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crs_R43471	crs_R43471_0	Introduction Although Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Unemployment Insurance (UI) both provide income support to eligible individuals, the two programs serve largely separate populations. SSDI provides long-term benefits to statutorily disabled individuals who worked in jobs covered by Social Security and to their eligible dependents. In contrast, UI provides temporary benefits to involuntarily unemployed workers who meet the requirements of state law. Opponents argue that concurrent receipt of SSDI and UI benefits is consistent and appropriate under law, because the SSDI program actively encourages beneficiaries to return to work through various work incentives. This report provides background on SSDI and UI and explains how individuals may be eligible for both programs concurrently. The report ends with a discussion of potential issues in implementing such proposals. GAO Report on Overlapping SSDI and UI Benefits In July 2012, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report that examined the issue of overlapping SSDI and UI benefits. GAO found that in FY2010, 117,000 individuals received more than $850 million in concurrent benefit payments from the SSDI and UI programs. These individuals represented about 1% of the beneficiaries in each program, and the cash payments they received in FY2010 totaled more than $281 million from SSDI (0.2% of annual benefit outlays) and more than $575 million from UI (0.4% of annual benefit outlays). Number of Concurrent SSDI and UI Recipients As shown in Table 1 , SSA's Office of the Chief Actuary estimates that for each month in 2015, an average of about 0.34% of disabled-worker beneficiaries will be in concurrent receipt of SSDI and UI benefits. Arguments For and Against Preventing or Reducing Concurrent Receipt of SSDI and UI Proponents of eliminating or abating concurrent receipt of SSDI and UI benefits argue that the practice is "double dipping" or duplicative, because both programs are intended to replace lost earnings. Proponents also maintain that receipt of one benefit is fundamentally contradictory with the eligibility requirements of the other, in that UI beneficiaries are required to be able and available for work (as determined under state law), whereas SSDI beneficiaries must be generally unable to work due to a severe physical or mental impairment. They contend that denying or offsetting the SSDI benefits of individuals in receipt of UI would discourage disabled-worker beneficiaries from attempting to return to work. In addition, many opponents contend that such proposals discriminate against individuals with disabilities who have lost their job through no fault of their own. Legislative Proposals in the 114th Congress to Prevent or Reduce Concurrent Receipt of SSDI and UI Several proposals have been introduced in the 114 th Congress to deny or limit overlapping SSDI and UI benefits. These proposals take one of three approaches: The first approach treats receipt of UI payments as engaging in SGA for SSDI eligibility purposes ( H.R. 918 and S. 499 ); The second approach suspends SSDI benefits for any month in which a disabled-worker beneficiary receives UI payments ( S. 343 ); and The third approach reduces SSDI benefits, dollar for dollar, by the amount of UI payments (the President's FY2016 budget).	Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Unemployment Insurance (UI) are forms of social insurance that provide protection against the risk of economic loss due to specific adverse events. SSDI provides long-term benefits to nonelderly workers and their eligible dependents if the worker is unable to engage in substantial gainful activity (SGA) due to a qualifying impairment. UI provides temporary benefits to involuntarily unemployed workers who meet the requirements of state law. Although SSDI and UI serve largely separate populations, some individuals may be concurrently (simultaneously) eligible for benefits under both programs. In 2012, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) examined the issue of overlapping SSDI and UI benefits. GAO found that in FY2010, 117,000 individuals received more than $850 million in concurrent benefit payments from the SSDI and UI programs. These individuals represented about 1% of the beneficiaries in each program, and the benefit payments they received constituted 0.2% of SSDI benefit outlays and 0.4% of UI benefit outlays for that year. The Social Security Administration (SSA) estimates that for each month in 2015, an average of about 0.34% of disabled-worker beneficiaries will be in concurrent receipt of SSDI and UI (approximately 30,000 people). During the 114th Congress, several proposals have been introduced to deny or offset the SSDI benefits of disabled-worker beneficiaries who receive UI benefits. These proposals take one of three approaches. The first approach treats receipt of UI payments as engaging in SGA, which would prevent UI recipients from qualifying for SSDI. It could also lead to a suspension or termination of SSDI benefits for individuals already entitled to SSDI who receive UI payments based on work activity that occurred under an SSA-approved work incentive. The second approach suspends SSDI benefits for any month in which a disabled-worker beneficiary receives UI payments. The third approach reduces SSDI benefits, dollar for dollar, by the amount of UI benefits. Supporters of these proposals argue that concurrent receipt of SSDI and UI benefits is "double dipping" or duplicative, because both programs are intended to replace lost earnings. They also maintain that receipt of one benefit is fundamentally contradictory with the eligibility requirements of the other: UI beneficiaries are required to be able and available for work (as determined under state law), whereas SSDI beneficiaries must be generally unable to work due to a severe physical or mental impairment that prevents them from performing SGA. Opponents argue that concurrent receipt of SSDI and UI benefits is consistent and appropriate under law, because the SSDI program actively encourages beneficiaries to return to work through various work incentives. Many opponents also contend that denying or offsetting the SSDI benefits of individuals in receipt of UI discriminates against people with disabilities who have lost their job through no fault of their own. This report provides an overview of the SSDI and UI programs and explores the issue of overlapping payments. It also examines many of the proposals introduced during the 114th Congress to prevent or reduce concurrent receipt of SSDI and UI. The report ends with a discussion of potential issues for SSA in implementing such proposals.
crs_R44379	crs_R44379_0	As has been typical in recent years, about 95% of that total is for military activities of the Department of Defense (DOD). For FY2017, the Administration proposes a DOD discretionary budget totaling $582.7 billion, of which $523.9 billion comprises the base budget while $58.8 billion would fund OCO. The $523.9 billion DOD discretionary budget request is compliant with the spending caps established for FY2017 by the Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) of 2015 ( P.L. The OCO request also includes $3.4 billion to enhance the U.S. presence in Eastern Europe, often referred to as the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI). Selected Budget Matters Military Personnel Under the budget request the number of active duty military personnel in the U.S. military services would decline from 1.30 million to 1.28 million, with the Army dropping by 15,000 to 460,000 (heading toward a planned level of 450,000) and the Navy declining by 4,400, partly to reflect a proposal to disband one of 10 carrier air wings. The budget proposes that military basic pay increase by 1.6%, costing about $300 million less than if military pay rose at the 2.1% rate that is the average in the private sector (according to the Labor Department's Employment Cost Index (ECI) survey). The Army's request for helicopter procurement funds underscored the Administration's acknowledgement that procurement accounts—and aircraft accounts in particular—bore the brunt of DOD's belt-tightening. Although the service's total procurement request for FY2017 was a net of $1.3 billion lower than the amount appropriated in FY2016, the amount requested for procurement of Army aircraft was a net $2.3 billion less than the corresponding FY2016 appropriation. Naval Forces As planned last year, the request would fund two DDG-51 Aegis destroyers ($3.4 billion) and two Virginia - class submarines ($5.2 billion), both types being purchased under multi-year, multi-ship procurement authority. The request also includes $1.3 billion for two Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs). Combat Air Forces The request funds 63 Joint Strike Fighters (43 F-35A, 16 F-35B, and 4 F-35C), deferring the planned FY2017 procurement of an additional five F-35As for the Air Force but buying two more F-35Bs for the Marine Corps than had been projected. DOD officials cited this reduction as one instance of a program reduction made in response to budgetary limits. To compensate for the slower-than-planned fielding of the F-35—a so-called "5 th generation" design incorporating stealth and other advanced technologies—the budget request includes funds to enlarge and upgrade DOD's fleet of earlier, so-called "4 th generation" fighters. Thus, the Administration's budget includes funds for programs that been funded in recent years as congressional initiatives, for instance: To mitigate a shortfall in the Navy's fleet of strike fighters, the Administration requests $185 million (in FY2017 OCO funds) to replace two Navy F/A-18s lost in combat and plans to continue F/A-18 purchases in future budget years. The budget requests $900.0 million in FY2017 to keep in service A-10 ground-attack planes that the Administration has been trying for years to retire, over congressional objections. The current plan is to keep the planes in service—at a cost of $3.4 billion—through FY2022 when they would be replaced by F-35s.	The Administration's FY2017 budget request includes $619.5 billion for national defense of which $590.6 billion is for the Department of Defense (DOD). Of the DOD total, $523.9 billion covers the base budget, discretionary spending subject to the spending caps established for FY2017 by the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 2015. An additional $58.8 billion of the DOD total is to support Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). OCO funding supports the continued U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and assistance to Iraqi and Syrian opposition forces. The OCO request also includes $3.4 billion to enhance the U.S. presence in Eastern Europe, referred to as the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI). The budget request would reduce active-component end-strength of the armed forces from 1.30 million to 1.28 million. The Army would drop by 15,000 to 460,000 (heading toward a planned level of 450,000). The Navy decline is 4,400, largely to reflect a proposal to disband one of 10 carrier air wings. Military basic pay would increase by 1.6%, costing about $300 million less than if military pay rose at the 2.1% rate that is the average in the private sector (according to the Labor Department's Employee Compensation Index). The Administration has acknowledged that procurement accounts—and aircraft accounts in particular—bore the brunt of DOD's belt-tightening. For example, although the Army's total procurement request for FY2017 was a net of $1.3 billion lower than the amount appropriated in FY2016, the amount requested for procurement of Army aircraft was a net $2.3 billion less than the corresponding FY2016 appropriation. The request funds 63 Joint Strike Fighters (43 for the Air Force, 16 for the Marine Corps, and 4 for the Navy), deferring the planned FY2017 procurement of an additional five F-35As. DOD officials cited this reduction as one instance of a program reduction made in response to budgetary limits. To compensate for the slower-than-planned fielding of the F-35, the budget request includes funds to enlarge and upgrade DOD's fleet of earlier model fighters. Thus the Administration's budget includes funds for programs that been funded in recent years as congressional initiatives, for instance: To mitigate a shortfall in the Navy's fleet of strike fighters, the Administration requests $185 million (in FY2017 OCO funds) to replace two Navy F/A-18s lost in combat; and it plans to continue F/A-18 purchases in future budget years. The budget request would fund two DDG-51 Aegis destroyers for $3.4 billion, two Virginia-class submarines for $5.2 billion, and two Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) for $1.3 billion. The budget assumes the Navy would save $200 million by removing seven Aegis cruisers from service for long-term modernization. Congress has rejected similar proposals in previous years. The budget requests $900.0 million in FY2017 to keep in service A-10 ground-attack planes that the Administration has been trying for years to retire, over congressional objections. The current plan is to keep the planes in service—at a cost of $3.4 billion—through FY2022 when they would be replaced by F-35s.
crs_RL34454	crs_RL34454_0	Scientific and technical knowledge and guidance influences many of today's public policies. Today, science and engineering research and innovations are intricately linked to societal needs and the nation's economy in areas such as energy, transportation, communication, agriculture, education, environment, health, defense, and jobs. As a result, policymakers are interested in almost every aspect of science and technology policy. Science and technology policy guidance can be used to frame policy issues, craft legislation, oversee federal activities, and govern. OSTP defines its major objectives, based on the act, as follows: Advise the President and others within the Executive Office of the President on the impacts of science and technology on domestic and international affairs; Lead an interagency effort to develop and implement sound science and technology policies and budgets; Work with the private sector to ensure Federal investments in science and technology contribute to economic prosperity, environmental quality, and national security; Build strong partnerships among Federal, State, and local governments, other countries, and the scientific community; and Evaluate the scale, quality, and effectiveness of the Federal effort in science and technology. The science and engineering community, however, is not represented by one individual or organization. On matters of scientific and technical knowledge and guidance, its opinions are consensus-based with groups of scientists and engineers coming together from different perspectives to debate an issue based on the available empirical evidence. In the end, consensus is achieved if there is widespread agreement on the evidence and its implications. If this occurs, the knowledge is conveyed to policymakers so they can determine, among other factors, whether or not to take policy actions in response. If there are major disagreements within large portions of the community, however, the lack of consensus adds to the uncertainty facing policymakers responding to a concern. Several organizations, when requested by the federal government or Congress, provide formal science and technology policy advice: federal advisory committees, congressionally chartered honorific organizations, and federally funded research and development corporations. In addition, many other organizations and individuals—policy institutes, the public, professional organizations and disciplinary societies, universities and colleges, advocacy, special interest, industry, trade associations, and labor—also provide their thoughts (see Figure 5 ). These organizations may agree on the scientific and technical knowledge, but disagree on what actions to take in response on an S&T policy, as their values on a proposed policy may differ. Despite these challenges, scientific and technical knowledge and advice has the potential of being useful in making decisions related to public policy. Policymakers have an opportunity to make their decisions based on the best knowledge and guidance available, along with the other factors they must take into account. An intuitive sense can only go so far in such situations, while scientific and technical knowledge and guidance can help policymakers assess the potential risk and benefits of a decision they make so that societal and economic benefits are enhanced and losses are mitigated.	Scientific and technical knowledge and guidance influences not just policy related to science and technology, but also many of today's public policies as policymakers seek knowledge to enhance the quality of their decisions. Science and technology policy is concerned with the allocation of resources for and encouragement of scientific and engineering research and development, the use of scientific and technical knowledge to enhance the nation's response to societal challenges, and the education of Americans in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. Science and engineering research and innovations are intricately linked to societal needs and the nation's economy in areas such as transportation, communication, agriculture, education, environment, health, defense, and jobs. As a result, policymakers are interested in almost every aspect of science and technology policy. The three branches of government—executive, congressional, and judiciary—depending on each branch's responsibility, use science and technology knowledge and guidance to frame policy issues, craft legislation, and govern. The science and engineering community, however, is not represented by one individual or organization. On matters of scientific and technical knowledge and guidance, its opinions are consensus-based with groups of scientists and engineers coming together from different perspectives to debate an issue based on the available empirical evidence. In the end, consensus is achieved if there is widespread agreement on the evidence and its implications, which is conveyed to policymakers. Policymakers then determine, based on this knowledge and other factors, whether or not to take action and what actions to take. If there are major disagreements within large portions of the community, however, consensus is not yet achieved, and taking policy actions in response to a concern can be challenging. Several organizations, when requested by the federal government or Congress, provide formal science and technology policy advice: federal advisory committees, congressionally chartered honorific organizations, and federally funded research and development corporations. In addition, many other organizations and individuals—international intergovernmental organizations, policy institutes/think tanks, the public, professional organizations, disciplinary societies, universities and colleges, advocacy, special interest, industry, trade associations, and labor—also provide their thoughts. These organizations may agree on the scientific and technical knowledge regarding an issue, but disagree on what actions to take in response, as their values on a proposed policy may differ. Policymakers may be overwhelmed with an abundance of information from these organizations. Despite these challenges, scientific and technical knowledge and guidance can provide policymakers with an opportunity to make their decisions based on the best information available, along with other factors they might take into account, such as cultural, economic, and other values, so that societal and economic benefits are enhanced and losses are mitigated.
crs_R45220	crs_R45220_0	Introduction In 1984, Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act (CCCA ) . . . to make major comprehensive improvements to the federal criminal laws." In an effort to achieve that goal, the CCCA established new bail procedures, imposed mandatory minimum sentences for many criminal offenses, increased the penalties for drug offenses and violent crimes, and created additional federal criminal offenses. Various provisions of the CCCA employ the term "crime of violence" in reference to the elements of certain offenses, the conditions for the issuance of bail, and the circumstances where enhanced prison sentences are required. In addition, courts have sometimes looked to the COV definition (and jurisprudence interpreting that provision) for guidance in interpreting similarly worded provisions found elsewhere in the federal criminal code, such as those statutory provisions referencing a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" or "violent felony." The COV definition contains two prongs. In its 2018 ruling in Sessions v. Dimaya , the Supreme Court struck down on vagueness grounds the second prong of the COV definition, as incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which covers any felony offense that, "by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force . The Statutory Definition of a "Crime of Violence" Prior to the CCCA, some federal statutes employed the term "crime of violence" in setting forth the elements of a criminal offense or the conditions of confinement. § 16, covers each of the following: (a) [A]n offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing any offense. For example, under the INA, a non-U.S. national who commits a crime of violence for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year may face significant immigration consequences, including being subject to removal from the United States, subject to mandatory detention pending removal proceedings, ineligible for certain forms of relief from removal, barred from naturalization, and generally barred for readmission into the United States. Judicial Interpretation of the Crime of Violence Definition Despite Congress's attempt to provide a uniform definition of a crime of violence, courts have struggled to assess the scope of that definition. The following section briefly discusses three major issues the courts have considered in assessing the scope of activities covered by the COV definition: (1) whether to examine either the underlying conduct of a criminal offense, the statutory elements of the offense, or some combination in order to determine whether a person has been convicted of a crime of violence; (2) the degree of force necessary for an act to satisfy the "physical force" element of the COV definition; and (3) whether a crime of violence requires a specific mental state. With respect to 18 U.S.C. Other courts, meanwhile, concluded that crimes of violence encompassed only offenses that involved deliberate, intentional acts. The Court held that the use of force requirement in the first prong of the COV definition, 18 U.S.C. Constitutional Challenges to the Second Prong of the Crime of Violence Definition In addition to considering the degree of physical force that must be employed and the mental state required for an offense to constitute a crime of violence, courts have also considered a more fundamental question—is the COV definition unconstitutionally vague? § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague because it has no standard to determine whether a criminal offense carries a "substantial risk" of physical force.	In an effort to deter violent crime, and to limit the broad discretion accorded to federal judges with respect to prison sentencing, Congress in 1984 passed legislation that revised the federal criminal code. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (CCCA) aimed to substantially reform and improve federal criminal laws, and "to restore a proper balance between the forces of law and the forces of lawlessness." To that end, the CCCA adopted new bail procedures, imposed mandatory minimum sentences for certain criminal offenses, increased the penalties for drug offenses and violent crimes, and created new federal criminal offenses. The term "crime of violence" was used in various provisions of the CCCA that defined the elements of certain newly established criminal offenses, set forth conditions for bail, and provided for enhanced prison sentences when certain aggravating factors were met. Since the CCCA's enactment, several federal laws have incorporated the act's "crime of violence" definition. For example, under the Immigration and Nationality Act, a non-U.S. national who commits a "crime of violence" for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year may face significant immigration consequences, including being subject to removal from the country and thereafter rendered generally ineligible for readmission. As codified in 18 U.S.C. § 16, the CCCA contains a two-pronged definition of a crime of violence. Specifically, the term includes both (1) "an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another"; and (2) "any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing any offense." Since the CCCA's enactment, reviewing courts have had to interpret and apply the statutory definition of a crime of violence, sometimes reaching disparate conclusions over the scope of that term. For example, courts have differed regarding the degree of "physical force" required for an offense to constitute a crime of violence. Courts have also reached conflicting rulings on whether a crime of violence encompasses only intentional or deliberate acts, or whether the term also covers offenses involving gross negligence or pure recklessness. Moreover, courts have sometimes looked to the crime of violence definition (and jurisprudence interpreting that provision) for guidance in interpreting similarly worded provisions found elsewhere in the federal criminal code, such as those provisions referencing a "misdemeanor crime of domestic violence" or "violent felony." More recently, courts have addressed an entirely different question—whether the crime of violence definition is unconstitutionally vague. In particular, litigants have challenged the second prong of 18 U.S.C. § 16's crime of violence definition, arguing that there is no reliable standard to assess whether a criminal offense constitutes a crime of violence because it carries a "substantial risk" of physical force. In its 2018 decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, the Supreme Court held that the second prong of the crime of violence definition, as incorporated into the INA, was unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause. While the first prong of the crime of violence definition was not affected by the Dimaya ruling, the Court's invalidation of the second prong narrows the potential application of the crime of violence definition, possibly having far-reaching consequences for the application of numerous statutes that incorporate that definition.
crs_R44430	crs_R44430_0	E ach year Congress provides funding for a variety of grant programs through the Department of Justice (DOJ). These programs provide support to state, local, and tribal governments and nonprofit organizations for a variety of criminal justice-related purposes, such as combatting violence against women, reducing backlogs of DNA evidence, supporting community policing, assisting crime victims, promoting prisoner reentry, and improving the functioning of the juvenile justice system. Congress funds these programs through five accounts in the annual Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations act: Violence Against Women Programs; Research, Evaluation, and Statistics; State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance; Juvenile Justice Programs; and Community Oriented Policing Services. Office on Violence Against Women (OVW) The Office on Violence Against Women (OVW) was established to administer programs created under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994. The Obama Administration also proposed transferring $326 million from the Crime Victims Fund to the OVW. 115-31 ), Congress adopted the Obama Administration's proposal to supplement direct appropriations for OVW with a $326 million transfer from the Crime Victims Fund. Congress provided $89 million for the Research, Evaluation, and Statistics account for FY2017. The decrease in funding for FY2017 (-23.3%) is largely the result of Congress moving funding for the Regional Information Sharing System to the Community Oriented Policing Services account. While the Obama Administration proposed eliminating or reducing funding for several programs under the State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance account, it has also proposed increasing funding for reentry initiatives authorized under the Second Chance Act (+$32 million), programs for children exposed to violence (+$15 million), grants for residential substance abuse treatment (+$2 million), and programs to assist people with mental illness in the criminal justice system (+$4 million). In addition, the Obama Administration requested funding for several new programs under the State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance account, including $10 million for the Byrne Incentive Grant program, which would have made supplemental grants to JAG program grantees who choose to use a portion of their JAG funding to support programs or initiatives that are evidence-based, or are promising and will be coupled with rigorous evaluation to determine their effectiveness; $15 million for the Byrne Competitive Grant program to implement evidence-based and data-driven strategies on issues of national significance; $20 million for grants and technical assistance to state, local, and tribal courts and juvenile and criminal justice agencies to support efforts to improve the perception of fairness in the juvenile and criminal justice systems and to build community trust; $5 million for the Violence Reduction Network, which would allow cities to develop data-driven, evidence-based strategies to reduce violence by consulting directly with and receiving coordinated training and technical assistance from multiple DOJ components; and $6 million for grants to counter violent extremism. However, most of the funding for this initiative is not new. The Obama Administration also requested that funding be restored to the Juvenile Accountability Block Grants ($30 million), which were eliminated in FY2014. The Obama Administration's FY2017 request for COPS was $74 million more than the FY2016 appropriation of $212 million.	Each year Congress provides funding for a variety of grant programs through the Department of Justice (DOJ). These programs are used to fund state, local, and tribal governments and nonprofit organizations for a variety of criminal justice-related purposes, such as efforts to combat violence against women, reduce backlogs of DNA evidence, support community policing, assist crime victims, promote prisoner reentry, and improve the functioning of the juvenile justice system. Congress funds these programs through five accounts in the annual Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations act: Violence Against Women Programs; Research, Evaluation, and Statistics; State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance; Juvenile Justice Programs; and Community Oriented Policing Services. For FY2017, the Obama Administration requested a total of $2.361 billion for these five accounts. The Obama Administration's FY2017 request for DOJ's grant accounts included proposals to change the funding levels of several DOJ grant programs. First, the Obama Administration proposed to transfer $326 million from the Crime Victims Fund to the Office on Violence Against Women (OVW). It also proposed to eliminate funding for the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (-$210 million), and reduce funding for other programs, such as the National Criminal History Improvement program (-$23 million), and DNA backlog reduction initiatives (-$20 million). However, the Obama Administration proposed increases for grants to encourage arrests in domestic violence cases and enforcement of protection orders (+$11 million), grants authorized under the Second Chance Act (+$32 million), and programs for children exposed to violence (+$15 million). It also proposed funding a variety of new programs and initiatives, such as the Byrne Incentive Grant program ($10 million), the Byrne Competitive Grant program ($15 million), and the Violence Reduction Network ($5 million). Finally, it proposed restoring funding to the Juvenile Accountability Block Grant (+$30 million), which was eliminated in FY2014. Congress provided a total of $2.320 billion for DOJ's five grant accounts, an amount that is 6.7% less than the FY2016 appropriation and 1.8% less than the Administration's request. Funding for three of the five grant accounts decreased for FY2017, the exceptions being Violence Against Women Programs (+$2 million) and the Community Oriented Policing Services (+$10 million). However, the increase in funding for the Community Oriented Policing Services account is largely attributable to Congress moving funding for the Regional Information Sharing System from the Research, Evaluation, and Statistics account to the Community Oriented Policing Services account. Congress, by and large, did not support many of the Obama Administration's proposals that would have eliminated funding for particular programs, increased funding for existing programs, or provided funding for new programs. However, Congress did adopt the proposal to supplement direct appropriations for the Office on Violence Against Women with a $326 million transfer from the Crime Victims Fund.
crs_94-408	crs_94-408_0	The Davis-Bacon Act was adopted in early 1931. For more than 4 decades now, and continuing into the 21 st century, Davis-Bacon has been almost constantly a focus of public policy concern: as legislation, through administrative rulemaking, and in litigation before the courts. In addition to direct federal construction contracts, the Davis-Bacon prevailing wage "principle" has been written into more than 50 federal program statutes. This report examines policy issues the act has sparked through the years and which remain a part of the Davis-Bacon debate into the 21 st century. These include such questions as: wage rate determination procedures, reporting requirements under the Copeland Act, an appropriate threshold for activation of the statute, interagency relationships with respect to Davis-Bacon enforcement and compliance activity, administrative or judicial appeals procedures, the use of "helpers" and other low-skilled workers on covered projects, and the right of a President to suspend the statute as well as the conditions under which such a suspension may occur. Controversy Concerning the Davis-Bacon Act Historically, the act has enjoyed strong bipartisan support; but, at the same time, especially since the middle 1950s, it has provoked militant criticism. Through the years, however, Congress has extended the act's provisions to cover an ever wider segment of federal and federally assisted construction; and, at least during the past several decades, such extensions of coverage have provided an opportunity for renewed debate concerning the act and its impact. Bacon wanted to keep it that way: in 1927, he introduced legislation to require that locally prevailing wage standards be met in federal construction work. How is a prevailing wage to be determined and when? The Copeland "Anti-Kickback" Act (1934) While Davis-Bacon required payment of not less than the locally prevailing wage on federal contract construction, it remained to be enforced. On June 13, 1934, President Roosevelt signed the measure. Whatever the diversity of opinion may have been during the 1950s with respect to the prevailing wage statute (and, however vigorous opposition to the act may have been), Congress continued to preserve the act and to extend Davis-Bacon coverage through the provisions in various federal program statutes. The issue was further complicated by prefabrication of components for general construction. Amendments to the SCA were adopted in 1972 and 1976—in each instance, over contractor objections. 500 , a proposal not only to repeal the Davis-Bacon and Copeland Acts per se but, also, to remove Davis-Bacon requirements from all federal laws into which they had been incorporated. In the wake of the President's action, several bills were introduced that would have had the effect of overturning the President's Davis-Bacon proclamation: H.R. The article continued, quoting Labor Secretary Elaine Chao, that "[u]pon review of current conditions in the declared areas, the administration will reinstate Davis-Bacon...." Issues Remaining for the New Century Although the Davis-Bacon Act has been in place for 75 years, it remains a focus of controversy. In the mid-1990s, there seemed to be some suggestion that critics were making inroads on the act, and that repeal (or significant revision) was likely. But, the thrust of congressional policy has been consistently toward expanded coverage and a strengthening of the act.	In 1931, at the urging of the Hoover Administration, Congress adopted the Davis-Bacon Act. The measure set certain minimum labor standards for workers employed in federal contract construction: notably, that contractors must pay their employees not less than the locally prevailing wage. The threshold for coverage is currently $2,000 and up. Construction crafts are divided into four components: commercial buildings, highways, residential, and heavy construction. Locality, in this case, is normally the equivalent of a county, though other options are possible. In addition, the Copeland "anti-kickback" Act of 1934 sets reporting requirements intended to aid in Davis-Bacon enforcement and compliance. Through the years, the Davis-Bacon requirements have been applied to dozens of program statutes that involve federal and federally assisted construction. Davis-Bacon has been amended over the years to expand its coverage and to strengthen enforcement. It has generally enjoyed strong bipartisan support throughout its history; but, the act has also sparked continuing controversy and opposition, especially from non-union contractors. Issues of policy concerning the act, raised initially in the 1920s and 1930s, continue to be debated into the 21st century. Seventy-five years after its enactment, questions remain about its economic impact, its scope and pattern of coverage, and its administration. Since the early 1950s, the act has been variously the focus of rulemaking, litigation, and legislative interest and, through the past quarter century, of all three. In 1934 and in 1971, the act was generally (but temporarily) suspended by Presidents Roosevelt and Nixon. From October 1992 until March 1993, it was suspended by President George H.W. Bush, but only for locations affected by Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki. From September into November 2005, it was suspended by President George W. Bush for areas affected by Hurricane Katrina. Into the early 1990s, bills were introduced that would have repealed the Davis-Bacon and Copeland Acts outright, had they been adopted, eliminating the prevailing wage and reporting requirements from program statutes into which they have been incorporated. In the mid-1990s, a shift in political control in Congress seemed to forecast victory for those favoring repeal. But ultimately, the prevailing wage issue proved to be bipartisan and the statutes (Davis-Bacon and Copeland) remained unchanged. Prevailing wage/Davis-Bacon provisions have continued to be included in federal program statutes where construction has been a program component. With the advent of the 21st century, the Davis-Bacon debate has continued sporadically, but its focus, increasingly, has been upon the prevailing wage standards of program legislation. Given the experience of the past seven decades, it seems likely that Davis-Bacon will remain an issue of public policy for the immediate future.
crs_RL30135	crs_RL30135_0	Recognition for one-minute speeches is the prerogative of the Speaker. During this time, Representatives ask unanimous consent to address the House for one minute on a topic of their choice. In addition, one minutes are often permitted after legislative business ends but before special order speeches begin. Instead, they have evolved as a unanimous consent practice of the chamber. During one-minute speeches, Members must abide by the rules of the House, the chamber's precedents, and the "Speaker's announced policies," in that order. A period for one-minute speeches (hereinafter referred to as "the one-minute speech period") usually takes place at the beginning of each legislative day after the daily prayer, the Pledge of Allegiance, and approval of the previous day's Journal . Representatives seeking recognition for one minutes sit in the first row on their party's side of the chamber. From the chair's vantage point, Republican Members sit on the left side of the chamber and Democratic Members on the right side. In recognizing Members for one minutes, the chair observes the following announced policies of the Speaker: The chair will alternate recognition for one-minute speeches between majority and minority Members, in the order in which they seek recognition in the well under present practice from the Chair's right to the Chair's left, with possible exceptions for Members of the leadership and Members having business requests. Coordination Role of Party Leadership Members do not have to reserve one-minute speeches in advance through their party's leadership. Nevertheless, the party leadership communication arms—known as the "Democratic Message Group" and the "Republican Theme Team"—sometimes coordinate party Members to deliver one minutes on the issue designated as the party's daily message. Delivering One-Minute Speeches When recognized by the chair, individual Members ask unanimous consent to address the House for one minute and to revise and extend their remarks. Permission is almost always granted. They are limited to one minute and cannot ask unanimous consent for additional time. Inserting One-Minute Speeches Instead of delivering a one-minute speech on the House floor, a Member may insert the speech in the House section of the Congressional Record alongside the one minutes delivered on the floor that day.	Recognition for one-minute speeches (commonly called "one minutes") in the House of Representatives is the prerogative of the Speaker. A period for one minutes usually takes place at the beginning of the legislative day after the daily prayer, the Pledge of Allegiance, and approval of the previous day's Journal. During this time, Representatives ask unanimous consent to address the House for one minute on a topic of their choice. In addition, one-minute speeches are often permitted after legislative business ends, but before special order speeches begin. The rules of the House do not provide for one-minute speeches. Instead, one minutes have evolved as a unanimous consent practice of the chamber. During one-minute speeches, Members must abide by the rules of the House, the chamber's precedents, and the "Speaker's announced policies," in that order. The term Speaker's announced policies refers to the Speaker's policies on certain aspects of House procedure, such as recognition for one minutes. Representatives seeking recognition for one minutes sit in the first row on their party's side of the chamber. From the chair's vantage point, Republican Members sit on the left side of the chamber and Democratic Members on the right side. The chair moves from his right to left in recognizing Members on each side of the aisle. When recognized by the chair, individual Members ask unanimous consent to address the House for one minute and to revise and extend their remarks. Permission is almost always granted. Members deliver one-minute speeches from the well of the chamber. They are limited to one minute and cannot ask unanimous consent for additional time. Instead of delivering a one-minute speech on the House floor, a Member may ask unanimous consent to insert the speech in the House section of the Congressional Record. Members need not reserve one-minute speeches in advance through their party's leadership. Nevertheless, the party leadership communication arms—known as the "Democratic Message Group" and the "Republican Theme Team"—sometimes coordinate party Members to deliver one minutes on the issue designated as the party's daily message. These party Members usually receive priority seating for recognition purposes. This report will be updated if rules and procedures change.
crs_R44914	crs_R44914_0	The 2014 farm bill (Agricultural Act of 2014, P.L. In contrast, this report uses actual historical data to construct a series of charts and tables that provide information on the distribution of commodity-specific outlays under the farm safety-net programs of the 2014 farm bill during its first three years of operation (2014 through 2016). Overview of U.S. In particular, when farm program payments are linked to specific crops, they can influence relative market incentives and resource allocations. Also, significant differences in support levels across program crops may have strong regional or geographic implications, because not all agricultural activities may be undertaken successfully in all agro-climatic settings, as these vary widely across the United States. The Federal Crop Insurance Act of 1980 ( P.L. Under this framework, private insurance companies deliver and service crop insurance policies that are regulated and supported by USDA's Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC). Commodity-Specific CCC Support CCC-funded commodity support programs include the marketing assistance loan (MAL) program and two revenue support programs—the Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) and Price Loss Coverage (PLC) programs. An expanded list of "loan commodities" is eligible for MAL benefits. Premium subsidies are crop-specific. However, the major farm program crops (i.e., the covered crops) account for over 90% of all federal premium subsidies. Program-Specific Outlays The 2014 farm bill's safety-net programs cover the five crop years of 2014 through 2018. In annual terms, commodity-specific outlays are estimated at $12.7 billion per year, including $7.5 billion for CCC programs plus $5.2 billion in FCIC crop insurance premium subsidies ( Figure 4 and Table 6 ). Corn support represents 46% of annual CCC and FCIC commodity-specific payments ( Figure 6 ). The next section adjusts commodity payments for planted acres and for the value of production. Payments Per-Acre and as a Share of Value of Production When federal subsidies are measured as payments per acre ( Figure 12 ) or as a share of the program crop's value of production ( Figure 13 ), then peanuts, rice, and cotton emerge as the program crops with the highest payment levels under the current structure of farm programs and market conditions. Another important observation is the absence of measureable direct support for the U.S. dairy sector. When USDA payments are expressed as a share of variable COP ( Figure 14 ) and total COP ( Figure 15 ) for each program crop for crop years 2014-2016, peanuts, at 66%, receive higher levels of federal assistance than other program crops. Then, the level of "price protection" provided under the MAL and PLC programs is measured as the percent of monthly farm price observations below the MAL loan rates and PLC reference prices established under the 2014 farm bill for each program crop. Results for the 40% price-protection level are displayed in ( Figure 20 ). To the extent that the January 2008 through May 2017 time period reflects long-term market conditions, then the parity price-protection method of comparison evaluated in this report suggests that peanuts (and cottonseed when included as a hypothetical program crop) receive significantly higher price protection levels under both the MAL and PLC reference price programs as compared to the other program crops under the 2014 farm bill. Canola, sorghum, and rice also have greater support levels relative to the remaining program crops by these measures. In contrast, soybeans and pulse crops receive relatively lower price protection.	The 2014 farm bill (Agricultural Act of 2014, P.L. 113-79) authorizes farm safety-net programs for the five crop years of 2014 through 2018. This includes revenue support for 20 "covered commodities" under either the Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) program or the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) program and interim financing and floor price support for an expanded list of 24 "loan commodities" under the Marketing Assistance Loan (MAL) program. Outlays under the MAL, ARC, and PLC programs are funded by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). In addition, federally subsidized crop insurance is available for over 100 agricultural commodities—including both covered and loan commodities. Federal crop insurance is permanently authorized by the Federal Crop Insurance Act (7 U.S.C. 1501 et seq.) but is periodically modified by new farm bill legislation. The principal subsidy component of federal crop insurance is premium subsidies that pay for an average of 62% of the cost of buying an insurance policy since 2014. Premium subsidies are funded by USDA's Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC). Through the first three years of the 2014 farm bill (2014 through 2016), USDA has spent over $38 billion on commodity-specific farm program outlays. Annually, commodity-specific outlays are estimated at $12.7 billion per year, including $7.5 billion for CCC programs and $5.2 billion in FCIC crop insurance premium subsidies. When farm program payments are linked to specific crops, they can influence relative market incentives and resource allocations. Furthermore, significant differences in spending across program crops may have regional or geographic implications. This report looks at available CCC and FCIC data for the major program crops and compares relative support using several different measures: absolute payments, payments per acre, payments as a share of the value of production, and payments as a share of the cost of production. In addition, price and income support levels are compared to market prices. By all of these measures, there has been substantial variation in relative support across program crops. Annual corn payments account for 46% of all CCC and FCIC commodity-specific outlays; however, corn also has the most planted acres and the largest annual value of production. When payments are compared per acre, and as a share of either the value or the cost of production for each crop, then peanuts and rice receive higher levels of support than do other program crops. Also significant is the absence of any net program outlays for the U.S. dairy sector under the 2014 farm bill. One particular analytical method for comparing price-protection levels across program crops involves PLC reference prices. PLC reference prices for each commodity are adjusted such that 35%, 40%, or 45% of monthly farm price observations fall below the adjusted reference price during the January 2008 through May 2017 period. The choice of these reference levels is arbitrary but facilitates comparison. Important differences in support levels emerge. Peanuts and cottonseed (included for comparative purposes as a hypothetical program crop) receive significantly higher price protection levels compared to the other program crops. Canola and sorghum also have above-average support levels relative to the remaining program crops. In contrast, soybeans and pulse crops receive lower levels of price protection.
crs_RL34443	crs_RL34443_0	Introduction The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) protects the interests of participants and beneficiaries in private-sector employee benefit plans. 109-280 ) and contains provisions designed to help pension plans and plan participants weather the current economic downturn. Title I sets out specific protections of employee rights in pensions and welfare benefit plans. Civil actions under Section 502(a) include the following actions that may be brought by a participant or a beneficiary, or, in some cases, a plan fiduciary or the Secretary of Labor, to: redress the failure of a plan administrator to provide information required by ERISA's reporting and disclosure requirements or COBRA requirements (Section 502(a)(1)(A)); recover benefits due to a participant or beneficiary under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan (Section 502(a)(1)(B)); receive appropriate relief due to breaches of fiduciary duty (Section 502(a)(2)); enjoin any act or practice which violates ERISA or the terms of the plan, as well as to obtain other appropriate equitable relief to redress such violations (Section 502(a)(3)); collect civil penalties (Section 502(a)(6)). Criminal Enforcement under ERISA and Other Federal Law ERISA provides for three types of criminal sanctions. L. Special Regulation of Health Benefits Besides the regulation of pension plans, ERISA also regulates welfare benefit plans offered by an employer to provide medical, surgical and other health benefits. However, these health plans must also meet additional requirements under ERISA. It also contains certain abbreviations used within this report.	Due to the recent economic decline and the desire to enact large-scale health reform, the current federal regulation of pension plans, health plans, and other employee benefit plans has received considerable congressional attention. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) provides a comprehensive federal scheme for the regulation of employee pension and welfare benefit plans offered by private-sector employers. ERISA contains various provisions intended to protect the rights of plan participants and beneficiaries in employee benefit plans. These protections include requirements relating to reporting and disclosure, participation, vesting, and benefit accrual, as well as plan funding. ERISA also regulates the responsibilities of plan fiduciaries and other issues regarding plan administration. ERISA contains various standards that a plan must meet in order to receive favorable tax treatment, and also governs plan termination. This report provides background on the pension laws prior to ERISA, discusses various types of employee benefit plans governed by ERISA, provides an overview of ERISA's requirements, and includes a glossary of commonly used terms.
crs_RL31790	crs_RL31790_0	These prices were mandated by a formula in the law. The economic stability that was desired and expected from the tobacco support program was not achieved. In 1982 there were about 180,000farms producing tobacco. 106-224 , P.L. These three sources of financial assistance, rather than income from the sale of tobacco, are the primary reason active producers were able to pay higher rental rates to absentee quota owners as theybid against each other for their share of a declining national tobacco quota. Active producers, not just absentee landlords, also would have received quota buyout payments under all of the legislative proposals that were offered. This framework for a quota buyout, of licensed future production and continued price support, was developed by the President's Commission on Improving Economic Opportunity in CommunitiesDependent on Tobacco Production While Protecting Public Health. This bill was similar to the McConnell bill in most respects. However, S. 1490 included somecommunity development assistance that was not present in H.R. to quota owners plus $4/lb. However, all of the legislative proposals described in this reportincluded an assessment on manufacturers and importers of tobacco products, or the use of U.S.Treasury funds, rather than an increase in excise taxes on cigarettes. One tobacco manufacturer, Philip Morris, stated its willingness to help pay for a tobaccobuyout program. (13) Philip Morris was the only major manufacturer known to support FDA regulation or a quota buyout. (See identical bills H.R. 4433 and S. 2461 ). Doubts about whether strong divisions in Congress over proposed FDA regulatory authority could be overcome encouraged sponsors of H.R. 4033 (Jenkins; March 25, 2004) toseek about $9.6 billion in funding out of the U.S. Treasury, rather than from assessments onmanufacturers. The bill was cosponsored by most supporters of the so-called House consensus bill. The Jenkins bill also was included as Title VIIin the House-passed H.R. Following the lead of the House in using the tax bill as the legislative vehicle for the tobacco quota buyout, the Senate retrieved its previously adopted S. 1637 , the Jumpstart OurBusiness Strength (JOBS) Act, and amended it by attaching the slightly modified McConnell buyoutbill ( S. 1490 ) and the DeWine-Kennedy FDA tobacco product regulation authority( S. 2461 ). Conferees took up the tax legislation (the differing House and Senate versions of H.R. 4520 ) on October 5, 2004. The Chairman's mark for the conference committeeincluded tobacco quota buyout provisions (Title VI). Like the House version of H.R. The Chairman's mark, like both the House and Senate proposals, eliminated tobacco marketing quotas, acreage allotments, and nonrecourse loan price support authority. Similarly, the roughly 57,000 active producers would be paid $3 per pound on their 2002effective marketing quotas (totaling about $2.9 billion). Nearly all of the active producers also werequota owners, and they would get both payments on that portion of the effective quota they alsoowned. CRS Report RL31528, Tobacco Quota Buyout Proposals in the 107th Congress .	On October 22, 2004, the tobacco quota buyout was signed into law. Title VI of P.L. 108-357 is known as the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 2004. This legislation eliminated thetobacco quota program and compensated active producers and absentee quota owners for the lostvalue. The concept of a quota buyout was not new, but it gained political momentum after beingendorsed in the final report of a presidential commission on tobacco, Tobacco at a Crossroads, ACall for Action (May 14, 2001), and by the leading U.S. cigarette manufacturer, Philip Morris. Several quota bills were introduced in the 107th Congress without subsequent legislative action. Supporters of a buyout and legislative sponsors again put the proposal on the legislative agenda ofthe 108th Congress by introducing several differing bills. Eventually, H.R. 4033 (Jenkins; March 25, 2004) and S. 1490 (McConnell; July 30, 2003) were attached to unrelated tax legislation ( H.R. 4520 in theHouse and S. 1637 in the Senate), which was taken up by conferees on October 5, 2004. These bills proposed to eliminate tobacco quotas and the price support loan program. Ascompensation, quota owners (including absentee owners) and active producers would receive lumpsum payments. Active producers were to receive $7 per pound in the House version or $8 per poundin the Senate version for the quota they owned in 2002, plus $3 per pound in the House version or$4 per pound in the Senate version for the quantity of tobacco they were allowed to produce. Mostproducers grow more than the quota they own because they lease quota from other landlords. Theabsentee landlords also were be paid for the quota they owned in 2002. The estimated cost of the House and Senate bills was, respectively, $9.6 billion and $12 billion. The source of funding for the two bills differed, coming from the federal treasury in the House billand from tobacco product manufacturers and importers in the Senate bill. Many public health advocates and Philip Morris strongly supported a tobacco quota buyout accompanied by new legal authority for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulatetobacco products. The proposed FDA authority was included in identical bills in the House andSenate ( H.R. 4433 , Davis-Waxman; and S. 2461 , DeWine-Kennedy). TheFDA authority also was included in the Senate version of the tax bill, but not in the House version,where there was strong opposition. The Chairman's mark for the conference committee on H.R. 4520 included a tobacco title (Title VI) that closely matched the House version, H.R. 4033 , with quotabuyout payments of $7 per pound and active producer payments of $3 per pound. Under theconference agreement, funding would come from assessments on tobacco product manufacturers andimporters (as proposed in S. 1490 ). FDA regulatory authority over tobacco products,however, was not included. This report is intended to serve as a history and evolution of the tobacco buyout. It will not be updated.
crs_RL30508	crs_RL30508_0	Most Recent Developments President Clinton signed the FY2001 Department of Transportation (DOT) Appropriations Act( P.L. 106-346 ) into law on October 23, 2000. The House and Senate had approved the conferenceagreement ( H.Rept. The FY2001 Act provides $57.978 billion forDOT. This is an increase of more than 14% over enacted FY2000 funding. The FY2001 Act appearsto be in conformance with the requirements of both the Transportation Equity Act for the 21stCentury (TEA-21) and the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century(FAIR21). It also includes, in modified form, a Senate provision to strengthen state drunk driverblood alcohol standards to 0.08%. In addition, the enacted bill permits the Federal Motor CarrierSafety Administration (FMCSA) to collect and analyze public comments and data on its proposedhours of service rules, but prohibits FMCSA from taking final action during FY2001. The FY2001 Act includes conference agreement provisions not found in either the Senate or House bills, such as, additional appropriations of $1.37 billion for miscellaneous highway projects,$600 million for the Woodrow Wilson Memorial Bridge, and $55 million for the Appalachiandevelopment highway system. Also provided is $720 million for the Emergency Relief Federal AidHighway Program. On December 21, 2000, President Clinton signed the FY2001 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 106-554 ) which provided for a 0.22% government-wide rescission. The Act rescinded roughly$125 million from the DOT budget. However, the FY2001 Actprovides increases for all major DOT agencies except for the FRA budget which is funded at roughly1% below its FY2000 enacted level. 4475 . 4475 . The Senate version of H.R. The conference agreement includes penaltieson states for failure to adopt a 0.08 BAC law but phases them in at a rate of 2%annually over a four year period beginning in FY2004, to a maximum of 8%. The House version of H.R. The Administration proposal, House, Senate, and enacted versions of H.R. The Senate-passed version of the FY2001 appropriations bill provided FHWA with total budgetary resources of $30.7 billion, comparable to those found in theHouse-passed version of the bill, also $30.7 billion. 106-940 ; P.L. Congress hasrejected the Administration's proposed use of some RABA funding for transit. (11) The $ 6.3billion (an 8.4% increase over FY2000)provided for in the FY2001 Act, continues the impact of TEA-21 on transit spending.	President Clinton signed the FY2001 Department of Transportation (DOT) Appropriations Act ( P.L. 106-346 ; H.Rept. 106-940 ) on October 23, 2000. The agreement provides $57.978 billion forDOT. This is an increase of more than 14% over the enacted FY2000 level. The Act providesincreases for all major DOT agencies except the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). OnDecember 21, 2000, President Clinton signed the FY2001 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L.106-554 ). The Act provided for a government-wide rescission of 0.22%. This cut $125 million fromthe DOT budget for FY2001. Both houses of Congress had passed somewhat different versions of the FY2001 appropriations bill ( H.R. 4475 ). The House of Representatives version would have provided totalbudgetary resources of $55.2 billion; the Senate version $54.7 billion. The roughly $500 milliondifference was partly an outgrowth of the lower budget cap that Senators had to work with. For theoverall DOT budget, the Senate bill would have represented a 9.5% increase over the FY2000budget; the House bill a nearly 10.5% increase. The FY2001 Act reflects the ongoing impact of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21). It raises highway funding by 16% and mass transit funding by almost 8.5%.These spending levels meet or exceed TEA-21's requirements. The Administration had proposedincreases of 5% for highways and roughly 9% for transit. The enacted version of H.R. 4475 appropriates additional funds not included in either the House or Senate-passed versions, such as: $1.37 billion for miscellaneous highwayprojects, $600 million for the Woodrow Wilson Memorial Bridge, roughly $55 million for theAppalachian development highway system; and $720 million for the Emergency Relief Federal AidHighway Program. The Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (FAIR21) ( P.L. 106-181 )has also had a major impact on the FAA's funding for FY2001. H.R. 4475 ,in conformance with FAIR21, provides for an increase in the FAA's total budget of roughly 25%. The FY2001 Act includes language to strengthen state drunk driver blood alcohol standards to 0.08% but phases in the highway funds reduction penalties more gradually than in the Senate passedbill -- at a rate of 2% annually beginning in FY2004 up to a maximum of 8%. It also permits theFederal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) to collect and analyze public comments anddata on its proposed hours of service rules but prohibits FMCSA from taking final action duringFY2001. Key Policy Staff Division abbreviations: RSI = Resources, Science, and Industry Division.
crs_R40119	crs_R40119_0	Introduction The length of the appointment process during presidential transitions has been of concern to observers for more than 30 years. The appointment process is likely to develop a bottleneck during this time due to the large number of candidates who must be selected, vetted, and, in the case of positions filled through appointment by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate (PAS positions), considered by that body. The report then discusses processes—recess appointments and designations under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998—that could be used by the President to unilaterally fill positions on a temporary basis. The appointment process consists of three stages—selection and vetting, Senate consideration, and appointment. The Intelligence Reform Act also amended the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (PTA). The Senate adopted a sense of the Senate resolution stating that the 30-day target should be the goal. Other nominations to Cabinet or top-level positions also have been approved by committees in advance of their actual submission. The comparisons found that, in general, transition-period Cabinet-level nominees were selected, vetted, considered, and confirmed expeditiously; they generally took office shortly after the new President's inauguration. Comparisons among the five transitions suggest that some Presidents announced their Cabinet-position selections sooner than did others, but that this did not appear to accelerate the pace of the overall appointment process. Comparisons among the median intervals for the five transitions suggest that (1) the time required for selection and vetting of nominees for these positions has grown longer; (2) the period of Senate consideration has also grown longer; (3) Senate consideration of a nomination was generally faster than the selection and vetting process that preceded it; and (4) the median durations of the appointment process for the George H.W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama transitions were notably longer than for the Reagan transition. The graphs suggest, with regard to nominees to these subcabinet positions, the following: (1) the selection and vetting of these nominees grew longer over the course of the five transitions; (2) the selection and vetting process does not seem to have been shortened by the changes enacted in response to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission; (3) the Senate consideration process grew longer over the course of the five transitions; (4) on average, the Senate consideration process makes up a shorter portion of the appointment process for these positions than does the selection and vetting process; and (5) the median length of the process from election to final disposition during the four later transitions was notably longer than it was during the Reagan transition. Appendix C. Transition Period Nominations to Selected Subcabinet Positions, 1981-2009	The length of the appointment processes during presidential transitions has been of concern to observers for more than 30 years. The process is likely to develop a bottleneck during this time due to the large number of candidates who must be selected, vetted, and, in the case of positions filled through appointment by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate (PAS positions), considered by that body. The appointment process has three stages: selection and vetting, nomination and Senate consideration, and presidential appointment. Congress has taken steps to accelerate appointments during presidential transitions. In recent decades, Senate committees have provided for pre-nomination consideration of Cabinet-level nominations; examples of such actions are provided in this report. In addition, recently adopted statutory provisions appear designed to facilitate faster processing of appointments during presidential transitions. Among the new statutory provisions were those enacted by Congress in response to certain 9/11 Commission recommendations, mainly in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Also part of this act was a sense of the Senate resolution stating that nominations to national security positions should be submitted by the President-elect to the Senate by Inauguration Day, and that Senate consideration of all such nominations should be completed within 30 days of submission. The President has certain powers—constitutional recess appointment authority and statutory authority under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998—that he or she could, under certain circumstances, use unilaterally to fill PAS positions on a temporary basis. Analyses of data related to Cabinet and selected subcabinet appointments during the last five transitions from 1981 through 2009 suggest the following: In general, transition-period Cabinet-level nominees were selected, vetted, considered, and confirmed expeditiously; they generally took office shortly after the new President's inauguration. Comparisons among the five transitions suggest that some Presidents announced their Cabinet-position selections sooner than did others, but that this did not appear to affect the pace of the overall appointment process. On average, the interval between election day and final disposition of nominations to selected subcabinet positions was more than twice as long as that of nominations to Cabinet-level positions, though nominees to subcabinet positions in some departments were faster than others. Comparisons among the median intervals for the five transitions suggest that (1) the time required for selection and vetting of nominees for these positions has grown longer; (2) the period of Senate consideration has also grown longer; (3) Senate consideration of nominations is generally faster than the selection and vetting process that precedes it; and (4) the median durations of the appointment process for the George H.W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama transitions were notably longer than for the Reagan transition.
