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crs_R43931	crs_R43931_0	During Senate debates over judicial nominations, differing perspectives have been expressed about the relative degree of success of a President's nominees in gaining Senate confirmation, compared with the nominees of other recent Presidents. Bush, and Obama presidencies, as well as during just the sixth year of each presidency; (2) by providing, for the same four Presidents, a comparison of the time from nomination to confirmation for circuit and district court nominees approved by the Senate during each President's first six years; and (3) by comparing the percentage of circuit and district court judgeships vacant at the beginning of each President's sixth and seventh years in office as well as the percentage of such vacancies considered "judicial emergencies." Bush's first six years were eventually confirmed later in his presidency, raising the number and percentage of nominees confirmed who were first nominated during his first six years to 55 and 80.9%, respectively. Bush nominated the fewest number of individuals during his first six years in office (234). President Reagan had the highest percentage of district court nominees confirmed by the end of his sixth year in office (97.4%), while President G.W. Bush had the lowest percentage of nominees confirmed by the end of his sixth year (86.8%). President Clinton had 90.2% confirmed, while President Obama had the second-highest percentage (92.6%) confirmed during the first six years of his presidency. The number of circuit court nominees confirmed during a sixth year ranged from a high of 13 during the Clinton presidency to a low of 9 during the G.W. U.S. District Court Nominees Number Confirmed For district court nominees, the number of nominees confirmed during a sixth year ranged from a high of 77 during the Obama presidency to a low of 21 during the G.W. Bush's circuit court nominees who were confirmed during his first six years waited, on average, the longest period of time from first nomination to confirmation (366.7 days). In terms of the median number of days from nomination to confirmation, President Obama's circuit court nominees waited the longest period of time from nomination to confirmation (228 days), followed by President G.W. The district court nominees confirmed during President Clinton's first six years waited an average of 129.6 days while those confirmed during President Reagan's first six years waited 50.2 days. The median waiting times from nomination to confirmation for district court nominees ranged from a high of 214.5 days during President Obama's first six years to a low of 35 days during President Reagan's first six years. Compared to nominees confirmed during the three most recent two-term presidencies, the average number of days from nomination to confirmation for this group of nominees (167.0) was closest to the average waiting time for U.S. district court nominees approved by the Senate during the first six years of the G.W. Table 3 compares for the four Presidents: (1) the percentage of vacant U.S. circuit and district court judgeships on January 1 of a President's sixth year in office; (2) the percentage of vacant U.S. circuit and district court judgeships vacant on January 1 of a President's seventh year in office; and (3) the change in the percentage of vacant U.S. circuit and district court judgeships from January 1 of a President's sixth year to January 1 of his seventh year in office. Circuit Court Vacancies Table 3 shows that the percentage of circuit court judgeships that were vacant at the beginning of a President's sixth year in office was greatest during the Clinton and Obama presidencies (12.8% and 9.5%, respectively) while, at the beginning of a President's seventh year in office, the percentage of circuit court judgeships that were vacant was greatest during the Clinton and G.W. The percentage of vacant district court judgeships at the beginning of President Obama's seventh year in office, 4.9%, was the lowest percentage of vacant judgeships on January 1 of any of the Presidents' sixth or seventh years in office.	The selection and confirmation process for U.S. circuit and district court judges is of continuing interest to Congress. Recent Senate debates over judicial nominations have focused on issues such as the relative degree of success of President Barack Obama's nominees in gaining Senate confirmation compared with other recent Presidents, as well as the time from nomination to confirmation for nominees, and the relative prevalence of vacant judgeships compared to years past. This report addresses these issues, and others, by providing a statistical analysis of nominations to U.S. circuit and district court judgeships during the first six years of President Obama's time in office and that of his three most recent two-term predecessors, Presidents Reagan, Clinton and G.W. Bush. Some of the report's findings include the following: During his first six years in office, President Obama nominated 61 persons to U.S. circuit court judgeships. Of the 61, 53 were also confirmed during this same six-year period. The 53 confirmed Obama circuit court nominees represented the second-highest number of nominees confirmed during recent Presidents' first six years. President Clinton had the lowest number at 50. The percentage of circuit court nominees confirmed during President Obama's first six years, 86.9%, was also the second-highest, while the percentage confirmed during President G.W. Bush's, 75.0%, was the lowest. Of the four Presidents, President Reagan had both the greatest number (66) and percentage (97.1%) of circuit court nominees confirmed within the first six years of his presidency. Of the 270 persons nominated by President Obama to U.S. district court judgeships during his first six years, 250 (92.6%) were confirmed. Of the four recent two-term Presidents analyzed here, this was the greatest number and second-greatest percentage of district court nominees confirmed. Of the comparison group, President Reagan had the greatest percentage of district court nominees confirmed (97.4%), while President G.W. Bush had the lowest percentage confirmed (86.8%). President Clinton had, during his first six years, 90.2% of his district court nominees confirmed. The average number of days elapsed from nomination to confirmation for circuit court nominees confirmed during a President's first six years ranged from a low of 55.8 days during the Reagan presidency to a high of 366.7 days during the G.W. Bush presidency. The median number of days from nomination to confirmation for circuit court nominees confirmed during a President's first six years ranged from a low of 37.0 days (Reagan) to a high of 228.0 (Obama). The average number of days elapsed from nomination to confirmation for district court nominees confirmed during a President's first six years ranged from a low of 50.2 days during the Reagan presidency to a high of 219.4 days during the Obama presidency. The median number of days from nomination to confirmation for district court nominees confirmed during a President's first six years ranged from a low of 35.0 days (Reagan) to a high of 214.5 (Obama). The percentage of circuit court judgeships vacant on January 1 of President Obama's seventh year in office was less than the percentage of such judgeships vacant on January 1 of his sixth year in office (3.9% and 9.5%, respectively). The percentage of circuit court judgeships vacant at the beginning of President Obama's seventh year in office was less than the percentage vacant at the beginning of the seventh year of the Reagan, Clinton, and G.W. Bush presidencies. The percentage of district court judgeships vacant on January 1 of President Obama's seventh year in office was less than the percentage of such judgeships vacant on January 1 of his sixth year in office (4.9% and 11.1%, respectively). The percentage of district court judgeships vacant at the beginning of President Obama's seventh year in office was less than the percentage vacant at the beginning of the seventh year of the Reagan, Clinton, and G.W. Bush presidencies.
crs_R42822	crs_R42822_0	Australia is a strong supporter of the U.S. rebalancing to Asia strategy, as it has long held the view that continued U.S. presence in the region is a stabilizing influence on the region that enhances Australian security interests. Australia has a strong focus on international trade and is the world's 13 th -largest economy. The United States is the largest investor in Australia and Australia is the ninth-largest provider of foreign direct investment in the United States. Political Context in Australia The expansion of Australia's already close alliance relationship with the United States was facilitated politically by a dramatic increase in Australian popular opinion of U.S. leadership with the election of President Obama. Tony Abbott strongly supported the Gillard government's decision to move forward with the deployment of U.S. Marines to the Northern Territory and to deepen the alliance with the United States. Australia's Strategic World View Australia has long sought to balance its strategic relationship with the United States with its profitable economic relationship with China. More recently, Minister of Defense Stephen Smith has stated that: the presence of the United States in the Asia Pacific region is unambiguously a force for peace and security and for prosperity and that's why we strongly support what we're doing already ... and the point we've made to China is that it's not inconsistent with Australia having a comprehensive relationship with China as we do and also having a military alliance with the United States. While Canberra clearly seeks to have a strong economic relationship with China, while also having a strong strategic and economic relationship with the United States, some Australian strategic analysts are of the view that the desire to strengthen the alliance reflects growing unease among some in strategic circles in Canberra with the rise of China and is a hedge against strategic uncertainty in the Asia Pacific. A new 2013 Defense White Paper is planned to rearticulate Australia's strategic vision into the future. Australian Force Posture Review The Australian Defense Force Posture Review, which was released by Prime Minister Gillard and Defense Minister Stephen Smith on May 3, 2012, was conducted in the context of a number of Australian strategic and security terms of reference, including: The rise of the Asia Pacific as a region of global strategic significance; The rise of the Indian Ocean rim as a region of global strategic significance; The growth of military power projection capabilities of countries in the Asia Pacific; The growing need for the provision of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and The rising importance of energy security and security issues associated with expanding offshore resource exploitation in Australia's North West and Northern approaches. The report further stated: This review complements the work underway with the United States on its global force posture review initiatives involving Australia, specifically the implications for Australia's force posture of the initiatives announced during President Obama's visit to Australia in November 2011. This Indo-Pacific conception of strategic geography is consistent with the evolving U.S. strategic conception of the Indo-Pacific region as articulated by Secretary of State Clinton as part of the rebalancing to Asia strategy. In this way, Australia favors a strategic environment that includes the United States as an active and engaged partner in Asia. The Defense Budget and Capability Development Plans Although there is much political will in support of the U.S. rebalancing to Asia strategy in Australia, there may be budgetary limits on the extent to which Australia can follow through with its defense plans. This has led to significant cuts to the defense budget. Australia has recently made some increases in its defense capabilities. Such a system could reinforce the rebalancing to Asia strategy. Issues for Congress There are several issues for Congress related to Australia's role as an ally of the United States in the context of the Obama Administration's rebalancing to Asia strategy.	Australia, a traditionally staunch U.S. ally, is exploring ways to support the U.S. strategy of increasing its involvement in Asia—often called the rebalancing to Asia strategy—at a time when Australia has embarked on significant cuts to its defense budget. Australia is seeking to strengthen its long-standing defense alliance with the United States without jeopardizing its important trade relationship with China. Australia's strategic geography is increasingly focused on its north and west at a time when the United States is also increasingly focused on the same areas, namely Southeast Asia and the northern reaches of the Indian Ocean. An analysis of Australia's role in the United States' Asia strategy is particularly relevant as Congress considers future U.S. strategy, force structure, and defense procurement decisions. Australia's place in the U.S. rebalancing to Asia strategy is an important one to a large extent because the United States and Australia share many values and strategic perspectives. Australia's strategic worldview generally is one that views the United States as a force for good in the world and in Australia's Indo-Pacific region. The May 2012 Australian force posture review gives insight into Australian strategic thinking relative to its defense posture. While there is strong support for further developing bilateral defense cooperation with the United States, planned Australian defense budget cuts, and their potential impact on Australian defense capability plans, may place limits on the extent to which Australian defense capabilities can grow in the years ahead. That said, Australia has a relatively strong economy and a political context that could lead to more defense capability development in the future. What is clear is that there is strong bipartisan elite and popular support in Australia for remaining a close and valuable strategic ally of the United States. During President Obama's visit to Australia in 2011, he and Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard announced the deployment of up to 2,500 United States Marines to Australia's Northern Territory. This deployment is one of the most tangible examples of the rebalancing to Asia strategy, and also demonstrates Australia's resolve to support that strategy. When in Australia, President Obama stated, "Our alliance [with Australia] is going to be indispensible to our shared future, the security we need and the prosperity that we seek, not only in this region but around the world." The Marine rotational deployment announcement, and subsequent disclosures of additional plans to further expand the United States' already strong alliance relationship with Australia, did much to give the rebalancing to Asia strategy military substance. It was also during his speech to the Australian Parliament that President Obama pledged not to cut the United States' Asia Pacific force posture as cuts to the U.S. defense budget are considered. Australia's decision to place renewed emphasis on its strategic relationship with the United States within the context of America's rebalancing to Asia strategy makes its partnership with the United States a valuable piece of U.S. strategic engagement with the Indo-Pacific region. Australia's decision to strengthen its American alliance may also reflect growing uncertainty in Canberra with the evolving correlates of power in Asia.
crs_R45173	crs_R45173_0	L aw enforcement officials in the United States and abroad increasingly seek access to electronic communications, such as emails and social media posts, stored on servers and in data centers located in foreign countries. The architecture of the internet allows technology companies significant flexibility as to the geographic location where they may store collected data. As a result, electronic communications that may be evidence of a crime are not necessarily housed in the same country where the crime occurred. This disconnect has caused governments around the world, including the United States, to seek data stored outside their territorial jurisdictions in the course of law enforcement investigations. Although the SCA generally prohibits certain technology companies from disclosing the contents of electronic communications to third parties, it mandates disclosure to the U.S. government pursuant to a warrant based on probable cause that the communications contain evidence of a crime. In United States v. Microsoft Corp. , the Supreme Court was set to address whether the United States could compel Microsoft to release emails housed in a data center in Ireland through a warrant issued under the SCA. But less than one month after oral argument, Congress passed and the President signed into law the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act (CLOUD Act) as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018. The CLOUD Act amends the SCA and requires service providers subject to the SCA to release data in their possession, custody, or control in response to an SCA warrant—regardless of whether the data is located in the United States. A second facet of the CLOUD Act addresses the reciprocal issue of foreign governments' desire to access data in the United States as part of their investigation and prosecution of crimes. Prior to the CLOUD Act, foreign nations seeking data in the United States generally were required to request the assistance of the U.S. government through either procedures established by mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) or judicial requests known as letters rogatory. Requests under either instrument are reviewed by U.S. courts before disclosure to the foreign nation is authorized, but U.S. and foreign officials have criticized these processes as inefficient and unable to accommodate the increasing cross-border data demands in the digital era. The CLOUD Act responds to calls for modernization by authorizing the executive branch to conclude a new form of international agreement through which select foreign governments can seek data directly from U.S. technology companies without undergoing individualized review by the U.S. government. Agreements authorized by the CLOUD Act would remove legal restrictions on certain foreign nations' ability to seek data directly from U.S. providers in cases involving "serious crimes" when not targeting U.S. persons, provided that the United States has determined that the foreign nation's laws adequately protect privacy and civil liberties, among other requirements. Restrictions differ depending on the data at issue. . . electronic communication . Because technology companies headquartered in the United States hold a majority of the world's electronic communications on their servers, foreign governments frequently seek data held by U.S. companies. Supporters also argue that the CLOUD Act provides adequate protection for privacy, civil liberties, and human rights.	Law enforcement officials in the United States and abroad increasingly seek access to electronic communications, such as emails and social media posts, stored on servers and in data centers in foreign countries. Because the architecture of the internet allows technology companies to store data at a great distance from the physical location of their customers, electronic communications that could serve as evidence of a crime often are not housed in the same country where the crime occurred. This disconnect has caused governments around the world, including the United States, to seek data stored outside their territorial jurisdictions. In the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, Congress enacted one of the first major changes in years to U.S. law governing cross-border access to electronic communications held by private companies. The CLOUD Act has two major components. The first facet addresses the U.S. government's ability to compel technology companies to disclose the contents of electronic communications stored on the companies' servers and data centers overseas. The Stored Communications Act (SCA) mandates that certain technology companies disclose the contents of electronic communications pursuant to warrants issued by U.S. courts based on probable cause that the communications contain evidence of a crime. But a dispute arose over whether warrants issued under the SCA could compel disclosure of data held outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. While the Supreme Court was set to resolve this issue in United States v. Microsoft, the CLOUD Act amended the SCA to require that technology companies provide data in their possession, custody, or control in response to an SCA warrant—regardless of whether the data is located in the United States. On April 17, 2018, the Supreme Court ruled that the change in law mooted the Microsoft case. The second facet of the CLOUD Act addresses the reciprocal issue of foreign governments' ability to access data in the United States as part of their investigation and prosecution of crimes. Prior to the CLOUD Act, foreign nations seeking data in the United States were required to request the assistance of the U.S. government through either mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) or judicial instruments known as letters rogatory. Requests under either instrument are reviewed by U.S. courts before disclosure to the foreign nation can be authorized, but U.S. and foreign officials criticized the processes as inefficient and unable to accommodate the increasing number of data requests in the digital era. The CLOUD Act responds to calls for modernization by authorizing the executive branch to conclude a new form of international agreement through which select foreign governments can seek data directly from U.S. technology companies without individualized review by the U.S. government. Agreements authorized by the CLOUD Act would remove legal restrictions on certain foreign nations' ability to seek data directly from U.S. providers in cases involving "serious crimes" when not targeting U.S. persons, provided the Executive has determined that the foreign nation's laws adequately protect privacy and civil liberties, among other requirements. While the CLOUD Act conditions approval of covered agreements upon a host of restrictions, commentators debate whether these agreements will provide adequate protections for privacy, human rights, and civil liberties.
crs_RL31921	crs_RL31921_0	Introduction The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for implementing federal pesticide policies under two statutes: the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), governing the sale and use of pesticide products within the United States, and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), which limits pesticide residues on food in interstate commerce (including imports). FIFRA requires EPA to regulate the sale and use of pesticides in the United States through registration and labeling. FIFRA directs EPA to restrict the use of pesticides as necessary to prevent unreasonable adverse effects on people and the environment, taking into account the costs and benefits of various pesticide uses. The act prohibits sale of any pesticide in the United States unless it is registered (licensed) and labeled to indicate approved uses and restrictions. For the 600 or more pesticides (i.e., active ingredients) registered for use in food production, the FFDCA Section 408 authorizes EPA to establish maximum allowable residue levels (also known as "tolerances") to ensure that human exposure to the pesticide ingredients in food and animal feed will be "safe." Pesticides may not be registered under FIFRA for use on food unless tolerances (or exemptions) have been established under the FFDCA. The 1972 law replaced the original 1947 law, and is the basis of current federal policy, which is summarized in this report. Substantial changes to FIFRA also were made in 1978 ( P.L. The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 (FQPA) established a new, more stringent safety standard for pesticide residues on food, required special protection for children, directed EPA to reassess pesticides posing the greatest risks first, facilitated registration of pesticides for special (so-called "minor") uses, mandated a periodic review of all registered pesticides at least once every 15 years, and required coordination of regulations implementing FIFRA and FFDCA. The Pesticide Registration Improvement Renewal Act of 2007, or PRIA 2, reauthorized and revised these fee provisions through the end of FY2012, and the Pesticide Registration Improvement Extension Act of 2012, or PRIA 3 ( P.L. Congress expanded the requirement for tolerances in the Food Additives Amendment of 1958, which added Section 409, directing FDA to set tolerances for food additives, including pesticide residues in processed foods. In 1996, Congress substantially revised requirements for pesticide residue tolerance setting in the Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA). The FQPA also established a new safety standard of a "reasonable certainty of no harm" from exposure to pesticides. A tolerance must be established before a pesticide registration may be granted for use on food crops. FIFRA Section 3 also allows "conditional," temporary registrations if (1) the proposed pesticide ingredients and uses are substantially similar to currently registered products and will not create additional significant environmental risks; (2) an amendment is proposed for additional uses of a registered pesticide, and sufficient data are submitted indicating that there is no significant additional risk; or (3) data requirements for a new active ingredient require more time to generate than normally allowed, and use of the pesticide during the period will not cause any unreasonable adverse effect on the environment and will be in the public interest. The FFDCA, Section 408, as amended by the FQPA, requires EPA to assess safety in terms of total exposure to the pesticide (that is, to the concentration of pesticide allowed by the tolerance, together with all other dietary and non-food exposures for which there is reliable information) as well as to other pesticides that have the same toxic effects on people. However, applicants may claim certain data are protected as trade secrets under FIFRA, Section 10. These funds supplement EPA appropriations and are meant to expedite EPA processing of applications for pesticide reregistration (including tolerance reassessment) and to offset costs associated with pesticide registration review (see below). 112-177 ), enacted September 28, 2012, continued the authorization of the moneys in this Fund and retained the October 1, 2022, deadline. Special Review EPA continues to evaluate the safety of pesticides after they are registered as new information becomes available. Canceling or Suspending a Registration If a special review or reregistration evaluation finds that a registered use may cause "unreasonable adverse effects," EPA may amend or cancel the registration. CRS Report RL32218, Pesticide Registration and Tolerance Fees: An Overview , by [author name scrubbed].	This report summarizes the major statutory authorities governing pesticide regulation: the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), and Section 408 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), as amended, as well as the major regulatory programs for pesticides. Text relevant to FIFRA is excerpted, with minor modifications, from the corresponding chapter of CRS Report RL30798, Environmental Laws: Summaries of Major Statutes Administered by the Environmental Protection Agency, coordinated by [author name scrubbed], which summarizes more than a dozen environmental statutes. Congress enacted the original version of FIFRA in 1947, but a revision in 1972 is the basis of current pesticide policy. Substantial changes were made in 1988, with a focus on the reregistration of older pesticides, and again in the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA), which also amended the FFDCA. The Pesticide Registration Improvement Act of 2003 (PRIA 1), the Pesticide Registration Improvement Renewal Act of 2007 (PRIA 2), and the Pesticide Registration Improvement Extension Act of 2012 (PRIA 3; P.L. 112-177), enacted September 28, 2012, amended FIFRA to revise EPA authorities for collecting and expending fees imposed on pesticide manufacturers and formulators. These fees are used to supplement annual appropriations so as to expedite EPA processing of applications for pesticide registration and reregistration. Congress first required limits on pesticide residues on raw food in 1954 amendments to the FFDCA. Limits were required for food additives (including pesticide residues in processed foods) in the 1958 FFDCA amendments. In the 1996 FFDCA amendments, Congress established a new standard of safety for pesticide residues in food (both raw and processed): maximum residue levels set by EPA must ensure with "a reasonable certainty" that "no harm" will result from pesticide exposure. The FQPA directed EPA to coordinate tolerance setting with pesticide registration under FIFRA for food-use registrations of pesticides. FIFRA requires the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate the sale and use of pesticides in the United States through registration and labeling of pesticide products. The sale of any pesticide is prohibited in the United States unless it is registered and labeled. EPA is directed to restrict the use of pesticides as necessary to prevent unreasonable adverse effects on people and the environment, taking into account the costs and benefits of various pesticide uses. Pesticides manufactured solely for export do not require registration. FIFRA also requires EPA to review registrations for pesticides periodically and to reregister older pesticides based on new data that meet current regulatory and scientific standards. For pesticides to be registered for use in food production, FFDCA Section 408 authorizes EPA to establish allowable residue levels, called "tolerances," that ensure that human exposure to pesticide residues in food will be "safe." Foods with pesticide residues above the tolerance, or for which there is no tolerance established, may not be imported or sold in interstate commerce. A pesticide may not be registered under FIFRA for a food use unless a tolerance for that pesticide and food has been established under FFDCA. FIFRA directs EPA to make public any data submitted to support a registration application, if EPA registers the pesticide, but certain data are protected as trade secrets, and other registrants may not use the same data to support registration applications for similar pesticides for a period of 10 years. EPA continues to evaluate the safety of pesticides after they are registered, as new information becomes available. A pesticide registration may be canceled or amended if EPA determines that current use may cause unreasonable adverse effects.
crs_R44393	crs_R44393_0	While Congress has not modified FDA's authority for promulgating standards of identity, it has called for FDA to promulgate specific standards for certain foods. FDA Standards of Identity A standard of identity establishes the composition of a food, including mandatory and optional ingredients, and fixes the amounts or relative proportions of each ingredient or a specific method of manufacture. Section 401 of the FFDCA provides the primary statutory authority for the FDA to promulgate standards of identity for food via regulation. Thus, an appropriate standard of identity for a particular food is one that "will promote honesty and fair dealing in the interest of consumers." Section 403(g) of the FFDCA states that the FDA shall deem a food misbranded if "it purports to be or is represented as" a food for which the FDA has established a standard of identity and whose composition deviates from the standard. Legislative History of Section 401 Congress first authorized the promulgation of standards of identity for foods with the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938. Regulatory Process for Adoption of Food Standards The FDA promulgates standards of identity for food through the rulemaking process. First, the FDA or any "interested person" via a citizen petition may propose a standard of identity for adoption. Judicial Review The FDA's final standard of identity constitutes a final agency action that is eligible for judicial review. FDA Enforcement of Standards of Identity The FDA enforces standards of identity through the misbranding provision in the FFDCA (Section 403). Once the agency deems a food to be misbranded under this provision, then the agency can exercise various enforcement options against the manufacturer or other industry representatives. Related Legislation in the 114th Congress While Congress has not amended the FDA's legal authority to create standards of identity, Congress has introduced legislation in the past to encourage FDA's promulgation of specific standards of identity. For example, the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 includes a provision declaring that it "is the sense of Congress that the Commissioner of Food and Drugs should promptly establish a national standard of identity for honey for the Commissioner responsible for U.S. Customs and Border Protection to use to ensure that imports of honey are (1) classified accurately and for purposes of assessing duties; and (2) denied entry into the United States if such imports pose a threat to the health or safety of consumers in the United States."	Standards of identity for foods overseen by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) generally define the composition of a food, prescribing both mandatory and optional ingredients and fixing the relative proportions of each ingredient. This report addresses the following legal issues associated with the promulgation and enforcement of standards of identity for foods. Section 401 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) establishes the legal authority for the FDA to promulgate standards of identity for food. According to this statutory authority, a standard of identity for a particular food is necessary if such a standard would "promote honesty and fair dealing in the interest of consumers." Congress first authorized the promulgation of standards of identity for foods in 1938 in response to the failure of the federal government's enforcement actions to regulate "imitation" foods. The FDA creates standards of identity for food through the rulemaking process. The FDA or an interested person via a citizen petition may propose a standard of identity for adoption. After the FDA publishes the proposed standard of identity in the Federal Register, members of the public may submit objections and demand a public hearing. The standard of identity is effective once the FDA publishes the final order in the Federal Register. The FDA's promulgation of a final standard of identity constitutes a final agency action that is eligible for judicial review. The FDA enforces standards of identity through the misbranding provision in the FFDCA, which states that a food is misbranded if "it purports to be or is represented as" a food for which the FDA has established a standard of identity and deviates from that standard. Once the agency deems a food to be misbranded under this provision, then the agency can exercise various enforcement options. Congress generally has not modified FDA's authority for promulgating standards of identity. However, Congress has introduced legislation calling for the FDA to promulgate standards for specific foods. For example, the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (H.R. 644, S. 1269) of the 114th Congress includes a provision to encourage a standard of identity for honey.
crs_R45198	crs_R45198_0	Introduction Congress plays a central role in the negotiation, approval and implementation of U.S. trade agreements, reflecting its constitutional authority over foreign commerce. As Congress works with the Trump Administration in establishing and implementing U.S. trade policy, it may have interest in more closely examining the implications of the type and content of U.S. trade agreements and those pursued by major U.S. trading partners that exclude the United States. Key questions to consider may include how other countries' trade agreements may affect U.S. economic and strategic interests and negotiating priorities; the influence of bilateral and regional agreements on broader international commercial norms and their impact on the multilateral trading system; the role of the United States in international trade agreement negotiations; whether the United States should pursue new trade agreement negotiations and if so how to prioritize potential partners; and the costs and benefits of bilateral versus multi-party or regional negotiating approaches. This includes the U.S. withdrawal from the signed but not ratified 12-party Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), renegotiation of existing FTAs, including with a stated intent to place a major focus on trade imbalances, and a stated preference to negotiate future agreements bilaterally, rather than on a multi-party or regional basis. Congress will likely play a critical role in shaping future U.S. trade agreements since it must pass implementing legislation to bring FTAs into force. In order to receive expedited legislative consideration, such trade agreements must advance the U.S. trade negotiating objectives Congress established in its 2015 grant of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), which is scheduled to remain in effect until July 1, 2021 unless Congress enacts, by July 1, 2018, an extension disapproval resolution regarding the Administration's recently submitted extension request. WTO Rules on RTAs The WTO Agreements provide three different exceptions for RTAs. The economic effects of trade liberalization under RTAs are less clear, due to their discriminatory nature. The Obama Administration also pursued two major multi-party FTA negotiations, which, if implemented, would have nearly doubled the share of U.S. trade occurring with FTA partners. The Obama Administration also initiated negotiations with the European Union (EU), collectively the largest U.S. trade and investment partner, on a potential Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP). These stem in part from updated negotiating objectives in the 2002 grant of TPA as well as the 2007 agreement between the George W. Bush Administration and congressional leadership known as the "May 10 th Agreement," which further clarified U.S. trade negotiating objectives; The Jordan FTA was negotiated and ratified without TPA procedures in effect in 2001, and generally has less extensive commitments than NAFTA (e.g., the FTA contains no commitments on investment); and The multilateral Uruguay Round Agreements entered into force in 1995, one year after NAFTA became effective, and included commitments on issues also included in NAFTA, such as services trade, intellectual property rights protections, agriculture and dispute settlement. Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) . Some U.S. FTAs also establish industry-specific TBT commitments. U.S. Trade Shares with FTA Partners U.S. FTAs have been a significant component of U.S. trade policy, have been influential in establishing new rules for the global trading system, and are a major focus of the current U.S. trade debate. Since 1990, the number of RTAs in force and notified to the WTO has increased seven-fold, while metrics on the average depth of provisions (i.e., the number of legally enforceable commitments) have doubled over the same period. As of May 2018, there were 287 such agreements in force and notified to the WTO of which the United States is party to 14 (involving 20 countries). However, other countries continue to pursue mega-regional pacts such as the recently concluded but not yet ratified and implemented Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) agreement without the United States, making it likely that mega-regional agreements will remain a significant component of the global trading system for the foreseeable future. Economically significant trade agreements currently under negotiation or awaiting implementation include (see " Major U.S. Trade Partners' RTAs " for more) EU-Japan RTA, which includes two of the five largest U.S. trading partners; CPTPP, which includes all TPP countries except the United States; Expansion of the Pacific Alliance (current members Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru are negotiating with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Singapore); Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which includes several of the world's largest economies, such as China, Japan, India, and South Korea; and Tripartite Agreement and Continental Free Trade Area, 27- and 55-member RTA negotiations, respectively, encompassing all major African economies. While RTAs may deepen existing multilateral commitments by further reducing tariffs or providing additional access to services markets, they may also go beyond WTO rules and establish new provisions. From the U.S. perspective, this heterogeneity in RTAs raises at least two questions: (1) are these agreements adhering to the WTO criteria on RTAs and creating an environment conducive to future multilateral negotiations, and (2) are these agreements creating new rules that differ in type from U.S. RTAs and how could those new rules affect U.S. interests? In general, U.S. FTAs cover a broader range of issues than most global RTAs. Services. Better coordination in regulatory approaches to minimize impediments to trade was a primary goal of the now stalled T-TIP negotiations. None of China's RTAs include enforceable labor or environmental commitments. European Union China Canada Mexico Japan South Korea United States Issues for Congress Both domestically and internationally, shifts are underway in trade agreement policies that Congress may consider whether to address. As other countries, particularly economically significant powers such as the EU, China, and Japan, move forward with new agreements that do not involve the United States, some trade policy experts worry that the United States may be losing an opportunity to shape future trade rules and influence other countries in adopting standards in areas such as IPR and labor. These industries have raised concerns over the potential disadvantage in foreign markets due to other countries RTA negotiations.	Congress plays a prominent role in shaping, debating, and approving legislation to implement trade agreements, and over the past three decades, bilateral and regional trade agreements (RTAs, or free trade agreements (FTAs) in the U.S. context) have become a primary source of new international trade liberalization commitments. The United States has historically pursued FTAs to open markets for U.S. goods, services, and agriculture, and establish trade rules and disciplines to enhance overall domestic and global economic growth. They are actively debated and can be contentious due to concerns over the potential employment effects of greater import competition, among other reasons. RTAs are reciprocal preferential arrangements among two or more parties. Their content has evolved significantly, partly as a result of change in the international economy where new trade barriers have been erected and/or where RTAs may provide a testing ground for new trade rules for potential future multilateral agreement. The United States historically has aimed for comprehensive coverage in eliminating barriers to trade and addressing all sectors in its FTAs. In addition to the reduction and elimination of tariffs and more traditional nontariff trade barriers, U.S. FTAs also cover services trade, enhance intellectual property rights (IPR), provide investment protections, and include enforceable labor and environmental commitments. Some countries pursue more limited agreements—only half of RTAs worldwide cover services and they rarely include labor and environmental provisions. Congressional interest in U.S. and global RTAs stems from their potential economic and foreign policy implications, implementation issues, and Congress' role in establishing U.S. trade policy (Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress authority to regulate foreign commerce). In its 2015 grant of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), Congress set specific negotiating objectives for U.S. trade agreements that must be advanced in order for Congress to provide expedited consideration to the implementing legislation needed to bring new agreements into force. TPA is scheduled to be in effect through July 2021, unless Congress, before July 1, 2018, enacts an extension disapproval resolution regarding the Administration's recently submitted extension request. Since 1990, the number of RTAs in force globally has grown six-fold from fewer than 50 to nearly 300. All 164 members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are now party to at least one RTA; as of 2014 each member had on average 11 RTA partners. The United States began negotiating FTAs in the 1980s, and as of 2018, is party to 14 such agreements involving 20 trading partners. The multilateral trading system, meanwhile, has not produced a broad set of new trade liberalization agreements (excluding more limited scope agreements, such as the Trade Facilitation Agreement) since the Uruguay Round, which also established the WTO in 1995. In the current environment of stalled multilateral negotiations, RTAs provide an alternative venue to pursue trade liberalization and establish new rules on emerging issues. RTAs are, however, inherently discriminatory given their limited membership (i.e., they provide preferential treatment to some countries and not others), leading to debate over their global economic effect and whether they serve to facilitate future multilateral agreements or lead to the creation of competing trade blocs. U.S. exporters benefit from the preferential aspects of FTAs when they gain better access to FTA partner markets than their foreign competitors, but may be similarly harmed when third parties negotiate agreements that do not include the United States. To date there are no RTAs in force between the world's largest economies (China, Japan, European Union (EU), and the United States). This could change in the near future as these and other major U.S. trading partners are involved in several pending RTAs, including an ongoing negotiation between 16 Asian nations that involves both China and Japan, and two recently concluded but not yet ratified and implemented RTAs: the EU-Japan agreement (one of twelve pending EU RTAs) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). In some ways, the United States has pulled back from its recent FTA policy. Under the Obama Administration, the United States pursued two major regional FTA negotiations, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) including Japan and 10 other Asia-Pacific nations, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) with the European Union. These FTAs would have nearly doubled the share of U.S. trade occurring with FTA partners. The Trump Administration, however, has criticized existing FTAs, withdrawn the United States from the concluded but not enacted TPP, placed the T-TIP negotiations on hold, and initiated renegotiation or modification of the largest U.S. FTAs with Canada, Mexico, and South Korea. The Administration has also stated its intent to negotiate future FTAs on a bilateral rather than multi-party basis. As other countries move forward with new RTA negotiations that cover a significant share of world trade, a number of issues arise that may be of interest to Congress, including how these agreements will affect U.S. economic and strategic interests, their impact on U.S. leadership in trade liberalization efforts and establishing new trade rules, and the appropriate U.S. response.
crs_RS22645	crs_RS22645_0	The U.S. Congress and successive U.S. administrations have supported the EU project since its inception as a way to foster a stable Europe, democratic states, and strong trading partners. The United States and the EU share a huge and mutually beneficial economic relationship. Nevertheless, the U.S.-EU relationship has been challenged in recent years as numerous trade and foreign policy conflicts have emerged. Since 2003, however, both sides have made efforts to improve relations, and successive U.S.-EU summits have sought to emphasize areas of cooperation and partnership. Issues at the U.S.-EU April 2007 Summit U.S.-EU summits are held annually; the 2007 summit took place on April 30 in Washington, DC. Congressional approval will not be required.	The U.S. Congress and successive U.S. administrations have supported the European Union (EU) and the process of European integration as ways to foster a stable Europe, democratic states, and strong trading partners. In recent years, a number of trade and foreign policy conflicts have strained the U.S.-EU relationship. Since the divisive dispute over Iraq in 2003, however, both the United States and the EU have sought to improve cooperation and demonstrate a renewed commitment to partnership in tackling global challenges. This report evaluates the results of the annual U.S.-EU summit on April 30, 2007, in Washington, DC. It will not be updated again. Also see CRS Report RS21372, The European Union: Questions and Answers , by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL30732, Trade Conflict and the U.S.-European Union Economic Relationship , by [author name scrubbed].
crs_RL32200	crs_RL32200_0	The consideration of a measure in the Committee of the Whole and in the House can be divided into five stages: (1) the House resolves itself into the Committee of the Whole; (2) Members engage in general debate on the measure; (3) Members offer, consider, and vote on amendments to the measure; (4) the Committee of the Whole rises and reports back to the House with a recommendation; and (5) the House votes on the recommendation and then on the measure itself. Various rules and procedures, discussed in this report, govern how and when Members can participate in debate, offer amendments, make motions and requests, and take other actions in the Committee of the Whole. Measures considered in the Committee of the Whole typically are subject to conditions governing debate and amendments that are specified by a special rule from the Committee on Rules or a unanimous consent agreement. During the amendment process, the chair would distribute time in five-minute portions as described in the " Debate Under the Five-Minute Rule " section, below. Controlled Time for Debating an Amendment If debate time on an amendment is controlled under the terms of a special rule, the rule usually specifies the Member (or a designee) who may offer the amendment and how long the amendment may be debated. Pro forma amendments are amendments to strike one or more words of the text under consideration, and they are offered solely for the purpose of gaining recognition to speak for five minutes. The motion is usually made by the majority floor manager, although any Member who is recognized might make the motion. The Committee of the Whole might agree to close or limit debate by unanimous consent, rather than by motion. Alternatively, the chair might make the remaining time controlled time. A Member can also make a motion to amend an amendment unless prohibited by a special rule. Actions Concerning Rules and Procedures Point of Order Any Member may make a point of order against a pending matter (e.g., a provision in a bill or an amendment) on the grounds that it violates a rule of the House, although a special rule, or a unanimous consent agreement, may waive certain points of order. Parliamentary Inquiry A Member may make a parliamentary inquiry asking for an explanation of the procedural situation or the interpretation of a House rule. A Member cannot ask for unanimous consent, therefore, to take actions in the Committee of the Whole that could not be done by motion, such as to reconsider a vote on an amendment. The motion to rise may appear in several different forms: to rise, when it has not concluded consideration; to rise and report, when it has concluded consideration; or in conjunction with an attempt to strike the enacting (or resolving) clause. After all parts of a measure have been read for amendment in the Committee of the Whole, and no further amendments are offered or are in order, a Member may offer a motion to rise and report the measure back to the House, ending the consideration of the measure in the Committee of the Whole and recommending that the House formally accept the Committee's actions. A quorum is always presumed to be present unless it is otherwise demonstrated through a process that begins when a Member makes a point of order on the floor. Three kinds of votes can take place in the Committee of the Whole: voice, division, and recorded.	The House of Representatives resolves into the Committee of the Whole, a parliamentary device designed to allow greater participation by Members in debate, to consider most major measures. Various rules and procedures govern how and when Members can engage in debate, offer amendments, make motions and requests, and take other actions in the Committee of the Whole. In addition, measures considered in the Committee of the Whole typically are subject to conditions governing debate and amendments that are specified by a special rule or a unanimous consent agreement. Time during general debate is controlled by the chair and ranking member of the committee that reported the measure under consideration. These Members, called floor managers, determine who may speak, for how long, and in what order. Time during the amendment process is sometimes controlled in a similar way under the terms of a special rule. Alternatively, the amending process might proceed under the "five-minute rule," whereby the proponent and an opponent of an amendment are recognized by the chair of the Committee of the Whole for five minutes each. Additional Members may offer "pro forma amendments" solely for the purpose of gaining recognition to speak for five minutes. In some circumstances, Members might make motions to close or limit five-minute debate. If a Member believes a pending matter violates a House rule, he or she may make a point of order against it; a Member may also reserve a point of order to be made later against an amendment. A ruling by the chair as to whether a matter violates a House rule may be appealed. A Member might also make a parliamentary inquiry to ask a question about a procedural situation. Some actions can be taken in the Committee of the Whole by unanimous consent; however, a Member cannot ask unanimous consent to take actions in Committee of the Whole that are properly performed by the House or that substantially modify conditions established by a special order agreed to by the House. The Committee of the Whole resolves back into the House proper by "rising." Members might make a motion simply to rise, when the Committee of the Whole has not concluded consideration of a measure, or to rise and report, when consideration has concluded. Special rules usually include language that makes a motion to rise and report unnecessary. Members occasionally make the motion to rise and report with the recommendation to strike the enacting clause. A quorum for conducting business in the Committee of the Whole is 100 Members, but a quorum is presumed to be present unless it is otherwise demonstrated through a process that begins when a Member makes a point of order on the floor. Three kinds of votes can take place in the Committee of the Whole: voice, division, and recorded.
crs_RS22544	crs_RS22544_0	E nacted over three decades ago, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded education programs or activities. In 2006, however, the Department of Education (ED) issued Title IX regulations that, for the first time, authorized schools to operate individual classes on a single-sex basis. The issuance of these regulations has raised a number of legal questions regarding whether single-sex classrooms pose constitutional problems under the equal protection clause or conflict with statutory requirements under Title IX or under the Equal Educational Opportunities Act (EEOA).	Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibits sex discrimination in federally funded education programs or activities, school districts have long been permitted to operate single-sex schools. In 2006, the Department of Education (ED) published Title IX regulations that, for the first time, authorized schools to establish single-sex classrooms as well. This report evaluates the regulations in light of statutory requirements under Title IX and the Equal Educational Opportunities Act (EEOA) and in consideration of constitutional equal protection requirements.
crs_R43655	crs_R43655_0	The summit is being organized around the theme "Investing in the Next Generation." It will consist of discourse between President Obama, attending African heads of state, and the chairperson of the African Union (AU) Commission. The theme pays heed to an increasing U.S. policy focus on expanding trade and investment ties with Africa, and the political, economic, and security-related opportunities and challenges associated with Africa's development, particularly those related to its overwhelmingly youthful population. The Administration has characterized the summit format as being designed to enable a frank, mutual exchange of ideas on which to base U.S.-Africa cooperative relations, rather than to cap a pre-negotiated set of communiques. Cabinet members and other top officials, however, will hold bilateral meetings with some countries' leaders. Summit side meetings on selected issues (e.g., the threat of the Ebola viral disease in West Africa and the Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram and other armed Islamist groups in the Sahel) are also planned. The summit will be the first such event hosted by the United States. The summit signals both continuity in long-standing U.S.-African cooperation and increasing U.S. engagement with Africa on numerous fronts—particularly with regard to trade and investment, following strong economic growth on the continent and a marked rise in U.S. development assistance to Africa since 2000. Are all African heads of state attending the summit? There are some indications of bipartisan Hill support for the summit, as indicated, for instance, by the introduction of S.Res. 522 , A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate supporting the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit to be held in Washington, DC, from August 4 through 6, 2014, by Senator Coons, joined by co-sponsors Senator Menendez, Senator Corker, and Senator Flake, on July 24. Some Members of Congress are slated to participate in other summit events, and several related congressionally hosted events are scheduled on the Hill during the three-day summit period. What other official and unofficial events are being held in conjunction with the summit?12 In addition to the three days of official events to be held in conjunction with the summit—described in this report's Appendix A —over 50 deliberation, learning, and advocacy-based forums on a wide variety of topics are scheduled to be held during or after the summit. Other observers contend that such U.S. emphasis on democracy and human rights may, in fact, decrease the U.S. business facilitation prospects arising from the summit, when contrasted with summits held by China. Key additional democracy, governance, and security challenges are discussed below. Trade, Investment, and Economic Cooperation What is the nature and focus of U.S.-Africa trade and economic relations? U.S. trade and investment policy toward Africa is focused on economic development goals and encouraging African trade with the United States in order to promote economic growth, as well as enabling U.S. firms to tap emergent opportunities and invest in the region. Improvements in some African countries' economic and political climates in recent years have led to increasing interest in the region as a destination for U.S. goods, services, and investment. Some key factors include: Infrastructure . The strategy also seeks to increase U.S. firms' knowledge of the realities of sub-Saharan African business environments and markets, and provide more assistance to help the U.S. private sector to take advantage of trade and investment opportunities in the region. Trade capacity building (TCB). U.S. Aid to Africa How does U.S. assistance help address Africa's development challenges? Much U.S. bilateral aid to African countries is provided under these presidential initiatives: Global Health Initiative. At a YALI summit in late July President Obama also announced that: the program is being renamed the Mandela Washington Fellowship for Young African Leaders; the 2015 program summit will be held in sub-Saharan Africa; and that YALI is providing a new set of online courses, mentoring, and networking resources for program fellows, and that the Administration will launch four regional Leadership Centers to house such resources and foster public and private sector management and leadership development through training, interpersonal networking forums, and related activities. Governance, Democracy, and Human Rights What is the state of democracy and human rights in Africa? In several other countries, elected governments have been ousted by military coups in recent years. Peace and Security Issues What are the major challenges to peace and security in Africa? Major conflicts in Africa include the ones below: East Africa. North Africa. The Obama Administration's National Security Strategy, issued in 2010, focuses on advancing "effective partnerships" in Africa. CRS Report R43173, African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): Background and Reauthorization , by [author name scrubbed].	This report provides information about the early August 2014 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington, DC, and policy issues likely to be addressed by participants in the summit and other events being held in conjunction with it. In providing background on key U.S.-Africa policy issues, the report addresses: Africa's development and economic challenges; U.S.-Africa trade, investment, and economic cooperation; U.S. aid to Africa; Governance, democracy, and human rights issues; and Peace and security issues, including selected U.S. responses. The summit is organized around the theme "Investing in the Next Generation." Summit participants—President Obama, the chairperson of the African Union, and an anticipated majority of African heads of state—will discuss investment issues, peace and security, governance, and other topics. No U.S.-African bilateral presidential meetings are planned, although Cabinet officials will hold bilateral meetings with some countries' leaders and summit side meetings on selected issues (e.g., the West African Ebola viral disease outbreak and regional terrorism challenges) are planned. All African heads of state, apart from four, were invited to the summit. The summit is designed to enable frank exchanges of ideas on which to base U.S.-African ties, rather than to formulate a set of pre-negotiated outcomes. The summit and associated events will highlight key goals in the Administration's 2012 Africa Strategy, which focuses on U.S. efforts to help African countries to foster: good governance; increased economic growth, trade, and investment, in partnership with U.S. firms; durable peace and security; and greater socioeconomic opportunity and development. There are some indications of bipartisan congressional support for the summit, as reflected by the introduction of S.Res. 522 (Coons, co-sponsored by Menendez, Corker, and Flake) on July 24. There will be one official congressional summit event, a reception, and several unofficial Capitol Hill discussion forums, in addition to dozens of other unofficial events, sponsored mostly by major firms, think tanks, non-profit advocacy groups, universities, and others. Key event topics include trade and investment, development, governance, and human rights. The summit focuses on the continent as a whole, both sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa, although the Administration's 2012 Africa Strategy focuses on sub-Saharan Africa alone. Likewise, sub-Saharan Africa is the main focus of this report, although some coverage of North Africa is included. The summit, the first such U.S.-hosted event, follows similar Africa summits hosted by China, France, the European Union, and others, and may be seen, in part, as a response to such events. No major new U.S. initiatives have been publicly announced ahead of the summit. The style of the U.S. summit distinguishes it from those held in other countries to date, which often culminate in pledges of large host financial commitments. This is notably the case for China, which has rapidly expanded economic and political ties with Africa in recent years. The summit has drawn some criticism focused on the lack of both "deliverables" and bilateral presidential engagement, resulting from the belief of some that inadequate attention will be focused on business deal-making, among other reasons. The report discusses some key social and economic issues in the region. This includes key development challenges—a need for health, education, and other social indicator improvements, especially catering to Africa's youthful population, and a need to address climatic and environmental shocks, among other ends. It also briefly addresses the recent positive shift in Africa's economic environment, including rapid economic growth and growing discretionary spending by consumers, while considering factors that may continue to limit business interest in the region. U.S. trade and investment aid programs, especially trade preferences and trade capacity building efforts under the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which expires in 2015 and may be reauthorized (as the report discusses), are also addressed, as is the nature of U.S. development aid. U.S. bilateral aid to Africa, funded at about $7 billion in FY2014 and supplemented by additional types of aid, including emergency humanitarian assistance, focuses on health, education, agriculture and food security, and, more recently, electrification. U.S. security assistance supports the professionalization of African militaries and the deployment of African peacekeeping troops. U.S. assistance to Africa is delivered largely under six major presidential initiatives, which the report discusses.
crs_R40215	crs_R40215_0	This report provides a brief analysis of selected "general oversight provisions" in the House- and Senate-passed versions of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, H.R. The analysis is included in a side-by-side discussion of similar provisions in each bill. For purposes of this report, the term "general oversight provision" means an oversight-related provision that addresses multiple agencies or programs. Therefore, oversight-related provisions that are specific to a single program or appropriation, such as appropriations set-asides, are excluded from the report's scope. Among these in the present context is the question of how to balance speed with prudence. More general challenges in formulating a response to a crisis include how to reconcile values of transparency, accountability, efficiency, effectiveness, and equity. Longer-term issues include questions of how to build the capacity of federal agencies, Congress, and the President to better respond to crises. In addition, and arguably no less significant, questions arise of how to anticipate and avoid preventable crises. Oversight Systems and Objectives The federal government might be viewed as a system of "nested" oversight, with multiple entities engaging in simultaneous oversight activity. Congress oversees the President and agencies, including the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), an entity within the Executive Office of the President. Inspectors general and congressional support agencies such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) provide assistance to Congress, agencies, and the President with oversight. In turn, within the executive branch, OMB has a statutory responsibility to provide management leadership for many agencies, including monitoring and oversight of their activities. Agencies oversee their own activities through organizational and procedural arrangements, often as Congress has mandated via statute. Throughout, tools such as monitoring, analysis, and evaluation may be utilized. In developing an overall oversight framework, there also are multiple perspectives on the potential objectives of oversight. These include the following: compliance with applicable laws and regulations (e.g., adherence to legal requirements and avoidance of fraud); implementation that is faithful with congressional intent, when an agency or the President exercises discretion; avoidance of mismanagement (e.g., adherence to sound management practices); avoidance of undesired bias in funding allocations and policy execution (e.g., fair allocation of resources and fair implementation of policy, with intended equity); effectiveness of funded activities (e.g., achievement of programmatic missions and purposes); and efficiency of funded activities (e.g., minimization of avoidable "waste" and unnecessary redundancy).	This report provides a brief analysis of selected "general oversight provisions" in the House- and Senate-passed versions of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, H.R. 1, 111th Congress). The analysis is included in a side-by-side discussion of similar provisions in each bill. For purposes of this report, the term "general oversight provision" means an oversight-related provision that addresses multiple agencies or programs. Therefore, oversight-related provisions that are specific to a single program or appropriation, such as appropriations set-asides, are excluded from the report's scope. General oversight provisions in the House- and Senate-passed bills provide for, among other things, an oversight board composed of executive branch officials, several reporting requirements, and increased resources for agency inspectors general (IGs). In the context of crises, several oversight issues may arise. In the short term, these include questions of how to balance speed with prudence, and more general challenges of how to reconcile values of transparency, accountability, efficiency, effectiveness, and equity. Longer-term issues include questions of how to build the capacity of federal agencies, Congress, and the President to better respond to crises. In addition, and arguably no less significant, questions arise of how to anticipate and avoid preventable crises. The federal government might be viewed as a system of "nested" oversight, with multiple entities engaging in simultaneous oversight activity. Congress oversees the President and agencies, for example, including the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Inspectors general and congressional support agencies such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) provide assistance to Congress, agencies, and the President with oversight. In turn, within the executive branch, OMB has a statutory responsibility to provide management leadership for many agencies and oversees their activities. Agencies oversee their own activities through organizational and procedural arrangements. Throughout, tools such as monitoring, analysis, and evaluation may be utilized. In developing an overall oversight framework, there also are multiple perspectives on the potential objectives of oversight. These include compliance with applicable laws and regulations (e.g., adherence to legal requirements and avoidance of fraud); implementation that is faithful with congressional intent, when an agency or the President exercises discretion; avoidance of mismanagement (e.g., adherence to sound management practices); avoidance of undesired bias in funding allocations (e.g., fair allocation of resources and implementation of authorities, with intended equity); effectiveness of funded activities (e.g., achievement of programmatic missions and purposes); and efficiency of funded activities (e.g., minimization of avoidable "waste" and unnecessary redundancy). This report will be updated as events warrant.
