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crs_RS20866 | crs_RS20866_0 | Corps of Engineers and Its Civil Works Program
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) is an agency in the Department of Defense that has military and civilian responsibilities. Under its civil works program at the direction of Congress, the Corps plans, constructs, operates, and maintains a wide range of water resources projects. The Corps' oldest civil responsibilities are creating navigable channels and flood control projects. Environmental infrastructure refers to municipal water and wastewater facilities. Once authorized, appropriations for Corps studies are sought through the annual Energy and Water Development Appropriations Acts. Project Cost-Sharing
How to allocate the cost of Corps projects among non-federal sponsors and the federal government has been debated for decades. These legislative changes have given the Corps environmental responsibility beyond its traditional water resources development projects. | At the direction of Congress primarily through Water Resources Development Acts (WRDAs), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (an agency within the Department of Defense) undertakes water resources projects. The agency's civil works mission has expanded beyond its original responsibility of improving and maintaining navigable channels; the mission now includes flood control, emergency and disaster response, environmental restoration, municipal water infrastructure, and other activities. The non-federal sponsors and the federal government (primarily through the annual Energy and Water Development Appropriations Acts) share the cost of most Corps projects and activities. This report outlines the agency's organization, project development process, civil works appropriations, and evolution of its responsibilities. |
crs_R43972 | crs_R43972_0 | Advances in science and technology can help drive economic growth, improve human health, increase agricultural productivity, and help meet national priorities. The federal government establishes and maintains the legal and regulatory framework that affects science and technology activities in the private sector. Federal tax, intellectual property, and education policies can have large effects on private sector science and technology (S&T) activity performance. This report serves as a brief introduction to many of the science and technology policy issues that may come before the 114 th Congress. Each issue section provides background information and outlines the policy issues that may be considered. Overarching S&T Policy Issues
Several issues of potential congressional interest apply to federal science and technology policy in general. For Further Information
[author name scrubbed], Specialist in Science and Technology Policy ( [email address scrubbed] , [phone number scrubbed])
CRS Report RL34736, The President's Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]
Federal Funding for Research and Development
The federal government has long supported the advancement of scientific knowledge and technological development through investments in research and development (R&D). For Further Information
John Moteff, Specialist, Science and Technology Policy ( [email address scrubbed] , [phone number scrubbed])
"Department of Defense" in CRS Report R43944, Federal Research and Development Funding: FY2016 , coordinated by [author name scrubbed]
Energy
The science and technology related-energy issues that may come before the 114 th Congress include the funding and role of the Department of Energy's Office of Science and the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy, development of biofuels, reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, and the development of biofuels and of ocean energy technology. | Science and technology (S&T) have a pervasive influence over a wide range of issues confronting the nation. Public and private research and development spur scientific and technological advancement. Such advances can drive economic growth, help address national priorities, and improve health and quality of life. The constantly changing nature and ubiquity of science and technology frequently create public policy issues of congressional interest.
The federal government supports scientific and technological advancement directly by funding research and development and indirectly by creating and maintaining policies that encourage private sector efforts. Additionally, the federal government establishes and enforces regulatory frameworks governing many aspects of S&T activities.
This report briefly outlines an array of science and technology policy issues that may come before the 114th Congress. Given the ubiquity of science and technology and its constantly evolving nature, some science- and technology-related issues not discussed in this report may come before the 114th Congress. The selected issues are grouped into 11 categories:
Overarching S&T issues, Workforce and Education, Agriculture, Biomedical Research and Development, Defense, Energy, Environment, Homeland Security Information Technology, Physical and Material Sciences, and Space.
Each of these categories includes concise analysis of multiple policy issues. The material presented in this report should be viewed as introductory rather than comprehensive. Each section identifies available CRS reports and the appropriate CRS experts for further information and analysis. |
crs_R44754 | crs_R44754_0 | Introduction
In October 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the establishment of a new China-led multilateral development bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), to "promote interconnectivity and economic integration in the region" and "cooperate with existing multilateral development banks," such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The centerpiece of Chinese foreign economic policy since 2013 is the "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR) initiative. A report released by the China International Trade Institute in August 2015 identified 65 countries along the Belt and Road that will be participating in the Initiative, which aims to use trade promotion, infrastructure development, and regional connectivity, to boost economic linkages between China and dozens of countries along a land route (the Silk Road Economic Belt) and a sea route (the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road). AIIB Membership and Operations
Chinese President Xi Jinping first proposed the AIIB in October 2013, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Bali, Indonesia. Initially, the United States government was opposed to the AIIB's creation and reportedly urged its allies and partners in Europe and in Asia not to join the AIIB, ostensibly because of concerns about the Bank's proposed policy guidelines and standards, and whether they would undermine existing MDB standards. As of March 2017, AIIB has 52 members. As AIIB membership grew to include European and other advanced economies, Chinese officials distanced the AIIB from China's OBOR initiative. It is uncertain how China will balance its stated goal of establishing an independent and high-standard MDB with pursuing its own economic and national security priorities for the region. Membership
Membership in the AIIB is open to all members of the World Bank or the ADB and is divided into regional and non-regional members. Regional members are those located within areas classified as Asia and Oceania by the United Nations. The AIIB has potentially 57 permanent founding members ( Table 1 ). Governance
The AIIB has a governance structure similar to the other MDBs, with two key differences: the AIIB does not have a resident board of executive directors, and the AIIB's articles give a larger degree of decisionmaking authority to regional countries and the largest shareholder country, China. China's voting share at the AIIB (28%) is over 350% that of the second-largest AIIB member nation, India (8%). This is currently the largest gap between the first- and second-largest shareholders at any of the MDBs, although the United States has the largest voting share in any single other MDB (30% at the Inter-American Development Bank). Mr. Jin worked previously as chairman of China's first joint-venture investment bank, China International Capital Corporation, Ltd (CICC); chairman of the Supervisory Board of China's sovereign wealth fund, the China Investment Corporation (CIC); vice president of the ADB; and vice minister of China's Ministry of Finance. The initial subscribed capital of the AIIB is $100 billion. To date, the AIIB has approved nine projects worth $1.7 billion, most of which are being co-financed with established MDBs ( Table 2 ). Potential U.S. Role
Members of Congress could consider possible ways to participate with the AIIB beyond the co-financing of projects between the AIIB and U.S.-led institutions such as the World Bank and the ADB. | In October 2013, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Bali, Indonesia, China proposed creating a new multilateral development bank (MDB), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). As its name suggests, the Bank's stated purpose is to provide financing for infrastructure needs throughout Asia, as well as in neighboring regions. As of January 2017, the AIIB has approved nine projects, investing a total of $1.7 billion.
The AIIB commenced operations on January 16, 2016. Membership in the AIIB is open to all members of the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The AIIB's Articles of Agreement create two classes of membership: regional and non-regional members. According to the AIIB articles, regional members hold 75% of the total voting power in the Bank. Fourteen of the G-20 nations are AIIB members. The United States is not an AIIB member.
The AIIB was initially conceived as a regional financing mechanism for Chinese President Xi Jinping's "One Belt, One Road (OBOR)" initiative. This initiative is a central component of President Xi's regional economic and foreign policy and aims to boost economic connectivity from China to Central and South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe (the Silk Road Economic Belt) and, along a maritime route, from Southeast Asia to the Middle East, Africa, and Europe (the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road). President Xi, more than previous Chinese leaders, has pursued policies to establish new China-led trade and financial institutions, as well as to further integrate China within the existing international financial institutions. President Xi said that the AIIB would "promote interconnectivity and economic integration in the region" and "cooperate with existing multilateral development banks," including the World Bank and the ADB.
As AIIB membership has expanded to include developed countries in Asia and Europe (and possibly Canada), China has since tried to distance the AIIB from the OBOR initiative through co-financing arrangements for its initial loans. It is uncertain how China will balance its stated goal of establishing an independent and high-standard MDB, while pursuing China's own economic and national security priorities.
The AIIB's initial total capital is $100 billion, with 20% paid-in and 80% callable. China has subscribed to $29.7 billion as authorized under the Articles. India is the second-largest shareholder, contributing $8.4 billion. The Bank is based in Beijing, China, and headed by Jin Liqun, a former Chinese vice minister of finance, Chinese sovereign wealth fund chairman, and ADB vice president.
China's voting share at the AIIB (28.7%) is substantially larger than that of the second-largest AIIB member nation, India (8.3%). This is the largest gap between the first- and second-largest shareholders at any existing MDB. Voting share will reduce as remaining capital is subscribed by remaining permanent founding members and any new members. The AIIB has a governance structure similar to other MDBs.
The AIIB presents several policy issues for Members of Congress to consider, including
the future direction of the AIIB and potential U.S. role, including the question of whether the United States should join and U.S. policy toward the new institution; independence, transparency, and governance of the bank and implications for other MDBs, particularly projects that are co-financed with other MDBs; and commercial implications for U.S. firms, including procurement opportunities. |
crs_R44800 | crs_R44800_0 | A National Traffic Safety Agency was established to carry out the provisions of the new law; it was renamed the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in 1970. Since its establishment, NHTSA has issued dozens of safety standards, including regulations affecting windshield wipers, hood latches, tires, brakes, seat belts, and airbags. Instead, the law provides that "[a] manufacturer or distributor of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment shall certify to the distributor or dealer at delivery that the vehicle or equipment complies with applicable motor vehicle safety standards prescribed under this chapter.... Certification of a vehicle must be shown by a label or tag permanently fixed to the vehicle...."
Manufacturers are responsible for testing their vehicles and are liable for recalls and penalties if they are later found not to meet NHTSA's Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS). Estimates of Effects of Federal Safety Standards
A recent NHTSA study estimated that passenger vehicle safety technologies associated with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) have saved 613,501 lives between 1960 and 2012. However, the study also highlighted the importance of other measures in addition to federal vehicle safety regulation: it estimated that the number of lives saved annually by seat belts rose from 800 to 6,000 after many states allowed police to issue tickets if a driver or passengers were not wearing seat belts. And standards can take many years to develop and issue. Trends in Vehicle Recalls
In addition to promulgating and enforcing vehicle safety standards, NHTSA investigates vehicle defects that affect safety . The annual number of recall action s has generally risen in the past decade (except for the recession year of 2009), and the number of vehicles and items of equipment recalled has risen steeply since 2013 ( Figure 1 ) . There are several reasons for the rising number of recalls , including stricter laws, larger fines, delayed detection by NHTSA of vehicle problems , and several recent high-visibility cases affecting millions of vehicles . The defect may cause the airbags' inflators to explode . 3. 5. More thorough and earlier reporting requirements and steeper penalties are thought to have increased the number of defects reported and hence the number of recalls. As a result, many defective vehicles are still on the road long after a recall is initiated. Power and Associates, a market research company, found that of the more than 120 million vehicles recalled from 2013 through 2015, 45 million had not been repaired as of mid-2016. Big recalls have the lowest completion rates: recalls affecting fewer than 10,000 vehicles have a 67% completion rate, while recalls affecting more than a million vehicles have a completion rate of 49%. Obtaining an adequate supply of replacement parts can delay repairs. In addition, owners of vehicles involved in smaller recalls are easier to contact through personalized communication methods, such as a phone call. The J.D. Automated Vehicles
Increasingly, such innovations are being combined as manufacturers produce vehicles with higher levels of automation. Vehicle safety is enhanced by these changes. Former DOT Secretary Anthony Foxx and former NHTSA Administrator Mark Rosekind broadened the agency's approach beyond the traditional rulemaking to include new means of interacting with manufacturers and other vehicle safety stakeholders. New Vehicle Safety Laws
Congress dealt extensively with vehicle safety issues in the FAST Act, the five-year surface transportation law enacted in December 2015. The provision does not require dealers in used motor vehicles to repair vehicles subject to a recall prior to selling them to consumers. Cybersecurity
The Security and Privacy in Your Car Act of 2017 ( S. 680 ) would direct NHTSA and the Federal Trade Commission to establish federal standards to secure connected features and other motor vehicle data from hackers and data trackers. | Federal motor vehicle safety regulation was established more than 50 years ago by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (P.L. 89-563) to address the rising number of motor vehicle fatalities and injuries. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) administers vehicle safety laws and has issued dozens of safety standards, including regulations affecting windshield wipers, hood and door latches, tires, and airbags.
NHTSA has estimated that between 1960 and 2012, federal motor vehicle safety standards saved more than 600,000 lives, and the risk of a fatality declined by 56%. Although dozens of technologies were made subject to federal standards in the decades after federal regulation began, a NHTSA study reported that more than half of the lives saved—329,000—were from use of seat belts. While the federal standard was helpful in reducing fatalities, the study found that the passage of state laws allowing police to issue tickets if a driver or passengers are not wearing seat belts caused the number of lives saved to climb from 800 per year to 6,000 per year.
In addition to promulgating and enforcing vehicle safety standards, NHTSA investigates vehicle defects that affect safety and issues vehicle or parts recalls if safety defects are discovered. In recent years, the number of vehicle and parts recalls has risen significantly, from 16.3 million vehicles and parts in 2013 to 87.5 million in 2015. The rising number of recalls is due to stricter laws and reporting requirements, larger fines, delayed detection of vehicle problems by NHTSA, and several high-visibility cases, including General Motors' faulty ignition switch and Takata airbags.
Recalls rarely obtain 100% completion rates, leaving many defective vehicles on the road long after a recall is initiated. A recent study by J.D. Power, a market research company, showed that between 2013 and 2015, recalls of fewer than 10,000 vehicles had a 67% completion rate, while recalls of more than a million vehicles had a completion rate of only 49%. The larger recalls are thought to result in fewer repaired vehicles because of the difficulty in finding and notifying larger numbers of owners, a lengthened repair period due to lack of an adequate supply of replacement parts, and the ability of manufacturers to use more personalized communications, such as telephone calls, in smaller recalls.
Many emerging technologies, such as automatic emergency braking and lane departure warning, are expected to reduce vehicle injuries and deaths in the future. Over time, these separate technologies will be combined as vehicles are built with higher levels of automation. To deal with these rapid changes, NHTSA has broadened the agency's approach beyond the traditional rulemaking to include new means of interacting with manufacturers and other vehicle safety stakeholders, such as voluntary agreements to accelerate use of life-saving technologies.
The 2015 Fixing America's Surface Transportation (FAST) Act included significant vehicle safety provisions, including a new requirement that rental car fleets be covered by recalls, new methods for notifying consumers about recalls, larger penalties for violations, and a longer period for consumers to obtain remedies for defects.
Congress remains interested in motor vehicle safety; proposed legislation calls for used vehicles to be subject to recalls, NHTSA to provide more public access to safety information, civil penalties to be increased, regional recalls to be terminated, and federal standards to be issued to secure electronic motor vehicle data from hackers. |
crs_RL31831 | crs_RL31831_0 | Background
Current popular attention being paid to the threat of chemical and biological weapons (CBW)use by terrorists may give the impression that this is a new phenomenon, but it is not. Possible Reasons for Increased Terrorist Use
The reasons for increased potential use can be grouped into four major categories: the growthof militant religious groups with political agendas as a percentage of all terrorist groups, theincreasing global availability of CBW information and stockpiles, the internationalization of thethreat of terrorism, and the clear evidence of terrorist interest and capabilities. First, there has been a sharp increase in militant religious groups internationally as a percentage of all terrorist groups. If measured strictly in terms of their proven capacity to kill people or thefrequency of terrorist use in the past, CBW weapons are not the most worrisome threat. It is difficult in most scenarios to execute an attack with chem-bioweapons that kills a large number of people. Within the United States, some measures enhancing the security oflaboratories/facilities have already been enacted. | There is widespread belief that the likelihood of terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) is increasing, in part as a result of publicized new evidence of terrorist interest andcapabilities, as well as the political fall-out from the war in Iraq. This is a serious present concernthat deserves examination in the broader framework provided by the patterns, motivations andhistorical context for the current terrorist threat. Although it can have a powerful psychologicalimpact, past CBW use by terrorists has been rare and has not caused a large number of casualties,especially compared to other weapons. Terrorist attacks are deliberately designed to surprise, so notrend analysis will ever perfectly predict them, especially in the contemporary international climate. This report presents the arguments for and against future nonstate terrorist acquisition and/or use ofCBW weapons against the United States, as well as a brief discussion of issues for congressconcerning how best to counter the threat. It will not be updated. |
crs_R43943 | crs_R43943_0 | Introduction
On May 27, 2015, the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finalized a rule revising regulations that define the scope of waters protected under the Clean Water Act (CWA). Discharges to waters under CWA jurisdiction, such as the addition of pollutants from factories or sewage treatment plants and the dredging and filling of spoil material through mining or excavation, require a CWA permit. The rule was proposed in 2014 in light of Supreme Court rulings that created uncertainty about the geographic limits of waters that are and are not protected by the CWA. According to EPA and the Corps, the agencies' intent was to clarify CWA jurisdiction, not expand it. Nevertheless, the rule has been extremely controversial, especially with groups representing property owners, land developers, and the agriculture sector, who contend that it represents a massive federal overreach beyond the agencies' statutory authority. Most state and local officials are supportive of clarifying the extent of CWA-regulated waters, but some are concerned that the rule could impose costs on states and localities as their own actions (e.g., transportation or public infrastructure projects) become subject to new requirements. Most environmental advocacy groups welcomed the intent of the proposal to more clearly define U.S. waters that are subject to CWA protections, but beyond that general support, some favored even a stronger rule. Congressional Options
As noted earlier, some in Congress have long favored halting EPA and the Corps' current approach to defining "waters of the United States." If Congress passes a joint resolution disapproving the rule under procedures provided by the act, and the resolution becomes law, the rule cannot take effect or continue in effect. Also, the agency may not reissue either that rule or any substantially similar one, except under authority of a subsequently enacted law. However, President Obama vetoed the joint resolution on January 19. The path to enactment of a CRA joint resolution is a steep one. Appropriations Bills
Including a provision in an appropriations bill is a second option for halting or redirecting the "waters of the United States" rule by limiting or preventing agency funds from being used for the rule. Such a bill could be similar to a limitation in an appropriations bill with provisions to bar or prohibit EPA and/or the Corps from finalizing, adopting, implementing, or enforcing the "waters of the United States" rule, the 2011 proposed revised guidance, or any similar rule. The Obama Administration opposed H.R. Targeted legislation might seek to address substantive aspects of the proposed rule that were widely criticized. This type of legislation would have broad implications for the CWA, since questions of CWA jurisdiction are fundamental to all of the act's regulatory requirements. In the 111 th Congress, one of these bills was reported in the Senate ( S. 787 ), but no further action occurred. 2705 , which would have repealed the final rule that was announced in May 2015. Conclusion
This report has discussed four legislative options that Congress could consider to halt or redirect EPA and the Corps' "waters of the United States" rule and that were reflected in bills in the 114 th Congress: the Congressional Review Act, appropriations bill limitations, standalone legislation, and broad amendments to the Clean Water Act. As described above, on October 9, 2015, a federal appeals court placed a nationwide stay on the clean water rule. The 114 th Congress legislative activity in the Senate on S.J.Res. With a change in administration in January 2017, the 115 th Congress and the new administration seem likely to revisit the "waters of the United States" issue and controversies. | On May 27, 2015, the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finalized a rule revising regulations that define the scope of waters protected under the Clean Water Act (CWA). Discharges to waters under CWA jurisdiction, such as the addition of pollutants from factories or sewage treatment plants and the dredging and filling of spoil material through mining or excavation, require a CWA permit. The rule was proposed in 2014 in light of Supreme Court rulings that created uncertainty about the geographic limits of waters that are and are not protected by the CWA.
According to EPA and the Corps, their intent in proposing the rule was to clarify CWA jurisdiction, not expand it. Nevertheless, the rule has been extremely controversial, especially with groups representing property owners, land developers, and agriculture, who contend that it represents a massive federal overreach beyond the agencies' statutory authority. Most state and local officials are supportive of clarifying the extent of CWA-regulated waters, but some are concerned that the rule could impose costs on states and localities as their own actions become subject to new requirements. Most environmental advocacy groups welcomed the proposal, which would more clearly define U.S. waters that are subject to CWA protections, but beyond that general support, some in these groups favor an even stronger rule. The final rule contains a number of changes to respond to criticisms of the proposal, but the revisions may not satisfy all critics of the rule. The rule became effective August 28, 2015, replacing EPA-Corps guidance that has governed permitting decisions since the Supreme Court's rulings. However, a federal appeals court issued a nationwide stay of the rule that has been in effect since October 2015.
Despite the court's stay of the rule, some in Congress favor halting EPA and the Corps' current approach to defining "waters of the United States." To do so legislatively, at least four options were reflected in bills in the 114th Congress.
The Congressional Review Act. If Congress passes a joint resolution disapproving a covered rule under procedures provided by the act, and the resolution becomes law, the rule cannot take effect or continue in effect. The agency may not reissue either that rule or any substantially similar one, except under authority of a subsequently enacted law. The Senate and House passed such a joint resolution (S.J.Res. 22), but President Obama vetoed it on January 19. On January 21, a procedural vote in the Senate to override the veto failed. Appropriations bill limitations. A provision in an appropriations bill can be a mechanism to block or redirect an agency's course of action by limiting or preventing agency funds from being used for the rule. Bills with such limitations were reported in 2015 and 2016, but none of these bills were enacted. Standalone targeted legislation. Other legislation can take several forms, such as a bill similar to limits in an appropriations bill to prohibit EPA and the Corps from finalizing, implementing, or enforcing the proposed rule. Another approach could be legislation to address substantive aspects of the rule that have been criticized. The House passed one such bill (H.R. 1732) in 2015. Similar legislation was reported in the Senate, but failed to advance (S. 1140). Broad amendments to the Clean Water Act. Legislation to affirm or clarify Congress's intention regarding CWA jurisdiction would have broad implications for the CWA, since questions of jurisdiction are fundamental to all of the act's regulatory requirements.
These options and related legislative activity in the 114th Congress are discussed in this report. Each option faced a steep path to enactment, because of the Obama Administration's opposition to legislation to halt or weaken a major regulatory initiative such as the "waters of the United States" rule. With a change in administration in January 2017, the 115th Congress and the new administration seem likely to revisit the "waters of the United States" issue and controversies, but how that will occur is unclear for now. |
crs_R40634 | crs_R40634_0 | The Incompatibility Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that "no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office." This provision is generally understood to ensure the separation of powers by preventing Members of Congress from serving in two government posts at one time. The prohibition on simultaneous service in multiple offices of the government prevents the individual from exercising influence of one branch while serving in the office of another. To avoid constitutional violations under the Incompatibility Clause, Members generally are required to resign their previous offices before being seated in Congress. The Incompatibility Clause often raises questions of the propriety of Members' conduct in the context of military service, particularly service in the Armed Forces Reserves, and whether service in the Reserves would disqualify the Member from simultaneously serving in Congress. The Constitution also provides that "each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own Members." In some cases, the House and Senate have exercised their authority under this provision to determine the eligibility of their Members to hold commissions in the military, including the Reserves. The central issue in determining whether a Member may simultaneously serve in the Reserves is whether a position in the Reserves constitutes an "Office under the United States." This issue has been litigated in the U.S. Supreme Court in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War . The Court resolved the case on procedural grounds, finding that the Reservists Committee did not have standing to raise the matter in court, and did not address the substantive constitutional claim. Other courts have dealt with related issues, including what positions constitute offices of the United States. Although Congress has taken action in some instances of Members' service in the military and courts have resolved some related challenges related to service in the Reserves, the issue of whether a Member may serve in Congress and the Reserves simultaneously has never been clearly resolved. In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War , an association of officers and enlisted members of the Reserves and several individual members of the association alleged that Members of Congress who simultaneously served in the Reserves were acting in violation of the U.S. Constitution's prohibition on "holding any Office under the United States" while also serving as a Member of Congress. | The Incompatibility Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that "no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office." This provision is generally understood to ensure the separation of powers by preventing Members of Congress from serving in two government posts at one time. The prohibition on simultaneous service in multiple offices of the government prevents the individual from exercising influence of one branch while serving in the office of another. To avoid related constitutional violations, Members generally are required to resign their previous offices before being seated in Congress.
The Incompatibility Clause often raises questions of the propriety of Members' conduct in the context of military service, particularly service in the U.S. Armed Forces Reserves, and whether service in the Reserves would disqualify the Member from simultaneously serving in Congress. The Constitution also provides that "each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own Members." In some cases, the House and Senate have exercised their authority under this provision to determine the eligibility of their Members to hold commissions in the military, including the Reserves.
The central issue in determining whether a Member may simultaneously serve in the Reserves is whether a position in the Reserves constitutes an "Office under the United States." This issue has been litigated in the courts and made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War. The Court resolved the case on procedural grounds, finding that the Reservists Committee did not have standing to raise the matter in court, and did not address the substantive constitutional claim. Other courts have dealt with related issues, including what positions constitute offices of the United States.
Although Congress has taken action in some instances of Members' service in the Reserves and courts have resolved some related challenges, the issue of whether a Member may serve in Congress and the Reserves simultaneously has never been clearly resolved. This report will analyze the legal issues related to Members of Congress serving in the Armed Forces Reserves during their congressional tenure. It will discuss previous congressional action regarding Members' simultaneous service as well as federal legislation addressing the status of Reservists. It will also analyze court decisions related to challenges to simultaneous service. |
crs_R42370 | crs_R42370_0 | Since the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010, religious institutions have raised concerns regarding the applicability of certain statutory provisions that would require the coverage of health services to which religious organizations may object. Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS), Labor, and Treasury issued interim final regulations that required coverage for a range of preventive services. However, the controversy has intensified over the scope of the exemption, which appears to apply to churches, but potentially not other religiously affiliated institutions such as universities, hospitals, and social service providers. It also examines proposed legislative options and examples of religious exemptions in existing state and federal law. A definition for the term "religious employer" was added by the interim final rule:
[A] "religious employer" is an organization that meets all of the following criteria:
(1) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the organization;
(2) The organization primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of the organization;
(3) The organization serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the organization; and
(4) The organization is a nonprofit organization as described in section 6033(a)(1) and section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. Both constitutional and statutory rules govern whether an exemption would be required and what the scope of that exemption may be. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) requires that federal actions that substantially burden religious exercise must have a compelling governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to meet that interest. Courts have generally held that religious exemptions are not constitutionally required for laws and regulations that do not specifically target religious exercise. Thus, religious exemptions to requirements for health benefits coverage are generally regarded as permissible, but not required. Although federal courts have never considered the constitutionality of requirements to cover contraceptives and related health services, at least two state courts have considered challenges to religious exemptions to similar rules at the state level. Each state includes an exemption for religious employers that is essentially identical to the federal exemption. RFRA provides that a statute or regulation of general applicability may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it (1) furthers a compelling governmental interest and (2) uses the least restrictive means to further that interest. Public Health and Gender Equity as Compelling Interests
Among the stated goals and benefits of the preventive services requirements at issue are the improvement of public health and the equitable distribution of costs for preventive services. Accommodating Religious Exercise to Achieve the Government's Interest
Even if the government has a compelling interest in requiring coverage of contraceptives, it must use the least restrictive means to achieve that interest in order for the requirement to be upheld consistent with RFRA. Under this standard, a court may find that an accommodation is possible without undermining the program, but that the exemption may need to be drawn narrowly. Potential Consequences for Non-Compliance with Requirements for Contraceptive Coverage
Employers that object to contraceptives coverage requirements and do not qualify for an exemption may refuse to offer the required coverage. Furthermore, employers who do not cover contraceptives may face potential liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as some courts have indicated that denying coverage may constitute sex discrimination. As discussed above, with respect to the preventive health services requirements in ACA, health plans and health insurance coverage established or maintained by a "religious employer" could be exempt from providing contraceptive services, and certain organizations with religious objections to contraceptive coverage are not to be subject to an enforcement action under a temporary enforcement safe harbor. However, ERISA does not generally apply to governmental or church plans. In 2000, the U.S. In other words, even if a religious employer qualifies for an exemption from the requirements for contraceptive coverage under ACA and even if the employer qualifies for Title VII's religious discrimination exemption, the employer must still comply with Title VII's ban on sex discrimination. 3897/S. H.R. 1179/S. | Since the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010, controversy has surrounded the applicability of requirements for health plans and health insurers to cover certain recommended preventive health services, including a range of contraceptive services, without cost sharing. The U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and Treasury have issued regulations that provide an exemption from ACA for certain religious employers who have religious objections to contraceptives. The exemption appears to cover churches and church associations, but potentially does not extend to other religiously affiliated employers, such as universities and hospitals. The scope of the exemption has been the subject of intense debate and has raised questions of the legal protections for religious institutions.
Both constitutional and statutory rules govern whether a religious exemption from the coverage requirement is required and what the scope of that exemption may be. Courts have generally held that exemptions to legal mandates that conflict with religious beliefs are permissible, but not required under the First Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated in several decisions that a religious exemption is not required for neutral laws of general applicability, and state courts have applied the Court's analysis to state contraceptive requirements. The Court has explicitly noted, however, that an exemption may be included or broadened at the discretion of Congress.
As a statutory protection, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) requires that any federal action that substantially burdens religious exercise must (1) further a compelling interest and (2) use the least restrictive means to further that interest. Because the contraceptive coverage requirement is a federal action subject to RFRA, a court must find that the requirement serves a compelling interest and is implemented to burden as few religious objectors as possible without undermining that interest. Courts, including state courts considering challenges to similar provisions in state law, have recognized at least two of the stated purposes of the requirement—public health and gender equity—as compelling interests. State courts have also upheld exemptions that are essentially identical to the one included in the federal rule as sufficient accommodations which use the least restrictive means to avoid undermining that interest.
Employers with health plans that fail to offer the required coverage of contraceptives and do not qualify for an exemption may be subject to penalties or other liability. With respect to the preventive health services requirement, ACA does not expressly include a means of enforcing the provision. However, if a health plan or health insurer does not provide contraceptive coverage, it is possible that enforcement mechanisms found in the Employer Retirement Income Security Act, the Public Health Service Act, and the Internal Revenue Code could be applied. Furthermore, employers who do not cover contraceptives may be subject to liability for sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, even if the employer qualifies for the religious exemption.
This report provides an overview of the preventive health services requirements and the exemption for religious employers. It analyzes the legal protections for religious organizations with objections to the requirements and examines state court decisions upholding similar requirements. The report also discusses the implications of non-compliance for organizations that do not qualify for the exemption and fail to provide the required coverage. Finally, the report analyzes several legislative proposals for statutory exemptions (H.R. 3897/S. 2043; H.R. 1179/S. 1467) and provides examples of religious exemptions in other federal laws and in state contraceptive coverage laws. |
crs_RL31005 | crs_RL31005_0 | 107-117 , the FY2002 DOD Appropriations Act( H.R. Status (1)
On January 10, 2002, the President signed P.L. Although P.L. Total Funding for National Defense in FY2002
Total funding appropriated for the national defense function in FY2002, including the $3.5 billion of funding from the Emergency Terrorism Response supplemental that wasallocated in the DOD bill, is $346.8 billion (see Table 2 ). (6)
Combined with the emergency funding allocated to non-defense agencies and the impact of the recession that began in the spring of 2001, this additional funding for Defense requiredthat Congress set aside earlier budgetary guidelines designed to protect the surplus generatedby the Social Security and Medicare trust funds and return to deficit spending (see below). 3338 , P.L. 3338 ( H.Rept. Before that, the week-long evacuation of some congressional offices for anthraxtesting, a dispute between the Administration and Congress about the total amount fordiscretionary spending, and congressional passage of the $40 billion emergency supplementalfor FY2001 in response to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagonall moved consideration of the Defense bill to late in the congressional session. There has been broad bipartisan support for the enactment ofsignificant additional resources for recovery and response to the September 11 terrorismattacks. Nevertheless, sharp differences emerged as to whether the original $40 billionpackage is sufficient, whether the allocations matched the most critical priorities, especiallyregarding homeland security needs, and whether New York and other jurisdictions directlyaffected by the attacks are received adequate funds. DOD Allocations under $40 billion EmergencyTerrorism Response Supplemental
Notes:
a. P.L. After the attacks of September 11, however, withthe new concern about combating terrorism, and the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, the fiscal debate shifted from the potential problem of tapping the social securitysurplus to adding funding for defense programs and homeland security. e. Reflects congressional actions as of October 4, 2001, including passage of the Airline AssistanceAct, the $40 billion Emergency Anti-Terrorism supplemental, and agreement between Congressand the Administration to hold total discretionary spending to $686 billion in 2002.
f. Reflects estimate by budget committee of potential effect on the surplus of a recession; theestimate is higher than the Congressional Budget Office's estimates that are based on the1990-91 recession - reducing the surplus by $47 billion in the first year and $63 billion in thesecond year; see Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook , January2001, p. 102.
g. Reflects agreement between the Administration and Congress reached at the end of Septemberthat total discretionary spending would be held to $686 billion in FY2002, $24.2 billion morethan was included in the Concurrent Budget Resolution passed by Congress; that total includes$18.4 billion for defense, $2.2 billion for emergencies, and $4 billion for education. Action on the FY2002 DOD Appropriations Bill
On December 20, 2001, the House and the Senate passed the conference versionof H.R. 107-107 , H.Rept.107-333 , see Table 1b ). The Act provides the $343.3 billion as requested by theAdministration, an 11% increase over FY2001 without taking into account fundingfrom the emergency supplemental. Conference Version of FY2002 DOD Authorization Act
The conference version of S. 1438 resolve several contentious issues as follows:
Approves the President's request for another round of base closures, but delayed the date to 2005, and changed the procedures proposed byDOD;
Authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to close the trainingfacilities at Vieques (and transfer the facility to the Department of the Interior) aftercertifying that alternative training sites are available;
Provides $7.0 billion for ballistic missile defense as requestedby the President but authorizes the President to transfer $1.3 billion of that total toefforts to combat terrorism, permitting the President to fund the requestfully;
Adopts provisions that reduced non-readiness related spendingfor Operation and Maintenance by $2.1 billion and Working Capital Funds by $400million to reflect savings in management reforms, fuel and utility prices, foreigncurrency decreases. 107-117 , H.R. Note that this doesnot include defense-related activities of the Department of Energy and other agencies- with all defense-related activities added, the April 9 budget projected $325.1 billionin FY2002 for the national defense budget function. Passed by the House and Senate on September 14, 2001. 107-107 )on December 28, 2001. | On June 27, the Administration submitted an amended fiscal year 2002 defense budget request to Congress. The request totaled $343.5 billion in funding for the national defense budget function,$32.9 billion above the amount originally enacted for FY2001, an 11% increase. The total includedfunding for the Department of Defense and for defense-related activities of the Department of Energyand other agencies. Both House and Senate versions of the DOD appropriations bill provided thetotal for national defense that the Administration requested. To accommodate that level, Congressadjusted limitations in the 1997 Balanced Budget Act and set aside provisions in this year'sconcurrent budget resolution that were designed to protect the social security surplus.
With the onset of a recession last spring, along with higher defense spending and additional federal spending in response to the terrorist attacks, and lower revenues due to the tax cut, thegovernment is expected to run a deficit as well as use all of the surplus generated by social securityrevenues. With the destruction of the World Trade Center and the extensive damage to the Pentagonby terrorists on September 11th, congressional concerns shifted from whether the overall federalbudget could accommodate higher defense expenditures without spending the budget surplus toadding funding for defense programs that combat terrorism.
Funding to aid the victims and provide for recovery from the attacks, for the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, and for other programs to combat terrorism, was approved in the $40 billionEmergency Terrorism Response supplemental appropriations act ( P.L. 107-38 ) that passed CongressSeptember 14, 2001. Of that total, DOD receives $17.5 billion of the total funding in the EmergencyTerrorism Response supplemental, about 44% of the total (see P.L. 107-117 and H.Rept. 107-350 )with about 56% going to other agencies. Allocation of half of the $40 billion was included in P.L.107-117 / H.R. 3338 , the FY2002 DOD appropriations act, which was signed by thePresident on January 10, 2002.
Although there had been broad bipartisan support for adding funds for recovery and response to the September 11 terrorism attacks, sharp differences emerged about whether the total amountwas sufficient and whether the allocations matched the most critical priorities, particularly for NewYork and other homeland security needs. The President, however, threatened to veto any spendingmeasure this year that went beyond the $40 billion. Faced with this threat, both the House and theSenate rejected proposals to add more emergency funding to H.R. 3338 when theypassed the bill. Instead, within the $20 billion total that was acceptable to the President, theconference bill shifts $3.4 billion of the $7.3 billion funds allocated to Defense by the Administrationto homeland security and recovery of New York.
The conference version of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2002 was passed by the House and the Senate on December 13, 2001, and signed by the President on December 28, 2001( P.L. 107-107 / S. 1438 , H.Rept. 107-333 ). The Act provides $343.3 billion as requestedby the Administration and authorizes another round of base closures but delays the date to 2005,settling the chief issue in contention.
Key Policy Staff
Abbreviations:
FDT = Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
G&F = Government and Finance Division
RSI = Resources, Science, and Industry Division |
crs_R43002 | crs_R43002_0 | A commercial or depository bank is typically a corporation that obtains either a federal or state charter to accept federally insured deposits and pay interest to depositors; make residential and commercial mortgage loans; provide check cashing and clearing services; and may underwrite securities that include U.S. Treasuries, municipal bonds, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issuances, and commercial paper (unsecured short-term loans to cover short-term liquidity needs). The permissible activities of depository banks are defined by statute. Congressional interest in the financial conditions of depository banks, also referred to as the commercial banking system, has increased following a challenging economic and regulatory environment. The conditions of the banking industry can be examined in terms of profitability, lending activity, and capitalization levels (to buffer against the financial risks); but this report focuses primarily on profitability and lending activity levels. These measures show that profitability for the banking industry has improved, but the rate of lending activity has not returned to pre-crisis levels. At the other extreme are the large financial institutions that have $10 billion or more in assets. The bank failure rate has since diminished with 92 bank failures in 2011, 51 bank failures in 2012, and 24 bank failures in 2013. As previously stated, declines in RoA and RoE may be attributed to loan repayment problems that led to an increase in the numbers of distressed institutions. The more rapid pace of non-current loans led to a substantial decline in the industry coverage ratio, shown in Figure 5 . Consequently, regulators are requiring banks to increase loan loss provisioning (as well as other components of regulatory capital) to levels that better match the levels of problem loans. Conclusion
The banking industry has exhibited profitability since the 2007-2009 financial crisis. | A bank is an institution that obtains either a federal or state charter that allows it to accept federally insured deposits and pay interest to depositors. In addition, the charter allows banks to make residential and commercial mortgage loans; provide check cashing and clearing services; underwrite securities that include U.S. Treasuries, municipal bonds, commercial paper, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issuances; and other activities as defined by statute.
Congressional interest in the financial conditions of depository banks or the commercial banking industry has increased in the wake of the financial crisis that unfolded in 2007-2009, which resulted in a large increase in the number of distressed institutions. A financially strained banking system would have difficulty making credit available to facilitate macroeconomic recovery.
The financial condition of the banking industry can be examined in terms of profitability, lending activity, and capitalization levels (to buffer against the financial risks). This report focuses primarily on profitability and lending activity levels. Issues related to higher bank capitalization requirements are discussed in CRS Report R42744, U.S. Implementation of the Basel Capital Regulatory Framework, by [author name scrubbed].
The banking industry continues consolidating, with more total assets held by a smaller total number of institutions. There are fewer problem banks since the peak in 2011, as well as fewer bank failures in 2013 in comparison to the peak amount of failures in 2010. Non-current loans still exceed the capacity of the banking industry to absorb potential losses (should they become uncollectible), meaning that news of industry profitability should be tempered by the news that aggregate loan loss provisions are currently insufficient. Consequently, the rate of bank lending growth may not return to pre-crisis levels until loan-loss capacity exhibits even more improvement. |
crs_R40052 | crs_R40052_0 | They announced that the economy had reached a cyclical peak, and that a recession had begun in December 2007. The term "recession" may often be used loosely to describe an economy that is slowing down or characterized by weakness in at least one major sector like the housing market. A recession is one of several discrete phases in the overall business cycle. The beginning of a recession is known as a business cycle "peak," and the end of a recession is referred to as a business cycle "trough." The members of the committee are appointed by the president of the NBER, and they are now responsible for determining the dates of the beginnings and ends of recessions. With all statistics it takes some time to compile the data, which means that the statistics are only available after the events they describe. Moreover, because it takes time to discern changes in trends given the usual month-to-month volatility in economic indicators, and because the data are subject to revision, it takes some time before the dating committee can agree that a recession (or an expansion) began at a certain date. | The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) recently announced that the economy had reached a cyclical peak and that a recession had begun in December 2007. A recession is one of several discrete phases in the overall business cycle. The term may often be used loosely to describe an economy that is slowing down or characterized by weakness in at least one major sector like the housing market. When used by economists, "recession" means a significant decline in overall economic activity that lasts more than a few months. NBER business cycle dating committee is the generally recognized arbiter of the dates of the beginnings and ends of recessions. With all statistics it takes some time to compile the data, which means they are only available after the events they describe. Moreover, because it takes time to discern changes in trends given the usual month-to-month volatility in economic indicators, and because the data are subject to revision, it takes some time before the dating committee can agree that a recession began at a certain date. It can be a year or more after the fact that the dating committee announces the date of the beginning of a recession. Just as it took some time for the business cycle dating committee to determine when the recession began, it is likely to be some time after the fact that they determine when the recession has come to an end. |
crs_R41296 | crs_R41296_0 | BCAP Overview
The Biomass Crop Assistance Program (BCAP) is intended to assist with some of the feedstock supply challenges facing the cellulosic biofuels industry. In particular, through the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA, P.L. Similarly, the 2008 farm bill (the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, P.L. Among the Title IX bioenergy programs of the 2008 farm bill is BCAP —authorized by Congress to support the establishment and production of eligible biomass crops for conversion to bioenergy in selected areas, and to assist agricultural and forest land owners and operators with collection, harvest, storage, and transportation (CHST) of eligible material for use in a biomass conversion facility. Changes to BCAP in 2014 Farm Bill
The 2014 farm bill (Agricultural Act of 2014; P.L. 113-79 ) extends BCAP through FY2018 with some modifications to its implementation and with new mandatory funding. Program Operation
BCAP is administered by USDA's Farm Service Agency (FSA) and receives mandatory funding through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). BCAP provides two categories of financial assistance:
1. establishment and annual payments , including a one-time payment of up to 50% of the cost of establishment for perennial crops, and annual payments (i.e., rental rates based on a set of criteria) of up to 5 years for non-woody and 15 years for woody perennial biomass crops; and 2. Project Areas
BCAP assistance for establishing and producing biomass crops is available within designated project areas. BCAP project areas are specific geographic areas where producers may enroll land into BCAP contracts and produce specified biomass crops. The statute authority requires project area sponsors to include the following as part of the proposal:
a description of the eligible land including the geographic boundary describing the area where land can be enrolled; a list of eligible crops of each producer that will participate in the proposed project area; a letter of commitment from a biomass conversion facility that the facility will use the eligible crops intended to be produced in the project area; evidence that the biomass conversion facility has sufficient equity available, if the facility is not operational at the time the proposal is submitted; and any other appropriate information about the biomass conversion facility that gives reasonable assurance that the plant will be in operation by the time eligible crops are ready for harvest. 110-246 ) through FY2013. No new mandatory funding was included for BCAP under ATRA; instead, ATRA included discretionary funding of $20 million for BCAP authorized to be appropriated for FY2013, but Congress appropriated no funds for BCAP for FY2013
Funding Under the 2014 Farm Bill
The 2014 farm bill authorized mandatory funding of $25 million annually for FY2014 through FY2018; no discretionary funding is authorized. For FY2015, Congress further limited mandatory funding for BCAP to not more than $23 million in the Consolidated and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 ( P.L. 113-235 ). The presidential memorandum requested the Secretary of Agriculture to accelerate investment in and production of biofuels, and it specifically listed energy programs in the 2008 farm bill, including "guidance and support for collection, harvest, storage, and transportation (CHST) assistance for eligible materials for use in biomass conversion facilities." In June 2014, under the authority of the 2014 farm bill, USDA issued a Notice of Funds Availability for BCAP for FY2014 in which it made available $12.5 million for BCAP matching payments to facilitate the delivery of eligible biomass material, with the balance of the funds available for FY2014 to be used for technical assistance activities, such as implementation, operation, compliance, monitoring and maintenance of all components of BCAP. Many of the issues that initially arose around BCAP have been addressed, and so have become less acute over time. Another concern centers on the continued slow development of a commercial-scale cellulosic biofuels industry that BCAP was meant to support. USDA's final rule for BCAP states that black liquor is considered an industrial waste by-product and therefore is not eligible under BCAP. Grants and loan guarantees leverage industry investments in new technologies and infrastructure, as well as in the production of cellulosic feedstocks. However, BCAP is the principal program designed to help "kick start" the U.S. cellulosic biofuels sector. | The Biomass Crop Assistance Program (BCAP) is designed to assist the bioenergy industry to overcome the hurdle of continuous biomass availability—viewed as a critical deterrent to private sector investment in the cellulosic biofuels industry. To accomplish this, BCAP is charged with two tasks: (1) to support the establishment and production of eligible crops for conversion to bioenergy in selected areas, and (2) to assist agricultural and forest land owners and operators with collection, harvest, storage, and transportation (CHST) of eligible material for use in a biomass conversion facility.
BCAP was created in 2008 by the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-246, 2008 farm bill), shortly after Congress had vastly expanded the usage mandate for renewable fuels, including cellulosic biofuels in the Energy Security and Independence Act of 2007 (EISA, P.L. 110-140). BCAP was envisaged as a mechanism for jump-starting the production of cellulosic feedstock for what was expected to be a rapidly expanding industry. The 2014 farm bill (Agricultural Act of 2014; P.L. 113-79) extends BCAP through FY2018, but with a number of changes aimed at limiting program costs. BCAP is administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) Farm Service Agency (FSA). BCAP provides two categories of financial assistance: (1) annual and establishment payments that share in the cost of establishing and maintaining production of eligible biomass crops; and (2) matching payments that share in the cost of the collection, harvest, storage, and transportation (CHST) of biomass to an eligible biomass conversion facility. BCAP assistance for establishing and producing biomass crops is available within designated project areas. BCAP project areas are specific geographic areas where producers may enroll land into BCAP contracts and produce specified biomass crops.
Under the 2008 farm bill, BCAP was authorized to receive such sums as necessary, meaning that funding for BCAP was both mandatory through the borrowing authority of USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation and open-ended since it depended on program participation. However, Congress imposed an upper limit on BCAP funding from FY2010 through FY2012 through appropriations bills. No funds were available for BCAP for FY2013.
In fashioning the 2014 farm bill, Congress made a number of changes to BCAP. Standing out among the changes was a hard cap on the program's mandatory authorization level. The 2014 farm bill replaced the open-ended authorization for BCAP in the 2008 farm bill with a cap of $25 million per year of mandatory funding for FY2014 through FY2018. Congress has further limited BCAP through appropriations bills, with the result that outlays under the program have declined steeply since peaking at nearly $250 million in FY2010. In December 2014, Congress passed the Consolidated and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235), which imposed an upper limit of $23 million in funding for BCAP for FY2015. In part, these changes reflect the much slower-than-expected pace at which the cellulosic biofuels industry has developed.
Concerns that arose in the early years after BCAP was authorized—for example, that it could heighten competition over eligible woody biomass, thus raising the price of that material to the detriment of traditional users, such as nurseries and others, and that the by-product of paper production, "black liquor," could qualify for CHST matching payments—have been addressed, and so have become less acute. Some have argued the payments are largely unnecessary and therefore wasteful. An ongoing issue is that while BCAP's primary purpose is to facilitate the development of an expanding, commercial-scale cellulosic biofuel industry by helping it meet its feedstock challenges, numerous headwinds continue to retard the development of that industry. |
crs_RL33330 | crs_RL33330_0 | In general, Congress has provided increased flexibility and allocated additional CDBG funds to affected communities and states to help them respond to and recover from presidentially declared disasters. This includes allowing communities to reprogram CDBG funds to meet disaster-related needs, including short-term disaster relief, mitigation activities, and long-term recovery activities. For instance, approximately $250 million in CDBG funds were used to finance the emergency temporary restoration of utilities in the affected areas of Lower Manhattan following the destruction of the World Trade Center, and an additional $500 million was made available for permanent utility restoration and infrastructure improvements. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress appropriated $2 billion under P.L. 107-117 for disaster relief and recovery assistance to New York. In addition, the act earmarked at least $10 million for the tourism and travel industry. For instance, to assist in the redevelopment of the Lower Manhattan area of New York following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress appropriated $3.5 billion in CDBG funds. Other Actions by HUD in Support of Disaster Recovery
In addition to providing CDBG funding assistance, Congress has included a number of other provisions in past disaster relief appropriations to facilitate relief and recovery efforts and to ensure accountability. In response to the 1992 Los Angeles riots, Congress increased the ceiling on the use of the CDBG funds for public service activities in Los Angeles from 15% to 25%. Legislation providing CDBG disaster relief assistance to communities affected by the 1997 and 1998 Midwest floods included provisions that required HUD and FEMA to jointly submit quarterly reports to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees on the use of CDBG funds for land acquisition and buyouts. Legislation providing CDBG assistance to New York following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Gulf Coast hurricanes of 2005, and natural disasters of 2008 also included quarterly reporting provisions. Recent Legislation
On July 29, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Supplemental Appropriations Act for FY2010, P.L. The legislation appropriates supplemental CDBG funds for disaster recovery activities. 4899 , the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2010, recommended appropriating $100 million in CDBG supplemental funds for presidentially declared disaster areas affected by severe storms and flooding during the period from March 2010 to May 2010. P.L. 111-212 limits the $100 million in CDBG disaster assistance to states where
the entire state has been declared a presidential disaster area; or at least 20 counties in the state have been declared presidential disaster areas. In addition, P.L. The latter provision gives grantees greater flexibility in developing and implementing CDBG disaster recovery plans. Disaster Relief 112th Congress: P.L. It would have:
directed HUD to allocate funds to both states and local governments; allowed CDBG disaster funds to be used to meet the matching fund requirements of other federal programs; allowed states and localities to use up to 5% of their CDBG disaster allocation to cover administrative costs; and allowed HUD to grant waivers or specify alternative program requirements (except those related to fair housing, nondiscrimination, labor standards, and environmental review) as long as such waivers or alternative requirements are not inconsistent with purpose and rules governing the CDBG program. During consideration of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2012, H.R. 2112 , which was signed into law as P.L. 112-55 by the President on November 18, 2011, Congress included $400 million in supplemental CDBG assistance in response to multiple disasters that occurred during 2011. prohibits funds from being used to for activities reimbursable by, or made available, by the Federal Emergency Management Administration or the Army Corps of Engineers; and allows HUD to waive statutory or regulatory provisions governing the use of CDBG funds, except those related to fair housing, nondiscrimination, labor standards, and environmental review. Should Congress require states to meet a matching fund requirement as a condition for receiving disaster recovery-related CDBG funds? | In the aftermath of presidentially declared disasters, Congress has used a variety of programs to help states and local governments finance recovery efforts, among them the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program. Over the years, Congress has appropriated supplemental CDBG funds to assist states and communities to recover from such natural disasters as hurricanes, earthquakes, and tornadoes. In addition, CDBG funds supported recovery efforts in New York City following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; in Oklahoma City following the bombing of the Alfred Murrah Building in 1995; and in the city and county of Los Angeles following the riots of 1992. In response to those calamities, CDBG funds were made available for short-term relief efforts, mitigation actions, and long-term recovery, and to provide housing and business assistance, infrastructure reconstruction, and public services.
The Gulf Coast hurricanes of 2005 (Katrina, Rita, and Wilma) resulted in the largest appropriation of CDBG funds for disaster relief and recovery in the program's history. Since December 2005, Congress has provided $19.85 billion in CDBG disaster-related assistance to the five states (Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas) affected by the Gulf Coast hurricanes of 2005. This included $11.5 billion in CDBG assistance appropriated in the Defense Appropriations Act for FY2006, P.L. 109-148; $5.2 billion in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery Act of 2006, P.L. 109-234; and $3 billion (exclusively for Louisiana's Road Home Program) appropriated in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for FY2008, P.L. 110-116.
The 110th Congress appropriated $6.8 billion in CDBG funds to be used to respond to presidentially declared disasters occurring in 2008. This included $300 million appropriated under the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, P.L. 110-252, and $6.5 billion included in the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, P.L. 110-329.
In general, CDBG disaster relief acts passed since 2005 have included provisions that limit the amount a state could use for administrative expenses to 5%; allow a state to seek waivers of program requirements, except those related to fair housing, nondiscrimination, labor standards, and environmental review; prohibit the use of funds for activities that were reimbursable by or made available by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) or the Army Corp of Engineers; and require each state to develop and HUD to approve state recovery plans
As a condition for the receipt of CDBG disaster recovery assistance, states are required to submit quarterly reports to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees on all awards and use of funds. The acts do not prescribe the form these quarterly reports are to take nor the content they are to include, except for identifying and rationalizing the use of sole source contracts.
The 111th Congress approved a supplemental appropriations act for 2010, H.R. 4899, which was signed by the President on July 29, 2010, as P.L. 111-212. The act provided an additional $100 million in CDBG funds to help states and communities undertake disaster recovery activities in presidentially declared disaster areas affected by severe storms and flooding during the period from March 2010 through May 2010. Most recently, the 112th Congress also considered and passed legislation (P.L. 112-55) appropriating $400 million in supplemental CDBG disaster assistance for disasters occurring in 2011. This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R45318 | crs_R45318_0 | Introduction
Exchange-traded funds (ETFs) offer investors a way to pool money in a fund that invests in multiple stocks, bonds, or other combinations of financial assets. Over the past 25 years, ETFs have become common investment vehicles to help American retail investors build financial nest eggs and to help institutional investors meet financial obligations. The report also discusses other key policy issues, including ETFs' relevance to financial stability considerations, the implication of the rise of passively managed funds (a category that encompasses the majority of ETFs), the higher risks often associated with nontraditional ETPs, investor protection issues, and the SEC's recent ETF rulemaking, among other topics. They package a portfolio of assets like a mutual fund and can be traded on exchanges like a stock. When purchasing an ETF share, public investors are buying and selling a collective exposure to the underlying basket of securities. But ETF shares are traded intraday on exchanges; as such, an ETF's market share price (in the secondary market) could differ, at a particular time, from the value of its underlying basket (in the primary market) as expressed in the fund's NAV. Arbitrageurs would simultaneously buy or sell ETF shares and their underlying assets. Regulatory Framework
The first U.S. ETF was introduced in 1993 to track the S&P 500 index. Because it was an innovative product at the time, it did not fit completely within any of the existing statutory schemes for securities, investment companies, or listing standards. ETFs generally have the following characteristics:
Investment companies that comply with and gain exemptive relief from the Investment Company Act of 1940 (1940 A ct). The SEC proposed a new ETF approval process on June 28, 2018. It would replace individual exemptive orders with a single rule for index-based and actively managed open-end ETFs (in-scope ETFs). Financial Stability
With U.S. ETFs accounting for more than $3.4 trillion in assets under management and 30% of all U.S. equity trading volume, ETFs' scale and continued growth give rise to financial stability considerations. ETFs' involvement in any future financial crisis is likely, given their scale of representation in financial markets. However, it is uncertain whether ETFs would simply be affected by the next financial crisis (e.g., their value would fall with the value of other assets) or would amplify it. As such, some consider ETFs to have not yet experienced a truly extreme market downturn. Many industry practitioners assert that liquidity mismatch is among the most widely misunderstood aspects of ETF structure and mechanics. Higher-Risk Products
ETFs are one main type of investment within a broader category of all portfolio products that trade on exchanges called exchange-traded products (ETPs). Not all ETPs are created equal. To add to the confusion, many of the complex and high-risk ETPs are also referred to as ETFs. The industry has not adopted a consistent naming convention for ETFs and ETPs. The vast majority (92.5%) of the global market consists of plain-vanilla ETFs that are physically backed, and the rest of the market (7.5%) is relatively small, yet filled with more complex ETPs. Although plain-vanilla physically backed ETFs, which make up the vast majority of the ETP market, are generally considered lower risk, a small subset of ETPs is the source of concerns over investor protection and systemic risk. This has led to multifaceted discussions of concentration risk. Investors in physically backed ETFs, which represent the vast majority of the ETF market, would each own a small share of the underlying securities and would generally not be exposed to credit risk in the event of issuer default. | Exchange-traded funds (ETFs) are common ways for Americans to invest. An ETF is an investment vehicle that, similar to a mutual fund, offers public investors shares of a pool of assets; unlike a mutual fund, however, an ETF can be traded on exchanges like a stock. The catchall category of exchange-traded products (ETPs) includes all portfolio products that trade on exchanges.