crs_R42454	crs_R42454_0	Introduction In disputes between Congress and the executive, questions arise about Congress's ability to turn to the federal courts to vindicate its powers and prerogatives or for declarations that the executive is in violation of the law or the Constitution. This report seeks to provide an overview of Congress's ability to participate in litigation before Article III courts. The report is limited to a discussion of Congress's participation in litigation as either a plaintiff (e.g., the party initiating the suit alleging some sort of harm or violation of law) or as a third-party intervener (e.g., a party who is seeking to join litigation already initiated by another plaintiff). The report does not address situations where Congress or individual Members appear as a defendant, or congressional participation in court cases as amicus curiae ("friend of the court"), as those situations do not raise the same legal and constitutional questions at issue when Congress or a Member is the party plaintiff. Congressional plaintiffs, whether they be individual Members, committees, houses of Congress (i.e., the House or Senate), or legislative branch entities, must demonstrate that they meet the requirements established by Article III of the Constitution in order to participate as party litigants. The failure to establish standing is fatal to the litigation and will result in its dismissal without the court addressing the merits of the presented claims. The Supreme Court's 1997 decision in Raines v. Byrd has had a chilling effect on the ability of individual Members of Congress to demonstrate Article III standing and thereby have their claims adjudicated in federal court. Courts have emphasized the distinction between suits brought by individual congressional plaintiffs asserting abstract and diffuse injuries and suits brought by organs of Congress alleging concrete institutional harms. Recent case law in this area suggests that suits brought by Congress in an institutional capacity have a greater chance of satisfying standing requirements than do cases where individual Members attempt to assert political or institutional injuries based on executive action. Despite holding that the legislators had standing, the Court affirmed the holding of the Kansas Supreme Court. With respect to the status of its pre- Raines rulings, a majority of the D.C. The case, however, presented a conflict between the Court's holding in Raines and the D.C. In Committee on Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers and Committee on Oversight and Government Reform v. Holder , two different judges for the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia heard cases involving a House committee seeking to enforce a congressional subpoena against current or former executive branch officials through a civil suit. In 2008, the district court in Miers held that the Judiciary Committee "had been expressly authorized by the House of Representatives as an institution " to bring the suit by House resolution. The subcommittee chairmen's failure to obtain an authorizing resolution from the full House, therefore, required the dismissal of the appeal without any decision on the merits. In Miers , the District Court for the District of Columbia explicitly applied the reasoning in AT&T and concluded that the Committee plaintiff had standing to enforce a subpoena because it was authorized to sue via House resolution.	In disputes between Congress and the executive, questions arise about Congress's ability to turn to the federal courts for vindication of its powers and prerogatives, or for declarations that the executive is in violation of the law or the Constitution. This report seeks to provide an overview of Congress's ability to participate in litigation before Article III courts. The report is limited to a discussion of Congress's participation in litigation as either a plaintiff (e.g., the party initiating the suit alleging some sort of harm or violation of law) or as a third-party intervener (e.g., a party who is seeking to join litigation already initiated by another plaintiff). The report does not address situations where Congress or individual Members appear as a defendant, or congressional participation in court cases as amicus curiae ("friend of the court"), as those situations do not raise the same legal and constitutional questions as does the involvement of Congress or its Members as a party plaintiff. Generally, to participate as party litigants, congressional plaintiffs, whether they be individual Members, committees, houses of Congress (i.e., the House or Senate), or legislative branch entities, must demonstrate that they meet the requirements of the standing doctrine, derived from Article III of the Constitution. The failure to satisfy the standing requirements is fatal to the litigation and will result in its dismissal without a decision by the court on the merits of the presented claims. With respect to the ability of Congress and Members to demonstrate Article III standing, the Supreme Court's 1997 decision in Raines v. Byrd has had a chilling effect on the ability of individual Members of Congress to adjudicate claims before federal courts. Despite the Court's holding in Raines, in 2008 the House Judiciary Committee, acting on a resolution from the full House of Representatives, was able to convince the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia that it had standing to sue the White House for its failure to make subpoenaed witnesses and documents available. In its decision, the court emphasized the distinction between suits brought by individual congressional plaintiffs asserting abstract and diffuse injuries and suits brought by organs of Congress alleging institutional harms. In 2013, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform was similarly successful, with a different judge for the District Court for the District of Columbia adopting the same reasoning as the 2008 case, holding that the Committee had standing to sue to enforce a congressional subpoena, in part because the suit was authorized by the House. Recent case law in this area suggests that suits brought by Congress in an institutional capacity have a far greater chance of being decided on their merits than do cases where individual Members attempt to assert personal or political injuries based on executive action. Through the years, Congress has had a fair amount of success bringing suits to enforce subpoenas and intervening as a third party in ongoing litigation when it is specifically authorized to seek judicial recourse. However, outside the subpoena and intervenor contexts, it remains unclear whether a house of Congress could satisfy the requirements of standing as a plaintiff in an authorized lawsuit against the executive branch. In July 2014, the House authorized the Speaker to institute a lawsuit against the executive branch regarding its implementation of the Affordable Care Act, which may lead to the development of case law in this area of congressional standing.
crs_RL30153	crs_RL30153_0	These activities and capabilities are supported by an array of physical assets, functions, information, people, and systems, forming what has been called the nation's critical infrastructures. The reader who is not interested in the evolution of this policy and the organizational structures that have evolved to implement it can proceed to the " Policy Implementation " and/or " Issues and Discussion " sections of this report. Its tasks were to: report to the President the scope and nature of the vulnerabilities and threats to the nation's critical infrastructures (focusing primarily on cyber threats); recommend a comprehensive national policy and implementation plan for protecting critical infrastructures; determine legal and policy issues raised by proposals to increase protections; and propose statutory and regulatory changes necessary to effect recommendations. That review led to a Presidential Decision Directive released in May 1998. Presidential Decision Directive No. 63 (PDD-63) set as a national goal the ability to protect the nation's critical infrastructure from intentional attacks (both physical and cyber) by the year 2003. The PDD also called for a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan. After September 11, its focus included both cyber and physical security. All groups within the Council established during previous Administrations were abolished. E.O. PDD-63 focused on cybersecurity. Among the responsibilities assigned the IA/IP Directorate were to access, receive, analyze, and integrate information from a variety of sources in order to identify and assess the nature and scope of the terrorist threat; to carry out comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States, including risk assessments to determine risks posed by particular types of attacks; to integrate relevant information, analyses, and vulnerability assessments in order to identify priorities for protective and support measures; to develop a comprehensive national plan for securing key resources and critical infrastructures; to administer the Homeland Security Advisory System; to work with the intelligence community to establish collection priorities; and to establish a secure communication system for receiving and disseminating information. ISACs were formed around two primary models. Congress continues to debate these issues primarily in the context of cybersecurity. Since much of what is considered to be critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, critical infrastructure protection relies to a large extent on the ability of the private sector and the federal government to share information.	The nation's health, wealth, and security rely on the production and distribution of certain goods and services. The array of physical assets, functions, and systems across which these goods and services move are called critical infrastructures (e.g., electricity, the power plants that generate it, and the electric grid upon which it is distributed). The national security community has been concerned for some time about the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to both physical and cyberattack. In May 1998, President Clinton released Presidential Decision Directive No. 63. The Directive set up groups within the federal government to develop and implement plans that would protect government-operated infrastructures and called for a dialogue between government and the private sector to develop a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan that would protect all of the nation's critical infrastructures by the year 2003. While the Directive called for both physical and cyber protection from both man-made and natural events, implementation focused on cyber protection against man-made cyber events (i.e., computer hackers). Following the destruction and disruptions caused by the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the nation directed increased attention toward physical protection of critical infrastructures. Over the intervening years, policy, programs, and legislation related to physical security of critical infrastructure have stabilized to a large extent. However, current legislative activity has refocused on cybersecurity of critical infrastructure. This report discusses in more detail the evolution of a national critical infrastructure policy and the institutional structures established to implement it. The report highlights two primary issues confronting Congress going forward, both in the context of cybersecurity: information sharing and regulation.
crs_R44409	crs_R44409_0	T his report describes actions taken by the Administration and Congress to provide FY2017 appropriations for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) accounts. It also provides an overview of enacted FY2016 appropriations for agencies and bureaus funded as part of annual CJS appropriations. The vast majority of funding for the science agencies goes to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the National Science Foundation. 114-113 ). Division B of the act (the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2016) provided $66.000 billion for CJS, which included $9.246 billion for the Department of Commerce, $29.090 billion for DOJ, $26.754 billion for the science agencies, and $910 million for the related agencies. The Obama Administration's FY2017 Request For FY2017, the Obama Administration requested a total of $67.573 billion for CJS, which included $66.410 billion in discretionary funding and $1.163 billion in new mandatory funding. The Administration's FY2017 budget proposal included $9.728 billion for the Department of Commerce, $29.828 billion for DOJ, $26.995 billion for the science agencies, and $1.022 billion for the related agencies. The Senate Committee-Reported FY2017 CJS Appropriations Bill On April 21, 2016, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported their FY2017 CJS appropriations bill ( S. 2837 ). The Senate committee-reported bill included $9.316 billion for the Department of Commerce, $29.246 billion for the DOJ, $26.821 billion for the science agencies, and $925 million for the related agencies. H.R. 5393 included $9.051 billion for the Department of Commerce, $29.437 billion for the Department of Justice, $26.920 billion for the science agencies, and $887 million for the related agencies. The House Committee on Appropriations recommended $65 million for the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, an $11 million (19.3%) increase over the FY2016 appropriation. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 ( P.L. 115-31 ) provides a total of $66.360 billion for CJS. The total appropriation includes $9.237 billion for the Department of Commerce, $28.962 billion for the Department of Justice, $27.240 billion for the science agencies, and $921 million for the related agencies. Appropriations for CJS decreased from FY2010 to FY2013. Nominal appropriations for CJS were relatively flat in FY2014 and FY2015, though appropriations in both FY2014 and FY2015 were higher than they were in FY2013. CJS appropriations increased by approximately $4 billion in FY2016, largely due to the fact that Congress increased the discretionary budget cap when it passed, and the President signed, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 ( P.L. 114-74 ). The data indicate that the increases in CJS appropriations in FY2009 (not including ARRA funding) and FY2010 resulted from Congress appropriating more funding for the Department of Commerce in support of the 2010 decennial census. Although decreased appropriations for the Department of Commerce mostly explain the overall decrease in CJS appropriations between FY2010 and FY2013 (a 47.4% reduction), cuts in funding for DOJ (-8.7%) and NASA (-9.8%) also contributed to the decrease. Appropriations for both the Departments of Commerce and Justice and NASA have generally increased in the three fiscal years since FY2013. The NSF's appropriation increased in seven of the ten fiscal years from FY2007 to FY2016. The decrease in the NSF's funding for FY2013 was the result of sequestration.	This report describes actions taken by the Administration and Congress to provide FY2017 appropriations for the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) accounts. It also provides an overview of FY2016 appropriations for agencies and bureaus funded as part of annual CJS appropriations. Division B of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), provided $66.000 billion for CJS, which included $9.246 billion for the Department of Commerce, $29.090 billion for the Department of Justice (DOJ), $26.754 billion for the science agencies, and $910 million for the related agencies (e.g., the Legal Service Corporation and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative). For FY2017, the Obama Administration requested a total of $67.573 billion for CJS, which included $9.728 billion for the Department of Commerce, $29.828 billion for DOJ, $26.995 billion for the science agencies, and $1.022 billion for the related agencies. The Obama Administration proposed supplementing discretionary appropriations for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the National Science Foundation (NSF) with $763 million and $400 million, respectively, in new one-time mandatory funding. On April 21, 2016, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported their FY2017 CJS appropriations bill (S. 2837). The bill would have provided a total of $66.309 billion for CJS, including $9.316 billion for the Department of Commerce, $29.246 billion for the Department of Justice, $26.821 billion for the science agencies, and $925 million for the related agencies. On June 7, 2016, the House Committee on Appropriations reported their FY2017 CJS appropriations bill (H.R. 5393). The bill would have provided a total of $66.296 billion for CJS, including $9.051 billion for the Department of Commerce, $29.437 billion for the Department of Justice, $26.920 billion for the science agencies, and $887 million for the related agencies. On May 5, 2017, President Trump signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31). The act provides a total of $66.360 billion (which includes $109 million in emergency funding) for CJS. Under the act, the Department of Commerce receives $9.237 billion, the Department of Justice receives $28.962 billion, the science agencies receive $27.240 billion, and the related agencies receive $921 million. Over the past 10 fiscal years, nominal appropriations for CJS have experienced annual increases and decreases. CJS appropriations increased from FY2007 to FY2010, but generally declined from FY2010 to FY2013. Nominal appropriations for CJS were relatively flat in FY2014 and FY2015. CJS appropriations increased again by approximately $4 billion from FY2015 to FY2016, largely due to Congress increasing the discretionary budget cap in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-74). Increases in CJS appropriations in FY2009 and FY2010 were largely the result of Congress appropriating more funding for Commerce to support the 2010 decennial census. Although subsequent decreases in appropriations for Commerce account for much of the overall decrease in CJS appropriations between FY2010 and FY2013, cuts in funding for DOJ and NASA and sequestration in FY2013 also contributed to the decrease. The exception the trend of decreasing appropriations from FY2010 to FY2013 was the NSF. The NSF's appropriations generally increased each fiscal year since FY2007. Appropriations for the Departments of Commerce and Justice and for NASA have generally increased each fiscal year since FY2013.
crs_RL33912	crs_RL33912_0	Introduction This report addresses the authority of the District of Columbia Council to implement a proposed reorganization of the District of Columbia Board of Education. Specifically, the report addresses the authority of the Council to implement the proposed District of Columbia Public Education Reform Amendment Act of 2007 (hereinafter Education Reform Bill), a bill currently being considered by the Council. In addition, the report considers to what extent Congress would be required to legislate to implement this reorganization. It involves extensive revision of the D.C. Code, including parts of the District of Columbia Home Rule Act (Home Rule Act). Conclusion In conclusion, it would appear likely that the D.C. Council has sufficient authority to "create, abolish, or organize" or "define the powers, duties, and responsibilities" of independent "agencies," including the Board of Education. However, the Council may not have the necessary budgetary authority to allocate funds to individual schools, nor may it delegate such authority to the mayor. Thus, although it would appear that the Council could engage in significant reorganization of the Board under the Education Reform Bill, congressional implementation would appear to be needed to address the public schools budget restrictions provided for under the Home Rule Act.	This report addresses the authority of the District of Columbia Council to implement a proposed reorganization of the District of Columbia Board of Education. Specifically, the report addresses the authority of the Council to implement the proposed District of Columbia Public Education Reform Amendment Act of 2007, a bill currently being considered by Council. The proposed Act would involve extensive revision of the D.C. Code, including parts of the District of Columbia Home Rule Act. In addition, the report considers to what extent Congress would be required to legislate to implement this reorganization. It would appear likely that the D.C. Council has sufficient authority to reorganize an independent agency such as the Board of Education, including defining the Board's powers, duties, and responsibilities. However, the Council may not have the necessary budgetary authority to allocate funds to individual schools, nor may it delegate such authority to the mayor. Thus, although it would appear that the Council could engage in significant reorganization of the Board under the proposed bill, congressional implementation would appear to be needed to address the public school budget restrictions provided for under the Home Rule Act.
crs_R45271	crs_R45271_0	According to some experts, prize competitions should be viewed as "a potential complement to, and not a substitute for, the primary instruments of direct federal support of research and innovation—peer-reviewed grants and procurement contracts." The comparative strengths of prize competitions in relation to the use of federal grants and contracts, as described by the National Academy of Sciences in a 1999 report, include (1) the ability to attract a broader spectrum of participants and ideas by reducing costs and bureaucratic barriers to participation; (2) the potential leveraging of a sponsor's financial resources; (3) the ability of federal agencies to shift the technical and other risks to contestants; and (4) the capacity to educate, inspire, and potentially mobilize the public around scientific, technical, and societal objectives. Similarly, during the Obama Administration, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) described prize competitions as having the benefit of allowing the federal government to pay only for success and identify novel approaches, without bearing high levels of risk; establish ambitious goals without having to predict which team or approach is most likely to succeed; increase the number and diversity of individuals, organizations, and teams tackling a problem, including nonscientists and individuals who have not previously received federal funding; increase cost effectiveness, stimulate private-sector investment, and maximize the return on taxpayer dollars; further a federal agency's mission while motivating and inspiring others and capturing the public imagination; and establish clear success metrics and validation protocols that themselves become defining tools and standards for the subject, industry, or field. 111-358 ) providing the head of a federal agency with the authority to carry out prize competitions "to stimulate innovation that has the potential to advance the mission of the respective agency." 111-358 . Agency Specific Prize Competition Authorities Over the years, Congress has provided some federal agencies with additional explicit authority to conduct prize competitions. P.L. Prize Competition Trends The use of prize competitions by federal agencies has grown since the enactment of the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 ( P.L. In FY2011, the active prize competitions conducted by federal agencies under P.L. 111-358 offered a total of $247,000 and in FY2016 the total amount of prize money offered exceeded $30 million ( Figure 2 ). However, an examination of the median amount of prize money offered per prize indicates that the size of federal prizes has remained relatively steady over time with a median value of $34,500 in FY2011 compared to $41,590 in FY2016. Overall, the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) estimates that since 2010 federal agencies have conducted more than 840 prize competitions and offered more than $280 million in prize money. Potential Policy Considerations Federal agencies have increased the use of prize competitions to spur innovation and advance the mission of their respective agencies; however, there is limited information on the effectiveness and impact of prize competitions generally. In addition to examining current federal prize competitions and federal agency expertise, some Members of Congress may want to establish new federal prize competitions through legislation. List of Federal Prize Competition Legislation	Prize competitions are a tool for incentivizing the achievement of scientific and technological innovation by offering monetary and nonmonetary benefits (e.g., recognition) to competition participants. Prize competitions have a long history of use in both the public and private sectors, but have gained popularity in recent years. Experts view federal prize competitions as an alternative policy instrument for spurring innovation, not a substitute for more traditional methods of federal support for research and innovation such as competitive research grants and procurement contracts. The use of prize competitions by the federal government has increased significantly since the passage of the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-358). P.L. 111-358 encouraged the use of prize competitions by providing the head of any federal agency with the authority to carry out prize competitions that have the potential to stimulate innovation and advance the agency's mission. Congress has also provided various federal agencies, including the Department of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Energy, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of Health and Human Services, with additional authority to conduct prize competitions. The United States General Services Administration estimates that since 2010 federal agencies have conducted more than 840 prize competitions and offered more than $280 million in prize money. While the total amount of prize money offered by federal prize competitions conducted under P.L. 111-358 has increased over time—from $247,000 in FY2011 to over $30 million in FY2016—the median amount of prize money offered per prize has remained relatively steady—$34,500 in FY2011 compared to $41,590 in FY2016. According to the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Science and Technology Policy, prize competitions benefit the federal government by allowing federal agencies to (1) pay only for success; (2) establish ambitious goals and shift technological and other risks to prize participants; (3) increase the number and diversity of individuals, organizations, and teams tackling a problem, including those who have not previously received federal funding; (4) increase cost effectiveness, stimulate private-sector investment, and maximize the return on taxpayer dollars; and (5) motivate and inspire the public to tackle scientific, technical, and societal problems. Despite an increase in the use of federal prize competitions, there is limited information on their effectiveness and impact in spurring innovation and providing other potential benefits to the federal government. Members of Congress may wish to examine the ability of prize competitions to spur innovation in comparison to more traditional policy tools (e.g., grants and contracts); the cost effectiveness of prize competitions; the metrics federal agencies are using to evaluate the success of federal prize competitions; and the capability of federal agencies to appropriately design and administer prize competitions.
crs_R42509	crs_R42509_0	These volatile industry trends have adversely affected the operations of many solar companies, forcing some to reassess their business models and others to close factories or declare bankruptcy. These trends affect the ability of the United States to build a sustained domestic production base for PV equipment. Following an unprecedented period of growth, the number of PV systems in the United States reached more than 445,000 by the end of 2013, more than twice the total at the end of 2011. But even if the popularity of solar systems grows, falling equipment prices are likely to undermine efforts to sustain a solar manufacturing base in the United States. It is the material used to make the semiconductors that convert sunlight into electricity. Chinese manufacturers have come to dominate module manufacturing, making up about 70% of the total global production in 2013. In 2014, Suniva began construction of a second solar PV facility in Michigan. Estimates dating to 2010, before the imposition of dumping and countervailing duties on imports from China, indicated that U.S. content accounted for 20% of the value of U.S.-installed crystalline silicon modules and 71% of the value of U.S.-installed thin-film modules. For example, SolarWorld had fewer than 1,000 production workers in 2013, and Suniva expects to employ a few hundred production workers when its newest factory in Michigan becomes fully operational. Ten firms now control nearly half of global solar module production. U.S. Trade in Solar Products As part of their global business strategies, U.S. solar panel manufacturers source a significant share of components outside the United States. The import decline may be related to the imposition of U.S. antidumping and countervailing duties on Chinese-manufactured solar cells in 2012, which resulted in double- and triple-digit tariffs on imports of PV products from China. The first case started in October 2011, when the Coalition for American Solar Manufacturing (CASM), led by the U.S. unit of SolarWorld, along with MX Solar USA, Helios Solar Works, and four unnamed companies, filed antidumping and countervailing duty petitions with the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) and the International Trade Commission (ITC). Solar equipment disputes have expanded beyond the United States and China. U.S. Government Support for Solar Power Federal policies favoring development of a domestic solar power sector include support for the U.S. solar PV manufacturing industry as well as incentives for solar generation of electricity. An advanced energy manufacturing tax credit (MTC) was aimed at supporting renewable energy manufacturers. The current ITC, allowing residential and commercial owners of solar projects to offset 30% of a solar system's cost through tax credits, is in place through the end of 2016, when it is scheduled to revert back to a permanent rate of 10% for commercial investments and lapse entirely for residential investments. These include the PV incubator program, which began in 2007 and aims to support promising commercial manufacturing processes and products; the PV supply chain and cross-cutting technologies project, which provides up to $20.3 million in funds to non-solar companies that may have technologies and practices that could strengthen the domestic PV industry; the Advanced Solar Photovoltaic Manufacturing Initiative (PVMI), with up to $112.5 million in funding over five years, to advance manufacturing techniques to lower the cost of producing PV panels; and SUNPATH, which stands for Scaling Up Nascent PV At Home and is funded at less than $45 million, aims to increase domestic manufacturing by supporting industrial-scale demonstration projects for PV modules, cells, substrates, or module components. While state-level renewable fuels standards, which require utilities to obtain a certain proportion of their electricity from renewable sources, may provide continuing demand for utility-scale PV installations in some states, the lower cost of gas-fired generation may limit interest.	Every President since Richard Nixon has sought to increase U.S. energy supply diversity. Job creation and the development of a domestic renewable energy manufacturing base have joined national security and environmental concerns as reasons for promoting the manufacturing of solar power equipment in the United States. The federal government maintains a variety of tax credits and targeted research and development programs to encourage the solar manufacturing sector, and state-level mandates that utilities obtain specified percentages of their electricity from renewable sources have bolstered demand for large solar projects. The most widely used solar technology involves photovoltaic (PV) solar modules, which draw on semiconducting materials to convert sunlight into electricity. By year-end 2013, the total number of grid-connected PV systems nationwide reached more than 445,000. Domestic demand is met both by imports and by about 75 U.S. manufacturing facilities employing upwards of 30,000 U.S. workers in 2014. Production is clustered in a few states including California, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, and Washington. Domestic PV manufacturers operate in a dynamic, volatile, and highly competitive global market now dominated by Chinese and Taiwanese companies. China alone accounted for nearly 70% of total solar module production in 2013. Some PV manufacturers have expanded their operations beyond China to places like Malaysia, the Philippines, and Mexico. Overcapacity has led to a precipitous decline in module prices, which have fallen 65%-70% since 2009, causing significant hardship for many American manufacturers. Some PV manufacturers have closed their U.S. operations, some have entered bankruptcy, and others are reassessing their business models. Although hundreds of small companies are engaged in PV-related manufacturing around the world, profitability concerns appear to be driving consolidation, with fewer than a dozen firms now controlling half of global module production. In 2012, the United States imposed significant dumping and countervailing duties on imports of Chinese solar products after ruling that U.S. producers had been injured by dumped and subsidized solar equipment from China. In a second case, the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) and the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) ruled in 2014 and early 2015 that U.S. producers were being injured by imports of Chinese-made modules that avoided the duties imposed in 2012 by incorporating solar cells from Taiwan. While these duties may help U.S. production become more competitive with imports, the cost of installing solar systems might rise. Domestic demand for solar products may also be depressed by the end of various federal incentives. Unless extended, the commercial Investment Tax Credit for PV systems will revert to 10% from its current 30% rate after 2016, while the 30% credit for residential investments will expire. Looking ahead, the competitiveness of solar PV as a source of electric generation in the United States will likely be adversely affected by the rapid development of shale gas, which has lowered the cost of gas-fired power generation and made it harder for solar to compete as an energy source for utilities. In light of these developments, the ability to sustain a significant U.S. production base for PV equipment is in question.
crs_RL30304	crs_RL30304_0	Under current law, the tax rate is 18.3 cents per gallon on gasoline and 24.3 cents per gallon on diesel fuel. A 0.1 cents per gallon tax is also levied on top of these fuel tax rates to help fund expenses associated with fuel regulation. These rates do not automatically adjust for inflation. Specific tax rates also apply to special motor fuels, such as kerosene, compressed natural gas, and fuels derived from biomass. Under current law, federal motor fuels excise tax collections are credited to two federal spending accounts: the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) and the Leaking Underground Storage Tank (LUST) Trust Fund. Future declines in tax collections are projected largely due to scheduled increases in corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards . Since 2008, Congress has prevented projected shortfalls in the HTF by transferring money from the Treasury's general fund and the LUST Trust Fund to the HTF. This report provides an overview of current law and a legislative history of the federal motor fuels excise tax and financing of the HTF. Specifically, this report analyzes tax collections from gasoline and diesel motor fuels for highway use, since they have historically composed approximately 90% of the source of funding for the HTF. The report also includes a summary of the history of the gas tax and funding for the HTF in past sessions of Congress. Issues related to Federal Highway Trust Fund spending programs and infrastructure financing more broadly are beyond the scope of this report. Current and Historical Motor Fuel Excise Tax Rates Federal Tax Rates Federal tax rates on motor fuels used for transportation purposes are summarized in Table 1 . Under H.R. In addition, H.R. 114-41 also transferred $8.068 billion from the general fund to the HTF. FAST Act (Five-Year Authorization) On December 4, 2015, President Obama signed the Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act ( P.L. 114-94 ). The FAST Act authorizes federal highway and public transportation programs for five years (FY2016-FY2020). In order to fund the spending levels in the FAST Act, the law authorizes a $70 billion transfer from the general fund to the HTF (offset by the provisions in Table 4 ) and $300 million in scheduled transfers from the LUST Fund (spread out over three, subsequent annual payments of $100 million beginning immediately in FY2016) to supplement projected HTF revenues. The FAST Act also reauthorized current law tax rates for motor fuels and the LUST Fund tax through FY2022. H.R. 2971 . Under the bill introduced in the 114 th Congress, federal motor fuel taxes would be phased down from the current rates of 18.3 cents per gallon of gasoline and 24.3 per gallon of diesel fuel to 3.7 cents per gallon and 5.0 cents gallon, respectively, over the 2018-2021 period. CRS Report R42877, Funding and Financing Highways and Public Transportation , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], discusses several of these options and other approaches that could be used in various combinations to reform HTF funding, such as the following: Indexing existing fuel taxes to some measure of inflation. History of the Federal Motors Fuels Excise Tax and the Highway Trust Fund Gasoline Excise Tax for Deficit Reduction—1932 Although excise taxes have long been a source of federal tax revenue, the federal manufacturers excise tax on gasoline was first incorporated into the federal tax structure by the Revenue Act of 1932, which became law on June 6, 1932.	The federal government levies an excise tax on various motor fuels. Under current law, the tax rate is 18.3 cents per gallon on gasoline and 24.3 cents per gallon on diesel fuel. A 0.1 cents per gallon tax is also levied on top of these fuel tax rates to help fund expenses associated with fuel regulation. These rates are not automatically adjusted for inflation. Specific tax rates also apply to special motor fuels. Under current law, federal motor fuels excise tax collections are credited to two federal spending accounts: the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) and the Leaking Underground Storage Tank (LUST) Trust Fund. On December 4, 2015, President Obama signed the Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act (P.L. 114-94). The FAST Act reauthorized federal highway and public transportation programs for five years (FY2016-FY2020) and reauthorized current gas tax and LUST tax levels through FY2022. Spending levels in the FAST Act are funded by HTF revenues and a $70 billion transfer from the general fund to the HTF and $300 million in scheduled transfers from the LUST Fund. The transfers from the general fund were offset by non-transportation-related provisions. A major policy debate surrounding the motor fuels excise tax relates to the ability of the HTF to be self-sustaining. Approximately 90% of HTF receipts are composed of annual tax collections on gasoline and diesel fuels. Since 2008, HTF spending obligations have exceeded receipts and $139.9 billion (after sequestration) has been transferred from the Treasury's general fund (as well as $3.7 billion from the LUST Trust Fund) to address these projected shortfalls. Tax collections have declined over time because of inflation's effect on the value of the tax rates, among other factors. Future declines in tax collections are anticipated because of scheduled increases in corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards. Although left unaddressed by the FAST Act, federal motor fuels excise tax rates could be a major subject of debate as Congress considers longer-term sources of funding for the HTF. In the 114th Congress, multiple bills (H.R. 680, H.R. 2971, S. 1994) propose an increase in the federal motor fuels excise tax. Some bills also contain provisions linking the excise tax rate to increases in inflation (H.R. 680, H.R. 2971, H.R. 1846, S. 1994). Alternatively, other proposals in the 114th Congress would link funding for the HTF with international tax policy changes, or would cut the federal motor fuels tax and devolve authority for transportation projects to the states. The President's FY2017 budget also proposes funding a "21st Century Clean Transportation System" initiative partly with revenue raised from a fee on U.S. crude oil consumption. This report provides an overview of current law and a recent legislative history of federal motor fuels excise tax rates (with an emphasis on gasoline and diesel fuel for highway use) and the HTF. State motor fuels tax rates are mentioned in brief. The report also includes a summary of the history of the gas tax and funding for the HTF. Issues related to HTF spending programs and infrastructure financing, more broadly, are beyond the scope of this report, but are discussed in CRS Report R42877, Funding and Financing Highways and Public Transportation, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
crs_RL34056	crs_RL34056_0	That NTR status was made permanent (PNTR) effective July 1, 1999, obviating the annual trade status review process. This report provides background information on Mongolia, including political and economic conditions, the status of U.S.-Mongolian political and economic relations, and key security and foreign policy issues. Public demonstrations for political pluralism in 1990 led to the resignation of the Communist MPRP government, whose leaders declared the end of a one-party Communist state. Since then, Mongolia has been undergoing a political and economic transition to a parliamentary democracy under new constitutional rules adopted in 1991. Post-2006: Uneasy MPRP Dominance Since the collapse of the Democratic Coalition in 2006, the MPRP has been able to maintain an uneasy dominance in what has become a volatile political scene in Mongolia. In legislative elections for the Great Hural on June 29, 2008, the MPRP increased its legislative margin to 47 seats (up from 39 in the previous election) out of a total of 76 seats, followed by the Democratic Party with 25 seats. After Democratic Party Chairman Tsakhya Elbegdorj declared the elections to have been fraudulent, demonstrators attacked MPRP headquarters in Ulan Bator, burning the building and causing the government to declare a four-day state of emergency – the first in the country's history – in the capital. The newly elected parliament finally was sworn in on August 26, 2008, after the MPRP invited the opposition to join in yet another fragile coalition government and agreed to investigate allegations of electoral fraud. In June 2009, the Mongolian government reportedly requested the United States to re-direct nearly $188 million dollars in U.S. aid to improve the rail network to other projects, due to objections from Russia. The United States recognized Mongolia in 1987 and since then has sought to expand cultural and economic ties. At Mongolia's invitation, the United States began a Peace Corps program there in 1991, which by 2007 was maintaining about 100 Peace Corps volunteers in the country. Also in 1991, following the signing of a bilateral trade agreement, the President restored Mongolia's most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status—now referred to as Normal Trade Relations (NTR)—under the conditional annual waiver provisions of Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974. The Administration proposed FY2009 USAID budget would give Mongolia $10.4 million. U.S. support for both Mongolia's political and its economic reforms has been tangible. In addition, in 2007, the House Democracy Assistance Commission initiated a program of parliamentary assistance to Mongolia's parliament, the State Great Hural. Bilateral Trade Relations Mongolia is a relatively minor U.S. trading partner. Mongolia has asked for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States. Millennium Challenge Account In FY2004, Mongolia became an eligible country for U.S. assistance through a Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). On September 12, 2007, the MCC Board of Directors awarded Mongolia a $285 million aid program, focused mainly on improving rail transportation, property rights, and vocational education and health care.	Once a Soviet satellite state ruled by the communist Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP), Mongolia underwent a democratic transformation in 1990 after public demonstrations for political pluralism led to the resignation of the MPRP government. Since then, Mongolia has been undergoing a chaotic political and economic transition to a parliamentary democracy under new constitutional rules adopted in 1991. The now non-communist MPRP has competed in free elections with opposition parties that grew from economic reformists. The country remains quite undeveloped, but with enormous potential from vast metal and mineral resources. Mongolia's political scene remains democratic but volatile, with the MPRP able to maintain an uneasy dominance. In legislative elections on June 29, 2008, the MPRP increased its legislative margin to 47 seats (up from 39) out of a total of 76 seats, followed by the Democratic Party with 25 seats. After Democratic Party Chairman Tsakhya Elbegdorj declared the elections to have been fraudulent, demonstrators attacked MPRP headquarters in Ulaanbaatar, causing the government to declare a four-day state of emergency in the capital. Ultimately, the MPRP invited the opposition to join in yet another in a series of fragile coalition governments. Mongolia has seen several reshufflings of government since 1990. A former coalition government collapsed in 2006. The United States recognized Mongolia in 1987 and since then has sought to expand cultural and economic ties. At Mongolia's invitation, the United States began a Peace Corps program there in 1991, which by 2007 was maintaining about 100 Peace Corps volunteers in the country. Also in 1991, following the signing of a bilateral trade agreement, the President restored Mongolia's most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status—now referred to as Normal Trade Relations (NTR)—under conditional annual waiver provisions. NTR status was made permanent (PNTR) for Mongolia effective July 1, 1999. In FY2004, Mongolia became eligible for U.S. assistance through the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), and submitted a proposal late in 2005. On September 12, 2007, the MCC Board of Directors awarded Mongolia a $285 million aid program, focused mainly on improving rail transportation, property rights, and vocational education and health care. President Bush approved the aid package on October 22, 2007. The House Democracy Assistance Commission (HDAC) has established a partnership with the Mongolian parliament, the State Great Hural, focusing on parliamentary reform and improving transparency in government. HDAC sent its first bipartisan delegation to Mongolia in the summer of 2007. Mongolia's relatively small economy relies heavily on trade and, like many other countries, has been hit hard by the global economic downturn. Prices for Mongolia's main export, copper, have declined sharply. U.S.-Mongolian bilateral trade is relatively small; total trade in 2008 was $110 million. China and Russia account for a large share of Mongolia's trade. U.S. foreign aid to Mongolia has focused largely on helping it complete its transition to a free market economy and enhancing the rule of law; the Administration's proposed FY2009 USAID budget would give Mongolia $10.4 million. In June 2009, Mongolia's government reportedly asked the United States to re-direct nearly $188 million dollars in aid to improve the rail network, due to objections from Russia. This report provides background information on Mongolia, including political and economic conditions, the status of U.S.-Mongolian political and economic relations, and key security and foreign policy issues.
crs_R44699	crs_R44699_0	The U.S. Constitution vests the judicial power in the Supreme Court and any inferior courts established by Congress, limiting the power of federal courts to the context of a of a "case" or "controversy." This report offers a brief overview of some of the most important issues arising when individuals bring suit in federal court to challenge agency actions. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is perhaps the most prominent modern vehicle for challenging the actions of a federal agency. Whether judicial review of agency action is available in federal court turns on a number of factors, including constitutional, prudential, and statutory considerations. Courts must possess statutory jurisdiction to adjudicate a lawsuit, and plaintiffs must generally rely on a cause of action that allows a court to grant legal relief. Disputes must also present "cases" or "controversies" that satisfy the requirements of Article III of the Constitution. Finally, a suit must be presented to a court at the proper time for judicial review. The APA directs reviewing courts to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed" and to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions" that are: (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (D) without observance of procedure required by law; (E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title [concerning formal rulemaking and adjudicatory proceedings] or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or (F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court. Courts may also review an agency's compliance with statutory procedural requirements, such as notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures imposed by other provisions of the APA. In addition, a court may examine an agency's discretionary decisions, such as a denial of a rulemaking petition, and invalidate actions that are arbitrary or capricious. "Final" Agency Action Review under the APA is also limited to final agency action. Committed to Agency Discretion Finally, review under the APA is unavailable if the agency's action is legally committed to the agency's discretion.	The U.S. Constitution vests the judicial power in the Supreme Court and any inferior courts established by Congress, limiting the power of federal courts to the context of "cases" or "controversies." Pursuant to constitutional and statutory requirements, courts may hear challenges to the actions of federal agencies in certain situations. This report offers a brief overview of important considerations when individuals bring a lawsuit in federal court to challenge agency actions, with a particular focus on the type of review authorized by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), perhaps the most prominent modern vehicle for challenging the actions of a federal agency. Whether judicial review of agency action is available in federal court turns on a number of factors. Courts must possess statutory jurisdiction to adjudicate a lawsuit, and plaintiffs must generally rely on a cause of action that allows a court to grant legal relief. Disputes must also present "cases" or "controversies" that satisfy the requirements of Article III of the Constitution. Finally, a suit must be presented to a court at the proper time for judicial review. The APA directs reviewing courts to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed" and to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions" that violate the law or are otherwise "arbitrary and capricious." This review is limited, however, to "final agency action" that is not precluded from review by another statute or legally committed to the agency's discretion. Pursuant to this mandate, courts are authorized to review agency action in a number of contexts. First, courts will examine the statutory authority for an agency's action and will invalidate agency choices that exceed these limits. In addition, a court may examine an agency's discretionary decisions, or discrete actions with legal consequences for the public. Finally, courts may also review an agency's compliance with statutory procedural requirements, such as the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures imposed by the APA. This report provides a broad overview of the issues that may be relevant to any number of present and future challenges to agency action in federal court.
crs_RL32152	crs_RL32152_0	(2) Funded andoverseen by DHS, the program has three main elements each coordinated by different agencies,sampling, analysis, and response. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) maintains thesampling component, the sensors that collect airborne particles. The Centers for Disease Controland Prevention (CDC) coordinates analysis, the laboratory testing of the samples, though testing isactually carried out in state and local public health laboratories. Local jurisdictions are responsiblefor the public health response to positive findings. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) isdesignated as the lead agency for the law enforcement response if a bioterrorism event is detected.The installation of the sensor network is ongoing, with over 30 cities chosen as locations for thesesensors. A fundamental question to be asked of the BioWatch Program is whether it is an appropriatefederal response to the threat of bioterrorism. These issues mayraise questions about the role that the Department of Homeland Security plays with respect to thepublic health infrastructure, aspects of federal and state communication and coordination, and therole of the federal and state governments in protecting the populace against biological attack. The function of the BioWatch Program is to detect the release of pathogens into the air,providing warning to the government and public health community of a potential bioterror event. Airborne particles passing through the system arecaptured on a filter. This section presents some of these concerns, including overallstrategy, sensor siting, detector performance, and public health response. Strategic Issues Countering the threat of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction against civilians hastaken on new priority since the anthrax mailings of 2001. In theory, the BioWatch program might have this effect, withpotential bioterrorists knowing that cities have early warning capability due to the BioWatchprogram being deterred from using biological weapons. (65) Research and development efforts on other detection systems continue. Unlike previous investments in public health preparedness, the BioWatch Program maynot have dual-use application, being predominantly applicable only as an anti-bioterrorism program. Another area of potential interest to Congress may be the method DHS used to prioritizedevelopment and deployment of national monitoring systems. The Act allows this institute, following a determination by the Secretary of Homeland Security, totake on the duties of "evaluation of the effectiveness of measures deployed to enhance the securityof institutions, facilities, and infrastructure that may be terrorist targets," "assistance for Federalagencies and departments in establishing testbeds to evaluate the effectiveness of technologies underdevelopment and to assess the appropriateness of such technologies for deployment," and "designof metrics and use of those metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of homeland security programsthroughout the Federal Government, including all national laboratories." (88) Whether this focus shouldcontinue, the funding levels for the BioWatch Program, and how high a priority this specificdetection system should be for DHS are areas where Congress may exercise its oversight role. (92) Clarifying Roles and Responsibilities The BioWatch Program is a federal program, while first responders and some immediatedecision makers are state and local officials.	The anthrax mailings of 2001 increased public and governmental awareness of the threat ofterrorism using biological weapons. The federal response to this threat includes increases incountermeasure research funding, greater investment in public health infrastructure, and greaterpreparation of first responders who might be the first to encounter such weapons in an event. Thenew Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made preparation against biological weaponattack a priority and deployed the BioWatch Program to provide early warning of a mass pathogenrelease. The BioWatch Program uses a series of pathogen detectors co-located with EnvironmentalProtection Agency air quality monitors. These detectors collect airborne particles onto filters, whichare subsequently transported to laboratories for analysis. It is expected that this system will provideearly warning of a pathogen release, alerting authorities before victims begin to show symptoms andproviding the opportunity to deliver treatments earlier, decreasing illness and death. The BioWatch Program, funded and overseen by DHS, has three main elements eachcoordinated by different agencies, sampling, analysis, and response. The Environmental ProtectionAgency (EPA) maintains the sampling component, the sensors that collect airborne particles. TheCenters for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) coordinates analysis, the laboratory testing of thesamples, though testing is actually carried out in state and local public health laboratories. Localjurisdictions are responsible for the public health response to positive findings. The Federal Bureauof Investigation (FBI) is designated as the lead agency for the law enforcement response if abioterrorism event is detected. The BioWatch Program has raised concerns in some quarters, withquestions about its general effectiveness, the siting of pathogen detectors, the reliability of its results,its cost and workforce requirements, and the ability of public health officials to respond to BioWatchresults. Efforts to develop integrated response plans, lower the system cost, and developcomplementary and next-generation systems continue. Some aspects of the BioWatch Program may be of particular interest to policymakers. Forexample, Congress may be interested in whether these types of detection systems can substitute foror supplement other mechanisms in protecting the general populace; whether this detection systemwas implemented optimally; how the success of this system is to be evaluated; whether theimplementation, operational, and expansion costs for the BioWatch Program make it a cost-effectivefederal investment; and how to optimize and streamline performance in the future. Since theBioWatch Program is a federal program implemented using state infrastructure, Congress may wishto examine how this new program coordinates with already existing public health andcounterterrorism programs, as well as consider the roles and responsibilities of the federalgovernment and coordination with state governments in an actual bioterrorism event.
crs_R44685	crs_R44685_0	Introduction The length of time a congressional staff member spends employed in Congress, or job tenure, is a source of recurring interest among Members of Congress, congressional staff, those who study staffing in the House and Senate, and the public. There may be interest in congressional tenure information from multiple perspectives, including assessment of how a congressional office might oversee human resources issues, how staff might approach a congressional career, and guidance for how frequently staffing changes may occur in various positions. This report provides tenure data for 15 staff position titles that are typically used in Senate committees, and information for using those data for different purposes. The positions include the following: Chief Clerk Chief Counsel Communications Director Counsel Deputy Staff Director Legislative Assistant Minority Staff Director Press Secretary Professional Staff Member Senior Counsel Senior Professional Staff Member Staff Assistant Staff Director Subcommittee Staff Director Systems Administrator Data Source and Concerns Publicly available information sources do not provide aggregated congressional staff tenure data in a readily retrievable or analyzable form. Senate committee staff tenure data were calculated for each year between 2006 and 2016. Presentation of Tenure Data Tables in this section provide tenure data for selected positions in Senate committees and detailed data and visualizations for each position. Table 1 provides a summary of staff tenure for selected positions since 2006. The "Trend" column provides information on whether the time staff stayed in a position increased, was unchanged, or decreased between 2006 and 2016. A number of staff who stay in a position for only a brief period may depress the average length of tenure. Finally, since each Senate committee serves as its own hiring authority, variations from committee to committee, which for each position may include differences in job duties, work schedules, office emphases, and other factors, may limit the extent to which data provided here might match tenure in a particular office. Between 2006 and 2016, staff tenure, based on the trend of the median number of years in the position, appears to have increased by six months or more for staff in four position titles in Senate committees. The median tenure was unchanged for seven positions, and decreased for four positions. This may be consistent with overall workforce trends in the United States. Although pay is not the only factor that might affect an individual's decision to remain in or leave a particular job, staff in positions that generally pay less typically remained in those roles for shorter periods of time than those in higher-paying positions. Some of these lower-paying positions may also be considered entry-level positions in some Senate committees; if so, Senate committee employees in those roles appear to follow national trends for others in entry-level types of jobs, remaining in the role for a relatively short period of time. Similarly, those in more senior positions, which often require a particular level of congressional or other professional experience, typically remained in those roles comparatively longer, similar to those in more senior positions in the general workforce.	The length of time a congressional staff member spends employed in a particular position in Congress—or congressional staff tenure—is a source of recurring interest to Members, staff, and the public. A congressional office, for example, may seek this information to assess its human resources capabilities, or for guidance in how frequently staffing changes might be expected for various positions. Congressional staff may seek this type of information to evaluate and approach their own individual career trajectories. This report presents a number of statistical measures regarding the length of time Senate committee staff stay in particular job positions. It is designed to facilitate the consideration of tenure from a number of perspectives. This report provides tenure data for a selection of 15 staff position titles that are typically used in Senate committee offices, and information on how to use those data for different purposes. The positions include Chief Clerk, Chief Counsel, Communications Director, Counsel, Deputy Staff Director, Legislative Assistant, Minority Staff Director, Press Secretary, Professional Staff Member, Senior Counsel, Senior Professional Staff Member, Staff Assistant, Staff Director, Subcommittee Staff Director, and Systems Administrator. Senate committee staff tenure data were calculated as of March 31, for each year between 2006 and 2016, for all staff in each position. An overview table provides staff tenure for selected positions for 2016, including summary statistics and information on whether the time staff stayed in a position increased, was unchanged, or decreased between 2006 and 2016. Other tables provide detailed tenure data and visualizations for each position title. Between 2006 and 2016, staff tenure, based on the trend of the median number of years in the position, appears to have increased by six months or more for staff in four position titles in Senate committees. The median tenure was unchanged for seven positions, and decreased for four positions. These findings may be consistent with overall workforce trends in the United States. Pay may be one of many factors that affect an individual's decision to remain in or leave a particular job. Senate committee staff holding positions that are generally lower-paid typically remained in those roles for shorter periods of time than those in generally higher-paying positions. Lower-paying positions may also be considered entry-level roles; if so, tenure for Senate committee employees in these roles appears to follow national trends for other entry-level jobs, which individuals hold for a relatively short period of time. Those in more senior positions, where a particular level of congressional or other professional experience is often required, typically remained in those roles comparatively longer, similar to those in more senior positions in the general workforce. Generalizations about staff tenure are limited in some ways, because each Senate committee serves as its own hiring authority. Variations from office to office, which might include differences in job duties, work schedules, office emphases, and other factors, may limit the extent to which data provided here might match tenure in another office. Direct comparisons of congressional employment to the general labor market may have similar limitations. Change in committee leadership, for example, may cause staff tenure periods to end abruptly and unexpectedly. This report is one of a number of CRS products on congressional staff. Others include CRS Report R43946, Senate Staff Levels in Member, Committee, Leadership, and Other Offices, 1977-2016, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R44325, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senate Committees, FY2001-FY2014, coordinated by [author name scrubbed].
crs_R44769	crs_R44769_0	On January 3, 2017, the House passed H.Res. 5 , adopting the standing rules for the House of Representatives for the 115 th Congress. In addition to the standing rules, H.Res. 5 includes several additional provisions, called separate orders, that also govern proceedings in the House.	On January 3, 2017, the House passed H.Res. 5 , adopting the standing rules for the House of Representatives for the 115 th Congress. In addition to the standing rules, H.Res. 5 included several separate orders. This report provides information on the standing rules and separate orders that might affect the congressional budget process.
crs_R40809	crs_R40809_0	Finally, H.R. 2454 allows). Putting Emission Reductions under H.R. It is in this context that the United States and other developed countries agreed both to reduce their own emissions to help stabilize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and to take the lead in reducing greenhouse gases when they ratified the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Conclusion This report examines seven studies that project the costs of the cap-and-trade provisions of H.R. 2454 to 2030 or 2050. It is difficult (and some would consider it unwise) to project costs up to the year 2030, much less beyond. The already tenuous assumption that current regulatory standards will remain constant becomes more unrealistic, and other unforeseen events (such as technological breakthroughs) loom as critical issues which cannot be modeled. Hence, long-term cost projections are at best speculative, and should be viewed with attentive skepticism . The finer and more detailed the estimate presented, the greater the skepticism should be. In the words of the late Dr. Lincoln Moses, the first Administrator of the Energy Information Administration: "There are no facts about the future." But if models cannot predict the future, they can indicate the sensitivity of a program's provisions to varying economic, technological, and behavioral assumptions that may assist policymakers in designing a greenhouse gas reduction strategy. The various cases examined here do provide some important insights on the costs and benefits of H.R. 2454 and its many provisions. First, if enacted, the ultimate cost of H.R. 2454 w ould be determined by the response of the economy to the technological challenges presented by the bill. 2454 will determine who bears much of the program's cost. Third, the cases studied generally indicate that the availability of offsets (particularly international offsets) is a major factor in determining the cost of H.R. Fourth, the interplay between nuclear power, renewables, natural gas, and coal-fired capacity with carbon capture and storage (CCS) among the cases emphasizes the need for a low-carbon source of electric generating capacity in the mid- to long-term. A considerable amount of low-carbon generation will have to be built under H.R. 2454 in order to meet the reduction requirement. F ifth , attempts to predict household effects (or conduct other fine-grained analyses) are fraught with numerous difficulties ; estimates generated reflect more on the philosophies and assumptions of the cases reviewed than on any credible future effect. 2454 ' s climate-related environmental benefit should be considered in a global context and the desire to engage the developing world in the reduction effort. This global scope raises two issues for H.R. 2454 : (1) whether the bill's greenhouse gas reduction program and other provisions would be considered sufficiently credible by developing countries so that schemes for including them in future international agreements become more likely, and (2) whether the bill's reductions meet U.S. commitments to stabilization under the UNFCCC and occur in a timely fashion so that global stabilization may occur at an acceptable level.	This report examines seven studies that project the costs of H.R. 2454 to 2030 or beyond. It is difficult (and some would consider it unwise) to project costs up to the year 2030, much less beyond. The already tenuous assumption that current regulatory standards will remain constant becomes more unrealistic as time goes forward, and other unforeseen events (such as technological breakthroughs) loom as critical issues which cannot be modeled. Hence, long-term cost projections are at best speculative, and should be viewed with attentive skepticism. The finer and more detailed the estimate presented, the greater the skepticism should be. In the words of the late Dr. Lincoln Moses, the first Administrator of the Energy Information Administration: "There are no facts about the future." But if models cannot reliably predict the future, they can indicate the sensitivity of a program's provisions to varying economic, technological, and behavioral assumptions that may assist policymakers in designing a greenhouse gas reduction strategy. The various cases examined here do provide some important insights on the costs and benefits of H.R. 2454 and its many provisions. If enacted, the ultimate cost of H.R. 2454 would be determined by the response of the economy to the technological challenges presented by the bill. The allocation of allowance value under H.R. 2454 will determine who ultimately bears the cost of the program. The cases generally indicate that the availability of offsets (particularly international offsets) is potentially the key factor in determining the cost of H.R. 2454. The interplay between nuclear power, renewables, natural gas, and coal-fired capacity with carbon capture and storage technology among the cases emphasizes the need for a low-carbon source of electric generating capacity in the mid- to long-term. A considerable amount of low-carbon generation will have to be built under H.R. 2454 in order to meet the emission reduction requirement. Attempts to estimate household effects (or other fine-grained analyses) are fraught with numerous difficulties that reflect more on the philosophies and assumptions of the cases reviewed than on any credible future effect. Finally, H.R. 2454's climate-related environmental benefit should be considered in a global context and the desire to engage the developing world in the reduction effort. When the United States and other developed countries ratified the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), they agreed both to reduce their own emissions to help stabilize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and to take the lead in reducing greenhouse gases. This global scope raises two issues for H.R. 2454: (1) whether the bill's greenhouse gas reduction program and other provisions would be considered sufficiently credible by developing countries so that schemes for including them in future international agreements become more likely, and (2) whether the bill's reductions meet U.S. commitments to stabilization of atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations under the UNFCCC, and whether those reductions occur in a timely fashion so that global concentrations are stabilized at an acceptable level.
crs_R41838	crs_R41838_0	Introduction In many advanced economies, the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and ensuing recession resulted in large fiscal stimulus packages, the nationalization of private-sector debt, lower tax revenue, and higher government spending. In many of these fiscal debates, parallels are drawn between the United States and other advanced economies, such as Greece, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Third, how other countries reduce their debt impacts the U.S. economy. Most advanced economies are implementing fiscal austerity programs to lower their debt levels. Simultaneous austerity programs in the advanced countries, the United States' major trading partners, could depress demand for U.S. exports abroad, as well as deter investment in and from advanced economies. Background Definitions and Concepts Why and How Governments Borrow Sovereign debt, also called public debt or government debt, refers to debt incurred by governments. Some argue that if growth returned to the economy, debt levels would fall due to rising tax receipts and lower spending on programs such as unemployment insurance. Long-term trends, however, suggest that aging populations could strain public finances in advanced economies in coming years, and that public debt levels could continue to be a problem. Challenges Posed by High Levels of Debt Historically high public debt levels in advanced economies, combined with the threat of additional debt increases due to age-related spending, have become a source of serious concern for a number of reasons. To date, four Eurozone countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus) have come under this type of market pressure. Because private investment is important for long-term economic growth, government budget deficits tend to reduce the economic growth rate. However, because the financial assistance provided by the IMF, as well as from the European countries in the case of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus, takes the form of loans, others argue that this financial assistance only exacerbates the country's problems and leads to ever-increasing debt levels. Current Strategies The primary policy response across advanced economies to historically high debt levels has been fiscal austerity. Issues for Congress Is the United States Headed for a Eurozone-Style Debt Crisis? Some analysts, as well as some Members of Congress, have expressed concern that the United States is headed towards a debt crisis similar to those experienced by some Eurozone countries. The United States also has a strong historical record of debt repayment that helps bolster its reputation in capital markets. Bond market data indicate that investors do not view the United States in a similar light to Greece, Ireland, or Portugal. Higher bond spreads indicate higher levels of risk. Policy Options for Congress Most advanced economies, including the United States, have focused on addressing high debt levels through fiscal austerity. Additionally, some argue that Congress can urge the Administration to address the issues related to historically high levels of sovereign debt issues in multilateral discussions, particularly in the context of the G-20 and the international financial institutions (IFIs). Data on General Government Debt and U.S. Bank Exposure Overseas	Sovereign debt, also called public debt or government debt, refers to debt incurred by governments. Since the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, public debt in advanced economies has increased substantially. A number of factors related to the financial crisis have fueled the increase, including fiscal stimulus packages, the nationalization of private-sector debt, and lower tax revenue. Even if economic growth reverses some of these trends, such as by boosting tax receipts and reducing spending on government programs, aging populations in advanced economies are expected to strain government debt levels in coming years. High levels of debt in advanced economies arose as an issue for concern for some analysts following the global financial crisis, after decades of attention on debt levels in developing and emerging markets. Four Eurozone countries, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus, have turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other European governments for financial assistance. Some analysts and policymakers are also concerned about are also concerned about debt levels in other advanced economies. To date, many advanced-economy governments have embarked on fiscal austerity programs (such as cutting spending and/or increasing taxes) to address historically high levels of debt. This policy response has been criticized by some economists as possibly undermining a weak recovery from the global financial crisis. Others argue that the austerity plans do not go far enough, and that more reforms are necessary to bring debt levels down, especially considering the aging populations in many countries. Issues for Congress Is the United States headed for a Eurozone-style debt crisis? Some economists and Members of Congress fear that, given historically high levels of U.S. public debt, the United States is headed towards a debt crisis similar to those experienced by some Eurozone countries. Others argue that important differences between the United States and Eurozone economies, such as growth rates, borrowing rates, and type of exchange rate (floating or fixed), put the United States in a stronger position. The United States has a long historical record of debt repayment, and bond spreads indicate that investors currently view the United States as far less risky than Greece, Ireland, or Portugal. Impact on U.S. economy. The focus of most advanced economies on austerity programs to lower debt levels could slow growth in advanced economies and depress demand for U.S. exports. Financial instability stemming from high debt levels could also impact U.S. markets and financial institutions. Policy options for Congress. Congress is debating proposals to reduce federal debt levels in the United States. Congress could urge the Administration to coordinate fiscal policies multilaterally to avoid simultaneous austerity measures that undermine the economic recovery.
