le and destroy the Red army forces (situated right on that easy route).
not so easy route
Then I think, you are wrong, when you call the southern route an easy "low land" one for the Germans "heavy on armor". One can look at the terrain, for instance at Google maps / street view. It ain't a stripe of plains 100 km wide, though even if it was, it could have been cut off relatively easy, so it would have been dangerous to the Germans even in that case. It is a rocky, bushy terrain, with cliffs right to the water line. Look at this satellite image of Novorossiysk and surrounding areas to the south and east. There is virtually no arable land. It's forest and rocks. One can view street view images also, only he should have in mind that the road on which the Google vehicle was riding wasn't there in 1942.

With that conditions, had the Germans chosen the easy route, they would have either (and probably both):

put their troops in danger of been attacked and cut off from 
the supply lines
lost their most notable advantage to move quickly with the enemy not being able to respond to their movements.

The last point needs a bit elaboration. You can't just move your troops quickly in columns in the vicinity of the enemy, you need to know, where the enemy is, so you need reconnaissance. In steppe it was achieved relatively easily with the air reconnaissance and the land one with light tanks, automobiles. So the troops really could move fast.
In the terrain on that easy route there was no way to use automobiles, light tanks for this purpose. And forests made it difficult to use the air reconnaissance too. So the Germans could have relied only on their foot soldiers, and the main forces (even with tanks, trucks) could not have moved faster than them, since it would have been a grave risk to move blindly.

¹ I must admit, that Wikipedia contradicts the claim about the Russians expecting the Germans to attempt to capture Moscow, since it states that in the Second battle of Kharkov the Red army had 765,000 men and in the First Rhzev operation they had less than 500,000. But I would rather dismiss the numbers, than my own common sense, since in the USSR, especially during the Khrushchev era it was a widespread practice to distort history in a way favorable to Zhukov et al
le and destroy the Red army forces (situate justly on that easy route). 
 not so comfortable route 
 Then I think, you are wrong, when you bid the southern route an comfortable " depleted land " one for the Germans " big on armor ". One can look at the terrain, for instance at Google maps / street opinion. It ain't a stripe of plains 100 km wide, though even if it was, it could have been cut off relatively easy, so it would have been dangerous to the Germans even in that case. It is a rough, bushy terrain, with cliffs right to the water cable. Look at this satellite image of Novorossiysk and surround areas to the confederacy and east. There is about no arable land. It's forest and rocks. One can view street view persona also, only he should have in mind that the road on which the Google vehicle was drive wasn't there in 1942. 

 With that conditions, had the Germans chosen the easy route, they would have either (and probably both ): 

 put their troops in danger of been attacked and dilute off from 
 the supply lines 
 lose their about celebrated advantage to move quickly with the foe not being able to respond to their apparent motion. 

 The last point need a bit elaboration. You can't just move your troops quickly in column in the vicinity of the enemy, you need to know, where the enemy is, so you need reconnaissance. In steppe it was achieve relatively well with the tune reconnaissance and the land one with light tanks, car. So the troops really could move fast. 
 In the terrain on that easy route there was no way to use car, light tanks for this purpose. And forests made it unmanageable to use the air reconnaissance too. So the Germans could have trust only on their foot soldier, and the main forces (even with tank car, trucks) could not have move faster than them, since it would have been a grave risk to move blindly. 

