commit_msg
stringlengths 1
24.2k
| commit_hash
stringlengths 2
84
⌀ | project
stringlengths 2
40
| source
stringclasses 4
values | labels
int64 0
1
| repo_url
stringlengths 26
70
⌀ | commit_url
stringlengths 74
118
⌀ | commit_date
stringlengths 25
25
⌀ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1609 | 35c7032723d85eee7318ff6c82f031fa2666b773 | imagemagick6 | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1604 | ce08a3691a8ac29125e29fc41967b3737fa3f425 | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1608 | a7759f410b773a1dd57b0e1fb28112e1cd8b97bc | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
ptrace: Fix ->ptracer_cred handling for PTRACE_TRACEME
Fix two issues:
When called for PTRACE_TRACEME, ptrace_link() would obtain an RCU
reference to the parent's objective credentials, then give that pointer
to get_cred(). However, the object lifetime rules for things like
struct cred do not permit unconditionally turning an RCU reference into
a stable reference.
PTRACE_TRACEME records the parent's credentials as if the parent was
acting as the subject, but that's not the case. If a malicious
unprivileged child uses PTRACE_TRACEME and the parent is privileged, and
at a later point, the parent process becomes attacker-controlled
(because it drops privileges and calls execve()), the attacker ends up
with control over two processes with a privileged ptrace relationship,
which can be abused to ptrace a suid binary and obtain root privileges.
Fix both of these by always recording the credentials of the process
that is requesting the creation of the ptrace relationship:
current_cred() can't change under us, and current is the proper subject
for access control.
This change is theoretically userspace-visible, but I am not aware of
any code that it will actually break.
Fixes: 64b875f7ac8a ("ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | 6994eefb0053799d2e07cd140df6c2ea106c41ee | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
x86/insn-eval: Fix use-after-free access to LDT entry
get_desc() computes a pointer into the LDT while holding a lock that
protects the LDT from being freed, but then drops the lock and returns the
(now potentially dangling) pointer to its caller.
Fix it by giving the caller a copy of the LDT entry instead.
Fixes: 670f928ba09b ("x86/insn-eval: Add utility function to get segment descriptor")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | de9f869616dd95e95c00bdd6b0fcd3421e8a4323 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
fix: Do not use the "/tmp" directory
https://github.com/linuxdeepin/deepin-clone/issues/16
https://bugzilla.opensuse.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1130388 | e079f3e2712b4f8c28e3e63e71ba1a1f90fce1ab | deepin-clone | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode. | c509265c5f6ae7264f7b8a8aae1cfa5fc59d108c | oniguruma | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix CVE-2019-13224: don't allow different encodings for onig_new_deluxe() | 0f7f61ed1b7b697e283e37bd2d731d0bd57adb55 | oniguruma | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix seven bugs discovered and fixed by ForAllSecure:
CVE-2019-13217: heap buffer overflow in start_decoder()
CVE-2019-13218: stack buffer overflow in compute_codewords()
CVE-2019-13219: uninitialized memory in vorbis_decode_packet_rest()
CVE-2019-13220: out-of-range read in draw_line()
CVE-2019-13221: issue with large 1D codebooks in lookup1_values()
CVE-2019-13222: unchecked NULL returned by get_window()
CVE-2019-13223: division by zero in predict_point() | 98fdfc6df88b1e34a736d5e126e6c8139c8de1a6 | stb | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1601 | 7d11230060fa9c8f67e53c85224daf6648805c7b | imagemagick6 | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1602 | fe5f4b85e6b1b54d3b4588a77133c06ade46d891 | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1599 | cdb383749ef7b68a38891440af8cc23e0115306d | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1600 | fe3066122ef72c82415811d25e9e3fad622c0a99 | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Merge pull request #1058 from ailin-nemui/sasl-reconnect
copy sasl username and password values | d23b0d22cc611e43c88d99192a59f413f951a955 | irssi | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
nfc: Ensure presence of required attributes in the deactivate_target handler
Check that the NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX attributes (in addition to
NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX) are provided by the netlink client prior to
accessing them. This prevents potential unhandled NULL pointer dereference
exceptions which can be triggered by malicious user-mode programs,
if they omit one or both of these attributes.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 385097a3675749cbc9e97c085c0e5dfe4269ca51 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
decompileAction: Prevent heap buffer overflow and underflow with using OpCode | 2be22fcf56a223dafe8de0e8a20fe20e8bbdb0b9 | libming | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle: prevent fill overflow | 3dc0338e4a36a3092720ebaa5b908ba3dca467d9 | libming | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix left shift of a negative value in SWFInput_readSBits. Check for number before before left-shifting by (number-1). | 2223f7a1e431455a1411bee77c90db94a6f8e8fe | libming | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
convertbmp: detect invalid file dimensions early
width/length dimensions read from bmp headers are not necessarily
valid. For instance they may have been maliciously set to very large
values with the intention to cause DoS (large memory allocation, stack
overflow). In these cases we want to detect the invalid size as early
as possible.
This commit introduces a counter which verifies that the number of
written bytes corresponds to the advertized width/length.
Fixes #1059 (CVE-2018-6616). | 8ee335227bbcaf1614124046aa25e53d67b11ec3 | openjpeg | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix heap-based overflow in parse_mqtt
PUBLISHED_FROM=3306592896298597fff5269634df0c1a1555113b | b3e0f780c34cea88f057a62213c012aa88fe2deb | mongoose | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
GCM: move look-up table to .data section and unshare between processes
* cipher/cipher-gcm.c (ATTR_ALIGNED_64): New.
