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Therein, the District Court concluded that Roach had four predicate convictions under the ACCA, three of which were serious drug offenses committed 15 days apart. The Roach court rejected that contention, concluding that, as long as the offenses are committed on occasions different from one another, they constituted separate predicate offenses under the ACCA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31",
"parenthetical": "prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | 3,817,042 | a |
Therein, the District Court concluded that Roach had four predicate convictions under the ACCA, three of which were serious drug offenses committed 15 days apart. The Roach court rejected that contention, concluding that, as long as the offenses are committed on occasions different from one another, they constituted separate predicate offenses under the ACCA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | 3,817,042 | a |
Therein, the District Court concluded that Roach had four predicate convictions under the ACCA, three of which were serious drug offenses committed 15 days apart. The Roach court rejected that contention, concluding that, as long as the offenses are committed on occasions different from one another, they constituted separate predicate offenses under the ACCA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | 3,817,042 | a |
Therein, the District Court concluded that Roach had four predicate convictions under the ACCA, three of which were serious drug offenses committed 15 days apart. The Roach court rejected that contention, concluding that, as long as the offenses are committed on occasions different from one another, they constituted separate predicate offenses under the ACCA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | 3,817,042 | b |
Therein, the District Court concluded that Roach had four predicate convictions under the ACCA, three of which were serious drug offenses committed 15 days apart. The Roach court rejected that contention, concluding that, as long as the offenses are committed on occasions different from one another, they constituted separate predicate offenses under the ACCA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "989 F.2d 303, 306-07",
"parenthetical": "two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | 3,817,042 | b |
Therein, the District Court concluded that Roach had four predicate convictions under the ACCA, three of which were serious drug offenses committed 15 days apart. The Roach court rejected that contention, concluding that, as long as the offenses are committed on occasions different from one another, they constituted separate predicate offenses under the ACCA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74",
"parenthetical": "two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | 3,817,042 | a |
Therein, the District Court concluded that Roach had four predicate convictions under the ACCA, three of which were serious drug offenses committed 15 days apart. The Roach court rejected that contention, concluding that, as long as the offenses are committed on occasions different from one another, they constituted separate predicate offenses under the ACCA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | 3,817,042 | a |
Therein, the District Court concluded that Roach had four predicate convictions under the ACCA, three of which were serious drug offenses committed 15 days apart. The Roach court rejected that contention, concluding that, as long as the offenses are committed on occasions different from one another, they constituted separate predicate offenses under the ACCA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | 3,817,042 | a |
Therein, the District Court concluded that Roach had four predicate convictions under the ACCA, three of which were serious drug offenses committed 15 days apart. The Roach court rejected that contention, concluding that, as long as the offenses are committed on occasions different from one another, they constituted separate predicate offenses under the ACCA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | 3,817,042 | b |
Therein, the District Court concluded that Roach had four predicate convictions under the ACCA, three of which were serious drug offenses committed 15 days apart. The Roach court rejected that contention, concluding that, as long as the offenses are committed on occasions different from one another, they constituted separate predicate offenses under the ACCA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "970 F.2d 1312, 1315",
"parenthetical": "two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | 3,817,042 | a |
Therein, the District Court concluded that Roach had four predicate convictions under the ACCA, three of which were serious drug offenses committed 15 days apart. The Roach court rejected that contention, concluding that, as long as the offenses are committed on occasions different from one another, they constituted separate predicate offenses under the ACCA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62",
"parenthetical": "sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | 3,817,042 | b |
Therein, the District Court concluded that Roach had four predicate convictions under the ACCA, three of which were serious drug offenses committed 15 days apart. The Roach court rejected that contention, concluding that, as long as the offenses are committed on occasions different from one another, they constituted separate predicate offenses under the ACCA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | 3,817,042 | a |
Therein, the District Court concluded that Roach had four predicate convictions under the ACCA, three of which were serious drug offenses committed 15 days apart. The Roach court rejected that contention, concluding that, as long as the offenses are committed on occasions different from one another, they constituted separate predicate offenses under the ACCA. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | 3,817,042 | b |
Therein, the District Court concluded that Roach had four predicate convictions under the ACCA, three of which were serious drug offenses committed 15 days apart. The Roach court rejected that contention, concluding that, as long as the offenses are committed on occasions different from one another, they constituted separate predicate offenses under the ACCA. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA",
"sentence": "See e.g. United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1480-31 (10th Cir.1997) (prior convictions for drug trafficking offenses that occurred three days apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 829, 119 S.Ct. 78, 142 L.Ed.2d 61 (1998); United States v. Maxey, 989 F.2d 303, 306-07 (9th Cir.1993) (two sales of PCP-laced cigarettes occurring within 24 days of each other were separate predicate convictions under the ACCA); United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1473-74 (5th Cir.) (two deliveries of cocaine two weeks apart in different counties were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993); United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir.1992) (two drug offenses one day apart were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA); United States v. McDile, 914 F.2d 1059, 1061-62 (8th Cir.1990) (sales of drugs on September 15, November 15, 17, and 23, 1983, were separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1100, 111 S.Ct. 997, 112 L.Ed.2d 1080 (1991); see also United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292 (6th Cir.2006) (two burglaries occurring immediately after each other, at properties located across the street from one another, were committed on occasions different from one another under the ACCA)."
} | 3,817,042 | a |
In this case, the child-victim's mother and Dr. Calhoun provided additional information. We hold that witnesses other than the patient can provide this foundational information. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "29 M.J. 578, 581",
"parenthetical": "social worker's testimony established that the declarant made statements to her with expectation of receiving medical benefit",
"sentence": "See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992) (victim’s statement to medical personnel admissible although victim did not testify at trial); see also United States v. Tornowski, 29 M.J. 578, 581 (A.F.C.M.R.1989) (social worker’s testimony established that the declarant made statements to her with expectation of receiving medical benefit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "victim's statement to medical personnel admissible although victim did not testify at trial",
"sentence": "See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992) (victim’s statement to medical personnel admissible although victim did not testify at trial); see also United States v. Tornowski, 29 M.J. 578, 581 (A.F.C.M.R.1989) (social worker’s testimony established that the declarant made statements to her with expectation of receiving medical benefit)."
} | 3,591,202 | b |
In this case, the child-victim's mother and Dr. Calhoun provided additional information. We hold that witnesses other than the patient can provide this foundational information. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "29 M.J. 578, 581",
"parenthetical": "social worker's testimony established that the declarant made statements to her with expectation of receiving medical benefit",
"sentence": "See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992) (victim’s statement to medical personnel admissible although victim did not testify at trial); see also United States v. Tornowski, 29 M.J. 578, 581 (A.F.C.M.R.1989) (social worker’s testimony established that the declarant made statements to her with expectation of receiving medical benefit)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "victim's statement to medical personnel admissible although victim did not testify at trial",
"sentence": "See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992) (victim’s statement to medical personnel admissible although victim did not testify at trial); see also United States v. Tornowski, 29 M.J. 578, 581 (A.F.C.M.R.1989) (social worker’s testimony established that the declarant made statements to her with expectation of receiving medical benefit)."
} | 3,591,202 | b |
Lambeth's continued detention to await the arrival of a canine unit after the completion of the traffic stop investigation and after the completion of the investigations into the troopers' other reasonable suspicions -- that Lambeth was driving with an expired license, had no registration sticker, and was driving while intoxicated -- violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Because Lambeth's detention should have ended prior to the point in time when Trooper Hatfield said that he smelled marijuana on Lambeth, this fact cannot retroactively justify Lambeth's unauthorized, continued detention. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "54 S.W.3d 924, 924",
"parenthetical": "explaining that traffic stop will not justify continued detention to await the arrival of a drug detection dog",
"sentence": "See Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 244-45; $217,590.00 In U.S. Currency, 54 S.W.3d at 924 (explaining that traffic stop will not justify continued detention to await the arrival of a drug detection dog)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "188 S.W.3d 708, 719",
"parenthetical": "holding officer's articulated reasonable suspicion justified appellant's contin ued detention to await canine unit when officer suspected appellant of drug trafficking based on appellant's prior arrests for drug offenses, appellant's lie about his prior criminal history, and appellant's possession of small jeweler's bags used in cocaine trafficking",
"sentence": "Cf. Coleman v. State, 188 S.W.3d 708, 719 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2005, pet. ref'd) (holding officer’s articulated reasonable suspicion justified appellant’s contin ued detention to await canine unit when officer suspected appellant of drug trafficking based on appellant’s prior arrests for drug offenses, appellant’s lie about his prior criminal history, and appellant’s possession of small jeweler’s bags used in cocaine trafficking), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 502, 166 L.Ed.2d 376 (2006)."
} | 8,312,735 | a |
Lambeth's continued detention to await the arrival of a canine unit after the completion of the traffic stop investigation and after the completion of the investigations into the troopers' other reasonable suspicions -- that Lambeth was driving with an expired license, had no registration sticker, and was driving while intoxicated -- violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Because Lambeth's detention should have ended prior to the point in time when Trooper Hatfield said that he smelled marijuana on Lambeth, this fact cannot retroactively justify Lambeth's unauthorized, continued detention. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding officer's articulated reasonable suspicion justified appellant's contin ued detention to await canine unit when officer suspected appellant of drug trafficking based on appellant's prior arrests for drug offenses, appellant's lie about his prior criminal history, and appellant's possession of small jeweler's bags used in cocaine trafficking",
"sentence": "Cf. Coleman v. State, 188 S.W.3d 708, 719 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2005, pet. ref'd) (holding officer’s articulated reasonable suspicion justified appellant’s contin ued detention to await canine unit when officer suspected appellant of drug trafficking based on appellant’s prior arrests for drug offenses, appellant’s lie about his prior criminal history, and appellant’s possession of small jeweler’s bags used in cocaine trafficking), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 502, 166 L.Ed.2d 376 (2006)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "54 S.W.3d 924, 924",
"parenthetical": "explaining that traffic stop will not justify continued detention to await the arrival of a drug detection dog",
"sentence": "See Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 244-45; $217,590.00 In U.S. Currency, 54 S.W.3d at 924 (explaining that traffic stop will not justify continued detention to await the arrival of a drug detection dog)."
} | 8,312,735 | b |
Lambeth's continued detention to await the arrival of a canine unit after the completion of the traffic stop investigation and after the completion of the investigations into the troopers' other reasonable suspicions -- that Lambeth was driving with an expired license, had no registration sticker, and was driving while intoxicated -- violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Because Lambeth's detention should have ended prior to the point in time when Trooper Hatfield said that he smelled marijuana on Lambeth, this fact cannot retroactively justify Lambeth's unauthorized, continued detention. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "54 S.W.3d 924, 924",
"parenthetical": "explaining that traffic stop will not justify continued detention to await the arrival of a drug detection dog",
"sentence": "See Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 244-45; $217,590.00 In U.S. Currency, 54 S.W.3d at 924 (explaining that traffic stop will not justify continued detention to await the arrival of a drug detection dog)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding officer's articulated reasonable suspicion justified appellant's contin ued detention to await canine unit when officer suspected appellant of drug trafficking based on appellant's prior arrests for drug offenses, appellant's lie about his prior criminal history, and appellant's possession of small jeweler's bags used in cocaine trafficking",
"sentence": "Cf. Coleman v. State, 188 S.W.3d 708, 719 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2005, pet. ref'd) (holding officer’s articulated reasonable suspicion justified appellant’s contin ued detention to await canine unit when officer suspected appellant of drug trafficking based on appellant’s prior arrests for drug offenses, appellant’s lie about his prior criminal history, and appellant’s possession of small jeweler’s bags used in cocaine trafficking), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 502, 166 L.Ed.2d 376 (2006)."
} | 8,312,735 | a |
Objectors contend inadequate representation is demonstrated in the settlement's allocation terms, which designate the vast majority of the fund to Injury Claims, while Purchase Claims are capped at $250,OOO. But varied relief among class members with differing claims in class settlements is not unusual. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "148 F.3d 289, 289-90",
"parenthetical": "holding the district court properly certified a national settlement class in a circumstance in which the class was comprised of policyholders who allegedly were the victims of several different types of fraudulent and misleading sales practices and the settlement created an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to determine the kind and amount of relief to be granted",
"sentence": "See Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., 200 F.3d 1140, 1146 (8th Cir.1999) (“[Ajlmost every settlement will involve different awards for various class members.”); see also Prudential, 148 F.3d at 289-90 (holding the district court properly certified a national settlement class in a circumstance in which the class was comprised of policyholders who allegedly were the victims of several different types of fraudulent and misleading sales practices and the settlement created an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to determine the kind and amount of relief to be granted). Such differences in settlement value do not, without more, demonstrate conflicting or antagonistic interests within the class."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "200 F.3d 1140, 1146",
"parenthetical": "\"[Ajlmost every settlement will involve different awards for various class members.\"",
"sentence": "See Petrovic v. Amoco Oil Co., 200 F.3d 1140, 1146 (8th Cir.1999) (“[Ajlmost every settlement will involve different awards for various class members.”); see also Prudential, 148 F.3d at 289-90 (holding the district court properly certified a national settlement class in a circumstance in which the class was comprised of policyholders who allegedly were the victims of several different types of fraudulent and misleading sales practices and the settlement created an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to determine the kind and amount of relief to be granted). Such differences in settlement value do not, without more, demonstrate conflicting or antagonistic interests within the class."
} | 4,079,071 | b |
Additionally, as Janczak explains, the record makes it arguable that the decision to terminate him became definitive not on Oden's stated date of August 14, but instead later that month, shortly after additional information about Janczak's medical condition had been received. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "577 F.3d 1160, 1160",
"parenthetical": "observing that \"[w]henever termination occurs while the employee is on leave, that timing has significant probative force,\" and describing a termination that \"occurred just one day after [the employee] told [the employer] that she would need to take a full six weeks off and could not return sooner\" as involving \"particularly suggestive\" timing",
"sentence": "See DeFreitas, 577 F.3d at 1160 (observing that “[w]henever termination occurs while the employee is on leave, that timing has significant probative force,” and describing a termination that “occurred just one day after [the employee] told [the employer] that she would need to take a full six weeks off and could not return sooner” as involving “particularly suggestive” timing); cf. Brown, 700 F.3d at 1227 (stating that an employee’s being “fired only two days after his emails and meeting with [the employer] about taking time off’ for FMLA reasons “may be enough to prove ■the third element of an interference claim, especially because the employer’s intent is irrelevant”). A reasonable jury might rely on this information to infer that the decision to eliminate Janczak’s position was related to his medical condition and his exercise of FMLA leave."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "700 F.3d 1227, 1227",
"parenthetical": "stating that an employee's being \"fired only two days after his emails and meeting with [the employer] about taking time off' for FMLA reasons \"may be enough to prove #the third element of an interference claim, especially because the employer's intent is irrelevant\"",
"sentence": "See DeFreitas, 577 F.3d at 1160 (observing that “[w]henever termination occurs while the employee is on leave, that timing has significant probative force,” and describing a termination that “occurred just one day after [the employee] told [the employer] that she would need to take a full six weeks off and could not return sooner” as involving “particularly suggestive” timing); cf. Brown, 700 F.3d at 1227 (stating that an employee’s being “fired only two days after his emails and meeting with [the employer] about taking time off’ for FMLA reasons “may be enough to prove ■the third element of an interference claim, especially because the employer’s intent is irrelevant”). A reasonable jury might rely on this information to infer that the decision to eliminate Janczak’s position was related to his medical condition and his exercise of FMLA leave."
} | 6,056,650 | a |
As discussed above, Summerrain is a "petition preparer," as that term is defined by Section 110(a). Accordingly, she must provide her social security number along with her signature on each document she prepares. 11 U.S.C. SS 110(c)(2). Supplying the tax identification number of the partnership through which she conducted business does not meet the plain requirements of Section 110(c). | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "197 B.R. 116, 116",
"parenthetical": "rejecting argument that petition preparer should be allowed to use some form of identification other than social security number because \"[u]se of an alternative number ... would be less effective for tracking the identifies of petition preparers in the nation-wide bankruptcy system\"",
"sentence": "See In re Rausch, 197 B.R. at 116 (rejecting argument that petition preparer should be allowed to use some form of identification other than social security number because “[u]se of an alternative number ... would be less effective for tracking the identifies of petition preparers in the nation-wide bankruptcy system”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "259 B.R. 379, 384",
"parenthetical": "requiring individual to provide social security number even though petition preparer was employee of corporation",
"sentence": "In re Gomez, 259 B.R. 379, 384 (Bankr.D.Colo.2001) (requiring individual to provide social security number even though petition preparer was employee of corporation). Moreover, allowing a petition preparer to circumvent the requirements of Section 110(c) in such a manner would undermine the purposes of Section 110(c) by inhibiting the easy identification and tracking of unscrupulous petition preparers."
