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The trustee broadly contends that a receiver's common law protection from being sued in a non-appointing court only applies to claims which arose after the appointment of the receiver. The trustee, however, refers to no decision so holding, and there are cases to the contrary. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver",
"sentence": "See Porter v. Sabin, 149 U.S. at 473, 13 S.Ct. 1008 (recognizing that the claim at issue arose prior to the appointment of the receiver); see also Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 49 S.Ct. 310, 73 L.Ed. 669 (1929) (holding that a party may prosecute a claim which arose prior to the appointment of the receiver but may not then execute upon the judgment); cf. McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U.S. 327, 12 S.Ct. 11, 35 L.Ed. 796 (1891) (finding that the predecessor to section 959 is applicable to a claim arising from the operations of a predecessor receiver)."
} | 9,295,385 | a |
There may have been many reasons, some potentially bearing on the disposition of Rosado's application, as to why Dr. Spillman may have reported that she could not make these determinations. The ALJ, however, made no effort to determine what the reasons were and how otherwise to obtain that vital information. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "205 F.Supp.2d 164, 172-73",
"parenthetical": "\"The duty of the ALJ to develop the record is particularly important when it comes to obtaining information from a claimant's treating physician.\"",
"sentence": "See Devora v. Barnhart, 205 F.Supp.2d 164, 172-73 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (“The duty of the ALJ to develop the record is particularly important when it comes to obtaining information from a claimant’s treating physician.”); see also Rosa, 168 F.3d at 79-80 (stating that the ALJ may not rely on sparse notes nor conclusory assessments from the treating physician)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "168 F.3d 79, 79-80",
"parenthetical": "stating that the ALJ may not rely on sparse notes nor conclusory assessments from the treating physician",
"sentence": "See Devora v. Barnhart, 205 F.Supp.2d 164, 172-73 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (“The duty of the ALJ to develop the record is particularly important when it comes to obtaining information from a claimant’s treating physician.”); see also Rosa, 168 F.3d at 79-80 (stating that the ALJ may not rely on sparse notes nor conclusory assessments from the treating physician)."
} | 9,050,017 | a |
The mere fact that the sentenced offense is not technically a sex offense "does not make the imposition of the special condition[s] inconsistent with the [Sentencing Guidelines'] policy statement." The mere fact that Dr. Miles has no history of sex offense convictions is not dispositive as to whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "275 Fed.Appx. 433, 442",
"parenthetical": "leaving open the possibility for imposing sex offender treatment and registration conditions",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ybarra, 289 Fed.Appx. 726, 732 (5th Cir.2008) (unpublished) (noting that § 3583(d) “does not expressly prohibit the imposition of sex offender registration for offenders with no history of sex offense convictions”); United States v. Jimenez, 275 Fed.Appx. 433, 442 (5th Cir.2008) (unpublished) (leaving open the possibility for imposing sex offender treatment and registration conditions); see also United States v. Genovese, 311 Fed.Appx. 465 (2d Cir.2009) (unpublished) (affirming imposition of sex offender registration requirements in light of the defendant’s history and characteristics); United States v. Prochner, 417 F.3d 54, 63-64 (5th Cir.2005) (affirming sex offender evaluation and treatment conditions where the defendant’s journal entries and mental health evaluations supported sentencing judge’s belief that the defendant, who had no history of sex offenses, might pose a threat to children)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming imposition of sex offender registration requirements in light of the defendant's history and characteristics",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ybarra, 289 Fed.Appx. 726, 732 (5th Cir.2008) (unpublished) (noting that § 3583(d) “does not expressly prohibit the imposition of sex offender registration for offenders with no history of sex offense convictions”); United States v. Jimenez, 275 Fed.Appx. 433, 442 (5th Cir.2008) (unpublished) (leaving open the possibility for imposing sex offender treatment and registration conditions); see also United States v. Genovese, 311 Fed.Appx. 465 (2d Cir.2009) (unpublished) (affirming imposition of sex offender registration requirements in light of the defendant’s history and characteristics); United States v. Prochner, 417 F.3d 54, 63-64 (5th Cir.2005) (affirming sex offender evaluation and treatment conditions where the defendant’s journal entries and mental health evaluations supported sentencing judge’s belief that the defendant, who had no history of sex offenses, might pose a threat to children)."
} | 4,098,945 | a |
The mere fact that the sentenced offense is not technically a sex offense "does not make the imposition of the special condition[s] inconsistent with the [Sentencing Guidelines'] policy statement." The mere fact that Dr. Miles has no history of sex offense convictions is not dispositive as to whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "275 Fed.Appx. 433, 442",
"parenthetical": "leaving open the possibility for imposing sex offender treatment and registration conditions",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ybarra, 289 Fed.Appx. 726, 732 (5th Cir.2008) (unpublished) (noting that § 3583(d) “does not expressly prohibit the imposition of sex offender registration for offenders with no history of sex offense convictions”); United States v. Jimenez, 275 Fed.Appx. 433, 442 (5th Cir.2008) (unpublished) (leaving open the possibility for imposing sex offender treatment and registration conditions); see also United States v. Genovese, 311 Fed.Appx. 465 (2d Cir.2009) (unpublished) (affirming imposition of sex offender registration requirements in light of the defendant’s history and characteristics); United States v. Prochner, 417 F.3d 54, 63-64 (5th Cir.2005) (affirming sex offender evaluation and treatment conditions where the defendant’s journal entries and mental health evaluations supported sentencing judge’s belief that the defendant, who had no history of sex offenses, might pose a threat to children)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "417 F.3d 54, 63-64",
"parenthetical": "affirming sex offender evaluation and treatment conditions where the defendant's journal entries and mental health evaluations supported sentencing judge's belief that the defendant, who had no history of sex offenses, might pose a threat to children",
"sentence": "See United States v. Ybarra, 289 Fed.Appx. 726, 732 (5th Cir.2008) (unpublished) (noting that § 3583(d) “does not expressly prohibit the imposition of sex offender registration for offenders with no history of sex offense convictions”); United States v. Jimenez, 275 Fed.Appx. 433, 442 (5th Cir.2008) (unpublished) (leaving open the possibility for imposing sex offender treatment and registration conditions); see also United States v. Genovese, 311 Fed.Appx. 465 (2d Cir.2009) (unpublished) (affirming imposition of sex offender registration requirements in light of the defendant’s history and characteristics); United States v. Prochner, 417 F.3d 54, 63-64 (5th Cir.2005) (affirming sex offender evaluation and treatment conditions where the defendant’s journal entries and mental health evaluations supported sentencing judge’s belief that the defendant, who had no history of sex offenses, might pose a threat to children)."
} | 4,098,945 | a |
. In the instant case, notwithstanding that the challenged AFP procedures were revised within three months after the filing of the pro se complaint, Domegan does not contend that an informal alteration in the parties' legal relationship was occasioned by the litigation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "581 F.2d 281, 281",
"parenthetical": "\"We ... consider the chronological sequence of events to be an important, although clearly not definitive factor, in determining whether or not defendant can be reasonably inferred to have guided his actions in response to plaintiffs lawsuit.\"",
"sentence": "See Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 281 (“We ... consider the chronological sequence of events to be an important, although clearly not definitive factor, in determining whether or not defendant can be reasonably inferred to have guided his actions in response to plaintiffs lawsuit.\"); see also Langton, 928 F.2d at 1225 (“‘the mere existence of a temporal coincidence ... cannot alone suffice’ to engage the gears of the catalyst test.”) (quoting Martinez v. Rhode Island Housing & Mortgage Finance Corp., 628 F.Supp. 996, 1001 (D.R.I.1986))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "928 F.2d 1225, 1225",
"parenthetical": "\"'the mere existence of a temporal coincidence ... cannot alone suffice' to engage the gears of the catalyst test.\"",
"sentence": "See Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 281 (“We ... consider the chronological sequence of events to be an important, although clearly not definitive factor, in determining whether or not defendant can be reasonably inferred to have guided his actions in response to plaintiffs lawsuit.\"); see also Langton, 928 F.2d at 1225 (“‘the mere existence of a temporal coincidence ... cannot alone suffice’ to engage the gears of the catalyst test.”) (quoting Martinez v. Rhode Island Housing & Mortgage Finance Corp., 628 F.Supp. 996, 1001 (D.R.I.1986))."
} | 1,871,505 | a |
The trial court, however, did not consider whether Nikzad's disclaimer of ownership itself may have been tainted by his ineffective consent to the police interview. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "544 F.2d 407, 410",
"parenthetical": "if defendant's arrest were illegal, his subsequent denial of ownership of luggage would have been inadmissible",
"sentence": "See United States v. Jackson, 544 F.2d 407, 410 (9th Cir.1976) (if defendant’s arrest were illegal, his subsequent denial of ownership of luggage would have been inadmissible)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that defendant's disclaimer was not caused by illegal police action",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Canady, 615 F.2d at 697 n. 3 (finding that defendant’s disclaimer was not caused by illegal police action); United States v. Anderson, 500 F.2d 1311, 1318 (5th Cir.1974) (same)."
} | 654,401 | a |
If Fullerton had been convicted on the murder counts after a full trial, there would be no question that the jury's factual finding that he killed intentionally would satisfy the full-and-fair-litigation prong of the test for issue preclusion. Texas law collaterally estops an insured who has suffered a conviction for murder before a jury from arguing in a subsequent coverage dispute that the killing was not willful. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "709 F.2d 968, 972",
"parenthetical": "\"Because of the existence of a higher standard of proof and greater procedural protection in a criminal prosecution, a conviction is conclusive as to an issue arising against the criminal defendant in a subsequent civil action.\"",
"sentence": "See also United States v. Thomas, 709 F.2d 968, 972 (5th Cir.1983) (“Because of the existence of a higher standard of proof and greater procedural protection in a criminal prosecution, a conviction is conclusive as to an issue arising against the criminal defendant in a subsequent civil action.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "841 S.W.2d 51, 54",
"parenthetical": "imposing sanctions for frivolous litigation on an insured who sought to recover benefits after a murder conviction",
"sentence": "Francis v. Marshall, 841 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Tex.App.— Houston 1992) (imposing sanctions for frivolous litigation on an insured who sought to recover benefits after a murder conviction)."
} | 509,021 | b |
Plaintiff attempts to avoid making this showing by asserting that the violation of his constitutional rights is alone sufficient to prove irreparable harm and the inadequacy of a remedy at law. This statement is overbroad in that it must be tempered by the general rule that monetary injury is not a sufficient basis for injunctive relief. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "868 F.2d 69, 73",
"parenthetical": "\"Constitutional harm is not necessarily synonymous with the irreparable harm necessary for issuance of a preliminary injunction.\"",
"sentence": "See Back v. Carter, 933 F.Supp. 738, 754 (N.D.Ind.1996) (“When violations of constitutional rights are alleged, further showing of irreparable injury may not be required if what is at stake is not monetary damages”) (emphasis added); Milwaukee County Pavers Ass’n v. Fiedler, 707 F.Supp. 1016, 1031-32 (W.D.Wis.1989) (“Where violations of constitutional rights are alleged, further showing of irreparable injury may not be required if more than money is at stake”) (emphasis added); Kennedy-Kartheiser v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 1987 WL 17164, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 11, 1987); see also Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 73 (3d Cir.1989) (“Constitutional harm is not necessarily synonymous with the irreparable harm necessary for issuance of a preliminary injunction.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "933 F.Supp. 738, 754",
"parenthetical": "\"When violations of constitutional rights are alleged, further showing of irreparable injury may not be required if what is at stake is not monetary damages\"",
"sentence": "See Back v. Carter, 933 F.Supp. 738, 754 (N.D.Ind.1996) (“When violations of constitutional rights are alleged, further showing of irreparable injury may not be required if what is at stake is not monetary damages”) (emphasis added); Milwaukee County Pavers Ass’n v. Fiedler, 707 F.Supp. 1016, 1031-32 (W.D.Wis.1989) (“Where violations of constitutional rights are alleged, further showing of irreparable injury may not be required if more than money is at stake”) (emphasis added); Kennedy-Kartheiser v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 1987 WL 17164, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 11, 1987); see also Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 73 (3d Cir.1989) (“Constitutional harm is not necessarily synonymous with the irreparable harm necessary for issuance of a preliminary injunction.”)."
} | 11,992,113 | b |
Plaintiff attempts to avoid making this showing by asserting that the violation of his constitutional rights is alone sufficient to prove irreparable harm and the inadequacy of a remedy at law. This statement is overbroad in that it must be tempered by the general rule that monetary injury is not a sufficient basis for injunctive relief. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "868 F.2d 69, 73",
"parenthetical": "\"Constitutional harm is not necessarily synonymous with the irreparable harm necessary for issuance of a preliminary injunction.\"",
"sentence": "See Back v. Carter, 933 F.Supp. 738, 754 (N.D.Ind.1996) (“When violations of constitutional rights are alleged, further showing of irreparable injury may not be required if what is at stake is not monetary damages”) (emphasis added); Milwaukee County Pavers Ass’n v. Fiedler, 707 F.Supp. 1016, 1031-32 (W.D.Wis.1989) (“Where violations of constitutional rights are alleged, further showing of irreparable injury may not be required if more than money is at stake”) (emphasis added); Kennedy-Kartheiser v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 1987 WL 17164, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 11, 1987); see also Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 73 (3d Cir.1989) (“Constitutional harm is not necessarily synonymous with the irreparable harm necessary for issuance of a preliminary injunction.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "707 F.Supp. 1016, 1031-32",
"parenthetical": "\"Where violations of constitutional rights are alleged, further showing of irreparable injury may not be required if more than money is at stake\"",
"sentence": "See Back v. Carter, 933 F.Supp. 738, 754 (N.D.Ind.1996) (“When violations of constitutional rights are alleged, further showing of irreparable injury may not be required if what is at stake is not monetary damages”) (emphasis added); Milwaukee County Pavers Ass’n v. Fiedler, 707 F.Supp. 1016, 1031-32 (W.D.Wis.1989) (“Where violations of constitutional rights are alleged, further showing of irreparable injury may not be required if more than money is at stake”) (emphasis added); Kennedy-Kartheiser v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 1987 WL 17164, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 11, 1987); see also Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 73 (3d Cir.1989) (“Constitutional harm is not necessarily synonymous with the irreparable harm necessary for issuance of a preliminary injunction.”)."
} | 11,992,113 | b |
Pis.' Post-Trial Br. at 58-59. The court, however, does not have jurisdiction to award relief for future infringements. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "228 Ct.Cl. 780, 784",
"parenthetical": "\"[R]elief for future infringements is beyond the power of the court by declaratory judgment or otherwise.\"",
"sentence": "De Graffenried v. United States, 228 Ct.Cl. 780, 784 (1981) (“[R]elief for future infringements is beyond the power of the court by declaratory judgment or otherwise.”); see also Motorola, 729 F.2d at 768 n,3 (“[I]njunctive relief under 35 U.S.C. § 283 is not available to a patent owner in a [Section] 1498 action.”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[I]njunctive relief under 35 U.S.C. SS 283 is not available to a patent owner in a [Section] 1498 action.\"",
"sentence": "De Graffenried v. United States, 228 Ct.Cl. 780, 784 (1981) (“[R]elief for future infringements is beyond the power of the court by declaratory judgment or otherwise.”); see also Motorola, 729 F.2d at 768 n,3 (“[I]njunctive relief under 35 U.S.C. § 283 is not available to a patent owner in a [Section] 1498 action.”) (citations omitted)."
} | 12,322,667 | a |
Plaintiffs have simply not alleged enough context specific details and facts to plausibly support a disparate impact claim based on these vague facts. Furthermore, there is no allegation that these remarks were made by decisionmakers or that they are contemporaneous in time as to the underlying action. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "304 F.3d 63, 69",
"parenthetical": "\" '[Sjstray workplace remarks,' as well as statements made either by nondecisionmakers or by decisionmakers not involved in the decisional process, normally are insufficient, standing alone, to establish either pretext or the requisite discriminatory animus.\"",
"sentence": "See Gonzalez v. El Dia, Inc., 304 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir.2002) (“ ‘[Sjstray workplace remarks,’ as well as statements made either by nondecisionmakers or by decisionmakers not involved in the decisional process, normally are insufficient, standing alone, to establish either pretext or the requisite discriminatory animus.”); see also Lehman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 74 F.3d 323, 329 (1st Cir.1996) (“Isolated, ambiguous remarks are insufficient, by themselves, to prove discriminatory intent.”); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir.1992) (“Stray remarks by non-decision-makers or by decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely given great weight....”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "74 F.3d 323, 329",
"parenthetical": "\"Isolated, ambiguous remarks are insufficient, by themselves, to prove discriminatory intent.\"",
"sentence": "See Gonzalez v. El Dia, Inc., 304 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir.2002) (“ ‘[Sjstray workplace remarks,’ as well as statements made either by nondecisionmakers or by decisionmakers not involved in the decisional process, normally are insufficient, standing alone, to establish either pretext or the requisite discriminatory animus.”); see also Lehman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 74 F.3d 323, 329 (1st Cir.1996) (“Isolated, ambiguous remarks are insufficient, by themselves, to prove discriminatory intent.”); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir.1992) (“Stray remarks by non-decision-makers or by decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely given great weight....”)."
