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. The Court notes the existence of authority outside this circuit holding that the existence of a civil service system is a factor in determining the question at issue in this case. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "454 F.3d 770, 773-74",
"parenthetical": "inclusion in civil service system that gives protection to some level of party affiliation \"amend[s] the job description\" and confirms that political loyalty is not a valid qualification",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bavaro v. Pataki, 130 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir.1997) (no presumption that positions defined as \"exempt\" from civil service protection are necessarily exempt from First Amendment protection, but interests of federalism counsel substantial deference to state’s judgment about definition of job position); Waskovich v. Morgano, 2 F.3d 1292, 1299 n. 7 (3d Cir.1993) (position’s exemption from civil protection is \"one of the factors to be considered in determining whether a dismissal on political grounds offends the First Amendment\"); Fields v. Prater, 566 F.3d 381, 388 (4th Cir.2009) (“whether state law prohibits politically-based hiring for a particular position is relevant to whether political affiliation is ‘necessary for effective job performance’ ”); Stott v. Haworth, 916 F.2d 134, 142 (4th Cir.1990) (exemption from civil service system creates presumption that patronage dismissals are proper); Back v. Hall, 537 F.3d 552, 556-57 (6th Cir.2008) (inclusion in civil service system warrants deference to state legislature’s decision to make position nonpolitical); Hall v. Tollett, 128 F.3d 418, 423 (6th Cir.1997) (\"state legislatures have the ability to remove government positions from the political sphere by including them in a civil service system and ... the legislature’s decision as to whether a particular job should be classified as political or nonpolitical is at least entitled ... to ‘some deference.' ”); Fuerst v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 770, 773-74 (7th Cir.2006) (inclusion in civil service system that gives protection to some level of party affiliation “amend[s] the job description\" and confirms that political loyalty is not a valid qualification); and Finkelstein v. Bergna, 924 F.2d 1449, 1453 (9th Cir.1991) (noting that a person with civil service status might be in a different and more protected position than a political appointee)."
} | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"state law classification of a position is not determinative in the Branti analysis\"",
"sentence": "But see Hadfield v. McDonough, 407 F.3d 11, 18 n. 5 (1st Cir.2005) (\"state law classification of a position is not determinative in the Branti analysis”)."
} | 4,226,075 | a |
. The Court notes the existence of authority outside this circuit holding that the existence of a civil service system is a factor in determining the question at issue in this case. | {
"signal": "but see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"state law classification of a position is not determinative in the Branti analysis\"",
"sentence": "But see Hadfield v. McDonough, 407 F.3d 11, 18 n. 5 (1st Cir.2005) (\"state law classification of a position is not determinative in the Branti analysis”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "924 F.2d 1449, 1453",
"parenthetical": "noting that a person with civil service status might be in a different and more protected position than a political appointee",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Bavaro v. Pataki, 130 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir.1997) (no presumption that positions defined as \"exempt\" from civil service protection are necessarily exempt from First Amendment protection, but interests of federalism counsel substantial deference to state’s judgment about definition of job position); Waskovich v. Morgano, 2 F.3d 1292, 1299 n. 7 (3d Cir.1993) (position’s exemption from civil protection is \"one of the factors to be considered in determining whether a dismissal on political grounds offends the First Amendment\"); Fields v. Prater, 566 F.3d 381, 388 (4th Cir.2009) (“whether state law prohibits politically-based hiring for a particular position is relevant to whether political affiliation is ‘necessary for effective job performance’ ”); Stott v. Haworth, 916 F.2d 134, 142 (4th Cir.1990) (exemption from civil service system creates presumption that patronage dismissals are proper); Back v. Hall, 537 F.3d 552, 556-57 (6th Cir.2008) (inclusion in civil service system warrants deference to state legislature’s decision to make position nonpolitical); Hall v. Tollett, 128 F.3d 418, 423 (6th Cir.1997) (\"state legislatures have the ability to remove government positions from the political sphere by including them in a civil service system and ... the legislature’s decision as to whether a particular job should be classified as political or nonpolitical is at least entitled ... to ‘some deference.' ”); Fuerst v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 770, 773-74 (7th Cir.2006) (inclusion in civil service system that gives protection to some level of party affiliation “amend[s] the job description\" and confirms that political loyalty is not a valid qualification); and Finkelstein v. Bergna, 924 F.2d 1449, 1453 (9th Cir.1991) (noting that a person with civil service status might be in a different and more protected position than a political appointee)."
} | 4,226,075 | b |
Vives seeks an injunction enjoining the NYPD, through Commissioner Raymond Kelly, from "arresting persons pursuant to section 240.30(1) of the Penal Law of the State of New York for the mailing of nonthreatening materials that are protected by the First Amendment when such materials are mailed with the intent to 'annoy' .or to 'alarm.' " Compl. at ad damnum clause P 5. Although the Court has no doubt that the enforcement of section 240.30(1) with respect to "annoying" or "alarming" conduct is unconstitutional as applied to anyone, see infra Part III.A.2, it is outside the scope of the Court's power to enjoin the NYPD from enforcing the statute against non-parties. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "442 U.S. 682, 702",
"parenthetical": "\"[IJnjunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.\"",
"sentence": "See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979) (“[IJnjunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.”); United States Dep’t of Defense v. Meinhold, 510 U.S. 939, 114 S.Ct. 374, 126 L.Ed.2d 324 (1993) (“Meinhold I”) (staying injunction, pending appeal, to the extent it granted relief to non-parties); Meinhold v. United States Dep’t of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1480 (9th Cir.1994) (“Meinhold II”) (finding injunction over broad where it enjoined the Department of Defense from denying enlistment to anyone based on sexual orientation, and limiting injunction to the Department’s actions with respect, to the plaintiff); see also Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Assn., 10 F.3d 207, 217 (4th Cir.1993) (“Although injunctive relief should be designed to grant the full relief needed to remedy the injury to the prevailing party, it should not go beyond the extent of the established violation.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "10 F.3d 207, 217",
"parenthetical": "\"Although injunctive relief should be designed to grant the full relief needed to remedy the injury to the prevailing party, it should not go beyond the extent of the established violation.\"",
"sentence": "See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979) (“[IJnjunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.”); United States Dep’t of Defense v. Meinhold, 510 U.S. 939, 114 S.Ct. 374, 126 L.Ed.2d 324 (1993) (“Meinhold I”) (staying injunction, pending appeal, to the extent it granted relief to non-parties); Meinhold v. United States Dep’t of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1480 (9th Cir.1994) (“Meinhold II”) (finding injunction over broad where it enjoined the Department of Defense from denying enlistment to anyone based on sexual orientation, and limiting injunction to the Department’s actions with respect, to the plaintiff); see also Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Assn., 10 F.3d 207, 217 (4th Cir.1993) (“Although injunctive relief should be designed to grant the full relief needed to remedy the injury to the prevailing party, it should not go beyond the extent of the established violation.”)."
} | 9,261,532 | a |
Vives seeks an injunction enjoining the NYPD, through Commissioner Raymond Kelly, from "arresting persons pursuant to section 240.30(1) of the Penal Law of the State of New York for the mailing of nonthreatening materials that are protected by the First Amendment when such materials are mailed with the intent to 'annoy' .or to 'alarm.' " Compl. at ad damnum clause P 5. Although the Court has no doubt that the enforcement of section 240.30(1) with respect to "annoying" or "alarming" conduct is unconstitutional as applied to anyone, see infra Part III.A.2, it is outside the scope of the Court's power to enjoin the NYPD from enforcing the statute against non-parties. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "10 F.3d 207, 217",
"parenthetical": "\"Although injunctive relief should be designed to grant the full relief needed to remedy the injury to the prevailing party, it should not go beyond the extent of the established violation.\"",
"sentence": "See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979) (“[IJnjunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.”); United States Dep’t of Defense v. Meinhold, 510 U.S. 939, 114 S.Ct. 374, 126 L.Ed.2d 324 (1993) (“Meinhold I”) (staying injunction, pending appeal, to the extent it granted relief to non-parties); Meinhold v. United States Dep’t of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1480 (9th Cir.1994) (“Meinhold II”) (finding injunction over broad where it enjoined the Department of Defense from denying enlistment to anyone based on sexual orientation, and limiting injunction to the Department’s actions with respect, to the plaintiff); see also Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Assn., 10 F.3d 207, 217 (4th Cir.1993) (“Although injunctive relief should be designed to grant the full relief needed to remedy the injury to the prevailing party, it should not go beyond the extent of the established violation.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[IJnjunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.\"",
"sentence": "See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979) (“[IJnjunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.”); United States Dep’t of Defense v. Meinhold, 510 U.S. 939, 114 S.Ct. 374, 126 L.Ed.2d 324 (1993) (“Meinhold I”) (staying injunction, pending appeal, to the extent it granted relief to non-parties); Meinhold v. United States Dep’t of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1480 (9th Cir.1994) (“Meinhold II”) (finding injunction over broad where it enjoined the Department of Defense from denying enlistment to anyone based on sexual orientation, and limiting injunction to the Department’s actions with respect, to the plaintiff); see also Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Assn., 10 F.3d 207, 217 (4th Cir.1993) (“Although injunctive relief should be designed to grant the full relief needed to remedy the injury to the prevailing party, it should not go beyond the extent of the established violation.”)."
} | 9,261,532 | b |
Vives seeks an injunction enjoining the NYPD, through Commissioner Raymond Kelly, from "arresting persons pursuant to section 240.30(1) of the Penal Law of the State of New York for the mailing of nonthreatening materials that are protected by the First Amendment when such materials are mailed with the intent to 'annoy' .or to 'alarm.' " Compl. at ad damnum clause P 5. Although the Court has no doubt that the enforcement of section 240.30(1) with respect to "annoying" or "alarming" conduct is unconstitutional as applied to anyone, see infra Part III.A.2, it is outside the scope of the Court's power to enjoin the NYPD from enforcing the statute against non-parties. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[IJnjunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.\"",
"sentence": "See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979) (“[IJnjunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.”); United States Dep’t of Defense v. Meinhold, 510 U.S. 939, 114 S.Ct. 374, 126 L.Ed.2d 324 (1993) (“Meinhold I”) (staying injunction, pending appeal, to the extent it granted relief to non-parties); Meinhold v. United States Dep’t of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1480 (9th Cir.1994) (“Meinhold II”) (finding injunction over broad where it enjoined the Department of Defense from denying enlistment to anyone based on sexual orientation, and limiting injunction to the Department’s actions with respect, to the plaintiff); see also Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Assn., 10 F.3d 207, 217 (4th Cir.1993) (“Although injunctive relief should be designed to grant the full relief needed to remedy the injury to the prevailing party, it should not go beyond the extent of the established violation.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "10 F.3d 207, 217",
"parenthetical": "\"Although injunctive relief should be designed to grant the full relief needed to remedy the injury to the prevailing party, it should not go beyond the extent of the established violation.\"",
"sentence": "See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979) (“[IJnjunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.”); United States Dep’t of Defense v. Meinhold, 510 U.S. 939, 114 S.Ct. 374, 126 L.Ed.2d 324 (1993) (“Meinhold I”) (staying injunction, pending appeal, to the extent it granted relief to non-parties); Meinhold v. United States Dep’t of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1480 (9th Cir.1994) (“Meinhold II”) (finding injunction over broad where it enjoined the Department of Defense from denying enlistment to anyone based on sexual orientation, and limiting injunction to the Department’s actions with respect, to the plaintiff); see also Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Assn., 10 F.3d 207, 217 (4th Cir.1993) (“Although injunctive relief should be designed to grant the full relief needed to remedy the injury to the prevailing party, it should not go beyond the extent of the established violation.”)."
} | 9,261,532 | a |
Vives seeks an injunction enjoining the NYPD, through Commissioner Raymond Kelly, from "arresting persons pursuant to section 240.30(1) of the Penal Law of the State of New York for the mailing of nonthreatening materials that are protected by the First Amendment when such materials are mailed with the intent to 'annoy' .or to 'alarm.' " Compl. at ad damnum clause P 5. Although the Court has no doubt that the enforcement of section 240.30(1) with respect to "annoying" or "alarming" conduct is unconstitutional as applied to anyone, see infra Part III.A.2, it is outside the scope of the Court's power to enjoin the NYPD from enforcing the statute against non-parties. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "34 F.3d 1469, 1480",
"parenthetical": "finding injunction over broad where it enjoined the Department of Defense from denying enlistment to anyone based on sexual orientation, and limiting injunction to the Department's actions with respect, to the plaintiff",
"sentence": "See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979) (“[IJnjunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.”); United States Dep’t of Defense v. Meinhold, 510 U.S. 939, 114 S.Ct. 374, 126 L.Ed.2d 324 (1993) (“Meinhold I”) (staying injunction, pending appeal, to the extent it granted relief to non-parties); Meinhold v. United States Dep’t of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1480 (9th Cir.1994) (“Meinhold II”) (finding injunction over broad where it enjoined the Department of Defense from denying enlistment to anyone based on sexual orientation, and limiting injunction to the Department’s actions with respect, to the plaintiff); see also Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Assn., 10 F.3d 207, 217 (4th Cir.1993) (“Although injunctive relief should be designed to grant the full relief needed to remedy the injury to the prevailing party, it should not go beyond the extent of the established violation.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "10 F.3d 207, 217",
"parenthetical": "\"Although injunctive relief should be designed to grant the full relief needed to remedy the injury to the prevailing party, it should not go beyond the extent of the established violation.\"",
"sentence": "See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979) (“[IJnjunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.”); United States Dep’t of Defense v. Meinhold, 510 U.S. 939, 114 S.Ct. 374, 126 L.Ed.2d 324 (1993) (“Meinhold I”) (staying injunction, pending appeal, to the extent it granted relief to non-parties); Meinhold v. United States Dep’t of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1480 (9th Cir.1994) (“Meinhold II”) (finding injunction over broad where it enjoined the Department of Defense from denying enlistment to anyone based on sexual orientation, and limiting injunction to the Department’s actions with respect, to the plaintiff); see also Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Assn., 10 F.3d 207, 217 (4th Cir.1993) (“Although injunctive relief should be designed to grant the full relief needed to remedy the injury to the prevailing party, it should not go beyond the extent of the established violation.”)."
} | 9,261,532 | a |
As the Second Circuit has observed, "[o]n a large parcel of land, a pond 300 feet away from a dwelling may be as intimately connected to the residence as is the backyard grill of the bloke next door." Nonetheless, even in rural areas, it is rare for curtilage to extend more than 100 feet beyond the home. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "229 F.3d 805, 817",
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court to not clearly err in finding that a distance of 100 feet is within the curtilage",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. Furrow, 229 F.3d 805, 817 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that the district court to not clearly err in finding that a distance of 100 feet is within the curtilage); Depew, 8 F.3d at 1427 (distance of 50 to 60 feet is within the curtilage)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "480 U.S. 297, 297, 302",
"parenthetical": "holding that deputies who approached within 90 feet of a rural residence were not within the boundaries of the curtilage",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dunn, 480 U.S. at 297, 302, 107 S.Ct. 1134 (holding that deputies who approached within 90 feet of a rural residence were not within the boundaries of the curtilage); United States v. Van Damme, 48 F.3d 461, 464 (9th Cir.1995) (200 feet is outside of the curtilage); United States v. Brady, 993 F.2d 177, 178 (9th Cir.1993) (45 feet is outside of the curtilage); United States v. Traynor, 990 F.2d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir.1993) (70 to 75 feet is outside of the curti-lage); United States v. Calabrese, 825 F.2d 1342, 1350 (9th Cir.1987) (50 feet is outside of the curtilage)."
} | 9,032,074 | b |
As the Second Circuit has observed, "[o]n a large parcel of land, a pond 300 feet away from a dwelling may be as intimately connected to the residence as is the backyard grill of the bloke next door." Nonetheless, even in rural areas, it is rare for curtilage to extend more than 100 feet beyond the home. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "480 U.S. 297, 297, 302",
"parenthetical": "holding that deputies who approached within 90 feet of a rural residence were not within the boundaries of the curtilage",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dunn, 480 U.S. at 297, 302, 107 S.Ct. 1134 (holding that deputies who approached within 90 feet of a rural residence were not within the boundaries of the curtilage); United States v. Van Damme, 48 F.3d 461, 464 (9th Cir.1995) (200 feet is outside of the curtilage); United States v. Brady, 993 F.2d 177, 178 (9th Cir.1993) (45 feet is outside of the curtilage); United States v. Traynor, 990 F.2d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir.1993) (70 to 75 feet is outside of the curti-lage); United States v. Calabrese, 825 F.2d 1342, 1350 (9th Cir.1987) (50 feet is outside of the curtilage)."
} | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "8 F.3d 1427, 1427",
"parenthetical": "distance of 50 to 60 feet is within the curtilage",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. Furrow, 229 F.3d 805, 817 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that the district court to not clearly err in finding that a distance of 100 feet is within the curtilage); Depew, 8 F.3d at 1427 (distance of 50 to 60 feet is within the curtilage)."
} | 9,032,074 | a |
As the Second Circuit has observed, "[o]n a large parcel of land, a pond 300 feet away from a dwelling may be as intimately connected to the residence as is the backyard grill of the bloke next door." Nonetheless, even in rural areas, it is rare for curtilage to extend more than 100 feet beyond the home. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "229 F.3d 805, 817",
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court to not clearly err in finding that a distance of 100 feet is within the curtilage",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. Furrow, 229 F.3d 805, 817 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that the district court to not clearly err in finding that a distance of 100 feet is within the curtilage); Depew, 8 F.3d at 1427 (distance of 50 to 60 feet is within the curtilage)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that deputies who approached within 90 feet of a rural residence were not within the boundaries of the curtilage",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dunn, 480 U.S. at 297, 302, 107 S.Ct. 1134 (holding that deputies who approached within 90 feet of a rural residence were not within the boundaries of the curtilage); United States v. Van Damme, 48 F.3d 461, 464 (9th Cir.1995) (200 feet is outside of the curtilage); United States v. Brady, 993 F.2d 177, 178 (9th Cir.1993) (45 feet is outside of the curtilage); United States v. Traynor, 990 F.2d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir.1993) (70 to 75 feet is outside of the curti-lage); United States v. Calabrese, 825 F.2d 1342, 1350 (9th Cir.1987) (50 feet is outside of the curtilage)."
} | 9,032,074 | b |
As the Second Circuit has observed, "[o]n a large parcel of land, a pond 300 feet away from a dwelling may be as intimately connected to the residence as is the backyard grill of the bloke next door." Nonetheless, even in rural areas, it is rare for curtilage to extend more than 100 feet beyond the home. | {
"signal": "but cf.",
"identifier": "8 F.3d 1427, 1427",
"parenthetical": "distance of 50 to 60 feet is within the curtilage",
"sentence": "But cf. United States v. Furrow, 229 F.3d 805, 817 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that the district court to not clearly err in finding that a distance of 100 feet is within the curtilage); Depew, 8 F.3d at 1427 (distance of 50 to 60 feet is within the curtilage)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that deputies who approached within 90 feet of a rural residence were not within the boundaries of the curtilage",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Dunn, 480 U.S. at 297, 302, 107 S.Ct. 1134 (holding that deputies who approached within 90 feet of a rural residence were not within the boundaries of the curtilage); United States v. Van Damme, 48 F.3d 461, 464 (9th Cir.1995) (200 feet is outside of the curtilage); United States v. Brady, 993 F.2d 177, 178 (9th Cir.1993) (45 feet is outside of the curtilage); United States v. Traynor, 990 F.2d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir.1993) (70 to 75 feet is outside of the curti-lage); United States v. Calabrese, 825 F.2d 1342, 1350 (9th Cir.1987) (50 feet is outside of the curtilage)."