U.S. ETF domestic listings stand at more than $3.4 trillion, making ETFs among the most important investment methods and critical components of the financial system. The first U.S. ETF was introduced in 1993 to track the S&P 500 stock index. That was the first time a public investor could buy or sell a basket of stocks in a single publicly traded share. It was considered as one of the most important financial innovations in decades and one that transformed the asset management industry. In the ensuing 25 years, ETFs have grown to become a mainstream investment vehicle held by 6% of U.S. households and representing 30% of all U.S. equity trading, according to data from Investment Company Institute and iShares.
The rapid growth of the ETF market has simultaneously elevated its importance in the global financial system and brought risk and regulatory considerations to the fore. A key consideration is ETFs' behavior under market stress. ETFs drew media attention when market distress occurred in 2010, 2015, and 2018. These events have led to global discussions of ETFs' effects on financial stability. Although the events did not seem to leave long-lasting impacts on financial markets, they revealed aspects of ETFs' vulnerability that could not be observed under normal market conditions.
Given ETFs' scale of representation in financial markets, it is likely that they would be affected by any future financial crisis (e.g., their value would fall with the value of other assets), but it is uncertain whether ETFs would also amplify it. At the center of the debate over ETFs and financial stability is "liquidity mismatch," which is often discussed under the context of the difficulty of buying and selling ETFs during a market downturn. This mismatch points to a relatively complex ETF operational structure that has generated misunderstanding.
Not all ETFs are created equal. The majority of ETFs are "plain vanilla" index-tracking products that are considered lower risk. There is also a growing subset of complex, higher-risk ETFs that are sources of concern over financial stability and investor protection. To add to the confusion, the industry does not currently have a consistent naming convention to differentiate the types of products that vary in risk exposure.
Lastly, despite ETFs' common usage, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has not yet established a comprehensive listing standard. As such, each aspiring issuer must typically be approved by the SEC under an exemption to the Investment Company Act of 1940 and other securities regulations. The SEC proposed a new ETF approval process on June 28, 2018, that would replace individual exemptive orders with a single rule for plain vanilla ETFs. The proposed approach excludes certain higher-risk ETFs and mandates new disclosures and other conditions generally on index-based and actively managed ETFs. |
crs_RL32492 | crs_RL32492_0 | Introduction
This report provides war casualty statistics. It includes data tables containing the number of fatalities and the number of wounded among American military personnel who served in principal wars and combat actions from 1775 to the present. It also includes information such as race and ethnicity, gender, branch of service, and, in some cases, detailed information on types of casualties and causes of death. Casualty statistics for conflicts prior to the Persian Gulf War (Desert Shield and Desert Storm) are updated periodically by the DCAS of the DMDC. The data on World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War, respectfully, are taken from the U.S. National Archives. The data for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF); Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF); Operation New Dawn (OND); Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR); and Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS), respectively, are available from the Defense Casualty Analysis System website at https://dcas.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/casualties.xhtml . Resources
This section provides information on authoritative sources for statistics; demographic indicators by conflict; websites for additional sources of research; and other publications including related CRS reports. The names of U.S. military personnel killed in major wars and other combat actions are published in the following sources:
World War I
Soldiers of the Great War, Volume 1-3 from the collection of the Harvard University Library. | This report provides U.S. war casualty statistics. It includes data tables containing the number of casualties among American military personnel who served in principal wars and combat operations from 1775 to the present. It also includes data on those wounded in action and information such as race and ethnicity, gender, branch of service, and cause of death. The tables are compiled from various Department of Defense (DOD) sources.
Wars covered include the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam Conflict, and the Persian Gulf War. Military operations covered include the Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission; Lebanon Peacekeeping; Urgent Fury in Grenada; Just Cause in Panama; Desert Shield and Desert Storm; Restore Hope in Somalia; Uphold Democracy in Haiti; Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF); Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF); Operation New Dawn (OND); Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR); and Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS).
Starting with the Korean War and the more recent conflicts, this report includes additional detailed information on types of casualties and, when available, demographics. It also cites a number of resources for further information, including sources of historical statistics on active duty military deaths, published lists of military personnel killed in combat actions, data on demographic indicators among U.S. military personnel, related websites, and relevant Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports. |
crs_RL30511 | crs_RL30511_0 | Most Recent Developments
For the most controversial FY2001 Foreign Operations issue - internationalfamily planning - Congress increased spending to $425 million. Lawmakers,however, restricted the obligation of funds until after February 15, 2001. The enacted legislation falls about $550million, or 3.5%, below the President's combined FY2000 supplemental/FY2001requests, but is substantially higher than the roughly $13.4 billion spendingmeasures passed by the House and Senate during the summer. Introduction
The annual Foreign Operations appropriations bill is the primary legislativevehicle through which Congress reviews and votes on the U.S. foreign assistancebudget and influences executive branch foreign policy making generally. (1) It containsthe largest share -- about two-thirds -- of total international affairs spending by theUnited States (see Figure 1 ). Those problems were settled and the Senate approved S. 2522 on June 22. 4811 on October 24 ( H.Rept. 106-997 ). 4811 on November 6, 2000 ( P.L.106-429 ). Foreign Operations Appropriations Request for FY2001 and Congressional Consideration
In February 2000 President Clinton asked Congress to appropriate $15.1 billionfor FY2001 Foreign Operations. Summary of Foreign Operations Appropriations (Discretionary funds - in millions of dollars)
Note: For comparative purposes and to conform to the account structure of the FY2000 and FY2001 enacted Foreign Operations, some funding in the FY2001request and Senate bill have been shifted: UNICEF, GAVI, Inter-AmericanFoundation, and African Development Foundation amounts requested for FY2001are included in development aid under title II. (6)
FY2000 Supplemental. As approved by the Senate, S. 2522 provided $13.4 billion for Foreign Operations programsin FY2001. (7) The Senaterecommendation fell about$1.7 billion, or 11%, below the President's (at that time) $15.1 billion FY2001request. As approved by the House on July 13, H.R. 4811 provided $13.3 billion, about $200 millionless than the FY2000 Act (after subtracting from FY2000 the one-time, $1.8 billionWye River/Middle East peace aid package and the enacted supplemental), and $1.8billion, or 12%, below the President's (at the time) $15.1 billion FY2001 request. During floor debate, the House adopted anamendment (Waters, 216-211) that raised this amount to $238 million, $24 millionbelow the FY2001 request, but still far less than the combined request. As enacted, Congress approved $14.9 billion for Foreign Operations spending in FY2001. FY2001 Request. The centerpiece of theSenate proposal was the creation of a new $691 million account for Global Health. Family Planning and Abortion Restrictions. The Administration asked Congress to approve items carried over from 1999:
HIPC Trust Fund $210 million contribution as an FY2000 supplemental appropriation;
HIPC bilateral and multilateral debt relief request of $225million for FY2001;
Tropical forestry debt relief initiative of $37million;
HIPC bilateral and multilateral debt relief advanceappropriation (FY2002/2003) of $375 million;
Authorization for the U.S. to participate in the HIPC TrustFund; and
Authorization permitting the U.S. to support the full use of theIMF for gold transaction profits for debt relief. S. 2522 provided $75 million in debt reduction for FY2001, far below the combined FY2000/2001 requests for $472 million. International Family Planning: The "Mexico City" Policy , by [author name scrubbed]. 106-246 ( H.R. h. FY2000 supplemental enacted in P.L. | The annual Foreign Operations appropriations bill is the primary legislative vehicle through which Congress reviews the U.S. foreign aid budget and influences executive branch foreign policymaking generally. It contains the largest share -- over two-thirds -- of total U.S. internationalaffairs spending.
President Clinton asked Congress initially to appropriate $15.1 billion for FY2001 Foreign Operations, plus $1.25 billion in FY2000 supplemental funds. Congress approved some of thesupplemental spending in P.L. 106-246 , but in October 2000 reconsidered and approved as FY2001emergency appropriations portions of the FY2000 supplemental rejected earlier. Consequently, thecombined FY2000 supplemental/FY2001 regular Foreign Operations request, as it stood whenCongress debated the FY2001 Foreign Operations conference report in October, totaled $15.45billion. The largest program increases for FY2001 were those for the Export-Import Bank (+26%),USAID development aid (+18%), nonproliferation, terrorism, and demining (+44%), voluntarycontributions to international organizations (+45%), and multilateral development bank contributions(+24%).
S. 2522 , as approved by the Senate on June 22, provided $13.4 billion for FY2001 Foreign Operations Appropriations. The measure was about $65 million less than FY2000 enactedand about $1.7 billion, or 11%, below the President's initial FY2001 request. A major new initiativein S. 2522 was the creation of a Global Health account ($691 million). Population aidwould have increased by $110 million and a new set of conditions on family planning programswould have effectively eliminated the FY2000 abortion-related restrictions.
H.R. 4811 , as approved by the House on July 13, provided $13.3 billion, about $200 million less than the FY2000 enacted, and 13% less than the President's original request. Thebill maintained the FY2000 funding level and abortion-related restrictions for family planningprograms. At $238 million, the bill provided most of the Administration's FY2001 request for debtrelief, but still fell well short of the combined FY2000/2001 debt reduction request of $472 million.
On October 25, Congress approved the conference report on H.R. 4811 ( H.Rept. 106-997 ), increasing FY2001 Foreign Operations spending to $14.9 billion, well above levels passedearlier by either the House or Senate. The enacted legislation ( P.L. 106-429 ) falls about $550million, or 3.5% below the President's combined FY2000 supplemental/FY2001 requests, but fullyfunds several top Administration priorities, including international debt relief and global healthprograms. For international family planning, Congress increased spending to $425 million, butrestricted the obligation of funds until after February 15, 2001. Prior to the release of these funds,President Bush reimposed the so-called "Mexico City" abortion restrictions that apply to FY2001and future U.S. family planning appropriations |
crs_R43238 | crs_R43238_0 | A profile of each board and commission provides information on its organizational structure, membership as of the end of the 111 th Congress, and appointment activity during that Congress. Three distinct stages mark the appointment process: selection, clearance, and nomination by the President; consideration by the Senate; and appointment by the President. As just noted, however, positions on most boards and commissions are not covered by this act. Characterization of Regulatory and Other Collegial Bodies
The boards and commissions discussed in this report share, among other characteristics, the following: (1) with the exception of one agency—the United States Sentencing Commission—they are executive branch bodies; (2) they are located, with four exceptions, outside executive departments; (3) several members head each entity, and at least one member serves full time; (4) the members are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate; and (5) the members serve fixed terms of office, and, except in a few bodies, the President's power to remove them is restricted. Appointments During the 111th Congress
During the 111 th Congress, President Barack Obama submitted nominations to the Senate for 77 of the 148 full-time positions on 33 regulatory and other boards and commissions. (Most of the remaining positions were not vacant during that time.) A total of 99 nominations were submitted for these positions, of which 76 were confirmed, 4 were withdrawn, and 19 were returned to the President. The number of nominations exceeded the number of positions being filled because the President submitted multiple nominations for some positions. In some cases, for example, the President submitted one nomination for the end of a term in progress and a second nomination of the same person to the same position for the succeeding term. In other cases, the President submitted a second nomination after his first choice failed to be confirmed. The President also submitted an "extra" nomination of the one individual to whom he had given a recess appointment in order to comply with a law affecting the payment of that appointee (see " Recess Appointments ," above). Table 1 summarizes the appointment activity for the 111 th Congress. At the end of the Congress, 24 incumbents were serving past the expiration of their terms. In addition, there were 10 vacancies among the 148 positions. The organizational sections discuss the statutory requirements for the appointed positions, including the number of members on each board or commission, their terms of office, whether or not they may continue in their positions after their terms expire, whether or not political balance is required, and the method for selection of the chair. The chair is also appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. Summary of All Nominations and Appointments to Collegial Boards and Commissions
Appendix B. Board/Commission Abbreviations | The President makes appointments, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to some 148 full-time leadership positions on 33 federal regulatory and other collegial boards and commissions. This appointment process consists of three distinct stages: selection, clearance, and nomination by the President; consideration by the Senate; and appointment by the President. These advice and consent positions can also temporarily be filled by the President alone through a recess appointment. Membership positions on this set of collegial bodies often have fixed terms, and incumbents are often protected from arbitrary removal by the President. The enabling statutes for most of these boards and commissions require political party balance in their membership.
During the 111th Congress, President Barack Obama submitted nominations to the Senate for 77 of these 148 positions. (Most of the remaining positions on these boards and commissions were not vacant during that time.) A total of 99 nominations were submitted, of which 76 were confirmed, 4 were withdrawn, and 19 were returned to the President. The number of nominations exceeded the number of positions being filled because the President submitted multiple nominations for some positions. In some cases, for example, the President submitted one nomination for the end of a term in progress and a second nomination of the same person to the same position for the succeeding term. In other cases, the President submitted a second nomination after his first choice failed to be confirmed. President Obama made seven recess appointments to boards covered by this report during the 111th Congress, and he submitted an "extra" nomination of those individuals in order to comply with a law affecting the payment of recess appointees. At the end of the 111th Congress, 24 incumbents were serving past the expiration of their terms. In addition, there were 10 vacancies among the 148 positions.
This report specifies, for the 111th Congress, all nominations to full-time positions on 33 regulatory and other collegial boards and commissions. Profiles of each board and commission provide information on their organizational structures, membership as of the end of the 111th Congress, and appointment activity during that Congress. The organizational section discusses the statutory requirements for the appointed positions, including the number of members on each board or commission, their terms of office, whether or not they may continue in their positions after their terms expire, whether or not political balance is required, and the method for selection of the chair. Membership and appointment activity are provided in tabular form. The report also includes tables summarizing the collective appointment activity for all 33 bodies.
Information for this report was compiled from data from the Senate nominations database of the Legislative Information System at http://www.congress.gov/nomis/, telephone discussions with agency officials, agency websites, the United States Code, and the 2008 edition of United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions (more commonly known as the "Plum Book").
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL30981 | crs_RL30981_0 | 112-43 ). Since that time, the country has had five successive civilian governments, with the current government of President Ricardo Martinelli of the center-right Democratic Change (CD) party elected in May 2009 to a five-year term. Inaugurated on July 1, 2009, Martinelli is a businessman and former government minister. Panama's Cabinet approved the expansion plan in June, and the National Assembly approved it in July 2006. Martinelli's Alliance for Change also won a majority of seats in the unicameral National Assembly. Challenges for the Martinelli Government
The strength of President Martinelli's CD grew significantly after the 2009 election because of defections from other parties, but the CD's ruling alliance with the PP fell apart at the end of August 2011. Varela retains his position as vice president, but plays the role of an opposition leader. Tensions within the coalition between the CD and the PP had been growing throughout 2011, largely related to which party would head the coalition's ticket for the 2014 presidential election. President Martinelli's once strong approval rating diminished significantly in the aftermath of his break with the Panameñista Party in 2011, but has recovered recently. Nevertheless, at various junctures, President Martinelli has been criticized by civil society groups and political opponents for taking a heavy-handed approach toward governing and for not being more consultative, and this has affected his popularity. The president has backed away from other policy initiatives after strong public opposition. Since then, the economy has rebounded, with a growth rate of 7.6% in 2010, 10.6% in 2011, and a forecast of 9.5% growth in 2012, fueled by both the Canal expansion project and the construction of a metro system in Panama City. 2014 Presidential Election
While Panama's next presidential election is not scheduled until May 2014, the country will be gearing up for the race in early 2013. Martinelli is not eligible to run since Panama's Constitution only allows for a president to return to power after two terms (10 years). U.S.-Panama Relations
Since the 1989 U.S. military intervention that ousted the regime of General Manuel Antonio Noriega from power (see " Background on the 1989 U.S. Military Intervention "), the United States has had close relations with Panama, stemming in large part from the extensive history of linkages developed when the Panama Canal was under U.S. control and Panama hosted major U.S. military installations. The current U.S. relationship with Panama is characterized by extensive cooperation on counternarcotics efforts; support to promote Panama's economic, political, and social development; and a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) that was approved by Congress in October 2011 and entered into force on October 31, 2012. U.S. bilateral assistance (not including Peace Corps) amounted to $3 million in FY2011 and an estimated $2.8 million in FY2012. Second, Panama has been receiving significant amounts of assistance since FY2008 initially under the Mexico-focused Mérida Initiative and, beginning in FY2010, under the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) that assists countries in their efforts to combat drug trafficking and organized crime. A number of U.S. agencies provide support to Panama. After more than four years, the U.S. Congress approved implementing legislation for the FTA on October 12, 2011 ( P.L. After the FTA was approved by both countries, work began on the implementation of the agreement over the next year. According to the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), both countries completed a thorough review of their respective laws and regulations related to the implementation of the agreement. For additional information, see the USTR's website on the U.S.-Panama FTA, available at http://www.ustr.gov/uspanamatpa ; also see CRS Report RL32540, The U.S.-Panama Free Trade Agreement , by [author name scrubbed]. Once the TAA issue was resolved, President Obama submitted implementing legislation for the Panama FTA on October 3, 2011 ( H.R. | With five successive elected civilian governments, the Central American nation of Panama has made notable political and economic progress since the 1989 U.S. military intervention that ousted the regime of General Manuel Antonio Noriega from power. Current President Ricardo Martinelli of the center-right Democratic Change (CD) party was elected in May 2009, defeating the ruling center-left Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) in a landslide. Martinelli was inaugurated to a five-year term on July 1, 2009. Martinelli's Alliance for Change coalition with the Panameñista Party (PP) also captured a majority of seats in Panama's National Assembly. Panama's service-based economy has been booming in recent years—with a growth rate of 7.6% in 2010 and 10.6% in 2011—largely because of the ongoing Panama Canal expansion project, now slated for completion in early 2015.
The CD's coalition with the PP fell apart at the end of August 2011 when President Martinelli sacked PP leader Juan Carlos Varela as foreign minister. Varela, however, retains his position as vice president. Tensions between the CD and the PP had been growing throughout 2011, largely related to which party would head the coalition's ticket for the 2014 presidential election. Despite the breakup of the coalition, the strength of the CD has grown significantly since 2009 because of defections from the PP and the PRD, and it now has a majority on its own in the legislature. President Martinelli's strong approval rating diminished in the aftermath of his break with the PP in 2011, but has recovered recently. President Martinelli has been criticized by civil society groups and political opponents for taking a heavy-handed approach toward governing and for not being more consultative. At times, strong public protests have resulted in President Martinelli backing away from unpopular policy initiatives. While Panama's next presidential election is not scheduled until May 2014, the country will be gearing up for the race in early 2013. Martinelli is not eligible to run since Panama's Constitution only allows for a president to return to power after two terms (10 years).
U.S. Relations
The United States has close relations with Panama, stemming in large part from the extensive linkages developed when the Canal was under U.S. control and Panama hosted major U.S. military installations. The current relationship is characterized by extensive counternarcotics cooperation; support to promote Panama's economic, political, and social development; and a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) that entered into force at the end of October 2012. U.S. bilateral assistance amounted to $3 million in FY2011 and an estimated $2.8 million for FY2012 while the FY2013 request is for $3.7 million. This funding does not include health assistance to combat HIV/AIDS and malaria funded under regional programs or assistance allocated to Panama under the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) that assists countries in their efforts to combat drug trafficking and organized crime. A number of U.S. agencies provide additional support to Panama.
The United States and Panama signed the bilateral FTA in June 2007, and Panama's National Assembly approved the agreement in July 2007. After more than four years, the U.S. Congress considered and approved FTA implementing legislation, H.R. 3079, on October 12, 2011, which President Obama signed into law on October 21, 2011 (P.L. 112-43). U.S. congressional concerns had included Panama's labor rights and tax transparency issues, but the Obama Administration worked with Panama to resolve concerns over these issues. After the FTA was approved by both countries, work began on the implementation of the agreement over the next year. The agreement entered into force on October 31, 2012, after both countries had completed a thorough review of their respective laws and regulations needed for FTA implementation.
For additional information, see: CRS Report RL32540, The U.S.-Panama Free Trade Agreement, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R41731, Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44224 | crs_R44224_0 | Those entitled to Medicare Part A have the option of enrolling in Medicare Part B, which provides coverage for physicians' services, outpatient hospital services, durable medical equipment, outpatient dialysis, and other medical services. The Social Security Act (SSA) includes a provision that holds most Social Security and Railroad Retirement Board beneficiaries harmless for increases in their Medicare Part B premiums that exceed the dollar amount of the increase in their Social Security checks. Affected beneficiaries' Part B premiums are reduced to ensure that their Social Security benefit checks do not decline from one year to the next. In a typical year, this hold - harmless provision affects a small fraction of beneficiaries and has a limited impact on program finances. However, in a year in which Medicare Part B premiums increase but Social Security benefits do not, the effects of the hold-harmless provision are larger and more complex. This report provides an overview of Medicare Part B premiums, the relationship between the Social Security cost-of-living increase (COLA) and Part B premiums, and the potential impact of a projected 0% Social Security COLA in 2016 on Medicare premiums, based on recent projections by the Medicare Trustees. Medicare Part B Premiums
Most people who elect to participate in the Medicare Part B program pay the Part B premium. Part B costs not covered by premiums are paid for through transfers from the General Fund of the Treasury. In 2015, about 5.6% of Medicare beneficiaries pay these higher premiums. Depending on their level of income, beneficiaries may be classified into one of five income categories. Additionally, Part B premiums are deducted from the benefits of those receiving a Federal Civil Service Retirement annuity. The Social Security Administration therefore expects that there will be no COLA in 2016. Specifically, if in a given year the increase in the standard Part B premium would cause a beneficiary's Social Security check to be less, in dollar terms, than it was the year before, then the Part B premium is reduced to ensure that the amount of the individual's Social Security check does not decline. If there were to be a 0% Social Security COLA and an increase in Medicare Part B premiums in a given year, as in 2010 and 2011, the majority of Medicare beneficiaries would be protected by the hold-harmless provision. The beneficiaries who are not held harmless therefore shoulder the entire beneficiary share of the increase in Part B costs. But, as previously noted, the trustees also expect that there will be no Social Security COLA in 2016 and that the hold-harmless provision will apply to most beneficiaries. Because most beneficiaries would be held harmless in this situation and their premiums would remain at the 2015 amount ($104.90 per month), the premiums of the 30% of beneficiaries not held harmless would need to cover all of the expected increased costs so that 25% of Part B costs would still be covered by beneficiary premiums. Impact on Beneficiaries
Most Beneficiaries Would Be Held Harmless
About 70% of all Part B enrollees are expected to be held harmless for the increase in Part B premiums in 2016. As previously noted, persons not eligible to be held harmless include higher-income beneficiaries who pay income-related Part B premiums, lower-income beneficiaries whose premiums are paid by Medicaid, new enrollees to either Medicare Part B or Social Security in 2016, and persons whose premiums are not deducted from Social Security benefits. In 2016, about 6% of Part B enrollees are expected to be subject to income-related premiums and therefore would not be held harmless. As previously described, in the absence of a Social Security COLA, Part B premiums must be increased substantially on those who are not held harmless to prevent potential SMI Trust Fund exhaustion (see " Effect on Those Not Held Harmless ," above). The federal-state Medicaid program pays the entire amount of these beneficiaries' Part B premiums, including any increase. However, given that the SSA also requires that income from beneficiary premiums be set at 25% of expected per capita costs and that income to the SMI Trust Fund from general revenues be based on the aggregate dollar amount of beneficiary premiums, CMS has determined that substantially increasing the premiums on those not held harmless is the only way to make up for the revenue shortfalls caused by the hold-harmless provision. | Medicare Part B covers physician services, outpatient care, durable medical equipment, laboratory services, and some home health services. Most beneficiaries pay a monthly Part B premium that is set at a rate to cover about 25% of the costs of Part B. The General Fund of the U.S. Treasury covers most of the remaining costs.
These monthly Medicare Part B premiums are automatically deducted from the checks of Social Security beneficiaries. Current projections indicate that there will be no Social Security cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) in 2016, which means that monthly Social Security benefit amounts will not be increased. However, total Medicare Part B program costs are expected to grow. Because Part B premiums must cover 25% of projected Part B costs, premiums are also expected to increase.
The Social Security Act (SSA) includes a provision that holds most Social Security beneficiaries harmless from increases in the Medicare Part B premium that exceed the dollar amount of the increase in their Social Security checks. Affected beneficiaries' Part B premiums are reduced to ensure that their Social Security checks do not decline from one year to the next. In a typical year, the hold-harmless provision affects a small fraction of beneficiaries and has a limited impact on program finances. However, in a scenario where Medicare Part B premiums increase but Social Security benefits do not, such as in 2010 and 2011, the effects of the hold-harmless provision are larger and more complex.
If there were to be no Social Security COLA in 2016, Medicare Part B premiums would be affected in two ways. For about 70% of Part B participants, the hold-harmless provision would prevent their Part B premiums from increasing, so their Social Security checks would remain the same. For the other 30% of beneficiaries, the hold-harmless provision would not apply. These individuals would shoulder the entire beneficiary share of the increase in Part B costs.
The hold-harmless provision does not apply to four main groups of beneficiaries (there may be some overlap among groups):
Low-income beneficiaries whose Part B premiums are paid by the Medicaid program (about 19% of beneficiaries); High-income beneficiaries who are subject to income-related Part B premiums (about 6% of beneficiaries); Those whose Medicare premiums are not deducted from Social Security benefits (about 3% of beneficiaries); and New enrollees in 2016 (about 5% of beneficiaries).
Additionally, late-enrollment premium surcharges would be based on the premium amount of those not held harmless. Thus, those held harmless in 2016 who pay a late-enrollment penalty may still see reduced Social Security benefits as a result of the increased surcharges.
The substantial majority of those not held harmless are low-income beneficiaries whose Part B premiums are paid by the federal-state Medicaid program. As a result, most of the cost of the increase in Part B premiums in 2016 would be paid by Medicaid.
The statutory formula for determining the general revenue portion of Part B funding is based on aggregate beneficiary premiums. Therefore, unless Part B premiums are increased substantially on those who are not held harmless, the Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) Trust Fund, which finances Part B, would be at risk of exhaustion during the year.
On October 15, 2015, the Social Security Administration announced that there would be no Social Security COLA in 2016. Subsequent to that announcement, on November 2, 2015, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA 2015; P.L. 114-74) was enacted. Section 601 of that act mitigates the expected sharp increases to Medicare Part B premiums for enrollees not held harmless and the deductibles for all enrollees in 2016. On November 10, 2015, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) issued the Part B premiums for 2016 using the determination methodology prescribed in the BBA 2015. As noted in this report, those enrollees held harmless will continue to pay the 2015 rate of $104.90 per month in 2016. Those not held harmless will pay monthly premiums of $121.80, and higher-income enrollees will pay $170.50, $243.60, $316.70, or $389.80, depending on their level of income. |
crs_98-368 | crs_98-368_0 | 98-368 -- A Tax Limitation Constitutional Amendment: Issues and Options Concerning a Super-Majority Requirement
Updated July 15, 2003
Introduction
In recent years, there have been a number of proposals to place limits on the federal government's authority to raise taxes. The term "tax limitation" is also used to describelegislativeproposals that would limit Congress's ability to consider revenue measures, regardless of their effect on the levelor growthof tax revenues, by requiring a super-majority (typically two-thirds or three-fifths) for their passage. This type oflimitationwould allow increases in taxes only under one of two circumstances. First, tax revenues could increase underexisting taxlaws as a result of economic upturns. Alternatively, they could increase because of a new law, but only if it werepassed bya super-majority. On June 12, 2002, the proposal was considered by the House under the terms of H.Res. 96 failed to achieve the necessary two-thirds, 227-178. H.J.Res. 111 failed to achieve thenecessary two-thirds, 238-186. (8)
Action in the104th Congress. | Proposals to limit the federal government's authority to raise taxes have been made several times in recent years. Most frequently, these proposals call for limits on Congress's ability to passrevenuemeasures. Typically, limitation proposals would allow increases in tax revenues only under one of twocircumstances. First, tax revenues could increase under existing tax laws as a result of economic upturns. Alternatively, they couldincreasebecause of a new law, but only if it were passed by a super-majority (typically two-thirds or three-fifths). Questionsabouthow such proposals might be applied in practice have not been clearly answered. Congress has previouslyconsidered suchproposals in 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001. In each case the proposal has failed to achieve the two-thirdsmajority necessary for passage.
Most recently, the House considered H.J.Res. 96 on June 12, 2002. The measure failed to achieve thenecessary two-thirds, 227-178. This report will be updated to reflect any further legislative actions on suchproposals. |
crs_R41354 | crs_R41354_0 | However, because of concerns over the cost of any renewal of expiring child nutrition and WIC program authorities and of new proposals that went beyond current law (and how to pay for these new initiatives), Congress delayed action on a comprehensive bill and enacted a one-year extension (through September 30, 2010) of expiring authorities as part of the FY2010 appropriations law for the Agriculture Department. The Administration proposed spending $10 billion over the next 10 years in an effort to "end childhood hunger by 2015," but did not advance specific program changes or ways to offset any new costs. After more than a year of debate, Congress responded with the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-296 ; enacted December 13, 2010). 111-296 includes the most extensive changes in child nutrition/WIC programs since the 1970s, it requires much less new spending than the Administration called for and includes a relatively controversial provision reducing Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the food stamp program) benefits as one of its offsetting savings. A section-by-section summary of the law can be found in " Summary of 's Provisions," below. 111-296 , child nutrition and WIC programs were last amended in a substantial way by the Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act of 2004 ( P.L. The most recent legislation
increases funding for school lunches and links this new money to schools meeting updated nutrition standards; provides for gradually increasing prices for school lunches served to paying (non-poor) students; increases access to free school meals by (1) expanding automatic (direct) certification of those receiving public assistance benefits, and (2) giving schools new options to offer free meals to all students; requires updated school meal nutrition standards and professional standards for school meal providers; broadens coverage of and support for local school "wellness policies"; establishes nutrition standards for foods sold in competition with school meals (e.g., a la carte foods and those sold from vending machines); encourages "farm-to-school" and other initiatives to combat childhood obesity; expands support for food service through summer programs and after-school and outside-of-school programs; adds to food safety requirements for foods served on school campuses and foods provided by the Agriculture Department; improves food procurement practices used by schools; increases WIC program support for breastfeeding; establishes a time frame for introducing electronic benefit transfer systems to the WIC program; improves schools' accountability for proper program operations; introduces new rules for nutrition standards and heightened physical activity in child care settings; and supports and finances state and local initiatives to end childhood hunger. The bill reported by the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee (with costs of just under $5 billion over 10 years) included four offsets. One would have substantially reduced payments for the Agriculture Department's Environmental Quality Incentive Program (EQIP) and the other would have, over the long term, effectively cut spending for the nutrition education component of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp program). Largely in response to criticism of the EQIP offset from the agricultural community and others, the child nutrition/WIC reauthorization bill passed by the Senate on August 5, 2010, and the final version of the new child nutrition reauthorization law replaces it with a provision that reduces future SNAP/food stamp benefits by terminating an across-the-board benefit increase legislated in the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. In the end, P.L. 111-296)
On December 13, 2010, S. 3307 , the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 , was enacted as P.L. This followed Senate approval on August 5, 2010, and House passage on December 2, 2010. 5504 , as extensively revised in the committee). Background, Costs, and Cost Offsets
On May 5, 2010, the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee reported the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 ( S. 3307 ; S.Rept. 111-178 ). On August 5, 2010, the Senate approved an amended version of S. 3307 . 111-296's Provisions
In addition to reauthorization of all expiring authorities/programs in the Richard B. Russell National School Lunch Act and the Child Nutrition Act and the four cost-saving measures noted above, P.L. Congress plays an oversight role as USDA implements these policies. 111-296
In large part, the bill approved by the 111 th Congress's House Education and Labor Committee (the Improving Nutrition for America's Children Act; H.R. 5504 ) included a number of provisions that went beyond or substantially differed from those in the Senate's bill. | The most recent WIC and child nutrition reauthorization, P.L. 111-296, "Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010," was signed into law at the end of the 111th Congress on December 13, 2010. Subsequently, Congress plays an oversight role as the U.S. Department of Agriculture promulgates rules, releases guidance, and otherwise implements the legislation. This report features a summary of the legislative history of P.L. 111-296 as well as a section-by-section summary of what was contained within the law. For a brief overview of this periodic reauthorization, see CRS In Focus IF10266, An Introduction to Child Nutrition Reauthorization, by [author name scrubbed].
A comprehensive congressional review ("reauthorization") of the primary laws governing child nutrition and WIC programs (the Richard B. Russell National School Lunch Act and the Child Nutrition Act) had been scheduled for 2009 (the last reauthorization was in 2004). Congress did not meet the September 30, 2009, deadline for comprehensive reauthorization. Instead, a one-year extension (through September 30, 2010) was included in the FY2010 Agriculture Department appropriations measure to give Congress time to consider a full reauthorization bill. The delay in child nutrition/WIC reauthorization was primarily due to a lack of agreement on how to fund any new child nutrition initiatives subject to congressional "pay-go" rules. The Administration had proposed spending $10 billion over the next 10 years on expanding child nutrition efforts to "end childhood hunger by 2015," but did not offer specific policy changes or spending/revenue offsets. In 2010, Congress moved to begin the process of enacting the most sweeping changes in child nutrition and WIC programs since the 1970s.
In May 2010, the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee reported the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (S. 3307; S.Rept. 111-178). It legislated substantial changes in the child nutrition and WIC programs (most importantly, increasing federal financing for school lunches) that were estimated to cost just about $4.5 billion over 10 years. It also included spending reductions in other programs that offset this cost. Most significantly, it (1) reduced payments under the Agriculture Department's Environmental Quality Incentive Program (EQIP) and (2) included a restructuring of, and long-term cut in spending for, the nutrition education component of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp program). On August 5, 2010, the Senate approved an amended version of S. 3307. It differed from the committee-reported version of the bill in that it replaced savings from the EQIP offset with spending reductions achieved by reducing future benefits under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp program) and dropped authority for the Agriculture Department to bar certain foods from the WIC program.
In July 2010, the House Education and Labor Committee approved the Improving Nutrition for America's Children Act (H.R. 5504, as extensively amended in committee). This bill included provisions that were much the same as the Senate initiative, but the anticipated cost (more than $7 billion over 10 years) would have been substantially larger because of provisions expanding child nutrition efforts well beyond those in the Senate's bill and only relatively minimal offsets.
After lengthy internal debates over the cost of any child nutrition/WIC reauthorization initiative and how to pay for it, the House approved the Senate's bill on December 2, 2010, and the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 was enacted on December 13, 2010 (P.L. 111-296). |
crs_RS21685 | crs_RS21685_0 | RS21685 -- Coup in Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and Implications
Updated December 4, 2003
Background
(1)
Former President Eduard Shevardnadze had led Georgia since 1972, except for 1985-1992, during which he primarily served as the pro-Western foreignminister of the Soviet Union. Implications for U.S. The United States quickly recognized Burjanadze as interim president, with Secretary Powell reportedly telephoning her on November 23 to offer U.S. supportand to urge that new elections be free and fair. Some pro-Shevardnadze supporters were highlycritical of what they viewed as U.S.indifference to -- if not active support for -- Shevardnadze's ouster. | This report examines the ouster of Georgia's President Eduard Shevardnadze in thewake of a legislative electionthat many Georgians viewed as not free and fair. Implications for Georgia and U.S. interests are discussed. Thisreport may be updated as events warrant. Seealso CRS Report 97-727, Georgia; and CRS Issue Brief IB95024, Armenia, Azerbaijan, andGeorgia, updated regularly. |
crs_R43685 | crs_R43685_0 | During the Cold War, the Rocky Flats Plant (CO) manufactured as many as 2,000 pits per year (ppy). In one track, Plutonium Facility 4 (PF-4), the main plutonium building at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) (NM), would house a pilot plant to develop pit production processes and manufacture a small number of pits. A Department of Defense (DOD) official stated in 2013 that "there is no daylight between the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense on the need for both a near-term pit manufacturing capacity of 10 to 20 and then 30 by 2021, and then in the longer term for a capacity of 50 to 80 per year." Specifically, regardless of what capacity is needed, and when, Congress and the Administration will need to decide among options. This report presents three key decisions and an approach to help structure them. It shows that it is not known whether available amounts suffice. Space and MAR requirements for manufacturing 80 ppy have never been calculated rigorously, though they could be. Over time, however, various factors will affect availability and requirements. "Material At Risk" (MAR) is "the amount of radioactive materials … available to be acted on by a given physical stress." It is configured for AC. Margin , in this case, is the amount by which (1) space available for pit manufacturing exceeds (2) space required to manufacture 80 ppy, and the amount by which (3) MAR available for pit manufacturing exceeds (4) MAR required to manufacture 80 ppy. AC also has space and MAR requirements but, as discussed in " Options for Analytical Chemistry ," margins are not at issue because the nuclear weapons complex has ample space and MAR for AC for 80 ppy. While MAR and space margins could be calculated precisely for the present moment, they cannot be calculated in advance because many actions, events, decisions, and discoveries have the potential to create uncertainties that could increase or decrease availability of, or requirements for, space and MAR, thus increasing or decreasing margin. If not, what can be done to provide it? Decision 2: Once enough margin for space and margin for MAR are provided for pit manufacturing, what steps can be taken to maintain these margins over decades in the face of uncertainties? Decision 3: For AC, space and MAR available across the nuclear weapons complex exceed space and MAR required by a considerable amount, so margin is not an issue. Producing 80 ppy would require increasing AC capacity. LANL has provided data from which this report calculated how much MAR and space various options would make available. It would be simple to compare data on the required MAR and space, once they become available, against the amount of MAR and space released by each option to see which options provide a positive margin. Questions Requiring Data on MAR and Space
Questions such as the following can only be answered with data on how much MAR and space suffice for pit manufacturing and supporting AC for 80 ppy:
Once certain seismic upgrades are completed, is there expected to be enough MAR margin for PF-4 to accommodate the added MAR needed to manufacture 80 ppy? At issue: How much AC should be done at LANL, what is needed to make the space and MAR at LANL sufficient to support that amount of AC, and how much, if any, AC should be done at other sites? This involves validating weapons codes, among other things. | A "pit" is the plutonium "trigger" of a thermonuclear weapon. During the Cold War, the Rocky Flats Plant (CO) made up to 2,000 pits per year (ppy), but ceased operations in 1989. Since then, the Department of Energy (DOE) has made at most 11 ppy for the stockpile, yet the Department of Defense stated that it needs DOE to have a capacity of 50 to 80 ppy to extend the life of certain weapons and for other purposes. This report focuses on 80 ppy, the upper end of this range.
Various options might reach 80 ppy. Successfully establishing pit manufacturing will require, among other things, enough laboratory space and "Material At Risk" (MAR). MAR is essentially the amount of radioactive material permitted in a building that could be released in an accident; there must be enough MAR available for manufacturing within the MAR "ceiling." PF-4, the main plutonium building at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), or other structures would house manufacturing. Analytical chemistry (AC), which analyzes the composition of samples from each pit to support manufacturing, will also require availability of MAR and space.
For an option to support 80 ppy, MAR and space available for manufacturing and AC must exceed MAR and space required for 80 ppy. "Margin" is the amount by which an available amount exceeds a required amount. This report presents amounts of MAR and space potentially available for manufacturing under several options, though they may require updating. Calculation of margin—needed to determine if an option passes a minimum test for feasibility—also requires data on MAR and space required for 80 ppy, yet these data have never been calculated rigorously. As a result, it is not known if an option would increase capacity too little (making an option infeasible), too much (making an option too costly), or by an appropriate amount. Congress could direct the National Nuclear Security Administration, which operates the nuclear weapons program, to provide data on space and MAR required to manufacture 80 ppy. These data would permit calculation of space margin and MAR margin as static numbers. However, the situation is dynamic: uncertainties may materialize over time, increasing or decreasing margin.
AC poses different issues. It is needed to support production. It requires much space but uses little MAR. The nuclear weapons complex has ample excess space and MAR available for AC, so margin is not at issue, though such factors as logistics might become an issue.
Thus, three key decisions face Congress in deciding how to produce 80 ppy:
Decision 1: For pit manufacturing, is there currently enough margin for space and MAR in PF-4? If not, what can be done to provide it? Decision 2: Once enough margin for space and margin for MAR are provided for pit manufacturing, what steps can be taken to maintain these margins over decades in the face of uncertainties? Decision 3: How much AC should be done at LANL, what is needed to make the space and MAR at LANL sufficient to support that amount of AC, and how much, if any, AC should be done at other sites?
Choosing among options also requires data on how options compare on cost and other metrics, setting up a process for downselection.
This report is best viewed in color, as it contains many multicolored graphics. |
crs_R45205 | crs_R45205_0 | Introduction
As of FY2018, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) administers benefits under six GI Bills: the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance program (Post-9/11 GI Bill), Survivors' and Dependents' Educational Assistance Program (DEA), Montgomery GI Bill—Selected Reserve (MGIB-SR), Montgomery GI Bill—Active Duty (MGIB-AD), Reserve Educational Assistance Program (REAP), and Post-Vietnam Era Veterans Educational Assistance Program (VEAP). The Harry W. Colmery Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2017 (Colmery Act; P.L. Post-9/11 GI Bill Amendments
The Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008 ("Post-9/11 GI Bill")—originally established by Title V of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 ( P.L. 110-252 ) and enacted on June 30, 2008—is the newest and most widely used GI Bill. Post-9/11 GI Bill Eligible Individuals
Prior to the enactment of the Colmery Act, to be eligible for the Post-9/11 GI Bill, servicemembers and veterans were required to fulfill a minimum aggregate period under qualifying active duty service orders on or after September 11, 2001, and meet other requirements. Under the new provisions, an individual with at least 6 months, but less than 12 months, of qualifying active duty service increases from 50% of the full benefit level to 60%. However, if an individual was on active duty on the first day of a month, the individual was not eligible for a housing allowance for any portion of that month. Under the STEM Scholarship, the VA is authorized to grant up to an additional nine months of entitlement to selected Post-9/11 GI Bill participants. Section 112 of the Colmery Act eliminates the delimiting dates for some individuals—making the Post-9/11 GI Bill the "forever GI Bill" for some. This provision went into effect upon the bill's enactment. There is no delimiting date
for a qualifying individual whose last discharge or release from active duty was on or after January 1, 2013; for a spouse using benefits transferred from a qualifying individual who was last discharged or released from active duty service on or after January 1, 2013; and for a Fry Scholarship recipient who first became eligible on or after January 1, 2013. The provision was intended to become effective on December 16, 2017. Reduction in DEA Entitlement
Section 202 of the Colmery Act reduces the DEA entitlement from 45 months to 36 months for individuals who first enroll in a program of education for which they receive DEA benefits on or after August 1, 2018. Restoration of Entitlement for Closed Schools and Disapproved Programs of Education
Since 2015, the closure of multiple large, private for-profit institutions of higher education, such as those owned by Corinthian Colleges, Inc. (e.g., Heald College) and ITT Educational Services (e.g., ITT Technical Institutes) has disrupted the postsecondary education and career plans of many students. 115-62 , restores entitlement for individuals affected by school closures and disapproved programs of education. The SAA role is intended to ensure that veterans and other GI Bill participants have access to a range of high-quality education and training programs at which to use their GI Bill benefits. Prior to the enactment of the Colmery Act, the reporting fee for the year beginning on August 1, 2018, would have been $7 for each GI Bill and VR&E participant enrolled in a program of education or pursuing training and $12 for each GI Bill participant for whom the institution received an advanced GI Bill payment. The pilot program is intended to provide GI Bill-eligible veterans the opportunity to enroll in high technology programs of education that the Secretary determines provide training or skills sought by employers in a relevant field or industry. The VA reimburses the qualified provider for the cost of tuition and other fees for the high technology program. In addition, the reports are to include other information and several measures. Reconsideration of Previously Denied Claims
Section 502(a) of the Colmery Act requires the VA to reconsider claims for disability compensation based on exposure to mustard gas or Lewisite during World War II that had been denied before the date of the enactment of the Colmery Act. | Since the enactment of the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008 (Post-9/11 GI Bill; P.L. 110-252), Congress has enacted several bills aimed to improve it. Congress's most recent effort to refine the Post-9/11 GI Bill and respond to stakeholder feedback is the Harry W. Colmery Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2017 (Colmery Act; P.L. 115-48), enacted on August 16, 2017. The Colmery Act enacted over 30 amendments to the Post-9/11 GI Bill and other programs administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Most provisions become effective on enactment or on August 1, 2018.
The Colmery Act is better known as the "Forever GI Bill". One of the prominent provisions of the bill eliminated the Post-9/11 GI Bill delimiting dates (period within which benefits must be used) for some individuals—making the Post-9/11 GI Bill the Forever GI Bill for some. As of enactment, there is no delimiting date for veterans whose last discharge or release from active duty was on or after January 1, 2013; for a spouse using benefits transferred from a veteran who was last discharged or released from active duty service on or after January 1, 2013; or for a Marine Gunnery Sergeant John David Fry Scholarship (Fry Scholarship) recipient who first became eligible on or after January 1, 2013. Other Post-9/11 GI Bill-eligible individuals must use their 36-month entitlement within 15 years of discharge or release, or by a specified age.
Another key provision that went into effect upon enactment allows the restoration of GI Bill entitlement for individuals affected by school closures and disapproved programs of education since 2015. This provision was in response to the closure of multiple large, proprietary institutions of higher education, such as those owned by Corinthian Colleges, Inc. (e.g., Heald College) and ITT Educational Services (e.g., ITT Technical Institutes) that disrupted the postsecondary education and career plans of many students.
Other Post-9/11 GI Bill amendments increase benefit levels for several groups of individuals including, but not limited to, Purple Heart recipients, individuals with at least 6 months of qualifying service but less than 12 months, Fry Scholarship recipients, and reservists on active duty on the first day of a month. Select Post-9/11 GI Bill participants pursuing science, technology, engineering, and math programs that are of longer than average duration may receive an additional nine months of entitlement through the Edith Nourse Rogers STEM Scholarship (STEM Scholarship). Benefit levels for the Survivors' and Dependents' Educational Assistance Program (DEA) also increase, but the months of entitlement are reduced from 45 months to 36 months for individuals who first enroll on or after August 1, 2018.
The Colmery Act enacted several provisions intended to improve administration of all of the GI Bills. The VA is now required to use a risk-based approach in conducting oversight of approved programs of education in an effort to ensure they are of a high-quality and meet all statutory provisions. Additionally, school certifying officials will now be required to complete training on their GI Bill administrative responsibilities and are to have access to information to help them advise GI Bill participants.
In addition to GI Bill amendments, the Colmery Act authorizes a five-year High Technology Pilot Program. The program is intended to provide GI Bill-eligible veterans the opportunity to enroll in high technology programs of education that are not GI Bill approved, such as coding boot camps. Under the pilot, the VA reimburses education providers with successful outcomes for the cost of tuition and other fees and provides a monthly housing allowance to GI Bill-eligible veterans.
Finally, the bill requires the VA to reconsider claims for disability compensation based on exposure to mustard gas or lewisite during World War II that had been denied before the date of enactment of the Colmery Act. |
crs_RL30918 | crs_RL30918_0 | Although economic conditions have improved over the last five years, there is still extensive poverty inPeru. (1)
Peru has a free market economy. Political Conditions: State of Democracy in Peru
Basic elements of a democracy include effective and independent legislative and judicial branches ofgovernment, freedomof expression, respect for human rights, and free elections. That controversy,combinedwith the revelation of high-level corruption in his administration led Fujimori first to agree to new presidentialelections inwhich he would not run, and then to flee to Japan and resign in November 2000. Under the constitution's rules of succession, the president of the Congress, Valentin Paniagua, became Peru's newpresident. The immediate challenge facing the interim government was to organize the extraordinary elections, heldonApril 8, 2001, with a presidential run-off held on June 3. The Toledo administration faces the more long-termchallenge ofmaintaining stability in Peru while trying to strengthen democratic institutions weakened by 10 years of ademocraticallyelected, but autocratically run, government. Erosion of Democratic Institutions under Fujimori. He did much to bring undercontroldestabilizing factors such as terrorism, drug trafficking, hyperinflation, and border disputes. But Fujimori also ledthecountry into several constitutional crises. Elections of 2000. The Paniagua government committeditself to holding presidential and parliamentary elections as scheduled, on April 8, 2001. Stabilizing the Economy. Voting is mandatory in Peru. U. S. Relations with Peru
The United States and Peru enjoyed generally friendly relations over the past decade, although the recurringpolitical crisesof the Fujimori government strained those relations. (7)
The primary U.S. interest in Peru over the past decade has been the reduction of illicit narcotics production and trafficking. The United States pressed the Fujimori government forimprovement in respect for human rights; for much of Fujimori's term his regime had one of the worst human rightsrecordin the hemisphere, according to State Department and other human rights reports. U.S. The United States has been concerned about security in Peruand in the Andean region as a whole. His enhancement of national security came at the cost of high levelsof humanrights violations, however, and his administration had one of the worst human rights records in the hemisphere. (14)
Congressional Concerns Regarding Peru
Congress has expressed concern about the development of democratic institutions in Peru, and has conditionedaid on therespect for those institutions, respect for human rights, and the holding of free and fair elections. Congress has alsoexpressed concern about counter-narcotics assistance, including whether to resume an air drug-interdiction programsuspended after the accidental shootdown of an American missionary plane, and the relationship between U.S.agencies andPeru's former intelligence chief, Vladimiro Montesinos. Members have also expressed concern regarding the case of Lori Berenson, an American prisoner in Peru. | Peru survived constitutional and political crises in 1999 and 2000 and now faces the challenges of further strengtheningdemocratic institutions and stimulating the economy. President Alejandro Toledo assumed office on July 28, 2001. Hewon extraordinary elections that had to be organized following the sudden resignation in November 2000 ofPresidentAlberto Fujimori in the wake of electoral, human rights, and corruption scandals.
President Fujimori headed Peru from 1990 to 2000. During that time he did much to bring under control destabilizingfactors such as terrorism, drug trafficking, hyperinflation, and border disputes. But Fujimori also led the countryintoconstitutional crises, and his efforts to remain in power eroded democratic institutions. Allegations of electoralfraud andan eruption of scandals involving his top aide led to his sudden resignation, after which constitutional successionpassed thepresidency to the President of the Congress, Valentin Paniagua, in November 2000.
The immediate challenge facing the interim government was to organize new presidential and parliamentary elections. First and second round elections on April 8 and June 3 were widely praised as being free and fair, and AlejandroToledowas elected President. The Toledo administration faces the more long-term challenge of maintaining stability whiletryingto strengthen democratic institutions weakened by 10 years of a democratically elected, but autocratically run,government.
Peru is located along the Andean mountains of South America. Although economic conditions have improved over the lastfive years, there is still extensive poverty in Peru. Peru has a free market economy.
The United States and Peru have enjoyed generally friendly relations over the past decade, although the recurring politicalcrises of the Fujimori government strained those relations. The primary U.S. interest in Peru has been the reductionofillicit narcotics production and trafficking. Other stated goals of U.S. assistance are: broader citizen participationand moreresponsive government; increased incomes for Peru's poor; improved health of high risk populations; and improvedenvironmental conditions. The United States pressed the Fujimori government to improve respect for human rights;formuch of his term Fujimori's regime had one of the worst human rights record in the hemisphere. Both the interimand theToledo governments have taken steps to improve respect for human rights. The United States has been concernedaboutsecurity in Peru and in the Andean region as a whole.
The U.S. Congress has expressed concern about the development of democratic institutions in Peru, and has conditionedaid on the respect for those institutions, and for human rights, and the holding of free and fair elections. Congresshas alsoexpressed concern about the case of Lori Berenson, an American prisoner in Peru; the relationship between U.S.agenciesand Peru's spy chief, Vladimiro Montesinos; and whether to resume a joint aerial drug-interdiction program that wassuspended after the accidental shooting of an American missionary plane. |
crs_RL32060 | crs_RL32060_0 | In addition, countries increasingly have been seeking bilateral or regional trade agreements. Known as the "20-20-20 proposal," the offer (1) called on the United States to accept a ceiling on domestic farm subsidies under $20 billion, (2) proposed the negotiations use the Group of 20 proposal of 54% as the minimum average cut to developed country agricultural tariffs, and (3) set a tariff ceiling of 20% for developing country industrial tariffs. Yet, a G-4 summit in Potsdam, Germany, collapsed in acrimony on June 21, 2007, over competing demands for higher cuts in developed country agricultural subsidies made by developing countries and developed country demands for greater cuts in industrial tariffs in developing countries. In response to the global financial crisis, a summit of G-20 heads of state of leading economic powers meeting on November 14-15, 2008, in Washington, DC, agreed to work to reach an agreement by year's end on modalities leading to an "ambitious outcome" to the Doha Round and to refrain from raising new barriers to trade and investment. Some states called for negotiations based on the December 2008 draft texts, however, the United States has maintained that these texts were not agreed to by the United States and do not reflect consensus on the way forward. The U.S. Selected topics under negotiation are discussed below in five groups: market access, development issues, WTO rules, trade facilitation, and other issues. Agriculture has become the linchpin in the Doha Development Agenda. U.S. goals in the new round were elimination of agricultural export subsidies, easing of tariffs and quotas, and reductions in trade-distorting domestic support. It stated that the members committed to "comprehensive negotiations aimed at substantial improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade distorting support." In March 2010, the chair of the negotiating committee summarized the state of the negotiations,
it is clear that there has been little or no significant progress in the market access negotiations since July 2008. To date, advanced developing countries such as Brazil, China, and India have not taken part in the negotiations. This scenario would allow developing countries to choose one of the following flexibilities based on the coefficient x or y they chose for the tariff reduction formula: (1) apply less than formula cuts for up to [14% for x][10% for y]of tariff lines provided that the cuts applied are no less than half the formula cuts, and that the tariff lines do not exceed [16% for x][10% for y] of the value of a member's non-agricultural imports, or (2) keep tariff lines unbound or not applying formula cuts for [6.5% for x] [5% for y ]of tariff lines provided they do not exceed [7.5% for x][5% for y]of the value of a member's non-agricultural imports. The United States has insisted that major developing countries participate in the sectorals, while developing countries have countered that the original negotiating mandate makes such negotiations voluntary. As noted above, the industrial market access talks also encompass negotiations on the reduction of non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Informal talks began in May 2012 to expand and update the agreement. Development Issues
Three development issues are most noteworthy. One pertains to compulsory licensing of medicines and patent protection. A second deals with a review of provisions giving special and differential treatment to developing countries. A third addresses problems that developing countries were having in implementing current trade obligations. The negotiations have been split along a developing-country/developed-country divide. Trade facilitation aims to improve the efficiency of international trade by harmonizing and streamlining customs procedures such as duplicative documentation requirements, customs processing delays, and nontransparent or unequally enforced importation rules and requirements. WTO Rules
Rules Negotiations
The Doha Round negotiations included an objective of "clarifying and improving disciplines" under the WTO Agreements on Antidumping (AD) and on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM). The second phase would be the creation of a plurilateral Environmental Goods and Services Agreement (EGSA) that would liberalize 153 additional environmental-related goods and services among developed and advanced developing countries. | The WTO Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, begun in November 2001, has entered its 12th year. The negotiations have been characterized by persistent differences among the United States, the European Union, and developing countries on major issues, such as agriculture, industrial tariffs and non-tariff barriers, services, and trade remedies. Partly as a result of being labeled a development round to entice developing countries to participate in the first place, developing countries (including emerging economic powerhouses such as China, Brazil, and India) have sought the reduction of agriculture tariffs and subsidies among developed countries, non-reciprocal market access for manufacturing sectors, and protection for their services industries. The United States, the European Union, and other developed countries have sought increased access to developing countries' industrial and services sectors while attempting to retain some measure of protection for their agricultural sectors. Given the differences, there is frustration over the ability of WTO member states to reach a comprehensive agreement.