} | 4,177,499 | a |
Plaintiffs have simply not alleged enough context specific details and facts to plausibly support a disparate impact claim based on these vague facts. Furthermore, there is no allegation that these remarks were made by decisionmakers or that they are contemporaneous in time as to the underlying action. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "304 F.3d 63, 69",
"parenthetical": "\" '[Sjstray workplace remarks,' as well as statements made either by nondecisionmakers or by decisionmakers not involved in the decisional process, normally are insufficient, standing alone, to establish either pretext or the requisite discriminatory animus.\"",
"sentence": "See Gonzalez v. El Dia, Inc., 304 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir.2002) (“ ‘[Sjstray workplace remarks,’ as well as statements made either by nondecisionmakers or by decisionmakers not involved in the decisional process, normally are insufficient, standing alone, to establish either pretext or the requisite discriminatory animus.”); see also Lehman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 74 F.3d 323, 329 (1st Cir.1996) (“Isolated, ambiguous remarks are insufficient, by themselves, to prove discriminatory intent.”); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir.1992) (“Stray remarks by non-decision-makers or by decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely given great weight....”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "983 F.2d 509, 545",
"parenthetical": "\"Stray remarks by non-decision-makers or by decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely given great weight....\"",
"sentence": "See Gonzalez v. El Dia, Inc., 304 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir.2002) (“ ‘[Sjstray workplace remarks,’ as well as statements made either by nondecisionmakers or by decisionmakers not involved in the decisional process, normally are insufficient, standing alone, to establish either pretext or the requisite discriminatory animus.”); see also Lehman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 74 F.3d 323, 329 (1st Cir.1996) (“Isolated, ambiguous remarks are insufficient, by themselves, to prove discriminatory intent.”); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir.1992) (“Stray remarks by non-decision-makers or by decisionmakers unrelated to the decision process are rarely given great weight....”)."
} | 4,177,499 | a |
It is clear that transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the motive of the taxpayer. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "435 U.S. 561, 583-84",
"parenthetical": "where \"there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,\" the transaction is not a sham",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Boynton, 649 F.2d at 1172 (transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams); Tolwinsky v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1009, 1037 (1986) (“[wjhere transactions serve no ‘purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences’ they are disregarded for tax purposes”); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 492 (1984) (interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. § 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions); cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04, 55 L.Ed.2d 550 (1978) (where “there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,” the transaction is not a sham)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "808 F.2d 1220, 1220",
"parenthetical": "inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Boynton, 649 F.2d at 1172 (transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams); Tolwinsky v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1009, 1037 (1986) (“[wjhere transactions serve no ‘purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences’ they are disregarded for tax purposes”); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 492 (1984) (interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. § 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions); cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04, 55 L.Ed.2d 550 (1978) (where “there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,” the transaction is not a sham)."
} | 1,825,669 | b |
It is clear that transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the motive of the taxpayer. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04",
"parenthetical": "where \"there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,\" the transaction is not a sham",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Boynton, 649 F.2d at 1172 (transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams); Tolwinsky v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1009, 1037 (1986) (“[wjhere transactions serve no ‘purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences’ they are disregarded for tax purposes”); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 492 (1984) (interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. § 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions); cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04, 55 L.Ed.2d 550 (1978) (where “there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,” the transaction is not a sham)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "808 F.2d 1220, 1220",
"parenthetical": "inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Boynton, 649 F.2d at 1172 (transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams); Tolwinsky v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1009, 1037 (1986) (“[wjhere transactions serve no ‘purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences’ they are disregarded for tax purposes”); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 492 (1984) (interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. § 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions); cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04, 55 L.Ed.2d 550 (1978) (where “there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,” the transaction is not a sham)."
} | 1,825,669 | b |
It is clear that transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the motive of the taxpayer. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "808 F.2d 1220, 1220",
"parenthetical": "inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Boynton, 649 F.2d at 1172 (transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams); Tolwinsky v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1009, 1037 (1986) (“[wjhere transactions serve no ‘purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences’ they are disregarded for tax purposes”); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 492 (1984) (interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. § 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions); cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04, 55 L.Ed.2d 550 (1978) (where “there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,” the transaction is not a sham)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where \"there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,\" the transaction is not a sham",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Boynton, 649 F.2d at 1172 (transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams); Tolwinsky v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1009, 1037 (1986) (“[wjhere transactions serve no ‘purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences’ they are disregarded for tax purposes”); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 492 (1984) (interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. § 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions); cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04, 55 L.Ed.2d 550 (1978) (where “there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,” the transaction is not a sham)."
} | 1,825,669 | a |
It is clear that transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the motive of the taxpayer. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "435 U.S. 561, 583-84",
"parenthetical": "where \"there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,\" the transaction is not a sham",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Boynton, 649 F.2d at 1172 (transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams); Tolwinsky v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1009, 1037 (1986) (“[wjhere transactions serve no ‘purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences’ they are disregarded for tax purposes”); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 492 (1984) (interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. § 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions); cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04, 55 L.Ed.2d 550 (1978) (where “there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,” the transaction is not a sham)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "649 F.2d 1172, 1172",
"parenthetical": "transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Boynton, 649 F.2d at 1172 (transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams); Tolwinsky v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1009, 1037 (1986) (“[wjhere transactions serve no ‘purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences’ they are disregarded for tax purposes”); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 492 (1984) (interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. § 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions); cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04, 55 L.Ed.2d 550 (1978) (where “there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,” the transaction is not a sham)."
} | 1,825,669 | b |
It is clear that transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the motive of the taxpayer. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "649 F.2d 1172, 1172",
"parenthetical": "transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Boynton, 649 F.2d at 1172 (transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams); Tolwinsky v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1009, 1037 (1986) (“[wjhere transactions serve no ‘purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences’ they are disregarded for tax purposes”); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 492 (1984) (interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. § 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions); cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04, 55 L.Ed.2d 550 (1978) (where “there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,” the transaction is not a sham)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04",
"parenthetical": "where \"there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,\" the transaction is not a sham",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Boynton, 649 F.2d at 1172 (transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams); Tolwinsky v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1009, 1037 (1986) (“[wjhere transactions serve no ‘purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences’ they are disregarded for tax purposes”); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 492 (1984) (interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. § 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions); cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04, 55 L.Ed.2d 550 (1978) (where “there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,” the transaction is not a sham)."
} | 1,825,669 | a |
It is clear that transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the motive of the taxpayer. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where \"there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,\" the transaction is not a sham",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Boynton, 649 F.2d at 1172 (transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams); Tolwinsky v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1009, 1037 (1986) (“[wjhere transactions serve no ‘purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences’ they are disregarded for tax purposes”); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 492 (1984) (interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. § 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions); cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04, 55 L.Ed.2d 550 (1978) (where “there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,” the transaction is not a sham)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "649 F.2d 1172, 1172",
"parenthetical": "transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Boynton, 649 F.2d at 1172 (transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams); Tolwinsky v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1009, 1037 (1986) (“[wjhere transactions serve no ‘purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences’ they are disregarded for tax purposes”); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 492 (1984) (interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. § 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions); cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04, 55 L.Ed.2d 550 (1978) (where “there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,” the transaction is not a sham)."
} | 1,825,669 | b |
It is clear that transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the motive of the taxpayer. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "86 T.C. 1009, 1037",
"parenthetical": "\"[wjhere transactions serve no 'purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences' they are disregarded for tax purposes\"",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Boynton, 649 F.2d at 1172 (transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams); Tolwinsky v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1009, 1037 (1986) (“[wjhere transactions serve no ‘purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences’ they are disregarded for tax purposes”); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 492 (1984) (interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. § 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions); cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04, 55 L.Ed.2d 550 (1978) (where “there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,” the transaction is not a sham)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "435 U.S. 561, 583-84",
"parenthetical": "where \"there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,\" the transaction is not a sham",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Boynton, 649 F.2d at 1172 (transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams); Tolwinsky v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1009, 1037 (1986) (“[wjhere transactions serve no ‘purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences’ they are disregarded for tax purposes”); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 492 (1984) (interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. § 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions); cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04, 55 L.Ed.2d 550 (1978) (where “there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,” the transaction is not a sham)."
} | 1,825,669 | a |
It is clear that transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the motive of the taxpayer. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04",
"parenthetical": "where \"there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,\" the transaction is not a sham",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Boynton, 649 F.2d at 1172 (transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams); Tolwinsky v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1009, 1037 (1986) (“[wjhere transactions serve no ‘purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences’ they are disregarded for tax purposes”); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 492 (1984) (interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. § 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions); cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04, 55 L.Ed.2d 550 (1978) (where “there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,” the transaction is not a sham)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "86 T.C. 1009, 1037",
"parenthetical": "\"[wjhere transactions serve no 'purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences' they are disregarded for tax purposes\"",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Boynton, 649 F.2d at 1172 (transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams); Tolwinsky v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1009, 1037 (1986) (“[wjhere transactions serve no ‘purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences’ they are disregarded for tax purposes”); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 492 (1984) (interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. § 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions); cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04, 55 L.Ed.2d 550 (1978) (where “there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,” the transaction is not a sham)."
} | 1,825,669 | b |
It is clear that transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the motive of the taxpayer. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "86 T.C. 1009, 1037",
"parenthetical": "\"[wjhere transactions serve no 'purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences' they are disregarded for tax purposes\"",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Boynton, 649 F.2d at 1172 (transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams); Tolwinsky v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1009, 1037 (1986) (“[wjhere transactions serve no ‘purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences’ they are disregarded for tax purposes”); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 492 (1984) (interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. § 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions); cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04, 55 L.Ed.2d 550 (1978) (where “there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,” the transaction is not a sham)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where \"there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,\" the transaction is not a sham",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Boynton, 649 F.2d at 1172 (transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams); Tolwinsky v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1009, 1037 (1986) (“[wjhere transactions serve no ‘purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences’ they are disregarded for tax purposes”); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 492 (1984) (interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. § 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions); cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04, 55 L.Ed.2d 550 (1978) (where “there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,” the transaction is not a sham)."
} | 1,825,669 | a |
It is clear that transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the motive of the taxpayer. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. SS 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Boynton, 649 F.2d at 1172 (transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams); Tolwinsky v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1009, 1037 (1986) (“[wjhere transactions serve no ‘purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences’ they are disregarded for tax purposes”); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 492 (1984) (interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. § 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions); cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04, 55 L.Ed.2d 550 (1978) (where “there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,” the transaction is not a sham)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "435 U.S. 561, 583-84",
"parenthetical": "where \"there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,\" the transaction is not a sham",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Boynton, 649 F.2d at 1172 (transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams); Tolwinsky v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1009, 1037 (1986) (“[wjhere transactions serve no ‘purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences’ they are disregarded for tax purposes”); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 492 (1984) (interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. § 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions); cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04, 55 L.Ed.2d 550 (1978) (where “there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,” the transaction is not a sham)."
} | 1,825,669 | a |
It is clear that transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the motive of the taxpayer. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. SS 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Boynton, 649 F.2d at 1172 (transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams); Tolwinsky v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1009, 1037 (1986) (“[wjhere transactions serve no ‘purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences’ they are disregarded for tax purposes”); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 492 (1984) (interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. § 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions); cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04, 55 L.Ed.2d 550 (1978) (where “there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,” the transaction is not a sham)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04",
"parenthetical": "where \"there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,\" the transaction is not a sham",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Boynton, 649 F.2d at 1172 (transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams); Tolwinsky v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1009, 1037 (1986) (“[wjhere transactions serve no ‘purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences’ they are disregarded for tax purposes”); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 492 (1984) (interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. § 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions); cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04, 55 L.Ed.2d 550 (1978) (where “there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,” the transaction is not a sham)."
} | 1,825,669 | a |
It is clear that transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams, regardless of the motive of the taxpayer. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "where \"there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,\" the transaction is not a sham",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Boynton, 649 F.2d at 1172 (transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams); Tolwinsky v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1009, 1037 (1986) (“[wjhere transactions serve no ‘purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences’ they are disregarded for tax purposes”); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 492 (1984) (interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. § 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions); cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04, 55 L.Ed.2d 550 (1978) (where “there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,” the transaction is not a sham)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. SS 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions",
"sentence": "See Mahoney, 808 F.2d at 1220 (inquiry is whether transaction has any practical economic effects beyond the creation of tax benefits); Boynton, 649 F.2d at 1172 (transactions that have no economic effect other than creation of tax losses are shams); Tolwinsky v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1009, 1037 (1986) (“[wjhere transactions serve no ‘purpose, substance, or utility apart from their anticipated tax consequences’ they are disregarded for tax purposes”); Julien v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 492 (1984) (interest expenses incurred in silver straddles disallowed under I.R.C. § 162(a) because transactions served no economic purpose beyond generating interest deductions); cf. Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 1303-04, 55 L.Ed.2d 550 (1978) (where “there is a ... transaction ... encouraged by business or regulatory realities, ... imbued with tax-independent considerations, and ... not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features,” the transaction is not a sham)."
} | 1,825,669 | b |
Departures pursuant to Section 5K2.0 do not hinge upon a Government's motion in support thereof. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "296 F.3d 192, 195",
"parenthetical": "holding that district court had authority to grant Section 5K2.0 downward departure despite Government's opposition",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996); United States v. Dominguez, 296 F.3d 192, 195 (3d Cir.2002) (holding that district court had authority to grant Section 5K2.0 downward departure despite Government’s opposition); see also United States v. Vitale, 159 F.3d 810, 813 (3d Cir.1998) (noting that district court granted defendant’s § 5K2.0 departure, without mention of Government support or opposition thereto)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "159 F.3d 810, 813",
"parenthetical": "noting that district court granted defendant's SS 5K2.0 departure, without mention of Government support or opposition thereto",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996); United States v. Dominguez, 296 F.3d 192, 195 (3d Cir.2002) (holding that district court had authority to grant Section 5K2.0 downward departure despite Government’s opposition); see also United States v. Vitale, 159 F.3d 810, 813 (3d Cir.1998) (noting that district court granted defendant’s § 5K2.0 departure, without mention of Government support or opposition thereto)."
} | 2,190,431 | a |
The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." Even a search conducted pursuant to a warrant may be "unreasonable" given the manner in which the search has been conducted. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "523 U.S. 65, 71",
"parenthetical": "\"Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71, 118 S.Ct. 992, 140 L.Ed.2d 191 (1998) (“Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful.”); cf. United States v. Young, 877 F.2d 1099, 1105 (1st Cir.1989) (“[Nothing] forbids continuing a search at night, at least when doing so is reasonable.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "877 F.2d 1099, 1105",
"parenthetical": "\"[Nothing] forbids continuing a search at night, at least when doing so is reasonable.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71, 118 S.Ct. 992, 140 L.Ed.2d 191 (1998) (“Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful.”); cf. United States v. Young, 877 F.2d 1099, 1105 (1st Cir.1989) (“[Nothing] forbids continuing a search at night, at least when doing so is reasonable.”)."
} | 3,754,119 | a |
The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." Even a search conducted pursuant to a warrant may be "unreasonable" given the manner in which the search has been conducted. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71, 118 S.Ct. 992, 140 L.Ed.2d 191 (1998) (“Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful.”); cf. United States v. Young, 877 F.2d 1099, 1105 (1st Cir.1989) (“[Nothing] forbids continuing a search at night, at least when doing so is reasonable.”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "877 F.2d 1099, 1105",
"parenthetical": "\"[Nothing] forbids continuing a search at night, at least when doing so is reasonable.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71, 118 S.Ct. 992, 140 L.Ed.2d 191 (1998) (“Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful.”); cf. United States v. Young, 877 F.2d 1099, 1105 (1st Cir.1989) (“[Nothing] forbids continuing a search at night, at least when doing so is reasonable.”)."