} | 9,411,841 | b |
. This conflict of interest not only suggests a heightened level of knowledge of Rish, but also is grounds for disciplinary proceedings. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "public reprimand for attempting to represent buyers of mobile home when attorney also represented seller",
"sentence": "See Florida Bar v. Madsen, 400 So.2d 947 (Fla.1981) (public reprimand for attempting to represent buyers of mobile home when attorney also represented seller); Florida Bar v. Mueller, 351 So.2d 960 (Fla.1977) (disbarment based in part on attorney's conduct in representing buyer in purchase of business and later representing seller in suit against buyer); Florida Bar v. Moore, 194 So.2d 264 (Fla.1966) (three-month suspension for representing both life tenant and trustee); see also Florida Bar v. Shannon, 398 So.2d 453 (Fla.1981) (public reprimand warranted for failing to carry out contract for professional services by overlooking defect in title and for subsequent delay in bringing quiet title action to clear defect)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "public reprimand warranted for failing to carry out contract for professional services by overlooking defect in title and for subsequent delay in bringing quiet title action to clear defect",
"sentence": "See Florida Bar v. Madsen, 400 So.2d 947 (Fla.1981) (public reprimand for attempting to represent buyers of mobile home when attorney also represented seller); Florida Bar v. Mueller, 351 So.2d 960 (Fla.1977) (disbarment based in part on attorney's conduct in representing buyer in purchase of business and later representing seller in suit against buyer); Florida Bar v. Moore, 194 So.2d 264 (Fla.1966) (three-month suspension for representing both life tenant and trustee); see also Florida Bar v. Shannon, 398 So.2d 453 (Fla.1981) (public reprimand warranted for failing to carry out contract for professional services by overlooking defect in title and for subsequent delay in bringing quiet title action to clear defect)."
} | 10,534,438 | a |
. This conflict of interest not only suggests a heightened level of knowledge of Rish, but also is grounds for disciplinary proceedings. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "disbarment based in part on attorney's conduct in representing buyer in purchase of business and later representing seller in suit against buyer",
"sentence": "See Florida Bar v. Madsen, 400 So.2d 947 (Fla.1981) (public reprimand for attempting to represent buyers of mobile home when attorney also represented seller); Florida Bar v. Mueller, 351 So.2d 960 (Fla.1977) (disbarment based in part on attorney's conduct in representing buyer in purchase of business and later representing seller in suit against buyer); Florida Bar v. Moore, 194 So.2d 264 (Fla.1966) (three-month suspension for representing both life tenant and trustee); see also Florida Bar v. Shannon, 398 So.2d 453 (Fla.1981) (public reprimand warranted for failing to carry out contract for professional services by overlooking defect in title and for subsequent delay in bringing quiet title action to clear defect)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "public reprimand warranted for failing to carry out contract for professional services by overlooking defect in title and for subsequent delay in bringing quiet title action to clear defect",
"sentence": "See Florida Bar v. Madsen, 400 So.2d 947 (Fla.1981) (public reprimand for attempting to represent buyers of mobile home when attorney also represented seller); Florida Bar v. Mueller, 351 So.2d 960 (Fla.1977) (disbarment based in part on attorney's conduct in representing buyer in purchase of business and later representing seller in suit against buyer); Florida Bar v. Moore, 194 So.2d 264 (Fla.1966) (three-month suspension for representing both life tenant and trustee); see also Florida Bar v. Shannon, 398 So.2d 453 (Fla.1981) (public reprimand warranted for failing to carry out contract for professional services by overlooking defect in title and for subsequent delay in bringing quiet title action to clear defect)."
} | 10,534,438 | a |
Although the victim's testimony that he did not remember saying "Elliot Fucking Snider" was not directly inconsistent with his prior use of that name in court, a witness' claim that he doesn't remember making a particular statement may be deemed to be inconsistent with the witness' actual making of that statement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "69 Conn. App. 1, 17-21",
"parenthetical": "victim's testimony that he did not remember who had shot him was deemed to be inconsistent with victim's prior statement to police identifying defendant as person who shot him",
"sentence": "See State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 748-49 n.4, 513 A.2d 86 (“A statement’s inconsistency ... is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposed assertions have been made. . . . [IJnconsistencies may be found in changes in position and ... in denial[s] of recollection.”); see also State v. Trotter, 69 Conn. App. 1, 17-21, 793 A.2d 1172 (victim’s testimony that he did not remember who had shot him was deemed to be inconsistent with victim’s prior statement to police identifying defendant as person who shot him), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 932, 799 A.2d 297 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A statement's inconsistency ... is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposed assertions have been made. . . . [IJnconsistencies may be found in changes in position and ... in denial[s] of recollection.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 748-49 n.4, 513 A.2d 86 (“A statement’s inconsistency ... is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposed assertions have been made. . . . [IJnconsistencies may be found in changes in position and ... in denial[s] of recollection.”); see also State v. Trotter, 69 Conn. App. 1, 17-21, 793 A.2d 1172 (victim’s testimony that he did not remember who had shot him was deemed to be inconsistent with victim’s prior statement to police identifying defendant as person who shot him), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 932, 799 A.2d 297 (2002)."
} | 4,344,680 | b |
Although the victim's testimony that he did not remember saying "Elliot Fucking Snider" was not directly inconsistent with his prior use of that name in court, a witness' claim that he doesn't remember making a particular statement may be deemed to be inconsistent with the witness' actual making of that statement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A statement's inconsistency ... is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposed assertions have been made. . . . [IJnconsistencies may be found in changes in position and ... in denial[s] of recollection.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 748-49 n.4, 513 A.2d 86 (“A statement’s inconsistency ... is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposed assertions have been made. . . . [IJnconsistencies may be found in changes in position and ... in denial[s] of recollection.”); see also State v. Trotter, 69 Conn. App. 1, 17-21, 793 A.2d 1172 (victim’s testimony that he did not remember who had shot him was deemed to be inconsistent with victim’s prior statement to police identifying defendant as person who shot him), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 932, 799 A.2d 297 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "victim's testimony that he did not remember who had shot him was deemed to be inconsistent with victim's prior statement to police identifying defendant as person who shot him",
"sentence": "See State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 748-49 n.4, 513 A.2d 86 (“A statement’s inconsistency ... is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposed assertions have been made. . . . [IJnconsistencies may be found in changes in position and ... in denial[s] of recollection.”); see also State v. Trotter, 69 Conn. App. 1, 17-21, 793 A.2d 1172 (victim’s testimony that he did not remember who had shot him was deemed to be inconsistent with victim’s prior statement to police identifying defendant as person who shot him), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 932, 799 A.2d 297 (2002)."
} | 4,344,680 | a |
Although the victim's testimony that he did not remember saying "Elliot Fucking Snider" was not directly inconsistent with his prior use of that name in court, a witness' claim that he doesn't remember making a particular statement may be deemed to be inconsistent with the witness' actual making of that statement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "victim's testimony that he did not remember who had shot him was deemed to be inconsistent with victim's prior statement to police identifying defendant as person who shot him",
"sentence": "See State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 748-49 n.4, 513 A.2d 86 (“A statement’s inconsistency ... is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposed assertions have been made. . . . [IJnconsistencies may be found in changes in position and ... in denial[s] of recollection.”); see also State v. Trotter, 69 Conn. App. 1, 17-21, 793 A.2d 1172 (victim’s testimony that he did not remember who had shot him was deemed to be inconsistent with victim’s prior statement to police identifying defendant as person who shot him), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 932, 799 A.2d 297 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A statement's inconsistency ... is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposed assertions have been made. . . . [IJnconsistencies may be found in changes in position and ... in denial[s] of recollection.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 748-49 n.4, 513 A.2d 86 (“A statement’s inconsistency ... is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposed assertions have been made. . . . [IJnconsistencies may be found in changes in position and ... in denial[s] of recollection.”); see also State v. Trotter, 69 Conn. App. 1, 17-21, 793 A.2d 1172 (victim’s testimony that he did not remember who had shot him was deemed to be inconsistent with victim’s prior statement to police identifying defendant as person who shot him), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 932, 799 A.2d 297 (2002)."
} | 4,344,680 | b |
Although the victim's testimony that he did not remember saying "Elliot Fucking Snider" was not directly inconsistent with his prior use of that name in court, a witness' claim that he doesn't remember making a particular statement may be deemed to be inconsistent with the witness' actual making of that statement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "victim's testimony that he did not remember who had shot him was deemed to be inconsistent with victim's prior statement to police identifying defendant as person who shot him",
"sentence": "See State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 748-49 n.4, 513 A.2d 86 (“A statement’s inconsistency ... is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposed assertions have been made. . . . [IJnconsistencies may be found in changes in position and ... in denial[s] of recollection.”); see also State v. Trotter, 69 Conn. App. 1, 17-21, 793 A.2d 1172 (victim’s testimony that he did not remember who had shot him was deemed to be inconsistent with victim’s prior statement to police identifying defendant as person who shot him), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 932, 799 A.2d 297 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A statement's inconsistency ... is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposed assertions have been made. . . . [IJnconsistencies may be found in changes in position and ... in denial[s] of recollection.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 748-49 n.4, 513 A.2d 86 (“A statement’s inconsistency ... is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposed assertions have been made. . . . [IJnconsistencies may be found in changes in position and ... in denial[s] of recollection.”); see also State v. Trotter, 69 Conn. App. 1, 17-21, 793 A.2d 1172 (victim’s testimony that he did not remember who had shot him was deemed to be inconsistent with victim’s prior statement to police identifying defendant as person who shot him), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 932, 799 A.2d 297 (2002)."
} | 4,344,680 | b |
Although the victim's testimony that he did not remember saying "Elliot Fucking Snider" was not directly inconsistent with his prior use of that name in court, a witness' claim that he doesn't remember making a particular statement may be deemed to be inconsistent with the witness' actual making of that statement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A statement's inconsistency ... is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposed assertions have been made. . . . [IJnconsistencies may be found in changes in position and ... in denial[s] of recollection.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 748-49 n.4, 513 A.2d 86 (“A statement’s inconsistency ... is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposed assertions have been made. . . . [IJnconsistencies may be found in changes in position and ... in denial[s] of recollection.”); see also State v. Trotter, 69 Conn. App. 1, 17-21, 793 A.2d 1172 (victim’s testimony that he did not remember who had shot him was deemed to be inconsistent with victim’s prior statement to police identifying defendant as person who shot him), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 932, 799 A.2d 297 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "69 Conn. App. 1, 17-21",
"parenthetical": "victim's testimony that he did not remember who had shot him was deemed to be inconsistent with victim's prior statement to police identifying defendant as person who shot him",
"sentence": "See State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 748-49 n.4, 513 A.2d 86 (“A statement’s inconsistency ... is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposed assertions have been made. . . . [IJnconsistencies may be found in changes in position and ... in denial[s] of recollection.”); see also State v. Trotter, 69 Conn. App. 1, 17-21, 793 A.2d 1172 (victim’s testimony that he did not remember who had shot him was deemed to be inconsistent with victim’s prior statement to police identifying defendant as person who shot him), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 932, 799 A.2d 297 (2002)."
} | 4,344,680 | a |
Although the victim's testimony that he did not remember saying "Elliot Fucking Snider" was not directly inconsistent with his prior use of that name in court, a witness' claim that he doesn't remember making a particular statement may be deemed to be inconsistent with the witness' actual making of that statement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "victim's testimony that he did not remember who had shot him was deemed to be inconsistent with victim's prior statement to police identifying defendant as person who shot him",
"sentence": "See State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 748-49 n.4, 513 A.2d 86 (“A statement’s inconsistency ... is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposed assertions have been made. . . . [IJnconsistencies may be found in changes in position and ... in denial[s] of recollection.”); see also State v. Trotter, 69 Conn. App. 1, 17-21, 793 A.2d 1172 (victim’s testimony that he did not remember who had shot him was deemed to be inconsistent with victim’s prior statement to police identifying defendant as person who shot him), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 932, 799 A.2d 297 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A statement's inconsistency ... is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposed assertions have been made. . . . [IJnconsistencies may be found in changes in position and ... in denial[s] of recollection.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 748-49 n.4, 513 A.2d 86 (“A statement’s inconsistency ... is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposed assertions have been made. . . . [IJnconsistencies may be found in changes in position and ... in denial[s] of recollection.”); see also State v. Trotter, 69 Conn. App. 1, 17-21, 793 A.2d 1172 (victim’s testimony that he did not remember who had shot him was deemed to be inconsistent with victim’s prior statement to police identifying defendant as person who shot him), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 932, 799 A.2d 297 (2002)."
} | 4,344,680 | b |
Although the victim's testimony that he did not remember saying "Elliot Fucking Snider" was not directly inconsistent with his prior use of that name in court, a witness' claim that he doesn't remember making a particular statement may be deemed to be inconsistent with the witness' actual making of that statement. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A statement's inconsistency ... is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposed assertions have been made. . . . [IJnconsistencies may be found in changes in position and ... in denial[s] of recollection.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 748-49 n.4, 513 A.2d 86 (“A statement’s inconsistency ... is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposed assertions have been made. . . . [IJnconsistencies may be found in changes in position and ... in denial[s] of recollection.”); see also State v. Trotter, 69 Conn. App. 1, 17-21, 793 A.2d 1172 (victim’s testimony that he did not remember who had shot him was deemed to be inconsistent with victim’s prior statement to police identifying defendant as person who shot him), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 932, 799 A.2d 297 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "victim's testimony that he did not remember who had shot him was deemed to be inconsistent with victim's prior statement to police identifying defendant as person who shot him",
"sentence": "See State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 748-49 n.4, 513 A.2d 86 (“A statement’s inconsistency ... is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposed assertions have been made. . . . [IJnconsistencies may be found in changes in position and ... in denial[s] of recollection.”); see also State v. Trotter, 69 Conn. App. 1, 17-21, 793 A.2d 1172 (victim’s testimony that he did not remember who had shot him was deemed to be inconsistent with victim’s prior statement to police identifying defendant as person who shot him), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 932, 799 A.2d 297 (2002)."
} | 4,344,680 | a |
Although the victim's testimony that he did not remember saying "Elliot Fucking Snider" was not directly inconsistent with his prior use of that name in court, a witness' claim that he doesn't remember making a particular statement may be deemed to be inconsistent with the witness' actual making of that statement. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "victim's testimony that he did not remember who had shot him was deemed to be inconsistent with victim's prior statement to police identifying defendant as person who shot him",
"sentence": "See State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 748-49 n.4, 513 A.2d 86 (“A statement’s inconsistency ... is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposed assertions have been made. . . . [IJnconsistencies may be found in changes in position and ... in denial[s] of recollection.”); see also State v. Trotter, 69 Conn. App. 1, 17-21, 793 A.2d 1172 (victim’s testimony that he did not remember who had shot him was deemed to be inconsistent with victim’s prior statement to police identifying defendant as person who shot him), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 932, 799 A.2d 297 (2002)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"A statement's inconsistency ... is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposed assertions have been made. . . . [IJnconsistencies may be found in changes in position and ... in denial[s] of recollection.\"",
"sentence": "See State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 748-49 n.4, 513 A.2d 86 (“A statement’s inconsistency ... is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposed assertions have been made. . . . [IJnconsistencies may be found in changes in position and ... in denial[s] of recollection.”); see also State v. Trotter, 69 Conn. App. 1, 17-21, 793 A.2d 1172 (victim’s testimony that he did not remember who had shot him was deemed to be inconsistent with victim’s prior statement to police identifying defendant as person who shot him), cert. denied, 260 Conn. 932, 799 A.2d 297 (2002)."
} | 4,344,680 | b |
The trial court denied the motion and began the trial immediately. The court of appeals reversed and concluded that "Walker's right to a fair trial was violated because his counsel was deprived of an adequate opportunity to determine the existence of a substantial insanity defense." | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "724 F.2d 1425, 1434-35",
"parenthetical": "not an abuse of discretion to deny continuance to prepare insanity defense because counsel was appointed three months before trial and defendant failed to show even \"the mere possibility of prejudice\"",
"sentence": "But see Hutchins v. Garrison, 724 F.2d 1425, 1434-35 (4th Cir.1983) (not an abuse of discretion to deny continuance to prepare insanity defense because counsel was appointed three months before trial and defendant failed to show even “the mere possibility of prejudice”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 750, 79 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "633 F.2d 1146, 1150",
"parenthetical": "denial of fair trial to refuse requested six-hour continuance to enable defense psychiatric expert to appear and testify",
"sentence": "Id. at 1194; see also Hicks v. Wainwright, 633 F.2d 1146, 1150 (5th Cir.1981) (denial of fair trial to refuse requested six-hour continuance to enable defense psychiatric expert to appear and testify)."
} | 325,316 | b |
The trial court denied the motion and began the trial immediately. The court of appeals reversed and concluded that "Walker's right to a fair trial was violated because his counsel was deprived of an adequate opportunity to determine the existence of a substantial insanity defense." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "633 F.2d 1146, 1150",
"parenthetical": "denial of fair trial to refuse requested six-hour continuance to enable defense psychiatric expert to appear and testify",
"sentence": "Id. at 1194; see also Hicks v. Wainwright, 633 F.2d 1146, 1150 (5th Cir.1981) (denial of fair trial to refuse requested six-hour continuance to enable defense psychiatric expert to appear and testify)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "not an abuse of discretion to deny continuance to prepare insanity defense because counsel was appointed three months before trial and defendant failed to show even \"the mere possibility of prejudice\"",
"sentence": "But see Hutchins v. Garrison, 724 F.2d 1425, 1434-35 (4th Cir.1983) (not an abuse of discretion to deny continuance to prepare insanity defense because counsel was appointed three months before trial and defendant failed to show even “the mere possibility of prejudice”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 750, 79 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984)."
} | 325,316 | a |
The trial court denied the motion and began the trial immediately. The court of appeals reversed and concluded that "Walker's right to a fair trial was violated because his counsel was deprived of an adequate opportunity to determine the existence of a substantial insanity defense." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "633 F.2d 1146, 1150",
"parenthetical": "denial of fair trial to refuse requested six-hour continuance to enable defense psychiatric expert to appear and testify",
"sentence": "Id. at 1194; see also Hicks v. Wainwright, 633 F.2d 1146, 1150 (5th Cir.1981) (denial of fair trial to refuse requested six-hour continuance to enable defense psychiatric expert to appear and testify)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "not an abuse of discretion to deny continuance to prepare insanity defense because counsel was appointed three months before trial and defendant failed to show even \"the mere possibility of prejudice\"",
"sentence": "But see Hutchins v. Garrison, 724 F.2d 1425, 1434-35 (4th Cir.1983) (not an abuse of discretion to deny continuance to prepare insanity defense because counsel was appointed three months before trial and defendant failed to show even “the mere possibility of prejudice”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 750, 79 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984)."
