfortunately for Remy, Donny is a federal Drug Enforcement Agent who thereafter arrests Remy for possession of marijuana and cocaine.
In this example, the federal government can most likely prosecute Remy for possession of both marijuana and cocaine, even though her state legalizes marijuana for medical use and Remy has complied with the requirements of the state medical marijuana statute. The US Supreme Court has held that the federal government may criminalize the possession of small amounts of marijuana, and there is no federal medical necessity exemption. Thus Remy may be subject to prosecution for and conviction of both of these offenses under federal law. Remy’s state also can prosecute Remy for possession of cocaine. Remy’s state has a drug court program, so Remy may be qualified to go through drug court for the possession of cocaine charge and may face only probation and rehabilitation for this offense rather than incarceration.
Crimes Involving Prostitution
Every state except Nevada criminalizes prostitution. In Nevada, legal prostitution must follow specific guidelines and can occur only in a licensed house of prostitution.N.R.S. 201.354, accessed April 18, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/nevada/crimes/201.354.html.
The criminal act element required for prostitution varies, depending on the jurisdiction. In many states, prostitution is offering, agreeing, or engagingN.Y. Penal Law § 230.00, accessed April 21, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN0230.00_230.00.html. in sexual conduct for money,N.Y. Penal Law § 230.00, accessed April 21, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN0230.00_230.00.html. property, or anything of value.720 ILCS § 5/11-14, accessed April 21, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/illinois/720ilcs5/11-14.html. Agreeing and engaging are both considered prostitution, so the prostitute and the prostitute’s client could be prosecuted for and convicted of prostitution in most jurisdictions. The Model Penal Code criminalizes loitering in or within view of any public place for the purpose of being hired to engage in sexual activity and an inmate of a house of prostitution engaging in sexual activity as a business (Model Penal Code § 251.1(1)). The sexual conduct or sexual activity specified in statutes criminalizing prostitution generally includes sexual penetration, touching, or fondling sexual organs for sexual gratification.720 ILCS § 5/11-14, accessed April 21, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/illinois/720ilcs5/11-14.html. The Model Penal Code includes homosexual and deviate activity (Model Penal Code § 251.1).
The criminal intent element required for prostitution is either strict liabilityN.Y. Penal Law § 230.00, accessed April 21, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN0230.00_230.00.html. or general intent or knowingly in most jurisdictions.N.M. Stat. § 30-9-2, accessed April 21, 2011, http://law.justia.com/codes/new-mexico/2009/chapter-30/article-9/section-30-9-2. The Model Penal Code requires purposeful intent if the defendant is loitering to engage in prostitution or strict liability if an inmate in a house of prostitution engages in prostitution as a business (Model Penal Code § 251.1). Prostitution is typically graded as a misdemeanor, with sentencing enhancements for habitual offenders, prostitution that occurs near a school,720 ILCS § 5/11-14, accessed April 21, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/illinois/720ilcs5/11-14.html. or clients who patronize juvenile prostitutes.N.Y. Penal Law § 230.06, accessed April 21, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN0230.06_230.06.html. The Model Penal Code grades prostitution as a petty misdemeanor (Model Penal Code § 251.1(1)).
Two crimes associated with prostitution are pimping and pandering. Although the elements of these offenses vary depending on the jurisdiction, in general, the criminal act element required for pimping is receiving anything of value from a prostitute with the general intent or knowingly that it was earned by prostitution.720 ILCS § 5/11-19, accessed April 21, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/illinois/720ilcs5/11-19.html. Pimping is generally graded as a misdemeanor720 ILCS § 5/11-19, accessed April 21, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/illinois/720ilcs5/11-19.html. or felony,N.M. Stat. § 30-9-4.1, accessed April 21, 2011, http://law.justia.com/codes/new-mexico/2009/chapter-30/article-9/section-30-9-4-1. with sentencing enhancements if intimidation or force is used to compel an act of prostitutionN.Y. Penal Law § 230.33, accessed April 21, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN0230.33_230.33.html. or if the prostitute is a juvenile.N.Y. Penal Law § 230.32, accessed April 21, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN0230.32_230.32.html.
Pandering is generally procuring another (criminal act) with the specific intent or purposely to commit an act of prostitution.Cal. Penal Code § 266 i, accessed April 21, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/266i.html. Pandering is typically graded as a felony, with sentencing enhancement if the pandering occurs near a school.720 ILCS § 5/11-16, accessed April 21, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/illinois/720ilcs5/11-16.html. The Model Penal Code criminalizes a broad spectrum of conduct as promoting prostitution, including encouraging and inducing another purposely to become or remain a prostitute (Model Penal Code § 251.1(2) (c)). The Model Penal Code grades these acts of promoting prostitution as felonies of the third degree (Model Penal Code § 251.1(3) (a)).
Example of Crimes Involving Prostitution
Daniel approaches Penelope, a sixteen-year-old, as she wanders down the sidewalk. Daniel asks Penelope if she would like to earn a little extra cash. Penelope responds affirmatively, and Daniel asks her if she will have sexual intercourse with John (who is an adult) for one hundred and fifty dollars. Penelope eagerly agrees. Daniel walks Penelope over to the entrance of a motel where John is waiting. John and Penelope enter the motel, and John rents a room where they engage in sexual intercourse. Afterward, John pays Penelope the one hundred and fifty dollars. As Penelope leaves the motel, Daniel swiftly walks over, grabs Penelope by the wrist, and demands the one hundred and fifty dollars. Penelope protests, but Daniel twists her arm behind her back, and she grudgingly hands him the money. Daniel removes twenty dollars, hands it to Penelope, and informs her that it is her “share,” and if she wants more, she needs to engage in another act of sexual intercourse.
In this example, Penelope and John have probably committed prostitution, and Daniel has most likely committed pimping and pandering in many jurisdictions. When Penelope has sexual intercourse with John for one hundred and fifty dollars, she is engaging in sexual conduct for money with general intent or knowingly, which constitutes prostitution in most jurisdictions. When John has sexual intercourse with Penelope and thereafter pays her one hundred and fifty dollars, he is engaging in sexual conduct for money with general intent or knowingly, which is also generally criminal prostitution. Penelope is a juvenile, so John’s sentence may be enhanced and more severe than Penelope’s. When Daniel procures John and Penelope for the purpose of committing prostitution, he is most likely committing pandering. When Daniel takes money from Penelope with the general intent or knowingly that it was earned by prostitution, he is probably committing pimping. The use of force to obtain the money and Penelope’s age could enhance Daniel’s sentence for both crimes in many jurisdictions. Thus Penelope, John, and Daniel may be subject to prosecution for and conviction of the stated crimes of prostitution, pimping, and pandering in most jurisdictions.
Prostitution Video
“The Yard Blues”: A Reality of Drugs and Prostitution
A prostitute’s life is described in this video:
(click to see video)
Eliot Spitzer Video
New York Governor Eliot Spitzer Resigns after Sex Scandal
This video shows former New York Governor Spitzer resigning after being exposed for his connection with a prostitution ring:Danny Hakim, William K. Rashbaum, “Spitzer Is Linked to Prostitution Ring,” New York Times website, accessed September 4, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2008/03/10/nyregion/10cnd-spitzer.html.
(click to see video)
Various Vice Statutes
Most states criminalize gambling,18 Pa. C.S. § 5513, accessed April 21, 2011, law.onecle.com/pennsylvania/crimes-and-offenses/00.055.013.000.html. drunkenness in public,Cal. Penal Code § 647(f), accessed April 21, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/647.html. and driving while under the influence.Or. Rev. Stat. § 813.010, et seq., accessed April 21, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/oregon/813-driving-under-the-influence-of/index.html. Review the representative state statutes in the Notes for the elements of these vice crimes.
Exercises
• Federal criminal statutes targeting illegal drugs are part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, commonly known as the Controlled Substances Act. The states follow one of the three versions of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, which was drafted by a commission striving for uniformity in state and federal laws.
• For the purpose of drug crimes, the states and the federal government categorize illegal drugs in schedules. The schedules generally focus on the harmful or addictive qualities of the drug, with Schedule I drugs being the most harmful or addictive, and the remaining schedules reflecting less harmful or addictive drugs, including drugs that are legal with a prescription.
• In most jurisdictions, the manufacture of scheduled drugs is a felony, and cultivation of marijuana, which must be done with general intent or knowingly, can be a misdemeanor or a felony, depending on the quantity cultivated. Possession of scheduled drugs is typically graded based on the quantity, schedule classification, and whether or not the possession is for sale, with penalties ranging from a misdemeanor for simple possession to a serious felony for possession with intent to sell. Possession of less than an ounce of marijuana is graded lower than possession of other scheduled drugs in many jurisdictions. Sale, distribution, or trafficking of scheduled drugs is generally graded as a felony, with sentencing enhancements for drugs in a higher schedule, the sale of larger quantities, a sale by an adult to a minor, or a sale near school grounds. Scheduled drug use is typically a misdemeanor with more severe penalties for habitual offenders.
• Two modern trends in state drug crimes statutes are the emphasis on rehabilitation for nonviolent drug offenders, which drug courts provide through sentencing, and the legalization of marijuana for medical use in sixteen states and the District of Columbia.
• Technically, a state’s legalization of marijuana for medical use violates the Supremacy Clause because federal law classifies marijuana as a Schedule I drug and does not allow its possession, sale, or use for any purpose.
• Prostitution is generally offering, agreeing, or engaging in sexual conduct for money or anything of value (criminal act), with general intent or knowingly, or strict liability. Prostitution is typically graded as a misdemeanor, with sentencing enhancements for habitual offenders, prostitution that occurs near a school, or clients who patronize juvenile prostitutes. Pimping is generally receiving anything of value from a prostitute (criminal act), with general intent or knowingly that it was earned by prostitution in many jurisdictions, and is typically graded as a misdemeanor or felony, with sentencing enhancements if intimidation or force is used to compel an act of prostitution or if the prostitute is a juvenile. Pandering is generally procuring another (criminal act) with specific intent or purposely to commit an act of prostitution and is typically graded as a felony with sentencing enhancement if the pandering takes place near a school.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Anita lives in a state that permits the possession and use of marijuana for medical reasons. Anita obtains some marijuana and uses it to treat her medical condition, carefully following her state’s statutory requirements. Has Anita committed a crime(s)?
2. Read Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W. 3d 402 (2005). In Poindexter, the defendant purchased cocaine from a confidential informant inside his house. After the defendant left, a subsequent law enforcement search uncovered the cocaine inside a tin breath mints can hidden in the ceiling of the master bedroom closet. The defendant was convicted at trial, but the appellate court reversed, based on the fact that another individual was seen on the premises, so there was insufficient proof of the defendant’s possession. Did the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirm the court’s reversal? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10968287895213637721&q= possession+of+drugs+roommate+control+%22joint+possession%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2002.
3. Read People v. Watson, No. 90962 (Ohio 2120 2009). In Watson, the defendant was convicted of compelling prostitution. The defendant appealed on the grounds that the proper interpretation of compelling prostitution under the Ohio statute requires force, duress, or coercion and the defendant merely arranged it so that the prostitute had no money for shelter, clothes, and food if she did not continually commit prostitution. Did the Court of Appeals of Ohio uphold the defendant’s conviction? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5203798681398361958&q= prostitution+client+acquitted+%22convicted+of+prostitution+%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2002.
LAW AND ETHICS
Should Convicted Prostitutes Be Subjected to Involuntary AIDS Testing?
Read Love v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. App. 3d 736 (1990). The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16603325888575880385&q= Love+v.+Superior+Court&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. In Love, the defendants, convicted prostitutes, challenged the constitutionality of a California statute that required AIDS testing and counseling for those convicted of prostitution and other sex offenses.Cal. Penal Code § 1202.1, accessed April 22, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/1202.1.html. The defendants claimed the statute was an unreasonable search pursuant to the Fourth Amendment and also violated the due process and the equal protection clauses. The California Court of Appeals upheld the statute, holding that the “special need” of preventing the spread of AIDS was a valid exercise of state police power, and the statute was a reasonable means to effectuate that interest. In California, soliciting or agreeing to exchange sexual conduct for money constitutes prostitution,Cal. Penal Code § 647(b), accessed April 2, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/647.html. so a conviction for prostitution does not necessarily indicate an exchange of bodily fluids that could spread AIDS.
1. Do you think it is ethical to require all convicted prostitutes to submit to AIDS testing, whether or not they engaged in sexual intercourse? Why or why not?
Check your answer using the answer key at the end of the chapter. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/12%3A_Crimes_against_the_Public/12.03%3A_Vice_Crimes.txt |
Summary
States have an interest in protecting the quality of life of citizens, and therefore prohibit crimes against the public. Most jurisdictions criminalize disorderly conduct, which is making a loud and unreasonable noise, obscene utterance or gesture, fighting, threatening or stating fighting words, or creating a hazardous condition in public, with the specific intent or purposely or reckless intent to cause public inconvenience and alarm or a risk thereof. Disorderly conduct statutes target speech, so they are subject to constitutional challenges under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Disorderly conduct is typically graded as a misdemeanor. Unconstitutionally vague statutes criminalizing vagrancy have been supplanted by precisely drafted statutes criminalizing loitering, which is loitering, wandering, or remaining with specific intent or purposely to gamble, beg, or commit prostitution in a specified area. Loitering is typically graded as a misdemeanor or a violation. Panhandling or begging is also criminal in many jurisdictions, and panhandling statutes should be narrowly tailored to target aggressive conduct or conduct that blocks public access or the normal flow of traffic. Sit-lie laws prohibit sitting or lying down with strict liability intent in public or on a sidewalk during specified times in certain areas. Sit-lie laws are subject to constitutional challenges as cruel and unusual punishment or void for vagueness and are typically graded as an infraction.
Group conduct tends to enhance the potential for force and violence. Most jurisdictions criminalize unlawful assembly, which is purposefully assembling or meeting to cause a breach of the peace, and failure to disperse, which is the knowing refusal or failure to disperse when ordered to by law enforcement. Both unlawful assembly and failure to disperse statutes are subject to constitutional challenges under the First Amendment or as void for vagueness and overbroad, require the attendant circumstance of a group minimum of two, three, or five, and are graded as a misdemeanor. Most jurisdictions also criminalize riot, which is group commission of an unlawful act of violence or a lawful act in an unlawful manner, with the specific intent or purposely to commit or facilitate a misdemeanor or felony or prevent official action, or the general intent or knowingly that one of the group plans to use a firearm or deadly weapon. In some jurisdictions, riot is a strict liability offense. A few jurisdictions require the defendants to be the factual and legal cause of riot harm, which is public terror and alarm. Riot typically requires the attendant circumstance of a group minimum of two, five, or six and is graded as a misdemeanor or a felony if a firearm is used or if there is property damage or physical injury to someone other than the defendants.
Gang conduct is prohibited federally and in state statutes. States either criminalize gang conduct as gang participation, enhance a penalty for a crime committed by a criminal gang or gang member, or both. Gang participation is generally furthering the commission of a felony for the benefit of a criminal gang with the general intent or knowingly that other members participate in gang activity and is a felony. Gang enhancement statutes enhance the penalty for the commission of a felony or misdemeanor at the direction of or to further a criminal gang. Civil responses to gang conduct are civil gang activity statutes providing for damages and civil gang injunctions, which prohibit gang association, hand signs, wearing of gang colors, and loitering in areas known for gang activity. Statutes regulating gangs are subject to constitutional challenges under the First Amendment and as void for vagueness or overbroad.
All states and the federal government criminalize specific controlled substances offenses. Jurisdictions classify drugs in schedules, based on their harmful or addictive qualities, and punish drug offenses accordingly. Common offenses are the manufacture, cultivation, possession for personal use or sale, sale, and use of scheduled drugs, with the grading ranging from a felony to an infraction, depending on the offense and the drug. Some jurisdictions provide rehabilitation combined with probation as a penalty for nonviolent offenders through a drug court procedure. Some jurisdictions also legalize marijuana for medical use, which could violate federal supremacy because the federal government does not legalize marijuana for this purpose.
All states except Nevada criminalize prostitution. In Nevada, only prostitution that occurs in a licensed house of prostitution is noncriminal. Prostitution is offering, agreeing, or engaging in specified sexual conduct for money or anything of value, with strict liability or general intent or knowingly in most jurisdictions, and is typically graded as a misdemeanor with sentencing enhancements for habitual offenders, prostitution that occurs near a school, or patronizing a juvenile prostitute. Pimping is generally receiving something of value from a prostitute, with general intent or knowingly that it was earned by prostitution, and is graded as a misdemeanor or a felony with sentencing enhancements if the defendant uses force or the prostitute is a juvenile. Pandering is generally procuring another for an act of prostitution with specific intent or purposely and is typically graded as a felony with sentencing enhancement if the pandering takes place near a school.
YOU BE THE LEGISLATOR
You are a legislator with a perfect record for voting on statutes that are constitutional. You have been presented with four proposed statutes. Read each one, and then read the case analyzing a replica statute for constitutionality. Decide whether you should vote for or against the proposed statute if you want to keep your perfect record. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. The proposed statute is Disorderly Conduct and reads as follows: It is a misdemeanor to engage in indecent or disorderly conduct in the presence of another in a public place. This statute was analyzed for constitutionality by Satterfield v. State, 395 S.E. 2d 816 (1990). The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8539981756406627329&q= Satterfield+v.+State+395&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. Should you vote for or against the statute?
2. The proposed statute is Loitering for prostitution and reads as follows: It is unlawful for any person to loiter in or near any public place in a manner and under circumstances manifesting the purpose of inducing, enticing, soliciting for or procuring another to commit an act of prostitution. Among the circumstances that may be considered in determining whether such purpose is manifested are that such person repeatedly beckons to, stops, or attempts to stop or engages persons passing by in conversation, or repeatedly stops or attempts to stop motor vehicle operators by hailing, waving of arms or any other bodily gesture. This statute was analyzed for constitutionality by Silvar v. Dist. Ct., 129 P.3d 682 (2006). The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15323479136078401167&q= Silvar+v.+Dist.+Ct.&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. Should you vote for or against the statute?
3. The proposed statute is Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act and reads as follows: State Prosecutors are hereby authorized to bring specified crime charges against minors fourteen and older in the criminal division of adult court rather than in the juvenile division without a judicial determination that the minor is unfit for a juvenile court disposition. This statute was analyzed for constitutionality by Manduley v. Superior Court, 41 P.3d 3 (2002). The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14196981766707899172&q= Manduley+v.+Superior+Court&hl=e.n&as_sdt=2,5. Should you vote for or against the statute?
4. The proposed statute is Mere Possession and reads as follows: It is a crime to possess an unprescribed controlled substance. This statute was analyzed for constitutionality by State v. Bradshaw, 98 P.3d 1190 (2004). The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=33245956757868529&q= State+v.+Bradshaw+98&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. Should you vote for or against the statute?
Answers to Exercises
From Section 12.1
1. The ordinance can be challenged under the First Amendment, as void for vagueness, and as overbroad. A sign is expressive, so a First Amendment challenge is appropriate. The words “extended period” are vague, which can lead to uneven application by law enforcement and a failure to provide notice to the public of what behavior is criminal. Holding a sign such as a school crossing sign is protected activity, so an overbreadth challenge is also in order. The government has an interest in keeping the roadways safe, and in preventing dangerous distractions that could occur when drivers try to read signs while approaching a crosswalk.
2. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the disorderly conduct statute was not vague or overbroad simply because it does not require conduct to occur in public, and therefore the defendant’s attack of his spouse in a private residence could be prosecuted as “creating a hazardous condition.”
3. The Supreme Court of New York held that “begging” is constitutionally protected expression under the First Amendment, and thereafter reversed the defendant’s conviction under New York’s loitering for the purpose of begging statute.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 12.2
1. The First Amendment protects an individual’s right to stand in a public place and hold a sign as long as the sign is not obscene, fighting words, or a true threat. Signs indicating a disbelief in the holocaust are most likely upsetting to Jewish individuals attending temple, but they must constitute fighting words or a true threat if they are to be constitutionally prohibited. If the law enforcement officer arrests the individuals for unlawful assembly pursuant to a statute that arguably prohibits such conduct, the statute is subject to constitutional attack under the First Amendment or for overbreadth.
2. The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the defendant’s conviction. The court held that the lower court’s interpretation of New York’s first-degree riot statute did not violate due process by denying the defendant notice that his conduct was criminal, even though the interpretation extended the statute’s reach by including conduct that occurred after the defendant left the scene of the riot.
3. The California Court of Appeal held that the defendant was not entitled to a jury trial on his gang membership for purposes of a civil gang injunction because of the civil nature of the action and the fact that his physical liberty was not directly at stake.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 12.3
1. Anita has committed the federal crimes of possession and use of marijuana. Although Anita’s state has legalized marijuana for medical use, and Anita complied with her state’s statutory requirements, the Federal Controlled Substances Act criminalizes the possession and use of marijuana, and there is no federal medical necessity exemption.
2. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reversed, holding that evidence of the cocaine’s presence in a hidden location accessible only to someone exercising control over the house, the defendant’s ownership of the house, and evidence that the cocaine was conveniently accessible to the defendant was sufficient to convict the defendant of possession of cocaine.
3. The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed, finding no evidence of force, duress, or coercion because the prostitute’s testimony indicated that “nothing would happen” if she refused to turn money earned from prostitution over to the defendant.
Answer to Law and Ethics Question
1. Combating a syndrome like AIDS is clearly a legitimate state concern, and, generally, individual protections can be sublimated constitutionally as long as they are outweighed by the government interest at stake. In this case, the individual interest in avoiding a potentially life-saving blood test is not nearly as paramount as the government interest in preventing the spread of a communicable disease. Neither the risk of a stigma nor the ethics involved in targeting prostitutes are outweighed by the government interest. It is reasonable to infer, as the court stated, that convicted prostitutes have been or will be sexually active with multiple partners. Thus the California statutory scheme appears to be a minimally invasive and reasonable method to protect the health and well-being of California citizens, which makes it as ethical as statutes targeting the homeless, for example, sit-lie laws.
Answers to You Be the Legislator
1. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the statute fails to define in any manner what is meant by indecent or disorderly conduct, so it does not provide fair warning to persons of ordinary intelligence of what is criminal, gives too much discretion to law enforcement, and is therefore void for vagueness. Thus you should vote against the proposed statute if you want to keep your perfect record.
2. The Nevada Supreme Court held that the statute is void for vagueness because it does not adequately specify the circumstances for which a person could be arrested, thus failing to provide fair warning to persons of ordinary intelligence of what is criminal and giving too much discretion to law enforcement. The court also held that the statute is overbroad because it criminalizes protected conduct like waving and beckoning. Thus you should vote against the proposed statute if you want to keep your perfect record.
3. The California Supreme Court held that the statute did not violate separation of powers and was not unconstitutionally discriminatory pursuant to the equal protection clause, even though filing charges in adult court affects a juvenile’s sentencing because this is incidental to the prosecutor’s traditional role in charging individuals with crimes. In addition, the court held that juveniles were subject to concurrent jurisdiction between juvenile and adult court, so the statute did not deprive them of rights guaranteed by due process of law, nor did it subject them to cruel and unusual punishment. Thus you should vote for the proposed statute and you will keep your perfect record.
4. The Washington Supreme Court found that the legislature had revised the statute to omit a criminal intent requirement, and this revision is constitutional even though the law disfavors strict liability criminal statutes. Thus you should vote for the proposed statute and you will keep your perfect record. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/12%3A_Crimes_against_the_Public/12.04%3A_End-of-Chapter_Material.txt |
Bribery, of course, connotes a voluntary offer to obtain gain, where extortion connotes some form of coercion.
- U.S. v. Adcock, cited in Section 13.3.2 "Bribery Elements"
Source: Image courtesy of Tara Storm.
13.01: Crimes Involving National Security
Learning Objectives
1. Define the elements of treason, and analyze treason’s evidentiary requirements and grading.
2. Define the elements of sedition, and analyze sedition grading.
3. Define the elements of various forms of sabotage, and analyze sabotage grading.
4. Define the elements of espionage, and analyze espionage grading.
The government is tasked with keeping the nation safe from domestic and international attacks on the government and citizens. National security is an issue that affects the entire country, so most of the regulation in this area is federal, rather than state.Pennsylvania v. Nelson, accessed May 1, 2011, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), http://supreme.justia.com/us/350/497/case.html. Criminal statutes protecting the government can encroach on the individual freedom to protest government action and can also affect privacy interests, which subjects them to enhanced constitutional scrutiny similar to the crimes against the public reviewed in Chapter 12. This section explores crimes against the nation, such as treason, sedition, sabotage, and espionage. Section 13.2 examines terrorism and the USA PATRIOT Act. The last section of this chapter discusses other crimes against the government that are primarily state regulated, such as perjury, bribery, and obstruction of justice.
Treason
Article III § 3 of the US Constitution defines treason and specifies the evidentiary requirements for any treason trial. The founding fathers wanted to ensure that the government would not charge an individual with treason without significant and reliable proof. Treason was punishable by death in England, so it was a constant threat to anyone who disagreed with the ruling party. Although the treason clause in the Constitution is modeled after the early English law defining treason, it omits a section that criminalized “imagining the death of the King” and also limits Congress’s authority to extend or expand the crime of treason or to lighten the evidentiary requirements.
The pertinent section of the Constitution states, “Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying War against them, or, in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.”
Treason Elements and Grading
The criminal act element required for treason is levying war against the United States or adhering to the enemy by giving aid and comfort.18 U.S.C. § 2381, accessed April 29, 2011, www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/718/usc_sec_18_00002381----000-.html. Prosecutions for treason are practically nonexistent, so case law in this area is dated, yet still constitutes viable precedent. In U.S. v. Burr, 25 F Cas 55 (1807), a case involving then-vice president Aaron Burr’s prosecution for treason, the US Supreme Court held that levying war means an actual assembling of men, not a conspiracy to levy war, nor a mere enlistment of men. In Haupt v. U.S., 330 U.S. 631 (1947), the US Supreme Court held that the defendant’s acts of harboring and sheltering his son in his home, helping him to purchase an automobile, and obtain employment constituted providing aid and comfort to the enemy because the defendant’s son was a spy and saboteur. The criminal intent element required for treason is most likely the general intent or knowingly to commit an act of levying war or the specific intent or purposely to betray the United States by giving aid and comfort to enemies.Cramer v. U.S., 325 U.S. 1 (1945), http://supreme.justia.com/us/325/1. The Constitution specifies the evidentiary requirements that two witnesses testify to an overt act of treason or that the defendant confess in open court, although this is not set forth in the federal treason statute.18 U.S.C. § 2381, accessed April 29, 2011, www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/718/usc_sec_18_00002381----000-.html. As stated in Cramer v. U.S., 325 U.S. 1, 34, 35 (1945), “Every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses,” and it is not enough that the elements of treason can be inferred from the witness statements. Treason is graded as a felony that can merit the death penalty or prohibit the defendant from ever holding federal office.18 U.S.C. § 2381, accessed April 29, 2011, www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/718/usc_sec_18_00002381----000-.html.
Example of a Case Lacking Treason Elements and Evidentiary Requirements
Benedict is identified as a person of interest in a treason case. A government agent posing as an enemy spy invites Benedict to dinner, and they discuss the decline of the United States and whether or not they should “do something about it.” At the conclusion of the dinner, Benedict picks up the tab. Thereafter, Benedict is arrested for treason and refuses to incriminate himself by responding to law enforcement interrogation. It is unlikely that Benedict will be convicted of treason in this case. Benedict paid for the government agent’s dinner, which could constitute providing aid to the enemy. However, Benedict indicated a hesitancy to take further action, which does not satisfy the requirement that he act with the specific intent or purposely to betray the United States. In addition, only the government agent can testify as to Benedict’s act of paying for a meal because Benedict is asserting his right to remain silent. Therefore, the constitutional requirement that two witnesses testify about the overt act charged as treason is not satisfied. The intent element and evidentiary requirement for treason are lacking, so Benedict probably will not be subject to prosecution for and conviction of this offense.
Sedition
Sedition criminalizes the incitement of insurrection or revolution by seditious speech or writings and, as such, is subject to the restrictions set forth in the First Amendment. The first federal law prohibiting sedition was the Sedition Act enacted in 1798 and repealed by Thomas Jefferson after his election as president. The current federal statute criminalizing sedition was originally enacted in 1940 and is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2385. Conspiracy to commit sedition is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2384. Many states have similar provisions.51 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6018, accessed April 30, 2011, law.onecle.com/pennsylvania/military-affairs/00.060.018.000.html. Like treason, sedition is rarely prosecuted.
The criminal act element required for sedition is either advocating, aiding, teaching, organizing or printing, publishing, or circulating written matter that advocates, aids, or teaches the overthrow of the US government or any state, district, or territory thereof by force or violence.18 U.S.C. § 2385, accessed April 30, 2011, www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/718/usc_sec_18_00002385----000-.html. The criminal intent element required for sedition is the general intent or knowingly to advocate, aid, teach, or organize, or the specific intent or purposely to print, publish, or circulate written matter that advocates, aids, or teaches the violent government overthrow.18 U.S.C. § 2385, accessed April 30, 2011, www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/718/usc_sec_18_00002385----000-.html. In Yates v. U.S., 354 U.S. 298 (1957), the US Supreme Court held that only advocacy directed at promoting unlawful action could be constitutionally prohibited. Advocacy of an “abstract doctrine” was protected by the First Amendment as free speech.Yates v. U.S., 354 U.S. 298, 318 (1957), accessed April 30, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14369441513839511604&q= Yates+v.+U.S.&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5. Sedition is graded as a felony that can prohibit the defendant from obtaining employment with the US government for a minimum of five years postconviction.18 U.S.C. § 2385, accessed April 30, 2011, www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/718/usc_sec_18_00002385----000-.html.
Example of Sedition
Mo, a disgruntled immigrant who has been denied citizenship, decides he wants to overthrow the US government and supplant it with a new government that will grant the citizenship privileges he desires. Mo prints up leaflets advocating the overthrow of the government by placing a series of bombs in strategic and specifically named places and passes them out every Saturday in front of varied places known for ethnic diversity throughout the city. Mo has most likely committed sedition in this example. Mo printed written matter advocating the overthrow of the US government by unlawful action, using force and violence. Mo’s intent was to get rid of the current government so that he could gain citizenship, which is specific intent or purposely. Thus Mo’s conduct probably constitutes sedition, and he may be subject to prosecution for and conviction of several counts of this offense.
Sabotage
Sabotage is criminalized at 18 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq., which includes several different forms of this offense. Many states have similar provisions.RCW § 9.05.060, accessed May 1, 2011, apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=9.05.060. In general, sabotage is destroying, damaging, or defectively producing (criminal act and harm) property with the specific intent or purposely, general intent or knowingly, or negligently to impede the nation’s ability to prepare for or participate in war and national defense and is detailed in the following United States Codes:
• 18 U.S.C. § 2152 focuses on destroying or damaging harbor-defense property.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2153 focuses on destroying or damaging war material, premises, or utilities.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2154 focuses on producing defective war materials, premises, or utilities.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2155 focuses on destroying or damaging national defense material, premises, or utilities.
• 18 U.S.C. § 2156 focuses on producing defective national defense material, premises, or utilities.
Both 18 U.S.C. §§ 2153 and 2154 have the attendant circumstance that the conduct occur during war or a national emergency. All the sabotage statutes grade sabotage as a felony, with sentences ranging from five to thirty years’ incarceration in federal prison.
Sabotage is prosecuted more often than treason and sedition, and there have been some extremely interesting criminal sabotage cases, including sabotage indictments against a corporation manufacturing defective raincoats for the armed forces during wartime, a sabotage trial for the burning of an ROTC building on the Washington University campus after the Kent State University riots, a sabotage trial for defendants who stole copper wire from a railroad track that was used to ship war materials, and the sabotage indictment of Osama bin Laden for extraterritorial (outside the United States) activity.
Example of Sabotage
Review the example in Section 13 with Mo. Add to this example and imagine that Mo gets no response to his fliers and becomes enraged. He decides to get back at the United States for not allowing him to become a US citizen by harming its national security and exposing it to attack by enemy forces. He thereafter hacks into the computer system used by the US Department of Defense and damages it so that it is out of commission for two weeks. Mo has most likely committed the federal crime of sabotage. Mo damaged national defense material with the specific intent or purposely to interfere with the nation’s security and defense, which is prohibited under 18 U.S.C. § 2155, whether or not it is wartime or during a national emergency. Thus Mo may be subject to prosecution for and conviction of this offense and could face many years of incarceration for his conduct.