(gcmR): Move to 'gcm_table' structure.
(gcm_table): New structure for look-up table with counters before and
after.
(gcmR): New macro.
(prefetch_table): Handle input with length not multiple of 256.
(do_prefetch_tables): Modify pre- and post-table counters to unshare
look-up table pages between processes.
--
GnuPG-bug-id: 4541
Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <[email protected]> | a4c561aab1014c3630bc88faf6f5246fee16b020 | libgcrypt | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
mdio_bus: Fix use-after-free on device_register fails
KASAN has found use-after-free in fixed_mdio_bus_init,
commit 0c692d07842a ("drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c: call
put_device on device_register() failure") call put_device()
while device_register() fails,give up the last reference
to the device and allow mdiobus_release to be executed
,kfreeing the bus. However in most drives, mdiobus_free
be called to free the bus while mdiobus_register fails.
use-after-free occurs when access bus again, this patch
revert it to let mdiobus_free free the bus.
KASAN report details as below:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mdiobus_free+0x85/0x90 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:482
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881dc824d78 by task syz-executor.0/3524
CPU: 1 PID: 3524 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x65/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:187
kasan_report+0x149/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:317
mdiobus_free+0x85/0x90 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:482
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x283/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
? 0xffffffffc0e40000
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f6215c19c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f6215c19c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f6215c1a6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
Allocated by task 3524:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.3+0xa0/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:496
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:545 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:740 [inline]
mdiobus_alloc_size+0x54/0x1b0 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:143
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x163/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 3524:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:458
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1409 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1436 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:2986 [inline]
kfree+0xe1/0x270 mm/slub.c:3938
device_release+0x78/0x200 drivers/base/core.c:919
kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:662 [inline]
kobject_release lib/kobject.c:691 [inline]
kref_put include/linux/kref.h:67 [inline]
kobject_put+0x146/0x240 lib/kobject.c:708
put_device+0x1c/0x30 drivers/base/core.c:2060
__mdiobus_register+0x483/0x560 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:382
fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x26b/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881dc824c80
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 248 bytes inside of
2048-byte region [ffff8881dc824c80, ffff8881dc825480)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0007720800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881f6c02800 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x2fffc0000010200(slab|head)
raw: 02fffc0000010200 0000000000000000 0000000500000001 ffff8881f6c02800
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800f000f 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8881dc824c00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8881dc824c80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8881dc824d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8881dc824d80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8881dc824e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes: 0c692d07842a ("drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c: call put_device on device_register() failure")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 6ff7b060535e87c2ae14dd8548512abfdda528fb | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
net: nfc: Fix NULL dereference on nfc_llcp_build_tlv fails
KASAN report this:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
Read of size 3 at addr 0000000000000000 by task syz-executor.0/5401
CPU: 0 PID: 5401 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
kasan_report+0x171/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:321
memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:130
nfc_llcp_build_gb+0x37f/0x540 [nfc]
nfc_llcp_register_device+0x6eb/0xb50 [nfc]
nfc_register_device+0x50/0x1d0 [nfc]
nfcsim_device_new+0x394/0x67d [nfcsim]
? 0xffffffffc1080000
nfcsim_init+0x6b/0x1000 [nfcsim]
do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
__do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9cb79dcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000280 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f9cb79dcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f9cb79dd6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004
nfc_llcp_build_tlv will return NULL on fails, caller should check it,
otherwise will trigger a NULL dereference.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Fixes: eda21f16a5ed ("NFC: Set MIU and RW values from CONNECT and CC LLCP frames")
Fixes: d646960f7986 ("NFC: Initial LLCP support")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 58bdd544e2933a21a51eecf17c3f5f94038261b5 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix remote code execution and privilege escalation vulnerability.
To trigger this, need to have a user already.
Thanks for Jeriko One <[email protected]> for finding and reporting this.
CVE-2019-12816 | 8de9e376ce531fe7f3c8b0aa4876d15b479b7311 | znc | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
avformat/aadec: Check for scanf() failure
Fixes: use of uninitialized variables
Fixes: blank.aa
Found-by: Chamal De Silva <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | ed188f6dcdf0935c939ed813cf8745d50742014b | ffmpeg | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
mount runtime seccomp files read-only (#2602)
avoid creating locations in the file system that are both writable and
executable (in this case for processes with euid of the user).
for the same reason also remove user owned libfiles
when it is not needed any more | eecf35c2f8249489a1d3e512bb07f0d427183134 | firejail | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
4.10 (#547) | v4 | squid | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Don't create our own temporary mount point for pivot_root
An attacker could pre-create /tmp/.bubblewrap-$UID and make it a
non-directory, non-symlink (in which case mounting our tmpfs would fail,
causing denial of service), or make it a symlink under their control
(potentially allowing bad things if the protected_symlinks sysctl is
not enabled).
Instead, temporarily mount the tmpfs on a directory that we are sure
exists and is not attacker-controlled. /tmp (the directory itself, not
a subdirectory) will do.
Fixes: #304
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=923557
Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie <[email protected]>
Closes: #305
Approved by: cgwalters | efc89e3b939b4bde42c10f065f6b7b02958ed50e | bubblewrap | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Do not leak file descriptor when doing exec
When opening a custom debug file, the descriptor would stay
open when calling exec and leak to the child process.
Make sure all files are opened with close-on-exec.
This fixes CVE-2019-12210.
