id
stringlengths 9
18
| pid
stringlengths 11
20
| input
stringlengths 120
17k
| output
stringlengths 127
13.7k
|
|---|---|---|---|
crs_RS22416
|
crs_RS22416_0
|
Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program
The Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-162 ) combined the Byrne Grant programs and LLEBG into the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant program (JAG). Under the current JAG formula, the total funding allocated to a state is based on the state's population and reported violent crimes. The other half is based on the state's respective share of the average number of reported violent crimes in the United States for the three most recent years for which data are available. After each state's allocation is calculated, 40% of the state's allocation is directly awarded to units of local government. JAG funds can be used for state and local initiatives, technical assistance, training, personnel, equipment, supplies, contractual support, and criminal justice information systems to improve or enhance such areas as
law enforcement programs; prosecution and court programs; prevention and education programs; corrections and community corrections programs; drug treatment programs; planning, evaluation, and technology improvement programs; and crime victim and witness programs (other than compensation). Appropriations for the Byrne Formula Grant, LLEBG, and JAG Programs
Funding for JAG has averaged $440 million per fiscal year since Congress started appropriating funding for the program in FY2005. However, as shown in Table 1 , funding for the program fluctuated over that time period. The appropriations data also show that there has been a general downward trend in providing assistance to state and local law enforcement through these formula grant programs.
|
The Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program was created by the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-162), which collapsed both the Edward Byrne Memorial Formula (Byrne Formula) Grant and the Local Law Enforcement Block Grant (LLEBG) into a single program. This report provides a brief overview of JAG and its funding.
JAG funds are awarded to state and local governments based on a statutorily defined formula. Each state's allocation is based on its proportion of the country's population and the state's proportion of the average total number of reported violent crimes (homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) for the last three years. After a state's allocation is calculated, 60% goes directly to the state government and the remaining 40% is awarded directly to units of local government in the state. State and local governments can use their JAG funding for programs or projects in one of seven purpose areas: (1) law enforcement programs; (2) prosecution and court programs; (3) prevention and education programs; (4) corrections and community corrections programs; (5) drug treatment programs; (6) planning, evaluation, and technology improvement programs; and (7) crime victim and witness programs (other than compensation).
Funding for JAG has averaged $440 million per fiscal year since Congress started appropriating funding for the program in FY2005. However, funding for the program fluctuated over that time period. The appropriations data also show that since FY1998 there has been a general downward trend in providing assistance to state and local law enforcement through the LLEBG, Byrne Formula, and JAG grant programs.
|
crs_RL34324
|
crs_RL34324_0
|
FEC Nominations and the Commission's Operating Status
Due to the loss of its quorum between January and June 2008, the FEC was unable to execute some of its core functions, including rulemaking to implement campaign finance law. On June 24, 2008, the Senate confirmed five nominations to the agency. Campaign Finance Legislation in the 110th Congress
Legislative activity regarding campaign finance has occurred on two fronts during the 110 th Congress. First, and most notably, the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA) contains some campaign finance provisions, but the law is primarily devoted to lobbying and ethics. Campaign Finance Provisions in HLOGA
S. 1 , which became P.L. The Administrative Fine Program
P.L. 6296 (Brady), will extend until 2013 the FEC's authority to conduct the Administrative Fine Program (AFP). However, the Rules and Administration Committee has held hearings on four bills. First, on March 28, 2007, the committee held a hearing on S. 223 (Feingold), which would require Senate campaign committees (including candidate committees and party committees) to file campaign finance disclosure reports electronically. S. 1091 remains in committee. House Activity on Other Campaign Finance Legislation
The House has passed three bills (in addition to lobbying reform measures and H.R. First, H.R. 3093 , the House version of the FY2008 Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies appropriations bill, contained an amendment sponsored by Representative Pence that would have prohibited spending funds for criminal enforcement of BCRA's electioneering communication provision (discussed below). However, the measure was not included in companion Senate legislation or the FY2008 consolidated appropriations law. A second House bill, H.R. 2630 (Schiff), would prohibit candidate campaign committees and leadership PACs from paying candidate spouses for campaign work. It has not been considered in the Senate. Third, the House passed H.R. The bill would permit candidates to designate to the FEC an individual (or a backup) to spend campaign funds if the candidate dies. Hearings on Automated Political Calls
Also during the 110 th Congress, House and Senate committees have held hearings on automated political telephone calls (also known as "robo calls" or "auto calls"). The Senate Rules and Administration Committee also held a hearing on the calls, and related bill S. 2624 (Feinstein), on February 27, 2008. On June 25, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a 5-4 decision in Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II) . "Millionaire's Amendment"
On June 26, 2008, a 5-4 majority of the U.S. Supreme Court declared the "Millionaire's Amendment" unconstitutional in Davis v. Federal Election Commission . Conclusion and Analysis
HLOGA represents the most significant legislative development related to campaign finance during the 110 th Congress.
|
During the 110th Congress, the House and Senate's campaign finance work has overlapped in three areas. First and most significantly, a lobbying and ethics law enacted in September 2007, the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA; P.L. 110-81, which was S. 1), contains some campaign finance provisions. Second, P.L. 110-433 (H.R. 6296) will extend the Federal Election Commission's (FEC) Administrative Fine Program (AFP) until 2013. Third, the Committee on House Administration and the Senate Rules and Administration Committee have held hearings on automated political telephone calls (also known as "robo calls" or "auto calls"), a subject that is related to campaign finance.
Otherwise, the House and Senate have largely focused on different campaign finance issues. Specifically, the House has passed three bills, not passed by the Senate, containing campaign finance provisions. First, H.R. 3032 would allow candidates to designate an individual to disburse remaining campaign funds if the candidate dies. Second, H.R. 2630 would restrict campaign and leadership political action committee (PAC) payments to candidate spouses. Third, a provision in the House-passed version of an appropriations bill (H.R. 3093) would have prohibited spending Justice Department funds on criminal enforcement of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) "electioneering communication" provision. However, the language was not included in the FY2008 consolidated appropriations law (P.L. 110-161).
Similarly, the Senate has largely considered legislation not considered in the House. The Senate's campaign finance activity has also been confined largely to hearings. S. 223, which would require electronic filing of campaign disclosure reports was reported from the Rules and Administration Committee but has not received floor consideration. During the spring and summer of 2007, the committee also held hearings on coordinated party expenditures (S. 1091) and congressional public financing legislation (S. 1285).
Non-legislative items are also noteworthy. Following a Senate impasse over four nominees to the Federal Election Commission (FEC) during the first session of the 110th Congress, the Commission lacked the quorum necessary to make major policy decisions between January and June 2008. Senate confirmations of five nominees on June 24, 2008, restored the FEC to full capacity. FEC rulemakings are ongoing or expected in response to legislative activity, and Supreme Court rulings addressing electioneering communications (Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.) and the "Millionaire's Amendment" (Davis v. Federal Election Commission).
This report will be updated in the event of other significant legislative or policy developments in the 110th Congress.
|
crs_R44176
|
crs_R44176_0
|
95-504 ) granted U.S. passenger airlines almost total freedom to determine which domestic markets to serve and what airfares to charge. With the advent of deregulation, there were concerns that small communities would lose air service because airlines would shift their operations to serve larger and often more profitable markets. To address these concerns, Congress established the Essential Air Service (EAS) program in the Airline Deregulation Act to ensure continuous air service to small communities. At the end of FY2018, a total of 174 communities received subsidized EAS service. The Airline Deregulation Act authorized CAB to require carriers to continue providing scheduled service at eligible communities after deregulation, with subsidies if necessary. The Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 ( P.L. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 ( P.L. 115-254 ) reauthorized the program through FY2023 and introduced several legislative measures, including Section 453, which amends 49 U.S.C. §41736 to sunset the Air Transportation to Noneligible Places (ATNEP) program in 2020. Airports that were formerly eligible but did not receive subsidized service during the specified year are no longer eligible for subsidized service and may not reenter the program. EAS Communities in Alaska and Hawaii
Communities in Alaska and Hawaii are generally exempt from almost all EAS eligibility requirements, except one measure established by the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014 ( P.L. 113-76 ) and the Continued Appropriations Resolution of 2015 ( P.L. 113-164 ). Program Administration
The EAS program is administered by the Office of the Secretary of Transportation, which determines the minimum level of service required at each eligible community by specifying
a hub through which the community is linked to the national passenger airline network; a minimum number of round trips and available seats that must be provided to that hub; certain characteristics of the aircraft to be used; and the maximum permissible number of intermediate stops to the hub. Certain features of the program may have contributed to the challenge of controlling costs:
Few carriers may bid for any particular EAS contract. Subsidy cost is not among the four major factors DOT is required by statute to consider when evaluating bids. Measures to Shrink the Program
Over the years, Congress has sought to limit the scope of the EAS program, mostly by eliminating subsidy support for communities within a reasonable driving distance of a major hub airport and by imposing a cap on the per-passenger subsidy. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 ( P.L.
|
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 gave airlines almost total freedom to determine which domestic markets to serve and what airfares to charge. This raised the concern that communities with relatively low passenger levels would lose service as carriers shifted their operations to serve larger and often more profitable markets. To address this concern, Congress established the Essential Air Service (EAS) program to ensure that small communities that were served by certificated air carriers before deregulation would continue to receive scheduled passenger service, with subsidies if necessary.
The EAS program is administered by the Office of the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), which enforces the eligibility requirements and determines the level of service required at eligible communities. By the end of FY2018, 174 communities in the United States received subsidized service under EAS.
Over the years, Congress has limited the scope of the program, mostly by eliminating subsidy support for communities within a specified driving distance of a major hub airport and capping subsidies under certain criteria. The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 included additional EAS reform measures, including the requirement that a community have a minimum number of daily enplanements to remain eligible for subsidy. Further, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-76) and the Continuing Appropriations Resolution of 2015 (P.L. 113-164) introduced additional measures to shrink the program. The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-254) changed certain requirements regarding application of subsidy caps and would discontinue the Air Transportation to Noneligible Places (ATNEP) program in 2020.
Despite these efforts to limit spending for EAS subsidies, inflation-adjusted program expenditures have risen 132% since 2008. Some factors contributing to the rising program costs are external, such as high aviation fuel prices from 2008 through 2014 and the prospect of higher pilot wage costs due to changes in federal regulations. However, certain features of the EAS program itself may have contributed to the challenge of controlling costs. The statute governing EAS does not list cost among the four factors that DOT must consider when evaluating air carriers' bids to provide subsidized EAS service, and neither the carriers nor the communities receiving subsidized service are obliged to select service options that minimize the government's costs.
EAS traditionally has been authorized in laws reauthorizing the Federal Aviation Administration and other civil aviation programs. The 2018 FAA reauthorization act reauthorized the program through FY2023.
|
crs_R43065
|
crs_R43065_0
|
To implement the sequester-related reductions, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) began to furlough personnel, including air traffic controllers, on April 21, 2013. The bill provided new authority to the Secretary of Transportation to transfer up to $253 million to FAA's "operations" account from other FAA accounts, including discretionary grants-in-aid for airports. 113-9 . FAA implemented various air traffic management initiatives to mitigate impacts of the reduced staffing due to furloughs, including increased aircraft spacing, which reduces the number of flights an airport can handle in a given period. In total, delays related to staffing reductions appear to have affected about 3%-4% of flights, with some acute delay impacts occurring in congested airspace, particularly in the New York City area. On April 27, 2013, following House and Senate passage of legislation to allow it to transfer $253 million from other accounts to its operations account, FAA announced that it had suspended all employee furloughs and that air traffic facilities would resume operations under normal staffing levels. Contrast with FAA's Summer 2011 Furloughs
FAA previously furloughed employees in the summer of 2011. The 2011 furloughs resulted from the effective temporary shutdown of the Airport Improvement Program (AIP) and a lapse in revenue collection authority for the Airport and Airways Trust Fund (AATF), which provides major funding for FAA programs. Other employees paid from the facilities and equipment and research, engineering, and development accounts were also furloughed, as the sole funding source for those FAA programs, the AATF, could no longer collect revenue. Certain employees funded from the facilities and equipment account who inspected FAA navigation and communications equipment were ordered to stay on the job without pay because they were deemed to be essential to the safety of the air traffic system. This distinction explains why, during FAA's April 2013 implementation of the sequester, federal civil service employees such as air traffic controllers were treated differently in comparison with the 2011 shutdown of certain FAA activities in response to a lapse in budget authority. Implications of the Reducing Flight Delays Act of 2013 (RFDA; P.L. Amounts made available for obligation under the Airport Improvement Program (AIP) in FY2013 for discretionary grants derived from apportioned funds not required in FY2013, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. RFDA and the Airport Improvement Program (AIP)
The Airport Improvement Program provides federal grants to airports for airport development and planning. In recent years, the balance of protected entitlement funds (i.e., carryover funds) has grown. Also, prior to the enactment of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 ( P.L. The transfer of these funds to other parts of FAA under RFDA will reduce eventual AIP discretionary outlays by a like amount. This reduction of obligational authority for AIP discretionary funding will eventually lead to reductions in outlays for airport improvements unless Congress decides to restore the funding in the future. Consequently, if the transfers authorized by RFDA reduce the $3.343 billion made available for FY2013 below $3.2 billion, most airports' entitlements could be reduced for the remainder of FY2013.
|
In response to across-the-board funding reductions in federal programs through the budget sequestration process implemented in FY2013, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) began to furlough personnel, including air traffic controllers, on April 21, 2013. In conjunction with air traffic controller furloughs, FAA implemented various air traffic management initiatives to mitigate impacts of the reduced staffing on controller workload. This resulted in some delays affecting about 3%-4% of flights, with some acute delay impacts occurring in congested airspace, particularly in the New York City area.
Amid concerns over the impacts of air traffic controller furloughs, Congress passed the Reducing Flight Delays Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-9). The act authorized FAA to transfer up to $253 million from funding available for airport grants or other FAA programs and accounts to the FAA operations account for necessary costs to prevent reduced operations and staffing and ensure a safe and efficient air transportation system. Following passage of this legislation in Congress, FAA suspended all employee furloughs and resumed air traffic control operations under normal procedures and full staffing levels.
Prior to the April 2013 furloughs, FAA furloughed employees in the summer of 2011. However, the FAA furlough actions associated with sequestration had a different legal basis and were consequently implemented quite differently. The summer 2011 furloughs arose as a result of a lapse in authority to collect Airport and Airways Trust Fund (AATF) revenues, the sole funding source for FAA's facilities and equipment (F&E) account, the Airport Improvement Program (AIP), and research, engineering, and development activities. Expenditure authority for AIP also expired in the summer of 2011. The expiration of these authorities resulted in immediate furloughs for most employees funded from these accounts. Some employees funded through the F&E account responsible for ensuring the safety and reliability of navigation and communications equipment were ordered to stay on the job. Employees paid through FAA's operations account, including air traffic controllers, were not furloughed in 2011.
Certain AIP grants-in-aid funds for airport development and planning are now subject to provisions of the Reducing Flight Delays Act of 2013. It appears that the transfer of the designated AIP discretionary funds to air traffic operations reduces the amount made available to airports under 49 U.S.C. 48103. This has implications for both the eventual spending of AIP discretionary funds and the calculation of the amount of AIP entitlement funding available for distribution.
Unless Congress takes further action, the transferred funds will eventually lead to real reductions in AIP discretionary spending. FAA may need to stop or reduce its AIP discretionary grant making for the remainder of FY2013 to comply with the act. Individual airports' formula "entitlements" could be reduced for the remainder of the fiscal year if FAA transfers most or all of the $253 million allowed under the act.
|
crs_R43540
|
crs_R43540_0
|
Introduction
Experts widely assess that Afghanistan will remain the world's primary source of opium poppy cultivation and opium and heroin production, as well as a major global source of cannabis resin, in the coming years (see Figure 1 below). The government of Afghanistan continues to depend on foreign donors for assistance and cooperation in responding to the drug problem. As coalition combat operations in Afghanistan draw to a close in 2014 and as the full transition of security responsibilities to Afghan forces is achieved, some Members of the 113 th Congress have expressed concern regarding the future direction and policy prioritization of U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan, in light of diminishing resources and an uncertain political and security environment in 2015 and beyond. The U.S. government updated its counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan in late 2012 to address transition-oriented objectives. It describes the transition as involving "two simultaneous and parallel transfers of responsibility," which includes not only the transfer of security responsibility to Afghan forces, but also the transfer of counternarcotics responsibilities and law enforcement operational activities to the Afghan government. After 2014, the State Department does not plan to have a permanent counternarcotics presence outside Kabul. In the context of a growing drug problem in Afghanistan and diminished coalition participation in counternarcotics operations, some observers have questioned whether the drug issue will be an Afghan policy priority following the transition—and whether the U.S. government will lose its ability to exert pressure for counternarcotics actions, including corruption investigations that target high-level officials. The alternative development piece of the program is intended to be a two-year, $20 million initiative. Potentially enhancing DOD's support to the region following the transition in Afghanistan, DOD is in the process of establishing a Regional Narcotics and Analysis and Illicit Trafficking Task Force (RNAIT-TF). Some, including DOD, suggest that a more regional approach to combating Afghanistan's drug production may be beneficial, as it may provide "greater fidelity" on the illicit networks that operate throughout the region, including not only drug traffickers, but also weapons traffickers and money launderers. SIGAR has called drug trafficking in Afghanistan "one of the most significant factors putting the entire U.S. and international-donor investment in the reconstruction of Afghanistan at risk" and identified narcotics as one of several "critical issues" for its activities related to U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. The FY2014 appropriations ( P.L. As Congress continues to evaluate counternarcotics policy options and programs in Afghanistan, key questions for consideration include the following:
How can the U.S. government preserve the counternarcotics gains it has achieved over the past 12 years in Afghanistan and prevent backsliding following transition to a reduced U.S. security presence? What is the risk and potential scale of increased cultivation and production of opium and heroin in Afghanistan in 2015 and beyond? How can U.S. counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan be appropriately monitored and evaluated, given security constraints on U.S. personnel mobility? Appendix.
|
Afghanistan is the world's primary source of opium poppy cultivation and opium and heroin production, as well as a major global source of cannabis (marijuana) and cannabis resin (hashish). Drug trafficking, a long-standing feature of Afghanistan's post-Taliban political economy, is linked to corruption and insecurity, and provides a source of illicit finance for non-state armed groups. Based on recent production and trafficking trends, the drug problem in Afghanistan appears to be worsening—just as the U.S. government finalizes plans for its future relationship with the government of Afghanistan in 2015 and beyond and reduces its counternarcotics operational presence in the country to Kabul, the national capital. As coalition combat operations in Afghanistan draw to a close in 2014, and as the full transition of security responsibilities to Afghan forces is achieved, some Members of the 113th Congress have expressed concern regarding the future direction and policy prioritization of U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan in light of diminishing resources and an uncertain political and security environment in 2015 and beyond.
According to the U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan, released in late 2012, the U.S. government envisions a counternarcotics policy future that results in "two simultaneous and parallel transfers of responsibility." Not only does it envision the transfer of security responsibility to Afghan forces, but also the transfer of counternarcotics programming responsibilities and law enforcement operational activities to the Afghan government. Assuming a reduced U.S. security presence and limited civilian mobility throughout the country, the U.S. government is also increasingly emphasizing a regional approach to combating Afghan drugs.
Although some counternarcotics efforts, including eradication and alternative development programming, are already implemented by the government of Afghanistan or by local contractors, others may require a two- to five-year time horizon, or potentially longer, before a complete transition would be feasible, according to Administration officials. Some counternarcotics initiatives are only in their infancy, including the Defense Department's plans to establish a new Regional Narcotics Analysis and Illicit Trafficking Task Force (RNAIT-TF). Other activities, particularly those that required a significant presence at the local and provincial levels, are anticipated to be reduced or limited in scope.
The 113th Congress continues to monitor drug trafficking trends in Afghanistan and evaluate U.S. policy responses. Both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives held hearings on the topic in early 2014 and included provisions in FY2014 appropriations (P.L. 113-76) that limit the scope of and resources devoted to future counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has also identified narcotics as a "critical issue" for policy makers.
This report describes key U.S. counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan in the context of the 2014 transition and analyzes policy issues related to these programs for Congress to consider as policy makers examine the drug problem in Afghanistan. The report's Appendix contains historical figures and tables on trends in Afghan drug cultivation, production, and trafficking.
|
crs_R43415
|
crs_R43415_0
|
Among the various environmental impacts identified in the FEIS are those involving greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. On March 23, 2017, the State Department issued a Presidential Permit for the project, having determined that issuing the permit "would serve the national interest." The Department announced that the Record of Decision and National Interest Determination (2017 Determination) for the Presidential Permit "is informed by" the 2014 FEIS. It cites no new documentation aside from fresh communications with the Canadian pipeline company. The State Department, in the FEIS for the Keystone XL Pipeline project, has produced one such assessment. In addition to a general assessment of the oil sands resource, the FEIS includes an analysis of (1) the GHG emissions associated with the construction and operation of the proposed Keystone XL Pipeline (i.e., the impacts of issuing a Presidential Permit); (2) the GHG emissions associated with using other transport options (i.e., impacts of denying the permit application); and (3) the GHG emissions attributable to the production and use of the oil sands crudes that would be transported to market, regardless of the transport option assumed. The State Department characterizes the GHG emissions attributable to the construction and operation of the project (as well as the alternatives to the project) as "direct and indirect GHG emissions." This value is generated by examining the full GHG emissions profile of oil sands crudes (i.e., the aggregate GHG emissions released by all activities from the extraction of the resource to the refining, transportation, and end-use combustion of refined fuels). The project would emit approximately 0.24 million metric tons of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) equivalents (MMTCO 2 e) during the construction period and 1.44 MMTCO 2 e per year during normal operations. The range of incremental life-cycle GHG emissions attributable to the oil sands crudes that would be transported through the proposed pipeline is estimated to be 1.3 to 27.4 MMTCO 2 e per year over and above the life-cycle GHG emissions attributable to the crude oils expected to be displaced in U.S. refineries. As projected in the market analysis, "approval or denial of any one crude oil transport project, including the proposed project, is unlikely to significantly impact the rate of extraction in the oil sands or the continued demand for heavy crude oil at refineries in the United States based on expected oil prices, oil-sands supply costs, transport costs, and supply-demand scenarios." EPA reports total domestic GHG emissions for all sectors in 2012 to be 6,502 MMTCO 2 e, thus making the incremental emissions attributable to the project comparable to 0.02%-0.4% of U.S. annual emissions. It reports construction emissions of 0.24 MMTCO 2 e (due to land use changes, electricity use, and fuels for construction vehicles) and pipeline operation emissions of 1.44 MMTCO 2 e/year (due to electricity for pumping stations, fuels for maintenance and inspection vehicles, and fugitive emissions). The Demand Argument . Members of Congress remain divided on the merits of the project, as many have expressed support for the potential energy security and economic benefits, while others have reservations about its potential health and environmental impacts. Though Congress, to date, has had no direct role in permitting the pipeline's construction, it has oversight stemming from federal environmental statutes that govern the review.
|
On March 23, 2017, the State Department issued a Presidential Permit for the border facilities of the proposed Keystone XL Pipeline, having determined that issuing the permit "would serve the national interest." The Department announced that the Record of Decision and National Interest Determination for the Presidential Permit "is informed by" the 2014 Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS). It cites no new documentation aside from fresh communications with the Canadian pipeline company.
State Department Assessment
The State Department released the FEIS on January 31, 2014, to inform the project's national interest determination. Among the various environmental impacts analyzed, the FEIS estimates GHG emissions that would be attributable to both the approval and the denial of the permit application for the project. The FEIS finds that
the direct and indirect GHG emissions released during the construction period for the project would be approximately 0.24 million metric tons of carbon dioxide (CO2) equivalents (MMTCO2e) due to land use changes, electricity use, and fuels for construction vehicles (this estimate is comparable to 0.004% of U.S. annual GHG emissions); the direct and indirect GHG emissions released during normal operations would be approximately 1.44 MMTCO2e/year due to electricity use for pumping stations, fuels for maintenance and inspection vehicles, and fugitive emissions (this estimate is comparable to 0.02% of U.S. annual GHG emissions); the total, or "gross," life-cycle GHG emissions (i.e., the aggregate GHG emissions released by all activities from the extraction of the resource to the refining, transportation, and end-use combustion of refined fuels) attributable to the oil sands crudes transported through the proposed pipeline would be approximately 147 to 168 MMTCO2e per year (this estimate is comparable to 2.2%-2.6% of U.S. annual GHG emissions); the incremental, or "net," life-cycle GHG emissions (i.e., life-cycle GHG emissions over and above those from the crude oils expected to be displaced in U.S. refineries) are estimated to be 1.3 to 27.4 MMTCO2e per year (this estimate is comparable to 0.02%-0.4% of U.S. annual GHG emissions); but according to the State Department's market analysis, "approval or denial of any one crude oil transport project, including the proposed project, is unlikely to significantly impact the rate of extraction in the oil sands or the continued demand for heavy crude oil at refineries in the United States based on expected oil prices, oil-sands supply costs, transport costs, and supply-demand scenarios."
Many oil industry stakeholders, the Canadian and Albertan governments, and proponents of the project have supported the analysis as presented in the FEIS. They contend that the demand for the oil sands resource, as well as the economic incentives for producers and the Canadian governments, is too significant to dampen production. However, other stakeholders have questioned several of the conclusions in the FEIS and argue that the project may have greater climate change impacts than projected, depending upon the assumptions selected from the range of scenarios considered in the FEIS. These assumptions include projections for global market conditions, crude oil prices, rail transport costs, new project costs, refinery inputs, and carbon regulatory policies in the United States or Canada.
Congressional Attention
Members of Congress remain divided on the merits of the project, as many have expressed support for the potential energy security and economic benefits, while others have reservations about its potential health and environmental impacts. Though Congress, to date, has had no direct role in permitting the pipeline's construction, it has oversight stemming from federal environmental statutes that govern the review.
|
crs_R42831
|
crs_R42831_0
|
590 . Conclusion and Summary
The apportionment process determines the number of seats in the House of Representatives that will be assigned each state, based on population counts. The redistricting process determines where those seats are geographically located within each state. Redistricting draws the maps. Redistricting is a state process that is governed by federal law. Much of this law is judicially imposed because, in 1929, Congress let lapse its standards requiring districts to be made up of "contiguous and compact territory and containing as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants." If Congress chooses to legislate again in this area, its mandate will come from Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution, granting the authority to Congress to change state laws pertaining to congressional elections. The goal of redistricting is to draw boundaries around geographic areas such that each district results in "fair" representation. An effort to favor one group of interests over another by using the redistricting process to distort this fairness is referred to as gerrymandering. Aside from distorting representation, it is believed by some that such gerrymandering diminishes electoral responsiveness by minimizing political competition among the parties. Many of the "rules" or criteria for drawing congressional boundaries are meant to enhance fairness and minimize the impact of gerrymandering. These rules, standards, or criteria include assuring population equality among districts within the same state, protecting racial and language minorities from vote dilution while at the same time not promoting racial segregation, promoting geographic compactness and contiguity when drawing districts, minimizing the number of split political subdivisions and "communities of interest" within congressional districts, and preserving historical continuity in the cores of previous congressional districts. Most redistricting is currently done by state legislatures. Some believe that allowing redistricting to be the purview of state legislators promotes, at best, status quo districts protecting incumbents and, at worst, blatant partisan gerrymandering, which can lead to a decade of one-party dominance. Reform efforts mostly have aimed at taking the redistricting task from state legislatures and assigning it to independent redistricting commissions. Efforts at creating these commissions have been successful at the state level. However, efforts to enact federal legislation to create such commissions within all states have proved less successful.
|
The decennial apportionment process determines the number of seats in the House of Representatives for which each state qualifies, based on population counts (for more on the apportionment process, see CRS Report R41357, The U.S. House of Representatives Apportionment Formula in Theory and Practice, by [author name scrubbed]). The redistricting process determines where those seats are geographically located within each state. Apportionment allocates the seats by state, while redistricting draws the maps.
Redistricting is a state process governed by federal law. Much of this law is judicially imposed because, in 1929, Congress let lapse its standards requiring districts to be made up of "contiguous and compact territory and containing as nearly as practicable an equal number of inhabitants." If Congress chooses to legislate again in this area, its authority will come from Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution, granting the authority to Congress to change state laws pertaining to congressional elections.
The goal of redistricting is to draw boundaries around geographic areas such that each district results in "fair" representation. An effort to favor one group of interests over another by using the redistricting process to distort this fairness is often referred to as gerrymandering. Aside from distorting representation, it is believed by some that such gerrymandering diminishes electoral responsiveness by minimizing political competition among the parties.
Many of the "rules" or criteria for drawing congressional boundaries are meant to enhance fairness and minimize the impact of gerrymandering. These rules, standards, or criteria include assuring population equality among districts within the same state; protecting racial and language minorities from vote dilution while at the same time not promoting racial segregation; promoting geographic compactness and contiguity when drawing districts; minimizing the number of split political subdivisions and "communities of interest" within congressional districts; and preserving historical stability in the cores of previous congressional districts.
Most redistricting is currently done by state legislatures. Some believe that allowing redistricting to be the purview of state legislators promotes, at best, status quo districts protecting incumbents and, at worst, blatant partisan gerrymandering that can lead to a decade of one-party dominance. Reform efforts mostly have aimed at transferring the redistricting task from state legislatures to independent redistricting commissions. Efforts at creating these commissions have been successful at the state level; however, proposed federal legislation (for the 112th Congress, see H.R. 453, H.R. 590, H.R. 3846, and S. 694) to create such commissions within all states has not been successful.
|
crs_RL32546
|
crs_RL32546_0
|
Introduction
In 1963, responding to projections of an impending physician shortage, Congress passed the Health Professions Educational Assistance Act (P.L. 88-129) to support the training of health professionals. This act, which authorized grants for the construction of new teaching facilities, was the first comprehensive legislation to address health care provider supply. Related programs, authorized in Title VII of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA), have evolved in subsequent reauthorizations. Title VII programs provide scholarships to students through grants and loans to institutions. These programs instead aim to improve the placement of providers in underserved areas, improve the racial and ethnic diversity of providers, and push back against market forces favoring specialization by encouraging "generalist" providers, those in primary care, family medicine, and geriatrics. This has resulted in recommendations from the Administration to eliminate many of the programs, recommendations which have persisted for many years. This report examines the legislative, programmatic and funding histories of Title VII health professions programs, and discusses issues including workforce analysis and the evaluation of program effectiveness. In addition, a number of social or market trends likely to affect the health professions, such as the aging population, are discussed. This report will be updated as events warrant. In 1998, Congress reauthorized and consolidated health professions programs in the Health Education Partnerships Act ( P.L. 105-392 ), creating new authority for programs in geriatrician training and health workforce analysis. The Effectiveness of Title VII Programs
The effectiveness of Title VII health professions programs in meeting a variety of stated objectives has long been a subject of debate. On the other hand, Congress has continued to fund these programs, and they continue to evolve, complicating the task of evaluating program effectiveness. Description of Title VII Programs
Programs are administered by the Bureau of Health Professions (BHPr) of the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
|
In 1963, responding to projections of an impending physician shortage, Congress passed the Health Professions Educational Assistance Act (P.L. 88-129). This act was the first comprehensive legislation to address the supply of health care providers. Relevant programs, authorized in Title VII of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA), have evolved in subsequent reauthorizations, to provide grants to institutions for primary care curriculum and faculty development, scholarships and loans to individuals training in certain health professions, and other programs. Title VII programs are administered by the Bureau of Health Professions at the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). These programs are intended to counter market forces that encourage specialization, and instead aim to alleviate particular provider supply shortages, improve the placement of providers in underserved areas, and improve the racial and ethnic diversity of providers.
The most recent reauthorization of HRSA Title VII programs was in the Health Education Partnerships Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-392), which added authority for geriatrician training, and health workforce analysis, among others. Though authority for these programs expired at the end of FY2002, Congress has continued to fund most of them each year since then.
The effectiveness of Title VII health professions programs has long been a subject of debate. Evaluating program effectiveness is complicated by differing perspectives on the ultimate program goals, by continuous evolution of the programs, and by the influence of other federal and private sector programs on provider supply and demand. The unresolved debate about Title VII program effectiveness has resulted in recommendations from the Administration to eliminate many of these programs, recommendations which have persisted for many years.
This report will examine the legislative, programmatic and funding histories of Title VII health professions programs, and discuss issues including workforce analysis and evaluating program effectiveness. In addition, a number of social or market trends likely to affect the health professions, such as the aging population, will be discussed. This report will be updated as events warrant.
|
crs_R40159
|
crs_R40159_0
|
Background
Three important principles color the issues in public health and medical preparedness and response. First, preparedness and response are different functions. The 2001 terrorist attacks, the flawed response to Hurricane Katrina, and concerns about an influenza ("flu") pandemic sharpened congressional interest in the nation's ability to track and respond to health threats. The 109 th Congress established or reauthorized relevant programs and activities in the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Homeland Security (DHS). The 110 th Congress focused on oversight of these activities, in particular (1) the fitness of HHS and DHS—in terms of authority, funding, policies, and workforce—to respond to health emergencies; (2) the effectiveness of federal agency coordination; and (3) the status of major initiatives such as pandemic flu preparedness and disaster planning for at-risk populations. The 111 th Congress is likely to remain engaged in oversight of the nation's readiness for health threats. This report, which will be updated as needed, summarizes key issues in domestic public health and medical preparedness and response, citing other CRS Reports and sources of additional information. Shifts in doctrine or priority in the new Administration, if any, may manifest when key positions are filled, or when the budget proposal for FY2010 is unveiled. Other substantial reorganizations of federal homeland security agencies do not appear to be under debate at this time. HHS Response Capability and Funding Authority
The 111 th Congress may consider the adequacy of permanent authorities of the HHS Secretary for responding to public health threats, including authority to declare a public health emergency and the expanded authorities that flow from it. Although the HHS Secretary has authority for a no-year Public Health Emergency Fund, Congress has not appropriated monies to the fund for many years. Also, it is not clear that a flu pandemic would qualify as a major disaster under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act). Since then there has been an expansion of the federal role through direct procurement and deployment of medical response assets, providing a stronger backstop for state, local, and private-sector response efforts. Disaster Victims and Health Care Costs
There is no federal assistance program designed purposefully to cover the uncompensated or uninsured costs of individual health care that may be needed as a result of a disaster. Congress or the Bush Administration provided special assistance to address this concern three times in response to recent disasters. Communicable Disease Control
The response to communicable disease threats may involve movement restrictions, business and school closures, compulsory treatments, and other constraints. While state and local governments have the primary authority over these domestic containment measures, a comprehensive response to a public health emergency may involve overlapping governmental authorities and attendant legal and economic issues. Finally, health emergencies often involve scarcities of resources, including personnel, equipment, drugs, and vaccines. Development, Procurement, and Use of Countermeasures
Project BioShield
The 108 th Congress launched Project BioShield to encourage the development of countermeasures that lack commercial markets.
|
Key recent events—the 2001 terrorist attacks, Hurricane Katrina, and concerns about an influenza ("flu") pandemic, among others—sharpened congressional interest in the nation's systems to track and respond to public health threats. The 109th Congress passed several laws that established, reorganized, or reauthorized key public health and medical preparedness and response programs in the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Homeland Security (DHS). The 110th Congress was engaged in oversight of the implementation of these laws, focused in particular on such matters as (1) the fitness of HHS and DHS—in terms of authority, funding, policies, and workforce—to respond to health emergencies; (2) the effectiveness of coordination among them and other federal agencies; and (3) the status of major initiatives such as pandemic flu preparedness and disaster planning for at-risk populations. The 111th Congress is likely to remain engaged in oversight of the nation's readiness for health threats.
The Obama Administration may reconsider homeland security objectives and priorities established by the George W. Bush Administration. Shifts in doctrine or priority, if any, may manifest as key positions are filled, or in the budget proposal for FY2010.
The 111th Congress may review HHS's disaster response capabilities, including its authority to declare a public health emergency and the means to fund its response efforts. Among other things, it is not clear that a flu pandemic would qualify for major disaster assistance under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act). Also, although the HHS Secretary has authority for a no-year Public Health Emergency Fund, Congress has not appropriated monies to the fund for many years. Finally, since Hurricane Katrina, Congress has urged and HHS has adopted a more aggressive federal role in the response to health emergencies.
Historically, federal assistance to states in dealing with disasters has come mainly as guidance and funding for preparedness and response activities. Since Hurricane Katrina, the federal role has been more direct, involving, for example, more procurement and deployment of medical response assets. Congress may wish to consider whether this trend is appropriate and sustainable.
At this time, there is no federal assistance program designed purposefully to cover the uncompensated or uninsured health care costs for disaster victims. The 111th Congress may reconsider earlier proposals to provide such assistance under certain circumstances.
Health emergencies often involve scarcities of resources (including personnel), movement restrictions, business and school closures, and other constraints. While state and local governments have the primary authority over such measures as quarantine and isolation, a comprehensive response to a public health emergency may involve overlapping governmental authorities and attendant legal and economic issues.
The 108th Congress launched Project BioShield to encourage the development of medical countermeasures. Some concerns remain about the program's ability to attract private-sector developers. Also, the 109th Congress provided a means for liability protection for product developers and others, if countermeasures are used during a health emergency. A program to compensate persons who may be injured by such covered countermeasures has not been funded.
This report summarizes key issues in domestic public health and medical preparedness and response, citing other CRS Reports and sources of additional information.
|
crs_RS22541
|
crs_RS22541_0
|
Background
The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) was established by the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 114-27 ). Expiration of the program in 2017 means that GSP renewal could be a legislative issue in the 115 th Congress. Agricultural products accounted for 15% of all imports under GSP, totaling $2.6 billion in 2015. Leading agricultural imports (based on value) include processed foods and food processing inputs; beverages and drinking waters; processed and fresh fruits and vegetables; sugar and sugar confectionery; olive oil; and miscellaneous food preparations and inputs for further processing. In 2015, five beneficiary countries ranked by import value—Thailand, Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkey—accounted for roughly two-thirds of the value of agricultural imports under the GSP program (see Table 2 ). Legislative and Administrative Changes
GSP was most recently extended until December 31, 2017 (Title II of P.L. Over the past decade, GSP renewal has been somewhat controversial. Some in Congress have continued to call for changes to the program, including tightening the program's requirements on products that can be imported under the program and limiting GSP benefits for certain eligible countries. Leaders of the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee have continued to express an interest in evaluating the effectiveness of U.S. trade preference programs, including GSP, and broader reform of these programs might be possible. In response to these concerns, both Congress and the previous Administrations have made changes to the program regarding product coverage (e.g., the type of products that can be imported under the program) and country eligibility (e.g., limiting GSP benefits to certain countries). In addition, the most recent GSP extension in 2015 broadly designated five new cotton products as eligible for GSP status (for least-developed beneficiary developing countries only), along with some other non-agricultural products ( Table 3 ). In September 2015, President Obama announced, among other things, that Seychelles, Uruguay, and Venezuela had become "high income" countries and were no longer eligible to receive GSP benefits, effective January 1, 2017. For more information and for a discussion of possible legislative options, see CRS Report RL33663, Generalized System of Preferences: Overview and Issues for Congress .
|
The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) provides duty-free tariff treatment for certain products from designated developing countries. Agricultural imports under GSP totaled $2.6 billion in 2015, nearly 15% of the value of all U.S. GSP imports. Leading agricultural imports (based on value) include processed foods and food processing inputs; beverages and drinking waters; processed and fresh fruits and vegetables; sugar and sugar confectionery; olive oil; and miscellaneous food preparations and inputs for further processing. The majority of these imports are from Thailand, Brazil, India, Indonesia, and Turkey, which combined account for roughly two-thirds of total agricultural GSP imports.
GSP was most recently extended until December 31, 2017 (Title II of P.L. 114-27). Expiration of the program in 2017 means that GSP renewal could be a legislative issue in the 115th Congress. Additional background information on such legislation is available in CRS Report RL33663, Generalized System of Preferences: Overview and Issues for Congress.
Over the past decade, GSP renewal has been somewhat controversial. Some in Congress have continued to call for changes to the program. Both Congress and the previous Administrations have made changes to the program regarding product coverage (e.g., the type of products that can be imported under the program) and country eligibility (e.g., limiting GSP benefits to certain countries). Both Congress and the previous Administrations have tightened and/or expanded the program's requirements on imports under certain circumstances. In recent years, a number of countries have had their GSP status revoked, including Argentina and Russia, among others. In September 2015, President Obama announced, among other things, that Seychelles, Uruguay, and Venezuela had become "high income" countries and were no longer eligible to receive GSP benefits, effective January 1, 2017. Also, as part of the most recent GSP extension, Congress designated a few new product categories as eligible for GSP status, including some cotton products (for least-developed beneficiaries only) and other non-agricultural products.
Congressional leaders have continued to express an interest in evaluating the effectiveness of U.S. trade preference programs, including GSP, and broader reform of these programs might be possible. Opinion within the U.S. agriculture industry is mixed, reflecting both support for and opposition to the current program.
|
crs_R41981
|
crs_R41981_0
|
Generally, only after local and state/territory/tribal government resources have been overwhelmed, and the governor of the state or chief executive of a tribal nation has requested assistance, does the federal government begin to provide additional help. The role of the federal government, as described in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act, P.L. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), or any other federal agency, is there to aid the disaster response process through the National Response Framework and the programs it administers, and to coordinate federal resources in response to state/tribal requests—not to be in the lead or take command. Similar requests are made to the chiefs of tribes. The NDRF provides a structure and process to assist short- and long-term recovery following a disaster incident, including basic recovery principles, and an explanation of roles and responsibilities at the respective levels of government. An example of a Recovery Support Function is the Economic Recovery Support Function, which is coordinated by the U.S. Department of Commerce. While the process is informed by that information and its relationship to potential assistance programs, the information gathered at the state and local level does not preclude the exercise of judgment by the governor/chief or the President. This decision rests primarily with the governor's judgment on whether a situation is "beyond the capabilities of the state." §247d); various disaster declarations from the Administrator of the Small Business Administration (SBA); and various disaster declarations and designations from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Federal Financial Assistance Programs
If a major disaster is declared under the Stafford Act, the three principal forms of federal financial assistance are the following:
Public Assistance (PA), which provides grants to tribal, state, and local governments and certain private nonprofit organizations to provide emergency protective services, conduct debris removal operations, and repair or replace damaged public infrastructure. In addition to financial assistance that may be available from the Stafford Act, there are a number of other programs not administered by DHS or FEMA that can be involved in certain circumstances. Congressional Activity in Disasters
As mentioned previously, the Stafford Act, and overall federal disaster assistance, is fundamentally a relationship between the federal, state, and tribal governments. Be cognizant of the financial status of the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) that funds the Stafford Act programs as well as other missions assigned to other departments and agencies to carry out response and recovery missions. Sources of information on disaster assistance programs.
|
The principles of disaster management assume a leadership role by the local, state, and tribal governments affected by the incident. The federal government provides coordinated supplemental resources and assistance, only if requested and approved. The immediate response to a disaster is guided by the National Response Framework (NRF), which details roles and responsibilities at various levels of government, along with cooperation from the private and nonprofit sectors, for differing incidents and support functions. A possible declaration of a major disaster or emergency under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288, as amended) must, in almost all cases, be requested by the governor of a state or the chief executive of an affected Indian tribal government, who at that point has declared that the situation is beyond the capacity of the state or tribe to respond. The governor/chief also determines for which parts of the state/tribal territory assistance will be requested, and suggests the types of assistance programs that may be needed. The President considers the request, in consultation with officials of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and makes the initial decisions on the areas to be included as well as the programs that are implemented.
The majority of federal financial disaster assistance is made available from FEMA under the authority of the Stafford Act. In addition to that assistance, other disaster aid may be available through programs of the Small Business Administration, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of Transportation (DOT), and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), among other federal programs.
While the disaster response and recovery process is fundamentally a relationship between the federal government and the requesting state or tribal government, there are roles for congressional offices. For instance, congressional offices may help provide information to survivors on available federal and nonfederal assistance, oversee the coordination of federal efforts in their respective states and districts, and consider legislation to provide supplemental disaster assistance or authorities. Congressional offices also serve as a valuable source of accurate and timely information to their constituents on response and relief efforts.
|
crs_97-615
|
crs_97-615_0
|
Introduction
The automatic annual adjustment for Members of Congress is determined by a formula using a component of the Employment Cost Index (ECI), which measures rate of change in private sector pay. The adjustment automatically takes effect unless (1) Congress statutorily prohibits the adjustment; (2) Congress statutorily revises the adjustment; or (3) the annual base pay adjustment of General Schedule (GS) federal employees is established at a rate less than the scheduled increase for Members, in which case the percentage adjustment for Member pay is automatically lowered to match the percentage adjustment in GS base pay. 115-244 , enacted September 21, 2018, included the pay freeze provision. 115-90 , through December 22, 2017; P.L. 115-120 , through February 8, 2018; and P.L. 115-123 , through March 23, 2018. P.L. Any other action related to pay for Members of Congress that occurred during that calendar year is also listed. 114-254 ). 114-113 ). 113-235 ). Although discussion of Member pay is often associated with appropriations bills, the legislative branch bill does not contain language funding or increasing Member pay, and a prohibition on the automatic Member pay adjustments could be included in any bill, or be introduced as a separate bill. The Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014 ( P.L. 113-46 , Section 146, enacted October 17, 2013), prohibited the scheduled 2014 pay adjustment for Members of Congress. It was signed by the President on September 28, 2012 ( P.L. 112-175 . 8 , the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, which was enacted on January 2, 2013 ( P.L. It was enacted on February 4, 2013 ( P.L. 111-165 ) on May 14, 2010. Additionally, P.L. On April 8, 2011, the Speaker of the House issued a "Dear Colleague" letter indicating that in the event of a shutdown, Members of Congress would continue to be paid pursuant to the Twenty-seventh Amendment to the Constitution, which as stated above, states: "No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened"—although Members could elect to return any compensation to the Treasury. Actions to Deny the Scheduled 2010 Member Pay Increase
This adjustment was denied by Congress through a provision included in the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, which was enacted on March 11, 2009. 2009
Under the formula established in the Ethics Reform Act, Members received a pay adjustment in January 2009 of 2.8%, increasing salaries to $174,000. Actions Related to the Scheduled Annual Adjustment for 2001
Under the Ethics Reform Act, Members originally were scheduled to receive a January 2001 annual pay adjustment of 3.0%. The salary for Senators and Representatives remained $136,700. This did not preclude an amendment from being offered on the floor to challenge the prohibition. 07/22/97 —The Senate passed (99-0, vote 191) S. 1023 with the provision prohibiting the annual adjustment for Members of Congress. Actions on Annual Adjustment Scheduled for 1996
P.L. Actions on Annual Adjustment Scheduled for 1995
P.L. This amendment would prohibit pay for Members of Congress and the President during a lapse in appropriations. 1991
Representatives and Senators received a 3.6% pay increase in January 1991 pursuant to the annual adjustment procedure established in Section 704 of the Ethics Reform Act ( P.L.
|
Article I, Section 6, of the U.S. Constitution requires that compensation for Members of Congress be "ascertained by law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States."
Congress has relied on three different methods in adjusting salaries for Members. Specific legislation was last used to provide increases in 1990 and 1991. It was the only method used by Congress for many years.
The second method, under which annual adjustments took effect automatically unless disapproved by Congress, was established in 1975. From 1975 to 1989, these annual adjustments were based on the rate of annual comparability increases given to the General Schedule (GS) federal employees. This method was changed by the 1989 Ethics Act to require that the annual adjustment be determined by a formula based on certain elements of the Employment Cost Index (ECI). Under this revised process, annual adjustments were accepted 13 times (scheduled for January 1991, 1992, 1993, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, and 2009) and denied 16 times (scheduled for January 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019).
Since January 2009, the salary for Members of Congress has been $174,000. Subsequent adjustments were denied by P.L. 111-8 (enacted March 11, 2009), P.L. 111-165 (May 14, 2010), P.L. 111-322 (December 22, 2010), P.L. 112-175 (September 28, 2012), P.L. 112-240 (January 2, 2013), P.L. 113-46 (October 17, 2013), P.L. 113-235 (December 16, 2014), P.L. 114-113 (December 18, 2015), P.L. 114-254 (December 10, 2016), P.L. 115-141 (March 23, 2018), and P.L. 115-244 (September 21, 2018).
Although provisions prohibiting the annual adjustment often appear in appropriations acts, both the automatic annual adjustments and funding for Members' salaries are provided pursuant to other laws (2 U.S.C. §4501)—not the annual appropriations bills—and a provision prohibiting the scheduled adjustment could be included in any bill, or introduced as a separate bill.
A third method for adjusting Member pay is congressional action pursuant to recommendations from the President, based on the recommendations of the Citizens' Commission on Public Service and Compensation established in the 1989 Ethics Reform Act. Although the Citizens' Commission was to have convened in 1993, it did not and has not met since then.
This report contains information on actions taken affecting each pay year since the establishment of the Ethics Reform Act adjustment procedure. It also provides information on other floor action related to pay for Members of Congress.
CRS Report 97-1011, Salaries of Members of Congress: Recent Actions and Historical Tables, by Ida A. Brudnick, has additional information on the rate of pay for Members of Congress since 1789; recent proposals to change Member pay; the adjustments projected by the Ethics Reform Act as compared with actual pay adjustments; details on enacted legislation with language prohibiting the automatic annual pay adjustment; and Member pay in constant and current dollars since 1992.
Members of Congress only receive salaries during the terms for which they are elected. Former Members of Congress may be eligible for retirement benefits. For additional information on retirement benefit requirements, contributions, and formulas, see CRS Report RL30631, Retirement Benefits for Members of Congress, by Katelin P. Isaacs.
|
crs_R43743
|
crs_R43743_0
|
This report provides a catalog of the 19 memorials in the District of Columbia that have been authorized, completed, and dedicated since the passage of the CWA. A picture of each work is also included. The Appendix includes a map showing each memorial's location. For a further discussion of the placement of memorials in the District of Columbia see CRS Report R41658, Commemorative Works in the District of Columbia: Background and Practice , by Jacob R. Straus and CRS Report R43744, Monuments and Memorials Authorized Under the Commemorative Works Act in the District of Columbia: Current Development of In-Progress and Lapsed Works , by Jacob R. Straus. Authorized Commemorative Works
Since the passage of the Commemorative Works Act (CWA) in 1986, Congress has authorized 35 commemorative works to be placed in the District of Columbia or its environs, 19 of which have been completed and dedicated—16 under the auspices of the CWA and three outside of the CWA process. Table 1 lists the commemorative works authorized and dedicated since 1986.
|
Since the enactment of the Commemorative Works Act (CWA) in 1986, Congress has authorized 35 commemorative works to be placed in the District of Columbia or its environs. Nineteen of these works have been completed and dedicated.
This report contains a catalog of the 19 authorized works that have been completed and dedicated since 1986. For each memorial, the report provides a rationale for each authorized work, as expressed by a Member of Congress, as well as the statutory authority for its creation; and identifies the group or groups which sponsored the commemoration, the memorial's location, and the dedication date. A picture of each work is also included. The Appendix includes a map showing each completed memorial's location.
For more information on the Commemorative Works Act, see CRS Report R41658, Commemorative Works in the District of Columbia: Background and Practice, by Jacob R. Straus; CRS Report R43241, Monuments and Memorials in the District of Columbia: Analysis and Options for Proposed Exemptions to the Commemorative Works Act, by Jacob R. Straus; and CRS Report R43744, Monuments and Memorials Authorized Under the Commemorative Works Act in the District of Columbia: Current Development of In-Progress and Lapsed Works, by Jacob R. Straus.
|
crs_R41959
|
crs_R41959_0
|
Introduction
The United States looks to Europe for partnership on an extensive range of global issues. Although the United States continues to maintain strong and active bilateral relations with the individual countries of Europe, and the transatlantic defense relationship remains centered in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), some observers assert that much of the transatlantic partnership is increasingly set in the context of U.S. relations with the EU. Possible avenues for exploring such interest include examining the EU's global role in the context of evolving U.S. foreign policy priorities, the relationship between the EU and NATO, and the dynamics of the U.S.-EU-NATO relationship. Since the Treaty on European Union (also commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty) established the modern EU in 1992, EU external policies have been formulated and managed under one of two separate institutional processes:
The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which includes a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), is intergovernmental in nature: the 27 member state governments, acting on the basis of unanimous agreement in the European Council (the heads of state or government) and the Council of the European Union (also called the Council of Ministers), are the key actors. The end of the Cold War, however, sparked debates within the EU about the desirability of developing a stronger foreign policy identity. Under the treaty, the EU aims to
(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence, and integrity;
(b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law;
(c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders;
(d) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty;
(e) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade;
(f) help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development;
(g) assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; and
(h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance. The Common Foreign and Security Policy
Building on earlier efforts to coordinate member states' foreign policies, the 1992 Treaty on European Union formally established the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. Under the EU treaties, these types of political and security issues remain the prerogative of the member state governments—conceptually, in the case of CFSP, "common" means 27 sovereign governments choosing to work together to the extent that they can reach a consensus on any given policy issue. Joint Actions often consist of launching or extending an out-of-area civilian or military operation under the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Assessment
The EU has created institutional structures and instruments to develop and implement a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the member states of the EU have integrated their foreign policies to a remarkable degree on many issues. Nevertheless, European policymakers have sought to establish a more robust CSDP by enhancing and coordinating EU countries' military capabilities. Active Missions in the Middle East and Asia
The EU has a police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) that mentors and trains Afghan police. The fact that the majority of CSDP operations have been civilian missions reflects what many analysts consider to be the EU's strengths. As a corollary to U.S. concerns about European defense budgets and capabilities, some U.S. officials and Members of Congress have been concerned that these trends in perception and strategy could be leading Europe to focus disproportionately on soft power, leaving the United States to do the heavy lifting and assume the costs of providing "hard" power. In any case, like the United States, the EU is seeking to develop new tools and mechanisms, and to find a way to use all of its assets in a coherent and comprehensive manner to address the global challenges it faces. In areas such as trade, aid, neighborhood policy, and enlargement negotiations—what some observers call the "technical" aspects of external relations—the member states have agreed to pool their sovereignty and decision making at the level of the EU institutions. Assessment
Trade, aid and development assistance, the enlargement process, and neighborhood policy are important instruments in the EU's external policy approach. Some analysts have suggested that an overdependence on the United States prevents Europe from acting as an equal partner—both sides might be better off with a Europe, speaking and acting as one, that takes a more robust, assertive, and independent approach to international security issues. While some remain skeptical, CSDP has become increasingly viewed as a helpful means to build European capabilities and permit expanded EU engagement in global challenges. Conversely, a stagnant or ineffective CSDP would also have important long-term implications for the transatlantic security relationship. Both Americans and Europeans have an interest in establishing a stable and enhanced U.S.-EU-NATO dynamic that is as efficient and effective as possible.
|
The United States often looks to Europe as its partner of choice in addressing important global challenges. Given the extent of the transatlantic relationship, congressional foreign policy activities and interests frequently involve Europe. The relationship between the United States and the European Union (EU) has become increasingly significant in recent years, and it is likely to grow even more important. In this context, Members of Congress often have an interest in understanding the complexities of EU policy making, assessing the compatibility and effectiveness of U.S. and EU policy approaches, or exploring the long-term implications of changing transatlantic dynamics.
The EU As a Global Actor
Seeking to play a more active role in global affairs, the EU has developed a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). On many foreign policy and security issues, the 27 EU member states exert a powerful collective influence. On the other hand, some critics assert that on the whole the EU remains an economic power only, and that its foreign and security policies have little global impact. Some of the shortcomings in the EU's external policies stem from the inherent difficulties of reaching a complete consensus among the member state governments. Moreover, past institutional arrangements have often failed to coordinate the EU's full range of resources.
Elements of EU External Policy
The Common Foreign and Security Policy is based on unanimous consensus among the member states. CFSP is a mechanism for adopting common principles and guidelines on political and security issues, committing to common diplomatic approaches, and undertaking joint actions. Many analysts argue that Europe's relevance in world affairs increasingly depends on its ability to speak and act as one.
The EU is currently conducting 16 operations under its Common Security and Defense Policy. To establish a more robust CSDP, EU member states have been exploring ways to increase their military capabilities and promote greater defense integration. These efforts have met with limited success thus far. Civilian missions and capabilities, however, are also central components of CSDP; the majority of CSDP missions have been civilian operations in areas such as police training and rule of law.
External policies in technical areas such as trade, humanitarian aid, development assistance, enlargement, and neighborhood policy are formulated and managed through a "community" process at the level of the EU institutions. (The European Neighborhood Policy seeks to deepen the EU's relations with its southern and eastern neighbors while encouraging them to pursue governance and economic reforms.) These are the EU's most deeply integrated external policies. Given events in North Africa, the Middle East, and some of the former Soviet states, EU policymakers have been rethinking how such external policy tools might be used to better effect.
