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crs_RL34093 | crs_RL34093_0 | Developments from March 2010-June 2010
The Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) is an industrial park located in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) just across the demilitarized zone from South Korea. As of the end of December 2010, approximately 120 medium-sized South Korean companies were using North Korean labor to manufacture products there, employing over 47,000 workers. The complex was planned, developed, and financed largely by South Korea, and it has become a symbol of engagement between the North and the South. The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of the role, purposes, and results of the KIC and examine U.S. interests, policy issues, options, and legislation. First, on March 26, 2010, a South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan , sank in waters disputed by the two Koreas. However, the Kaesong complex was not shut down, although North Korea threatened to take this step if South Korean loudspeaker broadcasts resumed. The KIC provides the North Korean government with a constant revenue stream of around $2 million a month, by virtue of the share the government takes from the salaries paid to North Korean workers. The KIC and Inter-Korean Relations
The KIC is virtually the last vestige of the range of inter-Korean cooperation projects initiated during the period of détente between South Korea and North Korea from 2000-2008. As shown in Table 1 , the number of South Korean manufacturers operating in the complex has nearly doubled since his inauguration in early 2008. On the one hand, as mentioned above, the project provides an ongoing revenue stream to the Kim Jong-il regime in Pyongyang. On the other hand, the KIC provides a possible beachhead for market reforms in the DPRK that could eventually spill over to areas outside the park and expose tens of thousands of North Koreans to outside influences and incentives. The United States has limited direct involvement in the KIC, which the United States has officially supported since its conception. At present, no U.S. companies have invested in the Kaesong complex, though a number of South Korean officials have expressed a desire to attract U.S. investment. U.S. government approval is needed for South Korean firms to ship to the KIC certain U.S.-made equipment currently under U.S. export controls. The Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), which has yet to be submitted to Congress for approval, provides for a Committee on Outward Processing Zones (OPZ) to be formed and to consider whether zones such as the KIC will receive preferential treatment under the FTA (see " Kaesong and the Proposed Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement " below). According to the terms of the agreement, the OPZ Committee will pass its decisions to the South Korean and U.S. governments, which then would be responsible for "seeking legislative approval for any amendments" to the KORUS FTA. In March 2011, the office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) issued a statement that Congress "would need to pass, and the President would need to sign, a law to extend any KORUS tariff benefits to products made in Kaesong or any OPZ." Kaesong-Made Components and the KORUS FTA
Another issue raised by the KORUS FTA is whether intermediate products made in the KIC can enter the United States under the provisions of the FTA if they are incorporated into products that are manufactured in South Korea and that qualify as originating in South Korea. Existing production facilities continued to manufacture and expand. | This purpose of this report is to provide an overview of the role, purposes, and results of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) and examine U.S. interests, policy issues, options, and legislation. The KIC is a six-year-old industrial park located in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) just across the demilitarized zone from South Korea. As of the end of 2010, over 120 medium-sized South Korean companies were employing over 47,000 North Korean workers to manufacture products in Kaesong. The facility, which in 2010 produced $323 million in output, has the land and infrastructure to house two to three times as many firms and workers. Products vary widely, and include clothing and textiles (71 firms), kitchen utensils (4 firms), auto parts (4 firms), semiconductor parts (2 firms), and toner cartridges (1 firm).
Despite a rise in tensions between North and South Korea since early 2008, the complex has continued to operate and expand. The KIC was not shut down in 2010 despite two violent incidents between the two Koreas that year: the March sinking of a South Korean naval vessel, the Cheonan, which was found to be caused by a North Korean torpedo, and North Korea's artillery attack on a South Korean island in November. Indeed, the complex has become virtually the last vestige of inter-Korean cooperation. After the Cheonan sinking, South Korea announced it would cut off all inter-Korean economic relations except the Kaesong complex. It also has reduced the number of South Korean workers—primarily government officials and business managers—at the complex because of worries about them being taken hostage by North Korea.
The KIC represents a dilemma for U.S. and South Korean policymakers. On the one hand, the project provides an ongoing revenue stream to the Kim Jong-il regime in Pyongyang, by virtue of the share the government takes from the salaries paid to North Korean workers. South Korean and U.S. officials estimate this revenue stream to be around $20 million per year. On the other hand, the KIC arguably helps maintain stability on the Peninsula and provides a possible beachhead for market reforms in the DPRK that could eventually spill over to areas outside the park and expose tens of thousands of North Koreans to outside influences, market-oriented businesses, and incentives.
The United States has limited direct involvement in the KIC, which the United States has officially supported since its conception. At present, no U.S. companies have invested in the Kaesong complex, though a number of South Korean officials have expressed a desire to attract U.S. investment. U.S. government approval is needed for South Korean firms to ship to the KIC certain U.S.-made equipment currently under U.S. export controls. The Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), which has yet to be submitted to Congress for approval, provides for a Committee on Outward Processing Zones (OPZ) to be formed and to consider whether zones such as the KIC will receive preferential treatment under the FTA. The KORUS FTA says that the executive branch will seek "legislative approval" for any changes to the agreement. The Obama Administration says this would take the form of a law to extend any KORUS tariff benefits to products made in Kaesong or any OPZ.
Another issue raised by the KIC is whether components made in the complex can enter the United States if they are incorporated into products that are manufactured in South Korea and that qualify as originating in South Korea. This possibility is likely to be determined mainly by the KIC's evolution; the more that is produced in the complex, the more products are likely to enter South Korea's supply chain. |
crs_R41078 | crs_R41078_0 | Introduction
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 ) created an Emergency Contingency Fund (ECF) within the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant. The fund expired on September 30, 2010. It helped states, Indian tribes, and territories pay for additional costs of providing economic aid to families during the current economic downturn for FY2009 and FY2010. TANF
The TANF block grant provides states, Indian tribes, and territories with federal funding for a wide range of benefits and services to ameliorate the effects of, or address the root causes of, economic disadvantage for families with children. TANF is best known for funding cash welfare payments for very low-income families with children. The ARRA included a number of provisions related to taxes and benefit payments, designed to partially offset the declines in family income and purchasing power resulting from the increased joblessness caused by the recession. While TANF funds a wide range of economic aid and human services to families, the ECF reimbursed for only three categories of activities: basic assistance, non-recurrent short-term aid, and subsidized employment. These categories typically are those that provide direct aid to families, rather than fund services. The ECF did not pay for the full increase in expenditures for basic assistance, short-term aid, or subsidized employment. State, Tribe, and Territorial Use of TANF Emergency Funds
At the end of FY2010 (September 30, 2010), all $5 billion appropriated to the ECF was awarded to states, tribes, and territories. It shows that $1.6 billion, 32% of the total grant awards, was to help finance increases in expenditures for basic assistance. Another $2.1 billion, 41% of the total, was for non-recurrent short-term aid and $1.3 billion, 26% of the total, was for subsidized employment. A total of 49 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands were awarded ECF funds. In addition, 25 tribes and tribal organizations were awarded ECF grants. Twelve states (Colorado, Delaware, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, and Washington State) received their maximum allotment of contingency funds, and some others were close to receiving their maximums. As discussed above, states, tribes, and territories were limited to receiving only up to 50% of their basic TANF block grant in combined grants from the regular and emergency contingency funds over the two years, FY2009 and FY2010. Though the economy grew in the last half of 2009 and the first three quarters of 2010, unemployment remained high. Historically, the trend in the cash welfare caseload has sometimes followed economic conditions, but sometimes not. After the 1990-1991 recession, welfare caseloads actually peaked in March 1994, before beginning their decline. The House voted twice in 2010 to extend the ECF, though such proposals failed to clear the Senate. A provision of the Claims Resolution Act of 2010 ( P.L. 111-291 ) extended the basic TANF program through the end of FY2011 without the ECF. | The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5) created a $5 billion Emergency Contingency Fund (ECF) within the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant to help states, Indian tribes, and the territories pay for additional economic aid to families during the current economic downturn. It was part of a package of tax and benefit program provisions aimed at stemming the decline in family incomes and purchasing power caused by increased unemployment. The ECF was a temporary fund for two years, FY2009 and FY2010, and expired on September 30, 2010. All of the available $5 billion was awarded by the fund's expiration date to states, tribes, and territories.
Though the economy grew in the last half of 2009 and the first three quarters of 2010, unemployment remained high. Historically, the trend in the cash welfare caseload has sometimes followed economic conditions, but sometimes not. After the 1990-1991 recession, welfare caseloads actually peaked in March 1994 before beginning their decline. The 111th Congress considered legislation in 2010 to extend the ECF beyond September 30, 2010. However, though the House twice passed bills to extend the ECF, none of these measures received Senate approval. A provision of the Claims Resolution Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-291) extended the basic TANF program through the end of FY2011 without the ECF.
TANF is best known for funding cash welfare payments for low-income families, but it actually provides funds for a wide range of benefits and services to ameliorate the effects of, or address the root causes of, economic disadvantage among families with children. While TANF funds a wide range of both economic aid and human services to families with children, the ECF was limited to funding three categories of expenditures: basic assistance, a category that most closely resembles traditional cash welfare; non-recurrent short-term (e.g., emergency) aid; and subsidized employment. These categories typically are those that provide direct aid to families, rather than fund services. States, Indian tribes, and the territories were reimbursed 80% of the costs of increased expenditures in these categories. To qualify for ECF grants for increased basic assistance expenditures, a state, tribe, or territory had to aid more families on its assistance rolls than it did in FY2007 or FY2008. Qualification of states, tribes, and territories for ECF grants supporting short-term aid or subsidized employment were dependent only on increased expenditures from FY2007 or FY2008. ARRA placed a limit on total ECF and other TANF contingency fund payments to states, at a combined 50% of a state's basic block grant over the two years, FY2009 and FY2010.
A total of 49 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands had their applications for ECF grants approved. Additionally, 25 tribes and tribal organizations had approved ECF applications. Of the total $5 billion awarded, $1.6 billion was for basic assistance, $2.1 billion for short-term aid, and $1.3 billion for subsidized employment. Twelve states (Colorado, Delaware, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee, and Washington State) have received their maximum ECF grants. |
crs_R40716 | crs_R40716_0 | Instead, widespread social unrest has increased as growing inflation combines with anger that social conditions for Peru's poorest people have not improved with Peru's remarkable economic growth over the past eight years. Now, in the third year of his five-year term, President García is facing the worst crisis of his presidency to date. On June 5, 2009, the unrest exploded into a deadly conflict when the government sent police to break up blockades set up by thousands of indigenous protesters in the Amazon. Protests and Exploitation of Natural Resources
The deadly clash between indigenous protesters and police, and the reaction to it, is indicative of the polarization both within Peru and within the Andean region. The protest stems from disputes over who has the right to exploit natural resources in the Amazon and elsewhere in the country. The fallout from the protests has also heightened regional tensions over how to reduce poverty and the nature of the region's foreign relations. García's ability to govern effectively may continue to be challenged by ongoing political unrest. Conviction of Former President Alberto Fujimori
In a landmark legal case, on April 7, 2009, former President Fujimori was convicted and sentenced to 25 years in prison for "crimes against humanity," on charges of corruption and human rights abuses, including authorizing killings by an army death squad and the abduction of a journalist and a businessman. Analysts also regard it as a considerable accomplishment for Peru's judicial system, which has been considered weak and subject to political influence. Economic Issues
Peru's economy has been stronger than virtually all other Latin American economies since 2001. While Peru's sound public finances and cushion of foreign reserves can help offset damage from the global financial crisis, its institutional weaknesses could limit the effectiveness of economic stimulus measures. Peru's poverty rates have been dropping since 2000. Indeed, the percentage of the population living in poverty in cities in 2007 was about 26%, while the percentage living in poverty in rural areas was about 65%. Economic power has been traditionally, and remains, concentrated in the hands of a small economic elite of European descent. The subsistence sector, on the other hand, is concentrated in the mountainous interior, and among the mostly indigenous population there. The Peruvian government's ability to carry out poverty reduction programs is somewhat limited by its institutional capacity. Nonetheless, as the world economic downturn leads to a dramatic slowing of Peru's economic growth, this weak institutional capacity may also hinder the government's ability to implement responsive economic policies effectively. Relations with the United States
Peru and the United States have a strong and cooperative relationship. The United States supports the strengthening of Peru's democratic institutions and respect for human rights. The United States and Peru signed the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA) in April 2006. Terrorism17
Peru's main concern regarding terrorism is containing the violent guerrilla movement Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path. It has reemerged in recent years, now linked to drug-trafficking. | Peru shows promising signs of economic and political stability and the inclination to work with the United States on mutual concerns. President Alan García is, however facing challenging times during this, the third year of his five-year term. Widespread social unrest has increased as growing inflation combines with unmet expectations that social conditions for Peru's poorest citizens would improve with Peru's economic growth. Peru's economy has been stronger than virtually all other Latin American economies since 2001. Peru's poverty rates have been dropping since 2000, but still remain high considering Peru's income levels. Economic power is, and has been traditionally, concentrated in the hands of a small economic elite of European descent. The subsistence sector, on the other hand, is concentrated in the mountainous interior, and among the mostly indigenous population there. Indeed, the percentage of the population living in poverty in cities in 2007 was about 26%, while the percentage living in poverty in rural areas was about 65%.
On June 5, 2009, unrest exploded into a deadly conflict when the government sent police to break up blockades set up by thousands of indigenous protesters in the Amazon. The deadly clash between the indigenous protesters and police, and the reaction to it, is indicative of the polarization both within Peru and within the Andean region. The protest stemmed from disputes over who has the right to exploit natural resources in the Amazon and elsewhere in the country. The fallout from the protests has also heightened regional tensions over how to reduce poverty and the nature of foreign relations.
While Peru's sound public finances can help offset damage from the global financial crisis, its institutional weaknesses may limit the effectiveness of economic stimulus measures and the Peruvian government's ability to carry out poverty reduction programs. As the world economic downturn leads to a dramatic slowing of Peru's economic growth, this weak institutional capacity may also hinder the government's ability to implement responsive economic policies effectively. The García Administration's ability to govern may continue to be challenged by ongoing political unrest.
The violent guerrilla movement Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, which helped drive Peru to the brink of collapse during García's first presidency (1985-1990), has reemerged in recent years, now linked to drug-trafficking.
On a more positive note, in a landmark legal case, on April 7, 2009, former President Fujimori was convicted and sentenced to 25 years in prison for "crimes against humanity," on charges of corruption and human rights abuses. Analysts regard the court's decision as a considerable accomplishment for Peru's judicial system, which has been considered weak and subject to political influence.
Peru and the United States have a strong and cooperative relationship. The United States supports the strengthening of Peru's democratic institutions and respect for human rights. A U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA) went into effect on February 1, 2009. The two countries also cooperate on counter-narcotics efforts, maritime concerns, combating human trafficking, and improving disaster preparedness. |
crs_RL34606 | crs_RL34606_0 | Attempts to establish a government-wide ombudsman at the federal level or to standardize ombudsman-like offices have received attention—from Congress, the executive, international organizations, academia, relevant professional societies, and the press—sporadically since at least the mid-1960s. These across-the-board plans, however, have remained on the drawing board. This overview is not a comprehensive study of various complaint-handling, ombudsman, or advocacy offices. Instead, it examines and provides examples of ombudsman-like offices, recognizing their variations. Although no proposals along these lines have been adopted, a number of studies and recommendations have emerged over the years. In the mid-1970s, the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs examined proposals for an office of consumer affairs, a plan that President Jimmy Carter later endorsed. Executive Sources
The executive has also conducted research and sponsored initiatives in this field over the past three decades. Another related development was President Clinton's 1993 Executive Order 12862 on "Setting Customer Service Standards." It called on agencies to make information, services, and complaint systems easily accessible, and to provide a means to address customer complaints. These include a proposal for a federal ombudsman (1972); the ways and means by which certain federal agencies handled citizen complaints, based on survey responses from 64 separate units (1974); improved complaint-handling procedures in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (1979); and a comparison of ombudsmen-like offices in the United States with similar ones in other countries (1985). Differences Among Offices
Although most earlier studies are dated or limited to certain entities, these efforts reveal a wide variety of complaint-handling mechanisms at the federal level. Consequently, existing federal complaint-handling offices vary with regard to their basic characteristics—including powers and duties, jurisdiction, location, controls, neutrality, resources, and communications. A single ombudsman-like office could be granted government-wide jurisdiction and located in the Executive Office of the President. Despite these advances, some recent studies have discovered weaknesses and limitations in several aspects of e-gov: what it currently does (e.g., primarily providing information); how well it does it (declining levels of satisfaction); and what it has been unable to do satisfactorily (particularly, progressing into the "transactions stage," referring to exchanges among entities in the same agency, among agencies at the same level of government, among governments at different levels, and among government agencies, private sector stakeholders, and the general public). As noted throughout this report, federal complaint-handling offices exhibit different forms, capacities, and designations. Variations also arise over time and across policy areas, as the needs and demands of government and society change. Efforts to establish a government-wide ombudsman, create complaint-handling offices throughout the executive branch, and/or standardize such entities have existed since the mid-1960s. This assignment results in the ESGR being a combination of an internal ombudsman (for active duty military personnel) as well as an external ombudsman (for discharged personnel reentering the private sector). According to its statutory authority, the OCRCL is to
review and assess information concerning abuses of civil rights, civil liberties, and profiling on the basis of race, ethnicity, or religion, by employees and officials of DHS; make public through the Internet, radio, television, or newspaper advertisements information on the responsibilities and functions of, and how to contact, the OCRCL; help the DHS Secretary, directorates, and offices of DHS to develop, implement, and periodically review DHS policies and procedures to ensure that the protection of civil rights and civil liberties is appropriately incorporated into DHS programs and activities; oversee compliance with constitutional, statutory, regulatory, policy, and other requirements relating to the civil rights and civil liberties of individuals affected by the programs and activities of DHS; coordinate with the Privacy Officer to ensure that programs, policies, and procedures involving civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy considerations are addressed in an integrated and comprehensive manner; and that Congress receives appropriate reports regarding such programs, policies, and procedures; and investigate complaints and information indicating possible abuses of civil rights or civil liberties, unless the inspector general of the Department determines that any such complaint or information should be investigated by the inspector general. | Federal complaint-handling, ombudsman, and advocacy offices have different forms, capacities, and designations. This report, which reviews the state of research in this field and the heritage of such offices, examines and compares them, along with recent legislative developments and past proposals to establish a government-wide ombudsman. In so doing, the report identifies the basic characteristics of these offices, recognizing differences among them with regard to their powers, duties, jurisdictions, locations, and resources, as well as control over them. This study covers only ombudsman-like offices at the federal level that deal with the public, sometimes known as "external ombudsmen." It does not cover "internal ombudsmen," that is, offices created to handle complaints from employees and resolve disputes between them and management; ombudsman-like offices in the private sector; or similar entities at other levels of government in the United States or abroad, except to note differences among them.
Legislative interest, albeit sporadic, in establishing a government-wide ombudsman or standardizing individual offices across-the-board dates to the early 1960s. These efforts extended in the 1970s to proposals to establish an independent office of consumer representation or consumer affairs, a plan that President Jimmy Carter later endorsed. Another initiative emerged in 1993, when President William Clinton—through an executive order "Setting Customer Service Standards"—directed executive departments and agencies to make information, service, and complaint-systems easily accessible and provide means to address such complaints. The order also called for agencies to set customer service standards, survey customers, report to the President on those surveys, and publish customer service plans. A subsequent government-wide customer satisfaction survey, incidentally, found a similar range of satisfaction between the private and public sectors.
Notwithstanding these efforts over the past five decades, no comprehensive, across-the-board transformations have occurred. Nonetheless, numerous individual offices have been established, modified, and proposed by administrative directives, public laws, and congressional bills. This piecemeal approach—reflecting different demands in both the government and society over time and across policy areas—has resulted in a variety of ombudsman-like offices. Although a complete, authoritative identification and description of current offices does not exist, a number of studies—from past and contemporary eras, along with the examples here—provide a wide sampling of complaint-handling and advocacy offices for examination and consideration as models.
This report consists of three parts: (1) an analysis of the ombudsman concept and a brief look at which countries around the world have used ombudsmen; (2) a breakdown of the various ways in which federal complaint-handling offices differ; and (3) an identification and description of selected ombudsman-like offices, including specifics on their origins and operations.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R42032 | crs_R42032_0 | The Bakken Formation has emerged as the leading tight oil resource play. The Bakken Formation is a large unconventional petroleum and natural gas resource that is part of the Williston Basin, a historic oil-producing area underlying parts of North Dakota, Montana, and the Canadian provinces of Saskatchewan and Manitoba (see Figure 1 ). The key to its development lies now in technologically advanced horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing methods. The U.S. Geological Survey's (USGS) mean estimate for the Bakken is that it may contain 3.65 billion bbls of undiscovered oil (less than 3% of total U.S. estimates), 1.85 trillion cubic feet (tcf) associated/dissolved undiscovered natural gas (less than 1% of total U.S. estimates), and 148 million bbls of undiscovered natural gas liquids (NGLs) (there is not a comparable estimate for total U.S. NGLs) recoverable under current technology. The USGS announced in July 2011 that it will reassess the resources in the Bakken by the end of 2013. In the development of tight oil and shale plays, the pace of this change is rapid. High oil prices and low natural gas prices have encouraged oil and gas producers to shift their exploration and development activity from gas-rich areas to areas with oil and gas liquids deposits. Pipelines that would take oil and natural gas produced from the Bakken to refineries and to markets are at full capacity. Oil producers have resorted to rail and truck transportation to move Bakken oil production to market. It could start operating in 2015 if it and the Keystone XL pipeline receive regulatory approvals. Congress has asked the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to study this issue, and other studies are underway as well. Water Quality Issues Associated with Bakken Development
Protecting groundwater quality during oil production is acutely important in the Bakken region, where aquifers often provide the principal source of water for domestic, agricultural, stock and municipal needs. While the use of hydraulic fracturing and directional drilling has enabled the oil industry to greatly increase domestic oil production, concern has emerged regarding the potential impacts that this process may have on groundwater quality. The Presidential Permit for the Keystone XL project was denied on January 18, 2012; however, TransCanada resubmitted its application to the State Department on May 4, 2012, with a different configuration. Additionally, the Keystone XL pipeline would eventually connect to another new TransCanada pipeline, the Gulf Coast pipeline, and run to refineries on the Gulf Coast, which would help alleviate a pipeline bottleneck in oil transportation at Cushing, OK. In addition to the above issues, development of the Bakken is facing the same environmental scrutiny as shale gas and other unconventional oil and gas resources, as they all use the controversial production technique of hydraulic fracturing. The rapid growth in the use of this technology for oil and gas production has raised public concerns, particularly over its possible impact on water resources. Currently, states broadly regulate oil and gas exploration and production on state and private lands (and often on federal lands within the state). Lake Sakakawea is managed by the Army Corps of Engineers. While administering a fee would be consistent with the authority used as the basis for the surplus water contracts and Corps practices elsewhere, the Corps' potential fee for the storage of Missouri River water has frustrated North Dakota stakeholders that consider the Corps to be interfering with a state's right to allocate its water resources and being insensitive to the history of the development of the Missouri River reservoirs (e.g., flooding of a significant quantity of land in North Dakota and promised irrigation projects). | The Bakken Formation is a large unconventional petroleum and natural gas resource underlying parts of North Dakota, Montana, and the Canadian provinces of Saskatchewan and Manitoba. Bakken oil production is now viable because of advanced horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing methods. Growth in production is rapidly changing.
High oil prices and low natural gas prices have prompted shale gas producers to turn to shale oil or tight oil. The Bakken Formation has emerged as a major tight oil resource "play." The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimated that the Bakken may contain 3.65 billion barrels (bbls) of undiscovered oil (or less than 3% of total U.S. estimates), 1.85 trillion cubic feet (tcf) associated/dissolved undiscovered natural gas (less than 1% of total U.S. estimates), and 148 million bbls of undiscovered natural gas liquids (NGLs) recoverable under current technology. USGS announced in July 2011 that it will reassess the Bakken resources.
Full development of this resource faces a number of hurdles. A major constraint to more vigorous development of the Bakken is the lack of pipeline capacity to move more crude oil to refineries. A proposed pipeline, the Keystone XL pipeline, would extend from Canada to Nebraska, where it would connect to another TransCanada pipeline for transport to Gulf Coast refineries, and could transport oil from the Bakken. The original proposed Keystone XL pipeline did not receive a necessary Presidential Permit; however, TransCanada, the company that proposed the pipeline resubmitted its application to the State Department on May 4, 2012, with a different configuration. Flaring of natural gas in association with Bakken oil production has also attracted a lot of interest. If producers are forced to decrease flaring it would also likely result in oil production being curtailed.
Another issue potentially affecting development of the Bakken is the need to make use of hydraulic fracturing. This technology is the subject of increasing regulatory scrutiny, along with public concern over its possible impact on water quality. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is conducting a congressionally mandated study on the impact the technique may have on drinking water, and the Department of Energy (DOE) has undertaken a broader assessment of the potential environmental effects of this practice. Legislation pending in the House and the Senate would authorize EPA to regulate hydraulic fracturing used in oil and natural gas production. Currently, states broadly regulate oil and gas exploration and production on non-federal lands, and proposals to give EPA new authority in this area have been highly controversial.
A longer-term constraint may be water availability and access, as the industry's cumulative water demand for fracturing and other well development activities expands. Groundwater tables in the Bakken region have been falling as water extractions for municipal, agricultural, industrial and other purposes have exceeded aquifer recharge. The Army Corps of Engineers announced in May 2012 that it is moving forward with processing requests from oil development interests for access to a key surface water source, Lake Sakakawea on the Missouri River in North Dakota. Initially the Corps will not assess a fee for the withdrawn water, while it undertakes a pricing policy rulemaking. Uncertainty over charges related to water withdrawn from the lake has ignited concerns among those withdrawing water for other purposes (e.g., municipal and agricultural uses) and the state's authority over surface waters within its borders. |
crs_RS22687 | crs_RS22687_0 | Background and Case History
Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) prohibits corporate or labor union treasury funds from being spent for "electioneering communications." Supreme Court Decision
Overview
In a 5 to 4 decision, FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II) , affirming a lower court ruling, the Supreme Court found that Section 203 of BCRA was unconstitutional as applied to the WRTL ads, and that they should have been permissible to broadcast. In applying the standard it developed for as-applied challenges to the ads that WRTL sought to broadcast, the Court determined that the FEC had failed to demonstrate that such ads constituted the functional equivalent of express advocacy because they could reasonably be interpreted as something other than a vote for or against a candidate. In a case currently pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (FEC) , the constitutionality of the BCRA "electioneering communication" provision is once again under consideration. On March 24, 2009, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in this case and again on September 9, after ordering the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether the Court should overrule its earlier holdings in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and the portion of its decision in McConnell v. FEC addressing the facial validity of Section 203 of BCRA, the "electioneering communication" prohibition. A decision in this case is expected in early 2010. | Voting 5-4, the U.S. Supreme Court in the 2007 decision FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II) held that a provision of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), prohibiting corporate or labor union treasury funds from being spent on advertisements broadcast within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election, was unconstitutional as applied to ads that Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. sought to run. While not expressly overruling its 2003 ruling in McConnell v. FEC, which upheld the BCRA provision against a First Amendment facial challenge, the Court limited the law's application. Specifically, it ruled that advertisements that may reasonably be interpreted as something other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate are not the functional equivalent of express advocacy and, therefore, cannot be regulated.