Espionage
Espionage, also known as “spying,” is criminalized at 18 U.S.C. § 792 et seq. Originally part of one of the early versions of the Sedition Act of 1918, the crime of espionage has a colorful history and many interesting criminal prosecutions similar to criminal sabotage. Federal espionage statutes criminalize various acts, depending on whether the conduct occurs during peace or during war. During times of peace, it is criminal espionage to gather, transmit, or attempt to gather or transmit defense information (criminal act) with general intent or knowingly, or with the specific intent or purposely that it will be used to damage the United States or assist any foreign nation.18 U.S.C. § 793, accessed May 1, 2011, www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/718/usc_sec_18_00000793----000-.html. During times of war, it is criminal espionage to collect, record, publish, or communicate information about military activities or to attempt any of the foregoing (criminal act) with the specific intent or purposely that the information will be transmitted to the enemy.18 U.S.C. § 794(b), accessed May 1, 2011, www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/718/usc_sec_18_00000794----000-.html. Espionage is graded as a felony, with potential sentencing of life in prison or the death penalty.18 U.S.C. § 792 et seq., accessed May 1, 2011, www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/718/usc_sup_01_18_10_I_20_37.html.
Some interesting criminal espionage cases are the Rosenberg case, where a married couple conspired to pass nuclear secrets to the Soviets and were later executed pursuant to the death penalty, the Hanssen case, where an FBI agent sold state secrets to Moscow for \$1.4 million in cash and diamonds, and the Aragoncillo case, where a White House employee stole intelligence documents from White House computers and e-mailed them to the Philippines.
Example of Espionage
Review the example given in Section 13 with Mo and his computer hacking. Change the example so that before Mo damages the US Department of Defense computer system, he copies some information from different top-secret sites and sends them to operatives in an enemy nation with this message: “I have stolen this information directly from the US Department of Defense. I have also disabled their computer system, which will probably take some time to repair. Now is an excellent time to attack the United States.” He thereafter severely damages the computer system. In this example, Mo has most likely committed both sabotage and espionage. As stated in Section 13, Mo probably committed sabotage when he damaged national defense material with the specific intent or purposely to interfere with the nation’s security and defense. When Mo copied top-secret information and sent it to an enemy nation, along with informing the nation that the US Department of Defense computer system was disabled, he gathered and transmitted information with the specific intent or purposely that it be used to injure the United States. Thus Mo has probably committed both sabotage and espionage and may be subject to prosecution for and conviction of these offenses.
Video of the President Informing the Nation bin Laden is Dead
President Obama on the Death of Osama bin Laden
President Obama’s speech explaining Osama bin Laden’s death is shown in this video:
(click to see video)
Table 13.1 Comparing Treason, Sedition, Sabotage, and Espionage
Crime Criminal Act or Harm Criminal Intent Attendant Circumstance(s)
Treason* Levy war, or give aid and comfort to enemies Most likely, general intent or knowingly to levy war, specific intent or purposely to betray the United States with aid and comfort
Sedition Advocating or printing matter that advocates the forceful or violent overthrow of the US government General intent or knowingly to advocate, specific intent or purposely when printing matter that advocates the forceful or violent overthrow of the US government
Sabotage Varies: either destroying, damaging, or producing defective property that impedes US defense capabilities Varies: specific intent or purposely, general intent or knowingly or negligently Certain conduct must take place during war or a national emergency
Espionage Spying Varies: either general intent or knowingly, or specific intent or purposely that information will be transmitted to the enemy Certain conduct must take place during war
*Includes the evidentiary requirement of the testimony of two witnesses or the defendant’s confession in open court
Exercises
• The criminal act element required for treason is levying war against the United States or adhering to the enemy by giving the enemy aid and comfort. The criminal intent element required for treason is most likely the general intent or knowingly to commit an act of levying war, or the specific intent or purposely to betray the United States by giving aid and comfort to enemies. Treason also has the constitutional evidentiary requirement that two witnesses corroborate the acts of treason or that the defendant confess in open court. Treason is graded as a felony.
• The criminal act element required for sedition is advocating, aiding, teaching, organizing, or printing, publishing, or circulating written matter that advocates, aids, or teaches the overthrow of the US government by force or violence. The criminal intent element required for sedition is the general intent or knowingly to advocate, aid, teach, or organize or the specific intent or purposely to print, publish, or circulate written matter that advocates, aids, or teaches the forceful or violent government overthrow. Sedition is graded as a felony.
• The criminal act and harm elements required for sabotage vary but are generally damaging, destroying, or producing defective property that impedes the US national defense or ability to participate in or prepare for war. The criminal intent element required for sabotage also varies but is either specific intent or purposely, general intent or knowingly, or negligent intent, depending on the criminal act. Some forms of sabotage require the attendant circumstance that the conduct occurs during wartime or a national emergency. Sabotage is graded as a felony.
• Espionage is spying (criminal act) with general intent or knowingly, or the specific intent or purposely to transmit information to another nation. Some forms of espionage require the attendant circumstance that the conduct occurs during wartime. Espionage is graded as a felony.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Stephanie stands in front of a mosque and advocates for the overthrow of the US government. Is Stephanie committing sedition? Why or why not?
2. Read U.S. v. Kabat, 797 Fed.2d 580 (1986). Did the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit uphold the defendants’ convictions for sabotage when, as nuclear protestors, they intentionally damaged US missiles? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5276967647790252481&q= sabotage+%222155%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=1992.
3. Read In re Squillacote, 790 A.2d 514 (2002). Did the District of Columbia Court of Appeals hold that conspiracy to commit espionage and attempted espionage are crimes of moral turpitude that could support the defendant’s disbarment? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8408409521873710428&q= espionage+%22793%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2000. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/13%3A_Crimes_against_the_Government/13.00%3A_Prelude_to_Crimes_against_the_Government.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Identify three federal statutory schemes targeting terroristic conduct.
2. Ascertain the function of the Department of Homeland Security.
3. Define international and domestic terrorism.
4. Identify crimes involving terrorism.
5. Identify potential constitutional challenges to the USA PATRIOT Act.
In recent years, crimes involving terrorism have escalated both in the United States and abroad. The federal government’s response has been to enact comprehensive criminal statutes with severe penalties targeting terroristic conduct. In this section, federal statutes criminalizing acts of terrorism are reviewed, along with potential constitutional challenges.
Statutory Schemes Targeting Terrorism
Before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the primary federal statutes criminalizing terrorism were the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which was enacted after the Oklahoma City bombings. After September 11, 2001, Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act, which stands for Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001.
The USA PATRIOT Act changed and strengthened existing laws targeting terrorism and enhanced US capabilities to prosecute terrorism committed abroad. Specifically, the USA PATRIOT Act increases federal jurisdiction over crimes committed outside the United States,USA PATRIOT Act, Tit. VIII § 804, accessed May 4, 2011, frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ056.107.pdf. creates new crimes involving financial support of terrorism or terrorists abroad,USA PATRIOT Act, Tit. VIII § 805, accessed May 4, 2011, frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ056.107.pdf. and provides for the civil forfeiture of assets connected to terrorism.USA PATRIOT Act, Tit. VIII § 806, accessed May 4, 2011, frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ056.107.pdf. Other fundamental changes incorporated in the USA PATRIOT Act are the expansion of government surveillance capabilities, including telephone interception and scrutiny of e-mails.USA PATRIOT Act, Tit. II, § 203 et seq., frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ056.107.pdf.
In 2002, Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under the authority of the Homeland Security Act. DHS enforces provisions of federal laws against terrorism and includes the following agencies: the Secret Service, Customs, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, United States Coast Guard, Border Patrol, Transportation Security Administration, and Citizenship and Immigration Services.Department of Homeland Security website, accessed May 4, 2011, http://www.dhs.gov/index.shtm.
Criminal Terroristic Conduct
International terrorism is defined as violent acts committed outside the United States that would be criminal if committed in the United States, and that appear to be intended to influence a civilian population or government by intimidation, or to affect the conduct of government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.18 U.S.C. § 2331(1), accessed May 3, 2011, www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/718/usc_sec_18_00002331----000-.html. Specific crimes such as murder, attempted murder, and conspiracy to commit murder committed against an American national (defined as an American citizen or individual who owes permanent allegiance to the United States)8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (22), accessed May 3, 2011, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode08/usc_sec_08_00001101----000-.html. while outside the United States are graded as high-level felonies with all ranges of sentencing options available, including the death penalty.18 U.S.C. § 2332, accessed May 3, 2011, www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/718/usc_sec_18_00002332----000-.html.Domestic terrorism is defined exactly the same as international terrorism, except that the violent acts are committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.18 U.S.C. § 2331(5), accessed May 3, 2011, www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/718/usc_sec_18_00002331----000-.html. Prohibited as terrorism are the use of a weapon of mass destruction, which is defined as any destructive device or weapon designed to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release of chemicals, toxins, or radioactivity,18 U.S.C. § 2332A(c) (2), accessed May 4, 2011, www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/718/usc_sec_18_00002332---a000-.html. bombings of places of public use—including public transportation systems18 U.S.C. § 2332F, accessed May 4, 2011, www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/718/usc_sec_18_00002332---f000-.html.—financing of terrorism,18 U.S.C. § 2339C, accessed May 3, 2011, www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/718/usc_sec_18_00002339---C000-.html. harboring or concealing terrorists,18 U.S.C. § 2339, accessed May 3, 2011, www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/718/usc_sec_18_00002339----000-.html. or attempt or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing. All these crimes are graded as serious felonies.
Example of Terrorism
Zacarias Moussaoui, a French citizen, was the only defendant prosecuted for the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Although Moussaoui was not onboard any of the planes that crashed into the World Trade Center, Pentagon, and a Pennsylvania field because he was in federal custody, he was indictedZacarias Moussaoui indictment, Justice.gov website, accessed May 4, 2011, http://www.justice.gov/ag/moussaouiindictment.htm. for several counts of conspiracy to commit terrorism and aircraft piracy and pleaded guilty to all charges. Specifically, Moussaoui pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries, conspiracy to commit aircraft piracy, conspiracy to destroy aircraft, conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, conspiracy to murder US employees, and conspiracy to destroy property of the United States. After the extended trial, during which Moussaoui attempted to represent himself, and the resulting guilty pleas, the jury carefully considered and recommended against the death penalty for Moussaoui, who was thereafter sentenced to life in prison.Jerry Markon, Timothy Dwyer, “Jurors Reject Death Penalty for Moussaoui,” Washington Post website, accessed May 11, 2011, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/03/AR2006050300324.html. Moussaoui later moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, but his motion was rejected by the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,U.S. v. Moussaoui, Criminal No. 01-455-A (2003), accessed May 4, 2011, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/moussaoui/withdrawguilty.pdf. whose decision was later affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.U.S. v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263 (2010), accessed May 4, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5511221851556025255&q= U.S.+v.+Moussaoui&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5.
Constitutional Challenges to the USA PATRIOT Act
Portions of the USA PATRIOT Act provide for enhanced government surveillance capabilities, which are considered a search, so constitutional implications are present pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable search and seizure. In addition, provisions of the Act that prohibit financing terrorists and terrorism have been attacked as violative of the First Amendment’s protection of free speech, free association, and freedom of religion. Litigation involving these challenges is ongoing and was filed on behalf of citizens by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).Nancy Kranich, “The Impact of the USA PATRIOT Act: An Update,” Fepproject.org website, accessed May 4, 2011, http://www.fepproject.org/commentaries/patriotactupdate.html.
Exercises
• Three statutory schemes targeting terroristic conduct are the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, and the USA PATRIOT Act.
• The Department of Homeland Security enforces terrorism laws.
• The definition of international terrorism is violent acts committed outside the United States that would be criminal if committed in the United States and that appear to be intended to influence a civilian population or government by intimidation, or to affect the conduct of government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. The definition of domestic terrorism is exactly the same, except the criminal acts take place within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
• Examples of crimes involving terroristic conduct are murder, use of a weapon of mass destruction, bombing places of public use, financing terrorism, harboring a terrorist, and conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the foregoing.
• The USA PATRIOT Act expands government surveillance capabilities, so it is subject to a Fourth Amendment challenge as an unreasonable search, and also prohibits financing terrorism, so it is subject to a First Amendment challenge as a prohibition on free speech, freedom of religion, and freedom to associate.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Joshua shoots and kills Khalid in front of the Pakistani Embassy in Washington, DC. Is this an act of domestic terrorism? Why or why not?
2. Read Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (2000). Did the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit uphold 18 U.S.C. § 2339, which prohibits providing material support to terrorists? What were the constitutional challenges to this federal statute? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6926778734800618484&q= convicted+%222339%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2000.
3. Read Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Department of Justice, 352 F.3d 382 (2003). In this case, the same federal statute was analyzed (18 U.S.C. § 2339) as in Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, in Exercise 2. Did the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit uphold the statute in the face of a Fifth Amendment challenge that the statute deprived the defendants of due process of law? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2048259608876560530&q= convicted+%222339%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5&as_ylo=2000. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/13%3A_Crimes_against_the_Government/13.02%3A_Crimes_Involving_Terrorism.txt |
Learning Objectives
1. Define the elements of perjury.
2. Identify the issues commonly encountered in a perjury prosecution.
3. Identify a potential defense to perjury.
4. Define perjury by inconsistent statements and subornation of perjury.
5. Analyze perjury and subornation of perjury grading.
6. Define the elements of bribery, identify the primary difficulty in a prosecution for this offense, and analyze bribery grading.
7. Define the elements of various forms of obstruction of justice, and analyze obstruction of justice grading.
Crimes against the administration of justice impede the government’s ability to carry out the important functions of prosecuting and convicting criminals, which, in turn, destroys citizens’ confidence that the US legal system is effective in ensuring individual safety and security. This section analyzes perjury, bribery, and obstruction of justice, along with the issues commonly encountered when prosecuting these offenses. Additional statutes criminalizing contempt of court, resisting arrest, and escape are also available for review.
Perjury History and Elements
Witness testimony is important in a variety of settings. Juries depend on witness testimony to reach a fair and impartial verdict in civil and criminal trials, and grand juries depend on witness testimony to indict defendants for criminal conduct. Thus modern laws of perjury are calculated to ensure that witnesses testify truthfully so that justice can be done in each individual case.
In the Middle Ages, the witnesses were the jurors, so the criminalization of false witness testimony did not occur until the sixteenth century when the idea of a trial by an impartial jury emerged. The first common-law prohibition against witness perjury criminalized false testimony, given under oath, in a judicial proceeding, about a material issue. This definition was also incorporated into early American common law.“Perjury—Perjury at Common Law,” Jrank.org website, accessed May 5, 2011, http://law.jrank.org/pages/1632/Perjury-Perjury-at-common-law.html.
In modern times, every state prohibits perjury, as well as the federal government.18 U.S.C. § 1621, accessed May 5, 2011, www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/718/usc_sec_18_00001621----000-.html. Most state statutes or state common law, in states that allow common-law crimes, define perjury as a false material statement (criminal act), made with the specific intent or purposely to deceive, or the general intent or knowingly that the statement was false, in a judicial or official proceeding (attendant circumstance), under oath (attendant circumstance).Ga. Code tit. 16 § 16-10-70, accessed May 5, 2011, law.onecle.com/georgia/16/16-10-70.html. The Model Penal Code defines perjury as a false material statement, that the defendant does not believe to be true, made under oath in any official proceeding (Model Penal Code § 241.1(1)). The biggest issues commonly encountered in any perjury prosecution are proving the validity of the oath, the defendant’s criminal intent, the materiality of the false statement, and any requirement of corroborative evidence.
Necessity of a Valid Oath
The defendant must be under oath when making the statement at issue in any perjury prosecution, and the oath must be administered by someone of legal authority or someone authorized to take evidence under oath,Connecticut Jury Instructions § 53a-156, accessed May 5, 2011, www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part4/4.5-9.htm. including a referee, hearing examiner, commissioner, notary, or other person authorized to take evidence in connection with an official or judicial proceeding.Connecticut Jury Instructions § 53a-156, accessed May 5, 2011, www.jud.ct.gov/ji/criminal/part4/4.5-9.htm. Federally and in many jurisdictions, the false statement can be written, as long as it is certified, such as a signature on an income tax return18 U.S.C. § 6065, accessed May 5, 2011, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/26/usc_sec_26_00006065----000-.html. or a report.Cal. Penal Code § 129, accessed May 5, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/129.html. The Model Penal Code also considers a false written statement perjury, as long as the document containing the statement is made upon oath or affirmation (Model Penal Code § 241.1(3)). In spite of the attendant circumstance requirement that the statement be made under oath, many jurisdictions disallow a defense to a prosecution for perjury based on the assertion that the oath or affirmation was administered or taken in an irregular manner.Ala. Code § 13A-10-108, accessed May 5, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-10-108.html. The Model Penal Code has a similar provision (Model Penal Code § 241.1(3)). In addition, many jurisdictions have a provision that witnesses who refuse to take an oath shall have the option of making a nonreligous affirmation that has the same legal effect as the oath.42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5901, accessed May 5, 2011, law.onecle.com/pennsylvania/judiciary-and-judicial-procedure/00.059.001.000.html. The Model Penal Code allows for an “oath or equivalent affirmation” (Model Penal Code § 241.1(1)).
Perjury Criminal Intent
As stated previously, in many jurisdictions, the defendant must know that a statement is false or must make the statement with the specific intent or purposely to deceive. When the intent requirement is general intent or knowledge that the statement is false, proof that the statement is false could give rise to an inference of intent.State v. Kimber, 48 Conn. App. 234 (1998), accessed May 5, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17399056576949304157&q= State+v.+Kimber+48&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5.
Materiality Requirement
Perjury generally requires a false statement that is material, which means that it substantially affected or could substantially affect the outcome of the proceeding.Mo. Ann. Stat. § 575.040, accessed May 5, 2011, http://www1.law.umkc.edu/suni/CrimLaw/calendar/Class_4_Mo_perjury.htm. In many jurisdictions and federally, materiality is a question of fact for the trier of fact, which could be a jury.U.S. v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995), accessed May 5, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12281686524757008977&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. The Model Penal Code defines materiality as a statement that could have affected the course or outcome of the proceeding and declares that materiality should be a question of law, which means it should be determined by a judge, not a jury (Model Penal Code § 241.1(2)). Typically, it is not a defense to perjury that the defendant did not know that the statement was material.Mo. Ann. Stat. § 575.040(3) (1), accessed May 5, 2011, http://www1.law.umkc.edu/suni/CrimLaw/calendar/Class_4_Mo_perjury.htm. The Model Penal Code has a similar provision (Model Penal Code § 241.1(2)).
Corroborative Evidence Requirement
Some jurisdictions have a requirement of corroborative evidence for perjury, which necessitates the testimony of two witnesses to support a conviction, similar to a treason conviction.Tex. Code of Criminal Procedure, § 38.18, accessed May 5, 2011, law.onecle.com/texas/criminal-procedure/38.18.00.html. The Model Penal Code also has this corroborative evidence requirement (Model Penal Code § 241.1(6)).
Defense of Retraction
Many jurisdictions provide a defense to perjury if the defendant retracts his or her false statement in the course of the same proceeding in which it was made before it becomes manifest that the falsification will be exposed.Ala. Code § 13A-10-107, accessed May 6, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-10-107.html. The Model Penal Code has a similar provision (Model Penal Code § 241.1(4)).
Example of a Case Lacking an Element of Perjury
Marcus is a witness in a civil suit for damages against Lindsay. Macy’s department store is suing Lindsay for the alleged theft of a diamond necklace. Marcus takes an oath sworn by the court commissioner. He thereafter testifies that he saw Lindsay try on the necklace and then walk out of the store without paying for it. When the Macy’s attorney asks Marcus what he was doing at Macy’s, Marcus responds that he was buying some jewelry as a gift for his wife. In actuality, Marcus was shopping for jewelry as a gift for his girlfriend. Marcus has probably not committed perjury in this case. Marcus is testifying as a witness in a civil rather than criminal trial, but this satisfies the perjury requirement that the testimony be offered during a judicial or official proceeding. Before testifying, Marcus took an oath that was administered by a court commissioner, also satisfying the perjury requirement that the defendant take an oath administered by someone with the legal authority or authorization to take evidence under oath. Marcus’s statement is false, and he made the statement with knowledge of its falsity, which satisfies the perjury criminal intent requirement. However, Marcus’s statement does not appear to be material to this judicial proceeding because the reason for Marcus’s presence at Macy’s will not affect the outcome of Lindsay’s civil theft trial (usually called the tort of conversion). Thus Marcus is probably not subject to prosecution for and conviction of perjury, based on his testimony in this case.
Example of Perjury
Review the example in Section 13 with Marcus. Change this example so that Marcus testifies that he did not see Lindsay walk out of the Macy’s department store without paying for the necklace because he does not want to admit that he was shopping for jewelry to buy his girlfriend. Anthony, the Macy’s civil trial attorney, cross-examines Marcus, and forces him to admit that he saw Lindsay steal the necklace, and that he was lying previously. Marcus has most likely committed perjury in this example. Marcus made a false statement, under a validly administered oath, in a judicial proceeding, with knowledge of its falsity. Marcus’s statement was material because, if believed, it would have helped exonerate Lindsay in her civil case. In many jurisdictions, the trier of fact, which could be a judge or jury, determines whether or not the statement is material. Marcus’s admission that he was lying is not a retraction that could serve as a defense because it was not made until the lie was about to be exposed. Thus all the elements of perjury appear to be present, and Marcus may be subject to prosecution for and conviction of this offense.
Perjury by Inconsistent Statements
Some jurisdictions criminalize perjury by inconsistent or contradictory statements, which is slightly different from criminal perjury.Ala. Code § 13A-10-104, accessed May 6, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-10-104.html. Perjury by inconsistent statements is easier to prove than traditional perjury because the prosecution can simply offer evidence that the defendant made statements that are inconsistent, in a judicial proceeding, after taking a validly administered oath. Corroborative evidence is not required, and the prosecution does not have the burden of proving that one of the statements is false, just that one or the other was false and not believed by the defendant to be true.Ala. Code § 13A-10-104, accessed May 6, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-10-104.html. The Model Penal Code has a similar provision (Model Penal Code § 241.1(5)).
Example of Perjury by Inconsistent Statements
Review the example with Marcus in Section 13. If Marcus’s jurisdiction criminalizes perjury by inconsistent statements, Marcus could most likely be prosecuted for this offense. Marcus made two inconsistent statements while under a validly administered oath in Lindsay’s conversion trial, which is a judicial proceeding. In Marcus’s criminal perjury by inconsistent statements prosecution, the prosecutor need only offer evidence of the inconsistent statements to the trier of fact. The prosecutor does not have to provide corroborative evidence and does not have the burden of proving that the first statement was false, which will simplify and expedite the trial and may subject Marcus to conviction of this offense.
Subornation of Perjury
Most jurisdictions criminalize subornation of perjury, which is typically procuring another to commit perjury (criminal act) with specific intent or purposely, or general intent or knowingly, and factually and legally causing the resulting harm that perjury is in fact committed.N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-210, accessed May 6, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/north-carolina/14-criminal-law/14-210.html.
Example of a Case Lacking an Element of Subornation of Perjury
Review the example given with Marcus in Section 13. Add to this example and assume that Marcus begs Janelle, another witness in Lindsay’s conversion trial, to say that she did not see him at Macy’s the day Lindsay stole the necklace. Janelle flatly refuses. Marcus has not committed subornation of perjury in this case. Although Marcus tried to procure Janelle to commit perjury, with specific intent or purposely, Janelle did not cooperate and did not commit the perjury. Thus the harm element of subornation of perjury is lacking, and Marcus can be prosecuted only for attempted subornation of perjury or solicitation to commit perjury, rather than the completed offense.
Perjury Grading
Perjury is generally graded as a felony,N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-209, accessed May 6, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/north-carolina/14-criminal-law/14-209.html. with a potential sentencing enhancement for committing perjury that causes another to be sentenced to prison or the death penalty.Ga. Code tit. 16, § 16-10-70, accessed May 6, 2011, law.onecle.com/georgia/16/16-10-70.html. The Model Penal Code grades perjury as a felony of the third degree (Model Penal Code § 241.1(1)). Subornation of perjury is also graded as a felony.N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-210, accessed May 6, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/north-carolina/14-criminal-law/14-210.html. However, because of the procedural difficulties in successfully convicting a defendant of perjury and subornation of perjury, these crimes are not often prosecuted. Nonetheless, the threat of a felony conviction still serves as a deterrent and helps to ensure that witnesses testify truthfully in judicial and official proceedings and give accurate statements in certified writings.
Bribery Elements
Bribery is often compared to extortion, yet extortion is considered a crime of threatened force or violence, while bribery involves financial inducement.U.S. v. Adcock, 558 F.2d 397 (1977), accessed May 6, 2011, http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=189694239263939940&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr. At early common law, bribery was the receiving or offering any undue reward by or to any person in a public office in order to influence his or her behavior in office and induce him or her to act contrary to the known rules of honesty and integrity.Legal definition of bribery, Duhaime.org website, accessed May 6, 2011, www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/B/Bribery.aspx. In modern times, many criminal statutes define bribery as conferring, offering, agreeing to confer, or soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit upon a public official (criminal act) with the specific intent or purposely or the general intent or knowingly to form an agreement or understanding that the public official’s vote, opinion, judgment, action, decision, or exercise of discretion will be influenced by the benefit.N.Y. Penal Law § 200.00, accessed May 6, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN0200.00_200.00.html; N.Y. Penal Law § 200.10, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN0200.10_200.10.html. The crime of bribery is often extended to apply to persons other than public officials, such as employees, agents, or fiduciaries for the purpose of influencing the bribed individual’s on-the-job conduct.N.Y. Penal Law § 180.00, accessed May 6, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN0180.00_180.00.html. This type of bribery is typically called commercial bribery.N.Y. Penal Law § 180.00, accessed May 6, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN0180.00_180.00.html. Bribery can also cover members of a state legislature,Cal. Penal Code § 85, accessed May 6, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/85.html; Cal. Penal Code § 86, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/86.html. any judicial officer, juror, referee, umpire,Cal. Penal Code § 92, accessed May 6, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/92.html; Cal. Penal Code § 93, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/93.html. or witnessOr. Rev. Stat. § 162.265, accessed May 6, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/oregon/162-offenses-against-the-state-and/162.265.html; Or. Rev. Stat. §162.275, accessed May 7, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/oregon/162-offenses-against-the-state-and/162.275.html. when a bribe is conferred or offered, asked for, received, or agreed to be received to influence their vote or decision. The Model Penal Code criminalizes as bribery the act of conferring, offering, agreeing to confer, soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any pecuniary (which means monetary) benefit in exchange for a public servant, party official, voter’s decision, opinion, recommendation, vote, or other exercise of discretion (Model Penal Code § 240.1(1)). The Model Penal Code also criminalizes as bribery the act of conferring, offering, agreeing to confer, soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit in exchange for a judicial or administrative officer’s decision, vote, recommendation, or other exercise of official discretion (Model Penal Code § 240.1(2)).
Prosecutorial Burden in Bribery Prosecutions
Similar to perjury, bribery is notoriously difficult to prove, which is a factor prosecutors must consider when deciding whether or not to charge an individual(s) with this offense. The most difficult bribery element to prove beyond a reasonable doubt is the criminal intent element of specific intent or purposely or general intent or knowingly to enter into an agreement that influences the bribed individual’s decision.
Example of Bribery
Isabel, a defendant on trial for perjury, notices the judge presiding in her case shopping at Macy’s department store. Isabel thereafter buys an expensive watch, has it wrapped, walks up to the judge, and offers it to him as a gift. Isabel has most likely committed bribery in this case. Although the judge did not accept Isabel’s “gift,” most states criminalize as bribery the offer of any benefit, so the act of bribery is complete when Isabel proffers the watch. In addition, based on these facts, Isabel’s connection to the judge is only through her perjury prosecution, so her act appears calculated to influence his decision in that case, especially because the watch is expensive and not merely a token. Note that a prosecutor is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Isabel’s specific intent or purposely or general intent or knowingly to enter into an agreement with the judge influencing his decision, which is challenging even under the obvious circumstances apparent in this case.
Another Example of Bribery
Review the example with Isabel in Section 13. Add to this example and assume that the judge graciously accepts Isabel’s gift and thereafter rules in her favor, acquitting her of perjury. In this example, both the judge and Isabel have likely committed bribery because most states criminalize the conferring, offering, and accepting and receiving a bribe as the criminal act elements. Thus both Isabel and the judge may be subject to prosecution for and conviction of this offense, and the judge’s acquittal of Isabel will ease the prosecutor’s burden in proving the specific intent or purposely or general intent or knowingly to enter into an agreement corruptly influencing the decision making in this case.
Example of a Case Lacking an Element of Bribery
Isabel notices a gentleman struggling to pay his bill at a local coffee shop. Isabel steps up and charitably offers to pay the gentleman’s bill. Later in the day, while watching her son’s professional baseball game, Isabel notices that the umpire looks familiar. After pondering it for a few minutes, she realizes that he is the same gentleman who could not pay his bill at the coffee shop. Isabel and the umpire probably have not committed bribery in this case. Although Isabel gave the umpire money, and he was the decision maker in her son’s baseball game, Isabel did not give the money, nor did the umpire accept it, with the specific intent or purposely or general intent or knowingly to enter into an agreement influencing the umpire’s decisions. Thus the criminal intent element for bribery appears to be lacking, and neither Isabel nor the umpire are subject to prosecution for and conviction of this offense.
Bribery When No Authority to Act Is Present
In many states and under the Model Penal Code, it is no defense to bribery that the individual bribed does not have the authority to act or make the decision that is the subject of the bribe (Model Penal Code § 240.1).Ala. Code § 13A-10-61, accessed May 7, 2011, law.onecle.com/alabama/criminal-code/13A-10-61.html.
Example of Bribery When No Authority to Act Is Present
Review the example with Isabel and the judge in Section 13. Change this example and assume that the “judge” in question is an imposter who is merely masquerading as a judge to live out a lifelong fantasy. Isabel and the “judge” may still be prosecuted for and convicted of bribery in many jurisdictions and under the Model Penal Code because lack of authority is typically not a defense to bribery under modern statutes criminalizing this offense.
Bribery Grading
Bribery is typically graded as a felonyN.Y. Penal Law § 200.00, accessed May 6, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN0200.00_200.00.html. with enhancements for bribery that is carried out with a larger sum of moneyN.Y. Penal Law § 200.03, accessed May 6, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN0200.03_200.03.html. or bribery that results in someone’s prosecution or incarceration for a felony.N.Y. Penal Law § 200.04, accessed May 6, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN0200.04_200.04.html. When a state legislatorCal. Penal Code § 88, accessed May 7, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/88.html. or a public officialCal. Penal Code § 74, accessed May 7, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/california/penal/74.html. commits bribery, it is typical to disqualify that individual from his or her office for life, in addition to any other sentence.
Obstruction of Justice
Obstruction of justice takes many forms and is a classic example of an offense against the administration of justice. States and the federal government exercise broad latitude in enacting statutes that criminalize interference with any aspect of law enforcement procedure or the prosecution and conviction of criminal offenders. Some typical examples of obstruction of justice are as follows: giving false identification to a law enforcement officer,720 ILCS § 5/31-4.5, accessed May 7, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/illinois/720ilcs5/31-4.5.html. impersonating a law enforcement officer,Fla. Stat. Ann. § 843.08, accessed May 7, 2011, law.onecle.com/florida/crimes/843.08.html. refusing to aid a law enforcement officer when requested,N.Y. Penal Law § 195.10, accessed May 7, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/new-york/penal/PEN0195.10_195.10.html. giving false evidence,720 ILCS § 5/31-4, accessed May 7, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/illinois/720ilcs5/31-4.html. hiding or concealing oneself and refusing to give evidence,720 ILCS § 5/31-4, accessed May 7, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/illinois/720ilcs5/31-4.html. tampering with evidence,Or. Rev. Stat. § 162.295, accessed May 7, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/oregon/162-offenses-against-the-state-and/162.295.html. and tampering with a witness18 U.S.C. § 1512, accessed May 7, 2011, www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/718/usc_sec_18_00001512----000-.html. or juror.Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2807, accessed May 7, 2011, law.onecle.com/arizona/criminal-code/13-2807.html. All these acts are generally supported by specific intent or purposely or general intent or knowingly. The Model Penal Code prohibits threatening unlawful harm to any person or public servant with purpose to influence his decision, opinion, recommendation, vote, or other exercise of discretion (Model Penal Code § 240.2). Obstruction of justice offenses are most often graded as a misdemeanor or felony, depending on the offense.