In response to the global economic crisis, the G-20 leading economies have repeatedly called for conclusion of the Doha Round as a way to bolster economic confidence and recovery. However, these hortatory statements have not led to renewed progress on the core negotiations. The subjects of the current negotiations are draft texts developed and refined by the chairs of the agriculture, industrial, and rules negotiating groups. These texts have been the subject of much disagreement since their initial release in 2007, not least of which by the United States, which views them as not reflecting the state of play in the negotiations.
Yet, work has started on expanding the reach of the current WTO agreements outside the scope of the Doha Round. A group of 47 developed and advanced developing countries began negotiating a plurilateral services agreement in January 2012 that would expand disciplines in services beyond the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS). Negotiations to expand the scope of the current plurilateral Information Technology Agreement (ITA) have also been proposed.
Agriculture has become the linchpin of the Doha Development Agenda. U.S. goals are reductions in trade-distorting domestic support; elimination of export subsidies, and improved market access in both developed and developing countries. The United States has also sought improved market access for its industrial goods, especially in developing countries. Developed countries generally are seeking improved market access for their services industries in developing countries. In addition, Members of Congress likely will carefully scrutinize any agreement that may require changes to U.S. trade remedy laws.
Several issues are among the most important to developing countries, in addition to concessions on agriculture. One issue, now resolved, pertained to compulsory licensing of medicines and patent protection. Trade facilitation, which aims to improve the efficiency of international trade by harmonizing and streamlining customs procedures, has received strong support from developed and developing countries. A third issue deals with a review of provisions giving special and differential treatment to developing countries along with problems that developing countries are having in implementing current trade obligations. |
crs_R42963 | crs_R42963_0 | Under the Constitution, high-level leadership positions in the executive branch are filled through appointment by the President "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate." These posts include most of the approximately two dozen that form the President's Cabinet. In recent decades, it also has become customary for each two-term President to reshuffle his Cabinet during the inter-term transition—the transition that takes place at the end of a President's first term in office and beginning of his second term. The Cabinet
The President's Cabinet is an institution established by custom, rather than by law. Overview of the Appointments Process
The appointments process for advice and consent positions, and therefore for most members of the President's Cabinet, is generally considered to have three stages: selection and nomination by the President, consideration in the Senate, and appointment by the President. Selection and Nomination
In the first stage, the White House selects and clears a prospective Cabinet appointee before sending a formal nomination to the Senate. The Senate historically has confirmed most, but not all, Cabinet nominations. Appointment
Following Senate confirmation, the confirmed nominee is given a commission bearing the Great Seal of the United States and signed by the President. Cabinet Nominations During Inter-Term Transitions Since 1984
The remainder of this report examines all Cabinet nominations made during inter-term transition periods of recent Presidents. Data in this Report
The Appendix of this report lists nominations to Cabinet positions during inter-term transitions for the four most recent Presidents who served two terms in office (Ronald W. Reagan, William J. Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack H. Obama). The data included in the Appendix are nominations to Cabinet positions submitted during the inter-term transition period, which is defined as the period between November 1 of a President's re-election year and December 31 of the first year of his second term. As discussed above, several methods might be used to measure the duration of the appointments process. As shown in the first set of numerical columns in Table 2 , measuring from the date of announcement to the date of confirmation, the mean (average) number of days to confirm was 61.6, while the median was 53.0. The median number of days from receipt to final action was 32.5. Using a measure of the Senate's receipt of the nomination to confirmation, the inter-term Cabinet nomination that took the longest to be confirmed was President Obama's nomination of Regina McCarthy to be Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency in 2013. The Cabinet nomination made during an inter-term transition that proceeded most quickly from receipt to confirmation was also made by President Obama in 2013—the nomination of former Senator John F. Kerry to be Secretary of State. Stages of Senate Consideration
Another way to measure the duration of Senate consideration of nominations is to calculate the length of particular stages within the confirmation process—for example, the number of days elapsed from receipt of the nomination in the Senate (at which point it is immediately referred to committee) to the date on which a nominee's first hearing is held. | Under the Constitution, high-level leadership positions in the executive branch are filled through appointment by the President "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate." These posts include most of the approximately two dozen that form the President's Cabinet, which is an institution established by custom, rather than by law. In recent decades, it has become customary for each two-term President to reshuffle his Cabinet during the inter-term transition—the transition that takes place at the end of a President's first term in office and beginning of his second term. Typically about half the Cabinet members change during this transition period.
The appointments process for Cabinet and other advice and consent positions is generally considered to have three stages. In the first stage, the White House selects and clears a prospective appointee before sending a formal nomination to the Senate. In the second stage, the Senate initially relies on its committees to investigate each nominee and conduct hearings before taking up and deciding whether to approve the nomination. The Senate historically has confirmed most, but not all, Cabinet nominations. In the final stage of the appointments process, the confirmed nominee is given a commission bearing the Great Seal of the United States and signed by the President.
Since 1984, four two-term Presidents—Ronald W. Reagan, William J. Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack H. Obama—made 48 nominations to Cabinet positions during inter-term transitions. For the purposes of this report, CRS considered an inter-term nomination to be one made between November 1 of each President's reelection year and December 31 of the first year of his second term. In total, the Senate confirmed 46 of these 48 nominations; two nominations submitted by President Clinton were withdrawn during Senate consideration.
The duration of the appointments process, including the pace of Senate consideration, of these Cabinet nominations during inter-term transitions varied considerably. The mean (average) number of days elapsed from Senate receipt of Cabinet nominations during inter-term transitions to final action was 34.8. The median number of days from receipt to final action was 32.5. The Appendix of this report lists the data used to calculate these statistics.
As measured from the date of receipt in the Senate until the date of confirmation, the inter-term Cabinet nomination under Senate consideration for the shortest period was President Obama's nomination of former Senator John F. Kerry to be Secretary of State in 2013, which was confirmed after seven days. The nomination under Senate consideration for the longest period was President Obama's nomination in 2013 of Regina McCarthy to be Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, which was confirmed after 133 days.
Another method of measuring the duration of the appointments process during inter-term transitions is to measure the number of days elapsed using, as a starting point, the date of the President's announcement of his intention to nominate the individual, rather than receipt of the nomination in the Senate. The mean (average) number of days elapsed using this methodology was 61.6, and the median was 53.0.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R40142 | crs_R40142_0 | Background
Most Americans with private group health insurance are covered through an employer, or through the employer of a family member. A recent study by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation found that in 2012, 59.5% of insured Americans had their insurance through an employer. When workers lose their jobs, they can also lose their health insurance. If that health insurance is family coverage, then a worker's family members can also become uninsured. Title X of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA; P.L. 99-272 . General Requirements
Under COBRA, employers who provide health insurance benefits must offer the option of continued health insurance coverage at group rates to qualified employees and their families who are faced with loss of coverage due to certain events. Qualified Beneficiaries
In general, a qualified beneficiary is
an employee covered under the group health plan who loses coverage due to termination of employment or a reduction in hours; a retiree who loses retiree health insurance benefits due to the former employer's bankruptcy under Chapter 11; a spouse or dependent child of the covered employee who, on the day before the "qualifying event" (see below), was covered under the employer's group health plan; or any child born to or placed for adoption with a covered employee during the period of COBRA coverage. Although coverage must begin on the date of the qualifying event, it can end on the earliest of the following:
the first day for which timely payment of the premium is not made (payment is timely if it is made within 30 days of the payment due date and payment cannot be required before 45 days after the date of election (see below)); the date on which the employer ceases to maintain any group health plan; the first day after the qualified beneficiary becomes actually covered (and not just eligible to be covered) under another employer's group health plan, unless the new plan excludes coverage for a preexisting condition; or the date the qualified beneficiary is entitled to Medicare benefits, if this condition is specified in the group health plan. In this case, the individual's covered family members can continue their COBRA coverage for up to 36 months from the date of the original qualifying event. Issues
Cost Issues
COBRA was enacted to provide access to group health insurance for people who lose their employer-sponsored coverage, and thus to help reduce the number of uninsured. The average annual premium for employer-sponsored health insurance in 2012 was $5,615 for single coverage and $15,745 for family coverage. Under COBRA, former employees may be required to pay up to 102% of the premium. Employers also express concerns about costs. COBRA and the Affordable Care Act
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) did not eliminate COBRA, and it made no direct changes to COBRA benefits. However, effective in 2014, ACA enacts health insurance reforms, establishment of newly established health insurance exchanges, and premium credits for certain individuals. How the ACA provisions will impact demand for COBRA coverage may vary by individual. For retirees who are under the age of 65, and the near-elderly, those aged 55 to 65, separated from employment, COBRA coverage can be an important source of health insurance: the 18 months of COBRA benefits provide a bridge to Medicare for those who are close to the age of 65. | Health insurance helps to protect individuals and families against financial loss. Having health insurance also promotes access to regular health care. Most Americans with private health insurance are covered through an employer, or through the employer of a family member. A recent study by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation found that in 2012, 59.5% of insured Americans had their insurance through an employer.
When an employee is terminated, his or her employer-sponsored health insurance usually ends within 30 to 60 days. If that health insurance is family coverage, then a worker's family members can also become uninsured. Even if the worker finds another job with health benefits, a family can experience long periods of uninsurance, as they wait to qualify for the new benefit. This same problem is also faced by families that experience a reduction in hours in the workplace, the death of a worker, or a divorce.
In 1985, Congress passed legislation to provide the unemployed temporary access to their former employer's health insurance. Under Title X of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA; P.L. 99-272), an employer with 20 or more employees who provided health insurance benefits must provide qualified employees and their families the option of continuing their coverage under the employer's group health insurance plan in the case of certain events. The former employee is responsible for paying the entire premium. Employers who fail to provide the continued health insurance option are subject to penalties.
COBRA coverage usually lasts for 18 months, but it can be extended up to a total of 36 months, depending on the nature of the triggering event. Those who take up their COBRA benefits are required to pay up to 100% of the premium, which averaged $15,745 for a family in 2012, plus an additional 2% for the administrative costs incurred.
COBRA can be an important source of health insurance for the recently unemployed, but it also benefits the disabled, the retired, the divorced, and their families. For example, spouses and dependent children can also qualify for COBRA benefits in the event of divorce or the death of the family member with employer-sponsored health coverage. Since 2009, about 3 million individuals and families have used COBRA benefits each year.
Critics argue that COBRA addresses the health insurance problems of only a small number of Americans, and that the high cost of premiums makes COBRA coverage unaffordable to many who need it. Others maintain that COBRA has resulted in extra costs for employers, as well as the added administrative burden of providing benefits to people no longer working for them.
Implementation of Affordable Care Act provisions, such as the health insurance exchanges, insurance reforms, and premium subsidies for lower-income individuals in 2014, may make COBRA benefits less valuable for certain individuals and families.
This report provides background on COBRA, a brief explanation of the program, its origins, issues, and how the Affordable Care Act might impact COBRA. |
crs_RL32178 | crs_RL32178_0 | Introduction
Conferees on the House and Senate energy bills ( H.R. 6 ) met on November 17,2003 and approved a conference report ( H.Rept. On November 18, 2003, the Houseapproved the Conference report to H.R. 6 by a vote of 246-180. On November 21,2003, a cloture motion to limit debate on H.R. 6 failed in the Senate by a vote of 57-40. This reportsummarizes the electricity title of H.R. 6 , Title XII. This section would require the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to promulgate ruleswithin 180 days of enactment to create a FERC-certified electric reliability organization (ERO). TheERO would develop and enforce reliability standards for the bulk-power system. All ERO standardswould be approved by FERC. Under this title, the ERO could impose penalties on a user, owner,or operator of the bulk-power system that violates any FERC-approved reliability standard. Based on the findings, the Secretary of Energy coulddesignate a geographic area as being congested. New FPA section 216(e) would allow permit holders to petition in U.S. District Court toacquire rights-of-way through the exercise of the right of eminent domain. Federal Utility Participation inRegional Transmission Organizations. FERC'sproposed rulemaking on standard market design would be remanded to FERC for reconsideration. The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA) wouldbe repealed. The Public Utility Holding Company Act and the Federal Power Act (FPA) of 1935 (TitleI and Title II of the Public Utility Act) established a regime of regulating electric utilities that gavespecific and separate powers to the states and the federal government. The Securitiesand Exchange Commission would be required to transfer all applicable books and records to FERC. Within 180 days after enactment, FERC would be required to issue rules to establish an electronicsystem that provides information about the availability and price of wholesale electric energy andtransmission services. Criminal and civil penalties under the FederalPower Act would be increased. Section206(b) of the Federal Power Act would be amended to allow the effective date for refunds to beginat the time of the filing of a complaint with FERC but not later than five months after such a filing. Within 180 days of enactment, the Secretary of Energy would be required totransmit to Congress a study on whether FERC's merger review authority is duplicative with otheragencies' authority and that would include recommendations for eliminating any unnecessaryduplication. TheFederal Power Act would be amended to give FERC review authority for transfer of assets valuedin excess of $10 million. | Conferees on the House and Senate energy bills ( H.R. 6 ) met on November 17,2003 and approved a conference report. On November 18, 2003, the House approved the Conferencereport to H.R. 6 by a vote of 246-180. On November 21, 2003, a cloture motion to limitdebate on H.R. 6 in the Senate failed by a vote of 57-40.
This report describes Title XII of the conference report on H.R. 6 which dealswith electric power issues. In part, this Title would create an electric reliability organization (ERO)that would enforce mandatory reliability standards for the bulk-power system. All ERO standardswould be approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). Under this Title, theERO could impose penalties on a user, owner, or operator of the bulk-power system that violates anyFERC-approved reliability standard. This Title also addresses transmission infrastructure issues. The Secretary of Energy would be able to certify congestion on the transmission lines and issuepermits to transmission owners. Permit holders would be able to petition in U.S. District Court toacquire rights-of-way for the construction of transmission lines through the exercise of the right ofeminent domain.
The Standard Market Design notice of proposed rulemaking would be remanded to theFederal Energy Regulatory Commission. The Conference report would clarify native load serviceobligation. Federal utilities would be allowed to participate in regional transmission organizations.
The electricity Title would repeal the mandatory purchase requirements under the PublicUtility Regulatory Policy Act. The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA) wouldbe repealed. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and state regulatory bodies would be givenaccess to utility books and records.
FERC would be required to issue rules to establish an electronic system that providesinformation about the availability and price of wholesale electric energy and transmission services. For electric rates that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission finds to be unjust, unreasonable,or unduly discriminatory, the effective date for refunds would begin at the time of the filing of acomplaint with FERC but not later than five months after filing of a complaint. Criminal and civilpenalties would be increased.
The Secretary of Energy would be required to transmit to Congress a study on whetherFERC's merger review authority is duplicative with other agencies' authority. The Federal Power Actwould be amended to give FERC review authority for transfer of assets valued in excess of $10million.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL31401 | crs_RL31401_0 | Introduction and Background
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. , provides broad nondiscrimination protection for individuals with disabilities in employment, public services, public accommodations and services operated by private entities, transportation, and telecommunications. Enacted in 1990 and amended in 2008 by P.L. 110-325 , the ADA is a civil rights statute that has as its purpose "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." The ADA has been the subject of numerous lower court decisions and the Supreme Court has decided 20 ADA cases. | The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) provides broad nondiscrimination protection for individuals with disabilities in employment, public services, public accommodations and services operated by private entities, transportation, and telecommunications. Enacted in 1990, and amended in 2008 by P.L. 110-325, the ADA is a civil rights statute that has as its purpose "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." It has been the subject of numerous lower court decisions, and the Supreme Court has decided 20 ADA cases, most recently in 2006 United States v. Georgia. This report examines the Supreme Court decisions on the ADA. It will be updated as necessary. |
crs_98-738 | crs_98-738_0 | As a party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the United States committed to the objective of achieving "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system"; and to preparing "national action plans" to address emissions of greenhouse gases. Specifically, under the terms of the Kyoto Protocol, the United States would have committed to reducing its average annual net carbon-equivalent emissions of six gases—carbon dioxide (CO 2 ), nitrous oxide, methane, perfluorocarbons, hydrofluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride—by 7% below 1990 levels (1995 for the fluorinated gases) over the five-year period 2008-2012. If it had been ratified by the Senate, the Kyoto Agreement would have moved the debate beyond the mix of "study," "no regrets," and "voluntary actions" policies of the George H. W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush Administrations. Because of the uncertainties associated with global climate change—the extent to which global climate change is occurring, what the effects might be and their magnitude, the economic and social consequences that would follow from actions to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, the relationships between emissions and economic activity, the costs of actions or of taking no action, the time frame of impacts, etc.—each individual's perception of what, if anything, to do is strongly influenced by personal and community values; perceptions of human progress and adaptability; experience, education and training; and outlook in how to cope with risks and uncertainty. These perspectives, which can intertwine and overlap, are:
that environmental problems are the result of inappropriate or misused technologies, and that the solutions to the problems lie in improving or correcting technology; that environmental problems are the result of market failures, and that the solutions to the problems lie in ensuring that market decisions take into account all costs, including environmental damages; and that environmental problems result from a combination of ignorance of, indifference to, and even disregard for, the ecosystem on which human life ultimately depends, as well as for the other living creatures that share the planet; and that the solutions to environmental problems lie in developing an understanding of and a respect for that ecosystem and in providing mechanisms for people to express the priority they place on the environment in their daily choices. For shorthand, they might be termed the technological lens , the economic lens , and the ecological lens , respectively. The purpose here is not to suggest that one lens is superior to another, but rather to articulate the differing perspectives in order to facilitate communication among different parties and interests. The government's role in this scenario is to ensure the correct market signals. Consumers' desires are seen as responsive to price. The issue then is for the price to reflect the costs of relevant externalities. The private sector can solve the problem if given sufficient incentive with minimal governmental interference. | The 1992 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change requires that signatories, including the United States, establish policies for constraining future emission levels of greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide (CO2). The George H. W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush Administrations each drafted action plans in response to requirements of the convention. These plans have raised significant controversy and debate.
This debate intensified following the 1997 Kyoto Agreement, which, had it been ratified by the United States, would have committed the United States to reduce greenhouse gases by 7% over a five-year period (2008-2012) from specified baseline years. Controversy is inherent, in part, because of uncertainties about the likelihood and magnitude of possible future climate change, the consequences for human well-being, and the costs and benefits of minimizing or adapting to possible climate change. Controversy also is driven by differences in how competing policy communities view the assumptions underlying approaches to this complex issue.
This paper examines three starting points from which a U.S. response to the convention is being framed. These starting points, or policy "lenses," lead to divergent perceptions of the issue with respect to uncertainty, urgency, costs, and government roles. They also imply differing but overlapping processes and actions for possible implementation, thus shaping recommendations of policy advocates concerning the federal government's role in reducing greenhouse gases.
A technological lens views environmental problems as the result of inappropriate or misused technologies. The solutions to the problems lie in improving or correcting technology. The implied governmental role would be to provide leadership and incentives for technological development.
An economic lens views environmental problems as the result of inappropriate or misleading market signals (prices). The solutions to the problems lie in ensuring that the prices of goods and services reflect their total costs, including environmental damages. The implied governmental role would be to improve the functions of the market to include environmental costs, so the private sector can respond efficiently.
An ecological lens views environmental problems as the result of indifference to or disregard for the planet's ecosystem on which all life depends. The solutions to the problems lie in developing an understanding of and a respect for that ecosystem, and providing people with mechanisms to express that understanding in their daily choices. The implied governmental role would be to support ecologically based education and values, as well as to promote "green" products and processes, for example through procurement policies, efficiency standards, and regulations.
Some initiatives are underway; all the perspectives are relevant in evaluating them and possible further policies. The purpose here is not to suggest that one lens is "better" than another, but rather to articulate the implications of the differing perspectives in order to clarify terms of debate among diverse policy communities. |
crs_RL34633 | crs_RL34633_0 | Introduction
The Congressional Review Act ("CRA," 5 U.S.C. §§801-808) requires federal agencies to submit all of their final rules to both houses of Congress and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) before they can take effect. The act also establishes a special set of expedited or "fast track" legislative procedures, primarily in the Senate, through which Congress may enact joint resolutions disapproving agencies' final rules. The CRA was initially considered a reassertion of congressional authority over rulemaking agencies, but thus far it has had little direct effect on agency rules. The March 2001 rejection of the ergonomics rule was the result of a specific set of circumstances created by a transition in party control of the presidency. Section 802(e) of the CRA states that the Senate has 60 session days from the date a rule is submitted to Congress or published in the Federal Register to use these expedited procedures and act on a joint resolution of disapproval. Carryover Period
Section 801(d) of the CRA provides that, if Congress adjourns its annual session sine die less than 60 legislative days in the House of Representatives or 60 session days in the Senate after a rule is submitted to it, then the rule is subject, during the following session of Congress, to (1) a new initiation period in both chambers and (2) a new action period in the Senate. For purposes of this new initiation period and Senate action period, a rule originally submitted during the carryover period of the previous session is treated as if it had published in the Federal Register on the 15 th legislative day (House) or session day (Senate) after Congress reconvenes for the next session. Counting backwards from the end of each session, we determined the date after which there were either less than 60 days of session in the Senate or less than 60 legislative days in the House. The median relevant starting point (i.e., half occurring before, half after) for all of these sessions of Congress was June 25. The median starting point during all second sessions was June 9; the median during first sessions was July 19. Any rule that was submitted to Congress after the relevant starting point date in any session since the CRA was enacted in March 1996 would not have had 60 days of session in both houses, and Congress' ability to introduce and act on CRA resolutions of disapproval regarding the rule carried over to the next session of Congress. Final Rules That May Be Issued Late in the Second Session of the 110th Congress
Another way to understand the significance of the starting point dates for CRA carryover periods is to identify some of the rules that may be issued late in the second session of the 110 th Congress (and that therefore may be subject to disapproval during the first session of the 111 th Congress). Potential Effect of Carryover Period on Rules Issued Late in the Second Session of the 110th Congress
The foregoing information suggests the following observations:
Federal departments and agencies are likely to issue a number of significant final rules during the last months of the current Bush Administration, as has been done at the conclusion of most recent presidential administrations. | The Congressional Review Act ("CRA," 5 U.S.C. §§801-808) established a special set of expedited or "fast track" legislative procedures, primarily in the Senate, through which Congress may enact joint resolutions disapproving agencies' final rules. Members of Congress have 60 "days of continuous session" to introduce a resolution of disapproval after a rule has been submitted to Congress or published in the Federal Register, and the Senate has 60 "session days" to use CRA expedited procedures. Although the CRA was considered a reassertion of congressional authority over rulemaking agencies, only one rule has been disapproved using its procedures, and that reversal was the result of a specific set of circumstances created by a transition in party control of the presidency.
The CRA also indicates that if a rule is submitted to Congress less than 60 session days in the Senate or 60 legislative days in the House of Representatives before Congress adjourns a session sine die, then the rule is carried over to the next session of Congress and treated as if it had been submitted to Congress or published in the Federal Register on the 15th legislative day (House) or session day (Senate). This restart of the CRA process in a new session of Congress occurs even if no joint resolution of disapproval had been introduced regarding the rule during the preceding session of Congress.
A review of the House and Senate calendars from the first session of the 100th Congress to the first session of the 110th Congress indicates that the date triggering the carryover provisions of the CRA (i.e., the date after which less than 60 legislative or session days remained in a session) has usually been determined by the House of Representatives, and that the date was almost always earlier in second sessions of Congress (during which congressional elections are held) than in first sessions. The median date after which the "carryover periods" began for all sessions during this period was June 25, and the median for all second sessions was June 9. Since the CRA was enacted in March 1996, the median starting point for these carryover periods during second sessions of Congress has been somewhat earlier—June 7.
At the conclusion of most recent presidential administrations, the volume of agency rulemaking has increased noticeably. In May 2008, the White House Chief of Staff generally required federal agencies to finalize all regulations to be issued during the Bush Administration by November 1, 2008. According to press accounts and other sources, federal agencies are planning to issue a number of significant final rules by the end of 2008. If any of these "midnight rules" are submitted within the "carryover period" of the second session of the 110th Congress, then they will be subject to the carryover provisions of the CRA.
This report will be updated to reflect changes in factual material or other developments. |
crs_R41215 | crs_R41215_0 | An Overview of Illicit Drugs in Latin America and the Caribbean1
In recent decades, Latin America has played a central role in several major global illicit drug markets. Marijuana and methamphetamine are also produced domestically. Drug Traffickers and Related Criminal-Terrorist Actors
Latin American drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) control various aspects of the drug supply chain and vary in terms of capabilities, organizational structures, and levels of associated violence. Mexican drug trafficking organizations and their affiliates now "dominate the supply and wholesale distribution of most illicit drugs in the United States" and are present more than one thousand U.S. cities. U.S. Antidrug Assistance Programs in Latin America and the Caribbean37
For at least 30 years, combating drug production and trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean has been a major focus of U.S. international drug control efforts. The central premise of counternarcotics assistance has been to halt drug production and trafficking at the foreign source, both through assistance to eliminate drug crops or to interdict drug shipments, as well as through assistance to address related economic, social, and institutional vulnerabilities that made drug source and transit countries susceptible to the drug trade in the first place. While the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) oversees the overall strategy related to U.S. drug control efforts, both domestically and internationally, counterdrug assistance programs in the region are funded by the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). U.S. drug control programs in Latin America and the Caribbean were first authorized by Congress in the mid-1970s, coinciding with national policy debates on the so-called "war on drugs." Conversely, antidrug funding for Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean is significantly higher now than in the mid-2000s as a result of the Mérida Initiative and two related programs that received initial funding in FY2010, the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). According to the 2011 National Drug Threat Assessment , Mexican DTOs and their affiliates "dominate the supply and wholesale distribution of most illicit drugs in the United States" and are present more than one thousand U.S. cities. Increasing flows of narcotics through Central America are contributing to rising levels of violence and the corruption of government officials, both of which are weakening citizens' support for democratic governance and the rule of law. The United States has provided antidrug assistance to Caribbean countries through bilateral assistance programs, USAID's Caribbean Regional Program, and the State Department's Western Hemisphere Regional Program. In FY2012, Congress conditioned the provision of certain counterdrug-related aid to countries in Latin America on the Secretary of State reporting to congressional appropriators on a range of human rights issues. Newly inaugurated Guatemalan President Otto Perez Molina recently asserted that the region needs to consider legalizing the use and transport of drugs. Congress has influenced aspects of U.S. counterdrug assistance programs in Latin America and related domestic efforts in oversight hearings, legislation, and through the appropriations process. Some Members have argued that a more integrated effort might include having the State Department develop a multi-year drug strategy for the region that would seek to avoid the so-called "balloon effect" in which successful efforts in one area drive drug-related activities to another area. The Obama Administration has taken steps to better coordinate the country and regional antidrug programs previously discussed, and to ensure that U.S.-funded efforts complement the efforts of partner governments and other donors. The Administration has appointed a coordinator within the State Department to oversee the planning and implementation of the aforementioned regional security assistance packages. In the case of eradication in Colombia, results have been mixed. Drug demand in the United States fuels a multi-billion dollar illicit industry. | Drug trafficking is viewed as a primary threat to citizen security and U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean despite decades of anti-drug efforts by the United States and partner governments. The production and trafficking of popular illicit drugs—cocaine, marijuana, opiates, and methamphetamine—generate a multi-billion dollar black market in which Latin American criminal and terrorist organizations thrive. These groups challenge state authority in source and transit countries where governments are often fragile and easily corrupted. According to the Department of Justice, Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) and their affiliates "dominate the supply and wholesale distribution of most illicit drugs in the United States" and are solidifying that dominance. Drug trafficking-related crime and violence in the region has escalated in recent years, raising the drug issue to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy concerns.
Since the mid-1970s, the U.S. government has invested billions of dollars in anti-drug assistance programs aimed at reducing the flow of Latin American-sourced illicit drugs to the United States. Most of these programs have emphasized supply reduction tools, particularly drug crop eradication and interdiction of illicit narcotics, and have been designed on a bilateral or sub-regional level. Many would argue that the results of U.S.-led drug control efforts have been mixed. Temporary successes in one country or sub-region have often led traffickers to alter their cultivation patterns, production techniques, and trafficking routes and methods in order to avoid detection. As a result of this so-called "balloon effect," efforts have done little to reduce the overall availability of illicit drugs in the United States. Former Latin American presidents and Guatemalan President Otto Perez Molina have challenged the effectiveness of the so-called "war on drugs." Perez Molina has recently asserted that the region needs to consider legalizing the use and transport of some drugs in order to stem drug trafficking-related violence.
The Obama Administration has continued U.S. support for Plan Colombia and the Mérida Initiative, but has broadened the focus of those aid packages to focus more on citizen security and institution-building than on mainly prioritizing drug supply control efforts. Newer programs like the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) and the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) include an emphasis on rule of law, anti-corruption, and community and youth development programs. The Administration has appointed a coordinator within the State Department to oversee the aforementioned assistance packages, which it has termed "citizen security programs," and is developing a comprehensive Western Hemisphere Counterdrug Strategy. In order to complement these international efforts, President Obama and his top advisers have acknowledged the role that U.S. drug demand has played in fueling the drug trade in the region and requested increased funding for prevention and treatment programs. Obama Administration officials remain opposed to legalization or decriminalization of illicit drug use.
Congress has influenced U.S. drug control policy in Latin America by appropriating certain types and levels of funding for counterdrug assistance programs and conditioning the provision of antidrug funding on the basis of human rights and other reporting requirements. Congress has also sought to ensure that counterdrug programs are implemented in tandem with judicial reform, anti-corruption, and human rights programs. The 112th Congress has held hearings evaluating drug assistance programs and related domestic initiatives and border security efforts.
This report provides an overview of the drug flows in the Americas and U.S. antidrug assistance programs in the region. It also raises some policy issues for Congress to consider as it exercises oversight of U.S. antidrug programs and policies in the Western Hemisphere. |
crs_RL34333 | crs_RL34333_0 | Current Organization
In 2003, the Armyâin what it described as the "most significant Army restructuring in the past 50 years"âbegan to restructure its division-based force into a brigade combat team (BCT)-based force, primarily to increase the force pool of combat units available for deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan. Doctrinal, Education, and Training Changes Resulting from Iraq and Afghanistan
The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Services, taking into account "lessons learned" in Iraq and Afghanistan, have initiated a multitude of doctrinal, educational, and training changes, primarily focused on improving counterinsurgency and stabilization capabilities. While the Army has changed and added to course curriculum to reflect current operational needs, the Army has also significantly shortened the duration of a number of officer and NCO "bedrock" courses to meet the needs of commanders for officers and NCOs to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan. Force Structure Changes
In addition to its conversion to BCTsâwhich was largely an initiative to create a greater pool of deployable unitsâthe Army has instituted a number of what can be described as force structure changes. This debate has supposedly divided Army leaders into two groups: one that wants the Army to develop specialized units to conduct counterinsurgency, stabilization, and training/advisory missions, and another group that believes that the Army must remain generalists, that is, one of full-spectrum units, all capable of conducting a wide range of missions. Proposals for Specialized Units
There are a variety of proposals for the creation of specialized units to address the needs of counterinsurgency, stabilization, and training and advisory missions. A perceived benefit to this proposal is the Army would be able to optimize its forces for any specific task as opposed to the current full-spectrum approach, where it can be argued that the Army is no longer optimized for any task, given the recent heavy emphasis on counterinsurgency, stabilization, and training missions. Augmenting Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) . Given this, it would not be an effective use of resources to create specialized units for counterinsurgency combat. Why Full-Spectrum Units Are the Answer: The Army's Position64
The Army's insistence that specialized units are not needed and that full-spectrum units can meet the operational challenges of counterinsurgency, stabilization, and training/advising appears to be "more of the same" or "the path of least resistance" to some, but the Army cites its experiences in Iraq as validation of its position. Potential Issues for Congress
Should the Army's Missions Be Prioritized? Because the Army has opted to continue with full-spectrum units while radically redesigning military doctrine, education, and training, some might question why the Army has not taken that final step and custom designed special units to deal with counterinsurgency, stabilization, and training and advising. Without a formal analytic review, the Army could be accused of being dismissive and "choosing the easier path" of continuing to rely on full-spectrum forces. Are We Asking Too Much of Soldiers and Brigade Combat Teams? The loss of these junior officers has other implications as well. | This report is intended to provide information that might be of interest to Congress on the current debate surrounding the creation of special U.S. Army units and organizations, which some believe are needed to address current and future security requirements. While the Army has recently changed from a division-based force to a brigade-centric force, it has resisted the creation of special units to deal with counterinsurgency, stabilization, and training/advisory operations. In contrast, there have been a number of proposals to create new units and organizations better suited to address the challenges of these mission areas. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates's recent challenge to the Army to organize and prepare for asymmetric warfare and advising and training foreign armies could renew and elevate this debate.
The Army began reorganizing to a brigade-based, full-spectrum force in 2003 primarily to provide a larger pool of deployable units. Based on lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Army have initiated significant changes in doctrine, education, and training, focusing on counterinsurgency, stabilization, and training/advising foreign militaries. The Army has also begun the conversion from what it describes as "Cold War force structure" into a number of other types of units that have been considered high-demand, low-density units that the Army believes will be required in the future. There have also been a number of proposals to create specialized units to meet the operational challenges of counterinsurgency, stabilization, and training/advisory operations, but the Army insists that its current force structure is adequate to meet these challenges, and that the dynamic and unpredictable nature of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan precludes the effective use of these specialized units.
There are potential issues for congressional consideration. For example, should the Army's missions be prioritized to reflect current and possible future security environments instead of holding the Army equally responsible for all of its full-spectrum missions? Another potential issue is the Army's emphasis on new doctrine, education, and training. It can be argued that changes to Army force structure have not matched the significant changes in doctrine, education, and training. There might also be concern that the Army has not conducted a sufficient analysis of the proposals for specialized units and has chosen to continue to rely on full-spectrum units without subjecting this decision to sufficient analytic rigor. Questions also might arise as to whether too much is being asked of soldiers and Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in terms of being able to perform the myriad challenging missions that they are being assigned, particularly given the loss of non-commissioned officers and junior officers. The need for specialized Army units might also be a topic of the congressionally mandated Roles and Missions Review slated to occur sometime in 2008. This report may not be updated. |
crs_R40794 | crs_R40794_0 | Introduction and Statutory Background
The federal antitrust laws are directed at insuring that markets remain competitive, with the ultimate goal of securing consumer welfare. Antitrust is a means of governing market behavior that is, in essence, the flip side of market regulation accomplished via regulatory oversight. Any proposed health care reform scheme, therefore, is likely to contain latent conflicts with existing federal law. The consolidation or integration of health care entities, or other behavior by them (collusive and/or unilateral), even if prompted by or taken in furtherance of achieving some level of joint functioning deemed necessary to achieve the stated goals of health care legislation, could create cause for antitrust concern; and any of the named statutes might, depending on the circumstances of the behavior, be deemed applicable. [On the other hand,] providers also have a less legitimate incentive to engage in collective action that will increase their income." Two Minnesota bills to authorize collective bargaining by Minnesota health care cooperatives became law despite the Commission's negative assessment of their likely antitrust or consumer-related consequences, as did a New York measure to mandate or prohibit certain behavior by pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs). Nevertheless, as the discussion on pages 4-5 and accompanying notes indicate, the antitrust agencies are aware that certain activities which at first glance would appear to violate the antitrust laws may be saved by the fact that they are consumer-friendly as necessary to achieve either improvement in health care delivery or reduced cost and/or greater availability of health insurance, or all of them. , predatory) behavior, as opposed to, e.g. For example, in the 1996 version of their Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care , the antitrust agencies noted that "[n]ew arrangements and variations on existing arrangements involving joint activity by health care providers continue to emerge to meet consumers', purchasers', and payers' desire for more efficient delivery of high quality health care services." And, pursuant to its Advisory Opinion policy, the Commission will consider a request for advice concerning "a course of action which the requesting party proposes to pursue," including such requests from health care providers; and make its responses publicly available after it has responded to the requester. Under this precedent, it appears that McCarran-Ferguson generally would not prohibit the application of the antitrust laws or the FTC Act to many of the activities of an organization or a group of private companies acting at the behest of the federal government; an organization, however, deemed "an agency or establishment of the United States Government" or a private entity operating with the specific approval or authorization of the federal government, would likely remain exempt from antitrust challenge for even activities that could not be characterized the "business of insurance." Discussion
Applicability of the Antitrust Statutes; "State Action" Doctrine
The antitrust statutes are neither generally applicable to the federal government, nor, pursuant to the "state action" doctrine as articulated by the Supreme Court, to the states when they are acting as states (as opposed to acting as market participants in competition with private entities). Those holdings were interspersed with others that indicated that actions taken with a state's approval (pursuant to authorization but not compelled by a state) could likely still violate the federal antitrust laws. Moreover, although there may be antitrust concerns with government participation in the market as a competitor of private enterprise; or with the antitrust legality of actions taken by private entities, either in cooperation with, or at the behest of the federal government, we are not aware of any decision that directly addresses those issues. , what may decide at least some issues is the way in which Congress chooses to style whatever entity is designated as a competitor to existing health plans or health insurers. To the extent the legislative intent is to assure the antitrust immunization of either, it would seem prudent to correctly characterize and/or specifically immunize the entities deemed integral to the operation of a health care system. | The federal antitrust laws are directed at insuring that markets remain competitive, with the ultimate goal of securing consumer welfare. Antitrust is a means of governing market behavior that is, in essence, the flip side of market regulation accomplished via regulatory oversight. Accordingly, any scheme that affects the functioning of a segment of the market by prescribing or proscribing the behavior of entities that participate in that segment may impact and be impacted by the antitrust laws. That is no less a given in the health care arena than in any other. This report will set out the antitrust laws that might be of concern in efforts to reform health care markets, to indicate some of the ways in which those laws might be applicable to health care market participants, and to raise questions about the laws' applicability to market participants who act in cooperation with or at the behest of the federal government.
Restraint of trade, monopolization (as distinct from monopoly), predatory pricing, and price discrimination are among the behaviors considered unlawful under the antitrust laws; some joint activity by health care providers, therefore, could violate the antitrust statutes, especially if it impacts the prices to be paid for services—whether by purchasers (e.g., health plans, health insurers) or consumers. But the federal antitrust laws are not applicable to either the federal government or, pursuant to the antitrust "state action" doctrine, to the states qua states; there is not, therefore, likely to be much if any antitrust consequence to actions taken by federally or state-controlled or operated entities. On the other hand, applicability of the antitrust laws to entities established by either federal or state government, but not themselves designated as government bodies, however, is more nuanced: although there is ample case law prescribing the necessary prerequisites for "state-action" immunity to be conferred on private actors at the state level, there is practically none providing guidance concerning the extent to which (or whether), and the circumstances under which, the federal government can convey its antitrust immunity to private actors absent a specific grant of such immunity.
Although the antitrust laws themselves are very brief and lacking in detail, there are literally hundreds of pages of case-law annotation to provide the detail lacking in the statutes. Moreover, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have jointly issued Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care, a document that provides specifics about the agencies' likely treatment of nine forms of collaboration by health care providers. Further, the Federal Trade Commission has responded to several queries about health care entities' plans to achieve "clinical integration," indicating that it would not prosecute the models presented to it unless the assumptions noted by the advocates (efficiency-enhancing potential likely resulting in lowered health care costs and improved health care outcomes) did not occur.
The Commission has also asserted, however, in comments requested by state legislators on then-pending state legislation, that at least two of them (Mississippi's attempt to permit collective bargaining by health care cooperatives with health plans and New York's planned legislation to mandate/forbid certain activities by pharmacy benefit managers) would likely result in increased health care costs to consumers and/or decreased access to services.
The report will be updated as necessary as the specifics of health care reform legislation become more concrete and it becomes possible to discuss the general principles provided here in the context of specific legislative language. |
crs_R43289 | crs_R43289_0 | Introduction
Congress is deeply divided over implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the health reform law enacted in March 2010 during the 111 th Congress. Since the ACA's enactment, lawmakers opposed to specific provisions in the ACA or the entire law have repeatedly debated its implementation and considered bills to repeal, defund, delay, or otherwise amend the law. The Republican-led House passed numerous ACA-related bills, including legislation that would have repealed the entire law. There was less debate in the Senate, which remained under Democratic control during the 112 th and 113 th Congresses. Most of the House-passed ACA legislation was not considered in the Senate during that period. A few bills to amend specific elements of the ACA that attracted sufficiently broad and bipartisan support were approved by both the House and the Senate and signed into law. With Republicans in control of both chambers in the 114 th Congress, opponents of the ACA sought new opportunities to pass and send to the President legislation that would change the law. Republican leaders used a special legislative process known as budget reconciliation in an effort to repeal parts of the ACA. On October 23, 2015, the House passed a reconciliation bill ( H.R. The House-passed bill was taken up by the Senate, which substituted its own more extensive set of ACA repeal provisions. The Senate approved H.R. 3762 , as amended, on December 3, 2015. In addition to considering ACA repeal or amendment in authorizing legislation, lawmakers have used the annual appropriations process in an effort to eliminate funding for ACA implementation and address other concerns they have with the law. A companion report, CRS Report R44100, Use of the Annual Appropriations Process to Block Implementation of the Affordable Care Act (FY2011-FY2017) , summarizes the ACA-related language added to annual appropriations legislation by congressional appropriators since the ACA was signed into law. During the 111 th Congress, when the House was still under Democratic control, a number of clarifications and technical adjustments to the law were enacted. For example, Congress repealed Title VIII of the ACA—the Community Living Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) Act—which would have established a voluntary, long-term care insurance program to pay for community-based services and supports for individuals with functional limitations. Lawmakers also repealed a tax-filing provision (IRS Form 1099) that had been included in the ACA, and, in two separate legislative actions, they reduced the PPHF annual appropriations over the period FY2013-FY2024 by a total of $9.75 billion. The House-passed legislation included stand-alone bills as well as provisions in broader, often unrelated measures that would have (1) repealed the ACA in its entirety and, in some cases, replaced it with new law; (2) repealed, or by amendment restricted or otherwise limited, specific provisions in the ACA; (3) eliminated appropriations provided by the ACA and rescinded all unobligated funds; (4) replaced the mandatory appropriations for one or more ACA programs with authorizations of (discretionary) appropriations, and rescinded all unobligated funds; and (5) blocked or otherwise delayed implementation of specific ACA provisions. H.R. The House approved the Senate-passed bill on January 6, 2016. | Congress is deeply divided over implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the health reform law enacted in March 2010 during the 111th Congress. Since the ACA's enactment, lawmakers opposed to specific provisions in the ACA or the entire law have repeatedly debated its implementation and considered bills to repeal, defund, delay, or otherwise amend the law.
During the 112th, 113th, and 114th Congresses, the Republican-led House passed numerous ACA-related bills, including legislation that would repeal the entire law. There was much less debate in the Senate, which remained under Democratic control during the 112th and 113th Congresses. Most of the House-passed ACA legislation was not considered in the Senate during that period. With Republicans in control of both chambers in the 114th Congress, opponents of the ACA sought new opportunities to pass legislation that would change the law.
The House-passed legislation included stand-alone bills as well as provisions in broader, often unrelated measures that would have (1) repealed the ACA in its entirety and, in some cases, replaced it with new law; (2) repealed, or by amendment restricted or otherwise limited, specific provisions in the ACA; (3) eliminated appropriations provided by the ACA and rescinded all unobligated funds; (4) replaced the ACA's mandatory appropriations with authorizations of (discretionary) appropriations, and rescinded all unobligated funds; or (5) blocked or otherwise delayed implementation of specific ACA provisions.
Republican leaders used a special legislative process known as budget reconciliation in an effort to repeal parts of the ACA. On October 23, 2015, the House passed a reconciliation bill that would have repealed several provisions of the ACA. The House-passed bill (H.R. 3762) was taken up by the Senate, which substituted its own more extensive set of ACA repeal provisions. The Senate approved H.R. 3762, as amended, on December 3, 2015. The House subsequently approved the Senate-passed bill. President Obama vetoed H.R. 3762 on January 8, 2016. The House failed to override the veto.
A few bills to amend specific elements of the ACA that attracted sufficiently broad and bipartisan support were approved by both the House and the Senate and signed into law. During the 111th Congress, a number of clarifications and technical adjustments to the ACA were enacted. During the 112th, 113th, and 114th Congresses, several more substantive ACA amendments became law. For example, Congress repealed Title VIII of the ACA—the Community Living Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) Act—which would have established a voluntary, long-term care insurance program to pay for community-based services and supports for individuals with functional limitations. Lawmakers also repealed a tax-filing provision (IRS Form 1099) that had been included in the ACA, and, in two separate legislative actions, reduced the annual appropriations to the ACA's Prevention and Public Health Fund over the period FY2013-FY2024 by a total of $9.75 billion.
In addition to considering ACA repeal or amendment in authorizing legislation, lawmakers used the annual appropriations process in an effort to eliminate funding for the ACA's implementation and address other concerns they have with the law. A companion report, CRS Report R44100, Use of the Annual Appropriations Process to Block Implementation of the Affordable Care Act (FY2011-FY2017), summarizes the ACA-related language added to annual appropriations legislation by congressional appropriators since the ACA was signed into law. |
crs_RL34493 | crs_RL34493_0 | However, since nanotechnology is still largely in an early stage of development the U.S. government does not collect this type of data for nanotechnology products. Estimated global annual public investments in nanotechnology, including those of the United States, reached $6.4 billion in 2006, with another $6.0 billion invested by the private sector. In the act, Congress explicitly established global technological leadership, commercialization, and national competitiveness as central goals of the NNI:
The activities of the Program shall include—
...ensuring United States global leadership in the development and application of nanotechnology;
advancing the United States productivity and industrial competitiveness through stable, consistent, and coordinated investments in long-term scientific and engineering research in nanotechnology;
accelerating the deployment and application of nanotechnology research and development in the private sector, including start-up companies; ...and
encouraging research on nanotechnology advances that utilize existing processes and technologies. Accordingly, measures such as revenues, market share, and global trade statistics—indicators often used to assess and track U.S. competitiveness in other technologies and industries—are not available for assessing the U.S. position in nanotechnology. To date, the federal government does not collect data on nanotechnology-related revenues, trade or employment, nor is comparable international government data available. These indicators offer insights into nations' scientific and technological strength which may serve as a foundation for future product and process innovation. However, the long-term value of these investments may be affected by a variety of factors such as: the capability of the scientists and engineers conducting the R&D and the tools available to them; the efficiency of the system (e.g., businesses, supply chains, infrastructure, innovation climate, government policies) for translating R&D results into commercial products; the fields of nanoscience and nanotechnology pursued; the balance in fundamental research, applied research, and development efforts; and balance in R&D directed at exploiting commercial opportunities, meeting societal needs (e.g., health, environment), addressing government missions (e.g., defense, homeland security), and non-directed efforts to expand the scientific knowledge frontier. The U.S. lead was particularly pronounced in biology. Among those concerned about nanotechnology's potential adverse implications for health, safety, and the environment are those who support a more active federal role in funding environmental, health, and safety (EHS) research to better understand, characterize, and regulate nanotechnology, and those who prefer the federal government act to slow the development and commercialization of nanotechnology pending further EHS research. Libertarians generally assert that markets, free from government interventions, are the most effective mechanism for allocating resources to the most promising opportunities. In addition, some experts advocate efforts to create regulatory processes that can keep pace with rapid technological change and help create a more predictable environment for those investing in nanotechnology development and commercialization. Concluding Observations
Nanotechnology is expected by many to deliver significant economic and societal benefits. The United States launched the first national nanotechnology initiative in 2000, but has since been joined by more than 60 other nations. While it has been estimated that there are more than 600 nanotechnology products on the market today, most involve incremental improvements to existing products. The potential implications of nanotechnology, coupled with the substantial sustained investments, have raised concerns and interest in the U.S. competitive position in nanotechnology. By these measures, the United States appears to lead all other nations in nanotechnology, though the U.S. lead in this field may not be as large as it has been in previous emerging technology areas. Some support an active federal approach; others believe that a more limited federal involvement is likely to be more successful and equitable. | The projected economic and societal benefits of nanotechnology have propelled global investments by nations and companies. The United States launched the first national nanotechnology initiative in 2000. Since then, more than 60 nations have launched similar initiatives. In 2006, global public investment in nanotechnology was estimated to be $6.4 billion, with an additional $6.0 billion provided by the private sector. More than 600 nanotechnology products are now in the market, generally offering incremental improvements over existing products. However, proponents maintain that nanotechnology research and development currently underway could offer revolutionary applications with significant implications for the U.S. economy, national and homeland security, and societal well-being. These investments, coupled with nanotechnology's potential implications, have raised interest and concerns about the U.S. competitive position.
The data used to assess competitiveness in mature technologies and industries, such as revenues and market share, are not available for assessing nanotechnology. In fact, the U.S. government does not currently collect such data for nanotechnology, nor is comparable international data available. Without this information, an authoritative assessment of the U.S. competitive position is not possible. Alternatively, indicators of U.S. scientific and technological strength (e.g., public and private research investments, nanotechnology papers published in scientific journals, patents) may provide insight into the current U.S. position and serve as bellwethers of future competitiveness. By these criteria, the United States appears to be the overall global leader in nanotechnology. However, other nations are investing heavily and may lead in specific areas of nanotechnology. Some believe the U.S. leadership position in nanotechnology may not be as large as it has been in previous emerging technologies.
Efforts to develop and commercialize nanotechnology face a variety of challenges—e.g., technical hurdles; availability of capital; environmental, health, and safety concerns; and immature manufacturing technology and infrastructure. Some advocate a more active federal government role in overcoming these challenges, including funding to aid in the translation of research to commercial products; general and targeted tax provisions; incentives for capital formation; increased support for development of manufacturing and testing infrastructure, standards and nomenclature development, and education and training; creation of science, technology, and innovation parks; and efforts to establish a stable and predictable regulatory environment that keeps pace with innovation.
Some support a more limited federal role. Some who hold this view maintain that the market, free from government interventions, is most efficient. They assert that federal efforts can create market distortions and result in the federal government picking "winners and losers" among technologies, companies, and industries. Others oppose federal support for industrial research and applications, labeling such efforts "corporate welfare." Still others argue for a moratorium on nanotechnology R&D until environmental, health, and safety concerns are addressed. |
crs_R43929 | crs_R43929_0 | Introduction
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was last amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB; P.L. 107-110 ). During the 114 th Congress, the House Education and the Workforce Committee considered and on February 20, 2015, reported the Student Success Act ( H.R. 5 ), a bill that would reauthorize the ESEA. H.R. 5 would make several changes to current law, but one issue that has attracted substantial congressional interest is a new option that would be available to states for distributing funds available under Title I-A of the ESEA to local educational agencies (LEAs) and schools. In H.R. 5 , this option is referred to as "Title I Portability" and "Title I Funds Follow the Low-Income Child State Option." Hereinafter, this option will be referred to as the "state option." Only LEAs meeting minimum numbers and/or percentages of children counted in the population factor may receive grants. The adjustments include (1) reservation of 4% of state total allocations to be used for school improvement grants; (2) reservation of 1% of state total allocations under all formulas for ESEA Title I, Part A, plus Title I, Parts C and D (discussed below), or $400,000, whichever is greater, for state administration; (3) optional reservation of up to 5% of any statewide increase in total Part A grants over the previous year for academic achievement awards to participating schools that significantly reduce achievement gaps between disadvantaged and other pupil groups and/or exceed adequate yearly progress standards for two consecutive years or more; (4) adjustment of LEA grants to provide funds to eligible charter schools or to account for recent LEA boundary changes; and (5) optional use by states of alternative methods to reallocate all of the grants as calculated by ED among the state's small LEAs (defined as those serving an area with a total population of 20,000 or fewer). State Option: Overview and Possible Issues
Under the state option, Title I-A LEA grants would be calculated by ED using the four formulas prescribed by current statute. However, once the grants were calculated, each state would have the option to reallocate the total amount of Title I-A funds that were "earned" by the LEAs in the state using a new formula. States would be permitted to redistribute all of the Title I-A funds received to LEAs based on each LEA's share of enrolled eligible children. An eligible child would be defined as a child from a family with an income below 100% of the poverty level based on the most recent data available from the Department of Commerce. LEAs would, in turn, distribute the funds received to individual public schools in the LEA based on each school's share of enrolled eligible children. That is, all of the current law requirements for providing funds to schools with relatively high concentrations of poverty would no longer apply. The amount of funding provided would be the same for every eligible child in the state under the state option. The solid line represents the estimated grant per child in poverty that an LEA would receive under the state option—all LEAs would receive the same grant amount per child in poverty. Thus, LEAs that are above the line based on current law would receive smaller grant amounts per child in poverty under the state option and vice versa. This is due to the targeting included in the formulas under current law. The bottom graph shows estimated grants per child in poverty based on the number of children in poverty in each LEA. The pattern may not be as clear as funds under the state option were allocated based on SAIPE data, so LEAs with a higher number of children living in families in poverty would get a higher grant than an LEA with a lower number of such children in the same state. Thus, under current law, Loudon County Public Schools would only meet the eligibility requirements to receive a Basic Grant. | The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was last amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB; P.L. 107-110). During the 114th Congress, the House Education and the Workforce Committee considered and reported the Student Success Act (H.R. 5), a bill that would reauthorize the ESEA. H.R. 5 would make several changes to current law, but one issue that has attracted substantial congressional interest is a new option that would be available to states for distributing funds available under Title I-A of the ESEA to local educational agencies (LEAs) and schools. In H.R. 5, this option is referred to as "Title I Portability" and "Title I Funds Follow the Low-Income Child State Option." Hereinafter, this option will be referred to as the "state option."
Under current law, Title I-A grants to LEAs are calculated based on four formulas specified in statutory language. In order to receive funds under each grant, an LEA must meet certain eligibility requirements related to the number and percentage of children (primarily those living in families in poverty) in the LEA. That is, only LEAs meeting specific thresholds are eligible to receive Title I-A funds. Once the U.S. Department of Education (ED) calculates these grants, the grant information is shared with states, which subsequently make adjustments to these grant amounts based on provisions included in current law. After states make the grant adjustments, funds are provided to LEAs, which subsequently make grants primarily to schools with relatively high concentrations of poverty.