In a case currently pending before the Supreme Court, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), the constitutionality of the BCRA "electioneering communication" provision is once again under consideration. On March 24, 2009, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in this case and again on September 9, after ordering the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether the Court should overrule its earlier holdings in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and the portion of its decision in McConnell v. FEC addressing the facial validity of Section 203 of BCRA, the "electioneering communication" prohibition. A decision in this case is expected in early 2010. |
crs_R42848 | crs_R42848_0 | Latest Developments
In a sharp reversal of its policy of denying the existence of a chemical weapons program, the Syrian government agreed to destroy its chemical weapons stocks and joined the treaty banning the possession and use of these weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), on September 12. President Obama had been seeking congressional authorization to use military force in response to a large-scale chemical weapons attack by Syria, but on September 10 asked congressional leaders to postpone a vote in order to give the Administration time to pursue a U.S.-Russian diplomatic initiative to achieve chemical weapons disarmament in Syria. As a first step, the Syrian government is required to declare all its stocks, munitions, precursor chemicals, and production and storage facilities to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). They would also check that any related production facilities were shuttered or converted. The United Nations and the OPCW have had experience successfully monitoring the destruction of chemical weapons in several countries. This contingency has raised two major policy concerns: the use of chemical weapons by the regime of President Bashar al Asad; and whether the regime could lose control over these weapons. The largest-scale use to date was on August 21, 2013. President Barack Obama and other world leaders had said that the use of chemical weapons against the civilian population would be met with consequences, which could include the use of military force. For example, President Obama suggested during an August 2012 press briefing that the United States might take military action against Syria if Damascus used or lost control of its chemical weapons, explaining that "a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. On August 31, 2013, President Obama stated that the United States should respond with "military action against Syrian regime targets" and added that he would ask Congress to grant authorization for the use of military force. The White House had previously announced on June 13, 2013, that the Syrian government had used chemical weapons "on a small scale against the opposition multiple times in the last year." The statement added that, in response to the Asad regime's use of chemical weapons, the President had authorized the expansion of military assistance to the opposition forces in Syria. Due to the urgency of preventing access to these weapons by unauthorized groups, including terrorists, the United States government has been preparing for scenarios to secure the weapons in the event of the Asad regime's loss of control. Syria is likely to have procured equipment and precursor chemicals from private companies in Western Europe. Stating that "Damascus is enhancing its chemical weapon capability," the cable explains that the United States was imposing export controls on eight dual-use chemicals that "can be used … in the manufacture of chemical weapons." Damascus possesses mustard blister agent, sarin nerve agent, and VX nerve agent, according to official U.S. assessments. According to an August 30, 2013, White House statement, the United States assesses that Syria "has used chemical weapons on a small scale against the opposition multiple times in the last year"—an assessment "based on multiple streams of information including reporting of Syrian officials planning and executing chemical weapons attacks and laboratory analysis of physiological samples obtained from a number of individuals, which revealed exposure to sarin." August 21, 2013, Attack
Public intelligence assessments issued by the United Kingdom and the United States on August 29 and August 30, 2013, respectively, stated that the Syrian government used chemical weapons on August 21 against opposition forces outside of Damascus. A U.S. team investigating chemical weapons use in Syria was in the country at the time. The U.N. team should make their report and deliver it to the U.N. Security Council for their assessment. That would change my calculus. On September 14, 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov presented a proposed Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons. Key implementation issues will include verification, access, security of stocks and of international personnel, and timelines for action. Funding for Syrian chemical weapons destruction may also be proposed in a continuing resolution or supplemental. Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs
As referenced above (" Resources "), U.S. government programs could be used to address or fund efforts to secure or dismantle Syrian weapons of mass destruction or advanced conventional weapons following a regime collapse scenario. Some experts and policy makers have suggested that the United States and other countries make joining the Chemical Weapons Convention (and therefore chemical weapons dismantlement) a condition for recognition and support of a new government in Syria. 1960 ) as reported by the House includes Section 1205, which gives authority to the "Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to provide assistance to the military and civilian response organizations of Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Turkey, and other countries in the region of Syria in order for such countries to respond effectively to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction in Syria and the region." The use, change of hands, or loss of control of chemical weapons stocks in Syria could have unpredictable consequences for the Syrian population as well as for U.S. allies and forces in the region. Congress may also wish to assess the Administration's plan for chemical weapons verification and destruction in Syria. | Syria has produced, stored, and weaponized chemical agents, but it remains dependent on foreign suppliers for chemical precursors. The regime of President Bashar al Asad possesses stocks of nerve (sarin, VX) and blister (mustard gas) agents, possibly weaponized into bombs, shells, and missiles. The government also has associated production facilities. Chemical weapons and their agents can deteriorate depending on age and quality; little is known from open sources about the current condition of the stockpile. Syria continues to attempt to procure new supplies of chemical weapons precursors, which are dual-use, through front companies in third countries. Most countries that have had chemical weapons arsenals in the past have destroyed, or are in the process of destroying, these weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The U.S. intelligence community cites Iran, North Korea, and Syria as having active chemical weapons programs. The Syrian government acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention on September 14, 2013. This convention requires its member states to eliminate all of their chemical weapon stocks, munitions, precursor chemicals, and related production and storage facilities.
A major policy concern of the United States has been the use or loss of control of chemical weapons stocks in Syria, which could have unpredictable consequences for the Syrian population and neighboring countries, as well as U.S. allies and forces in the region. The United States and other countries have assessed that the Syrian government has used chemical weapons against opposition forces in the country. The largest-scale use to date was on August 21, 2013. A U.N. inspection team began working in Syria on August 19, 2013, and completed their mission on August 31. The U.N. team's investigative report confirmed the large-scale use of sarin nerve agent against civilians in the Ghouta area of Damascus on August 21.
President Barack Obama and other world leaders had said that the use of chemical weapons against the civilian population would be met with consequences, which could include the use of military force. For example, President Obama suggested during an August 2012 press briefing that the United States might take military action against Syria if Damascus used or lost control of its chemical weapons, explaining that "a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus."
On August 31, 2013, President Obama stated that the United States should respond with "military action against Syrian regime targets" in response to the August 21 attack and added that he would ask Congress to grant authorization for the use of military force. The White House had previously announced on June 13, 2013, that the Syrian government had used chemical weapons "on a small scale against the opposition multiple times in the last year." The statement added that, in response to the Asad regime's use of chemical weapons, the President had authorized the expansion of military assistance to the opposition forces in Syria.
However, President Obama subsequently explained in a September 10 speech that he had asked congressional leaders to postpone a vote to authorize the use of military force in order to give the Administration time to pursue a new diplomatic initiative. Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Moallem stated the previous day that Damascus had accepted a proposal presented by the Russian government, according to which Syria would turn over its chemical weapons for international control and supervised destruction. The United Nations Security Council is discussing a draft resolution designed to accomplish this goal. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov presented a proposed Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons, which outlines deadlines and actions required. Key issues for implementation of chemical weapons destruction in Syria include verification, inspectors' access, destruction method and location, and the security of international personnel.
While the United States and other governments have said they believe the Asad regime has kept its chemical weapons stocks secure, policy makers are also concerned about what could happen to these weapons in the course of the civil war, such as diversion to terrorist groups or loss of control during a regime collapse. There is also concern that Syria could transfer its chemical weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Administration officials have stated that the United States has been working with regional allies to detect the movement of chemical weapons, prepare interdiction scenarios, and mitigate possible use against military or civilian populations.
During conflict, the intelligence community and Special Forces units would likely play a major role in locating and securing such weapons in a combat environment. The nature and recent course of the conflict in Syria suggests that rapid changes in control over critical military facilities may occur. U.S. government programs established to secure or remove chemical or other weapons of mass destruction through threat reduction or nonproliferation programs have focused on destruction or scientist redirection in an atmosphere of cooperation. At present, such programs are providing border security assistance to neighboring states. These programs may also be used to contribute financial or in-kind technical assistance to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) mission to eliminate chemical weapons in Syria. U.S. policy makers and Congress may wish to review and discuss authorities, funding, forces, and scenarios.
For additional information on chemical weapons agents, see CRS Report R42862, Chemical Weapons: A Summary Report of Characteristics and Effects, by [author name scrubbed]. For a broader discussion of U.S. policy options, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Background and U.S. Response, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R43335 | crs_R43335_0 | Introduction
The question of legalizing the status of unauthorized aliens in the United States is a key—and controversial—issue in immigration reform. While recent discussions have focused on legislative proposals that aim to enable a large proportion of the unauthorized population to obtain legal status, for many years narrower bills were regularly introduced in Congress to address both the immigration- and education-related circumstances of a subset of unauthorized aliens: individuals brought, as children, to live in the United States by their parents or other adults. Known as the "DREAM Act," these bills have sought to establish a pathway to permanent legal status for these unauthorized childhood arrivals and have historically been less controversial than broader legalization proposals. The name DREAM Act derives from a bill title, Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, but refers more broadly to measures to provide immigration relief to unauthorized students, whether or not particular bills carry that name. DREAM Act legislation introduced and considered in these Congresses is the focus of this report. This legislation serves as a bridge between older and newer versions of the DREAM Act and provides useful background information for analysis of more recent DREAM Act proposals. Background
Unauthorized immigrant children living in the United States are able to receive free public education through high school. One reason for this is a provision enacted in 1996 as section 505 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which discourages states and localities from granting resident unauthorized aliens certain "postsecondary education benefits," commonly interpreted to include in-state tuition rates. Another factor that may make it difficult for some unauthorized immigrants to attend college is that they are not eligible for federal student financial aid under the Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965, as amended. More broadly, as unauthorized aliens, they typically are unable to work legally and are subject to removal from the United States. These measures generally proposed to repeal the 1996 provision and to enable certain unauthorized students to adjust to legal permanent resident (LPR) status. Bills in the 110th Congress
DREAM Act proposals were again introduced in the 110 th Congress, both as stand-alone bills and as part of larger comprehensive immigration reform measures. 1275 would have repealed IIRIRA §505 and thereby eliminated a restriction on state provision of postsecondary educational benefits to unauthorized aliens. They also would have been ineligible under H.R. | Legalization of unauthorized immigrants living in the United States is a key issue in immigration reform. Recent discussions of this issue have focused mainly on controversial legislative proposals to create a pathway to legal status for a large majority of today's unauthorized aliens. For many years, however, narrower bills were regularly introduced in Congress that sought to provide both legal immigration status and education-related relief to a subgroup of the larger unauthorized population: individuals who were brought, as children, to live in the United States by their parents or other adults. Historically, these bills, commonly referred to as the "DREAM Act," have been less controversial than broader legalization proposals. The name DREAM Act derives from a bill title, Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, but refers more broadly to measures to provide immigration relief to unauthorized childhood arrivals, whether or not particular bills carry that name.
Unauthorized alien children in the United States may face various obstacles as they get older. They receive free public primary and secondary education, but may find it difficult to attend college for financial reasons. A provision enacted as part of a 1996 immigration law prohibits states from granting unauthorized aliens certain postsecondary educational benefits on the basis of state residence, unless equal benefits are made available to all U.S. citizens. This prohibition is commonly understood to apply to the granting of "in-state" residency status for tuition purposes. In addition, unauthorized immigrants are not eligible for federal student financial aid. More generally, they are not legally allowed to work in the United States and are subject to being removed from the country at any time.
Multiple DREAM Act measures were introduced in the 109th and 110th Congresses both as stand-alone measures and as parts of larger immigration reform bills. Most of these bills had two key components. They would have repealed the 1996 provision, thereby eliminating a restriction on state provision of postsecondary educational benefits to unauthorized aliens. They also would have provided immigration relief to certain unauthorized alien students by establishing a process for them to become legal permanent residents of the United States.
DREAM Act bills introduced and considered in the 109th and 110th Congresses are the focus of this report. While none of these measures were enacted, they serve as a bridge between older and newer versions of the DREAM Act and provide useful background information for analysis of more recent DREAM Act proposals. For discussion of these more recent proposals, see CRS Report RL33863, Unauthorized Alien Students: Issues and "DREAM Act" Legislation, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44103 | crs_R44103_0 | Introduction
The United States is currently facing two key challenges related to the U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. The discussion about whether to modernize or replace the ICBM force is a significant part of the national debate about the future of U.S. nuclear weapons. The United States also continues to extend deterrence to allies and partner nations with a "credible U.S. 'nuclear umbrella.'" As President Obama noted in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, the threat of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk of nuclear attack has increased. There are several issues for Congress. First, Congress may consider whether the current plans for the nuclear enterprise (consisting of leadership, people and things that work on the nuclear mission) are sufficient to address the problems within the ICBM force or whether there may be other ways to sustain the current force. Second, Congress may consider whether the United States should continue to deploy ICBMs in the future nuclear force structure, particularly in light of expected financial constraints. It may consider whether nuclear weapons modernization programs will compete with each other, or with conventional weapons programs, for scarce resources. Finally, Congress may question whether the United States can afford to forgo ICBM sustainment and modernization programs in an era of changing national security challenges. Current U.S. Nuclear Force Structure
The U.S. nuclear force is a "Triad" consisting of strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) that carry submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the land-based ICBM force, and long-range bomber aircraft. According to the Nuclear Posture Review, "strategic nuclear submarines and the SLBMs they carry represent the most survivable leg of the U.S. nuclear Triad." Congress will play a key role in determining the future of the GBSD. | Determining the future role of U.S. nuclear weapons within the U.S. national security strategy is currently a topic of much debate. Many senior leaders are determined to design a strategy that defines a new role for U.S. nuclear weapons and makes those weapons responsive and relevant in today's global threat environment. The current U.S. nuclear enterprise consists of a triad of options: Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers. All three legs of the nuclear triad are aging, since they were largely built to counter the threat of the Soviet Union. Policymakers in Congress and the Executive Branch are now deciding whether to modernize or replace parts of each leg.
The Obama Administration's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) outlines its approach to reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, while simultaneously advancing broader U.S. security interests. In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama highlighted the current nuclear dangers in the global environment and declared the United States will "seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons." The Nuclear Posture Review provides the roadmap for implementing President Obama's agenda for reducing nuclear risks to the United States, U.S. allies and partners, and the international community.
This raises several issues for Congress particularly regarding the Triad's ICBM component. First, Congress may consider whether the current plans for the nuclear enterprise are sufficient to address the problems within the ICBM force or whether there may be other ways to sustain the current force. Second, Congress may consider whether the United States should continue to deploy ICBMs in the future nuclear force structure, particularly in light of expected financial constraints. It may consider whether nuclear weapons modernization programs will compete with each other, or with conventional weapons programs, for scarce resources. Finally, Congress may address questions about whether the United States can afford to forgo ICBM sustainment and modernization programs in an era of changing national security challenges. |
crs_RL30365 | crs_RL30365_0 | Context
The federal government has employed government corporations to achieve policy goals for over a century. Among Members of Congress, the executive branch, and the scholarly community, interest in the government corporation option, and variations on this class of agency, has increased in recent decades. In the typical contemporary Congress, several bills are introduced to establish government corporations. At the time of publication of this report, two bills had been introduced in the 112 th Congress to improve U.S. infrastructure by establishing government corporations— H.R. 404 and S. 652 . Similarly, in the 111 th Congress, government corporations bills included ones that would have created an Indian Development Finance Corporation ( H.R. 1607 ), a Green Bank ( H.R. 1698 ), and a National Infrastructure Development Bank ( H.R. As defined in this report, a federal government corporation is an agency of the federal government, established by Congress to perform a public purpose, which provides a market-oriented product or service and is intended to produce revenue that meets or approximates its expenditures. By this definition, there are 17 entities that are government corporations. Title 5 of the U.S. Code defines a "government corporation" as "a corporation owned or controlled by the Government of the United States" (5 U.S.C. Corporations cover the spectrum from such large, well-known corporations as the United States Postal Service and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to such small, low-visibility corporate bodies as the Federal Financing Bank in the Treasury Department and Federal Prison Industries (UNICOR) in the Justice Department. Government corporations should not be confused with quasi governmental entities, such as government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). In 1945, partly in response to the proliferation of corporate bodies created for the war effort, Congress passed the Government Corporation Control Act (GCCA; 59 Stat. The act standardized budget, auditing, debt management, and depository practices for corporations. In the absence of a general incorporation act with organizational definitions, how is one to know when a government corporation is the most suitable option, and what criteria should be met before a government corporation is established? Government corporations have been structured so that they are but financial entities whose employees are actually employees of the parent agency (e.g., the Federal Financing Bank in the Department of the Treasury and the Commodity Credit Corporation in the Department of Agriculture). That is, government corporations will continue to be reviewed by the Resource Management Office (RMO) which has responsibility for the functional area most closely associated with the corporation's mission.... OMB does not review government corporations separately from other government organizations that perform similar functions. 2776) established the U.S. Enrichment Corporation as a wholly owned government corporation. | To assist Congress in its oversight activities, this report provides an overview of the government corporation as an administrative model. As defined in this report, a government corporation is a government agency that is established by Congress to provide a market-oriented public service and to produce revenues that meet or approximate its expenditures. By this definition, currently there are 17 government corporations.
In the typical contemporary Congress, several bills are introduced to establish government corporations. At the time of publication of this report, two bills had been introduced in the 112th Congress to improve U.S. infrastructure by establishing government corporations—H.R. 404 and S. 652. Similarly, in the 111th Congress, government corporations bills included ones that would have created an Indian Development Finance Corporation (H.R. 1607 ), a Green Bank (H.R. 1698), and a National Infrastructure Development Bank (H.R. 2521).
The government corporation model has been utilized by the federal government for over a century. Today's government corporations cover the spectrum in size and function from large, well-known entities, such as the U.S. Postal Service and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, to small, low-visibility corporate bodies, such as the Federal Financing Bank in the Department of the Treasury and Federal Prison Industries in the Department of Justice.
The federal government does not possess a general incorporation statute as states do. Each government corporation is chartered through an act of Congress. The use of separate acts to charter each corporation has resulted in wide variance in the legal and organizational structure of government corporations. That said, the Government Corporation Control Act of 1945, as amended, does provide for the standardized budget, auditing, debt management, and depository practices for those corporations listed in the act.
Within the executive branch, no one agency is responsible for the oversight and supervision of government corporations. Neither the House nor the Senate have single committees with the responsibility to oversee all government corporations. Instead, each corporation is overseen by the committee(s) with jurisdiction over its policy area.
Many government corporations, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, have been established to exist in perpetuity. Other government corporations, such as the U.S. Enrichment Corporation, though, have been designed to serve as transition vehicles to transform from governmental entities into private firms.
Congress at times has found the government corporation an attractive governance option. A well-designed and -operated government corporation does not require annual appropriations because it generates revenues from the provision of goods and services. Moreover, each government corporation may be endowed with the administrative flexibilities required to accomplish its goals while remaining responsive to Congress and the President. Finally, as noted above, the government corporation may be established to serve an enduring purpose or may serve as a vehicle for privatization.
This report will be updated in the event of a significant development. |
crs_R44038 | crs_R44038_0 | Introduction
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), an agency within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), performs multiple functions including the adjudication of immigration and naturalization petitions and refugee and asylum claims, as well as other immigration-related services. The agency and its predecessor, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), have had the legal authority to do so since at least the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA). In 1988, Congress created the Immigration Examinations Fee Account, which made the portion of USCIS's budget collected from user fees no longer subject to annual congressional approval. USCIS would process all new deferred action petitions, the cost of which would be paid for through user fees. Some Members of Congress oppose the executive action, particularly its expansion of existing deferred action provisions. However, because USCIS's funding is largely independent of the annual appropriations process, Congress cannot use that process to halt the deferred action programs contained in the President's executive action. If Congress wanted to alter existing statutory provisions governing the collection of user fees in the Immigration Examinations Fee Account, the availability of user fees for expenditure, or the prohibition of user fees for certain purposes, it would need to enact legislation. These include the agency's capacity to handle surges in application volume while maintaining stable service levels for the rest of its caseload; whether the underlying reasoning used to establish petition fees continues to be appropriate; whether current fees are at a level where they may be affecting or altering both the pool of applicants who apply for benefits and the pool of lawful permanent residents who decide to naturalize; and the pace and progress of information technology modernization within an agency that remains reliant upon paper copies of petitions and documents. Responsibilities
Three major activities dominate USCIS functions: adjudication of immigration petitions, adjudication of naturalization petitions, and consideration of refugee and asylum claims and related humanitarian and international concerns. USCIS also provides a range of immigration-related services, such as employment authorizations and change-of-status petitions. Immigration Adjudication : USCIS processes roughly 6 million petitions each year, including about 1 million for permanent status and 5 million for temporary nonimmigrant status. Work Authorization : USCIS adjudicates work authorizations for aliens who meet certain conditions. Since FY2007, congressional appropriations have supported the E-Verify program. USCIS also receives a small portion of its budget through appropriations. In FY2014, direct appropriations constituted less than 4% of USCIS's budget ( Figure 1 ). This account is not subject to annual congressional approval. Related Issues for Congress
Accountability to Congress
The President's executive action of November 20, 2014, highlights the challenges facing Congress if it wishes to exert control over USCIS's budget or activities which are funded through user fees. Some may appreciate that a declining portion of USCIS's budget consists of appropriations because it reduces the agency's fiscal burden on U.S. taxpayers. To alter existing statutory provisions concerning the collection of the fees in the Immigration Examinations Fee Account, the availability of user fees for expenditure, or the prohibition of its use for certain purposes would require an enactment of law. Immigrant advocates in particular argue that fee increases place disproportionate hardship on applicants for immigration services and benefits. Since that time, and particularly since USCIS was created in 2002, the agency has relied almost entirely on user fees to fund its operations. Fee and Processing Volume Statistics | U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), an agency within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), performs multiple functions including the adjudication of immigration and naturalization petitions, consideration of refugee and asylum claims and related humanitarian and international concerns, and a range of immigration-related services, such as issuing employment authorizations and processing nonimmigrant change-of-status petitions. Processing immigrant petitions remains USCIS's leading function. In FY2014, it handled roughly 6 million petitions for immigration-related services and benefits.
USCIS's budget relies largely on user fees. The agency and its predecessor, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), have had the legal authority to charge fees for immigration services since before the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA). In 1988, Congress created the Immigration Examinations Fee Account, which made the portion of USCIS's budget collected from user fees no longer subject to annual congressional approval.
Since the President announced the Immigration Accountability Executive Action on November 20, 2014, USCIS's budgetary structure has received increased attention. Among other provisions, the executive action included an expansion of the existing Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program that was initiated in 2012, as well as a new Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) program that grants certain unauthorized aliens protection from removal, and work authorization, for three years. If implemented, these programs would require applicants to submit petitions and pay a user fee to USCIS. The user fees would purportedly pay for the cost of administering the program.
Some in Congress oppose deferred action programs. However, Congress has limited options for halting the programs using the annual appropriations process. The executive action highlights some challenges Congress faces if it wishes to exert control over an agency whose funding is largely independent of the annual appropriations process. To alter existing statutory provisions governing the collection of user fees in the Immigration Examinations Fee Account, the availability of user fees for expenditure, or their prohibited use for certain purposes would require an enactment of law.
Congress does appropriate a small portion of the agency's budget each year, primarily to fund E-Verify, a system used to electronically confirm that individuals have proper authorization to work in the United States. Since 2003, such annual direct appropriations have constituted a declining portion of USCIS's budget. While some have welcomed this trend for reducing the cost to U.S. taxpayers of running USCIS, others have voiced concerns over the limitations on congressional oversight it reflects. Some contend that such budget independence also makes the agency less responsive to the need for affordable user fees and timely and effective customer service.
Potential issues that Congress may decide to consider include USCIS's accountability to Congress, given that much of its funding does not require annual congressional approval; whether some fees are at levels that inhibit some potential applicants from applying for benefits or inhibit lawful permanent residents from becoming citizens; whether the pace and progress of information technology modernization is sufficient to meet the agency's multiple functions and efficiently serve petitioners; and whether USCIS's management of its personnel and resources adequately addresses sudden demands for processing and adjudication of petitions while maintaining processing times and adequate levels of service for all other petitions. |
crs_RL34605 | crs_RL34605_0 | In recent years, Congress, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and members of the public have questioned whether hospitals are conducting sufficient charitable activities to justify these benefits. Standard for § 501(c)(3) Charitable Status
Non-profit hospitals typically qualify for federal tax-exempt status as charitable organizations described in § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Under the standard developed in Revenue Ruling 69-545, which is known as the "community benefit standard," hospitals are judged on whether they promote the health of a broad class of individuals in the community. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA; P.L. 111-148 , § 9007) imposes additional requirements on hospitals in order to qualify for § 501(c)(3) status. The act imposes four new requirements. First, starting with taxable years beginning after March 23, 2012, hospitals will be required to conduct a "community health needs assessment" in the current or past two taxable years and adopt an implementation strategy to meet those needs. Second, starting with taxable years beginning after March 23, 2010, hospitals are required to have written financial assistance and emergency medical care policies. Third, with respect to emergency and other medically necessary care, hospitals may not charge individuals eligible under the financial assistance policy more than the lowest amounts charged to those with insurance coverage. Fourth, hospitals are required to make reasonable efforts to determine whether an individual is eligible for financial assistance before beginning extraordinary collection actions. Appendix. Schedule H
As discussed in this report, hospitals with tax-exempt status are now required to provide information specific to their industry on the new Schedule H of the redesigned Form 990 (the annual information return filed by tax-exempt organizations). The metric the IRS has chosen to quantify community benefit is dollars spent. | The recently enacted Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA; P.L. 111-148, § 9007) imposes requirements on hospitals with § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status. Under the act, hospitals will be required to regularly conduct "community health needs assessments" and adopt implementation strategies to meet those needs. They are also required to have written financial assistance and emergency medical care policies that are consistent with standards imposed by the act. Furthermore, hospitals are not able to charge eligible uninsured individuals more than the lowest amounts charged to insured individuals for emergency and other medically necessary care, and they must make reasonable efforts to determine an individual's eligibility for financial assistance before beginning extraordinary collection actions.
The act's requirements appear to reflect concerns that have arisen in recent years about whether non-profit hospitals are providing adequate public benefits to justify their tax-exempt status. Non-profit hospitals are eligible for federal tax-exempt status as charitable organizations described in § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Under the "community benefit" standard developed by the IRS, charitable hospitals are judged on whether they provide sufficient health benefits to the community. The IRS has recently developed a new annual reporting requirement (Schedule H of the Form 990) for hospitals to report information regarding their activities.