} | 325,316 | a |
Suffice it to say, Plaintiffs Motion to Strike lacked any colorable basis in the factual record. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "899 F.2d 40, 43-44",
"parenthetical": "affirming district court's finding that party \"failed to make a reasonable inquiry into the factual basis of the amended complaint\" and imposition of Rule 11 sanctions",
"sentence": "Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Banov, 899 F.2d 40, 43-44 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (affirming district court’s finding that party “failed to make a reasonable inquiry into the factual basis of the amended complaint” and imposition of Rule 11 sanctions); cf. Marina Mgmt. Services, Inc. v. Vessel My Girls, 202 F.3d 315, 325 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding sanctions for counterclaim “which included allegations not necessarily integrally linked to the legitimacy of the ... action”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "202 F.3d 315, 325",
"parenthetical": "upholding sanctions for counterclaim \"which included allegations not necessarily integrally linked to the legitimacy of the ... action\"",
"sentence": "Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Banov, 899 F.2d 40, 43-44 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (affirming district court’s finding that party “failed to make a reasonable inquiry into the factual basis of the amended complaint” and imposition of Rule 11 sanctions); cf. Marina Mgmt. Services, Inc. v. Vessel My Girls, 202 F.3d 315, 325 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding sanctions for counterclaim “which included allegations not necessarily integrally linked to the legitimacy of the ... action”)."
} | 12,273,721 | a |
Shi and Lin argue that these facts are insufficient evidence of permanent injury. We believe that the district court's application of the permanent bodily injury enhancement to these facts presents a predominantly factual issue, which we review for clear error. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "342 F.3d 536, 540",
"parenthetical": "reviewing finding of permanent or life-threatening bodily injury under clearly erroneous standard",
"sentence": "See Gotti, 459 F.3d at 349 (citing United States v. Selioutsky, 409 F.3d 114, 118-19 (2d Cir.2005)); see also United States v. Baggett, 342 F.3d 536, 540 (6th Cir.2003) (reviewing finding of permanent or life-threatening bodily injury under clearly erroneous standard); United States v. Pandiello, 184 F.3d 682, 685 (7th Cir.1999) (conclusion that assailants inflicted bodily injury reviewed for clear error); United States v. Jacobs, 167 F.3d 792, 798 (3d Cir.1999) (findings regarding permanent or life threatening injury reviewed for clear error); United States v. Price, 149 F.3d 352, 353 (5th Cir.1998) (“severity of a victim’s injuries is a factual determination and thus reviewed for clear error,” construing permanent bodily injury)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "184 F.3d 685, 685",
"parenthetical": "applying de novo review to question whether welts fell within Guidelines' definition of bodily injury",
"sentence": "But see Pandiello, 184 F.3d at 685 (applying de novo review to question whether welts fell within Guidelines’ definition of bodily injury)."
} | 4,067,916 | a |
Shi and Lin argue that these facts are insufficient evidence of permanent injury. We believe that the district court's application of the permanent bodily injury enhancement to these facts presents a predominantly factual issue, which we review for clear error. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "184 F.3d 685, 685",
"parenthetical": "applying de novo review to question whether welts fell within Guidelines' definition of bodily injury",
"sentence": "But see Pandiello, 184 F.3d at 685 (applying de novo review to question whether welts fell within Guidelines’ definition of bodily injury)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "184 F.3d 682, 685",
"parenthetical": "conclusion that assailants inflicted bodily injury reviewed for clear error",
"sentence": "See Gotti, 459 F.3d at 349 (citing United States v. Selioutsky, 409 F.3d 114, 118-19 (2d Cir.2005)); see also United States v. Baggett, 342 F.3d 536, 540 (6th Cir.2003) (reviewing finding of permanent or life-threatening bodily injury under clearly erroneous standard); United States v. Pandiello, 184 F.3d 682, 685 (7th Cir.1999) (conclusion that assailants inflicted bodily injury reviewed for clear error); United States v. Jacobs, 167 F.3d 792, 798 (3d Cir.1999) (findings regarding permanent or life threatening injury reviewed for clear error); United States v. Price, 149 F.3d 352, 353 (5th Cir.1998) (“severity of a victim’s injuries is a factual determination and thus reviewed for clear error,” construing permanent bodily injury)."
} | 4,067,916 | b |
Shi and Lin argue that these facts are insufficient evidence of permanent injury. We believe that the district court's application of the permanent bodily injury enhancement to these facts presents a predominantly factual issue, which we review for clear error. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "184 F.3d 685, 685",
"parenthetical": "applying de novo review to question whether welts fell within Guidelines' definition of bodily injury",
"sentence": "But see Pandiello, 184 F.3d at 685 (applying de novo review to question whether welts fell within Guidelines’ definition of bodily injury)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "167 F.3d 792, 798",
"parenthetical": "findings regarding permanent or life threatening injury reviewed for clear error",
"sentence": "See Gotti, 459 F.3d at 349 (citing United States v. Selioutsky, 409 F.3d 114, 118-19 (2d Cir.2005)); see also United States v. Baggett, 342 F.3d 536, 540 (6th Cir.2003) (reviewing finding of permanent or life-threatening bodily injury under clearly erroneous standard); United States v. Pandiello, 184 F.3d 682, 685 (7th Cir.1999) (conclusion that assailants inflicted bodily injury reviewed for clear error); United States v. Jacobs, 167 F.3d 792, 798 (3d Cir.1999) (findings regarding permanent or life threatening injury reviewed for clear error); United States v. Price, 149 F.3d 352, 353 (5th Cir.1998) (“severity of a victim’s injuries is a factual determination and thus reviewed for clear error,” construing permanent bodily injury)."
} | 4,067,916 | b |
Shi and Lin argue that these facts are insufficient evidence of permanent injury. We believe that the district court's application of the permanent bodily injury enhancement to these facts presents a predominantly factual issue, which we review for clear error. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": "184 F.3d 685, 685",
"parenthetical": "applying de novo review to question whether welts fell within Guidelines' definition of bodily injury",
"sentence": "But see Pandiello, 184 F.3d at 685 (applying de novo review to question whether welts fell within Guidelines’ definition of bodily injury)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "149 F.3d 352, 353",
"parenthetical": "\"severity of a victim's injuries is a factual determination and thus reviewed for clear error,\" construing permanent bodily injury",
"sentence": "See Gotti, 459 F.3d at 349 (citing United States v. Selioutsky, 409 F.3d 114, 118-19 (2d Cir.2005)); see also United States v. Baggett, 342 F.3d 536, 540 (6th Cir.2003) (reviewing finding of permanent or life-threatening bodily injury under clearly erroneous standard); United States v. Pandiello, 184 F.3d 682, 685 (7th Cir.1999) (conclusion that assailants inflicted bodily injury reviewed for clear error); United States v. Jacobs, 167 F.3d 792, 798 (3d Cir.1999) (findings regarding permanent or life threatening injury reviewed for clear error); United States v. Price, 149 F.3d 352, 353 (5th Cir.1998) (“severity of a victim’s injuries is a factual determination and thus reviewed for clear error,” construing permanent bodily injury)."
} | 4,067,916 | b |
We respectfully disagree; First, neither Return Mail nor the Postal Service discusses the significance, if any, of the word "person" as-used in SS 18(a)(1)(B). This issue is distinct - and independent from the dispute before us regarding the meaning of the phrase "sued for infringement." Return Mail's failure to develop any arguments on this issue would typically constitute waiver. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "439 F.3d 1319, 1319",
"parenthetical": "\"Our law is well established that arguments not raised in the opening brief are waived.\"",
"sentence": "See SmithKline Beecham, 439 F.3d at 1319 (“Our law is well established that arguments not raised in the opening brief are waived.”); see also Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1063, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“[F]ailure to raise a particular question of statutory construction before an agency constitutes waiver of the argument in court.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "25 F.3d 1063, 1074",
"parenthetical": "\"[F]ailure to raise a particular question of statutory construction before an agency constitutes waiver of the argument in court.\"",
"sentence": "See SmithKline Beecham, 439 F.3d at 1319 (“Our law is well established that arguments not raised in the opening brief are waived.”); see also Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1063, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“[F]ailure to raise a particular question of statutory construction before an agency constitutes waiver of the argument in court.”)."
} | 12,267,304 | a |
"Raw fish procured by processors are likely to have come into contact with the organism in the wild," Bierman concludes. L. monocytogenes is, thus, not an inherent natural constituent of fish but, rather, a bacterial organism present in the environment that comes into contact with, and contaminates, some fish. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "902 F.Supp. 778, 786",
"parenthetical": "finding L. monocytogenes not to be an inherent natural constituent of cheese but rather the result of environmental contamination",
"sentence": "See United States v. Union Cheese Co., 902 F.Supp. 778, 786 (N.D.Ohio 1995) (finding L. monocytogenes not to be an inherent natural constituent of cheese but rather the result of environmental contamination); cf. United States v. An Article of Food Consisting of Cartons of Swordfish, 395 F.Supp. 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding mercury to be an added substance because it does not occur naturally in swordfish)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding mercury to be an added substance because it does not occur naturally in swordfish",
"sentence": "See United States v. Union Cheese Co., 902 F.Supp. 778, 786 (N.D.Ohio 1995) (finding L. monocytogenes not to be an inherent natural constituent of cheese but rather the result of environmental contamination); cf. United States v. An Article of Food Consisting of Cartons of Swordfish, 395 F.Supp. 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding mercury to be an added substance because it does not occur naturally in swordfish)."
} | 9,449,720 | a |
Appellant argues that this factor should weigh in favor of EJJ because he was never offered formal programming and that the district court erred in considering informal programming in his home and school. However, we have consistently held that, in the consideration of this factor, the district court may evaluate the juvenile's willingness to cooperate with informal programming by considering his behavior in school, home, and juvenile detention and his affiliations with gangs. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "823 N.W.2d 676, 683",
"parenthetical": "holding that the juvenile's failure to go to school or participate in online schooling did not support a finding that he was willing to cooperate with juvenile programming",
"sentence": "See In re Welfare of P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d 676, 683 (Minn.App.2012), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2013) (holding that the juvenile’s failure to go to school or participate in online schooling did not support a finding that he was willing to cooperate with juvenile programming); see also In re Welfare of N.J.S., 753 N.W.2d 704, 711 (Minn.2008) (stating that consideration of pre-offense voluntary programming and “defiant and uncooperative behavior during [defendant’s] detention” relative to the “programming history” factor was not an abuse of discretion); In re Welfare of K.M., 544 N.W.2d 781, 785 (Minn.App.1996) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by considering juvenile’s failure to participate in school programs and affiliation with gangs under the programming history factor)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "753 N.W.2d 704, 711",
"parenthetical": "stating that consideration of pre-offense voluntary programming and \"defiant and uncooperative behavior during [defendant's] detention\" relative to the \"programming history\" factor was not an abuse of discretion",
"sentence": "See In re Welfare of P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d 676, 683 (Minn.App.2012), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2013) (holding that the juvenile’s failure to go to school or participate in online schooling did not support a finding that he was willing to cooperate with juvenile programming); see also In re Welfare of N.J.S., 753 N.W.2d 704, 711 (Minn.2008) (stating that consideration of pre-offense voluntary programming and “defiant and uncooperative behavior during [defendant’s] detention” relative to the “programming history” factor was not an abuse of discretion); In re Welfare of K.M., 544 N.W.2d 781, 785 (Minn.App.1996) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by considering juvenile’s failure to participate in school programs and affiliation with gangs under the programming history factor)."
} | 7,068,019 | a |
Appellant argues that this factor should weigh in favor of EJJ because he was never offered formal programming and that the district court erred in considering informal programming in his home and school. However, we have consistently held that, in the consideration of this factor, the district court may evaluate the juvenile's willingness to cooperate with informal programming by considering his behavior in school, home, and juvenile detention and his affiliations with gangs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "544 N.W.2d 781, 785",
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by considering juvenile's failure to participate in school programs and affiliation with gangs under the programming history factor",
"sentence": "See In re Welfare of P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d 676, 683 (Minn.App.2012), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2013) (holding that the juvenile’s failure to go to school or participate in online schooling did not support a finding that he was willing to cooperate with juvenile programming); see also In re Welfare of N.J.S., 753 N.W.2d 704, 711 (Minn.2008) (stating that consideration of pre-offense voluntary programming and “defiant and uncooperative behavior during [defendant’s] detention” relative to the “programming history” factor was not an abuse of discretion); In re Welfare of K.M., 544 N.W.2d 781, 785 (Minn.App.1996) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by considering juvenile’s failure to participate in school programs and affiliation with gangs under the programming history factor)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "823 N.W.2d 676, 683",
"parenthetical": "holding that the juvenile's failure to go to school or participate in online schooling did not support a finding that he was willing to cooperate with juvenile programming",
"sentence": "See In re Welfare of P.C.T., 823 N.W.2d 676, 683 (Minn.App.2012), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2013) (holding that the juvenile’s failure to go to school or participate in online schooling did not support a finding that he was willing to cooperate with juvenile programming); see also In re Welfare of N.J.S., 753 N.W.2d 704, 711 (Minn.2008) (stating that consideration of pre-offense voluntary programming and “defiant and uncooperative behavior during [defendant’s] detention” relative to the “programming history” factor was not an abuse of discretion); In re Welfare of K.M., 544 N.W.2d 781, 785 (Minn.App.1996) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by considering juvenile’s failure to participate in school programs and affiliation with gangs under the programming history factor)."
} | 7,068,019 | b |
Thus, in determining whether a claim sufficiently touches and concerns the territory of the United States to confer jurisdiction to U.S. courts, the citizenship or corporate status of the defendant is relevant. If the defendants are U.S. citizens, some of the foreign policy concerns that the presumption against extraterritorial application is intended to reduce may be assuaged or inapplicable, since we would not be haling foreign nationals into U.S. courts to defend themselves. Additionally, the acts of U.S. citizens may impact the United States, whether their actions occur extrat'erritorially or within the United States, particularly if those actions include international law violations. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "758 F.3d 530, 530-31",
"parenthetical": "considering \"the expressed intent of Congress ... to provide aliens access to United States courts and to hold citizens of the United States accountable for acts of torture committed abroad\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 530-31 (considering “the expressed intent of Congress ... to provide aliens access to United States courts and to hold citizens of the United States accountable for acts of torture committed abroad”); cf. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. 542 U.S. 155, 159, 165, 124 S.Ct. 2359, 2363, 2367, 159 L.Ed.2d 226 (2004) (noting that Congress may impose liability for extraterritorial conduct that has adverse effects within the United States and may do so with even “greater leeway when it seeks to control ... the actions of American companies”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "542 U.S. 155, 159, 165",
"parenthetical": "noting that Congress may impose liability for extraterritorial conduct that has adverse effects within the United States and may do so with even \"greater leeway when it seeks to control ... the actions of American companies\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 530-31 (considering “the expressed intent of Congress ... to provide aliens access to United States courts and to hold citizens of the United States accountable for acts of torture committed abroad”); cf. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. 542 U.S. 155, 159, 165, 124 S.Ct. 2359, 2363, 2367, 159 L.Ed.2d 226 (2004) (noting that Congress may impose liability for extraterritorial conduct that has adverse effects within the United States and may do so with even “greater leeway when it seeks to control ... the actions of American companies”)."
} | 6,053,664 | a |
Thus, in determining whether a claim sufficiently touches and concerns the territory of the United States to confer jurisdiction to U.S. courts, the citizenship or corporate status of the defendant is relevant. If the defendants are U.S. citizens, some of the foreign policy concerns that the presumption against extraterritorial application is intended to reduce may be assuaged or inapplicable, since we would not be haling foreign nationals into U.S. courts to defend themselves. Additionally, the acts of U.S. citizens may impact the United States, whether their actions occur extrat'erritorially or within the United States, particularly if those actions include international law violations. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "124 S.Ct. 2359, 2363, 2367",
"parenthetical": "noting that Congress may impose liability for extraterritorial conduct that has adverse effects within the United States and may do so with even \"greater leeway when it seeks to control ... the actions of American companies\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 530-31 (considering “the expressed intent of Congress ... to provide aliens access to United States courts and to hold citizens of the United States accountable for acts of torture committed abroad”); cf. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. 542 U.S. 155, 159, 165, 124 S.Ct. 2359, 2363, 2367, 159 L.Ed.2d 226 (2004) (noting that Congress may impose liability for extraterritorial conduct that has adverse effects within the United States and may do so with even “greater leeway when it seeks to control ... the actions of American companies”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "758 F.3d 530, 530-31",
"parenthetical": "considering \"the expressed intent of Congress ... to provide aliens access to United States courts and to hold citizens of the United States accountable for acts of torture committed abroad\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 530-31 (considering “the expressed intent of Congress ... to provide aliens access to United States courts and to hold citizens of the United States accountable for acts of torture committed abroad”); cf. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. 542 U.S. 155, 159, 165, 124 S.Ct. 2359, 2363, 2367, 159 L.Ed.2d 226 (2004) (noting that Congress may impose liability for extraterritorial conduct that has adverse effects within the United States and may do so with even “greater leeway when it seeks to control ... the actions of American companies”)."