crs_R43199	crs_R43199_0	Water and energy are critical resources that are reciprocally linked. Likewise, as described in this report, meeting energy sector needs depends upon the local availability of water, often in large quantities, for mineral fuel production, hydropower, and thermoelectric power plant cooling. This interdependence is often described as the water-energy nexus. The U.S. energy sector's use of water is significant in terms of water withdrawals and water consumption. Thermoelectric cooling water represented 38% of freshwater withdrawn nationally in 2010 and almost 6% of water consumed nationally. Fuel Production: Water is either an essential input or is difficult and costly to substitute; degraded water is often a waste byproduct. Embedded Water: U.S. unconventional oil and natural gas production has expanded quickly due to the combined use of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling techniques for well development. This expansion has sparked interest in the quantities of water and other inputs "embedded" in energy resources. Much of the growth in water demand for unconventional fuel production is concentrated in regions with already intense competition over water (e.g., tight gas and other unconventional production in Colorado, Eagle Ford shale gas and oil in south Texas), preexisting water concerns (e.g., groundwater decline in North Dakota before Bakken oil development), or abundant but ecologically sensitive surface water resources (e.g., Marcellus shale region in Pennsylvania and New York). U.S. energy-related wastewaters are primarily from conventional oil and natural gas and coal bed methane (CBM). Electric Grid and Generation Water availability issues, such as regional drought, low flow, or intense competition for water, can curtail hydroelectric and thermoelectric generation. While identifying broad resiliency, the western U.S. assessment revealed two regions whose electric generation was at greater risk: The Pacific Northwest was shown to be vulnerable because of its heavy reliance on hydroelectric generation. Thermoelectric Cooling Represents Difficult Tradeoffs More than 80% of U.S. electricity is generated at thermoelectric facilities that depend on cooling water; these facilities withdrew 117 billion gallons of freshwater and 44 billion gallons of saline water daily in 2010, representing 45% of total water withdrawals. However, future withdrawals associated with electric generation may grow slightly, remain steady, or decline depending on a number of factors, including reduced generation from facilities using once-through cooling (industry actions resulting from proposed federal cooling water intake regulations) or shifts in how electricity is generated (e.g., less from coal and more from certain natural gas technologies and wind). Policy Response Options and Considerations Policy makers at the federal, state, and local levels are deciding whether to respond to the growing water needs of the energy sector, and if so, which policy levers to use. In the United States, private entities make many of the energy sector's water decisions. Often federal entities lack authority over water use, and states have most of the water allocation authority. Instead of direct influence on water use, the public sector influences private water decisions through other routes (e.g., tax incentives, loan guarantees, permits, regulations, planning, and education). Energy choices represent complex tradeoffs; water use and wastewater byproducts are two of many factors to consider. For many policy makers, concerns other than water—low-cost reliable energy, energy independence and security, climate change mitigation, public health, and job creation—are more significant drivers of their positions on energy policies.	Water and energy are critical resources that are reciprocally linked; this interdependence is often described as the water-energy nexus. Meeting energy-sector water needs, which are often large, depends upon the local availability of water for fuel production, hydropower generation, and thermoelectric power plant cooling. The U.S. energy sector's use of water is significant in terms of water withdrawals and water consumption. Thermoelectric cooling represented 38% of freshwater withdrawn nationally and 45% of all water (fresh and saline) withdrawn in 2010, and the broader energy sector's water use (including biofuels) represented around 14% of water consumed nationally. Energy-related water consumption is anticipated to continue to increase in coming decades as the result of more domestic biofuel and unconventional onshore oil and natural gas production. Policy makers at the federal, state, and local levels are faced with deciding whether to respond to the growing water needs of the energy sector, and if so, which policy levers to use (e.g., tax incentives, loan guarantees, permits, regulations, planning, or education). Many U.S. energy sector water decisions are made by private entities, and state entities have the majority of the authority over water use and allocation policies and decisions. For fuel production, water is either an essential input or is difficult and costly to substitute, and degraded water is often a waste byproduct that creates management and disposal challenges. U.S. unconventional oil and natural gas production has expanded quickly since 2008, and U.S. natural gas and coal exports may rise. This has sparked interest in the quantities of water and other inputs "embedded" in these resources, as well as the wastes produced (e.g., wastewaters from oil and natural gas extraction) and how they are reused or disposed (e.g., concerns over induced seismicity from injection of oil and natural gas wastewaters). Much of the growth in water demand for unconventional fuel production is concentrated in regions with already intense competition over water (e.g., tight gas and other unconventional production in Colorado, Eagle Ford shale gas and oil in south Texas), preexisting water concerns (e.g., groundwater decline in North Dakota before Bakken oil development), or regions with abundant, but ecologically sensitive surface water resources (e.g., Marcellus shale region in Pennsylvania and New York). Conventional hydropower accounts for approximately 8% of total U.S. net electricity generation, and more than 80% of U.S. electricity is generated at thermoelectric facilities that depend on cooling water. Water availability issues, such as regional drought, low flow, or intense competition for water, can curtail hydroelectric and thermoelectric generation. An assessment of the drought vulnerability of electricity in the western United States found broad resiliency, while also identifying the Pacific Northwest and the Texas grid at higher risk. Future withdrawals associated with electric generation may grow slightly, remain steady, or decline depending on a number of factors. These include reduced generation from facilities using once-through cooling because of compliance with proposed federal cooling water intake regulations or shifts in how electricity is generated (e.g., less from coal and more from certain natural gas technologies and wind). Energy choices represent complex tradeoffs; water use and wastewater byproducts are two of many factors to consider when making energy choices. For many policy makers, concerns other than water—low-cost reliable energy, energy independence and security, climate change mitigation, public health, and job creation—are more significant drivers of their positions on energy policies.
crs_R43461	crs_R43461_0	Introduction President Obama's FY2015 budget proposes to add to the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant a $602 million per year "Pathways to Jobs" fund. The fund would exclusively finance subsidized employment programs. The Administration's "Pathways to Jobs" proposal comes as interest in subsidized employment for the economically disadvantaged has been rekindled by a brief experience of TANF-funded jobs during the recent recession. Background Subsidized employment programs use government funds to pay all or part of the wages of those working in jobs. The job may be in either the public or the private sector. CETA's public service employment program ended in 1981. Since the enactment of the 1996 welfare reform law, which established TANF, states have had the authority to use TANF funds for subsidizing the employment for certain populations. The TANF Emergency Contingency Fund and Subsidized Employment The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 ) included a provision to create a special temporary "Emergency Contingency Fund" (ECF) within TANF. The ECF was created, in part, because of projections that the "regular" TANF contingency fund created in the 1996 welfare reform law would be exhausted. Of the $5 billion in extra funds provided to states and tribes under the ECF, $1.3 billion financed extra spending for subsidized employment. About half of these slots were for needy parents; the other half were used to expand youth employment programs. Many of those served by ECF subsidized jobs were not on the TANF cash assistance rolls. ECF-subsidized employment benefitted a broader population of disadvantaged adults and youth. Subsidized employment programs can be intended to serve a number of policy purposes, including (1) creating jobs, (2) providing income support to those in subsidized jobs, and (3) increasing the long-term employability of participants. There is some research to draw upon in assessing whether the TANF subsidized employment initiative might meet these goals. Job Creation A policy goal of subsidized employment, particularly during economic downturns, is creating jobs that would otherwise not exist. Thus, the past research indicates that if the goal of a subsidized employment program is to provide income support through work, subsidized employment can be an effective strategy. Ending the Current Law Contingency Fund The President's FY2015 budget proposal would offset the cost of the new "Pathways to Jobs" fund by ending the current law contingency fund. As shown in the figure, the contingency fund often has not behaved as a countercyclical source of extra TANF funds. The fund was little used before FY2008.	President Obama's FY2015 budget proposal would establish within the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant a "Pathways to Jobs" fund. The fund would help states pay for subsidized employment programs targeted toward needy parents, guardians, and youth. Subsidized employment programs use government funds to pay all or part of the wages, benefits, and other costs of employing a participant. Under the President's proposal, the subsidized job could be in either the public or the private sector. Funding for "Pathways to Jobs" would be $602 million per year beginning in FY2015. The Administration's "Pathways to Jobs" proposal comes as interest in subsidized employment as a policy for the economically disadvantaged was rekindled by a brief experience of TANF-funded jobs during the recent recession. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) created a temporary "Emergency Contingency Fund" (ECF) that provided $5 billion for FY2009 and FY2010. The ECF was created, in part, because of projections that the TANF contingency fund created in the 1996 welfare reform law would be exhausted. The ECF was different from other TANF grants to states in that it financed only certain TANF expenditures: basic assistance, short-term aid, and subsidized employment. Of the $5 billion in ECF funding, $1.3 billion financed increased subsidized employment expenditures. An estimated 280,000 persons benefitted from ECF-funded subsidized jobs. About half of these persons were adult parents; the other half were youth. ECF subsidized employment differed from earlier subsidized jobs initiatives by placing some adult parents in private sector jobs, in addition to public service employment. ECF-funded subsidized employment served a population broader than those on the TANF cash assistance rolls. Subsidized employment programs can have a number of policy goals: job creation, particularly during a recession; providing income support through work; and improving the long-term employability of participants. There is little recent experience to draw on in assessing the Administration's proposal. However, past research has indicated that subsidized employment programs can meet the goal of providing income support through work, as evaluations have indicated that such programs employ those who would otherwise not have a job. The research is less conclusive on the other policy goals. The costs of the Administration's proposed TANF-subsidized employment initiative would be offset by ending the current law TANF contingency fund. The TANF contingency fund was created in the 1996 welfare reform law and provided $2 billion for extra grants to states during recessions. However, the fund often has not behaved as a countercyclical source of extra TANF funds. In assessing the Administration's proposal, policy makers might also consider whether savings from ending the current contingency fund should go to subsidized employment programs or other uses—for example, creating a modified contingency fund to provide a better countercyclical source of extra TANF funds.
crs_R43848	crs_R43848_0	State and non-state actors carry out cyberattacks every day. Cyberspace is currently defined by the DOD as a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. These systems, as they control the operations of a particular platform, are referred to by the Defense Department as "operations technology." This strategy mitigated the effects of the attack. Had Estonia invoked NATO's Article V collective security provision, doing so would have raised several thorny questions about what kind of attack triggers those alliance obligations. The DOD and U.S. Cyber Command The Department of Defense is responsible for securing its own networks, the Department of Defense information networks (DODIN), or .mil domain, formerly known as the Global Information Grid (GIG). After recognizing that cyberspace is a global operating domain as well as a strategic national asset, DOD reorganized its cyber resources and established the U.S. Cyber Command in 2010. This sub-unified command under the U.S. Strategic Command is co-located at Fort Meade, Maryland with the National Security Agency (NSA). U.S. Cyber Command operates under U.S.C. Title 10, Armed Forces—the authorities through which the military organizes, trains, and equips its forces in defense of the nation. Subject to such delegation and in coordination with mission partners, specific missions include: directing DODIN operations, securing and defending the DODIN; maintaining freedom of maneuver in cyberspace; executing full-spectrum military cyberspace operations; providing shared situational awareness of cyberspace operations, including indications and warning; integrating and synchronizing of cyberspace operations with combatant commands and other appropriate U.S. Government agencies tasked with defending the our nation's interests in cyberspace; provide support to civil authorities and international partners. Presidential Policy Directive 20, discussed in greater detail below, distinguishes between network defense on the one hand and offensive and defensive cyberspace operations on the other. The following section provides a brief overview of evolving norms in cyberspace and the authorities that govern network defense and cyberspace operations. The U.S. Cyber Command, the military entity responsible for offensive operations in cyberspace and subject to Title 10 authorities, is co-located with and led by the Director of the National Security Agency, a Title 50 intelligence organization. Computer Network Attack, the military parlance for offensive operations, is closely related to and at times indistinguishable from Computer Network Exploitation, which is used to denote data extrapolation or manipulation. 1455 , July 25, 1991, traditional military activities include activities by military personnel under the direction and control of a United States military commander (whether or not the U.S. sponsorship of such activities is apparent or later to be acknowledged) preceding and related to hostilities which are either anticipated (meaning approval has been given by the National Command Authorities for the activities and or operational planning for hostilities) to involve U.S. military forces, or where such hostilities involving United States military forces are ongoing, and, where the fact of the U.S. role in the overall operation is apparent or to be acknowledged publicly. The directive does not create new powers for federal agencies or the military; however, by distinguishing between network defense and cyber operations, it provides a policy framework for the Pentagon's rules of engagement for cyberspace. In addition to codifying the DECS program, the order provides specific responsibilities to DHS and the sector-specific agencies, as well as the Departments of Commerce, Defense, and Justice, the intelligence community, the General Services Administration, and the Office of Management and Budget, addressed below. International Authorities The DOD's role in defense of cyberspace follows the body of laws, strategies, and directives outlined above. As discussed, the international community must contend with a certain amount of ambiguity regarding what constitutes an "armed attack" attack in cyberspace and what the thresholds are for cyberattack as an act of war, an incident of national significance, or both. Reports have described the USCYBERCOM cyber force's "National Mission Teams" as protecting the networks that undergird critical infrastructure.	Cyberspace is defined by the Department of Defense as a global domain consisting of the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. Attacks in cyberspace have seemingly been on the rise in recent years with a variety of participating actors and methods. As the United States has grown more reliant on information technology and networked critical infrastructure components, many questions arise about whether the nation is properly organized to defend its digital strategic assets. Cyberspace integrates the operation of critical infrastructures, as well as commerce, government, and national security. Because cyberspace transcends geographic boundaries, much of it is outside the reach of U.S. control and influence. The Department of Homeland Security is the lead federal agency responsible for securing the nation's non-security related digital assets. The Department of Defense also plays a role in defense of cyberspace. The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations instructs DOD to support the DHS, as the lead federal agency, in national incident response and support to other departments and agencies in critical infrastructure and key resources protection. DOD is responsible for defensive operations on its own information networks as well as the sector-specific agency for the defense of the Defense Industrial Base. Multiple strategy documents and directives guide the conduct of military operations in cyberspace, sometimes referred to as cyberwarfare, as well as the delineation of roles and responsibilities for national cybersecurity. Nonetheless, the overarching defense strategy for securing cyberspace is vague and evolving. This report presents an overview of the threat landscape in cyberspace, including the types of offensive weapons available, the targets they are designed to attack, and the types of actors carrying out the attacks. It presents a picture of what kinds of offensive and defensive tools exist and a brief overview of recent attacks. The report then describes the current status of U.S. capabilities, and the national and international authorities under which the U.S. Department of Defense carries out cyber operations. Of particular interest for policy makers are questions raised by the tension between legal authorities codified at 10 U.S.C., which authorizes U.S. Cyber Command to initiate computer network attacks, and those stated at 50 U.S.C., which enables the National Security Agency to manipulate and extrapolate intelligence data—a tension that Presidential Policy Directive 20 on U.S. Cyber Operations Policy manages by clarifying the Pentagon's rules of engagement for cyberspace. With the task of defending the nation from cyberattack, the lines of command, jurisdiction, and authorities may be blurred as they apply to offensive and defensive cyberspace operations. A closely related issue is whether U.S. Cyber Command should remain a sub-unified command under U.S. Strategic Command that shares assets and its commander with the NSA. Additionally, the unique nature of cyberspace raises new jurisdictional issues as U.S. Cyber Command organizes, trains, and equips its forces to protect the networks that undergird critical infrastructure. International law governing cyberspace operations is evolving, and may have gaps for determining the rules of cyberwarfare, what constitutes an "armed attack" or "use of force" in cyberspace, and what treaty obligations may be invoked.
crs_RL32305	crs_RL32305_0	Most Recent Developments Early in the morning on October 7, 2004, a conference agreement on the FY2005 defenseauthorization bill ( H.R. 4200 ) was announced. The House approved the conferencereport (by a vote of 359-14) on October 8, and the Senate approved it (by unanimous consent) onOctober 9. The President signed the bill into law ( P.L. 108-375 ) on October 28. On the key issues,conferees rejected a House provision to delay military base closures; authorized purchases, but notleasing, of Boeing KC-767 or other refueling aircraft; increased statutory caps on Army and MarineCorps active duty end-strength in FY2005 by 23,000; rejected a House provision that would limitpurchases of defense goods from nations that require offsets for purchases of U.S. weapons; andincreased benefits for 62-and-older survivors of military retirees. Earlier, on July 22, 2004, both theHouse (by a vote of 410-12) and the Senate (by a vote of 96-0) approved a conference agreement onthe FY2005 defense appropriations bill ( H.R. 4613 ). The President signed the bill intolaw on August 5, 2004 ( P.L. 108-287 ). The conference appropriations agreement provides $416.9billion in new budget authority, including $391.2 billion for regular Department of Defense programsand $28.2 billion in emergency funding, of which $25 billion is for operations in Iraq andAfghanistan. The $391.2 billion in regular defense appropriations is about $1.7 billion below theAdministration request. Conferenceoutcome: The conference agreement on the energy and water appropriations bill,included in the consolidated appropriations bill, H.R. Side by Side Comparison of Key Provisions: Defense Authorization Defense Appropriations Conference Agreement The conference agreement on the FY2005 defense appropriations bill,approved in the House and Senate on July 22, 2004, and signed into law on August5, provides $25 billion for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and resolves a numberof major weapons issues. The main issue in Congress was how much flexibility to provide the DefenseDepartment in allocating the funds among budget accounts. The conferenceagreement provides $3.8 billion of the money in a flexible transfer account, called theIraq Freedom Fund, and the remainder in regular appropriations accounts. (2) Of the $3.8billion in the Iraq Freedom Fund, $1.8 billion is for classified programs, so $2 billionis available for unforseen expenses. The defense billincludes emergency funds for a number of other programs, including $685 millionfor State Department operations in Iraq,$95 million to respond to the humanitariancrisis in the Darfur region of Sudan and Chad, $400 million to fight wild fires in theWest, $50 million for security at the upcoming Democratic and Republican politicalconventions, and $26 million to make up a shortfall in Federal Judiciary defenderservices. Navy DD(X) and LCS ship construction. Major Weapons Programs. Approved requested funding for the Robust Nuclear EarthPenetrator and for other nuclear weapons R&D. Amendments Agreed To. Provided $228 million for the Space-Based Radar program,$100 million below the request. The appropriationsconference report cut $300 million. This year, the issue was again on the agenda. Notwithstanding the House and Senate votes on the defense authorization bill,however, the committee-reported and House-passed version of the Energy and WaterAppropriations bill ( H.R. The agreement followed the House and eliminates funds for the RobustNuclear Earth Penetrator and the Advanced Concepts Initiative. Congressional Action.	Early on the morning on October 7, 2004, a conference agreement on the FY2005 defenseauthorization bill ( H.R. 4200 ) was announced. The House approved the conferenceagreement by a vote of 359-14 on October 8, and the Senate approved it by unanimous consent onOctober 9. The President signed the bill into law ( P.L. 108-375 ) on October 23. On the key issues,conferees rejected a House provision to delay military base closures; authorized purchases, but notleasing, of Boeing KC-767 or other refueling aircraft; increased statutory caps on Army and MarineCorps active duty end-strength in FY2005 by 23,000; rejected a House provision that would limitpurchases of defense goods from nations that require offsets for purchases of U.S. weapons; andincreased benefits for 62-and-older survivors of military retirees. Earlier, on July 22, 2004, both the House (by a vote of 410-12) and the Senate (by a vote of96-0) approved a conference agreement on the FY2005 defense appropriations bill( H.R. 4613 ). The President signed the bill into law ( P.L. 108-287 ) on August 5, 2004. The conference agreement provides $391.2 billion for regular Department of Defense programs,about $1.7 billion below the Administration request, $25 billion in emergency funds for operationsin Iraq and Afghanistan, $685 million for State Department operations in Iraq, $95 million forassistance to refugees in Sudan and Chad, $500 million for fire fighting, $50 million for security atthe party conventions, and $26 million for a federal judiciary shortfall. Later, the energy and waterappropriations bill, included in the consolidated appropriations bill ( H.R. 4818 ),rescinded $300 million in regular FY2005 defense appropriations. The appropriations conference agreement resolves what was, perhaps, the major defense issuein Congress this year: whether to provide additional funds for ongoing operations in Iraq andAfghanistan. On May 12, after considerable prodding from Congress, the Administration requested$25 billion to cover costs for the next few months. The key issue in Congress then became howmuch flexibility to grant the Defense Department in allocating the funds. None of the congressionaldefense committees agreed to the Administration request for full funding flexibility. The conferenceagreement on the appropriations bill provides $3.8 billion of the funds in a flexible transfer account,of which $1.8 billion is for classified programs, leaving $2 billion available for unforseen expenses. The remainder is provided in regular defense appropriations accounts subject to standard proceduresrequiring advance congressional approval if funds are shifted between accounts. The appropriationsconference report also resolves a number of major weapons issues. It makes substantial cuts in a fewhigh-profile weapons programs, including the Space-Based Radar and the TransformationalCommunications Satellite. It approves funding to begin construction of the Navy DD(X) destroyerand Littoral Combat Ship. One other major defense policy issue was resolved in action on the energy and waterappropriations bill. In floor votes on the defense authorization bill, both the House and the Senaterejected amendments to eliminate funds for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator nuclear warheadand new low-yield nuclear weapons development. The conference agreement on the energy andwater appropriations bill, however, following the House, eliminates funds for both programs. Key Policy Staff
crs_RL34450	crs_RL34450_0	On March 25, 2008, the Supreme Court issued a decision in the case of MedellÃn v. Texas. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Alito, Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia, the Court held that neither the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States) ( Avena ) nor the President's Memorandum requiring state courts to give effect to the Avena decision constituted enforceable federal law preempting state procedural default rules. Justice Stevens wrote an opinion concurring with the Court's judgment, and Justice Breyer issued a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Ginsburg and Souter. Background The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), ratified by the United States in 1969, is a multilateral agreement codifying consular practices originally governed by customary practice and bilateral agreements between States (i.e., countries). When the United States became a party to the VCCR, it also chose to become a party to the VCCR's Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (Optional Protocol). Parties to the Optional Protocol agree to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ to resolve disputes arising between nations with respect to the VCCR. Pursuant to Article 36 of the VCCR, when a national of a signatory State is arrested or otherwise detained in another signatory State, appropriate authorities within the receiving State must inform him "without delay" of his right to have his consulate notified. Nevertheless, foreign nationals detained by U.S. state and local authorities are not always provided with requisite consular information, and some have been convicted of criminal charges carrying serious penalties without ever having their consulate notified of their detention. In Avena , the ICJ held that Article 36 confers an individually-enforceable right to consular notification, and that the state convictions of 51 named Mexican nationals were entitled to review and reconsideration, regardless of whether such review was otherwise barred by state procedural default rules. Although the United States subsequently withdrew from the Optional Protocol, the President thereafter issued a Memorandum instructing state courts to give effect to the ICJ's decision in Avena with respect to the 51 Mexican nationals at issue in that case.	The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) is a multilateral agreement codifying consular practices originally governed by customary practice and bilateral agreements between States (i.e., countries). Article 36 of the VCCR provides that when a national of a signatory State is arrested or otherwise detained in another signatory State, appropriate authorities within the receiving State must inform him "without delay" of his right to have his consulate notified. Nevertheless, foreign nationals detained by U.S. state and local authorities are not always provided with requisite consular information. Until March 2005, the United States was also a party to the VCCR's Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. Parties to the Optional Protocol agree to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to resolve disputes arising between nations with respect to the VCCR. Prior to U.S. withdrawal from the Optional Protocol, the ICJ issued a judgment in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States) ( Avena ), instructing the United States to review and reconsider the state convictions and sentences of 51 Mexican nationals who were not timely informed of their right to consular notification under VCCR Article 36, regardless of whether such review was otherwise barred by state procedural default rules. Although the United States subsequently withdrew from the Optional Protocol, the President thereafter issued a Memorandum instructing state courts to give effect to the ICJ's decision in Avena with respect to the 51 Mexican nationals at issue in that case. On March 25, 2008, the Supreme Court issued a decision in the case of MedellÃn v. Texas. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Alito, Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia, the Court held that neither the judgment of the ICJ in Avena nor the President's Memorandum constituted enforceable federal law preempting state procedural default rules. Justice Stevens wrote an opinion concurring with the Court's judgment, and Justice Breyer issued a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Ginsburg and Souter. For further background on issues related to VCCR Article 36, see CRS Report RL33613, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon: Recent Developments Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations , by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL32390, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Overview of U.S. Implementation and International Court of Justice (ICJ) Interpretation of Consular Notification Requirements , by [author name scrubbed] (pdf).
crs_R40031	crs_R40031_0	Federal law establishes many personnel authorities governing employee awards and incentives. The statutory authorities generally have been established by Congress to provide agencies with tools to help them manage their workforces and, thereby, to better accomplish individual agency missions as well as public policy goals that cut across agency boundaries. Some of these authorities are contained within Title 5 of the United States Code (hereafter "Title 5"). These authorities cover most agencies in the executive branch and some in the legislative branch. Other authorities may be unique in their coverage to a single agency, occupation type, or workforce, and may be located in agency-specific "carve outs" in Title 5 or in other titles. In the report, the term award refers to an agency payment that is used to reward an individual employee or group of employees for quality of past performance. Title 5 award authorities differ in their coverage and requirements among three general types of employees: federal employees generally; career Senior Executive Service (SES) employees; and political appointees. By contrast, the term incentive refers to a payment that is designed to provide a monetary inducement for an individual (or a group) to accept a new position or to remain employed in a current position. Title 5 incentive authorities come in three types: recruitment, relocation, and retention (also known as "the three Rs" or "3Rs"). The next two sections of this report discuss each topic, in turn. Potential Issues for Congress Potential issues for Congress that are related to federal employee awards and incentives include questions of how to provide agencies with effective human resources management tools in light of agency missions and resource levels; how agencies are using these and other authorities to recruit, motivate, reward, and retain high-performing workforces; how to structure oversight and regulation of agency practices within the executive branch; and how to exercise congressional oversight over a civil service system that is increasingly fragmented (i.e., decentralized in execution and customized to individual agencies and workforces).	Federal law establishes many authorities governing employee awards and incentives. The authorities generally have been established by Congress to provide agencies with tools to help them manage their workforces and, thereby, to better accomplish agency missions and public policy goals that cut across agency boundaries. Some of these authorities are contained within Title 5 of the United States Code, and cover most agencies in the executive branch and some in the legislative branch. These authorities are the subject of this report. Other statutory authorities may be unique in their coverage to a single agency, occupation type, or workforce, and are located in agency-specific "carve outs" in Title 5 or in other titles. The term award refers to an agency payment that is used to reward an individual employee or group of employees for quality of past performance. By contrast, the term incentive refers to a payment that is designed to provide a monetary inducement for an individual (or group) to accept a new position or to remain employed in a current position. Title 5 award authorities differ in their coverage and requirements among three general types of employees: federal employees generally; career Senior Executive Service (SES) employees; and political appointees. In turn, Title 5 incentive authorities come in three types: recruitment, relocation, and retention (also known as the "three Rs" or "3Rs"). Each incentive authority has the same statutory eligibility requirements. Payment of awards and incentives may be subject to statutory limitations on aggregate compensation. Potential issues for Congress related to employee awards and incentives include questions of how to provide agencies with effective human resources management tools in light of agency missions and resource levels; how agencies are using these and other authorities to recruit, motivate, reward, and retain high-performing workforces; how to structure oversight and regulation of agency practices within the executive branch; and how to exercise congressional oversight over a civil service system that is increasingly fragmented (i.e., decentralized in execution and customized to individual agencies and workforces). This report will be updated to reflect changes in authorities or emerging issues.
crs_RL32904	crs_RL32904_0	Most Recent Developments After the FY2006 Agriculture Appropriations Act was signed into law (below), Congress enacted emergency supplemental appropriations for hurricane recovery and pandemic influenza (Division B of P.L. Accounts in the agriculture appropriations bill receive $1.08 billion for hurricane recovery, and $111 million for avian influenza. 109-97 , H.R. The act includes all of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (except the Forest Service), plus the Food and Drug Administration and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. The $100.1 billion law is $15.0 billion (+18%) above FY2005 levels overall, and contains $17.03 billion in discretionary spending (+1.2% above FY2005) and $83.07 billion for mandatory programs (+22% above FY2005). 2744 ) into law on November 10, 2005. Increases in mandatory programs affected by economic or weather conditions account for nearly 99% of the increase over FY2005 levels. The discretionary amount, the category of spending over which appropriators have direct control, is 1.2% above FY2005 levels, and 1.2% above the House-passed bill, but 1.8% below the Senate-passed bill ( Table 3 ). Mandatory programs administered by USDA (primarily food and nutrition programs, farm commodity support, and crop insurance) account for 83% of the total. The supplemental act also contains targeted rescissions totaling $66 million to agriculture accounts and a 1% across-the-board rescission to discretionary spending. Because most of this spending rises or falls automatically on economic or weather conditions, funding needs are sometimes difficult to estimate. The agreement rejects many of the Administration's proposed reductions from FY2005 funding for discretionary programs. Foreign Food Assistance For P.L. The President's budget contained a proposal to shift about $300 million from P.L. The conference agreement concurs with both the House and Senate versions of the bill in rejecting the Administration proposal to cut formula funds for the state agricultural experiment stations (under the Hatch Act) by 50% and to provide a new pool of $75 million for distribution through competitively awarded grants, plus an additional $70 million for the National Research Initiative (NRI), the primary existing competitive grants program in agriculture. 2744 , to prohibit nonambulatory livestock (also called "downers") from being used for human food. Horse Slaughter Amendment Conferees retained a provision in both the House and Senate-passed versions which prohibits the use of funds to pay for the inspection of horses destined for human food. U.S.-Japan Beef Trade Issue Dropped by conferees was an amendment, adopted 72 to 26 by the Senate on September 20, 2005, to bar USDA implementation of a proposed rule enabling Japan to export beef to the United States, unless Japan has opened its own markets for U.S. beef and beef products. 109-97 postpones for an additional two years—until September 30, 2008—a requirement that retailers provide country of origin labeling (COOL) for raw cuts of ground beef, lamb, and pork; fresh fruits and vegetables; and peanuts. 109-148 , the FY2006 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, contains supplemental appropriations and rescissions that change the amounts available under the regular agriculture appropriations law cited above ( P.L.	The President signed the FY2006 Agriculture Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-97, H.R. 2744) into law on November 10, 2005. The act includes all of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (except the Forest Service), plus the Food and Drug Administration, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. The $100.1 billion law is $15.0 billion (+18%) above FY2005 levels, and contains $17.03 billion in discretionary spending and $83.07 billion for mandatory programs. The discretionary amount is $199 million (+1.2%) above FY2005 levels, $201 million (+1.2%) more than the House bill, and $317 million (-1.8%) below the Senate bill. Increases in mandatory programs account for 99% of the increase over FY2005 levels. About 83% of the $100.1 billion total is for mandatory programs (primarily food and nutrition assistance, farm commodity support, and crop insurance), and most of this spending rises or falls on economic or weather conditions. Appropriators have direct control over discretionary programs, the remaining 17%. P.L. 109-97 rejects or limits many of the Administration's proposed reductions to many conservation and rural development programs. It rejects the Administration's proposal to redirect $300 million in foreign food assistance funds to purchase food in foreign markets. This has proven controversial with farm groups and private voluntary organizations. The law also rejects the Administration's proposal to cut formula funds for state agricultural experiment stations (under the Hatch Act) by 50% and provide a new pool of competitive grants. The act postpones country of origin labeling (COOL) for two more years (until 2008) and expands the scope of the delay to include not only beef, but also lamb, pork, fresh fruits and vegetables, and peanuts. Regarding a trade dispute, conferees dropped a Senate amendment that would have stopped USDA from allowing Japan to resume exporting beef to the United States; conferees instead inserted report language encouraging negotiations with Japan to reopen its market to U.S. beef. A Senate amendment prohibiting nonambulatory livestock ("downers") from being used for human food was dropped by conferees. However, an amendment was retained that prohibits the inspection of horses destined for human food, but it remains unclear whether the provision will be entirely effective. The National Organic Program was amended in response to a recent court decision on organic standards that prohibits the use of synthetic substances and non-organic feed. Conferees did not adopt a House amendment that would have allowed prescription drug re-importation, thus averting a possible veto. Supplementals and Rescissions. Subsequent to the regular agriculture appropriation, Congress enacted emergency supplemental appropriations (Division B of P.L. 109-148, the FY2006 Defense Appropriations Act). Agriculture accounts receive $1.08 billion for hurricane recovery, and $111 million for avian influenza. The supplemental act also contains targeted rescissions totaling $66 million to agriculture accounts and a 1% across-the-board rescission to discretionary spending.
crs_R45218	crs_R45218_0	A ccording to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) , "115 Americans die every day from an opioid overdose," and deaths from prescription opioids have more than quadrupled since 1999. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA)âthe executive branch agency tasked with protecting the public health by ensuring the nation's drug supply is safe and effective âhas a central role in confronting drug abuse, including the opioid epidemic. This report focuses on FDA as a key player in these efforts. The report provides a brief overview of FDA's role in approving new prescription drugs, including opioids, and also addresses selected examples of the agency's existing legal authorities under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act or Act) and recent action taken with respect to the opioid crisis. The report concludes with a discussion of selected provisions of the recently enacted Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and Communities Act (SUPPORT Act), which amends the FD&C Act. As part of these questions, FDA officials have discussed the importance of striking the right balance between taking aggressive action to fight opioid misuse and addiction, while simultaneously protecting patients who experience severe pain. FDA Authority and Recent Agency Action Related to the Opioid Epidemic FDA is taking a multifaceted approach in its response to the opioid epidemic.	According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the annual number of drug overdose deaths in the United States involving opioids has more than quadrupled since 1999. CDC estimates that in 2016, more than 63,000 people died from a drug overdose, and approximately 42,000 of these deaths involved an opioid. In combating the opioid epidemic, one central challenge for state and federal regulators is striking a balance between taking aggressive action to fight opioid misuse and addiction, while simultaneously protecting access to medication for patients who experience severe pain. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA)âthe executive agency tasked with protecting the public health by ensuring the nation's drug supply is safe and effectiveâhas a pivotal role in addressing these issues. This report focuses on FDA's role as a key player in federal efforts to curb the opioid epidemic. The report provides an overview of FDA's role in approving new prescription drugs, including certain challenges presented by the approval and regulation of opioid products. Next, the report addresses FDA's multifaceted approach in its response to the opioid epidemic, the agency's use of its existing legal authorities under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act or Act), and recent agency action taken to target the misuse of opioid medications. The report concludes with a discussion of selected provisions of the recently enacted Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and Communities Act (SUPPORT Act), which amends the FD&C Act and provides FDA with new tools to combat opioid abuse.
crs_R41279	crs_R41279_0	In June 2009, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. , a case in which the Court evaluated a mixed-motive claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which prohibits employment discrimination against individuals over the age of 40. In Gross , the plaintiff alleged that his employer's decision to reassign him was motivated at least in part by his age, while the employer claimed that its decision was based on other legitimate factors. The question at trial was what types of evidence the parties must present and who bears the burden of proof in such mixed-motive cases, which generally involve employment actions that are based on both permissible and impermissible reasons. Sidestepping the evidentiary question presented, the Court determined that an employer never bears the burden of persuasion because the traditional mixed-motive burden-shifting framework is not applicable to the ADEA. Finding instead that the ADEA does not authorize the type of mixed-motive claims that are available under a similar employment discrimination law, the Court, in a 5-4 ruling, held that an employee in a mixed-motive case bears the burden of establishing that "age was the 'but-for' cause of the challenged adverse employment action," meaning that the employee must show that age was the deciding factor, rather than just one of several motivating factors, behind the employer's action. This standard is likely to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in age discrimination cases in which age is only one of several factors behind the adverse employment decision.	This report discusses Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., a recent case in which the Supreme Court evaluated a mixed-motive claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which prohibits employment discrimination against individuals over the age of 40. In Gross, the plaintiff alleged that his employer's decision to reassign him was motivated at least in part by his age, while the employer claimed that its decision was based on other legitimate factors. The question at trial was what types of evidence the parties must present and who bears the burden of proof in such mixed-motive cases, which generally involve employment actions that are based on both permissible and impermissible reasons. Sidestepping the evidentiary question presented, the Court determined that an employer never bears the burden of persuasion because the traditional mixed-motive burden-shifting framework is not applicable to the ADEA. Instead, based on its conclusion that the ADEA does not authorize the type of mixed-motive claims that are available under a similar employment discrimination law, the Court held that an employee bears the burden of establishing that age is the decisive cause of the challenged employment action. This standard is likely to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in age discrimination cases in which age is only one of several factors behind the adverse employment decision. Currently, several bills that would supersede the Gross decision by amending the ADEA have been introduced in the 111th Congress, including H.R. 3721 and S. 1756.
crs_R40574	crs_R40574_0	108-199 ), which combined six appropriations bills—including the FY2004 District of Columbia Appropriations Act—authorized and appropriated funding for the Opportunity Scholarship program, a federally funded school voucher program, for the District of Columbia. More specifically, the Opportunity Scholarship program was enacted under the DC School Choice Incentive Act of 2003, which was included in P.L. 108-199 . The Opportunity Scholarship program provides scholarships (also known as vouchers) to students in the District of Columbia to attend participating private elementary and secondary schools, including religiously affiliated private schools. Appropriations for the program were authorized through FY2008. While the program is no longer authorized, the 111 th Congress provided appropriations for the program in FY2009 under the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 ( P.L. 111-8 ) and in FY2010 under the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2010 ( P.L. 111-117 ). P.L. 111-8 specified that the use of any funds in any act for Opportunity Scholarships after the 2009-2010 school year shall be available only upon reauthorization of the program and the adoption of legislation by the District of Columbia approving such reauthorization. P.L. 111-117 eliminated this restriction on funding and provided continued appropriations for the Opportunity Scholarship program, as well as school improvement funding for DCPS and public charter schools in the District of Columbia. It provided $42.2 million to DCPS, $20 million for public charter schools, and $13.2 million for Opportunity Scholarships. The latter, however, could be used to provide private school vouchers only to students who received scholarships in the 2009-2010 school year. The 112 th Congress has introduced two bills that would reauthorize the DC Opportunity Scholarship Program: the Scholarships for Opportunity and Results Act of 2011 ( S. 206 ) and the Scholarships for Opportunity and Results Act ( H.R. 471 ). 471 was ordered reported ( H.Rept. 112-36 ) by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on March 17, 2011. On March 30, 2010, H.R. 471 was considered by the House. It passed without amendment by a vote of 225 to 195. S. 206 was referred to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. No further legislative action has occurred with respect to S. 206 . The FY2004 Consolidated Appropriations Act, which authorized the School Choice Incentive Act, provided funding specifically for school improvement in the District of Columbia that is allocated among three entities: (1) the District of Columbia Public Schools for the improvement of public education; (2) the State Education Office for the expansion of public charter schools; and (3) ED for the DC School Choice Incentive program. P.L. H.R.	The Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2004 (P.L. 108-199), which combined six appropriations bills—including the FY2004 District of Columbia Appropriations Act—authorized and appropriated funding for the Opportunity Scholarship program, a federally funded school voucher program, for the District of Columbia. It also provided funding for the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) for the improvement of public education and the State Education Office for public charter schools. The provision of federal funds for DCPS, public charter schools, and vouchers is commonly referred to as the "three-prong approach" to supporting elementary and secondary education in the District of Columbia. More specifically, the Opportunity Scholarship program was enacted under the DC School Choice Incentive Act of 2003, which was included in P.L. 108-199. The Opportunity Scholarship program provides scholarships (also known as vouchers) to students in the District of Columbia to attend participating private elementary and secondary schools, including religiously affiliated private schools. Appropriations for the program were authorized through FY2008. While the program is no longer authorized, the 111th Congress provided appropriations for the program in FY2009 under the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8) and in FY2010 under the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117). P.L. 111-8 specified that the use of any funds in any act for Opportunity Scholarships after the 2009-2010 school year shall be available only upon reauthorization of the program and the adoption of legislation by the District of Columbia approving such reauthorization. P.L. 111-117 eliminated this restriction on funding and provided continued appropriations for the Opportunity Scholarship program, as well as school improvement funding for DCPS and public charter schools in the District of Columbia. It provided $42.2 million to DCPS, $20 million for public charter schools, and $13.2 million for Opportunity Scholarships. The latter, however, could be used to provide private school vouchers only to students who received scholarships in the 2009-2010 school year. The 112th Congress has introduced two bills that would reauthorize the DC Opportunity Scholarship Program: the Scholarships for Opportunity and Results Act of 2011 (S. 206) and the Scholarships for Opportunity and Results Act (H.R. 471). H.R. 471 was ordered reported (H.Rept. 112-36) by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on March 17, 2011. On March 30, 2010, H.R. 471 was considered by the House. It passed without amendment by a vote of 225 to 195. S. 206 was referred to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. No further legislative action has occurred with respect to S. 206.
crs_R41910	crs_R41910_0	The United States has long engaged in civil nuclear commerce with other countries, buying and selling nuclear fuel, reactors, and related components. Current Proliferation Barriers and Disincentives The international community has adopted a variety of means to address the potential for ostensibly peaceful enrichment and reprocessing facilities to enable nuclear weapons programs. (See Appendix D .) All U.N. member-states except for India, Israel, and Pakistan are parties to the NPT. An NPT state-party is obligated to conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). An increasing number of countries, particularly those with significant nuclear activities, have been signing Additional Protocols and bringing them into force. (See Appendix F .) Although many analysts and observers have expressed concerns about the possibility that a country seeking nuclear weapons might use dual-use technology supplied to a peaceful nuclear energy program in a covert weapons program, all legitimate transfers of nuclear technology to NPT non-nuclear-weapon states are under IAEA safeguards and no country with comprehensive safeguards in place, and a record in good standing with the IAEA, has used declared nuclear facilities to produce fissile material for weapons. These policies were voluntary, but resulted in no contractual transfers of enrichment or reprocessing technology to additional states. In addition, the amended guidelines require a recipient state to have brought into force an Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement or, "pending this," to implement "appropriate safeguards agreements in cooperation with the IAEA, including a regional accounting and control arrangement for nuclear materials, as approved by the IAEA Board of Governors." Multilateral Nuclear Fuel Arrangements In 2004, the United States proposed that the international community adopt a ban on all future transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technology. Another proposal has been the establishment of an international spent fuel repository. For example, the U.N. Security Council has adopted resolutions prohibiting the transfer of such technologies to Iran and North Korea. Moreover, individual states can refrain from transferring enrichment and reprocessing technologies; as noted, no such transfers are planned. Policy Goals of U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreements The United States often has diverse policy goals when deciding to conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement with another country, including promoting nonproliferation, supporting the U.S. nuclear industry, satisfying the needs of the U.S. domestic nuclear energy program, and improving or sustaining overall bilateral and strategic relations. Nuclear Nonproliferation A major U.S. goal of concluding nuclear cooperation agreements has been to ensure the peaceful use of any transferred nuclear technology. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, which amended Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, added new requirements for nuclear cooperation with the United States. The United States and other countries have become increasingly concerned that with the spread of nuclear energy facilities, additional countries may obtain enrichment and reprocessing technology, the most sensitive components of the nuclear fuel cycle. Promoting the U.S. Nuclear Industry U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements with foreign countries are also designed to help promote growth in the U.S. nuclear industry by facilitating U.S. nuclear exports. Additional Issues for Consideration This report has focused on nonproliferation and bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements. Some argue that the U.S. nuclear industry is at a disadvantage when competing for foreign contracts because the U.S. government does not provide similar liability protections. As discussed above, the U.S. nuclear industry's market power has declined and foreign competitors have been concluding nuclear supply agreements with other countries. Moreover, some influential governments have demonstrated limited enthusiasm for such regulations. In the future, Congress may choose to consider such factors as the 2011 Nuclear Suppliers Group's (NSG) decision on the supply of enrichment and reprocessing technology; the extent to which the U.S. nuclear industry is dependent on foreign suppliers; the magnitude of the proliferation threat from nuclear power programs; the efficacy of current nonproliferation mechanisms, including IAEA safeguards; and whether and to what extent the United States can influence other governments' nuclear supply policies. Status of World Wide Nuclear Power Plants Appendix C. U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreements The following states and other entities had civilian nuclear cooperation (Section 123) agreements with the United States in force as of November 1, 2014: Appendix D. Articles I, II, and IV of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Article I Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.	U.S. civil nuclear cooperation agreements ("123" agreements), which are bilateral agreements with other governments or multilateral organizations, have several important goals, including promoting the U.S. nuclear industry, which is increasingly dependent on foreign customers and suppliers, and preventing nuclear proliferation. Increased international interest in nuclear power has generated concern that additional countries may obtain fuel-making technology that could also be used to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. Ensuring the peaceful use of transferred nuclear technology has long been a major U.S. objective, and Congress has played a key role. For example, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, which amended the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, added new requirements for nuclear cooperation with the United States. Moreover, the United States has been a longtime proponent of restrictive international nuclear export policies. In recent years, some observers and Members of Congress have advocated that the United States adopt new conditions for civil nuclear cooperation. These would include requiring potential recipients of U.S. civil nuclear technology to forgo fuel-making enrichment and reprocessing technologies and to bring into force an Additional Protocol to their International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements. Such protocols augment the IAEA's legal authority to inspect nuclear facilities. The near-term proliferation threat posed by civil nuclear commerce, particularly reactor transfers, is far from clear: All but three states (India, Israel, and Pakistan, all of which have nuclear weapons) are parties to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); all legitimate transfers of nuclear technology to NPT non-nuclear-weapon states are subject to IAEA safeguards; and no country with comprehensive safeguards in place and a record in good standing with the IAEA has used declared nuclear facilities to produce fissile material for weapons. Further, the international community has multiple mechanisms to dissuade countries from developing domestic enrichment or reprocessing facilities. States such as India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan did acquire enrichment or reprocessing technology, but did so either clandestinely or prior to the establishment of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in the mid-1970s. Key factors and issues for Congress: The United States concludes nuclear cooperation agreements for a variety of reasons, including promoting nonproliferation, supporting the U.S. nuclear industry, and improving or sustaining overall bilateral and strategic relations. (See "Policy Goals of U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreements.") The U.S. nuclear industry's market share has declined in recent years; foreign customers and suppliers are important to the industry's viability. Some argue that the absence of U.S. government liability protections for U.S. reactor exports puts that industry at a disadvantage relative to foreign competitors who enjoy such protections. (See "U.S. Nuclear Industry" and "Liability.") Fears of additional states obtaining enrichment or reprocessing technologies may not materialize. Neither the United States nor any other states possessing enrichment or reprocessing technology have plans to transfer any such technologies (although the United States is currently conducting joint reprocessing research with South Korea). Moreover, the market for nuclear fuel currently functions well and the international community has begun to implement mechanisms to support the market. Although countries have the right under the NPT to develop their own nuclear fuel production capabilities, a functioning nuclear fuel market should reduce the need for them to do so. Nevertheless, as noted, states have previously managed to acquire these technologies. (See "Enrichment and Reprocessing Worldwide.") The number of NPT states-parties that have signed Additional Protocols has been steadily increasing; most states with significant nuclear activities have signed such protocols, giving the IAEA greater inspection authority over civil nuclear programs. (See "The NPT and IAEA Safeguards.") Some argue that the United States should use its influence to persuade other countries to adopt additional constraints on nuclear transfers. However, the relative decline of the U.S. nuclear industry, as well as some key states' demonstrated lack of willingness to accept such constraints, suggests that U.S. influence in this area is limited. (See "Additional Issues for Consideration.") This report discusses broad themes related to U.S. nuclear cooperation with other countries. More details of specific legislative proposals from the 113th Congress are found in CRS Report RS22937, Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
crs_R41035	crs_R41035_0	The offenses with which terrorists may be charged fall within one or more of several categories: crimes committed aboard an aircraft; crimes committed against an aircraft; crimes committed using dangerous instrumentalities, such as a bomb; crimes of terrorism; crimes committed by or against certain classes of individuals; and crimes for which accomplices may be liable. 2332f outlaws, among other things, placing or detonating explosives on foreign flagged airlines in the United States or on U.S. flagged airlines overseas (or attempting or conspiring to do so). Some have already been mentioned. Other statutes focus on the offenses which a terrorist might commit against an American. Each proscription applies to attempts and conspiracies as well. Selected Procedural Aspects Special procedures often apply to those accused or convicted of terrorists attacks on commercial airlines. Even greater diversity marks the jurisdictional circumstances under which federal law permits the prosecution of such offenses especially when committed overseas.	Federal authorities can and have prosecuted terrorist attacks on commercial airlines under a wide variety of federal statutes. Some of those statutes outlaw crimes committed aboard a commercial airliner; some, crimes committed against the aircraft itself; others, crimes involving the use of firearms or explosives; still others, crimes committed for terrorist purposes. Within each category, the law reaches co-conspirators and other accomplices. Moreover, although most apply when committed within the United States, many apply to terrorist attacks overseas, particularly but necessarily, when the victims are Americans or U.S. airlines.
crs_R41210	crs_R41210_0	Introduction The President signed into law H.R. 3590 , the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 ), on March 23, 2010. Seven days later, a second bill, H.R. 4872 , was signed into law by the President to modify ACA. This second law, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (the Reconciliation Act or HCERA; P.L. 111-152 ), was signed into law on March 30, 2010. Together these measures constitute what is referred to as the health care reform law, which makes many significant changes to the private and public markets for health insurance, as well as modifies aspects of the publicly financed health care delivery system. It also represents the most significant reform to the Medicaid program since its establishment in 1965. This report highlights some of the major changes to the Medicaid and CHIP programs and provides a timeline of effective dates for these provisions. In general, the Medicaid law (1) raises Medicaid income eligibility levels for certain people up to 133% of the federal poverty level, (2) adds both mandatory and optional benefits to Medicaid, (3) increases the federal matching payments for certain groups of beneficiaries and for particular services provided, (4) provides new requirements and incentives for states to improve quality of care and encourage more use of preventive services, and (5) makes a number of other Medicaid program changes. Regarding CHIP, the law includes a new requirement for states to maintain their current program structures through FY2019 and extends additional CHIP funding through FY2015. To help explain the most important Medicaid and CHIP changes, provision descriptions are grouped into the following six major issue areas: eligibility, benefits, financing, program integrity, demonstrations and grant funding, and miscellaneous. Appendix A provides a detailed implementation timeline of the Medicaid and CHIP provisions. Appendix B is a crosswalk between the provision titles and the amending sections of P.L. 111-148 and P.L. 111-152 for all of the Medicaid and CHIP provisions. Finally, Appendix C is a list of abbreviations used in this report and their definitions. Overview of the Medicaid and CHIP Provisions in the Health Reform Law Key Medicaid and CHIP provisions included in the health reform law are summarized below.	The President signed into law H.R. 3590, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148), on March 23, 2010. Seven days later, a second bill, H.R. 4872, was signed into law by the President to modify ACA. This second law, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA; P.L. 111-152), was signed into law on March 30, 2010. Together these measures constitute what is referred to as the health care reform law, which makes many significant changes to the private and public markets for health insurance, as well as modifies aspects of the publicly financed health care delivery system. It represents the most significant reform to the Medicaid program since its establishment in 1965. This report details some of the major changes to the Medicaid and CHIP programs and provides a timeline of effective dates for these provisions. In general, the Medicaid law (1) raises Medicaid income eligibility levels for certain people up to 133% of the federal poverty level, (2) adds both mandatory and optional benefits to Medicaid, (3) increases the federal matching payments for certain groups of beneficiaries and for particular services provided, (4) provides new requirements and incentives for states to improve quality of care and encourage more use of preventive services, and (5) makes a number of other Medicaid program changes. Regarding CHIP, the law includes a new requirement for states to maintain their current program structures through FY2019 and extends additional CHIP funding through FY2015. To help explain the most important Medicaid and CHIP changes, provision descriptions are grouped into the following six major issue areas: eligibility, benefits, financing, program integrity, demonstrations and grant funding, and miscellaneous. Appendix A provides a detailed implementation timeline of the Medicaid and CHIP provisions. Appendix B is a crosswalk between the provision titles and the amending sections of P.L. 111-148 and P.L. 111-152 for all of the Medicaid and CHIP provisions. Finally, Appendix B is a list of abbreviations used in this report and their definitions. This report reflects the Medicaid and CHIP provisions at the time of ACA's enactment. It is meant to serve as a historical reference to the complete set of Medicaid and CHIP provisions included in the law, as of March 23, 2010. It will not be updated to capture subsequent legislative changes, program guidance, public notices, or rulemaking, or the June 28, 2012, U.S. Supreme Court decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, where the Court held that the federal government cannot terminate current Medicaid program federal matching funds if a state does not expand its Medicaid program. The U.S. Supreme Court decision effectively makes the ACA Medicaid expansion optional.
