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Can I solve research problems with only BS in Mathematics or do I need PhD?. <p>Currently I'm undergrad in Mathematics and confused about getting a Phd. I'm not interested in academia. I'm more interested in startups or jobs in the industry.</p>
<p>The only thing that is making me to do PhD is solving research problems. Say I'm reading a machine learning book or QFT book or a random thought in my mind and I find something(a problem) that can solved in a different way(maybe a new discovery!!) and more efficiently and it involves some research. Will I be able to do that research and solve that problem with only BS or do I need PhD? </p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Are the unwound thin realization and fat realization homotopy equivalent?. <p>This is a question about a theorem (proposition 2) in the article--<a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF01189090">On the homotopy type of classifying spaces</a></p>
<p>Recall some definitions first: </p>
<p>Given a category $\mathcal{C}$ internal in $\operatorname{Top}$, the unwound thin realization is defined by </p>
<p>$$\vert N_{\cdot}\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{N}}\vert,$$ </p>
<p>where $\mathcal{C}_{\mathbb{N}}$ is the subcategory of the product category $\mathcal{C}\times \mathbb{N}$ obtained by deleting all the morphisms $(f,i\leq i)$ with $f$ not an identity (this is defined, I think, first by Segal) and $N_{\cdot}$ stands for the nerve construction.</p>
<p>This is equivalent to the fat realization $\vert\vert-\vert\vert$ of the following product simplicial space
$$N_{\cdot}\mathcal{C}\times S_{\cdot}$$
where $S_{\cdot}$ is the semi-simplicial set<br>
$$\triangle_{in}\rightarrow \mathbb{N}$$<br>
sending $[k]$ to $Hom([k],\mathbb{N})$, the set of all injective increasing maps.</p>
<p><strong>Now it is proved in <a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF01189090">On the homotopy type of classifying spaces</a> (proposition 2)
by tom Dieck that the canonical projection</strong></p>
<p>$$\pi:\vert\vert N_{\cdot}\mathcal{C}\times S_{\cdot}\vert\vert\rightarrow \vert\vert N_{\cdot}\mathcal{C}\vert\vert$$ </p>
<p>is a homotopy equivalence. Actually his proposition is more general--for any simplicial space $X_{\cdot}$.</p>
<p>In his proof, he constructed a map $$\rho:\vert\vert X_{\cdot} \vert\vert\rightarrow\vert\vert X_{\cdot} \times S_{\cdot}\vert\vert$$
and then showed it is the homotopy inverse of $\pi$.</p>
<p>There $\rho$ is defined by<br>
$$\rho(x)=[y,i_{n},s_{0}(x),...,s_{n}(x)]$$</p>
<p>where we assume $x$ is represented by
$$(y,t_{0},...,t_{n})\in X_{n}\times \triangle^{n},$$
$i_{n}(k)=k+1$,
and $s_{i}$ is the partition of unity constructed by considering the composition
$$X_{n}\times \triangle^{n}\rightarrow \triangle^{n}\xrightarrow{\sigma_{j,n}} [0,1],$$
where
$$\sigma_{j,n}\equiv \sum_{E\subset [n],card(E)=j+1} \operatorname{Max}(0,\operatorname*{Min}_{j\in E}t_{j}-\operatorname*{Max}_{j\in [n]\setminus E}t_{j}),$$ for all $j\leq n$.
Since $\sigma_{j,n}$ are compatible for all $n$, it defines a map
$$\sigma_{j}:\vert\vert X_{\cdot}\vert\vert\rightarrow [0,1]$$
and $s_{j}\equiv (j+1)\sigma_{j}$</p>
<p><strong>Now my questions are:</strong> </p>
<ol>
<li>Is the map
$$\rho:\vert\vert X_{\cdot}\times S_{\cdot}\vert\vert\rightarrow \vert\vert X_{\cdot}\vert\vert
$$ well-defined?</li>
</ol>
<p>For example, if $t_{k}=0$, then $x$ might also be represented by $(d_{k}y,t_{0},...,t_{n-1})$,
whereas $(d_{k}y,i_{n-1},s_{0}(x),...,s_{n}(x))$
doesn't always represent the same element as
$(y,i_{n},s_{0}(x),...,s_{n}(x))$.</p>
<p>Or do I actually misunderstand what he means there?</p>
<ol start="2">
<li>What actually concerns me is the case
when $X_{\cdot}$ is $N_{\cdot}\mathcal{C}$. </li>
</ol>
<p>Is there an easier way to see $$\vert\vert N_{\cdot}\mathcal{C}\times S_{\cdot}\vert\vert$$ and $$\vert \vert N_{\cdot}\mathcal{C}\vert\vert$$ are actually homotopy equivalent? </p>
<ol start="4">
<li>Or if not, is there any counterexample?</li>
</ol>
<p>Any suggestion or comment concerning this question will be very much appreciated.</p>
<p>Thank you so much.</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
How do I recall the correct number from a text string in Excel?. <p>Consider the following text string:</p>
<pre><code>(*4,14)(7,15)(10,13)(9,12)-(1,8)(2,6)-5,3-11
</code></pre>
<p>My goal is to count how many left brackets ("("), commas outside brackets, and hyphens before each individual number in this string (e.g., 3 left brackets in front of the number 10, 6 left brackets and 3 hyphens in front of 11).</p>
<p>My current solution is to first recall the remaining text string in front of each individual number, simply <code>=LEFT(A1,(FIND("1",A1,1)-1))</code>, but it happens that Excel will recall the string appeared before the first "1" (i.e., <code>(*4,</code>), instead of recalling the remaining string from the actual number "1" in the string (i.e., <code>(*4,14)(7,15)(10,13)(9,12)-(</code>).</p>
<p>Side note, any idea on how to count the number of commas that are outside of brackets?</p>
<p>Help would be much appreciate! </p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Find string in text file and execute a script depending of the result. <p>I have a file (Data.txt) with something like this:</p>
<p><code>A=1234597890 B=192.168.1.1</code></p>
<p>sometimes B goes first and sometimes only A or B.</p>
<p>So, If I find:</p>
<pre><code> A, Print A content and execute A script
B, " B " " " B "
A&B, " A&B " " " A "
Neither, Print a error message
</code></pre>
<p>Now the problem is the content in A or B is not the same always!</p>
<p>I don't know which would be the best command to use.</p>
<p>Thank you for your help and for trying to understand my basic English :)!</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
There should be a term for the phenomenon of really wanting to order something but not doing so because the menu name is something you don't want to say.. | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
Why the Minnesota Vikings should play outside. | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
Wildcat Campground, Point Reyes (2/27/2018). | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
How to use spot instance with amazon elastic beanstalk?. <p>I have one infra that use amazon elastic beanstalk to deploy my application.
I need to scale my app adding some spot instances that EB do not support.</p>
<p>So I create a second autoscaling from a launch configuration with spot instances.
The autoscaling use the same load balancer created by beanstalk.</p>
<p>To up instances with the last version of my app, I copy the user data from the original launch configuration (created with beanstalk) to the launch configuration with spot instances (created by me).</p>
<p>This work fine, but:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>how to update spot instances that have come up from the second autoscaling when the beanstalk update instances managed by him with a new version of the app?</p>
</li>
<li><p>is there another way so easy as, and elegant, to use spot instances and enjoy the benefits of beanstalk?</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>UPDATE</strong></p>
<p>Elastic Beanstalk add support to spot instance since 2019... see:
<a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/elasticbeanstalk/latest/relnotes/release-2019-11-25-spot.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://docs.aws.amazon.com/elasticbeanstalk/latest/relnotes/release-2019-11-25-spot.html</a></p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
How to use spot instance with amazon elastic beanstalk?. <p>I have one infra that use amazon elastic beanstalk to deploy my application.
I need to scale my app adding some spot instances that EB do not support.</p>
<p>So I create a second autoscaling from a launch configuration with spot instances.
The autoscaling use the same load balancer created by beanstalk.</p>
<p>To up instances with the last version of my app, I copy the user data from the original launch configuration (created with beanstalk) to the launch configuration with spot instances (created by me).</p>
<p>This work fine, but:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>how to update spot instances that have come up from the second autoscaling when the beanstalk update instances managed by him with a new version of the app?</p>
</li>
<li><p>is there another way so easy as, and elegant, to use spot instances and enjoy the benefits of beanstalk?</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>UPDATE</strong></p>
<p>Elastic Beanstalk add support to spot instance since 2019... see:
<a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/elasticbeanstalk/latest/relnotes/release-2019-11-25-spot.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://docs.aws.amazon.com/elasticbeanstalk/latest/relnotes/release-2019-11-25-spot.html</a></p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Polynomials and division algorithm. <p><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/fcQmw.png" alt="enter image description here"></p>
<p>How can I use division algorithm to solve this question? </p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
How do I get unique incoming request IP address. <p>There are four people who are sharing a same wifi connection,
according to below definition there IP must be unique.<br>
<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IP_address" rel="nofollow">An IP address is a numerical label assigned to each device participating in a computer network that uses the Internet Protocol for communication.</a> </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Q1. IS IT SO OR NOT?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>For uniquely identifying them I tried: </p>
<pre><code>request.remoteAddress
</code></pre>
<p>But I get same IP for those all four person.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Q2.HOW UNIQUELY IDENTIFY THEM?(should I say them to pass some token like thing to identify them uniquely? but I will prefer unique IP) </p>
</blockquote>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
WiFi Internet connection for after some time. <p>I have had some problems with WiFi on my computer.</p>
<p>After a few minutes (random time), the internet stops working on it, however I can still see the other networks available for connection via WiFi and I can also access the IP that gives access to my router.</p>
<p>This happens in Ubuntu 16.04 and 18.04.</p>
<p>I have a Windows partition on the same machine and this does not occur on it.</p>
<p>What can it be?</p>
<pre><code> $ lspci -knn | grep Net -A3; rfkill list
03:00.0 Network controller [0280]: Qualcomm Atheros QCA6174 802.11ac Wireless Network Adapter [168c:003e] (rev 32)
Subsystem: Dell QCA6174 802.11ac Wireless Network Adapter [1028:0310]
Kernel driver in use: ath10k_pci
Kernel modules: ath10k_pci
04:00.0 Ethernet controller [0200]: Qualcomm Atheros QCA8171 Gigabit Ethernet [1969:10a1] (rev 10)
0: hci0: Bluetooth
Soft blocked: yes
Hard blocked: no
1: phy0: Wireless LAN
Soft blocked: no
Hard blocked: no
$ dmesg | grep ath10k
[ 4.924654] ath10k_pci 0000:03:00.0: enabling device (0000 -> 0002)
[ 4.926447] ath10k_pci 0000:03:00.0: pci irq msi oper_irq_mode 2 irq_mode 0 reset_mode 0
[ 5.210002] ath10k_pci 0000:03:00.0: Direct firmware load for ath10k/pre-cal-pci-0000:03:00.0.bin failed with error -2
[ 5.210009] ath10k_pci 0000:03:00.0: Direct firmware load for ath10k/cal-pci-0000:03:00.0.bin failed with error -2
[ 5.210210] ath10k_pci 0000:03:00.0: Direct firmware load for ath10k/QCA6174/hw3.0/firmware-6.bin failed with error -2
[ 5.210214] ath10k_pci 0000:03:00.0: Direct firmware load for ath10k/QCA6174/hw3.0/firmware-5.bin failed with error -2
[ 5.211949] ath10k_pci 0000:03:00.0: qca6174 hw3.2 target 0x05030000 chip_id 0x00340aff sub 1028:0310
[ 5.211950] ath10k_pci 0000:03:00.0: kconfig debug 0 debugfs 1 tracing 1 dfs 0 testmode 0
[ 5.212294] ath10k_pci 0000:03:00.0: firmware ver WLAN.RM.2.0-00180-QCARMSWPZ-1 api 4 features wowlan,ignore-otp,no-4addr-pad crc32 75dee6c5
[ 5.277471] ath10k_pci 0000:03:00.0: board_file api 2 bmi_id N/A crc32 20d869c3
[ 5.866535] ath10k_pci 0000:03:00.0: htt-ver 3.26 wmi-op 4 htt-op 3 cal otp max-sta 32 raw 0 hwcrypto 1
[ 5.959759] ath10k_pci 0000:03:00.0 wlp3s0: renamed from wlan0
</code></pre>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Family Falls Sick After Eating 'Ganja Sabzi' As Vegetable Seller Sold Weed As Methi As A 'Joke'. | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
Finding the matrix of the linear transformation defined by $\mbox{L}(f) = \frac{\partial^2\!f}{\partial x^2} + \frac{\partial^2\!f}{\partial y^2}$. <p>I have a linear transformation $L: V_n \to V_{n-2}$ where </p>
<p>$$V_n = \{ a_0x^n + a_1x^{n-1}y + \ldots + a_ny^n : a_i \in \mathbb{R}\}$$</p>
<p>i.e. the space of homogeneous polynomials of degree $n$ in two variables $x$ and $y$.</p>
<p>$L$ is defined by: $$\mbox{L}(f) = \frac{\partial^2\!f}{\partial x^2} + \frac{\partial^2\!f}{\partial y^2}$$</p>
<p>There is an obvious basis for $V_n$:</p>
<p>$$\mathcal{B_n} = \{x^n, x^{n-1}y,\;\ldots\;,xy^{n-1},y^n\}$$</p>
<p>I am having trouble finding the matrix of $L$ with respect to $\mathcal{B}_n$ and $\mathcal{B}_{n-2}$. I know that because:</p>
<p>$$x^n \to n(n-1)x^{n-2}$$
$$x^{n-1}y \to (n-1)(n-2)x^{n-3}y$$
$$x^{n-2}y^2 \to (n-2)(n-3)x^{n-4}y^2 + 2x^{n-2}$$
$$\ldots$$
$$y^n \to n(n-1)y^{n-2}$$</p>
<p>The matrix I'm looking for looks sort of like this:</p>
<p>$$
\left(
\begin{matrix}
n(n-1) & 0 & 2 & \ldots \\
0 & (n-1)(n-2) & 0 & \ldots \\
0 & 0 & (n-2)(n-3) & \ldots \\
\vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots
\end{matrix}
\right)
$$</p>
<p>But how can I describe that matrix, and what is its rank?</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Why is my stack trace missing steps?. <p>My logged stack trace seems to be missing a step.</p>
<pre><code>private void StartLoadingResources(DataService separateDataService)
{
...
batchResource.Resources.Add(key, new List<string>());
// batchResource.Resources is the Dictionary object involved
...
}
</code></pre>
<p>Why has the stack trace gone straight from <code>StartLoadingResources</code> to <code>Insert</code> (missing the <code>Add</code> step)?</p>
<pre><code>System.AggregateException: One or more errors occurred. ---> System.ArgumentException: An item with the same key has already been added.
at System.Collections.Generic.Dictionary`2.Insert(TKey key, TValue value, Boolean add)
at MyApp.Importer.StartLoadingResources(DataService separateDataService) in ****\MyApp\MyApp\Importer.cs:line 313
at MyApp.Importer.<Execute>b__5() in ****\MyApp\MyApp\Importer.cs:line 142
at System.Threading.Tasks.Task.Execute()
--- End of inner exception stack trace ---
at System.Threading.Tasks.Task.Wait(Int32 millisecondsTimeout, CancellationToken cancellationToken)
at System.Threading.Tasks.Task.Wait()
at MyApp.Importer.Execute() in ****\MyApp\MyApp\Importer.cs:line 157
at MyApp.Program.Execute() in ****\MyApp\MyApp\Program.cs:line 252
at MyApp.Program.Main(String[] args) in ****\MyApp\MyApp\Program.cs:line 47
---> (Inner Exception #0) System.ArgumentException: An item with the same key has already been added.
at System.Collections.Generic.Dictionary`2.Insert(TKey key, TValue value, Boolean add)
at MyApp.Importer.StartLoadingResources(DataService separateDataService) in ****\MyApp\MyApp\Importer.cs:line 313
at MyApp.Importer.<Execute>b__5() in ****\MyApp\MyApp\Importer.cs:line 142
at System.Threading.Tasks.Task.Execute()<---
</code></pre>
<p>The code is compiled as Debug, with "Optimize code" in Build options left unchecked.</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
What is a breaking change in software?. <p>In our company we have a definition of what a breaking change is.</p>
<p>It is a change </p>
<pre><code> - that changes a method signature.
- that changes the behavior of a method.
- that changes settings, configuration.
- that adds dependencies to a module, assembly etc..
</code></pre>
<p>Would you say this is a good/complete definition of a breaking change? Is there something missing? Would you consider a change in the database schema a breaking change too (e.g. a new column or new table)?</p>
<p>Thanks in advance.</p>
<p><strong>EDIT:</strong> Just found this <a href="https://stackoverflow.com/questions/1456785/a-definitive-guide-to-api-breaking-changes-in-net">A definitive guide to API-breaking changes in .NET</a></p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Free Talk Sunday - /r/PS4 Weekly Open Discussion Thread (2016.05.01). Weekly Open Discussion Thread ([previous free talk threads](http://www.reddit.com/r/PS4/search?q=title%3A%22Weekly+Open+Discussion+Thread%22+author%3Aautomoderator+&restrict_sr=on&sort=new&t=all)) ([schedule](/r/PS4/wiki/subreddit/schedule)) ([games wiki](/r/PS4/wiki/games))
***
Share any thoughts or opinions you'd like to here, ranging from things related to PS4 and PlayStation to general thoughts about the world today.
Rules:
- The only requirements of this thread are basic [reddiquette](https://www.reddit.com/wiki/reddiquette) and following our general comment rules ([listed here](http://www.reddit.com/r/PS4/w/subreddit/rules)).
| 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
This is what I imagine when I think of vegans playing shooters.. | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
This stackable media hub plays your old 16-bit game cartridges -- Pretty interesting in comparison to other Android PCs!. | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
Update information is outdated. <blockquote>
<p><strong>Possible Duplicate:</strong><br>
<a href="https://askubuntu.com/questions/65911/how-can-i-fix-a-404-error-using-a-ppa">How can I fix a 404 Error using a PPA?</a> </p>
</blockquote>
<p>I can't remove the red triangle in the right upper corner of my desktop. When I type
<code>sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get upgrade</code>
I get the error message below:</p>
<pre><code>W: Failed to fetch http://ppa.launchpad.net/michael-gruz/canon/ubuntu/dists/precise/main/source/Sources 404 Not Found
W: Failed to fetch http://ppa.launchpad.net/michael-gruz/canon/ubuntu/dists/precise/main/binary-i386/Packages 404 Not Found
E: Some index files failed to download. They have been ignored, or old ones used instead.
</code></pre>
<p>How to fix my problem?</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Number of terms in the expansion of $(1+x^3+x^5) ^n$?. <p>How can we find the number of terms in the expansion of $(1+x^3+x^5)^n$ ?</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Kate editor : Indentation in Python. <p>When I user TAB to indent my code, Some times there is a >> sign in the beginning of the line
and some times not.</p>
<p>This happens automatically.
<a href="https://i.stack.imgur.com/sbogH.png" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/sbogH.png" alt="enter image description here" /></a></p>
<p>when ever that happens, python results in error for indentation.</p>
<p><a href="https://i.stack.imgur.com/0jq6w.png" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/0jq6w.png" alt="Indentation error" /></a></p>
<p>But on this line, when I press the single tab it indents the code automatically to the correct position.
So it is more convenient if it happens, but python does not parse it.</p>
<p>Dos any one also has faced such a problem?</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
How to get the last records for a combination of 2 columns?. <p>I have a situation which I think can be compared to services like CamelCamelCamel, Keepa and so on.
Lets say I track the price of an article on each day for a couple of countries. So my table, lets call it <code>Trend</code>, would look something like this</p>
<pre><code>Id Created ArticleId Country Price
-------------------------------------------------
01 19/11/05 452 US 45.90
02 19/11/05 452 CA 52.99
03 19/11/05 452 MX 99.99
04 19/11/06 452 US 20.00
05 19/11/06 452 CA 25.00
06 19/11/06 452 MX 50.00
...