} | 6,053,664 | b |
Thus, in determining whether a claim sufficiently touches and concerns the territory of the United States to confer jurisdiction to U.S. courts, the citizenship or corporate status of the defendant is relevant. If the defendants are U.S. citizens, some of the foreign policy concerns that the presumption against extraterritorial application is intended to reduce may be assuaged or inapplicable, since we would not be haling foreign nationals into U.S. courts to defend themselves. Additionally, the acts of U.S. citizens may impact the United States, whether their actions occur extrat'erritorially or within the United States, particularly if those actions include international law violations. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "noting that Congress may impose liability for extraterritorial conduct that has adverse effects within the United States and may do so with even \"greater leeway when it seeks to control ... the actions of American companies\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 530-31 (considering “the expressed intent of Congress ... to provide aliens access to United States courts and to hold citizens of the United States accountable for acts of torture committed abroad”); cf. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. 542 U.S. 155, 159, 165, 124 S.Ct. 2359, 2363, 2367, 159 L.Ed.2d 226 (2004) (noting that Congress may impose liability for extraterritorial conduct that has adverse effects within the United States and may do so with even “greater leeway when it seeks to control ... the actions of American companies”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "758 F.3d 530, 530-31",
"parenthetical": "considering \"the expressed intent of Congress ... to provide aliens access to United States courts and to hold citizens of the United States accountable for acts of torture committed abroad\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 530-31 (considering “the expressed intent of Congress ... to provide aliens access to United States courts and to hold citizens of the United States accountable for acts of torture committed abroad”); cf. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. 542 U.S. 155, 159, 165, 124 S.Ct. 2359, 2363, 2367, 159 L.Ed.2d 226 (2004) (noting that Congress may impose liability for extraterritorial conduct that has adverse effects within the United States and may do so with even “greater leeway when it seeks to control ... the actions of American companies”)."
} | 6,053,664 | b |
First, when did the movant become aware of the issue in dispute? Second, was the movant diligent in attempting to resolve the dispute and/or in bringing that dispute to the Court's attention as soon as practicable? Third, was the movant otherwise at fault for creating the crisis situation? When an attorney knows of the existence of a dispute and unreasonably delays in bringing that dispute to the Court's attention until the eleventh hour, the attorney has created the emergency situation and the request for relief may be denied outright. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "2011 WL 4905639, *1",
"parenthetical": "overruling objections to magistrate judge order finding an emergency motion to quash subpoena was untimely when three-weeks' notice was provided for a deposition but the motion to quash was filed only three days before the deposition",
"sentence": "See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Nassiri, 2011 WL 4905639, *1 (D.Nev. Oct. 14, 2011) (overruling objections to magistrate judge order finding an emergency motion to quash subpoena was untimely when three-weeks’ notice was provided for a deposition but the motion to quash was filed only three days before the deposition); see also Painter, 2014 WL 6871750, at *1 (requiring parties to comply with the deadline to file pretrial order where emergency motion was filed two business days before deadline because the movant’s attorney waited roughly 30 days to file the motion)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2014 WL 6871750, at *1",
"parenthetical": "requiring parties to comply with the deadline to file pretrial order where emergency motion was filed two business days before deadline because the movant's attorney waited roughly 30 days to file the motion",
"sentence": "See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Nassiri, 2011 WL 4905639, *1 (D.Nev. Oct. 14, 2011) (overruling objections to magistrate judge order finding an emergency motion to quash subpoena was untimely when three-weeks’ notice was provided for a deposition but the motion to quash was filed only three days before the deposition); see also Painter, 2014 WL 6871750, at *1 (requiring parties to comply with the deadline to file pretrial order where emergency motion was filed two business days before deadline because the movant’s attorney waited roughly 30 days to file the motion)."
} | 4,225,769 | a |
However, other factors may motivate or contribute to an accused's decision to attempt suicide. Instead of seeking to avoid punishment, a defendant who attempts suicide may, for reasons unrelated to the crime charged, choose to inflict upon himself or herself a punishment more severe than that following a conviction of the charge. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding error in exclusion of testimony that offered alternative basis for defendant's attempted suicide",
"sentence": "State v. Coudette, 7 N.D. 109, 72 N. W. 913, 915 (1897) (rejecting evidence of attempted suicide as corroboration of accomplice testimony based on likelihood that Sioux Indian would commit suicide when incarcerated to avoid confinement regardless of guilt); see also People v. Carter, 48 Cal.2d 737, 312 P.2d 665, 671 (1957) (finding error in exclusion of testimony that offered alternative basis for defendant’s attempted suicide); Meggison v. State, 540 So.2d 258, 259 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (holding that admitting evidence of attempted suicide was error when defendant had already pled guilty and attempt was not probative of guilt)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting evidence of attempted suicide as corroboration of accomplice testimony based on likelihood that Sioux Indian would commit suicide when incarcerated to avoid confinement regardless of guilt",
"sentence": "State v. Coudette, 7 N.D. 109, 72 N. W. 913, 915 (1897) (rejecting evidence of attempted suicide as corroboration of accomplice testimony based on likelihood that Sioux Indian would commit suicide when incarcerated to avoid confinement regardless of guilt); see also People v. Carter, 48 Cal.2d 737, 312 P.2d 665, 671 (1957) (finding error in exclusion of testimony that offered alternative basis for defendant’s attempted suicide); Meggison v. State, 540 So.2d 258, 259 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (holding that admitting evidence of attempted suicide was error when defendant had already pled guilty and attempt was not probative of guilt)."
} | 710,777 | b |
However, other factors may motivate or contribute to an accused's decision to attempt suicide. Instead of seeking to avoid punishment, a defendant who attempts suicide may, for reasons unrelated to the crime charged, choose to inflict upon himself or herself a punishment more severe than that following a conviction of the charge. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting evidence of attempted suicide as corroboration of accomplice testimony based on likelihood that Sioux Indian would commit suicide when incarcerated to avoid confinement regardless of guilt",
"sentence": "State v. Coudette, 7 N.D. 109, 72 N. W. 913, 915 (1897) (rejecting evidence of attempted suicide as corroboration of accomplice testimony based on likelihood that Sioux Indian would commit suicide when incarcerated to avoid confinement regardless of guilt); see also People v. Carter, 48 Cal.2d 737, 312 P.2d 665, 671 (1957) (finding error in exclusion of testimony that offered alternative basis for defendant’s attempted suicide); Meggison v. State, 540 So.2d 258, 259 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (holding that admitting evidence of attempted suicide was error when defendant had already pled guilty and attempt was not probative of guilt)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "312 P.2d 665, 671",
"parenthetical": "finding error in exclusion of testimony that offered alternative basis for defendant's attempted suicide",
"sentence": "State v. Coudette, 7 N.D. 109, 72 N. W. 913, 915 (1897) (rejecting evidence of attempted suicide as corroboration of accomplice testimony based on likelihood that Sioux Indian would commit suicide when incarcerated to avoid confinement regardless of guilt); see also People v. Carter, 48 Cal.2d 737, 312 P.2d 665, 671 (1957) (finding error in exclusion of testimony that offered alternative basis for defendant’s attempted suicide); Meggison v. State, 540 So.2d 258, 259 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (holding that admitting evidence of attempted suicide was error when defendant had already pled guilty and attempt was not probative of guilt)."
} | 710,777 | a |
However, other factors may motivate or contribute to an accused's decision to attempt suicide. Instead of seeking to avoid punishment, a defendant who attempts suicide may, for reasons unrelated to the crime charged, choose to inflict upon himself or herself a punishment more severe than that following a conviction of the charge. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "rejecting evidence of attempted suicide as corroboration of accomplice testimony based on likelihood that Sioux Indian would commit suicide when incarcerated to avoid confinement regardless of guilt",
"sentence": "State v. Coudette, 7 N.D. 109, 72 N. W. 913, 915 (1897) (rejecting evidence of attempted suicide as corroboration of accomplice testimony based on likelihood that Sioux Indian would commit suicide when incarcerated to avoid confinement regardless of guilt); see also People v. Carter, 48 Cal.2d 737, 312 P.2d 665, 671 (1957) (finding error in exclusion of testimony that offered alternative basis for defendant’s attempted suicide); Meggison v. State, 540 So.2d 258, 259 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (holding that admitting evidence of attempted suicide was error when defendant had already pled guilty and attempt was not probative of guilt)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "540 So.2d 258, 259",
"parenthetical": "holding that admitting evidence of attempted suicide was error when defendant had already pled guilty and attempt was not probative of guilt",
"sentence": "State v. Coudette, 7 N.D. 109, 72 N. W. 913, 915 (1897) (rejecting evidence of attempted suicide as corroboration of accomplice testimony based on likelihood that Sioux Indian would commit suicide when incarcerated to avoid confinement regardless of guilt); see also People v. Carter, 48 Cal.2d 737, 312 P.2d 665, 671 (1957) (finding error in exclusion of testimony that offered alternative basis for defendant’s attempted suicide); Meggison v. State, 540 So.2d 258, 259 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (holding that admitting evidence of attempted suicide was error when defendant had already pled guilty and attempt was not probative of guilt)."
} | 710,777 | a |
However, other factors may motivate or contribute to an accused's decision to attempt suicide. Instead of seeking to avoid punishment, a defendant who attempts suicide may, for reasons unrelated to the crime charged, choose to inflict upon himself or herself a punishment more severe than that following a conviction of the charge. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding error in exclusion of testimony that offered alternative basis for defendant's attempted suicide",
"sentence": "State v. Coudette, 7 N.D. 109, 72 N. W. 913, 915 (1897) (rejecting evidence of attempted suicide as corroboration of accomplice testimony based on likelihood that Sioux Indian would commit suicide when incarcerated to avoid confinement regardless of guilt); see also People v. Carter, 48 Cal.2d 737, 312 P.2d 665, 671 (1957) (finding error in exclusion of testimony that offered alternative basis for defendant’s attempted suicide); Meggison v. State, 540 So.2d 258, 259 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (holding that admitting evidence of attempted suicide was error when defendant had already pled guilty and attempt was not probative of guilt)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "72 N. W. 913, 915",
"parenthetical": "rejecting evidence of attempted suicide as corroboration of accomplice testimony based on likelihood that Sioux Indian would commit suicide when incarcerated to avoid confinement regardless of guilt",
"sentence": "State v. Coudette, 7 N.D. 109, 72 N. W. 913, 915 (1897) (rejecting evidence of attempted suicide as corroboration of accomplice testimony based on likelihood that Sioux Indian would commit suicide when incarcerated to avoid confinement regardless of guilt); see also People v. Carter, 48 Cal.2d 737, 312 P.2d 665, 671 (1957) (finding error in exclusion of testimony that offered alternative basis for defendant’s attempted suicide); Meggison v. State, 540 So.2d 258, 259 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (holding that admitting evidence of attempted suicide was error when defendant had already pled guilty and attempt was not probative of guilt)."
} | 710,777 | b |
However, other factors may motivate or contribute to an accused's decision to attempt suicide. Instead of seeking to avoid punishment, a defendant who attempts suicide may, for reasons unrelated to the crime charged, choose to inflict upon himself or herself a punishment more severe than that following a conviction of the charge. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "312 P.2d 665, 671",
"parenthetical": "finding error in exclusion of testimony that offered alternative basis for defendant's attempted suicide",
"sentence": "State v. Coudette, 7 N.D. 109, 72 N. W. 913, 915 (1897) (rejecting evidence of attempted suicide as corroboration of accomplice testimony based on likelihood that Sioux Indian would commit suicide when incarcerated to avoid confinement regardless of guilt); see also People v. Carter, 48 Cal.2d 737, 312 P.2d 665, 671 (1957) (finding error in exclusion of testimony that offered alternative basis for defendant’s attempted suicide); Meggison v. State, 540 So.2d 258, 259 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (holding that admitting evidence of attempted suicide was error when defendant had already pled guilty and attempt was not probative of guilt)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "72 N. W. 913, 915",
"parenthetical": "rejecting evidence of attempted suicide as corroboration of accomplice testimony based on likelihood that Sioux Indian would commit suicide when incarcerated to avoid confinement regardless of guilt",
"sentence": "State v. Coudette, 7 N.D. 109, 72 N. W. 913, 915 (1897) (rejecting evidence of attempted suicide as corroboration of accomplice testimony based on likelihood that Sioux Indian would commit suicide when incarcerated to avoid confinement regardless of guilt); see also People v. Carter, 48 Cal.2d 737, 312 P.2d 665, 671 (1957) (finding error in exclusion of testimony that offered alternative basis for defendant’s attempted suicide); Meggison v. State, 540 So.2d 258, 259 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (holding that admitting evidence of attempted suicide was error when defendant had already pled guilty and attempt was not probative of guilt)."
} | 710,777 | b |
However, other factors may motivate or contribute to an accused's decision to attempt suicide. Instead of seeking to avoid punishment, a defendant who attempts suicide may, for reasons unrelated to the crime charged, choose to inflict upon himself or herself a punishment more severe than that following a conviction of the charge. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "72 N. W. 913, 915",
"parenthetical": "rejecting evidence of attempted suicide as corroboration of accomplice testimony based on likelihood that Sioux Indian would commit suicide when incarcerated to avoid confinement regardless of guilt",
"sentence": "State v. Coudette, 7 N.D. 109, 72 N. W. 913, 915 (1897) (rejecting evidence of attempted suicide as corroboration of accomplice testimony based on likelihood that Sioux Indian would commit suicide when incarcerated to avoid confinement regardless of guilt); see also People v. Carter, 48 Cal.2d 737, 312 P.2d 665, 671 (1957) (finding error in exclusion of testimony that offered alternative basis for defendant’s attempted suicide); Meggison v. State, 540 So.2d 258, 259 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (holding that admitting evidence of attempted suicide was error when defendant had already pled guilty and attempt was not probative of guilt)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "540 So.2d 258, 259",
"parenthetical": "holding that admitting evidence of attempted suicide was error when defendant had already pled guilty and attempt was not probative of guilt",
"sentence": "State v. Coudette, 7 N.D. 109, 72 N. W. 913, 915 (1897) (rejecting evidence of attempted suicide as corroboration of accomplice testimony based on likelihood that Sioux Indian would commit suicide when incarcerated to avoid confinement regardless of guilt); see also People v. Carter, 48 Cal.2d 737, 312 P.2d 665, 671 (1957) (finding error in exclusion of testimony that offered alternative basis for defendant’s attempted suicide); Meggison v. State, 540 So.2d 258, 259 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (holding that admitting evidence of attempted suicide was error when defendant had already pled guilty and attempt was not probative of guilt)."
} | 710,777 | a |
Section 500 differs in this respect from legislation that specifically provides for payments to school districts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "81 Wash.2d 82, 86",
"parenthetical": "distinguishing impact aid cases and upholding Washington's scheme for distributing SS 500 funds against challenge by school districts",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Shepheard v. Godwin, 280 F.Supp. 869 (E.D.Va.1968) (construing Federal Impact Aid Act, now codified at 20 U.S.C. § 7703, (West.2001), which pays funds directly to school districts burdened by the federal government’s acquisition of property within the district); cf. Carroll v. Bruno, 81 Wash.2d 82, 86, 499 P.2d 876 (1972) (distinguishing impact aid cases and upholding Washington’s scheme for distributing § 500 funds against challenge by school districts)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "construing Federal Impact Aid Act, now codified at 20 U.S.C. SS 7703, (West.2001",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Shepheard v. Godwin, 280 F.Supp. 869 (E.D.Va.1968) (construing Federal Impact Aid Act, now codified at 20 U.S.C. § 7703, (West.2001), which pays funds directly to school districts burdened by the federal government’s acquisition of property within the district); cf. Carroll v. Bruno, 81 Wash.2d 82, 86, 499 P.2d 876 (1972) (distinguishing impact aid cases and upholding Washington’s scheme for distributing § 500 funds against challenge by school districts)."
} | 9,434,548 | b |
Section 500 differs in this respect from legislation that specifically provides for payments to school districts. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "distinguishing impact aid cases and upholding Washington's scheme for distributing SS 500 funds against challenge by school districts",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Shepheard v. Godwin, 280 F.Supp. 869 (E.D.Va.1968) (construing Federal Impact Aid Act, now codified at 20 U.S.C. § 7703, (West.2001), which pays funds directly to school districts burdened by the federal government’s acquisition of property within the district); cf. Carroll v. Bruno, 81 Wash.2d 82, 86, 499 P.2d 876 (1972) (distinguishing impact aid cases and upholding Washington’s scheme for distributing § 500 funds against challenge by school districts)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "construing Federal Impact Aid Act, now codified at 20 U.S.C. SS 7703, (West.2001",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Shepheard v. Godwin, 280 F.Supp. 869 (E.D.Va.1968) (construing Federal Impact Aid Act, now codified at 20 U.S.C. § 7703, (West.2001), which pays funds directly to school districts burdened by the federal government’s acquisition of property within the district); cf. Carroll v. Bruno, 81 Wash.2d 82, 86, 499 P.2d 876 (1972) (distinguishing impact aid cases and upholding Washington’s scheme for distributing § 500 funds against challenge by school districts)."