The United States, the EU, and NATO
Although some observers remain concerned that a strong EU might act as a counterweight to U.S. power, others maintain that an assertive and capable EU is very much in the interest of the United States. The focus of the transatlantic relationship has changed since the end of the Cold War: it is now largely about the United States and Europe working together to manage a range of global problems. According to some experts, U.S.-EU cooperation holds the greatest potential for successfully tackling many of today's emergent threats and concerns.
Nevertheless, NATO remains the dominant institutional foundation for transatlantic security affairs. U.S. policymakers have supported efforts to develop EU security policies on the condition that they do not weaken NATO, where the United States has a strong voice on European security issues. Despite their overlapping membership, the EU and NATO have struggled to work out an effective cooperative relationship. Analysts suggest that sorting out the dynamics of the U.S.-EU-NATO relationship to allow for a comprehensive and effective use of Euro-Atlantic resources and capabilities will be a key challenge for U.S. and European policymakers in the years ahead.
|
crs_R43102
|
crs_R43102_0
|
Pursuant to these provisions, in 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005, an independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission recommended the closure and realignment of more than 100 defense facilities throughout the United States. The Department of Defense (DOD) formally asked Congress to provide it with statutory authority to conduct another round of base closures and realignments in 2015, but no round was authorized. Under the BRAC process, the final recommendations of a bipartisan commission are submitted to Congress and automatically take effect unless Congress passes and the President signs legislation disapproving the recommendations within a stated time period. Congressional consideration of such a BRAC resolution of disapproval is governed not by the standing rules of the House and Senate but by special expedited parliamentary procedures laid out in the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended ( P.L.
|
In 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005, an independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) Commission was authorized by law to recommend the disposal of unneeded defense facilities throughout the United States. The Department of Defense (DOD) formally asked Congress to provide it with statutory authority to conduct another round of base closures and realignments in 2015, but no new round was authorized.
Under the terms of the statutes that authorized these previous BRAC rounds, the BRAC Commission's recommendations automatically take effect unless, within a stated period after the recommendations are approved by the President and submitted to the House and Senate, a joint resolution of disapproval is enacted rejecting them in their entirety. Congressional consideration of this disapproval resolution was governed not by the standing rules of the House and Senate but by special expedited or "fast track" parliamentary procedures laid out in statute. This report describes these expedited parliamentary procedures and explains how they differ from the regular legislative processes of Congress. The report will be updated as needed.
|
crs_R43115
|
crs_R43115_0
|
The $6.8 billion FY2018 request included $6.5 billion for related efforts financed through State-Foreign Operations (SFOPS) appropriations and $0.3 billion for global health programs supported through Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education (Labor-HHS) appropriations. The United States has contributed substantially to improving global access to ART through PEPFAR and its support for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund). Almost 75% of FY2018 global health appropriations, for example, were aimed at controlling HIV/AIDS (61%), TB (3%), and malaria (10%). In contrast, Congress mostly maintained global health funding levels in FY2018 and is considering the FY2019 budget request. Strengthening Health Systems
The global spread of recent disease outbreaks, including Ebola and Zika, has intensified debates about the advantages and disadvantages of disease-specific funding. Congressional interest in bolstering weak health systems was particularly strong during the Ebola outbreak. Congressional discussions about health system strengthening have been waning though some interest remains. In the 115 th Congress, for example, H.R. Bolstering Pandemic Preparedness
Since 1980, infectious diseases have caused outbreaks that have been occurring with greater frequency and have been causing higher numbers of human infections. Outbreaks are caused by diseases that were once concentrated in tropical regions, including Ebola and Zika, are spreading through international travel. At the same time, long-standing diseases like tuberculosis and malaria are becoming increasingly resistant to available drugs and also threaten global health. The United States has been a key supporter in global efforts to bolster pandemic preparedness in low- and middle- income countries. It is unclear whether the 115 th Congress will provide supplemental funds to maintain ongoing global health security efforts. In its report on H.R. 5515 , National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 , the House Committee on Armed Services indicated that the "2014 Ebola outbreak demonstrated the need for a prompt and efficient response to a highly infectious disease outbreak" and directed the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response at the Department of Health and Human Services, to brief the committee no later than June 1, 2019, on the development of an action plan focused on efforts to counter emerging infectious disease threats. The 115 th Congress is considering the FY2019 budget request, which includes over $7 billion for global health assistance, roughly 24% less than FY2018 enacted levels. The Trump Administration proposes reducing the USAID global health budget by nearly 40% through the elimination of funding for global health security, vulnerable children, and HIV/AIDS programs and reductions to other health programs. The Trump Administration also recommended cuts for PEPFAR programs managed by the State Department (-11%), the Global Fund (-31%), and CDC global health programs (-16%). Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance
In 1984, former President Ronald Reagan issued what has become known as the "Mexico City policy," which required foreign nongovernmental organizations receiving USAID family planning assistance to certify that they would not perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning, even if such activities were conducted with non-U.S. funds. The policy has been rescinded and reinstituted across Administrations. Under the Trump Administration, the policy was reinstated, renamed to Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance (PLGHA), and expanded to apply to all global health programs. Global health experts are working to measure the impact of the PLGHA policy. Opponents maintain that the policy imperils all global health programs because some health providers may not be able to disentangle FP/RH, HIV/AIDS, and maternal and child health services from one another, particularly in areas with limited access to health workers and facilities. Supporters of the policy maintain that although existing laws ban U.S. funds from being used to perform or promote abortions abroad, money is fungible and the PLGHA policy closes loopholes. Since the Mexico City Policy was first established, Members on both sides of the issue have introduced legislation to permanently enact or repeal the policy. 671 and S. 210 , Global Health, Empowerment, and Rights Act , would prohibit the application of the PLGHA to foreign NGOs. Authorizing PEPFAR
Legislation that authorizes appropriations for PEPFAR and describes congressional priorities for the initiative expires September 30, 2018. PEPFAR continues to receive bipartisan support and is being maintained by the Trump Administration, though at lower levels than previous administrations. Following the release of the FY2018 budget and Strategy, some HIV/AIDS advocates and Members of Congress questioned the Administration's commitment to controlling the global AIDS epidemic and expressed concern about whether people on ART would lose coverage due to spending cuts. The Trump Administration proposal to maintain treatment levels is a departure from the Bush and Obama Administrations, under which executive and legislative priorities for PEPFAR included steadily increasing the number of people receiving ART through PEPFAR programs. Some Members of Congress have challenged the Trump Administration's approach to PEPFAR, raising questions about whether executive and legislative consensus around broadening the reach of PEPFAR and advancing the global goal of achieving an AIDS-free generation is fraying. Appendix. Global Health Funding Tables, by Agency and Appropriation Vehicle
|
Congressional interest in and support for global health programs has remained strong for several years. In FY2018, Congress provided $8.7 billion for global health programs through State, Foreign Operations appropriations and $488.6 million through Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education (Labor-HHS) appropriations. These funds are managed by several U.S. agencies and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund)—a multilateral organization aimed at combating the three diseases worldwide. Concern about infectious diseases, especially HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria (HTAM), continues to drive budget growth. In FY2001, roughly 47% of the U.S. global health budget was aimed at these three diseases. By FY2018, almost 75% of U.S. global health funding was provided for fighting HTAM. The Appendix outlines U.S. funding for global health by agency and program. The 115th Congress may debate several pressing global health issues, including the following:
Strengthening Health Systems. The global spread of recent disease outbreaks, including Ebola and Zika, has intensified debates about the advantages and disadvantages of disease-specific funding. Congressional interest in bolstering weak health systems was particularly strong during the Ebola outbreak. Congressional discussions about health system strengthening have been waning, though some interest remains, including in proposed legislation (see for example H.Res. 342, 115th Congress). Bolstering Pandemic Preparedness. Since 1980, infectious diseases have caused outbreaks that have been occurring with greater frequency and have been leading to higher numbers of human infections. Outbreaks caused by diseases that were once concentrated in tropical regions, including Ebola and Zika, are spreading through international travel. At the same time, long-standing diseases like tuberculosis and malaria are becoming increasingly resistant to available drugs and also threaten global health.
The United States has been a key supporter in global efforts to bolster pandemic preparedness in low- and middle- income countries. It is unclear whether the 115th Congress will sustain high levels of supports, including through funding, for global health security efforts. In its report on H.R. 5515, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, the House Committee on Armed Services directed the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response at the Department of Health and Human Services, to develop an action plan to counter emerging infectious disease threats.
Considering the FY2019 Budget Request. The 115th Congress is considering the FY2019 budget request, which includes over $7 billion for global health assistance, roughly 24% less than FY2018 enacted levels. The Trump Administration proposes reducing the USAID global health budget by nearly 40% through the elimination of funding for global health security, vulnerable children, and HIV/AIDS programs and reductions to other health programs. The Trump Administration also recommended cuts for PEPFAR programs managed by the State Department (-11%), the Global Fund (-31%), and CDC global health programs (-16%). Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance. In 1984, former President Ronald Reagan issued what has become known as the "Mexico City policy," which required foreign nongovernmental organizations receiving USAID family planning assistance to certify that they would not perform or actively promote abortion as a method of family planning, even if such activities were conducted with non-U.S. funds. The policy has been rescinded and reinstituted across Administrations. Under the Trump Administration, the policy was reinstated, renamed to Protecting Life in Global Health Assistance (PLGHA), and expanded to apply to all global health programs.
Global health experts are working to measure the impact of the PLGHA policy. Opponents maintain that the policy imperils all global health programs because some health providers may not be able to disentangle FP/RH, HIV/AIDS, and maternal and child health services from one another, particularly in areas with limited access to health workers and facilities. Supporters maintain that although existing laws ban U.S. funds from being used to perform or promote abortions abroad, money is fungible and the PLGHA policy closes loopholes. Since the Mexico City Policy was first established, Members on both sides of the issue have introduced legislation to permanently enact or repeal the policy (for example, see H.R. 671 and S. 210, Global Health, Empowerment, and Rights Act, 115th Congress).
Authorizing the extension of PEPFAR. Legislation that authorizes appropriations for PEPFAR and describes congressional priorities for the initiative expires September 30, 2018. PEPFAR continues to receive bipartisan support and is being maintained by the Trump Administration, though at lower levels than previous administrations. Following the release of the FY2018 budget and Strategy, some HIV/AIDS advocates and Members of Congress questioned the Administration's commitment to controlling the global AIDS epidemic and expressed concern about whether people on ART would lose coverage due to spending cuts. The Administration has pledged to maintain the current level of antiretroviral treatment provided through PEPFAR
Plans to maintain treatment levels are a departure from the Bush and Obama Administrations, under which executive and legislative priorities for PEPFAR included steadily increasing the number of people receiving ART through PEPFAR programs. Some Members of Congress have challenged the Trump Administration's approach to PEPFAR, raising questions about whether executive and legislative consensus around broadening the reach of PEPFAR and advancing the global goal of achieving an AIDS-free generation is fraying.
|
crs_RL33037
|
crs_RL33037_0
|
Federal commodity support, conservation, food assistance, agricultural trade, marketing, and rural development policies are governed by a variety of separate laws. However, many of these laws periodically are evaluated, revised, and renewed through an omnibus, multi-year farm bill. The most recent omnibus farm bill, the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-171 ), and many of its provisions expire in 2007. The heart of every omnibus farm bill is farm income and commodity price support policy—namely, the methods and levels of support that the federal government provides to agricultural producers. However, farm bills typically include titles on agricultural trade and foreign food aid, conservation and environment, forestry, domestic food assistance (primarily food stamps), agricultural credit, rural development, agricultural research and education, and marketing-related programs. Often, such "miscellaneous" provisions as food safety, marketing orders, animal health and welfare, and energy are added. This omnibus nature of the farm bill creates a broad coalition of support among sometimes conflicting interests for policies that, individually, might not survive the legislative process. How should agricultural product development, marketing, and research-related issues be addressed in the next farm bill? Following the forum series, Secretary Johanns has repeatedly stated the USDA's goal for a new farm bill is that it be "equitable, predictable and beyond challenge" in the WTO. Both the American Farm Bureau Federation and National Farmers Union have strongly endorsed a continuation into the future of current commodity support programs. Continuing multilateral trade negotiations on agriculture, if they result in a new trade agreement, also could have an influence on U.S. farm policy as expressed in the next farm bill. How much will it cost, and who should pay? Prospective Issues and Options
In considering renewal of the export promotion programs, Congress will again be confronted with questions of program direction and funding. ), most notably revised by the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987. Statute and oversight by the Agriculture Committees determine the scope of FCS activity, and provide benefits such as tax exemptions. Federal assistance may be a needed catalyst. Food Stamps74
The Food Stamp program is the largest of all the nutrition assistance programs and accounts for 95% of the spending in the nutrition title of the farm bill.
|
Federal farm support, food assistance, agricultural trade, marketing, and rural development policies are governed by a variety of separate laws. However, many of these laws periodically are evaluated, revised, and renewed through an omnibus, multi-year "farm bill." The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-171) was the most recent omnibus farm bill, and many of its provisions expire in 2007, so reauthorization is expected to be addressed in the first session of the 110th Congress.
The heart of every omnibus farm bill is farm income and commodity price support policy—namely, the methods and levels of support that the federal government provides to agricultural producers. However, farm bills typically include titles on agricultural trade and foreign food aid, conservation and environment, forestry, domestic food assistance (primarily food stamps), agricultural credit, rural development, agricultural research and education, and marketing-related programs. Often, such "miscellaneous" provisions as food safety, marketing orders, animal health and welfare, and energy are added. This omnibus nature of the farm bill creates a broad coalition of support among sometimes conflicting interests for policies that, individually, might not survive the legislative process.
The scope and direction of a new farm bill may be shaped by such factors as financial conditions in the agricultural economy, competition among various interests, international trade obligations, and—possibly most important—a tight limit on federal funds. Among the thorniest issues may be future farm income and commodity price support. Questions of equity (who should get aid and how much), program cost, conformance with WTO trade obligations, effects on U.S. competitiveness in the global marketplace, and the unintended impacts of agricultural activities on the environment are among the considerations.
The economic prosperity of the U.S. farm sector is heavily dependent upon exports, so the provisions of a new bill reauthorizing farm export and foreign food aid programs also will be of keen interest. Moreover, the agricultural credit, research, conservation, domestic nutrition assistance, and rural development titles bring an array of interests into the debate, and their issues and concerns could prove equally contentious.
Several farm groups have strongly endorsed a continuation of current policies and programs. However, agriculture and rural interests not receiving much benefit from current programs oppose a simple extension and would like some of the spending to be aimed at solving their problems. Furthermore, the Secretary of Agriculture has repeatedly stated that farm programs need to be made "equitable, predictable and beyond challenge" in the WTO.
This report will be updated as related developments transpire.
|
crs_R41991
|
crs_R41991_0
|
Introduction
This report discusses state and local restrictions upon employing unauthorized aliens in light of the May 26, 2011, decision by the Supreme Court in Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. Whiting . 1070, which authorized or required the suspension or termination of the licenses of businesses that knowingly or intentionally hire unauthorized aliens, as well as required that employers in Arizona use the federal government's E-Verify database to check employees' work authorization. The doctrine of preemption derives from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which establishes that federal law, treaties, and the Constitution itself are "the supreme Law of the Land." Thus, one essential aspect of the federal structure of government is that states can be precluded from taking actions that are otherwise within their authority if federal law is thereby thwarted. An act of Congress may preempt state or local action in a given area in any one of three ways: (1) the statute expressly states preemptive intent (express preemption); (2) a court concludes that Congress intended to occupy the regulatory field, thereby implicitly precluding state or local action in that area (field preemption); or (3) state or local action directly conflicts with or otherwise frustrates the purpose of the federal scheme (conflict preemption). In finding that LAWA was not preempted by federal immigration law, a majority of the Court apparently opens the door to additional state and local restrictions upon employing unauthorized aliens. Measures that would criminalize the seeking or performance of work by unauthorized aliens were not at issue in Whiting , but were found to be preempted in the Supreme Court's June 25, 2012, decision in Arizona v. United States . However, the INA did not originally regulate employment of unauthorized aliens. A number of states subsequently enacted measures prohibiting the employment of individuals who were not lawful residents of the United States. Federal regulation of the employment of unauthorized aliens expanded significantly in 1986, when the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) was enacted. Ten years later, Congress expanded upon IRCA's employment verification regime when it enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). IIRIRA also provided that participation by private parties in the pilot programs is generally voluntary, and the Secretary of Homeland Security "may not require any person or other entity to participate." Some courts found that state licensing measures were within IRCA's "savings clause" even when the state independently determined whether an employer employed unauthorized aliens, and that IIRIRA did not prohibit a state from requiring use of E-Verify. Others found that such measures were preempted because the licensing provisions disrupted the balance struck by Congress between deterring illegal immigration, minimizing burdens on employers, and preventing discrimination against those perceived as "foreign," and Congress did not want use of E-Verify to be mandatory. Implications
The Supreme Court's decision in Whiting apparently opens the door to the enactment of additional state and local measures restricting the employment of unauthorized aliens. However, several lower court decisions subsequent to Whiting suggest that any state and local E-Verify measures, in particular, may need to parallel federal law to avoid being found to be preempted.
|
In May 2011, the Supreme Court ruled in Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. Whiting that federal immigration law did not preempt an Arizona statute that authorized or required the suspension or termination of the licenses of businesses that knowingly or intentionally hire unauthorized aliens, and also required that employers within Arizona use the federal government's E-Verify database to check employees' work authorization.
The doctrine of preemption derives from the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which establishes that federal law, treaties, and the Constitution itself are "the supreme Law of the Land." Thus, one essential aspect of the federal structure of government is that states can be precluded from taking actions that are otherwise within their authority if federal law is thereby thwarted. An act of Congress may preempt state or local action in a given area in any one of three ways: (1) the statute expressly states preemptive intent (express preemption); (2) a court concludes that Congress intended to occupy the regulatory field, thereby implicitly precluding state or local action in that area (field preemption); or (3) state or local action directly conflicts with or otherwise frustrates the purpose of the federal scheme (conflict preemption).
When it was enacted in 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) did not regulate the employment of unauthorized aliens, and several states subsequently enacted measures prohibiting the employment of individuals who were not lawful residents of the United States. In a 1976 decision declining to find one such measure preempted, the Supreme Court recognized that it was "within the mainstream of [a state's] police power" to restrict the employment of aliens within their jurisdiction whose presence in the United States was not authorized by the federal government. However, in 1986, Congress enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which amended the INA to sanction employers of unauthorized aliens and expressly preempt states and localities from sanctioning employers other than through "licensing and similar laws." Then, in 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which authorized the creation of a pilot program for verifying work authorization that ultimately developed into the program known as E-Verify. Under federal law, use of E-Verify by private entities is generally voluntary, and the Secretary of Homeland Security may not require persons or entities not specified in IIRIRA to participate.
Prior to Whiting, the federal courts of appeals had disagreed as to whether IRCA and IIRIRA preempted state and local measures like the Arizona statute. Some found that state licensing measures were within IRCA's "savings clause" even when the state independently determined whether an employer employed unauthorized aliens, and that IIRIRA did not prohibit states from requiring E-Verify use. Others found that licensing provisions disrupted the balance struck by Congress between deterring illegal immigration, minimizing burdens on employers, and preventing discrimination, and Congress did not want use of E-Verify to be mandatory.
The majority in Whiting relied primarily upon the "plain meaning" of IRCA and IIRIRA, while two dissents relied more heavily upon the legislative history and overall purpose of IRCA. The majority's decision apparently opens the door to additional state and local restrictions upon employing unauthorized aliens. However, several lower court decisions subsequent to Whiting suggest that any state and local E-Verify measures, in particular, may need to parallel federal law to avoid being found to be preempted. Measures that would criminalize the seeking or performance of work by unauthorized aliens were not at issue in Whiting, but were later found to be preempted in the Supreme Court's June 25, 2012, decision in Arizona v. United States.
|
crs_R40940
|
crs_R40940_0
|
Introduction
This report examines China's "economic assistance"—a term that encompasses a mix of development aid, loans, technical assistance, and state-sponsored investments—in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. In recent years, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has bolstered its diplomatic presence and economic influence, often referred to as "soft power," in the developing world. China has garnered considerable international goodwill through financing infrastructure and natural resource development projects, assisting in the execution of such projects, and backing PRC state enterprise ventures in many developing countries. Measuring China's Foreign "Aid"
PRC foreign assistance is difficult to quantify. Other analysts do not consider such activities as foreign direct investment (FDI), because they are secured by diplomatic agreements, do not impose real financial risks upon the PRC companies involved, or do not result in Chinese ownership of foreign assets. According to their measurements, PRC development financing, technical assistance, and state-sponsored investments in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia exceed officially reported ODA and FDI totals combined, suggesting that much of Chinese foreign economic activity is not accounted for in either conventional measurements of ODA or foreign investment. Some reported values may be inflated: some loans represent offers or pledges that may not have been fulfilled; some projects may have been cancelled, while others involving several parts or taking several years to complete may have been counted more than once. The Impact of China's Economic Assistance
In addition to their actual monetary value, Chinese assistance and related economic activities often garner appreciation disproportionate to their size, for several reasons, including
loans and investments often are made available relatively quickly and easily—without the political, economic, social, and environmental conditions and safeguards and bureaucratic procedures that major OECD aid donors, multilateral financial institutions, and multinational corporations typically impose; China often promotes economic projects in countries, geographic areas, and sectors that developed-country governments and multinational corporations have avoided because they have determined them to be unfriendly, too arduous, or infeasible; many PRC-funded or -built public works in developing countries, such as national cultural centers, stadiums, and highways, are highly visible and provide tangible, short-term benefits; and Chinese economic and investment activities are often announced at bilateral summit meetings with great fanfare and are referred to by Chinese officials as "assistance," powerfully symbolizing the friendship between China and other countries. Of the loans, infrastructure projects, and other economic assistance provided by China to the three regions between 2002 and 2007, 44% was allocated to Africa, 36% to Latin America, and 20% to Southeast Asia. They are not meant to be directly compared to estimates of Chinese assistance to the region, which are based upon different definitions. China is Africa's third largest trading partner after the European Union (EU) and the United States. In terms of official development assistance as measured by the OECD, the EU, the United States, and Japan are the largest providers in the region. While China is not counted as a major regional provider of ODA as measured by the OECD, some reports and observations suggest that the PRC is one of the largest sources of economic assistance in Southeast Asia. Although access to natural resources plays a prominent role in China's engagement in the region, strategic objectives likely influence China's activities in Southeast Asia to a greater extent than they do in Africa and Latin America. The Wagner School team compiled a list of PRC economic assistance and related investment projects or offers in Southeast Asia reported during the 2002-2007 period.
|
In recent years, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has bolstered its diplomatic presence and garnered international goodwill in the developing world through financing infrastructure and natural resource development projects, assisting in the execution of such projects, and backing PRC state enterprises in many developing countries. This report examines China's foreign assistance and government-supported, often-preferential investment ventures in three regions: Africa, Latin America (Western Hemisphere), and Southeast Asia. These activities often are collectively referred to as "economic assistance" by some analysts and in this report.
Much of China's "economic assistance" does not constitute "official development assistance" (ODA) as measured by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and as generally provided by members of the OECD. However, many activities have an aid component—they are secured through official bilateral agreements, promote development, and provide economic benefits to recipient countries that otherwise might not be made possible. Furthermore, they are not strictly commercial or do not result in foreign ownership of productive assets, and thus they do not qualify as foreign direct investment (FDI). In terms of development grants, the primary form of assistance provided by major aid donors, China is a relatively small source of global aid. However, when China's commercial and concessional loans, technical assistance, and state-sponsored or subsidized investments are included, the PRC becomes a major source of economic assistance.
This report is largely based upon research conducted in 2007-2008 by graduate students at the New York University Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service under the supervision of Wagner School faculty and CRS specialists. The students' findings, while not comprehensive, suggest a dramatic increase in PRC economic assistance and state-sponsored investment from 2002 through 2007. The numbers provided in this report are not meant to be interpreted as reliable foreign aid totals. Furthermore, some PRC loans or aid pledges may not have been fulfilled and some aid pledges that include multiple projects or that span several years may have been counted more than once.
According to the Wagner School research, during the 2002-2007 period, Africa received the greatest amount of loans and other economic assistance, followed by Latin America and Southeast Asia. The findings suggest that China's aid activities in Africa and Latin America serve the PRC's immediate economic interests, while those in Southeast Asia relate to longer term diplomatic or strategic objectives. In Africa and Southeast Asia, PRC-sponsored infrastructure and public works projects constitute the most common form of activity, while in Latin America, where some countries are more developed, Chinese natural resource development projects are more prominent. China is fast becoming a top trading partner with Africa and Southeast Asia, and it is second to the United States as a market for Latin American commodities and goods. Although the PRC's economic assistance activities are a highly visible reminder of China's growing diplomatic and economic influence, or "soft power," the European Union, the United States, and Japan continue to dominate foreign investment in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia.
This report will not be updated.
|
crs_98-208
|
crs_98-208_0
|
For FY1999, the U.S.Department of Transportation (DOT) requested total funding of $43.3 billion, a 1%increase over the FY1998 enacted level of $42.8 billion. Both the House ( H.Con.Res. The impact ofits provisions have been addressed in other sections of this report. On July 15, 1998, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported out S. 2307 , Department of Transportation and Related AgenciesAppropriations Bill for 1999 ( S.Rept. 105-249 ). On July 24, with few substantive floor amendments, the Senate passed its version of the DOT appropriations for FY1999. That provision, which drew a veto warning from Administrationofficials, would have barred the use of federal funds to impose "project laboragreements" on highway and transit fund projects. On July 22, 1998, the House Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 4328 ( H.Rept. 105-648 ) The bill provides for a total of$46.9billion (new budget authoruty, guaranteed obligations contained in the TEA-21,limitation on obligations and exempt obligations) for FY1999. This amount is $4.8billion greater than FY1998 enacted levels, and $3.9 billion greater than theAdministration's FY1999 request. 4328 was referred to the Senate, whichamended the bill by inserting S. 2307 after the enacting clause. The conference agreement provided approximately $47 billion in FY1999 for federal transportation programs -- an amount 12% greater than the FY1998funding, 9% more than requested by the Administration, and about$150 million morethan that included in the House bill. The amount for some DOT programs (includingFederal Highways and Mass Transit) was virtually insured by funding "firewalls"that had been placed in the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21). The Department'sFY1999 budget request was similar in many respects to the FY1998 appropriation. First, funding proposals for several national transportation priorities,such as safety, national security, infrastructure needs, and technology development,are highlighted and selected policy issues associated with these are presented. Throughout its budget request, the DOT continues to emphasize several prioritiesincluding: safety, infrastructure, innovative financing, environmental enhancement,technology, and national security. 105-178 , H.R. Surface Transportation Infrastructure Policy
The Administration requested a total of approximately $30.0 billion for FY1999. In reality the Administration's FY1999 request is very similar to the levels of funding provided in the FY1998 Act. Other Factors
The debate on the FY1999 budget request has focused partly on the Administration's funding priorities. This was a total of $1.6 billion when coupled with the $1.1 billion Amtrak will receive inFY1999 without further legislative action as a result of the Taxpayer Relief Act of1997 ( P.L. 105-134 ), is given additional responsibility by the report language ofthe Senate Appropriations Committee for FY1999. The House and Senate transit proposals recommended the same fundinglevels for FY1999, $5.39 billion, an increase of $549 million over FY1998. CRS Issue Brief IB97029.
|
For FY1999, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) requested total funding of approximately $43 billion, a 1% increase over the FY1998 enacted level of $39 billion. The FY1999budget request for the DOT was similar in many respects to the FY1998 appropriation.
There are many "macro" issues or factors that are influencing the debate over the Administration's FY1999 budget request. Some of them have been carried over from the previousfiscal year. Complicating the budget process had been the delay associated with reauthorizing manyof the Department's programs.
The recently concluded reauthorization of surface transportation programs will dramatically effect the FY1999 appropriations process. The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century ( P.L.105-178 , TEA-21) provides for an increase in spending at a level above that contemplated in theAdministration budget request. In addition, the new legislation provides a new budget environmentfor highway and transit programs that limits the ability of the appropriations process to alter spendingfor these activities.
In its FY1999 request, the Administration reiterated that safety is its highest priority, followed by technology development, environmental enhancement, infrastructure needs, and innovativefinancing. The budget proposal included requests of: $3.1 billion for direct safety funding; $30.0billion for infrastructure investments; $1.1 billion for transportation research and development(R&D); and $0.6 billion for Amtrak (See CRS Issue Brief 97030).
On July 15, 1998, the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported S. 2307 ( S.Rept. 105-249 ). The committee recommended total funding of approximately $47 billion forFY1999. S. 2307 was passed by the Senate on July 24, 1998. Few amendments weremade, excepting one controversial proposal to bar the use of federal funds to impose "project laboragreements" on highway and transit fund projects. A compromise substitute was offered.
The House Appropriations Committee reported its own bill ( H.R. 4328 , H.Rept. 105-648 ) which would have provided a total of $46.9 billion, an amount $4.8 billion greater thanFY1998 and $3.9 billion greater than the amount requested by the Administration. The committeevoiced its objections to the impact of TEA-21 legislation, whose "firewalls" significantly limited itslatitude in funding. According to the report, "These 'firewalls' make it virtually impossible for theAppropriations Committee to make downward adjustments to those funding levels in the annualappropriations process over the next 5 years."
By July 31, both the House and Senate had passed their respective bills; the House bill was referred to the Senate; the Senate substituted its own language; and the House requested a conferenceon the substitute amendment. See the "Most Recent Developments" section of this report for thelatest legislative action.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: E = Economics; STM = Science, Technology, and Medicine.
|
crs_RL33932
|
crs_RL33932_0
|
Illegal logging is a pervasive problem affecting countries that produce, export, and import wood and wood products. The World Bank estimates that illegal logging costs governments approximately $15 billion annually in lost royalties. Some are concerned that U.S. demand for tropical timber from countries in Latin America and Southeast Asia may be a driver of illegal logging. The United States is the world's largest wood products consumer and one of the top importers of tropical hardwoods. If there were no illegally logged wood in the global market, it has been projected that the value of U.S. exports of roundwood, sawnwood, and panels could increase by an average of approximately $460 million each year. Some countries allegedly contribute to illegal logging by importing illegally obtained wood products. Illegal logging can affect local communities in the countries where it is occurring. International Initiatives and Institutions
Several relevant multilateral and international agreements relate to illegal logging and illegal timber trade. These range from voluntary agreements that, for example, allow consumer countries to exchange data with producing countries, to legally binding multilateral agreements that enable signatory governments to seize illegal products and exercise financial penalties on illegally produced timber. U.S. Laws That Address Illegal Logging
The United States has no specific laws that address all aspects of illegal logging. Logging within the United States is addressed by several laws and regulations—some federal, but many state—that depend on what species is logged, and where and how it is done. Amending the Lacey Act to include plants traded in violation of foreign laws would establish legal structures to prosecute parties who import and trade wood found in violation of other countries' forest laws. The 2008 farm bill ( P.L. Foreign Policy on Illegal Logging
In 2003, the United States developed an initiative to help developing countries stop illegal logging. This initiative adopted several approaches to address illegal logging: addressing legal and institutional barriers that prevent on-the-ground law enforcement of illegal logging; using technology to monitor logging; encouraging good business practices, legal trade, and transparency in logging; and creating incentives to promote local communities to abolish illegal logging practices. This partnership is aimed at improving forest management and governance to reduce forest degradation and reduce illegal logging in the region. Similarly, some contend that an FTA with Peru could lead to an increase in exports of illegal logged timber to the United States from Peru.
|
Illegal logging is a pervasive problem throughout the world, affecting countries that produce, export, and import wood and wood products. Illegal logging is generally defined as the harvest, transport, purchase, or sale of timber in violation of national laws. In some timber-producing countries in the developing world, illegal logging represents over half of timber production and exports. The World Bank estimates that illegal logging costs governments approximately $15 billion annually in lost royalties. Illegal logging may stimulate corruption, collusion, and other crimes within governments, and has been linked to the purchase of weapons in regional conflicts in Africa. Illegal logging, however, benefits perpetrators by reducing the cost of legal and regulatory compliance of timber harvesting, sometimes resulting in higher profits. Illegal logging in protected areas can lead to degraded forest ecosystems, loss of biodiversity, and indirectly to deforestation and the spread of agrarian activity in some developing countries.
Several relevant multilateral and international agreements address illegal logging and illegal timber trade. These range from voluntary agreements that, for example, allow consumer countries to exchange data with producing countries, to legally binding multilateral agreements that enable signatory governments to seize illegal products and exercise financial and criminal penalties on those who possess or transport illegally produced timber.
The United States is the world's largest wood products consumer and one of the top importers of tropical hardwoods. Some are concerned that U.S. demand for tropical timber from countries in Latin America and Southeast Asia may be a driver of illegal logging. Others assert that if there were no illegally logged wood in the global market, the value of U.S. exports of timber could increase substantially. The United States has no specific domestic laws that address all aspects of illegal logging. Logging within the United States is addressed by several laws and regulations—some federal, but many state—that depend on what species is logged, and where and how it is done.
In 2003, the United States developed an initiative to help developing countries stop illegal logging. This initiative aims to remove legal and institutional barriers to combating illegal logging; promote technology to improve monitoring the legal trade in logging; and create incentives to abolish illegal logging practices in rural communities. The United States also addressed illegal logging in a free trade agreement (FTA) with Peru. The agreement requires that the Peruvian government enforce its international treaty obligations and increase monitoring and enforcement of illegal logging in its country.
Illegal logging is addressed by Congress in the 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-234). A provision in the law amends the Lacey Act to include plants traded in violation of foreign laws. This was primarily intended to deter imports of illegally obtained timber from foreign countries.
|
crs_RL31757
|
crs_RL31757_0
|
Background
On November 22, 2002, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finalized revisions to several aspects of the Clean Air Act's (CAA) New Source Review (NSR) requirements. At the same time, EPA proposed a rule to clarify the definition of "routine maintenance" under NSR. The proposed and final rules have generated controversy. The Bush Administration has argued that the new rules will reduce pollution and increase energy efficiency. In contrast, the State and Territorial Air Pollution Program Administrators (STAPPA) and Association of Local Air Pollution Control Officials (ALAPCO) argue that the revisions will "undermine efforts to achieve and sustain clean, healthful air." The attorneys general in nine Northeastern states filed suit against the final rules issued by EPA on December 31, 2002 in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Pennsylvania filed a separate lawsuit on January 27, 2003. On January 30, the attorneys general in eight states, mostly from the Midwest and the South filed a petition in support of the final rule. In promulgating implementing regulations, EPA exempted certain activities from the definition of physical or operational change. Among those activities exempted was: "maintenance, repair, and replacement which the Administrator determines to be routine for a source category...." In addition, increases in production rates that do not involve capital expenditures do not constitute a modification. Responding to this situation, utilities began to spread out their life extension efforts in an attempt to make them fit into their routine maintenance schedules. If one believes that EPA's routine maintenance exemption as enunciated in the 1970s was delimited and not a license to rehabilitate existing facilities, then one would conclude that many of the industry's rehabilitation activities of the last 20 years go beyond what NSR requirements allow. This perspective that applying NSR requirements to rehabilitation would reduce emissions is consistent with the enforcement initiative of the Clinton Administration, an initiative for which the Bush Administration has stated its support. In contrast, if one believes that an exemption for routine maintenance is appropriate and should be defined in terms of current industry practices, then one would conclude that the potential threat of NSR (and the installation of BACT or LAER) prevents owners from making cost-effective improvements in the overall performance and efficiency of their existing facilities (e.g., improved heat rates). From this perspective, NSR discourages plant owners from upgrading facilities operating with old, worn-out, inefficient components, thereby foregoing opportunities to conserve energy and to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by installing newer, more efficient components. This perspective that NSR discourages energy efficiency is reflected in the Bush Administration's proposed revisions to routine maintenance published in December, 2002.
|
On November 22, 2002, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finalized revisions to several aspects of the Clean Air Act's (CAA) New Source Review (NSR) requirements. At the same time, EPA proposed rules to clarify the definition of "routine maintenance" under NSR. The proposed and final rules have generated controversy. The Bush Administration has argued that the new rules will reduce pollution and increase energy efficiency. In contrast, the State and Territorial Air Pollution Program Administrators (STAPPA) and Association of Local Air Pollution Control Officials (ALAPCO) argue that the revisions will "undermine efforts to achieve and sustain clean, healthful air." Nine Northeastern states filed suit against the final rules issued by EPA on December 31, 2002 in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and Pennsylvania filed a separate lawsuit on January 27, 2003; on January 30, eight states, mostly from the Midwest and the South, filed a petition in support of the final rule.
Into the 1970s, coal-fired electric generating facilities were built with a projected useful life of 30-40 years. Over time a powerplant's efficiency declined, until it would be replaced or put on standby for use during emergencies. As the CAA evolved, it established stringent pollution control requirements on newly constructed facilities, but not on older ones unless they underwent a modification that increases emissions (or emitted pollutants that exceeded health-based air quality standards). By the early 1980s, however, it became technically feasible to refurbish a powerplant to preserve its efficiency, so plants could continue in regular operation.
Thus, "life extension" became more advantageous than building new facilities that would incur capital and operating costs of CAA-required pollution controls. The crucial issue was whether life extension triggered the "modification" provision of the CAA: In promulgating regulations in 1975, EPA had exempted certain activities from the definition of modification, including "maintenance, repair, and replacement which the Administrator determines to be routine for a source category...." In response, utilities began to spread out their plant rehabilitation efforts in an attempt to fit them into their routine maintenance schedules.
If one believes that EPA's routine maintenance exemption was limited and did not permit the rehabilitation of existing facilities, then one would conclude that many of the industry's rehabilitation activities of the last 20 years go beyond what NSR allows. From this perspective, current law requires existing sources undergoing refurbishment to meet stringent NSR standards. This is the perspective underlying the Clinton Administration's enforcement initiative, an initiative for which the Bush Administration has stated its support. In contrast, if one believes that an exemption for routine maintenance is appropriate and should be defined in terms of current industry practices, then one would argue that NSR discourages plant owners from upgrading facilities operating with worn-out, inefficient components, thereby foregoing opportunities to conserve energy and to reduce emissions by installing newer, more efficient components. This perspective that NSR discourages energy efficiency is reflected in the Bush Administration's proposed revisions to routine maintenance published in December 2002. This report will not be updated.
|
crs_RL34521
|
crs_RL34521_0
|
Introduction
On February 24, 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Carcieri v. Salazar , ruled that the Secretary of the Interior (SOI) did not have authority to take land into trust for the Narragansett Indian Tribe (Tribe) under 25 U.S.C. §465, a provision of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA). Although the facts of the case involve only a small parcel of land in Rhode Island, the reach of the decision may be much broader because it rests on the major statute under which the SOI acquires land in trust for the benefit of Indians and Indian tribes and restricts its coverage with respect to Indian tribes receiving federal recognition after 1934. The case was brought under the Administrative Procedure Act within the six-year period covered by the applicable statute of limitations. The Supreme Court ruled that the suit directly challenging the DOI and its decision to acquire the land in trust could go forward, refuting a long-held assumption that U.S. sovereign immunity under the Quiet Title Act barred challenges to any decision of the Secretary to take land into trust once title has passed to the United States. On June 4, 2015, in Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, an en banc decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a claim challenging the validity of a trust acquisition for a tribe not recognized in 1934 may not be raised as a collateral attack on the status of the land for purposes of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. The Supreme Court agreed to review the ruling of the appellate court on the basis of two issues: (1) whether the IRA provision covers trust acquisitions by a tribe not recognized by DOI in 1934 or under federal jurisdiction at that time, and (2) whether the trust acquisition violated the terms of RIICSA. It found that the definition of Indian in 25 U.S.C. Circuit Judge Howard would have found that (1) the parties to the JMOU and Congress, in enacting RIICSA, intended to resolve all Indian claims in Rhode Island past, present, and future; (2) RIICSA contains broad language which may be fairly interpreted as impliedly and partially repealing SOI authority under the IRA to take land into trust for the Tribe; (3) the fact that other settlement acts included provisions limiting jurisdiction, should there be subsequent approvals of trust acquisitions, is irrelevant because RIICSA clearly contemplated that there would be no trust acquisition other than that of the settlement lands; and (4) to read RIICSA as if it did not preclude subsequent jurisdictional adjustments outside of the settlement lands would be "antithetical to Congress' intent" and "absurd." The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Thomas, found that the 1934 legislation unambiguously restricted beneficiaries for whom the SOI may take land into trust under this statute to "Indians" and "Indian tribe[s]" as defined in the statute. The Court, therefore, found that the Narragansett Indian Tribe was not "under Federal jurisdiction" in 1934 and ruled that the trust acquisition was contrary to the statute and reversed the lower court. The decision appears to call into question the ability of the SOI to take land into trust for any tribe added to DOI's list of federally recognized tribes since 1934 unless the trust acquisition has been authorized under legislation other than the 1934 Act. DOI Solicitor's Memorandum Indicates How a Tribe May Demonstrate That It Was "Under Federal Jurisdiction" in 1934
The DOI released a memorandum, on March 12, 2014, in which the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior interprets "The Meaning of 'Under Federal Jurisdiction' for the Purposes of the Indian Reorganization Act" (Memorandum). According to the decision, such a claim must be brought under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and is, therefore, subject to a six-year statute of limitations. On the basis of the Carcieri decision, the state claimed that the site had not been validly taken into trust because the tribe had not been under federal jurisdiction in 1934. It quoted the statement by the Supreme Court in Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, that "a challenge to the BIA's 'decision to take land into trust' is 'a garden-variety APA claim.'" One case involves a tribe that was not formally recognized until 2002; another, a tribe that dates to colonial times. They found the language ambiguous with respect to whether it was limited to tribes that were recognized in 1934 and under federal jurisdiction in 1934 or whether it could apply to a tribe that could be found to be under federal jurisdiction in 1934 but not recognized formally until after 1934. Other Federal District Court Decisions Deferring to SOI Interpretation of IRA Jurisdictional and Recognition Requirements in Taking Land Into Trust
Trust Acquisition for the Oneida Indian Nation of New York
On March 26, 2015, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, in Central New York Fair Business Association v. Jewell , applied the framework employed by the Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council ( Chevron ) and found that the SOI's interpretation of "under Federal jurisdiction" warranted judicial deference. The case involved a tribe that had conducted a vote in 1934 under a provision of the IRA and had had a relationship with the federal government that included a 1794 treaty. Trust Acquisition for Ione Band of Miwok Indians
On September 30, 2015, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California filed two opinions dismissing suits by the County of Amador, California, and various citizens advocate groups contesting a SOI decision to take land into trust for the Ione Band of Miwok Indians (Ione Band). District Court Decision Invalidating Trust Acquisition for the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe
On July 28, 2016, in Littlefield v. U.S. Department of the Interior, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts invalidated the SOI's decision to take land into trust for the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe (Mashpee Tribe). The Mashpee Tribe was officially acknowledged to be an Indian tribe in 2007. On the basis of its analysis of the grammatical structure of the IRA's second definition of "Indian," the court held that the plain meaning of the language is that "a descendant of a 'recognized Indian tribe' will be an eligible beneficiary of the IRA's land-into-trust provision only if that tribe was under federal jurisdiction in June 1934." H.R. 114th Congress
S. 1879
On June 6, 2016, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs reported an amended version of S. 1879 , the Interior Improvement Act, which had been introduced by Senator John Barrasso, chairman of the Senate Indian Affairs Committee, on July 28, 2015. Other Bills
S. 732 / H.R.
|
In Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a 1934 statute provides no authority for the Secretary of the Interior (SOI) to take land into trust for the Narragansett Indian Tribe (Tribe) because the statute applies only to tribes under federal jurisdiction when that law was enacted. The reach of the decision may be broad because it relies on the major statute under which the SOI acquires land in trust for the benefit of Indians. It affects the SOI's authority to take land into trust for any recently recognized tribe unless the trust acquisition has been authorized by legislation other than the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) or the tribe can show that it was "under Federal jurisdiction" in 1934.
A subsequent decision of the Supreme Court, Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2199 (2012), appears to have opened the way to undo trust acquisitions on the basis of the Administrative Procedure Act. In that case, the Court refuted a long-held assumption that U.S. sovereign immunity under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. §2409(a), barred challenges to any decision of the Secretary to take Indian land into trust once title has passed to the United States. In the case, the Court ruled that a suit directly challenging the Department of the Interior (DOI) and its decision to acquire the land in trust could go forward. The case involved a challenge to a trust acquisition for a tribe that had not been officially recognized in 1934. It was brought under the Administrative Procedure Act and within its six-year statute of limitations. Subsequent cases, including a June 4, 2015, en banc decision, Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California, 789 F. 3d 947 (9th Cir. 2015), of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, indicate that challenges to the status of Indian trust lands not raised within the six-year statute of limitations will not be entertained by the courts.
Carcieri involves a parcel of land which the SOI had agreed to take into trust for the benefit of the Narragansett Tribe, thereby presumably subjecting it to federal and tribal jurisdiction and possibly opening the way for gaming under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. The land is outside the Tribe's current reservation, which is subject to the civil and criminal laws of Rhode Island according to the terms of the Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1974 (RIICSA). RIICSA does not explicitly address the possibility that lands other than the "settlement lands" could be placed in trust; nor does it specify what jurisdictional arrangement should apply should that occur. The issues before the Supreme Court were (1) whether the authority under which the SOI has agreed to acquire the land, 25 U.S.C. §465, a provision of the IRA of 1934, covers trust acquisitions by a tribe that was neither federally recognized nor under federal jurisdiction in 1934, and (2) whether the trust acquisition violated the terms of RIICSA. The Supreme Court's decision is predicated on the Court's finding that the definitions of "Indians" and "Indian tribe" in the 1934 legislation unambiguously restrict the beneficiaries for whom the SOI may take land into trust to tribes that, in 1934, were "under Federal jurisdiction." The Court also held that the Narragansett Indian Tribe was not "under Federal jurisdiction" in 1934. It, therefore, ruled that the trust was not authorized by the statute and reversed the lower court.
Carcieri prompted the March 12, 2014, DOI issuance of a Solicitor of the Interior Memorandum on "The Meaning of 'Under Federal Jurisdiction' for Purposes of the Indian Reorganization Act." In it, the agency set forth its standards for determining whether a tribe not officially recognized until after 1934 was "under Federal jurisdiction" in 1934. These standards have found judicial acceptance in some recent cases. The Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community of Oregon v. Jewell, No. 14-5326, 2016 WL 40560092 (D.C. Cir. July 29, 2016), involved a trust acquisition for a tribe not officially acknowledged as an Indian tribe until 2002. Central New York Fair Business Association v. Jewell, No. 6:08-cv-0660(LEK/DEP), 2015 WL 1400384 (N.D. N.Y. March 26, 2015), involved a decision to take land into trust for the Oneida Indian Nation of New York, a tribe that had conducted an IRA vote in 1934. Acquisition of trust land for that tribe was challenged on the basis of the claim that a 19th century statute terminating the tribe's reservation resulted in placing the tribe under state jurisdiction. Moreover, two September 30, 2015, decisions of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, No Casino in Plymouth and Citizens Equal Rights Alliance v. Jewell, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1166 (E.D. Cal. 2015), and County of Amador v Jewell, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1193 (E.D. Cal. 2015), dismissed challenges to a trust acquisition for the Ione Band of Miwok Indians. Those challenges sought to show that the Ione Band of Indians was not "under Federal jurisdiction in 1934" on the basis of various inconsistencies in the DOI's treatment of that tribe.
One land-into-trust determination by the SOI has been rejected by a federal court. Littlefield v. U.S. Department of the Interior, No. 16-10184-WGY (D. Mass. July 28, 2016), invalidated a DOI decision to take land into trust under the 1934 legislation for the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe. That tribe had been formally acknowledged in 2007. Its application for a land-into-trust acquisition was approved on the basis of a second definition of "Indian" in the IRA. The DOI had found that definition to be ambiguous. The federal district court disagreed. It ruled that, under its plain meaning, that definition applies only to Indians whose tribes were "under Federal jurisdiction" in 1934.
In the 114th Congress, S. 1879, the Interior Improvement Act, introduced by Senator John Barrasso, chairman of the Senate Indian Affairs Committee and reported by the Senate Indian Affairs Committee on June 6, 2016 (S.Rept. 114-275), joins three other bills, S. 732/H.R. 407, and H.R. 249, which have been introduced to amend the Indian Reorganization Act to permit trust land acquisitions for all federally recognized Indian tribes.
|
crs_RL33129
|
crs_RL33129_0
|
Midwestern flooding in 2008 and Hurricane Katrina flooding in 2005 have enlivened interest in reducing the risk of flooding in communities across the nation. The 110 th Congress, like many earlier Congresses, is faced with numerous flood control issues, including responding to flood events and altering federal flood damage reduction, mitigation, and insurance policies. In the United States, local governments are responsible for land use and zoning decisions that direct floodplain and coastal development; however, state and federal governments also influence community and individual decisions on managing flood risk. For example, the federal government constructs some of the nation's flood control infrastructure, supports hazard mitigation actions, offers flood insurance, and provides emergency response and disaster aid for significant floods. The federal agencies most involved in flood damage reduction and flood fighting and emergency response are the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The Flood Control Act of 1936 (19 Stat. 1570) declared flood control a "proper" federal activity in the national interest. Section 1 of the act established the following policy:
It is hereby recognized that destructive floods upon the rivers of the United States, upsetting orderly processes and causing loss of life and property, including the erosion of lands and impairing and obstructing navigation, highways, railroads, and other channels of commerce between the States, constitute a menace to national welfare; that it is the sense of Congress that flood control on navigational waters or their tributaries is a proper activity of the Federal Government in cooperation with States, their political sub-divisions and localities thereof; that investigations and improvements of rivers and other waterways, including watersheds thereof, for flood-control purposes are in the interest of the general welfare; that the Federal Government should improve or participate in the improvement of navigable waters or their tributaries including watersheds thereof, for flood-control purposes if the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of the estimated costs, and if the lives and social security of people are otherwise adversely affected. The 2008 midwestern floods and Hurricane Katrina have contributed to interest in fundamental reexaminations of the approach to managing floodwaters. Some of the questions raised are: Do current policies, programs, practices, and investments result in an acceptable level of aggregate risk for the nation? Do they promote wise use and investments of the nation's floodplains and coasts? Flood Management Issues in the 110th Congress
A Legislative Response to Katrina's Lessons: Factoring in Safety
In the first omnibus Water Resources Development Act (WRDA, which is the legislative authorization vehicle for the Corps) enacted after Hurricane Katrina—WRDA 2007 ( P.L. Water Resources Priorities Report (§2032)— Ths provision requires the President submit to Congress a report by 2010 on the vulnerability of the nation to flood damages, including the risk to human life, which is to include assessments of current programs and recommendations for improvements. National Levee Safety Program (Title IV ) — This title creates a Committee on Levee Safety to make recommendations to Congress by mid-2008 for a national levee safety program; however, the committee has not yet been funded. How these changes are implemented over the next few years may affect the nature of the federal investment in flood and storm damage infrastructure and mitigation measures.
|
Midwestern flooding and Hurricane Katrina have raised concerns about reducing human and economic losses from flooding. In the United States, local governments are responsible for land use and zoning decisions that shape floodplain and coastal development; however, state and federal governments also influence community and individual decisions on managing flood risk. The federal government constructs some of the nation's flood control infrastructure, supports hazard mitigation, offers flood insurance, and provides emergency response and disaster aid for significant floods. In addition to constructing flood damage reduction infrastructure, state and local entities operate and maintain most of the flood control infrastructure and have initial flood-fighting responsibilities.
Prior to the Lower Mississippi River Flood of 1927, the federal role in flood control was limited. The Flood Control Act of 1936 (19 Stat. 1570) declared some flood control a "proper" federal activity. Today, the federal agencies most involved in flood control and flood fighting and emergency response are the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
The 110th Congress is faced with numerous flood control issues, including responding to disasters and adjusting federal flood policies. The recent midwestern floods and Hurricane Katrina have broadened interest in fundamental review of the current approach to managing floodwaters. Questions raised are: Do current policies, programs, and practices result in an acceptable level of aggregate national risk? Do they promote wise use and investments in the nation's floodplains and coasts? Do they encourage development that puts people in harm's way? Levees represent a particular challenge in that they may encourage development in flood-prone areas, but sometimes fail or are overtopped by significant storms. Hurricane Katrina brought national attention to the catastrophic consequences when structures fail or are breached. Similarly, two major midwestern floods in the span of 15 years (one in 1993 and one in 2008) have raised concerns about structures' ability to reduce or avoid flood damages and their effects on development patterns.
The 110th Congress addressed some flood issues in the first omnibus Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) enacted after Hurricane Katrina—WRDA 2007 (P.L. 110-114). For example, WRDA 2007 requires that national water resources planning avoid the unwise use of floodplains and flood-prone areas, and requires the President to report by 2010 on national vulnerability to flood damages, including the risk to human life. This report is to include assessments of current programs and recommendations for improvements. The law also creates a Committee on Levee Safety to make recommendations for a national levee safety program. How these changes are implemented over the next few years may affect the nature of federal investment in flood and storm damage infrastructure and mitigation measures.
This report provides a primer on responsibilities for flood management, describes the role of federal agencies, and discusses flood issues before the 110th Congress. The report also discusses the legislative response to Hurricane Katrina.
|
crs_R43718
|
crs_R43718_0
|
The most recent is Title VI of the Agricultural Act of 2014 ( P.L. 113-79 ). The trends noted above suggest a range of issues that were important in shaping the provisions of the rural development title of the 2014 farm bill:
conservation and environmental restoration as rural employment opportunities; stemming rural population out-migration; vertical integration and coordination of agriculture into supply networks and their implication for rural areas; developing rural entrepreneurial capacity; rebuilding an aging rural physical infrastructure; public service delivery innovations in sparsely populated areas; increasing suburbanization and the conflicts between agriculture and suburban development; human capital deficiencies in rural areas; regionally based efforts for economic development; and connecting businesses and rural communities with broadband telecommunications infrastructure. The rural development title of omnibus farm bills does not address every program administered by the three USDA mission agencies. In addition to the authorization of three new regional development commissions in the 2008 farm bill, the 2014 farm bill also prioritized multijurisdictional planning for strategic rural development. The rural development title authorizes a new Strategic Economic and Community Development initiative (Section 6025) that will prioritize projects that support economic development plans on a multijurisdictional basis. The program reserves 10% of the appropriation for community facilities, rural utilities, rural business and cooperative development accounts for projects that meet the criteria of strategic development. Section 6205 authorizes a new Rural Energy Savings Progra m. The program provides loans to utility districts and Rural Utility Service borrowers to assist rural households and small businesses in implementing durable, cost-effective energy efficiency measures. Section 6105 authorizes a new Rural Gigabit Network Pilot Program (operating at a 1 gigabit per second downstream transmission capacity) that could bring ultra high-speed broadband to more rural areas. Section 6006 authorizes an Essential Community Facilities Technical Assistance and Training Program . Other Major Provisions
In addition to these newly authorized programs, the rural development title also includes other provisions to reauthorize and/or amend a wide variety of loan and grant programs that provide further assistance in four key areas: (1) broadband and telecommunications, (2) rural water and wastewater infrastructure, (3) business and community development, and (4) regional development. Each of these programs has authorized discretionary spending subject to annual appropriations, with the exception of one mandatory spending authorization of $150 million for reducing the backlog of pending water and waste water applications. Section 6201 reauthorizes the Distance Learning and Telemedicine Loan and Grant Program, which provides funding for end-user telecommunications equipment. Funding is authorized at $20 million annually (FY2014-FY2018), subject to annual appropriations. Section 6008 reauthorizes Water Systems for Rural and Native Villages in Alaska . Section 6210 provides $150 million in mandatory funding for Pending Water and Wastewater Loan and Grant Applications. Business and Community Development
Section 6005 reauthorizes Tribal College and University Essential Community Facilities through 2018. Side-by-Side Comparison of Rural Development Provisions in the 2014 Farm Bill with the House- and Senate-Passed Farm Bills
|
While many legislative proposals introduced in a given Congress may have implications for rural America, Congress has generally expressed concern with economic development of rural communities within the context of periodic omnibus farm bills, most recently in Title VI of the Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-79). Congress uses farm bills to address emerging rural issues as well as to reauthorize and/or amend a wide range of rural programs administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) three rural development mission agencies: Rural Housing Service, Rural Business-Cooperative Service, and Rural Utilities Service.
Title VI of the 2014 farm bill addresses a wide range of policy issues concerning rural America, many of which were also addressed in the 2008 farm bill. These issues included provisions such as equity capital development in rural areas, regional economic planning and development, essential community facilities, water and wastewater infrastructure needs, value-added agricultural development, and broadband telecommunications development. The 2014 farm bill expands high-speed broadband access in rural areas through a new rural gigabit network pilot program, establishes new criteria for prioritizing broadband loans, creates a new rural energy savings program, establishes a program for strategic economic and community development, and consolidates several existing business development grants into a broader program of business development grants. The bill also authorizes $150 million in mandatory spending for pending rural development loans and grants, primarily water and wastewater infrastructure projects. A side-by-side comparison of the final bill with the House- and Senate-passed provisions is provided at the end of the report.