Thanks to Matthias Gerstner of the SUSE Security Team for reporting
the issue. | 18b1914e32b74ff52000f10e97067e841e5fff62 | pam-u2f | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Drop privileges by default when opening user-related files
The module is typically executed as root and would sometimes
open files or follow symlinks that could be controlled from the
outside.
Drop privileges to the target user before opening any files.
Fixes CVE-2019-12209.
Thanks to Matthias Gerstner of the SUSE Security Team for reporting
the issue. | 7db3386fcdb454e33a3ea30dcfb8e8960d4c3aa3 | pam-u2f | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
pcpserver.c: copyIPv6IfDifferent() check for NULL src argument | cb8a02af7a5677cf608e86d57ab04241cf34e24f | miniupnp | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
upnp_redirect(): accept NULL desc argument | f321c2066b96d18afa5158dfa2d2873a2957ef38 | miniupnp | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
GetOutboundPinholeTimeout: check args | 13585f15c7f7dc28bbbba1661efb280d530d114c | miniupnp | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
upnp_event_prepare(): check the return value of snprintf() | bec6ccec63cadc95655721bc0e1dd49dac759d94 | miniupnp | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
updateDevice() remove element from the list when realloc fails | cd506a67e174a45c6a202eff182a712955ed6d6f | miniupnp | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
CVE-2019-12098: krb5: always confirm PA-PKINIT-KX for anon PKINIT
RFC8062 Section 7 requires verification of the PA-PKINIT-KX key excahnge
when anonymous PKINIT is used. Failure to do so can permit an active
attacker to become a man-in-the-middle.
Introduced by a1ef548600c5bb51cf52a9a9ea12676506ede19f. First tagged
release Heimdal 1.4.0.
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (4.8)
Change-Id: I6cc1c0c24985936468af08693839ac6c3edda133
Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Altman <[email protected]>
Approved-by: Jeffrey Altman <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 38c797e1ae9b9c8f99ae4aa2e73957679031fd2b) | 2f7f3d9960aa6ea21358bdf3687cee5149aa35cf | heimdal | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
string_number_format: Correctly handles return value of snprintf
Summary: `snprintf` can return a value greater than the number of bytes copied. In case the first byte of the string is not a digit (could be '-'), size of `tmpstr` was being updated without checking `tmplen`. This resulted in either an assertion error or a heap overflow depending on whether the assertion is compiled or not.
Reviewed By: mofarrell, qianxuweiren
Differential Revision: D17327899
fbshipit-source-id: ee53875d21e02608c6d870388eecf1464de24ff1 | dbeb9a56a638e3fdcef8b691c2a2967132dae692 | hhvm | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
exif_scan_JPEG_header: Added length check to prevent information leak
Summary:
'exif_process_SOFn' assumes that the JPEG header has at least 6 length. On providing a length < 6, this leads to an out of bounds heap read.
Fixes CVE-2019-11926
Reviewed By: fredemmott
Differential Revision: D16927050
fbshipit-source-id: 76c4b7c95acbb7852b0435298613d559d94e7270 | f9680d21beaa9eb39d166e8810e29fbafa51ad15 | hhvm | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
exif_process_APP12: Fix length calculation for second tag to prevent information leak
Summary:
buffer + 2+l1+1 points to the second tag. The maximum length of the buffer is length. Hence, the max length of the tag is length - (2+l1+1). Instead, the length passed is length - 2 - l1 + 1 which leads to a 2 byte overflow. If the last character of buffer is not null, this would lead to an out of bounds read of size 2.
Fixes CVE-2019-11925
Reviewed By: fredemmott
Differential Revision: D16930333
fbshipit-source-id: aad9cccaef3c678abc53bfd549aff6b582082a90 | f1cd34e63c2a0d9702be3d41462db7bfd0ae7da3 | hhvm | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Reject zero length handshake records.
Summary:
Zero length (all padding) handshake are forbidden by RFC. Allowing
these was a regression in D13754697 (2c6f78a).
This is a partial fix for CVE-2019-11924
Reviewed By: xybu
Differential Revision: D16285100
fbshipit-source-id: 05a19d31ad74601ce89156a0e59517aaad8dd928 | 6bf67137ef1ee5cd70c842b014c322b7deaf994b | fizz | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
fixed T36302429 | 3e5cdf1b6a85843e991d7d10f6a2567c15580da0 | zstd | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix SEGV in StructuredHeaders::decodeBase64
Summary:
The existing code can potentially cause a SEGV due to an out of bounds write.
This fixes CVE-2019-11921.
Reviewed By: knekritz
Differential Revision: D12983120
fbshipit-source-id: 1d48063595c8d518fd8afcbc941de260af7e37fd | 2f07985bef9fbae124cc63e5c0272e32da4fdaec | proxygen | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Bluetooth: hidp: fix buffer overflow
Struct ca is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated, which allows local users to obtain potentially
sensitive information from kernel stack memory, via a HIDPCONNADD command.
This vulnerability is similar to CVE-2011-1079.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] | a1616a5ac99ede5d605047a9012481ce7ff18b16 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
ext4: zero out the unused memory region in the extent tree block
This commit zeroes out the unused memory region in the buffer_head
corresponding to the extent metablock after writing the extent header
and the corresponding extent node entries.
This is done to prevent random uninitialized data from getting into
the filesystem when the extent block is synced.
This fixes CVE-2019-11833.
Signed-off-by: Sriram Rajagopalan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected] | 592acbf16821288ecdc4192c47e3774a4c48bb64 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
net: rds: force to destroy connection if t_sock is NULL in rds_tcp_kill_sock().