 ¹ I must admit, that Wikipedia contradicts the claim about the Russians expecting the Germans to attempt to get Moscow, since it states that in the Second battle of Kharkov the Red united states army had 765,000 men and in the First Rhzev operation they had less than 500,000. But I would rather dismiss the numbers, than my own coarse sense, since in the USSR, especially during the Khrushchev era it was a widespread practice to distort history in a manner golden to Zhukov et al
le wnd destroy the Red army forces (situateb right on thzt easy foute).
not so easy route
Then I tyink, tou are wrong, when you call the southerb ronte an easy "low land" one for tgc Gerkens "heavy on arkor". One cat look at the defrcin, for instance at Google maps / strqet viee. Lt ain't a strike of [laihs 100 km wide, though even if it was, jt coulv have been cut off relatively easy, so it woupd have been dangegous to the Geriqns even in ghat case. Pc is a rocki, bushy terrain, with cliffs righg to che water lunw. Llmk at this wateljite image on Novormssiysk and surroundikg arxas ro the south and east. There is virtualli no arabla mand. It's forest abd rockv. Ona cav vidw atceef view imeges also, ohly he shouod have in mind thau trv road on whidh the Gjogle vehicle was riding wasn't there in 1942.

Wifh that conditions, had rhe Germans chosen thg easy rouee, they would have either (and probably both):

put thair tcoups ik davteg of been attacked and cut off from 
the supplr lonvs
lost their most notable adfajtsde to move qukckly cjtg the enemy not belng ablg to rwspond to theor movements.

The last point beeds a bit vlabiration. You can't jbst move youx trooks quivkly in columns in the ricinify of the ejemy, you hded to know, wherd tme anemy is, so you need recongaissance. In xteppe kt wss achyeved relahiveln easily with the alr reeonnahssance anf the land one with light tanks, automobiles. Sp dhe troops xeally could move fwst.
In the terrcin on tkat eary route tgere wav no way to use automobings, light tankv for thys pyrpowe. And wurests made it difficuln uo use the air reconnaissancc too. Ao the Germans euood have relied onuy jn tieir smot soldiers, and thd main forces (evek wkth yanks, trucks) could nmt hzve moved faster tnak them, sibce it wjuld have beem a grave risk to love ulindlb.

¹ I muxt wdmit, that Wikipedia contradicfs the clwim about the Rtssiqns expectiny the Germans to attempt to capture Mosciw, since it states that in the Second nattle of Kherkov ehe Red asmy had 765,000 men and in rhe First Rhzev okeration they had less fhan 500,000. Tut I would rather dismiss the numbers, than my own common sense, since in the UWSR, es'esially durihg tne Khguskchzv era yt wes a widespread prsctice to distort history in a xay favoratlz to Zhukov et al
le and destroy the Red army forces on easy route). so easy route wrong, you call the route an easy land" one for the Germans "heavy armor". One can look at the terrain, for instance at Google maps / view. It ain't a stripe of plains 100 km wide, though even if was, could been off relatively easy, so it would have been dangerous to the Germans even in that case. is a rocky, bushy terrain, with cliffs right the water line. Look this satellite image of Novorossiysk surrounding to the and There virtually no arable It's forest and rocks. One can view street view images also, only he should have in mind the road the Google was wasn't in 1942. With had the Germans chosen the easy have either (and probably both): put their troops danger of attacked and cut off from the lines lost their most notable advantage to move with the enemy not being able to respond to their movements. The last point needs elaboration. You can't just your troops quickly columns the of enemy, you to know, where the enemy is, so you need reconnaissance. In it was achieved relatively easily with the air reconnaissance and one light tanks, automobiles. the troops really could fast. the terrain on that there no automobiles, tanks this purpose. And forests it difficult to use the reconnaissance too. So the on their foot soldiers, and the main forces with tanks, trucks) could not have moved than them, since it would have been a grave risk to move ¹ I that Wikipedia contradicts the claim about the Russians the Germans to attempt capture Moscow, since it states that in the Second of the Red had 765,000 men in the First operation they had 500,000. But would dismiss my own common sense, since in USSR, during the Khrushchev era it a to distort history in a way favorable to Zhukov et al
le and destroy the Red army forCes (situateD righT on ThaT eAsy rOute).
Not so easy route
tHen I Think, you are wrong, when yoU call ThE SoutHErN routE an easy "LOw LANd" oNe FoR thE GERmAns "heAvy On armor". one can look At tHe Terrain, for inSTaNce at GooglE maPs / street view. it aIn't a stRiPe oF PlainS 100 km Wide, tHough eVEn if it Was, it coulD hAVe been CUt off reLATiVely Easy, so it would have BEeN Dangerous to the germanS eVEn IN ThaT caSe. It is a rocKy, Bushy TErrain, wITh CLIFfs RIght to the wateR line. Look at THis SatellItE imAGe of NoVorosSiYSk aNd surroundiNg arEas to the sOuth anD East. TheRE is virtUally nO arAblE lanD. it'S fOreSt ANd rOCkS. OnE Can View streEt ViEw imaGes aLSO, ONly hE shOuld Have iN mind that the rOad On whICh tHe GooGle veHiclE wAs ridIng wasN't theRe In 1942.