This report examines the standard under which hospitals qualify for tax-exempt charitable status under federal law, recent inquiries made by Congress and the IRS into whether hospitals are conducting sufficient activities to justify their exemption, and Section 9007 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The Appendix to the report discusses the new Schedule H in detail. |
crs_R41964 | crs_R41964_0 | The minibus passed both chambers by more than two-thirds majorities on November 17, 2011. It reduces regular discretionary Agriculture appropriations by $372 million to $19.8 billion, a cut of -1.8% below FY2011 levels after adjusting for disaster designations and certain jurisdiction issues. Scope of the Agriculture Appropriations Bill
The Agriculture appropriations bill—formally known as the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act—provides funding for the following agencies and departments:
all of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (except the Forest Service, which is funded by the Interior appropriations bill), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health and Human Services, and in the House, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). It was the lead division of a three-bill "minibus" appropriation that also included Commerce-Justice-Science and Transportation-Housing and Urban Development appropriations. The minibus was the first FY2012 appropriation to be enacted, and it also included another short-term continuing resolution, through December 16, 2011, for the remaining nine appropriations bills. The Agriculture bill was the vehicle for the minibus since it was the only one of the three subcommittee bills in the minibus to have passed the House. The House-passed bill would have cut discretionary Agriculture appropriations to $17.2 billion, 14% below FY2011 levels, following a 15% cut in FY2011 from FY2010 levels ( able 2 ). Much of the floor debate related to funding reductions for the Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) feeding program (-11%), food safety (-10%), international food aid (-31%); preventing USDA payments to Brazil in relation to the U.S. loss in the WTO cotton case; and programs promoting locally produced food such as USDA's "know-your-farmer-know-your-food" initiative ( Table 3 ). This Senate total was $2.7 billion more than the House bill's discretionary total (excluding CFTC from both bills for comparison). The bill also included $367 million of conservation-related disaster assistance that was not subject to the same budgetary caps; with this spending, the appropriation is $20.2 billion, a slight increase over FY2011 levels. The FY2012 Agriculture appropriation spreads its reductions in discretionary spending by trimming most agency's budgets in the range of 3%-6%, although some programs have greater reductions. The act makes cuts to rural development programs (-$233 million, -8.8%), discretionary agriculture programs (-$209 million, -3%), discretionary nutrition assistance (-$127 million, -1.8%), foreign assistance programs (-$56 million, -2.9%), and conservation programs (-$45 million, -5.1%). The Food and Drug Administration and Commodity Futures Trading Commission each receive small increases in budget authority of about 1.5% to 2%. The appropriation increases the amount of limitations on mandatory farm bill programs by 27% to $1.2 billion, though rescissions from prior year appropriations were smaller by about half, at $445 million. But on August 2, 2011, the Budget Control Act of 2011 ( P.L. These limitations and rescissions, though greater than most years, were less in total than for FY2011. The net reduction in the amount of limitations and rescissions from $1.87 billion in FY2011 to $1.65 billion in FY2012 effectively increased the amount of cuts required to agency programs by about $220 million to achieve the FY2012 bill's reduction in total discretionary spending to $19.8 billion. 2112 . The House version of H.R. P.L. 112-25 ). 112-55 . The House-passed version of H.R. 2112 as passed by the Senate, and the conference agreement P.L. 112-55 , signed by the President on November 18, 2011. | The Agriculture appropriations bill provides funding for all of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) except the Forest Service, plus the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and, in alternating years, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).
The FY2012 Agriculture Appropriations Act (P.L. 112-55, H.R. 2112) was signed by the President on November 18, 2011, after passing both chambers by more than two-thirds majorities. It was the lead division of a three-bill "minibus" appropriation that also included Commerce-Justice-Science and Transportation-Housing and Urban Development appropriations. The minibus was the first FY2012 appropriation to be enacted, and it also included another short-term continuing resolution, through December 16, 2011, for the remaining nine appropriations bills. The Agriculture bill was the vehicle for the minibus since it was the only one of the three subcommittee bills in the minibus to have passed the House.
P.L. 112-55 provides $20.2 billion of discretionary budget authority, including $367 million of conservation-related disaster assistance that was not subject to the regular budgetary caps. After subtracting the disaster funding and adjusting for CFTC jurisdiction, the $19.8 billion of regular discretionary budget authority reflects a $372 million reduction from FY2011 levels (-1.8%). The bill also includes $116.8 billion of mandatory funding for nutrition assistance and farm supports, up +11% from FY2011 due to a 19% increase in nutrition assistance because of the economy.
The FY2012 Agriculture appropriation spreads its reductions in discretionary spending by trimming most agency budgets in the range of 3%-6%, although some programs have greater reductions. The act makes cuts to rural development programs (-$233 million, -8.8%), discretionary agriculture programs (-$209 million, -3%), discretionary nutrition assistance (-$127 million, -1.8%), foreign assistance programs (-$56 million, -2.9%), and conservation programs (-$45 million, -5.1%). The Food and Drug Administration and Commodity Futures Trading Commission each receive small increases in budget authority of about 1.5% to 2%.
The appropriation increases the amount of limitations on mandatory farm bill programs by 27% to $1.2 billion, though rescissions from prior-year appropriations were smaller by about half, at $445 million. These limitations and rescissions, though greater than most years, were less in total than for FY2011. Reliance on these provisions in FY2011 and relatively less use in FY2012 increased the amount of cuts required to agency programs by about $220 million to meet the bill's discretionary allocation.
The final appropriation is closer to the Senate-passed version from November 1, 2011, than the House-passed version from June 16, 2011. The Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25, August 2, 2011) set the discretionary limits that were used for the Senate bill and in the conference agreement. The Senate-passed version cut discretionary Agriculture appropriations to $19.8 billion, $2.7 billion more than the House bill in its discretionary total.
The House version of H.R. 2112, passed under the House's more austere budget resolution, would have cut discretionary Agriculture appropriations to $17.25 billion, a reduction of $2.7 billion from FY2011 levels (-14%), and following a 15% cut in FY2011. Much of the floor debate in the House related to funding reductions for the Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) feeding program (-11%), food safety (-10%), and international food aid (-31%); preventing USDA payments to Brazil in relation to the U.S. loss in the WTO cotton case; and programs promoting locally produced food (USDA's "know-your-farmer-know-your-food" initiative). |
crs_RL32343 | crs_RL32343_0 | Simply stated,pump prices are essentially determined by the supply of and demand for gasoline, although the costof crude figures into the equation. Gasoline Prices
According to the American Automobile Association (AAA) daily survey of retail gasolineprices around the country, gasoline prices at the pump nationwide have exceeded previous records.Since the start of 2003, prices at the gas pump have fluctuated by as much as 55 cents per gallon, andreached peaks above $1.70 three times. Figure 1 shows pump prices for the United States as a wholeand California, where both price levels and peaks exceed the national averages -- a result of variouslocal conditions. California pump prices peaked in October at $2.45 for regular. The ebb and flow of gasoline stocks during2004 -- a period of noteworthy gasoline price volatility -- reflects a balance between gasolineinventories, seasonal driving demand, and the crude available to make more at U.S. refineries as wellas the supply of imports. These data consistof domestic refinery production, (2) imports of finished gasoline that meets U.S. specifications, as wellas a significant amount -- between 300,000 and 500,000 barrels per day -- of blending componentsfrom refineries abroad. Above-minimum gasoline inventory levels and increased gasoline availability maywell be a price stabilizing factor, having contributed to the decline of pump prices from theirall-time highs during the last part of 2004. This hasresulted in much higher prices in the United States. Other Factors Contributing to High Gasoline Prices
U.S. gasoline quality and composition regulations have created unusual fuel requirementsthat are not easily met by foreign refiners. In a nation where refinery capacity can only meet about90% of gasoline needs, calling for significant supplies from abroad, meeting U.S. product "specs"for imports can present a barrier to supplying market demand. In addition to U.S. requirements forreformulated gasoline, low sulfur requirements began in 2004. In addition to manufacturing challenges at U.S. refineries, two purely economic factors haveoperated to raise the cost of importing gasoline. Gasoline Prices and the Strategic Petroleum Reserve
The recent increase in the prices of crude oil and gasoline have prompted calls for use of theStrategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). While a release of SPR oil may soften crude prices to some extent, it may be little reflected in localgasoline prices if demand for fuel remains high where refining capacity is tight. As suggested, this is likelier in some regions of the country than others. In sum, opinion appears divided on the effect that the Administration's current fill policy ishaving on crude price and product supply, as well as on the benefits that might be more thanshort-term if RIK oil is diverted to the markets, or a swap/exchange of SPR is held. Steadily growing gasoline demand, which has increased by 600,000 barrels perday since 1999, has risen from 8.4 mbd to 9.0 mbd for the whole of 2004. This has accounted forvirtually all the nation's increase in oil consumption. | Since late 2002, gasoline prices have been extremely volatile, with the national averagespiking above $1.70 three times. Most recently, the nationwide pump price for regular fuel set a newrecord as momentum carried it over $2.00 per gallon. Prices in some states -- reaching a high of$2.45 per gallon in California -- are much above the national average. In addition to the marketforces affecting pump prices in the United States, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC) announced a production cut effective in January 2005. At a minimum, this is likely tosupport crude prices; crude prices have significant impact on prices at the pump.
Apart from higher crude oil prices, gasoline prices are strongly influenced by the supply anddemand situation at the pump. Since 1999, the only growth in U.S. oil consumption has beenincreased gasoline demand, which has risen by 600,000 barrels per day to a current annual averageof 9.0 million barrels per day. While this might seem to be a relatively small amount, it has directlyincreased demand for imports of foreign gasoline, since U.S. refineries have not added capacity asgasoline demand has grown. Demand for imported gasoline now exceeds one million barrels per day.
In addition to the high demand for imported gasoline, the quality of gasoline sought fromforeign refiners has become a factor. As the specifications for environmentally acceptable fuel havebecome more stringent, the complexity of manufacturing "U.S. spec" gasoline has increased. Not allrefiners can economically make fuel that meets domestic requirements. U.S. gasoline marketersseeking imports must shop world markets for a scarce commodity; accordingly, prices are high.These high-priced incremental supplies play an important role in determining prices at the pump,because all gasoline tends to be priced by the market at the cost of the last units supplied.
Other factors contributing to the pump price situation include the state of gasoline and crudeoil inventories at U.S. refineries. Both are recovering from low levels. Gasoline inventories availablefor consumption amount to less than two days of supply. Crude oil stocks -- from which gasolineconsumed is replaced -- are still at low levels, although rebounding somewhat from last winter'srecord lows. Petroleum inventories are low because global oil supplies are tight, in part due to strongdemand, especially in Asia. OPEC production policy is a consideration as well.
As gasoline prices rise, so does interest in finding some sort of public policy remedy thatwould return lower and more stable prices. Among the options generally discussed are a release ofcrude from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and the relaxation of Environmental Protection Agencyrules regarding gasoline composition. Both are controversial, with the wisdom and effectiveness ofeach challenged by some.
This report will be updated to reflect significant changes in the factors impacting gasolinemarkets and prices. |
crs_R44320 | crs_R44320_0 | The principal focus of this report is the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations in the developing world—where most analysts agree that the potential for the outbreak of regional military conflicts currently is greatest, and where the greatest proportion of the conventional arms trade is conducted. Nations in the developing world continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by conventional weapons suppliers. During the period of this report, 2007-2014, conventional arms transfer agreements (which represent orders for future delivery) to developing nations comprised 77.2% of the value of all international arms transfer agreements . The portion of agreements with developing countries constituted 75.5% of all agreements globally from 2011-2014. In 2014, arms deliveries to developing nations constituted 44% of the value of all such arms deliveries worldwide. Major Findings
General Trends in Arms Transfers Worldwide
The value of all arms transfer agreements worldwide (to both developed and developing nations) in 2014 was $71.8 billion. In 2014, the United States led in arms transfer agreements worldwide, making agreements valued at $36.2 billion (50.4% of all such agreements), up from $26.7 billion in 2013. In 2014, the United States ranked first in the value of all arms deliveries worldwide, making nearly $12.2 billion in such deliveries or 26%. General Trends in Arms Transfers to Developing Nations
The value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 2014 was $61.8 billion, a substantial increase from the $54.3 billion total in 2013 ( Figure 1 ) ( Table 1 ) ( Table 3 ) ( Table 4 ). The United States and Russia have dominated the arms market in the developing world since 2011. Both nations either ranked first or second among countries for all four years in terms of the value of arms transfer agreements. From 2011 to 2014, the United States made nearly $115 billion of these agreements, or 46.3%. During this same period, Russia made $41.7 billion, 16.8% of all such agreements, expressed in current dollars. Collectively, the United States and Russia made 63.1% of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations during this four-year period. France, the third leading supplier, from 2011 to 2014 made nearly $14.2 billion or 5.7% of all such agreements with developing nations during these years. In the earlier period (2007-2010) Russia ranked second with $35.9 billion in arms transfer agreements with developing nations or 20%; the United States made $65.9 billion in arms transfer agreements during this period or 37%. The United States ranked first among these suppliers for all but one year during this period. Russia
The total value of Russia's arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 2014 was $10.1 billion, a slight decrease from $10.2 billion in 2013, still placing Russia second in such agreements with the developing world. Of these four nations, France was the leading supplier with $4.3 billion in agreements in 2014. The Asia region ranked second in 2011-2014 with $72.4 billion of these agreements or 29.3% ( Table 6 and Table 7 ). In the later period (2011-2014), the United States ranked first in Asian agreements with 32.9% ($23.8 billion in current dollars); Russia ranked second with 24.9% ($18 billion in current dollars). | This report provides Congress with official, unclassified, quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countries for the preceding eight calendar years for use in its policy oversight functions. All agreement and delivery data in this report for the United States are government-to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) transactions. Similar data are provided on worldwide conventional arms transfers by all government suppliers, but the principal focus is the level of arms transfers by major weapons supplying governments to nations in the developing world.
Developing nations continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by weapons suppliers. During the years 2007-2010, the value of arms transfer agreements with developing nations comprised 74.4% of all such agreements worldwide. More recently, arms transfer agreements with developing nations constituted 75.5% of all such agreements globally from 2011-2014, and 86.0% of these agreements in 2014.
The value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 2014 was $61.8 billion. In 2014, the value of all arms deliveries to developing nations was $20.6 billion.
Recently, from 2011 to 2014, the United States and Russia have dominated the arms market in the developing world, with both nations either ranking first or second for each of these four years in the value of arms transfer agreements. From 2011 to 2014, the United States made nearly $115 billion in such agreements, 46.3% of all these agreements (expressed in current dollars). Russia made $41.7 billion, 16.8% of these agreements. During this same period, collectively, the United States and Russia made 63.1% of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations, ($156.4 billion in current dollars).
In 2014, the United States ranked first in arms transfer agreements with developing nations with $29.8 billion or 48.2% of these agreements. In second place was Russia with $10.1 billion or 16.3% of such agreements.
In 2014, Russia ranked first in the value of arms deliveries to developing nations at $8.4 billion, or 40.8% of all such deliveries. The United States ranked second in these deliveries at over $7.6 billion or 27.2%.
In worldwide arms transfer agreements in 2014—to both developed and developing nations—the United States dominated, ranking first with $36.2 billion in such agreements or 50.4% of all such agreements. Russia ranked second in worldwide arms transfer agreements in 2014 with $10.2 billion in such global agreements or 14.2%. The value of all arms transfer agreements worldwide in 2014 was $71.8 billion.
In 2014, South Korea ranked first concluding $7.8 billion in agreements. Brazil ranked third in the value of arms transfer agreements among all developing nations weapons purchasers, concluding $6.5 billion in such agreements. Iraq ranked second with $7.3 billion in such agreements. |
crs_R44392 | crs_R44392_0 | Introduction
Certain workers who have experienced job loss and retirees whose private pension plans were taken over by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) may be eligible for the Health Coverage Tax Credit (HCTC). The HCTC has a sunset date of January 1, 2020. The HCTC is refundable, so taxpayers may claim the full credit amount even if they have little or no federal income tax liability. The credit also is advanceable, so taxpayers may receive the credit on a monthly basis to coincide with the payment of premiums. Eligibility
To claim the HCTC, taxpayers must be in one of two eligibility groups and not enrolled in (or sometimes even eligible for) certain types of health insurance. Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance (ATAA) . Qualified Health Insurance
An eligible taxpayer is only allowed to claim the HCTC to cover part of the premium for qualified health insurance. The other seven categories of coverage are known as state-qualified health plans . Receiving the HCTC
Eligible taxpayers with qualified health insurance may claim the tax credit when they file their tax returns for the year, or they may receive advance payments for the credit, on a monthly basis, throughout the year. | The Health Coverage Tax Credit (HCTC) subsidizes most of the cost of qualified health insurance for eligible taxpayers and their family members. Potential eligibility for the HCTC is limited to two groups of taxpayers. One group is comprised of individuals eligible for Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) allowances because they experienced qualifying job losses. The other group consists of individuals whose defined-benefit pension plans were taken over by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) because of financial difficulties. HCTC-eligible individuals are allowed to receive the tax credit only if they either could not enroll in certain other health coverage (e.g., Medicaid) or are not eligible for other specified coverage (e.g., Medicare Part A).
To claim the HCTC, eligible taxpayers must have qualified health insurance (specific categories of coverage, as specified in statute). Several of those categories, known as state-qualified health plans, are available only after being established by state action.
The HCTC is refundable, so eligible taxpayers may receive the full credit amount even if they had little or no federal income tax liability. The credit is also advanceable, so taxpayers may receive the credit on a monthly basis to coincide with the payment of premiums.
The HCTC has a sunset date of January 1, 2020. |
crs_R41243 | crs_R41243_0 | For its civil works mission, Congress directs the agency through authorizations, appropriations, and oversight of the agency's study, construction, and ongoing operations of water resource projects. The agency's civil works responsibilities are principally to support navigation, reduce flood and storm damage, and protect and restore aquatic ecosystems. The Corps attracts congressional attention because its projects can have significant local and regional economic benefits and environmental effects. This report provides an overview of the Corps water resource activities, including congressional authorization and appropriations. The report also covers the standard project development process for Corps projects and other Corps activities and authorities. Corps Authorizations
Congress generally authorizes Corps activities prior to funding those activities. The authorization can be project-specific, programmatic, or general. Water Resources Development Acts
In recent decades, Congress has legislated on most Corps authorizations in Water Resources Development Acts (WRDAs). A WRDA is not a reauthorization bill; rather, it is an authorization bill. WRDA 2016, which was enacted as Title I of the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN; P.L. Congress with WRDA 2016 returned enactment of Corps authorization legislation to a biennial timeframe. For a discussion of water resource issues in the 115 th Congress including issues that may shape congressional oversight of WRRDA 2014 and WRDA 2016 and consideration of a WRDA bill in the 115 th Congress, see CRS Report R44738, Water Resource Issues in the 115th Congress , by [author name scrubbed] et al. This situation results in competition for funds among authorized activities during the budget and appropriations processes. Over the last decade, enacted annual Corps civil works appropriations (excluding supplemental appropriations) have remained steady or increased slightly, ranging from $4.5 billion to nearly $6.0 billion, whereas the President's request consistently has been less than the final enacted amount. However, numerous authorized projects have yet to be initiated. For most activities, the Corps also needs a nonfederal sponsor to share the study and construction costs. WRRDA 2014 expanded and consolidated the authorities for nonfederal entities to both perform studies and construct projects (or elements of projects) that typically would be undertaken by the Corps and for the cost of these nonfederal-led studies and construction to be shared by the federal government largely as if the Corps had performed them. Feasibility Study
Once a study is authorized, appropriations are sought from monies provided in the annual Energy and Water Development appropriations acts. Preconstruction Engineering and Design
Corps preconstruction engineering and design (PED) of a project may begin after the Chief's Report while awaiting congressional authorization for project construction (33 U.S.C. Construction and Operation and Maintenance
Once the project receives congressional construction authorization, federal funds for construction are sought in the annual appropriations process. The Corps has some general authorities to undertake small projects, technical assistance, and emergency actions. Flood-Fighting and Emergency Response
In addition to work performed as part of the National Response Framework, Congress has given the Corps its own emergency response authority. Repair of Damaged Levees and Other Flood and Storm Projects
In P.L. The nature of the involvement of the Corps (i.e., a grant from the Corps to the project owner or the Corps acting as the construction project manager) and nonfederal cost-share varies according to the specifics of the authorization. | The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) undertakes activities to maintain navigable channels, reduce flood and storm damage, and restore aquatic ecosystems. The agency's water resource projects can have significant local and regional economic benefits and environmental effects. Congress directs the Corps through authorizations; appropriations; and oversight of its studies, construction projects, and the ongoing operations of Corps infrastructure. This report summarizes congressional project authorization and annual appropriations processes for the Corps.
Authorizations. Congress generally authorizes Corps activities prior to funding them. The authorization can be project specific, programmatic, or general. The agency's ability to act on an authorization is often determined by funding. Congress typically authorizes numerous new Corps site-specific activities and provides policy direction in an omnibus Corps authorization bill, often titled a Water Resources Development Act (WRDA). Congress often considers a WRDA biennially. WRDAs generally do not provide funds to conduct activities, nor are they reauthorization bills.
During the 114th Congress, Congress enacted the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN; P.L. 114-322). Title I of the bill had the short title of Water Resources Development Act of 2016 (WRDA 2016). WIIN Title I contained many provisions similar to two WRDA 2016 bills considered earlier in the 114th Congress—S. 2848 and H.R. 5303. For a discussion of water resource issues in the 115th Congress, including issues that may shape congressional oversight of WRDA 2016 and consideration of a WRDA bill in the 115th Congress, see CRS Report R44738, Water Resource Issues in the 115th Congress, by [author name scrubbed] et al.
Appropriations. Federal funding for authorized Corps activities is provided in annual Energy and Water Development appropriations acts or supplemental appropriations acts. Annual Corps appropriations for its water resource activities have ranged from $4.5 billion to nearly $6.0 billion during the last decade. An increasing share of the agency's appropriations has been used for operation and maintenance. In recent years, some new studies, new construction projects, and new programs have been funded using enacted appropriations. However, many of the projects authorized for construction by previous Congresses have yet to be initiated, in part because of competition for funds and because Corps authorizations have outpaced appropriations.
Standard Project Development. The standard process for a Corps project requires two separate congressional authorizations—one for studying feasibility and a subsequent one for construction—as well as appropriations for both. Congressional authorization for project construction in recent years has been based on a favorable report by the Chief of Engineers (known as a Chief's Report) and an accompanying feasibility report. For most activities, Congress requires a nonfederal sponsor to share some portion of study and construction costs. Cost-sharing requirements vary by type of project. For some project types (e.g., levees), nonfederal sponsors own the completed works after construction and are responsible for operation and maintenance.
Other Corps Activities and Authorities. Although most Corps projects are developed under the standard project-development process, exceptions exist. Congress has granted the Corps some general authorities to undertake some studies, small projects, technical assistance, and emergency actions (e.g., flood fighting, repair of damaged levees, and limited drought assistance). Additionally, under the National Response Framework, the Corps may be tasked with performing activities in response to an emergency or disaster, such as emergency power restoration. |
crs_R41812 | crs_R41812_0 | Background
The United States currently addresses issues related to global hunger and food security through two primary types of approaches: (1) agricultural development, such as the Obama Administration's Feed the Future initiative; and (2) emergency and humanitarian food aid and assistance, such as the Food for Peace (P.L. Foreign assistance, including agricultural development and some emergency food assistance programs, is administered primarily by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), using existing authorities provided in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Funding is provided through the annual Department of State and Foreign Operations appropriation bill. In addition, funding for some multilateral efforts, such as the World Bank Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) Trust Fund, is provided through annual appropriations to the Treasury Department. U.S. international food aid programs are administered by USAID and USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), as authorized by the 2008 farm bill ( P.L. 110-246 ), and are funded through annual Agriculture appropriation bills. For FY2010, the Administration allocated about $1.31 billion to FtF from resources available. FtF allocations in FY2010 included $1.17 billion for agricultural development programs at USAID, $75 million for nutrition-related activities from the Global Health and Child Survival (GHCS) account at USAID, and $67 million allocated to the World Bank GAFSP. Separately, the Title II program within Food for Peace received $1.84 billion and the McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program was allocated $209.5 million. The FY2011 congressional budget justification for the Department of State and Foreign Operations was the first instance in which the Administration requested funds specifically to implement FtF. The Administration's FY2011 budget request included $1.84 billion for FtF-related activities, which was a little over 3% of the total international affairs budget request, and just over 40% more than the estimated FY2010 allocation to similar activities. The FY2011 increase was largely due to a new request in FY2011 of $408 million for the World Bank GAFSP Trust Fund. On April 14, 2011, Congress passed a continuing resolution (final FY2011 CR; P.L. 112-10 ) that funded federal agencies and programs through the remainder of FY2011. In addition, the final FY2011 CR includes $1.5 billion for Title II Food for Peace food aid programs, an 18% decrease from FY2010 levels and 11% below the Administration's request; $199.5 million for the McGovern-Dole Food for Education program, an almost 5% decrease from the FY2010 levels and the Administration's request; and $865 million for IDA, a 33% decrease from FY2010 and about 2% above the Administration's request ( Table 3 ). In February 2011, the Administration submitted its FY2012 budget, which requests funding of $1.56 billion for the FtF initiative, about $250 million, or 19%, more than the amount allocated in FY2010 ( Table 3 ). The FY2012 request for FtF activities further includes $150 million for the Global Health and Child Survival program, to be directed to nutrition activities linked with the FtF initiative, and a U.S. contribution of $308 million to the World Bank GAFSP. Separately, for FY2012, the Administration also requests $1.690 billion for Food for Peace Title II emergency and non-emergency food aid and $300 million of International Disaster Assistance for emergency food security, which could be used for local and regional purchase of food and interventions such as cash vouchers and cash transfer programs to facilitate access to food ( Table 3 ). | The United States currently addresses issues related to global hunger and food security through two primary types of approaches: (1) agricultural development and (2) emergency and humanitarian food aid and assistance. Agricultural development activities, such as the Administration's Feed the Future initiative and some emergency food assistance programs, are administered primarily by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) using existing authorities provided in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. Funding is provided through the annual Department of State and Foreign Operations appropriation bill. In addition, funding for some multilateral efforts, such as the World Bank Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) Trust Fund, is provided through annual appropriations to the Treasury Department. U.S. international food aid programs are administered by USAID and USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), as authorized by the 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-246), and are funded through annual Agriculture appropriation bills.
For FY2010, the Administration allocated about $1.31 billion to its Feed the Future (FtF) initiative, which included $1.17 billion for bilateral agricultural development programming, $75 million for nutrition-related activities carried out in collaboration with global health initiatives, and $67 million allocated to the World Bank GAFSP. Separately, in FY2010, about $1.84 billion was allocated to Title II activities under the Food for Peace program, $209.5 million for the McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program, and $300 million from the International Disaster Assistance account at USAID for other emergency food assistance activities including safety net programs, cash vouchers, and local and regional procurement.
The FY2011 congressional budget justification for the Department of State and Foreign Operations was the first instance in which the Administration requested funds specifically to implement FtF. The Administration's FY2011 budget request included $1.84 billion for FtF-related activities, which was more than a 40% increase in the FY2010 allocation, primarily due to a $408 million request for the World Bank GAFSP Trust Fund. On April 14, 2011, Congress passed a continuing resolution to provide government-wide funding through the end of FY2011 (P.L. 112-10). The FY2011 CR provided allocations only to primary USAID budget accounts, several of which, such as Development Assistance, the Economic Support Fund, and the Global Health and Child Survival accounts at USAID, received decreases in funding relative to FY2010 levels. At the same time, the final FY2011 CR did not include specific allocations from USAID budget accounts for food security-related activities, so the implications of the FY2011 budget-level changes on the funding and programming for the Feed the Future initiative remain uncertain. The final FY2011 CR also included $1.5 billion for Title II Food for Peace food aid programs and $199.5 million for the McGovern-Dole Food for Education program.