} | 9,032,074 | b |
.To die extent that the claims could be construed as a mandamus action against HUD, they are dismissed because the Grand Manor Regulatory Agreement vests HUD with discretion, as opposed to non-discretionary ministerial duties required to support a mandamus action. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "607 F.2d 506, 512-13",
"parenthetical": "dismissing mandamus action by tenants \"challenging the pervasive failure of HUD to enforce its own regulations\" because \"[ojnly when the duty is clear and unmistakable is the extraordinary remedy of mandamus appropriate.\"",
"sentence": "See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (\"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.”); Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (\"The common-law writ of mandamus, as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1361, is intended to provide a remedy for a plaintiff ... only if the defendant owes him a clear nondiscretionary duty.\"); Hsieh v. Kiley, 569 F.2d 1179, 1182 (2d Cir.1978); see also Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506, 512-13 (1st Cir.1979) (dismissing mandamus action by tenants \"challenging the pervasive failure of HUD to enforce its own regulations” because \"[ojnly when the duty is clear and unmistakable is the extraordinary remedy of mandamus appropriate.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "466 U.S. 602, 616",
"parenthetical": "\"The common-law writ of mandamus, as codified in 28 U.S.C. SS 1361, is intended to provide a remedy for a plaintiff ... only if the defendant owes him a clear nondiscretionary duty.\"",
"sentence": "See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (\"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.”); Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (\"The common-law writ of mandamus, as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1361, is intended to provide a remedy for a plaintiff ... only if the defendant owes him a clear nondiscretionary duty.\"); Hsieh v. Kiley, 569 F.2d 1179, 1182 (2d Cir.1978); see also Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506, 512-13 (1st Cir.1979) (dismissing mandamus action by tenants \"challenging the pervasive failure of HUD to enforce its own regulations” because \"[ojnly when the duty is clear and unmistakable is the extraordinary remedy of mandamus appropriate.”)."
} | 4,224,346 | b |
.To die extent that the claims could be construed as a mandamus action against HUD, they are dismissed because the Grand Manor Regulatory Agreement vests HUD with discretion, as opposed to non-discretionary ministerial duties required to support a mandamus action. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "607 F.2d 506, 512-13",
"parenthetical": "dismissing mandamus action by tenants \"challenging the pervasive failure of HUD to enforce its own regulations\" because \"[ojnly when the duty is clear and unmistakable is the extraordinary remedy of mandamus appropriate.\"",
"sentence": "See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (\"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.”); Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (\"The common-law writ of mandamus, as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1361, is intended to provide a remedy for a plaintiff ... only if the defendant owes him a clear nondiscretionary duty.\"); Hsieh v. Kiley, 569 F.2d 1179, 1182 (2d Cir.1978); see also Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506, 512-13 (1st Cir.1979) (dismissing mandamus action by tenants \"challenging the pervasive failure of HUD to enforce its own regulations” because \"[ojnly when the duty is clear and unmistakable is the extraordinary remedy of mandamus appropriate.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The common-law writ of mandamus, as codified in 28 U.S.C. SS 1361, is intended to provide a remedy for a plaintiff ... only if the defendant owes him a clear nondiscretionary duty.\"",
"sentence": "See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (\"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.”); Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (\"The common-law writ of mandamus, as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1361, is intended to provide a remedy for a plaintiff ... only if the defendant owes him a clear nondiscretionary duty.\"); Hsieh v. Kiley, 569 F.2d 1179, 1182 (2d Cir.1978); see also Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506, 512-13 (1st Cir.1979) (dismissing mandamus action by tenants \"challenging the pervasive failure of HUD to enforce its own regulations” because \"[ojnly when the duty is clear and unmistakable is the extraordinary remedy of mandamus appropriate.”)."
} | 4,224,346 | b |
.To die extent that the claims could be construed as a mandamus action against HUD, they are dismissed because the Grand Manor Regulatory Agreement vests HUD with discretion, as opposed to non-discretionary ministerial duties required to support a mandamus action. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "607 F.2d 506, 512-13",
"parenthetical": "dismissing mandamus action by tenants \"challenging the pervasive failure of HUD to enforce its own regulations\" because \"[ojnly when the duty is clear and unmistakable is the extraordinary remedy of mandamus appropriate.\"",
"sentence": "See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (\"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.”); Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (\"The common-law writ of mandamus, as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1361, is intended to provide a remedy for a plaintiff ... only if the defendant owes him a clear nondiscretionary duty.\"); Hsieh v. Kiley, 569 F.2d 1179, 1182 (2d Cir.1978); see also Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506, 512-13 (1st Cir.1979) (dismissing mandamus action by tenants \"challenging the pervasive failure of HUD to enforce its own regulations” because \"[ojnly when the duty is clear and unmistakable is the extraordinary remedy of mandamus appropriate.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The common-law writ of mandamus, as codified in 28 U.S.C. SS 1361, is intended to provide a remedy for a plaintiff ... only if the defendant owes him a clear nondiscretionary duty.\"",
"sentence": "See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (\"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.”); Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984) (\"The common-law writ of mandamus, as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1361, is intended to provide a remedy for a plaintiff ... only if the defendant owes him a clear nondiscretionary duty.\"); Hsieh v. Kiley, 569 F.2d 1179, 1182 (2d Cir.1978); see also Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506, 512-13 (1st Cir.1979) (dismissing mandamus action by tenants \"challenging the pervasive failure of HUD to enforce its own regulations” because \"[ojnly when the duty is clear and unmistakable is the extraordinary remedy of mandamus appropriate.”)."
} | 4,224,346 | b |
While such a characterization is improper, it did not, in this case, constitute plain error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error",
"sentence": "See People v. Williams, 146 Ill. App.3d 767, 100 Ill.Dec. 399, 497 N.E.2d 377 (1986) (in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error); see also United States v. Tullos, 868 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were “liars” and “a crooked lawyer” who spoke with a “serpent’s tongue” were not plain error); Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo.1990) (prosecution’s reference to defendant as “leech,” a “blood sucker,” and “a predator on society” was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel’s failure to object); State v. Williams, 630 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.App.1981) (reference to defendant as “sex animal who thinks he’s doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse” was not plain error based on facts of attack); and De-Pauw v. State, 658 S.W.2d 628 (Tex.App. 1983) (closing argument that defendant was “a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim” was not plain error)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prosecutor's comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were \"liars\" and \"a crooked lawyer\" who spoke with a \"serpent's tongue\" were not plain error",
"sentence": "See People v. Williams, 146 Ill. App.3d 767, 100 Ill.Dec. 399, 497 N.E.2d 377 (1986) (in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error); see also United States v. Tullos, 868 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were “liars” and “a crooked lawyer” who spoke with a “serpent’s tongue” were not plain error); Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo.1990) (prosecution’s reference to defendant as “leech,” a “blood sucker,” and “a predator on society” was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel’s failure to object); State v. Williams, 630 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.App.1981) (reference to defendant as “sex animal who thinks he’s doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse” was not plain error based on facts of attack); and De-Pauw v. State, 658 S.W.2d 628 (Tex.App. 1983) (closing argument that defendant was “a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim” was not plain error)."
} | 10,351,711 | a |
While such a characterization is improper, it did not, in this case, constitute plain error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error",
"sentence": "See People v. Williams, 146 Ill. App.3d 767, 100 Ill.Dec. 399, 497 N.E.2d 377 (1986) (in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error); see also United States v. Tullos, 868 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were “liars” and “a crooked lawyer” who spoke with a “serpent’s tongue” were not plain error); Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo.1990) (prosecution’s reference to defendant as “leech,” a “blood sucker,” and “a predator on society” was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel’s failure to object); State v. Williams, 630 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.App.1981) (reference to defendant as “sex animal who thinks he’s doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse” was not plain error based on facts of attack); and De-Pauw v. State, 658 S.W.2d 628 (Tex.App. 1983) (closing argument that defendant was “a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim” was not plain error)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prosecution's reference to defendant as \"leech,\" a \"blood sucker,\" and \"a predator on society\" was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel's failure to object",
"sentence": "See People v. Williams, 146 Ill. App.3d 767, 100 Ill.Dec. 399, 497 N.E.2d 377 (1986) (in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error); see also United States v. Tullos, 868 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were “liars” and “a crooked lawyer” who spoke with a “serpent’s tongue” were not plain error); Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo.1990) (prosecution’s reference to defendant as “leech,” a “blood sucker,” and “a predator on society” was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel’s failure to object); State v. Williams, 630 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.App.1981) (reference to defendant as “sex animal who thinks he’s doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse” was not plain error based on facts of attack); and De-Pauw v. State, 658 S.W.2d 628 (Tex.App. 1983) (closing argument that defendant was “a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim” was not plain error)."
} | 10,351,711 | a |
While such a characterization is improper, it did not, in this case, constitute plain error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error",
"sentence": "See People v. Williams, 146 Ill. App.3d 767, 100 Ill.Dec. 399, 497 N.E.2d 377 (1986) (in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error); see also United States v. Tullos, 868 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were “liars” and “a crooked lawyer” who spoke with a “serpent’s tongue” were not plain error); Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo.1990) (prosecution’s reference to defendant as “leech,” a “blood sucker,” and “a predator on society” was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel’s failure to object); State v. Williams, 630 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.App.1981) (reference to defendant as “sex animal who thinks he’s doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse” was not plain error based on facts of attack); and De-Pauw v. State, 658 S.W.2d 628 (Tex.App. 1983) (closing argument that defendant was “a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim” was not plain error)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reference to defendant as \"sex animal who thinks he's doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse\" was not plain error based on facts of attack",
"sentence": "See People v. Williams, 146 Ill. App.3d 767, 100 Ill.Dec. 399, 497 N.E.2d 377 (1986) (in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error); see also United States v. Tullos, 868 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were “liars” and “a crooked lawyer” who spoke with a “serpent’s tongue” were not plain error); Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo.1990) (prosecution’s reference to defendant as “leech,” a “blood sucker,” and “a predator on society” was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel’s failure to object); State v. Williams, 630 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.App.1981) (reference to defendant as “sex animal who thinks he’s doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse” was not plain error based on facts of attack); and De-Pauw v. State, 658 S.W.2d 628 (Tex.App. 1983) (closing argument that defendant was “a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim” was not plain error)."
} | 10,351,711 | a |
While such a characterization is improper, it did not, in this case, constitute plain error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error",
"sentence": "See People v. Williams, 146 Ill. App.3d 767, 100 Ill.Dec. 399, 497 N.E.2d 377 (1986) (in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error); see also United States v. Tullos, 868 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were “liars” and “a crooked lawyer” who spoke with a “serpent’s tongue” were not plain error); Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo.1990) (prosecution’s reference to defendant as “leech,” a “blood sucker,” and “a predator on society” was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel’s failure to object); State v. Williams, 630 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.App.1981) (reference to defendant as “sex animal who thinks he’s doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse” was not plain error based on facts of attack); and De-Pauw v. State, 658 S.W.2d 628 (Tex.App. 1983) (closing argument that defendant was “a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim” was not plain error)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "closing argument that defendant was \"a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim\" was not plain error",
"sentence": "See People v. Williams, 146 Ill. App.3d 767, 100 Ill.Dec. 399, 497 N.E.2d 377 (1986) (in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error); see also United States v. Tullos, 868 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were “liars” and “a crooked lawyer” who spoke with a “serpent’s tongue” were not plain error); Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo.1990) (prosecution’s reference to defendant as “leech,” a “blood sucker,” and “a predator on society” was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel’s failure to object); State v. Williams, 630 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.App.1981) (reference to defendant as “sex animal who thinks he’s doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse” was not plain error based on facts of attack); and De-Pauw v. State, 658 S.W.2d 628 (Tex.App. 1983) (closing argument that defendant was “a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim” was not plain error)."
} | 10,351,711 | a |
While such a characterization is improper, it did not, in this case, constitute plain error. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prosecutor's comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were \"liars\" and \"a crooked lawyer\" who spoke with a \"serpent's tongue\" were not plain error",
"sentence": "See People v. Williams, 146 Ill. App.3d 767, 100 Ill.Dec. 399, 497 N.E.2d 377 (1986) (in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error); see also United States v. Tullos, 868 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were “liars” and “a crooked lawyer” who spoke with a “serpent’s tongue” were not plain error); Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo.1990) (prosecution’s reference to defendant as “leech,” a “blood sucker,” and “a predator on society” was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel’s failure to object); State v. Williams, 630 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.App.1981) (reference to defendant as “sex animal who thinks he’s doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse” was not plain error based on facts of attack); and De-Pauw v. State, 658 S.W.2d 628 (Tex.App. 1983) (closing argument that defendant was “a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim” was not plain error)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error",
"sentence": "See People v. Williams, 146 Ill. App.3d 767, 100 Ill.Dec. 399, 497 N.E.2d 377 (1986) (in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error); see also United States v. Tullos, 868 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were “liars” and “a crooked lawyer” who spoke with a “serpent’s tongue” were not plain error); Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo.1990) (prosecution’s reference to defendant as “leech,” a “blood sucker,” and “a predator on society” was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel’s failure to object); State v. Williams, 630 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.App.1981) (reference to defendant as “sex animal who thinks he’s doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse” was not plain error based on facts of attack); and De-Pauw v. State, 658 S.W.2d 628 (Tex.App. 1983) (closing argument that defendant was “a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim” was not plain error)."
} | 10,351,711 | b |
While such a characterization is improper, it did not, in this case, constitute plain error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error",
"sentence": "See People v. Williams, 146 Ill. App.3d 767, 100 Ill.Dec. 399, 497 N.E.2d 377 (1986) (in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error); see also United States v. Tullos, 868 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were “liars” and “a crooked lawyer” who spoke with a “serpent’s tongue” were not plain error); Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo.1990) (prosecution’s reference to defendant as “leech,” a “blood sucker,” and “a predator on society” was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel’s failure to object); State v. Williams, 630 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.App.1981) (reference to defendant as “sex animal who thinks he’s doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse” was not plain error based on facts of attack); and De-Pauw v. State, 658 S.W.2d 628 (Tex.App. 1983) (closing argument that defendant was “a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim” was not plain error)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prosecution's reference to defendant as \"leech,\" a \"blood sucker,\" and \"a predator on society\" was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel's failure to object",
"sentence": "See People v. Williams, 146 Ill. App.3d 767, 100 Ill.Dec. 399, 497 N.E.2d 377 (1986) (in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error); see also United States v. Tullos, 868 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were “liars” and “a crooked lawyer” who spoke with a “serpent’s tongue” were not plain error); Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo.1990) (prosecution’s reference to defendant as “leech,” a “blood sucker,” and “a predator on society” was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel’s failure to object); State v. Williams, 630 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.App.1981) (reference to defendant as “sex animal who thinks he’s doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse” was not plain error based on facts of attack); and De-Pauw v. State, 658 S.W.2d 628 (Tex.App. 1983) (closing argument that defendant was “a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim” was not plain error)."
} | 10,351,711 | a |
While such a characterization is improper, it did not, in this case, constitute plain error. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reference to defendant as \"sex animal who thinks he's doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse\" was not plain error based on facts of attack",
"sentence": "See People v. Williams, 146 Ill. App.3d 767, 100 Ill.Dec. 399, 497 N.E.2d 377 (1986) (in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error); see also United States v. Tullos, 868 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were “liars” and “a crooked lawyer” who spoke with a “serpent’s tongue” were not plain error); Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo.1990) (prosecution’s reference to defendant as “leech,” a “blood sucker,” and “a predator on society” was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel’s failure to object); State v. Williams, 630 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.App.1981) (reference to defendant as “sex animal who thinks he’s doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse” was not plain error based on facts of attack); and De-Pauw v. State, 658 S.W.2d 628 (Tex.App. 1983) (closing argument that defendant was “a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim” was not plain error)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error",
"sentence": "See People v. Williams, 146 Ill. App.3d 767, 100 Ill.Dec. 399, 497 N.E.2d 377 (1986) (in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error); see also United States v. Tullos, 868 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were “liars” and “a crooked lawyer” who spoke with a “serpent’s tongue” were not plain error); Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo.1990) (prosecution’s reference to defendant as “leech,” a “blood sucker,” and “a predator on society” was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel’s failure to object); State v. Williams, 630 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.App.1981) (reference to defendant as “sex animal who thinks he’s doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse” was not plain error based on facts of attack); and De-Pauw v. State, 658 S.W.2d 628 (Tex.App. 1983) (closing argument that defendant was “a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim” was not plain error)."
} | 10,351,711 | b |
While such a characterization is improper, it did not, in this case, constitute plain error. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "closing argument that defendant was \"a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim\" was not plain error",
"sentence": "See People v. Williams, 146 Ill. App.3d 767, 100 Ill.Dec. 399, 497 N.E.2d 377 (1986) (in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error); see also United States v. Tullos, 868 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were “liars” and “a crooked lawyer” who spoke with a “serpent’s tongue” were not plain error); Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo.1990) (prosecution’s reference to defendant as “leech,” a “blood sucker,” and “a predator on society” was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel’s failure to object); State v. Williams, 630 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.App.1981) (reference to defendant as “sex animal who thinks he’s doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse” was not plain error based on facts of attack); and De-Pauw v. State, 658 S.W.2d 628 (Tex.App. 1983) (closing argument that defendant was “a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim” was not plain error)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error",
"sentence": "See People v. Williams, 146 Ill. App.3d 767, 100 Ill.Dec. 399, 497 N.E.2d 377 (1986) (in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error); see also United States v. Tullos, 868 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were “liars” and “a crooked lawyer” who spoke with a “serpent’s tongue” were not plain error); Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo.1990) (prosecution’s reference to defendant as “leech,” a “blood sucker,” and “a predator on society” was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel’s failure to object); State v. Williams, 630 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.App.1981) (reference to defendant as “sex animal who thinks he’s doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse” was not plain error based on facts of attack); and De-Pauw v. State, 658 S.W.2d 628 (Tex.App. 1983) (closing argument that defendant was “a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim” was not plain error)."
} | 10,351,711 | b |
While such a characterization is improper, it did not, in this case, constitute plain error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error",
"sentence": "See People v. Williams, 146 Ill. App.3d 767, 100 Ill.Dec. 399, 497 N.E.2d 377 (1986) (in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error); see also United States v. Tullos, 868 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were “liars” and “a crooked lawyer” who spoke with a “serpent’s tongue” were not plain error); Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo.1990) (prosecution’s reference to defendant as “leech,” a “blood sucker,” and “a predator on society” was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel’s failure to object); State v. Williams, 630 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.App.1981) (reference to defendant as “sex animal who thinks he’s doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse” was not plain error based on facts of attack); and De-Pauw v. State, 658 S.W.2d 628 (Tex.App. 1983) (closing argument that defendant was “a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim” was not plain error)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prosecutor's comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were \"liars\" and \"a crooked lawyer\" who spoke with a \"serpent's tongue\" were not plain error",
"sentence": "See People v. Williams, 146 Ill. App.3d 767, 100 Ill.Dec. 399, 497 N.E.2d 377 (1986) (in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error); see also United States v. Tullos, 868 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were “liars” and “a crooked lawyer” who spoke with a “serpent’s tongue” were not plain error); Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo.1990) (prosecution’s reference to defendant as “leech,” a “blood sucker,” and “a predator on society” was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel’s failure to object); State v. Williams, 630 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.App.1981) (reference to defendant as “sex animal who thinks he’s doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse” was not plain error based on facts of attack); and De-Pauw v. State, 658 S.W.2d 628 (Tex.App. 1983) (closing argument that defendant was “a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim” was not plain error)."
} | 10,351,711 | a |
While such a characterization is improper, it did not, in this case, constitute plain error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error",
"sentence": "See People v. Williams, 146 Ill. App.3d 767, 100 Ill.Dec. 399, 497 N.E.2d 377 (1986) (in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error); see also United States v. Tullos, 868 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were “liars” and “a crooked lawyer” who spoke with a “serpent’s tongue” were not plain error); Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo.1990) (prosecution’s reference to defendant as “leech,” a “blood sucker,” and “a predator on society” was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel’s failure to object); State v. Williams, 630 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.App.1981) (reference to defendant as “sex animal who thinks he’s doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse” was not plain error based on facts of attack); and De-Pauw v. State, 658 S.W.2d 628 (Tex.App. 1983) (closing argument that defendant was “a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim” was not plain error)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "prosecution's reference to defendant as \"leech,\" a \"blood sucker,\" and \"a predator on society\" was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel's failure to object",
"sentence": "See People v. Williams, 146 Ill. App.3d 767, 100 Ill.Dec. 399, 497 N.E.2d 377 (1986) (in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error); see also United States v. Tullos, 868 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were “liars” and “a crooked lawyer” who spoke with a “serpent’s tongue” were not plain error); Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo.1990) (prosecution’s reference to defendant as “leech,” a “blood sucker,” and “a predator on society” was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel’s failure to object); State v. Williams, 630 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.App.1981) (reference to defendant as “sex animal who thinks he’s doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse” was not plain error based on facts of attack); and De-Pauw v. State, 658 S.W.2d 628 (Tex.App. 1983) (closing argument that defendant was “a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim” was not plain error)."