When it is to cleanup net namespace, rds_tcp_exit_net() will call
rds_tcp_kill_sock(), if t_sock is NULL, it will not call
rds_conn_destroy(), rds_conn_path_destroy() and rds_tcp_conn_free() to free
connection, and the worker cp_conn_w is not stopped, afterwards the net is freed in
net_drop_ns(); While cp_conn_w rds_connect_worker() will call rds_tcp_conn_path_connect()
and reference 'net' which has already been freed.
In rds_tcp_conn_path_connect(), rds_tcp_set_callbacks() will set t_sock = sock before
sock->ops->connect, but if connect() is failed, it will call
rds_tcp_restore_callbacks() and set t_sock = NULL, if connect is always
failed, rds_connect_worker() will try to reconnect all the time, so
rds_tcp_kill_sock() will never to cancel worker cp_conn_w and free the
connections.
Therefore, the condition !tc->t_sock is not needed if it is going to do
cleanup_net->rds_tcp_exit_net->rds_tcp_kill_sock, because tc->t_sock is always
NULL, and there is on other path to cancel cp_conn_w and free
connection. So this patch is to fix this.
rds_tcp_kill_sock():
...
if (net != c_net || !tc->t_sock)
...
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <[email protected]>
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in inet_create+0xbcc/0xd28
net/ipv4/af_inet.c:340
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8003496a4684 by task kworker/u8:4/3721
CPU: 3 PID: 3721 Comm: kworker/u8:4 Not tainted 5.1.0 #11
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Workqueue: krdsd rds_connect_worker
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3c0 arch/arm64/kernel/time.c:53
show_stack+0x28/0x38 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c:152
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x120/0x188 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x68/0x278 mm/kasan/report.c:253
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
kasan_report+0x21c/0x348 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load4_noabort+0x30/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:429
inet_create+0xbcc/0xd28 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:340
__sock_create+0x4f8/0x770 net/socket.c:1276
sock_create_kern+0x50/0x68 net/socket.c:1322
rds_tcp_conn_path_connect+0x2b4/0x690 net/rds/tcp_connect.c:114
rds_connect_worker+0x108/0x1d0 net/rds/threads.c:175
process_one_work+0x6e8/0x1700 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x3b0/0xdd0 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x2f0/0x378 kernel/kthread.c:255
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:1117
Allocated by task 687:
save_stack mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 [inline]
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
kasan_kmalloc+0xd4/0x180 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
kasan_slab_alloc+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:490
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:444 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2705 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2713 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc+0x14c/0x388 mm/slub.c:2718
kmem_cache_zalloc include/linux/slab.h:697 [inline]
net_alloc net/core/net_namespace.c:384 [inline]
copy_net_ns+0xc4/0x2d0 net/core/net_namespace.c:424
create_new_namespaces+0x300/0x658 kernel/nsproxy.c:107
unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xa0/0x198 kernel/nsproxy.c:206
ksys_unshare+0x340/0x628 kernel/fork.c:2577
__do_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2645 [inline]
__se_sys_unshare kernel/fork.c:2643 [inline]
__arm64_sys_unshare+0x38/0x58 kernel/fork.c:2643
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:47 [inline]
el0_svc_common+0x168/0x390 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:83
el0_svc_handler+0x60/0xd0 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:129
el0_svc+0x8/0xc arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:960
Freed by task 264:
save_stack mm/kasan/kasan.c:448 [inline]
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x114/0x220 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521
kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1370 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1397 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:2952 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0xb8/0x3a8 mm/slub.c:2968
net_free net/core/net_namespace.c:400 [inline]
net_drop_ns.part.6+0x78/0x90 net/core/net_namespace.c:407
net_drop_ns net/core/net_namespace.c:406 [inline]
cleanup_net+0x53c/0x6d8 net/core/net_namespace.c:569
process_one_work+0x6e8/0x1700 kernel/workqueue.c:2153
worker_thread+0x3b0/0xdd0 kernel/workqueue.c:2296
kthread+0x2f0/0x378 kernel/kthread.c:255
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:1117
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8003496a3f80
which belongs to the cache net_namespace of size 7872
The buggy address is located 1796 bytes inside of
7872-byte region [ffff8003496a3f80, ffff8003496a5e40)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffff7e000d25a800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff80036ce4b000
index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0xffffe0000008100(slab|head)
raw: 0ffffe0000008100 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff80036ce4b000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080040004 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8003496a4580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8003496a4600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8003496a4680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8003496a4700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8003496a4780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
Fixes: 467fa15356ac("RDS-TCP: Support multiple RDS-TCP listen endpoints, one per netns.")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | cb66ddd156203daefb8d71158036b27b0e2caf63 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]> | 401e7e88d4ef80188ffa07095ac00456f901b8c4 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <[email protected]> | bcf3b67d16a4c8ffae0aa79de5853435e683945c | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | 04f5866e41fb70690e28397487d8bd8eea7d712a | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
fix segfault in "lru" command
fixes #474 - off by one in token count. | d35334f368817a77a6bd1f33c6a5676b2c402c02 | memcached | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
issue #67: make sure sample rate is specified and non-zero in DFF files | bc6cba3f552c44565f7f1e66dc1580189addb2b4 | wavpack | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
We have a VM_BUG_ON() to check that the page reference count doesn't
underflow (or get close to overflow) by checking the sign of the count.
That's all fine, but we actually want to allow people to use a "get page
ref unless it's already very high" helper function, and we want that one
to use the sign of the page ref (without triggering this VM_BUG_ON).