97 19/11/05 738 US 12.99
98 19/11/05 738 CA 17.50
99 19/11/05 738 MX 45.50
</code></pre>
<p>So it's the next day and I want to update the <code>Trend</code> table. If the price in a country is still the same, I skip the article/country combination. If there is a new price I'll add a new record.</p>
<p>Now I want to query the table to get each <code>ArticleId</code> / <code>Country</code> combination. But only the last record of it (orderd by timestamp). So taken the example above I'd expect to get the records <code>04</code>, <code>05</code> and <code>06</code> for <code>ArticleId</code> <code>452</code>. Not <code>01</code>, <code>02</code> and <code>03</code></p>
<p>So I start out with this basic query. But how do I get to change it to get my expected results?</p>
<pre><code>SELECT
*
FROM
Trend
ORDER BY
Created DESC
</code></pre>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
How to actually approach someone you like (My story). I've honestly been a guy who had a hard time dating or getting a girl to like me. After years of being the "Nice guy" I just decided to actually take matters in my own hands and actually do something to get a gf. I am in no way a 10, or athletic or a fedora wearing weeb. I'm just me. Thats something to keep in mind. When I was 16 I was a mega virgin but the guy you would never guess would ever get laid and I thought like most "nice guys" the usual "all girls are bitches that want hot guys" "All girls just want is money" and I sent cringe filled messages to girls I liked and texted them all the time. When I went to 9th grade (3rd in Belgium) I arrived in a class with mostly girls, I was completely out of my element. The most contact I ever had with a girl was when a teacher wanted to do group works in class and decided that I had to go with a girl. So basically I had to make friends. Long story short I made friends and I learned 2 valuable things that now just seem extremely logical and true with everyone, 1. Not all girls are assholes and only about the looks, sure there are some like that but if you think that about all of them it's just stupid, 2. Girls prefer when a guy in genuine and isn't an asshole, 3. Don't force anything, getting into a relationship has to be natural, follow hints, ask around if she is interested and if not then just dont try and force anything just stay friends (if you are friends) and see where it goes from there, 3. Accept rejection, don't insult people when they reject you please please please thats almost as bad as asking nudes someone you dont know. People talk and will know about you saying that you called that girl a bitch and a piece of shit for not being interested in you. 4. Understanding the person you like, build a bond and continue building it. Getting in a relationship demands work and you have to be invested, building a bond and a very strong friendship is really good, even if in the end you dont end up dating you just gained a new friendship and someone that can advise you on what to do and what not to do. I don't guarentee any results but it worked for me, I really do want to stress the fact that girls are just like guys if you say weird shit to a guy you don't know he's also not gonna talk to you or wanna be your friend or hang out with you. Most importantly be yourself, be confident, don't look around you just work on yourself to be the best you, and most of the points I make here are reversable. AND DON'T BE A PIECE OF SHIT | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
How to use spot instance with amazon elastic beanstalk?. <p>I have one infra that use amazon elastic beanstalk to deploy my application.
I need to scale my app adding some spot instances that EB do not support.</p>
<p>So I create a second autoscaling from a launch configuration with spot instances.
The autoscaling use the same load balancer created by beanstalk.</p>
<p>To up instances with the last version of my app, I copy the user data from the original launch configuration (created with beanstalk) to the launch configuration with spot instances (created by me).</p>
<p>This work fine, but:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>how to update spot instances that have come up from the second autoscaling when the beanstalk update instances managed by him with a new version of the app?</p>
</li>
<li><p>is there another way so easy as, and elegant, to use spot instances and enjoy the benefits of beanstalk?</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>UPDATE</strong></p>
<p>Elastic Beanstalk add support to spot instance since 2019... see:
<a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/elasticbeanstalk/latest/relnotes/release-2019-11-25-spot.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://docs.aws.amazon.com/elasticbeanstalk/latest/relnotes/release-2019-11-25-spot.html</a></p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
LIFT UP Trailer - The film follows two brothers as they return to their native Haiti to pay tribute to their late grandfather, and to all those that passed away in the January 12th earthquake.
. | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
Cancel auto-renewal subscriptions with Swift. <p>I want to create a button where a user can cancel a auto-renewal subscription (or get redirected to App Store).
<br /> Is that possible without the user having to go through the whole purchase process first? If it is, how would you go about doing it?
<br /> Any thoughts on the matter will be greatly appreciated!! </p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
NSSegmentedControl highlighting with blue tint and single-selection. <p>Is there a documented way for an <code>NSSegmentedControl</code> to use the trackingMode <code>NSSegmentSwitchTrackingSelectOne</code> (i.e. exclusively select one segment in the control) and have it <strong>rendered using the blue tint highlighting mode</strong> - the one we get automatically when using <code>NSSegmentSwitchTrackingSelectAny</code>?</p>
<p>What I’m looking for is a style similar to the one seen in <strong>Xcode’s toolbar</strong> or <strong>Navigator</strong> sub tool bar/switcher:</p>
<p><a href="https://i.stack.imgur.com/CBn7k.png" rel="noreferrer"><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/CBn7k.png" alt="enter image description here"></a></p>
<p>Attempts so far using either different styles or poking around the headers didn’t turn up anything -<br>
the segmented control is rendered with dark grey highlighting (similar to the one observed in Finder windows).</p>
<p>Any hints on how to activate the blue highlighting mode much appreciated.</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Bash: pressing escape 4 times. <p>When I press escape 4 times in a bash terminal, it displays something like this:</p>
<pre><code>-bash-4.1$
Display all 2837 possibilities? (y or n)
:
!
./
[
[[
]]
{
}
411toppm
a2p
ac
accept
accton
aclocal
aclocal-1.11
acpi_listen
</code></pre>
<p>What is this feature, and how are these entries found? (On the second esc press, the terminal gives an audible alert.)</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
If a giant mirror was the same distance as the ISS.. | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
dotnet build not building non-npm SPA. <p>I'm currently trying to integrate a single page app into a C# .Net Core 3.1 project but I'm struggling to convince MSBuild to compile the spa and bundle it into the runtime executable.</p>
<p>The SPA uses Elm + create-elm-app and thus doesn't use npm. I've tweaked my .csproj file to delegate to <code>elm-app build</code> but this isn't invoked. Deliberately breaking the Elm code to force build failures again has no effect. Please note, I've replaced node_modules with elm-stuff which is where dependencies etc are downloaded to. I'm presuming this is something to do with my ItemGroups but the source files are recognised in my (Rider) project browser. Also note, </p>
<p>Interesting parts of my .csproj:</p>
<pre><code><Project Sdk="Microsoft.NET.Sdk.Web">
<PropertyGroup>
<TargetFramework>netcoreapp3.1</TargetFramework>
<IsPackable>false</IsPackable>
<SpaRoot>ClientApp\</SpaRoot>
<DefaultItemExcludes>$(DefaultItemExcludes);$(SpaRoot)elm-stuff\**</DefaultItemExcludes>
</PropertyGroup>
<ItemGroup>
<PackageReference Include="EventStore.ClientAPI.NetCore" Version="4.1.0.23" />
<PackageReference Include="Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.OpenIdConnect" Version="3.1.4" />
<PackageReference Include="Microsoft.AspNetCore.Mvc.Razor.RuntimeCompilation" Version="3.1.4" />
<PackageReference Include="Microsoft.AspNetCore.SpaServices.Extensions" Version="3.1.4" />
<PackageReference Include="Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration" Version="3.1.4" />
</ItemGroup>
<ItemGroup>
<!-- Don't publish the SPA source files, but do show them in the project files list -->
<Content Remove="$(SpaRoot)**" />
<None Remove="$(SpaRoot)**" />
<None Include="$(SpaRoot)**" Exclude="$(SpaRoot)elm-stuff\**" />
</ItemGroup>
<Target Name="PublishRunWebpack" AfterTargets="ComputeFilesToPublish">
<!-- As part of publishing, ensure the JS resources are freshly built in production mode -->
<Exec WorkingDirectory="$(SpaRoot)" Command="elm-app build" />
<!-- Include the newly-built files in the publish output -->
<ItemGroup>
<DistFiles Include="$(SpaRoot)build\**" />
<ResolvedFileToPublish Include="@(DistFiles->'%(FullPath)')" Exclude="@(ResolvedFileToPublish)">
<RelativePath>%(DistFiles.Identity)</RelativePath>
<CopyToPublishDirectory>PreserveNewest</CopyToPublishDirectory>
<ExcludeFromSingleFile>true</ExcludeFromSingleFile>
</ResolvedFileToPublish>
</ItemGroup>
</Target>
</Project>
</code></pre>
<p>Interesting parts of my Startup.cs</p>
<pre><code> public void ConfigureServices(IServiceCollection services)
{
....
if (_environment.IsDevelopment())
{
services.AddControllersWithViews()
.AddRazorRuntimeCompilation();
}
else
{
services.AddControllersWithViews();
}
services.AddSpaStaticFiles(configuration => { configuration.RootPath = "ClientApp/build"; });
}
// This method gets called by the runtime. Use this method to configure the HTTP request pipeline.
public void Configure(IApplicationBuilder app, IWebHostEnvironment env)
....
if (env.IsDevelopment())
{
app.UseDeveloperExceptionPage();
}
else
{
app.UseExceptionHandler("/Home/Error");
// The default HSTS value is 30 days. You may want to change this for production scenarios, see https://aka.ms/aspnetcore-hsts.
app.UseHsts();
}
app.UseHttpsRedirection();
app.UseStaticFiles();
app.UseSpaStaticFiles();
app.UseRouting();
app.UseSpa(spa =>
{
spa.Options.SourcePath = "ClientApp";
if (_environment.IsDevelopment())
{
spa.UseProxyToSpaDevelopmentServer("http://localhost:3000/");
}
});
}
</code></pre>
<p>And the result of a dotnet build showing successful compilation of C# source, but no mention of delegation or failure to delegate to elm-app:</p>
<pre><code>will@cafell Application % dotnet build
Microsoft (R) Build Engine version 16.5.0+d4cbfca49 for .NET Core
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
Restore completed in 49.73 ms for /Users/will/src/startups/ideasforphotography/ideasforphotography/IdeasForPhotography.Framework/IdeasForPhotography.Framework.csproj.
Restore completed in 49.74 ms for /Users/will/src/startups/ideasforphotography/ideasforphotography/Application/Application.csproj.
Restore completed in 49.74 ms for /Users/will/src/startups/ideasforphotography/ideasforphotography/IdeasForPhotography.Domain.ClubIdeas/IdeasForPhotography.Domain.ClubIdeas.csproj.
IdeasForPhotography.Framework -> /Users/will/src/startups/ideasforphotography/ideasforphotography/IdeasForPhotography.Framework/bin/Debug/netcoreapp3.1/IdeasForPhotography.Framework.dll
IdeasForPhotography.Domain.ClubIdeas -> /Users/will/src/startups/ideasforphotography/ideasforphotography/IdeasForPhotography.Domain.ClubIdeas/bin/Debug/netcoreapp3.1/IdeasForPhotography.Domain.ClubIdeas.dll
Clubs/ClubApplicationService.cs(19,21): warning CS8509: The switch expression does not handle all possible values of its input type (it is not exhaustive). [/Users/will/src/startups/ideasforphotography/ideasforphotography/Application/Application.csproj]
Infrastructure/EventDeserializer.cs(21,30): warning CS0168: The variable 'ex' is declared but never used [/Users/will/src/startups/ideasforphotography/ideasforphotography/Application/Application.csproj]
Application -> /Users/will/src/startups/ideasforphotography/ideasforphotography/Application/bin/Debug/netcoreapp3.1/Application.dll
Application -> /Users/will/src/startups/ideasforphotography/ideasforphotography/Application/bin/Debug/netcoreapp3.1/Application.Views.dll
Build succeeded.
Clubs/ClubApplicationService.cs(19,21): warning CS8509: The switch expression does not handle all possible values of its input type (it is not exhaustive). [/Users/will/src/startups/ideasforphotography/ideasforphotography/Application/Application.csproj]
Infrastructure/EventDeserializer.cs(21,30): warning CS0168: The variable 'ex' is declared but never used [/Users/will/src/startups/ideasforphotography/ideasforphotography/Application/Application.csproj]
2 Warning(s)
0 Error(s)
Time Elapsed 00:00:03.34
</code></pre>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
How to use spot instance with amazon elastic beanstalk?. <p>I have one infra that use amazon elastic beanstalk to deploy my application.
I need to scale my app adding some spot instances that EB do not support.</p>
<p>So I create a second autoscaling from a launch configuration with spot instances.
The autoscaling use the same load balancer created by beanstalk.</p>
<p>To up instances with the last version of my app, I copy the user data from the original launch configuration (created with beanstalk) to the launch configuration with spot instances (created by me).</p>
<p>This work fine, but:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>how to update spot instances that have come up from the second autoscaling when the beanstalk update instances managed by him with a new version of the app?</p>
</li>
<li><p>is there another way so easy as, and elegant, to use spot instances and enjoy the benefits of beanstalk?</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>UPDATE</strong></p>
<p>Elastic Beanstalk add support to spot instance since 2019... see:
<a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/elasticbeanstalk/latest/relnotes/release-2019-11-25-spot.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://docs.aws.amazon.com/elasticbeanstalk/latest/relnotes/release-2019-11-25-spot.html</a></p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
combining key values in object of an array. <p>I am looking to combine all the key values in the objects of this array. </p>
<p><div class="snippet" data-lang="js" data-hide="false" data-console="true" data-babel="false">
<div class="snippet-code">
<pre class="snippet-code-js lang-js prettyprint-override"><code>var currentInventory = [
{
name: 'Brunello Cucinelli',
shoes: [
{name: 'tasselled black low-top lace-up', price: 1000},
{name: 'tasselled green low-top lace-up', price: 1100},
{name: 'plain beige suede moccasin', price: 950},
{name: 'plain olive suede moccasin', price: 1050}
]
},
{
name: 'Gucci',
shoes: [
{name: 'red leather laced sneakers', price: 800},
{name: 'black leather laced sneakers', price: 900}
]
}
];</code></pre>
</div>
</div>
</p>
<p>the end result should be: </p>
<pre><code>[
['Brunello Cucinelli', 'tasselled black low-top lace-up', 1000],
['Brunello Cucinelli', 'tasselled green low-top lace-up', 1100],
// ...
]
</code></pre>
<p>I have the following code: </p>
<pre><code>function renderInventory(inventory) {
const arr = [];
for (var i = 0; i < inventory.length; i++) {
for (var n = 0; n < inventory[i].shoes.length; n++) {
arr.push([inventory[i].name + ', ' + inventory[i].shoes[n].name + ', ' + inventory[i].shoes[n].price]);
}
}
return arr;
}
</code></pre>
<p>and it gives me the result of: </p>
<pre><code>[
['Brunello Cucinelli, tasselled black low-top lace-up, 1000'],
['Brunello Cucinelli, tasselled green low-top lace-up, 1100'],
...
]
</code></pre>
<p>I'm not sure what to do so the quotations wraps around each element rather than the whole array. </p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Yeah.... don’t trust scientists..... | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
View from Machu Picchu, Peru [1,936 x 2,592] [OC]. | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
Can I check whether integral solutions exist if I know a rational solution?. <p>The pell-like equation $$x^2-101y^2=-71$$ has the rational solution $(x,y)=(\frac{25}{2},\frac{3}{2})$</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Can I use this rational point to find out , whether an integral solution exists ? If yes, can I also find it out for an arbitary equation $$Ax^2+Bxy+Cy^2+Dx+Ey+F=0$$ Again, we can assume that we know a rational solution.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>I read somewhere that a rational point allows a parametrization, but I am not sure whether this helps to solve my problem.</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Nearly 70 lbs lost and near 10% body fat and NO loose skin yet. :). ... which is good news. So I can confirm that for the most part my skin is tightening up very well.
I took my time and lost at about 1-2 lbs per week. Didn't really do anything crazy. Drank lots of water all the time. Avoid the sun ... don' tan.
I'm in my early 30s... male.
Hope this gives people some confidence that this problem won't hit them because I was really worried about it for a while. | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
Can we prove that $p_N + 3 \leq 2 p_{N-1}$ for sufficiently large $N$?. <p>Question in the title. </p>
<p>It intuitively seems absurd that $p_N - p_{N-1} \gt p_{N-1} - 3 = $ the largest gap formable from all $p_i = $ odd primes $3, \dots, p_{N-1}$.</p>
<p>Was wondering how difficult the proof is.</p>
<hr>
<p>$2 p_i$ is the smallest composite divisible by $p_i$. And $p_N + 3$ is certainly a composite. Not sure if that helps : ></p>
<hr>
<p>Thanks @PaoloLeonetti in the comments. According to the article:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In 1998, Pierre Dusart improved the result in his doctoral thesis,
showing that for $k \geq 463, p_{k+1} \leq (1 + 1/(\ln^2 p_k))p_k$, ...</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So we want to show that $p_{k+1} \leq 2 p_{k} - 3$ for sufficiently large $k$. </p>
<p>$2 p_k - 3 = (2 - \dfrac{3}{p_k})p_k$ and</p>
<p>$$
2 - \dfrac{3}{p_k} \geq 1 + 1 / (\ln^2 p_k) \iff
(1 - \dfrac{3}{p_k})\ln^2 p_k \geq 1 \iff \\
\ln^2 p_k \geq \dfrac{p_k}{p_k - 3}
$$</p>
<p>the last operation being valid since $k \geq 463$ and so $3$ is much less than $p_k$ and so $1 - \dfrac{3}{p_k} \gt 0$. </p>
<p>Now take the exponential:</p>
<p>$$
\iff 8 \approx \ln(p_k) \geq e^{\frac{p_k}{p_k - 3}} \approx 2
$$
Where the approximation is at least valid enough for $k \geq 463$.</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Where are all of the dailies?. might be a bit much to ask but could i get a list of all the new dailies in mop and their locations? all i know of so far are the cloud serpent ones. | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
Do any of you have some good salad and raw veggie meal prep recipes?. Hey, I am new to prepping and I am looking for some good simple recipes for salads and/or raw veggies. Any help would be great or to point me to a good place to start.
Thanks! | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
Tips on getting my cat to not hiss at the new kitten?. So I'm babysitting my friends new kitten while she's away for the long weekend. I have my own cat who's 6 years old, and for the most part hasn't lived with other cats much (I did have an apartment with roomie and another cat, but we moved in at the same time, and for the most part they were fine together).
Right now my cat is constantly hissing and growling at the new kitten. He hasn't gotten violent and tried to hurt the kitten yet, nor has he chased the kitten, and I can still pet him when he's hissing and he immediately calms down. For the most part my cat has stayed in my bedroom, while the kitten has stayed in the living room; sometimes my cat would come and roam around the living room and the kitten would usually hide (http://i.imgur.com/57jie.jpg). Sometimes, my cat would hiss and growl, and then run away back to my room! I can spritz my cat with a water bottle, and when I do he usually stops hissing for that bit.