crs_R40139	crs_R40139_0	Introduction Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Congress passed the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), which granted the President the authority "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those ... [who] planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks" against the United States. As part of the subsequent "war on terror," many persons captured during military operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere were transferred to the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for detention and possible prosecution before military tribunals. Although nearly 800 persons were transported to Guantanamo from early 2002 through 2008, the substantial majority of Guantanamo detainees have ultimately been transferred to a third country for continued detention or release. Detainees who remain fall into three categories: Persons who have been placed in preventive detention to stop them from returning to the battlefield (formerly labeled "enemy combatants" by the Bush Administration ). As a result, Guantanamo detainees may seek habeas review of the legality of their detention. 111-81 ) was signed into law, and modified rules governing military commissions. Efforts by the executive branch to close the facility have been hampered by a series of congressional enactments limiting executive discretion to transfer or release detainees into the United States, with the most significant limitations initially established by the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011 (2011 NDAA; P.L. By prohibiting funds from being used to transfer or release detainees into the United States, or to assist in the transfer or release of detainees into the country, these and subsequent similar acts seem to ensure that the Guantanamo detention facility remains open for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the measures appear to make military tribunals the only viable forum by which Guantanamo detainees could be tried for criminal offenses, as no civilian court operates within Guantanamo. 112-239 . The closure of the Guantanamo detention facility would raise a number of legal issues with respect to the individuals presently interned there, particularly if those detainees were transferred to the United States. This report provides an overview of major legal issues that are likely to arise in the event of executive and legislative action to close the Guantanamo detention facility. It discusses legal issues related to the transfer or release of Guantanamo detainees (either to a foreign country or into the United States), the continued detention of such persons in the United States, and the possible removal of persons brought to the United States. On March 7, 2011, President Obama issued Executive Order 13567, which establishes a process to periodically review whether the continued detention of a lawfully held Guantanamo detainee is warranted. These provisions restrict the use of funds (NDAA funds or funds under any act, respectively) to transfer a detainee to a foreign country or entity unless the Secretary of Defense certifies, with the agreement of the Secretary of State and in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, that (1) the government of the foreign country or the recognized leadership of the foreign entity to which the individual detained at Guantanamo is to be transferred— (A) is not a designated state sponsor of terrorism or a designated foreign terrorist organization; (B) maintains control over each detention facility in which the individual is to be detained ... ; (C) is not, as of the date of the certification, facing a threat that is likely to substantially affect its ability to exercise control over the individual; (D) has taken or agreed to take effective actions to ensure that the individual cannot take action to threaten the United States, its citizens, or its allies in the future; (E) has taken or agreed to take such actions as the Secretary of Defense determines are necessary to ensure that the individual cannot engage or reengage in any terrorist activity; and (F) has agreed to share with the United States any information that— (i) is related to the individual or any associates of the individual; and (ii) could affect the security of the United States, its citizens, or its allies; and (2) includes an assessment, in classified or unclassified form, of the capacity, willingness, and past practices (if applicable) of the foreign country or entity in relation to the Secretary's certifications. These restrictions have continued through the 2013 NDAA and CAA without modification. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P.L. The following sections discuss selected constitutional issues that may arise in the criminal prosecution of detainees, emphasizing the procedural and substantive protections that apply in different adjudicatory forums. In any event, the closure of the Guantanamo detention facility may raise complex legal issues, particularly if detainees are transferred to the United States. The nature and scope of constitutional protections owed to detainees within the United States may be different from the protections owed to those held elsewhere. The transfer of detainees into the country may also have immigration consequences.	Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Congress passed the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), which granted the President the authority "to use all necessary and appropriate force against those ... [who] planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks" against the United States. Many persons subsequently captured during military operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere were transferred to the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for detention and possible prosecution. Although nearly 800 persons have been held at Guantanamo since early 2002, the substantial majority of Guantanamo detainees have been transferred to another country for continued detention or release. Those detainees who remain fall into three categories: (1) persons placed in non-penal, preventive detention to stop them from rejoining hostilities; (2) persons who face or are expected to face criminal charges; and (3) persons who have been cleared for transfer or release, whom the United States continues to detain pending transfer. Although the Supreme Court ruled in Boumediene v. Bush that Guantanamo detainees may seek habeas corpus review of the legality of their detention, several legal issues remain unsettled. In January 2009, President Obama issued an Executive Order to facilitate the closure of the Guantanamo detention facility within a year. This deadline was not met, but the Administration has repeatedly stated its intent to close the facility. In March 2011, President Obama issued a new Executive Order establishing a process to periodically review whether the continued detention of a lawfully held Guantanamo detainee is warranted, which resulted in some 80 detainees being cleared for release and transfer to a foreign country. Efforts to transfer these prisoners and close Guantanamo have been hampered by a series of congressional enactments limiting executive discretion to transfer or release detainees into the United States, including, most recently, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013 (2013 NDAA; P.L. 112-239) and the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (2013 CAA; P.L. 113-6 ). By prohibiting funds from being used to transfer or release detainees into the United States, or to assist in the transfer or release of detainees into the country, these acts seem to ensure that the Guantanamo detention facility remains open at least through the 2013 fiscal year, and perhaps for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the measures appear to make military tribunals the only viable forum by which Guantanamo detainees could be tried for criminal offenses, as no civilian court operates within Guantanamo, unless efforts to close the facility are successfully renewed. Upon signing each of these measures into law, President Obama issued a statement describing his opposition to the restrictions imposed on the transfer of Guantanamo detainees, and asserted that his Administration will work with Congress to mitigate their effect. The closure of the Guantanamo detention facility would raise a number of legal issues with respect to the individuals formerly interned there, particularly if those detainees are transferred to the United States. The nature and scope of constitutional protections owed to detainees within the United States may be different from the protections owed to aliens held abroad. The transfer of detainees to the United States may also have immigration consequences. This report provides an overview of major legal issues likely to arise as a result of executive and legislative action to close the Guantanamo detention facility. It discusses legal issues related to the transfer of Guantanamo detainees (either to a foreign country or into the United States), the continued detention of such persons in the United States, and the possible removal of persons brought into the country. It also discusses selected constitutional issues that may arise in the criminal prosecution of detainees, emphasizing the procedural and substantive protections that are utilized in different forums (i.e., federal courts, court-martial proceedings, and military commissions).
crs_RL34636	crs_RL34636_0	Background A "Dear Colleague" letter is official correspondence that is sent by a Member, committee, or officer of the House of Representatives or Senate and that is widely distributed to other congressional offices. "Dear Colleague" letters are often used to encourage others to cosponsor, support, or oppose a bill. Additionally, "Dear Colleague" letters are used to inform Members and their offices about events connected to congressional business or modifications to House or Senate operations. The length of such correspondence varies, with a typical "Dear Colleague" running one to two pages. The use of the phrase "Dear Colleague" has been used to refer to a widely distributed letter among Members at least since early in the 20 th century. Congress has since expanded its use of the Internet and electronic devices to facilitate distribution of legislative documents. Such electronic communication has increased the speed and facilitated the process of distributing "Dear Colleague" letters. Members of the House often send out "Dear Colleague" letters to recruit cosponsors for their measures.	"Dear Colleague" letters are correspondence signed by Members of Congress and distributed to their colleagues. Such correspondence is often used by one or more Members to persuade others to cosponsor, support, or oppose a bill. "Dear Colleague" letters also inform Members about new or modified congressional operations or about events connected to congressional business. A Member or group of Members might send a "Dear Colleague" letter to all of their colleagues in a chamber, to Members of the other chamber, or to a subset of Members, such as all Democrats or Republicans. The use of the phrase "Dear Colleague" to refer to a widely distributed letter among Members dates at least to the start of the 20th century, and refers to the generic salutation of these letters. New technologies and expanded use of the Internet have increased the speed and facilitated the process of distributing "Dear Colleague" letters.
crs_R40621	crs_R40621_0	What is the "farm share" of a retail food price, and does it matter? As the raw ingredients for retail food items move along the marketing chain from the farm to a grain elevator or collection terminal, then on to a processor, a wholesaler, and finally to the retail customer, an array of costs is layered on top of the price of the raw agricultural commodity ( Figure 1 ). The farm share of the market price declines as a commodity moves from the farm to the retail outlet and consumer. The farm-value share of consumer food expenditures also has fallen by more than half, from 41% in 1950 to 17.4% in 2013 ( Figure 2 ). The average farm share for eggs was estimated at nearly 58% during 2010-2012. Linking Farm and Retail Prices Price is the primary mechanism by which various levels of the market system are linked. To estimate a food product's farm-to-retail price spread, the farm share must first be calculated. As a result, the nature of price transmission between the price paid by the consumer for the retail food product and the farm price of the underlying agricultural commodity can be better understood by evaluating two key aspects of any particular food product: (1) the farm share of the retail price, and (2) the competitiveness of markets at each stage of the marketing chain. In direct contrast, the greater the degree and duration of processing and value-added that is accumulated between the farm and the consumers, the smaller will be the effect of a change in farm price on the retail price. Asymmetry in price transmission directly encapsulates the concept of "sticky" retail prices mentioned earlier and addressed later in this report. What Is Known About Price Transmission? However, a broad review of economic analysis on the relationship between farm and retail prices leads to three generalizations: first, causality usually runs from changes in farm prices to changes in retail prices; second, time lags in retail price response to farm price changes are generally months in length, even for perishables like milk, meat, and fresh fruits and vegetables; and third, retail prices appear to respond asymmetrically, with adjustments to increases in farm prices occurring faster and with greater pass-through than adjustments to decreases in farm prices. The general perception (supported by considerable empirical evidence) is that retail food prices are "sticky"—that is, retail prices follow commodity prices upwards rapidly, but fall back only slowly and partially when commodity prices recede. However, economic theory does not fully explain the observed phenomena. Economists have noted several exceptions to the "retail price competition" paradigm that may limit retail prices from adjusting fully to downward farm price movements, including certain aspects of consumer behavior, as well as store inventory management and retailing strategies. As a result, the presence of asymmetric price transmission alone does not necessarily imply the presence of excessive market power. Several major market-shifting factors have emerged since 2006—including increased demand for corn under strong federal biofuels incentives, a prolonged surge in China's soybean import demand, and the severe U.S. drought of 2012—that resulted in tight U.S. and global grain and oilseed supplies and sharply higher farm and wholesale commodity prices through most of 2013. have increased in importance as a share of retail food prices.	Heightened commodity price volatility since 2008—driven by major market-shifting events, including increased demand for corn under strong federal biofuels incentives, a prolonged surge in China's soybean import demand, and the severe U.S. drought of 2012—has generated many questions about linkages between farm commodity prices and U.S. food price inflation from Members of Congress and their constituents. This report responds to those concerns by addressing the linkage between farm and retail food prices. Retail food price inflation is addressed in CRS Report R40545, Consumers and Food Price Inflation. Price is the primary mechanism that links raw farm commodities through the various levels of the market system to the retail food product. The nature of price transmission between farm and retail levels depends, in general, on the size of the farm share of the retail price and the degree of market competition at each stage of the marketing chain. For example, the farm share represents nearly 58% of the retail value of a dozen eggs. Similarly, it ranges from 30% to 50% for most fresh meat retail product prices. In contrast, the farm share is only about 8% of cereal and bakery product prices. An array of costs is layered on top of the price of a raw agricultural commodity at each stage of the marketing chain as it moves to the consumer. As a result, the farm share of a food product's price declines as it moves to the retail outlet. Since 1950, the average farm share has been declining as a share of total consumer food expenditures, falling from about 41% in 1950 to 17.4% in 2013. This has important implications for farm-to-retail price linkages because the smaller the share of farm value in the retail product, the smaller will be the effect of a change in farm price on the retail price. Economic analysis of farm-to-retail price transmission leads to three generalizations: first, causality usually runs from changes in farm prices to changes in retail prices; second, time lags in retail price response to farm price changes are generally months in length, even for perishables like milk, meat, and fresh fruits and vegetables; and third, retail prices appear to respond asymmetrically, with adjustments to increases in farm prices occurring faster and with greater pass-through than adjustments to decreases in farm prices. This last generalization is often referred to as "sticky" retail food prices—that is, retail prices follow commodity prices upward rapidly, but fall back only slowly and partially when commodity prices recede. "Sticky" retail price behavior is supported by empirical evidence; however, economic theory does not fully explain the observed phenomenon. Economists have noted that certain aspects of consumer behavior, store inventory management, and retailing strategies may limit retail prices from adjusting fully to downward farm price movements. As a result, the presence of asymmetric price transmission alone does not necessarily imply abnormal or excessive market power. Comparisons of price data for major food groups confirm that farm-to-retail price transmission behaves slowly, with substantial lags and asymmetry. For example, the rise in farm prices that occurred between 2006 and mid-2008 was substantially larger and occurred about six months earlier than the rise in corresponding retail food product prices. Similarly, the subsequent fall in farm prices from their 2008 peaks preceded the downturn in corresponding retail food prices by several months.
crs_RL32340	crs_RL32340_0	Introduced by Representative Elton Gallegly, the bill provided forthe election of a Delegate from the Northern Mariana Islands for the congressional term beginningin 1999 (106th Congress). 4067 before the markup. H.R. DC Delegate Rights and Additional House Seat Another issue under discussion in the 109th Congress is whether to grant the Delegate fromthe District of Columbia voting rights on the floor of the House and, if so, how it should be done. Replacement of Delegates and the ResidentCommissioner. Evolution of Territorial Delegates Northwest Ordinance The office of Delegate -- sometimes called "nonvoting Delegate" -- dates to the late 1700s,when territories bound for statehood were granted congressional representation. (19) The Delegate's duties, privileges, and obligations, were otherwise left unspecified. Representative James Madison disagreed. Apparently, it was Congress's intent that themandate of these representatives be broader than service in the U.S. Which committees Delegates could serve on and their rights on those committee becamethemes in Congress over the last 200 years. Currently, Delegates enjoy powers, rights, and responsibilities identical, in most respects, tothose of House Members from the states. Delegates can speak and introduce bills and resolutions onthe floor of the House and can speak and vote in House committees. Delegates are not, however,full-fledged Members of the House. The Housebegan to define the functions of Delegates when, on January 13, 1795, it appointed Mr. White amember of a select committee to investigate better means of promulgating the laws of the UnitedStates. (43) The first regular assignment of Delegates to standing committee duty occurred under a Houserule adopted in December 1871. Although a House rule provided for the appointment of territorialDelegates as additional members on certain committees, the report noted, "the House could not electto one of its standing committees a person not a Member of the House." Expressly the Delegate shall exercise inthe committee . . . . the same powers and privileges as in the House, to wit, the "right of debating,but not the right of voting." (52) That same year, Congress enacted the Legislative ReorganizationAct, which contained a provision to amend the House rule on Delegates (rule XII) to read: The Resident Commissioner to the United Statesfrom Puerto Rico shall be elected to serve on standing committees in the same manner as Membersof the House and shall possess in such committees the same powers and privileges as the otherMembers. In theircomplaint, the plaintiffs stated: [N]on-member voting in the Committee of the Wholeimpairs and dilutes the constitutional rights of the plaintiff-Representatives, both as Members of theHouse and as voters who enjoy the right to full, fair and proportionate representation in the Houseof Representatives. "If the only action of the House of Representativeshad been to grant to the Delegates from the District of Columbia, Guam, Virgin Islands, andAmerican Samoa, and the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico the authority to vote in theCommittee of the Whole," he wrote, "its action would have been plainly unconstitutional."	Territorial Delegates have served in the House since the late 1700s, representing territoriesthat had not yet achieved statehood. In the 20th Century, the concept of Delegate grew to includerepresentation of territories where the United States exercises some degree of control but which werenot expected to become states. Currently, the U.S. insular areas of American Samoa, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and thefederal municipality of the District of Columbia are each represented in Congress by a Delegate tothe House of Representatives. The individual elected to represent Puerto Rico is called the ResidentCommissioner instead of delegate. The Delegates and Resident Commissioner are the successorsof Delegates from statehood-bound territories, who first took seats in the House in the late 1700s. Proposals offered in recent Congresses have sought to grant the Delegate from the Districtof Columbia voting rights on the floor of the House. Another proposal would expand territorialrepresentation to include the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. Floor action in theHouse and Senate on these bills could occur before the end of the 109th Congress. Early laws providing for territorial Delegates to Congress did not specify the duties,privileges, and obligations of these representatives. It was left to the House and the Delegatesthemselves to define their role. On January 13, 1795, the House took an important step towardestablishing the functions of Delegates when it appointed James White, the first territorialrepresentative, to membership on a select committee. In subsequent years, Delegates continued toserve on select committees as well as on conference committees. The first fixed assignment of aDelegate to standing committee occurred under a House rule of 1871, which gave Delegates placesas additional members on two standing committees. In these committees, the Delegates exercisedthe same powers and privileges as in the House; that is, they could debate but not vote. In the 1970s, Delegates gained the right to be elected to standing committees and to exercisein those committees the same powers and privileges as Members of the House, including the rightto vote. Today, Delegates enjoy powers, rights, and responsibilities identical, in most respects, tothose of House Members from the states. Like these Members, Delegates can speak and introducebills and resolutions on the House floor; and they can speak and vote in House committees. Delegates are not, however, full-fledged Members of Congress. Most significantly, they cannot voteon the House floor. This report builds on earlier reports on territorial delegates prepared by former colleagues,[author name scrubbed] and the late William H. Tansill, and also benefitted from the production assistanceof Daphne Bigger. Paul Rundquist was a major contributor to this report. This report will be updatedas events warrant.
crs_RS22784	crs_RS22784_0	1512) Section 1512 applies to the obstruction of federal proceedings—congressional, judicial, or executive. Prosecution requires the commission of an underlying federal crime by someone else. It also prohibits economic retaliation against a federal witnesses, but only witnesses in court proceedings and only on criminal cases. Its penalty structure is comparable to that of Section 1503. Obstructing Congressional or Administrative Proceedings (18 U.S.C. The statutory contempt of Congress provision, 2 U.S.C. Obstruction of Justice by Violence or Threat Several other federal statutes outlaw use of threats or violence to obstruct federal government activities. Obstruction of Justice by Destruction of Evidence Other than subsection 1512(c), there are three federal statutes which expressly outlaw the destruction of evidence in order to obstruct justice: 18 U.S.C. Obstruction of Justice by Deception In addition to the obstruction of justice provisions of 18 U.S.C. §3C1.1) Regardless of the offense for which an individual is convicted, his sentence may be enhanced as a consequence of any obstruction of justice for which he is responsible, if committed during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing for the offense of his conviction. The enhancement may result in an increase in his term of imprisonment by as much as four years.	Obstruction of justice is the frustration of governmental purposes by violence, corruption, destruction of evidence, or deceit. It is a federal crime. In fact, it is several crimes. Obstruction prosecutions regularly involve charges under several statutory provisions. Federal obstruction of justice laws are legion; too many for even passing reference to all of them in a single report. The general obstruction of justice provisions are six: 18 U.S.C. 1512 (tampering with federal witnesses), 1513 (retaliating against federal witnesses), 1503 (obstruction of pending federal court proceedings), 1505 (obstruction of pending congressional or federal administrative proceedings), 371 (conspiracy), and contempt. Other than Section 1503, each prohibits obstruction of certain congressional activities. In addition to these, there are a host of other statutes that penalize obstruction by violence, corruption, destruction of evidence, or deceit. Moreover, regardless of the offense for which an individual is convicted, his sentence may be enhanced as a consequence of any obstruction of justice for which he is responsible, if committed during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing for the offense of his conviction. The enhancement may result in an increase in his term of imprisonment by as much as four years. This is an abridged version of CRS Report RL34304, Obstruction of Congress: a Brief Overview of Federal Law Relating to Interference with Congressional Activities, by [author name scrubbed], without the footnotes, quotations, or citations to authority found in the longer report.
crs_R44756	crs_R44756_0	Introduction Cabo Verde is a small island nation that has historical ties to the United States. Cabo Verde is of strategic significance because its geographic location has made the country a transshipment point for Latin American cocaine bound for Europe for more than two decades. Its location has also made it a key refueling stopover for trans-Atlantic air traffic between Africa and the United States. U.S.-Cabo Verdean cooperation focuses on counternarcotics efforts and related military professionalization under the State Department's International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, and development projects supported by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). Background Cabo Verde, a small volcanic island archipelago located off the coast of Senegal in West Africa, is slightly larger than Rhode Island. The U.S.	Cabo Verde, a small island nation of just over half a million people located off the west coast of Africa, is of strategic significance to the United States because its geographic location has made the country a transshipment point for Latin American cocaine bound for Europe and a key refueling stopover for trans-Atlantic air traffic between Africa and the United States. The country is also a long-standing U.S. ally in Africa that the State Department has cited as a model of democratic governance in the region since its transition from single party rule to a multi-party political system in 1991. U.S. bilateral aid to Cabo Verde is limited, and centers on military professionalization, counternarcotics efforts, and development projects supported by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).
crs_R44932	crs_R44932_0	Introduction Livestock grazing on federal lands primarily occurs on public lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM, in the Department of the Interior) and on National Forest System lands managed by the Forest Service (FS, in the Department of Agriculture). Both agencies operate under statutory principles of multiple use and sustained yield, with livestock grazing among generally authorized uses. The extent to which BLM and FS lands are protected and available for various land uses and activities is of perennial interest to Congress. This report provides data on the extent of livestock grazing in recent years to assist with congressional deliberations on uses of federal lands generally and availability of lands for livestock grazing in particular. However, it does not discuss the relative likelihood of any one of these factors to affect grazing trends at national, regional, or local levels. Data Information and Caveats This report generally provides data on livestock grazing for BLM and FS from FY2002 to FY2016. The four categories roughly correspond with the number of livestock operators, the number of grazing permits and leases held by these operators, how much grazing could have been authorized for use, and how much grazing was actually used. For the other three categories of data, livestock grazing on BLM land was the same or somewhat less in FY2016 than in FY2002. FS had relatively larger declines over the years examined for the other three categories of livestock grazing. Figure 1 illustrates the changes in the numbers of BLM livestock operators and grazing permits and leases from FY2002 to FY2016. The number of active permits averaged 6,601. During the period of analysis, the agencies also experienced different patterns and amounts of change in the four categories of data. The amount of grazing used increased for both agencies from FY2002 to FY2016, but the increase was higher for BLM (5.2%) than for FS (1.1%). Grazing use was based on the amount of time livestock spent on the range, as measured in AUMs or HD-MOs. With regard to the number of livestock operators, BLM started and ended the FY2002-FY2016 period with nearly the same level, with some fluctuation in between; by contrast, FS livestock permittees decreased steadily from FY2006 to FY2016 and ended the period down 12.4%. By contrast, FS active permits decreased steadily from FY2006 to FY2016 and by a larger amount—12.5% overall. With regard to the amount of grazing that could have been used, the BLM's AUMs declined between FY2002 and FY2016 by 2.6%, whereas FS's HD-MOs ended the same period down by 18.4%. The size of the change in livestock grazing on BLM and FS lands depends in part on the length of the period examined. For example, although AUMs used on BLM lands increased by 5.2% over the last 15 years, over the past several decades they declined significantly—about 52.2% from the 1954 level of 18.2 million AUMs. Changes in grazing on BLM and FS land nationally reflect a variety of different conditions on rangelands in diverse locations. Similarly, no examination was made of the effect of change in particular areas on the national levels reflected in this report. However, national grazing changes identified herein can be attributed to a variety of factors, including amendments to agency land use plans to accommodate other land uses, such as increased recreation.	Livestock grazing on federal lands primarily occurs on lands of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM, in the Department of the Interior) and the Forest Service (FS, in the Department of Agriculture). Both agencies manage lands under sustained-yield and multiple-use principles, with livestock grazing among generally authorized uses. Congress continues to be interested in the extent to which BLM and FS lands are protected and used for a variety of activities, including livestock grazing. This report provides data on the extent of livestock grazing in recent years to assist with congressional deliberations on uses of federal lands generally and decisionmaking on the availability of lands for livestock grazing in particular. This report generally provides data for 15 years, from FY2002 to FY2016, for four categories of livestock data. The four categories of data are similar but not identical between the agencies. The categories roughly correspond with the number of livestock operators, the number of grazing permits and leases held by these operators, how much grazing could have been authorized for use, and how much grazing was actually used. Both agencies saw increases over the period in the amount of grazing used, based on the time livestock spent on the range. This time is measured in animal unit months (AUMs) for BLM and head months (HD-MOs) for FS. The increase in the amount of grazing was higher for BLM (5.2%) than for FS (1.1%). For the other three categories of data, livestock grazing on BLM land was the same or somewhat less in FY2016 than in FY2002. FS saw relatively larger declines than BLM for these other three categories of livestock grazing. With regard to livestock operators, BLM started and ended the FY2002-FY2016 period with nearly the same number, with some fluctuation in between, whereas the number of FS livestock permittees decreased steadily from FY2006 to FY2016 and ended the period down 12.4%. Regarding the number of BLM permits and leases, there was a relatively small overall decline of 1.7% from FY2002 to FY2016. By contrast, the number of FS active permits decreased steadily from FY2006 to FY2016 and by a larger amount—12.5% overall. As for the amount of grazing that could have been used, BLM's AUMs declined by 2.6% between FY2002 and FY2016, whereas FS's HD-MOs declined by 18.4% over the same period. The size of the change in livestock grazing on BLM and FS lands depends on the length of the period examined and the particular years of analysis. For instance, although AUMs used on BLM lands increased by 5.2% over the last 15 years, since 1954 there has been a 52.2% reduction in the number of AUMs—from 18.2 million to about 8.7 million. Changes in grazing on BLM and FS lands nationally reflect a variety of different conditions on rangelands in diverse locations. The national changes can be attributed to various factors, including amendments to agency land use plans, resource protection needs and the long-term health of rangelands, the effect of weather (e.g., rain/drought) and fire on forage, voluntary nonuse by permit holders for a variety of reasons, and development on nearby private lands. The relative extent to which any one of these factors contributed to any national, regional, or local changes in grazing on federal lands is beyond the scope of this report.
crs_R43688	crs_R43688_0	Introduction The Protecting Americans From Tax Hikes (PATH) Act, considered as an amendment to the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ), was signed into law on December 18, 2015. That legislation made some tax provisions that had expired at the end of 2014 permanent, and extended others through the 2016 tax year. This report briefly summarizes and discusses four items categorized as individual tax provisions. These and other temporary tax provisions that are regularly extended for one or two years are often referred to as tax extenders . In total, the extensions of tax provisions included PATH Act is estimated to increase the deficit by $628.8 billion from FY2016 to FY2025. The three extender provisions discussed in this report that were made permanent by the PATH Act, along with their 10-year revenue costs, are Above-the-Line Deduction for Certain Expenses of Elementary and Secondary School Teachers ($2.9 billion over ten years), which was modified by the PATH Act, Deduction for State and Local Sales Taxes ($42.4 billion over 10 years), and Parity for Exclusion for Employer-Provided Mass Transit and Parking Benefits ($1.8 billion over 10 years). The PATH Act also extends one provision discussed in this report through 2016. In the 114 th Congress, legislation has been introduced that would make the deduction permanent ( H.R. 2692 ), make the provision permanent and index it for inflation ( H.R. Deduction for State and Local Sales Taxes9 The PATH Act made permanent the option to deduct state and local sales taxes. Above-the-Line Deduction for Qualified Tuition and Related Expenses16 The PATH Act extended the above-the-line deduction for qualified tuition and related expenses through the 2016 tax year.	The Protecting Americans From Tax Hikes (PATH) Act, considered as an amendment to the Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), was signed into law on December 18, 2015. That legislation made some tax provisions that had expired at the end of 2014 permanent, and extended others through the 2016 tax year. This report briefly summarizes and discusses selected items categorized as individual tax provisions. These and other temporary tax provisions that have been regularly extended for one or two years are often referred to as "tax extenders." Other bills in the 114th Congress would make provisions discussed in this report permanent, including the deduction for state and local sales taxes (H.R. 622) and the deduction for teacher's expenses (H.R. 2692 and H.R. 2940), both discussed in this report. Additional information on other extender provisions may be found in other CRS reports. These reports include CRS Report R43517, Recently Expired Charitable Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders"): In Brief, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43510, Selected Recently Expired Business Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders"), by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43449, Recently Expired Housing Related Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders"): In Brief, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R43541, Recently Expired Community Assistance-Related Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders"): In Brief, by [author name scrubbed]. The four provisions discussed are Above-the-Line Deduction for Certain Expenses of Elementary and Secondary School Teachers, which the PATH Act modifies and makes permanent; Deduction for State and Local Sales Taxes, which the PATH act makes permanent; Above-the-Line Deduction for Qualified Tuition and Related Expenses, which the PATH Act extends through 2016; and Parity for Exclusion for Employer-Provided Mass Transit and Parking Benefits, which the PATH Act makes permanent. In terms of revenue, the most significant provision is the optional deduction for sales taxes, which is estimated to cost $42.4 billion over 10 years. The next largest is the classroom expense deduction at $2.9 billion, followed by the mass transit provision at $1.8 billion. The two-year extension for the deduction for tuition expenses is estimated to cost $0.6 billion.
crs_R45110	crs_R45110_0	T his report provides an overview of the portion of Department of Defense (DOD) research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) funding referred to as Defense Science and Technology (Defense S&T). Defense Science and Technology is a subset of DOD RDT&E appropriations that includes funding for basic research (6.1), applied research (6.2), and advanced technology development (6.3)—the earliest stages of the RDT&E process. Perspectives on the Roles and Value of Defense S&T Defense S&T is of particular interest and importance to Congress due to its perceived value in supporting military competitive advantage. Defense S&T is also of interest to key stakeholders in the private sector and academia. For example, advocates of strong and sustained Defense S&T funding assert that this funding plays important and unique roles in the DOD innovation system. Defense S&T supports both medium -term, evolutionary technologies and incremental innovation s to help improve existing products and systems; and longer-term, revolutionary technologies to support U.S. technological dominance, deter conflict, and defeat adversaries. These technologies—both evolutionary and revolutionary—are seen by most warfighters and policymakers as central to U.S. national security as well as to the lives of those serving in uniform in the medium and long term. During the FY1978-FY2017 period, Defense S&T grew at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 4.6%. Similar to overall Defense S&T, most of the growth in applied research occurred between FY1978 and FY2006 (4.8% CAGR); from FY2006 to FY2017 applied research grew at a slower pace of 0.3% CAGR. Advanced technology development funding nearly quadrupled in constant dollars from FY1978 to FY1993. The Navy accounted for the largest share (29.2%) of DOD basic research, followed by the Defense-Wide agencies (27.3%), the Air Force (23.4%), and the Army (20.1%). The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is the largest funder of basic research among the D-W agencies, accounting for 17.9% of total DOD RDT&E. Universities and colleges performed nearly half ($1.1 billion, 48.8%) of DOD basic research in FY2016. Approach: Defense S&T as a Share of Total DOD Funding A 1998 Defense Science Board (DSB) report suggested two conceptual frameworks for Defense S&T funding. The first approach, using industrial practice as a guide, proposed setting Defense S&T funding at 3.4% of total DOD funding: The DOD S&T budget corresponds most closely to the research component of industrial R&D. Approach: DOD Science and Technology as a Share of DOD RDT&E The DSB's second proposed framework, also based on industrial practice, was to use the metric of Defense S&T as a share of DOD RDT&E: Another approach to this question is to note that the ratio of research funding to total R&D funding in high-technology industries, such as pharmaceuticals, is about 24%. In 2015, the Coalition for National Security Research, a coalition of industry, universities, and associations, asserted that Defense S&T funding should be 20% of DOD RDT&E. At the time of the DSB report (1998), S&T's share of DOD RDT&E was approximately 20.7%. After rising to 21.5% in FY2000, the share fell to 15.2% in FY2011, and then recovered to 17.9% in FY2017. Approach: DOD Basic Research as a Share of Defense S&T In 2004, the Council on Competitiveness asserted that DOD basic research should be at least 20% of Defense S&T. As a share of Defense S&T, basic research declined from 14.6% in FY1996 to 11.0% in FY2006, then began a steady rise to 18.4% in FY2015, its highest level in two decades. Basic research's share of Defense S&T fell in 2016 to 17.4% and in 2017 to 16.2%.	Defense science and technology (Defense S&T) is a term that describes a subset of Department of Defense (DOD) research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) activities. The Defense S&T budget is the aggregate of funding provided for the three earliest stages of DOD RDT&E: basic research, applied research, and advanced technology development. Defense S&T is of particular interest to Congress due to its perceived value in supporting technological advantage and its importance to key private sector and academic stakeholders. Advocates of strong and sustained Defense S&T funding assert that Defense S&T funding plays important and unique roles in the DOD innovation system, supporting medium-term, evolutionary technologies and incremental innovation that help improve existing products and systems, as well as longer-term, revolutionary technologies providing U.S. technological dominance, deterring conflict, and, when necessary, defeating adversaries. Both evolutionary and revolutionary technologies are viewed by most warfighters and policymakers as central to U.S. national security as well as to the lives of those serving in uniform. In FY2017, Defense S&T was $13.4 billion, nearly six times the FY1978 level of $2.3 billion. Most growth occurred from FY1978 to FY2006, at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 6.4%. From FY2006 to FY2017, growth was slower (0.1% CAGR). Most of the growth and volatility was in advanced technology development. In FY2017 constant dollars, Defense S&T funding peaked at $16.2 billion in FY2005 and declined by $2.8 billion through FY2017. In FY2016, basic research accounted for $2.2 billion of the Defense S&T total. The Navy accounted for the largest share of DOD basic research (29.2%), followed by the Defense-Wide agencies (27.6%), Air Force (23.0%), and Army (20.3%). Universities and colleges performed nearly half ($1.1 billion, 48.8%) of DOD basic research in FY2016; DOD and other intramural federal laboratories performed 22.9%; industry, 18.2%; other nonprofits, 7.5%; federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), 0.7%; and others, 2.0%. A number of recommendations have been put forth by various organizations regarding the appropriate level of funding for Defense S&T and DOD basic research, as well as the level of funding for investments in research supporting potentially revolutionary advancements. A 1998 Defense Science Board (DSB) report recommended setting Defense S&T at 3.4% of total DOD funding. In 2001, the Quadrennial Defense Review recommended that 3.0% of total DOD funding be directed toward Defense S&T. In FY1996, Defense S&T was at the 3.0% level. It subsequently fell to 1.7% in FY2011 and has since risen to 2.2%. An alternative approach recommended by the DSB in 1998 was to set Defense S&T at a percentage of DOD RDT&E, similar to the industry ratio of research funding to total R&D funding (which it calculated for the pharmaceutical industry as 24%). In 2015, the Coalition for National Security Research (CNSR), a coalition of industry, universities, and associations, recommended a target of 20%. At the time of the DSB report, S&T's share of DOD RDT&E was approximately 21%. After rising to 21.5% in FY2000, Defense S&T's share fell to 15.2% in FY2011, and then rose to 17.9% in FY2016. With respect to DOD basic research, the Council on Competitiveness (2004) and the CNSR (2015) recommended a target of at least 20% of Defense S&T. As a share of Defense S&T, basic research declined from 14.6% in FY1996 to 11.0% in FY2006, then began a steady rise to 18.4% in FY2015. In FY2016, basic research's share of Defense S&T was 17.4%. In its 1998 report, the DSB recommended that one-third of Defense S&T be devoted to research targeted toward revolutionary technological advancements. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has been the lead DOD agency focused on revolutionary R&D. In FY2017, DARPA accounted for 21.6% of Defense S&T.
crs_R45404	crs_R45404_0	Introduction Four decades have passed since the first trans-oceanic supersonic passenger flight took off from London Heathrow Airport in 1976. Several U.S. startup companies are now developing supersonic commercial and business jets. In subsonic flight, sound waves may be emitted in all directions. More than 2.5 million passengers flew supersonically before Concorde was taken out of service in 2003. But it was not financially successful. Future Aircraft Development The revival of interest in supersonic aircraft is the result of technological advances in materials, airframe and engine designs, and aircraft manufacturing that would be able to give the aircraft longer range through improved fuel efficiency and substantial weight savings with advanced composites and aerodynamics. At present, there are no agreed-upon international standards for next-generation supersonic aircraft. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection is presently seeking to develop international noise and emissions standards for future supersonic aircraft. Noise standards in the United States and other countries, dating to the early years of the Concorde, prohibit supersonic flight over land. Aircraft Certification Timeline The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 directs FAA to take a leadership role in creating federal and international policies, regulations, and standards to certify safe and efficient civil supersonic aircraft operations within U.S. airspace. The legislation requires FAA to consult with industry stakeholders on noise-certification issues, including operational differences between subsonic and supersonic aircraft. It further requires FAA to issue an NPRM, no later than March 31, 2020, to develop noise standards for sonic boom over the United States and for takeoff and landing and noise test requirements applicable to civil supersonic aircraft, and to publish the final rule within 18 months after the public comment period closes. Furthermore, beginning December 31, 2020, and every two years thereafter, FAA would be required to review available aircraft noise and performance measurements to determine if federal regulations should be amended to remove the current ban on civil supersonic flight over land. However, language in P.L. However, as it turned out, no Concorde aircraft were produced after 1979. Many recent commercial jet models already meet the Stage 5 requirements, and in general, the subsonic commercial aircraft fleet is considered to be 75% quieter overall than aircraft produced in the 1970s. Further, FAA stated that "noise standards for supersonic operation will be developed as the unique operational flight characteristics of supersonic designs become known and the noise impacts of supersonic flight are shown to be acceptable."	It has been over 40 years since British Airways' first Concorde passenger flight took off in 1976. So far the Concorde is the only commercial supersonic passenger aircraft to travel at more than twice the speed of sound. It was a technological accomplishment but not a commercial success. In 2003, all Concorde aircraft were taken out of service. Recent years have seen a revival of interest in supersonic aircraft. Several startup companies are developing new supersonic commercial and business jets, hoping technological advances in materials, design, and engine efficiency will make it possible to produce commercially viable aircraft. The main regulatory issues related to supersonic flight remain unchanged from the Concorde era: limiting ground-level noise during subsonic flight and sonic booms during supersonic flight. Aircraft noise standards have become much stricter since the Concorde entered service, and the commercial aircraft fleet is considered to be 75% quieter overall than during the 1970s. However, some of the technical approaches used to reduce noise during subsonic flight may hinder efforts to reduce the magnitude of sonic booms in future supersonic aircraft. In the United States, the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-254) directs the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to take a leadership role in creating federal and international policies, regulations, and standards to certify safe and efficient civil supersonic aircraft operations. It requires FAA to consult with industry stakeholders on noise-certification issues, including operational differences between subsonic and supersonic aircraft. It also requires FAA to develop and issue noise standards for sonic boom over the United States and for takeoff and landing and noise test requirements applicable to civil supersonic aircraft. Furthermore, beginning December 31, 2020, and every two years thereafter, FAA will be required to review available aircraft noise and performance measurements to determine if federal regulations should be amended to remove the current ban on civil supersonic flight over land. Since new supersonic aircraft are expected to operate internationally, the lack of agreed-upon international standards or agreements is likely to hinder production as well as operations. FAA is already engaged with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to develop certification standards for future supersonic aircraft, but this process to produce an international standard may not be completed until 2025. In addition, the United States and other countries prohibit supersonic flights over land except in limited circumstances, and changes in those restrictions may be necessary for supersonic aircraft to be commercially viable.
crs_R41419	crs_R41419_0	Introduction The world is experiencing a shortage of helium-3, a rare isotope of helium with applications in homeland security, national security, medicine, industry, and science. This report discusses the nature of the shortage; federal actions undertaken so far to address it; current and potential sources of helium-3 and options for increasing the supply; current and projected uses of helium-3 and options for reducing the demand; and options for allocating the supply if it continues to fall short of demand. How Is Helium-3 Made? This means that the tritium needs of the nuclear weapons program, not demand for helium-3 itself, determine the amount of helium-3 produced. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government began deploying neutron detectors at the U.S. border to help secure the nation against smuggled nuclear and radiological material. The deployment of this equipment created new federal demand for helium-3. Use of the polarized helium-3 medical imaging technique also increased. As a result, the stockpile shrank. After several years of demand exceeding supply, federal officials realized that insufficient helium-3 was available to meet the likely future demand. Policymakers now face a number of challenging decisions. Currently, these decisions are mainly about how to allocate a scarce resource in the face of competing priorities: science versus security, the private sector versus the public sector, and national needs versus international obligations. Applications with unique needs may pose particular challenges. For example, some types of cryogenic research can only be accomplished using helium-3, whereas in medical imaging and neutron detection, helium-3 has advantages but also alternatives. To address future helium-3 concerns, policymakers also face choices about how or whether to increase helium-3 supply or reduce helium-3 demand and about possible alternative processes for allocating the supply. Thus, the executive branch response to the helium-3 shortage began after the shortage had occurred. First an ad-hoc interagency group formed by the Departments of Energy (DOE), Homeland Security (DHS), and Defense (DOD) set policy, then that role passed to an interagency policy committee established by the National Security Staff. The interagency policy committee developed a rationing scheme for allocating the available helium-3. As a result, some federal and private-sector users received no allocation or an amount less than they had previously planned. Several federal agencies are investigating alternative sources of helium-3 and ways to reduce the demand. Congressional Actions Congressional attention predominantly has been focused on oversight of the current situation, how it arose, and the processes currently in place for addressing it. In future hearings and legislation, Congress may address additional issues, such as increasing the helium-3 supply, reducing demand, or modifying the allocation of the limited supply. Potential Additional Sources Potential additional sources of helium-3 include increased production of tritium in light-water nuclear reactors (beyond the amount already produced for the weapons program); extraction of tritium produced as a byproduct in commercial heavy-water nuclear reactors; production of either tritium or helium-3 using particle accelerators; and extraction of naturally occurring helium-3 from natural gas or the atmosphere. Until recently, the ready supply of helium-3 from the nuclear weapons program meant that these alternative sources were not considered economically attractive. With the current shortage, this consideration may change.	The world is experiencing a shortage of helium-3, a rare isotope of helium with applications in homeland security, national security, medicine, industry, and science. For many years the supply of helium-3 from the nuclear weapons program outstripped the demand for helium-3. The demand was small enough that a substantial stockpile of helium-3 accumulated. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government began deploying neutron detectors at the U.S. border to help secure the nation against smuggled nuclear and radiological material. The deployment of this equipment created new demand for helium-3. Use of the polarized helium-3 medical imaging technique also increased. As a result, the size of the stockpile shrank. After several years of demand exceeding supply, a call for large quantities of helium-3 spurred federal officials to realize that insufficient helium-3 was available to meet the likely future demand. Policymakers now face a number of challenging decisions. In the short term, these decisions are mainly about how to allocate a scarce resource in the face of competing priorities: science versus security, the private sector versus the public sector, and national needs versus international obligations. Applications with unique needs may pose particular challenges. For example, some types of cryogenic research can only be accomplished using helium-3, whereas in medical imaging and neutron detection, helium-3 has advantages but also alternatives. In the longer term, policymakers also face choices about how or whether to increase helium-3 supply or reduce helium-3 demand and about possible alternative mechanisms for allocating supply. It seems likely that a combination of policy approaches will be necessary. In addition to the nuclear weapons program, potential sources of helium-3 include tritium produced as a byproduct in commercial heavy-water nuclear reactors; extraction of naturally occurring helium-3 from natural gas or the atmosphere; and production of either tritium or helium-3 using particle accelerators. Until recently, the ready supply of helium-3 from the nuclear weapons program meant that these alternative sources were not considered economic. With the current shortage, this perception may change. The federal response to the helium-3 shortage began only after the shortage had occurred. Policy was established first by an ad-hoc interagency group formed by the Departments of Energy (DOE), Homeland Security (DHS), and Defense (DOD), and then by an interagency policy committee established by the National Security Staff. The committee developed a rationing scheme for allocating the available helium-3. Some federal and private-sector users received no allocation or an amount less than they had planned. Several federal agencies are investigating alternative sources of helium-3 and ways to reduce the demand. Congressional attention appears predominantly focused on oversight of the current situation, how it arose, and the processes currently in place for addressing it. In future hearings and legislation, Congress may address additional issues, such as increasing the helium-3 supply, reducing demand, or changing how supply is allocated. This report discusses the nature of the shortage; federal actions undertaken so far to address it; current and potential sources of helium-3 and options for increasing the supply; current and projected uses of helium-3 and options for reducing the demand; and options for allocating the supply if it continues to fall short of the demand.
crs_RS21237	crs_RS21237_0	RS21237 -- Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Updated February 17, 2005 Background Almost 50 years of nuclear ambiguity were swept away by the May 1998 nuclear tests of India and Pakistan. Indian Nuclear Weapon Capabilities and Thinking India began its nuclear program shortly after independence in 1947. and refined others. In the 1980s, Pakistan moved assiduously to acquire ballistic missilecapabilities and now deploys short-range ballistic missiles and asmall number of medium-range missiles. (12) On June 4, 2002, President Musharraf went further: "The possession of nuclear weapons by any state obviouslyimplies they will be used under some circumstances." In September 2004, Indiaand Pakistan announced 13 confidence-building measures. (24) Foreign secretaries reported progress in their discussions on missile notifications in December 2004.	Until 2005, India and Pakistan were the only states outside the NuclearNonproliferation Treaty to declare, openly, their nuclear weaponscapability. In 1998, they tested nuclear weapons and since then, deployed ballistic missiles, enunciated nucleardoctrine, and made organizational changes to their nuclearestablishments. In 2002, they teetered on the brink of war in Kashmir. This paper summarizes Indian and Pakistaninuclear weapon capabilities and thinking, and discusses someconfidence-building measures in place intended to help avert nuclear war. It will be updated as events warrant.
crs_RL34466	crs_RL34466_0	Reclamation manages water resource facilities in 17 western states with an original development cost of approximately $21.2 billion. Reclamation is over 100 years old, and most of its facilities are more than 50 years old. (The average age of Reclamation's dams is provided in Figure 1 ). Assuming limited budgetary resources as this infrastructure continues to age, maintenance needs are likely to increase, as is competition for limited funding. In contrast, the remaining two-thirds of Reclamation's facilities are also owned by Reclamation (i.e., Reclamation has title to the facilities), but their operation and maintenance has been transferred to a nonfederal entity ("transferred works"). This report discusses Reclamation's approach to managing aging infrastructure. It also discusses alternative approaches that have recently been proposed or enacted to deal with the issue of Reclamation's aging infrastructure, and the status of these efforts. However, for transferred works, Reclamation notes that performance data is in some cases limited. In the past, these needs have provided informally by Reclamation to Congress as an approximate estimate of maintenance needs on all of Reclamation's infrastructure. For instance, in a 2008 hearing, Reclamation estimated that throughout the West, maintenance needs on Reclamation facilities exceeded $3.2 billion. Additionally, a number of other efforts that would provide additional options to address aging infrastructure have been recently proposed or enacted by Congress. The authorization and funding for this project may be significant because it provides federal funding for a maintenance issue at a transfer project that would otherwise be the responsibility of non-federal users. Loan Programs and Extended Repayment Periods The one-time costs of extraordinary maintenance and rehabilitation efforts can be prohibitive for nonfederal entities that operate infrastructure owned by Reclamation (i.e., transferred works). As a result of this disagreement, to date, no projects have been funded under this program. 111-11 ) authorized the Secretary of the Interior to advance funding for emergency extraordinary operation and maintenance work on both transferred and reserved works. Corps and NRCS Approaches to Aging Infrastructure Management Two other federal agencies associated with significant inventories of dams and other water resources infrastructure are the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS). Unlike Reclamation, the Corps is responsible for O&M at the majority of its projects. Summary and Analysis There is a process within Reclamation for identifying and prioritizing rehabilitation funding needs of the water resources infrastructure that the agency has constructed since it was created in 1902. An overarching question for Congress is whether the efforts of Reclamation and other agencies to identify and prioritize aging infrastructure are adequate. As previously noted, current practices within the Corps, Reclamation, and NRCS have generally provided limited funding for aging water resource projects that are owned and operated by the federal government, and have provided limited or no funding for upgrades to projects that are operated by nonfederal partners. In the future, Congress may be called upon to reconsider these and other proposals which attempt to address the issue of Reclamation's aging infrastructure.	The Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) is responsible for the construction of most of the large irrigation and water resources infrastructure in the West. These water resource facilities are dispersed throughout 17 western states and have an original development cost of more than $21 billion. Most of Reclamation's infrastructure has an average age of over 50 years. This aging infrastructure requires increased maintenance and replacement efforts and expenditures. Reclamation estimates that the total cost for upgrades at all of its facilities exceeds $3 billion. Reclamation has a documented plan to assess the management needs of its portfolio of aging infrastructure. However, deferred maintenance needs are increasing, and water resource infrastructure management objectives require prioritization due in part to a finite budget. Reclamation's work on deferred maintenance and replacement is complicated by the fact that it maintains only one-third of the infrastructure that it owns. The remaining two-thirds are owned by Reclamation but have been transferred to local entities ("transferred works"). This makes for a unique combination of deteriorating infrastructure, patchwork management responsibilities, and limited financing that inevitably leads to conflicts over project priorities. As Reclamation's portfolio of infrastructure continues to age, these conflicts are likely to arise more often. Some have argued for changes to the existing processes that address Reclamation's aging infrastructure. To date, funds have been authorized and appropriated for a national program that focuses on a certain class of resources (dams). However, outside of this program, no national list of maintenance and upgrade priorities exists, and there are no major programmatic authorities for Reclamation to address these needs without repayment by users (which can make upgrades prohibitive in some cases). Recently, Congress has authorized a loan program to address aging infrastructure and has provided the Secretary of the Interior with the authority to advance federal funds and extend repayment periods for extraordinary maintenance projects. However, as a matter of policy, the Administration has generally refused to request funding for efforts that would primarily benefit nonfederal users. In the future, users are likely to continue to argue for more funding (particularly for transferred works), as well as for reforms to the overall process of documenting and selecting projects for improvements. At issue for Congress is whether to require additional analysis on the status of Reclamation's infrastructure needs. Additionally, Congress may consider whether Reclamation's existing planning and funding mechanisms for aging infrastructure are adequate, or whether new or enhanced mechanisms for these maintenance needs are required. This report describes Reclamation's approach to managing aging infrastructure as well as that of two other agencies—the Army Corps of Engineers and the Natural Resources Conservation Service—involved with significant portfolios of dams and related infrastructure. It includes discussion of several alternative approaches to managing Reclamation's aging infrastructure that have been enacted or proposed, and thus may be the subject of debate.
crs_R42038	crs_R42038_0	Insurance companies, unlike banks and securities firms, have been chartered and regulated solely by the states for the past 150 years. Another state reform largely implemented in the late 1980s and early 1990s was the introduction of state insurance guaranty funds. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act The 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) significantly overhauled the general financial regulatory system in the United States. Some insurance companies believe that in the post-GLBA environment, state regulation places them at a competitive disadvantage in the marketplace. They maintain that their non-insurer competitors in certain lines of products have federally based systems of regulation that are more efficient, while insurers remain subject to perceived inefficiencies of state insurance regulation, such as the regulation of rates and forms as well as other delays in getting their products to market. Many industry participants, particularly life insurers, larger property/casualty insurers, and larger insurance brokers, began supporting broad regulatory change for insurance in the form of an optional federal charter for insurance patterned after the dual chartering system for banks. GLBA also addressed the issue of modernizing state laws dealing with the licensing of insurance agents and brokers and made provision for a federally backed licensing association, the National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers (NARAB), which would have come into existence three years after the date of enactment if at least 29 states failed to enact the necessary legislation for state uniformity or reciprocity. In the same time frame, a number of narrower bills affecting different facets of insurance regulation and regulatory requirements were also introduced in Congress, including bills addressing surplus lines and reinsurance, insurance producer licensing, and expansion of the Liability Risk Retention Act beyond liability insurance. This crisis overlaid a range of new issues and arguments to the previously existing debate on insurance regulatory reforms. The second failure in the insurance industry was that of a specific company, American International Group. The 111 th Congress responded to the financial crisis with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which enacted broad financial regulatory reform. The Dodd-Frank Act provisions that most directly addressed insurance and are of ongoing concern were (1) creation of a Federal Insurance Office (FIO); (2) systemic-risk provisions, such as the creation of a Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) with the authority to oversee systemically important insurers; and (3) previously introduced provisions harmonizing the tax and regulatory treatment of surplus lines insurance and reinsurance (the Nonadmitted and Reinsurance Reform Act). Issues in the 112th Congress Insurance issues before the 112 th Congress include Oversight and implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act; Legislation that would narrowly reform the current regulatory system, such as H.R. 2126 that would extend the Liability Risk Retention Act; and Response to international developments, such as the changes to the European Union's regulatory scheme known as Solvency II. The Insurance Consumer Protection and Solvency Act (H.R. 6423) H.R. To take effect, however, these changes must be made to state law and regulation by the individual state legislatures and insurance regulators. State Regulatory Modernization Efforts Following the passage of GLBA, state insurance regulators working through the NAIC embarked on a regulatory modernization program. Although the financial crisis had begun at that time, the Treasury blueprint was not primarily a response to the crisis, but instead an attempt to create "a more flexible, efficient and effective regulatory framework." Systemic risk regulation as proposed in the legislation would have been the primary responsibility of the Federal Reserve in conjunction with a new Financial Services Oversight Council made up of the heads of most of the federal financial regulators. This legislation included the following: The Insurance Industry Competition Act of 2009 ( H.R.	The individual states have been acknowledged as the primary regulators of insurance since 1868. Following the 1945 McCarran-Ferguson Act, this system has operated with the explicit blessing of Congress, but has also been subject to periodic scrutiny and suggestions that the time may have come for Congress to reclaim the regulatory authority that it granted to the states. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, congressional scrutiny was largely driven by the increasing complexities of the insurance business and concern over whether the states were up to the task of ensuring consumer protections, particularly insurer solvency. Immediately prior to the recent financial crisis, congressional attention to insurance regulation focused on the inefficiencies in the state regulatory system. A major catalyst was the aftermath of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA), which overhauled the regulatory structure for banks and securities firms, but left the insurance sector largely untouched. Many larger insurers, and their trade associations, had previously defended state regulation but considered themselves at a competitive disadvantage in the post-GLBA regulatory structure. Some advocated for an optional federal charter similar to that available to banks. Various pieces of insurance regulatory reform legislation have been introduced, including bills establishing a broad federal charter for insurance as well as narrower, more targeted bills. The states, particularly working through the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), were not idle following congressional attention. They reacted quickly to GLBA requirements that related to insurance agent licensing and have since embarked on a wider-ranging project to modernize insurance regulation. This has included both regulatory aspects, such as streamlining the process for rate and form filing, and more basic legal aspects, such as the creation of an interstate compact to provide uniformity across states for some life insurance products. Because enactment by the state legislature is necessary before the legal changes suggested by the NAIC can take effect in that state, the process typically does not move rapidly. The recent financial crisis refocused the debate surrounding insurance regulatory reform. Unlike in many financial crises in the past, insurers played a large role in this crisis. In particular, the failure of the large insurer American International Group (AIG) spotlighted sources of risk that had gone unrecognized. The need for a risk regulator for the entire financial system was a common thread in many of the recent financial regulatory reform proposals. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203), enacted following the crisis, gave enhanced systemic risk regulatory authority to the Federal Reserve and to a new Financial Services Oversight Council (FSOC), including some oversight authority over insurers. The Dodd-Frank Act also included measures affecting the states' oversight of surplus lines insurance and reinsurance and the creation of a new Federal Insurance Office (FIO) within the Treasury Department. The 112th Congress faces both relatively new issues arising from the Dodd-Frank Act (addressed in H.R. 3559 and H.R. 6423) and issues that predate the financial crisis, such as the licensing of insurance agents and brokers (addressed in H.R. 1112) and the expansion of the federal Liability Risk Retention Act (addressed in H.R. 2126). In addition, various international issues may be of concern to Congress, such as the European Union's Solvency II project to overhaul the European insurance regulatory system.