Under the state option, Title I-A LEA grants would be calculated at the LEA level by ED using the four formulas prescribed by current statute and the grant allocation information would be provided to the states. However, once the grants were calculated, each state would have the option to reallocate the total amount of Title I-A funds that were "earned" by the LEAs in the state using a new formula. States would be permitted to redistribute all of the Title I-A funds received to LEAs based on each LEA's share of enrolled eligible children. An eligible child would be defined as a child from a family with an income below 100% of the poverty level based on the most recent data available from the Department of Commerce. LEAs would, in turn, distribute the funds received to individual public schools in the LEA based on each school's share of enrolled eligible children. Under the state option, grants to LEAs and schools would not be targeted based on the number or percentage of eligible children, but rather any LEA or public school that enrolled at least one eligible child would receive a grant. The amount provided per child in poverty would be the same for every child in the state. This would result in millions of dollars moving among LEAs in a given state: LEAs with the highest numbers or percentages of eligible children would receive lower grants per child in poverty under the state option than under current law so that LEAs with lower numbers or percentages of children in poverty could receive the standard state amount per child in poverty, which would exceed their grant amount per child in poverty under current law. |
crs_R40752 | crs_R40752_0 | Introduction
Shortly after combat operations began pursuant to the congressional authorization to use military force in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush issued a Military Order (M.O.) authorizing trial by military commission of non-citizens suspected of terrorist acts or associations who were to be designated as subject to the M.O. The Supreme Court, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld , invalidated the military commission system established by presidential order, holding that although Congress had in general authorized the use of military commissions, such commissions were required to follow procedural rules as similar as possible to courts-martial proceedings, as required by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The Department of Defense issued regulations for the conduct of military commissions pursuant to the MCA. President Obama's Detention Policy Task Force issued a preliminary report July 20, 2009, reaffirming that the White House considers military commissions to be an appropriate forum for trying some cases involving suspected violations of the laws of the war, although federal criminal court would be the preferred forum for trials of detainees. Appended to the report was a set of criteria to govern the disposition of cases involving Guantanamo detainees. The Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR) reversed. The MCA, 10 U.S.C. Review and Appeal
The MCA codified the establishment of the review body set up under the previous DOD rules for military commissions. (This change codifies an amendment to the Manual for Military Commission already made under the Obama Administration). The following charts provide a comparison of the military tribunals under the regulations issued by the Department of Defense, standard procedures for general courts-martial under the Manual for Courts-Martial, and military tribunals as authorized by the Military Commissions Act of 2006. Chart 2, which compares procedural safeguards incorporated in the MCA to court-martial procedures and to proposed amendments, follows the same order and format used in CRS Report RL31262, Selected Procedural Safeguards in Federal, Military, and International Courts , by [author name scrubbed], in order to facilitate comparison of the proposed legislation to safeguards provided in federal court, the international military tribunals that tried World War II crimes at Nuremberg and Tokyo, and contemporary ad hoc tribunals set up by the UN Security Council to try crimes associated with hostilities in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. For a comparison with previous rules established under President Bush's Military Order, refer to CRS Report RL33688, The Military Commissions Act of 2006: Analysis of Procedural Rules and Comparison with Previous DOD Rules and the Uniform Code of Military Justice , by [author name scrubbed]. | On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued a Military Order (M.O.) authorizing trial by military commission of certain non-citizens suspected of participating in the war against terrorism. The Supreme Court struck down military commissions established pursuant to the M.O. as inconsistent with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). To permit military commissions to go forward, Congress approved the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), conferring authority to promulgate rules that depart from the strictures of the UCMJ and possibly U.S. international obligations. The Department of Defense (DOD) published regulations to govern military commissions pursuant to the MCA. Three prosecutions under those regulations resulted in convictions.
Shortly after taking office, President Obama took action to suspend the operation of military commissions pending a review of all Guantanamo detentions for the purpose of assessing options for the lawful disposition of each detainee. The Detention Policy Task Force set up to conduct the review issued a preliminary report announcing that while federal criminal court would be the preferred forum for trying enemy terrorists who are suspected of having violated U.S. criminal law, military commissions, with significant reforms, would remain an option for prosecuting violations of the law of war.
This report provides a background and analysis of military commissions rules under the MCA. After reviewing the history of the implementation of military commissions in the "global war on terrorism," the report provides an overview of the procedural safeguards provided in the MCA. The report identifies pending legislation, including Senate-passed S. 1390, and describes proposals suggested by the Obama Administration. Finally, the report provides two charts comparing the MCA with proposed legislation. The first chart describes the composition and powers of the military tribunals, as well as their jurisdiction. The second chart, which compares procedural safeguards under the MCA with those established for courts-martial as well as proposed amendments to the MCA, follows the same order and format used in CRS Report RL31262, Selected Procedural Safeguards in Federal, Military, and International Courts, to facilitate comparison with safeguards provided in federal court and international criminal tribunals. For similar charts comparing military commissions as envisioned under the MCA to the rules that had been established by DOD for military commissions and to general military courts-martial conducted under the UCMJ, see CRS Report RL33688, The Military Commissions Act of 2006: Analysis of Procedural Rules and Comparison with Previous DOD Rules and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL34772 | crs_RL34772_0 | Four federal agencies administer about 95% of the approximately 653 million acres of federal land in the United States: the Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), National Park Service, and Fish and Wildlife Service in the Department of the Interior (DOI). Because the ramifications of a merger would be more significant than a transfer or some joint operations, the rest of this section discusses the possible impacts of a merger on users, on the agencies, on the federal budget, and on political structures. And if a new agency were created, everybody would have to learn the new laws, regulations, policies, procedures, and practices. However, an agency merger would be more significant than a transfer, and keeping committee jurisdictions distinct could be difficult. In theory, few object to fair and consistent compensation to state and local governments for the tax-exempt status of federal lands. More importantly, rising wildfire suppression costs are affecting other FS programs. Wildfire management activities that seek to reduce damages, such as protecting individual structures and reducing biomass fuels, are less likely to be emphasized by a wildfire suppression agency. Summary and Observations
The Forest Service (FS) in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the Department of the Interior (DOI) are both directed to manage their lands for multiple uses and for sustained yields of resource outputs without impairing resource productivity. The similarity of missions, the proximity of lands and offices, and their existence in separate Cabinet departments have led to frequent proposals to transfer one agency to the other department and/or to merge the BLM and the FS. Proponents and critics have cited various benefits and problems associated with transferring the agencies or merging the BLM and the FS. Improved service to the public has been touted as a reason for merging the agencies. A merger would probably provide limited benefits if the legal authorities governing FS and BLM management and planning were not also merged. Recent questions about a possible merger have been raised because of concerns that wildfire suppression costs are impeding federal multiple-use management. However, it would also separate wildfire management from other land and resource management, even though wildfire is integral to most temperate ecosystems. | The Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in the Department of the Interior are both directed to manage lands for multiple uses and sustained yields, but their unique histories have led to different laws, regulations, practices, and procedures in managing resources. The similar missions and neighboring and intermingled lands in separate Cabinet departments have led to frequent proposals, dating back to 1911, to transfer one agency to the other department or to consolidate them into one agency.
Proponents and critics cite various benefits and problems to a transfer or merger of the agencies. General questions over the nature of the change—which agency, if either, would remain and in which department—would affect the ramifications of a transfer or merger. Commonly cited benefits of a merger are possibly improved service to users and the public and greater efficiency in federal land management. However, such benefits are likely only if the legal authorities governing BLM and FS management and planning were consolidated, and this could be a daunting challenge. Furthermore, institutional differences, congressional committee jurisdictions, and compensation to state and local governments for the tax-exempt status of federal lands would complicate a merger. In some locations, the agencies are implementing a Service First program of joint facilities and cooperative management efforts as a step toward more efficient federal land management.
The possibility of merging the BLM and FS has arisen most recently because of concerns that high and growing expenditures on wildfire suppression are affecting other land and resource management activities. A distinct, combined federal fire suppression agency, separate from both the FS and the BLM, would reduce the impact of wildfire costs on BLM and FS budgets, but wildfire is integral to most wildland ecosystems, and a separate fire agency would likely emphasize suppression, rather than management to reduce wildfire damages.
This report is an update of out-of-print CRS Report 95-1117, The Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management: History and Analysis of Merger Proposals, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] (1995). |
crs_RL33634 | crs_RL33634_0 | Introduction
Talks on Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Round refer to the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on industrial and primary products, basically all trade in goods which are not foodstuffs. While the agriculture negotiations have received greater scrutiny in the Doha round, trade of industrial and primary products, the subject of the NAMA negotiations, continues to make up the bulk of world trade. Previous to the Doha Round, industrial tariff negotiations were the mainstay of General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations. These rounds led to the reduction of developed country average tariffs from 40% at the end of World War II to 6% today. For the United States and other developed countries, prospective gains from the NAMA talks in this round would be from the reduction of high tariffs in the developing world, particularly from such countries as Brazil, India, and China. This dynamic has been one of the factors contributing to the current deadlock in the negotiations. Legislation to implement any agreement that results from the Doha Round negotiations would need to be passed by Congress. In this study, conducted at the beginning of the round, the model measures the welfare effects of a 33% reduction in tariffs and subsidies on agriculture, the same reduction on tariffs in manufactures, and service sector liberalization. All but one found a greater net welfare benefit from liberalization of manufacturing tariffs than from agriculture. The studies suggest that developing countries would gain the most from manufacturing liberalization, at least in relative terms, and that the single largest gainer in terms of net welfare benefit would be China. The December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial declaration endorsed the use of a non-linear, "Swiss" style, tariff reduction formula. Tariff peaks refer to a country's adoption of the maximum allowable tariff in order to protect sensitive products from competition. Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries
Aside from the formula-based flexibilities and binding concessions described above, the negotiations, it provides least developed countries (LDCs) with other special and differential treatment. Non-tariff barriers include such activities as import licensing; quotas and other quantitative import restrictions; conformity assessment procedures; and technical barriers to trade. Sectoral Approaches
WTO members have agreed to consider the use of sectoral tariff elimination as a supplementary modality for the NAMA negotiations. Congressional Consideration
Although Doha Round negotiations are continuing, U.S. trade promotion authority (TPA) expired on July 1, 2007. | Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) in the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Doha Round has emerged as a major stumbling block in the seven-year Doha Round negotiations. NAMA refers to the cutting of tariff and non-tariff barriers (NTB) on industrial and primary products, basically all trade in goods which are not foodstuffs. While the agriculture negotiations have often overshadowed the NAMA talks, trade of industrial and primary products continues to make up the bulk of world trade. Average tariffs in developed countries have declined from 40% at the end of World War II to 6% today through successive rounds of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO trade negotiations. Developed countries seek the reduction of continuing high tariffs in the developing world, particularly from such countries as Brazil, India, and China. Developing countries seek special and differential treatment and tie their cuts in industrial tariffs to reductions in agricultural tariffs and subsidies.
Several econometric studies have modeled the possible effect of industrial tariff liberalization on the global economy. The studies vary based on the assumptions and data used. All but one found a greater net welfare benefit from liberalization of manufacturing tariffs than from agriculture. The studies indicate that developing countries in the aggregate would gain the most from manufacturing liberalization, at least in relative terms, and that the single largest gainer in terms of net welfare benefit would be China.
In response to the global economic crisis, the Group of 20 (G-20) leading economies have repeatedly called for conclusion of the Doha Round as a way to bolster economic confidence and recovery. WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy has referred to 2011 as a window of opportunity to conclude the round and announced an intensive work program to achieve this goal. The subject of the current NAMA negotiation is a draft text—revised several times since its initial release in 2007—that has been subject to much disagreement.
The negotiation of the tariff reduction formula was initially the main stumbling block in the negotiations. Members agreed to a Swiss-formula non-linear tariff reduction formula approach at the December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial, one in which higher tariffs are decreased more than lower tariffs. However, disagreements persist about the size or amounts of the tariff cuts. The talks also seek to reduce the incidence of non-tariff barriers, which include import licensing; quotas and other quantitative import restrictions; conformity assessment procedures; and technical barriers to trade. The use of sectoral tariff elimination and special and differential treatment for developing countries has also proven controversial.
Legislation to implement any agreement that results from the Doha Round negotiations would need to be passed by Congress. U.S. Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), under which Congress agreed to a time line for voting on implementing legislation with no amendments in return for consultation and adherence to congressional negotiating objectives, expired on July 1, 2007. Consequently, there may be attempts to revise or extend TPA in order to consider legislation resulting from a Doha agreement. |
crs_R42663 | crs_R42663_0 | Introduction
A health insurance exchange is a structured marketplace for the sale and purchase of health insurance. For instance, an exchange may be responsible for implementing regulatory standards, such as requiring standardization of all products offered through it or imposing requirements on exchange participants. Nonetheless, while the authority and responsibilities of an exchange may vary, its fundamental purpose is to provide a venue where insurance companies may sell their insurance products and purchasers can compare and choose from multiple options available to them. The exchange concept was included in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148 , as amended), as a means to increase access to health insurance. For example, a state may decide to operate an exchange by itself, establish an exchange in partnership with the federal government, or leave this work entirely to the federal government. The coverage offered through exchanges will be comprehensive and meet all applicable private market reforms specified in ACA. ACA explicitly states that enrollment in exchanges is voluntary and no individual may be compelled to enroll in exchange coverage. While the main purpose of the exchanges will be to facilitate the offer and purchase of health insurance, nothing in ACA prohibits qualified individuals, qualified small businesses, and insurance carriers from participating in the health insurance market outside of exchanges. Small businesses seeking coverage for their employees will be able to use the small business health options program (SHOP) exchange. States that enter into a partnership exchange are required to carry out certain functions and activities related to plan management or consumer assistance or both. State-based Exchange (SBE)
The HHS Secretary must approve the operation of a SBE if it meets the following standards:
the exchange is able to carry out the required functions of the exchange as established in the law and regulation, which include making QHPs available to qualified individuals and qualified employers; the exchange is capable of carrying out the information reporting requirements related to sharing information with the federal government in order to determine an individual's eligibility for a premium tax credit; and either the entire geographic area of the state is covered in the exchange or the state has established multiple exchanges that cover the entire geographic area of the state. Operational Structure of a SBE
A state that is approved to establish its own exchange has a number of decisions to make regarding the exchange's operational structure. States can also establish one or more subsidiary exchanges in the state if each exchange serves a geographically distinct area and if the area served by each exchange meets the geographic size requirement established in the law. A SBE may contract with
an entity, including a state agency other than a Medicaid agency, incorporated under and subject to the laws of at least one state, that has demonstrated experience on a state or regional basis in the individual and small group health insurance markets and in benefits coverage, but is not an issuer; and/or a state Medicaid agency. In general, FFEs are required to carry out many of the same functions as SBEs. Additionally, FFEs and SBEs must adhere to many of the same standards outlined in ACA and regulations. What Exchanges Do
Exchanges are required to carry out a number of different functions, including determining eligibility and enrolling individuals in appropriate plans; conducting plan management activities; assisting consumers; ensuring plan accountability; and providing financial management. Federal Responsibilities for Establishment and Administration of All Exchanges
ACA requires federal agencies, primarily HHS, to oversee the exchanges, thus carrying out a number of responsibilities related to the establishment and administration of exchanges. Coverage Levels and Benefits
Generally, exchange plans must (1) cover "essential health benefits" (EHBs), at a minimum; (2) limit cost-sharing, including out-of-pocket costs; and (3) provide coverage that meets one of four levels of plan generosity based on actuarial value (defined below). Cost Assistance
To make exchange coverage more affordable, certain individuals will receive premium assistance in the form of federal tax credits. Moreover, some recipients of premium credits may also receive subsidies towards cost-sharing expenses. | The fundamental purpose of a health insurance exchange is to provide a structured marketplace for the sale and purchase of health insurance. The authority and responsibilities of an exchange may vary, depending on statutory or other requirements for its establishment and structure. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended) requires health insurance exchanges to be established in every state by January 1, 2014. ACA provides certain requirements for the establishment of exchanges, while leaving other choices to be made by the states.
Qualified individuals and small businesses will be able to purchase private health insurance through exchanges. Issuers selling health insurance plans through an exchange will have to follow certain rules, such as meeting the private market reform requirements in ACA. While the fundamental purpose of the exchanges will be to facilitate the offer and purchase of health insurance, nothing in the ACA prohibits qualified individuals, qualified employers, and insurance carriers from participating in the health insurance market outside of exchanges. Moreover, ACA explicitly states that enrollment in exchanges is voluntary and no individual may be compelled to enroll in exchange coverage.
Exchanges may be established either by the state itself as a "state-based exchange" or by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) as a "federally-facilitated exchange." A federally-facilitated exchange may be operated solely by the federal government, or it may be operated by the federal government in conjunction with the state, as a "partnership" exchange. All exchanges are required to carry out many of the same functions and adhere to many of the same standards, although there are important differences between the types of exchanges.
ACA and regulations require exchanges to carry out a number of different functions. The primary functions relate to determining eligibility and enrolling individuals in appropriate plans, plan management, consumer assistance and accountability, and financial management. ACA gives various federal agencies, primarily HHS, responsibilities relating to the general operation of exchanges. Federal agencies are generally responsible for promulgating regulations, creating criteria and systems, and awarding grants to states to help them create and implement exchanges.
A state that is approved to operate its own exchange has a number of operational decisions to make, including decisions related to organizational structure (governmental agency or a nonprofit entity); types of exchanges (separate individual and Small Business Health Options Program (SHOP) exchanges, or a merged exchange); collaboration (a state may independently operate an exchange or enter into contracts with other states); service area (a state may establish one or more subsidiary exchanges in the state if each exchange serves a geographically distinct area and meets certain size requirements); contracted services (an exchange may contract with certain entities to carry out one or more responsibilities of the exchange); and governance (governing board and standards of conduct).
In general, health plans offered through exchanges will provide comprehensive coverage and meet all applicable private market reforms specified in ACA. Most exchange plans will provide coverage for "essential health benefits," at minimum; be subject to certain limits on cost-sharing, including out-of-pocket costs; and meet one of four levels of plan generosity based on actuarial value. To make exchange coverage more affordable, certain individuals will receive premium assistance in the form of federal tax credits. Moreover, some recipients of premium credits may also receive subsidies toward cost-sharing expenses.
This report outlines the required minimum functions of exchanges, and explains how exchanges are expected to be established and administered under ACA. The coverage offered through exchanges is discussed, and the report concludes with a discussion of how exchanges will interact with selected other ACA provisions. |
crs_R45421 | crs_R45421_0 | Introduction
This report provides a review of congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community (IC) since establishment of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), particularly since the 9-11 Commission published its recommendations in its 2004 report. When there have been perceived abuses, Congress has often intervened to conduct hearings and legislate changes in intelligence process or organization. Several competing, sometimes overlapping, perspectives exist on the purpose for conducting congressional oversight of the IC:
Some have argued that the primary responsibility of the intelligence committees is to provide the authority and strategic direction to enable continual improvement in the performance of intelligence programs in support of the most pressing national security challenges. To the extent that Members share a perspective on oversight of the IC, they may be more likely to share views on the ways to conduct the oversight. This legislation resulted from Congress not being informed of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) activities abroad—in Chile and Southeast Asia in particular. Church and Pike Committees
In 1974, media reporting about potentially illegal domestic surveillance by the IC of the anti-Vietnam War movement prompted Congress to establish two select committees on intelligence to investigate—in the Senate, chaired by Idaho Senator Frank Church, and in the House, chaired by Representative Otis Pike. Previously, the Subcommittees on the CIA of the Senate and House Committees on Armed Services exercised nominal oversight of the IC. Since their establishment, however, the HPSCI and SSCI have been assisted in their oversight role by other committees that long had jurisdiction over intelligence matters related to their areas of responsibility. Intelligence and intelligence-related activities are often closely tied to foreign and defense policy, military operations, homeland security, cybersecurity, and law enforcement. Committees in both chambers for Foreign Affairs/Relations, Armed Services, Appropriations, Judiciary, and Homeland Security (after they were created), therefore, today share oversight jurisdiction of intelligence programs. Some observers of the IC have suggested these overlapping committee jurisdictions contribute to a perception of weak congressional intelligence committees that have relatively little authority and insufficient expertise. Under a section on "Oversight of Intelligence Organizations," the order established that the:
"…[Director of Central Intelligence] and heads of departments and agencies of the United States involved in intelligence activities shall…keep the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate fully and currently informed concerning intelligence activities, including any significant anticipated activities which are the responsibility of, or engaged in, by such department or agency." Nevertheless, many have suggested more needs to be done and continue to cite the Commission's recommendations as a frame of reference for further reform. A single committee could also enable Congress to have a more focused, integrated perspective of intelligence programs and strengthen Congress's accountability of IC performance, advocates say. Others have observed that it has been very difficult to change longstanding congressional appropriations rules and organization. Aside from what more might be done, a potential overarching question for Congress to frame the discussion is: Could additional changes to the rules governing congressional oversight of intelligence enable Congress to more effectively fund programs, influence policy, and legislate improvements in intelligence standards, organization, and process that would make the country safer? Would enhancements in oversight enable Congress to measure the IC's effectiveness more effectively? | Prior to the establishment of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) in 1976 and 1977, respectively, Congress did not take much interest in conducting oversight of the Intelligence Community (IC). The Subcommittees on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the congressional Armed Services Committees had nominal oversight responsibility, though Congress generally trusted that IC could more or less regulate itself, conduct activities that complied with the law, were ethical, and shared a common understanding of national security priorities. Media reports in the 1970s of the CIA's domestic surveillance of Americans opposed to the war in Vietnam, in addition to the agency's activities relating to national elections in Chile, prompted Congress to change its approach. In 1975, Congress established two select committees to investigate intelligence activities, chaired by Senator Frank Church in the Senate (the "Church Committee"), and Representative Otis Pike in the House (the "Pike Committee").
Following their creation, the Church and Pike committees' hearings revealed the possible extent of the abuse of authority by the IC and the potential need for permanent committee oversight focused solely on the IC and intelligence activities. SSCI and HPSCI oversight contributed substantially to Congress's work to legislate improvements to intelligence organization, programs, and processes and it enabled a more structured, routine relationship with intelligence agencies. On occasion this has resulted in Congress advocating on behalf of intelligence reform legislation that many agree has generally improved IC organization and performance. At other times, congressional oversight has been perceived as less helpful, delving into the details of programs and activities.
Other congressional committees have cooperated with the HPSCI and SSCI in their oversight role since their establishment. Intelligence programs are often closely tied to foreign and defense policy, military operations, homeland security, cybersecurity, and law enforcement. Committees in both chambers for Foreign Affairs/Relations, Armed Services, Appropriations, Judiciary, and Homeland Security, therefore, share jurisdiction over intelligence. Some have suggested the current overlapping jurisdictions for oversight of the IC in Congress contribute to the perception of weak congressional intelligence committees that have relatively little authority and insufficient expertise. Others cite the overlapping responsibilities as a strength. Oversight of the IC spread over more committees can contribute to greater awareness and transparency in Congress of classified intelligence activities that are largely hidden from public view. They also claim that since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Senate, and House rules have changed to enable the congressional intelligence committees to have more authority and be more effective in carrying out their oversight responsibilities. Further reform, they argue, may be unrealistic from a political standpoint.
An oft-cited observation of the Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (i.e., the 9-11 Commission) that congressional oversight of intelligence is "dysfunctional" continues to overshadow discussion of whether Congress has done enough. Does congressional oversight enable the IC to be more effective, better funded and organized, or does it burden agencies by the sheer volume of detailed inquiries into intelligence programs and related activities?
A central question for Congress is: Could additional changes to the rules governing congressional oversight of intelligence enable Congress to more effectively fund programs, influence policy, and legislate improvements in intelligence standards, organization and process that would make the country safer? |
crs_RL33405 | crs_RL33405_0 | 109-289 , on the same day. Also on September 29, the House approved a conference agreement on the FY2007 national defense authorization bill, H.R. The President signed the authorization bill into law, P.L. 109-364 , on October 17. The conference agreement on the appropriations bill provides $436.6 billion in new appropriations for defense, including $366.6 billion in regular appropriations and $70 billion in additional appropriations as a "bridge fund" for operations abroad and for some other purposes. The total of regular appropriations is $4 billion below the Administration request. But the White House threatened to veto the bill if it trimmed defense by more than $4 billion as a means of providing additional funds for non-security-related programs. The authorization bill also approves Senate amendments to the Insurrection Act to allow the President substantially expanded authority to used the armed forces in response to domestic emergencies, allows all off-duty reservists, except Federal employees with Federal health insurance, to enroll in the TRICARE health insurance program with a premium or 28% of the program's cost, and provides expanded authority for the Defense Department to use its funds for security assistance to foreign governments. 4939 , P.L. FY2007 Defense Appropriations
The House Appropriations Committee marked up its version of the FY2007 defense appropriations bill, H.R. Pay raise: The bill provided a pay raise of 2.7% for uniformed personnel, rather than the 2.2% requested. On some of the key weapons issues, the conference agreement,
rejects the Administration proposal to terminate C-17 cargo aircraft production after FY2007 and buys 22 aircraft, 12 in the regular bill and 10 in the "bridge fund" for operations abroad; approves a Navy proposal to provide partial funding for 2 DDG-1000 destroyers—formerly DD(X)—rather than providing full funding for just one ship as in the House bill; includes funds as requested for one T-AKE cargo ship and for 2 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), rather than eliminating T-AKE funds and procuring only one LCS, as in the Senate bill; also adds $117 million, as in the Senate bill, for a T-AGS ocean survey ship; provides $3.4 billion for Army Future Combat system R&D, about $300 million below the request; slows F-35 Joint Strike Fighter procurement, with funds to buy 2 rather than the requested 5 aircraft, but does not eliminate FY2007 aircraft procurement funds as the Senate bill did, and also adds $340 million to maintain development of an alternative engine; provides full funding for F-22 procurement in FY2007, rather than partial funding as the Air Force requested, and also approves the requested multiyear procurement of F-22s, although the multiyear contract must also be approved in the defense authorization bill; follows the Senate bill by shifting funds for 4 EA-18Gs to procurement of 4 F/A-18s—the House had eliminated all funds for the 8 EA-18s requested and added funds for 12 F/A-18s; provides $70 million in R&D for a new refueling aircraft to replace KC-135 tankers, which will allow the Air Force to carry on a request for bids in what appears to be a very high-stakes, high-profile competition between Boeing and Airbus; adds $290 million for National Guard and reserve equipment; reduces funding for the Transformational Communication Satellite (TSAT) by $130 million, for the Space Radar by $80 million, and for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle by $80 million; for missile defense, cuts $48 million from the Kinetic Energy Interceptor, adds $200 million for the Ground-Based Missile Defense program, adds $85 million for sea-based missile defense, and adds $58 million for the U.S.-Israeli Arrow system. Conferees resolved the issue by dropping the House provision, but by including language in the report on the bill that requires the Army and Navy to rescind recent directives on prayer and return to earlier practices. | In the week before Congress adjourned for recess on September 30, the House and Senate passed conference agreements on both the FY2007 national defense authorization bill, H.R. 5122, and the FY2007 defense appropriations bill, H.R. 5631. The President signed the appropriations bill into law, P.L. 109-289, on September 29, and he signed the authorization bill into law, P.L. 109-364, on October 17.
The conference agreement on the appropriations bill provides $436.6 billion for defense, including $366.6 billion in regular appropriations and $70 billion in additional appropriations, mainly as a "bridge fund" for operations abroad. The total of regular appropriations is $4 billion below the Administration request. The Senate-passed bill provided $9 billion less than the request, which freed that much to add to non-defense appropriations bills. The White House , however, threatened to veto the defense bill if reduced defense by more than $4 billion.
In action on other key issues, the appropriations bill–
rejected the Administration proposal to terminate C-17 cargo aircraft production after FY2007 and provided funds for 22 aircraft; approved a Navy proposal to provide partial funding for 2 DDG-1000 destroyers—formerly the DD(X)—rather than providing full funding for just one ship as in the House bill; included funds as requested for one T-AKE cargo ship and for 2 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), rather than eliminating T-AKE funds and procuring only one LCS, as in the Senate bill; and slowed F-35 Joint Strike Fighter procurement, with funds to buy 2 rather than the requested 5 aircraft, but did not eliminate FY2007 aircraft procurement funds as had the Senate bill.
On key defense policy issues, the authorization bill
provided a 2.2% pay raise, as requested, rather than or a 2.7% raise as in the House bill; approved access for all reservists, except Federal employees with Federal health insurance, to the DOD TRICARE medical insurance program with a premium of 28% of the cost of the program; rejected House language permitting chaplains to use denominational prayers according to each chaplain's conscience, but, instead, in report language, required the Army and Navy to rescind recent directives on prayer and return to earlier policies; agreed to a substantially amended Senate change in the Buy American Act to allow use of foreign-supplied specialty metals in U.S.-built systems; and did not agree to a Senate provision giving the head of the National Guard four-star rank and the authority to make independent budget requests, but assigned these issues to a commission on the reserves. |
crs_R43039 | crs_R43039_0 | The House of Representatives has several different parliamentary procedures through which it can bring legislation to the chamber floor. Which will be used in a given situation depends on many factors, including the type of measure being considered, its cost, the amount of political or policy controversy surrounding it, and the degree to which Members want to debate it and propose amendments. According to the Legislative Information System of the U.S. Congress (LIS), in the 112 th Congress (2011-2012), 888 pieces of legislation received House floor action. This report provides a statistical snapshot of the forms, origins, and party sponsorship of these measures and of the parliamentary procedures used to bring them to the chamber floor during their initial consideration. Of these, 602 were bills or joint resolutions and 286 were simple or concurrent resolutions, a breakdown between lawmaking and non-lawmaking legislative forms of approximately 68% to 32%, respectively. Origin of Measures
Of the 888 measures receiving House floor action in the 112 th Congress, 783 originated in the House and 105 originated in the Senate. The ratio of majority to minority party sponsorship of measures receiving initial House floor action in the 112 th Congress varied widely based on the parliamentary procedure used to raise the legislation on the House floor. As is noted in Table 2 , 67% of the measures considered under the Suspension of the Rules procedure were sponsored by Republicans, 32% by Democrats, and less than 1% by political independents. The ratio of party sponsorship on measures initially brought to the floor under the terms of a special rule reported by the House Committee on Rules and adopted by the House was far wider. In the 112 th Congress, 473 measures, representing 53% of all legislation receiving House floor action, were initially brought up using the Suspension of the Rules procedure. When only lawmaking forms of legislation are counted, 72% of bills and joint resolutions receiving floor action in the 112 th Congress came up by Suspension of the Rules. In the 112 th Congress, 137 measures, or 15% of all legislation receiving House floor action, were initially brought before the chamber under the terms of a special rule reported by the Rules Committee and agreed to by the House. When only lawmaking forms of legislation are counted, 21% of bills and joint resolutions receiving floor action in the 112 th Congress came up by Special Rule. As is noted above, all but three measures brought before the House using this parliamentary mechanism was sponsored by a majority party Member. Unanimous Consent
In current practice, legislation is sometimes brought before the House of Representatives for consideration by the unanimous consent of its Members. In the 112 th Congress, seven measures were brought to the floor via the call of the Private Calendar. | House of Representatives has several different parliamentary procedures through which it can bring legislation to the chamber floor. Which of these will be used in a given situation depends on many factors, including the type of measure being considered, its cost, the amount of political or policy controversy surrounding it, and the degree to which Members want to debate it and propose amendments. This report provides a snapshot of the forms and origins of measures that, according to the Legislative Information System of the U.S. Congress (LIS), received action on the House floor in the 112th Congress (2011-2012) and the parliamentary procedures used to bring them up for initial House consideration.
In the 112th Congress, 888 pieces of legislation received floor action in the House of Representatives. Of these, 602 were bills or joint resolutions and 286 were simple or concurrent resolutions, a breakdown between lawmaking and non-lawmaking legislative forms of approximately 68% to 32%. Of these 888 measures, 783 originated in the House and 105 originated in the Senate.
During the same period, 53% of all measures receiving initial House floor action came before the chamber under the Suspension of the Rules procedure; 23% came to the floor as business "privileged" under House rules and precedents; 15% were raised by a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules and adopted by the House; and 7% came up by the unanimous consent of Members. Seven measures, representing approximately 1% of legislation receiving House floor action in the 112th Congress, were processed under the procedures associated with the call of the Private Calendar.
When only lawmaking forms of legislation (bills and joint resolutions) are counted, 72% of such measures receiving initial House floor action in the 112th Congresses came before the chamber under the Suspension of the Rules procedure; 21% were raised by a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules and adopted by the House; and 5% came up by the unanimous consent of Members. Around 1% of lawmaking forms of legislation received House floor action via the call of the Private Calendar and an even smaller fraction of lawmaking measures were "privileged" under House rules.
The party sponsorship of legislation receiving initial floor action in the 112th Congress varied based on the procedure used to raise the legislation on the chamber floor. Sixty-seven percent of the measures considered under the Suspension of the Rules procedure were sponsored by majority party Members. All but three of the 137 measures brought before the House under the terms of a special rule reported by the House Committee on Rules and adopted by the House were sponsored by majority party Members. |
crs_R43338 | crs_R43338_0 | Introduction
Congress uses an annual appropriations process to provide discretionary spending for federal government agencies. If regular appropriations are not enacted by that deadline, one or more continuing resolutions (CRs) may be enacted to provide funds until all regular appropriations bills are completed, or the fiscal year ends. During the fiscal year, supplemental appropriations may also be enacted to provide funds in addition to those in regular appropriations acts or CRs. Amounts provided in appropriations acts are subject to limits, both procedural and statutory, which are enforced through respective mechanisms such as points of order and sequestration. Second, in addition to the issues related to FY2013 spending, the FY2014 appropriations process was affected by a lack of agreement between the House and Senate over future constraints on discretionary spending as required by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA). On December 10, 2013, the chairs of the House and Senate Budget Committees announced an agreement as to the level of FY2014 and FY2015 discretionary spending (the Bipartisan Budget Act; Division A, H.J.Res. 59 ), which was enacted into law on December 26, 2013 ( P.L. 113-67 ). No regular appropriations bills for FY2014 were enacted prior to the beginning of the fiscal year (October 1, 2013), and an interim CR to provide budget authority for the projects and activities covered by those 12 bills did not become law until October 17, 2013 (Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014; P.L. 113-76 ). Congressional consideration of three supplemental appropriations measures occurred late in the fiscal year ( H.R. 5230 , S. 2648 , and H.J.Res. 76 , a measure that provides additional appropriations for military cooperation with the government of Israel related to the Iron Dome program. This report provides background and analysis with regard to the FY2014 appropriations process. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) evaluates enacted FY2014 discretionary spending relative to the spending limits, and determine if sequestration is necessary to enforce those limits, within 15 calendar days after the 2013 congressional session adjourns sine die . The total amount of discretionary spending in this suballocation, as well as the distribution of defense and nondefense spending, was based on the levels assumed in the Senate-adopted budget resolution. During the FY2014 appropriations process, the House Appropriations Committee reported 10 of the 12 regular appropriations bills, while the Senate Appropriations Committee reported 11 of the 12 regular bills. The House initially considered five regular appropriations bills on the floor and passed four of them before final action on regular appropriations occurred. The Senate began floor consideration of one regular appropriations bill, but did not complete it. After a total amount for defense and nondefense FY2014 discretionary spending was provided through the enactment of the Bipartisan Budget Act, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees announced an agreement on regular appropriations for FY2014. This agreement was enacted as the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 ( H.R. For up-to-date information on the status of regular appropriations measures, see the CRS FY2014 status table, available at http://www.crs.gov/pages/AppropriationsStatusTable.aspx . The bill was signed into law on January 17, 2014 ( P.L. One day before that funding gap, a narrow CR was enacted that funded FY2014 pay and allowances for (1) certain members of the Armed Forces, (2) certain DOD and DHS civilian personnel, and (3) other specified DOD and DHS contractors (the Pay Our Military Act; H.R. During the funding gap, consideration of appropriations was limited to a number of narrow CRs to provide funds for specified projects and activities, of which only one was enacted (the Department of Defense Survivor Benefits Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2014; H.J.Res. 113-44 ). The funding gap terminated with the enactment of a broad CR covering FY2013 projects and activities at an annualized rate of $986.3 billion, through January 15, 2014. 2775 ; P.L. 113-46 .) 59
Prior to the beginning of the fiscal year, congressional action with regard to continuing appropriations was primarily focused on the Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2014 ( H.J.Res. Congressional action to resolve House and Senate differences with regard to H.J.Res. 3210 (P.L. The House began floor consideration of H.R. 113-39 ). 106 (P.L. 113-73 ). On that same day, however, a point of order under Section 306(a) of the Congressional Budget Act was raised and sustained for including matter under the jurisdiction of the Senate Budget Committee, after the Senate rejected a motion to waive the point of order. 5230 , the Secure the Southwest Border Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2014. The following day, the House resumed consideration of H.R. | This report provides background and analysis on congressional action relating to the FY2014 appropriations process. The annual appropriations process currently anticipates that 12 regular appropriations bills will be enacted prior to the beginning of the fiscal year (October 1) to provide discretionary spending for federal government agencies. If all regular appropriations bills are not enacted by that time, one or more continuing resolutions (CRs) may be enacted to provide interim or full-year funds until regular appropriations are completed, or the fiscal year ends. During the fiscal year, supplemental appropriations may also be enacted to provide funds in addition to those in regular appropriations acts or CRs. Amounts provided in appropriations acts are subject to limits, both statutory (as provided by the Budget Control Act of 2011 [BCA]), and procedural (as provided by the Congressional Budget Act of 1974), and are enforced through respective mechanisms such as sequestration and points of order.
The FY2014 BCA discretionary spending limits are to be first enforced within 15 calendar days after the congressional session adjourns sine die. Any necessary reductions to bring appropriations into compliance with those limits would occur through sequestration. The House-and Senate-adopted versions of the budget resolution differ as to total discretionary spending, as well as how it should be distributed between defense and nondefense spending. On December 10, 2013, however, the chairs of the House and Senate Budget Committees announced an agreement that would establish FY2014 and FY2015 discretionary spending levels (the Bipartisan Budget Act; Division A, H.J.Res. 59). This agreement was enacted into law on December 26, 2013 (P.L. 113-67).
The regular appropriations process for FY2014 was concluded on January 17, 2014, when the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76), was enacted. Prior to this time, the House Appropriations Committee had reported all but two regular appropriations bills, while the Senate Appropriations Committee had reported all but one such bill. The House previously considered five regular appropriations bills on the floor and passed four of them. The Senate began floor consideration of one regular appropriations bill, but did not complete it. At the start of the fiscal year, each chamber's appropriations bills reflected the differing assumptions on the levels of FY2014 discretionary spending that were in the House- and Senate-adopted versions of the budget resolution. Once the House and Senate agreed to a total level of FY2014 discretionary spending in the Bipartisan Budget Act, however, the two chambers were able to resolve their differences with regard to the regular appropriations bills.
A broad CR to provide temporary funding for FY2013 projects and activities did not become law until October 17, 2013 (The Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014; H.R. 2775; P.L. 113-46), resulting in a funding gap for affected projects and activities from October 1 until that time. Prior to the funding gap, a narrow CR was enacted providing funding for FY2014 pay and allowances for (1) certain members of the Armed Forces, (2) certain Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) civilian personnel, and (3) other specified DOD and DHS contractors (the Pay Our Military Act; H.R. 3210; P.L. 113-39, 113th Congress). After the funding gap commenced, only narrow CRs to provide funds for specified projects and activities received congressional consideration, of which one was enacted (the Department of Defense Survivor Benefits Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2014; H.J.Res. 91; P.L. 113-44). The Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014, provided funds at an annualized rate of $986.3 billion through January 15, 2014. Funding was extended to January 18, 2014, through the enactment of H.J.Res. 106 (P.L. 113-73).
Congressional consideration of FY2014 supplemental appropriations measures (H.R. 5230, S. 2648, and H.J.Res. 76) occurred late in the fiscal year. The primary purpose of H.R. 5230 and S. 2648 is to provide additional funds to address the influx of unaccompanied and escorted children illegally crossing the Southwest border. On July 29, during floor consideration of S. 2648 in the Senate, the bill was referred to the Senate Appropriations Committee after a point of order under Section 306(a) of the Congressional Budget Act was raised and sustained. The following day, H.R. 5230 was passed by the House. No further action on these proposals has occurred as of the date of this report. H.J.Res. 76, a related measure that provides supplemental appropriations for military cooperation with the government of Israel related to the Iron Dome program, was adopted by both the House and Senate on August 1; the measure currently awaits presidential action.
This report will be updated if further FY2014 appropriations are enacted. For up-to-date information on the status of appropriations measures, see the CRS FY2014 status table, available at http://www.crs.gov/pages/AppropriationsStatusTable.aspx. |
crs_RL34147 | crs_RL34147_0 | Introduction
Pursuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has established regulations regarding the transport, treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes. Many states have opted to do so—particularly with regard to the management of certain hazardous wastes generated by households. Households and certain small businesses are essentially exempt from RCRA. One category of household hazardous waste that many states are choosing to regulate more strictly is electronic waste, commonly referred to as "e-waste." There is no universally accepted definition of e-waste, but it generally refers to obsolete, broken, or irreparable electronic equipment such as televisions, computers and computer monitors, laptops, printers, cell phones, VCRs, DVD players, copiers, fax machines, stereos, and video gaming systems. State and local agencies, particularly municipal waste management agencies, have become increasingly concerned about the landfill disposal or incineration of e-waste because of the large volumes in which it is being generated and because of the hazardous constituents the waste may contain. To avoid landfill disposal or incineration, e-waste may be recycled. As more states propose such legislation, potentially regulated stakeholders (particularly electronics manufacturers and retailers) have expressed concern that they will be required to comply with a patchwork of state requirements throughout the United States. With increased legislative activity in the states, it is anticipated that stakeholders will increase their call for federal legislation regarding e-waste management. To illustrate the issues associated with individual state action, this report discusses the key issues that have led to state action, describes common elements in state waste laws and proposals, and provides an overview of each enacted state law. In addition to the bulky nature of electronic devices such as televisions and computers, the increasing volume of e-waste concerns some states, particularly state and municipal waste management agencies. One factor driving states to develop e-waste laws is to implement a system that will provide financing for an e-waste collection, transportation, and recycling system. Provisions of each law vary significantly and range from a ban on the landfill disposal of CRTs to implementation of a state-wide e-waste collection and recycling program. Common Provisions of State E-Waste Laws
Fourteen states have enacted some form of e-waste management law. Although the goals of each law are similar—to avoid landfill disposal of certain e-waste—the approaches taken to achieve those goals differ significantly. However, most state laws and proposals have certain broad elements in common, such as specifying the electronic devices covered under the law, how a collection and recycling program will be financed, collection and recycling criteria that must be implemented to minimize impacts on human health and the environment, and restrictions or requirements that products must meet to be lawfully sold in the state. Some states have responded to these concerns by banning e-waste exports. | Pursuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has established regulations regarding the disposal of hazardous wastes. Although there are federal requirements under RCRA for the management of hazardous waste, some states have opted to implement more stringent requirements—particularly with regard to the management of certain hazardous wastes generated by households and small businesses (entities that are essentially exempt from RCRA's hazardous waste management requirements).
One category of household hazardous waste that many states are choosing to regulate more strictly is electronic waste, commonly referred to as "e-waste." E-waste generally refers to obsolete, broken, or irreparable electronic equipment like televisions, computers and computer monitors, laptops, printers, cell phones, copiers, fax machines, stereos, or video gaming systems. Cathode ray tubes (CRTs) in televisions and computer monitors have presented a particular concern to states, primarily due to the potentially significant amounts of lead they contain and the large numbers in which they are generated.
State concerns specific to the landfill disposal or incineration of e-waste are largely due to its increasing volume and often bulky nature; hazardous constituents, such as lead and mercury, it may contain; its high cost of recycling; and the inability of interested stakeholders, such as electronics retailers and manufacturers, to reach consensus on how to voluntarily implement a national e-waste management system. States have responded to this concern by enacting their own e-waste management laws. Requirements of those laws range from a ban only on the landfill disposal or incineration of designated e-wastes to the implementation of a full e-waste collection, transportation, and recycling system.
To date, 14 states have enacted some form of e-waste management law (as many as 20 states proposed e-waste laws in 2006 and 2007). Although the goal of each law is similar—to avoid landfill disposal and incineration of certain types of e-waste—approaches taken to achieve that goal differ significantly. However, most state laws and proposals have certain broad elements in common, such as specifying the electronic devices covered under the law; how a collection and recycling program will be financed; collection and recycling criteria that must be met to minimize the impact to human health and the environment; and restrictions or requirements that products must meet to be sold in the state.
As more states propose e-waste legislation, potentially regulated stakeholders (particularly electronics manufacturers and retailers) have expressed concern that they will be required to comply with a patchwork of state requirements throughout the United States. This concern has led to an increased call for federal legislation regarding e-waste management. To help policy makers better understand the impact of state e-waste legislation, this report discusses issues that have led to state action, common elements in state-waste laws and proposals, and an overview of each enacted state law. |
crs_R42608 | crs_R42608_0 | This report answers several common questions regarding the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR), an index representing prevailing interest rates in London money markets. Recently, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) reached settlements with Barclays, in which the British bank admitted submitting false responses to the survey used to calculate LIBOR and the Euro Interbank Offer Rate (EURIBOR) to manipulate the indexes. How is LIBOR Calculated? Which Banks Serve on the Dollar LIBOR Panel? How is LIBOR Used in the U.S. Financial System? Are There Alternatives to LIBOR? Can a Single Reporting Bank Manipulate a LIBOR Index? In Its Admissions, How Did Barclays Manipulate LIBOR? Were U.S. Policymakers Aware of Problems with LIBOR? The Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) reportedly raised concerns with Barclays about its LIBOR responses. | The London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) is an estimate of prevailing interest rates in London money markets. Barclays, a British bank that serves on the panel responding to the LIBOR survey, recently admitted submitting false responses to manipulate the index (and attempting to manipulate a similar index, the Euro Interbank Offer Rate [EURIBOR]). The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) reached settlements with Barclays in which the bank agreed to admit fault and pay a large fine.
This report answers several frequently asked questions.
How is LIBOR calculated? Which banks serve on the dollar LIBOR panel? How can a single bank manipulate LIBOR? How did Barclays manipulate LIBOR? How is LIBOR used in the U.S. financial systems? Are there alternatives to LIBOR? Were U.S. policymakers, such as the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, aware of problems with LIBOR? |
crs_R40636 | crs_R40636_0 | Introduction
Federal agencies often must collect information from the public to accomplish their missions. However valuable they are, though, federal information collection requirements can also impose a substantial paperwork burden on the public. The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) (44 U.S.C. The PRA of 1980 established the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to provide central agency leadership and oversight of government-wide efforts to reduce unnecessary paperwork burden and improve the management of information resources. Scope of the PRA
The scope of the PRA is very broad, both in terms of the federal agencies that must comply with its requirements, and the types of information collection requirements and activities that are covered. The PRA requires agencies to justify any collection of information from the public by establishing the need and intended use of the information, estimating the burden that the collection will impose on respondents, and showing that the collection is the least burdensome way to gather the information. The burden-hour estimate for an information collection is a function of (1) the frequency of the information collection, (2) the estimated number of respondents, and (3) the amount of time that the agency estimates it takes each respondent to complete the collection. As discussed more fully later in this report, as of May 2009, the government-wide paperwork burden estimate is nearly 10 billion burden hours. Agencies must receive OIRA approval (signified by an OMB control number displayed on the information collection) for each information collection request before it is implemented, and those approvals must be renewed at least every three years. As discussed in more detail later in this report, failure to obtain OIRA approval for an active collection, or the lapse of that approval, represents a violation of the act, and triggers the PRA's public protection provision. Table 2 below shows the 10 largest IRS information collections in May 2009, which totaled nearly 6.6 billion burden hours—85.6% of the IRS estimate (which was about 7.7 million burden hours), and 66.4% of the government-wide estimate (which was more than 9.9 million burden hours). Therefore, if Congress and the public want a fuller picture of how the PRA's burden-reduction goals are being implemented, they will have to carefully review the information in OIRA's ICB reports...."
The Cost of Paperwork
Although federal paperwork is most commonly measured in terms of burden hours, OIRA also collects information from federal agencies on the financial costs that are sometimes associated with information collection requirements—e.g., costs for equipment, supplies, information technology systems, and postage related to the collection of the information. 535 would, if enacted, amend the PRA to "provide for the suspension of fines under certain circumstances for first-time paperwork violations by small business concerns." Similar legislation was introduced but not enacted in the 110 th Congress ( H.R. 456 and S. 281 ), and was a provision in other legislation that was not enacted ( H.R. Several IGs have said that the PRA's requirements have affected their ability to conduct timely audits and investigations, and that the requirement for agency and OIRA approval compromises their independence. Reauthorization of OIRA
The PRA of 1995 authorized appropriations for OIRA to carry out the PRA's requirements through September 30, 2001. Since then, OIRA has been funded through OMB's general appropriation. Historically, the reauthorization of appropriations for OIRA has provided an opportunity for Congress to amend the PRA and, in so doing, to try and improve the act's implementation. | Federal agencies often collect information from the public to accomplish their missions, but those information collection requirements can also impose a substantial paperwork burden on the public. The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) (44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520) established the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to provide central agency leadership and oversight of government-wide efforts to reduce unnecessary paperwork burden and improve the management of information resources. The PRA's scope is very broad, both in terms of the federal agencies that must comply with its requirements, and the types of information collection requirements and activities that are covered. The PRA requires agencies to justify any collection of information from the public by establishing the need and intended use of the information, estimating the burden that the collection will impose on respondents, and showing that the collection is the least burdensome way to gather the information. Agencies must receive OIRA approval for each information collection request (signified by an OMB control number displayed on collection) before it is implemented. Failure to obtain OIRA approval for an active collection, or the lapse of that approval, represents a violation of the PRA, and the public is not required to provide the requested information. As a result of OIRA initiatives in recent years, the number of reported violations of the act declined from more than 800 in FY1998 to 15 in FY2007.
Paperwork burden is most commonly estimated in terms of "burden hours," which is a function of (1) the frequency of an information collection, (2) the estimated number of respondents, and (3) the amount of time that the agency estimates it takes each respondent to complete the collection. As of May 2009, the government-wide estimate was about 9.9 billion burden hours, an increase of nearly 2 billion burden hours (25%) between 2004 and 2009. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) represents nearly 80% of the government-wide estimate (about 7.7 billion burden hours), and more than 85% of the IRS estimate is driven by 10 large information collections. If the total labor cost to complete federal paperwork is $40 per hour (including benefits and overhead), then the 9.9 billion burden hours cost providers nearly $400 billion. About $60 billion in other financial costs raises the total annual cost of federal paperwork to about $460 billion. However, the benefits associated with these collections may far exceed these costs.
Some inspectors general (IGs) and the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) have expressed concerns that the PRA's commenting and review requirements affect their ability to conduct timely audits and investigations, and have proposed that they (like the Government Accountability Office) be exempted from the act's requirements.
The PRA of 1995 authorized appropriations for OIRA to carry out the PRA's requirements through September 30, 2001. Since then, OIRA has been funded through OMB's general appropriation. Historically, the reauthorization of appropriations for OIRA has provided an opportunity for Congress to amend the PRA and, in so doing, to try and improve the act's implementation. In the 111th Congress, the only proposed legislation to amend the PRA is H.R. 535, which would, if enacted, "provide for the suspension of fines under certain circumstances for first-time paperwork violations by small business concerns." Similar legislation was introduced but not enacted in the 110th Congress (H.R. 456 and S. 281).
This report will be updated as other information becomes available. |
crs_RL33483 | crs_RL33483_0 | They have been especially critical of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), asserting that they administer the Section 404 program in an overzealous and inflexible manner. Wetlands: Science and Information
Scientific questions about wetlands, with answers that can be important to policymakers, include how to define wetlands; how to catalogue the rate and pattern of wetland declines and losses as well as restorations and increases; and how to assess the importance of wetland changes to broader ecosystems. Many of these values have been recognized only recently. According to its most recent report of national trends, issued in 2011, total wetland acreage in 2009 was estimated to be 110.1 million acres. In April 2008, the Bush Administration issued a report saying that more than 3.6 million acres of wetlands had been restored, protected, or improved as part of the President's program to create, improve and protect wetlands, and that the number was expected to climb to 4.5 million acres by the original date set by that program—Earth Day 2009. Selected Federal Wetlands Programs
Federal program issues include the administration of programs to protect, restore, or mitigate wetland resources (especially the Clean Water Act Section 404 program); relationships between agricultural and regulatory programs; whether all wetlands should be treated the same in federal programs, and which wetlands should be subject to regulation; and whether protecting wetlands by acres is an effective proxy for protecting wetlands based on the functions they perform and the values they provide. In addition, private property questions are raised, because almost three-quarters of the remaining wetlands are located on private lands. Some wetland protection advocates have proposed that it be replaced or greatly altered. The current nationwide permit program has few strong supporters, for differing reasons. SWANCC
An issue of long-standing controversy is whether isolated waters are properly within the jurisdiction of Section 404. According to the nonbinding guidance, the agencies would assert regulatory jurisdiction over certain waters, such as traditional navigable waters and adjacent wetlands. Some critics argued that the guidance represented over-reaching by the agencies, beyond authority provided by Congress. 2015 Revised Rule
On May 27, 2015, EPA and the Corps issued a final rule revising their regulations that define the scope of waters protected under the CWA. These lawsuits, filed by industry groups, more than half of the states, and several environmental groups (nearly 90 plaintiffs in all), will test whether the agencies' interpretation of CWA jurisdiction is consistent with the Supreme Court's rulings and whether the rule complies with substantive and procedural requirements of the CWA and other laws. Other Federal Protection Efforts
Many federal agencies have been active in wetland improvement efforts in recent years. In particular, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) has been promoting the success of its Partners for Fish and Wildlife program, which Congress reauthorized through FY2011 in 2006 ( P.L. State Protection Efforts
In addition to federal programs and activities, wetlands in the United States are regulated and protected through a variety of state and local laws and regulations, as well as through initiatives and actions of nongovernmental organizations, schools and universities, and private citizens. The inclusion of wetlands in a state's definition of state waters does not give automatic protection to these waters; the state must also have some form of complementary regulatory authority, such as to issue permits. The Louisiana Experience
Much of the attention to reversing wetland loss has focused on Louisiana, where an estimated 80% of the total loss of U.S. coastal wetlands has occurred and where about 40% of U.S. coastal wetlands that remain in the lower 48 states are located (coastal wetlands are about 5% of all U.S. wetlands). More recent data paint a larger picture. | Recent Congresses have considered numerous policy topics that involve wetlands. Many reflect issues of long-standing interest, such as applying federal regulations on private lands, wetland loss rates, and restoration and creation accomplishments.
The issue receiving the greatest attention recently has been determining which wetlands should be included and excluded from requirements of the Clean Water Act (CWA), especially the Section 404 permit program that regulates waste discharges affecting wetlands, which is administered by the Army Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). As a result of Supreme Court rulings in 2001 and 2006 that narrowed federal regulatory jurisdiction over certain isolated wetlands, the jurisdictional reach of the permit program has also been narrowed. In 2015, EPA and the Army Corps promulgated a rule to define the scope of waters protected by the CWA. The rule revises the existing administrative definition of "waters of the United States" consistent with the Supreme Court's rulings and consistent with science concerning the interconnectedness of tributaries, wetlands, and other waters and the effects of these connections on the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of downstream waters. The rule has been controversial with groups and many Members of Congress who contend that it would vastly increase federal assertion of jurisdiction that triggers CWA regulatory requirements.
Wetland protection efforts continue to engender controversy over issues of science and policy. Topics include the rate and pattern of loss, whether all wetlands should be protected in a single fashion, the effectiveness of the current suite of laws in protecting them, and the fact that 75% of remaining U.S. wetlands are located on private lands.
Many public and private efforts have sought to mitigate damage to wetlands and to protect them through acquisition, restoration, enhancement, and creation, particularly coastal wetlands. While recent data indicate success in some restoration efforts, leading to increases in some types of wetlands in some locations, many scientists question if restored or created wetlands provide equivalent replacement for natural wetlands that contribute multiple environmental services and values.