I get that my cat is trying to assert his dominance over his territory (while hiding in my room, go figure). Question is, is there anything I can do? The kitten hasn't really done anything to my cat; sometimes he'd try to go up to him and meow. Othertimes he'd hide. Othertimes he'd just lie down and blink at him slowly. Should I try to bring the kitten closer to my cat? Should I spritz my cat when he hisses? Should I leave them be? | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
Human Cognition through the Lens of Social
Engineering Cyberattacks
A Preprint
Rosana Montañez
Department of Computer Science
University of Texas at San Antonio
San Antonio, TX, USA
[email protected]
Edward Golob
Department of Psychology
University of Texas at San Antonio
San Antonio, TX, USA
[email protected]
Shouhuai Xu
Department of Computer Science
University of Texas at San Antonio
San Antonio, TX, USA
[email protected]
July 13, 2020
Abstract
Social engineering cyberattacks are a major threat because they often prelude sophisticated
and devastating cyberattacks. Social engineering cyberattacks are a kind of psychological
attack that exploits weaknesses in human cognitive functions. Adequate defense against social
engineering cyberattacks requires a deeper understanding of what aspects of human cognition
are exploited by these cyberattacks, why humans are susceptible to these cyberattacks, and
how we can minimize or at least mitigate their damage. These questions have received some
amount of attention but the state-of-the-art understanding is superficial and scattered in the
literature. In this paper, we review human cognition through the lens of social engineering
cyberattacks. Then, we propose an extended framework of human cognitive functions to
accommodate social engineering cyberattacks. We cast existing studies on various aspects of
social engineering cyberattacks into the extended framework, while drawing a number of
insights that represent the current understanding and shed light on future research directions.
The extended framework might inspire future research endeavor towards a new sub-field
that can be called Cybersecurity Cognitive Psychology, which tailors or adapts principles of
Cognitive Psychology to the cybersecurity domain while embracing new notions and concepts
that are unique to the cybersecurity domain.
Keywords Social Engineering Cyberattacks · Cyberattacks · Cyberdefenses · Human Cognition · Cognitive
Psychology
1 Introduction
Social engineering cyberattacks are a kind of psychological attack that attempts to persuade an individual
(i.e., victim) to act as intended by an attacker [Mitnick and Simon, 2003, Anderson, 2008]. These attacks
exploit weaknesses in human interactions and behavioral/cultural constructs Indrajit [2017] and occur in
many forms, including phishing, scam, frauds, spams, spear phishing and social media sock puppets [Stajano
and Wilson, 2009, Linvill et al., 2019].
For example, in the 2016 U.S. election, attackers used so-called social media sock puppets (also know as
Russian Troll) or fictional identities to influence others’ opinions [Linvill et al., 2019].
ar
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7.
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20
20
A preprint - July 13, 2020
The effectiveness of current security technologies has made social engineering attacks the gateway to ex-
ploiting cyber systems. Most sophisticated and devastating cyberattacks often start with social engineering
cyberattacks, such as spear phishing, where the attacker gains access into an enterprise network [Hutchins
et al., 2011]. Indeed, Mitnick and Simon [2003] describe many ways to gain access to secure systems using
social engineering cyberattacks. Research in social engineering has mostly focused on understanding and/or
detecting the attacks from a technological perspective (e.g., detecting phishing emails by analyzing email
contents). However, there is no systematic understanding of the psychological components of these attacks,
which perhaps explains why these attacks are so prevalent and successful.
This motivates the present study, which aims to systematize human cognition through the lens of social
engineering cyberattacks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first of its kind in filling this void.
1.1 Our contributions
In this paper, we make the following contributions. First, we advocate treating social engineering cyberattacks
as a particular kind of psychological attack. This new perspective may be of independent value, even from
a psychological point of view, because it lays a foundation for a field that may be called Cybersecurity
Cognitive Psychology, which extends and adapts principles of cognitive psychology to satisfy cybersecurity’s
needs while embracing new notions and concepts that may be unique to the cybersecurity domain. This
approach would pave the way for designing effective defenses against social engineering cyberattacks and
assuring that they are built based on psychologically valid assumptions. For example, it may be convenient to
assume that individuals are willing to participate in defenses against social engineering cyberattacks or that
victims are simply reckless. However, these assumptions are questionable because most social engineering
cyberattacks are crafted to trigger subconscious, automatic responses from victims while disguising these
attacks as legitimate requests.
Second, as a first step towards the ultimate Cybersecurity Cognitive Psychology, we propose extending the
standard framework of human cognition to accommodate social engineering cyberattacks. This framework
can accommodate the literature studying various aspects of social engineering cyberattacks. In particular, the
framework leads to a quantitative representation for mathematically characterizing persuasion, which is a core
concept in the emerging Cybersecurity Cognitive Psychology and it is key for understanding behavior in the
traditional framework of human cognition. Some of our findings are highlighted as follows: (i) a high cognitive
workload, a high degree of stress, a low degree of attentional vigilance, a lack of domain knowledge, and/or
a lack of past experience makes one more susceptible to social engineering cyberattacks; (ii) awareness or
gender alone does not necessarily reduce one’s susceptibility to social engineering cyberattacks; (iii) cultural
background does affect one’s susceptibility to social engineering cyberattacks; (iv) the more infrequent the
social engineering cyberattacks, the higher susceptibility to these attacks; (v) for training to be effective, it
should capitalize on high capacity unconscious processing, with the goal of creating a warning system that
operates in parallel with the user’s conscious focus of attention; (vi) it is currently not clear how personality
affects one’s susceptibility to social engineering cyberattacks; and (vii) more studies, especially quantitative
studies, need to be conducted to draw better and consistent results. In addition to these findings, we propose
a range of future research directions, with emphasis on quantifying the effect of model parameters (i.e.,
victim’s short-term cognition factors, long-term cognition factors, long-memory, and attacker effort) on the
amount of persuasion experienced by the human target.
1.2 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to systematically explore the psychological foundation of social
engineering cyberattacks. As discussed in the main body of the present paper, most prior studies focus
on social engineering cyberattack or cyberdefense techniques. For example, Gupta et al. [2016] investigate
defenses against phishing attacks; Abass [2018] discusses social engineering cyberattacks and non-technical
defenses against them.
Few prior studies have an aim that is similar to ours. Salahdine and Kaabouch [2019] review social engineering
cyberattacks and mitigation strategies, but they do not discuss factors such as human cognition. Darwish
et al. [2012] discuss at a high-level the relationship between human factors, social engineering cyberattacks,
and cyberdefenses, but they neither examine what makes an individual susceptible to social engineering
cyberattacks nor do they discuss the effect of a victim’s psychological and situational conditions (e.g., culture
and short-term factors) on the outcome. Pfleeger and Caputo [2012] take a multidisciplinary approach to
examine cybersecurity from a Behavioral Science perspective, but they do not offer any systematic framework
of looking at human cognition in the context of social engineering cyberattacks. The lack of studies in
2
A preprint - July 13, 2020
social engineering cyberattacks might be associated with these studies involving human subjects. In an
academic setting, approval for deceptive studies on human subjects requires consent from all entities involved,
including ethics board and IT department [Vishwanath et al., 2011]. The nature of the topic might also
raise sensitivities among those involved [Jagatic et al., 2007], which can lengthen the process. This can be
discouraging for most researchers.
1.3 Paper Outline
Section 2 reviews a basic framework for human cognition (without the presence of social engineering
cyberattacks). Section 3 extends the basic framework to accommodate social engineering cyberattacks and
systematizes victim’s cognition through the lens of social engineering cyberattacks, with future research
directions.
Section 4 concludes the present paper.
2 Overview of Human Cognition
In this section, we review human cognition functions prior to the presence of social engineering cyberattacks.
This framework of human cognition serves as a basis for exploring how victims’ cognition functions are
exploited to wage social engineering cyberattacks.
2.1 Human Cognitive Functions
The term “cognition” can have radically different meanings in different contexts. Here we use the term
“cognition” in the broadest sense - as a descriptive term for the software counterpart to the brain as hardware.
That is, cognition is the abstract information processing that is being implemented by neurons in the brain
[Pinker, 2009]. From this perspective, cognition can also include information processing that computes
emotions as well as the vast majority of neural information processing that is not reflected in our conscious
awareness [Baars, 1997].
Cognitive psychologists often consider information processing to be the basic function of the brain, in the
same way that the liver functions as a complex filter and arteries and veins are essentially pipes. Correlates
of information processing in the brain can be directly observed using various methods to record electrical
and chemical activity [Kandel et al., 2000]. Information processing is evident at multiple spatial, from
compartments within individual neurons to tightly organized networks having members in different parts of
the brain. These concrete, physically measurable, neurophysiological activities are analogous to the hardware
of a computer. Indeed, neurons have been profitably studied in terms of functioning as Boolean logic gates,
and action potentials, perhaps the most characteristic property of neurons, is convey all-or-none binary states
[Shepherd, 2004].
Behavior
Working
memory
Decision
making
Workload Stress Vigilance
Perception
Action
Short-term cognition factors
Personality Expertise Individual difference
Long-term cognition factors
Culture
Legend
Information flow
Interactions
Figure 1: A basic, selective schema of human cognition, where the blue background within the oval indicates
long-term memory that is accessible by the four components of human cognition functions.
Figure 1 presents a very basic, and selective, schematic of human cognition functions, which are centered
at four information processing components analogous to software components in an information processing
system. These four components are called perception, working memory, decision making and action. These
3
A preprint - July 13, 2020
four components are elaborated below as follows. Perception converts information in the word, sampled from
the senses, into neural codes that can be used for intelligent behavior and conscious experience [Mesulam,
1998]. Working memory consists of attention and short-term memory, and coordinates information processing
by prioritizing certain information for short periods of time, often to accomplish a goal [Miyake and Shah,
1999]. Decision making further prioritizes information from working memory and other unconscious sources,
and is a gateway to behavior [Kahneman, 2011]. Action is the implementation of computations from decision
making, as well as other influences, and also organizes the physical activity of muscles and glands that are
measurable as behavior [Franklin and Wolpert, 2011]. Perception, working memory, decision making, and
action are often considered to be roughly sequential, as when trying to hit a baseball, but can mutually
influence each other in many ways. All of these cognitive processes operate on a foundation of accumulated
knowledge in memory, which informs these processes, such as when perceiving a familiar face.
Memory is intrinsic to cognition, because information processing occurs over time and thus requires some
information to be retained over time. The basic processes of perception, working memory, decision making,
and action that are engaged “in the moment” use information that is preserved from earlier moments in
time. Memory consists of distinct systems [Tulving and Craik, 2000], in the same way that our domain
of “perception” includes the visual, auditory, somatosensory, olfactory, gustatory, and vestibular systems.
One important distinction among systems is whether the information is retained over short periods of time,
typically seconds to minutes, or longer periods of time. In our overview shown in Figure 1, short-term memory
is a component of working memory. Long-term memory contributes to cognition in general, and for this
reason, we have situated all of four domains supporting cognition in the moment within long-term memory
(indicated by the blue background). As with the other cognitive domains, memory systems can work in
parallel. For example, the memory of the previous sentence is supported by short-term memory, yet the
memory for what each word means resides in long-term memory.
Above, we presented several basic types of information processing that together generate behavior. We now
consider how these basic cognitive processes can be influenced, for better or worse, by a few important factors
that are demonstrably relevant to cybersecurity. The “short-term” factors, reflecting the immediate situation,
and “long-term” factors are ultimately coded in some form by the brain and exert an influence on the basic
cognitive processes that drive behavior. The short-term and long-term factors are elaborated in the next two
subsections.
2.2 Short-Term Cognitive Factors
We focus on three short-term factors: workload, stress, and vigilance. These factors operate on relatively short
timescales (minutes to hours) that have been intensively studied because they impair human performance.
We will consider how these factors may relate to social engineering, and point out the extant literature and
promising future directions.
2.2.1 Workload
Human cognition is affected by cognitive workload,
which depends on task demand and the operator in question.
Depending on the details, two tasks can be done at the same time with little or no performance costs (a
manageable workload) or be nearly impossible to do well together (a very high workload). A nice example
comes from [Shaffer, 1975], who found that typists could very accurately read and type while they also
verbally repeated a spoken message. Performance, however, plummeted on both tasks if they tried to take
dictation (typing a spoken message) while also trying to read a written message out loud. The differences
are thought to reflect the use of phonological (sound-based) and orthographic (visual letter-based) cognitive
codes. In the first example one code is used per task (phonological: listen to speech-talk; orthographic:
read-type), while in the second each code is used for both tasks (speech-type; read-talk). To account for these
complexities, psychologists have developed theories that consider different types of cognitive codes
[Navon and Gopher, 1979], such as auditory or visual sensory input, higher-level verbal or spatial codes, and
output codes for driving speech or manual behaviors
[Wickens, 2008]. Measures have also been developed to quantify the subjective sense of how much “cognitive
work” is being done in a given task. Perhaps the most common instrument to measure subjective workload is
the NASA-TLX, which has six dimensions that are clearly explained to the subject, such as “mental demand”
or temporal demand (time pressure), and are rated on a scale from low to high. Lastly, neurophysiological
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measures are often used to provide objective, convergent measures of workload as well as suggest potential
neural mechanisms. Neurophysiological measures such as transcranial Doppler measures of blood flow velocity
in the brain, EEG measures of brain electrical potentials, autonomic nervous system activity such as skin
conductance and heart rate and its variability, and functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) to quantify
changes in blood flow that are secondary to neural activity are commonly used [Parasuraman and Rizzo,
2008].
2.2.2 Stress
Acute stress may also influence cognition and behaviors that are relevant to cybersecurity. We distinguish
acute from chronic stress, with chronic stress beginning after a duration on the order of months, as their impact
on cognition can differ and chronic stress is better classified here as a long-term factor. The neurobiological
and hormonal responses to a stressful event have been well studied, as have their impact on behavior [Lupien
et al., 2009]. Acute stress can influence attention, a vital component to working memory, in ways that are
beneficial as well as detrimental [Al’Absi et al., 2002]. Attentional tunneling is one such effect of acute stress
where attention is hyper-focused on aspects relevant to the cause of the stress, but is less sensitive to other
information. The term tunneling derives from the use of spatial attention tasks, where arousal due to stress
leads to subjects ignoring things that are more distant from the focus of attention [Mather and Sutherland,
2011]. In the realm of cyber security, attention tunneling from an emotion-charged phishing message could
lead one to hyper-focusing on the email text but ignore a suspicious address or warnings at the periphery.
Working memory is also vulnerable to acute stress
[Schwabe and Wolf, 2013], particularly by way of interfering with prefrontal cortex function
[Arnsten, 2009, Elzinga and Roelofs, 2005]. Decision making can be driven in two fundamentally different
ways [Evans, 2008]. The first is by relatively automatic processes that are fast but may not be the optimal
choice in some instances (termed “heuristics” and “biases”)
[Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, Gigerenzer, 2008].
The second approach is by using conscious, controlled processing reasoning, which is slower but can be more
sensitive to the particulars of a given situation. Acute stress has a variety of effects on decision making and
many subtleties
[Starcke and Brand, 2012], but in general, can impair rational decision making, and one way is by reducing
the likelihood of controlled decision making and increasing the use of automatic processing.
2.2.3 Vigilance
Vigilance and sustained attention are two closely related, sometimes synonymous, terms for the concept that
cognitive performance will systematically change the longer you perform a given task. Here we will use the
term vigilance, which in the laboratory is studied in sessions that typically last 30-60 min. In a classic work
by
[Mackworth, 1948], subject watched an analog clock and responded to intermittent jumps in the clock hand.
Much work since then has showed that performance in a wide range of tasks declines substantially over these
relatively short periods of time (termed the “vigilance decrement)
[Parasuraman and Rizzo, 2008]. In our view, the potential impact of the vigilance decrement on behavior is an
important factor to explore, because the probability of user error may covary with time on task. For example,
the likelihood of downloading malware may increase as users go through their email inbox, particularly if they
have limited time. Lastly, we note that although the situational categories of workload, stress, and vigilance
are individually important to examine in the realm of cybersecurity, they are also known to interact with
each other. For example, a high workload and prolonged vigilance are stressful
[Parasuraman and Rizzo, 2008]. Another distinction to keep in mind is that many laboratory vigilance tasks
are boring and have a low workload. The extent that the vigilance literature generalizes to other settings such
as an office, where workers may have high workloads and stress from complex job demands, is an empirical
question worth considering in future cybersecurity studies.
2.3 Long Term Cognitive Factors
In contrast to short-term factors that reflect the current situation and can change rapidly, our second grouping
of “long-term factors” covers more stable attributes of a person and their experiences that only gradually
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change. We consider factors of personality, expertise, age and gender, and culture. We include personality as
a long-term factor, even though it can be situation-dependent as well (as with short-term factors)
[Kenrick and Funder, 1988]. These factors offer some predictability of individual behavior in a given situation.
In the context of cybersecurity, long-term psychological factors can impact how an individual responds to
social engineering attacks.
2.3.1 Personality
To Psychologists, “personality” is a technical term that differs somewhat from ordinary usage. It refers
to individual differences in thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that are relatively consistent over time and
situations. We say "relatively" because, as noted above, thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are highly dependent
on the situation, and lifespan approaches have defined notable changes in personality with age
[Donnellan and Robins, 2009]. Personality research is dominated by the Big 5 framework of personality
domains, which was developed over much of the 20th century in various forms
[Digman, 1997]. The Big 5 framework is based on statistical methods (factor analysis) that identify abstract
dimensions that can economically account for much of the variance in personality measures. The factors are
labelled conscientiousness, agreeableness, neuroticism, openness to experience, and extraversion. For present
purposes, the labels of the factors are adequate descriptions of the underlying constructs. Many studies
on the relationship between social engineering and personality focus on openness, conscientiousness, and
neuroticism which are thought to have the most impact on susceptibility to social engineering. The factors
that comprise the Big 5 framework are:
1. Openness: the willingness to experience new things.
2. Conscientiousness: favors-norms, exhibiting self-control and self-discipline, competence.
3. Extraversion: being more friendly, outgoing, interactive with more people.
4. Agreeableness: being cooperative, eager to help others, believe in reciprocity.
5. Neuroticism: tendency to experience negative feelings, guilt, disgust, anger, fear, and sadness.
2.3.2 Expertise
Expertise is typically limited to relatively narrow domain and does not transfer to other areas as much as we
tend to believe (termed the “transfer problem”) [Kimball and Holyoak, 2000]. Limited transfer of expertise
can be compounded by cognitive illusions such as the Dunning-Kruger effect. The Dunning-Kruger effect
empirically shows that individuals often overestimate their competence relative to their objective performance
[Kruger and Dunning, 1999]. Similarly, the “illusion of knowledge” shows that people generally know far less
about a topic than they believe, as revealed by questioning
[Keil, 2003]. In the realm of cybersecurity, these and other empirical phenomena underpin user over confidence
. As will be detailed below, narrow expertise about cybersecurity can be beneficial, but computer expertise
more generally may not confer security benefits.
2.3.3 Individual Differences
There are many kinds of individual differences and we focus on two kinds: age and sex/gender; others would
include role in companies and seniority. In terms of age, there are dramatic changes in cognitive function
and behavioral capacities of children as they develop [Damon et al., 2006]. Considering how youths can
safely use computers is a major parenting, education, public policy, and law enforcement challenge. Social
engineering attacks can readily take advantage of the cognitive and emotional vulnerabilities of children, and
countermeasures are often quite different than with adults (see below). Cognition changes throughout the
adult lifespan at a less frenetic pace vs. in children, but longer term changes are similarly dramatic
[Park and Reuter-Lorenz, 2009, Salthouse, 2012].
Declines in fluid intelligence, essentially ones ability to “think on your feet”, are particularly dramatic and
have wide implications for everyday life
[Horn and Cattell, 1967].
Overall, there are many changes, some declining with age (fluid intelligence) but others not
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[Schaie, 2005]. Another angle is that age is positively associated with the risk for many neurological disorders
that can impair cognition, such as stroke and Alzheimer’s disease [Hof and Mobbs, 2001]. Age-related
neurological disorders are not considered “normal aging”, but the potential vulnerability of many elders due
to brain disease has been well-known to criminals for a long time. As expected, social engineering attacks are
a major problem for this vulnerable population.
Psychology has a long history of studying sex differences, defined by biology (i.e., the presence of two X or
one X and one Y chromosome) and gender, which is a social, rather than biological, construct. In terms
of basic cognitive functions such as working memory and decision making, which are typically studied in a
neutral laboratory context (such as remembering strings of letters, judging categories of pictures, etc.) there
are generally little or no differences between sexes and genders. There are a few well-documented exceptions,
such as males having an advantage for mental spatial rotations [Voyer et al., 1995]. The situation is quite
different when examining cognition in the context of social and emotional factors [Cahill, 2006]. For our
purposes, sex and gender is a basic consideration for social engineering attacks, particularly spear phishing
which is tailored to an individual. Our list could include many other types of individual differences that are
useful for social engineering attacks, such as socio-economic class, education, personal interests, job position.