The 2014 farm bill authorizes USDA to prioritize otherwise eligible applications that support multijurisdictional strategic economic and community development. The provision reserves 20% of a fiscal year's appropriation for community facilities, water and wastewater projects, and rural business development for such strategic economic development projects. The bill authorizes a new Rural Energy Savings Program that will provide 0% interest rate loans to eligible borrowers to implement energy efficiency measures. The bill also authorizes appropriations of $10 million annually (FY2014-FY2018) for a new Rural Gigabit Network Pilot program for "ultra-high speed" broadband connectivity, and amends through FY2018 many long-standing programs funded through annual appropriations—water and waste disposal grants, technical assistance for rural water systems, emergency community water assistance, business opportunity grants, water assistance to Native villages in Alaska, community facilities for tribal colleges, and distance learning and telemedicine, to name a few. Most of these programs received authorized funding at levels generally lower than authorized by the 2008 farm bill.
|
crs_RS22792
|
crs_RS22792_0
|
This report focuses specifically on differences over time in selected labor market outcomes of individuals associated with their educational attainment. Earnings
Workers with more education historically have had higher annual earnings on average than workers with less education. As also can be seen from the columns labeled "current dollars" in Table 1 , the importance of educational attainment to earnings has increased over the years. This disparate pattern has sparked still ongoing concern about the extent of wage inequality in U.S. society. The risk of displacement is lower and the likelihood of reemployment is higher for long-tenured workers with at least a bachelor's degree compared to other workers. Many of the estimated five million new jobs are in professional occupations.
|
The amount of education in which individuals invest greatly influences their labor market outcomes. For example, highly educated workers on average are better paid than other workers. Four-year college graduates also are less at risk of unemployment; if they should lose their jobs, these displaced workers are more likely than others to find new jobs. The importance of educational attainment to earnings levels has grown over time as well. Concern about the extent of wage inequality in U.S. society arose in part because of the comparatively large increases in real (inflation-adjusted) earnings of workers with at least a bachelor's degree.
|
crs_98-42
|
crs_98-42_0
|
These amendments are the most comprehensive and significantchanges made to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) since its enactment in 1975.Several of the most important changes were made regarding the discipline of children withdisabilities. Congress attempted to strike "a careful balance between the LEA's duty to ensure thatschool environments are safe and conducive to learning for all children, including children withdisabilities, and the LEA's continuing obligation to ensure that children with disabilities receive afree appropriate public education." The IDEAAmendments of 1997 allow a school to place a child with a disability in an interim alternativeeducational setting for not more than forty-five days if the student has been involved with drugs orweapons (not just firearms as under previous law). An impartial hearing officer may order a changein placement for a child with a disability to an interim alternative educational placement for up toforty-five days if the hearing officer finds that the school has demonstrated by substantial evidencethat leaving the child in the current placement is substantially likely to result in injury to the childor others. In addition, P.L. 105-17 codifies the previous interpretation by the Department ofEducation that educational services may not cease for children with disabilities who have beensuspended or expelled.
|
The 1997 Amendments to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act are the most comprehensive and significant changes made since its original enactment. Several of the mostimportant changes were made regarding the discipline of children with disabilities. Congressattempted to strike "a careful balance between the LEA's (local educational agency's) duty to ensurethat school environments are safe and conducive to learning for all children, including children withdisabilities, and the LEA's obligation to ensure that children with disabilities receive a freeappropriate public education."
Generally, the new provisions give schools increased flexibility for dealing with children with disabilities who misbehave. A school may now place a child with a disability in an interimalternative educational setting for not more than forty-five days if the student has been involved withdrugs or weapons (not just firearms as under previous law). An impartial hearing officer may ordera change in placement for a child with a disability to an interim alternative educational placementfor up to forty-five days if the hearing officer finds that the school has demonstrated by substantialevidence that leaving the child in the current placement is substantially likely to result in injury tothe child or others. In addition, P.L. 105-17 codifies the previous interpretation by the Departmentof Education that educational services may not cease for children with disabilities who have beensuspended or expelled. Final regulations, issued by the Department of Education on March 12, 1999,elaborated upon these statutory requirements. This report examines both the statutory and regulatoryprovisions relating to discipline as well as recent proposed amendments. It will be updated asnecessary.
|
crs_RL32855
|
crs_RL32855_0
|
Introduction
Steadily increasing presidential involvement in agency rulemaking efforts has often been cited as one of the most significant developments in administrative law and domestic policymaking since the introduction of the first formal review programs in the 1970s. The evolution of presidential review of agency rulemaking efforts since the Reagan era in particular constitutes a significant assertion and accumulation of presidential power in the regulatory context. While initial presidential forays into centralized regulatory review were limited in scope, presidential review of rules has emerged as one of the most widely-used and controversial mechanisms by which a President can ensure the realization of his regulatory agenda. The first formal regulatory review program was instituted by President Nixon in 1971 through the establishment of a "Quality of Life Review" program designed to improve "the interagency coordination of proposed agency regulations, standards, guidelines and similar materials pertaining to environmental quality, consumer protection, and occupational and public health and safety." President Ford extended regulatory review through Executive Order 11,821, requiring agencies to prepare "inflation impact statements" for any "major" regulatory action. President Carter expanded presidential review through the issuance of Executive Order 12,044, which required agencies to prepare a "regulatory analysis" of all proposed "major rules," examining the potential economic impact of the proposal and an evaluation of alternative regulatory options. E.O. In practical effect, the impact of the Reagan orders on agency regulatory activities was immediate and substantial. Not surprisingly, this review process generated criticism and controversy. 12,291. 12,866
A. Clinton Administration
Many of the concerns voiced over the effects of E.O. Upon assuming office, President Clinton supplanted the Reagan Administration's review scheme through the issuance of Executive Order 12,866, entitled "Regulatory Planning and Review." E.O. These requirements mark a significant departure from the provisions of E.O. 12,291. 12,866 were welcomed by many as improving upon the transparency and selectiveness of OIRA review, other aspects of the order could be taken to indicate that the Clinton Administration ' s view of presidential authority over agency rulemaking was largely consonant with that of the Reagan and George H.W. E.O. Conclusion
As has been illustrated by the consideration of the review regimes discussed above, there has been a steady evolution of presidential review of agency rulemaking from the Nixon Administration to the current Administration of George W. Bush. Furthermore, while the actions of both the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations in implementing the provisions of E.O. 12,866 appear to indicate a conception of presidential authority consonant with that conveyed by the Reagan order, their more nuanced approach to exercising this authority has largely diminished charges against its constitutionality. In turn, presidential review of agency rulemaking has become a widely used and increasingly accepted mechanism by which a President can exert significant, and sometimes determinative, authority over the agency rulemaking process.
|
Presidential review of agency rulemaking is widely regarded as one of the most significant developments in administrative law since the introduction of the first formal review programs in the 1970s. The evolution of presidential review of agency rulemaking efforts from the Reagan era through the current Administration marks a significant assertion and accumulation of presidential power in the regulatory context. While initial presidential forays into centralized regulatory review were limited in scope, presidential review of rules has emerged as one of the most effective and controversial mechanisms by which a President can ensure the realization of his regulatory agenda.
Limited regulatory review began with President Nixon's establishment of a program requiring proposed environmental, consumer protection, and occupational and public health and safety regulations be circulated within the executive branch for comment. President Reagan issued an executive order requiring agencies to prepare inflationary impact statements for any major regulatory actions, and President Carter expanded presidential review through the issuance of an executive order requiring a regulatory analysis of all proposed major rules.
In 1981, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291, ushering in a new era of presidential assertions of authority over agency rulemaking efforts. E.O. 12,291 required cost-benefit analyses and established a centralized review procedure for all agency regulations. E.O. 12,291 delegated responsibility for this clearance requirement to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, which had recently been created within the Office of Management and Budget as part of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980. The impact of E.O. 12,291 on agency regulatory activities was immediate and substantial, generating controversy and criticism. Opponents of the order asserted that review thereunder was distinctly anti-regulatory and constituted an unconstitutional transfer of authority from the executive agencies. The review scheme established in the Reagan Administration was retained by President George H.W. Bush to similar effect and controversy.
Many of the concerns voiced regarding E.O. 12,291 were assuaged by President Clinton's issuance in 1993 of Executive Order 12,866, which implemented a more selective and transparent review process. E.O. 12,866 has been retained by the current Administration, which has utilized it to implement a review regime subjecting rules to greater scrutiny than in the Clinton Administration. The actions of both the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations in implementing the provisions of E.O. 12,866 could be taken to indicate a conception of presidential authority consonant with that conveyed by the Reagan order. However the comparatively nuanced exercise of this asserted authority by these Administrations has largely diminished arguments against the constitutionality of presidential review. Accordingly, presidential review of agency rulemaking has become a widely used and increasingly accepted mechanism by which a President can exert significant and sometimes determinative authority over the agency rulemaking process.
|
crs_R44997
|
crs_R44997_0
|
Generally, to serve as an acting officer for an advice and consent position, a government officer or employee must be authorized to perform the duties of a vacant office by the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (Vacancies Act). This report first describes how the Vacancies Act operates and outlines its scope, identifying when the Vacancies Act applies to a given office, how it is enforced, and which offices are exempt from its provisions. The report then explains who may serve as an acting officer and for how long, focusing on the limitations the Vacancies Act places on acting service. Finally, the report turns to issues of particular relevance to Congress, primarily highlighting the Vacancies Act's enforcement mechanisms. . . shall have no force or effect." Unless an acting officer is serving in compliance with the Vacancies Act, only the agency head can perform a nondelegable duty of a vacant advice and consent office. The Vacancies Act creates two primary types of limitations on acting service: it limits (1) the classes of people who may serve as an acting officer, and (2) the time period for which they may serve. There is an exception to this limitation: a person who is nominated to an office may serve as acting officer for that office if that person is in a "first assistant" position to that office and either (1) has served in that position for at least 90 days or (2) was appointed to that position through the advice and consent process. The Vacancies Act generally limits the amount of time that a vacant advice and consent position may be filled by an acting officer. The 210-day time limitation is tied to the vacancy itself, rather than to any person serving in the office, and the period generally begins on the date that the vacancy occurs. Potential Considerations for Congress
Exclusivity of the Vacancies Act
The Vacancies Act provides "the exclusive means" to authorize "an acting official to perform the functions and duties" of a vacant office—unless another statute "expressly"
(A) authorizes the President, a court, or the head of an Executive department, to designate an officer or employee to perform the functions and duties of a specified office temporarily in an acting capacity; or
(B) designates an officer or employee to perform the functions and duties of a specified office temporarily in an acting capacity[.] . . under the [Vacancies Act] the President 'may' override that default rule." Although the Vacancies Act is, in a sense, self-executing, violations of the Vacancies Act are generally enforced only if a third party with standing (such as a regulated entity that has been injured by agency action) successfully challenges the action as void in court.
|
The Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 (Vacancies Act) generally provides the exclusive means by which a government employee may temporarily perform the nondelegable functions and duties of a vacant advice and consent position in an executive agency. Unless an acting officer is serving in compliance with the Vacancies Act, any attempt to perform the functions and duties of that office will have no force or effect.
The Vacancies Act limits a government employee's ability to serve as an acting officer in two primary ways. First, the Vacancies Act provides that only three classes of people may serve temporarily in an advice and consent position. As a default rule, the first assistant to a position automatically becomes the acting officer. Alternatively, the President may direct either a senior official of that agency or a person serving in any other advice and consent position to serve as the acting officer. Second, the Vacancies Act limits the length of time a person may serve as acting officer: a person may serve either (1) for a limited time period running from the date that the vacancy occurred or (2) during the pendency of a nomination to that office. The Vacancies Act is primarily enforced when a person who has been injured by an agency's action challenges the action based on the theory that it was taken in contravention of the Act.
There are, however, a few key limitations on the scope of the Vacancies Act. Notably, the Vacancies Act governs the ability of a person to perform only those functions and duties of an office that are nondelegable. Unless a statute or regulation expressly specifies that a duty must be performed by the absent officer, that duty may be delegated to another government employee. In other words, delegable job responsibilities are outside the purview of the Vacancies Act. In addition, if another statute expressly authorizes acting service, that other statute may render the Vacancies Act nonexclusive, or possibly even inapplicable.
This report first describes how the Vacancies Act operates and outlines its scope, identifying when the Vacancies Act applies to a given office, how it is enforced, and which offices are exempt from its provisions. The report then explains who may serve as an acting officer and for how long, focusing on the limitations the Vacancies Act places on acting service. Finally, the report turns to issues of particular relevance to Congress, primarily highlighting the Vacancies Act's enforcement mechanisms.
|
crs_RL31404
|
crs_RL31404_0
|
Introduction
The full funding policy is a federal budgeting rule that has been applied to Department of Defense (DOD) procurement programs since the 1950s. Although technical in nature, the policy relates to Congress's power of the purse and its responsibility for conducting oversight of DOD programs. In recent years, some DOD weapons—specifically, certain Navy ships—have been procured with funding profiles that do not conform to the policy as it traditionally has been applied to DOD weapon procurement programs. DOD, in recent budget submissions and testimony, has proposed or suggested procuring ships, aircraft, and satellites using funding approaches that do not conform to the policy as traditionally applied. DOD's proposals, if implemented, could establish new precedents for procuring other DOD weapons and equipment with non-conforming funding approaches. Such precedents could further circumscribe the full funding policy, which in turn could limit and complicate Congress's ability to conduct oversight of DOD procurement programs. Background
Description of Policy
For DOD procurement programs, the full funding policy requires the entire procurement cost of a weapon or piece of equipment to be funded in the year in which the item is procured. A principal effect of the full funding policy is to prevent the use of incremental funding in the procurement of DOD weapons and equipment. Support for the policy has been periodically reaffirmed over the years by Congress, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and DOD. Incremental funding fell out of favor because opponents believed it did (or could do) one or more of the following:
make the total procurement costs of weapons and equipment more difficult for Congress to understand and track; create a potential for DOD to start procurement of an item without necessarily understanding its total cost, stating that total cost to Congress, or providing fully for that total cost in future DOD budgets—the so-called "camel's-nose-under-the-tent" issue; permit one Congress to "tie the hands" of one or more future Congresses by providing initial procurement funding for a weapon whose cost would have to be largely funded by one or more future Congresses; increase weapon procurement costs by exposing weapons under construction to potential uneconomic start-up and stop costs that can occur when budget reductions or other unexpected developments cause one or more of the planned increments to be reduced or deferred. Although incremental funding fell out of favor due to the above considerations, supporters of incremental funding could argue that its use in DOD (or federal) procurement can be advantageous because it can do one or more of the following:
permit very expensive items, such as large Navy ships, to be procured in a given year without displacing other programs from that year's budget, which can increase the costs of the displaced programs due to uneconomic program-disruption start-up and start costs; avoid a potential bias against the procurement of very expensive items that might result from use of full funding due to the item's large up-front procurement cost (which appears in the budget) overshadowing the item's long-term benefits (which do not appear in the budget) or its lower life cycle operation and support (O&S) costs compared to alternatives with lower up-front procurement costs; permit construction to start on a larger number of items in a given year within that year's amount of funding, so as to achieve better production economies of that item than would have been possible under full funding; recognize that certain DOD procurement programs, particularly those incorporating significant amounts of advanced technology, bear some resemblance to research and development activities, even though they are intended to produce usable end items; reduce the amount of unobligated balances associated with DOD procurement programs; implicitly recognize potential limits on DOD's ability to accurately predict the total procurement cost of items, such as ships, that take several years to build; and preserve flexibility for future Congresses to stop "throwing good money after bad" by halting funding for the procurement of an item under construction that has become unnecessary or inappropriate due to unanticipated shifts in U.S. strategy or the international security environment. Issues
In considering options for responding to specific DOD proposals for non-conforming approaches, or for addressing the issue of full funding in DOD procurement generally, Congress can consider several factors, including Congress's power of the purse, congressional oversight of DOD procurement programs, future Congresses, DOD budgeting and program-execution discipline, and the potential impact on weapon procurement costs. Nevertheless, addressing such proposals may involve balancing a need to meet DOD procurement goals within available funding against the goal of preserving Congress's control over DOD spending and its ability to conduct oversight of DOD programs.
|
The full funding policy is a federal budgeting rule imposed on the Department of Defense (DOD) by Congress in the 1950s that requires the entire procurement cost of a weapon or piece of military equipment to be funded in the year in which the item is procured. Although technical in nature, the policy relates to Congress's power of the purse and its responsibility for conducting oversight of DOD programs. Support for the policy has been periodically reaffirmed over the years by Congress, the Government Accountability Office, and DOD.
In recent years some DOD weapons—specifically, certain Navy ships—have been procured with funding profiles that do not conform to the policy as it traditionally has been applied to DOD weapon procurement programs. DOD, in recent budget submissions and testimony, has proposed or suggested procuring ships, aircraft, and satellites using funding approaches that do not conform to the policy as traditionally applied. DOD's proposals would establish new precedents for procuring other DOD weapons and equipment with non-conforming funding approaches. Such precedents could further circumscribe the full funding policy. This, in turn, could limit and complicate Congress's oversight of DOD procurement programs, or require different approaches to exercise control and oversight.
A principal effect of the full funding policy is to prevent the use of incremental funding, under which the cost of a weapon is divided into two or more annual portions. Incremental funding fell out of favor because opponents believed it could make the total procurement costs of weapons and equipment more difficult for Congress to understand and track, create a potential for DOD to start procurement of an item without necessarily stating its total cost to Congress, permit one Congress to "tie the hands" of future Congresses, and increase weapon procurement costs by exposing weapons under construction to uneconomic start-up and stop costs. Supporters of incremental funding, however, could argue that its use in DOD procurement programs could produce certain advantages in terms of reducing disruption to other programs, avoiding investment bias against very expensive items, improving near-term production economies of scale, and preserving flexibility for future Congresses to halt funding for weapons under construction that have become unnecessary or inappropriate.
Congress has several options for responding to recent proposals for procuring DOD ships and aircraft with funding mechanisms that do not conform to the full funding policy. These options could have the effect of terminating, modifying, maintaining, or strengthening the full funding policy. In weighing these options, Congress may consider several factors, including Congress's power of the purse, its ability to conduct oversight of DOD procurement programs, the impact on future Congresses, DOD budgeting discipline, and the potential impact on weapon costs. The process of weighing options may involve balancing a need to meet DOD procurement goals within available funding against the goal of preserving Congress's control over DOD spending and its ability to conduct oversight of DOD programs. This report will be updated as events warrant.
|
crs_R44398
|
crs_R44398_0
|
Introduction
Daily fantasy sports (DFS), a form of online gaming in which players assemble imaginary teams that amass points based on how well individual players perform in real-life sporting events, operates in a gray area of the law. Congressional action directly affecting the DFS industry dates back to a 2006 law, the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA; P.L. It is also possible that courts could determine that DFS is subject to a 1992 law, the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA; P.L. Roughly two dozen other companies also offer daily fantasy sports. According to Eilers Research, which studies the gaming industry, the DFS industry's net revenue (entry fees minus prizes) in the United States totaled $86 million in 2014. DFS and the Broader Gambling Industry
DFS is tiny relative to the gambling industry, whose casinos, Indian gaming operations, racinos, and state lotteries generated nearly $70 billion in net revenue in 2014. For example, in Indiana, some racinos, which are gambling venues located at racetracks, want to offer DFS sports contests at licensed racetrack casinos in hopes of stimulating interest in horse racing, even as other racino operators worry that DFS could negatively affect racino revenue. Some state-run lotteries are considering whether to offer online DFS games, while others are more concerned about losing customers to DFS. The Indian tribes that operate casinos generally have not weighed in on DFS, but some are concerned that it could affect gaming facilities that generated $28.5 billion in gross revenue in 2015. The legal status of fantasy sports under most state laws often turns on whether success in the activity depends primarily on the skill of individual contestants (which would likely make it legal) or mostly chance (which would probably make it unlawful gambling). Federal Laws Potentially Applicable to DFS
DFS may implicate at least four federal laws that are directly related to gambling: (1) the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act; (2) the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act; (3) the Wire Act; and (4) the Illegal Gambling Business Act. The Massachusetts Gaming Commission released a "white paper" on daily fantasy sports in January 2016 that explored in detail the possible "constraint to state action" toward DFS that PASPA may pose:
The fact that PASPA prohibits a government entity "to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license or authorize by law or compact " suggests that conflict would only arise when a state passes legislation or joins a compact that involves one of the six PASPA verbs.… There is presently a dearth of case law discussing the limits of what would constitute affirmative state action sufficient to trigger a PASPA violation …
Any approach to state action outside of the six PASPA verbs should be a cautious one … While some states have promulgated legislation to specifically exempt DFS from their definitions of gambling/bet/wager, such action could be challenged as "authorizing" or "promoting" a sports betting scheme particularly where a state would be required to take affirmative action to achieve the goal. Some states are considering requiring DFS operators to obtain licenses and comply with certain consumer protection safeguards (such as employee background checks and ensuring that players are not underage or employed by a DFS company); others are interested in regulating the industry as they regulate gambling; still others are seeking to clarify its status under their existing gambling laws. Some DFS operators do not offer fantasy sports competitions in states where their legal status is unclear. These agreements might, for instance,
inadequately or imprecisely define what constitutes "customer funds" or "customer deposits"; fail to require that customer deposits be held at financial institutions that are insured by federal or state governments; fail to require that customer accounts be held and administered by independent third parties; expressly state that the agreement does not create a fiduciary or similar legal relationship between the customer and the DFS company; allow the DFS company to unilaterally amend the terms of agreement at any time and for any reason; allow the DFS company to deny prizes or "points" for amorphous reasons, such as if a customer has engaged in an activity that the company considers to be "adverse to [its] operation"; fail to establish what rights a customer might have to recover funds if the customer's account is canceled by the DFS operator for a violation of the terms of service agreement; and include liability waiver provisions. In response to these allegations, FanDuel and DraftKings prohibited their employees from playing DFS games on any DFS website. Federal Regulation
Congress could pass legislation specifically governing DFS games, such as laws to oversee state and tribal agencies that regulate DFS contests.
|
Daily fantasy sports (DFS) companies, which operate online gaming platforms that allow players to assemble imaginary sports teams and compete in daily or weekly contests, function in a gray area of the law. The federal government does not license or regulate them. State governments have the main responsibility for regulating gaming activities that offer the prospect of monetary rewards, but a series of federal laws, most recently the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA; P.L. 109-347), may limit states' ability to oversee DFS. The 2006 law, however, was enacted at a time when only season-long fantasy sports existed. Whether Congress intended it to exempt DFS from state regulation is unclear.
Congress, multiple states, and law enforcement agencies have questioned the legality of the fledgling DFS industry, with a central focus on whether DFS contests are indeed games of skill (which would most likely make DFS legal) or chance (which would probably make DFS unlawful gambling). The legal status of DFS under state law directly affects whether DFS operators may be federally prosecuted under the Illegal Gambling Business Act (P.L. 91-452) and whether banks and payment processors could be held liable for violating UIGEA if they process monetary transactions related to daily fantasy sports. It is also possible that courts could determine that the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA; P.L. 102-559) prohibits most state legislatures from authorizing or regulating DFS.
In 2015, more than a dozen states considered whether or not to allow DFS operators to offer their gaming activities to individuals located within their borders. Nevada has decided to require DFS operators to obtain a license from its state gaming commission. Other states are considering a similar approach, which could include wagering taxes akin to the ones casinos pay. If state lawmakers decide to treat DFS as gambling, and if the courts determine that status is consistent with federal law, DFS would be subject to regulations, licensing, consumer protection safeguards, and other mandates where states choose to impose and enforce them. In the absence of state regulation, there is no means of assuring customers' access to funds on deposit with DFS operators and of enforcing prohibitions on participation by underage gamers.
Despite the controversy that surrounds it, the DFS sector is relatively small. FanDuel and DraftKings, the two largest operators, and the roughly two dozen smaller DFS companies are estimated to have booked around $86 million in net revenue (receipts minus prizes) from DFS in 2014, a small fraction of the regulated gambling industry's net revenue. Nonetheless, a variety of sports teams and organizations and media companies have invested in the DFS industry, suggesting a potential for rapid expansion if the industry's legal status is clarified.
There are strong differences of opinion within the traditional gambling industry on DFS. Some land-based casino operators fear losing customers to DFS games, while other casino owners see it as a potential new revenue source allowing them to attract younger players. Some Indian tribes that operate casinos have expressed concern about the prospect that DFS could reduce their revenues, but many tribes have not weighed in. In some states, racinos (gambling venues located at racetracks) may lobby to offer DFS sports to help increase interest in horse racing; in other states, racino operators worry that DFS will divert potential bettors from their facilities. A few state lotteries are considering whether to offer online DFS games.
|
crs_R40208
|
crs_R40208_0
|
He also said that it may be time to consider relaxing U.S. restrictions on the sale of military items to Vietnam. In 2010, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding that Obama Administration officials said would be a "stepping stone" to a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement, under which the United States could license the export of nuclear reactor and research information, material, and equipment to Vietnam. Introduction
Since 2002, overlapping strategic and economic interests have led the United States and Vietnam to improve relations across a wide spectrum of issues. Over the past several years, the two sides also have signed a new agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation and have increased their non-proliferation cooperation. In 2013, President Obama and Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang met in the White House and announced a bilateral "comprehensive partnership" that is to provide an "overarching framework" for moving the relationship to a "new phase." Interests and Goals in the Bilateral Relationship
Currently, factors generating U.S. interest in the relationship include growing trade and investment flows, the population of more than 1 million Americans of Vietnamese descent, the legacy of the Vietnam War, the perception that Vietnam is becoming a "middle power" with commensurate influence in Southeast Asia, and shared concern over the rising strength of China. U.S. goals with respect to Vietnam include opening markets for U.S. trade and investment, furthering human rights and democracy within the country, countering China's increasing regional influence, cooperating to ensure freedom of navigation and operation in and around the South China Sea, and expanding U.S. influence in Southeast Asia. Securing greater access to the U.S. market, which already is the largest destination for Vietnam's export, would boost Vietnam's economy and is a major reason Vietnam is participating in the TPP negotiations. Ultimately, the pace and extent of the improvement in bilateral relations is limited by several factors, including Hanoi's wariness of upsetting Beijing, U.S. scrutiny of Vietnam's human rights record, and Vietnamese conservatives' suspicions that the United States' long-term goal is to end the Vietnamese Communist Party's (VCP's) monopoly on power through a "peaceful evolution" strategy. Sometime in 2014, Congress may also take up the U.S.-Vietnam nuclear energy cooperation agreement. However, the rules regarding consideration of such "123 agreements" reduce Congress' ability to use them to influence U.S. policy: the agreements enter into force upon the 90 th day of continuous session after its submittal to Congress (a period of 30 plus 60 days of review) unless Congress enacts a Joint Resolution of disapproval. The Obama Administration appeared to be reluctant to schedule one in part due to concerns about the perceived deterioration in Vietnam's human rights conditions. Since the mid-2000s, the United States has been Vietnam's largest single-country export market; in 2013, exports to the United States represented about 18% of Vietnam's total exports. Trade in catfish has been particularly controversial, both with Vietnam and within the United States. Human Rights Issues
Overview
Vietnam is a one-party, authoritarian state. For more than a decade, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) appears to have followed a strategy of informally permitting (while not necessarily legalizing) most forms of personal and religious expression while selectively repressing individuals and organizations that it deems a threat to the party's monopoly on power. Human Rights in U.S.-Vietnam Relations
In general, differences over human rights between the U.S. and Vietnamese governments have not prevented the two countries from improving the overall relationship. Additionally, concerns about Vietnam's human rights record are likely to complicate Congress' debate over a TPP agreement, if the current negotiations are successful. The Vietnam Human Rights Act
Since the 107 th Congress, when Members of Congress became concerned with Vietnamese government crackdowns against protestors in the Central Highlands region, various legislative attempts have been made to link U.S. assistance to the human rights situation in Vietnam. Vietnam-China Relations
History
Vietnam's relations with China, Vietnam's most important bilateral relationship, have been fraught with ambivalence for thousands of years. For instance, since the late 2000s Vietnam has sought to upgrade its relations with outside powers, such as the United States and Japan. 116 (Kinzinger)/ S.J.Res. H.J.Res. S.J.Res.
|
After communist North Vietnam's victory over U.S.-backed South Vietnam in 1975, the United States and Vietnam had minimal relations until the mid-1990s. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1995, overlapping security and economic interests have led the two sides to expand relations across a wide range of sectors. In 2013, President Obama and his Vietnamese counterpart announced a "comprehensive partnership" that is to provide a framework for moving the relationship to a "new phase." A key factor driving the two countries together is a shared concern about China's increased assertiveness in Southeast Asia, particularly in the South China Sea.
In 2014, the 113th Congress is likely to confront four inter-related issues with respect to U.S. relations with Vietnam: a 2014 bilateral nuclear energy cooperation agreement; Vietnam's participation with the United States in the 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement negotiations; questions about how the United States can influence human rights conditions inside Vietnam; and a debate over bilateral security ties, including whether to consider relaxing restrictions on military sales to Vietnam.
U.S. and Vietnamese Interests
In the United States, voices favoring improved relations have included those reflecting U.S. business interests in Vietnam's growing economy and U.S. strategic interests in expanding cooperation with a populous country—Vietnam has over 90 million people—that has an ambivalent relationship with China. Others argue that improvements in bilateral relations should be contingent upon Vietnam's authoritarian government improving its record on human rights. The population of more than 1 million Vietnamese Americans, as well as legacies of the Vietnam War, also drive continued U.S. interest.
Vietnamese leaders have sought to upgrade relations with the United States in part due to the desire for continued access to the U.S. market and to their worries about China's expanding influence in Southeast Asia. That said, Vietnam's relationship with China is its most important. Also, some Vietnamese officials remain suspicious that the United States' long-term goal is to erode the Vietnamese Communist Party's (VCP's) monopoly on power.
Economic Ties
The United States is Vietnam's largest export market and in some years its largest source of foreign direct investment. Bilateral trade in 2013 was almost $30 billion, a more than 60% increase since 2010. The United States and Vietnam are 2 of 12 countries negotiating the TPP. To go into effect, legislation to implement a TPP agreement (if one is reached) would require approval by both houses of Congress. Since the late 2000s, annual U.S. aid typically surpasses $100 million, much of it for health-related activities.
Human Rights
Human rights are perhaps the most contentious issue in the relationship. Although disagreements over Vietnam's human rights record have not prevented the two sides from improving relations, they appear to limit the pace and extent of these improvements. Vietnam is a one-party, authoritarian state ruled by the VCP, which appears to be following a strategy of informally permitting (though not necessarily legalizing) most forms of personal and religious expression while selectively repressing individuals and organizations that it deems a threat to the party's monopoly on power. Most human rights observers contend that for the past several years, the government has intensified its suppression of dissenters and protestors.
Some human rights advocates have argued that the United States should use Vietnam's participation in the TPP talks as leverage to pressure Hanoi to improve the country's human rights situation. Also, since the 107th Congress, various legislative attempts have been made to link the provision of U.S. aid, as well as arms sales, to Vietnam's human rights record.
U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Energy Cooperation Agreement
In May 2014 the Obama transmitted to Congress a U.S.-Vietnam nuclear energy cooperation agreement, under which the United States could license the export of nuclear reactor and research information, material, and equipment to Vietnam. S.J.Res. 36, S.J.Res. 39, and H.J.Res. 116 would approve the agreement, which will enter into force upon the 90th day of continuous session after its submittal to Congress (a period of 30 plus 60 days of review) unless Congress enacts a Joint Resolution of disapproval.
|
crs_R40656
|
crs_R40656_0
|
This has led to variation among the states in the precise regulations applied to annuities and other insurance products. Some annuity products, however, are also considered securities products and are regulated by the SEC. This rule was finalized on January 8, 2009. The primary impact of this rule change is that many, if not most, of the practices related to the sale of indexed annuities of those companies and individuals selling indexed annuities will be regulated by both the SEC and the states. Final SEC Rule
On December 17, 2008, the SEC approved the previously proposed rule, with one commissioner dissenting. The reasoning for this, according to the SEC in its final rule, is that, though the indexed annuities will be considered securities under the new rule, they will not be traded in a secondary market, and activities of the insurance companies issuing them, including the seller's assets and income, are already monitored and regulated at the state level. Legal Challenge24
On the day the SEC published its final Rule 151A, a coalition of insurance companies and insurance trade groups filed a Petition for Review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit challenging the rule. The court therefore remanded the rule for reconsideration and a more complete analysis of the impact of the rule upon competition, efficiency, and capital formation. Analysis of Argument
Petitioners first argued that the SEC improperly excluded FIAs from the Section 3(a)(8) exemption of the 1933 Act and that this argument could be supported by the text of the exemption; by two Supreme Court decisions, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company of America (VALIC) and Securities and Exchange Commission v. United Benefit Life Insurance Company (United Benefit) ; and by the language of the SEC's earlier rule, Rule 151. On July 12, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ordered that Rule 151A be vacated and that its 2009 decision be amended accordingly. Legislation
The Fixed Indexed Annuities & Insurance Products Classification Act of 2009 (H.R. 2733 was introduced in the House on June 4, 2009, by Representative Gregory Meeks along with 21 cosponsors. Senator Benjamin Nelson introduced an identical bill, S. 1389 , in the Senate on June 25, 2009. This bill would have the effect of returning the regulation of indexed annuities to the status quo before the SEC's promulgation of Rule 151A; namely, indexed annuities would be exempted from SEC regulation and solely subject to regulation by the state insurance regulators. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (H.R. As introduced, neither directly addressed SEC Rule 151A or the issue of SEC oversight of annuities. 4173 , Senator Harkin offered another annuities amendment, which was ultimately adopted as Section 989J of the conference report. Although not specifically addressing SEC Rule 151A, the section requires the SEC to treat certain annuities and insurance contracts as exempt securities. The House agreed to the H.R. 4173 conference report on June 30, 2010 by a vote of 237-192. The Senate agreed to the conference report on July 15, 2010 by a vote of 60-39. President Obama signed the bill into law as P.L. 111-203 on July 21, 2010.
|
In January 2011, a new rule from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Rule 151A, entitled "Indexed Annuities and Certain Other Insurance Contracts," is slated to go into effect. This rule would effectively reclassify indexed annuities as both security products and insurance products. Since insurance products generally are regulated solely by the states, this rule will expand federal authority over indexed annuities, putting them in a similar classification as variable annuities, which are already regulated by both the SEC and the individual states.
The SEC has cited as a primary reason for increased federal oversight numerous problems with improper marketing and sales of these annuity products. This proposal has been controversial, with nearly 5,000 comments received by the SEC. The SEC's final rule was adopted on December 17, 2008, and was published in the Federal Register on January 16, 2009. Although some changes were made from the initial proposed rule, the final rule retained the majority of the original language. The U.S. Court of Appeals considered a legal challenge to the SEC's rule, in American Equity Investment Life Insurance Co. vs. SEC. In July 2009, the court found that the SEC was not unreasonable in classifying indexed annuities as securities, but remanded the rule to the SEC for the SEC to provide a more thorough analysis of the effects of the rule upon competition, efficiency, and capital formation. More recently, on July 12, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ordered that Rule 151A be vacated and that its 2009 decision be amended accordingly.
On June 4, 2009, Representative Gregory Meeks introduced the Fixed Indexed Annuities and Insurance Products Classification Act of 2009 (H.R. 2733). Senator Benjamin Nelson introduced an identical bill, S. 1389, in the Senate on June 25, 2009. The bills would specifically nullify SEC Rule 151A and return to the states sole regulatory authority over indexed annuities. Neither individual bill has been brought up for consideration by relevant committees.
During the conference committee on the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (H.R. 4173), Senator Harkin offered an amendment, ultimately adopted as Section 989J, that directs the SEC to treat as exempt securities annuities that meet a number of conditions. This language has been generally interpreted as preventing SEC oversight of indexed annuities, although its precise impact may be clarified by future court or regulatory decisions. The House agreed to the H.R. 4173 conference report on June 30, 2010, by a vote of 237-192 and the Senate agreed to the conference report on July 15, 2010, by a vote of 60-39. President Obama signed the bill into law as P.L. 111-203 on July 21, 2010.
This report explains the different types of annuities, the taxation of annuities, and disentangles the federal and state roles in the regulation of annuities. It outlines the SEC rule, including practical considerations for implementation. It also discusses legal and congressional action in response to the SEC rule. The report will be updated as legislative or regulatory events warrant.
|
crs_RL33542
|
crs_RL33542_0
|
Broadband or high-speed Internet access is provided by a series of technologies that give users the ability to send and receive data at volumes and speeds far greater than Internet access over traditional telephone lines. Meanwhile, the federal government—through Congress and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)—is seeking to ensure fair competition among the players so that broadband will be available and affordable in a timely manner to all Americans who want it. Broadband access, along with the content and services it enables, has the potential to transform the Internet—both what it offers and how it is used. In truth, it is possible that many of the applications that will best exploit the technological capabilities of broadband, while also capturing the imagination of consumers, have yet to be developed. Broadband Technologies
There are multiple transmission media or technologies that can be used to provide broadband access. These include cable modem, an enhanced telephone service called digital subscriber line (DSL), satellite technology, fiber, mobile or fixed wireless technologies, and others. Fiber
Another broadband technology is optical fiber to the home (FTTH). Access to Broadband and the "Digital Divide"13
While the number of new broadband subscribers continues to grow, the rate of broadband deployment in urban and high income areas appears to be outpacing deployment in rural and low-income areas. A major facet of the debate centers on whether present laws and regulations are needed to ensure the development of competition and its subsequent consumer benefits, or, conversely, whether such laws and policies are overly burdensome and discourage needed investment and deployment of such services. The remaining four titles dealt with a wide range of telecommunications issues. Seeks to improve the quality of federal broadband data collection and encourage state initiatives that promote broadband deployment. Directs the FCC to expand assistance provided by the Lifeline Assistance Program and the Link Up Program to include broadband service. Targets universal service support specifically to eligible telecommunications carriers in high-cost geographic areas to ensure that communications services and high-speed broadband services are made available throughout all of the States of the United States in a fair and equitable manner. Reauthorizes broadband program at the Rural Utilities Service through FY2012.
|
Broadband or high-speed Internet access is provided by a series of technologies that give users the ability to send and receive data at volumes and speeds far greater than Internet access over traditional telephone lines. In addition to offering speed, broadband access provides a continuous, "always on" connection and the ability to both receive (download) and transmit (upload) data at high speeds. Broadband access, along with the content and services it might enable, has the potential to transform the Internet: both what it offers and how it is used. It is possible that many of the future applications that will best exploit the technological capabilities of broadband have yet to be developed. There are multiple transmission media or technologies that can be used to provide broadband access. These include cable; an enhanced telephone service called digital subscriber line (DSL); fiber-to-the-home (FTTH); satellite, mobile, and fixed wireless (including "wi-fi" and "Wi-Max"); broadband over powerlines (BPL); and others.
From a public policy perspective, the goals are to ensure that broadband deployment is timely and contributes to the nation's economic growth, that industry competes fairly, and that affordable and high-quality service is provided to all sectors and geographical locations of American society. The federal government—through Congress and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)—is seeking to ensure fair competition among the players so that broadband will be available and affordable in a timely manner to all Americans who want it.
Some areas of the nation—particularly rural and low-income communities—continue to lack full access to high-speed broadband Internet service. In order to address this problem, the 110th Congress is examining a wide range of issues including the scope and effect of federal broadband financial assistance programs (including universal service and the broadband programs at the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Rural Utilities Service), the adequacy of broadband data collection by the FCC, and the impact of telecommunications regulation and new technologies on broadband deployment. One facet of the debate over broadband services focuses on whether present laws and subsequent regulatory policies are needed to ensure the development of competition and its subsequent consumer benefits, or conversely, whether such laws and regulations are overly burdensome and discourage investment in and deployment of broadband services.
This report which will be updated as events warrant.
|
crs_RL33308
|
crs_RL33308_0
|
T he Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program was created by Title I of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 ( P.L. 103-322 , "the 1994 Crime Act"). The mission of the COPS program is to advance community policing in all jurisdictions across the United States. The COPS program was reauthorized by the Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-162 ). The act reauthorized appropriations for the COPS program for FY2006-FY2009 (see Table A-1 ). When Congress reauthorized the COPS program it changed from a multi-grant program to a single grant program under which state or local law enforcement agencies are eligible to apply for a "COPS grant." COPS Funding
From FY1995 to FY1999, the annual appropriation for the COPS program averaged nearly $1.4 billion. The relatively high levels of funding during this time period were largely the result of Congress's and the Clinton Administration's efforts to place 100,000 new law enforcement officers on the street. After the initial push to fund 100,000 new law enforcement officers through COPS grants, Congress moved away from providing funding for hiring law enforcement officers and changed COPS into a conduit for providing federal assistance to support local law enforcement agencies. Funding for hiring programs was revived when the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-5 ) provided $1 billion for COPS. Appropriations for hiring programs in FY2009-FY2012 were the result of Congress's efforts to help local law enforcement agencies facing budget cuts as a result of the recession either hire new law enforcement officers or retain officers they would otherwise have to lay off. Congress has continued to provide appropriations for hiring programs even as the effects of the recession have waned. There are several issues policymakers might consider if they take up legislation to reauthorize the COPS program or when considering legislation to provide appropriations for the program. One potential question facing Congress is whether the federal government should continue to provide grants to state and local law enforcement agencies to hire additional officers at a time of historically low crime rates. Congress might consider whether in the future it should fund COPS as a single-grant program or if it should continue to appropriate funds for individual programs.
|
The Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program was created by Title I of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-322). The mission of the COPS program is to advance community policing in jurisdictions across the United States. The Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-162) reauthorized the COPS program for FY2006-FY2009 and changed it from a multi-grant program to a single-grant program. Even though the COPS grant program is not currently authorized, Congress has continued to appropriate funding for it.
Between FY1995 and FY1999, the annual appropriation for the COPS program averaged nearly $1.4 billion. The relatively high levels of funding during this time period were largely the result of Congress's and the Clinton Administration's efforts to place 100,000 new law enforcement officers on the street. After the initial push to fund 100,000 new law enforcement officers through COPS grants, Congress moved away from providing funding for hiring new law enforcement officers and changed COPS into a conduit for providing federal assistance to support local law enforcement agencies. Decreasing appropriations for hiring programs resulted in decreased funding for the COPS program overall. Appropriations for hiring programs were almost non-existent from FY2005 to FY2008, but for FY2009 Congress provided $1 billion for hiring programs under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5). Appropriations for hiring programs for FY2009-FY2012 were the result of Congress's efforts to help local law enforcement agencies facing budget shortages as a result of the recession either hire new law enforcement officers or retain officers they might have to lay off. Congress has continued to provide appropriations for hiring programs even though the effects of the recession have waned over the past few fiscal years.
There are several issues policymakers might consider if they take up legislation to reauthorize or fund the COPS program. One potential policy question is whether the federal government should continue to provide grants to state and local law enforcement agencies to hire additional officers at a time of historically low crime rates. Policymakers might also consider whether Congress should appropriate funding for the COPS program so that law enforcement agencies could take advantage of the current single grant program authorization, or if Congress should continue to appropriate funding for individual programs under the COPS account.
|
crs_95-875
|
crs_95-875_0
|
Background
The United States remains the only major industrialized country in which a nonmetric measurement system is predominantly employed. Section 5164 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 ( P.L. 100-418 ). Other legislation in the 104 th Congress sought to amend the Metric Conversion Act. This provision would have repealed the provision of the Metric Conversion Act which requires federal agencies to use the metric system in their procurements, grants, and other business-related activities.
|
The United States remains the only major industrialized country in which a nonmetric measurement system is predominantly employed. Section 5164 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-418) amended the Metric Conversion Act to require federal agencies to use the metric system in their activities. Legislation in the 104th and 105th Congress limits federal metric conversion activities, particularly in instances where states, local governments, and the private sector may be required to convert to the metric system in order to participate in federally funded programs.
|
crs_R43788
|
crs_R43788_0
|
President Obama's FY2015 DOD budget request complied with the applicable cap as did the versions of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that were passed by the House ( H.R. Similarly, the versions of the FY2015 Defense Appropriations Act passed by the House and reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee ( H.R. By contrast, congressional action on the FY2014 DOD budget had been prolonged by the fact that the Administration's DOD budget request for that year exceeded the spending cap then in force, as did the FY2014 defense funding bills reported by the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of both the House and Senate. FY2015 OCO Budget Request Highlights
The Administration amended its FY2015 budget request for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) three times, expanding that category's scope to include funding for DOD activities other than operations relating to combat and post-combat activities in Afghanistan and Iraq. Ebola-related Funding Addition
On November 5, 2014, after the House had passed the FY2015 DOD appropriations bill and the Senate Appropriations Committee had reported its version of the measure to the Senate, the President requested $6.18 billion in emergency appropriations to deal with the outbreak of Ebola in Africa and to beef up domestic public health systems to deal with such threats. (See Figure 5 .) Compared to what the FY2015 DOD health care budget would have been in the absence of the Administrations proposed TRICARE changes, the Administration request incorporated:
an addition of $88 million to cover the administrative cost of consolidating into a single TRICARE coverage plan the current menu of three TRICARE options; a reduction of $180 million to reflect the higher copayment fees for pharmaceuticals that TRICARE beneficiaries would pay under one of the Administration's legislative proposals, which is intended to encourage the use of generic medications and mail-order refills; and a reduction of $92 million in anticipation of savings that result from the consolidation and reorganization of some DOD health care facilities on the basis of a DOD study currently underway. FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA): H.R. 3979
The versions of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2015 that were passed by the House on May 25, 2014 ( H.R. The base budget authorized by H.R. (See Table 11 .) Subsequent legislation ( P.L. 113-76 and P.L. The final version. The Senate bill would have authorized $447.8 million: $351.0 million for Iron Dome and $220.6 million for the other three. 3979 authorizes up to $1.3 billion in FY2015 DOD appropriations to establish the new Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) requested by the Administration in June 2014. P.L. 83 , codified as P.L. 113-235 ) incorporates as Division C the FY2015 Defense Appropriations Act which appropriates $483.7 billion for DOD's FY2015 base budget. (See Table 19 .) Within those similar gross totals, however, the budget request and the enacted bill have some significant differences. The bill—like the companion FY2015 NDAA—either rejects outright or defers a decision on several cost reduction initiatives proposed by the Administration. At the same time, it appropriates billions of dollars for weapons programs and "readiness" improvements that were not included in the budget request. Those added costs, in turn, are offset—in part—by reductions which, according to the bill's authors, reflect fact-of-life developments and will have no adverse impact on DOD programs. The cost of the congressional additions (in the base budget) is further offset by the fact that some other costs are shifted into the part of the bill that funds war costs (or Overseas Contingency Operations—OCO), and thus are exempt from the statutory cap on discretionary spending. DOD Appropriations Overview
As is the case with the companion NDAA, the versions of H.R. 4870 and the enacted version of H.R. 83, Division C, the enacted version of the FY2015 Defense Appropriations Bill. 113-82 ) nullified a provision of the 2013 Balanced Budget Act ( P.L. 4870 would have added $789.3 million for this purpose. It includes three congressional additions costing more than $1.0 billion apiece:
$2.9 billion for Operations and Maintenance (O&M) activities that DOD included in its base budget request, but which the bill funds in OCO accounts exempt from the statutory budget caps; $1.0 billion (Section 9018) "for the purposes of improving military readiness," and $1.2 billion for equipment for the National Guard and reserve components.
|
In contrast with the debate over the FY2014 defense budget, congressional action on the FY2015 Department of Defense (DOD) "base budget" (that is, the part of the budget not associated with operations in Afghanistan or other situations designated by the President as emergencies) was not complicated by disputes over the total amount at issue. For both the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and the FY2015 Defense Appropriations Act, President Obama's request, and versions of the legislation that were passed by the House, approved by the relevant Senate committees, and finally enacted, varied by amounts that amounted to a small fraction of 1%. The narrow range of disagreements reflected the fact that, in each case, the request and all versions of the legislation were consistent with the binding cap on defense spending in FY2015 that had been established by the Balanced Budget Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-67).
For the FY2015 NDAA, the President requested base budget authorizations for DOD totaling $495.5 billion. The version of that bill passed by the House (H.R. 4435) would have authorized $495.8 billion, the version reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee would have authorized $496.0 billion, and the enacted bill (H.R. 3979/P.L. 113-291) authorizes $495.9 billion. (See Table 11.)
For base budget programs covered by the FY2015 Defense DOD Appropriations Act (which does not cover the military construction budget), the Administration requested $484.3 billion. The version of the bill (H.R. 4870) passed by the House would have added $166.3 million to that total while the version of H.R. 4870 reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee would have cut $1.1 billion. The final version of the Defense Appropriations Act (Division C of H.R. 83/P.L. 113-235) provides $$483.7 billion. (See Table 19.)
Within those similar gross totals, however, the Administration's budget request and the enacted DOD funding legislation have some significant differences. Both bills either reject outright or defers a decision on several cost reduction initiatives proposed by the Administration. At the same time, both add to the budget billions of dollars for weapons programs and "readiness" improvements that were not included in the budget request. Those added costs, are offset, in part, by reductions which, according to the congressional defense committees, will have no adverse impact on DOD programs. The cost of the congressional additions (in the base budget) is further offset by the fact that some other costs are shifted into the part of the bill that funds war costs (or Overseas Contingency Operations – OCO), and thus are exempt from the statutory cap on discretionary spending. (See "NDAA Highlights" and "DOD Appropriations Overview", below.)
The Administration amended its FY2015 budget request for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) three times in the course of 2014, each time expanding its scope to fund other emergent DOD activities in addition to combat and post-combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The final version of the NDAA (H.R. 3979/P.L. 113-291) addressed an OCO request totaling $63.7 billion from which it cut $1.5 million. Additions, including $1.25 billion to fund equipment for the National Guard and reserve components and $351.0 million for the Iron Dome anti-rocket system were offset by a cut to the amended request for the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF) for which the act authorizes $1.3 billion of the $4.0 billion requested.
The final version of the FY2015 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 83, Division C/P.L. 113-265) adds $1.54 billion to a $63.7 billion OCO request (which included $112.0 million in emergency appropriations for DOD activities to combat the Ebola virus).
|
crs_R42147
|
crs_R42147_0
|
Statutory Authority
The program was created under Title IV of the Energy Conservation and Production Act of 1976 ( P.L. Table A -1 shows that the accumulated congressional appropriations for the 32-year period from FY1977 through FY2008 reached a sum of nearly $8.7 billion. For FY2001, Congress approved about $187 million (in 2010 dollars), which was just about $1 million less than was requested by the outgoing Clinton Administration. As with other state and local activities, recession-driven budget shortfalls and staff furloughs delayed many required state training initiatives. In early 2010, the IG found that the nation had not realized the potential economic benefits of the $5 billion in Recovery Act funds allocated to the program. Performance Assessments and Evaluation Studies of Cost-Effectiveness
This part of the report reviews a selection of key studies that examined Weatherization Program management processes, performance, and economic (energy and non-energy) impacts. For a more in-depth examination of program operations, DOE has a history of directing the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to conduct evaluation impact studies. From late 2002 through early 2003, DOE's Office of the Inspector General (IG) conducted a performance audit of the program. The IG observed that the program has a long-established structure for transferring funds to state and local agencies and that improvements over the years had made use of the funds more efficient and effective. A recent OMB program assessment found that DOE had addressed the IG's concern about distorted efficiency (benefit-cost) measures:
Average cost per home employed in the calculation of benefit/cost ratios now reflects total costs (including non-DOE funds) expended per unit in the states whose evaluations were used in the energy savings estimates. 2011 GAO Performance Audit of Recovery Act Funding
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) defines a performance audit broadly:
Performance audits provide objective analysis so that management and those charged with governance and oversight can use the information to improve program performance and operations, reduce costs, facilitate decision making by parties with responsibility to oversee or initiate corrective action, and contribute to public accountability. The Recovery Act directed GAO to conduct bimonthly reviews and reporting on selected states and localities' use of the funds it provided, including the funds for the DOE Weatherization Program. For example, in December 2009, GAO published a performance audit report on Recovery Act funds used by states and localities. GAO made several observations about the status of program implementation and offered some recommendations for program improvement. Selected findings, as of the end of FY2011, included: (1) recipients had spent about $3.46 billion (73%) of the $4.75 billion allocated, (2) recipients reported that implementation challenges were declining, (3) the average cost per home was about $4,900, about 563,000 homes had been weatherized, and DOE projected it would exceed the original target of 607,000 homes by the deadline set for the end of March 2012; and (4) GAO found that the quality of employed data reported by recipients had improved. In particular, a comprehensive evaluation of the PY1989 program was published in 1993. The program perspective compared energy benefits to total program costs. This metaevaluation was based on data from 38 evaluation studies of weatherization programs in 19 states, published between 1993 and 2005. Current Plans for Assessment and Evaluation Studies
Three activities are underway to assess and evaluate DOE's Weatherization program: a DOE (Deloitte) strategic assessment, a DOE (APPRISE) impact study for PY2007 through PY2008, and a DOE (APPRISE) impact evaluation for the Recovery Act period of PY2009 through PY2011. Performance measures will include program costs and benefits. Evaluation Plan for Recovery Act (APPRISE, 2009-2011 Data)
The Recovery Act committed $5 billion over two years to an expanded weatherization program. This large sum greatly heightened interest in the program, the population served, its energy and cost savings, and its cost-effectiveness. First, Reingold argues that an agency's control over evaluation funding allows it to retain a strong influence over evaluation content:
[W]hen purchasing evaluation services via contracts, the purchasing agency has total control over all aspects of the services to be provided ... [thus] ... [i]t is inconsistent to argue that contracted program evaluation can be independent when the agency purchasing the evaluation owns (or controls) the research question and design, the method of data collection, the strategy of analysis, the data, the final report, and the rules governing the dissemination of results.
|
This report analyzes the Department of Energy's (DOE's) Weatherization Assistance Program. (WAP, the "program"). It provides background—a brief history of funding, program evolution, and program activity—and a review of program assessments and benefit-cost evaluations.
Budget debate over the program is focused on a $5 billion appropriation in the Recovery Act of 2009, a report that state and local governments have yet to commit about $1.5 billion of that total, and concerns about the quality of weatherization projects implemented with Recovery Act funding. During the debate over FY2011 funding, the House Republican Study Committee called for program funding to be eliminated. In April 2011, Congress approved $171 million for the program in the final continuing resolution for FY2011 (P.L. 112-10). For FY2012, DOE requested $320 million, the House approved $30 million, the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $171 million, and the Conference Committee approved $68 million. The budget debate provides the context for this report, but details of the current debate are beyond the scope of this report, which is focused on evaluations of program cost-effectiveness.
WAP is a formula grant program: funding flows from DOE to state governments and then to local governments and weatherization agencies. Over the 32 years from the program's start-up in FY1977 through FY2008, Congress appropriated about $8.7 billion (in constant FY2010 dollars). The $5 billion provided by the Recovery Act added more than 50% to the previous spending total.
Over the program's history, DOE's Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and the Office of Management and Budget have used process and impact evaluation research methods to assess WAP operations and estimate cost-effectiveness. Virtually all the studies conducted through 2005 showed that the program was moderately cost effective. The studies included measures of operational effectiveness, energy savings, and non-energy benefits. The timing of past studies was a bit sporadic, driven mainly by new statutory requirements and program audits. Performance assessments have alternately identified improvements in program operations or identified operational problems that subsequently stimulated program improvements. Only the intensive evaluation study of program year 1989 (published in 1993) was designed to directly draw a national sample to produce empirical data on program cost-effectiveness. Such in-depth evaluations are costly and time-consuming. Most other "metaevaluations" were much less costly, using available state-level evaluation studies as the basis to infer national-level program impacts.
The large infusion of Recovery Act funding—and attendant changes in program structure—heightened interest in conducting a fresh assessment of operations and new scientifically based evaluations of program impacts. Unforeseen recession-driven events delayed use of Recovery Act funding. For example, the DOE Inspector General (DOE IG) found that recession-driven budget shortfalls, state hiring freezes, and state-wide planned furloughs delayed program implementation—and created barriers to meeting spending and home weatherization targets. In December 2011, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a performance audit which found that the Recovery Act phase of the program was successfully addressing most goals and the challenges identified by the DOE IG. Recently-launched evaluation studies by DOE aim to determine whether Recovery Act funding was used cost-effectively and whether it fulfilled goals for job creation.