crs_R43316	crs_R43316_0	Introduction In recent years a subject of continuing interest to Senators has been the length of time taken for lower federal court nominations to receive Senate confirmation. This report seeks to inform the current debate in three ways: first, by providing an overview of the time taken by the Senate during recent presidencies to confirm U.S. circuit and district court nominees; second, by identifying potential consequences of a protracted confirmation process for such nominees; and third, by identifying policy options the Senate might consider to shorten the length of time from nomination to confirmation for U.S. circuit and district court nominees. A third section identifies possible consequences of the relatively longer periods of time lower federal court nominees have waited, once nominated, to be confirmed by the Senate. Length of Time from Nomination to Confirmation for Judicial Nominees Across Recent Presidencies This section provides statistics related to the length of time it has taken for circuit and district court nominees, once nominated by the President, to be confirmed by the Senate. Figure 1 tracks by President, from Reagan to Obama, the mean (average) and median number of days from nomination to confirmation for all circuit and district court nominees confirmed during a President's tenure in office (whether one or two terms). In general, the average and median time from nomination to confirmation has increased during each presidency since President Reagan. Bush (103.7 days), and Reagan (68.7 days). Bush (85.5 days), and Reagan (45 days). The median waiting times from nomination to confirmation for district court nominees ranged from a high of 215 days, thus far, during President Obama's time in office to a low of 41 days during President Reagan's two terms. Increase in Vacancy Rates of Circuit and District Court Judgeships A protracted confirmation process might contribute to an increase in vacancy rates for U.S. circuit and district court judgeships as well as an increase in the number of vacancies considered "judicial emergencies" by the Judicial Conference of the United States. Such difficulties might lead some individuals, who would otherwise be highly qualified nominees for the federal bench, to pass on the opportunity to be nominated. Excessive Emphasis on the Ideological or Partisan Predisposition of Nominees Longer waiting times from nomination to confirmation might politicize the confirmation process in a way that leaves the public with the impression that the ideological or partisan predisposition of the nominee is the primary consideration in determining how the nominee will approach his or her work on the bench. During the G.W. Another option available to the Senate is to consider some judicial nominations as "privileged nominations" for the purpose of potentially shortening the time from nomination to confirmation. Treat District Court Nominations Differently than Circuit Court Nominations Another option the Senate might consider is to treat, during various stages of the confirmation process, district court nominations differently than circuit court nominations. Such time frames might have the effect of shortening the confirmation process for judicial nominees as well as standardizing (as much as possible) the process across presidencies.	The process by which lower federal court judges are nominated by the President and considered by the Senate is of continuing interest to Congress. Recent Senate debate over judicial nominations has frequently concerned whether a particular President's judicial nominees, relative to the nominees of other recent Presidents, waited longer for their nominations to be considered by the Senate. This report addresses this issue by (1) providing a statistical analysis of the time from nomination to confirmation for U.S. circuit and district court nominees from Presidents Reagan to Obama; (2) identifying possible consequences of a protracted confirmation process for circuit and district court nominees; and (3) identifying policy options the Senate might consider to shorten the length of time from nomination to confirmation for lower federal court nominees. In general, the mean (average) and median number of days from nomination to confirmation increased during each presidency since President Reagan. For circuit court nominees confirmed during a President's time in office (whether one or two terms), the average number of days elapsed from nomination to confirmation ranged from 68.7 days during the Reagan presidency to 350.6 days during George W. Bush's presidency. The median number of days from nomination to confirmation for circuit court nominees confirmed ranged from 45 days (Reagan) to 229 days (Obama). For district court nominees, the average time between nomination and confirmation ranged from 67.9 days (Reagan) to 220.8 days (Obama). For district court nominees, the median time elapsed ranged from a low of 41 days (Reagan) to 215 days (Obama). There are several potential consequences of a protracted confirmation process for lower federal court nominees. These include (1) consistently high vacancy rates for circuit and district court judgeships as well as a greater number of such vacancies considered "judicial emergencies" by the Judicial Conference of the United States; (2) detrimental effects on the management of the federal courts, including judicial caseloads; (3) greater difficulty in finding highly qualified individuals who are willing to be nominated to the federal bench; (4) the politicization of the confirmation process in a manner that might leave the public with the impression that the ideological or partisan predisposition of the nominee is the primary consideration in determining how the nominee will approach his or her work on the bench. Three policy options discussed in the report include the following: Utilizing time frames for various stages of the confirmation process for U.S. circuit and district court nominees, including the length of time from nomination to committee hearing as well as the length of time from committee report to final Senate action. Expediting the confirmation process for judicial nominations using "fast-track" procedures. Such procedures might include classifying some judicial nominations as "privileged nominations" as is currently done to expedite Senate consideration of nominations to some positions in the executive branch. Treating district court nominations differently than circuit court nominations by changing certain features of the confirmation process for district court nominations. Such changes might result in shortening the time from nomination to confirmation for district court nominees.
crs_R44816	crs_R44816_0	Press coverage of Congress and other government institutions helps inform citizens about public policy, the legislative process, and representation. As the number of reporters and news outlets covering Congress increased during the 1800s, the House and Senate established formal press galleries, resources, and administrative rules to help manage the Capitol press corps while preserving its access and independence. In 1877, the House and Senate decided to create a committee of correspondents to oversee press gallery membership and administration. Today, the congressional press galleries provide services both for journalists and for Members of Congress. The press galleries also distribute press releases; provide the press with information on floor proceedings, upcoming rules, amendments, and legislation; provide information on committee hearings, witness testimony, and mark-ups; and deliver messages or facilitate Member communications with journalists. Additional House and Senate chamber rules that apply generally to photography, use of electronic equipment, and audio and video recording or broadcasting in the Capitol may also affect how members of the press cover Congress. Due to the similarities across galleries, this report first presents the general rules and authorities that affect the press galleries and media coverage of Congress, followed by the credentialing requirements that the galleries typically share. The report concludes with a brief discussion of some of the considerations that commonly underlie the galleries' practices and some current developments in news production and distribution that may affect the congressional press galleries. General Authorities for Media and Press Galleries The House and Senate press galleries have historically operated under a unified set of governing rules, approved by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. The rules established for each press gallery type, and the names of gallery members, are published in the Official Congressional Directory . Four correspondents' committees exist today: one for the House and Senate daily press galleries; one for the House and Senate periodical press galleries; one for the House and Senate radio/TV galleries; and one for the Senate press photographers' gallery. Press credentials may be offered on a temporary or permanent basis, and they entitle journalists admission to a particular gallery type in both the House and the Senate, along with access to the resources provided by the gallery's office. Changes to press gallery rules or credentialing requirements may be suggested by the correspondents' committees on behalf of gallery members, but are subject to the approval of the Speaker of the House and the Committee on Rules and Administration. In the House and Senate galleries, for example, use of cameras and electronic devices is generally prohibited. The radio/TV galleries manage reservations from Members and congressional staff seeking to hold press conferences in various locations around the Capitol Complex. The radio/TV galleries can also assist Members with media logistics and security for these events. Gallery staff can assist Members with logistics for events in these locations. Correspondents may be credentialed as representatives of multiple news outlets, and although the number of accredited correspondents has increased, the number of media outlets they represent has diminished by more than half, decreasing from 1,272 in 1975 to 581 in 2015. This may reflect broader trends in the news industry, including the consolidation of smaller media outlets into larger entities. New Media Environment and Gallery Operations Changes in how news is produced and distributed have sometimes led the House, Senate, and correspondents' committees to revisit the existing rules, facilities, and administration related to the congressional press. Non-journalists may also be able to effectively report news from the Capitol with handheld Internet-connected devices, like smartphones, and the ubiquity of social media publishing and broadcasting applications.	The House and Senate press galleries provide services both for journalists and for Members of Congress. The news media helps Members communicate with the public, and enables the public to learn about policy initiatives, understand the legislative process, and observe elected officials representing their constituents. In the earliest Congresses, news reports commonly provided the most comprehensive record of congressional proceedings, even for Members themselves, because few official documents were kept. To accommodate the press, and in response to its growth through the mid-19th century, the House and Senate established formal press galleries in 1877, providing resources and organization for journalists reporting from the Capitol. This report provides information about the rules and authorities that affect media coverage of Congress, current practices among the press galleries, and selected data on gallery membership since the 94th Congress. It also provides a brief discussion of considerations that commonly underlie the galleries' practices or may affect gallery operations and congressional media rules. Although they are separate entities, the House and Senate press galleries have traditionally operated under the same governing rules, approved by the Speaker of the House and the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. Additionally, chamber rules addressing use of electronic devices, photography, and recording or broadcasting of audio and video, also affect journalists covering Congress. Increasingly, non-journalists may also be able to effectively report news from the Capitol with handheld Internet-connected devices. Many elements of the original press gallery rules have persisted over time, and include provisions to preserve journalistic independence from encroachment by Congress. One key feature that helps preserve this independence is the delegation of many gallery responsibilities to correspondents' committees, comprised of gallery members, and to nonpartisan House and Senate staff. Requirements for press credentials, along with other gallery practices, also reflect a balance between ensuring congressional access for professional reporters while managing the limited space and resources available in the Capitol. Today, four correspondents' committees exist to oversee the seven congressional press galleries: one for the House and Senate daily press galleries; one for the House and Senate periodical press galleries; one for the House and Senate radio/television galleries; and one for the Senate press photographers' gallery. Credentials from a correspondents' committee provide journalists with access to the relevant House and Senate galleries and office resources. Each committee's credentialing requirements, along with other gallery rules and the names of accredited journalists and news outlets, are published in the Official Congressional Directory. The congressional press galleries also provide services for Members of Congress and staff. This can include distributing press releases or helping to facilitate Member communications with journalists. Members can use a number of sites around the Capitol Complex for press conferences or interviews. Some of these locations need to be reserved through a particular press gallery. Press gallery staff can also assist Members with media logistics and security for certain events. Although the press galleries have retained similar structures and practices over the years, changes in gallery membership and broader trends in how news is produced and distributed may be relevant as the House, Senate, and correspondents' committees consider the existing rules related to media coverage of Congress and the press galleries. Since the 94th Congress, for example, the number of credentialed correspondents has grown, particularly for the radio/television galleries, but the number of outlets they represent has decreased. Cable and satellite television and the Internet allow for smaller, more specialized news outlets to exist, yet many news outlets are consolidated under larger parent companies. Additionally, journalists making use of the multimedia capacities of Internet-based journalism may find it difficult to categorize themselves under the current gallery structure.
crs_RL33307	crs_RL33307_0	At the local level, program benefits are provided to more than 39million children and infants, and some 2 million lower-income pregnant and postpartumwomen, through just over 100,000 public and private schools and residential child careinstitutions, about 200,000 child care centers and family day care homes, approximately30,000 summer program sites, and, in the case of the WIC program, some 10,000 local healthcare clinics/sites operated by nearly 2,000 health agencies. In the meal service programs like the School Lunch and School Breakfast programs,summer programs, and assistance for child care centers and day care homes, federal aid is inthe form of legislatively set subsidies paid for each meal/snack served that meets federalnutrition guidelines. While all meals/snacks served are subsidized, those served free or at a reducedprice to lower-income children are supported at higher rates. (3) However, federal subsidies do not necessarily cover the fullcost of the meals and snacks offered by participating providers, and states and localitiescontribute significantly to cover program costs -- as do children's families (by paying chargesfor nonfree or reduced-price meals and snacks). Participating schools/RCCIs alsomust guarantee to offer free/reduced-price meals to lower-income children, adhere tofederally set administrative standards (under state oversight), and follow "BuyAmerican" rules. For the2006-2007 school year, these subsidies are 23 cents a lunch. (See the later discussionof the Child and Adult Care Food program for the various federal subsidy rates forsnacks, as well as separate authority for child care organizations, including schools,to get subsidies for snacks and, in some cases, meals served free in after-schoolprograms.) Commodity Assistance(20) The Agriculture Department provides commodity support for School Lunchprogram schools, the CACFP, and the Summer Food Service program. In addition to cash subsidies, schools (which receive the bulk of federallydonated commodities) and other providers are "entitled" to a specific dollar value ofcommodities based on the number of meals they serve. The WIC and WIC Farmers' Market Programs(22) The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, andChildren (the WIC program) provides nutritious foods and other support tolower-income pregnant, postpartum, and breastfeeding women, and to infants andchildren (up to age 5). Special FNS projects -- "TeamNutrition" nutrition education projects, a food safety project, technical assistance toprogram operators, food service training grants, aid with electronic food serviceresource systems, "program integrity" initiatives -- are aimed at helping schools andother providers with nutrition education materials, assisting them to improve theirmeal service operations and the quality of meals, and ensuring federal support is spentcorrectly; they are typically funded at about $10-$20 million a year. (31) Funding for Child Nutrition and WIC Programs Federal support for child nutrition and WIC programs is derived from fundingprovided out of (1) annual Agriculture Department appropriations, (2) permanentappropriations not included in the annual appropriations laws (e.g., money directlyappropriated for the Food Service Management Institute under its authorizing law andother spending mandated by law), (3) unused money available (carried over) fromprior years' appropriations, transferred from other Agriculture Departmentappropriations accounts, or recovered from states and operators, and (4) funds paidfor child nutrition initiatives from budget accounts separate from appropriations to thechild nutrition and WIC accounts (e.g., a large share of commodity assistance). 5384 ; H.Rept.109-463 ), and the Senate-reported FY2007 appropriations measure (H.R.5384; S.Rept. Added funds for a free fresh fruit and vegetable program in selected schools are not includedin the House bill amounts shown here (they are appropriated separately), but are included in the Senate child nutritionappropriation. The Administration's request for FY2007 includesonly the $9 million mandated amount.	Federally supported child nutrition programs/initiatives and the Special SupplementalNutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (the WIC program) reach more than 39million children and 2 million lower-income pregnant/ postpartum women. In FY2006,spending on them is anticipated to be $18.4 billion, supported by new appropriations of alesser amount ($17.9 billion). The Administration's FY2007 budget request envisionsspending a total of $19.1 billion, with new appropriations of $18.8 billion. For FY2007, theHouse and Senate appropriations bills ( H.R. 5384 ) call for spending $19.2billion, supported by new appropriations of $18.6 billion in the House and $18.9 billion inthe Senate. Child Nutrition Programs. The School Lunch and School Breakfast programs provide cash subsidies for all meals they serve to schools choosing to participate; largersubsidies are granted for free and reduced-price meals offered to lower-income children. The Child and Adult Care Food program subsidizes meals/snacks served by child care centersand day care homes; federal subsidy rules differ significantly between those provided tocenters and those for day care homes. Schools and organizations operating programs forchildren also can receive subsidies for snacks (and, in some cases, meals) served in after-school and other outside-of-school settings . The Summer Food Service program subsidizes food service operations by public/private nonprofit sponsors volunteering tooperate projects during the summer; all meals/snacks they serve are free. The Special Milkprogram operates in schools and other venues without a lunch program and subsidizes allmilk served. All these subsidies are inflation-indexed and are paid only where themeals/snacks meet federal nutrition and other standards. In addition to cash aid, manyproviders receive food commodities from the Agriculture Department, at a set value per meal(and may receive "bonus" commodities from Department surplus stocks). Grants also aremade to help cover state administrative expenses . Other significant federalprograms/activities include a free fresh fruit and vegetable program in selected schools,money for a Food Service Management Institute, a small nutrition education initiative,activities to improve program integrity, meal quality, food service and safety, and support forlocal school "wellness policies." Separately, the WIC program provides nutrition services(e.g., nutrition education, breastfeeding support) and tailored food packages to lower-incomepregnant and postpartum women, infants, and children who are judged to be at nutritionalrisk. And a WIC farmers' market program offers vouchers to WIC recipients for the purchaseof fresh fruit and vegetables at farmers' markets. These are administered by the Agriculture Department's Food and Nutrition Serviceand state education, health, social service, and agriculture agencies. They actually areoperated, under state oversight, by over 300,000 local providers (such as schools, child carecenters, health clinics). Federal payments do not necessarily cover all program costs, andnonfederal support is significant (e.g., children's families' school meal payments, state/localcontributions). This report will be updated as warranted.
crs_R43321	crs_R43321_0	Patent infringement is the unauthorized making, using, offering for sale, selling, and importing of a patented invention. The patent provides the patent holder with the right to protect against such infringement by suing for relief in the appropriate federal court. The amount of patent infringement litigation has substantially increased during the last decade. Some commentators believe that the possibility of a large financial award together with the minimal information required to bring a patent infringement claim has encouraged abuses of the patent system in courts by "patent trolls." Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Form 18 Patent infringement cases begin with the filing of a complaint by a party seeking relief in federal court. For assistance in satisfying these rules, attorneys often rely on the sample forms provided in the appendix of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as models for their complaints. According to this form, a complaint for patent infringement must include four statements asserting jurisdiction, patent ownership, patent infringement by the defendant, and demand for relief. In its opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court reasserted the heightened "plausibility" pleading. Court Interpretation of Form 18 Despite the Twombly and Iqbal holdings, the level of particularity regarding information in the patent complaint, specifically Form 18, is a frequent issue before the courts. Commentators have linked PAEs together with the current patent pleading requirements for a patent infringement claim. They argue that the minimal information required in a patent infringement complaint encourages PAEs to initiate "frivolous" lawsuits that otherwise would not survive the initial pleading stage under a more stringent standard. 3309 , proposes changes to the patent pleading requirements specifically. These proposed requirements would demand more specific information from the plaintiff than Form 18. However, some commentators believe that the heightened pleading requirements would render patent enforcement impractical. Patent Abuse Reduction Act The Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 2013, S. 1013 , proposes changes to pleading requirements in patent infringement cases. However, members of the judicial branch have raised objections to the patent pleading reforms and have suggested potential separation of powers issues triggered by these proposed changes.	Patent infringement is the unauthorized making, using, offering for sale, selling, and importing of a patented invention. The patent provides the patent holder with the right to protect against such infringement by suing for relief in the appropriate federal court. Litigation of a patent infringement claim begins with the filing of a complaint in federal court. Form 18 in the appendix of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a model for a patent infringement complaint. This form requires four statements asserting jurisdiction, patent ownership, patent infringement by the defendant, and demand for relief. Commentators, legal practitioners, and patent holders disagree as to whether Form 18 requires a sufficient level of detail in the patent infringement complaint to meet the standards outlined in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and by the U.S. Supreme Court. Despite two recent Supreme Court rulings concerning the appropriate pleading standard, the level of particularity regarding information in the patent complaint, specifically Form 18, is a frequent issue before the courts. Patent infringement litigation has increased over the last decade. Commentators have linked the current patent pleading requirements and the minimal level of information required to patent assertion entities (PAE), colloquially known as "patent trolls." According to "patent troll" critics, the minimal information required in a patent infringement complaint encourages PAEs to initiate frivolous lawsuits that otherwise would not survive the initial pleading stage under a more stringent standard. Congress has recently proposed several bills offering patent reform in this area. The recently introduced Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, and the Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, both offer changes to the patent pleading system. These bills would provide for, among other things, heightened initial pleading requirements demanding more specific information in the complaint than required by Form 18 alone. Sponsors of the bills intend these more rigorous pleading requirements to deter "patent trolls" from filing what they deem as frivolous lawsuits. However, some commentators believe that the heightened pleading requirements would render patent enforcement impractical. Additionally, some members of the judicial branch have commented that these proposed changes trigger constitutional issues by potentially violating the separation of powers doctrine.
crs_R43298	crs_R43298_0	WRRDA Conference Report Developments The Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 (WRRDA 2014, P.L. 113-121 ) became law on June 10, 2014. Its conference report, H.Rept. 113-449 , resolved differences between the House-passed H.R. 3080 , the Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2013 (WRRDA 2013), and the Senate-passed S. 601 , the Water Resources Development Act of 2013 (WRDA 2013). 3080 and S. 601 represented omnibus authorization legislation focused on water resource activities, principally of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and a few other environmental issues. It requires an "Annual Report" from the ASA to Congress identifying proposed new studies (including studies proposed by nonfederal entities) and completed feasibility and project modification reports. 3080 and S. 601 , encouraged completion of Corps studies within three years, limited study costs, and established new procedures intended to expedite Corps completion of environmental compliance requirements, including the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). WRRDA 2014's conference report raised the standard threshold for performing an independent peer review of a feasibility study from $45 million total project costs to $200 million, and extend applicability of the review requirement to studies initiated through 2019. Expanding Project Delivery and Financing Opportunities . 3080 and S. 601 , encouraged nonfederal opportunities in delivering water resources projects through provisions on crediting for nonfederal work and increasing opportunities for nonfederal contributions and nonfederal study and project management. The Corps and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are responsible for administering the pilot program. Investing in Navigation . 3080 and S. 601 , encouraged increased spending from the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund (HMTF). It modified prioritization of HMTF funding among different types of harbors but retained similar provisions contained in H.R. 3080 and S. 601 reserving certain portions of funds to harbors with less cargo. 3080 and S. 601 , did not enact changes to inland waterway revenues in general but increased the threshold for major rehabilitation efforts on inland waterways, authorized changes to waterway project delivery, and altered the cost-share for one project (Olmsted Locks and Dam). These changes may increase the likelihood of Inland Waterways Trust Fund (IWTF) monies being available for use on other inland waterway construction projects. Like H.R. Restoring and Protecting Aquatic Ecosystems . WRRDA 2014 provided congressional direction related to various regional river and coastal restoration efforts (e.g., Chesapeake Bay, North Atlantic coastal restoration) and authorized the construction of projects which have previously been studied in the Everglades and in Coastal Louisiana, among other places. 3080 , WRRDA 2014 also added to Corps authority to undertake activities for the prevention, control, and eradication of invasive species at Corps projects. WRRDA 2014 created a one-time process aimed at deauthorizing previously authorized projects with federal costs to complete totaling $18 billion; the ASA is responsible for leading the process, and is required to provide opportunity for public input and congressional disapproval. Addressing Other Issues. The conference report included provisions, different from those in S. 601 , amending the applicability of the Environmental Protection Agency's oil spill prevention, control, and countermeasure regulations. The enacted legislation also included certain water infrastructure provisions of the Clean Water Act (CWA) that were not included in H.R. These CWA provisions, while representing the first amendments to CWA Title VI since 1987, did not address many of the more longstanding or controversial CWA issues. Expediting Studies, Environmental Reviews, and Permits Like both the House and Senate bills, the conference report for WRRDA 2014 included provisions aimed at expediting water project delivery and permit processing. Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (WIFIA) Like S. 601 , WRRDA 2014 included the Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (WIFIA), which authorized a five-year pilot program for loans and loan guarantees for flood damage reduction projects assisted by the Corps and public water supply and wastewater projects assisted by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Like H.R. Like H.R. Reducing Flood Risks H.R. WRRDA 2014 established a levee safety initiative (§3016) that included authorizations for: Corps technical assistance and training to promote levee safety, Corps levee rehabilitation assistance at 65% federal cost share and maximum federal project cost of $10 million per project (activities under the authority have an authorization of appropriations of $30 million for FY2015 through 2019), and FEMA to assist in establishing or improving state and tribal levee safety programs. 3080 and S. 601 , WRRDA 2014 required the Corps develop national levee safety guidelines.	The Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 (WRRDA 2014, P.L. 113-121) became law on June 10, 2014. The conference report, H.Rept. 113-449, resolved differences between H.R. 3080, the Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2013 (WRRDA 2013), and S. 601, the Water Resources Development Act of 2013 (WRDA 2013). Both bills represented omnibus authorization legislation for water resource activities, principally associated with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). Authorizing and Deauthorizing Projects. WRRDA 2014 authorized 34 construction projects totaling $25.65 billion ($15.64 billion federal, $10.01 billion nonfederal). It established expedited House and Senate procedures for bills authorizing construction projects meeting specified criteria. It requires an annual report from the Administration identifying proposed new studies, completed feasibility reports, and project modification reports. WRRDA 2014 also authorized a process to deauthorize previously authorized projects with federal costs to complete totaling $18 billion; the process will be led by the Administration, with opportunities for public input and congressional disapproval. Expediting Studies, Environmental Reviews, and Permits. The conference report, like H.R. 3080 and S. 601, aimed to expedite Corps studies and compliance with applicable environmental laws, including the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). It raised the project cost trigger for independent peer review of feasibility studies from $45 million to $200 million. Expanding Project Delivery and Financing Opportunities. The conference report, like H.R. 3080 and S. 601, encouraged nonfederal opportunities in delivering water resources projects. It expanded opportunities for crediting for nonfederal work, financial, and study and project management. Like S. 601, the conference report established a pilot program known as the Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (WIFIA) to finance water infrastructure projects. The Corps and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency are responsible for administering the WIFIA pilot program. Investing in Navigation. WRRDA 2014 encouraged increased spending from the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund (HMTF). It modified prioritization of HMTF funding among different types of harbors but retains similar provisions contained in H.R. 3080 and S. 601 reserving certain portions of funds to harbors with less cargo. The conference report, like H.R. 3080 and S. 601, did not enact changes to inland waterway revenues in general but increased the threshold for major rehabilitation efforts on inland waterways, authorized changes to waterway project delivery, and altered the cost-share for one project (Olmsted Locks and Dam). These changes may increase the likelihood of Inland Waterways Trust Fund (IWTF) monies being available for use on other inland waterway construction projects. Reducing Flood Risks. WRRDA 2014 authorized establishment of a levee safety initiative—a scaled-down version of S. 601 provisions—expanding Corps technical assistance and training to promote levee safety, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) assistance in establishing or improving state and tribal levee safety programs, and Corps levee rehabilitation assistance. Like H.R. 3080 and S. 601, WRRDA 2014 required the Corps to develop national levee safety guidelines and review. Restoring and Protecting Aquatic Ecosystems. WRRDA 2014 provided congressional direction on various efforts for regional river and coastal restoration (e.g., Chesapeake Bay, North Atlantic coastal restoration) and authorized the construction of projects which have previously been studied in the Everglades and Coastal Louisiana, among other places. It also added to Corps authorities for the prevention, control, and eradication of invasive species. Addressing Other Issues. WRRDA 2014 included provisions amending the applicability of the scope of the Environmental Protection Agency's oil spill prevention, control, and countermeasure regulations, by exempting certain farms from the requirements. It also included amendments to certain water infrastructure provisions of the Clean Water Act (CWA). These CWA provisions, while representing the first amendments to CWA Title VI since 1987, did not address many of the more long-standing or controversial CWA issues. WRRDA 2014 did not include the ocean-related provisions of H.R. 3080 and S. 601. Instead, it authorized the Corps studies and limited construction of Corps projects to enhance ocean and coastal ecosystem resiliency.
crs_R44971	crs_R44971_0	Introduction Pursuant to the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), Congress charged the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) with reviewing whether proposed mergers comport with federal antitrust laws and preventing anticompetitive mergers. Pre-Merger Review: Application of the Clayton Act and FTC Act While other federal laws, including the Sherman Act, seek to deter anticompetitive harms caused by monopolization and agreements to restrain trade, two federal statutes, the Clayton and the FTC Acts, relate particularly to proposed mergers. Section 7 of the Clayton Act applies to mergers "in any line of commerce" when their effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly" unless the merger is statutorily exempt. Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits unfair methods of competition and includes any activity that violates Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act and the Pre-Merger Review Process The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act (HSR Act) requires businesses exceeding certain sizes to report proposed mergers and other transactions valued above specified thresholds to the DOJ and FTC so that the agencies may examine whether those transactions comply with federal antitrust laws. If the agency determines that the merger would be likely to lessen competition substantially, the agency may either negotiate with the transacting parties to address its concerns or act to block the merger. Conclusion Federal antitrust law prohibits mergers and acquisitions that may substantially lessen competition.	Preserving competition is an overarching purpose of federal laws governing business mergers. Though other federal laws, including the Sherman Act, seek to address anticompetitive behavior relating to monopolization, two federal statutes, in particular, address harms that may result from proposed mergers. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers "in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce" that may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) prohibits unfair methods of competition, which includes any activity that violates Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Pursuant to the Clayton and FTC Acts, Congress authorized the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to determine whether a proposed merger would substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. Title II of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act (HSR Act) requires transacting parties, which exceed certain sizes, to report significant planned mergers and acquisitions to the FTC and DOJ so that the agencies may determine whether the proposed transactions raise anticompetitive concerns. If the FTC or DOJ determines that such concerns exist, the agencies may commence administrative or judicial proceedings to block the proposed transaction. Reviewing courts and administrative law judges consider a variety of factors when determining whether a proposed merged complies with federal antitrust laws. This report examines the primary statutes and processes that govern federal pre-merger review and merger challenges.
crs_R40832	crs_R40832_0	Most Recent Developments USDA Adopts New Approach to Animal Disease Traceability On February 5, 2010, Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack announced that USDA was substantially revising its approach to achieving a national capability for animal disease traceability. The previous plan, called the National Animal Identification System (NAIS), first proposed in 2002, was being abandoned. In its place USDA proposed a new approach—Animal Disease Traceability—that will allow individual states and tribal nations to choose their own degree of within-state animal identification (ID) and traceability for livestock populations. The flexibility is intended to allow each state to respond to its own producer needs and interests. However, under the new Animal Disease Traceability framework, USDA will require that all animals moving in interstate commerce have a form of ID that allows traceability back to its originating state. The Secretary of Agriculture derives the authority to regulate interstate movement of farm-raised livestock from Section 10406 of the Animal Health Protection Act ( P.L. 107-171 , Subtitle E; 7 U.S.C. 8305). The within-state programs are intended to be implemented by the states and tribal nations, not the federal government. As such, any data collection and storage would done by state, not federal, authorities. The program governing animal disease traceability of interstate animal movements and coordination between different state "identification and traceability programs" will be implemented through federal regulations and the federal rulemaking process. USDA has indicated that a proposed rule could be published in April 2011 with a 60- to 90-day comment period. Animal identification (ID) refers to keeping records on individual farm animals or groups (e.g., flocks or herds) of farm animals so that they can be more easily tracked from their birth through the marketing chain. Historically, animal ID was intended to indicate ownership and prevent thievery. Objectives The reasons for identifying and tracking animals and their products have evolved and include rapid response to animal health and/or food safety concerns, as well as verification of recognized premium commercial production processes as specified on qualifying product labels. As such, traceability is limited specifically to movements from the animal's point of birth to its slaughter and processing location. Premises were to be registered at one of the state (or tribal) animal health authorities. USDA stated that much higher levels of participation would be needed to successfully implement NAIS. This practice is most common in the poultry and pork industries. Poultry and sheep registration was estimated at 95%, swine at 80%, goat at 60%, horse at 50%, and cattle at 18%. However, Dr. Clifford suggested that a much higher participation rate, perhaps as high as 90%, would be necessary to ensure the full benefits of the system. However, since 2008 Congress expressed growing frustration with the slow pace of NAIS implementation relative to the funding outlays. ), to implement an animal ID program. 2002 APHIS officials working with the National Institute for Animal Agriculture, the U.S. March 2010 Through August 2010 USDA held a series of public meetings on the Animal Disease Traceability framework to provide opportunities for state and tribal nation animal health officials to discuss and provide feedback. Initiated in 2004 as a voluntary program, the BTS became mandatory for domestically produced beef in 2009.	Animal identification (ID) refers to keeping records on individual farm animals or groups of farm animals so that they can be easily tracked from their birth through the marketing chain. Historically, animal ID was used to indicate ownership and prevent theft, but the reasons for identifying and tracking animals have evolved to include rapid response to animal health and/or food safety concerns. As such, traceability is limited specifically to movements from the animal's point of birth to its slaughter and processing location. On February 5, 2010, Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack announced that USDA was revising its approach to achieving a national capability for animal disease traceability. The previous plan, called the National Animal Identification System (NAIS), first proposed in 2002, was being abandoned. In its place USDA proposed a new approach—Animal Disease Traceability—that will allow individual states and tribal nations to choose their own degree of within-state animal identification and traceability for livestock populations. The within-state programs are intended to be implemented by the states and tribal nations, not the federal government. As such, any data collection and storage would be done by state, not federal, authorities. The flexibility is intended to allow each state or tribal nation to respond to its own producer needs and interests. However, under the proposed revision USDA will require that all animals moving in interstate commerce have a form of ID that allows traceability back to their originating state or tribal nation. The Secretary of Agriculture derives the authority to regulate interstate movement of farm-raised livestock from Section 10406 of the Animal Health Protection Act (P.L. 107-171, Subtitle E; 7 U.S.C. 8305). The larger program governing traceability of interstate animal movements and coordination between different states and tribal nations will be implemented in federal regulations through the federal rulemaking process. Since the February announcement, USDA has held a series of public meetings for animal health officials and producers to provide opportunities for discussion and feedback. USDA expects to issue a proposed rule in April 2011, and a final rule could be released 12 to 15 months later. Since 2004, USDA had spent $150 million trying to get NAIS up and running. Since 2008, key committee leaders in Congress had expressed frustration with the slow pace of NAIS implementation and, as a result, had reduced annual funding appropriations for the program. USDA's decision to revise NAIS was made after a series of 15 listening sessions across the country in 2009, and after receiving thousands of comments concerning NAIS. While the poultry and pork industries have endorsed a mandatory national animal ID program in general, certain portions of the U.S. cattle industry have shown strong resistance to what they perceive as a costly government intrusion in their private affairs. Participation in the initial phase of NAIS, premises registration, reflected this same degree of interest, as very high percentages of eligible premises were registered for most major animal species—poultry (95%), sheep (95%), swine (80%), goats (60%), and horses (50%)—with the exception of cattle (18%). USDA stated that such a low participation rate for cattle rendered NAIS ineffective as a tool for controlling animal disease, and that a much higher participation rate would be necessary to respond effectively to an animal disease outbreak. Under the new proposal, USDA anticipates much higher participation rates. Lawmakers in the 112th Congress will continue to monitor USDA's work on animal ID and traceability, and could propose legislation aimed at shaping its scope, design, and pace of implementation, as well as possible federal financial support of state-level programs.
crs_R44335	crs_R44335_0	For several years, some have expressed concern about the possibility of a "data gap," which could occur if the newest POES satellite, launched in 2011, fails before its successor is launched and operational sometime in 2017. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported that a polar-orbiting weather satellite data gap would result in less accurate and timely weather forecasts and warnings of extreme weather events, which could endanger lives, property, and critical infrastructure. In its FY2016 budget justification, NOAA released a new strategy called Polar Follow On (PFO) that would fund two JPSS satellites that would launch in FY2026 and FY2031, as well as other contingency options to mitigate the consequences of a data gap (in the JPSS program, one satellite is currently in orbit and two satellites are under construction and scheduled to launch in FY2017 and FY2022). NOAA requested $380 million as initial funding for PFO in FY2016. House appropriators did not provide any funding for PFO in the House FY2016 appropriations bill for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies ( H.R. 2578 ), and Senate appropriators provided $135 million for FY2016 in their bill. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. 114-113 ), however, provided $370 million for PFO in FY2016. The Data Gap The Suomi-NPP satellite operates in the afternoon orbit, providing full global coverage twice a day. The likelihood and duration of a data gap are subject to considerable uncertainty. In written testimony delivered to the Subcommittees on Environment and Oversight of the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology on December 10, 2015, the NOAA witness stated that "NOAA's annual lifetime analysis report indicates a high probability (greater than 80 percent) that the expected lifetime of Suomi-NPP will extend beyond JPSS-1 launch and commissioning." If Suomi-NPP operated through JPSS-1 launch and commissioning, then no data gap would occur, assuming JPSS-1 was fully operational. However, we reported that several factors could cause a gap to occur sooner and last longer—potentially up to several years. These terms have specific meanings in the report: "the IRT believes that the definition of a robust program is that two failures must occur before a gap is created and an option must be available to return to a 'two failure' condition if a failure occurs." Conversely, a fragile program is "one spacecraft away from catastrophe." NOAA testified in front of the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology on December 10, 2015, that the PFO plan would achieve a resilient and fault-tolerant position by 2023 (implying robustness) and would secure that position through 2038. Outlook Funding the PFO at $370 million in FY2016 appears to reflect congressional support of the PFO strategy for NOAA's polar-orbiting weather satellite program. However, Congress likely will continue close scrutiny of the program and oversight of cost and scheduling changes, given the history of NPOESS and JPSS since the mid-1990s. In addition to efficient and effective management, the PFO program's success likely will also hinge on Congress appropriating funding to meet program needs without disrupting the cadence of the procurement, construction, launch, and on-orbit checkout schedule. If Congress continues to support and fund PFO and if NOAA implements the program as planned, then the polar-orbiting weather satellite system could achieve robustness by 2023. Given that the rubric of robustness and fragility threads through the PFO proposal and in congressional report language accompanying appropriations legislation, congressional oversight of the many factors determining robustness versus fragility likely will be a priority for many years.	Concerns have been raised in Congress about the possibility of a "data gap" in the polar-orbiting weather satellite coverage. A near-term data gap could occur if the currently operating polar-orbiting weather satellite, the Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership (Suomi-NPP), fails before its successor, the first Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS-1), is launched and operational sometime in 2017. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported that a polar-orbiting weather satellite data gap would result in less accurate and timely weather forecasts and warnings of extreme weather events, which could endanger lives, property, and critical infrastructure. The likelihood and duration of a data gap are subject to considerable uncertainty. In testimony provided to the Subcommittees on Environment and Oversight of the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology on December 10, 2015, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) indicated a high probability (greater than 80%) that the expected lifetime of Suomi-NPP will extend beyond the JPSS-1 launch and commissioning. If Suomi-NPP continues to function until JPSS-1 is fully operational, then no data gap would occur. At the same hearing, the witness for GAO stated that several factors could cause a gap to occur sooner and last longer—potentially up to several years. NOAA released a new strategy called Polar Follow On (PFO) that would fund the third and fourth JPSS satellites and other contingency options to mitigate the consequences of a data gap. The PFO is NOAA's strategy to transition the current JPSS polar-orbiting weather satellite program from its current "fragile" state to a "robust" state. An independent review team (IRT) for NOAA defined a robust program as one in which two failures must occur before a gap is created and in which an option must be available to quickly return to a two-failure condition if a failure occurs. Conversely, the IRT defines a fragile program as one spacecraft away from catastrophe. NOAA argues that the PFO plan would achieve a resilient and fault-tolerant position by 2023 (implying robustness) and would secure that position through 2038. NOAA requested $380 million as initial funding for PFO in FY2016. House appropriators did not provide any funding for PFO in H.R. 2578, the House FY2016 appropriations bill for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, and Senate appropriators provided $135 million for PFO in their bill. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), however, provides $370 million for PFO in FY2016. The decision to fund the PFO at $370 million in FY2016 appears to reflect congressional support of the PFO strategy for NOAA's polar-orbiting weather satellite program. However, Congress likely will continue close scrutiny of the program and oversight of cost and scheduling changes, given the program's delays and cost growth since the mid-1990s. In addition to efficient and effective management, the PFO program's success may also hinge on Congress appropriating continued funding to meet program needs without disrupting the cadence of the procurement, construction, launch, and on-orbit checkout schedule. Congressional oversight of the many factors determining robustness versus fragility likely will be a priority for many years. Without robustness, the threat of a polar-orbiting weather satellite data gap would remain.
crs_RL31954	crs_RL31954_0	1588 , the NationalDefense Authorization Act for FY2004, amended, by a 361 to 68 (Roll No. 194) vote, did not include these Title XI personnel managementprovisions (but included other personnel provisions at Title XI). Implementation of Title XI of P.L. Beginning in late April 2006, theclassification, performance management, compensation, staffing, and workforce shaping provisionsof the new system will be implemented. DOD and OPM jointly published the finalregulations in the Federal Register on November 1, 2005. The new Section 9902(a) of P.L.108-136 provides that notwithstanding any other provision of Part III, the Secretary of Defense may,in regulations prescribed jointly with the OPM Director, establish, and from time to time adjust, ahuman resources management (HRM) system, referred to as the National Security Personnel System(NSPS), for some or all of the organizational or functional units of DOD. Many of the details that will govern theoperation of these areas are currently under discussion by DOD and the labor organizations. Classification. Â§9902(f), that requires the Secretary of Defense and the Director of OPM toprovide a written description of the proposed personnel system or adjustments to such system to thelabor organizations representing employees in the department. Thedecision to bargain at a level above the level of exclusive recognition is not subject to review or todispute resolution procedures outside the department. (33) DOD hasindicated that it will appeal the decision. Subpart I of the regulations defines the department's labor-relations system. The board is authorized to dismiss any petition that, in the board'sview, does not raise substantial questions of fact or law. Subpart H of the final regulations on appeals implements the provisions of Section 9902(h)of Title 5 of the United States Code, which establishes the system for DOD employees to appealcertain adverse actions covered under Subpart G. In applying existing legal standards andprecedents, the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) is bound by the regulation set forth inSection 9901.107(a)(2)of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which provides that theregulations must be interpreted in a way that recognizes the critical national security mission of theDepartment of Defense and that each provision must be construed to promote the swift, flexible,effective day-to-day accomplishment of this mission as defined by the Secretary of Defense. The Director of the Office of Personnel Management, after consulting with the Secretary ofDefense, may seek reconsideration by MSPB of a final Board decision. Congress authorized DOD and OPM to establish an appeals process that provides employeeswith "fair treatment in any appeals that they bring in decisions relating to their employment." OnNovember 7, 2005, following the issuance of final regulations to establish the NSPS, a coalition offederal unions, including the American Federation of Government Employees, filed a lawsuit infederal district court challenging the regulations. On February 27, 2006, the court enjoined the newregulations on the grounds that they failed to ensure collective bargaining rights, did not provide forthe independent third-party review of labor relations decisions, and failed to provide a fair processfor appealing adverse actions. Current law only entitlesReserve component members to the additional military leave. The eight elements are as follows: adherence to merit system principles under 5 U.S.C.Â§2301; a fair, credible, and transparent employee performance appraisalsystem; a link between elements of the pay-for-performance system, the employeeperformance appraisal system, and the agency's strategic plan; a means for ensuring employee involvement in the design and implementationof the system; adequate training and retraining for supervisors, managers, and employees inthe implementation and operation of the pay-for-performance system; a process for ensuring ongoing performance feedback and dialogue betweensupervisors, managers, and employees throughout the appraisal period, and setting timetables forreview; effective safeguards to ensure that the management of the system is fair andequitable and based on employee performance; and a means for ensuring that adequate agency resources are allocated for thedesign, implementation, and administration of the pay-for-performancesystem. According to the law, thefund will reward the highest performing and most valuable employees in an agency and offer federalmanagers a new tool for recognizing employee performance that is critical to an agency achievingits mission.	Title XI of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2004, P.L. 108-136 , includesprovisions on a National Security Personnel System (NSPS) for the Department of Defense (DOD)and provisions on personnel management that are applicable government-wide. The law was enactedon November 24, 2003. Title XI, Subtitle A, of the law authorizes the Secretary of Defense and the Director of theOffice of Personnel Management (OPM) to establish a new human resources management (HRM)system for DOD's civilian employees and to jointly prescribe regulations for the system. TheSecretary and the Director are authorized to establish and adjust a labor relations system and arerequired to provide a written description of the proposed personnel system or any adjustments tosuch system to the labor organizations representing DOD employees. A collaboration proceduremust be followed by the Secretary, Director, and employee representatives. The Secretary isauthorized to engage in any collaboration activities and collective bargaining at an organizationallevel above the level of exclusive recognition. The Secretary also is authorized to establish anappeals process that provides fair treatment for DOD employees covered by the NSPS. Regulationsapplicable to employee misconduct or performance that fails to meet expectations may not beprescribed until after the Secretary consults with the Merit Systems Protections Board (MSPB) andmust afford due process protections and conform to public employment principles of merit andfitness at 5 U.S.C. Â§3201. A qualifying employee subject to some severe disciplinary actions maypetition the MSPB for review of the department's decision. The board could dismiss any petition thatdoes not raise a substantial question of fact or law and order corrective action only if the board findsthat the department's personnel decision did not meet some prescribed standards. An employeeadversely affected by a final decision or order of the board could obtain judicial review. Subtitle Cof Title XI includes amendments to the government-wide policies for the federal employee overtimepay cap, military leave, and Senior Executive Service pay, and creates a Human Capital PerformanceFund to reward the highest-performing and most valuable employees in an agency. DOD and OPM jointly published final regulations for the NSPS in the Federal Register onNovember 1, 2005. The regulations state that "issuances" to implement the regulations will beprepared by DOD. Draft versions of the "issuances" are currently under discussion by thedepartment and labor organizations. A coalition of federal unions, including the AmericanFederation of Government Employees, filed a lawsuit in federal district court challenging the finalregulations. On February 27, 2006, the court enjoined the regulations because they failed to ensurecollective bargaining rights, did not provide for independent third-party review of labor relationsdecisions, and failed to provide a fair process for appealing adverse actions. DOD said that it willappeal the decision. In early March 2006, DOD stated that the phased implementation of the newsystem and its classification, performance management, compensation, staffing, and workforceshaping components would begin in April 2006, with some 11,000 employees. This report will beupdated to reflect changes in the status of implementation.
crs_RS20775	crs_RS20775_0	Congressional Use of the War Powers Resolution to Compel Withdrawal of U.S. Military Forces Deployed Overseas Since its enactment in 1973, there is no specific instance when the Congress has successfully utilized the War Powers Resolution to compel the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from foreign deployments against the President's will.	This report provides background information on major instances, since 1970, when Congress has utilized funding cutoffs to compel the withdrawal of United States military forces from overseas military deployments. It also highlights key efforts by Congress to utilize the War Powers Resolution to force the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from foreign deployments. It will be updated should developments warrant.
crs_RS22510	crs_RS22510_0	There are also courts of appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and the Federal Circuit, but those courts do not have the same connection to state geography as the regional circuit courts of appeals. A 1997 law requires that every state within a circuit be represented among appeals court judges by a resident of that state. In addition, except for the D.C. and Federal Circuits, appeals nominees must "reside" within the circuit at the time of appointment and "thereafter while in active service." Otherwise, the President is not required by statute to nominate appeals judges from particular states. On April 2, 2009, President Obama nominated Judge Andre M. Davis of the District Court of Maryland to fill this seat. In the 111 th Congress, the confirmation of Albert Diaz to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit resulted in a change in state representation, moving a seat from South Carolina to North Carolina. In the present Congress, no nomination pending, if confirmed, would result in changes to state representation in a circuit. This report limits the inquiry to 1891-2009. Changes in State Representation The data indicate that a seat is usually filled by a judge nominated from the same state as the predecessor in that seat. One explanation for the latter two patterns might be a practice of rotating seats among smaller states, particularly before a federal statute required that each state be represented on its circuit court and before Congress created enough judgeships within each circuit to allow each state to be represented at the same time. The cells in the table list the number of changes in state representation each President made in each circuit (e.g., "1 of 2," meaning one change in state representation out of two total appointments to that circuit). Of the 455 opportunities for changes in state representation since 1891, 104 confirmed nominations (23%) resulted in such changes. Specifically, 40% of appointments through the Kennedy Administration marked changes in state representation, as compared with 13% from the Lyndon Johnson Administration to the present. On that circuit, only four of 54 appointments to the court (7%) have resulted in changes in state representation.	When a seat becomes vacant on a federal court of appeals (the "circuit courts"), the President has the opportunity to nominate a new judge for the Senate's consideration. Geography is often a factor in the decision, particularly whether the new judge will be nominated from the same state as the predecessor. One scholar refers to the custom of maintaining state continuity in seats within a court (e.g., a "Missouri seat" or an "Ohio seat") as "state representation." Federal statutes currently require that judges "reside" in the circuit at the time of appointment and while in active service, and that each state within the circuit be represented among the court's judges, but do not require that particular seats be reserved for nominees from particular states. As of this writing, President Obama has nominated 23 individuals to circuit court judgeships (excluding nominations made to the Federal Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia) during the 111th and 112th Congresses. Of the 16 confirmed, only one — that of Albert Diaz to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit — has resulted in a change in state representation. Of the seven whose nominations have not yet received final action, none would result in changes in state representation. This report provides an overview and analysis of changes in state representation of circuit court judges confirmed since 1891, when Congress created the modern regional appeals courts. The data reveal that some seats are consistently filled by judges from the same state. Other seats are filled by judges from various states in that circuit. Overall, changes in state representation have occurred in 23% of confirmed nominations since 1891. Changes in state representation were more common prior to the 1960s than in recent decades. Over 40% of appointments made during the Kennedy Administration or earlier have resulted in changes to state representation in a circuit; 13% of circuit court appointments after the Kennedy Administration have made such a change. The frequency of those changes has also varied by circuit. This report will be updated periodically to reflect changes in state representation or other notable developments.
crs_RS21135	crs_RS21135_0	Enron Corp., the first nationwide natural gas pipeline network, shifted its business focus during the 1990s from the regulated transportation of natural gas totrading in unregulated energy markets. Until late 2001, nearly all observers -- including Wall Street professionals-- regarded this transformation as anoutstanding success. Rather than disclose its true condition to public investors, as the law requires, Enronfalsified its accounts. In other words, the firm'spublic accounting statements pretended thatlosses were occurring not to Enron, but to the so-called Raptor entities, which were ostensibly independent firmsthat had agreed to absorb Enron's losses, butwere in fact accounting contrivances created and entirely controlled by Enron's management. In response to the auditing and accounting problems at Enron and other major corporations scandals, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ( P.L.107-204 ), containing perhaps the most far-reaching amendments to the securities laws since the 1930s. Very briefly,the law does the following: creates a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to regulate independent auditors of publicly traded companies -- a private sectorentity operating under the oversight of the SEC; raises standards of auditor independence by prohibiting auditors from providing certain consulting services to their audit clients andrequiring preapproval by the client's board of directors for other nonaudit services; requires top corporate management and audit committees to assume more direct responsibility for the accuracy of financialstatements; enhances disclosure requirements for certain transactions, such as stock sales by corporate insiders, transactions with unconsolidatedsubsidiaries, and other significant events that may require "real-time" disclosure; directs the SEC to adopt rules to prevent conflicts of interest that affect the objectivity of stock analysts; authorizes $776 million for the SEC in FY2003 (versus $469 million in the Administration's budget request) and requires the SEC toreview corporate financial reports more frequently; and establishes and/or increases criminal penalties for a variety of offenses related to securities fraud, including misleading an auditor, mailand wire fraud, and destruction of records. As of December 31, 2000, 62% of the assets held in the corporation's 401(k) retirement planconsisted of Enron stock. Similar legislation has not advanced in the 108th Congress. See also CRS Report RL31507 , Employer Stock in Retirement Plans: Investment Risk and Retirement Security , by [author name scrubbed] ([phone number scrubbed]); and CRS Report RL31551 , Employer Stock in Pension Plans: Economic and Tax Issues, by Jane Gravelle. See also CRS Report RL31348(pdf) , Enron and Stock Analyst Objectivity , by [author name scrubbed]. 106-554 ) , by [author name scrubbed].	The sudden and unexpected collapse of Enron Corp. was the first in a series of majorcorporate accounting scandalsthat has shaken confidence in corporate governance and the stock market. Only months before Enron's bankruptcyfiling in December 2001, the firm waswidely regarded as one of the most innovative, fastest growing, and best managed businesses in the United States. With the swift collapse, shareholders,including thousands of Enron workers who held company stock in their 401(k) retirement accounts, lost tens ofbillions of dollars. It now appears that Enronwas in terrible financial shape as early as 2000, burdened with debt and money-losing businesses, but manipulatedits accounting statements to hide theseproblems. Why didn't the watchdogs bark? This report briefly examines the accounting system that failed to providea clear picture of the firm's true condition,the independent auditors and board members who were unwilling to challenge Enron's management, the Wall Streetstock analysts who failed to warn investorsof trouble ahead, the rules governing employer stock in company pension plans, and the unregulated energyderivatives trading that was the core of Enron'sbusiness. This report also summarizes the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (P.L. 107-204), the major response by the107th Congress to Enron's fall, and related legislativeand regulatory actions during the 108th Congress. It will be updated as events warrant. Other contributors to this report include [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed].
crs_R45321	crs_R45321_0	Introduction The Trump Administration requested $76.2 billion for the Department of Transportation (DOT) for FY2019, 8.6% ($10 billion) less than DOT received in FY2018. On May 23, 2018, the House Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. 6072 , the FY2019 Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) appropriations bill. The committee recommended $87.8 billion for DOT, a 1.8% ($1.6 billion) increase over the comparable FY2018 amount and 15% ($11.6 billion) above the Administration request. On August 1, 2018, the Senate passed H.R. 6147 ; Division D of that bill is the FY2019 THUD appropriations bill. It would provide a total of $86.6 billion in new budget authority for DOT for FY2019, less than 1% ($427 million) above the comparable FY2018 amount and 14% ($10.4 billion) above the Administration request. With inflation forecast at 2.0% for FY2019, the House committee bill would result in roughly level inflation-adjusted funding for DOT compared to FY2018, while the Senate bill would likely result in a slight reduction in inflation-adjusted funding for DOT compared to its FY2018 level. Table 1 shows the breakdown between the discretionary and mandatory funding in DOT's budgets in recent years. The highway, transit, and rail programs are currently authorized through FY2020, but the authorization for the federal aviation programs is scheduled to expire on September 30, 2018. Selected Issues Highway Trust Fund Solvency Virtually all federal highway funding and most federal transit funding come from the Highway Trust Fund, the revenues of which come largely from the federal motor fuels excise tax ("gas tax"). One reason for the shortfall in the fund is that the federal gas tax has not been raised since 1993. Congress has continued to support the BUILD/TIGER program through annual DOT appropriations. The House committee bill recommended a $175 million discretionary appropriation, $20 million more than the FY2018 level. This act also authorized three new programs to make grants to states, public agencies, and rail carriers for intercity passenger rail development: Consolidated Rail Infrastructure and Safety Improvement Grants Federal-State Partnership for State of Good Repair Grants Restoration and Enhancement Grants The Administration's FY2019 budget requested a total of $738 million for intercity passenger rail funding, all of it for grants to Amtrak; no funding was requested for the three grant programs. Similarly, both the House-reported bill and the Senate-passed bill for FY2019 would provide more than twice the amount requested by FTA for the CIG program, and the committee reports for these bills direct FTA to continue to advance eligible projects through the program. The Senate-passed bill does not have such a provision. The Administration requested $120 million for this grant to WMATA for FY2019; the House Appropriations Committee recommended $150 million, and the Senate-passed bill would provide $150 million.	The Trump Administration proposed a $76.2 billion budget for the Department of Transportation (DOT) for FY2019: $16 billion in discretionary funding and $60 billion in mandatory funding. That is approximately $11 billion less than was provided for FY2018. The budget request reflected the Administration's call for significant cuts in funding for transit and rail programs. The DOT appropriations bill funds federal programs covering aviation, highways and highway safety, public transit, intercity rail, maritime safety, pipelines, and related activities. Federal highway, transit, and rail programs were reauthorized in fall 2015, and their future funding authorizations were somewhat increased. There is general agreement that more funding is needed for transportation infrastructure, but Congress has not been able to agree on a source that could provide the additional funding. The federal excise tax on motor fuel, which is the primary funding source for federal highway and transit programs, has not been increased in over 20 years, and does not raise enough revenue to support even the current level of spending. To address this shortfall, Congress periodically transfers money from the general fund to the Highway Trust Fund to provide sufficient funding for the programs. The annual appropriations for DOT are combined with those for the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in the Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) appropriations bill. The House Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 3353, the THUD FY2019 appropriations bill, in which Division A provides FY2019 appropriations for DOT. The committee recommended $87.8 billion in new budget authority for DOT, approximately 1.8% ($1.6 billion) more than the comparable figure in FY2018. The Senate passed H.R. 6147, a bill containing appropriations for several federal agencies; Division D is an FY2019 THUD appropriations bill, in which Division A is DOT appropriations. The Senate bill would provide $86.6 billion in new budget authority, less than 1% ($427 million) more than the comparable FY2018 amount. Notable differences between the House-reported and Senate-passed bills include funding for the federal-aid highway program (the House committee bill would provide $900 million more than the Senate) and for intercity passenger rail (the House committee would provide $950 million for grants, including $150 million for the maglev program, compared to the Senate's $565 million, with no funding for maglev). With inflation forecast at 2.0% for FY2019, the House committee bill would result in roughly level inflation-adjusted funding for DOT compared to FY2018, while the Senate bill would likely result in a slight decrease in inflation-adjusted funding.