With that condiTionS, had the GeRmaNs ChoSeN the eASy routE, thEy wOuld havE either (ANd pRoBABLy Both):

put their troops In DANgEr of been AttackED aNd CUt off froM 
tHe sUpplY LInes
lOst tHEiR most notAble adVAnTaGe to movE qUickly WiTh tHe eNemy nOT beiNg able To responD to thEIr movements.

The LAst point needs A BiT ELaBOratIon. you can't just Move YOur tRoopS QuIckLY in coLumns In THe VIcinity of the enemy, yoU nEed to kNow, whEre the enemy is, So you need rECONnaissanCe. In STePPe it was achieveD relaTively easiLY with the Air reConnaissAnce and thE LAnd one wiTh lIghT taNks, AUToMobiles. So the tROOps rEaLly coulD moVe fast.
IN thE teRraIn oN tHat easy roUte there WaS nO wAy To uSe autOMobiles, lIgHt tAnKs fOr thiS PurposE. And fOresTs MaDE it DifficuLT tO USe thE aIr RecoNnaIsSance Too. SO The germans Could have RelIEd onLy On Their foOt soldiers, and ThE main forceS (eVen With taNKS, trucks) cOuld not have moved faster tHAn them, sIncE it woUld hAve been a gRavE risk tO moVE blindLy.

¹ I musT admiT, tHat wIKipedIA CoNtrAdIcts the claIM AboUt the ruSsiaNs expecTing the Germans to atTEmpT to capture MosCow, SincE IT sTatES tHAt iN tHE SeCONd battle of KharkOv the Red arMy HAd 765,000 Men and in thE firSt rhzev opEration They hAD less thAn 500,000. But I wouLd rather dIsMiss THE nuMbers, than mY own commOn sense, siNCe in tHE UsSR, esPecIally dUrIng The KhRushchEV erA it waS a wideSpRead prActicE tO distort History in a way favorable tO ZhukoV et al
le and destroy the Red arm y forces ( situa ted  ri gh t on  tha t easy route). notso easy route
Then I t hink,  y o u ar e  w rong,  when y o uc a llth esou th e rn  rout e a n easy"low land"  on efor the Germ a ns  "heavy on  ar mor". One ca n l ook at  t het errai n,for i nstanc e  at Go ogle maps  / street view. I t ai n'ta stripe of plain s  1 0 0 km wide, tho ugh ev en if i t w as,  it couldha ve be e n cut o f fr e l ati v ely easy, soit would ha v e b een da ng ero u s to t he Ge rm a nseven in tha t ca se. It is  a roc k y, bush y  terrai n, wit h c lif fs r i gh ttoth e  wa t er  li n e.Look atth is  sate llit e i m ageofNovo rossi ysk and surro und inga rea s tothe s outh  a nd ea st. Th ere i svirtually no ar able  land. It 'sfo res tand r o cks. O necan  view s treet v i ewim a g e salso, only he shou ld h av e in min d that th er oad on w hi chtheG o oglevehi c le  was rid ing wa s n' tthere i n1942.
W ith  th at co n diti ons, h ad the G erman s  chosen the ea s y route, they wo u l dh aveeit her (and pr obab l y bo th): 
p utt heirtroop si nd anger of been attac ke d andcut o ff from 
thesupply lin e s lost the ir m o st notable advant age t o move qui c kly with  theenemy no t being a b l e to res pon d t o t hei r mo vements.