We chose to focus on age and sex/gender because they are prominent topics in the cognition literature and
important considerations for cyber security challenges such as spear phishing.
2.3.4 Culture
In mainstream cognitive psychology, culture is not a prominent variable, as much of the basic literature
studies participants in countries that have predominantly western cultures [Arnett, 2008]. Nonetheless, a
wide variety of studies have shown that cultural differences are evident in many aspects of cognition, such
as basic perception, language and thought, attention, and reasoning [Grandstrand, 2013]. Culture is an
important variable to consider for any social engineering attack. A phishing email, for example, is unlikely to
be effective if the message violates norms of the target’s culture. We also consider the more specific case of
organizational culture in the workplace, because it is highly relevant to employee behavior as it applies to
cyber security [Bullee et al., 2017]. As with all of the other short-and long-term variables that we consider,
culture is assumed to interact with the other variables, with particularly large interactions with age, gender,
and perhaps personality.
3 Victim Cognition through the Lens of Social Engineering Cyberattacks
Social engineering cyberattacks are a type of psychological attack that exploits human cognition functions to
persuade an individual (i.e., victim) to comply with an attacker’s request [Anderson, 2008]. These attacks are
centered around a social engineering message crafted by an attacker with the intent of persuading a victim to
act as desired by the attacker. These attacks often leverage behavioral and cultural constructs to manipulate
a victim into making a decision based on satisfaction (gratification), rather than based on the best result
(optimization) [Indrajit, 2017, Kahneman, 2011].
For example, one behavioral construct is that most individuals would trade privacy for convenience, or bargain
release of information for a reward [Acquisti and Grossklags, 2005].
To establish a systematic understanding of the victim’s cognition through the lens of social engineering
cyberattacks, we propose extending the framework presented in Figure 1 to accommodate social engineering
cyberattacks against human victims’ cognition functions, leading to the framework highlighted in
Figure 2. This implies that the resulting behavior of a victim will also depend on the attacker’s effort. In what
follows, we will cast the social engineering cyberattacks literature into this framework, by first discussing the
literature related to short-term and long-term cognition factors, and then the literature related to cognition
functions.
3.1 Short-term Cognition Factors through the Lens of Social Engineering Cyberattacks
3.1.1 Workload
In computer-mediated communications, cognitive workload can affect an individual’s ability to process socially
engineered messages. Pfleeger and Caputo [2012] observe that cognitive workload could make individuals
overlook elements that are not associated with the primary task. This effect, called inattentional blindness,
affects an individual’s ability to notice unexpected events when focusing on the primary task [Simons, 2000].
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Behavior (associated to persuasion)
Working
memory
Decision
making
Workload Stress Vigilance
Perception
Action
Short-term cognition factors
Personality Expertise Individual difference
Long-term cognition factors
Culture
Legend
Information flow
Interactions
Attacker
Attack
Figure 2: Extending the basic schema of human cognition presented in Figure 1 to accommodate social
engineering cyberattacks. The extension is to incorporate an attacker that wages a social engineering
cyberattack against a victim’s human cognition functions (i.e., the oval). The resulting behavior is associated
to persuasion (i.e., an attack succeeds when a victim is persuaded to act as intended by the attacker)..
In most cases, security is a secondary task. For example, when an employee attempts to manage several tasks
simultaneously (e.g., reply to hundreds of emails in the email inbox while answering calls and an occasional
request from the boss), the employee is more likely to overlook cues in phishing messages that might indicate
deception. A study that examined actual phishing behavior by sending employees an innocuous phishing
email, found that self-perceived work overload was positively associated with the likelihood of clicking on the
phishing link [Jalali et al., 2020]. Vishwanath et al. [2011] investigate the effect of information processing
and user’s vulnerability to phishing. Leveraging two phishing attacks that target a university, they survey
undergraduate students on their recollection and response to the phishing emails. They find that in the
presence of a perceived relevant email, individuals focus more on urgency cues, while overlooking deception
cues in the message, such as sender’s email address or email grammar spelling. They also find that individuals
that regularly manage large volumes of emails have a high inattentiveness when evaluating emails, making
them more vulnerable to phishing attacks. They also find that a high email load triggers an automatic
response, meaning that workload significantly increases a victim’s vulnerability to phishing attacks.
Summarizing the preceding discussion, we draw:
Insight 1 Cognitive workload, via mechanisms such as inattentional blindness, can increase vulnerability to
social engineering cyberattacks.
3.1.2 Stress
The particular kind of stress, namely acute stress mentioned above, has only been indirectly investigated in
the context of social engineering cyberattacks. Stajano and Wilson [2009] examine how principles of scams
apply to systems security. Scams are a form of social engineering cyberattack that usually involves a physical
interaction between attacker and victim. One scamming technique is the principle of distraction, by which
the attacker can take advantage of a victim that is in a state of mind that prevents them from evaluating
deceptive cues. For example, when an unemployed individual pays a job recruiting company for job hunting
assistance, the individual does not realize that it is a scam. Catphishing is a social engineering cyberattack by
which the attacker creates a fictional online persona to lure a victim into a romantic relationship for financial
gains. In this case, an individual who is searching for a romantic partner and is experiencing some personal
stress might find a catphishing message appealing and, therefore, unable to detect the deception cues in the
catphishing messages. In summary, we draw:
Insight 2 Stress may reduce one’s ability to detect deception cues in social engineering cyberattack messages
but the direct effects of acute stress on cybersecurity social engineering have not been examined.
3.1.3 Vigilance
Purkait et al. [2014] conduct a study to examine cognitive and behavioral factors that affect user’s capabilities
in detecting phishing messages. They study attentional vigilance and short-term memory by surveying 621
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participants’ ability to identify phishing sites, Internet skills, usage and safe practices, and demographics.
The measure of "vigilance" was a brief visual search task in six photographs, which did not evaluate vigilance
as we conventionally defined it above. Individual differences in these visual search scores were significant
predictors of performance distinguishing spam from phishing websites, which likely reflects the ability to
detect visual cues on the website that distinguish spam from phish sites.
Insight 3 Attentional vigilance, particularly the vigilance decrement, may be an important influence on
susceptibility to social engineering attacks, but more research is needed.
3.2 Long-term Cognition Factors through the Lens of Social Engineering Cyberattacks
3.2.1 Personality
Personality has been extensively studied in the context of phishing.
Studies show that Big 5 personality traits are related to individuals’ susceptibility to social engineering
cyberattacks. Pattinson et al. [2012] study how personality traits and impulsiveness affect behavioral responses
to phishing messages. They find that individuals that score high on extraversion and openness manage
phishing emails better than individuals with other personality types. Halevi et al. [2013] find that high
neuroticism increases responses to prize phishing messages and that individuals with a high openness have
low security setting on social media account, increasing their exposures to privacy attacks. Halevi et al.
[2016] find that personality traits affect security attitudes and behaviors as follows: high conscientiousness is
associated to highly secure behaviors, but does not affect self-efficacy (i.e., one’s ability in independently
resolving computer security issues); high openness is associated to high self-efficacy; high neuroticism is
associated to low self-efficacy; and high emotional stability (inverse of neuroticism) is associated to high
self-efficacy.
Cho et al. [2016] contradict some of the findings presented in Halevi et al. [2013], by finding that high
neuroticism decreases trust and increases risk perception, which makes one more likely to misclassify benign
emails as phishing ones. They also find that higher agreeableness increases trust and lowers risk perception
(i.e., more likely classifying phishing messages as benign). Consciousness is commonly associated with
self-control, which diminishes impulsive behavior [Cho et al., 2016]. Pattinson et al. [2012] find that less
impulsive individuals manage phishing messages better. Halevi et al. [2015] show that individuals with high
consciousness and lower risk perception are more likely to fall victims to social engineering cyberattack
messages. Lawson et al. [2018] find that extroversion decreases phishing detection accuracy while high
consciousness increases detection accuracy, and that openness is associated with higher accuracy in detecting
legitimate messages. Darwish et al. [2012] find that individuals high in extraversion and agreeableness pose a
higher security risk. McBride et al. [2012] find that consciousness is associated with low self-efficacy and
threat severity. Workman [Workman, 2008] and Lawson et al. [2018] show that personality traits are related
to the degree of persuasion by social engineering cyberattacks. Summarizing the preceding discussion, we
draw:
Insight 4 Literature results are not conclusive on how personality may influence one’s susceptibility to social
engineering cyberattacks.
3.2.2 Expertise
Related to expertise, domain knowledge, awareness, and experience have been studied in the literature on
their impact on reducing one’s susceptibility to social engineering cyberattacks.
Impact of domain knowledge. An individual’s knowledge related to cyberattacks increases their capability
to resist social engineering cyberattacks. For example, the knowledge can be about web browsers, including
how to view site information and evaluate certificates. Kumaraguru et al. [2006] find (i) non-expert individuals
consider fewer security indicators (e.g., meaningful signals) than experts; (ii) non-expert individuals used
simple rules to determine the legitimacy of a request, while experts also consider other useful information (e.g.,
context) that may reveal security concerns with the request; (iii) non-expert individuals make decisions based
on their emotions, while experts make their decisions based on reasoning; and (iv) non-expert individuals
rely more on (spoofable) visual elements to make decisions because they lack the knowledge that security
indicators can be compromised, while experts are more efficient at identifying suspicious elements in a message.
For example, corresponding to (iii), they observe that a non-expert individual might decide to download a
software program based on how much they want it and if the downloading website is recognizable; whereas
an expert might consider how much they need it and if the downloading website is a reputable source. These
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findings resonate with what is found by Klein and Calderwood [1991], namely that experts make decisions
based on pattern recognition, rather than purely analyzing the available options. Byrne et al. [2016] find that
risk perception for non-expert individuals is influenced by the benefit that can be obtained for an activity,
meaning that actions that an individual considers beneficial are performed more often and are perceived as
less risky.
Insight 5 Domain knowledge helps reduce vulnerability to social engineering cyberattacks.
Impact of awareness. As a rule of thumb, training on non-expert individuals often emphasize on awareness.
In a study of victims in frauds involving phishing and malware incidents, Jansen and Leukfeldt [2016] find
that most participants express that they have knowledge of cybersecurity, but it turns out only a few of them
indeed have the claimed knowledge. Downs et al. [2006] find that awareness of security cues in phishing
messages does not translate into secure behaviors because most participants are unable to tie their actions to
detrimental consequences. On the other hand, it may be intuitive that individuals received formal computer
education would be less vulnerable to social engineering cyberattacks. To the contrary, Ovelgönne et al.
[2017] find that software developers are involved in more cyberattack incidents when compared to others.
Purkait et al. [2014] find that there is no relationship between one’s ability to detect phishing sites and one’s
education and technical backgrounds, Internet skills and hours spent online. Halevi et al. [2013], Junger et al.
[2017], Sheng et al. [2010] find that knowledge acquired through priming and warning does not affect ones’
susceptibility to phishing attacks.
Insight 6 Awareness and general technical knowledge do not necessarily reduce one’s susceptibility to social
engineering cyberattacks, perhaps because human cognition functions have not been taken into consideration.
Impact of experience. Harrison et al. [2016] find that knowledge about phishing attacks increases one’s
attention and elaboration when combined with subjective knowledge and experience, and therefore lowers
one’s susceptibility to fall victim to social engineering cyberattack messages. Wang et al. [2012] find that
knowledge about phishing attacks increases one’s attention to detect indicators. Pattinson et al. [2012] find
that the higher familiarity with computers, the higher capability in coping with phishing messages. Wright
and Marett [2010] find (i) a combination of knowledge and training is effective against phishing attacks; (ii)
individuals with a lower self-efficacy (i.e., one’s ability to manage unexpected events) and web experience
are more likely to fall victims to social engineering cyberattacks; and (iii) individuals with high self-efficacy
are less likely to comply with information requests presented in phishing attacks. Halevi et al. [2016] find
that a high self-efficacy correlates a better capability to respond to security incidents. Arachchilage and Love
[2014] find that self-efficacy, when combined with knowledge about phishing attacks, can lead to effective
strategies for coping with phishing attacks. Wright and Marett [2010] find that experiential factors (e.g.,
self-efficacy, knowledge, and web experience) have a bigger effect on individuals’ response to phishing attacks
than dispositional factors (e.g., the disposition to trust and risk perception). Van Schaik et al. [2017] find that
a higher risk perception of online threats is associated with exposure to the knowledge that is specific to the
threat. Downs et al. [2006] find that users can detect social engineering cyberattacks that are similar to the
ones they have been exposed to. Redmiles et al. [2018] find that the more time an individual spends online,
the more skilled they are at identifying spams, and the less likely they will click on the links in the spam
messages. Gavett et al. [2017] find that education and previous experience with phishing attacks increased
suspicion on phishing sites. Cain et al. [2018] find that past security incidents do not significantly affect secure
behaviors. Abbasi et al. [2016] find (i) older, educated females and males fell victim to phishing attacks in the
past are less likely to fall victim to phishing attacks again; (ii) young females with low phishing awareness and
previous experience in suffering from small losses caused by phishing attacks do not necessarily have a lower
susceptibility to phishing attacks in the future; and (iii) young males with high self-efficacy and phishing
awareness and previous experiences in phishing attacks also do not necessarily have a lower susceptibility to
phishing attacks in the future.
Insight 7 Self-efficacy, knowledge, and previous encounter of social engineering cyberattacks collectively
reduce one’s susceptibility to social engineering cyberattacks. In particular, costly phishing experiences would
greatly reduce one’s susceptibility to social engineering cyberattacks, while non-costly experiences do not.
3.2.3 Individual Differences
Two kinds of individual differences have been investigated in the context of social engineering cyberattacks:
gender and age.
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Impact of gender. Initial studies suggest a relationship between gender and phishing susceptibility. Hong
et al. [2013] finds that individual differences (e.g., dispositional trust, personality, and gender) are associated
with the ability to detect phishing emails. Halevi et al. [2015] find that for women, there is a positive
correlation between conscientiousness and clicking on links and downloading files associated with phishing
attacks. Halevi et al. [2013] find that women exhibit a strong correlation between neurotic personality traits
and susceptibility to phishing attacks, but no correlation to any personality trait is found for men. Halevi
et al. [2016] reports that women exhibit lower self-efficacy than men. Sheng et al. [2010] find that women
with low technical knowledge are more likely to fall victim to phishing attacks. Sheng et al. [2010] find that
women are more likely to fall victim to phishing attacks.
However, later studies provide a different view. Sawyer and Hancock [2018] finds that there is no relationship
between gender and phishing detection accuracy. Similarly, Purkait et al. [2014] find that there is no
relationship between gender and the ability to detect phishing sites. Byrne et al. [2016] finds that there
is no relationship between gender and risk perception. Rocha Flores et al. [2014] finds that there is no
significant correlation between phishing resiliency and gender. Bullee et al. [2017] finds that gender does
not contribute to phishing message responses. Abbasi et al. [2016] finds (i) women with a high self-efficacy
have a low susceptibility to social engineering cyberattacks, and that women without awareness of the social
engineering cyberattack threat have a high susceptibility to these attacks; and (ii) men with previous costly
experiences with phishing attacks have a low susceptibility to these attacks, while overconfidence increases
the susceptibility to these attacks. Cain et al. [2018] find that although men may have more knowledge about
cybersecurity than women, there is no difference in terms of insecure behaviors by gender. Redmiles et al.
[2018] show that in the context of social media spam, gender affects message appeal but not susceptibility to
social engineering cyberattacks, and that women are more likely to click on sales-oriented spams while men
are more likely to click on media spams that feature pornography and violence. Goel et al. [2017] find that
women open more messages on prize reward and course registration than men. Rocha Flores et al. [2014] find
that gender affects the type of phishing message an individual would respond to and that women are less
susceptible than men to generic phishing messages.
Insight 8 Gender does not have a big impact on the susceptibility to social engineering cyberattacks.
Impact of age. Most studies focus on age groups in young people (18-24) and old (45+) ones. In general,
youth is related to inexperience, high emotional volatility [Zhou et al., 2016], less education, less exposure
to information on social engineering, and fewer years of experience with the Internet. These factors are
often accompanied by a low aversion to risk and therefore can increase the chances of falling victim to social
engineering cyberattacks [Sheng et al., 2010]. In an experiment involving 53 undergraduate students in the
age group of 18-27, Hong et al. [2013] find that the students’ confidence in their ability to detect phishing
messages does not correlate to their detection rate. Sheng et al. [2010] investigate the relationship between
demographics and susceptibility to phishing attacks and find that individuals at the age group of 18-25 are
more susceptible to phishing attacks than other groups 25+. Lin et al. [2019] report a similar result but for
an old group. Howe et al. [2012] find that age also affects risk perception: individuals in the age groups
of 18-24 and 50-64 perceive themselves at lower security risks compared to other groups and therefore are
more susceptible to social engineering cyberattacks. Purkait et al. [2014] find that the detection of phishing
messages decreases with the age and frequency of online transactions. Bullee et al. [2017] find that age has no
effect on spear-phishing responses and that Years of Service (YoS) is a better indicator of victimization (i.e.,
a greater YoS means less likely susceptible to social engineering cyberattacks). Gavett et al. [2017] examine
the effect of age on phishing susceptibility and show that processing speed and planning executive functions
affect phishing suspicion, hinting a relationship between phishing susceptibility and cognitive degradation
from ageing.
Insight 9 Old people with higher education, higher awareness and higher exposure to social engineering
cyberattacks are less susceptible to these attacks.
3.2.4 Culture
Culture affects individuals’ online activities [Sample et al., 2018], decision making process and uncertainty
assessment [Chu et al., 1999], development of biases and risk perception [da Veiga and Martins, 2017, Pfleeger
and Caputo, 2012], reactions to events [Rocha Flores et al., 2014, Hofstede et al., 2010], and self-efficiency
[Halevi et al., 2016, Sheng et al., 2010]. Redmiles et al. [2018] suggest that country/communal norms might
affect spam consumption as follows: in countries where spam is more prevalent, users are 59% less likely to
click on spam when compared to countries where spam is less prevalent.
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Halevi et al. [2016] find that individuals with higher risk perception have higher privacy attitudes, which
reduce the susceptibility to social engineering cyberattacks. Al-Hamar et al. [2010] perform experimental
spear-phishing attacks against two groups from Qatar, where one group consists of 129 employees of a
company (dubbed employees) and the other consists of 30 personal acquaintance (dubbed friends); they
find that 44% of the individuals in the employees group are successfully phished while 57% of the friends
groups are successfully phished. Tembe et al. [2014] report that participants from India exhibit a higher
susceptibility to phishing attacks when compared with participants from the USA and China. [Bullee et al.,
2017] report that participants from China and India might not be aware of the harms and consequences of
phishing attacks, while participants from the USA exhibit more awareness of privacy and online security
features (i.e., SSL padlocks) and are more active in safeguarding their personal information. Halevi et al.
[2016] find that although culture is a significant predictor of privacy attitude, it does not predict security
behavior and self-efficacy.
Bohm [2011] finds that culturally sound messages do not raise suspicion. [Farhat, 2017, Hofstede et al.,
2010] show that scams with culture-specific shame appeal are more likely to be effective in a certain culture.
Bullee et al. [2017] find that participants from countries with a higher Power Distance Index (PDI), which
means that individuals are more likely to comply with hierarchy, are more vulnerable to phishing than those
individuals from countries with a lower PDI. Sharevski et al. [2019] show how to leverage cultural factors to
tailor message appeal.
Insight 10 Culture affects privacy and trust attitudes, which indirectly affect one’s susceptibility to social
engineering cyberattacks.