One reason for controversies about wetlands is that they occur in a wide variety of physical forms, and the numerous values they provide, such as wildlife habitat, also vary widely. In addition, the total wetland acreage in the lower 48 states is estimated to have declined from more than 220 million acres three centuries ago to 110.1 million acres in 2009. The national policy goal of no net loss, endorsed by Administrations for the past two decades, had been reached by 2004, according to the Fish and Wildlife Service, as the rate of loss had been more than offset by net gains through expanded restoration efforts authorized in multiple laws. However, more recent data show wetlands losses of nearly 14,000 acres per year. Many protection advocates say that gains do not necessarily account for the changes in quality of the remaining wetlands, and many also view federal protection efforts as inadequate or uncoordinated. Others, who advocate the rights of property owners and development interests, characterize these efforts as too intrusive. Numerous state and local wetland programs add to the complexity of the protection effort. |
crs_R41323 | crs_R41323_0 | The explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig and subsequent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico have led to substantial damages, particularly in the form of lost wages and income. Furthermore, given the magnitude of the economic disruption resulting from the spill, policymakers have begun to explore possible alternative mechanisms for providing relief to the affected region. We will then provide an analysis of the tax treatment of the BP payments to the individuals and businesses impacted by the oil spill as well as various policy options for providing tax relief to oil spill victims, highlighting the circumstantial differences between previous natural disasters and the current oil spill. For example, taxpayers are allowed a deduction for casualty losses. The oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico presents lawmakers with unique challenges in using the tax code to provide relief. First, unlike other recent disasters, such as the 2005 hurricanes in the Gulf, the oil spill is not a natural disaster. The oil spill is the result of human action, where unlike a natural disaster, there may be a liable party. Second, the nature of the damages is different from those typically borne by victims of natural disasters. Specifically, damages are more likely to be in the form of lost business income and employment, rather than direct property loss. Certain relief that has been awarded in the past, such as tax filing extensions to assist with the destruction of taxpayer records, is not likely to be an issue. As of August 23, 2010, all claims are to be filed with the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF), an independent entity that is administering the claims, with payments coming from an escrow account funded by BP. For example, payments received by individuals due to physical injury or sickness arising from the oil spill may qualify for exclusion under IRC § 104. Specifically, the loss to business and individuals may exceed insurance or the claims compensation. Tax Treatment of Claims Payments
As discussed above, unless Congress enacts legislation, the payments for lost income will generally be included in recipients' gross income. Charitable Relief
As a response to past disasters, Congress has adopted legislation to promote charitable assistance to disaster victims. Legislative Response
A number of bills have been introduced in both the House and the Senate that would provide tax relief to victims of the oil spill. The Oil Spill Tax Relief Act of 2010 ( H.R. 5598 ) would require that any compensation provided by BP to an oil spill victim be treated as a qualified disaster payment, and thereby excluded from gross income for tax purposes. The Gulf Coast Access to Savings Act of 2010 ( H.R. The Gulf Oil Spill Recovery Act of 2010 ( H.R. 5699 ) would make various tax relief measures available for oil spill victims. H.R. 5699 has been referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means. In the Senate, the Gulf Coast Oil Recovery Zone Tax Relief and Economic Recovery Act ( S. 3934 ), would provide various forms of tax relief for Gulf oil spill victims. | The explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig and subsequent oil spill into the Gulf of Mexico has led to substantial damages, particularly in the form of lost wages and income. BP has begun to make interim payments to compensate for lost income resulting from the oil spill. Individuals and businesses impacted by the oil spill may file a claim with the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, an independent entity established to administer the claims, with payments coming from an escrow account funded by BP. The tax consequences of these payments to the recipients will depend on the nature of the underlying claim. Payments received for lost wages or income will generally be taxable, while payments for other types of claims, such as physical injury or damage of property, may qualify for exclusion or deferral.
Given the magnitude of the economic disruption resulting from the spill, however, policymakers may consider exploring alternative mechanisms for providing relief to the affected region. In the past, Congress has used the tax code as a tool to provide relief to disaster victims. While the Gulf of Mexico oil spill has not been classified as a federally declared disaster, the tax code could be used as a mechanism for delivering additional relief. Tax policy options that could be explored include added casualty loss deductions, an extended net operating loss (NOL) period, employment incentives, enhanced access to retirement savings, and incentives for charitable relief.
Similar policies were adopted following past disasters. However, the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico presents lawmakers with unique challenges in using the tax code to provide relief. First, the oil spill is not a natural disaster. The oil spill is the result of human action where, unlike a natural disaster, compensation may be recovered from a financially responsible party. Second, the nature of the damages is different from those typically borne by victims of natural disasters. Specifically, damages may primarily be in the form of lost business income and employment, rather than direct property loss. Relief that has been awarded in the past, such as tax filing extensions to assist with the destruction of taxpayer records, is not likely to be an issue. Finally, if the goal is to provide relief or assistance to the poor, the tax code may not be the best policy instrument.
Legislation has been introduced in the House and Senate that would provide tax relief to the Gulf Coast oil spill victims. The Oil Spill Tax Relief Act of 2010 (H.R. 5598) would require that any compensation provided by BP to an oil spill victim be treated as a qualified disaster payment, and thereby excluded from gross income for tax purposes. The Gulf Coast Access to Savings Act of 2010 (H.R. 5602) would allow for enhanced access to retirement savings. The Gulf Oil Spill Recovery Act of 2010 (H.R. 5699) would make various tax relief measures available to businesses and individuals. Similar to H.R. 5699, the Gulf Coast Oil Recovery Zone Tax Relief and Economic Recovery Act (S. 3934) would provide various forms of tax relief for businesses and individuals in the affected region. |
crs_R42464 | crs_R42464_0 | Introduction
A number of federal laws prohibit discrimination in employment decisions, including hiring and firing of employees. The exceptions in these laws for religious organizations reflect a constitutional protection commonly known as the ministerial exception. In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the ministerial exception as a protection grounded in the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC . However, the Court did not define the scope of the exception, and a number of questions still remain unanswered in how it may be applied in future cases. This report analyzes the constitutional bases of the ministerial exception and examines selected statutory provisions reflecting its protections under federal employment laws. The report addresses critical questions involved in the application of the ministerial exception, including which employees qualify as ministers, the extent to which courts may defer to religious entities claiming the exception, and whether the exception may apply to any claim brought against a religious entity. Congress has included explicit statutory recognition of the hiring rights of religious organizations in these laws. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex. The ADA includes exemptions for religious organizations. Origins of the Ministerial Exception
In a 1972 case recognizing a constitutional ministerial exception to employment discrimination laws, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the employment relationship between a church and its minister was beyond the reach of governmental regulation. It agreed with the circuit courts that the First Amendment provides protection for a religious organization's decisions regarding employment of its ministers. Distinctions Between Statutory Religious Exemptions and the Constitutional Ministerial Exception
The statutory exemptions for religious organizations provided by Congress differ from the constitutional ministerial exception, though both are rooted in the same principles of non-interference in the internal decisions of church authority and operations. To invoke the constitutional ministerial exception, an employer must be a religious organization and the employee must be a minister or ministerial employee. | Congress has enacted a number of federal laws banning discrimination in employment decisions, including hiring and firing of employees. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in employment if the discrimination is based on race, color, religion, national origin, or sex. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits discrimination based on disability. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibits discrimination in employment based on age. Exceptions in these laws for religious organizations have reflected long-standing recognition of the autonomy of religious organizations in certain employment decisions.
While these statutory provisions protect religious organizations in selected contexts, religious organizations also have constitutional protection, known as the ministerial exception. The ministerial exception protects the employment relationship between a religious entity and its ministerial employees. Courts have long held that the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution bars the government from interfering with internal governance of religious organizations, including decisions regarding employment of ministers or ministerial employees. This exception has generally been framed relatively narrowly to avoid undermining the public policy goals of nondiscrimination legislation. Thus, only religious institutions may claim the ministerial exception and may only do so if the employee functions as a minister or ministerial employee. The boundaries of the exception are not yet settled though. In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the ministerial exception as a necessary outgrowth of its jurisprudence on non-interference in the internal governance of religious organizations (Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC). However, the Court did not define the scope of the exception and declined to identify a standard for determining whether an employee could be labeled as ministerial.
This report analyzes the history and constitutional bases for the ministerial exception and examines selected statutory provisions reflecting its protections under federal employment laws. The report examines the distinction between the constitutional and statutory protections for religious organizations and addresses critical questions involved in judicial consideration of the ministerial exception. It analyzes which employees may qualify as ministerial, the extent to which courts may defer to religious entities claiming the exception, and whether the exception may apply to any claim brought against a religious entity. |
crs_RL33016 | crs_RL33016_0 | 109-401 ), which then-President Bush signed into law December 18, 2006, provided the President with the means to waive a U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement with India from several requirements of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended. President Bush submitted the text of the proposed agreement to Congress September 10, 2008. President Bush also determined that P.L. On October 8, President Bush signed P.L. Then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and India's then-External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee signed the agreement October 10, 2008. India has not signed the NPT and does not have such safeguards, but other countries have still been increasing their nuclear cooperation with New Delhi. Although Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake stated November 15, 2010, that "U.S. firms have already begun negotiations with their Indian counterparts," U.S. firms may be reluctant to engage in nuclear trade with India if the government does not resolve concerns regarding its policies on liability for nuclear reactor operators and suppliers. India signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC), which has not yet entered into force, October 27, 2010. In addition, the agreement requires the United States and India to "agree on arrangements and procedures under which such reprocessing or other alteration in form or content will take place in this new facility." India's Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries22
Since a September 2008 NSG decision to exempt India from some of its export requirements, New Delhi has negotiated nuclear cooperation agreements with NSG countries other than the United States. 109-401 requires (1) provision of a credible separation plan for India's nuclear facilities; (2) approval by the IAEA Board of Governors of India's new nuclear safeguards agreement; (3) substantial Indian progress toward concluding an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement; (4) India's active support for the conclusion of a treaty to ban fissile material production for nuclear weapons; (5) India's support for U.S. and international efforts to halt the spread of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technologies (enrichment and reprocessing); (6) India taking necessary steps to secure nuclear and other sensitive materials and technologies through adherence to multilateral control regimes, such as the NSG and the Missile Technology Control Regime; and (7) a consensus decision by the NSG to except India from some of the Group's export control guidelines. India signed the agreement February 2, 2009, and it entered into force May 11, 2009. According to a November 8, 2010, White House fact sheet, the United States "intends to support India's full membership" in the NSG, as well as the MTCR, the Australia Group, and the Wassenaar Arrangement "in a phased manner." P.L. 110-369 into law October 8, 2008. P.L. Although India conducted a "peaceful" nuclear test in 1974 and tested nuclear weapons in 1998, it is not a recognized nuclear-weapon state. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a voluntary nuclear export regime, in 1975. Bush Administration Policy
The Bush Administration had been considering a strategic partnership with India as early as 2001. Noting the "significance of civilian nuclear energy for meeting growing global energy demands in a cleaner and more efficient manner," President Bush said he would "work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India" and would "also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies." Many observers have noted that India has not taken any measures to restrain its nuclear weapons program. | India, which has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and does not have International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all of its nuclear material, exploded a "peaceful" nuclear device in 1974, convincing the world of the need for greater restrictions on nuclear trade. The United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a direct response to India's test, halted nuclear exports to India a few years later, and worked to convince other states to do the same. India tested nuclear weapons again in 1998. However, President Bush announced July 18, 2005, he would "work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India" and would "also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies," in the context of a broader partnership with India.
U.S. nuclear cooperation with other countries is governed by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 (P.L. 95-242). However, P.L. 109-401, which President Bush signed into law on December 18, 2006, allows the President to waive several provisions of the AEA. On September 10, 2008, President Bush submitted to Congress, in addition to other required documents, a written determination that P.L. 109-401's requirements for U.S. nuclear cooperation with India to proceed had been met. President Bush signed P.L. 110-369, which approved the agreement, into law October 8, 2008. Then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and India's then-External Affairs Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee signed the agreement two days later, and it entered into force December 6, 2008. Additionally, the United States and India signed a subsequent arrangement in July 2010 which governs "arrangements and procedures under which" India may reprocess U.S.-origin nuclear fuel in two new national reprocessing facilities, which New Delhi has not yet constructed.
The NSG, at the behest of the Bush Administration, agreed in September 2008 to exempt India from some of its export guidelines. That decision has effectively left decisions regarding nuclear commerce with India almost entirely up to individual governments. Since the NSG decision, India has concluded numerous nuclear cooperation agreements with foreign suppliers. However, U.S. companies have not yet started nuclear trade with India and may be reluctant to do so if New Delhi does not resolve concerns regarding its policies on liability for nuclear reactor operators and suppliers. Taking a step to resolve such concerns, India signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, which has not yet entered into force, October 27, 2010. However, many observers have argued that Indian nuclear liability legislation adopted in August 2010 is inconsistent with the Convention.
The Obama Administration has continued with the Bush Administration's policy regarding civil nuclear cooperation with India. According to a November 8, 2010, White House fact sheet, the United States "intends to support India's full membership" in the NSG, as well as other multilateral export control regimes. |
crs_R43133 | crs_R43133_0 | "Sequestration" is a process of automatic, largely across-the-board spending reductions under which budgetary resources are permanently canceled to enforce certain budget policy goals. Currently, sequestration is being used as an enforcement tool under the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. Certain federal programs are exempt from sequestration, and special rules govern the effects of sequestration on other programs. Which Types of Unemployment Insurance Benefits Are Affected by the Sequester? 112-25 ) and first implemented on March 1, 2013 (delayed by P.L. 112-240 ), affects some but not all types of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. Benefits from the regular Unemployment Compensation (UC), Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers (UCX), and Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE) programs are exempt and not subject to the sequester reductions. Extended Benefits (EB) and the temporary, now-expired Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08)—as well as most forms of UI administrative funding—are not exempt from the sequester, however, and, therefore, are subject to the sequester reductions. This DOL guidance outlines how states, which administer UI benefits, must reduce all EB and EUC08 benefits, when that program was authorized. What Are the Consequences of the Sequester for Nonexempt UI Benefits in FY2015? However, under federal law, a state may choose to reduce EB benefits by the amount sequestered if the state changes its state unemployment law and the reduction is equivalent to the sequester reduction. EB benefits were not available in any state in FY2014. | "Sequestration" refers to a process of automatic, largely across-the-board spending reductions under which budgetary resources are permanently canceled to enforce certain budget policy goals. Most recently, sequestration was triggered by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25) and first implemented on March 1, 2013 (delayed by P.L. 112-240).
Some, but not all, types of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits are subject to reductions under the BCA sequester. Regular Unemployment Compensation (UC), Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers (UCX), and Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE) benefits are specifically exempt from the sequester reductions. UI payments from the Extended Benefit (EB) and now-expired Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08) programs, however, are subject to the sequester reductions. States administer all types of UI benefits. Therefore, states are responsible for carrying out the sequester reduction in UI benefit payments. The amount and method by which a UI recipient's benefit is reduced varies by state and the date the reduction begins.
This report provides brief answers to some frequently asked questions regarding sequestration and unemployment insurance benefits.
Additional information on UI programs and benefits is available in CRS Report RL33362, Unemployment Insurance: Programs and Benefits, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R42444, Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08): Status of Benefits Prior to Expiration, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
Additional information on modifications to UI programs and benefits as a result of recent changes to state laws is available in CRS Report R41859, Unemployment Insurance: Consequences of Changes in State Unemployment Compensation Laws, by [author name scrubbed].
More general information on the sequester is available in CRS Report R42050, Budget "Sequestration" and Selected Program Exemptions and Special Rules, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44235 | crs_R44235_0 | Background
The appointment of a Supreme Court Justice is an event of major significance in American politics. Each appointment to the nine-member Court is of consequence because of the enormous judicial power that the Court exercises, separate from, and independent of, the executive and legislative branches. Appointments may be infrequent (with a vacancy on the Court occurring only once or twice, or never at all, during a particular President's years in office) or occur in close proximity to each other (with a particular President afforded several opportunities to name persons to the Court). The procedure for appointing a Justice to the Supreme Court is provided for in the U.S. Constitution in only a few words. The "Appointments Clause" (Article II, Section 2, Clause 2) states that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Judges of the supreme Court." While the process of appointing Justices has undergone some changes over two centuries, its most essential feature—the sharing of power between the President and the Senate—has remained unchanged: To receive appointment to the Court, one must first be formally selected ("nominated") by the President and then approved ("confirmed") by the Senate. Although not mentioned in the Constitution, an important role is also played midway in the process—after the President selects, but before the Senate as a whole considers the nominee—by the Senate Judiciary Committee. For the President, the appointment of a Supreme Court Justice can be a notable measure by which history will judge his Presidency. Senators are also mindful that, as noted earlier, Justices receive what can amount to lifetime appointments. A President has no power to remove a Supreme Court Justice from office. Advice and Consent
As discussed above, the need for a Supreme Court nominee arises when a vacancy occurs on the Court due to the death, retirement, or resignation of a Justice (or when a Justice announces his or her intention to retire or resign). For instance, most Presidents, it is assumed, will be inclined to select a nominee whose political or ideological views appear compatible with their own. The prospects for a potential nominee receiving Senate confirmation are another consideration. Note that the percentage of nominees serving as U.S. appellate court judges at the time of nomination is even greater during relatively recent presidencies. A President's search for professional excellence in a nominee rarely proceeds without also taking political factors into account. Factors Affecting the Speed by Which a Nominee Is Selected
Advance Notice of Vacancy
A President may be well positioned to make a quick announcement when a retiring Justice alerts the President beforehand (thus giving the President lead time, before the vacancy occurs, to consider whom to nominate as a successor). The terms of these recess appointments, however, were limited, expiring at the end of the next session of Congress (unlike the potentially lifetime appointments Court appointees receive when nominated and then confirmed by the Senate). Despite the temporary nature of these appointments, every person appointed during a recess of the Senate, except one, ultimately received a later appointment to the Court after being nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Recess appointments, when they do occur, may cause controversy, in large part because they bypass the Senate and its "advice and consent" role. Because of the criticisms of judicial recess appointments in recent decades, the long passage of time since the last Supreme Court recess appointment in 1958, and the relatively short duration of contemporary Senate recesses (which might diminish the need for recess appointments to the Court), a President in the 21 st century might hesitate to make a recess appointment to the Court and do so only under unusual circumstances. | The appointment of a Supreme Court Justice is an event of major significance in American politics. Each appointment is of consequence because of the enormous judicial power the Supreme Court exercises as the highest appellate court in the federal judiciary. Appointments are usually infrequent, as a vacancy on the nine-member Court may occur only once or twice, or never at all, during a particular President's years in office. Under the Constitution, Justices on the Supreme Court receive what can amount to lifetime appointments which, by constitutional design, helps ensure the Court's independence from the President and Congress.
The procedure for appointing a Justice is provided for by the Constitution in only a few words. The "Appointments Clause" (Article II, Section 2, clause 2) states that the President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Judges of the supreme Court." The process of appointing Justices has undergone changes over two centuries, but its most basic feature—the sharing of power between the President and Senate—has remained unchanged: To receive appointment to the Court, a candidate must first be nominated by the President and then confirmed by the Senate.
Political considerations typically play an important role in Supreme Court appointments. It is often assumed, for example, that Presidents will be inclined to select a nominee whose political or ideological views appear compatible with their own. The political nature of the appointment process becomes especially apparent when a President submits a nominee with controversial views, there are sharp partisan or ideological differences between the President and the Senate, or the outcome of important constitutional issues before the Court is seen to be at stake.
Additionally, over more than two centuries, a recurring theme in the Supreme Court appointment process has been the assumed need for professional excellence in a nominee. During recent presidencies, nominees have at the time of nomination, most often, served as U.S. appellate court judges. The integrity and impartiality of an individual have also been important criteria for a President when selecting a nominee for the Court.
The speed by which a President selects a nominee for a vacancy has varied during recent presidencies. A President might announce his intention to nominate a particular individual within several days of when a vacancy becomes publicly known, or a President might take multiple weeks or months to announce a nominee. The factors affecting the speed by which a President selects a nominee include whether a President had advance notice of a Justice's plan to retire, as well as when during the calendar year a Justice announces his or her departure from the Court.
On rare occasions, Presidents also have made Court appointments without the Senate's consent, when the Senate was in recess. Such "recess appointments," however, were temporary, with their terms expiring at the end of the Senate's next session. Recess appointments have, at times, been considered controversial because they bypassed the Senate and its "advice and consent" role. The last recess appointment to the Court was made in 1958 when President Eisenhower appointed Potter Stewart as an Associate Justice (Justice Stewart was confirmed by the Senate the following year).
Additional CRS reports provide information and analysis related to other stages of the confirmation process for nominations to the Supreme Court. For a report related to consideration of nominations by the Senate Judiciary Committee, see CRS Report R44236, Supreme Court Appointment Process: Consideration by the Senate Judiciary Committee, by [author name scrubbed]. For a report related to Senate floor debate and consideration of nominations, see CRS Report R44234, Supreme Court Appointment Process: Senate Debate and Confirmation Vote, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R41315 | crs_R41315_0 | Introduction
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA, P.L. 111-148 , March 23, 2010) creates, requires others to create, or authorizes dozens of new entities to implement the legislation. Some of these new entities are offices within existing cabinet departments and agencies, and are assigned certain administrative or representational duties related to the legislation. Other entities are new boards and commissions with particular planning and reporting responsibilities. Still others are advisory bodies that were created to study particular issues, offer recommendations, or both. Although PPACA describes some of these new organizations and advisory bodies in detail, in most cases it is currently impossible to know how much influence they will ultimately have over the implementation of the legislation. This Report
This report describes dozens of entities that PPACA created, requires others to create, or authorizes. The table does not include other types of activities and work products that PPACA created or required to be created, such as demonstration projects, grants, trust funds, programs, systems, formulas, guidelines, risk pools, websites, ratings areas, model agreements, and protocols. The table in the Appendix is organized in terms of governmental units and advisory bodies (1) that appear to have been created by PPACA itself (e.g., through statutory language stating that an organization is "established" or "created"); (2) that PPACA requires the President to establish (e.g., "the President shall establish"); (3) that PPACA requires the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to establish (e.g., "the Secretary shall establish"); (4) that PPACA requires some other organization to establish (e.g., state governments or agencies within HHS); and (5) that PPACA authorizes to be established. For each entity (or set of entities) listed, the table identifies (to the extent provided in the legislation)
the relevant section of PPACA, the name of the entity, the date that the entity is required to be created and its location, the composition of the entity and its leadership, and the purpose and duties of the entity. Total Number of New PPACA Entities Is Unclear
Although some observers have asserted that PPACA will result in a precise number of new boards and commissions, the exact number of new organizations and advisory bodies that will ultimately be created pursuant to the legislation is currently unknowable. Some individual sections of PPACA are expected to create more than one new entity, the number of entities created pursuant to some sections of the legislation is contingent upon other factors, the requirements in more than one section may be satisfied by a single new entity, and some new entities may be created to implement the legislation even though they are not specifically mentioned in PPACA. The wording of these provisions notwithstanding, in practical terms, many of these entities will not be able to function until their members are appointed and funds are appropriated or made available for the entities to operate (to the extent that operating funds are required). In other cases, however, PPACA is silent with regard to some or all of these dimensions. Those differences may have significant implications for congressional control and, conversely, agency discretion in the implementation of PPACA. Also, it is unclear how GAO will be able to independently audit these entities when the CG has appointed their members. | The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA, P.L. 111-148, March 23, 2010) creates, requires others to create, or authorizes dozens of new entities to implement the legislation. Some of these new entities are offices within existing cabinet departments and agencies, and are assigned certain administrative or representational duties related to the legislation. Other entities are new boards and commissions with particular planning and reporting responsibilities. Still others are advisory bodies that were created to study particular issues, offer recommendations, or both. Although PPACA describes some of these new organizations and advisory bodies in detail, in many cases it is currently impossible to know how much influence they will ultimately have over the implementation of the legislation.
This report describes dozens of new governmental organizations or advisory bodies that are mentioned in PPACA, but does not include other types of entities that were created by the legislation (e.g., various demonstration projects, grants, trust funds, programs, systems, formulas, guidelines, risk pools, websites, ratings areas, model agreements, or protocols). A table in the Appendix is organized in terms of entities (1) that were created by PPACA itself (e.g., through statutory language stating that an organization is "established" or "created"); (2) that PPACA requires the President to establish (e.g., "the President shall establish"); (3) that PPACA requires the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to establish (e.g., "the Secretary shall establish"); (4) that PPACA requires some other organization to establish; and (5) that PPACA authorizes to be established. For each entity listed, the table identifies (to the extent provided in the legislation) the relevant section of PPACA, the name of the entity, the date that the entity is required to be created and its location, the composition of the entity and its leadership, and the purpose and duties of the entity.
The precise number of new entities that will ultimately be created pursuant to PPACA is currently unknowable, for the number of entities created by some sections is contingent upon other factors, and some new entities may satisfy more than one requirement in the legislation. Although PPACA states that certain entities were "established" by the legislation, in practical terms, these entities will not be able to function until members are appointed and appropriations are provided or made available. The legislation sometimes indicates when and where certain entities are to be established, how members are to be appointed, the amount and timing of appropriations, whether certain general management laws are applicable, and when the entities will cease to exist. In other cases, however, PPACA is silent with regard to these and other issues. The degree of specificity in these provisions may have implications for congressional control and, conversely, the amount of discretion that agencies will have in the implementation of the legislation. PPACA significantly increased the appointment responsibilities of the Comptroller General of the United States, and it is unclear how the Government Accountability Office (GAO) will be able to independently audit entities whose members are appointed by the head of GAO.
This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL34074 | crs_RL34074_0 | Since the United States established ties with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during the 1990s, the United States has sought to help facilitate a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, counter Palestinian terrorist groups, and provide certain types of assistance to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. After the signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles in 1993, Congress has committed more than $5 billion in bilateral assistance to the Palestinians. Palestinian National Identity and Aspirations
The Palestinians are Arabs who live in the geographical area comprising present-day Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, or who have historical and cultural ties to that area. In Gaza, Hamas maintains de facto control. U.S.-Palestinian Tensions
The Trump Administration's relations with the PLO are tense. After President Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital in December 2017 and announced that the U.S. embassy would move there from Tel Aviv, PLO Chairman and PA President Abbas broke off high-level political contacts with the United States. Changes to Diplomatic Facilities
During 2018, the Trump Administration has instituted changes affecting both the PLO's representative office in the United States and the U.S. diplomatic facility in Jerusalem with responsibility for Palestinian relations. Merger: U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem into U.S. Embassy to Israel
On October 18, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem and the U.S. embassy to Israel would merge into a single diplomatic mission. As Congress considers legislative options—including on annual appropriations for the Palestinians—and exercises oversight over Israeli-Palestinian developments, Members may consider a number of issues, including the following:
various aspects of U.S.-Palestinian relations; the status of Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy and Palestinian international initiatives; humanitarian and economic development concerns, especially in Gaza; countering terrorism from Hamas and other groups, including rocket attacks from Gaza that have escalated during fall 2018; the surrounding region's effects on the West Bank and Gaza, and vice versa; and Palestinian domestic leadership and civil society. Then, in October, Sinwar gave a lengthy interview in which he stated a desire for a cease-fire with Israel (which Egypt is trying to broker) in exchange for an end to the "siege" (access restrictions on Gaza) currently in place. According to a Gazan journalist, Hamas may consider a long-term cease-fire with Israel to be a better option than losing its control over Gaza—either via a large-scale conflict with Israel or a national unity agreement with the Abbas-led PA—and the domestic prestige that goes with it. They appear to depend on Hamas's willingness to cede control of security in Gaza to the PA. PA President Abbas has insisted that he will not accept a situation where PA control is undermined by Hamas's militia. Israel occupies the West Bank and effectively annexed East Jerusalem after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War; and it maintains significant control over administrative borders, resources, and trade in both the West Bank and Gaza. In fall 2011, the Palestinians obtained membership in the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). In 2016, the Palestinians acceded to the U.N. International Criminal Court Actions97
The Palestinians have taken various actions relating to the ICC since late 2014:
In January 2015, Palestinian leaders deposited an instrument of accession for the "State of Palestine" to become party to the Rome Statute of the ICC, after declaring acceptance in December 2014 of ICC jurisdiction over crimes allegedly "committed in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, since June 13, 2014." International Court of Justice Suit over U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem
In September 2018, the PLO filed suit to have the International Court of Justice (ICJ) order the United States to remove its embassy from Jerusalem. While the Palestinian Authority (PA) maintains a measure of self-rule over various areas of the West Bank, as well as a legal claim to self-rule over Gaza despite Hamas's security presence, the PLO remains the representative of the Palestinian people to Israel and other international actors. All of these factions have minor political support relative to Fatah and Hamas. | The Palestinians are an Arab people whose origins are in present-day Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Congress pays close attention—through legislation and oversight—to the Palestinians' ongoing conflict with Israel.
The current structure of Palestinian governing entities dates to 1994. In that year, Israel agreed with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to permit a Palestinian Authority (PA) to exercise limited rule over Gaza and specified areas of the West Bank, subject to overarching Israeli military administration that dates back to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
After the PA's establishment, U.S. policy toward the Palestinians focused on encouraging a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, countering Palestinian terrorist groups, and aiding Palestinian goals on governance and economic development. Since then, Congress has committed more than $5 billion in bilateral aid to the Palestinians, who rely heavily on external donor assistance.
Under the Trump Administration, U.S. policy toward the Palestinians has shifted. In 2018, the Administration significantly cut U.S. funding for the Palestinians, closed the PLO's representative office in Washington, DC, and merged the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem (which had dealt independently with the Palestinians for decades) into a single diplomatic mission with the U.S. embassy to Israel.
Some of these moves relate to an increase in U.S.-Palestinian tensions stemming from the Administration's recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital (in December 2017) and transfer of the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem (in May 2018). In response to the Administration's policy changes on Jerusalem, PLO Chairman and PA President Mahmoud Abbas has broken off high-level political contacts with the Administration, and the Administration reportedly is seeking leverage to persuade Abbas to renew bilateral discussions. Meanwhile, the PLO has filed suit in 2018 to have the International Court of Justice order the United States to remove its embassy from Jerusalem.
Even before tensions increased under the Trump Administration, lack of progress toward peace with Israel had led the PLO to advocate the Palestinian cause in international fora. The Palestinians obtained membership in the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 2011, and a 2012 resolution in the U.N. General Assembly identified "Palestine" as a "non-member state." Palestinians also have applied international legal pressure on Israel. The Palestinians acceded to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in April 2015, and the ICC could conceivably investigate Israeli, Palestinian, or other individuals for alleged crimes committed in the West Bank and Gaza.
Conducting relations with the Palestinians has presented challenges for several Administrations and Congresses. The United States has historically sought to bolster PA President Abbas vis-à-vis Hamas (a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization supported in part by Iran). Since 2007, Hamas has had de facto control over Gaza. The Abbas-led PA still exercises limited self-rule over specified areas of the West Bank. Given Abbas's age (he was born in 1935) and questions regarding his health, observers speculate about who will succeed him and about the implications for the current situation of divided rule in the West Bank and Gaza.
Gaza also presents a dilemma. Severe humanitarian and economic problems persist there, and it is a small, population-dense territory that has been the site of three major conflicts between Palestinian militants and Israel over the past decade (2008-2009, 2012, and 2014). Israel and Egypt maintain tight control over access to and from Gaza. They seem reluctant to significantly open Gaza's borders because of concerns about bolstering Hamas. Fatah and Hamas have agreed in principle numerous times to reinstate unified PA rule over the West Bank and Gaza, but Abbas has maintained that he will not accept responsibility in Gaza if Hamas's militia remains intact. Hamas and other Palestinian militants have turned to a range of violent actions, seeking an arrangement in which Israel eases restrictions on access to and from Gaza in exchange for a long-term cease-fire. Hamas provocations and Israeli military operations both carry a risk of escalating into wider conflict, even if both sides would prefer to avoid that outcome. |
crs_R42430 | crs_R42430_0 | On January 4, 2011, President Obama signed P.L. 111-358 , the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010. The law responds to concerns about U.S. competitiveness by increasing funding for research in the physical sciences and engineering; authorizing certain federal science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education programs and policies; as well as addressing other related issues. The purpose of this report is to provide information on the President's FY2013 budget request—and the status of FY2013 congressional appropriations—for the agencies, programs, and activities authorized by COMPETES 2010. Certain provisions of the law, including many funding authorizations, expired at the end of FY2013. The President's FY2013 Budget Request
Like its predecessor, COMPETES 2007, the central policy contributions of COMPETES 2010 were the "doubling path" policy for the NSF, NIST core laboratories and construction accounts, and the DOE Office of Science, as well as the authorization of STEM education activities at various federal agencies. Congress and the Bush and Obama Administrations have sought to double funding for the NSF, Department of Energy's Office of Science, and National Institute of Standards and Technology's core laboratory and construction accounts (collectively "the targeted accounts") from their FY2006 levels. Table A-1 summarizes the FY2013 funding status of these selected provisions, including House-passed, Senate Committee on Appropriations recommended, and final (post-rescission, post-sequestration) FY2013 appropriations to these accounts. 113-6 (FY2013 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, H.R. 933 ), which provided regular appropriations for some federal agencies and continuing appropriations for others. 113-6 . Selected COMPETES 2010-related policy provisions from H.Rept. This amount was $18.6 million (2.5%) more than the FY2012 enacted funding level of $750.8 million and was $270.3 million (26.0%) less than the COMPETES 2010 authorized funding level of $1.040 billion. National Science Foundation
Top Line Allocations. Other than this difference, the House and the Senate Committee on Appropriations agreed on major funding levels for the NSF in FY2013. At the top line, both the full House and Senate committee-proposed funding levels for NSF were between $40.6 and $100.0 million less than the President's request for $7.373 billion. FY2013 post-rescission, post-sequestration funding for NSF's main education account, Education and Human Resources (E&HR), was $833.3 million. Among other things, the act provided FY2013 appropriations for the Department of Energy's Office of Science and the Advanced Research Projects Agency–Energy (ARPA-E). Selected COMPETES 2010-related policy provisions in H.Rept. 5325 would have provided $4.801 billion for the Office of Science in FY2013. This was consistent with the Office of Science FY2013 budget request. COMPETES 2010 authorized $312.0 million for ARPA-E in FY2013. P.L. The Doubling Path
Under COMPETES 2010, targeted account funding was set to increase at a compound annual growth rate of 6.3%, close to the 6.4% growth rate in actual appropriations for the targeted accounts during the COMPETES 2007 authorization period (FY2008 to FY2010). Further, FY2013 funding levels for the targeted accounts—separately and combined—were generally below FY2010 levels. Only the NIST core laboratory account was higher in FY2013 than in FY2010. Although the full House, Senate Committee on Appropriations, and the President all initially sought increases over FY2012 levels for many (not all) key COMPETES 2010 accounts in FY2013; the combined effects of sequestration, as well as rescissions and funding levels in the final FY2013 appropriations act ( P.L. | Signed on January 4, 2011, the America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010 (COMPETES 2010, P.L. 111-358) sought to improve U.S. competitiveness and innovation by authorizing, among other things, increased federal support for research in the physical sciences and engineering, as well as science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education. Certain provisions of the law, including major funding authorizations, expired in FY2013. This report describes the President's FY2013 budget request for selected COMPETES 2010 provisions and tracks the status of FY2013 funding for these appropriations accounts.
The President's FY2013 budget requested an increase of 4.1% for the "doubling path" accounts at the National Science Foundation (NSF), Department of Energy's Office of Science, and National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST's) core laboratory and construction. This growth rate was less than the COMPETES 2010 authorized rate of 6.3% and equal to the FY2012 enacted appropriations rate. At the end of the COMPETES 2010 authorization period in FY2013, the growth rate in the targeted accounts was 3.0% (from the FY2006 baseline). Funding levels for the targeted accounts—individually and combined—were generally below FY2010 levels. The sole exception was the NIST core laboratory account, which was higher in FY2013 than in FY2010.
For FY2013, Congress provided both regular and continuing appropriations to COMPETES 2010 agencies. NSF and NIST received regular appropriations, while the Office of Science and Department of Education received continuing funding. The combined effects of sequestration and rescissions in P.L. 113-6 (FY2013 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act) resulted in year-over-year reductions for the Office of Science, the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy (ARPA-E), and most NSF accounts. FY2013 funding for most NIST accounts increased slightly over FY2012 enacted levels. All of the selected COMPETES 2010 accounts were funded below authorized levels. Table A-1 contains information about the FY2013 funding status of selected provisions from COMPETES 2010.
Both the House and the Senate Committee on Appropriations approved FY2013 appropriations bills for the NSF, NIST, and Office of Science before Congress enacted P.L. 113-6. As initially proposed, differences between House and Senate top line funding levels for NSF and NIST were less than 1%, while the difference in funding for the Office of Science was 2.2%. Proposed FY2013 funding for ARPA-E revealed larger differences between the chambers. The House would have provided $200 million while the Senate Committee on Appropriations sought the authorized amount ($312.0 million). FY2013 funding for COMPETES 2010's STEM education provisions were largely consistent with previous appropriations cycles, which have not typically included specific funding levels for these activities. A notable exception to this rule is the main education account at NSF. As initially requested, passed, and recommended, the President's, House, and Senate Committee on Appropriations each provided $875.6 million for this account in FY2013. Post-rescission, post-sequestration FY2013 funding for this account was $833.3 million. |
crs_R44674 | crs_R44674_0 | A steady increase in the revenues flowing into the HTF due to increased motor vehicle use and occasional increases in fuel tax rates accommodated growth in surface transportation spending over several decades. In 2008 Congress began providing Treasury general fund transfers to keep the HTF solvent. The last $70 billion of these transfers were authorized in the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94 ), which was signed by President Barack Obama on December 4, 2015. The FAST Act funds federal surface transportation programs from FY2016 through FY2020. When the act expires the de facto policy of relying on general fund transfers to sustain the HTF will be 12 years old. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections indicate that the imbalance between motor fuel tax receipts and HTF expenditures will reemerge and the HTF balance will approach zero in FY2021. It was believed at the time of SAFETEA's passage that the tax changes, a $12.5 billion unexpended balance in the trust fund, and higher fuel tax revenue due to expected economic growth would be sufficient to finance the surface transportation program through FY2009. What Congress Faces
Since FY2008, the balance of federal highway user tax revenues in the HTF has been inadequate to fund the surface transportation program authorized by Congress. In recent decades, Congress has typically sought to reauthorize surface transportation programs for periods of five or six years. Unless this is changed, $88.5 billion represents the minimum amount the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Committee on Finance would need to find over the FY2021-FY2025 period in some combination of additional revenue and budget offsets for general fund transfers, should Congress choose to continue funding surface transportation at the current, or "baseline," level, adjusted for inflation. Because transportation projects can take years to complete, both the highway and public transportation programs must make payments in future years pursuant to commitments that have already been incurred. 86-342) raised the rate to 4 cents per gallon. During this period, revenues grew automatically from year to year as fuel consumption grew along with increases in vehicle miles traveled. This solution raises a number of issues. A federal sales tax on motor fuel would likely be at best an interim solution to the long-term problem of financing transportation infrastructure because, as with the current motor fuel tax, it relies on fuel consumption to fund transportation programs. Implementation of a mileage-based road user charge would have to overcome a number of potential disadvantages relative to the motor fuels tax, including public concern about personal privacy; the higher costs to establish, collect, and enforce this charge (estimates range from 5% to 13% of collections); the administrative challenge of the billing process given the size of the vehicle fleet (estimated at roughly 263 million vehicles); and the setting and adjusting of the road user charge rates, which would likely be as controversial as increasing the motor fuels taxes. Any of the financing options discussed above could be used to sustain the existing federal financing mechanism, the HTF, but could also be used to support the general fund if Congress considers alternatives to the trust fund financing model. Making a General Fund Share Permanent
By FY2020, the last year of the FAST Act, federal highway programs will have been funded for 12 years under a de facto policy of providing a Treasury general fund share. Although vehicles miles traveled declined in the wake of the recession that began in 2007, vehicle use has been rising again since 2014. For these reasons, while tolls may be an effective way of financing specific facilities—especially major roads, bridges, or tunnels that are likely to be used heavily and are located such that the tolls are difficult to evade—they would likely be less effective in providing broad financial support for surface transportation programs. Because they are issued by state and local government, the federal government has less control over the types of projects supported and the amount of the federal contribution than it does with grant and loan programs. Tax credit bonds typically do not pay interest. | For many years, federal surface transportation programs were funded almost entirely from taxes on motor fuels deposited in the Highway Trust Fund (HTF). Although there has been some modification to the tax system, the tax rates, which are fixed in terms of cents per gallon, have not been increased at the federal level since 1993. Prior to the recession that began in 2007, annual increases in driving, with a concomitant increase in fuel use, were sufficient in most years to keep revenue rising steadily. This is no longer the case. Although vehicle miles traveled have recently surpassed prerecession levels, future increases in fuel economy standards are expected to reduce motor fuel consumption and therefore fuel tax revenue in the years ahead.
Congress has yet to address the surface transportation program's fundamental revenue issues, and has given limited legislative consideration to raising fuel taxes in recent years. Instead, since 2008 Congress has financed the federal surface transportation program by supplementing fuel tax revenues with transfers from the U.S. Treasury general fund. The most recent reauthorization act, the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94), was enacted on December 4, 2015, and authorized spending on federal highway and public transportation programs through September 30, 2020. The act provided $70 billion in general fund transfers to the HTF to support the programs over the five-year life of the act. This use of general fund transfers to supplement the HTF will have been the de facto funding policy for 12 years when the FAST Act expires. The FAST Act did not address funding of surface transportation programs over the longer term. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections indicate that the HTF revenue shortfalls relative to spending will reemerge following expiration of the FAST Act.
The trust fund financing system (which supports both federal highway and public transportation programs) faces a number of challenges. As Congress examines possible options for financing surface transportation infrastructure, it may consider several key points:
Raising motor fuel taxes could provide the HTF with sufficient revenue to fully fund the program in the near term, but may not be a viable long-term solution due to expected declines in fuel consumption. It would also not address the equity issue arising from the increasing number of personal and commercial vehicles that are powered electrically and therefore do not pay motor fuel taxes. Replacing the fuels tax with a mileage-based road user charge or vehicle miles traveled (VMT) charge would need to overcome a variety of financial, administrative, and privacy barriers, but could be a solution in the longer term. Treasury general fund transfers could continue to be used to make up for the HTF's projected shortfalls but could require budget offsets of an equal amount. The political difficulty of adequately funding the HTF could lead Congress to consider altering the trust fund system or eliminating it altogether. This might involve a reallocation of responsibilities and obligations among federal, state, and local governments. Private investment and federal loans can meet some surface transportation needs, but many projects are not well suited to alternative financing. Tolling may be an effective way to finance specific roads, bridges, or tunnels that are likely to have heavy use and are located such that the tolls are difficult to evade, but tolls are unlikely to provide broad financial support for surface transportation programs. |
crs_R45009 | crs_R45009_0 | Introduction
The National Science Foundation (NSF) supports basic research and education in the non-medical sciences and engineering. The NSF is a major source of federal support for U.S. university research, especially in certain fields such as computer science. It is also responsible for significant shares of the federal science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education program portfolio and federal STEM student aid and support. NSF has six appropriations accounts: Research and Related Activities (RRA), Education and Human Resources (EHR), Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction (MREFC), Agency Operations and Award Management (AOAM), National Science Board (NSB), and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG). FY2018 Budget and Appropriations Actions
The Trump Administration is seeking $6.653 billion for NSF in FY2018, an $819 million decrease (-11%) from the FY2017 enacted level of $7.472 billion (see Table 1 ).The request would decrease budget authority primarily in three accounts relative to the FY2017 enacted levels: RRA by $672 million (-11.1%), EHR by $119 million (-13.6%), and MREFC by $26.2 million (-12.5%). The request would provide slight decreases to the AOAM ($1.5 million decrease, -0.5%) and OIG ($200,000 decrease, -1.3%) accounts. The bill would keep funding for the RRA, EHR, NSB, and OIG accounts the same as the FY2017 enacted amounts, and decrease the MREFC and AOAM accounts by $131 million (-62.8%) and $1.5 million (-0.5%), respectively. The text of H.R. 3267 was incorporated as Division C into the omnibus appropriations bill, the Make America Secure and Prosperous Appropriations Act, 2018 ( H.R. 3354 ), and passed, as amended, by the House on September 14, 2017. H.R. 3354 would provide the same total funding amounts for NSF accounts as provided in H.R. 3267 . As reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations on July 27, 2017, S. 1662 , the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018, would provide a total of $7.311 billion to NSF for FY2018. This would be a decrease of $161 million (-2.2%) from the FY2017 enacted funding level and $658 million (9.9%) over President Trump's FY2018 funding request. Compared to the FY2017 enacted level, this bill would keep funding for the NSB and OIG accounts the same and decrease funding for four accounts: RRA by $116 million (-1.9%), MREFC by $26.2 million (-12.5%), EHR by $17.6 million (-2%), and AOAM by $1.5 million (-0.5%). The Continuing Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-56 , Division D), signed by the President on September 8, 2017, provided funding for NSF at the FY2017 level through December 8, 2017, subject to a 0.6791% across-the-board decrease. The Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. 115-90 , Division A) amends P.L. 115-56 to extend funding through December 22, 2017. As reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations, S. 1662 would provide a total of $182.8 million for MREFC in FY2018, $26.2 million below (-12.5%) the FY2017 enacted level, and equal to the FY2018 request. 111-358 ), expired in FY2013. Various reauthorization measures were introduced in the 114 th Congress that included proposed funding levels, but no authorizations of appropriations were enacted. The American Innovation Act ( H.R. 1569 and S. 641 ), introduced as companion bills in March 2017, would adjust annual discretionary spending limits for federal science agencies conducting basic research, including NSF, in FY2017-FY2021 to allow for specified increases in appropriations and would authorize appropriations at these increased levels. Since FY2003, growth in the NSF budget has slowed compared to prior years. Average annual growth in NSF appropriations was 8% between FY1997 and FY2003, 4% from FY2004 to FY2010, and 1% between FY2011 and FY2017. | The National Science Foundation (NSF) supports basic research and education in the non-medical sciences and engineering. NSF is a major source of federal support for U.S. university research, especially in certain fields such as computer science. It is also responsible for significant shares of the federal science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education program portfolio and federal STEM student aid and support.
Overall, the Trump Administration is seeking $6.653 billion for NSF in FY2018, an $819 million decrease (-11%) from the FY2017 enacted level of $7.472 billion. NSF has six appropriations accounts: Research and Related Activities (RRA), Education and Human Resources (EHR), Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction (MREFC), Agency Operations and Award Management (AOAM), National Science Board (NSB), and Office of Inspector General (OIG). The FY2018 request would decrease total budget authority primarily in three accounts relative to FY2017 enacted funding: RRA by $672 million (-11%), EHR by $119 million (-14%), and MREFC by $26 million (-12%). The request would provide slight decreases to AOAM ($1.5 million decrease, -0.5%) and OIG ($200,000 decrease, -1.3%), and no change for NSB.
As reported by the House Committee on Appropriations, H.R. 3267 would provide a total of $7.340 billion to NSF for FY2018. This amount is $133 million below (-1.8%) the FY2017 enacted funding level and $687 million (10.3%) above President Trump's FY2018 request. The bill would keep funding for the RRA, EHR, NSB, and OIG accounts the same as the FY2017 enacted amounts and decrease the MREFC and AOAM accounts by $131 million (-62.8%) and $1.5 million (-0.5%), respectively. The text of H.R. 3267 was incorporated into the omnibus appropriations bill, the Make America Secure and Prosperous Appropriations Act, 2018 (H.R. 3354, Division C), and passed, as amended, by the House on September 14, 2017. H.R. 3354 would provide the same total funding amounts for NSF accounts as provided in H.R. 3267.
As reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations, S. 1662 would provide a total of $7.311 billion to NSF for FY2018. This amount is $161 million below (-2.2%) the FY2017 enacted funding level, and $658 million above (9.9%) President Trump's FY2018 funding request. Compared to the FY2017 enacted level, this bill would keep funding for the NSB and OIG accounts the same and decrease funding for four accounts: RRA by $116 million (-1.9%), MREFC by $26.2 million (-12.5%), EHR by $17.6 million (-2%), and AOAM by $1.5 million (-0.5%).
The Continuing Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-56, Division D), signed by the President on September 8, 2017, provided funding for NSF through December 8, 2017, at the FY2017 level, subject to a 0.6791% across-the-board decrease. The Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-90, Division A) amends P.L. 115-56 to extend funding through December 22, 2017.
Overall growth in the NSF budget has slowed since FY2003. Average annual growth in NSF appropriations was 8% between FY1997 and FY2003, 4% from FY2004 to FY2010, and 1% between FY2011 and FY2017. Among NSF's appropriations accounts, RRA has accounted for the lion's share of growth in obligations since FY2003. Agency appropriations levels were last authorized in FY2010 and expired in FY2013. Various reauthorization measures were introduced in the 114th Congress that included proposed funding levels; none were enacted. In the 115th Congress, the American Innovation Act (H.R. 1569 and S. 641), introduced as companion bills in March 2017, would authorize increasing appropriations for NSF through FY2021 and adjust the discretionary spending limits to accommodate those increases. |
crs_RL32623 | crs_RL32623_0 | The prospect and potential for severe weather or other natural disasters on or immediately before election day, in addition to lingering hypotheticals about terrorist attacks in the United States, have brought attention to the possibility of postponing as well as the authority to postpone, cancel, or reschedule an election for federal office. There is no provision in the United States Constitution which currently authorizes in express language any federal official or institution to "postpone" an election for federal office. The Constitution expressly delegates to the states the primary authority to administer within their respective jurisdictions elections for federal office, with a residual and superseding authority within the United States Congress over most aspects of congressional elections (other than the place of choosing Senators). Additionally, the Constitution provides an express authority in Congress over at least the timing of the selections of presidential electors in the states. As to the time established for holding federal elections under these express constitutional authorities, Congress has legislated, originally in 1845, a uniform date for presidential electors to be chosen in the states, and in 1872, a uniform date for congressional elections across the country. In addition to the absence of specific constitutional direction, there is also no federal law which currently provides express authority to "postpone" an election, although the potential operation of federal statutes regarding vacancies and the consequences of a state's failure to select on the prescribed election day may allow the states to hold subsequent elections in "exigent" circumstances. A handful of states have provided in s tate law express authority to postpone or reschedule elections within their jurisdictions based on certain emergency contingencies, and others have provided general emergency provisions which might be applicable to election situations. Rather, this has been done by Congress by the enactment of federal law. I, §4, cl. II, §1, cl. Congress could, therefore, pass legislation regarding dates, and emergency postponements and/or rescheduling times for elections to federal offices. §8) and presidential elections (3 U.S.C. Conformance With Federal Law
Does a state law or order instituting a rescheduling of an election to federal office within that state, or a portion of the state, impermissibly affect the date of such election in contravention of the federal laws that have established election day for federal offices to be the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November? Federal courts interpreting the federal statutes regarding the timing of elections to Congress have noted that a state's scheme for elections must be in general conformance with the date prescribed by federal law, at 2 U.S.C. It may be contended in the first place that the express constitutional authority of the state legislatures over the selection of presidential electors at Article II, Section 1, clause 2, which language allows the state legislatures to enact statutory schemes to protect the validity of their elections for presidential electors in the state, including fashioning protest or contest procedures, may be consonant with such an authority in the legislature itself to temporarily postpone or to authorize by state law the postponement and rescheduling of state-wide elections by the state executive in certain emergency circumstances. 2 U.S.C. Failure to make choice on prescribed day . | The prospect and potential for severe weather or other natural disasters, in addition to lingering hypotheticals about terrorist attacks directed at certain metropolitan areas, have brought attention to the possibility of postponing and/or the authority to postpone, cancel, or reschedule an election for federal office.
The United States Constitution does not provide in express language current authority for any federal official or institution to "postpone" an election for federal office. Although the Constitution does expressly delegate to the states the primary authority to administer within their respective jurisdictions elections for federal office, there remains within the Constitution a residual and superseding authority in the U.S. Congress over most aspects of congressional elections (art. I, §5, cl. 1), and an express authority in Congress over at least the timing of the selections of presidential electors in the states (article II, §1, cl. 4). Under this authority Congress has legislated a uniform date for presidential electors to be chosen in the states, and a uniform date for congressional elections across the country, to be on the Tuesday immediately following the first Monday in November in the particular, applicable even-numbered election years.
In addition to the absence of an express constitutional direction, there is also no federal law which currently provides express authority to "postpone" an election, although the potential operation of federal statutes regarding vacancies and the consequences of a state's "failure to select" on the prescribed election day (see 2 U.S.C. §8, and 3 U.S.C. §2) might allow a state to hold subsequent elections in "exigent" circumstances. It would appear that under Congress's express constitutional authority over the timing of federal elections that Congress could, at some time, enact a federal law setting conditions, times, and dates for rescheduling of elections to federal offices in the states in emergency or other exigent circumstances, and with the proper standards and guidelines could delegate the execution and application of those provisions to executive branch or state officials.
With regard to state laws and federal elections, in addition to the general protest, contest, and challenge statutes whereby the results of elections to federal office are initially adjudicated in the states, a handful of states have provided in state law express authority to postpone or reschedule elections within their jurisdictions based on certain emergency contingencies. The states' authority within the United States Constitution appears to be sufficient to enact legislation to deal with emergency and exigent circumstances concerning federal elections, as long as such laws do not conflict with federal law enacted under Congress's superseding constitutional authority. Federal courts have thus generally interpreted federal law to permit the states to reschedule elections to congressional office when "exigent" circumstances have necessitated a postponement. There may be different issues raised in the case of the election of presidential electors if the state attempted to hold the entire election within the state on a different date, because the federal statute regarding the "failure to make a choice" on the prescribed election day for presidential electors is different than that regarding congressional elections.
This report has been revised from an earlier version and will be updated as case law or events warrant. |
crs_RL30461 | crs_RL30461_0 | (2)
Antidumping (AD) is relief to remedy the adverse price impact of imports sold on the U.S.market at "less than fair value." (3)
Countervailing duty (CVD) is relief from the adverse price impact of imports that receiveforeign government subsidies. The relief is in the form of extra duties on those imports. Changes in Trade Remedy Laws
The Congress has amended U.S. trade remedy statutes over the years largely in response toindustry concerns that the remedy procedures were not adequately meeting their needs. (17)
Trade Remedy Reform Proposals in the 108th Congress
A number of bills have been introduced in the 108th Congress to the U.S. safeguard (section201) and the antidumping and countervailing duty laws. 2365 (English), the Trade Reform Act of 2003, would make changes in anumber of U.S. trade remedy laws, including the section 201 safeguard law. 2365 would lower the causal threshold to requirethat import surges be only "a cause" of injury to U.S. domestic industry. TPA Debate
Treatment of trade remedy laws during U.S. trade agreement negotiations became a highlycontentious subject during the 107th Congress's debate on extending trade promotion authority (TPA)to the President. The House version of the bill did not contain thisprovision. Trade remedy legislation is largely supported by those industries,such as steel, that are most sensitive to foreign competition. The legislation is often opposed by thoseindustries and groups that are users of imports as inputs or consumers of final products. Increasedtrade relief would likely result in higher prices to these groups. | Trade remedies are government measures to minimize the adverse impact of imports ondomestic industries. Antidumping duties are used to counter the effects of imports sold at unfairlylow prices on the domestic market. Countervailing duties are used to counter the price effects ofimports that benefit from government subsidies in the exporting countries. Safeguard remedies (alsocalled Section 201 and escape clause remedies) are used to reduce the injurious impact of surges infairly trade imports.
Some of the bills introduced in the 108th Congress would revise safeguard remedies. Otherswould change antidumping and countervailing-duty remedies. The congressional proposals followdifferent approaches to the same goal -- to ease the procedural burden in obtaining relief andimprove the chances that U.S. industries would obtain relief. In so doing, the legislation would make it less likely that industries would press Congress to directly restrict imports throughprotectionist legislation.
The 106th Congress did pass one change to U.S. trade remedy law, the so-called Byrdamendment. The 107th Congress did not act on trade remedy legislation, but treatment of traderemedy laws in trade negotiations was a major point of contention during the debate over legislationto grant the President trade promotion authority. Several bills that would amend U.S. trade remedylaws have been introduced in the 108th Congress.