} | 3,754,119 | a |
The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." Even a search conducted pursuant to a warrant may be "unreasonable" given the manner in which the search has been conducted. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "877 F.2d 1099, 1105",
"parenthetical": "\"[Nothing] forbids continuing a search at night, at least when doing so is reasonable.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71, 118 S.Ct. 992, 140 L.Ed.2d 191 (1998) (“Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful.”); cf. United States v. Young, 877 F.2d 1099, 1105 (1st Cir.1989) (“[Nothing] forbids continuing a search at night, at least when doing so is reasonable.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful.\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71, 118 S.Ct. 992, 140 L.Ed.2d 191 (1998) (“Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful.”); cf. United States v. Young, 877 F.2d 1099, 1105 (1st Cir.1989) (“[Nothing] forbids continuing a search at night, at least when doing so is reasonable.”)."
} | 3,754,119 | b |
Yet, just as it would be ridiculous to presume that title clearing litigation might take 21 years to complete, it would be ridiculous to presume that it might take Calvert County 21 years to act on appellant's application for permits. Indeed, a number of cases have involved enforcement of land sales contracts that condition settlement upon rezoning or obtaining requisite permits, yet, in none of these cases was the rule against perpetu-ities even raised. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "256 Md. 490, 497",
"parenthetical": "clause providing for settlement \" 'on or before (90) days from date hereof or as soon thereafter as report of title can be obtained' \" was not so indefinite as to destroy enforceability of contract",
"sentence": "See also Paape v. Grimes, 256 Md. 490, 497, 260 A.2d 644 (1970) (clause providing for settlement “ ‘on or before (90) days from date hereof or as soon thereafter as report of title can be obtained’ ” was not so indefinite as to destroy enforceability of contract)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "contract provided that settlement would be within 30 days after final determination of rezoning application by zoning authority",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michael v. Towers, 253 Md. 114, 119, 251 A.2d 878 (1969) (contract contingent upon rezoning); Sears v. Polan’s, 250 Md. 525, 243 A.2d 602 (1968) (contract provided that settlement would be within 30 days after final determination of rezoning application by zoning authority); Scheffres v. Columbia Realty Co., 244 Md. 270, 275-76, 286, 223 A.2d 619 (1966) (settlement contingent upon rezoning and approval from Board of Education to trade certain acreage); Cadem v. Nanna, 243 Md. 536, 543-44, 221 A.2d 703 (1966) (contract contingent upon rezoning)."
} | 157,428 | b |
Yet, just as it would be ridiculous to presume that title clearing litigation might take 21 years to complete, it would be ridiculous to presume that it might take Calvert County 21 years to act on appellant's application for permits. Indeed, a number of cases have involved enforcement of land sales contracts that condition settlement upon rezoning or obtaining requisite permits, yet, in none of these cases was the rule against perpetu-ities even raised. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "contract provided that settlement would be within 30 days after final determination of rezoning application by zoning authority",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michael v. Towers, 253 Md. 114, 119, 251 A.2d 878 (1969) (contract contingent upon rezoning); Sears v. Polan’s, 250 Md. 525, 243 A.2d 602 (1968) (contract provided that settlement would be within 30 days after final determination of rezoning application by zoning authority); Scheffres v. Columbia Realty Co., 244 Md. 270, 275-76, 286, 223 A.2d 619 (1966) (settlement contingent upon rezoning and approval from Board of Education to trade certain acreage); Cadem v. Nanna, 243 Md. 536, 543-44, 221 A.2d 703 (1966) (contract contingent upon rezoning)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "clause providing for settlement \" 'on or before (90) days from date hereof or as soon thereafter as report of title can be obtained' \" was not so indefinite as to destroy enforceability of contract",
"sentence": "See also Paape v. Grimes, 256 Md. 490, 497, 260 A.2d 644 (1970) (clause providing for settlement “ ‘on or before (90) days from date hereof or as soon thereafter as report of title can be obtained’ ” was not so indefinite as to destroy enforceability of contract)."
} | 157,428 | a |
Yet, just as it would be ridiculous to presume that title clearing litigation might take 21 years to complete, it would be ridiculous to presume that it might take Calvert County 21 years to act on appellant's application for permits. Indeed, a number of cases have involved enforcement of land sales contracts that condition settlement upon rezoning or obtaining requisite permits, yet, in none of these cases was the rule against perpetu-ities even raised. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "256 Md. 490, 497",
"parenthetical": "clause providing for settlement \" 'on or before (90) days from date hereof or as soon thereafter as report of title can be obtained' \" was not so indefinite as to destroy enforceability of contract",
"sentence": "See also Paape v. Grimes, 256 Md. 490, 497, 260 A.2d 644 (1970) (clause providing for settlement “ ‘on or before (90) days from date hereof or as soon thereafter as report of title can be obtained’ ” was not so indefinite as to destroy enforceability of contract)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "contract provided that settlement would be within 30 days after final determination of rezoning application by zoning authority",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michael v. Towers, 253 Md. 114, 119, 251 A.2d 878 (1969) (contract contingent upon rezoning); Sears v. Polan’s, 250 Md. 525, 243 A.2d 602 (1968) (contract provided that settlement would be within 30 days after final determination of rezoning application by zoning authority); Scheffres v. Columbia Realty Co., 244 Md. 270, 275-76, 286, 223 A.2d 619 (1966) (settlement contingent upon rezoning and approval from Board of Education to trade certain acreage); Cadem v. Nanna, 243 Md. 536, 543-44, 221 A.2d 703 (1966) (contract contingent upon rezoning)."
} | 157,428 | b |
Yet, just as it would be ridiculous to presume that title clearing litigation might take 21 years to complete, it would be ridiculous to presume that it might take Calvert County 21 years to act on appellant's application for permits. Indeed, a number of cases have involved enforcement of land sales contracts that condition settlement upon rezoning or obtaining requisite permits, yet, in none of these cases was the rule against perpetu-ities even raised. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "clause providing for settlement \" 'on or before (90) days from date hereof or as soon thereafter as report of title can be obtained' \" was not so indefinite as to destroy enforceability of contract",
"sentence": "See also Paape v. Grimes, 256 Md. 490, 497, 260 A.2d 644 (1970) (clause providing for settlement “ ‘on or before (90) days from date hereof or as soon thereafter as report of title can be obtained’ ” was not so indefinite as to destroy enforceability of contract)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "contract provided that settlement would be within 30 days after final determination of rezoning application by zoning authority",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michael v. Towers, 253 Md. 114, 119, 251 A.2d 878 (1969) (contract contingent upon rezoning); Sears v. Polan’s, 250 Md. 525, 243 A.2d 602 (1968) (contract provided that settlement would be within 30 days after final determination of rezoning application by zoning authority); Scheffres v. Columbia Realty Co., 244 Md. 270, 275-76, 286, 223 A.2d 619 (1966) (settlement contingent upon rezoning and approval from Board of Education to trade certain acreage); Cadem v. Nanna, 243 Md. 536, 543-44, 221 A.2d 703 (1966) (contract contingent upon rezoning)."
} | 157,428 | b |
Yet, just as it would be ridiculous to presume that title clearing litigation might take 21 years to complete, it would be ridiculous to presume that it might take Calvert County 21 years to act on appellant's application for permits. Indeed, a number of cases have involved enforcement of land sales contracts that condition settlement upon rezoning or obtaining requisite permits, yet, in none of these cases was the rule against perpetu-ities even raised. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "244 Md. 270, 275-76, 286",
"parenthetical": "settlement contingent upon rezoning and approval from Board of Education to trade certain acreage",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michael v. Towers, 253 Md. 114, 119, 251 A.2d 878 (1969) (contract contingent upon rezoning); Sears v. Polan’s, 250 Md. 525, 243 A.2d 602 (1968) (contract provided that settlement would be within 30 days after final determination of rezoning application by zoning authority); Scheffres v. Columbia Realty Co., 244 Md. 270, 275-76, 286, 223 A.2d 619 (1966) (settlement contingent upon rezoning and approval from Board of Education to trade certain acreage); Cadem v. Nanna, 243 Md. 536, 543-44, 221 A.2d 703 (1966) (contract contingent upon rezoning)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "256 Md. 490, 497",
"parenthetical": "clause providing for settlement \" 'on or before (90) days from date hereof or as soon thereafter as report of title can be obtained' \" was not so indefinite as to destroy enforceability of contract",
"sentence": "See also Paape v. Grimes, 256 Md. 490, 497, 260 A.2d 644 (1970) (clause providing for settlement “ ‘on or before (90) days from date hereof or as soon thereafter as report of title can be obtained’ ” was not so indefinite as to destroy enforceability of contract)."
} | 157,428 | a |
Yet, just as it would be ridiculous to presume that title clearing litigation might take 21 years to complete, it would be ridiculous to presume that it might take Calvert County 21 years to act on appellant's application for permits. Indeed, a number of cases have involved enforcement of land sales contracts that condition settlement upon rezoning or obtaining requisite permits, yet, in none of these cases was the rule against perpetu-ities even raised. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "clause providing for settlement \" 'on or before (90) days from date hereof or as soon thereafter as report of title can be obtained' \" was not so indefinite as to destroy enforceability of contract",
"sentence": "See also Paape v. Grimes, 256 Md. 490, 497, 260 A.2d 644 (1970) (clause providing for settlement “ ‘on or before (90) days from date hereof or as soon thereafter as report of title can be obtained’ ” was not so indefinite as to destroy enforceability of contract)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "244 Md. 270, 275-76, 286",
"parenthetical": "settlement contingent upon rezoning and approval from Board of Education to trade certain acreage",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michael v. Towers, 253 Md. 114, 119, 251 A.2d 878 (1969) (contract contingent upon rezoning); Sears v. Polan’s, 250 Md. 525, 243 A.2d 602 (1968) (contract provided that settlement would be within 30 days after final determination of rezoning application by zoning authority); Scheffres v. Columbia Realty Co., 244 Md. 270, 275-76, 286, 223 A.2d 619 (1966) (settlement contingent upon rezoning and approval from Board of Education to trade certain acreage); Cadem v. Nanna, 243 Md. 536, 543-44, 221 A.2d 703 (1966) (contract contingent upon rezoning)."
} | 157,428 | b |
Yet, just as it would be ridiculous to presume that title clearing litigation might take 21 years to complete, it would be ridiculous to presume that it might take Calvert County 21 years to act on appellant's application for permits. Indeed, a number of cases have involved enforcement of land sales contracts that condition settlement upon rezoning or obtaining requisite permits, yet, in none of these cases was the rule against perpetu-ities even raised. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "settlement contingent upon rezoning and approval from Board of Education to trade certain acreage",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michael v. Towers, 253 Md. 114, 119, 251 A.2d 878 (1969) (contract contingent upon rezoning); Sears v. Polan’s, 250 Md. 525, 243 A.2d 602 (1968) (contract provided that settlement would be within 30 days after final determination of rezoning application by zoning authority); Scheffres v. Columbia Realty Co., 244 Md. 270, 275-76, 286, 223 A.2d 619 (1966) (settlement contingent upon rezoning and approval from Board of Education to trade certain acreage); Cadem v. Nanna, 243 Md. 536, 543-44, 221 A.2d 703 (1966) (contract contingent upon rezoning)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "256 Md. 490, 497",
"parenthetical": "clause providing for settlement \" 'on or before (90) days from date hereof or as soon thereafter as report of title can be obtained' \" was not so indefinite as to destroy enforceability of contract",
"sentence": "See also Paape v. Grimes, 256 Md. 490, 497, 260 A.2d 644 (1970) (clause providing for settlement “ ‘on or before (90) days from date hereof or as soon thereafter as report of title can be obtained’ ” was not so indefinite as to destroy enforceability of contract)."
} | 157,428 | a |
Yet, just as it would be ridiculous to presume that title clearing litigation might take 21 years to complete, it would be ridiculous to presume that it might take Calvert County 21 years to act on appellant's application for permits. Indeed, a number of cases have involved enforcement of land sales contracts that condition settlement upon rezoning or obtaining requisite permits, yet, in none of these cases was the rule against perpetu-ities even raised. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "clause providing for settlement \" 'on or before (90) days from date hereof or as soon thereafter as report of title can be obtained' \" was not so indefinite as to destroy enforceability of contract",
"sentence": "See also Paape v. Grimes, 256 Md. 490, 497, 260 A.2d 644 (1970) (clause providing for settlement “ ‘on or before (90) days from date hereof or as soon thereafter as report of title can be obtained’ ” was not so indefinite as to destroy enforceability of contract)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "settlement contingent upon rezoning and approval from Board of Education to trade certain acreage",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Michael v. Towers, 253 Md. 114, 119, 251 A.2d 878 (1969) (contract contingent upon rezoning); Sears v. Polan’s, 250 Md. 525, 243 A.2d 602 (1968) (contract provided that settlement would be within 30 days after final determination of rezoning application by zoning authority); Scheffres v. Columbia Realty Co., 244 Md. 270, 275-76, 286, 223 A.2d 619 (1966) (settlement contingent upon rezoning and approval from Board of Education to trade certain acreage); Cadem v. Nanna, 243 Md. 536, 543-44, 221 A.2d 703 (1966) (contract contingent upon rezoning)."
} | 157,428 | b |
Because Lurie's petition, filed in October 1998, postdates the enactment of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Because [petitioner] filed his petition in December 1997, [his] case is governed by the statute as amended by AEDPA.\"",
"sentence": "See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“Because [petitioner] filed his petition in December 1997, [his] case is governed by the statute as amended by AEDPA.”); cf. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2061, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 242 (2d Cir.1998) (hold ing that pre-AEDPA standards govern petitions filed prior to AEDPA’s enactment)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "135 F.3d 235, 242",
"parenthetical": "hold ing that pre-AEDPA standards govern petitions filed prior to AEDPA's enactment",
"sentence": "See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“Because [petitioner] filed his petition in December 1997, [his] case is governed by the statute as amended by AEDPA.”); cf. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2061, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 242 (2d Cir.1998) (hold ing that pre-AEDPA standards govern petitions filed prior to AEDPA’s enactment)."
} | 11,227,051 | a |
Because Lurie's petition, filed in October 1998, postdates the enactment of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518",
"parenthetical": "\"Because [petitioner] filed his petition in December 1997, [his] case is governed by the statute as amended by AEDPA.\"",
"sentence": "See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“Because [petitioner] filed his petition in December 1997, [his] case is governed by the statute as amended by AEDPA.”); cf. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2061, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 242 (2d Cir.1998) (hold ing that pre-AEDPA standards govern petitions filed prior to AEDPA’s enactment)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "135 F.3d 235, 242",
"parenthetical": "hold ing that pre-AEDPA standards govern petitions filed prior to AEDPA's enactment",
"sentence": "See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“Because [petitioner] filed his petition in December 1997, [his] case is governed by the statute as amended by AEDPA.”); cf. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2061, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 242 (2d Cir.1998) (hold ing that pre-AEDPA standards govern petitions filed prior to AEDPA’s enactment)."
} | 11,227,051 | a |
Because Lurie's petition, filed in October 1998, postdates the enactment of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "135 F.3d 235, 242",
"parenthetical": "hold ing that pre-AEDPA standards govern petitions filed prior to AEDPA's enactment",
"sentence": "See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“Because [petitioner] filed his petition in December 1997, [his] case is governed by the statute as amended by AEDPA.”); cf. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2061, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 242 (2d Cir.1998) (hold ing that pre-AEDPA standards govern petitions filed prior to AEDPA’s enactment)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"Because [petitioner] filed his petition in December 1997, [his] case is governed by the statute as amended by AEDPA.\"",
"sentence": "See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (“Because [petitioner] filed his petition in December 1997, [his] case is governed by the statute as amended by AEDPA.”); cf. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2061, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997); Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 242 (2d Cir.1998) (hold ing that pre-AEDPA standards govern petitions filed prior to AEDPA’s enactment)."
} | 11,227,051 | b |
Eastern conceded at oral argument, however, that our recent decision in West Virginia CWP Fund v. Bender forecloses that contention. Our precedent also readily dispatches Eastern's complaints about the ALJ's consideration of the preamble to the 2000 Final Rule in evaluating the opinions of Drs. Rosenberg and Renn. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "718 F.3d 319, 323",
"parenthetical": "explaining that ALJ \"may consider\" regulatory preamble \"in assessing medical expert opinions\"",
"sentence": "See Harman Mining Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 678 F.3d 305, 314-16 (4th Cir.2012) (concluding that ALJ did not err in invoking regulatory preamble in assessing medical expert’s credibility); see also Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Cochran, 718 F.3d 319, 323 (4th Cir.2013) (explaining that ALJ \"may consider” regulatory preamble \"in assessing medical expert opinions”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "678 F.3d 305, 314-16",
"parenthetical": "concluding that ALJ did not err in invoking regulatory preamble in assessing medical expert's credibility",
"sentence": "See Harman Mining Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 678 F.3d 305, 314-16 (4th Cir.2012) (concluding that ALJ did not err in invoking regulatory preamble in assessing medical expert’s credibility); see also Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Cochran, 718 F.3d 319, 323 (4th Cir.2013) (explaining that ALJ \"may consider” regulatory preamble \"in assessing medical expert opinions”)."