The Administration's FY2012 request includes $1.56 billion for the FtF initiative, about $250 million, or 19%, more than the amount allocated in FY2010. This includes $1.1 billion in bilateral agricultural development assistance, $150 million for nutrition-related activities, and a U.S. contribution of $308 million to the World Bank GAFSP. Separately, for FY2012, the Administration is also requesting $1.690 billion for Food for Peace Title II emergency and non-emergency food aid, $200.5 million for the McGovern-Dole Food for Education Program, and $300 million of International Disaster Assistance for emergency food security-related activities. |
crs_R42728 | crs_R42728_0 | The conflict of interest provisions applicable after one leaves government service to enter private employment are often referred to as "revolving door" laws. It restricts or regulates private "representational," lobbying, and other advocacy type activities. Section 207 of title 18 provides a series of post-employment restrictions on "representational" activities for executive branch personnel when they leave government service, including (1) a lifetime ban on "switching sides" on a matter involving specific parties on which any executive branch employee had worked personally and substantially while with the government; (2) a two-year ban on "switching sides" on a somewhat broader range of matters which were under the employee's official responsibility; (3) a one-year restriction on assisting others on certain trade or treaty negotiations; (4) a one-year "cooling off" period for certain "senior" officials barring representational communications before their former departments or agencies; (5) a two-year "cooling" period for "very senior" officials barring representational communications to and attempts to influence certain other high ranking officials in the entire executive branch of government; and (6) a one-year ban on certain officials in performing some representational or advisory activities for foreign governments or foreign political parties. "Very Senior" Officials: Two-Year "Cooling Off" Period
The restrictions of 18 U.S.C. Presidential and Vice-Presidential "Appointees" in Obama Administration
President Obama issued an executive order on January 21, 2009, which places two additional post-employment, "revolving door" restrictions on all full-time, non-career presidential or vice presidential appointees in the executive branch, including non-career SES appointees and appointees to positions in the excepted service which are of a confidential and policy-making nature (such as Schedule C appointees). §1602(3)), or any non-career SES appointee, for the remainder of the entire Obama Administration. Section 207(c)(1), whereby such former officials may not lobby or make advocacy communications to certain officials in their former agencies and departments, must now abide by such "cooling off" period for two years. These additional restrictions go beyond the prohibitions on merely "representational," lobbying, or advocacy activities on behalf of private entities before the government, and extend also to any compensated activity for or on behalf of certain private contractors for a period of time after a former procurement official had worked on certain contracts for the government. Executive Branch
In addition to the general reporting of negotiations under the STOCK Act by certain high-level officials, all federal employees in the executive branch who are seeking private employment may also incur restrictions on the performance of their current duties for the government under other provisions of federal law. The principal federal conflict of interest law, which is a criminal provision at 18 U.S.C. Members of the House of Representatives, as well as "senior" legislative branch employees, are now subject to a one-year "cooling off" or "no contact" period after they leave congressional office or employment. 2. Representing Foreign Governments
Members of Congress, and those "senior" legislative branch employees who are covered by the one-year "cooling off" periods, are also prohibited for a year after leaving office or employment from representing an official foreign entity before the United States, or aiding or advising such entity with intent to influence any decision of an agency or employee of any agency or department of the U.S. government. | Federal personnel may be subject to certain conflict of interest restrictions on private employment activities even after they leave service for the United States government. These restrictions—applicable when one enters private employment after having left federal government service—are often referred to as "revolving door" laws. For the most part, other than the narrow restrictions specific to procurement officials or bank examiners, these laws restrict only certain representational types of activities for private employers, such as lobbying or advocacy directed to, and which attempt to influence, current federal officials.
Under federal conflict of interest law, at 18 U.S.C. Section 207, federal employees in the executive branch of government are restricted in performing certain post-employment "representational" activities for private parties, including (1) a lifetime ban on "switching sides," that is, representing a private party on the same "particular matter" involving identified parties on which the former executive branch employee had worked personally and substantially for the government; (2) a two-year ban on "switching sides" on a somewhat broader range of matters which were under the employee's official responsibility; (3) a one-year restriction on assisting others on certain trade or treaty negotiations; (4) a one-year "cooling off" period for certain "senior" officials barring representational communications to and attempts to influence persons in their former departments or agencies; (5) a new two-year "cooling off" period for "very senior" officials barring representational communications to and attempts to influence certain other high-ranking officials in the entire executive branch of government; and (6) a one-year ban on certain former high-level officials performing certain representational or advisory activities for foreign governments or foreign political parties.
In the legislative branch, this law applies the one-year "cooling off" period, as well as the restrictions on representations on behalf of official foreign entities and assistance in trade negotiations, to Members of the House and to senior legislative staff. United States Senators are subject to a two-year "cooling off" period in which they may not lobby Congress after leaving the Senate.
"Procurement personnel" in federal agencies are not only limited in their post-employment representational, lobbying, or advocacy activities on behalf of private entities after leaving government service, but they are also prohibited from receiving compensation from certain private contractors for a period of time after being responsible for procurement action on certain large contracts as government officials. Procurement personnel also have additional rules on reporting "contacts" from prospective employers who are government contractors.
The provisions of an executive order issued by President Obama on January 21, 2009, impose stricter limits on certain executive branch personnel. Full time, non-career presidential and vice-presidential appointees, including non-career appointees in the Senior Executive Service, and excepted service confidential, policy-making appointees, are barred after leaving the Administration from "lobbying" any executive branch official "covered" by the Lobbying Disclosure Act (2 U.S.C. §1602(3)), or any non-career SES appointee, for the remainder of the Administration. Additionally, all appointees who are "senior" officials subject to the statutory one-year "cooling off" period on lobbying and advocacy communications to their former agencies must now abide by such "cooling off" period for two years. |
crs_R41522 | crs_R41522_0 | One of those companies, Spain-based Repsol, is expected to start exploratory drilling in early 2012. Finally, the report examines legislative initiatives that have been advanced to deal with Cuba's offshore oil development. The USGS estimates that the offshore North Cuba Basin could contain an additional 4.6 billion barrels of undiscovered technically recoverable crude oil resources, as well as 0.9 billion barrels of natural gas liquids and 9.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. In its current project, Repsol leads a consortium which also includes Norway's NOC, Statoil, and India's NOC, the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC). If oil is found, some experts estimate that companies would have to invest in developing production capacity for at least three to five years before production could begin. Risks that Oil Spilled in Cuban Waters Reaches the United States
If an oil spill were to occur in the waters northwest of Cuba, currents in the Florida Straits could carry that oil to U.S. waters and coastal areas in southern and south eastern Florida. (See " Oil Spill Preparedness and Response " below for a discussion of U.S. policy related to preparedness and response in the event of an oil spill.) Waters
If significant quantities of oil did reach U.S. waters, risks to the marine and coastal resources of Southern Florida could be of particular concern. Oil Spill Preparedness and Response
In light of oil spill concerns, there has been increased congressional and public interest on the status of oil spill preparedness and response and coordination between Cuba and the United States. A number of analysts and policy groups have been encouraging U.S.-Cuban engagement on the issue, while some policy groups maintain that the United States should focus on preventing Cuba from engaging in offshore oil exploration altogether. The Obama Administration has been making efforts to prepare for a potential oil spill in Cuban waters that could affect the United States. With Cuba's movement toward developing its offshore oil resources so close to the United States, some analysts have called for more institutionalized or formal U.S.-Cuban cooperation and planning to minimize potential damage from an oil spill. The final report of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, issued in January 2011, maintained that since Mexico already drills in the Gulf of Mexico and Cuba has expressed an interest in deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, that it is in the U.S. national interest to negotiate with these countries to agree on a common, rigorous set of standards, a system of regulatory oversight, and operator adherence to an effective safety culture, along with protocols to cooperate on containment and response strategies in case of a spill. This would require recommendations on a joint contingency plan with Mexico, Cuba, and the Bahamas. The report maintains: that it would help reduce Cuba's dependence on Venezuela for its oil imports; that it would increase U.S. influence in Cuba if U.S. companies had a significant presence in the county; that U.S. companies have the expertise to develop Cuba's offshore oil and gas in a safe and responsible manner; and that it is preferable to have U.S. companies involved because they have higher standards of transparency than some foreign oil companies. 5620 , would have gone further by imposing visa restrictions and economic sanctions on foreign companies and their executives who help facilitate the development of Cuba's petroleum resources. Another approach, reflected by S. 405 , would impose requirements on companies conducting hydrocarbon operations off the coast of Cuba if the companies also wanted leases for oil and gas development in U.S. waters, and would also require the development and implementation of oil spill response plans for nondomestic oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico, including a joint contingency plan with Mexico, Cuba, and the Bahamas. 111th Congress
In the 111 th Congress, legislative initiatives reflected two contrasting policy approaches toward Cuba's development of its offshore oil reserves. H.R. 372 (Buchanan), introduced January 26, 2011, would amend the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to deny oil and gas leases and permits "to persons who engage in activities with the government of any foreign country that is subject to any sanction or an embargo" by the U.S. government. H.R. H.R. U.S. officials have also engaged with Repsol, and will be inspecting the oil rig before it enters Cuban waters. | Cuba is moving toward development of its offshore oil resources. While the country has proven oil reserves of just 0.1 billion barrels, the U.S. Geological Survey estimates that offshore reserves in the North Cuba Basin could contain an additional 4.6 billion barrels of undiscovered technically recoverable crude oil. The Spanish oil company Repsol, in a consortium with Norway's Statoil and India's Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, is expected to begin offshore exploratory drilling in early 2012, and several other companies are considering such drilling. At present, Cuba has six offshore projects with foreign oil companies. If oil is found, some experts estimate that it would take at least three to five years before production would begin.
In the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, some Members of Congress and others have expressed concern about Cuba's development of its deepwater petroleum reserves so close to the United States. They are concerned about oil spill risks and about the status of preparedness and coordination in the event of an oil spill. Dealing with these challenges is made more difficult because of the long-standing poor state of relations between Cuba and the United States. If an oil spill did occur in the waters northwest of Cuba, currents in the Florida Straits could carry the oil to U.S. waters and coastal areas in Florida, although a number of factors would determine the potential environmental impact. If significant amounts of oil did reach U.S. waters, marine and coastal resources in southern Florida could be at risk.
The Obama Administration has been making efforts to prepare for a potential oil spill in Cuban waters that could affect the United States. This has included: updating oil spill area contingency plans covering Florida and developing a broader offshore drilling response plan; engaging with Repsol over its oil spill response plans (including plans to inspect the oil rig that Repsol will use); and licensing U.S. companies to provide personnel and export equipment needed for oil spill preparedness and response. Some energy and policy analysts have called for the Administration to ease regulatory restrictions on the transfer of U.S. equipment and personnel to Cuba for oil spill preparedness and response. Some have also called for direct U.S.-Cuban government cooperation to minimize potential oil spill damage, looking at U.S. cooperation with Mexico as a potential model as well as information sharing and cooperation through multilateral channels under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization. In contrast, some policy groups call for the United States to focus on preventing Cuba from engaging in offshore oil exploration altogether.
In the 112th Congress, five legislative initiatives have been introduced taking varying approaches toward Cuba's offshore oil development, and there have been two oversight hearings. H.R. 372 would authorize the Secretary of the Interior to deny oil leases and permits to those companies that engage in activities with the government of any foreign country subject to any U.S. government sanction or embargo. S. 405, among its provisions, would require the development of oil spill response plans for nondomestic oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico, including recommendations for a joint contingency plan with Mexico, Cuba, and the Bahamas. H.R. 2047 would impose visa restrictions on foreign nationals and economic sanctions on companies that help facilitate the development of Cuba's offshore petroleum resources. S. 1836 and H.R. 3393 would provide that foreign offshore oil developers would be liable for damages from oil spills that enter U.S. waters.
This report is current through November 2011. For further developments and the final status of legislative initiatives discussed in this report, see CRS Report R41617, Cuba: Issues for the 112th Congress. |
crs_R44482 | crs_R44482_0 | M ore than two dozen legislative proposals in the 114 th Congress included provisions concerning water use efficiency, or water conservation. These legislative proposals did not seek to set specific enforceable water use efficiency standards or goals. Rather, most sought to encourage or provide incentives for practices, technologies, and measures to achieve improved water use efficiency. Many of the water use efficiency proposals also had been introduced in previous Congresses, but did not advance. The 114 th Congress legislation can be broadly grouped in five categories of proposals, which are described in this report. A few bills passed the Senate or House, and one measure that addressed water use efficiency in part (i.e., water use in buildings) was enacted. Codifying the WaterSense Program
WaterSense is a voluntary labeling and recognition program created by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2006 as a companion to Energy Star, which is a similar program administered by EPA and the Department of Energy (DOE). Bills to establish WaterSense in law included the following. Underlying these provisions is concern that there is need for more and better data on water use that would assist decisionmaking by government, water managers, communities, and the private sector. Water Use Efficiency in Buildings
Buildings are estimated to account for approximately 13% of total water consumed in the United States per day. It is sometimes argued that, on matters of policy, the federal government should lead by example. Several bills in the 114 th Congress addressed aspects of water use efficiency in federal buildings. Financial and Technical Assistance
The largest number of water use efficiency bills in the 114 th Congress proposed to provide technical and financial assistance for adopting or demonstrating practices or measures that conserve water. A number of the bills proposed to assist owners and operators of public water systems and water utilities in adopting or installing water-efficient systems, while a few proposed to help provide incentives for consumers to purchase and install water-efficient products or services. Two bills that addressed the western U.S. drought ( S. 1837 and H.R. Tax Incentives
The final category of bills in the 114 th Congress proposed to use the federal tax code to provide incentives for improved water use efficiency. 4615 ) proposed to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide that rebates or other types of financial incentives received for installing water conservation measures are exempt from federal taxation. Some of the policy approaches described in this report were included in bills that addressed multiple aspects of water use efficiency. In other proposals, water use efficiency was one of a number of issues, but not the main issue, contained in comprehensive policy proposals on topics such as energy policy (e.g., H.R. | More than two dozen legislative proposals in the 114th Congress were introduced that included provisions concerning water use efficiency, or water conservation, in nonagricultural sectors. These legislative proposals did not seek to set specific enforceable water use efficiency standards or goals. Rather, most sought to encourage or provide incentives for adoption of practices, technologies, and measures to achieve improved water use efficiency.
The 114th Congress legislation can be broadly grouped in five categories of proposals.
Codifying the WaterSense program. WaterSense is a voluntary labeling and recognition program that seeks to help consumers and businesses identify highly water-efficient products, services, and homes. It was established administratively by the Environmental Protection Agency in 2006. Nine legislative measures included provisions to establish the program in law. Research and development. Several bills focused on research and development aspects of water use efficiency, including proposals that addressed needs for more and better water use data. Research also is examining technology advances in water and wastewater treatment facilities that would achieve water and energy savings. Water use efficiency in buildings. Buildings are estimated to account for about 13% of total water consumed in the United States; one-quarter of that total is used by commercial buildings, and three-quarters by residences. It is sometimes argued that the federal government should lead by example. Thus, several bills in the 114th Congress addressed aspects of water use efficiency in federal buildings. Financial and technical assistance. The largest number of bills in the 114th Congress proposed to provide technical and financial assistance for identifying, adopting, or demonstrating practices or measures that conserve water. A number of the bills proposed to assist owners and operators of public water systems and water utilities in adopting or installing water-efficient systems, while a few proposed to help provide incentives for consumers to purchase and install water-efficient products or services. Federal tax incentives. Several bills proposed to use the federal tax code to provide incentives for adopting or installing equipment or practices to save water, such as a federal tax credit for purchasing qualified equipment or federal tax exemption of rebates or other financial incentives received for installing water conservation measures.
Some of the policy approaches described in this report were included in bills that addressed multiple aspects of water use efficiency alone, such as WaterSense and financial assistance. In other proposals, water use efficiency was one of a number of issues, but not the main issue, contained in a comprehensive policy proposal on topics such as energy policy, water policy generally, or solutions to the western U.S. drought. A few of the bills discussed here passed the Senate or House during the 114th Congress, and one measure that addressed water use efficiency in part (i.e., water use in buildings) was enacted. Many of these proposals also were introduced in previous Congresses. |
crs_98-201 | crs_98-201_0 | 105-277 , H.R. Contained within the measure was $55.9 billion in regular FY1999appropriations for the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and related agencies and an additional $5.9 billioninemergency supplemental spending for farm economic and disaster assistance. 2. FY1999 Agriculture Appropriations Action
The conference agreement on the FY1999 omnibus appropriations bill ( P.L. 4328 ) wassignedinto law on October 21, 1998. The measure contains $55.9 billion in regular FY1999 appropriations for USDAand relatedagencies and $5.9 billion in emergency funding to help farmers recover from natural disasters and low crop prices. The House and Senate earlier had approved a separate conference agreement for FY1999 USDA appropriations ( H.R. Republican leadership opposed any increase in loan rates, but instead agreed to an increase in the amount of emergencyfarm assistance provided from $4.2 billion in the vetoed bill ( H.R. 4101 ) to $5.9 billion in P.L. Abudget emergency was declared for this amount, which by definition requires no budgetary offsets for the newspending. 105-277 isabout equal to the House-passed level of H.R. 4101 , $1.3 billion below the Senate-passed level( S. 2159 ), and nearly $3 billion below the Administration request. Of this amount, $42.25 billion is formandatory programs and $13.69 billion for discretionary spending. Total non-emergency budget authority in P.L. 105-277 for USDA and related agencies is significantly higher than the$49.55 billion appropriated in FY1998, which is mainly attributable to a change in the formula for determining howmuchis required to reimburse the Commodity Credit Corporation for its net realized losses. Included in the final total of $5.9 billion in emergency farm assistance provided by P.L. Of this amount $2.857 billion are for grain and cotton farmers who wereeligiblefor a 1998 production flexibility contract payment, and $200 million is reserved for dairy farmers. A provision not included in the conference agreement, but strongly supported by the Administration and Senate Democraticleadership during the debate, was a temporary increase in the loan rate (price guarantees) for certain farmcommodities.One attempt to raise the loan rates for grains and cotton was defeated during Senate floor action on S. 2159 . P.L.105-277 waives the statute of limitations on civil rights cases for eligible complaints made during the period January1,1981 through December 31, 1996. 105-277 contains a House-adoptedprovision that requires USDA to issue its final rule for federal milk marketing order reform between February 1,and April4, 1999, and extend the deadline for implementation from April 4, 1999 to October 1, 1999. H.R. Agricultural Trade Sanctions. For FY1999, the Administration proposed a total budget authority of $967 million for P.L. 4101 . 105-277 includes provisions found in the original House- or Senate-passed versions of the bill, including earmarks of:
$16.2 million in technical assistance for water and sewer funding;
$5.3 million for the circuit rider program;
$33.9 million for assistance to empowerment zones and enterprise communities (EZ/EC);
$500,000 in transportation related technical assistance; and . The Act in effect prohibits the spending of the $60 million that isauthorized forthe program in FY1999. 4101 . 105-277 provides $272.1 million in FY1999 for commodity donation programs -- the emergency food assistance program(EFAP),the commodity supplemental food program (CSFP), the elderly nutrition (commodities) program, and the NeedyFamilyprogram. | The conference agreement on the FY1999 omnibus appropriations bill ( P.L. 105-277 / H.R. 4328 ) was signedinto law on October 21, 1998. The measure contains $55.9 billion in regular FY1999 appropriations for the U.S.Department of Agriculture and related agencies and $5.9 billion in emergency disaster and economic assistance foragriculture, for a total of $61.8 billion. The House and Senate earlier had approved a separate conference agreementforFY1999 USDA appropriations ( H.R. 4101 ), but the President vetoed the measure because its emergencyprovisions did not authorize an increase in the loan rates, or farm price guarantees, for growers of certain crops.
Republican leadership strongly opposed any increases in the loan rates, but instead agreed to increase the total level ofdirect farm assistance from the $4.2 billion provided in the vetoed version of H.R. 4101 , to $5.9 billion in P.L.105-277 . A budget emergency was declared for this amount, which by definition requires no budgetary offsets forthe newspending. The $5.9 billion in emergency funding includes: $3.057 billion in "market loss" payments, of which$2.857billion is for grain and cotton farmers and $200 million for dairy farmers; $1.5 billion for 1998 crop loss payments;$875million for farmers affected by multiple years of disasters; $200 million in livestock feed assistance; and $31 milliontocover the cost of making or guaranteeing $440 million in additional farm operating loans.
The $55.9 billion in regular USDA and related agencies appropriations for FY1999 in P.L. 105-277 is about equal to theHouse-passed level ( H.R. 4101 ), $1.2 billion below the Senate-passed level ( S. 2159 ), and $2.1billion below the Administration request. Of this amount, $42.25 billion is for mandatory programs and $13.69billion fordiscretionary spending. Even excluding the additional emergency aid spending, total budget authority is significantlyhigherthan the $49.5 billion appropriated in FY1998, mainly because of a change in the formula for determining howmuch isrequired to reimburse the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) for its net realized losses. In order to stay within thediscretionary spending allocation for the bill, P.L. 105-277 either limits or eliminates FY1999 funding for severalmandatory programs. It prohibits the spending of any of the $60 million authorized for FY1999 for the Fund forRuralAmerica, and reduces spending for commodities in the Emergency Food Assistance Program (EFAP) by $10million. Thelaw also concurs with a House provision to prohibit the FY1999 spending ($120 million) for a new mandatoryagriculturalresearch program; restrict the amount of acreage that can be enrolled in the Wetlands Reserve Program; and limitpaymentsin the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP).
P.L. 105-277 also extends the statutory deadline for federal milk marketing order reform from April 4 to October 9, 1999;waives the statute of limitations on certain civil rights complaints against USDA; modifies eligibility for farm loans; and makes additional changes to trade sanction policy. A House provision to prohibit FDA from approving the abortiondrugRU-486 was deleted in conference on H.R. 4101 , after the President threatened a veto if the provision wasincluded.
Key Policy Staff
Division abbreviations: ENR = Environment and Natural Resources; GOV = Government; STM = Science,Technology,and Medicine; ECON= Economics Division. |
crs_RL31960 | crs_RL31960_0 | Introduction
Four and a half months after announcing his decision to vaccinate military personnel and front-line civilianhealth workers against smallpox, 3 months after the vaccination program officiallybegan, and 7 weeks after Senator Gregg introduced the administration smallpox vaccine injurycompensation proposal, President George W. Bush, on April 30, 2003, signed the SmallpoxEmergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003 ( P.L. Compensation had emerged as a major obstacle to the implementation of the Administration's smallpox vaccination program soon after it began. The Public Safety Officers' Benefits Act ( P.L. This report includes details of H.R. The Secretary ofHealth and Human Services will establish regulations and will run the compensation program. The program will pay lost employment income compensation inaddition to payment for covered medical care, but survivors cannot receive both lost income anddeath benefits. (Knowing the chain of contact would be important,however, for public health reasons.) 108-20 addresses compensation of health care and emergency workers who volunteer and receive smallpox vaccine-related injuries resulting from an HHS Secretary's declaration of the needto prepare for bioterrorist actions. | Four and a half months after announcing his decision to vaccinate military personnel and front-line civilian health workers against smallpox, President George W. Bush, on April 30, 2003, signedthe Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003 ( P.L. 108-20 ). Under the new law, thefederal government will provide -- to eligible individuals (or their survivors), for covered injuries-- payment for related medical care, lost employment income, and death benefits.
Compensation had emerged as a major obstacle to the successful implementation of the Administration's smallpox vaccination program. Worker groups, public health experts, and otherscited the lack of a clear and comprehensive compensation program as a primary reason for the lowerthan expected volunteer vaccination rate among health care workers.
The enacted legislation is modeled after the Public Safety Officers' Benefits Program. It provides for compensation of individuals injured by vaccinations given as part of a countermeasureplan declared by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in preparation for potential hostileactivities involving the smallpox virus.
This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_RL34094 | crs_RL34094_0 | Introduction1
State measures, media attention, and a recent Senate committee hearing have brought attention to the issue of pharmaceutical companies' gifts and payments to physicians. This report first discusses the arguments for and against a federal requirement that pharmaceutical companies disclose gifts and payments. Finally, it analyzes potential legal hurdles to a federal disclosure requirement. Groups opposing a federal disclosure provision argue that disclosure is unnecessary because existing guidelines within the medical and pharmaceutical-marketing professions discourage unethical behavior. State Disclosure Measures
Legislation requiring pharmaceutical companies to disclose gifts and payments to physicians is already in effect in Maine, Minnesota, Vermont, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. The state laws are fairly similar; they all require disclosure on an annual basis and exempt certain categories of gifts and payments. Also, although the methods differ, all states provide for dissemination of the disclosed information to the public or to state legislatures. Legal Analysis of a Federal Disclosure Requirement
If Congress were to enact a federal disclosure requirement, it would likely survive judicial scrutiny. Specifically, pharmaceutical companies might argue that mandatory disclosure of gifts and payments to physicians violates their First Amendment freedoms of speech and association. A federal provision would likely survive a compelled speech challenge. Mandatory disclosure of gifts and payments to physicians appears reasonably related to potential governmental interests, such as transparency and patient protection. Even if a court found that the pharmaceutical company-physician relationship constituted an "association" such that it triggered right of association claims under the First Amendment, it is unlikely that a court would find that a disclosure law violated privacy of association rights because the Court has upheld disclosure laws against freedom of association challenges in other contexts. Senator Herb Kohl and others have indicated support for the introduction of federal legislation that would require pharmaceutical companies to disclose gifts and payments made to physicians, arguing that such a measure is necessary in order to prevent a negative result for health care cost and quality. Most state laws exempt certain categories of gifts from the reporting requirements, including product samples intended for free distribution to patients and gifts worth less than a specified amount. | A recent Senate hearing, state efforts, and media attention have brought the issue of pharmaceutical companies' gifts and payments to physicians into focus. Pharmaceutical companies sometimes give gifts or make payments to doctors as part of their marketing efforts. Senator Herb Kohl has expressed interest in introducing a federal bill that would mandate disclosure of such gifts and payments. This report briefly outlines the arguments for and against a federal disclosure measure. Next, it describes the state disclosure laws already in effect. Finally, it analyzes potential legal hurdles to a federal disclosure requirement.
Proponents of disclosure express concern that gifts and payments from pharmaceutical companies increase prescription drug costs and create incentives for physicians that obscure patients' best interests; they argue that disclosure would alleviate those problems by providing transparency. Opponents of disclosure emphasize the educational benefits that marketing provides; in addition, they argue that disclosure is unnecessary because existing professional codes, such as American Medical Association guidelines, discourage pharmaceutical representatives and physicians from engaging in unethical behavior.
Several states and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation requiring pharmaceutical companies to disclose gifts and payments made to physicians. The state laws require disclosure to the states of such gifts and payments on an annual basis. Certain categories of gifts and payments are exempted from reporting requirements under most of the state laws. For example, nearly all of the laws exempt product samples intended for free distribution to patients and gifts worth less than a certain amount. The state laws also provide for dissemination to the public or state legislatures of information disclosed pursuant to the laws.