Example of Obstruction of Justice
Barry Bonds, a baseball player and record-breaking home run hitter for the San Francisco Giants, was found guilty by a federal jury for obstruction of justice, based on his refusal to answer a question during a grand jury investigation of his steroid use.Juliet Macur, “Bonds Guilty of Obstruction, but Not of Perjury,” New York Times website, accessed May 8, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/sports/baseball/14bonds.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1. Bonds was also charged with three counts of perjury, but the jury could not agree to convict, resulting in a mistrial on all three counts.Jorge L. Ortiz, “Verdict in: Bonds Found Guilty, but Case Not Closed Yet,” USA TODAY website, accessed May 8, 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/2011-04-13-verdict-barry-bonds-guilty_N.htm. The perjury charges stemmed from Bonds’s claim while testifying under oath that he never knowingly used steroids, never knowingly used human growth hormones, and was never injected with a substance by anyone other than his trainer. The obstruction of justice conviction resulted from Bonds’s evasive answer to the question of whether his personal trainer had ever injected him with steroids.Juliet Macur, “Bonds Guilty of Obstruction, but Not of Perjury,” New York Times website, accessed May 8, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/sports/baseball/14bonds.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1. Instead of answering yes or no to this question, Bonds began reminiscing about his friendship with the trainer, who went to prison four times in five years for also refusing to testify in the investigation.Juliet Macur, “Bonds Guilty of Obstruction, but Not of Perjury,” New York Times website, accessed May 8, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/sports/baseball/14bonds.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1. The perjury charges support the obstruction of justice charge, so the defense asked for a court dismissal of the obstruction of justice conviction in order to clear the way for an appeal.Jorge L. Ortiz, “Verdict in: Bonds Found Guilty, but Case Not Closed Yet,” USA TODAY website, accessed May 8, 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/2011-04-13-verdict-barry-bonds-guilty_N.htm. Note that Bonds’s obstruction of justice charge of evading the question and refusing to give evidence appears easier to prove than the perjury charges, which have a daunting criminal intent requirement, as discussed in Section 13.
The Barry Bonds Verdict Video
Associated Press: Bonds Guilty of Obstruction, Jury Hung on Others
The verdict in the federal Barry Bonds case is explained in this video:
(click to see video)
Additional Crimes against the Government
Additional crimes against the government that impair the orderly administration of justice are contempt,N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5A-11, et seq., accessed May 8, 2011, http://law.onecle.com/north-carolina/5a-contempt/index.html. resisting arrest,18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5104, accessed May 8, 2011, law.onecle.com/pennsylvania/crimes-and-offenses/00.051.004.000.html. and escape.Tex. Penal Code § 38.06, accessed May 8, 2011, law.onecle.com/texas/penal/38.06.00.html. Review the statutes in the endnotes for common elements and grading of these offenses.
Exercises
• Most jurisdictions define perjury as a false material statement (criminal act), made with specific intent or purposely to deceive, or the general intent or knowingly that the statement was false, in a judicial or official proceeding, or in a certified writing (attendant circumstance), under oath (attendant circumstance).
• The issues commonly encountered in any perjury prosecution are proving the validity of the oath, the defendant’s criminal intent, or the materiality of the false statement, and any requirement of corroborative evidence.
• Many jurisdictions provide a defense to perjury if the defendant retracts his or her false statement in the course of the same proceeding in which it was made before it becomes manifest that the falsification will be exposed.
• Perjury by inconsistent statements is when the defendant makes statements that are inconsistent (criminal act), in a judicial proceeding (attendant circumstance), after taking a validly administered oath (attendant circumstance). The prosecution does not need to prove which statement is false for this offense. Subornation of perjury is procuring another to commit perjury (criminal act), with specific intent or purposely, or general intent or knowingly, and factually and legally causing the resulting harm that perjury is actually committed.
• Perjury is generally graded as a felony, with a potential sentencing enhancement for committing perjury that causes another to be sentenced to prison or the death penalty. Subornation of perjury is also graded as a felony.
• Many criminal statutes define bribery as conferring, offering, agreeing to confer, or soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept, any benefit upon a public official (criminal act) with the specific intent or purposely, or the general intent or knowingly to form an agreement or understanding that the public official’s decision making will be influenced by the benefit. The crime of bribery is often extended to apply to persons other than public officials, such as employees, agents, or fiduciaries for the purpose of influencing the bribed individual’s on-the-job conduct, which is called commercial bribery. Bribery can also cover members of a state legislature, any judicial officer, juror, referee, umpire, or witness. The primary issue in a bribery prosecution is proving the defendant’s criminal intent to enter into an agreement that influences the bribed individual’s decision making. Bribery is typically graded as a felony, with enhancements for a bribe that is a large sum of money or bribery that results in incarceration for a felony, along with a disqualification from office.
• Some typical examples of obstruction of justice are as follows: giving false identification to a law enforcement officer, impersonating a law enforcement officer, refusing to aid a law enforcement officer when requested, giving false evidence, hiding or concealing oneself and refusing to give evidence, tampering with evidence, and tampering with a witness or juror. All these acts are generally supported by specific intent or purposely, or general intent or knowingly. Obstruction of justice is graded anywhere from a misdemeanor to a felony, depending on the offense.
Exercises
Answer the following questions. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. Susannah, a Hollywood movie star, is a witness in a civil personal injury case. Susannah saw a car accident and is subpoenaed to testify that the defendant was at fault. After the court commissioner administers an oath to tell the truth, Susannah takes the witness stand. She knows the case will generate significant publicity, so Susannah shaves ten years off of her age when asked routine background questions by the prosecutor. If Susannah is thereafter caught in this lie and prosecuted for perjury, what will be the primary issue in her perjury prosecution? How will this issue be resolved?
2. Read State v. Carr, 172 Conn. 458 (1977). In this case, the defendant was convicted of bribery when he paid an undercover detective to refrain from investigating narcotics crimes in the area. The defendant appealed, claiming the jury should have been instructed on the lesser included offense of offering gifts to state police officers. Did the Supreme Court of Connecticut uphold the defendant’s bribery conviction? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14705028387089517508&q= %22State+v.+Carr%22&hl=en&as_sdt=2,5.
3. Read People v. Silverberg, 771 N.Y.S. 2d 274 (2003). In this case, the defendant was convicted of witness tampering for a single telephone call he made to an attorney that implied he would send letters to a grievance committee if the attorney did not drop charges against him. Did the Supreme Court of New York uphold the defendant’s conviction? Why or why not? The case is available at this link: http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3089258849772766127&q= %22witness+tampering%22&hl=en&as_sdt=4,33&as_ylo=2003.
LAW AND ETHICS
Should Former President Clinton Have Been Criminally Prosecuted for Perjury and Obstruction of Justice?
On May 6, 1994, Paula Jones filed a civil lawsuit for sexual harassment against then-president Bill Clinton. The US Supreme Court ruled that the president was not immune to this lawsuit, allowing it to continue.Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), accessed May 9, 2011, http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/95-1853.ZS.html. An investigation pursuant to the Jones lawsuit revealed that the president was currently having an affair with a White House intern, Monica Lewinsky.“Presidential Impeachment Proceedings,” Historyplace.com website, accessed May 9, 2011, http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/impeachments/clinton.htm. During a Jones lawsuit deposition, the president stated under oath that he did not have sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky pursuant to the definition of sexual relations given by the questioning attorneys.Deposition excerpts, Jones v. Clinton deposition, Historyplace.com website, accessed May 9, 2011, http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/impeachments/jones-deposition.htm. He also stated that he could not recall ever being alone with Lewinsky at the White House.Deposition excerpts, Jones v. Clinton deposition, Historyplace.com website, accessed May 9, 2011, http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/impeachments/jones-deposition.htm. After the deposition, he was involved in an effort to get Ms. Lewinsky a federal job outside Washington, DC.“Presidential Impeachment Proceedings,” Historyplace.com website, accessed May 9, 2011, http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/impeachments/clinton.htm. Although the Jones lawsuit was dismissed, the president was evasive when asked questions regarding the Lewinsky affair during a grand jury investigation instigated by Prosecutor and former Solicitor General Kenneth Starr. The evening of the grand jury investigation, the president appeared on national TV and admitted, “Indeed, I did have a relationship with Ms. Lewinsky that was not appropriate. In fact, it was wrong. It constituted a critical lapse in judgment and a personal failure on my part for which I am solely and completely responsible.”“Presidential Impeachment Proceedings,” Historyplace.com website, accessed May 9, 2011, http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/impeachments/clinton.htm. The House of Representatives later impeached Clinton for perjury and obstruction of justice, based on the statements he made at the grand jury investigation and his conduct during the Jones deposition. After a trial in the Senate, he was acquitted of both counts and thereafter served out his term as president.“Presidential Impeachment Proceedings,” Historyplace.com website, accessed May 9, 2011, http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/impeachments/clinton.htm. He was never criminally prosecuted for perjury or obstruction of justice outside the impeachment procedure, although he was later disbarred for his behavior.Ann Gearan, “Clinton Disbarred by Supreme Court,” Famguardian.org website, accessed May 9, 2011, http://famguardian.org/Subjects/LawAndGovt/News/ClintonDisbar-011001.htm.
1. Is it ethical to allow the president to avoid a criminal prosecution for perjury and obstruction of justice while he is in office? Why or why not?
Check your answer using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
Clinton Declaration and Admission Videos
Clinton: “I did not have sexual relations with that woman…”
In this video, President Clinton denies that he had sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky:
(click to see video)
President Clinton Apologizes to the Nation
In this video, President Clinton admits that he had an inappropriate relationship with Monica Lewinsky:
(click to see video) | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/13%3A_Crimes_against_the_Government/13.03%3A_Perjury_Bribery_and_Obstruction_of_Justice.txt |
Summary
The federal government protects national security by primarily regulating crimes against the United States. One of the only crimes defined in the Constitution, treason, prohibits levying war against the United States, most likely with general intent or knowingly, or providing aid and comfort to the enemy with the specific intent or purposely to betray the United States, and is graded as a serious felony with all sentencing options available, including capital punishment. The Constitution specifies the evidentiary requirement that treason be proven by the testimony of two witnesses or the defendant’s confession in open court. Sedition criminalizes the advocating, aiding, organizing, or teaching with general intent or knowingly, or publishing, printing, or circulating writings that advocate, aid, or teach with specific intent or purposely the forceful or violent overthrow of the US government and is graded as a serious felony that can prohibit the defendant from holding federal office for five years postconviction. Sabotage is destroying, damaging, or defectively producing specified property with specific intent or purposely, general intent or knowingly, or negligently to impede national defense and is graded as a serious felony. Espionage is gathering or transmitting defense information with general intent or knowingly or the specific intent or purposely to damage the United States or assist any foreign nation, during peace or war, and is graded as a serious felony with all range of sentencing options available, including capital punishment.
The federal government also primarily regulates terrorism and terroristic acts using the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, and the USA PATRIOT Act. The Department of Homeland Security enforces criminal laws targeting terrorism. Terrorism is violent acts committed inside (domestic) or outside (international) the United States that appear to be intended to influence a civilian population or government by intimidation or to affect the conduct of government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. Currently prohibited as terrorism or terroristic conduct are murder, use of a weapon of mass destruction, bombing places of public use, financing terrorism, harboring a terrorist, and conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the foregoing. The USA PATRIOT Act expands government surveillance capabilities, so it is subject to a Fourth Amendment challenge as an unreasonable search, and also prohibits financing terrorism, so it is subject to a First Amendment challenge as a prohibition on free speech, freedom of religion, and freedom to associate.
The state and federal government both criminalize conduct that impedes the administration of justice, including perjury, bribery, and obstruction of justice. Perjury is typically defined as a false material oral or written statement made under oath or affirmation with the specific intent or purposely to deceive, or the general intent or knowingly that the statement is false, in a judicial or official proceeding or in a certified writing. The biggest issues encountered in a perjury prosecution are proving the validity of the oath, the defendant’s criminal intent, the materiality of the false statement, and any requirement of corroborative evidence. One defense to perjury is retraction of the false material statement during the same judicial or official proceeding before it becomes manifest that the falsity will be exposed. Many jurisdictions also criminalize perjury committed by inconsistent statements made under oath or affirmation in an official or judicial proceeding and subornation of perjury, which is procuring another to commit perjury with specific intent or purposely. Perjury and subornation of perjury are typically graded as felonies. Bribery is conferring, offering, agreeing to confer, or soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept a benefit upon a public official, employee, legislator, participant in a judicial proceeding, or sports official with the specific intent or purposely, or the general intent or knowingly to influence the bribed individual’s decision making. The most difficult bribery element to prove is the criminal intent element. Bribery is typically graded as a felony. Obstruction of justice crimes interfere with the orderly administration of justice. Examples of obstruction of justice offenses are giving false identification to a law enforcement officer, impersonating a law enforcement officer, refusing to aid a law enforcement officer when requested, giving false evidence, hiding or concealing oneself and refusing to give evidence, tampering with evidence, and tampering with a witness or juror, with specific intent or purposely, or general intent or knowingly. Obstruction of justice is graded as a misdemeanor or felony, depending on the offense.
YOU BE THE USA
You are an assistant US attorney starting your first day on the job. You have been presented with four case files and told to review them and recommend criminal prosecutions based on the facts. Read each one and then decide which crime should be prosecuted. Check your answers using the answer key at the end of the chapter.
1. The defendant, an army intelligence analyst stationed near Baghdad, Iraq, downloaded thousands of classified Iraq and Afghanistan documents and confidential cables and released them to an ex-computer hacker who thereafter exposed them to the public. Which crime should be prosecuted: treason or obstruction of justice? Read about this case at this link: http://coto2.wordpress.com/2011/03/02/bradley-manning-charged-with-22-crimes-including-capital-offense-aiding-the-enemy.
2. The defendant typed up notes while her husband was analyzing sketches of a top-secret bomb’s design for the purpose of passing the design on to another nation. Which crime should be prosecuted: conspiracy to commit espionage or sabotage? Read about this case at this link: http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/rosenb/ROS_ACCT.HTM.
3. The defendant, a cosmetic company, paid Chinese officials to obtain direct licensing of its product in China. Which crime should be prosecuted: harboring terrorists abroad or bribery? Read about this case at this link: fashionablyjust.com/2011/05/avon-bribery-case-in-china-an-embarrassment.
4. The defendant, a corrections officer, lied to federal law enforcement during an investigation of her role in the assault of an inmate. Which crime should be prosecuted: perjury or obstruction of justice? Read about this case at this link: www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/article_3d7cd11a-8f67-11df-bc07-00127992bc8b.html.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 13.1
1. Stephanie has not committed sedition because she did not advocate for the use of force or violence or the commission of an unlawful act. Stephanie’s speech is most likely protected because she might be envisioning a peaceful government overthrow by legitimate means.
2. The US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the defendants’ convictions for sabotage, stating that the specific intent or purposely to impede the US national defense could be gleaned from the defendants’ conduct in deliberately damaging the missiles.
3. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the defendant’s disbarment based on convictions for crimes of moral turpitude, and stated that other than treason, no act was more base, vile, or depraved than an intentional act to breach the confidentiality of national defense secrets that have come into the hands of an individual.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 13.2
1. Whether or not this is an act of terrorism requires more information. Although the killing takes place in front of the Pakistani Embassy within the territory of the United States, this evidence is not enough to prove that Joshua intended his conduct to influence a civilian population or government by intimidation or to affect the government’s conduct by assassination. The location of the shooting could be a pure coincidence, and Joshua could have a nonterroristic motive for the killing, such as a personal hatred or malice toward Khalid.
2. The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the statute, which was in place before September 11, 2001, and under AEDPA prohibited domestic material support to terrorists and terroristic organizations. The court held that the statute was not an unconstitutional prohibition on the right of free association or expression under the First Amendment, nor did it violate federal due process under the Fifth Amendment by granting the secretary of state unfettered and unreviewable authority to designate organizations as terroristic. However, the court affirmed the US District Court’s decision that portions of the statute defining “personnel” and “training” were unconstitutionally vague.
3. The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the statute against a Fifth Amendment due process challenge by construing the statute to require proof that the defendant act with the general intent or knowledge of the terrorist organization’s designation or of the unlawful activities that caused it to be so designated.
Answers to Exercises
From Section 13.3
1. The primary issue in Susannah’s perjury prosecution is the materiality of her false statement made under oath in a judicial proceeding. While Susannah was asked her age during routine background questions, her lie might still be material if her advanced age affected her vision because Susannah is testifying about an important personal observation. In many jurisdictions, the trier of fact, which could be a jury, determines the materiality of this statement.
2. The Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld the defendant’s bribery conviction, holding that offering gifts to state police officers is not a lesser included offense of bribery because it requires specific intent, and bribery under Connecticut law is not a specific intent crime.
3. The New York Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction because the defendant did not have a complaint filed against him, so the “witness” was not about to testify in a judicial proceeding, which is required under the witness tampering statute.
Answer to Law and Ethics Question
1. The criminal prosecution of a sitting president would set a good example for the citizens of the United States, but it would pose an immense disruption to the orderly functioning of the government without a leader or commander in chief of the armed forces and would also expose the nation to a security risk. The US Supreme Court decision to allow a civil lawsuit against the president forced him to spend time away from office attending depositions that were protracted and inordinately time consuming. If the case had not been dismissed, the president would have expended an additional amount of time and effort in preparing for and defending against the Jones lawsuit. A similar and even more time-consuming disruptive process would ensue if a sitting president were to be criminally prosecuted. Not only would the criminal prosecution require a series of procedures from arrest, indictment, and discovery through pretrial motions, hearings, and the trial itself, but if the president were to be convicted, the consequences to the nation would be irreparable. It might not be ethical to spare a sitting president a criminal prosecution when a “normal person” would not be spared, but the ethical concerns are outweighed by the important interests at stake, and most countries would protect their leaders from this type of legal action while in office.
Answers to You Be the USA
1. This conduct aids the enemy, rather than impeding the administration of justice by interfering with law enforcement procedure, criminal prosecution, or conviction, so the proper crime to prosecute is treason.
2. Copying a top-secret design and providing it to another nation is spying, rather than destroying, damaging, or producing defective property to impede national defense, so the proper crime to prosecute is conspiracy to commit espionage.
3. This payment is made for the purpose of influencing a public official’s decision, rather than harboring a terrorist abroad, so the proper crime to prosecute is bribery.
4. The defendant was not under oath when she made the false statement. She was giving false evidence and impeding a law enforcement investigation, so the proper crime to prosecute is obstruction of justice. | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/13%3A_Crimes_against_the_Government/13.04%3A_End-of-Chapter_Material.txt |
Chapter 10
• State v. Salaman, 949 A.2d 1092 (2008)
• Toomer v. State, 529 SE 2d 719 (2000)
• Fleming v. State, 323 SW 3d 540 (2010)
• State v. Higgs, 601 N.W.2d 653 (1999)
• Commonwealth v. Henson, 259 N.E.2d 769 (1970)
• State v. Holbach, 2009 ND 37 (2009)
• Burke v. State, 676 S.E.2d 766 (2009)
• Commonwealth v. Rivera, 828 A.2d 1094 (2003)
• U.S. v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997)
• Oregon v. Rangel, 934 P.2d 1128 (1997)
• Chatwin v. U.S, 326 U.S. 455 (1946)
• Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 2641 (2008)
• Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
• Iowa v. Vander Esch, 662 N.W. 2d 689 (2002)
• Boro v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 1224 (1985)
• In re John Z., 29 Cal. 4th 756 (2003)
• State v. Borthwick, 880 P.2d 1261 (1994)
• State v. Lile, 699 P.2d 456 (1985)
• People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337 (1975)
• State v. Plunkett, 934 P.2d 113 (1997)
• Associated Press et. al. v. District Court for the Fifth Judicial District of Colorado, 542 U.S. 1301 (2004)
• State of New Jersey in the Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (1972)
• People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y. 2d 152 (1984)
• Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981)
• Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
• Commonwealth v. Matthews, 205 PA Super 92 (2005)
• People v. Nickens, 685 NW 2d 657 (2004)
• Clark v. Commonwealth, 676 S.E.2d 332 (2009)
• Commonwealth v. Porro, 458 Mass. 526 (2010)
• People v. Dominguez, 140 P.2d 866 (2006)
14.01: Crimes against Property
Chapter 11
• State v. Larson, 605 N.W. 2d 706 (2000)
• People v. Traster, 111 Cal. App. 4th 1377 (2003)
• U.S. v. Ingles, 445 F.3d 830 (2006)
• State v. Robertson, 531 S. E. 2d 490 (2000)
• People v. Pratt, 656 N.W.2d 866 (2002)
• Butler v. Florida, (Fla: Dist. Court of Appeals, 2009)
• In the Matter of V.V.C., No. 04-07-00166 CV (Tex.: Court of Appeals, 2008)
• People v. Beaver, 186 Cal. App. 4th 107 (2010)
• State v. Castillo, Docket No. 29, 641 (NM: 2011)
• People v. Nowack, 614 N.W.2d 78 (2000)
• Britt v. Commonwealth, 667 S.E.2d 763 (2008)
• Commonwealth v. Mills, 436 Mass. 387 (2002)
• Itin v. Ungar, 17 P.3d 129 (2000)
• In the Matter of Schwimmer, 108 P.3d 761 (2005)
• People v. Lueth, 660 N.W.2d 322 (2002)
• People v. Curtin, 22 Cal. App. 4th 528 (1994)
• People v. Beaver, 186 Cal. App. 4th 107 (2010)
• Durland v. U.S., 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896),
• U.S. v. McClelland, 868 F.2d 704 (1989)
• S.W. v. State, 513 So. 2d 1088 (1987)
• State v. Handburgh, 830 P.2d 641 (1992)
• Jones v. State, 652 So. 2d 346 (1995)
• Metheny v. State, 755 A.2d 1088 (2000)
• Williams v. State, 91 S.W. 3d 54 (2002)
• Commonwealth v. Hallums, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 50 (2004)
• People v. Nible, 200 Cal. App. 3d 838 (1988)
• State v. Hall, 3 P.3d 582 (2000)
• People v. Nunley, 168 Cal. App. 3d 225 (1985)
• State v. Allen, 110 P. 3d 849 (2005)
• State v. Reavis, 700 S.E.2d 33 (2010)
• People v. Atkins, 25 Cal. 4th 76 (2001)
• Ursulita v. State, Docket No. A10A1733 (Georgia 2011) | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/14%3A_Appendix_-_Case_Listings/14.00%3A_Sex_Offenses_and_Crimes_Involving_Force_Fear_and_Physical_Restraint.txt |
Chapter 12
• People v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090 (1997)
• Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972)
• State v. Russell, 890 A.2d 453 (2006)
• People v. Hoffstead, 905 N.Y.S.2d 736 (2010)
• City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999)
• Ortiz v. NYS Parole in Bronx, 586 F.3d 149 (2009)
• People v. Englebrecht, 88 Cal. App. 4th 1236 (2001)
• Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W. 3d 402 (2005)
• People v. Watson, No. 90962, (Ohio 2120 2009)
• Love v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. App. 3d 736 (1990)
• Satterfield v. State, 395 S.E. 2d 816 (1990)
• Silvar v. Dist. Ct., 129 P.3d 682 (2006)
• Manduley v. Superior Court, 41 P.3d 3 (2002)
• State v. Bradshaw, 98 P.3d 1190 (2004)
• Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300 (1996)
• Noy v. State, 83 P.3d 538 (2003)
• Phillips v. State, 25 So. 3d 404 (2010)
• In re BW, 313 S.W. 3d 818 (2010)
• Wolfe v. State, 24 P.3d 1252 (2001)
• Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972)
• Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941)
• City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999)
• Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)
• Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899 (2000)
• Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (2006)
• People v. Sanchez, 888 N.Y.S. 2d 352 (2009)
• Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)
• People v. Parra, 70 Cal. App. 4th 222 (1999)
• Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)
• U.S. v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483 (2001)
14.03: Crimes against the Government
Chapter 13
• U.S. v. Adcock, 558 F.2d 397 (1977)
• U.S v. Burr, 25 F Cas 55 (1807)
• Haupt v. U.S., 330 U.S. 631 (1947)
• Cramer v. U.S., 325 U.S. 1, 34, 35 (1945)
• Yates v. U.S., 354 U.S. 298 (1957)
• U.S. v. Kabat, 797 Fed.2d 580 (1986)
• In re Squillacote, 790 A.2d 514 (2002)
• Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (2000)
• Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Department of Justice, 352 F.3d 382 (2003)
• State v. Carr, 172 Conn. 458 (1977)
• People v. Silverberg, 771 N.Y.S. 2d 274 (2003)
• Kawakita v. U.S., 343 U.S. 717 (1952)
• U.S. v. Rosen, 445 F.Supp.2d 602 (2006)
• Schultz v. Sykes, 638 N.W. 2d 604 (2001)
• Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956)
• U.S. v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 236 (2010)
• State v. Kimber, 48 Conn. App. 234 (1998)
• U.S. v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995)
• Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997)
14.04: Introduction to Criminal Law
Chapter 1
• BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)
• Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006)
• Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)
• Johnson v. Pearce, 148 N.C.App. 199 (2001)
• State v. Gillison, 766 N.W. 2d 649 (2009)
• Campbell v. State, 5 S.W.3d 693 (1999)
• Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (1970)
• Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)
• Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1Cranch) 137 (1803)
• Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001)
• Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
• Cetacean Community v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004)
• People v. Wrotten, 2010 NY Slip Op 04501 (2010)
• Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999)
• Padilla v. Gonzales, 397 F.3d 1016 (2005)
• Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001)
• Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
• Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)
• United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32 (1812)
• Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002) | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/14%3A_Appendix_-_Case_Listings/14.02%3A_Crimes_against_the_Public.txt |
Chapter 2
• Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)
• U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 518 (2000)
• Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956)
• Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
• Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)
• United States v. P.H.E., Inc., 965 F.2d 848 (1992)
• Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S.Ct. 1181 (2010)
• Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)
• Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993)
• Robles v. State, 758 N.E. 2d 581 (2001)
• Donahue v. Burl Cain, 231 F.3d 1000 (2000)
• State v. Hall, 966 P.2d 208 (1998)
• Richards v. Florida, No. 4008-4216 (2010)
• Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997)
• Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004)
• U.S. v. Comstock, 627 F.3d 513 (2010)
• McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)
• Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295 (1850)
• In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)
• U.S. v. Arizona, No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB (2010)
14.06: Constitutional Protections
Chapter 3
• Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)
• Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003)
• Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003)
• Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974)
• Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)
• Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)
• R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)
• Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
• Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974)
• United States v. Stevens, 552 U.S. 442 (2010)
• Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 47 (1993)
• Reno v. American Civ. Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)
• Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010)
• Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
• Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
• Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
• District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008)
• McDonald v. Chicago, No. 08-1521 (2010)
• Lewis v. U.S., 445 U.S. 55 (1980)
• U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
• Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)
• Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)
• Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008)
• Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)
• Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008)
• Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)
• U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)
• Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)
• Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)
• Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301 (1996)
• Gall v. U.S., 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007)
• South Dakota v. Asmussen, 668 N.W.2d 725 (2003)
• Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010)
• U.S. v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198 (2010)
• Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751 (2011)
• Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)
• U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965)
• U.S. v. White, 882 F.2d 250 (1989)
• Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926)
• Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)
• Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
• Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)
• Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
• R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)
• Sable Communis. of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)
• Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1919)
• Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)
• Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974)
• Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972)
• Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
• Virginia v. Black, 535 U.S. 343 (2003)
• Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
• City of Erie et al v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000)
• Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S.Ct. 1610 (2007)
• Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)
• Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)
• Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
• Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/14%3A_Appendix_-_Case_Listings/14.05%3A_The_Legal_System_in_the_United_States.txt |
Chapter 4
• State ex rel. Kuntz v. Thirteenth Jud. Dist., 995 P.2d 951 (2000)
• Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)
• Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968)
• Oler v. State, 998 S.W.2d 363 (1999)
• Staples v. U.S., 511 U.S. 600 (1994)
• Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246 (1952)
• State v. Crosby, 154 P.3d 97 (2007)
• State v. Horner, 126 Ohio St. 3d 466 (2010)
• Dean v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 1849 (2009)
• Bullock v. State, 775 A.2d. 1043 (2001)
• Commonwealth v. Casanova, 429 Mass. 293 (1999)
• State v. Andrews, 572 S.E.2d 798 (2002)
• State v. Sowry, 155 Ohio App. 3d 742 (2004)
• Regalado v. U.S., 572 A.2d 416 (1990)
• State v. Slayton, 154 P.3d 1057 (2007)
• State v. Kanavy, 4 A.3d 991 (2010)
• U.S. v. Grajeda, 581 F.3d 1186 (2009)
• People v. Roberts, 826 P.2d 274 (1992)
• Govt. of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 278 F.2d 169 (1960)
• State ex rel. Kuntz v. Thirteenth Jud. Dist., 995 P.2d 951 (2000)
• Jones v. U.S., 308 F.2d 307 (1962)
• State v. Davis, 84 Conn. App. 505 (2004)
• U.S. v. Pompanio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976)
• People v. McDaniel, 24 Cal. 3d 661 (1979)
• Commonwealth v. Ely, 444 N.E. 2d 1276 (1983)
• State v. Huff, 469 A.2d 1251 (1984)
• Key v. State, 890 So. 2d 1043 (2002)
14.08: Criminal Defenses Part 1
Chapter 5
• State v. Burkhart, 565 S.E.2d 298 (2002)
• Hoagland v. State, 240 P.3d 1043 (2010)
• Rodriguez v. State, 212 S.W.3d 819 (2006)
• Shuler v. Babbitt, 49 F.Supp.2d 1165 (1998)
• Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012 (2005)
• Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)
• Commonwealth v. Alexander, 531 S.E.2d 567 (2000)
• Dutton v. Hayes-Pupko, No. 03-06-00438 (2008)
• People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823 (1974)
• State v. Daoud, 141 N.H. 142 (1996)
• Donaldson v. Lungren, 2 Cal. App. 4th 1614 (1992)
• Ramey v. State, 417 S.E.2d 699 (1992)
• State v. Perez, 840 P.2d 1118 (1992)
• Allison v. Birmingham, 580 So.2d 1377 (1991)
• Roy v. Inhabitants of Lewiston, 42 F.3d 691 (1994)
• U.S. v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483 (2001)
• Acers v. United States, 164 U.S. 388 (1896)
• Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)
• State v. Rogers, 912 S.W.2d 670 (1995)
• State v. Williams 644 P.2d 889 (1982)
• State v. Belgard, 410 So.2d 720 (1982)
• State v. Taylor, 858 P.2d 1358 (1993)
• Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1 (1992)
• State v. Sandoval, 130 P.3d 808 (2006)
• State v. Faulkner, 483 A.2d 759 (1984)
• People v. Kurr, 654 N.W.2d 651 (2002)
• Commonwealth v. Miranda, No. 08-P-2094 (2010)
• State v. Curley, Docket # 0000011.WA, (Wash. App. 2010)
• People v. Ceballos, 12 Cal.3d 470 (1974)
• State v. Holmes, 129 Ohio Misc. 2d 38 (2004)
14.09: Criminal Defenses Part 2
Chapter 6
• Durham v. U.S., 214 F.2d 862 (1954)
• U.S. v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (1972)
• State v. Guido, 191 A.2d 45 (1993)
• State v. Hornsby, 484 S.E.2d 869 (1997)
• People v. Register, 60 N.Y.2d 270 (1983)
• Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d 797 (1993)
• Sosa v. Jones, 389 F.3d 644 (2004)
• Farley v. State, 848 So.2d 393 (2003)
• Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006)
• State v. Ramer, 86 P.3d 132 (2004)
• People v. Garcia, 87 P.3d 159 (2003)
• Sebesta v. State, 783 S.W.2d 811 (1990)
• U.S. v. Hinckley, 493 F.Supp. 2d 65 (2007)
• Legue v. State, 688 N.E.2d 408 (1997)
• U.S. v. Albertini, 830 F.2d 985 (1987)
• Queen v. M’Naghten, 10 Clark & F.200, 2 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843)
• State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488 (1983)
• State v. Skaggs, 586 P.2d 1279 (1978)
• State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d 1314 (1990)
• State v. White, 270 P.2d 727 (1954)
• Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966)
• Hopkins v. State, 69 A.2d 456 (1949)
• People v. Olsen, 685 P.2d 52 (1984)
• People v. Barraza, 23 Cal.3d 675 (1979)
• Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010)
14.10: Parties to Crime
Chapter 7
• New York Central R. Co. v. U.S., 212 U.S. 481 (1909)
• State v. Ulvinen, 313 N.W.2d 425 (1981)
• People v. Premier House, Inc., 662 N.Y.S 2d 1006 (1997)
• Commonwealth v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., 456 Mass. 826 (2010)
• U.S. v. Hill, 268 F.3d 1140 (2001)
• State v. Truesdell, 620 P.2d 427 (1980)
• Collins v. State, 438 So. 2d 1036 (1983)
• State v. Jackson, 137 Wn. 2d 712 (1999)
• U.S. v. L.E. Meyers Co., 562 F.3d 845 (2009)
• State v. Melvin, No. 382PA09 (North Carolina 2010)
• State v. Merida-Medina, 191 P.3d 708 (2008)
• State v. Guminga, 395 N.W.2d 344 (1986)
• Staten v. State, 519 So. 2d 622 (1988)
• Commonwealth v. Hargrave, 745 A.2d 20 (2000)
• People v. Rolon, 160 Cal. App. 4th 1206 (2008)
• People v. Lauria, 251 Cal. App. 2d 471 (1967)
• Bogdanov v. People, 941 P.2d 247, 251 n. 8 (1997)
• Standefer v. U.S., 447 U.S. 10 (1980)
• State v. Akers, 400 A.2d 38 (1979)
• Joubert v. State, 235 S.W.3d 729 (2007) | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/14%3A_Appendix_-_Case_Listings/14.07%3A_The_Elements_of_a_Crime.txt |
Chapter 8
• People v. Hart, 176 Cal. App. 3d 662 (2009)
• U.S. v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966)
• Reynolds v. State, 207 Tex. App. LEXIS 6139 (2007)
• Rex v. Scofield, Cald. 397 (1784)
• Rex v. Higgins, 102 Eng. Rep. 269 (K.B. 1801)
• State v. Withrow, 8 S.W.3d 75 (1999)
• People v. Strand, 539 N.W.2d 739 (1995)
• Pinkerton v. U.S., 328 U.S. 640 (1946)
• State v. Blackmer, 816 A.2d 1014 (2003)
• Commonwealth v. Roux, 350 A.2d 867 (1976)
• People v. Han, 78 Cal. App. 4th 797 (2000)
• Planter v. State, 9 S.W. 3d 156 (1999)
• People v. Dennis, 340 N.W.2d 81 (1983)
• U.S. v. Contreras, 950 F.2d 232 (1991)
• People v. Miller, 856 N.Y.S. 2d 443 (2008)
• State v. Montgomery, 22 Conn. App. 340 (1990)
• State v. Pinson, 895 P.2d 274 (1995)
• Grill v. State, 337 Md. 91 (1995)
• People v. Luna, 170 Cal. App. 4th 535 (2009)
• Commonwealth v. Hamel, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 250 (2001)
• People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697 (1983)
• Hamiel v. Wisconsin, 285 N.W.2d 639 (1979)
• U.S. v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 373 fn. 5, (1974)
• Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494 (1951),
• State v. Bond, 49 Conn. App. 183 (1998)
• State v. Verive, 627 P.2d 721 (1981)
• State v. Lewis, 220 Conn. 602 (1991)
• U.S. v. Castaneda, 9 F.3d 761 (1993)
• Ianelli v. U.S, 420 U.S. 770, 785 (1975)
• Callanan v. U.S., 364 U.S. 587 (1961)
• Clune v. U.S., 159 U.S. 590 (1895)
• Commonwealth v. Barsell, 424 Mass. 737 (1997)
14.12: Criminal Homicide
Chapter 9
• People v. Cole, 95 P.3d 811 (2004)
• Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)
• U.S. v. Moore, 846 F.2d 1163 (1988)
• State v. West, 844 S.W.2d 144 (1992)
• U.S. v. Downs, 56 F.3d 973 (1995)
• People v. Anderson, 666 N.W.2d 696 (2003)
• Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)
• Berry v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 3d 783 (1989)
• Dowda v. State, 776 So.2d 714 (2000)
• Stevens v. State, 691 N.E.2d 412 (1997)
• Tripp v. State, 374 A.2d 384 (1977)
• Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal.3d 112 (1988)
• People v. Taylor, 86 P.3d 881 (2004)
• State v. Evangelista, 353 S.E.2d 375 (1987)
• Wood v. State, 620 S.E.2d 348 (2005)
• State v. Warmke, 879 A.2d 30 (2005)
• United States v. Watson, 501 A.2d 791 (1985)
• Calderon v. Prunty, 59 F.3d 1005 (1995)
• Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975)
• People v. Ochoa, 966 P.2d 442 (1999)
• Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.3d 619 (1970)
• Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)
• People v. Carines, 597 N.W. 2d 130 (1999)
• Acers v. United States, 164 U.S. 388 (1896)
• Hawthorne v. State, 835 So. 2d 14 (2003)
• People v. Anderson, 447 P.2d 942 (1968)
• State v. Snowden, 313 P.2d 706 (1957)
• Commonwealth v. Carroll, 412 Pa. 525 (1963)
• State v. Schrader, 302 SE 2d 70 (1982)
• Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008)
• State v. Hoang, 755 P.2d 7 (1988)
• People v. Hernandez, 82 N.Y.2d 309 (1993)
• State v. Canola, 73 N.J. 206 (1977)
• People v. Young, 105 P.2d 487 (2005)
• People v. Steele, 47 P.2d 225 (2002)
• Ohio v. Shane, 63 Ohio St.3d 630 (1992)
• Girouard v. State, 583 A.2d 718 (1991)
• State v. Cole, 338 S.C. 97 (2000)
• State v. Doub III, 32 Kan.App.2d 1087 (2004) | textbooks/biz/Criminal_Law/Introduction_to_Criminal_Law/14%3A_Appendix_-_Case_Listings/14.11%3A_Inchoate_Offenses.txt |
Learning Objectives
By the end of this chapter, students should be able to:
• Describe how ignorance of the principles of money and banking has injured the lives of everyday people.