} | 4,356,820 | b |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "343 F.3d 985, 985",
"parenthetical": "reversing the district court's denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "458 F.3d 892, 898",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | 4,076,298 | a |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "439 F.3d 529, 534",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where petitioner's claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant's false testimony was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "343 F.3d 985, 985",
"parenthetical": "reversing the district court's denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | 4,076,298 | b |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "458 F.3d 892, 898",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61",
"parenthetical": "affirming the district court's partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | 4,076,298 | b |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61",
"parenthetical": "affirming the district court's partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "439 F.3d 529, 534",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where petitioner's claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant's false testimony was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | 4,076,298 | a |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "481 F.3d 1170, 1171",
"parenthetical": "noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "458 F.3d 892, 898",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | 4,076,298 | a |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "439 F.3d 529, 534",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where petitioner's claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant's false testimony was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "481 F.3d 1170, 1171",
"parenthetical": "noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | 4,076,298 | b |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "458 F.3d 892, 898",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | 4,076,298 | b |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "439 F.3d 529, 534",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where petitioner's claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant's false testimony was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | 4,076,298 | b |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "458 F.3d 892, 898",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | 4,076,298 | b |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "439 F.3d 529, 534",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where petitioner's claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant's false testimony was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | 4,076,298 | a |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "462 F.3d 1099, 1102",
"parenthetical": "granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant's testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "458 F.3d 892, 898",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | 4,076,298 | a |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "462 F.3d 1099, 1102",
"parenthetical": "granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant's testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "439 F.3d 529, 534",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where petitioner's claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant's false testimony was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | 4,076,298 | a |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "458 F.3d 892, 898",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "989 F.2d 333, 333",
"parenthetical": "vacating a defendant's conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | 4,076,298 | b |
Furthermore, we have recognized the unreliability of jailhouse informants -- who are themselves incarcerated criminals with significant motivation to garner favor -- and on occasion have granted habeas or other relief where a defendant was convicted as a result of fabricated or potentially fabricated testimony. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "439 F.3d 529, 534",
"parenthetical": "denying habeas relief where petitioner's claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant's false testimony was harmless",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "989 F.2d 333, 333",
"parenthetical": "vacating a defendant's conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Hall, 343 F.3d at 985 (reversing the district court’s denial of habeas relief where a 1985 California jailhouse informant later confessed to perjury and the alteration of evidence); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1060-61 (9th Cir.2008) (affirming the district court’s partial grant of habeas relief where a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed the full benefit he received in exchange for his testimony); Goldstein v. City of Long Beach, 481 F.3d 1170, 1171 (9th Cir.2007), reversed, on other grounds by Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 855, 172 L.Ed.2d 706 (2009) (noting that Goldstein was granted habeas relief when it was revealed that a 1980s California jailhouse informant had not disclosed that his sentence was reduced in return for testimony) ; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.2006) (granting habeas relief where counsel was ineffective in failing to cross-examine the 1990 California jailhouse informant about his motivation for testifying and the informant’s testimony was suspiciously similar to a recent television broadcast about the case); Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d at 333 (vacating a defendant’s conviction on direct review and remanding the case back to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the government informant had lied about prior convictions); but see Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 898 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where failure to impeach a 1980 California jailhouse informant was not ineffective assistance of counsel); Morales v. Ornoski, 439 F.3d 529, 534 (9th Cir.2006) (denying habeas relief where petitioner’s claim that prosecution knowingly presented a 1980s California jailhouse informant’s false testimony was harmless)."
} | 4,076,298 | b |
In addition to making it difficult to ascertain the factual allegations that correspond to each claim, shotgun pleadings also fail to specify which defendant is responsible for each act alleged. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "921 F.2d 1465, 1518",
"parenthetical": "dismissing shotgun complaint that made \"factual allegations that could not possibly be material to any of the causes of action.\"",
"sentence": "Beckwith, 146 Fed.Appx. at 373 (“It is virtually impossible to ascertain what factual allegations correspond with each claim and which claim is directed at which defendant.”); see also Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1518 (11th Cir.1991) (dismissing shotgun complaint that made “factual allegations that could not possibly be material to any of the causes of action.”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "146 Fed.Appx. 373, 373",
"parenthetical": "\"It is virtually impossible to ascertain what factual allegations correspond with each claim and which claim is directed at which defendant.\"",
"sentence": "Beckwith, 146 Fed.Appx. at 373 (“It is virtually impossible to ascertain what factual allegations correspond with each claim and which claim is directed at which defendant.”); see also Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1518 (11th Cir.1991) (dismissing shotgun complaint that made “factual allegations that could not possibly be material to any of the causes of action.”)."
} | 5,701,083 | b |
The factfinder must assess the totality of the circumstances, with no single factor necessarily attaining talismanic importance. Given a minimally sufficient evidentiary predicate, determining the nature of the relationship between the hirer and the hi-ree is precisely the sort of "mixed" fact-law question which falls peculiarly within the competence of the jury qua factfinder. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "866 F.2d 507, 510-11",
"parenthetical": "evaluative applications of legal standards to circumstances of particular cases are ordinarily for the factfinder",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilson v. Hooter Corp., 475 F.2d 497, 501 (1st Cir.) (question of which employer exercised right to control “borrowed” servant susceptible to resolution by jury), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 865, 94 S.Ct. 116, 38 L.Ed.2d 85 (1973); cf. Swift v. United States, 866 F.2d 507, 510-11 (1st Cir.1989) (evaluative applications of legal standards to circumstances of particular cases are ordinarily for the factfinder)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "475 F.2d 497, 501",
"parenthetical": "question of which employer exercised right to control \"borrowed\" servant susceptible to resolution by jury",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilson v. Hooter Corp., 475 F.2d 497, 501 (1st Cir.) (question of which employer exercised right to control “borrowed” servant susceptible to resolution by jury), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 865, 94 S.Ct. 116, 38 L.Ed.2d 85 (1973); cf. Swift v. United States, 866 F.2d 507, 510-11 (1st Cir.1989) (evaluative applications of legal standards to circumstances of particular cases are ordinarily for the factfinder)."
} | 10,535,261 | b |
The factfinder must assess the totality of the circumstances, with no single factor necessarily attaining talismanic importance. Given a minimally sufficient evidentiary predicate, determining the nature of the relationship between the hirer and the hi-ree is precisely the sort of "mixed" fact-law question which falls peculiarly within the competence of the jury qua factfinder. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "question of which employer exercised right to control \"borrowed\" servant susceptible to resolution by jury",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilson v. Hooter Corp., 475 F.2d 497, 501 (1st Cir.) (question of which employer exercised right to control “borrowed” servant susceptible to resolution by jury), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 865, 94 S.Ct. 116, 38 L.Ed.2d 85 (1973); cf. Swift v. United States, 866 F.2d 507, 510-11 (1st Cir.1989) (evaluative applications of legal standards to circumstances of particular cases are ordinarily for the factfinder)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "866 F.2d 507, 510-11",
"parenthetical": "evaluative applications of legal standards to circumstances of particular cases are ordinarily for the factfinder",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilson v. Hooter Corp., 475 F.2d 497, 501 (1st Cir.) (question of which employer exercised right to control “borrowed” servant susceptible to resolution by jury), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 865, 94 S.Ct. 116, 38 L.Ed.2d 85 (1973); cf. Swift v. United States, 866 F.2d 507, 510-11 (1st Cir.1989) (evaluative applications of legal standards to circumstances of particular cases are ordinarily for the factfinder)."
} | 10,535,261 | a |
The factfinder must assess the totality of the circumstances, with no single factor necessarily attaining talismanic importance. Given a minimally sufficient evidentiary predicate, determining the nature of the relationship between the hirer and the hi-ree is precisely the sort of "mixed" fact-law question which falls peculiarly within the competence of the jury qua factfinder. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "question of which employer exercised right to control \"borrowed\" servant susceptible to resolution by jury",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilson v. Hooter Corp., 475 F.2d 497, 501 (1st Cir.) (question of which employer exercised right to control “borrowed” servant susceptible to resolution by jury), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 865, 94 S.Ct. 116, 38 L.Ed.2d 85 (1973); cf. Swift v. United States, 866 F.2d 507, 510-11 (1st Cir.1989) (evaluative applications of legal standards to circumstances of particular cases are ordinarily for the factfinder)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "866 F.2d 507, 510-11",
"parenthetical": "evaluative applications of legal standards to circumstances of particular cases are ordinarily for the factfinder",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilson v. Hooter Corp., 475 F.2d 497, 501 (1st Cir.) (question of which employer exercised right to control “borrowed” servant susceptible to resolution by jury), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 865, 94 S.Ct. 116, 38 L.Ed.2d 85 (1973); cf. Swift v. United States, 866 F.2d 507, 510-11 (1st Cir.1989) (evaluative applications of legal standards to circumstances of particular cases are ordinarily for the factfinder)."
} | 10,535,261 | a |
The factfinder must assess the totality of the circumstances, with no single factor necessarily attaining talismanic importance. Given a minimally sufficient evidentiary predicate, determining the nature of the relationship between the hirer and the hi-ree is precisely the sort of "mixed" fact-law question which falls peculiarly within the competence of the jury qua factfinder. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "question of which employer exercised right to control \"borrowed\" servant susceptible to resolution by jury",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilson v. Hooter Corp., 475 F.2d 497, 501 (1st Cir.) (question of which employer exercised right to control “borrowed” servant susceptible to resolution by jury), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 865, 94 S.Ct. 116, 38 L.Ed.2d 85 (1973); cf. Swift v. United States, 866 F.2d 507, 510-11 (1st Cir.1989) (evaluative applications of legal standards to circumstances of particular cases are ordinarily for the factfinder)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "866 F.2d 507, 510-11",
"parenthetical": "evaluative applications of legal standards to circumstances of particular cases are ordinarily for the factfinder",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Wilson v. Hooter Corp., 475 F.2d 497, 501 (1st Cir.) (question of which employer exercised right to control “borrowed” servant susceptible to resolution by jury), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 865, 94 S.Ct. 116, 38 L.Ed.2d 85 (1973); cf. Swift v. United States, 866 F.2d 507, 510-11 (1st Cir.1989) (evaluative applications of legal standards to circumstances of particular cases are ordinarily for the factfinder)."
} | 10,535,261 | a |
Finally, the fact that his income substantially exceeds hers does not justify permanent periodic alimony. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "evidence that his income was more than wife's during her previous employment did not support award of permanent periodic alimony where wife was 35 years old, in good health, and had some job skills that could eventually enable her to become self-supporting",
"sentence": "Rojas v. Rojas, 656 So.2d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (evidence that his income was more than wife’s during her previous employment did not support award of permanent periodic alimony where wife was 35 years old, in good health, and had some job skills that could eventually enable her to become self-supporting); Hann v. Hann, 629 So.2d 918 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (fact that his income was more than wife’s does not justify award of permanent alimony to her where she was 40, had no health disabilities, and had education and experience to become self-supporting); Fulks v. Fulks, 558 So.2d 205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (no justification for permanent periodic alimony where he had more income than wife who was 40, in good health, and had 14 years work experience); see also Wismar v. Wismar, 522 So.2d 552 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) (award of permanent alimony in' this case, without any basis or justification in the record, except as a means to provide the wife with a higher standard of living at the husband’s expense, constitutes an abuse of discretion)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "award of permanent alimony in' this case, without any basis or justification in the record, except as a means to provide the wife with a higher standard of living at the husband's expense, constitutes an abuse of discretion",
"sentence": "Rojas v. Rojas, 656 So.2d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (evidence that his income was more than wife’s during her previous employment did not support award of permanent periodic alimony where wife was 35 years old, in good health, and had some job skills that could eventually enable her to become self-supporting); Hann v. Hann, 629 So.2d 918 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (fact that his income was more than wife’s does not justify award of permanent alimony to her where she was 40, had no health disabilities, and had education and experience to become self-supporting); Fulks v. Fulks, 558 So.2d 205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (no justification for permanent periodic alimony where he had more income than wife who was 40, in good health, and had 14 years work experience); see also Wismar v. Wismar, 522 So.2d 552 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) (award of permanent alimony in' this case, without any basis or justification in the record, except as a means to provide the wife with a higher standard of living at the husband’s expense, constitutes an abuse of discretion)."
} | 8,352,598 | a |
Finally, the fact that his income substantially exceeds hers does not justify permanent periodic alimony. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "award of permanent alimony in' this case, without any basis or justification in the record, except as a means to provide the wife with a higher standard of living at the husband's expense, constitutes an abuse of discretion",
"sentence": "Rojas v. Rojas, 656 So.2d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (evidence that his income was more than wife’s during her previous employment did not support award of permanent periodic alimony where wife was 35 years old, in good health, and had some job skills that could eventually enable her to become self-supporting); Hann v. Hann, 629 So.2d 918 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (fact that his income was more than wife’s does not justify award of permanent alimony to her where she was 40, had no health disabilities, and had education and experience to become self-supporting); Fulks v. Fulks, 558 So.2d 205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (no justification for permanent periodic alimony where he had more income than wife who was 40, in good health, and had 14 years work experience); see also Wismar v. Wismar, 522 So.2d 552 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) (award of permanent alimony in' this case, without any basis or justification in the record, except as a means to provide the wife with a higher standard of living at the husband’s expense, constitutes an abuse of discretion)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "fact that his income was more than wife's does not justify award of permanent alimony to her where she was 40, had no health disabilities, and had education and experience to become self-supporting",
"sentence": "Rojas v. Rojas, 656 So.2d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (evidence that his income was more than wife’s during her previous employment did not support award of permanent periodic alimony where wife was 35 years old, in good health, and had some job skills that could eventually enable her to become self-supporting); Hann v. Hann, 629 So.2d 918 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (fact that his income was more than wife’s does not justify award of permanent alimony to her where she was 40, had no health disabilities, and had education and experience to become self-supporting); Fulks v. Fulks, 558 So.2d 205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (no justification for permanent periodic alimony where he had more income than wife who was 40, in good health, and had 14 years work experience); see also Wismar v. Wismar, 522 So.2d 552 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) (award of permanent alimony in' this case, without any basis or justification in the record, except as a means to provide the wife with a higher standard of living at the husband’s expense, constitutes an abuse of discretion)."
} | 8,352,598 | b |
Finally, the fact that his income substantially exceeds hers does not justify permanent periodic alimony. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "no justification for permanent periodic alimony where he had more income than wife who was 40, in good health, and had 14 years work experience",
"sentence": "Rojas v. Rojas, 656 So.2d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (evidence that his income was more than wife’s during her previous employment did not support award of permanent periodic alimony where wife was 35 years old, in good health, and had some job skills that could eventually enable her to become self-supporting); Hann v. Hann, 629 So.2d 918 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (fact that his income was more than wife’s does not justify award of permanent alimony to her where she was 40, had no health disabilities, and had education and experience to become self-supporting); Fulks v. Fulks, 558 So.2d 205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (no justification for permanent periodic alimony where he had more income than wife who was 40, in good health, and had 14 years work experience); see also Wismar v. Wismar, 522 So.2d 552 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) (award of permanent alimony in' this case, without any basis or justification in the record, except as a means to provide the wife with a higher standard of living at the husband’s expense, constitutes an abuse of discretion)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "award of permanent alimony in' this case, without any basis or justification in the record, except as a means to provide the wife with a higher standard of living at the husband's expense, constitutes an abuse of discretion",
"sentence": "Rojas v. Rojas, 656 So.2d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (evidence that his income was more than wife’s during her previous employment did not support award of permanent periodic alimony where wife was 35 years old, in good health, and had some job skills that could eventually enable her to become self-supporting); Hann v. Hann, 629 So.2d 918 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (fact that his income was more than wife’s does not justify award of permanent alimony to her where she was 40, had no health disabilities, and had education and experience to become self-supporting); Fulks v. Fulks, 558 So.2d 205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (no justification for permanent periodic alimony where he had more income than wife who was 40, in good health, and had 14 years work experience); see also Wismar v. Wismar, 522 So.2d 552 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988) (award of permanent alimony in' this case, without any basis or justification in the record, except as a means to provide the wife with a higher standard of living at the husband’s expense, constitutes an abuse of discretion)."