crs_RS21977	crs_RS21977_0	Several types of lenders make loans to farmers. The one most controlled by the federal government is the Farm Service Agency (FSA) in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). It receives federal appropriations to make direct loans to farmers and to issue guarantees on loans made by commercial lenders to farmers who do not qualify for regular credit. The lender with the next-largest amount of government intervention is the Farm Credit System (FCS). It is a cooperatively owned and funded—but federally chartered—private lender with a statutory mandate to serve agriculture-related borrowers only. FCS makes loans to creditworthy farmers and is not a lender of last resort but is a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE). FSA provides about 2.6% of the debt through direct loans. FSA also guarantees about another 4%-5% of the market through loans that are made by commercial banks and the FCS. Commercial banks are the largest lender for non-real estate loans (49%), although FCS has gained share in recent years as the shares by others have decreased ( Figure 3 ). Delinquency Rates on Farm Loans While the global financial crisis in 2008-2009 was slower to affect the balance sheets of farmers and agricultural lenders than the housing market, its presence was observed in agricultural lending. As the lender of last resort, the FSA experienced significantly higher demand for its direct loans and guarantees. But weakness in farm income since 2014 has increased pressure on some farmers' repayment capacity. In FY2017, an appropriation of $90 million in budget authority (plus $317 million for salaries and expenses) supported $8 billion of new direct loans and guarantees. Part of the FSA loan program is reserved for beginning farmers and ranchers (7 U.S.C. Funds are raised through the sale of bonds on Wall Street. The federal regulator is the Farm Credit Administration (FCA). Recent Congressional Issues for Agricultural Credit Competition Between Farm Credit System and Commercial Banks The FCS is unique among the GSEs because it is a retail lender making loans directly to farmers and thus is in direct competition with commercial banks.	The federal government provides credit assistance to farmers to help assure adequate and reliable lending in rural areas, particularly for farmers who cannot obtain loans elsewhere. Federal farm loan programs also target credit to beginning farmers and socially disadvantaged groups. The primary federal lender to farmers, though with a small share of the market, is the Farm Service Agency (FSA) in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Congress funds FSA loans with annual discretionary appropriations—about $90 million of budget authority and $317 million for salaries—to support $8 billion of new direct loans and guarantees. FSA issues direct loans to farmers who cannot qualify for regular credit and guarantees the repayment of loans made by other lenders. FSA thus is called a lender of last resort. Of about $374 billion in total farm debt, FSA provides about 2.6% through direct loans and guarantees about another 4%-5% of loans. Another federally related lender is the Farm Credit System (FCS)—cooperatively owned and funded by the sale of bonds in the financial markets. Congress sets the statutes that govern the FCS banks and lending associations, mandating that they serve agriculture-related borrowers. FCS makes loans to creditworthy farmers and is not a lender of last resort. FCS accounts for 41% of farm debt and is the largest lender for farm real estate. Commercial banks are the other primary agricultural lender, holding slightly more than FCS with 42% of total farm debt. Commercial banks are the largest lender for farm production loans. Generally speaking, the farm sector's balance sheet has remained strong in recent years. While delinquency rates on farm loans increased from 2008 into 2010 during the global financial crisis, farmers and agricultural lenders did not face credit problems as severe as those of other economic sectors. Since 2010, loan repayment rates have improved, but recent weakness in farm income has begun to put pressure on some farmers' loan repayment capacity.
crs_RL33611	crs_RL33611_0	Current Funding Information Introduction The United States has been, and remains, the single largest financial contributor to the United Nations (U.N.) system. This included more than $895,982,000 in assessed contributions to the regular budgets of the United Nations and its specialized agencies; $96,414,194 in assessed contributions to the two war crimes tribunals; $1,266,129,767 in assessed contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations; and $2,560,429,000 in voluntary contributions to U.N. system special programs and funds. Congressional debate over U.N. funding has focused on several questions: (1) What is the appropriate level of U.S. funding for U.N. system operations and programs? (2) What U.S. funding actions are most likely to produce a positive continuation of U.N. system reform efforts? This report tracks the process by which Congress provides the funding for U.S. assessed contributions to the regular budgets of the United Nations, its agencies, and U.N. peacekeeping operation accounts as well for U.S. voluntary contributions to U.N. system programs and funds. It includes information on the President's request and the congressional response as well as congressional initiatives during this legislative process. Basic information is provided to help the reader understand this process. The system is financed by contributions from member and/or participant states. system.) Congress and Funding the U.N. System Congress has, over the years, sought to influence the direction of the United Nations and U.S. policy at the United Nations and in its agencies. The Helms-Biden Agreement and Payment of Arrears The U.S. government pressed for U.N. reform in the 1990s, linking payment of past arrears to reforms. Appendix A.	The congressional debate over United Nations funding focuses on several questions, including (1) What is the appropriate level of U.S. funding for U.N. system operations and programs? (2) What U.S. funding actions are most likely to produce a positive continuation of U.N. system reform efforts? The U.N. system includes the United Nations, a number of specialized or affiliated agencies, voluntary and special funds and programs, and U.N. peacekeeping operations. Participating states finance the system with assessed contributions to the budgets of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. In addition, voluntary contributions are made both to those agencies and to the special programs and funds they set up and manage. For more than 60 years, the United States has been the single largest financial contributor to the U.N. system, supplying in recent years 22% of most U.N. agency budgets. (See Appendix D for an organizational chart that illustrates the components of the U.N. system.) Both Congress and the executive branch have sought to promote their policy goals and reform of the United Nations and its system of organizations and programs, especially to improve management and budgeting practices. In the 1990s, Congress linked payment of U.S. financial contributions and its arrears to reform. This report, which will be updated, tracks the process by which Congress provides the funding for U.S. assessed contributions to the regular budgets of the United Nations, its agencies, and U.N. peacekeeping operation accounts, as well as for U.S. voluntary contributions to U.N. system programs and funds. It includes information on the President's request and the congressional response, as well as congressional initiatives during this legislative process. Basic information is provided to help the reader understand this process.
crs_RL32110	crs_RL32110_0	Most Recent Developments On December 30, 2005, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announced thatthe United States will implement the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement(DR-CAFTA) "on a rolling basis as countries make sufficient progress" in completing theircommitments under the agreement. a. Negotiating Objectives for Agriculture U.S. objectives in negotiating DR-CAFTA's agricultural provisions were to (1) eliminateCentral American and Dominican Republic tariffs, quotas, and non-tariff barriers to trade, (2)provide adequate transition periods and relief mechanisms for the U.S. agricultural sector to adjustto increased imports of sensitive products from the region, (3) eliminate any unjustified sanitary andphytosanitary (SPS) restrictions imposed by the six countries and seek their affirmation of theirWorld Trade Organization (WTO) commitments on SPS measures, and (4) develop a mechanismwith its FTA partners to support the U.S. objective to eliminate all agricultural export subsidies inthe WTO and Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations. DR-CAFTA's Main Agricultural Provisions In the agreement, the United States and the six countries agreed to completely phase outtariffs and quotas -- the primary means of border protection -- on all but four agriculturalcommodities and food products in seven stages either immediately or over 5, 10, 12, 15, 18, or 20years. The four most sensitive commodities -- fresh potatoes and fresh onions imported by CostaRica, white corn imported by the other four Central American countries, and sugar entering the U.S.market -- will be treated uniquely. Safeguardswill serve to protect agricultural producers from sudden surges in imports, triggered when quantitiesincrease above specified levels. Each countrynegotiated its own list of agricultural products eligible for safeguard protection. Once quotas are fullyphased out, U.S. grain exports are expected to increase substantially. NA - Not applicable U.S. Agriculture and Food Sectors' Views on DR-CAFTA's Agricultural Provisions Most U.S. commodity organizations, agribusiness and food firms, and theAmerican Farm Bureau Federation (a general farm organization) supported this tradeagreement, expecting their producer-members and exporters to benefit from theincreased access guaranteed to the Central American and Dominican Republicmarkets. One trade organization representing cattlemen with concerns about freetrade agreements in general opposed DR-CAFTA's beef provisions. The NationalFarmers Union (a general farm organization) opposed the agreement. Costa Rica would eliminate its tariff on U.S. white corn over 15 years;the Dominican Republic will continue current duty-free treatment. Dairy Products. The ITC report, according to the ASA, did not take into account the U.S.commitment under NAFTA to allow free access to sugar imports from Mexicostarting in 2008 and potential obligations to open the U.S. sugar market to importsfrom other sugar-exporting countries with which the United States is negotiating freetrade agreements. The SweetenerUsers Association responded that the ITC's projections "appear to be overstated" -- by not considering the additional demand for sugar created by U.S. populationgrowth over time and USDA's authority to limit the amount of domestic sugar thatcan be marketed to ensure that no change in domestic prices occurs. The U.S. sugar industry rejected theAdministration's "repackaged, short-term offer," stating that it did not address theirlong term concerns about (1) sugar that could enter in future trade agreements, (2) itsobjectives for a resolution of the dispute on Mexico sugar access to the U.S. market,and (3) the continuation of the features of the current sugar program after FY2008. A spokesman for the ASA vowed to work to defeat DR-CAFTA. In its analysis of the DR-CAFTA implementation bill ( H.R. (30) Beef. To date, the legislatures of the DominicanRepublic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua have approved the tradeagreement.	On August 2, 2005, President Bush signed into law the bill to implement the DominicanRepublic-Central American Free Trade Agreement, or DR-CAFTA ( P.L. 109-53 , H.R. 3045 ). Drawing much attention during congressional debate were the agreement's sugar provisionsto allow additional sugar from the region to enter the U.S. market. To assuage concerns expressedby some Members, the Administration pledged prior to Senate passage to take steps to ensure thatall sugar imports, including those under DR-CAFTA, do not exceed a "trigger" that could underminethe U.S. Department of Agriculture's ability to manage the domestic sugar program. Sugar producersand processors responded that USDA's pledge did not address their long-term concerns, andcontinued last-minute efforts to defeat the agreement. In DR-CAFTA, the United States and six countries will completely phase out tariffs andquotas -- the primary means of border protection -- on all but four agricultural commodities tradedbetween them in stages up to 20 years. The four exempted products are as follows: for the UnitedStates, sugar; for Costa Rica, fresh onions and fresh potatoes; and for the four other CentralAmerican countries, white corn. The Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, andNicaragua have approved the agreement; Costa Rica's legislature is currently considering it. As ittakes effect on a rolling basis, the U.S. agricultural sector will over time gain free access to the sixhighly protected markets on a reciprocal basis, matching these countries' current duty-free entry fornearly all their agricultural exports to the United States. Other provisions establish safeguards forspecified agricultural products to protect U.S. and the region's producers from sudden import surges;prohibit the use of export subsidies between partners; and establish a mechanism to address sanitaryand phytosanitary barriers to agricultural trade. DR-CAFTA's provisions, once fully implemented, are expected to result in trade gains,though small, for the U.S. agricultural sector. The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC)estimates that $328 million in additional exports (primarily grains, meat products, and processedfood products) would be offset by a $52 million increase in imports (largely reflecting additionalaccess granted for sugar and beef from the six countries). Of the $2.7 billion increase in total U.S.exports that the ITC projects under DR-CAFTA, 12% would be attributable to the U.S. agriculturalsector. Most U.S. commodity groups, agribusiness and food manufacturing firms, and the AmericanFarm Bureau Federation (a general farm organization) supported DR-CAFTA, expecting to benefitfrom the guaranteed increased access to these six markets. Cotton producers announced theirsupport only after one major textile trade association came out in favor of it. The U.S. sugar industrystrongly opposed the additional access for sugar imports from these countries, fearing its economicimpact on domestic producers and processors. Two cattlemen trade organizations held differingpositions on the agreement's beef provisions. The National Farmers Union (a general farmorganization) opposed DR-CAFTA. Congress is expected to monitor developments on DR-CAFTAimplementation during the second session of the 109th Congress. This report will be updated.
crs_RS21948	crs_RS21948_0	(2) In addition, the occupant of theposition would "retain the present DCI's role as the principal intelligence adviser to the president." On December 17, 2004, the President approved the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (hereafter the "Intelligence ReformAct")( P.L. 108-458 ). The Act incorporated many of the proposals of the 9/11 Commission, including theestablishment of a Director of NationalIntelligence (DNI) separate from the Director of the CIA. The DNI will serve as head of the Intelligence Community and asthe principal adviser to thePresident and the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters relatedto the national security. (In thefuture they will report to the DNI.)	The 9/11 Commission made a number of recommendations to improve the quality ofintelligenceanalysis. A key recommendation was the establishment of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) position tomanage the national intelligenceeffort and serve as the principal intelligence adviser to the President -- along with a separate director of the CentralIntelligence Agency. Subsequently, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, P.L. 108-458, made the DNI theprincipal adviser to the President onintelligence and made the DNI responsible for coordinating community-wide intelligence estimates. Some observersnote that separating the DNIfrom the analytical offices may complicate the overall analytical effort. This report will be updated as newinformation becomes available.
crs_RL33258	crs_RL33258_0	The "trade preference" framework helps explain Brazil's trade strategy. (3) Brazil's tradepreferences in order of priority are: 1) expand and strengthen Mercosul, where Brazilis the undisputed industrial hub and political leader; 2) advocate developing countryinterests in the Doha Round, especially on agricultural issues, and; 3) resist what itviews as a welfare reducing, U.S.-designed FTAA, and to a lesser extent, also apreferential trade arrangement with the European Union unless it serves as a counterinfluence to the FTAA. regional or multilateral). It is comprehensive by its inclusion of issuesthat go beyond market access such as services trade, intellectual property rights,government procurement, and investment. In the Western Hemisphere, this implies taking on theUnited States. The foreign policy aspect of trade policy may also be seen in the emphasis ondeepening developing country trade relations. Today Brazil's macroeconomic priorities still constraintrade and other policy choices. Brazil's Balance of Merchandise Trade, 1988-2004 Brazilian Trade with the World Brazil has a modern, diversified economy, with services accounting for 53%of GDP, followed by industry and manufacturing at 37%, and agriculture at 9%. Depending on how agribusiness is measured, it contributes to some 30% of GDP. Brazil is the number one producer of raw sugar, oranges, and coffee in the world, andthe second largest producer of soybean, beef, poultry, and corn. (18) It is alsoa major producer of steel, aircraft, automobiles, and auto parts. Together they account for overone-third of Brazil's world trade and each, interestingly, is the dominant tradingpartner of a different region or trade group (NAFTA, Mercosul, and the EuropeanUnion). Importantly, natural resource-based goods dominate in all categories. Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) The FTAA is a proposed free trade area that would include 34 nations (allexcept Cuba) of the Western Hemisphere. For Brazil, opening up theU.S. U.S.-Brazil Trade Trends Brazil is the 15th largest U.S. export market, but a distant second to Mexicoas the United States' largest trading partner in Latin America. barriers to entry, such as citrus and steel. U.S.-Brazil Bilateral Trade Issues and Disputes Brazil and the United States have a number of specific trade issues that aretaken up at all levels of trade negotiations. (32) Brazil has raised its major concerns over broad U.S. policies such as the ByrdAmendment, which directs duties from trade remedy (antidumping) cases to affectedindustries, the calculation of antidumping margins, and what it considers to bediscriminatory treatment inherent in U.S. expansion of preferential trade agreementsin Latin America (NAFTA, Chile, CAFTA-DR). The Byrd Amendment was foundto be in violation of WTO rules. Although repealed by Congress on February 1,2006, the program remains in effect until October 1, 2007. Brazil also objects to product-specific barriers thatinclude restrictive tariff rate quotas (TRQs -- sugar, orange juice, ethanol, andtobacco), subsidies (cotton, ethanol, and soybeans), and trade remedy cases (steel andorange juice). Tariffs Structures. Orange Juice. Tobacco. High Tariffs. Prohibited Imports. Export and Financing Subsidies. Services Trade and Investment. Brazil mayactually have more to lose, however, because as much as both countries couldimprove their economic well-being from greater trade liberalization, as a developingcountry, Brazil seems to have the most to gain from not only reducing foreignbarriers to its exports, but unilaterally opening its economy further, particularly aspart of completing its ongoing economic reform agenda.	As the largest and one of the most influential countries in Latin America, Brazil has emergedas a leading voice for developing countries in setting regional and multilateral trade agendas. TheUnited States and Brazil have cultivated a constructive relationship in pursuit of their respectiveefforts to promote trade liberalization, including attempting to broker a compromise with theEuropean Union in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Round and forming bilateralworking groups on trade (and other) issues. Still, they approach trade policy quite differently, areat odds over how to proceed regionally with the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and shareconcerns over specific trade policies and practices. Brazil's trade strategy can be explained only in part by economic incentives. Its "tradepreferences" also reflect deeply embedded macroeconomic, industrial, and foreign policies. WhereasU.S. trade strategy emphasizes the negotiation of comprehensive trade agreements on multiple fronts,Brazil is focused primarily on market access issues as they pertain to its economic dominance inSouth America. Brazil exercises this priority in all trade arenas, such as pursuing changes toagricultural policies in the WTO, expanding the Southern Common Market (Mercosul) in SouthAmerica, and resisting the FTAA for lack of a balance conducive to Brazilian interests. Brazil has a modern, diversified economy in which services account for 53% of GDP,followed by industry and manufacturing at 37%, and agriculture at 9%. Agribusiness (commodityand processed goods) account for some 30% of GDP, explaining Brazil's emphasis on agriculturalpolicies in trade negotiations. Brazil is the world's largest producer of sugar cane, oranges, andcoffee, and the second largest of soybean, beef, poultry, and corn. It is also a major producer of steel,aircraft, automobiles, and auto parts, yet surprisingly, a relatively small trader by world standards. The United States is Brazil's largest single-country trading partner. Brazil is critical of U.S. trade policies such as the Byrd Amendment (repealed, but programin effect until October 1, 2007), which directs duties from trade remedy cases to affected industries,the administration of trade remedy rules, and what it considers to be discriminatory treatment in theU.S. expansion of free trade agreements in Latin America. It also objects to product-specific barrierssuch as tariff rate quotas on sugar, orange juice, ethanol, and tobacco; subsidies for cotton, ethanol,and soybeans; and prolonged antidumping orders on steel and orange juice. U.S. concerns focus onBrazil's comparatively high tariff structure, especially on industrial goods, Mercosul's commonexternal tariff program, and Brazil's refusal to address issues of critical importance to the UnitedStates such as services trade, intellectual property rights, government procurement, and investment. Despite these differences, both countries recognize the potential for important gains to be hadfrom mutually acceptable trade liberalization at all levels. As a developing country with anopportunity for considerable growth in both exports and imports, however, Brazil may have the mostto gain from addressing both foreign barriers to its trade, and unilaterally opening its economyfurther.
crs_R42387	crs_R42387_0	However, several statutes that outlaw federal sex offenses insist upon a minimum sentence. In a United States Sentencing Commission survey which addressed mandatory minimum sentences in child pornography cases but not other sex offense cases, a majority of the judges responding thought that the mandatory minimum sentences for production and distribution of child pornography and other child exploitation offenses were generally appropriate. Well over two-thirds, however, considered those for receipt of child pornography too high. The Commission's report on mandatory minimum sentencing statutes noted that its "review of available sentencing data [relating to sex offenses] indicates that further study of these penalties is needed before it can offer specific recommendations in this area." Constitutional Considerations : Defendants sentenced to mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment have challenged them on a number of constitutional grounds ranging from Congress' legislative authority, to cruel and unusual punishment, through ex post facto and double jeopardy, to equal protection and due process. Chapter 109A violations trigger mandatory minimum sentencing provisions when: (1) the offender commits or attempts to commit a sexual act by force or threat or by rendering the victim unconscious or intoxicated (aggravated sexual abuse); (2) a sexual act is committed against a minor under the age of 12, or under the age of 16, if is there is disparity of 4 years or more between the age of the victim and the age of the offender (aggravated sexual abuse of a child); (3) the offender commits or attempts to commit a sexual act by threat or when the victim is incapacitated (sexual abuse); (4) had the sexual contact been a sexual act, it would have been punishable as sexual abuse or aggravated sexual abuse (abusive sexual contact); or (5) the offense is a federal sex offense, including an offense subject to a mandatory minimum sentence, committed against a minor by an offender with a prior state or federal conviction for a sex offense committed against a minor (repeated sexual offense). They will do so in most serious sex offense cases. Child Pornography Four federal child pornography sections establish mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for violations: 18 U.S.C. Qualifying prior convictions may include convictions under either state or federal law. Transporting : A 5-year mandatory term of imprisonment must be imposed on "[a]ny person who - (1) knowingly mails, or transports or ships using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, any child pornography." Jurisdiction exists if the offense occurs on federal enclaves or facilities or in Indian country. It requires a fine and a minimum term of 15 years for recidivists.	Sex offenses are usually state crimes. Federal law, however, outlaws sex offenses when they occur on federal lands or in federal prisons, when they involve interstate or foreign travel, or when they involve child pornography whose production or distribution is associated in some way with interstate or foreign commerce. Mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment attend conviction for any of several of these federal sex crimes. The most severe mandatory minimum sentences have been reserved for aggravated sexual assaults committed in federal enclaves or federal prisons, for sex offenses resulting in death, and for sex crimes committed against children by repeat offenders. Two-thirds of the federal trial judges responding to a U.S. Sentencing Commission survey questioned the severity of the mandatory minimum penalties required for receipt of child pornography (5 years; 15 years for repeat offenders). The Commission's report suggested that as a preliminary matter the perception may lead to inconsistent sentencing in child pornography cases. It explained that more study would be required before it could make any specific recommendations concerning mandatory minimum sentencing in sex offenses. The constitutional authority to enact federal sex offense punishable by mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment is not unlimited. The ex post facto and double jeopardy clauses; the Fifth Amendment's equal protection component; the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause; the separation of powers and the reservation of powers principles—all establish boundaries that must be honored. Nevertheless, few defendants have successfully challenged the constitutionality of a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment imposed following their conviction for a federal sex offense. This report is an abridged version of CRS Report R42386, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing for Federal Sex Offenses: An Overview, without the footnotes or citations to authority found here.
crs_RL33337	crs_RL33337_0	Introduction In the past year, policy consequences of U.S. aid restrictions on International Criminal Court (ICC) member countries that have not signed agreements exempting U.S. citizens from ICC prosecution have prompted policy-makers to alter the policy somewhat. Background The International Criminal Court (ICC) In July 2002, the Rome Statute that created the International Criminal Court (ICC) entered into force. The ICC is the first permanent world court with jurisdiction to try individuals accused of war crimes and other serious human rights abuses. The United States is not a party to the court and does not recognize ICC jurisdiction over U.S. soldiers or civilians serving in other countries. Accordingly, the United States has sought immunity provisions through the U.N. Security Council for U.N.-authorized peacekeeping operations, and has pursued bilateral agreements with countries that are parties to the ICC in order to preclude extradition or surrender of U.S. citizens from each respective country to the ICC. Bilateral Immunity ("Article 98") Agreements Since 2003, the Bush Administration has sought bilateral agreements worldwide to exempt Americans from ICC prosecution, so-called "Article 98 agreements." Legislation There has been strong bipartisan support in Congress for legislation aimed at protecting U.S. soldiers and civilian officials from the jurisdiction of the ICC. The Nethercutt Amendment The Nethercutt Amendment to the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( H.R. 4818 / P.L. 108-447 ) prohibited Economic Support Funds (ESF) assistance to the governments of countries that have not entered into an Article 98 agreement with the United States. 3057 / P.L. 109-102 ). Nethercutt aid restrictions continued in the FY2007 Continuing Appropriations Resolution ( P.L. 109-289 , as amended) and are likely to be included in the FY2008 Foreign Operations Appropriation bill. Article 98 and U.S. Aid to Latin America The ASPA and the Nethercutt Amendment have had an impact on U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. Military Assistance Pursuant to the American Servicemembers' Protection Act or ASPA ( P.L. On November 28, 2006, pursuant to Section 574 of P.L. The conference agreement, following the Senate version of the bill, modifies ASPA to end the ban on International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance to countries that are members of the ICC and that do not have Article 98 agreements in place. 109-364 , on October 17. Restrictions on Foreign Military Financing (FMF) remain in place under ASPA. Although some Members of Congress advocate ending all ICC-related sanctions, others believe that some aid restrictions should remain in place in order to encourage other countries to sign Article 98 agreements. The issue of whether to continue these aid restrictions is likely to be considered during the 110 th Congress.	During 2006, the Administration and Congress began to reassess some aspects of U.S. policy towards the International Criminal Court (ICC) because of unintended negative effects of that policy on relations with some ICC member countries, especially in Latin America. In Congress, support for aid restrictions on foreign aid to ICC member countries that have not agreed to exempt U.S. citizens from the court's jurisdiction has diminished. This policy shift has occurred largely because of increasing concerns about the negative effects that ICC-related sanctions have had on U.S. relations with Latin America, particularly in the area of security cooperation. In July 2002, the Rome Statute that created the ICC, the first permanent world court created to judge cases involving serious human rights abuses, entered into force. The United States is not a party to the ICC and does not recognize its jurisdiction over U.S. citizens. Since 2002, the Bush Administration has sought bilateral agreements worldwide to exempt U.S. citizens from ICC prosecution, so-called "Article 98 agreements." There has been strong bipartisan support in Congress for legislation aimed at protecting U.S. soldiers and civilian officials from the jurisdiction of the ICC. In 2002, Congress passed the American Servicemembers' Protection Act or ASPA (P.L. 107-206, title II), which prohibits military assistance to countries that are party to the ICC and that do not have Article 98 agreements. The Nethercutt Amendment to the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447) and FY2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (H.R. 3057/P.L. 109-102) prohibited some economic assistance to the governments of those same countries. Nethercutt aid restrictions continued in the FY2007 Continuing Appropriations Resolution (P.L. 109-289, as amended) and are likely to be included in the FY2008 Foreign Operations Appropriation bill. The FY2007 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364), which President Bush signed into law on October 17, 2006, modifies ASPA to end the ban on International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance to affected countries. Restrictions on Foreign Military Financing (FMF) remain in place. On November 28, 2006, pursuant to section 574 of P.L. 109-102, President Bush waived Nethercutt restrictions on FY2006 Economic Support Funds (ESF) to 14 countries, including Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru. While some Members of Congress advocate ending all ICC-related sanctions, others believe that some aid restrictions should remain in place in order to encourage other countries to sign Article 98 agreements. The issue of whether to continue these aid restrictions is likely to be considered during the 110th Congress. This report may be updated.
crs_R42885	crs_R42885_0	Congress passed comprehensive food safety legislation in December 2010 (FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, or FSMA, P.L. 111-353 ), representing the largest expansion and overhaul of U.S. food safety authorities since the 1930s. FSMA greatly expanded food safety oversight authority at the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), but did not alter oversight authorities within other federal agencies responsible for food safety, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). In the wake of these reforms, Congress continues to actively address concerns of the U.S. food safety system given challenges facing FDA in implementing this law and also continued food safety incidents. Congress will likely continue to monitor FDA's implementation of the law but might also continue to consider additional changes to other food safety laws and policies that have been actively debated in Congress. Following Congress's passage of FSMA in December 2010, FDA has been actively engaged in developing new regulations to implement the law. Under FSMA, FDA is responsible for more than 50 regulations, guidelines, and studies; however, some major provisions under FSMA have been substantially delayed, and it is uncertain whether full implementation of some provisions in the law will meet their expected deadlines. Existing Food Safety Legal and Regulatory Landscape Numerous federal, state, and local agencies share responsibilities for regulating the safety of the U.S. food supply. 111-353) FSMA focused on FDA-regulated foods and amended FDA's existing structure and authorities, in particular the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA, 21 U.S.C. §§301 et seq .). Among its many provisions, FSMA expanded FDA's authority to conduct a mandatory recall of contaminated food products; enhanced surveillance systems to investigate foodborne illness outbreaks; established new preventive controls and food safety plans at some food processing facilities and farms; enhanced FDA's traceability capacity within the nation's food distribution channels; increased inspection frequencies of high-risk food facilities (both domestic and foreign facilities); and expanded FDA's authority and oversight capabilities regarding foreign companies that supply food imports to the United States. In addition, the 114 th Congress also may continue to consider changes to other food safety laws and policies that continue to be actively debated in Congress. Among these are food safety initiatives covering meat, poultry, and seafood products; legislation intended to curtail the non-therapeutic use of antibiotics in animal feeds and to ban the use of certain plastic components commonly used in food containers; issues regarding food labeling; and the use of plant and animal biotechnology, as well as other issues. Regulations were to have been proposed or, in some cases, finalized within one to two years of enactment (roughly January 2012 and January 2013); other rules were to have been submitted within 18 months of enactment (mid-2012). Implementation of some provisions has also required coordination with other federal agencies, including Department of Homeland Security, USDA, and EPA. Given delays in the rulemaking process, the Center for Food Safety filed suit in federal court against FDA and OMB, citing the government's failure to implement several food safety regulations required by FSMA. To date, FDA has not yet issued final rules and guidance for many of the regulations required under certain key sections of FSMA. FDA re-proposed aspects of the Foreign Supplier Verification Program in September 2014. Many of these bills were reintroduced from previous Congresses. Single Food Agency Some in Congress may continue to advocate for additional reforms to the nation's food safety system, particularly with respect to coordination and organization among federal agencies.	Congress passed comprehensive food safety legislation in December 2010 (FDA Food Safety Modernization Act [FSMA], P.L. 111-353), representing the largest expansion and overhaul of U.S. food safety authorities since the 1930s. FSMA greatly expanded food safety oversight authority at the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), but did not alter oversight authorities within other federal agencies responsible for food safety, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Given challenges facing FDA in implementing this law and also a continued prevalence of food safety incidents, Congress continues to actively address concerns of the U.S. food safety system. Numerous agencies share responsibility for regulating food safety; however, FSMA focused on FDA-regulated foods and amended FDA's existing structure and authorities, in particular the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA; 21 U.S.C. §§301 et seq.). Among its many provisions, FSMA expanded FDA's authority to conduct a mandatory recall of contaminated food products, enhanced surveillance systems for foodborne illness outbreaks, established preventive controls at some food processing facilities and farms, enhanced FDA's traceability capacity within the nation's food distribution channels, increased the number of FDA inspections at domestic and foreign food facilities, and expanded FDA's authority and oversight of foreign companies that supply food imports to the United States. Since the law was signed in January 2011, FDA has been actively engaged in developing regulations to implement FSMA. Congress will likely continue to monitor FDA's implementation of the law and provide oversight over how some provisions are carried out and enforced, as well as FDA's coordination with other federal agencies, such as those in USDA and the Department of Homeland Security. Under FSMA, FDA is responsible for more than 50 regulations, guidelines, and studies; however, some FDA rules under FSMA have been substantially delayed, and it is uncertain whether full implementation of some provisions in the law will meet their expected deadlines. Regulations were to have been proposed or, in some cases, finalized within one to two years of enactment (roughly January 2012 and January 2013). Given delays in the rulemaking process, the Center for Food Safety filed suit in federal court against FDA and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), citing the government's failure to implement several food safety regulations required by FSMA. By early 2014, FDA had proposed a majority of the regulations that constitute the food safety framework under FSMA, but there are continued delays in some rules, industry guidance, and reports as required under the law. FDA also re-proposed some aspects of four major proposed rules in September 2014. FDA has agreed to a new court-ordered schedule for issuing final FSMA regulations for many of the major rules between 2015 and 2016. Congress may also continue to consider changes to other food safety laws and policies that continue to be actively debated. Among these are food safety initiatives covering meat, poultry, and seafood products; legislation intended to curtail the non-medical use of antibiotics in animal feeds and to ban the use of certain plastic components commonly used in food containers; food labeling; stricter food safety enforcement mechanisms; and the use of plant and animal biotechnology. Several of these issues were actively debated leading up to the passage of FSMA. Several bills debated in previous Congresses were reintroduced in the 112th and 113th Congress. Some in Congress also might continue to advocate for additional policy reforms to existing FDA or USDA food safety laws to address other perceived concerns about the safety of the U.S. food supply. These include concerns about the adequacy of resources and regulatory tools to combat foodborne illness, and concerns about coordination and organization among federal agencies.
crs_RS20752	crs_RS20752_0	Is the Outgoing or Incoming President Required to Submit the Budget? The deadline for submission of the budget, first set in 1921 as "on the first day of each regular session," has changed several times over the years: in 1950, to "during the first 15 days of each regular session"; in 1985, to "on or before the first Monday after January 3 of each year (or on or before February 5 in 1986)"; and in 1990, to "on or after the first Monday in January but not later than the first Monday in February of each year." The 1990 change in the deadline made it possible for an outgoing President to leave the annual budget submission to his successor, an option which the three outgoing Presidents since then (George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush) took. Similarly, the budget for FY2002 was submitted by the incoming President George W. Bush, rather than by outgoing President Bill Clinton. President George W. Bush indicated early on that he would not submit a budget for FY2010. President Barack Obama submitted an overview of his budget, "A New Era of Responsibility: Renewing America's Promise" on February 26, 2009, two days after delivering an address on his economic and budget plan to a joint session of Congress. Six incoming Presidents chose to modify their predecessor's budget by submitting revisions shortly after taking office: Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan. Two incoming Presidents during this period (Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan) submitted budget revisions and one (George H.W. Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush submitted the original budgets for FY1994 and FY2002 (on April 8, 1993, and April 9, 2001, respectively), and President Obama submitted the FY2010 budget on May 7, 2009. Special Messages to Congress Although Presidents Reagan, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama did not submit detailed budget proposals until April or May of their first year in office, each of them advised Congress regarding the general contours of their economic and budgetary policies in special messages submitted to Congress in February.	At the time of a presidential transition, one question commonly asked is whether the outgoing or incoming President submits the budget for the upcoming fiscal year. Under past practices, outgoing Presidents in transition years submitted a budget to Congress just prior to leaving office, and incoming Presidents usually revised them. Six incoming Presidents—Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan—revised their predecessor's budget shortly after taking office, while only two Presidents during this period, Lyndon Johnson and George H. W. Bush, chose not to do so. The deadline for submission of the President's budget, which has been changed several times over the years, was set in 1990 as "on or after the first Monday in January but not later than the first Monday in February of each year." The change made it possible for an outgoing President, whose term ends on January 20, to leave the annual budget submission to his successor. The three outgoing Presidents since the 1990 change—George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush—exercised this option. Accordingly, the budget was submitted in 1993, 2001, and 2009 by the three incoming Presidents (Bill Clinton for FY1994, George W. Bush for FY2002, and Barack Obama for FY2010). Before President Barack Obama, the last three incoming Presidents that submitted a budget or revised their predecessor's budget (Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush) did not submit detailed budget proposals during their transitions until early April; however, each of them advised Congress regarding the general contours of their economic and budgetary policies in a special message submitted to Congress in February concurrently with a presentation made to a joint session of Congress. President Barack Obama followed a comparable approach. He delivered an address on his economic and budget plan to a joint session of Congress on February 24, 2009, and submitted an overview document two days later. He submitted his detailed budget proposal on May 7, 2009, and submitted additional supplemental volumes four days later, on May 11, 2009. This report will be updated as developments warrant.
crs_R42111	crs_R42111_0	This report summarizes the evidence on the relationship between tax rates and economic growth, referring in a number of cases to more-detailed CRS reports. Potentially negative effects of tax rates on economic growth have been an issue in the debate about whether to increase taxes to address the budget deficit and whether to broaden the base and lower the rates with tax reform. Short-Run Counter-Cyclical Effects Versus Long-Run Growth Initially, it is important to make a distinction between the effects of policies aimed at short-term stimulation of an underemployed economy and long-run growth. In the short run, both spending increases and tax cuts are projected to increase employment and output in an underemployed economy, such as the United States today. These effects operate through the demand side of the economy. In general, the largest effects are from direct spending and transfers to lower-income individuals, whereas the smallest effects are from cutting taxes of high-income individuals or businesses. Long-run growth is a supply-side phenomenon. In the long run, the availability of jobs is not an issue, as an economy naturally creates jobs. Output can grow through increases in labor participation and hours, increases in capital, and changes such as education and technological advances that enhance the productivity of these inputs. Because much discussion is focused on the consequences of individuals in the top marginal tax rate brackets who provide much of the saving and entrepreneurial input in the economy, the following charts include examinations of the relationship between labor supply, savings, and growth rates for the top marginal rates. Over the same 60-year period, the top marginal income tax rate and effective tax rate of capital gains income has fluctuated. In general, however, tax cuts still lead to similar effects as wages because both income and substitution effects are small. Empirical evidence suggests a negligible and possibly negative savings response. This inflow would generally not be affected by individual income taxes but could be affected by corporate rate cuts. Sometimes the capital gains tax is singled out as being particularly important to savings. In summation, the evidence in this section suggests that changing tax rates is likely to have small effects on supply of labor and capital and on output. Dynamic Revenue Estimating Claims that the cost of tax reductions is significantly reduced through feedback effects, because of increases in economic growth (and that gains from tax increases are significantly reduced) have been made. A series of studies providing direct relationships between tax rates and tax revenues designed to measure these responses initially found large effects. In any case, the evidence suggests feedback effects from 3% to 10%. More recent estimates, however, have suggested a feedback effect of about 20%. Any positive feedback effects would be much more than offset, for a stand-alone tax change, by the interest and crowding out effects of debt.	This report summarizes the evidence on the relationship between tax rates and economic growth, referring in a number of cases to other CRS reports providing more substance and detail. Potentially negative effects of tax rates on economic growth have been an issue in the debates about whether to increase taxes to reduce the deficit and whether to reform taxes by broadening the base to lowering tax rates. Initially, it is important to make a distinction between the effects of policies aimed at short-term stimulation of an underemployed economy and long-run growth. In the short run, both spending increases and tax cuts are projected to increase employment and output in an underemployed economy. These effects operate through the demand side of the economy. In general, the largest effects are from direct government spending and transfers to lower-income individuals, whereas the smallest effects are from cutting taxes of high-income individuals or businesses. Long-run growth is a supply-side phenomenon. In the long run, the availability of jobs is not an issue as an economy naturally creates jobs. Output can grow through increases in labor participation and hours, increases in capital, and changes such as education and technological advances that enhance the productivity of these inputs. Historical data on labor participation rates and average hours worked compared to tax rates indicate little relationship with either top marginal rates or average marginal rates on labor income. Relationships between tax rates and savings appear positively correlated (that is, lower savings are consistent with lower, not higher, tax rates), although this relationship may not be causal. Similarly, during historical periods, slower growth periods have generally been associated with lower, not higher, tax rates. A review of statistical evidence suggests that both labor supply and savings and investment are relatively insensitive to tax rates. Small effects arise in part because of offsetting income and substitution effects (which make the direction of effects uncertain) and in part because each of these individual responses appears small. Institutional constraints may also have an effect. Offsetting income and substitution effects also affect savings. Capital gains taxes are often singled out as determinants of growth, but their effects on the cost of capital are quite small. International capital flows also appear to have a small effect. Most expenditures that affect the productivity of labor and capital inputs (research and development, education, or infrastructure) are already tax favored or provided by the government. Small business taxes are also sometimes emphasized as important to growth, but the evidence suggests a modest and uncertain effect on entrepreneurship. Claims that the cost of tax reductions are significantly reduced by feedback effects do not appear to be justified by the evidence, where feedback effects are in the range of 3% to 10% and can, in some cases, be negative. Because of the estimated realizations response, capital gains tax cuts have in the past been estimated to have a large revenue offset (about 60%), but more recent empirical estimates suggest one of about 20%. In general, for stand-alone rate reductions the additions to the deficit would cause tax cuts to have a larger cost both because of debt service and because of crowding out of investment, which would swamp most behavioral effects.
crs_R42004	crs_R42004_0	Health related data can be very valuable to researchers, scientists, and other academics. It can be just as valuable to participants in the market for the provision of health care. For example, pharmaceutical manufacturers use a process known as detailing to market prescription drugs. Detailing involves sending representatives of the pharmaceutical manufacturers to individual doctors' offices with information about prescription drugs and their various uses. The more information a detailer has about the doctor (or medication prescriber) that he or she is planning to market to, the better targeted, and more effective, the detailing becomes. Consequently, information about the past prescribing practices of doctors can be valuable to detailers in designing their marketing strategies. An industry has developed to collect, aggregate, and analyze these prescriber data. The information they collect from pharmacies and hospitals about prescriber practices is then sold to pharmaceutical manufacturers for use in marketing. They also sell the data to researchers and others that might use the data for purposes unrelated to marketing, but this market is far smaller than the market consisting of pharmaceutical marketers. Some doctors find better-targeted detailing to be useful. Other doctors find the sharing of their prescriber history without their consent, and its subsequent use as a marketing tool, to be an invasion of privacy. Three states—Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont —enacted statutes to restrict the sale and use of prescriber history data for the purposes of marketing (though not for any other purpose) without the consent of the doctor. As discussed below, the states claimed to be protecting the privacy interest of the doctors. Also, the states were interested in lowering the costs of health care. Because detailing effectively encourages the prescription of more expensive, brand-name drugs, data suggest that health care costs are measurably increased by detailing. The states reasoned that if detailing were less effective, then doctors might be more likely to prescribe generic drugs, which are cheaper than brand-name drugs, and health care costs overall would go down. The companies that collect, analyze, and sell these data challenged the laws, claiming that they were an unconstitutional restriction of their free speech rights under the First Amendment, as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that the statute regulated conduct rather than speech, and that even if it regulated speech the regulation was constitutionally permissible pursuant to the Supreme Court's commercial speech case law. Consequently, the Second Circuit struck down the Vermont law as unconstitutional. As a result the Court affirmed the decision of the Second Circuit striking down the law.	Health related data can be very valuable to researchers, scientists, and other academics. It can be just as valuable to participants in the market for the provision of health care. For example, pharmaceutical manufacturers use a process known as detailing to market prescription drugs. Detailing involves sending representatives of the pharmaceutical manufacturers to individual doctors' offices with information about prescription drugs and their various uses. The more information a detailer has about the doctor (or medication prescriber) that he or she is planning to market to, the better targeted, and more effective, the detailing becomes. Consequently, information about the past prescribing practices of doctors can be valuable to detailers in designing their marketing strategies. An industry has developed to collect, aggregate, and analyze these prescriber data. These data gatherers sell the information they collect from pharmacies and hospitals about prescriber practices to pharmaceutical manufacturers for use in marketing. They also sell the data to researchers and others that might use the data, but this market is far smaller than the market consisting of pharmaceutical manufacturers and marketers. Some doctors find better-targeted detailing to be useful. Other doctors find the sharing of their prescriber history without their consent, and its subsequent use as a marketing tool, to be an invasion of privacy. Three states—Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont—have enacted statutes to restrict the sale and use of prescriber history data for the purposes of marketing (though not for any other purpose) without the consent of the doctor. The states claimed to be protecting the privacy interest of the doctors. Also, the states were interested in lowering the costs of health care. Because detailing effectively encourages the prescription of more expensive, brand-name drugs, data suggest that health care costs are measurably increased by detailing. The states reasoned that if detailing were less effective, then doctors might be more likely to prescribe generic drugs, which are cheaper than brand-name drugs, and health care costs overall would go down. The companies that collect, analyze, and sell these data challenged the laws, claiming that they were an unconstitutional restriction of their free speech rights under the First Amendment. The First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the laws enacted by Maine and New Hampshire as restrictions on conduct rather than speech, and further found that even if the laws did restrict speech they were constitutional restrictions on commercial speech. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals struck down a functionally identical Vermont statute. The Second Circuit found that the Vermont law unconstitutionally restricted commercial speech. In order to resolve this split in the circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Second Circuit Case. A divided Court affirmed the decision of the Second Circuit but applied a slightly different standard than the lower court.
crs_R44581	crs_R44581_0	Global Trends Trafficking in persons, or human trafficking, refers to the subjection of men, women, and children to compelled service for the purposes of exploitation. Examples of human trafficking include trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation, including child sexual exploitation; forced labor, including bonded labor, involuntary domestic servitude, and forced child labor; and the unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers. Reports suggest that human trafficking is a global phenomenon, victimizing millions of people and contributing to a multi-billion dollar criminal industry. It is a centuries-old problem that, despite international efforts, continues to occur in virtually every country in the world. U.S. Policy Background The U.S. government, including Congress, has played a leading role in international efforts to combat human trafficking, particularly through the enactment of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA, Division A of P.L. 106-386 ) and its subsequent amendments and reauthorizations (TVPRAs of 2003, 2005, 2008, and 2013). 114-119 ); and other country-specific statutes. The Secretary of State chairs the President's Interagency Task Force (PITF) on Trafficking in Persons, and the Director of the State Department's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (J/TIP) chairs the Senior Policy Operating Group (SPOG), a working-level interagency entity that coordinates the U.S. government's response to human trafficking. In addition, the J/TIP director oversees the annual publication of the TIP Report , required by the TVPA, as well as the administration of an international grants program for projects seeking to combat human trafficking. INL supports justice sector and law enforcement capacity building, including human trafficking-related training. United Nations Role Internationally, the U.S. government is party to multiple treaties related to human trafficking that variously require participating countries to criminalize all forms of human trafficking, support international efforts to protect victims, prosecute traffickers, and prevent opportunities for traffickers to exploit. The annual T IP Report is due each year to Congress on June 1. The State Department was widely praised by observers for what they viewed as an accurate portrayal of human trafficking problems in Burma and Uzbekistan, both rated Tier 3 in the 2016 TIP Report . Funding and Assistance Issues As Congress continues to evaluate U.S. efforts to address human trafficking internationally, foreign assistance funding will remain a central focus. Appendix. International Human Trafficking Legislation in the 114th Congress The following list provides an overview of bills in the 114 th Congress that pertain, at least in part, to international dimensions of trafficking in persons. Advisory Council on Human Trafficking. Sex Trafficking Demand Reduction Act—pertaining to the minimum standards for the elimination of severe forms of trafficking in persons and government policies on the purchase of commercial sex. China Human Rights Protection Act of 2015—pertaining to, among other issues, human trafficking in China.	Trafficking in persons, or human trafficking, refers to the subjection of men, women, and children to exploitative conditions that may be tantamount to slavery. Reports suggest that human trafficking is a global phenomenon, victimizing millions of people each year and contributing to a multi-billion dollar criminal industry. Common forms of human trafficking include trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation, forced labor, and debt bondage. Other forms of human trafficking include trafficking for domestic servitude and the use of children in armed conflict (e.g., child soldiers). Human trafficking is a centuries-old problem that, despite international and U.S. efforts to eliminate it, continues to occur in virtually every country in the world. The modern manifestation of the human trafficking problem is driven by gaps in the enforcement of anti-trafficking laws and regulations and the willingness of some labor and service providers to violate such laws in order to fulfill international demand. Such demand is particularly concentrated among industries and economic sectors that are low-skill and labor-intensive. Human trafficking is an international and cross-cutting policy problem that affects a range of major national security, human rights, criminal justice, social, economic, migration, gender, public health, and labor issues. The U.S. government and successive Congresses have long played a leading role in international efforts to combat human trafficking. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA, Division A of P.L. 106-386, as amended) and its reauthorizations are the cornerstone legislative vehicles for current U.S. policy to combat international human trafficking. Since enactment of the TVPA in 2000, Congress has remained active on international human trafficking issues, particularly with appropriations identified for anti-trafficking assistance purposes, proposed legislation related to the TVPA, and other anti-trafficking initiatives. Periodic oversight hearings have focused in particular on the State Department's annual Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, a detailed country-by-country ranking and analysis of government efforts to achieve congressionally established minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking. Although there is widespread support among policy makers for U.S. anti-trafficking goals, ongoing reports of continued trafficking worldwide raise questions regarding whether sufficient progress has been made to deter and ultimately eliminate the problem. This report provides an overview of recent global trends and U.S. foreign policy responses to address human trafficking. The report focuses in particular on efforts conducted by the State Department's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (J/TIP) and the President's Interagency Task Force (PITF) on human trafficking, as well as discussion of the 2016 TIP Report. An Appendix includes the status of legislation introduced in the 114th Congress on international dimensions of human trafficking. Drawing on CRS Report R42497, Trafficking in Persons: International Dimensions and Foreign Policy Issues for Congress, this report reflects policy activity in the 114th Congress and will be updated to reflect international trafficking developments through the end of the second session. .
crs_RL33000	crs_RL33000_0	Most Recent Developments Congressman Christopher H. Smith introduced H.R. 2601 on May 24, 2005. House floor debate occurred the week of July 18, 2005. Earlier in 2005, Senator Lugar introduced a Senate version of the foreign relationsauthorization legislation ( S. 600 ) on March 10. On April 5 and 6, the Senate debated the bill at which time thecombination of numerous amendments on the bill, world events (the death of the Pope),nominations, and filibusters on judges put off action on the measure. Introduction Congress is required by law to authorize the spending of appropriations for the StateDepartment and foreign policy activities every two years. The foreign relations authorization process dovetails with the annual appropriationprocess for the Department of State (within the Science, State, Justice, Commerce and RelatedAgency Appropriation in the House and the State-Foreign Operations Appropriation in the Senate)and foreign assistance activities (within the Foreign Operations Appropriation in both House andSenate). The mostrecently-enacted stand-alone authorization Act was for FY2003 ( P.L. 107-228 / H.R. Congress can influence U.S. foreign policy regarding specific regions or countries via this biannuallegislation, as well. Both contain similar provisions for the State Department spending levels, theoperation, organization and personnel of State. S. 600 goes beyond that to include titleson: 1) authorizing foreign assistance programs, 2) radiological terrorism security, 3) global pathogensurveillance, 4) safe water, 5) protection of vulnerable populations during humanitarian emergencies,and 6) reconstruction and stabilization issues. 2601 includes measures on: 1)democracy promotion, 2) U.N. reform, 3) export controls and security assistance, and 4)nonproliferation. 2601 and S. 600 Titles in both bills include State Department Authorizations of Appropriations; StateDepartment Authorities and Activities; Organization and Personnel of the Department of State,International Organizations; and International Broadcasting (Board of Governors). Cuba Broadcasting. Foreign Assistance Authorization(10) Congress last enacted a broad foreign assistance authorization act in 1985. Title XXI includes FY2006 and FY2007 authorizations ofappropriations for most, but not all foreign aid programs. TitleXXIV is the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act. Although the House International Relations Committee did not consider a substantive foreignassistance authorization separately or as part of the Foreign Relations Authorization bill, H.R. More than a half-dozen loans have beenapproved since that time.	The foreign relations authorization process dovetails with the annual appropriation processfor the Department of State, foreign policy, and foreign assistance. Congress is required by law toauthorize the spending of appropriations for the State Department and foreign policy activities everytwo years. The last time Congress passed a stand-alone foreign relations authorization bill was inFY2003 ( P.L. 107-228 ). Foreign assistance authorization measures (such as authorization for the U.S. Agency forInternational Development, economic and military assistance to foreign countries, and internationalpopulation programs) typically have been merged into the State Department authorization legislationsince 1985. Since that time, Congress has not passed a stand-alone foreign assistance authorizationbill. On March 10, 2005, Senator Lugar introduced S. 600 . The bill includesappropriations for the Department of State, international broadcasting, the Peace Corps, and foreignassistance programs for FY2006 and FY2007. In early April, the Senate debated S. 600on the Senate floor. The measure is stalled for now with the introduction of numerous flooramendments. Congressman Christopher H. Smith introduced a foreign relations authorization bill( H.R. 2601 ) on May 24, 2005. The bill was marked up at the subcommittee and fullcommittee level in late May and early June. House floor action occurred the week of July 18th. The House and Senate legislation contain similar titles regarding authorization language forthe Department of State, international organizations, and international broadcasting; StateDepartment organization and personnel issues, and miscellaneous reporting requirements. S. 600 goes beyond H.R. 2601 on foreign assistance authorization andnumerous other foreign policy issues including avian flu, debt relief, global pathogen surveillance,safe water, and reconstruction and stabilization initiatives. Issues covered in H.R. 2601,but not significantly in S. 600 include democracy promotion, U.N. reform, strategic exportcontrols, missile and nuclear nonproliferation measures, and World Bank loans to Iran. This report will be updated as legislative action occurs. Key Policy Staff Division abbreviations: RSI = Resources, Science, and Industry Division; DSP = Domestic Social Policy Division; FDT = Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.