} | 10,351,711 | a |
While such a characterization is improper, it did not, in this case, constitute plain error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error",
"sentence": "See People v. Williams, 146 Ill. App.3d 767, 100 Ill.Dec. 399, 497 N.E.2d 377 (1986) (in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error); see also United States v. Tullos, 868 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were “liars” and “a crooked lawyer” who spoke with a “serpent’s tongue” were not plain error); Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo.1990) (prosecution’s reference to defendant as “leech,” a “blood sucker,” and “a predator on society” was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel’s failure to object); State v. Williams, 630 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.App.1981) (reference to defendant as “sex animal who thinks he’s doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse” was not plain error based on facts of attack); and De-Pauw v. State, 658 S.W.2d 628 (Tex.App. 1983) (closing argument that defendant was “a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim” was not plain error)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "reference to defendant as \"sex animal who thinks he's doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse\" was not plain error based on facts of attack",
"sentence": "See People v. Williams, 146 Ill. App.3d 767, 100 Ill.Dec. 399, 497 N.E.2d 377 (1986) (in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error); see also United States v. Tullos, 868 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were “liars” and “a crooked lawyer” who spoke with a “serpent’s tongue” were not plain error); Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo.1990) (prosecution’s reference to defendant as “leech,” a “blood sucker,” and “a predator on society” was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel’s failure to object); State v. Williams, 630 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.App.1981) (reference to defendant as “sex animal who thinks he’s doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse” was not plain error based on facts of attack); and De-Pauw v. State, 658 S.W.2d 628 (Tex.App. 1983) (closing argument that defendant was “a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim” was not plain error)."
} | 10,351,711 | a |
While such a characterization is improper, it did not, in this case, constitute plain error. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error",
"sentence": "See People v. Williams, 146 Ill. App.3d 767, 100 Ill.Dec. 399, 497 N.E.2d 377 (1986) (in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error); see also United States v. Tullos, 868 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were “liars” and “a crooked lawyer” who spoke with a “serpent’s tongue” were not plain error); Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo.1990) (prosecution’s reference to defendant as “leech,” a “blood sucker,” and “a predator on society” was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel’s failure to object); State v. Williams, 630 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.App.1981) (reference to defendant as “sex animal who thinks he’s doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse” was not plain error based on facts of attack); and De-Pauw v. State, 658 S.W.2d 628 (Tex.App. 1983) (closing argument that defendant was “a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim” was not plain error)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "closing argument that defendant was \"a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim\" was not plain error",
"sentence": "See People v. Williams, 146 Ill. App.3d 767, 100 Ill.Dec. 399, 497 N.E.2d 377 (1986) (in rape case, prosecutor s statements that defendant picked out, stalked, and captured his victim like a predator was not plain error); see also United States v. Tullos, 868 F.2d 689 (5th Cir.1989) (prosecutor’s comments, based on record evidence, that defendants were “liars” and “a crooked lawyer” who spoke with a “serpent’s tongue” were not plain error); Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339 (Wyo.1990) (prosecution’s reference to defendant as “leech,” a “blood sucker,” and “a predator on society” was not plain error in light of the evidence and trial counsel’s failure to object); State v. Williams, 630 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.App.1981) (reference to defendant as “sex animal who thinks he’s doing a girl a favor and shows no remorse” was not plain error based on facts of attack); and De-Pauw v. State, 658 S.W.2d 628 (Tex.App. 1983) (closing argument that defendant was “a shark [who] was swimming in that sea of troubled humanity [and] who silently, selectively, stalked, and slew his victim” was not plain error)."
} | 10,351,711 | a |
However, prejudice to the nonmoving party is not the only factor courts consider; the reasons for the delay are also relevant. Accordingly, a district court has discretion to deny leave to amend when the moving party's delay was the result of bad faith, dilatory tactics, or sheer inadvertence, or when the moving party offers no adequate explanation for a lengthy delay. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "357 F.3d 1213, 1218",
"parenthetical": "affirming the denial of leave to amend where the moving party offered no explanation for why she could not have included the proposed amended pleadings in her original complaint or her first amended complaint",
"sentence": "See Carruthers v. BSA Adver., Inc., 357 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir.2004) (affirming the denial of leave to amend where the moving party offered no explanation for why she could not have included the proposed amended pleadings in her original complaint or her first amended complaint); Campbell v. Emory Clinic, 166 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir.1999) (affirming denial where “[t]he facts upon which the claims ... were based were available at the time the complaints were filed”); Hester, 941 F.2d at 1579 (“Given the long history of this case, and the opportunities for [the plaintiff] to attempt to cure the deficiencies in the complaint, [the plaintiffs] proposed amendment was clearly untimely....”); see also Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. v. Garrity Oil Co., 884 F.2d 1510, 1517 (1st Cir.1989) (“[P]arties seeking the benefit of the rule’s liberality have an obligation to exercise due diligence ____”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "884 F.2d 1510, 1517",
"parenthetical": "\"[P]arties seeking the benefit of the rule's liberality have an obligation to exercise due diligence ____\"",
"sentence": "See Carruthers v. BSA Adver., Inc., 357 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir.2004) (affirming the denial of leave to amend where the moving party offered no explanation for why she could not have included the proposed amended pleadings in her original complaint or her first amended complaint); Campbell v. Emory Clinic, 166 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir.1999) (affirming denial where “[t]he facts upon which the claims ... were based were available at the time the complaints were filed”); Hester, 941 F.2d at 1579 (“Given the long history of this case, and the opportunities for [the plaintiff] to attempt to cure the deficiencies in the complaint, [the plaintiffs] proposed amendment was clearly untimely....”); see also Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. v. Garrity Oil Co., 884 F.2d 1510, 1517 (1st Cir.1989) (“[P]arties seeking the benefit of the rule’s liberality have an obligation to exercise due diligence ____”)."
} | 4,203,178 | a |
However, prejudice to the nonmoving party is not the only factor courts consider; the reasons for the delay are also relevant. Accordingly, a district court has discretion to deny leave to amend when the moving party's delay was the result of bad faith, dilatory tactics, or sheer inadvertence, or when the moving party offers no adequate explanation for a lengthy delay. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "884 F.2d 1510, 1517",
"parenthetical": "\"[P]arties seeking the benefit of the rule's liberality have an obligation to exercise due diligence ____\"",
"sentence": "See Carruthers v. BSA Adver., Inc., 357 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir.2004) (affirming the denial of leave to amend where the moving party offered no explanation for why she could not have included the proposed amended pleadings in her original complaint or her first amended complaint); Campbell v. Emory Clinic, 166 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir.1999) (affirming denial where “[t]he facts upon which the claims ... were based were available at the time the complaints were filed”); Hester, 941 F.2d at 1579 (“Given the long history of this case, and the opportunities for [the plaintiff] to attempt to cure the deficiencies in the complaint, [the plaintiffs] proposed amendment was clearly untimely....”); see also Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. v. Garrity Oil Co., 884 F.2d 1510, 1517 (1st Cir.1989) (“[P]arties seeking the benefit of the rule’s liberality have an obligation to exercise due diligence ____”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "166 F.3d 1157, 1162",
"parenthetical": "affirming denial where \"[t]he facts upon which the claims ... were based were available at the time the complaints were filed\"",
"sentence": "See Carruthers v. BSA Adver., Inc., 357 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir.2004) (affirming the denial of leave to amend where the moving party offered no explanation for why she could not have included the proposed amended pleadings in her original complaint or her first amended complaint); Campbell v. Emory Clinic, 166 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir.1999) (affirming denial where “[t]he facts upon which the claims ... were based were available at the time the complaints were filed”); Hester, 941 F.2d at 1579 (“Given the long history of this case, and the opportunities for [the plaintiff] to attempt to cure the deficiencies in the complaint, [the plaintiffs] proposed amendment was clearly untimely....”); see also Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. v. Garrity Oil Co., 884 F.2d 1510, 1517 (1st Cir.1989) (“[P]arties seeking the benefit of the rule’s liberality have an obligation to exercise due diligence ____”)."
} | 4,203,178 | b |
However, prejudice to the nonmoving party is not the only factor courts consider; the reasons for the delay are also relevant. Accordingly, a district court has discretion to deny leave to amend when the moving party's delay was the result of bad faith, dilatory tactics, or sheer inadvertence, or when the moving party offers no adequate explanation for a lengthy delay. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "884 F.2d 1510, 1517",
"parenthetical": "\"[P]arties seeking the benefit of the rule's liberality have an obligation to exercise due diligence ____\"",
"sentence": "See Carruthers v. BSA Adver., Inc., 357 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir.2004) (affirming the denial of leave to amend where the moving party offered no explanation for why she could not have included the proposed amended pleadings in her original complaint or her first amended complaint); Campbell v. Emory Clinic, 166 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir.1999) (affirming denial where “[t]he facts upon which the claims ... were based were available at the time the complaints were filed”); Hester, 941 F.2d at 1579 (“Given the long history of this case, and the opportunities for [the plaintiff] to attempt to cure the deficiencies in the complaint, [the plaintiffs] proposed amendment was clearly untimely....”); see also Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. v. Garrity Oil Co., 884 F.2d 1510, 1517 (1st Cir.1989) (“[P]arties seeking the benefit of the rule’s liberality have an obligation to exercise due diligence ____”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "941 F.2d 1579, 1579",
"parenthetical": "\"Given the long history of this case, and the opportunities for [the plaintiff] to attempt to cure the deficiencies in the complaint, [the plaintiffs] proposed amendment was clearly untimely....\"",
"sentence": "See Carruthers v. BSA Adver., Inc., 357 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir.2004) (affirming the denial of leave to amend where the moving party offered no explanation for why she could not have included the proposed amended pleadings in her original complaint or her first amended complaint); Campbell v. Emory Clinic, 166 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir.1999) (affirming denial where “[t]he facts upon which the claims ... were based were available at the time the complaints were filed”); Hester, 941 F.2d at 1579 (“Given the long history of this case, and the opportunities for [the plaintiff] to attempt to cure the deficiencies in the complaint, [the plaintiffs] proposed amendment was clearly untimely....”); see also Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. v. Garrity Oil Co., 884 F.2d 1510, 1517 (1st Cir.1989) (“[P]arties seeking the benefit of the rule’s liberality have an obligation to exercise due diligence ____”)."
} | 4,203,178 | b |
Other courts, however, have neglected to restrict the "good cause" test to claimants alone, opting instead to apply the "good cause" test to both the claimant and the Commissioner. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "1994 WL 414299, at *2",
"parenthetical": "denying the Commissioner's motion to remand where the plaintiff has not consented to remand and where the Commissioner failed to introduce new and material evidence and show good cause why the evidence was not introduced at the prior administrative proceeding",
"sentence": "See Schaefer, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2629 (construing the statutory language as allowing a remand “where new, material evidence is adduced that was for good cause not presented before the agency”); see also Formica, Civ. No. 2:92CV00084(AHN), 1994 WL 414299, at *2 (denying the Commissioner’s motion to remand where the plaintiff has not consented to remand and where the Commissioner failed to introduce new and material evidence and show good cause why the evidence was not introduced at the prior administrative proceeding); Hodges v. Secretary of HHS, No. 87-CV-625, 1989 WL 281926, at *5 n. 3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1989) (denying remand where the Commissioner failed to show the existence of new, material evidence and good cause for failure to obtain such evidence for the record); Rivera Sanchez v. Secretary of HHS, 786 F.Supp. 147, 149 (D.P.R.1992) (finding Commissioner’s motion to remand presented good cause for remand where the ALJ needed to “further develop the evidence regarding plaintiffs back disorder, psychiatric condition and mental residual functional capacity, as well as further develop the vocational evidence as necessary”); Spurlock, 783 F.Supp. at 478 (requiring Commissioner to show good cause for failing to consider new evidence in the prior proceedings)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "113 S.Ct. 2629, 2629",
"parenthetical": "construing the statutory language as allowing a remand \"where new, material evidence is adduced that was for good cause not presented before the agency\"",
"sentence": "See Schaefer, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2629 (construing the statutory language as allowing a remand “where new, material evidence is adduced that was for good cause not presented before the agency”); see also Formica, Civ. No. 2:92CV00084(AHN), 1994 WL 414299, at *2 (denying the Commissioner’s motion to remand where the plaintiff has not consented to remand and where the Commissioner failed to introduce new and material evidence and show good cause why the evidence was not introduced at the prior administrative proceeding); Hodges v. Secretary of HHS, No. 87-CV-625, 1989 WL 281926, at *5 n. 3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1989) (denying remand where the Commissioner failed to show the existence of new, material evidence and good cause for failure to obtain such evidence for the record); Rivera Sanchez v. Secretary of HHS, 786 F.Supp. 147, 149 (D.P.R.1992) (finding Commissioner’s motion to remand presented good cause for remand where the ALJ needed to “further develop the evidence regarding plaintiffs back disorder, psychiatric condition and mental residual functional capacity, as well as further develop the vocational evidence as necessary”); Spurlock, 783 F.Supp. at 478 (requiring Commissioner to show good cause for failing to consider new evidence in the prior proceedings)."
} | 7,841,897 | b |
Other courts, however, have neglected to restrict the "good cause" test to claimants alone, opting instead to apply the "good cause" test to both the claimant and the Commissioner. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "denying remand where the Commissioner failed to show the existence of new, material evidence and good cause for failure to obtain such evidence for the record",
"sentence": "See Schaefer, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2629 (construing the statutory language as allowing a remand “where new, material evidence is adduced that was for good cause not presented before the agency”); see also Formica, Civ. No. 2:92CV00084(AHN), 1994 WL 414299, at *2 (denying the Commissioner’s motion to remand where the plaintiff has not consented to remand and where the Commissioner failed to introduce new and material evidence and show good cause why the evidence was not introduced at the prior administrative proceeding); Hodges v. Secretary of HHS, No. 87-CV-625, 1989 WL 281926, at *5 n. 3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1989) (denying remand where the Commissioner failed to show the existence of new, material evidence and good cause for failure to obtain such evidence for the record); Rivera Sanchez v. Secretary of HHS, 786 F.Supp. 147, 149 (D.P.R.1992) (finding Commissioner’s motion to remand presented good cause for remand where the ALJ needed to “further develop the evidence regarding plaintiffs back disorder, psychiatric condition and mental residual functional capacity, as well as further develop the vocational evidence as necessary”); Spurlock, 783 F.Supp. at 478 (requiring Commissioner to show good cause for failing to consider new evidence in the prior proceedings)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "113 S.Ct. 2629, 2629",
"parenthetical": "construing the statutory language as allowing a remand \"where new, material evidence is adduced that was for good cause not presented before the agency\"",
"sentence": "See Schaefer, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2629 (construing the statutory language as allowing a remand “where new, material evidence is adduced that was for good cause not presented before the agency”); see also Formica, Civ. No. 2:92CV00084(AHN), 1994 WL 414299, at *2 (denying the Commissioner’s motion to remand where the plaintiff has not consented to remand and where the Commissioner failed to introduce new and material evidence and show good cause why the evidence was not introduced at the prior administrative proceeding); Hodges v. Secretary of HHS, No. 87-CV-625, 1989 WL 281926, at *5 n. 3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1989) (denying remand where the Commissioner failed to show the existence of new, material evidence and good cause for failure to obtain such evidence for the record); Rivera Sanchez v. Secretary of HHS, 786 F.Supp. 147, 149 (D.P.R.1992) (finding Commissioner’s motion to remand presented good cause for remand where the ALJ needed to “further develop the evidence regarding plaintiffs back disorder, psychiatric condition and mental residual functional capacity, as well as further develop the vocational evidence as necessary”); Spurlock, 783 F.Supp. at 478 (requiring Commissioner to show good cause for failing to consider new evidence in the prior proceedings)."
} | 7,841,897 | b |
Other courts, however, have neglected to restrict the "good cause" test to claimants alone, opting instead to apply the "good cause" test to both the claimant and the Commissioner. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "113 S.Ct. 2629, 2629",
"parenthetical": "construing the statutory language as allowing a remand \"where new, material evidence is adduced that was for good cause not presented before the agency\"",
"sentence": "See Schaefer, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2629 (construing the statutory language as allowing a remand “where new, material evidence is adduced that was for good cause not presented before the agency”); see also Formica, Civ. No. 2:92CV00084(AHN), 1994 WL 414299, at *2 (denying the Commissioner’s motion to remand where the plaintiff has not consented to remand and where the Commissioner failed to introduce new and material evidence and show good cause why the evidence was not introduced at the prior administrative proceeding); Hodges v. Secretary of HHS, No. 87-CV-625, 1989 WL 281926, at *5 n. 3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1989) (denying remand where the Commissioner failed to show the existence of new, material evidence and good cause for failure to obtain such evidence for the record); Rivera Sanchez v. Secretary of HHS, 786 F.Supp. 147, 149 (D.P.R.1992) (finding Commissioner’s motion to remand presented good cause for remand where the ALJ needed to “further develop the evidence regarding plaintiffs back disorder, psychiatric condition and mental residual functional capacity, as well as further develop the vocational evidence as necessary”); Spurlock, 783 F.Supp. at 478 (requiring Commissioner to show good cause for failing to consider new evidence in the prior proceedings)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "786 F.Supp. 147, 149",
"parenthetical": "finding Commissioner's motion to remand presented good cause for remand where the ALJ needed to \"further develop the evidence regarding plaintiffs back disorder, psychiatric condition and mental residual functional capacity, as well as further develop the vocational evidence as necessary\"",
"sentence": "See Schaefer, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2629 (construing the statutory language as allowing a remand “where new, material evidence is adduced that was for good cause not presented before the agency”); see also Formica, Civ. No. 2:92CV00084(AHN), 1994 WL 414299, at *2 (denying the Commissioner’s motion to remand where the plaintiff has not consented to remand and where the Commissioner failed to introduce new and material evidence and show good cause why the evidence was not introduced at the prior administrative proceeding); Hodges v. Secretary of HHS, No. 87-CV-625, 1989 WL 281926, at *5 n. 3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1989) (denying remand where the Commissioner failed to show the existence of new, material evidence and good cause for failure to obtain such evidence for the record); Rivera Sanchez v. Secretary of HHS, 786 F.Supp. 147, 149 (D.P.R.1992) (finding Commissioner’s motion to remand presented good cause for remand where the ALJ needed to “further develop the evidence regarding plaintiffs back disorder, psychiatric condition and mental residual functional capacity, as well as further develop the vocational evidence as necessary”); Spurlock, 783 F.Supp. at 478 (requiring Commissioner to show good cause for failing to consider new evidence in the prior proceedings)."