} | 9,434,548 | b |
Courts from other jurisdictions that apply a domicile test have concluded that the act of registering to vote or voting in a new district results in the loss of residence in a district where the voter previously resided. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "finding that three brothers were not residents of the county where their family ranch was located because, although they visited the ranch regularly and kept personal items there, they had moved outside the county and voted at those locations",
"sentence": "See Klumker v. Van Allred, 112 N.M. 42, 811 P.2d 75, 78-79 (1991) (finding that three brothers were not residents of the county where their family ranch was located because, although they visited the ranch regularly and kept personal items there, they had moved outside the county and voted at those locations); Kauzlarich v. Bd. of Trs., 78 Ariz. 267, 278 P.2d 888, 891 (1955) (husband and wife were not residents of a county for voting purposes even though they purchased property there, moved a house and some personal property onto the premises, and went there each weekend to work on the property with the intention of moving there because they were still living outside the county, where they had registered to vote and voted); see also Del Rio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldrete, 398 S.W.2d 597, 603 (Tex.Civ.App.1966) (noting that the place where a person votes is evidence of whether that person’s actions corroborate his stated intention to change his residence for voting purposes)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "398 S.W.2d 597, 603",
"parenthetical": "noting that the place where a person votes is evidence of whether that person's actions corroborate his stated intention to change his residence for voting purposes",
"sentence": "See Klumker v. Van Allred, 112 N.M. 42, 811 P.2d 75, 78-79 (1991) (finding that three brothers were not residents of the county where their family ranch was located because, although they visited the ranch regularly and kept personal items there, they had moved outside the county and voted at those locations); Kauzlarich v. Bd. of Trs., 78 Ariz. 267, 278 P.2d 888, 891 (1955) (husband and wife were not residents of a county for voting purposes even though they purchased property there, moved a house and some personal property onto the premises, and went there each weekend to work on the property with the intention of moving there because they were still living outside the county, where they had registered to vote and voted); see also Del Rio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldrete, 398 S.W.2d 597, 603 (Tex.Civ.App.1966) (noting that the place where a person votes is evidence of whether that person’s actions corroborate his stated intention to change his residence for voting purposes)."
} | 12,313,880 | a |
Courts from other jurisdictions that apply a domicile test have concluded that the act of registering to vote or voting in a new district results in the loss of residence in a district where the voter previously resided. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "811 P.2d 75, 78-79",
"parenthetical": "finding that three brothers were not residents of the county where their family ranch was located because, although they visited the ranch regularly and kept personal items there, they had moved outside the county and voted at those locations",
"sentence": "See Klumker v. Van Allred, 112 N.M. 42, 811 P.2d 75, 78-79 (1991) (finding that three brothers were not residents of the county where their family ranch was located because, although they visited the ranch regularly and kept personal items there, they had moved outside the county and voted at those locations); Kauzlarich v. Bd. of Trs., 78 Ariz. 267, 278 P.2d 888, 891 (1955) (husband and wife were not residents of a county for voting purposes even though they purchased property there, moved a house and some personal property onto the premises, and went there each weekend to work on the property with the intention of moving there because they were still living outside the county, where they had registered to vote and voted); see also Del Rio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldrete, 398 S.W.2d 597, 603 (Tex.Civ.App.1966) (noting that the place where a person votes is evidence of whether that person’s actions corroborate his stated intention to change his residence for voting purposes)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "398 S.W.2d 597, 603",
"parenthetical": "noting that the place where a person votes is evidence of whether that person's actions corroborate his stated intention to change his residence for voting purposes",
"sentence": "See Klumker v. Van Allred, 112 N.M. 42, 811 P.2d 75, 78-79 (1991) (finding that three brothers were not residents of the county where their family ranch was located because, although they visited the ranch regularly and kept personal items there, they had moved outside the county and voted at those locations); Kauzlarich v. Bd. of Trs., 78 Ariz. 267, 278 P.2d 888, 891 (1955) (husband and wife were not residents of a county for voting purposes even though they purchased property there, moved a house and some personal property onto the premises, and went there each weekend to work on the property with the intention of moving there because they were still living outside the county, where they had registered to vote and voted); see also Del Rio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldrete, 398 S.W.2d 597, 603 (Tex.Civ.App.1966) (noting that the place where a person votes is evidence of whether that person’s actions corroborate his stated intention to change his residence for voting purposes)."
} | 12,313,880 | a |
Courts from other jurisdictions that apply a domicile test have concluded that the act of registering to vote or voting in a new district results in the loss of residence in a district where the voter previously resided. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "husband and wife were not residents of a county for voting purposes even though they purchased property there, moved a house and some personal property onto the premises, and went there each weekend to work on the property with the intention of moving there because they were still living outside the county, where they had registered to vote and voted",
"sentence": "See Klumker v. Van Allred, 112 N.M. 42, 811 P.2d 75, 78-79 (1991) (finding that three brothers were not residents of the county where their family ranch was located because, although they visited the ranch regularly and kept personal items there, they had moved outside the county and voted at those locations); Kauzlarich v. Bd. of Trs., 78 Ariz. 267, 278 P.2d 888, 891 (1955) (husband and wife were not residents of a county for voting purposes even though they purchased property there, moved a house and some personal property onto the premises, and went there each weekend to work on the property with the intention of moving there because they were still living outside the county, where they had registered to vote and voted); see also Del Rio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldrete, 398 S.W.2d 597, 603 (Tex.Civ.App.1966) (noting that the place where a person votes is evidence of whether that person’s actions corroborate his stated intention to change his residence for voting purposes)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "398 S.W.2d 597, 603",
"parenthetical": "noting that the place where a person votes is evidence of whether that person's actions corroborate his stated intention to change his residence for voting purposes",
"sentence": "See Klumker v. Van Allred, 112 N.M. 42, 811 P.2d 75, 78-79 (1991) (finding that three brothers were not residents of the county where their family ranch was located because, although they visited the ranch regularly and kept personal items there, they had moved outside the county and voted at those locations); Kauzlarich v. Bd. of Trs., 78 Ariz. 267, 278 P.2d 888, 891 (1955) (husband and wife were not residents of a county for voting purposes even though they purchased property there, moved a house and some personal property onto the premises, and went there each weekend to work on the property with the intention of moving there because they were still living outside the county, where they had registered to vote and voted); see also Del Rio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldrete, 398 S.W.2d 597, 603 (Tex.Civ.App.1966) (noting that the place where a person votes is evidence of whether that person’s actions corroborate his stated intention to change his residence for voting purposes)."
} | 12,313,880 | a |
Courts from other jurisdictions that apply a domicile test have concluded that the act of registering to vote or voting in a new district results in the loss of residence in a district where the voter previously resided. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "278 P.2d 888, 891",
"parenthetical": "husband and wife were not residents of a county for voting purposes even though they purchased property there, moved a house and some personal property onto the premises, and went there each weekend to work on the property with the intention of moving there because they were still living outside the county, where they had registered to vote and voted",
"sentence": "See Klumker v. Van Allred, 112 N.M. 42, 811 P.2d 75, 78-79 (1991) (finding that three brothers were not residents of the county where their family ranch was located because, although they visited the ranch regularly and kept personal items there, they had moved outside the county and voted at those locations); Kauzlarich v. Bd. of Trs., 78 Ariz. 267, 278 P.2d 888, 891 (1955) (husband and wife were not residents of a county for voting purposes even though they purchased property there, moved a house and some personal property onto the premises, and went there each weekend to work on the property with the intention of moving there because they were still living outside the county, where they had registered to vote and voted); see also Del Rio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldrete, 398 S.W.2d 597, 603 (Tex.Civ.App.1966) (noting that the place where a person votes is evidence of whether that person’s actions corroborate his stated intention to change his residence for voting purposes)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "398 S.W.2d 597, 603",
"parenthetical": "noting that the place where a person votes is evidence of whether that person's actions corroborate his stated intention to change his residence for voting purposes",
"sentence": "See Klumker v. Van Allred, 112 N.M. 42, 811 P.2d 75, 78-79 (1991) (finding that three brothers were not residents of the county where their family ranch was located because, although they visited the ranch regularly and kept personal items there, they had moved outside the county and voted at those locations); Kauzlarich v. Bd. of Trs., 78 Ariz. 267, 278 P.2d 888, 891 (1955) (husband and wife were not residents of a county for voting purposes even though they purchased property there, moved a house and some personal property onto the premises, and went there each weekend to work on the property with the intention of moving there because they were still living outside the county, where they had registered to vote and voted); see also Del Rio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldrete, 398 S.W.2d 597, 603 (Tex.Civ.App.1966) (noting that the place where a person votes is evidence of whether that person’s actions corroborate his stated intention to change his residence for voting purposes)."
} | 12,313,880 | a |
At oral arguments, Birth's appellate counsel conceded that Birth had not presented this argument to the trial court. Birth cannot prevail by raising on appeal reasons for suppressing evidence that were not presented to the trial court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "280 Kan. 931, 932",
"parenthetical": "defendant precluded from raising on appeal points not presented to trial court",
"sentence": "See State v. Mack, 255 Kan. 21, 27-28, 871 P.2d 1265 (1994) (determining that defendant could not prevail by presenting on appeal reasons for suppressing identification that were never presented to trial court); see also State v. Rojas, 280 Kan. 931, 932, 127 P.3d 247 (2006) (defendant precluded from raising on appeal points not presented to trial court)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "255 Kan. 21, 27-28",
"parenthetical": "determining that defendant could not prevail by presenting on appeal reasons for suppressing identification that were never presented to trial court",
"sentence": "See State v. Mack, 255 Kan. 21, 27-28, 871 P.2d 1265 (1994) (determining that defendant could not prevail by presenting on appeal reasons for suppressing identification that were never presented to trial court); see also State v. Rojas, 280 Kan. 931, 932, 127 P.3d 247 (2006) (defendant precluded from raising on appeal points not presented to trial court)."
} | 3,675,898 | b |
At oral arguments, Birth's appellate counsel conceded that Birth had not presented this argument to the trial court. Birth cannot prevail by raising on appeal reasons for suppressing evidence that were not presented to the trial court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "255 Kan. 21, 27-28",
"parenthetical": "determining that defendant could not prevail by presenting on appeal reasons for suppressing identification that were never presented to trial court",
"sentence": "See State v. Mack, 255 Kan. 21, 27-28, 871 P.2d 1265 (1994) (determining that defendant could not prevail by presenting on appeal reasons for suppressing identification that were never presented to trial court); see also State v. Rojas, 280 Kan. 931, 932, 127 P.3d 247 (2006) (defendant precluded from raising on appeal points not presented to trial court)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant precluded from raising on appeal points not presented to trial court",
"sentence": "See State v. Mack, 255 Kan. 21, 27-28, 871 P.2d 1265 (1994) (determining that defendant could not prevail by presenting on appeal reasons for suppressing identification that were never presented to trial court); see also State v. Rojas, 280 Kan. 931, 932, 127 P.3d 247 (2006) (defendant precluded from raising on appeal points not presented to trial court)."
} | 3,675,898 | a |
At oral arguments, Birth's appellate counsel conceded that Birth had not presented this argument to the trial court. Birth cannot prevail by raising on appeal reasons for suppressing evidence that were not presented to the trial court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "determining that defendant could not prevail by presenting on appeal reasons for suppressing identification that were never presented to trial court",
"sentence": "See State v. Mack, 255 Kan. 21, 27-28, 871 P.2d 1265 (1994) (determining that defendant could not prevail by presenting on appeal reasons for suppressing identification that were never presented to trial court); see also State v. Rojas, 280 Kan. 931, 932, 127 P.3d 247 (2006) (defendant precluded from raising on appeal points not presented to trial court)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "280 Kan. 931, 932",
"parenthetical": "defendant precluded from raising on appeal points not presented to trial court",
"sentence": "See State v. Mack, 255 Kan. 21, 27-28, 871 P.2d 1265 (1994) (determining that defendant could not prevail by presenting on appeal reasons for suppressing identification that were never presented to trial court); see also State v. Rojas, 280 Kan. 931, 932, 127 P.3d 247 (2006) (defendant precluded from raising on appeal points not presented to trial court)."
} | 3,675,898 | a |
At oral arguments, Birth's appellate counsel conceded that Birth had not presented this argument to the trial court. Birth cannot prevail by raising on appeal reasons for suppressing evidence that were not presented to the trial court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "determining that defendant could not prevail by presenting on appeal reasons for suppressing identification that were never presented to trial court",
"sentence": "See State v. Mack, 255 Kan. 21, 27-28, 871 P.2d 1265 (1994) (determining that defendant could not prevail by presenting on appeal reasons for suppressing identification that were never presented to trial court); see also State v. Rojas, 280 Kan. 931, 932, 127 P.3d 247 (2006) (defendant precluded from raising on appeal points not presented to trial court)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant precluded from raising on appeal points not presented to trial court",
"sentence": "See State v. Mack, 255 Kan. 21, 27-28, 871 P.2d 1265 (1994) (determining that defendant could not prevail by presenting on appeal reasons for suppressing identification that were never presented to trial court); see also State v. Rojas, 280 Kan. 931, 932, 127 P.3d 247 (2006) (defendant precluded from raising on appeal points not presented to trial court)."
} | 3,675,898 | a |
While the public certainly has an interest in a competent prosecution of a criminal case, we hold that a mistrial is not manifestly necessary when the trial court believes, as it did in the present case that the prosecutor is "shooting [himself] in the foot with the jury." Clearly, if the Commonwealth makes mistakes which damage its prosecution, it is not entitled to a second bite at the apple due to its poor performance. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "83 S.Ct. 1035, 1035-1036",
"parenthetical": "trial of defendant by a second jury, after the jury first empanelled had been sworn and discharged because a prosecution witness had not been served a summons and because no other arrangements had been made to ensure the witness' presence violated the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Downum v. United States, 83 S.Ct. at 1035-1036, 372 U.S. at 737-738 (trial of defendant by a second jury, after the jury first empanelled had been sworn and discharged because a prosecution witness had not been served a summons and because no other arrangements had been made to ensure the witness’ presence violated the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy); cf., Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. at 369, 81 S.Ct. at 1526-1527 (double jeopardy protections prohibit a judge from exercising his authority to grant a mistrial at a trial which is going badly for the prosecution to afford the state another more favorable opportunity to convict the accused)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "367 U.S. 369, 369",
"parenthetical": "double jeopardy protections prohibit a judge from exercising his authority to grant a mistrial at a trial which is going badly for the prosecution to afford the state another more favorable opportunity to convict the accused",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Downum v. United States, 83 S.Ct. at 1035-1036, 372 U.S. at 737-738 (trial of defendant by a second jury, after the jury first empanelled had been sworn and discharged because a prosecution witness had not been served a summons and because no other arrangements had been made to ensure the witness’ presence violated the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy); cf., Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. at 369, 81 S.Ct. at 1526-1527 (double jeopardy protections prohibit a judge from exercising his authority to grant a mistrial at a trial which is going badly for the prosecution to afford the state another more favorable opportunity to convict the accused)."
} | 9,435,391 | a |
While the public certainly has an interest in a competent prosecution of a criminal case, we hold that a mistrial is not manifestly necessary when the trial court believes, as it did in the present case that the prosecutor is "shooting [himself] in the foot with the jury." Clearly, if the Commonwealth makes mistakes which damage its prosecution, it is not entitled to a second bite at the apple due to its poor performance. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "81 S.Ct. 1526, 1526-1527",
"parenthetical": "double jeopardy protections prohibit a judge from exercising his authority to grant a mistrial at a trial which is going badly for the prosecution to afford the state another more favorable opportunity to convict the accused",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Downum v. United States, 83 S.Ct. at 1035-1036, 372 U.S. at 737-738 (trial of defendant by a second jury, after the jury first empanelled had been sworn and discharged because a prosecution witness had not been served a summons and because no other arrangements had been made to ensure the witness’ presence violated the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy); cf., Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. at 369, 81 S.Ct. at 1526-1527 (double jeopardy protections prohibit a judge from exercising his authority to grant a mistrial at a trial which is going badly for the prosecution to afford the state another more favorable opportunity to convict the accused)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "83 S.Ct. 1035, 1035-1036",
"parenthetical": "trial of defendant by a second jury, after the jury first empanelled had been sworn and discharged because a prosecution witness had not been served a summons and because no other arrangements had been made to ensure the witness' presence violated the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Downum v. United States, 83 S.Ct. at 1035-1036, 372 U.S. at 737-738 (trial of defendant by a second jury, after the jury first empanelled had been sworn and discharged because a prosecution witness had not been served a summons and because no other arrangements had been made to ensure the witness’ presence violated the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy); cf., Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. at 369, 81 S.Ct. at 1526-1527 (double jeopardy protections prohibit a judge from exercising his authority to grant a mistrial at a trial which is going badly for the prosecution to afford the state another more favorable opportunity to convict the accused)."
} | 9,435,391 | b |
While the public certainly has an interest in a competent prosecution of a criminal case, we hold that a mistrial is not manifestly necessary when the trial court believes, as it did in the present case that the prosecutor is "shooting [himself] in the foot with the jury." Clearly, if the Commonwealth makes mistakes which damage its prosecution, it is not entitled to a second bite at the apple due to its poor performance. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "367 U.S. 369, 369",
"parenthetical": "double jeopardy protections prohibit a judge from exercising his authority to grant a mistrial at a trial which is going badly for the prosecution to afford the state another more favorable opportunity to convict the accused",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Downum v. United States, 83 S.Ct. at 1035-1036, 372 U.S. at 737-738 (trial of defendant by a second jury, after the jury first empanelled had been sworn and discharged because a prosecution witness had not been served a summons and because no other arrangements had been made to ensure the witness’ presence violated the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy); cf., Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. at 369, 81 S.Ct. at 1526-1527 (double jeopardy protections prohibit a judge from exercising his authority to grant a mistrial at a trial which is going badly for the prosecution to afford the state another more favorable opportunity to convict the accused)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "372 U.S. 737, 737-738",
"parenthetical": "trial of defendant by a second jury, after the jury first empanelled had been sworn and discharged because a prosecution witness had not been served a summons and because no other arrangements had been made to ensure the witness' presence violated the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Downum v. United States, 83 S.Ct. at 1035-1036, 372 U.S. at 737-738 (trial of defendant by a second jury, after the jury first empanelled had been sworn and discharged because a prosecution witness had not been served a summons and because no other arrangements had been made to ensure the witness’ presence violated the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy); cf., Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. at 369, 81 S.Ct. at 1526-1527 (double jeopardy protections prohibit a judge from exercising his authority to grant a mistrial at a trial which is going badly for the prosecution to afford the state another more favorable opportunity to convict the accused)."