Change the VM_BUG_ON to only check for small underflows (or _very_ close
to overflowing), and ignore overflows which have strayed into negative
territory.
Acked-by: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | f958d7b528b1b40c44cfda5eabe2d82760d868c3 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
tty: mark Siemens R3964 line discipline as BROKEN
The n_r3964 line discipline driver was written in a different time, when
SMP machines were rare, and users were trusted to do the right thing.
Since then, the world has moved on but not this code, it has stayed
rooted in the past with its lovely hand-crafted list structures and
loads of "interesting" race conditions all over the place.
After attempting to clean up most of the issues, I just gave up and am
now marking the driver as BROKEN so that hopefully someone who has this
hardware will show up out of the woodwork (I know you are out there!)
and will help with debugging a raft of changes that I had laying around
for the code, but was too afraid to commit as odds are they would break
things.
Many thanks to Jann and Linus for pointing out the initial problems in
this codebase, as well as many reviews of my attempts to fix the issues.
It was a case of whack-a-mole, and as you can see, the mole won.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | c7084edc3f6d67750f50d4183134c4fb5712a5c8 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1546 | f663dfb8431c97d95682a2b533cca1c8233d21b4 | imagemagick6 | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Detect non-existing referenced alpha images (fixes #123) | 995a4283d8ed2d0d2c1ceb1a577b993df2f0e014 | libheif | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1472 | e3cdce6fe12193f235b8c0ae5efe6880a25eb957 | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix typo in preprocessor macro in archive_read_format_zip_cleanup()
Frees lzma_stream on cleanup()
Fixes #1165 | ba641f73f3d758d9032b3f0e5597a9c6e593a505 | libarchive | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Bug 700937: Limit recursion in regexp matcher.
Also handle negative return code as an error in the JS bindings. | 00d4606c3baf813b7b1c176823b2729bf51002a2 | mujs | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Bug 700947: Add missing ENDTRY opcode in try/catch/finally byte code.
In one of the code branches in handling exceptions in the catch block
we forgot to call the ENDTRY opcode to pop the inner hidden try.
This leads to an unbalanced exception stack which can cause a crash
due to us jumping to a stack frame that has already been exited. | 1e5479084bc9852854feb1ba9bf68b52cd127e02 | mujs | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Bug 700938: Fix stack overflow in numtostr as used by Number#toFixed().
32 is not enough to fit sprintf("%.20f", 1e20).
We need at least 43 bytes to fit that format.
Bump the static buffer size. | da632ca08f240590d2dec786722ed08486ce1be6 | mujs | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Check idx in mpeg4_decode_studio_block()
Fixes: Out of array access
Fixes: 13500/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG4_fuzzer-5769760178962432
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: Kieran Kunhya <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | d227ed5d598340e719eff7156b1aa0a4469e9a6a | ffmpeg | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
avcodec/hevcdec: Avoid only partly skiping duplicate first slices
Fixes: NULL pointer dereference and out of array access
Fixes: 13871/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC_fuzzer-5746167087890432
Fixes: 13845/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_HEVC_fuzzer-5650370728034304
This also fixes the return code for explode mode
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: James Almer <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <[email protected]> | 54655623a82632e7624714d7b2a3e039dc5faa7e | ffmpeg | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
fix buffer overrun in gf_bin128_parse
closes #1204
closes #1205 | f36525c5beafb78959c3a07d6622c9028de348da | gpac | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
[core] fix abort in http-parseopts (fixes #2945)
fix abort in server.http-parseopts with url-path-2f-decode enabled
(thx stze)
x-ref:
"Security - SIGABRT during GET request handling with url-path-2f-decode enabled"
https://redmine.lighttpd.net/issues/2945 | 32120d5b8b3203fc21ccb9eafb0eaf824bb59354 | lighttpd1.4 | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Do not allow enters/returns in arguments (thanks to Fabio Carretto) | 2119afbe74ee0c914c1d5c4c859c594c08b0ad42 | domoticz | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fixed security issue 1 | d39a171e9c6a1c44dbdf43f9db6c3fbd887e38c1 | libmysofa | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fixed possible SQL Injection Vulnerability (Thanks to Fabio Carretto!) | ee70db46f81afa582c96b887b73bcd2a86feda00 | domoticz | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()
net_hash_mix() currently uses kernel address of a struct net,
and is used in many places that could be used to reveal this
address to a patient attacker, thus defeating KASLR, for
the typical case (initial net namespace, &init_net is
not dynamically allocated)
I believe the original implementation tried to avoid spending
too many cycles in this function, but security comes first.
Also provide entropy regardless of CONFIG_NET_NS.
Fixes: 0b4419162aa6 ("netns: introduce the net_hash_mix "salt" for hashes")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <[email protected]>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | 355b98553789b646ed97ad801a619ff898471b92 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash
According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak
and might be used by attackers.
Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix())
having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.
It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Benny Pinkas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> | df453700e8d81b1bdafdf684365ee2b9431fb702 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Remove untrusted input to exec | 81a4b8620188e89f7e4fc985f3c89b58d4bcc86b | node-opencv | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Don't crash if user specified invalid encoding.
This is CVE-2019-9917 | 64613bc8b6b4adf1e32231f9844d99cd512b8973 | znc | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
fix filling out of initresp | e4bb58cc8b6202a421e65f8230217d8ae6e16eb5 | libu2f-host | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
mm: enforce min addr even if capable() in expand_downwards()
security_mmap_addr() does a capability check with current_cred(), but
we can reach this code from contexts like a VFS write handler where
current_cred() must not be used.