} | 8,352,598 | a |
. Young's statement that Alexander "[has] a gun on him now" is not rendered inadmissible simply because it was made in response to the dispatcher's question. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "192 F.3d 767, 767",
"parenthetical": "fact that declarant answered dispatcher's questions, rather than giving spontaneous narrative, did not disprove excitement",
"sentence": "See Joy, 192 F.3d at 767 (fact that declarant answered dispatcher’s questions, rather than giving spontaneous narrative, did not disprove excitement); see also United States v. Glenn, 473 F.2d 191, 194 (D.C.Cir.1972) (\"Declarations relating to the circumstances of a violent crime, made by the victim shortly after its occurrence ... may be admissible although made in response to an inquiry.\")."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "473 F.2d 191, 194",
"parenthetical": "\"Declarations relating to the circumstances of a violent crime, made by the victim shortly after its occurrence ... may be admissible although made in response to an inquiry.\"",
"sentence": "See Joy, 192 F.3d at 767 (fact that declarant answered dispatcher’s questions, rather than giving spontaneous narrative, did not disprove excitement); see also United States v. Glenn, 473 F.2d 191, 194 (D.C.Cir.1972) (\"Declarations relating to the circumstances of a violent crime, made by the victim shortly after its occurrence ... may be admissible although made in response to an inquiry.\")."
} | 3,719,662 | a |
Once a witness voluntarily has revealed an incriminating fact, "the privilege cannot be invoked to avoid disclosure of the details." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "488 F.2d 1210, 1210-11",
"parenthetical": "witness's disclosures in entering guilty plea at Rule 11 hearing do not constitute waiver of privilege at co-defendant's trial",
"sentence": "United States v. Cain, 544 F.2d 1113, 1117 (1st Cir.1976) (co-defendant’s submission to deposition in unrelated criminal proceeding not waiver of Fifth Amendment in proceeding in which co-defendant called as witness); see also Johnson, 488 F.2d at 1210-11 (witness’s disclosures in entering guilty plea at Rule 11 hearing do not constitute waiver of privilege at co-defendant’s trial); Kirane v. City of Lowell, 622 F.Supp. 262, 265 (D.Mass.1985) (“[A] person who waives his privilege as to the one trial [is not] estopped from asserting the privilege as to the same matter in a subsequent trial or proceeding.”); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2276, at 470-72 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (“The waiver involved is limited to the particular proceeding in which the witness volunteers the testimony or the accused takes the stand_ Nor is his testimony at a first trial a waiver for a later trial.”) (emphasis in original). Therefore, Gary’s contention that Hopkins waived his privilege in the second trial by testifying in the first trial is misplaced."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "544 F.2d 1113, 1117",
"parenthetical": "co-defendant's submission to deposition in unrelated criminal proceeding not waiver of Fifth Amendment in proceeding in which co-defendant called as witness",
"sentence": "United States v. Cain, 544 F.2d 1113, 1117 (1st Cir.1976) (co-defendant’s submission to deposition in unrelated criminal proceeding not waiver of Fifth Amendment in proceeding in which co-defendant called as witness); see also Johnson, 488 F.2d at 1210-11 (witness’s disclosures in entering guilty plea at Rule 11 hearing do not constitute waiver of privilege at co-defendant’s trial); Kirane v. City of Lowell, 622 F.Supp. 262, 265 (D.Mass.1985) (“[A] person who waives his privilege as to the one trial [is not] estopped from asserting the privilege as to the same matter in a subsequent trial or proceeding.”); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2276, at 470-72 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (“The waiver involved is limited to the particular proceeding in which the witness volunteers the testimony or the accused takes the stand_ Nor is his testimony at a first trial a waiver for a later trial.”) (emphasis in original). Therefore, Gary’s contention that Hopkins waived his privilege in the second trial by testifying in the first trial is misplaced."
} | 7,627,225 | b |
Once a witness voluntarily has revealed an incriminating fact, "the privilege cannot be invoked to avoid disclosure of the details." | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "544 F.2d 1113, 1117",
"parenthetical": "co-defendant's submission to deposition in unrelated criminal proceeding not waiver of Fifth Amendment in proceeding in which co-defendant called as witness",
"sentence": "United States v. Cain, 544 F.2d 1113, 1117 (1st Cir.1976) (co-defendant’s submission to deposition in unrelated criminal proceeding not waiver of Fifth Amendment in proceeding in which co-defendant called as witness); see also Johnson, 488 F.2d at 1210-11 (witness’s disclosures in entering guilty plea at Rule 11 hearing do not constitute waiver of privilege at co-defendant’s trial); Kirane v. City of Lowell, 622 F.Supp. 262, 265 (D.Mass.1985) (“[A] person who waives his privilege as to the one trial [is not] estopped from asserting the privilege as to the same matter in a subsequent trial or proceeding.”); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2276, at 470-72 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (“The waiver involved is limited to the particular proceeding in which the witness volunteers the testimony or the accused takes the stand_ Nor is his testimony at a first trial a waiver for a later trial.”) (emphasis in original). Therefore, Gary’s contention that Hopkins waived his privilege in the second trial by testifying in the first trial is misplaced."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "622 F.Supp. 262, 265",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] person who waives his privilege as to the one trial [is not] estopped from asserting the privilege as to the same matter in a subsequent trial or proceeding.\"",
"sentence": "United States v. Cain, 544 F.2d 1113, 1117 (1st Cir.1976) (co-defendant’s submission to deposition in unrelated criminal proceeding not waiver of Fifth Amendment in proceeding in which co-defendant called as witness); see also Johnson, 488 F.2d at 1210-11 (witness’s disclosures in entering guilty plea at Rule 11 hearing do not constitute waiver of privilege at co-defendant’s trial); Kirane v. City of Lowell, 622 F.Supp. 262, 265 (D.Mass.1985) (“[A] person who waives his privilege as to the one trial [is not] estopped from asserting the privilege as to the same matter in a subsequent trial or proceeding.”); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2276, at 470-72 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (“The waiver involved is limited to the particular proceeding in which the witness volunteers the testimony or the accused takes the stand_ Nor is his testimony at a first trial a waiver for a later trial.”) (emphasis in original). Therefore, Gary’s contention that Hopkins waived his privilege in the second trial by testifying in the first trial is misplaced."
} | 7,627,225 | a |
HDC commissioners do not enjoy the insulation from political influence that comes from lifetime or long-term tenure. Once appointed, a commissioner is entitled to serve, by law, for a term of either five years (regular members) or three years (alternates). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "344 F.3d 292, 298",
"parenthetical": "assuming, in part because the health commissioner was entitled to serve a finite term, \"that the commissioner is not removable at will [by the governor] and that such insulation from political influence weighs in favor of a grant of absolute immunity\"",
"sentence": "See id. § 12-4(C). That said, there is no indication that HDC commissioners can be removed at will by members of the Board of Warden and Burgess-es, and the fact that commissioners are entitled to serve at least three or five years is somewhat suggestive of the fact that they are not removable at will. See DiBlasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d 292, 298 (2d Cir. 2003) (assuming, in part because the health commissioner was entitled to serve a finite term, “that the commissioner is not removable at will [by the governor] and that such insulation from political influence weighs in favor of a grant of absolute immunity”); see also Tulloch, 50 F.3d at 117 (Department of Correctional Services’ “control over the hearing officers’ terms of employment” undermines the officers’ insulation from political influence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "50 F.3d 117, 117",
"parenthetical": "Department of Correctional Services' \"control over the hearing officers' terms of employment\" undermines the officers' insulation from political influence",
"sentence": "See id. § 12-4(C). That said, there is no indication that HDC commissioners can be removed at will by members of the Board of Warden and Burgess-es, and the fact that commissioners are entitled to serve at least three or five years is somewhat suggestive of the fact that they are not removable at will. See DiBlasio v. Novello, 344 F.3d 292, 298 (2d Cir. 2003) (assuming, in part because the health commissioner was entitled to serve a finite term, “that the commissioner is not removable at will [by the governor] and that such insulation from political influence weighs in favor of a grant of absolute immunity”); see also Tulloch, 50 F.3d at 117 (Department of Correctional Services’ “control over the hearing officers’ terms of employment” undermines the officers’ insulation from political influence)."
} | 12,271,680 | a |
The district court properly dismissed the action because Davis clearly conceded that he failed to exhaust prison grievance procedures prior to filing suit. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "532 U.S. 731, 741",
"parenthetical": "requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies regardless of the type of relief sought",
"sentence": "See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 (“A prisoner’s [clear] concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal .... ”); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies regardless of the type of relief sought); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200-01 (9th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies pri- or to filing suit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "315 F.3d 1120, 1120",
"parenthetical": "\"A prisoner's [clear] concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal .... \"",
"sentence": "See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 (“A prisoner’s [clear] concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal .... ”); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies regardless of the type of relief sought); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200-01 (9th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies pri- or to filing suit)."
} | 5,736,367 | b |
The district court properly dismissed the action because Davis clearly conceded that he failed to exhaust prison grievance procedures prior to filing suit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "315 F.3d 1120, 1120",
"parenthetical": "\"A prisoner's [clear] concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal .... \"",
"sentence": "See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 (“A prisoner’s [clear] concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal .... ”); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies regardless of the type of relief sought); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200-01 (9th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies pri- or to filing suit)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies regardless of the type of relief sought",
"sentence": "See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 (“A prisoner’s [clear] concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal .... ”); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies regardless of the type of relief sought); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200-01 (9th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies pri- or to filing suit)."
} | 5,736,367 | a |
The district court properly dismissed the action because Davis clearly conceded that he failed to exhaust prison grievance procedures prior to filing suit. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies regardless of the type of relief sought",
"sentence": "See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 (“A prisoner’s [clear] concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal .... ”); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies regardless of the type of relief sought); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200-01 (9th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies pri- or to filing suit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "315 F.3d 1120, 1120",
"parenthetical": "\"A prisoner's [clear] concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal .... \"",
"sentence": "See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 (“A prisoner’s [clear] concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal .... ”); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies regardless of the type of relief sought); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200-01 (9th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies pri- or to filing suit)."
} | 5,736,367 | b |
The district court properly dismissed the action because Davis clearly conceded that he failed to exhaust prison grievance procedures prior to filing suit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "315 F.3d 1120, 1120",
"parenthetical": "\"A prisoner's [clear] concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal .... \"",
"sentence": "See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 (“A prisoner’s [clear] concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal .... ”); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies regardless of the type of relief sought); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200-01 (9th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies pri- or to filing suit)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "311 F.3d 1198, 1200-01",
"parenthetical": "requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies pri- or to filing suit",
"sentence": "See Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 (“A prisoner’s [clear] concession to nonexhaustion is a valid ground for dismissal .... ”); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies regardless of the type of relief sought); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200-01 (9th Cir.2002) (per curiam) (requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies pri- or to filing suit)."
} | 5,736,367 | a |
Under such circumstances, even though economic harm is not an element of the Florida common law claim for restitution, it may be required for superiority under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This is especially likely when, as in the present suit, the defendants' potential liability would be enormous and completely out of proportion to any harm suffered by the plaintiff. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "202 F.R.D. 310, 318",
"parenthetical": "certifying class on facts almost identical to the present suit",
"sentence": "But see Fabricant v. Sears Roebuck, 202 F.R.D. 310, 318 (S.D.Fla.2001) (certifying class on facts almost identical to the present suit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "508 F.2d 226, 234-35",
"parenthetical": "noting that class treatment lacks superiority when damages \"shock the conscience\"",
"sentence": "See Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 234-35 (9th Cir.1974) (noting that class treatment lacks superiority when damages \"shock the conscience”); Wilcox v. Commerce Bank of Kansas City, 474 F.2d 336, 341-47 (10th Cir.1973) (holding district court did not abuse discretion when it denied class certification for TILA violations case where class members were not harmed and aggregate of statutory damages would be extremely large); In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litig., 211 F.R.D. 328, 350-51 (N.D.Ill.2002) (finding class action lacked superiority in part because of due process concerns where statutory damages would be \"grossly disproportionate” to any actual damage suffered by plaintiffs); Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y.1972) (finding class certification lacked superiority where violation was technical and aggregation of statutory damages under TILA would be financially devastating for defendant)."
} | 9,102,920 | b |
Under such circumstances, even though economic harm is not an element of the Florida common law claim for restitution, it may be required for superiority under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This is especially likely when, as in the present suit, the defendants' potential liability would be enormous and completely out of proportion to any harm suffered by the plaintiff. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "202 F.R.D. 310, 318",
"parenthetical": "certifying class on facts almost identical to the present suit",
"sentence": "But see Fabricant v. Sears Roebuck, 202 F.R.D. 310, 318 (S.D.Fla.2001) (certifying class on facts almost identical to the present suit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "474 F.2d 336, 341-47",
"parenthetical": "holding district court did not abuse discretion when it denied class certification for TILA violations case where class members were not harmed and aggregate of statutory damages would be extremely large",
"sentence": "See Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 234-35 (9th Cir.1974) (noting that class treatment lacks superiority when damages \"shock the conscience”); Wilcox v. Commerce Bank of Kansas City, 474 F.2d 336, 341-47 (10th Cir.1973) (holding district court did not abuse discretion when it denied class certification for TILA violations case where class members were not harmed and aggregate of statutory damages would be extremely large); In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litig., 211 F.R.D. 328, 350-51 (N.D.Ill.2002) (finding class action lacked superiority in part because of due process concerns where statutory damages would be \"grossly disproportionate” to any actual damage suffered by plaintiffs); Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y.1972) (finding class certification lacked superiority where violation was technical and aggregation of statutory damages under TILA would be financially devastating for defendant)."
} | 9,102,920 | b |
Under such circumstances, even though economic harm is not an element of the Florida common law claim for restitution, it may be required for superiority under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This is especially likely when, as in the present suit, the defendants' potential liability would be enormous and completely out of proportion to any harm suffered by the plaintiff. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "202 F.R.D. 310, 318",
"parenthetical": "certifying class on facts almost identical to the present suit",
"sentence": "But see Fabricant v. Sears Roebuck, 202 F.R.D. 310, 318 (S.D.Fla.2001) (certifying class on facts almost identical to the present suit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "211 F.R.D. 328, 350-51",
"parenthetical": "finding class action lacked superiority in part because of due process concerns where statutory damages would be \"grossly disproportionate\" to any actual damage suffered by plaintiffs",
"sentence": "See Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 234-35 (9th Cir.1974) (noting that class treatment lacks superiority when damages \"shock the conscience”); Wilcox v. Commerce Bank of Kansas City, 474 F.2d 336, 341-47 (10th Cir.1973) (holding district court did not abuse discretion when it denied class certification for TILA violations case where class members were not harmed and aggregate of statutory damages would be extremely large); In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litig., 211 F.R.D. 328, 350-51 (N.D.Ill.2002) (finding class action lacked superiority in part because of due process concerns where statutory damages would be \"grossly disproportionate” to any actual damage suffered by plaintiffs); Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y.1972) (finding class certification lacked superiority where violation was technical and aggregation of statutory damages under TILA would be financially devastating for defendant)."
} | 9,102,920 | b |
Under such circumstances, even though economic harm is not an element of the Florida common law claim for restitution, it may be required for superiority under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This is especially likely when, as in the present suit, the defendants' potential liability would be enormous and completely out of proportion to any harm suffered by the plaintiff. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "54 F.R.D. 412, 416",
"parenthetical": "finding class certification lacked superiority where violation was technical and aggregation of statutory damages under TILA would be financially devastating for defendant",
"sentence": "See Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 234-35 (9th Cir.1974) (noting that class treatment lacks superiority when damages \"shock the conscience”); Wilcox v. Commerce Bank of Kansas City, 474 F.2d 336, 341-47 (10th Cir.1973) (holding district court did not abuse discretion when it denied class certification for TILA violations case where class members were not harmed and aggregate of statutory damages would be extremely large); In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litig., 211 F.R.D. 328, 350-51 (N.D.Ill.2002) (finding class action lacked superiority in part because of due process concerns where statutory damages would be \"grossly disproportionate” to any actual damage suffered by plaintiffs); Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y.1972) (finding class certification lacked superiority where violation was technical and aggregation of statutory damages under TILA would be financially devastating for defendant)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "202 F.R.D. 310, 318",
"parenthetical": "certifying class on facts almost identical to the present suit",
"sentence": "But see Fabricant v. Sears Roebuck, 202 F.R.D. 310, 318 (S.D.Fla.2001) (certifying class on facts almost identical to the present suit)."