} | 9,435,391 | b |
While the public certainly has an interest in a competent prosecution of a criminal case, we hold that a mistrial is not manifestly necessary when the trial court believes, as it did in the present case that the prosecutor is "shooting [himself] in the foot with the jury." Clearly, if the Commonwealth makes mistakes which damage its prosecution, it is not entitled to a second bite at the apple due to its poor performance. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "372 U.S. 737, 737-738",
"parenthetical": "trial of defendant by a second jury, after the jury first empanelled had been sworn and discharged because a prosecution witness had not been served a summons and because no other arrangements had been made to ensure the witness' presence violated the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Downum v. United States, 83 S.Ct. at 1035-1036, 372 U.S. at 737-738 (trial of defendant by a second jury, after the jury first empanelled had been sworn and discharged because a prosecution witness had not been served a summons and because no other arrangements had been made to ensure the witness’ presence violated the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy); cf., Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. at 369, 81 S.Ct. at 1526-1527 (double jeopardy protections prohibit a judge from exercising his authority to grant a mistrial at a trial which is going badly for the prosecution to afford the state another more favorable opportunity to convict the accused)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "81 S.Ct. 1526, 1526-1527",
"parenthetical": "double jeopardy protections prohibit a judge from exercising his authority to grant a mistrial at a trial which is going badly for the prosecution to afford the state another more favorable opportunity to convict the accused",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Downum v. United States, 83 S.Ct. at 1035-1036, 372 U.S. at 737-738 (trial of defendant by a second jury, after the jury first empanelled had been sworn and discharged because a prosecution witness had not been served a summons and because no other arrangements had been made to ensure the witness’ presence violated the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy); cf., Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. at 369, 81 S.Ct. at 1526-1527 (double jeopardy protections prohibit a judge from exercising his authority to grant a mistrial at a trial which is going badly for the prosecution to afford the state another more favorable opportunity to convict the accused)."
} | 9,435,391 | a |
While Plaintiffs' position would satisfy the public policy of making whole the victims of underinsured motorists, it otherwise runs contrary to the policy guidance from the Rhode Island Supreme Court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2009 WL 1765670, at *7-9",
"parenthetical": "ambiguous selection form, with two inconsistent boxes checked, may be interpreted based on unambiguous intent of insured",
"sentence": "See Dubreuil, 511 A.2d at 302-03; Capuano, 433 A.2d at 956; daSilva, 263 A.2d at 103. It is inconsistent with the well-reasoned holding of the federal court in the Western District of Virginia in Mel ton, which examined a selection form with a similar error. 760 F.Supp.2d at 637-38 (when intent is undisputed, substantial compliance, rather than hypertechnical compliance, is what is required); see also Jefferson, 2009 WL 1765670, at *7-9 (ambiguous selection form, with two inconsistent boxes checked, may be interpreted based on unambiguous intent of insured). Analogous cases from other jurisdictions that ignore intent and impose a hypertechnical UIM selection requirement do not focus on the public policy considerations that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has held must be considered here."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "69 A.3d 835, 835",
"parenthetical": "goal of UIM statute to protect insurers from unwarranted claims",
"sentence": "See LaFlam, 69 A.3d at 835 (goal of UIM statute to protect insurers from unwarranted claims); Henderson, 35 A.3d at 906 (courts must construe UIM statute in a manner that affords insurers some financial protection); Ferreira, 809 A.2d at 1101 (courts should avoid interpretation that would impose an “arguably onerous burden on insurers”). It flies in the face of the holding that UIM endorsements must be interpreted in light of the benefit to all parties from certainty and predictability, including in the setting of premiums. Streicker, 583 A.2d at 554; see Century Indem. Co., 815 F.Supp.2d at 516. It ignores the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s consistent emphasis on contract principles, including due respect for the intent of the parties."
} | 4,317,153 | b |
While Plaintiffs' position would satisfy the public policy of making whole the victims of underinsured motorists, it otherwise runs contrary to the policy guidance from the Rhode Island Supreme Court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "35 A.3d 906, 906",
"parenthetical": "courts must construe UIM statute in a manner that affords insurers some financial protection",
"sentence": "See LaFlam, 69 A.3d at 835 (goal of UIM statute to protect insurers from unwarranted claims); Henderson, 35 A.3d at 906 (courts must construe UIM statute in a manner that affords insurers some financial protection); Ferreira, 809 A.2d at 1101 (courts should avoid interpretation that would impose an “arguably onerous burden on insurers”). It flies in the face of the holding that UIM endorsements must be interpreted in light of the benefit to all parties from certainty and predictability, including in the setting of premiums. Streicker, 583 A.2d at 554; see Century Indem. Co., 815 F.Supp.2d at 516. It ignores the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s consistent emphasis on contract principles, including due respect for the intent of the parties."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2009 WL 1765670, at *7-9",
"parenthetical": "ambiguous selection form, with two inconsistent boxes checked, may be interpreted based on unambiguous intent of insured",
"sentence": "See Dubreuil, 511 A.2d at 302-03; Capuano, 433 A.2d at 956; daSilva, 263 A.2d at 103. It is inconsistent with the well-reasoned holding of the federal court in the Western District of Virginia in Mel ton, which examined a selection form with a similar error. 760 F.Supp.2d at 637-38 (when intent is undisputed, substantial compliance, rather than hypertechnical compliance, is what is required); see also Jefferson, 2009 WL 1765670, at *7-9 (ambiguous selection form, with two inconsistent boxes checked, may be interpreted based on unambiguous intent of insured). Analogous cases from other jurisdictions that ignore intent and impose a hypertechnical UIM selection requirement do not focus on the public policy considerations that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has held must be considered here."
} | 4,317,153 | a |
While Plaintiffs' position would satisfy the public policy of making whole the victims of underinsured motorists, it otherwise runs contrary to the policy guidance from the Rhode Island Supreme Court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2009 WL 1765670, at *7-9",
"parenthetical": "ambiguous selection form, with two inconsistent boxes checked, may be interpreted based on unambiguous intent of insured",
"sentence": "See Dubreuil, 511 A.2d at 302-03; Capuano, 433 A.2d at 956; daSilva, 263 A.2d at 103. It is inconsistent with the well-reasoned holding of the federal court in the Western District of Virginia in Mel ton, which examined a selection form with a similar error. 760 F.Supp.2d at 637-38 (when intent is undisputed, substantial compliance, rather than hypertechnical compliance, is what is required); see also Jefferson, 2009 WL 1765670, at *7-9 (ambiguous selection form, with two inconsistent boxes checked, may be interpreted based on unambiguous intent of insured). Analogous cases from other jurisdictions that ignore intent and impose a hypertechnical UIM selection requirement do not focus on the public policy considerations that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has held must be considered here."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "809 A.2d 1101, 1101",
"parenthetical": "courts should avoid interpretation that would impose an \"arguably onerous burden on insurers\"",
"sentence": "See LaFlam, 69 A.3d at 835 (goal of UIM statute to protect insurers from unwarranted claims); Henderson, 35 A.3d at 906 (courts must construe UIM statute in a manner that affords insurers some financial protection); Ferreira, 809 A.2d at 1101 (courts should avoid interpretation that would impose an “arguably onerous burden on insurers”). It flies in the face of the holding that UIM endorsements must be interpreted in light of the benefit to all parties from certainty and predictability, including in the setting of premiums. Streicker, 583 A.2d at 554; see Century Indem. Co., 815 F.Supp.2d at 516. It ignores the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s consistent emphasis on contract principles, including due respect for the intent of the parties."
} | 4,317,153 | b |
While Plaintiffs' position would satisfy the public policy of making whole the victims of underinsured motorists, it otherwise runs contrary to the policy guidance from the Rhode Island Supreme Court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "583 A.2d 554, 554",
"parenthetical": "courts should avoid interpretation that would impose an \"arguably onerous burden on insurers\"",
"sentence": "See LaFlam, 69 A.3d at 835 (goal of UIM statute to protect insurers from unwarranted claims); Henderson, 35 A.3d at 906 (courts must construe UIM statute in a manner that affords insurers some financial protection); Ferreira, 809 A.2d at 1101 (courts should avoid interpretation that would impose an “arguably onerous burden on insurers”). It flies in the face of the holding that UIM endorsements must be interpreted in light of the benefit to all parties from certainty and predictability, including in the setting of premiums. Streicker, 583 A.2d at 554; see Century Indem. Co., 815 F.Supp.2d at 516. It ignores the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s consistent emphasis on contract principles, including due respect for the intent of the parties."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2009 WL 1765670, at *7-9",
"parenthetical": "ambiguous selection form, with two inconsistent boxes checked, may be interpreted based on unambiguous intent of insured",
"sentence": "See Dubreuil, 511 A.2d at 302-03; Capuano, 433 A.2d at 956; daSilva, 263 A.2d at 103. It is inconsistent with the well-reasoned holding of the federal court in the Western District of Virginia in Mel ton, which examined a selection form with a similar error. 760 F.Supp.2d at 637-38 (when intent is undisputed, substantial compliance, rather than hypertechnical compliance, is what is required); see also Jefferson, 2009 WL 1765670, at *7-9 (ambiguous selection form, with two inconsistent boxes checked, may be interpreted based on unambiguous intent of insured). Analogous cases from other jurisdictions that ignore intent and impose a hypertechnical UIM selection requirement do not focus on the public policy considerations that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has held must be considered here."
} | 4,317,153 | a |
While Plaintiffs' position would satisfy the public policy of making whole the victims of underinsured motorists, it otherwise runs contrary to the policy guidance from the Rhode Island Supreme Court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2009 WL 1765670, at *7-9",
"parenthetical": "ambiguous selection form, with two inconsistent boxes checked, may be interpreted based on unambiguous intent of insured",
"sentence": "See Dubreuil, 511 A.2d at 302-03; Capuano, 433 A.2d at 956; daSilva, 263 A.2d at 103. It is inconsistent with the well-reasoned holding of the federal court in the Western District of Virginia in Mel ton, which examined a selection form with a similar error. 760 F.Supp.2d at 637-38 (when intent is undisputed, substantial compliance, rather than hypertechnical compliance, is what is required); see also Jefferson, 2009 WL 1765670, at *7-9 (ambiguous selection form, with two inconsistent boxes checked, may be interpreted based on unambiguous intent of insured). Analogous cases from other jurisdictions that ignore intent and impose a hypertechnical UIM selection requirement do not focus on the public policy considerations that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has held must be considered here."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "263 A.2d 103, 103",
"parenthetical": "when intent is undisputed, substantial compliance, rather than hypertechnical compliance, is what is required",
"sentence": "See Dubreuil, 511 A.2d at 302-03; Capuano, 433 A.2d at 956; daSilva, 263 A.2d at 103. It is inconsistent with the well-reasoned holding of the federal court in the Western District of Virginia in Mel ton, which examined a selection form with a similar error. 760 F.Supp.2d at 637-38 (when intent is undisputed, substantial compliance, rather than hypertechnical compliance, is what is required); see also Jefferson, 2009 WL 1765670, at *7-9 (ambiguous selection form, with two inconsistent boxes checked, may be interpreted based on unambiguous intent of insured). Analogous cases from other jurisdictions that ignore intent and impose a hypertechnical UIM selection requirement do not focus on the public policy considerations that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has held must be considered here."
} | 4,317,153 | b |
While Plaintiffs' position would satisfy the public policy of making whole the victims of underinsured motorists, it otherwise runs contrary to the policy guidance from the Rhode Island Supreme Court. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2009 WL 1765670, at *7-9",
"parenthetical": "ambiguous selection form, with two inconsistent boxes checked, may be interpreted based on unambiguous intent of insured",
"sentence": "See Dubreuil, 511 A.2d at 302-03; Capuano, 433 A.2d at 956; daSilva, 263 A.2d at 103. It is inconsistent with the well-reasoned holding of the federal court in the Western District of Virginia in Mel ton, which examined a selection form with a similar error. 760 F.Supp.2d at 637-38 (when intent is undisputed, substantial compliance, rather than hypertechnical compliance, is what is required); see also Jefferson, 2009 WL 1765670, at *7-9 (ambiguous selection form, with two inconsistent boxes checked, may be interpreted based on unambiguous intent of insured). Analogous cases from other jurisdictions that ignore intent and impose a hypertechnical UIM selection requirement do not focus on the public policy considerations that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has held must be considered here."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "760 F.Supp.2d 637, 637-38",
"parenthetical": "when intent is undisputed, substantial compliance, rather than hypertechnical compliance, is what is required",
"sentence": "See Dubreuil, 511 A.2d at 302-03; Capuano, 433 A.2d at 956; daSilva, 263 A.2d at 103. It is inconsistent with the well-reasoned holding of the federal court in the Western District of Virginia in Mel ton, which examined a selection form with a similar error. 760 F.Supp.2d at 637-38 (when intent is undisputed, substantial compliance, rather than hypertechnical compliance, is what is required); see also Jefferson, 2009 WL 1765670, at *7-9 (ambiguous selection form, with two inconsistent boxes checked, may be interpreted based on unambiguous intent of insured). Analogous cases from other jurisdictions that ignore intent and impose a hypertechnical UIM selection requirement do not focus on the public policy considerations that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has held must be considered here."
} | 4,317,153 | b |
In comparing the provisions of the ADEA disapproved in Kimel, and the remedial scheme of the Equal Pay Act, perhaps the most significant difference between the two statutes is in the exemptions from liability provided to employers once a prima, facie case of discrimination has been made. In Kimel, the Supreme Court stated that, despite the narrowly-construed "bona fide occupational qualification" defense from liability under the ADEA, "the Act's substantive requirements nevertheless remain at a level akin to our heightened scrutiny cases under the Equal Protection Clause." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "442 U.S. 275, 275",
"parenthetical": "stating that where an action \"could not be plausibly explained on a neutral ground, impact itself would signal that the real classification made ... was in fact not neutral\"",
"sentence": "See Gunther, 452 U.S. at 170, 101 S.Ct. 2242 (stating that “[t]he fourth affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act ... was designed ... to confine the application of the Act to wage differentials attributable to sex discrimination”); see also Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275, 99 S.Ct. 2282 (stating that where an action “could not be plausibly explained on a neutral ground, impact itself would signal that the real classification made ... was in fact not neutral”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "452 U.S. 170, 170",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]he fourth affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act ... was designed ... to confine the application of the Act to wage differentials attributable to sex discrimination\"",
"sentence": "See Gunther, 452 U.S. at 170, 101 S.Ct. 2242 (stating that “[t]he fourth affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act ... was designed ... to confine the application of the Act to wage differentials attributable to sex discrimination”); see also Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275, 99 S.Ct. 2282 (stating that where an action “could not be plausibly explained on a neutral ground, impact itself would signal that the real classification made ... was in fact not neutral”)."
} | 11,234,183 | b |
In comparing the provisions of the ADEA disapproved in Kimel, and the remedial scheme of the Equal Pay Act, perhaps the most significant difference between the two statutes is in the exemptions from liability provided to employers once a prima, facie case of discrimination has been made. In Kimel, the Supreme Court stated that, despite the narrowly-construed "bona fide occupational qualification" defense from liability under the ADEA, "the Act's substantive requirements nevertheless remain at a level akin to our heightened scrutiny cases under the Equal Protection Clause." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "452 U.S. 170, 170",
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]he fourth affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act ... was designed ... to confine the application of the Act to wage differentials attributable to sex discrimination\"",
"sentence": "See Gunther, 452 U.S. at 170, 101 S.Ct. 2242 (stating that “[t]he fourth affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act ... was designed ... to confine the application of the Act to wage differentials attributable to sex discrimination”); see also Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275, 99 S.Ct. 2282 (stating that where an action “could not be plausibly explained on a neutral ground, impact itself would signal that the real classification made ... was in fact not neutral”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that where an action \"could not be plausibly explained on a neutral ground, impact itself would signal that the real classification made ... was in fact not neutral\"",
"sentence": "See Gunther, 452 U.S. at 170, 101 S.Ct. 2242 (stating that “[t]he fourth affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act ... was designed ... to confine the application of the Act to wage differentials attributable to sex discrimination”); see also Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275, 99 S.Ct. 2282 (stating that where an action “could not be plausibly explained on a neutral ground, impact itself would signal that the real classification made ... was in fact not neutral”)."