• Describe how understanding the principles of money and banking has enhanced the lives of everyday people.
• Explain how bankers can simultaneously be entrepreneurs and lend to entrepreneurs.
Thumbnail: Image by Skitterphoto from Pexels
01: Money Banking and Your World
Learning Objectives
• How can ignorance of the principles of money and banking destroy your dreams?
At 28, Ben is in his prime. Although tall, dark, and handsome enough to be a movie star, Ben’s real passion is culinary, not thespian. Nothing pleases him more than applying what he learned earning his degrees in hospitality and nutrition to prepare delicious yet healthy appetizers, entrées, and desserts for restaurant-goers. He chafes, therefore, when the owner of the restaurant for which he works forces him to use cheaper, but less nutritional, ingredients in his recipes. Ben wants to be his own boss and thinks he sees a demand for his style of tasty, healthy cuisine. Trouble is, Ben, like most people, came from humble roots. He doesn’t have enough money to start his own restaurant, and he’s having difficulty borrowing what he needs because of some youthful indiscretions concerning money. If Ben is right, and he can obtain financing, his restaurant could become a chain that might revolutionize America’s eating habits, rendering Eric Schlosser’s exposé of the U.S. retail food industry, Fast Food Nation (2001),[1] as obsolete as The Jungle (1901),[2] Upton Sinclair’s infamous description of the disgusting side of the early meatpacking industry. If Ben can get some financial help but is wrong about Americans preferring natural ingredients to hydrogenized this and polysaturated that, he will have wasted his time and his financial backers may lose some money. If he cannot obtain financing, however, the world will never know whether his idea was a good one or not. Ben’s a good guy, so he probably won’t turn to drugs and crime but his life will be less fulfilling, and Americans less healthy, if he never has a chance to pursue his dream.
Married for a decade, Rose and Joe also had a dream, the American Dream, a huge house with a big, beautiful yard in a great neighborhood. The couple could not really afford such a home, but they found a lender that offered them low monthly payments. It seemed too good to be true because it was. Rose and Joe unwittingly agreed to a negative amortization mortgage with a balloon payment. Their monthly payments were so low because they paid just part of the interest due each year and none of the (growing) principal. When housing prices in their area began to slide downward, the lender foreclosed, although they had never missed a payment.[3] They lost their home and, worse, their credit. The couple now rents a small apartment and harbors a deep mistrust of the financial system.
Rob and Barb had a more modest dream of a nice house in a good location with many conveniences, a low crime rate, and a decent public school system. They found a suitable home, had their offer accepted, and obtained a conventional thirty-year mortgage. But they too discovered that their ignorance of the financial system came with a price when they had difficulty selling their old house. They put it up for sale just as the Federal Reserve,[4] America’s central bank (monetary authority), decided to raise the interest rate because the economy, including the housing market, was too hot (growing too quickly), portending a higher price level across the economy (inflation). Higher interest meant it was more expensive to borrow money to buy a house (or anything else for that matter). To compensate, buyers decreased the amount they were willing to offer and in some cases stopped looking for a new home entirely. Unable to pay the mortgage on both houses, Rob and Barb eventually sold their old house for much less than they had hoped. The plasma TV, new carpeting, playground set in the yard, sit-down mower, and other goods they planned to buy evaporated. That may have been good for the economy by keeping inflation in check, but Rob and Barb, like Rose, Joe, and Ben, wished they knew more about the economics of money, banking, and interest rates.
Samantha too wished that she knew more about the financial system, particularly foreign exchange. Sam, as her friends called her, had grown up in Indiana, where she developed a vague sense that people in other countries use money that is somehow different from the U.S. dollar. But she never gave the matter much thought, until she spent a year in France as an exchange student. With only \$15,000 in her budget, she knew that things would be tight. As the dollar depreciated (lost value) vis-à-vis France’s currency, the euro, she found that she had to pay more and more dollars to buy each euro. Poor Sam ran through her budget in six months. Unable to obtain employment in France, she returned home embittered, her conversational French still vibrating with her Indiana twang.
Jorge would have been a rich man today if his father had not invested his inheritance in U.S. government bonds in the late 1960s. The Treasury promptly paid the interest contractually due on those bonds, but high rates of inflation and interest in the 1970s and early 1980s reduced their prices and wiped out most of their purchasing power. Instead of inheriting a fortune, Jorge received barely enough to buy a midsized automobile. That his father had worked so long and so hard for so little saddened Jorge. If only his father had understood a few simple facts: when the supply of money increases faster than the demand for it, prices rise and inflation ensues. When inflation increases, so too do nominal interest rates. And when interest rates rise, the prices of bonds (and many other types of assets that pay fixed sums) fall. Jorge’s father didn’t lack intelligence, and he wasn’t even atypical. Many people, even some otherwise well-educated ones, do not understand the basics of money, banking, and finance. And they and their loved ones pay for it, sometimes dearly.
Madison knows that all too well. Her grandparents didn’t understand the importance of portfolio diversification (the tried-and-true rule that you shouldn’t put all of your eggs in one basket), so they invested their entire life savings in a single company, Enron.[5] They lost everything (except their Social Security checks)[6] after that bloated behemoth went bankrupt in December 2001. Instead of lavishing her with gifts, Madison’s grandparents drained resources away from their granddaughter by constantly seeking handouts from Madison’s parents. When the grandparents died—without life insurance, yet another misstep—Madison’s parents had to pay big bucks for their “final expenses.”[7]
Stop and Think Box
History textbooks often portray the American Revolution as a rebellion against unjust taxation, but the colonists of British North America had other, more important grievances. For example, British imperial policies set in London made it difficult for the colonists to control the supply of money or interest rates. When money became scarce, as it often did, interest rates increased dramatically, which in turn caused the value of colonists’ homes, farms, and other real estate to decrease quickly and steeply. As a consequence, many lost their property in court proceedings and some even ended up in special debtors’ prisons. Why do history books fail to discuss this important monetary cause of the American Revolution?
Most historians, like many people, generally do not fully understand the principles of money and banking.
KEY TAKEAWAY
• People who understand the principles of money and banking are more likely to lead happy, successful, fulfilling lives than those who remain ignorant about them.
[1] www.amazon.com/Fast-Food-Nation-Eric-Schlosser/dp/0060838582/sr=8-1/qid=1168386508/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1/104-9795105-9365527?ie=UTF8&s=books
[3] Traditionally, one has to miss several payments before a lender can foreclose, but several new types of mortgages developed during the housing boom of the mid-2000s have “call” features that allow lenders to ask for immediate repayment of the principal if the value of the home sinks, leaving the lender undersecured.
[5] www.riskglossary.com/link/enron.htm
[6] www.ssa.gov | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/01%3A_Money_Banking_and_Your_World/1.01%3A_Dreams_Dashed.txt |
Learning Objectives
• How can knowledge of the principles of money and banking help you to achieve your dreams?
Of course, sometimes things go right, especially when one knows what one is doing. Henry Kaufman,[1] who as a young Jewish boy fled Nazi persecution in the 1930s, is now a billionaire because he understood what made interest rates (and as we’ll see, by extension, the prices of all sorts of financial instruments) rise and fall. A little later, another immigrant from Central Europe, George Soros, made a large fortune correctly predicting changes in exchange rate.[2] David did not become uberwealthy trading financial derivatives for a Wall Street firm, but he did earn enough money to retire at the age of forty. Instead of missing the early years of his two children’s lives in a maze of meetings and dying early from a heart attack, David spends his days raising his kids and living healthily.
Millions of other individuals have improved their lot in life by making astute life decisions informed by knowledge of the economics of money and banking. Over several decades, Henri leveraged his knowledge of the financial system by regularly buying low and selling high. A confirmed bachelor, he died of cancer at a relatively young age but felt blessed that he was able to share his substantial nest egg with online microlender Kiva[3] and several other worthy charities. Songho doesn’t earn much tutoring Korean, but he is single and frugal so he can save a little each month in conservative (low risk) investments that he will one day use to aid his aging parents or to bring his brother and niece to America. Aesha, a single mom and nurse, can’t afford to invest, let alone retire, but she uses her knowledge of the financial system to minimize her borrowing costs, thus freeing up resources that she uses to send Kelton to a private school that provides him with a far better educational experience than his public school did. Your instructor and I cannot guarantee you riches and fame, but we can assure you that, if you read this book carefully, attend class dutifully, and study hard, your life will be the better for it.
The study of money and banking can be a daunting one for students. Seemingly familiar terms here take on new meanings. Derivatives refer not to calculus (though calculus helps to calculate their value) but to financial instruments for trading risks. Interest is not necessarily interesting; stocks are not alive nor are they holding places for criminals; zeroes can be quite valuable; CDs don’t contain music; yield curves are sometimes straight lines; and the principal is a sum of money or an owner, not the administrative head of a high school. In finance, unlike in retail or publishing, returns are a good thing. Military-style acronyms and jargon also abound: 4X, A/I, Basel II, B.I.G., CAMELS, CRA, DIDMCA, FIRREA, GDP, IMF, LIBOR, m, NASDAQ, NCD, NOW, OTS, r, SOX, TIPS, TRAPS, and on and on.[4]
People who learn this strange new language and who learn to think like a banker (or other type of financier) will be rewarded many times over in their personal lives, business careers, and civic life. They will make better personal decisions, run their businesses or departments more efficiently, and be better-informed citizens. Whether they seek to climb the corporate ladder or start their own companies, they will discover that interest, inflation, and foreign exchange rates are as important to success as are cell phones, computers, and soft people skills. And a few will find a career in banking to be lucrative and fulfilling. Some, eager for a challenging and rewarding career, will try to start their own banks from scratch. And they will be able to do so, provided they are good enough to pass muster with investors and with government regulators charged with keeping the financial system, one of the most important sectors of the economy, safe and sound.
One last thing. This book is about Western financial systems, not Islamic ones. Islamic finance performs the same functions as Western finance but tries to do so in a way that is sharia-compliant, or, in other words, in a way that accords with the teachings of the Quran and its modern interpreters, who frown upon interest. To learn more about Islamic finance, which is currently growing and developing very rapidly, you can refer to one of the books listed in Suggested Readings.
Stop and Think
Gaining regulatory approval for a new bank has become so treacherous that consulting firms specializing in helping potential incorporators to navigate regulator-infested waters have arisen and some, like Nubank,[5] have thrived. Why are regulations so stringent, especially for new banks? Why do people bother to form new banks if it is so difficult?
Banking is such a complex and important part of the economy that the government cannot allow just anyone to do it. For similar reasons, it cannot allow just anyone to perform surgery or fly a commercial airliner. People run the regulatory gauntlet because establishing a new bank can be extremely profitable and exciting.
KEY TAKEAWAY
• Not everyone will, or can, grow as wealthy as Henry Kaufman, George Soros, and other storied financiers, but everyone can improve their lives by understanding the financial system and their roles in it.
[1] www.theglobalist.com/AuthorBiography.aspx?AuthorId=126
[3] www.kiva.org
[5] www.nubank.com
1.03: Suggested Browsing
Financial Literacy Foundation: www.finliteracy.org/
The FLF “is a nonprofit organization created to address the growing problem of financial illiteracy among young consumers.” Similar organizations include the Community Foundation for Financial Literacy (http://www.thecommunityfoundation-ffl.org) and the Institute for Financial Literacy (http://www.financiallit.org/).
Museum of American Finance: www.moaf.org/index
In addition to its Web site and its stunning new physical space at the corner of William and Wall in Manhattan’s financial district, the Museum of American Finance publishes a financial history magazine.
1.04: Suggested Reading
Ayub, Muhammed. Understanding Islamic Finance. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2008.
El-Gamal, Mahmoud. Islamic Finance: Law, Economics, and Practice. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Kaufman, Henry. On Money and Markets: A Wall Street Memoir. New York: McGraw Hill, 2001.
Soros, George. Soros on Soros: Staying Ahead of the Curve. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 1995. | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/01%3A_Money_Banking_and_Your_World/1.02%3A_Hope_Springs.txt |
Learning Objectives
By the end of this chapter, students should be able to:
• Critique cultural stereotypes of financiers.
• Describe the financial system and the work that it performs.
• Define asymmetric information and sketch the problems that it causes.
• List the major types of financial markets and describe what distinguishes them.
• List the major types of financial instruments or securities and describe what distinguishes them.
• List the major types of intermediaries and describe what distinguishes them.
• Describe and explain the most important trade-offs facing investors.
• Describe and explain borrowers’ major concerns.
• Explain the functions of financial regulators.
Thumbnail: Image by Pixabay
02: The Financial System
Learning Objectives
• Are bankers, insurers, and other financiers innately good or evil?
A ubiquitous stereotype portrays financiers as evil, brilliant, or both. While instances of uberintelligent, unfathomly selfish financiers can be adduced, most people working in the financial services sector are normal folks and not unusually greedy or smart. To understand the financial system in all its glorious complexity, readers need to expunge stereotypes of financiers from their minds. One way to do that is to cultivate critiques of media portrayals of all things financial.
Ever notice that movies and books tend to portray financiers as evil and powerful monsters, bent on destroying all that decent folks hold dear for the sake of a fast buck? In his best-selling 1987 novel Bonfire of the Vanities,[1] for example, Tom Wolfe depicts Wall Street bond trader Sherman McCoy (played by Tom Hanks in the movie version)[2] as a slimy “Master of the Universe”: rich, powerful, and a complete butthead. Who could forget Danny DeVito[3] as the arrogant, donut-scarfing “Larry the Liquidator” juxtaposed against the adorable, old factory owner Andrew Jorgenson (played by Gregory Peck)[4] in Other People’s Money?[5] And moviegoers have now been treated to two flicks called Wall Street,[6] which revile the nation’s largest and most important financiers and financial firms under thinly disguised names and circumstances.
Bashing finance and financiers is not a passing fad; you may recall the unsavory Shylock character from Shakespeare’s play The Merchant of Venice.[7] Even the Christmas classic It’s a Wonderful Life[8] contains at best a dual message. In the film, viewers learn that George Bailey, the lovable president of the local building and loan association (a type of community bank) played by Jimmy Stewart, saved Bedford Falls from the clutches of a character portrayed by Lionel Barrymore, actress Drew Barrymore’s grand-uncle, the ancient and evil financier Henry F. Potter. (No relation to Harry, I’m sure.) That’s hardly a ringing endorsement of finance.[9]
Truth be told, some financiers have done bad things. Then again, so have members of every occupational, geographical, racial, religious, and ethnic group on the planet. But most people, most of the time, are pretty decent, so we should not malign entire groups for the misdeeds of a few, especially when the group as a whole benefits others. Financiers and the financial systems they inhabit benefit many people. The financial system does so much good for the economy, in fact, that some people believe that financiers are brilliant rocket scientists or at least “the smartest guys in the room.”[10] This positive stereotype, however, is as flawed as the negative one. While some investment bankers, insurance actuaries, and other fancy financiers could have worked for NASA, they are far from infallible. The financial crisis that began in 2007 reminds us, once again, that complex mathematical formulas are less useful in economics (and other social sciences) than in astrophysics. Financiers, like politicians, religious leaders, and, yes, college professors, have made colossal mistakes in the past and will undoubtedly do so again in the future.
So rather than lean on stereotypes, this chapter will help you to form your own view of the financial system. In the process, it will review the entire system. It’s well worth your time and effort to read this chapter carefully because it contains a lot of descriptive information and definitions that will help you later in the text, as well as later in life.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• Financiers are not innately good or evil but rather, like other people, can be either, or can even be both simultaneously.
• While some financiers are brilliant, they are not infallible, and fancy math does not reality make.
• Rather than follow prevalent stereotypes, students should form their own views of the financial system.
• This important chapter will help students to do that, while also bringing them up to speed on key terms and concepts that will be used throughout the book.
[1] www.amazon.com/Bonfire-Vanities-Tom-Wolfe/dp/0553275976
[6] 1987: www.imdb.com/title/tt0094291; 2010: www.imdb.com/title/tt1027718
[9] video.google.com/videoplay?docid=4820768732160163488 | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/02%3A_The_Financial_System/2.01%3A_Evil_and_Brilliant_Financiers.txt |
Learning Objectives
• What is a financial system and why do we need one?
A financial system is a densely interconnected network of intermediaries, facilitators, and markets that serves three major purposes: allocating capital, sharing risks, and facilitating all types of trade, including intertemporal exchange. That sounds mundane, even boring, but it isn’t once you understand how important it is to human welfare. The material progress and technological breakthroughs of the last two centuries, ranging from steam engines, cotton gins, and telegraphs, to automobiles, airplanes, and telephones, to computers, DNA splicing, and cell phones, would not have been possible without the financial system. Efficiently linking borrowers to lenders is the system’s main function. Borrowers include inventors, entrepreneurs, and other economic agents, like domestic households, governments, established businesses, and foreigners, with potentially profitable business ideas (positive net present value projects) but limited financial resources (expenditures > revenues). Lenders or savers include domestic households, businesses, governments, and foreigners with excess funds (revenues > expenditures). The financial system also helps to link risk-averse entities called hedgers to risk-loving ones known as speculators. As Figure 2.1 illustrates, you are probably already deeply embedded in the financial system as both a borrower and a saver.
Occasionally, people and companies, especially small businesses or ones that sell into rapidly growing markets, have enough wealth (a stock) and income (a flow) to implement their ideas without outside help by plowing back profits (aka internal finance). Most of the time, however, people and firms with good ideas do not have the savings or cash needed to draw up blueprints, create prototypes, lease office or production space, pay employees, obtain permits and licenses, or suffer the myriad risks of bringing a new or improved good to market. Without savings, a rich uncle or close friend, or some other form of external finance, people remain wannabe entrepreneurs and companies cannot complete their projects. That should concern you because the world is a poorer place for it.[1] It should also concern you because many students need loans in order to afford college and thereby increase their future earnings.
Why do we need a financial system? Why can’t individuals and companies simply borrow from other individuals and companies when they need to? Lending, like supplying many other types of goods, is most efficiently and cheaply conducted by specialists, companies that do only one thing (or a couple of related activities) very well because they have much practice doing it and because they tap economies of scale. The fixed costs of making loans—advertising for borrowers, buying and maintaining computers, leasing suitable office space, writing up contracts, and the like—are fairly substantial. To recoup those fixed costs, to drive them toward insignificance, lenders have to do quite a volume of business. Little guys usually just can’t be profitable. This is not to say, however, that bigger is always better, only that to be efficient financial companies must exceed minimum efficient scale.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• The financial system is a dense network of interrelated markets and intermediaries that allocates capital and shares risks by linking savers to spenders, investors to entrepreneurs, lenders to borrowers, and the risk-averse to risk-takers.
• It also increases gains from trade by providing payment services and facilitating exchange.
• A financial system is necessary because few businesses can rely on internal finance alone.
• Specialized financial firms that have achieved minimum efficient scale are better at connecting investors to entrepreneurs than nonfinancial individuals and companies are. | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/02%3A_The_Financial_System/2.02%3A_Financial_Systems.txt |
Learning Objectives
• What is asymmetric information, what problems does it cause, and what can mitigate it?
Finance also suffers from a peculiar problem that is not easily overcome by just anybody. Undoubtedly, you’ve already encountered the concept of opportunity costs, the nasty fact that to obtain X you must give up Y, that you can’t have your cake and eat it too. You may not have heard of asymmetric information, another nasty fact that makes life much more complicated. Like scarcity, asymmetric information inheres in nature, the devil incarnate. That is but a slight exaggeration. When a seller (borrower, a seller of securities) knows more than a buyer (lender or investor, a buyer of securities), only trouble can result. Like the devil in Dante’s Inferno,[1] this devil has two big ugly heads, adverse selection, which raises Cain before a contract is signed, and moral hazard, which entails sinning after contract consummation. (Later, we’ll learn about a third head, the principal-agency problem, a special type of moral hazard.)
Due to adverse selection, the fact that the riskiest borrowers are the ones who most strongly desire loans, lenders attract sundry rogues, knaves, thieves, and ne’er-do-wells, like pollen-laden flowers attract bees (Natty Light[2] attracts frat boys?). If they are unaware of that selection bias, lenders will find themselves burned so often that they will prefer to keep their savings under their mattresses rather than risk lending it. Unless recognized and effectively countered, moral hazard will lead to the same suboptimal outcome. After a loan has been made, even good borrowers sometimes turn into thieves because they realize that they can gamble with other people’s money. So instead of setting up a nice little ice cream shop with the loan as they promised, a disturbing number decide instead to try to get rich quick by taking a quick trip to Vegas or Atlantic City[3] for some potentially lucrative fun at the blackjack table. If they lose, they think it is no biggie because it wasn’t their money.
One of the major functions of the financial system is to tangle with those devilish information asymmetries. It never kills asymmetry, but it reduces its influence, intermediaries by screening insurance and credit applicants and monitoring them thereafter, and markets by providing price information and analysis. With asymmetric information thus scotched, businesses and other borrowers can obtain funds and insurance cheaply enough to allow them to become more efficient, innovate, invent, and expand into new markets. By providing relatively inexpensive forms of external finance, financial systems make it possible for entrepreneurs and other firms to test their ideas in the marketplace. They do so by eliminating, or at least reducing, two major constraints on liquidity and capital, or the need for short-term cash and long-term dedicated funds. They reduce those constraints in two major ways: directly (though often with the aid of facilitators) via markets and indirectly via intermediaries. Another way to think about that is to realize that the financial system makes it easy to trade intertemporally, or across time. Instead of immediately paying for supplies with cash, companies can use the financial system to acquire what they need today and pay for it tomorrow, next week, next month, or next year, giving them time to produce and distribute their products.
Stop and Think Box
You might think that you would never stoop so low as to take advantage of a lender or insurer. That may be true, but financial institutions are not worried about you per se; they are worried about the typical reaction to asymmetric information. Besides, you may not be as pristine as you think. Have you ever done any of the following?
• Stolen anything from work?
• Taken a longer break than allowed?
• Deliberately slowed down at work?
• Cheated on a paper or exam?
• Lied to a friend or parent?
If so, you have taken advantage (or merely tried to, if you were caught) of asymmetric information.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• Asymmetric information occurs when one party knows more about an economic transaction or asset than the other party does.
• Adverse selection occurs before a transaction takes place. If unmitigated, lenders and insurers will attract the worst risks.
• Moral hazard occurs after a transaction takes place. If unmitigated, borrowers and the insured will take advantage of lenders and insurers.
• Financial systems help to reduce the problems associated with both adverse selection and moral hazard by screening applicants and monitoring borrowers and insureds.
[3] www.pickeringchatto.com/index.php/pc_site/monographs/gambling_on_the_american_dream | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/02%3A_The_Financial_System/2.03%3A_Asymmetric_Information-_The_Real_Evil.txt |
Learning Objectives
• What are financial instruments or securities?
• What economic function do financial instruments fulfill?
• What are the characteristics of different types of financial instruments?
Financial instruments, sometimes called financial securities, are legal contracts that detail the obligations of their makers, the individuals, governments, or businesses that issue (initially sell) them and promise to make payment, and the rights of their holders, the individuals, governments, or businesses that currently own them and expect to receive payment. Their major function is to specify who owes what to whom, when or under what conditions payment is due, and how and where payment should be made.
Financial instruments come in three major varieties—debt, equity, and hybrid. Debt instruments, such as bonds, indicate a lender–borrower relationship in which the borrower promises to pay a fixed sum and interest to the lender at a specific date or over some period of time. Equity instruments, such as stocks, represent an ownership stake in which the holder of the instrument receives some portion of the issuer’s profits. Hybrid instruments, such as preferred stock, have some of the characteristics of both debt and equity instruments. Like a bond, preferred stock instruments promise fixed payments on specific dates but, like a common stock, only if the issuer’s profits warrant. Convertible bonds, by contrast, are hybrid instruments because they provide holders with the option of converting debt instruments into equities.
Today, many financial instruments are merely electronic accounting entries—numbers in a spreadsheet linked to a contract. In the past, however, they took corporeal form as in the case of stock certificates, like that pictured in Figure 2.2 "Allied Paper stock certificate, 1964".
Compliments Wikimedia Commons: wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/File:Allied_Paper_Corporation_Stock_Certificate_1964.jpg.
Stop and Think Box
How would you characterize financial instruments in the following forms?
• I, Joe Schmo, promise to pay to Jane Doe at her home on Mockingbird Lane \$100 at the end of the fiscal quarter.
• I, Joe Schmo, promise to pay to Jane Doe at her home on Mockingbird Lane 10 percent of all profits arising from my taco stand at the end of each fiscal quarter.
• I, Joe Schmo, promise to pay to Jane Doe at her home on Mockingbird Lane \$100 at the end of each fiscal quarter if my taco stand earns at least that much profit.
The first instrument is a debt because Joe promises to pay Jane a fixed sum on a certain date. Joe is a simple borrower and Jane, his creditor/lender. The second instrument is an equity because Joe promises to pay Jane a percentage of profit, making Jane a part owner of the business. The third instrument is a hybrid because Joe promises to pay Jane a fixed sum but only if his taco stand is profitable. Parallel to the first instrument, Jane will receive a fixed sum on a fixed date (as in a loan), but like the second instrument, payment of the sum is contingent on the taco stand’s profits (as in an ownership stake).
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• Financial instruments, or securities, are contracts that specify who pays whom as well as how, if, when, and where payment is due.
• Debt instruments are for fixed sums on fixed dates and need to be paid in all events.
• Equities are ownership stakes that entitle owners to a portion of profits.
• Hybrid instruments are part debt and part equity or are convertible from one into the other. | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/02%3A_The_Financial_System/2.04%3A_Financial_Instruments.txt |
Learning Objectives
• In what ways can financial markets and instruments be grouped?
Financial markets come in a variety of flavors to accommodate the wide array of financial instruments or securities that have been found beneficial to both borrowers and lenders over the years. Primary markets are where newly created (issued) instruments are sold for the first time. Most securities are negotiable. In other words, they can be sold to other investors at will in what are called secondary markets. Stock exchanges, or secondary markets for ownership stakes in corporations called stocks (aka shares or equities), are the most well-known type, but there are also secondary markets for debt, including bonds (evidences of sums owed, IOUs), mortgages, and derivatives and other instruments. Not all secondary markets are organized as exchanges, centralized locations, like the New York Stock Exchange or the Chicago Board of Trade, for the sale of securities. Some are over-the-counter (OTC) markets run by dealers connected via various telecom devices (first by post and semaphore [flag signals], then by telegraph, then telephone, and now computer). Completely electronic markets have gained much ground in recent years and now dominate most trading.[1]
Money markets are used to trade instruments with less than a year to maturity (repayment of principal). Examples include the markets for T-bills (Treasury bills or short-term government bonds), commercial paper (short-term corporate bonds), banker’s acceptances (guaranteed bank funds, like a cashier’s check), negotiable certificates of deposit (large-denomination negotiable CDs, called NCDs), Fed funds (overnight loans of reserves between banks), call loans (overnight loans on the collateral of stock), repurchase agreements (short-term loans on the collateral of T-bills), and foreign exchange (currencies of other countries).
Securities with a year or more to maturity trade in capital markets. Some capital market instruments, called perpetuities, never mature or fall due. Equities (ownership claims on the assets and income of corporations) and perpetual interest-only loans are prime examples. (Some interest-only loans mature in fifteen or thirty years with a so-called balloon payment, in which the principal falls due all at once at the end of the loan.) Most capital market instruments, including mortgages (loans on real estate collateral), corporate bonds, government bonds, and commercial and consumer loans, have fixed maturities ranging from a year to several hundred years, though most capital market instruments issued today have maturities of thirty years or less. Figure 2.4 briefly summarizes the differences between various types of financial markets.
Derivatives contracts trade in a third type of financial market. Derivatives allow investors to spread and share a wide variety of risks, from changes in interest rates and stock market indices[2] to undesirable weather conditions[3] (too sunny for farmers, too rainy for amusement parks, too cold for orange growers, too hot for ski resorts). Financial derivatives are in some ways even more complicated than the derivatives in calculus, so they are discussed in detail in a separate chapter.