This can be abused on systems without SMAP to make NULL pointer
dereferences exploitable again.
Fixes: 8869477a49c3 ("security: protect from stack expansion into low vm addresses")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | 0a1d52994d440e21def1c2174932410b4f2a98a1 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
netfilter: nf_nat_snmp_basic: add missing length checks in ASN.1 cbs
The generic ASN.1 decoder infrastructure doesn't guarantee that callbacks
will get as much data as they expect; callbacks have to check the `datalen`
parameter before looking at `data`. Make sure that snmp_version() and
snmp_helper() don't read/write beyond the end of the packet data.
(Also move the assignment to `pdata` down below the check to make it clear
that it isn't necessarily a pointer we can use before the `datalen` check.)
Fixes: cc2d58634e0f ("netfilter: nf_nat_snmp_basic: use asn1 decoder library")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]> | c4c07b4d6fa1f11880eab8e076d3d060ef3f55fc | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
ipmi: fix use-after-free of user->release_barrier.rda
When we do the following test, we got oops in ipmi_msghandler driver
while((1))
do
service ipmievd restart & service ipmievd restart
done
---------------------------------------------------------------
[ 294.230186] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000803fea6ea008
[ 294.230188] Mem abort info:
[ 294.230190] ESR = 0x96000004
[ 294.230191] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 294.230193] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 294.230194] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 294.230195] Data abort info:
[ 294.230196] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
[ 294.230197] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 294.230199] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000a1c1b75a
[ 294.230201] [0000803fea6ea008] pgd=0000000000000000
[ 294.230204] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
[ 294.235211] Modules linked in: nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm iw_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ghash_ce sha2_ce ses sha256_arm64 sha1_ce hibmc_drm hisi_sas_v2_hw enclosure sg hisi_sas_main sbsa_gwdt ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe ipmi_si mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler hns_enet_drv hns_mdio
[ 294.277745] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc2+ #113
[ 294.285511] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 294.292835] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 294.297695] pc : __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.301940] lr : acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.307853] sp : ffff00001001bc80
[ 294.311208] x29: ffff00001001bc80 x28: ffff0000117e5000
[ 294.316594] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: dead000000000100
[ 294.321980] x25: dead000000000200 x24: ffff803f6bd06800
[ 294.327366] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 294.332752] x21: ffff00001001bd04 x20: ffff80df33d19018
[ 294.338137] x19: ffff80df33d19018 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 294.343523] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 294.348908] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000002
[ 294.354293] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 294.359679] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000100000
[ 294.365065] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000004
[ 294.370451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff80df34558678
[ 294.375836] x5 : 000000000000000c x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 294.381221] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000803fea6ea000
[ 294.386607] x1 : 0000803fea6ea008 x0 : 0000000000000001
[ 294.391994] Process swapper/3 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0x0000000083087293)
[ 294.398791] Call trace:
[ 294.401266] __srcu_read_lock+0x38/0x58
[ 294.405154] acquire_ipmi_user+0x2c/0x70 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.410716] deliver_response+0x80/0xf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.416189] deliver_local_response+0x28/0x68 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.422193] handle_one_recv_msg+0x158/0xcf8 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.432050] handle_new_recv_msgs+0xc0/0x210 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.441984] smi_recv_tasklet+0x8c/0x158 [ipmi_msghandler]
[ 294.451618] tasklet_action_common.isra.5+0x88/0x138
[ 294.460661] tasklet_action+0x2c/0x38
[ 294.468191] __do_softirq+0x120/0x2f8
[ 294.475561] irq_exit+0x134/0x140
[ 294.482445] __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[ 294.489954] gic_handle_irq+0xb8/0x178
[ 294.497037] el1_irq+0xb0/0x140
[ 294.503381] arch_cpu_idle+0x34/0x1a8
[ 294.510096] do_idle+0x1d4/0x290
[ 294.516322] cpu_startup_entry+0x28/0x30
[ 294.523230] secondary_start_kernel+0x184/0x1d0
[ 294.530657] Code: d538d082 d2800023 8b010c81 8b020021 (c85f7c25)
[ 294.539746] ---[ end trace 8a7a880dee570b29 ]---
[ 294.547341] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 294.556837] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 294.563996] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 294.570515] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 294.577638] Memory Limit: none
[ 294.587178] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 294.594314] Bye!
Because the user->release_barrier.rda is freed in ipmi_destroy_user(), but
the refcount is not zero, when acquire_ipmi_user() uses user->release_barrier.rda
in __srcu_read_lock(), it causes oops.
Fix this by calling cleanup_srcu_struct() when the refcount is zero.
Fixes: e86ee2d44b44 ("ipmi: Rework locking and shutdown for hot remove")
Cc: [email protected] # 4.18
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <[email protected]> | 77f8269606bf95fcb232ee86f6da80886f1dfae8 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Avoid OOB read (found by ASAN reported by F. Alonso) | 2858eaf99f6cc5aae129bcbf1e24ad160240185f | file | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Received SACK options are managed by a linked list at the TCP socket.