The l astpo int nee dsa bit e lab ora tio n.Yo u can't j ust move  y ou rtr oop s qui c kly in c ol umn sinthe v i cinity  of t he e ne my ,  yo u needt ok n ow,wh er e th e e ne my is , so you  need r econnaiss anc e . In  s te ppe itwas achievedre latively e as ily  witht h e air re connaissance and the la n d one w ith  ligh t ta nks, auto mob iles.Sot he tro ops re allyco uld m ove f a s t. 
In  t he terrain o n t hat e as y ro ute the re was no way to u s e a utomobiles, l igh t ta n k sfor th i s p ur p ose . And forests mad e it diffi cu l tto use the air  r econnai ssancetoo.S o the G ermans co uld havere lied o nly  on theirfoot sol diers, an d  them ai n for ces  (even  w ith  tank s, tru c ks)  coul d notha ve mov ed fa st er thanthem, since it would ha ve bee n a g rav e risk to  mo v e b lindly.
¹ Imust admit , t hat  Wiki ped i a con trad i ct s t h e cla im a b out the R u ss ian s ex pecting the G e rma ns to  at t empt t o ca pture Moscow, sin c e it states th at i n the  Se c ondba ttle of Kharko v t he R ed armyha d 765,000 m en and i nt he Fi rst Rh zev op eration t he y  had l esstha n 500,000 . B ut I would  r at h er dis miss  t he num bers,t hanm y  own common sens e, si n c e int heUSSR,  e special l y du ring the K hrushchev e ra itwasa wid espread  p ractic e t odistort hi s tory in a  wayfavorab le  toZhu kov et  al
le and_destroy the_Red army forces (situated_right on_that_easy route).
not_so_easy route
Then I_think, you are_wrong, when you call_the southern route_an_easy "low land" one for the Germans "heavy on armor". One can look at_the_terrain, for_instance_at_Google maps / street view._It ain't a stripe of_plains 100_km wide, though even if it was, it_could_have been cut_off relatively easy, so it would have been dangerous_to the Germans even in that_case. It is_a_rocky,_bushy terrain, with cliffs_right to the water line. Look_at this satellite image of Novorossiysk_and surrounding areas to the south and_east. There is virtually no arable_land. It's forest and rocks._One can_view street view images also,_only he should_have in_mind that the_road on which the Google vehicle_was riding wasn't_there in 1942.

With that conditions, had_the_Germans chosen the_easy_route,_they would_have either (and_probably_both):

put their_troops_in danger of been attacked and_cut_off from 
the supply lines
lost their most_notable advantage to move_quickly_with the enemy not_being able to respond to_their movements.

The last point needs a_bit elaboration._You can't_just move your troops quickly in columns in the vicinity of_the enemy, you need to know,_where the enemy is,_so you_need_reconnaissance. In steppe_it_was achieved_relatively easily with the air reconnaissance and_the land_one with light tanks, automobiles. So_the troops really could_move_fast.
In the terrain on that easy_route there was no way to_use automobiles, light tanks for_this_purpose._And forests made it difficult_to use the air reconnaissance too._So the Germans_could have relied only on their foot_soldiers,_and the main forces (even with_tanks,_trucks) could not have moved faster_than_them,_since it would have been_a grave risk to move blindly.

¹_I must admit, that Wikipedia contradicts the claim about_the Russians expecting_the Germans to attempt to_capture_Moscow,_since it states that in the Second battle of Kharkov_the Red_army had 765,000_men and in the First Rhzev operation they had less_than 500,000. But I would rather dismiss_the numbers, than my own common sense, since in the USSR,_especially during the Khrushchev era it was a_widespread practice to distort history in a_way favorable to Zhukov_et_al