crs_RS21302	crs_RS21302_0	While federally funded training programs existed (and continue to exist) through USFA's National Fire Academy, and while federal money has been available to first responders for counterterrorism training and equipment through the Department of Justice, there did not exist a dedicated program, exclusively for firefighters, which provided federal money directly to local fire departments to help address a wide variety of equipment, training, and other firefighter-related needs. Title XVII of P.L. In the 108 th Congress, Congress enacted the Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response Firefighters (SAFER) Act as Section 1057 of the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. No funding was proposed for SAFER grants. FY2009 The Administration proposed $300 million for fire grants in FY2009, a 46% cut from the FY2008 level of $560 million. The bill would provide $750 million for firefighter assistance, including $560 million for fire grants and $190 million for SAFER grants. The Committee would provide $800 million for firefighter assistance, consisting of $570 million for fire grants and $230 million for SAFER grants. However, the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program Reauthorization Act of 2004 ( P.L.	The Assistance to Firefighters Grant (AFG) Program, also known as the FIRE Act grant program, was established by Title XVII of the FY2001 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 106-398). The program provides federal grants directly to local fire departments and unaffiliated Emergency Medical Services (EMS) organizations to help address a variety of equipment, training, and other firefighter-related and EMS needs. A related program is the Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response Firefighters (SAFER) program, which provides grants for hiring, recruiting, and retaining firefighters. The Administration proposed $300 million for fire grants in FY2009, a 46% cut from the FY2008 level of $560 million. No funding was proposed for SAFER grants. The Senate Appropriations Committee approved $750 million for firefighter assistance in FY2009 ($560 million for fire grants and $190 million for SAFER grants), while the House Appropriations Committee approved $800 million for firefighter assistance ($570 million for fire grants and $230 million for SAFER grants). This report will be updated as events warrant.
crs_RL33565	crs_RL33565_0	Two western water resource bills became law on October 10: H.R. At issue for entities not party to the settlement is how reintroduction of federally threatened or endangered species (salmon) would affect existing irrigation and power project operations, as well as how increases in water flow would affect land use and flood flows. Background and Analysis For more than a century, the federal government has been involved in developing water projects for a variety of purposes, including flood control, navigation, power generation, and irrigation. Most of the nation's public municipal water systems have been built by local communities under prevailing state water laws. Water supply for traditional off-stream uses—including municipal, industrial, and agricultural uses—was increasingly in direct competition with a growing interest in allocating water to maintain or enhance in-stream uses, such as recreation, scenic enjoyment, and fish and wildlife habitat. Legislative and Oversight Issues The 109 th Congress is considering several water resource issues in legislation ranging from re-authorizing the Bureau of Reclamation's water recycling program, to individual project authorizations and agency policy changes (e.g., re-operation of water project facilities in the Central Valley of California and in the Colorado and Columbia River Basins). Oversight of ongoing agency activities, such as water management in the Klamath and San Joaquin River Basins, Salton Sea restoration, allocation of Colorado River water supplies (particularly within California), and CALFED (a program to carry out activities affecting the delta confluence of the San Joaquin and Sacramento Rivers at the San Francisco Bay), may also be discussed. For example, H.R. Some laws authorize the transfers (e.g., P.L. Authorized recipients of program assistance include "legally organized non-federal entities" (e.g., irrigation districts, water districts, and municipalities). 109th Congress Legislation Title 16 Projects20 P.L. 5768 (Napolitano) and S. 3639 (Murkowski). Senate Energy and Natural Resources Subcommittee on Water and Power held hearing July 27, 2006. S. 895 (Domenici). To direct the Secretary of the Interior to establish a rural water supply program in the Reclamation States to provide a clean, safe, affordable, and reliable water supply to rural residents. The following water supply and conservation bills have also been introduced: H.R. 5136 (Hall).	For more than a century, the federal government has constructed water resource projects for a variety of purposes, including flood control, navigation, power generation, and irrigation. While most municipal and industrial water supplies have been built by non-federal entities, most of the large, federal water projects in the West, including Hoover and Grand Coulee dams, were constructed by the Bureau of Reclamation (Department of the Interior) to provide water for irrigation. Growing populations and changing values have increased demands on water supplies and river systems, resulting in water use and management conflicts throughout the country, particularly in the West, where population is expanding rapidly. In many western states, agricultural needs are often in direct conflict with urban needs, as well as with water demand for threatened and endangered species habitat, recreation, and scenic enjoyment. Debate over western water resources revolves around the issue of how best to plan for and manage the use of this renewable, yet sometimes scarce and increasingly sought after, resource. Some observers advocate enhancing water supplies, for example, by building new storage or diversion projects, expanding old ones, or funding water reclamation and reuse facilities. Others emphasize the need to manage existing supplies more efficiently—through conservation, revision of policies that encourage inefficient use of water, and establishment of market mechanisms to allocate water. The 109th Congress is considering a number of bills on western water issues, including title transfer, water recycling (e.g., S. 3639 and H.R. 5768), rural water supply (e.g., S. 895), and drought legislation (e.g., H.R. 5136 and S. 2751). Oversight of CALFED—a joint federal and state program to restore fish and wildlife habitat and address California water supply/quality issues—and Klamath River Basin and San Joaquin River Basin issues are also under consideration. The 109th Congress may also consider Indian water rights settlement legislation; however, Indian settlement bills are not tracked in this report.
crs_R44208	crs_R44208_0	114-113 ( H.R. The act i ncluded all 12 regular appropriations acts . The total EPA appropriation for FY201 6 was the same as enacted for FY2015 but $451.8 million (5.3%) below the President's FY2016 request of $8.59 billion . 2822 for the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies on June 18, 2015, and proposed $7.42 billion for EPA for FY2016. The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 1645 on June 23, 2015, and proposed a total of $7.60 billion for EPA. 114-74 ; H.R. The allocation of funding for EPA and most other departments and agencies within the increased spending limits was left to the appropriations process. Continuing Resolution Enacted September 30, 2015, P.L. 114-53 ( H.R. No exceptions to the across-the-board rescission were specified for EPA in the CR. Bipartisan Budget Act of 201512 Consideration of the enacted FY2016 appropriations for EPA and other federal departments and agencies were subject to the higher limits on discretionary spending enacted November 2, 2015, in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 ( P.L. 1314 ). Table 2 presents the FY2016 enacted appropriations for EPA under Title II of Division G of P.L. As indicated in Table 2 , the FY2016 enacted appropriations provided the same level of funding as the FY2015 enacted level for all nine of the EPA appropriations accounts but was below the FY2016 requested levels for all nine accounts. The President's FY2016 requested funding for each of the nine EPA appropriations accounts would have been an increase compared to FY2015 enacted levels. The House and Senate committee-reported bills recommended decreases compared to the FY2016 request for all nine EPA appropriations accounts. Funding and Policy-Related Issues During the debate and consideration of EPA's FY2016 appropriations, much attention was focused on the agency's implementation of air quality and climate change regulations and research activities, prioritization and adequacy of funding for wastewater and drinking water infrastructure projects, categorical grants to assist states in implementing federal pollution control laws, and federal financial assistance for environmental cleanup of Superfund and brownfield sites. Funding for geographic-specific water quality initiatives (e.g., the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative and efforts to restore the Chesapeake Bay) also drew some attention. In addition to funding priorities among the various EPA programs and activities, several recent and pending EPA regulatory actions—including several that were central to debates during previous EPA appropriations—were again prominent in the debate regarding the FY2016 appropriations. Actions under the CWA, most notably the EPA and Army Corps of Engineers joint rule to define the scope of waters protected under the CWA and the Safe Drinking Water Act—including the use of U.S. iron and steel for drinking water infrastructure projects; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), including coal ash regulations; the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA); the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) Superfund financial responsibility; and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), including regulation of lead in ammunition and fishing tackle—also received attention. The general provisions in Title IV of Division G of P.L. 114-113 included provisions restricting the use of funds for certain EPA actions similar to those contained in previous recent appropriations but incorporated only a subset of those included in H.R. Section 425 (Notification Requirements) requires the EPA Administrator to work with states having publicly owned treatment works that discharge to the Great Lakes to create public notice requirements for a combined sewer overflow discharge to the Great Lakes. Section 418 addresses reporting requirements for GHG emissions associated with manure management systems. The FY2016 enacted appropriation for these grants in P.L. As noted earlier in this report (see "EPA Regulations: Prohibitions/Restrictions on Use of FY2016 Appropriations"), in the general provisions in Title IV of Division G of P.L. 1268(c)) to establish the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative to carry out certain protection and restoration programs and projects and authorizes $300.0 million for FY2016. P.L. 114-113 generally funds these program activities for FY2016 at or near the FY2015 enacted levels and similar to H.R. 2822 and S. 1645 as reported, the President's FY2016 request, and FY2015 enacted levels. The total FY2016 enacted appropriations of $153.3 million for the EPA brownfields program is the same amount as the total FY2015 enacted level, $35.8 million (18.9%) less than the President's FY2016 request of $189.1 million, $2.0 million (1.3%) less than the $155.3 million included in the Senate committee-reported bill, but $6.9 million (4.7%) more than the $146.4 million proposed in the House committee-reported bill. Appendix C. Congressional Hearings Hearings Regarding EPA's FY2016 Budget Request: House Committee on Energy and Commerce: Subcommittees on Energy and Power and Environment and the Economy The Fiscal Year 2016 EPA Budget , February 25, 2015. http://energycommerce.house.gov/hearing/fiscal-year-2016-epa-budget House Committee on Appropriations: Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Budget Hearing — Environment Protection Agenc y , February 26, 2015. http://appropriations.house.gov/calendararchive/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=393995 Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works Oversight h earing: Examining the President's budget request for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency , March 4, 2015. http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/hearings?ID=01067C9A-0F60-8C2F-302C-D4CE887F604E House Committee on Appropriations: Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Public and Outside Witness Hearing—Interior, Environment and related Agencies , March 18, 2015. http://appropriations.house.gov/calendararchive/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=393958 House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment The President's Fiscal Year 2016 Budget: Administration Priorities for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency , March 18, 2015. http://transportation.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=398705 Senate Committee on Appropriations: Interior Environment and Related Agencies Subcommittee Interior Subcommittee Hearing: FY16 Environmental Protection Agency Budget: Hearing to review the Fiscal Year 2016 funding request and budget justification for the Environmental Protection Agency , April 29, 2015. http://www.appropriations.senate.gov/hearings/interior-subcommittee-hearing-fy16-environmental-protection-agency-budget Appendix D. Funding Prohibitions Proposed in H.R. 2822 and S. 1645 as Reported but Not Retained in P.L. 114-113 ).	Enacted on December 18, 2015, Title II of Division G of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113; H.R. 2029) provided $8.14 billion for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for FY2016. The act appropriated funding for the full fiscal year through September 30, 2016, for the 12 regular appropriations acts, including "Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies," under which EPA is funded. The total FY2016 enacted appropriations of $8.14 billion for EPA was the same as enacted for FY2015 but $451.8 million (5.3%) below the President's FY2016 request of $8.59 billion. No regular appropriations acts for FY2016—including the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies—were enacted prior to the start of the fiscal year. Instead, EPA and other federal departments and agencies operated under a continuing resolution (P.L. 114-53; H.R. 719) prior to the enactment of P.L. 114-113. Total discretionary appropriations enacted for FY2016 for all federal departments and agencies were based on increased limits on discretionary spending enacted November 2, 2015, in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-74; H.R. 1314). Prior to the increased spending limits per the Bipartisan Budget Act, the House Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. 2822 on June 18, 2015, for the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies proposing $7.42 billion for EPA for FY2016. The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 1645 on June 23, 2015, proposing $7.60 billion for EPA. With the exception of the State and Tribal Assistance Grants (STAG) account, which represents almost 44% of the FY2016 total appropriations for EPA, the FY2016 appropriations were the same as the FY2015 enacted level for eight of the nine EPA appropriations accounts but were below the FY2016 requested levels for all nine accounts. The House and Senate committee-reported bills (H.R. 2822 and S. 1645) proposed decreases for all of the EPA appropriations accounts for FY2016 compared to the President's request and were generally less than or equal to FY2015 enacted appropriations for the nine accounts. There were both increases and decreases enacted for FY2016 across the individual program activities funded within the nine EPA appropriations accounts when compared to the FY2016 requested and FY2015 enacted appropriations. Congressional debate and hearings on EPA's FY2016 appropriations focused significantly on federal financial assistance to states for wastewater and drinking water infrastructure projects, various categorical grants to states to support general implementation and enforcement of federal environmental programs as delegated to the states, funding for the agency's implementation and research support for air pollution control regulations, EPA actions to address climate change and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and funding for environmental remediation. Funding levels for several geographic-specific initiatives, including the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative and efforts to restore the Chesapeake Bay, also garnered congressional interest. Additionally, similar to the debate regarding recent fiscal years appropriations for EPA, several recent and pending EPA regulatory actions received considerable attention during the consideration of EPA's FY2016 appropriations—most notably those that address GHG emissions and the definition of "waters of the United States." The general provisions in Title IV of Division G of P.L. 114-113 included provisions restricting the use of funds for certain EPA actions. Those provisions were similar to those contained in previous appropriations but represent only a subset of those included in the House and Senate committee-reported bills. Provisions included in P.L. 114-113 addressed EPA air quality regulation of livestock operations and reporting requirements for manure systems, use of U.S. iron and steel for drinking water infrastructure projects, and possible EPA regulation of lead in ammunition and fishing tackle. (EPA has not proposed such lead regulations.) Title IV of P.L. 114-113 also includes two provisions concerning the Great Lakes—one regarding public notice requirements for a combined sewer overflow discharge to the Great Lakes and another to amend the Clean Water Act to establish and authorize $300.0 million for the Great Lakes Restoration Initiative to carry out certain specified protection and restoration programs and projects. This CRS report provides an overview of FY2016 enacted appropriations for EPA accounts and certain program activities specified in P.L. 114-113 compared to H.R. 2822 and S. 1645 as reported, the President's FY2016 request, and FY2015 enacted appropriations. The report also highlights issues associated with a subset of accounts and programs that were prominent in the debate on EPA's FY2016 appropriations during the 114th Congress.
crs_RL33662	crs_RL33662_0	§ 2441) The War Crimes Act imposes criminal penalties against persons who commit certain offenses under the law of war, when those offenses are either committed by or against a U.S. national or member of the U.S. Armed Forces. However, Congress amended the War Crimes Act the following year to cover additional war crimes that had been suggested by the State and Defense Departments, including violations under Article 3 of any of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Common Article 3). Common Article 3 is applicable to armed conflicts "not of an international character" (e.g., civil wars, rebellions, and other conflicts between State and non-State actors) and covers persons taking no active part in hostilities, including those who have laid down their arms or been incapacitated by capture or injury. Implications of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld There has been controversy concerning whether activities by military and intelligence personnel relating to captured Al Qaeda suspects might give rise to prosecution under the War Crimes Act, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in the 2006 case of Hamdan v . Rumsfeld . The Administration further claimed that the conflict with Al Qaeda is international in scope, and Common Article 3 accordingly was inapplicable to the conflict because it only covers armed conflicts "not of an international nature." They argued that the scope of the War Crimes Act was ambiguous, particularly as it related to offenses concerning violations of Common Article 3. As a result, some have raised questions as to whether U.S. personnel might be criminally liable under the War Crimes Act for the pre- Hamdan treatment of some Al Qaeda detainees. Although not immune from prosecution, U.S. personnel who could be charged with violating the War Crimes Act would have several possible defenses to criminal liability, so long as their activities were conducted with the authorization of the Administration and under the reasonable (though mistaken) belief that their actions were lawful. Section 1004(a) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA, P.L. As discussed later, the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA, P.L. 109-366 ), which was enacted into law on October 17, 2006. § 2340); cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, as defined under the McCain Amendment and the MCA; any activities subject to criminal penalties under the War Crimes Act (e.g., murder, rape, mutilation); other acts of violence serious enough to be considered comparable to the kind expressly prohibited under the War Crimes Act; willful and outrageous acts of personal abuse done for the purpose of humiliating or degrading the individual in a manner so serious that any reasonable person, considering the circumstances, would deem the acts to be beyond the bounds of human decency, such as sexual or sexually indecent acts undertaken for the purpose of humiliation, forcing the individual to perform sexual acts or to pose sexually, threatening the individual with sexual mutilation, or using the individual as a human shield; or acts intended to denigrate the religion, religious practices, or religious objects of the individual. Recent Legislative Activity In the 110 th Congress, legislative proposals were introduced to modify the scope of the War Crimes Act.	The War Crimes Act of 1996, as amended, makes it a criminal offense to commit certain violations of the law of war when such offenses are committed by or against U.S. nationals or Armed Service members. Among other things, the act prohibits certain violations of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which sets out minimum standards for the treatment of detainees in armed conflicts "not of an international character" (e.g., civil wars, rebellions, and other conflicts between State and non-State actors). Common Article 3 prohibits protected persons from being subjected to violence, outrages upon personal dignity, torture, and cruel, humiliating, or degrading treatment. In the 2006 case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court rejected the Bush Administration's long-standing position that Common Article 3 was inapplicable to the present armed conflict with Al Qaeda. As a result, questions have arisen regarding the scope of the War Crimes Act as it relates to violations of Common Article 3 and the possibility that U.S. military and intelligence personnel may be prosecuted for the pre-Hamdan treatment of Al Qaeda detainees. As amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA, P.L. 109-366), the War Crimes Act now criminalizes only specified Common Article 3 violations labeled as "grave breaches." Previously, any violation of Common Article 3 constituted a criminal offense. Both the MCA and the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA, P.L. 109-148, Title X) also afford U.S. personnel who engaged in the authorized interrogation of suspected terrorists with a statutory defense in any subsequent prosecution under the War Crimes Act or other criminal laws. These statutory protections, along with a number of other available defenses, appear to make it unlikely that U.S. personnel could be convicted under the War Crimes Act for any authorized conduct which was undertaken with the reasonable (though mistaken) belief that such conduct was legal. In the 110th Congress, legislative proposals were introduced to modify the scope of the War Crimes Act, and it is possible that new legislative proposals will be introduced in the 111th Congress. This report discusses current issues related to the War Crimes Act and Common Article 3.
crs_R43563	crs_R43563_0	More often than not, Senate leaders—as agents of their party responsible for defending the political, policy, and procedural interests of their colleagues—honor a hold request because not doing so could trigger a range of parliamentary responses from the holding Senator(s), such as a filibuster, that could expend significant amounts of scarce floor time. Types of Holds Holds can be used to accomplish a variety of purposes. Until recently, many holds were considered a nonymous (or secret ) because the source and contents of the request were not made available to the public, or even to other Senators. Recent Efforts to Regulate Holds Written hold requests emerged as an informal practice in the late 1950s under the majority leadership of Lyndon B. Johnson as a way for Senators to make routine requests of their leaders regarding the Senate's schedule. The Senate has considered a variety of proposals targeting the Senate hold in recent years, two of which the chamber adopted. Prior to these rules changes, hold letters were written with the expectation that they would be treated as private correspondences between a Senator and his or her party leader. 110-81 The first proposal, enacted in 2007 as Section 512 of the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act ( P.L. 110-81 ), established new reporting requirements that were designed to take effect if either the majority or minority leader or their designees, acting on behalf of a party colleague on the basis of a hold letter previously received, objected to a unanimous consent request to advance a measure or matter to the Senate floor for consideration or passage. If objection was raised on the basis of a hold letter, then the Senator who originated the hold was expected to submit a "notice of intent to object" to his or her party leader and, within six days of session thereafter, deliver the objection notice to the Legislative Clerk for publication in both the Congressional Record and the Senate's Calendar of Business (or, if the hold pertained to a nomination, the Executive Calendar ). To accommodate the publication of these notices, a new "Notice of Intent to Object to Proceeding" section was added to both Senate calendars as shown in Appendix B . Many holds lodged during the 110 th and 111 th Congresses (2007-2010) are likely to have fallen outside the purview of Section 512 regulation. 28 ) that extends notification requirements to a larger share of hold activity. Instead of a six day reporting window, S.Res. 28 provides two days of session during which Senators are expected to deliver their objection notices for publication. The action that triggers the reporting requirement also changed: from an objection on the basis of a colleague's hold request (under Section 512) to the initial transmission of a written objection notice to the party leader (under S.Res. 28 ). In the event that a Senator neglects to deliver an objection notice for publication within two session days and a party leader nevertheless raises objection on the basis of that hold, S.Res. 28 requires that the name of the objecting party leader be identified as the source of the hold in the "Notice of Intent to Object" section of the appropriate Senate calendar. Challenges Inherent in Regulating Hold Activity Senate holds are predicated on the unanimous consent nature of Senate decision-making. The influence they exert in chamber deliberations is based primarily upon the significant parliamentary prerogatives individual Senators are afforded in the rules, procedures, and precedents of the chamber. As such, efforts to regulate holds are inextricably linked with the chamber's use of unanimous consent agreements to structure the process of calling up measures and matters for floor debate and amendment.	The Senate "hold" is an informal practice whereby Senators communicate to Senate leaders, often in the form of a letter, their policy views and scheduling preferences regarding measures and matters available for floor consideration. Unique to the upper chamber, holds can be understood as information-sharing devices predicated on the unanimous consent nature of Senate decision-making. Senators place holds to accomplish a variety of purposes—to receive notification of upcoming legislative proceedings, for instance, or to express objections to a particular proposal or executive nomination—but ultimately the decision to honor a hold request, and for how long, rests with the majority leader. Scheduling Senate business is the fundamental prerogative of the majority leader, and this responsibility is typically carried out in consultation with the minority leader. The influence that holds exert in chamber deliberations is based primarily upon the significant parliamentary prerogatives individual Senators are afforded in the rules, procedures, and precedents of the chamber. More often than not, Senate leaders honor a hold request because not doing so could trigger a range of parliamentary responses from the holding Senator(s), such as a filibuster, that could expend significant amounts of scarce floor time. As such, efforts to regulate holds are inextricably linked with the chamber's use of unanimous consent agreements to structure the process of calling up measures and matters for floor debate and amendment. In recent years the Senate has considered a variety of proposals that address the Senate hold, two of which the chamber adopted. Both sought to eliminate the secrecy of holds. Prior to these rules changes, hold letters were written with the expectation that their source and contents would remain private, even to other Senators. In 2007, the Senate adopted new procedures to make hold requests public in certain circumstances. Under Section 512 of the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (P.L. 110-81), if objection was raised to a unanimous consent request to proceed to or pass a measure or matter on behalf of another Senator, then the Senator who originated the hold was expected to deliver for publication in the Congressional Record, within six session days of the objection, a "notice of intent to object" identifying the Senator as the source of the hold and the measure or matter to which it pertained. A process for removing a hold was also created, and a new "Notice of Intent to Object" section was added to both Senate calendars to take account of objection notices that remained outstanding. An examination of objection notices published since 2007 suggests that many hold requests are likely to have fallen outside the scope of Section 512 regulation. In an effort to make public a greater share of hold requests, the Senate adjusted its notification requirements by way of a standing order (S.Res. 28) adopted at the outset of the 112th Congress (2011-2012). Instead of the six session day reporting window specified in Section 512, S.Res. 28 provides two days of session during which Senators are expected to deliver their objection notices for publication. The action that triggers the reporting requirement also shifted: from an objection on the basis of a colleague's hold request (under Section 512) to the initial transmission of a written objection notice to the party leader (under S.Res. 28). In the event that a Senator neglects to deliver an objection notice for publication and a party leader nevertheless raises objection on the basis of that hold, S.Res. 28 requires that the name of the objecting party leader be identified as the source of the hold in the "Notice of Intent to Object" section of the appropriate Senate calendar.
crs_R42053	crs_R42053_0	Introduction This report reviews estimates of fiscal impacts to the federal, state, and local governments of the foreign born who reside in the United States. The report examines the academic and policy literature on fiscal impacts of two populations: the entire foreign-born population and the unauthorized alien population. These frameworks typically describe elements necessary to produce accurate and comprehensive impact estimates: defining precisely the foreign-born population analyzed; distinguishing among the foreign born by legal status, education, decade of U.S. arrival, or other policy-relevant criteria; determining an appropriate unit of analysis for computing fiscal impacts; deciding which public service costs and tax revenues to include; making assumptions about the extent to which the foreign born use public services and contribute taxes relative to native residents; and deciding over how many generations to compute impacts. How Should U.S.-Born Children be Treated? According to his own calculations, removing this assumption changed the estimated $111,000 net fiscal surplus to a $21,000 net fiscal deficit (in 2010 dollars). The foreign born, like the native born, impose their largest costs on U.S. taxpayers as children through their consumption of public education, and as the elderly through their consumption of public health services from programs like Medicare and their receipt of Social Security retirement benefits. Yet, the majority of the foreign born who come to the United States as young adults and reside permanently pay taxes and contribute to programs like Social Security for most of their working lives. The relatively young ages at arrival for most foreign born help explain why many fiscal impact studies reviewed by the authors of The New Americans, for example, found that foreign-born residents over the long term generated net fiscal surpluses. Fiscal impacts differ at the state and federal levels. Foreign-born residents' relatively young age distribution accentuates the degree to which states and localities incur greater fiscal costs from the foreign born than the federal government. Federal programs such as Social Security and Medicare are oriented toward assisting the elderly, while state and local level jurisdictions are often responsible for services consumed by younger persons, such as public education and criminal justice administration. Studies of the fiscal impact of unauthorized aliens reach less consensus than those of the total foreign-born population. Three national estimates of the net fiscal impact of unauthorized aliens evaluated in a 1995 GAO report varied considerably and left the agency unable to definitively quantify such impacts. Subsequent state-level studies emphasized fiscal impacts from the most costly public services: public education, health care, and law enforcement. Many also estimated tax and other fiscal contributions. Studies estimating fiscal impacts for unauthorized aliens were more likely to yield estimated net fiscal deficits than those that estimated fiscal impacts for all foreign born. On average, unauthorized aliens tend to be younger and less educated, thereby earning lower wages and salaries than all foreign-born workers. As a consequence, they are more likely to use public education for their children and contribute relatively less in tax revenues compared to all foreign born. However, deriving more specific conclusions or estimates from studies of unauthorized aliens reviewed in this report remains elusive due to differences in study methodology and variation in costs across states where these analyses were conducted.	This report reviews estimates of fiscal impacts to the federal, state, and local governments of the foreign born who reside in the United States. It examines the academic and policy literature on fiscal impacts of two populations: all U.S. foreign born and unauthorized aliens. Computing such fiscal impacts involves numerous methodological and conceptual challenges, and resulting estimates vary considerably according to the assumptions used, including those about the time frame considered, the treatment of U.S.-born children, the unit of analysis used, and which costs and revenues are included. For the total foreign-born population, the findings of a 1996 analysis commissioned by the National Research Council entitled The New Americans remain authoritative and relevant. The report estimated that each new immigrant at that time, with his or her descendents, would generate an average net fiscal surplus. The authors illustrated how their estimate varied according to foreign-born residents' age composition and educational attainment. Varied assumptions about education generated substantially different impacts. For instance, immigrants with above-average education generated a considerably larger than average net fiscal surplus; those with below-average education levels generated a net fiscal deficit. Reducing the time frame of the analysis to fewer generations changes the average net fiscal surplus into an average net fiscal deficit. This study and others confirm that the foreign born, like the native born, impose their largest costs on U.S. taxpayers as children, through their consumption of public education, and as the elderly, through their consumption of government-funded public health programs. Yet, the majority of the foreign born come to the United States as young adults, where they pay taxes and contribute to programs like Social Security for most of their working lives. Relatively young ages at arrival for most foreign born help explain why many fiscal impact studies found that foreign-born residents generated net fiscal surpluses over the long term. Findings from all of the studies reviewed in this report indicate different impacts at the state and federal levels. Many federal programs, such as Social Security and Medicaid, are oriented toward assisting the elderly, while many state and local level jurisdictions are responsible for services consumed by younger persons, such as public education and criminal justice administration. Foreign-born residents' relatively young age distribution thus accentuates the degree to which states and localities incur greater fiscal costs from the foreign born than the federal government. Fiscal impact studies of unauthorized aliens reach less consensus than those of the total foreign-born population. Three national estimates evaluated in a 1995 General Accounting Office (GAO) report varied considerably and left the agency unable to definitively quantify such fiscal impacts. Subsequent state-level studies emphasized fiscal impacts of costly public services: public education, health care, and law enforcement. Many estimated tax and other fiscal contributions. Studies estimating fiscal impacts for unauthorized aliens are more likely to yield estimated net fiscal deficits than those estimating fiscal impacts for all foreign born, because unauthorized aliens, on average, tend to be younger and less educated. Consequently, they are more likely to use public education for their children and contribute relatively less in tax revenues compared to all foreign born. Given their unauthorized status, they are also less likely themselves to receive public benefits, although their U.S.-born children may be more likely to qualify for such benefits. However, deriving more specific conclusions or estimates from studies of unauthorized aliens reviewed in this report remains elusive due to variation in study design and methodology.
crs_R44652	crs_R44652_0	Introduction Veterans' preference provides special consideration for qualified former members of the Armed Forces who pursue civilian employment with the federal government. This report discusses veterans' preference and how it is applied to positions that use competitive examination processes to assess and select candidates. Note on Assessment Systems and Terminology Typically, competitive examination consists of assessment of a candidate's qualifications (e.g., education and experience). Preference Types Preference-eligible veterans qualify for different types of preference depending on the nature of their service and the assessment method used for the particular position. Under numerical rating, a veteran could qualify for ten, five, or zero points that are added to the veteran's final assessment score. Preference for Veterans with a Service-Connected Disability9 The strongest preference is given to veterans with service-connected disabilities, regardless of the assessment method used. Derived Preference In certain scenarios, a spouse, widow/widower, or parent of a veteran may qualify for preference if the veteran is not able to use it. Application of Veterans' Preference For federal positions that are filled using the competitive examination process, candidates are typically assessed on the basis of their qualifications relative to the requirements of the position. Application in Category Rating21 Under the category rating method, applicants are assigned to a "quality category" on the basis of their qualifications (e.g., minimally qualified, well qualified, or highly qualified). For positions other than the aforementioned scientific or professional positions at GS-9 or above, a preference eligible goes to the top of the quality category for which he or she was assigned, except that veterans in any quality category with a service-connected disability rated at 10% or higher (that is, veterans in the CPS and CP categories) "float" to the top of the highest quality category. Application of Veterans' Preference in Selection and Pass Over Procedures In cases where a preference eligible is among the highest-ranked candidates (either among the highest numerical scores or in the highest quality category), the hiring official must either (1) select a preference eligible or (2) formally pass over the preference eligible. Data in this section refer to nonseasonal, full-time, permanent employees. Table 3 shows that veterans with preference accounted for 28% of all permanent, nonseasonal, full-time, executive branch employees in FY2016. Veterans with preference accounted for 37% of federal new hires in FY2016.	Veterans' preference is a system that provides special consideration to certain former members of the Armed Forces who pursue civilian employment with the federal government. This report describes how veterans' preference is established and applied in the assessment and selection of candidates for federal positions that use competitive examination procedures. The specific type of preference for which a veteran qualifies (if any) depends on the timing of the veteran's service and whether or not the veteran has a service-connected disability. The strongest preference is for veterans who have a service-connected disability rated at 30% or greater. In some cases, if a veteran is not able to use his or her preference due to death or disability, a family member may claim derived preference. For federal positions that follow competitive examination procedures, applicants are typically assessed on the basis of their qualifications (e.g., education and experience). The application of veterans' preference depends on the assessment procedure being used. When applicants are assessed using category rating, a process that assigns applicants to quality categories (e.g., minimally qualified, well qualified, and highest qualified), preference is applied by moving an eligible veteran to the top of the category for which he or she qualifies or, in some cases, to the top of the highest quality category. When applicants are assessed using numerical rating, preference is applied by adding extra points to a veteran candidate's assessed score. Veterans' preference also has a role in the selection process. In cases where a preference eligible is among the highest-ranked candidates and therefore eligible for selection, the selecting official must either (1) select the preference eligible or (2) pass over the preference eligible by disqualifying the preference eligible. In FY2016, the most recent year for which data are available, veterans with preference made up 28% of nonseasonal, full-time, permanent federal employees. In recent years, veterans with preference have accounted for a larger portion of new federal hires and the proportion of veterans in the federal workforce has gradually increased. In FY2016, veterans with preference accounted for 37% of nonseasonal, full-time, permanent new hires.
crs_96-769	crs_96-769_0	Taxes on long-term capital gains (on assets held for at least a year) are imposed at rates that correspond to pre-2018 brackets: a 0% rate for those whose income placed them in the regular 15% bracket or less (now in the 12% bracket), and 15% for taxpayers in higher brackets, except for those in the 39.6% bracket. The tax revision adopted in December 2018 ( P.L. 115-97 ) maintained the links to the income level corresponding to the rate brackets in prior law. Therefore, the tax rates on capital gains are affected only by changes in the deductions to arrive at taxable income and the use of a different method of indexing for inflation. Under the new law, the original 10% and 15% brackets are replaced by a single 12% rate bracket that ends at the same point as the end of the 15% bracket. There is no 39.6% bracket (the top rate is 37% and begins at a higher level than the top bracket under previous law). In 2017, the 39.6% bracket began with taxable income of $470,700 for joint returns and $418,400 for single returns. There is also an exclusion of $500,000 ($250,000 for single returns) for gains on home sales. Health reform legislation in 2010 provided for a tax of 3.8% (the same level as the Medicare rate of 3.8% on labor income) on high-income taxpayers on various forms of passive income, including capital gains. Under the final legislation, there was a maximum tax of 20% on capital gains held for a year. 4297 , adopted in 2006, extended these lower rates for two more years. 111-312 , enacted in 2010, extended the lower rates for an additional two years, through 2010. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, P.L. 112-240 , made these lower rates permanent except for very high incomes. The tax applies to passive income in excess of $250,000 for joint returns and $200,000 for single returns. Issues: Efficiency, Growth, Distribution, and Complexity One argument in favor of reducing the capital gains tax is the lock-in effect. Arguments have also been made that lower gains taxes will increase economic growth and entrepreneurship. The benefit of the lower rates on capital gains alone would be more concentrated because a larger proportion of capital gains accrues to those with higher incomes, compared with dividends. Critics of lower capital gains taxes cite the contribution of preferential capital gains treatment to tax sheltering activities and complexity.	Taxes on long-term capital gains (on assets held for at least a year) are imposed at rates that correspond to pre-2018 brackets: a 0% rate for those whose income placed them in the regular 15% bracket or less (now in regular bracket of 12%), and 15% for taxpayers in higher brackets, except for those in the 39.6% bracket. The tax revision adopted in December 2018 (P.L. 115-97) maintained the links to the income level corresponding to the rate brackets in prior law. Therefore, the tax rates on capital gains are affected only by changes in the deductions to arrive at taxable income and the use of a different method of indexing for inflation. Under the new law, the original 10% and 15% brackets are replaced by a single 12% rate bracket that ends at the same point as the end of the 15% bracket. There is no 39.6% bracket (the top rate is 37% and begins at a higher level than the top bracket under previous law). In 2017, the 39.6% bracket began with taxable income of $470,700 for joint returns and $418,400 for single returns. There is also an exclusion of $500,000 ($250,000 for single returns) for gains on home sales. Tax legislation in 1997 reduced capital gains taxes on several types of assets, imposing a 20% maximum tax rate on long-term gains, a rate temporarily reduced to 15% for 2003-2008, which was extended for two additional years in 2006. Legislation enacted in December 2010 extended the lower rates for an additional two years, thorough 2010. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-240) made the lower rates permanent except for very high-income taxpayers. Health reform legislation in 2010 provided for a tax at Medicare rates of 3.8% on high-income taxpayers on various forms of passive income, including capital gains. The tax applies to passive income in excess of $250,000 for joint returns and $200,000 for single returns. The capital gains tax had been a tax cut target since the 1986 Tax Reform Act treated capital gains as ordinary income. An argument for lower capital gains taxes is reduction of the lock-in effect. Some also believe that lower capital gains taxes will cost little compared to the benefits they bring and that lower taxes induce additional economic growth, although the magnitude of these potential effects is in some dispute. Others criticize lower capital gains taxes as benefitting higher-income individuals and express concerns about the budget effects, particularly in future years. Another criticism of lower rates is the possible role of a larger capital gains tax differential in encouraging tax sheltering activities and adding complexity to the tax law.
crs_R43840	crs_R43840_0	Questions Related to Residency Status 1. How are noncitizens categorized for federal income tax purposes? Noncitizens in or outside the United States may be liable for U.S. income taxes. The terms "immigrant" and "nonimmigrant" are not used in the Internal Revenue Code. For more information, see CRS Report RS21732, Federal Taxation of Aliens Working in the United States . Noncitizens who are in the country unlawfully (called unlawfully present aliens for purposes of this report) generally do not have a special designation under the IRC. This classification is for federal tax purposes only. While nonresident aliens are not subject to U.S. taxation on income earned abroad, all aliens—whether resident or nonresident and whether lawfully present or not—are generally subject to federal income taxes on their U.S.-source income (e.g., wages earned in the United States). Questions Related to Individual Taxpayer Identification Numbers (ITINs) 6. SSNs are issued by the Social Security Administration (SSA) to certain groups of noncitizens, specifically lawful permanent residents (green card holders); aliens admitted on a temporary basis who are authorized to work in the United States; and other aliens who are required by federal or state law to have an SSN in order to receive certain public benefits. These include noncitizens who are lawfully present on a temporary basis in the United States but are SSN-ineligible because they are unauthorized to work; individuals who are outside the United States but still have federal tax obligations (e.g., because they have U.S.-source investment income); and unlawfully present aliens. Questions Related to Unlawfully Present Aliens and Federal Income Taxes 13. Are there special tax benefits for aliens starting businesses in the United States? This rumor is false.	This report answers frequently asked questions about noncitizens and federal income taxes. Noncitizens may be subject to U.S. income taxes when, for example, they work in the United States or they live abroad but have U.S. source income. Noncitizens who may be subject to U.S. income taxes include legal permanent residents (LPRs or green card holders) who are authorized to live and work in the United States permanently; aliens who are authorized to stay in the United States temporarily, and may or may not be authorized to work; aliens who are not authorized to be in the United States (called unlawfully present aliens for purposes of this report); and foreigners who are outside the United States but have U.S. tax obligations. This report groups similar questions by category: questions concerning residency status for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC); questions related to individual taxpayer identification numbers (ITINs), which are ID numbers issued to noncitizens for tax-filing purposes; and questions regarding unlawfully present aliens and federal income taxes. The report also refutes a persistent rumor that there are special tax benefits for aliens starting businesses in the United States. The report focuses on federal income taxes. Other taxes, such as payroll taxes, excise taxes, and estate and gift taxes, are outside the scope of this report. For information on aliens and the federal estate and gift taxes, see CRS Report R43576, Estate and Gift Taxes for Nonresident Aliens, by [author name scrubbed].
crs_RS21721	crs_RS21721_0	Background: An Independent Kosovo On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia, sparking celebration among the country's ethnic Albanians, who form over 90% of the country's population. Serbia and the Kosovo Serb minority heatedly objected to the declaration and refused to recognize it. KFOR, the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo, has the role of ensuring the overall security of Kosovo, while leaving policing duties to local authorities and EULEX. The agreements reached from the beginning of the talks until the end of 2012 included ones on free movement of persons, customs stamps, mutual recognition of university diplomas, cadastre (real estate) records, civil registries (which record births, deaths, marriages, etc. for legal purposes), integrated border/boundary management (IBM), and on regional cooperation. The 15-point agreement calls for the creation of an "Association/Community of Serbian-majority municipalities" in Kosovo. The agreement faces serious challenges to its implementation, including the strong opposition of most Serb leaders in northern Kosovo. Kosovo's Other Challenges Kosovo faces daunting challenges as an independent state in addition to those posed by its struggle for international recognition and the status of its ethnic minorities. Kosovo suffers from weak institutions, particularly in the area of the rule of law. As noted above, despite the differences between member countries on recognizing Kosovo's independence, the European Commission recommended on April 22, 2013, that the EU open negotiations on a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) between Kosovo and the EU. The United States has urged other countries to extend diplomatic recognition to Kosovo, with mixed success. Although strongly supporting the Serbia-Kosovo talks, U.S. officials have said the United States is a "guest," not a participant or mediator. On September 10, 2012, the White House issued a statement by President Obama hailing the end of supervised independence in Kosovo. He said Kosovo has made "significant progress" in "building the institutions of a modern, multi-ethnic, inclusive and democratic state." He added Kosovo had more work to do in ensuring that the rights enshrined in the country's constitution are realized for every citizen. President Obama also called on Kosovo to continue to work to resolve outstanding issues with its neighbors, especially Serbia. U.S. Aid to Kosovo U.S. aid to Kosovo has declined significantly in recent years. For FY2013, the Administration requested a total of $57.669 million for Kosovo. Of this amount, $42.544 million is aid for political and economic reforms from the Economic Support Fund (ESF), $10.674 million from the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account (INCLE), $0.7 million in IMET military training aid, $3 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and $0.75 million from the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) account. In its FY2014 budget, the Administration aid request for Kosovo includes $41 million in ESF funding, $10.7 million from the INCLE account, $0.75 million in IMET aid, and $4 million in FMF.	On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia. The United States and 22 of the 27 European Union countries have recognized Kosovo's independence. The Kosovo government claims that 98 countries in all have extended diplomatic recognition to it. EULEX, a European Union-led law-and-order mission, is tasked with improving the rule of law in Kosovo. KFOR, a NATO-led peacekeeping force that includes more than 700 U.S. soldiers, has the mission of providing a secure environment. Serbia strongly objects to Kosovo's declaration of independence. It has used diplomatic means to try to persuade countries to not recognize Kosovo. It has retained parallel governing institutions in Serb-majority areas in Kosovo. Since March 2011, the EU has mediated negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo. The agreements reached include ones on free movement of persons, customs stamps, recognition of university diplomas, cadastre (real estate) records, civil registries (which record births, deaths, marriages, etc. for legal purposes), integrated border/boundary management, and on regional cooperation. However, the accords have not been implemented or only partly implemented. On April 19, 2013, Kosovo and Serbia reached a key agreement on normalizing relations. The agreement calls for the abolishing of the parallel institutions and the establishment of an "Association/Community" of Serb-majority municipalities within Kosovo, which would function according to Kosovo's laws. Most Kosovo Serb leaders are strongly against the agreement, and its implementation is uncertain. Kosovo faces other daunting challenges, aside from those posed by its struggle for international recognition and the status of its ethnic minorities. According to reports by the European Commission, the country suffers from weak institutions, including the judiciary and law enforcement. Kosovo has high levels of government corruption and powerful organized crime networks. Many Kosovars are poor and reported unemployment is very high. The United States has supported the EU-brokered talks between Serbia and Kosovo, but has stressed that it is an observer, not a participant in them. On September 10, 2012, the White House issued a statement by President Obama hailing the end of international supervision of Kosovo. He said Kosovo has made "significant progress" in "building the institutions of a modern, multi-ethnic, inclusive and democratic state." He added Kosovo had more work to do in ensuring that the rights enshrined in the country's constitution are realized for every citizen. President Obama also called on Kosovo to continue to work to resolve outstanding issues with its neighbors, especially Serbia. U.S. officials hailed the April 19, 2013, agreement between Serbia and Kosovo on normalizing relations. Since U.S. recognition of Kosovo's independence in 2008, congressional action on Kosovo has focused largely on foreign aid appropriations legislation. For FY2013, the Administration requested a total of $57.669 million for Kosovo. Of this amount, $42.544 million is aid for political and economic reforms from the Economic Support Fund, $10.674 million from the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account, $0.7 million in IMET military training aid, $3 million in Foreign Military Financing, and $0.75 million in NADR aid to assist non-proliferation and anti-terrorism efforts. In its FY2014 budget, the Administration aid request for Kosovo includes $41 million in ESF funding, $10.7 million from the INCLE account, $0.75 million in IMET aid, and $4 million in FMF.
crs_RL33389	crs_RL33389_0	This report provides a chronology of events relevant to U.S. relations with North Korea in 2005 and is a continuation of CRS Report RL32743, North Korea: A Chronology of Events, October 2002-December 2004 , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. The chronology includes significant meetings, events, and statements that shed light on the issues surrounding North Korea's nuclear weapons program. An introductory analysis highlights the key developments and notes other significant regional dynamics. Particular attention is paid to the Six-Party Talks, inter-Korean relations, key U.S. officials in charge of North Korean policy, Chinas leadership in the negotiations, Japans relationship with its neighbors, and contact with North Korea outside of the executive branch, including a Congressional delegation.	This report provides a chronology of events relevant to U.S. relations with North Korea in 2005 and is a continuation of CRS Report RL32743, North Korea: A Chronology of Events, October 2002-December 2004, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. The chronology includes significant meetings, events, and statements that shed light on the issues surrounding North Korea's nuclear weapons program. An introductory analysis highlights the key developments and notes other significant regional dynamics. Particular attention is paid to the Six-Party Talks, inter-Korean relations, key U.S. officials in charge of North Korean policy, China's leadership in the negotiations, Japan's relationship with its neighbors, and contact with North Korea outside of the executive branch, including a Congressional delegation. Information for this report came from a variety of news articles, scholarly publications, government materials, and other sources, the accuracy of which CRS has not verified. This report will not be updated.
crs_R43111	crs_R43111_0	Introduction Increasingly, the federal government uses technology to facilitate and support the federal procurement (or acquisition) process. Primary beneficiaries of this shift to online procurement systems (i.e., websites and databases) are the government's acquisition workforce and prospective and incumbent government contractors. The government's reliance on web-based systems is not surprising for yet another reason: the magnitude of government procurement. Congressional interest in the executive branch's procurement systems (and, more broadly, government procurement) is fueled by a combination of its responsibilities. While congressional oversight of government procurement includes overseeing web-based acquisition systems, these systems also serve as resources for congressional oversight efforts as well as legislative activities. The next section of the report then examines several issues and topics, including data quality, the System for Award Management (SAM), and the posting of contracts online. Major web-based, executive branch procurement systems are the focus of this report. To aid in ensuring that the government does business only with responsible contractors, agency personnel also use SAM to determine whether a contractor is presently suspended or debarred, and query the Federal Awardee Performance Information and Integrity System (FAPIIS). FFATA mandated the development of a user-friendly system comprising a variety of government spending data, including procurement data. Table 1 contains information regarding 11 web-based acquisition systems and a related Department of Labor system. Three websites—Central Contractor Registration (CCR, which includes Federal Agency Registration (FedReg)), Excluded Parties List System (EPLS), and Online Representations and Certifications Application (ORCA)—migrated to SAM in July 2012. Selected Topics Quality of Procurement Data Over the years, questions have been raised regarding the accuracy, completeness, and timeliness of the contract award data available from FPDS and its successor, FPDS-NG. The latest guidance, which was issued by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) in 2011, complements and expands upon FAR 4.604. OFPP's 2011 memorandum provides instructions, sampling methodologies, and templates for agencies to use in calculating and reporting the accuracy and completeness of data submitted to FPDS-NG. Governmentwide, the four-year average (FY2008-FY2011) for completeness was 98.3% and for sample accuracy 94.0%. OFPP also stated in its memorandum that, in conjunction with GSA, it would carry out the following activities as part of its "sustained efforts to improve procurement data quality throughout the year": "continue the interagency working group on data quality, focusing on emerging issues, challenges, solutions, guidance, and process improvements;" "revitalize the [online] community of practice ... to collect tools and agency best practices for improving data quality and host focused discussions on key issues; and" "collaborate with the Federal Acquisition Institute and the Defense Acquisition University to review and improve related workforce training and development and to develop a better understanding of how procurement data are used throughout the acquisition process." The eight procurement websites are Central Contractor Registration, Electronic Subcontract Reporting System, Excluded Parties List System, Federal Business Opportunities, Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation, Online Representations and Certifications Application, Past Performance Information Retrieval System, and Wage Determinations OnLine.gov. Table 2 shows how SAM will be organized when completed. Access to online systems and procurement information and data, however, does not necessarily equate to comprehension. Posting Contracts Online Presently, the federal government does not have a database of contracts awarded by federal agencies. (FPDS-NG includes discrete information, in data fields (data elements), about contract awards.) Working through its Integrated Acquisition Environment, GSA established a working group, which consisted of representatives from several federal agencies, to examine the feasibility, challenges, and anticipated benefits of posting federal contracts online. More recently, DOD, GSA, and NASA issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking regarding posting contracts online. 6411 , was enacted. Digital Accountability and Transparency Act (DATA Act)73 and FPDS-NG The DATA Act—which is the title of two similar bills, H.R. 2061 and S. 994 , that were introduced during the 113 th Congress—would amend the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (FFATA; P.L. Generally, the DATA Act would require, among other things, the following: The Treasury Secretary, in consultation with the heads of OMB, GSA, and other federal agencies, to establish governmentwide "financial data standards for Federal funds"; The Director of OMB to lead an effort to consolidate financial reporting requirements for recipients of federal awards; and The Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the head of OMB, to establish a pilot program for recipients of federal funds that meet certain conditions. Possible implications for FPDS-NG involve the connection between it and USAspending.gov. Concluding Remarks Web-based systems increasingly have become embedded in the federal government's acquisition process, providing the means for collecting, storing, searching, or disseminating a variety of data and other information to the acquisition workforce and other interested parties.	Increasingly, the federal government uses technology to facilitate and support the federal acquisition process. Primary beneficiaries of this shift to online systems (websites and databases) are the government's acquisition workforce and prospective and incumbent government contractors. The suite of web-based systems supports contracting officers' efforts to ensure the government contracts only with responsible parties, is essential to the dissemination of information regarding contracting opportunities, and facilitates interagency contracting. From the contractor perspective, the government's online systems streamline the processes involved in fulfilling various administrative requirements, provide access to possible contracting opportunities, and are potential resources for market research. Congressional interest in the government's online procurement systems, and, relatedly, the federal acquisition process, flows from the institution's responsibilities involving government spending and oversight of executive branch operations. Congress monitors how well the federal acquisition process works, which includes several web-based systems, and also uses data and information available from some of the systems as resources for its oversight activities. The federal government's major, governmentwide web-based acquisition systems include Acquisition Central, Electronic Subcontracting Reporting System (eSRS), Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps), Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (FFATA) Portal (this system is known as the "FFATA Portal"), Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG), Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity Information System (FAPIIS), FFATA Sub-Award Reporting System (FSRS), Interagency Contract Directory (ICD), Past Performance Information Retrieval System (PPIRS), System for Award Management (SAM), USAspending.gov, and Wage Determinations On-line (WDOL). Interest in the federal government's online acquisition systems is reflected in a variety of issues and topics. Over the years, questions have been raised regarding the accuracy, completeness, and timeliness of the contract award data available from FPDS and its successor, FPDS-NG. Recent efforts to remedy these problems include guidance issued by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) in 2011, which provides instructions for calculating and reporting the accuracy and completeness of data submitted to FPDS-NG. The most recent information available regarding FPDS-NG data shows that, governmentwide, the four-year average (FY2008-FY2011) for completeness was 98.3% and for sample accuracy 94.0%. Another significant topic involving the government's web-based acquisition systems was the launch of the System for Award Management in 2012. The following three systems became part of SAM in July 2012: Central Contractor Registration (CCR, which includes Federal Agency Registration (FedReg)), Excluded Parties List System (EPLS), and Online Representations and Certifications Application (ORCA). When completed, SAM will also include five other online procurement systems, plus the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA). A variety of issues and problems, including separate logins, overlapping data, the absence of a single, uniform level of service, and multiple vendors hosting the systems, prompted interest in developing an integrated system. Although this report does not focus on transparency, several issues discussed here are related to transparency. First, while the Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps) website and FPDS-NG provide information about executive branch agencies' procurements, a database of federal agencies' contracts does not exist. In 2003, GSA established a working group to examine the feasibility, challenges, and anticipated benefits of posting federal contracts online. Ultimately, the working group concluded there were insufficient data to support recommending the establishment of a central system for posting contracts online. In 2010, the Department of Defense (DOD), GSA, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) regarding posting contracts online. Comments submitted in response to the notice identified several challenges, and the matter was concluded when the agencies withdrew the ANPR. Second, transparency does not necessarily equate to comprehension. Generally, variation exists among the users of government procurement systems regarding their knowledge of government procurement and procurement data. Third, during the 113th Congress, two similar bills (H.R. 2061 and S. 994) with the same name (Digital Accountability and Transparency Act, or DATA Act) were introduced, either of which would enhance transparency of spending data, including certain procurement data. If either bill is enacted, it might have implications for FPDS-NG.
crs_R41053	crs_R41053_0	Introduction The Obama Administration and Congress continue to grapple with high rates of unemployment despite some tentative signs of economic recovery. On December 8, 2009, President Obama outlined a series of proposals intended to accelerate job growth, focusing on incentives to small businesses, spending on various infrastructure projects, and job creation through energy efficiency and clean energy initiatives. The President also signaled support for the extension of some of the direct assistance provisions included in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ), including Unemployment Compensation (UC) benefits and health insurance premium subsidies under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA). On December 16, 2009, the House passed the Jobs for Main Street Act ( H.R. 2847 ), which would spend approximately $154 billion in three general areas: infrastructure investment, public service jobs, and emergency relief for families. Appropriations for infrastructure and jobs would total about $75 billion, to be offset by redirecting Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds. Emergency assistance (which are primarily entitlement or mandatory spending provisions) would total another $79 billion, as estimated by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on the date of House passage; however, this amount includes some spending for UC and COBRA provisions that were subsequently enacted into law under the FY2010 Defense Appropriations Act ( P.L. 111-118 ). Among other provisions, the bill would also extend enhanced Medicaid matching provisions established under ARRA, temporarily expand the child tax credit, and freeze federal poverty guidelines at 2009 levels to prevent a reduction in eligibility for certain means-tested programs. On February 24, 2010, the Senate passed an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. This substitute would provide tax credits for hiring and retaining unemployed workers, extend a tax provision in ARRA related to expensing for small businesses, and reauthorize certain transportation authorities. The Senate version of H.R. 2847 contains none of the education, training, or direct assistance provisions of the House-passed bill that are discussed in this report, with the single exception of provisions for school construction bonds. Meanwhile, on February 25, 2010, the House passed the Temporary Extension Act of 2010 ( H.R. 4691 ), which would provide a shorter extension of some of the direct assistance provisions also included in the House-passed version of H.R. 2847 , including UC benefits and COBRA subsidies. This report focuses specifically on provisions in the House-passed bill that would support education and training or that would provide direct support to unemployed workers or low-income individuals. 2847 includes provisions to create an Education Jobs Fund. The State Fiscal Stabilization Fund did not include a similar provision. 2847 ( S.Amdt. Tax Refund Disregard Certain means-tested programs treat income tax refunds, including advance payments of refundable tax credits, as income or resources for purposes of determining eligibility and benefit levels.	The Obama Administration and Congress continue to grapple with high rates of unemployment despite some tentative signs of economic recovery. On December 8, 2009, President Obama outlined a series of proposals intended to accelerate job growth, focusing on incentives to small businesses, spending on infrastructure projects, and job creation through energy initiatives. The President also signaled support for the extension of some of the direct assistance provisions included in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, P.L. 111-5), including Unemployment Compensation (UC) benefits and health insurance premium subsidies under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA). On December 16, 2009, the House passed the Jobs for Main Street Act (H.R. 2847), which would spend approximately $154 billion over 10 years in three general areas: infrastructure investment, public service jobs, and emergency relief for families. Appropriations for infrastructure and jobs would total about $75 billion, to be offset by redirecting Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds. Emergency assistance (which are primarily entitlement or mandatory spending provisions) would total another $79 billion, as estimated by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on the date of House passage; however, this amount includes some spending for UC and COBRA provisions that were subsequently enacted into law through the FY2010 Defense Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-118). On February 24, 2010, the Senate passed an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 2847 (S.Amdt. 3310). This substitute would provide tax credits for hiring and retaining unemployed workers, extend a tax provision in ARRA related to expensing for small businesses, and reauthorize certain transportation authorities. The Senate version of H.R. 2847 contains none of the education, training, or direct assistance provisions of the House-passed bill that are discussed in this report, with the single exception of provisions for school construction bonds. Meanwhile, on February 25, 2010, the House passed the Temporary Extension Act of 2010 (H.R. 4691), which would provide a shorter extension of some of the direct assistance provisions also included in the House-passed version of H.R. 2847, including UC benefits and COBRA subsidies. This report focuses specifically on provisions in the House-passed bill that would support education and training or that would provide direct support to unemployed workers or low-income individuals. Education provisions include an Education Jobs Fund, which is similar in some respects to the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund created under ARRA; additional funding for the Federal Work-Study Program; and provisions for school construction bonds. Training provisions include additional funding for youth employment and training activities, particularly summer employment, and grants to support worker training and job placement in high-growth industries. Direct assistance includes a further extension of certain temporary UC benefits and COBRA health insurance premium subsidies; a temporary expansion of the child tax credit; a provision that would freeze federal poverty guidelines at 2009 levels to prevent a reduction in eligibility for certain means-tested programs; and a provision that would disregard income tax refunds as income or resources for determining eligibility or benefit levels under means-tested programs.