} | 9,102,920 | a |
Although we have located no cases exactly on point, we do note that our conclusion is consistent with the conclusions reached in several similar cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "492 N.W.2d 679, 680-682",
"parenthetical": "refusing to apply Tschida, Wilcoxen and Wendland because groomer not an \"owner\" under state strict-liability dog-bite statute that \"has always placed responsibility only on the legal owner\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Tschida v. Berdusco, 462 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing that legal owner and keeper/owner both could be liable under Minnesota dog-bite statute but dismissing strict-liability claim of veterinarian's employee because there was no negligence by the legal owner); Wilcoxen v. Paige, 528 N.E.2d 1104, 1106 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988) (owner and operator of dog boarding and grooming business barred from bringing action against dog's legal owner because plaintiff was an \"owner\" under Illinois dog-bite statute and therefore could not recover given her own failure to control dog); Wendland v. Akers, 356 So.2d 368, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (veterinarian assistant's strict-liability claim against dog's legal owners dismissed because of absence of active negligence by legal owners); see also Collins v. Kenealy, 492 N.W.2d 679, 680-682 (Iowa 1992) (refusing to apply Tschida, Wilcoxen and Wendland because groomer not an \"owner\" under state strict-liability dog-bite statute that \"has always placed responsibility only on the legal owner\" (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "recognizing that legal owner and keeper/owner both could be liable under Minnesota dog-bite statute but dismissing strict-liability claim of veterinarian's employee because there was no negligence by the legal owner",
"sentence": "See Tschida v. Berdusco, 462 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing that legal owner and keeper/owner both could be liable under Minnesota dog-bite statute but dismissing strict-liability claim of veterinarian's employee because there was no negligence by the legal owner); Wilcoxen v. Paige, 528 N.E.2d 1104, 1106 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988) (owner and operator of dog boarding and grooming business barred from bringing action against dog's legal owner because plaintiff was an \"owner\" under Illinois dog-bite statute and therefore could not recover given her own failure to control dog); Wendland v. Akers, 356 So.2d 368, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (veterinarian assistant's strict-liability claim against dog's legal owners dismissed because of absence of active negligence by legal owners); see also Collins v. Kenealy, 492 N.W.2d 679, 680-682 (Iowa 1992) (refusing to apply Tschida, Wilcoxen and Wendland because groomer not an \"owner\" under state strict-liability dog-bite statute that \"has always placed responsibility only on the legal owner\" (emphasis added))."
} | 8,665,092 | b |
Although we have located no cases exactly on point, we do note that our conclusion is consistent with the conclusions reached in several similar cases. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "528 N.E.2d 1104, 1106",
"parenthetical": "owner and operator of dog boarding and grooming business barred from bringing action against dog's legal owner because plaintiff was an \"owner\" under Illinois dog-bite statute and therefore could not recover given her own failure to control dog",
"sentence": "See Tschida v. Berdusco, 462 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing that legal owner and keeper/owner both could be liable under Minnesota dog-bite statute but dismissing strict-liability claim of veterinarian's employee because there was no negligence by the legal owner); Wilcoxen v. Paige, 528 N.E.2d 1104, 1106 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988) (owner and operator of dog boarding and grooming business barred from bringing action against dog's legal owner because plaintiff was an \"owner\" under Illinois dog-bite statute and therefore could not recover given her own failure to control dog); Wendland v. Akers, 356 So.2d 368, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (veterinarian assistant's strict-liability claim against dog's legal owners dismissed because of absence of active negligence by legal owners); see also Collins v. Kenealy, 492 N.W.2d 679, 680-682 (Iowa 1992) (refusing to apply Tschida, Wilcoxen and Wendland because groomer not an \"owner\" under state strict-liability dog-bite statute that \"has always placed responsibility only on the legal owner\" (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "492 N.W.2d 679, 680-682",
"parenthetical": "refusing to apply Tschida, Wilcoxen and Wendland because groomer not an \"owner\" under state strict-liability dog-bite statute that \"has always placed responsibility only on the legal owner\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Tschida v. Berdusco, 462 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing that legal owner and keeper/owner both could be liable under Minnesota dog-bite statute but dismissing strict-liability claim of veterinarian's employee because there was no negligence by the legal owner); Wilcoxen v. Paige, 528 N.E.2d 1104, 1106 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988) (owner and operator of dog boarding and grooming business barred from bringing action against dog's legal owner because plaintiff was an \"owner\" under Illinois dog-bite statute and therefore could not recover given her own failure to control dog); Wendland v. Akers, 356 So.2d 368, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (veterinarian assistant's strict-liability claim against dog's legal owners dismissed because of absence of active negligence by legal owners); see also Collins v. Kenealy, 492 N.W.2d 679, 680-682 (Iowa 1992) (refusing to apply Tschida, Wilcoxen and Wendland because groomer not an \"owner\" under state strict-liability dog-bite statute that \"has always placed responsibility only on the legal owner\" (emphasis added))."
} | 8,665,092 | a |
Although we have located no cases exactly on point, we do note that our conclusion is consistent with the conclusions reached in several similar cases. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "492 N.W.2d 679, 680-682",
"parenthetical": "refusing to apply Tschida, Wilcoxen and Wendland because groomer not an \"owner\" under state strict-liability dog-bite statute that \"has always placed responsibility only on the legal owner\" (emphasis added",
"sentence": "See Tschida v. Berdusco, 462 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing that legal owner and keeper/owner both could be liable under Minnesota dog-bite statute but dismissing strict-liability claim of veterinarian's employee because there was no negligence by the legal owner); Wilcoxen v. Paige, 528 N.E.2d 1104, 1106 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988) (owner and operator of dog boarding and grooming business barred from bringing action against dog's legal owner because plaintiff was an \"owner\" under Illinois dog-bite statute and therefore could not recover given her own failure to control dog); Wendland v. Akers, 356 So.2d 368, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (veterinarian assistant's strict-liability claim against dog's legal owners dismissed because of absence of active negligence by legal owners); see also Collins v. Kenealy, 492 N.W.2d 679, 680-682 (Iowa 1992) (refusing to apply Tschida, Wilcoxen and Wendland because groomer not an \"owner\" under state strict-liability dog-bite statute that \"has always placed responsibility only on the legal owner\" (emphasis added))."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "356 So.2d 368, 371",
"parenthetical": "veterinarian assistant's strict-liability claim against dog's legal owners dismissed because of absence of active negligence by legal owners",
"sentence": "See Tschida v. Berdusco, 462 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (recognizing that legal owner and keeper/owner both could be liable under Minnesota dog-bite statute but dismissing strict-liability claim of veterinarian's employee because there was no negligence by the legal owner); Wilcoxen v. Paige, 528 N.E.2d 1104, 1106 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988) (owner and operator of dog boarding and grooming business barred from bringing action against dog's legal owner because plaintiff was an \"owner\" under Illinois dog-bite statute and therefore could not recover given her own failure to control dog); Wendland v. Akers, 356 So.2d 368, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (veterinarian assistant's strict-liability claim against dog's legal owners dismissed because of absence of active negligence by legal owners); see also Collins v. Kenealy, 492 N.W.2d 679, 680-682 (Iowa 1992) (refusing to apply Tschida, Wilcoxen and Wendland because groomer not an \"owner\" under state strict-liability dog-bite statute that \"has always placed responsibility only on the legal owner\" (emphasis added))."
} | 8,665,092 | b |
[P 20] Some courts have held, however, that the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. SS 362 does not prevent the filing of a renewal affidavit. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "282 B.R. 917, 917",
"parenthetical": "filing of renewal application under California law violated automatic stay",
"sentence": "But see In re Lobherr, 282 B.R. at 917 (filing of renewal application under California law violated automatic stay)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding ministerial action of filing renewal affidavit not prohibited by automatic bankruptcy stay",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Smith, 209 Ariz. 343, 101 P.3d 637, 639 (2004) (holding ministerial action of filing renewal affidavit not prohibited by automatic bankruptcy stay); O’Lane v. Spinney, 110 Nev. 496, 874 P.2d 754, 755-56 (1994) (rejecting argument that automatic stay prevented filing a renewal affidavit); Barber v. Emporium P’ship, 800 P.2d 795, 797 (Utah 1990) (stating action to renew a judgment does not violate automatic stay provisions because a renewal is not an attempt to enforce, collect, or expand the original judgment); In re Morton, 866 F.2d 561, 564 (2d Cir.1989) (concluding automatic stay does not eliminate state-law requirement of extending a judgment lien)."
} | 7,082,039 | b |
[P 20] Some courts have held, however, that the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. SS 362 does not prevent the filing of a renewal affidavit. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "282 B.R. 917, 917",
"parenthetical": "filing of renewal application under California law violated automatic stay",
"sentence": "But see In re Lobherr, 282 B.R. at 917 (filing of renewal application under California law violated automatic stay)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "101 P.3d 637, 639",
"parenthetical": "holding ministerial action of filing renewal affidavit not prohibited by automatic bankruptcy stay",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Smith, 209 Ariz. 343, 101 P.3d 637, 639 (2004) (holding ministerial action of filing renewal affidavit not prohibited by automatic bankruptcy stay); O’Lane v. Spinney, 110 Nev. 496, 874 P.2d 754, 755-56 (1994) (rejecting argument that automatic stay prevented filing a renewal affidavit); Barber v. Emporium P’ship, 800 P.2d 795, 797 (Utah 1990) (stating action to renew a judgment does not violate automatic stay provisions because a renewal is not an attempt to enforce, collect, or expand the original judgment); In re Morton, 866 F.2d 561, 564 (2d Cir.1989) (concluding automatic stay does not eliminate state-law requirement of extending a judgment lien)."
} | 7,082,039 | b |
[P 20] Some courts have held, however, that the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. SS 362 does not prevent the filing of a renewal affidavit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that automatic stay prevented filing a renewal affidavit",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Smith, 209 Ariz. 343, 101 P.3d 637, 639 (2004) (holding ministerial action of filing renewal affidavit not prohibited by automatic bankruptcy stay); O’Lane v. Spinney, 110 Nev. 496, 874 P.2d 754, 755-56 (1994) (rejecting argument that automatic stay prevented filing a renewal affidavit); Barber v. Emporium P’ship, 800 P.2d 795, 797 (Utah 1990) (stating action to renew a judgment does not violate automatic stay provisions because a renewal is not an attempt to enforce, collect, or expand the original judgment); In re Morton, 866 F.2d 561, 564 (2d Cir.1989) (concluding automatic stay does not eliminate state-law requirement of extending a judgment lien)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "282 B.R. 917, 917",
"parenthetical": "filing of renewal application under California law violated automatic stay",
"sentence": "But see In re Lobherr, 282 B.R. at 917 (filing of renewal application under California law violated automatic stay)."
} | 7,082,039 | a |
[P 20] Some courts have held, however, that the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. SS 362 does not prevent the filing of a renewal affidavit. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "282 B.R. 917, 917",
"parenthetical": "filing of renewal application under California law violated automatic stay",
"sentence": "But see In re Lobherr, 282 B.R. at 917 (filing of renewal application under California law violated automatic stay)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "874 P.2d 754, 755-56",
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that automatic stay prevented filing a renewal affidavit",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Smith, 209 Ariz. 343, 101 P.3d 637, 639 (2004) (holding ministerial action of filing renewal affidavit not prohibited by automatic bankruptcy stay); O’Lane v. Spinney, 110 Nev. 496, 874 P.2d 754, 755-56 (1994) (rejecting argument that automatic stay prevented filing a renewal affidavit); Barber v. Emporium P’ship, 800 P.2d 795, 797 (Utah 1990) (stating action to renew a judgment does not violate automatic stay provisions because a renewal is not an attempt to enforce, collect, or expand the original judgment); In re Morton, 866 F.2d 561, 564 (2d Cir.1989) (concluding automatic stay does not eliminate state-law requirement of extending a judgment lien)."
} | 7,082,039 | b |
[P 20] Some courts have held, however, that the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. SS 362 does not prevent the filing of a renewal affidavit. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "800 P.2d 795, 797",
"parenthetical": "stating action to renew a judgment does not violate automatic stay provisions because a renewal is not an attempt to enforce, collect, or expand the original judgment",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Smith, 209 Ariz. 343, 101 P.3d 637, 639 (2004) (holding ministerial action of filing renewal affidavit not prohibited by automatic bankruptcy stay); O’Lane v. Spinney, 110 Nev. 496, 874 P.2d 754, 755-56 (1994) (rejecting argument that automatic stay prevented filing a renewal affidavit); Barber v. Emporium P’ship, 800 P.2d 795, 797 (Utah 1990) (stating action to renew a judgment does not violate automatic stay provisions because a renewal is not an attempt to enforce, collect, or expand the original judgment); In re Morton, 866 F.2d 561, 564 (2d Cir.1989) (concluding automatic stay does not eliminate state-law requirement of extending a judgment lien)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "282 B.R. 917, 917",
"parenthetical": "filing of renewal application under California law violated automatic stay",
"sentence": "But see In re Lobherr, 282 B.R. at 917 (filing of renewal application under California law violated automatic stay)."
} | 7,082,039 | a |
[P 20] Some courts have held, however, that the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. SS 362 does not prevent the filing of a renewal affidavit. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "282 B.R. 917, 917",
"parenthetical": "filing of renewal application under California law violated automatic stay",
"sentence": "But see In re Lobherr, 282 B.R. at 917 (filing of renewal application under California law violated automatic stay)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "866 F.2d 561, 564",
"parenthetical": "concluding automatic stay does not eliminate state-law requirement of extending a judgment lien",
"sentence": "See, e.g., In re Smith, 209 Ariz. 343, 101 P.3d 637, 639 (2004) (holding ministerial action of filing renewal affidavit not prohibited by automatic bankruptcy stay); O’Lane v. Spinney, 110 Nev. 496, 874 P.2d 754, 755-56 (1994) (rejecting argument that automatic stay prevented filing a renewal affidavit); Barber v. Emporium P’ship, 800 P.2d 795, 797 (Utah 1990) (stating action to renew a judgment does not violate automatic stay provisions because a renewal is not an attempt to enforce, collect, or expand the original judgment); In re Morton, 866 F.2d 561, 564 (2d Cir.1989) (concluding automatic stay does not eliminate state-law requirement of extending a judgment lien)."
} | 7,082,039 | b |
In the School Committee case, the parents were statutorily entitled to the cost of the special education their child never received, and for which they expended their own money. Unlike Hubbard, they, like the State of Massachusetts in Bowen, met all the pre-existing legal obligations to receive a cash entitlement from the government, at the time they were denied it. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that back pay was equitable under the Internal Revenue Code but nevertheless compensatory",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Burke, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 1867, 119 L.Ed.2d 34 (finding that back pay was equitable under the Internal Revenue Code but nevertheless compensatory)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "105 S.Ct. 2002, 2002",
"parenthetical": "noting that the Education for the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. SS 1401 et seq., provides for public payment of private school expenses when an appropriate public education cannot be provided",
"sentence": "See id. at 369, 105 S.Ct. at 2002 (noting that the Education for the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq., provides for public payment of private school expenses when an appropriate public education cannot be provided). At any rate, the Court’s treatment of the reimbursement in School Committee as restitutionary was in a completely different context than § 702 and required no decision as to whether the relief was specific."
} | 36,488 | b |
In the School Committee case, the parents were statutorily entitled to the cost of the special education their child never received, and for which they expended their own money. Unlike Hubbard, they, like the State of Massachusetts in Bowen, met all the pre-existing legal obligations to receive a cash entitlement from the government, at the time they were denied it. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that back pay was equitable under the Internal Revenue Code but nevertheless compensatory",
"sentence": "Cf. United States v. Burke, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 1867, 119 L.Ed.2d 34 (finding that back pay was equitable under the Internal Revenue Code but nevertheless compensatory)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "105 S.Ct. 2002, 2002",
"parenthetical": "noting that the Education for the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. SS 1401 et seq., provides for public payment of private school expenses when an appropriate public education cannot be provided",
"sentence": "See id. at 369, 105 S.Ct. at 2002 (noting that the Education for the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq., provides for public payment of private school expenses when an appropriate public education cannot be provided). At any rate, the Court’s treatment of the reimbursement in School Committee as restitutionary was in a completely different context than § 702 and required no decision as to whether the relief was specific."
} | 36,488 | b |
The Application Note gives the examples of an attorney serving as a guardian who embezzles funds from a client and a bank executive's fraudulent loan scheme. In determining whether an enhancement for an abuse of a position of trust is appropriate, we look "to the nature of a defendant's relationship to the victims and to the responsibility he was given." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "74 F.3d 763, 763",
"parenthetical": "enhancement appropriate where assistant vice president of bank proposed to split commissions from bank loan insurance policies with insurance broker",
"sentence": "Strang, 80 F.3d at 1220 (enhancement appropriate where defendants befriended victims in order to persuade them to invest in phony scheme); see also Sinclair, 74 F.3d at 763 (enhancement appropriate where assistant vice president of bank proposed to split commissions from bank loan insurance policies with insurance broker)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "80 F.3d 1220, 1220",
"parenthetical": "enhancement appropriate where defendants befriended victims in order to persuade them to invest in phony scheme",
"sentence": "Strang, 80 F.3d at 1220 (enhancement appropriate where defendants befriended victims in order to persuade them to invest in phony scheme); see also Sinclair, 74 F.3d at 763 (enhancement appropriate where assistant vice president of bank proposed to split commissions from bank loan insurance policies with insurance broker)."