} | 7,841,897 | a |
Other courts, however, have neglected to restrict the "good cause" test to claimants alone, opting instead to apply the "good cause" test to both the claimant and the Commissioner. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "113 S.Ct. 2629, 2629",
"parenthetical": "construing the statutory language as allowing a remand \"where new, material evidence is adduced that was for good cause not presented before the agency\"",
"sentence": "See Schaefer, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2629 (construing the statutory language as allowing a remand “where new, material evidence is adduced that was for good cause not presented before the agency”); see also Formica, Civ. No. 2:92CV00084(AHN), 1994 WL 414299, at *2 (denying the Commissioner’s motion to remand where the plaintiff has not consented to remand and where the Commissioner failed to introduce new and material evidence and show good cause why the evidence was not introduced at the prior administrative proceeding); Hodges v. Secretary of HHS, No. 87-CV-625, 1989 WL 281926, at *5 n. 3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1989) (denying remand where the Commissioner failed to show the existence of new, material evidence and good cause for failure to obtain such evidence for the record); Rivera Sanchez v. Secretary of HHS, 786 F.Supp. 147, 149 (D.P.R.1992) (finding Commissioner’s motion to remand presented good cause for remand where the ALJ needed to “further develop the evidence regarding plaintiffs back disorder, psychiatric condition and mental residual functional capacity, as well as further develop the vocational evidence as necessary”); Spurlock, 783 F.Supp. at 478 (requiring Commissioner to show good cause for failing to consider new evidence in the prior proceedings)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "783 F.Supp. 478, 478",
"parenthetical": "requiring Commissioner to show good cause for failing to consider new evidence in the prior proceedings",
"sentence": "See Schaefer, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2629 (construing the statutory language as allowing a remand “where new, material evidence is adduced that was for good cause not presented before the agency”); see also Formica, Civ. No. 2:92CV00084(AHN), 1994 WL 414299, at *2 (denying the Commissioner’s motion to remand where the plaintiff has not consented to remand and where the Commissioner failed to introduce new and material evidence and show good cause why the evidence was not introduced at the prior administrative proceeding); Hodges v. Secretary of HHS, No. 87-CV-625, 1989 WL 281926, at *5 n. 3 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 1989) (denying remand where the Commissioner failed to show the existence of new, material evidence and good cause for failure to obtain such evidence for the record); Rivera Sanchez v. Secretary of HHS, 786 F.Supp. 147, 149 (D.P.R.1992) (finding Commissioner’s motion to remand presented good cause for remand where the ALJ needed to “further develop the evidence regarding plaintiffs back disorder, psychiatric condition and mental residual functional capacity, as well as further develop the vocational evidence as necessary”); Spurlock, 783 F.Supp. at 478 (requiring Commissioner to show good cause for failing to consider new evidence in the prior proceedings)."
} | 7,841,897 | a |
Even the Defendants appear to concede the existence of choice-of-law problems regardless of where the trial occurs; for instance, one defense expert explained that even though the Swiss action invokes contractual claims under Argentine law, "because [some of] the assets are located in Switzerland, Swiss law may govern certain of the legal issues in the action." (Russenberger Decl. P 13.) In sum, then, the Court believes that this trial will be difficult regardless of where it takes place, and thus the Gilbert private factors do not weigh strongly in favor of the Defendants. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "942 F.2d 168, 168-69",
"parenthetical": "holding that need to apply foreign law was not dispositive factor, especially where key evidence regarding production and condition of goods was located in New York",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Peregrine, 89 F.3d at 46-47 (denying forum non conveniens motion in part because critical documents were located in New York and witnesses would be forced to travel regardless of where trial took place); Herbstein, 743 F.Supp. at 189 (finding that existence of American defendants, who committed acts of fraud in this country, weighed heavily in favor of maintaining action in United States); see also Maganlal, 942 F.2d at 168-69 (holding that need to apply foreign law was not dispositive factor, especially where key evidence regarding production and condition of goods was located in New York)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "89 F.3d 46, 46-47",
"parenthetical": "denying forum non conveniens motion in part because critical documents were located in New York and witnesses would be forced to travel regardless of where trial took place",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Peregrine, 89 F.3d at 46-47 (denying forum non conveniens motion in part because critical documents were located in New York and witnesses would be forced to travel regardless of where trial took place); Herbstein, 743 F.Supp. at 189 (finding that existence of American defendants, who committed acts of fraud in this country, weighed heavily in favor of maintaining action in United States); see also Maganlal, 942 F.2d at 168-69 (holding that need to apply foreign law was not dispositive factor, especially where key evidence regarding production and condition of goods was located in New York)."
} | 1,140,584 | b |
Even the Defendants appear to concede the existence of choice-of-law problems regardless of where the trial occurs; for instance, one defense expert explained that even though the Swiss action invokes contractual claims under Argentine law, "because [some of] the assets are located in Switzerland, Swiss law may govern certain of the legal issues in the action." (Russenberger Decl. P 13.) In sum, then, the Court believes that this trial will be difficult regardless of where it takes place, and thus the Gilbert private factors do not weigh strongly in favor of the Defendants. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "743 F.Supp. 189, 189",
"parenthetical": "finding that existence of American defendants, who committed acts of fraud in this country, weighed heavily in favor of maintaining action in United States",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Peregrine, 89 F.3d at 46-47 (denying forum non conveniens motion in part because critical documents were located in New York and witnesses would be forced to travel regardless of where trial took place); Herbstein, 743 F.Supp. at 189 (finding that existence of American defendants, who committed acts of fraud in this country, weighed heavily in favor of maintaining action in United States); see also Maganlal, 942 F.2d at 168-69 (holding that need to apply foreign law was not dispositive factor, especially where key evidence regarding production and condition of goods was located in New York)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "942 F.2d 168, 168-69",
"parenthetical": "holding that need to apply foreign law was not dispositive factor, especially where key evidence regarding production and condition of goods was located in New York",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Peregrine, 89 F.3d at 46-47 (denying forum non conveniens motion in part because critical documents were located in New York and witnesses would be forced to travel regardless of where trial took place); Herbstein, 743 F.Supp. at 189 (finding that existence of American defendants, who committed acts of fraud in this country, weighed heavily in favor of maintaining action in United States); see also Maganlal, 942 F.2d at 168-69 (holding that need to apply foreign law was not dispositive factor, especially where key evidence regarding production and condition of goods was located in New York)."
} | 1,140,584 | a |
In Hall, we enunciated the standard practice a district judge should follow when he or she needs more time to determine an amount of restitution. Specifically, a district judge should expressly enter an order of continuance and conduct a second hearing in open court with the defendant present. Although we recognized in Hall that there have been no " 'magic words' " required from a district judge under Cooper and its progeny to continue a sentencing from one hearing to the next and enable setting of a final restitution amount, more than nothing has nevertheless been the rule. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "37 Kan. App. 2d 924, 925, 927-31",
"parenthetical": "judge ordered restitution with \"amount to be determined within 30 days\"",
"sentence": "Hall, 298 Kan. at 987; see, e.g., Cooper, 267 Kan. at 16, 18-19 (judge ordered restitution “with that amount to be determined within 30 days”); see also State v. Phillips, 45 Kan. App. 2d 788, 790-93, 253 P.3d 372 (2011) (defendant contested restitution amount at sentencing; parties agreed, judge ordered evidentiary hearing on amount of restitution); State v. Bryant, 37 Kan. App. 2d 924, 925, 927-31, 163 P.3d 325 (judge ordered restitution with “amount to be determined within 30 days”), rev. denied 285 Kan. 1175 (2007); State v. Lang, No. 104, 714, 2011 WL 6943098, at *1-2 (Kan. App. 2011) (unpublished opinion) (restitution ordered but judge decided to “leave that amount open” for later hearing); State v. Lewis, No. 101,127, 2010 WL 2502873, at *5-6 (Kan. App. 2010) (unpublished opinion) (judge held issue of restitution “open”), rev. denied 292 Kan. 968 (2011); State v. Wagoner, No. 100,180, 2009 WL 1692248, at *1-2 (Kan. App. 2009) (unpublished opinion) (district court failed to reserve ruling on restitution at sentencing; lacked jurisdiction to increase restitution amount later)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "267 Kan. 16, 16, 18-19",
"parenthetical": "judge ordered restitution \"with that amount to be determined within 30 days\"",
"sentence": "Hall, 298 Kan. at 987; see, e.g., Cooper, 267 Kan. at 16, 18-19 (judge ordered restitution “with that amount to be determined within 30 days”); see also State v. Phillips, 45 Kan. App. 2d 788, 790-93, 253 P.3d 372 (2011) (defendant contested restitution amount at sentencing; parties agreed, judge ordered evidentiary hearing on amount of restitution); State v. Bryant, 37 Kan. App. 2d 924, 925, 927-31, 163 P.3d 325 (judge ordered restitution with “amount to be determined within 30 days”), rev. denied 285 Kan. 1175 (2007); State v. Lang, No. 104, 714, 2011 WL 6943098, at *1-2 (Kan. App. 2011) (unpublished opinion) (restitution ordered but judge decided to “leave that amount open” for later hearing); State v. Lewis, No. 101,127, 2010 WL 2502873, at *5-6 (Kan. App. 2010) (unpublished opinion) (judge held issue of restitution “open”), rev. denied 292 Kan. 968 (2011); State v. Wagoner, No. 100,180, 2009 WL 1692248, at *1-2 (Kan. App. 2009) (unpublished opinion) (district court failed to reserve ruling on restitution at sentencing; lacked jurisdiction to increase restitution amount later)."
} | 12,417,296 | b |
In Hall, we enunciated the standard practice a district judge should follow when he or she needs more time to determine an amount of restitution. Specifically, a district judge should expressly enter an order of continuance and conduct a second hearing in open court with the defendant present. Although we recognized in Hall that there have been no " 'magic words' " required from a district judge under Cooper and its progeny to continue a sentencing from one hearing to the next and enable setting of a final restitution amount, more than nothing has nevertheless been the rule. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "267 Kan. 16, 16, 18-19",
"parenthetical": "judge ordered restitution \"with that amount to be determined within 30 days\"",
"sentence": "Hall, 298 Kan. at 987; see, e.g., Cooper, 267 Kan. at 16, 18-19 (judge ordered restitution “with that amount to be determined within 30 days”); see also State v. Phillips, 45 Kan. App. 2d 788, 790-93, 253 P.3d 372 (2011) (defendant contested restitution amount at sentencing; parties agreed, judge ordered evidentiary hearing on amount of restitution); State v. Bryant, 37 Kan. App. 2d 924, 925, 927-31, 163 P.3d 325 (judge ordered restitution with “amount to be determined within 30 days”), rev. denied 285 Kan. 1175 (2007); State v. Lang, No. 104, 714, 2011 WL 6943098, at *1-2 (Kan. App. 2011) (unpublished opinion) (restitution ordered but judge decided to “leave that amount open” for later hearing); State v. Lewis, No. 101,127, 2010 WL 2502873, at *5-6 (Kan. App. 2010) (unpublished opinion) (judge held issue of restitution “open”), rev. denied 292 Kan. 968 (2011); State v. Wagoner, No. 100,180, 2009 WL 1692248, at *1-2 (Kan. App. 2009) (unpublished opinion) (district court failed to reserve ruling on restitution at sentencing; lacked jurisdiction to increase restitution amount later)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "judge ordered restitution with \"amount to be determined within 30 days\"",
"sentence": "Hall, 298 Kan. at 987; see, e.g., Cooper, 267 Kan. at 16, 18-19 (judge ordered restitution “with that amount to be determined within 30 days”); see also State v. Phillips, 45 Kan. App. 2d 788, 790-93, 253 P.3d 372 (2011) (defendant contested restitution amount at sentencing; parties agreed, judge ordered evidentiary hearing on amount of restitution); State v. Bryant, 37 Kan. App. 2d 924, 925, 927-31, 163 P.3d 325 (judge ordered restitution with “amount to be determined within 30 days”), rev. denied 285 Kan. 1175 (2007); State v. Lang, No. 104, 714, 2011 WL 6943098, at *1-2 (Kan. App. 2011) (unpublished opinion) (restitution ordered but judge decided to “leave that amount open” for later hearing); State v. Lewis, No. 101,127, 2010 WL 2502873, at *5-6 (Kan. App. 2010) (unpublished opinion) (judge held issue of restitution “open”), rev. denied 292 Kan. 968 (2011); State v. Wagoner, No. 100,180, 2009 WL 1692248, at *1-2 (Kan. App. 2009) (unpublished opinion) (district court failed to reserve ruling on restitution at sentencing; lacked jurisdiction to increase restitution amount later)."
} | 12,417,296 | a |
In Hall, we enunciated the standard practice a district judge should follow when he or she needs more time to determine an amount of restitution. Specifically, a district judge should expressly enter an order of continuance and conduct a second hearing in open court with the defendant present. Although we recognized in Hall that there have been no " 'magic words' " required from a district judge under Cooper and its progeny to continue a sentencing from one hearing to the next and enable setting of a final restitution amount, more than nothing has nevertheless been the rule. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "judge ordered restitution with \"amount to be determined within 30 days\"",
"sentence": "Hall, 298 Kan. at 987; see, e.g., Cooper, 267 Kan. at 16, 18-19 (judge ordered restitution “with that amount to be determined within 30 days”); see also State v. Phillips, 45 Kan. App. 2d 788, 790-93, 253 P.3d 372 (2011) (defendant contested restitution amount at sentencing; parties agreed, judge ordered evidentiary hearing on amount of restitution); State v. Bryant, 37 Kan. App. 2d 924, 925, 927-31, 163 P.3d 325 (judge ordered restitution with “amount to be determined within 30 days”), rev. denied 285 Kan. 1175 (2007); State v. Lang, No. 104, 714, 2011 WL 6943098, at *1-2 (Kan. App. 2011) (unpublished opinion) (restitution ordered but judge decided to “leave that amount open” for later hearing); State v. Lewis, No. 101,127, 2010 WL 2502873, at *5-6 (Kan. App. 2010) (unpublished opinion) (judge held issue of restitution “open”), rev. denied 292 Kan. 968 (2011); State v. Wagoner, No. 100,180, 2009 WL 1692248, at *1-2 (Kan. App. 2009) (unpublished opinion) (district court failed to reserve ruling on restitution at sentencing; lacked jurisdiction to increase restitution amount later)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "267 Kan. 16, 16, 18-19",
"parenthetical": "judge ordered restitution \"with that amount to be determined within 30 days\"",
"sentence": "Hall, 298 Kan. at 987; see, e.g., Cooper, 267 Kan. at 16, 18-19 (judge ordered restitution “with that amount to be determined within 30 days”); see also State v. Phillips, 45 Kan. App. 2d 788, 790-93, 253 P.3d 372 (2011) (defendant contested restitution amount at sentencing; parties agreed, judge ordered evidentiary hearing on amount of restitution); State v. Bryant, 37 Kan. App. 2d 924, 925, 927-31, 163 P.3d 325 (judge ordered restitution with “amount to be determined within 30 days”), rev. denied 285 Kan. 1175 (2007); State v. Lang, No. 104, 714, 2011 WL 6943098, at *1-2 (Kan. App. 2011) (unpublished opinion) (restitution ordered but judge decided to “leave that amount open” for later hearing); State v. Lewis, No. 101,127, 2010 WL 2502873, at *5-6 (Kan. App. 2010) (unpublished opinion) (judge held issue of restitution “open”), rev. denied 292 Kan. 968 (2011); State v. Wagoner, No. 100,180, 2009 WL 1692248, at *1-2 (Kan. App. 2009) (unpublished opinion) (district court failed to reserve ruling on restitution at sentencing; lacked jurisdiction to increase restitution amount later)."
} | 12,417,296 | b |
Rather, they embody the positions and opinions of individual staff members, which the agency ultimately declined to accept. Our conclusion is in accord with other circuits that have held that interim agency reports or preliminary memoranda do not satisfy Rule 803(8)(C)'s requirements. See Figures y. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "967 F.2d 357, 360",
"parenthetical": "holding that a draft of a proposed letter from an area director of a government agency to a municipal administrative agency was properly excluded because it did not represent an agency finding",
"sentence": "Board of Pub. Util., 967 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir.1992) (holding that a draft of a proposed letter from an area director of a government agency to a municipal administrative agency was properly excluded because it did not represent an agency finding); United States v. Gray, 852 F.2d 136,139 (4th Cir.1988) (holding that the district court properly refused to admit a tentative internal IRS referral report because it did not contain “agency factual findings”); City of New York v. Pullman, Inc., 662 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.1981)(holding that an interim recommendation by a transit authority staff member to the transit authority administrator was not a factual finding of an agency within the meaning of Rule 803(8)(C)); cf. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Austin Travel Corp., 867 F.2d 737, 743 (2d Cir.1989) (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding government reports that the district court concluded were untrustworthy because of the “interim or inconclusive nature of the reports ____”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "867 F.2d 737, 743",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding government reports that the district court concluded were untrustworthy because of the \"interim or inconclusive nature of the reports ____\"",
"sentence": "Board of Pub. Util., 967 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir.1992) (holding that a draft of a proposed letter from an area director of a government agency to a municipal administrative agency was properly excluded because it did not represent an agency finding); United States v. Gray, 852 F.2d 136,139 (4th Cir.1988) (holding that the district court properly refused to admit a tentative internal IRS referral report because it did not contain “agency factual findings”); City of New York v. Pullman, Inc., 662 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.1981)(holding that an interim recommendation by a transit authority staff member to the transit authority administrator was not a factual finding of an agency within the meaning of Rule 803(8)(C)); cf. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Austin Travel Corp., 867 F.2d 737, 743 (2d Cir.1989) (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding government reports that the district court concluded were untrustworthy because of the “interim or inconclusive nature of the reports ____”)."
} | 105,959 | a |
Rather, they embody the positions and opinions of individual staff members, which the agency ultimately declined to accept. Our conclusion is in accord with other circuits that have held that interim agency reports or preliminary memoranda do not satisfy Rule 803(8)(C)'s requirements. See Figures y. | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "867 F.2d 737, 743",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding government reports that the district court concluded were untrustworthy because of the \"interim or inconclusive nature of the reports ____\"",
"sentence": "Board of Pub. Util., 967 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir.1992) (holding that a draft of a proposed letter from an area director of a government agency to a municipal administrative agency was properly excluded because it did not represent an agency finding); United States v. Gray, 852 F.2d 136,139 (4th Cir.1988) (holding that the district court properly refused to admit a tentative internal IRS referral report because it did not contain “agency factual findings”); City of New York v. Pullman, Inc., 662 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.1981)(holding that an interim recommendation by a transit authority staff member to the transit authority administrator was not a factual finding of an agency within the meaning of Rule 803(8)(C)); cf. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Austin Travel Corp., 867 F.2d 737, 743 (2d Cir.1989) (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding government reports that the district court concluded were untrustworthy because of the “interim or inconclusive nature of the reports ____”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "852 F.2d 136, 139",
"parenthetical": "holding that the district court properly refused to admit a tentative internal IRS referral report because it did not contain \"agency factual findings\"",
"sentence": "Board of Pub. Util., 967 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir.1992) (holding that a draft of a proposed letter from an area director of a government agency to a municipal administrative agency was properly excluded because it did not represent an agency finding); United States v. Gray, 852 F.2d 136,139 (4th Cir.1988) (holding that the district court properly refused to admit a tentative internal IRS referral report because it did not contain “agency factual findings”); City of New York v. Pullman, Inc., 662 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.1981)(holding that an interim recommendation by a transit authority staff member to the transit authority administrator was not a factual finding of an agency within the meaning of Rule 803(8)(C)); cf. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Austin Travel Corp., 867 F.2d 737, 743 (2d Cir.1989) (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding government reports that the district court concluded were untrustworthy because of the “interim or inconclusive nature of the reports ____”)."
} | 105,959 | b |
Rather, they embody the positions and opinions of individual staff members, which the agency ultimately declined to accept. Our conclusion is in accord with other circuits that have held that interim agency reports or preliminary memoranda do not satisfy Rule 803(8)(C)'s requirements. See Figures y. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that an interim recommendation by a transit authority staff member to the transit authority administrator was not a factual finding of an agency within the meaning of Rule 803(8",
"sentence": "Board of Pub. Util., 967 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir.1992) (holding that a draft of a proposed letter from an area director of a government agency to a municipal administrative agency was properly excluded because it did not represent an agency finding); United States v. Gray, 852 F.2d 136,139 (4th Cir.1988) (holding that the district court properly refused to admit a tentative internal IRS referral report because it did not contain “agency factual findings”); City of New York v. Pullman, Inc., 662 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.1981)(holding that an interim recommendation by a transit authority staff member to the transit authority administrator was not a factual finding of an agency within the meaning of Rule 803(8)(C)); cf. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Austin Travel Corp., 867 F.2d 737, 743 (2d Cir.1989) (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding government reports that the district court concluded were untrustworthy because of the “interim or inconclusive nature of the reports ____”)."