crs_RL33763	crs_RL33763_0	Action in the 110th Congress The CLEAN Energy Act of 2007 ( H.R. 6 ) was introduced by the House Democratic leadership to revise certain tax and royalty policies for oil and natural gas and to use the resulting revenue to support a reserve for energy efficiency and renewable energy. Title I proposes to repeal certain oil and natural gas tax subsidies, and use the resulting revenue stream to support the reserve. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the provisions in Title I would make about $7.7 billion available for the reserve over the 10-year period from 2008 through 2017. In the floor debate, opponents argued that the reduction in oil and natural gas incentives would dampen production, cause job losses, and lead to higher prices for gasoline and other fuels. Proponents of the bill counterargued that record profits show that the oil and natural gas incentives were not needed. The bill passed the House on January 18 by a vote of 264-123. The tax incentives for the oil and gas industry in the EPACT05 originated in the106 th Congress's effort in 1999 to help the ailing domestic oil and gas producing industry, particularly small producers, deal with depressed oil prices. 109-58 . All the early bills appeared to be weighted more toward stimulating the supply of conventional fuels, including capital investment incentives to stimulate production and transportation of oil and gas. The House approved the conference report on July 28, 2005, and the Senate on July 29, 2005, clearing it for the President's signature on August 8 ( P.L. 109-58 ). The 2005 act became law at a time of very high prices for crude oil, petroleum products, and natural gas, and record oil and gas industry profits. The Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act ( P.L. H.R. The JCT estimates that the 2005 act provides about $2.6 billion in tax cuts for the oil and gas industry as a whole over 11 years, comprising about $1.1 billion for upstream operations and $1.5 billion for downstream, or refining and distribution, operations. However, because the oil spill liability tax and the Leaking Underground Storage Tank financing taxes are excise taxes on oil and petroleum products, and are imposed on oil refineries, the net effect of the 2005 act on the oil and gas refinery sector was a tax increase of about $1.3 billion over 11 years. Other Oil and Gas Tax Subsidies The Energy Policy Act of 2005 expanded some (but not all) of the preexisting tax subsidies for oil and gas and introduced several new ones. Other Oil and Gas Tax Subsidies A list of the preexisting federal tax subsidies (incentives) available for the U.S. oil and gas industry—those in effect before EPACT05 and still in effect today—(and their corresponding revenue loss estimates) appears in Table 2 .	The CLEAN Energy Act of 2007 (H.R. 6) was introduced by the House Democratic leadership to revise certain tax and royalty policies for oil and natural gas and to use the resulting revenue to support a reserve for energy efficiency and renewable energy. Title I proposes to repeal certain oil and natural gas tax subsidies, and use the resulting revenue stream to support the reserve. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that Title I would repeal about $7.7 billion in oil and gas tax subsidies over the 10-year period from 2008 through 2017. In House floor debate, opponents argued that the cut in oil and natural gas subsidies would dampen production, cause job losses, and lead to higher prices for gasoline and other fuels. Proponents counterargued that record profits show that the oil and natural gas subsidies were not needed. The bill passed the House on January 18 by a vote of 264-123. This report presents a detailed review of oil and gas tax subsidies, including those targeted for repeal by H.R. 6. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT05, P.L. 109-58) included several oil and gas tax incentives, providing about $2.6 billion of tax cuts for the oil and gas industry. In addition, EPACT05 provided for $2.9 billion of tax increases on the oil and gas industry, for a net tax increase on the industry of nearly $300 million over 11 years. Energy tax increases comprise the oil spill liability tax and the Leaking Underground Storage Tank financing rate, both of which are imposed on oil refineries. If these taxes are subtracted from the tax subsidies, the oil and gas refinery and distribution sector received a net tax increase of $1,356 million ($2,857 million minus $1,501 million). EPACT05 was approved and signed into law at a time of very high petroleum and natural gas prices and record oil industry profits. The House approved the conference report on July 28, 2005, and the Senate on July 29, 2005, clearing it for the President's signature on August 8 (P.L. 109-58). However, the tax sections originated in the106th Congress, with its effort in 1999 to help the ailing domestic oil and gas producing industry, particularly small producers, deal with depressed oil prices. Subsequent price spikes prompted concern about insufficient domestic energy production capacity and supply. All the early bills appeared to be weighted more toward stimulating the supply of conventional fuels, including capital investment incentives to stimulate production and transportation of oil and gas. In addition to the tax subsidies enacted under EPACT05, the U.S. oil and gas industry qualifies for several other targeted tax subsidies (FY2006 revenue loss estimates appear in parenthesis): (1) percentage depletion allowance ($1 billion); (2) expensing of intangible drilling costs for successful wells and non-geological and geophysical costs for dry holes, including the exemption from the passive loss limitation rules that apply to all other industries ($1.1 billion); (3) a tax credit for small refiners of low-sulfur diesel fuel that complies with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sulfur regulations ($ 50 million); (4) the enhanced oil recovery tax credit ($0); and (5) marginal oil and gas production tax credits ($0).
crs_RL32754	crs_RL32754_0	Immigration and identification-document security proposals were considered in the context of implementing recommendations of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) to improve homeland security, and some of these were enacted under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. At the time that the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act was enacted, some congressional leaders reportedly agreed to revisit some of the dropped immigration and document-security proposals in the 109 th Congress. The REAL ID Act of 2005 was first introduced as H.R. 418 by Representative James Sensenbrenner on January 26, 2005, and passed the House, as amended, on February 10, 2005, on a vote of 261-161. The text of House-passed H.R. 418 was subsequently added to H.R. 1268 , the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, which was introduced by Representative Jerry Lewis on March 11, 2005, and passed the House, as amended, on March 16, 2005 on a vote of 388-43. 1268 passed the Senate on April 21, 2005, as amended, on a vote of 99-0, but did not include the REAL ID Act provisions, and a conference was held to resolve differences between the House- and Senate-passed versions of H.R. The conference report, H.Rept. 109 - 72 , passed the House on a vote of 368-58 on May 5, 2005, and the Senate on a vote of 100-0 on May 10, 2005. The REAL ID Act, as amended, was enacted into law on May 11, 2005 as P.L. 109 - 13 , Division B. The version of the REAL ID Act enacted into law contains most of the provisions found in House-passed version of H.R. However, some notable changes were made, including, inter alia , (1) removing provisions relating to the release of aliens in removal proceedings on bond; (2) making asylum and withholding of removal eligibility and credibility standards less stringent than those proposed in earlier versions of the REAL ID Act; (3) providing for limited judicial review of Secretary of Homeland Security decisions to waive certain legal requirements to facilitate the construction of barriers at the borders; (4) providing broader waiver authority to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Homeland Security regarding terrorist-related grounds for inadmissibility and removal; and (5) modifying, and in some cases making more stringent, REAL ID Act provisions concerning minimum security standards for state-issued drivers' licenses and personal identification cards accepted for federal purposes This report analyzes the major provisions of the REAL ID Act of 2005, as enacted. However, aliens who are inadmissible or deportable on account of terror-related activity are ineligible for such relief. In addition, section 203 requires that the Secretary of Homeland Security enter into the appropriate aviation-screening database the personal information of anyone convicted of using a false drivers' license at an airport.	During the 108th Congress, a number of proposals related to immigration and identification-document security were introduced, some of which were considered in the context of implementing recommendations made by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) and enacted pursuant to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458). At the time that the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act was adopted, some congressional leaders reportedly agreed to revisit certain immigration and document-security issues in the 109th Congress that had been dropped from the final version of the act. The REAL ID Act of 2005 was first introduced as H.R. 418 by Representative James Sensenbrenner on January 26, 2005, and passed the House, as amended, on February 10, 2005. The text of House-passed H.R. 418 was subsequently added to H.R. 1268, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, which was introduced by Representative Jerry Lewis on March 11, 2005, and passed the House, as amended, on March 16, 2005. H.R. 1268 passed the Senate on April 21, 2005, as amended, on a vote of 99-0, but did not include the REAL ID Act provisions. A conference report resolving differences between the two versions of the bill, H.Rept. 109-72, passed the House on May 5, 2005 and the Senate on May 10, 2005, before being enacted into law on May 11, 2005. The version of the REAL ID Act (P.L. 109-13, Division B) ultimately enacted includes most of the provisions of the REAL ID Act that initially passed the House (though not those relating to the bond of aliens in removal proceedings), though some changes were made to certain REAL ID Act provisions. This report analyzes the major provisions of the REAL ID Act, as enacted, which, inter alia, (1) modifies the eligibility criteria for asylum and withholding of removal; (2) limits judicial review of certain immigration decisions; (3) provides additional waiver authority over laws that might impede the expeditious construction of barriers and roads along land borders, including a 14-mile wide fence near San Diego; (4) expands the scope of terror-related activity making an alien inadmissible or deportable, as well as ineligible for certain forms of relief from removal; (5) requires states to meet certain minimum security standards in order for the drivers' licenses and personal identification cards they issue to be accepted for federal purposes; (6) requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to enter into the appropriate aviation security screening database the appropriate background information of any person convicted of using a false driver's license for the purpose of boarding an airplane; and (7) requires the Department of Homeland Security to study and plan ways to improve U.S. security and improve inter-agency communications and information sharing, as well as establish a ground surveillance pilot program.
crs_R45192	crs_R45192_0	§668dd), whereas others think that oil and gas activities can be managed so as to avoid undue harm to wildlife or that U.S. energy needs outweigh conservation concerns. Both the executive branch and Congress have addressed oil and gas activity in the NWRS through debating the compatibility of oil and gas activities with the purposes of the NWRS; examining the potential economic and energy security benefits of developing oil and gas resources in the NWRS, predominantly in Alaska; and promulgating regulations for oil and gas activities in the NWRS to ensure access to nonfederal mineral rights while attempting to minimize impacts on natural resources, including lands, waters, and wildlife. The 115 th Congress also has considered the regulation of nonfederal oil and gas activities in the NWRS and has enacted legislation to establish a federal oil and gas program in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) in Alaska. These activities most often occur when rights to the surface and subsurface estates have been severed and FWS has acquired only the surface rights for addition to the NWRS, but valid existing rights to the mineral estate remain in nonfederal ownership. However, in certain cases, such as where the federal leases predate the establishment or expansion of the refuge, there may be federal leases and development on refuge lands. The administration of federal oil and gas resources in the NWRS is delegated to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), in the DOI, under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 (30 U.S.C. Relevant Alaska laws include the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA; P.L. ), among others. This report contains sections on recent developments related to oil and gas wells in the NWRS, nonfederal wells in NWRS units outside of Alaska, federal wells in NWRS units outside of Alaska, nonfederal and federal wells in Alaskan NWRS units, and issues for Congress in considering oil and gas activities in the NWRS. 115-97 , which provides for the creation of an oil and gas program in a portion of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR, or the refuge) in northeastern Alaska. P.L. Nonfederal Oil and Gas Operations in the National Wildlife Refuge System The FWS "Management of Non-Federal Oil and Gas Rights" rule revised requirements applicable to nonfederal oil and gas activities that occur in the NWRS outside of Alaska. Forty-five NWRS units were reported to have active wells, including 44 with oil and gas wells and 11 with other well types (some units had both oil and gas wells and other well types). For a complete list of NWRS units with nonfederal wells, see Table A-1 . The agency states that the development of oil and gas resources within the NWRS has the potential to "adversely impact [other] refuge resources." BLM regulations provide that any drilling in national wildlife refuges may take place only "with the consent and approval of the Secretary [of the Interior] with the concurrence of the Fish and Wildlife Service as to the time, place and nature of such operations in order to give complete protection to wildlife populations and wildlife habitat on the areas leased." Compatibility of Federal Oil and Gas Activities Because new development of federal oil and gas resources on refuge lands typically is prohibited, in undertaking such evaluations, it is unclear whether the FWS "concurrence" required in BLM's oil and gas leasing regulations would involve an FWS compatibility determination. Oil and Gas Activities in Alaska in the National Wildlife Refuge System National wildlife refuges in Alaska are governed by the provisions of ANILCA and other Alaska-specific laws, as well as by general authorities for the NWRS. §§4321-4347). These could include issues related to limits on the footprint of development, other environmental protections, compliance with NEPA, FWS and BLM management roles, judicial review of legal challenges, and treatment of special areas within the Coastal Plain, among other matters.	Oil- and gas-related wells are documented in 110 (approximately 18%) of the 605 units of the National Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS). The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), in the Department of the Interior (DOI), administers the NWRS, which includes primarily national wildlife refuges, along with wetland management districts and waterfowl production areas. The wells in the NWRS most commonly involve nonfederal oil and gas resources but sometimes encompass federal resources. Oil and gas development in the NWRS has the potential to adversely impact wildlife and/or the environment, and some see it as contrary to the mission and purposes for which the NWRS was established. Others think that some levels of oil and gas activity may take place in refuges without harming the system's central mission of wildlife conservation and that such activity could benefit the U.S. economy and provide greater energy security. FWS, which administers nonfederal mineral activities on refuge lands, and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which administers federal mineral activities on refuge lands, have developed regulations that seek to minimize the adverse impacts of oil and gas development in the NWRS, among other purposes. Nonfederal oil and gas activities in refuges most often occur where FWS has acquired surface rights to refuge lands without acquiring mineral rights. In these cases, the entity (such as an individual, corporation, or tribe) that retains a valid existing right to the mineral estate has the right to develop the oil and gas resources pursuant to regulations established by FWS. According to FWS data, there are 107 NWRS units with nonfederal wells, and 45 of these units have active wells. Nonfederal oil and gas activities in the NWRS outside of Alaska are governed by a final rule promulgated by FWS on November 2016, "Management of Non-Federal Oil and Gas Rights." In contrast to these nonfederal activities, leasing and development of federal oil and gas resources within the NWRS generally is prohibited. The primary exception is when federal oil and gas leases predate the establishment or expansion of an NWRS unit, in which case the lease can be allowed to continue. According to BLM records, outside of Alaska, there are 11 NWRS units with federal oil and gas wells, all of which have at least 1 producing well. BLM regulations require FWS concurrence as to the time, place, and nature of oil and gas activities in refuges, in order to maximize protection for wildlife populations and habitat. For both federal and nonfederal wells in the NWRS, regulation within Alaska is different from that in the rest of the United States. In addition to general FWS and BLM regulations, these units also are subject to requirements of Alaska-specific laws, including the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA; P.L. 96-487). Within Alaska, Kenai National Wildlife Refuge has both federal and nonfederal oil and gas wells. Three other Alaskan units have nonfederal wells. Congress has debated both the extent of oil and gas activities in the NWRS and the compatibility of these activities with the NWRS's mission and purposes. One issue that has been debated for many years is whether to allow energy development in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in northeastern Alaska. P.L. 115-97, enacted in December 2017, established a federal oil and gas program for a portion of the refuge. Congress may continue to pursue oversight or legislation related to the implementation of this program, including issues related to limits on the footprint of development, compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. §§4321-4347), or judicial review of legal challenges, among other matters. Congress also has addressed FWS's 2016 nonfederal oil and gas rule through both oversight and legislation, and it may continue to consider aspects of these regulations as well as the appropriate role for FWS in overseeing nonfederal oil and gas wells in the NWRS.
crs_RS20921	crs_RS20921_0	Europe has a long tradition of using semipostal stamps to raise funds for worthy causes. In the United States, however, semipostals are a recent innovation. The Breast Cancer Research Stamp Despite USPS opposition, Congress authorized a semipostal stamp for the benefit of breast cancer research in 1997. The act extended the BCRS for two more years, until July 29, 2002, and gave USPS broad authority to issue and sell semipostals for 10 more years "in order to advance such causes as the Postal Service considers to be in the national public interest and appropriate." USPS said it intended to invite nominations from the public for a new semipostal every two years, with no more than one semipostal in circulation at any given time. Part 551), USPS will not issue other semipostals under the Semipostal Authorization Act of 2000 until after the sales period of the BCRS has ended. GAO reported the views of some observers that the large initial sales figures of the "Heroes of 2001" semipostal "were not sustainable because that semipostal did not benefit from the support of a long-established, well-organized, nationwide network of organizations to keep the Heroes semipostal in the public eye," in contrast to the nationwide support base for the breast cancer stamp. The Heroes stamp was withdrawn from sale when its authorization expired on December 31, 2004. The 109 th Congress extended the BCRS until December 31, 2007 ( P.L.	Semipostal stamps, postage sold at a premium to raise funds for particular causes, have only recently been authorized by Congress for use in the United States. The Breast Cancer Research Stamp (BCRS) was introduced in July 1998, and as of December 2007, has raised over $60.1 million to support research in treating breast cancer through distributions to designated agencies. In the 106th Congress, the Semipostal Authorization Act of 2000 extended the BCRS two years and authorized the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) to issue other semipostals until 2010. USPS issued regulations inviting public nominations for future semipostals, providing that each can be sold for two years but only one can be on sale at any given time. Subsequent Congresses have further extended the life of the BCRS. Most recently, the 110th Congress authorized its sale through December 31, 2011. The breast cancer stamp's success is no guarantee that other semipostals will be equally successful. The "Heroes of 2001" stamp did not sell especially well and was withdrawn from circulation.
crs_R43908	crs_R43908_0	Mission The U.S. Department of Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is the "lead national laboratory for providing the measurements, calibrations, and quality assurance techniques which underpin United States commerce, technological progress, improved product reliability and manufacturing processes, and public safety." In addition to its long-standing work in standards and metrology, NIST was directed to offer support to the private sector for the development of precompetitive generic technologies and the diffusion of government-developed innovation to users in all segments of the U.S. economy. The authorization levels for NIST were part of a larger effort to double funding for selected accounts—all of the National Science Foundation, the Department of Energy Office of Science, and the NIST laboratory and construction accounts—that support physical sciences and engineering research. As specified in the act, the purpose of the NMI is to improve the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing and to increase the production of goods manufactured predominantly within the United States; to stimulate U.S. leadership in advanced manufacturing research, innovation, and technology; to facilitate the transition of innovative technologies into scalable, cost-effective, and high-performing manufacturing capabilities; to facilitate access by manufacturing enterprises to capital-intensive infrastructure, including high-performance electronics and computing, and the supply chains that enable these technologies; to accelerate the development of an advanced manufacturing workforce; to facilitate peer exchange and the documentation of best practices in addressing advanced manufacturing challenges; to leverage nonfederal sources of support to promote a stable and sustainable business model without the need for long-term federal funding; and to create and preserve jobs. The explanatory statement accompanying the act directs NIST to "follow the direction of the Revitalize American Manufacturing and Innovation Act of 2014 in requiring open competition to select the technological focus areas of industry-driven manufacturing institutes." Congress continues to use the term National Network for Manufacturing Innovation in appropriations reports. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-141 ) provides $15 million to NIST for the NNMI for FY2018, to include funding for center establishment and up to $5 million for coordination activities. In December 2015, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 ( P.L. NIST FY2019 Appropriations President Trump requested a total of $629.1 million for NIST in FY2019, $569.4 million (47.5%) below the FY2018 enacted level of $1,198.5 million. In the absence of a year-long appropriation act for FY2019, NIST was funded under two continuing resolutions, first through December 7, 2018 (under P.L. 115-245 ), then through December 21, 2018 (under P.L. NIST has been without appropriations since December 22, 2018. Following the start of the 116 th Congress, the House passed H.R. 21 , which would provide funding for each of the NIST accounts at the same levels as the Senate committee-passed bill from the 115 th Congress ( S. 3072 ). For FY2018, President Trump requested $6.0 million for the MEP program to provide "for the orderly wind down of federal funding for the program"; however, Congress appropriated $140.0 million. No funding has been requested for TIP since FY2012. Actual appropriations, however, did not keep pace with the America COMPETES Act authorization levels. Beginning with the 104 th Congress, many Members expressed skepticism over a "technology policy" based on providing federal funds to industry for development of precompetitive generic technologies. This philosophical shift from previous Congresses, coupled with pressures to balance the federal budget, led to significant reductions in funding for NIST's external programs. The Advanced Technology Program and the Manufacturing Extension Partnership, which accounted for over 50% of the FY1995 NIST budget, were proposed for elimination. In December 2014, Congress enacted the Revitalize American Manufacturing and Innovation (RAMI) Act of 2014 as Title VII of Division B of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. 113-235 ), establishing a Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NMI). As of the date of this report, 14 NNMI institutes have been established—8 by DOD, 5 by DOE, and 1 by the Department of Commerce. Requested and Enacted Discretionary Appropriations for NIST Accounts Appendix B.	The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), a laboratory of the Department of Commerce, is mandated to provide technical services to facilitate the competitiveness of U.S. industry. NIST is directed to offer support to the private sector for the development of precompetitive generic technologies and the diffusion of government-developed innovation to users in all segments of the American economy. Laboratory research is to provide measurement, calibration, and quality assurance techniques that underpin U.S. commerce, technological progress, improved product reliability, manufacturing processes, and public safety. President Trump requested $725.0 million in discretionary funding for NIST in FY2018. In March 2018, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) was enacted, providing $1,198.5 million in funding for NIST for FY2018. President Trump requested $629.1 million in discretionary funding for NIST in FY2019, $569.4 million (47.5%) below the FY2018 enacted level. The House-reported appropriations level for FY2019 is $985.0 million; the Senate-reported level is $1,037.5 million. In the absence of a year-long appropriation act for FY2019, NIST was funded under two continuing resolutions, first through December 7, 2018 (under P.L. 115-245), then through December 21, 2018 (under P.L. 115-298). NIST has been without appropriations since December 22, 2018. Following the start of the 116th Congress, the House passed H.R. 21, which would provide funding for each of the NIST accounts at the same levels as the Senate committee-passed bill from the 115th Congress (S. 3072). Concerns about the adequacy of federal funding for physical science and engineering research led to efforts by successive Presidents and Congresses to double funding for the NIST laboratory and construction accounts, together with the National Science Foundation and the Department of Energy Office of Science. However, appropriations did not keep pace with authorization levels or presidential requests. In addition, the appropriations authorizations for the accounts targeted for doubling lapsed at the end of FY2013. Appropriations for the targeted NIST accounts increased by 42.3% from FY2006 to FY2016. Funding for NIST extramural programs directed toward increased private sector commercialization has been a topic of congressional debate. Some Members of Congress have expressed skepticism over a "technology policy" based on providing federal funds to industry for development of precompetitive generic technologies. This approach, coupled with pressures to balance the federal budget, led to significant reductions in funding for NIST. The Advanced Technology Program (ATP) and the Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP), which accounted for over 50% of the FY1995 NIST budget, were subsequently proposed for elimination. In 2007, ATP was terminated and replaced by the Technology Innovation Program (TIP). TIP was subsequently defunded in the FY2012 appropriations legislation. President Trump has proposed the elimination of funding for the MEP program in FY2019. In December 2014, Congress enacted the Revitalize American Manufacturing and Innovation Act of 2014 (Title VII of Division B of P.L. 113-235), establishing a Network for Manufacturing Innovation (also referred to as the National Network for Manufacturing Innovation or NNMI). The explanatory statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113) directed NIST to use an open competition to select the technological focus areas of industry-driven manufacturing institutes. Upon completion of its first competition, NIST announced its selection of the National Institute for Innovation in Manufacturing Biopharmaceuticals (NIIMBL) in December 2016. Congress appropriated $15 million in FY2018 funding for NIST to continue its support for NIIMBL and to coordinate network activities. In total, 14 NNMI institutes have been established by the Department of Defense (8), Department of Energy (5), and Department of Commerce (1).
crs_R41543	crs_R41543_0	Introduction The role of natural gas in the U.S. economy has been a major part of the energy policy debate in the 114 th Congress. This report highlights key aspects of global natural gas markets, including supply and demand, and major U.S. developments. Select statutes of U.S. law related to natural gas can be found in Appendix G . Some consider natural gas a potential bridge fuel to a lower-carbon economy, because it is cleaner burning than coal and oil. Natural gas combustion emits about one-half less carbon dioxide than coal and one-quarter less than oil when consumed in a typical electric power plant, offset somewhat by fugitive emissions. Natural gas combustion also emits less particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen oxides than coal or oil. In recent years, the United States has become the home to the shale gas revolution, as improved methods to extract natural gas from certain shale formations have significantly increased the resource profile of the United States. This has spurred other countries to try to develop shale gas, but progress is slow outside of North America. If the United States continues to and other countries can bring large new volumes of natural gas to market at a competitive price, then natural gas could play a larger role in the world's economy. Several key factors will determine whether significant new quantities of natural gas come to market, particularly unconventional natural gas resources. These factors include price, technical capability, environmental concerns, and political considerations. Many countries, both producing and consuming, are watching how the development of U.S. unconventional natural gas resources evolves. Key Points Natural gas is likely to play a greater role in the world energy mix given its growing resource base and its relatively low carbon emissions compared to other fossil fuels. The world used 122,442 billion cubic feet (bcf) of natural gas in 2015, of which the United States consumed over 27,463 bcf, or about 23% (the most of any country). World natural gas consumption grew by 1.7% in 2015, which was below the 10-year average of 2.3%; U.S. consumption grew by 3%. U.S. unconventional natural gas reserves and production, particularly shale gas, have grown rapidly in recent years. The new shale gas resources have changed the U.S. natural gas position from a net importer to a potential net exporter. Global trade in natural gas is increasing and new players are entering on both the supply side and the import side, making the global gas market more integrated.	The role of natural gas in the U.S. economy has been a major part of the energy policy debate in the 114th Congress. This report briefly explains key aspects of global natural gas markets, including supply and demand, and major U.S. developments. Natural gas is considered by some as a potential bridge fuel to a lower-carbon economy, because it is cleaner burning than its hydrocarbon alternatives coal and oil. Natural gas combustion emits about one-half less carbon dioxide than coal and one-quarter less than oil when consumed in a typical electric power plant, although fugitive gas emissions offset some of the advantages. Natural gas combustion also emits less particulate matter, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen oxides than coal or oil. Additionally, improved methods to extract natural gas from shale formations have significantly increased the resource profile of the United States, which has spurred other countries to try to develop shale gas. If the United States and other countries can bring large new volumes of natural gas to market, particularly unconventional natural gas, then natural gas could play a larger role in the world's economy. Several key factors will determine whether this happens, including price, technical capability, environmental concerns, and political considerations. Many countries, both producing and consuming, are watching how the development of U.S. unconventional natural gas resources evolves. Key Points Natural gas is likely to play a greater role in the world energy mix given its growing resource base and its relatively low carbon emissions compared to other fossil fuels. The world used 122,442 billion cubic feet (bcf) of natural gas in 2015, of which the United States consumed 27,463 bcf (the most of any country). World natural gas consumption in 2015 grew by 1.7%, which was below the 10-year average of 2.3% but above the 0.6% increase in 2014; U.S. consumption grew by 3%. U.S. unconventional natural gas reserves and production, particularly shale gas, have grown rapidly in recent years. The United States accounts for 89% of global shale gas production. The new shale gas resources have changed the United States' natural gas position from a net importer to a potential net exporter. Other countries are now exploring their own shale gas resources. Global trade in natural gas is increasing and new players are entering on both the supply side and the import side, making the global gas market more integrated.
crs_R44868	crs_R44868_0	Introduction Short-term, small-dollar loans are consumer loans with relatively low initial principal amounts (often less than $1,000) with short repayment periods (generally for a small number of weeks or months). Short-term, small-dollar loan products are frequently used to cover cash flow shortages that may occur due to unexpected expenses or periods of inadequate income. Small-dollar loans can be offered in various forms and by various types of lenders. Federally insured depository institutions (i.e., banks and credit unions) can make small-dollar loans via financial products such as credit cards, credit card cash advances, and checking account overdraft protection programs. Nonbank lenders, such as alternative financial service (AFS) providers (e.g., payday lenders, automobile title lenders), also provide small-dollar loans. The costs associated with small-dollar loans appear to be higher in comparison with longer-term, larger-dollar loans. Furthermore, borrowers may fall into debt traps . Debt traps are frequently discussed in the context of nonbank products such as payday loans; but they may occur when a consumer makes only the minimum payment (rather than paying off the entire balance at the end of each statement period) on a credit card, which is an example of a loan product provided by depositories. Policy initiatives to protect consumers from what may be considered expensive borrowing costs could result in less credit availability for financially distressed individuals, which may place them in worse financial situations (e.g., bankruptcy). 111-203 ), which created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). A recent proposed rule by the CFPB, which would implement federal requirements that would act as a floor for state regulations, would, among other things, require lenders to underwrite small-dollar loans to ensure borrower affordability unless the loan meets certain conditions. The CFPB estimates that its proposal would result in a material decline in small-dollar offerings by AFS lenders. The CFPB proposal has been subject to debate. H.R. 10 , the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, which was passed by the House of Representatives on June 8, 2017, would prevent the CFPB from exercising any rulemaking, enforcement, or any other authority with respect to payday loans, vehicle title loans, or other similar loans. This report provides an overview of the small-dollar consumer lending markets and related policy issues. The report also discusses current federal and state regulatory approaches to consumer protection in lending markets, followed by a summary of the recent CFPB proposal and policy implications. The degree of market competitiveness, which may be revealed by analyzing market price dynamics, may provide insights pertaining to affordability concerns as well as available options for users of certain small-dollar loan products. Given that small-dollar markets contain both competitive and noncompetitive price dynamics, determining whether borrowers pay "too much" for small-dollar loan products is challenging. The Appendix describes how to calculate the annual percentage rate (APR) and provides information about general loan pricing. Short-Term, Small-Dollar Product Descriptions and Selected Metrics Table 1 provides descriptions of various small-dollar and short-term lending products. Data are also collected from different years and sources. An understanding of price dynamics in the small-dollar lending markets may shed light on the degree of market competitiveness, which may in turn inform the policy debate about the affordability and available options for consumers who use these loan products. The small-dollar lending markets exhibit both competitive and noncompetitive market pricing dynamics; consequently, determining whether the prices borrowers pay for their loans are "too high" is challenging. Similarly, the ability of the credit union system to compete in the small-dollar loan market depends upon regulatory requirements.	Short-term, small-dollar loans are consumer loans with relatively low initial principal amounts (often less than $1,000) with relatively short repayment periods (generally for a small number of weeks or months). Short-term, small-dollar loan products are frequently used to cover cash-flow shortages that may occur due to unexpected expenses or periods of inadequate income. Small-dollar loans can be offered in various forms and by various types of lenders. Banks and credit unions (depositories) can make small-dollar loans through financial products such as credit cards, credit card cash advances, and checking account overdraft protection programs. Small-dollar loans can also be provided by nonbank lenders (alternative financial service [AFS] providers), such as payday lenders and automobile title lenders. The extent that borrower financial situations would be made worse from the use of expensive credit or from limited access to credit is widely debated. Consumer groups often raise concerns regarding the affordability of small-dollar loans. Borrowers pay rates and fees for small-dollar loans that may be considered expensive. Borrowers may also fall into debt traps, situations where borrowers repeatedly roll over existing loans into new loans and subsequently incur more charges rather than completely paying off the loans. Although the vulnerabilities associated with debt traps are more frequently discussed in the context of nonbank products such as payday loans, borrowers may still find it difficult to repay outstanding balances and face additional charges on loans such as credit cards that are provided by depositories. Conversely, the lending industry often raises concerns regarding the reduced availability of small-dollar credit. Regulations aimed at reducing costs for borrowers may result in higher costs for lenders, possibly limiting or reducing credit availability for financially distressed individuals. This report provides an overview of the small-dollar consumer lending markets and related policy issues. Descriptions of basic short-term, small-dollar cash advance products are presented. Current federal and state regulatory approaches to consumer protection in small-dollar lending markets are also explained, including a summary of a proposal by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to implement federal requirements that would act as a floor for state regulations. The CFPB estimates that its proposal would result in a material decline in small-dollar loans offered by AFS providers. The CFPB proposal has been subject to debate. H.R. 10, the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, which was passed by the House of Representatives on June 8, 2017, would prevent the CFPB from exercising any rulemaking, enforcement, or any other authority with respect to payday loans, vehicle title loans, or other similar loans. After discussing the policy implications of the CFPB proposal, this report examines general pricing dynamics in the small-dollar credit market. The degree of market competitiveness, which may be revealed by analyzing market price dynamics, may provide insights concerning affordability and availability options for users of certain small-dollar loan products. The small-dollar lending market exhibits both competitive and noncompetitive market pricing dynamics. Some industry financial data metrics are arguably consistent with competitive market pricing. Factors such as regulatory barriers and differences in product features, however, limit the ability of banks and credit unions to compete with AFS providers in the small-dollar market. Borrowers may prefer some loan product features offered by nonbanks, including how the products are delivered, in comparison to products offered by traditional financial institutions. Given the existence of both competitive and noncompetitive market dynamics, determining whether the prices borrowers pay for small-dollar loan products are "too high" is challenging. The Appendix discusses how to conduct meaningful price comparisons using the annual percentage rate (APR) as well as some general information about loan pricing.
crs_R41157	crs_R41157_0	On February 12, 2010, President Barack Obama signed H.J.Res. 45 into law, as P.L. 111-139 . In addition to an increase in the statutory limit on the public debt to $14.294 trillion, the act contains two titles dealing with budgetary matters. Title I, referred to as the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, establishes a new budget enforcement mechanism generally requiring that direct spending and revenue legislation enacted into law not increase the deficit. Title II, which contains only a single section, pertains to routine investigations by the Comptroller General aimed at eliminating duplicative and wasteful spending. This report provides a summary and legislative history of the P.L. 111-139 , focusing on the features of the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010. Overview The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 (Statutory PAYGO Act) establishes a process intended, as Section 2 of the act states, "to enforce a rule of budget neutrality on new revenue and direct spending legislation." The budgetary effects of revenue and direct spending provisions enacted into law, including both costs and savings, are recorded by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on two PAYGO scorecards covering rolling five-year and 10-year periods (i.e., in each new session, the periods covered by the scorecards roll forward one fiscal year). The budgetary effects of PAYGO measures are determined by statements inserted into the Congressional Record by the chairmen of the House and Senate Budget Committees and referenced in the measures. As a general matter, the statements are expected to reflect cost estimates prepared by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Shortly after a congressional session ends, OMB finalizes the two PAYGO scorecards and determines whether a violation of the PAYGO requirement has occurred (i.e., if a debit has been recorded for the budget year on either scorecard). If so, the President issues a sequestration order that implements largely across-the-board cuts in nonexempt direct spending programs sufficient to remedy the violation by eliminating the debit. Many direct spending programs and activities are exempt from sequestration. If no PAYGO violation is found, no further action occurs and the process is repeated during the next session. The new statutory PAYGO process was created on a permanent basis; there are no expiration dates in the act. The process became effective upon enactment. As a budget enforcement tool, the new statutory PAYGO process is aimed at preventing, or at least discouraging, net deficit increases arising from the enactment of direct spending and revenue legislation. Any costs designated as emergencies are excluded from the scorecards, and significant costs associated with four specified categories of legislation may be excluded as well. Finally, debt service costs are excluded as well. The statutory PAYGO process does not address deficit increases, stemming from changes in direct spending or revenue levels, that are projected to occur under existing law. Other budget enforcement procedures, such as the reconciliation process under the Congressional Budget Act (CBA) of 1974, may be used to reduce deficit levels projected under existing law. Further, the statutory PAYGO process does not apply to discretionary spending, which is provided in annual appropriations acts. In recording the budgetary effects of a PAYGO act on the scorecards, OMB must adhere to the following rules: Look Back —the budgetary effects for the current year of a PAYGO measure enacted during a session are combined with the budgetary effects for the budget year, thereby closing a potential enforcement loophole (Section 4(e)); Averaging —for the 5-Year Scorecard, an average is derived for the cumulative budgetary effects of a PAYGO measure over the five fiscal years (with the budgetary effects for the current year added to the effects for the budget year), and entered for each of the five years on the scorecard; the same process is followed for the 10-Year Scorecard with regard to the cumulative budgetary effects of the measure over ten years, plus the current year (Section 4(f)); Emergency Legislation —the amounts of new budget authority, outlays, or revenue that result from a provision designated as an emergency in a PAYGO measure are not included in the estimates made by CBO or OMB of the measure's budgetary effects, and therefore are not recorded on the PAYGO scorecards (Section 4(g)); and CLASS Act Savings —the scorecards must exclude the net savings from legislation titled the "Community Living Assistance Services and Supports Act," which establishes a Federal insurance program for long-term care, if enacted or subsequently amended after enactment of the Statutory PAYGO Act (Section 4(d)(6)).	On February 12, 2010, President Barack Obama signed H.J.Res. 45 into law, as P.L. 111-139. In addition to an increase in the statutory limit on the public debt to $14.294 trillion, the act contains two titles dealing with budgetary matters. Title I, referred to as the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, establishes a new budget enforcement mechanism generally requiring that direct spending and revenue legislation enacted into law not increase the deficit. Title II, which contains only a single section, pertains to routine investigations by the Comptroller General aimed at eliminating duplicative and wasteful spending. This report provides a summary and legislative history of P.L. 111-139, focusing on the features of the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010. The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 (Statutory PAYGO Act) establishes a process intended, as Section 2 of the act states, "to enforce a rule of budget neutrality on new revenue and direct spending legislation." The budgetary effects of revenue and direct spending provisions enacted into law, including both costs and savings, are recorded by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on two PAYGO scorecards covering rolling five-year and 10-year periods (i.e., in each new session, the periods covered by the scorecards roll forward one fiscal year). The budgetary effects of PAYGO measures are determined by statements inserted into the Congressional Record by the chairmen of the House and Senate Budget Committees and referenced in the measures. As a general matter, the statements are expected to reflect cost estimates prepared by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). If this procedure is not followed for a PAYGO measure, then the budgetary effects of the measure are determined by OMB. Shortly after a congressional session ends, OMB finalizes the two PAYGO scorecards and determines whether a violation of the PAYGO requirement has occurred (i.e., if a debit has been recorded for the budget year on either scorecard). If so, the President issues a sequestration order that implements largely across-the-board cuts in nonexempt direct spending programs sufficient to remedy the violation by eliminating the debit. Many direct spending programs and activities are exempt from sequestration. If no PAYGO violation is found, no further action occurs and the process is repeated during the next session. The new statutory PAYGO process was created on a permanent basis; there are no expiration dates in the act. The process became effective upon enactment. As a budget enforcement tool, the new statutory PAYGO process is aimed at preventing, or at least discouraging, net deficit increases arising from the enactment of direct spending and revenue legislation. Any costs designated as emergencies are excluded from the scorecards, and significant costs associated with four specified categories of legislation may be excluded as well. In addition, significant savings stemming from the Community Living Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) Act, establishing an insurance program for long-term care, are excluded from the scorecards. Finally, debt service costs are excluded as well. The statutory PAYGO process does not address deficit increases, stemming from changes in direct spending or revenue levels, that are projected to occur under existing law. Other budget enforcement procedures, such as the reconciliation process under the Congressional Budget Act (CBA) of 1974, may be used to reduce deficit levels projected under existing law. Further, the statutory PAYGO process does not apply to discretionary spending, which is provided in annual appropriations acts.
crs_R40074	crs_R40074_0	Held in Miami in 1994, the Summit was the first meeting of the region's leaders since 1967 and was attended by all 34 democratically elected heads of government in the region, excluding only Fidel Castro of Cuba. Between the 1994 Miami Summit and the 2009 Port of Spain Summit , there were three Summits of the Americas and two Special Summits of the Americas , each introducing new initiatives and producing extensive Plans of Action . The Declaration of Nuevo León set the goal of providing anti-retroviral therapy to 600,000 people living with HIV/AIDS in the hemisphere by 2005. 2009 Port of Spain Summit The fifth Summit of the Americas was held April 17-19, 2009 in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago. The theme of the Port of Spain Summit was, "Securing our citizens' future by promoting human prosperity, energy security, and environmental sustainability." In the years following the Summit, the United States had become even more isolated from the rest of the region. Likewise, a number of heads of state and government from the region—including some traditional allies—vocally blamed the United States for the global financial crisis and called for a new U.S. policy toward Cuba. Given these divisions, many observers had low expectations for the Summit and cautioned that President Obama needed to be careful not to let it turn into a political circus. Despite these challenges, a number of analysts were optimistic about the Summit. Several Latin American leaders had expressed hope for improved relations with the United States following President Obama's election, leading some analysts to believe that President Obama would have an opportunity to strike a new tone in U.S. relations with the region. Strengthening Democratic Governance The nations of the Americas reaffirm their commitments to a variety of regional democratic initiatives in the Declaration, such as the Inter-American Democratic Charter and the Inter-American Conventional Against Corruption. Strengthening the Summit Process and Implementation In order to improve the effectiveness of the Summit of the Americas and ensure that the commitments made at the Summit are met, the Declaration adopts a number of reforms to the Summit process. Initiatives Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas During his speech at the Summit, President Obama proposed an "Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas." Microfinance Growth Fund for the Western Hemisphere As part of his commitment to combating inequality and creating prosperity from the bottom up, President Obama introduced a $100 million "Microfinance Growth Fund for the Western Hemisphere" at the Summit. Hemispheric Relations A number of analysts think that the most significant result of the Port of Spain Summit of the Americas may be an improvement in U.S. relations with the rest of the hemisphere. Despite speeches from some leaders that criticized past and current U.S. policies in the region and a few other confrontational incidents, the Summit was largely free of the contentious climate that characterized the previous Summit in Mar del Plata, Argentina.	The fifth Summit of the Americas in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago was held April 17-19, 2009. It was the first hemispheric forum for President Barack Obama to engage with leaders from across Latin America and the Caribbean. The Port of Spain Summit was also the first meeting of all 34 democratic heads of government from Latin America, the Caribbean, Canada, and the United States since the contentious 2005 Summit in Mar del Plata, Argentina. Despite some criticism of past and current U.S. policies in the region, the Summit was largely cordial and may provide the foundation for improved hemispheric relations. There have now been five Summits of the Americas, two Special Summits of the Americas, and a number of ministerial-level summits held since 1994. Previous Summits led to a number of successful initiatives in the region, including the creation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, reductions in the cost of remittance transfers, and increased provision of anti-retroviral therapy to victims of HIV/AIDS. Despite these accomplishments, some observers have criticized the Summits of the Americas as lacking transparency, being ineffective, or failing to advance U.S. interests. The theme for the Port of Spain Summit was, "Securing our citizens' future by promoting human prosperity, energy security, and environmental sustainability." Given the confrontational nature of the previous Summit and the actions of some regional leaders prior to their arrival in Port of Spain, many observers had low expectations for the Summit. Other analysts were optimistic about the possibility of improving hemispheric relations given President Obama's popularity in the region. Disagreements over Cuba's reintegration into the Inter-American System and other issues such as the global financial crisis prevented the Summit from producing a unanimous Declaration of Commitment, though a somewhat vague document was adopted as the consensus thought of the countries of the region. While the Summit Declaration introduced few concrete initiatives, President Obama offered several proposals, including an "Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas" and a "Microfinance Growth Fund for the Western Hemisphere." President Obama received a warm reception from the leaders of the region, leading some analysts to assert the most significant result of the Port of Spain Summit may be an improvement in U.S. relations with the rest of the hemisphere. On March 31, 2009, the Senate approved S.Res. 90 (Kerry) expressing support for the fifth Summit of the Americas and calling on the United States to reinvigorate and strengthen its engagement with the hemisphere, especially concerning the financial crisis, energy security, and public safety. The resolution also declared that the United States was prepared to work with the rest of the region to advance an agenda of human prosperity, implement a regional energy strategy, encourage the participation of non governmental organizations in the Summit process, and strengthen the Summit follow-up mechanisms. This report will not be updated.
crs_RL34157	crs_RL34157_0	Introduction to the Caribbean Region The Caribbean, encompassing 16 independent nations and 13 overseas territories, is a region of almost 42 million people that includes some of the hemisphere's richest and poorest nations. The region consists of 13 island nations from the Bahamas in the north to Trinidad and Tobago in the south; Belize, which is geographically located in Central America; and the two nations of Guyana and Suriname, located on the north central coast of South America. Guyana, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Suriname are republics headed by presidents. Regular free and fair elections have been the norm in most Caribbean nations for many years, with the exception of Cuba and Haiti. Although many Caribbean nations have maintained long democratic traditions, they are not immune from terrorist and other threats to their political stability. Many Caribbean nations experienced an economic slump in 2001-2002 due to downturns in the tourism and agriculture sectors, although most economies in the region have rebounded since 2003. Issues in Caribbean-U.S. Relations U.S. interests in the Caribbean are diverse, and include economic, political, and security concerns. The Administration describes the Caribbean as America's "third border," with events in the region having a direct impact on the homeland security of the United States. The U.S.-Caribbean relationship is characterized by extensive economic linkages, cooperation on counternarcotics efforts and security, and a sizeable U.S. foreign assistance program supporting a variety of projects to strengthen democracy, promote economic growth and development, alleviate poverty, and combat the AIDS epidemic in the region. Despite close U.S. relations with most Caribbean nations, at times there has been tension in the relationship. In another example, Caribbean nations generally maintain good relations with Cuba and Venezuela, and resent U.S. expressions of concern about these relations. U.S. Foreign Assistance The United States has provided considerable amounts of foreign assistance to the Caribbean over the past 25 years. Congress approved the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) ( P.L. The CBTPA benefits are scheduled to expire at the end of September 2008, or earlier if the country enters into a free trade agreement with the United States. Since the United States first implemented a preferential trade program for Caribbean Basin imports in 1984, the overall performance of the region's exports has been mixed (see Table 6 ). President Bush pledged to Caribbean leaders that he would work with Congress to extend and update the CBPTA. Most significantly, the initiative included increased funding to combat HIV/AIDS in the region. CRS Report RL32001, HIV/AI DS in the Caribbean and Central America , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL33951, U.S. Trade Policy and the Caribbean: From Trade Preferences to Free Trade Agreements , by [author name scrubbed].	With some 42 million people encompassing 16 independent countries and 13 overseas territories, the Caribbean is a diverse region that includes some of the hemisphere's richest and poorest nations. The region consists of 13 island countries, from the Bahamas in the north to Trinidad and Tobago in the south; Belize, which is geographically located in Central America; and the two countries of Guyana and Suriname, located on the north central coast of South America. With the exception of Cuba and Haiti, regular elections in the region are the norm, and for the most part have been free and fair. Nevertheless, while many Caribbean nations have long democratic traditions, they are not immune to threats to their political stability, including terrorism. Many nations in the region experienced economic decline in 2001-2002 due to downturns in the tourism and agriculture sectors, but most Caribbean economies have rebounded since 2003. U.S. interests in the Caribbean are diverse, and include economic, political, and security concerns. The Bush Administration describes the Caribbean as America's "third border," with events in the region having a direct impact on the homeland security of the United States. The U.S.-Caribbean relationship is characterized by extensive economic linkages, cooperation on counternarcotics and security, and a sizeable U.S. foreign assistance program. U.S. aid supports a variety of projects to strengthen democracy, promote economic growth and development, alleviate poverty, and combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the region. The United States has offered preferential treatment for Caribbean imports since 1984 under the Caribbean Basin Initiative yet the performance of the region's exports to the United States has been mixed. During a June 2007 meeting in Washington, DC, Caribbean leaders and President Bush pledged to strengthen existing trade arrangements. President Bush vowed to work with Congress to extend and update the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act, which provides NAFTA-like tariff treatment for Caribbean imports, before it expires at the end of September 2008. Despite close U.S. relations with most Caribbean nations, there has been tension at times in relations. Many Caribbean nations resent U.S. expressions of concern about their relations with Cuba and Venezuela. Another delicate issue has been the large number of deportations from the United States to the region over the past several years. This report, which will be updated periodically, deals with broad issues in U.S. relations with the Caribbean, including foreign assistance; counternarcotics and security cooperation; support to combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic; trade policy; the deportation issue; and energy issues. It does not include an extensive discussion of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, or Haiti, which are covered in other CRS reports. Additional CRS reports on the Caribbean region include CRS Report RL33951, U.S. Trade Policy and the Caribbean: From Trade Preferences to Free Trade Agreements, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL32001, HIV/AIDS in the Caribbean and Central America, by [author name scrubbed].
crs_R45251	crs_R45251_0	T he February 14, 2018, shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, FL; the March 20, 2018, shooting at Great Mills High School in Great Mills, MD; and the May 18, 2018, shooting at Santa Fe High School in Santa Fe, TX, are the latest school shootings to grab the country's attention. School resource officer (SRO) programs have emerged as one of the most popular strategies for increasing school safety. NCES reports that 42% of U.S. public schools that participated in the SSOCS survey indicated they had at least one full-time or part-time SRO during the 2015-2016 school year (SY). Select Issues for Congress There are multiple issues policymakers might consider should Congress take up legislation to promote SRO programs, including the following: What is the likelihood that children will be killed at school? Can the presence of an SRO at a school prevent a shooting? What effect do SROs have on the school environment? What steps can be taken to maximize the benefits of SRO programs? Figure 1 presents data on the number of at-school homicides of children ages 5-18 each school year from SY1992-1993 to SY2014-2015. While there were instances where there was a noticeable change in the number of at-school homicides from one school year to the next, the trend line (the dashed line in the figure) indicates that there has been a general downward trend in the number of at-school homicides during this period. NCES reported that during SY2014-2015 there were 1,168 homicides of children ages 5-18, of which 20 occurred at schools. While research on the effectiveness of SRO programs largely focuses on their effect on school crime, studies have also evaluated what effect they have on student and staff perceptions of school safety. How Often Does the Presence of an SRO Stop or Deter a School Shooter? As noted above, there is not a robust body of research addressing these issues. A recent Washington Post examination offers some insights on issues related to SROs and school shootings. After the Washington Post published its article on school shootings, there were two incidents where SROs intervened after someone had opened fire at a school. Therefore, while assigning an SRO to a school might improve relationships between law enforcement and youth, serve as a deterrent to a potential school shooter, or provide a quicker law enforcement response in cases where a school shooting occurs, it will also establish a regular law enforcement presence in the school. There might be some concern that onsite benefits and any potential deterrent effect generated by placing SROs in schools could be offset by the social costs that might arise by potentially having more children suspended or expelled from school or entering the juvenile justice system for relatively minor offenses. The question driving the research was whether the presence of SROs leads to greater use of suspensions and expulsions. They conclude that the presence of SROs in high schools is associated with higher levels of exclusionary discipline. While evaluation research on the efficacy of particular program models or characteristics is limited, the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Office, an office within the Department of Justice, has identified several elements of a successful SRO program. First, the COPS guide suggests that all schools should develop a comprehensive school safety plan based on their school safety goals and a thorough analysis of the problem(s) the school is facing before determining if it is necessary to employ an SRO. Second, the COPS guide suggests that schools and the law enforcement agencies that SROs work for should be aware of any pitfalls before agreeing to establish an SRO program. Third, the COPS guide suggests that selecting officers who are likely to succeed in a school environment—such as officers who can effectively work with students, parents, and school administrators; have an understanding of child development and psychology; and have public speaking and teaching skills—and properly training those officers are important components of a successful SRO program.	The school shootings at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, FL, Great Mills High School in Great Mills, MD, and Santa Fe High School in Santa Fe, TX, have generated renewed interest in what Congress might consider to enhance security at the nation's schools. School resource officer (SRO) programs have been discussed as a possible strategy for increasing school safety. SROs are sworn law enforcement officers who are assigned to work at a school on a long-term basis. While there are no current figures on the number of SROs in the United States, data indicate that 42% of U.S. public schools reported that they had at least one full-time or part-time SRO present at least once a week during the 2015-2016 school year (SY). There are multiple issues policymakers might consider should Congress take up legislation to promote SRO programs as a solution to school shootings, including the following: How common are at-school homicides? On average, annually, 23 children ages 5-18 were victims of homicide at school from SY1992-1993 to SY2014-2015. There was a general downward trend in the number of school-related homicides of children between these two time periods. Also, to place the number of school-related homicides in context, during SY2014-2015 there were 1,168 homicides of children ages 5-18, of which 20 occurred at schools. Can the presence of an SRO at a school prevent a school shooting? Much of the research evaluating the effectiveness of SRO programs has examined their effect on more common crimes and not school shootings, and the findings are mixed. Also potentially illuminating is a recent effort undertaken by the Washington Post that examined school shootings since 1999. It identified 197 incidences of gun violence during and near school hours and uncovered one instance when an SRO killed an active school shooter. Since the Post published its story there have been two other incidents where an SRO intervened during a school shooting. The extent to which the presence of an SRO has prevented a school shooting, however, is unknown. What effect do SROs have on the school environment? SROs may have varied effects on school environments. While assigning an SRO to a school might serve as a deterrent to a potential school shooter, or provide a quicker law enforcement response in cases where a school shooting occurs, it may also escalate the consequences associated with students' actions. SROs establish a regular law enforcement presence in schools and there is some concern their presence might result in more children either being suspended or expelled or entering the criminal justice system for relatively minor offenses. There is a limited body of research available regarding the effect SROs have on the school setting. One meta-analysis suggests the presence of SROs is associated with more suspensions and expulsions. Research findings regarding the effect SROs have on student arrests suggest that the presence of SROs might increase the chances that students are arrested for some low-level offenses such as disorderly conduct. What steps can be taken to maximize the benefits of SRO programs? The Community Oriented Policing Services Office in the Department of Justice has identified several steps that can be taken that might improve outcomes for SRO programs, including developing a comprehensive school safety plan to help assess whether it is necessary to employ an SRO, being aware of potential pitfalls before agreeing to establish an SRO program, and selecting officers who are likely to succeed in a school environment and properly training those officers.