If a federal disclosure requirement was enacted and subsequently challenged, it appears likely to survive judicial scrutiny on First Amendment grounds. If pharmaceutical companies challenged a federal disclosure measure, they would likely argue that it violates their First Amendment rights of freedom of speech or association. However, governmental interests, for example in transparency or patient protection, might be sufficient to survive the applicable tests under compelled speech, restricted speech, and private association precedents. |
crs_R42378 | crs_R42378_0 | The Social Security Act addresses some of the health care needs of children in foster care—through provisions in titles pertaining to child welfare (Titles IV-B and IV-E) and those in the title pertaining to the Medicaid program (Title XIX). Effective January 1, 2014, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. As many as one-half to three-fourths show behavioral or social competency problems that may warrant mental health services. In addition, states must develop a strategy that addresses the health care needs of each child in foster care including, among other things, health care screenings and oversight of prescription medicines. States must also ensure that young people aging out of foster care are provided a copy of their health records, and information about health insurance options and designating other individuals to make health care decisions on their behalf in the event that they are unable to do so. Unlike most Medicaid eligibility pathways, eligibility for former foster youth who aged out of care must be provided without regard to the youths' income and assets. The Supreme Court's ruling effectively allows states to choose whether or not to provide Medicaid coverage to this new eligibility group. The ACA made additional changes outside of Medicaid to assist childless adults and children and their families (e.g., children in foster care who are vulnerable to losing Medicaid upon returning home) in obtaining and maintaining Medicaid eligibility, and in obtaining private health insurance. Other research has found that young adults who aged out of foster care at age 18 or soon thereafter were more likely than their peers generally to report having a health condition that limits their daily activities and to participate in psychological and substance abuse counseling. Finally, under the Chafee Foster Care Independence Program (Section 477, Title IV-E of the Social Security Act) state child welfare agencies receive funds to provide independent living services—such as mentoring, tutoring, substance abuse prevention, and preventive health services—to youth who are expected to age out of foster care (without placement in a new permanent family), those who have recently aged out, and those who left foster care for adoption or kinship guardianship at age 16 or older. Child Welfare Policies Addressing the Health Care Needs of Children in Foster Care and Those Aging Out of Foster Care
As a condition of receiving federal funds dedicated to child welfare purposes, states must meet federal requirements related to planning for and administering services to children and families, and they must provide certain protections for children in foster care. Child welfare policy does not permit states to use federal child welfare program funds (under Title IV-B or Title IV-E) to pay medical expenses of children in care or those who leave foster care due to their age. Health Care Records
Federal law requires that the state child welfare agency have a written plan for each child in foster care, including certain health-related records. Additionally states are not permitted to require mandatory enrollment of these children in Medicaid ABPs. Under fee-for-service, state Medicaid agencies pay providers directly for each covered service received by the Medicaid beneficiary. Overall Medicaid Service Spending for "Foster Care" Children
For FY2010, the most recent year for which data were available for this analysis from all states, state Medicaid agencies reported spending $5.754 billion on services for children in foster care. Notably, four pathways are specifically available for this population—a mandatory pathway for children if they qualify for the Title IV-E program (whether in foster care or after leaving foster care for adoption or legal guardianship); an optional pathway for certain children who are adopted (primarily from foster care) and who receive adoption assistance funded wholly by the state; as of January 1, 2014, a mandatory pathway for young adults up to the age of 26 who "aged out" of foster care at age 18 (or 19, 20, or 21 years of age if the state extends federal foster care to that older age); and an optional pathway for "independent foster care adolescents" up to the age of 21 who were in foster care at age 18. ACA Income Counting Rule, Protections for Children, and Exemptions
The ACA established the Modified Adjusted Gross Income (MAGI) income counting rule, which draws on federal income tax rules to establish uniform standards for what income to include or disregard in determining Medicaid eligibility for most non-elderly and non-disabled people. In transitioning to the new income counting rule, states were required to establish income eligibility thresholds no less than the effective income eligibility levels that were applicable in the state on the date of enactment of the ACA (i.e., March 23, 2010). These eligibility pathways are subject to MAGI income counting rules. Finally, children in care, including those who are age 18, may also be eligible under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) eligibility pathway for certain individuals (any age) with severe disabilities. Optional Pathways
A child in foster care who is not eligible for a mandatory pathway may be covered under several optional Medicaid eligibility groups. Some states reported having explicit definitions of what it means to be in care on a youth's 18 th birthday. Families of Children Entering Foster Care
The ACA may also provide greater opportunities for a child welfare agency to provide mental health or other Medicaid-supported services to the parents of children entering foster care. | Approximately 641,000 children spend some time in foster care each year. Most enter care because they have experienced neglect or abuse by their parents. Between 35% and 60% of children entering foster care have at least one chronic or acute physical health condition that needs treatment. As many as one-half to three-fourths show behavioral or social competency problems that may warrant mental health services. A national survey of children adopted from foster care found that 54% had special health care needs. Research on youth who aged out of foster care shows these young adults are more likely than their peers to report having a health condition that limits their daily activities and to participate in psychological and substance abuse counseling.
The Social Security Act addresses some of the health care needs of children in, or formerly in, foster care through provisions in the titles pertaining to child welfare (Titles IV-B and IV-E) and to the Medicaid program (Title XIX). Under child welfare law, state child welfare agencies are required to have a written plan for each child in foster care that includes, among other items, the child's regularly reviewed and updated health-related records. In addition, state child welfare agencies, in cooperation with state Medicaid agencies, must develop a strategy that addresses the health care needs of each child in foster care. Upon aging out of foster care, youth must receive from the state child welfare agency a copy of their health record and information about health insurance options and designating other individuals to make health care decisions on their behalf if they are unable to do so on their own.
States are not permitted to use federal child welfare program funds to pay medical expenses of children in care or those who left foster care due to their age or placement in a new permanent family. However, states can (and do) receive federal support through Medicaid to pay a part of the medical expenses, including well-child visits, dental care, and other services for many of these children and youth. In FY2010, the most recent year for which these data were available from all states, Medicaid agencies reported spending $5.754 billion to provide services to foster care children. Most of this Medicaid services spending was provided on a fee-for-services basis (82%) with the remainder provided through managed care arrangements.
Most children in foster care are eligible for Medicaid under mandatory eligibility pathways, meaning that states must provide coverage because these children receive assistance under the Title IV-E program, or, because they meet other eligibility criteria such as low income, or receipt of Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Children in foster care who are not eligible under mandatory pathways generally qualify for Medicaid because the state has implemented one or more optional eligibility categories allowing coverage. Further, children who leave foster care for legal guardianship and nearly all children with state-defined "special needs" who leave foster care for adoption retain mandatory eligibility for Medicaid provided they receive Title IV-E assistance. Additionally, special needs adoptees who receive state-funded support may also be eligible under an optional Medicaid eligibility pathway specifically for them.
Separately, as of January 1, 2014, states are required to continue Medicaid coverage to youth who age out of foster care on their 18th (or later) birthday. This Medicaid coverage was added to the law by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended), must be available until the youth reaches age 26, and unlike most Medicaid pathways must be provided without regard to the youth's income and assets. This new pathway for youth who age out of care without return to their parents or placement with a new permanent family parallels another ACA requirement that directs health insurance companies to continue coverage of children up to age 26 who are enrolled in their parents' private health care plans. Additionally, under a separate eligibility pathway states continue to have the option of providing Medicaid to youth aging out of foster care (up to the age of 21). Under this optional pathway, and unlike the newer mandatory pathway, a youth does not need to have received Medicaid while in foster care to be eligible for the coverage.
Effective January 1, 2014, the ACA established the Modified Adjusted Gross Income (MAGI) income counting rule. MAGI draws on federal income tax rules (with certain revisions defined in Medicaid law and regulation) to establish uniform standards for what income to include or disregard in determining Medicaid eligibility for most non-elderly and non-disabled people. In transitioning to the new MAGI income counting rule, states were required to establish income eligibility thresholds no less than the effective income eligibility levels that were applicable in the state on the date of enactment of the ACA (i.e., March 23, 2010). In addition to this transition policy, several additional protections ensure that children in, or formerly in, foster care retain eligibility under the new counting rules.
The ACA made additional changes to assist adults in obtaining private health insurance, and young adults leaving foster care may benefit from these changes. The ACA may also include new opportunities for providing health insurance to child welfare-involved children and their families, such as those children in foster care who are vulnerable to losing Medicaid upon returning home. |
crs_R41870 | crs_R41870_0 | 2551 ), no further action was taken before the beginning of FY2012. Division G of the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( H.R. 2055 , P.L. 112-74 ), which was enacted on December 23, 2011, provided $4.307 billion in discretionary funding for the legislative branch. 112-10 ) provided $4.54 billion for legislative branch activities for FY2011. The FY2011 level represented a decrease of nearly 3% from the $4.66 billion provided for FY2010. From October 1, 2010, until the enactment of this legislation on April 11, 2011, the legislative branch operated on continuing resolutions. H.Res. Section 1902 of P.L. Previously, the FY2010 Legislative Branch Appropriations Act ( P.L. 111-68 ) provided $4.66 billion for FY2010 legislative branch operations, and the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act provided $4.40 billion. In FY2009, an additional $25 million was provided for the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. P.L. Status of FY2012 Appropriations
Action on the FY2012 Legislative Branch Appropriations Bill
Submission of FY2012 Budget Request on February 14, 2011
The FY2012 U.S. Budget submitted on February 14, 2011, contained a request for $4.857 billion in new budget authority for legislative branch activities, an increase of approximately 7% from the FY2011 enacted level. The House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch held a markup on July 7, 2011, and reported the bill to the full committee with no amendments by voice vote. The full committee held its markup on July 13, 2011. The full committee ordered reported a $3.3 billion bill with a roll call vote of 28-19 ( H.R. 2551 , H.Rept. 112-148 ). The total funding level represents a $227 million, or 6.4%, reduction from the FY2011 level (not including Senate items). The House agreed to this rule on July 21, 2011 (Roll no. 4. 5. 6. 8. 11. The House passed the bill, as amended, on July 22 (Roll no. 629, 252-159). 2551 , as amended, on September 15, 2011, by a recorded vote of 28–2 ( S.Rept. The Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. Highlights of the House Hearing on the FY2012 Budget of the House of Representatives
At a hearing on May 12, 2011, the House subcommittee discussed Member and district office security, including costs; expenses for legal services related to the Defense of Marriage Act following Attorney General Eric Holder's February 23, 2011, letter to Speaker John Boehner regarding the President's determination that Section 3 of this act is unconstitutional and the Speaker's March 9, 2011, announcement that the House General Counsel was directed to initiate a legal defense of this law; greening efforts, including functions of the Architect of the Capitol and the use of Styrofoam in the House cafeteria; and the House wounded warrior program and the experiences and long-term employment prospects of its alumni. 111-212 provided an additional $12.96 million in supplemental appropriations. Highlights of the House and Senate Hearings on the FY2012 Budget of the Architect of the Capitol
At a hearing on March 3, 2011, the Senate subcommittee discussed the timing of repairs to the Capitol dome; the completion of the tunnel project, scheduled for 2012; the completion of the radio project; potential savings from a unified legislative branch financial management system; Capitol Power Plant east chiller relocation project; and how the agency would operate under various potential funding cuts. Previously, $45.2 million was provided for FY2010, $44.1 million was provided in the FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, and $2.0 million, to remain available through FY2010, was provided in the FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act ( P.L. 111-32 ). The House-reported bill ( H.R. Previously, P.L. | The legislative branch appropriations bill provides funding for the Senate; House of Representatives; Joint Items; Capitol Police; Office of Compliance; Congressional Budget Office; Architect of the Capitol; Library of Congress, including the Congressional Research Service; Government Printing Office; Government Accountability Office; and Open World.
The legislative branch budget request of $4.857 billion, which is included in the President's budget, was submitted on February 14, 2011. This represents an approximately 7% increase over funds provided for FY2011, although the request was submitted prior to the enactment of the FY2011 appropriations act. The FY2011 act (P.L. 112-10, enacted on April 11, 2011) provided $4.54 billion for legislative branch activities, which represented a decrease of nearly 3% from the $4.66 billion provided for FY2010.
The House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch held a markup on July 7, 2011, which was followed by a full committee markup on July 13. The full committee ordered reported a $3.3 billion bill, H.R. 2551 (H.Rept. 112-148). This total represents a $227 million, or 6.4%, reduction from the FY2011 level. The House agreed to a rule for consideration of the bill (H.Res. 359) on July 21, 2011. The House passed the bill, as amended, on July 22 (Roll no. 629, 252-159).
The Senate Appropriations Committee, by a vote of 28-2, ordered H.R. 2551 reported with amendments on September 15, 2011.
No further action was taken on H.R. 2551. The legislative branch operated under a series of continuing resolutions until the enactment of P.L. 112-74, the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act, on December 23, 2011. Division G of that act provided $4.3 billion for legislative branch activities for FY2012.
The Subcommittees on the Legislative Branch of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees both held hearings during which Members considered the FY2011 legislative branch requests. Among issues that were considered during hearings were the following:
the potential for flat or reduced funding levels, including the effect on agency operations, plans for various budget scenarios, and potential efficiencies; security plans and costs, especially for Members and district offices; the role of the Government Printing Office in the digital age; and status of current Architect of the Capitol projects and timing of renovations.
Previously, P.L. 111-68 (enacted October 1, 2009) provided $4.656 billion for FY2010. The FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-212) provided an additional $12.96 million for the Capitol Police. The FY2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-8, enacted on March 11, 2009) provided $4.4 billion for the legislative branch. In FY2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) provided an additional $25 million for the Government Accountability Office, and the FY2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-32) provided $71.6 million for the Capitol Police and $2 million for the Congressional Budget Office. |
crs_RS21331 | crs_RS21331_0 | Most Recent Developments
The Modified Waters Deliveries Project (Mod Waters) is being implemented by the Department of the Interior (DOI) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in southern Florida. Previously, DOI had solely funded the project. The Administration's position appeared to be for the Corps to pay for roughly two-thirds of the remaining $146 million required to complete the project from FY2007 to FY2009. A provision in the Interior Appropriations Act for FY2006 ( P.L. 109-54 ) conditions funding for Mod Waters on meeting state water quality standards. The completion of Mod Waters is expected to be significant step towards the implementation of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP; Title VI, P.L. A general reevaluation report and environmental impact statement have been prepared for this project. Issues Surrounding the Modified Water Deliveries Project
Three issues are being debated about the implementation of Mod Waters, including its estimated funding level, project delays, and the controversy surrounding land acquisition in the 8.5 SMA. The current estimated cost for completing the project is $398 million. Three conditions are specified in the section authorizing implementation of Alternative 6D: (1) the Corps may acquire residential property needed to carry out Alternative 6D if the owners are first offered comparable property in the 8.5 SMA that will be provided with flood protection; (2) the Corps is authorized to acquire land from willing sellers in the flood-protected portion of the 8.5 SMA to carry out the first condition; and (3) the Corps and the nonfederal sponsor may carry out these provisions with funds provided under the Everglades National Park Protection and Expansion Act of 1989 ( P.L. | The Modified Water Deliveries Project (Mod Waters) is a controversial ecological restoration project in south Florida designed to improve water delivery to Everglades National Park. The implementation schedule of Mod Waters is of interest to Congress partly because its completion is required before the implementation of portions of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan. Concerns have been raised in hearings on the Administration's FY2007 budget request regarding the cost of implementing the project, project delays, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' role in funding the project. Currently, the project is eight years behind schedule and will cost an estimated $400 million to build. Part of the delay is due to extended efforts to acquire land from private and state owners. Federal agencies have used eminent domain to acquire some lands, a process that has been contentious. Further, funding for the project in Interior appropriations acts (FY2004-FY2006) is being conditioned on the State of Florida meeting water quality standards by reducing excessive phosphorus, among other things. This report provides background on Mod Waters and discusses issues relating to its current status, funding, and land acquisition needs. This report will be updated as warranted. |
crs_RL32120 | crs_RL32120_0 | Introduction
The purpose of this report is to provide Congress with an overview of the nature and statusof the designated foreign terrorist organizations list (FTO list), as a potential tool in overseeing theimplementation and effects of U.S. legislation designed as a basis for imposing sanctions onterrorists. The report centers on the list of terrorist groups that are formally designated by theSecretary of State pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. ), as amended under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ( P.L.104-132 ). These groups are often collectively referred to as the "terrorist group list" or "FTO list." (1) Next follows a sectionexplaining the distinctions between the FTO list and other terrorist lists that are maintained by theU.S. The report concludeswith a discussion of potential policy options for Congress, including some of the recently proposedamendments to the legislation that establishes it. This report will be updated as events warrant. Designations last for two years, at which time they may be renewed. (3) Designations normally occur after an involved interagency process; but the Secretary of State makesthe ultimate decision. A variety of different agencies in the Department of Homeland Security are then involved in carryingout immigration sanctions, including deportations. Not the Only U.S. "Terrorist List"
The FTO list is not the only so-called "terrorist list" that the U.S. government keeps. (6) There are a number of others,and it is important to clarify the distinctions among them. (7)
Probably the best known is the "state-sponsors of terrorism" list, which is pursuant to section6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 ( P.L. 96-72 ; 50 U.S.C. app. 2405(j)(asamended)). The "specially designatedterrorists" (SDTs) list was generated pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act( P.L. 95-223 ; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq .). It was initiated under Presidential Executive Order 12947 on25 January 1995 and was specifically oriented toward persons (individuals and entities) who threatento disrupt the Middle East Peace Process. (13)
The SDT, SDGT, state sponsors, and (as of October 2002) FTO lists were placed togetherin a new, larger roster called the "Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons" (SDN) listmaintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Treasury Department. (15)
There is also the so-called "Terrorist Exclusion List" or "TEL," which is pursuant to Section411 of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 ( P.L. The State Department maintains theTEL list. (See Appendix A.) The groups on the FTO list are stigmatized. It is true that the FTO list is generally considered the primarymeans of imposing sanctions against terrorist organizations. (27) Of course, the publicattention and diplomatic leverage that goes along with being on the better-known FTO list is notequalled; however, the point is that in terms of the results with respect to fighting an organization'sactivities, the U.S. sanctions regime is far more complicated than either being "on" the list or "off"the list would imply. | The purpose of this report is to provide Congress with an overview of the nature and statusof the designated foreign terrorist organizations list, as a potential tool in overseeing theimplementation and effects of U.S. legislation designed to sanction terrorists. It centers on the listof terrorist groups that are formally designated by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 219 ofthe Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended under the Antiterrorism and Effective DeathPenalty Act of 1996 ( P.L. 104-132 ). These groups are often collectively referred to as the "FTO list."
FTO list designations, which last for two years and must be renewed, occur after aninteragency process involving the departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security, and theTreasury. Since the designations can be challenged in court, they require a detailed administrativerecord often based on classified information. An organization that is placed on the FTO list issubject to financial and immigration sanctions, potentially including the blocking of assets, theprosecution of supporters who provide funds, refusal of visas, and deportations of members. Therehave been a number of designations and changes since the list was established, but it currentlyincludes thirty-six organizations. (See Appendix A.)
The FTO list is often confused with some of the other "terrorist lists" that are maintained bythe U.S. government. These include the "state-sponsors of terrorism" list, which is pursuant toSection 6(j) of the 1979 Export Administration Act ( P.L. 96-72 ; 50 U.S.C. app. 2405(6)(j)); the"Specially Designated Terrorists" (SDTs) list, which is pursuant to the International EmergencyEconomic Powers Act ( P.L. 95-223 ; 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq .) and was initiated in 1995 underPresidential Executive Order 12947; the "Specially Designated Global Terrorists" (SDGT) list,initiated in 2001 under Presidential Executive Order 13224; and, finally, the "Specially DesignatedNationals and Blocked Persons" (SDN) list, a master list that contains the other lists. All of theseare summarized and maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Treasury Department. Lastly, the "Terrorist Exclusion List" or "TEL," which relates to immigration and is pursuant toSection 411 of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 (8 U.S.C.1182) is maintained by the State Department. Like the FTO list, the TEL includes the names of terrorist organizations, but it has a broader standardfor inclusion, is subject to less stringent administrative requirements, and is not challengeable incourt. There is a complicated interplay among all of these lists, and it is important to distinguishthem from the better-known FTO list.
The FTO list has been of considerable interest to Congress, and there are arguments in favorand against it. It publicly stigmatizes groups and provides a clear focal point for interagencycooperation on terrorist sanctions; however, some argue that it is inflexible and misleading, sincegroups that are not on the list are still often subject to U.S. sanctions. The report concludes with adiscussion of potential policy options for Congress, including some of the recently proposedamendments to the legislation that establishes it. It will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R41436 | crs_R41436_0 | Part D provides optional outpatient prescription drug coverage through private plans. For example, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. Medicare Trust Funds
Medicare's financial operations are accounted for through two trust funds maintained by the Department of the Treasury—the Hospital Insurance (HI) trust fund for Part A and the Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) trust fund for Parts B and D. For beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Advantage (Part C), payments are made on their behalf in appropriate portions from the HI and SMI trust funds. The HI and SMI trust funds are overseen by a Board of Trustees that provides annual reports to Congress. Income from these sources is credited to the SMI trust fund and any SMI revenues that exceed SMI spending accumulate in the SMI trust fund; however, SMI trust fund balances are generally small. Part B Financing
Medicare Part B is financed mostly by federal general revenues, and beneficiary premiums are set at a rate to cover 25% of estimated Part B program costs for the aged. Part D Financing
Medicare Part D is primarily financed through a combination of beneficiary premiums and federal general revenues. The Secretary of the Treasury is the Managing Trustee, and the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is designated the Secretary of the Board. The 2014 report of the Medicare Trustees was issued July 28, 2014. As such, the actuaries of CMS conducted a separate analysis that provides projections based on an "illustrative alternative" to current law. Additionally, unlike in prior years' projections, these growth rates assume that the scheduled physician payment reductions of about 21% in April 2015 will not go into effect. The 2014 Trustees report estimates that the HI trust fund will become insolvent in 2030, four years later than projected in last year's report (see Figure 4 ). Instead, the long-term financial soundness of the Medicare program is generally determined using one or more of the following measures:
A comparison of the program's income and its cost as a percentage of taxable payroll (how much would need to be added to the payroll tax to keep HI solvent—this measure is only applicable to the HI trust fund); A determination of the present value of the program's unfunded liabilities over a particular period (the amount in today's dollars that would be needed to be in the trust fund for the program to remain financially sound for a specified period); and/or A comparison of expected benefit costs with GDP, the most frequently used measure of the total output of the U.S. economy (the amount spent on Medicare compared to the size of the economy in general). The 2014 Trustees report projects that in the short term, as a result of the expected continued economic recovery and changes made by the ACA, the cost rate will continue to decline through 2017. Under current law, the Trustees expect Medicare costs to increase from 3.5% of GDP in 2013 to 5.3% of GDP in 2035 and to 6.9% in 2088. For example, forecasts are based on the assumption that health spending will outpace GDP growth in the future because it has consistently done so in the past. | Medicare is the nation's health insurance program for individuals aged 65 and over and certain disabled persons. Medicare consists of four distinct parts: Part A, or Hospital Insurance (HI); Part B, or Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI); Part C, or Medicare Advantage (MA); and Part D, the outpatient prescription drug benefit. The Part A program is financed primarily through payroll taxes levied on current workers and their employers; these are credited to the HI trust fund. The Part B program is financed through a combination of monthly premiums paid by current enrollees and general revenues. Income from these sources is credited to the SMI trust fund. Beneficiaries can choose to receive all their Medicare services, except hospice, through managed care plans under the MA program; payment is made in appropriate parts from the HI and SMI trust funds. A separate account in the SMI trust fund accounts for the Part D drug benefit; Part D is financed through general revenues, beneficiary premiums, and state contributions. The HI and SMI trust funds are overseen by a Board of Trustees that provides annual reports to Congress.
The 2014 report of the Medicare Board of Trustees estimates that the HI trust fund will become insolvent in 2030, four years later than it had predicted in the 2013 report. Because of the way that it is financed, the SMI fund cannot face insolvency; however, the Trustees project that SMI expenditures will continue to grow rapidly, and thus place increasing demands on Medicare beneficiaries and all taxpayers. Additionally, unlike in prior years, the projections in the 2014 report assume that reductions in physician payment rates scheduled under current law will not occur, because these reductions have usually been overridden by Congress. The Trustees estimate that total Medicare costs will increase from 3.5% of GDP in 2013 to 6.9% in 2088.
Although the Medicare Trustees report that the financial outlook for the Medicare program appears to have improved as a result of changes made by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as amended (ACA, P.L. 111-148), they caution that the projections in the report are somewhat uncertain, due to the potential for future expenditure reductions not to materialize. As it has done each year subsequent to the enactment of ACA, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Office of the Actuary issued a supplemental analysis that provides illustrative alternative projections based on the assumption that certain ACA provisions affecting Medicare provider payments will be phased out. |
crs_RL33571 | crs_RL33571_0 | This report highlights those personnel-related issues that seem to generate the most intense constituent interest and tracks their status in the FY2007 House and Senate versions of the NDAA. The resulting Conference Report ( H.Rept. 109-702 ) was approved by the House on September 29, 2006, and by the Senate on September 30, 2006; it was signed by the President on October 17, 2006, becoming P.L. 109-364 . Each presentation in this report offers the background on a given issue, tracks its legislative status, discusses the proposed language, identifies other relevant CRS products, and designates a CRS issue expert. This exception was included in the FY2002 National Defense Authorization Act to support the Global War on Terror. Among the information to be reported is a "synopsis of, and the disciplinary action taken in, each substantiated case." Senate and conference language seeks a presidential report on the issue. Military Pay Raise
Background: Ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with recruiting challenges, continue to highlight military pay issues. Critics contend that this is a form of dual compensation based on the same period of military service. If enacted, members may request a copy of the court order. The House position was adopted. Reference(s): CRS Report RL30802, Reserve Component Personnel Issues: Questions and Answers , by [author name scrubbed]. In carrying out these duties, the legislation would require the Chairman of the JCS to assist the CNGB, and require the CNGB to consult with the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force;
(9) require that budget justification documents submitted to the Congress in support of the President's budget specify separate amounts for training and equipping the National Guard for MACA and other domestic operations. Discussion : Supporters of H.R. | Military personnel issues typically generate significant interest from many Members of Congress and their staffs. Ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in support of the Global War on Terror, along with the emerging operational role of the Reserve Components, further heightened interest and support for a wide range of military personnel policies and issues.
CRS selected a number of issues considered by Congress as it acted on the FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act. In each case, a brief synopsis is provided that includes background information, a comparison of the House and Senate provisions, if any, and a brief discussion of the issue. Where appropriate, other CRS products are identified to provide more detailed background information and analysis of the issue. For each issue, a CRS analyst is identified and contact information is provided.
This report focuses exclusively on the annual authorization process. It does not include appropriations, veterans' affairs, tax implications of policy choices or any discussion of separately introduced legislation. The Conference Report on H.R. 5122 (H.Rept. 109-702) was adopted by the House on September 29, 2006, and by the Senate on September 30, 2006. The legislation was signed by the President on October 17, 2006, becoming P.L. 109-364.
It is not anticipated that this report will be updated. |
crs_RL33545 | crs_RL33545_0 | The report of the President's Advisory Panel on Tax Reform, issued in November 2005, recommended two reform plans to consider: 1) a revised income tax, referred to as the simplified income tax (SIT); and 2) a consumption tax coupled with a tax on financial income, referred to as the growth and investment tax (GIT). The GIT is not a pure consumption tax plan because it also includes a 15% tax on financial income (interest, dividends, and capital gains); rather it is a consumption tax, with a wage credit and an add-on tax on passive capital income at the individual level. The section on economic effects considers the effects on the allocation of capital, overall effects on growth, potential consequences of the international tax rules, and effects of other tax incentives, including health care, charitable contributions, and spending by state and local governments. ( Note: deductions for state and local taxes would be eliminated). Simplify employer savings plans. Tax burdens on capital income would also be affected by the preferred savings accounts. Provide a new, simplified depreciation system. The VAT would be similar to the PCT but would not allow a deduction at the firm level for wages and would not tax wages to individuals, and therefore would eliminate all of the features of the individual tax including the mortgage credit and the deduction for charitable contributions for that part of the tax. This baseline differs from the baseline used by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which simply relies on the current tax law, and thus assumes that temporary provisions, including the 2001-2003 tax cuts, will expire. Such a loss could be significant. Simplification
Both proposals contain many elements that would simplify tax compliance. The proposal, on its surface, also eliminates some itemized deductions that are difficult to dispense with, such as the casualty loss deduction, the deduction for extraordinary medical costs, and the deduction for miscellaneous items such as employee and investment costs. The effects will likely be larger than the effects in the SIT, which are already significant. One might propose to allocate the tax according to consumption, along with a credit for wage tax reductions due to graduated rates. These effective tax rates can differ substantially from average tax rates in the economy because the timing of deductions has a different (and in the long run, more powerful) effect on tax burdens on new investment than is reflected in average tax rate measures. In addition, for the income tax plan, the exemption of dividends and most of capital gains should allow more interest-bearing assets to be placed into exempt accounts. For current law, the calculations assume that small non-corporate businesses would be able to expense investments in equipment under current provisions of the tax law that allow expensing with a ceiling. The panel's proposal would make changes in all of these areas. The 1% floor would contribute to target efficiency, which focuses on how much charitable contributions are increased for each dollar of revenue loss. In the case of the income tax plan (SIT), these transition issues are likely to be most problematic for moderately high- and higher-income homeowners who have purchased homes with values high relative to income, and will lose part of the value of their mortgage deductions and their deduction for property taxes. There would be a four-year phaseout of depreciation deductions and interest deductions—80% in the first year, 60% in the second, 40% in the third, and 20% in the fourth. But inventories would bear virtually the full loss, and the loss is substantial. There are some important simplifications in the SIT, especially for businesses and high-income individuals, although lower-income taxpayers may find their affairs more complicated. There are also some transition problems, but they are small compared to the consumption proposal. | In November 2005, the President's Advisory Panel on Tax Reform presented two potential reform proposals: a simplified income tax (SIT) and a direct consumption tax proposal (the growth and investment tax, or GIT). Both proposals would eliminate itemized deductions while allowing, for all taxpayers, a credit for mortgage interest deductions and deductions for charitable contributions and health insurance. Both proposals substitute credits for personal exemptions and standard deductions. Both would allow greatly expanded tax-preferred savings plans. SIT would eliminate taxes on dividends and most capital gains from corporate stock, simplify depreciation and allow expensing (deducting costs immediately) for small business, and alter the international tax regime. GIT, as a consumption tax, would allow expensing of all investment. GIT also includes a tax on passive capital income (dividends, interest, and capital gains).