} | {
"signal": "cf.",
"identifier": "867 F.2d 737, 743",
"parenthetical": "concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding government reports that the district court concluded were untrustworthy because of the \"interim or inconclusive nature of the reports ____\"",
"sentence": "Board of Pub. Util., 967 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir.1992) (holding that a draft of a proposed letter from an area director of a government agency to a municipal administrative agency was properly excluded because it did not represent an agency finding); United States v. Gray, 852 F.2d 136,139 (4th Cir.1988) (holding that the district court properly refused to admit a tentative internal IRS referral report because it did not contain “agency factual findings”); City of New York v. Pullman, Inc., 662 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.1981)(holding that an interim recommendation by a transit authority staff member to the transit authority administrator was not a factual finding of an agency within the meaning of Rule 803(8)(C)); cf. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Austin Travel Corp., 867 F.2d 737, 743 (2d Cir.1989) (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding government reports that the district court concluded were untrustworthy because of the “interim or inconclusive nature of the reports ____”)."
} | 105,959 | a |
P 9. Landowners concede that they base their business losses on the change in the flow of traffic from the construction of the median strip. Like the property owners in Sand Bar and Spear, they contend that because the median strip was part of the same project that resulted in the taking of portions of their land, they are entitled to compensation for the effects of the highway project as a whole. They rely on several out-of-state cases, including a closely analogous case from South Carolina, to argue that when a project results in a taking, the owner of the land that has been taken is entitled to compensation for all incidental effects of the project on the value of the remaining land. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "175 S.E.2d 391, 396",
"parenthetical": "holding that a landowner could recover for placement of a median strip that could not have occurred but for the taking of the landowner's property because \"the inquiry is, how much has the particular public improvement decreased the fair market value of the property, taking into consideration the use for which the land was taken and all the reasonably probable effects of its devotion to that use\"",
"sentence": "S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Wilson, 175 S.E.2d 391, 396 (S.C. 1970) (holding that a landowner could recover for placement of a median strip that could not have occurred but for the taking of the landowner’s property because “the inquiry is, how much has the particular public improvement decreased the fair market value of the property, taking into consideration the use for which the land was taken and all the reasonably probable effects of its devotion to that use”) (quotations omitted); see also State ex rel. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n v. Jim Lynch Toyota, Inc., 830 S.W.2d 481, 485 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that loss of access resulting from a median strip constructed as part of a highway widening project was a proper consideration because “[a]ny factor that has a present, quantifiable effect on the market value of the property is proper as an element of damages”) (quotations omitted)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "830 S.W.2d 481, 485",
"parenthetical": "holding that loss of access resulting from a median strip constructed as part of a highway widening project was a proper consideration because \"[a]ny factor that has a present, quantifiable effect on the market value of the property is proper as an element of damages\"",
"sentence": "S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Wilson, 175 S.E.2d 391, 396 (S.C. 1970) (holding that a landowner could recover for placement of a median strip that could not have occurred but for the taking of the landowner’s property because “the inquiry is, how much has the particular public improvement decreased the fair market value of the property, taking into consideration the use for which the land was taken and all the reasonably probable effects of its devotion to that use”) (quotations omitted); see also State ex rel. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n v. Jim Lynch Toyota, Inc., 830 S.W.2d 481, 485 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that loss of access resulting from a median strip constructed as part of a highway widening project was a proper consideration because “[a]ny factor that has a present, quantifiable effect on the market value of the property is proper as an element of damages”) (quotations omitted)."
} | 3,148,674 | a |
Dunlap's remaining claims are without merit and were properly dismissed. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "939 F.2d 702, 707-09",
"parenthetical": "holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability",
"sentence": "See Price v. State of Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-09 (9th Cir.1991) (holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability); see also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329-32, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (holding witnesses are absolutely immune from suit for damages with respect to testimony); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "460 U.S. 325, 329-32",
"parenthetical": "holding witnesses are absolutely immune from suit for damages with respect to testimony",
"sentence": "See Price v. State of Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-09 (9th Cir.1991) (holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability); see also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329-32, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (holding witnesses are absolutely immune from suit for damages with respect to testimony); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983)."
} | 3,674,562 | a |
Dunlap's remaining claims are without merit and were properly dismissed. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding witnesses are absolutely immune from suit for damages with respect to testimony",
"sentence": "See Price v. State of Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-09 (9th Cir.1991) (holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability); see also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329-32, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (holding witnesses are absolutely immune from suit for damages with respect to testimony); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "939 F.2d 702, 707-09",
"parenthetical": "holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability",
"sentence": "See Price v. State of Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-09 (9th Cir.1991) (holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability); see also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329-32, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (holding witnesses are absolutely immune from suit for damages with respect to testimony); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983)."
} | 3,674,562 | b |
Dunlap's remaining claims are without merit and were properly dismissed. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding witnesses are absolutely immune from suit for damages with respect to testimony",
"sentence": "See Price v. State of Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-09 (9th Cir.1991) (holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability); see also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329-32, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (holding witnesses are absolutely immune from suit for damages with respect to testimony); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "939 F.2d 702, 707-09",
"parenthetical": "holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability",
"sentence": "See Price v. State of Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-09 (9th Cir.1991) (holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability); see also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329-32, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (holding witnesses are absolutely immune from suit for damages with respect to testimony); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983)."
} | 3,674,562 | b |
Dunlap's remaining claims are without merit and were properly dismissed. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "939 F.2d 702, 707-09",
"parenthetical": "holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability",
"sentence": "See Price v. State of Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-09 (9th Cir.1991) (holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability); see also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329-32, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (holding witnesses are absolutely immune from suit for damages with respect to testimony); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "520 U.S. 43, 69",
"parenthetical": "holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983",
"sentence": "See Price v. State of Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-09 (9th Cir.1991) (holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability); see also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329-32, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (holding witnesses are absolutely immune from suit for damages with respect to testimony); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983)."
} | 3,674,562 | a |
Dunlap's remaining claims are without merit and were properly dismissed. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "939 F.2d 702, 707-09",
"parenthetical": "holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability",
"sentence": "See Price v. State of Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-09 (9th Cir.1991) (holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability); see also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329-32, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (holding witnesses are absolutely immune from suit for damages with respect to testimony); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983",
"sentence": "See Price v. State of Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-09 (9th Cir.1991) (holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability); see also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329-32, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (holding witnesses are absolutely immune from suit for damages with respect to testimony); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983)."
} | 3,674,562 | a |
Dunlap's remaining claims are without merit and were properly dismissed. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "939 F.2d 702, 707-09",
"parenthetical": "holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability",
"sentence": "See Price v. State of Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-09 (9th Cir.1991) (holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability); see also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329-32, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (holding witnesses are absolutely immune from suit for damages with respect to testimony); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983",
"sentence": "See Price v. State of Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707-09 (9th Cir.1991) (holding private actors are not acting under the color of state law for the purposes of section 1983 liability); see also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329-32, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (holding witnesses are absolutely immune from suit for damages with respect to testimony); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997) (holding states are not persons for the purposes of section 1983)."
} | 3,674,562 | a |
It is a settled principle that we will not address arguments that an appellant has not raised in an opening brief submitted to this Court. See Health Servs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "109 Md.App. 652, 679-80",
"parenthetical": "stating that an argument concerning an underlying divorce order that was not previously challenged on appeal could not be raised in a later appeal concerning collateral matters",
"sentence": "Cost Review Comm’n v. Lutheran Hosp., 298 Md. 651, 664, 472 A.2d 55 (1984) (“[A] question not presented or argued in an appellant’s brief is waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for review.”); see also Harrison v. Harrison, 109 Md.App. 652, 679-80, 675 A.2d 1003 (stating that an argument concerning an underlying divorce order that was not previously challenged on appeal could not be raised in a later appeal concerning collateral matters), cert. denied, 343 Md. 564, 683 A.2d 177 (1996); Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 94 Md.App. 505, 544, 617 A.2d 1163, cert. denied, 330 Md. 319, 624 A.2d 491 (1993)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "298 Md. 651, 664",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] question not presented or argued in an appellant's brief is waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for review.\"",
"sentence": "Cost Review Comm’n v. Lutheran Hosp., 298 Md. 651, 664, 472 A.2d 55 (1984) (“[A] question not presented or argued in an appellant’s brief is waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for review.”); see also Harrison v. Harrison, 109 Md.App. 652, 679-80, 675 A.2d 1003 (stating that an argument concerning an underlying divorce order that was not previously challenged on appeal could not be raised in a later appeal concerning collateral matters), cert. denied, 343 Md. 564, 683 A.2d 177 (1996); Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 94 Md.App. 505, 544, 617 A.2d 1163, cert. denied, 330 Md. 319, 624 A.2d 491 (1993)."
} | 1,292,449 | b |
It is a settled principle that we will not address arguments that an appellant has not raised in an opening brief submitted to this Court. See Health Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "298 Md. 651, 664",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] question not presented or argued in an appellant's brief is waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for review.\"",
"sentence": "Cost Review Comm’n v. Lutheran Hosp., 298 Md. 651, 664, 472 A.2d 55 (1984) (“[A] question not presented or argued in an appellant’s brief is waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for review.”); see also Harrison v. Harrison, 109 Md.App. 652, 679-80, 675 A.2d 1003 (stating that an argument concerning an underlying divorce order that was not previously challenged on appeal could not be raised in a later appeal concerning collateral matters), cert. denied, 343 Md. 564, 683 A.2d 177 (1996); Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 94 Md.App. 505, 544, 617 A.2d 1163, cert. denied, 330 Md. 319, 624 A.2d 491 (1993)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that an argument concerning an underlying divorce order that was not previously challenged on appeal could not be raised in a later appeal concerning collateral matters",
"sentence": "Cost Review Comm’n v. Lutheran Hosp., 298 Md. 651, 664, 472 A.2d 55 (1984) (“[A] question not presented or argued in an appellant’s brief is waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for review.”); see also Harrison v. Harrison, 109 Md.App. 652, 679-80, 675 A.2d 1003 (stating that an argument concerning an underlying divorce order that was not previously challenged on appeal could not be raised in a later appeal concerning collateral matters), cert. denied, 343 Md. 564, 683 A.2d 177 (1996); Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 94 Md.App. 505, 544, 617 A.2d 1163, cert. denied, 330 Md. 319, 624 A.2d 491 (1993)."
} | 1,292,449 | a |
It is a settled principle that we will not address arguments that an appellant has not raised in an opening brief submitted to this Court. See Health Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "298 Md. 651, 664",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] question not presented or argued in an appellant's brief is waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for review.\"",
"sentence": "Cost Review Comm’n v. Lutheran Hosp., 298 Md. 651, 664, 472 A.2d 55 (1984) (“[A] question not presented or argued in an appellant’s brief is waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for review.”); see also Harrison v. Harrison, 109 Md.App. 652, 679-80, 675 A.2d 1003 (stating that an argument concerning an underlying divorce order that was not previously challenged on appeal could not be raised in a later appeal concerning collateral matters), cert. denied, 343 Md. 564, 683 A.2d 177 (1996); Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 94 Md.App. 505, 544, 617 A.2d 1163, cert. denied, 330 Md. 319, 624 A.2d 491 (1993)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that an argument concerning an underlying divorce order that was not previously challenged on appeal could not be raised in a later appeal concerning collateral matters",
"sentence": "Cost Review Comm’n v. Lutheran Hosp., 298 Md. 651, 664, 472 A.2d 55 (1984) (“[A] question not presented or argued in an appellant’s brief is waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for review.”); see also Harrison v. Harrison, 109 Md.App. 652, 679-80, 675 A.2d 1003 (stating that an argument concerning an underlying divorce order that was not previously challenged on appeal could not be raised in a later appeal concerning collateral matters), cert. denied, 343 Md. 564, 683 A.2d 177 (1996); Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 94 Md.App. 505, 544, 617 A.2d 1163, cert. denied, 330 Md. 319, 624 A.2d 491 (1993)."
} | 1,292,449 | a |
It is a settled principle that we will not address arguments that an appellant has not raised in an opening brief submitted to this Court. See Health Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "298 Md. 651, 664",
"parenthetical": "\"[A] question not presented or argued in an appellant's brief is waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for review.\"",
"sentence": "Cost Review Comm’n v. Lutheran Hosp., 298 Md. 651, 664, 472 A.2d 55 (1984) (“[A] question not presented or argued in an appellant’s brief is waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for review.”); see also Harrison v. Harrison, 109 Md.App. 652, 679-80, 675 A.2d 1003 (stating that an argument concerning an underlying divorce order that was not previously challenged on appeal could not be raised in a later appeal concerning collateral matters), cert. denied, 343 Md. 564, 683 A.2d 177 (1996); Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 94 Md.App. 505, 544, 617 A.2d 1163, cert. denied, 330 Md. 319, 624 A.2d 491 (1993)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that an argument concerning an underlying divorce order that was not previously challenged on appeal could not be raised in a later appeal concerning collateral matters",
"sentence": "Cost Review Comm’n v. Lutheran Hosp., 298 Md. 651, 664, 472 A.2d 55 (1984) (“[A] question not presented or argued in an appellant’s brief is waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for review.”); see also Harrison v. Harrison, 109 Md.App. 652, 679-80, 675 A.2d 1003 (stating that an argument concerning an underlying divorce order that was not previously challenged on appeal could not be raised in a later appeal concerning collateral matters), cert. denied, 343 Md. 564, 683 A.2d 177 (1996); Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 94 Md.App. 505, 544, 617 A.2d 1163, cert. denied, 330 Md. 319, 624 A.2d 491 (1993)."
} | 1,292,449 | a |
It is a settled principle that we will not address arguments that an appellant has not raised in an opening brief submitted to this Court. See Health Servs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "109 Md.App. 652, 679-80",
"parenthetical": "stating that an argument concerning an underlying divorce order that was not previously challenged on appeal could not be raised in a later appeal concerning collateral matters",
"sentence": "Cost Review Comm’n v. Lutheran Hosp., 298 Md. 651, 664, 472 A.2d 55 (1984) (“[A] question not presented or argued in an appellant’s brief is waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for review.”); see also Harrison v. Harrison, 109 Md.App. 652, 679-80, 675 A.2d 1003 (stating that an argument concerning an underlying divorce order that was not previously challenged on appeal could not be raised in a later appeal concerning collateral matters), cert. denied, 343 Md. 564, 683 A.2d 177 (1996); Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 94 Md.App. 505, 544, 617 A.2d 1163, cert. denied, 330 Md. 319, 624 A.2d 491 (1993)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] question not presented or argued in an appellant's brief is waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for review.\"",
"sentence": "Cost Review Comm’n v. Lutheran Hosp., 298 Md. 651, 664, 472 A.2d 55 (1984) (“[A] question not presented or argued in an appellant’s brief is waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for review.”); see also Harrison v. Harrison, 109 Md.App. 652, 679-80, 675 A.2d 1003 (stating that an argument concerning an underlying divorce order that was not previously challenged on appeal could not be raised in a later appeal concerning collateral matters), cert. denied, 343 Md. 564, 683 A.2d 177 (1996); Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 94 Md.App. 505, 544, 617 A.2d 1163, cert. denied, 330 Md. 319, 624 A.2d 491 (1993)."
} | 1,292,449 | b |
It is a settled principle that we will not address arguments that an appellant has not raised in an opening brief submitted to this Court. See Health Servs. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that an argument concerning an underlying divorce order that was not previously challenged on appeal could not be raised in a later appeal concerning collateral matters",
"sentence": "Cost Review Comm’n v. Lutheran Hosp., 298 Md. 651, 664, 472 A.2d 55 (1984) (“[A] question not presented or argued in an appellant’s brief is waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for review.”); see also Harrison v. Harrison, 109 Md.App. 652, 679-80, 675 A.2d 1003 (stating that an argument concerning an underlying divorce order that was not previously challenged on appeal could not be raised in a later appeal concerning collateral matters), cert. denied, 343 Md. 564, 683 A.2d 177 (1996); Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 94 Md.App. 505, 544, 617 A.2d 1163, cert. denied, 330 Md. 319, 624 A.2d 491 (1993)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] question not presented or argued in an appellant's brief is waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for review.\"",
"sentence": "Cost Review Comm’n v. Lutheran Hosp., 298 Md. 651, 664, 472 A.2d 55 (1984) (“[A] question not presented or argued in an appellant’s brief is waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for review.”); see also Harrison v. Harrison, 109 Md.App. 652, 679-80, 675 A.2d 1003 (stating that an argument concerning an underlying divorce order that was not previously challenged on appeal could not be raised in a later appeal concerning collateral matters), cert. denied, 343 Md. 564, 683 A.2d 177 (1996); Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 94 Md.App. 505, 544, 617 A.2d 1163, cert. denied, 330 Md. 319, 624 A.2d 491 (1993)."
} | 1,292,449 | b |
It is a settled principle that we will not address arguments that an appellant has not raised in an opening brief submitted to this Court. See Health Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] question not presented or argued in an appellant's brief is waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for review.\"",
"sentence": "Cost Review Comm’n v. Lutheran Hosp., 298 Md. 651, 664, 472 A.2d 55 (1984) (“[A] question not presented or argued in an appellant’s brief is waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for review.”); see also Harrison v. Harrison, 109 Md.App. 652, 679-80, 675 A.2d 1003 (stating that an argument concerning an underlying divorce order that was not previously challenged on appeal could not be raised in a later appeal concerning collateral matters), cert. denied, 343 Md. 564, 683 A.2d 177 (1996); Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 94 Md.App. 505, 544, 617 A.2d 1163, cert. denied, 330 Md. 319, 624 A.2d 491 (1993)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that an argument concerning an underlying divorce order that was not previously challenged on appeal could not be raised in a later appeal concerning collateral matters",
"sentence": "Cost Review Comm’n v. Lutheran Hosp., 298 Md. 651, 664, 472 A.2d 55 (1984) (“[A] question not presented or argued in an appellant’s brief is waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for review.”); see also Harrison v. Harrison, 109 Md.App. 652, 679-80, 675 A.2d 1003 (stating that an argument concerning an underlying divorce order that was not previously challenged on appeal could not be raised in a later appeal concerning collateral matters), cert. denied, 343 Md. 564, 683 A.2d 177 (1996); Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 94 Md.App. 505, 544, 617 A.2d 1163, cert. denied, 330 Md. 319, 624 A.2d 491 (1993)."
} | 1,292,449 | a |
It is a settled principle that we will not address arguments that an appellant has not raised in an opening brief submitted to this Court. See Health Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"[A] question not presented or argued in an appellant's brief is waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for review.\"",
"sentence": "Cost Review Comm’n v. Lutheran Hosp., 298 Md. 651, 664, 472 A.2d 55 (1984) (“[A] question not presented or argued in an appellant’s brief is waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for review.”); see also Harrison v. Harrison, 109 Md.App. 652, 679-80, 675 A.2d 1003 (stating that an argument concerning an underlying divorce order that was not previously challenged on appeal could not be raised in a later appeal concerning collateral matters), cert. denied, 343 Md. 564, 683 A.2d 177 (1996); Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 94 Md.App. 505, 544, 617 A.2d 1163, cert. denied, 330 Md. 319, 624 A.2d 491 (1993)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "stating that an argument concerning an underlying divorce order that was not previously challenged on appeal could not be raised in a later appeal concerning collateral matters",
"sentence": "Cost Review Comm’n v. Lutheran Hosp., 298 Md. 651, 664, 472 A.2d 55 (1984) (“[A] question not presented or argued in an appellant’s brief is waived or abandoned and is, therefore, not properly preserved for review.”); see also Harrison v. Harrison, 109 Md.App. 652, 679-80, 675 A.2d 1003 (stating that an argument concerning an underlying divorce order that was not previously challenged on appeal could not be raised in a later appeal concerning collateral matters), cert. denied, 343 Md. 564, 683 A.2d 177 (1996); Monumental Life Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 94 Md.App. 505, 544, 617 A.2d 1163, cert. denied, 330 Md. 319, 624 A.2d 491 (1993)."