Some call financial markets “direct finance,” though most admit the term is a misnomer because the functioning of the markets is usually aided by one or more market facilitators, including brokers, dealers, brokerages, and investment banks. Brokers facilitate secondary markets by linking sellers to buyers of securities in exchange for a fee or a commission, a percentage of the sale price. Dealers “make a market” by continuously buying and selling securities, profiting from the spread, or the difference between the sale and purchase prices. (For example, a dealer might buy a certain type of bond at, say, \$99 and resell it at \$99.125, ten thousand times a day.) Brokerages engage in both brokering and dealing and usually also provide their clients with advice and information. Investment banks facilitate primary markets by underwriting (buying for resale to investors) stock and bond offerings, including initial public offerings (IPOs) of stocks, and by arranging direct placement of bonds. Sometimes investment banks act merely as brokers, introducing securities issuers to investors, usually institutional investors like the financial intermediaries discussed below. Sometimes they act as dealers, buying the securities themselves for later (hopefully soon!) resale to investors. And sometimes they provide advice, usually regarding merger and acquisition. Investment banks took a beating during the financial crisis that began in 2007. Most of the major ones went bankrupt or merged with large commercial banks. Early reports of the death of investment banking turned out to be premature, but the sector is depressed at present; two large ones and numerous small ones, niche players called boutiques, remain.[4]
Stop and Think Box
In eighteenth-century Pennsylvania and Maryland, people could buy real estate, especially in urban areas, on so-called ground rent, in which they obtained clear title and ownership of the land (and any buildings or other improvements on it) in exchange for the promise to pay some percentage (usually 6) of the purchase price forever. What portion of the financial system did ground rents (some of which are still being paid) inhabit? How else might ground rents be described?
Ground rents were a form of market or direct finance. They were financial instruments or, more specifically, perpetual mortgages akin to interest-only loans.
Financial markets are increasingly international in scope. Integration of transatlantic financial markets began early in the nineteenth century and accelerated after the mid-nineteenth-century introduction of the transoceanic telegraph systems. The process reversed early in the twentieth century due to both world wars and the Cold War; the demise of the gold standard;[5] and the creation of Bretton Woods, a system of fixed exchange rates, discretionary monetary policy, and capital immobility.[6] (We’ll explore these topics and a related matter, the so-called trilemma, or impossible trinity, in another chapter.) With the end of the Bretton Woods arrangement in the early 1970s and the Cold War in the late 1980s/early 1990s, financial globalization reversed course once again. Today, governments, corporations, and other securities issuers (borrowers) can sell bonds, called foreign bonds, in a foreign country denominated in that foreign country’s currency. (For example, the Mexican government can sell dollar-denominated bonds in U.S. markets.) Issuers can also sell Eurobonds or Eurocurrencies, bonds issued (created and sold) in foreign countries but denominated in the home country’s currency. (For example, U.S. companies can sell dollar-denominated bonds in London and U.S. dollars can be deposited in non-U.S. banks. Note that the term Euro has nothing to do with the euro, the currency of the European Union, but rather means “outside.” A Euro loan, therefore, could be a loan denominated in euro but made in London, New York, Tokyo, or Perth.) It is now also quite easy to invest in foreign stock exchanges,[7] many of which have grown in size and importance in the last few years, even if they struggled through the panic of 2008.
Stop and Think Box
To purchase the Louisiana Territory from Napoleon in 1803, the U.S. government sold long-term, dollar-denominated bonds in Europe. What portion of the financial system did those bonds inhabit? Be as specific as possible.
Those government bonds were Eurobonds because the U.S. government issued them overseas but denominated them in U.S. dollars.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• Financial markets can be categorized or grouped by issuance (primary vs. secondary markets), type of instrument (stock, bond, derivative), or market organization (exchange or OTC).
• Financial instruments can be grouped by time to maturity (money vs. capital) or type of obligation (stock, bond, derivative).
[1] “Stock Exchanges: The Battle of the Bourses,” The Economist (31 May 2008), 77–79.
[2] quote.yahoo.com/m1?u
[3] www.cme.com/trading/prd/weather/index.html
[4] “American Finance: And Then There Were None. What the death of the investment bank means for Wall Street,” The Economist (27 September 2008), 85–86.
[5] John H. Wood, “The Demise of the Gold Standard,” Economic Perspectives (Nov. 1981): 13-23.
[7] www.foreign-trade.com/resources/financel.htm | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/02%3A_The_Financial_System/2.05%3A_Financial_Markets.txt |
Learning Objectives
• In what ways can financial intermediaries be classified?
Like financial markets, financial intermediaries are highly specialized. Sometimes called the indirect method of finance, intermediaries, like markets, link investors/lenders/savers to borrowers/entrepreneurs/spenders but do so in an ingenious way, by transforming assets. Unlike facilitators, which, as we have seen, merely broker or buy and sell the same securities, intermediaries buy and sell instruments with different risk, return, and/or liquidity characteristics. The easiest example to understand is that of a bank that sells relatively low risk (which is to say, safe), low return, and highly liquid liabilities, called demand deposits, to investors called depositors and buys the relatively risky, high return, and nonliquid securities of borrowers in the form of loans, mortgages, and/or bonds. Note, too, that investor–depositors own claims on the bank itself rather than on the bank’s borrowers.
Financial intermediaries are sometimes categorized according to the type of asset transformations they undertake. As noted above, depository institutions, including commercial banks, savings banks, and credit unions, issue short-term deposits and buy long-term securities. Traditionally, commercial banks specialized in issuing demand, transaction, or checking deposits and making loans to businesses. Savings banks issued time or savings deposits and made mortgage loans to households and businesses, while credit unions issued time deposits and made consumer loans. (Finance companies also specialize in consumer loans but are not considered depository institutions because they raise funds by selling commercial paper, bonds, and equities rather than by issuing deposits.)
Due to deregulation, though, the lines between different types of depository institutions have blurred in recent years. Ownership structure, charter terms, and regulatory agencies now represent the easiest way to distinguish between different types of depository institutions. Almost all commercial and many savings banks are joint-stock corporations. In other words, stockholders own them. Some savings banks and all credit unions are mutual corporations and hence are owned by those who have made deposits with them.
Insurance companies are also divided between mutual and joint-stock corporations. They issue contracts or policies that mature or come due should some contingency occur, which is a mechanism for spreading and sharing risks. Term life insurance policies pay off if the insured dies within the contract period, while life annuities pay off if the insured is still alive. Health insurance pays when an insured needs medical assistance. Property or casualty insurance, such as fire or automobile insurance, comes due in the event of a loss, like a fire or an accident. Liability insurance pays off when someone is sued for a tort (damages). Insurers invest policyholder premiums in stocks, corporate and government bonds, and various money market instruments, depending on the nature of the contingencies they insure against. Life insurance companies, for example, invest in longer-term assets than automobile or health insurers because, on average, life insurance claims occur much later than property or health claims. (In the parlance of insurance industry insiders, life insurance has a much longer “tail” than property insurance.)
The third major type of intermediary is the investment company, a category that includes pension and government retirement funds, which transform corporate bonds and stocks into annuities, and mutual funds and money market mutual funds, which transform diverse portfolios of capital and money market instruments, respectively, into nonnegotiable but easily redeemable “shares.
As Figure 2.5 shows, the relative importance of commercial banks and life insurance companies has waned since World War II due to the proliferation of additional investment options. As Figure 2.6 shows, their decline is relative only; the assets of all major types of intermediaries have grown rapidly over the last six decades. The figures are in current dollars, or dollars not adjusted for inflation, and the U.S. economy has grown significantly since the war, in no small part due to the financial system. Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 2.7, the assets of financial intermediaries have grown steadily as a percentage of GDP.
Financial markets have exhibited similar growth. For example, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA),[1] a mechanism for tracking the prices of the shares of the nation’s most important corporations, grew from less than 200 at the end of World War II to just shy of 700 when John F. Kennedy took office in 1961, to around 1,000 when Ronald Reagan became president twenty years later, to over 3,200 in 1992 and over 10,000 by 1999.[2] Trading volumes on the New York Stock Exchange[3] and the NASDAQ[4] have likewise soared. In 1945, daily trading volumes rarely exceeded 2 million shares. By 1975, 10 million shares was considered a slow day. By 2005, over 1 billion shares were regularly traded each day.
KEY TAKEAWAY
• Financial intermediaries, including depository institutions (commercial banks, savings banks, credit unions) and insurers (life, health, property, and casualty), can be grouped by the composition of their balance sheets (nature of their assets and liabilities and the asset transformations they undertake) or their ownership structure, the origin of their corporate charters, and/or the identity of their regulators.
[1] www.djindexes.com/mdsidx/index.cfm?event=showAverages
[2] www.measuringworth.com/datasets/DJA/index.php
[3] www.nyse.com
[4] www.nasdaq.com | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/02%3A_The_Financial_System/2.06%3A_Financial_Intermediaries.txt |
Learning Objectives
• What trade-offs do investors face? How do borrowers decide whether to use financial markets or intermediaries to obtain the funds they need?
Why do investors (savers) sometimes choose to invest in intermediaries rather than directly in financial markets? Why do borrowers sometimes choose to reduce their liquidity and capital constraints via intermediaries and sometimes via markets? Markets and intermediaries often fulfill the same needs, though in different ways. Borrowers/securities issuers typically choose the alternative with the lowest overall cost, while investors/savers choose to invest in the markets or intermediaries that provide them with the risk-return-liquidity trade-off that best suits them.
Return is how much an investor gets from owning an asset. It can be positive (yipee!) or negative (d’oh!). Risk is variability of return. A “risky” asset might pay off big or be a big loser. A “safe” asset will probably return something mundane and expected. Liquidity is the speed with which an asset can be sold at something close to its real market value. A highly “liquid” asset, like a Federal Reserve note, can be exchanged instantaneously at no cost. A “liquid” asset, like a Treasury bond, can be sold in a few minutes for a minimal fee. An “illiquid” asset, like a house in a depressed neighborhood, may take months or years to sell and cost several percent of its value to unload.
Risk is a bad thing, while return and liquidity are good things. Therefore, every saver wants to invest in riskless, easily saleable investments that generate high returns. Of course, such opportunities occur infrequently because investors bid up their prices, thus reducing their returns. (As we’ll see in another chapter, the higher the price of an investment, the lower its return, ceteris paribus.) To keep returns high, some investors will be willing to give up some liquidity or to take on more risk. For example, they might buy securities not backed by collateral (assets like buildings, businesses, or safe financial instruments like T-bills that the borrower promises to forfeit in case of default). As a result of the competition between investors, and between borrowers, the financial system offers instruments with a wide variety of characteristics, ranging from highly liquid, very safe, but low-return T-bills and demand deposits, to medium-risk, medium-liquidity, medium-return mortgages, to risky but potentially lucrative and easily sold derivatives like put options and foreign exchange futures contracts.
Investors care about more than risk, return, and liquidity, but generally other considerations are secondary. For example, investors will pay more for investments with fixed redemption dates rather than ones that can be called (repaid) at the borrower’s option because fixed redemption dates reduce investors’ uncertainty. They will also sometimes pay a little more for instruments issued by environmentally or socially conscious companies and countries and less for those issued by dirty, rude ones.
Stop and Think Box
In the fall of 2006, interest rates on conventional thirty-year home mortgages without a prepayment penalty (a fee charged to the borrower if he/she repays the principal early) were about 6.5 percent per year. But mortgages with otherwise identical terms that contained a prepayment penalty for the first seven years of the loan could be had for 6.25 percent per year. Why was that the case?
In addition to risk, return, and liquidity, investors are concerned about the uncertainty of repayment terms. They are willing to receive a lower return (ceteris paribus, of course) in exchange for a guarantee that a loan will not be repaid for a significant period of time.
As noted above, borrowers also compete with each other for the lowest cost methods of meeting their external financing needs. Obviously, borrowers want to pay as little for funds as possible and would like nothing better than to borrow huge sums forever, unconditionally, and at zero interest. Nobody wants to lend on those terms, though, so borrowers compete with each other for funds by offering investors higher returns, less risk, or more liquid instruments. They use whichever part of the financial system, markets or intermediaries, offers them the best deal. A company may sell commercial paper in the money market rather than obtain a bank loan, for example, if it is large enough and well-known enough to interest enough investors and market facilitators. A smaller, newer company, though, may find that a bank loan is much easier and cheaper to obtain.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• Investors primarily trade off among risk, return, and liquidity, and to a lesser extent they also value the certainty of redemption terms.
• Borrowers want to obtain funds as cheaply as possible and on repayment terms as flexible as possible. | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/02%3A_The_Financial_System/2.07%3A_Competition_Between_Markets_and_Intermediaries.txt |
Learning Objectives
• What are the major goals of financial regulation?
Like investors, borrowers are concerned about the total net costs (all costs plus all benefits) of different types of finance. One big consideration is government and self-regulation. Compared with most other parts of modern capitalist economies, the financial system is relatively heavily regulated. Regulators like the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, which oversees exchanges and OTC markets), the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE, which oversees itself as an SRO or self-regulating organization[1]), and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC, which oversees futures market exchanges) monitor and regulate financial markets. Other regulators, including the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (which oversees federally chartered commercial banks), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC, which oversees almost all depositories), and sundry state banking and insurance commissions, monitor financial intermediaries. Companies that wish to avoid direct regulatory scrutiny due to its high cost tend to use intermediaries rather than markets. For example, instead of selling shares to the public, which would require following the many rules of the SEC and the NYSE (or other exchange or OTC market), a company might decide that it would be cheaper to obtain a long-term bank loan or sell bonds to life insurers, mutual funds, and other institutional investors in a direct placement.
Regulators serve four major functions. First, they try to reduce asymmetric information by encouraging transparency. That usually means requiring both financial market participants and intermediaries to disclose accurate information to investors in a clear and timely manner. A second and closely related goal is to protect consumers from scammers, shysters, and assorted other grifters, as well as from the failure of honest but ill-fated or poorly run institutions. They do the latter by directly limiting the types of assets that various types of financial institutions can hold and by mandating minimum reserve and capitalization levels. Third, they strive to promote financial system competition and efficiency by ensuring that the entry and exit of firms is as easy and cheap as possible, consistent with their first two goals. For example, new banks can form but only after their incorporators (founders) and initial executives have been carefully screened. Insurance companies can go out of business (exit) but only after they have made adequate provision to fulfill their promises to policyholders.
Finally, regulators also try to ensure the soundness of the financial system by acting as a lender of last resort, mandating deposit insurance, and limiting competition through restrictions on entry and interest rates. The first two forms of regulation are relatively uncontroversial, although many believe that the lender of last resort function should not be combined with a too big to fail (TBTF) policy, and that deposit insurance can increase risk-taking by bankers. Limiting competition is a highly controversial means of ensuring safety because it extends privileges to existing institutions over new ones. Little surprise, then, that the regulated companies themselves are often the strongest supporters of that type of regulation!
Stop and Think Box
For decades, the Federal Reserve capped the interest rates that banks could pay on checking deposits at zero and the interest rates that they could pay on time or savings deposits at around 6 percent per year. What was the intended economic effect of those restrictions? Why didn’t existing banks lobby for their repeal until the Great Inflation of the 1970s?
The restrictions were put in place to limit competition among banks, allowing them to be profitable without assuming too much risk. Existing banks were more than happy to reap relatively riskless profits until inflation exceeded the interest rates that they could legally pay. At that point, disintermediation was rampant. In other words, many people pulled their money out of banks and put them directly into the market, via money market and stock and bond mutual funds.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• Regulators attempt to maximize macroeconomic stability and transparency and to minimize investor risk and loss.
• The policies they implement to do so, however, can be controversial and are not always effective.
2.09: Suggested Reading
Anonymous, Finance for Managers. Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press, 2002.
Barth, James, Gerard Caprio, and Ross Levine. Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels Govern. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Bebczuk, Ricardo. Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets: Introduction and Applications. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Fabozzi, Frank. The Handbook of Financial Instruments. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2002.
Landier, Augustin, and Vinay Nair. Investing for Change: Profit from Responsible Investment. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Tyson, Eric. Personal Finance for Dummies, 5th ed. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2006. | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/02%3A_The_Financial_System/2.08%3A_Regulation.txt |
Learning Objectives
By the end of this chapter, students should be able to:
• Define money.
• Describe the work or economic functions that money performs.
• Define barter and explain why it is economically inefficient.
• Explain why some forms of commodity money are better than others.
• Explain why representative, credit, and fiat money are supplanted commodity money.
• Define the money supply and explain how and why it is measured.
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03: Money
Learning Objectives
• What is money and what economic functions does it perform?
Like love, money is ubiquitous, yet few of us feel that we have enough of either. As abstract concepts, money and love are both slippery, yet most of us believe that we know them when we see them. Despite those similarities, mixing money and love can be dangerous. The love of money is said to be one of the seven deadly sins; the money of love, despite its hoariness, is illegal in many jurisdictions in the United States and abroad.
Jest and wordplay aside, money is, perhaps, the most important invention of all time. Like the other major contenders for the title, indoor plumbing, internal combustion engines, computers, and other modern gadgets of too recent origin to consider; the wheel, which needs no introduction; the hearth, a pit for controlling fire; and the atlatl, a spear thrower similar in concept to a lacrosse stick, money is a force multiplier. In other words, it allows its users to complete much more work in a given amount of time than nonusers can possibly do, just as the wheel let porters move more stuff, the hearth helped cooks prepare more food, and the atlatl allowed hunters (warriors) to kill more prey (enemies).
What work does money do? It facilitates trade by making it easier to buy and sell goods compared to barter, the exchange of one nonmoney good for another. (If you’ve ever traded baseball cards, clothes, beers, phone numbers, homework assignments, or any other nonmoney goods, you’ve engaged in barter.) This is no minor matter because trade is the one thing that makes us human. As that great eighteenth-century Scottish economist Adam Smith (and others) pointed out, no other animal trades with nonrelatives of the same species. The inherent predisposition to trade may explain why humans have relatively large brains and relatively small digestive tracts. Trade certainly explains why humans have more material comforts by far than any other species on the planet. Each trade that is fairly consummated enriches both the buyer and the seller. The good feeling people get when they buy (sell) a good is what economists call consumer surplus (producer surplus). By making trading relatively easy, money helps to make humanity happier. (Note that this is not the same as claiming that wealth makes people happy. Although sometimes used synonymously with wealth in everyday speech, money is actually a special form of wealth.)
Imagine what life would be like without money. Suppose you try to fill up your automobile’s gasoline tank, or take mass transit to school, or acquire any good, without using money (or credit, money’s close cousin). How would you do it? You would have to find something that the seller desired. That could take a long time and quite possibly forever. If you don’t believe me, go to any Craigslist posting,[1] where you will find listings like the one below. It’s a fun diversion, but what would this person think is a “fair” trade? A lava lamp and a Grateful Dead poster? Would she give you a ball of yarn in change?
Date: 2006-11-30, 2:37 PM EST
Hello Craigslisters,
I recently moved to NYC and I have no use for the six items pictured below. Starting from the upper left going clockwise, I have: a working desk lamp, a hardcover copy of the NY Times best-selling book The Historian, an unused leather-bound photo album, a giant bouncy-ball that lights up when it bounces, a pair of goofy sunglasses, and a hand-made tribal mask from Mexico.
Make me any offer for any or all of the items, and if it’s fair, we’ll trade.
Answer: Only if you have a lot of time to waste.
In the lingo of economists, by serving as a means or medium of exchange, money eliminates one of the major difficulties of barter, fulfilling this mutual or double coincidence of wants. And it does it quite well as it zips across the country and the entire globe.
Another serious difficulty with barter helps us to see the second major type of work that money does. Suppose that the gas station attendant or bus driver wanted chewing gum and you had some. Exchange may still not take place because a crucial question remains unanswered: how many sticks of gum is a gallon of gas or a bus trip worth? Ascertaining the answer turns out to be an insurmountable barrier in most instances. In a money economy, the number of prices equals the number of traded goods because each has a money price, the good’s cost in terms of the unit of account. In a barter economy, by contrast, the number of prices equals the number of pairs of goods. So, for example, an economy with just 1,000 goods (a very poor economy indeed) would require 499,500 different prices! Little wonder, then, that barter economies, when they exist, usually produce only ten or so tradable goods, which means about forty-five different prices, each good paired with nine others. By serving as a unit of account, a measuring rod of economic value, money makes price determination much easier.
The unit of account function of money is more abstract than its work as a medium of exchange and hence is less well understood, but that does not mean that it is less important. To be an effective force multiplier, money has to eliminate both of barter’s biggest deficiencies. In other words, it has to end the double coincidence of wants problem and reduce the number of prices, ideally to one per good. It does the former by acting as a medium of exchange, something that people acquire not for its own sake but to trade away to another person for something of use. The latter it does by serving as a unit of account, as a way of reckoning value. When functioning as a unit of account, money helps us to answer the question, How much is that worth? much like inches help us to answer, How long is that? or degrees Fahrenheit or Celsius help us to ascertain, What is the temperature of that? By helping us to reckon value, money allows us to easily and quickly compare the economic value of unlike things, to compare apples and oranges, both literally and figuratively.
Stop and Think Box
After the demise of the Soviet Union, inflation reigned supreme as the Russian ruble lost more and more of its value each day. Rubles remained a medium of exchange, but in many places in Russia, prices and debts began to be denominated in “bucks.” What were bucks and why did they arise?
Bucks were U.S. dollars, used not just as a physical medium of exchange but also as a unit of account and standard of deferred payment, as a way of reckoning value in a stable unit. Russians could buy goods and services with Federal Reserve Notes, if they had any, or with enough paper rubles to buy the number of U.S. dollars demanded in the spot market. So if it took 100 rubles to buy a “buck,” a shopkeeper would want 3,000 rubles or \$30 for a pair of blue jeans he priced at \$30.
Money also works as a store of value and as a standard of deferred compensation. By store of value, economists mean that money can store purchasing power over time. Of course, many other assets—real estate, financial securities, precious metals, and gems—perform precisely the same function. Storing value, therefore, is not exclusively a trait of money, and, in fact, fiat monies are usually a very poor store of value. By standard of deferred compensation, economists mean that money can be used to denominate a debt, an obligation to make a payment in the future.
To help you to see the different functions of money, consider the following transaction:
Customer: How much for a gallon of gasoline? (A)
Attendant: \$2.99 (A)
Customer: Great, fill ’er up. (A)
Attendant: Will that be cash (E), check (E), debit (E), or credit (D)?
In the places labeled (A), money is working as a unit of account. The customer is trying to reckon the value of the gasoline, information that the attendant quickly encapsulates by quoting a money price. The customer just as quickly decides that she would rather have the gasoline than the money, or more precisely the other goods that the money could acquire, and requests the trade. The attendant responds by inquiring which medium of exchange (E) the customer wishes to use to pay for the good. Cash refers to physical currency, like Federal Reserve notes or Treasury coins. Check refers to a paper order for the transfer of money from a bank account. Debit refers to an electronic order for a transfer from a bank account or a prepaid declining balance debit card. Credit entails the prearranged transfer of funds from the customer’s creditor, a bank or other lender, in exchange for a small service fee from the gas station[2] and the customer’s promise to repay the lender (and perhaps interest and a yearly fee). In the case of the credit transaction, money is working as a standard of deferred payment (D) because the customer promises to repay the lender the value of the gas at some point in the future. (We will speak of credit money below, but students should not allow the lingo to confuse them. Credit cards and other loans are not money per se but rather are ways of obtaining it. The distinction will become clearer as your course of study during the semester unfolds.)
Of course, conversations like the one above rarely occur today. Except in New Jersey and a few other places, people pump their own gas; stations post their prices on big signs for all to see; and in addition to dispensing the product, gas pumps handle credit and debit (and sometimes cash) purchases with ease. Money makes all that possible, saving humanity untold hours of waste over the trillions of exchanges completed each year.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• Barter entails the exchange of one good for another. It is inefficient because it requires satisfaction of the double coincidence of wants (party one must have what party two desires, and vice versa) and pricing problems (the number of prices of goods equals the number of possible pairs).
• Perhaps the most important invention of all time, money is anything that reduces the transaction costs of barter, anything that is commonly accepted as payment or in exchange.
• Money serves as a medium of exchange (physical means of payment), unit of account (measure of economic value), store of value (method of storing said value over time), and standard of deferred payment (basis upon which debts are repaid).
[1] newyork.craigslist.org/about/sites
[2] Gas stations and other vendors sometimes charge higher prices for credit than for cash sales to compensate them for the transaction fee charged by the credit card companies. Most have given up such policies, however, due to competition for customers who found it convenient to charge purchases at a time before debit cards were widespread and many merchants refused to accept checks due to the high moral hazard. (Too many “bounced,” or were returned, unpaid, for insufficient funds in the customer’s account.) | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/03%3A_Money/3.01%3A_Of_Love_Money_and_Transactional_Efficiency.txt |
Learning Objectives
• What usually happens when money is absent in an economy?
To further appreciate money’s importance, consider what happens when it is absent—universal distress, followed quickly by money’s reintroduction or reinvention! After World War I, for example, the German government created too much money too quickly. Hyperinflation, a very rapid rise in the prices of all goods, ensued. Prices increased so fast that workers insisted on being paid twice daily so they could run, not walk, to the nearest store to buy food before their hard-earned wages became worthless. Before the hyperinflation, it was said that you could buy a wheelbarrow full of food with a purse full of cash. During the hyperinflation, you needed a wheelbarrow full of cash to purchase a purse full of food. At the end of the debacle, you kept the wheelbarrow at home lest your most valuable asset, the wheelbarrow, be stolen! At the end of the crisis, the German economy was on a barter basis, but only briefly before currency reforms stopped the inflation and restored a money economy.
Stop and Think Box
During its most recent financial crisis, in 2001–2002, Argentina faced a severe shortage of its money, called pesos. Private firms responded by setting up giant flea markets where goods were priced and paid for using the firm’s notes, which in most instances were called creditós. The creditós could be used in subsequent flea markets run by the issuing firm but not in markets run by other firms. Creditós had very limited circulation outside the flea markets. As soon as the peso crisis passed, the firms stopped running flea markets and no longer honored the creditós they had issued. What happened in Argentina?
A new form of private credit money spontaneously arose to fill the vacuum created by the dearth of pesos. Although not as liquid or safe as pesos, creditós were far superior to barter. The end-game default can be interpreted as seigniorage, the profit the issuers of creditós exacted for providing money to local Argentine communities. In other nations, like Ecuador, collapse of the local currency led to dollarization or adoption of a foreign currency (such as U.S. dollars) as both a medium of exchange and unit of account.
In prisons, prisoner-of-war camps, and other settings where money is unavailable, inmates quickly learn the inadequacies of barter firsthand and adopt the best available commodity as money—a medium of exchange; unit of account; a store of value; and even, to the limited extent that credit is available in such circumstances, a standard of deferred payment. Packs of cigarettes often emerge as the commodity money of choice. (Talk about one’s fortune going up in smoke!) There are good economic reasons for this preference. Although not perfect, cigarettes are a serviceable medium of exchange. First and foremost, sealed packs of cigarettes are easily authenticated because it would be extremely difficult to counterfeit or adulterate them, especially under prison conditions. Although they differ somewhat from brand to brand, they are also relatively uniform in quality. If you gave up a bar of soap for two packs, you could rest relatively well assured that you were not being cheated. Second, cigarette packs are divisible, into twenty individual cigarettes, or “loosies,” without giving up much of their ease of authentication. (A loosie is easier to adulterate than a sealed pack, say, by replacing the tobacco with sawdust, but is still not easy.) Divisibility is important because supply and demand might well dictate an equilibrium price that includes a fraction of a pack, just as it often leads to prices that are a fraction of a dollar (\$), yen (¥), euro (€), or pound (£). Individual cigarettes are also somewhat divisible but only when filterless or when consumed. One might, for instance, sell a good blanket for four packs, two loosies, and five drags or puffs.
Cigarettes also have relatively high value-to-weight and value-to-bulk ratios. In other words, they are relatively valuable given their size and weight. That portability is, of course, important to their function as a medium of exchange. Although they eventually go stale and can be ruined if smashed or drenched in water, sealed cigarettes packs are durable enough to also serve as an intermediate term store of value. The elasticity of the supply of cigarette packs is volatile, however, because smokers find it difficult to quit smoking, no matter the price and the fact that the quantity of packs in circulation depends on shipments from the outside world. In modern prisons, this is less of a problem, but in prisoner-of-war (POW) camps, sudden gluts caused the prices of goods (noncigarettes) to soar (that is, the value of cigarettes plummeted), only to be followed by long periods of deflation (lower prices for noncigarettes) as the supply of cigarettes dried up and each cigarette gained in purchasing power.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• Where money is absent, an available commodity with the best combination of ease of authentication, uniformity, divisibility, durability, portability, and elasticity of supply may emerge as money.
• In other instances, as in Argentina, private credit money may emerge. | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/03%3A_Money/3.02%3A_Better_to_Have_Had_Money_and_Lost_It_Than_to_Have_Never_Had_Money_at_All.txt |
Learning Objectives
• What characteristics does a good medium of exchange possess?
Much stranger commodities than cigarettes have served as money over the ages, and for the most part served well. As storied economist John Kenneth Galbraith once claimed, “More than most things, an understanding of money requires an appreciation of its history,” so a brief history lesson is in order here.[1] As Figure 3.1 suggests, various types of live animals, parts of dead animals, grains, metals, rocks, and shells have been money at one time and place or another.[2]
We generally find that, as with the case of prison inmates, early societies used available commodities that had the best combination of ease of authentication, uniformity, divisibility, durability, portability, and elasticity of supply. Hay (grassy livestock feed) rarely emerges as money because it is too easy to adulterate with weeds; its low value-to-bulk renders its portability very low due to the trouble and expense of transporting it; and until it is properly baled and stored, a rainstorm can ruin it. Tobacco, by contrast, has served as a commodity money because it is more uniform, durable, portable, and easily authenticated than hay. In colonial Virginia, tobacco was turned into a form of representative money when trustworthy and knowledgeable inspectors attested to its quality, stored it in safe warehouses, and issued paper receipts for it. The receipts, shown in Figure 3.2, rather than the tobacco itself, served as an extremely uniform, durable, divisible, portable, and easily authenticated medium of exchange.
Diamonds, rubies, and other rare gems seldom become money because they are not uniform in quality and are difficult to authenticate. One needs expensive specialized training and equipment to value them properly. (See Figure 3.3 for an example.) Gold, by contrast, has often served as money because, as an element (symbol = Au; atomic number = 79),[3] it is perfectly uniform in its pure form. It is also easily divisible; relatively highly portable for a commodity; and, though soft for a metal, quite durable. Gold can be adulterated by mixing it with cheaper metals. Even when coined, it can be clipped, sweated, or otherwise adulterated. Relatively easy ways of authenticating gold and other precious metals in their bullion (bar or brick) and coin forms exist, however.[4] Gold’s elasticity of supply, traditionally quite low due to its rarity, is its biggest shortcoming. Money must be scarce, meaning that free goods like air and water (where plentiful) will not work as money, but it need not be rare, and in fact, the best forms of money are not rare.
Many students have no problem seeing how commodities with use value, like food and cigarettes, or rarity value, like gold and silver, can be money. They often wonder, though, about the sanity of people who used common, useless items as money. Before congratulating themselves on their own rationality, however, they ought to peek into their wallets and purses, where they may discover, if they haven’t already used it on tuition, books, and entertainment, that they possess some greenish pieces of paper, called Federal Reserve notes, the use value of which is nearly nil.[5] True, those notes are fiat money. In other words, they appear to enjoy the advantage of legal tender status. The face of the notes makes clear that they are “legal tender for all debts, public and private.” That means that it is illegal to refuse them. That little note on the notes notwithstanding, it is clear[6] that people today accept Federal Reserve notes for the same reason that people in the past accepted clamshells, beads, or other low use-value items, because they know that they can turn around and successfully exchange them for goods. In fact, many economists define money as anything commonly accepted in exchange. (So Ron Paul dollars are not money!)[7]
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• The best medium of exchange combines ease of authentication, uniformity, divisibility, durability, portability, and elasticity of supply.
• Gold is not necessarily the best type of money because its supply is relatively inelastic.
• Declaring a medium of exchange as legal tender may help that medium of exchange to circulate, but simply knowing that something is readily accepted in exchange can work just as well.
[4] If you look through the Gunston Hall probate inventory database here: www.gunstonhall.org/probate/index.html, you’ll discover that a large percentage of households in Maryland and Virginia in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries owned a set of money scales. People regularly weighed coins to authenticate them and determine their real value.
[5] In the past, paper money that lost its value in exchange was used as wallpaper; thumb paper (to keep grimy young hands from dirtying textbooks, which in real terms were even more expensive in the distant past than at present, believe it or not); and tissue paper, for both the nose and the posterior! They were also used to tar and feather dogs and the occasional hated government official.
[6] During the American Revolution, Congress declared its paper money, Continental dollars, a legal tender. Despite the proclamation, Continentals soon lost almost all of their value, giving rise to the expression “Not worth a Continental.” Other examples of the failure of tender clauses abound. | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/03%3A_Money/3.03%3A__A_Short_History_of_Moolah.txt |
Learning Objectives
• How do representative and credit monies compare to commodity monies?
Truth be told, the people who used lion teeth or rocks with holes in them as money might find moderns a bit off their rockers for using money created by the government. The reason is simple: commodity monies are self-equilibrating, but government fiat monies are not because they are sometimes subject more to the whims of politicians and bureaucrats than to the forces of supply and demand, as we will see in a later chapter. Commodity money systems can self-equilibrate, or essentially run themselves, because commodities are scarce (but as noted above, not necessarily rare). In other words, the opportunity costs of their acquisition and production are greater than zero. That means that at some point people will find it just as profitable to produce nonmonetary goods as to produce money directly. At that point, money creation naturally ceases until more is needed. One way to see this is to consider the incentives of individuals to produce money or nonmonetary goods in a very simple economy.