} | 11,234,183 | a |
In comparing the provisions of the ADEA disapproved in Kimel, and the remedial scheme of the Equal Pay Act, perhaps the most significant difference between the two statutes is in the exemptions from liability provided to employers once a prima, facie case of discrimination has been made. In Kimel, the Supreme Court stated that, despite the narrowly-construed "bona fide occupational qualification" defense from liability under the ADEA, "the Act's substantive requirements nevertheless remain at a level akin to our heightened scrutiny cases under the Equal Protection Clause." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "442 U.S. 275, 275",
"parenthetical": "stating that where an action \"could not be plausibly explained on a neutral ground, impact itself would signal that the real classification made ... was in fact not neutral\"",
"sentence": "See Gunther, 452 U.S. at 170, 101 S.Ct. 2242 (stating that “[t]he fourth affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act ... was designed ... to confine the application of the Act to wage differentials attributable to sex discrimination”); see also Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275, 99 S.Ct. 2282 (stating that where an action “could not be plausibly explained on a neutral ground, impact itself would signal that the real classification made ... was in fact not neutral”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]he fourth affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act ... was designed ... to confine the application of the Act to wage differentials attributable to sex discrimination\"",
"sentence": "See Gunther, 452 U.S. at 170, 101 S.Ct. 2242 (stating that “[t]he fourth affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act ... was designed ... to confine the application of the Act to wage differentials attributable to sex discrimination”); see also Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275, 99 S.Ct. 2282 (stating that where an action “could not be plausibly explained on a neutral ground, impact itself would signal that the real classification made ... was in fact not neutral”)."
} | 11,234,183 | b |
In comparing the provisions of the ADEA disapproved in Kimel, and the remedial scheme of the Equal Pay Act, perhaps the most significant difference between the two statutes is in the exemptions from liability provided to employers once a prima, facie case of discrimination has been made. In Kimel, the Supreme Court stated that, despite the narrowly-construed "bona fide occupational qualification" defense from liability under the ADEA, "the Act's substantive requirements nevertheless remain at a level akin to our heightened scrutiny cases under the Equal Protection Clause." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that \"[t]he fourth affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act ... was designed ... to confine the application of the Act to wage differentials attributable to sex discrimination\"",
"sentence": "See Gunther, 452 U.S. at 170, 101 S.Ct. 2242 (stating that “[t]he fourth affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act ... was designed ... to confine the application of the Act to wage differentials attributable to sex discrimination”); see also Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275, 99 S.Ct. 2282 (stating that where an action “could not be plausibly explained on a neutral ground, impact itself would signal that the real classification made ... was in fact not neutral”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that where an action \"could not be plausibly explained on a neutral ground, impact itself would signal that the real classification made ... was in fact not neutral\"",
"sentence": "See Gunther, 452 U.S. at 170, 101 S.Ct. 2242 (stating that “[t]he fourth affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act ... was designed ... to confine the application of the Act to wage differentials attributable to sex discrimination”); see also Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275, 99 S.Ct. 2282 (stating that where an action “could not be plausibly explained on a neutral ground, impact itself would signal that the real classification made ... was in fact not neutral”)."
} | 11,234,183 | a |
. The statute does not define "homemaker services," but the court has assumed that such contributions may take many forms, including contributions to the family's food, clothing, furniture, payment of telephone bills, and household upkeep. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "353 A.2d 276, 279",
"parenthetical": "contribution to maintenance of household to be taken into account in distribution of jointly owned house",
"sentence": "See Brice v. Brice, 411 A.2d 340, 343 n. 6 (D.C.1980) (evaluating the claim on the premise presented, namely, viewing such contributions \"as an offset to the husband’s payments of all the bills for the house itself'); see also Campbell v. Campbell, 353 A.2d 276, 279 (D.C.1976) (contribution to maintenance of household to be taken into account in distribution of jointly owned house); 1 J.P. McCahey, Valuation and Distribution of Marital Property, 19.05[4][b], at 19-37 (1984) (discussing three common categorizations of homemaker contributions: contributions to child care, contributions which allow the other spouse to enhance his or her education or career, and contributions which result in the loss of the homemaker’s own career opportunities); Chastain, Henry & Woodside, Determination of Property Rights Upon Divorce In South Carolina: An Exploration And Recommendation, 33 S.C.L.Rev. 227, 269-70 (1981) (nature of marriage relationship may affect definition of homemaker services, contrasting provider-homemaker with marriage partnership relationship)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "evaluating the claim on the premise presented, namely, viewing such contributions \"as an offset to the husband's payments of all the bills for the house itself'",
"sentence": "See Brice v. Brice, 411 A.2d 340, 343 n. 6 (D.C.1980) (evaluating the claim on the premise presented, namely, viewing such contributions \"as an offset to the husband’s payments of all the bills for the house itself'); see also Campbell v. Campbell, 353 A.2d 276, 279 (D.C.1976) (contribution to maintenance of household to be taken into account in distribution of jointly owned house); 1 J.P. McCahey, Valuation and Distribution of Marital Property, 19.05[4][b], at 19-37 (1984) (discussing three common categorizations of homemaker contributions: contributions to child care, contributions which allow the other spouse to enhance his or her education or career, and contributions which result in the loss of the homemaker’s own career opportunities); Chastain, Henry & Woodside, Determination of Property Rights Upon Divorce In South Carolina: An Exploration And Recommendation, 33 S.C.L.Rev. 227, 269-70 (1981) (nature of marriage relationship may affect definition of homemaker services, contrasting provider-homemaker with marriage partnership relationship)."
} | 11,298,307 | b |
This statement indicates that the Court of Appeals failed to recognize the significance of this Court's prior decisions refusing to adopt "public policy" exceptions to the Public Records Act. Indeed, in Holt, this Court rejected a public policy exception that bears a striking resemblance to the law enforcement privilege the Court of Appeals herein adopted. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "856 F.2d 481, 484",
"parenthetical": "stating that the law enforcement privilege is intended \"to prevent disclosure of law enforcement techniques and procedures, to preserve the confidentiality of sources, to protect witness and law enforcement personnel, to safeguard the privacy of individuals involved in an investigation, and otherwise to prevent interference with an investigation\"",
"sentence": "See Holt, 710 S.W.2d at 517; Memphis Publ’g Co. v. City of Memphis, 871 S.W.2d at 685 (describing Holt and stating that the Court rejected the public policy exception despite forceful arguments from the police department of the City of Memphis and “various amicus curiae ” that subjecting closed investigative police files to public scrutiny “would result in greater reluctance of witnesses to criminal activity to talk with authorities, and to a concomitant reduction in the effectiveness of law enforcement”); cf. United States v. Myerson, 856 F.2d 481, 484 (2d Cir.1988) (stating that the law enforcement privilege is intended “to prevent disclosure of law enforcement techniques and procedures, to preserve the confidentiality of sources, to protect witness and law enforcement personnel, to safeguard the privacy of individuals involved in an investigation, and otherwise to prevent interference with an investigation”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "871 S.W.2d 685, 685",
"parenthetical": "describing Holt and stating that the Court rejected the public policy exception despite forceful arguments from the police department of the City of Memphis and \"various amicus curiae \" that subjecting closed investigative police files to public scrutiny \"would result in greater reluctance of witnesses to criminal activity to talk with authorities, and to a concomitant reduction in the effectiveness of law enforcement\"",
"sentence": "See Holt, 710 S.W.2d at 517; Memphis Publ’g Co. v. City of Memphis, 871 S.W.2d at 685 (describing Holt and stating that the Court rejected the public policy exception despite forceful arguments from the police department of the City of Memphis and “various amicus curiae ” that subjecting closed investigative police files to public scrutiny “would result in greater reluctance of witnesses to criminal activity to talk with authorities, and to a concomitant reduction in the effectiveness of law enforcement”); cf. United States v. Myerson, 856 F.2d 481, 484 (2d Cir.1988) (stating that the law enforcement privilege is intended “to prevent disclosure of law enforcement techniques and procedures, to preserve the confidentiality of sources, to protect witness and law enforcement personnel, to safeguard the privacy of individuals involved in an investigation, and otherwise to prevent interference with an investigation”)."
} | 8,374,475 | b |
Substantial evidence supports the agency's finding that Rosas-Grijalva failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "555 F.3d 734, 740",
"parenthetical": "the REAL ID Act \"requires that a protected ground represent 'one central reason' for an asylum applicant's persecution\"",
"sentence": "See Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir.2009) (the REAL ID Act “requires that a protected ground represent ‘one central reason’ for an asylum applicant’s persecution”); see also Molina-Morales v. INS, 237 F.3d 1048, 1051-52 (9th Cir.2001) (personal retribution is not persecution on account of a protected ground); Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir.2010) (“An alien’s desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "237 F.3d 1048, 1051-52",
"parenthetical": "personal retribution is not persecution on account of a protected ground",
"sentence": "See Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir.2009) (the REAL ID Act “requires that a protected ground represent ‘one central reason’ for an asylum applicant’s persecution”); see also Molina-Morales v. INS, 237 F.3d 1048, 1051-52 (9th Cir.2001) (personal retribution is not persecution on account of a protected ground); Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir.2010) (“An alien’s desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”)."
} | 4,219,208 | a |
Substantial evidence supports the agency's finding that Rosas-Grijalva failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "555 F.3d 734, 740",
"parenthetical": "the REAL ID Act \"requires that a protected ground represent 'one central reason' for an asylum applicant's persecution\"",
"sentence": "See Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir.2009) (the REAL ID Act “requires that a protected ground represent ‘one central reason’ for an asylum applicant’s persecution”); see also Molina-Morales v. INS, 237 F.3d 1048, 1051-52 (9th Cir.2001) (personal retribution is not persecution on account of a protected ground); Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir.2010) (“An alien’s desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "622 F.3d 1007, 1016",
"parenthetical": "\"An alien's desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.\"",
"sentence": "See Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir.2009) (the REAL ID Act “requires that a protected ground represent ‘one central reason’ for an asylum applicant’s persecution”); see also Molina-Morales v. INS, 237 F.3d 1048, 1051-52 (9th Cir.2001) (personal retribution is not persecution on account of a protected ground); Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir.2010) (“An alien’s desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.”)."
} | 4,219,208 | a |
[P 20] Our decision is consistent with decisions in other cases holding a defendant is not entitled to a defense of premises instruction when the case involves a cohabitant as the alleged trespasser. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "934 S.W.2d 788, 794",
"parenthetical": "roommate did not commit the offense of criminal trespass by entering another roommate's unlocked bedroom in a house shared by multiple individuals",
"sentence": "See State v. Hare, 575 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn.1998) (statute contemplates an unauthorized intrusion into the defendant’s dwelling and the defense does not apply when the defendant and victim reside in the same dwelling); State v. Warren, 147 N.H. 567, 794 A.2d 790, 793 (2002) (defense of premises statute does not apply where the assailant is a cohabitant); State v. Rambo, 401 N.J.Super. 506, 951 A.2d 1075, 1087 (2008) (defendant’s wife was not a trespasser, she was a co-owner of the property, and the trial court did not err in declining to give a jury instruction on the use of force in defense of premises); see also Crunk v. State, 934 S.W.2d 788, 794 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (roommate did not commit the offense of criminal trespass by entering another roommate’s unlocked bedroom in a house shared by multiple individuals)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "575 N.W.2d 828, 832",
"parenthetical": "statute contemplates an unauthorized intrusion into the defendant's dwelling and the defense does not apply when the defendant and victim reside in the same dwelling",
"sentence": "See State v. Hare, 575 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn.1998) (statute contemplates an unauthorized intrusion into the defendant’s dwelling and the defense does not apply when the defendant and victim reside in the same dwelling); State v. Warren, 147 N.H. 567, 794 A.2d 790, 793 (2002) (defense of premises statute does not apply where the assailant is a cohabitant); State v. Rambo, 401 N.J.Super. 506, 951 A.2d 1075, 1087 (2008) (defendant’s wife was not a trespasser, she was a co-owner of the property, and the trial court did not err in declining to give a jury instruction on the use of force in defense of premises); see also Crunk v. State, 934 S.W.2d 788, 794 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (roommate did not commit the offense of criminal trespass by entering another roommate’s unlocked bedroom in a house shared by multiple individuals)."
} | 7,059,453 | b |
[P 20] Our decision is consistent with decisions in other cases holding a defendant is not entitled to a defense of premises instruction when the case involves a cohabitant as the alleged trespasser. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defense of premises statute does not apply where the assailant is a cohabitant",
"sentence": "See State v. Hare, 575 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn.1998) (statute contemplates an unauthorized intrusion into the defendant’s dwelling and the defense does not apply when the defendant and victim reside in the same dwelling); State v. Warren, 147 N.H. 567, 794 A.2d 790, 793 (2002) (defense of premises statute does not apply where the assailant is a cohabitant); State v. Rambo, 401 N.J.Super. 506, 951 A.2d 1075, 1087 (2008) (defendant’s wife was not a trespasser, she was a co-owner of the property, and the trial court did not err in declining to give a jury instruction on the use of force in defense of premises); see also Crunk v. State, 934 S.W.2d 788, 794 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (roommate did not commit the offense of criminal trespass by entering another roommate’s unlocked bedroom in a house shared by multiple individuals)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "934 S.W.2d 788, 794",
"parenthetical": "roommate did not commit the offense of criminal trespass by entering another roommate's unlocked bedroom in a house shared by multiple individuals",
"sentence": "See State v. Hare, 575 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn.1998) (statute contemplates an unauthorized intrusion into the defendant’s dwelling and the defense does not apply when the defendant and victim reside in the same dwelling); State v. Warren, 147 N.H. 567, 794 A.2d 790, 793 (2002) (defense of premises statute does not apply where the assailant is a cohabitant); State v. Rambo, 401 N.J.Super. 506, 951 A.2d 1075, 1087 (2008) (defendant’s wife was not a trespasser, she was a co-owner of the property, and the trial court did not err in declining to give a jury instruction on the use of force in defense of premises); see also Crunk v. State, 934 S.W.2d 788, 794 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (roommate did not commit the offense of criminal trespass by entering another roommate’s unlocked bedroom in a house shared by multiple individuals)."
} | 7,059,453 | a |
[P 20] Our decision is consistent with decisions in other cases holding a defendant is not entitled to a defense of premises instruction when the case involves a cohabitant as the alleged trespasser. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "934 S.W.2d 788, 794",
"parenthetical": "roommate did not commit the offense of criminal trespass by entering another roommate's unlocked bedroom in a house shared by multiple individuals",
"sentence": "See State v. Hare, 575 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn.1998) (statute contemplates an unauthorized intrusion into the defendant’s dwelling and the defense does not apply when the defendant and victim reside in the same dwelling); State v. Warren, 147 N.H. 567, 794 A.2d 790, 793 (2002) (defense of premises statute does not apply where the assailant is a cohabitant); State v. Rambo, 401 N.J.Super. 506, 951 A.2d 1075, 1087 (2008) (defendant’s wife was not a trespasser, she was a co-owner of the property, and the trial court did not err in declining to give a jury instruction on the use of force in defense of premises); see also Crunk v. State, 934 S.W.2d 788, 794 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (roommate did not commit the offense of criminal trespass by entering another roommate’s unlocked bedroom in a house shared by multiple individuals)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "794 A.2d 790, 793",
"parenthetical": "defense of premises statute does not apply where the assailant is a cohabitant",
"sentence": "See State v. Hare, 575 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn.1998) (statute contemplates an unauthorized intrusion into the defendant’s dwelling and the defense does not apply when the defendant and victim reside in the same dwelling); State v. Warren, 147 N.H. 567, 794 A.2d 790, 793 (2002) (defense of premises statute does not apply where the assailant is a cohabitant); State v. Rambo, 401 N.J.Super. 506, 951 A.2d 1075, 1087 (2008) (defendant’s wife was not a trespasser, she was a co-owner of the property, and the trial court did not err in declining to give a jury instruction on the use of force in defense of premises); see also Crunk v. State, 934 S.W.2d 788, 794 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (roommate did not commit the offense of criminal trespass by entering another roommate’s unlocked bedroom in a house shared by multiple individuals)."
} | 7,059,453 | b |
[P 20] Our decision is consistent with decisions in other cases holding a defendant is not entitled to a defense of premises instruction when the case involves a cohabitant as the alleged trespasser. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "defendant's wife was not a trespasser, she was a co-owner of the property, and the trial court did not err in declining to give a jury instruction on the use of force in defense of premises",
"sentence": "See State v. Hare, 575 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn.1998) (statute contemplates an unauthorized intrusion into the defendant’s dwelling and the defense does not apply when the defendant and victim reside in the same dwelling); State v. Warren, 147 N.H. 567, 794 A.2d 790, 793 (2002) (defense of premises statute does not apply where the assailant is a cohabitant); State v. Rambo, 401 N.J.Super. 506, 951 A.2d 1075, 1087 (2008) (defendant’s wife was not a trespasser, she was a co-owner of the property, and the trial court did not err in declining to give a jury instruction on the use of force in defense of premises); see also Crunk v. State, 934 S.W.2d 788, 794 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (roommate did not commit the offense of criminal trespass by entering another roommate’s unlocked bedroom in a house shared by multiple individuals)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "934 S.W.2d 788, 794",
"parenthetical": "roommate did not commit the offense of criminal trespass by entering another roommate's unlocked bedroom in a house shared by multiple individuals",
"sentence": "See State v. Hare, 575 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn.1998) (statute contemplates an unauthorized intrusion into the defendant’s dwelling and the defense does not apply when the defendant and victim reside in the same dwelling); State v. Warren, 147 N.H. 567, 794 A.2d 790, 793 (2002) (defense of premises statute does not apply where the assailant is a cohabitant); State v. Rambo, 401 N.J.Super. 506, 951 A.2d 1075, 1087 (2008) (defendant’s wife was not a trespasser, she was a co-owner of the property, and the trial court did not err in declining to give a jury instruction on the use of force in defense of premises); see also Crunk v. State, 934 S.W.2d 788, 794 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (roommate did not commit the offense of criminal trespass by entering another roommate’s unlocked bedroom in a house shared by multiple individuals)."