} | 1,292,449 | a |
Under Home and earlier Supreme Court decisions, a motion to vacate, such as defendants have filed here, requires the Court to determine whether the "objective" of the court orders has been attained. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "540 U.S. 442, 442",
"parenthetical": "\"The federal court must exercise its equi table powers to ensure that when the objects of the decree have been attained, responsibility for discharging the State's obligations is returned promptly to the State and its officials.\"",
"sentence": "Id.; Frew, 540 U.S. at 442, 124 S.Ct. 899 (“The federal court must exercise its equi table powers to ensure that when the objects of the decree have been attained, responsibility for discharging the State’s obligations is returned promptly to the State and its officials.”); see also LaShaim, 701 F.Supp.2d at 98, 2010 WL 1270202, at *11 (in addressing motion to vacate consent decree, “it is appropriate to consider whether the objectives of the decree have been achieved”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "701 F.Supp.2d 98, 98",
"parenthetical": "in addressing motion to vacate consent decree, \"it is appropriate to consider whether the objectives of the decree have been achieved\"",
"sentence": "Id.; Frew, 540 U.S. at 442, 124 S.Ct. 899 (“The federal court must exercise its equi table powers to ensure that when the objects of the decree have been attained, responsibility for discharging the State’s obligations is returned promptly to the State and its officials.”); see also LaShaim, 701 F.Supp.2d at 98, 2010 WL 1270202, at *11 (in addressing motion to vacate consent decree, “it is appropriate to consider whether the objectives of the decree have been achieved”)."
} | 3,935,696 | a |
Under Home and earlier Supreme Court decisions, a motion to vacate, such as defendants have filed here, requires the Court to determine whether the "objective" of the court orders has been attained. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2010 WL 1270202, at *11",
"parenthetical": "in addressing motion to vacate consent decree, \"it is appropriate to consider whether the objectives of the decree have been achieved\"",
"sentence": "Id.; Frew, 540 U.S. at 442, 124 S.Ct. 899 (“The federal court must exercise its equi table powers to ensure that when the objects of the decree have been attained, responsibility for discharging the State’s obligations is returned promptly to the State and its officials.”); see also LaShaim, 701 F.Supp.2d at 98, 2010 WL 1270202, at *11 (in addressing motion to vacate consent decree, “it is appropriate to consider whether the objectives of the decree have been achieved”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "540 U.S. 442, 442",
"parenthetical": "\"The federal court must exercise its equi table powers to ensure that when the objects of the decree have been attained, responsibility for discharging the State's obligations is returned promptly to the State and its officials.\"",
"sentence": "Id.; Frew, 540 U.S. at 442, 124 S.Ct. 899 (“The federal court must exercise its equi table powers to ensure that when the objects of the decree have been attained, responsibility for discharging the State’s obligations is returned promptly to the State and its officials.”); see also LaShaim, 701 F.Supp.2d at 98, 2010 WL 1270202, at *11 (in addressing motion to vacate consent decree, “it is appropriate to consider whether the objectives of the decree have been achieved”)."
} | 3,935,696 | b |
Under Home and earlier Supreme Court decisions, a motion to vacate, such as defendants have filed here, requires the Court to determine whether the "objective" of the court orders has been attained. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The federal court must exercise its equi table powers to ensure that when the objects of the decree have been attained, responsibility for discharging the State's obligations is returned promptly to the State and its officials.\"",
"sentence": "Id.; Frew, 540 U.S. at 442, 124 S.Ct. 899 (“The federal court must exercise its equi table powers to ensure that when the objects of the decree have been attained, responsibility for discharging the State’s obligations is returned promptly to the State and its officials.”); see also LaShaim, 701 F.Supp.2d at 98, 2010 WL 1270202, at *11 (in addressing motion to vacate consent decree, “it is appropriate to consider whether the objectives of the decree have been achieved”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "701 F.Supp.2d 98, 98",
"parenthetical": "in addressing motion to vacate consent decree, \"it is appropriate to consider whether the objectives of the decree have been achieved\"",
"sentence": "Id.; Frew, 540 U.S. at 442, 124 S.Ct. 899 (“The federal court must exercise its equi table powers to ensure that when the objects of the decree have been attained, responsibility for discharging the State’s obligations is returned promptly to the State and its officials.”); see also LaShaim, 701 F.Supp.2d at 98, 2010 WL 1270202, at *11 (in addressing motion to vacate consent decree, “it is appropriate to consider whether the objectives of the decree have been achieved”)."
} | 3,935,696 | a |
Under Home and earlier Supreme Court decisions, a motion to vacate, such as defendants have filed here, requires the Court to determine whether the "objective" of the court orders has been attained. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "2010 WL 1270202, at *11",
"parenthetical": "in addressing motion to vacate consent decree, \"it is appropriate to consider whether the objectives of the decree have been achieved\"",
"sentence": "Id.; Frew, 540 U.S. at 442, 124 S.Ct. 899 (“The federal court must exercise its equi table powers to ensure that when the objects of the decree have been attained, responsibility for discharging the State’s obligations is returned promptly to the State and its officials.”); see also LaShaim, 701 F.Supp.2d at 98, 2010 WL 1270202, at *11 (in addressing motion to vacate consent decree, “it is appropriate to consider whether the objectives of the decree have been achieved”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"The federal court must exercise its equi table powers to ensure that when the objects of the decree have been attained, responsibility for discharging the State's obligations is returned promptly to the State and its officials.\"",
"sentence": "Id.; Frew, 540 U.S. at 442, 124 S.Ct. 899 (“The federal court must exercise its equi table powers to ensure that when the objects of the decree have been attained, responsibility for discharging the State’s obligations is returned promptly to the State and its officials.”); see also LaShaim, 701 F.Supp.2d at 98, 2010 WL 1270202, at *11 (in addressing motion to vacate consent decree, “it is appropriate to consider whether the objectives of the decree have been achieved”)."
} | 3,935,696 | b |
The Court, in order to accept unopposed portions of the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, need only satisfy itself that there is no "plain error" on the face of the record. See Douglass v. United Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "79 F.3d 1415, 1419",
"parenthetical": "en banc Xextending the deferential \"plain error\" standard of review to the un-objected to legal conclusions of a magistrate judge",
"sentence": "Auto., Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1419 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc Xextending the deferential “plain error” standard of review to the un-objected to legal conclusions of a magistrate judge); see also Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc)(appeal from district court’s acceptance of un-objected to findings of magistrate judge reviewed for “plain error”); see also Nogueras-Cartagena v. United States, 172 F.Supp.2d 296, 305 (D.P.R.2001) (finding that the “Court reviews [unopposed] Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation to ascertain whether or not the Magistrate’s recommendation was clearly erroneous”)(adopting the Advisory Committee note regarding Fed. R.Crv.P. 72(b)); see also Garcia v. I.N.S., 733 F.Supp. 1554, 1555 (M.D.Pa.1990) (finding that “when no objections are filed, the district court need only review the record for plain error”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "677 F.2d 404, 410",
"parenthetical": "appeal from district court's acceptance of un-objected to findings of magistrate judge reviewed for \"plain error\"",
"sentence": "Auto., Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1419 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc Xextending the deferential “plain error” standard of review to the un-objected to legal conclusions of a magistrate judge); see also Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc)(appeal from district court’s acceptance of un-objected to findings of magistrate judge reviewed for “plain error”); see also Nogueras-Cartagena v. United States, 172 F.Supp.2d 296, 305 (D.P.R.2001) (finding that the “Court reviews [unopposed] Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation to ascertain whether or not the Magistrate’s recommendation was clearly erroneous”)(adopting the Advisory Committee note regarding Fed. R.Crv.P. 72(b)); see also Garcia v. I.N.S., 733 F.Supp. 1554, 1555 (M.D.Pa.1990) (finding that “when no objections are filed, the district court need only review the record for plain error”)."
} | 4,265,926 | a |
The Court, in order to accept unopposed portions of the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, need only satisfy itself that there is no "plain error" on the face of the record. See Douglass v. United Servs. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "79 F.3d 1415, 1419",
"parenthetical": "en banc Xextending the deferential \"plain error\" standard of review to the un-objected to legal conclusions of a magistrate judge",
"sentence": "Auto., Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1419 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc Xextending the deferential “plain error” standard of review to the un-objected to legal conclusions of a magistrate judge); see also Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc)(appeal from district court’s acceptance of un-objected to findings of magistrate judge reviewed for “plain error”); see also Nogueras-Cartagena v. United States, 172 F.Supp.2d 296, 305 (D.P.R.2001) (finding that the “Court reviews [unopposed] Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation to ascertain whether or not the Magistrate’s recommendation was clearly erroneous”)(adopting the Advisory Committee note regarding Fed. R.Crv.P. 72(b)); see also Garcia v. I.N.S., 733 F.Supp. 1554, 1555 (M.D.Pa.1990) (finding that “when no objections are filed, the district court need only review the record for plain error”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "733 F.Supp. 1554, 1555",
"parenthetical": "finding that \"when no objections are filed, the district court need only review the record for plain error\"",
"sentence": "Auto., Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1419 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc Xextending the deferential “plain error” standard of review to the un-objected to legal conclusions of a magistrate judge); see also Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc)(appeal from district court’s acceptance of un-objected to findings of magistrate judge reviewed for “plain error”); see also Nogueras-Cartagena v. United States, 172 F.Supp.2d 296, 305 (D.P.R.2001) (finding that the “Court reviews [unopposed] Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation to ascertain whether or not the Magistrate’s recommendation was clearly erroneous”)(adopting the Advisory Committee note regarding Fed. R.Crv.P. 72(b)); see also Garcia v. I.N.S., 733 F.Supp. 1554, 1555 (M.D.Pa.1990) (finding that “when no objections are filed, the district court need only review the record for plain error”)."
} | 4,265,926 | a |
The present complaint might be interpreted, alternatively, as asserting a substantive due process violation based on the theory that the conduct of appellee Morales "shocks the conscience." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "927 F.2d 6, 6",
"parenthetical": "alternate tests for analyzing substantive due process claim: (1) as violation of specific property or liberty interest, or (2) as conduct which \"shocks the conscience\"",
"sentence": "See Pittsley, 927 F.2d at 6 (alternate tests for analyzing substantive due process claim: (1) as violation of specific property or liberty interest, or (2) as conduct which “shocks the conscience”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "904 F.2d 754, 754",
"parenthetical": "substantive due process violation obtains when state action in and of itself is \"egregiously unacceptable, outrageous, or conscience-shocking\"",
"sentence": "See also Amsden, 904 F.2d at 754 (substantive due process violation obtains when state action in and of itself is “egregiously unacceptable, outrageous, or conscience-shocking”). Offensive conduct is not conscience-shocking, however, in a substantive due process sense, merely because it trespasses on “some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism,” Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 209, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952)."
} | 1,855,923 | a |
The present complaint might be interpreted, alternatively, as asserting a substantive due process violation based on the theory that the conduct of appellee Morales "shocks the conscience." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "342 U.S. 165, 172",
"parenthetical": "substantive due process violation obtains when state action in and of itself is \"egregiously unacceptable, outrageous, or conscience-shocking\"",
"sentence": "See also Amsden, 904 F.2d at 754 (substantive due process violation obtains when state action in and of itself is “egregiously unacceptable, outrageous, or conscience-shocking”). Offensive conduct is not conscience-shocking, however, in a substantive due process sense, merely because it trespasses on “some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism,” Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 209, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "927 F.2d 6, 6",
"parenthetical": "alternate tests for analyzing substantive due process claim: (1) as violation of specific property or liberty interest, or (2) as conduct which \"shocks the conscience\"",
"sentence": "See Pittsley, 927 F.2d at 6 (alternate tests for analyzing substantive due process claim: (1) as violation of specific property or liberty interest, or (2) as conduct which “shocks the conscience”)."
} | 1,855,923 | b |
The present complaint might be interpreted, alternatively, as asserting a substantive due process violation based on the theory that the conduct of appellee Morales "shocks the conscience." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "927 F.2d 6, 6",
"parenthetical": "alternate tests for analyzing substantive due process claim: (1) as violation of specific property or liberty interest, or (2) as conduct which \"shocks the conscience\"",
"sentence": "See Pittsley, 927 F.2d at 6 (alternate tests for analyzing substantive due process claim: (1) as violation of specific property or liberty interest, or (2) as conduct which “shocks the conscience”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "72 S.Ct. 205, 209",
"parenthetical": "substantive due process violation obtains when state action in and of itself is \"egregiously unacceptable, outrageous, or conscience-shocking\"",
"sentence": "See also Amsden, 904 F.2d at 754 (substantive due process violation obtains when state action in and of itself is “egregiously unacceptable, outrageous, or conscience-shocking”). Offensive conduct is not conscience-shocking, however, in a substantive due process sense, merely because it trespasses on “some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism,” Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 209, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952)."
} | 1,855,923 | a |
The present complaint might be interpreted, alternatively, as asserting a substantive due process violation based on the theory that the conduct of appellee Morales "shocks the conscience." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "substantive due process violation obtains when state action in and of itself is \"egregiously unacceptable, outrageous, or conscience-shocking\"",
"sentence": "See also Amsden, 904 F.2d at 754 (substantive due process violation obtains when state action in and of itself is “egregiously unacceptable, outrageous, or conscience-shocking”). Offensive conduct is not conscience-shocking, however, in a substantive due process sense, merely because it trespasses on “some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism,” Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 209, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "927 F.2d 6, 6",
"parenthetical": "alternate tests for analyzing substantive due process claim: (1) as violation of specific property or liberty interest, or (2) as conduct which \"shocks the conscience\"",
"sentence": "See Pittsley, 927 F.2d at 6 (alternate tests for analyzing substantive due process claim: (1) as violation of specific property or liberty interest, or (2) as conduct which “shocks the conscience”)."
} | 1,855,923 | b |
At best, however, Otarola stands for the proposition that a party will not be permitted to exploit procedural mechanisms to secure the application of more favorable law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "270 F.3d 1276, 1276",
"parenthetical": "\"Allowing the INS to appeal a correct IJ decision on a frivolous, non-discretionary procedural ground in order to avail itself of the stop-time rule would undermine clear Congressional intent to enact a 180-day delay period [before the effective date of IIRIRA].\"",
"sentence": "See Otarola, 270 F.3d at 1276 (“Allowing the INS to appeal a correct IJ decision on a frivolous, non-discretionary procedural ground in order to avail itself of the stop-time rule would undermine clear Congressional intent to enact a 180-day delay period [before the effective date of IIRIRA].”); see also INS v. Rios-Pine-da, 471 U.S. 444, 452, 105 S.Ct. 2098, 85 L.Ed.2d 452 (1985) (upholding the BIA’s decision refusing to reopen a suspension proceeding where the aliens had filed frivolous appeals in order to accrue seven years of continuous residence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "471 U.S. 444, 452",
"parenthetical": "upholding the BIA's decision refusing to reopen a suspension proceeding where the aliens had filed frivolous appeals in order to accrue seven years of continuous residence",
"sentence": "See Otarola, 270 F.3d at 1276 (“Allowing the INS to appeal a correct IJ decision on a frivolous, non-discretionary procedural ground in order to avail itself of the stop-time rule would undermine clear Congressional intent to enact a 180-day delay period [before the effective date of IIRIRA].”); see also INS v. Rios-Pine-da, 471 U.S. 444, 452, 105 S.Ct. 2098, 85 L.Ed.2d 452 (1985) (upholding the BIA’s decision refusing to reopen a suspension proceeding where the aliens had filed frivolous appeals in order to accrue seven years of continuous residence)."
} | 1,221,952 | a |
At best, however, Otarola stands for the proposition that a party will not be permitted to exploit procedural mechanisms to secure the application of more favorable law. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding the BIA's decision refusing to reopen a suspension proceeding where the aliens had filed frivolous appeals in order to accrue seven years of continuous residence",
"sentence": "See Otarola, 270 F.3d at 1276 (“Allowing the INS to appeal a correct IJ decision on a frivolous, non-discretionary procedural ground in order to avail itself of the stop-time rule would undermine clear Congressional intent to enact a 180-day delay period [before the effective date of IIRIRA].”); see also INS v. Rios-Pine-da, 471 U.S. 444, 452, 105 S.Ct. 2098, 85 L.Ed.2d 452 (1985) (upholding the BIA’s decision refusing to reopen a suspension proceeding where the aliens had filed frivolous appeals in order to accrue seven years of continuous residence)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "270 F.3d 1276, 1276",
"parenthetical": "\"Allowing the INS to appeal a correct IJ decision on a frivolous, non-discretionary procedural ground in order to avail itself of the stop-time rule would undermine clear Congressional intent to enact a 180-day delay period [before the effective date of IIRIRA].\"",
"sentence": "See Otarola, 270 F.3d at 1276 (“Allowing the INS to appeal a correct IJ decision on a frivolous, non-discretionary procedural ground in order to avail itself of the stop-time rule would undermine clear Congressional intent to enact a 180-day delay period [before the effective date of IIRIRA].”); see also INS v. Rios-Pine-da, 471 U.S. 444, 452, 105 S.Ct. 2098, 85 L.Ed.2d 452 (1985) (upholding the BIA’s decision refusing to reopen a suspension proceeding where the aliens had filed frivolous appeals in order to accrue seven years of continuous residence)."
} | 1,221,952 | b |
At best, however, Otarola stands for the proposition that a party will not be permitted to exploit procedural mechanisms to secure the application of more favorable law. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "270 F.3d 1276, 1276",
"parenthetical": "\"Allowing the INS to appeal a correct IJ decision on a frivolous, non-discretionary procedural ground in order to avail itself of the stop-time rule would undermine clear Congressional intent to enact a 180-day delay period [before the effective date of IIRIRA].\"",
"sentence": "See Otarola, 270 F.3d at 1276 (“Allowing the INS to appeal a correct IJ decision on a frivolous, non-discretionary procedural ground in order to avail itself of the stop-time rule would undermine clear Congressional intent to enact a 180-day delay period [before the effective date of IIRIRA].”); see also INS v. Rios-Pine-da, 471 U.S. 444, 452, 105 S.Ct. 2098, 85 L.Ed.2d 452 (1985) (upholding the BIA’s decision refusing to reopen a suspension proceeding where the aliens had filed frivolous appeals in order to accrue seven years of continuous residence)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "upholding the BIA's decision refusing to reopen a suspension proceeding where the aliens had filed frivolous appeals in order to accrue seven years of continuous residence",
"sentence": "See Otarola, 270 F.3d at 1276 (“Allowing the INS to appeal a correct IJ decision on a frivolous, non-discretionary procedural ground in order to avail itself of the stop-time rule would undermine clear Congressional intent to enact a 180-day delay period [before the effective date of IIRIRA].”); see also INS v. Rios-Pine-da, 471 U.S. 444, 452, 105 S.Ct. 2098, 85 L.Ed.2d 452 (1985) (upholding the BIA’s decision refusing to reopen a suspension proceeding where the aliens had filed frivolous appeals in order to accrue seven years of continuous residence)."
} | 1,221,952 | a |
The "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing is that for each claim, each plaintiff must allege an actual or imminent injury that is traceable- to the defendant and redressable by the court. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "504 U.S. 555, 560-62",
"parenthetical": "holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior's interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members' harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals",
"sentence": "Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members’ harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals); see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 185, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (agreeing that “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "528 U.S. 167, 185",
"parenthetical": "agreeing that \"a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought\"",
"sentence": "Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members’ harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals); see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 185, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (agreeing that “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought”)."
} | 12,264,857 | a |
The "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing is that for each claim, each plaintiff must allege an actual or imminent injury that is traceable- to the defendant and redressable by the court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "agreeing that \"a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought\"",
"sentence": "Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members’ harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals); see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 185, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (agreeing that “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "504 U.S. 555, 560-62",
"parenthetical": "holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior's interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members' harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals",
"sentence": "Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members’ harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals); see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 185, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (agreeing that “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought”)."
} | 12,264,857 | b |
The "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing is that for each claim, each plaintiff must allege an actual or imminent injury that is traceable- to the defendant and redressable by the court. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": "504 U.S. 555, 560-62",
"parenthetical": "holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior's interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members' harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals",
"sentence": "Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members’ harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals); see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 185, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (agreeing that “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "agreeing that \"a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought\"",
"sentence": "Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members’ harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals); see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 185, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (agreeing that “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought”)."
} | 12,264,857 | a |
The "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing is that for each claim, each plaintiff must allege an actual or imminent injury that is traceable- to the defendant and redressable by the court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "528 U.S. 167, 185",
"parenthetical": "agreeing that \"a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought\"",
"sentence": "Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members’ harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals); see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 185, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (agreeing that “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior's interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members' harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals",
"sentence": "Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members’ harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals); see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 185, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (agreeing that “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought”)."