crs_RL34161	crs_RL34161_0	Since 2004, Washington and New Delhi have been pursuing a "strategic partnership" based on numerous shared values and improved economic and trade relations. India is in the midst of a rapid economic expansion, and many U.S. companies view India as a lucrative market and a candidate for foreign investment. For its part, the current Indian government sees itself continuing the economic reforms started in 1991, aimed at transforming a quasi-socialist economy into a more open, market-oriented economy. However, the U.S. government is concerned that India's economic reforms are progressing too slowly and unevenly. 5682 , the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 ( P.L. Despite the growth in bilateral trade and the improvement in trade relations, there are still a number of economic and trade issues between India and the United States. Both nations seek greater market access to the other's domestic markets, as well as the lowering of perceived trade barriers. India's real gross domestic product (GDP) rose by 9.2% in 2006—a growth rate second only to China among Asian nations. The following is a selected listing of key economic players in the current government: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh , INC member and widely-respected Oxford-educated economist who, as finance minister from 1991-1995, was the architect of a comprehensive set of national economic reforms; INC President Sonia Gandhi , the Italian-born widow of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, while not formally a member of the central government, oversaw the UPA's 2004 poll victory and wields considerable influence over the coalition's policy making; Finance Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram , a Harvard-educated lawyer from the southern state of Tamil Nadu (and member a regional affiliate of the INC) who served as finance minister in the late1990s, is considered to be a highly-competent, pro-market fiscal manager; Commerce and Industry Minister Kamal Nath , an INC stalwart from the east-central Madhya Pradesh state, has launched major trade policy initiatives and is a key interlocutor for the U.S. government; Planning Commission Deputy Chairman Montek Singh Ahluwalia , a widely-respected, Oxford-educated economist who works directly under Prime Minister Singh and has close ties to Washington; Oil Minister Murli Deora , INC member and former mayor of Mumbai who was appointed in 2006, by some accounts due to pressures for a more pro-business, pro-U.S. oil minister; Power Minister Sushilkumar Shinde , an INC stalwart and former Chief Minister of Maharashtra; CPI-M General Secretary Prakash Karat , a vocal critic of many economic reforms and of India's warming relations with the United States, is the most notable leader of the UPA-supporting Left Front; BJP President Rajnath Singh , a Hindu nationalist from the Uttar Pradesh state who served in the government of former Prime Minister Vajpayee, is seen as a new-generation leader for India's main opposition party and has been critical of the UPA for slowing the process of economic reform; The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) , a nationwide grouping of corporations, chambers of commerce, and business associations that claims to speak directly or indirectly for more than 250,000 Indian business units; and The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) , a nongovernmental industry group with a membership of more than 6,300 private and public sector organizations that employs advisory and consultative processes aimed at improving India's business climate. A byproduct of India's growth is the emergence of a relatively prosperous and substantial middle class. Balance of Trade The overall growth of international trade has also created a potential economic problem—a growing trade and current account deficit (see Figure 3 ). Commentators often point to India's rising rate of inflation as evidence that its economy is growing too fast. As a result, India was the 21 st largest export market for the United States in 2006 and its 18 th largest supplier of imports. The United States remains India's leading trading partner on the strength of India's exports to the United States. To summarize, from both the U.S. and Indian perspective, there has been a recent rapid increase in bilateral merchandise trade flows, with India's exports to the United States our performing U.S. exports to India. Foreign Direct Investment The recent growth in U.S. foreign direct investments (FDI) in India parallels the growth in bilateral trade. 109-401 ). However, in July, the United States and India announced having concluded negotiations 123 Agreement, calling it a "historic milestone" in the bilateral strategic partnership. The U.S. Trade Representative has also indicated that the United States would like to see India join the World Intellectual Property Organization's (WIPO) Internet Treaties. This has raised concerns about the possible import of so-called "conflict diamonds." There are currently two bills before Congress that offer additional assistance and/or protection to displaced U.S. workers.	After decades of strained political relations, the U.S. and Indian governments are currently pursuing a "strategic partnership" based on numerous overlapping interests, shared values, and improved economic and trade relations. India is in the midst of a rapid economic expansion, and many U.S. companies view India as a lucrative market and a candidate for foreign investment. For its part, the current Indian government sees itself continuing the economic reforms started in 1991, aimed at transforming a quasi-socialist economy into a more open, market-oriented economy. However, the U.S. government is concerned that India's economic reforms are progressing too slowly and unevenly. Bilateral merchandise trade has grown from $6 billion in 1990 to $33 billion in 2006. Although India was only the 21st largest export market for the United States in 2006, the United States has become India's leading trading partner, mostly due to the growth in India's exports to the United States. However, recent increases in trade with China have made it a close second to the United States. In 2006, the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with India totaled $13 billion. In 2006, India's gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 9.2%, a growth rate second only to China among Asian nations. India's economic growth has also brought about the emergence of a sizeable "middle class" and the largest number of billionaires in Asia, but the country's mostly rural population remains comparatively poor and largely isolated from the benefits of growth. In addition, there is growing concern that the economy is "overheated," as evidenced by rising rates of inflation. Moreover, despite several years of strong growth, investment in infrastructure is lagging, creating a potential bottleneck for long-term economic expansion. Finally, attempts at additional economic reforms aimed at resolving these and other economic problems are constrained by India's political dynamics. Despite the significant liberalization of India's trade and foreign investment policies, there remain a number of bilateral and multilateral trade issues between the United States and India. The United States seeks greater market access to India's agricultural market and key service sectors for its exports and for foreign direct investment. The United States is also concerned about "outsourcing," and would also like to see improvements in India's intellectual property rights protection. India, for its part, calls for the lowering of perceived U.S. barriers to agricultural and service imports, as well as an expansion of the H-1B visa program. Many of the more prominent Indo-U.S. trade issues may have indirect implications for Congress. The growth of India's services exports to the United States has contributed to congressional consideration of possible legislation to provide greater assistance to displaced U.S. workers. Also, India's growing demand for crude oil has raised the possibility of boosting bilateral energy cooperation. Finally, the passage of the Hyde Act in 2006 (P.L. 109-401) has led to the negotiations of a bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation ("123") agreement, which cannot go into effect without congressional approval. For a broader review, see CRS Report RL33529, India-U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed]. This report will be updated as warranted.
crs_R40872	crs_R40872_0	Introduction Current discussions of U.S. and global energy supply refer to oil, natural gas, and coal using several terms that may be unfamiliar to some. The terms used to describe different types of fossil fuels have technically precise definitions, and misunderstanding or misuse of these terms may lead to errors and confusion in estimating energy available or making comparisons among fuels, regions, or nations. Characteristics of Fossil Fuels Fossil fuels are categorized, classified, and named using a number of variables. It is important to keep in mind that naturally occurring deposits of any material, whether it is fossil fuels, gold, or timber, comprise a broad spectrum of concentration, quality, and accessibility (geologic, technical, and cultural). Proved Reserves and Undiscovered Resources For oil and natural gas, a major distinction in measuring quantities of energy commodities is made between proved reserves and undiscovered resources. Proved reserves are those amounts of oil, natural gas, or coal that have been discovered and defined at a significant level of certainty, typically by drilling wells or other exploratory measures, and which can be economically recovered. In the United States, proved reserves are typically measured by private companies, who report their findings to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), and to the Securities and Exchange Commission because those reserves are considered capital assets. In addition to the volumes of proved reserves, there are other deposits of oil and gas that have not yet been discovered, which are called undiscovered resources. But the phrase "undiscovered resources" has a specific meaning. Undiscovered resources are amounts of oil and gas estimated to exist by examining geologic characteristics in unexplored areas. In-place resources are intended to represent all of the oil, natural gas, or coal contained in a formation or basin without regard to technical or economic recoverability. USGS now estimates that the Bakken Formation contains 3.65 billion barrels of undiscovered technically recoverable oil and 1.85 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of undiscovered technically recoverable natural gas. Importantly, however, more than 92% of the fossil fuel reserves of the United States is coal. U.S. Production and Consumption of Oil, Natural Gas, and Coal To provide some scale for the reserves and undiscovered resource values reported above, Table 7 lists production and consumption of oil, natural gas, and coal by the United States. Reserves. Undiscovered technically recoverable resources (UTRR).	Discussions of U.S. and global energy supply refer to oil, natural gas, and coal using several terms that may be unfamiliar to some. The terms used to describe different types of fossil fuels have technically precise definitions, and misunderstanding or misuse of these terms may lead to errors and confusion in estimating energy available or making comparisons among fuels, regions, or nations. Fossil fuels are categorized, classified, and named using a number of variables. Naturally occurring deposits of any material, whether it is fossil fuels, gold, or timber, comprise a broad spectrum of concentration, quality, and accessibility (geologic, technical, and cultural). Terminology is adopted to reflect those characteristics. For oil and natural gas, a major distinction in measuring quantities of energy commodities is made between proved reserves and undiscovered resources. Proved reserves are those amounts of oil, natural gas, or coal that have been discovered and defined, typically by drilling wells or other exploratory measures, and which can be economically recovered. In the United States, proved reserves are typically measured by private companies, who report their findings to the Energy Information Administration, and also to the Securities and Exchange Commission because they are considered capital assets. In addition to the volumes of proved reserves are deposits of oil and gas that have not yet been discovered, which are called undiscovered resources. The term has a specific meaning: undiscovered resources are amounts of oil and gas estimated to exist by examining geologic characteristics in unexplored areas. If they are considered to be recoverable using existing production technologies, they are referred to as undiscovered technically recoverable resources (UTRR). In-place resources are intended to represent all of the oil, natural gas, or coal contained in a formation or basin without regard to technical or economic recoverability. In the United States, certain institutions are designated to determine and report quantities of oil, natural gas, and coal reserves and undiscovered resources. Other institutions also estimate these values, but differences in estimating methodology can produce significantly different values. U.S. proved reserves of oil total 22.3 billion barrels, and reserves of natural gas total 272.5 trillion cubic feet. Undiscovered technically recoverable oil in the United States is 139.6 billion barrels, and undiscovered technically recoverable natural gas is 1445.3 trillion cubic feet. The demonstrated reserve base for coal is 486 billion short tons, of which 261 billion short tons are considered technically recoverable. Comparisons of different fuel types can be made by converting all of them to a common unit, such as barrels of oil equivalent, based on their heat content. The amounts of fossil fuels found in other nations as reserves and undiscovered resources are much more difficult to determine reliably because data are sometimes lacking or unreliable, but gross comparisons of national endowments can be made using available data.
crs_RL33948	crs_RL33948_0	States and localities have at times proposed or enacted measures restricting governmental transactions with entities doing business or having financial ties with foreign countries whose conduct is found objectionable, particularly because of terrorism or human rights concerns. The report also discusses a 2007 federal district court decision which held that an Illinois law that imposed sanctions upon Sudan was unconstitutional, along with a 2012 federal district court decision preliminarily enjoining the enforcement of a Florida statute which, among other things, restricts the state or local governments from entering contracts with certain entities that do business in Cuba. Due to the troubled situation in Darfur, between 2006 and 2010 a number of states proposed or enacted divestment legislation focused on Sudan. The state's appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was subsequently dismissed as moot. Notable Federal Judicial Rulings on State Sanctions (2000-Present) Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council , the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that a Massachusetts selective purchasing law targeted at Burma was impliedly preempted by federal sanctions against Burma contained in the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, 1997 ( P.L. American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) In American Insurance Association v. Garamendi , the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Zschernig Court's finding of a dormant federal foreign affairs power. In a 5-4 vote, the Court struck down a California law, the Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act, which required any insurer doing business in the state to disclose information about all life insurance policies issued in Europe during the Nazi regime. Some Ongoing Legal and Practical Concerns Where state or local sanctions are held to be preempted by federal statute, Congress may choose expressly to authorize such measures in new legislation. Notable Federal Enactments Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act The Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-174 ), enacted into law on December 31, 2007, authorizes state and local governments to adopt divestment measures involving (1) federally identified persons with investments and business in the Sudanese energy and military equipment sectors or (2) persons having a direct investment in or carrying on a trade or business with Sudan or the Government of Sudan, provided certain notification requirements are met; the statute also provides that a measure falling within the scope of the authorization is not preempted by any federal law or regulation. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act ( P.L. 111-195 ), enacted into law on July 1, 2010, includes provisions authorizing state and local governments to divest or prohibit investments of public monies in Iran. Specifically, states can require public divestment from businesses making investments of (or extending credit to persons who will make investments of) $20 million or more in Iran's energy sector.	States and localities have occasionally enacted measures restricting their agencies from conducting economic transactions with entities that do business with or in foreign countries whose conduct these jurisdictions find objectionable. While some maintain that sub-federal entities may enact such laws under sovereign proprietary powers and other constitutional prerogatives, others argue that these measures impermissibly invade federal commerce and foreign affairs authorities and may, in some cases, be preempted by federal statute. In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council that a Massachusetts law restricting state transactions with firms doing business in Burma was preempted by federal statute. In its 2003 decision in American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, the Court reaffirmed the relevance of the dormant federal foreign affairs power to preemption analysis when it struck down a California law requiring certain businesses to disclose information regarding Holocaust-era insurance policies sold in Europe, but the scope of the 5-4 decision is unclear. In recent years, a number of states have proposed or enacted some type of divestment legislation against Sudan in response to the troubled situation in Darfur. States have also considered or adopted divestment legislation involving Iran, Cuba, or terrorist states in general. In February 2007, a federal district court held Illinois's Sudan sanctions law unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement (National Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias). Illinois subsequently repealed its statute, and the state's appeal in the case was dismissed as moot later that year. In 2012, a U.S. federal district court issued a preliminary injunction barring the enforcement of a Florida statute which, among other things, restricted the state or local governments from entering into contracts with certain entities that do business in Cuba. In recent years, Congress has enacted legislation authorizing states to prohibit investments in, or divest assets from, Sudan and Iran. The Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-174) authorizes states and local governments to adopt divestment or investment prohibition measures involving (1) persons the state or local government determines are conducting business operations in the Sudanese energy and military equipment sectors or (2) persons having a direct investment in or carrying on a trade or business with Sudanese entities or the Government of Sudan, provided certain notification requirements are met. The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (P.L. 111-195) which was enacted in 2010, includes provisions authorizing state and local governments to divest from those businesses making investments of $20 million or more in Iran's energy sector after adequate investigation and notification have occurred. Both laws provide that a measure falling within the scope of the authorization is not preempted by any federal law or regulation.
crs_R44521	crs_R44521_0	Broad Challenges for Federal Law Enforcement According to CRS analysis of publicly available information, IS supporters have accounted for 67 homegrown violent jihadist plots between 2014 and early June 2016. The first two categories focus on foreign fighters, the last on people willing to do harm in the United States: The Departed — American foreign fighters who plan to leave or have left the United States to fight for the Islamic State. The Returned — American foreign fighters who trained with or fought in the ranks of the Islamic State and return to the United States, where they can potentially plan and execute attacks at home. The Inspired — Americans lured—in part—by IS propaganda to participate in terrorist plots within the United States. Beyond the Departed, Returned, and Inspired Aside from the three categories based on the courses of action that IS supporters follow, at least two other sorts of IS foreign fighters pose some threat to U.S. interests. The Lost: unidentified Americans who fight in the ranks of the Islamic State. Such individuals may come home after fighting abroad and remain unknown to U.S. law enforcement. Some American IS fighters will never book a trip back to the United States. Finally, some American IS supporters will perish abroad. The Others: foreign IS adherents who radicalize in and originate from places outside of the United States or non-American foreign fighters active in the ranks of the Islamic State. These persons could try to enter the United States from abroad. The datasets in the regimen include identities linked to the Islamic State. Shrink "the lost" and "the others" categories described above. Preempting Terrorists Preemption of terrorist activity by U.S. law enforcement can be broadly described in terms of screening and interdiction (stopping a suspected terrorist from entering the United States, for example), law enforcement investigation, and government activities aimed at keeping radicalized individuals from morphing into terrorists .	Analysis of publicly available information on homegrown violent jihadist activity in the United States since September 11, 2001, suggests that the Islamic State (IS) and its acolytes may pose broad challenges to domestic law enforcement and homeland security efforts. Homegrown IS-inspired plots can be broken into three rough categories based on the goals of the individuals involved. The first two focus on foreign fighters, the last on people willing to do harm in the United States: The Departed—Americans, often described as foreign fighters, who plan to leave or have left the United States to fight for the Islamic State. The Returned—American foreign fighters who trained with or fought in the ranks of the Islamic State and come back to the United States, where they can potentially plan and execute attacks at home. The Inspired—Americans lured—in part—by IS propaganda to participate in terrorist plots within the United States. At least two other categories of IS foreign fighters pose some threat to U.S. interests: The Lost—Unknown Americans who fight in the ranks of the Islamic State but do not plot terrorist attacks against the United States. Such individuals may come home after fighting abroad and remain unknown to U.S. law enforcement. Additionally, some American IS fighters will never book a trip back to the United States. Finally, some American IS supporters will perish abroad. The Others—Foreign IS adherents who radicalize in and originate from places outside of the United States or non-American foreign fighters active in the ranks of the Islamic State. These persons could try to enter the United States when done fighting abroad. Federal law enforcement has numerous approaches to go after each of these categories of terrorist actors. These include the following: Watchlisting—the federal counterterrorism watchlisting regimen effectively attempts to shrink "the lost" category described above. Preemption—efforts geared toward preemption of terrorist activity can be broadly described in terms of interdiction (stopping a suspected terrorist from entering the United States, for example), law enforcement investigation, and government activities aimed at keeping radicalized individuals from morphing into terrorists, also known as countering violent extremism.
crs_RL34595	crs_RL34595_0	In February 1998, President Clinton issued a decision directive (PDD-61) instructing DOE to implement 13 reforms, the balance of which was geared to strengthening the Department's CI program. Designated the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), NNSA was placed in charge of all DOE national security-related nuclear programs. DOE had continued to complain that the structure impeded the smoother functioning of the Department's security operations. Despite any initial skepticism over the consolidation of the two offices, the Senate pronounced that the outcome had been successful and, in its version of the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act, adopted language that would eliminate the sunset provision and permanently consolidate the two counterintelligence offices into a single office within DOE. This, critics suggest, has come at the expense of CI capabilities. DOE Implements Internal Consolidation, Combining Offices of Intelligence and Counterintelligence In 2006, the same year Congress agreed to consolidate the DOE and NNSA counterintelligence offices, DOE decided to combine its Offices of Intelligence and Counterintelligence under a new Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Specifically, proponents contend a more integrated FI/CI structure will make it easier for the Department's Senior Intelligence Officer to foster cooperation between the two disciplines and to develop and implement a CI program that is both more synergistic and strategic in approach. If organizational changes are sought, policymakers might consider several questions. 109 - 364 and not reestablish NNSA's CI office in 2010; retain DOE's FI/CI consolidated program; (2) maintain the 2010 sunset provision and reestablish NNSA's CI office, but as an office independent of DOE, dropping the previously existing bifurcated CI structure; retain DOE's FI/CI consolidated program; (3) eliminate both the 2010 sunset provision and DOE's FI/CI consolidated program, reestablishing independent FI and CI offices within DOE; (4) maintain the 2010 sunset provision and reestablish NNSA's CI office, but consolidate within that office DOE's CI directorate; retain DOE's FI/CI consolidated program; (5) maintain the 2010 sunset provision and reestablish NNSA's CI on a bifurcated basis under which NNSA and DOE would share certain CI resources; eliminate DOE's FI/CI consolidated program and reestablish independent FI and CI offices within DOE; and (6) place the FBI in charge of DOE CI. Possible Oversight Alternatives The Congress also could consider adopting one or more of several oversight alternatives. Alternative Two: Commission a Formal Assessment of FI/CI Consolidation A second approach would be for Congress to commission an assessment of any benefits that have been derived from the DOE FI/CI consolidation. Some have questioned whether the consolidation is consistent with current law, suggesting that consolidation amounted to a "transfer of function" from the Office of Counterintelligence or the Office of Intelligence to a new layer of bureaucracy within the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.	After the repeated urging of the Department of Energy (DOE), Congress in 2006 agreed to temporarily consolidate separate counterintelligence (CI) offices at the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) into a single CI office under DOE control. The Senate version of the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Bill contains language that would make the consolidation permanent. DOE had complained that the dual office structure was ineffective. In permitting DOE to consolidate the two offices, Congress reversed its 1999 authorization to establish a separate NNSA CI office—a decision that at the time was prompted by congressional concerns over repeated departmental security and counterintelligence lapses. At the same time, in 2006, DOE combined its separate Offices of Intelligence, and Counterintelligence into a new DOE office called the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. The Department reasoned that combining the disciplines of counterintelligence and foreign intelligence under one integrated office would foster synergistic cooperation that would lead to a more strategic and ultimately more effective counterintelligence program. This report analyzes both consolidations—the first authorized by Congress at DOE's request; the second initiated by DOE—and examines the impact of each on the effectiveness of the Department's CI program. A major oversight issue for Congress is whether either, or both, organizational changes will strengthen the Department's CI program as intended. Some observers are concerned that the two consolidations may have undercut CI capabilities. Congress could maintain the status quo or choose from several alternative organizational approaches, some of which continue to be discussed despite the most recent organizational changes to the Department's CI program. Such alternatives range from maintaining the consolidated DOE/NNSA CI office but reversing DOE's decision to combine its formerly independent offices of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, to eliminating both consolidations. Congress also could exercise several oversight options, ranging from conducting classified CI briefings to commissioning a formal assessment of DOE's current CI reorganization.
crs_R43863	crs_R43863_0	This report attempts to identify and provide information about federal programs that are targeted in some way toward low-income people and communities. Programs included in this report are distinct from social insurance programs such as Social Security, Medicare, or Unemployment Insurance. Important Caveats While they share the common feature of an explicit low-income focus, programs discussed in this report are highly diverse in their purpose, design, and target population. No single label accurately describes all programs in the report. Similarly, no single trait characterizes the people served by these programs. Families with children where an adult is working account for the next largest share of spending, followed by the elderly. Still focusing on the 10 largest programs, the next section presents an analysis of spending by the population groups served, including the elderly and disabled, families with children, and childless adults and couples. Trends in Low-Income Spending, FY2008-FY2013 Federal spending for low-income programs totaled $561 billion in FY2008 and jumped to $708 billion the next year, as the Great Recession of 2007-2009 took hold. Federal spending for low-income programs peaked in FY2011 at $764 billion, dropped in FY2012, and edged up again in FY2013. By that year, spending for low-income benefits and services had receded below FY2010 levels, but remained a third higher than comparable spending in FY2008. Health Care Just as health care dominates total federal spending on low-income programs, Medicaid dominates the health category. Medicaid accounted for 83% of health care spending in FY2013 and is the single largest program included in this report (accounting for 39% of total FY2013 low-income spending). Trends in Low-Income Spending by Category Health care is by far the largest category of low-income spending, accounting for nearly half of all expenditures in each of the six years from FY2008 through FY2013. Spending for cash aid and food assistance generally rose over each of the six years (with a dip in the cash aid category in FY2012); peak spending for both of these categories occurred in FY2013. (The food category showed the largest growth over the period, with an 82% increase in spending between FY2008 and FY2013.) Smaller categories—housing and development, social services, employment and training, and energy assistance—all saw their peak spending in FY2009. The amount of federal spending for discretionary programs, on the other hand, is determined by Congress through the annual appropriations process. The four largest programs accounted for nearly two-thirds (65%) of total low-income spending in FY2013, and the top 10 comprised almost 82%. Because the report includes only programs with direct spending, it does not include tax provisions, with the exception of direct spending for the refundable portion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the refundable ACTC. For each program, the following information is provided: Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) number(s); statutory and regulatory citations; the name of the federal administering agency and (where relevant) the specific office within that agency; the program's purpose; the type of benefit or service provided; criteria used to determine individual eligibility; the form and recipient of federal assistance (note that "state" includes the District of Columbia); the allocation formula used if relevant; any matching or related nonfederal spending requirements; the amount of new obligations in FY2013; the budgetary classification of the program's spending; some limited detail on program participation; and citations to relevant CRS reports. Additional Child Tax Credit (no CFDA #) Authority: Statute: 26 U.S.C. Benefit/service: Refundable tax credit. Adults who receive SNAP, FDPIR, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) or Medicaid benefits are automatically eligible for free meals/snacks.	The Congressional Research Service (CRS) regularly receives requests about the number, size, and programmatic details of federal benefits and services targeted toward low-income populations, and the characteristics of people who participate. This report attempts to identify and provide information about such programs, including their federal spending during FY2008-FY2013. The report does not discuss social insurance programs such as Social Security, Medicare, or Unemployment Insurance, but includes only programs with an explicit focus on low-income people or communities. Tax provisions, other than the refundable portion of two tax credits, are excluded. Key findings include the following: No single label best describes all programs with a low-income focus, and no single trait characterizes those who benefit. Programs are highly diverse in their purpose, design, and target population. Readers should use caution in making generalizations about the programs described in this report. Total federal spending on low-income programs rose sharply between FY2008 and FY2009 as the Great Recession took hold. Spending ultimately peaked in FY2011, dropped in FY2012, and edged up again in FY2013. Total low-income spending in FY2013 totaled $744 billion, significantly higher than the FY2008 level of $561 billion but below the FY2010 level of $750 billion. Peak spending over the six years was $764 billion in FY2011. Health care is the single largest category of low-income spending, accounting for nearly half of the total, and drives overall trends. The single largest program within the health category is Medicaid. Cash aid and food assistance are the next largest categories, with food assistance seeing the largest growth over the six-year period. Other categories (in descending size) are education, housing and development, social services, employment and training, and energy assistance. Most low-income spending (82% in FY2013) is classified in budgetary terms as "mandatory" (or "direct"), which means the amount spent is a function of eligibility and payment rules established by Congress in authorizing laws. Congress determines the amount spent for the remaining "discretionary" programs through the annual appropriations process. Four programs accounted for 65% of low-income spending in FY2013, and 10 programs made up 82%. Medicaid alone contributed 39% of the total. In addition to Medicaid, the top four include the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and the refundable portion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). The disabled receive the single largest share of federal low-income spending, based on an analysis of spending for the top 10 programs in FY2011. The disabled received almost a third of such spending, primarily for health care and secondarily for cash aid. Working families with children received the next largest share of spending (including from the EITC and Additional Child Tax Credit), followed by the elderly. The bulk of spending for low-income elderly was in the health category. Less than 12% of total low-income spending in FY2011 went to families with nonelderly nondisabled adults who were not working.
crs_R40939	crs_R40939_0	The revolving funds generally fall into two categories: the first provides a means of accounting for services provided by one agency to other governmental entities, while the other covers services for the public. Although legislative branch revolving funds comprise a small portion of the total legislative branch operating budget, they have provided a means through which the House, Senate, and legislative branch agencies are able to account for these types of activities. Over time, Congress has revisited their use, structure, and solvency; conducted oversight through hearings and the review of audits; and considered legislation amending the revolving funds, either through proposals offered by Members or at the request of legislative branch agencies. Revolving funds must be established statutorily. The legislative branch currently has 27 revolving funds, including eight funds for the House of Representatives, nine for the Senate, five for the Architect of the Capitol, four for the Library of Congress, and one for the Government Publishing Office. This report traces the establishment, use, and recent development of these funds. Where applicable, the report refers to publications that provide further details on individual revolving funds. Repealed Revolving Funds Four legislative branch revolving funds have been repealed.	Legislative branch revolving funds support the "business-type activities" of the House, Senate, and legislative branch agencies. The revolving funds are generally established as a means of accounting either for services provided by one agency to other governmental entities or for services provided to the general public. They comprise a small portion of the total legislative branch operating budget. Revolving funds must be established statutorily. Authority for some legislative branch revolving funds dates back many decades, while others have been established more recently. The legislative branch currently has statutory authority for 27 revolving funds, including eight funds for the House of Representatives, nine for the Senate, five for the Architect of the Capitol, four for the Library of Congress, and one for the Government Publishing Office. Over time, Congress has revisited the use, structure, and solvency of these revolving funds; conducted oversight through hearings and the review of audits; and considered legislation amending the revolving funds, either through proposals offered by Members or at the request of legislative branch agencies. This report traces the establishment, use, and recent developments related to these funds. Where applicable, the report refers to publications that provide further details on individual revolving funds. This report will be updated as events warrant.
crs_R42039	crs_R42039_0	Introduction On September 12, 2011, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued its final policy letter on the Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions ("Policy Letter 11-01" or "final policy letter"). Scheduled to take effect on October 12, 2011, the policy letter represents the Obama Administration's guidance for executive branch agencies on (1) identifying inherently governmental and critical functions; (2) ensuring that only federal employees perform inherently governmental functions or work that "otherwise needs to be reserved to the public sector;" and (3) managing functions that are closely associated with inherently governmental functions and critical functions. The policy letter was issued, in part, under the authority of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009 (NDAA'09) and President Obama's memorandum of March 4, 2009, on government contracting. Section 321 of NDAA'09 tasked OMB with (1) reviewing existing definitions of "inherently governmental function" to determine whether such definitions are "sufficiently focused" to ensure that only government personnel perform inherently governmental functions or "other critical functions necessary for the mission of a Federal department or agency;" (2) developing a "single consistent definition" of "inherently governmental function" that would address any deficiencies in the existing definitions, reasonably apply to all agencies, and ensure that agency personnel can identify positions that perform inherently governmental functions; (3) developing criteria for identifying "critical functions" that should be performed by government personnel; and (4) developing criteria for identifying positions that government personnel should perform in order to ensure that agencies develop and maintain "sufficient organic expertise and technical capacity" to perform their missions and oversee contractors' work. OFPP issued a proposed policy letter in response to these requirements on March 31, 2010. However, the proposed policy letter differed from the final one in focusing on "work reserved for performance by federal government employees" and in other ways discussed below. Congressional interest in inherently governmental functions may persist notwithstanding the issuance of the final policy letter. The Commission on Wartime Contracting included recommendations based on perceived deficiencies in existing guidance on inherently governmental functions in its final report to Congress, and several Members of the 112 th Congress have introduced legislation regarding inherently governmental functions (e.g., H.R. 1474 ; H.R. 1540 ; H.R. 1949 ; H.R. 2017 ; S. 709 ; S. 785 ; S. 991 ; S. 1253 ; S. 1254 ; S. 1546 ; S. 1573 ). Final Policy Letter The final policy letter articulates that it is the "policy of the Executive Branch to ensure that government action is taken as a result of informed, independent judgments made by government officials." In support of this policy, the letter directs agencies to do three things. Second, agencies are directed to take steps to employ and train an adequate number of government personnel to administer contracts when work is contracted out, particularly when contractors engage in functions that are critical or closely associated with an inherently governmental function. Third, agencies are required, as part of strategic human capital planning, to dedicate a sufficient amount of work to performance by federal employees in order to build competencies, provide for continuity of operations, and retain institutional knowledge of operations. The policy letter also directs agencies, when reviewing outsourced work for potential insourcing, to place a lower priority on reviewing work performed by small businesses that is not inherently governmental, particularly if the agency has not met its small business goals. Agencies are also directed to give small businesses preference when determining who performs the private-sector work that remains after related activities are insourced. The letter defines an "inherently governmental function," in accordance with the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act ( P.L. 105-270 ), as "one that is so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal Government employees." The policy letter establishes two tests for identifying inherently governmental functions. The policy letter does not define functions closely associated with inherently governmental functions, but lists examples in its Appendix B (see Table A-2 ). The policy letter defines a critical function as one "necessary to the agency being able to effectively perform and maintain control of its mission and operations."	On September 12, 2011, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued its final policy letter on Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions. The policy letter is to guide executive branch agencies in (1) identifying inherently governmental and critical functions; (2) ensuring that only federal employees perform inherently governmental functions or work that "otherwise needs to be reserved to the public sector;" and (3) managing functions that are closely associated with inherently governmental functions and critical functions. The policy letter defines an "inherently governmental function," in accordance with the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act (P.L. 105-270), as "one that is so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal Government employees." It also defines a critical function as one "that is necessary to the agency being able to effectively perform and maintain control of its mission and operations." The policy letter does not define functions closely associated with inherently governmental functions, but lists examples of such functions in an Appendix. The policy letter was issued, in part, in response to Section 321 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009 (P.L. 110-417), which tasked OMB with reviewing existing definitions of "inherently governmental function" and developing a "single consistent definition" of this term which would address any deficiencies in existing definitions. President Obama's memorandum of March 4, 2009, on government contracting similarly charged OMB with clarifying when it is "appropriate" to contract out work. OFPP issued a proposed policy letter in response to these requirements on March 31, 2010. However, the proposed policy letter differed from the final one in focusing on "work reserved for performance by federal government employees" and in other ways. Beyond defining "inherently governmental function" and "critical function," the final policy letter articulates that it is the "policy of the Executive Branch to ensure that government action is taken as a result of informed, independent judgments made by government officials." In support of this policy, the letter directs agencies to (1) ensure that work which should be performed by federal employees is properly reserved for government performance; (2) take steps to employ and train an adequate number of government personnel to administer contracts when work is contracted out; and (3) as part of strategic human capital planning, dedicate a sufficient amount of work to performance by federal employees in order to build competencies, provide for continuity of operations, and retain institutional knowledge of operations. The policy letter establishes two tests for identifying inherently governmental functions, the "nature of the function" test and the "exercise of discretion" test, as well as lists examples of inherently governmental functions. These include certain security functions, but not routine building security. The policy letter also directs that, when agencies review outsourced work for potential insourcing, they should place a lower priority on reviewing certain work performed by small businesses, as well as give small businesses preference when determining who performs work that will remain in the private sector after related functions are insourced. Congressional interest in inherently governmental functions may persist notwithstanding the issuance of the final policy letter. The Commission on Wartime Contracting included recommendations based on perceived deficiencies in existing guidance on inherently governmental functions in its final report to Congress, and several Members of the 112th Congress have introduced legislation regarding inherently governmental functions (e.g., H.R. 1474; H.R. 1540; H.R. 1949; H.R. 2017; S. 709; S. 785; S. 991; S. 1253; S. 1254; S. 1546; S. 1573).
crs_R45243	crs_R45243_0	Overview Congress has demonstrated long-standing interest in the U.S. trade deficit as part of its efforts to examine U.S. trade policy and key trading relationships. In some areas, particularly in negotiating trade agreements, Congress has opted to delegate certain authorities to the executive branch. A key element of the Trump Administration's approach to international trade has been the use of the U.S. trade deficit as a barometer for evaluating the success or failure of the global trading system, U.S. trade policy, and trade agreements. Although Congress and previous Administrations have focused on the trade deficit as a key economic issue at times, they generally have not implemented specific measures to lower the trade deficit or to make reducing bilateral trade deficits a major objective in evaluating or negotiating U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs). It also has used numerous other policy tools to address specific trade and investment issues regarding U.S. commercial economic engagement with other countries to achieve a level playing field, and other trade policy objectives. Some analysts argue that trade agreements play an important role in the U.S. trade deficit; they contend the agreements have failed to provide U.S. exporters with reciprocal treatment or have exposed U.S. producers to increased competition. While most economists are concerned over the long-term impact of sustained trade deficits on the economy, they question the role that trade agreements play in determining the trade deficit or the conclusion that the trade deficit is substantially the product of unfair treatment. Most economists, however, argue that this characterization misrepresents the nature of the trade deficit and the role of trade in the U.S. economy. In general, most economists conclude that the overall U.S. trade deficit stems from U.S. macroeconomic policies and, as such, attempting to alter the trade deficit without addressing the underlying macroeconomic issues would be counterproductive and create distortions in the economy. Addressing these issues may be worthwhile, but is unlikely to affect the overall U.S. trade deficit. Standard economic theory recognizes, however, that some workers and producers in the economy may experience a disproportionate share of the short-term adjustment costs that are associated with shifts in resources stemming from greater international competition. Although the attendant adjustment costs for businesses and labor are difficult to measure, some estimates suggest they may be significant over the short run and can entail dislocations for some segments of the labor force, companies, and communities. This gap between domestic savings and the demand for capital is filled by capital inflows. One concern expressed by economists and others is the debt accumulation associated with sustained trade deficits. They argue that the long-term impact on the economy of borrowing to finance imports depends on whether those funds are used for greater investments in productive capital with high returns that raise future standards of living, or whether they are used for current consumption. As indicated, most economists argue that the macroeconomic origins of the U.S. trade deficit mean that trade agreements tend to alter the composition of the trade deficit among various trading partners and among a different mix of goods and services, but they are unlikely to alter the overall size of the U.S. trade deficit. Some countries, however, may not be fully abiding by international trade agreements and rules, or they may continue to maintain certain trade barriers. In general, the unemployment rate and the trade deficit are not directly related. While many of the economic arguments can be arcane at times, economists generally contend that from the perspective of the economy as a whole, both consumers and producers benefit from liberalized trade and that the gains for the economy as a whole outweigh the costs, irrespective of the bilateral trade deficit or surplus. Most economists argue that the economy operates more efficiently as a result of competition through international trade and that consumers throughout the economy experience a wider variety of goods and services at varying levels of quality and price than would be possible in an economy closed to international trade. They also contend that trade may have a long-term positive dynamic effect on an economy that enhances both production and employment. Since taking office, the Trump Administration has used the U.S. trade deficit as a proxy for evaluating the success or failure of the global trading system and of U.S. trade policy.	The economic effects of the U.S. trade deficit have been a topic of long-standing congressional interest. The U.S. Constitution grants authority to Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and to lay and collect duties, and Congress exercises this authority in numerous ways. These include oversight of trade policy and consideration of legislation to implement trade agreements and to authorize trade programs. In some cases, Congress has delegated certain authorities over trade policy to the Executive Branch: for example, to facilitate trade negotiations. As part of efforts to examine U.S. trade policy and key trading relationships, Congress and previous Administrations have focused on the trade deficit at times, but generally have not implemented specific measures to lower the trade deficit. Nor has reducing bilateral trade deficits been a major objective in evaluating or negotiating U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) and implementing trade laws. Previous Administrations rarely linked trade deficits and import tariffs with U.S. national security. The Trump Administration, however, is using the U.S. trade deficit as a barometer for evaluating the success or failure of the global trading system, U.S. trade policy, and bilateral trade relations with various countries. It also characterizes the trade deficit as harming the performance and national security of the U.S. economy. The Trump Administration's approach contrasts with the views of most economists, who argue that the overall U.S. trade deficit stems from U.S. macroeconomic policies that create a savings and investment imbalance in which domestic sources of capital are not sufficient to meet domestic capital demands. As such, attempting to alter the trade deficit without addressing the underlying macroeconomic issues will likely be counterproductive and create distortions in the economy. Some analysts argue that trade agreements play an important role in the U.S. trade deficit; they contend the agreements have failed to provide U.S. exporters with reciprocal treatment or have exposed U.S. producers to increased competition. Most economists, however, question both the role that trade agreements play in determining the trade deficit and the position that the trade deficit is substantially the product of unfair treatment. The Trump Administration's approach does not rule out the possibility that some countries may not be fully abiding by international trade agreements and rules, or may be maintaining certain trade barriers. Such actions may distort market performance and erode public support for the international trade system. As a result, addressing these issues and continuing to negotiate new agreements to remove trade barriers are likely to have benefits by improving efficiency and creating a level playing field in the global trading system. Nevertheless, given the macroeconomic origins of the trade deficit, as is generally accepted, addressing such distortions may alter the composition of U.S. trade among trading partners and commodities, but would be unlikely to affect the overall U.S. trade deficit. Most economists also question the role the trade deficit plays in affecting jobs, wages, and the distribution of income in the U.S. economy. One concern expressed by economists and others is the debt accumulation associated with sustained trade deficits. They argue that the long-term impact on the U.S. economy of borrowing to finance imports depends on whether those funds are used for greater investments in productive capital with high returns that raise future standards of living, or whether they are used for current consumption. These concerns and the various policy approaches that have been used to alter the savings-investment imbalance in the economy are beyond the scope of this report. Most economists generally contend that from the perspective of the economy as a whole, both consumers and producers benefit from liberalized trade and that the gains for the economy as a whole outweigh the costs, irrespective of the bilateral trade deficit or surplus. Most economists argue that the economy as a whole operates more efficiently as a result of competition through international trade and that consumers and producers who may use imported inputs throughout the economy experience a wider variety of goods and services at varying levels of quality and price than would be possible in an economy closed to international trade. They also contend that trade may have a long-term positive dynamic effect on an economy that enhances both production and employment. Standard economic theory also recognizes that some workers and producers in the economy may experience a disproportionate share of the short-term adjustment costs that are associated with shifts in resources stemming from greater international competition. Although the attendant adjustment costs for businesses and labor are difficult to measure, some estimates suggest they may be significant over the short run and can entail dislocations for some segments of the labor force, companies, and communities. Policymakers generally have aimed to address such dislocations through specific training and other readjustment assistance programs, among other trade-related measures.
crs_R44128	crs_R44128_0	Introduction The Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) program, administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD's) Federal Housing Administration (FHA), is a reverse mortgage insurance program whereby older homeowners—those age 62 and older—borrow against the equity in their homes and FHA insures lenders against potential losses associated with the loans. The HECM program came about as a demonstration in 1988. The HECM program became permanent in 1998 and has insured nearly 1 million reverse mortgages since its creation. As the result of a court decision, HUD has attempted to ensure that non-borrowing spouses are protected from foreclosure. Reverse mortgages are based on the same concept of using home equity for home maintenance and other needs, but reverse mortgages differ from forward mortgages primarily in the way that borrowers pay back the amount owed. However, particularly since the 2008 economic downturn, nearly all reverse mortgages are insured through the HECM program. Borrowers pay up-front and annual insurance premiums to HUD, and if the amount of the loan exceeds the sale price at the end of its life, HUD reimburses the lender for the difference up to a maximum claim amount. While most borrowers already occupy their homes, HECMs can also be used to purchase property. This requirement was made part of final regulations, issued January 19, 2017, with an effective date of September 19, 2017. The initial interest rate on the loan is 5%. Borrowers can opt for loan payouts in a number of different ways: as a lump sum, a line of credit, in monthly payments for a term of months, in monthly payments for the borrower's lifetime, or a combination of credit line and monthly payments. Further, spouses are to participate in counseling even if they will not be on the mortgage. Property Taxes and Homeowners Insurance: Borrowers must pay their property taxes and homeowner's insurance. HECMs become due and payable when a borrower dies or conveys the property. (HECMs became part of FHA's Mutual Mortgage Insurance (MMI) Fund in 2009, which made the loan portfolio subject to actuarial review. ) Since 2009, the estimated economic value of the HECM loan portfolio has fluctuated between positive and negative. Despite changes to the program, most recently, the FY2016 HECM actuarial review reported an economic value of negative $7.7 billion. Reasons for Financial Instability Over the years, a variety of factors have contributed to estimates of negative economic value for the HECM portfolio. For example, at the time of the FY2012 Actuarial Review, the year of the first negative estimate exceeding $1 billion (the estimate was negative $2.8 billion), contributing factors included declines in home values after the housing market decline that began in 2008; longer loan life than expected; an increase in the number of homes conveyed to FHA (versus retained and sold by the borrower or lender), meaning that FHA had to maintain and market the homes; and an increasing number of borrowers who withdrew the maximum lump sum payment at loan closing rather than receiving smaller amounts. However, due to the court decision invalidating HUD's interpretation of the statute, HUD has changed the way in which non-borrowing surviving spouses are treated to ensure that, in most cases, they may remain in the home. Loans Entered Into On or After August 4, 2014: Originally provided via mortgagee letter, HUD released final HECM regulations on January 19, 2017, and effective September 19, 2017, that include provisions to protect non-borrowing spouses and to ensure that, going forward, the ages of non-borrowing spouses are taken into account when determining loan levels. Non-borrowing spouses may remain in the home as long as they satisfy certain qualifying attributes and maintain additional criteria during the deferral period. The qualifying attributes are (1) borrower and non-borrower were spouses at the time the loan was entered into and remained spouses through the duration of the borrower's lifetime; (2) the relationship as a non-borrowing spouse was disclosed at the time of mortgage origination and was included in the mortgage documents; and (3) the non-borrowing spouse occupied and continues to occupy the house as a principal residence. The law also directed the HUD Secretary to consult with consumer groups, industry representatives, and representatives from counseling organizations to "identify alternative approaches to providing consumer information" to potential HECM borrowers; authorized (from FY2000-FY2003) up to $1 million of the amount appropriated for HUD's Housing Counseling program to be used for HECM counseling and consumer education; expanded disclosure requirements, requiring that borrowers know all charges involved in the mortgage, including those for estate planning and financial advice, and which charges are required for obtaining the mortgage and which are not; and gave the HUD Secretary the authority to put in place restrictions to ensure that a borrower "does not fund any unnecessary or excessive costs for obtaining the mortgage, including any costs of estate planning, financial advice, or other related services." The Reverse Mortgage Stabilization Act of 2013 ( P.L.	Reverse mortgages allow older homeowners to borrow against the equity in their homes and repay the loans at a later time, after they sell the home or pass away. Reverse mortgages differ from traditional forward mortgages both in the way in which borrowers receive the loan proceeds and the way in which the loans are repaid. Like traditional forward mortgages and home equity lines of credit, borrowers may receive a lump sum payment from the loan or have an available line of credit. However, additional options include monthly payments over a period of time or monthly payments for the life of the borrower, as long as the borrower remains in the home. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provides Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insurance for reverse mortgages through the Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) program. Reverse mortgages need not be insured by HUD; nevertheless, nearly all reverse mortgages are now insured through the HECM program. If homes with HECM loans are sold for less than the amount owed, the program will reimburse lenders up to a maximum claim amount (typically the appraised value of the home at the time the HECM was entered into). HUD has insured nearly 1 million HECMs since the program's inception as a demonstration in 1988. It was made permanent in 1998. Homeowners can qualify for HECMs if they are age 62 or older and occupy their home as a principal residence. Potential borrowers are also required to go through a counseling process and satisfy certain financial criteria to ensure that they will be able to maintain payments toward property taxes and homeowner's insurance while they live in the home. The loan amount for which borrowers qualify depends on their age, the interest rate, and the value of the home. Borrowers pay both up-front and annual insurance premiums to participate in the HECM program. Recent years have brought uncertainty in the financial stability of the HECM loan portfolio, part of the FHA Mutual Mortgage Insurance (MMI) Fund. After the FY2012 HECM actuarial report estimated that the portfolio had a negative economic value, HUD took steps to improve its financial stability via authority granted through the Reverse Mortgage Stabilization Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-29). These steps included requiring HECM applicants to go through a financial assessment (previously, borrower financial criteria were not taken into account) and reducing the amount that borrowers can draw during the first year of the loan. Since then, the economic value of HECMs has alternated between positive and negative economic value in each year. Most recently, the FY2016 actuarial report on HECMs estimated that the portfolio had a value of negative $7.7 billion. Among the reasons for the finding of negative value in FY2016 are new data showing lower-than-expected home sales prices and increased costs to FHA of maintaining homes prior to sale. Another issue HUD has been compelled to address is how non-borrowing spouses are treated when HECM borrowers pass away. A court found that HUD interpreted the statute incorrectly when it required loans to be due and payable on a borrower's death even when a non-borrowing spouse was present in the home. As a result of the court decision, HUD issued mortgagee letters allowing non-borrowing spouses to avoid foreclosure and defer paying off the loan balance. They may instead remain in the home on the death of a borrower as long as the non-borrowing spouse meets certain conditions. In addition, the age of non-borrowing spouses is now part of the actuarial calculation used to determine loan amounts. Some of these changes were made part of a final regulation released on January 19, 2017, with an effective date of September 19, 2017.
crs_RL34502	crs_RL34502_0	In designing a cap-and-trade program, one of the more controversial and challenging questions for policymakers is how, to whom, and for what purpose to distribute the emission allowances. Concerning the question of how to distribute allowances, policymakers could (1) sell the allowances through an auction process (2) allocate the allowances at no cost to covered sources, (3) provide allowances to non-covered sources, who would, in turn, sell them to covered sources via the emissions trading market, or (4) use some combination of these methods. The strategy would not affect the environmental integrity of the emissions cap. Potential Minimization of Costs on Society If Congress decides to use an auction to distribute emission allowances to covered sources—as opposed to providing allowances to covered sources at no cost—the auction revenues could be used to substantially minimize the overall costs on society of the cap-and-trade program. Economic studies have found that, if revenues are used in the most economically efficient manner , the overall costs imposed by a cap-and-trade program could be reduced by approximately 50%. Auction Design Issues Although many of the cap-and-trade proposals in the 110 th Congress would employ an auction to some degree, none of the bills specifies the design of the auction. Policymakers may consider various auction designs . Reserve Price One issue that arguably transcends auction design considerations is whether or not the auction should have a reserve price, and if so, at what level. However, when covered sources receive allowances at no cost ( Figure 2 ), consumers in price-regulated and competitive regions experience dramatically different price changes. Emission allowances would become a valuable new commodity, potentially accounting—in aggregate—for tens or hundreds of billions of dollars ( Table 1 and surrounding discussion). Policymakers would face a choice between minimizing the costs imposed on the entire economy (society's costs) or using the allowance value for other purposes. The combined costs of these activities are the "compliance costs" of the cap-and-trade program. Options for Allowance Value Distribution Provide Transition Assistance to Carbon-Intensive Industries Several economic studies have estimated the percentage of allowances (a comparable amount of auction revenues could also be used) that would provide compensation for projected profit losses to specific carbon-intensive industries. For example, Congress may decide to allot allowance value to electricity consumers, particularly those in low-income households. Distribution to Support Specific Objectives Policymakers may also consider distributing a percentage of the allowances or auction revenues to support a range of objectives, including: Technology development: Promotion of emission mitigation technology is widely recognized as a vital step towards making substantial GHG emission reductions. Energy efficiency: Improvements in energy efficiency could make considerable contributions in achieving GHG emission reductions. Such compensation would forgo the opportunity to reduce the overall cost of the emission program.	When designing a cap-and-trade program, one of the more controversial and challenging questions for policymakers is how, to whom, and for what purpose to distribute the emission allowances. Regarding the method of distribution to covered sources, policymakers could (1) sell the allowances through an auction process, (2) allocate the allowances at no cost to covered sources, (3) provide allowances to non-covered sources who would, in turn, sell them to covered sources, or (4) use some combination of these methods. Although the emission allocation method would not affect the environmental integrity of the cap-and-trade program, the selected allocation strategy could have considerable consequences. Using auctions as a distribution method could avoid certain concerns that are likely to occur if covered sources receive all (or most) of the allowances at no cost: (1) consumers in different electricity markets may face inequitable price increases; (2) a weak price signal for electricity may be sent in areas with the most carbon-intensive fuel portfolios; and (3) no-cost allowances may overcompensate covered sources. In addition, auction revenues offer a unique opportunity to reduce the overall costs of the emissions program. Several economic studies indicate that if used in the most efficient manner, overall costs could be minimized by almost 50%. A greenhouse gas (GHG) emission cap-and-trade program would create a valuable new commodity: the GHG emission allowance. EPA estimates that allowance value could potentially account—in aggregate—for tens or hundreds of billions of dollars each year. When distributing this value, policymakers would face a choice between minimizing the costs imposed on the entire economy, minimizing the expected burden on specific parties, or supporting a range of climate- or non-climate-related policy objectives. For example, Congress may consider providing transition assistance to carbon-intensive industries. Studies have estimated profits could be maintained in the energy production and electricity generation sectors, if approximately 20% of allowances were provided to those sectors at no cost. Members may also consider allotting allowance value to consumers, particularly low-income households, who are expected to bear the majority of the compliance costs via higher energy prices. Another option would involve distributing the allowance value to support various objectives: technology development, energy efficiency improvements, biological sequestration, climate change adaptation efforts, or non climate-related purposes, such as deficit reduction. Of these objectives, technology advancement is arguably the most crucial in terms of mitigation. Moreover, deployment of new technologies could potentially lower the overall costs of the program. Although many of the proposals in the 110th Congress (e.g., S. 2191, S. 1766, and S. 3036) would employ an auction to some degree, none of the bills specifies the design of the auction. Congress may want to consider including specific design elements in legislative text, particularly auction frequency and whether or not the auction should have a reserve price, and if so, at what level.