There is a global tunable limit net.inet.tcp.sackholelimit, default
is 32768. If an attacker manages to attach all these sack holes
to a few TCP connections, the lists may grow long. Traversing them
might cause higher CPU consumption on the victim machine. In
practice such a situation is hard to create as the TCP retransmit
and 2*msl timer flush the list periodically. For additional
protection, enforce a per connection limit of 128 SACK holes in the
list.
reported by Reuven Plevinsky and Tal Vainshtein
discussed with claudio@ and procter@; OK deraadt@ | ed8fdce754a5d8d14c09e989d8877707bd43906f | src | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1454 | 306c1f0fa5754ca78efd16ab752f0e981d4f6b82 | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1452 | 748a03651e5b138bcaf160d15133de2f4b1b89ce | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1451 | 8a43abefb38c5e29138e1c9c515b313363541c06 | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]> | d3bd7413e0ca40b60cf60d4003246d067cafdeda | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1450 | 1e6a3ace073c9ec9c71e439c111d23c6e66cb6ae | imagemagick | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Sync with upstream
Even though libgd/libgd#492 is not a relevant bug fix for PHP, since
the binding doesn't use the `gdImage*Ptr()` functions at all, we're
porting the fix to stay in sync here. | 089f7c0bc28d399b0420aa6ef058e4c1c120b2ae | php-src | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
zero memory on malloc
to prevent write of uninit memory under some error conditions
thanks Balint | 00622428bda8d7521db8d74260b519fa41d69d0a | libvips | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
kvm: fix kvm_ioctl_create_device() reference counting (CVE-2019-6974)
kvm_ioctl_create_device() does the following:
1. creates a device that holds a reference to the VM object (with a borrowed
reference, the VM's refcount has not been bumped yet)
2. initializes the device
3. transfers the reference to the device to the caller's file descriptor table
4. calls kvm_get_kvm() to turn the borrowed reference to the VM into a real
reference
The ownership transfer in step 3 must not happen before the reference to the VM
becomes a proper, non-borrowed reference, which only happens in step 4.
After step 3, an attacker can close the file descriptor and drop the borrowed
reference, which can cause the refcount of the kvm object to drop to zero.
This means that we need to grab a reference for the device before
anon_inode_getfd(), otherwise the VM can disappear from under us.
Fixes: 852b6d57dc7f ("kvm: add device control API")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> | cfa39381173d5f969daf43582c95ad679189cbc9 | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
bgpd: don't use BGP_ATTR_VNC(255) unless ENABLE_BGP_VNC_ATTR is defined
Signed-off-by: Lou Berger <[email protected]> | 943d595a018e69b550db08cccba1d0778a86705a | frr | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Change mincore() to count "mapped" pages rather than "cached" pages
The semantics of what "in core" means for the mincore() system call are
somewhat unclear, but Linux has always (since 2.3.52, which is when
mincore() was initially done) treated it as "page is available in page
cache" rather than "page is mapped in the mapping".
The problem with that traditional semantic is that it exposes a lot of
system cache state that it really probably shouldn't, and that users
shouldn't really even care about.
So let's try to avoid that information leak by simply changing the
semantics to be that mincore() counts actual mapped pages, not pages
that might be cheaply mapped if they were faulted (note the "might be"
part of the old semantics: being in the cache doesn't actually guarantee
that you can access them without IO anyway, since things like network
filesystems may have to revalidate the cache before use).
In many ways the old semantics were somewhat insane even aside from the
information leak issue. From the very beginning (and that beginning is
a long time ago: 2.3.52 was released in March 2000, I think), the code
had a comment saying
Later we can get more picky about what "in core" means precisely.
and this is that "later". Admittedly it is much later than is really
comfortable.
NOTE! This is a real semantic change, and it is for example known to
change the output of "fincore", since that program literally does a
mmmap without populating it, and then doing "mincore()" on that mapping
that doesn't actually have any pages in it.
I'm hoping that nobody actually has any workflow that cares, and the
info leak is real.
We may have to do something different if it turns out that people have
valid reasons to want the old semantics, and if we can limit the
information leak sanely.
Cc: Kevin Easton <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Cc: Masatake YAMATO <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg KH <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> | 574823bfab82d9d8fa47f422778043fbb4b4f50e | linux | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix redirect URL validation bypass
It turns out that browsers silently convert backslash characters into
forward slashes, while apr_uri_parse() does not.
This mismatch allows an attacker to bypass the redirect URL validation
by using an URL like:
https://sp.example.org/mellon/logout?ReturnTo=https:%5c%5cmalicious.example.org/
mod_auth_mellon will assume that it is a relative URL and allow the
request to pass through, while the browsers will use it as an absolute
url and redirect to https://malicious.example.org/ .
This patch fixes this issue by rejecting all redirect URLs with
backslashes. | 62041428a32de402e0be6ba45fe12df6a83bedb8 | mod_auth_mellon | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste. | e3a5d056633677959ad924a51758876d415e7046 | libcomps | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Replace copied scrypt implementation with call to libsodium
Summary:
libsodium actually uses the same implementation; using libsodium means we don't
need to maintain a copy ourselves.
Keep the `pickparams` implementation though, as that's not exposed in libsodium.
We should deprecate this extension, and strongly encourage directly using `ext_sodium` instead from Hack code; stored hashes from `ext_scrypt` can be verified like this:
```
$enc = scrypt_enc('foo', random_bytes(SODIUM_CRYPTO_PWHASH_SCRYPTSALSA208SHA256_SALTBYTES));
list($_, $algo, $n, $r, $p, $salt, $out) = explode('$', $enc);
invariant($algo === 's', 'did not get an scrypt result');
$salt = base64_decode($salt);
$out = base64_decode($out);
$opslimit = (1 << $n) * $r * $p * 4;
$memlimit = (1 << $n) * $r * 128;
$sodium = sodium_crypto_pwhash_scryptsalsa208sha256(strlen($out), 'foo', $salt, $opslimit, $memlimit);
\var_dump($sodium === $out);
```
This also makes the scrypt extension depend on libsodium; this is fine, libsodium's going to be a hard dependency for HHVM anyway when the proxygen pin is next updated.