3.3 Victim Cognition Functions through the Lens of Social Engineering Cyberattacks
3.3.1 Long-term Memory
As reviewed in Section 2.1, long-term memory is a very broad field, of which the following aspects have
been studied through the lens of social engineering cyberattacks. The first aspect is the frequency of attacks.
The environment, in which a victim operates, provides a context that may be exploited by an attacker. For
example, the attacker may leverage an ongoing societal incident or personal information to craft messages
to make the victim trust these messages. The attacker attempts to build trust with a victim while noting
that a suspicion thwarts the attack [Vishwanath et al., 2018]. Both trust and suspicion are affected by
the environment, such as the frequency of the social engineering events exploited by the social engineered
messages. For example, in a situation where social engineering cyberattacks are expected, the attacker is at a
disadvantage [Redmiles et al., 2018]; in a situation where social engineering cyberattacks are infrequent, the
attacker has the advantage. Sawyer and Hancock [2018] investigate how infrequent occurrence of phishing
events (i.e., the prevalence of phishing) affects individuals’ abilities to detect cyberattacks delivered over
emails. In their experiment, they ask three groups to identify malicious and legitimate email messages. The
three groups respectively contain 20%, 5%, and 1% malicious emails. They find that the accuracy of the
detection of malicious emails is lower for the group dealing with emails that contain 1% malicious ones.
Similarly, Kaivanto [Kaivanto, 2014] show that a lower probability of phishing occurrence increases victim’s
susceptibility to phishing cyberattacks.
Insight 11 The success of social engineering cyberattacks is inversely related to their prevalence.
Insight 11 causes a dilemma: when automated defenses are effective at detecting and filtering most social
engineering cyberattacks, the remaining attacks that make it through to users are more likely to succeed.
One approach to dealing with this dilemma is to resort to principles in Cognitive Psychology. It is known
that most of the brain’s information processing is sealed-off from conscious awareness [Nisbett and Wilson,
1977], some permanently while other information could be consciously appreciated, but may not be conscious
at a given moment. Our visual system, for example, computes 3-D depth from 2-D retinal inputs [DeValois
and DeValois, 1990]. We do not consciously experience the calculations needed to transform the 2-D input
into a 3-D percept. Instead, we are aware of the product (i.e., seeing a 3-D world) but not the process that
led to the product. The influences of subconscious processing are well-known to impact behavior [Kahneman,
2011, Nosek et al., 2011]. This fact leads to the following insight:
Insight 12 Training methods that ask people to consciously think about social engineering cyberattacks are
unlikely to be very successful unless the learning reaches the point where it is a habit that, largely unconsciously,
guides safer computer use behavior.
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Insight 12 would avoid the dilemma mentioned above because when the training/learning effort reaches the
point that users can deal with social engineering cyberattacks subconsciously, users can effectively defend
these attacks. This coincides with findings of Halevi et al. [2015], Rocha Flores et al. [2014], Halevi et al.
[2016], Howe et al. [2012], Sheng et al. [2010], namely that users with higher risk perception can reduce the
chance they fall victim to social engineering cyberattacks.
3.3.2 Victim Cognition Functions: A Preliminary Mathematical Representation
The framework described in Figure 2 formulates a way of thinking in modeling how the behavior of a victim
is influenced by the victim’s short-term cognition factors (or short_term factors), long-term cognition
factors (or long_term factors) and long-memory (or long_memory) as well as the attacker’s effort (or
attacker_effort). This formulation is applicable to phishing, spear phishing, whaling, water holing, scams,
angler phishing and other kinds of social engineering attacks, where the resulting behavior is whether a victim
is persuaded by the attacker to act as intended. For example, spear-phishing is a special case of the model
because the attacker often makes a big effort at enhancing message appeal by exploiting personalization;
scam is another special case of the model because the attacker often makes a big effort at enhancing message
appeal by exploiting situational setting and possibly stress. In principle, the behavior (behavior) of social
engineering cyberattacks can be described as some mathematical function f (mathematically speaking, more
likely it will be a family of functions):
behavior = f(short_term_factors, long_term_factors, long_memory, attacker_effort). (1)
Note that f mathematically abstracts and represents the interactions between the four cognitive domains
operating in long-memory (i.e., perception, working memory, decision making, and action), while also taking
short-term and long-term factors into account. Moreover, f accommodates attacker’s effort as input. It
is an outstanding research problem to identify the appropriate abstractions for representing these model
parameters and what kinds of mathematical functions f are appropriate to what kinds of social engineering
attacks. These questions need to be answered using experimental studies. Note that the framework can be
expanded to include measures of brain activity, either direct measures such as electroencephalography, or
indirectly using peripheral measures such as eye tracking and autonomic nervous system activity [Valecha
et al., 2020].
Specific to the cybersecurity domain, we propose considering persuasion-related behavior, as shown in Figure
2 and the corresponding mathematical representation of Eq. (1), meaning that the outcome in Eq. (1) can be
replaced by the probability that a user is persuaded by the attacker to act as the attacker intended. Intuitively,
persuasion is the act of causing someone to change their attitudes, beliefs, or values based on reasoning or
argument. Wright et al. [2014] defines Cialdini’s Principles of Persuasion, which have been extensively used to
study the response to social engineering messages (but not social engineering cyberattacks). Table 1 presents
a brief summary of Cialdini’s Principles of Persuasion.
Principle Description
Liking The act of saying yes to something you know and like; for example, a social engineer
presenting himself as helpful and empathetic towards the victim in a password reset process.
Reciprocity Repaying an earlier action in kind; for example, conveying to a victim that they have
detected suspicious activities in the victim’s credit card account while encouraging the
victim to reset the password with their assistance.
Social Proof The use of endorsement; for example, stating that due to recent suspicious activities, new
security requirements are issued and must be complied by all account holders.
Consistency Leveraging the desire of individuals to be consistent with their words, belief, and actions;
for example, reminding users that they have to comply with a password reset policy as
they have previously done.
Authority Responding to others with more experience, knowledge, or power;for example, an email
signed by a Senior Vice President of a bank requesting customers to reset their account
passwords.
Scarcity Something being valuable when it is perceived to be rare or available for a limited time;
for example, giving a user 24-hours notice before they deactivate the user’s account.
Unity Shared identity between the influencer and the influenced
Table 1: Summary of Cialdini Principles of Persuasion. The principle of Unity was introduced in Cialdini [2016]
but has not been studied in social engineering research; it is presented here for the purpose of completeness.
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Intuitively, the mathematical function f in Eq. (1) should accommodate or reflect Cialdini’s Principles of
Persuasion. Although the state-of-the-art does not allow us to draw insights into how these Principles would
quantitatively affect the form of f , we can still draw some insights from existing studies, as discussed below.
van der Heijden and Allodi [2019] study the relation between phishing attack success and Cialdini Principles
of Persuasion using enterprise emails from a financial institution. They find that phishing emails that received
the most responses (’clicks’) are those who use consistency and scarcity principles mentioned above. They
also find that emails with more cognitive elements (e.g., proper grammar, personalization, and persuasion
elements) receive most responses.
In a related study, Lin et al. [2019] find that younger individuals are more susceptible to phishing messages
that use the scarcity and authority principles, while older individuals are more susceptible to phishing emails
that use the reciprocity and liking principles.
Rajivan and Gonzalez [2018] find that the most successful phishing message strategies are notifications
messages, authoritative messages, friend request messages, shared interest messages, and assistance with a
failure. These strategies map to Cialdini’s Principles of liking, authority, and unity.
Lawson et al. [2018] find that socially engineered messages
that use authority and scarcity principles are considered more suspicious than those that use the liking
principle.
There have been proposals to augment Cialdini’s Principles to better represent the psychological vulnerabilities
that have been exploited by social engineering cyberattacks. Ferreira and colleagues [Ferreira and Lenzini,
2015, Ferreira et al., 2015] present five Principles of Persuasion
by combining (i) Cialdini Principles of Persuasion; (ii) Stajano’s study on scams and how distraction, social
compliance, herd, dishonesty, kindness, need and greed, and time affect the persuasive power of scam
messages [Stajano and Wilson, 2009]; and (iii) Gragg’s psychological triggers on how strong affect or emotion,
overloading, reciprocation, deceptive relationships, diffusion of responsibility and moral duty, authority, and
integrity and consistency can influence an individual’s response to social engineered messages [Gragg, 2003].
Table 2 presents a summary of these newly proposed five principles.
Principle Description
Authority Obeying pretense of authority or performing a favor for an authority.
Social Proof Mimicking behavior of the majority of people.
Liking, Similarity, and De-
ception (LSD)
Obeying someone a victim knows/likes, or someone similar to the victim, or
someone a victim finds attractive.
Commitment, Reciprocity,
and Consistency (CRC)
Making a victim act as committed, assuring consistency between saying and
doing, or returning a favor.
Distraction Focusing on what a victim can gain, need, or lose/miss out.
Table 2: Summary of the five newly proposed principles of persuasion that would better represent the
psychological vulnerabilities exploited by social engineering cyberattacks [Ferreira et al., 2015].
Guided by the newly proposed principles, Ferreira and Lenzini [2015]
conduct experiments, using phishing emails, to show that distraction (e.g., fear of missing out, scarcity, strong
affection, overloading, and time) is the most prevalent phishing tactic, followed by authority and LSD.
Summarizing the preceding discussion, we draw:
Insight 13 The representation of mathematical function f in Eq. (1) should adequately reflect the Principles
of Persuasion.
Since quantitatively describing the mathematical function f , as demanded in Insight 13, is beyond the scope
of the state-of-the-art, in what follows we explore some qualitative properties of the these mathematical
functions, showing how an increase (decrease) in a model parameter would affect the outcome behavior (more
precisely, persuasion) of a victim. These qualitative observations also need to be quantitatively verified by
future experimental studies.
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3.3.3 Impact of Attacker Effort on Victim Behavior
As shown in Eq. (1), the attacker can affect victim’s behavior through the attack effort variable, which can
be reflected by attacker’s message quality and message appeal with respect to the victim in question. In
terms of the impact of message quality, Downs et al. [2006] find that most individuals rely on superficial
elements when determining if a message is legitimate, without knowing that most of those elements can be
spoofed. Jansen and Leukfeldt [2016] find that in online banking frauds involving phishing or malware, most
victims report that fraudulent stories in phishing emails or phone calls appear to be trustworthy. Message
quality appears increase social engineering cyberattack success. Wang et al. [2012] find that visceral triggers
and deception indicators affect phishing responses. Visceral triggers increases phishing responses, whereas
deception indicators have the opposite effect, reducing phishing response. Similarly, Vishwanath et al. [2011]
find that individuals use superficial message cues to determine their response to phishing messages. The study
reports that urgency cues make it less likely for an individual to detect deception cues. One common method
of trustworthiness is through the use of visual deception, which is effective because most individuals associate
professional appearance and logos with a website or message been legitimate. Visual deception involves
the use of high-quality superficial attributes (e.g., legitimate logos, professional design, and name spoofing).
Hirsh et al. [2012] find that phishing messages that use visual deception have a higher victim response rate.
Jakobsson [2007] observes that for most individuals, the decision to trust a website or not is based on-site
content and not on the status of a site security indicators (e.g., the use security certificates, HTTPS). He
also notes that most users could not detect subtle changes in URLs (e.g., a malicious www.IUCU.com versus a
benign www.IUCU.org). Dhamija [Dhamija et al., 2006] conducts a study on malicious website identification.
Using malicious and legitimate websites with professional appearance, with the difference that malicious sites
display security indicators (e.g., missing padlock icon on the browser, warning on site’s digital certificate),
they find that 23% of their participants fail to identify fraudulent sites for 40% of the time. This group
of participants are asked to assess a website’s legitimacy based on its appearance (e.g., website design and
logos); 90.9% of participants fail to identify a high-quality malicious website that uses visual deception (i.e.,
URL spoofing replacing letters in a legitimate URL, for example, "W" for "vv").
On the other hand, message appeal is associated with the benefit an individual derives from complying with
a request. Halevi et al. [2013, 2015] find that many individuals that fall to social engineering cyberattacks
ignore the risk of their actions because they focus on the potential benefit that the phishing email offers.
Message appeal has the most weight on social engineering susceptibility. An example of this is the Nigerian
scam, also known as "419" scam. Herley [Herley, 2012] notes that although the scam is well-known and
information on the scam is readily available online, individuals still fall victim to it because the message is
designed to appeal the most gullible. Two techniques that are commonly used to increase message appeal are
contextualization, also known as pretexting, and personalization.
• Contextualization is a variation of message framing where the sender provides details or discusses topics
relevant to the group to vouch for the victim’s membership in the group. Luo et al. [2013] conducts
a study on phishing victimization with contextualization in the message. In the experiment, they use
work benefits and compensation as a pretext in an email to university staff. They find that individuals
interpret high-quality content and argument messages (e.g., well written, persuasive messages) as
originating from a credible sender. Basing the message argument on a topic that is common within a
community (i.e., contextualization) gives the message the appearance of originating from a known
person within a group. Using this technique, they are able to achieve 15.24% victimization in 22
minutes by combining pretexting and message quality. Similarly, Goel et al. [2017] examine the effect
of messages contextualization (i.e., pretexting) on phishing message opening and compliance rates.
They find that highly contextualized messages that target issues relevant to the victim are more
successful. They also find that messages with higher perceived loss have higher success rates than
those with high perceived gains. Rajivan and Gonzalez [2018] also find that phishing messages on
work-related or social communication topics (e.g., friend requests) have a higher success rate than
messages requesting a password change or offering a deal.
• Personalization is another framing technique in which a message is tailored to the preference of the
victim [Hirsh et al., 2012], such as friendship appeals, expressing similar interests. In a phishing
experiment, [Jagatic et al., 2007] find that adding personal data found in social networks to phishing
emails increased the response rate from 16% to 72%. Rocha Flores et al. [2014] find that targeted,
personalized phishing messages are more effective than generic messages. They find that phishing
emails that receive the most responses are those perceived to come from a known source. Bullee et al.
[2017] also find that emails using personalized greeting line were responded 1.7 times more likely
when compared with emails with generic greeting lines.
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Summarizing the preceding discuss, we draw:
Insight 14 Message quality and message appeal, which reflect attacker effort (e.g., using contextualization
and personalization), have a significant impact on the attacker’s success.
3.3.4 Countermeasures against Social Engineering Cyberattacks
There have been some studies on defending against social engineering cyberattacks. First, it is intuitive that
effective training should heighten a victim’s sense of threat because individuals are more cautious and sensitive
to detecting elements that might indicate deception. Along this line, Wright and Marett [2010] find that
suspicion of humanity was a dispositional factor that increases the detection of deception in phishing messages,
more so than risk beliefs and trust. Pattinson et al. [2012] also find that when individuals participating in
experiments are aware that a phishing attack is involved, they perform better on detecting phishing emails.
Second, Tembe et al. [2014] find that individuals from the U.S. having higher suspicion and caution attitudes
on online communications, when compared to individuals from China and India. Third, Vishwanath et al.
[2018] find that habitual patterns of email habits and deficient self-regulation reduce viewers’ suspicion.
Moreover, detecting deception cues decrease social engineering susceptibility. Kirmani and Zhu [2007] find
that detecting persuasion cues in a message activates suspicion and generates a negative response to the
message. Fourth, Canfield et al. [2016] find that individuals’ inability to detect phishing messages increases
their susceptibility, regardless of their cautionary behavior. For suspicions to be effective in reducing social
engineering susceptibility, the risk must out weight the benefit of complying with the message (e.g., message
appeal) without affecting decision performance (i.e., accuracy, precision and negative prediction)[Cho et al.,
2016]. Goel et al. [2017] find that suspicion alone does not prevent phishing victimization because they
report that individuals that are suspicious about email messages can still fall victim to social engineering
cyberattacks. Summarizing the preceding discussion, we draw:
Insight 15 Individual’s capabilities in detection social engineering cyberattacks are affected by their awareness
of the threats, their cultural backgrounds, and their individual differences in trust/suspicion.
Insight 15 highlights that there is no silver-bullet solution to countering social engineering cyberattacks. On
the contrary, effective defense must take into consideration the differences between individuals because they
are susceptible to social engineering cyberattacks at different degrees.
For more effective defenses against social engineering cyberattacks, the following aspects need to be systemat-
ically investigated in the future.
• Achieving effective human-machine interactions in defending against social engineering cyberattacks.
Effective defense would require to (i) detecting message elements that attempt to increase recipients’
trust and (ii) increasing recipients’ suspicion on messages. In either approach, we would need
human-machine teaming in detecting social-engineering cyberattacks, highlighting the importance of
effective defenses against social engineering cyberattacks.
• Improving users’ immunity to social engineering cyberattacks. To improve users’ immunity to
social engineering cyberattacks, we first need to investigate how to quantify their immunity. In
order to improve users’ immunity to social engineering cyberattacks, we need to enhance users’
protection motivation and capabilities in detecting deceptive cues. One approach is to enhance the
user-interface design to highlight the security alerts/indicators in email systems and web browsers
because their current designs are not effective [Schechter et al., 2007, Downs et al., 2006, Abbasi
et al., 2016, Kumaraguru et al., 2006]. Along this direction, the user-interface must highlight
security alerts/indicators with specific and quantified severity of threats to the user. The current
user-interface design appears to mainly focus on usability and user experience while assuming the
presence of (social engineering) cyberattacks as a default. This design premise needs to be changed
to treating the presence of (social engineering) cyberattacks as the default. In order to enhance users’
capabilities in detecting deceptive cues, we need to design new techniques to enhance our capabilities
in automatically detecting or assisting users to detect social engineering cyberattacks. Automatic
detection has been pursued by previous studies, which however only focus on examining certain
message elements that are known to be associated with previous social engineering cyberattacks
(i.e., signature-based detectors); these signatures can be easily avoided by attackers. In order to
possibly detect new social engineering cyberattacks, future detectors should incorporate cognitive
psychology elements to detect social engineering cyberattacks, such as the quantification of messages’
persuasiveness and deceptiveness. In order to design automated techniques to assist users in detecting
social engineering cyberattacks, human-machine interaction is an important issue.
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• Achieving human-centric systems design with quantifiable cybersecurity gain. Modern systems design,
including security systems design, often focuses on optimizing performance without considering how
humans would introduce vulnerabilities while interacting with the system (i.e., assuming away that
humans are often the weakest link). One approach to addressing this problem is to change the
designers’ mindset to treat users of these systems as the weakest link. This can be achieved by, for
example, using security designs that are simpler and less error-prone, while considering the worst-case
scenario that the users may have a high cognitive load when using these systems. How to quantify
users’ vulnerability to social engineering attacks is an outstanding problem because it paves the way
to quantify the cybersecurity gain of a better design when compared with a worse design.
• Designing effective training to enhance users’ self-efficacy. Training is an important mechanism for
defending against social engineering cyberattacks. However, it is a challenging task to design effective
training. One approach to addressing the problem is to routinely expose users to specific socially
engineering cyberattacks (e.g., messages that have been used by attackers). Another approach is to
insert sanitized social engineering attacks (e.g., phishing emails without malicious payload) into users’
routine activities to trigger users’ response to social engineering cyberattacks (e.g., the feedback will
point to the user in question whether the user correctly processed the message). This also effectively
increases users’ perception of social engineering cyberattacks, making them appear more frequent
than it is.
• Understanding and quantifying the impact of short-term factors in social engineering cyberattacks.
We observe that as discussed above, few studies have examined the effect of short-term factors in
social engineering cyberattacks. Short-term factors are known to affect cognition and behavior in
other contexts profoundly. As highlighted in Eq. (1) and discussed above, we stress the importance
of defining and quantifying social engineering cyberattack metrics, which are largely missing and will
become an indispensable component of the broader family of cybersecurity metrics as discussed in
Pendleton et al. [2016], Cho et al. [2019], Xu [2019].