crs_R43394	crs_R43394_0	Introduction The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), was first authorized by Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act (HCDA) of 1974, P.L. 93-383 . During the program's 40-year existence, Congress has allocated approximately $138 billion to assist state and local governments in undertaking housing, economic development, neighborhood revitalization, and other community development activities principally benefitting low- and moderate-income persons. In addition to its annual appropriations, Congress also has used the program's framework to provide additional, supplemental, and special appropriations to assist states and communities in responding to various economic crises and manmade and natural disasters. This report is a review of the CDF account's funding history from FY2000 to FY2013; as well as current FY2014 funding. It includes a discussion of the three primary components of the CDF account: CDBG formula grants; CDBG-related set-asides and earmarks; and CDBG-linked supplemental and special appropriations. From FY2000 to FY2014, total appropriations for the CDF account—excluding supplemental appropriations for disaster relief, mortgage foreclosures (NSP), and economic recovery (ARRA)—fluctuated between a high of $5.112 billion in FY2001 and a low of $3.008 billion in FY2012 (see Table 2 ). As noted in Table 3 , during the period from FY2000 to FY2013, the average grant amount allocated to CDBG entitlement communities declined by 43.7% from a high of $3 million in FY2001 and FY2002 to a low of $1.7 million in FY2012. The decline in the average grant amount is both a function of lower funding levels and an increase in the number of entitlement communities as more cities and counties achieve the population threshold necessary to be designated an entitlement community. Short of appropriating additional funds that would mitigate both the impact of inflation and the increasing number of eligible communities, Congress may consider a number of options intended to address the decline in average CDBG formula allocations. Some set-asides included in the account are intended to complement the activities of the larger formula grant program (see Appendix A for a full list of set-asides funded under the CDF account). From FY2000 to FY2013, the number and appropriations for set-aside programs included in the CDF account have fluctuated significantly. In FY2001 Congress appropriated $713 million for CDF set-asides, with earmarks under the Economic Development Initiative (EDI) and Neighborhood Initiative (NI) programs accounting for 56% of this total. The average CDBG-formula allocation for FY013 was 37.9% less than the average allocation in FY2000. For the period from FY2000 to FY2013, the number of jurisdictions that received a direct allocation as CDBG entitlement communities increased by 171, from 1,012 to 1,183.	The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), under the Community Development Fund (CDF) account, was first authorized by Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act (HCDA) of 1974, P.L. 93-383. During the program's nearly 40-year existence, Congress has allocated approximately $138 billion to help state and local governments undertake housing, economic development, neighborhood revitalization, and other community development activities. In addition to its annual appropriations, Congress, as events have warranted, has used the program's framework to provide supplemental and special appropriations to assist states and communities in responding to various economic crises and manmade and natural disasters. This report is a review of the CDF account's funding history from FY2000 to FY2013, as well as current funding in FY2014. It includes a discussion of the three primary components of the CDF account: (1) CDBG formula grants; (2) CDBG-related set-asides and earmarks; and (3) CDBG-linked supplemental and special appropriations. It is intended to provide recent historical background as the 113th Congress considers CDF funding levels and composition. For information on CDF appropriation legislation considered during the 113th Congress, the reader should consult CRS Report Community Development Block Grant Funding Issues in the 113th Congress. From FY2000 to FY2014, total appropriations for the CDF account—excluding special and supplemental appropriations for disasters, mortgage foreclosures, and economic recovery—fluctuated between a high of $5.112 billion in FY2001 and a low of $3.008 billion in FY2012. During this period the average grant amount allocated to CDBG entitlement communities (typically metropolitan-based cities and counties) declined by 43.7% from a high of $3 million in FY2002 to a low of $1.7 million in FY2012. The decline in the average grant amount is both a function of fewer dollars appropriated and an increase in the number of entitlement communities as more cities and counties achieve the population threshold necessary to be designated an entitlement community. From FY2000 to FY2013, the number of jurisdictions receiving a direct allocation as CDBG entitlement communities increased by 171 (16.9%), from 1,012 to 1,183, while the average allocation for entitlement communities declined by 37.9%. Short of appropriating additional funds, Congress may consider a number of options intended to address the decline in average CDBG formula allocations. These may include (1) increasing the population threshold for eligibility as a CDBG entitlement community, or (2) encouraging communities receiving less than a designated minimum allocation to enter into cooperative agreements with the urban county in which they are located. From FY2000 to FY2014, both the number of and appropriations for set-aside programs included in the CDF account have fluctuated significantly. In FY2001 Congress appropriated $713 million for CDF set-asides, with earmarks under the Economic Development Initiative (EDI) and Neighborhood Initiative (NI) programs accounting for 56% of this total. By FY2013 CDBG-linked set-asides reached a low for the period of $57 million as other national priorities have supplanted the programs funded under the account, or those activities have been transferred to other accounts or agencies.
crs_R43993	crs_R43993_0	In support of these goals, several UI programs provide benefits for eligible unemployed workers. Overview of Unemployment Insurance Programs In general, when eligible workers lose their jobs, the joint federal-state Unemployment Compensation (UC) program may provide up to 26 weeks of income support through regular UC benefit payments. For information on the expired EUC08 program, which provided additional unemployment benefits depending on state economic conditions during the period of July 2008 to December 2013, see CRS Report R42444, Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08): Status of Benefits Prior to Expiration . Unemployment Compensation Program The Social Security Act of 1935 (P.L. See the " President's Budget Proposal for FY2017 " section of this report for details on the proposals. Enacted Laws in the 114th Congress The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016(P.L. 114-92 . In addition to many other actions, the law altered certain conditions for individuals to receive Unemployment Compensation for Former Servicemembers (UCX). Legislative Proposals in the 114th Congress Concurrent Receipt of SSDI and UI Benefits33 S. 499 (Senator Orin Hatch), S. 2005 (Senator David Vitter), and H.R. H.R. H.R. UI Program Integrity Representative David Reichert sponsored H.R. H.R. H.R. Rehiring UI Beneficiaries and Exhaustees Representative Bill Pascrell introduced H.R. 3555 . 3622 . 4593 . 4973 . Reauthorize Emergency Unemployment Compensation Two bills would have reauthorized the lapsed temporary Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) benefits until the end of 2015: H.R. Vouchers and Demonstration Projects Representative James Renacci sponsored H.R. H.R. Both H.R. Job Training and Education Representative Rodney Davis sponsored H.R. Relocation Subsidies Representative Tony Cárdenas sponsored H.R. Short-Time Compensation39 Both H.R. 5408 and S. 1902 , respectively. 3841 and S. 2208 , respectively.	The 114th Congress considered many issues related to unemployment insurance (UI) programs: Unemployment Compensation (UC), the temporary, now-expired Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08), and Extended Benefits (EB). This report gives a brief overview of the UI programs that may provide benefits to eligible unemployed workers. In addition, it briefly summarizes the President's budget proposal for FY2017. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, P.L. 114-92, altered certain conditions for individuals to receive Unemployment Compensation for Former Servicemembers (UCX). This report also describes UI legislation proposed in the 114th Congress that addressed: Concurrent receipt of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and UI benefits—S. 343, S. 499, H.R. 5919, H.R. 918, and S. 2005 UI program integrity—H.R. 2503 and H.R. 2512 Unemployment Compensation for Former Servicemembers (UCX)—P.L. 114-92, S. 1376, and H.R. 1735 Drug testing—H.R. 1136, H.R. 2148, and H.R. 5945 Rehiring UI beneficiaries and exhaustees—H.R. 481, H.R. 2265, H.R. 2721, H.R. 3555, H.R. 3622, H.R. 4593, H.R. 4973 and S. 1517 Reauthorization of EUC08—H.R. 2721 and H.R. 3555 Vouchers and demonstration projects—H.R. 2509, H.R. 2721, and H.R. 3555 Job training and education—H.R. 2219 Relocation Subsidies—H.R. 2755 Short-time Compensation (STC)—H.R. 2721, H.R. 3555, H.R. 5408, and S. 1902 New benefits for certain energy workers—H.R. 5669 and S. 2398 Domestic violence—H.R. 3841 and S. 2208 For information on the expired EUC08 program, which provided additional unemployment benefits depending on state economic conditions during the period of July 2008 to December 2013, see CRS Report R42444, Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08): Status of Benefits Prior to Expiration. For a brief overview of UC, see CRS In Focus IF10336, The Fundamentals of Unemployment Compensation.
crs_R43060	crs_R43060_0	Introduction Late in the 113 th Congress, former House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave Camp introduced a comprehensive tax reform bill, the Tax Reform Act of 2014 ( H.R. 1 ). While no action was taken on H.R. There are various policy options for achieving comprehensive tax reform. One option is to enact a base-broadening reform, maintaining the current system with reduced tax rates, in the spirit of the Tax Reform Act of 2014. A second option is to substantially revise or eliminate the current tax system, instead relying on an alternative tax base for revenues (e.g., taxing consumption rather than income). Tax reform legislation introduced early in the 114 th Congress has tended to take the latter approach, proposing a retail sales tax at the federal level or a flat tax. Framework for Evaluation In evaluating any change in tax policy, the prevailing economic framework is to analyze the tax policy for equity, efficiency, and simplicity. When considering the fairness of the distribution of tax burdens, the concepts of horizontal and vertical equity are often considered. Vertical equity examines the distribution of tax burdens across different income groups. How much more is a policy question. Efficiency Tax policy should promote economic efficiency; that is, tax policy should be as neutral as possible by minimizing economic distortions. Will business compliance costs change? Tax Reform in the 114th Congress Tax reform options continue to be actively debated in the 114 th Congress. A cash flow tax, similar to what is proposed in H.R. 11 ) for FY2016. Additionally, the budget resolution demonstrates some support for congressional action on tax reform. In total, there are nearly 150 revenue proposals contained in the President's FY2017 budget. The revenue-raising proposals in the President's budget include reforms to the international tax system, the elimination of a number of fossil fuel tax preferences, reform of the tax treatment of financial and insurance products, and the closure of a variety of items that the Administration views as "loopholes." While comprehensive tax reform was not enacted, proposals introduced in the 113 th Congress may continue to inform the debate. This proposal would have broadened the tax base and restructured statutory tax rates in both the individual and corporate income tax systems, changed the tax treatment of foreign-source income for U.S. multinational corporations, and made dozens of other changes to the federal tax system (additional details can be found in the shaded text box below). The End Wasteful Tax Loopholes Act ( S. 8 ) proposes to express the sense of the Senate that Congress should enact legislation to (1) eliminate wasteful tax loopholes; (2) eliminate corporate tax loopholes and wasteful tax breaks for special interests; (3) enhance tax fairness by reforming or eliminating tax breaks that provide excessive benefits to millionaires and billionaires; (4) crack down on tax cheaters and close the tax gap; (5) use the revenue saved by curtailing tax loopholes to reduce the deficit and reform the federal tax code; (6) address provisions in the tax code that make it more profitable for companies to create jobs overseas than in the United States; and (7) reform the tax code in a manner that promotes job creation, competitiveness, and economic growth. The Senate budget resolution ( S.Con.Res.	Many agree that the U.S. tax system is in need of reform. Congress continues to explore ways to make the U.S. tax system simpler, fairer, and more efficient. Identifying and enacting policies that will result in a simpler, fairer, and more efficient tax system remains a challenge. On December 10, 2014, the chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means introduced a comprehensive tax reform proposal, the Tax Reform Act of 2014 (H.R. 1). The bill proposed substantial changes to both the individual and corporate income tax systems, reducing statutory tax rates for many taxpayers, while repealing dozens of credits, deductions, and other tax preferences. While no further action was taken on H.R. 1 in the 113th Congress, the proposal continues to inform the ongoing tax reform debate. There are various policy options for achieving comprehensive tax reform. One option is a base-broadening, rate-reducing tax reform, in the spirit of the Tax Reform Act of 2014. An alternative approach would be to substantially revise or eliminate the current tax system, instead relying on an alternative tax base for revenues. Tax reform legislation introduced early in the 114th Congress has tended to take the latter approach, proposing a retail sales tax at the federal level or a flat tax. Similar proposals were introduced in the 112th and 113th Congresses, and did not advance. A cash flow tax for businesses has also been introduced in the 114th Congress. Both Congress and the Administration have indicated interest in tax reform through their respective budget processes. The budget resolution for FY2016 (S.Con.Res. 11) communicates congressional support for action on tax reform. The President's FY2017 budget proposes a number of tax policy changes, similar to the President's FY2016 budget, including substantial changes in the international tax system. The prevailing framework for evaluating tax policy considers equity (or fairness), efficiency, and simplicity. Equity examines the distribution of the tax burden across different groups. This information can then be used to assess the "fairness" of the tax system. A tax system that is economically efficient generally provides neutral treatment, minimizing economic distortions and maximizing output. A tax system that is simple reduces administrative and compliance costs while also promoting transparency. Oftentimes, there are trade-offs to be considered when evaluating tax policy options. For example, shifting toward a consumption tax might enhance economic efficiency. However, taxing consumption rather than income tends to put an increased tax burden on lower-income taxpayers relative to higher-income taxpayers, reducing the progressivity of the tax system. Policymakers may want to consider the trade-off between equity and efficiency when evaluating tax policy options.
crs_R41333	crs_R41333_0	Support of Terrorism (18 U.S.C. More precisely, Section 2339A outlaws: (1) whoever (2) [knowingly] (3)(a) attempts to, (b) conspires to, or (c) actually (4)(a) provides material support or resources, or (b) conceals or disguises i. the nature, ii. location, iii. source, or iv. ownership of material support or resources (5) knowing or intending that they be used (a) in preparation for, (b) in carrying out, (c) in preparation for concealment of an escape from, or (d) in carrying out the concealment of an escape from (5) an offense identified as a federal crime of terrorism. Material Support Section 2339A defines "material support" to encompass "any property, tangible or intangible, or service." An attempt to provide material support in violation of Section 2339A and actually providing such assistance are punished the same: imprisonment for not more than 15 years (for any term of years or life, if death results from the commission of the offense), and/or a fine of not more than $250,000 (not more than $500,000 for an organization)(or not more than twice the amount of gain or loss associated with the offense). Under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Unlike Section 2339B, Section 2339A has neither a general nor a descriptive statement of extraterritorial jurisdiction. In its present form, Section 2339B condemns: (1) whoever (2) knowingly (3)(a) attempts to provide, (b) conspires to provide, or (c) provides (4) material support or resources (5) to a foreign terrorist organization (6) knowing that the organization (a) has been designated a foreign terrorist organization, or (b) engages, or has engaged, in "terrorism" or "terrorist activity." Knowingly Section 2339B has two knowledge elements. In H umanitarian Law Project , the Supreme Court concluded that Section 2339B, as applied, was not unconstitutionally vague; did not constitute an abridgement of the First Amendment right to free speech; and did not impermissibly intrude on the right of free association. In others, it describes the circumstances under which it reaches offenses committed overseas. Although neither Section 2339B nor Section 2339A creates a private civil cause of action, 18 U.S.C.	The material support statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§2339A and 2339B, have been among the most frequently prosecuted federal anti-terrorism statutes. Section 2339A outlaws: (1) whoever (2) [knowingly] (3)(a) attempting to, (b) conspiring to, or (c) actually (4)(a) providing material support or resources, or (b) concealing or disguising (i) the nature, (ii) location, (iii) source, or (iv) ownership of material support or resources (5) knowing or intending that they be used (a) in preparation for, (b) in carrying out, (c) in preparation for concealment of an escape from, or (d) in carrying out the concealment of an escape from (6) an offense identified as a federal crime of terrorism. Section 2339B outlaws: (1) whoever (2) knowingly (3)(a) attempting to provide, (b) conspiring to provide, or (c) actually providing (4) material support or resources (5) to a foreign terrorist organization (6) knowing that the organization (a) has been designated a foreign terrorist organization, or (b) engages, or has engaged, in "terrorism" or "terrorist activity." The sections use a common definition for the term "material support or resources": any service or tangible or intangible property. The Supreme Court in Humanitarian Law Project upheld Section 2339B, as applied, against challenges that it was unconstitutionally vague and inconsistent with the First Amendment's freedom of speech and freedom of association requirements. Violations of Section 2339A are punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years; violations of Section 2339B by imprisonment for not more than 20 years. Although neither section creates a civil cause of action for victims, treble damages and attorneys' fees may be available for some victims under 18 U.S.C. §2333. Section 2339B has two extraterritorial jurisdiction provisions. One is general (there is extraterritorial jurisdiction over an offense under this section) and the other descriptive (there is extraterritorial jurisdiction over an offender under this section if the offender is a U.S. national, etc.). Section 2339A has no such provisions, but it is likely applicable overseas at least in cases in which its predicate offenses have extraterritorial reach. This report is available in an abridged version as CRS Report R41334, Terrorist Material Support: A Sketch of 18 U.S.C. §2339A and §2339B, by Charles Doyle.
crs_R45121	crs_R45121_0	Brief Overview of Past Practices When a President dies, a number of activities and events are set in motion. Departments of The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Treasury) This Army pamphlet outlines state and official funeral policy, and it contains detailed information on funeral eligibility, procedures, and sequences of events. Ambassador Mary Mel French, "Ceremonies: State and Official Funerals," in United States Protocol: The Guide to Official Diplomatic Etiquette (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010).	This fact sheet is a brief resource guide for congressional staff on funerals and burials for Presidents of the United States. It contains an overview of past practices for presidential funerals and selected online information resources related to official and ceremonial protocols, past presidential funerals, congressional documents, and other documents and books.
crs_RL33185	crs_RL33185_0	Background Liberia, a small, poor West African country of about 3.4 million people, is undergoing a post-conflict transition and peace-building process after its second civil war within a decade. It pitted the forces of Charles Taylor, elected president in 1997 after Liberia's first civil war (1989-1997), against two armed anti-Taylor rebel groups: Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). It also affected neighboring states, which accepted Liberian refugees and, in some cases, hosted anti-Taylor forces. UNMIL provides a military guard force for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, discussed below, for which it assumed responsibility from the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), upon UNMIL's termination in late 2005. On November 15, 2005, the National Elections Commission (NEC) declared Sirleaf the winner of the presidential race, with 59.4% of votes against Weah's 40.6%, making her the first-ever female president of an African country. A presidential election will next be held in 2011. Prominent cases involving key officials, among others, include the suspension in October 2009, resignation in January 2010, and current prosecution of the former information minister, Lawrence Bropleh, over allegations of his involvement in a "ghost worker" fund diversion scheme; a procurement irregularities case that led to the February 2010 resignation of the then-internal affairs minister, Ambulai Johnson, Sirleaf's brother, and questions over the origins of his personal assets; the September 2009 dismissal of Harry Greaves, a former Sirleaf advisor, as managing director of the Liberian Petroleum Refinery Corporation (LPRC) over a case involving Greaves' alleged involvement in the allocation of a contract to a firm in exchange for compensation more than double as large as the estimated value of the contract by another bidder, and allegations of bribery pertaining to an ensuing investigation of the contract award; and the resignation in 2009 or removal of serving ministers, including Agriculture Minister Christopher Toe, Public Works Minister Luseni Donzo, and Justice Minister Philip Banks, in cases involving alleged fiscal mismanagement, administrative irregularities, or other matters, and there have been allegations of mismanagement and possible corruption regarding the administration of county development funds, of which, as a result, the presidency has taken control. Security Issues Security Conditions Liberia's security situation has improved markedly since August 2003. It is currently "generally stable, but fragile," and is subject to periodic volatility and localized instability. Taylor's trial is being conducted by the SCSL in the Hague, the Netherlands, where under a special agreement the SCSL is using the premises of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Former President Bush—whose Administration had played key roles in ending Liberia's second civil war and in stabilizing and helping the country to rebuild in the immediate post-war years, backed by substantial, congressionally supported U.S. post-war rebuilding assistance —admired Sirleaf's leadership and achievements, and awarded the U.S. Presidential Medal of Freedom to her in November 2007. She reportedly closely consulted with U.S. officials regarding her priorities for Liberia and the status of Charles Taylor. Two bills, S. 656 (Reed), the Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 2009, introduced March 19, 2009, and H.R. H.R. H.R. Congress's focus on Liberia also centered on aiding Liberia's efforts to consolidate its post-war governance and economic rebuilding processes. 110-28 ( H.R. 110-161 ( H.R. Immigration Issues H.R. Similarly, in March 2006, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) had announced that "following the election of President Ellen John Sirleaf and the conclusion of its long civil war," it had "reopened its programs in Liberia for the first time since 1990" as part of an effort of "[r]eaffirming U.S. government support for Liberia."	This report covers developments in Liberia, a small, poor West African country. Liberia held elections in October 2005, with a presidential runoff in November, a key step in a peace-building process following its second civil war in a decade. That war began in 1999, escalated in 2000, and ended in 2003. It pitted the forces of Charles Taylor, elected president in 1997 after Liberia's first civil war (1989-1997), against two armed anti-Taylor rebel groups. The war also destabilized neighboring states, which accepted Liberian refugees and, in some cases, hosted anti-Taylor forces and became targets of the Taylor regime. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, an economist, won the presidential runoff vote with 59.4% of votes cast and took office in January 2006, becoming the first elected female president of an African country. Her runoff rival, George Weah, a former star soccer player, conceded Sirleaf's win after initially contesting it. Most observers viewed the vote as orderly, free, and fair. It fulfilled a key goal of an August 2003 peace accord that had ended the second civil war and led to an ongoing, U.S.-aided post-war transition process, which is bolstered by the multifaceted peacekeeping and development-focused U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The next election is scheduled for 2011, and President Sirleaf has announced that she will seek reelection. Liberia's security situation is stable but subject to periodic volatility. Progress in governance under the interim government that preceded that of President Sirleaf was mixed; widespread corruption within it was widely reported. Liberia's economy and state structures remain devastated by war but, along with humanitarian conditions, are improving. Liberia has received extensive U.S. post-war reconstruction and security sector reform assistance. In March 2006, former President Taylor was arrested in Nigeria and transferred to the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) to face war crimes charges. He was later transferred to The Hague, the Netherlands, where he is on trial by the SCSL. In addition to providing substantial support for Liberia's post-war peace and reconstruction processes, Congress has maintained a continuing interest in the status of Charles Taylor and in ensuring funding for the SCSL. Other legislation proposed in the 109th and 110th Congresses centered on immigration, debt, and tax haven issues, and the commendation of Liberia for successfully holding elections. Liberia-specific legislation introduced or acted upon in the 111th Congress has included H.R. 1105 (Obey); H.R. 3288 (Olver); S. 656 (Reed); H.R. 2258 (Kennedy); H.R. 2410 (Berman); H.R. 2475 (Ros-Lehtinen); S. 1434 (Leahy); and H.R. 2346 (Obey).
crs_R44244	crs_R44244_0	Since states initially began recognizing same-sex marriage, one of the primary questions has been whether recognition of same-sex marriage requires individuals, who officiate at weddings or issue marriage licenses but object to same-sex marriage on religious grounds, to provide those services to same-sex couples. Obergefell v. Hodges: Federal Constitutional Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage In its landmark decision, Obergefell v. Hodges , the U.S. Supreme Court struck down state bans on same-sex marriage as unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The issues presented to the Court included whether states were required to permit same-sex couples to marry in their states and whether states were required to recognize same-sex marriages formed in other states, but did not include any issue directly affecting the manner in which such marriages were formed or what legal rights such couples may have beyond the ability to marry itself. This dual role of religious officiants has raised concerns that ministers, because of their concurrent role for civil requirements, may be forced to solemnize marriages to which they object. Notably, the Court's decision in Obergefell specifically addresses the right of same-sex couples to enter " civil marriage[s] on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples," and does not require or suggest that religious marriages must include all couples. Questions also arise regarding whether an individual working for the government and having job duties related to officiating or facilitating civil marriages could be required to do so for same-sex couples. Balancing the First Amendment with Nondiscrimination Laws Under Supreme Court Jurisprudence A number of Supreme Court decisions have indicated that First Amendment rights are not absolute when weighed against nondiscrimination requirements. Implications of Hobby Lobby and the Applicability of RFRA Protection for Businesses with Religious Objections Prior to the Court's decision in Hobby Lobby , it may have seemed unlikely that business owners could claim protection for their religious beliefs. Religiously Affiliated Social Service Providers' Participation in Publicly Funded Programs Concerns about religious objections to same-sex marriage have also manifested in the context of government funding programs that provide financial assistance to private entities, including organizations with religious objections to same-sex marriage. It may also rely on the conscience clause model that has been used to protect entities with religious objections to abortion that receive federal funds under certain health care programs. Although the Supreme Court has not considered challenges to these provisions, the Court has permitted religious entities to receive federal funds directed for secular purposes with certain conditions in a number of other cases. Potential Effects for Tax-Exempt Status Another potential issue, which was raised at oral argument in Obergefell and recently addressed by Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Commissioner Koskinen in testimony before Congress, is whether churches and other religious entities could be denied federal tax-exempt status if they act in opposition to same-sex marriage (e.g., a church that does not perform same-sex marriages or a religious school that refuses to provide same-sex couples with married student housing). One qualification for Section 501(c)(3) status and Section 170 eligibility is that an organization cannot engage in activities that are illegal or violate a well-established, fundamental public policy. This is referred to as the "illegality doctrine." First Amendment's Religious Clauses The first question is whether a religious entity's First Amendment rights would be violated if it were denied Section 501(c)(3) status due to actions that were based on sincerely held religious beliefs. With respect to the Free Exercise Clause, the Court explained that the government can justify a burden on religion by showing it is necessary to accomplish a compelling governmental interest that cannot be achieved by less restrictive means. As such, it is not clear whether the Bob Jones analysis would support the denial of tax-exempt status under the illegality doctrine for churches and other houses of worship acting on sincerely held religious beliefs, particularly in light of the constitutional protection of noninterference in internal matters of religious institutions discussed above. This raises two fundamental issues: (1) whether a Section 501(c)(3) organization that acts in opposition to same-sex marriage would be in violation of a law or public policy and thus trigger the doctrine's application; and (2) if so, whether the organization's specific actions would justify the denial of tax-exempt status under the doctrine. Illegality Doctrine's Application in the Context of Same-Sex Marriage The first issue is whether a Section 501(c)(3) organization's action in opposition to same-sex marriage would be in violation of a law or public policy and thus trigger the application of the illegality doctrine. The Commissioner did, however, leave open the possibility that the IRS might revisit the issue in response to future legal and policy developments.	The U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decision in Obergefell v. Hodges in June 2015 held that the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution required states to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples and to recognize same-sex marriages formed in other states. The Court's decision in Obergefell does not directly address incidental claims related to religious freedom in the context of same-sex marriage. However, the case has generated a number of other questions regarding potential implications of the Court's decision, particularly with respect to the rights of individuals or entities with religious objections to same-sex marriage. Among the issues raised are the obligation of marriage officiants to perform or facilitate same-sex marriage ceremonies; civil rights protections for same-sex couples and religious objectors; potential protections for religious social service providers in federally funded programs; and the impact on tax-exempt status of religious entities that object to same-sex marriage. Questions related to the solemnization of same-sex marriages involve whether individuals who serve as marriage officiants, either in religious or civil ceremonies, would be required to solemnize marriages to which they object. Although long-standing Supreme Court jurisprudence indicates that religious officiants would be protected under the First Amendment, the protections available to civil servants whose duties include issuing state marriage licenses or officiating at civil ceremonies are not as straightforward, and may depend on a number of other factors. Expansion of constitutional protection to same-sex couples also may have implications under civil rights law and certain federally funded social service programs. Under federal and state civil rights provisions, questions have involved whether owners of public accommodations may be required to serve same-sex couples; whether health care providers may be required to provide medical treatment regardless of a patient's sexual orientation; and whether religious institutions must provide housing to same-sex couples. Generally, courts are finding that a business must provide the same services to same-sex couples as it provides to opposite-sex couples, or that the business must not offer services that it would object to offering to same-sex couples. In the context of social service programs, some religious organizations receive federal funding to provide certain social services (e.g., adoption). However, concerns have been raised regarding whether such organizations could decline to serve same-sex couples based on their religious objections to same-sex marriage. Finally, the Court's decision may affect religious entities' tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. One qualification for Section 501(c)(3) status is that an organization cannot engage in activities that are illegal or violate a fundamental public policy. This is referred to as the "illegality doctrine." A question that has been raised in light of the Obergefell decision is whether religious entities that act in opposition to same-sex marriage could be in violation of the doctrine. In testimony before Congress in July 2015, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Commissioner stated that the IRS would not currently apply the doctrine to religious entities acting in opposition to same-sex marriage, but left open the possibility that the agency could change its position in response to future legal and policy developments. If the doctrine were to apply, one question that might arise is whether a religious entity's First Amendment rights would be violated if its tax-exempt status were revoked due to actions based on sincerely held religious beliefs. The Supreme Court has held in another context that denial of tax-exempt status of religious schools under the illegality doctrine may be permissible under the First Amendment, so long as the law or policy requiring the denial advances a compelling governmental interest that could not be served by less restrictive means and is based on neutral, secular criteria. Notably, the Court's holding did not address the doctrine's application to houses of worship, thus leaving open the possibility that they may be afforded greater protections.
crs_R44214	crs_R44214_0	None of the FY2016 regular appropriations bills was enacted by the start of the fiscal year (October 1, 2015). H.R. 719 , a CR for FY2016, was passed by the House and Senate and signed into law by the President on September 30, 2015 ( P.L. 114-53 ). The purpose of this report is to provide an analysis of the continuing appropriations in H.R. 719 . For general information on the content of CRs and historical data on CRs enacted between FY1977 and FY2015, see CRS Report R42647, Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components and Recent Practices , by [author name scrubbed]. For information on the FY2016 appropriations process, see CRS Report R44062, Congressional Action on FY2016 Appropriations Measures , by [author name scrubbed]. Coverage The CR for FY2016 covers all 12 regular appropriations bills by providing continuing budget authority for projects and activities funded in FY2015 by that fiscal year's regular appropriations acts—Divisions A-K of the FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, P.L. The CR includes both budget authority that is subject to those limits and also budget authority that is effectively exempt from those limits. Duration Funding in the CR is effective October 1, 2015, through December 11, 2015—about the first 10 weeks of the fiscal year. Most projects and activities funded in the CR are subject to an across-the-board decrease of less than 1% (0.2108%). The CR and the Statutory Discretionary Spending Limits Background Appropriations for FY2016 are subject to statutory discretionary spending limits on "defense" and "nondefense" spending pursuant to the BCA. According to CBO, the total amount of annualized budget authority for regular appropriations in the CR that is subject to the BCA limits (including projects and activities funded at the rate for operations and anomalies) is $1,016.582 billion. When spending is included in the CBO estimate that is effectively not subject to those limits—because it was designated or otherwise provided as OCO/GWOT, continuing disability reviews and redeterminations, health care fraud and abuse control, disaster relief, and emergency requirements—the total amount of annualized budget authority in the CR is $1,099.962 billion. Agency, Account, and Program-Specific Provisions In addition to the general provisions that establish the coverage, duration, and rate, CRs usually include provisions that are specific to certain agencies, accounts, or programs. First, certain provisions designate exceptions to the formula and purpose for which any referenced funding is extended. These are often referred to as "anomalies." Second, certain provisions may have the effect of creating new law or changing existing law. These same general provisions have been included in CRs for a number of previous fiscal years.	The purpose of this report is to provide an analysis of the FY2016 continuing appropriations in H.R. 719. None of the FY2016 regular appropriations bills were enacted by the start of the fiscal year (October 1, 2015). On September 30, 2015, H.R. 719, a continuing resolution (CR) for FY2016, was signed into law by the President (P.L. 114-53). The CR for FY2016 covers all 12 regular appropriations bills by providing continuing budget authority for projects and activities funded in FY2015 by that fiscal year's regular appropriations acts, with some exceptions. It includes both budget authority that is subject to the statutory discretionary spending limits on defense and nondefense spending and also budget authority that is effectively exempt from those limits, such as that designated as for "Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism." Funding under the terms of the CR is effective October 1, 2015, through December 11, 2015—roughly the first 10 weeks of the fiscal year. The CR generally provides budget authority for FY2015 projects and activities at the rate they were funded during that fiscal year. Most projects and activities funded in the CR are subject to an across-the-board decrease of less than 1% (0.2108%). According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the total amount of annualized budget authority for regular appropriations in the FY2016 CR that is subject to the statutory discretionary spending limits is $1,016.582 billion. When spending is included in the CBO estimate that is effectively not subject to those limits, the total amount of annualized budget authority in the CR is $1,099.962 billion. In addition to the general provisions that establish the coverage, duration, and rate, CRs usually include provisions that are specific to certain agencies, accounts, or programs. These include provisions that designate exceptions to the formula and purpose for which any referenced funding is extended (referred to as "anomalies") and provisions that have the effect of creating new law or changing existing law (often used to renew expiring provisions of law). The CR includes a number of such provisions, each of which is briefly summarized in this report. CRS appropriations process experts for each of these provisions are listed in Table 1. For general information on the content of CRs and historical data on CRs enacted between FY1977 and FY2015, see CRS Report R42647, Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components and Recent Practices, by [author name scrubbed]. For information on the FY2016 appropriations process, see CRS Report R44062, Congressional Action on FY2016 Appropriations Measures, by [author name scrubbed].
crs_R45344	crs_R45344_0	Congress has often played an important role in supporting and institutionalizing U.S. democracy promotion by passing key legislation, appropriating funds for foreign assistance programs and other democracy promoting activities, and conducting oversight of aspects of U.S. foreign policy relevant to democracy promotion. Widespread concerns exist among analysts and policymakers over the current trajectory of democracy around the world and multiple hearings in the 115 th Congress reflected bipartisan concern over this issue. In particular, it provides brief conceptual background on democracy and on democracy promotion's historical role in U.S. policy, analyzes aggregate trends in the global level of democracy using data from two major democracy indexes, and discusses some of the key factors that may be broadly affecting democracy around the world. Interpreting the Declines The above analysis appears to support the growing consensus that the global expansion of democracy has been halted for more than a decade. While declines in EIU's index have been less uniform, EIU's data also indicates that democracy has not advanced since 2006. Some of the foreign policy activities of influential authoritarian countries may already be having negative impacts on democracy internationally, such as by attempting to undercut international support for democratic norms or related human rights norms; eroding democracy's appeal by serving as examples of economically successful alternative political systems; providing aid or other support that undermines democracy or the prospects for democratization in recipient countries; subverting democratic institutions or norms within existing democracies through "soft" and "sharp" power projection; and actively or indirectly supporting the diffusion of techniques or tools for repressing political dissent. In general, to date there is more evidence that some authoritarian governments may hope to "contain" the spread of democracy because of its potential threat to their own regime stability than there is of broad, affirmative agendas to promote authoritarianism. Challenges to Democracy's Global Appeal as a Political System Signs of backsliding within existing democracies in recent years have led some experts to question whether the appeal and prestige of democracy as a political system itself is eroding around the globe. If traditionally high levels of support for democracy around the world have related at least in part to its instrumental appeal, then challenges within democracies in recent years (including within the United States) may be eroding support for democracy as a political system. Relatedly, a class of economically successful authoritarian capitalist states has emerged. Rather, to the extent that public opinion polling is a reliable indicator (see text box below), support overall appears resilient to this point. These methods, some of which are discussed below, are thus potentially contributing to more durable forms of nondemocratic governance. A broad range of other governments have imposed similar restrictions on civil society. These arguments draw on academic research indicating that structural conditions such as wealth, international linkages, and levels of inequality may have considerable impact on a country's likelihood of sustained democratization. Experts who have emphasized these factors as helping to explain the challenges to democracy in the current period concede that favorable conditions are not always necessary for democratization, but contend that they are causally important. More broadly, many disagreements over the proper placement of democracy promotion within U.S. foreign policy tend to relate to the extent to which democracy promotion is seen as supportive of U.S. national interests, the extent of its potential tension with the pursuit of other objectives, and whether the United States has the means and capacity over the long-term to effectively support the spread of democracy and prevent backsliding. How does the Trump Administration view democracy promotion? The Administration's degree of interest regarding democracy promotion may evolve over time, however, as has arguably been the case with prior administrations. Nonetheless, there may continue to be points of tension between the Administration's approach to and prioritization of democracy promotion as compared to the preferences of some Members of Congress. Those particularly critical of democracy promotion tend to argue that the United States should curtail these efforts in pursuit of a foreign policy that, in their view, more closely reflects U.S. capacity and the pursuit of vital U.S. interests .	Widespread concerns exist among analysts and policymakers over the current trajectory of democracy around the world. Congress has often played an important role in supporting and institutionalizing U.S. democracy promotion, and current developments may have implications for U.S. policy, which for decades has broadly reflected the view that the spread of democracy around the world is favorable to U.S. interests. The aggregate level of democracy around the world has not advanced for more than a decade. Analysis of data trend-lines from two major global democracy indexes indicates that, as of 2017, the level of democracy around the world has not advanced since around the year 2005 or 2006. Although the degree of democratic backsliding around the world has arguably been modest overall to this point, some elements of democracy, particularly those associated with liberal democracy, have receded during this period. Declines in democracy that have occurred may have disproportionately affected countries with larger population sizes. Overall, this data indicates that democracy's expansion has been more challenged during this period than during any similar period dating back to the 1970s. Despite this, democratic declines to this point have been considerably less severe than the more pronounced setbacks that occurred during some earlier periods in the 20th century. Numerous broad factors may be affecting democracy globally. These include (but are not limited to) the following: The growing international influence of nondemocratic governments. These countries may in some instances view containing the spread of democracy as instrumental toward other goals or as helpful to their own domestic regime stability. Thus they may be engaging in various activities that have negative impacts on democracy internationally. At the same time, relatively limited evidence exists to date of a more affirmative agenda to promote authoritarian political systems or norms as competing alternatives to democracy. The state of democracy's global appeal as a political system. Challenges to and apparent dissatisfaction with government performance within democracies, and the concomitant emergence of economically successful authoritarian capitalist states, may be affecting in particular democracy's traditional instrumental appeal as the political system most capable of delivering economic growth and national prestige. Public opinion polling data indicate that democracy as a political system may overall still retain considerable appeal around the world relative to nondemocratic alternatives. Nondemocratic governments' use of new methods to repress political dissent within their own societies. Tools such as regulatory restrictions on civil society and technology-enhanced censorship and surveillance are arguably enhancing the long-term durability of nondemocratic forms of governance. Structural conditions in nondemocracies. Some scholars argue that broad conditions in many of the world's remaining nondemocracies, such as their level of wealth or economic inequality, are not conducive to sustained democratization. The importance of these factors to democratization is complex and contested among experts. Democracy promotion is a longstanding, but contested, element of U.S. foreign policy. Wide disagreements and well-worn policy debates persist among experts over whether, or to what extent, the United States should prioritize democracy promotion in its foreign policy. Many of these debates concern the relevance of democracy promotion to U.S. interests, its potential tension with other foreign policy objectives, and the United States' capacity to effectively promote democratization. Recent developments pose numerous potential policy considerations and questions for Congress. Democracy promotion has arguably not featured prominently in the Trump Administration's foreign policy to this point, creating potential continued areas of disagreement between some Members of Congress and the Administration. Simultaneously, current challenges around the world present numerous questions of potential consideration for Congress. Broadly, these include whether and where the United States should place greater or lesser emphasis on democracy promotion in its foreign policy, as well as various related questions concerning the potential tools for promoting democracy.
crs_RL34611	crs_RL34611_0	Introduction Conference committees have long been known as "the third house of Congress." Current developments suggest, however, that the "third house" characterization might require modification. It is not that conference committees are unimportant, it is that another method for adjusting and reconciling bicameral differences on significant legislation has taken on greater prominence in the contemporary Congress. This method is the exchange of amendments—or "messages" —between the houses, the so-called "ping pong" procedure. If the conference committee is being somewhat eclipsed by the ping pong procedure as an important way to achieve bicameral reconciliation on consequential legislation, that would represent an important institutional change. This apparent development merits some attention and analysis. Accordingly, this report's purposes are fundamentally twofold: to examine the reasons for the heightened salience of the ping pong approach and to consider several reasons for and the implications that seem to flow from using this procedure rather than convening conferences to resolve inter-chamber disagreements on major legislation. To fulfill these two purposes, the report is organized into six sections as follows. First, it will provide an overview of the methods Congress employs to achieve inter-chamber agreement on legislation, including ping pong's place in the bicameral resolution process. Second, it will briefly discuss how each chamber gets to conference, underscoring how the convening of conference committees in the Senate can be effectively blocked, even if a majority of Senators would agree to send the measure to conference. Procedures usually are not isolated actions; they are employed in a policy, political, and legislative context. Hence, the fourth section of the report provides an overview of three case examples to illustrate in a concrete setting the factors that may trigger use of ping ponging over the convening of conference committees. Fifth, the report will discuss several reasons for, and implications of, ping ponging amendments back-and-forth between the chambers instead of forming conference committees to achieve bicameral agreement on legislation. Lastly, summary observations will be presented, including why the exchange of amendment pattern has seemingly evolved to become a more important feature of bicameral lawmaking activity. It was passed by the House and sent to the Senate.	Conference committees have long been known as the "third house of Congress." They are often the principal forum for resolving bicameral differences on major measures when the House and Senate pass dissimilar versions of the same bills. Current developments suggest, however, that the "third house" characterization might require modification. It is not that conference committees are unimportant, it is that another method for adjusting and reconciling bicameral differences on significant legislation has taken on greater prominence in the contemporary Congress. This method is the exchange of amendments between the houses—the so-called "ping pong" method. If the conference committee is being somewhat eclipsed by the ping pong procedure as a way to achieve bicameral reconciliation on consequential measures, that would represent an important institutional development. This apparent development requires attention and analysis. Accordingly, this report's purposes are fundamentally twofold: to examine the reasons for the heightened salience of the ping pong approach and to consider several implications that seem to flow from using this procedure rather than convening conferences to resolve inter-chamber disagreements on major legislation. To fulfill these two purposes, the report will examine six issues. First, it will provide an overview of the methods Congress employs to achieve bicameral agreement on legislation. Second, it will briefly discuss how each chamber gets to conference, underscoring how the convening of conferences in the Senate can be effectively blocked, even if a majority of Senators would agree to send the measure to conference. Third, it will examine several factors that have apparently contributed to the more conspicuous use of the ping pong method on significant measures. Fourth, procedures are usually not isolated actions; they are employed in a policy, political, and legislative context. Hence, the report will use three case examples to illustrate in a concrete setting the factors that might trigger use of ping ponging over the convening of conference committees. Fifth, the report will discuss several reasons for, and implications of, ping ponging amendments back-and-forth between the chambers instead of forming conference committees to achieve bicameral agreement on legislation. Lastly, summary observations will be presented, including why the exchange of amendment pattern has seemingly evolved to become a more important feature of bicameral lawmaking activity. This report will be updated if circumstances warrant such action.
crs_RL33259	crs_RL33259_0	—U.S. Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (1972-1987) Federal habeas corpus is the statutory procedure under which state and federal prisoners may petition federal courts to review their convictions and sentences to determine whether they are being held contrary to the laws or the Constitution of the United States. In 1996, Congress passed legislation that restricted a prisoner's ability to seek relief through the writ of habeas corpus. At issue for Congress is whether it should further restrict state prisoners' access to federal habeas corpus relief by limiting the federal role in policing constitutional violations in the states' criminal justice systems. Two issues have emerged as the Congress considers legislation that would further alter the writ of habeas corpus— trial finality and adequate representation . Proponents of habeas corpus reform contend that restricting state prisoners' access to federal habeas corpus relief is necessary due to many prisoners filing excessive and frivolous claims that result in a backlog in the system and substantial delays in the processing of cases. Critics contend, however, that many states' criminal justice systems are flawed, with many indigent defendants lacking proper representation throughout all stages of the criminal justice system. They contend that for many defendants, the writ of habeas corpus plays a key role in restoring justice when the system fails. This report examines the issues surrounding the debate on whether to further restrict state prisoners' access to federal habeas corpus filings. The current debate over whether to reform the federal habeas corpus law is centered around state capital cases. These cases experience some of the lengthier delays that have been highlighted in Congressional testimony, and for many this is where the concern rests. The issue of trial finality becomes apparent in these cases due to the mandated outcome—execution—being suspended pending the outcome of the habeas corpus proceeding. The bills would have provided for an expeditious habeas review of convictions that involved a killing of a child (§303 of H.R. In 1988, Congress passed legislation that required the appointment of counsel in federal capital habeas corpus proceedings, that is, since 1988, prisoners serving a federal capital sentence are entitled to counsel during all post-conviction proceedings. Unlike the federal criminal justice system, most states do not afford its prisoners with the same right. Critics contend that by having a non-mandatory system of post-conviction representation, many states ignore the reality that indigent death row prisoners are simply not able to competently engage in post-conviction litigation. The authors conducted a study of death sentences over a 23-year period (from 1973 to 1995). The research of Liebman, Fagan, West and Lloyd discussed previously raised the question of whether the delays commonly associated with federal habeas corpus review are necessary to make sure that justice is administered fairly. Moreover, the research raised the possibility that the errors found in capital cases may be the result of poor representation. Until the issue of adequate representation is fully addressed in the nation's criminal justice system, reform efforts will continue to be debated.	Federal habeas corpus is the statutory procedure under which state and federal prisoners may petition the federal courts to review their convictions and sentences to determine whether they are being held contrary to the laws or the Constitution of the United States. In 1996, Congress passed legislation that restricted a prisoner's ability to seek relief through the writ of habeas corpus. The 109th Congress considered legislation that would have further restricted a state prisoner's access to federal habeas relief, and would have provided for expeditious habeas review of cases where a child, public safety officer, or state judge was killed. The 110th Congress may consider similar issues. At issue for Congress is whether it should further restrict state prisoners' access to federal habeas relief by limiting the federal role in policing constitutional violations in the states' criminal justice systems. Two issues have emerged as Congress considers such legislation—trial finality and adequate representation. Proponents contend that restricting state prisoners' access to federal habeas relief is necessary due to many prisoners filing excessive and frivolous claims that result in a backlog in the system and substantial delays in the processing of these cases. Critics contend, however, that many states' criminal justice systems are flawed, with many indigent defendants lacking proper representation throughout all stages of the criminal justice system. They argue that for many defendants, the writ of habeas corpus plays a key role in restoring justice when the system fails. The current debate over whether to reform the federal habeas corpus law is centered around state capital cases. These cases experience some of the lengthier delays that have been highlighted in congressional testimony. The issue of trial finality becomes apparent in these cases because the mandated outcome—execution—is suspended pending the outcome of the habeas proceeding. An analysis of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts' (AOUSC) data, however, does not fully support the claim that state capital habeas cases take excessively long to process. The data reveals that although the median time for state capital cases to make their way through a federal habeas proceeding is twice as long as state non-capital cases, the rate of filing for habeas relief for both types of cases has remained constant. Since 1988, prisoners serving a federal capital sentence are entitled to counsel during all post-conviction proceedings. Unlike the federal criminal justice system, most states do not afford prisoners the same right. Critics contend that by not having a mandatory system of post-conviction representation, many states ignore the reality that indigent death row prisoners are not able to competently engage in post-conviction litigation. A study that was conducted over a 23-year period raised the question of whether the delays commonly associated with federal habeas corpus review are necessary to make sure that justice is administered fairly. The research also raised the possibility that the errors found in capital cases may be the result of poor representation. Until the issue of adequate representation is fully addressed in the states' criminal justice systems, habeas corpus reform efforts will continue to be debated. This report will be updated as warranted.
crs_R45394	crs_R45394_0	Section 3: Implementations to Date Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment has been informally implemented once, by President Ronald Reagan in 1985, and formally implemented twice, by President George W. Bush, in 2002 and 2007. Section 4: Constitutional Provisions and Analysis The text of Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment follows: Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President. Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. If the Congress within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office. Section 3 was designed to be invoked either in anticipation of presidential inability, or as a response to a disability, while Section 4 was intended by the amendment's sponsors to be activated only in response to a presidential disability. Section 4 includes the following four distinct possible procedures: a declaration of presidential disability by the Vice President acting in agreement with a majority of the Cabinet or such other body as Congress may establish by law (disability review body), followed by assumption of the powers and duties of the presidency by the Vice President as Acting President; and an uncontested declaration by the President that no inability exists, followed by the President's resumption of the office's powers and duties; and a declaration by the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet or the disability review body contesting the President's declaration and asserting that he or she remains disabled, followed by a decision on the issue by Congress. Under these circumstances, in the words of the amendment, "Congress shall decide the issue ..." The amendment further directs Congress to convene within 48 hours if it is not in session, and to vote to decide whether or not the President is still disabled within 21 days. It could be argued from this practical effect and the language in Section 4, which refers to the Vice President first and then the Cabinet or disability review body, that the amendment's framers intended the Vice President to take the lead in activating Section 4. The question of the disability is then decided by Congress. First, Congress has 21 days to consider the question of the President's disability if it is in session when the Speaker and President pro tempore receive the joint declaration. H.R. 1987—Oversight Commission on Presidential Capacity Act This measure was introduced by Representative Jamie Raskin on April 6, 2017. H.R. 1987 has been referred to the Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary and to the Committee on House Rules for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdictions of the committees concerned. H.R. 2093 has been referred to the Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. Section 4's comparative complexity, particularly its potential for declaring a President to be disabled without his or her concurrence, has troubled some observers.	Sections 3 and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provide for presidential disability or inability. Section 3 of the amendment sets the procedure whereby a President may declare himself or herself "unable to discharge the powers and duties" of the office by transmitting a written declaration to this effect to the President pro tempore of the Senate (President pro tem) and the Speaker of the House of Representatives (Speaker). For the duration of the disability, the Vice President discharges the President's powers and duties as Acting President. When the President transmits "a written declaration to the contrary" to the President pro tem and the Speaker, he or she resumes the powers and duties of the office. Section 3 is intended to cover either unanticipated disability, such as injury or illness, or anticipated disability, such as medical treatment. It has been activated three times under circumstances in which the President underwent general anesthesia for medical treatment. It was informally implemented by President Ronald Reagan in 1985 and was formally implemented twice by President George W. Bush, in 2002 and 2007, under similar circumstances. Section 4 provides for instances of contingent presidential disability. It was intended by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment's authors to provide for cases in which a President was unable or unwilling to declare a disability. In these circumstances, the section authorizes the Vice President and a majority of either the Cabinet, or such other body established by law (a presidential disability review body), acting jointly, to declare the President to be disabled. When they transmit a written message to this effect to the President pro tem and the Speaker, the Vice President immediately assumes the powers and duties of the office as Acting President. If the President, at a time of his choice, transmits a written message to the President pro tem and the Speaker that no disability exists, he or she resumes office. The Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet or disability review body may, however, contest this finding by a written declaration to the contrary to the aforementioned officers, delivered within four days of the President's declaration. Congress then decides the question, assembling within 48 hours if it is not in session. If Congress decides by a two-thirds vote of both houses that the President is unable to discharge the duties of the office, the Vice President continues as Acting President until the disability is resolved. If the two-thirds margin is not obtained, or if Congress is in session at the time but does not vote on the question within 21 days of receiving the requisite declaration, then the President resumes the powers and duties of the office. Similarly, if Congress is not in session at the time, and assembles as required by Section 4, but does not vote within 21 days of the day on which it is required to assemble, then the President resumes the powers and duties of the office. Section 4's complexity and concern about its potential for misuse have raised questions among some observers that it could be implemented for political purposes. During debate on the amendment, its authors and proponents largely rejected such claims. They insisted the section was not intended to facilitate the removal of an unpopular or failed President, in support of which they cited checks and balances incorporated in the amendment that were designed to prevent abuse of the procedure. To date, Section 4 has not been implemented. Two bills pending in the 115th Congress would establish a presidential disability review body as authorized by Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: H.R. 1987, introduced on April 6, 2017, and H.R. 2093, introduced on April 14 of the same year. H.R. 1987 has been referred to the House Committee on House Rules and the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. H.R. 2093 has been referred to Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice.