The report concludes by reviewing the debate over the use of "outside" contractors to improve the objectivity and independence of weatherization program evaluations.
|
crs_RL32342
|
crs_RL32342_0
|
In the second session of the 110 th Congress, Members will likely exhibit an interest in NATO's effort to develop more mobile combat forces, enhance the alliance's role in Afghanistan, examine the appropriateness of a possible missile defense system for Europe, and enlargement of the alliance. Evolution of NATO and the EC/EU after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has brought with it some friction between the United States and several of its allies over the security responsibilities of the two organizations. These differences center around threat assessment, defense institutions, and military capabilities. However, there are disputes with the United States over how or whether to involve international institutions, such as the UN, in international crises. There are also disagreements over the weight given to political versus military instruments in resolving these crises. Congress is actively engaged in the evolving NATO-EU relationship. While Congress has supported the greater political integration that marked the European Community's evolution into the European Union, many Members have called for improved European military capabilities to share the security burden, and to ensure that NATO's post-Cold War mission embraces combating terrorism and WMD proliferation. The issues raised in the 1990s debate over European security remain the essence of the debate today. What are the missions in security affairs of NATO and the European Union? What is the proper weight to be given to political and military instruments in defending Europe and the United States from terrorism and proliferation? What types of military forces are necessary for NATO's role in collective defense, and for the EU's role in crisis management? Are NATO and EU decision-making structures and procedures appropriate and compatible to ensure that there is an adequate and timely response to emerging threats? U.S. At the same time, all allies underscore the importance of their strategic relationship with the United States. A New Security Actor: The European Union
For decades, there has been discussion within the EU about creating a common security and defense policy. They also hope that ESDP will give EU member states more options for dealing with future crises. Newer EU member states from central and eastern Europe, such as Poland and the three Baltic states, back ESDP but maintain that it must not weaken NATO or the transatlantic link. Administrations, backed by Congress, have supported the EU's ESDP project as a means to improve European defense capabilities, thereby enabling the allies to operate more effectively with U.S. forces and to shoulder a greater degree of the security burden. As noted previously, U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress insist that EU efforts to build a defense arm be tied to NATO. Some U.S. officials remain concerned, however, that France and a few other EU members may continue to press for a more autonomous EU defense identity that could rival NATO structures and ultimately destroy the indivisibility of the transatlantic security guarantee.
|
Since the end of the Cold War, both NATO and the European Union (EU) have evolved along with Europe's changed strategic landscape. While NATO's collective defense guarantee remains at the core of the alliance, members have also sought to redefine its mission as new security challenges have emerged on Europe's periphery and beyond. At the same time, EU members have taken steps toward political integration with decisions to develop a common foreign policy and a defense arm to improve EU member states' abilities to manage security crises, such as those that engulfed the Balkans in the 1990s.
The evolution of NATO and the EU, however, has generated some friction between the United States and several of its allies over the security responsibilities of the two organizations. U.S.-European differences center around threat assessment, defense institutions, and military capabilities. Successive U.S. administrations and the U.S. Congress have called for enhanced European defense capabilities to enable the allies to better share the security burden, and to ensure that NATO's post-Cold War mission embraces combating terrorism and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. U.S. policymakers, backed by Congress, support EU efforts to develop a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) provided that it remains tied to NATO and does not threaten the transatlantic relationship.
Most EU member states support close NATO-EU links, but also view ESDP as a means to give themselves more options for dealing with future crises, especially in cases in which the United States may be reluctant to become involved. A minority of EU countries, spearheaded traditionally by France, continue to favor a more autonomous EU defense identity. This desire has been fueled further recently by disputes with the United States over how or whether to engage international institutions, such as the United Nations, on security matters and over the weight given to political versus military instruments in resolving international crises.
This report addresses several questions central to the debate over European security and the future of the broader transatlantic relationship that may be of interest in the second session of the 110th Congress. These include what are the specific security missions of NATO and the European Union, and what is the appropriate relationship between the two organizations? What types of military forces are necessary for NATO's role in collective defense, and for the EU's role in crisis management? Are NATO and EU decision-making structures and procedures appropriate and compatible to ensure that there is an adequate and timely response to emerging threats? What is the proper balance between political and military tools for defending Europe and the United States from terrorism and weapons proliferation? What is the effect of enlargement on security and stability?
This report will be updated as events warrant. For more information, see CRS Report RL33627, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RS21372, The European Union: Questions and Answers, by [author name scrubbed].
|
crs_RS22149
|
crs_RS22149_0
|
Whether broader exemptions are needed to ensure military readiness has been subject to much debate. Other Members, states, environmental organizations, and communities have opposed broader exemptions, raising questions about the degree to which environmental requirements have compromised readiness overall. In response to DOD's request, the 107 th Congress enacted an exemption from the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and the 108 th Congress enacted exemptions from the Marine Mammal Protection Act and from designation of military lands as critical habitat under the Endangered Species Act, if certain conditions are satisfied. Congress has not enacted these exemptions to date. Past Administration Proposals
Although Congress has enacted the above statutory authorities for exemptions from the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, Endangered Species Act, and the Marine Mammal Protection Act, Congress has not acted on the exemptions from the Solid Waste Disposal Act, CERCLA, and the Clean Air Act that DOD has requested. DOD included these three latter exemptions in the Administration's defense authorization proposals from FY2003 through FY2008. The Administration's FY2009 defense authorization bill ( H.R. 5658 and S. 2787 , introduced by request) does not include these exemptions.
|
Whether broader exemptions from federal environmental laws are needed to preserve military readiness has been an issue. Questions have been raised as to whether environmental requirements have limited military training activities to the point that readiness would be compromised. The potential impacts of broader exemptions on environmental quality have raised additional questions. Although certain exemptions the Department of Defense (DOD) first requested in FY2003 have been enacted into law, Congress has opposed others. The 107th Congress enacted an exemption from the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and the 108th Congress enacted exemptions from the Marine Mammal Protection Act and from designation of military lands as critical habitat under the Endangered Species Act, if certain conditions are satisfied. In Administration defense authorization proposals from FY2003 through FY2008, DOD also requested exemptions from the Clean Air Act, Solid Waste Disposal Act, and Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). To date, Congress has not enacted these three latter exemptions. Some Members have noted their concern about the potential impacts of these exemptions on human health and the environment. The Administration's FY2009 defense authorization bill (H.R. 5658 and S. 2787, introduced by request) does not include these exemptions.
|
crs_RL30551
|
crs_RL30551_0
|
Iran, partly because of U.S.efforts during the Iran-Iraq war to shut off worldwide arms sales to Iran, lacked a wide choice of willing suppliers,and the Soviet Union saw arms sales toIran as one way to broaden its influence in the Gulf. Attempting to curb Russia's arms and technology relationships with Iran, U.S. officials have consistently impressed upon their Russian counterparts thepossibility that Iran's historic resentment of past Russian actions in Iran might some day make Russia itself a targetof Iranian WMD. These arguments have not dissuadedRussia from selling arms and technology to Iran, and the Clinton Administration and Congress tried to use the threatof sanctions in efforts to achievenonproliferation goals. Russian Pledge to the United States. The Bush Administration could choose to impose sanctions on Russia for the new sales to Iran under legislation passed by Congress in 1996; the legislationattempts to punish suppliers of conventional arms to Iran and other countries on the U.S. "terrorism list." Ballistic Missiles
Since late 1996, U.S. officials and published reports have cited Russia, which has been a formal member of the MTCR since August 8, 1995, as a primarysupplier of Iran's ballistic missile programs. The sanctions authorized by the new law include:
a ban on U.S. government procurement from or contracts with the entity;
a ban on U.S. assistance to the entity; (21)
a prohibition of U.S. sales to the entity of any defense articles or services; and
denial of U.S. licenses for exports to the entity of items that can have military applications ("dual use items"). The Bush Administration has not added any Russian entities to those alreadysanctioned for WMD technology sales to Iran. Chemical and Biological Programs
Recent U.S. proliferation reports say that Iran has sought chemical weapons technology and chemical precursors from Russia (and China) in order to create amore advanced and self-sufficient chemical warfare infrastructure. Others note that China has not cultivated Iran exclusively, but has sought to expand its influence broadlywithin the Middle East. Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles And Other Advanced Conventional Weapons
Over the past five years, China has supplied Iran with artillery pieces , tanks, the Chinese version of the SA-2 surface-to-air missile, and 24 F-7 combataircraft, but it is China's past sales to Iran of anti-ship cruise missiles that have caused the most significant U.S.concern. Nuclear Issues
In the nuclear field, the Clinton Administration extracted significant pledges from China to limit its relationship with Iran. This certification, required by P.L. In their statements and cooperation, Iran and North Koreaappear to try to reinforce each other'scriticism of the United States as a global hegemon bent on dominating developing nations. The Clinton Administration's engagement of North Korea began gradually in 1994 with a U.S. effort to halt North Korea's nuclear program and, later, itsdevelopment of missiles capable of hitting the United States. Majorexamples of suppliers to Iran, other than its three key supplier countries, include the following:
Poland sold Iran 100 T-72 tanks in 1994, and subsequently pledged to the United States not to sell Iran any additionaltanks.
|
Successive U.S. administrations since Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution have viewed Iran as a potential threat to U.S. allies and forces in the Persian Gulf andin the broader Middle East and have sought to limit its strategic capabilities. The greater visibility of moderateelements inside Iran since 1997 led theUnited States to seek to engage Iran in a formal governmental dialogue, but the Clinton and George W. BushAdministration did not reduce U.S. efforts todeny Iran advanced conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology. Iran's moderatesappear to see regional threats to Iran as doIran's hardliners and have made no apparent effort to curb Iran's efforts to acquire WMD. Even if moderate leadershad sought to do so, they have beenlargely outmaneuvered on defense and other issues by hardliners who still control the armed forces, internal securityservices, the judiciary, and keydecision-making bodies.
In the past, Iran has generally lacked the indigenous skills to manufacture sophisticated conventional arms or independently develop weapons of massdestruction (WMD), and one of Iran's objectives over the past decade has been to obtain the technology and skillsto become self-sufficient. Iran has come along way toward that objective in certain areas, including ballistic missiles and chemical weapons, but in theaggregate, Iran remains reliant on foreignsuppliers. This dependence has given the United States some opportunity to work with potential suppliers to containIran's WMD capabilities. Europeanallies of the United States have agreed not to sell conventional weaponry to Iran, and the United States haspersuaded its European allies not to sell anytechnology that could have military applications ("dual use items") to Iranian military or security entities.
To try to thwart U.S. efforts, Iran has cultivated close relationships with foreign suppliers that are not allied to the United States, especially Russia, China,and North Korea. Curtailing arms and technology supplies to Iran has formed an important part of the U.S. agendawith all three of these countries, but morepressing U.S. objectives with each of them have sometimes hampered the U.S. ability to dissuade them fromassisting Iran. Iran apparently continues toreceive critical technology from all three, but U.S. efforts appear to be limiting their supply relationships with Iran.
Congress and successive Administrations have enacted several laws and executive orders, many of which are similar to each other, that impose sanctions oncountries and firms that sell WMD technology to Iran. The most recent measure enacted is the Iran NonproliferationAct ( P.L. 106-178 ), signed in March2000. The Clinton Administration generally preferred diplomacy and engagement with supplier states, and it usedthe threat of sanctions to obtain suppliercooperation. The Bush Administration has taken much the same approach, although it has appeared more willingthan its predecessor to sanction entities insome supplier states.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
|
crs_R40996
|
crs_R40996_0
|
Introduction
Almost 30 years ago, Congress addressed growing concerns regarding nuclear waste management by calling for the federal collection of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level waste for safe, permanent disposal. To this end, the Department of Energy (DOE) was authorized by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) to enter into contracts with nuclear power providers to gather and dispose of the provider's SNF in exchange for payments into the statutorily established Nuclear Waste Fund (NWF). Under the terms of the NWPA, these contracts were to require that the federal government begin disposal of the nation's nuclear waste no later than January 31, 1998. Over 10 years ago, DOE breached these nuclear waste contracts by failing to begin the acceptance and disposal of SNF by the statutory deadline established in the NWPA. As a result, nuclear utilities have spent billions of dollars on temporary storage for toxic SNF that DOE was contractually and statutorily required to collect for disposal. The breach has triggered a prolonged series of suits by nuclear power providers, many of which continue unresolved to this day. Approximately 78 breach of contract claims have been filed against DOE since 1998, resulting in over $2 billion in damage awards and settlements thus far. In 2010 alone, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims awarded nuclear utilities approximately $507 million in contract damages. First, the report will provide a brief overview of the NWPA, the statute's subsequent amendments, and its relationship to nuclear waste disposal. Circuit and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. Circuit in 1996. In Indiana Michigan Power Co. v. Department of Energy , the D.C. Circuit, in a significant exercise of authority, issued a writ of mandamus prohibiting DOE from concluding that the lack of an operational permanent repository constituted an "unavoidable delay" under the Standard Contract. The court ordered DOE to "proceed with contractual remedies in a manner consistent with NWPA's command that it undertake an unconditional obligation to begin disposal of the SNF by January 31, 1998." However, absent a significant change in the direction of NWPA-related litigation, DOE predicts that damages stemming from partial breach of contract claims will measure close to $20.8 billion if the government is able to begin accepting SNF by 2020—an unlikely occurrence given the Administration's decision to terminate the Yucca Mountain project. Approximately $500 million in additional legal damages will continue to build with each year beyond 2020 that DOE is unable to begin accepting SNF. It is important to note that all paid legal damages are drawn from the DOJ Judgment Fund rather than the DOE budget.
|
Almost 30 years ago, Congress addressed growing concerns regarding nuclear waste management by calling for the federal collection of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level waste for safe, permanent disposal. To this end, the Department of Energy (DOE) was authorized by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) to enter into contracts with nuclear power providers to gather and dispose of the provider's SNF in exchange for payments into the statutorily established Nuclear Waste Fund (NWF). Under the terms of the NWPA, these contracts were to require that the federal government begin disposal of the nation's nuclear waste no later than January 31, 1998. Over 10 years ago, DOE breached these nuclear waste contracts by failing to begin the acceptance and disposal of SNF by the statutory deadline established in the NWPA. As a result, nuclear utilities have spent billions of dollars on temporary storage for toxic SNF that DOE was contractually and statutorily required to collect for disposal. The breach has triggered a prolonged series of suits by nuclear power providers, many of which continue unresolved to this day.
Approximately 78 breach of contract claims have been filed against DOE since 1998, resulting in over $2 billion in damage awards and settlements thus far. In 2010 alone, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims awarded nuclear utilities approximately $507 million in contract damages. DOE predicts that damages stemming from partial breach of contract claims will measure close to $20.8 billion if the government is able to begin accepting SNF by 2020. Approximately $500 million in additional legal damages will continue to build with each year beyond 2020 that DOE is unable to begin accepting SNF. All paid legal damages are drawn from the DOJ Judgment Fund rather than the DOE budget.
DOE's liability for breach of contract was first established in 1996 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Indiana Michigan Power Co. v. U.S. After DOE hesitated to act on its legal obligations, citing the absence of a completed SNF storage facility (Yucca Mountain), the court issued a writ of mandamus mandating that DOE "proceed with contractual remedies in a manner consistent with NWPA's command that it undertake an unconditional obligation to begin disposal of SNF by January 31, 1998." The mandamus, issued in Northern States Power Co. v. U.S., may prohibit DOE from deflecting liability by arguing that the lack of an existing storage facility constitutes an "unavoidable delay."
This report will present a brief overview of the NWPA and its subsequent amendments; provide a survey of key issues that have emerged during the protracted waste storage litigation; and consider the potential for future liability arising from further delays in the storage and disposal of nuclear waste.
|
crs_R44762
|
crs_R44762_0
|
The following is a profile of the 115 th Congress (2017-2018). Party Breakdown
In the 115 th Congress, the current party alignments as of December 20, 2018, are as follows:
House of Representatives: 238 Republicans (including 1 Delegate and the Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico), 201 Democrats (including 4 Delegates), and 2 vacant seats. Senate: 51 Republicans, 47 Democrats, and 2 Independents, who both caucus with the Democrats. Age
The average age of Members of the 115 th Congress is among the highest of any Congress in recent U.S. history. Congressional Service
The average length of service for Representatives at the beginning of the 115 th Congress was 9.4 years (4.7 House terms); for Senators, 10.1 years (1.7 Senate terms). Statistics gathered by the Pew Research Center on Religion and Public Life, which studies the religious affiliation of Members, and CQ at the beginning of the 115 th Congress showed the following:
55.9% of the Members (241 in the House, 58 in the Senate) are Protestant, with Baptist as the most represented denomination, followed by Methodist; 31.4% of the Members (144 in the House, 24 in the Senate) are Catholic; 5.6% of the Members (22 in the House, 8 in the Senate) are Jewish; 2.4% of the Members (7 in the House, 6 in the Senate) are Mormon (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints); 3 Members (2 in the House, 1 in the Senate) are Buddhist, 2 House Members are Muslim, and 3 House Members are Hindu; and other religious affiliations represented include Greek Orthodox, Pentecostal Christian, Unitarian Universalist, and Christian Science. Twenty-one African American women, including two Delegates, serve in the House, and one serves in the Senate. Hispanic/Latino American Members
There are 46 Hispanic or Latino Members in the 115 th Congress, 8.5% of the total membership and a record number. Ten are women, including the Resident Commissioner. American Indian Members
There are two American Indian (Native American) Members of the 115 th Congress; both are Republican Members of the House.
|
This report presents a profile of the membership of the 115th Congress (2017-2018) as of December 20, 2018. Statistical information is included on selected characteristics of Members, including data on party affiliation, average age, occupation, education, length of congressional service, religious affiliation, gender, ethnicity, foreign births, and military service.
In the House of Representatives, there are 238 Republicans (including 1 Delegate and the Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico), 201 Democrats (including 4 Delegates), and 5 vacant seats. The Senate has 51 Republicans, 47 Democrats, and 2 Independents, who both caucus with the Democrats.
The average age of Members of the House at the beginning of the 115th Congress was 57.8 years; of Senators, 61.8 years, among the oldest in U.S. history. The overwhelming majority of Members of Congress have a college education. The dominant professions of Members are public service/politics, business, and law. Most Members identify as Christians, and Protestants collectively constitute the majority religious affiliation. Roman Catholics account for the largest single religious denomination, and numerous other affiliations are represented, including Jewish, Mormon, Buddhist, Muslim, Hindu, Greek Orthodox, Pentecostal Christian, Unitarian Universalist, and Christian Science.
The average length of service for Representatives at the beginning of the 115th Congress was 9.4 years (4.7 House terms); for Senators, 10.1 years (1.7 Senate terms).
One hundred fifteen women (a record number) serve in the 115th Congress: 92 in the House, including 5 Delegates and the Resident Commissioner, and 23 in the Senate. There are 49 African American Members of the House and 3 in the Senate. This House number includes two Delegates. There are 46 Hispanic or Latino Members (a record number) serving: 41 in the House, including 1 Delegate and the Resident Commissioner, and 5 in the Senate. Eighteen Members (13 Representatives, 2 Delegates, and 3 Senators) are Asian Americans, Indian Americans, or Pacific Islander Americans. This is also a record number. Two American Indians (Native Americans) serve in the House.
The portions of this report covering political party affiliation, gender, ethnicity, and vacant seats will be updated as events warrant. The remainder of the report will not be updated.
|
crs_R40531
|
crs_R40531_0
|
Most Recent Developments
On June 11, 2009, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees announced a conference agreement on H.R. 2346 , a bill providing supplemental appropriations for the remainder of FY2009. The House passed the conference report ( H.Rept. 111-151 ) with a vote of 226 to 202 on June 16; the Senate passed it (91 to 5) on June 18. President Obama signed the bill into law ( P.L. 111-32 ) on June 24. The agreement includes $5 billion, as in the Senate bill, to support U.S. loans to the International Monetary Fund, and does not include a Senate provision allowing the Secretary of Defense to exempt photos of military detainees from release under the Freedom of Information Act. Because the bill did not include that provision, there was enough support from House Democrats who initially opposed the bill to overcome opposition from Republicans who objected to IMF funding. Overview of FY2009 Supplemental Requests
Between April 9, 2009 and June 2, 2009, the Administration submitted four requests for FY2009 supplemental appropriations, including:
An April 9, 2009, request for $83.4 billion in net additional FY2009 funding, mainly for defense and international affairs, with smaller amounts for domestic fire fighting, Department of Energy counter-proliferation programs, Justice Department programs including measures to facilitate closure of the Guantanamo Bay prison, National Security Council administration, and Capitol Police radios; An April 30, 2009, request for $1.5 billion to be appropriated to the Executive Office of the President for transfer to other agencies for H1N1 influenza preparedness and response measures; A May 12, 2009, request for appropriations of $5 billion to support U.S. financial backing of International Monetary Fund loans in response to the global financial crisis; and A June 2, 2009, request for an additional $2.0 billion for influenza preparedness and response, $200 million for humanitarian assistance to Pakistan, and several billion dollars of transfer authority for influenza response. 111-32 ), includes a total of $105.9 billion in supplemental appropriations, including $5.8 billion for flu preparedness that is contingent on the President determining that the money is needed to respond to the illness. For account-by-account funding, see Appendix G .) The supplemental provides:
$79.9 billion for defense and intelligence activities in Iraq and Afghanistan; $10.4 billion for international affairs, including $700 million for P.L. Of amounts available immediately, $350 million is for state and local response measures, and $50 million is in the Global Health and Child Survival Fund for international measures; $250 million, as requested, for domestic fire fighting; $72 million, as requested, for Capitol Police radios; $847 million, as in the Senate bill, in unrequested funds for the Corps of Engineers for disaster-related flood control projects; and $1 billion as initial funding for the "Cash for Clunkers" program to provide vouchers of $3,500 or $4,500 for consumers who trade in inefficient vehicles for more efficient new ones. The act does not include $50 million requested for the Department of Defense and $30 million for the Department of Justice to facilitate closure of the Guantanamo Bay prison. 480 food aid. On June 11, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared that the outbreak was a flu pandemic. H.R.
|
On June 11, 2009, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees announced a conference agreement on H.R. 2346, a bill providing supplemental appropriations for the remainder of FY2009. The House passed the conference report (226 to 202) on June 16; the Senate passed it (91 to 5) on June 18. President Obama signed it into law (P.L. 111-32) on June 24.
On key issues, the agreement includes: $5 billion, as in the Senate bill, to support U.S. loans to the International Monetary Fund, does not include a Senate provision allowing the Secretary of Defense to exempt photos of military detainees from release under the Freedom of Information Act; does not include $80 million requested for the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice to facilitate closure of the Guantanamo Bay prison; prohibits the release of Guantanamo detainees in the United States and prohibits transfers of prisoners except to be prosecuted; provides $1.9 billion for H1N1 pandemic flu preparedness (declared to be a pandemic by the World Health Organization on June 11), along with $5.8 billion more, contingent on the President determining it is needed; and $1 billion for the "Cash for Clunkers" program to provide payments to consumers who trade in their inefficient vehicles and purchase more fuel efficient ones.
Including the contingent influenza funding, the bill provides a total of $105.9 billion in supplemental appropriations. The total includes $79.9 billion for defense and intelligence activities in Iraq and Afghanistan; $10.4 billion for international affairs (including food aid); $5 billion for IMF loans; $7.7 billion for influenza measures; $250 million, as requested, for domestic fire fighting; $847 million, as in the Senate bill, in unrequested funds for the Corps of Engineers for flood control projects; $72 million, as requested, for Capitol Police radios; and $1 billion for the "Cash for Clunkers" program.
The decision to exclude the Senate provision on detainee photos was reportedly approved in the conference only after the President agreed in a letter to take steps to prevent release of photos or videos of prisoner abuse. Because the bill does not include that provision, Democratic leaders said they were able to get enough support from House Democrats who initially opposed the bill to overcome opposition from Republicans who objected to IMF funding.
H.R. 2346 provides funds, with some adjustments, that the Administration requested in four supplemental appropriations proposals, including an April 9 request for $83.4 billion in supplemental funding for defense, international affairs, domestic fire fighting, and other purposes; an April 30 request for $1.5 billion for influenza preparedness and response; and a May 12 request for $5 billion to support International Monetary Fund borrowing authority. On June 2, the Administration submitted an additional request for $2.0 billion more for influenza response, for expanded authority to transfer funds from other appropriations for influenza measures, and for $200 million in additional humanitarian assistance to Pakistan.
|
crs_R43947
|
crs_R43947_0
|
T he manner in which staff are deployed within an organization may reflect the mission and priorities of that organization. In the House of Representatives, employing authorities hire staff to carry out duties in Member-office, committee, leadership, and other settings. This report provides staffing levels in House Member, committee, leadership, and other offices since 1977. Data for leadership offices include a full count of staff working for Members in leadership positions. House Staff Data
Between 1977 and 2016, the number of House staff grew from 8,831 to 9,420 or 6.67%. Figure 1 displays staff levels in five categories since 1977. In 2016, 41 staff worked for congressional commissions. Overall, there have been increases in the number of staff working in chamber leadership offices, and larger increases in the staffing of chamber officers and officials. Staff have shifted from committee settings to leadership settings or the personal offices of Members. Some of these changes may be indicative of the growth of the House as an institution, or the value the chamber places on its various activities. House committee staff has decreased.
|
The manner in which staff are deployed within an organization may reflect the mission and priorities of that organization. This report provides staffing levels in House Member, committee, leadership, and other offices since 1977. Between 1977 and 2016, the number of House staff grew from 8,831 to 9,420, or 6.67%. Since 2008, however, the number of staff working for the House of Representatives has decreased 5.84%. These changes were characterized in part by increases in the number of staff working in chamber leadership offices, and larger increases in the staffing of chamber officers and officials. House staff working for Members have shifted from committee settings to the personal offices of Members. Some of these changes may be indicative of the growth of the House as an institution.
This report is one of several CRS products focusing on congressional staff. Others include CRS Report RL34545, Congressional Staff: Duties and Functions of Selected Positions; CRS Report R43946, Senate Staff Levels in Member, Committee, Leadership, and Other Offices, 1977-2016; CRS Report R43774, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senators' Offices, FY2009-FY2013; CRS Report R43775, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Member Offices, 2009-2013; CRS Report R44322, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Committees, 2001-2014; CRS Report R44325, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senate Committees, FY2001-FY2014.
|
crs_R41090
|
crs_R41090_0
|
Introduction
Legislative interest in the patent system was evidenced by the introduction of reform legislation in earlier sessions of Congress. In the 111 th Congress, bills would have amended existing patent law in numerous respects, including changes to the right of a patent owner to obtain compensatory damages, the standard for judicial award of enhanced damages for willful infringement, the ability of patent owners to select the court in which they will bring suit, and the willingness of courts to accept appeals of orders interpreting a patent. Discussion of these issues may potentially continue in the 112 th Congress. Although the patent system has been the subject of congressional scrutiny over the past few years, the courts have also been active in making changes to important patent law principles. Many changes introduced by the judiciary have concerned topics that are also the subject of congressional consideration. For example, the Supreme Court issued an important decision concerning injunctive relief in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange , L.L.C. Second, some observers believe that several of these opinions have addressed the very concerns that had motivated legislative reform proposals, thereby obviating or reducing the need for congressional action. None of this legislation has yet been enacted. Among them are the availability of injunctions in patent cases, selection of the appropriate venue for trying a patent case, the assessment of damages against adjudicated infringers, the standards governing determinations of willful infringement, extraterritorial patent enforcement, and the availability of patents for tax planning methods. However, in its 2007 decision in In re Seagate Technology , the Federal Circuit made significant changes to the law of willful infringement itself. In 2007, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp. Most notable is the 2010 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos .
|
Legislative interest in the patent system has been evidenced by the introduction of reform legislation in the 111th and predecessor Congresses. These bills would have amended existing patent law in numerous respects. Although none of these bills were enacted, discussion of patent reform may continue in the 112th Congress.
Although the patent system has been the subject of congressional interest over the past few years, the courts have also been active in making changes to important patent law principles. Many changes introduced by the judiciary have concerned topics that are also the subject of congressional consideration. In particular:
The Supreme Court issued an important decision in 2007 concerning the availability of injunctive relief against adjudicated patent infringers in eBay v. MercExchange.
In 2008, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") reached its ruling in In re TS Tech concerning the standards for deciding which venue is appropriate for conducting a patent trial.
In 2009, the Federal Circuit handed down its opinion in Lucent Technologies. v. Gateway with respect to the assessment of damages in patent infringement cases.
The Federal Circuit issued a decision in 2007 concerning the availability of enhanced damages for willful patent infringers in In re Seagate Technology.
The 2007 Supreme Court opinion in Microsoft v. AT&T addressed the scope of extraterritorial protection afforded to U.S. patents.
The 2010 Supreme Court opinion in Bilski v. Kappos concerned the issue of patentable subject matter.
Some observers believe that several of these opinions have addressed the very concerns that had motivated legislative reform proposals, thereby obviating or reducing the need for congressional action. However, other commentators believe that these decisions have not fully addressed perceived problems with principles of patent law.
|
crs_RL32625
|
crs_RL32625_0
|
Congress greatly expanded the federal role in passenger rail security in Title XIV (the National Transit Systems Security Act of 2007) and Title XV (Surface Transportation Security) of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 ( H.R. The first three are forms of public transit, which, along with Amtrak, share certain characteristics that make them vulnerable to attack: (1) they make scheduled stops along fixed routes; (2) their operations depend on people having quick and easy access to stations and trains; (3) the number of access points, volume of ridership, and pace of operations make it impractical to subject all rail passengers to the type of screening that airline passengers undergo; and (4) the number of operators and scale of operations of all forms of passenger rails systems in the United States make it difficult to provide uniform levels of security to each and every rail system. 108-458 ), Congress directed DHS to prepare a national strategy for transportation security and security plans for each transportation mode. Issues
A Federal Strategy for Passenger Rail Security
In the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ( P.L. This strategic plan is to include "risk-based priorities across all transportation modes" for protecting transportation assets, "the most appropriate, practical, and cost-effective means of defending those assets," and "the agreed upon roles and missions of Federal, state, regional, and local authorities." This national transportation strategic plan, and the security plans for each transportation mode, were due to Congress by April 1, 2005. DHS sent a classified report to Congress in September 2005 on a "National Strategy for Transportation Security." GAO notes that "these plans are only a first step...[they] are not required to address how the sector is actually assessing risk and protecting its most critical assets." 110-53 ) authorizes funding for grants to transit and rail operators to provide security training for their employees; the amount of funding to be provided for those grants will be determined by Congress each year through appropriations to DHS. The act also authorizes DHS to regulate the security training programs of transit and rail operators. 1 ), which was signed into law August 3, 2007 ( P.L. Passenger rail security-related provisions in the legislation include authorization for several new grant programs: a total of $3.4 billion over the period FY2008-FY2011 for grants for public transportation security, for which commuter rail agencies will be among the eligible recipients (§ 1406); a total of $1.2 billion over the same period for grants for railroad security, for which eligible recipients include rail carriers, Amtrak, and state and local governments (§ 1513); a total of $650 million over the same period for grants to Amtrak for systemwide security upgrades (§ 1514); and a total of $200 million over the same period for grants to Amtrak for safety improvements to rail tunnels in New York, Baltimore, and Washington, DC (§ 1515). Legislation dealing with appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security also has implications for passenger rail security. The FY2008 DHS appropriations act (Division E of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008/ P.L. 110-161 ) provided $47 million for surface transportation security activities (up from $37 million in FY2007), including $22 million for rail security inspectors and canine teams (up from $13 million in FY2007), and $400 million for public transportation and railroad security assistance grants (up from $275 million in FY2007).
|
Bombings of passenger trains in Europe and Asia in the last few years have demonstrated the vulnerability of passenger rail systems to terrorist attack. The number of riders and access points makes it impractical to subject all rail passengers to the type of screening airline passengers undergo. Nevertheless, steps can be taken to reduce the risks of terrorist attacks.
The 9/11 Commission called for a systematic analysis of transportation assets, the risks to those assets, and the costs and benefits of different approaches to defending those assets. The commission also called for homeland security assistance to be distributed based on these assessments of risks and vulnerabilities, rather than according to population. A comprehensive assessment of risk across all passenger rail operations has not been submitted to Congress. Most federal assistance for passenger rail security has been allocated to systems judged by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to be at highest risk.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ) did not directly address passenger rail security, but did direct DHS to create a national strategy for transportation security. This plan would identify national transportation assets, set risk-based priorities for their protection, assign responsibilities for their protection, and recommend appropriate levels and sources of funding for these efforts. DHS delivered a classified report on a "National Strategy for Transportation Security" to Congress in September 2005; this report was updated in April 2006. A security plan for the surface transportation sector was due to Congress by the end of 2006; DHS announced the plan's release in May 2007. The Government Accountability Office has noted that this plan is only a first step, as it is only required to describe how the most critical transportation assets will be identified and how their risk will be assessed, but is not required to address how risks to transportation assets are actually being assessed or how those assets will be protected.
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 ( H.R. 1 / P.L. 110-53 ) signed into law on August 3, 2007, included comprehensive surface transportation security legislation. This act authorized a total of $3.5 billion for transit security and $2.0 billion for rail security, including grant programs for which commuter rail operators, Amtrak, and state and local governments will be eligible recipients. Some funds are specifically authorized for Amtrak's security and tunnel safety projects. The act also authorizes DHS to regulate the employee security training programs of transit and rail entities. The FY2008 DHS appropriations act (Division E of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008/ P.L. 110-161 ) provides $47 million for surface transportation security activities, including $22 million for rail security inspectors and dogs, and $400 million for public transportation and railroad security assistance grants. This report will be updated.
|
crs_R45031
|
crs_R45031_0
|
T he official measure provides a consistent historical view of poverty in the United States , but t he SPM may be better suited to help ing c ongress ional policymakers and other experts understand how taxes and government programs affect the poor . Also, it may better illustrate how medical expenses and work-related expenses such as child care can affect a family's economic well-being . Like the official poverty measure, it is a measure of economic deprivation. Measures of need are used to establish poverty thresholds that are valued in dollars. The SPM poverty thresholds measure a standard of living based on expenditures for food, clothing, shelter, and utilities (FCSU), and "a little more" for other expenses. Broadly Comparing the Official Poverty Measure to the SPM
Both the SPM and the official measure determine the poverty status of people and families by comparing their financial resources against poverty thresholds. For both measures, poverty thresholds vary by family size and composition, and families whose resources are lower than the thresholds are considered to be poor. The measures differ in their definitions of the following:
N eed , as it is used in the thresholds (the dollar amounts used to determine poverty status). F inancial resources that are considered relevant for comparing against the measure of need as specified in the thresholds. Financial resources to meet needs, whether in the SPM or the official measure, are based on the sum of income of all family members. While the official measure uses money income before taxes, the SPM makes additional adjustments and considers a wider range of resources. F amily , for the purpose of assigning thresholds and counting resources. These include unmarried partners and their children (if any are present) and foster children not legally adopted. First, the measure of need is defined differently in the SPM's poverty thresholds. According to a 1955 USDA food consumption survey, families spent approximately one-third of their income on food, on average; therefore, the costs of the food plans were multiplied by three to produce family income amounts. To obtain the dollar amount used as a starting point for computing the complete set of thresholds, an average is taken among consumer units whose out-of-pocket expenditures on FCSU rank in the 30 th to the 36 th percentiles, among units with exactly two children, according to the Consumer Expenditure Survey. In contrast, the SPM uses mathematical formulas to adjust the thresholds by family size. Estimated Value of In-Kind Benefits
Unlike the official measure, the SPM includes estimates of the monetary value of in-kind benefits, such as for food and subsidized housing, in the measure of income. The SPM includes WIC in its resource definition. When computing resources for the SPM, the sum of child care expenses and other work-related expenses are capped at the income of the lower-earning parent (so that for determining poverty status, expenses cannot exceed the amount brought in by working). However, in terms of programs targeted to lower income people and families, the official measure excludes noncash medical, food, and housing benefits as well as benefits paid through the tax code. After it, the components with the most impact are MOOP (with 10.5 million persons added to the poverty population once those expenses are taken into account); refundable tax credits (with 8.1 million kept out of the estimated poor population because they or a family member received the credits), work expenses, including child care (6.0 million added to the poverty population, on the margin); FICA (4.7 million added to the poverty population, on the margin); and SNAP (3.6 million kept out of the poor population, on the margin). Differences in the Demographic Profile of the Poor
As seen above, people can be affected by multiple resource components considered in the SPM. While MOOP can be high for the aged, their effect on poverty rates is mitigated by the fact that homeowners without a mortgage (such as aged persons who have paid off their mortgages and still live in that house) have lower housing expenses—and in turn lower poverty thresholds—than do mortgage-paying homeowners and renters. Poverty rates in the Northeast and West tend to be higher under the SPM than under the official measure, in part because of the relatively higher thresholds in those regions, compared with the Midwest and the South. Regional differences in income, noncash benefits, and items subtracted from SPM resources (such as MOOP or work expenses) also drive differences in regional poverty rates. Limitations of the SPM and Outstanding Issues
Data Considerations
Because it is based mainly on survey data, the SPM warrants the same caveats as do any estimates based on surveys (including the official poverty measure): the data are estimates based on a sample of the population and, as a result, have margins of error. That is, it does not count the "value" of health insurance as a resource, and subtracts from resources health insurance premium payments, deductibles, copayments, and other out-of-pocket health expenses made by the family. Medical needs are not included in the SPM poverty thresholds. The SPM thresholds were defined to include the recurring needs of food, clothing, shelter, utilities, and a little more for miscellaneous expenses; MOOP are subtracted from family income because they cannot be used to meet the needs identified in the threshold. There has been some debate about whether the SPM is closer to a relative or an absolute poverty measure. Poverty Thresholds under the SPM and the Official Poverty Measure
Unlike the official poverty measure, which uses 48 poverty thresholds that are updated annually for inflation and applied nationwide, the SPM thresholds are computed using additional variables, resulting in thousands of thresholds once they are geographically adjusted. The SPM thresholds are based on Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE) data for food, clothing, shelter, and utilities (FCSU), and adjustments are made thereafter by housing tenure (that is, for homeowners with mortgages, homeowners without mortgages, and renters), by geographic variations in housing costs for each housing tenure group, and by family composition.
|
The Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM) is a measure of economic deprivation—having insufficient financial resources to achieve a specified standard of living. The SPM addresses some of the limitations of the official poverty measure, without supplanting it outright.
Both the SPM and the official measure determine the poverty status of people and families by comparing their financial resources against poverty thresholds that are valued in dollars. For both measures, poverty thresholds vary by family size and composition, and families whose resources are lower than the thresholds are considered to be poor.
The measures differ in their definitions of
need, as it is used in the thresholds (the dollar amounts used to determine poverty status), financial resources that are considered relevant for comparing against the measure of need as specified in the thresholds, and family, for the purpose of assigning thresholds and counting resources.
Need
The official poverty thresholds measure needs derived from the cost of an austere food budget. The food budget was multiplied by three, based on the finding that food accounted for about one-third of total family expenditures in 1955. Since their original computation, these thresholds have been adjusted annually for price inflation. In contrast, the SPM's thresholds are based on consumer expenditures for food, clothing, shelter, and utilities, and it uses five years of data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey in calculating needs and thresholds. Developing the SPM thresholds starts with spending data for families with exactly two children. These data are refined by using approximately the 33rd percentile of families' expenditures on food, clothing, shelter, and utilities. Next, an extra 20% is figured into the thresholds for miscellaneous expenses such as cleaning supplies and personal care items. The thresholds then undergo further adjustment to reflect that
housing costs differ between homeowners with mortgages, homeowners without mortgages, and renters; housing costs differ geographically; and costs differ by family size and composition.
Financial Resources
Financial resources to meet needs, whether in the SPM or the official measure, are based on the sum of income of all family members. While the official measure uses money income before taxes, the SPM makes additional adjustments and considers a wider range of resources. The SPM includes the value of certain in-kind benefits (such as food and housing subsidies), uses income after estimated federal and state taxes, and subtracts some expenses from income. These expenses include medical out-of-pocket costs, such as health insurance premiums, physician co-pays, and over-the-counter medications; child support paid outside of the household; and work expenses, such as child care and the cost of commuting, tools, uniforms, or licensing fees related to a person's employment. Work expenses, including child care, are capped at the amount of earnings from work of the lowest-earning family member. These expenses are subtracted from family income because they cannot be used to obtain the needs defined in the SPM thresholds. Unlike the official poverty measure, the range of financial resources included in the SPM is defined to be consistent with the types of needs used to compute the SPM poverty thresholds.
Family
Like the official measure, the SPM family unit definition includes people related by birth, marriage, or adoption living in the same housing unit. However, the SPM additionally includes cohabiting couples and their children, and foster children below age 22.
How Does Poverty Look through the Lens of the SPM?
The demographic profile of the poverty population is different under the SPM than under the official measure. Children have a comparatively lower poverty rate (percentage in poverty) under the SPM, and the aged (65 and older) and working-age persons (18 to 64) have comparatively higher poverty rates. These differences can be explained by the SPM's resource definition. The SPM includes tax credits and in-kind benefits that help families with children (in effect, boosting the measure of family income). It subtracts medical out-of-pocket expenses, which disproportionately affects the aged (lowering their measure of income), and subtracts work-related expenses, which disproportionately affects the working-age population (lowering their measure of income).
Uses and Limits
The SPM can give policymakers the tools to understand how taxes and government programs, including the noncash programs, affect the poor. It also illustrates how medical expenses and work-related expenses such as child care can affect a family's economic well-being. However, the SPM poverty estimates are derived from household survey data, and hence are affected by issues such as underreporting of income from government benefit programs, limitations on how tax liabilities and tax benefits can be estimated based on survey data, and differences in how noncash benefits and lump-sum tax refunds are "valued" by program recipients versus how they are valued for the purposes of poverty measurement. Additionally, the SPM does not directly value health insurance provided publicly or privately. Further, poverty has historically been measured in the United States as an "absolute" measure, based on how many people fall below a set standard of living. Questions have been raised about whether the SPM continues to measure poverty in that way, or represents a "relative" measure of poverty, based on how the population ranks in terms of well-being relative to each other.
|
crs_R44693
|
crs_R44693_0
|
T he Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA; P.L. 103-3 , as amended) entitles eligible employ ees to unpaid, job-protected leave for certain family and medical needs, with continuation of group health plan benefits. An Overview of the Family and Medical Leave Act
The FMLA requires that covered employers grant up to 12 workweeks of leave in a 12-month period to eligible employees for one or more of the following reasons:
the birth and care of the employee's newborn child, provided that leave is taken within 12 months of the child's birth; the placement of an adopted or fostered child with the employee, provided that leave is taken within 12 months of the child's placement; to care for a spouse, child (generally a minor child), or parent with a serious health condition; the employee's own serious health condition that renders the employee unable to perform the essential functions of his or her job; and qualified military exigencies if the employee's spouse, child, or parent is a covered military member on covered active duty. Proposals in the 114th Congress to Amend FMLA
Several bills were introduced in the 114 th Congress to amend the FMLA. H.R. H.R. New Qualifying Uses of Leave
Bills introduced in the 114 th Congress would have allowed employees to use the existing FMLA leave entitlement for bereavement, needs related to domestic violence experienced by the employee or a close family member, family involvement, and medical needs related to certain service-connected disabilities for veterans. Bereavement
The following proposals would have permitted eligible employees to use the existing FMLA leave entitlement for the death of a close family member (or members):
S. 1302 / H.R. Proposals to Broaden Current FMLA-Qualifying Uses of Leave
Several proposals sought to expand employees' options for using the current set of FMLA-qualifying uses of leave by either (1) expanding the set of relationships for which an employee may use family leave or (2) amending definitions related to the current entitlement. H.R. Because the bill would have amended the FMLA definition of son or daughter to include adult children, leave would also be permitted for the placement of an adult child. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. H.R. As noted elsewhere in this report, S. 473 , H.R. 5519 , and H.R. S. 473 and H.R. S. 2584 and H.R. 5518 , which would have reduce d the minimum number of employees (of the same employer) within 75 miles of an employee's worksite from 50 employees to 15 employees ; and 2. H.R. 5496 , which proposed to amend the general hours - of - service requirement to remove reference to " 1,250 hours of service ... during the previous 12-month period" , and include part-time and full-time employees as "eligible employees . " Eligibility Requirements for Specific Worker Groups
Two bills proposed new eligibility requirements for certain veterans with service-connected disabilities and for education support professionals. 5165 proposed to provide a new FMLA-qualifying use of leave for veterans with a service-connected disability rated at 30% or higher. Education Support Professionals
S. 3444 would have created a separate hours-of-service requirement for educational support professionals (ESP).
|
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA; P.L. 103-3, as amended) entitles eligible employees to unpaid, job-protected leave for certain family and medical needs, with continuation of group health plan benefits.
Through the act, Congress sought to strike a balance between workplace responsibilities and workers' growing need to take leave for significant family and medical events. Subsequently, Congress added new categories of leave that allow eligible employees to address certain military exigencies stemming from the deployment of a close family member to a foreign country and to care for a servicemember with a serious injury or illness who is a close family member. The act has also been amended to expand access to certain legislative branch employees and to clarify eligibility criteria for airline flight crew. FMLA was last amended in 2009.
FMLA remains an issue of interest for Members, and the 114th Congress considered several proposals to amend the act in various ways:
Additional leave entitlements. Two bills would have created a new entitlement to take leave for certain family members' school or community activities (H.R. 5535, H.R. 5518) and for the employee's own routine medical needs or that of certain family members (H.R. 5518 only). New FMLA-qualifying uses of the existing leave entitlement. Several proposals aimed to allow employees to use the existing entitlement for new categories of leave, including bereavement (S. 1302/H.R. 2260, S. 473), domestic violence and its effects (S. 473), family involvement (S. 473; in addition to new leave entitlements in H.R. 5535, H.R. 5518), and medical leave for veterans with service-connected disabilities rated at 30% or higher (H.R. 5165). Broader application of existing FMLA-qualifying uses of leave. Five bills proposed to expand employee's options for using the current set of FMLA-qualifying uses of leave by either broadening the set of relationships for which an employee may use family leave (S. 473, H.R. 5519, H.R. 5701) or amending definitions referenced in the descriptions of the current entitlement (S. 473, H.R. 5519, and H.R. 5701 sought to amend the definition of son or daughter to include adult children; and S. 2584/H.R. 4616 proposed amending the definition of serious health condition to reference the recovery from organ donation surgery as a possible condition). Less-restrictive eligibility requirements, generally, and separate requirements for certain worker groups. For general eligibility, H.R. 5518 aimed to reduce the minimum number of employees required within 75 miles of an employee's worksite from 50 employees to 15 employees and H.R. 5496 sought to amend the general hours-of-service requirement to remove the minimum of "1,250 hours of service ... during the previous 12-month period" and allow eligible workers to be "part-time or full-time" employees. H.R. 5165 would have provided new eligibility requirements for certain veterans that allowed them to use FMLA leave for medical treatment related to a service-connected disability rated at 30% or higher sooner than the standard 12-month employment requirement. S. 3444 would have created a separate hours-of-service requirement for educational support professionals.
|
crs_RL34070
|
crs_RL34070_0
|
There is no single model for how each center is structured or operates. Finally, the report will provide Congress with a number of legislative options for consideration. The foreign intelligence agencies were watching overseas, alert to foreign threats to U.S. interests there. In the absence of a common understanding about what constitutes intelligence, fusion center development and progress may be impeded. Most of the fusion center representatives interviewed for this report appeared to be aware of the need to be respectful of privacy and civil liberties as a result of 28 CFR Part 23, the Fusion Center Guidelines, the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP), DHS/Department of Justice (DOJ)-sponsored fusion center conferences, and DHS—provided Technical Assistance Training, as well as interactions with peer fusion centers. Prior to 9/11, the benefits of collocation, coordination of resources, and information sharing across agencies was apparent to many in the law enforcement communities, and there were several states and regions that were looking to replicate the HIDTA model in their communities. 8 encourages an all-hazards approach to homeland security preparedness and specifically defines "all-hazards preparedness" as "preparedness for domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies." While some states have seen limited success in integrating federal intelligence community analysis into their fusion centers, research indicates most continue to struggle with developing a "true fusion process" which includes value added analysis of broad streams of intelligence, identification of gaps, and fulfillment of those gaps, to prevent criminal and terrorist acts. If fusion centers are serving both state, local, and federal ends, one of the central questions becomes what is the role of the federal government in supporting these centers, and what products and services can the federal government reasonably expect the centers to produce, given federal funding levels. The question of what the federal government collectively defines as a "mature" center, or what the minimum level of capability for a fusion center is from a federal perspective, it could be argued, hampers the development of a long-term and sustained partnership between the federal government and the state and regional fusion centers. Under ISE Guideline 2, one recommendation is that DOJ and DHS, in consultation with the Program Manager's Office, develop standards to: (1) specify the means through which State, local and tribal data related to terrorist risks and threats and associated requirements and tasks is communicated to federal authorities and private sector entities and (2) develop, maintain and disseminate assessments of terrorist risks and threats gathered at the state, local or tribal levels, and (3) develop processes and protocols to ensure Suspicious Incident Reports and Suspicious Activity Reports are reported to appropriate law enforcement authorities. Located within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Program Manger for ISE has been working to integrate fusion centers into a broad initiative to enhance information and intelligence between the federal government, and state and local law enforcement and public safety entities, as well as the private sector. Congressional remedies could potentially involve a broad range of possible actions including, but not limited to, oversight of federal agencies and entities engaged in interaction with fusion centers, requesting Executive Branch action on any number of fusion center-related issues, establishing a statutory basis for fusion centers, convening additional hearings which include state and local fusion center leaders as expert witnesses, adjusting future funding levels for fusion centers, and/or considering the extent to which, if at all, any future federal funding may be conditioned on certain performance benchmarks being met. Ultimate goals and performance measures. Although the centers may all have some core functions, the financial and personnel resources they have to dedicate to those functions differ widely. Establishment of a National Fusion Center Representative Organization
Today, there are more than 40 plus fusion centers operating, largely independently, around the country. It is important to explain that there are different definitions of "intelligence," and those used by the fusion centers often differ from the more "pure," conception of "intelligence" outlined immediately above.
|
Although elements of the information and intelligence fusion function were conducted prior to 9/11, often at state police criminal intelligence bureaus, the events of 9/11 provided the primary catalyst for the formal establishment of more than 40 state, local, and regional fusion centers across the country.
The value proposition for fusion centers is that by integrating various streams of information and intelligence, including that flowing from the federal government, state, local, and tribal governments, as well as the private sector, a more accurate picture of risks to people, economic infrastructure, and communities can be developed and translated into protective action. The ultimate goal of fusion is to prevent manmade (terrorist) attacks and to respond to natural disasters and manmade threats quickly and efficiently should they occur. As recipients of federal government-provided national intelligence, another goal of fusion centers is to model how events inimical to U.S. interests overseas may be manifested in their communities, and align protective resources accordingly. There are several risks to the fusion center concept—including potential privacy and civil liberties violations, and the possible inability of fusion centers to demonstrate utility in the absence of future terrorist attacks, particularly during periods of relative state fiscal austerity.
Fusion centers are state-created entities largely financed and staffed by the states, and there is no one "model" for how a center should be structured. State and local law enforcement and criminal intelligence seem to be at the core of many of the centers. Although many of the centers initially had purely counterterrorism goals, for numerous reasons, they have increasingly gravitated toward an all-crimes and even broader all-hazards approach. While many of the centers have prevention of attacks as a high priority, little "true fusion," or analysis of disparate data sources, identification of intelligence gaps, and pro-active collection of intelligence against those gaps which could contribute to prevention is occurring. Some centers are collocated with local offices of federal entities, yet in the absence of a functioning intelligence cycle process, collocation alone does not constitute fusion.
The federal role in supporting fusion centers consists largely of providing financial assistance, the majority of which has flowed through the Homeland Security Grant Program; sponsoring security clearances; providing human resources; producing some fusion center guidance and training; and providing congressional authorization and appropriation of national foreign intelligence program resources, as well as oversight hearings. This report includes over 30 options for congressional consideration to clarify and potentially enhance the federal government's relationship with fusion centers. One of the central options is the potential drafting of a formal national fusion center strategy that would outline, among other elements, the federal government's clear expectations of fusion centers, its position on sustainment funding, metrics for assessing fusion center performance, and definition of what constitutes a "mature" fusion center. This report will be updated.
|
crs_R43583
|
crs_R43583_0
|
It may be time to examine fundamental questions related to the use of such partnership structures. When and under what specific conditions should task forces be disbanded? Notably, no one formally and publicly catalogs the creation or existence of task forces. As such, there is no official roster, or task force census, of federally led task forces operating around the country or even in a particular region, nor is there an inventory of those task forces targeting specific threats. Moreover, it outlines how this coordination is pivotal to 21 st century federal policing. While this report acknowledges that law enforcement coordination may be influenced by many mechanisms including task forces, fusion centers, memoranda of understanding, and interagency agreements, among other things, the bulk of the report focuses on the use of task forces and intelligence sharing entities such as fusion centers. Nonetheless, they are federally backed and important to national strategies and policing efforts. Realities Promoting Law Enforcement Coordination
In recent decades, a number of realities have helped foster a need for increased coordination between federal law enforcement agencies and their state and local counterparts, particularly along the Southwest border. For one, borders or boundaries often enhance criminal operations. Criminals exploit borders to their advantage, profiting from the movement of black market goods across state and national boundaries. Task forces and fusion centers may be developed for a number of reasons, including overcoming jurisdictional limitations and leveraging expertise and resources—both money and manpower. Roots of Federally Led Counterdrug and Counterterrorism Task Forces
The task force concept in federal law enforcement is not new. The New York task force led to DEA's creation of a State and Local Task Force Program. While not all task forces are multijurisdictional (some may consist of law enforcement agencies within the same jurisdictional confines (e.g., city, county, state, etc. Further, these multijurisdictional task forces can be used to counter a wide array of threats posed by criminal networks, or they can be tailored to concentrate efforts on a particular criminal activity. Tallying Task Forces Countering Illegal Drugs and Terrorism along the Southwest Border
One of the challenges in trying to understand the breadth of task force activity in any given geographic region involves establishing exactly how many are active in the area. No central , widely available repository of such information —a task force census— exists, and law enforcement agencies may be reticent to part with the specific locations of their collaborative efforts. Without such information it is difficult to measure exactly how much cooperation is occurring. How much cooperation is enough? How can we ascertain whether task force programs in various agencies overlap each other's work, especially if they target the same class or category criminals (such as drug traffickers or violent gangs)? Nevertheless, Executive Branch responses to such issues could greatly inform congressional policy making. To be included in the list, a task force had to exhibit the possibility of either directly or indirectly combatting drug trafficking or terrorism. Thus, task forces devoted to fighting gangs, violent crime, public corruption, capturing fugitives, and money laundering may be included. They are highlighted in this report as notable information sharing efforts because of their relevance to federal policing. Coordination Startup
Task forces, fusion centers, and other collaborative efforts can be initiated legislatively, administratively, or through a combination of the two. Much as suggested elsewhere in this report (see Tallying Task forces , Countering Illegal Drugs and Terrorism along the Southwest Border ; and Dissolving Coordinating Units ), at the federal level, no uniform metrics exist for either the evaluation of task forces or of the federal strategies that may employ them. This can involve a number of permutations such as evaluating the success of a particular class of task forces. Using a Common Language
For law enforcement task forces and interagency intelligence sharing bodies, as with many other organizations, measuring success can be characterized as involving the assessment of inputs , outputs , and outcomes . Likewise it is disingenuous to suggest that law enforcement output is not tied to outcome. More narrowly, should the success of law enforcement coordination be judged in terms of task force work (output), impact (outcome), or some combination of these? ONDCP has outlined one broad "indicator" of enhanced information sharing in task forces as well as fusion centers:
[i]ncreased number of criminal intelligence databases relevant to the Southwest border or counternarcotics to which the following entities have access: El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Fusion Center, International Organized Crime and Intelligence Operations Center (IOC-2), Southwest border HIDTAs, ICE HSI's National Bulk Cash Smuggling Center (BCSC), and state and major urban area fusion centers in the Southwest border region. At another level, what is less clear is exactly how effectively a task force supports a given strategy.
|
Federally led law enforcement task forces and intelligence information sharing centers are ubiquitous in domestic policing. They are launched at the local, state, and national levels and respond to a variety of challenges such as violent crime, criminal gangs, terrorism, white-collar crime, public corruption, even intelligence sharing. This report focuses on those task forces and information sharing efforts that respond to federal counterdrug and counterterrorism priorities in the Southwest border region. More generally, the report also offers context for examining law enforcement coordination. It delineates how this coordination is vital to 21st century federal policing and traces some of the roots of recent cooperative police endeavors.
Policy makers interested in federal law enforcement task force operations may confront a number of fundamental issues. Many of these can be captured under three simple questions:
1. When should task forces be born? 2. When should they die? 3. What overarching metrics should be used to evaluate their lives?