Table 3 highlights the five future research directions and their relationships to the insights.
Future Research Direction Insights
Human-Machine interactions Reduce trust (Insights 1, 2, 10, 14); Increase suspicion (Insights 3, 5, 7,
9)
Immunity to social engineering
cyber attacks
Identify and quantify underlying causes of immunity (Insights 5, 7, 9);
Security and UI design (Insight 1, 2, 3); Improve message detection
(Insight 10, 13, 14)
Human-Centric System Design Incorporate psychological state of computer user during system design
(Insight 1, 2, 3, 11)
Designing effective training Training based on susceptibility elements (Insight 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12,
14, 15)
Understanding and quantifying
the impact of short-term factors
Increase research focus on short term factors impact in security (Insight
1, 2, 3)
Table 3: Relationships between future research directions and insights.
3.4 Further Discussion
First, we observe that the 15 insights mentioned above are all qualitative, rather than quantitative. Moreover,
the factors are typically investigated standalone. Furthermore, even the qualitative effects are discussed
in specific scenarios, meaning that they may not be universally true. Summarizing most of the insights
mentioned above, the state-of-the understanding is: (i) cognitive workload, stress, and attack effort, increases
one’s vulnerability to social engineering cyberattacks; (ii) the effect of vigilance, personality, awareness,
culture remains to be investigated to be conclusive; (iii) domain knowledge, (certain kind) experience, age
(together with certain other factors) reduces one’s vulnerability to social engineering cyberattacks; and (iv)
gender may not have a significant effect on one’s vulnerability to social engineering cyberattacks.
Figure 3 depicts our speculation of the impact on one’s susceptibility to social engineering cyberattacks.
Specifically, we suspect that expertise can decrease one’s susceptibility to the largest extent among the factors
because expertise equips one the capability to detect the deceptive cues that are used by social engineering
cyberattacks. We suspect that vigilance and domain knowledge have a significant, but smaller, impact on
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Susceptibility
decrease
No effect on
susceptibility
Susceptibility
increase
Expertise Gender Workload
Vigilance
Awareness
Stress
Attack effort
Domain Knowledge
Figure 3: Our speculation of the impact on one’s susceptibility to social engineering cyberattacks: a factor
on the left-hand side means that substantially increasing the factor (e.g., expertise) will decrease one’s
susceptibility, with further left indicating a bigger degree in decreasing susceptibility; a factor on the right-
hand side means that substantially increasing the factor (e.g., workload) will increase one’s susceptibility,
with further right indicating a bigger degree in increasing susceptibility; gender has little or no effect on one’s
susceptibility.
reducing one’s susceptibility because it is perhaps harder for an expert to fall into victim of social engineering
cyberattacks. Since there is no evidence to show which one of these two factors would have a bigger impact
than the other, we subjectively treat them as if they have the same impact. We suspect awareness would have
a significant impact on reducing one’s susceptibility, despite that the literature does not provide any evidence.
According to Insight 8 (which is drawn from a body of literature reviewed above), gender has little or no
impact. We suspect that stress would decrease one’s capability in detecting deception cues, but attack effort
would have an even more significant impact on increasing one’s susceptibility. We suspect that workload may
have the biggest impact on one’s susceptibility because it would substantially reduce one’s ability in detecting
deception cues. For other factors like age and culture, we suspect that their impacts might have to be
considered together with other factors, explaining why we do not include them in Figure 3. In summary, our
understanding of the factors that have impacts on human’s susceptibility to social engineering cyberattackers
is superficial. This was indeed one of our motivations for proposing the mathematical framework outlined in
Eq. (1).
Second, it is a fascinating research problem to fulfill the quantitative framework envisioned in the paper
because its fulfillment will permit us to identify cost-effective, if not optimal, defense strategies against social
engineering cyberattacks. This will also help identify the most important factors. However, we suspect
that the optimal defense strategies will vary with, for example, different combinations of short-term factors
and long-term factors. For example, we suspect that the importance of factors may be specific to attack
scenarios. This is supported by two very recent studies: van der Heijden and Allodi [2019] observed that
certain short-term and long-term factors (e.g., workload) may be exploited to wage phishing attacks because
malicious emails can coincide with high email volume; and [Jalali et al., 2020] showed that certain short-term
and long-term factors (e.g., high workload and lack of expertise) are two important factors against medical
workers. For example, Insight 6 says that awareness and general technical knowledge do not necessarily reduce
one’s susceptibility to social engineering cyberattacks; however, this may not hold when taking awareness and
human cognition functions into consideration. In other words, we can speculate that the effect of considering
one factor alone and the effect of considering multiple interacting factors together may be different. This
phenomenon is also manifested by Insight 7, showing that self-efficacy, knowledge, and previous encounter
of social engineering cyberattacks collectively reduce one’s susceptibility to social engineering cyberattacks.
In particular, costly phishing experiences would greatly reduce one’s susceptibility to social engineering
cyberattacks, while non-costly experiences do not. Putting another way, a certain previous encounter may or
may not have a big effect when considered together with other factors.
Third, Insight 12 says that effective training should not ask people to consciously think about social engineering
cyberattacks, but making people to formulate an unconscious habit in coping with these attacks. This points
out an important research direction on designing future training systems.
Fourth, last but not the least, studies in the context of social engineering cyberattacks inevitably involve
human subject, meaning that ethical aspects of these studies must be taken into adequate consideration when
designing such experiments and an IRB approval must be sought before conducting any such experiment.
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For ethical considerations in phishing experiments, we refer to [Finn and Jakobsson, 2007] for a thorough
treatment.
4 Conclusion
We have presented a framework for systematizing human cognition through the lens of social engineering
cyberattacks, which exploit weaknesses in human’s cognition functions. The framework is extended from
the standard cognitive psychology to accommodate components that emerge from the cybersecurity context.
In particular, the framework leads to a representation of a victim’s behavior, or more precisely, the degree
a victim is persuaded by an attacker to act as the attacker intended, as some mathematical function(s) of
many aspects, including victim’s cognition functions and attacker’s effort. We articulate a number of research
directions for future research. We hope that this mathematical representation will guide future research
endeavors towards a systematic and quantitative theory of Cybersecurity Cognitive Psychology.
Acknowledgement. We thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments, which have guided
us in improving the paper. In particular, the entire Section 3.4 is inspired by the reviewers’ comments.
5 Funding
This paper was partially funded through a Mitre Basic Education Assistance Program (BEAP). The funders
had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
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24
1 Introduction
1.1 Our contributions
1.2 Related Work
1.3 Paper Outline
2 Overview of Human Cognition
2.1 Human Cognitive Functions
2.2 Short-Term Cognitive Factors
2.2.1 Workload
2.2.2 Stress
2.2.3 Vigilance
2.3 Long Term Cognitive Factors
2.3.1 Personality
2.3.2 Expertise
2.3.3 Individual Differences
2.3.4 Culture
3 Victim Cognition through the Lens of Social Engineering Cyberattacks
3.1 Short-term Cognition Factors through the Lens of Social Engineering Cyberattacks
3.1.1 Workload
3.1.2 Stress
3.1.3 Vigilance
3.2 Long-term Cognition Factors through the Lens of Social Engineering Cyberattacks
3.2.1 Personality
3.2.2 Expertise
3.2.3 Individual Differences
3.2.4 Culture
3.3 Victim Cognition Functions through the Lens of Social Engineering Cyberattacks
3.3.1 Long-term Memory
3.3.2 Victim Cognition Functions: A Preliminary Mathematical Representation
3.3.3 Impact of Attacker Effort on Victim Behavior
3.3.4 Countermeasures against Social Engineering Cyberattacks
3.4 Further Discussion
4 Conclusion
5 Funding
| 1cybersec
| arXiv |
John the Ripper - Can't get cracked MD5 hash to show. <p>I'm trying to crack some MD5 hashes given in OWASP's BWA on their DVWA site. I was able to use John the Ripper and the very first time it worked fine and it showed the reversed hashes using the code:</p>
<pre><code>john --format=raw-md5 --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hash.txt
</code></pre>
<p>However, whenever I try to do it again for the exact same file, it gives back the following:</p>
<pre><code>Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 6 password hashes with no different salts (Raw-MD5 [MD5 128/128 XOP 4x2])
Remaining 1 password hash
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
0g 0:00:00:01 DONE (2017-02-22 17:31) 0g/s 8746Kp/s 8746Kc/s 8746KC/s ..*7¡Vamos!
Session completed
</code></pre>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
How do I write a batch script that copies one directory to another, replaces old files?. <p>I'd like a batch script in Windows with which I can copy one directory to another. If this directory already exists, and then for each file that already exists in both with the same name and location, it should be overwritten, if it does not exists, it should just be added.</p>
<p>In the end it should be a batch script to which I can pass 2 arguments, source & destination.</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Visual Studio Tools for Git can't commit. <pre><code>Opening repository: D:\testproject\DotNet.
Failed to push new glyph for D:\testproject\DotNet\DotNet.WinForms\DotNet.WinForm.User\DotNet.WinForm.User.csproj. Return code from SccGlyphChanged was -2147467263.
Failed to push new glyph for D:\testproject\DotNet\DotNet.WinForms\DotNet.WinForm.User\DotNet.WinForm.User.csproj. Return code from SccGlyphChanged was -2147467263.
Failed to push new glyph for D:\testproject\DotNet\DotNet.WinForms\DotNet.WinForm.User\DotNet.WinForm.User.csproj. Return code from SccGlyphChanged was -2147467263.
Undoing edit: D:\testproject\DotNet\DotNet.WinForms\DotNet.WinForm.Staff\DotNet.WinForm.Staff.csproj
Failed to push new glyph for D:\testproject\DotNet\DotNet.WinForms\DotNet.WinForm.User\DotNet.WinForm.User.csproj. Return code from SccGlyphChanged was -2147467263
</code></pre>
<p>when commit the solution,the output window show the error message.
who can give me a advice.</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
How to rotate symbols in the equation environment?. <p>I would like to make the following equation in the equation environment</p>
<p><a href="https://i.stack.imgur.com/Yjkzu.jpg" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/Yjkzu.jpg" alt="enter image description here"></a></p>
<p>However, I don't know how to insert the equality symbol that links both lines. Can this be done in the equation environment? If not, should we proceed?</p>
<p>Thanks in advance for your attention.</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Ubuntu 16.04 (guest) fails start on VirtualBox (Win7 host): LSB, Raise, Login Service and Accounts Service. <p>My Ubuntu 16.04 fails to start on Win7 host (VBox 5.0.20) as shown below
Ubuntu 16.04 stuck to start:</p>
<p><a href="https://i.stack.imgur.com/Gonoe.png" rel="nofollow noreferrer"><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/Gonoe.png" alt="enter image description here"></a></p>
<p>Any hints are very appreciated.</p>
<p>Thanks,</p>
<p>UPDATE: I can access recovery mode normally, but don't know how to fix.</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Bounding the size of certain sumsets in the plane. <p>Let $A$ be a finite set in $\mathbb{R}^2$ of $k^2$ elements and consider a set $B=\{x_1,x_2,x_3,x_4\}$ such that the points in $B$ are in general position (no three points on a line). </p>
<p>Question 1: Is it true that $|A+B|\geq (k+1)^2$?</p>
<p>Question 2: Is it true that $|\cap_{i}(A+x_i)|\leq (k-1)^2$?</p>
<p>Question 3: If either of 1-2 are true, is it the case that one of the extremal
sets $A$ is a discrete square? </p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Lattice structure in the root poset. <p>Let <span class="math-container">$W$</span> be a Coxeter group with simple generators <span class="math-container">$s_1$</span>, <span class="math-container">$s_2$</span>, ..., <span class="math-container">$s_r$</span>. Let <span class="math-container">$\Phi^+$</span> be the corresponding positive root system, with <span class="math-container">$\alpha_i$</span> the positive root corresponding to <span class="math-container">$s_i$</span>. <a href="https://sites.math.washington.edu/~billey/classes/coxeter/EntireBook.pdf" rel="noreferrer">Bjorner and Brenti, <em>Combinatorics of Coxeter Groups</em>, Chapter Four</a> define the root poset to be a partial order on <span class="math-container">$\Phi$</span> as follows: </p>
<p>If <span class="math-container">$\beta \in \Phi$</span> and <span class="math-container">$s_i \beta - \beta \in \mathbb{R}_{>0} \alpha_i$</span>, then <span class="math-container">$\beta < s_i \beta$</span>. The root poset is then the transitive closure of this relation. </p>
<p>Bjorner and Brenti, Exercise 4.15 asks: </p>
<blockquote>
<p>Is the positive root poset <span class="math-container">$(\Phi^+, \leq)$</span>, with a bottom element appended, a meet-semilattice?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>I can't find the answer to this exercise. Can someone help?</p>
<p>What I would actually like to know is:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Are intervals <span class="math-container">$[\beta, \gamma]$</span> in the root poset lattices?</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Below, some bibliographic notes:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>I cheated slightly above: Bjorner and Brenti, as well as the sources below, actually only order <span class="math-container">$\Phi^+$</span>, not <span class="math-container">$\Phi$</span>. But I see no reason not to extend the order to the negative roots.</p></li>
<li><p>This poset was introduced in <a href="https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b32e/cf5167389c99c9ebd206cdcd6bedad5cef9c.pdf" rel="noreferrer">Henrik Eriksson's PhD thesis</a> and, independently, by Brink and Howlett:</p></li>
</ul>
<p><em>Brink, Brigitte; Howlett, Robert B.</em>, <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01445101" rel="noreferrer"><strong>A finiteness property and an automatic structure for Coxeter groups</strong></a>, Math. Ann. 296, No. 1, 179-190 (1993). <a href="https://zbmath.org/?q=an:0793.20036" rel="noreferrer">ZBL0793.20036</a>.</p>
<ul>
<li><p>This poset is not the same as defining <span class="math-container">$\beta \leq \gamma$</span> if <span class="math-container">$\gamma - \beta$</span> is in the positive span of the <span class="math-container">$\alpha_i$</span>; a condition which is also sometimes called the root poset. </p></li>
<li><p>Let <span class="math-container">$\beta$</span> be a positive root and <span class="math-container">$t$</span> the corresponding reflection. Then <span class="math-container">$s_i \beta - \beta \in \mathbb{R}_{>0} \alpha_i$</span> if and only if <span class="math-container">$s_i$</span> is an inversion of <span class="math-container">$s_i t s_i$</span>. Thus, we can define this relation in a purely Coxeter theoretic way, without mentioning root systems.</p></li>
</ul>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Not one thing in the first tweet was accurate.... | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
React inheritance vs. composition pattern. <p>(This is more of a philosophical / pedagogical question, not a practical one.)</p>
<p>I'm try to explain the benefits of composition over inheritance in React. Immediately I imagined an inheritance hierarchy that would break:</p>
<pre><code>class Border extends React.Component {}
class ColorBorder extends Border {}
class DashedBorder extends Border {}
class DashedColorBorder extends ??? {}
</code></pre>
<p>And then I thought, "Hah! This will be easy to achieve with composition!"</p>
<p>[EDIT] The rest that follows distracts from the core question: "How do <em>you</em> most effectively demonstrate how composition in React rocks where inheritance would fall apart?" That's the question I'm most keen about. [/EDIT]</p>
<p>But interestingly I got stuck just the same:</p>
<pre><code>const Border = ({ children }) => (
<div className="Border">
{children}
</div>
)
const ColorBorder = ({ color, children }) => (
<Border style={{ borderColor: color }}>
{children}
</Border>
)
const DashedBorder = ({ children }) => (
<Border style={{ borderStyle: 'dashed' }}>
{children}
</Border>
)
const DashedColorBorder = ({ color, children }) => (
// how to use both ColorBorder and DashedBorder?
)
</code></pre>
<p>From a practical standpoint, the solution is easy: just extend <code>Border</code> to accept more props and don't bother with any of this nonsense. But I'm curious if there <em>is</em> a way to do it, for the sake of argument.</p>
<p>It left me wondering if it's not a great example of where composition dominates inheritance, and if there's a better more obvious example out there. Most articles talk about React composition in imprecise terms, quickly diving into HOCs and such. <strong>Further, they don't even try to explain React using inheritance and where it starts to fall over. I always want to figure out "why not?" People take it on faith that composition is better, and I'm looking for examples of how.</strong></p>
<p>The best I could come up with was this, but I'm curious how others might tackle it. I'm dissatisfied with how you still have to provide a manually in these examples:</p>
<pre><code>const Border = ({ children, style }) => (
<div className="Border mb-3" style={style}>
{children}
</div>
)
const ColorBorder = ({ color, children }) => (
React.Children.map(children, child => (
React.cloneElement(child, {
style: { ...child.props.style, borderColor: color },
})
))
)
const DashedBorder = ({ children }) => (
React.Children.map(children, child => (
React.cloneElement(child, {
style: { ...child.props.style, borderStyle: 'dashed' },
})
))
)
const DashedColorBorder = ({ color, children }) => (
<DashedBorder>
<ColorBorder color={color}>
{children}
</ColorBorder>
</DashedBorder>
)
export const App = () => (
<div className="App">
<Border>
Hello world
</Border>
<ColorBorder color="green">
<Border>
Hello world
</Border>
</ColorBorder>
<DashedBorder>
<Border>
Hello world
</Border>
</DashedBorder>
<DashedColorBorder color="red">
<Border>
Hello world
</Border>
</DashedColorBorder>
</div>
)
</code></pre>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Do $p^n$-th powers determine the field?. <p>This is a question which came to my mind, when seeing
<a href="https://math.stackexchange.com/questions/53096/a-quick-question-on-transcendence">A quick question on transcendence</a></p>
<p>Suppose $F$ is a field of characteristic $p$. Then the set of $p^n$-powers of the elements
of $F$ is again a field which I denote by $F^n$ and is a subfield of $F$.
Now let $d_n=[F:F^n]$.</p>
<p>My question is, what can be said about $F$ if we know the sequence $(d_n)_n$.
Of course for finite fields $d_n$ is monotonically increasing and eventually constant.
<strike>The constant will be the index degree of $F$ over the prime field $F_p$ and thus
$F$ is determined up to isomorphism.</strike></p>
<p>So what happens in general. Of course $d_n$ is monotonically increasing. In general $d_n$ will not be finite. This can be seen by taking $F=F_p(t_1,t_2,\ldots)$ where $t_i$ is transcendental over $F_p(t_1,t_2,\ldots,t_{i-1})$.</p>
<p>So now my questions:</p>
<ul>
<li><p>Can it happen that $d_1$ is finite but $d_n$ is infinite for some $n$?</p></li>
<li><p>Under the assumption that $(d_n)_n$ is finite and the same for a field $F_1$ and $F_2$. Are these fields necessarily isomorphic?</p></li>
</ul>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
I never really hated my special bond with my sister, not until the day she died.. Pt 1.
It all started when we were 7 years old. The reason I say we, is because we’re twins. Ever since I could remember my sister and I were best friends, naturally, being twins and all.
We shared the same clothes, liked the same foods and even shared the same bedroom. These things however, were not the only things we shared, at least not for me. My sister claimed to have no idea what I was ever talking about.
For our 7th birthday party, my parents took us to a fun park. We had pizza, opened gifts and played bumper cars. One of our friends bumped my sister pretty hard before she had a chance to strap on her seat belt. As you can imagine, she hurt herself pretty badly and suffered minor whip-lash. For a week her neck hurt and she had headaches. The weird thing however, is that I suffered the same symptoms. Unfortunately being a 7 year old no one believed me. Not my parents nor my sister, who both thought I was jealous of the attention she was getting and I wasn’t.
I decided this may have been a pure coincidence, the fact that I was feeling this way. As a young kid often does when unsure, I thought logically, dismissed any bizarre ideas and convinced myself I must had hurt myself as well, one way or another, but just couldn’t remember how.