Suppose, for example, that clamshells are money and that ten can be found in one hour, on average. Suppose too that people on average can also produce a bow in two hours, an arrow in one hour, and a dead rabbit in three hours. In that situation, an arrow would cost ten clamshells, a bow twenty clamshells, and a rabbit thirty clamshells because at those prices people would be indifferent whether they spent, say, six hours collecting clamshells (6 × 10 = 60), making arrows (6 × 10 = 60), making bows ([6/2 hours per bow] = 3 bows produced in 6 hours; 3 × 20 = 60), or hunting rabbits ([6/3] = 2; 2 × 30 = 60). If clamshells are somehow removed from circulation (maybe by being traded away), it will be more remunerative to harvest clamshells than to make bows or arrows or to fricassee rabbits until the supply of clamshells is restored, which should not be long. (In fact, if people expected the exodus of the clamshells, the adjustment might well be instantaneous.)
Commodity money systems also automatically adjust to structural changes in the economy. If it suddenly became easier to find clamshells, say, twenty in an hour, everybody would harvest clamshells until the clamshell prices of arrows, bows, and rabbits doubled, restoring equilibrium. If clamshell production dropped to five an hour, prices would also drop by half because no one would harvest clamshells when they could earn twice as many clamshells in an hour producing arrows, bows, or rabbits. If clamshell production remained steady but it became easier to produce bows, the only thing that would change would be the price of bows relative to the prices of arrows and rabbits, and not the price level, or all prices. For example, if it was possible to produce bows in 1.5 hours instead of 2, the price of bows would drop to 15 clamshells (when 10 clamshells can be harvested in an hour).
As noted earlier, gold is a very good commodity money in most respects and, like clamshells, its quantity is self-equilibrating. (If you wish, you can reread the previous two paragraphs substituting “grain of gold” for clamshell.) Early in the twentieth century, however, governments shifted away from its use, ostensibly because of competition from superior types of exchange medium and the inelasticity of its supply. When gold became more abundant and output remained constant, the price level increased because there was more money chasing the same amount of goods and services. When the quantity of gold remained constant and output increased, the price level declined because there was no longer enough gold around to maintain the former prices, as in Figure 3.5. By making each ounce of gold more valuable, thus increasing one’s ability to purchase more goods and services than formerly, the decline in prices should have triggered an immediate increase in gold production, thereby rendering the deflation, or reduction of the price level, mild and transitory, as in our hypothetical clam case above. Due to the difficulty of finding new veins of gold, however, changes in the price level were often prolonged.[1]
During the deep economic troubles of the 1930s, many countries experiencing prolonged deflations, including the United States, decided it was better to abandon gold in favor of much more elastic credit and fiat monies.
The end of gold’s reign was, in a sense, overdue. Gold’s monetary life had been extended by the invention and widespread use of credit money, including banknotes and deposits, because such money essentially rendered the gold supply more elastic. By the late seventeenth century, goldsmiths, skilled artisans who made gold watches and other auric goods, began to safeguard gold for their customers and to issue a form of representative money by issuing receipts to depositors. Like tobacco receipts, the gold receipts could be returned to the issuing goldsmith for gold. People often preferred to hold the receipts rather than the gold itself because they were even more portable and easily authenticated than the metal. So the receipts began to circulate as a medium of exchange. Credit money was born when the goldsmiths, now protobankers, discovered that due to the public’s strong preference for the receipts, they could issue notes to a greater value than the gold they had on physical deposit. They could therefore use the receipts to make loans or buy bonds or other income-generating assets.
By the eighteenth century, banks in Great Britain, the United States, and a few other places increased the elasticity of the supply of gold by engaging in just such fractional reserve banking. Consider the following bank balance sheet:
Assets:
Gold 200
Public securities 100
Loans 600
Office and real estate 100
Liabilities:
Notes (receipts) 900
Equity 100
Because most people preferred to hold notes and deposits instead of gold, the bank could hold only a small reserve of gold to pay to holders of its demand liabilities (notes and deposits) and earn seigniorage, or the profit from the issuance of money, on the rest.[2] Here only 200 (dollars or pounds or whatever) of gold did the work of 900 (the value of receipts or notes in circulation). Bankers essentially made gold less rare and also gained some control over its elasticity via the reserve ratio (reserves/monetary liabilities or 200/900), which was relatively unregulated by government at that time. Bankers could change the ratio as they saw fit, sometimes decreasing and sometimes increasing it, thereby changing the money supply, or the total quantity of money in the economy.
Stop and Think Box
In Ithaca, New York, and hundreds of other communities worldwide, consortia of businesses issue zero-interest bearer paper notes. The notes are denominated in local units (Hours in Ithaca; Greenbacks, Berkshares, and other names elsewhere)[3] and are designed to circulate as cash, like Federal Reserve notes. In the United States, the issuer must redeem the notes for dollars (unit of account) upon demand at a fixed conversion rate. Each Ithaca Hour, for example, is equal to 10 USD. The community notes are not a legal tender, have no intrinsic value, and generally circulate in an extremely limited geographical area. The issuers often use Marxist rhetoric (workers create all value but get shafted by the “capitalist” political and economic system, etc.), claiming that holding the notes will help the local economy by keeping money invested locally. (For more details, browse www.ithacahours.com). What is really going on in Ithaca and the other community money centers?
The issuers of the notes are interested in earning seigniorage, or profits from the issuance of money. They act like fractional reserve bankers, issuing Hours in exchange for dollars, which they put out to interest. They don’t earn much, though, because most people are smart enough to realize their credit money is less liquid and more risky than other forms of credit money, like bank deposits, and much higher risk than fiat money, like Federal Reserve Notes. In fact, there is no good reason to hold such notes unless one believes (“buys into”) the dubious Marxist rhetoric that often accompanies them.
Since its invention, credit money has been extremely successful because it is an almost perfect medium of exchange. Take, for example, bank deposits. Essentially just an accounting entry crediting so much money (unit of account) to a person or organization, deposits are easily authenticated, perfectly uniform, divisible to fractions of a penny, highly portable via written or electronic orders, and extremely durable. Moreover, their supply is highly elastic because they can be created and destroyed at will. The usefulness of deposits is further extended by varying their characteristics to meet different risk, return, liquidity, and maturity preferences. The most common and familiar type of deposit, called a checking, transaction, or demand deposit account, pays no or relatively low interest, but funds can be withdrawn at any time via teller during banking hours, via ATM 24/7, or with a debit card or check. Other deposits, called time or savings deposits or certificates of deposit, pay relatively high interest but either cannot be withdrawn at all before a prespecified date or can be withdrawn only if the depositor suffers a penalty that wipes out much of the interest earned. Between those two extremes have emerged a variety of hybrids, like automatic transfer from savings (ATS), and sweep accounts, and money market mutual funds. Most forms of electronic or e-money, like sQuidcards[4], are just new forms of credit money.
The biggest problem with credit money is that the issuer may default. Many banking regulations, as we will see in a later chapter, attempt to minimize that risk. Other issuers of credit money are not so closely regulated, however, and hence constitute serious credit risk for holders of their liabilities. Due to the inherently risky nature of fractional reserve banking, an issuer of credit money is much more likely to default (be unable to pay as promised) than the issuer of representative money. Like representative and fiat monies, credit money is relatively easy to counterfeit (illegally copy).
As mentioned earlier, fiat money, like Federal Reserve Notes, ostensibly circulates because the government requires market participants to accept it in payment at face value. Ultimately, however, people accept fiat money for the same reason they accept other types of money, because they know other people will take it without complaint or cavil. Fiat money is even more elastic than credit money because governments can create or destroy it at will for very little cost. This tremendous elasticity, however, means governments can cause inflation if they issue more fiat money than the current price level requires. In other words, unlike commodity and representative monies, fiat money is not self-equilibrating. A central bank or other monetary authority must decide how much to circulate at any given time. Monetary authorities choose wisely at times, but other times they do not, either as an honest mistake or quite purposefully.
In short, each major type of money has some advantages and disadvantages. Monetary systems, like everything else in economic life, are subject to trade-offs. What is best for one society may not be best for another and, indeed, may change over time. Table 3.1 reviews the taxonomy of money discussed in this chapter and the relative merits of different types of money.
Table 3.1 A Taxonomy of Money
Type Definition Examples Advantage(s) Disadvantage(s)
Commodity Physical assets with a relatively high degree of liquidity due to their uniformity, durability, divisibility, portability, and ease of authentication Clamshells; tobacco; gold Self-equilibrating Inelastic supply; storage, transportation, division, wastage, and authentication costs
Representative Claims on commodities in the actual physical possession of the money issuer Tobacco notes; gold deposit notes Easier/cheaper to store, transport, divide, safekeep, and authenticate than the underlying commodity Default and counterfeiting risk; supply elasticity limited by the underlying commodity
Credit Claims on the general assets of the money issuer and NOT fully backed by commodity, fiat, or other monies Bank deposits; banknotes Supply elasticity limited only by the reserve ratio Default and counterfeiting risk; some inflation risk
Fiat Legal tender enforced by government decree Federal Reserve Notes Extremely elastic supply Inflation risk; counterfeiting risk
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• Representative, fiat, and credit monies are more efficient than commodity money because they are superior media of exchange and units of account. Their quality is more uniform and easily ascertained, they have low weight-to-value ratios, they are more divisible and their divisibility is more flexible, and their supply is more elastic.
• The supply of representative, credit, and especially fiat monies generally does not self-equilibrate the way the supply of commodity money does, which creates inflation risks. Also, all three types of money are more easily counterfeited than commodity monies, and representative and especially credit monies are subject to default risk.
[1] This chart depicts changes in the price level in the United States between 1865 and 1900, when the country’s unit of account was defined in gold. Note that prices fell in most years. That deflation led to a series of political upheavals that resulted in the formation of the Populist Party and a prolonged struggle among Silverites, who desired to raise prices by monetizing silver; Greenbackers, who sought to raise prices through the issuance of fiat money; and Gold Bugs, who insisted on maintenance of the status quo. The Wonderful Wizard of Oz, a children’s book by Frank Baum made legendary by a movie version starring Judy Garland as protagonist Dorothy, is an allegory depicting the major political divisions of the era. Oz is of course the abbreviation for ounce; the yellow brick road refers to the gold standard; the Emerald City symbolizes Greenbacks; and in the book, Dorothy’s slippers were silver, not ruby, as they were depicted in the movie.
[2] Seigniorage can be earned in several ways. One way is to earn interest on assets acquired with liabilities that pay no interest or, more generally, on the positive spread between return on assets and the cost of monetary liabilities. The Federal Reserve, for example, pays no interest on its notes or deposits but earns interest on the Treasury securities and other assets that it buys with its notes and deposits. Another way to earn seigniorage is to mint coins that have a higher face or nominal value than production cost. Debasing the coinage, or extracting seigniorage by increasing the nominal value of a given sum of gold or silver, was highly profitable and therefore a favorite sport of kings.
[4] www.squidcard.com/corporate/emoney.html
3.05: Measuring Money
Learning Objectives
• What is the money supply and how is it measured?
Due in part to the profusion of different types of credit money, measuring the money supply today is no easy task. The Fed, or Federal Reserve System, America’s monetary authority and central bank, has therefore developed a number of monetary aggregates, or different measures of the money supply. The monetary base (MB) is the unweighted total of Federal Reserve notes and Treasury coins in circulation, plus bank reserves (deposits with the Federal Reserve). M0 is MB minus bank reserves. M1 adds to M0 (cash in circulation) travelers’ checks, demand deposits, and other deposits upon which checks can be drawn. (Banks other than the Fed no longer issue notes. If they did, they would be considered components of M1.) A broader aggregate, M2, includes M1 as well as time/savings deposits and retail money market mutual fund shares. A yet broader aggregate, M3, includes M2 as well as institutional time deposits, money market mutual fund shares, repurchase agreements, and Eurodollars, but its publication was discontinued by the Fed in 2006.
The Fed estimates several measures of the money supply because the movements of each estimate are not highly correlated and the appropriate monetary aggregate varies over time and question. As we will see, the money supply helps to determine important macroeconomic variables like inflation, unemployment, and interest rates. Accurately measuring the money supply is so important that monetary economists still search for better ways of doing it. One approach, called divisia after its French inventor, François Divisia (1925), weights credit instruments by their liquidity, or in other words, their degree of money-ness, or ease of use as a medium of exchange. The Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis tracks the U.S. money supply using various divisia formulas.[1]
Each Friday, the Wall Street Journal publishes the M1 and M2 monetary aggregates in its “Federal Reserve Data” column. The data is also available on the Federal Reserve’s Web site: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/. Students are cautioned, however, that the published data are mere estimates; the Fed often revises the figures by as much as 2 or 3 percent. Other countries’ central banks also report their monetary aggregates. Links to the Web sites of other central banks can be found here: http://www.bis.org/cbanks.htm.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• The money supply is the stock of all money in an economy.
• It is measured in a variety of ways to aid in the conduct of monetary policy and in macroeconomic forecasting.
3.06: Suggested Reading
Anderson, Richard G., and Kenneth A. Kavajecz. “A Historical Perspective on the Federal Reserve’s Monetary Aggregates: Definition, Construction and Targeting.” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review (March/April 1994): 1–31. http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/94/03/9403rg.pdf.
Bernstein, Peter. A Primer on Money, Banking, and Gold. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2008.
Davies, Glyn. A History of Money: From Ancient Times to the Present Day. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2002.
Eagleton, Catherine, Jonathan Williams, Joe Cribb, Elizabeth Errington. Money: A History. Richmond Hill, Ontario, Canada: Firefly Books, 2007. | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/03%3A_Money/3.04%3A_Commodity_and_Credit_Monies.txt |
Learning Objectives
By the end of this chapter, students should be able to:
• Define interest and explain its importance.
• Write and explain the present value formula.
• Write and explain the future value formula.
• Calculate present and future value for multiple periods with annual and more frequent compounding.
• Define and price major types of debt instruments including discount bonds, simple loans, fixed payment loans, coupon bonds, and perpetuities.
• Define yield to maturity and identify the types of financial instruments for which it is relatively easy to calculate.
• Explain why bond prices move inversely to market interest rates.
• Explain why some bond prices are more volatile than others.
• Define rate of return and explain how it differs from yield to maturity.
• Explain the difference between real and nominal interest rates.
Thumbnail: Image by PublicDomainPictures from Pixabay
04: Interest Rates
Learning Objectives
• What is interest and why is it important?
Interest, the opportunity cost of money, is far from mysterious, but it warrants our careful consideration because of its importance. Interest rates, the price of borrowing money, are crucial determinants of the prices of assets, especially financial instruments like stocks and bonds, and general macroeconomic conditions, including economic growth. In fact, ceteris paribus (like your grades!) the probability of you landing a job upon graduation will depend in large part on prevailing interest rates. If rates are low, businesses will be more likely to borrow money, expand production, and hire you. If rates are high, businesses will be less likely to expand or to hire you. Without a job, you’ll be forced to move back home. Best to pay attention then!
Interest can be thought of as the payment it takes to induce a lender to part with his, her, or its money for some period of time, be it a day, week, month, year, decade, or century. To make comparisons between those payments easier, interest is almost always expressed as an annual percentage rate, the number of dollars (or other currency)[1] paid for the use of \$100 per year. Several ways of measuring interest rates exist, but here you’ll learn only yield to maturity (YTM), the method preferred by economists for its accuracy. The key is to learn to compare the value of money today, called present value (PV) (represented here by the variable PV and aka present discounted value or price), to the value of money tomorrow, called future value (FV) (represented here by the variable FV).
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• Interest is the opportunity cost of lending money or the price of borrowing it and can be thought of as the payment a borrower needs to induce him, her, or it to lend.
• Interest is important because it helps to determine the price of assets, especially financial assets, and to determine various macroeconomic variables, including aggregate output.
[1] fx.sauder.ubc.ca/currency_table.html
4.02: Present and Future Value
Learning Objectives
• What are the formulas for present value and future value, and what types of questions do they help to answer?
A moment’s reflection should convince you that money today is always [1] worth more than money tomorrow. If you don’t believe me, send me all of your money immediately. I’ll return every cent of it—scout’s honor—in exactly one year. I won’t hold my breath. You’d be foolish indeed to forgo food, clothes, housing, transportation, and entertainment for a year for no remuneration whatsoever. That’s why a dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow. (Another reason that a dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow is that, in modern economies based on fiat money, prices tend to rise every year. So $100 tomorrow will buy fewer goods and services than$100 today will. We will discuss the impact of inflation on interest rates more at the end of this chapter. For now, we consider only nominal interest rates, not the real interest rate.) But what if I told you that if you gave me $100 today, I’d give you$1,000 in a year? Most lenders would jump at that offer (provided they thought I would pay as promised and not default), but I wouldn’t offer it and neither would most borrowers. In fact, about $110 would be the most I’d be willing to give you in a year for$100 today. That’s an interest rate of 10 percent ($10/$100 = .1 or 10%), which, as comedian Adam Sandler might say, is “not too shabby.” [2] If we let the loan ride, as they say, capitalizing the interest or, in other words, paying interest on the interest every year, called annually compounding interest, your $100 investment would grow in value, as shown in Figure 4.1. (The compounding period need not be a year, and it is even possible to compound interest continuously, but unless otherwise noted we will compound annually in this chapter.) The figures in the table are easily calculated by multiplying the previous year’s value by 1.10, 1 representing the principal value and .10 representing the interest rate expressed as a decimal. So$100 today (year = 0) is, at 10 percent interest compounded annually, worth $110 in a year (100 × 1.1),$121 after two years (110 × 1.1), $131.10 after three years (121 × 1.1), and so forth. The quick way to calculate this for any year is to use the following formula: FV = PV(1 + i)n where FV = the future value (the value of your investment in the future) PV = the present value (the amount of your investment today) (1 + i)n = the future value factor (aka the present value factor or discount factor in the equation below) i = interest rate (decimalized, for example, 6% = .06; 25% = .25, 2.763% = .02763, etc.) n = number of terms (here, years; elsewhere days, months, quarters) For$100 borrowed today at 10 percent compounded annually, in 100 years I’d owe you $1,378,061 (FV = 100 × 1.1100). (Good luck collecting that one!) What if someone offers to pay you, say,$1,000 in 5 years? How much would you be willing to pay today for that? Clearly, something less than $1,000. Instead of taking a PV and expanding it via multiplication to determine an FV, here you must do the opposite, or in other words, reduce or “discount” an FV to a PV. You do so by dividing, as in the following formula: $PV=FV/(1+i)^n\ \text{or}\ PV=1000/(1+i)^5 \nonumber$ Obviously, we can’t solve this equation unless one of the two remaining variables is given. If the interest rate is given as 5 percent, you would pay$783.53 today for $1,000 payable in 5 years (PV = 1000/1.055). If it is 20 percent, you’d give only$401.88 (PV = 1000/1.25). If it is 1 percent, you would give $951.47 (PV = 1000/1.015). Notice that as the interest rate rises (falls), the present value (price) of the future payment falls (rises). In other words, the price (PV) of some future payment (some FV; generically, a bond) and the rate of interest are inversely related. You can see this algebraically by noting that the i term is in the denominator, so as it gets larger, PV must get smaller (holding FV constant, of course). Economically this makes sense because a higher interest rate means a higher opportunity cost for money, so a sum payable in the future is worth less the more dear money is (the more it costs to borrow it). If payment of the bond described just above were to be made in ten years instead of five, at 1 percent interest per year, you’d pay$905.29 (PV = 1000/1.0110). Note here that, holding the interest rate (and all other factors) constant, you give less today for a payment further in the future ($905.29 <$951.47). That too makes good sense because you’re without your money longer and need to be compensated for it by paying a lower price for the bond/promise/IOU today.
Congratulations, you just won the Powerball: $100 million payable in$5 million installments over 20 years! Did you really win $100 million? (Hint: Calculate the PV of the final payment with interest at 4 percent.) No; 5 × 20 = 100, but the money payable next year and in subsequent years is not worth$5 million today if interest rates are above 0, and they almost always are. For example, the last payment, with interest rates at 4 percent compounded annually, has a PV of only 5,000,000/(1.04)20 = $2,281,934.73. This is a great place to stop and drill until calculating present value and future value becomes second nature to you. Work through the following problems until it hurts. Then do them again, standing on your head or on one leg. Exercises For all questions in this set, interest compounds annually and there are no transaction fees, defaults, etc. 1. On your seventieth birthday, you learn that your grandma, bless her soul, deposited$50.00 for you on the day of your birth in a savings account bearing 5 percent interest. How much is in the account?
2. You won $1 million in the lottery but unfortunately the money is payable in a year and you want to start spending it right away. If interest is at 8 percent, how much can you receive today in exchange for that$1 million in year?
3. As a college freshman, you hoped to save $2,500 to “pimp your ride” as a college graduation present to yourself. You put$2,012.98 from your high school graduation haul in the bank at 5 percent interest. Will you meet your goal?
4. You’ve won a scholarship for your senior year worth $1,500, but it is payable only after graduation, a year hence. If interest is at 15 percent, how much is your scholarship worth today? 5. You determine that you need$1,750,000 saved in order to retire comfortably. When you turn 25, you inherit $350,017. If you invest that sum immediately at 4.42 percent, can you retire at age 65 if you have no other savings? 6. You own two bonds, each with a face, or payoff, value of$1,000. One falls due in exactly one year and the other in exactly three years. If interest is at 2.35 percent, how much are those bonds worth today? What if interest rates jump to 12.25 percent?
7. To purchase a car, you borrowed $10,000 from your brother. You offered to pay him 8 percent interest and to repay the loan in exactly three years. How much will you owe your bro? 8. As part of a lawsuit settlement, a major corporation offers you$100,000 today or $75,000 next year. Which do you choose if interest rates are 5 percent? If they are 13.47886 percent? 9. Exactly 150 years ago, the U.S. government promised to pay a certain Indian tribe$3,500, or 7 percent interest until it did so. Somehow, the account was unpaid. How much does the government owe the tribe for this promise?
10. As part of an insurance settlement, you are offered $100,000 today or$125,000 in five years. If the applicable interest rate is 1 percent, which option do you choose? What if the interest rate is 5 percent?
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• The present value formula is PV = FV/(1 + i)n where PV = present value, FV = future value, i = decimalized interest rate, and n = number of periods. It answers questions like, How much would you pay today for $X at time y in the future, given an interest rate and a compounding period? • The future value formula is FV = PV× (1 + i)n. It answers questions like, How much will$X invested today at some interest rate and compounding period be worth at time Y?
[1] Certain interest rates occasionally turn very slightly (−0.004%) negative. The phenomenon is so rare and minor that it need not detain us here.
[2] www.tsrocks.com/a/adam_sandler_texts/the_chanukah_song.html | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/04%3A_Interest_Rates/4.01%3A_The_Interest_of_Interest.txt |
Learning Objectives
• If interest compounds other than annually, how does one calculate PV and FV?
Interest does not always compound annually, as assumed in the problems already presented in this chapter. Sometimes it compounds quarterly, monthly, daily, even continuously. The more frequent the compounding period, the more valuable the bond or other instrument, all else constant. The mathematics remains the same (though a little more difficult when compounding is continuous), but you must be careful about what you plug into the equation for i and n. For example, \$1,000 invested at 12 percent for a year compounded annually would be worth \$1,000 × (1.12)1 = \$1,120.00. But that same sum invested for the same term at the same rate of interest but compounded monthly would grow to \$1,000 × (1.01)12 = \$1,126.83 because the interest paid each month is capitalized, earning interest at 12 percent. Note that we represent i as the interest paid per period (.12 interest/12 months in a year = .01) and n as the number of periods (12 in a year; 12 × 1 = 12), rather than the number of years. That same sum, and so forth with interest compounded quarterly (4 times a year) would grow to \$1,000 × (1.03)4 = \$1,125.51. The differences among annual, monthly, and quarterly compounding here are fairly trivial, amounting to less than \$7 all told, but are important for bigger sums, higher interest rates, more frequent compounding periods, and longer terms. One million dollars at 4 percent for a year compounded annually comes to \$1,000,000 × (1.04) = \$1,040,000, while on the same terms compounded quarterly, it produces \$1,000,000 × (1.01)4 = \$1,040,604.01. (I’ll take the latter sum over the former any day and “invest” the surplus in a very nice dinner and concert tickets.) Likewise, \$100 at 300 percent interest for 5 years compounded annually becomes 100 × (4)5 = \$102,400. Compounded quarterly, that \$100 grows to \$100 × (1.75)20 = \$7,257,064.34! A mere \$1 at 6 percent compounded annually for 100 years will be worth \$1 × (1.06)100 = \$339.30. The same buck at the same interest compounded monthly swells in a century to \$1 × (1.005)1200 = \$397.44. This all makes good sense because interest is being received sooner than the end of the year and hence is more valuable because, as we know, money now is better than money later.
Do a few exercises now to make sure you get it.
EXERCISES
For all questions in this set, interest rates are stated in annual terms, but the interest compounds quarterly (four times a year). Also, assume there are no transaction fees, defaults, etc.
1. On your seventieth birthday, you learn that your grandma, bless her soul, deposited \$50.00 for you on the day of your birth in a savings account bearing 5 percent interest. How much is in the account?
2. You won \$1 million in the lottery but unfortunately the money is payable in a year and you want to start spending it right away. If interest is at 8 percent, how much can you receive today in exchange for that \$1 million in year?
3. As a freshman, you hoped to save \$2,500 to “pimp your ride” as a college graduation present to yourself. You put \$2,012.98 from your high school graduation haul in the bank at 5 percent interest. Will you meet your goal if you graduate in four years?
4. You’ve won a scholarship for your senior year worth \$1,500, but it is payable only after graduation, a year hence. If interest is at 15 percent, how much is your scholarship worth today?
5. You won the lottery and netted a million bucks, but you need \$5 million to buy a little island that you have had your eye on. If interest is at 12 percent, will you be able to buy your island in 30 years, assuming its price is unchanged at that time?
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• Present and future value can be calculated for any compounding period (except continuously) using the same formulas presented in this chapter.
• Care must be taken, however, to ensure that the i and n terms are adjusted appropriately. | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/04%3A_Interest_Rates/4.03%3A_Compounding_Periods.txt |
Learning Objectives
• What are debt instruments and how are they priced?
Believe it or not, you are now equipped to calculate the price of any debt instrument or contract provided you know the rate of interest, compounding period, and the size and timing of the payments. Four major types of instruments that you are likely to encounter include discount bonds, simple loans, fixed-payment loans, and coupon bonds.
A discount bond (aka a zero coupon bond or simply a zero) makes only one payment, its face value on its maturity or redemption date, so its price is easily calculated using the present value formula. If the interest rate is 6 percent, the price of a discount bond with a \$1,000 face value due in exactly a year would be \$943.40 (1000/1.06). If the interest rate is 12 percent, the same discount bond’s price would be only \$892.86 (1000/1.12). If the bond is due in two years at 12 percent, its price would be \$797.19 (1000/(1.122), and so forth.
A simple loan is the name for a loan where the borrower repays the principal and interest at the end of the loan. Use the future value formula to calculate the sum due upon maturity. For example, a simple loan of \$1,000 for one year at 3.5 percent would require the borrower to repay \$1,035.00 (1000× 1.035), while a simple loan at the same rate for two years would require a payment of \$1,071.23 (1000 × 1.0352). (Note that the correct answer is not just \$35 doubled due to the effects of compounding or capitalizing the interest due at the end of the first year.)
A fixed-payment loan (aka a fully amortized loan) is one in which the borrower periodically (for example, weekly, bimonthly, monthly, quarterly, annually, etc.) repays a portion of the principal along with the interest. With such loans, which include most auto loans and home mortgages, all payments are equal. There is no big balloon or principal payment at the end because the principal shrinks, slowly at first but more rapidly as the final payment grows nearer, as in Figure 4.2 "Sample thirty-year amortizing mortgage".
Principal borrowed: \$500,000.00; Annual number of payments: 12; Total number of payments: 360; Annual interest rate: 6.00%; Regular monthly payment amount: \$2,997.75
Today, such schedules are most easily created using specialized financial software, including Web sites like ray.met.fsu.edu/cgi-bin/amortize, http://www.yona.com/loan/, or realestate.yahoo.com/calculators/amortization.html. If you wanted to buy this mortgage (in other words, if you wanted to purchase the right to receive the monthly repayments of \$2,997.75) from the original lender (there are still secondary markets for mortgages, though they are less active than they were before the financial crisis that began in 2007), you’d simply sum the present value of each of the remaining monthly payments. (Again, a computer is highly recommended here!)
Finally, a coupon bond is so-called because, in the past, owners of the bond received interest payments by clipping one of the coupons and remitting it to the borrower (or its paying agent, usually a bank). Figure 4.3 "Sample bond coupon, Malden & Melrose Railroad Co., 1860", for example, is a coupon paid (note the cancellation holes and stamp) to satisfy six months’ interest on bond number 21 of the Malden & Melrose Railroad Company of Boston, Massachusetts, sometime on or after April 1, 1863. Figure 4.4 "Michigan Central Railroad, 3.5 percent bearer gold bond with coupons attached, 1902" is a \$1,000 par value coupon bond issued in 1902, with some of the coupons still attached (on the left side of the figure).
Even if it no longer uses a physical coupon like those illustrated in Figure 4.3 "Sample bond coupon, Malden & Melrose Railroad Co., 1860" and Figure 4.4 "Michigan Central Railroad, 3.5 percent bearer gold bond with coupons attached, 1902", a coupon bond makes one or more interest payments periodically (for example, monthly, quarterly, semiannually, annually, etc.) until its maturity or redemption date, when the final interest payment and all of the principal are paid. The sum of the present values of each future payment will give you the price. So we can calculate the price today of a \$10,000 face or par value coupon bond that pays 5 percent interest annually until its face value is redeemed (its principal is repaid) in exactly five years if the market rate of interest is 6 percent, 4 percent, or any other percent for that matter, simply by summing the present value of each payment:
PV1 = \$500/(1.06) = \$471.70 (This is the interest payment after the first year. The \$500 is the coupon or interest payment, which is calculated by multiplying the bond’s face value, in this case, \$10,000, by the bond’s contractual rate of interest or “coupon rate,” in this case, 5 percent. \$10,000 × .05 = \$500.)
P V 2 = \$ 500 / ( 1.06 ) 2 = \$ 445.00
(If this doesn’t look familiar, you didn’t do Exercise 1 enough!)
P V 3 = \$ 500 / ( 1.06 ) 3 = \$ 419.81
P V 4 = \$ 500 / ( 1.06 ) 4 = \$ 396.05
P V 5 = \$ 10,500 / ( 1.06 ) 5 = \$ 7,846.21
(\$10,500 is the final interest payment of \$500 plus the repayment of the bond’s face value of \$10,000 .)
That adds up to \$9,578.77. If you are wondering why the bond is worth less than its face value, the key is the difference between the contractual interest or coupon rate it pays, 5 percent, and the market rate of interest, 6 percent. Because the bond pays at a rate lower than the going market, people are not willing to pay as much for it, so its price sinks below par. By the same reasoning, people should be willing to pay more than the face value for this bond if interest rates sink below its coupon rate of 5 percent. Indeed, when the market rate of interest is 4 percent, its price is \$10,445.18 (give or take a few pennies, depending on rounding):
P V 1 = \$ 500 / ( 1.04 ) = \$ 480.77
P V 2 = \$ 500 / ( 1.04 ) 2 = \$ 462.28
P V 3 = \$ 500 / ( 1.04 ) 3 = \$ 444.50
P V 4 = \$ 500 / ( 1.04 ) 4 = \$ 427.40
P V 5 = \$ 10,500 / ( 1.04 ) 5 = \$ 8,630.23
If the market interest rate is exactly equal to the coupon rate, the bond will sell at its par value, in this case, \$10,000.00. Check it out:
P V 1 = \$ 500 / ( 1.05 ) = \$ 476.1905
P V 2 = \$ 500 / ( 1.05 ) 2 = \$ 453.5147
P V 3 = \$ 500 / ( 1.05 ) 3 = \$ 431.9188
P V 4 = \$ 500 / ( 1.05 ) 4 = \$ 411.3512
P V 5 = \$ 10,500 / ( 1.05 ) 5 = \$ 8,227.0247
Calculating the price of a bond that makes quarterly payments over thirty years can become quite tedious because, by the method shown above, that would entail calculating the PV of 120 (30 years times 4 payments a year) payments. Until not too long ago, people used special bond tables to help them make the calculations more quickly. Today, to speed things up and depending on their needs, most people use financial calculators, specialized financial software, and canned spreadsheet functions like Excel’s PRICEDISC or PRICEMAT, custom spreadsheet formulas, or Web-based calculators like http://www.calculatorweb.com/calculators/bondcalc.shtml or http://www.investinginbonds.com/calcs/tipscalculator/TipsCalcForm.aspx.