Task forces are born out of a number of realities that foster a need for increased coordination between federal law enforcement agencies and their state and local counterparts. These realities are particularly evident at the Southwest border. Namely, official boundaries often enhance criminal schemes but can constrain law enforcement efforts. Criminals use geography to their advantage, profiting from the movement of black market goods across state and national boundaries. At the same time, police have to stop at their own jurisdictional boundaries. Globalization may aggravate such geographical influences. In response, task forces ideally leverage expertise and resources—including money and manpower to confront such challenges. Identifying instances where geography, globalization, and criminal threat come together to merit the creation of task forces is arguably a process best left to informed experts. Thus, police and policy makers can be involved in highlighting important law enforcement issues warranting the creation of task forces. Task forces, fusion centers, and other collaborative policing efforts can be initiated legislatively, administratively, or through a combination of the two, and they can die through these same channels.
While some clarity exists regarding the circumstances governing the creation of task forces, it is less clear when they should die and how their performance should be measured. Two basic difficulties muddy any evaluation of the life cycles of law enforcement task forces.
First, and in the simplest of terms, at the federal level no one officially and publicly tallies task force numbers. The lack of an interagency "task force census" creates a cascading set of conceptual problems.
Without such information, it is challenging, if not impossible, to measure how much cooperation is occurring, let alone how much cooperation on a particular threat is necessary. Concurrently, it may be difficult to establish when specific task forces should be disbanded or when funding for a particular class of task forces (e.g., violent crime, drug trafficking, counterterrorism) should be scaled back. Additionally, how can policy makers ascertain whether task force programs run by different agencies duplicate each other's work, especially if they target the same class or category of criminals (such as drug traffickers or violent gangs)? For example, do the violent crime task forces led by one agency complement, compete with, or duplicate the work of another's?
To give a very broad sense of federal task force activity in one geographic area, CRS compiled a list of task forces and fusion centers operating along the Southwest border, which are geographically depicted in this report. To be included in the list, a task force had to exhibit the possibility of either directly or indirectly combatting drug trafficking or terrorism. Thus, task forces devoted to fighting gangs, violent crime, public corruption, capturing fugitives, and money laundering may be included.
Second, there is no general framework to understand the life trajectory of any given task force or class of task forces. What key milestones mark the development and decline of task forces? (Can such a set of milestones even be produced?) How many task forces outlive their supposed value because no thresholds regarding their productivity are established? Though federal law enforcement has embraced the task force concept, it has not agreed on the breadth or duration of such cooperation. Such lack of accord extends to measuring the work of task forces. This report suggests a way of conceptualizing these matters by framing task force efforts and federal strategies tied to them in terms of input, output, and outcome—core ideas that can be used to study all sorts of organizations and programs, including those in law enforcement.
An official task force census coupled with a conceptual framework for understanding and potentially measuring their operations across agencies could greatly assist policy making tied to federal policing throughout the country, and particularly along the Southwest border.
|
crs_RL34529
|
crs_RL34529_0
|
Nearly 300,000 federal employees are presently in pay systems that attempt to link pay increases to job performance—which arguably may be defined as how effectively, efficiently, or thoroughly one performs his or her job. A basic challenge with such arrangements, whether used in the private or the public sector, is arriving at credible and objective performance measures. In addition, while the private sector is ultimately concerned that employee performance be of such effectiveness that it contributes to the profits of a business, the federal government has other objectives to which employee performance is expected to contribute—such as the efficient, economical, and effective provision of services to those who qualify for, and are otherwise entitled to, them. Available performance-based pay funding is often pooled. This variability in pay increases may lead to valence problems for the merit-based pay system.
|
In many occupations today, pay is intended to reflect employee performance—or how effectively, efficiently, or thoroughly one performs his or her job. The federal government is no different from the private sector in this regard. Nearly 300,000 federal employees are currently in pay systems that attempt to make pay increases contingent upon job performance—such a system is often referred to as either a merit-based pay system or a performance-based pay system. A basic challenge with such an arrangement is arriving at credible and objective performance measures. In addition, while the private sector is ultimately concerned that employee performance be of such effectiveness that it contributes to the profits of a business, the federal government has other objectives to which employee performance is expected to contribute—such as the efficient, economical, and effective provision of services to those who qualify for, and are otherwise entitled to, them. This report discusses issues related to measuring performance across the federal government and analyzes a variety of methods utilized by the government to measure employee performance and its linkage to pay. As developments warrant, this report will be updated.
|
crs_R45145
|
crs_R45145_0
|
T he U.S. federal tax system includes several elements. At the end of 2017, President Trump signed into law P.L. 115-97 , which substantially changed the U.S. federal tax system. This report provides an overview of the federal tax system, including the individual income tax, corporate income tax, payroll taxes, estate and gift taxes, and federal excise taxes, as in effect for 2018. The largest component, in terms of revenue generated, is the individual income tax. For fiscal year (FY) 2018, an estimated $1.7 trillion, or 50% of the federal government's revenue, will come from the individual income tax. The corporate income tax is estimated to generate another $218 billion in revenue in FY2018, or just under 7% of total revenue. Social insurance or payroll taxes will generate an estimated $1.2 trillion, or 35% of revenue in FY2018. The Individual Income Tax4
The individual income tax is the largest source of revenue in the federal income tax system. Filing Status and Deductions
Tax liability depends on the filing status of the taxpayer. The amount of the standard deduction also depends on filing status. Deductions are subtracted before determining taxable income. At a particular statutory marginal tax rate, all individuals subject to the regular income tax, regardless of their overall level of earnings, pay the same tax rate on taxable income within the bracket. Certain higher-income individuals may be subject to the alternative minimum tax (AMT). Tax Credits
After a taxpayer's tax liability has been calculated, tax credits are subtracted from gross tax liability to arrive at a final tax liability (see Figure 3 ). The corporate income tax rate is a flat 21%. Social Insurance and Retirement Payroll Taxes
Payroll taxes are used to fund specific programs, largely Social Security and Medicare. Social Security and Medicare taxes are generally paid at a combined rate of 15.3% of wages, with 7.65% being paid by the employee and employer alike. In 2018, the tax applies to the first $128,400 in wages. This wage base is adjusted annually for inflation. Up through the $100,000 to $200,000 income category, the share of taxpayers paying more in payroll taxes than income taxes exceeds the share of taxpayers paying more in income taxes than payroll taxes. Federal excise taxes are levied on a variety of products. For 2018, it is estimated that revenues will be 16.7% of GDP, slightly below the post-World War II average of 17.2% of GDP. Since the mid-1940s, the individual income tax has been the most important single source of federal revenue (business income may also be taxed under the individual income tax system, as discussed above in " The Individual Income Tax "). Composition of Tax Revenue
The changing shares of federal revenues over time are more clearly shown in Figure 6 . The tax system as a whole is progressive, but not as progressive as the individual income tax system. Four countries have tended to have lower taxes as a percentage of GDP than the United States, with most others tending to have higher taxes relative to the size of the economy.
|
At the end of 2017, President Trump signed into law P.L. 115-97, which substantially changed the U.S. federal tax system. This report describes the federal tax structure and system in effect for 2018, incorporating these recent changes. The report also provides selected statistics on the tax system as a whole.
Historically, the largest component of the federal tax system, in terms of revenue generated, has been the individual income tax. For fiscal year (FY) 2018, an estimated $1.7 trillion, or 50% of the federal government's revenue, will be collected from the individual income tax. The corporate income tax is estimated to generate another $218 billion in revenue in FY2018, or just under 7% of total revenue. Social insurance or payroll taxes will generate an estimated $1.2 trillion, or 35% of revenue in FY2018. For 2018, it is estimated that revenues will be 16.7% of GDP, slightly below the post-World War II average of 17.2% of GDP.
The largest source of revenue for the federal government is the individual income tax. The federal individual income tax is levied on an individual's taxable income, which is adjusted gross income (AGI) less deductions. Tax rates based on filing status (e.g., married filing jointly, head of household, or single individual) determine the amount of tax liability. Income tax rates in the United States are generally progressive, such that higher levels of income are typically taxed at higher rates. Once tentative tax liability is calculated, tax credits can be used to reduce tax liability. Tax deductions and tax credits are tools available to policymakers to increase or decrease the after-tax price of undertaking specific activities. Individuals with high levels of deductions and credits relative to income may be required to pay the alternative minimum tax (AMT).
The federal government also levies taxes on corporations, wage earnings, and certain other goods. Corporate taxable income is also subject to tax at a flat rate of 21%. Social Security and Medicare tax rates are, respectively, 12.4% and 2.9% of earnings. In 2018, Social Security taxes are levied on the first $128,400 of wages. Medicare taxes are assessed against all wage income. Federal excise taxes are levied on specific goods, such as transportation fuels, alcohol, and tobacco.
Looking at the tax system as a whole, several observations can be made. Notably, the composition of revenues has changed over time. Corporate income tax revenues have become a smaller share of overall tax revenues over time, while social insurance revenues have trended upward as a share of total revenues. Social insurance revenues are a sizable component of the overall federal tax system. Most taxpayers pay more in payroll taxes than income taxes. Many taxpayers pay social insurance taxes but do not pay individual income taxes, having incomes below the amount that would generate a positive income tax liability. From an international perspective, the U.S. federal tax system tends to collect less in federal revenues as a percentage of GDP than other OECD countries.
|
crs_R43350
|
crs_R43350_0
|
Introduction
The federal government levies an excise tax, at the manufacturer and importer level, based on the per unit production or importation of alcoholic beverages (e.g., distilled spirits, wine, and beer) for sale in the U.S. market. The modern-day interest in alcohol taxes is broad, with arguments presented to either raise or decrease current alcohol excise tax rates. Various approaches could be taken, such as follows:
Increasing excise taxes could serve as a source of revenue as part of a larger budget deficit reduction package or as an offset, Reducing excise taxes could benefit firms in the alcoholic beverage manufacturing industry, or Increasing excise taxes could discourage the negative spillover effects associated with alcohol consumption (health, safety, crime, etc.). First, this report provides a recent history of alcohol excise tax rates and a description of current law. Fourth, alcohol excise taxes are analyzed with a particular focus on market structure, the effects of alcohol excise taxes on negative spillover effects from alcohol consumption, and how the distribution of these excise taxes affect various measures of equity in the federal tax code. When converted to standard drink measures liquor drinks are generally subjected to a federal excise tax of approximately 13 cents per 1.5 ounce shot, wine is taxed at 4 cents per 5 ounce glass, and beer is taxed at 5 cents per 12 ounce can or bottle. Revenue
In FY2015, federal excise tax collections on distilled spirits, wine, and beer totaled approximately $10.4 billion. Since the last excise tax rate increase in 1991, the inflation-adjusted value of tax collections on alcohol has declined. The decline in the share of alcohol excise tax revenue collections as a share of all of TTB's excise tax collections is due to three main factors: (1) the decline in real (inflation-adjusted) value of the alcohol excise tax rate over time, (2) multiple increases in the statutory, per-unit tax rates on tobacco products, and (3) firearms and ammunition tax collections automatically adjust for inflation because they are levied as a percentage of the manufacturer's price (i.e., an ad valorem tax). Economic theory suggests that excise tax increases could be borne by producers or consumers in the short run, but are generally passed on to the consumer in the long run. Although lower-income households tend to spend a higher share of their pre-tax income on alcoholic beverages, average household spending on alcoholic beverages is more evenly distributed than spending on non-alcoholic beverages or food. Horizontal Equity
Consumers pay different amounts of federal excise tax on the same amount of alcohol content, based on the type of alcoholic beverages they purchase. At current rates, distilled spirits are taxed at about 21 cents per ounce of alcohol, whereas wine and beer are taxed at 8 cents and 10 cents per ounce of alcohol, respectively. Potential Approaches to Increasing Alcohol Excise Tax Rates
Most of the legislation introduced in the 114 th Congress, described above, would reduce tax rates on alcoholic beverages. Policymakers could also increase the tax rate commensurate with the estimated costs of alcohol consumption to society, and possibly increase economic efficiency. A rough estimate in the Appendix of this report measures the combined federal, state, and local taxes between 25 cents and 28 cents per ounce (in 2013 dollars) of alcohol compared with Manning's inflation-adjusted rate of $1.02 per ounce (in 2013 dollars).
|
The federal excise tax on alcoholic beverages is imposed at the manufacturer and importer level, based on the per unit production or importation of alcoholic beverages (e.g., distilled spirits, wine, and beer) for sale in the U.S. market. When converted to standard drink measures liquor drinks are generally subjected to a federal excise tax of approximately 13 cents per 1.5 ounce shot, wine is taxed at 4 cents per 5 ounce glass, and beer is taxed at 5 cents per 12 ounce can or bottle. Alcohol excise tax collections totaled $10.4 billion in FY2015, with collections from distilled spirits comprising 55.1% of that amount.
Congressional interest in alcohol excise taxes is broad, given a variety of policy motivations and the industry's wide geographic distribution. Since their inception in 1791, federal excise taxes on alcohol have been imposed or increased throughout history primarily to fund emergency spending during wartime or in response to concerns over the growth of budget deficits.
Today, three main approaches drive interest in alcohol taxes: (1) tax rates could be decreased to benefit firms in the industry, (2) excise tax rates could be increased for deficit reduction, or (3) excise tax rates could be increased to discourage the negative spillover effects of alcohol consumption (e.g., drunk driving fatalities, property damage, domestic violence).
This report provides a brief historical overview of alcohol excise tax policy and a description of current law. Next, the report analyzes alcohol excise tax rates based on some of the standard criteria for tax evaluation: revenue, economic efficiency, and equity. Lastly, this report discusses bills introduced in the 114th Congress that would reduce current excise tax rates as well as possible approaches to raising alcohol excise tax rates.
Despite three tax rate increases since 1951 (with the last increase in 1991), alcohol excise taxes have declined in inflation-adjusted value over time. Excise tax reductions would reduce excise tax collections, reduce some of the regressivity in the federal tax code, and provide owners of the affected alcohol producers with a temporary increase in their profits (due to lower tax rates).
Economists typically justify imposing excise taxes on alcohol consumption to better reflect the costs of an individual's consumption of alcohol to society. While there is much debate surrounding the technical measurement of these linkages, most researchers argue that alcohol excise tax rates are set below the economically efficient level to compensate for social costs. One estimate finds the combined federal, state, and local taxes between 25 cents and 29 cents (in 2013 dollars) per ounce of pure alcohol compared with the external cost of $1.02 per ounce.
Analysis suggests that excise tax increases are usually passed forward to consumers through higher prices and are not borne by the owners of alcoholic beverage manufacturers or importers.
Excise taxes are generally regressive, alcohol included. Lower income households tend to spend a higher share of their pre-tax income on alcoholic beverages, but this distribution is not as uneven as spending on non-alcoholic beverages or food. Consumers also pay different amounts of federal excise tax on the same amount of alcohol content, based on the type of alcoholic beverages they purchase. At current rates, the federal tax per ounce of pure alcoholic content for spirits, wine, and beer is 21 cents, 10 cents, and 8 cents, respectively.
|
crs_R43143
|
crs_R43143_0
|
Many in Congress have also expressed concerns about the potential terrorist use of CBRN weapons and have supported U.S. efforts to address and mitigate this threat. One key set of tools is a set of financial and technical programs known, variously, as cooperative threat reduction programs, nonproliferation assistance, or, global security engagement. Through these programs, the United States seeks to work with other nations to help them secure and eliminate their CBRN weapons and material, to stem the flow of weapons and related knowledge and materials to hostile nations or non-state actors who might seek to develop their own weapons, and to develop training programs and share "best practices" to ensure that other nations can protect the materials and knowledge that remain in their countries. This initiative grew over the years, such that the United States spent around $1.65 billion in FY2013 on programs that have sought to secure and eliminate nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and materials in the former Soviet states; enhance border security and export controls to deter and detect efforts to transport these materials across state lines; secure and eliminate nuclear, chemical, or biological materials in nations outside the former Soviet Union; and redirect weapons scientists in many nations around the world so that they will pursue programs with peaceful purposes. In addition, these programs are now funded and administered by DOD, the Department of Energy (DOE), the State Department, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and several other U.S. agencies. It also reviews some of the issues that Congress may confront as it seeks to provide oversight of these programs and reviews budget requests for them. As a result, in the years leading up to the 2013 expiration of the agreement governing these programs, U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in Russia completed much of the work focused on eliminating retired Soviet-era nuclear weapons delivery systems, transporting and securing nuclear warheads, and paving the way for the destruction of Soviet-era chemical weapons. Some Members of Congress actively encouraged the Obama Administration to expand cooperative threat reduction efforts in the Middle East and North Africa. Projects in both areas were already winding down after many years of successful cooperation. Together, these agencies are seeking nearly $1.65 billion for these programs in FY2014. DOD divides the projects funded by the CTR program into several categories, including strategic offensive arms elimination, chemical weapons destruction, global nuclear security, cooperative biological engagement, and proliferation prevention. In addition, DOE established in 2004 the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) to secure, protect, and in some cases, remove vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials at civilian facilities worldwide. Although DOE could continue much of its work under the bilateral protocol to the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR) Agreement, it can no longer work with the Russian Ministry of Defense. Issues for Congress
Over the years, Congress has addressed a number of issues that came up during implementation of U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in Russia and the former Soviet Union. DOE continued to work at these sites through June 2013, providing assistance with sustainability support. It has also funded efforts to convert these materials to forms that might be less attractive to nations seeking materials for nuclear weapons. The United States, with funding provided by DOD's CTR program, assisted Russia with the design and construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye until July 2013. It also has expanded geographically. It began as a program focused on dismantling the vast biological weapons complex that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union, but has now become a tool that the United States uses to promote "best practices" in physical security and safety at biological laboratories with dangerous pathogens, and to develop disease surveillance systems on several continents, particularly Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. The State Department program is primarily designed to prevent terrorist access to dangerous pathogens (or chemicals or nuclear material), and programs are concentrated in countries with the highest current risk. Both the State Department and the Department of Energy developed programs that were designed to reduce the risk that the weapons scientists would sell their knowledge to the highest bidder. Today, this suite of programs is aimed at preventing terrorists from exploiting scientists, personnel, or materials to develop these weapons. The programs also now train not only scientists, but other lab personnel about international security standards and improve personnel reliability programs to address the "insider threat."
|
The United States uses a number of policy tools to address the threat of attack using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. These include a set of financial and technical programs known, variously, as cooperative threat reduction (CTR) programs, nonproliferation assistance, or, global security engagement. Congress has supported these programs over the years, but has raised a number of questions about their implementation and their future direction.
Over the years, the CTR effort shifted from an emergency response to impending chaos in the Soviet Union to a broader program seeking to keep CBRN weapons away from rogue nations or terrorist groups. It has also grown from a DOD-centered effort to include projects funded by the Department of Defense (DOD), the State Department, the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Together, these agencies sought nearly $1.67 billion for these programs in FY2016.
Although initially focused on the former Soviet Union, these programs now seek to engage partners around the world. The United States has used its funding and expertise to help secure or destroy dangerous weapons and materials in nations that experience civil strife or regime collapse, such as in Libya, and to prevent their spread outside a conflict's borders, such as with Syria's neighboring countries. U.S. cooperation has nearly stopped, with many of the CTR projects in Russia winding down after the June 2013 expiration of the Memorandum of Understanding that governed DOD's cooperation with Russia. The two countries could continue to cooperate on some areas of nuclear security with a bilateral protocol under the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation Agreement (MNEPR).
In its oversight of these programs, Congress has addressed questions about the coordination of and priority given to these programs, about partner nations' willingness to provide access to their weapons facilities, and about metrics used to measure progress. Congress has also reviewed efforts to engage nations around the world in cooperative threat reduction and security engagement activities. Some Members have actively encouraged the Obama Administration to expand these programs to the Middle East and North Africa.
This report summarizes cooperative activities conducted during the full 20 years of U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance. Many older programs have concluded their work, while more recent programs continue to expand their scope and their geographic reach.
Several DOD and DOE programs have helped Russia and the other former Soviet states eliminate nuclear weapons delivery systems and secure nuclear warheads in storage. DOE has also helped Russia strengthen security and materials accounting at facilities that store nuclear materials. These agencies are seeking to expand this effort to other nations by sharing "best practices" with partner countries through Centers of Excellence. DOE is also working, through the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), to secure, protect, and in some cases, remove vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials at civilian facilities worldwide.
DOD has also helped Russia secure and eliminate chemical weapons by supporting the design and construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye. DOD and the State Department also provide assistance to address concerns about the proliferation of pathogens that might be used in biological weapons. DOD's biological threat reduction program now accounts for nearly 60% in the FY2016 budget request. It also has grown from a program focused on dismantling the vast biological weapons complex in Russia into a tool used to promote "best practices" at biological laboratories with dangerous pathogens and to develop disease surveillance systems on several continents, particularly Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.
The United States also supports global programs that are designed to prevent the smuggling or illegal export of CBRN materials and technology. The State Department and DOE have also developed programs that are designed to reduce the risk that the weapons scientists would sell their knowledge to nations seeking their own CBRN weapons. These programs seek to prevent terrorists from exploiting scientists, other personnel, or materials to develop these weapons. The programs also train not only scientists, but other lab personnel about international security standards and improve personnel reliability programs to address the "insider threat."
This report will be updated as needed.
|
crs_R42868
|
crs_R42868_0
|
("Byproduct material" includes specified types radioactive material other than uranium or plutonium as defined in Appendix A .) Congress may find this analysis of interest for several reasons: Congress attaches great importance to protecting the United States against terrorist threats; the rule will affect the many industrial, research, and medical activities nationwide that use radioactive materials, thereby affecting many constituents and raising cost-benefit issues; and there is wide concern about regulation and radiation more generally. This report analyzes the rule. 37. These orders went, among others, to licensees of large irradiators, manufacturers and distributors of radioactive material, and certain transporters of radioactive material, as detailed in Appendix C . An "Increased Controls" (IC) order went to other licensees authorized to possess specified quantities of certain radioactive material. In the Federal Register of June 15, 2010, NRC solicited comments for a proposed rule, "Physical Protection of Byproduct Material," that would incorporate and modify previous security orders as 10 C.F.R. The rulemaking process may take years, as it involves issuing a preliminary draft, soliciting comments, in some cases obtaining approval from the Office of Management and Budget, and a waiting period before the rule takes effect. Orders apply only to current licensees; having an order apply to future licensees requires notifying them individually that the order applies to them. In contrast, a rule applies to current and future licensees. An order and a rule both have the effect of law. This part of the report comments on selected sections of Subpart A (General Provisions), B (Background Investigations and Access Control Program), C (Physical Protection Requirements During Use), and D (Physical Protection in Transit). Some radiation professionals stated that 10 C.F.R. Often, however, T&R adjudications are done by human resources personnel, who do not need unescorted access to radioactive material or access to safeguards information to do their job. Some interviewees also felt that it should be possible to transfer a T&R adjudication in addition to personal information. Some interviewees were unsure how many, and what types of, security features they needed to install in order to satisfy these requirements. NRC notes that the U.S. procedure is different. Generally speaking, when transportation requirements are set by many regulators and by federal interstate commerce rules as well, compliance with transportation regulations can become very complicated. If the Orders were adequate, why change? Should trustworthiness and reliability (T&R) screening be enhanced? Wrap-Up
Several general points emerge from the foregoing analysis. While the rule imposes many requirements on licensees, the previously issued security orders did so as well, so the incremental burden of the rule is much less than would have been the case had the orders not been issued first. Since many actions must be undertaken by all facilities with category 1 or 2 material regardless of facility size, the rule would appear to impose a proportionately larger burden on small licensees than on larger ones. The rule puts into effect a layered defense using personnel reliability, ability to detect intrusion, police response, etc. Whether the costs of these measures are worth the potential benefit is a matter for political judgment. 37 regulates "byproduct material." Byproduct material means—(1) Any radioactive material (except special nuclear material) yielded in, or made radioactive by, exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or using special nuclear material;
(2)(i) Any discrete source of radium-226 that is produced, extracted, or converted after extraction, before, on, or after August 8, 2005, for use for a commercial, medical, or research activity; or
(ii) Any material that—
(A) Has been made radioactive by use of a particle accelerator; and
(B) Is produced, extracted, or converted after extraction, before, on, or after August 8, 2005, for use for a commercial, medical, or research activity; and
(3) Any discrete source of naturally occurring radioactive material, other than source material, that—
(i) The Commission, in consultation with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the head of any other appropriate Federal agency, determines would pose a threat similar to the threat posed by a discrete source of radium-226 to the public health and safety or the common defense and security; and
(ii) Before, on, or after August 8, 2005, is extracted or converted after extraction for use in a commercial, medical, or research activity. Appendix B. Radionuclides and Quantities of Concern Regulated by NRC
Appendix C. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Security Orders to Licensees
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, NRC issued orders to its licensees to enhance the security of radioactive materials. Manufacturers and distributors of radioactive material (69 FR 5375, February 4, 2004).
|
This report analyzes 10 C.F.R. 37, a forthcoming rule promulgated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), "Physical Protection of Byproduct Material." "Byproduct material" includes specified types of radioactive material other than uranium or plutonium. The rule regulates byproduct material of types and in quantities that could be used to make a "dirty bomb."
Congress may find this analysis of interest for several reasons: Congress attaches great importance to protecting the United States against terrorist threats; the rule will affect the many industrial, research, and medical activities nationwide that use radioactive materials, thereby affecting many constituents and raising cost-benefit issues; and there is wide concern about regulation and radiation more generally.
NRC may regulate through orders or rules. Both have the effect of law. If prompt action is required, NRC may issue orders to its licensees. After 9/11, NRC issued orders to enhance radioactive material security. Orders went to licensees of irradiators having a large amount of radioactive material (2003), manufacturers and distributors of radioactive material (2004), licensees transporting radioactive materials in quantities of concern (2005), and others.
NRC prefers, however, to regulate through rules. The rulemaking process is transparent, as it solicits public comments and revises draft rules to reflect them, a process that may take years, whereas NRC may issue orders with little or no public involvement. An order applies only to licensees receiving it, while a rule applies to all current and future licensees. Accordingly, NRC began a rulemaking process to consolidate the security orders into a rule. It solicited public comments in the June 15, 2010, Federal Register.
10 C.F.R. 37 incorporates many provisions of the orders. Its main areas are:
Background investigations and access control programs, setting trustworthiness and reliability (T&R) requirements for persons granted unescorted access to radioactive material in quantities of concern. Physical protection requirements during use, requiring licensees to establish a written security program, coordinate with local law enforcement, and be able to monitor, detect, and assess theft of radioactive material. Physical protection in transit, requiring transporters of radioactive material to follow certain procedures.
To assess impacts of the rule, CRS interviewed 14 radiation professionals, including state regulators, university radiation safety officers, manufacturers and distributors of radioactive material, and a transportation specialist. They noted such impacts as:
T&R adjudication: Some interviewees felt requirements were burdensome; others could meet requirements easily. Some felt human resources staff lacked expertise needed to adjudicate T&R; others were confident in staff capability. Cooperation with local law enforcement: Some interviewees felt that cooperation was excellent. Some found it improved greatly once the threat had been explained. Others found poor cooperation. Still others noted that multiple emergencies or the size of an officer's patrol area could delay response. Transportation security: NRC relinquishes parts of its regulatory authority to certain states. One interviewee felt the Department of Transportation, not NRC and states, should regulate transport of radioactive materials to establish uniform national requirements: "when transportation requirements are set by many [state] regulators and by federal interstate commerce rules as well, compliance with transportation regulations can become very complicated."
The analysis raises several general points:
The orders imposed many requirements on licensees. Since the rule incorporates many of these requirements, it imposes less additional regulatory burden than would have been the case if the orders had not been issued first. Since the rule requires many actions regardless of facility size, it would appear to impose a proportionately larger burden on small licensees. The rule implements a layered defense. The ability of one layer to offset weaknesses in others should improve security but cannot guarantee it. Further steps—such as requiring licensees to install more monitoring equipment or mandating more stringent requirements for adjudicating personnel reliability—might increase security beyond what the rule provides. Whether their costs are worth potential benefits is a matter for political judgment.
|
crs_R41818
|
crs_R41818_0
|
Introduction
Enactment of P.L. Under the law, the head of each executive agency of the federal government is required to establish and implement a policy under which employees shall be authorized to telework. The policy must ensure that telework does not diminish employee performance or agency operations. The law defines telework as a work flexibility arrangement under which an employee performs the duties and responsibilities of his or her position, and other authorized activities, from an approved worksite other than the location from which the employee would otherwise work. To participate in telework, an employee must enter into a written agreement with the agency. These issues, as well as the development of the Telework Managing Officer's role; the establishment of training programs for managers and supervisors and the employees under their direction who telework; the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and Government Accountability Office (GAO) evaluations of the law's implementation; the operation of the test program on travel expenses; and the documentation of measureable outcomes resulting from telework are among those that the House and Senate may focus on in exercising oversight of the law's implementation. 111-292, the Telework Enhancement Act of 20105
The law amends Part III of Title 5 of the United States Code by adding a new chapter, Chapter 65, on telework. Executive Agency Telework Policies
Within 180 days (by June 7, 2011) after the enactment of Chapter 65, the head of each executive agency is required to establish a telework policy under which eligible employees would be authorized to telework, determine the eligibility of all employees to participate in telework, and notify all employees of their eligibility. Executive agencies are updating their telework plans. Continuity of Operations Plans (COOP)15
An agency's telework policy must be incorporated as part of its continuity of operations plans in the event of an emergency. During any period that an executive agency is operating under a COOP plan, that plan supersedes any telework policy. An employee whose official duties require on a daily basis (every work day) direct handling of secure materials determined to be inappropriate for telework by the agency head, or on-site activity that cannot be handled remotely or at an alternate worksite, is not eligible to telework, except in emergency situations, as determined by the agency head. The CG is directed to review the OPM report submitted to Congress and then submit a report to Congress on the progress each executive agency has made toward its established goals on telework. Reports by Chief Human Capital Officers
The CHCO of each executive agency, in consultation with the agency's TMO, must submit an annual report to the chair and vice chair of the CHCO Council on the agency's management efforts to promote telework. The report of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs that accompanied S. 707 explained the provision:
For example, if an agency wishes to recruit an individual who lives a substantial distance from the agency and who wants to telework, the agency might use the test program to pay for the employee's occasional trips to the agency's offices....[T]elework travel test programs must be designed to save the Government money, so the agency would have to demonstrate that its ability to pay teleworkers travel expenses would yield gains in efficiency and productivity that would more than make up for the increased travel expenses paid by the agency....[I]f an employee voluntarily relocates away from the employee's pre-existing duty station, and if the agency wishes to retain the employee as a teleworker, the agency may establish a reasonable number of occasional visits to the agency offices that the employee must make at the employee's own expense before the employee would become eligible for reimbursement of travel expenses by the agency. Up to 10 test programs may be conducted simultaneously. Possible Issues for Oversight by Congress
As P.L.
|
The Telework Enhancement Act of 2010, enacted as P.L. 111-292 (December 9, 2010), requires the head of each executive agency to establish and implement a policy under which employees shall be authorized to telework.
The law amends Title 5 of the United States Code by adding a new chapter, Chapter 65, entitled "Telework," and defines telework as a work flexibility arrangement under which an employee performs the duties and responsibilities of his or her position, and other authorized activities, from an approved worksite other than the location from which the employee would otherwise work. The head of each executive agency is required to establish a policy under which employees (with some exceptions) would be authorized to telework. The policy on telework must be established within 180 days after enactment of the new Chapter 65 of Title 5 United States Code and ensure that telework does not diminish employee performance or agency operations. Executive agency employees not eligible for telework generally include those whose official duties require the daily (every work day), direct handling of secure materials determined to be inappropriate for telework by the agency head, or on-site activity that cannot be handled remotely or at an alternate worksite. Employees are required to enter into written agreements with their agencies before participating in telework. Each executive agency must appoint a Telework Managing Officer, who is responsible for implementing the telework policies, and provide training to managers, supervisors, and employees participating in telework. The telework policy must be incorporated as part of an executive agency's continuity of operations plans (COOP) in the event of an emergency. When an executive agency is operating under a COOP plan, that plan must supersede any telework policy. The Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is directed to submit annual reports on telework to Congress, and the Comptroller General (CG) is directed to review the OPM report and then annually report to Congress on the progress of executive agencies in implementing telework. The CG also will annually submit a report to Congress on telework at the Government Accountability Office. The agency chief human capital officers (CHCOs) will annually report to the chair and vice-chair of the CHCO Council on telework in their organizations. Test programs for telework travel expenses are authorized. Such programs are authorized for seven years and no more than 10 programs may be conducted simultaneously.
As executive agencies implement the law on telework, Congress may wish to examine several issues, including the policies and guidance that the Office of Management and Budget and OPM, respectively, will be prescribing on the security of information and systems during telework, and the operation of executive agency telework programs. This report summarizes the provisions of P.L. 111-292 and identifies several possible issues for congressional oversight of telework. It will be updated as the law is implemented.
|
crs_RL30605
|
crs_RL30605_0
|
Over the years, Congress has focused on
the overall cost of the U.S. assessment to the regular budget per year, as well as any outstanding contributions; how the United States assessment compares to the assessments of other U.N. member states; and how the United States' payment of its assessed contributions over time compares with other U.N. member states. In 2010—the last calendar year for which data are publicly available—the United States was the single largest contributor to the regular budget, paying $532,435,102, or 22%, in assessed contributions. The next largest contributors were Japan (12.530%), Germany (8.018%), the United Kingdom (6.604%), and France (6.123%). This report highlights, for each of the past 20 years, payments and the total outstanding contributions of the top contributors to the U.N. regular budget—including the United States.
|
The United States is the single largest contributor to the United Nations (U.N.) regular budget. As such, Members of the 113th Congress will likely continue to demonstrate an interest in the United States' assessment level, the cost of the U.S. assessment each year, how U.S. contributions to the regular budget compare to those of other countries, and how assessment levels have changed over time.
This report provides the assessment level, actual payment, and total outstanding contributions for the United States and other selected U.N. member states from 1990 to 2010—the last year for which data are publicly available. In 2010, the United States was assessed to pay 22% (or $532,435,102) of the regular budget. The next largest contributors were Japan (12.53%), Germany (8.018%), the United Kingdom (6.604%), and France (6.112%).
This report is updated annually, or as the U.N. document upon which the data are based is published.
|
crs_R41183
|
crs_R41183_0
|
Introduction
The United States witnessed an increase in sex offender management policy at the federal, state, and local levels beginning in the 1990s. As a result, laws have been enacted which impose a variety of post-incarceration controls on sex offenders. In two cases decided in the spring of 2010, United States v. Comstock and United States v. Carr , the U.S. Supreme Court addressed questions raised by federal civil commitment and registration requirements. Proponents of strong post-incarceration controls argue that the restrictions are necessary to reduce a demonstrably high recidivism rate, safeguard potential victims, and assist law enforcement in tracking offenders. Opponents question the restrictions' efficacy and argue that they are disproportionate to the crimes committed. These and other policy issues may be informed by judicial determinations. This report examines background and case law related to registration requirements and residency restrictions. Most recently, Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (Adam Walsh Act). They organize persons convicted of sex offenses into three tiers, calling for progressively more scrutiny and longer registration requirements for each tier. With a few notable exceptions, the U.S. courts of appeals have upheld the federal registration provisions and § 2250. Federal courts have distinguished Lambert in cases challenging SORNA. Legislators and others are debating the efficacy of these restrictions as courts are determining the constitutional limits of enacting such laws. On the federal level, defendants have been unsuccessful with their challenges. In determining whether the statute's punitive effects were sufficient to negate or override the legislature's intent to create a civil, non-punitive regulatory scheme, the court relied on the five factors the Court used in Smith v. Doe : (1) whether the law has been regarded in U.S. history and traditions as punishment; (2) whether it promotes the traditional aims of punishment (deterrence and/or retribution); (3) whether it imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; (4) whether it has a rational connection to a non-punitive purpose; and (5) whether it is excessive with respect to that purpose. Conversely, in Lee v. State , the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals upheld Alabama's sex offender residency restriction statute against an ex post facto challenge. As restrictions have increased in both number and severity, questions arise. For example, is it possible that a statute's effect is so punitive as to negate a legislature's apparent non-punitive intent? Under what circumstances may these restrictions be applied?
|
The United States witnessed increased attention to sex offender management policy at the federal, state, and local levels beginning in the 1990s. As a result, laws have been enacted which impose a variety of post-incarceration controls on sex offenders, including but not limited to registration and community notification requirements, civil commitment, global positioning system (GPS) monitoring and tracking, and residency restrictions. Two recent U.S. Supreme Court cases—United States v. Carr and United States v. Comstock—involved challenges to such controls passed at the federal level. This report provides background information and examines relevant case law, with a particular focus on registration requirements and residency restrictions.
Legislation enacted to protect the community from sex offenders is not a novel concept. At the federal level, Congress has passed a series of laws adopting the use of sex offender registries and community notification for sexually violent offenders and those committing offenses against children. Most recently, as part of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-248), Congress passed the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). The statute categorizes sex offenders into three tiers, with progressively longer and more scrutinizing registration requirements for each tier.
Proponents argue that post-incarceration restrictions are necessary to reduce a demonstrably high recidivism rate, safeguard potential victims, and assist law enforcement in tracking offenders. Opponents question the restrictions' practical impact on recidivism rates and argue that the controls may be disproportionate to the crimes committed.
As some commentators question the efficacy of these controls, courts are assessing their constitutionality. Defendants have invoked a myriad of constitutional grounds in challenges to post-conviction restrictions. With some exceptions, federal courts have generally upheld the restrictions. For example, in a 2003 case, Smith v. Doe, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Alaska's sex offender registration requirements against an ex post facto challenge. Applying Smith, federal courts of appeals have also generally upheld the federal registration law against such challenges. However, as restrictions have increased in both number and severity, questions remain. Is it possible that a statute's purpose or effect is so punitive as to negate a legislature's apparent non-punitive intent? Under what circumstances may these restrictions be applied? Can states and localities apply these restrictions retroactively? These are some of the issues likely to emerge in pending and future federal court cases.
|
crs_RL31265
|
crs_RL31265_0
|
This report provides an overview and policy analysis of the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group in the Philippines and the Philippine-U.S. program of military cooperation against it. It examines the origins and operations of Abu Sayyaf, the efforts of the Philippine government and military to eliminate it, the implications of a greater U.S. military role in attempts to suppress it, and the implications for dealing with the broader problem of Muslim insurgency and terrorism in the Philippines. Muslims revolted in the 1970s under a Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which demanded an independent Muslim state. An estimated 120,000 people were killed in the 1970s in heavy fighting between the MNLF and the Philippine armed forces (AFP). A segment of the MNLF broke away in 1978 and formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The MILF gained strength into the 1990s. However, peace talks have come to a stalemate, and elements of the MILF have increased cooperation with Jeemah Islamiah, an Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist group that emerged in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States. Second, in the late 1990s, Jeemah Islamiah and Al Qaeda cadre began to use MILF bases on Mindanao for training and planning operations, which brought JI into direct contact with Abu Sayyaf. Several joint bombing operations followed. Abu Sayyaf-JI collaboration also resulted in another important development in Abu Sayyaf's emergence after 2000 as a bona fide member of the Al Qaeda-backed Southeast Asian terrorist network: Abu Sayyaf gained access to MILF camps where JI-MILF training was ongoing, and MILF commands began to support Abu Sayyaf-JI bombings. The July 2007 ambush of the Philippine Marines on Basilan may be another case of cooperation between a local MILF command and Abu Sayyaf, given the longstanding ties between the two groups on Basilan and the reported Abu Sayyaf attempt to re-establish a significant presence on Basilan after the setbacks suffered in 2002 as a result of the Philippine military operations supported by the United States. Unlike Muslims of the southern Philippines, the RSM appears to be composed primarily of Filipinos from the northern Philippines, including the Manila area. Philippine Government and AFP Policies and Operations
The basic Philippine government policy since August 2000 has been constant military pressure on Abu Sayyaf. AFP operations have been limited by several factors. The early proposals of the Bush Administration envisaged a large, direct, and assertive role for U.S. forces: a direct combat role for U.S. military personnel, the commitment of the elite Delta Force to lead operations to rescue the Burnhams, and assistance to the AFP against Abu Sayyaf. In February 2002, the United States dispatched 1,300 U.S. troops to provide training, advice, and other non-combat assistance to 1,200 Filipino troops against Abu Sayyaf on Basilan island in an operation dubbed "Balikatan" (shoulder-to-shoulder). The Bush Administration's initiative in offering 350 U.S. personnel to conduct civic action projects on Basilan reportedly proved popular with the people on the island and probably helped to neutralize public support for Abu Sayyaf on the island. U.S. Support Role on Jolo Island and in Western Mindanao
A key decision for post-July 31 cooperation was whether to extend the U.S. support and assistance role southward from Basilan to Jolo (pronounced "Holo") and other islands in the Sulu group where Abu Sayyaf continued to operate. Abu Sayyaf strength on Jolo is down to an estimated 200-300. In May 2005, U.S. The U.S. initial U.S.-AFP training exercise drew a protest march by Muslim civilian groups allied with the MILF and a warning from an MILF central committee official over the increasing presence of U.S. military forces in the Muslim areas of Mindanao.
|
From January 2002 until July 31, 2002, the United States committed nearly 1,300 troops to the Philippines to assist Philippine armed forces (AFP) in operations against the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group in the southern Philippines, on the island of Basilan southwest of Mindanao. From 2005 into 2007, the U.S. committed up to 450 military personnel to western Mindanao and Jolo island south of Basilan These U.S. non-combat, support operations were in response to Philippine President Arroyo's strong support of the United States following the September 11 Al Qaeda attack on the United States. A historic Muslim resistance to non-Muslim rulers in the Philippines broke out into massive rebellion in the 1970s. Two large resistance groups, a Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and a Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) fought the Philippine government into the 1990s and entered into tenuous truces in 1996 and 2001 respectively. Abu Sayyaf emerged in 1990 as a splinter group composed of former MNLF fighters and Filipinos who had fought in Afghanistan. Abu Sayyaf resorted to terrorist tactics, including executions of civilians, bombings, and increasingly kidnapings for ransom. Abu Sayyaf had links with Osamu bin Laden's Al Qaeda organization in the early 1990s, but these links reportedly dwindled in the late 1990s. After the 2002 Balikatan operation, the remaining Abu Sayyaf leadership established links with Jeemah Islamiah (JI), an Al Qaeda-affiliated group in Southeast Asia that had begun to use Mindanao for training and organizing terrorist strikes. Abu Sayyaf also established links with Rajah Solaiman, a radical Muslim group made up of Filipinos from the northern Philippines who had converted to Islam. Together, these groups carried out major bombings after 2003, including bombings in metropolitan Manila.
Philippine government policy has been to apply military pressure on Abu Sayyaf. Operations have been constrained by several factors including difficult terrain, inadequate Philippine military equipment, avoiding clashing with the MILF and MNLF, and reportedly high level of corruption in the Philippine military. U.S. military support, however, did achieve successes. AFP operations against Abu Sayyaf became more aggressive and effective against Abu Sayyaf on Basilan in 2002 and on Jolo island in 2006-2007; Abu Sayyaf strength was seriously eroded to an estimated 200-300, and key commanders have been killed. AFP commanders praised U.S. equipment, U.S. intelligence gathering, and U.S. assistance in planning AFP operations. The U.S. military's civic action projects on Basilan and Jolo appeared to weaken support for Abu Sayyaf on the islands. In 2005, U.S. forces began direct support missions for the Philippine military in western Mindanao against Abu Sayyaf, and U.S. military personnel began joint training exercises with the AFP in MILF areas of Mindanao. U.S. officials expressed concern over the presence of JI on Mindanao and links among JI, Abu Sayyaf, and the MILF. The Bush Administration supported the ongoing peace talks between the Philippine government and the MILF as the best means of eroding the MILF-JI linkage. However, coordination among Abu Sayyaf, JI, and elements of the MILF present the threat of a wider terrorist war in the Philippines and could confront the Bush Administration with decisions for greater U.S. involvement.
|
crs_R42981
|
crs_R42981_0
|
The term "set-aside" is commonly used to refer to a competition in which only small businesses may compete. In support of this policy, Congress has authorized agencies to conduct set-asides and make sole-source awards to small businesses, among other things. Specifically, with various provisions of the Small Business Act of 1958, as amended, Congress has permitted federal agencies to conduct competitive set-asides for small businesses, as well as for specific types of small businesses (i.e., small disadvantaged businesses (SDBs) participating in the "8(a) Program," Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) small businesses, women-owned small businesses (WOSBs), and service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses (SDVOSBs)). The Small Business Act also authorizes federal agencies to make sole-source awards to 8(a) participants, HUBZone small businesses, SDVOSBs, and WOSBs in certain circumstances, as well as grant price evaluation adjustment preferences to HUBZone small businesses in unrestricted competitions. In addition, the Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act of 2006, as amended, grants the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) additional authority to conduct competitive set-asides for, and make sole-source awards to, SDVOSBs and other veteran-owned small businesses (VOSBs). The 112 th Congress enacted legislation that expands agencies' authority to conduct competitive set-asides for WOSBs, while the 113 th Congress enacted legislation that permits sole-source awards to such firms. Specifically, on February 22, 2016, the Court is scheduled to hear oral arguments in Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States , a case in which a SDVOSB challenges the Department of Veterans Affairs' procurement of certain supplies and services through the Federal Supply Schedules, rather than through a set-aside for SDVOSBs or VOSBs. Then, it turns to the legal issues, including (1) the implementation of the "Rule of Two," which permits or, in some cases, requires that agencies use set-asides when offers can reasonably be expected from at least two small businesses, and the award made at a fair price; (2) when agencies may be required to use set-asides for small businesses; (3) partial set-asides of contracts that cannot be totally set aside for small businesses; (4) set-asides under certain indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity (ID/IQ) contracts (i.e., contracts that call for the contractor to supply quantities of goods or services that are unknown at the time of contracting to the government upon the government's order); (5) priority of and among the set-aside programs; and (6) limitations on the use of small business set-asides. The Small Business Act does not expressly contemplate such exclusions. Small Purchases "Reserved" Under the Small Business Act
Congress amended the Small Business Act in 1978 to address agencies' use of small businesses when making "small purchases." However, larger purchases differ in that agencies may not use simplified acquisition procedures, but instead must use either sealed bidding or contracting by negotiation when conducting a competitive set-aside. Contracts whose value exceeds the competitive threshold must generally be competed whenever the Rule of Two is satisfied (i.e., the contracting officer reasonably expects offers from at least two responsible 8(a) firms, and the award can be made at fair market price).
|
It has long been the "declared policy of the Congress" that a "fair proportion" of federal contracts be awarded to small businesses. In support of this policy, Congress has enacted various statutes authorizing procuring agencies to conduct competitions in which only small businesses may compete, or to make noncompetitive ("sole-source") awards to such firms in circumstances when similar awards could not be made to other firms.
Federal agencies can award contracts to small businesses by several different methods, depending upon the value of the contract and the number of small businesses likely to submit offers, among other factors.
"Small purchases" valued at between $3,500 and $150,000 are "reserved exclusively" for small businesses and are generally made using simplified acquisition procedures (e.g., purchase orders, blanket purchase agreements), sealed bidding, or contracting by negotiation. Contracts whose value exceeds $150,000 can be awarded via sealed bidding or contracting by negotiation in competitions in which only small businesses may participate (i.e., "competitive set-asides"), so long as the contracting officer reasonably expects offers from at least two small businesses, and the award can be made at fair market price. Contracts whose value exceeds $150,000 can, in some cases, be entered into by negotiating directly with a small business if the contracting officer does not reasonably expect offers from at least two small businesses.
All the foregoing are authorized under the Small Business Act, which permits federal agencies to conduct competitive set-asides for small businesses, as well as for specific types of small businesses (i.e., small disadvantaged businesses (SDBs) participating in the "8(a) Program" (8(a) firms), Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) small businesses, women-owned small businesses (WOSBs), and service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses (SDVOSBs)). The Small Business Act also authorizes agencies to make sole-source awards to 8(a) firms, HUBZone small businesses, SDVOSBs, and WOSBs in certain circumstances. In addition, the Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act of 2006, as amended, grants the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) additional authority to conduct competitive set-asides for, and make sole-source awards to, SDVOSBs and other veteran-owned small businesses (VOSBs).
Small business set-asides are of perennial interest to Congress because of their role in effectuating the congressional policy of assisting small businesses. For example, the 112th Congress enacted legislation (P.L. 112-239) that expanded agencies' authority to conduct competitive set-asides for WOSBs, while the 113th Congress enacted legislation that permits sole-source awards to such businesses (P.L. 113-291). In addition, on February 22, 2016, the Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral arguments in Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States, a case in which a SDVOSB challenges the Department of Veterans Affairs' procurement of certain supplies and services through the Federal Supply Schedules, rather than through a set-aside for SDVOSBs or VOSBs. For more information on this case, see CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1322, UPDATED: Supreme Court Postpones Oral Arguments in Challenge to the Department of Veterans Affairs' Practices as to Contracting "Set-Asides" for Veteran-Owned Small Businesses, by [author name scrubbed].
|
crs_R40118
|
crs_R40118_0
|
Introduction
The HOME Investment Partnerships Program was created by the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990 ( P.L. 101-625 ). HOME is a federal block grant program administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) that provides funding for affordable housing activities to states and certain localities through formula grants. States and localities that receive HOME grants can choose to fund a wide range of rental and homeownership housing activities that benefit low-income households in order to best meet local affordable housing needs. The HOME Program
This section of the report describes the structure of the HOME program, including the requirements that states and localities must meet in order to receive their own allocations of HOME funds, eligible uses of program funds, and certain requirements that HOME-assisted housing must meet. A participating jurisdiction can administer HOME funds itself, or it can designate a public agency or nonprofit organization to administer all or part of the HOME program on its behalf. Participating jurisdictions or their subrecipients can distribute funds to a variety of organizations to undertake specific projects. Accordingly, all HOME funds must be used to assist low-income households, which are defined as households with annual incomes at or below 80% of area median income (AMI). At least 90% of HOME-assisted rental units must be occupied by households whose incomes are at or below 60% of area median income, and at least 90% of households that receive tenant-based rental assistance with HOME funds must have incomes at or below 60% of area median income. Rental units must continue to meet these requirements for between five and twenty years, depending on the per-unit amount of HOME funds expended on a project and the type of activity for which HOME funds are used. By law, 40% of the funds are allocated to states and the remaining 60% are allocated to localities. For the purposes of the HOME program, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico are considered to be states. In FY2014, the amount set aside for the insular areas was $2 million. The HOME formula takes into account six factors. The number of families at or below the poverty level in a jurisdiction. The median state grant amount was about $6 million, and the mean grant was close to $8 million. Accordingly, the HOME statute requires participating jurisdictions to match the HOME funds that they spend in a fiscal year with their own 25% permanent contribution to affordable housing activities. Types of Activities (Rehabilitation, Acquisition, New Construction, or Tenant-Based Rental Assistance)
Eligible uses of HOME funds generally fall into four categories: owner-occupied housing rehabilitation activities, assistance to home buyers, rental housing development activities, and tenant-based rental assistance (TBRA). As described earlier in the " The Consolidated Plan " section of this report, PJs submit Consolidated Plans to HUD describing their affordable housing needs and specifying how HOME funds will be used to meet those needs.
|
The HOME Investment Partnerships Program was authorized by the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-625). HOME is a federal block grant program that provides funding to states and localities to be used exclusively for affordable housing activities to benefit low-income households.
Funds for HOME are appropriated annually to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which in turn distributes funding to states and certain localities by formula. Forty percent of HOME funds are allocated to states and 60% are allocated to localities. The formula takes into account six factors, including the number of units in a jurisdiction that are substandard or unaffordable, the age of a jurisdiction's housing, and the number of families living below the poverty line in the jurisdiction.
States and localities that receive HOME funds are known as "participating jurisdictions." Participating jurisdictions must match the HOME funds they spend with their own 25% permanent contribution to affordable housing activities. They also must submit a Consolidated Plan to HUD that identifies the community's housing needs and describes in detail how HOME and other HUD block grant funds will be used to meet those needs. Participating jurisdictions can administer HOME funds themselves, or they can designate public agencies or nonprofit organizations to administer all or part of the HOME program on their behalf.
HOME funds can be used to finance a wide variety of affordable housing activities that generally fall into four categories: rehabilitation of owner-occupied housing; assistance to home buyers; acquisition, rehabilitation, or construction of rental housing; and tenant-based rental assistance. Projects that use HOME funding must meet certain income targeting and affordability requirements. Specifically, all HOME-assisted housing units must benefit households with incomes at or below 80% of area median income. Additionally, 90% of occupants of HOME-assisted rental units and households that receive tenant-based rental assistance must have incomes at or below 60% of area median income. HOME-assisted housing must also meet certain definitions of affordability and must continue to remain affordable to low-income households for a specified period of time. The specific affordability requirements vary according to the type of activity for which funds are used and the amount of HOME funding contributed to the project.
Funding for HOME fluctuated between $1.5 billion and $2 billion for several years before falling to $1 billion in FY2012-FY2014. (The FY2013 appropriation was about $950 million after accounting for sequestration.) In FY2014, all 50 states and 587 localities received HOME formula grants, along with the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and four insular areas. The median state grant amount (including the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico) was about $6 million, and the median locality grant amount was about $580,000.
|
crs_R41610
|
crs_R41610_0
|
The act initially designated 54 wilderness areas containing 9.1 million acres of federal land within the national forests. Since then, Congress has passed more than 100 subsequent laws designating additional wilderness areas. As of September, 1, 2017, the National Wilderness Preservation System totaled 765 areas, spanning nearly 110 million acres. Many believe that certain areas should be designated to protect and preserve their unique value and characteristics, and bills are usually introduced in each Congress to designate wilderness areas. Wilderness Designations and Prohibited and Permitted Uses
In the Wilderness Act, Congress reserved for itself the authority to designate federal lands as part of the system. Wilderness areas are part of existing units of federal land administered by the four federal land management agencies—the Forest Service (FS), in the Department of Agriculture; and the National Park Service (NPS); Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS); and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) within the Department of the Interior (DOI). Wilderness designations can be controversial because the Wilderness Act (and subsequent laws) restricts the allowed uses of the land within designated areas. Wilderness designations are permanent unless revised by law. Congress has statutorily removed lands from several wilderness areas, commonly to adjust boundaries to delete private lands or roads included inadvertently in the original designation. Various existing wilderness statutes have included special access provisions for particular needs. Debate Surrounding Wilderness Designations
Proponents of adding new areas to the National Wilderness Preservation System generally seek designations of specific areas to preserve them in their current condition and to prevent development activities from altering their wilderness character. Rather, deliberations commonly focus on trying to maximize the benefits of preserving pristine areas and minimize the resulting opportunity costs. Issues and Legislation in the 115th Congress
In general, Congress addresses several issues when drafting and considering wilderness bills. These issues include the general pros and cons of wilderness designation—generally and regarding identified areas of interest—and specific provisions regarding management of wilderness areas to allow or prohibit certain uses. In the 114 th Congress, more than 30 bills were introduced to designate new or add to existing wilderness areas, and one was enacted: P.L. Management in Accordance with the Wilderness Act
Most bills direct that the designated areas are to be managed in accordance with the Wilderness Act, meaning human impacts, such as commercial activities, motorized and mechanical access, and infrastructure developments, are generally prohibited. Some bills designating wilderness areas may terminate or accommodate any existing nonconforming uses or conditions, however. The enabling statutes for two of the five border wilderness areas contain specific language authorizing access for border security reasons. For example, H.R. Similar bills were introduced in previous Congresses. Wilderness Study Areas and Reviews for Wilderness Potential
Congress directed FS and BLM to initially evaluate the wilderness potential of their lands at different times, and these wilderness reviews have been controversial. Although these areas have been reviewed and several statutes have been enacted to designate BLM wilderness areas based on them, many of the wilderness recommendations for BLM lands remain pending before Congress. It is unclear, however, whether BLM is required to conduct any future assessments of the wilderness potential of its lands. 114th Congress Wilderness Legislation
The 114 th Congress added 275,665 acres to the wilderness system by either adding new wilderness areas or expanding existing areas. Many other bills to designate additional wilderness areas were introduced and considered (see Table A-1 ).
|
The Wilderness Act of 1964 established the National Wilderness Preservation System and, in it, Congress reserved for itself the authority to designate federal lands as part of the system. The act initially designated 54 wilderness areas containing 9.1 million acres of national forest lands. Since then, more than 100 laws designating wilderness areas have been enacted. As of September 2017, the system consisted of 110 million acres over 765 units, owned by four land management agencies: the Forest Service (FS), in the Department of Agriculture; the National Park Service (NPS); Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS); and Bureau of Land Management (BLM) within the Department of the Interior (DOI). The act also directed the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior to review certain lands for their wilderness potential.
Free-standing bills to designate wilderness areas are typically introduced and considered in each Congress; such bills are not amendments to the Wilderness Act, but typically refer to the act for management guidance and sometimes include special provisions. The 114th Congress considered many bills to add to the wilderness system, and one was enacted into law—P.L. 114-46—designating three additional wilderness areas totaling 275,665 acres. To date, several bills have been introduced in the 115th Congress to designate additional wilderness areas.