crs_RL33254	crs_RL33254_0	On October 17, 2006, the EPA published its revisions to the NAAQS for particulates to provide protection against potential health effects associated with short- and long-term exposure to particulate matter (including chronic respiratory disease and premature mortality). While the new 2006 particulates NAAQS generally tightened the air quality standards for particulate matter, the action has caused considerable controversy, including concerns that the standards are outside the range recommended by both EPA staff and by the scientific advisory panel (Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, or CASAC ) established by the Clean Air Act (CAA). In December 2006, 13 states and the District of Columbia petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit to review the new 2006 particulates NAAQS. Circuit challenging the new 2006 NAAQS. The EPA's most recent review found that the scientific evidence since 1997 reinforced the associations between exposure to particulates and numerous cardiovascular and respiratory health problems, including aggravated asthma, chronic bronchitis, reduced lung function, irregular heartbeat, nonfatal heart attacks, and premature death. In addition, the nonattainment counties tend to have larger populations than those in attainment: nearly 90 million people (about 30% of the U.S. population) live in the 208 counties designated nonattainment for the current standard. It is the CASAC ' s consensus scientific opinion that the decision to retain without change the annual PM 2.5 standard does not provid e an adequate margin of safety … requisite to protect the public health ' (as required by the Clean Air Act) ... . " Potential Health Benefits of a More Stringent PM2.5 Standard In its RIA, the EPA estimated the nationwide monetized human health and welfare benefits of attaining two suites of PM 2.5 NAAQS: (1) the newly revised PM 2.5 NAAQS, which include the new 35 µg/m 3 daily (24-hour) standard and the unchanged 15 µg/m 3 annual standard, and (2) an alternative standard similar to the least stringent of the CASAC recommendations that includes a tighter annual standard of 14 µg/m 3 and the same 35 µg/m 3 daily (24-hour) standard. The EPA's proposal to exclude any ambient mix of PM 10-2.5 that is dominated by rural windblown dust and soils and particulates generated by agricultural and mining sources, and how the EPA would distinguish the sources during its implementation, raised a number of questions and resulted in numerous comments. Critics of more stringent particulates standards contend that more stringent standards (and in some cases even the 1997 standards) are not justified by the scientific evidence; the proposal did not take into account hundreds of studies completed since the 2002 cut-off; requiring the same level of stringency for all fine particles without distinguishing sources is unfounded; costs and adverse impacts on regions and sectors of the economy are excessive; some commenters identified as "urban" sources contend exemption of rural particles may result in a disproportional compliance burden; those identified as "rural" sources contend exemption of rural particles is warranted by the lack of evidence regarding adverse effects associated with emission sources in these areas, and that not excluding these areas and sources creates an unnecessary burden; revising the standards could impede implementation of the existing particulates NAAQS and the process of bringing areas into compliance, given the current status of this process; revisions could also impede efforts to meet air quality regulations promulgated in 2004 and 2005, such as the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) and Clean Air Nonroad Diesel Rule; and the benefits (and costs) associated with implementation of the 1997 PM 2.5 NAAQS, as well as compliance with recent EPA air quality regulations, have not yet been realized. Circuit challenging the new 2006 NAAQS. Briefs from petitioners, EPA, and supporters were filed with the court by March 7, 2008, but the date for oral argument had not yet been scheduled at the time this report was updated. EPA anticipates a decision in late 2008. In December 2006, several states and industry, agriculture, business, environmental, and public health groups petitioned the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit to review the new 2006 particulates NAAQS.	On October 17, 2006, the EPA published its final revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for particulate matter (particulates, or PM). The EPA reviewed more than 2,000 scientific studies and found that the evidence continued to support associations between exposure to particulates in ambient air and numerous significant health problems, including aggravated asthma, chronic bronchitis, reduced lung function, heart attacks, and premature death in people with heart or lung disease. Based on several analytical approaches, the EPA estimated that compliance with the new NAAQS will prevent 1,200 to 13,000 premature deaths annually, as well as substantial numbers of hospital admissions and missed work or school days due to illness. Although a tightening of the standards, the new 2006 particulates NAAQS are not as stringent as recommended by EPA staff or the independent scientific advisory committee (Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, or CASAC) mandated under the Clean Air Act. The new 2006 particulates NAAQS strengthen the pre-existing (1997) standard for "fine" particulate matter 2.5 micrometers or less in diameter (PM2.5) by lowering the allowable daily concentration of PM2.5 in the air. The new daily standard averaged over 24-hour periods is reduced from 65 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m3) to 35 µg/m3. However, the annual PM2.5 standard, which is set in addition to the daily standard to address human health effects from chronic exposures to the pollutants, is unchanged from the 1997 standard of 15 µg/m3, although the CASAC had recommended a tighter annual standard in the range of 13 to 14 µg/m3. Nearly 90 million people live in the 208 counties designated as "nonattainment" areas for the 1997 PM2.5 NAAQS. The 2006 particulates NAAQS also retain the 24-hour standard and revoke the annual standard for slightly larger, but still inhalable, particles less than or equal to 10 micrometers (PM10). The EPA abandoned its proposal to replace the particle size indicator of PM10 with a range of 10 to 2.5 micrometers (PM10-2.5), and did not follow through on its proposal to exclude any mix of particles "dominated by rural windblown dust and soils and PM generated by agricultural and mining sources." The divergence from the CASAC's recommendation has proved controversial, as have several other elements of the 2006 particulates NAAQS, including the decision not to exclude rural sources from the coarse particle standard. Some have also questioned the EPA's strengthening of the standard for all fine particles, without distinguishing their source or chemical composition. In December 2006, several states and industry, agriculture, business, and public advocacy groups petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit to review the new 2006 particulates NAAQS. All briefs from petitioners, EPA, and supporters were filed with the court by March 7, 2008, but the date for oral argument has not yet been scheduled. EPA anticipates a decision in late 2008. Congress may conduct oversight of the new 2006 particulates NAAQS, given the potential public health and economic impacts, and concerns regarding the role of CASAC in NAAQS reviews.
crs_R42479	crs_R42479_0	Introduction Under programs administered by the Department of Transportation's (DOT's) Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), certain highway and bridge projects may be eligible to receive federal-aid funding. As a condition of receiving those funds, a project sponsor (e.g., a local or state transportation agency) must meet certain standards and requirements applicable to activities completed at every stage of project development. Although the names of those stages may vary somewhat from state to state, those stages generally include initial project planning, preliminary design/engineering and environmental review, final design and rights-of-way acquisition, construction, and facility operation and maintenance. When there is debate over the time it takes to complete federally funded highway projects, particularly debate over activities that may expedite or delay project delivery, various elements of the environmental review stage of project development have been the focus of attention. The two most recent laws authorizing DOT programs included requirements intended to expedite the environmental review process that focused primarily on procedures necessary to demonstrate compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §4321 et seq.). Current legislation to authorize DOT programs in the House and the Senate (the American Energy and Infrastructure Jobs Act of 2012 ( H.R. 7 ) and Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 st Century (MAP-21; S. 1813 )) also include provisions intended to expedite project delivery that focus primarily on the NEPA process. NEPA has two primary aims—to assure that federal agencies consider the environmental effects of their actions before proceeding with them and to involve the public in the decision-making process. However, the following factors call into question the degree to which NEPA alone is a significant source of project delay in overall project development: The majority of projects require limited review under NEPA. The NEPA compliance process is used to demonstrate compliance with all applicable environmental review requirements . Supplemental documents may be required in some instances. Among other requirements, the new process requires the project sponsor to notify DOT of the type of work, termini, length, general location of the proposed project, and a statement of any anticipated federal approvals; establishes a new entity required to participate in the NEPA process, referred to as a "participating agency," which includes any federal, state, tribal, regional, and local government agencies that may have an interest in the project; requires the lead agency to establish a plan for coordinating public and agency participation in and comment on the environmental review process for a project or category of projects; requires the lead agency to establish a 60-day deadline on agency and public comments on a draft EIS and a 30-day deadline on all other comment periods in the environmental review process, except under certain circumstances (e.g., the deadline is extended by the lead agency for "good cause"); and prohibits claims seeking judicial review of a permit, license, or approval issued by a federal agency for highway or transit projects unless they are filed within 180 days after publication of a notice in the Federal Register announcing the final agency action, unless a shorter time is specified in the federal law under which the judicial review is allowed (previously, the six-year limit under the Administrative Procedure Act applied to NEPA-related claims). However, it may be the threat of litigation that affects its current implementation. Demonstrating Compliance with Additional Requirements Unlike NEPA, which will apply in some way to all federally funded highway projects, additional environmental requirements applicable to a project will depend on site-specific conditions and potential impacts to resources at the site. Further, although there are no comprehensive data and available information tends to be anecdotal, when delays in the environmental review process have been identified, they primarily stemmed from local or project-specific issues (e.g., project complexity, changes in state priorities, or late changes in project scope). Surveys and Studies Applicable to the Environmental Review Process In this report, summary information and conclusions regarding factors applicable to measuring the stages of project development, the time it takes to complete the environmental review process, and primary sources of delay or perceptions among transportation agency officials regarding causes of delay in completing the environmental review process were drawn from data included in the following surveys and studies conducted by FHWA, GAO, universities, or transportation organizations: Federal Highway Administration (available on FHWA's "Environmental Toolkit: Streamlining/Stewardship—Performance Reporting" website, http://environment.fhwa.dot.gov/strmlng/es10measures.asp ).	Under programs administered by the Department of Transportation's (DOT's) Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), certain highway and bridge projects may be eligible for federal funding. Project approval and the receipt of federal funds are conditioned on the project sponsor (e.g., a local public works or state transportation agency) meeting certain standards and complying with federal law. Activities necessary to demonstrate compliance with those requirements may be completed at various stages of project development. Although the names of each stage may vary from state to state, project development generally includes the following: planning, preliminary design and environmental review, final design and rights-of-way acquisition, construction, and facility operation and maintenance. When there is debate over the time it takes to complete federal highway projects, the environmental review stage has been a primary focus of congressional attention concerning legislative options to speed project delivery. The current process includes activities necessary to demonstrate that all potential project-related impacts to the human, natural, and cultural environment are identified; effects of those impacts are taken into consideration (among other factors such as economic or community benefits) before a final decision is made; the public is included in that decision-making process; and all state, tribal, or federal compliance requirements applicable as a result of the project's environmental impacts are, or will be, met. Compliance requirements depend on site-specific factors, including the size and scope of the project, and whether and to what degree it may affect resources such as parks, historic sites, water resources, wetlands, or urban communities. For all proposed federal-aid highway projects, however, some level of review will be required under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §4321 et seq.). Broadly, NEPA requires federal agencies to consider the environmental effects of an action before proceeding with it and to involve the public in the decision-making process. The time it takes to complete the NEPA process is often the focus of debate over project delays attributable to the overall environmental review stage. However, the majority of FHWA-approved projects require limited documentation or analyses under NEPA. Further, when environmental requirements have caused project delays, requirements established under laws other than NEPA have generally been the source. This calls into question the degree to which the NEPA compliance process is a significant source of delay in completing either the environmental review process or overall project delivery. Causes of delay that have been identified are more often tied to local/state and project-specific factors, primarily local/state agency priorities, project funding levels, local opposition to a project, project complexity, or late changes in project scope. Further, approaches that have been found to expedite environmental reviews involve procedures that local and state transportation agencies may implement currently, such as efficient coordination of interagency involvement; early and continued involvement with stakeholders interested in the project; and identifying environmental issues and requirements early in project development. Bills in the House and Senate (the American Energy and Infrastructure Jobs Act of 2012 (H.R. 7) and Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century (MAP-21; S. 1813)) would reauthorize DOT programs. Both include provisions intended to expedite project delivery by changing elements of the environmental review process, particularly NEPA requirements. This report provides information on existing NEPA and environmental review requirements, particularly requirements that may be subject to change under the House and Senate proposals.
crs_RL33123	crs_RL33123_0	Also, it is suggested by numerous experts that terrorists may be enhancing their computer skills or forming alliances with cybercriminals that possess a high-level of telecommunications expertise. In addition, continuing publicity about Internet computer security vulnerabilities may encourage terrorists' interest in attempting a possible computer network attack, or cyberattack, against U.S. critical infrastructure. This report reviews publications and government reports to explore the following: (1) examples of vulnerabilities that may raise the level of interest that terrorists might have in attempting a coordinated cyberattack; (2) effects of the War on Terror that are driving terrorists to use the Internet more; (3) inconsistent reporting about terrorists' cyber activities; and (4) ways that terrorists may be improving their cyber skills. A February 2005 report by the President's Information Technology Committee (PITAC) stated that the information technology infrastructure of the United States, which is vital for communication, commerce, and control of the physical infrastructure, is highly vulnerable to terrorist and criminal attacks. U.S. federal agencies have come under criticism in past years for the effectiveness of their computer security programs. Others suggest that although the frequency and severity of cyberattacks are on the rise, the federal government may not be sufficiently increasing its efforts to improve cybersecurity. In April 2002, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) stated in a letter to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that cyberwarfare attacks against the U.S. critical infrastructure will become a viable option for terrorists as they become more familiar with the technology required for the attacks. The terrorist attacks in Bali, and recent attacks in several other countries, may have been funded through stolen credit cards. The recent subway and bus bombings in the U.K. also indicate that groups of terrorists may be active within other countries that have large computerized infrastructures, along with a large, highly skilled information technology workforce. Internet and computer system vulnerabilities are persistent and widely publicized. Terrorists may also be developing links with cybercriminals that will give them access to high-level computer skills. Experts now believe that terrorist collaborate with organized crime networks in the Middle East for international smuggling of arms and illegal drugs. Criminal drug traffickers can provide terrorists with access to computer specialists with high-level technical skills. Should the counterterrorism efforts be linked more closely with international efforts to prevent cybercrime? Trends for cybercrime indicate that computer attacks could increase in number, speed, and sophistication.	Terrorist's use of the internet and other telecommunications devices is growing both in terms of reliance for supporting organizational activities and for gaining expertise to achieve operational goals. Tighter physical and border security may also encourage terrorists and extremists to try to use other types of weapons to attack the United States. Persistent Internet and computer security vulnerabilities, which have been widely publicized, may gradually encourage terrorists to continue to enhance their computer skills, or develop alliances with criminal organizations and consider attempting a cyberattack against the U.S. critical infrastructure. Cybercrime has increased dramatically in past years, and several recent terrorist events appear to have been funded partially through online credit card fraud. Reports indicate that terrorists and extremists in the Middle East and South Asia may be increasingly collaborating with cybercriminals for the international movement of money, and for the smuggling of arms and illegal drugs. These links with hackers and cybercriminals may be examples of the terrorists' desire to continue to refine their computer skills, and the relationships forged through collaborative drug trafficking efforts may also provide terrorists with access to highly skilled computer programmers. The July 2005 subway and bus bombings in England also indicate that extremists and their sympathizers may already be embedded in societies with a large information technology workforce. The United States and international community have taken steps to coordinate laws to prevent cybercrime, but if trends continue computer attacks will become more numerous, faster, and more sophisticated. In addition, a recent report by the Government Accountability Office states that, in the future, U.S. government agencies may not be able to respond effectively to such attacks. This report examines possible terrorists' objectives and computer vulnerabilities that might lead to an attempted cyberattack against the critical infrastructure of the U.S. homeland, and also discusses the emerging computer and other technical skills of terrorists and extremists. Policy issues include exploring ways to improve technology for cybersecurity, or whether U.S. counterterrorism efforts should be linked more closely to international efforts to prevent cybercrime. This report will be updated as events warrant.
crs_R42522	crs_R42522_0	Introduction Policymakers have several options when considering legislation that would result in reducing carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions from the U.S. electricity sector. A federal clean energy standard (CES), such as that proposed in the Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012 ( S. 2146 ), is an alternative approach that requires certain utility companies to provide a prescribed amount of electricity from qualified clean energy sources based on a percentage of each utility company's annual electricity sales to consumers. According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the electric power sector represents approximately 41% of U.S. energy-related CO 2 emissions. The concept of a U.S. clean energy standard was proposed by President Barack Obama in his 2011 State of the Union address, and the White House subsequently published a proposed framework for a federal CES. On March 1, 2012, the Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012 ( S. 2146 ) was introduced in the Senate. Entities Required to Comply Some utility companies that sell electricity to consumers in U.S. states, except Alaska and Hawaii, plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, would be required to obtain a certain percentage of electricity sales from qualified clean energy generators. Whether or not a utility company is required to comply with the CES depends on the total amount of its annual electricity sales to consumers, in megawatthours (MWh). The annual sales threshold for utility compliance declines by 100,000 MWh each year from 2015 to 2025, after which the level remains constant at 1 million MWh of annual electricity sales. This electricity sales threshold exempts the majority of utility companies from having to comply with the CES. Clean Energy Compliance Requirements Starting in 2015, S. 2146 would require non-exempt utilities, as described above, to obtain a percentage of their total electricity sales to consumers—less applicable deductions of certain hydropower and nuclear power electricity—from qualified clean energy generators. S. 2146 provides a four-part definition of the term "clean energy." 1. Electricity generation from facilities placed in service after 1991 that use the following energy sources: renewable energy, renewable biomass, natural gas, hydropower, nuclear power, or waste-to-energy. Electricity generation from facilities placed in service after the date of enactment that use either combined heat and power or non-biomass energy sources that emit less than 0.82 metric tons of CO 2 per MWh. 3. Electricity generation that results from efficiency or capacity additions made after 1991 to nuclear or hydropower facilities that were originally placed in service before 1992. 4. Clean Energy Standard Compliance Utility companies required to comply with the CES have two compliance options: (1) submit clean energy credits to the Secretary of Energy, and/or (2) make alternative compliance payments to the Secretary of Energy. The ACP design element essentially places a cap on the cost of CES compliance. S. 2146 sets the initial ACP level at three cents ($0.03) per kilowatthour in 2015. In 2035, electricity generated from coal would decrease by 54%, nuclear power would increase by 62%, and non-hydro renewables would increase by 34% relative to reference case projections. With regard to the potential impact on electricity prices, EIA projects that average U.S. electricity prices would increase, compared to EIA reference case projections, by approximately 4% in 2025 and 18% in 2035. EIA also notes that the provision in S. 2146 to exempt certain utility companies from CES compliance requirements could create some degree of regional price disparity between exempt and non-exempt utilities.	U.S. policymakers have considered and deliberated on several policy designs that could potentially reduce energy-related carbon emissions. In his 2011 State of the Union address, President Obama proposed the concept of a Clean Energy Standard (CES) that would result in 80% of U.S. electricity generation from clean energy sources by 2035. In March of 2012, the Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012 (S. 2146) was introduced in the Senate. The primary goal of S. 2146 is to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from the U.S. electricity sector, which represents approximately 41% of total U.S. CO2 emissions. Generally, the approach used to achieve this goal is to require certain utility companies to source a portion of their electricity generation from qualified clean energy generators. Utilities located in either Alaska or Hawaii are exempted from CES requirements. Some utility companies that sell electricity directly to consumers (retail sales) would be required to comply with the CES. Determining which utilities have to comply is based on each utility company's total amount of annual retail sales. Starting in 2015, a utility company that sold more than 2 million megawatthours (MWh) of electricity to consumers would be required to comply. The retail sales level for compliance decreases by 100,000 MWh each year until 2025, where it remains constant at 1 million MWh. These thresholds represent a minority of electric utilities but a majority of U.S. electricity sales. Utilities required to comply with the CES would need to obtain a percentage of their electricity from qualified clean energy generators. In 2015 the minimum percentage is 24% and rises to 84% by 2035. The percentage is applied to a utility company's total retail sales; however, all electricity obtained from hydropower and nuclear power facilities placed in service before 1992 can be deducted from the sales base, potentially making compliance easier. The bill provides a four-part definition of electricity that would qualify as "clean energy": (1) electricity from renewable energy, biomass, natural gas, hydropower, nuclear power, or waste-to-energy facilities placed in service after 1991, (2) electricity from combined heat and power (CHP) systems or any non-biomass energy source that emits less than 0.82 metric tons of CO2 per MWh, (3) certain efficiency or capacity additions to nuclear or hydropower facilities that were placed in service before 1992, and (4) electricity from facilities that capture and store CO2. Utility companies can comply with the CES requirement by submitting clean energy credits, making alternative compliance payments (ACP), or a combination thereof. The ACP design element essentially caps the cost of CES compliance. ACP levels start at three cents per kilowatthour in 2015 and increase by 5% annually thereafter. Analysis by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) projects that enactment of S. 2146 could result in the following changes to the U.S. power sector in 2035, compared to EIA's reference case projections: (1) CO2 emissions from electric power facilities decline 44%, (2) electricity from coal decreases by 54%, (3) nuclear power and non-hydro renewable electricity increases by 62% and 34%, respectively, and (4) average electricity prices increase by 18%. EIA also notes that regional price disparity among exempt and non-exempt utilities could range between 3% and 30%. However, it should be noted that any projections over such a long time frame are difficult to accurately predict due to uncertainties associated with assumptions used to make such estimates.
crs_R44006	crs_R44006_0	A surprising number also have statutory minimum terms of imprisonment—for example, "imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years or for life." Under some circumstances, mandatory minimums have proven controversial. Legislative proposals in the 114 th Congress reflect both perspectives. S. 353 (Senator Paul) and H.R. 706 (Representative Scott (VA)) would permit federal courts to impose a sentence below an otherwise applicable mandatory minimum when necessary to avoid violating the sentencing standards found in Section 3553(a). Drug Offenses The Controlled Substances Act and the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act establish a series of mandatory minimum sentences for violation of their prohibitions. 920 (Representative Labrador) would reduce the mandatory minimum sentences for drug traffickers engaged in manufacture, cultivation, or distribution. Safety Valve The so-called safety valve provision of 18 U.S.C. 3553(f) allows a court to sentence qualified defendants below the statutory mandatory minimum in controlled substance trafficking and possession cases. H.R. 1255 (Representative Scott (VA)) would eliminate the sentencing distinction between powder and crack cocaine by eliminating the cocaine base specific references. S. 502 (Senator Lee) and H.R. The bills would instruct the commission to conduct this reexamination with six factors in mind: the need to minimize the risk that the federal prison population would exceed the system's capacity; the findings and recommendations of the Commission's report on mandatory minimum sentences; the fiscal implications of any changes to the Guidelines; relevant public safety concerns; congressional intent to maintain appropriately severe penalties for violent, repeat, and serious drug traffickers; and the need to reduce and prevent racial sentencing disparities. Those prohibitions carry with them mandatory minimum sentences when substantial amounts of marijuana are involved. 1013 (Representative Polis) would eliminate mandatory minimum sentences for trafficking in marijuana by removing marijuana from the coverage of the Controlled Substances Act. Attorney General Reports S. 502 (Senator Lee) and H.R. The mandatory minimums, imposed in addition to the sentence imposed for the underlying crime of violence or drug trafficking, vary, depending upon the circumstances: imprisonment for not less than five years, unless one of the higher mandatory minimums below applies; imprisonment for not less than seven years, if a firearm is brandished; imprisonment for not less than 10 years, if a firearm is discharged; imprisonment for not less than 10 years, if a firearm is a short-barreled rifle or shotgun or is a semi-automatic weapon; imprisonment for not less than 15 years, if the offense involves armor-piercing ammunition; imprisonment for not less than 25 years, if the offender has a prior conviction for violation of Section 924(c); imprisonment for not less than 30 years, if the firearm is a machine gun or destructive device or is equipped with a silencer; and imprisonment for life, if the offender has a prior conviction for violation of Section 924(c) and if the firearm is a machine gun or destructive device or is equipped with a silencer. H.R. 1254 (Representative Scott (VA)) would convert all of Section 924(c)'s mandatory minimum penalties to maximum penalties. So, for example, possession of a shotgun in furtherance of a crime of violence or of drug trafficking would be punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years. H.R. 1254 is a twin of a proposal offered by Representative Scott in the 113 th Congress. S. 847 (Senator McCain) and H.R. 1324(a), 1327, or 1328, to violent crimes and drug trafficking as predicate offenses which trigger Section 924(c)'s mandatory minimum sentences. The proposal has a number of antecedents in the 113 th Congress. A number of proposals would either clarify or expand the reach of those provisions. S. 178 , H.R. Some bills, H.R. The liability for advertising traffickers would require that they knew of or recklessly disregarded the victim's status. S. 178 , H.R.	A surprising number of federal crimes carry mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment; that is, they are punishably by imprisonment for a term of not less than some number of years. During the 114th Congress, Members have introduced a number of related proposals. Some would expand the scope of existing mandatory minimum sentencing provisions; others would contract their reach. The most sweeping proposal is that of Representative Scott (VA) (H.R. 706) and Senator Paul (S. 353), which impacts mandatory minimum sentencing across the board, allowing federal courts to disregard statutory mandatory minimum sentencing requirements in order to avoid conflicts with general sentencing standards. Other proposals are more narrowly drawn, and speak to a particular class of crime. Representative Polis (H.R. 1013), for example, has suggested decriminalizing marijuana, thereby eliminating the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions now associated with marijuana. Several bills, including those offered by Senators Cornyn (S. 178), Feinstein (S. 140), and Kirk (S. 572), as well as those offered by Representatives Poe (H.R. 181, H.R. 296), Granger (H.R. 1201), and Wagner (H.R. 285), would clarify or expand the coverage of a number of federal sex trafficking offenses, in one way or another, thereby increasing the number of defendants facing mandatory minimum sentences. While proposals relating to sex trafficking would largely increase the number of mandatory minimum sentences imposed, most of the proposals relating to drug trafficking would have the opposite impact. Senator Lee's S. 502 and Representative Labrador's H.R. 920, for instance, would reduce the mandatory minimum sentences that accompany a number of drug trafficking offenses. The same bills would expand the so-called safety valve which allows a court to sentence certain low-level drug offenders below the otherwise applicable mandatory minimum sentence. Finally, Representative Scott's H.R. 1255 would eliminate the distinction between powder and crack cocaine, and as a consequence potentially reduce the number of defendants subject to the more severe drug trafficking mandatory minimums. Firearms legislation is more varied. Existing law imposes a series of mandatory minimum sentences when a firearm is associated with the commission of a crime of violence or drug trafficking (18 U.S.C. 924(c)). Representative Scott's H.R. 1254 would convert all of Section 924(c)'s mandatory minimums (not-less-than) to statutory maximums (not-more-than). Senator McCain's S. 847 and Representative McSally's H.R. 1588, on the other hand, would make Section 924(c)'s mandatory minimums available not only in cases involving crimes of violence or drug trafficking, but also those involving the smuggling of aliens. Many of the proposals in the 114th Congress built upon earlier offerings in the 113th Congress, as described in CRS Report R43296, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Legislation in the 113th Congress, by [author name scrubbed].
crs_97-86	crs_97-86_0	Tribes thatoperated their own JOBS program also receive annual appropriations under TANF law of $7.6 million (theirFY1984 funding for JOBS) for work and training activities (renamed Native Employment Works -- NEW). Annual federalfunding, deducted from the basic TANF grant of their state(s), totals $134.2 million (for funding by tribal plan,see Table 1 ). Pending Legislation The House-passed TANF reauthorization bill ( H.R. 4 ) and the Senate Finance Committee substitute version of H.R. The Senate Committee bill also authorizes appropriation of $100 millionannually for five years for a tribal TANF improvement fund, which could be used to provide technical assistanceto tribes, fund competitive grants, and conduct research. Child Care and Child Support The 1996 law reserves between 1% and 2% of its child care funds for payments to Indian tribes and tribal organizations, to be subtracted from national totals. The 1996 welfarelaw authorizes direct federal funding for child support operations to Indian tribes (and, again, Alaska Nativeorganizations) with approved child support plans. TANF Grants for Tribal Family Assistance Programs (as of September 15, 2004) and Their Work Rules a.	The 1996 welfare law (P.L. 104-193) gives federally recognizedIndian tribes (defined to include certain Alaska Native organizations) the option to design and operate their owncash welfare programs for needy children with funds subtracted from their state's block grant for TemporaryAssistance to Needy Families (TANF). As of September 15, 2004, 45 tribal TANF plans were in operation in 16states. Their annual rate of federal funding totaled $134.2 million. The 1996 law also appropriated $7.6 millionannually for work and training activities to tribes in 24 states that operated a pre-TANF work and trainingprogram (now named Native Employment Works -- NEW), authorized direct federal funding to Indian tribes foroperation of child support enforcement programs, and set aside a share of child care funds for them. Theoriginal TANF law was scheduled to expire September 30, 2002, but Congress extended funding through severallaws, most recently through September 30, 2004. Pending are two major TANF reauthorization bills:H.R. 4, as passed by the House, and H.R. 4, as approved by the Senate FinanceCommittee. Both bills would renew tribal TANF grants through FY2008 and make tribal organizations eligiblefor new marriage promotion grants. In addition, the Senate Committee bill would authorize some new funding(tribal improvement fund). This report will be updated for significant developments.
crs_RS21857	crs_RS21857_0	Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross stated at a June 2017 SelectUSA investment summit that the Administration welcomes foreign investment into the U.S. economy. According to Commerce Department data, the increase in foreign direct investment in the United States in 2016, compared to 2015, reflects a 10% drop in net equity investments by foreign-owned firms from $390 billion in 2015 to $352 billion in 2016. As a result of foreign direct investment in the United States, the affiliates of foreign firms that are operating in the United States employ more than 6.6 million U.S. workers, as indicated in Figures 9 and 10. According to the Department of Commerce, about half of these workers are employed by the top six countries. Similarly, one-third of the foreign affiliate employment is in the U.S. manufacturing sector. By number, foreign investors acquired 791 existing U.S. firms, or 43% of foreign direct investment. Foreign Investment and National Security With a few exceptions for national security, U.S. foreign investment policy since the end of World War II has supported and promoted foreign direct investment, both U.S. direct investment abroad and foreign direct investment in the United States. The United States addresses national security concerns related to foreign acquisitions, mergers, or takeovers of existing U.S. firms through a multiagency process known as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). By other measures, foreign-owned manufacturing firms appear to be outperforming their U.S. counterparts. Estimates based on the first three quarters of 2016 indicate that foreign direct investment in the U.S. economy may increase slightly over that recorded in 2015. As the pace of economic growth in the nation increases relative to that of foreign economies, foreign direct investment likely will increase as new investments are attracted to the United States and existing firms are encouraged to reinvest profits in their U.S. operations.	Foreign direct investment in the United States in 2015 increased by 83% over that recorded in 2014. (Note: The United States defines foreign direct investment as the ownership or control, directly or indirectly, by one foreign person [individual, branch, partnership, association, government, etc.] of 10% or more of the voting securities of an incorporated U.S. business enterprise or an equivalent interest in an unincorporated U.S. business enterprise [15 CFR §806.15 (a)(1)].) In 2015, according to U.S. Department of Commerce data, foreigners invested $379 billion in U.S. businesses and real estate, compared with the $207 billion invested in 2014. Foreign direct investments are highly sought after by many state and local governments that are struggling to create additional jobs in their localities. While some in Congress encourage such investment to offset the perceived negative economic effects of U.S. firms investing abroad, others are concerned about foreign acquisitions of U.S. firms that are considered essential to U.S. national and economic security. On October 31, 2013, the Obama Administration launched a new initiative, known as Select USA, to attract more foreign direct investment to the United States. According to the Administration, the aim of the program is to make attracting foreign investment as important a component of U.S. foreign policy as promoting exports. As a result, the President reportedly instructed Commerce and State Department officials to make attracting foreign investment one of their "core priorities." In addition, the program has designated global teams led by U.S. ambassadors in 32 key countries to encourage foreign investment into the United States, and has established a "coordinated process" to connect prospective investors with senior U.S. officials. The initiative (selectusa.commerce.gov) offers a number of tools for foreign investors looking to invest in the United States, including a list of various state and federal programs that may be available to foreign investors.
crs_R42726	crs_R42726_0	Many economists and policy makers argue that reform of the corporate income tax system is needed, although a variety of rationales on why and how have been offered. Many believe it is a combination of these arguments that justify reforming the corporate tax system. Data on which companies pay the corporate tax, corporate tax revenue, and how the U.S. system compares to the rest of the world are then presented and analyzed. Next, the economic effects of the corporate tax are reviewed—including a discussion of the purpose of the corporate tax, who bears the burden of the tax, and how to evaluate alternative corporate tax systems. The corporate income tax is designed as a tax on corporate profits (also known as net income). Corporate Tax Rates Most corporate income is subject to a 35% statutory tax rate. Some of the largest corporate tax expenditures include the domestic production activities deduction (Section 199 deduction) and the deferral of income earned abroad. In 2014, the sum of all corporate tax expenditures was $154.4 billion. Some of this shift can be explained by various legislative and regulatory changes over this time period that reduced the top individual tax rate below the top corporate tax rate (making it more attractive to be a pass-through), increases in the shareholder limit for S corporations, and the ability of LLCs to elect partnership tax status. The share of business income generated by C corporations has also changed over time. There is also substantial variation in taxes paid by corporations in different industries. The corporate tax has also decreased in significance relative to other revenue sources. At its post-WWII peak in 1952, the corporate tax generated 32.1% of all federal tax revenue. In 2013, the corporate tax accounted for 9.9% of federal tax revenue, whereas the individual and payroll taxes generated 47.4% and 34.2%, respectively, of federal revenue. Second, the increasing fraction of business activity that is being carried out by pass-throughs (particularly partnerships and S corporations) has led to an erosion of the corporate tax base. Table 2 compares the statutory tax rate, the weighted effective rate, and the weighted effective marginal rate in the United States to the rest of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. While the U.S. statutory tax rate is about 10 percentage points higher than the other OECD countries, the U.S. effective tax rate is about the same as effective rates found elsewhere. There are a couple of reasons why the United States collects less in federal corporate tax revenue than other countries. The recent change in corporate tax incidence assumptions has important implications for policy analysis. Generally, it is believed that the corporate income tax contributes to the overall progressivity of the U.S. tax system. Policy makers frequently note that the U.S. tax system should be competitive. Corporate tax reforms and corporate tax systems designed to minimize economic distortions can help promote an efficient economy. The differential treatment of domestic and foreign-source income by U.S. multinationals also raises concerns that business decisions of U.S. multinational corporations may be motivated by tax policy. Competitiveness Policy makers often use "competitiveness" as a rationale for corporate tax reform. While the current U.S. system is occasionally referred to as a worldwide tax system, in reality it is actually a hybrid, containing features of both worldwide and territorial tax systems. Comparing Current Corporate and Business Tax Reform Proposals In recent years, economists, lawmakers, and others have offered a number of business and corporate tax reform proposals. While the discussion draft did include text that would reduce the corporate tax rate to 25% (supporting documentation indicated that this rate reduction would be paid for with unspecified base-broadening provisions), the focus of the discussion draft was on provisions that would shift the United States to a territorial tax system. The Administration's proposal would eliminate a number of corporate tax expenditures, and provides options for other corporate reforms.	Many economists and policy makers believe that the U.S. corporate tax system is in need of reform. There is, however, disagreement over why the corporate tax system needs to be reformed, and what specific policy measures should be included in a reform. To assist policy makers in designing and evaluating corporate tax proposals, this report (1) briefly reviews the current U.S. corporate tax system; (2) discusses economic factors that may be considered in the corporate tax reform debate; and (3) presents corporate tax reform policy options, including a brief discussion of current corporate tax reform proposals. The current U.S. corporate income tax system generally taxes corporate income at a rate of 35%. This tax is applied to income earned domestically and abroad, although taxes on certain income earned abroad can be deferred indefinitely if that income remains overseas. The U.S. corporate tax system also contains a number of deductions, exemptions, deferrals, and tax credits, often referred to as "tax expenditures." Collectively, these provisions reduce the effective tax rate paid by many U.S. corporations below the 35% statutory rate. In 2014, the sum of all corporate tax expenditures was $154.4 billion. The significance of the corporate tax as a federal revenue source has declined over time. At its post-WWII peak in 1952, the corporate tax generated 32.1% of all federal tax revenue. In 2013, the corporate tax accounted for 9.9% of federal tax revenue. The decline in corporate revenues is a combination of decreasing effective tax rates, an increasing fraction of business activity that is being carried out by pass-through entities (particularly partnerships and S corporations, which are not subject to the corporate tax), and a decline in corporate sector profitability. A particular aspect of the corporate tax system that receives substantial attention is the 35% statutory corporate tax rate. Although the United States has the world's highest statutory corporate tax rate, the U.S. effective corporate tax rate is similar to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average. Further, the United States collects less in corporate tax revenue relative to Gross Domestic Production (GDP) (2.3% in 2011) than the average of other OECD countries (3.0% in 2011). This report discusses a number of economic considerations that may be made while evaluating various corporate tax reform proposals. These might include analyses of the likely effect on households of certain reforms (also known as incidence analysis). Policy makers might also want to consider how certain corporate tax provisions contribute to the allocation of economic resources, choosing policies that promote an efficient use of resources. Other goals of corporate tax reform may include designing a system that is simple to comply with and administer, while also promoting competitiveness of U.S. corporations. Commonly discussed corporate tax reforms include policies that would broaden the tax base (i.e., eliminate tax expenditures) to finance reduced corporate tax rates. Concerns that the U.S. corporate tax system inefficiently imposes a "double tax" on corporate income have led some to consider an integration of the corporate and individual tax systems. The treatment of pass-through income—business income not earned by C corporations—has also received considerable attention in tax reform debates. How the United States taxes income earned abroad, and the possibility of moving to a territorial tax system, have emerged as important issues.
crs_R44086	crs_R44086_0	Relatedly, are all large businesses also C corporations? Answering these questions may help to better target particular tax, and nontax, policies. This report uses 2015 U.S. Census data to investigate how the size of businesses varies by legal form (corporate and pass-through), as well as the distribution of employment across firm types. Firm size is measured by using employment. The majority of both corporations and pass-throughs in 2011 had fewer than five employees (55% of C corporations and 64% of pass-throughs). Nearly 99% of both corporations and pass-throughs had fewer than 500 employees, the most common employment-based threshold used by the Small Business Administration (SBA). Thus, it appears that based on an employment-based measure of size most businesses were small, with the exact share depending on the definition chosen. Looking further into the data reveals that while the majority of firms were small, the largest firms accounted for the majority of employment. For example, about 53% of all employees worked at firms with 500 or more employees. In contrast, 25% of pass-through employees worked at firms with more than 500 employees. For example, 73% of corporations and 81% of pass-throughs had fewer than 10 employees; 85% of corporations and 91% of pass-throughs had fewer than 20 employees; 97% of corporations and 99% of pass-throughs had fewer than 100 employees; and 99% of corporations and 99.7% of pass-throughs had fewer than 500 employees—the most common employee-based threshold used by the SBA for small business determination. Roughly 76% of corporate employees worked at firms with more than 500 employees in 2015. Thus, nearly a quarter of pass-through workers were employed at the largest firms, while in the corporate sector the share was nearly 76%. Average Number of Employees at the Largest Firms Observing the average number of employees at large firms (more than 500 employees) offers insight into how large the largest firms were in 2015. The average number of employees at the largest C corporations (500 or more employees) was slightly above 4,100, while the average number of employees for pass-throughs was just over 1,100. Among large pass-throughs, partnerships tended to have the most employees on average with 1,203, S-corporations fall in the middle with 1,102 employees on average, and sole proprietorships have the fewest with 1,086 employees on average. Understanding these data may help policymakers when considering tax policy. But the analysis presented here shows this is not the case.	In tax policy discussions it is not uncommon for the terms pass-through and small business to be interchanged, or, similarly, for the terms corporation and large business to be interchanged. This report uses 2015 U.S. Census data to investigate how the size of businesses varies by legal form (corporate versus pass-through). For this report, firm size is based on employment. The analysis finds that the majority of both corporations and pass-throughs in 2015 had fewer than five employees (55% of C corporations and 64% of pass-throughs). Nearly 99% of both corporations and pass-throughs had fewer than 500 employees, the most common employment-based threshold used by the Small Business Administration (SBA). Thus, when using an employment-based measure of size, the majority of all businesses can be considered small, with the exact share depending on the chosen definition of small. Analysis of the data also reveals that while the majority of firms were small, the largest firms accounted for the majority of employment. About 53% of all employees worked at firms (corporate and pass-through) with 500 or more employees in 2015. Looking at this statistic separately for corporations and pass-throughs, 76% of corporate employees worked at firms with more than 500 employees, while 25% of pass-through employees worked at firms with more than 500 employees. Thus, while a greater proportion of workers in the corporate sector were employed by the largest firms, the proportion of pass-through employees employed at the largest firms was not small. The average number of employees at large firms (more than 500 employees) was computed to gain insight into how large the largest firms were in 2015. There was a substantial difference in the average number of employees at large firms that were corporations as opposed to pass-throughs. The average number of employees at the largest C corporations (500 or more employees) was 4,143, while the average number of employees for pass-throughs was 1,141. Among large pass-throughs, partnerships tended to have the most employees on average with 1,203, S-corporations fall in the middle with 1,102 employees on average, and sole proprietorships have the fewest with 1,086 employees on average. Understanding the data presented in this report may help policymakers when considering tax and nontax policies. Specifically, it may help to better target policies that are geared toward affecting businesses of a particular size.
crs_RS20792	crs_RS20792_0	U.S. Participation in the MDBs The United States is a member of five multilateral development banks (MDBs): the World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (AsDB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). It also belongs to two similar organizations, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the North American Development Bank (NADBank). The World Bank also administers trust funds, focused on particular global issues such as food security and the environment. Except for the EBRD, which makes only market-based loans, all the MDBs make both market-based loans to middle-income developing countries and concessional loans to the poorest countries. The MDBs also have specialized facilities which have their own operating staff and management but report to the bank's president and executive board. The NADBank was created by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to fund environmental infrastructure projects in the U.S.-Mexico border region. The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), created in 1977, focuses on reducing poverty and hunger in poor countries through agricultural development. Finally, the World Bank also serves as the trustee for several targeted multilateral development funds, for which the Administration has requested and Congress has appropriated funds. These multilateral funds include the Clean Technology Fund (CTF), the Strategic Climate Fund (SCF), the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP). U.S. Appropriations for MDBs Figure 1 , Figure 2 , and Tables 1-4 show the amounts the Administration has requested and Congress has appropriated annually since FY2000 to the multilateral development banks. The uptick was driven largely by capital increases for the nonconcessional lending facilities at the MDBs in response to the global financial crisis, as well as the proliferation of trust funds administered by the World Bank focused on specific policy issues. President Trump campaigned on an "America First" platform and has signaled a reorientation of U.S. foreign policy. For FY2019, the Trump Administration requested $1.42 billion for the MDBs, a 16% cut from the amount appropriated in FY2017. The bulk of the request—$1.32 billion, about 90%—would fund U.S. commitments to concessional lending facilities at the MDBs, particularly IDA.	This report shows in tabular form how much the Administration requested and how much Congress appropriated for U.S. payments to the multilateral development banks (MDBs) since 2000. Multilateral development banks provide financial assistance to developing countries in order to promote economic and social development. The United States belongs to several multilateral development banks, including the World Bank and four regional development banks (the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development). It also belongs to the North American Development Bank, which is a binational (U.S.-Mexico) development bank; the International Fund for Agricultural Development, which focuses on poverty and hunger in developing countries; and several trust funds administered by the World Bank, which focus on specific global issues, such as food security and the environment. The United States appropriates funding on an annual basis to various multilateral development banks and related funds. In FY2018, U.S. appropriations for MDB programs totaled $1.5 billion. Most of the FY2018 funding (about 90%) went to the concessional lending facilities at the MDBs, which provide grants and low-cost loans to the world's poorest countries. Congress also provided funding for the African Development Bank, IFAD, and the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), administered by the World Bank. The Treasury Department manages U.S. participation in the MDBs, and the Administration's request is submitted as part of Treasury International Programs. For FY2019, the Administration has requested $1.4 billion for the MDBs and related funds. Most of the funding would go to the concessional lending facilities at the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. It would also provide funding for the African Development Bank. The Administration has proposed cutting U.S. contributions to IFAD and reducing U.S. contributions to the GEF. For further information about the MDBs and relevant U.S. policy process, see the following CRS reports: CRS Report R41170, Multilateral Development Banks: Overview and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R41537, Multilateral Development Banks: How the United States Makes and Implements Policy, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; CRS In Focus IF10144, The Global Environment Facility (GEF), by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R44890, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2018 Budget and Appropriations, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]
crs_R41038	crs_R41038_0	Introduction The purpose of this report is to provide a broad, but by no means exhaustive, survey of federal statutes that specifically refer to race, gender, or ethnicity as factors to be considered in the administration of any federal program. Such measures may include, but are not limited to, goals, timetables, set-asides, quotas, priorities, and preferences, as those terms are generally (however imperfectly) understood. Based on searches of the LEXIS/NEXIS and WESTLAW legal databases using a variety of search strategies, the compilation reflects our effort to be as comprehensive as possible. Nonetheless, included are any statutes found during the course of our research that appear, in any manner, to prefer or consider race, gender, or ethnicity as affirmative factors in federal employment, in the award of federal contracts, or in granting any federal benefit to individuals or institutions. Several laws directed to "socially and economically disadvantaged" individuals, groups, and institutions are included because, as explained below, that term has been defined administratively and by statute to presumptively apply to specific racial or ethnic minorities or women.	This report provides a broad, but by no means exhaustive, survey of federal statutes that specifically refer to race, gender, or ethnicity as factors to be considered in the administration of any federal program. Such measures may include, but are not limited to, goals, timetables, set-asides, quotas, priorities, and preferences, as those terms are generally (however imperfectly) understood. Based on searches of the LEXIS/NEXIS and WESTLAW legal databases using a variety of search strategies, the compilation seeks to be as comprehensive as possible. With certain noted exceptions, the report collectively describes those statutes found during the course of our research that appear, in any manner, to prefer or consider race, gender, or ethnicity as affirmative factors in federal employment, in the award of federal contracts, or in granting any federal benefit to individuals, groups, or institutions. Several laws directed to "socially and economically disadvantaged" individuals, groups, and institutions are included because, as more fully explained by the report, that term has been defined administratively and by statute to presumptively apply to specific racial or ethnic minorities or women.
crs_RL34751	crs_RL34751_0	Overview The military retirement system is a government-funded benefit system that has been viewed historically as a significant incentive in retaining a career military force. The defined benefit includes a monthly annuity for qualified active and reserve retirees paid out of the Military Retirement Fund. The amount of the retirement annuity depends on time served and basic pay at retirement. Military retirees are also entitled to nonmonetary benefits, which include exchange and commissary privileges, medical care through TRICARE, and access to Morale, Welfare and Recreation facilities and programs. For reserve component personnel, the system is based on points , and reservists do not generally begin to receive retired pay until the age of 60. In FY2017, approximately $53.5 billion was paid to approximately 2 million military retirees, and an additional $3.9 billion was paid to 319,431 survivors. In the past, some have viewed military retirement as a place where substantial savings could be made, arguing that the military retirement compensation is overly generous relative to pension systems in the civilian sector. In addition, some have argued that past modifications to the system intended to save money have had a deleterious effect on military recruiting and retention, particularly in times of strong economic performance. While congressionally mandated changes to the military retirement system have been infrequent, any potential changes are closely monitored by current servicemembers, retirees, survivors and the veterans' service organizations that support them. Some disability retirees are retired before becoming eligible for longevity retirement, while others have completed 20 or more years of service. A defined benefit plan similar to the current High Three system that would vest personnel at 10 years of service, with benefits to begin either at age 60 (for personnel who have served less than 20 years of service) or age 57 (for those that served more than 20 years of service). 112-239 mandated that the commission comply with conditions that would grandfather existing servicemembers and retirees into the existing retirement system, stating: (i) For members of the uniformed services as of such date, who became members before the enactment of such an Act, the monthly amount of their retired pay may not be less than they would have received under the current military compensation and retirement system, nor may the date at which they are eligible to receive their military retired pay be adjusted to the financial detriment of the member.	The military retirement system is a government-funded, noncontributory, defined benefit system that has historically been viewed as a significant incentive in retaining a career military force. The system currently includes monthly compensation for qualified active and reserve retirees, disability benefits for those deemed medically unfit to serve, and a survivor annuity program for the eligible survivors of deceased retirees. The amount of compensation is dependent on time served, basic pay at retirement, and annual Cost-of-Living-Adjustments (COLAs). Military retirees are also entitled to nonmonetary benefits including exchange and commissary privileges, medical care through TRICARE, and access to Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR) facilities and programs. Currently, there are three general categories of military retiree, active component, reserve component, and disability retiree. Active component personnel are eligible for retirement (i.e., vested) after completing 20 years of service (YOS). Reserve personnel are eligible after 20 years of creditable service based on a points system, but do not typically begin to draw retirement pay until age 60. Finally, those with a disability retirement do not need to have served 20 years to be eligible for retired pay; however, they must have been found unqualified for further service due to a permanent, stable disability. In FY2017, approximately $57 billion was paid to 2.3 million military retirees and survivors. Given the size of the program, some have viewed military retirement as a place where substantial budgetary savings could be made. Others have argued that past modifications intended to save money have had a deleterious effect on military recruiting and retention. Military retirees, families, and veterans' service organizations closely monitor potential changes to the retirement system. When considering alternatives to the current system, Congress may choose to consider the balance among the benefits of the military retirement system as a retention incentive, budget constraints, and the needs and concerns of their constituents.
crs_97-97	crs_97-97_0	101-619 ) to renew the federal role in environmental education and reestablish an office of environmental education within EPA. P.L. Since the beginning of the program in FY1992, EPA has awarded grants for environmental education projects in each of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories for educating elementary and secondary school students, training teachers, purchasing textbooks, developing curricula, and other educational activities. Appropriations The original funding authorization for EPA's environmental education program expired at the end of FY1996. Congress has continued to fund the program since then through the annual appropriations process without enacting reauthorizing legislation. Congress returned funding to previous levels in FY2008, appropriating $8.9 million. Although funding for the program has continued, the President has proposed to eliminate its funding in his annual budget requests each year since FY2003, including his FY2009 budget request. In response, Congress has continued the program's funding each year. As introduced on August 2, 2007, the No Child Left Inside Act of 2007 ( S. 1981 ) would expand the federal role in environmental education by creating an Office of Environmental Education within the Department of Education to administer new grant programs intended to supplement EPA's existing program. In addition to creating a new role for the Department of Education, H.R. 3036 would further amend the National Environmental Education Act of 1990 to reauthorize funding for EPA's existing program in FY2009 and to require the integration of certain activities into EPA's teacher training program, such as "scientifically valid" research (as defined in the bill), technology-based teaching, interdisciplinary instruction, and outdoor learning. H.R. Two other bills in the 110 th Congress would address environmental education within the more specific contexts of environmental justice and climate change.	The federal role in environmental education has been an ongoing issue. For nearly two decades, EPA has been the primary federal agency responsible for providing financial assistance to schools to support environmental education. The National Environmental Education Act of 1990 ( P.L. 101-619 ) established a program within EPA to award grants for educating elementary and secondary school students and training teachers in environmental subjects, and to fund other related activities. The President has proposed to eliminate this program in his annual budget requests each year since FY2003, and did not include any funding for the program in his FY2009 budget request. In response to strong interest at the state and local level, Congress has continued to fund the program each year, appropriating $8.9 million for FY2008. Although Congress has continued to fund the program through the appropriations process, the original funding authorization in the National Environmental Education Act of 1990 expired at the end of FY1996. As passed by the House, H.R. 3036 would reauthorize funding for EPA's environmental education program in FY2009, require the integration of certain elements into the agency's teacher training program, and expand the federal role in environmental education by authorizing a new grant program within the Department of Education. As introduced, S. 1981 also would create a new role for the Department of Education in supporting environmental education, but would not reauthorize funding for EPA's existing program nor amend any aspects of it. As introduced, H.R. 5902 and H.R. 6316 would address environmental education in the more specific contexts of environmental justice and climate change, respectively.
crs_RL34759	crs_RL34759_0	The purpose of this report is to examine three labor issues and arguments related to the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (CFTA): violence against trade unionists; impunity (accountability for or punishment of the perpetrators); and worker rights protections for Colombians. For general issues relating to the CFTA, see CRS Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Background and Issues , by [author name scrubbed]. For background on Colombia and its political situation and context for the agreement, see CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]. Opponents of the U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement argued against it on three points: (1) the high rate of violence (homicides, arbitrary detentions/kidnappings, and death threats) against trade unionists in Colombia; (2) the lack of adequate punishment for the perpetrators of that violence; and (3) weak Colombian enforcement of International Labor Organization (ILO) core labor principles, the Conventions behind them, and their own labor laws. Proponents of the agreement primarily argued for the Colombia FTA on the basis of economic and national security benefits. They also argued that it will reinforce the rule of law, spread values of capitalism in Colombia, and anchor hemispheric stability. Proponents specifically respond to the above labor complaints that (1) homicides and kidnappings against trade unionists have declined dramatically since former President Álvaro Uribe took office in 2002; (2) substantial progress is being made on the impunity issue as the government has undertaken great efforts to find perpetrators and bring them to justice; and (3) the Colombian government is taking steps to improve conditions for workers. Possible Implications The Colombia FTA (along with Panama and South Korea) is in the second set of FTAs (after Peru) to have some labor enforcement "teeth." Labor provisions including the four basic ILO core labor principles (enumerated previously) would be enforceable through the same dispute settlement procedures as for all other provisions, such a those for commercial interests. Opponents argued that under the CFTA, only the concepts of core labor principles, and not the details of the ILO Conventions behind them, would be enforceable. Proponents pointed to recent Colombian progress in protecting workers on many fronts. Opponents argued that delaying the vote on the CFTA further would give Colombia more time to keep improving protections for its workers. Proponents argued that the window of opportunity to pass the CFTA may be relatively narrow, and that approval of the FTA and the economic growth in Colombia that would result is the best way to protect Colombia's trade unionists. They also argued that not passing the agreement would not resolve Colombia's labor issues. Passage of the Colombia FTA implementing legislation on October 21, 2011 ( P.L. 112-42 ), opens up a new lens through which to observe Colombia's progress relating to labor rights.	This report examines three labor issues and arguments related to the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (CFTA), signed on October 21, 2011 (P.L. 112-42): violence against trade unionists; impunity (accountability for or punishment of the perpetrators); and worker rights protections for Colombians. For general issues relating to the CFTA, see CRS Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Background and Issues, by [author name scrubbed]. For background on Colombia and its political situation and context for the agreement, see CRS Report RL32250, Colombia: Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. Opponents of the U.S.-Colombia free trade agreement (CFTA) argued against it on three points: (1) the high rate of violence against trade unionists in Colombia; (2) the lack of adequate punishment for the perpetrators of that violence; and (3) weak Colombian enforcement of International Labor Organization (ILO) core labor standards and Colombia's labor laws. Proponents of the agreement argued primarily for the Colombia FTA on the basis of economic and national security benefits. Accordingly, they argued, the CFTA would support increased exports, expand economic growth, create jobs, and open up investment opportunities for the United States. They also argued that it would reinforce the rule of law, spread values of capitalism in Colombia, and anchor hemispheric stability. Proponents specifically responded to labor complaints of the opponents, that (1) violence against trade unionists has declined dramatically since former President Álvaro Uribe took office in 2002; (2) substantial progress is being made on the impunity issue as the government has undertaken great efforts to find perpetrators and bring them to justice; and (3) the Colombian government is taking steps to improve conditions for workers. The most recent steps are outlined in the "Colombian Action Plan Related to Labor Rights," released and jointly endorsed by President Obama and Colombian President Juan Manual Santos, on April 7, 2011. The Colombia FTA, along with FTAs for Panama and South Korea, are the second set of FTAs (after Peru) to have some labor enforcement "teeth." Labor provisions including the four basic ILO core labor principles are enforceable through the same dispute settlement procedures as for all other provisions (i.e., primarily those for commercial interests). Opponents argued that under CFTA, only the concepts of core labor principles, and not the details of the ILO conventions behind them, would be enforceable. Proponents pointed to recent Colombian progress in protecting workers on many fronts. They argued that approval of the FTA and the economic growth in Colombia that would result is the best way to protect Colombia's trade unionists. They also argued that not passing the agreement would not resolve Colombia's labor issues. In addition, they argued, the United States could lose jobs through trade diversion as Colombia continues to enter into regional trade agreements with other countries. Opponents argued that delaying approval of the CFTA further would give Colombia more time to keep improving protections for its workers. In fact, proponents point out, this has occurred in the five years between 2011 when Congress approved the implementing legislation, and 2006, when the agreement was first signed.