But as time went on, these “episodes” continued, and became more apparent and real. As if my growing up, also allowed whatever was causing me to feel this way, to also grow with me. Whenever my sister was physically hurt, I always knew. Whether it was a stubbed toe, a headache or burnt finger. I felt her pain just as she did.
Eventually of course, we grew up and we both went off to college. After we moved away from each other these “episodes” stopped. Oddly enough, it seemed being in the same vicinity had some correlation to my sharing her feelings. My sister and I remained close, talking on the regular, but never really getting the chance to get together, being so far away from each other and all.
For the next two years, I never had these feelings again, as if moving away caused them to suddenly seize like the engine of an old beat-up car. Not until my 19th birthday that is, the night my sister disappeared. That night I felt the realest, most horrifying grief and pain I have ever experienced. I felt her die...I could feel every second.
According to the police reports, my sister may not be dead. She was never seen after that night and we’ve been unsuccessful receiving any solid leads or getting closer to finding out what really happened to her. But at the time I desperately wanted to know, we all did. I told the police everything I felt that night, every ounce of pain and discomfort but they dismissed me as delusional due to unfathomable grief. But I knew, deep down inside that she was gone, that something terrible took place that night, she was kidnapped and murdered. But not before being apart of something evil, something so satanic it haunts me just as much as the physical pain.
The craziest thing is, I get the exact same feelings every year on my birthday at exactly 2:19am, the time of her death. My 21st birthday was yesterday...
| 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
Tyreke Evans gets stuck in an elevator before Suns-Pelicans. | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
How do you keep a conversation going with a stranger?. This is what I'm struggling the most with.
I just don't know what to say to them.
Doesn't necessarily need to be a stranger, maybe a close relative that i never usually talk to or someones friend that i know nothing about.
After we greet each other it usually ends there and it makes this awkward situation. How do you avoid this? | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
Apple files trademarks for Beats 2, 3, 4, and 5. | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
How can I create my own public certificate using openssl?. <p>I have a public key/private key pair i generated using two primes p and q. I now need to use openssl to sign and create the certificate. I heard req utility and wrote this from the man pages.</p>
<pre><code>openssl req -x509 -days 365 -nodes -key inputfile.txt -keyout key.pem -out cert.pem
</code></pre>
<p>But what details should I specify in inputfile.txt and is there a particular format for that?</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Rick and Morty Meeseeks Box Easter Egg in Halo 5's new map, Riptide!!!. | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
Selinux 'var_t' base type warning. <p>I am currently 'lost' in the CentOS Selinux forest.</p>
<p>My setup involves setting up a WSGI socket in <code>/var/www/demo/out</code> which nginx uses to communicate with the UWSGI process. Whenever I request the page in my browser I get an nginx error.</p>
<p><strong>Why is this Selinux related?</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Disabling Selinux with <code>setenforce 0</code> fixes it.</li>
<li>/var/log/audit/audit.log and audit2why display a <code>denied</code> and <code>missing type enforcement (TE) allow rule</code></li>
</ul>
<p>I have tried adding the <code>httpd_sys_content_t</code> label to the socket so nginx was allowed to read and write to the socket file, restorecon after adding the new label.</p>
<p>Running the violation through <code>audit2allow</code> returns the following policy:</p>
<pre><code>module nginx 1.0;
require {
type httpd_t;
type var_t;
type httpd_sys_content_t;
class sock_file write;
}
#============= httpd_t ==============
allow httpd_t httpd_sys_content_t:sock_file write;
#!!!! WARNING: 'var_t' is a base type.
allow httpd_t var_t:sock_file write;
</code></pre>
<p>The first rule I understand, however what is the second rule conveying? I am guessing because the nginx process is requesting a tcontext that has <code>var_t</code> in it a new selinux policy is required that includes this new context? </p>
<p>So why is this warning here? Is it complaining that adding a directory like var to a policy is too general / isn't specific enough? If this is the case, can't this policy be narrowed to something like <code>var_www_t</code>? Also if this is the case then why is the uwsgi process, which is running under a non root user, allowed to write to the socket? </p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
How can I pass additional arguments to a property decorator in TypeScript?. <p>I have this simple class with a property that has a <a href="https://github.com/Microsoft/TypeScript-Handbook/blob/master/pages/Decorators.md#property-decorators" rel="noreferrer">property decorator</a> applied to it:</p>
<pre><code>class MyClass {
@collectionMember
public myProperty: number[];
// ...
}
</code></pre>
<p>And the decorator function:</p>
<pre><code>function collectionMember(target: Object, propertyKey: string | symbol): void {
// ...
}
</code></pre>
<p>How can I pass <em>additional</em> arguments to the decorator function? I tried doing the following with no avail:</p>
<pre><code>class MyClass {
@collectionMember("MyProp")
public myProperty: number[];
// ...
}
</code></pre>
<p>Obviously, this yields the error</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Supplied parameters do not match any signature of call target.</p>
</blockquote>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Passing arguments to Set-AzureRmVmDscExtension. <p>I'm trying to pick up a passed-in argument to a PowerShell DSC configuration fired by Set-AzureRmVMDscExtension and not having much luck. The idea is to have a xRemoteFile section download a file at a URL in the arguments. The URL is in $certificateSASToken</p>
<pre><code>$dscConfigurationArguments = @{
certificateToken = $certificateSASToken
}
</code></pre>
<p>Creates the hash table of the arguments, then I'm calling;</p>
<pre><code>Publish-AzureRmVMDscConfiguration -ConfigurationPath ".\DSC\webserver.ps1" -ResourceGroupName "MyResourceGroup" -StorageAccountName "MyStorageAccount" -Force
</code></pre>
<p>and then finally;</p>
<pre><code>Set-AzureRmVMDscExtension -Version 2.72 -ResourceGroupName "MyResourceGroup" -VMName "WebServer1" -ArchiveStorageAccountName "MyStorageAccount" -ArchiveBlobName "webserver.ps1.zip" -AutoUpdate:$true -ConfigurationName "WebServer" -ConfigurationArgument $dscConfigurationArguments
</code></pre>
<p>In the DSC configuration there's</p>
<pre><code>xRemoteFile TLSCertificateDownload
{
Uri = $certificateToken['certificateToken']
DestinationPath = "C:\webcert.pfx"
MatchSource = $false
}
</code></pre>
<p>DSC fails because $certificateToken is null. The hash table of config gets all the way through fine because I missed the index on it the first time and it complained that a system object hash table wasn't a URL. Why isn't this getting passed through?</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Fame Studios (1970). | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
Prediksi Dakar Sabtu 03 Maret 2018. | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
[2592*1552] My boyfriend made lunch! Tortilla's from scratch with a filling of chicken, carrots, currysauce (also from scratch), apple and a bit of cheese.. | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
Assign permanent drive name to USB (across different computers)?. <p>Some of the shortcuts on my flash drive need the drive to be assigned to a specific name, and I need to access this across several computers. Is there a way that the flash drive's drive name can be set to one so that this will work for any computer that this drive will be plugged into? Alternatively, can I make a shortcut without use of a drive name? </p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
How to set apache 2.2 gzip compression level?. <p>I am running Debian and Apache/2.2.22 I have gzip enabled, and I would like to know, what is my compression level and how to change it. I know this can be achieved editing php.ini, but I would like to configure it in apache. How can it be done?</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
TIFU by crashing a shopping cart, cracking some ribs, and nearly killing my children in the process.. Was doing some grocery shopping with my 2 kids (both under 4.) They were loaded into a 2-seater race-car-styled shopping cart, little steering wheels, they love it and it makes shopping a bit easier.
On the way out to the car I thought I'd be the cool dad and pop a wheelie. I set my foot on the axle gave a little push down on the handle. I grossly misestimated the center of gravity. The whole cart-grocery-child system turned into a type 3 lever with their noggins headed for the asphalt.
Still holding the handle I tried to get under them. My elbows and ribs ended up taking the brunt of the impact. The kids were shaken, but okay. I cracked 4 ribs and bloodied my elbows up.
This was actually a week ago, but it still hurts to breathe.
Fucking idiot. | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
How to use spot instance with amazon elastic beanstalk?. <p>I have one infra that use amazon elastic beanstalk to deploy my application.
I need to scale my app adding some spot instances that EB do not support.</p>
<p>So I create a second autoscaling from a launch configuration with spot instances.
The autoscaling use the same load balancer created by beanstalk.</p>
<p>To up instances with the last version of my app, I copy the user data from the original launch configuration (created with beanstalk) to the launch configuration with spot instances (created by me).</p>
<p>This work fine, but:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>how to update spot instances that have come up from the second autoscaling when the beanstalk update instances managed by him with a new version of the app?</p>
</li>
<li><p>is there another way so easy as, and elegant, to use spot instances and enjoy the benefits of beanstalk?</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>UPDATE</strong></p>
<p>Elastic Beanstalk add support to spot instance since 2019... see:
<a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/elasticbeanstalk/latest/relnotes/release-2019-11-25-spot.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://docs.aws.amazon.com/elasticbeanstalk/latest/relnotes/release-2019-11-25-spot.html</a></p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
How to use spot instance with amazon elastic beanstalk?. <p>I have one infra that use amazon elastic beanstalk to deploy my application.
I need to scale my app adding some spot instances that EB do not support.</p>
<p>So I create a second autoscaling from a launch configuration with spot instances.
The autoscaling use the same load balancer created by beanstalk.</p>
<p>To up instances with the last version of my app, I copy the user data from the original launch configuration (created with beanstalk) to the launch configuration with spot instances (created by me).</p>
<p>This work fine, but:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>how to update spot instances that have come up from the second autoscaling when the beanstalk update instances managed by him with a new version of the app?</p>
</li>
<li><p>is there another way so easy as, and elegant, to use spot instances and enjoy the benefits of beanstalk?</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>UPDATE</strong></p>
<p>Elastic Beanstalk add support to spot instance since 2019... see:
<a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/elasticbeanstalk/latest/relnotes/release-2019-11-25-spot.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://docs.aws.amazon.com/elasticbeanstalk/latest/relnotes/release-2019-11-25-spot.html</a></p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Reddit Roadtrip™ - I'm driving home from South Carolina to San Francisco for Christmas. Anyone want to join along the way?. Leaving around the 18th or 19th of December, taking the southern-most route ([Interstates 20 and 10 for most of the way](http://maps.google.com/maps?f=d&source=s_d&saddr=Charleston,+SC&daddr=33.65286,-85.41573+to:32.33987,-89.12759+to:32.49058,-99.72915+to:31.7521,-102.56009+to:San+Francisco,+CA&hl=en&geocode=FXYh9AEd1lk8-yl3JKjcQnr-iDFr7OGu4Pf6NQ%3BFXyAAQIdzqjo-ikL97JT6ByLiDGPtKFQc7A0cQ%3BFZ537QEdWgWw-in1ZAM-jwqDiDFcBECsyMWTfA%3BFVTE7wEdAkEO-ilJ23x12Y9WhjHtHORkGQwBwQ%3BFaR_5AEdpg7j-SmhrNITPrP7hjEh-rTyhUTgAw%3BFVJmQAIdKAe0-CkhAGkAbZqFgDH_rXbwZxNQSg&mra=dpe&mrcr=0&mrsp=3&sz=10&via=1,2,3,4&sll=32.303385,-100.06897&sspn=0.629123,1.485901&ie=UTF8&ll=29.458731,-100.458984&spn=20.661683,30.805664&z=5)). Should be a fun, safe, affordable drive. Dressing as Santa and pretending you're in a kids' action film is optional but suggested.
I'm male/25/[enjoy travel](http://sumeetjain.com/travels).
**Update: Two Redditors from Austin, TX are in!** | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
What port is this and what is is used for?. <p>I have long wondered what this port is on some harddrives?</p>
<p>I assume it may be some sort of serial or factory programming port. The top-most hard drive in the stack pictured below is an SSD, it has the same pins, just not broken out on a connector.</p>
<p><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/6AXfC.jpg" alt="mystery port"></p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Active Duty Army Ranger Named #3 Pastry Chef in World - He's a Bronze Star recipient and his peanut butter ganache is to die for!!. | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
Is it possible to attach artifacts in an email notification in Bamboo?. <p>We have a plan that produces an executable artifact. Is there a way to tell bamboo to email those artifacts as attachments in a build notification? For the record we're using atlassian on-demand.</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
text to appear in a cell upon input of yes in a cell. <p>Hi I need a fix to this please help with a formula.</p>
<p>Please refer above picture.</p>
<p>on input of yes in I 8709 i want the word "printed" in J8709</p>
<p><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/nSuRm.png" alt="enter image description here"></p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Any proper way of sending byte data to Unity3D from a C plugin?. <p>Just a question of curiosity here.</p>
<p>When you write plugins for Unity on the iOS platform, the plugins have a limited native-to-managed callback functionality (from the plugin and then to Unity). Basically this documentation:
<a href="http://docs.unity3d.com/Documentation/Manual/PluginsForIOS.html" rel="nofollow">iOS plugin Unity documentation</a></p>
<p>states that the function signature you are able to call back to is this:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Only script methods that correspond to the following signature can be called from native code: function MethodName(message:string)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>The signature defined in C looks like this:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>void UnitySendMessage(const char* obj, const char* method, const char* msg);</p>
</blockquote>
<p>So this pretty much means I can only send strings back to Unity.</p>
<p>Now in my plugin I'm using protobuf-net to serialize objects and send them back to unity to be deserialized. I have gotten this to work, but by a solution I feel is quite ugly and not very elegant at all:</p>
<pre><code>Person* person = [[[[[Person builder] setId:123]
setName:@"Bob"]
setEmail:@"[email protected]"] build];
NSData* data = [person data];
NSString *rawTest = [[NSString alloc] initWithData:data encoding:NSUTF8StringEncoding];
UnitySendMessage("GameObject", "ReceiveProductRequestResponse", [rawTest cStringUsingEncoding:NSUTF8StringEncoding]);
</code></pre>
<p>Basically I simply encode the bytestream into a string. In Unity I then get the bytes of the string and deserialize from there:</p>
<pre><code>System.Text.UTF8Encoding encoding=new System.Text.UTF8Encoding();
Byte[] bytes = encoding.GetBytes(message);
</code></pre>
<p>This does work. But is there really no other way of doing it? Perhaps someone have an idea of how it could be done in some alternative way?</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Where are Windows photo albums actually saved. <p>The Windows 10 photo app allows you to save pictures to "Creations" such as photo albums. Where are these albums located in Explorer? </p>
<p>The implication from what I've read is that they are somewhere on the user's OneDrive - but I don't imagine the photos themselves are saved into an album, merely their filepaths. Either way I can't find this information. </p>
<p>Can I access the file paths associated with the images contained in one of these albums?</p>
<p>(NB, I don't want to <em>upload</em> to onedrive, I just want to know where the album data is saved on the machine usually, and whether I can access it from explorer or the command line say)</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Is there any intrinsic ( without any reference to embedding ) and coordinate free , basis free definition of a differentiable manifold?. <p>Is there any way to uniquely characterise manifolds ( their geometrical and topological properties) without refering to charts or to a particular hyperspace containing the manifold. For example could the 2 sphere be defined as a set of points on which all geodesics are its circles of equal lenght ,which in turn are just sets which are the codomain of the exponential map. Could a metric tensor be defined on such a manifold in a coordinate free way.
This is just an example of an attempt , but the idea is to use intrinsic curvatures and topological properties to define manifolds.
The point is , how does one characterise the geometry of a manifold ( all the intrinsic curvatures of differential geometry , gaussian curvature most importantly) without refering to a basis or an embedding space and how that would work on some concrete exaples, like spheres or ellipsoids.</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Angular Material 2 - handling multiple validation error messages. <p>I am creating a form with Angular Material 2. I am using template driven form and I have email input which has two validators (required and email). In the doc for the input component (<a href="https://material.angular.io/components/component/input" rel="noreferrer">https://material.angular.io/components/component/input</a>) it only says:</p>
<p>"If an input element can have more than one error state, it is up to the consumer to toggle which messages should be displayed. This can be done with CSS, ngIf or ngSwitch."</p>
<p>there is no example and I can't find it anywhere.</p>
<p>This is my html:</p>
<pre><code>...
<form (ngSubmit)="onSubmit(registrationForm)" #registrationForm="ngForm">
...
<md-input-container floatPlaceholder="never">
<input mdInput type="email" placeholder="Enter your email address" name="email" [(ngModel)]="email" required email>
<md-error class="required">Email is required.</md-error>
<md-error class="email">Invalid email.</md-error>
</md-input-container>
...
</code></pre>
<p>Currently both messages are shown all the time. Even if I enter some invalid email.</p>
<p>Any of the mentioned solutions (CSS, ngIf or ngSwitch) would be fine but I'd prefer CSS.</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Gaussian measure on function spaces. <p>I'm reading <a href="https://projecteuclid.org/download/pdf_1/euclid.cmp/1103907873" rel="nofollow noreferrer">this</a> classic work and I'd like to get deeper inside some of its techniques. In particular, the authors state: "We construct a Gaussian measure <span class="math-container">$d\mu_{0}(\phi)$</span> on a measure space of continuous functions <span class="math-container">$\phi(x), x\in \Lambda \subset \mathbb{R}^{3}$</span> with covariance <span class="math-container">$u$</span>:
<span class="math-container">\begin{eqnarray}
\int d\mu_{0}(\phi)e^{i\int f\phi} = e^{-\frac{1}{2}\int f u f} \tag{1}\label{1}
\end{eqnarray}</span>
It is then straightforward to show that:
<span class="math-container">\begin{eqnarray}
e^{-\beta U} = \int d\mu_{0}(\phi) e^{i\sqrt{\beta}\sum_{\alpha}e_{i(\alpha)}\phi(x_{\alpha})}" \tag{2}\label{2}
\end{eqnarray}</span></p>
<p>First of all, how to construct such a Gaussian measure <span class="math-container">$d\mu_{0}$</span> on a space of continuous functions? Is it defined by condition (\ref{1}) or does (\ref{1}) follow as a consequence? Besides, how can we prove existence? Does anyone know any reference on this construction?</p>
<p>Second, equation (\ref{2}) seems to follow by taking <span class="math-container">$f = \sum e_{i(\alpha)}\delta(x_{\alpha})$</span>. But how can we take such an <span class="math-container">$f$</span> is <span class="math-container">$f$</span> must be a continuous function rather than a distribution?</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
The Odin Project. I love coding and I started learning many languages after I realized it. But it just didn't feel good jumping from one language to another. I started The Odin Project this month as it has a path set up for me. Should I complete it and if yes, then what after it? If no then please guide me what should I do. I can dedicate any amount of work hours and would like to be able to build amazing things.
And ya, english is not my first language, so pardon my grammar | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
Swift text to speech. <p>I have a block of code that is not working, but not giving me a runtime error either. There is just no speech coming out of the speaker.</p>
<pre><code>let synth = AVSpeechSynthesizer()
var myUtterance = AVSpeechUtterance(string: audioTextField.text)
myUtterance.rate = 0.3
synth.speak(myUtterance)
</code></pre>
<p>Is there any code I'm missing out on or is it something else? Help would be much appreciated.</p>
<p>Edit: It's not working in any @IBActions, but is working fine in the view did load function....</p>
<pre><code>override func viewDidLoad() {
super.viewDidLoad()
speechRecognizer?.delegate = self
timer = Timer.scheduledTimer(timeInterval: 1.0, target: self, selector: #selector(tick), userInfo: nil, repeats: true)
tick()
requestSpeechAuth()
//WORKS HERE
}
@IBAction func audioButtonPressed(_ sender: Any) {
//DOESN"T WORK HERE
if isRecording {
stopRecording()
} else {
startRecording()
}
}
</code></pre>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
How to use spot instance with amazon elastic beanstalk?. <p>I have one infra that use amazon elastic beanstalk to deploy my application.
I need to scale my app adding some spot instances that EB do not support.</p>
<p>So I create a second autoscaling from a launch configuration with spot instances.