Both proposals are stated to be both revenue and distributionally neutral. Because the panel uses a baseline assuming the 2001 tax cuts are permanent, both would lose revenue compared to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) official baseline, which has the tax cuts expire as provided by current law. An additional revenue loss is expected in the long run because of the proposals for tax-deferred savings plans. These measures also cause the income tax proposal to be slightly less progressive than current law. The consumption tax proposal is likely to be significantly less progressive than current law.
The plans would simplify tax filing for higher-income individuals and the self employed; lower-income taxpayers could, in some cases, have more complicated tax returns. Much simplification rests on the assumption that many minor provisions, not actually discussed, will be eliminated, an unlikely event in the case of certain provisions such as casualty losses and catastrophic medical expenses.
Both plans would likely increase efficiency in the allocation of capital, but these effects would be quite small for SIT and lessened for GIT due to the tax on financial income. The SIT may magnify distortions in the allocation of capital around the world. The effects on overall economic growth would be negligible for SIT because of the limited change in marginal tax rates. Although there would be a substantial reduction in effective tax rates on new investment under GIT, the growth effects for this plan are uncertain and may be quite modest. In any case, they are not large enough to materially affect the budget outlook. The effects on economic efficiency other than in the allocation of capital are mixed: a floor under charitable deductions along with expansion to non-itemizers would contribute to efficiency, but the effects on health markets are unclear.
Transition problems present difficulties; the main issue with the SIT would probably be in the loss of deductions for homeowners with large houses and mortgages. These transition problems in the SIT are minor, however, in comparison with the significant problems in the GIT arising from the loss of depreciation deductions, interest deductions, and deductions for the recovery of inventory. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R40462 | crs_R40462_0 | It provides broad nondiscrimination protection in employment, public services, public accommodations, and services operated by private entities, transportation, and telecommunications for individuals with disabilities. As stated in the act, its purpose is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." However, the ADA, enacted on July 26, 1990, prior to widespread use of the Internet, does not specifically cover the Internet, and the issue of coverage has not been definitively resolved. The Supreme Court has yet to address this issue, and lower court decisions have varied in how they have approached the ADA and the Internet. On July 23, 2010, the Department of Justice issued an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking which would require Internet accessibility for individuals with disabilities. | The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) provides broad nondiscrimination protection in employment, public services, public accommodations and services operated by private entities, transportation, and telecommunications for individuals with disabilities. As stated in the act, its purpose is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities."
However, the ADA, enacted on July 26, 1990, prior to widespread use of the Internet, does not specifically cover the Internet, and the issue of coverage has not been definitively resolved. The Supreme Court has yet to address this issue, and lower court decisions that directly discuss the ADA's application to the Internet vary in their conclusions about coverage. On July 23, 2010, the Department of Justice issued an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking which would require Internet providers to ensure accessibility for persons with disabilities. |
crs_R42553 | crs_R42553_0 | The Administration dubbed this effort "countering violent extremism" (CVE). Here, private citizens are free to weigh competing ideologies and engage in constitutionally protected speech and expression. For example,
the success of terrorist plots in the secretive realm may spur radicalization and generate public fear in the marketplace of ideas; conversely, successful investigations in the secretive realm may discourage radicalizing individuals within the marketplace of ideas from eventually embracing violent acts of terrorism as an ultimate goal; effective policing within the secretive realm may depend on a trusting community acting supportively in the marketplace of ideas; perceived policing excesses in the secretive realm may impede community engagement with law enforcement; and high levels of radicalization occurring in the marketplace of ideas may expand the potential pool of terrorist recruits, while an effective government strategy to counter radicalization may staunch terrorist recruitment. In fact, some of the key challenges involved in implementing a national strategy to deal with terrorist radicalization spring from the interplay between the marketplace of ideas and the secretive realm. Administration Strategy and Current Activities
The Administration's CVE strategy revolves around countering the radicalization of all types of potential terrorists. The initial August 2011 strategy was supported by the Administration's release in December 2011 of its "Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States" (SIP). The SIP is a large-scale planning document with three major objectives and numerous future activities and efforts. Likewise, there is no single agency managing all of the individual future activities and efforts of the plan. The SIP's three objectives or "core areas of activity" are "(1) enhancing engagement with and support to local communities that may be targeted by violent extremists; (2) building government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism; and (3) countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting our [U.S.] ideals." The following sections provide examples of Administration CVE activity and discussion of the risks and challenges evident in the SIP's three core areas of activity. The "future activities and efforts" outlined for each of the three core areas of activity in the SIP are also diagramed and briefly discussed below. In order to have access to these critical tools and information, law enforcement recognized the need to build bridges required for effective communication with these groups." This program did not specifically focus on CVE efforts but has included radicalization-related outreach. Could this be possible in the United States? With the announcement of the CVE strategy, the Obama Administration has begun to address this concern. Picking Partners and Establishing "Rules of the Road"
Who speaks for diverse Muslim communities in America? What criteria will the Administration employ in its selection efforts, and how transparent will the process be? Once approved as partners, what "rules of the road" will govern continued cooperation? Ad hoc decision making might cause the whole CVE outreach process to appear arbitrary to some community participants. Congress may consider requiring the Administration to release public guidelines in this area. Intervention with At-Risk Individuals
There appears to be little federally driven guidance to community groups on how to intervene with people vulnerable to radicalization. Congress may consider examining the utility and feasibility of developing a CVE intervention model for the United States. A publicly available comprehensive list of grant programs that can be harnessed for CVE activities does not exist. Congress may opt to consider the feasibility or the value of such a list or a clearinghouse available to local entities to identify such programs. By possibly pursuing this, Congress may help to ensure that local constituents have better information about and more direct access to federal CVE programs. On the other hand, such a list may be perceived as an additional layer of bureaucracy between constituents and grant programs. Even more fundamentally, the task of countering extremist ideas raises key issues regarding the implementation of the CVE strategy. This begs the question: do the strategy and the SIP place the federal government in the business of determining which ideologies are dangerous and which are safe—essentially determining which beliefs are good and which are bad? As a start, Congress may wish to ask the Administration to better define what it means when referring to "violent extremist narratives." The Lack of a Lead Agency
There is no designated single lead agency for any of the three objectives laid out in the SIP. At the national level, it arguably may be of value to have a single federal agency in charge of the government's CVE efforts. Without a lead agency it may be difficult to monitor the levels of federal funding devoted to CVE efforts. How many personnel are devoted to CVE in the federal government? For how many of these employees is counter radicalization a full-time job? Are there mechanisms to track federal CVE expenditure? Which federal body is responsible for this? Congress may pursue with the Administration the feasibility or value of designating a lead agency, or the possibility of naming a lead via legislation. However, it is unclear what types of authority—especially in the budgetary realm—such a lead may be able to wield over well-established agencies playing central roles in the CVE strategy. Secretiveness vs. Transparency
Without a high degree of transparency, an engagement strategy driven by federal agencies charged with intelligence gathering and law enforcement responsibilities may run the risk of being perceived as an effort to co-opt communities into the security process—providing tips, leads, sources, and informants. This threatens to "securitize" a relationship intended as outreach within the marketplace of ideas. As such, some suggest that it might not be particularly effective to have the same federal agencies responsible for counterterrorism also be the main players in the CVE strategy. Because of this reality, Congress may decide to assess whether there is a need for greater transparency from the Administration in its CVE efforts. | In August 2011, the Obama Administration announced its counter-radicalization strategy. It is devised to address the forces that influence some people living in the United States to acquire and hold radical or extremist beliefs that may eventually compel them to commit terrorism. This is the first such strategy for the federal government, which calls this effort "combating violent extremism" (CVE). Since the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has prosecuted hundreds of individuals on terrorism charges. Unlike the necessarily secretive law enforcement and intelligence efforts driving these investigations, the CVE strategy includes sizeable government activity within the open marketplace of ideas, where private citizens are free to weigh competing ideologies and engage in constitutionally protected speech and expression. Some of the key challenges in the implementation of the CVE strategy likely spring from the interplay between the marketplace of ideas and the secretive realm encompassing law enforcement investigations and terrorist plotting.
The strategy addresses the radicalization of all types of potential terrorists in the United States but focuses on those inspired by Al Qaeda. To further elaborate this strategy, in December 2011 the Administration released its "Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States" (SIP). The SIP is a large-scale planning document with three major objectives and numerous future activities and efforts. The SIP's three objectives involve (1) enhancing federal community engagement efforts related to CVE, (2) developing greater government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism, and (3) countering violent extremist propaganda.
This report provides examples of Administration CVE activity and examines some of the risks and challenges evident in the SIP's three objectives. The report also diagrams and briefly discusses the "future activities and efforts" outlined in the SIP for each of these three objectives. A number of areas may call for oversight from Congress. These include the following:
Picking Partners and Establishing "Rules of the Road"
Much of the federal government's CVE effort centers on engagement with Muslim American community groups. This may not be as easy as simply reaching out to local organizations. Who speaks for diverse Muslim communities in America? What criteria will the Administration employ in its selection efforts, and how open will the process be? Once approved as partners, what "rules of the road" will govern continued cooperation? Ad hoc and opaque decision making might render the whole CVE outreach process arbitrary to some community participants. Congress may opt to consider whether there is a need to require the Administration to release public guidelines in this area.
Intervention with At-Risk Individuals
There appears to be little federally driven guidance to community groups on how to intervene with people vulnerable to radicalization. Congress may desire to require the Administration to examine the utility and feasibility of developing a CVE intervention model—possibly akin to gang intervention models—for the United States.
Identifying Programs to Assist Grassroots CVE Efforts
Working with communities entails informing them of possible resources they can use. A publicly available, comprehensive list of grant programs that can be harnessed for CVE activities does not exist. Congress may be interested in asking the Administration to formalize a roster or designate a clearinghouse available to local entities to identify such programs. By possibly pursuing this, Congress may help to ensure that local constituents have better information about and more direct access to federal CVE programs. On the other hand, such a list could be perceived as an additional layer of bureaucracy between constituents and grant programs.
Countering Extremist Ideas: Choosing Good vs. Bad
The task of countering extremist ideas highlighted in the CVE strategy and SIP raises a number of questions. Do the strategy and the SIP place the federal government in the business of determining which ideologies are dangerous and which are safe—essentially determining which beliefs are good and which are bad? In order to conduct effective oversight, Congress may choose to ask the Administration to define exactly what it means when referring to "violent extremist narratives."
The Lack of a Lead Agency
There is no single agency managing all of the individual activities and efforts of the plan. At the national level, some may argue that it would be of value to have a single federal agency in charge of the government's CVE efforts. From their perspective, without a lead agency it may be difficult to monitor the levels of federal funding devoted to CVE efforts and how many personnel are devoted to CVE in the federal government. For how many of these employees is counter-radicalization a full-time job? Are there mechanisms to track federal CVE expenditure? Which federal body is responsible for this? Congress may wish to pursue with the Administration the feasibility or value of designating a lead agency, or the possibility of naming a lead via legislation. However, it is unclear what types of authority—especially in the budgetary realm—such a lead may be able to wield over well-established agencies playing central roles in the CVE strategy.
Transparency
Without a high degree of transparency, an engagement strategy driven by federal agencies charged with intelligence gathering and law enforcement responsibilities may run the risk of being perceived as an effort to co-opt communities into the security process—providing tips, leads, sources, and informants. Some may maintain that this threatens to "securitize" a relationship intended as outreach within the marketplace of ideas. As such, critics may argue that it might not be particularly effective to have the same federal agencies responsible for classified counterterrorism investigations grounded in secrecy also be the main players in the CVE strategy. However, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have responsibilities for much of the CVE program. Because of this reality, Congress may opt to consider whether there is a need for greater transparency from the Administration in its CVE efforts. |
crs_R40915 | crs_R40915_0 | Currently, Medicare policy is made largely by Congress and, to varying degrees, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). The proposals being debated would essentially create an independent body of health care experts with the power to make fundamental decisions affecting Medicare. Advocates of these types of proposals argue that creating an independent, policymaking entity in Medicare is necessary if we hope to achieve any real health care reform. Supporters claim that members of Congress are easily influenced by special interests and lobbyists when making Medicare policy decisions, particularly those related to provider reimbursement. As a result, some of the decisions that are made may not be fiscally sustainable or in the best interest of beneficiaries. Advocates also contend that lawmakers do not have the necessary technical or operational expertise required to govern a program as complex as Medicare. Opponents of these proposals express concern about reducing Congress's role in the policymaking and oversight process. The proposals being discussed would establish a new policymaking body with the authority to make changes in the program without congressional approval. On June 25, 2009, Senator Jay Rockefeller introduced S. 1380 , the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) Reform Act of 2009, which would elevate MedPAC, a congressional advisory commission, to an executive branch agency with the authority to determine Medicare payment and coverage policies. The Obama administration submitted a similar proposal to Congress, titled the Independent Medicare Advisory Council Act (IMAC) of 2009, on July 17, 2009. The Administration's proposal would create an independent five-member executive council charged with issuing recommendations on Medicare payment policy to the President. Finally, the Senate Finance Committee included a provision to establish an independent Medicare advisory board in its health reform legislation, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ( H.R. 3590 ), which passed the Senate on December 24, 2009. This report introduces readers to the concept of creating an independent, policymaking entity in Medicare. The report begins with a discussion of the types of policymaking entities that have been proposed in the current health care reform debate, as well as in Medicare. The report then provides an overview of the role that Congress and CMS play in determining Medicare policy. The report concludes with a comparison of some of the key features of S. 1380 , the Administration's draft IMAC proposal, and H.R. Congress has debated the merits of creating a new administrative entity in Medicare several times throughout the program's history, most recently in the Medicare reform discussions of 2000 and 2001. 3590 would have the authority to develop and submit recommendations, in certain years, to Congress and the President to reduce Medicare spending. | Current health care reform discussions have included debates about the merits of creating an independent entity in Medicare to make changes in the program. Currently, Medicare policy is made largely by Congress and, to varying degrees, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the federal agency responsible for administering the program. The proposals being debated would essentially create an independent body of experts with the power to set provider payment rates and make other Medicare policy decisions.
Advocates of these types of proposals argue that creating a new independent entity or governance structure in Medicare is necessary if we hope to achieve any real health care reform, particularly reductions in overall spending. According to supporters, members of Congress are easily influenced by special interests and lobbyists when developing Medicare policies, particularly those related to provider reimbursement. As a result, some of the decisions that are made may not be fiscally sustainable or in the best interest of beneficiaries. Additionally, proponents argue that members do not have the technical expertise or professional experience required to manage a health insurance program as complex as Medicare. They contend that the public would be better served by having independent experts, insulated from political pressures, responsible for making Medicare policy.
Opponents of these proposals express concern about reducing Congress's role in the Medicare policymaking and oversight process. Under the proposals being discussed, recommendations made by the new commission or decision-making entity would automatically become law without congressional action. Critics contend that giving too much power to an entity composed of unelected officials would reduce its accountability to Congress and the public.
Over the past year, several proposals have been introduced by Congress to create a new administrative or governing structure in Medicare. On June 25, 2009, Senator Jay Rockefeller introduced S. 1380, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) Reform Act of 2009, which would elevate MedPAC, a congressional advisory commission, to an executive branch agency. The Obama Administration submitted a similar proposal to Congress titled the Independent Medicare Advisory Council Act (IMAC) on July 17, 2009. The Administration's draft proposal would create an independent five-member executive council to make recommendations to the President. Finally, the Senate Finance Committee included a provision establishing an independent Medicare advisory board in its health reform legislation, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (H.R. 3590), which passed the Senate on December 24, 2009. All proposals would transfer certain Medicare oversight and decision-making responsibilities to an independent, policymaking entity.
This report introduces readers to the concept of creating an independent, policymaking entity in Medicare. The report begins with a discussion of the types of policymaking entities that have been proposed in the current health care reform debate, as well as in Medicare. The report then provides an overview of the role that Congress and CMS play in determining Medicare policy. The report concludes with a comparison of some of the key features of S. 1380, the Administration's draft IMAC proposal, and H.R. 3590. |
crs_R41700 | crs_R41700_0 | However, the decrease in net new budget authority only represented a 4% decrease in appropriations for HUD programs in aggregate, due to a substantial increase in offsetting collections and receipts from the FHA mortgage insurance programs from FY2010 to FY2011. 112-55 ) was signed into law on November 18, 2011. In terms of funding for HUD, the act provides about $37.3 billion in net funding for HUD, which is about 9% less than was provided in FY2011. However, part of the decrease in net funding is attributable to increases in offsetting receipts and rescission. Looking only at gross appropriations, total funding for HUD's programs was decreased by about 2%. Senate Action
On September 21, 2011, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported an FY2012 THUD funding bill ( S. 1596 ). It included about $3 billion less in net budget authority (reflecting increased offsetting receipts) and about $1.3 billion less in regular appropriations (not reflecting rescissions) for HUD than was provided in FY2011. The Minibus, S.Amdt. 738 to H.R. 2112 , includes FY2011 appropriations for those agencies under the jurisdiction of the THUD subcommittee (reflecting S. 1596 ) as well as two other subcommittees (Agriculture and Commerce-Justice-Science). The bill was approved by the full Senate on November 1, 2011. House Action
The House Appropriations Committee did not formally report an FY2012 THUD bill; however, on September 7, 2011, the THUD subcommittee released a draft version of its unnumbered bill, which was approved by the subcommittee the next day. According to the subcommittee's press release, the bill included about $3 billion less for HUD than was provided in FY2011 and $4 billion less than was requested by the President. It included a request for nearly $47.9 billion in gross new appropriations for HUD in FY2012. After accounting for rescissions of prior-year unobligated balances and offsets available from the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage insurance programs, the President's request for net new budget authority for HUD in FY2012 totaled over $42 billion. The final FY2012 HUD funding law funds the operating fund at the President's requested level. Administrative Reforms to Rental Assistance Programs
The President's budget included a request for several statutory changes that would affect HUD's rental assistance programs, including the public housing and Section 8 programs. 112-25 . For more information, see CRS Report R41754, Community Development Block Grants: Funding Issues in the 112 th Congress and Recent Funding History , by [author name scrubbed]. For FY2012, Congress provided the same amount for the Homeless Assistance Grants that was appropriated in FY2011—$1.9 billion—and less than the amount proposed in the President's budget for FY2012 ($2.4 billion). 112-55 ( H.Rept. The President's budget request included a $165 million increase in funding for project-based rental assistance. In FY2012, P.L. The President's FY2012 budget, which came out prior to the enactment of the final FY2011 appropriations law, requested $88 million for HUD's housing counseling program. Appendix. Related Legislation
The Budget Control Act of 2011
On August 2, 2011, President Obama signed the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. | The President's FY2012 budget was released on February 14, 2011. It included a request for nearly $47.9 billion in gross new appropriations for HUD in FY2012. After accounting for rescissions of prior-year unobligated balances and offsets available from the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage insurance programs, the President's request for net new budget authority for HUD in FY2012 totaled just over $42 billion. The President's budget, which was released prior to enactment of a final FY2011 appropriations law, included proposals for some funding increases relative to FY2010 (Section 8 Tenant-Based Rental Assistance and Project-Based Rental Assistance), and some funding decreases relative to FY2010 (public housing operating fund, Community Development Block Grant program, HOME, and Section 202 and 811). However, in the case of almost all of the programs proposed for funding decreases relative to FY2010, the President's requested amount was higher than what was ultimately provided in the FY2011 appropriations law. In total, the President's funding request for HUD would have resulted in a nearly $2.5 billion increase in gross new appropriations in FY2012 relative to FY2011. However, because the President's budget estimated a substantial increase (nearly $2 billion) in the amount of offsetting receipts available from FHA in FY2012 relative to FY2011, the net budget authority requested in the President's budget would have represented an increase of only about $600 million in FY2012 relative to FY2011.
While the House Appropriations Committee did not formally report an FY2012 Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies (THUD) bill, on September 7, 2011, the THUD subcommittee released a draft version, including about $3 billion less in net funding for HUD than was provided in FY2011 (about $1.4 billion less in gross appropriations). It was approved by the subcommittee the next day.
On September 21, 2011, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its FY2012 THUD funding bill (S. 1596). It included about $4 billion less in net funding for HUD than was provided in FY2011 (about $1.3 billion less in gross regular appropriations). On November 1, 2011, the full Senate approved S.Amdt. 738 to H.R. 2112, the so-called Senate "Minibus." It included FY2012 appropriations for those agencies under the jurisdiction of the THUD subcommittee (reflecting S. 1596) as well as two other subcommittees (Agriculture and Commerce-Justice-Science). Several HUD-related amendments were considered and adopted.
In mid-November, the House and Senate reported a conference agreement on the Minibus (H.R. 2112, H.Rept. 112-284), which was subsequently enacted by Congress and then signed into law by the President on November 18, 2011 (P.L. 112-55). The final FY2012 appropriations law provided about $37.3 billion in net funding for HUD, which is about 9% less than was provided in FY2011. However, part of the decrease in net funding is attributable to increases in offsetting receipts and rescission. Looking only at gross appropriations, total funding for HUD's programs was decreased by about 2%.
While not directly affecting HUD funding, the provisions in the Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25) relating to statutory discretionary budget caps and their enforcement through sequestration could have implications for the amount of funding available for HUD in FY2012 and the future (see the Appendix for more information). |
crs_R40808 | crs_R40808_0 | If the gasoline tax is designed in such a way that it contributes to stabilizing the price of gasoline, more informed decisions concerning the purchase of fuel-efficient vehicles and the funding of mass transit might also be made. It is widely believed that the federal gasoline tax is unpopular with consumers and that increasing the tax will likely generate opposition. The tax raises revenue for highway construction and maintenance, which is directly related to automobile and gasoline use, suggesting that the tax can be viewed as a user charge. Excise taxes have been used to provide general, or dedicated, revenue and deficit reduction, but in some cases, for example, as in the taxes on liquor and cigarettes, there is some presumption that discouraging consumption, in addition to raising revenues, is a motivating factor in enacting the tax. After the oil embargo of 1973-1974, interest in the use of the gasoline tax as a policy instrument expanded to areas beyond highway financing. A number of tax provisions related to Highway Trust Fund financing are scheduled to expire on September 30, 2011. Changing Demand-Supply Relationships
The legal, or statutory, incidence of an excise tax on gasoline is on the refiner; however, the tax is typically passed on to the consumer, and is paid at the pump along with state and local taxes, leaving the economic incidence of the tax with the consumer. Economists have empirically estimated that in the short run, the sensitivity of the quantity demand of oil, and therefore, gasoline quantities, to price variations is low. On the revenue side, the federal gasoline tax, along with the corresponding tax on diesel fuel (24.4 cents per gallon) provided over $30 billion in revenue to the Highway Trust Fund in FY2008, and over $22 billion in the first three quarters of FY2011; however, the Highway Trust Fund, the financing of which depends on fuel excise taxes for about 90% of its funding, has recently been relatively unstable financially. In addition, because the existing federal tax is relatively small, compared to the price of gasoline, and is a declining portion of consumer income, as incomes rise, it likely is not having as large an effect in reducing consumption as it might have had when it was instituted. Since the federal gasoline tax is a fixed amount per gallon, and small relative to the price of gasoline, it does little to provide incentives to consumers to consider fuel-efficient vehicles. A variable gasoline tax would target a specific price of gasoline (including tax) that was thought by policy makers to achieve desirable levels of gasoline consumption and/or revenue production. The variable gasoline tax, set at a sufficiently high level to affect consumer decisions, could be expected to stimulate the demand for smaller, more fuel-efficient automobiles, spur the development of cars that use alternative energy sources, reduce U.S. oil imports and dependence on supplies from unstable parts of the world, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and reduce the costs of maintaining the highway and road system, as well as likely reduce the number of accidents and fatalities. While U.S consumers have enjoyed low taxes on gasoline for some time, taxes in other industrialized nations make retail prices higher. This could be ameliorated if tax revenue were recycled back into the economy through increased infrastructure projects, or expenditures on alternative energy projects. If gasoline demand is extremely price inelastic, as discussed in this report, the magnitude of the effects on the refining industry would likely be proportionately small, especially if the gasoline tax was small. These goals might be attained through a renewal of, and possibly an increase in, the federal excise tax on gasoline. | American drivers, compared to those in industrialized nations in Europe, pay relatively low federal, state, and local gasoline and diesel excise taxes. The federal taxes are used specifically to fund annual highway construction, maintenance, and mass transit. Over the years, proposals have come forth to raise the federal tax as a way to address long-standing national policy concerns, including U.S. dependence on imported oil and various environmental problems related to large volumes of gasoline consumption. The current federal gasoline tax legislation is set to expire on September 30, 2011, and renewal of the tax could be controversial.
Policy attention on the role of the gasoline tax has also increased recently due to two major developments. First, the 2008 and 2011 oil and gasoline price run-ups and continuing effects of the economic downturn have periodically led to a decline in gasoline tax revenues available for needed highway construction and maintenance. Second, the volatility of gasoline prices has affected investment planning (e.g., for alternative fuels and vehicles) and arguably contributed to the troubles facing domestic automobile manufacturers. In the above context, this report outlines some of the macroeconomic and microeconomic pros and cons of using the federal gasoline excise tax for policy purposes in addition to the funding of highway infrastructure.
Whether an increase in the gasoline tax is fixed or variable, advocates argue that increasing the relative price of gasoline would promote beneficial short- and long-term changes in how we use this form of energy. A higher relative price would encourage consumers and manufacturers to move toward more fuel-efficient vehicles, or to switch to alternative fuels, thus reducing oil consumption and imports, reducing air pollution, and possibly encouraging greater use of mass transit. Advocates further argue that such taxes could be recycled back into the economy through changes in the tax structure and/or increased investment in renewable or alternative fuels, among other options.
Opponents of gasoline tax increases point to the effects on consumer and business spending, which affect the short- and long-term performance of the overall U.S. economy, especially in a time of needed economic recovery. Additionally, opponents point out that the gasoline tax has a regressive impact and affects rural areas disproportionately. Opponents also argue that such tax revenues could be better spent if left in the private sector.