It’s time once again to get a little practice. Don’t worry; these are easy enough to work out on your own.
EXERCISES
Assume no default risks or transaction costs.
1. What is the price of a 10 percent coupon bond, payable annually, with a \$100 face value that matures in 3 years if interest rates are 7 percent?
2. What is the price of a 5 percent coupon bond, payable annually, with a \$1,000 face value that matures in 5 years if interest rates are 5 percent?
3. If interest rates were 4 percent, how much would you give today for a loan with a \$100,000 balloon principal payment due in a year and that will pay \$16,000 in interest at the end of each quarter, including the final quarter when the principal falls due?
4. What is the value today of a share of stock that you think will be worth \$50 in a year and that throws off \$1 in dividends each quarter until then, assuming the market interest rate is 10 percent?
5. What is the value today of a share of stock that you think will be worth \$50 in a year and that throws off \$1 in dividends each quarter until then if the market interest rate is 1 percent?
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• Debt instruments—like discount bonds, simple loans, fixed payment loans, and coupon bonds—are contracts that promise payment in the future.
• They are priced by calculating the sum of the present value of the promised payments. | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/04%3A_Interest_Rates/4.04%3A_Pricing_Debt_Instruments.txt |
Learning Objectives
• What is yield to maturity and for what types of financial instruments is the yield to maturity relatively easy to calculate?
Thus far, we have assumed or been given a market interest rate and then calculated the price (PV) of the instrument. Or, given the PV and an interest rate, we’ve calculated the FV. Sometimes it is useful to do the opposite, to calculate the interest rate, or yield to maturity, if given the PV and FV. Say that you know that someone paid \$750 for a zero coupon bond with a face value of \$1,000 that will mature in exactly a year and you want to know what interest rate he or she paid. You know that PV = FV/(1 + i). Solving for i:
Multiply each side of the equation by ( 1 + i ) : ( 1 + i ) × P V = F V
Multiply the terms on the left side of the equation: P V + P V i = F V
Subtract PV from each side of the equation: P V i = F V - P V
Divide each side of the equation by P V : i = ( F V - P V ) / P V
So in this case i = ( 1000 - 750 ) / 750 = 250 / 750 = .3333 , or 33.33 percent.
You can check your work by reversing the problem—that is, asking how much you’d pay today for \$1,000 in a year if interest was at 33.33 percent: PV = 1000/(1.3333333) = \$750. Voilà!
Stop and Think Box
Suppose you have \$1,000 to invest for a year and two ways of investing it (each equal in terms of risk and liquidity): a discount bond due in one year with a face value of \$1,000 for \$912 or a bank account at 6.35 percent compounded annually. Which should you take?
Choose the bond, which will yield 9.65 percent: (1000 − 912)/912 = .0965. To maximize your haul, invest the \$88 left over from the purchase of the bond in the bank account.
Calculating the yield to maturity for a perpetual debt, one with no maturity or repayment date, like a Consol, ground rent, or perpetual interest-only mortgage, is also quite easy. The price or PV of a perpetuity is equal to the yearly payment—the only FV available from an instrument that by definition will never repay its principal—divided by the going rate of interest:
P V = F V / i (decimalized)
So a \$1,000 ground rent that pays \$50 a year (a 5 percent coupon rate) would be worth \$1,000 if interest rates were 5 percent, less if rates are higher, more if lower:
P V = 50 / .05 = \$ 1,000
P V = 50 / .10 = \$ 500
P V = 50 / .01 = \$ 5,000
Calculating the yield to maturity of a perpetuity, if given the PV and FV, is easily done by taking the equation and solving for i:
P V = F V / i
Multiply each side by i : P V i = F V
Divided by P V : i = F V / P V
So the yield to maturity of a ground rent that pays \$60 per year and that currently sells for \$600 would be 10 percent: i = 60/600 = .10 = 10%.
Stop and Think Box
A ground rent contract consummated in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in 1756 is still being paid today. Someone recently paid \$455 for the \$23.17 annual payment. What is the ground rent’s yield to maturity? If the interest rate rises to 10 percent, how much will the ground rent be worth? What if interest falls to 2 percent?
i = C/P so i = 23.17/455 = 0.05092 = 5.09%; PV = 23.17/.1 = \$231.70; PV = 23.17/.02 = \$1,158.50.
Calculating yield to maturity for coupon bonds and fixed-payment loans, however, is mathematically nasty business without a computer or bond table. In the past, people used to estimate the yield to maturity on such instruments by pretending they were perpetuities or engaging in trial-and-error interpolation. In the first method, you use the easy perpetuity equation above (i = FV/PV) to get a quick estimate called the current yield. Unfortunately, current yield can be wide of the mark, especially for bonds with maturities less than twenty years and bonds whose prices are far from their par value.[1] In the second method, one backs into the yield to maturity by making successive guesses about i and plugging them into the PV formula. Not fun, but you’ll eventually get there. Most people today therefore use a financial calculator, spreadsheet, or Web-based utility rather than such erroneous (current yield) or laborious (interpolation) processes. You should be able to calculate the yield to maturity of one-year discount bonds or perpetuities by hand, or at worst with the aid of simple (nonfinancial) calculator. Here is a little practice.
EXERCISES
1. A \$100 bond payable in a year sells for \$97.56. What is the yield to maturity?
2. Sam promises to pay Joe \$1,904 in a year if Joe gives him \$1,498 today. What interest rate is Sam paying and what interest rate Joe is earning?
3. Every year, the U.S. government pays a certain Indian tribe \$10,000 and, by terms of its treaty with that tribe, must do so forever. Mr. Trump offered to purchase the right to receive that stream for a one-time payment of \$143,500. What yield to maturity did Trump offer the Indians?
4. What is the yield to maturity of a British Consol paying £400 per year that sold for £27,653?
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• Yield to maturity is the most economically accurate way of measuring nominal interest rates.
• It is easily calculated for one-year discount bonds i = (FV–PV)/PV and perpetuities i = C/PV where C is the coupon or annual payment.
[1] Current yield is simply the yield to maturity of a perpetuity, so the more like a perpetuity a bond is, the better the current yield will approximate its yield to maturity. The shorter the maturity of a bond, the less like a Consol it is, so the less accurate the current yield formula will be. Similarly, the current yield works better the closer a bond’s price is to par because yield to maturity equals the coupon rate when the bond is at par. As the price deviates further from par, the less well the current yield can approximate the yield to maturity. | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/04%3A_Interest_Rates/4.05%3A_Whats_the_Yield_on_That.txt |
Learning Objectives
• What is the rate of return and how does it differ from yield to maturity?
The information provided in this chapter is not all you need to know about bonds if you were to become a bond trader because the bond market, which in the United States is over 200 years old, has some odd conventions that do not make much economic sense. Most students will not become professional bond traders, so in the interest of sanity, yours and ours, we will not delve into the intricacies here. (If you do become a bond trader, you will quickly and easily pick up on the conventions anyway.) Our goal here is to understand the basics of PV, FV, yield to maturity (YTM), and, finally, return. Students sometimes conflate the last two concepts. The yield to maturity is merely a measure of the interest rate. Return is more a measure of how lucrative an investment is because it accounts for changes in the price of the bond (or other asset, financial or otherwise) over some period. More formally,
$R = ( C + P_{t1} - P_{t0} ) / P_{t0}\nonumber$
where:
R = return from holding the asset for some time period, t0 to t1
Pt0 = the price at time t0 (this can also be thought of as the purchase price)
Pt1 = the price at time t1 (this can also be thought of as the sale or going market price)
C = coupon (or other) payment
So imagine you purchased a 5 percent coupon bond with a $100 face value that matures in three years when the interest rate is 5 percent. As we learned above, the market price of such a bond would equal its face value, or$100. We also learned that bond prices and interest rates are inversely related. As the market interest rate increases, the PV of the bond’s future payments decreases and the bond becomes less valuable. As the rate decreases, the PV of future payments increases and the bond becomes more valuable. If the interest rate increased (decreased) to 6 (4) percent, the value of the bond would decrease (increase), so the returns you earned on the bond would not equal the yield to maturity. For example, suppose you purchased the bond for $100 but its price a year hence stood at$103 because interest rates decreased a little. Your return would be R = (5 + 3)/100 = .08, or 8%. But if in the next year, interest rates soared, driving the market price of the bond down to $65, your return (from purchase) would be R = (10 − 35)/100 = −.25 or negative 25%. Yes, negative. It is quite possible to lose wealth by investing in bonds or other fixed-rate financial instruments, even if there is no default (i.e., even if payments are punctually made as promised). Similarly, if you purchased$1 million worth of municipal bonds that paid coupons of $50,000 annually, your return would not be a simple 5 percent because the market price of the bonds may have gone up or down in the first year. If the bonds lost$100,000 in market value, your return would be a negative 5 percent: R = (50,000 – 100,000)/1,000,000 = −.05. If they gained $100,000, by contrast, your return would be 15 percent: R = (50,000 + 100,000)/1,000,000 = .15. If the bonds gained$100,000 over two years, the total return would be 20 percent because two coupon payments would have been made too: R = (100,000 + 100,000)/1,000,000 = .20.
Stop and Think Box
As part of its effort to repay the large debts it accrued during the Revolutionary War, the U.S. federal government in the early 1790s issued three types of bonds: a coupon bond that paid 6 percent per year, a coupon bond that paid 3 percent per year, and a zero coupon bond that became a 6 percent coupon bond in 1801. For most of the 1790s and early 1800s, the price of the 6 percent bonds hovered around par. Given that information, what was the yield to maturity on government debt in that period? What, in general terms, were the prices of the 3 percent and zero coupon bonds?
The yield to maturity was about 6 percent because the 6 percent coupon bonds traded at around par. The price of the 3 percent coupon bonds must have been well below par because who would pay $100 to get$3 a year when she could pay $100 and get$6 a year? Finally, the zeroes must have appreciated toward the price of the 6 percent coupon bonds as the conversion date neared.
Note that a capital loss or gain is not, repeat not, predicated on actually selling the bond or other asset. One way to think about this is that the rate of return formula merely calculates the return if the bond were to be sold. Another way to think about it is to realize that whether the bond is sold or not, its owner is still poorer (richer) by the amount of the loss (gain) because the value of his assets, and hence his net worth, has shrunk (increased) by that amount. The risk of such loss or gain is known as interest rate risk to distinguish it from other types of risks, like default risk (the risk of nonpayment). Interest rate risk is higher the longer the maturity of a bond because more FVs are affected by increasing the interest rate, and the most distant ones are the most highly affected. Check this out: The PV of $1,000 in 10 years at 5% compounded annually is 1,000/(1.05)10 =$613.91. At 10% it is 1,000/(1.10)10 = $385.54, a loss of 37.2%. The PV of$1,000 in 30 years at 5% and 10% is 1,000/(1.05)30 = $231.38 and 1,000/(1.10)30 =$57.31, respectively, a loss of 75.23 percent. Duration is a technical measure of interest rate risk that we will not investigate here, where the main point is merely that rising interest rates hurt bond prices (and hence bondholders); falling interest rates help bond prices.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• The rate of return accounts for changes in the market price of a bond or other asset while the yield to maturity does not.
• Yield to maturity (YTM) is almost always positive but returns are often negative due to interest rate risk, the risk that interest rates will rise, depressing bond prices.
• When the market interest rate increases, bond prices decrease because the opportunity cost of lending money has increased, making bonds less attractive investments unless their price falls.
• Algebraically, PV = FV/(1 + i)n. The interest rate is in the denominator, so as i gets bigger, PV must get smaller.
• Bonds with longer periods to maturity have more volatile prices, ceteris paribus, because the PV of their distant FV shrinks more, to very small sums. | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/04%3A_Interest_Rates/4.06%3A_Calculating_Returns.txt |
Learning Objectives
• What is the difference between real and nominal interest rates and why is the distinction important?
You might well ask at this point, What factors change interest rates? One big factor is inflation. As the price level rises, so too do interest rates, or at least what economists call nominal interest rates, the type of rates we’ve discussed so far. If nominal rates do not increase (and they often don’t, or can’t), lenders might receive more nominal dollars than they lent but actually get back less purchasing power. Imagine, for example, that you lent $100 for one year at 6 percent interest when a loaf of bread, pack of chewing gum, and two-liter bottle of Mountain Dew each cost$1. At the end of the simple loan, you would get back $100 × 1.06 =$106 and be able to enjoy an extra $6 of goods, say, two loaves of bread, two packs of gum, and two bottles of the caffeine and sugar rush known as Doin’ the Dew. But what if prices doubled over that year? Instead of some combination of 106 goodies, you’d be able to buy only fifty-three. Your nominal return would be positive, but your real return, what you could actually buy with the$106, would be steeply negative.
A simple equation, the Fisher Equation, named after Irving Fisher, the early twentieth-century U.S. economist who articulated it,[1] helps us to understand the relationship between inflation and interest rates more precisely:
$i = i_r + π \ \textrm{or, rearranging the terms,} \ i_r = i - π \ \textrm{or, again rearranging the terms,} \ π = i - i_r\nonumber$
where
ir = the real interest rate
i = the nominal interest rate (the type of interest rate the first part of this chapter discussed exclusively)
$\pi$ = inflation (or expected inflation)
In plain English, after the fact (ex post in economists’ lingo), the nominal interest rate is equal to the real interest rate plus actual inflation. Before the fact (ex ante in economists’ lingo), the nominal interest rate is equal to the real interest rate plus the expectation of inflation.
Stop and Think Box
In early 2007, a man had a wallet returned that he had lost over sixty years earlier in France, during World War II.[2] In addition to his original Social Security card and a picture of his parents, the man received an unspecified sum of cash. Was losing the wallet a good investment? Why or why not?
No, because the risk that it would never be returned was very high. Plus, the dollar lost a significant amount of its purchasing power over the period due to inflation and the money earned no interest. At just 3 percent compounded annually, $100 would have grown to 100 × (1.03)60 =$589.16 after 60 years. At 6 percent, $100 would have grown to 100 × (1.06)60 =$3,298.77.
Traditionally, inflation expectations were unobservable so real rates were known only ex post. However, relatively new and special types of bonds indexed to inflation, called Treasury Inflation Protection Securities (TIPS), provide real interest rate information, allowing market participants to observe ex ante inflation expectations. For example, if the yield to maturity on a regular, nonindexed ten-year Treasury bond is 5 percent, and the yield on the ten-year TIPS is 2 percent, the inflation expectation, via the Fisher Equation π = i − ir, is 5 −2 = 3 percent. Figure 4.5 shows how inflation expectations have waxed and waned since the introduction of TIPS in 1997.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• The difference between the real and the nominal interest rate is literally inflation or inflation expectations.
• According to the Fisher Equation, nominal interest equals real interest plus inflation (or inflation expectations), or real interest equals nominal interest minus inflation (expectations).
• If actual inflation exceeds inflation expectations, real ex post (inflation-adjusted, after the fact) returns on bonds can be negative.
[1] To be frank, Benjamin Franklin and other colonists in eighteenth-century America understood it well.
[2] ABC News video, “Wallet Returned, 60 Years Later, A World War II Veteran gets his wallet returned to him sixty years later” (1/9/2007).
4.08: Suggested Reading
Fisher, Irving. The Purchasing Power of Money: Its Determination and Relation to Credit Interest and Crises. New York: Cosimo Classics, 2006.
Strumeyer, Gary. Investing in Fixed Income Securities: Understanding the Bond Market. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2005.
Wild, Russell. Bond Investing for Dummies. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2007. | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/04%3A_Interest_Rates/4.07%3A_Inflation_and_Interest_Rates.txt |
Learning Objectives
By the end of this chapter, students should be able to
• Describe, at the first level of analysis, the factors that cause changes in the interest rate.
• List and explain four major factors that determine the quantity demanded of an asset.
• List and explain three major factors that cause shifts in the bond supply curve.
• Explain why the Fisher Equation holds; that is, explain why the expectation of higher inflation leads to a higher nominal interest rate.
• Predict, in a general way, what will happen to the interest rate during an economic expansion or contraction and explain why.
• Discuss how changes in the money supply may affect interest rates.
Thumbnail: Image by Mediamodifier from Pixabay
05: The Economics of Interest-Rate Fluctuations
Learning Objectives
• As a first approximation, what causes the interest rate to change?
If you followed the gist of Chapter 4, you learned (we hope!) about the time value of money, including how to calculate future value (FV), present value (PV), yield to maturity, current yield (the yield to maturity of a perpetuity), rate of return, and real interest rates. You also learned that a change in the interest rate has a profound effect on the value of assets, especially bonds and other types of loans, but also equities and derivatives. (In this chapter, we’ll use the generic term bonds throughout.) That might not be a very important insight if interest rates were stable for long periods. The fact is, however, interest rates change monthly, weekly, daily, and even, in some markets, by the nanosecond. Consider Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2. The first figure shows yields on one-month U.S. Treasury bills from 2001 to 2008, the second shows a zoomed-in view on just March 2008. Clearly, there are long-term secular trends as well as short-term ups and downs.
You should now be primed to ask, Why does the interest rate fluctuate? In other words, what causes interest rate movements like those shown above? In this aptly named chapter, we will examine the economic factors that determine the nominal interest rate. We will ignore, until the next chapter, the fact that interest rates differ on different types of securities. In this chapter we will concern ourselves only with the general level of interest rates, which economists call “the” interest rate. As Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 show, interest rates tend to track each other, so by focusing on what makes one interest rate move, we have a leg up on making sense of movements in the literally thousands of interest rates out there in the real world.
The ability to forecast changes in the interest rate is a rare but profitable gift. Professional interest rate forecasters are seldom right on the mark and often are far astray, and half the time they don’t even get the direction (up or down) right.[1] That’s what we’d expect if their forecasts were determined by flipping a coin! Therefore, we don’t expect you to be able to predict changes in the interest rate, but we do expect you to be able to post-dict them. In other words, you should be able to narrate, in words and appropriate graphs, why past changes occurred. You should also be able to make predictions by invoking the ceteris paribus assumption.
The previous graphs reveal that interest rates generally trended downward from 1920 to 1945, then generally rose until the early 1980s, when they began trending downward again through 2011. During the 1920s, general business conditions were favorable. In other words, taxes and regulations were relatively low, while confidence in public policies was high. President Calvin Coolidge summed this up when he said, “The business of America is business.” Therefore, the demand for bonds increased (the demand curve shifted right), pushing prices higher and yields lower. The 1930s witnessed the Great Depression, an economic recession of unprecedented magnitude that dried up profit opportunities for businesses and hence shifted the supply curve of bonds hard left, further increasing bond prices and depressing yields. (If the federal government had not run budget deficits some years during the depression, the interest rate would have dropped even further.) During World War II, the government used monetary policy to keep interest rates low. After the war, that policy came home to roost as inflation began to become, for the first time in American history, a perennial fact of life. Contemporaries called it “creeping inflation.” A higher price level, of course, put upward pressure on the interest rate (think Fisher Equation). The unprecedented increase in prices during the 1970s (what some have called the “Great Inflation”) drove nominal interest rates higher still. Only in the early 1980s, after the Federal Reserve mended its ways (a topic to which we will return) and brought inflation under control, did the interest rate begin to fall. Positive geopolitical events in the late 1980s and early 1990s, namely, the end of the Cold War and the birth of what we today call “globalization,” also helped to reduce interest rates by rendering the general business climate more favorable (thus pushing the demand curve for bonds to the right, bond prices upward, and yields downward). Pretty darn neat, eh?
The keys to understanding why “the” interest rate changes over time are simple price theory (supply and demand) and the theory of asset demand. Like other types of goods, bonds and other financial instruments trade in markets. The demand curve for bonds, as for most goods, slopes downward; the supply curve slopes upward in the usual fashion. There is little mystery here. The supply curve slopes upward because, as the price of bonds increases (which is to say, as their yield to maturity decreases), holding the bonds’ face values and coupons and the rest of the world constant, borrowers (sellers of securities) will supply a higher quantity, just as producers facing higher prices for their wares will supply more cheese or automobiles. As the price of bonds falls, or as the yield to maturity that sellers and borrowers offer increases, sellers and borrowers will supply fewer bonds. (Why sell ’em if they aren’t going to fetch much?) When they can obtain funds cheaply, companies will be eager to borrow to expand because it is more likely that it will be profitable to do so. When funds are dear, companies will not see many positive present net value projects to pursue.
The demand curve for bonds slopes downward for similar reasons. When bond prices are high (yields to maturity are low), few will be demanded because investors (buyers) will find other, more lucrative uses of their money. As bond prices fall (bond yields increase), investors will want more of the increasingly good deals (better returns) that they offer.
The market price of a bond and the quantity that will be traded is determined, of course, by the intersection of the supply and demand curves, as in Figure 5.5. The equilibrium price prevails in the market because, if the market price were temporarily greater than p*, the market would be glutted with bonds. In other words, the quantity of bonds supplied would exceed the quantity demanded, so sellers of bonds would lower their asking price until equilibrium was restored. If the market price temporarily dipped below p*, excess demand would prevail (the quantity demanded would exceed the quantity supplied), and investors would bid up the price of the bonds to the equilibrium point.
As with other goods, the supply and demand curves for bonds can shift right or left, with results familiar to principles (“Econ 101”) students. If the supply of bonds increases (the supply curve shifts right), the market price will decrease (the interest rate will increase) and the quantity of bonds traded will increase. If the supply of bonds decreases (the supply curve shifts left), bond prices increase (the interest rate falls) and the equilibrium quantity decreases. If the demand for bonds falls (the demand curve shifts left), prices and quantities decrease (and the interest rate increases). If demand increases (the demand curve shifts right), prices and quantities rise (and the interest rate falls).
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• The interest rate changes due to changes in supply and demand for bonds.
• Or, to be more precise, any changes in the slopes or locations of the supply and/or demand curves for bonds (and other financial instruments) lead to changes in the equilibrium point (p* and q*) where the supply and demand curves intersect, which is to say, where the quantity demanded equals the quantity supplied. | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/05%3A_The_Economics_of_Interest-Rate_Fluctuations/5.01%3A_Interest_Rate_Fluctuations.txt |
Learning Objectives
• What causes the supply and demand for bonds to shift?
Shifting supply and demand curves around can be fun, but figuring out why the curves shift is the interesting part. (Determining the shape and slope of the curves is interesting too, but these details will not detain us here.) Movements along the curve, or why the supply curve slopes upward and the demand curve downward, were easy enough to grasp. Determining why the whole curve moves, why investors are willing to buy more (or fewer) bonds, or why borrowers are willing to sell more (or fewer) bonds at a given price is a bit more involved. Let’s tackle demand first, then we will move on to supply.
Wealth determines the overall demand for assets. An asset (something owned) is any store of value, including financial assets like money, loans (for the lender), bonds, equities (stocks), and a potpourri of derivatives[1] and nonfinancial assets like real estate (land, buildings), precious metals (gold, silver, platinum), gems (diamonds, rubies, emeralds), hydrocarbons (oil, natural gas) and (to a greater or lesser extent, depending on their qualities) all other physical goods (as opposed to bads, like pollution, or freebies, like air). As wealth increases, so too does the quantity demanded of all types of assets, though to different degrees. The reasoning here is almost circular: if it is to be maintained, wealth must be invested in some asset, in some store of value. In which type of asset to invest new wealth is the difficult decision. When determining which assets to hold, most economic entities (people, firms, governments) care about many factors, but for most investors most of the time, three variables—expected relative return, risk, and liquidity—are paramount.
Expected relative return is the ex ante (before the fact) belief that the return on one asset will be higher than the returns of other comparable (in terms of risk and liquidity) assets. Return is a good thing, of course, so as expected relative return increases, the demand for an asset also increases (the entire demand curve shifts right). That can happen because the expected return on the asset itself increases, because the expected return on comparables decreases, or because of a combination thereof. Clearly, two major factors will affect return expectations and hence the demand for certain financial assets, like bonds: expected interest rates and, via the Fisher Equation, expected inflation. If the interest rate is expected to increase for any reason (including, but not limited to, expected increases in inflation), bond prices are expected to fall, so the demand will decrease (the entire demand curve will shift left). Conversely, if the interest rate is thought to decrease for any reason (including, but not limited to, the expected taming of inflation), bond prices are expected to rise, so the entire demand curve will shift right.
Overall, though, calculating relative expected returns is sticky business that is best addressed in more specialized financial books and courses. If you want an introduction, investigate the capital asset pricing model (CAPM)[2] and the arbitrage pricing theory (APT).[3] Calculating return is not terribly difficult and neither is comparing returns among a variety of assets. What’s tricky is forecasting future returns and making sure that assets are comparable by controlling for risk, among other things. Risk is the uncertainty of an asset’s returns. It comes in a variety of flavors, all of them unsavory, so as it increases, the demand decreases (the entire curve shifts left), ceteris paribus. Two major types of risk are default risk (aka credit risk), the chance that a financial contract will not be honored, and interest rate risk, the chance that the interest rate will rise and hence decrease a bond or loan’s price. An offsetting risk is called reinvestment risk, which bites when the interest rate decreases because coupon or other interest payments have to be reinvested at a lower yield to maturity. To be willing to take on more risk, whatever its flavor, rational investors must expect a higher relative return. Investors who require a much higher return for assuming a little bit of risk are called risk-averse. Those who will take on much risk for a little higher return are called risk-loving, risk-seekers, or risk-tolerant. (Investors who take on more risk without compensation are neither risk-averse nor risk-tolerant, but rather irrational.) Risks can be idiosyncratic (pertinent to a particular company), sectoral (pertinent to an entire industry, like trucking or restaurants), or systemic (economy-wide). Liquidity risk occurs when an asset cannot be sold as quickly or cheaply as expected, be it for idiosyncratic, sectoral, or systemic reasons. This, too, is a serious risk because liquidity, or (to be more precise) liquidity relative to other assets, is the third major determinant of asset demand. Because investors often need to change their investment portfolio or dis-save (spend some of their wealth on consumption), liquidity, the ability to sell an asset quickly and cheaply, is a good thing. The more liquid an asset is, therefore, the further right the demand curve for it will shift, all else being equal.
During the financial crisis that began in 2007, the prices of a certain type of bond collateralized by subprime mortgages, long-term loans collateralized with homes and made to relatively risky borrowers, collapsed. In other words, their yields had to increase markedly to induce investors to own them. They dropped in price after investors realized that the bonds, a type of asset-backed security (ABS), had much higher default rates and much lower levels of liquidity than they had previously believed. Figure 5.6 summarizes the chapter discussion so far.
So much for demand. Why does the supply curve for bonds shift to and fro? There are many reasons, but the three main ones are government budgets, inflation expectations, and general business conditions. When governments run budget deficits, they often borrow by selling bonds, pushing the supply curve rightward and bond prices down (yields up), ceteris paribus. When governments run surpluses, and they occasionally do, believe it or not, they redeem and/or buy their bonds back on net, pushing the supply curve to the left and bond prices up (yields down), all else being equal. (For historical time series data on the U.S. national debt, which was usually composed mostly of bonds, browse http://www.economagic.com/em-cgi/data.exe/treas/pubdebt.)
Stop and Think Box
You are a copyeditor for Barron’s. What, if anything, appears wrong in the following sentence? How do you know?
“Recent increases in the profitability of investments, inflation expectations, and government surpluses will surely lead to increased bond supplies in the near future.”
Government deficits, not surpluses, lead to increased bond supplies.
The expectation of higher inflation, other factors held constant, will cause borrowers to issue more bonds, driving the supply curve rightward, and bond prices down (and yields up). The Fisher Equation, ir = i – πe, explains this nicely. If the inflation expectation term πe increases while nominal interest rate i stays the same, the real interest rate ir must decrease. From the perspective of borrowers, the real cost of borrowing falls, which means that borrowing becomes more attractive. So they sell bonds.
Borrowing also becomes more attractive when general business conditions become more favorable, as when taxes and regulatory costs decrease or the economy expands. Although individuals sometimes try to borrow out of financial weakness or desperation, relatively few such loans are made because they are high risk. Most economic entities borrow out of strength, to finance expansion and engage in new projects they believe will be profitable. So when economic prospects are good, taxes are low, and regulations are not too costly, businesses are eager to borrow, often by selling bonds, shifting the supply curve to the right and bond prices down (yields up). Figure 5.7 summarizes the chapter discussion so far.
As Yoda might say, “Pause here, we must” to make sure we’re on track.[4] Try out these questions until you are comfortable. Remember that the ceteris paribus condition holds in each.
EXERCISES
1. What will happen to bond prices if stock trading commissions decrease? Why?
2. What will happen to bond prices if bond trading commissions increase? Why?
3. What will happen to bond prices if the government implements tax increases? Why?
4. If government revenues drop significantly (and remember all else stays the same, including government expenditures), what will likely happen to bond prices? Why?
5. If the government guaranteed the payment of bonds, what would happen to their prices? Why?
6. What will happen to bond prices if the government implements regulatory reforms that reduce regulatory costs for businesses? Why?
7. If government revenues increase significantly, what will likely happen to bond prices? Why?
8. What will happen to bond prices if terrorism ended and the world’s nations unilaterally disarmed and adopted free trade policies? Why?
9. What will happen to bond prices if world peace brought substantially lower government budget deficits?
If you’ve already figured out that expected inflation will decrease bond prices, and increase bond yields, by both shifting the supply curve to the right and the demand curve to the left, as in Figure 5.8 , kudos to you!
If you noticed that the response of bond prices and yields to a business cycle expansion is indeterminate, booya! As noted above, a boom shifts the bond supply curve to the right by inducing businesses to borrow and thus take advantage of the bonanza. Holding demand constant, that action reduces bond prices (raises the interest rate). But demand does not stay constant because economic expansion increases wealth, which increases demand for bonds (shifts the curve to the right), which in turn increases bond prices (reduces the interest rate). The net effect on the interest rate, therefore, depends on how much each curve shifts, as in Figure 5.9.
In reality, the first scenario is the one that usually wins out: during expansions, the interest rate usually rises, and during recessions, it always falls. For example, the interest rate fell to very low levels during the Great Depression (an almost worldwide downturn in economic output in the early 1930s) and during Japan’s extended economic funk (period of low to no increase in per capita incomes) in the 1990s.[5]
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• The demand curve for bonds shifts due to changes in wealth, expected relative returns, risk, and liquidity.
• Wealth, returns, and liquidity are positively related to demand; risk is inversely related to demand.
• Wealth sets the general level of demand. Investors then trade off risk for returns and liquidity.
• The supply curve for bonds shifts due to changes in government budgets, inflation expectations, and general business conditions.
• Deficits cause governments to issue bonds and hence shift the bond supply curve right; surpluses have the opposite effect.
• Expected inflation leads businesses to issue bonds because inflation reduces real borrowing costs, ceteris paribus; decreases in expected inflation or deflation expectations have the opposite effect.
• Expectations of future general business conditions, including tax reductions, regulatory cost reduction, and increased economic growth (economic expansion or boom), induce businesses to borrow (issue bonds), while higher taxes, more costly regulations, and recessions shift the bond supply curve left.
• Theoretically, whether a business expansion leads to higher interest rates or not depends on the degree of the shift in the bond supply and demand curves.
• An expansion will cause the bond supply curve to shift right, which alone will decrease bond prices (increase the interest rate).
• But expansions also cause the demand for bonds to increase (the bond demand curve to shift right), which has the effect of increasing bond prices (and hence lowering bond yields).
• Empirically, the bond supply curve typically shifts much further than the bond demand curve, so the interest rate usually rises during expansions and always falls during recessions.
[1] www.margrabe.com/Dictionary/DictionaryAC.html#sectA
[4] www.yodaspeak.co.uk/index.php | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/05%3A_The_Economics_of_Interest-Rate_Fluctuations/5.02%3A_Shifts_in_Supply_and_Demand_for_Bonds.txt |
Learning Objectives
• How does the interest rate react to changes in the money supply?
We’re almost there! At first blush, increasing the money supply would seem to decrease interest rates through what is called a liquidity effect: more money in circulation means more money to lend and hence, like more apples or carrots in a market, lower prices. Reality, however, is not so simple when it comes to the money supply. Government entities regulate the money supply and have a habit of expanding it because doing so prudently increases economic growth, employment, incomes, and other good stuff. Unfortunately, expanding the money supply also causes prices to rise almost every year, with no reversion to earlier levels. When the money supply increases, incomes rise, prices increase, and people expect inflation to occur. Each of those three effects, called the income, price level, and expected inflation effects, respectively, causes the interest rate to rise. Higher incomes mean more demand for bonds and higher prices, and expected inflation means bondholders need to receive a higher interest rate to offset losses in money’s purchasing power (the Fisher Effect). When the money supply increases, the liquidity effect, which lowers the interest rate, battles those three countervailing effects. Sometimes, the liquidity effect wins. When the money supply increases (or increases faster than usual), the liquidity effect overpowers the countervailing effects, and the interest rate declines and stays below the previous level. Sometimes, often in modern industrial economies with independent central banks, the liquidity effect prevails at first and the interest rate declines, but then incomes rise, inflation expectations increase, and the price level actually rises, eventually causing the interest rate to increase above the original level. Finally, sometimes, as in modern undeveloped countries with weak central banking institutions, the expectation of inflation is so strong and so quick that it overwhelms the liquidity effect, driving up the interest rate immediately. Later, after incomes and the price level increase, the interest rate soars yet higher. Figure 5.10 summarizes this discussion graphically.