The autoscaling use the same load balancer created by beanstalk.</p>
<p>To up instances with the last version of my app, I copy the user data from the original launch configuration (created with beanstalk) to the launch configuration with spot instances (created by me).</p>
<p>This work fine, but:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>how to update spot instances that have come up from the second autoscaling when the beanstalk update instances managed by him with a new version of the app?</p>
</li>
<li><p>is there another way so easy as, and elegant, to use spot instances and enjoy the benefits of beanstalk?</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>UPDATE</strong></p>
<p>Elastic Beanstalk add support to spot instance since 2019... see:
<a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/elasticbeanstalk/latest/relnotes/release-2019-11-25-spot.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://docs.aws.amazon.com/elasticbeanstalk/latest/relnotes/release-2019-11-25-spot.html</a></p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Body fat and building muscle. I understand why it is necessary to eat a caloric excess when lifting to build muscle. However, if I have an excess of body fat, then why wouldn't my body use my body fat to build muscle in the event that I'm at small caloric deficit? Would a caloric deficit have differential effects on off vs. on days?
I recently started lifting again, mostly for strength, but also for a little vanity. I'm not crazy about putting on additional paunch that comes with eating extra calories, but I also don't want to stymie muscle growth by not eating correctly. | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
From the recent street protests in Romania [x-post /r/romania]. | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
My first "real" woodworking project.. | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
Consider $\{a+b \sqrt[3]2+c (\sqrt[3]{2})^2:a,b,c ∈\Bbb{Q}\}$. Show that this set is a field. <p>Am I supposed to check the property one by one, especially the multiplicative inverse? </p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Copying portion of line as integer in Python scripting language. <p>I need to copy timing window into a variable from line of .txt file using Python.</p>
<p>Input file:</p>
<pre><code>[Fri Dec 07 18:50:16.775 2018] [ 3.610065] dwc3 e2d00000.usb_core: SUCCESS allocating dump_regset memory
[Fri Dec 07 18:50:16.775 2018] [ 3.610770] dwc3 e2d00000.usb_core: Soft reset timeout -29631
[Fri Dec 07 18:50:16.775 2018] [ 3.614879] dwc3 e2d00000.usb_core: Dump USB registers
</code></pre>
<p>So from the above input file i need <strong>"3.610770"</strong> value to be copied into integer variable because that line contains <strong>"Soft reset timeout"</strong> string.</p>
<p>I have managed to write some portion of code but unable to proceed further.</p>
<p>Python script snippet:</p>
<pre><code>import sys
inFile = sys.argv[1]
with open(inFile) as fp:
line = fp.readline()
while line:
if "Soft reset timeout" in line:
#print line
if "[ " in line:
#To Do...
#if "Dump USB registers" in line:
line = fp.readline()
</code></pre>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
getSupportFragmentManager().getFragments() shows a compile time error. <p>Calling <code>getSupportFragmentManager().getFragments()</code> shows a compile time error with the message below:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>getSupportFragmentManager().getFragments() can only be called from
within the same library group(groupId = com.android.support)</p>
</blockquote>
<p>I have imported the following classes in <code>MainActivity</code>:</p>
<pre><code>import android.os.Bundle;
import android.support.annotation.NonNull;
import android.support.design.widget.BottomNavigationView;
import android.support.v4.app.Fragment;
import android.support.v4.app.FragmentManager;
import android.support.v4.app.FragmentTransaction;
import android.support.v7.app.AppCompatActivity;
import android.util.Log;
import android.view.MenuItem;
import android.widget.Toast;
</code></pre>
<p><code>MainActivity</code> extends <code>AppCompatActivity</code>.</p>
<p>My project module level <code>build.gradle</code> file is as follows:</p>
<pre><code>apply plugin: 'com.android.application'
android {
compileSdkVersion 25
buildToolsVersion "25.0.2"
defaultConfig {
applicationId "com.mycompany.floatingdemo"
minSdkVersion 16
targetSdkVersion 25
versionCode 1
versionName "1.0"
testInstrumentationRunner "android.support.test.runner.AndroidJUnitRunner"
vectorDrawables.useSupportLibrary = true
}
buildTypes {
release {
minifyEnabled false
proguardFiles getDefaultProguardFile('proguard-android.txt'), 'proguard-rules.pro'
}
}
}
dependencies {
compile fileTree(dir: 'libs', include: ['*.jar'])
androidTestCompile('com.android.support.test.espresso:espresso-core:2.2.2', {
exclude group: 'com.android.support', module: 'support-annotations'
})
compile 'com.android.support:appcompat-v7:25.2.0'
compile 'com.android.support:design:25.2.0'
compile 'com.android.support:support-vector-drawable:25.2.0'
testCompile 'junit:junit:4.12'
}
</code></pre>
<p>This is the source code for the method <code>getFragments</code> inside <code>FragmentManager.java</code>. </p>
<pre><code>/**
* Get a list of all fragments that have been added to the fragment manager.
*
* @return The list of all fragments or null if none.
* @hide
*/
@RestrictTo(LIBRARY_GROUP)
public abstract List<Fragment> getFragments();
</code></pre>
<p>I have recently updated my Android Studio to the latest stable version (2.3) and updated the Android Gradle plugin as well. I think this may be relevant because I have not previously seen this error.</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
I am a man who has never been in a relationship and buys women perfume for himself because the scent is comforting..
I understand many people find this behavior to be creepy. A part of me wants to say that I'm sorry. The other part of me doesn't want to apologize for anything--but not entirely in a brazen manner.
I've never been in a relationship. I've never been embraced by or embraced a lover. I know what it's like to love but don't know what it's like for my love to be reciprocated. A decade or so ago I had strongly wanted to love and be loved in a romantic sense but no longer. Don't get me wrong, I'm not pessimistic about it-- nor am I cynical. I live my life the best that I can and try to be kind to everyone.
Some days though I get lonely and start to wonder what it would be like to be loved. To have a partner lie in bed next to me. Someone who would feel like home. I would tell her that waiting this long was all worth it but at the same time I would tell her I wished we found each other faster.
When I have my days of occasional loneliness I like to get out a bottle of women's perfume that I previously brought and spritz it here and there. I am comforted by a women's scent and...well I feel my loneliness gets alleviated--even if it is just a bit. | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
Sweet twist!. | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
How to give a tty a mode other than 640 and have it persist through reboot. <p>I have an embedded device (Nvidia Jetson TX2 running Ubuntu 16.04) in a carrier board and need to use the serial port. The serial port on the carrier board maps to ttyS0 which by default is owned by root and belongs to group tty:</p>
<pre><code>crw--w---- 1 root tty 4, 64 Aug 1 13:34 ttyS0
</code></pre>
<p>I've added user <code>ubuntu</code> to group <code>tty</code> (which is what I log in as) however by default the group doesn't have read access to ttyS0. </p>
<p><code>sudo chmod g+r /dev/ttyS0</code> fixes it, but this doesn't persist through a reboot. I've tried creating various udev rules (99-z_setup.rules):</p>
<pre><code>KERNEL=="ttyS0", NAME="ttyS0", SYMLINK+="my_tty", GROUP:="tty", MODE:="0660", OWNER:="ubuntu"
</code></pre>
<p>or</p>
<pre><code>KERNEL=="ttyS0", NAME="ttyS0", SYMLINK+="my_tty", GROUP:="tty", MODE:="0660"
</code></pre>
<p>or</p>
<pre><code>KERNEL=="ttyS0", NAME="ttyS0", SYMLINK+="my_tty", GROUP="tty", MODE="0660"
</code></pre>
<p>these result in:</p>
<pre><code>lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 5 Aug 1 13:34 my_tty -> ttyS0
crw--w---- 1 root tty 4, 64 Aug 1 13:34 ttyS0
</code></pre>
<p>so I still can't access it. I also tried</p>
<pre><code>KERNEL=="ttyS0", ACTION=="add", PROGRAM="/usr/bin/sudo /home/ubuntu/bin/setup_tty.sh"
</code></pre>
<p>with <code>setup_tty.sh</code> containing</p>
<pre><code>#!/bin/bash
chmod g+r /dev/ttyS0
echo "setup_tty ran" >> /home/ubuntu/bin/tty.log
</code></pre>
<p>It echos to the <code>tty.log</code> file so I know the script runs, but the permissions are still</p>
<pre><code>crw--w---- 1 root tty 4, 64 Aug 1 13:44 ttyS0
</code></pre>
<p>It's like the group / owner / mode settings are being ignored or being overwritten. I've searched and there are a lot of similar questions, but the answer to them always seems to be to add the user to group <code>tty</code> or <code>dialout</code>. My user account is already a member of both of those but no dice since for some reason by default, the group doesn't have read permission.</p>
<p>I checked the /etc/login.defs and found these lines:</p>
<pre><code># TTYPERM Login tty will be set to this permission.
#
# If you have a "write" program which is "setgid" to a special group
# which owns the terminals, define TTYGROUP to the group number and
# TTYPERM to 0620. Otherwise leave TTYGROUP commented out and assign
# TTYPERM to either 622 or 600.
#
# In Debian /usr/bin/bsd-write or similar programs are setgid tty
# However, the default and recommended value for TTYPERM is still 0600
# to not allow anyone to write to anyone else console or terminal
# Users can still allow other people to write them by issuing
# the "mesg y" command.
TTYGROUP tty
TTYPERM 0600
</code></pre>
<p>I changed the TTYPERM value to 0660 and rebooted, but it made no difference. </p>
<p>Any ideas how I can make this tty have a mode other than 640 after reboot?</p>
<p>This will probably be the answer-I ran <code>journalctl | grep tty</code> and among other things found this output:</p>
<pre><code>Aug 02 11:05:45 TX2-JUDY systemd[1]: Started Serial Getty on ttyS0.
Aug 02 11:05:47 TX2-JUDY systemd[1]: [email protected]: Service hold-off time over, scheduling restart.
Aug 02 11:05:47 TX2-JUDY systemd[1]: Stopped Serial Getty on ttyS0.
Aug 02 11:05:47 TX2-JUDY systemd[1]: Started Serial Getty on ttyS0.
Aug 02 11:05:47 TX2-JUDY systemd[1]: [email protected]: Service hold-off time over, scheduling restart.
Aug 02 11:05:47 TX2-JUDY systemd[1]: Stopped Serial Getty on ttyS0.
Aug 02 11:05:47 TX2-JUDY systemd[1]: Started Serial Getty on ttyS0.
Aug 02 11:05:47 TX2-JUDY systemd[1]: [email protected]: Service hold-off time over, scheduling restart.
Aug 02 11:05:47 TX2-JUDY systemd[1]: Stopped Serial Getty on ttyS0.
Aug 02 11:05:47 TX2-JUDY systemd[1]: Started Serial Getty on ttyS0.
Aug 02 11:05:48 TX2-JUDY systemd[1]: [email protected]: Service hold-off time over, scheduling restart.
Aug 02 11:05:48 TX2-JUDY systemd[1]: Stopped Serial Getty on ttyS0.
Aug 02 11:05:48 TX2-JUDY systemd[1]: Started Serial Getty on ttyS0.
Aug 02 11:05:48 TX2-JUDY systemd[1]: [email protected]: Service hold-off time over, scheduling restart.
Aug 02 11:05:48 TX2-JUDY systemd[1]: Stopped Serial Getty on ttyS0.
Aug 02 11:05:48 TX2-JUDY systemd[1]: [email protected]: Start request repeated too quickly.
Aug 02 11:05:48 TX2-JUDY systemd[1]: Failed to start Serial Getty on ttyS0.
</code></pre>
<p>so it appears some other service (not sure what Getty is) is trying to use ttyS0. </p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
What calculation shortcuts exist to help or speed-up mental (or paper) calculations?. <p>Anything to speed up or simplify calculations. </p>
<p>A simple example might be to get a multiple of $19$, for instance, $38 \cdot 19 = 38 \cdot 20 - 38$.</p>
<hr>
<p>(This is hard to tag with so few tags in play!)</p>
<p>mental-calculations tips tricks shortcut cheats time-saver</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
[DETAIL] Use layered snow for carpets when building with slabs.. | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
How to use spot instance with amazon elastic beanstalk?. <p>I have one infra that use amazon elastic beanstalk to deploy my application.
I need to scale my app adding some spot instances that EB do not support.</p>
<p>So I create a second autoscaling from a launch configuration with spot instances.
The autoscaling use the same load balancer created by beanstalk.</p>
<p>To up instances with the last version of my app, I copy the user data from the original launch configuration (created with beanstalk) to the launch configuration with spot instances (created by me).</p>
<p>This work fine, but:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>how to update spot instances that have come up from the second autoscaling when the beanstalk update instances managed by him with a new version of the app?</p>
</li>
<li><p>is there another way so easy as, and elegant, to use spot instances and enjoy the benefits of beanstalk?</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>UPDATE</strong></p>
<p>Elastic Beanstalk add support to spot instance since 2019... see:
<a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/elasticbeanstalk/latest/relnotes/release-2019-11-25-spot.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://docs.aws.amazon.com/elasticbeanstalk/latest/relnotes/release-2019-11-25-spot.html</a></p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Multiple colors in a facet STRIP background. <p>I would like to modify the colors of the facet background based on the group. I'm not sure if this is even possible. Specifically, I am using <code>facet_grid</code> (not <code>facet_wrap</code>) with multiple layers.</p>
<pre><code>## Sample data
dat <- mtcars
## Add in some colors based on the data
dat$facet_fill_color <- c("red", "green", "blue", "yellow", "orange")[dat$gear]
## Create main plot
library(ggplot2)
P <- ggplot(dat, aes(x=cyl, y=wt)) + geom_point(aes(fill=hp)) + facet_grid(gear+carb ~ .)
## I can easily cahnge the background using:
P + theme(strip.background = element_rect(fill="red"))
</code></pre>
<p>However, I would like to change the color differently for different groups.
Ideally, something like the following (which of course does not work)</p>
<pre><code>P + theme(strip.background = element_rect(fill=dat$facet_fill_color))
P + theme(strip.background = element_rect(aes(fill=facet_fill_color)))
</code></pre>
<p>Can there be more than one color for facet backgrounds? </p>
<p>(related, but not an actual answer to above: <a href="https://stackoverflow.com/questions/19440069/ggplot2-facet-wrap-strip-color-based-on-variable-in-data-set">ggplot2: facet_wrap strip color based on variable in data set</a>)</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Weak convergence of a sequence of elements of a compact set implies strong convergence. <p>Let <em>E</em> be a Banach space and $K \subset E$ a compact subset in the strong topology. Let $(x_n)_{n \geq 1} \subset K$ such that $x_n \rightharpoonup x$ in $\sigma (E, E^*)$. <br/>
<em>K</em> is compact, so $(x_n)_n$ has a convergent subsequence $(x_{n_k})_k$ which has the limit $\bar{x} \in K$. Then we have:
$$x_{n_k} \to \bar{x} \Rightarrow x_{n_k} \rightharpoonup \bar{x}, \;\; \text{i.e} \;\; <f, x_{n_k}> \; \to \; <f, \bar{x}>, \; \forall f \in E^*.$$
But
$$ x_n \rightharpoonup x, \; \text{i.e.} \; <f, x_n> \;\; \to \;\; <f, x>, \;\; \forall f \in E^*. $$
It follows that
$$ <f, \bar{x}> = <f, x> \;\; \text{i.e.} \;\; \bar{x} = x. $$
So
$$ x_{n_k} \to x. $$
How can I show that $(x_n)$ is convergent?</p>
<p>Thank you!</p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Eureka 2.0 is discontinued. What service discovery platform is Netflix using now?. <p>According to the Eureka wiki (<a href="https://github.com/Netflix/eureka/wiki" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://github.com/Netflix/eureka/wiki</a>), the Eureka 2.0 has been discontinued.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>The open source work on eureka 2.0 has been discontinued. The code base and artifacts that were released as part of the existing repository of work on the 2.x branch is considered use at your own risk.</p>
</blockquote>
<p><strong>Questions</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><p>What is new in Eureka 2.0 compared to Eureka 1.0 (which Spring Cloud 2.0 is still using)?</p></li>
<li><p>Does Netflix still use any service discovery platform internally? If yes, what is it?</p></li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Edit</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><p>Found some answers for the first question. Read these:</p>
<ul>
<li>Eureka 2.0 Motivation, <a href="https://github.com/Netflix/eureka/wiki/Eureka-2.0-Motivations" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://github.com/Netflix/eureka/wiki/Eureka-2.0-Motivations</a></li>
<li>Eureka 2.0 Architecture Overview, <a href="https://github.com/Netflix/eureka/wiki/Eureka-2.0-Architecture-Overview" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://github.com/Netflix/eureka/wiki/Eureka-2.0-Architecture-Overview</a></li>
<li>Eureka 2.0 Client Configuration And Use, <a href="https://github.com/Netflix/eureka/wiki/Eureka-2.0-Client-Configuration-And-Use" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://github.com/Netflix/eureka/wiki/Eureka-2.0-Client-Configuration-And-Use</a></li>
<li>Eureka 2.0 Server Configuration And Use, <a href="https://github.com/Netflix/eureka/wiki/Eureka-2.0-Server-Configuration-And-Use" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://github.com/Netflix/eureka/wiki/Eureka-2.0-Server-Configuration-And-Use</a></li>
</ul></li>
</ol>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
How to use spot instance with amazon elastic beanstalk?. <p>I have one infra that use amazon elastic beanstalk to deploy my application.
I need to scale my app adding some spot instances that EB do not support.</p>
<p>So I create a second autoscaling from a launch configuration with spot instances.
The autoscaling use the same load balancer created by beanstalk.</p>
<p>To up instances with the last version of my app, I copy the user data from the original launch configuration (created with beanstalk) to the launch configuration with spot instances (created by me).</p>
<p>This work fine, but:</p>
<ol>
<li><p>how to update spot instances that have come up from the second autoscaling when the beanstalk update instances managed by him with a new version of the app?</p>
</li>
<li><p>is there another way so easy as, and elegant, to use spot instances and enjoy the benefits of beanstalk?</p>
</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>UPDATE</strong></p>
<p>Elastic Beanstalk add support to spot instance since 2019... see:
<a href="https://docs.aws.amazon.com/elasticbeanstalk/latest/relnotes/release-2019-11-25-spot.html" rel="nofollow noreferrer">https://docs.aws.amazon.com/elasticbeanstalk/latest/relnotes/release-2019-11-25-spot.html</a></p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
Whale uses a fish as bait. | 0non-cybersec
| Reddit |
What is better driver for GeForce Gt 220 M?. <p>Are three times that I format my notebook, and I play on Nexuiz online.
And I need what is the best driver for target device video GeForce Gt 220M.
I use Lubuntu 64 bit:</p>
<pre><code>uname -a
Linux mrk 3.16.0-28-generic #38-Ubuntu SMP Fri Dec 12 17:37:40 UTC 2014
x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
</code></pre>
<p>This is the image that there are 5 options:</p>
<p><img src="https://i.stack.imgur.com/dbzBF.png" alt="enter image description here"></p>
<p>I have the driver that is checked how in image and with this question, I want to know, which is the better driver for fast "reproduction video"?</p>
<p>Update:
Ok I compile <code>ubuntu-drivers devices</code> and the result is:</p>
<pre><code> ubuntu-drivers devices
== /sys/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:01.0/0000:01:00.0 ==
vendor : NVIDIA Corporation
modalias : pci:v000010DEd00000654sv00001043sd00002039bc03sc00i00
model : G96M [GeForce GT 220M]
driver : nvidia-304-updates - distro non-free
driver : nvidia-331-updates - distro non-free
driver : nvidia-331 - distro non-free recommended
driver : xserver-xorg-video-nouveau - distro free builtin
driver : nvidia-304 - distro non-free
</code></pre>
<p>Then what is the better because I not understand <code>distro</code> or <code>free</code> or <code>non-free</code></p>
| 0non-cybersec
| Stackexchange |
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