Wilderness designations can be controversial. The designation generally prohibits commercial activities, motorized access, and human infrastructure from wilderness areas; however, there are several exceptions to this general rule. Advocates propose wilderness designations to preserve the generally undeveloped conditions of the areas. Opponents express concern that such designations prevent certain uses and potential economic development in rural areas where such opportunities are relatively limited. The potential benefits or costs of wilderness designations are difficult to value or quantify. Thus, wilderness deliberations commonly focus on trying to maximize the benefits of preserving pristine areas while minimizing potential opportunity costs. Wilderness debates also focus on the extent of the National Wilderness Preservation System and whether it is of sufficient size or whether lands should be added or subtracted.
Most bills direct management of designated wilderness in accordance with the Wilderness Act. However, proposed legislation also often seeks a compromise among interests by allowing other activities in the area. Preexisting uses or conditions may be allowed to continue, sometimes temporarily, with or without halting or rectifying any associated nonconforming uses or conditions. Wilderness bills also often contain additional provisions, such as providing special access for particular purposes, for example, border security. Water rights associated with wilderness designations have also proved controversial; many statutes have addressed water rights in specific wilderness areas. In some cases, Congress has statutorily removed lands from several wilderness areas, commonly to adjust boundaries to delete private lands or roads included inadvertently in the original designation.
Controversies regarding management of existing wilderness areas also have been the subject of legislation. In previous Congresses, bills have been introduced to expand access to wilderness areas for border security; to guarantee access for hunting, fishing, and shooting; to release wilderness study areas (WSAs) from wilderness-like protection; and to limit agency review of the wilderness potential of their lands. The latter two issues have been contentious for BLM lands because BLM is required by law to protect the wilderness characteristics of its WSAs until Congress determines otherwise.
|
crs_98-819
|
crs_98-819_0
|
This report provides an overview of the legal requirements for dual citizenship and some of the issues concerning dual citizenship. There are several potential problems and issues falling into two categories—first, actions which may result in expatriation from the U.S., i.e. , loss of American citizenship, and second, potentially conflicting obligations to both countries, e.g. , mandatory military service for men, double income taxation, voting privileges, public office or employment and repatriation of income from employment or investment abroad. The report will first discuss the legal basis for dual citizenship, then the expatriation actions, the potentially conflicting obligations of holding citizenship of the U.S. and another nation, the dual citizenship laws and legislative activity of selected countries in which a significant number of U.S. citizens may be eligible for dual citizenship, and finally, current legislative activity in the 105 th Congress.
|
This report provides an overview of the legal requirements for dual citizenship and some of the issues concerning dual citizenship. There are several potential problems and issues falling into two categories—first, actions which may result in expatriation from the U.S., i.e., loss of American citizenship, and second, potentially conflicting obligations to both countries, e.g., mandatory military service for men, double income taxation, voting privileges, public office or employment and repatriation of income from employment or investment abroad. The report will first discuss the legal basis for dual citizenship, then the expatriation actions, the potentially conflicting obligations of holding citizenship of the U.S. and another nation, the dual citizenship laws and legislative activity of selected countries in which a significant number of U.S. citizens may be eligible for dual citizenship, and finally, current legislative activity in the 105th Congress.
|
crs_R43367
|
crs_R43367_0
|
Even though housing markets showed some signs of improvement, Congress continued to grapple with multiple issues related to the aftermath of the recent turmoil in housing and mortgage markets. These issues included considering large-scale reforms to the housing finance system and overseeing the implementation of new rules related to mortgage lending that were enacted in response to issues that were perceived to have contributed to the housing market collapse. Furthermore, in response to concerns about the long-term budget outlook, Congress has been providing less funding for many domestic discretionary programs, including housing programs primarily administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). In this light, the 113 th Congress considered issues such as how to prioritize funding for housing assistance programs in an environment of fiscal austerity, as well as possible reforms to certain housing assistance programs. These issues are broadly divided into two categories: issues related to homeownership and housing finance, and issues related to housing assistance for low-income households. Several new federal regulations related to mortgage lending that were mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act, P.L. Mortgage Market Composition
The mortgage market in recent years has largely consisted of mortgages insured by government agencies, such as the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), or purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that are currently under government control. Issues Related to Housing Finance and Homeownership
A number of the housing issues that were on the agenda of the 113 th Congress had to do with housing finance or homeownership. One major issue that Congress considered was the possible large-scale reform of the housing finance system. In the House, the PATH Act proposed to wind down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac over several years. Tax Exclusion for Canceled Mortgage Debt Income
A home foreclosure, mortgage default, or mortgage modification can have important tax consequences. Issues Related to Housing for Low-Income Individuals and Families
The 113 th Congress also deliberated on a number of issues related to housing assistance programs and policies. Several issues that were considered by Congress were related to funding for housing assistance programs and possible reforms to certain programs. No reform legislation was considered in the 113 th Congress. No reauthorization bill was enacted before the end of the 113 th Congress. Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
The low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC) program is one of the federal government's primary policy tools for encouraging the development and rehabilitation of affordable rental housing. That lawsuit was dismissed due to lack of standing in September 2014.
|
The 113th Congress was active in considering a number of housing-related issues. In general, these issues can be divided into two broad categories: (1) issues related to homeownership and financing home purchases, and (2) issues related to housing assistance programs for low-income households. Housing assistance for low-income households tends to be primarily, but not exclusively, related to rental housing.
During the 113th Congress, housing and mortgage markets showed some signs of recovering after several years of distress. Nevertheless, several issues that Congress considered were related to addressing problems that arose from the turmoil in housing and mortgage markets in recent years. Congress also considered policy changes designed to address problems that were perceived to have contributed to the housing downturn in an attempt to avoid a similar situation in the future.
One major issue that was on Congress's agenda was reform of the housing finance system. Specifically, Congress considered measures to wind down and possibly replace Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that purchase mortgages and package them into guaranteed mortgage-backed securities. Congress also considered reforms to the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), both as part of larger housing finance reform proposals and as stand-alone measures, in light of concerns about FHA's finances. However, no housing finance reform legislation or broad FHA reform legislation was enacted during the 113th Congress. Additionally, Congress was interested in overseeing the implementation of several mortgage-related rulemakings that were enacted as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203) in the 111th Congress, and deliberated on other issues related to housing finance.
Congress also considered a number of issues related to housing assistance for low-income individuals and families. In recent years, housing affordability issues have become more prevalent, partly due to the effects of the economic recession. At the same time, in response to growing concerns about the long-term budget outlook, less funding has been provided for many of the housing assistance programs administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Therefore, an issue before the 113th Congress was how to prioritize funding for housing programs. Congress also considered additional issues related to housing for low-income families, including extensions of certain provisions related to the low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC) program and efforts to reauthorize the major federal program that provides federal housing assistance to low-income Native Americans living in tribal areas.
Congress also weighed whether to extend certain housing-related tax provisions that expired at the end of 2013, such as the tax exclusion for canceled mortgage debt income.
|
crs_RS21907
|
crs_RS21907_0
|
The Abraham Lincoln penny (one cent) was introduced in 1909, the Thomas Jefferson nickel (five cents) was introduced in 1938, the Franklin D. Roosevelt dime (10 cents) was introduced in 1946, the George Washington quarter (25 cents) was introduced in 1932, the John F. Kennedy half-dollar (50 cents) was introduced in 1964, the Sacagawea dollar was introduced in 2000, and the Presidential dollar coin series began in 2007. All of the portrait changes were authorized by law. Previous Coin Tributes
During the 20 th century, three Presidents, Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and Kennedy, were honored shortly after their deaths by their images being placed on circulating U.S. coins. President Dwight D. Eisenhower was a two-term President first elected in 1952. Legislation (H.R. 14127) to place the likeness of President Eisenhower on a dollar coin was introduced in the fall of 1969. Current Legislation
Many tributes and memorials have been proposed to honor President Reagan. The project is in favor of redesigning circulating currency to incorporate the likeness of the late President. 4705 , the President Ronald Reagan $50 Bill Act, was introduced on February 25, 2010, by Representative Patrick T. McHenry and others, and referred to the House Committee on Financial Services. The bill would redesign the $50 note by replacing the portrait of President Ulysses S. Grant with the image of President Reagan. Placing the image of President Reagan on currency might invite a partisan fight. Finally, President Reagan's image will eventually be on the dollar coin as part of the ongoing Presidential dollar coin series.
|
President Ronald W. Reagan, the 40th President of the United States, died on June 5, 2004. Since President Reagan's death, there have been several attempts to pass legislation that would place the likeness of President Reagan on U.S. coin or currency. Similar action was taken after the death of Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and John F. Kennedy. The portrait of President Roosevelt was placed on the dime, President Kennedy's portrait was placed on the half dollar, and President Eisenhower's portrait was placed on a dollar coin. Current legislation (H.R. 4705, the President Ronald Reagan $50 Bill Act) would place the likeness of President Ronald W. Reagan on the circulating $50.
This report discusses the history of the current design of the circulating coin and currency and the statutory requirements for the designs and portrait changes. It reviews what was done after the deaths of the three other Presidents. It concludes with a discussion of the current proposal and describes possible issues raised by the legislation.
This report will be updated as warranted by events.
|
crs_R45016
|
crs_R45016_0
|
The attacks, allegedly conducted by a relatively new and little known Rohingya nationalist group, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), and an ensuing "clearance operation" conducted by Burma's security forces have resulted in the rapid displacement of more than 600,000 Rohingya into makeshift camps in eastern Bangladesh, and the internal displacement of an unknown number of people within Rakhine State. Starting in the 1960s under Burma's military juntas and continuing until today under a mixed civilian/military government, Burma's laws and policies have deprived most of the Rohingya of many of their human rights, including their citizenship. Some Rohingya may join the ranks of ARSA or become supporters of other more militant extremist organizations. The initial response from the State Department was to denounce the alleged ARSA attacks, and call upon the Burmese government and military to exercise restraint in responding to the attacks. Repatriation/Resettlement Issues : What are the prospects for safe and voluntary repatriation of the displaced Rohingya? Does the treatment of the Rohingya minority pose a radicalization risk for communities elsewhere in the region? 4223 ) and the Burma Human Rights and Freedom Act of 2017 ( S. 2060 ) would impose sanctions on selected Burmese military leaders, limit security and military assistance, and place conditions on multilateral assistance until the Burmese government and military meet certain criteria to address the various crises in Rakhine State. In 1982, Burma's military junta promulgated the Citizenship Law that effectively stripped the Rohingya of their citizenship. Tens of thousands are estimated to have been displaced internally. Many of those who have fled their homes and villages are reportedly being hosted by relatives and friends. Overcrowding is a critical problem. On September 20, 2017, the State Department announced that it would provide an additional $32 million in humanitarian assistance for the displaced people in Bangladesh and northern Rakhine State, with approximately $28 million allocated to assistance in Bangladesh and $4 million for Rakhine State. Trump Administration policy on humanitarian assistance to Burma is not known and the amount of humanitarian assistance to be provided in FY2018 has not been determined. It is unlikely that many of the displaced Rohingya possess documents to establish their prior residence in Burma given the circumstances under which they fled to Bangladesh. Allegations of Human Rights Violations
The United Nations, the local and international media, human rights organizations, and international humanitarian organizations have accused Burma's security forces of serious human rights abuses that may constitute ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, or possibly genocide during both "clearance operations" conducted following the October 2016 and August 2017 attacks on security installations. Many of the Rohingya and others who have arrived in Bangladesh following the two "clearance operations" claim that Tatmadaw soldiers entered their villages, and proceeded to kill civilians, rape women and girls, and then burn down the entire village. Senior Burmese government officials have also denied the human rights abuse allegations. In March 2017, the U.N. Human Rights Council approved a fact-finding mission to investigate alleged human rights violations in Rakhine State, but Aung San Suu Kyi has so far refused to permit the mission entry into Burma, stating that their presence "would have created greater hostility between the different communities." Displaced Rakhine may look to groups such as the Arakan Army, a Rakhine-based ethnic armed organization reportedly active in southern Chin State and northern Rakhine State, to defend them from ARSA. Secretary Tillerson also said, "We need to support Aung San Suu Kyi and her leadership but also be very clear to the military that are power-sharing in that government that this [the violence] is unacceptable." It is also their responsibility to investigate the reports of atrocities. The types of sanction imposed in the past included
a prohibition on issuing visas to certain Burmese nationals; a general ban on the import of goods of Burmese origin; a ban on the import of goods produced by certain Burmese companies or containing materials originating in Burma; a prohibition of new U.S. investments in Burma; the suspension of Burma's trade benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program; the freezing of assets owned by certain Burmese nationals and held by U.S. financial institutions; a prohibition of providing financial services to certain Burmese nationals; a prohibition on the sales of arms to Burma; restrictions on the types of bilateral and multilateral aid that can be given to Burma; and limitations on interaction with the Burmese military, or Tatmadaw. The Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability Act of 2017 (BURMA Act; H.R. Both bills would impose a visa ban on senior military officers involved in human rights abuses in Burma, place new restrictions on security assistance and military cooperation, reinstate the jadeite and ruby import ban of Section 3A of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act, and require U.S opposition to international financial institution (IFI) loans to Burma if the project involves an enterprise owned or directly or indirectly controlled by the military of Burma. S. 2060 also requires the President to review Burma's eligibility for the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program.
|
A series of interrelated humanitarian crises, stemming from more than 600,000 ethnic Rohingya who have fled Burma into neighboring Bangladesh in less than 10 weeks, pose challenges for the Trump Administration and Congress on how best to respond.
The flight of refugees came following attacks on security outposts in Burma's Rakhine State, reportedly by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), an armed organization claiming it is defending the rights of the region's predominately Muslim Rohingya minority, and an allegedly excessive military response by Burma's military. Some of the displaced Rohingya report that Burmese soldiers systematically killed civilians, sexually assaulted women and girls, and burned down their homes. The Burmese government and military have denied the veracity of these reports. An unknown number of Rohingya, Rakhine, and other ethnic minorities have been forced out of their villages into temporary camps within Rakhine State, while others remain isolated in their home villages under a government-imposed curfew.
In Bangladesh, an estimated 700,000-900,000 Rohingya—including people who fled Burma during earlier instances of violence—require urgent humanitarian assistance. In Burma, tens of thousands are in need of humanitarian assistance, but the Burmese government and military have restricted access to the affected areas. Efforts to facilitate the voluntary and safe return of the displaced Rohingya and other ethnic minorities to their original villages face several problems. Bangladesh and Burma have been unable to agree to terms for repatriation. Many of the villages have been destroyed, raising questions about when the people can return and where they will go. It is also uncertain how many of the displaced Rohingya are willing to return to Burma, given the nation's history of discriminatory policies and practices, including a 1982 law that effectively stripped them of their citizenship.
The crises raise questions about U.S. policy toward Burma, following its transition to a civilian/military government after six decades of military rule. The day before the August 2017 attacks, a special commission established by Burma's de facto leader, State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, and headed by former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, made a series of recommendations on how to end ethnic tensions in Rakhine State, including calling for the repeal of the anti-Rohingya laws and regulations. While Aung San Suu Kyi accepted most of those recommendations, it is unclear how soon and to what extent they will be implemented.
The human rights allegations have led some observers to say the Burmese military is guilty of crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. The Burmese government and others assert that ARSA is a terrorist organization. The United Nations Human Rights Council has created a special, fact-finding mission to investigate human rights violations in Burma, but the Burmese government and military have dismissed the allegations of widespread human rights violations and have refused to allow the fact-finding mission into Burma.
The displaced Rohingya in Bangladesh may also pose a serious radicalization risk. Some Rohingya may be recruited by ARSA or Islamist extremist groups. Some Rakhine may choose to join the Arakan Army, a Rakhine-based ethnic armed organization involved in active resistance against the Burmese government.
The Trump Administration and the State Department have adopted a measured approach to the emerging challenges presented by the crises in Bangladesh and Burma. The initial response was to increase humanitarian assistance to both nations by a total of $32 million, raising the amount of assistance provided since October 2016 to $95 million. New restrictions on relations with senior Burmese military officers have been imposed using existing authority.
Two bills have been introduced in the 115th Congress since the August attacks and the Burmese military's "clearance operations"—the Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability Act of 2017 (BURMA Act; H.R. 4223) and the Burma Human Rights and Freedom Act of 2017 (S. 2060). Both bills would impose a visa ban on senior military officers responsible for human rights abuses in Burma, place new restrictions on security assistance and military cooperation, reinstate jadeite and ruby import bans, and require U.S opposition to international financial institution loans to Burma if the project involves an enterprise owned or directly or indirectly controlled by the military. S. 2060 also would provide an additional $104 million in humanitarian assistance, and would require the President to review Burma's eligibility for the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program.
This report will be updated as circumstances require.
|
crs_RS21579
|
crs_RS21579_0
|
King Mohammed VI conducted an official state visit to Washington, DC, in November 2013, his first since 2004. With regard to the disputed territory of Western Sahara, the United States has recognized neither Morocco's claim of sovereignty nor the self-proclaimed independent government-in-exile, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which is hosted and supported by Algeria. U.S. policy over the past decade has been to support United Nations (U.N.)-facilitated negotiations between Morocco and the independence-seeking Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario, which formed the SADR) toward a mutually accepted settlement. The king has said that he is committed to building a democracy, and in 2011 he introduced a new constitution (later adopted in a popular referendum) that, if fully implemented, could strengthen the legislature, the judiciary, and local-level government. The constitution, however, preserves the king's role as the ultimate arbiter of state decision-making, head of the military, and Morocco's highest religious authority. Protests periodically occur, though they have dwindled in size since their peak in 2011. Some Moroccans continue to call for deeper political changes. The Party for Justice and Democracy (PJD, also known as Al Misbah /The Beacon), an Islamist political party, won a plurality of seats (27%) in the most recent elections for the Chamber of Representatives, in 2011. In turn, the PJD has reportedly faced opposition from pro-palace elites. It has a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and bilateral investment treaty with the United States; an Association Agreement with the European Union; FTAs with several other countries in the Middle East and North Africa; and several free-trade zones. In 2007, King Mohammed VI submitted an autonomy plan for Western Sahara, asserting Moroccan sovereignty, to the United Nations. Foreign Policy
Morocco's foreign policy focuses on its Western partners, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Morocco broke diplomatic relations with the Syrian government in 2012, and the Moroccan military has reportedly participated in U.S.-led military operations against the Islamic State. Morocco and Algeria are regional rivals. The dispute over the territory of Western Sahara has stymied Moroccan-Algerian relations, Moroccan relations with the African Union (AU), and regional economic and security cooperation. Morocco is also a top recipient of U.S. Morocco also participates in U.S. regional aid programs, including the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a State Department-led interagency initiative that includes 11 states in North and West Africa; the Administration's Middle East and North Africa Transition Fund, which has provided technical aid for good governance; and grants administered by the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the State Department's regional democracy-promotion entity, for women's empowerment, civil society, job growth, and legal reforms. Congressional views on the Western Sahara issue have been stated in official correspondence and in foreign aid appropriations legislation. The FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act (Division K of P.L. It has been the policy of successive Administrations that funds appropriated for bilateral aid for Morocco may not be programmed in Western Sahara, as doing so could represent a tacit acknowledgment of Moroccan sovereignty. 113-235 , §7041[g][1]) states that funds appropriated for global bilateral economic assistance "shall be made available for assistance for the Western Sahara." The executive branch interpretation of the FY2015 provision, and its implications, remain to be seen. Morocco's role in counterterrorism and regional security is likely to remain of interest to Members of Congress, as is the bilateral trade and investment relationship.
|
Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed Morocco as an important regional ally, a partner in counterterrorism, and a free trade counterpart. Morocco receives substantial U.S. development aid, and bilateral trade and investment have increased following a 2006 Free Trade Agreement. Morocco also benefits from U.S. security assistance and military cooperation, and is a purchaser of U.S. defense articles, including F-16 jets. Some observers have placed greater emphasis on the U.S.-Morocco relationship amid regional turmoil and terrorist threats emanating from neighboring states in North Africa and the nearby Sahel region of West Africa. The United States and Morocco initiated a Bilateral Strategic Dialogue in 2012, and King Mohammed VI undertook an official state visit to Washington, DC, in November 2013, his first since 2004.
King Mohammed VI, who inherited the throne in 1999, retains supreme political power in Morocco but has taken some liberalizing steps. In 2011, amid popular demonstrations that echoed unrest elsewhere in the region, the king backed a new constitution that was then adopted by referendum. Provisions in the new constitution could strengthen the legislature, judiciary, and local-level government, if fully implemented. It nonetheless preserves the king's role as the arbiter of political decision-making, head of the military, and the country's highest religious authority. Legislative elections held in 2011, the first under the new constitution, brought an Islamist political party, the Justice and Development Party (PJD), to power for the first time. The PJD has sought to bolster the power of elected officials and to institute economic and governance reforms. However, the party has faced challenges in transitioning from an outsider opposition role to the day-to-day responsibility of policymaking. It has also struggled to overcome tensions with pro-palace elites, as well as with nominal allies. Public protests have dwindled since their peak in 2011, but sporadic demonstrations continue over economic and social grievances, while some Moroccans continue to call for deeper political changes.
With regard to the disputed territory of Western Sahara, which Morocco considers an integral part of its sovereign territory, the United States has recognized neither Morocco's claim to the region, nor the self-declared independent Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which is backed and hosted by Algeria. U.S. policy over the past decade has been to support U.N.-facilitated negotiations over the territory's final status. Congressional views of the Western Sahara issue have been stated in foreign aid appropriations legislation. Most recently, the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235, Division J, section 7041[g][1]) states that funds appropriated for foreign bilateral economic assistance "shall be made available for assistance for the Western Sahara." It has been the policy of successive Administrations that funds appropriated for bilateral aid for Morocco may not be programmed in Western Sahara, as doing so could represent a tacit acknowledgment of Moroccan sovereignty. The executive branch interpretation of the FY2015 provision, and its implications, remain to be seen.
Morocco's foreign policy focuses on its Western partners (especially France, Spain, the European Union, and the United States); the Middle East; and francophone Africa. The Moroccan military has reportedly participated in U.S.-led operations to counter the Islamic State organization in Syria. Neighboring Algeria is a regional rival and supports independence for Western Sahara. Friction over the Western Sahara issue has stymied Moroccan-Algerian relations, Moroccan relations with the African Union (Morocco withdrew in 1984 over recognition of the SADR), and regional economic and security cooperation. See also CRS Report RS20962, Western Sahara.
|
crs_R43548
|
crs_R43548_0
|
Introduction to HUD
Most of the funding for the activities of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) comes from discretionary appropriations provided each year in the annual appropriations acts enacted by Congress. FY2015 Appropriations
Final FY2015 Appropriations
On December 16, 2014, the President signed the FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act ( P.L. Prior to enactment of P.L. 113-235 , the government had been funded with three continuing resolutions. 113-235 provides $45.4 billion in gross discretionary appropriations for HUD programs, not accounting for savings from offsets and other sources, about $90 million less than in FY2014 ($45.5 billion). However, net budget authority is higher than in FY2014, approximately $35.6 billion in FY2015 compared to $32.8 billion in FY2014. The primary difference between FY2015 and FY2014 is that estimated receipts from the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loan insurance program dropped by about $3 billion in FY2015 so that there were fewer offsets. House Action
The House Appropriations Committee approved its version of the FY2015 Departments of Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) Appropriations Act ( H.R. 4745 ) on May 27, 2014. Two weeks later, on June 10, 2014, the full House approved the bill after voting on a number of amendments. 4745 would have provided $44.7 billion in gross budget authority, and $35.0 billion in net budget authority. It included $46.7 billion in gross discretionary budget authority for HUD, which did not account for savings from rescissions and offsets from receipts and collections. The President's gross funding request was about $1.2 billion more than the amount provided in FY2014 ($45.5 billion). After the President's request was reduced to account for CBO's estimates of offsetting collections and receipts, net budget authority would have been $36.9 billion (compared to $32.8 billion in FY2014). Selected FY2015 Funding Issues
Funding for Assisted Housing Programs
More than 75% of discretionary funding for HUD supports three programs: Section 8 tenant-based rental assistance (which funds Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers), Section 8 project-based rental assistance, and the Public Housing program. The House-passed bill ( H.R. Both bills would have provided less than was requested in the President's budget. The Senate Committee-passed bill ( S. 2438 ) included $1.9 billion for the capital fund, splitting the difference between FY2014 ($1.875 billion) and the President's request ($1.925 billion), and proposed to increase funding for the operating fund compared to FY2014, providing about $4.5 billion. The House-passed THUD appropriations bill included $25 million for Choice Neighborhoods, and the Senate Committee-passed bill would have maintained funding at the FY2014 level of $90 million. And for related programs see CRS Report R43520, Community Development Block Grants and Related Programs: A Primer , by [author name scrubbed].) 113-235
P.L.
|
In FY2015, the Department of Housing and Urban Development was funded as part of the FY2015 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-235), enacted on December 16, 2014, following funding through three short-term continuing resolutions. The bill provides $45.4 billion in gross discretionary appropriations, not accounting for savings from offsets and other sources, about $90 million less than in FY2014 ($45.5 billion). However, net budget authority is higher than in FY2014, approximately $35.6 billion in FY2015 compared to $32.8 billion in FY2014. Net budget authority takes into account rescissions and offsets from receipts and collections. The primary difference between FY2015 and FY2014 is that estimated receipts from the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loan insurance program dropped by about $3 billion.
For the most part, P.L. 113-235 funds HUD programs at approximately the same levels as FY2014. Exceptions include increased funding for Research and Technology (by nearly 57%), Housing for the Elderly and Housing for Persons with Disabilities (by 9% and 7%, respectively), Housing Counseling (by 4%), and the Homeless Assistance Grants (by not quite 1%). However, in most cases any increases would largely support renewals of existing assistance. Decreased funding includes Choice Neighborhoods (by 11%), HOME Investment Partnerships (by 10%), Project-Based Section 8 Rental Assistance (by 2%), and the Community Development Fund and Fair Housing activities (by 1% each).
Prior to enactment of P.L. 113-235, the President requested $46.7 billion in gross discretionary appropriations for HUD, about $1.2 billion more than the amount provided in FY2014. Net budget authority requested was $36.9 billion. While the President requested increased funding for some programs (for example, the Homeless Assistance Grants, Housing for the Elderly, and Housing for Persons with Disabilities), in most cases, funding for these programs would largely have supported renewals of existing rental assistance contracts. Programs proposed for decreased funding included the Community Development Block Grant program (more than 7%), and the HOME Investment Partnerships Program (5%).
The House Appropriations Committee approved H.R. 4745, its version of the Departments of Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) appropriations bill, on May 27, 2014. Two weeks later, on June 10, 2014, the full House approved the bill, with amendments, though none changed the total amount of funding the bill would have provided for HUD. The bill would have provided approximately $44.7 billion in gross appropriations, a decrease of about $800 million compared to FY2014 and about $2 billion compared to the President's budget request. After accounting for offsetting collections and receipts, H.R. 4745 would have provided $35.0 billion in net budget authority.
The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the THUD appropriations bill, S. 2438, on June 5, 2014. The bill would have provided about $1 billion more than the House-passed bill for both gross and net budget authority—$45.8 billion and $36.0 billion, respectively.
For FY2014 and FY2015 funding levels, see Table 2.
|
crs_RL32276
|
crs_RL32276_0
|
Perhaps the most notable international agreement prohibiting the use of torture is the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention or CAT), which obligates parties to prohibit the use of torture and to require the punishment or extradition of torturers found within their territorial jurisdiction. CAT Article 3 requires that no state party expel, return, or extradite a person to another country where "there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture." Implementation of the Convention Against Torture in the United States
The United States signed CAT on April 18, 1988, and ratified the Convention on October 21, 1994, subject to certain declarations, reservations, and understandings, including a declaration that CAT Articles 1 through 16 were not self-executing, and therefore required domestic implementing legislation. This section will discuss relevant declarations, reservations, and understandings made by the United States to CAT, and U.S. laws and regulations implementing the Convention. With respect to the provisions of CAT Article 3 prohibiting expulsion or refoulement of persons to states where substantial grounds exist for believing the person would be subjected to torture, the United States declared its understanding that this requirement refers to situations where it would be "more likely than not" that an alien would be tortured, a standard commonly used by the United States in determining whether to withhold removal of an alien for fear of persecution. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998
The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA) announced the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary removal of any person to a country where there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture. Regulations Concerning the Removal of Aliens
The requirements of CAT Article 3 take the form of a two-track system requiring the withholding or deferral of an alien's removal to a proposed receiving state if it is more likely than not that he would be tortured there. Summary Exclusion of Arriving Aliens Inadmissible on Security and Related Grounds 61
U.S. law designates certain arriving aliens as inadmissible on security-related grounds, including for having engaged in terrorist activities. In Zadvydas v. Davis , the Supreme Court concluded that the indefinite detention of deportable aliens (e.g., aliens who were admitted into the U.S., and thereafter committed an immigration violation that caused them to become removable) would raise significant due process concerns. It is important to note that CAT only prohibits signatory parties from expelling persons to states where they would likely to be tortured—it does not provide aliens with protection from removal to states where they would not be tortured, even if such aliens would face cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment not rising to the level of torture. For a detailed discussion concerning the legality of renditions under the laws on torture, including CAT, see CRS Report RL32890, Renditions: Constraints Imposed by Laws on Torture , by [author name scrubbed].
|
The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) requires signatory parties to take measures to end torture within their territorial jurisdictions. For purposes of the Convention, torture is defined as an extreme form of cruel and inhuman punishment committed under the color of law. The Convention allows for no circumstances or emergencies where torture could be permitted. Additionally, CAT Article 3 requires that no state party expel, return, or extradite a person to another country where there are substantial grounds to believe he would be subjected to torture. CAT Article 3 does not expressly prohibit persons from being removed to countries where they would face cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment not rising to the level of torture.
The United States ratified CAT subject to certain declarations, reservations, and understandings, including that the Convention was not self-executing, and therefore required domestic implementing legislation to take effect. In accordance with CAT Article 3, the United States enacted statutes and regulations to prohibit the transfer of aliens to countries where they would be tortured, including the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, and certain regulations implemented and enforced by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of State. These authorities, which require the withholding or deferral of the removal of an alien to a country where he is more likely than not to be tortured, generally provide aliens already residing within the United States a greater degree of protection than aliens arriving to the United States who are deemed inadmissible on security- or terrorism-related grounds. Further, in deciding whether or not to remove an alien to a particular country, these rules permit the consideration of diplomatic assurances that an alien will not be tortured there. Nevertheless, under U.S. law, the removal or extradition of all aliens from the United States must be consistent with U.S. obligations under CAT.
CAT obligations concerning alien removal have additional implications in cases of criminal and other deportable aliens. The Supreme Court's ruling in Zadvydas v. Davis suggests that certain aliens receiving protection under CAT cannot be indefinitely detained, raising the possibility that certain otherwise-deportable aliens could be released into the United States if CAT protections make their removal impossible. CAT obligations also have implications for the practice of "extraordinary renditions," by which the U.S. purportedly has transferred aliens suspected of terrorist activity to countries that possibly employ torture as a means of interrogation. For additional background on renditions and other CAT-related issues, see CRS Report RL32890, Renditions: Constraints Imposed by Laws on Torture, and CRS Report RL32438, U.N. Convention Against Torture (CAT): Overview and Application to Interrogation Techniques, both by [author name scrubbed].
|
crs_RS22628
|
crs_RS22628_0
|
H.R. 157 (111th Congress), the District of ColumbiaHouse Voting Rights Act of 2009
On March 2, 2009, the House Judiciary Committee reported the District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2009, H.R. The bill, as amended ( H.Rept. 111-22 ), among other provisions, would expand the U.S. House of Representatives by two members to a total of 437 members. The first of these two new seats would be allocated to create a voting member representing the District of Columbia. The second seat would be assigned in accordance with 2000 census data and existing federal law, resulting in the addition of a fourth congressional seat in the state of Utah that would be a temporary at-large district. No further action was taken by the House. On February 26, 2009, the Senate passed a related bill, S. 160 , by a vote of 61-37. During the 110 th Congress, the House passed similar legislation, H.R. 1905 , by a vote of 241 to 177. A similar bill, S. 1257 , was considered by the Senate, but a motion to invoke cloture failed by a vote of 57 to 42. This report discusses the constitutionality of the aspect of this legislation that would create an at-large congressional district. Based on the authority granted to Congress under the Constitution to regulate congressional elections and relevant Supreme Court precedent, it appears that a federal law establishing a temporary at-large congressional district would likely be upheld as constitutional.
|
This report discusses the constitutionality of legislation, such as the District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2009, H.R. 157 (111th Congress), that would create an at-large congressional district. While it is not without doubt, based on the authority granted to Congress under the Constitution to regulate congressional elections and relevant Supreme Court precedent, it appears that federal law establishing a temporary at-large congressional district would likely be upheld as constitutional.
H.R. 157, among other provisions, would expand the U.S. House of Representatives by two members to a total of 437 members. The first of these two new seats would be allocated to create a voting member representing the District of Columbia. The second seat would be assigned in accordance with 2000 census data and existing federal law, resulting in the addition of a fourth congressional seat in the state of Utah that would be a temporary at-large district.
On March 2, 2009, the House Judiciary Committee reported the bill, as amended (H.Rept. 111-22), but no further action was taken by the House. On February 26, 2009, the Senate passed a related bill, S. 160, by a vote of 61-37. During the 110th Congress, the House passed similar legislation, H.R. 1905, by a vote of 241 to 177. A companion bill, S. 1257, was considered by the Senate, but a motion to invoke cloture failed by a vote of 57 to 42.
|
crs_R44329
|
crs_R44329_0
|
Introduction
In FY2014, the Department of Defense (DOD) obligated more than $280 billion for federal contracts, more than all other federal agencies combined. Many analysts and government officials have argued that by more effectively using data to support acquisition decisionmaking, DOD could save billions of dollars, allocate resources more efficiently and effectively, and improve the effectiveness of military operations. In recent years Congress has pursued a variety of approaches to improving DOD's efficiency, such as requiring the department to be auditable, including provisions on acquisition reform in National Defense Authorization Acts, and holding numerous hearings on agency operations and acquisition reform. To the extent that improved data analysis could enable more effective decisionmaking, Congress may choose to enhance oversight in this area and explore ways to enable DOD to conduct more effective data analysis. When decisionmakers have access to sufficient data from which to draw reasonable conclusions, they are in a better position to measure or assess the effectiveness of government programs, inform policy decisions, and provide transparency into government operations. Challenges in Using Data to Support Decisions
A number of analysts and government officials have argued that some of the critical elements required for DOD to use data more effectively include:
1. having the information systems to gather and manage data; 2. ensuring that data is sufficiently comprehensive and accurate; and 3. using data to inform decisionmaking. Analysts and Senior DOD officials acknowledge that the department does not sufficiently use data to inform decisionmaking. In recent years, a number of senior acquisition officials in DOD have emphasized the need to transition to a more data-informed decisionmaking process. DOD and the federal government are also working to improve the quality of data. Despite current efforts to improve data-based decisionmaking, success is not guaranteed. Many past efforts to improve the efficiency and management of DOD have not succeeded, and those that have met with success sometimes fell short of initial expectations. Under the best of circumstances, it will take years for DOD to implement and improve data systems and foster a culture that routinely uses data to support its decisions. Answering the following questions could help Congress determine further actions to take in its efforts to improve defense acquisitions. To What Extent Does DOD Have the Systems and Qualified People in Place to Conduct Robust Data Analysis? To What Extent Does DOD Have the Right Culture and Processes in Place to Foster the use of Data to Inform Decisionmaking? Many analysts argue that a prerequisite for effectively using data throughout an organization is having a culture that not only values using data to drive decisions, but also integrates data gathering and analysis into the very fabric of an organization, making it part of standard routines and operating procedures. How Can DOD Balance the Benefits of Sharing Data with the Need to Safeguard Information Security Concerns?
|
Many analysts believe that data analysis is a critical element in making smart, informed, policy decisions and in managing government programs. Without data, there may not be an appropriate basis for making policy decisions, measuring or assessing the effectiveness of government programs, or providing transparency into government operations. Despite the importance of data, most observers believe that the Department of Defense (DOD), and other government agencies lag behind the private sector in effectively incorporating data analyses into decisionmaking. These analysts argue that by using data more effectively to support acquisition decisionmaking, DOD could save billions of dollars, more efficiently and effectively allocate resources, and improve the effectiveness of military operations.
In FY2014, DOD obligated more than $280 billion for federal contracts, more than all other federal agencies combined. Given the size of the defense budget, Congress has pursued a variety of approaches to improving the efficiency of DOD, such as requiring the department to be auditable, including provisions on acquisition reform in National Defense Authorization Acts, and holding numerous hearings on agency operations and acquisition reform. To the extent that improved data analysis could enable more effective decisionmaking, Congress may opt to conduct oversight in this area and explore ways to enable DOD to conduct more effective data analysis.
A number of analysts and government officials have argued that some of the critical elements required for DOD to use data more effectively include:
1. having the information systems to gather and manage data; 2. ensuring that data is sufficiently comprehensive and accurate; and 3. using data to inform decisionmaking.
Senior DOD officials acknowledge that the department does not sufficiently use data to inform decisionmaking and have emphasized the need to transition to a more data-driven decisionmaking process. Efforts are underway to improve IT systems, data quality, and the use of data to inform policy decisions—but success is not guaranteed. Many past efforts to use data to drive efficiency and management within DOD have not succeeded, and those that have met with success still sometimes fell short of initial expectations. To succeed in these efforts, many analysts argue that there must be a culture within DOD that not only values using data to drive decisions, but also integrates data gathering and analysis into the very fabric of the organization, making it part of standard routines and operating procedures. Under the best of circumstances, it will take years for DOD to implement and improve data systems and to foster a culture that routinely uses data to support its decisions. DOD's efforts to use data analyses to improve business operations and decisionmaking raise a number of questions for Congress, including:
To what extent does DOD have the systems and qualified people in place to conduct robust data analysis? To what extent does DOD have the right culture and processes in place to foster better decisionmaking? How can DOD balance the benefits of sharing data with the need to safeguard information security concerns?
The answer to these and other questions could help inform congressional efforts to improve defense acquisitions.
|
crs_RL34026
|
crs_RL34026_0
|
Background
The Department of Defense acquires goods and services from contractors, federal arsenals, and shipyards to support military operations. Acq uisition is a broad term that applies to more than just the purchase of an item or service; the acquisition process encompasses the design, engineering, construction, testing, deployment, sustainment, and disposal of weapons or related items purchased from a contractor. From concept to deployment, a weapon system must go through the three-step process of identifying the required weapon system, establishing a budget, and acquiring the system. These three steps are organized as follows:
1. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System—for identifying requirements. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System—for allocating resources and budgeting. 3. The Defense Acquisition System—for developing and/or buying the item. Generally, the defense acquisition system uses "milestones" to oversee and manage acquisition programs (see Figure 2 ). To pass a milestone, a program must meet specific statutory and regulatory requirements and be deemed ready to proceed to the next phase of the acquisition process. There are three milestones:
Milestone A—initiates technology maturation and risk reduction. Milestone B—initiates engineering and manufacturing development. Milestone C—initiates production and deployment. For more than 50 years, both Congress and DOD have initiated numerous attempts to improve defense acquisitions. DOD has also undertaken a comprehensive effort to improve the overall operation of the defense acquisition system. In November 2012, Secretary Carter's successor, Frank Kendall, launched the Better Buying Power 2.0 initiative, an update to the original Better Buying Power effort, aimed at "implementing practices and policies designed to improve the productivity of the Department of Defense and of the industrial base that provides the products and services" to the warfighters. The most recent legislation that had a significant impact on weapon system acquisitions was enacted in May 2009, when Congress passed and the President signed into law the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 ( S. 454 / P.L. 111-23 ). Key provisions in the act included
the appointment of a Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation within DOD who communicates directly with the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense and who issues policies and establishes guidance on cost estimating and developing confidence levels for such cost estimates; the appointment of a Director of Developmental Test and Evaluation who serves as principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on developmental test and evaluation and develops polices and guidance for conducting developmental testing and evaluation in DOD, as well as reviewing, approving, and monitoring such testing for each Major Defense Acquisition Program; the appointment of a Director of Systems Engineering who serves as principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on systems engineering and who will develop policies and guidance for the use of systems engineering, as well as review, approve, and monitor such testing for each MDAP; a requirement that the Director of Defense Research and Engineering periodically assess technological maturity of MDAPs and annually report findings to Congress, requiring the use of prototyping, when practical; a requirement that combatant commanders have more influence in the requirements-generation process; changes to the Nunn-McCurdy Act, including rescinding the most recent milestone approval for any program experiencing critical cost growth; a requirement that DOD revise guidelines and tighten regulations governing conflicts of interest by contractors working on MDAPs; and a requirement that a principal official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense be responsible for conducting performance assessments and analyses of major defense acquisition programs that experience certain levels of cost growth.
|
The Department of Defense (DOD) acquires goods and services from contractors, federal arsenals, and shipyards to support military operations. Acquisition is a broad term that applies to more than just the purchase of an item or service; the acquisition process encompasses the design, engineering, construction, testing, deployment, sustainment, and disposal of weapons or related items purchased from a contractor.
As set forth by statute and regulation, from concept to deployment, a weapon system must go through a three-step process of identifying a required (needed) weapon system, establishing a budget, and acquiring the system. These three steps are organized as follows:
1. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)—for identifying requirements. 2. The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBE)—for allocating resources and budgeting. 3. The Defense Acquisition System (DAS)—for developing and/or buying the item.
The Defense Acquisition System uses "milestones" to oversee and manage acquisition programs. At each milestone, a program must meet specific statutory and regulatory requirements before the program can proceed to the next phase of the acquisition process. There are three milestones:
Milestone A—initiates technology maturation and risk reduction. Milestone B—initiates engineering and manufacturing development. Milestone C—initiates production and deployment.
Both Congress and DOD have been active in trying to improve defense acquisitions. A comprehensive legislative effort to improve weapon system acquisition occurred in May 2009, when Congress passed and the President signed into law the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (S. 454/P.L. 111-23). Key provisions in the act include appointment of a Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation within DOD to establish guidance on cost estimating; appointment of a Director of Developmental Test and Evaluation; appointment of a Director of Systems Engineering; and a requirement that the Director of Defense Research and Engineering periodically assess technological maturity of Major Defense Acquisition Programs.
DOD has undertaken a comprehensive effort to improve defense acquisitions, including rewriting elements of the regulatory structure that govern defense acquisitions and launching the Better Buying Power and Better Buying Power II initiatives aimed at "implementing practices and policies designed to improve the productivity of the Department of Defense and of the industrial base."
An oversight issue for Congress is the extent to which the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act and the various DOD initiatives are having a positive effect on acquisitions, and what additional steps, if any, Congress can take to further the effort to improve defense acquisitions.
|
crs_R45177
|
crs_R45177_0
|
Introduction
The year 2014 was pivotal for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, or the alliance). Among them is the challenge of protecting NATO's military technological superiority over its potential adversaries, and staying ahead of political and technological change. NATO faces both conventional and hybrid challenges, but threats could expand to include new challenges related to the diffusion of technology, the accelerating pace of technological change, or NATO's military and societal dependence on commercial technologies. Operating domains have already expanded to include cyberspace, land, sea, and air, and could soon include space. Policymakers from across the alliance, concerned that NATO's technological edge is eroding across domains, have urged NATO to address the risks and opportunities associated with technological change. In the future, NATO might have to rely as much on its agility and capacity for innovation as it has previously relied on its military technological advantage. This report provides analysis for Congress on how NATO is responding to the technology landscape, and includes sections on
the evolving threat environment and how NATO is affected by global trends in defense spending and advancing technology; U.S. defense strategy and its increasing focus on strategic competition for technological superiority and innovation; NATO's response, including institutional strategies as well as national responses from Europe's top-three defense spenders (the UK, France, and Germany); and the opportunities and the challenges that NATO faces in fostering a NATO capacity for innovation in light of technological change. Congress may consider what role it can play in supporting NATO's adaptation to the changing technology environment. It has modernized its military and increased investments in unmanned systems and other emerging technologies. In the United States, it grew by 45%. International competition for technology and innovation is also increasing. Responsibility for NATO's transformation or adaptation rests largely with NATO's military command, Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, VA, which is working with other NATO stakeholders to build a shared vision for the future, to identify potential capability needs for future operations, and to use that information to establish and align S&T investment priorities for the allies. U.S. defense innovation strategies raise questions for the United States and its allies about their expectations of one another in terms of technology and innovation, and about their willingness to collaborate on technology development. Namely, it confronts a major state rival with sophisticated military capabilities as well as an expanding group of nonstate challengers with potential access to disruptive technologies. Many European states are now taking steps to increase their defense budgets and, at the same time, balance commitments to national sovereignty in defense with efforts to increase practical cooperation with European partners. When it comes to defense innovation, investments in R&D, and reforms to improve access to commercial innovation, European nations are in the early stages of formulating predominantly national strategies. German analysts point to a deep-seated concern in the German public consciousness about defense research and its potential to undermine peace. Generally speaking, NATO's innovation challenges relate to
securing resources for innovation and engaging commercial industry; balancing short-term priorities with preparations for the future; preserving interoperability and transatlantic burden-sharing; harmonizing defense planning processes, including with the EU; and using allies' diversity to foster more effective innovation. The risk is that the gap could deepen if the United States continues to pursue a technology-driven strategy and Europeans do not, or if the United States moves faster than its NATO allies on fielding new technologies. Discussions about technology and future warfare are beginning to take place in some national governments and in NATO institutions. Global commercial investments in R&D are growing, and commercial innovation is increasingly important for defense and security.
|
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has a renewed focus on defense and deterrence in Europe. In the past, NATO relied at least in part on its military technological superiority over potential adversaries for defense and deterrence in Europe, but some policymakers are increasingly concerned that NATO's technological superiority is eroding.
Russia, China, and others are modernizing their militaries, investing in new and emerging technologies, and exploring their applications for defense. In addition, NATO faces rising operating costs, and both conventional and hybrid challenges in operating domains that have expanded to include cyberspace as well as land, sea, and air. NATO must also contend with a growing group of nonstate challengers empowered by the pace of technological change and the global diffusion of technology. Increasingly dependent on ubiquitous technology, NATO is adapting to a world in which commercial investments in research and development (R&D) outpace those of governments, innovation cycles are shortening, and there is more international competition for technology and innovation.
Since 2014, the United States has promoted defense innovation as a strategy to integrate new technologies into military capabilities and strengthen U.S. technological superiority over its potential adversaries. Today, many European allies acknowledge the importance of technology and innovation in defense, and they are beginning to respond to the changing environment by committing more resources to defense, and a few have national defense innovation strategies of their own. The United Kingdom, France, and Germany—NATO's largest European defense spenders—are investing more in R&D and reforming their defense ministries to take more risk, procure technology faster, develop innovative concepts, and strengthen their links with commercial industry. Generally speaking, however, European governments are still in the early stages of developing what are predominantly national strategies.
NATO seeks to harmonize the allies' national strategies and defense investments, promote collaboration, and build a shared vision for the future. Its member states have sophisticated militaries, institutional frameworks for collaboration, and dynamic economies that attract talent, and support innovation. Innovation challenges persist, however, such as those related to NATO's limited budgets and its bureaucratic processes, which make it difficult for NATO to attract the attention of commercial industry and global technology companies. NATO is also working to balance its member states' concerns over national sovereignty with the need for more multinational cooperation, both from a cost and from an interoperability point of view. NATO also seeks to enhance interoperability among allied militaries and balance short-term priorities with preparations for future warfare. In the future, NATO might have to rely as much on its agility and on its capacity for innovation as it has relied on its military technological advantage in the past.
Congress may consider what role the United States can play to support NATO's adaptation, and what channels Congress could pursue to exert influence over NATO's direction. There are both risks and opportunities associated with sharing technology or developing it jointly with NATO allies, and there are questions about what the United States and its allies expect from one another in terms of technology and innovation. Technology has the potential to enhance NATO's effectiveness, but it also has the potential to undermine interoperability or political cohesion if the United States develops a technology-driven strategy and its NATO allies either do not keep pace, or do not adapt to strategic, political, and technological change.
|
crs_RL31876
|
crs_RL31876_0
|
On December 17, 2004, PresidentBush signed into law the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ( S. 2845 / P.L. 108-458 ), with provisions to increase immigration law enforcement personnel and to adoptmore stringent border control and identity document standards. In 2001, Presidents Fox and Bush met in mid-February in Mexico, in mid-April in Canada, in earlyMay in the United States, in early September in the United States on an official state visit, and inearly October in the United States when President Fox expressed solidarity with the United Statesfollowing the terrorist attacks. Bilateral Issues for Congress
Trade Issues
Trade between Mexico and the United States has grown dramatically in recent years, encouraged by the adoption of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between theUnited States, Mexico, and Canada. Several NAFTA institutions mandated by the agreements have been functioning since 1994. The NAFTA institutions have operated to encourage cooperation on trade, environmental and labor issues, and to consider nongovernmental petitions under the labor and environmental sideagreements. (4)
Recent Trade Disputes. A NAFTA dispute resolution panel supportedMexico's position in February 2001. Bush Administration Initiatives. During the Bush-Fox meeting in Monterrey, Mexico, on March 22, 2002, the Presidents noted that important progress had been made to enhance migrant safety, and they agreed to continue thecabinet-level talks to achieve safe, legal, and orderly migration flows between the countries. In early 2004, President Bush seeking to revive the immigration discussion, proposed an overhaul of the U.S. immigration system on January 7, 2004, to permit the matching of willingforeign workers with willing U.S. employers when no Americans can be found to fill the jobs. In presidential meetings in 2001,Presidents Bush and Fox agreed to enhance law enforcement and counter-narcotics cooperation, andPresident Fox called for reform of the U.S. drug certification process. On October 19, 2004, DEA officials announced the dismantling through, OperationMoney Clip, of a major Mexican money-laundering and drug trafficking organization operating inthe United States. Political and Human Rights Issues
Concerns over Elections and Political Rights. On July 6, 2003, Mexico held nation-wide elections to renew the membership of the 500-seat Chamber of Deputies, and to elect local officials in ten states. Allegations of Human Rights Abuses. On December 10, 2004, President Fox, responding to an analysis by the U.N. HighCommission for Human Rights, presented a series of proposed human rights reforms that woulddiscourage torture and strengthen the rights of defendants in Mexico. Mexico's Counter-Narcotics Efforts Under Fox, December 2000 to October 2004 , by [author name scrubbed].
|
The United States and Mexico have a special relationship as neighbors and partners under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The friendly relationship has been strengthenedby President Bush's meetings with President Fox but has been weakened by disagreements over Iraqand other issues. Major congressional issues are trade, migration/border security, drug trafficking,and political issues.
Trade. Since 1994, NAFTA institutions have been functioning, trade between the countries has tripled, and allegations of violations of labor and environmental laws have been considered. TheBush Administration has argued that NAFTA has had modest positive impacts on all three membercountries, but Mexican farmers have strongly criticized the effects of NAFTA. Recent trade disputeswith Mexico have involved trucking, telecommunications, tuna, sweeteners and sugar.
Migration/Border Security. In February 2001, Presidents Bush and Fox agreed to establish high-level talks to ensure safe, legal, and orderly migration flows between the countries, but the talksstalled after the September 2001 terrorist attacks, and border controls were later strengthened underthe new Department of Homeland Security. In January 2004, President Bush proposed a majorimmigration reform "to match willing foreign workers with willing U.S. employers when noAmericans can be found to fill the jobs." In December 2004, Congress passed the IntelligenceReform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ( S. 2845 / P.L. 108-458 ), with provisionsto increase immigration law enforcement personnel and to adopt more stringent border control andidentity document standards.
Drug Trafficking. Bush Administration officials have regularly praised Mexico's counter-narcotics efforts under Fox, especially action against major traffickers, and havecharacterized the bilateral cooperation in this area as unprecedented. The State Department reportedin April 2004, however, that marijuana and opium poppy cultivation increased significantly inMexico in 2003. In recent law enforcement actions, on October 19, 2004, DEA officials announcedthe dismantling, through Operation Money Clip, of a major Mexican money-laundering and drugtrafficking organization operating in the United States.
Political and Human Rights. In nation-wide elections on July 6, 2003, to renew the Chamber of Deputies, President Fox's PAN fared poorly, while the previously dominant PRI and the leftistPRD increased representation, making congressional approval of President Fox's reform measuresless likely. Local elections are being held in an environment in which the parties are positioningthemselves for the July 2006 presidential elections. On human rights issues, President Fox hasdesignated special prosecutors to prosecute those responsible for human rights abuses in the 1970sand 1980s, but little progress has been made. On December 10, 2004, President Fox, responding toan analysis by the U.N. High Commission for Human Rights, presented a series of proposed reformsto discourage torture and to strengthen the rights of defendants in Mexico.
|
crs_R43627
|
crs_R43627_0
|
Introduction
The State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) is a federal-state program that provides health coverage to certain uninsured low-income children and pregnant women in families that have annual income above Medicaid eligibility levels, but have no health insurance. CHIP is jointly financed by the federal government and states, and the states are responsible for administering CHIP. The federal government sets basic requirements for CHIP, but states have the flexibility to design their own version of CHIP within the federal government's basic framework. As a result, there is significant variation across CHIP programs. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148 , as amended) largely maintains the current CHIP structure through FY2019. On April 16, 2015, President Obama signed into law the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA; P.L. 114-10 ). MACRA repeals the sustainable growth rate (SGR) mechanism (which overrides the reduction in the Medicare physician fee schedule that was set to begin in April 2015) and extends funding for CHIP, among other provisions. Specifically, MACRA extends CHIP funding for two additional years (i.e., through FY2017) and maintains the current allotment formula with the 23 percentage point increase to the enhanced federal medical assistance percentage (E-FMAP). MACRA also extends the "qualifying state" option, the Child Enrollment Contingency Fund, "Express Lane" eligibility, Outreach and Enrollment Grants, the Pediatric Quality Measures Program, and the Childhood Obesity Demonstration Project. Congress will face a decision with regard to the future of CHIP when federal CHIP funding expires after FY2017. Congress's action or inaction on the CHIP program will affect the health insurance options available to targeted low-income children and their resulting health coverage. This report describes the basic elements of CHIP, focusing on how the program is designed, who is eligible, what services are covered, how enrollees share in the cost of care, and how the program is financed. The report ends with a brief discussion of the future of CHIP. Program Design
States may design their CHIP programs in three ways. They may cover eligible children under their Medicaid programs (i.e., CHIP Medicaid expansion), create a separate CHIP program, or adopt a combination approach where the state operates a CHIP Medicaid expansion and one or more separate CHIP programs concurrently. This provision is often referred to as the ACA Maintenance of Effort (MOE) requirement. Upper Income Eligibility Levels in CHIP
Statewide upper income eligibility thresholds for CHIP-funded child coverage vary substantially across states, ranging from a low of 175% FPL to a high of 405% FPL. EPSDT sets Medicaid benefit coverage for children (including CHIP children) apart from other sources of health insurance in that it permits coverage of all services listed in Medicaid statute (regardless of whether a given benefit is covered in the state plan) and it effectively eliminates any state-defined limits on the amount, duration, and scope of this benefit. Separate CHIP Programs
If a state implements a separate CHIP program, premiums or enrollment fees may be imposed for program participation, but the maximum allowable amount is dependent on annual family income. The federal government reimburses states for a portion of every dollar they spend on CHIP (for both CHIP Medicaid expansions and separate CHIP programs) up to state-specific limits called allotments. In FY2013, CHIP expenditures totaled $13.2 billion. The federal share totaled $9.2 billion and the state share was $4.0 billion. If Congress takes no action and CHIP funding runs out, states need to adhere to the MOE requirements that are in effect through FY2019. The MOE requires states to maintain income eligibility levels for CHIP children through September 30, 2019, as a condition for receiving Medicaid payments (notwithstanding the lack of corresponding federal CHIP appropriations for FY2016 through FY2019). The MOE requirements impact CHIP Medicaid expansion programs and separate CHIP programs differently. For CHIP Medicaid expansion programs , when federal CHIP funding is exhausted, the CHIP-eligible children in these programs continue to be enrolled in Medicaid but financing switches from CHIP to Medicaid. For separate CHIP programs , states are provided a couple of exceptions to the MOE: (1) after September 1, 2015, states may enroll CHIP-eligible children into qualified health plans in the health insurance exchanges or (2) states may impose waiting lists or enrollment caps in order to limit CHIP expenditures. In addition, in the event that a state's CHIP allotment is insufficient to fund CHIP coverage for all eligible children, a state must establish procedures to screen children for Medicaid eligibility, and enroll those who are Medicaid-eligible. For children not eligible for Medicaid, the state must establish procedures to enroll CHIP children in qualified health plans in the health insurance exchanges that have been certified by the HHS Secretary. If no additional federal CHIP appropriations are provided, CHIP children in CHIP Medicaid expansion programs (roughly half of CHIP enrollees) would continue to receive coverage through the Medicaid program through FY2019, but coverage of CHIP children in separate CHIP programs (roughly half of CHIP enrollees) who are not eligible for Medicaid is reliant on whether the children have access to qualified health plans that are certified by the HHS Secretary.
|
The State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) is a means-tested program that provides health coverage to targeted low-income children and pregnant women in families that have annual income above Medicaid eligibility levels but have no health insurance. CHIP is jointly financed by the federal government and states, and the states are responsible for administering CHIP. In FY2013, CHIP enrollment totaled 8.4 million individuals and CHIP expenditures totaled $13.2 billion.