Stop and Think Box
Famed monetary economist and Nobel laureate Milton Friedman was a staunch supporter of free markets and a critic of changes in the price level, particularly the rampant inflation of the 1970s. He argued that government monetary authorities ought to increase the money supply at some known, constant rate. If Friedman was so worried about price level changes, why didn’t he advocate permanently fixing the money supply (MS)?[1]
By fixing the MS, the interest rate would have risen higher and higher as the demand for money increased due to higher incomes and even simple population growth. Only deflation (decreases in the price level) could have countered that tendency, but deflation, Friedman knew, was as pernicious as inflation. A constant rate of MS growth, he believed, would keep the price level relatively stable and interest rate fluctuations less frequent or severe.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• Intuitively, an increase in the money supply decreases the interest rate and a decrease in the money supply increases it.
• Under a floating or fiat money system like we have today, an increase in the money supply might induce interest rates to rise immediately if inflation expectations were strong or to rise with a lag as actual inflation took place.
5.04: Suggested Reading
Constable, Simon, and Robert E. Wright. The Wall Street Journal Guide to the 50 Economic Indicators That Really Matter: From Big Macs to “Zombie Banks,” the Indicators Smart Investors Watch to Beat the Market. New York: HarperCollins Business, 2011.
Evans, Michael. Practical Business Forecasting. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2002.
Friedman, Milton. The Optimum Quantity of Money. Piscataway, NJ: Aldine Transaction, 2005. | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/05%3A_The_Economics_of_Interest-Rate_Fluctuations/5.03%3A_Predictions_and_Effects.txt |
Learning Objectives
By the end of this chapter, students should be able to:
• Define the risk structure of interest rates and explain its importance.
• Explain flight to quality.
• Define the term structure of interest rates and explain its importance.
• Describe a yield curve and explain its economic meaning.
Thumbnail: Image by Mediamodifier from Pixabay
06: The Economics of Interest-Rate Spreads and Yield Curves
Learning Objectives
• What is the risk structure of interest rates and flight to quality, and what do they explain?
In this chapter, we’re going to figure out, as best we can, why yields on different types of bonds differ. The analysis will help us to understand a couple of stylized facts derived from the history of interest rates and Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2:
1. Why the yields on Baa corporate bonds are always higher than the yields on Aaa corporate bonds, which in turn are higher than those on Treasury bonds (issued by the federal government), which for a long time have been higher still than those on munis (bonds issued by municipalities, like state and local governments)
2. Why the yields on corporate Baa bonds bucked the trend of lower rates in the early 1930s and why, at one time, municipal bonds yielded more than Treasuries
3. Why bonds issued by the same economic entity (the U.S. government) with different maturities generally, but not always, have different yields and why the rank ordering changes over time
Figure 6.1, which holds maturity constant, is the easiest to understand because we’ve already discussed the major concepts. We’ll tackle it, and what economists call the risk structure of interest rates, first. Investors care mostly about three things: risk, return, and liquidity. Because the bonds in Figure 6.1 are all long-term bonds, their expected relative returns might appear at first glance to be identical. Investors know, however, that bonds issued by different economic entities have very different probabilities of defaulting. Specifically, they know the following:
1. The U.S. government has never defaulted on its bonds and is extremely unlikely to do so because even if its much-vaunted political stability were to be shattered and its efficient tax administration (that wonderful institution, the Internal Revenue Service [IRS]) were to stumble, it could always meet its nominal obligations by creating money. (That might create inflation, as it has at times in the past. Nevertheless, except for a special type of bond called TIPS, the government and other bond issuers promise to pay a nominal value, not a real [inflation-adjusted] sum, so the government does not technically default when it pays its obligations by printing money.)
2. Municipalities have defaulted on their bonds in the past and could do so again in the future because, although they have the power to tax, they do not have the power to create money at will. (Although in the past, most recently during the Great Depression, some issued money-like—let’s call them extralegal—bills of credit, or chits.) Nevertheless, the risk of default on municipal bonds (aka munis) is often quite low, especially for revenue bonds, upon which specific taxes and fees are pledged for interest payments.
3. Interest earned on munis is exempt from most forms of income taxation, while interest earned on Treasuries and corporate bonds is fully taxable.
4. Corporations are more likely to default on their bonds than governments are because they must rely on business conditions and management acumen. They have no power to tax and only a limited ability to create the less-liquid forms of money, a power that decreases in proportion to their need! (I’m thinking of gift cards, declining balance debit cards, trade credit, and so forth.) Some corporations are more likely to default on their bonds than others. Several credit-rating agencies, including Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s, assess the probability of default and assign grades to each bond. There is quite a bit of grade inflation built in (the highest grade being not A or even A+ but Aaa), the agencies are rife with conflicts of interest, and the market usually senses problems before the agencies do. Nevertheless, bond ratings are a standard proxy for default risk because, as Figure 6.3 shows, lower-rated bonds are indeed more likely to default than higher-rated ones. Like Treasuries, corporate bonds are fully taxable.
5. The most liquid bond markets are usually those for Treasuries. The liquidity of corporate and municipal bonds is usually a function of the size of the issuer and the amount of bonds outstanding. So the bonds of the state of New Jersey might be more liquid than those of a small corporation, but less liquid than the bonds of, say, General Electric.
Equipped with this knowledge, we can easily understand the reasons for the rank ordering in Figure 6.1.[1] Corporate Baa bonds have the highest yields because they have the highest default risk (of those graphed), and the markets for their bonds are generally not very liquid. Corporate Aaa bonds are next because they are relatively safer (less default risk) than Baa bonds and they may be relatively liquid, too. U.S. Treasuries are extremely safe and the markets for them are extremely liquid, so their yields are lower than those of corporate bonds. In other words, investors do not need as high a yield to own Treasuries as they need to own corporates. Another way to put this is that investors place a positive risk premium (to be more precise, a credit or default risk, liquidity, and tax premium) on corporate bonds.
Stop and Think Box
Corporate bond ratings go all the way down to C (Moody’s) or D (Standard and Poor’s). (These used to be called high-yield or junk bonds but are now generally referred to as B.I.G. or below investment grade bonds.) If plotted on Figure 6.1, where would the yields of such bonds land? How do you know?
They would have higher yields and hence would be above the Baa line because they would have a higher default risk, the same tax treatment, and perhaps less liquidity.
The low yield on munis is best explained by their tax exemptions. Before income taxes became important, the yield on munis was higher than that of Treasuries, as we would expect given that Treasuries are more liquid and less likely to default. During World War II, investors, especially wealthy individuals, eager for tax-exempt income and convinced that the fiscal problems faced by many municipalities during the depression were over, purchased large quantities of municipal bonds, driving their prices up (and their yields down). Almost all the time since, tax considerations, which are considerable given our highest income brackets exceed 30 percent, have overcome the relatively high default risk and illiquidity of municipal bonds, rendering them more valuable than Treasuries, ceteris paribus.
Risk, after-tax returns, and liquidity also help to explain changes in spreads, the difference between yields of bonds of different types (the distance between the lines in Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.4). The big spike in Baa bond yields in the early 1930s, the darkest days of the Great Depression, was due to one simple cause: companies with Baa bond ratings were going belly-up left and right, leaving bondholders hanging. As Figure 6.4 shows, companies that issued Aaa bonds, municipalities, and possibly even the federal government were also more likely to default in that desperate period, but they were not nearly as likely to as weaker companies. Yields on their bonds therefore increased, but only a little, so the spread between Baa corporates and other bonds increased considerably in those troubled years. In better times, the spreads narrowed, only to widen again during the so-called Roosevelt Recession of 1937–1938.
During crises, spreads can quickly soar because investors sell riskier assets, like Baa bonds, driving their prices down, and simultaneously buy safe ones, like Treasuries, driving their prices up. This so-called flight to quality is represented in Figure 6.5.
Stop and Think Box
In the confusion following the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, DC, in September 2001, some claimed that people who had prior knowledge of the attacks made huge profits in the financial markets. How would that have been possible?
The most obvious way, given the analyses provided in this chapter, would have been to sell riskier corporate bonds and buy U.S. Treasuries on the eve of the attack in expectation of a flight to quality, the mass exchange of risky assets (and subsequent price decline) for safe ones (and subsequent price increase).
Time for a check of your knowledge.
EXERCISES
1. What would happen to the spreads between different types of bonds if the federal government made Treasuries tax-exempt and at the same time raised income taxes considerably?
2. If the Supreme Court unexpectedly declared a major source of municipal government tax revenue illegal, what would happen to municipal bond yields?
3. If several important bond brokers reduced the brokerage fee they charge for trading Baa corporate bonds (while keeping their fees for other bonds the same), what would happen to bond spreads?
4. What happened to bond spreads when Enron, a major corporation, collapsed in December 2001?
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• The risk structure of interest rates explains why bonds of the same maturity but issued by different economic entities have different yields (interest rates).
• The three major risks are default, liquidity, and after-tax return.
• By concentrating on the three major risks, you can ascertain why some bonds are more (less) valuable than others, holding their term (repayment date) constant.
• You can also post-dict, if not outright predict, the changes in rank order as well as the spread (or difference in yield) between different types of bonds.
• A flight to quality occurs during a crisis when investors sell risky assets (like below-investment-grade bonds) and buy safe ones (like Treasury bonds or gold).
[1] Figure 6.3, by the way, should not be taken as evidence that credit rating agencies provide investors with useful information. Before 1970 or so, they sold ratings to investors and generally did a good job of ranking risks in a competitive market for ratings. Thereafter, however, they formed a government-sanctioned oligopoly and began to charge issuers for ratings. The resulting conflict of interest degraded the quality of ratings to the point that the big three rating agencies failed to predict the crises of 1997–98 in Southeast Asia and 2008 in the United States and Europe. Today, few investors still take their ratings seriously, as evidenced by the fact that Treasury bond prices actually increased after U.S. government bonds were downgraded by credit rating agency Standard and Poor’s in August 2011. | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/06%3A_The_Economics_of_Interest-Rate_Spreads_and_Yield_Curves/6.01%3A_Interest-Rate_Determinants_I-_The_Risk_Structure.txt |
Learning Objectives
• What is the term structure of interest rates and the yield curve, and what do they explain?
Now we are going to hold the risk structure of interest rates—default risk, liquidity, and taxes—constant and concentrate on what economists call the term structure of interest rates, the variability of returns due to differing maturities. As Figure 6.2 reveals, even bonds from the same issuer, in this case, the U.S. government, can have yields that vary according to the length of time they have to run before their principals are repaid. Note that the general postwar trend is the same as that in Figure 6.1, a trend upward followed by an equally dramatic slide. Unlike Figure 6.1, however, the ranking of the series here is much less stable. Sometimes short-term Treasuries have lower yields than long-term ones, sometimes they have about the same yield, and sometimes they have higher yields.
To study this phenomenon more closely, economists and market watchers use a tool called a yield curve, which is basically a snapshot of yields of bonds of different maturities at a given moment. Figure 6.6 is what the Treasury yield curve looks like as reported by Reuters. The current yield curve can also be viewed many places online, including Bloomberg, the Wall Street Journal, and the U.S. Treasury itself.[1] What observers have discovered is that the yields of bonds of different maturities (but identical risk structures) tend to move in tandem. They also note that yield curves usually slope upward. In other words, short-term rates are usually lower than long-term rates. Sometimes, however, the yield “curve” is actually flat—yields for bonds of different maturities are identical, or nearly so. Sometimes, particularly when short-term rates are higher than normal, the curve inverts or slopes downward, indicating that the yield on short-term bonds is higher than that on long-term bonds. And sometimes the curve goes up and down, resembling a sideways S (sometimes tilted on its face and sometimes its back) or Z. What explains this? (Remember, it can’t be tax, default, or liquidity risk because those variables are all the same for Treasuries.)
Theory and empirical evidence both point to the same conclusion: bonds of different maturities are partial substitutes for each other, not perfect substitutes, but not completely segmented either. Generally, investors prefer short-term bonds to long-term ones, but they reverse their preference if the interest rate goes unusually high. Investors are willing to pay more for short-term bonds, other factors (like “the” interest rate and the risk structure) held constant, because longer-term bonds are more subject to interest rate risk. Or, to put it another way, investors need a premium (in the form of a lower price or higher yield) to hold long-term bonds. (This notion has been called liquidity preference because it stresses that investors prefer shorter-term or more liquid bonds.) Ergo, the yield curve usually slopes upward, as it does in Figure 6.6.
But what about those times when the curve is flat or inverted? Investors give up their preference for short-term bonds when they expect a high interest rate for a short period. (This idea has been called preferred habitat because it suggests that short and long term bonds are, to some extent, substitutes, and whichever is preferred can change under the right circumstances or in the right habitat.) Investors can think of a long-term bond yield as the average of the yields on shorter-term obligations, so when the interest rate is high by historical norms but expected after a year or so to revert to some long-term mean, they will actually begin to prefer long-term bonds and will buy them at much higher prices (lower yields) than short-term bonds, which is in anticipation of relatively large price increases in long-term bonds when interest rates decrease. More formally, investors believe that
$i_n = [ ( i^e_0 + i^e_1 + i^e_2 + i^e_3 + …. i^e_{( n - 1 )} ) / n ] + ρ_n\nonumber$
where
in = interest rate today on a bond that matures in n years
iex = expected interest rate at time × (0, 1, 2, 3,…through n)
ρ = the liquidity or term premium for an n-period bond (it is always positive and increases with n)
So the yield today of a bond with 5 years to maturity, if the liquidity premium is .5 percent and the expected interest rate each year is 4, is 4.5:
i5 = (4 + 4 + 4 + 4 + 4)/5 + .5 = 20/5 + .5 = 4.5, implying an upward sloping yield curve because 4 < 4.5.
If the interest rate is expected to rise over the next 5 years, the yield curve slopes upward yet more steeply:
i5 = (4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8)/5 + .5 = 30/5 + .5 = 6.5, again implying an upward sloping curve because 4 < 6.5.
If, on the other hand, interest rates are expected to fall over the next 5 years, the yield curve will slope downward, as in this example:
i5 = (12 + 10 + 8 + 5 + 5)/5 + .5 = 40/5 + .5 = 8.5, implying an inverted yield curve because 12 > 8.5.
Investors may also realize that long-term bonds will increase in price when interest rates fall (as they are expected to do in this example and as we learned in Chapter 3), so they are willing to pay more for them now.
Stop and Think Box
In the nineteenth century, the yield curve was usually flat under normal conditions. (It inverted during financial panics.) In other words, short-term and long-term bonds issued by the same economic entity did not often differ much in price. Why might that have been?
One possibility is that there was no liquidity premium then. Then, as now, short-term bonds suffered less interest rate risk than long-term bonds, but investors often complained of extremely high levels of reinvestment risk, of their inability to easily and cheaply reinvest the principal of bonds and mortgages when they were repaid. Often, lenders urged good borrowers not to repay (but to continue to service their obligations, of course). Another not mutually exclusive possibility is that the long-term price level stability engendered by the specie standard made the interest rate less volatile. The expectation was that the interest rate would not long stray from its long-term tendency.
The neat thing about this theory is that it reveals the yield curve as the market’s prediction of future short-term interest rates, making it, by extension, an economic forecasting tool. Where the curve slopes sharply upward, the market expects future short-term interest rates to rise. Where it slopes slightly upward, the market expects future short-term rates to remain the same. Where the curve is flat, rates, it is thought, will fall moderately in the future. Inversion of the curve means short-term interest rates should fall sharply, as in the numerical example above. The simplest way to remember this is to realize that the prediction equals the yield curve minus ρn, the term premium.
Empirical research suggests that the yield curve is a good predictor of future interest rates in the very short term, the next few months, and the long term, but not in between. Part of the difficulty is that ρn is not well understood nor is it easily observable. It may change over time and/or not increase much from one maturity to the next on the short end of the curve. Nevertheless, economic forecasters use the yield curve to make predictions about inflation and the business cycle. A flat or inverted curve, for instance, portends lower short-term interest rates in the future, which is consistent with a recession but also with lower inflation rates, as we learned in Chapter 5. A curve sloped steeply upward, by contrast, portends higher future interest rates, which might be brought about by an increase in inflation rates or an economic boom.
Time once again to ensure that we’re on the same page, er, Web site.
EXERCISES
1. What does the following yield curve tell us?
Treasury yield curve for January 20, 2006.
Maturity Yield (%)
1 month 3.95
3 months 4.35
6 months 4.48
1 year 4.44
2 years 4.37
3 years 4.32
5 years 4.31
7 years 4.32
10 years 4.37
20 years 4.59
2. What does the following yield curve predict?
Treasury yield curve for July 31, 2000.
Maturity Yield (%)
1 month
1 year
7 years
30 years 5.78
10 years 6.03
5 years 6.15
3 months 6.20
2 years 6.30
3 years 6.30
6 months 6.35
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• The term structure of interest rates explains why bonds issued by the same economic entity but of different maturities sometimes have different yields.
• Plotting yield against maturity produces an important analytical tool called the yield curve.
• The yield curve is a snapshot of the term structure of interest rates created by plotting yield against maturity for a single class of bonds, like Treasuries or munis, which reveals the market’s prediction of future short-term interest rates, and thus, by extension, can be used to make inferences about inflation and business cycle expectations.
6.03: Suggested Reading
Choudry, Moorad. Analysing and Interpreting the Yield Curve. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2004.
Fabozzi, Frank. Interest Rate, Term Structure, and Valuation Modeling. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2002.
Fabozzi, Frank, Steven Mann, and Moorad Choudry. Measuring and Controlling Interest Rate and Credit Risk. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2003.
Homer, Sidney, and Richard E. Sylla. A History of Interest Rates, 4th ed. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2005. | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/06%3A_The_Economics_of_Interest-Rate_Spreads_and_Yield_Curves/6.02%3A_The_Determinants_of_Interest_Rates_II-_The_Term_Structure.txt |
Learning Objectives
By the end of this chapter, students should be able to:
• Explain when expectations are rational and when they are irrational.
• Explain how corporate equities (stocks, shares of a corporation) are valued.
• Explain what is meant by the term market efficiency.
• Describe the ways in which financial markets are efficient.
• Describe the ways in which financial markets are inefficient.
Thumbnail: Image by Markus Spiske from Unsplash
07: Rational Expectations Efficient Markets and the Valuation of Corporate Equities
Learning Objectives
• When are expectations rational and when are they irrational?
Market volatility, the constantly changing prices of financial instruments,[1] tricks some people into thinking that financial markets, especially stock markets, are flim-flams or gigantic roulette wheels. Stock prices, they suspect, are at best random and at worst rigged. In fact, financial markets are typically more efficient, and hence fairer, than other markets. The direction of price movements (up or down) is indeed random, but price levels are usually based on the rational expectations of a large number of market participants. While financial scams certainly exist, the stock and bond markets are not rigged. Except perhaps for some penny stocks, securities prices are usually based on economic fundamentals and are not systematically manipulated by insiders or conspirators. Investing in corporate equities certainly entails risk, but it is not akin to playing the lottery. Luck can play a role in investing, as in anything in life, but unlike a Powerball drawing, Lady Luck is not the whole of the game by a long shot. Far from being gamblers, investors are switches in the most advanced computing devices in the history of the world, financial markets. Prices in those markets help to determine what gets made and what doesn’t, how much gets produced and how, and where and how those goods are sold.
Financial markets, in the world’s most economically advanced countries anyway, have been rational and efficient decision-making machines for several centuries. In 1688, a broker in Amsterdam, Netherlands, named Joseph de la Vega, left posterity with vivid descriptions of the Dutch securities market.[2] The market, he claimed, was just a game of misinformation and spin management that pitted bulls (those who profited from an increase in prices) against bears (those who profited from a decrease in prices):
“The bulls are like the giraffe which is scared by nothing. . . . They love everything, they praise everything, they exaggerate everything. . . . The bulls make the public believe that their tricks signify wealth and that crops grow on graves. When attacked by serpents, they . . . regard them as both a delicate and a delicious meal. . . . They are not impressed by a fire nor perturbed by a debacle. . . . The bears, on the contrary, are completely ruled by fear, trepidation, and nervousness. Rabbits become elephants, brawls in a tavern become rebellions, faint shadows appear to them as signs of chaos. . . . What is there miraculous about the likelihood that every dwarf will become a giant in the eyes of the bears?”[3]
Joseph de la Vega went on to detail a dozen different ways in which cabals of bears and herds of bulls tried to influence securities prices. The net effect of such machinations, though, was unclear. Sometimes the bulls won, sometimes the bears won, but their activities often canceled each other out. “Numerous brokers are inexhaustible in inventing involved maneuvers,” de la Vega explained, “but for just this reason do not achieve their purposes.” Systematic manipulation of the market was impossible because the bulls and bears competed against each other, each tugging at the price, but ultimately in vain. Also, as rational investors learned the tricks of trading, they came to expect hyperbole, false rumors, sham sales, and the like. So, in the final analysis, market fundamentals, not the whims of nefarious individuals, determined prices. Exactly the same could be said of most of today’s securities markets. Generally speaking, stock and other securities prices fluctuate due to genuine changes in supply or demand, not because of the machinations of bulls and bears.
Joseph de la Vega’s 300+-year-old description of what was then the world’s most advanced securities market also made clear that expectations, rather than actualities, moved prices. “The expectation of an event,” he noted, “creates a much deeper impression upon the exchange than the event itself.” As noted in the preceding chapters, expectations are still paramount today. People invest based on what they believe the future will bring, not on what the present brings or the past has wrought, though they often look to the present and past (sometimes even the distant past) for clues about the future.
Rational expectations theory posits that investor expectations will be the best guess of the future using all available information. Expectations do not have to be correct to be rational; they just have to make logical sense given what is known at any particular moment. An expectation would be irrational if it did not logically follow from what is known or if it ignored available information. For the former reason, investors expend considerable sums on schooling, books, lectures, seminars, and the like, to learn the best ways to reason correctly given certain types of information. (This textbook and course are a good start, but competition for the best model is keen. Investment models and strategies constantly morph, adapting to changes in the real world.) For the latter reason, investors update their expectations, or forecasts, with great frequency, as new information becomes available, which occurs basically 24/7/365.
If everyone’s expectations are rational, then why don’t investors agree on how much assets are worth? One investor may think gold a steal at $900/ounce, while another wouldn’t touch the stuff for a penny over$750. One investor might think $943.40 just right for a zero coupon bond, but another might think it a good deal only at$942.51. One may think that XYZ stock is overpriced at $22.57 a share, while another would buy a small quantity of it at that price, and yet another would buy all she could at that price. Such differences in valuation are important because they allow trades to occur by inducing some investors to sell and others to buy. As it turns out, investors sometimes have different sets of information available to them. Some investors may have inside information, news that is unknown outside a small circle. Others may lack certain types of information because they think it is too costly to obtain. Other times, investors think of the information they know in common differently because their utility functions (their goals and aspirations, if you will) differ. So they have different time horizons, different holding periods, and different sensitivities to risk. At yet other times, investors use different valuation models, different theories of how to predict fundamentals most accurately and how those fundamentals determine securities prices. For example, some investors foresee long causal chains more clearly than other investors do. Recall from Chapter 5 that the demand for asset X is partly a function of its expected return relative to all assets not-X. So investors must consider information directly related to asset X and all other assets. A new piece of information half a world away that alters expectations about a nation’s ability to repay its debts, a sector’s future prospects, or a single company’s profits regularly ripples through the entire financial world. Ripple indeed evokes the right metaphor. Like throwing a pebble into a pond, the disruption is greatest at the epicenter, the spot where the rock hits the water, but it dissipates over time and space. The bigger the pebble (the bigger the news), the bigger the splash and the larger and longer lasting the disruption. Most days, the world’s financial pond is pelted with millions of little pebbles, little pieces of news that cause prices to jiggle up and down. Every now and again, a big stone, even a boulder, hits the pond, causing significant price changes throughout the pond for quite a long time. (Economists call such boulders shocks, and they include financial crises like that of 2007–2008. Financial crises almost always follow asset bubbles, which we will discuss in more detail below.) Some investors understand the effect of some ripples more quickly and clearly than others. This shouldn’t be taken to mean that some investors are smarter than others, only that they understand the types of ripples particular pebbles will make better than others do. The roles could reverse with the next pebble, with the next bit of news. Moreover, investors constantly strive to improve their understanding of the ways that certain types of news affect securities prices. They emulate successful people and develop new models and theories of their own, not for the joy of learning but for the clink of cold hard cash. For example, investors who understood that oil prices hitting$50 per barrel would increase the share price of home insulation manufacturers merely stayed up with the crowd. It’s pretty obvious that higher home heating costs would induce people to buy insulation. The investors who quickly figured out that the share price of a Canadian shingle manufacturer would jump too were the ones that earned above-market returns. (High oil prices made it profitable to extract oil from Canada’s oil sand fields, but not enough people lived in the area around Fort McMurray, Alberta, to meet labor demands. People flocking to the region to work needed new homes, the roofs of which needed shingles, lots of them.[4])
For all those reasons, investors often have a wide variety of opinions about the value of different assets. More mechanically, investors might have different opinions about bond valuations because they must have different views about the applicable discount or interest rate. To review,
$P V = F V / ( 1 + i )^n\nonumber$
If this is a one-year zero coupon bond, FV = $1,000, and i = 6%, then the bond price = ($1,000/1.06) = $943.40. But if one believes i = 6.01, then the bond price = ($1,000/1.0601) = \$942.51. To understand how investors can value the same stock differently, we must investigate how they value corporate equities.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• Expectations are rational when they logically follow from all available relevant information.
• Expectations are irrational if some available pertinent information is ignored or if conclusions do not flow logically from available information.
[3] Joseph de la Vega, Confusion de Confusiones. | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/07%3A_Rational_Expectations_Efficient_Markets_and_the_Valuation_of_Corporate_Equities/7.01%3A_The_Theory_of_Rational_Expectations.txt |
Learning Objectives
• How are corporate equities valued?
A corporate equity, or stock, is sometimes called a share because it is just that, a share in the ownership of a joint-stock corporation. Ownership entitles investors to a say in how the corporation is run. Today that usually means one vote per share in corporate elections for the board of directors, a group of people who direct, oversee, and monitor the corporation’s professional managers. Ownership also means that investors are residual claimants, entitling them to a proportionate share of the corporation’s net earnings (profits), its cash flows, and its assets once all other claims against it have been settled.
In exchange for their investment, stockholders may receive a flow of cash payments, usually made quarterly, called dividends. Dividends differ from bond coupons in important ways. Unlike coupons, they are not fixed. They may go up or down over time. Also, if a company fails to pay dividends on its stock, it is not considered in default. (We speak here of common stock. Another type of financial instrument, a preferred share [preference shares in the United Kingdom], promises to pay a fixed dividend. Such instruments are a type of equity-debt hybrid and are priced more like coupon bonds.) In fact, many corporations today do not pay any dividends, and for good reasons. Small, rapidly growing companies, it is widely believed, should plow their profits back into their businesses rather than return money to shareholders. That is not cheating the stockholders, because profits left with the company instead of paid out as dividends raise the share price. The company has more cash than it otherwise would, after all, and stockholders own the profits whether they are left with the company or put into their pockets. Plus, it is generally thought that growing companies put the money to more profitable use than stockholders could.
There is a tax benefit to retaining earnings, too. Taxes on dividends, which the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) considers income, are usually higher than taxes on share appreciation, which the IRS considers capital gains.[1] Also, dividends are taxed in the year they are paid, which may be inconvenient for stockholders, but capital gains taxes are incurred only when the stockholders sell their shares, so they have more control over their tax liabilities. Similarly, companies that have stopped growing will sometimes buy their own stock in the market rather than pay dividends. Fewer shares outstanding means that each share is worth more (the price per share equals the total value of the company divided by the number of shares, so as the denominator declines, the price per share increases), so stockholders are “paid” with a higher stock price. Nevertheless, some corporations continue to pay dividends. The point here is that what really matters when valuing corporate equities is earnings or profits because, as noted above, they belong to the stockholders whether they are divided, kept as cash, or used to repurchase shares.
The simplest stock valuation method, the one-period valuation model, simply calculates the discounted present value of dividends and selling price over a one-year holding period:
$P = \dfrac{E}{ 1 + k} + \dfrac{P_1}{ 1 + k}\nonumber$
where:
• P = price now
• E = yearly dividends
• k = required rate of return
• P₁ = expected price at year’s end
So if a company is expected to pay no dividends, its share price is expected to be $75 at the end of the year, and the required rate of return (or k) (a sort of risk-adjusted interest rate) on investments in its risk class is 10 percent, an investor would buy the stock if its market price was at or below P = 0/1.10 + 75/1.10 =$68.18. Another investor might also require a 10 percent return but think the stock will be worth $104 at the end of the year. He’d pay P = 0/1.10 + 104/1.1 =$94.55 for the stock today! A third investor might agree with the first that the stock will be worth $75 in a year, but she might need a 12 percent return. She’d pay only up to P = 0/1.12 + 75/1.12 =$66.96 per share. Yet another investor might also require a 12 percent return to hold the stock and think $75 a reasonable price a year from now, but he might also think earnings of$1 per share is in the offing. He’d pay P = 1/1.12 + 75/1.12 = .89 + 66.96 = $67.85 per share. For longer holding periods, one can use the generalized dividend valuation model, which discounts expected future earnings to their present value. That can be done mechanically, as we did for coupon bonds in Chapter 4, or with a little fancier math: $P = t = 1 ∞ \dfrac{E t}{1 + k t}$ That sideways 8 means infinity. So this equation basically says that the price of a share now is the sum (σ) of the discounted present values of the expected earnings between now and infinity. The neat thing about this equation is that the expected future sales price of the stock drops out of the equation because the present value of any sum at any decent required rate of return quickly becomes negligible. (For example, the present value of an asset expected to be worth$10 in 20 years at 15 percent interest is only PV = 10/(1.15)20 = $0.61 today.) So for all intents and purposes in this model, called the Gordon Growth model, a corporate equity is worth the discounted present value of its expected future earnings stream. $P = \dfrac{E ( 1 + g )}{k - g}$ where • P= price today • E = most recent earnings • k = required return • g = constant growth rate So the price of a stock today that recently earned$1 per share and has expected earnings growth of 5 percent would be $21.00 if the required return was 10 percent (P = 1.05/.05). If another investor estimates either k or g differently, perhaps because he knows more (or less) about a country, industry, or company’s future prospects, P will of course change, perhaps radically. For a little practice, complete the following exercises now. EXERCISES 1. Use the one-period valuation model P = E/(1 + k) + P1/(1 + k) to price the following stocks (remember to decimalize percentages). Dividends (E =$) Required return (k = %) Expected price next year (P1 = $) Answer: price today (P =$)
1.00 10 20 19.10
1.00 15 20 18.26
1.00 20 20 17.50
0 5 20 19.05
0 5 30 28.57
0 5 40 38.10
1.00 10 50 46.36
1.50 10 50 46.82
2.00 10 50 47.27
0 10 1 0.91
2. Use the Gordon growth model P = E × (1 + g)/(kg) to value the following stocks (remember to decimalize percentages).
Earnings (E = $) Required return (k = %) Expected earnings growth rate (g = %) Answer: price today (P =$)
1 10 5 20.00
1 15 5 10.00
1 20 5 6.67
1 10 5 20.00
2 10 5 40.00
3 10 5 60.00
1 30 5 4.00
1 30 10 10.00
1 30 15 20.00
100 20 10 1,000.00
Stop and Think Box
Stock prices plummeted after the terrorist attacks on 9/11. Use the Gordon growth model to explain why.
Stock prices plummeted after 9/11 because risks increased, raising k, and because expectations of corporate profits dropped, decreasing g. So the numerator of the Gordon growth model decreased and the denominator increased, both of which caused P to decrease.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• In general, corporate equities are valued the same way that any financial security is, by discounting expected future cash flows.
• With stocks, corporate earnings replace actual cash payments because shareholders own profits, whether they receive them as cash dividends or not.
• The formula for valuing a stock to be held one year, called the one-period valuation model, is P = E/(1 + k) + P1/(1 + k), where E is dividends, P1 is the expected sales price of the stock next year, and k is the return required to hold the stock given its risk and liquidity characteristics.
• In the Gordon growth model, earnings are assumed to grow at a constant rate forever, so stock values can be estimated without guessing the future sales price by using the following formula: P = E(1 + g)/(kg), where E = the most recent earnings, g = the rate of earnings growth, k = the required return where k > g.
[1] www.irs.gov/ | textbooks/biz/Finance/Book%3A_Finance_Banking_and_Money/07%3A_Rational_Expectations_Efficient_Markets_and_the_Valuation_of_Corporate_Equities/7.02%3A_Valuing_Corporate_Equities.txt |
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