By Choi Sung-jin





At last, a landmark meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has become a certainty ― unless, of course, Trump changes his mind once again.



With the successful mission in Washington last week by Kim's right-hand man Kim Yong-chol with nuclear bargaining, the U.S. and North Korea seem to have agreed on a framework that will become official in Singapore, June 12. What's left is an 11th-hour tug-of-war over details, ranging from specific action plans and their timetable to minuscule but symbolically meaningful protocols, including even who enters the room first and how they sit.



It's a relief in this regard that President Trump has realized he cannot denuclearize North Korea in one fell swoop but take a phased, gradual approach.



That is because the nuclear negotiation between Washington and Pyongyang will be about how to maintain equilibrium in the course of exchanging atomic weapons and security guarantee simultaneously.



Contrary to the allegations of hawks in Washington and Seoul, it was the failure of this word-for-word, action-for-action implementation ― not the North's cheating ― that destroyed the 1994 Agreed Framework. Both sides are to blame for the breakup, meaning the U.S. has to take at least half of the responsibility.



For similar reasons, not many watchers of the U.S.-North Korea relationship here are holding their breath this time around, either. Most are skeptical of the early resolution of the crisis less because Trump and Kim are whimsical, unpredictable leaders than because there are too many disrupters of detente between the longtime adversaries.



There may be hundreds of reasons for doubting the genuine intention of the North and its leader. Suffice it to say, however, Kim's notable shift to a low profile faced with Trump's threat to cancel their meeting reflects the young leader's dire wish for the summit to happen.



Provided Trump is earnest in his efforts to bring about peace on the Korean Peninsula ― either for his presidential legacy or personal ambition or both, he will have to surmount various obstacles.



First, there are hard-line conservatives, such as Trump's national security adviser John Bolton and Vice President Mike Pence, who believe any meaningful change of status can, and should, be through regime change in North Korea by external maneuvering and/or popular revolt. These successors of neocons under the George W. Bush administration will try to torpedo the negotiated settlement whenever there are hiccups in the process.



Second is the usual suspect ― the U.S. military-industrial complex.



It is not sure whether Trump can, or will, go as far to fight against the enormous lobbying power of defense contractors. These merchants of death, who need military conflicts in many part of the world anytime, are reportedly able to thwart any bona fide efforts of their chief executive.



Some U.S. experts say, however, Korea is too small a market for the complex to do its best to hinder the U.S. leader's peacemaking efforts. I can only hope these pundits are right. These gurus, including John Feffer, director of Foreign Policy in Focus, note the third, and most formidable, obstacle instead is the U.S. foreign policy establishment.



If true, most of U.S. career diplomats and politicians well versed in international affairs do not believe in settlement of the North Korean nuclear problem through talks. Backing up this theory seems to be a recent story aired by the Voice of America, which said all of the 30 U.S. experts surveyed did not believe Pyongyang would abandon its nuclear weapons altogether.



Citing the North's track records, some say the upcoming summit is another ploy for Pyongyang to gain time, win political concessions and economic aid, and complete its nuclear development program. Others believe the isolationist regime may be more sincere than ever but will stick to its atomic weapons as long as it can.



From North Korea's standpoint, however, the U.S. administration is the last thing it can trust. Pyongyang's diplomats think, with reason, the U.S. put forth new demands not agreed on previously and dragged its feet in the supply of heavy oil before dropping the entire agreement upon the change of political power, about two decades ago. Washington is still the only government in the world that blithely walks out of international accords, multilateral or bilateral.



More objectively, one needs to think who will lose the most if the summit next week ends in less than satisfactory ways. President Trump has only to give up his ambitions for the Nobel Prize. The mid-term elections in November, as with most, if not all, U.S. elections, will be more about domestic issues, including the livelihood of poor Americans, than foreign policy issues.



Kim Jong-un, however, will lose opportunities to rebuild the beleaguered economy, not to speak of his face as a leader with near absolute authority. Unlike most foreign watchers' views, the summit's failure, not its success, will speed up the Kim regime's collapse.



President Moon will be another big loser, ending up as a leader more eager than expert in seeking inter-Korean reconciliation and harmony.



All this points to the dire need for the two Korea's leaders to show to the international community their intentions to bring about peace and prosperity on this peninsula is not just for Koreans but for East Asia and the whole world.



Giving Kim Jong-un the benefit of the doubt once more would do far more good than harm. Ratcheting up tension is worst and maintaining the status quo can be no alternative, at least for Koreans. Succeed or fail, the summit in Singapore should change Korea in ways no other event in recent memory has done.





Choi Sung-jin is a Korea Times columnist. Contact him at choisj1955@naver.com.