} | 12,264,857 | b |
The "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing is that for each claim, each plaintiff must allege an actual or imminent injury that is traceable- to the defendant and redressable by the court. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior's interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members' harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals",
"sentence": "Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members’ harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals); see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 185, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (agreeing that “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "agreeing that \"a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought\"",
"sentence": "Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members’ harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals); see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 185, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (agreeing that “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought”)."
} | 12,264,857 | a |
The "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing is that for each claim, each plaintiff must allege an actual or imminent injury that is traceable- to the defendant and redressable by the court. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior's interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members' harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals",
"sentence": "Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members’ harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals); see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 185, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (agreeing that “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "agreeing that \"a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought\"",
"sentence": "Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members’ harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals); see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 185, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (agreeing that “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought”)."
} | 12,264,857 | a |
The "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing is that for each claim, each plaintiff must allege an actual or imminent injury that is traceable- to the defendant and redressable by the court. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior's interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members' harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals",
"sentence": "Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members’ harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals); see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 185, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (agreeing that “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "528 U.S. 167, 185",
"parenthetical": "agreeing that \"a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought\"",
"sentence": "Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members’ harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals); see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 185, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (agreeing that “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought”)."
} | 12,264,857 | a |
The "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing is that for each claim, each plaintiff must allege an actual or imminent injury that is traceable- to the defendant and redressable by the court. | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior's interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members' harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals",
"sentence": "Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members’ harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals); see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 185, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (agreeing that “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "agreeing that \"a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought\"",
"sentence": "Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members’ harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals); see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 185, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (agreeing that “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought”)."
} | 12,264,857 | a |
The "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing is that for each claim, each plaintiff must allege an actual or imminent injury that is traceable- to the defendant and redressable by the court. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "agreeing that \"a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought\"",
"sentence": "Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members’ harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals); see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 185, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (agreeing that “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought”)."
} | {
"signal": "no signal",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior's interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members' harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals",
"sentence": "Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (holding wildlife-conservation organizations lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior’s interpretation of the Endangered Species Act where . organization - members’ harm was the endangering of wild animals in Sri Lanka but where the members had no current plans to go to Sri Lanka- to observe the animals); see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 185, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (agreeing that “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought”)."
} | 12,264,857 | b |
Second, and for the sake of completeness, we note that in addition to the previously identified problem of the Federal Rules of Evidence not applying, many courts have permitted the introduction of similar evidence in the context of domestic violence to show intent, motive, and the general nature of the relationship. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "821 F.3d 502, 508-09",
"parenthetical": "rea soning that admission of .prior acts of domestic violence was appropriate because evidence was relevant to motive and nature of relationship",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Brown, 900 A.2d 1155, 1161 (R.I. 2006) (stating that admission of uncharged instances of assault was permissible to show “an escalating pattern of domestic violence tended to establish defendant’s intent”); State v. Williams, 188 Vt. 405, 9 A.3d 315, 320 (2010) (holding prior instances of domestic assault admissible “to show the nature of the parties’ relationship and explain what might otherwise appear to be incongruous behavior to a jury, such as remaining with an abusive partner and delaying a report of abuse”); see also United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 508-09 (4th Cir. 2016) (rea soning that admission of .prior acts of domestic violence was appropriate because evidence was relevant to motive and nature of relationship); Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 127-28 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that evidence of past instances of domestic abuse was admitted for the legitimate purpose of showing the defendant’s motive)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "900 A.2d 1155, 1161",
"parenthetical": "stating that admission of uncharged instances of assault was permissible to show \"an escalating pattern of domestic violence tended to establish defendant's intent\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Brown, 900 A.2d 1155, 1161 (R.I. 2006) (stating that admission of uncharged instances of assault was permissible to show “an escalating pattern of domestic violence tended to establish defendant’s intent”); State v. Williams, 188 Vt. 405, 9 A.3d 315, 320 (2010) (holding prior instances of domestic assault admissible “to show the nature of the parties’ relationship and explain what might otherwise appear to be incongruous behavior to a jury, such as remaining with an abusive partner and delaying a report of abuse”); see also United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 508-09 (4th Cir. 2016) (rea soning that admission of .prior acts of domestic violence was appropriate because evidence was relevant to motive and nature of relationship); Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 127-28 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that evidence of past instances of domestic abuse was admitted for the legitimate purpose of showing the defendant’s motive)."
} | 12,392,292 | b |
Second, and for the sake of completeness, we note that in addition to the previously identified problem of the Federal Rules of Evidence not applying, many courts have permitted the introduction of similar evidence in the context of domestic violence to show intent, motive, and the general nature of the relationship. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "900 A.2d 1155, 1161",
"parenthetical": "stating that admission of uncharged instances of assault was permissible to show \"an escalating pattern of domestic violence tended to establish defendant's intent\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Brown, 900 A.2d 1155, 1161 (R.I. 2006) (stating that admission of uncharged instances of assault was permissible to show “an escalating pattern of domestic violence tended to establish defendant’s intent”); State v. Williams, 188 Vt. 405, 9 A.3d 315, 320 (2010) (holding prior instances of domestic assault admissible “to show the nature of the parties’ relationship and explain what might otherwise appear to be incongruous behavior to a jury, such as remaining with an abusive partner and delaying a report of abuse”); see also United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 508-09 (4th Cir. 2016) (rea soning that admission of .prior acts of domestic violence was appropriate because evidence was relevant to motive and nature of relationship); Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 127-28 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that evidence of past instances of domestic abuse was admitted for the legitimate purpose of showing the defendant’s motive)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "485 F.3d 103, 127-28",
"parenthetical": "stating that evidence of past instances of domestic abuse was admitted for the legitimate purpose of showing the defendant's motive",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Brown, 900 A.2d 1155, 1161 (R.I. 2006) (stating that admission of uncharged instances of assault was permissible to show “an escalating pattern of domestic violence tended to establish defendant’s intent”); State v. Williams, 188 Vt. 405, 9 A.3d 315, 320 (2010) (holding prior instances of domestic assault admissible “to show the nature of the parties’ relationship and explain what might otherwise appear to be incongruous behavior to a jury, such as remaining with an abusive partner and delaying a report of abuse”); see also United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 508-09 (4th Cir. 2016) (rea soning that admission of .prior acts of domestic violence was appropriate because evidence was relevant to motive and nature of relationship); Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 127-28 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that evidence of past instances of domestic abuse was admitted for the legitimate purpose of showing the defendant’s motive)."
} | 12,392,292 | a |
Second, and for the sake of completeness, we note that in addition to the previously identified problem of the Federal Rules of Evidence not applying, many courts have permitted the introduction of similar evidence in the context of domestic violence to show intent, motive, and the general nature of the relationship. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "821 F.3d 502, 508-09",
"parenthetical": "rea soning that admission of .prior acts of domestic violence was appropriate because evidence was relevant to motive and nature of relationship",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Brown, 900 A.2d 1155, 1161 (R.I. 2006) (stating that admission of uncharged instances of assault was permissible to show “an escalating pattern of domestic violence tended to establish defendant’s intent”); State v. Williams, 188 Vt. 405, 9 A.3d 315, 320 (2010) (holding prior instances of domestic assault admissible “to show the nature of the parties’ relationship and explain what might otherwise appear to be incongruous behavior to a jury, such as remaining with an abusive partner and delaying a report of abuse”); see also United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 508-09 (4th Cir. 2016) (rea soning that admission of .prior acts of domestic violence was appropriate because evidence was relevant to motive and nature of relationship); Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 127-28 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that evidence of past instances of domestic abuse was admitted for the legitimate purpose of showing the defendant’s motive)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding prior instances of domestic assault admissible \"to show the nature of the parties' relationship and explain what might otherwise appear to be incongruous behavior to a jury, such as remaining with an abusive partner and delaying a report of abuse\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Brown, 900 A.2d 1155, 1161 (R.I. 2006) (stating that admission of uncharged instances of assault was permissible to show “an escalating pattern of domestic violence tended to establish defendant’s intent”); State v. Williams, 188 Vt. 405, 9 A.3d 315, 320 (2010) (holding prior instances of domestic assault admissible “to show the nature of the parties’ relationship and explain what might otherwise appear to be incongruous behavior to a jury, such as remaining with an abusive partner and delaying a report of abuse”); see also United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 508-09 (4th Cir. 2016) (rea soning that admission of .prior acts of domestic violence was appropriate because evidence was relevant to motive and nature of relationship); Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 127-28 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that evidence of past instances of domestic abuse was admitted for the legitimate purpose of showing the defendant’s motive)."
} | 12,392,292 | b |
Second, and for the sake of completeness, we note that in addition to the previously identified problem of the Federal Rules of Evidence not applying, many courts have permitted the introduction of similar evidence in the context of domestic violence to show intent, motive, and the general nature of the relationship. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "485 F.3d 103, 127-28",
"parenthetical": "stating that evidence of past instances of domestic abuse was admitted for the legitimate purpose of showing the defendant's motive",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Brown, 900 A.2d 1155, 1161 (R.I. 2006) (stating that admission of uncharged instances of assault was permissible to show “an escalating pattern of domestic violence tended to establish defendant’s intent”); State v. Williams, 188 Vt. 405, 9 A.3d 315, 320 (2010) (holding prior instances of domestic assault admissible “to show the nature of the parties’ relationship and explain what might otherwise appear to be incongruous behavior to a jury, such as remaining with an abusive partner and delaying a report of abuse”); see also United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 508-09 (4th Cir. 2016) (rea soning that admission of .prior acts of domestic violence was appropriate because evidence was relevant to motive and nature of relationship); Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 127-28 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that evidence of past instances of domestic abuse was admitted for the legitimate purpose of showing the defendant’s motive)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding prior instances of domestic assault admissible \"to show the nature of the parties' relationship and explain what might otherwise appear to be incongruous behavior to a jury, such as remaining with an abusive partner and delaying a report of abuse\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Brown, 900 A.2d 1155, 1161 (R.I. 2006) (stating that admission of uncharged instances of assault was permissible to show “an escalating pattern of domestic violence tended to establish defendant’s intent”); State v. Williams, 188 Vt. 405, 9 A.3d 315, 320 (2010) (holding prior instances of domestic assault admissible “to show the nature of the parties’ relationship and explain what might otherwise appear to be incongruous behavior to a jury, such as remaining with an abusive partner and delaying a report of abuse”); see also United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 508-09 (4th Cir. 2016) (rea soning that admission of .prior acts of domestic violence was appropriate because evidence was relevant to motive and nature of relationship); Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 127-28 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that evidence of past instances of domestic abuse was admitted for the legitimate purpose of showing the defendant’s motive)."
} | 12,392,292 | b |
Second, and for the sake of completeness, we note that in addition to the previously identified problem of the Federal Rules of Evidence not applying, many courts have permitted the introduction of similar evidence in the context of domestic violence to show intent, motive, and the general nature of the relationship. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "821 F.3d 502, 508-09",
"parenthetical": "rea soning that admission of .prior acts of domestic violence was appropriate because evidence was relevant to motive and nature of relationship",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Brown, 900 A.2d 1155, 1161 (R.I. 2006) (stating that admission of uncharged instances of assault was permissible to show “an escalating pattern of domestic violence tended to establish defendant’s intent”); State v. Williams, 188 Vt. 405, 9 A.3d 315, 320 (2010) (holding prior instances of domestic assault admissible “to show the nature of the parties’ relationship and explain what might otherwise appear to be incongruous behavior to a jury, such as remaining with an abusive partner and delaying a report of abuse”); see also United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 508-09 (4th Cir. 2016) (rea soning that admission of .prior acts of domestic violence was appropriate because evidence was relevant to motive and nature of relationship); Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 127-28 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that evidence of past instances of domestic abuse was admitted for the legitimate purpose of showing the defendant’s motive)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "9 A.3d 315, 320",
"parenthetical": "holding prior instances of domestic assault admissible \"to show the nature of the parties' relationship and explain what might otherwise appear to be incongruous behavior to a jury, such as remaining with an abusive partner and delaying a report of abuse\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Brown, 900 A.2d 1155, 1161 (R.I. 2006) (stating that admission of uncharged instances of assault was permissible to show “an escalating pattern of domestic violence tended to establish defendant’s intent”); State v. Williams, 188 Vt. 405, 9 A.3d 315, 320 (2010) (holding prior instances of domestic assault admissible “to show the nature of the parties’ relationship and explain what might otherwise appear to be incongruous behavior to a jury, such as remaining with an abusive partner and delaying a report of abuse”); see also United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 508-09 (4th Cir. 2016) (rea soning that admission of .prior acts of domestic violence was appropriate because evidence was relevant to motive and nature of relationship); Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 127-28 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that evidence of past instances of domestic abuse was admitted for the legitimate purpose of showing the defendant’s motive)."
} | 12,392,292 | b |
Second, and for the sake of completeness, we note that in addition to the previously identified problem of the Federal Rules of Evidence not applying, many courts have permitted the introduction of similar evidence in the context of domestic violence to show intent, motive, and the general nature of the relationship. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "485 F.3d 103, 127-28",
"parenthetical": "stating that evidence of past instances of domestic abuse was admitted for the legitimate purpose of showing the defendant's motive",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Brown, 900 A.2d 1155, 1161 (R.I. 2006) (stating that admission of uncharged instances of assault was permissible to show “an escalating pattern of domestic violence tended to establish defendant’s intent”); State v. Williams, 188 Vt. 405, 9 A.3d 315, 320 (2010) (holding prior instances of domestic assault admissible “to show the nature of the parties’ relationship and explain what might otherwise appear to be incongruous behavior to a jury, such as remaining with an abusive partner and delaying a report of abuse”); see also United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 508-09 (4th Cir. 2016) (rea soning that admission of .prior acts of domestic violence was appropriate because evidence was relevant to motive and nature of relationship); Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 127-28 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that evidence of past instances of domestic abuse was admitted for the legitimate purpose of showing the defendant’s motive)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "9 A.3d 315, 320",
"parenthetical": "holding prior instances of domestic assault admissible \"to show the nature of the parties' relationship and explain what might otherwise appear to be incongruous behavior to a jury, such as remaining with an abusive partner and delaying a report of abuse\"",
"sentence": "See, e.g., State v. Brown, 900 A.2d 1155, 1161 (R.I. 2006) (stating that admission of uncharged instances of assault was permissible to show “an escalating pattern of domestic violence tended to establish defendant’s intent”); State v. Williams, 188 Vt. 405, 9 A.3d 315, 320 (2010) (holding prior instances of domestic assault admissible “to show the nature of the parties’ relationship and explain what might otherwise appear to be incongruous behavior to a jury, such as remaining with an abusive partner and delaying a report of abuse”); see also United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 508-09 (4th Cir. 2016) (rea soning that admission of .prior acts of domestic violence was appropriate because evidence was relevant to motive and nature of relationship); Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 127-28 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that evidence of past instances of domestic abuse was admitted for the legitimate purpose of showing the defendant’s motive)."
} | 12,392,292 | b |
Here, the appeal was from the denial of a petition for writ of error coram nobis and there was no motion for new trial. "In the absence of express statutory provisions, when an appeal is taken and perfected from the judgment of any court to a higher court, the jurisdiction vests at once in the higher court and such appeal divests the court from which it is taken of all jurisdiction." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "465 So.2d 483, 484",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he second sentencing of appellant by the trial court during the time this court had exclusive jurisdiction of the case [after the sentence had been reversed and while the appeal was pending on rehearing], and before the final decision of this court was a nullity.... was invalid and void.\"",
"sentence": "See Pratte v. State, 465 So.2d 483, 484 (Ala.Cr.App.1985) (“[T]he second sentencing of appellant by the trial court during the time this court had exclusive jurisdiction of the case [after the sentence had been reversed and while the appeal was pending on rehearing], and before the final decision of this court was a nullity.... was invalid and void.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "After a defendant has appealed, the circuit court is \"without jurisdiction to grant and fix bail under SS 12-22-170, since, if the defendant has any rights under that section, he must proceed in the appellate court and not the circuit court.\"",
"sentence": "See also State v. Williams, 19 Ala.App. 597, 99 So. 660 (1923) (After a defendant has appealed, the circuit court is “without jurisdiction to grant and fix bail under § 12-22-170, since, if the defendant has any rights under that section, he must proceed in the appellate court and not the circuit court.”); De Bardeleben v. State, 16 Ala.App. 367, 369, 77 So. 979 (1918) (same); Ex parte Alabama State Bar, 285 Ala. 191, 194, 230 So.2d 519 (1970) (“While the appeal suspends the execution of the sentence of the criminal court pending appeal, ... the matter of the conviction remains and continues to exist.”) Brown v. State, 250 Ala. 444, 447, 35 So.2d 518 (1948) (“We think the petition to the circuit court for the writ [of error coram nobis] was properly dismissed because that court had no jurisdiction to hear it while the appeal [of the conviction] was pending and undisposed of, ..."
} | 7,541,960 | a |
Here, the appeal was from the denial of a petition for writ of error coram nobis and there was no motion for new trial. "In the absence of express statutory provisions, when an appeal is taken and perfected from the judgment of any court to a higher court, the jurisdiction vests at once in the higher court and such appeal divests the court from which it is taken of all jurisdiction." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "After a defendant has appealed, the circuit court is \"without jurisdiction to grant and fix bail under SS 12-22-170, since, if the defendant has any rights under that section, he must proceed in the appellate court and not the circuit court.\"",
"sentence": "See also State v. Williams, 19 Ala.App. 597, 99 So. 660 (1923) (After a defendant has appealed, the circuit court is “without jurisdiction to grant and fix bail under § 12-22-170, since, if the defendant has any rights under that section, he must proceed in the appellate court and not the circuit court.”); De Bardeleben v. State, 16 Ala.App. 367, 369, 77 So. 979 (1918) (same); Ex parte Alabama State Bar, 285 Ala. 191, 194, 230 So.2d 519 (1970) (“While the appeal suspends the execution of the sentence of the criminal court pending appeal, ... the matter of the conviction remains and continues to exist.”) Brown v. State, 250 Ala. 444, 447, 35 So.2d 518 (1948) (“We think the petition to the circuit court for the writ [of error coram nobis] was properly dismissed because that court had no jurisdiction to hear it while the appeal [of the conviction] was pending and undisposed of, ..."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "465 So.2d 483, 484",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he second sentencing of appellant by the trial court during the time this court had exclusive jurisdiction of the case [after the sentence had been reversed and while the appeal was pending on rehearing], and before the final decision of this court was a nullity.... was invalid and void.\"",
"sentence": "See Pratte v. State, 465 So.2d 483, 484 (Ala.Cr.App.1985) (“[T]he second sentencing of appellant by the trial court during the time this court had exclusive jurisdiction of the case [after the sentence had been reversed and while the appeal was pending on rehearing], and before the final decision of this court was a nullity.... was invalid and void.”)."
} | 7,541,960 | b |
Here, the appeal was from the denial of a petition for writ of error coram nobis and there was no motion for new trial. "In the absence of express statutory provisions, when an appeal is taken and perfected from the judgment of any court to a higher court, the jurisdiction vests at once in the higher court and such appeal divests the court from which it is taken of all jurisdiction." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "465 So.2d 483, 484",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he second sentencing of appellant by the trial court during the time this court had exclusive jurisdiction of the case [after the sentence had been reversed and while the appeal was pending on rehearing], and before the final decision of this court was a nullity.... was invalid and void.\"",
"sentence": "See Pratte v. State, 465 So.2d 483, 484 (Ala.Cr.App.1985) (“[T]he second sentencing of appellant by the trial court during the time this court had exclusive jurisdiction of the case [after the sentence had been reversed and while the appeal was pending on rehearing], and before the final decision of this court was a nullity.... was invalid and void.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "285 Ala. 191, 194",
"parenthetical": "\"While the appeal suspends the execution of the sentence of the criminal court pending appeal, ... the matter of the conviction remains and continues to exist.\"",
"sentence": "See also State v. Williams, 19 Ala.App. 597, 99 So. 660 (1923) (After a defendant has appealed, the circuit court is “without jurisdiction to grant and fix bail under § 12-22-170, since, if the defendant has any rights under that section, he must proceed in the appellate court and not the circuit court.”); De Bardeleben v. State, 16 Ala.App. 367, 369, 77 So. 979 (1918) (same); Ex parte Alabama State Bar, 285 Ala. 191, 194, 230 So.2d 519 (1970) (“While the appeal suspends the execution of the sentence of the criminal court pending appeal, ... the matter of the conviction remains and continues to exist.”) Brown v. State, 250 Ala. 444, 447, 35 So.2d 518 (1948) (“We think the petition to the circuit court for the writ [of error coram nobis] was properly dismissed because that court had no jurisdiction to hear it while the appeal [of the conviction] was pending and undisposed of, ..."