crs_R40458	crs_R40458_0	On January 13, 2009, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued a notice in the Federal Register regarding the availability of its guidance for industry on the distribution of medical journal articles and scientific publications regarding unapproved new uses (also known as off-label uses) of approved drugs. The guidance seemingly creates a safe harbor for dissemination of information on off-label uses of FDA-approved drugs. First, this report outlines the relevant provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) and related regulations that have been used to address misbranding violations of the act that relate to pharmaceutical manufacturers' promotion of off-label use. Second, the report summarizes the FDA's previous off-label marketing provisions under FDAMA § 401, which are no longer in effect. Third, the report details the January 2009 guidance document and its similarities to and differences from the FDAMA provisions. Fourth, the report outlines First Amendment challenges to FDAMA and older FDA guidance documents addressing off-label promotion. Fifth, the report discusses the nature of guidance documents, in contrast to rules promulgated under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), as well as administrative law issues associated with the FDA's issuance of the guidance. Sixth, the report provides an overview of the False Claims Act (FCA) and related qui tam cases that addressed off-label marketing practices of pharmaceutical companies. Finally, the report analyzes the interaction of the new guidance document and the FCA. When a person submits a new drug application to the FDA for approval, the application includes samples of the proposed labeling for the drug. While a physician may prescribe a drug for off-label uses, a pharmaceutical manufacturer may not market or promote a drug for uses other than those on the label—those uses approved by the FDA in a drug application. Manufacturer marketing and promotion of off-label uses is linked to the FFDCA's prohibition against misbranding. The guidance does not include the following, which were present in FDAMA: (1) the requirement for a submission of a supplemental new drug application or the Secretary's approval of an application for an exemption from this requirement; (2) the Secretary's ability to require a manufacturer to disseminate (a) additional scientifically sound information to provide objectivity and balance, and (b) a statement from the Secretary on the safety and effectiveness of the unapproved use; (3) the Secretary's ability to order the manufacturer to cease dissemination of information in certain situations, such as if the Secretary determined that the unapproved use may not be effective or may present a significant risk to public health, or if the information did not comply with FDAMA's provisions; (4) provisions that required manufacturers to submit lists of the articles and reference publications that they disseminated and to keep records in case the manufacturer was required to take corrective action; (5) the requirement that the manufacturer include, along with the information being disseminated, "a statement that there are products or treatments that have been approved or cleared for the use that is the subject of the information being disseminated" and, if applicable, a statement "that the information is being distributed at the expense of the manufacturer"; (6) the requirement that a copy of the information to be disseminated and clinical trial information regarding the unapproved use be submitted to the Secretary 60 days prior to dissemination; (7) the requirement that the article not have unapproved uses of drugs or devices as its primary focus; and (8) a provision requiring that a scientific or medical journal be a publication "that is generally recognized to be of national scope and reputation." The FDA appealed. Nor would the FDA's guidance affect the legal authority, enforcement powers, or other capabilities of outside agencies that have been involved in prosecuting FCA cases related to off-label marketing, such as the HHS Office of Inspector General, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Justice.	New drugs may not be introduced or marketed without the approval of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). When a person submits a drug application to the FDA for approval, the application includes samples of the proposed labeling. The FDA may refuse to approve an application if the drug is not safe or effective for the specific uses that are reflected in its labeling. An unapproved new use of a drug, also known as an off-label use, is a use not mentioned in the drug's approved labeling. Although a physician may prescribe a drug for off-label uses, a pharmaceutical manufacturer may not market or promote uses of a drug other than those on the label—those uses approved by the FDA in the application. In January 2009, the FDA issued a guidance document on the dissemination of medical information regarding off-label uses of drugs. The guidance seemingly creates a safe harbor for dissemination of information on off-label uses of FDA-approved drugs and medical devices. However, the agency's guidance statement does not have the force or effect of law, and the FDA still retains its legal authority under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) and FDA regulations to determine when promotion of an unapproved new use has occurred or when a product is misbranded. Additionally, the guidance does not affect the legal authority, enforcement powers, or other capabilities of outside entities that have been involved in prosecuting False Claims Act (FCA) cases related to off-label marketing and the submission of false claims for reimbursement from the U.S. government. First, this report outlines the relevant provisions of the FFDCA and related regulations that have been used to address misbranding violations of the act that relate to pharmaceutical manufacturers' promotion of off-label use. Second, the report summarizes the FDA's previous off-label marketing provisions under the FDA Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA), which are no longer in effect. Third, the report details the January 2009 guidance document and its similarities to and differences from the FDAMA provisions. Fourth, the report outlines First Amendment challenges to FDAMA and older FDA guidance documents addressing off-label promotion. Fifth, the report discusses the nature of guidance documents, in contrast to rules promulgated under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), as well as administrative law issues associated with the FDA's issuance of the guidance. Sixth, the report provides an overview of the FCA and related qui tam cases that addressed off-label marketing practices of pharmaceutical companies. Finally, the report analyzes the interaction of the new guidance document and the FCA.
crs_RS20095	crs_RS20095_0	Instead, a number of laws and congressional rules contribute to the federal budget process, with two statutes in particular forming the basic framework. The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, as codified in Title 31 of the United States Code , established the statutory basis for an executive budget process by requiring the President to submit to Congress annually a proposed budget for the federal government. Although it also does not have the force of law, the budget resolution is a central part of the budget process in Congress. Appropriations bills are constrained in terms of both their purpose and the amount of funding they provide. Any change in the authorized level of the public debt must be implemented through a statutory enactment.	The term "budget process," when applied to the federal government, actually refers to a number of processes that have evolved separately and that occur with varying degrees of coordination. This overview, and the accompanying flow chart, are intended to describe in brief each of the parts of the budget process that involve Congress, clarify the role played by each, and explain how they operate together. They include the President's budget submission, the budget resolution, reconciliation, sequestration, authorizations, and appropriations. This report will be updated to reflect any changes in the budget process.
crs_R40724	crs_R40724_0	3200 This report summarizes the key provisions affecting private health insurance in America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, found in Division A, as ordered reported by House Committees on Ways and Means, on Education and Labor, and on Energy and Commerce. Division A of H.R. 3200 focuses on reducing the number of uninsured, restructuring the private health insurance market, setting minimum standards for health benefits, providing financial assistance to certain individuals, and, in some cases, small employers. In general, H.R. 3200 would include the following: Individuals would be required to maintain health insurance, and employers would be required to either provide insurance or pay a payroll assessment, with some exceptions. Several market reforms would be made, such as modified community rating and guaranteed issue and renewal. Both the individual and employer mandates would be linked to acceptable health insurance coverage, which would meet required minimum standards and incorporate the market reforms included in the bill. Acceptable coverage would include coverage under a qualified health benefits plan (QHBP), which could be offered either through the newly created Exchange or outside the Exchange through new employer plans; grandfathered employment based plans; grandfathered nongroup plans; and other coverage, such as Medicare and Medicaid. The Exchange would offer private plans alongside a public option. Certain individuals with incomes below 400% of the federal poverty level could qualify for subsidies toward their premium costs and cost-sharing; these subsidies would be available only through the Exchange. In the individual market (the nongroup market), a plan could be grandfathered indefinitely, but only if no changes were made to the terms and conditions of the plan, including benefits and cost-sharing, and premiums were only increased as allowed by statute. Most of these provisions would be effective beginning in 2013. H.R. The Exchange would not be an insurer; it would provide eligible individuals and small businesses with access to insurers' plans in a comparable way (in the same way, for example, that Travelocity or Expedia are not airlines but provide access to available flights and fares in a comparable way). The public health insurance option and the income-based premium and cost-sharing credits for certain individuals (described below) would be available only through the Exchange. Individual and Employer Eligibility for Exchange Plans Under the Education and Labor as well as the Ways and Means versions of H.R. 3200 , the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) would establish a public health insurance option through the Exchange. 3200 , the Secretary would be required to negotiate with medical providers to set payment rates, subject to limits. The Energy and Commerce version of H.R. Cooperatives The Energy and Commerce version also would establish a federal grant and loan program to assist the establishment and initial operation of health insurance cooperatives. Such cooperatives would be state-licensed, non-profit, member-run organizations not sponsored by the state, and offer coverage through the Exchange. 3200 , Exchange-eligible individuals could receive a credit in the Exchange if they are lawfully present in a state in the United States, with some exclusions; are not enrolled under an Exchange plan as an employee or their dependent (through an employer who purchases coverage for its employees through the Exchange and satisfies the minimum employer premium contribution amounts); are not a full-time employee in a firm where the employer offers health insurance and makes the required contribution toward that coverage; have modified adjusted gross income (MAGI) of less than 400% of the federal poverty level (FPL); and are ineligible for Medicaid, except for the few previously mentioned exceptions.	This report summarizes key provisions affecting private health insurance in H.R. 3200, America's Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, as ordered reported by House Committees on Education and Labor, Ways and Means, and Energy and Commerce. Specifically, this report focuses on Division A (or I) of H.R. 3200 from those committees. Division A of H.R. 3200 focuses on reducing the number of uninsured, restructuring the private health insurance market, setting minimum standards for health benefits, and providing financial assistance to certain individuals and, in some cases, small employers. In general, H.R. 3200 would require individuals to maintain health insurance and employers to either provide insurance or pay a payroll assessment, with some exceptions. Several insurance market reforms would be made, such as modified community rating and guaranteed issue and renewal. Both the individual and employer mandates would be linked to acceptable health insurance coverage, which would meet required minimum standards and incorporate the market reforms included in the bill. Acceptable coverage would include (1) coverage under a qualified health benefits plan (QHBP), which could be offered either through the newly created Health Insurance Exchange (the Exchange) or outside the Exchange through new employer plans; (2) grandfathered employment based plans; (3) grandfathered nongroup plans; and (4) other coverage, such as Medicare and Medicaid. The Exchange would offer private plans alongside a public option. Based on income, certain individuals could qualify for subsidies toward their premium costs and cost-sharing (deductibles and copayments); these subsidies would be available only through the Exchange. In the individual market (the nongroup market), a plan could be grandfathered indefinitely, but only if no changes were made to the terms and conditions of that plan, including benefits and cost-sharing, and premiums were only increased as allowed by statute. Most of these provisions would be effective beginning in 2013. The Exchange would not be an insurer; it would provide eligible individuals and small businesses with access to insurers' plans in a comparable way. The Exchange would consist of a selection of private plans as well as a public option. Individuals wanting to purchase the public option or a private health insurance not through an employer or a grandfathered nongroup plan could only obtain such coverage through the Exchange. They would only be eligible to enroll in an Exchange plan if they were not enrolled in other acceptable coverage (e.g., from an employer, Medicare, and generally Medicaid). The public option would be established by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), would offer three different cost-sharing options, and would vary premiums geographically. For the public option, the Ways and Means and Education and Labor versions would have the Secretary set payments to health care providers based on Medicare payment rates, while the Energy and Commerce version would require the Secretary to negotiate rates with medical providers. The Energy and Commerce version also would establish a federal grant and loan program to assist the establishment and initial operation of health insurance cooperatives. Such cooperatives would be state-licensed, non-profit, member-run organizations not sponsored by the state, and offer coverage through the Exchange. Only within the Exchange, credits would be available to limit the amount of money certain individuals would pay for premiums and for cost-sharing (deductibles and copayments). (Although Medicaid is beyond the scope of this report, H.R. 3200 would extend Medicaid coverage for most individuals under 133⅓% of poverty; individuals would generally be ineligible for Exchange coverage if they were eligible for Medicaid.)
crs_RL34356	crs_RL34356_0	Introduction The Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T) is the primary organization for research and development (R&D) in the Department of Homeland Security. With a budget of $932.6 million in FY2009, the directorate conducts R&D in several laboratories of its own and funds R&D conducted by other government agencies, the Department of Energy national laboratories, industry, and universities. In the past, some Members of Congress have been highly critical of the directorate's performance. More recently, management changes have considerably muted this criticism. Nevertheless, a number of fundamental issues remain. It outlines key policy issues, including the balance of the directorate's programs, its priorities and how they are set, its relationships with other R&D organizations, its mission, its budgeting and financial management, and other concerns. The directorate consists primarily of six research divisions: the Explosives; Chemical and Biological; Command, Control, and Interoperability; Borders and Maritime Security; Human Factors; and Infrastructure and Geophysical Divisions. This section discusses three aspects of that debate: whether the directorate's "customers" are the other components of DHS, the ultimate end users, such as state and local first responders, or both; the scope of the directorate's R&D mission relative to other DHS components (such as DNDO); and the extent to which the directorate's role should include operational and other responsibilities as well as R&D. Directorate priorities can be somewhat inferred from the allocation of funding within the directorate, but no planning and prioritization documents were publicly available. The definitions of basic research appear similar. One aspect that has drawn the attention of congressional policymakers is the persistence of unobligated balances from prior fiscal years. In addition, the national laboratories can compete for the directorate's R&D funding. The Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, shall have the responsibility for— (1) advising the Secretary regarding research and development efforts and priorities in support of the Department's missions; (2) developing, in consultation with other appropriate executive agencies, a national policy and strategic plan for, identifying priorities, goals, objectives and policies for, and coordinating the Federal Government's civilian efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to chemical, biological, and other emerging terrorist threats, including the development of comprehensive, research-based definable goals for such efforts and development of annual measurable objectives and specific targets to accomplish and evaluate the goals for such efforts; (3) supporting the Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, by assessing and testing homeland security vulnerabilities and possible threats; (4) conducting basic and applied research, development, demonstration, testing, and evaluation activities that are relevant to any or all elements of the Department, through both intramural and extramural programs, except that such responsibility does not extend to human health-related research and development activities; (5) establishing priorities for, directing, funding, and conducting national research, development, test and evaluation, and procurement of technology and systems for— (A) preventing the importation of chemical, biological, and related weapons and material; and (B) detecting, preventing, protecting against, and responding to terrorist attacks; (6) establishing a system for transferring homeland security developments or technologies to Federal, State, local government, and private sector entities; (7) entering into work agreements, joint sponsorships, contracts, or any other agreements with the Department of Energy regarding the use of the national laboratories or sites and support of the science and technology base at those facilities; (8) collaborating with the Secretary of Agriculture and the Attorney General as provided in [7 U.S.C. The directorate's budgeting aligned with these portfolio topics.	The Directorate of Science and Technology is the primary organization for research and development (R&D) in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). With an appropriated budget of $932.6 million in FY2009, it conducts R&D in several laboratories of its own and funds R&D conducted by other government agencies, the Department of Energy national laboratories, industry, and universities. The directorate consists primarily of six divisions: Chemical and Biological; Explosives; Command, Control, and Interoperability; Borders and Maritime Security; Infrastructure and Geophysical; and Human Factors. Additional offices have responsibilities, such as laboratory facilities and university programs, that cut across the divisions. The directorate is headed by the Under Secretary for Science and Technology. In the past, some Members of Congress and other observers have been highly critical of the directorate's performance. Although management changes have somewhat muted this criticism in recent years, fundamental issues remain. Among these are the allocation of R&D funding within the directorate's programs, including the balance among basic research, applied research, and development and the proportion of funds allocated to government, industry, and academia; how the directorate sets priorities, including its use of strategic planning documents, its system of Integrated Product Teams, and the extent to which it bases priorities on risk assessment; the nature and effectiveness of the directorate's relationships with other federal R&D organizations, such as the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, other organizations inside DHS, the Department of Energy national laboratories, and other agencies; the definition of the directorate's mission, such as identification of its customers, the scope of its R&D role within DHS, and the extent of its non-R&D missions; the directorate's budgeting and financial management, including the quality of its budget documents and the persistence of unobligated balances; the directorate's responsiveness to Congress; and the establishment of metrics and goals for evaluating the directorate's output. Congressional policymakers are widely expected to consider reauthorization legislation for DHS during the 111th Congress. Such legislation would likely include provisions that would affect the Science and Technology Directorate.
crs_R45449	crs_R45449_0	Introduction On October 24, 2018, President Trump signed into law the Substance Use-Disorder Prevention That Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and Communities Act (SUPPORT Act; P.L. 115-271 ). The conference report on the bill was approved by the House 393-8 on September 28, 2018, and it cleared the Senate 98-1 on October 3, 2018. The law was enacted in response to growing concerns among the U.S. public and lawmakers about increasing numbers of drug overdose deaths. Opioid overdose deaths, in particular, have increased significantly since 2002. In 2015, an estimated 33,091 Americans died of opioid-related overdoses, almost three times as many as in 2002, around the beginning of the opioid epidemic in the United States. In 2016, that number had increased to 42,249. In October 2017, President Trump declared the opioid epidemic a national public health emergency. The SUPPORT Act is a sweeping measure designed to address widespread overprescribing and abuse of opioids in the United States. The act includes provisions to bolster law enforcement, public health, and health care financing and coverage, including under Medicare and Medicaid. The legislation imposes tighter oversight of opioid production and distribution; requires additional reporting and safeguards to address fraud; and limits coverage of prescription opioids. It also expands coverage of and access to opioid addiction treatment services. In addition, the act authorizes programs that seek to expand consumer and provider education on opioid use and train additional providers to treat individuals with opioid use disorders (OUDs). This report describes specific programmatic changes in the Medicare program in the SUPPORT Act. Overall, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated the SUPPORT Act would increase the on-budget deficit by $1,001 million over 5 years (FY2019-2023) but reduce the on-budget deficit by $52 million over 10 years (FY2019-FY2028). During the 114 th Congress, the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 (CARA; P.L. 114-198 ) was enacted. CARA addressed substance use issues broadly, targeting the opioid crisis predominantly through public health and law enforcement strategies. T he 21 st Century Cures Act (Cures Act; P.L. 114-255 ), also enacted in 2016, largely addressed cures and treatment research by authorizing new funding for medical research, amending the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) drug approval process, and authorizing additional funding to combat opioid addiction, among other things. SUPPORT ACT Provisions The SUPPORT Act consists of eight titles Title I: Medicaid Provisions to Address the Opioid Crisis Title II: Medicare Provisions to Address the Opioid Crisis Title III: FDA and Controlled Substance Provisions Title IV: Offsets Title V: Other Medicaid Provisions Title VI: Other Medicare Provisions Title VII: Public Health Provisions Title VIII: Miscellaneous The Congressional Research Service is publishing a series of reports on this law, organized by title. This report covers Medicare provisions in Title II and Title VI and one Medicare budget offset in Title IV. Another area of suggested action is improving Medicare coverage of medication-assisted treatment (MAT), which combines medications with counseling and behavioral therapies to provide a holistic approach to addressing OUD. However, Medicare does not cover MAT services in federally registered opioid treatment programs (OTPs, or methadone clinics). A section-by-section analysis of the SUPPORT Act follows Table 1 . CARA allows Part D plans to limit ( lock in ) the number of prescribers and pharmacies used by enrollees at risk of opioid overutilization, starting in 2019. Legislative and administrative options for improving coverage of and payment for non-opioid pain management therapies and for FDA-approved medical devices and non-opioid pharmacological and non-pharmacological therapies for treatment of pain as alternatives to or to augment opioid therapy; improving and disseminating treatment strategies for beneficiaries with psychiatric or substance use disorders, who are at risk of suicide, or who have comorbidities and require consultation or management by specialists in pain management, mental health, or addiction treatment, and to address health disparities related to opioid use and opioid abuse treatment; educating providers about the risks of co-administration of opioids and other drugs; ensuring appropriate management of transitions between inpatient and outpatient care or between opioid and non-opioid therapy; expanding outreach for and education of providers on alternative and non-opioid therapies for acute and chronic pain management; and creating a beneficiary education tool on opioid alternatives for chronic pain management.	On October 24, 2018, President Trump signed into law the Substance Use-Disorder Prevention That Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and Communities Act (SUPPORT Act; P.L. 115-271). The conference report on the bill was approved by the House 393-8 on September 28, 2018, and it cleared the Senate 98-1 on October 3, 2018. The law was enacted in response to growing concerns among the U.S. public and lawmakers about increasing numbers of drug overdose deaths. Opioid overdose deaths, in particular, have increased significantly since 2002. In 2015, an estimated 33,091 Americans died of opioid-related overdoses, almost three times as many as in 2002, around the beginning of the opioid epidemic in the United States. In 2016, that number had increased to 42,249. In October 2017, President Trump declared the opioid epidemic a public health emergency. The SUPPORT Act is a sweeping measure designed to address widespread overprescribing and abuse of opioids in the United States. The act includes provisions to bolster law enforcement, public health, and health care financing and coverage, including under Medicare and Medicaid. It imposes tighter oversight of opioid production and distribution; requires additional reporting and safeguards to address fraud; alters programs related to the provision of support to children in the child welfare system because of their parent's or caregiver's opioid use; and limits coverage of prescription opioids. It also expands coverage of and access to opioid addiction treatment services. In addition, the act authorizes programs to expand consumer education on opioid use and train additional providers to treat individuals with opioid use disorders (OUDs). The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) forecast that the SUPPORT Act would increase the on-budget deficit by $1,001 million over 5 years (FY2019-2023) but reduce the on-budget deficit by $52 million over 10 years (FY2019-FY2028). The SUPPORT Act is one of several recent laws aimed at addressing the opioid epidemic. The 114th Congress enacted the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 (CARA; P.L. 114-198). CARA addressed substance use issues broadly, targeting the opioid crisis predominantly through public health and law enforcement strategies. The 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act; P.L. 114-255), also enacted in 2016, authorized new funding for medical research, amended the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) drug approval process, and authorized additional funding to combat opioid addiction, among other provisions. The SUPPORT Act consists of eight titles. The Congressional Research Service is publishing a series of reports on this law, organized by title. This report provides a section-by-section description of Medicare provisions in Titles II and VI, as well as one Medicare budget offset in Title IV. Among significant Medicare changes, the law creates a Medicare bundled payment for an incident of medication-assisted treatment (MAT), which combines medications with counseling and behavioral therapies to provide a holistic approach to treating OUD and makes federally registered opioid treatment programs (OTPs) approved Medicare providers. It also requires private insurers that offer Medicare Part D prescription drug plans to implement "lock-in" programs, starting in CY2022, that limit the number of pharmacies and prescribers used by enrollees identified as at risk of opioid abuse. This report is intended to reflect the SUPPORT Act at enactment (i.e., October 24, 2018); it does not track the act's implementation or funding. This report will not be updated.
crs_RL30205	crs_RL30205_0	Most Recent Developments On October 6, conferees reached agreement on the FY2000 defenseappropriations bill, H.R. The House approved the conference agreement by a vote of 372-55 onOctober 13, and the Senate approved it by a vote of 87-11 on October 14, and thePresident signed the bill into law, P.L. The key issue in theconference concerned funding for the F-22 fighter. The total amount is about $500million below the request ($1.85 billion in procurement and $1.2 billion in R&D). The conference agreement also prohibits award of an initial low-rate productioncontract unless certain testing is successfully completed. A conference report was filed on October 8. The President signed the bill into law, P.L.106-79 , on October 25. The Senate-passed appropriations bill used about $4.9 billion of fundsprovided in the Kosovo supplemental appropriations bill as an offset for defenseincreases and provided a total of $264.7 billion, $1.4 billion above the request. The amount available to DOD and other agencies in the House bill was$5.4 billion above the request and $4.0 billion above the Senate level. The appropriations conference agreement reported on October 8 provides $267.8 billion, $1 billion below the House level and $4.5 billion above the request. In addition to debate about the level of defense spending, several other issues arose early in the session, including how much to increase military pay and benefits; whether to require deployment of a nationwide missile defense;and whether to approve military operations against Yugoslavia andhow much money to provide for Kosovo-related operations. The Senate-passed version of the FY2000 defense appropriationsbill, S. 1122 , included increases in various defense programs consistentwith the budget resolution and the defense authorization bills but then used $1.838billion provided in the Kosovo bill for personnel and $3.1 billion in the Kosovo billfor readiness and munitions as offsets for the increases (see Table 2 , above). As in the Senate proposal, it provides for higher than ECI pay raises in thefuture, but it does not expand GI Bill benefits, and it does not provide a highersubsistence allowance. Authorization and appropriations action: Funding for operations against Yugoslavia was a major issue in House action on the FY2000 defenseauthorization bill. Authorization and appropriations action: The conference agreement on the defense appropriations bill provides a total of $2.522 billion for the F-22program, including $1.222 billion for R&D, $1 billion for acquisition of aircraft,and $300 million in advance FY2001 appropriations for program terminationliability. The conference agreementalso prohibits award of an initial low-rate production contract unless certaintesting is successfully completed Aside from the F-22 debate, all of the defense bills added some funds for weapons procurement and R&D, -- see Table 2, above for a breakdown ofcommittee action by title, and Table A-2 in the appendix for a comparison ofaction on selected acquisition programs. 1555 ,offered by Senator Kyl, to establish an independent organization within theDepartment of Energy to oversee security. Supplemental Appropriations H.R. Military Base Closures: Time for Another Round? Military Interventions by U.S. a.	On October 6, conferees reached agreement on the FY2000 defense appropriations bill, H.R. 2561 , and the conference report was filed on October 8. The House approved theconference agreement by a vote of 372-55 on October 13, and the Senate approved it by a vote of87 to 11 on October 14, and the President signed the bill into law, P.L. 106-79 , on October 25. Thekey issue in the conference concerned funding for the F-22 fighter. The conference agreementprovides a total of $2.522 billion for the program, including $1.222 billion for R&D, $1 billion foracquisition of test aircraft, and $300 million in advance FY2001 appropriations for programtermination liability. The total amount is about $500 million below the request ($1.85 billion inprocurement and $1.2 billion in R&D). The conference agreement also prohibits award of an initiallow-rate production contract unless certain testing is successfully completed. Aside from the F-22, major issues in the FY2000 defense debate included whether to approve a new round of military base closures, how much to provide for military pay and benefits, whetherto impose constraints on funding for U.S. military operations in Kosovo, how to fund theater missiledefense programs, and how to respond to security lapses at Department of Energy (DOE) weaponslabs. The conference agreement on the defense authorization bill does not approve a new round ofmilitary base closures. It provides somewhat larger increases in pay and benefits than theAdministration had requested, including a 4.8% pay raise in 2000 and increased retirement benefits,though it does not include a Senate-passed provision to expand Montgomery GI Bill benefits. Although Congress approved supplemental FY1999 appropriations for Kosovo operations, theAdministration's policy remains controversial. The House removed a provision from the defenseauthorization bill prohibiting funds to be used for future operations in Kosovo, but only after theAdministration agreed to seek supplemental appropriations to cover costs of a peacekeeping missionin FY2000. Earlier in the year, both houses approved bills calling for deployment of a nationwidemissile defense, but funding for theater missile defense programs was a matter of dispute. Theauthorization conference agreement establishes an independent organization within DOE to overseesecurity, and the President objected to these provisions even as he signed the bill into law. Finally, the level of defense spending was resolved only at the very end of the appropriations process. The Senate-passed appropriations bill used about $4.9 billion of funds provided in theKosovo supplemental appropriations bill as an offset for defense increases and provided a net totalof $264.7 billion, $1.4 billion above the request. The House bill provided $268.7 billion in newbudget authority, $5.4 billion above the request and $4.0 billion above the Senate level. Theappropriations conference agreement provides $267.8 billion in FY2000, of which $7.2 billion isdesignated as emergency appropriations. Key Policy Staff
crs_R44026	crs_R44026_0	Introduction Advances in genomics technology and information technology infrastructure, together with policies regarding the sharing of research data, support expanded genomic research efforts but also raise new issues with respect to privacy, and specifically the effort to balance "the potential of scientific progress with privacy and respect for persons." The development of new genomic sequencing technologies has allowed for the generation of big data, and recent changes in information technology infrastructure—including, for example, cloud data storage—have facilitated big data storage and analytics. These developments are expected to support significant changes in health research and, eventually, in health care delivery. Genetic and genomic research have generated large amounts of genetic data. If these "large-scale genomic data" are generated as a part of research funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), then they are subject to specific data sharing policies and are often held in publicly available databases. Among other things, advances in sequencing technology have enabled this research, and have made available large amounts of data at a rate that has generally outpaced the ability to both store and analyze that data (see "What is DNA Sequencing?" NIH has established a comprehensive policy for the sharing of genomic data that "applies to all NIH-funded research that generates large-scale human or non-human genomic data as well as the use of these data for subsequent research." This policy requires investigators to outline their data sharing plans as part of their funding applications; if investigators fail to submit the required data, NIH may withhold funding. Investigators are required to de-identify the data prior to submitting it to NIH-designated data repositories. Data should be de-identified—stripped of identifiers such as an individual's name—according to the requirements of both the (1) HHS Common Rule and (2) the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule. Recent studies suggest that different types of genomic data may be more likely to raise privacy issues than had been previously understood. Researchers were able to reidentify these individuals using their publicly available de-identified personal genome data and other publicly available data. Relevant law includes (1) the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy and Security Rules; (2) the HHS Regulations for the Protection of Human Research Subjects, or the Common Rule; (3) GINA; and (4) the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). FOIA is relevant, not in the sense that it protects information from a potential privacy breach, but in that it allows public access to much of the information held by the federal government. The remaining sections of this report provide an overview of each of these relevant laws and regulations. The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA, P.L.	Advances in genomics technology and information technology infrastructure, together with policies regarding the sharing of research data, support new approaches to genomic research but also raise new issues with respect to privacy. The development of new genomic sequencing technologies has allowed for the generation of big data, and recent changes in information technology infrastructure have facilitated big data storage and analytics. These developments are expected to support significant changes in health research and, eventually, in health care delivery. Genetic and genomic research—and other "omics" research—have generated large amounts of genetic data. If these "large-scale genomic data" are generated as a part of research funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), then they are subject to specific data sharing policies and are often held in publicly available databases. Among other things, advances in sequencing technology have enabled this research, making large amounts of data available at a rate that has generally outpaced the ability to both store and analyze that data. NIH has established a comprehensive policy for the sharing of genomic data that "applies to all NIH-funded research that generates large-scale human or non-human genomic data as well as the use of these data for subsequent research." This policy requires investigators to outline their data sharing plans as part of their funding applications; if investigators fail to submit the required data, NIH may withhold funding. Investigators are required to de-identify the data prior to submitting it to NIH-designated data repositories, according to the requirements of both the HHS Common Rule and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule. Some recent studies have begun to suggest that different types of molecular data may be more likely to cause privacy issues than had been previously understood, and specifically, that de-identified large-scale genomic sequence data may in fact be able to be reidentified. In a recent study, researchers were able to reidentify research participants using the publicly available de-identified personal genome data and other publicly available metadata. This demonstration of reidentified individuals in a research study using de-identified genome data raises the question of whether—and if so, how—relevant current law should be modified in response to this new capability. Relevant law governs informed consent, access to research data, and the use of this data, and includes (1) the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy and Security Rules; (2) the HHS Regulations for the Protection of Human Research Subjects, or the Common Rule; and (3) the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA). In addition, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is relevant, not in the sense that it protects information from a potential privacy breach, but in that it allows public access to much of the information held by the federal government. This report discusses these considerations in the context of each of the relevant laws and regulations.
crs_R45340	crs_R45340_0	C ongress regularly considers legislative proposals to designate lands using a variety of titles, such as national park, national wildlife refuge, national monument, national conservation area, national recreation area, and many others. Additionally, Congress provides oversight of land designations made by executive branch entities. These congressional and executive land designations may bring few management changes to a site or may involve significant management changes, based on individual designating laws and/or general authorities governing a land system. The designations may authorize federal funding for an area, but they do not always do so. Who has authority to confer each designation? Which agency or nonfederal entity is responsible for managing the land under each designation, and which statutes would govern management decisions? What types of uses would be allowed on the land under each designation, and what uses would be prohibited? This report begins by briefly discussing some general factors that Congress may consider when determining which, if any, federal land designations might be suitable for a given area. It then compares selected designations across multiple attributes ( Table 1 ). Four agencies manage almost all federal land in the United States: the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and National Park Service (NPS) in the Department of the Interior (DOI), and the U.S. Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture.	This report provides a brief guide to selected titles—such as national park, national wildlife refuge, national monument, national conservation area, national recreation area, and others—that Congress and the executive branch have used to designate certain U.S. lands. These designations primarily apply to federal lands administered by land management agencies, including the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and National Park Service (NPS) in the Department of the Interior and the U.S. Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture. The report also discusses certain designations that Congress and executive branch entities have bestowed on nonfederally managed lands to recognize their national significance. It addresses questions about what the different land titles signify, which entity confers each designation, who manages the land under each designation, which statutes govern management decisions, and what types of uses may be allowed or prohibited on the land. Depending on the authorities governing each land designation, congressional and executive designations may bring few management changes to a site or may involve significant management changes. The designations may authorize new federal funding for an area, but they do not always do so. The report begins by briefly discussing some general factors that Congress may consider when contemplating which, if any, federal designation might be suitable for a given area. It then compares selected designations across multiple attributes.
crs_R42950	crs_R42950_0	For most of the twentieth century, the primary use of coal in the United States was for electric power generation. Electric Power Generation For most of the history of power generation in the United States, coal has been the dominant fuel used to produce electricity. Even as recently as 2011, coal was used to fuel almost 42% of power generation in the United States, as shown in Figure 2 . Coal has been the fuel of choice for many decades because of its wide availability, and the relatively low cost of producing electricity in large, coal-burning power plants. Coal's low-priced, high energy content enabled the building of power plants able to take advantage of economies of scale in steam-electric production. Horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing (i.e., fracking) have dramatically improved shale gas production, and the increased supplies of natural gas have caused prices to fall. In April 2012, for the first time in history, the amount of electricity generation from natural gas equaled that of coal, according to EIA statistics, each with about 32% of the market. The price of natural gas, coal's chief competitor, has dropped significantly in recent years due to the increase in domestic production of natural gas. If these previously unconventional shale gas resources can be economically developed and produced in an environmentally acceptable manner, then a sustained, relatively inexpensive supply of natural gas could persist. In addition to being the largest source of electric power, coal-fired power plants are among the largest sources of air pollution in the United States. More than half a dozen separate CAA programs could potentially be used to control emissions, which makes compliance strategy potentially complicated for utilities and difficult for regulators. Because the cost of the most stringent available controls, for the entire industry, could range into the tens of billions of dollars, power companies have fought hard and rather successfully to limit or delay regulations affecting them, particularly with respect to plants constructed before the Clean Air Act of 1970 was passed. The expected retirement of approximately 27 GW of coal-fired capacity by 2016 has been reported to EIA by coal plant owners and operators, accounting for approximately 8.5% of U.S. coal-fired capacity. While the costs of compliance with new EPA environmental regulations are a factor, several other issues are cited by coal plant owners and operators as contributing to these retirement decisions including the age of coal-fired power plants, modest electricity demand growth, the availability of previously underutilized natural gas combined-cycle power plants, and the lower price of natural gas due to shale gas development. And some coal plants which have made significant modifications to meet existing EPA regulations are being closed or mothballed due to a combination of low natural gas prices, and either transmission congestion or a lack of transmission options to sell power into other markets. Issues for Congress Given the expected increase in natural gas supplies and expected shift in electricity production from coal to natural gas as a primary fuel, the issue of what level of coal generation should be preserved for power generation in the United States may be a question Congress will be faced with. The electric utility industry values diversity in fuel choice options since reliance on one fuel or technology can leave electricity producers vulnerable to price and supply volatility. However, an "inverse relationship" is developing for coal vs. natural gas as a power generation choice based on market economics alone, and policies which allow one fuel source to dominate may come to the detriment of the other.	For most of the twentieth century, the primary use of coal in the United States was for electric power generation, and for most of the history of power generation in the United States, coal has been the dominant fuel used to produce electricity. Even as recently as 2011, coal was the fuel used for almost 42% of power generation in the United States accounting for 93% of coal use. Industrial uses represented the remaining 7%. However, in April 2012, coal's share of the power generation market dropped to about 32% (according to Energy Information Administration statistics), equal to that of natural gas. Coal was the fuel of choice because of its availability and the relatively low cost of producing electricity in large, coal-burning power plants which took advantage of coal's low-priced, high energy content to employ economies of scale in steam-electric production. However, coal use for power generation seems to be on the decline, and the magnitude of coal's role for power generation is in question. Two major reasons are generally seen as being responsible: the expectation of a dramatic rise in natural gas supplies, and the impact of environmental regulations on an aging base of coal-fired power plants. A recent drop in natural gas prices has been enabled by increasing supplies of natural gas largely due to horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing (i.e., fracking) of shale gas formations. If the production can be sustained in an environmentally acceptable manner, then a long-term, relatively inexpensive supply of natural gas could result. Decreased natural gas prices are lowering wholesale electricity prices, stimulating a major switch from coal to gas-burning facilities. The electric utility industry values diversity in fuel choice options since reliance on one fuel or technology can leave electricity producers vulnerable to price and supply volatility. However, an "inverse relationship" may be developing for coal vs. natural gas as a power generation choice based on market economics alone, and policies which allow one fuel source to dominate may come at the detriment of the other. Coal-fired power plants are among the largest sources of air pollution in the United States. More than half a dozen separate Clean Air Act programs could possibly be used to control emissions, which makes compliance strategy potentially complicated for utilities and difficult for regulators. Because the cost of the most stringent available controls, for the entire industry, could range into the tens of billions of dollars, some power companies have fought hard and rather successfully to limit or delay regulations affecting them, particularly with respect to plants constructed before the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 were passed. The expected retirement of approximately 27 GW of coal-fired capacity by 2016 has been reported to the Energy Information Administration (EIA) by coal plant owners and operators, accounting for approximately 8.5% of U.S. coal-fired capacity. While the costs of compliance with new Environmental Protection Agency regulations are a factor, several other issues are cited by coal plant owners and operators as contributing to these retirement decisions including the age of coal-fired power plants, flat to modest electricity demand growth, the availability of previously underutilized natural gas combined-cycle power plants, and the lower price of natural gas due to shale gas development. Even coal plants which have made significant modifications to meet existing EPA regulations are being closed or mothballed due to a combination of low natural gas prices, and the inability to sell power into other markets. EIA expects coal to be a significant part of the U.S. power generation industry's future to well past 2030. But given price competition from natural gas, and emerging environmental regulations, that role will likely be smaller than in recent decades. Coal-fired generation is likely to face a challenging future.
crs_R41709	crs_R41709_0	In the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 ), Congress authorized support for lithium-ion battery manufacturing, with $2.4 billion in grants. Promotion of electric vehicles and the batteries to power them is part of a long-standing federal effort to reduce oil consumption and air pollution. As manufacturers have brought hybrid, plug-in hybrid, and fully electric vehicles to market, U.S. policymakers have become concerned about the development of an electric vehicle supply chain in the United States. Because lithium is lightweight, it can be fabricated into large battery packs for use in hybrid and electric vehicles. The automakers' role is quite different from that with traditional lead-acid batteries, which are simply dropped into a vehicle's engine compartment and connected to the electrical system. Automakers are integrally involved in the design and production of Li-ion batteries for their vehicles. This is a highly automated process requiring great precision. It has been estimated that 70% of the value added in making Li-ion batteries is in the development and manufacture of the cell itself (compared with, for example, only 15% in the assembly of the battery and 10% in electrical and mechanical components). ARRA and the Battery Supply Chain In 2009, ARRA provided $2.4 billion in stimulus funding to support the establishment of Li-ion battery manufacturing facilities in the United States. The remaining ARRA funding for new electric battery development was allocated for two related goals: (1) $500 million was provided for U.S. production of electric drive components for vehicles, including electric motors, power electronics, and other drive train components; and (2) $400 million for purchase of several thousand PHEVs for demonstration purposes, installation of a charging station network, and workforce training related to transportation electrification. Moving beyond ARRA, President Obama has outlined several initiatives that could make electric vehicles more affordable, calling on Congress to Raise the tax credit for electric vehicles to $10,000 and make it a rebate from the dealer available to a car buyer at the time of purchase. In his first term, President Obama set a goal of having 1 million fully electric vehicles on the road by 2015. There is a consensus that the current cost of electric batteries is too high. If production of batteries were to increase substantially, then economies of scale could drive these costs down, as could research breakthroughs. Range . Price of gasoline . Sustained high gasoline prices would be expected to spur stronger demand for fuel-efficient vehicles, including hybrid and electric vehicles. Improved IC engine technology. Subsidies by other governments. As shown in Appendix C , nearly all automakers are offering electric vehicles, and some of the federal and private investments made since the recession have increased capacity in the domestic battery supply chain. Electric vehicles are still in their infancy, and there is a gap between the Administration's goal of having 1 million electric vehicles on the road by 2015 and consumer demand for such vehicles. Advanced battery manufacturing is still an infant industry whose technology and potential market remain highly uncertain. Its development in the United States is likely to depend heavily on how the federal government further addresses the challenges of building a battery supply chain and promoting advances in battery technologies.	The United States is one of several countries encouraging production and sales of fully electric and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles to reduce oil consumption, air pollution, and greenhouse gas emissions. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5) provided federal financial support to develop a domestic lithium-ion battery supply chain for electric vehicles. Some of these companies have brought on new production capacity, but others have gone bankrupt or idled their plants. While early in his Administration President Obama forecast that 1 million plug-in electric vehicles would be sold by 2015, motorists have been slow to embrace all-electric vehicles. At the beginning of 2013, about 80,000 plug-in electrics were on U.S. roads. In making a national commitment to building electric vehicles and most of their components in the United States, the federal government has invested $2.4 billion in electric battery production facilities and nearly $80 million a year for electric battery research and development. To increase sales of such vehicles, the President has recommended that the current $7,500 tax credit for purchase of a plug-in hybrid be converted into a $10,000 rebate, available at point of sale to car buyers upon purchase of a vehicle. Developing affordable batteries offering long driving range is the biggest challenge to increasing sales of plug-in electric vehicles. Batteries for these vehicles differ substantially from traditional lead-acid batteries used in internal combustion engine vehicles: they are larger, heavier, more expensive, and have safety considerations that mandate use of electronically controlled cooling systems. Various chemistries can be applied, with lithium-ion appearing the most feasible approach at the present time. The lithium-ion battery supply chain, expanded by ARRA investments, includes companies that mine and refine lithium; produce components, chemicals, and electronics; and assemble these components into battery cells and then into battery packs. Auto manufacturers design their vehicles to work with specific batteries, and provide proprietary cooling and other technologies before placing batteries in vehicles. Most of these operations are highly automated and require great precision. It has been estimated that 70% of the value added in making lithium-ion batteries is in making the cells, compared with only 15% in battery assembly and 10% in electrical and mechanical components. Despite these supply chain investments, it will be difficult to achieve the goal of 1 million plug-in electric vehicles on U.S. roads by 2015. Costs remain high; although data are confidential, batteries alone are estimated to cost $8,000 to $18,000 per vehicle. Vehicle range limitations and charging issues have so far slowed expected purchases. Lower gasoline prices and improvements in competing internal combustion engine technologies could slow acceptance of electric vehicles, whereas persistent high gasoline prices could favor it. Advanced battery manufacturing is still an infant industry whose technology and potential market remain highly uncertain. Its development in the United States is likely to depend heavily on foreign competition and how the federal government further addresses the challenges of building a battery supply chain and promoting advances in battery technologies.
crs_R42542	crs_R42542_0	Introduction to HUD The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is responsible for administering a set of programs and activities that are primarily designed to address housing problems faced by households with very low incomes or other special housing needs. Most of the funding for HUD's programs and activities comes from discretionary appropriations provided each year in annual appropriations acts. Components of HUD Funding: Key Concepts HUD's annual funding is made up of several components. The components of HUD's annual funding, or budget authority, include regular annual appropriations , emergency appropriations , rescissions , and offsets . HUD's programs and activities are funded almost entirely through discretionary regular annual appropriations . Appropriations measures are generally subject to limits, or caps, on the amount of new non-emergency discretionary funding that can be provided in a fiscal year. The total amount of net budget authority provided to HUD each year is important for federal budgeting purposes, as net budget authority is the amount that counts against discretionary spending limits. Recent Trends Total Funding Since FY2002, in terms of nominal (non-inflation adjusted) dollars, HUD's regular (non-emergency) annual net budget authority has increased by 21%. However, after adjusting for inflation, HUD's regular annual net budget authority in FY2015 was less than it was in FY2002 (a 6% decrease). However, by FY2013, the year of discretionary spending sequestration, declines in regular net budget authority for HUD erased most of the growth that had been seen since FY2002 in terms of nominal dollars, and all of the growth in terms of real (or inflation-adjusted) dollars. Some of the ups and downs are attributable as much or more to changes in the amount of savings available from offsets and rescissions as they are to changes in the amount of funding available for HUD's programs and activities. Yet, this overall increase masks several important interactions, which are illustrated by the bars in Figure 2 . This means that from FY2002 to FY2010, funding for HUD's programs and activities (i.e., appropriations) did not grow as rapidly as it would appear from looking at the growth in HUD's regular net budget authority. As explained earlier, these offsets are used to reduce the "cost" of appropriations for federal budget enforcement purposes. The difference in the size of the cut in net budget authority compared to the size of the cut in regular appropriations is the result of a nearly 12-fold increase in available offsets during this period (largely attributable to FHA, discussed in the next section). As a result of the increase in offsets, the "cost" (for federal budgeting purposes) of providing appropriations for HUD's programs and activities declined from FY2010 to FY2013. In FY2014, the rise (+5%, relative to FY2013) was attributable to an increase in appropriations for HUD's programs activities (+$3 billion) that was even greater than the increase in savings from offsets and rescissions (+$1.4 billion). That decline was largely attributable to reductions in offsetting receipts available from the FHA mortgage insurance programs. The tenant-based rental assistance account funds the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program, and the project-based rental assistance account funds the Section 8 project-based rental assistance program. As can be seen in Figure 4 , from FY2002 to FY2015 appropriations for the combined Section 8 programs grew by 86%, while combined funding for all other HUD programs and activities declined by about 13%. Decline in Funding for Block Grant Programs As illustrated in Figure 4 , while funding for Section 8 has grown by about 86% since FY2002, funding for all other HUD programs combined has declined by about 13%. HUD's two largest block grant programs—the HOME Investment Partnerships program and the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program —have seen some of the largest declines in funding over this period. Growth in Section 8 Costs Future cost growth in the Section 8 project-based rental assistance account should begin to slow now that most of the old rental assistance contracts are on an annual renewal cycle, although inflation costs built into renewal contracts may result in the need for increased funding in the future. The cost of individual vouchers is largely driven by market factors. If the pressure to reduce funding continues, federal policymakers may re-evaluate HUD's programs and activities and consider cost-saving program reforms. Any of these changes to FHA and any resulting reduction in offsetting receipts could increase pressure to further reduce appropriations for HUD's programs and activities.	The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) administers a number of programs and activities that are primarily designed to address housing problems faced by households with very low incomes or other special housing needs. Most of the funding for HUD's programs and activities comes from discretionary appropriations provided each year in the annual appropriations acts enacted by Congress. HUD's appropriations are generally made up of several components, including regular annual appropriations, which fund HUD's regular programs and activities; emergency appropriations, which are sometimes provided in response to national emergencies such as disasters; rescissions of unspent prior-year funding; and offsetting collections and receipts. Combined, these components make up HUD's net budget authority, which is the amount that counts for the purposes of federal budget enforcement, including discretionary spending limits. Since FY2002, in terms of nominal dollars, HUD's regular (non-emergency) annual net budget authority has increased by 21%. When adjusting for inflation, HUD's regular annual net budget authority in FY2015 is 6% less than it was in FY2002. However, these figures mask several important recent trends. New appropriations for HUD's programs and activities have increased since FY2002 by 32% in nominal dollars, 2% in inflation-adjusted dollars. The difference between the increase in appropriations versus net budget authority is due to an increase in the savings available from offsetting receipts attributable to the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage insurance program. FHA receipts are used to offset the cost (in terms of budget enforcement) of providing appropriations for HUD's programs and activities. The offsetting receipts available from FHA increased from a low of about $140 million in FY2010 to a peak of almost $12 billion in FY2014. The increase in funding for HUD has not been linear. After a period of steady increase, regular appropriations for HUD's programs and activities peaked in FY2010 and then declined so that in FY2015 they were 3% below the FY2010 level. Over that same period HUD's regular annual net budget authority was reduced much more dramatically, by 23%, attributable to growth in savings from FHA offsetting receipts. FY2013, the year of the discretionary spending sequestration, provided HUD's lowest level of appropriations since 2009, and the lowest level of net budget authority since FY2003. Growth in appropriations for HUD's programs and activities has largely been driven by increases in appropriations for the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher program and the Section 8 project-based rental assistance program. Combined, their funding has increased by 86% from FY2002 to FY2015. Conversely, funding for all other HUD programs combined has declined by about 13%. The formula grants under HUD's two largest block grant programs—the HOME Investment Partnerships Program and the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program—have experienced some of the largest reductions in funding during this time (48% and 31%, respectively). Looking toward the future, it can be assumed that if policymakers maintain interest in cutting the deficit, there will continue to be efforts to reduce overall discretionary spending, including HUD's budget. Deficit reduction measures led to the FY2013 sequestration, which resulted in a roughly 5% cut for most domestic discretionary spending from the FY2012 level. These overall budgeting considerations will likely interact with the specific cost-drivers in HUD's budget. Cost growth in the Section 8 project-based program is unlikely to continue at the same rate, given that most long-term contracts are now on an annual funding cycle. Future cost growth in the Section 8 voucher program is less certain, as it is driven by market factors, although if major reforms are enacted, that could change. Assuming policymakers continue to prioritize maintaining current service levels in the Section 8 voucher program, pressure to reduce funding for other HUD programs and activities, including block grant programs, may continue. Thus far, it appears that increases in offsetting receipts available from FHA have minimized the effect of efforts to limit discretionary spending on the amount of appropriations available for HUD programs and activities. As receipts from FHA eventually decline—anticipated because of market changes and policy changes—pressure to further reduce appropriations for HUD programs may increase.
crs_R40639	crs_R40639_0	Introduction In Altria Group, Inc. v. Good , the Supreme Court agreed to resolve a split that developed in the circuit courts with regard to whether the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA) expressly or impliedly preempted state law claims regarding light or low-tar nicotine descriptors in cigarette advertisements. On December 15, 2008, the Court in Good , by a vote of 5-4, affirmed the First Circuit Court of Appeals' holding that the FCLAA neither expressly nor impliedly preempted the respondents' state common law fraud claim. The Supreme Court has discussed the preemptive effect of the FCLAA in two previous cases, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. and Lo ri l lard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly . This report first provides an overview of the doctrine of preemption, the history of the FCLAA, and the major Supreme Court decisions that have interpreted the preemption provision (§5) of the act. This report examines the Supreme Court's decision in Altria Group, Inc. v. Good and the effect this decision could have on future tobacco litigation and preemption jurisprudence, in addition to the effect of H.R. 1256 , the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act. The court of appeals held that the district court erred in applying the predicate duty test when it ruled that the FCLAA did not expressly preempt any of the plaintiffs' state law claims for redhibition, breach of express and implied warranties, and fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment. According to the Court's decision, Congress had no intent to preempt these types of claims. claims." There is also the possibility that the Court's decision will affect preemption jurisprudence.	The Supreme Court issued its decision in Altria Group., Inc. v. Good on December 15, 2008. The Court, by a vote of 5-4, held that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA) neither expressly nor impliedly preempted state law claims of fraud. In this decision the Court examined the preemptive effect of section 5(b) of the act (15 U.S.C. §1334(b)) with regard to the claim that light or low-tar nicotine descriptors in cigarette advertising violated the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act. The decision resolved a split between the circuits—the First Circuit Court of Appeals had ruled that the FCLAA did not preempt the plaintiffs' claim and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, hearing a similar case, ruled that the FCLAA preempted such state-law claims. This report provides an overview of section 5 of the FCLAA and how it was amended in 1969; additionally, it examines the previous Supreme Court cases, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. and Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, that interpreted the preemptive scope of section 5. Both parties in Good relied on these cases to argue that the FCLAA either preempts or does not preempt state law claims of fraud. This report also discusses the lower court decisions that were issued prior to examining the Court's decision in Good. Finally, there is a discussion of potential issues that may arise out of the Court's decision, such as its impact on future litigation and preemption jurisprudence, in addition to the effect that H.R. 1256, the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, may have upon the Court's ruling.
crs_R44490	crs_R44490_0	Accurate identification of prospective and incumbent government contractors (or vendors) facilitates the federal government's procurement process, helping to ensure contractors are paid, supporting contract administration activities, enabling the identification of corporate families (e.g., a corporation and its subsidiaries), and, generally, contributing to the transparency of federal government procurement. To aid in accurately identifying the entities with which it does business, the federal government relies on a proprietary system, Dun & Bradstreet's (D&B's) Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS). Dun & Bradstreet assigns unique identification codes known as "DUNS numbers" to prospective federal government contractors. 109-282 ) and the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act (DATA Act; P.L. 113-101 ). This report focuses on identification numbers for acquisition and acquisition-related purposes that government contractors, generally, are required to have. A company or organization that is required by the federal government to obtain a DUNS number for the purpose of competing for a contract does not pay a fee for its DUNS number. The CAGE Branch of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), which is the only authorized source of these codes, assigns CAGE codes to entities located in the United States or its outlying areas. A CAGE code is a five-character alpha-numeric identifier that belongs to a nonproprietary system created by DOD. There is no cost for obtaining a CAGE code. The Government is fully leveraging [the] proprietary commercial product services uniquely offered by D&B to enhance data standards, quality, and reliability in such critical areas as contract award and management (back office Contract Writing Systems), advertising and delivery of solicitation and specifications data (Federal Business Opportunities and Federal Technical Documentation System), management and public reports (Federal Procurement Data System, Federal Funding and Accountability Transparency Act, American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery.gov and Federalreporting.gov) and USAspending.gov), debarred and suspended bidders (Excluded Parties List System), vendor submissions of subcontracting accomplishments (Electronic Subcontract Reporting System), past performance collection (Past Performance Information Retrieval System), for payment and invoicing (back office Financial Writing Systems and the Grants Community (Grants.Gov) and the Loans Community because the research has shown that D&B is uniquely positioned as the sole source to provide this capability. This process could be complicated by the data restrictions in GSA's contract with Dun & Bradstreet." The discussion of this data element by the Treasury and OMB (1) noted that the federal government continues to use the Data Universal Numbering System; (2) described relevant regulatory changes (i.e., the removal of references to DUNS in Title 2 of the Code of Federal Regulations , which involves grants, and the addition of provisions regarding an existing government-owned nonproprietary identification system to the FAR); (3) alluded to possible challenges if the government opts to implement a new identification system; and (4) confirmed that the federal government is exploring alternatives to DUNS. A final rule, which was issued on September 30, 2016, revised the FAR by removing references to DUNS and DUNS numbers and inserting the term unique entity identifier . The rationale for this change, which was provided in the preface to the proposed rule, is as follows: [E]limination of regulatory references to a proprietary entity identifier will provide opportunities for future competition that can reduce costs to taxpayers. GSA Explores Alternatives In February 2017, GSA posted a request for information (RFI) for "government-wide entity identification and validation services" on the federal government's Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps) website. GSA's tentative schedule is to issue a solicitation for identity identification and validation services in summer 2017 and to award a contract prior to June 2018. An entity that is required to be registered in SAM, or to have a DUNS number, must also provide, if applicable, the names and CAGE codes of its immediate owner and its highest-level owner in the applicable solicitation provision (i.e., FAR §52.204-17). 7. " Data Products 8. " 14. " The use of a generic entity identifier helps to mask the identity of a particular contractor while ensuring the accounting of the obligations associated with the contractor.	An essential element of the federal government's acquisition system is the capability to identify the businesses, and other types of entities, that do work for the government. Accurate identification of potential contractors and incumbent contractors facilitates a host of procurement processes while contributing to the transparency of federal government procurement. The federal government uses a proprietary system, Dun & Bradstreet's (D&B's) Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS), to uniquely identify the entities with which it does business. At no cost to the applicant, D&B assigns a DUNS number—a nine-digit unique identification code—to prospective government contractors. (Businesses that are not would-be government contractors also may apply for a DUNS number.) The federal government's use of DUNS, however, is not limited to the identification numbers. D&B provides, pursuant to its contract with the General Services Administration (GSA), 7 types of software products and 14 data products that enable the government to use DUNS for a variety of acquisition-related functions, such as paying contractors. Furthermore, approximately 80 data systems within the federal government contain DUNS information. Congress may have concerns regarding the continued use of DUNS numbers and has expressed interest in exploring other options. At the request of a Senate subcommittee, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) examined the costs and data restrictions involved with using a proprietary identification system and studied alternatives for identification numbers for government contractors. The implementation of the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act (DATA Act; P.L. 113-101) is accompanied by similar, significant interest within Congress—and within the agencies charged with implementing the act—for exploring options for a nonproprietary contractor identification system. One or more possible options might involve using an existing, nonproprietary identification system created and maintained by the federal government: the commercial and government entity (CAGE) code system. CAGE codes could be used as a stand-alone system, or incorporated into a hybrid system (e.g., combine CAGE codes with vendor-provided business products and services). The CAGE Branch of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) assigns the five-character alpha-numeric identifiers to entities located in the United States and outlying areas. Regulatory changes in 2014 and 2016 potentially pave the way for the government to adopt a new system. First, in 2014, a rule was adopted in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requiring prospective contractors to obtain CAGE codes. This rule also requires the contractor to provide to the government, if applicable, the name and CAGE codes of its immediate owner and its highest-level owner. Second, a final rule issued in 2016 removed all references to the Data Universal Numbering System and DUNS numbers from the FAR and inserted the terms unique entity identifier. The preface to the proposed rule noted that the government is not ready to eliminate DUNS numbers at this time, but that removing references to a proprietary system and identifier "will provide opportunities for future competition that can reduce costs to taxpayers." In early 2017, GSA initiated a process for exploring alternatives to DUNS by posting a request for information (RFI) for entity identification and validation services on the Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps) website. GSA's tentative schedule is to issue a solicitation in summer 2017 and award a contract prior to the expiration of its contract with Dun & Bradstreet, which will occur in June 2018.