Trade remedy legislation is largely supported by those industries, such as steel, that are mostsensitive to foreign competition. The legislation is generally opposed by those industries and groupsthat use imports as inputs or consume them as final products. Increased trade relief would likelyresult in higher prices to these latter groups. This report will be revised as congressional actionwarrants. |
crs_R43318 | crs_R43318_0 | Until recently, the DI trust fund was projected to be depleted in the fourth quarter of calendar year 2016, at which time ongoing revenues to the DI trust fund were projected to be sufficient to pay only about 80% of scheduled benefits. 1314 ; P.L. 114-74 ) extended the projected solvency of the DI trust fund by authorizing a reallocation of the Social Security payroll tax rate between the DI and the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) trust funds to provide DI with a larger share. In 2014, SSDI provided disability insurance coverage to more than 151 million nonelderly workers. The Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund finances the benefits of disabled workers and their dependents, and the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund pays for the benefits of retired workers and their dependents as well as survivors of deceased workers. Each trust fund is a separate account in the U.S. Treasury, and under current law, the two trust funds may not borrow from one another. Financing
SSDI and OASI are financed primarily by dedicated payroll and self-employment taxes levied on the earnings of covered workers under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and the Self-Employment Contributions Act (SECA). In other words, up to a certain rate, taxes paid on OASI benefits are deposited in the OASI trust fund and taxes paid on SSDI benefits are deposited in the DI trust fund. Causes of the DI Trust Fund's Financial Imbalance
The declining solvency of the DI trust fund is the result of an increasing imbalance between its income and cost. Over the past 20 years, the annual DI income rate has remained relatively flat at about 1.81% of taxable payroll, which is roughly the combined share of the tax rate allocated to the DI trust fund for that period plus a small amount of other income. The increase in the annual DI cost rate stems largely from the growth in the number of beneficiaries on SSDI. Between 1995 and 2014, the total number of disabled workers and their dependents in receipt of SSDI increased 85%, from 5.9 million to 10.9 million. The Social Security Act provides no guidance on the payment of benefits once a trust fund's asset reserves have been depleted and current tax revenues are insufficient to meet current cost. Although individuals who meet Social Security's eligibility requirements are legally entitled to disability benefits, a provision in the Antideficiency Act prohibits a federal agency from spending in excess of available funds. Because the Social Security Act stipulates that SSDI benefit payments shall be made only from the DI trust fund, without a change in the law, monthly cash payments to beneficiaries could be delayed or reduced if the DI trust fund were depleted. Upon depletion of its asset reserves in late 2016, the trustees projected that continuing tax revenues to the DI trust fund would have been sufficient to pay 81% of SSDI benefits. Under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015
On November 2, 2015, President Barack Obama signed into law the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 ( H.R. Among its many provisions, the act authorized a temporary reallocation of the Social Security payroll tax rate between the OASI and DI trust funds to provide DI with a larger share for 2016 through 2018. Specifically, the DI trust fund's share of the tax rate for employees and employers, each, increased by 0.285 percentage point at the beginning of 2016, from 0.900% to 1.185% ( Table 4 ). Because the act did not change the Social Security payroll tax rate, the portion of the tax rate allocated to OASI decrease d by a corresponding amount. On a combined basis , OASI's share of the 12.400% tax rate declined by 0.570 percentage point, from 10.600% to 10.030%. For 2019 and later, the shares allocated to the DI and OASI trust funds are scheduled to return to their 2015 levels. SSA's Office of the Chief Actuary (OACT) projects that the reallocation schedule in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 will extend the solvency of the DI trust fund from the fourth quarter of 2016 to approximately the third quarter of 2022 ( Figure 6 ). Although the reallocation is projected to reduce the solvency of the OASI trust fund by a number of months, OACT estimates that the depletion year for OASI will remain unchanged at 2035. For information on reform proposals that would affect the solvency of the DI trust fund (or both trust funds), see the following resources:
CRS Report R43054, Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) Reform: An Overview of Proposals to Manage the Growth in the SSDI Rolls , by [author name scrubbed]; CBO's 2012 report, Policy Options for the Social Security Disability Insurance Program , at http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43421 ; CBO's 2015 report, Social Security Policy Options, 2015 , at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/51011 ; OACT's Summary of Provisions That Would Change the Social Security Program , at https://www.ssa.gov/oact/solvency/provisions/summary.pdf ; OACT's collection of cost estimates for various proposals affecting the solvency of the trust funds at https://www.ssa.gov/oact/solvency/index.html ; and the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) 2015 report, Social Security's Future: Answers to Key Questions , at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-75SP . | Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) provides benefits to nonelderly workers and their eligible dependents if the worker paid Social Security taxes for a certain number of years and is unable to perform substantial work due to a qualifying impairment. As in Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI)—the retirement component of Social Security—benefits are based on a worker's past earnings in covered employment. In December 2014, SSDI provided disability insurance coverage to more than 151 million people and paid benefits to about 9 million disabled workers and 2 million of their spouses and children.
Benefits and administrative costs for SSDI and OASI are financed primarily by dedicated payroll and self-employment taxes levied on the earnings of covered workers, which are deposited in the Federal Disability Insurance (DI) Trust Fund and the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Trust Fund, respectively. The combined Social Security tax on earnings is 12.40%, which is split equally between workers and employers (6.20% each). Of that amount, 2.37% is allocated to the DI trust fund and 10.03% is allocated to the OASI trust fund. Each trust fund is a legally distinct account in the U.S. Treasury, and under current law, the two trust funds may not borrow from one another.
Over the past few years, Congress has grown increasingly concerned with the financial outlook of the DI trust fund. Cost has exceeded total income since 2009, causing the balance of the DI trust fund to shrink. In their July 2015 report, the Social Security trustees projected that the DI trust fund would be depleted in the fourth quarter of calendar year 2016. Upon depletion of its asset reserves, the DI trust fund was projected to have enough ongoing revenues to pay only about 80% of scheduled benefits. The trustees projected that the OASI trust fund would be depleted in 2035.
The Social Security Act provides no guidance on the payment of benefits once a trust fund's asset reserves have been depleted and current tax revenues are insufficient to meet current cost. Although individuals who meet Social Security's eligibility requirements are legally entitled to disability benefits, a provision in the Antideficiency Act prohibits a federal agency from spending in excess of available funds. Because the Social Security Act stipulates that SSDI benefit payments shall be made only from the DI trust fund, without a change in the law, monthly cash payments to beneficiaries could be delayed or reduced if the DI trust fund were depleted.
The decreasing solvency of the DI trust fund is the result of an increasing imbalance between the fund's income and cost. Over the past 20 years, tax revenues to the DI trust fund have remained relatively flat as a percentage of taxable payroll, whereas cost as a share of taxable payroll has grown markedly. The increase in cost stems largely from the growth in the number of beneficiaries in the program. Between 1995 and 2014, the number of disabled workers and their dependents in receipt of SSDI grew 85%, from 5.9 million to 10.9 million. Because benefit payments account for nearly all program spending, the growth in the SSDI rolls has contributed heavily to the financial difficulties of the DI trust fund.
On November 2, 2015, President Barack Obama signed into law the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (H.R. 1314; P.L. 114-74). Among its many provisions, the act authorized a temporary reallocation of the Social Security payroll tax rate between the OASI and DI trust funds to provide DI with a larger share for 2016 through 2018. Specifically, the DI trust fund's share of the combined tax rate increased by 0.57 percentage point at the beginning of 2016, from 1.80% to 2.37%. Because the act did not change the combined payroll tax rate of 12.40%, the portion of the tax rate allocated to OASI decreased by a corresponding amount. This means that OASI's share of the combined tax rate declined by 0.57 percentage point at the start of 2016, from 10.60% to 10.03%. For 2019 and later, the shares allocated to the DI and OASI trust funds are scheduled to return to their 2015 levels (i.e., 1.80% to the DI trust fund and 10.60% to the OASI trust fund).
The Social Security Administration's Office of the Chief Actuary (OACT) projects that the reallocation will extend the solvency of the DI trust fund from the fourth quarter of 2016 to the third quarter of 2022. Although the reallocation will reduce the solvency of the OASI trust fund slightly, OACT estimates that the depletion year for OASI will remain unchanged at 2035. |
crs_RL32256 | crs_RL32256_0 | Introduction
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, considerable concern has been raised because the 19 terrorists were aliens (i.e., noncitizens or foreign nationals) who apparently entered the United States on temporary visas. Fears that lax enforcement of immigration laws regulating the admission of foreign nationals into the United States may continue to make the United States vulnerable to further terrorist attacks have led many to call for revisions in the visa policy and possibly changes in who administers immigration law. Foreign nationals not already legally residing in the United States who wish to come to the United States generally must obtain a visa to be admitted. Under current law, three departments—the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ)—each play key roles in administering the law and policies on the admission of aliens. DOS's Bureau of Consular Affairs (Consular Affairs) is responsible for issuing visas, DHS's Citizenship and Immigration Services Bureau (USCIS) is charged with approving immigrant petitions, and DHS's Customs and Border Protection Bureau (CBP) is tasked with inspecting all people who enter the United States. This report addresses policies on immigration visa issuances, options to reassign this function to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that were considered prior to passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. H.R. During the week of July 8, 2002, the House Committees on Judiciary, International Relations, and Government all approved language on visa issuances that retained DOS's administrative role in issuing visas, but added specific language to address many of the policy and national security concerns raised during their respective hearings. When the House Select Committee on Homeland Security marked up H.R. 5005 as passed. 5710 retained the language clarifying that—although DOS's Consular Affairs would continue to issue visas—the Secretary of DHS would issue regulations regarding visa issuances and would assign staff to consular posts abroad to advise, review, and conduct investigations. H.R. 5005 . It also stated that DOS's Consular Affairs continues to be responsible for issuing visas. 107 - 296 ). Current Issues
Competing Concerns
Some have expressed the view that DOS retains too much power and control over visa issuances under the MOU. They maintain the Homeland Security Act intended DHS to be the lead department and that DOS was to merely administer the visa process. Proponents of DOS playing the lead role in visa issuances assert that only consular officers in the field have the country-specific knowledge to make decisions about whether an alien is admissible and that staffing 250 diplomatic and consular posts around the world would stretch DHS beyond its capacity. The question of whether DHS and DOS are adequately funded to process visas expeditiously while maintaining visa security procedures may arise as the FY2005 budget is debated. | Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, considerable concern has been raised because the 19 terrorists were aliens who apparently entered the United States on temporary visas despite provisions in immigration laws that bar the admission of terrorists. Fears that lax enforcement of immigration laws regulating the admission of foreign nationals into the United States may continue to make the United States vulnerable to further terrorist attacks have led many to call for revisions in the policy as well as changes in who administers immigration law.
Foreign nationals not already legally residing in the United States who wish to come to the United States generally must obtain a visa to be admitted, with certain exceptions noted in law. Prior to establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), two departments—the Department of State (DOS) Bureau of Consular Affairs and the Department of Justice (DOJ) Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)—each played key roles in administering the law and policies on the admission of aliens. Although DOS's Consular Affairs remains responsible for issuing visas, DHS's Bureau of Citizenship and Immigrant Services approves immigrant petitions, and DHS's Bureau of Customs and Border Protection inspects all people who enter the United States. In FY2002, DOS issued approximately 6.2 million visas and rejected over 2.2 million aliens seeking visas.
When the President's proposal to establish DHS (H.R. 5005, 107th Congress) was debated, his initial plan to give the DHS Secretary exclusive authority through the Secretary of State to issue or refuse to issue visas was a thorny point. The House Select Committee on Homeland Security approved compromise language on visa issuances in H.R. 5005 that retained DOS's administrative role in issuing visas, but added specific language to address many of the policy and national security concerns raised during hearings. An amendment to move the consular affairs visa function to DHS failed when the House passed H.R. 5005. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) retained the compromise language stating that DHS issues regulations regarding visa issuances and assigns staff to consular posts abroad to advise, review, and conduct investigations, and that DOS's Consular Affairs continues to issue visas.
Signing of a 2003 memorandum of understanding (MOU) that implements the working relationship between DOS and DHS's three immigration-related bureaus sparked immediate debate. Some have expressed the view that DOS retains too much control over visa issuances under the MOU, maintaining that the Homeland Security Act intended DHS to be the lead department and DOS to merely administer the visa process. Proponents of DOS playing the principal role in visa issuances assert that only consular officers in the field have the country-specific knowledge to make decisions about whether an alien is admissible and that staffing 250 diplomatic and consular posts around the world would stretch DHS beyond its capacity. Whether the visa security procedures are adequately funded may also arise as the FY2005 budget is considered. This report will be updated as significant developments occur. |
crs_R43480 | crs_R43480_0 | Introduction
Congress has at times expressed concern regarding ballistic missile and nuclear programs in Iran, North Korea, and Syria. Congress has held numerous hearings and passed laws designed to slow and deter Iran, North Korea, and Syria from developing ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. Congress has also established reporting requirements concerning these countries' missile and nuclear programs. This report focuses primarily on unclassified and declassified U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) assessments and reports over the past two decades. These assessments indicate that
no public evidence exists that Iran and North Korea have engaged in nuclear-related trade or cooperation with each other, although ballistic missile technology cooperation between the two is significant and meaningful, and Syria has received ballistic missiles and related technology from North Korea and Iran and also engaged in nuclear technology cooperation with North Korea. This report begins with a description of the key elements of a nuclear weapons program. It then explains the available information regarding cooperation among Iran, North Korea, and Syria on ballistic missiles and nuclear technology. Syria possesses only short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). The two countries may not have recently engaged in nuclear cooperation because Iran has, according to the IC, apparently halted its nuclear weapons program. Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act
Congress has passed legislation providing for sanctions on countries whose entities assist Iran, North Korea, and Syria to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile delivery systems. For example, the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA, P.L. 106-178 ) imposes penalties on countries whose companies assist the efforts of Iran, North Korea, and Syria to acquire WMD and missile delivery systems. Issues for Congress
Congress may wish to consider requiring additional reporting from the executive branch on WMD proliferation. The number of unclassified reports to Congress on WMD-related issues has decreased considerably in recent years. | Congress has at times expressed concern regarding ballistic missile and nuclear programs in Iran, North Korea, and Syria. This report focuses primarily on unclassified and declassified U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) assessments over the past two decades. These assessments indicate that
there is no evidence that Iran and North Korea have engaged in nuclear-related trade or cooperation with each other, although ballistic missile technology cooperation between the two is significant and meaningful, and Syria has received ballistic missiles and related technology from North Korea and Iran and also engaged in nuclear technology cooperation with North Korea.
All three countries discussed in this report have short-range ballistic missiles. Iran and North Korea also have medium-range ballistic missiles; North Korea has intermediate-range ballistic missiles as well. North Korea has tested nuclear weapons on three occasions; Iran and Syria's nuclear programs have raised suspicions that those countries are pursuing nuclear weapons. However, Iran has, according to the IC, halted its nuclear weapons program, and Syria does not appear to have an active nuclear weapons program.
Congress has held numerous hearings regarding these countries' nuclear and missile programs. It has also passed legislation providing for sanctions on countries whose entities assist Iran, North Korea, and Syria to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile delivery systems. For example, the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA, P.L. 106-178) imposes penalties on countries whose companies' exports assist the efforts of Iran, North Korea, and Syria to acquire WMD and missile delivery systems.
Congress has also established reporting requirements concerning these countries' missile and nuclear programs. Congress may wish to consider requiring additional reporting from the executive branch on WMD proliferation because the number of unclassified reports to Congress on WMD-related issues has decreased considerably in recent years.
This report describes the key elements of a nuclear weapons program; explains the available information regarding cooperation among Iran, North Korea, and Syria on ballistic missiles and nuclear technology; and discusses some specific issues for Congress. |
crs_R40452 | crs_R40452_0 | The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 ( P.L. Although the programs have expired, they are still making payments for losses that occurred prior to September 30, 2011. It essentially compensates eligible producers for a portion of losses that are not eligible for an indemnity payment under a crop insurance policy. The program departs, however, from both traditional disaster assistance and crop yield insurance by calculating and reimbursing losses using total crop revenue for the entire farm (i.e., summing revenue from all crops for an individual farmer). On December 28, 2009, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) issued regulations for SURE. In the next farm bill debate, Congress will likely be interested in the effectiveness of SURE, and, if the program is reauthorized, how it will be funded. SURE is one of 37 programs that does not have a continuing budgetary baseline that could be used to pay for extending the program. In an effort to end the ad-hoc nature of emergency assistance, with legislation enacted after the disaster occurred, Congress authorized the SURE program in the 2008 farm bill. Part of the motivation was to provide a pre-designed program that farmers could incorporate in their risk management planning. It would presumably provide more timely payments. Under the new program, a farmer's revenue from all crops in all counties is compared with a guaranteed level of revenue that is computed mostly from expected or average yields and prices. As a result, the program considers the disaster's impact on a farmer's entire enterprise and not on just the crop(s) that were adversely affected. If the actual farm revenue (including farm program payments and insurance indemnities) is less than the farm's guaranteed level, the producer receives a payment. In contrast, if actual whole farm revenue does not fall below the guaranteed level, whereby losses for one crop are offset by revenue gains for another, no disaster payment is made. Payments are limited so that the guaranteed level cannot exceed 90% of expected farm income in the absence of a natural disaster. The payment is 60% of the difference between the two. Payment Timing
Disaster payments under SURE arrive well after the crop loss because some of the data needed to computed payment rates become available more than one year after harvest. Computing actual farm revenue requires season-average prices, which USDA publishes after the market year ends. Program signup for 2010 losses began November 14, 2011. USDA officials say that SURE is the most complex program USDA's Farm Service Agency (FSA) has undertaken. It has faced a number of implementation challenges in terms of program administration. Insurance Issues
Another issue has been accounting for various insurance products when determining the farmer's guarantee level. A primary policy question is how well this whole-farm approach helps manage farm-level risk. Nevertheless, some farmers have complained that the whole-farm approach typically does not result in disaster payments for diversified operations because aggregating revenue across a farmer's entire operation substantially reduces the likelihood of receiving assistance. In contrast, where farmers have qualified for payments, the initial reaction has been generally favorable. Under the 2008 farm bill, the SURE program provides payments to producers for crop revenue losses due to natural disaster or adverse weather incurred on or before September 30, 2011. | In an effort to end the ad-hoc nature of emergency crop disaster assistance to farmers, Congress authorized a new Supplemental Revenue Assistance Payments Program (SURE) in the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008. The program provides payments to producers for crop revenue losses due to natural disaster or adverse weather incurred on or before September 30, 2011. Although program authority has expired, SURE is still making payments for losses that occurred prior to that date.
SURE essentially compensates eligible producers for a portion of losses that are not eligible for an indemnity payment under a crop insurance policy. The program departs from both traditional disaster assistance and crop yield insurance by calculating and reimbursing losses using total crop revenue for the entire farm (i.e., summing revenue from all crops for an individual farmer). Under SURE, a farmer's revenue from all crops in all counties is compared with a guaranteed level that is computed mostly from expected or average yields and prices. As a result, the program considers the disaster's impact on a farmer's entire enterprise and not on just the crop(s) that were adversely affected. If the actual farm revenue (including farm program payments and insurance indemnities) is less than the farm's guaranteed level, the producer receives a payment, calculated as 60% of the difference between the two amounts. In contrast, if actual whole farm revenue does not fall below the guarantee, whereby losses for one crop are offset by revenue gains for another, no disaster payment is made. Payments are limited so that the guaranteed level cannot exceed 90% of expected farm income in the absence of a natural disaster. As of mid-December 2011, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) had issued $2.8 billion for 2008 and 2009 losses under the SURE program. Program signup for 2010 losses began November 14, 2011.
USDA officials say that SURE is the most complex program USDA's Farm Service Agency has undertaken. It has faced a number of implementation challenges in terms of program administration, such as collecting and tabulating a significant amount of data for individual farmers, as well as crop price data that are not readily available. Another issue has been accounting for various insurance products when determining the farmer's guarantee level.
Part of the motivation behind SURE was to provide a pre-designed program that farmers could incorporate in their risk management planning. Also, payments would be presumably more timely because legislation would already be in place when disaster strikes. However, disaster payments under SURE arrive well after the crop loss because some of the data needed to compute payment rates become available more than one year after harvest. Computing actual farm revenue requires season-average prices, which USDA publishes after the market year ends. Also, government commodity payments, which are also needed for the revenue calculation, can occur 1½ years after the crop is harvested. Thus, SURE program payments have not been as timely as some farmers and policymakers would like.
In the next farm bill debate, Congress will likely be interested in the effectiveness of SURE, and, if the program is continued, how it will be funded. SURE is one of 37 programs that does not have budgetary baseline. Major policy questions are likely to be (1) whether the SURE program can be modified to eliminate the call for ad-hoc crop disaster payments, and (2) how well this whole-farm approach helps manage farm-level risk. Some farmers have complained that the whole-farm approach typically does not result in disaster payments for diversified operations. In contrast, where farmers have qualified for payments, the reaction has been generally favorable. |
crs_R42769 | crs_R42769_0 | Introduction
Congressional authorization of federal assistance to state and local governments can be traced back to the Continental Congress and its approval of the granting of nationally owned land to states formed out of the Northwest Territory. Those lands were to be sold for the support of public education. Congress subsequently granted millions of acres for wagon road and canal construction, 64 million acres for improvements to river navigation, and several thousand acres for the establishment and support of land grant colleges. The first federal cash grant program was adopted in 1808, to provide funds to states to support the National Guard. Since that time, there has been dramatic growth in federal cash assistance programs, now commonly referred to as "federal grant programs" or "federal domestic assistance programs." These programs transfer money, property, services, or other items of value for which the principal purpose is to accomplish a goal authorized by Congress. There are currently 2,179 congressionally authorized federal domestic assistance programs. As the number of congressionally authorized grant programs has increased over time, congressional interest in these programs, in terms of their efficiency and effectiveness, both individually and collectively, has also increased. The increasing cost of federal grants-in-aid assistance has also attracted congressional interest. Figure 2 illustrates that federal outlays for grants to state and local governments have grown from $13.2 billion (in constant FY2005 dollars) in 1940 to $514.6 billion in 2011. The growing number, perceived fragmentation, and complexity of these programs create challenges for federal agencies interested in standardizing various financial and administrative aspects of grant program management. As a result, there is wide variation across and within federal agencies in the administration of federal grant programs. This variation in federal grant administration makes it difficult for Congress to compare program performance, both within and across federal agencies, and to exercise its oversight of federal agencies. Federal agencies administering grant programs face challenges in providing timely, accurate, and detailed information on federal grant awards. Without complete and valid information about the distribution of federal grant funds, Congress may have a diminished capacity to engage in effective oversight of federal grants. This report is designed to assist Congress in its oversight of federal grants-in-aid programs by providing an overview of federal grants-in-aid generally; a description of the typical life cycle of a federal grant, including the processes for selecting, awarding, administering, and overseeing a federal grant award; and an analysis of the tracking of federal grants currently being done by federal agencies. | Congressional authorization of federal assistance to state and local governments can be traced back to the Continental Congress and its approval of the granting of nationally owned land to states formed out of the Northwest Territory. Those lands were to be sold for the support of public education. Congress subsequently granted millions of acres of land to states to support various congressional priorities, including wagon road and canal construction, improvements to river navigation, and the establishment of land grant colleges. The first federal cash grant program was adopted in 1808, to provide funds to states to support the National Guard.
Since that time, there has been dramatic growth in federal cash assistance programs, now commonly referred to as "federal grant programs" or "federal domestic assistance programs." These programs transfer money, property, services, or other items of value for which the principal purpose is to accomplish a goal authorized by Congress.
Currently there are 2,179 congressionally authorized federal domestic assistance programs administered by 26 federal agencies. Federal grant programs comprise 1,714, or 79%, of the domestic assistance programs. As the number of congressionally authorized grant programs has increased over time, congressional interest in these programs, in terms of their efficiency and effectiveness, both individually and collectively, has also increased. The increasing cost of federal grants-in-aid assistance has also attracted congressional interest. Federal outlays for grants to state and local governments has grown from $13.2 billion (in constant FY2005 dollars) in 1940 to $514.6 billion in 2011.
The growing number, perceived fragmentation, and complexity of these programs create challenges for federal agencies interested in standardizing various financial and administrative aspects of grant program management. As a result, there is wide variation across and within federal agencies in the administration of federal grant programs. This variation in federal grant administration makes it difficult for Congress to compare program performance, both within and among federal agencies, and to exercise its oversight of federal agencies.
This report is designed to assist Congress in its oversight of federal grants-in-aid programs by providing an overview of federal grants-in-aid generally; a description of the typical life cycle of a federal grant, including the processes for selecting, awarding, administering, and overseeing a federal grant award; and an analysis of the tracking of federal grants currently administered by federal agencies.
Federal agencies face challenges in providing Congress and the public with timely, accurate, and detailed information about federal grant awards. Limitations on the ability to track the distribution of federal grants raises questions about the validity of the information and suggests that Congress may have a diminished capacity to engage in effective oversight of federal grants. |
crs_R44540 | crs_R44540_0 | Introduction
Federal highway and public transportation programs are funded mainly by taxes on motor fuel that flow into the Highway Trust Fund (HTF). The tax rates, set on a per-gallon basis, have not been raised since 1993, and motor fuel tax receipts have been insufficient to support the transportation programs authorized by Congress since FY2008. Increases in vehicle fuel efficiency and wider use of electric vehicles raise questions about the long-term viability of motor fuel taxes as a means of funding surface transportation. Economists have long favored mileage-based user charges as an alternative source of highway funding. Under the user charge concept, motorists would pay fees based on distance driven and, perhaps, on other costs of road use, such as wear and tear on roads, traffic congestion, and air pollution. How Road User Charges Might Work
A road user charge system would involve assessing owners of individual vehicles on a per-mile basis for the distance the vehicle is driven. Most studies of road use charging envision a single national system that would distribute revenue to the HTF and directly to the states, which currently impose their own taxes on motor fuels for transportation purposes. Pay at the Pump
A different approach to distance-based user charges would mimic the way Americans now pay their fuel taxes. The participant received a receipt, printed at the pump, specifying the cost of fuel and the user charge. No information on the vehicle's location is collected. The road user charge would reverse this by taking a small and simple tax administration problem and making it large: A mileage-based road user charge that encompasses all private vehicles could require as many as 256 million points of collection. However, experience in the United States and other countries suggests that the administrative and enforcement costs of collecting user fees would be in the range of 5% to 13% of collections. Section 6020 of the FAST Act authorized $95 million over the life of the bill to provide grants to states to "demonstrate user-based alternative revenue mechanisms that utilize a user fee structure to maintaining the long term solvency of the Highway Trust Fund." State-Level Experiments
Several states have conducted trials of mileage-based road user charge systems. Foreign Use of Mileage-Based Road User Charges
A number of foreign countries have imposed distance-based road user charges. Although proposals have been made in some European countries to bring automobiles under mileage-based road user charges, no such measures have been implemented to date. | A mileage-based road user charge would involve assessing owners of individual vehicles on a per-mile basis for the distance the vehicle is driven. Currently, federal highway and public transportation programs are funded mainly by motor fuel tax receipts that flow into the Highway Trust Fund (HTF). The tax rates, set on a per-gallon basis, have not been raised since 1993, and receipts have been insufficient to support the transportation programs authorized by Congress since FY2008. The long-term viability of motor fuels taxes is also questionable because of increasing vehicle fuel efficiency and the wider use of electric vehicles. Economists have favored the use of mileage-based user charges as an alternative to motor fuels taxes to support highway funding. Congress, in Section 6020 of the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94), provided $95 million to fund large-scale pilot studies by states or groups of states to demonstrate "user-based revenue systems" to maintain the solvency of the HTF.
Under this user charge concept, motorists would pay based on distance driven and, perhaps, other costs of road use, such as wear and tear on roads, traffic congestion, and air pollution. Mileage-based road user charges could range from a flat cent per mile charge based on a simple odometer reading to a variable charge based on a global positioning system (GPS). Other proposals envision mileage-based road user charges that would mimic the way Americans now pay their fuel taxes by collecting the charge at the pump. Most road user charge systems would require electric vehicle users to pay for their use of the roads. Charging by the mile could in itself provide an incentive to drive less. Such a reaction would reduce revenue, however.
Implementation of a mileage-based road user charge would have to overcome a number of potential disadvantages relative to the motor fuels tax, including public concern about personal privacy; the higher costs to establish, collect, and enforce (estimates range from 5% to 13% of collections); the administrative challenge of the billing process given the size of the private vehicle fleet (estimated at roughly 256 million vehicles or points of collection); and the setting and adjusting of the road user charge rates, which would likely face as much opposition as increasing the motor fuels taxes.
Experiments with road user charges have been conducted in the United States. Although useful, most of these have been small-scale experiments done at the state or local level. Other countries have implemented full-scale road user charge systems that offer more information on the potential costs and benefits. These include road user charges on trucks in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, as well as charges on both trucks and automobiles in New Zealand. |
crs_R41536 | crs_R41536_0 | Introduction
Nearly half a million miles of high-volume pipeline transport natural gas, oil, and other hazardous liquids across the United States. While an efficient and fundamentally safe means of transport, many pipelines carry volatile, flammable, or toxic materials with the potential to cause public injury and environmental damage. These systems are vulnerable to accidents and terrorist attack. Recent pipeline accidents in Marshall, MI, San Bruno, CA, Allentown, PA, and Laurel, MT, have demonstrated this vulnerability and have heightened congressional concern about pipeline risks. The federal pipeline safety program is authorized through the fiscal year ending September 30, 2015, under the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 ( P.L. 112-90 ), which was signed by President Obama on January 3, 2012. Staffing Resources for Pipeline Safety and Security
The U.S. pipeline safety program employs a combination of federal and state staff to implement and enforce federal pipeline safety regulations. Nonetheless, the future availability of state pipeline safety inspectors remains uncertain. 112-90 requires verification of maximum allowable operating pressure for all natural gas transmission pipelines "as expeditiously as economically feasible" (§23(a)). Conclusion
Both government and industry have taken numerous steps to improve pipeline safety and security over the last 10 years. While stakeholders across the board agree that federal pipeline safety programs have been on the right track, major pipeline incidents since 2010 suggest there continues to be significant room for improvement. Likewise, the threat of physical and cyberattack on U.S. pipeline infrastructure remains a concern. The NTSB has identified improvement of federal pipeline safety oversight as a "top ten" priority for 2013. The leading pipeline industry associations have concurred. Whether the renewed efforts by industry, combined with additional oversight by federal agencies, will further enhance the safety and security of U.S. pipelines remains to be seen. As Congress oversees the federal pipeline safety program and the federal role in pipeline security, key issues of focus may be pipeline agency staff resources, automatic pipeline shutoff valves, penalties for safety violations, safety regulations for oil sands crudes, and the possible need for pipeline security regulations, among other concerns. In addition to these specific issues, Congress may assess how the various elements of U.S. pipeline safety and security activity fit together in the nation's overall strategy to protect transportation infrastructure. Pipeline safety and security necessarily involve many groups: federal agencies, oil and gas pipeline associations, large and small pipeline operators, and local communities. Reviewing how these groups work together to achieve common goals could be an oversight challenge for Congress. | Nearly half a million miles of pipeline transporting natural gas, oil, and other hazardous liquids crisscross the United States. While an efficient and fundamentally safe means of transport, many pipelines carry materials with the potential to cause public injury and environmental damage. The nation's pipeline networks are also widespread and vulnerable to accidents and terrorist attack. Recent pipeline accidents in Marshall, MI, San Bruno, CA, Allentown, PA, and Laurel, MT, have heightened congressional concern about pipeline risks and drawn criticism from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). Both government and industry have taken numerous steps to improve pipeline safety and security over the last 10 years. Nonetheless, while many stakeholders agree that federal pipeline safety programs have been on the right track, the spate of recent pipeline incidents suggest there continues to be significant room for improvement. Likewise, the threat of terrorist attacks, especially cyberattacks on pipeline control systems, remains a concern.
The federal pipeline safety program is authorized through the fiscal year ending September 30, 2015, under the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-90), which was signed by President Obama on January 3, 2012. The act contains a broad range of provisions addressing pipeline safety and security. Among the most significant are provisions that could increase the number of federal pipeline safety inspectors, require automatic shutoff valves for transmission pipelines, mandate verification of maximum allowable operating pressure for gas transmission pipelines, increase civil penalties for pipeline safety violations, and mandate reviews of diluted bitumen pipeline regulation.
Both government and industry have taken numerous steps to improve pipeline safety and security over the last 10 years. Nonetheless, the NTSB has identified improvement of federal pipeline safety oversight as a "top ten" priority for 2013. The leading pipeline industry associations have concurred. Whether renewed efforts by industry, combined with additional oversight by federal agencies, will further enhance the safety and security of U.S. pipelines remains to be seen.
As Congress oversees the federal pipeline safety program and the federal role in pipeline security, key issues of focus may be pipeline agency staff resources, automatic pipeline shutoff valves, penalties for safety violations, safety regulations for oil sands crudes, and the possible need for pipeline security regulations, among other concerns. In addition to these specific issues, Congress may assess how the various elements of U.S. pipeline safety and security activity fit together in the nation's overall strategy to protect transportation infrastructure. Pipeline safety and security necessarily involve many groups: federal agencies, oil and gas pipeline associations, large and small pipeline operators, and local communities. Reviewing how these groups work together to achieve common goals could be an oversight challenge for Congress. |
crs_RS22763 | crs_RS22763_0 | The Administration's proposed FY2011 defense budget proposed to end C-17 procurement and did not request any funding for the procurement of additional C-17s. Supporters of procuring additional C-17s in FY2011 believe additional C-17s will be needed to meet future operational needs. The issue of how much airlift capability will be needed in the future is currently being examined in a congressionally mandated study being done by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) and in a separate Department of Defense (DOD) study called the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16), which was due to be completed by the end of 2009. The Administration argues that enough C-17s have now been procured to meet future operational needs. 2647/P.L. 111-84)
Conference
The conference report ( H.Rept. 111-288 of October 7, 2009) on the FY2010 defense authorization act ( H.R. 111-84 of October 28, 2009) authorizes no funding for the procurement of additional C-17s. (Page 948)
Section 137 of the act prohibits the Secretary of the Air Force from proceeding with a decision to retire C-5As in any number that would reduce the active inventory of C-5s below 111 until certain conditions are met, and requires the Secretary of the Air Force to submit a report to the congressional defense committees on the issue of C-5 retirement. Section 138 requires the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Director of the Air National Guard, to submit to the congressional defense committees, at least 90 days before a C-5 airlift aircraft is retired, a report on the proposed force structure and basing of C-5 and C-17 aircraft. Section 139 amends 10 USC 8062(g)(1) to state that the Secretary of the Air Force shall maintain a total inventory of not less than 316 C-5s and C-17s. If the current force of 111 C-5s were retained, this provision would support a C-17 force of not less than 205 C-7s—the number procured through FY2008. FY2010 DOD Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326)
Final Version
In lieu of a conference report, the House Appropriations Committee on December 15, 2009, released an explanatory statement on a final version of H.R. This version was passed by the House on December 16, 2009, and by the Senate on December 19, 2009, and signed into law on December 19, 2009, as P.L. The explanatory statement includes $2,588.5 million for procurement of 10 C-17s in FY2010, an increase of $2,500.0 million over the administration request. As Congress decided to continue production, the administration request for $91.4 million in post-production support was not funded. The explanatory statement provides for the rescission of $22.4 million from Air Force research and development funds for the C-17 without further explanation. The budget for modification of in-service C-17s in the explanatory statement is reduced by $17.4 million, from the request of $469.7 million to $352.3 million. | A total of 223 C-17s have been procured through FY2010. The Administration's proposed FY2011 defense budget proposed to end C-17 procurement and did not request any funding for the procurement of additional C-17s. The Administration argues that enough C-17s have now been procured to meet future operational needs. Supporters of procuring additional C-17s in FY2011 believe additional C-17s will be needed to meet future operational needs. The issue of how much airlift capability will be needed in the future is currently being examined in a congressionally mandated study being done by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) and in a separate Department of Defense (DOD) study called the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16), which was due to be completed by the end of 2009.
FY2010 defense authorization bill: The conference report (H.Rept. 111-288 of October 7, 2009) on the FY2010 defense authorization act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009) authorizes no funding for the procurement of additional C-17s. Section 137 of the act prohibits the Secretary of the Air Force from proceeding with a decision to retire C-5As in any number that would reduce the active inventory of C-5s below 111 until certain conditions are met, and require the Secretary of the Air Force to submit a report to the congressional defense committees on the issue of C-5 retirement. Section 138 requires the Secretary of the Air Force, in coordination with the Director of the Air National Guard, to submit to the congressional defense committees, at least 90 days before a C-5 airlift aircraft is retired, a report on the proposed force structure and basing of C-5 and C-17 aircraft. Section 139 amends 10 USC 8062(g)(1) to state that the Secretary of the Air Force shall maintain a total inventory of not less than 316 C-5s and C-17s. If the current force of 111 C-5s were retained, this provision would support a C-17 force of not less than 205 C-7s—the number procured through FY2008.
FY2010 DOD appropriations bill: In lieu of a conference report, the House Appropriations Committee on December 15, 2009, released an explanatory statement on a final version of H.R. 3326. This version was passed by the House on December 16, 2009, and by the Senate on December 19, 2009, and signed into law on December 19, 2009, as P.L. 111-118.
The explanatory statement includes $2,588.5 million for procurement of 10 C-17s in 2010, an increase of $2,500.0 million over the administration request. The budget for modification of in-service C-17s is reduced in the statement by $17.4 million, from the request of $469.7 million to $352.3 million. As Congress decided to continue production, the Administration request for $91.4 million in post-production support was not funded.
The explanatory statement provides for the rescission of $22.4 million from Air Force research and development funds for the C-17 without further explanation. |
crs_RL34547 | crs_RL34547_0 | Recent high petroleum prices, and the economic burden on consumers and energy-intensive industries, has raised the issue of stimulating domestic supplies of crude oil. One possible source is the coastal plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), which is estimated to contain significant quantities of oil and gas. Interest in developing the ANWR oil resources has also focused on the significant revenues that the federal government could collect should exploration and development be successful. Observers have suggested using such revenues for purposes such as providing relief to petroleum consumers, further subsidizing energy conservation measures, or reducing federal budget deficits. However, current federal law prohibits this development. Federal revenues would consist primarily of corporate income taxes on profits earned by oil producers from the production and sale of ANWR oil. As landowner, the federal government would also collect royalties from such production on federal lands, which are included in the estimates. Revenues from bonus bids from federal leases, and rents on undeveloped leases, however, are not estimated separately, although Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates of bonus bids are reported. In addition, the federal government would collect income tax revenues from the secondary feedback effects as a result of the stimulus to general economic activity. However, these revenues are not included here due to the difficulty in estimation over an assumed 30-year production horizon. Estimates of technologically recoverable oil used in this report include the resources from the federal lands, and assume the availability of resources in Native lands in the Refuge and offshore state lands; however such availability is not within federal control. For instance, if producers were able to recover 10.3 billion barrels of oil over the life of the area—there is an estimated 50-50 chance that the ANWR coastal plain contains at least this amount of oil—and if oil prices average $90/barrel over the production lifetime of the area, then the federal government is projected to collect nearly $138 billion in revenues over the production period, estimated to be at least 30 years once production commences. This would consist of nearly $95 billion in federal corporate income taxes ( Table 2 ) , and nearly $43 billion in federal royalties ( Table 3 ). Bonus bids have been estimated by the Congressional Budget Office for President Bush's FY2009 budget proposal to lease the ANWR coastal plain. According to these estimates, bonus bids could total $6 billion between FY2011 and FY2018. The Alaska Statehood Act allocates 90% of the royalties from oil and gas production on federal lands to Alaska; the federal government retains the remaining 10%. | Recent high petroleum prices, and the related economic burden on consumers and energy-intensive industries, has raised the issue of stimulating domestic supplies of crude oil. One possible source is the coastal plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), which is estimated to contain significant quantities of oil and gas. Interest in developing the ANWR oil resources has also focused on the revenues that the federal government could collect should exploration and development be successful. Some observers have suggested using such revenues for purposes such as providing relief to petroleum consumers, further subsidizing energy conservation measures, or reducing federal budget deficits. However, current federal law prohibits the production of oil and gas in ANWR.
Federal revenues would consist primarily of corporate income taxes on profits earned by oil producers from the production and sale of ANWR oil. As landowner, the federal government would also collect royalties from such production on federal lands, which are included in the estimates. If producers were able to recover 10.3 billion barrels of oil over the life of the properties—the United States Geological Survey has estimated there is a 50-50 chance that the ANWR coastal plain contains at least this amount of oil—and if oil prices are $125/barrel, then the federal government might be able to collect $191 billion in revenues over the production period, estimated to be at least 30 years once production commences. This estimate consists of nearly $132 billion in federal corporate income taxes, and about nearly $59 billion in federal royalties. These estimates are subject to major limitations. Estimates of technologically recoverable oil used in this report include the resources from the federal lands, and assume the availability of resources in Native lands in the Refuge and offshore state lands. The Alaska Statehood Act would allot 90% of gross royalties to the state and 10% to the federal government.
The federal government would collect revenues from bonus bids from federal leases, and rents on undeveloped leases. These are not estimated separately by CRS. Independent estimates by the Congressional Budget Office for President Bush's FY2009 budget proposal show estimated bonus bid revenues of $6 billion between FY2011 and FY2018. Finally, income tax revenues from the secondary feedback effects would also increase as a result of the stimulus to general economic activity. However, these revenues are not included here due to the difficulty in estimation over the projection time horizon. |
crs_R43300 | crs_R43300_0 | Introduction
Congressional interest in carbon capture and sequestration (or carbon capture and storage, CCS) has been renewed since the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) re-proposed standards for carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) from new fossil-fueled power plants on September 20, 2013. As re-proposed, the standards would limit emissions of CO 2 to no more than 1,100 pounds per megawatt-hour of production from new coal-fired power plants and between 1,000 and 1,100 (depending on size of the plant) for new natural gas-fired plants. The standards would not apply to existing facilities. According to EPA, new natural gas-fired stationary power plants should be able to meet the proposed standards without additional cost or the need for add-on control technology. However, new coal-fired plants only would be able to meet the standards by installing carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technology. The future use of coal—a significant component of the U.S. energy portfolio—in the United States will likely depend on whether and how CCS is deployed if legislative or regulatory actions curtail future CO 2 emissions. Unlike the other two components of CCS, transportation and geologic storage, the first component of CCS—CO 2 capture—is almost entirely technology-dependent. For CCS to succeed at reducing CO 2 emissions from a significant fraction of large sources in the United States, CO 2 capture technology would need to be deployed widely. While all three approaches are capable of high CO 2 capture efficiencies (typically about 90%), the major drawbacks of current processes are their high cost and the large energy requirement for operation (which significantly reduces the net plant capacity and contributes to the high cost of capture). Another drawback in terms of their availability for greenhouse gas mitigation is that at present, there are still no applications of CO 2 capture on a coal-fired or gas-fired power plant at full scale (i.e., a scale of several hundred megawatts of plant capacity). Current Research and Development (R&D) Activities
To address the current lack of demonstrated capabilities for full-scale CO 2 capture at power plants, a number of large-scale demonstration projects at both coal combustion and gasification-based power plants are planned or underway in the United States and elsewhere. Also elaborated in the longer report are the substantial R&D activities underway in the United States and elsewhere to develop and commercialize lower-cost capture systems with smaller energy penalties. Current R&D activities include development and testing of new or improved solvents that can lower the cost of current post-combustion and pre-combustion capture, as well as research on a variety of potential "breakthrough technologies" such as novel solvents, sorbents, membranes, and oxyfuel systems that hold promise for even lower-cost capture systems. In general, the focus of most current R&D activities is on cost reduction rather than additional gains in the efficiency of CO 2 capture (which can result in cost increases rather than decreases). Future Outlook
Whether for new power plants or existing ones, the key questions are the same: When would advanced CO 2 capture systems be available for commercial rollout, and how much cheaper would they be compared to current technology? All of these roadmaps anticipate that CO 2 capture will be available for commercial deployment at power plants by 2020. A number of roadmaps also project that novel, lower-cost technologies like solid sorbent systems for post-combustion capture will be commercial in the 2020 time frame. Such projections acknowledge, however, that this will require aggressive and sustained efforts to advance promising concepts to commercial reality. In the context of this report and CRS Report R41325, Carbon Capture: A Technology Assessment , the key insight governing prospects for improved carbon capture technology is that achieving significant cost reductions would require not only a vigorous and sustained level of R&D, but also a substantial level of commercial deployment. At present such a market does not exist. While various types of incentive programs can accelerate the development and deployment of CO 2 capture technology, actions that significantly limit emissions of CO 2 to the atmosphere ultimately would be needed to realize substantial and sustained reductions in the future cost of CO 2 capture. | Carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) is widely seen as a critical strategy for limiting atmospheric emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2)—the principal "greenhouse gas" linked to global climate change—from power plants and other large industrial sources. This report focuses on the first component of a CCS system, the CO2 capture process. Unlike the other two components of CCS, transportation and geologic storage, the CO2 capture component of CCS is heavily technology-dependent. For CCS to succeed at reducing CO2 emissions from a significant fraction of large sources in the United States, CO2 capture technologies would need to be deployed widely. Widespread commercial deployment would likely depend, in part, on the cost of the technology deployed to capture CO2. This report summarizes prospects for improved, lower-cost technologies for each of the three current approaches to CO2 capture: post-combustion capture; pre-combustion capture; and oxy-combustion capture. CRS Report R41325, Carbon Capture: A Technology Assessment, provides a more detailed analysis of these technologies.
While all three approaches are capable of high capture efficiencies (typically about 90%), the major drawbacks of current processes are their high cost and the large energy requirements for operation. Another drawback is that at present there are still no full-scale applications of CO2 capture on a coal-fired or gas-fired power plant; these plants produce over a third of total U.S. CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion. However, a number of large-scale demonstration projects at both coal combustion and gasification-based power plants are planned or underway in the United States and elsewhere. Substantial research and development (R&D) activities are also underway in the United States and elsewhere to develop and commercialize lower-cost capture systems with smaller energy penalties. Current R&D activities include development and testing of new or improved solvents that can lower the cost of current post-combustion and pre-combustion capture, as well as research on a variety of potential "breakthrough technologies" such as novel solvents, sorbents, membranes, and oxyfuel systems that hold promise for even lower-cost capture systems.
The future use of coal in the United States will likely depend on whether and how CCS is deployed if legislative or regulatory actions curtail future CO2 emissions. Congressional interest in CCS was renewed when the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) re-proposed standards for carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from new fossil-fueled power plants on September 20, 2013. These re-proposed standards would not apply to existing power plants. As re-proposed, the standards would limit emissions of CO2 to no more than 1,100 pounds per megawatt-hour of production from new coal-fired power plants and between 1,000 and 1,100 for new natural gas-fired plants. According to EPA, new natural gas-fired stationary power plants should be able to meet the proposed standards. However, new coal-fired plants only would be able to meet the standards by installing CCS technology, which could add significant capital costs.
In general, the focus of most current R&D activities is on cost reduction rather than additional gains in CO2 capture efficiency. Key questions include: when would advanced CO2 capture systems be available for commercial rollout; and how much cheaper they would be compared to current technology. "Technology roadmaps" developed by governmental and private-sector organizations anticipate that CO2 capture may be available for commercial deployment at power plants by 2020. Some roadmaps also project that some novel, lower-cost technologies may be commercial by 2020. Such projections acknowledge, however, that this will require aggressive efforts to advance promising concepts to commercial viability.
Achieving significant cost reductions would likely require a vigorous and sustained level of R&D and also a significant market for CO2 capture. At present such a market does not exist. While various types of incentive programs can accelerate the development and deployment of CO2 capture technology, actions that significantly limit emissions of CO2 to the atmosphere ultimately would be needed to realize substantial and sustained reductions in the future cost of CO2 capture. |
crs_R40090 | crs_R40090_0 | Introduction
Research on climate change has identified a wide array of sources that emit "greenhouse gases" (GHGs)—compounds that trap the sun's heat, with effects on Earth's climate. In the United States, aviation emissions have grown more slowly than those of other transportation sectors, and slightly less than the emissions of the economy as a whole over the last two decades, but worldwide aviation has been among the faster-growing sources of GHG emissions. If they were included in the U.S. aviation statistics, emissions from aircraft of all types would have accounted for 3.4% of the U.S. GHG total. Thus, while the precise share of aviation in total greenhouse gas emissions depends on what is included, and the impact of some emissions is unclear, there is little doubt that aviation is a significant contributor to U.S. and world GHG emissions. Regulating Aircraft Under the Clean Air Act
As policy makers consider whether the federal government should regulate aircraft GHG emissions (versus continuing to rely solely on market forces to determine the level of emissions), some have turned their attention to the potential for regulation under the Clean Air Act. The aircraft petitions are among several others that EPA has received to regulate GHG emissions from cars and trucks, ships, and nonroad engines and vehicles. This might delay implementation of controls. (For a general discussion of how such cap-and-trade systems work, see CRS Report RL34502, Emission Allowance Allocation in a Cap-and-Trade Program: Options and Considerations , by [author name scrubbed], especially Appendix A.) Capping emissions from fuels upstream of the air carriers and eventually lowering the cap more than 80%, as the bill would do, could have several effects: first, it would provide an incentive for refiners to produce lower-carbon fuels ; second, it would increase the price of fuels, as refiners either purchased additional allowances for their emissions or were forced to reduce production, in essence rationing fuels through a higher price in order to stay beneath the emissions cap; third, as the cost of fuel increased, the demand for fuel-efficient aircraft would increase; and fourth, consumers of aviation services (airline passengers and shippers of freight) would have incentives to replace higher-cost air transportation with lower-cost alternatives (e.g., video-conferencing by business and government entities, increased reliance on lower-emission forms of transport, greater reliance on local sources of goods, etc.). International Developments
European Union
Unlike the upstream approach of U.S. cap-and-trade bills, the European Union (EU) has chosen to regulate aviation directly, by including the sector in its Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), beginning in 2012. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the international organization that administers standards and recommended practices for the aviation authorities of more than 190 countries, agreed in September 2007 to support the development of an "aggressive" action plan on aviation and climate change, but without a fixed timetable or specific emission reduction targets. As noted earlier, the House-passed version of H.R. Some means of emission reduction are beyond the industry's control, including the pace of modernization of the air traffic control system, and the degree to which aeronautical research and engine modifications can reduce fuel consumption. | Aircraft are a significant source of greenhouse gases—compounds that trap the sun's heat, with effects on the Earth's climate. In the United States, aircraft of all kinds are estimated to emit between 2.6% and 3.4% of the nation's total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, depending on whether one counts international air travel. The impact of U.S. aviation on climate change is perhaps twice that size when other factors are considered. These include the contribution of aircraft emissions to ozone formation, the water vapor and soot that aircraft emit, and the high altitude location of the bulk of aircraft emissions. Worldwide, aviation is projected to be among the faster-growing GHG sources.
If Congress or the Administration decides to regulate aircraft GHG emissions, they face several choices. The Administration could use existing authority under Sections 231 and 211 of the Clean Air Act, administered by the Environmental Protection Agency. EPA has already been petitioned to do so by several states, local governments, and environmental organizations. Congress could address aviation or aviation fuels legislatively, through cap-and-trade or carbon tax proposals, or could require EPA to set emission standards.
Among the legislative options, the cap-and-trade approach (setting an economy-wide limit on GHG emissions and distributing tradable allowances to emitters) has received the most attention. Most cap-and-trade bills, including the House-passed energy and climate bill, H.R. 2454, would include aviation indirectly, through emission caps imposed upstream on their source of fuel—the petroleum refining sector. By capping emissions upstream of air carriers and eventually lowering the cap more than 80%, bills such as these would have several effects: they would provide an incentive for refiners to produce lower-carbon fuels; they would increase the price of fuels, and thus increase the demand for more fuel-efficient aircraft; and they might increase the cost of aviation services relative to other means of transport, giving airline passengers and shippers of freight incentives to substitute lower-cost, lower-carbon alternatives.
Besides regulating emissions directly or through a cap-and-trade program or carbon tax, there are other tools available to policy makers that can lower aviation's GHG emissions. These include implementation of the Next Generation Air Traffic Control System (not expected to be complete until 2025, although some elements that could reduce aircraft emissions may be implemented sooner); research and development of more fuel-efficient aircraft and engines; and perhaps the development of lower-carbon jet fuel.
This report provides background on aviation emissions and the factors affecting them; it discusses the tools available to control emissions, including existing authority under the Clean Air Act and proposed economy-wide cap-and-trade legislation; and it examines international regulatory developments that may affect U.S. commercial airlines. These include the European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme for greenhouse gases (EU-ETS), which is to include the aviation sector beginning in 2012, and discussions under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). |
crs_R40397 | crs_R40397_0 | Background
Child nutrition programs and the WIC program provide cash, commodity, and other assistance (including funds for nutrition services and food packages in the WIC program and technical assistance and administrative cost aid in child nutrition programs) under three major federal laws: the Richard B. Russell National School Lunch Act (originally enacted as the National School Lunch Act in 1946), the Child Nutrition Act (originally enacted in 1966), and Section 32 of the Act of August 24, 1935 (7 U.S.C. The most recent reauthorization was in 2004 ( P.L. 108-265 ); the next reauthorization is scheduled for 2009. At the local level, program benefits are provided to more than 40 million children and infants, and some 2 million lower-income pregnant and post-partum women, through some 100,000 public and private schools and residential child care institutions, about 200,000 child care centers and family day care homes, approximately 30,000 summer program sites, and (in the case of the WIC program) about 10,000 local health care clinics/sites operated by nearly 2,000 health agencies. 1. Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (The WIC Program)
The WIC Program provides food assistance, nutrition risk screening, and related services (e.g., nutrition education and breastfeeding support, medical care referral) to low-income pregnant and postpartum women and their infants, as well as to children up to age 5 from low-income families. The program also provides states with funding for administrative costs and nutrition services (like nutrition education). Day Care, Summer, and After-School Programs
In addition to the school-day-based lunch and breakfast programs, child nutrition laws include provisions for federal subsidies and commodity support for schools and other institutions/ organizations offering meals and snacks to children in outside-of-school program settings. Federal assistance is made up overwhelmingly of cash subsidies based on the number of meals/snacks served and federally set indexed per-meal/snack subsidy rates; about 3% is in the form of federally donated food commodities. All snacks/meals generally are served free. Other Child Nutrition Programs, Initiatives, and Support Activities
Child nutrition laws also support a range of smaller programs, initiatives, and activities. States are entitled to federal grants to help cover administrative and oversight/monitoring costs associated with child nutrition programs. Federal costs for this program typically run about $15 million a year. | Federally supported child nutrition programs and initiatives, along with the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (the WIC program) reach more than 40 million children and some 2 million lower-income pregnant/post-partum women. In FY2007, federal spending on these programs totaled over $19 billion.
The basic goals of federal child nutrition programs are to improve children's nutrition, increase lower-income children's access to nutritious meals and snacks, and help support the agricultural economy. Child nutrition programs are "entitlements." Federal cash funding and commodity support is "guaranteed" to schools and other providers based on the number of meals/snacks served, who is served (e.g., free meals for poor children get higher subsidies), and legislatively established (and inflation-indexed) per-meal subsidy rates. On the other hand, the WIC program is a "discretionary" grant program where specific annual appropriations to pay for benefits and nutrition services and administration are distributed by formula.
In addition to the WIC program (and its ancillary farmers' market program), the child nutrition programs covered in this report include the School Lunch and Breakfast programs (providing federal subsidies for meals served in schools), day-care, summer and other outside-of-school programs assisting sponsors in providing meals/snacks, and payments to states covering administrative oversight costs, expenses for a Fresh Fruit and Vegetable program, the Special Milk program, and various support activities (e.g., various administrative oversight and nutrition education activities).