Under the CHIP program, the federal government sets basic requirements for CHIP, but states have the flexibility to design their own version of CHIP within the federal government's basic framework. As a result, there is significant variation across CHIP programs. Currently, state upper-income eligibility limits for children range from a low of 175% of the federal poverty level (FPL) to a high of 405% of FPL. States may also extend CHIP coverage to pregnant women when certain conditions are met.
States may design their CHIP programs in three ways: a CHIP Medicaid expansion, a separate CHIP program, or a combination approach where the state operates a CHIP Medicaid expansion and one or more separate CHIP programs concurrently. CHIP benefit coverage and cost-sharing rules depend on program design. CHIP Medicaid expansions must follow the federal Medicaid rules for benefits and cost sharing, which entitles CHIP enrollees to Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) coverage (effectively eliminating any state-defined limits on the amount, duration, and scope of any benefit listed in Medicaid statute) and exempts the majority of children from any cost sharing. For separate CHIP programs, the benefits are permitted to look more like private health insurance, and states may impose cost sharing, such as premiums or enrollment fees, with a maximum allowable amount that is tied to annual family income.
The federal government reimburses states for a portion of every dollar they spend on CHIP (including both CHIP Medicaid expansions and separate CHIP programs) up to state-specific annual limits called allotments. The federal share of FY2013 total expenditures was $9.2 billion and the state share was $4.0 billion.
CHIP was enacted in 1997. Since that time, Congress has extended federal CHIP funding. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) extended CHIP funding through FY2015. On April 16, 2015, President Obama signed into law the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA; P.L. 114-10). MACRA repeals the sustainable growth rate (SGR) mechanism (which overrides the reduction in the Medicare physician fee schedule that was set to begin in April 2015) and extends funding for CHIP, among other provisions. Specifically, MACRA extends CHIP funding for two additional years (i.e., through FY2017) and maintains the current allotment formula, including a 23 percentage point increase to the enhanced federal medical assistance percentage (E-FMAP). MACRA also extends the "qualifying state" option, the Child Enrollment Contingency Fund, "Express Lane" eligibility, Outreach and Enrollment Grants, the Pediatric Quality Measures Program, and the Childhood Obesity Demonstration Project.
Although MACRA adds two additional years to federal funding for CHIP (through FY2017), states still need to adhere to the ACA's maintenance of effort (MOE) requirements that are in effect through FY2019. The MOE requires states to maintain income eligibility levels for CHIP children through September 30, 2019, as a condition for receiving federal Medicaid payments (notwithstanding the lack of corresponding federal CHIP appropriations for FY2018 and FY2019). The MOE requirements impact CHIP Medicaid expansion programs and separate CHIP programs differently.
For CHIP Medicaid expansion programs, when federal CHIP funding is exhausted, the CHIP-eligible children in these programs continue to be enrolled in Medicaid but financing switches from CHIP to Medicaid. For separate CHIP programs, states are provided a couple of exceptions to the MOE: (1) after September 1, 2015, states may enroll CHIP-eligible children into qualified health plans in the health insurance exchanges or (2) states may impose waiting lists or enrollment caps in order to limit CHIP expenditures. In addition, in the event that a state's CHIP allotment is insufficient to fund CHIP coverage for all eligible children, a state must establish procedures to screen children for Medicaid eligibility, and enroll those who are Medicaid-eligible. For children not eligible for Medicaid, the state must establish procedures to enroll CHIP children in qualified health plans in the health insurance exchanges that have been certified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to be "at least comparable" to CHIP in terms of benefits and cost sharing.
Congress will face a decision with regard to the future of CHIP when federal CHIP funding expires after FY2017. If Congress does not act and federal CHIP funding ends, some CHIP enrollees likely would continue to have coverage through Medicaid as a result of the MOE requirements, but others would need to find another source of health insurance coverage (e.g., employer-sponsored health insurance or through the health insurance exchanges), and some likely would be uninsured. Congress's action or inaction on the CHIP program may affect health insurance options and resulting coverage for targeted low-income children that are eligible for the current CHIP program.
This report describes the basic elements of CHIP, focusing on how the program is designed, who is eligible, what services are covered, how enrollees share in the cost of care, and how the program is financed. The report ends with a brief discussion of the future of CHIP.
|
crs_R44642
|
crs_R44642_0
|
There are multiple sides to the encryption debate, but the sides generally reduce to two main parties: those who favor cryptosystems built as strongly as possible, and those who favor cryptosystems built with the opportunity for access if necessary and approved by a judicial authority. The recent adoption of encryption technologies hinders the orders of judges to authorize disclosure of information and law enforcement's ability to conduct investigations. Encryption is a process to secure information from unwanted access or use. Encryption uses the art of cryptography, which comes from the Greek words meaning "secret writing," to change information which can be read (plaintext) and make it so that it cannot be read (ciphertext). Decryption uses the same art of cryptography to change that ciphertext back to plaintext. How does encryption work? A cryptosystem is a five-element system which includes a set of plaintexts , keys , encryption methods , decryption methods , and ciphertexts . Key escrow systems propose that an intermediary holds encryption keys so that authorized users may access their data in the event that they lose or forget their password, or in the event that a government agency presents the intermediary with a court order to hand over the data. Hackers will seek to circumvent any security put in place to protect the keys, seeking to reap the payload of an unknown trove of users' keys—and data. There are legitimate and illegitimate ways to access encrypted data. for more. Encryption is not new to human communications. This by-default encryption exponentially increased the amount of digital evidence that law enforcement was not as easily able to access, and therefore the debate over security of individuals and national security became more prevalent. While a user accesses the data, or is otherwise processing the data, it is in plaintext. Uses
Who uses encryption? However, data that are in use are in a plaintext form to the user or system so that they can manipulate that data, and thus these data cannot be encrypted. A cybersystem includes the end terminals in use; the modems and routers used to transmit data; the servers that process the information; the software packages used in sharing that data; other network-connected devices on that network collecting, generating, and processing data; and the user. Encryption is used by all elements in the cybersystem to protect the data in that system, the users of the system, and the system itself. This expansion amplifies the opportunities for encryption to be applied as a protective measure. As a result, law enforcement has reported instances of being stymied from obtaining certain communications as well as stored data that have been encrypted. In the physical world, an attacker would need to be physically near its target to carry out an attack. Encryption is a tool information security professionals and end-users can employ to ensure the data under their care remains confidential and its integrity remains intact. Continue to allow the courts to develop case law on encryption . But after a few years of this strategy both the government and the technology community are coalescing around a view that Congress legislate on the matter of the availability of encryption and law enforcement's access to encrypted communications, in order to provide uniformity and certainty.
|
Encryption is a process to secure information from unwanted access or use. Encryption uses the art of cryptography to change information which can be read (plaintext) and make it so that it cannot be read (ciphertext). Decryption uses the same art of cryptography to change that ciphertext back to plaintext. Encryption takes five elements to work: plaintexts, keys, encryption methods, decryption methods, and ciphertexts. Data that are in a state of being stored or in a state of being sent are eligible for encryption. However, data that are in a state of being processed—that is being generated, altered, or otherwise used—are unable to be encrypted and remain in plaintext and vulnerable to unauthorized access.
Purposes of Encryption
Today, encryption is as ubiquitous as the devices that connect to the Internet. Encryption is a tool that information security professionals and end users alike can employ to ensure that the data in their custody remain confidential to only those who are authorized to access the data. It also helps to ensure that data is accessed as the authorized users intend, and not altered by a third party.
Strong encryption helps users around the world trust the systems and data they are using, thereby facilitating the transactions that allow society to operate, such as economic activity, control of utilities, and government. This is important because the world has become more connected, and attackers have become more persistent and pervasive. It is difficult to overemphasize the extent to which Internet-connected systems are under attack. But the frequency with which data breaches are exposed in the news media can act as an indicator of the prevalence of active exploitations. Encryption is a tool used to thwart attempts to compromise legitimate activity and national security.
Major Issues
However, encryption has posed challenges to law enforcement and elements of national security. Strong encryption sometimes hinders law enforcement's ability to collect digital evidence and investigate crimes in the physical world. As more real world transactions are conducted via digital means and adversaries continue to perpetrate crimes, this problem may become more pronounced. There are multiple sides to the encryption debate, but the sides generally reduce to two main parties: those who favor cryptosystems built as strongly as possible, and those who favor cryptosystems built with the opportunity for access if necessary and approved by a judicial authority.
Encryption has created new issues for end users, as well. The technology was adopted rapidly, and users were not afforded the same opportunities to alter their habits as with the more steady adoption of technologies in the past. With the quick adoption of encryption, users left themselves more vulnerable to being unable to access or share their own data, for instance in the event that they forget the key or lack a way to share that key.
One proposal to alleviate concerns over access to encrypted data by law enforcement includes mandating access for law enforcement while retaining strong encryption. However, this proposal undermines how encryption systems are built by introducing some extraordinary access into the system beyond the direct access of the user. This proposal carries risk as it creates an attack vector which adversaries of all types could seek to exploit. The increased risk raises the possibility that a persistent adversary will be able to circumvent the protections put in place to allow limited access and compromise the data and systems in use. In the 114th Congress, many activities have focused on encryption, including some legislative proposals.
|
crs_RL33528
|
crs_RL33528_0
|
Technology and Competitiveness
Technological advancement in U.S. industry often has been supported by congressional initiatives over the past 30 or more years. This approach has involved both direct measures that concern budget outlays and the provision of services by government agencies (such as the now terminated Advanced Technology Program (ATP) and the Technology Innovation Program (TIP), as well as the existing Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) of the National Institute of Standards and Technology) and indirect measures that include financial incentives and legal changes. Many of these efforts, however, have been revisited over the past several congresses. Thus, there has been increased congressional interest in mechanisms to accelerate the development and commercialization processes in the private sector. The development of a governmental effort to facilitate technological advance has been particularly difficult because of the absence of a consensus on the need for an articulated policy. Many of the programs implemented were based upon what individual committees judged appropriate for the agencies over which they have jurisdiction. Legislative Initiatives and Current Programs
Legislative initiatives have reflected a trend toward expanding the government's role beyond traditional funding of mission-oriented R&D and basic research toward the facilitation of technological advancement to meet other critical national needs, including the economic growth that flows from new commercialization and use of technologies and techniques in the private sector. Legislation to stimulate cooperative efforts among those involved in technology development has been viewed as one way to promote innovation and facilitate the international competitiveness of U.S. industry. As indicated above, the laws affecting the R&D environment have included both direct and indirect measures to facilitate technological innovation. In general, direct measures are those which involve budget outlays and the provision of services by government agencies. Indirect measures include financial incentives and legal changes (e.g., liability or regulatory reform; new antitrust arrangements).
|
There is ongoing interest in the pace of U.S. technological advancement due to its influence on U.S. economic growth, productivity, and international competitiveness. Because technology can contribute to economic growth and productivity increases, congressional attention has focused on how to augment private-sector technological development. Legislative activity over the past 30 or more years has created a policy for technology development, albeit an ad hoc one. Because of the lack of consensus on the scope and direction of a national policy, Congress has taken an incremental approach aimed at creating new mechanisms to facilitate technological advancement in particular areas and making changes and improvements as necessary.
Congressional action has mandated specific technology development programs and obligations in federal agencies. Many programs were created based upon what individual committees judged appropriate within the agencies over which they had authorization or appropriation responsibilities. However, there has been recent legislative activity directed at eliminating or significantly curtailing many of these federal efforts. Several programs have been terminated and the budgets for other initiatives have declined.
The proper role of the federal government in technology development and the competitiveness of U.S. industry continues to be a topic of congressional debate. Legislation affecting the research and development (R&D) environment has included both direct and indirect measures to facilitate technological innovation. In general, direct measures are those which involve budget outlays and the provision of services by government agencies. Indirect measures include financial incentives and legal changes (e.g., liability or regulatory reform; new antitrust arrangements). As the Congress develops its appropriation priorities, the manner by which the government encourages technological progress in the private sector again may be explored and/or redefined.
|
crs_RL34360
|
crs_RL34360_0
|
On December 29, 2007, the President signed S. 2499 , the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007 ( P.L. 110-173 ). This Act was passed by the House on December 19, 2007, and by a voice vote in the Senate on December 18, 2007. The Act makes changes to the nation's three major health programs, Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), as well as other federally funded programs. Perhaps the most prominent provisions of the Act were to (1) suspend the Medicare physician payment cut scheduled to take effect and (2) provide SCHIP funding through March 2009. 110-173 ( H.R. P.L. 110-173 mandates a 0.5% increase in the Medicare physician fee schedule for the six-month period from January 1, 2008, through June 30, 2008, and provides FY2008 and FY2009 SCHIP allotments through March 31, 2009. The Act also extends a number of expiring provisions and programs. These extensions affect Medicare plans and providers and Medicaid payments and programs. The Act also includes funding for some miscellaneous activities. The Act also extends exceptions to annual per beneficiary payment limits on outpatient physical therapy services and speech language pathology services for the next six months. The Act also extends cost reimbursement for brachytherapy services and cost reimbursement to therapeutic radiopharmaceuticals. Many extensions also affect certain Medicaid payments and programs. The Act extends increased payments for Medicaid disproportionate hospital share (DSH) allotments for Tennessee and Hawaii to provide additional assistance to certain hospitals that provide a disproportionate share of care to low-income patients with special needs. Medicare funds are also used to make grants for Area Agencies on Aging and Aging and Disability Resource Centers for FY2008 and FY2009. In addition, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) will become a congressional agency. These offsets include a reduction in federal payments for the Medicare Advantage stabilization fund in 2012. The Act also strengthened procedures and additional funding for the determination of Medicare's responsibility as a secondary rather than a primary payer for covered services. Payment rates for certain diagnostic laboratory tests are also changed. This report provides short descriptions of the provisions contained in S. 2499 . P.L. This continuation is called transitional medical assistance (TMA).
|
On December 29, 2007, the President signed S. 2499, the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-173). This Act was passed by the House on December 19, 2007, and by a voice vote in the Senate on December 18, 2007. The Act makes changes to the nation's three major health programs, Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), as well as other federally funded programs.
The most prominent provisions in the Act were to (1) suspend the Medicare physician payment cut scheduled to take effect and (2) provide SCHIP funding through March 2009. P.L. 110-173 mandates a 0.5% increase in the Medicare physician fee schedule for the six-month period from January 1, 2008, through June 30, 2008, and provides FY2008 and FY2009 SCHIP funding allotments through March 31, 2009. The Act also extends a number of expiring provisions and programs. These extensions affect Medicare plans and providers and Medicaid payments and programs. The Act also includes funding for some miscellaneous activities.
The Act's Medicare extensions include incentive payments for certain physicians, and extensions of current law provisions for Medicare Special Needs Plans and cost-based plans. A variety of extensions also affect how long-term care, rural, and acute care hospitals are paid or classified. Other extensions affect Medicare payments for certain services and providers, outpatient physical therapy services, speech language pathology services, certain pathology laboratories, brachytherapy services, and therapeutic radiopharmaceuticals.
The Act also includes Medicaid provisions designed to extend certain payments and programs, such as Medicaid disproportionate hospital share (DSH) allotments for Tennessee and Hawaii, the Transitional Medical Assistance (TMA) program, and the Qualifying Individual (QI) program, among other provisions.
Miscellaneous provisions include using Medicare funds to make grants to State Health Insurance Assistance Programs, Area Agencies on Aging, and Aging and Disability Resource Centers. The Act also establishes the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) as a congressional agency.
The Act provides a number of offsets to pay for the spending increases, including a reduction in the Medicare Advantage stabilization fund in 2012. The Act also includes provisions affecting Medicare's responsibility as a secondary payer for covered services, Medicare payments for Inpatient Rehabilitation Facilities (IRFs), payments for most Medicare part B drugs, payments for certain diagnostic laboratory tests, and Medicare Long-Term Care Hospitals.
This report provides short descriptions of the provisions contained in P.L. 110-173.
|
crs_RS20158
|
crs_RS20158_0
|
Overview of the System
The National Park System contains 412 units throughout the nation. They are administered by the National Park Service (NPS) in the Department of the Interior (DOI). Today, there are more than 20 different designations (i.e., titles) for units of the National Park System, reflecting the diversity of the areas. An act of Congress creating a National Park System unit may explain the unit's purpose; set its boundaries; provide specific directions for land acquisition, planning, uses, and operations; and authorize appropriations for acquisition and development. Criteria for Studies
The NPS studies must consider certain factors established in P.L. The law directs NPS to assess whether an area contains natural or cultural resources that are nationally significant, whether it constitutes one of the most important examples of a type of resource, and whether it is a suitable and feasible addition to the system. The NPS has developed criteria for determining national significance, suitability, and feasibility. 105-391 also requires the Secretary of the Interior to recommend annually to Congress a list of areas for study for potential inclusion in the National Park System. The NPS also must submit to Congress a list of areas previously studied that contain primarily historical resources and a list of areas with natural resources. Issues
The addition of units to the National Park System sometimes has been controversial. Some discourage adding units, asserting that the system is "mature" or "complete," while others assert that the system should evolve and grow to reflect current events, new information, and reinterpretations. A related issue is how to properly maintain existing and new units given limited fiscal and staffing resources. Differences exist as to the relative importance of including areas reflecting U.S. natural, cultural, and social history. The adequacy of standards and procedures for assuring that the most outstanding areas are included in the system also has been debated. Another issue has been whether particular resources are better protected outside the National Park System, and how to secure the best alternative protection. Alternatives to Inclusion in the National Park System
It is generally regarded as difficult to meet the criteria and to secure congressional support and funding for expanding the National Park System. Certain areas that receive technical or financial aid from the NPS, but are neither federally owned nor directly administered by the NPS, have been classified by the NPS as affiliated areas. Some programs give places honorary recognition. The NPS also supports local and state governments in protecting resources.
|
The National Park System includes 412 diverse units administered by the National Park Service (NPS) in the Department of the Interior. Units generally are added to the National Park System by acts of Congress, although the President may proclaim national monuments for inclusion in the system on land that is federally managed. An act of Congress creating a National Park System unit may explain the unit's purpose; set its boundaries; provide specific directions for land acquisition, planning, uses, and operations; and authorize appropriations for acquisition and development. Today, there are more than 20 different designations (i.e., titles) for units of the National Park System, reflecting the diversity of the areas.
Before enacting a law to add a unit, Congress often first enacts a law requiring the NPS to study an area, typically to assess its national significance, suitability and feasibility, and management options. When Congress directs the NPS to prepare a study, the agency must assess whether an area contains natural or cultural resources that are nationally significant, constitutes one of the most important examples of a type of resource, and is a suitable and feasible addition to the park system. The agency also is to consider certain other factors established in law (e.g., threats to resources).
The Secretary of the Interior is required by law to recommend annually to Congress a list of areas for study for potential inclusion in the National Park System. The Secretary is also required to submit to Congress a list of areas previously studied that contain primarily historical resources and a list of areas with natural resources. Since 2000, the Secretary has submitted such recommendations once, in 2012.
The addition of units to the National Park System sometimes has been controversial. Some discourage adding units, asserting that the system is "mature" or "complete," while others assert that the system should evolve and grow to reflect current events, reinterpretations, and a changing U.S. population. A related issue is how to properly maintain existing and new units given limited fiscal and staffing resources. Differences exist on the relative importance of including areas reflecting our natural, cultural, and social history. The adequacy of standards and procedures for ensuring that the most outstanding areas are included in the Park System also has been debated.
It is generally regarded as difficult to meet the criteria and to secure congressional support and funding for expanding the National Park System. Thus, another issue has been whether particular resources are better protected outside the National Park System, and how to secure the best alternative protection. Certain areas that receive technical or financial aid from the NPS, but are neither federally owned nor directly administered by the NPS, include affiliated areas and national heritage areas. Some programs give places honorary recognition. The NPS also supports local and state governments in protecting resources through grants for projects and technical assistance.
|
crs_R40995
|
crs_R40995_0
|
Recent Developments
On April 23, 2010, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), after determining that additional supplies of raw cane sugar are required in the U.S. market, announced a 200,000 short ton (ST) increase in the FY2010 raw sugar import quota. Current law authorizes the sugar program through the 2012 crops for sugar beets and sugarcane. This share has grown over the last 25 years, reflecting the price protection provided by the sugar program. The program's support level and import protection, however, keep the U.S. sugar price above the price of sugar traded internationally, and constitute an indirect subsidy to the production sector by way of higher prices paid by U.S. sugar users (food and beverage manufacturers) and household consumers. The 2008 farm bill ( P.L. for refined beet sugar. This provision guarantees a minimum 85% market share for the domestic sector, and is intended to ensure that imports do not displace the ability of U.S. sugar processors to sell more of their output in each successive year, to the extent that there is growth in U.S. demand for sugar. Although the WTO commitment sets this minimum level, the Secretary of Agriculture has authority to allow additional amounts of sugar to enter if "domestic supplies of sugars may be inadequate to meet domestic demand at reasonable prices." In a significant policy change, the 2008 farm bill requires USDA to set the WTO sugar TRQ commitments at the minimum levels at the beginning of the quota (i.e., marketing) year, lays out the factors to be considered to increase quota imports if there is an emergency sugar shortage before April 1 of each year, details what import actions USDA can take before and after April 1, and prescribes the mix of raw versus refined sugar allowed to enter, depending upon which half of the year such entries occur (see " 2008 Farm Bill Sugar TRQ Provision "). Food Use
The United States is the fifth-largest user of sugar for food in the world, consuming an estimated 10.5 million ST in FY2009. However, if sugar use trends higher than now projected, USDA would face continued calls to allow for additional imports. Reflecting this uncertainty, USDA admitted that its FY2010 sugar use projection may be at the low end of a range. Significance of Sugar Ending Stocks
USDA projected in early summer 2009 that U.S. sugar stocks relative to domestic food consumption would be much lower than usual at the end of both the FY2009 and FY2010 marketing years. In implementing the sugar marketing allotment provisions of the 2002 farm bill, USDA stated that its estimate of reasonable ending stocks will be set "at a level expected to preclude sugar loan collateral forfeitures" (i.e., to ensure that sugar market prices were above effective price support levels so that the statutory directive to operate the sugar program at no cost to the U.S. Treasury was met). The raw sugar futures price has since fallen back to average 31.0¢/lb. in April 2010. Issues
Sugar users continue to press their case for USDA to increase sugar imports, arguing that action is needed to restore supplies to more normal levels. Sugar processors maintain that the domestic market is adequately supplied now that the harvesting and processing of the 2009 crops is completed. Sugar processors seek to maintain their advantage in negotiating sales prices with users. Food and beverage firms want prices for refined sugar that are lower and closer to the historical average. Members of Congress have weighed in with letters to USDA in support of each side's position. To address this, sugar processors advocate increased coordination between the U.S. and Mexican governments on sugar policies. 2008 Farm Bill Sugar TRQ Provision
One new provision prescribes USDA's authority in administering the sugar TRQs established to meet U.S. WTO trade commitments. one year earlier. Sugar Users Call for Import Increase
Sugar users, beginning in March 2009, have made repeated requests for USDA to increase import quotas for raw and refined sugar in order to head off a shortage in the domestic sugar supply. Sugar Imports from Mexico
Free Trade under NAFTA
Unrestricted imports of sugar from Mexico since January 1, 2008, have introduced considerable uncertainty into USDA's efforts to manage the sugar program to ensure that market prices stay above effective support levels (i.e., that sugar processors have no incentive to forfeit on their loans if prices are lower).
|
The sugar program, as reauthorized by the 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-246), is designed to guarantee that growers and processors of sugar beets and sugarcane receive a minimum price. To do this, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) limits the amount of domestically produced sugar that processors can sell under "marketing allotments" and restricts imports. These decisions to control supply are aimed at keeping market prices above support levels, so that USDA can operate the sugar program at "no cost" to the U.S. Treasury. Separately, trade law authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to allow additional imports if the domestic sugar supply is not adequate to meet domestic demand at reasonable prices.
The United States is the fifth-largest consumer of sugar in the world. Consumption in food has increased in recent years, reflecting population growth and a shift back to sugar from corn syrup, an alternative and cheaper sweetener. Adverse weather significantly reduced beet sugar output in FY2009 and contributed to tight sugar supplies as FY2010 began. USDA projects a continued tight outlook at the end of FY2010 and also for FY2011, with ending stocks relative to demand at the low end of the range compared to earlier this decade. Reflecting this, the raw sugar futures price and the refined beet sugar spot price in April 2010 were 43% higher than year-ago levels. These prices were considerably above their support levels and 10-year market averages.
Since early 2009, food manufacturers that use sugar have called on USDA to allow for additional sugar imports to head off sugar "shortages" and to restore supplies to more normal levels. Sugar crop growers and their processors maintain that the domestic market is adequately supplied, with the processing of the 2009 crops now complete. Though these contrasting views spotlight the issue of sugar availability, the debate has more to do with the future level of the price of sugar. Sugar processors seek to maintain their advantage in negotiating higher sales prices with users. Sugar users want lower refined sugar prices that are closer to the historical average.
The debate over additional sugar imports centers around a provision in the 2008 farm bill that prescribes USDA's authority in administering the import quotas established to meet U.S. commitments under the World Trade Organization. It requires USDA at the beginning of each fiscal year to set the quotas for raw sugar and refined sugar at the minimum levels laid out in this obligation. The Secretary of Agriculture, however, is directed to increase imports before April 1 of any year if there is an "emergency shortage of sugar" due to war or a natural disaster. Sugar users have argued since summer 2009 that circumstances warranted additional imports before April 1. Processors urged USDA to wait until the supply picture became clearer. On April 23, 2010, USDA announced an increase in the raw sugar import quota. Over the last year, Members of Congress have weighed in to USDA in support of each side's position.
Differing estimates of U.S. sugar use for food have implications for USDA's management of the sugar program—in particular for import quota decisions. Some analysts view USDA's projection of FY2010 sugar use as too low. They argue that available data suggest consumption of sugar for food is actually higher, and that additional imports are needed.
Free trade in sweeteners with Mexico now introduces considerable uncertainty as to how much sugar Mexico might export in any year to the U.S. market. This, in turn, complicates USDA's effort to administer the sugar program. Sugar processors advocate increased coordination between the U.S. and Mexican governments on sugar policies. Sugar users oppose their "managed-trade proposal," arguing that it would result in inadequate domestic supplies and hurt U.S. jobs.
|
crs_97-290
|
crs_97-290_0
|
An estimated 123,000 industrial facilities (twice the number of industrial sources subject to the base NPDES program) and 220 municipalities and counties were covered by the 1990 permit rules for Phase I of the program. The 1999 Phase II rules were challenged by environmental groups. Omnibus energy legislation enacted in the 109 th Congress ( P.L. 109-58 , the Energy Policy Act of 2005) included a provision addressing this issue. In May 2008, a federal court held that the rule is arbitrary and capricious, and it vacated the rule. At the time, EPA said that it intends to issue a revised rule that would remove the 2006 rule from the Code of Federal Regulations consistent with the court vacatur and codify the statutory exemption in P.L. 109-58 , but the agency has not proposed any revisions or announced a specific schedule for doing. In the 111 th Congress, legislation to repeal the exemption passed the House (the provision was Section 728 of H.R. In the 114 th Congress, a bill has been introduced to repeal the oil and gas exemption enacted in P.L. 109-58 . Similar legislation was introduced in the 113 th Congress. Stormwater Management at Federal Facilities
Congress often looks to federal agencies to lead or test new policy approaches, a fact reflected in legislation passed in 2007. Section 438 of P.L. 110-140 , the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA), requires federal agencies to implement strict stormwater runoff requirements for development or redevelopment projects involving a federal facility in order to reduce stormwater runoff and associated pollutant loadings to water resources. To assist agencies in meeting these requirements, EPA issued technical guidance. The resulting report, issued in 2009, called for major changes to EPA's stormwater control program that would focus on the flow volume of stormwater runoff instead of just its pollutant load. Subsequently, EPA initiated information-gathering and public dialogue activities as a prelude to possible regulatory changes that would respond to the NRC's criticism of inconsistency in stormwater requirements nationally and embrace the report's recommendation to adequately control all sources of stormwater discharge that contribute to waterbody impairment. During efforts to develop a national rule, EPA explored regulatory options that would strengthen the regulatory program by establishing specific post-construction requirements for stormwater discharges from new development and redevelopment, which currently are not regulated. EPA officials said that the rule would focus on stormwater discharges from developed, or post-construction, sites, such as subdivisions, roadways, industrial facilities, and commercial buildings or shopping centers, and to seek to ensure that even after development projects are completed, runoff levels from sites are equivalent to pre-construction hydrology. In mid-March 2014, EPA announced that it would defer action on the post-construction stormwater rule and instead will provide incentives, technical assistance, and other approaches for cities to address stormwater runoff themselves.
|
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and states implement a federally mandated program for controlling stormwater discharges from industrial facilities and municipalities. Large cities and most industry sources are subject to rules issued in 1990 (Phase I rules), and EPA issued permit rules to cover smaller cities and other industrial sources and construction sites in 1999 (Phase II rules). Because of the large number of affected sources and deadline changes that led to confusion, numerous questions have arisen about this program. Impacts and costs of the program's requirements, especially on cities, are a continuing concern.
The 109th Congress enacted omnibus energy legislation (P.L. 109-58, the Energy Policy Act of 2005) that included a provision giving the oil and gas industry regulatory relief from some stormwater control requirements. In 2008, a federal court vacated an EPA rule implementing this provision. EPA intends to issue a revised rule that repeals the one that was vacated by the court and codifies the statutory exemption in P.L. 109-58, but the agency does not have a specific schedule for doing so. In the 111th Congress, the House passed a bill that included a provision that would repeal the exemption in P.L. 109-58, but the Senate took no action. Similar legislation has been introduced in the 114th Congress (H.R. 1460).
Congress often looks to federal agencies to lead or test new policy approaches, a fact reflected in legislation enacted in the 110th Congress. Section 438 of the Energy Independence and Security Act (P.L. 110-140, EISA) requires federal agencies to implement strict stormwater runoff requirements for development or redevelopment projects involving a federal facility in order to reduce stormwater runoff and associated pollutant loadings. EPA has issued technical guidance for federal agencies to use in meeting these requirements.
In 2009 the National Research Council issued a report calling for major changes to strengthen EPA's stormwater regulatory program, which it criticized as being inconsistent nationally and failing to adequately control all sources of stormwater discharge that contribute to waterbody impairment. In response, EPA began efforts to expand regulations and strengthen the current program with a revised rule. Agency officials said that the new rule would focus on stormwater discharges from newly developed and redeveloped, or post-construction, sites, such as subdivisions, roadways, industrial facilities, and commercial buildings or shopping centers. The rule was originally due to be proposed in 2011, but EPA missed that and several subsequent deadlines, due to analytic problems associated with developing the rule. In 2014, the agency announced that it would defer action on a national rule and instead will provide incentives, technical assistance, and other approaches for cities to address stormwater runoff themselves.
|
crs_RS20425
|
crs_RS20425_0
|
RS20425 -- Satellite Television: Historical Information on SHVIA and LOCAL
Updated December 15, 2004
The Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act (SHVIA)
The 1999 Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act (1) (SHVIA) expands on and extends some provisions of the 1988Satellite Home Viewer Act (SHVA), as amended, regarding consumer reception of television signals via satellitedishes. The 1999 law, SHVIA, provides consumers greater access to broadcast network television programming via theirsatellite dishes. The 1999 law continues to permit that activity, but also allows satellite companies to rebroadcast local network signals back into the same localmarket area. This does not mean that DBScompanies must carrylocal broadcast programming throughout the country . The 108th Congress isconsidering whetherto extend it further, and whether to change how the prices are set (see CRS Report RS21768 ). 1554 would have created a loan guarantee program to help ensure that subscribers in small and rural markets benefit from the local-into-local provisions even though EchoStarand DirecTV do not plan to offer such service in all areas. Congress subsequently passedthe"Launching Our Communities Access to Local Television Act" (LOCAL) as Title X of the FY2001Commerce-Justice-State Appropriations Act as enacted by the FY2001 District of Columbia Appropriations Act( P.L.106-553 ).
|
Congress has passed several laws to provide consumers greater access tolocal network television stations, particularly via satellite. The 1988 Satellite Home Viewer Act (SHVA), amendedin1994, was expanded in 1999 with the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act (SHVIA). SHVIA allows (notrequires) satellite companies to retransmit a local broadcast network signal back into the same localmarket area fromwhich it originates ("local-into-local"). Concerned that satellite TV companies do not plan to offer local-into-localinall parts of the country, Congress then passed the Launching Our Communities Access to Local Television Act(LOCAL). That act creates a loan guarantee program to help ensure that consumers in small and rural marketsreceivelocal network TV stations via satellite or other technologies. This historical report summarizes SHVIA andLOCAL,and the debate over whether a company called Northpoint should be able to use the same frequencies as satellitestotransmit data and television using terrestrial systems. It does not address the 2004 Satellite Home Viewer Extensionand Reauthorization Act (SHVERA). See CRS Report RS21768 instead. This report will not be updated.
|
crs_R42523
|
crs_R42523_0
|
Humala won the elections and was sworn in as Peru's president in July 2011 for a five-year term. As a complement to the new law, the Humala administration also created an office of conflict prevention. Deep social divides over how to pursue development continue to undercut political stability. The more radical elements of Humala's original support base and his party, Gana Peru, urge the pursuit of more leftist policies, such as nationalization of strategic industries, which Humala called for during the election campaign. Forces that resist more radical policies include a strong business sector; a conservative, wealthy elite; a centrist middle class; and a divided Congress. Humala's party does not have an outright majority; it has 43 seats to Fujimori's party's 36 seats in the 130-seat chamber. Socioeconomic Conditions
Peru's economy has been stronger than virtually all other Latin American economies since 2001. President Humala has maintained that "Economic growth and social inclusion will march together," and that he will expand social programs to reduce the number living in poverty. Indeed, the percentage of the population living in poverty in some mountain, jungle, and rural areas is over 60%. As mentioned above, President Humala and the Peruvian Congress have already approved an increase in mining royalties expected to generate US$1.1 billion a year to fund social development programs aimed at closing that social and economic distribution gap. Social unrest and debate over exploitation of natural resources is likely to remain a challenge for the Humala government. Relations with the United States
Peru and the United States have a strong and cooperative relationship. The United States supports the strengthening of Peru's democratic institutions and its respect for human rights. The two countries also cooperate on environmental protection and counternarcotics efforts. In the economic realm, the United States supports bilateral trade relations and Peru's further integration into the world economy. The Obama Administration requested $73 million for Peru for FY2013. Counternarcotics Efforts
A dominant theme in the relations between the two countries is the effort to stem the flow of illegal drugs, mostly cocaine, from Peru to the United States. Trade and Environment
The United States is one of Peru's top trading partners. The U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA) went into effect February 1, 2009.
|
This report provides an overview of Peru's government and economy and a discussion of issues in relations between the United States and Peru.
Peru and the United States have a strong and cooperative relationship. Several issues in U.S.-Peru relations are likely to be considered in decisions by Congress and the Administration on future aid to and cooperation with Peru. The United States supports the strengthening of Peru's democratic institutions, its respect for human rights, environmental protection, and counternarcotics efforts. A dominant theme in bilateral relations is the effort to stem the flow of illegal drugs, mostly cocaine, between the two countries. In the economic realm, the United States supports bilateral trade relations and Peru's further integration into the world economy. The United States is Peru's top trading partner. The U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA) went into effect in February 2009. The Obama Administration requested $73 million in foreign assistance for Peru for FY2014 to advance these objectives.
Ollanta Humala, of the left-wing Gana Peru, was sworn in as Peru's president in July 2011 for a five-year term. Gana Peru initially won 47 seats out of the 130 seats in the unicameral Congress, requiring Humala to rely on political alliances with lesser parties in order to pass legislation. As Humala has moderated his stance, he has lost left-leaning allies within his and other parties. Deep social divides over how to pursue development continue to undercut political stability. The more radical elements of Humala's original support base and his party urge the pursuit of more leftist policies, such as nationalization of strategic industries, which Humala called for during the election campaign. Forces that resist more radical policies include a strong business sector; a conservative, wealthy elite; a centrist middle class; and a divided Congress. Social unrest, especially over exploitation of natural resources, remains a challenge for the Humala government. It has established an office of conflict prevention and taken other actions to reduce social conflict.
Since 2001 Peru's economy has been stronger than all others in the region, with its growth due mostly to the export of natural resources. High economic growth, along with social programs, has helped to lower Peru's overall poverty rates. Nonetheless, in some jungle, mountain, and rural areas of the country, over 60% of the population continue to live in poverty. The income distribution gap remains quite large as well. This economic disparity has contributed to rising social unrest. President Humala submitted, and the legislature approved, a bill increasing royalties mining companies must pay. The government estimates the royalties will generate about US$1 billion a year, which it will use to finance social development programs intended to narrow both the social divide and the economic distribution gap.
|
crs_R43447
|
crs_R43447_0
|
T he existence of a sizable population of "DREAMers" in the United States has prompted questions about unauthorized aliens' eligibility for admission to public institutions of higher education, in-state tuition, and financial aid. The term DREAMer is widely used to describe aliens who were brought to the United States as children and raised here but lack legal immigration status. As children, DREAMers are entitled to public elementary and secondary education as a result of the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Plyler v. Doe . There, the Court struck down a Texas statute that prohibited the use of state funds to provide elementary and secondary education to children who were not "legally admitted" to the United States because the state distinguished between these children and other children without a "substantial" goal, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Plyler Court did not, however, purport to address unauthorized aliens' access to higher education, and several states subsequently adopted laws or practices barring their enrollment at public institutions of higher education. Congress has also restricted unauthorized aliens' eligibility for "public benefits," a term which has generally been construed to include in-state tuition and financial aid. Preemption
The doctrine of preemption, in turn, derives from the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which establishes that federal law, treaties, and the Constitution itself are "the supreme Law of the Land, ... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding." Education has historically been seen as a local, not a federal, matter. The first of these, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), enacted in August 1996, defines state public benefit to mean
(A) any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license provided by an agency of a State ... or by appropriated funds of a State ...; and (B) any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other similar benefit for which payments or assistance are provided to an individual, household, or family eligibility unit by an agency of a State ... or by appropriated funds of a State,
and generally bars states from providing such benefits to aliens who are "not lawfully present in the United States" unless they enact legislation that "affirmatively provides" for such aliens' eligibility. The second statute, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, enacted a little over a month after PRWORA, bars states from providing "postsecondary education benefits" to aliens who are not "lawfully present" based on their residence in the state unless other U.S. citizens or nationals are eligible for such benefits, regardless of their state of residence, but does not define benefit . State Restrictions on Access
State measures that would deny unauthorized aliens access to public institutions of higher education and in-state tuition have been challenged by plaintiffs and commentators on the grounds that they violate the Equal Protection or Supremacy Clauses. The Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Plyler v. Doe has generally been taken to mean that the Equal Protection Clause precludes states from denying unauthorized alien children access to public elementary and secondary schools. In-state tuition and financial aid, in contrast, have generally been viewed as public benefits. They would also not appear to be required to enact legislation that "affirmatively provides" for unauthorized aliens' eligibility on the ground that access to higher education has generally not been viewed as a public benefit for purposes of PRWORA. What, if any, limits IIRIRA may impose upon states enacting legislation that would provide for unauthorized aliens' eligibility for in-state tuition is less clear because the courts have taken different approaches in the two challenges decided, to date, to state laws permitting unauthorized aliens to receive in-state tuition based on high school attendance in the state. Thus, the high court found that the measure did not conflict with IIRIRA since IIRIRA refers to in-state tuition based on residence, not based on high school attendance and graduation. Similarly, the court found that IIRIRA did not create a private right of action, which means that individuals cannot sue to enforce it.
|
The existence of a sizable population of "DREAMers" in the United States has prompted questions about unauthorized aliens' eligibility for admission to public institutions of higher education, in-state tuition, and financial aid. The term DREAMer is widely used to describe aliens who were brought to the United States as children and raised here but lack legal immigration status. As children, DREAMers are entitled to public elementary and secondary education as a result of the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Plyler v. Doe. There, the Court struck down a Texas statute that prohibited the use of state funds to provide elementary and secondary education to children who were not "legally admitted" to the United States because the state distinguished between these children and other children without a "substantial" goal, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Once DREAMers complete high school, however, they may have less access to public higher education. Plyler's holding was limited to elementary and secondary education, and the Court's focus on the young age of those whom Texas denied a "basic education" has generally been taken to mean that measures denying unauthorized aliens access to higher education may be subject to less scrutiny than the Texas statute was. Thus, several states have adopted laws or practices barring the enrollment of unauthorized aliens at public institutions of higher education. In addition, Congress has enacted two statutes that restrict unauthorized aliens' eligibility for "public benefits," a term which has generally been construed to encompass in-state tuition and financial aid. The first of these statutes, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA, P.L. 104-193), bars the provision of "state and local public benefits" to aliens who are "not lawfully present in the United States" unless the state enacts legislation that "affirmatively provides" for their eligibility. The second, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA, P.L. 104-208), bars states from providing "postsecondary education benefits" to aliens who are "not lawfully present" based on their residence in the state unless all U.S. citizens or nationals are eligible for such benefits, regardless of their residence.
State measures that variously deny or grant access to public higher education, in-state tuition, or financial aid have been challenged on the grounds that they violate the Equal Protection Clause, like the Texas measure at issue in Plyler. They have also been alleged to violate the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which establishes that federal law is "the supreme Law of the Land" and may preempt any incompatible provisions of state law. Based on the case law to date, it would appear that states do not, as a general matter, violate the Equal Protection or Supremacy Clauses by excluding unauthorized aliens from public institutions of higher education. On the other hand, access to public higher education has generally not been construed as a public benefit for purposes of PRWORA, such that it may only be provided to "unlawfully present" aliens if a state enacts legislation that affirmatively provides for their eligibility.
In-state tuition and financial aid have generally been seen as public benefits for purposes of PRWORA. However, courts have rejected the view that state statutes providing in-state tuition to unauthorized aliens are preempted unless they expressly refer to PRWORA, or to unauthorized aliens being eligible. Courts have also found that IIRIRA does not bar states from providing in-state tuition to unauthorized aliens who complete a certain number of years of high school in the state and satisfy other criteria. In one case, the court reached this conclusion because it construed IIRIRA as barring only the provision of in-state tuition based on residence in the state, not based on other factors. In another case, the court found that IIRIRA did not create a private right of action such that individuals may sue to enforce alleged violations.
|
crs_R42889
|
crs_R42889_0
|
Overview
Amtrak—officially, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation—is the nation's primary provider of intercity passenger rail service. Amtrak is structured as a private company, but virtually all its shares are held by the United States Department of Transportation (DOT). Amtrak was created by Congress in 1970 to preserve a basic level of intercity passenger rail service, while relieving private railroad companies of the obligation to provide money-losing passenger service. Most of that track is owned by freight rail companies; Amtrak owns about 625 route miles. Amtrak also operates commuter service under contract with state and local commuter authorities in various parts of the country. Appropriations Status
Amtrak's expenses exceed its revenues each year. Roughly, the operating grant can be thought of as relating to Amtrak's annual cash loss, and the capital grant as relating to Amtrak's depreciation loss, as well as an amount for Amtrak debt repayments. Authorization Status
Amtrak funding was authorized through FY2013 in the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (Division B of P.L. 749 , the Passenger Rail Reform and Investment Act of 2015, as passed by the House of Representatives, and the actual amount of funding provided to Amtrak through appropriations. Amtrak has long sought some measure of certainty in its level of federal funding. The level of federal funding that Amtrak receives could not be provided solely from a tax on Amtrak passengers; to provide the same level of federal funding Amtrak currently receives, the tax on passengers would have to be roughly two-thirds of the current ticket cost. NEC Improvement Plans
The NEC is Amtrak's flagship corridor, with its fastest service. Amtrak does not actually own much of its rolling stock. This authorization expired in October 2010. Its current load factor, 52%, is near the record load factor Amtrak reported in FY1988, and higher than has been achieved since FY1993. Amtrak is able to cover about two-thirds of its operating costs from its revenues. It is not clear to what extent more infrastructure (parallel tracking, upgrading signal systems, etc.) Amtrak has stated that providing food and beverage service is essential to meet the needs of passengers, especially on long-distance trains, and it has interpreted the law as requiring that revenues cover the costs of food and beverage items and commissary operations but not the labor cost of Amtrak employees providing food service on board trains. Privatization of Intercity Passenger Rail Services
In the 112 th Congress, the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee conducted hearings on privatization of intercity passenger rail service. Amtrak itself can be considered a privatized rail provider, as it is legally a for-profit company which receives grants from federal and state governments. Passenger Train Access to Freight Rail Tracks
If a state or a private passenger rail operator other than Amtrak wished to begin passenger service over freight-owned right of way, it would likely have to pay more than Amtrak does to gain access to freight property. Recent Congressional Action
On March 4, 2015, the House passed H.R. This bill would authorize $7 billion in funding for passenger rail programs, including $5.8 billion for Amtrak and $1.2 billion for grants to states for passenger rail activities (including states along the NEC) over four years, and would make a number of changes to federal intercity passenger rail policies. Creating a program to provide grants to states for passenger rail service improvement projects on the NEC (§301). Streamlining of environmental review for passenger and freight rail construction projects in order to reduce the time required for review (§401). Federal Funding for Amtrak
|
Amtrak is the nation's primary provider of intercity passenger rail service. It was created by Congress in 1970 to preserve some level of intercity passenger rail service while enabling private rail companies to exit the money-losing passenger rail business. It is a quasi-governmental entity, a corporation whose stock is almost entirely owned by the federal government. It runs a deficit each year. Congressional appropriations cover about half its total loss, and represent essentially all of its funding for capital maintenance and improvements.
Amtrak can be divided into three parts. There is its Northeast Corridor (NEC) service between Washington, DC, and Boston, where Amtrak owns much of the infrastructure and operates frequent service using its fastest trains. There is its long-distance service, in which infrequent trains crisscross the country over tracks owned by freight rail companies. And there is its state-supported service, in which Amtrak operates shorter-distance trains under contract with states. Amtrak was last authorized in 2008, in the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act. That authorization expired at the end of FY2013. Amtrak's annual appropriations do not rely on separate authorization legislation, but authorization legislation does allow Congress to set multiyear Amtrak funding goals and federal intercity passenger rail policies.
Since Amtrak's inception, Congress has been divided on the question of whether it should even exist. Amtrak is regularly criticized for failing to cover its costs, and thus requiring federal assistance. The need for federal financial support is often cited as evidence that passenger rail service is not financially viable, or that Amtrak should yield to private companies that would find ways to provide rail service profitably. Yet it is not clear that a private company could perform the same range of activities better than Amtrak does. Indeed, Amtrak was created because private-sector railroad companies in the United States lost money for decades operating intercity passenger rail service and wished to be relieved of the obligation to do so.
By some measures, Amtrak is performing as well as or better than it ever has in its 44-year history. For example, it is carrying a record number of passengers, and its passenger load factor and its operating ratio are at the upper end of their historic ranges. On the other hand, Amtrak's plans do not envision significant decreases in its need for federal funding. Among the perennial questions that Congress may examine in considering reauthorizing Amtrak are whether Amtrak should continue to exist, what range of services it should offer, the appropriate level of federal financial support for Amtrak, its relations with states and with private rail companies, and its level of accountability to Congress.
On March 4, 2015, the House passed H.R. 749, the Passenger Rail Reform and Investment Act of 2015. This bill would authorize $7 billion for federal passenger rail programs over FY2016-FY2019, including $5.8 billion for grants to Amtrak and $1.2 billion for grants to states. It would also restructure Amtrak's financial structure, provide grants to states on the NEC for passenger rail improvement projects, streamline environmental review for passenger and freight rail construction projects, and make a variety of other changes in federal passenger rail policies.
|
crs_R43098
|
crs_R43098_0
|
Enacted appropriations and other budgetary legislation may vary in the level of detail they provide regarding how agencies should spend the funds that have been provided. Even when the purpose of appropriations has been specified in great detail, agencies have often been provided with some flexibility to decide how they will use their available budgetary resources during the fiscal year. In some instances, agencies are provided with limited authority to shift funds from one appropriations account or fund account to another—commonly referred to as "transfer authority." In addition, agencies are generally permitted to shift funds from one purpose to another within an appropriations account. This practice, usually referred to as "reprogramming," may be restricted by statute. This report provides an overview of transfers and reprogramming, and describes the statutory limitations and requirements for congressional notification that are applicable to each. An agency or department may only transfer budgetary resources if it has been provided the statutory authority to do so. Transfer authority may be broad or narrow in scope and it may apply to all agencies, to select agencies, or only to a single agency. Indefinite transfer authority is typically provided with specific restrictions on the circumstances under which the authority may be used. Transfer authority may be provided either in authorizing statutes or in appropriations acts. Transfer Authority in Authorizing Statutes
While transfer authority provided in annual appropriations acts is often limited to a specific dollar amount or percentage of the total budget authority provided, transfer authority in authorizing statutes is often broad or indefinite (i.e., provided without explicit caps on the amount of funds that may be transferred). Unlike transfers, reprogramming of funds is generally permitted unless such actions are otherwise restricted by statute, and an agency may not reprogram funds if doing so would violate any other provisions of law. An agency's ability to reprogram may be restricted by including "limiting provisions" within its annual appropriations acts or other statutes. For example, provisions in the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2013, established the following limitations and notification requirements on reprogramming actions by DHS:
(a) None of the funds provided by this Act, provided by previous appropriations Acts to the agencies in or transferred to the Department of Homeland Security that remain available for obligation or expenditure in fiscal year 2013, or provided from any accounts in the Treasury of the United States derived by the collection of fees available to the agencies funded by this Act, shall be available for obligation or expenditure through a reprogramming of funds that:
(1) creates a new program, project, or activity; (2) eliminates a program, project, office, or activity; (3) increases funds for any program, project, or activity for which funds have been denied or restricted by the Congress; (4) proposes to use funds directed for a specific activity by either of the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate or the House of Representatives for a different purpose; or (5) contracts out any function or activity for which funding levels were requested for Federal full-time equivalents in the object classification tables contained in the fiscal year 2013 Budget Appendix for the Department of Homeland Security, as modified by the joint explanatory statement accompanying this Act,
unless the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives are notified 15 days in advance of such reprogramming of funds. Limitations on Transfers and Reprogramming
General Restriction
In general, transferred and reprogrammed funds are subject to any limitations or conditions that were imposed by their original appropriations act. Additional Restrictions
Amount: "Not-to-Exceed" Limits
Statutes that provide authority to transfer funds may place a cap on the amounts that may be transferred. Congressional Notification
Agencies may be required by statute to notify Congress prior to (or shortly after) carrying out certain transfers and reprogramming transactions. Often, such requirements involve agencies notifying the relevant House and Senate Appropriations Committees a certain number of days (often 15, 30, or 45 calendar days) prior to transferring or reprogramming funds. Typically, all account-to-account transfers will require prior notification to Congress. Reprogramming actions generally require notification only when they exceed a certain dollar amount or "threshold." These adjustments may be necessary due to changing or unforeseen circumstances. When done so in accordance with the applicable authority, procedures, and limitations, transfers and reprogramming may enable agencies to operate more effectively or efficiently, while still adhering to congressional intent, thereby preserving Congress's "power of the purse." When transfers and reprogramming actions deviate from the applicable authorities, procedures, and limitations, however, it is possible that funds may be used in ways contrary to congressional intent. This, in turn, may pose challenges for congressional oversight of budget execution and agency operations.
|
Enacted appropriations and other budgetary legislation may vary in the level of detail they provide regarding how agencies should spend the funds that have been provided. Even when the purpose of appropriations is specified in great detail, agencies may be provided with some flexibility to make budgetary adjustments throughout the fiscal year. These adjustments may be necessary due to changing or unforeseen circumstances. In some instances, agencies are provided with transfer authority (i.e., authority to shift funds from one appropriations or fund account to another). In addition, agencies are generally permitted to shift funds from one purpose to another within an appropriations account. This practice, usually referred to as "reprogramming," is subject to statutorily imposed limitations.
An agency may only transfer budgetary resources if Congress has provided the agency with the statutory authority to do so. Transfer authority may be provided either in authorizing statutes or in appropriations acts. Transfer authority may be broad or narrow in scope, and may apply to all agencies, to select agencies, or only to a single agency. Transfer authority may be limited to a specific dollar amount. Alternatively, transfer authority may be provided for an indefinite amount, but with specific restrictions on the circumstances under which the authority may be used.
Reprogramming is generally permitted unless otherwise restricted or prohibited by statute. An agency's ability to reprogram may be restricted by including "limiting provisions" within its annual appropriations acts or other statutes. In addition, an agency may not reprogram funds if doing so would violate any other provisions of law.
In general, transferred and reprogrammed funds are subject to any limitations or conditions that were imposed by their original appropriations act. Statutes that provide transfer and reprogramming authority will commonly impose additional limitations or conditions, such as "not-to-exceed" limits, which place a cap on the amount of funds that may be transferred or reprogrammed, and "purpose" restrictions, which prohibit transferred or reprogrammed funds from being used for certain activities.
Agencies may be required by statute to notify Congress prior to (or shortly after) transferring or reprogramming funds. Such requirements usually involve notification to the relevant House and Senate Appropriations Committees a certain number of days (often 15, 30, or 45 calendar days) prior to transferring or reprogramming funds. Typically, all account-to-account transfers will require prior notification to Congress. Reprogramming actions generally require prior notification only when they exceed a certain dollar amount or "threshold."
When done so in accordance with the applicable authorities and procedures, transferring or reprogramming funds may enable agencies to operate more effectively or efficiently, and in a manner that is consistent with congressional intent. When transfers or reprogramming actions deviate from the applicable authorities, procedures, and limitations, however, it is possible that funds may be used in ways contrary to congressional intent.
This report provides an overview of transfers and reprogramming, and describes the statutory limitations and requirements for congressional notification that are applicable to each. This report concludes by discussing some of the challenges that transfers and reprogramming may pose for congressional oversight of budget execution.
|
crs_R40080
|
crs_R40080_0
|
After the long economic expansion that characterized much of the current decade, the nation entered its 11 th postwar recession in December 2007. The committee's announcement intensified congressional interest in passage of legislation aimed at encouraging creation of new jobs and warding off further loss of jobs. So, too, did comments equating the recession to the Great Depression. To mitigate all but one recession since the 1960s, Congress chose to increase federal expenditures on infrastructure (public works), thereby directly raising demand for goods and services to offset the reduced demand of consumers. After first briefly examining trends in employment since the latest recession began, this report focuses on job creation estimates available in late 2008 associated with increased spending on traditional and so-called green infrastructure, placing a heavy emphasis on explaining the methodology often used to derive them and the difficulties associated with developing estimates for green economic activities in particular. Once stimulus legislation is signed into law, the focus of Congress customarily turns to estimates of the number of jobs that result as federal funds are allocated to specific activities. In the case of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ), which was enacted in early 2009, Congress included language requiring entities that receive ARRA appropriations from federal agencies to report the number of jobs created or maintained as a result and requiring the Council of Economic Advisers to report on the employment and other economic effects of ARRA provisions. The report closes with a review of what is known to date about the number of jobs associated with the stimulus act. Historically, public works has been synonymous with heavy and civil construction activities (e.g., road and bridge building, flood control structures and dam building). Green jobs seemingly are those in and related to industries that utilize renewable resources to produce their outputs (e.g., energy generated by wind, solar, and geothermal technologies) and jobs in and related to industries that produce energy-efficient goods (e.g., Energy Star appliances) and services (e.g., mass transit). 111-5 requires entities that receive ARRA appropriations from federal agencies (e.g., grant, loan, or contract recipients; states) to include in their quarterly reports to the agencies estimates of the number of direct jobs created and retained by infrastructure projects, for example. Based on this definition, recipients reported that 608,311 jobs were funded by ARRA in the fourth quarter of 2009. The CEA's estimate of 1.0-1.1 million additional jobs as of August 2009, discussed in the preceding paragraph, falls within the range estimated by CBO. It estimated that the law might have raised employment by 2.2–2.8 million jobs above what it otherwise would have been as of the first quarter of 2010. Public investment outlays might have increased total employment by over 627,000 jobs in the first quarter of 2010, and by over 800,000 jobs in the second quarter of the year.
|
After the long economic expansion that characterized much of the current decade, the nation entered its 11th postwar recession in December 2007. The size of job losses and the comparison to the Great Depression intensified congressional interest in passing legislation early in 2009 aimed at encouraging job creation and warding off further cuts in employment.