crs_R44090	crs_R44090_0	Recent reports in the scientific literature and popular press have created some confusion about the GHG emissions profile and the subsequent climate implications of natural gas. On the one hand, a shift to natural gas is promoted as climate change mitigation because it has a lower CO 2 emissions intensity than either oil or coal (i.e., it is commonly stated that natural gas has half the CO 2 emissions intensity of coal). On the other hand, methane—the primary constituent of natural gas—is itself a more potent GHG than CO 2 per unit of mass, and some contend that methane leakage from the production, transport, and use of natural gas has the potential to offset the GHG emissions benefits of switching. Debate continues as to whether the increased production and use of natural gas brings net benefits to the general economy, including jobs, investments, infrastructure, national security, human health, safety, and the environment. Specifically, it presents a comparative analysis of the potential climate implications of switching from coal to natural gas in the domestic electric power generating sector. 2295 , S. 15 , S. 411 , S. 1196 , and S. 1276 ); Bills that would streamline the approval, permitting, and/or construction of natural gas infrastructure (including H.R. Many of these proposals promote technology and infrastructure investments that could be significant and long lasting. For this reason, some stakeholders recommend a thorough analysis of the costs and benefits of these proposals as well as a full assessment of the economic and environmental impacts of increased natural gas development. Some see a comparative analysis of the GHG emissions from the production and use of natural gas and other fossil fuels to be a significant component in this assessment. The net climate impact of replacing other fossil fuels with natural gas depends upon a number of analytic choices, including the following: The fuel being replaced (e.g., coal, fuel oil, gasoline, diesel), The end-use sector (e.g., electricity generation, transportation, home heating), The equipment or facility within the sector (e.g., all existing power plants, only the least efficient existing power plants, new power plant configurations), The rate and extent to which a sector will be converted, The time period over which the impacts will be estimated, The fuel cycle (e.g., combustion cycle, production cycle, "cradle-to-grave") and specific production processes modeled (e.g., conventional vertical wells, hydraulically fractured horizontal wells), and The GHGs modeled (e.g., CO 2 , methane, nitrous oxide). Natural gas, when combusted at different types of existing U.S. power plants, produces anywhere from 42% to 63% of the CO 2 emissions of coal, depending upon the power plant technology. However, in order to more fully assess the climate impacts of a fuel employed in the power sector, analyses aim to aggregate emissions across the entire supply and utilization chain (i.e., from extraction to end use). Such analyses are referred to as life-cycle assessments (LCAs). Due to its potency as a GHG, methane lost to the atmosphere during the production and transport of fossil fuels can greatly impact the life-cycle GHG emissions estimates for power generation. DOE and EPA currently estimate a FER of around 1% in natural gas systems; a number of academic studies estimate FERs in the range of 2%-4%. Further, due to its chemical composition, methane's climate impacts are significantly more pronounced in the short term as compared to the long term. Thus, when considering existing power plants, a natural-gas-fired combined cycle power plant produces approximately 50% of the life-cycle GHG emissions of a coal-fired steam generator, both in the short and the long terms, given a FER of around 1% in natural gas systems. However, when considering other existing natural-gas-fired technologies (e.g. single cycle), or advanced technologies, the comparative life-cycle emissions benefits of natural gas are reduced. Further, when considering the possibility of higher fugitive emissions rates for natural gas production and transport activities (e.g., 2%-4%), the life-cycle GHG emissions of existing natural-gas-fired technology could be comparable to coal-fired power generation initially (within 5%-35%) and could remain within range of the coal plant's life-cycle emissions over the first 20 after the emissions (within 20%-40%). A full assessment of the costs and benefits of fuel-switching strategies would demand an integrated analysis across all issues.	Recent expansion in natural gas production has made the resource an increasingly significant component in the U.S. energy market. Further, a number of policies recently proposed and/or promulgated at the federal, state, and local levels may serve to accelerate this development. Examples of federal policies include U.S. Environmental Protection Agency air standards for power plants and vehicles, as well as bills introduced in the 114th Congress to promote increased natural gas production on federal lands, amend provisions in the tax code to incentivize natural gas production and use, and streamline the approval, permitting, and/or construction of natural gas infrastructure. Many of these proposals promote technology and infrastructure investments that could be significant and long lasting. For this reason, some stakeholders recommend a thorough analysis of the costs and benefits of these proposals as well as a full assessment of the economic and environmental impacts of increased natural gas development. Fuel-switching strategies from other fossil fuels to natural gas have the potential to impact many segments of the general economy, including jobs, investments, infrastructure, national security, human health, safety, and the environment. A full assessment of the costs and benefits of these strategies would demand an integrated analysis across all issues. Some contend that an important component of this assessment would be a comparative analysis of the various fuels' greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. However, reports in the scientific literature and popular press have created some confusion about the climate implications of natural gas. On the one hand, a shift to natural gas is promoted as climate change mitigation because natural gas combustion has a lower carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions intensity than either oil or coal. On the other hand, methane, the primary constituent of natural gas, is itself a more potent GHG than CO2, and some contend that methane leakage from the production, transport, and use of natural gas has the potential to offset the GHG emissions benefits of switching. The net climate impact of replacing other fossil fuels with natural gas depends upon a number of analytic assumptions, including the choice of fuel, end-use sector, equipment, and processes modeled. This report presents a comparative analysis of the potential climate implications of switching from coal to natural gas in the domestic electric power generating sector. The findings include the following: Natural gas, when combusted at different types of existing U.S. power plants, produces anywhere from 42% to 63% of the CO2 emissions of coal, depending upon the power plant technology. However, in order to more fully assess the climate impacts of a fuel employed in the power sector, analyses aim to aggregate emissions across the entire supply and utilization chain (i.e., from extraction to end use). Such analyses are referred to as life-cycle assessments (LCAs). Due to its potency as a GHG, methane lost to the atmosphere during the production and transport of fossil fuels (i.e., fugitive emissions) can greatly impact the life-cycle GHG emissions estimates for power generation. The Department of Energy currently estimates a fugitive emissions rate (FER) of around 1% in natural gas systems; a number of academic studies estimate rates in the range of 2%-4%. Further, due to its chemical composition, methane's climate impacts are significantly more pronounced in the short term as compared to the long term. Thus, when considering existing power plants, the average natural-gas-fired combined cycle technology produces approximately 50% of the life-cycle GHG emissions of coal-fired steam generation, both in the short and the long terms, given a FER of around 1%. However, when considering other existing natural-gas-fired technologies (e.g. single cycle) or advanced technologies, the comparative life-cycle emissions benefits of natural gas are reduced. Further, when considering the possibility of higher FERs (e.g., 2%-4%), the life-cycle GHG emissions of both existing and advanced natural-gas-fired technology may be comparable to coal-fired technology in the short term and could remain within range of coal-fired technology for several decades after emissions.
crs_R41332	crs_R41332_0	Background Severity of the 2008-2009 Recession The 2008-2009 recession was long and deep, and according to several indicators was the most severe economic contraction since the 1930s (but still much less severe than the Great Depression). The slowdown of economic activity was moderate through the first half of 2008, but at that point the weakening economy was overtaken by a major financial crisis that would exacerbate the economic weakness and accelerate the decline. Congress was an active participant in the emergence of these policy responses and has an ongoing interest in macroeconomic conditions. Current macroeconomic concerns include whether the economic recovery will be sustained, reducing unemployment, speeding a return to normal output and employment growth, and addressing government's long-term debt situation. Moreover, in 2011-2012, the sharply fading effects of fiscal stimulus and weaker growth in Europe have likely dampened economic growth. The Shape of Economic Recovery In the typical post-war business cycle, lower than normal growth of aggregate demand during the recession is quickly followed by a recovery period with above normal growth of spending, perhaps spurred by some degree of monetary and fiscal stimulus. This above normal growth brings the economy back more quickly to the pre-recession growth path, and speeds up the reentry of the unemployed to the workforce. There is concern, however, that this time the U.S. economy, without supporting stimulus from policy actions, will either not return to its pre-recession growth path, perhaps remain permanently below it, or return to the pre-crisis path but at a slower than normal pace, or worse, dip into a second recession. The next sections of this report discuss problems on the supply side and the demand side of the economy that could lead to a weaker than normal recovery. Has the recent financial crisis caused a reduction in the potential output of the U.S. economy and placed it on a lower trend growth path? Policy Responses to Increase the Pace of Economic Recovery The momentum of the current economic recovery has been assisted by injections of fiscal and monetary stimulus. In regard to the long-term debt problem, it is often pointed out that for an economy operating close to potential output, government borrowing to finance budget deficits will draw down the pool of national saving, leaving less available to support private capital investment. However, the U.S. economy is currently operating well short of capacity and market interest rates are generally at or near historical lows, making the risk of such "crowding out" occurring and damaging future economic growth not seem immediate. Once the short-term problem of weak demand is solved and the economy has returned to a normal growth path, the appropriate policy response for an economy with a looming debt crisis is arguably fiscal consolidation—cutting deficits. Such a policy is thought to have the benefits of low and stable interest rates, a less fragile financial system, improved investment prospects, and possibly faster long-term growth. A Lesson from the Great Depression One of the important lessons from the Great Depression is to avoid a hasty withdrawal of fiscal and monetary stimulus in a fragile economy still recovering from a sharp economic decline.	The 2007-2009 recession was long and deep, and according to several indicators was the most severe economic contraction since the 1930s (but still much less severe than the Great Depression). The slowdown of economic activity was moderate through the first half of 2008, but at that point the weakening economy was overtaken by a major financial crisis that would exacerbate the economic weakness and accelerate the decline. Economic recovery began in mid-2009. Real gross domestic product (GDP) has been on a positive track since then, although the pace has been uneven and slowed significantly in 2011. The stock market has recovered from its lows, and employment has increased moderately. On the other hand, significant economic weakness remains evident, particularly in the balance sheet of households, the labor market, and the housing sector. Congress was an active participant in the policy responses to this crisis and has an ongoing interest in macroeconomic conditions. Current macroeconomic concerns include whether the economy is in a sustained recovery, rapidly reducing unemployment, speeding a return to normal output and employment growth, and addressing government's long-term debt problem. In the typical post-war business cycle, lower than normal growth during the recession is quickly followed by a recovery period with above normal growth. This above normal growth serves to speed up the reentry of the unemployed to the workforce. Once the economy reaches potential output (and full employment), growth returns to its normal growth path, where the pace of aggregate spending advances in step with the pace of aggregate supply. There is concern that this time the U.S. economy will either not return to its pre-recession growth path but perhaps remain permanently below it, or return to the pre-crisis path but at a slower than normal pace. Problems on the supply side and the demand side of the economy have so far led to a weaker than normal recovery. If the pace of private spending proves insufficient to assure a sustained recovery, would further stimulus by monetary and fiscal policy be warranted? One lesson from the Great Depression is to guard against a too hasty withdrawal of fiscal and monetary stimulus in an economy recovering from a deep decline. The removal of fiscal and monetary stimulus in 1937 is thought to have stopped a recovery and caused a slump that did not end until WWII. Opponents of further stimulus maintain that the accumulation of additional government debt would lower future economic growth, but supporters argue that additional stimulus is the appropriate near-term policy. Moreover, in 2011-2012, the sharply fading effects of fiscal stimulus and weaker growth in Europe have likely dampened economic growth. In regard to the long-term debt problem, in an economy operating close to potential output, government borrowing to finance budget deficits will in theory draw down the pool of national saving, crowding out private capital investment and slowing long-term growth. However, the U.S. economy is currently operating well short of capacity and the risk of such crowding out occurring is therefore low in the near term. Once the cyclical problem of weak demand is resolved and the economy has returned to a normal growth path, mainstream economists' consensus policy response for an economy with a looming debt crisis is fiscal consolidation—cutting deficits. Such a policy would have the benefits of low and stable interest rates, a less fragile financial system, improved investment prospects, and possibly faster long-term growth.
crs_RS21326	crs_RS21326_0	Background Environmental issues have received growing attention in trade liberalization debates as trade agreements have broadened in scope, from primarily involving negotiations to reduce tariffs, to including negotiations on nontariff trade barriers. Congressional interest in addressing environmental concerns in trade agreements has extended to the debate over renewing the President's trade promotion authority (TPA). This authority expired in 1994. The Trade Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-210 , Title XXI) renews the President's Trade Promotion Authority. The environment-related negotiating objectives and priorities included in the new law are discussed below. They further called for making such actions subject to dispute settlement procedures. Perhaps most notably, the new law states that it is a principal negotiating objective "to ensure that a party to a trade agreement with the United States does not fail to effectively enforce its environmental or labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the United States and that party ... ." A related objective is to recognize that parties retain the right to exercise discretion with respect to prosecutorial, regulatory and compliance matters and to make decisions regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to other environmental matters determined to have higher priorities. The Act parallels the U.S.-Jordan FTA and goes beyond NAFTA by calling for the inclusion within the texts of trade agreements of an obligation for parties to enforce their environmental laws. Environmental groups favored adding language in the investment objectives that would direct negotiators to seek provisions in trade agreements to limit expropriation provisions and otherwise protect legitimate environmental measures from challenge by foreign investors. The failure of this and related proposals resulted in reduced support for the Trade Act by some in Congress.	During the past decade, environmental issues have received increased attention in trade liberalization negotiations, and the question of how to address such concerns in trade agreements became a key issue in the debate over renewing the President's trade promotion authority (TPA). Under this authority, Congress agrees to consider trade agreements using expedited procedures and to vote up or down, with no amendments. With the Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210), Congress renewed the President's trade promotion authority. The Act includes more environment-related provisions than previous TPA legislation, and generally follows language contained in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), its environmental side agreement, and the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement. The Act includes negotiating objectives that call for negotiators to ensure that parties do not fail to effectively enforce their environmental laws in a manner affecting trade, and to make such failures subject to dispute settlement. Another objective seeks language in trade agreements committing parties not to weaken environmental laws to attract trade. The Act also calls for greater openness in proceedings related to trade disputes. It does not include an objective to protect environmental measures from challenge by foreign investors, and consequently, the Act lost some support in Congress and from environmental groups. This report discusses the environment-related provisions of the new law. It will be updated as events warrant.
crs_RL30340	crs_RL30340_0	This report addresses Subtitle II, which includes 92 congressionally chartered corporations. Patriotic and National Organizations: Subtitle II The chartering by Congress of organizations with a patriotic, charitable, historical, educational, or other eleemosynary purpose is essentially a 20 th century practice. Title 36 of the U.S. Code, where such corporate organizations are listed with their charters, was revised in 1998 ( P.L. The attraction of Title 36 status for national organizations is that it tends to provide an "official" imprimatur to their activities and, to that extent, it may provide them prestige and indirect financial benefit. These organization generally do not receive direct appropriations, they exercise no federal powers, their debts are not covered by the full faith and credit of the United States, and they do not enjoy original jurisdiction in the federal courts. A corporate body created by Congress, however, may be designated as a citizen of the United states for judicial purposes. Traditionally, the Senate Judiciary Committee has deferred to the House committee on these matters. Indeed, this has been the case in several instances in recent years. Although the charter does not award any material governmental status to the nonprofit corporation (e.g., right of eminent domain) there is an understandable assumption on the part of the public that somehow the charter signifies U.S. government approval of the corporation's activities and that the corporation is being supervised. The House Judiciary Committee's subcommittee of jurisdiction concluded that the chartering process served no useful public purpose and issued a moratorium on bills to issue new charters in 1989.	The chartering by Congress of organizations with a patriotic, charitable, historical, or educational purpose is essentially a 20th century practice. There are currently some 92 nonprofit corporations listed in Title 36, Subtitle II, of the U.S. Code. These so-called "Title 36 corporations," such as the Girl Scouts of America and the National Academy of Public Administration, are typically incorporated first under state law, then request that Congress grant them a congressional or federal charter. Chartered corporations listed in Title 36 are not agencies of the United States, and their charters only rarely assign the corporate bodies any governmental attributes. For instance, the corporation's debt is not guaranteed, explicitly or implicitly, by the full faith and credit of the United States. The attraction of Title 36 status for national organizations is that it tends to provide an "official" imprimatur to their activities, and to that extent it may provide them prestige and indirect financial benefit. In recent years, some in Congress have expressed concern that the public may be misled by its chartering process into believing that somehow the U.S. government approves and supervises the corporations, when in fact this is not the case. As a consequence, the House Judiciary Committee's subcommittee of jurisdiction instituted a moratorium on granting new charters in 1989. (The Senate generally defers to the House on chartering matters.) On several recent occasions, however, Congress has established Title 36 corporations despite the moratorium. This report will be updated in the event of a significant development.
crs_RS21344	crs_RS21344_0	The EU has long viewed the enlargement process as an historic opportunity to further the integration of the continent by peaceful means. Analysts contend that the carefully managed process of enlargement is one of the EU's most powerful policy tools and has helped transform former dictatorships such as Spain and many of the former communist states of Central and Eastern Europe into stable democracies and free market economies. The EU maintains that the enlargement door remains open to any European country, including Turkey and those of the Western Balkans, able to fulfill the EU's political and economic criteria for membership. Croatia is the newest member state, joining the EU on July 1, 2013. Evolution of the European Union The EU is the latest stage in a process of European integration aimed at promoting political reconciliation and economic prosperity throughout the European continent. At the same time, EU enlargement is very much a political process; most all steps on the path to accession require the unanimous agreement of the existing member states. As such, a prospective EU candidate's relationship or conflicts with individual member states may significantly influence a country's EU accession prospects and timeline. Current EU Candidates Currently, five countries are considered by the EU as official candidates for membership: Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey. Iceland's accession negotiations, however, have been on hold since May 2013, following the election of a new center-right coalition government largely opposed to EU membership. Macedonia has not yet secured a start date for accession negotiations. For years, this has been due largely to a long-running disagreement with Greece over the country's official name. The remaining Western Balkan states of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo are all officially recognized by the EU as potential candidates, but their accession prospects and timetables vary (see the text box on the next page for more information); most analysts believe that it will likely be many more years before any of these countries are ready to join the EU. Despite Croatia's recent accession and the EU's membership commitment to the other Western Balkan countries, experts assert that a number of European leaders and many EU citizens remain cautious about further EU enlargement. Apprehensions about continued EU enlargement seem to be driven by several issues. Nevertheless, such concerns persist, especially when considering the accession of big, relatively less affluent countries such as Turkey or possibly Ukraine in the longer term. Some key EU member states may fear that an ever-expanding Union could ultimately weaken their ability to set the tone and agenda in EU institutions and to drive EU policies. Moreover, commentators suggest that the EU's recent economic problems and sovereign debt crisis—which have hit the countries of the Eurozone particularly hard—could potentially slow future rounds of EU enlargement. Administrations and many Members of Congress have long backed EU enlargement, believing that it serves U.S. interests by advancing democracy and economic prosperity, and thereby creating strong European political allies and trading partners. Over the years, the only significant U.S. criticism of the EU's enlargement process has been that the Union was moving too slowly, especially with respect to Turkey. Successive U.S. Periodically, however, U.S. pressure to promote Turkey's EU accession prospects has generated tensions with the EU. Some U.S. officials remain concerned that "enlargement fatigue," as well as the EU's financial crisis, could hinder additional EU expansion.	The European Union (EU) has long viewed the enlargement process as an extraordinary opportunity to promote political stability and economic prosperity in Europe. Since 2004, EU membership has grown from 15 to 28 countries, bringing in most states of Central and Eastern Europe and fulfilling an historic pledge to further the integration of the continent by peaceful means. Croatia is the EU's newest member, acceding to the EU on July 1, 2013. Analysts contend that the carefully managed process of enlargement is one of the EU's most powerful policy tools, and that, over the years, it has helped transform many European states into functioning democracies and more affluent countries. The EU maintains that the enlargement door remains open to any European country that fulfills the EU's political and economic criteria for membership. At the same time, EU enlargement is also very much a political process; most all significant steps on the long path to accession require the unanimous agreement of the existing 28 member states. As such, a prospective EU candidate's relationship or conflicts with individual member states may also influence a country's EU accession prospects and timeline. Currently, five countries are recognized by the EU as official candidates for membership: Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey. All are at different stages of the accession process. While Montenegro and Serbia have only recently begun accession negotiations, Turkey's accession talks have been underway since 2005. Macedonia's accession negotiations have not yet started largely because of an ongoing dispute with Greece over the country's official name. And EU accession talks with Iceland, although relatively advanced, have been on hold since May 2013, when a new Icelandic government largely opposed to EU membership took office. The EU also considers the remaining Western Balkan states of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo as potential EU candidates, but most experts assess that it will likely be many years before any of these countries are ready to join the EU. Despite the EU's professed commitment to enlargement, some EU policy makers and many EU citizens are cautious about additional expansion, especially to Turkey or countries farther east, such as Georgia or Ukraine, in the longer term. Worries about continued EU enlargement range from fears of unwanted migrant labor to the implications of an ever-expanding Union on the EU's institutions, finances, and overall identity. Such qualms are particularly apparent towards Turkey, given its large size, predominantly Muslim culture, and comparatively less prosperous economy. Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have long backed EU enlargement, believing that it serves U.S. interests by advancing democracy and economic prosperity throughout the European continent. Over the years, the only significant U.S. criticism of the EU's enlargement process has been that the Union was moving too slowly, especially with respect to Turkey. Some U.S. officials are concerned that "enlargement fatigue" as well as the EU's economic and financial troubles, which have hit the countries that use the EU's common currency (the euro) particularly hard, could potentially slow future rounds of EU enlargement. The status of EU enlargement and its implications for both the EU itself and U.S.-EU relations may be of interest to the 113th Congress. For additional information, see also CRS Report RS21372, The European Union: Questions and Answers, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RS22517, European Union Enlargement: A Status Report on Turkey's Accession Negotiations, by [author name scrubbed].
crs_R44543	crs_R44543_0	The growth rate since the crisis has averaged one-quarter to one-half the average since World War II, depending on the measure used. While the recent lower-than-average economic performance is partly attributable to the financial crisis, it has persisted into the current expansion. Growth was more volatile during this period, with more frequent recessions, but on average was higher. This deceleration is likely not being driven solely by the Great Recession—GDP growth has not shown sustained acceleration at any point, remaining below 3% in each calendar year of the current expansion. What Has Caused Slow Growth Since 2008? As the expansion nears completion of its seventh year since the recession and continues to experience slower-than-average growth, economists have offered a number of explanations for the relatively slow recovery. Slow growth in the immediate aftermath of the crisis could be attributed to deleveraging and financial disruptions caused by the crisis, but those problems were of a temporary nature. Permanent damage from the crisis, called hysteresis , would be expected to leave the level of GDP permanently lower, but should not affect the long-term growth rate. Subsequent shocks to the economy during this expansion, called headwinds , could also be temporarily holding back growth, but over time, there is no reason to think that unlucky events would continually outweigh lucky ones. Secular stagnation is an explanation for the slowdown of a more long-lasting nature, but is distinct from an explanation based on changes in the structural factors that are the sources of long-term growth. An explanation based on structural factors would suggest a more permanent slowdown. As the duration of the slowdown persists, explanations based on temporary factors become less compelling and permanent factors become more compelling—particularly as the labor market approaches full employment. It should be noted that while this report presents these explanations as distinct and contrasting, they are not mutually exclusive, and some economists combine elements from more than one in their diagnoses. While hysteresis may have been the dominant cause of weakness early in the recovery, the longer the growth slowdown persists, the less it can be explained by hysteresis. This decrease in unemployment is problematic, because it is difficult to explain why the economy has been able to return to near full employment in spite of slow growth if the slow growth is caused by secular stagnation. These headwinds include the rise in oil and other commodity prices from 2009 to 2011, which reduced real U.S. incomes for commodities of which the United States is a net consumer; the European economic crisis, beginning in 2009, which reduced demand for U.S. exports and caused financial instability abroad; more recently, the deterioration in financial conditions and lower or negative economic growth in emerging markets, most notably China, which also has reduced demand for U.S. exports and caused the dollar to appreciate against most emerging currencies; fiscal contraction at both the state and federal level in the United States, which in GDP accounting terms reduced overall growth by about half a percentage point each year from 2011 to 2013, and did not start contributing to growth again until 2015; the effects of policy uncertainty on financial market volatility and consumer confidence, following events such as the 2011 debt limit impasse, the "fiscal cliff" at the end of 2012, and the 2013 debt limit impasse/government shutdown; and the effects of business and household deleveraging, discussed below. There is no systematic attempt to identify headwinds beforehand or search for positive "tailwinds" that might offset the headwinds. (Growth attributed to human capital did not slow, but growth in the labor supply did, so that, on net, labor contributed to the growth slowdown.) In terms of why the growth rate of all three factors has declined, the key question is whether this pattern is caused by long-term structural factors that are independent of the financial crisis or whether their decline was caused by the financial crisis or some other demand-side phenomenon—implying that the growth rate of each will bounce back. The aging of the population is the most easily identifiable factor that can explain the slowdown in at least some of the growth in the labor supply. Investment. When there has been a long-lasting change, it has largely been because of changes in productivity growth.	Between 2008 and 2015, economic growth has been, depending on the indicator, one-quarter to one-half the long-term average since World War II. Economic performance has been variable throughout the post-war period, but recent growth is markedly weaker than previous low growth periods, such as 1974 to 1995. Initially, slow growth was attributed to the financial crisis and its aftermath. But even after the recession ended and financial conditions normalized, growth has remained below average in the current economic expansion. The current expansion has already lasted longer than average, but growth has not picked up at any point during the expansion. By some indicators, growth began to slow during the 2001 to 2007 period, while other indicators suggest that the slowdown is more recent and abrupt. Although this report focuses on the U.S. economy, the same pattern has occurred across other advanced economies. Economists have offered a number of explanations at various points for the relatively slow recovery. These explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and some economists combine elements from more than one in their diagnoses. Slow growth in the immediate aftermath of the crisis could be attributed to deleveraging (debt reduction) by firms and households and financial disruptions caused by the crisis, but those problems were of a temporary nature. There is historical evidence that recoveries are slower after financial crises. Permanent damage from the crisis, called hysteresis, would affect the subsequent recovery. For example, if long-term unemployment resulting from the crisis eroded workers' skills, it could be more difficult for them to find a job when the labor market has recovered. This factor was of greater importance early in the recovery and of waning importance as the recovery continues because it would be expected to leave the level of GDP permanently lower, but should not affect the long-term growth rate. Subsequent shocks to the economy during the expansion, called headwinds, could also be temporarily holding back growth. Headwinds identified at various points in the expansion include high energy prices, the European economic crisis, the emerging market slowdown, fiscal contraction, and fiscal policy uncertainty. Headwinds can be easy to identify after the fact, but there has been little systematic attempt to determine whether there have also been offsetting tailwinds or whether recent headwinds have been relatively larger than in the past. Secular stagnation is an explanation for the slowdown of a more long-lasting nature that posits, atypically, this expansion cannot generate a healthy pace of economic activity on its own, even with the help of aggressive monetary stimulus. This explanation has focused on persistently low interest rates and low inflation as keys to understanding what has held back growth. This explanation struggles to explain the recent return to nearly full employment, however. An explanation based on structural factors would suggest a more permanent slowdown. This explanation looks at long-term shifts in the sources of long-term growth—growth in labor supply and quality, investment, and productivity. For example, the aging of the population has reduced the growth rate of the labor supply. While it is unlikely that slow growth is being driven solely by structural factors—that would imply the timing of the financial crisis and onset of the growth slowdown was purely coincidental—the longer that slow growth persists, the more it can be attributed to structural factors. As the duration of the slowdown persists, explanations based on temporary factors become less compelling and permanent factors become more compelling—particularly as the labor market approaches full employment.
crs_R43796	crs_R43796_0	It compares the President's request for FY2015 funding for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the enacted FY2014 appropriations for DHS, the House- and Senate-reported homeland security appropriations measures for FY2015, and the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. March 4-11, 2014—President's FY2015 Budget Request Submitted For FY2015, the Administration requested $38.332 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS, as part of an overall budget request of $60.919 billion (including fees, trust funds and other funding that is not appropriated or does not score against the budget caps). This request amounts to a $0.938 billion (2.4%) decrease below the $39.270 billion enacted for FY2014 through Division F of P.L. The Senate bill as approved by the committee would have provided a net discretionary appropriation of $39,000 million for DHS for FY2015, not including $6,438 million for disaster relief and $213 million for Coast Guard overseas contingency operations that would be paid for by adjustments to the discretionary spending cap under the BCA. 124 , the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2015, was introduced on September 9, 2014. This continuing resolution funded, with several specific exceptions and limitations, the operations of the federal government until December 11, 2014, or until full-year appropriations were passed, whichever was to come first. On September 19, 2014, the President signed it into law as P.L. 113-164 . 83 , the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, was signed into law on December 16, 2014. Consequently, Division L of H.R. 240 , an annual appropriations bill that would have provided DHS $39.7 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority was introduced by House Appropriations Committee Chairman Rogers on January 9, 2015. After adopting these five amendments, the bill passed the House on January 14, 2015, by a vote of 236-191. February 27, 2015—Senate and House Extend Continuing Resolution On February 27, 2015, a three-week extension of the continuing resolution funding DHS ( H.J.Res. March 3, 2015—House Agrees to the Senate Amendment On March 3, 2015, the House voted 257-167 to approve the Senate version of H.R. 240 . Information on the House-reported FY2015 DHS Appropriations bill is from H.R. It presents a comparison of the Administration's FY2015 budget request, showing the discretionary appropriations, mandatory appropriations, and adjustments under the Budget Control Act, in the context of the total amount of budgetary resources available to DHS, as well as other non-appropriated resources. 114-4 also included $213 million in overseas contingency operations funding for the Coast Guard. This amount, requested by the administration after the House Appropriations Committee had marked up H.R. 114-4 included $6,438 million for disaster relief as the Administration requested. Like the House-reported bill, the Senate-reported bill and report recommended structuring the grant programs as they were in the FY2014 DHS appropriations bill. The committee-reported bills and P.L. This matched the FY2014 level as well as the House Appropriations Committee level. In addition, the Senate committee report contained a section on wildfire mitigation.	This report analyzes the FY2015 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). While this report makes note of many budgetary resources provided to DHS, its primary focus is on funding approved by Congress through the appropriations process. The Administration requested $38.332 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS for FY2015, as part of an overall budget of $60.919 billion (including fees, trust funds, and other funding that is not appropriated or does not score against the budget caps). The request amounted to a $0.938 billion, or 2.4%, decrease from the $39.270 billion enacted through the consolidated appropriations act for FY2014 (P.L. 112-74). In addition, the Administration requested an additional $6.438 billion not reflected above for FEMA in disaster relief funding as defined by the Budget Control Act (BCA). On June 11, 2014, the House Appropriations Committee marked up its draft Homeland Security Appropriations bill, and voted to report it out of committee. The House committee-reported bill provided $39.220 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority, as well as the requested disaster relief funding. On June 26, 2014, the Senate Appropriations Committee marked up its draft Homeland Security Appropriations bill, and voted to report it out of committee. The Senate committee-reported bill provided $39.000 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority, as well as the requested disaster relief funding, and $213 million for Coast Guard overseas contingency operations. On September 19, 2014, the President signed H.J.Res. 124, the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2015, into law as P.L. 113-164. This continuing resolution originally funded the operations of the federal government at the current annual rate until December 11, 2014, or until full-year appropriations were passed, whichever came first. It has been extended by three other short-term continuing resolutions, including Division L of H.R. 83, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, which extended funding for DHS through February 27, 2015. With the beginning of the 114th Congress, both House- and Senate-reported FY2015 annual homeland security appropriations bills were no longer available for action. H.R. 240, a new FY2015 annual homeland security appropriations bill, was introduced on January 9, 2015, and considered in the House the following week under a structured rule that allowed five immigration policy-related amendments. After adopting these five amendments, the bill passed the House on January 14, 2015. On February 27, the Senate passed an amended H.R. 240 without the legislative text added by the House amendments. After the House did not pass a three-week extension of the continuing resolution, the Senate and House passed a one week extension of the continuing resolution to avoid a lapse in annual appropriations for DHS. On March 3, 2015, the House voted to approve the Senate version of H.R. 240. The bill was signed into law on March 4, 2015, as P.L. 114-4. As enacted, the bill provided $39.670 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority, as well as the requested $6.438 billion in disaster relief funding and $213 million for Coast Guard overseas contingency operations, for total adjustments under the BCA of $6.651 billion.
crs_R42324	crs_R42324_0	Introduction The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) offers a broad range of benefits to veterans of the U.S. Armed Forces and to certain members of their families. Among these benefits are various types of financial assistance, including monthly cash payments to disabled veterans, health care, education, and housing. Certain criteria must be met to be eligible to receive any of the benefits administered by the VA. Who Is a "Veteran"? The general requirement is the "full period" for which the servicemember was called or ordered to active duty or, if less, 24 months of continuous active duty. Veteran Status for National Guard and Reserve Servicemembers To be eligible for VA benefits, members of the National Guard and the reserve components must meet the same standards as other claimants. Members of the National Guard and reserves who are never activated for federal active duty military service do not meet the active duty requirement. Consideration of Civilian Groups for Veteran Status Some groups of civilians who participated in World War I and World War II are also eligible for VA benefits. The GI Bill Improvement Act of 1977 ( P.L. 95-202 ) recognized the service of the Women's Air Forces Service Pilots, a civilian group, as active service for benefits administered by the VA. That law also provided that the Secretary of Defense could determine that service for the Armed Forces by a group of civilians or contractors be considered active service for benefits administered by the VA. Based on the provisions of P.L.	The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) offers a broad range of benefits to U.S. Armed Forces veterans and certain members of their families. Among these benefits are various types of financial assistance, including monthly cash payments to disabled veterans, health care, education, and housing. Basic criteria must be met to be eligible to receive any of the benefits administered by the VA. This report examines the basic eligibility criteria for VA administered veterans' benefits, including the issue of eligibility of members of the National Guard and reserve components. For a former servicemember to receive certain VA benefits, the person must have active U.S. military service for a minimum period of time, generally the lesser of the full period ordered to active duty or 24 months, and be discharged "under conditions other than dishonorable." Some members of the National Guard and reserve components have difficulty meeting the active duty and length of service requirements. However, a member of the National Guard or reserve components who is activated for federal military service and meets the length of service requirement is considered a veteran for purposes of VA benefits. The Secretary of Defense may determine that service for the Armed Forces by a group of civilians or contractors will be considered active service, allowing members of those groups to be considered veterans for purposes of VA benefits. Such determinations, authorized by the GI Bill Improvement Act of 1977 (P.L. 95-202), have been made only for groups involved in World War I and World War II.
crs_R44275	crs_R44275_0	P uerto Rico's financial circumstances, including uncertainty about its ability to service its large public debt, have drawn attention in recent months. As Congress examines Puerto Rico's finances, questions have arisen about how federal health care programs (Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children's Health Insurance Program [CHIP]) and private health insurance reforms apply to Puerto Rico. Is Puerto Rico treated like a state, or is it treated differently? This report provides answers to frequently asked questions (FAQs) about how federal health care programs and requirements are implemented in Puerto Rico, including eligibility, coverage, program requirements, and payment rules. Examples provided in the FAQs illustrate that in many circumstances, health programs in Puerto Rico differ from programs in the 50 states and the District of Columbia (DC), while in other circumstances, Puerto Rico is treated the same as the states. As such, these questions and answers should be viewed as a discussion of the complexity of health care financing as it relates to Puerto Rico under current law. This report will be updated as additional relevant questions and answers arise. Demographic and Economic Overview This section addresses questions about Puerto Rico's population and key economic features. Does Puerto Rico Have a Medicaid Program?	Puerto Rico's financial circumstances, including uncertainty about its ability to service its large public debt, have drawn attention in recent months. As Congress examines Puerto Rico's finances, questions have arisen about how federal health care programs (Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children's Health Insurance Program [CHIP]) and private health insurance requirements apply to Puerto Rico. Is Puerto Rico treated like a state, or is it treated differently? This report provides answers to frequently asked questions (FAQs) about Puerto Rico's health care system. The FAQs are divided into the following sections: Demographic and Economic Overview Medicare Part A Part B Part C, Medicare Advantage Part D Medicaid CHIP Private Health Insurance The FAQ provides examples, which illustrate that in many circumstances, health programs in Puerto Rico differ from programs in the 50 states and the District of Columbia (DC), whereas in other circumstances, Puerto Rico is treated the same as the states. As such, these FAQs should be viewed as a discussion of the complexity of health care financing as it relates to Puerto Rico under current law. This report does not provide a comprehensive overview of how federal health care programs and requirements apply in Puerto Rico. Instead, the report answers questions about health care financing that have arisen in light of Puerto Rico's financial circumstances. This report will be updated as additional relevant questions and answers arise.
crs_RL32315	crs_RL32315_0	For example, the conference report on theomnibus energy bill ( H.R. 6 ) and the Senate substitute, S. 2095 hasprovisions that would examine restrictions and impediments to oil and gas development on publiclands, including an evaluation of the current permitting process. Reportedly, reflecting its EnergyTask Force recommendations, the Bush Administration has its own initiative to expedite the oil andgas permitting process on federal lands. As a result, the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920 (30 U.S.C. Conversely, development supporterscontend that numerous environmental laws are now in place to regulate oil and gas development onpublic lands. Oil and Gas Leasing on Public Lands Leasing of onshore federal public lands for oil and gas development is based on multiple-use/sustained yield Resource Management Plans (RMPs) developed by the Bureau of Land Management in the Department of the Interior. Drilling Permits After a lease has been obtained, either competitively or noncompetitively, an Application fora Permit to Drill (APD) must be approved for each oil and gas well. BLM is required to process the application within the 35-day period. In April 2003, BLM announced new strategies to expedite the APD process. Energy and mineral industry representatives maintain that federal withdrawals inhibitexploration and limit the reserve base even when conditions are favorable for production. (17) Because of increased interest in access to natural gas, theprotection of public lands and Bush Administration policies, the Rocky Mountain region has becomea focal point for U.S. oil and gas policy. Energy Policy and Conservation Act Amendments (EPCA) study, 2003; (18) U.S. Natural Gas Markets: Mid-term Prospects for Natural Gas Supply, 2001, by the EIA. As mentioned earlier, the numbers in the EPCA study are based on a much more selectivearea of the Rockies that included the five major geologic basins, and thus the numbers were smaller.However, as shown in Table 1, the relative rate with no access was similar to the other reports(11.6%), the amount of restricted gas was less (26%), and the amount of natural gas under standardlease terms was slightly higher (62.4%). On private lands, monitoring wells are not required (57) . The outlook is mixed for increased oil and natural gas production from leases on U.S. publiclands or areas where the United States holds mineral rights. While domestic natural gas productionand natural gas imports are expected to rise, it is unclear how much of the domestic supply will comefrom public lands that are currently restricted or off-limits. Environmental groups and some surfaceowners are concerned that drilling and production would damage sensitive lands, wildlife habitat andsurface water and groundwater quality and quantity. Under FLPMA, withdrawals can be madeby the executive branch or the Congress.	The U.S. Congress and the Administration are involved in a major policy debate over oil andgas development from federal lands and from federal mineral estate underlying certain privatelyowned lands. Within the framework of U.S. public lands policy, restrictions and withdrawals haveaffected the amount of land that can be developed. The Energy Policy and Conservation ActAmendments of 2000 (EPCA) mandated a study which was released in January 2003 to assess theoil and gas resource potential underlying restricted federal lands. It concluded that although theamount of land prospected for natural gas that was completely "off-limits" for development was35.6%, other restrictions and lease stipulations are in place. The conference report to the EnergyPolicy Act of 2003 ( H.R. 6 ) as well as the scaled-back Senate version of the bill( S. 2095 ) contains provisions that would address restrictions and impediments to oil andgas development on public lands. The Bush Administration has its own initiatives to expedite thepermitting process -- considered by some to be a major impediment -- on federal lands. As part of the oil and gas leasing system, lessees must file an application for a permit to drill(APD) for each well. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) is required to process the APD in 30days but delays may occur, extending the average approval time to over 120 days. Some approvalshave taken over three years. A new process to expedite the APDs has been established at the BLMthat includes, among other features, the processing and conducting of environmental analyses onmultiple permit applications with similar characteristics. Energy and mineral industry representatives maintain that federal withdrawals and/orrestrictions inhibit mineral exploration and limit the reserve base even when conditions are favorablefor development. They further contend that sufficient environmental standards are in place to protectpublic lands. Critics who oppose opening up more federal lands or the mineral estate under privatelands argue that the general environmental requirements are not adequate and that some forms ofdevelopment threaten water quality and quantity; therefore, certain restrictions and withdrawals areappropriate. Concern exists regarding natural gas supply and declining production rates. As a result, thereis increased interest in potential gas supplies in the Rocky Mountain region. Several resourceestimates suggest significant amounts of natural gas on public and private lands in the region, andRocky Mountain natural gas may become much more important to the overall supply picture. Elsewhere, the outlook is mixed for increased oil and natural gas production on U.S. publiclands. While domestic natural gas production and natural gas imports are expected to rise, it isunclear whether much of the domestic supply will come from public lands that are currentlyrestricted or off-limits. This report will not be updated.
crs_RS22580	crs_RS22580_0	6 renamed five committees. The name of the Committee on Resources was changed to the Committee on Natural Resources. Other Jurisdictional Policies Pursuant to a statement inserted in the Congressional Record by Rules Committee Chairwoman Louise Slaughter during the debate on H.Res. The rules resolution permitted the new committee rule to require those being deposed to subscribe to an oath.	This report details changes in the committee system contained in H.Res. 6 , the Rules of the House for the 110 th Congress, agreed to by the House January 4, 2007. The report will not be updated unless further rules changes for the 110 th Congress are adopted.
crs_R44434	crs_R44434_0	Introduction This report presents a side-by-side comparison of H.R. 2576 , the TSCA Modernization Act of 2015, as passed by the House on June 23, 2015, and S.Amdt. 2932 , the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21 st Century Act, as passed by the Senate on December 17, 2015, as a substitute amendment to H.R. The Senate amendment, but not the House bill, would also amend the Mercury Export Ban Act of 2008 and add a provision to the Public Health Service Act regarding potential cancer clusters. The first section of this report provides a brief background on Title I of TSCA. The second section describes differences between the House bill and the Senate amendment and also presents background on selected issues that the legislation addresses. The final section includes Table 1 , which presents a side-by-side comparison of the provisions of existing law, the House bill, and the Senate amendment. Title I of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) In 1976, President Ford signed into law the Toxic Substances Control Act, which authorizes the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to identify and regulate chemicals in U.S. commerce that present an "unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment." 2576 and the Senate Substitute Amendment The House bill would amend several provisions in TSCA, including: the authority for EPA to require testing of chemicals under TSCA Section 4; the process by which EPA would evaluate risks of chemicals and regulate those found to present unreasonable risks under TSCA Section 6; the procedures and standards under TSCA Section 14 for confidential treatment of certain information submitted to EPA under TSCA; TSCA's relationship to state laws regulating chemicals under TSCA Section 18; and the authority for EPA to collect fees under TSCA Section 26. The following sections provide a brief discussion of seven issues that have received attention in the debate to amend Title I of TSCA. These issues include: prioritization of existing chemical substances for the evaluation of risks; regulatory threshold criteria under which EPA would be authorized to restrict a chemical; regulatory options available to EPA in restricting a chemical found to warrant regulation; EPA's authority to require the development of new information regarding a chemical; preemption of state laws concerning the regulation of chemicals; disclosure and protection from disclosure of information submitted to EPA; and resources that may be available for EPA to administer the act. Some environment and public health groups have argued that it is unlikely another chemical could be regulated under TSCA if EPA was not able to regulate asbestos under the statute. Both the House bill and the Senate amendment would remove from TSCA the requirement that EPA promulgate the "least burdensome requirement" in order to restrict a chemical demonstrated by the agency to present unreasonable risks. Confidentiality and Disclosures of Information TSCA requires chemical manufacturers, processors, and distributors to submit certain information to EPA regarding their chemicals. The table includes a discussion of each provision of the House bill and the Senate amendment, although it does not provide comprehensive analysis of the potential effects of particular provisions in the House bill or the Senate amendment.	This report compares H.R. 2576, the TSCA Modernization Act of 2015, as passed by the House on June 23, 2015, and the Senate's substitute amendment (S.Amdt. 2932) to H.R. 2576, the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act, as passed by the Senate on December 17, 2015. The Senate amendment is based, in part, on S. 697, as reported by the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works on April 28, 2015. The House bill and the Senate amendment would amend Title I of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). Enacted in 1976, TSCA is the primary federal law that authorizes the regulation of commercial chemicals throughout their lifecycle from manufacture to disposal. TSCA authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to determine whether regulation of a chemical is necessary to provide protection against "unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment." The Senate amendment, but not the House bill, would also amend the Mercury Export Ban Act of 2008 and add a provision to the Public Health Service Act regarding potential cancer clusters. Over the 39-year history of TSCA, EPA, regulated entities, environmental and public health groups and others have observed significant challenges in implementing the statute. For example, concerns have been raised on whether the threshold to regulate a chemical under TSCA is too difficult for EPA to demonstrate and whether the agency is unnecessarily constrained by the requirement that it impose the "least burdensome requirement" to restrict a chemical. In addition, EPA has argued that limits in requesting test information have constrained its ability to assess risks of certain chemicals. Many have argued that these concerns have diminished public confidence in the "safety" of chemicals in commerce. Additionally, regulated entities and right-to-know advocates have raised concerns about the appropriate balance between disclosures of chemical information and confidentiality of business information submitted to EPA under TSCA. Regulated entities have also raised concerns that state and local governments are adopting different requirements with respect to particular chemicals and compliance may be difficult with this growing "patchwork" of requirements. They argue that there should be uniform regulation under TSCA nationally. However, certain states and others have expressed concerns regarding the role of preemption in limiting states' ability to regulate chemicals. Since 2005, these concerns and others led to the introduction of legislation that would amend TSCA in each Congress. The first section of the report provides a brief background on TSCA. The second section provides a brief comparison between the House bill and the Senate amendment and also provides a background discussion of seven issues: Prioritization of chemicals for the evaluation of risks; Regulatory threshold for restricting a chemical; Regulatory options for restricting a chemical; Requirements for the development of test information; Preemption of state requirements; Confidentiality and disclosures of information; and Resources to administer TSCA. Finally, Table 1 presents a side-by-side comparison of the provisions of existing law, the House bill, and the Senate amendment. This report does not provide a comprehensive analysis of the potential effect of particular provisions. Ultimately, the outcome, if either the House bill or the Senate amendment were enacted, depends on implementation.
crs_R43777	crs_R43777_0	Introduction The mission of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) is to serve the United States by providing reliable scientific information to describe and understand the Earth; minimize loss of life and property from natural disasters; manage water, biological, energy, and mineral resources; and enhance and protect the nation's quality of life. The USGS is housed in the Department of the Interior (DOI), and part of its mission is to provide scientific information to other agencies and bureaus within DOI. The USGS conducts scientific activities under seven interdisciplinary mission areas: (1) water resources; (2) climate and land use change; (3) energy and minerals; (4) natural hazards; (5) core science systems; (6) ecosystems; and (7) environmental health. Many scientific studies conducted by the agency affect areas of congressional interest. For example, the USGS conducts oil, gas, and mineral resource assessments that help Congress evaluate federal land use policy and provide broad-scale information for private-sector resource development. Because of recent congressional interest in the scope of the USGS mission, how it has changed since its inception, and how the agency is currently structured and funded, this report explores the evolution of the USGS since the USGS Organic Act in 1879 and its present structure. State and federal involvement in geology also contributed to the creation of the USGS. FY2015 Budget for the USGS The FY2015 budget request for the USGS was $1.073 billion, which was $41.3 million more than the FY2014 enacted level of $1.032 billion. Issues for Congress This section reviews some selected issues related to the USGS that have been of interest to Congress. Mission of USGS Some in Congress contend that the mission of the USGS has expanded beyond the scope of its organic act to the detriment of its original focus on geology and resources. In contrast, some others note that the USGS has expanded its scope due to congressional direction in terms of authorities and allocation of funding. Further, they note, the mission of the USGS has changed over time to reflect the needs of the country. These streamgages monitor water flow and quality and aid in the collection and retention of streamflow data for the nation. The Landsat program represents the world's longest continuously acquired collection of land remote sensing data. Under its Natural Hazards Program area, the USGS pursues activities for other natural hazards, such as volcano hazards, landslide hazards, floods and droughts, and wildfire hazards. Other hazard mitigation initiatives include USGS work on understanding coastal processes and improving the ability to assess the nation's vulnerability to extreme coastal storms such as hurricanes. The USGS actively monitors and studies water quality in these ecosystems and others.	The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) aims to provide unbiased scientific information to describe and understand the geological processes of the Earth; minimize loss of life and property from natural disasters; manage water, biological, energy, and mineral resources; and enhance and protect the nation's quality of life. The USGS is a scientific agency that is housed within the Department of the Interior. Its primary mission is conducting science; it has no regulatory authority, nor does it manage any significant federal lands. The USGS also collects and stores scientific information that is compiled into long-term continuous data sets. These data sets range from satellite imagery of land and ecosystem features to streamflow data on major rivers and streams. The USGS conducts scientific activities under seven interdisciplinary mission areas: (1) water resources; (2) climate and land use change; (3) energy and minerals; (4) natural hazards; (5) core science systems; (6) ecosystems; and (7) environmental health. The agency is funded through Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations laws. The FY2015 budget request for the USGS was $1.07 billion, which is $41.3 million more than the FY2014 enacted level of $1.03 billion. Congressional interest in the USGS is high because many USGS activities have nationwide and regional policy implications. USGS partners with several stakeholders in its monitoring and scientific endeavors and contributes scientific knowledge to seminal policy decisions such as the listing of species under the Endangered Species Act, the management of water supplies, and the placement of emergency response resources following major storm events or hurricanes. Some potential congressional concerns about the USGS involve the scope of its mission. For example, some in Congress contend that the mission of the USGS has expanded beyond the scope of its Organic Act, to the detriment of its work on geological issues. In contrast, some others note that the USGS has expanded its scope in response to congressional authorizations and that its mission has changed over time to reflect the needs of the country. Some specific USGS programs—for example, the agency's role in assessing the nation's mineral, oil, and natural gas resources—have also been of interest to Congress. Often, the results of these studies and assessments have led to congressional decision-making regarding resource development and federal land use. Other USGS activities that have generated congressional interest and debate include the National Streamflow Information Program, which deploys streamgages across the country to measure water flows and quality; the Landsat Program, which collects remotely sensed data from satellites and distributes it to stakeholders; and the Natural Hazards Program, which is involved in evaluating, observing, studying, and contributing to the mitigation of natural hazards such as earthquakes, volcanoes, landslides, and coastal storms, among others.