The underlying laws covering child nutrition and WIC programs were last reauthorized in 2004 in the Child Nutrition and WIC Reauthorization Act (P.L. 108-265). The next reauthorization is scheduled for 2009. The Administration's FY2010 budget calls for increased funding of approximately $1 billion a year for child nutrition programs (for "program reforms aimed at improving program access, enhancing the nutritional quality of school meals, expanding nutrition research and evaluation, and improving program oversight").
This report will be updated as warranted by significant changes in the programs covered and major legislative initiatives. |
crs_RS21698 | crs_RS21698_0 | CBP utilizes advanced technology to augment its U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) agents' ability to patrol the border. On June 23, 2010, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) granted a certificate of authorization requested by CBP, clearing the UAV flights along the Texas border and Gulf region. Other requests have reportedly been delayed due to safety concerns, some of which stem from previous incidents. Despite safety concerns raised by such incidents, some policymakers continue to call for the increased domestic use of UAVs. The Supplemental Appropriations Bill of FY2010 ( H.R. 4899 ) would include $32 million for the acquisition of two additional UAVs by A&M. Benefits and Limitations of UAVs
Benefits
One potential benefit of UAVs is that they could fill a gap in current border surveillance by improving coverage along remote sections of the U.S. borders. The range of UAVs is a significant asset when compared to border agents on patrol or stationary surveillance equipment. Limitations
Despite potential benefits of using UAVs for homeland security, various problems encountered in the past may hinder UAV implementation on the border. According to a 2003 report, there have been concerns regarding the high accident rate of UAVs, which can be multiple times higher than that of manned aircraft. According to the CBP Inspector General, the costs of operating a UAV are more than double the costs of operating a manned aircraft. Lack of Information
Testing of UAVs along the border has been limited. | Congress has expressed a great deal of interest in using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to surveil the United States' international land border. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) utilizes advanced technology to augment its USBP agents' ability to patrol the border, including a fleet of six UAVs. This report examines the strengths and limitations of deploying UAVs along the borders and related issues for Congress.
UAVs come with several costs and benefits. One potential benefit of UAVs is that they could fill a gap in current border surveillance by improving coverage along remote sections of the U.S. borders. Moreover, the range of UAVs is a significant asset when compared to border agents on patrol or stationary surveillance equipment. Yet, despite potential benefits of using UAVs for homeland security, various problems encountered in the past may hinder UAV implementation on the border. There are concerns regarding the high accident rates of UAVs, which have historically been multiple times higher than that of manned aircraft. Inclement weather conditions can also impinge on a UAV's surveillance capability. Also, according to the CBP Inspector General, the costs of operating a UAV are more than double the costs of operating a manned aircraft.
Recent attention has focused on the expanding area of operations for CBP-operated UAVs. On June 23, 2010, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) granted a certificate of authorization requested by CBP, clearing the UAV flights along the Texas border and Gulf region. Other requests have reportedly been delayed due to safety concerns, some of which stem from previous incidents. Despite safety concerns, some policymakers continue to call for the increased domestic use of UAVs. The Supplemental Appropriations Bill of FY2010 (H.R. 4899) would include $32 million for the acquisition of two additional UAVs by CBP.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41245 | crs_R41245_0 | Discretionary spending is provided and controlled through annual appropriations acts. Mandatory funds from the authorizing law are assumed to be available unless they are expressly reduced to smaller amounts by a subsequent act of Congress in the appropriations process or by the authorizing committees. Most of the rest, about $147 billion over 10 years, is funded through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Historically, mandatory agricultural funding was reserved for the farm commodity programs that began in the 1930s. Some consider this expansion to be beyond the chartered purpose of the CCC, while others prefer the stability and consistency of mandatory funding to that of the appropriations process. CHIMPS can offset increases in discretionary spending that are above discretionary budget caps. Similarly, authorizing committees also have reduced mandatory spending levels that initially were enacted. First, they reduce programs to offset spending increases for other mandatory programs within their jurisdiction (new authorizing laws that require pay-as-you-go budget rules). Second, they reduce programs to get credit for budget reconciliation (savings that are required when a budget resolution adopted by Congress forces many authorizing committees to reduce program spending to address budget deficits). Or should appropriators determine funding on an annual basis in appropriations acts? Given the use of CHIMPS in recent Agriculture appropriations bills, appropriators apparently believe that such mandatory spending is not always appropriate. CHIMPS in eight conservation programs are among the most notable, accounting for $3 billion of the $7.5 billion total over eight years. Among individual programs, the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) has the highest multiyear total, $1.2 billion over eight years. The Conservation Security Program was reduced by $3.1 billion in FY2003 and $2.9 billion in FY2005 to create offsets for agricultural disaster assistance (each were 10-year reductions). In that reconciliation, authorizers cut $2.7 billion of mandatory funding over five years, from many of the same conservation, rural development, and research programs that had been the subject of CHIMPS in prior years. More recently, a funding proposal for the Senate Agriculture Committee's Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 ( S. 3307 ) proposes to reduce EQIP by $2.2 billion over 10 years to offset the cost of increases to the child nutrition program. In addition to Congress taking action to reduce spending, the Administration sometimes can make changes that reduce mandatory outlays and these actions may affect the baseline. If action waits until a future farm bill, the Agriculture Committees could make similar reductions in crop insurance and be able to use the savings to offset other programs elsewhere in the farm bill—funds that would not be available if USDA makes cuts administratively. Reductions by Both Authorizers and Appropriators: CSP
Some programs have been a source of reductions for both appropriators and authorizers. 2301) and replaced by the Conservation Stewardship Program. For example,
A multiyear total of CHIMPS by appropriators can exceed the mandatory funds made available for the program in the authorizing legislation. | Many agricultural programs receive mandatory funding through the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). Mandatory funding is made available by multiyear authorizing legislation and does not require annual appropriations or subsequent action by Congress. However, mandatory funding can be reduced in the appropriations process or by the authorizing committees themselves. In contrast to mandatory funding, discretionary funding is made available by annual appropriations acts on a year-by-year basis through a different process originating in the appropriations committees.
While mandatory spending in agriculture historically was reserved for the farm commodity programs, the authorizing Agriculture Committees have expanded its use to conservation, rural development, and energy programs in the recent farm bills passed by Congress. Mandatory spending creates funding stability and consistency compared to that of the appropriations process. Some argue, however, that this use of mandatory spending has moved beyond the statutory purpose of the CCC. This has created tension between authorizers and appropriators, leading to actions by appropriators that are called "changes in mandatory program spending" (CHIMPS). CHIMPS usually reduce or block mandatory outlays, but sometimes appropriators replace some of the blocked funding with discretionary appropriations. Nonetheless, CHIMPS generate savings that appropriators can use to offset increases in discretionary spending.
Between FY2003 and FY2010, CHIMPS by appropriators to mandatory agricultural programs have totaled $7.5 billion. CHIMPS to eight conservation programs are among the most notable, accounting for $3 billion of this total. Among individual programs, the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) has the highest multiyear total of CHIMPS, at $1.2 billion.
Authorizing committees also have reduced mandatory program spending to generate savings after a farm bill has been enacted. The reason may be to offset spending increases for other programs within their jurisdiction or to comply with budget reconciliation directives.
Notable among changes to authorizing laws (not CHIMPS), the Conservation Security Program was reduced in FY2003 and again in FY2005 to offset agricultural disaster assistance ($3.1 billion and $2.9 billion, respectively). Authorizers also received credit for $2.7 billion in budget reconciliation savings (over five years) across 12 programs in 2005, many of which had been reduced by appropriators in prior years through CHIMPS.
More recently, the Senate Agriculture Committee's current funding plan for the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (S. 3307) proposes to use $2.2 billion of reductions from EQIP over 10 years to offset the cost of increases for child nutrition. A proposed alternative to use an offset from the Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP) would have similar budgetary effects, and would likewise affect a mandatory program.
The Administration also can take actions that reduce mandatory outlays. In renegotiating the Standard Reinsurance Agreement for the crop insurance program, the Administration has proposed changes that would reduce the baseline available for crop insurance by about $7-8 billion over 10 years. This has raised a debate over whether such reductions should wait so that Congress can get credit for any reduction, especially for future farm bills or possible budget reconciliation. |
crs_RL32163 | crs_RL32163_0 | Background
Radioactive waste is a byproduct of nuclear weapons production, commercial nuclear power generation, and the naval reactor program. Waste byproducts also result from radioisotopes used for scientific, medical, and industrial purposes. Waste classification policies have tended to link the processes that generate the waste to uniquely tailored disposal solutions. Consequently, the origin of the waste, rather than its radiologic characteristics, often determines its fate. 79-585) defined fissionable materials to include plutonium, uranium-235, and other materials that the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) determined to be capable of releasing substantial quantities of energy through nuclear fission. Spent nuclear fuel is the highly radioactive fuel rods withdrawn from nuclear reactors. The radiation protection standards for NRC activities licensed under 10 C.F.R. Uranium mill tailings (referred to as 11e. Most of the United States' high-level waste inventory was generated by DOE (and former AEC) nuclear weapons programs at the Hanford, INL, and Savannah River Sites. Weapons-production reactor fuel, and naval reactor spent fuel were processed to remove special nuclear material (plutonium and enriched uranium). A salt-stone byproduct will be permanently disposed of on site. 108-375 ) specified that the definition of the term "high-level radioactive waste" excludes radioactive waste from reprocessed spent fuel if (1) the Energy Secretary in consultation with the NRC determines the waste has had highly radioactive radionuclides removed to the maximum extent practical, and (2) the waste does not exceed concentration limits for Class C low-level waste. Spent mixed oxide fuel would be disposed of in the same manner as conventional commercial spent fuel in an NRC-licensed deep geologic repository. Energy Policy Act Provisions for NORM
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 contains a provision in Section 651 that amends the Atomic Energy Act's section 11(e) definition of "byproduct material" to exclude "any discrete source of naturally occurring radioactive material [NORM], other than source material" that the NRC, in consultation with the EPA, Department of Energy, and Department of Homeland Security, determines would pose a threat similar to the threat posed by a discrete source of radium-226. The Rocky Mountain Compact defines low-level waste as specifically excluding radioactive waste generated by defense activities, high-level waste (from spent nuclear fuel reprocessing), transuranic waste (produced from nuclear weapons fabrication), 11e(2) byproduct material, and mining process-related wastes. Waste Disposal Policy Issues
The AEC first acknowledged the problem of waste disposal in 1955. The national problem created by accumulating spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste prompted Congress to pass the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA). The controversy over DOE waste incidental to reprocessing appears to have been resolved by redefining high-level radioactive wastes as excluding the residue in high-level waste storage-tanks. Radioactive waste classification continues to raises issues for policymakers. | Radioactive waste is a byproduct of nuclear weapons production, commercial nuclear power generation, and the naval reactor program. Waste byproducts also result from radioisotopes used for scientific, medical, and industrial purposes. The legislative definitions adopted for radioactive wastes, for the most part, refer to the processes that generated the wastes. Thus, waste disposal policies have tended to link the processes to uniquely tailored disposal solutions. Consequently, the origin of the waste, rather than its radiologic characteristics, often determines its fate.
Plutonium and enriched uranium-235 were first produced by the Manhattan Project during World War II. These materials were later defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as special nuclear materials, along with other materials that the former Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) determined were capable of releasing energy through nuclear fission. Reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel to extract special nuclear material generated highly radioactive liquid and solid byproducts. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA) defined irradiated fuel as spent nuclear fuel, and the byproducts as high-level waste. Uranium ore processing technologically enhanced naturally occurring radioactive material and left behind uranium mill tailings. The fabrication of nuclear weapons generated transuranic waste. Both commercial and naval reactors continue to generate spent fuel. High-level waste generation has ceased in the United States, as irradiated fuel is no longer reprocessed. The routine operation and maintenance of nuclear reactors, however, continues to generate low-level radioactive waste, as do medical procedures using radioactive isotopes.
The NWPA provides for the permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste in a deep geologic repository. The repository is to be constructed and operated by the Department of Energy (DOE) under the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) licensing authority. Yucca Mountain, in Nevada, is the candidate site for the nation's first repository.
The NRC and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) share regulatory authority for radioactive waste disposal. However, these regulatory agencies have yet to adopt uniform radiation protection standards for disposal sites. The NRC's jurisdiction, however, does not extend to DOE's management of defense-related waste at DOE facilities other than Yucca Mountain.
Radioactive waste classification continues to raise issues for policymakers. Most recently, DOE policy on managing the residue in high-level waste storage tanks proved controversial enough that Congress amended the definition of high-level waste. The disposition of waste with characteristics left undefined by statute can be decided by an NRC administrative ruling. The case for low-activity waste promises to provoke similar controversy. This report will be updated as new radioactive waste classification issues arise. |
crs_RL31374 | crs_RL31374_0 | In 2005, the most recent year for which data are available, approximately $2.0 trillion was spent on health care and health-related activities. This amount represents a 6.9% increase over 2004 spending. The majority of health spending (84%) went towards paying for health care goods and services provided directly to individuals. These goods and services are referred to as personal health care. The remaining amount covered administrative expenses, public health activities, health research, construction of health facilities and offices and medical capital equipment. The latter half of the 1990s experienced historically low growth in personal health care spending. From the beginning of 1994 to the end of 1999, health spending increased at an average annual rate of 5.6%. The effect of these changes in public and private sector have subsided; in 2000, personal health expenditures grew at 6.7%, 1.1 percentage points higher than the average rate over the previous six years. Personal health expenditures grew at even higher rates in 2001 (8.7%) but have fallen steadily since then. In particular, the years 1979 through 1981 experienced growth rates between 13.8% and 15.9%. Real Growth in Personal Health Expenditures
Figure 1 depicts growth in nominal personal health expenditures. Health Spending and Gross Domestic Product
Spending on personal health care in 2005 increased relative to the overall economy. In 2005, personal health care expenditures accounted for 13.3% of gross domestic product (GDP), up from 13.2% of GDP in 2003 and 2004, 12.8% of GDP in 2002 and 12.2% of GDP in 2001. These increases mark a departure from the experience of the previous nine years, when health spending as a percent of GDP was relatively constant. Growth in Categories of Medical Care
Four categories of medical goods and services compose more than 84% of personal health care expenditures: hospital care, physician and clinical services, prescription drugs, and long-term care (which includes nursing home and home health care). In 2005, home health care was the fastest growing category of health expenditures, increasing 11.1% above 2004 expenditures (see Table 1 ). That is, growth in hospital care contributed most to increased personal health care expenditures in 2005. In 2005, about 10% of personal health spending was directed towards providing nursing home and home health care. Financing Health Care
In 2005, 85% of personal health expenditures were in the form of third-party payments. Private health insurance was the largest payer of personal health care in 2005; it paid 36% of personal health expenditures. The federal government, the second largest payer, accounted for 34% of all personal health spending. Conversely, almost all expenditures on non-durable medical goods (which includes mostly over-the-counter drugs) were paid out-of-pocket, although this category represents only a small share of all personal health care expenditures. Dental services and prescription drugs are funded mostly by private insurance and out-of-pocket expenditures; the federal government plays a relatively small role in the financing of these services. | In 2005, the most recent year for which data are available, just under $2 trillion was spent on health care and health-related activities. This amount represents a 6.9% increase over 2004 spending. The majority of health spending (84%) went towards paying for health care goods and services provided directly to individuals. These goods and services are referred to as personal health care. The remaining 16% of health spending covered research, public health activities, administrative costs, structures, and equipment.
Personal health care expenditures grew 7.1% in 2005, continuing a downward trend in the growth of expenditures that peaked in recent times in 2001 at 8.7%. From the beginning of 1992 to the end of 2000, personal health expenditures grew at an average annual rate of 5.8%, historically low levels not seen since 1960. Compared with spending increases over the past 40 years, the 7.1% increase that occurred in 2005 is relatively moderate. In particular, the years 1979 through 1981 experienced growth rates between 13.8% and 15.9%.
Relative to the overall economy, personal health expenditures increased in 2005. In 2005, personal health expenditures accounted for 13.3% of gross domestic product (GDP), up from 13.2% of GDP in 2004 and 2003, 12.8% of GDP in 2002, and 12.2% in 2001. For the nine years prior to 2001, health spending as a percentage of GDP was relatively constant. From 1992 to 2000, personal health expenditures, as a percentage of GDP, stayed between 11.5% and 11.7%. During the three decades prior to the 1990s, personal health expenditures, as a percentage of GDP, increased almost every year.
Home health care spending was the fastest growing category of personal health care in 2005. Home health care spending in 2005 was 11.1% higher than the amount spent in 2004. Yet, because home health care represents about 3% of personal health expenditures, it was one of the smallest contributors to overall growth in personal health spending. Hospital care, which grew 7.9% in 2005 and accounts for more than one-third of personal health expenditures, contributed the most to overall growth in personal health spending. Spending on physician and clinical services, which grew at 7.0% in 2005 and accounts for one-fourth of personal health expenditures, was the second largest contributor to overall growth in personal health spending.
Over 85% of personal health expenditures in 2005 were financed by third-party payers. The largest payer, private health insurance, financed 36% of all personal health expenditures. The second-largest payer, the federal government, accounted for 34% of all personal health spending. Certain categories of health care are funded primarily by third-party payers, whereas other categories are financed almost entirely out-of-pocket. The federal government is the largest payer of hospital care and nursing home and home health care. Private health insurance is the largest payer of dental services and prescription drugs. Out-of-pocket expenditures are the largest source of funding for non-durable medical goods (which include over-the-counter drugs) and durable medical goods (which include eyeglasses). |
crs_RS22618 | crs_RS22618_0 | The five environmental cases in the 2006-2007 term were a varied lot: two involving the Clean Air Act, one the Superfund Act, one the relationship between the Clean Water Act and Endangered Species Act, and one the federal constitutional limits on local solid-waste "flow control." On the merits, the Court held that CAA section 202 empowers EPA to regulate emissions from new motor vehicles based on their global warming impacts, the statute being "unambiguous" on this score. The dispute centers on how to measure the emissions from a stationary source of emissions so as to determine whether a physical or operational change in that source "increases the amount," in the CAA's words, of emissions. However, the district court held that those regulations impose an hourly standard. Two scenarios may occur. In either case, the liable party, if made to pay more than its fair share, may turn around and sue other parties made liable by CERCLA in a "contribution" action. And §107(a) permits cost recovery (as distinct from contribution) by a private party that has itself incurred cleanup costs." This case arose from EPA's ultimate position, in connection with Arizona's request for delegation of the permit program, that EPA's decision was not subject to ESA consultation. Flow control ordinances typically require that all waste generated within a locality be taken to a locally designated transfer or disposal facility. The question was, does this public-private distinction make a difference to the dormant commerce clause analysis? | The Supreme Court decided five environmental cases during its 2006-2007 term, a significant proportion of the 72 cases it heard. Two decisions involve the Clean Air Act: one ruling that the act allows the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate vehicle emissions based on their global warming impacts; the other, that EPA regulations validly impose an annual, as opposed to hourly, emissions change test in determining whether a modification of a stationary source makes it a "new source" requiring a permit. A Superfund Act decision held that liable parties who incur cleanup costs beyond their fair share may sue for reimbursement, despite another provision in the act restricting contribution actions. Another case dealt with the relationship between the Clean Water Act and Endangered Species Act, holding that the former's mandate that EPA "shall" delegate a permitting program to a state when statutory criteria are met is not subject to the equally unqualified command in the latter that consultation with federal wildlife-protection agencies occur. The remaining case involves a constitutional issue. It held that two counties' "flow control" laws, requiring that solid waste generated within the counties be taken to processing facilities within the counties, did not offend the Constitution's "dormant commerce clause" because the facilities were publicly owned. |
crs_R43054 | crs_R43054_0 | If depleted, the DI trust fund would be able to pay about 80% of scheduled SSDI benefits. Between 1980 and 2013, non-interest income to the DI trust fund (adjusted for inflation) increased 181%, while spending on benefits grew 219%. The increase in spending is due largely to the growth in the number of beneficiaries on SSDI. Over the same period, the number of disabled workers and their dependents more than doubled, rising from 4.7 million in 1980 to 11 million in 2013. To assist lawmakers in addressing the sustainability of the program, this report provides an overview of reform proposals to manage the long-term growth in the SSDI rolls. The third section investigates some of the causes of growth in SSDI, including changes in the demographic characteristics of the working-age population, changes in opportunities for work and compensation, and changes in federal policy. The fourth section examines various options to manage the growth in the SSDI rolls, namely, (1) stricter eligibility criteria, (2) improved administration of the program, (3) stronger return-to-work incentives, and (4) policies to encourage employers to help disabled workers continue to work. Many of the options discussed in this report could reduce spending by slowing or even reducing the growth of SSDI over the long term; however, such options are unlikely to produce savings in time to prevent the projected exhaustion of the DI trust fund in 2016. Like Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI), SSDI is a form of social insurance that replaces a portion of a worker's earnings based on the individual's career-average earnings in jobs covered by Social Security. Specifically, SSDI provides benefits to insured workers under the full retirement age (FRA) who meet the statutory test of disability and to their eligible dependents. FRA is the age at which unreduced Social Security retirement benefits are first payable (currently 66). To meet the statutory test of disability, insured workers must be unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity (SGA) because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or has lasted or can be expected to last for at least one year. In 2015, the monthly SGA earnings limit is $1,090 for most workers and $1,820 for statutorily blind individuals. In general, workers must have a severe condition that prevents them from doing any kind of substantial work that exists in the national economy, taking into account age, education, and work experience. Causes of the Growth in the SSDI Rolls
Ascribing shares of the growth in the SSDI program to specific factors has engendered disagreement among researchers, advocates, and some Members of Congress. In general, people who support higher spending on SSDI focus on changes in the demographic characteristics of insured workers. In contrast, individuals who want to limit program spending typically focus on the effect of changes in the economic incentives to apply for SSDI and legislative changes to the program's eligibility criteria. Changes in the Demographic Characteristics of Insured Workers
Growth in the Working-Age Population
One factor behind the increase in the total number of beneficiaries on SSDI is the overall growth in the working-age population ( Figure 6 ). For an overview of options to reduce benefit levels or to increase program revenues, see CBO's 2012 report, Policy Options for the Social Security Disability Insurance Program , available at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/43421 . As noted previously, while many of the proposals discussed in this report have the potential to slow or even reverse the prevalence of SSDI receipt and thus generate savings to the program over the longer term, such proposals are unlikely to produce savings in time to forestall the projected exhaustion of the DI trust fund. To avoid a 20% cut in benefits in 2016, lawmakers would likely need to enact some kind of short-term financing, such as a reallocation of the Social Security payroll tax rate or interfund borrowing. On the other hand, some people who could no longer qualify for SSDI would seek other federal support. Additionally, the agency received funding in FY2009 and FY2010 to increase the number of DDS staff by more than 2,900 employees. | Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) provides benefits to nonelderly workers with certain disabilities and their eligible dependents. As in Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI)—Social Security's retirement program—SSDI benefits are based on a worker's past earnings. To qualify, individuals must have worked and paid Social Security taxes for a certain number of years and be unable to engage in substantial gainful activity (SGA) due to a severe mental or physical impairment that is expected to last for at least one year or result in death. In 2015, the monthly SGA earnings limit for most individuals is $1,090. In general, disabled workers must be unable to do any kind of substantial work that exists in the national economy, taking into account age, education, and work experience.
Recently, some Members of Congress and the public have expressed concern over the growth in the SSDI program. Between 1980 and 2013, the number of disabled workers and their dependents more than doubled, rising from 4.7 million to 11.0 million. This increase has placed pressure on the Disability Insurance (DI) trust fund, from which SSDI benefits are paid. Over the same period, spending on benefits increased by more than 50%, from 0.54% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1980 to 0.84% of GDP in 2013. Without legislative action, the DI trust fund is projected to be depleted by the end of 2016. After that, ongoing tax revenues would be sufficient to pay about 80% of scheduled benefits.
Most researchers agree that changes in the demographic characteristics of the working-age population account for a large share of the growth in the number of individuals on SSDI. Demographic changes consist of (1) the aging of the baby boomers, (2) the influx of women into the labor force, and (3) the overall growth in the working-age population. However, there is considerable disagreement among researchers over how much non-demographic factors contributed to the growth. Non-demographic factors include (1) changes in opportunities for work and compensation (e.g., slow wage growth for low-skilled workers and high unemployment), (2) changes in federal policy that made it easier for some people to qualify as disabled, and (3) the rise in the full retirement age for unreduced Social Security retirement benefits. In general, people who support higher spending on SSDI focus on changes in the demographic characteristics of workers. In contrast, individuals who want to limit program spending typically focus on the effect of changes in the economic incentives to apply for SSDI and legislative changes to the program's eligibility criteria.
To assist lawmakers in addressing the sustainability of the program, this report provides an overview of proposals to manage the long-term growth in the SSDI rolls. Most of the proposals focus on reducing the inflow (enrollment) of new beneficiaries into the program. These proposals involve (1) tightening eligibility criteria, (2) improving the administration of the program, and (3) providing incentives for employers to help keep employees working when they become disabled. On the other hand, some of the proposals seek to increase the outflow (termination) of beneficiaries from the program. These proposals entail (1) providing stronger incentives for beneficiaries who can work to return to the labor force, and (2) increasing the number of periodic continuing disability reviews, which stop benefits for people found to be no longer disabled. This report does not examine options to reduce benefit levels or increase program revenues.
Although many of the options discussed in this report have the potential to slow or even reverse the growth of SSDI receipt and thus generate savings to the program over the longer term, such proposals are highly unlikely to significantly forestall the projected exhaustion of the DI trust fund. To avoid a 20% cut in benefits in late 2016, lawmakers would almost certainly have to use cash infusions to bolster the assets of the DI trust fund. For example, Congress could reallocate the Social Security payroll tax rate to give the DI trust fund a larger share (as was done in 1994), or it could authorize interfund borrowing from the OASI trust fund or Medicare's Hospital Insurance (HI) trust fund. These short-term financing options would give lawmakers more time to develop and implement some of the longer-term proposals mentioned in the report if they wished to slow the growth in the disability rolls. |
crs_RL33592 | crs_RL33592_0 | The Report concluded:
â In the case of Andrew Wilson, there exists proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the commanding officer of Area 2 and two other officers who interrogated Wilson committed aggravated battery, perjury and obstruction of justice in violation of Illinois law, but two of the officers are deceased and the Illinois 3 year statute of limitations bars prosecution the former commander of the Area 2 Violent Crime unit, Report at 63, 16.
â In the case of Phillip Adkins, there exists proof beyond a reasonable doubt that two other officers who interrogated Adkins committed aggravated battery in violation of Illinois law, but the Illinois statute of limitations bars prosecution, Report at 274, 16.
â In the case of Alfonzo Pinex, there exists proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a second pair of officers who interrogated Pinex, committed aggravated battery, perjury and obstruction of justice in violation of Illinois law, but the Illinois statute of limitations bar prosecution, Report at 290, 16. Federal Laws Implicated
Although the purpose of the Special State's Attorney's inquiry was to determine whether prosecution under Illinois law might be had, statements contained in the Report suggest the possibility that several federal criminal laws may have been violated. But at least in part, the problem may be one of time. On the other hand, here we have alleged civil rights violations followed by a series of denials themselves purportedly constituting violations of federal perjury and false statement statutes. Then there is the question of pattern. The Report suggests that dispelling statute of limitation difficulties, however, may be challenging, for on several occasions federal authorities have concluded that the passage of time bars federal prosecution:
On October 3, 1990 . . . the Task Force to Confront Police Violence wrote to . | The report of an Illinois Special State's Attorney, appointed to investigate allegations of police brutality committed against certain detainees during the early 1980s, concluded that in three instances indictable aggravated battery, perjury, and obstruction of justice had occurred, but that the 3-year Illinois statute of limitations barred prosecution. Media accounts, however, have suggested the possibility of federal prosecution.
Statements found in the report implicate, at a minimum, federal statutes outlawing civil rights violations, perjury, false statements, obstructions of justice, conspiracy, and racketeering. In most instances, the 5-year federal statute of limitations is not likely to prove any more forgiving that the Illinois law. Federal law, however, does recognize a longer period of limitation for certain conspiracies and racketeering offenses.
Yet it is unclear whether either of the exceptions is available. Federal authorities have apparently examined the question on several occasions in the past and declined to proceed at least in part on the basis of the statute of limitations.
At this time, we anticipate no subsequent revisions of this report. |
crs_R40172 | crs_R40172_0 | 111-353 , including provisions (a) directing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to update the Fish and Fisheries Products Hazards and Control Guidance to take into account advances in technology and (b) requiring a report by the Food and Drug Administration on the post-harvest processing of raw oysters. Congress last reauthorized and extensively amended the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA) in the 109 th Congress ( P.L. Eight Regional Fishery Management Councils were created by the FCMA. Today, individual states manage marine fisheries in inshore and coastal waters, generally within 3 miles of the coast. Beyond state waters, out to 200 miles, the federal government manages fish and shellfish resources for which FMPs have been developed under the MSFCMA. 111-281 amended the American Fisheries Act to modify provisions for vessel rebuilding and replacement, vessel exemptions, and fishery cooperative exemptions. P.L. P.L. 111-348 amended the MSFCMA to (1) modify language related to prohibiting shark finning, and (2) allow the United States-Canada Transboundary Resource Sharing Understanding to be considered an international agreement to create an exemption allowing federal fisheries managers to extend stock rebuilding deadlines for certain New England fisheries. 111-11 authorized the implementation of the San Joaquin River Restoration Settlement providing for the reintroduction of Chinook salmon. P.L. International Relations and Immigration
P.L. 111-215 extended the date on which the Environmental Protection Agency and applicable states might require permits for discharges from fishing vessels to December 18, 2013. P.L. Aquaculture
Background
Aquaculture is broadly defined as the farming or husbandry of fish, shellfish, and other aquatic animals and plants, usually in a controlled or selected environment. Action in the 111th Congress
Assistance
P.L. 111-5 contained language in (1) Section 103(d) providing as much as $50 million in total assistance to aquaculture producers for losses associated with high feed input costs during the 2008 calendar year; and (2) Section 1886 broadening the basis for determining import increases relating to trade adjustment assistance for fishing and aquaculture to include wild-caught fish and seafood in addition to farm-raised fish and seafood. P.L. 111-240 amended the Small Business Act to authorize certain disaster assistance to aquaculture enterprises that are small businesses. P.L. 111-307 amended the Lacey Act to add bighead carp to the list of injurious species that are prohibited from being imported or shipped interstate. Marine Mammals
Background
In 1972, Congress enacted the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA; 16 U.S.C. It also established a moratorium on importing marine mammals and marine mammal products into the United States. The MMPA shifted marine mammal management authority to the federal government. P.L. | Fish and marine mammals are important resources in open ocean and nearshore coastal areas; many federal laws and regulations guide their management as well as the management of their habitat.
Commercial and sport fishing are jointly managed by the federal government and individual states. States generally have jurisdiction within 3 miles of the coast. Beyond state jurisdiction and out to 200 miles, the federal government manages fisheries under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA) through eight regional fishery management councils. Beyond 200 miles, the United States participates in international agreements relating to specific areas or species. The 111th Congress enacted numerous measures, including P.L. 111-5, broadening the basis for determining import increases relating to trade adjustment assistance for fishing to include wild-caught fish and seafood in addition to farm-raised fish and seafood; P.L. 111-11 authorizing implementation of the San Joaquin River Restoration Settlement providing for the reintroduction of Chinook salmon; P.L. 111-215, extending the date on which the Environmental Protection Agency and applicable states might require permits for discharges from fishing vessels to December 18, 2013; P.L. 111-281, amending the American Fisheries Act to modify provisions for vessel rebuilding and replacement as well as vessel and fishery cooperative exemptions; P.L. 111-348, allowing a bilateral United States-Canada Understanding to be considered an international agreement to allow federal fisheries managers to extend stock rebuilding deadlines for certain New England fisheries; and P.L. 111-353, directing the Food and Drug Administration to update the Fish and Fisheries Products Hazards and Control Guidance to take into account advances in technology.
Aquaculture—the farming of fish, shellfish, and other aquatic animals and plants in a controlled environment—is expanding rapidly abroad, with more modest growth in the United States. In the United States, important species cultured include catfish, salmon, shellfish, and trout. The 111th Congress enacted several measures, including P.L. 111-5, providing as much as $50 million in total assistance to aquaculture producers for losses associated with high feed input costs during the 2008 calendar year; P.L. 111-240, amending the Small Business Act to authorize certain disaster assistance to aquaculture enterprises that are small businesses; P.L. 111-307, amending the Lacey Act to add bighead carp to the list of injurious species that are prohibited from being imported or shipped interstate; and P.L. 111-353, requiring a report by the Food and Drug Administration on the post-harvest processing of raw oysters.
Marine mammals are protected under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA). With few exceptions, the MMPA prohibits harm or harassment ("take") of marine mammals, unless restrictive permits are obtained. It also addresses specific situations of concern, such as dolphin mortality, primarily associated with the eastern tropical Pacific tuna fishery. Other than annual appropriations, the 111th Congress did not enact any legislation related to marine mammals. |
crs_R42395 | crs_R42395_0 | Introduction
A Retrospective of House Rules Changes Since the 110 th Congress is the second of two reports on rules changes adopted by the House at the beginning of a new Congress. One of the majority's prerogatives is writing the House's rules and using its majority status to effect the chamber's rules on the day the new House convenes. Although each new House largely adopts the chamber rules that existed in the previous Congress, each new House also adopts changes to those rules. (References to selected freestanding bills and resolutions are provided in footnotes in this report.) Provisions of the resolution related to the legislative management of the House included—
limiting roll-call votes to 20 minutes unless both parties' floor managers or leaders agreed to a longer time for voting; allowing the chair or ranking minority member of a committee to offer the committee-reported version of legislation as a preferential amendment if a special rule makes another version in order; a rule waiving points of order against a measure must waive the same points of order against an amendment requested by the minority leader; printed copies of a measure to be considered pursuant to a special rule and of conference reports must be available 24 hours before the House may begin consideration; the House may not go to conference with the Senate on an appropriations bill unless the Senate expressed its differences in the form of numbered amendments; conference discussion of disagreements must occur in an open meeting, and House conferees must vote by record vote in an open meeting on the conference agreement; the House may not consider a conference report that "differs in a material way" from the agreement approved by House conferees; the House may not consider a reconciliation measure that would increase the size of the budget deficit, unless agreed to by the majority and minority leaders and by a vote of two-thirds of the House; extending Budget Act points of order to unreported legislation considered by the House; disallowing a bill or conference report containing revenue provisions from being filed until the Joint Committee on Taxation had identified tax expenditures in the measure; and prohibiting the House from adjourning sine die unless "during at least 20 weeks of the session, a quorum call or recorded vote was taken on at least 4 of the weekdays…." (See, below, " 112th Congress " and " 115th Congress " under " Rules Changes Affecting Budgetary Legislation .") 112th Congress
H.Res. 111th Congress
Pursuant to the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act, the House renumbered two of its rules and inserted a new Rule XXVII. Concluding Observations
Changes made by Democrats after they took majority control of the House in the 110 th Congress and by Republicans after they took majority control in the 112 th Congress reflected, in part, critiques of the other party's management of the House. Democrats emphasized changes to ethics rules and laws in their new majority in the 110 th Congress, and Republicans emphasized changes to legislative procedures in their new majority in the 112 th Congress. Both parties addressed budget policymaking, in both rules changes and separate orders. Most standing rules, however, did not change, at all or substantially, when Democrats or Republicans became the majority, because the rules reflected decades of experience with majority control of the House. Rules facilitate the majority's organization and operation of the House; they do not dictate to party leaders and others how to run the House—their policy goals or procedural and political strategy—or determine what outcomes can be achieved. During the 112 th Congress and in the 2012 election, 75 new Members were elected. | One of the majority party's prerogatives is writing House rules and using its numbers to effect the chamber's rules on the day a new House convenes. Because all Members of the House stand for election every two years, the Members-elect constitute a new House that must adopt rules at the convening of each Congress. Although a new House largely adopts the chamber rules that existed in the previous Congress, it also adopts changes to those rules. Institutional and political developments during the preceding Congress inform rules changes that a party continuing in the majority might make. Those same developments, perhaps over the whole time that a party was in the minority, inform rules changes when the minority party wins enough seats to become the majority party and organize the House.
This report analyzes rules changes made on only the opening day of the 110th, 111th, 112th, 113th, 114th, and 115th Congresses (the Congresses convening in 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017, respectively), with references in footnotes to other selected legislation and actions during these Congresses that also affected House rules. Freestanding legislation such as the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act or a budget resolution can change House rules in consequential ways.
Changes made by Democrats after they took majority control in the 110th Congress and by Republicans after they took majority control in the 112th Congress reflected critiques of the other party's management of the House. Democrats emphasized changes to ethics rules and laws in their new majority beginning in the 110th Congress, and Republicans emphasized changes to legislative procedures in their new majority beginning in the 112th Congress. Both parties also addressed budget policymaking, in both rules changes and separate orders.
Most standing rules, however, did not change, at all or substantially, under either party because the rules reflect decades of experience with majority control of the House. Most of the changes that were made in each of the six Congresses covered in this report were incremental and, largely, grounded in experience. Changes, nonetheless, have touched the committee system and its procedures, the floor of the House, budgetary legislation, the administration of the House, and ethical norms of conduct. Rules facilitate the majority's organization and operation of the House; they do not dictate to party leaders and others how to run the House—their policy goals or procedural and political strategy—or determine what outcomes can be achieved.
This report is the second in a series on House rules changes at the beginning of a Congress. For changes in the 104th through the 109th Congresses, see CRS Report RL33610, A Retrospective of House Rules Changes Since the 104th Congress through the 109th Congress, by Michael L. Koempel and Judy Schneider. |
crs_RL32450 | crs_RL32450_0 | Public attention to the environmental impacts of the maritime industry has been especially focused on the cruise industry, in part because its ships are highly visible and in part because of the industry's desire to promote a positive image. The cruise industry is a significant and growing contributor to the U.S. economy, providing $40 billion in total benefits in 2009 and generating more than 357,000 U.S. jobs, but also making the environmental impacts of its activities an issue to many. Environmental advocates have raised concerns about the adequacy of existing laws for managing these wastes, and suggest that enforcement of existing laws is weak. It identifies the complex body of international and domestic laws that address pollution from cruise ships, as there is no single law in this area. The report then describes federal and state legislative activity concerning cruise ships in Alaskan waters and activities in a few other states. Similar legislation was introduced in the 111 th Congress (the Clean Cruise Ship Act, H.R. 3888 and S. 1820 ), but no legislative action occurred. Cruise Ship Waste Streams
Cruise ships generate a number of waste streams that can result in discharges to the marine environment, including sewage, graywater, hazardous wastes, oily bilge water, ballast water, and solid waste. They also emit air pollutants to the air and water. It is important, however, to keep these discharges in some perspective, because cruise ships represent a small—although highly visible—portion of the entire international shipping industry, and the waste streams described here are not unique to cruise ships. However, particular types of wastes, such as sewage, graywater, and solid waste, may be of greater concern for cruise ships relative to other seagoing vessels, because of the large numbers of passengers and crew that cruise ships carry and the large volumes of wastes that they produce. Applicable Laws and Regulations
The several waste streams generated by cruise ships are governed by a number of international protocols and U.S. domestic laws, regulations and standards, which are described in this section, but there is no single law or regulation. In some cases, states and localities have responsibilities as well. The Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS, 33 U.S.C. According to EPA, there have been discharges of solid waste and plastic from cruise ships. Issues for Congress
Concerns about cruise ship pollution raise issues for Congress in three broad areas: adequacy of laws and regulations, research needs, and oversight and enforcement of existing programs and requirements. No legislative action occurred on either bill. The legislation would amend the Clean Water Act to prohibit cruise vessels entering a U.S. port from discharging sewage, graywater, or bilge water into waters of the United States, including the Great Lakes, except in compliance with prescribed effluent limits and management standards. As noted above, a few states have passed legislation to regulate cruise ship discharges. | The cruise industry is a significant and growing contributor to the U.S. economy, providing more than $32 billion in benefits annually and generating more than 330,000 U.S. jobs, but also making the environmental impacts of its activities an issue to many. Although cruise ships represent a small fraction of the entire shipping industry worldwide, public attention to their environmental impacts comes in part from the fact that cruise ships are highly visible and in part because of the industry's desire to promote a positive image.
Cruise ships carrying several thousand passengers and crew have been compared to "floating cities," and the volume of wastes that they produce is comparably large, consisting of sewage; wastewater from sinks, showers, and galleys (graywater); hazardous wastes; solid waste; oily bilge water; ballast water; and air pollution. The waste streams generated by cruise ships are governed by a number of international protocols (especially MARPOL) and U.S. domestic laws (including the Clean Water Act and the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships), regulations, and standards, but there is no single law or rule. Some cruise ship waste streams appear to be well regulated, such as solid wastes (garbage and plastics) and bilge water. But there is overlap of some areas, and there are gaps in others. Some, such as graywater and ballast water, are not regulated (except in the Great Lakes), and concern is increasing about the impacts of these discharges on public health and the environment. In other areas, regulations apply, but critics argue that they are not stringent enough to address the problem—for example, with respect to standards for sewage discharges. Environmental advocates have raised concerns about the adequacy of existing laws for managing these wastes, and they contend that enforcement is weak.
In 2000, Congress enacted legislation restricting cruise ship discharges in U.S. navigable waters within the state of Alaska. California, Alaska, and Maine have enacted state-specific laws concerning cruise ship pollution, and a few other states have entered into voluntary agreements with industry to address management of cruise ship discharges. Meanwhile, the cruise industry has voluntarily undertaken initiatives to improve pollution prevention, by adopting waste management guidelines and procedures and researching new technologies. Concerns about cruise ship pollution raise issues for Congress in three broad areas: adequacy of laws and regulations, research needs, and oversight and enforcement of existing requirements. Legislation to regulate cruise ship discharges of sewage, graywater, and bilge water nationally was introduced in the 111th Congress (H.R. 3888 and S. 1820), but no legislative activity occurred on either bill.
This report describes the several types of waste streams that cruise ships may discharge and emit. It identifies the complex body of international and domestic laws that address pollution from cruise ships. It then describes federal and state legislative activity concerning cruise ships in Alaskan waters and activities in a few other states, as well as current industry initiatives to manage cruise ship pollution. Issues for Congress are discussed. |
crs_R44094 | crs_R44094_0 | In recent years, the rise of Islamist militancy has been a cause of concern to the United States and to Bangladesh's Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, and her government. This tension manifests itself through demonstrations, political gridlock, and at times violent street protests. A growing population, when combined with environmental stress brought on by natural disasters and climate change, may pose further challenges for Bangladesh, particularly given its already high population density. Bangladeshi authorities have struggled to accommodate the new arrivals, and Sheikh Hasina has called on Burma to take back the displaced Rohingya. A major source of instability is the rivalry between Prime Minister Hasina, of the governing Awami League (AL), and Khaleda Zia, the leader of the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Some analysts point out that the trials seem to be aimed at undermining the AL's political opponents, especially Islamists, including members of Jamaat-i-Islami (JI)—the largest Islamist political party in the country and a traditional BNP ally. Bangladesh-U.S. Relations
The United States has long-standing supportive relations with Bangladesh. The BNP boycotted because the AL government did not set up a neutral caretaker government prior to the vote. Partially as a result of the BNP's boycott, the AL won an overwhelming majority in parliament in 2014. After the election, in January 2015, the BNP called for a nationwide blockade and a series of strikes, known as hartals in South Asia. International Crimes Tribunal
The International Crimes Tribunal was established in 2009 to try to prosecute those who committed war crimes, such as murder and rape, during Bangladesh's 1971 war of independence from Pakistan. Several have been convicted and executed. According to the U.S. Department of State's 2016 Human Rights Report :
The most significant human rights problems [in Bangladesh] were extrajudicial killings, arbitrary or unlawful detentions, and forced disappearances by government security forces; the killing of members of marginalized groups and others by groups espousing extremist views; early and forced marriage; gender-based violence, especially against women and children; and poor working conditions and labor rights abuses. Bangladesh has struggled with inter-religious tensions and violence, particularly between Islamist extremists and Hindus. Since August 2017, an estimated half a million Rohingya have crossed the border into Bangladesh, fleeing from the latest outbreak of violence in Rakhine. However, the security forces allegedly have been targeting civilians and burning Rohingya villages. In 2015, the plight of the Rohingya and some Bangladeshis similarly gained international attention when many of them took to the sea to escape persecution and to find a better life. Possible Militant Ties
There is much uncertainty related to ARSA and the extent to which it has outside support. It is Bangladesh's policy not to allow ARSA to establish a base in Bangladesh, and the country's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mohammed Shahriar Alam, has stated that the Rohingya present a security issue as well as a humanitarian issue and that Bangladesh would take prompt action if ARSA tries to enter the country. Bangladesh is an important part of the global textile-supply chain, and its garment industry employs approximately four million workers. Yet successive factory disasters have led to additional global and U.S. scrutiny of Bangladesh's labor rights regime, especially following the Rana Plaza garment factory collapse which killed over 1,000 workers in April 2013. Many women in Bangladesh work in the garment sector—which accounted for over 80% of the country's exports in 2016. Environmental, Climate, and Food Security
Demographic pressures and environmental problems—including those linked to climate change—increasingly are challenges for Bangladesh, and they may result in thousands, perhaps millions, of people being displaced in future years. Moreover, some analysts believe cyclones likely will become more intense. In April 2016, a local employee at the U.S. Embassy was killed, along with a friend, and Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) claimed responsibility. But that is not to say [the] Islamic State is here." India also has expressed concerns about militant groups using Bangladesh as a "springboard for attacks in its territory." | Bangladesh (the former East Pakistan) is a Muslim-majority nation in South Asia, bordering India, Burma, and the Bay of Bengal. It is the world's eighth most populous country with nearly 160 million people living in a land area about the size of Iowa. It is an economically poor nation, and it suffers from high levels of corruption. In recent years, its democratic system has faced an array of challenges, including political violence, weak governance, poverty, demographic and environmental strains, and Islamist militancy. The United States has a long-standing and supportive relationship with Bangladesh, and it views Bangladesh as a moderate voice in the Islamic world. In relations with Dhaka, Bangladesh's capital, the U.S. government, along with Members of Congress, has focused on a range of issues, especially those relating to economic development, humanitarian concerns, labor rights, human rights, good governance, and counterterrorism.
The Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) dominate Bangladeshi politics. When in opposition, both parties have at times sought to regain control of the government through demonstrations, labor strikes, and transport blockades, as well as at the ballot box. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has been in office since 2009, and her AL party was reelected in January 2014 with an overwhelming majority in parliament—in part because the BNP, led by Khaleda Zia, boycotted the vote. The BNP has called for new elections, and in recent years, it has organized a series of blockades and strikes. The AL also has moved forward with a war crimes tribunal to prosecute atrocities committed during Bangladesh's war of independence from Pakistan in 1971. Many of the accused have been political opponents of the AL government.
There is little optimism among observers that the AL and the BNP will find a compromise over their political differences, and some analysts are concerned that the political crisis could increase the influence of Islamist extremists and further destabilize the country. Bangladeshi authorities have pursued Islamist militants—with some apparent success—but there have been reports of arbitrary detentions and extrajudicial killings. Several militant groups have re-formed after government operations against them, and some allegedly have developed links with international terrorist organizations, such as the Islamic State (IS) and Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). Also, Islamist extremists increasingly have targeted religious and ethnic minorities—as well as foreigners—in Bangladesh.
Bangladesh likely will face a range of other challenges, particularly related to its population growth, population density, and environmental degradation—which many experts believe likely will be exacerbated by climate change. Some experts project that millions could be displaced by climate change in the future.
In recent years, Rohingya refugees from Burma have fled to Bangladesh to escape persecution. This movement escalated dramatically between August and September 2017 when violence in Burma's Rakhine State led to a new surge of over half a million Rohingya refugees crossing the border into Bangladesh.
Much international attention has focused on working conditions in Bangladesh. The country plays a significant role in the global textile-industry supply chain. In 2016, Bangladesh's garment sector accounted for over 80% (or about $25 billion) of the country's exports. About $5.3 billion of those exports went to the United States. However, the industry has come under increased scrutiny, particularly following the 2013 Rana Plaza factory collapse, which killed over 1,000 workers. |
crs_R41624 | crs_R41624_0 | The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), as amended, greatly expanded federal regulation of health insurance by adding a number of health insurance market reforms designed to increase access to private health insurance for individuals and enhance the quality of health care. Among many other things, ACA sets new minimum standards for private health insurance coverage, including an extension of dependent coverage to age 26; the elimination of preexisting condition exclusions; a bar on lifetime and certain annual benefit limits; coverage of certain essential health benefits; a prohibition on health insurance rescissions except under limited circumstances; and coverage of preventive health services without cost sharing. This coverage may be sold both inside and outside of state health insurance exchanges (i.e., "marketplaces"). However, since ACA amends three preexisting statutes—the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), the Public Health Service Act (PHSA), and the Internal Revenue Code (IRC)—enforcement under federal law may be carried out through mechanisms in those statutes. This report examines these selected federal mechanisms. These three statutes apply to different types of private health insurance coverage and contain different types of enforcement mechanisms. Enforcement of Relevant ACA Provisions in ERISA, the PHSA, and the IRC
As noted above, Title XXVII of the PHSA, Part 7 of ERISA, and Chapter 100 of the IRC generally apply federal health insurance standards to different types of private-sector health coverage. ERISA applies to insured and self-insured group health plans, as well as insurance issuers providing group health coverage. The IRC, as administered by the Department of Treasury, covers employment-based group health plans, including church plans, but does not apply to health insurance issuers. If the Secretary determines that a state has failed to substantially enforce a provision of Title XXVII of the PHSA with respect to health insurance issuers in the state, the Secretary is responsible for enforcing these provisions. With respect to governmental plans, the Secretary of Health and Human Services is the primary enforcer of the PHSA requirements. In addition, Section 502(a) of ERISA authorizes various civil actions that may be brought by a participant or beneficiary of a plan against group health plans and health insurance issuers. Under the IRC, the group health plan requirements are enforced through the imposition of an excise tax. Since the provisions of ACA are incorporated by reference into Chapter 100 of the IRC, and Section 4980D of the IRC imposes a tax on any failure of a group health plan to meet the requirements of the chapter, group health plans subject to the Internal Revenue Code could be subject to the excise tax for violations of the ACA provisions. | The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), as amended, greatly expanded the scope of federal regulation over health insurance provided through employment-based group health plans, as well as coverage sold in the individual insurance market. Federal health insurance standards created by ACA require an extension of dependent coverage to age 26 if such coverage is offered; the elimination of preexisting condition exclusions; coverage of certain essential health benefits; a bar on lifetime or annual limits on the dollar value of certain benefits; a prohibition on health insurance rescissions except under limited circumstances; and coverage of preventive health services without cost-sharing, among many other things. While some of these changes took effect in 2010, others begin in 2014. In large part, ACA does not explicitly include any means for enforcing these health insurance requirements. However, these requirements were added to Title XXVII of the Public Health Service Act (PHSA), and incorporated by reference into Part 7 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and Chapter 100 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Accordingly, if these ACA provisions are not followed, enforcement may be carried out through mechanisms (such as judicial review and other penalties) that existed prior to ACA in these three federal statutes.
The PHSA, ERISA, and the IRC apply to different types of health coverage and contain different types of enforcement mechanisms. In general, the private health insurance requirements of Title XXVII of the PHSA apply to health insurers offering group and individual health coverage, as well as health plans offered to government employees. With respect to health insurers, the PHSA allows states to be the primary enforcers of the federal private health insurance requirements, but the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) assumes this responsibility if it is determined that a state has failed to "substantially enforce" the federal provisions. Pursuant to this enforcement structure, states are primarily responsible for enforcing federal health insurance requirements both inside and outside of health insurance exchanges. ERISA generally applies to group health coverage provided by private-sector employers. Section 502(a) of ERISA authorizes various civil actions that may be brought by a participant or beneficiary of a plan against both group health plans and health insurers. Chapter 100 of the IRC applies to group health coverage, and the Department of Treasury can enforce the health plan requirements through the imposition of an excise tax. This report examines these provisions in ERISA, the PHSA, and the IRC that may be used to enforce the ACA health insurance market reforms. |
crs_RL34704 | crs_RL34704_0 | 6893 ) is an omnibus child welfare bill designed to ensure greater permanence and improve the well-being of children served by public child welfare agencies—especially children in foster care, those who leave foster care in their later teens, and those who are Indian children. The legislation received strong support in Congress, and beyond revising and extending the Adoption Incentives program, it responds to a range of issues and concerns that have been variously raised (some for more than a decade) by public child welfare administrators; youth, adoption, tribal, and child welfare advocates; and by children and youth who have been (or still are) in foster care. The bill passed the House of Representatives, by voice vote (under suspension of the rules), on September 17, 2008, and the Senate, by unanimous consent, on September 22, 2008. It was signed into law by President George W. Bush on October 7, 2008. 110-351 ) revises and extends the Adoption Incentives program (under Section 473A of the Social Security Act) for five years, authorizes states to claim additional federal funds for certain child welfare purposes and adds new requirements for receipt of federal child welfare dollars. Financing Changes
P.L. 110-351 establishes new requirements for receipt of federal child welfare funding by public child welfare agencies. The bill requires these agencies (under Title IV-E or Title IV-B) to
provide assurance that each school-age child receiving federal foster care, adoption, or guardianship assistance is enrolled in school; work with other appropriate public agencies to reduce unnecessary school moves for all children in foster care and, separately, to coordinate and ensure access to health care for them, including mental health services and dental care; make "reasonable efforts" to place siblings together, whether in foster care, adoption, or guardianship; notify the adult relatives of children entering foster care of their options to participate in the care and placement of the child; no more than 90 days before a youth's exit from the foster care system (due to age rather than placement with a permanent family) develop with the youth a specific plan for his or her transition to independent living; negotiate "in good faith" with a tribe in the state that requests an agreement with the state to receive federal (Title IV-E) funds in return for that tribe's administration of some or all of the Title IV-E foster care, adoption assistance, and kinship guardianship assistance program for Indian children under its authority; and inform prospective adoptive parents of foster children of their potential eligibility for the federal adoption tax credit. 6307 and S. 3038 ). 110-351 will also extend it, as of FY2011, to kinship guardianship assistance.) However, the health- and education-related requirements included in P.L. Direct Federal Support to Tribal Programs
The Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 ( P.L. Federal Support for Training and Other Changes
Over five years, P.L. 110-351 makes several changes that are unrelated to child welfare policy. These non-child welfare-related provisions—together with savings projected from the implementation of kinship guardianship assistance and the school enrollment requirement—are estimated by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to fully offset the cost of the bill to the federal treasury over the next five and 10 years. 6893 , as enacted, authorizes significant expansions in federal support for state and tribal child welfare programs, CBO projects a combined change in federal spending and revenues from the overall bill that is roughly budget neutral over ten years (FY2009-FY2018). 110-351 , the final legislation represented a compromise between bills that were earlier acted on by the House and by the Senate Finance Committee. H.R. | The Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008 (H.R. 6893) is an omnibus child welfare bill designed to ensure greater permanence and improve the well-being of children served by public child welfare agencies. The legislation received strong support in Congress and, beyond revising and extending the Adoption Incentives program, responds to a range of issues and concerns that have been raised (some for more than a decade) by public child welfare administrators; youth, adoption, tribal, and child welfare advocates; and by children and youth who have been (or still are) in foster care. The bill passed the House of Representatives, by voice vote (under suspension of the rules), on September 17, 2008, and the Senate, by unanimous consent, on September 22, 2008. It was signed into law by the President on October 7, 2008 (P.L. 110-351).