To mitigate all but one recession since the 1960s, Congress chose to increase federal spending on public works (i.e., infrastructure). Public works expenditures traditionally have gone to certain types of construction activities (e.g., building highways and bridges, dams and flood control structures), which indirectly increase demand in industries that supply their products to construction firms (e.g., sand and gravel mines, heavy equipment manufacturers). Today, the definition of infrastructure has been expanded to include green economic activities (commonly referred to as green jobs), which include industries that utilize renewable resources (e.g., electricity generated by wind), produce energy-efficient goods and services (e.g., mass transit), and install energy-conserving products (e.g., retrofitting buildings with thermal-pane windows).
A question that typically arises during congressional consideration of economic stimulus legislation is which approach produces the most bang for the buck. In the instant case, this means how many jobs might be supported by federal expenditures on traditional and green infrastructure projects. Once stimulus legislation is signed into law, the focus of Congress customarily turns to estimates of the number of jobs that result as federal funds are allocated to specific activities. Therefore, after briefly examining the trend in employment since the recession's onset, the report turns to an in-depth look at estimates of job creation, including the limitations of the methodology often used to derive them and the difficulties associated with developing job estimates for green infrastructure in particular.
The report closes with a review of what is known to date about the number of jobs supported by infrastructure spending and other provisions in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, P.L. 111-5). Section 1512 requires entities that receive ARRA appropriations from federal agencies, totaling approximately $271 billion, to include in quarterly reports to the agencies the number of direct jobs created or maintained as a result. Section 1513 requires the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) to report quarterly on the effect of ARRA provisions on employment and other economic indicators. The CEA's reports are the most comprehensive because they contain estimates of not only jobs supported by ARRA appropriations but also of jobs associated with other parts of the act (e.g., unemployment and health insurance benefits, state fiscal relief, and tax provisions). The CEA has estimated that ARRA might have increased aggregate employment above what it otherwise would have been by 1.0-1.1 million jobs in the third quarter of 2009, 1.7-1.9 million jobs in the fourth quarter of 2009, 2.2-2.8 million jobs in the first quarter of 2010, and 2.5-3.6 million jobs in the second quarter of 2010.
|
crs_RL32710
|
crs_RL32710_0
|
Germany has instituted significant policy, legislative, and organizational reforms. Germany's Anti-Terrorism Policy after 9/11
Key Elements of German Strategy
Germany's counterterrorism strategy shares a number of elements with that of the UnitedStates, although there are clear differences in emphasis: Key elements include: (2)
Identifying terrorists and their supporters, bringing them to justice, andbreaking up their infrastructure at home and abroad. Significantly, Germany now sees radical Islamic terrorism as its primary security threat anditself as a potential target of attack. Although Germany supported the UN-sanctioned intervention in Afghanistan to root out theTaliban and al Qaeda, the German government strongly opposed the U.S. policy of broadening thewar against terrorism to a war against Iraq. (9)
Despite differences over Iraq, Germany is viewed as a key partner in the global war onterrorism. (10) Today,Germany perceives threats to its domestic security that lie far beyond its own borders. Possible Issues and Problems. DespiteGermany's sweeping reforms, critics point to continuing problems hampering Germany's domesticefforts. As a result of the emphasis on guarding civil liberties, the German law enforcement andintelligence communities face more bureaucratic hurdles, stricter constraints, and closer oversightthan those in many other countries. Currently Germany has about 7,800troops based abroad. (41) Some forty percent of those troops are directly engaged in counterterror missions. (44) In Afghanistan, some 2,300 German soldiers participate in theInternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Provincial Reconstruction Team(PRT)missions in the region of Kunduz and Feizabad. However critics point out that German military efforts have been hampered by the fact that,among major U.S. allies, German forces are presently among the least quickly deployable due todelays in implementing military reforms and, specifically, addressing a lack of airlift capacity. Some question whether this is adequate. (69) Ultimately, understanding and accepting these differences (agreeing to disagree), in the minds ofsome observers, may be the best approach to enhancing future U.S.-German cooperation in theglobal war on terrorism. For the United States, as well, German cooperation againstterrorism is likely to remain significant in light of Germany's importance as a European and worldactor, as a key hub for the transnational flow of persons and goods especially to the United States,and as a country whose soil has been used by terrorist to target the United States.
|
This report examines Germany's response to global Islamic terrorism after the September 11,2001 attacks in the United States. It looks at current German strategy, domestic efforts, andinternational responses, including possible gaps and weaknesses. It examines the state ofU.S.-German cooperation, including problems and prospects for future cooperation. This report maybe updated as needed.
Although somewhat overshadowed in the public view by the strong and vocal disagreementsover Iraq policy, U.S.-German cooperation in the global fight against international terrorism hasbeen extensive. German support is particularly important because several Al Qaeda members and9/11 plotters lived there and the country is a key hub for the transnational flow of persons and goods.Domestically, Germany faces the challenge of having a sizable population of Muslims, some withextremist views, whom terrorists might seek to recruit.
German counterterrorism strategy shares a number of elements with that of the United States,although there are clear differences in emphasis. Like the United States, Germany now sees radicalIslamic terrorism as its primary national security threat and itself as a potential target of attack. Today, Germany also recognizes that threats to its domestic security lie far beyond its own borders,in places such as Afghanistan.
Germany has introduced a number of policy, legislative, and organizational reforms since9/11 to make the country less hospitable to potential terrorists. Despite these reforms, critics pointto continuing problems hampering Germany's domestic efforts. German law enforcement andintelligence communities face more bureaucratic hurdles, stricter constraints, and closer oversightthan those in many other countries.
The German government has sent troops into combat beyond Europe for the first time sinceWorld War II. Currently Germany has about 7,800 troops based abroad of which some forty percentare directly engaged in counterterror missions. In Afghanistan, some 2,300 German soldiersparticipate in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Germany's role in Afghanistan'sstabilization and reconstruction is substantial. German military efforts have been hampered to someextent by delays in implementing military reforms to make German forces more expeditionary.
A key question for U.S. German relations is whether differences on issues such as Iraq policy-- shaped by different national interests, practices, and historical experiences -- will harmU.S.-German cooperation against terrorism. Some believe that understanding and accepting thesedifferences (agreeing to disagree) may be the best approach to enhancing future U.S.-Germancooperation in the global war on terrorism. Both countries have strong incentives to make thecooperation work.
|
crs_R41051
|
crs_R41051_0
|
Introduction
Two of the major goals of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 ( P.L. 107-110 ; NCLB), are to improve the quality of K-12 teaching and raise the academic achievement of students who fail to meet grade-level proficiency standards. In setting these goals, Congress recognized that reaching the second goal depends greatly on meeting the first; that is, quality teaching is critical to student success. Thus, NCLB established new standards for teacher qualifications and required that all courses in "core academic subjects" be taught by a highly qualified teacher by the end of the 2005-2006 school year. During implementation, the NCLB highly qualified teacher requirement came to be seen as setting minimum qualifications for entry into the profession and was criticized by some for establishing standards so low that nearly every teacher met the requirement. Meanwhile, policy makers have grown increasingly interested in the output of teachers' work; that is, their performance in the classroom and the effectiveness of their instruction. Attempts to improve teacher performance led to federal and state efforts to incentivize improved performance through alternative compensation systems. For example, through P.L. 109-149 , Congress authorized the Federal Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) program, which provides grants to support teacher performance pay efforts. In addition, there are various programs at all levels (national, state, and local) aimed at reforming teacher compensation systems. The most recent congressional action in this area came with the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5 ) and, in particular, enactment of the Race to the Top (RTTT) program. In the area of teacher effectiveness, the final rule proposed a definition of an effective teacher as one "whose students achieve acceptable rates (e.g., at least one grade level in an academic year) of student growth (as defined in this notice)." That is, to be considered effective, teachers must raise their students' learning to a level at or above what is expected within a typical school year. States, LEAs, and schools must also include additional measures to evaluate teachers; however, these evaluations must be based, "in significant part, [on] student growth." This report addresses issues associated with the evaluation of teacher effectiveness based on student growth in achievement. It focuses specifically on a method of evaluation referred to as value-added modeling (VAM). Although there are other methods for assessing teacher effectiveness, in the last decade, VAM has garnered increasing attention in education research and policy due to its promise as a more objective method of evaluation. The first section of this report describes what constitutes a VAM approach and how it estimates the so-called "teacher effect." The second section identifies the components necessary to conduct VAM in education settings. Third, the report discusses current applications of VAM at the state and school district levels and what the research on these applications says about this method of evaluation. The fourth section of the report explains some of the implications these applications have for large-scale implementation of VAM. Finally, the report describes some of the federal policy options that might arise as Congress considers legislative action around these issues.
|
Two of the major goals of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-110; NCLB), are to improve the quality of K-12 teaching and raise the academic achievement of students who fail to meet grade-level proficiency standards. In setting these goals, Congress recognized that reaching the second goal depends greatly on meeting the first; that is, quality teaching is critical to student success. Thus, NCLB established new standards for teacher qualifications and required that all courses in "core academic subjects" be taught by a highly qualified teacher by the end of the 2005-2006 school year.
During implementation, the NCLB highly qualified teacher requirement came to be seen as setting minimum qualifications for entry into the profession and was criticized by some for establishing standards so low that nearly every teacher met the requirement. Meanwhile, policy makers have grown increasingly interested in the output of teachers' work; that is, their performance in the classroom and the effectiveness of their instruction. Attempts to improve teacher performance led to federal and state efforts to incentivize improved performance through alternative compensation systems. For example, through P.L. 109-149, Congress authorized the Federal Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) program, which provides grants to support teacher performance pay efforts. In addition, there are various programs at all levels (national, state, and local) aimed at reforming teacher compensation systems. The most recent congressional action in this area came with the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5) and, in particular, enactment of the Race to the Top (RTTT) program.
In November 2009, the U.S. Department of Education released a final rule of priorities, requirements, definitions, and selection criteria for the RTTT. The final rule established a definition of an effective teacher as one "whose students achieve acceptable rates (e.g., at least one grade level in an academic year) of student growth (as defined in this notice)." That is, to be considered effective, teachers must raise their students' learning to a level at or above what is expected within a typical school year. States, LEAs, and schools must include additional measures to evaluate teachers; however, these evaluations must be based, "in significant part, [on] student growth."
This report addresses issues associated with the evaluation of teacher effectiveness based on student growth in achievement. It focuses specifically on a method of evaluation referred to as value-added modeling (VAM). Although there are other methods for assessing teacher effectiveness, in the last decade, VAM has garnered increasing attention in education research and policy due to its promise as a more objective method of evaluation. The first section of this report describes what constitutes a VAM approach and how it estimates the so-called "teacher effect." The second section identifies the components necessary to conduct VAM in education settings. Third, the report discusses current applications of VAM at the state and school district levels and what the research on these applications says about this method of evaluation. The fourth section of the report explains some of the implications these applications have for large-scale implementation of VAM. Finally, the report describes some of the federal policy options that might arise as Congress considers legislative action around these or related issues.
|
crs_R45278
|
crs_R45278_0
|
Introduction
The Chesapeake Bay (the Bay) is the largest estuary in the United States. 106-457 ), and it is recognized as a "Wetlands of International Importance" by the Ramsar Convention. The Chesapeake Bay estuary resides in a more than 64,000-square-mile watershed that extends across parts of Delaware, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. It is home to more than 18 million people and thousands of species of plants and animals. Over time, the Bay's ecological conditions have deteriorated due to land-use changes, increased sediment loads and nutrient pollution, the use and spread of chemical contaminants, overfishing and overharvesting of aquatic species, and the introduction of invasive species. These changes have resulted in reductions to economically important fisheries, such as oysters and crabs; the loss of habitat, such as underwater vegetation and sea grass; annual dead zones, as nutrient-driven algal blooms die and decompose; and potential impacts to tourism, recreation, and real estate values. Since then, federal agencies have worked together under a watershed-wide agreement and through a restoration program spearheaded by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). It then discusses issues facing Congress as work continues toward 2025 restoration goals set by several state and federal plans. Governance of Chesapeake Bay Restoration: The Chesapeake Bay Program
According to stakeholders, restoring the Bay ecosystem state is a complicated process due to the size of the Bay's watershed, the variety of stakeholders, and the complexity of Chesapeake Bay ecosystems. Congress ordered a series of reports from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the EPA to investigate issues including the decline in fisheries, "control of noxious weeds," water pollution, and water quality control in the Chesapeake Bay. Congress may consider the mechanisms in place to guide restoration activities, what role the federal government has in Bay restoration, and what federal agency authorities exist or are needed to complete, coordinate, and fund restoration activities in the Bay. There are currently three guiding documents for restoration and one draft plan: the 2010 Strategy for Protecting and Restoring the Chesapeake Bay Watershed (pursuant to President Obama's 2009 E.O. 13508), the EPA's 2010 Chesapeake Bay total maximum daily load (TMDL), the 2014 Chesapeake Bay Watershed Agreement, and the draft 2018 USACE Chesapeake Bay Comprehensive Water Resource and Restoration Plan. Others argue that the voluntary nature of the 2014 Chesapeake Bay Watershed Agreement weakens restoration efforts. Congress may examine the federal government's role in restoration efforts. In the Chesapeake Bay, coordination of broad restoration activities between state and federal agencies is largely achieved through the voluntary Chesapeake Bay Watershed Agreement and CBP, where decisions are determined by consensus. What Is the Total Cost of Restoring the Chesapeake Bay? The CBP has periodically assessed progress in restoring the Bay since the 1983 Chesapeake Bay Watershed Agreement. The 2014 Chesapeake Bay Watershed Agreement set 2025 as its target year to reach certain goals (and underlying outcomes) and tracks biennial progress toward the goals.
|
The Chesapeake Bay (the Bay) is the largest estuary in the United States. It is recognized as a "Wetlands of International Importance" by the Ramsar Convention, a 1971 treaty about the increasing loss and degradation of wetland habitat for migratory waterbirds. The Chesapeake Bay estuary resides in a more than 64,000-square-mile watershed that extends across parts of Delaware, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. The Bay's watershed is home to more than 18 million people and thousands of species of plants and animals.
A combination of factors has caused the ecosystem functions and natural habitat of the Chesapeake Bay and its watershed to deteriorate over time. These factors include centuries of land-use changes, increased sediment loads and nutrient pollution, overfishing and overharvesting, the introduction of invasive species, and the spread of toxic contaminants. In response, the Bay has experienced reductions in economically important fisheries, such as oysters and crabs; the loss of habitat, such as underwater vegetation and sea grass; annual dead zones, as nutrient-driven algal blooms die and decompose; and potential impacts to tourism, recreation, and real estate values.
Congress began to address ecosystem degradation in the Chesapeake Bay in 1965, when it authorized the first wide-scale study of water resources of the Bay. Since then, federal restoration activities, conducted by multiple agencies, have focused on reducing pollution entering the Chesapeake Bay, restoring habitat, managing fisheries, protecting sub-watersheds within the larger Bay watershed, and fostering public access and stewardship of the Bay. Congress has authorized various programs and activities to restore the Chesapeake Bay, including the Chesapeake Bay Program (CBP), created in 1983. The CBP implements the Chesapeake Bay Agreement, a periodically renewed agreement between executives in the watershed states, a joint Bay state legislative body, and select federal agencies that aims to coordinate Bay restoration efforts. The most recent agreement was signed in 2014 (known as the 2014 Chesapeake Bay Watershed Agreement) and set a series of restoration goals and actions to be completed by 2025. The 2014 Chesapeake Bay Watershed Agreement, like others in the past, is not binding. Other restoration plans—including the 2010 Chesapeake Bay Strategy for Protecting and Restoring the Chesapeake Bay Watershed (pursuant to President Obama's 2009 Executive Order 13508), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's 2010 Chesapeake Bay Total Maximum Daily Load, and a draft Comprehensive Plan from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers—harmonize with the goals of the 2014 Chesapeake Bay Watershed Agreement and contain objectives for federal agencies and states.
As work continues toward the 2025 restoration goals set by state and federal plans, Congress may consider what role the federal government plays in Chesapeake Bay restoration, if any. In considering the federal role in Chesapeake Bay restoration, Congress may weigh issues related to coordination of federal activities and federal agency authority, funding and total cost of activities, and the rate of progress toward restoration.
|
crs_RL34216
|
crs_RL34216_0
|
Introduction
Recent and projected large deficits and the need for revenue to offset spending or tax reduction proposals generated congressional and executive branch interest in different proposals to reduce the tax gap; and consequently, raise additional revenue. Proposals in the 110 th Congress to require brokers to report adjusted basis on publicly traded securities sold by individuals are examined in this report. Basis is "the amount a taxpayer uses to determine the cost of acquiring an asset, which is used to determine the asset's capital gain or loss." The original cost may have to be altered in order to calculate the appropriate "adjusted basis" for tax calculations. A proposal to report basis was included in the President's FY2008 Budget and is discussed in this report. The Senate Finance Committee's draft proposal to report basis on publicly traded securities, which was released on May 25, 2007, is also examined. On June 29, 2007, the committee held a hearing on this proposal. Written comments of representatives of private financial associations are examined and legislative implications presented. President's FY2009 Budget Proposal
The President's FY2009 Budget also proposed that information reporting to the IRS be expanded to include basis reporting on security sales. Senate Finance Committee's Proposal
The Senate Finance Committee drafted a proposal, which is almost the same as the proposal in the President's budget that brokers be required to report basis to the IRS and customers for publicly traded securities. Proposed Legislation in the 110th Congress
Two bills were introduced in the 110 th Congress that focused on requiring broker reporting of a customer's adjusted basis in securities transactions. These bills, H.R. 878 and S. 601 , had almost the exact same wording and the same title. 878 , Simplification Through Additional Reporting Tax Act of 2007, which would require broker reporting of customers' adjusted basis in securities transactions. 3970 , Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007. Nine other bills were introduced in the 110 th Congress that included a section to raise revenue by requiring broker reporting of customers' basis to the Internal Revenue Service on the sale of publicly traded securities. These bills are H.R. 2147 ( Healthy Kids Act of 2007 ), H.R. 3395 ( Responsible Fatherhood and Healthy Families Act of 2007 ), H.R. 5720 ( Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008 ), S. 1111 ( Fair Flat Tax Act of 2007 ), S. 1626 ( Responsible Fatherhood and Healthy Families Act of 2007 ), S. 2362 ( Property Tax Fairness Act of 2007 ), S. 3335 ( The Jobs, Energy, Families, and Disaster Relief Act of 2008 ), and H.R. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
On October 3, 2008, President George W. Bush signed H.R. 1424 , Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 , into law ( P.L. 110-343 ). The written comments of these witnesses provide useful insights. Numerous implications for drafting legislation to report basis may be derived from their testimony.
|
Recent and projected large deficits and the need for revenue to offset spending or tax reduction proposals generated congressional and executive branch interest in reducing the tax gap. Proposals in the 110th Congress to require brokers to report adjusted basis on publicly traded securities sold by individuals are examined in this report because this is a source of revenue. Basis is the amount a taxpayer uses to determine the cost of acquiring an asset, which is used to determine the asset's capital gain or loss. In order to calculate the appropriate "adjusted basis" for tax calculations the original cost may have to be altered.
Proposals to report basis were included in the President's FY2008 Budget and FY2009 Budget and are initially discussed in this report. Then the Senate Finance Committee's draft proposal to report basis on publicly traded securities, which was released on May 25, 2007, is examined. On June 29, 2007, the committee held a hearing on this proposal. Written comments of representatives of private financial associations are examined and legislative implications presented. Lastly, relevant legislation in the 110th Congress is described, including P.L. 110-343.
The President's FY2009 Budget proposes that information reporting to the IRS be expanded to include requiring basis reporting on security sales. The Senate Finance Committee drafted a proposal similar to the proposal in the President's Budget that brokers be required to report basis to the IRS and customers for publicly traded securities. Witnesses at a committee hearing on reporting basis included representatives from five financial associations. The written comments of these witnesses provide useful insights. Numerous implications for drafting legislation to report basis may be derived from their testimony.
Two bills had been introduced in the 110th Congress that would require broker reporting of a customer's adjusted basis in securities transactions. These bills, H.R. 878 and S. 601, have almost the exact same wording and the same title, the Simplification Through Additional Reporting Tax Act of 2007. Nine other bills have been introduced in the 110th Congress that include a section to raise revenue by requiring broker reporting of customers' basis to the Internal Revenue Service on the sale of publicly traded securities. These bills are H.R. 2147 (Healthy Kids Act of 2007), H.R. 3395 (Responsible Fatherhood and Healthy Families Act of 2007), H.R. 3970 (Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007), H.R. 5720 (Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008), S. 1111 (Fair Flat Tax Act of 2007), S. 1626 (Responsible Fatherhood and Healthy Families Act of 2007), S. 2362 (Property Tax Fairness Act of 2007), S. 3335 (The Jobs, Energy, Families, and Disaster Relief Act of 2008), and HR. 1424 (Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008). On October 3, 2008, President George W. Bush signed H.R. 1424 into law (P.L. 110-343), which included Section 403, "Broker Reporting of Customer's Basis in Securities Transactions."
This report will not be updated.
|
crs_R44658
|
crs_R44658_0
|
Introduction
This report is part of a suite of reports that discuss appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2017. It specifically discusses appropriations for the components of DHS included in the fourth title of the homeland security appropriations bill—in past years, this has been U.S. Citizenship and Naturalization Services (USCIS), the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). In FY2017, the Administration proposed moving the Domestic Nuclear Detection office into a new Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives Office (CBRNEO), along with several other parts of DHS. Congress has labeled this title of the bill in recent years as "Research and Development, Training, and Services." The report provides an overview of the Administration's FY2017 request for Research and Development, Training, and Services, and the appropriations proposed by the Senate and House appropriations committees in response. Rather than limiting the scope of its review to the fourth title of the bills, the report includes information on provisions throughout the bills and report that directly affect these components. Research and Development, Training, and Services
The Research and Development, Training, and Services (Title IV) of the DHS appropriations bill is the second smallest of the four titles that carry the bulk of the funding in the bill. The Administration requested $1.63 billion in FY2017 net discretionary budget authority for components included in this title, as part of a total budget for these components of $5.52 billion for FY2017. The appropriations request was $133 million (8.9%) more than was provided for FY2016. Senate Appropriations Committee-reported S. 3001 would have provided the components included in this title $1.50 billion in net discretionary budget authority. This would have been $132 million (8.1%) less than requested, and less than $1 million (<0.1%) more than was provided in FY2016. House Appropriations Committee-reported H.R. 5634 would have provided the components included in this title $1.63 billion in net discretionary budget authority. This would have been $1 million (0.1%) more than requested, and $134 million (9.0%) more than was provided in FY2016. On September 29, 2016, the President signed into law P.L. 114-223 , which contained a continuing resolution that funds the government at the same rate of operations as FY2016, minus 0.496%, through December 9, 2017. A second continuing resolution was signed into law on December 10, 2016 ( P.L. 114-254 ), funding the government at the same rate of operations as FY2016, minus 0.1901%, through April 28, 2017. For details on the continuing resolution and its impact on DHS, see CRS Report R44621, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2017 .
|
This report is part of a suite of reports that discuss appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for FY2017. It specifically discusses appropriations for the components of DHS included in the fourth title of the homeland security appropriations bill—in past years, this has comprised U.S. Citizenship and Naturalization Services, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the Science and Technology Directorate, and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). In FY2017, the Administration proposed moving the Domestic Nuclear Detection office into a new Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives Office, along with several other parts of DHS. Congress has labeled this title of the bill in recent years as "Research and Development, Training, and Services."
The report provides an overview of the Administration's FY2017 request for these components, and the appropriations proposed by the Senate and House appropriations committees in response. Rather than limiting the scope of its review to the fourth title of the bills, the report includes information on provisions throughout the bills and report that directly affect these components.
Research and Development, Training, and Services is the second smallest of the four titles that carry the bulk of the funding in the bill. The Administration requested $1.63 billion for these components in FY2017, $133 million (8.9%) more than was provided for FY2016. The amount requested for these components is 3.4% of the Administration's $47.7 billion request for net discretionary budget authority and disaster relief funding for DHS.
Contributing to the increase in the request was its proposal to consolidate several parts of DHS funded in other titles with DNDO into a new Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives Office, funded in Title IV.
Senate Appropriations Committee-reported S. 3001 would have provided the components included in this title $1.50 billion in net discretionary budget authority. This would have been $132 million (8.1%) less than requested, and less than $1 million (<0.1%) more than was provided in FY2016.
House Appropriations Committee-reported H.R. 5634 would have provided the components included in this title $1.63 billion in net discretionary budget authority. This would have been $1 million (0.1%) more than requested, and $134 million (9.0%) more than was provided in FY2016.
On September 29, 2016, the President signed into law P.L. 114-223, which contained a continuing resolution that funds the government at the same rate of operations as FY2016, minus 0.496% through December 9, 2017. A second continuing resolution was signed into law on December 10, 2016 (P.L. 114-254), funding the government at the same rate of operations as FY2016, minus 0.1901%, through April 28, 2017. For details on the continuing resolution and its impact on DHS, see CRS Report R44621, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2017, which also includes additional information on the broader subject of FY2017 funding for DHS as well as links to analytical overviews and details regarding components in other titles.
This report will be updated once the annual appropriations process for DHS for FY2017 is concluded.
|
crs_RL31533
|
crs_RL31533_0
|
Iran Strategically Strengthened
First and foremost, the Gulf states believe that the strategic weakness of post-Saddam Iraq has emboldened Iran to take a more active role in Gulf security and to seek to enlist the Gulf states in an Iran-led Gulf security structure. The rise of Iraqi Shiite parties are reportedly prompting growing Shiite demands for power in the Gulf states themselves. Spillover From Iraq Battlefield
Prior to the U.S. intervention in Iraq, the Gulf states had predicted that ousting Saddam would not necessarily produce stability in Iraq, and several were reluctant to support it. In June 1995, the U.S. Navy reestablished its long dormant Fifth fleet, responsible for the Persian Gulf region, and headquartered in Bahrain. The Gulf states are instituting gradual domestic political and economic reform efforts that are intended to satisfy the pro-reform elements of the population while maintaining tradition. Some of the Gulf leaders fear that more rapid liberalization could backfire by providing Islamist extremists a platform to challenge the incumbent regimes. Saudi Arabia, now under King Abdullah, is beginning to accelerate political liberalization. U.S. Democratization Efforts
As the Bush Administration has made political and economic reform a priority, it has expanded the programs and policies used to promote that agenda. As noted in the State Department's "Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The U.S. Record 2005-2006," released April 5, 2006, the Administration is promoting these reforms not only through diplomatic exchanges between U.S. diplomats in the Gulf and their counterparts but also with new programs run by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the State Department's Near East Bureau and its Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and the "Middle East Partnership Initiative" (MEPI). Because U.S. diplomats in the region generally seek to maintain good relations with their counterparts and because U.S. interests in the Gulf are broad, most U.S.-funded programs are supported by—or at least not opposed by—the Gulf governments. Several Gulf states have developed relatively dynamic tourism industries, particularly UAE, but increasingly including Qatar and Oman. U.S.-Gulf Free Trade Agreements
As part of its strategy to promote reform and democracy in the Middle East, the Bush Administration has been negotiating bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with the Gulf states. Most of the Gulf states have tried to support U.S. mediation efforts in the Arab-Israeli dispute, but they also have sought to modify and shape U.S. policy on that issue, as well as on other issues such as the July-August 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict. The Gulf states all publicly endorsed the Bush Administration's "road map" for Israeli-Palestinian peace. Cooperation Against Al Qaeda
The September 11 attacks stimulated some tensions between the United States and some of the Gulf monarchy states, particularly Saudi Arabia, over allegations that Gulf donors had, wittingly or unknowingly, been contributing to or tolerating groups and institutions linked to Al Qaeda. Osama bin Laden's Saudi origins, coupled with the revelation that fifteen of the nineteen September 11 hijackers were Saudis, caused substantial criticism of Saudi Arabia among some U.S. experts and opinion-makers. Since the September 11, 2001, attacks and the start of the Iraq war in March 2003, the Gulf states have been partners of the United States against Al Qaeda and pro-Al Qaeda movements as these militants have posed a threat to the Gulf states themselves.
|
The U.S.-led war to overthrow Saddam Hussein virtually ended Iraq's ability to militarily threaten the region, but it has produced new and un-anticipated security challenges for the Persian Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates). The Gulf states, which are all led by Sunni Muslim regimes, fear that Shiite Iran is unchecked now that Iraq is strategically weak. The Gulf states strongly resent that pro-Iranian Shiite Muslim groups and their Kurdish allies (who are not Arabs) have obtained preponderant power within Iraq. This has led most of the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, to provide only halting support to the fledgling government in Baghdad and to revive the focus on U.S.-Gulf defense cooperation that characterized U.S.-Gulf relations during the 1990s.
The new power structure in Iraq has had political repercussions throughout the Gulf region, particularly as Sunni-Shiite violence in Iraq has come to overshadow direct insurgent violence against U.S. forces as the key threat to Iraqi stability. The Sunni-Shiite tensions in Iraq apparently are spilling over into the Gulf states. Shiite communities, particularly that in Bahrain, have been emboldened by events in Iraq to seek additional power, and Sunni-Shiite tension in the Gulf states is said by observers to be increasing.
Some Shiite communities, which view themselves as long repressed, are attempting to benefit politically from the Bush Administration's focus on promoting democracy and political reform in the region. Domestically, all of the Gulf states are undertaking substantial but gradual economic and political liberalization to deflect popular pressure and satisfy U.S. calls for reform. However, the reforms undertaken or planned do not aim to fundamentally restructure power in any of these states. The Bush Administration advocates more rapid and sweeping political and economic liberalization as key to long-term Gulf stability and to reducing support in the Gulf states for terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. The Administration is funding civil society programs in the Gulf states—funding that is not necessarily welcomed by the Gulf leaderships—but it is also promoting the bilateral free trade agreements that most of the Gulf leaders seek.
The Bush Administration also is working to maintain or improve post-September 11 cooperation with the Gulf states against Al Qaeda. Some Gulf states allegedly tolerated the presence of Al Qaeda activists and their funding mechanisms prior to the September 11 attacks. Fifteen of the nineteen September 11 hijackers were of Saudi origin, as is Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden.
This report will be updated as warranted by regional developments. See also CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations; CRS Report RS21513, Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy; CRS Report RS21852, The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy; CRS Report RL31718, Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations; CRS Report 95-1013, Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy; and CRS Report RS21534, Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy.
|
crs_R42671
|
crs_R42671_0
|
Introduction
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator signed a proposal to strengthen the National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for particulate matter (PM) on June 14, 2012, intended to address potential health effects (including chronic respiratory disease and premature mortality) associated with short- and long-term exposure to particulate matter. The date of the proposal was per a June 6, 2012, order issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in response to petitions filed by advocacy groups and 11 states. The June 2012 PM NAAQS proposal is the culmination of EPA's statutorily required review of the NAAQS under the Clean Air Act (CAA) based on studies available through mid-2009 and recommendations of EPA staff and a scientific advisory panel (Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, or CASAC ) established by the CAA. The proposal includes options for new secondary standards to address visibility impacts in urban areas associated with PM 2.5 , but would not modify the standards for inhalable coarse particles smaller than 10 microns or PM 10 . As per statutory scheduling requirements under the CAA, the final designation of areas (primarily counties) as nonattainment for any revised PM standards would not be determined until the end of 2014, and states would have until at least 2020 to achieve compliance. Within three years of EPA's final designations of areas, states are required to submit plans (state implementations plans or SIPs) outlining how they will achieve or maintain compliance with the revised primary PM NAAQS. As proposed June 2012, the PM 2.5 and PM 10 standards and other implementation changes would be as follows:
Primary (Public Health) PM Standards
PM 2.5 : strengthen the annual standard, which currently is 15 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m 3 ), by setting a new limit of 12 µg/m 3 or 13 µg/m 3 ; retain the daily (24-hour) standard at 35 µg/m 3 based on the current three-year average of the 98 th percentile of 24-hour PM 2.5 concentrations as established in 2006. Implementing the Proposed Revised PM2.5 NAAQS
Promulgation of NAAQS sets in motion a process under which the states and EPA first identify geographic nonattainment areas, those areas failing to comply with the NAAQS based on monitoring and analysis of relevant air quality data. These may include new or amended state regulations and new or modified permitting requirements. As shown in the table, estimated benefits are expected to be at least 30 times greater than the costs of $69 million for the most stringent option included in the June 2012 proposal. As mentioned earlier, several states petitioned EPA, and subsequently filed suit in the D.C. Critics of more stringent PM NAAQS contend—
more stringent (and in some cases the existing) standards are not justified by the scientific evidence; the proposal does not take into account studies completed since the 2009 cut-off; requiring the same level of stringency for all fine particles without distinguishing sources is unfounded; costs and adverse impacts on regions and sectors of the economy are excessive; revising the standards could impede implementation of the existing (2006) PM NAAQS and the process of bringing areas into compliance, given the current status of this process; the benefits (and costs) associated with implementation of the 2006 PM NAAQS, as well as compliance with other relatively recent EPA air quality regulations, have not yet been realized, pointing out that based on EPA's trends data that annual and 24-hour measured PM national concentrations have declined 24% and 28% respectively from 2001 to 2010. Although EPA proposed to retain the PM 10 , some stakeholders and Members remain skeptical that the final revised NAAQS could be changed from the proposal. NAAQS decisions have often been a source of significant concern to many in Congress. EPA will likely receive considerable comments in response to the June 2012 proposal. Circuit's decision and a related Consent Agreement, EPA has agreed to issue final revised PM NAAQS by December 14, 2012.
|
On June 29, 2012, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) published a proposal to revise the National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) under the Clean Air Act (CAA) for particulate matter (PM), in response to a June 6, 2012, order issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Environmental and public health advocacy groups and 11 states had petitioned the agency, and subsequently filed suit in the D.C. Circuit alleging that EPA failed to perform its mandated duty to complete the review of the PM NAAQS within the statutory deadline. EPA has agreed to issue final revised PM NAAQS by December 14, 2012. EPA's review of the PM NAAQS has generated considerable debate and oversight in Congress.
The June 2012 proposal would strengthen the existing (2006) annual health-based ("primary") standard for "fine" particulate matter 2.5 micrometers or less in diameter (or PM2.5), lowering the allowable average concentration of PM2.5 in the air from the current level of 15 micrograms per cubic meter (µg/m3), to a range of 12 to 13 µg/m.3 The annual PM2.5 NAAQS is set so as to address human health effects from chronic exposures to the pollutants. The existing 24-hour primary standard for PM2.5 that was reduced from 65 µg/m3 to 35 µg/m3 in 2006 would be retained, as would the existing standards for larger, but still inhalable "coarse" particles less than 10 micrometers in diameter or PM10. "Secondary" standards that provide protection against "welfare" (non-health) effects, such as ecological effects and material deterioration, would be identical to the primary standards the same as in 2006, but the June 2012 proposal included two options for a 24-hour PM2.5 standard to improve visibility.
In developing the June 2012 proposal, EPA reviewed scientific studies available since the agency's previous review in 2006. EPA determined, and the independent scientific advisory committee mandated under the CAA (Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, or CASAC) concurred, that evidence continues to show associations between particulates in ambient air and numerous significant health problems, including aggravated asthma, chronic bronchitis, non-fatal heart attacks, and premature death. Populations shown to be most at risk include children, older adults, and those with heart and lung disease, and those of lower socioeconomic status.
EPA expects that the potential benefits of the proposed revisions would range from an estimated low of $88.0 million to a high of $5.9 billion dependent on the concentration level and other factors, and estimated costs would range from $2.9 million to $69.0 million. Some stakeholders and some Members express concerns that the cost impacts will be more significant than EPA estimated in those areas unable to comply with the new standards. EPA's establishment of or revisions to the PM NAAQS do not directly regulate emissions from specific sources, or compel installation of any pollution control equipment or measures, but indirectly could affect operations at industrial facilities and other sources throughout the United States.
Final revised PM NAAQS will start a process that includes a determination of areas in each state that exceed the standard and must, therefore, reduce pollutant concentrations to achieve it. Following the determination of "nonattainment" areas (primarily counties) based on multiple years of monitoring data and other factors submitted by the states, state and local governments must develop (or revise) State Implementation Plans (SIPs) outlining measures to attain the standard. These often involve promulgation of new regulations by states, leading to the issuance of revised air permits. The process typically takes several years. Based on statutory scheduling requirements, designation of areas as nonattainment for any revised PM NAAQS would not be determined until the end of 2014, and states would have until at least 2020 to achieve compliance.
|
crs_R42477
|
crs_R42477_0
|
(For more information on U visas, see Appendix C .) A second reauthorization in 2005 added protections and expanded eligibility for abused foreign nationals. Authorization for appropriations for the programs under VAWA expired in 2011. VAWA was reauthorized by the 113 th Congress with the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 ( P.L. 113-4 ). The act includes a number of additional protections to assist foreign nationals who have been victims of domestic abuse (see " Legislation in the 113th Congress " below). The Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) includes provisions to prevent marriage fraud such as the requirement for face-to-face interviews with trained adjudicators. Yet, concerns have been raised about the degree to which the VAWA provisions themselves and the manner in which VAWA petitions are processed by USCIS might facilitate marriage fraud, either through relatively lower standards of evidence or as the unintended result of procedural differences between local USCIS District Offices and the Vermont Service Center. How VAWA Immigration Provisions Work
Foreign national spouses of U.S. citizens and LPRs can acquire legal status through family-based provisions of the INA. Most notably, it maintained the annual number of U visas at its current limit of 10,000, in contrast with S. 1925 , which would have increased the number to 15,000. President Barack Obama signed the bill into law ( P.L. 113-4 ) on March 3, 2013. Among its immigration-related provisions, P.L. It allows federal judges as well as the Department of Justice (DOJ) to impose federal criminal penalties for specified marriage broker violations and criminally penalizes both the misuse of information obtained by international marriage brokers, and any fraudulent or false representations or lack of required disclosures made by U.S. clients to foreign nationals to foster a dating or matrimonial relationship. Comprehensive Immigration Reform
On June 27, the Senate approved by a 68-32 vote S. 744 , a comprehensive immigration reform bill entitled the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act. S. 744 includes several VAWA-related provisions. It would expand, from 10,000 to 18,000, the number of U visas available for victims who assist law enforcement agencies' efforts to investigate and prosecute domestic violence, sexual assault, alien trafficking, and other crimes. It would grant aging-out protection, deferred status eligibility, and work authorization eligibility to any derivative child on a VAWA petition. Work authorization would be granted to petitioners no later than six months following the petition filing date. S. 744 would allow VAWA applicants to adjust status without being subject to the family based immigration numerical limits. Finally, S. 744 would permit battered immigrants access to assisted housing. Selected Issues for Congress
Issues surrounding the VAWA immigration provisions often resemble those of other U.S. immigration policies: balancing the granting of immigration benefits with adequate enforcement to reduce fraud and ensure that persons whom the law is intended to protect are the only persons who receive its benefits. 113-4 does not, however, expand the annual number of U visas, which remains at 10,000. The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 represents a milestone in this legislative history by providing for the first time the opportunity for abused foreign nationals to self-petition for lawful permanent resident status independently of their abusers. The VAWA reauthorization in 2013 added "stalking" to the definition of criminal activity covered under the U visa. It increased DHS' congressional reporting requirements, extended VAWA coverage to derivative-status children of deceased self-petitioning parents, and provided waivers to VAWA petitioners who faced being classified as inadmissible immigrants because of a disadvantaged financial position. It included protections for children included in their parents' U visa petitions who "age out" of child status, for unknowing victims of bigamous marriages, and for foreign nationals under age 18. It required more extensive background checks for U.S. citizen petitioners of alien fiancés, imposed greater penalties for VAWA violations, and permitted VAWA information sharing by DHS for national security purposes. Prior to the enactment of the Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 2000 (see below), an applicant for cancellation of removal under the special battered foreign national rule had to demonstrate that he or she
had been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty in the United States by a citizen or LPR spouse or parent, or was the parent of a child who had been subjected to such abuse by a citizen or LPR parent; had been continuously physically present in the United States for at least three years prior to petitioning for cancellation of removal; had been a person of "good moral character" during the period of continuous physical presence in the United States; was not inadmissible to the United States on criminal or security grounds; was not deportable based on marriage fraud, criminal offenses, document fraud, or security-related activities; had not been convicted of an aggravated felony; and if removed, would have themselves experienced, their child would have experienced, or, if the foreign national was a child, the alien's parent would have experienced, extreme hardship. BIWPA included other related provisions. Most notably, it extended the aging out protections in the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA) for abused children and children of abused foreign national spouses; removed the two-year custody and residence requirements for abused adopted children; expanded eligibility for self-petitioning to foreign nationals abused by their U.S. citizen sons and daughters; and allowed abused spouses of certain nonimmigrants to apply for work authorization. 106-386 ), which reauthorized VAWA.
|
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) includes provisions to assist foreign nationals who have been victims of domestic abuse. These provisions, initially enacted by Congress with the Immigration Act of 1990 and the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994, afford benefits to abused foreign nationals and allow them to self-petition for lawful permanent resident (LPR) status independently of the U.S. citizen or LPR relatives who originally sponsored them. Congress reauthorized VAWA with the Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 2000, which also created the U visa for foreign national victims of a range of crimes—including domestic abuse—who assisted law enforcement. A second reauthorization in 2005 added protections and expanded eligibility for abused foreign nationals. Authorization for appropriations for the programs under VAWA expired in 2011.
The 113th Congress passed the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 in February. The bill was signed into law (P.L. 113-4) by President Barak Obama on March 7, 2013.
Among the immigration provisions, P.L. 113-4 includes "stalking" in the definition of criminal activity covered under the U visa. It increases the number of reports that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must submit each year to Congress. It extends VAWA coverage to derivative-status children of deceased self-petitioning parents. It allows abuse victims to petition to waive their being classified as an inadmissible immigrant because of a disadvantaged financial position that otherwise might classify them as a "public charge." It includes protections for children who are included in their parents' U visa petitions but who "age out" of eligibility by turning 21 before their parents' petitions have been adjudicated. The bill also extends protections to unknowing victims of bigamous marriages and to foreign nationals under age 18.
P.L. 113-4 requires more extensive background checks and demands more consistent self-disclosures for U.S. citizen petitioners of alien fiancés or fiancées to provide the latter with greater information about potential abuse. It imposes additional penalties for marriage broker violations as well as false or incomplete representations by U.S. clients to foreign nationals to foster dating or matrimonial relationships. It permits information sharing of VAWA data by DHS for national security purposes and maintains the annual number of U visas at 10,000.
On June 27, 2013, the Senate approved S. 744, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act. S. 744 includes the following VAWA-related provisions. It would expand the annual number of U visas from 10,000 to 18,000. It would grant protection against aging out of status, deferred status eligibility, and work authorization eligibility to any child included on a VAWA petition. It would grant work authorization to VAWA petitioners no later than six months after they filed their petitions. It would allow VAWA petitioners to adjust status without being subject to numerical limits found in the INA. Finally, S. 744 would permit battered immigrants access to assisted housing.
During the debate of the VAWA reauthorization in 2013, two potential concerns for Congress were emphasized regarding the immigration provisions of VAWA. The first was whether the VAWA reauthorization would provide sufficient relief to foreign nationals abused by their U.S. citizen or LPR sponsoring relatives. Advocates for battered foreign nationals suggested that additional provisions were needed to assist this population in obtaining legal and economic footing independently of their original sponsors for legal immigrant status. Critics of expanding immigration, however, questioned the extent to which the provisions would increase the number of legal immigrants, thereby incurring costs to U.S. taxpayers.
The second related concern was the degree to which VAWA provisions unintentionally facilitate immigration fraud. Critics of VAWA argued that such fraud might be occurring through what some perceived as relatively lenient standards of evidence to demonstrate abuse; as the unintended result of processing procedures between the District Offices of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which adjudicate most immigration applications, and the USCIS Vermont Service Center, which adjudicates VAWA petitions; or as an unintended consequence of the structure of current law. While some have suggested that VAWA provides opportunities for dishonest and enterprising foreign nationals to circumvent U.S. immigration laws, the available empirical evidence offers little support for these assertions.
While addressed to some extent in the VAWA reauthorization of 2013, these two issues remain ongoing and reflect the tension found in other provisions of U.S. immigration policy. Such policies often involve balancing the granting of immigration benefits with adequate enforcement to reduce fraud and ensure intended eligibility.
|
crs_R45023
|
crs_R45023_0
|
Introduction
On September 20, 2017, Hurricane Maria made landfall in Puerto Rico as a Category 4 storm with sustained wind speeds of over 155 miles per hour. The hurricane also brought torrential rainfall with a range of 15 to 25 inches in many areas and 40 inches or more in isolated spots. This resulted in widespread flooding across the island. Puerto Rico's office of emergency management reported that the storm had incapacitated the central electric power system, leaving the entire island without power. Puerto Rico's grid infrastructure was essentially destroyed by Hurricane Maria. Even before the 2017 hurricane season, Puerto Rico's electric power infrastructure was known to be in poor condition, due largely to underinvestment and poor maintenance. Questions are now being raised as to possible options for rebuilding the electricity grid on the island, given the financial debt of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) before the damage from the storms. With the poor state of the electricity system (physically, organizationally, and financially), and a perceived lack of transparency with regard to decisions (both before and since Hurricane Maria), some have called for a new electricity system regime to lead the reconstruction and resiliency planning efforts ahead. Should Congress decide that alternatives to PREPA be considered, the question of what entities and structures could replace PREPA will arise. Modernizing Puerto Rico's grid, and taking the next steps to incorporate resiliency, will be expensive. Congress may also want to consider whether the efforts to restore electric power in Puerto Rico will need to progress beyond simple restoration of electricity, and require new investment and oversight by the federal government, especially if Congress considers the further goal of building a resilient grid. Puerto Rico and the Electric Power Authority
Puerto Rico's Population and Economy
Puerto Rico was in a fiscal, economic, and social crisis before Hurricane Maria destroyed the electric grid on the island. PROMESA Creates Oversight Board and Debt Restructuring Processes
To address the lack of federal bankruptcy options, Congress established two processes for debt adjustment in the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA; P.L. 114-187 ), enacted at the end of June 2016. Title VI set out a process for voluntary collective action agreements, similar in ways to the RSA negotiations in progress. Title III set out a process that draws on procedures from the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. PROMESA also established a Financial Oversight and Management Board (OB) for Puerto Rico that required PREPA to draw up a fiscal plan. While PROMESA endowed the OB with wide authorities, the governor and legislature of Puerto Rico retained substantial control over public priorities, within constraints of fiscal plans and other provisions of PROMESA. Although the PREPA fiscal plan aimed to complete RSA negotiations by July 1, 2017, the OB decided to terminate PREPA's RSA and put it into the bankruptcy-like process of Title III on July 2, 2017. Recovery of Electricity in Puerto Rico
The extent of damage from Hurricanes Irma and Maria has slowed the restoration of electric power in Puerto Rico. The ability of the electricity system to deliver power was effectively destroyed, and restoration of electricity services to the majority of Puerto Rico's people has yet to be achieved, as of the writing of this report. However, neither a greater incorporation of renewables and natural gas nor privatization provides a silver bullet solution to the issues facing rebuilding the grid in Puerto Rico. The ability of the Commonwealth and its citizens to assume the burden of paying for a rebuilt (and possibly restructured) electricity system is a key consideration.
|
On September 20, 2017, Hurricane Maria made landfall in Puerto Rico as a Category 4 storm with sustained wind speeds of over 155 miles per hour. The hurricane also brought torrential rainfall with a range of 15 to 40 inches or more in some places, resulting in widespread flooding across the island. Puerto Rico's office of emergency management reported that the storm had incapacitated the central electric power system, leaving the entire island without power as the island's grid was essentially destroyed.
Even before the 2017 hurricane season, Puerto Rico's electric power infrastructure was known to be in poor condition, due largely to underinvestment and the perceived poor maintenance practices of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA). As of the date of this report, the most urgent need in Puerto Rico remains the restoration of power to the island, where the greatest challenge will likely be access by repair crews to rural areas due to storm-damaged roads and bridges.
The government of Puerto Rico was in a fiscal, economic, and social crisis before Hurricane Maria destroyed the electric grid on the island. PREPA's massive $9 billion debt (incurred before the damage from Hurricanes Irma and Maria) was a particular problem. To address the lack of federal bankruptcy options (due to the island's special status), Congress established two processes for debt adjustment in the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA; P.L. 114-187), enacted at the end of June 2016. Title VI set out a process for voluntary collective action agreements, similar to those PREPA had been negotiating with creditors since 2014. Title III set out a process that draws on procedures from the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. PROMESA also established a Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (OB) that required PREPA to draw up a fiscal plan. While PROMESA endowed the OB with wide authorities, the governor and legislature of Puerto Rico retained substantial control over public priorities, within constraints of fiscal plans and other provisions of PROMESA. The OB decided to put PREPA into the bankruptcy-like process of Title III on July 2, 2017.
While the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) are focused on simply restoring power, the potential arguably exists under current law for FEMA and USACE to restore the grid meeting existing, modern standards. Longer term, hurricanes and extreme weather will continue to threaten the Caribbean, necessitating consideration of infrastructure hardening and improvements to make the system more resilient. Building a modernized, flexible electric grid, capable of incorporating more renewable sources of electricity, underpinned by more efficient natural gas combined-cycle power plants and energy storage, may help Puerto Rico accomplish these goals.
Questions are now being raised as to possible options for rebuilding the electricity grid on the island, given PREPA's debt problem. The perceived failures of PREPA in managing the existing system, and an apparent lack of transparency with regard to decisions (both before and since Hurricane Maria), have led to calls for a new electricity system regime to lead the rebuilding and modernization effort. Should Congress decide that alternatives to PREPA be considered for this endeavor, the question of what entities could replace PREPA will likely arise.
This report explores several alternative electric power structures to PREPA for meeting the electricity services and needs of Puerto Rico. The ability of Puerto Rico and its citizens to assume the burden of paying for a rebuilt (and possibly restructured) electricity system is doubtful. Modernizing Puerto Rico's grid, and taking the next steps to incorporate resiliency, could be expensive. None of the options discussed provides a silver bullet solution to the issues of the grid in Puerto Rico. Congress may consider whether the efforts to restore electric power in Puerto Rico need to progress beyond simple restoration of electricity, and require new investment and oversight by the federal government.
|
crs_RL34652
|
crs_RL34652_0
|
The ADEA, which prohibits employment discrimination against persons over the age of 40, was enacted "to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment." The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." The statute not only applies to hiring, discharge, and promotion, but also prohibits discrimination in employee benefit plans such as health coverage and pensions. In addition to employers, the ADEA also applies to labor organizations and employment agencies. Requirements Under the ADEA
Coverage
Employers
The ADEA applies to employers who have "twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." A labor organization is covered by the ADEA if it "exists for the purpose ... of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment." Meanwhile, an employment agency and its agents are subject to the ADEA if the agency "regularly undertakes with or without compensation" to provide employees for an employer. Enforcement and Filing Procedures
The EEOC is responsible for enforcing the provisions of the ADEA.
|
This report provides an overview of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and discusses current legal and legislative developments. The ADEA, which prohibits employment discrimination against persons over the age of 40, was enacted "to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment."
The ADEA, which applies to employers, labor organizations, and employment agencies, makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." The statute not only applies to hiring, discharge, and promotion, but also prohibits discrimination in employee benefit plans such as health coverage and pensions. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is responsible for enforcing the provisions of the ADEA.
The ADEA applies to employers who have "twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." A labor organization is covered by the ADEA if it "exists for the purpose ... of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment." An employment agency and its agents are subject to the ADEA if the agency "regularly undertakes with or without compensation" the procurement of employees for an employer, other than an agency of the United States. The ADEA also covers congressional and most federal employees.
|
crs_R40576
|
crs_R40576_0
|
Overview
Congress has historically recognized the importance of teacher quality in improving the academic performance of elementary and secondary school students. Apart from the recently enacted Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF), federal education policy has not significantly addressed the nature of teacher compensation. Nevertheless, significant amounts of funding from several federal programs support the salaries of certain kinds of teachers, including teachers and paraprofessionals serving educationally disadvantaged students under the compensatory education program (ESEA, Title I-A), newly hired teachers under the continuation of activities provided by the Class Size Reduction program (antecedent to ESEA, Title II-A) and special education teachers (under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act). As Congress moves to reauthorize the ESEA, proposals to leverage federal education spending to reform teacher compensation systems may receive serious consideration. This report is intended to discuss a variety of issues that relate to compensation reform and the proposals Congress may consider during ESEA reauthorization. The report first provides background on the teacher pay system, including the history behind the development of the dominant feature of this system—the single salary schedule. Second, the report discusses the basic elements of compensation reform, namely performance-based pay, competency-based pay, and service-based pay. The third section of the report describes several reform efforts that are currently underway around the country at the national, state, and local levels. Finally, the report concludes with a discussion of recent legislative action and issues for ESEA reauthorization. Criticism of the single salary schedule has undergirded efforts to implement performance-based pay plans in elementary and secondary education. Service-Based Pay
This section discusses two teacher compensation reforms that involve increased pay for teachers who fill hard-to-staff positions or take on advanced responsibilities. According to the act, the goal of these projects is to "develop and implement performance-based teacher and principal compensation systems in high-need schools." Reconsidering the Federal Role
As Congress considers education legislation, including bills to reauthorize the ESEA, proposals to leverage federal education spending to reform teacher compensation systems may receive serious attention. Meanwhile, the program authority continues to provide only minimal guidance as to how these funds should be used. In recent sessions, Congress has considered alternative approaches that would have begun to alter or expand federal support for teacher incentives and compensation reform. The FY2006 authorizing language was again used to appropriate funds for TIF under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act ( P.L. 111-5 ), the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 ( P.L. 111-8 ), and the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, ( P.L.
|
Congress has historically recognized the importance of teacher quality in improving the academic performance of elementary and secondary school students; however, federal policy has only recently begun to address the impact of teacher compensation systems on both quality and performance. Growing concern about the dominant feature of these systems—the single salary schedule—has led to a variety of compensation reform efforts around the country. These efforts include pay-for-performance incentives that attempt to align teacher compensation more closely with student achievement, as well as other reforms that link increased pay to improved teacher competency or to service in hard-to-staff positions.
Congress provided significant support to several existing compensation reform efforts by enacting the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) through the Labor-HHS-Education Appropriations Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-149). The concise passage that provides program authority for TIF states that funds are intended to "develop and implement performance-based teacher and principal compensation systems in high-need schools." Little additional guidance has been provided with respect to how these reforms are to be implemented.
Subsequent congressional action to extend the TIF has left the authorizing language largely unchanged. Prior to the TIF, federal education policy had not significantly addressed the nature of teacher compensation. Nevertheless, significant amounts of funding from several federal programs support the salaries of specific kinds of teachers, including teachers and paraprofessionals serving educationally disadvantaged students, newly hired teachers, and special education teachers.
As Congress moves to reauthorize the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), proposals to leverage federal education spending to reform teacher compensation systems may receive serious consideration. Beyond recent increases in TIF appropriations through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (P.L. 111-5) and the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-8), Congress may also consider altering and expanding the federal role in this area. Some proposals that would make changes to the federal effort in this area received attention in recent congressional sessions. These include a discussion draft for ESEA reauthorization circulated by the leadership of the House Education and Labor Committee as well as legislation to create Innovation Districts as part of the Obama Administration's education agenda.
This report is intended to discuss a variety of issues that relate to compensation reform and the proposals Congress may consider during ESEA reauthorization. The report provides background on the teacher pay system, discusses the basic elements of compensation reform, and describes several reform efforts that are currently underway around the country. The report concludes with a discussion of recent legislative action and issues for ESEA reauthorization.
|
crs_R43883
|
crs_R43883_0
|
The primary source of funding for federal assistance following a major disaster is the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), which is managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). In addition to providing a national overview, the electronic version of this report includes links to CRS products that summarize actual and projected obligations from the DRF as a result of major disaster declarations in each state and the District of Columbia. Each state profile includes information on the most costly incidents and impacted localities. Types of Assistance Provided for Major Disasters
A major disaster declaration can authorize funding for different purposes, depending on the needs of the state. For the period FY2000 through FY2015, total obligations for emergency declarations were just over $2.37 billion.
|
The primary source of funding for federal assistance authorized by a major disaster declaration is the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), which is managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Major disaster declarations have occurred in every U.S. state since FY2000, with obligations for each incident ranging from a few hundred thousand dollars to more than $31 billion.
This report summarizes DRF actual and projected obligations as a result of major disaster declarations at the national level for the period FY2000 through FY2015. CRS profiles for each state and the District of Columbia are linked to this report. Information on major disaster assistance from the DRF for tribal lands, U.S. territories, and freely associated states is available upon request. This report also includes lists of additional resources and key policy staff who can provide more information on the emergency management issues discussed.
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.