} | 11,969,577 | b |
First, as earlier explained, the Secretary should indicate in her administrative summary which sources she regards as sufficiently credible that she relies on them; and she should explain to which part of section 1189(a)(1)(B) the information she relies on relates. Second, although the Secretary must give the PMOI an opportunity to rebut the unclassified material on which she relies, AEDPA does not allow access to the classified record as it makes clear that classified material "shall not be subject to disclosure for such time as it remains classified, except that such information may be disclosed to a court ex parte and in camera for purposes of judicial review." 8 U.S.C. SS 1189(a)(4)(B)(iv)(II); see id. SS 1189(c)(2) (providing for court's "ex parte and in camera review" of "classified information used in making the designation"). Our cases under AEDPA have suggested that this procedure can satisfy due process requirements, at least where the Secretary has not relied critically on classified material and the unclassified material provided to the FTO is sufficient to justify the designation. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "327 F.3d 1243, 1243",
"parenthetical": "\"We already decided in [NCRI I ] that due process required the disclosure of only the unclassified portions of the administrative record.\"",
"sentence": "See NCRI II, 373 F.3d at 159-60; PMOI II, 327 F.3d at 1243 (“We already decided in [NCRI I ] that due process required the disclosure of only the unclassified portions of the administrative record.”) (emphasis in original); NCRI I, 251 F.3d at 202, 208-09 (“We acknowledge that in reviewing the whole record, we have included the classified material, but] ... we will not and cannot disclose the contents of the record,” which “is within the privilege and prerogative of the executive”); see also Jifry v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 370 F.3d 1174, 1182, 1184 (D.C.Cir. 2004) (pilot denied licensure has no right to access to classified record because “[t]he due process protections afforded ... parallel those provided under similar circumstances in [NCRI I and PMOI II], and are sufficient to satisfy our case law”); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 164 (D.C.Cir.2003) (“HLF’s complaint, like that of the Designated Foreign Terrorists Organizations in [NCRI I and PMOI II ], that due process prevents its designation [under a different law] based upon classified information to which it has not had access is of no avail.”). We note, however, that none of the AED-PA cases decides whether an administrative decision relying critically on undisclosed classified material would comport with due process because in none was the classified record essential to uphold an FTO designation."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "370 F.3d 1174, 1182, 1184",
"parenthetical": "pilot denied licensure has no right to access to classified record because \"[t]he due process protections afforded ... parallel those provided under similar circumstances in [NCRI I and PMOI II], and are sufficient to satisfy our case law\"",
"sentence": "See NCRI II, 373 F.3d at 159-60; PMOI II, 327 F.3d at 1243 (“We already decided in [NCRI I ] that due process required the disclosure of only the unclassified portions of the administrative record.”) (emphasis in original); NCRI I, 251 F.3d at 202, 208-09 (“We acknowledge that in reviewing the whole record, we have included the classified material, but] ... we will not and cannot disclose the contents of the record,” which “is within the privilege and prerogative of the executive”); see also Jifry v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 370 F.3d 1174, 1182, 1184 (D.C.Cir. 2004) (pilot denied licensure has no right to access to classified record because “[t]he due process protections afforded ... parallel those provided under similar circumstances in [NCRI I and PMOI II], and are sufficient to satisfy our case law”); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 164 (D.C.Cir.2003) (“HLF’s complaint, like that of the Designated Foreign Terrorists Organizations in [NCRI I and PMOI II ], that due process prevents its designation [under a different law] based upon classified information to which it has not had access is of no avail.”). We note, however, that none of the AED-PA cases decides whether an administrative decision relying critically on undisclosed classified material would comport with due process because in none was the classified record essential to uphold an FTO designation."
} | 3,552,029 | a |
First, as earlier explained, the Secretary should indicate in her administrative summary which sources she regards as sufficiently credible that she relies on them; and she should explain to which part of section 1189(a)(1)(B) the information she relies on relates. Second, although the Secretary must give the PMOI an opportunity to rebut the unclassified material on which she relies, AEDPA does not allow access to the classified record as it makes clear that classified material "shall not be subject to disclosure for such time as it remains classified, except that such information may be disclosed to a court ex parte and in camera for purposes of judicial review." 8 U.S.C. SS 1189(a)(4)(B)(iv)(II); see id. SS 1189(c)(2) (providing for court's "ex parte and in camera review" of "classified information used in making the designation"). Our cases under AEDPA have suggested that this procedure can satisfy due process requirements, at least where the Secretary has not relied critically on classified material and the unclassified material provided to the FTO is sufficient to justify the designation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "333 F.3d 156, 164",
"parenthetical": "\"HLF's complaint, like that of the Designated Foreign Terrorists Organizations in [NCRI I and PMOI II ], that due process prevents its designation [under a different law] based upon classified information to which it has not had access is of no avail.\"",
"sentence": "See NCRI II, 373 F.3d at 159-60; PMOI II, 327 F.3d at 1243 (“We already decided in [NCRI I ] that due process required the disclosure of only the unclassified portions of the administrative record.”) (emphasis in original); NCRI I, 251 F.3d at 202, 208-09 (“We acknowledge that in reviewing the whole record, we have included the classified material, but] ... we will not and cannot disclose the contents of the record,” which “is within the privilege and prerogative of the executive”); see also Jifry v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 370 F.3d 1174, 1182, 1184 (D.C.Cir. 2004) (pilot denied licensure has no right to access to classified record because “[t]he due process protections afforded ... parallel those provided under similar circumstances in [NCRI I and PMOI II], and are sufficient to satisfy our case law”); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 164 (D.C.Cir.2003) (“HLF’s complaint, like that of the Designated Foreign Terrorists Organizations in [NCRI I and PMOI II ], that due process prevents its designation [under a different law] based upon classified information to which it has not had access is of no avail.”). We note, however, that none of the AED-PA cases decides whether an administrative decision relying critically on undisclosed classified material would comport with due process because in none was the classified record essential to uphold an FTO designation."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "327 F.3d 1243, 1243",
"parenthetical": "\"We already decided in [NCRI I ] that due process required the disclosure of only the unclassified portions of the administrative record.\"",
"sentence": "See NCRI II, 373 F.3d at 159-60; PMOI II, 327 F.3d at 1243 (“We already decided in [NCRI I ] that due process required the disclosure of only the unclassified portions of the administrative record.”) (emphasis in original); NCRI I, 251 F.3d at 202, 208-09 (“We acknowledge that in reviewing the whole record, we have included the classified material, but] ... we will not and cannot disclose the contents of the record,” which “is within the privilege and prerogative of the executive”); see also Jifry v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 370 F.3d 1174, 1182, 1184 (D.C.Cir. 2004) (pilot denied licensure has no right to access to classified record because “[t]he due process protections afforded ... parallel those provided under similar circumstances in [NCRI I and PMOI II], and are sufficient to satisfy our case law”); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 164 (D.C.Cir.2003) (“HLF’s complaint, like that of the Designated Foreign Terrorists Organizations in [NCRI I and PMOI II ], that due process prevents its designation [under a different law] based upon classified information to which it has not had access is of no avail.”). We note, however, that none of the AED-PA cases decides whether an administrative decision relying critically on undisclosed classified material would comport with due process because in none was the classified record essential to uphold an FTO designation."
} | 3,552,029 | b |
First, as earlier explained, the Secretary should indicate in her administrative summary which sources she regards as sufficiently credible that she relies on them; and she should explain to which part of section 1189(a)(1)(B) the information she relies on relates. Second, although the Secretary must give the PMOI an opportunity to rebut the unclassified material on which she relies, AEDPA does not allow access to the classified record as it makes clear that classified material "shall not be subject to disclosure for such time as it remains classified, except that such information may be disclosed to a court ex parte and in camera for purposes of judicial review." 8 U.S.C. SS 1189(a)(4)(B)(iv)(II); see id. SS 1189(c)(2) (providing for court's "ex parte and in camera review" of "classified information used in making the designation"). Our cases under AEDPA have suggested that this procedure can satisfy due process requirements, at least where the Secretary has not relied critically on classified material and the unclassified material provided to the FTO is sufficient to justify the designation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "370 F.3d 1174, 1182, 1184",
"parenthetical": "pilot denied licensure has no right to access to classified record because \"[t]he due process protections afforded ... parallel those provided under similar circumstances in [NCRI I and PMOI II], and are sufficient to satisfy our case law\"",
"sentence": "See NCRI II, 373 F.3d at 159-60; PMOI II, 327 F.3d at 1243 (“We already decided in [NCRI I ] that due process required the disclosure of only the unclassified portions of the administrative record.”) (emphasis in original); NCRI I, 251 F.3d at 202, 208-09 (“We acknowledge that in reviewing the whole record, we have included the classified material, but] ... we will not and cannot disclose the contents of the record,” which “is within the privilege and prerogative of the executive”); see also Jifry v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 370 F.3d 1174, 1182, 1184 (D.C.Cir. 2004) (pilot denied licensure has no right to access to classified record because “[t]he due process protections afforded ... parallel those provided under similar circumstances in [NCRI I and PMOI II], and are sufficient to satisfy our case law”); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 164 (D.C.Cir.2003) (“HLF’s complaint, like that of the Designated Foreign Terrorists Organizations in [NCRI I and PMOI II ], that due process prevents its designation [under a different law] based upon classified information to which it has not had access is of no avail.”). We note, however, that none of the AED-PA cases decides whether an administrative decision relying critically on undisclosed classified material would comport with due process because in none was the classified record essential to uphold an FTO designation."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "251 F.3d 202, 202, 208-09",
"parenthetical": "\"We acknowledge that in reviewing the whole record, we have included the classified material, but] ... we will not and cannot disclose the contents of the record,\" which \"is within the privilege and prerogative of the executive\"",
"sentence": "See NCRI II, 373 F.3d at 159-60; PMOI II, 327 F.3d at 1243 (“We already decided in [NCRI I ] that due process required the disclosure of only the unclassified portions of the administrative record.”) (emphasis in original); NCRI I, 251 F.3d at 202, 208-09 (“We acknowledge that in reviewing the whole record, we have included the classified material, but] ... we will not and cannot disclose the contents of the record,” which “is within the privilege and prerogative of the executive”); see also Jifry v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 370 F.3d 1174, 1182, 1184 (D.C.Cir. 2004) (pilot denied licensure has no right to access to classified record because “[t]he due process protections afforded ... parallel those provided under similar circumstances in [NCRI I and PMOI II], and are sufficient to satisfy our case law”); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 164 (D.C.Cir.2003) (“HLF’s complaint, like that of the Designated Foreign Terrorists Organizations in [NCRI I and PMOI II ], that due process prevents its designation [under a different law] based upon classified information to which it has not had access is of no avail.”). We note, however, that none of the AED-PA cases decides whether an administrative decision relying critically on undisclosed classified material would comport with due process because in none was the classified record essential to uphold an FTO designation."
} | 3,552,029 | b |
First, as earlier explained, the Secretary should indicate in her administrative summary which sources she regards as sufficiently credible that she relies on them; and she should explain to which part of section 1189(a)(1)(B) the information she relies on relates. Second, although the Secretary must give the PMOI an opportunity to rebut the unclassified material on which she relies, AEDPA does not allow access to the classified record as it makes clear that classified material "shall not be subject to disclosure for such time as it remains classified, except that such information may be disclosed to a court ex parte and in camera for purposes of judicial review." 8 U.S.C. SS 1189(a)(4)(B)(iv)(II); see id. SS 1189(c)(2) (providing for court's "ex parte and in camera review" of "classified information used in making the designation"). Our cases under AEDPA have suggested that this procedure can satisfy due process requirements, at least where the Secretary has not relied critically on classified material and the unclassified material provided to the FTO is sufficient to justify the designation. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "333 F.3d 156, 164",
"parenthetical": "\"HLF's complaint, like that of the Designated Foreign Terrorists Organizations in [NCRI I and PMOI II ], that due process prevents its designation [under a different law] based upon classified information to which it has not had access is of no avail.\"",
"sentence": "See NCRI II, 373 F.3d at 159-60; PMOI II, 327 F.3d at 1243 (“We already decided in [NCRI I ] that due process required the disclosure of only the unclassified portions of the administrative record.”) (emphasis in original); NCRI I, 251 F.3d at 202, 208-09 (“We acknowledge that in reviewing the whole record, we have included the classified material, but] ... we will not and cannot disclose the contents of the record,” which “is within the privilege and prerogative of the executive”); see also Jifry v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 370 F.3d 1174, 1182, 1184 (D.C.Cir. 2004) (pilot denied licensure has no right to access to classified record because “[t]he due process protections afforded ... parallel those provided under similar circumstances in [NCRI I and PMOI II], and are sufficient to satisfy our case law”); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 164 (D.C.Cir.2003) (“HLF’s complaint, like that of the Designated Foreign Terrorists Organizations in [NCRI I and PMOI II ], that due process prevents its designation [under a different law] based upon classified information to which it has not had access is of no avail.”). We note, however, that none of the AED-PA cases decides whether an administrative decision relying critically on undisclosed classified material would comport with due process because in none was the classified record essential to uphold an FTO designation."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "251 F.3d 202, 202, 208-09",
"parenthetical": "\"We acknowledge that in reviewing the whole record, we have included the classified material, but] ... we will not and cannot disclose the contents of the record,\" which \"is within the privilege and prerogative of the executive\"",
"sentence": "See NCRI II, 373 F.3d at 159-60; PMOI II, 327 F.3d at 1243 (“We already decided in [NCRI I ] that due process required the disclosure of only the unclassified portions of the administrative record.”) (emphasis in original); NCRI I, 251 F.3d at 202, 208-09 (“We acknowledge that in reviewing the whole record, we have included the classified material, but] ... we will not and cannot disclose the contents of the record,” which “is within the privilege and prerogative of the executive”); see also Jifry v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 370 F.3d 1174, 1182, 1184 (D.C.Cir. 2004) (pilot denied licensure has no right to access to classified record because “[t]he due process protections afforded ... parallel those provided under similar circumstances in [NCRI I and PMOI II], and are sufficient to satisfy our case law”); Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 164 (D.C.Cir.2003) (“HLF’s complaint, like that of the Designated Foreign Terrorists Organizations in [NCRI I and PMOI II ], that due process prevents its designation [under a different law] based upon classified information to which it has not had access is of no avail.”). We note, however, that none of the AED-PA cases decides whether an administrative decision relying critically on undisclosed classified material would comport with due process because in none was the classified record essential to uphold an FTO designation."
} | 3,552,029 | b |
One statutory exclusion from course and scope is implicated in this case: "transportation to and from the place of employment." Id. SS 401.011(12)(A). This exclusion is commonly referred to as the "coming and going" exclusion. If .an employee's ultimate destinations are home and work, despite any intermediate stops in-between, the "coming and going" exclusion merits analysis. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "330 S.W.3d 239, 246",
"parenthetical": "\"The 'coming and going' rule developed ... specifically for travel between home and work.\"",
"sentence": "Leordeanu v. Am. Prot. Ins. Co., 330 S.W.3d 239, 246 (Tex.2010) (“The ‘coming and going’ rule developed ... specifically for travel between home and work.”); see Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. McVey, 339 S.W.3d 724, 727-29 (Tex.App.-Austin 2011, pet. denied) (analyzing the “coming and going” exclusion because the travel was between work and home even though the injury occurred while the employee was first on his way to pick up a co-worker and then to a mandatory work conference in another city)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "339 S.W.3d 724, 727-29",
"parenthetical": "analyzing the \"coming and going\" exclusion because the travel was between work and home even though the injury occurred while the employee was first on his way to pick up a co-worker and then to a mandatory work conference in another city",
"sentence": "Leordeanu v. Am. Prot. Ins. Co., 330 S.W.3d 239, 246 (Tex.2010) (“The ‘coming and going’ rule developed ... specifically for travel between home and work.”); see Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. McVey, 339 S.W.3d 724, 727-29 (Tex.App.-Austin 2011, pet. denied) (analyzing the “coming and going” exclusion because the travel was between work and home even though the injury occurred while the employee was first on his way to pick up a co-worker and then to a mandatory work conference in another city)."