crs_RL33720	crs_RL33720_0	Background Canada and the United States have open borders for waste shipments, and waste has flowed across the border in both directions for years. Thus, it appears that more than 90% of the solid waste that Canada ships to the United States has gone to Michigan. While somewhat controversial throughout the 1990s, Canadian waste imports have received much greater attention since late 2002, when the city of Toronto—Canada's largest city—announced that it would close its last landfill and begin shipping all of its waste to Michigan. Under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress is given power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce; in a long series of cases beginning in the 1800s the Court has held that this grant of authority to Congress implies a prohibition of state actions to discriminate against interstate and foreign commerce, absent the consent of Congress. H.R. 2491 (Gillmor), which was reported by the House Energy and Commerce Committee on September 27, 2005, and passed the House by voice vote, September 6, 2006. Similar legislation ( H.R. 518 ) was introduced by Representative Dingell in the 110 th Congress, was reported by the Energy and Commerce Committee ( H.Rept. 110-81 ) March 29, 2007, and passed the House by voice vote, April 24, 2007. DHS Appropriations Bill In the 109 th Congress, H.R. A separate amendment, introduced by Senator Levin (with the co-sponsorship of Senators Stabenow and Voinovich) and also approved in the Senate by unanimous consent, would have required that the Secretary of Homeland Security deny entry into the United States to trucks carrying MSW unless he certifies to Congress that the methodologies and technologies used by the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection to detect the presence of chemical, nuclear, biological, and radiological weapons in municipal solid waste are as effective as those used to screen for such materials in other items of commerce entering the United States in commercial motor vehicles. Exchange of Letters with Ontario Following passage of the Stabenow and Levin amendments, on August 30, 2006, the Ontario Ministry of the Environment reached an agreement with the two Senators, under which Ontario will eliminate shipments of municipally managed waste to Michigan by the end of 2010. The steps taken by Congress in beginning to move legislation, as well as the separate legislation enacted by the state of Michigan, clearly played a role in bringing about the exchange of letters with Ontario. But large issues remain. It is not a treaty or an international agreement and does not provide the enforcement provisions or penalties that legislation might offer. To summarize, those who continue to be concerned about Canadian waste shipments are likely to note that the exchange of letters does not address two-thirds of the waste being shipped, does not protect states other than Michigan, and contains no enforcement provisions. 518 H.R. It is not clear how these obligations and the bill's grant of authority to the states to restrict waste imports would ultimately be reconciled.	Private waste haulers and Canadian cities—including the city of Toronto—ship large quantities of waste to the United States. About four million tons (as many as 400 truckloads a day) have been shipped annually since 2004, according to receiving states. Nearly three-quarters of this waste has gone to two large landfills near Detroit. The influx of waste has been highly controversial, in part because the ability of state and local governments to restrict it is limited. Under court rulings concerning the U.S. Constitution's Commerce Clause, only Congress can authorize restrictions that discriminate against foreign waste. Thus, for several years, the state of Michigan and the Michigan congressional delegation have pressed Congress for action. Legislation to provide limited authority to restrict waste imports, H.R. 518, was introduced early in the 110th Congress by Representative Dingell, with the co-sponsorship of the entire Michigan delegation. The bill was reported by the Energy and Commerce Committee March 29, and passed the House, by voice vote, April 24, 2007. Congress began to focus on this issue in the summer of 2006. In July of that year, in the Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill (H.R. 5441), the Senate approved the establishment of an inspection program for waste imports that might have added more than $400 in fees to the cost of importing a truckload of waste. In early September, the House passed legislation similar to H.R. 518 (H.R. 2491 in the 109th Congress), which would have given states limited authority to restrict waste imports. In between these actions, an agreement was reached between Michigan's two Senators and the Ontario Ministry of the Environment, under which Ontario will eliminate shipments of municipally managed waste to Michigan by the end of 2010. The steps taken by Congress in beginning to move legislation, as well as separate legislation enacted by the state of Michigan, clearly played a role in bringing about the voluntary agreement between Michigan's two Senators and Ontario. But large issues remain. The agreement is not a treaty or an international agreement, so it does not formally bind the United States or Canada or the parties shipping and receiving the waste. Assuming that its provisions are adhered to by Ontario's waste managers, it still would not address two-thirds of the waste being shipped to Michigan (i.e., the waste being managed by private waste management firms), and it would not affect waste shipments to states other than Michigan. This report provides background information on the history of Canadian waste imports, reviews congressional developments, and discusses issues raised by the voluntary agreement and legislation.
crs_RL33474	crs_RL33474_0	The National Transportation Safety Board Reauthorization Act of 2006 ( P.L. 109-443 did include a provision requiring the FAA to submit a report explaining why it has not implemented aviation-related safety improvements identified in the NTSB's Most Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements list issued in 2006. The enacted legislation ( P.L. In FY2008, the administration proposed a funding authorization of $100 million, 22% above the FY2007 requested amount. In contrast, the Senate ( S. 3679 ) initially passed a two-year authorization that would have matched the requested funding level in FY2007, but did not include the increased funding sought in FY2008. Other issues considered during the NTSB reauthorization process included the mission, operations, and funding of the NTSB Academy; relief from certain contracting requirements for investigation-related services; the designation of various reimbursements to the NTSB as offsetting collections; and payment for Department of Transportation Inspector General investigations and audits of the NTSB. While the House bill ( H.R. 109-443 ) authorizes a funding increase of roughly 13.5% in FY2008 compared to FY2007 authorized levels. In addition to providing a separate funding authorization for the NTSB Academy on top of NTSB base authorization levels, P.L. 109-443 ) also requires that the GAO evaluate and audit the programs and expenditures of the NTSB on at least an annual basis, or more frequently if determined necessary by the Comptroller General. Other Possible Issues for NTSB Reauthorization and Congressional Oversight Besides the issues specifically identified during the NTSB reauthorization debate, two other prominent, and related, issues involving the NTSB may come under congressional scrutiny. First, some have expressed concerns over possible industry stakeholder lobbying of NTSB officials in attempts to influence the scope or language of NTSB investigative findings. Second, concerns have also been raised about the NTSB's heavy reliance on experts from transportation entities with a vested interest in the outcome of an investigation, such as airlines and aircraft manufacturers, for fact gathering and data analysis. Some experts argue that the NTSB should instead create stronger ties with government laboratories and academic institutions for expertise to lessen the chances that bias, or the perception of bias, could creep into the accident investigation process. This issue has not been formally addressed by Congress in the current reauthorization process. These include a mandate for the FAA to complete a safety review examining runway safety area alternatives at Juneau International Airport, Juneau, Alaska; a provision directing the DOT Inspector General, in cooperation with the Department of Justice and the Attorney General of Massachusetts, to conduct investigations of criminal and fraudulent activities related to the construction of the Boston Central Artery Tunnel project; a provision directing the DOT Inspector General to provide oversight to the project-wide safety review of the Boston Central Artery Tunnel that was initiated in response to the July 10, 2006 collapse of a section of the tunnel's roof resulting in a fatality to a motor vehicle occupant; and a provision requiring the DOT Inspector General to provide periodic reports to Congress regarding the findings of its oversight, audits, and investigations of the Boston Central Artery Tunnel project.	The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is a small, independent agency with responsibility for investigating transportation accidents; conducting transportation safety studies; issuing safety recommendations; aiding victim's families in aviation disasters; and promoting transportation safety. Near the conclusion of the 109th Congress, a two-year NTSB reauthorization measure, covering fiscal years 2007 and 2008, was enacted (P.L. 109-443). During the 109th Congress, legislation to reauthorize the NTSB for fiscal years 2007-2009 was ordered reported in the House (H.R. 5076) seeking a three-year funding reauthorization for FY2007 through FY2009, that included a 22% increase to authorized funding levels in FY2008 compared to FY2007 requested levels, largely to support a proposed staffing increase of about 19%. In contrast, the Senate initially passed a two-year reauthorization bill (S. 3679) in September, 2006, covering FY2007 and FY2008, that paralleled the administration's FY2007 funding request, but did not provide the increase sought in FY2008, instead proposing to maintain staffing at current levels through FY2008. The NTSB indicated in reauthorization hearing testimony that a staffing increase was needed to effectively carry out its mission. P.L. 109-443 authorizes funding in FY2007 slightly above the President's requested appropriation level, and authorizes a 13.5% increase in the authorized level in FY2008, compared to FY2007. Actual funding levels, however, are dependent on amounts specified in appropriations legislation. In addition to setting funding authorization levels, P.L. 109-443 extends and expands provisions that relax certain contracting requirements for investigation-related services; establishes various reimbursements to the NTSB as offsetting collections that are available until expended; and authorizes reimbursable payment from the NTSB for Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General (DOT OIG) investigations and audits of the NTSB. The act also requires the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to submit a report explaining why it has not implemented NTSB's most wanted aviation-related transportation safety improvements, and charges the GAO with the responsibility of evaluating and auditing NTSB programs, operations, and activities on an annual basis, or more frequently if determined necessary. The act also directs the DOT OIG to conduct oversight and investigations related to the Boston Central Artery Tunnel project. While not formally addressed during reauthorization debate, two other prominent issues involving the NTSB may come under congressional scrutiny: concerns over industry stakeholders lobbying NTSB officials in attempts to influence the scope or language of NTSB investigative findings, and the NTSB's heavy reliance on experts from transportation entities with a vested interest in the outcome of an investigation for fact gathering and data analysis. Some experts argue that the NTSB should instead create stronger ties with government laboratories and academic institutions for expertise to lessen the chances that bias, or the perception of bias, could creep into the accident-investigation process. This report will not be updated.
crs_R41239	crs_R41239_0	On May 2, 2010, the Eurozone member states and the IMF announced a three-year, €110 billion (about $145 billion) financial assistance package for Greece. Seeking to head off the possibility of contagion to countries such as Portugal and Spain, EU finance ministers agreed on May 9, 2010, to a broader €500 billion (about $636 billion) financial assistance package available to vulnerable Eurozone governments. EU leaders also suggested the IMF could contribute up to an additional €220 billion to €250 billion (about $280 billion to about $318 billion). Some are concerned that Greece's debt crisis foreshadows the United States' future.	On May 2, 2010, the Eurozone member states and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced an unprecedented €110 billion (about $145 billion) financial assistance package for Greece. The following week, on May 9, 2010, EU leaders announced that they would make an additional €500 billion (about $636 billion) in financial assistance available to vulnerable European countries, and suggested that the IMF could contribute up to an additional €220 billion to €250 billion (about $280 billion to $318 billion). This report answers frequently asked questions about IMF involvement in the Eurozone debt crisis. For more information on the Greek debt crisis, see CRS Report R41167, Greece's Debt Crisis: Overview, Policy Responses, and Implications, coordinated by [author name scrubbed].
crs_RL32682	crs_RL32682_0	Introduction Child poverty persists as a social and economic concern in the United States. In 2007,12.8 million children were considered poor under the official U.S. Census Bureau definition. Family living arrangements, indicated by the presence of just one or both parents, greatly affect the chances that a child is poor. Children who are racial or ethnic minorities are at particular risk of being poor. Poverty affects children's life chances, their prospects of realizing their full potential, and their ability to successfully transition into adulthood. By almost any indicator, poor children fare worse than their nonpoor counterparts. Figure 2 presents data about poverty rates of children who lived in families in 2007. This is because Hispanic children are more likely than African-American children to be in married-couple families, and children in married-couple families have lower poverty rates than children in female-headed families. In 2007, about seven out of 100 children with such a worker were poor. Of children in single, female-headed families without an earner, 76.2% were poor. Younger parents, who have less job experience in the workforce, tend to earn less than older adults with more experience. In records dating back to 1959, the incidence of poverty among related children in families has ranged from a peak of 26.9% (1959) to a low of 13.8% (1969). From the mid-1990s to 2000, in the wake of the 1996 welfare reform law, the drop in the poverty rate was more pronounced for children in families headed by a lone mother than for children in families with a male present. The figure shows, for example, that in 2007 the child poverty rate was 17.6%, but had family composition in 2007 been the same as in 1960, the overall adjusted child poverty rate would have been 12.6%; instead of the observed 12.8 million children being counted as poor in 2007 had family composition remained unchanged from 1960, the number of poor children estimated by this method would have been 9.2 million, or 3.6 million fewer than the number observed. Rise in Work by Lone Mothers Dramatic gains have occurred in recent years in work by lone mothers—especially among those with preschool age children. Employment rates of single mothers with infants or toddlers (under age 3) increased markedly from 1993 through 2000, rising from 35.1% to 59.1% over the period (see Figure 17 ). It stood at 32.4% in 2007. Work is the principal means by which families with children support themselves. Without family earnings, a child is almost certain to be poor. However, earnings alone often fail to overcome poverty. In 2006, one-third of all poor children lived with at least one adult who was a full-time, full-year worker. In contrast, the second tier of the "safety net," programs targeted to low-income families and persons, has undergone a radical transformation over the past 20 years. Need-tested assistance increasingly is paid to families only in the form of noncash benefits (Medicaid and food stamps) whose value is not reflected in the official child poverty statistics. Along with the transformation of need-tested benefits have come expansions of refundable tax credits for families with children, particularly the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).	Child poverty persists as a social and economic concern in the United States. In 2007 12.8 million children (17.6% all children) were considered poor under the official U.S. definition. In records dating back to 1959, the incidence of poverty among related children in families has ranged from a peak of 26.9% in 1959 to a low of 13.8% in 1969. Poverty affects a child's life chances; by almost any indicator, poor children fare worse than their nonpoor counterparts. Family living arrangements, indicated by the presence of just one or both parents, greatly affect the chances that a child is poor. In 2007, 43.0% of children in female-headed families were poor, compared to 8.5% of children in married-couple families. In that year, 24% of children were living in female-headed families, more than double the share who lived in such families when the overall child poverty rate was at its historical low (1969). Children who are racial or ethnic minorities are at particular risk of being poor. In 2007, a little more than one-third of black children (34.2%) and almost three out of ten Hispanic children (28.3%) were poor, compared to about one in ten white non-Hispanic children (9.7%). Work is the principal means by which families with children support themselves. Without family earnings, a child is almost certain to be poor. However, earnings often fail to overcome poverty. In 2007, about one-third (32.4%) of all poor children lived with at least one adult who was a full-time, full-year worker; another one-third were in families with a worker who either worked part-year or (less likely) part-time; another third lived in families without an adult who worked during the year. Higher child poverty rates were observed for those whose parents had less, rather than more, education. Children of younger parents, with less potential time and experience in the workforce, were more likely to be poor than children of older parents. Additionally, dramatic gains have occurred in recent years in work by lone mothers—especially among those with preschool children. Employment rates of single mothers with children under age 3 rose from 35.1% in March 1993 to 59.1% in March 2000, but have since remained below their 2000 level, standing at 54.5% in March 2008. Nonetheless, many of these working single mothers (and their children) remained poor. The social safety net for children consists of (1) earnings-based social insurance programs and (2) need-based transfers of cash and noncash benefits. Need-tested benefits have undergone a radical transformation during the past 20 years, capped by the 1996 welfare reform law. Cash welfare caseloads have plummeted since the reforms of the mid-1990s, so that many families receiving need-tested aid only receive noncash benefits (e.g., Medicaid and food stamps) whose value is not reflected in official poverty statistics. Further, the welfare reforms of the mid-1990s were accompanied by expansions of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which supplements the earnings of low-income families with children. (The value of the EITC is also not considered in official poverty statistics.) The result has been to curtail benefit availability for nonworking families while raising the returns to work. This report will be updated annually, when new Census Bureau data are released.
crs_R41227	crs_R41227_0	Since the 1970s, energy tax policy in the United States has attempted to achieve two broad objectives. First, policymakers have sought to reduce oil import dependence and enhance national security through a variety of domestic energy investment and production tax subsidies. Second, environmental concerns have led to subsidization of a variety of renewable and energy efficiency technologies via the tax code. While these two broad goals continue to guide policy, enacted policies that solely focus on achieving only one of the goals are often inconsistent with policies solely designed to achieve the other goal. For example, subsidies to oil and gas producers, while enhancing domestic oil and gas production and ultimately increasing the burning of fossil fuels, encourage an activity which may have negative environmental consequences. By providing a longitudinal perspective on energy tax policy and expenditures, this report examines how current revenue losses resulting from energy tax provisions compare to historical losses and provides a foundation for understanding how current energy tax policy evolved. Further, this report compares the relative value of tax incentives given to fossil fuels, renewables, and energy efficiency. Recent legislation has introduced, reintroduced, expanded, and extended a number of energy tax provisions. While a number of the current energy provisions have a long historical standing in the tax code, a wider variety of tax incentives, to promote a range of energy sources, are presently available than have been available in the past. Examining trends in revenue losses associated with energy tax provisions provides insight into the actual direction of energy tax policy. In inflation-adjusted terms, revenue losses associated with energy tax provisions in the late 1970s and early 1980s are similar in total cost to revenue losses in the late 2000s. The composition of these revenue losses, however, has changed significantly. In the late 1970s nearly all revenue losses associated with energy tax provisions were the result of two tax preferences given to the oil and gas industry. In the early 1980s, revenue losses associated with special treatment for the oil and gas industry accounted for more than three quarters of all federal revenue losses associated with energy tax expenditures. Changes in policy, coupled with declining oil prices in the late 1980s, dramatically reduced revenue losses associated with oil and gas tax policy. Throughout the 1990s, the bulk of revenue losses associated with energy tax provisions were attributable to the tax credit for unconventional fuels. In the 2000s, revenue losses associated with renewable energy production incentives began to make up a larger portion of energy tax expenditure revenue losses, reaching an estimated 21% in 2006. Revenue losses associated with tax provisions benefitting fossil fuels also remained important into the 2000s, with a large proportion of revenue losses in the mid-to-late 2000s associated with the unconventional fuel production credit, benefitting synthetic coal producers. In the late 2000s, the majority of revenue losses have been associated with incentives designed to promote biofuels. The federal government also loses significant revenue from excise tax credits given to alcohol fuel blenders (specifically, the volumetric ethanol excise tax credit (VEETC)). While excise tax credits are not technically a tax expenditure (technically, tax expenditures are only revenue losses associated with income tax provisions), these excise tax credits have played an important role in shaping energy tax policy. By 2010, estimated revenue losses associated with the excise tax credit were $5.68 billion. By 2010, revenue losses associated with tax incentives for renewables exceeded those available for fossil energy resources.	Since the 1970s, energy tax policy in the United States has attempted to achieve two broad objectives. First, policymakers have sought to reduce oil import dependence and enhance national security through a variety of domestic energy investment and production tax subsidies. Second, environmental concerns have led to subsidization of a variety of renewable and energy efficiency technologies via the tax code. While these two broad goals continue to guide policy, enacted policies that solely focus on achieving only one of the goals are often inconsistent with policies solely designed to achieve the other goal. For example, subsidies to oil and gas producers, while enhancing domestic oil and gas production, encourage an activity with negative environmental consequences. By providing a longitudinal perspective on energy tax policy and expenditures, this report examines how current revenue losses resulting from energy tax provisions compare to historical losses and provides a foundation for understanding how current energy tax policy evolved. Further, this report compares the relative value of tax incentives given to fossil fuels, renewables, and energy efficiency. Recent legislation has introduced, reintroduced, expanded, and extended a number of energy tax provisions. While a number of the current energy provisions have a long historical standing in the tax code, a wider variety of tax incentives, to promote a range of energy sources, are presently available than have been available in the past. Examining trends in revenue losses associated with energy tax provisions provides insight into the actual direction of energy tax policy. In inflation-adjusted terms, revenue losses associated with energy tax provisions in the late 1970s and early 1980s are similar to revenue losses in the late 2000s. The composition of these revenue losses, however, has changed significantly. In the late 1970s nearly all revenue losses associated with energy tax provisions were the result of two tax preferences given to the oil and gas industry. In the early 1980s, revenue losses associated with special treatment for the oil and gas industry accounted for more than three quarters of all federal revenue losses associated with energy tax expenditures. Changes in policy, coupled with declining oil prices in the late 1980s, dramatically reduced revenue losses associated with oil and gas tax policy. Throughout the 1990s, the bulk of revenue losses associated with energy tax provisions were attributable to the tax credit for unconventional fuels. In the 2000s, revenue losses associated with renewable energy production incentives began to make up a larger portion of energy tax expenditure revenue losses. Revenue losses associated with tax provisions benefitting fossil fuels also remained important into the 2000s, with a large proportion of revenue losses in the mid-to-late 2000s associated with the unconventional fuel production credit, benefitting synthetic coal producers. In the late 2000s, the majority of revenue losses have been associated with incentives designed to promote alternative fuels and biofuels. By 2010, revenue losses associated with tax incentives for renewables exceeded revenue losses associated with fossil fuels. The Section 1603 grants in lieu of tax credits, made available starting in 2009, have resulted in increased federal financial support for renewables. The federal government also loses revenue from excise tax credits given to alcohol fuel blenders (specifically, the volumetric ethanol excise tax credit (VEETC)). While excise tax credits are not technically a tax expenditure (technically, tax expenditures are only revenue losses associated with income tax provisions), these excise tax credits have played an important role in shaping energy tax policy and were estimated to result in revenue losses of $5.7 billion in 2010 alone.
crs_R44445	crs_R44445_0	Political Background President Ollanta Humala, of the left-wing Peruvian Nationalist party (PNP) and the Gana Peru coalit ion, is in the last year of his five-year term. Because none of the presidential candidates won an absolute majority, a runoff was held June 5. President-elect Pedro Pablo Kuczynski is to take office on July 28 for a five-year term. National Elections Elections for the presidency and the 130-seat unicameral congress took place on April 10, 2016. Because no presidential candidate garnered 50% plus one vote, Peru held a run-off election between the top two contenders: Keiko Fujimori, aged 41, who won 40% of the vote, and Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, 77, who won 21% of the vote in the first round. Fujimori, of the conservative, populist Fuerza Popular (Popular Force) party, is a former member of congress (2006-2011) and daughter of discredited former president Alberto Fujimori, who is currently serving a 25-year jail sentence for crimes against humanity and corruption. As the younger Fujimori, remains strongly linked to her father and his legacy, thousands of Peruvians protested in the streets against her, shouting, "Never again." Economic Background Peru's economy has been one of the strongest in Latin America since 2001. Peru's economic growth in 2016 could be negatively affected by the current El Niño weather pattern hitting the country, however. Humala's economic strategy has been to maintain free-market policies while also working to narrow the wide economic distribution gap and eliminate the social exclusion of Peru's poor, mostly indigenous population. Deep social divides over how to pursue this development have continued to undercut political stability in Peru, however, and have thwarted some of Humala's plans. Conflicts over Natural Resources Social unrest and debate over exploitation of natural resources have long been and likely will remain major challenges for any Peruvian government. The more serious disputes have involved the mining industry and the rights of indigenous peoples in those areas where mining exists or where mining interests intend to operate. Humala has found it politically difficult to balance his stated desire to help the poor and indigenous with his effort to encourage investment by the business sector. U.S. Relations with Peru Peru and the United States have a strong and cooperative relationship. The United States supports the strengthening of Peru's democratic institutions and its respect for human rights. The two countries also cooperate on environmental protection and counternarcotics efforts. In the economic realm, the United States supports bilateral trade relations and Peru's further integration into the world economy. Counternarcotics Efforts A dominant theme in relations between the United States and Peru is the effort to stem the flow of illegal drugs, mostly cocaine, from Peru. Trade Issues35 The United States and Peru have a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) that entered into force on February 1, 2009. In addition, both countries are party to the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement (TPP), a proposed FTA with 10 other countries: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam.	This report provides an overview of Peru's political, economic, and security conditions and of U.S.-Peruvian relations. As President Ollanta Humala is nearing the end of his five-year term, Peru held national elections for the presidency and the 130-seat unicameral legislature on April 10, 2016. Because none of the presidential candidates won an absolute majority, a runoff was held June 5 between two center-right candidates. Economist Pedro Pablo Kuczynski defeated former congresswoman Keiko Fujimori by less than 1% of the vote, 50.12% to 49.88%. For months, Fujimori had maintained a strong lead in what began as a field of 18 candidates. However, there is strong sentiment against her candidacy, as well. Both the strong support for and the opposition to Fujimori stem mostly from the legacy of her father, Alberto Fujimori, whose harsh security policy helped to squash the Sendero Luminoso terrorist group but also entailed gross violations of human rights. The elder Fujimori is serving a 25-year prison sentence in Peru for crimes against humanity and corruption. In the first round, Keiko Fujimori won 40% of the vote and Kuczynski won 21% of the vote. Kuczynski pulled ahead in the final round in part because of support from anti-Fujimori voters, including leftist Verónika Mendoza, who had placed third in the first round. The new president and congress are to assume office on July 28, 2016, for five-year terms. Since 2001, Peru's economy has been one of the strongest in Latin America. President Humala's economic strategy has been to maintain free-market policies while working to narrow the wide economic distribution gap and eliminate the social exclusion of Peru's poor, mostly indigenous population. Deep social divides over how to pursue this aim have continued to undercut political stability in Peru. Social unrest and debate over exploitation of natural resources has long been and will likely remain a major challenge for any Peruvian government. The more serious disputes have involved the mining industry and the rights of indigenous peoples in those areas where mining exists or where mining interests intend to operate. Humala has found it politically difficult to balance his stated desire to help the poor and indigenous with his effort to encourage investment by the business sector, especially the extractive industry. In addition, some observers project that the current El Niño weather pattern hitting Peru could hurt Peru's economic growth. Peru and the United States have a strong and cooperative relationship. Several issues in U.S.-Peruvian relations are likely to be considered in decisions by Congress and the Administration on future aid to and cooperation with Peru. The United States supports the strengthening of Peru's democratic institutions, counternarcotics efforts, security and respect for human rights, and environmental protection. A dominant theme in bilateral relations is the effort to stem the flow of illegal drugs, mostly cocaine, between the two countries. In the economic realm, the United States supports bilateral trade relations and Peru's further integration into the world economy. A bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) between the United States and Peru entered into force on February 1, 2009. In addition, both countries are parties to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, a proposed FTA with 10 other countries.
crs_RL33146	crs_RL33146_0	Historical Context of the Guidelines The VSS were developed in response to concerns raised in the 1970s and 1980s about thethen largely unregulated voting technology industry. Thesecond version was approved by the FEC in May 2002. 107-252 ), was signed into law in October 2002. Also, Sec. (4) They willgo into effect two years after being adopted. HAVA does not specify whether the guidelines it establishes areto be used as the standard against which voting systems are tested and certified, but that is how the VSS have been used, and it is how the EAC intends to use the VVSG . A more extensive revision is reportedly underway. Volume I provides performanceguidelines for voting systems and is intended for a broad audience. Volume II provides details of the testing process for certification of voting systems. They alsopoint out that most states have adopted the VSS in whole or in part -- many require that any newvoting systems purchased adhere to the VSS or VVSG . Drafts are posted online andcomments incorporated. (25) Some observers argue that product standards such as theCommon Criteria (ISO/IEC 15408), which provides a set of evaluation criteria for the securityof information technology, (26) would be more appropriate. As described in the section above summarizing the guidelines, the TGDC decided toproduce only a partial revision of the VSS as the first version of the VVSG . The two major areas of revision are arguably the most important for immediate action,since usability and accessibility are major focuses of HAVA voting system requirements, andsecurity concerns have been prominent in recent public debate about voting systems,especially DREs. Until that time, federal certification of voting systems willpresumably continue to be based on the 2002 VSS, although state or local jurisdictions maychoose to require vendors to meet some or all of the VVSG requirements sooner, and the EACplans to issue guidelines to assist states in implementation. Among the reasons are worries about acquiring newsystems in time for the January 2006 deadline that might later be deemed not to be incompliance with the requirements, or not obtaining systems of as high a level of quality aswould be possible once the VVSG go into effect. Other observers believe that delaying the implementation of the VVSG meansthat the 2006 federal election will need to be conducted with voting systems that are notdesigned to conform to HAVA requirements. Integrated versus Component Certification The VVSG focus on voting systems rather than on individual components. Legislative Proposals in the 109th Congress Several bills introduced in the 109th Congress could affect the scope or other aspectsof the VVSG . None of the above bills have received committee or floor action in either chamber. This section also describes application of the guidelines and test specifications, pointing outthat commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products are exempt from some aspects of certificationif they are not modified for use in a voting system. Voting Functions. (58) Topics covered include access control, including general access control and individualprivileges, and specific measures such as passwords and encryption; equipment and data security , including physical security for pollingplaces and ballot-counting locations; software security , including installation requirements and testing offirmware, protection against malicious software, (59) and software distribution and validation requirements toensure that no unauthorized modifications have been made (this is a new set of detailedrequirements) (60) ; telecommunications and data transmission , including access control,integrity of transmission, use of encryption to protect data from interception, use of intrusiondetection methods, protection against external threats to COTS software, and specificrequirements for DREs that transmit data over public networks and for wirelesscommunications (this latter subsection is new), including the caution that the use of wirelesscommunications should be approached with "extreme caution" (61) ; optional requirements for voter-verified paper trail (VVPAT), includingrequirements for handling spoiled and accepted paper records, preserving voter privacy andvote secrecy, audit and election data such as linking electronic and paper records, machinereadability of paper records, tamper protection, printer reliability and maintenance, anddurability of the paper record, as well as usability and accessibility requirements (thissubsection is new). The Help America Vote Act of 2002, which, among other things, established theEAC, required it to develop the VVSG , and established a mechanism for that. The federal voluntary Voting Systems Standards ( VSS ) developed by the FEC. VVPAT.	The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA, P.L. 107-252 ) gave the federal ElectionAssistance Commission (EAC) the responsibility to develop a set of Voluntary Voting SystemGuidelines ( VVSG ) to replace the current voluntary Voting Systems Standards ( VSS ). The VVSG areto provide a set of specifications and requirements to be used in the certification of computer-assistedvoting systems, both paper-based and fully electronic. That was also the purpose of the VSS, whichwere developed in response to concerns raised about voting systems in the 1970s and 1980s. Moststates have adopted the VSS in whole or in part, and most are expected to adopt the VVSG, which arescheduled to go into effect two years after approval. The draft VVSG, a partial revision of the VSS, was released in June 2005 for a 90-daycomment period. Volume I provides performance guidelines for voting systems and is intended fora broad audience. It includes descriptions of functional requirements and performance standards,and requirements for vendors. The most extensive revisions are to the section on usability andaccessibility and the section on security of voting systems. Standards are also included for the useof voter-verified paper audit trails (VVPAT), a recent security measure developed in response toconcerns that electronic voting machines are vulnerable to tampering that might otherwise bedifficult to detect. Volume II provides details of the testing process for certification of votingsystems and has few revisions. Some issues associated with the VVSG have been controversial. Among them is the questionof timing. Some vendors claim that there needs to be more time for technology development beforethe new guidelines become effective; some activists argue that problems with voting systems, andHAVA provisions, demand more rapid implementation of the VVSG . In any event, it is generallyconsidered unlikely that the guidelines will have much direct impact on voting systems used in 2006,when HAVA requirements for voting systems go into effect. One exception may be the VVPATprovisions, since the VSS, under which most current voting systems are certified, have no provisionsrelating to this innovation. The VVSG will be voluntary, but some observers believe that a regulatoryapproach would be more appropriate given the importance of elections to the democratic process. However, since many states require that voting systems be certified, vendors are expected to treatthe VVSG in the same way they have treated the VSS -- as effectively mandatory. Among the other issues being debated about the guidelines are whether they should beexpanded to include voter registration systems, whether they impede innovation by focusing onintegrated systems rather than components, how to treat commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) productsthat are incorporated in voting systems, and whether a graded certification would be more effectivethan the current pass/fail approach. Several bills introduced in the 109th Congress could affect thescope or other aspects of the VVSG by requiring VVPAT or other security provisions, addressingconcerns about conflict of interest, and other measures. None have received committee or flooraction in either chamber during the first session. This report will be updated in response to majordevelopments.
crs_R42937	crs_R42937_0	The total number of inmates under BOP's jurisdiction increased from approximately 25,000 in FY1980 to over 205,000 in FY2015. Between FY1980 and FY2013, the federal prison population increased, on average, by approximately 5,900 inmates annually. However, the number of inmates in the federal prison system decreased from FY2013 to FY2015. Sentencing Commission (USSC), BOP, and scholars have identified several policy changes over the past three decades that have contributed to the growth of the federal prison population: increases in the number of federal offenses subject to mandatory minimum sentences, changes to the federal criminal code that have made more crimes federal offenses, and the elimination of parole. There are a number of policy avenues lawmakers could consider should Congress choose to address the growth in the federal prison population. Finally, policymakers could consider repealing federal criminal statutes for some offenses. Congress is currently considering legislation that would put into effect some of the policy options discussed in this report, including expanding the "safety valve" for some low-level offenders, allowing inmates to earn additional good time credit as a part of a risk and needs assessment system, and reducing mandatory minimum penalties for some offenses. According to GAO, BOP reported increased use of double and triple bunking, which brings together for longer periods of time inmates with a higher risk of violence and more potential victims; waiting lists for education and drug treatment programs, which can pose a threat to institutional security by increasing inmate idleness and may decrease recidivism-reducing benefits these programs can provide; limited meaningful work opportunities, which can also contribute to inmate idleness; crowded visiting rooms, which can make it difficult for inmates to visit with their families; and increased inmate-to-staff ratios, which can compromise institutional safety by increasing staff overtime and stress while reducing staff-inmate communication. The burgeoning prison population has contributed to mounting operational expenditures for the federal prison system. BOP's appropriations increased more than $7.1 billion from FY1980 ($330 million) to FY2016 ($7.479 billion). BOP's expanding budget is starting to consume a larger share of the Department of Justice's (DOJ) overall annual appropriations, meaning that funding for the federal prison system might start to crowd out funding for other DOJ initiatives. Continuing or Expanding Current Correctional Policies Under the umbrella of continuing existing policies, Congress could consider addressing issues related to the burgeoning federal prison population by (1) expanding the capacity of the federal prison system, (2) continuing to invest in rehabilitative programming, (3) placing more inmates in private correctional facilities, or some combination of the three. Placing More Inmates in Private Prisons BOP has placed an increasing share of federal inmates in contract facilities as a way of managing the growth in the federal prison population. Changing Existing Correctional and Sentencing Policies to Reduce the Prison Population Policymakers might also consider whether they want to revise some of the changes that have been made to federal criminal justice policy over the past three decades. A confluence of these changes has resulted in an increasing number of offenders being sent to federal prisons. Changes to Mandatory Minimum Penalties The U.S.	Since the early 1980s, there has been a historically unprecedented increase in the federal prison population. The total number of inmates under the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) jurisdiction increased from approximately 25,000 in FY1980 to over 205,000 in FY2015. Between FY1980 and FY2013, the federal prison population increased, on average, by approximately 5,900 inmates annually. However, the number of inmates in the federal prison system has decreased from FY2013 to FY2015. Some of the growth is attributable to changes in federal criminal justice policy during the previous three decades. These changes include increases in the number of federal offenses subject to mandatory minimum sentences, changes to the federal criminal code that have made more crimes federal offenses, and the elimination of parole. The growth in the federal prison population can be a detriment to BOP's ability to safely operate their facilities and maintain the federal prison infrastructure. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that the growing number of federal inmates has resulted in an increased use of double and triple bunking, waiting lists for education and drug treatment programs, limited meaningful work opportunities, and increased inmate-to-staff ratios. These factors can contribute to increased inmate misconduct, which negatively affects the safety and security of inmates and staff. The burgeoning prison population has contributed to mounting operational expenditures for the federal prison system. BOP's appropriations increased more than $7.1 billion from FY1980 ($330 million) to FY2016 ($7.479 billion). As a result, BOP's expanding budget is starting to consume a larger share of the Department of Justice's overall annual appropriation. Should Congress choose to consider policy options to address the issues resulting from the growth in the federal prison population, policymakers could choose options such as increasing the capacity of the federal prison system by building more prisons; investing in rehabilitative programming (e.g., substance abuse treatment or educational programs) as a way of keeping inmates constructively occupied and potentially reducing recidivism after inmates are released; or placing more inmates in private prisons. Policymakers might also consider whether they want to revise some of the policy changes over the past three decades that have contributed to the steadily increasing number of offenders being incarcerated. For example, Congress could consider options such as (1) modifying mandatory minimum penalties, (2) expanding the use of Residential Reentry Centers, (3) placing more offenders on probation, (4) reinstating parole for federal inmates, (5) expanding the amount of good time credit an inmate can earn, and (6) repealing federal criminal statutes for some offenses. Congress is currently considering legislation (e.g., S. 2123, H.R. 3713) that would put into effect some of the policy options discussed in this report, including expanding the "safety valve" for some low-level offenders, allowing inmates to earn additional good time credit as a part of a risk and needs assessment system, and reducing mandatory minimum penalties for some offenses.
crs_R42863	crs_R42863_0	Perkins IV supports the development of academic and career and technical skills among secondary and postsecondary education students who elect to enroll in career and technical education (CTE) programs, sometimes referred to as vocational education programs. Perkins IV was authorized by statute through FY2012 and was funded at $1.1 billion in FY2014. The General Education Provisions Act (GEPA) automatically extended the authorization for one additional fiscal year to FY2013. On April 19, 2012, the Obama Administration announced its blueprint for reauthorization of Perkins IV (hereinafter referred to as the Blueprint) in an effort to create more high quality CTE programs. The National Defense Education Act (P.L. 109-270 ). A major innovation was the requirement that each local recipient offer the relevant elements of at least one state developed program of education, providing a progressive sequence of secondary and postsecondary courses that lead to an industry recognized credential. Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Act of 2006 (Perkins IV) Perkins IV is the main source of specific federal funding for CTE. The act aims to achieve this through the following grant programs: Basic State Grants, which support the development, maintenance, and improvement of CTE at the state and local level; Tech Prep, which specifically supports programs that integrate secondary and postsecondary CTE; and Tribally Controlled Postsecondary Career and Technical Institutions (TCPCTI), which supports CTE programs at TCPCTIs. Title I—Basic State Grants Over 90% of the funds appropriated under Perkins IV are used to provide Basic State Grants. State Formula Allocation The base formula for determining state allocations is designed to favor states with larger populations that are of high school age and two years thereafter and states with a lower than average per capita income. One minimum amount is the state's FY1998 grant (hold harmless); the other minimum is 0.5% of the total allocated to states. Based on the most recent data available, in 2009-2010 states distributed 61% of funds, on average, to secondary education providers. Activities at the Local Level Perkins IV requires eligible recipients at the local level to develop and improve CTE programs. Each consortium receiving funding is required to establish and report on the following indicators of performance with respect to Tech Prep participants: the number of secondary and postsecondary education students served; the number and percent of secondary education students who enroll in postsecondary education, enroll in postsecondary education in the same field of study pursued at the secondary level, complete a state or industry-recognized credential or licensure, earn postsecondary credit while enrolled at the secondary level, and enroll in remedial math, writing, or reading courses in postsecondary education; and the number and percent of postsecondary education students who are placed in a related field of employment not later than 12 months following graduation from the program, complete a state or industry-recognized credential or licensure, complete a two-year degree or certificate program within the normal time of completion for the program, and complete a bachelor's degree within the normal time of completion for the degree. These courses may or may not be funded with Perkins IV funds.	The Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Improvement Act of 2006 (Perkins IV; P.L. 109-270) supports the development of academic and career and technical skills among secondary education students and postsecondary education students who elect to enroll in career and technical education (CTE) programs, sometimes referred to as vocational education programs. Perkins IV was authorized through FY2012, which ended on September 30, 2012. The authorization was extended through FY2013 under the General Education Provisions Act, although the act continues to receive appropriations in FY2014. The U.S. Department of Education issued its blueprint for reauthorization in April 2012. This report provides a summary of Perkins IV. The largest program authorized under Perkins IV is the Basic State Grants program. This program provides formula grants to states to develop, implement, and improve CTE programs, services, and activities. The formula awards proportionally larger grants to states with larger populations that are in the age range traditionally enrolled in high school or within two years of high school graduation and to states with a lower than average per capita income. Incorporated in the formula are certain features that guarantee minimum funding levels. These features are a FY1998 hold harmless and a minimum equal to 0.5% of the total amount available for state grants. Each state is able to decide how much of its federal funds will be dedicated to secondary education and how much to postsecondary education. Once this decision is made, funds must generally be distributed to the local secondary and postsecondary education providers through formulas defined by Perkins IV or the state. Approximately 12.5 million students enrolled in CTE courses during the 2009-2010 academic year (most recent data available). These courses may or may not be funded with Perkins IV funds. Two key requirements for receiving funds under the Basic State Grants program are offering CTE programs of study and compliance with accountability requirements. Secondary and postsecondary education providers must adopt the appropriate elements of at least one state-approved CTE program of study. Programs of study incorporate secondary and postsecondary education elements into a coordinated, nonduplicative progression of courses leading to an industry-recognized credential, certificate, or degree. Perkins IV also requires that states and secondary and postsecondary education providers meet targets on statutorily defined performance measures or face sanctions. Perkins IV also authorizes additional programs: Tech Prep, national programs, Tribally Controlled Postsecondary Career and Technical Institutions (TCPCTI), and Occupational and Employment Information. Of these, only national programs and TCPCTI received funding in FY2011-FY2014.
crs_R45143	crs_R45143_0	It also reviews the legislative attempts—which successfully culminated with the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-123 ; BBA)—to reintegrate cotton as a program crop eligible for major farm revenue support programs. With trade retaliation in the offing, the United States removed upland cotton from eligibility for the PLC and ARC revenue support programs in the 2014 farm bill. Cotton in the 2014 Farm Bill Under the 2014 farm bill, upland cotton was made ineligible for new revenue support programs available to traditional program crops—referred to as covered commodities —and was given a reduced marketing loan rate. Instead, upland cotton producers were eligible for new temporary transition payments and a stand-alone, county-based revenue insurance policy called the Stacked Income Protection Plan (STAX). Cotton Excluded from New Revenue Programs The 2014 farm bill established two new support programs—the Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) and Price Loss Coverage (PLC) programs—were established. Cotton-Specific Programs Remaining in the 2014 Farm Bill Producers of upland cotton remain eligible for support under several other farm programs under the 2014 farm bill including benefits under the following programs: Marketing Assistance Loan (MAL) Program for Cotton Producers . Under these conditions, the new ARC and PLC programs paid out nearly $20 billion to eligible program crops during the first three years of the 2014 farm bill ($5.3 billion in 2014, $7.8 billion in 2015, and $6.9 billion in 2016). In response to its exclusion from PLC program eligibility, the U.S. cotton sector actively sought to regain cotton's former status as a "covered commodity" but on the basis of cottonseed rather than cotton lint. Several members of the House Agriculture Committee agree d with the NCC proposal and, in December 2015, urged then-Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack to use his authority under the farm bill to designate cottonseed as a covered oilseed, thus allowing cottonseed to be a "covered commodity" eligible for the ARC and PLC programs immediately and without further action by Congress. Instead, the explanatory statement accompanying P.L. Both of these farm program changes have long-term policy implications because they change the 2014 farm bill statutes. Seed Cotton: Program Design The BBA provision, Section 60101(a), includes seed cotton as a covered commodity, thus making it eligible for participation in PLC and ARC beginning with crop year 2018. Participating producers must make three decisions during the signup period (July 30, 2018, to December 7, 2018): how to allocate their generic base acres, whether to update cotton program yields, and whether to participate in ARC or PLC. However, according to CBO, the net costs of the seed cotton provision in the BBA would be reduced to $61 million over 10 years by associated budget offsets—including the reallocation of generic base and the removal of residual generic base from ARC and PLC program eligibility (-$2.188 billion over 10 years) and by repealing the eligibility for the STAX program for cotton producers that enroll their seed cotton base in either ARC or PLC (-$711 million over 10 years). Potential Issues Three issues that could figure into future policy debate as a result of this program change include the potential for large budget costs if commodity markets weaken further, the realignment of program payment acres, and considerations surrounding the potential for re-opening of the WTO U.S.-Brazil cotton dispute Potential Budget Cost of Seed Cotton as a Program Crop Projections for PLC payments on seed cotton base are sensitive to changes in market prices.	The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123; BBA), signed into law on February 9, 2018, included a provision—Section 60101(a)—which amended the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79) to add seed cotton as a "covered commodity," thus making cotton eligible for the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) farm revenue support programs. The 2014 farm bill provides authority for farm programs for the 2014 through 2018 crop years. Under the 2014 farm bill as signed into law in February 2014, neither cotton nor its co-product, cottonseed, were eligible to participate in the newly created ARC and PLC programs. During the first three years of the 2014 farm bill (crop years 2014 through 2016), nearly $20 billion in support payments have been made to eligible program crops under ARC and PLC. Upland cotton had been eligible for U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) farm support programs since their origin in the 1930s. However, in response to a trade dispute with Brazil, the 2014 farm bill permanently removed upland cotton from eligibility for the ARC and PLC programs. Instead, the remaining cotton-specific support programs were supplemented by offering the U.S. cotton sector new transitional payments and, in 2015, a new shallow-loss revenue insurance product: the Stacked Income Protection Program (STAX). Since early 2014, U.S. cotton producers have been largely unsatisfied with their economic situation due to falling cotton prices and the perceived lack of revenue support offered under STAX. In early 2015, the U.S. cotton sector began advocating to be made eligible for payments under the ARC and PLC programs. Several Members of the House Agriculture Committee (including both its chairman and ranking member) were supportive of this effort and actively sought a legislative opportunity to reintegrate either cottonseed or seed cotton—the harvested but un-ginned cotton boll that includes both lint and cottonseed—back into the revenue support programs in the 2014 farm bill. After several legislative attempts, this effort was successful when Congress passed the BBA with a provision that amended the 2014 farm bill to add seed cotton as a "covered commodity," thus making it eligible for either ARC or PLC beginning with the 2018 crop. To participate in the seed cotton program, producers must first make three decisions specified in the new statute: what portion of their farm program generic base acres will be designated as cotton-specific base, whether to update historical cotton program yields (needed to determine the per-acre payment rate), and which program to participate in—ARC or PLC. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects the cost of adding seed cotton as a covered commodity at nearly $3 billion over 10 years. However, accompanying budget offsets are projected to lower the net cost to $61 million. The policy change for cotton has potential implications for both domestic and international commodity markets. However, perhaps the most critical aspect of the new seed cotton policy is that, as part of current law, it becomes part of CBO's budget baseline used to write the next farm bill. As a result, it avoids the potential policy debate surrounding a search for budgetary offsets that would otherwise be needed to pay for the costs associated with adding a new farm program. This result could facilitate reaching an agreement among congressional negotiators working on the farm support programs in Title I of a new farm bill.
crs_R41764	crs_R41764_0	Biennial budgeting proposals may focus on enacting budgetary legislation for either a two-year period or two succeeding one-year periods in a single measure. Types of Biennial Budgeting Biennial budgeting as a concept has many permutations, and may include a requirement for two-year budget resolutions, two-year appropriations, and also affect the timing of consideration for other types of legislation related to revenue and spending. The stretch approach would extend the current budget process timetable to two full years. In contrast, the split sessions approach is based on the expectation that all budgetary legislation would be considered in a single year or session of Congress (typically the first), while consideration of non-budgetary matters would occur primarily in the other year or session. Biennial budgeting proposals have also varied with respect to the time frame for appropriations. Proposals to convert the budget process to a two-year cycle have typically involved a process centered on a two-year budget resolution. Arguments Made by Proponents of Biennial Budgeting Supporters of biennial budgeting have generally advanced three arguments—that a two-year budget cycle would (1) reduce congressional workload by eliminating the need for annual consideration of routine or repetitious matters; (2) allow Congress to reserve time to promote improved oversight and program review; and (3) allow better long-term planning by the agencies that spend federal funds at the federal, state, or local level. Arguments Made by Opponents of Biennial Budgeting Critics of biennial budgeting have countered with several arguments as to why some of the projected benefits might not be realized. Reducing the number of times that Congress considers budget matters, they have suggested, may only raise the stakes, and thereby heighten the possibility for conflict and increased delay. Projecting revenues and expenditures for a two-year cycle requires forecasting as much as 30 months in advance, rather than 18 under an annual budget cycle, and even 18-month projections have previously been inaccurate. With only a limited ability to anticipate future conditions, critics have argued that a two-year cycle could require Congress to choose either to allow the President greater latitude for making budgetary adjustments in the off-years or to engage in mid-cycle corrections to a degree that would nullify any anticipated time savings or planning advantages. Furthermore, they have argued that annual review of appropriations requests is an important part of oversight that would be lost under a biennial budget, with no guarantee that committees would take advantage of a separate oversight session, or that oversight separate from review of funding decisions would be as effective. Again the experience at the state level is inconclusive. Congressional action related to biennial budgeting first occurred in 1982 with hearings on S. 2008 , the Budget and Oversight Reform Act of 1981 (97 th Congress). None of these proposals were ultimately enacted. In the 112 th Congress, the House Rules Committee Subcommittee on the Legislative and Budget Process held a hearing on H.R. 114 , the Biennial Budgeting and Appropriations Act of 2011; no further action occurred during that Congress. In the 113 th Congress, the Senate adopted an amendment ( S.Amdt. 136 ) to the FY2014 budget resolution ( S.Con.Res. Additionally, the House Budget Committee reported H.R. 1869 , the Biennial Budgeting and Enhanced Oversight Act of 2014, with an amendment ( H.Rept. No further action was taken. 8 , the FY2014 budget resolution, an amendment was offered that created a deficit neutral reserve fund for the establishment of a biennial budget and appropriations process ( S.Amdt. 113-382 ).	Difficulties in the timely enactment of budgetary legislation have long fueled interest in ways to structure the congressional budget process to ease time constraints. One long-discussed reform proposal would attempt to remedy this by changing the budget cycle from one to two years. Biennial budgeting is a concept that may involve several variations, including two-year budget resolutions, two-year appropriations, and other changes in the timing of legislation related to revenue or spending. Biennial budgeting proposals may focus on enacting budgetary legislation for either a two-year period or two succeeding one-year periods in a single measure. The overall time frame for a biennial budget cycle has previously taken either a "stretch" approach, where the current budget process timetable is extended to two full years, or a split sessions approach, where all budgetary activity is expected to occur in a single year or session of Congress (typically the first), while the other year or session is reserved primarily for oversight and the consideration of non-budgetary matters. Proponents of biennial budgeting have generally advanced three arguments—that a two-year budget cycle would (1) reduce congressional workload by eliminating the need for annual review of routine matters; (2) reserve the second session of each Congress for improved congressional oversight and program review; and (3) allow better long-term planning by the agencies that spend federal funds at the federal, state, or local level. Critics of biennial budgeting have countered by asserting that the projected benefits might not be realized. Projecting revenues and expenditures for a two-year cycle requires forecasting as much as 30 months in advance. This might result in less accurate forecasts and could require Congress to choose either allowing the President greater latitude to make budgetary adjustments in the off-years or engaging in mid-cycle corrections, which might effectively undercut any workload reduction or intended improvements in planning. Opponents have also pointed out that oversight through annual review of appropriations would be lost under a biennial budget, with no guarantee that a separate oversight session would be effective. Furthermore, they have argued that reducing the number of times that Congress considers budget matters may only raise the stakes, which heightens the possibility for conflict and increased delay. Biennial budgeting has a long history at the state level. The trend since World War II has been for states to convert to an annual budget cycle; however, the most recent data available, from 2011, indicate that 19 states operate with a two-year cycle, and some states operate with mixed cycles that put significant portions of their budgets on a two-year cycle. Congressional action related to biennial budgeting first occurred in 1982 with hearings on S. 2008, the Budget and Oversight Reform Act of 1981 (97th Congress). Additional action occurred with respect to biennial budgeting during the 100th, 101st, 102nd, 103rd, 104th, 105th, 106th, 107th, 108th, and 109th Congresses. None of these proposals were ultimately enacted. In the 112th Congress, the House Rules Committee Subcommittee on the Legislative and Budget Process held a hearing on H.R. 114, the Biennial Budgeting and Appropriations Act of 2011, but took no further action. In the 113th Congress, the Senate adopted an amendment (S.Amdt. 136) to the FY2014 budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 8), that created a deficit neutral reserve fund for the establishment of a biennial budget and appropriations process. Additionally, the House Budget Committee reported H.R. 1869, the Biennial Budgeting and Enhanced Oversight Act of 2014, with an amendment (H.Rept. 113-382). No further action was taken.

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