The final bill represented a compromise between earlier bills acted on in the House (H.R. 6307) and in the Senate Finance Committee (S. 3038). As enacted, it revises the Adoption Incentives program and extends its funding authorization for five years (FY2009-FY2013). It makes significant changes to federal funding for child welfare programs, which include authorizing new federal support for states that provide kinship guardianship assistance to eligible children leaving foster care; expanding eligibility for federal adoption assistance (by phasing out, over FY2010-FY2018, income and other eligibility criteria that are based on dated cash welfare program rules); extending, as of FY2011, eligibility for federal foster care assistance to youth who remain in care beyond their 18th birthday, up to age 21; and phasing in additional support to states for child welfare related training. Additionally, the bill authorizes tribal child welfare agencies, as of FY2010, to directly access federal funds for foster care, adoption, and guardianship assistance under the Title IV-E program, provided the tribes meet substantially the same requirements made of states. The bill also appropriates $15 million in annual funding, for five years, for a new competitive grant program, Family Connection Grants.
Apart from these financing changes, P.L. 110-351 establishes new requirements for receipt of federal child welfare funding by public child welfare agencies. These include several that focus exclusively on the health and education status of children in foster care and others intended to ensure, or enable, sibling and other kinship connections for children in, or entering, foster care, and those leaving to adoption or guardianship. The bill also requires states to make new efforts related to planning for the transition of older children leaving foster care for independent living and requires states to inform prospective adoptive parents of foster children of their potential eligibility for the adoption tax credit (under the federal tax code).
Many of the changes included in the new law are projected by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to increase federal spending for child welfare. However, the increases are projected to be fully offset (over the next five and ten years) by savings or increased revenues to the federal treasury that CBO expects to be produced by other changes in the bill (both related and unrelated to child welfare policy). This report may be updated if warranted by issues related to implementing the new law. |
crs_RL32188 | crs_RL32188_0 | There are three main avenues for students from other countriesto temporarily come to the United States to study, and each involves admission as a nonimmigrant. The three visa categories used by foreign students are: F visas for academic study; M visas forvocational study; and J visas for cultural exchange. (1)
Legislative History of the Student Monitoring System
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
When Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act(IIRIRA) of 1996, it added statutory language mandating that the Attorney General, in consultationwith the Secretaries of State and Education, develop by January 1, 1998, a program to collect thefollowing data on foreign students from at least five countries:
identity and address of the alien;
nonimmigrant classification of the alien (i.e., F, J, or M classification), dateof visa issuance, and any change or extension;
academic status of the alien (e.g., full-time enrollment);and
any disciplinary action taken by the school, college, or university as a resultof a crime committed by the alien. The law mandated that the data collection be extended to include all countries by 2003. IIRIRArequired the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) (2) to collect the informationelectronically "where practical." It also mandated that educational institutions report this informationto INS as a condition of continued approval to enroll foreign students. 107-56 ) included provisions to expand the foreign studenttracking system and authorized $36.8 million in appropriations for the foreign student monitoringsystem. (4)
Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS)
The foreign student monitoring system created by the INS is referred to as the Student andExchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS). (5) SEVIS automated an existing manual data collection process. SEVIS became operational for allincoming students on February 15, 2003, the deadline for all institutions which had previously beenapproved to admit foreign students to apply for SEVIS certification (6) and enter all new students intothe SEVIS system. (8) Theeducational institutions were given until August 1, 2003, the same day in which all schools wererequired to have their SEVIS certification completed, to enter all continuing students into the system. Issues
Management of SEVIS. Nonetheless,schools have reported discrepancies between information received from USCIS and ICE regardingSEVIS operations and requirements. (19)
Nonetheless, there have been few stories in the press of foreign students having problemsentering the United States as a result of the implementation of SEVIS. Through SEVIS, DHS should be able to identify students who have violated the terms oftheir visas; (26) however,some have questioned whether DHS has the staff to locate all student visa violators, and whether itis a beneficial use of DHS resources to do so. There are also concerns that SEVIS errors will leadto unwarranted enforcement action taken against innocent students. (28)
Delays in Visa Issuances. | There has been increased interest in monitoring foreign students while maintaining the longtradition of permitting international scholars to study in the United States. There are three mainavenues for students from other countries to temporarily come to the United States to study, and eachinvolves admission as a nonimmigrant. The three visa categories used by foreign students are: Fvisas for academic study; M visas for vocational study; and J visas for cultural exchange. Recently,the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implemented an electronic foreign student monitoringsystem.
When Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act(IIRIRA) of 1996, it added statutory language mandating that the Attorney General, in consultationwith the Secretaries of State and Education, develop by January 1, 1998, a program to collect dataon foreign students from at least five countries, and mandated that by 2003, the data collectioninclude all countries. IIRIRA required the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) tocollect the information electronically "where practical." The USA Patriot Act of 2001 includedprovisions to expand the foreign student tracking system and authorized appropriations for thesystem, which was supposed to be funded through fees, paid by the students. The Enhanced BorderSecurity and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 increased monitoring of foreign students and closedperceived loopholes.
The foreign student monitoring system created by the former INS, and mandated in IIRIRA,is referred to as the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS). SEVIS, whichautomated an existing manual data collection process, became operational for all incoming studentson February 15, 2003, the deadline for all institutions which had previously been approved to admitforeign students to apply for SEVIS certification and enter all new students into the SEVIS system. The educational institutions were given until August 1, 2003 to enter all continuing students into thesystem, and to have their SEVIS certification completed. Currently, there are 599,617 activestudents in SEVIS.
There have been few stories in the press of foreign students having problems entering theUnited States as a result of the implementation of SEVIS. Nonetheless, schools have reportedtechnical difficulties operating SEVIS, and reported discrepancies between information receivedfrom different bureaus in DHS regarding SEVIS operations and requirements. Additionally, somehave noted delays in student visa processing. Prior to the implementation of SEVIS it was difficultto know when foreign students overstayed their visas. Through SEVIS, DHS should be able toidentify students who have violated the terms of their visas; however, some question whether DHShas the staff to locate all student visa violators, and whether it is a beneficial use of DHS resourcesto do so. Others are concerned that clerical errors will lead to unwarranted enforcement actions. This report will be updated as needed. |
crs_RL31160 | crs_RL31160_0 | Expedited Procedures of the Congressional Review Act
Congressional Disapproval of Regulations
The Congressional Review Act, enacted in 1996, establishes special congressional procedures for disapproving a broad range of regulatory rules issued by federal agencies. The Senate may use the expedited procedures to complete initial consideration of a disapproval resolution only during the 60 days of session following congressional receipt of the rule (and, if required, its publication in the Federal Register ). Effect of Sine Die Adjournment
The Congressional Review Act makes special provision for the action period and initiation period if, within 60 days of session after a rule is submitted, Congress adjourns its session sine die. The Congressional Review Act provides that a "major rule" may not take effect until 60 calendar days after the rule has been both published in the Federal Register and submitted to Congress (unless the rule is one for which such publication is not required, in which case the 60 days begins when the rule is simply submitted to Congress). The Act also explicitly provides that if Congress enacts a resolution disapproving a rule that has already taken effect, under any of the circumstances just described, the rule "shall be treated as though [it] had never taken effect." Rejection by Either House. If both houses pass the disapproval resolution and the President vetoes it, the receipt by Congress of the veto message triggers the new waiting period of 30 days of session. If the President then vetoed the disapproval resolution, the rule would presumably be considered to remain in effect pending congressional action on the veto. Unlike some expedited procedure statutes, the Act does not provide that the joint resolution be introduced either automatically, or by specified Members, or at any specified time (except that it must be during the 60-day initiation period if the resolution is to qualify for consideration under the terms of the Act). relating to ergonomics." As described later, for example, the Congressional Review Act prohibits amendment of a disapproval resolution only in the Senate. If 30 Senators submit a petition for the purpose, the measure is automatically discharged and placed on the calendar, from which it may be called up for floor consideration. Taking Up a Disapproval Resolution in the Senate
Under the procedure provided by the Congressional Review Act, once a disapproval resolution is on the calendar in the Senate, a motion to proceed to consider it is in order. Third, Senate debate on the resolution is limited to 10 hours, equally divided between supporters and opponents, so that no filibuster is possible on the resolution itself. This action enables the two houses to proceed, by conference or otherwise, to resolve the differences between these two versions of the same measure. Specifically, the House might likely consider a disapproval resolution pursuant to the terms of a special rule. Yet the overall expedited procedures of the Act do not conclusively ensure:
that substantively similar disapproval resolutions will be submitted in each chamber; that neither house will amend a disapproval resolution in a way that makes it substantively dissimilar from the other, or otherwise ineligible for consideration under the expedited procedures for final action; or that each house will take initial action on a disapproval resolution of its own. Because the Congressional Review Act provides no expedited committee or floor procedure in the House, supporters of the disapproval resolution could not discharge the House committee, or bring the measure to the House floor, except under the general rules, which normally leave control in the hands of the committee and leadership. As long as the resolution had been submitted during the initiation period, and satisfied the description provided in the Act, its enactment would render the disapproved rule without force and effect, and would also prohibit the agency from issuing a "substantially similar" rule without subsequent legislative authority. | The Congressional Review Act of 1996 established expedited (or "fast track") procedures by which Congress may disapprove a broad range of regulatory rules issued by federal agencies by enacting a joint resolution of disapproval. For initial floor consideration, the Act provides an expedited procedure only in the Senate. (The House would likely consider the measure pursuant to a special rule.) The Senate may use the procedure for 60 days of session after the agency transmits the rule to Congress. In both houses, however, to qualify for expedited consideration, a disapproval resolution must be submitted within 60 days after Congress receives the rule, exclusive of recess periods. Pending action on a disapproval resolution, the rule may go into effect, unless it is a "major rule" on which the President or issuing agency does not waive a delay period of 60 calendar days.
If a disapproval resolution is enacted, the rule may not take effect and the agency may issue no substantially similar rule without subsequent statutory authorization. If a rule is disapproved after going into effect, it is "treated as though [it] had never taken effect." If either house rejects a disapproval resolution, the rule may take effect at once. If the President vetoes the resolution, the rule may not take effect for 30 days of session thereafter, unless the House or Senate votes to sustain the veto. If a session of Congress adjourns sine die less than 60 days of session after receiving a rule, the full 60-day periods for action begin anew on the 15th day of session after the next session convenes.
Except for submission of disapproval resolutions and final congressional action thereon, the expedited procedures under the Act apply only to Senate consideration. The House would consider a disapproval resolution under its general procedures, very likely as prescribed by a special rule reported from the Committee on Rules. In the Senate, once the resolution has been before committee for 20 calendar days, the panel is discharged if 30 Senators submit a petition for the purpose. Once the committee has reported or been discharged, a motion to proceed to consider the resolution would in practice be nondebatable, and the Act prohibits various other possible dilatory actions in relation to the motion and the resolution. Floor debate on the resolution is limited to 10 hours, and no amendment is in order.
The Act does not preclude amendment of a disapproval resolution in the House, and means may exist of overcoming the prohibition on amendment in the Senate. For these reasons, and because the initial texts could differ, the resolutions initially adopted by the two houses might not be identical. The Act enables Congress to avoid the need to resolve differences between the two versions by providing that, when either house adopts a disapproval resolution, the other shall first consider its own disapproval resolution and then vote on the resolution received from the first. As long as the substantive effect of both is similar, the difference in text should not affect the ultimate effect of the legislation. If the substantive effects differ, presumably the two measures could not be linked in this way by using the expedited procedures of the Act. |
crs_RS22785 | crs_RS22785_0 | Although CMS requires the care to be directed at the unborn child, the SCHIP unborn child SPA option effectively enables states to provide prenatal care to pregnant women including those with incomes at or above the Medicaid income eligibility thresholds and for individuals who do not qualify for Medicaid (or SCHIP) for other reasons, such as immigration status or incarceration. Finally, for the family coverage option, pregnancy-related benefits are those offered by participating private health plans. Summary of State Variation in Pregnancy Coverage Under SCHIP
Table 1 summarizes the variation in pregnancy coverage among states with §1115 waivers and those using the SCHIP unborn child SPA option. As of October 2007, 17 states offered pregnancy-related services using SCHIP funds. Of those, 12 states extended coverage through unborn child SCHIP SPAs and 6 states used the §1115 waiver authority (Rhode Island extends coverage to pregnant women through both authorities). Of the 12 states that offer pregnancy-related services to unborn children under the SCHIP SPAs, all but Tennessee extended coverage to the unborn children of undocumented aliens who otherwise would not have access to federally funded pregnancy-related services, except through emergency Medicaid. Three states indicated that the coverage offered to pregnant women and/or unborn children was comprehensive and not limited to pregnancy-related services. The reason CMS permits this is because the state has a global rate for their pregnancy services that includes the cost of prenatal care, labor and delivery, and 60 days of postpartum care. Finally, two states (one §1115 waiver state and one SCHIP SPA state) provided access to extended family planning services and supplies as a part of their postnatal care benefit. | The State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) does not include pregnancy status among its eligibility criteria and does not cover individuals over age 18. Under SCHIP, states can cover pregnant women aged 19 and older in one of three ways: (1) states may apply for waivers of program rules to extend coverage to adults such as pregnant women (§1115 waiver authority); (2) states may provide health benefits coverage, including prenatal care and delivery services, to unborn children through an SCHIP state plan amendment (SPA) as permitted through regulation (Federal Register, vol. 67, no. 191, Wednesday, October 2, 2002, Rules and Regulations); or (3) states may offer a "family coverage option" that allows them to provide coverage under a group health plan that may include maternity care to adult females in eligible families. Section 2105(c)(3) of the Social Security Act allows states to cover entire families including parents if the purchase of family coverage is cost-effective when compared with the cost of covering only the targeted low-income children in the families involved, and would not substitute for other health insurance coverage. E-mail correspondence (from June 7, 2007) with Kathleen Farrell, the CMS Director of the SCHIP program, indicates that New Jersey and Massachusetts are the only states with operational family coverage variance programs. As of October 2007, 17 states offered pregnancy-related services using SCHIP funds. Of those, 6 states used the §1115 waiver authority and 12 states extended coverage through unborn child SPAs (Rhode Island extends coverage to pregnant women through both authorities). This report summarizes the variation in pregnancy coverage and the financing streams associated with such coverage among these states. This report will be updated as state activity warrants. |
crs_R44319 | crs_R44319_0 | Partially due to enforcement controversies, Congress has occasionally considered restructuring the agency. In recent years, commissioners have sparred at open meetings and in the media about whether the agency's enforcement activities are inadequate or overzealous. Rather, it represents broader controversies about what the FEC does and what it should do, and what federal campaign finance policy is and should be. This report is not about the FEC's individual enforcement controversies, but, rather, about why controversies surrounding the enforcement process might matter to Congress as it provides the agency with overall direction and shapes campaign finance policy generally. In particular, another CRS product provides an overview of the FEC. Some discussions of the FEC's authority, which are generally beyond the scope of this report, use the term "commission" to denote members of the FEC as opposed to agency staff. More generally, enforcement is one of the most prominent topics in federal campaign finance policy. Latest Congressional Activity
Congress has considered various campaign finance legislation, and conducted FEC oversight, for decades. In the 114 th Congress, H.R. Another CRS report provides additional detail about the commission. The " Deadlocked Votes " section contains additional detail. Selected Major Topics of Debate in Enforcement
Transparency and the Enforcement Process
At least two transparency issues are central to the enforcement process. Much of that hearing emphasized transparency surrounding the FEC's enforcement process. Congress appears to have anticipated that the commission might be unable to reach consensus in some controversial cases, and perhaps intended for deadlocks to occur. Potential Considerations for Congress and Concluding Comments
Enforcement is important not only for encouraging compliance with law and regulation or correcting non-compliance, but also for what it represents about the state of campaign finance policy overall. For others, it is too lax to be effective. As such, some contend that more vigorous enforcement of campaign finance law requires restructuring the FEC. Other observers warn that an odd number of commissioners could invite politicized enforcement. Does the commission have a unified understanding of what the agency's enforcement priorities are and should be? The FEC can determine how to prioritize enforcement activities, fill relevant staff vacancies, and whether or not commissioners can agree on enforcement actions. | The Federal Election Commission (FEC) is responsible for civil enforcement of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and other campaign finance statutes. Enforcement, one of the FEC's principal functions, is perhaps the most controversial thing the agency does. Enforcement matters not only for encouraging compliance with law and regulation, but also for what it represents about the state of campaign finance policy overall. Some agency critics argue that modest fines, protracted processes, and deadlocked commission votes demonstrate that the FEC cannot effectively enforce campaign finance law. Others contend that Congress designed the FEC, which includes six commissioners who typically represent the two major political parties, to be deliberate and driven by consensus so that enforcement would not be politicized.
Enforcement has drawn attention inside and outside the agency. In recent years, commissioners have sparred at open meetings and in the media about whether the agency's enforcement activities are inadequate or overzealous. The commission has struggled to staff some senior enforcement positions. Through oversight hearings, recent Congresses have monitored the FEC's enforcement activities and, in some cases, criticized the transparency surrounding those processes. Congress occasionally has considered legislation to restructure the agency, particularly to change the number of commissioners, thereby reducing possibilities for deadlocked votes. H.R. 2931 in the 114th Congress is the latest such proposal.
This report provides Congress with a resource for understanding the FEC's enforcement process and context for why enforcement is consequential. Enforcement represents broader debates about what the FEC does and what it should do, and what federal campaign finance policy is and should be. The FEC can determine how to prioritize enforcement activities and can manage its response to ongoing campaign finance policy disagreements. The agency has less or no control over other aspects of its environment, such as the enforcement process mandated in FECA. CRS Report R44318, The Federal Election Commission: Overview and Selected Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed] provides an overview of the FEC generally, including attention to organizational and administrative matters that are related to but distinct from the enforcement topics discussed here.
This report will be updated occasionally as events warrant. |
crs_RL32927 | crs_RL32927_0 | Overview
On March 10, 2005, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued its final rule toaddress the effects of interstate transport of air pollutants on nonattainment of the National AmbientAir Quality Standards (NAAQS) for fine particulates (PM 2.5 ) and ozone (specifically, the eight-hourstandard). (1) The Clean AirInterstate Rule (CAIR) was first proposed as the Interstate Air Quality (IAQ) rule and appeared inthe Federal Register January 30, 2004. (2) For PM 2.5 , CAIR finds that the interstate transport of sulfur dioxide(SO 2 ) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) from 23 states and the District of Columbia contributessignificantly to downwind nonattainment; for ozone, CAIR finds that interstate transport of NOxfrom 25 states and the District of Columbia contributes significantly to downwind nonattainment ofthe eight-hour standard. With CAIR, EPA creates regional emissions caps for NOx and SO 2 to be implemented in twophases -- 2010 (2009 for NOx) and 2015. The Rule
As noted above, EPA decided in its final rule to create three emissions caps: Two are annualemissions caps that address the interstate contribution of SO 2 and NOx to PM 2.5 nonattainment; thethird is a seasonal cap to address interstate NOx contribution to ozone nonattainment. (47)
Conclusion
The final CAIR rule reflects several changes from the proposed IAQ resulting from improvedmodeling and other considerations. Inclusion of a fuel-type adjustment factor to the NOx allocation formula thatprovides more NOx allowances to states that burn coal for electricitygeneration. Although these changes may be important in specific cases, they do not represent a majorshift in the thrust and scope of CAIR. That the rule has not had the visibility of the Hg rule should not be interpreted to mean thatthe underlying issue of PM 2.5 and eight-hour ozone compliance has been solved. In particular, EPAis currently reviewing the stringency of the PM 2.5 NAAQS, a process that could result in a morestringent standard and more counties out of compliance. Likewise, CAIR does not address the most potent environmental issue surroundingfossil-fuel-fired electric generating facilities -- global warming and the possibility of carbon dioxidereductions. Movement on that issue over the next decade could result in a modification of CAIR,or a new multipollutant control regime. Bills have been introduced in Congress to impose such asystem. (49)
Finally, the promulgation of CAIR may raise questions about the future of the BushAdministration's legislative initiative -- Clear Skies. Clear Skies represents a complete rewrite ofTitle IV of the Clean Air Act and would impose a comprehensive cap-and-trade system on utilitySO 2 , NOx, and Hg emissions. In addition, it would have altered, deleted, or held in abeyance forsome time existing sections of the Clean Air Act with respect to affected electric generating unitsand industrial sources that chose to opt into the program. (50) With the promulgation of CAIR that achieves NOx and SO 2 emissions reductions from most of the country's electricity generating facilities, and of the final Hgrule, it is unclear what impetus remains for Clear Skies. | On March 10, 2005, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued its final rule toaddress the effects of interstate transport of air pollutants on nonattainment of the National AmbientAir Quality Standards (NAAQS) for fine particulates (PM 2.5 ) and ozone (specifically, the eight-hourstandard). The Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) was first proposed as the Interstate Air Quality(IAQ) rule and appeared in the Federal Register January 30, 2004. For PM 2.5 , CAIR finds that theinterstate transport of sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) and nitrogen oxides (NOx) from 23 states and the Districtof Columbia contributes significantly to downwind nonattainment; for ozone, CAIR finds thatinterstate transport of NOx from 25 states and the District of Columbia contributes significantly todownwind nonattainment of the eight-hour standard. This result differs some from the proposed rulebecause of improved modeling.
EPA decided in CAIR to create three emissions caps: Two are annual emissions caps thataddress the interstate contribution of SO 2 and NOx to PM 2.5 nonattainment; the third cap is a seasonalcap to address interstate contribution of NOx to ozone nonattainment. The three caps areimplemented in two phases: Phase 1 begins in 2009 for the NOx caps and 2010 for the SO 2 cap. Improved modeling and other considerations resulted in some changes in the final rule from theproposed IAQ. For example, in CAIR, EPA added a fuel-type adjustment factor to the NOxallocation formula that provides significantly more NOx allowances to states that have coal-firedelectric generation compared with those with natural gas-fired generation.
Although changes to the proposed rule may be important in specific cases, they do notrepresent a major shift in the thrust and scope of CAIR. That CAIR has not had the visibility of thecontemporaneous mercury (Hg) rule should not be interpreted to mean that the underlying issue ofPM 2.5 and eight-hour ozone compliance has been solved. EPA is currently reviewing the stringencyof the PM 2.5 NAAQS, a process that may result in a more stringent standard. Given CAIR's lengthyschedule, it seems likely that if the PM 2.5 NAAQS is strengthened, efforts to revise CAIR wouldoccur.
Likewise, CAIR does not address the most potent environmental issue surroundingfossil-fuel-fired electric generating facilities -- global warming and the possibility of carbon dioxidereductions. Movement on that issue over the next decade could result in a modification of CAIR,or a new multi-pollutant control regime. Bills have been introduced in Congress to create such asystem.
Finally, CAIR raises questions about the future of the Bush Administration's legislativeinitiative -- Clear Skies. Clear Skies represents a complete rewrite of Title IV of the Clean Air Actand would impose a comprehensive cap-and-trade system on utility SO 2 , NOx, and Hg emissions. In addition, Clear Skies would alter, delete, or hold in abeyance for some time existing sections ofthe CAA with respect to affected electric facilities and industrial sources that chose to opt into theprogram. With the promulgation of CAIR that achieves NOx and SO 2 emissions reductions frommost of the country's electricity generating facilities, and of the final Hg rule, it is unclear whatimpetus remains for Clear Skies. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL33504 | crs_RL33504_0 | Most Recent Developments
Congress generally authorizes new Army Corps of Engineers water resources studies and projects before appropriating funds for these activities. Authorization typically occurs in a Water Resources Development Act (WRDA). WRDA 2007 ( P.L. 110-114 ) became law on November 9, 2007, authorizing approximately 900 projects, studies, and modifications to existing authorizations. The President vetoed WRDA 2007, citing "excessive authorizations" and a lack of fiscal discipline and priorities. This was the first congressional override of a veto by President George W. Bush. Authorization Level
A central issue in the debate over WRDA 2007 was its level of authorizations. A Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analysis of the conference report estimated the 15-year impact at $23 billion. The Administration supported limiting authorizations to projects in the Corps' primary missions (navigation, flood and storm damage reduction, and ecosystem restoration) that demonstrated an economic and environmental justification for federal participation. WRDA 2007 also established a safety assurance review process for hurricane protection and flood damage projects; it gave the Corps' Chief of Engineers discretion regarding when to call for a safety review. Regional Project Authorizations
Other issues that shaped WRDA 2007 included different opinions about the specifics of project authorizations, including the billion-dollar regional authorizations for:
Coastal Louisiana wetlands restoration, flood and storm protection, and navigation projects (including authorization of the Morgana-to-the Gulf project, and the authorization levels and specifics of wetlands restoration activities for coastal Louisiana); Florida Everglades ecosystem restoration projects (including authorization of activities under the Modified Water Deliveries Project); and Upper Mississippi River Illinois Waterway (UMR-IWW) navigation and ecosystem restoration projects (including concerns about linking the funding of navigation and restoration activities). Other Issues
WRDA 2007 created a Committee on Levee Safety to make recommendations for a national levee safety program. It also authorized the Corps to participate in more than 200 municipal water and wastewater infrastructure projects (called environmental infrastructure at the Corps). Upper Mississippi River-Illinois Waterway
WRDA 2007 authorized $2.2 billion in navigation improvements and $1.7 billion in ecosystem restoration activities on the Upper Mississippi River and Illinois Waterway (UMR-IWW). | Congress generally authorizes new Army Corps of Engineers water resources studies and projects in a Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) before appropriating funds to them. WRDA 2007 (P.L. 110-114) became law on November 9, 2007. This was the first congressional override of a veto by President George W. Bush. WRDA 2007 authorized approximately 900 Corps projects, studies, and modifications to existing authorizations.
A central issue in the debate over WRDA 2007 was its level of authorizations. A Congressional Budget Office analysis estimated its 15-year impact at $23 billion. The President returned WRDA 2007 to Congress, citing its lack of fiscal discipline and priorities. The Administration supported limiting authorizations to projects in the Corps' primary missions (navigation, flood and storm damage reduction, and ecosystem restoration) that demonstrate an economic and environmental justification for federal participation. Other issues that shaped the WRDA 2007 debate included different opinions on Corps reform measures (such as independent review and project planning) and the need for prioritizing among authorized projects, increases in the federal cost for some water resources activities and nonfederal cost share credits, and expansion of the Corps' authorizations in municipal water and wastewater infrastructure (called environmental infrastructure projects).
WRDA 2007 authorized more than $2 billion in construction activities to restore wetlands in coastal Louisiana, as well as $6 billion in actions to improve hurricane protection in New Orleans. Authorizations for navigation improvements ($2.2 billion) and ecosystem restoration ($1.7 billion) on the Upper Mississippi River-Illinois Waterway, and Florida Everglades restoration (around $2 billion), also are included. WRDA 2007 created a Committee on Levee Safety to make recommendations for a national levee safety program. It also established a requirement for independent technical review of plans for Corps projects exceeding $45 million and a process for determining which flood and storm damage construction activities would undergo a safety review. |
crs_R42923 | crs_R42923_0 | Synthesis of Key Issues
The electric power industry is in the process of transformation. The electricity infrastructure of the United States is aging, and uncertainty exists around how to modernize the grid, and what technologies and fuels will be used to produce electricity in the future. Congress will likely be faced with policy issues regarding how the modernization of this vital industry will unfold. The choice of power generation technology in the United States is heavily influenced by the cost of fuel. Growing concerns over GHG emissions, other environmental costs associated with burning fossil fuels, and existing or anticipated state and federal policies addressing these issues are leading some utilities and energy providers to deploy more renewable energy technologies to meet power demands. With increasing production of natural gas has come a decline in natural gas prices, and a decline in coal consumption for power generation. In April 2012, for the first time in history, the amount of electricity generation from natural gas equaled that of coal, according to EIA statistics, with each representing about 32% of the market. The electric utility industry values diversity in fuel choice options since reliance on one fuel or technology can leave electricity producers vulnerable to price and supply volatility. However, an "inverse relationship" is developing for coal vs. natural gas as a power generation choice based on market economics alone, and policies which allow one fuel source to dominate could increase industry vulnerability to volatility. Upgrading the nation's transmission to accommodate current and future uses and ensuring the functioning and the security of the grid have been paramount concerns for the federal government. The federal government has already tasked the FERC with responsibility for enforcing reliability standards for the bulk electric system, but cybersecurity and physical security of the grid remain key issues. The recent damage sustained to the electrical grid by Hurricane Sandy in New York and New Jersey, and difficulty in restoring electricity service underscore the age and fragility of the power system, and how electricity service might benefit from hardening and modernization of various power systems. Environmental Issues
Coal has long been the major fossil fuel used to produce electricity. Recent Events
New regulations under development at EPA would impose new requirements on coal-fired power plants. Some of these rules would be implemented at the federal level, while others would be implemented at the state level. EPA also issued standards for greenhouse gas emissions which would require all new power plants to restrict carbon dioxide emissions. EPA has yet to propose rules for GHG emissions from existing power plants, as is required by court order. Much attention has focused recently on the resulting finalization of these regulations, and their potential to contribute to the retirement of mostly small, older coal-burning power plants without modern environmental controls. | The electric power industry is in the process of transformation. The electricity infrastructure of the United States is aging, and uncertainty exists around how to modernize the grid, and what technologies and fuels will be used to produce electricity in the future. Congress will likely be faced with policy issues regarding how the modernization of this vital industry will unfold.
For most of the 20th century, coal has been the dominant fuel used to produce electricity. In 2011, coal was the fuel used for almost 42% of power generation in the United States. However, coal use for power generation seems to be on the decline. In April 2012, for the first time in history, the amount of electricity generated from natural gas equaled that of coal (according to Energy Information Administration statistics) with each fuel claiming about 32% of the market. The future of coal as a fuel for power generation seems to be in question. Two major reasons are generally seen as being responsible: the expectation of a dramatic rise in natural gas supplies, and the impact of environmental regulations on an aging base of coal-fired power plants. The electric utility industry values diversity in fuel choice options since reliance on one fuel or technology can leave electricity producers vulnerable to price and supply volatility. However, an "inverse relationship" is developing for coal vs. natural gas as a power generation choice based on market economics alone, and policies which allow one fuel source to dominate may come at the detriment of the other.
Upgrading the nation's transmission system to accommodate current and future uses, and ensuring the reliable functioning and the security of the grid, has been a major concern for the federal government. Federal law has already tasked the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission with responsibility for enforcing reliability standards for the bulk electric system, including cybersecurity, but protection from natural hazards continues as a key issue. The recent damage sustained to the electrical grid by Hurricane Sandy in New York and New Jersey and difficulty in restoring electricity service underscore the age and fragility of the power system, and how electricity service might benefit from hardening and modernization of various power systems. Growing concerns over greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, other environmental costs associated with burning fossil fuels, and existing or anticipated state and federal policies addressing these issues are leading some utilities and energy providers to deploy more renewable energy technologies to meet power demands, and potentially increasing the need for new transmission lines to incorporate clean energy sources.
New environmental regulations under development would impose new requirements on coal-fired power plants. Some of these rules would be implemented at the federal level, while others would be implemented at the state level. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also issued standards for greenhouse gas emissions which would require all new power plants to restrict carbon dioxide emissions. EPA has yet to propose rules for GHG emissions from existing power plants, as is required by court order. Much attention has focused on the resulting finalization of these regulations, and their potential to contribute to power plant retirements, with some in the electric power industry expressing concern that reliability could be impacted. |
crs_R40978 | crs_R40978_0 | Introduction
The role of prevention in improving the quality of health care by preventing illness, disability, and death through expanded coverage or use of preventive services is a key topic of discussion among those seeking to reform the nation's health care delivery system. Some stakeholders have touted prevention as a means to contain health care costs. Whether expanding coverage or utilization of preventive services would actually save money for Medicare is, however, a matter of continuing debate. In general, Medicare law authorizes the Secretary to cover services for the diagnosis and treatment of illness, while coverage of preventive services (i.e., services provided in the absence of symptoms) has generally required legislation. Over the years, Congress has sought expert advice to determine, for the purposes of Medicare coverage, whether a given preventive service is effective, and whether its clinical use is likely to benefit the patient without posing potential risks from the procedure itself. Current Medicare coverage of preventive services does not always comport with evidence-based recommendations of expert panels such as the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF). A recent USPSTF recommendation regarding screening mammography has refocused congressional attention on the appropriate role of advisory panels with respect to Medicare coverage decisions. First, it provides a brief overview of the Medicare program and history of congressional actions that added coverage of various clinical preventive services under Medicare, including, most recently, a comprehensive health assessment for new Medicare beneficiaries, and a new administrative authority of the Secretary of HHS to expand Medicare coverage of preventive services. The report then discusses several advisory groups—in particular the USPSTF—and their recommendations regarding the effectiveness of clinical preventive services, Medicare coverage of these services, or related matters. This report will be updated as events warrant. "), if the Secretary determines that three conditions are met, namely that the proposed preventive service is
reasonable and necessary for the prevention or early detection of an illness or disability; recommended with a grade of A or B by the USPSTF; and appropriate for individuals entitled to benefits under Medicare part A or enrolled under Medicare part B.
MIPPA also authorizes the Secretary to consider cost in determining whether to add coverage of a preventive service, saying: "As part of the use of such [NCD] process, the Secretary may conduct an assessment of the relation between predicted outcomes and the expenditures for such service and may take into account the results of such assessment in making such determination." These panels have different mandates, and none is explicitly charged with evaluating preventive services for the purposes of Medicare coverage. Each panel is then discussed in more detail. Can Utilization of Medicare Preventive Services Be Improved? The House is preparing to vote on H.R. 3590 , as passed by the Senate, and on an accompanying reconciliation bill ( H.R. 4872 ). The reconciliation bill would change several controversial elements in H.R. 3590 and otherwise amend the underlying legislation so that its budgetary impact meets the reconciliation instructions in last year's budget resolution. If the House approves H.R. 3590 , it will be sent to the President to be signed into law. The reconciliation measure, if approved by the House, would then be taken up by the Senate. Senate-Passed H.R. 3590: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
On December 24, 2009, the Senate passed an amended version of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ( H.R. In addition, Section 4003, "Clinical and Community Preventive Services Task Forces," would reauthorize current authority for the USPSTF (calling it the "Preventive Services Task Force"), requiring the Task Force to review the scientific evidence related to the effectiveness, appropriateness, and cost-effectiveness of clinical preventive services for the purpose of developing recommendations for the health care community, and updating previous clinical preventive recommendations, to be published in the Guide to Clinical Preventive Services . House-Passed H.R. 3962 ). CBO has scored most of these proposals as incurring a net cost for the Medicare program. Appendix. | Congress established the Medicare program in 1965 in response to concerns that many seniors did not have health insurance, or had insurance that only covered hospital inpatient services. Historically, Medicare covered only diagnostic and treatment services, not preventive services provided in the absence of illness. Generally, adding coverage of a preventive service required statutory authority. Since 1980, Congress has established Medicare coverage for several preventive services in law. Recently, Congress gave the Secretary of HHS limited authority to cover new Medicare preventive services administratively.
While many view preventive services as a means to improve the quality of health care by preventing illness, disability, and death, some have also touted prevention as a means to contain health care costs. However, whether expanding coverage or utilization of preventive services would actually save money for Medicare is a matter of debate. While these screenings may be effective in preventing premature death or other unwanted outcomes in some beneficiaries, their broad use may incur a net cost for the Medicare program, rather than savings.
Efforts have also been made to determine whether specific preventive services are effective, and whether their use would be likely to benefit the patient without posing potential risks from the procedure itself. Congress has in the past sought the advice of expert panels to make these assessments. However, none of these panels is explicitly charged with evaluating preventive services for the purposes of Medicare coverage. For example, current Medicare coverage of preventive services does not always comport with evidence-based recommendations of a prominent expert panel, the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF). A recent USPSTF recommendation regarding screening mammography has refocused congressional attention on the appropriate role of advisory panels with respect to Medicare coverage decisions.
In November 2009, the House passed the Affordable Health Care for America Act (H.R. 3962). In December 2009, the Senate passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (an amendment to H.R. 3590). Each bill would, in general, expand Medicare coverage of preventive services, and reduce or eliminate most cost-sharing for these services. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has scored most of these proposals as incurring a net cost for Medicare. The House is preparing to vote on Senate-passed H.R. 3590 and on an accompanying reconciliation bill (H.R. 4872) that would change several controversial elements in the Senate-passed bill and otherwise amend it so that its budgetary impact meets the reconciliation instructions in last year's budget resolution. If the House approves H.R. 3590, it will be sent to the President to be signed into law. The reconciliation measure, if approved by the House, would then be taken up by the Senate.
This report first discusses the legislative and administrative history of Medicare coverage of preventive services. Then it discusses several advisory panels that have evaluated the effectiveness of preventive services, Medicare coverage of these services, or utilization of these services. Next, it discusses whether or not the use of preventive services would be cost-saving or cost-effective for Medicare, and whether utilization of preventive services can be improved. The report then presents relevant proposals in pending health reform legislation. Finally, the Appendix compares current Medicare coverage of preventive services with current USPSTF recommendations. This report will be updated to reflect legislative and other activity. |
crs_RS21695 | crs_RS21695_0 | Although this paper explains differences in these terms, it will refer to Wahhabism in association with a conservative Islamic creed centered in and emanating from Saudi Arabia and to Salafiyya as a more general puritanical Islamic movement that has developed independently at various times and in various places in the Islamic world. Saudi officials continue to assert that Islam is tolerant and peaceful, and they have denied allegations that their government exports religious or cultural extremism or supports extremist religious education. Current U.S. Policy and Legislation
In light of allegations against Wahhabism, some critics have called for a reevaluation of the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, although others maintain that U.S. economic and security interests require continued and close ties with the Saudis. 9/11 Commission
The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "9/11 Commission") claims that "Islamist terrorism" finds inspiration in "a long tradition of extreme intolerance" that flows "through the founders of Wahhabism," the Muslim Brotherhood, and prominent Salafi thinkers. Due in part to these findings, the Commission recommended a frank discussion of the relationship between the United States and its "problematic ally," Saudi Arabia. | The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent discussions of religious extremism have called attention to Islamic puritanical movements known as Wahhabism and Salafiyya. Al Qaeda leaders and their ideological supporters have advocated a violent message that some suggest is rooted in these conservative Islamic traditions. Other observers have accused Saudi Arabia, the birthplace of Wahhabism, of having disseminated religious ideology that promotes hatred and violence, targeting the United States and its allies. Saudi officials strenuously deny these allegations. This report provides a background on these traditions and their relationship to active terrorist groups; it also summarizes recent charges and responses, including the findings of the final report of the 9/11 Commission and relevant legislation in the 110th Congress. The report will be updated to reflect major developments. Related CRS products include CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed], CRS Report RL32499, Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues, by [author name scrubbed], CRS Report RS21529, Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict, by [author name scrubbed], CRS Report RS21654, Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL31718, Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44963 | crs_R44963_0 | Introduction
Waste discharges from municipal sewage treatment plants into inland and coastal waters are a significant source of water quality problems throughout the country. The collection and treatment of wastewater remains among the most important public health interventions in human history and has contributed to a significant decrease in waterborne diseases during the past century. Background
The Clean Water Act (CWA) establishes performance levels to be attained by municipal sewage treatment plants in order to prevent the discharge of harmful quantities of waste into surface waters and to ensure that residual sewage sludge meets environmental quality standards. Estimated Funding Needs
Although Congress has provided more than $104 billion in CWA assistance since 1972, funding needs for wastewater infrastructure remain high. According to the most recent estimate by EPA and the states, the nation's wastewater treatment facilities will need $271 billion over the next 20 years to meet the CWA's water quality objectives. Funding for Wastewater Treatment Activities
In addition to prescribing municipal treatment requirements, the CWA authorizes the principal federal program to support wastewater treatment plant construction and related eligible activities. Congress established this program in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (P.L. 92-500), significantly enhancing what had previously been a modest grant program. In both FY2016 and FY2017, Congress provided $1.394 billion for the CWSRF program. However, funding for the CWSRF program increased by about 22% in FY2018. 115-141 ), provided $1.694 billion to the CWSRF program. Clean Water State Revolving Fund Program
The CWSRF program represented a major shift in how the nation finances wastewater treatment needs. In contrast to the Title II construction grants program, which provided grants directly to localities, CWSRFs are loan programs. States use their CWSRFs to provide several types of financial assistance to communities, including project construction loans made at or below market interest rates, refinancing of local debt obligations, providing loan guarantees, and purchasing insurance. States may also provide additional loan subsidies (including forgiveness of principal and negative interest loans) in certain instances. The CWA identifies a number of types of projects and activities as eligible for CWSRF assistance. Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act program
The Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act of 2014 (WIFIA) program provides another source of financial assistance for water infrastructure. Congress established the WIFIA program in WRRDA. For FY2018, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 ( P.L. EPA estimated that its budget authority ($55 million) would provide approximately $5.5 billion in credit assistance. Issues debated in connection with these bills included extending CWSRF assistance to help states and cities meet the estimated funding needs, modifying the program to assist small and economically disadvantaged communities, and enhancing the CWSRF program to address a number of water quality priorities beyond traditional treatment plant construction—particularly the management of wet weather pollutant runoff from numerous sources, which is the leading cause of stream and lake impairment nationally. The 113 th Congress enacted considerable changes to the CWSRF provisions in 2014 ( P.L. 113-121 ). | The collection and treatment of wastewater remains among the most important public health interventions in human history and has contributed to a significant decrease in waterborne diseases during the past century. Nevertheless, waste discharges from municipal sewage treatment plants into rivers and streams, lakes, and estuaries and coastal waters remain a significant source of water quality problems throughout the country.
The Clean Water Act (CWA) establishes performance levels to be attained by municipal sewage treatment plants in order to prevent the discharge of harmful wastes into surface waters. The act also provides financial assistance so that communities can construct treatment facilities and related equipment to comply with the law. Although approximately $104 billion in CWA assistance has been provided since 1972, funding needs for wastewater infrastructure remain high. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that the nation's wastewater treatment facilities will need $271 billion over the next 20 years to meet the CWA's water quality objectives.
The CWA authorizes the principal federal program to support wastewater treatment plant construction and related eligible activities. Congress established the CWA Title II construction grants program in 1972, significantly enhancing what had previously been a modest grant program. In 1987, Congress amended the CWA and created the Clean Water State Revolving Fund (CWSRF) program. This program represented a major shift in how the nation finances wastewater treatment needs. In contrast to the Title II construction grants program, which provided grants directly to localities, CWSRFs are loan programs. States use their CWSRFs to provide several types of loan assistance to communities, including project construction loans made at or below market interest rates, refinancing of local debt obligations, providing loan guarantees, and purchasing insurance.
In 2014, Congress revised the CWSRF program by providing additional loan subsidies (including forgiveness of principal and negative interest loans) in certain instances (P.L. 113-121). In addition, the 2014 act increased the types of projects eligible for CWSRF assistance.
In both FY2016 and FY2017, Congress provided $1.394 billion for the CWSRF program. However, funding for the program increased by 22% in FY2018. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) provided $1.694 billion to the CWSRF program.
In addition, Congress established the Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (WIFIA) program in 2014 (P.L. 113-121). WIFIA provides direct loans for an array of water infrastructure projects, including CWSRF-eligible projects. EPA issued its first WIFIA loan in April 2018. In FY2018, Congress appropriated $63 million to EPA for the WIFIA program (roughly double the FY2017 appropriation). EPA estimates that this funding will provide approximately $5.5 billion in credit assistance.
Policymakers have continued to propose changes to wastewater infrastructure funding programs. Issues debated in connection with these proposals include extending CWSRF assistance to help states and cities meet the estimated funding needs, modifying the program to assist small and economically disadvantaged communities, and enhancing the CWSRF program to address a number of water quality priorities beyond traditional treatment plant construction—particularly the management of wet weather pollutant runoff from numerous sources, which is the leading cause of stream and lake impairment nationally. |
crs_RL34406 | crs_RL34406_0 | Introduction
As part of its proposed FY2010 defense budget, the Administration proposed deferring the start of a program to develop a next-generation bomber (NGB) for the Air Force, pending the completion of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and associated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), and in light of strategic arms control negotiations with Russia. The Administration's proposed FY2010 budget requested no funding specifically identified in public budget documents as being for an NGB program. Although the proposed FY2010 defense budget proposes to defer the start of an NGB program, the Secretary of Defense and Air Force officials in 2009 have expressed support for the need to eventually start such a program. FY2010 Air Force URL
The Air Force's FY2010 unfunded requirements list (URL)—a list of programs desired by the Air Force but not funded in the Air Force's proposed FY2010 budget—includes a classified $140-million item that some press reports have identified as being for continued work on a next-generation bomber. NGB Program Prior to FY2010 Budget Submission
Prior to the submission of the FY2010 budget, the Air Force was conducting research and development work aimed at fielding a next-generation bomber by 2018. FY2010 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647 , recommends authorizing no FY2010 funding in PE0604015F for development of a next-generation bomber. Conference
The conference report ( H.Rept. 111-288 of October 7, 2009) on H.R. 2647 / P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009 authorizes no FY2010 funding in the Air Force research and development line item (PE0604015F) that is explicitly identified in public budget documents as being for a next-generation bomber. 111-84 makes a series of findings regarding long-range strike capability and bombers, and makes it U.S. policy to support a development program for next-generation bomber aircraft technologies. 255. FY2010 DOD Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326)
Final Version
In lieu of a conference report, the House Appropriations Committee on December 15, 2009, released an explanatory statement on a final version of H.R. This version was passed by the House on December 16, 2009, and by the Senate on December 19, 2009, and signed into law on December 19, 2009, as P.L. 111-118 . The explanatory statement shows a total increase of $24.1 million for classified Air Force research and development programs. The report recommends a net $109.8 million in additional funding in the Air Force research and development account for a line item identified as "Other Programs" (page 199, line 999), including $140 million in additional funding for a classified program, but it is not clear whether any of this $140 million is related to a next-generation bomber. | As part of its proposed FY2010 defense budget, the Administration proposed deferring the start of a program to develop a next-generation bomber (NGB) for the Air Force, pending the completion of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and associated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), and in light of strategic arms control negotiations with Russia. The Administration's proposed FY2010 budget requested no funding specifically identified in public budget documents as being for an NGB program. Prior to the submission of the FY2010 budget, the Air Force was conducting research and development work aimed at fielding a next-generation bomber by 2018. Although the proposed FY2010 defense budget proposed deferring the start of an NGB program, the Secretary of Defense and Air Force officials in 2009 have expressed support for the need to eventually start such a program. The Air Force's FY2010 unfunded requirements list (URL)—a list of programs desired by the Air Force but not funded in the Air Force's proposed FY2010 budget—includes a classified $140-million item that some press accounts have identified as being for continued work on a next-generation bomber.
FY2010 defense authorization bill: The conference report (H.Rept. 111-288 of October 7, 2009) on the FY2010 defense authorization act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009) authorizes no FY2010 funding in the Air Force research and development line item (PE0604015F) that is explicitly identified in public budget documents as being for a next-generation bomber. The conference report authorizes $182 million in additional funding in the Air Force research and development account for a line item identified as "Other Programs," but it is not clear whether any of this funding is related to a next-generation bomber. Section 255 of the act makes a series of findings regarding long-range strike capability and bombers, and makes it U.S. policy to support a development program for next-generation bomber aircraft technologies.
FY2010 DOD appropriations bill: In lieu of a conference report, the House Appropriations Committee on December 15, 2009, released an explanatory statement on a final version of H.R. 3326. This version was passed by the House on December 16, 2009, and by the Senate on December 19, 2009, and signed into law on December 19, 2009, as P.L. 111-118.
The explanatory statement appropriates no FY2010 funding in the Air Force research and development line item (PE0604015F) that is explicitly identified in public budget documents as being for a next-generation bomber. Classified AIR Force R&D programs are increased by $24.1 million overall, with one unidentified classified program receiving an increase of $160.0 million. |
crs_R44399 | crs_R44399_0 | Individual office spending and actions, however, may be as varied as the states Senators represent. Senators operate their offices with funding from the Senators' Official Personnel and Office Expense Account (SOPOEA). The allowance is provided on a fiscal year basis (October 1-September 30). Senators have a high degree of flexibility to operate their offices in a way that supports their congressional duties and responsibilities, although they must operate within a number of restrictions and regulations. Additional guidelines and regulations may be provided by Senate rules, the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, the Senate Ethics Committee, and statute. Senate expenses, including those supported by the SOPOEA, are reported biennially in the Report of the Secretary of the Senate and available online. This report provides a history of the SOPOEA and overview of recent developments, including recent funding. It also analyzes actual SOPOEA spending patterns in selected years (fiscal years 2007, 2008, 2011, and 2012) for all Senators who served for a defined period. For a similar analysis of Member budgets in the House of Representatives, see CRS Report R40962, Members' Representational Allowance: History and Usage , by [author name scrubbed]. The SOPOEA allocation for each Senator is calculated based on three components:
administrative and clerical assistance allowance . legislative assistance allowance . The three components result in a single SOPOEA authorization for each Senator that can be used to pay for any type of official expense. The SOPOEA allocation formula results in varying levels depending on the state from which a Senator is elected. For FY2016, SOPOEA levels range from $3,008,288 to $4,760,211. As seen in Figure 2 , this appropriations account has decreased in recent years, from a high of $422.0 million in FY2010 to $390.0 million in FY2014, a decrease of 7.6%, not adjusted for inflation. 114-113 ) continued the FY2014 level. The Senate has taken actions to reduce this account both directly—for example, the FY2011 Continuing Appropriations Act stated that "each Senator's official personnel and office expense allowance (including the allowance for administrative and clerical assistance, the salaries allowance for legislative assistance to Senators, as authorized by the Legislative Branch Appropriation Act, 1978 ( P.L. | The Senators' Official Personnel and Office Expense Account (SOPOEA) is available to assist Senators in their official duties. The allowance is provided on a fiscal year basis (i.e., October 1-September 30). Funding is provided in the annual legislative branch appropriations bills.
Senators have a high degree of flexibility to use the SOPOEA to operate their offices in a way that supports their congressional duties and responsibilities, and individual office spending may be as varied as the states from which the Senators are elected.
This appropriations account has decreased in recent years, from a high of $422.0 million in FY2010 to $390.0 million in FY2014, a decrease of 7.6%. The appropriation remained at the FY2014 level in the FY2015 and FY2016 appropriations acts.
The SOPOEA for each Senator is calculated based on three variables—the administrative and clerical assistance allowance, the legislative assistance allowance, and the official office expense allowance. The formula results in a single, consolidated allowance for each Senator that can be used to pay for any type of approved official expense, subject to any regulations or limitations established by statute, Senate rules, the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, and the Senate Ethics Committee.
A preliminary list of SOPOEA levels shows a range in FY2016 of $3,008,288 to $4,760,211, depending on the state. The average allowance is $3,263,940.
Pursuant to 2 U.S.C. §4108, Senate expenses are reported online biennially on a fiscal year basis in the Report of the Secretary of the Senate.
This report provides a history of the SOPOEA and overview of recent developments, including funding levels. It also analyzes actual SOPOEA spending patterns in selected years (fiscal years 2007, 2008, 2011, and 2012).
For a similar analysis of Member office budgets in the House of Representatives, see CRS Report R40962, Members' Representational Allowance: History and Usage, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL34087 | crs_RL34087_0 | The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act ( P.L. 93-288 , as amended) authorizes the President to provide temporary housing and other disaster response and recovery activities. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, the size and scope of this disaster was truly unprecedented in comparison to other large events; as such, the disaster strained the traditional shelter system. For example, at a House Financial Services hearing on Katrina housing, one Member of Congress noted that the large FEMA contingent of workers in the area actually used a significant part of the remaining resources (both hotels and other housing) and suggested that FEMA staff were, in fact, in competition with local disaster victims wishing to return to the area. Mobile homes are larger and are generally used to house applicants who are unable to obtain rental housing in the area. The travel trailers "have been used principally for shorter-term housing needs" following disaster events. But a catastrophic disaster such as Katrina removes many options. Issues for Congress
National Disaster Housing Strategy
In Public Law 109-295, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, known as the post-Katrina Act, Congress directed FEMA to develop, in concert with other federal departments and agencies, as well as the non-profit sector and other interested parties, an overall strategy for disaster housing. This report was due 270 days after enactment, which would have placed its due date in July of 2007. On July 24, 2008 FEMA began a 60-day public comment period on the strategy. Since it was a catastrophic event that was the basis for the request for this strategy, as well as its overall context, it should more directly address how the strategy would address a catastrophic event. Two of these actions are the establishment of the Disaster Housing Assistance Program (DHAP), which transferred management of long-term rental housing to HUD, and FEMA's recent announced reversal, in the housing strategy, of its previous decision to no longer use travel trailers, due to safety concerns, as a disaster housing option . Further, all of the aforementioned considerations do not include the assistance some families and individuals received from charitable groups as well. 109-295 ). The changes in P.L. The work of the JHSG may be a part of the Disaster Housing Strategy that has been promised by FEMA to be provided to Congress in April of 2008. The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina illustrated the challenge of implementing Stafford Act programs on a large, national scale. The time-span of such a sheltering/housing program could be shifted to nine or 12 months, depending on the federal and state governments' ability to make contact with victims and provide them resources for alternative forms of housing. But the same concerns with costs exist regarding current FEMA temporary housing practices. Administrative Responsibility
Another policy question is which federal agency should be primarily responsible for catastrophic disaster housing. At present, the amount of funding spent on housing (both rental assistance and manufactured housing) for the Gulf Coast hurricane season of 2005 stands at over $10 billion. Congress could opt to consider the lessons of this disaster in terms not only of program adjustments and corrections, but also the appropriate governmental role throughout the recovery process for any possible future events of this magnitude. FEMA has been tasked by P.L. | Some have criticized the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) emergency housing policies, particularly its approach to health and safety standards (as exemplified by the evidence of formaldehyde in both trailers and mobile homes), as well as its overall strategy to perform its housing mission. To address disaster housing issues, Congress could opt to consider questions such as the following: how have disaster housing needs traditionally been addressed under the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288, as amended)? How did FEMA's approach during Hurricane Katrina differ from previous disasters and why? Should FEMA have pursued expanded authorities at the start of the disaster? Should housing vouchers have been used earlier and tailored to the disaster event? With a substantial amount of available funding provided by Congress, but without requesting expanded authority, FEMA found its sole option was to use traditional disaster housing practices. Those practices, successful for disasters of a historically familiar size, were hard-pressed to meet the unprecedented demands of the Katrina catastrophic disaster.
There are potential events (New Madrid earthquake or other large natural or terrorist events) that could conceivably produce many of the same challenges presented by the Gulf Coast hurricane season of 2005. Those challenges include large, displaced populations spread across the nation and separated families unable to return because of the loss of not only their homes but also their places of employment. Federal disaster housing policy may remain an issue in the 110th Congress, because, as Hurricane Katrina illustrated, the continued existence of communities after a catastrophic event involves extensive federal assistance issues.
In the past, FEMA's approaches have turned on practical and theoretical considerations. Practical considerations include the agency's ability to house families and individuals within a short time frame and in proximity to the original disaster, and in the case of Hurricane Katrina, to make contact with the hundreds of thousands of applicants who registered for assistance. Some of the theoretical policy considerations include questions of equity, self-reliance, federalism, and the duration of federal assistance. Those considerations have led to process questions concerning program stewardship and the potential for waste, fraud, and abuse of federal resources.
The Post-Katrina Act, enacted in October of 2006 (P.L. 109-295), includes changes in FEMA housing policy that provide the President with greater flexibility for meeting the challenges of disasters on a large scale. Also, Public Law 110-28 has eased the cost-share burden for some housing costs and other disaster relief programs. Future debate on the housing issue will also be informed by the report on the National Disaster Housing Strategy (as directed in P.L. 109-295). This Strategy was due to Congress in 2007, but a draft was not provided until late July of 2008. Following a 60-day comment period, a final National Disaster Housing Strategy is scheduled to be presented to Congress.
This report will be updated as warranted by events. |
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