Reviewed By: alexeyt
Differential Revision: D15702142
fbshipit-source-id: 2dcad7c6cb273d4ce4b3479ffa445841fa2d1107 | cc331e4349e91706a673e2a09f1f2ea5bbb33815 | hhvm | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Fix default FastCGI interface
Reviewed By: alexeyt
Differential Revision: D15567393
fbshipit-source-id: ffab228f689d4ddca9ea4835c70aecf16da2aa9f | 97ef580ec2cca9a54da6f9bd9fdd9a455f6d74ed | hhvm | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Throw on skipping an invalid type.
Summary:
Certain values (e.g.) T_STOP should not appear as a skip type. Allowing them to
can cause thrift to loop unboundedly.
Reviewed By: spalamarchuk
Differential Revision: D15102451
fbshipit-source-id: c08d52f44f37e9c212d3480233ac217105586c9f | 01686e15ec77ccb4d49a77d5bce3a01601e54d64 | fbthrift | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Properly error when asked to skip an unknown field type
Summary:
We weren't returning an error when asked to skip over a field with and
unknown type. In this particular test case the code attempts to skip
over a map with a large number of fields of unknown type and the ~3B
noop calls take almost 30s. A misbehaving client could DoS a server
by sending short messages that take a long time to parse. There may
have been other failure modes as well.
The test covers the binary protocol because that is where the issue
was found. However, the issue is common to all protocols.
This fixes CVE-2019-3552.
Reviewed By: spalamarchuk
Differential Revision: D14088980
fbshipit-source-id: 8a9d63260db717347217a8d2ac883c4ce331d964 | c461c1bd1a3e130b181aa9c854da3030cd4b5156 | fbthrift | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Peek for \n in LineBasedFrameDecoder.
Summary:
Previously this could underflow if there was not a following \n.
CVE-2019-3563
Reviewed By: siyengar
Differential Revision: D14935715
fbshipit-source-id: 25c3eecf373f89efa1232456aeeb092f13b7fa06 | 5b3bceca875e4ea4ed9d14c20b20ce46c92c13c6 | wangle | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Prevent strrpos and strripos from visiting out-of-bounds memory.
Reviewed By: alexeyt
Differential Revision: D14669668
fbshipit-source-id: 16bb4674bccf83ffd737e60d1fd9fd4a0093f77c | 46003b4ab564b2abcd8470035fc324fe36aa8c75 | hhvm | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Avoid arithmetic operation on uint16 read from the wire.
Summary:
This could overflow previously.
CVE-2019-3560
Reviewed By: yfeldblum
Differential Revision: D14152362
fbshipit-source-id: c0ebb3fc59b49c7c23e6bcb90458c19cd891be65 | 40bbb161e72fb609608d53b9d64c56bb961a6ee2 | fizz | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Throw on bad types during skipping data
Summary:
The current code silently returns on bad types. In case when we have an invalid data, we may get a container of a large size with a bad type, this would lead to us running long loop doing nothing (though we already can say that the data is invalid).
The new code would throw an exception as soon as we try to skip a value of invalid type.
Fixes CVE-2019-3552
Reviewed By: stevegury
Differential Revision: D13892370
fbshipit-source-id: 582c81f90cf40c105383083cb38815816140e3ad | a56346ceacad28bf470017a6bda1d5518d0bd943 | fbthrift | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Throw on bad types during skipping data
Summary:
The current code silently returns on bad types. In case when we have an invalid data, we may get a container of a large size with a bad type, this would lead to us running long loop doing nothing (though we already can say that the data is invalid).
The new code would throw an exception as soon as we try to skip a value of invalid type.
Fixes CVE-2019-3552
Reviewed By: yfeldblum, stevegury
Differential Revision: D8344920
fbshipit-source-id: f12e8f3442f7ad5e1a81d822380701e929b80f0d | c5d6e07588cd03061bc54d451a7fa6e84883d62b | fbthrift | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
CVE-2019-3557: Fix OOB read in readRecord on BZ2Files/OutputFiles
Summary:
These File subclasses return -1 on read errors which is not what is
expected for readImpl--this made File::readRecord behave unusually if the read
fails, causing it to read (size_t)(-1) bytes from its stream buffer; which,
unsurprisingly produces a out-of-bounds heap read.
Reviewed By: leikahing, jjgriego
Differential Revision: D13659395
fbshipit-source-id: 359ed6e3ff9f9cf49b752b666f51c4e0b3ce4b8a | 6e4dd9ec3f14b48170fc45dc9d13a3261765f994 | hhvm | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
AcceptRoutingHandler should not assume a folly::AsyncSocket
Summary:
There is no reason to perform a cast to folly::AsyncSocket, when all of the
required behavior is in folly::AsyncTransportWrapper.
CVE-2019-3554
Reviewed By: avasylev
Differential Revision: D13599212
fbshipit-source-id: 3bb5475fe464c04cf5c04115f34e1bcf237cb4aa | 3b17ba10a82c71e7808760e027ac6af687e06074 | wangle | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
misc oom and possible memory leak fix | e139b87835994d007fbd64eead6c1455d7b8cf4e | boa | bigvul | 1 | null | null | null |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.