crs_R45091	crs_R45091_0	While the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Defense (DOD) are the primary actors in the provision of such assistance to foreign countries—and the primary focus of this CRS report―other U.S. agencies may also conduct related programs, including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the Departments of Energy (DOE), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), and the Treasury; and parts of the intelligence community. Beginning in the 1980s, Congress began providing DOD with additional authority in Title 10 of the U.S. Code and annual NDAAs to conduct a range of programs and activities funded by DOD appropriations. Moreover, funding data for security assistance and data on historical security assistance funding are incomplete. For further background on U.S. security assistance and cooperation policies, see CRS Report R44444, Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense ; CRS Report R44602, DOD Security Cooperation: An Overview of Authorities and Issues ; CRS Report R44313, What Is "Building Partner Capacity?" Issues for Congress ; and CRS In Focus IF10582, Security Cooperation Issues: FY2017 NDAA Outcomes . Security Assistance Funding Trends Overview Based on DOS and DOD funding data, the U.S. government has provided at least $204.6 billion to provide security assistance and cooperation to allied countries abroad between FY2006 and FY2016. State Department and USAID Security Assistance Funding Levels DOS and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) security assistance programs are authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA, P.L. 87-195) and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA, P.L. 90-629), as amended, and codified in Title 22 of the U.S. Code . Security Cooperation (Title 10) . DOD uses the term security cooperation to refer to activities authorized by provisions in Title 10 and National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs). Security Sector Assistance . The report includes obligations data for major DOD security cooperation authorities and programs but not all DOD security cooperation programs. Most support under PKO is provided to foreign militaries.	Since FY2006, the United States government has provided more than $200 billion for programs providing security assistance and security cooperation to foreign countries. The Departments of State (DOS) and Defense (DOD) are the primary U.S. government agencies involved in providing security sector assistance and related support to foreign governments, militaries, and international organizations and groups. Congress has authorized security assistance programs through the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA, P.L. 87-195) and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA, P.L. 90-629), as amended. Assistance provisions, including those for security assistance, in the FAA and the AECA have since been codified in Title 22 of the U.S. Code, and funds for security assistance are regularly appropriated through DOS accounts. Beginning in the 1980s, Congress also provided DOD with authority to conduct security cooperation programs under Title 10 of the U.S. Code and annual National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs), as well as funding through defense appropriations. Cooperation between the two agencies to provide security sector assistance depends on statutory authority, applicable executive directives, and other established policy arrangements. With the 115th Congress considering legislation designed to fund and improve U.S. security assistance and security cooperation programs, this report provides funding data, top country recipients, and major funding accounts for Title 22 security assistance programs and major Title 10 and NDAA security cooperation authorities and programs. It may be updated as information and funding data are available. For further background on U.S. security assistance and cooperation policies, see CRS Report R44444, Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense; CRS Report R44602, DOD Security Cooperation: An Overview of Authorities and Issues; CRS Report R44313, What Is "Building Partner Capacity?" Issues for Congress; and CRS In Focus IF10582, Security Cooperation Issues: FY2017 NDAA Outcomes.
crs_R42652	crs_R42652_0	Introduction Introduced in each of the last several congressional sessions, the Student Non-Discrimination Act (SNDA) would prohibit discrimination on the basis of actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity in public elementary and secondary schools. The stated purpose of the legislation ( H.R. 846 / S. 439 in the 114 th Congress) is to ensure that students are free from discriminatory conduct such as harassment, bullying, intimidation, and violence. SNDA appears to be patterned on Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded education programs or activities, although SNDA does differ from Title IX in several important respects.	Introduced in each of the last several congressional sessions, the Student Non-Discrimination Act (SNDA) would prohibit discrimination on the basis of actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity in public elementary and secondary schools. The stated purpose of the legislation (H.R. 846/S. 439 in the 114th Congress) is to ensure that students are free from discriminatory conduct such as harassment, bullying, intimidation, and violence. SNDA appears to be patterned on Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded education programs or activities, although SNDA does differ from Title IX in several important respects.
crs_RL32244	crs_RL32244_0	History On August 11, 2006, revised grazing regulations of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) took effect (43 C.F.R. Part 4100). Some of the regulations have been enjoined. Among the changes made in 1995, many of which were reexamined by BLM during the development of the 2006 regulatory changes, are those that: separated grazing preference from permitted use , so that a permittee's preference for receiving a grazing permit was not tied to a specific amount of grazing based on historic levels (described as Animal Unit Months , or AUMs ) ; allowed permittees up to three years of nonuse of their permits; authorized suspending or canceling a permit if a permittee is convicted of violating certain state or federal environmental laws; eliminated the express requirement that a permittee be engaged in the livestock business; replaced the term affected interest with interested public ; allowed conservation use for the term of a grazing permit, thereby excluding livestock grazing from all or a portion of an allotment; required title of permanent structural improvements to be held in the name of the United States; required that water rights for livestock grazing be held in the name of the United States, to the extent allowed by state law; imposed a surcharge on a permittee who allows livestock not owned by the permittee or the permittee's children to graze on public land; eliminated Grazing Advisory Boards and replaced them with the broader interest Resource Advisory Councils; and adopted rangeland management standards called Fundamentals of Rangeland Health . They also contended that BLM had not justified a need for regulatory and policy changes and that the changes adopted remove important environmental protections and opportunities for public comment. BLM asserted that regulatory changes were needed to increase flexibility for grazing managers and permittees, to improve BLM's relationship with ranchers, to improve rangeland management and permit administration, to promote conservation, and to comply with court decisions. The BLM considered these comments, and on June 17, 2005, issued a final environmental impact statement (FEIS) on proposed changes and alternatives. On March 31, 2006, BLM issued an addendum to the FEIS that addressed the FWS and other public comment and made relatively minor changes to its proposed rules. Modify the Administrative Appeals Process The agency modified the administrative appeals process on grazing decisions and defined the extent to which grazing should continue in the face of an appeal or stay of a decision. They amend the timeframe and procedures for changing grazing management after a determination that grazing practices or levels are significant factors in failing to achieve standards or conform with guidelines. Remove Limit on Permit Nonuse The final rule removed the three-year limit on temporary nonuse of a permit by allowing permittees to apply for nonuse of all or part of a permit for up to one year at a time, for as many years as needed. According to BLM, the focus was on policy changes that could be carried out under existing rules. Policy changes considered included conservation partnerships, voluntary allotment restructuring, conservation easement acquisition, endangered species mitigation/landscape habitat improvement, and reserve common allotments (RCAs). BLM also examined the establishment of RCAs as a regulatory change, but did not propose rule language in this area. Conservation Partnerships The goal of conservation partnerships between permit holders and the BLM would be to improve environmental health. Conservation Easements Conservation easements—land use restrictions—were being considered to preserve open space. This concept was later considered as Landscape Habitat Improvement , to promote species conservation and facilitate ESA consultations. Changes to regulations became effective August 11, 2006, although some of the changes were subsequently enjoined. Among them are changes to allow shared title to range improvements, allow private acquisition of water rights, reduce requirements for public involvement, modify the administrative appeals process, broaden the definition of grazing preference, change the timeframe and procedures for remedying rangeland health problems, remove the limit on permit nonuse, and eliminate conservation use grazing permits. The agency postponed developing a final grazing rule to consider public comment received after the closing date, particularly from the Fish and Wildlife Service.	The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) issued changes to grazing regulations (43 C.F.R. Part 4100) on August 11, 2006, after a three year review. Some portions of the regulations have been enjoined. The previous major revision of grazing rules, which took effect in 1995, was highly controversial. The 2006 changes addressed many of the same issues, and received mixed reviews. BLM asserted that the 2006 changes were needed to increase flexibility for grazing managers and permittees, to improve rangeland management and grazing permit administration, to promote conservation, and to comply with court decisions. Critics contend that a need for change was not justified and that changes adopted removed important environmental protections and opportunities for public comment. Under the 2006 changes, the BLM and a permittee could share title to structural range improvements, such as a fence. Permittees could acquire water rights for grazing, consistent with state law. The occasions on which BLM would be required to get input from the public on grazing decisions were reduced. The administrative appeals process on grazing decisions was modified and the extent to which grazing could continue in the face of an appeal or stay of a decision was delineated. The definition of grazing preference was broadened to include a quantitative meaning—forage on public land. Changes were made to the timeframe and procedures for changing grazing management after a determination that grazing is a significant factor in failing to achieve rangeland health standards. The three-year limit on temporary nonuse of a permit was removed, and permittees are able to apply for nonuse of a permit for up to one year at a time. Conservation use grazing permits were eliminated. Changes that have been enjoined relate primarily to public participation, sharing title to range improvements, and fundamentals of rangeland health. BLM also considered, but did not propose, certain changes due to adverse public reaction or other considerations. On June 17, 2005, BLM had issued a final environmental impact statement (FEIS) analyzing the potential impact of proposed changes in the regulations, an alternative, and the status quo. On March 31, 2006, BLM published an addendum to the FEIS addressing public comment received after the closing date of March 2, 2004, primarily from the Fish and Wildlife Service. Final regulatory changes took effect August 11, 2006. BLM also considered, but did not make, changes to its grazing policies, which the agency had believed could be carried out under existing rules. Potential changes that were examined included the establishment of reserve common allotments to serve as backup forage when permittees' regular allotments are unavailable; conservation partnerships between the BLM and permittees whereby permittees work to improve environmental health in return for certain benefits; voluntary allotment restructuring to allow multiple permittees to merge allotments; conservation easement acquisition to preserve open space; and landscape habitat improvement to promote species conservation and facilitate consultations under the Endangered Species Act.
crs_R41496	crs_R41496_0	I. Introduction Congressional inaction on climate change has led various entities to pursue climate change measures off Capitol Hill. The principal focus of such suits has been to establish greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and climate change impacts as a nuisance. For reasons discussed in this report, the prospects of this common law litigation are limited. Recently, the outlook for at least those cases based on the federal common law of nuisance and seeking injunctive relief has particularly dimmed. In American Electric Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut , it held that in light of EPA's authority over GHG emissions as clarified in Massachusetts , federal common law in the climate change area is "displaced." That is, federal courts may not use federal common law to add their own judge-made GHG emission standards, whether or not EPA exercises its authority. Private nuisance actions are brought by the aggrieved landowner. II. In light of American Electric Power , however, one of these threshold issues—whether the federal common law of nuisance has been displaced—will likely prove the key one in future efforts to use federal common law to address climate change. Though the Supreme Court barred federal courts from developing a "general" common law 73 years ago (they should instead apply the substantive law of the state in which they sit), the Court has since clarified that in areas of national concern, such as interstate pollution, the articulation of federal common law by the federal courts is appropriate. Thus, the question arose early on in some of the climate change cases whether the federal CAA displaces judge-made law in the climate change area. (See Section III.A. Other, Now Less Important, Threshold Issues The threshold issues made less important by American Electric Power in federal-common-law climate change litigation are, again, the standing issue and political question doctrine. As explicated by the Court, this constraint demands that a plaintiff in federal court demonstrate (1) actual or imminent injury that is concrete and particularized, and not speculative; (2) that the injury is or will be caused by the defendant; and (3) that the injury likely will be redressed by a favorable court decision. A suit seeking relief from climate change impacts may run into difficulty with each of the three constitutional standing requirements. American Electric Power A. Plaintiffs sought to require the electric utilities to abate their contribution to the nuisance of climate change by reducing their CO 2 emissions. If the merits of the state common law nuisance claims are reached (in American Electric Power or other litigation), which state's common law will apply? A provocative question now getting attention is whether American Electric Power displaces climate-change-based federal common law actions seeking monetary relief. In the (perhaps unlikely) event that such a law would be silent as to its intended impact on common law claims, it could be argued that elimination of EPA authority over GHGs also eliminates any displacement of federal common law. The others are Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. and Comer v. Murphy Oil USA , discussed here. In Village of Kivalina , an Inupiat Eskimo village on the northwest Alaska coast sued 24 oil and energy companies, claiming that the large quantities of GHGs they emit contribute to climate change. The suit seeks monetary damages. Owners of Gulf coast property damaged by Hurricane Katrina sued certain oil, coal, and chemical companies under state law. However, on May 27, 2011, the plaintiffs refiled the case (with minor modifications), creating a second opportunity for a ruling on whether American Electric Power applies to cases seeking damages. V. A New Common Law Theory Enters the Fray: Public Trust Doctrine Since May 2011, the nuisance lawsuits above have been joined by a coordinated campaign of lawsuits and rulemaking petitions seeking to attack climate change by an entirely different common law theory: public trust doctrine.	Note: Despite this report being archived, the reader may find updated treatment of the topics covered herein in CRS Report R42613, Climate Change and Existing Law: A Survey of Legal Issues Past, Present, and Future, by [author name scrubbed]. See especially sections I, II.H., and III.A. Congressional inaction on climate change has led concerned parties to explore other ways to address climate change—including lawsuits seeking to establish climate change impacts as a common law nuisance. The prospects for these common law suits are limited, however, owing in part to the unsuitability of private litigation for dealing with global problems like climate change. Recently, the outlook for federal common-law suits seeking injunctive relief vis-a-vis climate change became particularly dim. On June 20, 2011, the Supreme Court ruled in American Electric Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut that given EPA's Clean Air Act authority over greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions—affirmed by the Court a few years ago—the federal common law of nuisance in the area of climate change is "displaced." Federal courts may not use federal common law to add their own judge-made GHG emission standards to those of EPA. The displacement of federal common law by American Electric Power is only one of three threshold issues that have bedeviled lawsuits seeking to establish climate change as a common law nuisance. The standing inquiry requires a plaintiff in federal court to show actual or imminent injury caused by the defendant, and the likelihood that the injury will be redressed by the requested relief. Each of these factors can pose difficulties for the climate-change plaintiff. Similarly, the political question doctrine has led some courts to dismiss common-law climate change suits on the ground that the issue is better left with the political branches. American Electric Power raises several questions. First, with federal common law displaced in the area of climate change, are state common law claims viable? Two threats to such claims are the possibility of preemption by the Clean Air Act (the sounder argument is against preemption), and the influence of the Supreme's Court's aversion to judge-made law in the climate change area so evident in American Electric Power. A second question is whether American Electric Power displaces climate-change-based federal common law actions when the remedy sought is monetary rather than injunctive. Finally, if Congress eliminates EPA authority over GHG emissions and is silent as to federal common law actions, does federal common law cease to be displaced so that such actions are again possible? In addition to American Electric Power, there are two other active cases raising common law nuisance claims as to climate change. In Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., a coastal Eskimo village is suing energy companies alleging that their GHG emissions have contributed to shoreline erosion, requiring relocation of the village. In Comer v. Murphy Oil, Gulf coast landowners are suing energy and chemical companies asserting that their GHG emissions intensified Hurricane Katrina, adding to plaintiffs' property damage. Both cases raise the above-noted issue whether American Electric Power applies to actions seeking monetary damages. A second common law theory recently has entered the fray. Since May 2011, either a suit or rulemaking petition has been filed in every state arguing that the respective state has a "public trust" duty to the atmosphere that requires it to address climate change.
crs_R43509	crs_R43509_0	Introduction This report tracks and provides an overview of actions taken by the Administration and Congress to provide FY2015 appropriations for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) accounts. It also provides an overview of enacted FY2014 appropriations for agencies and bureaus funded as a part of the annual appropriation for CJS. Overview of CJS The annual CJS appropriations act provides funding for the Departments of Commerce and Justice, the science agencies, and several related agencies. Appropriations for the Department of Commerce include funding for agencies such as Census Bureau; the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office; the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Appropriations for the Department of Justice provide funding for agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Bureau of Prisons; the U.S. Marshals; the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; along with funding for a variety of grant programs for state, local, and tribal governments. The annual appropriation for the related agencies includes funding for agencies such as the Legal Services Corporation and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The data show that nominal appropriations for CJS increased starting with FY2005, peaked in FY2010, and have generally declined since. After adjusting for inflation, FY2013 and FY2014 appropriations for CJS were generally at the same level they were at in FY2005. Since FY2010, total appropriations for CJS have been around $60 billion, with the exception of FY2013 when sequestration cut nearly $4 billion out of the total amount Congress appropriated for CJS for FY2013. While decreased appropriations for the Department of Commerce mostly explain the overall decrease in CJS appropriations since FY2010, there have also been cuts in funding for DOJ and NASA. Recent reductions to NASA's appropriation has brought it more in-line with what the agency received in FY2005. However, even with recent cuts to DOJ's appropriation, Congress still appropriated $6.883 billion more for DOJ in FY2014 than it did in FY2005. FY2014 and FY2015 Appropriations for CJS For FY2015, the Administration requested a total of $62.397 billion for the agencies and bureaus funded as a part of the annual CJS bill. The Administration's request included $8.746 billion for the Department of Commerce, $27.974 billion for the Department of Justice, $24.721 billion for the science agencies, and $956.1 million for the related agencies. The act provided a total of $61.623 billion for CJS, of which $8.181 billion was for the Department of Commerce, $27.737 billion was for the Department of Justice, $24.824 billion was for the science agencies, and $881.8 million was for the related agencies. The House-passed bill included $8.231 billion for the Department of Commerce, $28.162 billion for the Department of Justice, $25.296 billion for the science agencies, and $870.9 million for the related agencies. On June 5, 2014, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its version of the FY2015 CJS appropriations bill ( S. 2437 ). The bill reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations would have provided a total of $62.636 billion for CJS, an amount that would have been 1.6% more than the FY2014 appropriation, 0.4% more than the Administration's request, and 0.1% more than the House-passed CJS appropriations bill. The bill included $8.556 billion for the Department of Commerce, $27.997 billion for the Department of Justice, $25.161 billion for the science agencies, and $923.0 million for the related agencies. On December 16, 2014, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. The act provides a total of $61.753 billion for the agencies and bureaus funded by the annual CJS appropriations act. The act provides $8.467 billion for the Department of Commerce, $27.030 billion for the Department of Justice, $25.360 billion for the science agencies, and $895.9 million for the related agencies. Whether the Census Bureau would have received the funds requested to complete the research and testing necessary for a cost-effective 2020 census design, and to restore 12-month interviewing and the full American Community Survey sample size after a one-month break in data collection caused by the October 2013 federal government shutdown. Whether it should have funded the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) core laboratory and construction accounts at a level consistent with the goal of doubling funding for these and other targeted accounts, as proposed previously by President Obama and adopted implicitly in the America COMPETES Act ( P.L. 111-358 ). Whether it should have provided the $147.0 million in gun- and school violence-related grant funding under the State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance the Administration requests as a part of its "Now is the Time" initiative, which is the Administration's effort to combat gun violence. Whether the Bureau of Prisons has adequate resources to properly manage the growing number of inmates held in federal prisons. Science Agencies Whether the current direction for the U.S. human spaceflight program, established in October 2010 by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-267 ), can be implemented successfully in a period of increased budgetary constraint, as well as the potential impact of human spaceflight's funding needs on the availability of funding for other National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) programs, such as science, aeronautics, and education. Whether it should have adopted the Administration's proposed government-wide science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education program reorganization and consolidation, including proposed changes at NSF, NASA, and the Department of Commerce. The following agencies within the Commerce Department carry out these missions: International Trade Administration (ITA) seeks to develop the export potential of U.S. firms and improve the trade performance of U.S. industry; Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) enforces U.S. export laws consistent with national security, foreign policy, and short-supply objectives; Economic Development Administration (EDA) provides grants for economic development projects in economically distressed communities and regions; Minority Business Development Agency (MBDA) seeks to promote private- and public-sector investment in minority businesses; Economics and Statistics Administration (ESA) , excluding the Census Bureau, provides (1) information on the state of the economy through preparation, development, and interpretation of economic data and (2) analytical support to department officials in meeting their policy responsibilities; Census Bureau , a component of ESA, collects, compiles, and publishes a broad range of economic, demographic, and social data; National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) advises the President on domestic and international communications policy, manages the federal government's use of the radio frequency spectrum, and performs research in telecommunications sciences; United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) examines and approves applications for patents for claimed inventions and registration of trademarks; National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) assists industry in developing technology to improve product quality, modernize manufacturing processes, ensure product reliability, and facilitate rapid commercialization of products on the basis of new scientific discoveries; and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provides scientific, technical, and management expertise to (1) promote safe and efficient marine and air navigation; (2) assess the health of coastal and marine resources; (3) monitor and predict the coastal, ocean, and global environments (including weather forecasting); and (4) protect and manage the nation's coastal resources. 4660 . 110-69 ) and the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 ( P.L. 113-235 ). H.R. 113-76 ). P.L.	This report tracks and describes actions taken by the Administration and Congress to provide FY2015 appropriations for the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) accounts. It also provides an overview of FY2014 appropriations for agencies and bureaus funded as a part of the annual appropriation for CJS. The annual CJS appropriations act provides funding for the Departments of Commerce and Justice, the science agencies, and several related agencies. Appropriations for the Department of Commerce include funding for agencies such as the Census Bureau; the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office; the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Appropriations for the Department of Justice (DOJ) provide funding for agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Bureau of Prisons; the U.S. Marshals; the Drug Enforcement Administration; and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; along with funding for a variety of grant programs for state, local, and tribal governments. Funding for the science agencies goes to the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National Science Foundation (NSF). The annual appropriation for the related agencies includes funding for agencies such as the Legal Services Corporation and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Over the past 10 fiscal years, appropriations for CJS increased from FY2005 to FY2010, and they have generally declined since. After adjusting for inflation, FY2013 and FY2014 appropriations for CJS were generally at the same level as in FY2005. The peak in CJS appropriations around FY2010 was the result of increased appropriations for the Department of Commerce to support the 2010 decennial census. Since FY2010, total appropriations for CJS have been around $60 billion, with the exception of FY2013 when sequestration cut nearly $4 billion out of the total FY2013 CJS appropriations. While decreased appropriations for the Department of Commerce mostly explain the overall decrease in CJS appropriations since FY2010, there have also been cuts in funding for DOJ and NASA. Recent reductions to NASA's appropriation have brought it more in-line with what the agency received in FY2005. In addition, despite recent cuts to DOJ's appropriation, Congress still appropriated $6.883 billion more for DOJ in FY2014 than it did in FY2005. For FY2014, through P.L. 113-76, Congress appropriated a total of $61.623 billion for CJS, of which $8.181 billion was for the Department of Commerce, $27.737 billion was for the Department of Justice, $24.824 billion was for the science agencies, and $881.8 million was for the related agencies. For FY2015, the Administration requested a total of $62.397 billion for the agencies and bureaus funded as a part of the annual CJS bill. The Administration's request included $8.746 billion for the Department of Commerce, $27.974 billion for the Department of Justice, $24.721 billion for the science agencies, and $956.1 million for the related agencies. The House-passed CJS bill (H.R. 4660) would have provided $62.559 billion for the CJS departments and agencies. The House-passed bill included $8.231 billion for the Department of Commerce, $28.162 billion for the Department of Justice, $25.296 billion for the science agencies, and $870.9 million for the related agencies. On June 5, 2014, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its version of the FY2015 CJS appropriations bill (S. 2437). The bill reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations would have provided a total of $62.636 billion for CJS. The bill included $8.556 billion for the Department of Commerce, $27.997 billion for the Department of Justice, $25.161 billion for the science agencies, and $923.0 million for the related agencies. On December 16, 2014, President Obama signed into law the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235). The act provides a total of $61.753 billion for the agencies and bureaus funded by the annual CJS appropriations act. The act provides $8.467 billion for the Department of Commerce, $27.030 billion for the Department of Justice, $25.360 billion for the science agencies, and $895.9 million for the related agencies. Policy makers considered several issues while debating the FY2015 funding levels for CJS agencies and bureaus, including the following: Whether the Census Bureau would receive the funds requested to complete the research and testing necessary for a cost-effective 2020 census design, and to restore 12-month interviewing and the full American Community Survey sample size after a one-month break in data collection that was caused by the October 2013 federal government shutdown. Whether to fund the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) core laboratory and construction accounts at a level consistent with the goal of doubling funding for these and other targeted accounts, as proposed previously by President Obama and adopted implicitly in the America COMPETES Act (P.L. 110-69) and the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-358). Whether Congress should have provided the $147.0 million in gun- and school violence-related grant funding under the State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance the Administration requests as a part of its "Now is the Time" initiative, which is the Administration's effort to combat gun violence. Whether the Bureau of Prisons has adequate resources to properly manage the growing number of inmates held in federal prisons. Whether the current direction for the U.S. human spaceflight program, established in October 2010 by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-267), can be implemented successfully in a period of increased budgetary constraint, as well as what the potential impact of human spaceflight's funding needs will be on the availability of funding for other NASA programs, such as science, aeronautics, and education. Whether Congress should have adopted the Administration's proposed government-wide science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education program reorganization and consolidation, including proposed changes at NSF, NASA, and the Department of Commerce.
crs_R41665	crs_R41665_0	Introduction In the United States, 50.7 million people, or 16.7% of the U.S. population, had no health insurance for at least some of 2009. In fact, during the past decade, the aggregate uninsurance rate was never less than 13.4%. For these and other reasons, the uninsured often have worse health outcomes than the insured. Among the most likely to be uninsured in 2009 were adults between 19 and 25, Hispanics, those living in families with incomes below 200% of the federal poverty guidelines, and those in families with relatively weak attachments to the labor force. The Data This report uses data from the 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS) conducted by the Census Bureau of the U.S. Department of Commerce. The Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) to the CPS collects information on individual health insurance status, income, and poverty. On the other hand, young adults aged 19 to 25 were the most likely to have gone without coverage. Among people aged 65 and older, 93.5% were covered by Medicare, and less than 2% were uninsured. People in a family headed by a single mother were most likely to have public coverage (43.9%), compared with other family types, and those in a family headed by a single father, or a single man living alone, were most likely to be uninsured. In addition, administration and marketing costs are lower in larger firms than in smaller firms. Members of a family where the primary worker was employed full-time for a full year were about half as likely to be uninsured as those in families where the primary worker was employed full-time for only part of the year (13.7% versus 26.0%, respectively). Those who worked part-time, either for all of 2009 or for a part of it, were even more likely to be uninsured. Figure 1 looks at the total number of uninsured individuals and displays the percentage of uninsured individuals by citizenship status. This is because almost 75% of the total pool of the uninsured are native-born citizens, while about 20% of the total pool of the uninsured are not citizens, with the remaining 5% being naturalized citizens. Figure 1 demonstrates that noncitizens comprise the smallest citizenship group of the uninsured. The Likelihood of Being Uninsured An individual's probability of being uninsured can be measured in two ways. For example, among those under 65, blacks were 22.5% likely to be uninsured, whereas whites were 14.0% likely to be uninsured. In other words, blacks were 8.5 percentage points more likely to be uninsured than whites. This section first compares the likelihood of not having health insurance for representative individuals who are largely identical but differ by race. All individuals compared were assumed to be 40-year-old, native-born citizens living with a spouse and children in the Northeast. On the other hand, the economic downturn may cause children and adults to become eligible for the need-based entitlement programs of Medicaid and CHIP. Turning to the data, the uninsurance rate increased during and after the relatively short recession of the early 2000s, and during the relatively longer recession of the late 2000s. In fact, the aggregate uninsurance rate of 16.7% in 2009 was the highest reported insurance rate over the interval.	Almost 51 million people, or 16.7% of the U.S. population, had no health insurance for at least some of 2009. In fact, the aggregate uninsurance rate over the past decade was never less than 13.4%. Individuals living in poorer families, young adults between ages 19 and 25, and Hispanics were especially likely to be uninsured. On the other hand, individuals over 65, who are almost always eligible for Medicare, were the least likely to be uninsured. An extensive body of research suggests that those without health insurance are more likely to face worse health outcomes than those with insurance. This report examines the characteristics of the uninsured and those insured by private and public health insurance using data from the (March) Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS). The insurance information in the 2010 CPS supplement covers calendar year 2009, the most recent year for which CPS data are available. The first part of the report compares very broad groups of individuals under age 65. Those particularly likely to be uninsured included the groups listed above, single men, children living in families headed by single men, those living in the South and West, and noncitizens. In addition, individuals living in families where the primary worker was employed by a small firm or was employed less than full-time and full-year were more likely to be uninsured than those living in a family where the primary worker was employed by a larger firm or had a full-time position for the entire year. Groups particularly likely to receive publicly funded insurance included single mothers and those in families with incomes lower than the poverty threshold. The second section of the report compares two methods of measuring the uninsured. Using citizenship status as an example, the report analyzes uninsurance both in terms of the percentage of each citizenship status in the total pool of the uninsured (e.g., about 75% of the pool of the uninsured were native-born citizens), and in terms of the percentage of each citizenship status who were uninsured (e.g., about 16% of native born citizens were uninsured). The third part of the report compares more narrow groups of "representative" individuals, who were largely similar but differed across a single dimension. For example, the specific effects of an individual's race and age on the likelihood of being uninsured are isolated. Among individuals who were 40 years old, native born, and lived with a spouse and children in the Northeast, those who were white were 8.1% likely to be uninsured, whereas those who were black were 10.8% likely to be uninsured. On the other hand, among all individuals, those who were white were 14% likely to be uninsured, whereas those who were black were 22.5% likely to be uninsured. The final part of the report examines uninsurance rates over the past 10 years. The uninsurance rate increased during and after the relatively short economic recession of the early 2000s and during the relatively longer recession of the late 2000s.
crs_R40823	crs_R40823_0	Introduction During the past 15 years, the development and adoption of new electronic technologies has altered the traditional patterns of communication between Members of Congress and constituents. Many Members now use e-mail, official websites, blogs, Youtube channels, and Facebook pages to communicate with their constituents—technologies that were either non-existent or not widely available 15 years ago. These technologies have arguably served to potentially enhance the ability of Members of Congress to fulfill their representational duties by providing greater opportunities for communication between the Member and individual constituents, supporting the fundamental democratic role of spreading information about public policy and government operations. However, electronic communications have raised some concerns. Existing law and chamber regulations on the use of communication media such as the United States Postal Service have proven difficult to adapt to the new electronic technologies. This report examines Member use of one specific new electronic communication medium: Twitter. After providing an overview and background of Twitter, the report analyzes patterns of Member use of Twitter during two one-week periods in July and August 2009. This report is inherently a snapshot in time of a dynamic process. As with any new technology, the number of Members using Twitter and the patterns of use may change rapidly in short periods of time. Thus, the conclusions drawn from this data can not be easily generalized nor can these results be used to predict future behavior. In addition, electronic technology has reduced the marginal cost of constituent communications; unlike postal letters, Members can reach large numbers of constituents for a fixed cost. During the second week of data collection, the House and Senate were in recess. House Republicans, who constitute 54% of Members registered with Twitter, sent approximately 74% of all tweets during session and approximately 64% of tweets during recess. Overall, the data also suggest that Senators tweeted less than House Members. During the two non-consecutive weeks of observation, Members sent a total of 1,187 tweets, for an average of almost 85 Member tweets per day. To assess the content of Member tweets, six major message categories were hypothesized: position taking, press or web link, district or state, official or congressional action, personal or other, and reply. These tweets comprised 43% of in-session tweets and 46% of recess tweets.	During the past 15 years, the development of new electronic technologies has altered the traditional patterns of communication between Members of Congress and constituents. Many Members now use e-mail, official websites, blogs, Youtube channels, and Facebook pages to communicate with their constituents—technologies that were either non-existent or not widely available 15 years ago. These technologies have arguably served to potentially enhance the ability of Members of Congress to fulfill their representational duties by providing greater opportunities for communication between the Member and individual constituents, supporting the fundamental democratic role of spreading information about public policy and government operations. In addition, electronic technology has reduced the marginal cost of constituent communications; unlike postal letters, Members can reach large numbers of constituents for a fixed cost. Despite these advantages, electronic communications have raised some concerns. Existing law and chamber regulations on the use of communication media such as the franking privilege have proven difficult to adapt to the new electronic technologies. This report examines Member use of one specific new electronic communication medium: Twitter. After providing an overview and background of Twitter, the report analyzes patterns of Member use of Twitter during two one-week periods in July and August 2009. This report is inherently a snapshot in time of a dynamic process. As with any new technology, the number of Members using Twitter and the patterns of use may change rapidly in short periods of time. Thus, the conclusions drawn from this data can not be easily generalized nor can these results be used to predict future behavior. The data show that 158 Representatives and Senators are registered with Twitter (as of August 2009) and issued a total of approximately 1,187 "tweets" during the data collection periods in July and August 2009. With approximately 29% of House Members and 31% of Senators registered with Twitter, Members sent an average of 85 tweets per day collectively. House Republicans sent the most tweets (54%), followed by House Democrats (27%), Senate Republicans (10%), and Senate Democrats (9%). The data also suggest that more tweets were sent on Thursday than any other day of the week. Members' use of Twitter can be divided into six categories: position taking, press or web links, district or state activities, official congressional action, personal, and replies. The data suggest that the most frequent type of tweets were press and web link tweets, which comprised 43% of in-session and 46% of recess tweets. This is followed by official congressional action tweets during session (33%) and position-taking tweets during recess (14%).
crs_R44302	crs_R44302_0	Introduction For more than a decade, Congress and the federal government have focused on ending homelessness among the chronically homeless population, a group characterized by extended periods of time spent living on the street or other places not meant for human habitation and having one or more disabling conditions. In addition, it summarizes the research regarding chronically homeless individuals who move into PSH (" Research on Permanent Supportive Housing for Chronically Homeless Individuals "). Federal Definition of Chronic Homelessness The federal definition of chronic homelessness grew out of the George W. Bush Administration's plan to end chronic homelessness and an interagency project, the Collaborative Initiative to Help End Chronic Homelessness, that was funded in 2003. The best data in recent years comes from annual community point-in-time counts of people experiencing homelessness. Homeless individuals with mental illness and substance use disorders may struggle to earn income and otherwise stabilize their lives in order to achieve and maintain housing without assistance. Most simply, permanent supportive housing (PSH) is housing that is not time-limited and where services are available for residents. Housing First makes many services available but does not require residents to use them, nor does it require abstinence or medication compliance. The Housing First model was pioneered by the New York provider Pathways to Housing. It also stresses the importance of resident choice about where to live and the type and intensity of services, with services structured to fit individual resident needs. These included (1) a collaboration among HUD, HHS, and VA (the Collaborative Initiative to Help End Chronic Homelessness ) that funded housing and treatment for chronically homeless individuals; (2) a HUD and DOL project called Ending Chronic Homelessness through Employment and Housing , through which HUD funded permanent supportive housing and DOL offered employment assistance; and (3) a HUD pilot program called Housing for People Who Are Homeless and Addicted to Alcohol that provided supportive housing for chronically homeless persons. The HUD Homeless Assistance Grants are the primary way the federal government funds housing for people experiencing homelessness. (The target has since been updated to 2017. ) There are five common outcomes that appeared most frequently in the research: Housing status and stability —Typically measured by the number of days housed or days spent homeless after moving into housing; P ublic service use and costs —Evidenced by the number of visits to service providers or the amount of public funds spent on services such as hospitalizations, counseling, or shelter before and after a housing intervention; Substance use —Measured based on whether days drinking or using drugs increase or decrease after moving into housing; Mental health —Evaluated by such factors as psychiatric symptoms or time spent in treatment or psychiatric hospitals; Resident satisfaction and quality of life —Evaluated based on residents' impressions of housing and other aspects of their lives based on residents' responses to survey questions after moving into housing. A successful outcome in one area—such as stable housing—may not necessarily translate to a successful outcome in other areas, such as improved mental health or less use of alcohol and drugs. The results from these studies support the Housing First principle that individuals need not be housing-ready to succeed in ending a long-term spell of homelessness. Public Service Use and Costs An impetus for prioritizing permanent supportive housing for chronically homeless individuals is the idea that housing can reduce the use of expensive services, often paid with public funds, such as hospitals and emergency rooms; law enforcement resources, jails, and prisons; and temporary emergency shelter. Some descriptions of PSH, particularly those in the media, indicate that cost reductions from PSH should be expected. However, unlike housing stability, where providing PSH largely improved this outcome, findings regarding cost reductions are somewhat mixed. Factors accounting for the differences in service use and cost from one study to another include the neediness of the population receiving housing (very high-need populations with co-occurring mental illness and serious addictions likely have more opportunities to reduce service use); the type of assistance received by comparison groups, if any (a comparison group in transitional housing may have fewer differences in service use than one receiving no housing assistance); the number of costs included by researchers (if only a limited number of costs are assessed, or if the costs of housing are not included, it may not give a full picture of a housing intervention); and the length of the follow-up period (changes may be more positive in a short amount of time after receiving housing or could take longer to occur). Among veterans enrolled in the HUD-VASH program (which prioritizes chronically homeless veterans) in FY2010, 42% had a serious mental illness. While the evidence shows that PSH can be a solution to chronic homelessness, it is less clear whether PSH will "solve" other issues faced by homeless individuals or reduce treatment and other service costs for all homeless individuals. At least two states are using their state share of Medicaid for supportive housing. States and communities are also addressing the need to pay for PSH through Pay for Success initiatives (sometimes called Social Impact Bonds).	Chronically homeless individuals are those who spend long periods of time living on the street or other places not meant for human habitation, and who have one or more disabilities, frequently including mental illnesses and substance use disorders. In the 2015 Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) point-in-time count of people experiencing homelessness, more than 83,000 individuals met the definition of chronically homeless, down from nearly 120,000 in 2008. In part the decline is due to the federal government's plan, announced in 2002, to end chronic homelessness within 10 years. The target date has since been extended to 2017. Among the federal programs focused on ending chronic homelessness are the HUD Homelessness Assistance Grants, the HUD and Veterans Affairs Supported Housing Program (HUD-VASH), and several HUD demonstration programs. One of the reasons that federal programs have devoted resources to ending chronic homelessness is studies finding that individuals who experience it, particularly those with serious mental illness, use many expensive services often paid through public sources, including emergency room visits, inpatient hospitalizations, and law enforcement and jail time. Even emergency shelter resources can be costly. In addition to potential ethical reasons for ending chronic homelessness, doing so could reduce costs in providing assistance to this population. For years, ending chronic homelessness was thought to be a multi-step process, with individuals receiving treatment for addictions and illnesses, perhaps while living in transitional or temporary housing, before being found capable of living on their own. However, the strategy for ending homelessness has changed, largely due to research pioneered by housing providers. Instead of requiring chronically homeless individuals to be "housing ready" by first addressing issues thought to underlie homelessness, the new strategy allows chronically homeless individuals to move into permanent supportive housing without preconditions. Permanent supportive housing (PSH) is not time-limited and makes services available to residents. A particular PSH, called Housing First, focuses on resident choice about where to live and the type and intensity of services and does not require abstinence or medication compliance. Housing First has been embraced by HUD and the Department of Veterans Affairs as a way to end chronic homelessness. Many researchers have examined PSH, including Housing First, as a way to reduce homelessness. Some researchers have also examined related outcomes, including changes in the use of services, and the costs of those services, by formerly homeless individuals after they move into housing; whether drug and alcohol use decreases; if there are improvements in mental health outcomes; and resident satisfaction after moving to housing. Overall, based on a review of the research, PSH helps increase days spent in housing and reduce days spent homeless, showing that PSH can be a successful way to end homelessness. The outcomes in other areas are not as clear, perhaps evidence that reductions in service use and costs, reductions in substance use, and mental health improvements may depend on individual needs and circumstances and require more than a successful move out of homelessness. When reductions in service use result from chronically homeless individuals moving into PSH, any commensurate cost reductions are largely seen in public spending on health care. Medicaid funds can be used to pay for housing-related services, and increasingly housing advocates are encouraging this as a way to help chronically homeless individuals gain and maintain housing. In addition, with limited funding available for new units of housing through HUD programs, some states are using their own shares of Medicaid funds to finance permanent supportive housing for chronically homeless individuals. Another possible funding source is Pay for Success initiatives, where private investments in PSH are paid back if certain outcomes are attained.
crs_RS22195	crs_RS22195_0	Section 1811 of the Social Security Act provides that Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) beneficiaries are eligible for Medicare hospital insurance (Part A). Programs That May Provide Health Insurance During the 24-Month Waiting Period Medicaid Those SSDI beneficiaries with limited incomes and assets may qualify for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits.	Recipients of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits are eligible for Medicare benefits after a 24-month waiting period. This report explains this waiting period and its legislative history. This report also provides information on other programs that may provide access to health insurance during the required waiting period.This report will be updated to reflect legislative activity.
crs_RL33584	crs_RL33584_0	In the speech, he also called on the Congress to support his May 2007 call to double U.S. international funding for AIDS, to $30 billion over five years, starting in 2009. International AIDS issues are further covered in CRS Report RL33485, U.S. International HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Spending: FY2004-FY2008 , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL34192, PEPFAR: Policy Issues from FY2004 through FY2008 , by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RL33396, The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria: Progress Report and Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL31712, The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria: Background , by [author name scrubbed]. Characteristics of the African Epidemic2 Overview Sub-Saharan Africa ("Africa" hereafter) has been far more severely affected by HIV/AIDS than any other world region. Africa has nearly 12% of the world's population but about 68% of the global total of infected persons. In 2007, about 1.6 million adults and children were estimated to have died of AIDS, comprising about 76% of global AIDS deaths in 2007, down from a 2006 estimate of about 2.1 million deaths, when African AIDS deaths made up about 72% of global AIDS deaths. Aggregate estimates of deaths caused by AIDS suggest that many as 30 million Africans may have died of AIDS since 1982, at the start of the epidemic, including those who perished in 2007. It causes more deaths than malaria in African adults, and kills many times more people than Africa's armed conflicts. The adult rate of infection in Africa in late 2005 was 6.1%, compared with 1% worldwide, but had dropped to 5% by 2007, compared to .8% worldwide. Recent prevalence declines are attributable to a combination of deaths of infected persons; declines in new infections due to behavioral change and increased access to testing; the scaling up of access to drug therapy; and, in some cases, improved social services and access to better nutrition. Highest Rates Southern Africa, where nine countries have adult infection rates above 10% ( Table 1 ) , is the most severely affected region. They comprised about 59% of infected adults in Africa and about 76% of HIV-positive females globally in late 2005; women comprised a slightly higher proportion of all AIDS infections in Africa, 61%, by 2007. Nonetheless, roughly 2.24 million African children under age 15 were living with AIDS in 2007, down slightly from an estimated 2.3 million in late 2005. There were an estimated 11.4 million orphans due to AIDS in Africa in 2007. P.L. In the most severely affected countries, sharp drops in life expectancy are occurring, reversing major gains achieved in recent decades. Responses to the AIDS Epidemic Donor governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in Africa, and African governments have responded to the AIDS epidemic primarily by attempting to reduce the number of new HIV infections through prevention programs, and to some degree, by trying to ameliorate the damage done by AIDS to families, societies, and economies. Initiatives to expand ARV availability continued, and treatment became a major focus of Global Fund and the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) programs (see below). 108 - 25 , the United States Leadership Against Global HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, signed into law by President Bush on May 27, 2003. U.S. Assistance Under the President's FY2008 budget request, the 12 focus countries in Africa would receive $3.421 billion under the GHAI account. Legislation in the 110th Congress Apart from appropriations legislation that would fund global HIV/AIDS assistance programs, legislation introduced in the 110 th Congress that focus on AIDS in Africa include: S. 805 (Durbin) and H.R. H.R. 1713 (Lee) and S. 2415 (Clinton), both entitled Protection Against Transmission of HIV for Women and Youth Act of 2007. S.Con.Res.	Sub-Saharan Africa ("Africa" hereafter) has been more severely affected by AIDS than any other world region. In 2007, the United Nations reports, there were about 22.5 million HIV-positive persons in Africa, which has nearly 12% of the world's population but about 68% of the global total of infected persons. The adult rate of infection in Africa in late 2005 was 6.1%, compared with 1% worldwide, but had dropped to 5% by 2007, compared to .8% worldwide. Nine southern African countries have infection rates above 10%. In 2007, 35% of all people living globally with HIV lived in Southern Africa, where 32% of all global new HIV infections and AIDS deaths occurred. About 90% of infected children globally live in Africa, where about 61% of infected adults are women. As many as 30 million Africans may have died of AIDS since 1982, including 1.6 million who died in 2007, accounting for about 76% of global AIDS deaths in 2007. AIDS has surpassed malaria as the leading cause of death in Africa. It kills many more Africans than does war. Experts attribute the severity of Africa's AIDS epidemic to poverty, lack of female empowerment, high rates of male worker migration, and other factors. Many national health systems are ill-equipped for prevention, diagnosis, and treatment. AIDS causes severe socioeconomic consequences, e.g., declines in economic productivity due to sharp drops in life expectancy and the loss of skilled workers. It also devastates family structures. There are about 11.4 million African AIDS orphans, many of whom lack access to adequate nutrition and social services. Private organizations and the governments of donor and African nations have responded by supporting diverse efforts to prevent and reduce the rate of new infections and by trying to abate damage done by AIDS to families, societies, and economies. The adequacy of this response is much debated. An estimated 1.3 million Africa AIDS patients receiving antiretroviral (ARV) drug treatment in late-2005, up from 150,000 in mid-2004. An estimated 4.8 million Africans needed such therapy in late 2005. U.S. and other initiatives are reportedly sharply expanding access to treatment. Advocates see this goal as an affordable means of reducing the impact of the pandemic. Skeptics question whether drug access can continue to be rapidly scaled up in the absence of costly general health infrastructure improvements. U.S. concern over AIDS in Africa grew in the 1980s, as the epidemic's severity became apparent. Congress has steadily increased funding for global AIDS programs. P.L. 108-25, signed into law on May 27, 2003, authorized $15 billion over five years for international AIDS programs under the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Twelve of 15 PEPFAR "focus countries" are in Africa. Under the FY2008 budget request, these 12 countries would receive $3.421 billion under the State Department's Global HIV/AIDS Initiative. Many activists have praised the extent of such aid, but some urge that more funding or different programs be provided. Congress is likely to re-authorize PEPFAR, which expires after FY2008, or create a successor program. Other bills in the 110th Congress that focus on AIDS in Africa include S. 805 (Durbin), H.R. 3812 (Lee), H.R. 1713 (Lee), S. 2415 (Clinton), and S.Con.Res. 31 Global AIDS appropriations are discussed in other CRS reports cited within this report, which will be updated periodically.
crs_RL32141	crs_RL32141_0	Introduction Congress recently completed action on the Bush Administration's FY2004 supplemental budgetrequest to fund continuing military operations and reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan. (1) A majorissue in the congressional debate on this, and other such supplementals of the past, is whethermilitary and peacekeeping operations should be funded with supplemental requests or via the regulardefense appropriations process. Some Members of Congress have urged the President to include thecosts of current and future operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the Department of Defense's(DOD's) regular appropriations, arguing that these are now ongoing operations that should beplanned for and funded in the annual defense budget. Others prefer supplementals due to theunpredictability of military and peacekeeping circumstances in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thisunpredictability, they argue, makes it extremely difficult to estimate the costs of either type ofoperation in advance. This report examines 46 cases since FY1990 in which Congress approved funding for combat or peacekeeping operations using regular appropriations, supplemental appropriations, or acombination of the two. Table 1 shows that since 1990, Congress generally has funded combatoperations with supplemental appropriations. In initial post-combat peacekeeping operations,however, Congress has tended to rely on a combination of supplemental and regular appropriations. As peacekeeping operations have become ongoing, Congress has switched to using regularappropriations.	Congress recently completed action on the Bush Administration's FY2004 supplemental budget request to fund continuing military operations and reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan. It wassigned into law, P.L. 108-106 , on November 6, 2003. A major issue in the congressional debate onthis, and other such supplementals of the past, is whether military and peacekeeping operationsshould be funded with supplemental requests or via the regular defense appropriations process. Some Members of Congress have urged the President to include the costs of current and futureoperations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the Department of Defense's (DOD's) regular appropriations,arguing that these are now ongoing operations that should be planned for and funded in the annualdefense budget. Others prefer supplementals due to the unpredictability of military andpeacekeeping circumstances in Iraq and Afghanistan. This unpredictability, they argue, makes itextremely difficult to estimate the costs of either type of operation in advance. This report examines 46 cases since FY1990 in which Congress approved funding for combat or peacekeeping operations using regular appropriations, supplemental appropriations, or acombination of the two. The report shows that since 1990, Congress generally has funded combatoperations with supplemental appropriations. In initial stages of post-combat peacekeepingoperations, however, Congress has tended to rely on a combination of supplemental and regularappropriations. As peacekeeping operations have become ongoing, Congress has switched to usingregular appropriations.
crs_RL31983	crs_RL31983_0	Introduction In the 108th Congress, the House and Senate passed competing versions of the Patient Safetyand Quality Improvement Act ( H.R. 663 , S. 720 ). OnMarch 9, 2005, the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP)unanimously approved a new patient safety bill ( S. 544 ), which is identical to last year'sSenate-passed measure. (1) The IOM report concluded that preventable medical errors causeas many as 98,000 deaths each year and called on all parties to make improving patient safety anational health policy priority. It recommended establishing a national mandatory reporting systemto hold hospitals and other health care facilities accountable for errors that lead to serious injury ordeath. Emphasizing that medical errors are primarily the result of faulty systems, process, andconditions that lead people to make mistakes, the IOM also recommended the development ofvoluntary, confidential systems for reporting medical errors that result in no harm (i.e., close calls)or minimal harm. In an effort to encourage providers toreport errors, most states have adopted measures to protect reporting system data from use bymalpractice attorneys. To encourage reporting, the IOM further recommended that information collected undera voluntary reporting system be strictly confidential and protected from legal discovery. Providers, however, arereluctant to report adverse events. System design features, such as de-identifying data and receiving reports anonymously, mayreduce the need for strong legal protections by making it more difficult to link specific incidents toindividuals or institutions. However, in order to establish a nationwide mandatory reporting system, the IOM recommended thatCongress (1) designate the National Quality Forum as the entity responsible for issuing andmaintaining reporting standards to be used by states, (2) require health care institutions to reportstandardized information on a defined list of adverse events, and (3) provide funds and technicalexpertise to state governments to establish or improve their error reporting systems. National Medical Error Reporting Systems There are several national voluntary reporting systems for medical errors. They include thePatient Safety Information System within the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and the JointCommission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) Sentinel Events ReportingSystem. The data are analyzed by experts, and reporters receive timely feedback ofuseful information. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act To encourage providers to report errors without fear of the data being used in a medicalmalpractice lawsuit, the IOM recommended that information collected under a voluntary reportingsystem be protected from legal discovery and admission as evidence in civil cases. Under the House-passed bill, PSOs would be certified by AHRQ to collect and analyzepatient safety work product submitted by providers, and to develop and disseminaterecommendations for systems-based solutions to improve patient safety and health care quality. H.R. 663 would have required AHRQ to establish a national database to receiveand analyze de-identified information submitted by PSOs. Analysis of H.R. By comparison, S. 544 would prohibit lawyers from obtaining or using patient safety data in civil,administrative, and criminal proceedings, unless a judge determined that the information containedevidence of "a wanton and criminal act to directly harm the patient." In its 1999 report, the IOM focused on protecting voluntarily reported patient safetyinformation from discovery and admission as evidence in civil and administrative proceeding, notingthat "instances of criminal prosecution for medical errors are exceptionally rare." Analysis of such information would thenbe used to identify vulnerabilities in health care systems.	In the 108th Congress, the House and Senate passed competing versions of the Patient Safetyand Quality Improvement Act ( H.R. 663 , S. 720 ), but the differencesbetween the two measures were never resolved. On March 9, 2005, the Senate Committee onHealth, Education, Labor, and Pensions unanimously approved S. 544 , which isidentical to S. 720 . The legislation would establish legal protections for data andreports on medical errors in an effort to encourage voluntary reporting of such information. Thepatient safety bills are in response to the 1999 Institute of Medicine (IOM) report To Err Is Human ,which concluded that preventable medical errors cause as many as 98,000 deaths a year. The IOMfound that medical errors are primarily the result of faulty systems, processes, and conditions thatlead people to make mistakes. It recommended establishing a national mandatory reporting systemto hold hospitals accountable for serious medical errors, as well as developing voluntary, confidentialsystems for reporting errors that result in little or no harm. Analysis of such voluntarily reported datacould be used to identify vulnerabilities in health care systems. Twenty-two states mandate medical error reporting by hospitals. However, providers arereluctant to report adverse events in part because they fear that the information will be used inmalpractice litigation. States have sought to allay those concerns by passing laws to protect reporteddata from legal discovery and by de-identifying data and receiving reports anonymously. Suchmeasures risk limiting the usefulness of the data for research and quality management. There are several national voluntary reporting systems for medical errors, including thePatient Safety Information System within the Department of Veterans Affairs. Analysis of these andother voluntary reporting systems -- notably the Aviation Safety Reporting System -- has identifiedseveral design features associated with effective programs. For example, the reporting processshould be user-friendly and the information kept confidential and protected from legal discovery. Also, reports should be promptly evaluated by experts who are trained to recognize underlyingsystems causes, and reporters should receive timely feedback with recommendations forsystems-based improvements. To encourage voluntary reporting, H.R. 663 would have protected reportedinformation from legal discovery in civil and administrative proceeding, and from a Freedom ofInformation Act request. The bill required the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)to certify patient safety organizations to collect and analyze the information reported by providers. Such organizations would develop and disseminate recommendations for systems-based solutionsto improve patient safety and health care quality. H.R. 663 also would have requiredAHRQ to establish a national database to receive and analyze de-identified information submittedby patient safety organizations. S. 544 would protect information from use in criminalas well as civil and administrative proceedings, unless a judge determined that it contained evidenceof an intentional act to directly harm the patient. This report will be updated as legislative eventsin the 109th Congress warrant.

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