Gasoline price increases due to market forces, or earlier tax increases, of course, have been part of the economic environment for almost four decades. Since the mid-1970s, there have been significant spikes in gasoline prices due to world oil market turmoil attributed to political conflict and war in the Middle East and to financial market speculation. Depending on the specified purpose of a new gasoline tax increase, it could be modest, or more significant. Because the demand for gasoline is quite price insensitive (inelastic), significant revenues could be generated with little change in real consumption, even with a relatively low tax increase. A more substantial tax increase would likely be needed to change consumer preferences and business investment decisions. Any debate on modifying the gasoline excise tax will likely revolve around these tensions. |
crs_R42136 | crs_R42136_0 | Background
Since 1917, United States military services have researched and employed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). They are most often called UAVs, and when combined with ground control stations and data links, form UAS, or unmanned aerial systems. The military use of UAS in conflicts such as Kosovo (1999), Iraq (since 2003), and Afghanistan (since 2001) has illustrated the advantages and disadvantages of unmanned aircraft. UAS regularly make national headlines as they perform tasks historically performed by manned aircraft. UAS are thought to offer two main advantages over manned aircraft: they eliminate the risk to a pilot's life, and their aeronautical capabilities, such as endurance, are not bound by human limitations. Initial U.S. capabilities came from platforms acquired from Israel. Reflecting a growing awareness and support for UAS, Congress has increased investment in unmanned aerial vehicles annually. DOD's inventory of unmanned aircraft increased from 167 to nearly 7,500 from 2002 to 2010. The General Atomics I-GNAT developed into the Air Force Predator and Reaper, which served as the basis for the Army Gray Eagle and DHS's Predator optimized for marine environments; Northrop Grumman's Air Force Global Hawk became, with different equipment, the Navy's Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) system. FAA and the UAS industry are working with the Department of Defense in order to facilitate the universal development of "see and avoid" technology that would allow a UAV to operate autonomously and avoid approaching aircraft, potentially increasing the standard ACL for UAS to 4. If UAS are introduced into the force in large numbers, might personnel issues arise? Industrial Base Considerations
Defense industrial base issues perennially confront Congress. Management
Who should manage the development and procurement of DOD UAS? Other Issues
In recent years, the pace of UAS development has accelerated, and the scope of UAS missions and applications has expanded. Conventional wisdom states that UAS are cheap, or cost-effective. Northrop Grumman based the design of the Fire Scout on a commercial helicopter. Six production MQ-8 air vehicles have been delivered to date. Program Status . Small Tactical Unmanned Aerial System (STUAS)
In July 2010, the Department of the Navy awarded Insitu a two-year, $43.7 million contract for the design, development, integration, and test of the Small Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System (STUAS) for use by the Navy and Marine Corps to provide persistent maritime and land-based tactical reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) data collection and dissemination. Future UAS
Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS)
In the mid-1990s, the Pentagon began developing a UAS designed primarily for combat missions. | Unmanned aerial systems comprise a rapidly growing portion of the military budget, and have been a long-term interest of Congress. At times, Congress has encouraged the development of such systems; in other instances, it has attempted to rein in or better organize the Department of Defense's efforts.
Unmanned aircraft are commonly called unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and when combined with ground control stations and data links, form UAS, or unmanned aerial systems.
The use of UAS in conflicts such as Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and humanitarian relief operations such as Haiti, revealed the advantages and disadvantages provided by unmanned aircraft. Long considered experimental in military operations, UAS are now making national headlines as they are used in ways normally reserved for manned aircraft. Conventional wisdom states that UAS offer two main advantages over manned aircraft: they are considered more cost-effective, and they minimize the risk to a pilot's life. For these reasons and others, DOD's unmanned aircraft inventory increased more than 40-fold from 2002 to 2010.
UAVs range from the size of an insect to that of a commercial airliner. DOD currently possesses five UAVs in large numbers: the Air Force's Predator, Reaper, and Global Hawk; and the Army's Hunter and Shadow. Other key UAV developmental efforts include the Air Force's RQ-170 Sentinel; the Navy's Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS), MQ-8 Fire Scout, and Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAV; and the Marine Corps's Small Tactical Unmanned Aerial System.
In the past, tension existed between the services' efforts to acquire UAS and congressional initiatives to encourage a consolidated DOD approach. Some observers argue that the result has been a less than stellar track record for UAS programs. However, reflecting the growing awareness and support in Congress and the Department of Defense for UAS, investments in unmanned aerial vehicles have been increasing every year. DOD spending on UAS has increased from $284 million in FY2000 to $3.3 billion in FY2010.
Congressional considerations include the proper pace, scope, and management of DOD UAS procurement; appropriate investment priorities for UAS versus manned aircraft; UAS future roles and applications; legal issues arising from the use of UAS; issues of operational control and data management; personnel issues; industrial base issues; and technology proliferation. |
crs_R42661 | crs_R42661_0 | Background
Trade Adjustment Assistance Community College and Career Training (TAACCCT) grants are competitive grants to institutions of higher education (IHEs) to support career training programs that can be completed in two years or less. Statute specifies that TAACCCT-funded programs should target workers who have been adversely affected by international trade and are eligible for the Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers (TAAW) program. The program is administered by the Department of Labor (DOL). TAACCCT was created as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5 ) and is codified as part of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended. The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 ( P.L. As required by statute, at least 0.5% of total funds for grants (approximately $2.25 million) must be allocated to institutions in each state. Allowable Uses of Funds
Allowable uses of TAACCCT funds are the development, improvement, and expansion of education and career training programs. Duration of Grants
The most recent SGA specified that grants are for a 48-month period of performance. Grantees must develop and offer programs within the first 36 months and spend the final 12 months gathering information and reporting outcome data. Grant Application Requirements and Award Criteria
Statute establishes basic requirements for grant proposals and general criteria for choosing grantees. Statute further specifies that, when awarding grants, DOL will consider
the merits of the proposal to develop, offer, or improve training programs to be made available to TAAW-eligible workers; the employment opportunities available to workers who complete a program that is developed, offered, or improved by TAACCCT funding; and the prior and anticipated demand for training programs by TAAW-eligible workers served by the applying institution as well as the capacity of existing programs to meet anticipated demand. 5. 111-152 ). This act provided $500 million in mandatory funding for TAACCCT in each of the four years from FY2011 through FY2014 (see Table 1 ). Funding levels in FY2013 and FY2014 were reduced under sequestration. Application and Award Activity
The first SGA for TAACCCT funding was issued by DOL in January 2011 and closed in April 2011. The second SGA was issued in February 2012 and closed May 24, 2012. The third SGA was issued in April 2013. DOL announced the grantees September 18, 2013. The fourth SGA was issued in April 2014. This SGA represents the final round of TAACCCT grants under the funding provided under HCERA. | Trade Adjustment Assistance Community College and Career Training (TAACCCT) grants are competitive grants to institutions of higher education to support the development, offering, and improvement of career training programs that can be completed in two years or less. The program targets workers who have been adversely affected by international trade, though non-trade-affected workers may also participate in TAACCCT-funded programs.
TAACCCT is administered by the Department of Labor (DOL). It was created by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5) and is authorized under the Trade Act of 1974, as amended. The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA, P.L. 111-152) provided $500 million per fiscal year in mandatory appropriations for TAACCCT for FY2011 through FY2014. In FY2013 and FY2014, the funding for the program was reduced to $474.5 million and $464 million, respectively, due to sequestration. Funds equal to at least 0.5% of the total annual funding for grants must be awarded to institutions in each state.
TAACCCT grantees may use funds to design, develop, and offer career training programs. Allowable uses of funds include personnel as well as materials and other expenses related to content development and delivery. Under the most recent solicitation for grant applications (SGA), TAACCCT grants provide a 48-month period of performance. This period includes 36 months for the design, development, and delivery of a training program and 12 months for data gathering and evaluation.
Statute requires that grant applications include a description of the proposed project and how it will serve trade-affected workers. Statute further specifies that grants will be judged on the merit of the proposed project and the local employment prospects for individuals who would complete the proposed program. SGAs have specified an expanded set of criteria for program grants to operationalize the aims of the TAACCCT program.
The first SGA was issued in January 2011 and grantees were announced in September 2011. The second SGA was issued in February 2012 and grantees were announced in September 2012. The third SGA was issued in April 2013 and grantees were announced in September 2013. The fourth SGA, representing the final round of grants under the HCERA funding, was issued in April 2014. |
crs_R45204 | crs_R45204_0 | T his report addresses frequently asked questions about the federal and state standards that regulate fuel economy and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from new passenger cars and light trucks. The regulations include the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards promulgated by the U.S. Department of Transportation's National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the Light-Duty Vehicle GHG emissions standards promulgated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and California's Advanced Clean Car program. These are known as the Phase 1 standards. NHTSA and EPA promulgated the second (current) phase of CAFE and GHG emissions standards affecting MY 2017-2025 light-duty vehicles on October 15, 2012. Like the Phase 1 standards, the Phase 2 standards were preceded by a multiparty agreement, brokered by the White House. The Phase 2 agreement involved the State of California, 13 auto manufacturers, and the United Auto Workers union. The manufacturers agreed to reduce GHG emissions from new passenger cars and light trucks by about 50% by 2025, compared to 2010, with fleet-wide average fuel economy rising to nearly 50 miles per gallon. As part of the Phase 2 rulemaking, EPA and NHTSA made a commitment to conduct a midterm evaluation (MTE) for the latter half of the standards, MYs 2022-2025. EPA, NHTSA, and California also have differing statutory obligations. On November 30, 2016, the Obama Administration's EPA released a proposed determination stating that the MY 2022-2025 standards remained appropriate and that a rulemaking to change them was not warranted. On January 12, 2017, then-EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy finalized the determination, stating that "the standards adopted in 2012 by the EPA remain feasible, practical and appropriate." On March 15, 2017, after President Trump took office, EPA and NHTSA announced their joint intention to reconsider the Obama Administration's final determination and reopen the midterm evaluation process. On April 2, 2018, EPA released a revised final determination, stating that the MY 2022-2025 standards are "not appropriate and, therefore, should be revised." These factors include
the availability and effectiveness of technology, and the appropriate lead time for introduction of technology; the cost to the producers or purchasers of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines; the feasibility and practicability of the standards; the impact of the standards on emissions reduction, oil conservation, energy security, and fuel savings by consumers; the impact of the standards on the automobile industry; the impact of the standards on automobile safety; the impact of the GHG emissions standards on the CAFE standards and a national harmonized program; and the impact of the standards on other relevant factors. Until that new rulemaking is completed, the current standards remain in effect. In response to the announcements from the Trump Administration regarding potential revisions to standards, California restated its "continued support for the current National Program and California's standards." On March 24, 2017, CARB passed a resolution to accept its staff's midterm evaluation of the state's Advanced Clean Car program—which includes MY 2017-2025 vehicle GHG standards in line with EPA's 2017 final determination and the 2012 rulemaking. However, because EPA has concluded in its revised final determination that the MY 2022-2025 GHG emissions standards for light-duty vehicles "are not appropriate and, therefore, should be revised," the agency might decide to reconsider California's preemption waiver for the state's GHG standards for MYs 2017-2025. Below is a selected list of broader policy issues regarding the CAFE and GHG emission standards, their design, purpose, and potential revision. | The Trump Administration announced on April 2, 2018, its intent to revise through rulemaking the federal standards that regulate fuel economy and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from new passenger cars and light trucks. These standards include the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards promulgated by the U.S. Department of Transportation's National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the Light-Duty Vehicle GHG emissions standards promulgated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). They are known collectively—along with California's Advanced Clean Car program—as the National Program.
NHTSA and EPA promulgated the second (current) phase of CAFE and GHG emissions standards affecting model year (MY) 2017-2025 light-duty vehicles on October 15, 2012. Like the initial phase of standards for MYs 2012-2016, the Phase 2 rulemaking was preceded by a multiparty agreement, brokered by the White House. The agreement included the State of California, 13 auto manufacturers, and the United Auto Workers union. The manufacturers agreed to reduce GHG emissions from most new passenger cars, sport utility vehicles, vans, and pickup trucks by about 50% by 2025, compared to 2010, with fleet-wide fuel economy rising to nearly 50 miles per gallon.
As part of the Phase 2 rulemaking, EPA and NHTSA made a commitment to conduct a midterm evaluation for the latter half of the standards (i.e., MYs 2022-2025, for which EPA had finalized requirements and NHTSA, due to statutory limits, had proposed "augural" requirements). On November 30, 2016, the Obama Administration's EPA released a proposed determination stating that the MY 2022-2025 standards remained appropriate and that a rulemaking to change them was not warranted. On January 12, 2017, EPA finalized the determination, stating "that the standards adopted in 2012 by the EPA remain feasible, practical and appropriate."
After President Trump took office, however, EPA and NHTSA announced their joint intention to reconsider the Obama Administration's final determination and reopen the midterm evaluation process. EPA released a revised final determination on April 2, 2018. It stated the MY 2022-2025 standards were "not appropriate and, therefore, should be revised," and that key assumptions in the January 2017 final determination—including gasoline prices, technology costs, and consumer acceptance—"were optimistic or have significantly changed." With this revision, EPA and NHTSA announced that they would initiate a new rulemaking. Until that rulemaking is complete, the current standards would remain in force.
In response to the announcements from the Trump Administration, California has restated its "continued support for the current National Program and California's standards." On March 24, 2017, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) passed a resolution to accept its staff's midterm evaluation of the state's Advanced Clean Car program—which includes MY 2017-2025 vehicle GHG standards in line with EPA's 2017 final determination and the 2012 rulemaking. EPA granted CARB a Clean Air Act preemption waiver for its GHG standards on July 8, 2009.
A number of issues remain forefront regarding the CAFE and GHG emission standards, their design, purpose, and potential revision. These include (1) whether EPA has adequately justified its decision to revise the MY 2022-2025 standards and (2) whether California can continue to implement state standards that would be more stringent than the revised federal ones. These issues are informed by analyses regarding (1) whether the standards are technically and economically feasible; (2) the impact of the standards on GHG emissions and energy conservation; and (3) whether the standards adequately address consumer choice, safety, and other vehicle policies, both domestic and international. |
crs_R41919 | crs_R41919_0 | China's actions to address climate change also hold implications for broader economic and security concerns in the United States. Nonetheless, the UNFCCC contained a principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" among its Parties, with consensus that the already industrialized countries should lead in controlling their emissions and that all countries have obligations to address climate change. Despite efforts of many countries to reduce their GHG emissions, the continued and rapid growth of emissions from such large emitters as China and the United States has called into question the efficacy of the UNFCCC in meeting its objective of stabilizing concentrations of GHG in the atmosphere. Issues for Congress
U.S. congressional debate on potential climate change policies in the United States frequently invokes China's (and other emerging economies') surging greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as well as skepticism over whether, how, and when China might alter that trend. Some are concerned that U.S. investment in GHG controls without comparable Chinese actions would unfairly advantage China in global trade, and fail to slow human-induced climate change. In contrast, others point to China's announced aggressive actions to reduce GHG emissions by deploying efficient and non-fossil fuel technologies, and warn that U.S. businesses could fall technologically and competitively behind China in the energy sector and international trade. These facts lead some to contend that China is no longer a developing country. China's Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Transparency Concerns
Data from China are equivocal. The lack of China's reporting, transparency, and acceptance of international review of GHG emissions estimates (and underlying data) has been a major point of contention between China and the United States (and other countries) in the UNFCCC negotiations. Using data for energy and cement CO 2 only, China and the United States in 2009 emitted about 21% and 19%, respectively, of the global total. The Drivers of China's GHG Emissions
China's GHG emissions are the highest in the world because of its very large economy, the high share of the economy generated by energy-intensive (and GHG emitting) industry, and the high share of coal in China's energy mix. China's economy has experienced annual growth rates from 8 to 14% over the past decade. The government has sought to enforce and incentivize many programs to improve energy efficiency and expand the shares of non-emitting sources of energy. By 2010, the government says the nation fell just short of that goal, with a 19.1% improvement. Chinese leadership has warned against such tactics to reduce energy intensity and tightened its objectives in the 12 th 5-Year Plan, from 2011-2015. By 2015,
energy intensity should improve by 16% by 2015; carbon intensity should improve 17% by 2015, reaching 40-45% relative to 2005 levels by 2020; the share of non-fossil energy should reach 11.4% by 2015 and 15% by 2020; Forest coverage should increase by 12.5 million hectares (31 million acres) by 2015, and 40 million hectares (99 million acres) by 2020, compared to 2005 area; Nine pilot CO 2 cap and trade programs have been established across several cities; The length of high-speed railways is planned to increase to 45,000 km (27,962 miles). China's Stance on International Obligations
China and other countries that had low incomes in 1992 were exempted in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol from taking on quantified GHG reduction obligations, based on the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" contained in the Convention. Impasse continued until agreement was reached on the 2009 Copenhagen Accord: countries associated with the Accord submitted pledges to GHG targets and mitigation actions they would take. Also, China has extended its position on differentiation of obligations to cover GHG emission reporting and review, not just abatement responsibilities. In contrast, China has increased its engagement in technology cooperation in recent years, including with the United States. | The 112th Congress continues to debate whether and how the United States should address climate change. Most often, this debate includes concerns about the effects of U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions controls if China and other major countries were not to take comparable actions. China recently surpassed the United States to become the largest emitter of human-related GHG globally, and together, the two nations emit about 40% of the global total (with shares of 21% and 19%, respectively).
China's GHG emissions are growing rapidly and, even with policies adopted by China, are expected to rise until at least 2030. The emissions growth is driven by China's rapid economic and industrial growth and its reliance on fossil fuels despite measures to raise the shares of non-fossil energy sources. China requires 50% more energy to produce one billion dollars of GDP (its "energy intensity") compared with the United States. Over the past two decades, strong government directives and investments have dramatically reduced the energy and GHG intensities of China's economy, though the rates of improvement leveled off in the 2000s, and even reversed in subsequent years. A renewed emphasis on improving energy and GHG intensity emerged in the 11th 5-Year Plan, from 2006-2010, and the government says the nation nearly achieved its aggressive goal to reduce by 20% the energy required to produce GDP. In the context of China's 12th 5-Year Plan, from 2011-2015, leaders have set targets to further reduce energy intensity by 16% by 2015. Along with measures to reduce pollution and increase the shares of non-fossil fuels in the energy sector, China has set goals to improve its CO2 intensity by 40-45% by 2020, with an interim target in the 12th 5-Year Plan of 17% by 2015. Even if these targets are achieved, China's GHG emissions are expected to rise in absolute terms. In addition, the frequency, transparency, and data quality of China's reporting of its GHG emissions and mitigation actions (including underlying energy and other data) have been a challenging diplomatic issue between the United States and China and in the climate change negotiations. China has resisted reporting and reviews comparable to what other industrialized nations or what many developing countries accept. While technical bilateral cooperation on data has been productive and China has moved politically toward better information sharing, the continuing lack of transparency is apparent in uncertain emissions estimates and projections.
Chinese negotiators adhere to the principle of "common but differentiated" responsibilities, agreed in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992). They argue that emissions per person in China are low, that raising incomes must be their highest priority, and that industrialized countries bear primary responsibility for the historical buildup of GHGs in the atmosphere; therefore the industrialized countries should lead in mitigating emissions domestically. Industrialized countries also, they say, should assist developing countries with financial and technological support to mitigate emissions and adapt to coming change.
Debate on potential climate change legislation in the United States has been influenced by China's surging GHG emissions, and uncertainty over whether, how, and when China might alter that trend. There is concern that strong U.S. domestic action taken without Chinese reciprocity would unfairly advantage China in global trade, and fail to slow significantly the growth of atmospheric concentrations of GHGs. The governments of both China and the United States have indicated some closure of their gap on future actions to address climate change by agreeing on national pledges to GHG targets and mitigation actions rather than binding international obligations. China is also engaged with many other countries in bilateral programs to build its governance and technological capacities to abate its GHG emissions. |
crs_R42360 | crs_R42360_0 | Latin America and the Caribbean:Overview of U.S. Policy
U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere are diverse, and include economic, political, security and humanitarian concerns. Four Priorities for the Region
The Obama Administration has set forth a broad framework for U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean centered on four pillars or priorities:
promoting economic and social opportunity; ensuring citizen security; strengthening effective institutions of democratic governance; and securing a clean energy future. Continuity and Change in U.S. Policy
Substantial continuity characterizes U.S. policy toward the region under the Obama Administration, which has pursued some of the same basic policy approaches as the Bush Administration. Despite the continuity, the Obama Administration has made a number of changes that differentiate its policy from that of the Bush Administration. The Obama Administration has put an emphasis on partnership and multilateralism. Latin America's Increasing Independence
U.S. policy toward the Latin American region needs to be considered in the context of the region's increasing independence from the United States. The region has diversified its economic and diplomatic ties with countries outside the region—China, for example, has become a major trading partner for many countries in the region. Strong regional economic growth rates—6% in 2010 and 4.3% in 2011 —also has increased confidence in Latin America's ability to solve its own problems, and has lessened the region's dependency on the United States. Several Latin America regional integration organizations have been established in the past few years, a reflection of both the region's increasing independence and its growing internal cooperation. Congressional Interest in Latin America and the Caribbean
Overview
As in the previous Congress, legislative and oversight attention to Latin America and the Caribbean during the 112 th Congress focused on the continued increase in drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico and U.S. assistance to Mexico under the Mérida Initiative; efforts to help Central American and Caribbean countries contend with drug trafficking and violent crime; as well as continued counternarcotics and security support to Colombia, which still faces threats from armed actors. The earthquake that devastated Port-au-Prince in January 2010, combined with a cholera outbreak in the fall of 2010, continued to focus congressional attention on the enormous task of disaster recovery and reconstruction in Haiti. As in past years, debate over U.S. sanctions on Cuba, particularly restrictions on travel and remittances, remained a contentious issue with ongoing congressional debate over how to support change in one of the world's last remaining communist nations. There was increased congressional concern in 2012bout Iran's growing relations with several countries in the region, especially Venezuela, and related concerns about the activities of Hezbollah in the region. Key Policy Issues in 2012: Strong congressional interest on Cuba continued in 2012. Venezuela's October 2012 presidential elections also focused some attention on the state of democracy in the country. For additional information, see CRS Report R42639, Organization of American States: Background and Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]. Appendix. Hearings in the 112th Congress | Geographic proximity has ensured strong linkages between the United States and the Latin American and Caribbean region, with diverse U.S. interests, including economic, political and security concerns. U.S. policy toward the region under the Obama Administration has focused on four priorities: promoting economic and social opportunity; ensuring citizen security; strengthening effective democratic institutions; and securing a clean energy future. There has been substantial continuity in U.S. policy toward the region under the Obama Administration, which has pursued some of the same basic policy approaches as the Bush Administration. Nevertheless, the Obama Administration has made several significant policy changes, including an overall emphasis on partnership and shared responsibility.
U.S. policy toward the region must also contend with a Latin America that is becoming increasingly independent from the United States. Strong economic growth has increased Latin America's confidence in its ability to solve its own problems. The region has also diversified its economic and diplomatic ties with countries outside the region. Over the past few years, several Latin American regional organization organizations have been established that do not include the United States.
Congress plays an active role in policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean. Legislative and oversight attention to the region during the 112th Congress focused on the continued increase in drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico and U.S. assistance to Mexico under the Mérida Initiative; efforts to help Central American and Caribbean countries contend with drug trafficking and violent crime; as well as continued counternarcotics and security support to Colombia. The January 2010 earthquake that devastated Port-au-Prince, Haiti, continued to focus congressional attention on the enormous task of disaster recovery and reconstruction. As in past years, U.S. sanctions on Cuba, particularly restrictions on travel and remittances, remained a contentious issue in the debate over how to support change in one of the world's last remaining communist nations. Another area of congressional oversight was the deterioration of democracy in several Latin American countries, especially Nicaragua and Venezuela. Congressional concern also increased about Iran's growing relations in the region, especially with Venezuela, and about the activities of Hezbollah.
This report provides an overview of U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean in 2012, including the Obama Administration's priorities for U.S. policy and a brief comparison of policies under the Obama and Bush Administrations. It then examines congressional interest in Latin America, first providing an overview, and then looking at selected countries and regional issues and key policy issues faced by Congress in 2012. The final section of the report analyzes several key events in the region that took place in 2012: the Pope's trip to Cuba in March, the sixth Summit of the Americas in April, Mexico's elections in July, and Venezuela's upcoming elections in October. An appendix provides a listing of hearings in the 112th Congress focused on Latin America. For additional information and access to over 30 CRS reports on the region, see the CRS Issues in Focus webpage on "Latin America and the Caribbean." |
crs_R44926 | crs_R44926_0 | C riminals and other malicious actors increasingly rely on the Internet and rapidly evolving technology to further their operations. In this domain, criminals can compromise financial assets, hacktivists can flood websites with traffic—effectively shutting them down, and spies can steal intellectual property and government secrets. When such cyber incidents occur, a number of questions arise, including how the federal government will react and which agencies will respond. U.S. Cyber Incident Response
Federal law enforcement has the principal role in investigating and attributing cyber incidents to specific perpetrators, and this responsibility has been established within the broader framework of federal cyber incident response. Responding to cyber incidents involves (1) threat response, (2) asset response, and (3) intelligence support. DOJ, through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF), is the designated lead on threat response . The FBI's Cyber Division focuses on "high-level intrusions by state-sponsored hackers and global cyber syndicates, and the most prolific botnets." As established, the NCIJTF's mission is to "serve as a multi-agency national focal point for coordinating, integrating, and sharing pertinent information related to cyber threat investigations." Cyber-Related Task Forces and Partnerships
The FBI leads a variety of law enforcement task forces and partnerships focused on cyber threat response. Private Sector Information Sharing and Collaboration
In addition to its partnerships with law enforcement, the FBI has established several initiatives to interface with the private sector regarding cyber incidents. They collect and share information, build partnerships, and enhance awareness. The FBI stood up the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) in 2000. Cyber Workforce
In addressing the cyber threat, the FBI faces challenges in both recruiting and retaining an appropriate cyber workforce. On the retention side, DOJ's Inspector General recommended that the FBI, among other things, "evaluate the effectiveness of the step-by-step training course for FBI agents on how to investigate national security intrusion cases; reconsider the rotation policy for cyber agents and ensure that agents skilled and experienced in cyber intrusions are available to FBI field offices; and consider developing regional hubs with agents that are experts in investigating national security intrusions." Technology and Investigations
FBI investigators seek to use every tool in their cyber investigative toolkit to combat a range of threats and attribute activities to specific threat actors. FBI Cyber Threat Prioritization
Relating to the FBI's work in combating and responding to cyber threats, one question policymakers may have is how the bureau prioritizes cyber threats. The OIG's report made two recommendations:
The FBI should use an "algorithmic, data-driven, and objective methodology" to identify and prioritize cyber threats. The bureau currently tracks agent time by case classification (such as public corruption or counterterrorism), not specific threats. Congress may elect to exercise its oversight to examine whether (and if so, how) the FBI has made any adjustments to its cyber threat prioritization regimen. | Criminals and other malicious actors increasingly rely on the Internet and rapidly evolving technology to further their operations. In cyberspace, criminals can compromise financial assets, hacktivists can flood websites with traffic—effectively shutting them down, and spies can steal intellectual property and government secrets. When such cyber incidents occur, a number of questions arise, including how the federal government will react and which agencies will respond.
The Obama Administration, through Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-41, outlined how the government responds to significant cyber incidents. Responding to cyber incidents involves (1) threat response, (2) asset response, and (3) intelligence support. The Department of Justice (DOJ), through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI, or the bureau) and National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF), is the designated lead on threat response, which involves investigating and attributing specific cyber activities to particular individuals or entities as well as facilitating intelligence and information sharing.
In investigating cyber incidents, the FBI's Cyber Division focuses on "high-level intrusions by state-sponsored hackers and global cyber syndicates, and the most prolific botnets." In addition to conducting its own cyber investigations, the FBI
leads the NCIJTF, a multiagency hub for coordinating, integrating, and sharing information on cyber threat investigations; heads up other task forces and law enforcement partnerships focused on cyber threat response, including cyber task forces with subject matter experts at each field office, cyber action teams that can rapidly deploy in response to specific incidents, and cyber assistant legal attachés positioned in certain foreign countries to work with U.S. counterparts; has established several initiatives to interface with the private sector regarding cyber incidents; these resources (such as the Internet Crime Complaint Center, IfraGard program, and National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance) collect and share information, build partnerships, and enhance cyber threat awareness; has been working to recruit and retain an appropriate cyber workforce and has developed a multilayered cyber training program for its agents; and has been discussing with the technology community and policymakers how evolving technology, such as encrypted communications and devices, affects investigations, particularly in cyber-related cases, and how law enforcement can develop tools to investigate these cases most effectively.