} | 7,059,453 | a |
[P 20] Our decision is consistent with decisions in other cases holding a defendant is not entitled to a defense of premises instruction when the case involves a cohabitant as the alleged trespasser. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "934 S.W.2d 788, 794",
"parenthetical": "roommate did not commit the offense of criminal trespass by entering another roommate's unlocked bedroom in a house shared by multiple individuals",
"sentence": "See State v. Hare, 575 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn.1998) (statute contemplates an unauthorized intrusion into the defendant’s dwelling and the defense does not apply when the defendant and victim reside in the same dwelling); State v. Warren, 147 N.H. 567, 794 A.2d 790, 793 (2002) (defense of premises statute does not apply where the assailant is a cohabitant); State v. Rambo, 401 N.J.Super. 506, 951 A.2d 1075, 1087 (2008) (defendant’s wife was not a trespasser, she was a co-owner of the property, and the trial court did not err in declining to give a jury instruction on the use of force in defense of premises); see also Crunk v. State, 934 S.W.2d 788, 794 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (roommate did not commit the offense of criminal trespass by entering another roommate’s unlocked bedroom in a house shared by multiple individuals)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "951 A.2d 1075, 1087",
"parenthetical": "defendant's wife was not a trespasser, she was a co-owner of the property, and the trial court did not err in declining to give a jury instruction on the use of force in defense of premises",
"sentence": "See State v. Hare, 575 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn.1998) (statute contemplates an unauthorized intrusion into the defendant’s dwelling and the defense does not apply when the defendant and victim reside in the same dwelling); State v. Warren, 147 N.H. 567, 794 A.2d 790, 793 (2002) (defense of premises statute does not apply where the assailant is a cohabitant); State v. Rambo, 401 N.J.Super. 506, 951 A.2d 1075, 1087 (2008) (defendant’s wife was not a trespasser, she was a co-owner of the property, and the trial court did not err in declining to give a jury instruction on the use of force in defense of premises); see also Crunk v. State, 934 S.W.2d 788, 794 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (roommate did not commit the offense of criminal trespass by entering another roommate’s unlocked bedroom in a house shared by multiple individuals)."
} | 7,059,453 | b |
No doubt 'the rumor was scandalous, but the defendants do not argue that the plaintiff could not have reported Officer Drone's sexual misconduct if he had evidence that it was true. Sexual misconduct by a prison employee on the job would be a serious infraction and, the court presumes, an infraction reportable by inmates in a grievance. Like the insolence issue, the court has found no Seventh Circuit case discussing discipline for false accusations in a grievance, but a few courts outside this Circuit have upheld such discipline, though their analyses and conclusions differ. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "933 F.Supp. 1449, 1490",
"parenthetical": "proof by preponderance of evidence that grievance statements knowingly false required to impose discipline",
"sentence": "See Hancock v. Thalacker, 933 F.Supp. 1449, 1490 (N.D.Iowa, 1996)(proof by preponderance of evidence that grievance statements knowingly false required to impose discipline); Curry v. Hall, 839 F.Supp. 1437, 1440 (D.Or.1993)(no First Amendment right implicated by discipline for false statements in grievances; actual malice standard does not apply); see also Wolfel v. Bates, 707 F.2d 932, 934 (6th Cir.1983)(invalidating punishment for false statements in petition, but only on grounds that the officials had not found that statements false or maliciously communicated)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "707 F.2d 932, 934",
"parenthetical": "invalidating punishment for false statements in petition, but only on grounds that the officials had not found that statements false or maliciously communicated",
"sentence": "See Hancock v. Thalacker, 933 F.Supp. 1449, 1490 (N.D.Iowa, 1996)(proof by preponderance of evidence that grievance statements knowingly false required to impose discipline); Curry v. Hall, 839 F.Supp. 1437, 1440 (D.Or.1993)(no First Amendment right implicated by discipline for false statements in grievances; actual malice standard does not apply); see also Wolfel v. Bates, 707 F.2d 932, 934 (6th Cir.1983)(invalidating punishment for false statements in petition, but only on grounds that the officials had not found that statements false or maliciously communicated)."
} | 9,134,037 | a |
In the past, we have expressed doubt as to whether an agreement involving less than all of a customer's purchases even falls within the ambit of Section 3. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"An agreement affecting less than all purchases does not amount to true exclusive dealing.\"",
"sentence": "See Barr Labs., 978 F.2d at 110 n. 24 (“An agreement affecting less than all purchases does not amount to true exclusive dealing.”) (citation omitted); see also W. Parcel Express v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 190 F.3d 974, 976 (9th Cir.1999) (concluding that because volume discount contracts did “not preclude consumers from using other delivery services, they [we]re not exclusive dealing contracts that preclude[d] competition”); Magnus Petroleum Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 599 F.2d 196, 200 (7th Cir.1979) (“Because the agreements contained no exclusive dealing clause and did not require plaintiffs to purchase any amounts of gasoline that even approached their requirements, they did not violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act.”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "190 F.3d 974, 976",
"parenthetical": "concluding that because volume discount contracts did \"not preclude consumers from using other delivery services, they [we]re not exclusive dealing contracts that preclude[d] competition\"",
"sentence": "See Barr Labs., 978 F.2d at 110 n. 24 (“An agreement affecting less than all purchases does not amount to true exclusive dealing.”) (citation omitted); see also W. Parcel Express v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 190 F.3d 974, 976 (9th Cir.1999) (concluding that because volume discount contracts did “not preclude consumers from using other delivery services, they [we]re not exclusive dealing contracts that preclude[d] competition”); Magnus Petroleum Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 599 F.2d 196, 200 (7th Cir.1979) (“Because the agreements contained no exclusive dealing clause and did not require plaintiffs to purchase any amounts of gasoline that even approached their requirements, they did not violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act.”) (citations omitted)."
} | 5,865,946 | a |
In the past, we have expressed doubt as to whether an agreement involving less than all of a customer's purchases even falls within the ambit of Section 3. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"An agreement affecting less than all purchases does not amount to true exclusive dealing.\"",
"sentence": "See Barr Labs., 978 F.2d at 110 n. 24 (“An agreement affecting less than all purchases does not amount to true exclusive dealing.”) (citation omitted); see also W. Parcel Express v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 190 F.3d 974, 976 (9th Cir.1999) (concluding that because volume discount contracts did “not preclude consumers from using other delivery services, they [we]re not exclusive dealing contracts that preclude[d] competition”); Magnus Petroleum Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 599 F.2d 196, 200 (7th Cir.1979) (“Because the agreements contained no exclusive dealing clause and did not require plaintiffs to purchase any amounts of gasoline that even approached their requirements, they did not violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act.”) (citations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "599 F.2d 196, 200",
"parenthetical": "\"Because the agreements contained no exclusive dealing clause and did not require plaintiffs to purchase any amounts of gasoline that even approached their requirements, they did not violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act.\"",
"sentence": "See Barr Labs., 978 F.2d at 110 n. 24 (“An agreement affecting less than all purchases does not amount to true exclusive dealing.”) (citation omitted); see also W. Parcel Express v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 190 F.3d 974, 976 (9th Cir.1999) (concluding that because volume discount contracts did “not preclude consumers from using other delivery services, they [we]re not exclusive dealing contracts that preclude[d] competition”); Magnus Petroleum Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 599 F.2d 196, 200 (7th Cir.1979) (“Because the agreements contained no exclusive dealing clause and did not require plaintiffs to purchase any amounts of gasoline that even approached their requirements, they did not violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act.”) (citations omitted)."
} | 5,865,946 | a |
Through its freeze, the IRS did what no other creditor could do: it guaranteed payment of a pre-petition debt by withholding payment of a refund owed to the debtor. In short, the IRS's freeze, open-ended in time and excessive in scope, constituted a forbidden self-help scheme which violates the automatic bankruptcy stay. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under certain circumstances, the \"temporary\" withholding of payment of a debt that a creditor owes to a debtor may not violate the automatic stay",
"sentence": "See United States v. Reynolds, 764 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir.1985); see also Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 116 S.Ct. 286, 133 L.Ed.2d 258 (1995) (under certain circumstances, the “temporary” withholding of payment of a debt that a creditor owes to a debtor may not violate the automatic stay); cf. In re Tillery, 179 B.R. 576 (Bankr.W.D.Ark.1995) (IRS moved for relief from stay after imposing administrative freeze on refund)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "IRS moved for relief from stay after imposing administrative freeze on refund",
"sentence": "See United States v. Reynolds, 764 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir.1985); see also Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 116 S.Ct. 286, 133 L.Ed.2d 258 (1995) (under certain circumstances, the “temporary” withholding of payment of a debt that a creditor owes to a debtor may not violate the automatic stay); cf. In re Tillery, 179 B.R. 576 (Bankr.W.D.Ark.1995) (IRS moved for relief from stay after imposing administrative freeze on refund)."
} | 11,125,738 | a |
Through its freeze, the IRS did what no other creditor could do: it guaranteed payment of a pre-petition debt by withholding payment of a refund owed to the debtor. In short, the IRS's freeze, open-ended in time and excessive in scope, constituted a forbidden self-help scheme which violates the automatic bankruptcy stay. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under certain circumstances, the \"temporary\" withholding of payment of a debt that a creditor owes to a debtor may not violate the automatic stay",
"sentence": "See United States v. Reynolds, 764 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir.1985); see also Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 116 S.Ct. 286, 133 L.Ed.2d 258 (1995) (under certain circumstances, the “temporary” withholding of payment of a debt that a creditor owes to a debtor may not violate the automatic stay); cf. In re Tillery, 179 B.R. 576 (Bankr.W.D.Ark.1995) (IRS moved for relief from stay after imposing administrative freeze on refund)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "IRS moved for relief from stay after imposing administrative freeze on refund",
"sentence": "See United States v. Reynolds, 764 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir.1985); see also Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 116 S.Ct. 286, 133 L.Ed.2d 258 (1995) (under certain circumstances, the “temporary” withholding of payment of a debt that a creditor owes to a debtor may not violate the automatic stay); cf. In re Tillery, 179 B.R. 576 (Bankr.W.D.Ark.1995) (IRS moved for relief from stay after imposing administrative freeze on refund)."
} | 11,125,738 | a |
Through its freeze, the IRS did what no other creditor could do: it guaranteed payment of a pre-petition debt by withholding payment of a refund owed to the debtor. In short, the IRS's freeze, open-ended in time and excessive in scope, constituted a forbidden self-help scheme which violates the automatic bankruptcy stay. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "IRS moved for relief from stay after imposing administrative freeze on refund",
"sentence": "See United States v. Reynolds, 764 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir.1985); see also Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 116 S.Ct. 286, 133 L.Ed.2d 258 (1995) (under certain circumstances, the “temporary” withholding of payment of a debt that a creditor owes to a debtor may not violate the automatic stay); cf. In re Tillery, 179 B.R. 576 (Bankr.W.D.Ark.1995) (IRS moved for relief from stay after imposing administrative freeze on refund)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "under certain circumstances, the \"temporary\" withholding of payment of a debt that a creditor owes to a debtor may not violate the automatic stay",
"sentence": "See United States v. Reynolds, 764 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir.1985); see also Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 116 S.Ct. 286, 133 L.Ed.2d 258 (1995) (under certain circumstances, the “temporary” withholding of payment of a debt that a creditor owes to a debtor may not violate the automatic stay); cf. In re Tillery, 179 B.R. 576 (Bankr.W.D.Ark.1995) (IRS moved for relief from stay after imposing administrative freeze on refund)."
} | 11,125,738 | b |
An issue exists as to whether the Plaintiff must first exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing this action. The Sixth Circuit is yet to address this question. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that section 510 of ERISA mandates interpretation of the statute and should be done by federal courts",
"sentence": "Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies); Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985) cert. denied 474 U.S. 1087, 106 S.Ct. 863, 88 L.Ed.2d 902 (1986) (requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA); but see Zipf v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.1986) (holding that section 510 of ERISA mandates interpretation of the statute and should be done by federal courts); Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.1984) (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA); Curry v. Contract Fab."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies",
"sentence": "Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies); Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985) cert. denied 474 U.S. 1087, 106 S.Ct. 863, 88 L.Ed.2d 902 (1986) (requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA); but see Zipf v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.1986) (holding that section 510 of ERISA mandates interpretation of the statute and should be done by federal courts); Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.1984) (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA); Curry v. Contract Fab."
} | 7,849,131 | b |
An issue exists as to whether the Plaintiff must first exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing this action. The Sixth Circuit is yet to address this question. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies",
"sentence": "Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies); Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985) cert. denied 474 U.S. 1087, 106 S.Ct. 863, 88 L.Ed.2d 902 (1986) (requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA); but see Zipf v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.1986) (holding that section 510 of ERISA mandates interpretation of the statute and should be done by federal courts); Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.1984) (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA); Curry v. Contract Fab."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA",
"sentence": "Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies); Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985) cert. denied 474 U.S. 1087, 106 S.Ct. 863, 88 L.Ed.2d 902 (1986) (requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA); but see Zipf v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.1986) (holding that section 510 of ERISA mandates interpretation of the statute and should be done by federal courts); Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.1984) (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA); Curry v. Contract Fab."
} | 7,849,131 | a |
An issue exists as to whether the Plaintiff must first exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing this action. The Sixth Circuit is yet to address this question. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA",
"sentence": "Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies); Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985) cert. denied 474 U.S. 1087, 106 S.Ct. 863, 88 L.Ed.2d 902 (1986) (requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA); but see Zipf v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.1986) (holding that section 510 of ERISA mandates interpretation of the statute and should be done by federal courts); Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.1984) (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA); Curry v. Contract Fab."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that section 510 of ERISA mandates interpretation of the statute and should be done by federal courts",
"sentence": "Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies); Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985) cert. denied 474 U.S. 1087, 106 S.Ct. 863, 88 L.Ed.2d 902 (1986) (requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA); but see Zipf v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.1986) (holding that section 510 of ERISA mandates interpretation of the statute and should be done by federal courts); Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.1984) (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA); Curry v. Contract Fab."
} | 7,849,131 | a |
An issue exists as to whether the Plaintiff must first exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing this action. The Sixth Circuit is yet to address this question. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA",
"sentence": "Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies); Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985) cert. denied 474 U.S. 1087, 106 S.Ct. 863, 88 L.Ed.2d 902 (1986) (requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA); but see Zipf v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.1986) (holding that section 510 of ERISA mandates interpretation of the statute and should be done by federal courts); Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.1984) (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA); Curry v. Contract Fab."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA",
"sentence": "Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies); Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985) cert. denied 474 U.S. 1087, 106 S.Ct. 863, 88 L.Ed.2d 902 (1986) (requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA); but see Zipf v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.1986) (holding that section 510 of ERISA mandates interpretation of the statute and should be done by federal courts); Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.1984) (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA); Curry v. Contract Fab."
} | 7,849,131 | a |
An issue exists as to whether the Plaintiff must first exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing this action. The Sixth Circuit is yet to address this question. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA",
"sentence": "Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies); Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985) cert. denied 474 U.S. 1087, 106 S.Ct. 863, 88 L.Ed.2d 902 (1986) (requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA); but see Zipf v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.1986) (holding that section 510 of ERISA mandates interpretation of the statute and should be done by federal courts); Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.1984) (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA); Curry v. Contract Fab."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that section 510 of ERISA mandates interpretation of the statute and should be done by federal courts",
"sentence": "Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies); Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985) cert. denied 474 U.S. 1087, 106 S.Ct. 863, 88 L.Ed.2d 902 (1986) (requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA); but see Zipf v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.1986) (holding that section 510 of ERISA mandates interpretation of the statute and should be done by federal courts); Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.1984) (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA); Curry v. Contract Fab."
} | 7,849,131 | a |
An issue exists as to whether the Plaintiff must first exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing this action. The Sixth Circuit is yet to address this question. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA",
"sentence": "Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies); Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985) cert. denied 474 U.S. 1087, 106 S.Ct. 863, 88 L.Ed.2d 902 (1986) (requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA); but see Zipf v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.1986) (holding that section 510 of ERISA mandates interpretation of the statute and should be done by federal courts); Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.1984) (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA); Curry v. Contract Fab."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA",
"sentence": "Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies); Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985) cert. denied 474 U.S. 1087, 106 S.Ct. 863, 88 L.Ed.2d 902 (1986) (requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA); but see Zipf v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.1986) (holding that section 510 of ERISA mandates interpretation of the statute and should be done by federal courts); Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.1984) (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA); Curry v. Contract Fab."
} | 7,849,131 | b |
An issue exists as to whether the Plaintiff must first exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing this action. The Sixth Circuit is yet to address this question. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA",
"sentence": "Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies); Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985) cert. denied 474 U.S. 1087, 106 S.Ct. 863, 88 L.Ed.2d 902 (1986) (requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA); but see Zipf v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.1986) (holding that section 510 of ERISA mandates interpretation of the statute and should be done by federal courts); Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.1984) (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA); Curry v. Contract Fab."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that section 510 of ERISA mandates interpretation of the statute and should be done by federal courts",
"sentence": "Kross v. Western Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238 (7th Cir.1983) (affirming district court decision requiring Plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies); Mason v. Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985) cert. denied 474 U.S. 1087, 106 S.Ct. 863, 88 L.Ed.2d 902 (1986) (requiring exhaustion for claims grounded in statutory provisions of ERISA); but see Zipf v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.1986) (holding that section 510 of ERISA mandates interpretation of the statute and should be done by federal courts); Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.1984) (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies not required prior to bringing statutory claim under ERISA); Curry v. Contract Fab."
} | 7,849,131 | a |
Subsets and Splits