} | 7,541,960 | a |
Here, the appeal was from the denial of a petition for writ of error coram nobis and there was no motion for new trial. "In the absence of express statutory provisions, when an appeal is taken and perfected from the judgment of any court to a higher court, the jurisdiction vests at once in the higher court and such appeal divests the court from which it is taken of all jurisdiction." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"While the appeal suspends the execution of the sentence of the criminal court pending appeal, ... the matter of the conviction remains and continues to exist.\"",
"sentence": "See also State v. Williams, 19 Ala.App. 597, 99 So. 660 (1923) (After a defendant has appealed, the circuit court is “without jurisdiction to grant and fix bail under § 12-22-170, since, if the defendant has any rights under that section, he must proceed in the appellate court and not the circuit court.”); De Bardeleben v. State, 16 Ala.App. 367, 369, 77 So. 979 (1918) (same); Ex parte Alabama State Bar, 285 Ala. 191, 194, 230 So.2d 519 (1970) (“While the appeal suspends the execution of the sentence of the criminal court pending appeal, ... the matter of the conviction remains and continues to exist.”) Brown v. State, 250 Ala. 444, 447, 35 So.2d 518 (1948) (“We think the petition to the circuit court for the writ [of error coram nobis] was properly dismissed because that court had no jurisdiction to hear it while the appeal [of the conviction] was pending and undisposed of, ..."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "465 So.2d 483, 484",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he second sentencing of appellant by the trial court during the time this court had exclusive jurisdiction of the case [after the sentence had been reversed and while the appeal was pending on rehearing], and before the final decision of this court was a nullity.... was invalid and void.\"",
"sentence": "See Pratte v. State, 465 So.2d 483, 484 (Ala.Cr.App.1985) (“[T]he second sentencing of appellant by the trial court during the time this court had exclusive jurisdiction of the case [after the sentence had been reversed and while the appeal was pending on rehearing], and before the final decision of this court was a nullity.... was invalid and void.”)."
} | 7,541,960 | b |
Here, the appeal was from the denial of a petition for writ of error coram nobis and there was no motion for new trial. "In the absence of express statutory provisions, when an appeal is taken and perfected from the judgment of any court to a higher court, the jurisdiction vests at once in the higher court and such appeal divests the court from which it is taken of all jurisdiction." | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "465 So.2d 483, 484",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he second sentencing of appellant by the trial court during the time this court had exclusive jurisdiction of the case [after the sentence had been reversed and while the appeal was pending on rehearing], and before the final decision of this court was a nullity.... was invalid and void.\"",
"sentence": "See Pratte v. State, 465 So.2d 483, 484 (Ala.Cr.App.1985) (“[T]he second sentencing of appellant by the trial court during the time this court had exclusive jurisdiction of the case [after the sentence had been reversed and while the appeal was pending on rehearing], and before the final decision of this court was a nullity.... was invalid and void.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "250 Ala. 444, 447",
"parenthetical": "\"While the appeal suspends the execution of the sentence of the criminal court pending appeal, ... the matter of the conviction remains and continues to exist.\"",
"sentence": "See also State v. Williams, 19 Ala.App. 597, 99 So. 660 (1923) (After a defendant has appealed, the circuit court is “without jurisdiction to grant and fix bail under § 12-22-170, since, if the defendant has any rights under that section, he must proceed in the appellate court and not the circuit court.”); De Bardeleben v. State, 16 Ala.App. 367, 369, 77 So. 979 (1918) (same); Ex parte Alabama State Bar, 285 Ala. 191, 194, 230 So.2d 519 (1970) (“While the appeal suspends the execution of the sentence of the criminal court pending appeal, ... the matter of the conviction remains and continues to exist.”) Brown v. State, 250 Ala. 444, 447, 35 So.2d 518 (1948) (“We think the petition to the circuit court for the writ [of error coram nobis] was properly dismissed because that court had no jurisdiction to hear it while the appeal [of the conviction] was pending and undisposed of, ..."
} | 7,541,960 | a |
Here, the appeal was from the denial of a petition for writ of error coram nobis and there was no motion for new trial. "In the absence of express statutory provisions, when an appeal is taken and perfected from the judgment of any court to a higher court, the jurisdiction vests at once in the higher court and such appeal divests the court from which it is taken of all jurisdiction." | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "\"While the appeal suspends the execution of the sentence of the criminal court pending appeal, ... the matter of the conviction remains and continues to exist.\"",
"sentence": "See also State v. Williams, 19 Ala.App. 597, 99 So. 660 (1923) (After a defendant has appealed, the circuit court is “without jurisdiction to grant and fix bail under § 12-22-170, since, if the defendant has any rights under that section, he must proceed in the appellate court and not the circuit court.”); De Bardeleben v. State, 16 Ala.App. 367, 369, 77 So. 979 (1918) (same); Ex parte Alabama State Bar, 285 Ala. 191, 194, 230 So.2d 519 (1970) (“While the appeal suspends the execution of the sentence of the criminal court pending appeal, ... the matter of the conviction remains and continues to exist.”) Brown v. State, 250 Ala. 444, 447, 35 So.2d 518 (1948) (“We think the petition to the circuit court for the writ [of error coram nobis] was properly dismissed because that court had no jurisdiction to hear it while the appeal [of the conviction] was pending and undisposed of, ..."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "465 So.2d 483, 484",
"parenthetical": "\"[T]he second sentencing of appellant by the trial court during the time this court had exclusive jurisdiction of the case [after the sentence had been reversed and while the appeal was pending on rehearing], and before the final decision of this court was a nullity.... was invalid and void.\"",
"sentence": "See Pratte v. State, 465 So.2d 483, 484 (Ala.Cr.App.1985) (“[T]he second sentencing of appellant by the trial court during the time this court had exclusive jurisdiction of the case [after the sentence had been reversed and while the appeal was pending on rehearing], and before the final decision of this court was a nullity.... was invalid and void.”)."
} | 7,541,960 | b |
Thus, in contrast to Judge Coffey's representations, the Trust was funded with a significant portion of the Coffeys' assets, real and personal. Accordingly, we concur with the JCC's implicit finding that Judge Coffey was less than forthright, see AJS STUDY, supra at 82 (explaining how consideration should be given to whether a judge has offered an unlikely defense), and find that she made evasive and misleading statements to the JCC. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "141 N.H. 7, 7",
"parenthetical": "\"We cannot give the respondent credit for cooperating with the disciplinary process when he misle[d] the referee about the extent of his misconduct.\"",
"sentence": "See Fitzpatrick’s Case, 132 N.H. 211, 218 (1989) (finding that an attorney who attempts to mislead the PCC cannot be found to have fully cooperated); see also Basbanes’ Case, 141 N.H. at 7 (“We cannot give the respondent credit for cooperating with the disciplinary process when he misle[d] the referee about the extent of his misconduct.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "132 N.H. 211, 218",
"parenthetical": "finding that an attorney who attempts to mislead the PCC cannot be found to have fully cooperated",
"sentence": "See Fitzpatrick’s Case, 132 N.H. 211, 218 (1989) (finding that an attorney who attempts to mislead the PCC cannot be found to have fully cooperated); see also Basbanes’ Case, 141 N.H. at 7 (“We cannot give the respondent credit for cooperating with the disciplinary process when he misle[d] the referee about the extent of his misconduct.”)."
} | 4,139,430 | b |
P 5. Although Bailey is a defendant in the underlying suit, he is not a party to the 54(b) judgment. " 'Standing' is a jurisdictional issue which may be raised by any party or the Court at any time." We find that Bailey does not have standing to appeal the 54(b) judgment as there is no evidence that he has a considerable stake in the outcome of this appeal. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "568 F.3d 537, 546",
"parenthetical": "\"[a]s a general matter, a party who is not aggrieved by a judgment does not have standing to appeal it\"",
"sentence": "See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333-34, 100 S.Ct. 1166, 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980) (a party cannot appeal from a judgment unless he retains a personal stake in the outcome and is “aggrieved” by the judgment); see also Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund ex rel. St. Croix Ventures v. United States, 568 F.3d 537, 546 (5th Cir.2009) (“[a]s a general matter, a party who is not aggrieved by a judgment does not have standing to appeal it”)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "445 U.S. 326, 333-34",
"parenthetical": "a party cannot appeal from a judgment unless he retains a personal stake in the outcome and is \"aggrieved\" by the judgment",
"sentence": "See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333-34, 100 S.Ct. 1166, 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980) (a party cannot appeal from a judgment unless he retains a personal stake in the outcome and is “aggrieved” by the judgment); see also Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund ex rel. St. Croix Ventures v. United States, 568 F.3d 537, 546 (5th Cir.2009) (“[a]s a general matter, a party who is not aggrieved by a judgment does not have standing to appeal it”)."
} | 7,026,372 | b |
P 5. Although Bailey is a defendant in the underlying suit, he is not a party to the 54(b) judgment. " 'Standing' is a jurisdictional issue which may be raised by any party or the Court at any time." We find that Bailey does not have standing to appeal the 54(b) judgment as there is no evidence that he has a considerable stake in the outcome of this appeal. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a party cannot appeal from a judgment unless he retains a personal stake in the outcome and is \"aggrieved\" by the judgment",
"sentence": "See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333-34, 100 S.Ct. 1166, 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980) (a party cannot appeal from a judgment unless he retains a personal stake in the outcome and is “aggrieved” by the judgment); see also Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund ex rel. St. Croix Ventures v. United States, 568 F.3d 537, 546 (5th Cir.2009) (“[a]s a general matter, a party who is not aggrieved by a judgment does not have standing to appeal it”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "568 F.3d 537, 546",
"parenthetical": "\"[a]s a general matter, a party who is not aggrieved by a judgment does not have standing to appeal it\"",
"sentence": "See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333-34, 100 S.Ct. 1166, 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980) (a party cannot appeal from a judgment unless he retains a personal stake in the outcome and is “aggrieved” by the judgment); see also Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund ex rel. St. Croix Ventures v. United States, 568 F.3d 537, 546 (5th Cir.2009) (“[a]s a general matter, a party who is not aggrieved by a judgment does not have standing to appeal it”)."
} | 7,026,372 | a |
P 5. Although Bailey is a defendant in the underlying suit, he is not a party to the 54(b) judgment. " 'Standing' is a jurisdictional issue which may be raised by any party or the Court at any time." We find that Bailey does not have standing to appeal the 54(b) judgment as there is no evidence that he has a considerable stake in the outcome of this appeal. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "a party cannot appeal from a judgment unless he retains a personal stake in the outcome and is \"aggrieved\" by the judgment",
"sentence": "See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333-34, 100 S.Ct. 1166, 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980) (a party cannot appeal from a judgment unless he retains a personal stake in the outcome and is “aggrieved” by the judgment); see also Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund ex rel. St. Croix Ventures v. United States, 568 F.3d 537, 546 (5th Cir.2009) (“[a]s a general matter, a party who is not aggrieved by a judgment does not have standing to appeal it”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "568 F.3d 537, 546",
"parenthetical": "\"[a]s a general matter, a party who is not aggrieved by a judgment does not have standing to appeal it\"",
"sentence": "See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333-34, 100 S.Ct. 1166, 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980) (a party cannot appeal from a judgment unless he retains a personal stake in the outcome and is “aggrieved” by the judgment); see also Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund ex rel. St. Croix Ventures v. United States, 568 F.3d 537, 546 (5th Cir.2009) (“[a]s a general matter, a party who is not aggrieved by a judgment does not have standing to appeal it”)."
} | 7,026,372 | a |
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears from the face of the complaint that Corelleone's allegations imply the invalidity of his conviction, and he has not shown that his conviction was overturned or otherwise invalidated. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "512 U.S. 477, 487",
"parenthetical": "an action for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 if \"a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence ... unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated\"",
"sentence": "See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (an action for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence ... unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated”); see also Tripati, 821 F.2d at 1370 (“A district court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "821 F.2d 1370, 1370",
"parenthetical": "\"A district court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.\"",
"sentence": "See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (an action for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence ... unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated”); see also Tripati, 821 F.2d at 1370 (“A district court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.”)."
} | 5,721,983 | a |
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears from the face of the complaint that Corelleone's allegations imply the invalidity of his conviction, and he has not shown that his conviction was overturned or otherwise invalidated. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an action for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 if \"a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence ... unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated\"",
"sentence": "See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (an action for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence ... unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated”); see also Tripati, 821 F.2d at 1370 (“A district court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "821 F.2d 1370, 1370",
"parenthetical": "\"A district court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.\"",
"sentence": "See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (an action for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence ... unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated”); see also Tripati, 821 F.2d at 1370 (“A district court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.”)."
} | 5,721,983 | a |
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears from the face of the complaint that Corelleone's allegations imply the invalidity of his conviction, and he has not shown that his conviction was overturned or otherwise invalidated. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "an action for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983 if \"a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence ... unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated\"",
"sentence": "See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (an action for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence ... unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated”); see also Tripati, 821 F.2d at 1370 (“A district court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.”)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "821 F.2d 1370, 1370",
"parenthetical": "\"A district court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.\"",
"sentence": "See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (an action for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence ... unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated”); see also Tripati, 821 F.2d at 1370 (“A district court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.”)."
} | 5,721,983 | a |
Second, the fact that the Defendants are all governmental entities is compelling as well. The public's interest in accessing a settlement forming part of the public record is strong enough as it is, but it becomes even more so when the government is a party to that agreement. In such cases, the right of access plays an important role in giving the public oversight of the government's actions, an interest long recognized by the courts. | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a group of concerned citizens could have ac cess to files relating to county officials' possible conversion of funds",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-598, 98 S.Ct. 1306 (noting that the right of access is especially important when sought to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies); see also State ex rel. Colescott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 57 N.E. 535 (1900) (holding that a group of concerned citizens could have ac cess to files relating to county officials’ possible conversion of funds); Ferry v. Williams, 1879 WL 7013, 41 N.J.L. 332, 336 (N.J.Sup.Ct.1879) (allowing a taxpayer access to papers related to applications for licenses to sell alcohol when taxpayer thought that law was not being followed)."
} | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "435 U.S. 597, 597-598",
"parenthetical": "noting that the right of access is especially important when sought to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-598, 98 S.Ct. 1306 (noting that the right of access is especially important when sought to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies); see also State ex rel. Colescott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 57 N.E. 535 (1900) (holding that a group of concerned citizens could have ac cess to files relating to county officials’ possible conversion of funds); Ferry v. Williams, 1879 WL 7013, 41 N.J.L. 332, 336 (N.J.Sup.Ct.1879) (allowing a taxpayer access to papers related to applications for licenses to sell alcohol when taxpayer thought that law was not being followed)."
} | 5,319,410 | b |
Second, the fact that the Defendants are all governmental entities is compelling as well. The public's interest in accessing a settlement forming part of the public record is strong enough as it is, but it becomes even more so when the government is a party to that agreement. In such cases, the right of access plays an important role in giving the public oversight of the government's actions, an interest long recognized by the courts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "435 U.S. 597, 597-598",
"parenthetical": "noting that the right of access is especially important when sought to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-598, 98 S.Ct. 1306 (noting that the right of access is especially important when sought to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies); see also State ex rel. Colescott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 57 N.E. 535 (1900) (holding that a group of concerned citizens could have ac cess to files relating to county officials’ possible conversion of funds); Ferry v. Williams, 1879 WL 7013, 41 N.J.L. 332, 336 (N.J.Sup.Ct.1879) (allowing a taxpayer access to papers related to applications for licenses to sell alcohol when taxpayer thought that law was not being followed)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "holding that a group of concerned citizens could have ac cess to files relating to county officials' possible conversion of funds",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-598, 98 S.Ct. 1306 (noting that the right of access is especially important when sought to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies); see also State ex rel. Colescott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 57 N.E. 535 (1900) (holding that a group of concerned citizens could have ac cess to files relating to county officials’ possible conversion of funds); Ferry v. Williams, 1879 WL 7013, 41 N.J.L. 332, 336 (N.J.Sup.Ct.1879) (allowing a taxpayer access to papers related to applications for licenses to sell alcohol when taxpayer thought that law was not being followed)."
} | 5,319,410 | a |
Second, the fact that the Defendants are all governmental entities is compelling as well. The public's interest in accessing a settlement forming part of the public record is strong enough as it is, but it becomes even more so when the government is a party to that agreement. In such cases, the right of access plays an important role in giving the public oversight of the government's actions, an interest long recognized by the courts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "435 U.S. 597, 597-598",
"parenthetical": "noting that the right of access is especially important when sought to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-598, 98 S.Ct. 1306 (noting that the right of access is especially important when sought to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies); see also State ex rel. Colescott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 57 N.E. 535 (1900) (holding that a group of concerned citizens could have ac cess to files relating to county officials’ possible conversion of funds); Ferry v. Williams, 1879 WL 7013, 41 N.J.L. 332, 336 (N.J.Sup.Ct.1879) (allowing a taxpayer access to papers related to applications for licenses to sell alcohol when taxpayer thought that law was not being followed)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": null,
"parenthetical": "allowing a taxpayer access to papers related to applications for licenses to sell alcohol when taxpayer thought that law was not being followed",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-598, 98 S.Ct. 1306 (noting that the right of access is especially important when sought to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies); see also State ex rel. Colescott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 57 N.E. 535 (1900) (holding that a group of concerned citizens could have ac cess to files relating to county officials’ possible conversion of funds); Ferry v. Williams, 1879 WL 7013, 41 N.J.L. 332, 336 (N.J.Sup.Ct.1879) (allowing a taxpayer access to papers related to applications for licenses to sell alcohol when taxpayer thought that law was not being followed)."
} | 5,319,410 | a |
Second, the fact that the Defendants are all governmental entities is compelling as well. The public's interest in accessing a settlement forming part of the public record is strong enough as it is, but it becomes even more so when the government is a party to that agreement. In such cases, the right of access plays an important role in giving the public oversight of the government's actions, an interest long recognized by the courts. | {
"signal": "see",
"identifier": "435 U.S. 597, 597-598",
"parenthetical": "noting that the right of access is especially important when sought to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-598, 98 S.Ct. 1306 (noting that the right of access is especially important when sought to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies); see also State ex rel. Colescott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 57 N.E. 535 (1900) (holding that a group of concerned citizens could have ac cess to files relating to county officials’ possible conversion of funds); Ferry v. Williams, 1879 WL 7013, 41 N.J.L. 332, 336 (N.J.Sup.Ct.1879) (allowing a taxpayer access to papers related to applications for licenses to sell alcohol when taxpayer thought that law was not being followed)."
} | {
"signal": "see also",
"identifier": "41 N.J.L. 332, 336",
"parenthetical": "allowing a taxpayer access to papers related to applications for licenses to sell alcohol when taxpayer thought that law was not being followed",
"sentence": "See, e.g., Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-598, 98 S.Ct. 1306 (noting that the right of access is especially important when sought to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies); see also State ex rel. Colescott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 57 N.E. 535 (1900) (holding that a group of concerned citizens could have ac cess to files relating to county officials’ possible conversion of funds); Ferry v. Williams, 1879 WL 7013, 41 N.J.L. 332, 336 (N.J.Sup.Ct.1879) (allowing a taxpayer access to papers related to applications for licenses to sell alcohol when taxpayer thought that law was not being followed)."
} | 5,319,410 | a |
Subsets and Splits