} | 4,048,530 | a |
An employee may establish a causal connection "by showing that the employer had knowledge of the employee's protected activity, and that the [retaliatory] action took place shortly after that activity." Courts in this District have held that a gap of even two months is too remote to infer any casual, connection. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "294 F.Supp.2d 33, 41",
"parenthetical": "two-month gap between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to demonstrate temporal proximity to establish a casual connection",
"sentence": "See Baker v. Potter, 294 F.Supp.2d 33, 41 (D.D.C.2003) (two-month gap between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to demonstrate temporal proximity to establish a casual connection); see also, Mayers v. Laborers’ Health & Safety Fund of North America, 478 F.3d 364, 369 (D.C.Cir.2007) (Eight or nine month gap “far too long” to establish causal link); Nagpal v. Holder, 750 F.Supp.2d 20 (D.D.C.2010) (“four month gap between protected activity and the adverse employment action lacks the temporal proximity necessary to establish a casual connection” in this Circuit)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "478 F.3d 364, 369",
"parenthetical": "Eight or nine month gap \"far too long\" to establish causal link",
"sentence": "See Baker v. Potter, 294 F.Supp.2d 33, 41 (D.D.C.2003) (two-month gap between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to demonstrate temporal proximity to establish a casual connection); see also, Mayers v. Laborers’ Health & Safety Fund of North America, 478 F.3d 364, 369 (D.C.Cir.2007) (Eight or nine month gap “far too long” to establish causal link); Nagpal v. Holder, 750 F.Supp.2d 20 (D.D.C.2010) (“four month gap between protected activity and the adverse employment action lacks the temporal proximity necessary to establish a casual connection” in this Circuit)."
} | 4,346,753 | a |
An employee may establish a causal connection "by showing that the employer had knowledge of the employee's protected activity, and that the [retaliatory] action took place shortly after that activity." Courts in this District have held that a gap of even two months is too remote to infer any casual, connection. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "294 F.Supp.2d 33, 41",
"parenthetical": "two-month gap between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to demonstrate temporal proximity to establish a casual connection",
"sentence": "See Baker v. Potter, 294 F.Supp.2d 33, 41 (D.D.C.2003) (two-month gap between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to demonstrate temporal proximity to establish a casual connection); see also, Mayers v. Laborers’ Health & Safety Fund of North America, 478 F.3d 364, 369 (D.C.Cir.2007) (Eight or nine month gap “far too long” to establish causal link); Nagpal v. Holder, 750 F.Supp.2d 20 (D.D.C.2010) (“four month gap between protected activity and the adverse employment action lacks the temporal proximity necessary to establish a casual connection” in this Circuit)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"four month gap between protected activity and the adverse employment action lacks the temporal proximity necessary to establish a casual connection\" in this Circuit",
"sentence": "See Baker v. Potter, 294 F.Supp.2d 33, 41 (D.D.C.2003) (two-month gap between protected activity and adverse employment action insufficient to demonstrate temporal proximity to establish a casual connection); see also, Mayers v. Laborers’ Health & Safety Fund of North America, 478 F.3d 364, 369 (D.C.Cir.2007) (Eight or nine month gap “far too long” to establish causal link); Nagpal v. Holder, 750 F.Supp.2d 20 (D.D.C.2010) (“four month gap between protected activity and the adverse employment action lacks the temporal proximity necessary to establish a casual connection” in this Circuit)."
} | 4,346,753 | a |
However, determining the precise point at which a temporary investigative detention has ripened hito a warrantless arrest is no more susceptible to a blight-line rule than is determining when a suspect is "in custody." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "470 U.S. 675, 685",
"parenthetical": "observing that there are \"difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop from a defacto arrest\" and declining to adopt a \"bright line\" rule demarcating one from the other",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (observing that there are “difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop from a defacto arrest” and declining to adopt a “bright line” rule demarcating one from the other); Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir.1996) (“[t]here is no bright-line rule to determine when an investigatory stop becomes an arrest” (citing United States v. Parr, 843 F.2d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir.1988))); see also Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i at 210, 10 P.3d at 731. Nevertheless, it is self-evident that a temporary investigative detention in the absence of sustained and coercive questioning is “noncustodial,” whereas an arrest is “custodial.” See Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i at 210, 10 P.3d at 731. Accordingly, an arrestee is obviously “in custody” whether or not, in retrospect, the arresting officer had probable cause to effect the arrest in the first place."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "54 Haw. 552, 557",
"parenthetical": "observing that an officer's failure to state, \"I place you under arrest,\" does not preclude an arrest from occurring where an officer's action makes it clear to the defendant that he or she is not free to leave and holding that an officer who had probable cause to arrest took custody of the defendant by ordering him to leave a toilet stall, stand up against a wall, and remain subject to his commands",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Delmondo, 54 Haw. 552, 557, 512 P.2d 551, 554 (1973) (observing that an officer’s failure to state, “I place you under arrest,” does not preclude an arrest from occurring where an officer’s action makes it clear to the defendant that he or she is not free to leave and holding that an officer who had probable cause to arrest took custody of the defendant by ordering him to leave a toilet stall, stand up against a wall, and remain subject to his commands); State v. Ortiz, 4 Haw.App. 143, 662 P.2d 517 (“[a]n arrest occurs where the defendant clearly understands that he [or she] is not free to go and no ‘magic words’ such as, T place you under arrest,’ are required” (citations omitted)), affirmed, 67 Haw. 181, 683 P.2d 822 (1984)."
} | 12,259,019 | a |
However, determining the precise point at which a temporary investigative detention has ripened hito a warrantless arrest is no more susceptible to a blight-line rule than is determining when a suspect is "in custody." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "470 U.S. 675, 685",
"parenthetical": "observing that there are \"difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop from a defacto arrest\" and declining to adopt a \"bright line\" rule demarcating one from the other",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (observing that there are “difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop from a defacto arrest” and declining to adopt a “bright line” rule demarcating one from the other); Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir.1996) (“[t]here is no bright-line rule to determine when an investigatory stop becomes an arrest” (citing United States v. Parr, 843 F.2d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir.1988))); see also Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i at 210, 10 P.3d at 731. Nevertheless, it is self-evident that a temporary investigative detention in the absence of sustained and coercive questioning is “noncustodial,” whereas an arrest is “custodial.” See Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i at 210, 10 P.3d at 731. Accordingly, an arrestee is obviously “in custody” whether or not, in retrospect, the arresting officer had probable cause to effect the arrest in the first place."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "512 P.2d 551, 554",
"parenthetical": "observing that an officer's failure to state, \"I place you under arrest,\" does not preclude an arrest from occurring where an officer's action makes it clear to the defendant that he or she is not free to leave and holding that an officer who had probable cause to arrest took custody of the defendant by ordering him to leave a toilet stall, stand up against a wall, and remain subject to his commands",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Delmondo, 54 Haw. 552, 557, 512 P.2d 551, 554 (1973) (observing that an officer’s failure to state, “I place you under arrest,” does not preclude an arrest from occurring where an officer’s action makes it clear to the defendant that he or she is not free to leave and holding that an officer who had probable cause to arrest took custody of the defendant by ordering him to leave a toilet stall, stand up against a wall, and remain subject to his commands); State v. Ortiz, 4 Haw.App. 143, 662 P.2d 517 (“[a]n arrest occurs where the defendant clearly understands that he [or she] is not free to go and no ‘magic words’ such as, T place you under arrest,’ are required” (citations omitted)), affirmed, 67 Haw. 181, 683 P.2d 822 (1984)."
} | 12,259,019 | a |
However, determining the precise point at which a temporary investigative detention has ripened hito a warrantless arrest is no more susceptible to a blight-line rule than is determining when a suspect is "in custody." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "54 Haw. 552, 557",
"parenthetical": "observing that an officer's failure to state, \"I place you under arrest,\" does not preclude an arrest from occurring where an officer's action makes it clear to the defendant that he or she is not free to leave and holding that an officer who had probable cause to arrest took custody of the defendant by ordering him to leave a toilet stall, stand up against a wall, and remain subject to his commands",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Delmondo, 54 Haw. 552, 557, 512 P.2d 551, 554 (1973) (observing that an officer’s failure to state, “I place you under arrest,” does not preclude an arrest from occurring where an officer’s action makes it clear to the defendant that he or she is not free to leave and holding that an officer who had probable cause to arrest took custody of the defendant by ordering him to leave a toilet stall, stand up against a wall, and remain subject to his commands); State v. Ortiz, 4 Haw.App. 143, 662 P.2d 517 (“[a]n arrest occurs where the defendant clearly understands that he [or she] is not free to go and no ‘magic words’ such as, T place you under arrest,’ are required” (citations omitted)), affirmed, 67 Haw. 181, 683 P.2d 822 (1984)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that there are \"difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop from a defacto arrest\" and declining to adopt a \"bright line\" rule demarcating one from the other",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (observing that there are “difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop from a defacto arrest” and declining to adopt a “bright line” rule demarcating one from the other); Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir.1996) (“[t]here is no bright-line rule to determine when an investigatory stop becomes an arrest” (citing United States v. Parr, 843 F.2d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir.1988))); see also Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i at 210, 10 P.3d at 731. Nevertheless, it is self-evident that a temporary investigative detention in the absence of sustained and coercive questioning is “noncustodial,” whereas an arrest is “custodial.” See Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i at 210, 10 P.3d at 731. Accordingly, an arrestee is obviously “in custody” whether or not, in retrospect, the arresting officer had probable cause to effect the arrest in the first place."
} | 12,259,019 | b |
However, determining the precise point at which a temporary investigative detention has ripened hito a warrantless arrest is no more susceptible to a blight-line rule than is determining when a suspect is "in custody." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that there are \"difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop from a defacto arrest\" and declining to adopt a \"bright line\" rule demarcating one from the other",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (observing that there are “difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop from a defacto arrest” and declining to adopt a “bright line” rule demarcating one from the other); Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir.1996) (“[t]here is no bright-line rule to determine when an investigatory stop becomes an arrest” (citing United States v. Parr, 843 F.2d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir.1988))); see also Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i at 210, 10 P.3d at 731. Nevertheless, it is self-evident that a temporary investigative detention in the absence of sustained and coercive questioning is “noncustodial,” whereas an arrest is “custodial.” See Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i at 210, 10 P.3d at 731. Accordingly, an arrestee is obviously “in custody” whether or not, in retrospect, the arresting officer had probable cause to effect the arrest in the first place."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "512 P.2d 551, 554",
"parenthetical": "observing that an officer's failure to state, \"I place you under arrest,\" does not preclude an arrest from occurring where an officer's action makes it clear to the defendant that he or she is not free to leave and holding that an officer who had probable cause to arrest took custody of the defendant by ordering him to leave a toilet stall, stand up against a wall, and remain subject to his commands",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Delmondo, 54 Haw. 552, 557, 512 P.2d 551, 554 (1973) (observing that an officer’s failure to state, “I place you under arrest,” does not preclude an arrest from occurring where an officer’s action makes it clear to the defendant that he or she is not free to leave and holding that an officer who had probable cause to arrest took custody of the defendant by ordering him to leave a toilet stall, stand up against a wall, and remain subject to his commands); State v. Ortiz, 4 Haw.App. 143, 662 P.2d 517 (“[a]n arrest occurs where the defendant clearly understands that he [or she] is not free to go and no ‘magic words’ such as, T place you under arrest,’ are required” (citations omitted)), affirmed, 67 Haw. 181, 683 P.2d 822 (1984)."
} | 12,259,019 | a |
However, determining the precise point at which a temporary investigative detention has ripened hito a warrantless arrest is no more susceptible to a blight-line rule than is determining when a suspect is "in custody." | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "54 Haw. 552, 557",
"parenthetical": "observing that an officer's failure to state, \"I place you under arrest,\" does not preclude an arrest from occurring where an officer's action makes it clear to the defendant that he or she is not free to leave and holding that an officer who had probable cause to arrest took custody of the defendant by ordering him to leave a toilet stall, stand up against a wall, and remain subject to his commands",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Delmondo, 54 Haw. 552, 557, 512 P.2d 551, 554 (1973) (observing that an officer’s failure to state, “I place you under arrest,” does not preclude an arrest from occurring where an officer’s action makes it clear to the defendant that he or she is not free to leave and holding that an officer who had probable cause to arrest took custody of the defendant by ordering him to leave a toilet stall, stand up against a wall, and remain subject to his commands); State v. Ortiz, 4 Haw.App. 143, 662 P.2d 517 (“[a]n arrest occurs where the defendant clearly understands that he [or she] is not free to go and no ‘magic words’ such as, T place you under arrest,’ are required” (citations omitted)), affirmed, 67 Haw. 181, 683 P.2d 822 (1984)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that there are \"difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop from a defacto arrest\" and declining to adopt a \"bright line\" rule demarcating one from the other",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (observing that there are “difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop from a defacto arrest” and declining to adopt a “bright line” rule demarcating one from the other); Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir.1996) (“[t]here is no bright-line rule to determine when an investigatory stop becomes an arrest” (citing United States v. Parr, 843 F.2d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir.1988))); see also Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i at 210, 10 P.3d at 731. Nevertheless, it is self-evident that a temporary investigative detention in the absence of sustained and coercive questioning is “noncustodial,” whereas an arrest is “custodial.” See Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i at 210, 10 P.3d at 731. Accordingly, an arrestee is obviously “in custody” whether or not, in retrospect, the arresting officer had probable cause to effect the arrest in the first place."
} | 12,259,019 | b |
However, determining the precise point at which a temporary investigative detention has ripened hito a warrantless arrest is no more susceptible to a blight-line rule than is determining when a suspect is "in custody." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "observing that there are \"difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop from a defacto arrest\" and declining to adopt a \"bright line\" rule demarcating one from the other",
"sentence": "See, e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (observing that there are “difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an investigative stop from a defacto arrest” and declining to adopt a “bright line” rule demarcating one from the other); Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir.1996) (“[t]here is no bright-line rule to determine when an investigatory stop becomes an arrest” (citing United States v. Parr, 843 F.2d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir.1988))); see also Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i at 210, 10 P.3d at 731. Nevertheless, it is self-evident that a temporary investigative detention in the absence of sustained and coercive questioning is “noncustodial,” whereas an arrest is “custodial.” See Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i at 210, 10 P.3d at 731. Accordingly, an arrestee is obviously “in custody” whether or not, in retrospect, the arresting officer had probable cause to effect the arrest in the first place."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "512 P.2d 551, 554",
"parenthetical": "observing that an officer's failure to state, \"I place you under arrest,\" does not preclude an arrest from occurring where an officer's action makes it clear to the defendant that he or she is not free to leave and holding that an officer who had probable cause to arrest took custody of the defendant by ordering him to leave a toilet stall, stand up against a wall, and remain subject to his commands",
"sentence": "Cf. State v. Delmondo, 54 Haw. 552, 557, 512 P.2d 551, 554 (1973) (observing that an officer’s failure to state, “I place you under arrest,” does not preclude an arrest from occurring where an officer’s action makes it clear to the defendant that he or she is not free to leave and holding that an officer who had probable cause to arrest took custody of the defendant by ordering him to leave a toilet stall, stand up against a wall, and remain subject to his commands); State v. Ortiz, 4 Haw.App. 143, 662 P.2d 517 (“[a]n arrest occurs where the defendant clearly understands that he [or she] is not free to go and no ‘magic words’ such as, T place you under arrest,’ are required” (citations omitted)), affirmed, 67 Haw. 181, 683 P.2d 822 (1984)."
} | 12,259,019 | a |
The state argues that plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of laches. See New York State's Memo at 8. Although, as discussed above, plaintiff asserts that there are no time-bar defenses to this action, and that application of such a defense would be violative of both the separation of powers doctrine and the Supremacy Clause, this Court has already determined that application of a statute of limitations is proper and bars plaintiff's claims. However, separate and apart from the statute of limitations, this court finds that plaintiff's claims would be additionally barred by both laches and public policy. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "105 S.Ct. 1256, 1256-57, n. 16",
"parenthetical": "suggesting that application of laches to bar Indian land claims is inappropriate",
"sentence": "See County of Oneida, 470 U.S. at 261-73, 105 S.Ct. at 1265-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (wherein Justice Stevens offered a detailed explanation of, and approval to, application of the doctrine of laches to ancient land claims); but see, id. at 244-45, n. 16, 105 S.Ct. at 1256-57, n. 16 (suggesting that application of laches to bar Indian land claims is inappropriate) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "470 U.S. 261, 261-73",
"parenthetical": "wherein Justice Stevens offered a detailed explanation of, and approval to, application of the doctrine of laches to ancient land claims",
"sentence": "See County of Oneida, 470 U.S. at 261-73, 105 S.Ct. at 1265-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (wherein Justice Stevens offered a detailed explanation of, and approval to, application of the doctrine of laches to ancient land claims); but see, id. at 244-45, n. 16, 105 S.Ct. at 1256-57, n. 16 (suggesting that application of laches to bar Indian land claims is inappropriate) (citations omitted)."
} | 7,393,879 | b |
Subsets and Splits