Relating to the FBI's work in combating and responding to cyber threats, one question policymakers may have is how the bureau prioritizes cyber threats. DOJ's Inspector General, while noting strides in this arena, has recommended that (1) the FBI should use a more data-driven, objective methodology to identify and prioritize cyber threats, and (2) the FBI should develop a means to track agent time spent on specific cyber threats. Policymakers may elect to conduct oversight of the FBI's efforts in these areas, examine whether any changes to cyber threat prioritization affect where cyber threats rank within the broader universe of threats confronting the nation, and debate whether or how to direct the FBI's use of funds allocated to combating cyber threats. |
crs_R43842 | crs_R43842_0 | This is because Congress has the power under the U.S. Constitution to restrict state taxation in certain circumstances. Importantly, even when Congress has the authority to exercise legislative power over the states, other provisions of the Constitution may limit those powers. It also provides examples of where Congress has appeared to act under each authority. Additionally, the Supreme Court has long held that the Commerce Clause, by granting Congress the sole authority to regulate commerce, implicitly prohibits states from unduly burdening such commerce, even in the absence of federal regulation. This restriction is known as the dormant Commerce Clause. Congress can also authorize state taxation that would otherwise be an unconstitutional burden, so long as it is consistent with other provisions in the Constitution—for example, Congress could not use this authority to pass a law that violates taxpayers' due process rights. In 1977, the Supreme Court articulated a four-prong test for determining when a state tax runs afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause: (1) the activity taxed has a substantial nexus with the state; (2) the tax is fairly apportioned to reflect the degree of activity that occurs within the state; (3) the tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) the tax is fairly related to benefits provided by the state. Examples of Congressional Action
Below are examples of where it appears Congress has acted under the Commerce Clause to pass legislation affecting state taxation. It implicitly prevents states from taxing federal entities and property. Several other constitutional provisions—the Seat of Government Clause and the authority to erect forts, magazines, and arsenals —are similar in that they give Congress exclusive control over certain places and thus prohibit state taxation. Congress may use these authorities to clarify the scope of the federal tax immunity or to waive the immunity in specific instances. Finally, Congress's power to declare war and to raise and maintain the Armed Forces can also provide authority for legislation affecting state taxation of the Armed Forces. Examples of Congressional Action
The following are examples of Congress apparently acting under the Supremacy Clause or similar provisions to enact laws affecting state taxation. In general, these laws either waive federal immunity to permit state taxation of certain federal entities or clarify the immunity's scope. Tenth Amendment
Even if Congress has the constitutional authority to exercise legislative power over states, other provisions of the Constitution may, in certain instances, limit those powers. In general, however, under the Supreme Court's current interpretation of the Tenth Amendment, the Amendment does not represent a significant limit on Congress's ability to regulate state taxing authority. Spending Clause
The Spending Clause grants Congress the authority "to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States.... " One of the more significant ways that the federal government can encourage state behavior is to provide federal money to states and then impose conditions on that federal money. Although these examples, like most instances of grant conditioning by Congress, are constitutionally uncontroversial, the Supreme Court has suggested that there are limits on the Spending Clause authority. Further, the court noted that the grant condition was not a violation of the Tenth Amendment, which generally prevents Congress from "commandeering" state legislatures and executive branch officials to implement federal programs. The Clause expressly grants Congress the power to authorize state taxation that would otherwise be constitutionally impermissible (and is therefore similar to the implicit authority provided by the Commerce Clause, as discussed above). It does not appear that Congress has ever authorized states to tax under the Import-Export Clause. | A variety of clauses in the U.S. Constitution provide direct and implicit authority for Congress to enact legislation affecting the ability of states to impose taxes, and Congress has acted under several of them. In some situations, Congress has restricted the states' taxing power, such as by prohibiting them from taxing certain activities. In others, it has expanded the states' ability to tax, such as by waiving federal immunity to state taxation in specific circumstances.
Chief among these authorities is the Commerce Clause, which provides Congress with the authority to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. It has long been interpreted by the courts to contain an implicit restriction on state regulation and taxation that unduly burden interstate commerce—this is known as the dormant Commerce Clause. Under its commerce power, Congress can enact laws affecting state taxation of interstate commerce. In general, Congress has used this authority to limit state taxation, but it can also use it to expand the states' taxing power by authorizing state taxation that would otherwise violate the dormant Commerce Clause.
Other provisions in the Constitution that appear to contain an implicit authority for Congress to enact laws affecting state taxation include the Supremacy Clause and similar provisions in the Seat of Government Clause and the authority to erect forts, magazines, and arsenals. These provisions implicitly prohibit states from taxing federal entities. Congress has acted under them to waive the federal immunity and permit state taxation in certain circumstances, as well as to restrict states from taxing entities and activities that fall within the federal immunity. Similarly, Congress's War Powers could provide authority for legislation affecting state taxation of members of the Armed Forces.
Importantly, even if Congress has the constitutional authority to exercise legislative power over the states, other provisions of the Constitution may limit those powers. Two examples of the limitations that can be discussed in this context are the Tenth Amendment and the Spending Clause. In general, however, the Tenth Amendment, which prevents commandeering of state legislatures or executive branch officials to implement federal programs, has not been interpreted by the courts to represent a significant limit on Congress's ability to regulate state taxing authority. Nor have courts found there to be significant limits to Congress's power under the Spending Clause to encourage state behavior by conditioning the provision of federal money to the states. Most instances of grant conditioning by Congress appear to be constitutionally uncontroversial, so long as the grant conditions are related to the underlying grant and the amount of grant money conditioned is not so large as to be coercive.
Finally, two relatively obscure provisions of the Constitution—the Import-Export Clause and the Tonnage Clause—are also relevant. These prohibit states from enacting taxes on imports or exports and taxes based on tonnage, respectively. Both clauses expressly permit Congress to authorize what would otherwise be unconstitutional state taxation. However, it does not appear Congress has ever acted under these authorities. |
crs_RL32782 | crs_RL32782_0 | (3)
Much of the debate surrounding the Administration's Clear Skies proposal has focused onits cap-and-trade implementation scheme. (4) In some ways, the proposal'scap-and-trade provisions are its least significant aspects in terms of the proposal's interaction withthe structure of the Clean Air Act. EPA has already promulgated regulations using a regionalcap-and-trade program to control NOx emissions over the eastern United States (called the NOx SIPCall) under existing Clean Air Act authority, and has proposed other cap-and-trade regulations toachieve Clear Skies' level of reductions over 28 eastern states and the District of Columbia for bothSO 2 and NOx. (5) Inaddition, EPA has proposed other cap-and-trade regulations to achieve similar Clear Skies mercuryreductions, although their legality has been subject to some question. (6)
Far more important to the fabric of the Clean Air Act are the various provisions in ClearSkies to alter, delete, or hold in abeyance for some time existing sections of the Clean Air Act withrespect to affected electric generating units and industrial sources that choose to opt into theprogram. The Administration has made it clear that with Clear Skies, it believes certain CAAprovisions are no longer necessary. Background: Regulating Criteria Air Pollutants Under Title I
National Ambient Air Quality Standards / New SourcePerformance Standards / Lowest Achievable Emissions Rate. A list of the authorities removed (or limited in new ways) would include (1)provisions for major sources (i.e., affected EGUs and opt-in units would no longerbe considered major sources); (2) changes to the hazardous air pollutant provisionsof Section 112, removing utilities and opt-in units from the sources whose mercuryemissions can be controlled under Maximum Achievable Control Technology(MACT) and residual risk provisions; (3) changes to Section 126, establishing amoratorium on the use of petitions to control interstate air pollution, and establishingsubstantially more stringent requirements for acceptance of such petitions after themoratorium; (4) reduction of the noncompliance penalties under the new SO 2 cap-and-trade program; (5) effective preemption of more stringent state requirementsfor NOx and mercury; (6) elimination of New Source Review (NSR) formodifications of major sources; (7) elimination of Best Available RetrofitTechnology (BART) requirements under Section 169A (which concerns visibilityprotection); (8) establishment of a statutory 50 km zone around Class I areas forimposition of the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) requirements(replacing a current regulatory 100 km zone); (9) exempting affected units locatedin PSD Class II areas from Class II limitations on pollution increments; (10)extension of deadlines for meeting the ozone and PM 2.5 NAAQS; (11) a de facto moratorium on the provisions of Subpart 2 dealing with ozone nonattainment in mostareas; and (12) a de facto moratorium on the conformity requirements (for highwaysand other projects) under Section 176 in most ozone and PM 2.5 nonattainment areas. Any such standards could not be implemented before 2018. Conclusion
In some ways, former Administrator Whitman has identified the central issuein Clear Skies' interaction with the Clean Air Act: Are the targets stringent enoughto permit the relaxing or removal of some provisions of the Clean Air Act designedto achieve the same thing with respect to electric utilities? In terms of utility controls designed to achieve the NAAQS, it must be statedthat Clear Skies will not achieve either the 8-hour ozone NAAQS or the fineparticulate NAAQS within the current CAA compliance deadlines, neither in termsof the reductions necessary to achieve those standards nor the timing of thereductions Clear Skies would achieve. EPA's analysis indicates that somenonattainment areas will need additional controls and time to reach attainment. (26) Clear Skies,as currently drafted, would effectively remove additional electric utility control fromthe suite of options available to states to achieve that additional level of control. (28) As currently drafted, Clear Skies wouldeffectively remove additional electric utility controls from the suite of optionsavailable to the states to further reduce mercury emissions. The ability of industrialsources to opt into the Clear Skies program would further reduce state mercurycontrol options. | The 109th Congress, like the two before it, is expected to consider proposals to controlemissions of multiple pollutants from electric power plants. The bills include anAdministration-based proposal, the Clear Skies Act (S. 131), which would control emissions ofsulfur dioxide (SO 2 ), nitrogen oxides (NOx), and mercury, and other bills that would control thethree pollutants plus the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide.
Much of the debate surrounding the Administration's Clear Skies proposal has focused onits cap-and-trade implementation scheme. But in some ways, the proposal's cap-and-trade provisionsare its least significant aspects in terms of the proposal's interaction with the structure of the CleanAir Act. EPA has already promulgated regulations using a regional cap-and-trade program to controlNOx emissions over the eastern United States (the "NOx SIP Call") under existing Clean Air Actauthority, and has proposed other cap-and-trade regulations to achieve Clear Skies' level ofreductions over 28 eastern states and the District of Columbia for both SO 2 and NOx (in the CleanAir Interstate Rule). In addition, EPA has proposed cap-and-trade regulations to achieve mercuryreductions similar to those in Clear Skies, although the legality of these regulations is morequestionable.
Critical to the fabric of the Clean Air Act are the various provisions in Clear Skies to alteror to delete existing sections of the Act with respect to both electric generating units (EGUs) andindustrial sources that choose to opt into the program. The Administration has made it clear that withClear Skies' comprehensive approach to EGUs and opt-ins, it believes certain CAA provisions needno longer apply to them, in some cases permanently, in others for as long as 20 years or under certainconditions. These include most statutory requirements for Prevention of Significant Deteriorationand attainment of National Ambient Air Quality Standards under Title I of the Act, as well as mostcontrols on hazardous air pollutants as they apply to EGUs and opt-ins. These changes woulddiminish the suite of options states currently have to achieve compliance with air quality standards.
In July 2001 testimony, then-EPA Administrator Whitman identified the central issue inClear Skies' interaction with current law: Are the emission reduction targets stringent enough topermit the relaxing or removal of current provisions of the Clean Air Act designed to achieve thesame thing with respect to electric utilities? EPA's analysis indicates that Clear Skies will notachieve either the 8-hour ozone or the fine particulate ambient air quality standards that the agencyrecently implemented within current CAA compliance deadlines. Some nonattainment areas willneed additional controls and time to reach attainment. Clear Skies addresses these issues in part byproviding 5 to 15 years of additional time, while effectively removing additional electric utilitycontrol from the suite of options available to states to achieve the standards. Similarly, withmercury, Clear Skies proposes relatively modest controls on electric utilities, and, as currentlydrafted, would effectively remove additional electric utility controls from the suite of optionsavailable to the states. The ability of industrial sources to opt into Clear Skies could further reducestate control options for both mercury and criteria pollutants. This report will not be updated. |
crs_RL33075 | crs_RL33075_0 | When Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast region, the storm brought a halt to the flowof agricultural trade entering and exiting the United States through the Mississippi River Systemcentered on New Orleans and surrounding Mississippi-River-based Gulf ports. Flooding and poweroutages stopped operations at most of the port facilities within the affected region. August 29, 2005. The U.S. Dept. Most major ports located alongthe Texas and Louisiana Gulf coast were temporarily closed in advance of Hurricane Rita. September 24, 2005. Hurricane Damage to Barge Transportation. In addition to an "out-of-sync" transportation network, approximately 140 barges containinghurricane-damaged corn (primarily water damage) were left in the New Orleans region. However, USDA officials have expressed concern thatthe price decline resulting from the temporary delay in the Mississippi barge-based export flow ofagricultural products could persist for at least three months and possibly into the spring dependingon several factors including how quickly barge traffic resumes; how early the winter freeze andshut-down of the upper Mississippi River occurs; and whether the low water levels of the Missouriand Upper Mississippi Rivers are replenished by rainfall. As a result, both producers and marketers are eager to move surplus production throughthe marketing channels. Preliminary estimates by USDA economists are that Hurricane Katrina contributed to $882million in total crop, livestock, and aquaculture (16) losses in the Southeast. USDA reportsthat the greatest agricultural losses caused by Katrina, in terms of value of production, were toaquaculture ($151 million), sugarcane ($50 million), and cotton ($40 million). Top 5 Agricultural Commodities: Alabama, Louisiana,and Mississippi, 2003
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture's Economic Research Service. Information on the effects of Hurricane Katrina on Gulf Coast forests is sketchy. The impact of the hurricanes on wood products is less certain. Energy Costs and Agriculture
Following the damage inflicted by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita on the Gulf region's oil andnatural gas production, refining, and importing capability, energy prices -- gasoline, diesel fuel, andnatural gas -- rose sharply. (24) Considerable uncertainty surrounds the longevity of recentenergy price rises, and the implications for U.S. agriculture hinge on their permanency. In the near-term,it is likely that such strong energy price rises will significantly increase energy's share of totalproduction expenses and could significantly alter the farm income outlook for affected farmhouseholds and rural economies. (26) The relative importance of energy costs as a share of totalagricultural production expenses varies greatly by both activity and region. Anhydrous Ammonia and Natural Gas Prices
The post-Katrina jump in U.S. natural gas prices casts a cloud of uncertainty over the futureof the U.S. nitrogen fertilizer industry as well as raising concerns about the potential supply and priceof nitrogen fertilizer for crops in 2006. According to preliminary reports from USDA, the three-state region hasrelatively high participation rates in the crop insurance program. Agricultural producers in a county that has been declared a disaster area may be eligible forlow-interest emergency disaster (EM) loans available through USDA's Farm Service Agency. The combination of the Midwest drought andlosses caused by the two hurricanes is expected to provide momentum for Congress to consideremergency crop and livestock assistance for 2005 production losses some time this year. | On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast region coming ashore just eastof New Orleans. On September 24, 2005, Hurricane Rita hit the Gulf Coast region making land fallnear the border of Texas and Louisiana. Both hurricanes left behind widespread devastation. Ritaappears to have done most of its damage to energy infrastructure off-shore in contrast to Katrinawhich devastated large swaths of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. This report examines theimpact of these hurricanes on three important factors affecting the U.S. agricultural sector: marketinginfrastructure based on the Mississippi River waterway and Gulf ports; production losses for majorcrop and livestock producers in the affected region; and potential consequences for agriculturalproduction as a result of high energy costs. It also discusses the federal government response toagricultural concerns.
Agricultural producers from the states directly impacted by Katrina have suffered economiclosses, although this varies greatly by crop and locality. Preliminary estimates by USDA is thatHurricane Katrina contributed to $882 million in total crop, livestock, and aquaculture losses. Thoseactivities most affected were aquaculture ($151 million), sugar cane ($50 million), and cotton ($40million). The damage estimate does not include losses in timber and nursery and greenhouseproducts. No preliminary estimate has been released by USDA concerning agricultural damage fromHurricane Rita.
Hurricane Katrina temporarily halted the flow of agricultural trade through New Orleans --a major gateway for U.S. oil imports and agricultural exports -- causing commodity prices to declinein interior markets along the Mississippi River waterway. Although partial recovery of marketinginfrastructure occurred soon following Katrina's passage (with a brief shutdown in late Septemberdue to Hurricane Rita), substantial congestion and high costs continue to plague the MississippiRiver grain transport network. This traffic bottleneck and its depressive effect on farm commodityprices could persist into the spring of 2006.
Energy prices jumped substantially in early September 2005, as a significant portion of U.S.petroleum and natural gas production, import, and refining facilities were damaged and shut down. There is considerable uncertainty surrounding the permanency of energy price rises and theirpotential impact on the U.S. economy in general, and U.S. agriculture in particular. By raising theoverall price structure of production agriculture, sustained high energy prices could result insignificantly lower farm and rural incomes in 2006.
Certain ongoing federal programs, primarily crop insurance and disaster loans, are availableto eligible producers. The combination of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita with a Midwestern droughtmight also cause Congress to consider supplemental crop and livestock disaster assistance. Thisreport is intended as an overview of how the hurricanes have affected and are likely to continue toaffect the agricultural sectors of both the impacted regions and the United States. It is not intendedto provide a day-to-day update of events. It will, however, be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RL32241 | crs_RL32241_0 | Introduction
"Child care reauthorization" is composed of two parts: legislation to reauthorize the ChildCare and Development Block Grant (CCDBG) Act and legislation to extend mandatory fundingappropriated under Section 418 of the Social Security Act. The 108th Congress did not complete action to reauthorize either the CCDBG Act itself, orthe mandatory child care funding appropriated under the Social Security Act (along with theTemporary Assistance for Needy Families block grant). Both expired at the end of FY2002. However, funding for the CCDBG has been continued via a series of temporary extensions (in thecase of the mandatory funding) and annual appropriations law (for the discretionary funding portion). In terms of reauthorization legislation, the House passed a consolidated bill, H.R. 4 (Personal Responsibility and IndividualDevelopment for Everyone Act [PRIDE]) included mandatory funding for child care, while theSenate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee's reported bill, S. 880 (TheCaring for Children Act of 2003), included all provisions pertaining to discretionary fundingauthorization, and would have amended the CCDBG Act itself. Both the House versionof H.R. 4 (The Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act of 2003), and S. 880 (The Caring for Children Act of 2003) proposed to authorize discretionaryfunding at $2.3 billion in FY2004, rising by $200 million each year, up to $3.1 billion in FY2008. 4 reported by the Senate Finance Committeecontained the same $1 billion increase in mandatory child care funding over five years; however,Senator Snowe expressed plans at the time of voting for the committee bill to offer an amendmentfor a greater child care increase when the bill was brought to the Senate floor. The amendment would have provided anadditional $6 billion (over five years) in mandatory child care funding, above the $1 billion ($200million in each of five years) provided in the underlying bill, H.R. 4 would have allowed states to transfer up to 50% of theirannual TANF grants to the CCDBG. 4 proposed to maintaincurrent law. Quality Activities
Quality Set-Aside. 4 and S. 880 proposed to eliminate thefederal maximum of 85% of state median income (SMI) from the CCDBG law, replacing it with aprovision allowing states to set income eligibility levels (with no federal ceiling), with prioritiesbased on need. Both the House version of H.R. 4 and the HELP Committee's S. 880 would have amended current law to require that additional elements be certified in their stateplans. S. 880 would have retained the quarterly reporting in current law, but wouldhave amended the list of data elements that states would be required to collect on a monthly basis. Title II of the bill contained provisions to enhance securityat child care centers in federal facilities, and Title III would have established a small business childcare grant program, through which competitive grants would have been awarded to states forestablishment and operation of employer-operated child care programs. Detailed Comparison of Child Care Provisions of both House and Senate Versions of H.R. 4, S. 880, and Current Law
Table 1 provides a detailed comparison of the child care provisions included in theHouse-passed and Senate Finance Committee-reported versions of H.R. | The 108th Congress did not complete action to reauthorize child care legislation that expiredat the end of FY2002, but funding has continued via a series of temporary measures, and annualappropriations. "Child care reauthorization" is composed of two parts: legislation to reauthorize theChild Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG) Act and legislation to extend mandatoryfunding appropriated under Section 418 of the Social Security Act.
In February 2003, the House passed a consolidated bill, H.R. 4 , whichencompassed both parts of reauthorization by including provisions that would have addressedmandatory appropriations, discretionary funding authorization levels, and other amendments to theCCDBG Act. The Senate Finance Committee reported its own version of H.R. 4, whichincluded mandatory child care funding, and the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions(HELP) Committee reported a separate bill, S. 880 , which included all provisionspertaining to discretionary funding authorization, and amended the CCDBG Act itself. The fullSenate began consideration of H.R. 4 on March 29, 2004, passing one amendment toit (to increase child care funding), but then failed to resume consideration of the bill.
Both versions of H.R. 4 originally proposed to appropriate $2.917 billion inmandatory CCDBG funding for each of fiscal years 2004 through 2008, which would have reflectedan increase of $1 billion over five years above current (FY2002) funding. (The amendment approvedon the Senate floor would have provided an additional $6 billion, on top of the $1 billion.) Discretionary funding levels are authorized within the CCDBG Act, and both the House version ofH.R. 4 and S. 880 proposed to authorize $2.3 billion in FY2004, rising up to$3.1 billion in FY2008. Also of note, H.R. 4 (House) would have allowed states to transferup to 50% of their TANF block grants to the CCDBG (rather than current law's limit of 30%).
Both H.R. 4 (House) and S. 880 would have revised and expandedthe CCDBG program goals to include and emphasize school readiness. Of the two bills, S.880 provided the greater detail in terms of defining the skills and development to befostered in efforts to prepare children for school. Both bills included provisions to increase theminimum quality set-aside from 4% to 6%, and to define "quality activities" in more detail.
Both bills proposed to eliminate the federal eligibility ceiling (85% of state median income);and to place new requirements on state plans to emphasize coordination, consumer education, andprogram quality. S. 880 would have also strengthened requirements (currently only inregulation) that states set provider payment rates in accordance with a recent market rate survey.Other provisions in S. 880 included amending the list of data elements collected on amonthly basis; enhancing security at federal child care facilities, and establishing a small businesschild care grant program. This report provides a side-by-side comparison of the proposed bills, andwill not be updated. |
crs_R45037 | crs_R45037_0 | I n the wake of the 2016 election, concerns have been raised with respect to the legal regime governing foreign influence in domestic politics. The central law concerning the activities of the agents of foreign entities acting in the United States is the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA or the Act). FARA generally requires "agents of foreign principals" undertaking certain activities on behalf of foreign interests to register with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ); to file copies of informational materials that they distribute for a foreign principal; and to maintain records of their activities. The Act contains several exemptions to these registration, disclosure, and recordkeeping requirements. Although FARA has not been litigated extensively, courts have recognized a compelling governmental interest in requiring agents of foreign principals to register and disclose foreign influence in the domestic political process, resulting in a number of constitutional challenges being rejected over the decades since FARA's initial enactment. This report examines the nature and scope of the current regulatory scheme, including the scope of FARA's application to agents of foreign principals; what the statute requires of those covered under the Act; exemptions available under the statute; and methods of enforcement. The report concludes by discussing various legislative proposals to amend FARA in the 115th Congress. Historical Development of FARA
Enacted originally in 1938 to promote transparency with respect to foreign propaganda, FARA has evolved in its breadth and application over the course of subsequent decades. Selected Proposals to Amend FARA in the 115th Congress
In 2016, the Office of the Inspector General at DOJ issued a report on DOJ's enforcement of FARA, finding that the agency lacked a comprehensive strategy for enforcement. Among the criticisms highlighted in that report were the lack of enforcement actions brought by DOJ as well as issues of vagueness in the terms and breadth of the statute. Some Members of Congress have introduced legislation to amend FARA following the Inspector General's report and other allegations that potential misconduct by foreign agents is not currently policed under the statute. 4170 / S. 2039 would repeal the exemption that currently allows agents of foreign principals in the private sector to register under the LDA instead of under FARA. Provision of Civil Investigative Demand Authority . 2811 / S. 625 ) and the Disclosing Foreign Influence Act (DFIA; H.R. Reporting Requirements. 4170 / S. 2039 would require the Attorney General to "develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to improve the enforcement and administration of [FARA]," which would be subject to review by the Inspector General of DOJ and Congress. | In the wake of the 2016 election, concerns have been raised with respect to the legal regime governing foreign influence in domestic politics. The central law concerning the activities of the agents of foreign entities acting in the United States is the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA or Act). Enacted in 1938 to promote transparency with respect to foreign influence in the political process, FARA generally requires "agents of foreign principals" undertaking certain activities on behalf of foreign interests to register with and file regular reports with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). FARA also requires agents of foreign principals to file copies of informational materials that they distribute for a foreign principal and to maintain records of their activities on behalf of their principal. The Act contains several exemptions, including exemptions for news organizations, foreign officials, and agents who register under domestic lobbying disclosure laws. Failure to comply with FARA may subject agents to criminal and civil penalties. Although FARA has not been litigated extensively, courts have recognized a compelling governmental interest in requiring agents of foreign principals to register and disclose foreign influence in the domestic political process, resulting in a number of constitutional challenges being rejected over the decades since FARA's initial enactment.
In 2016, the Office of the Inspector General at DOJ issued a report on DOJ's enforcement of FARA, finding that the department lacked a comprehensive strategy for enforcement. Among the criticisms highlighted in that report were the lack of enforcement actions brought by DOJ, as well as issues of vagueness in the terms and breadth of the statute. Some Members of Congress have introduced legislation to amend FARA following the Inspector General's report and other allegations that potential misconduct by foreign agents is not currently policed under the statute. For example, the Disclosing Foreign Influence Act (H.R. 4170; S. 2039) would repeal the FARA exemption that allows foreign agents to file under domestic lobbying regulations in lieu of the Act; would provide DOJ with authority to make civil investigative demands to investigate potential FARA violations; and would require DOJ to develop a comprehensive enforcement strategy for FARA, with review of its effects by the agency's Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office. The bills' sponsors have explained that the bills are intended to address "ambiguous requirements for those lobbying on behalf of foreign governments," which "has, over the years, led to a sharp drop in the number of registrations and the prospect of widespread abuses."
This report examines the nature and scope of the current regulatory scheme, including the scope of FARA's application to agents of foreign principals; what the statute requires of those covered under the Act; exemptions available under the statute; and methods of enforcement. The report concludes by discussing various legislative proposals to amend FARA in the 115th Congress. |
crs_R42015 | crs_R42015_0 | Introduction
On February 2, 2012, the Senate passed S. 2038 , the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (STOCK Act). The House, however, stripped Title II from S. 2038 , and the bill was enacted into public law without it. 2572 refers to the bill ordered to be reported as reflected in the Manager's Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute, as amended in Judiciary Committee markup. Application of the statutes to public corruption was based on the theory that the mail and wire fraud statutes protected both tangible as well as intangible property and that such intangible property included the right of an employer or the public to the honest services of an employee or public official. Faced with vagueness challenges, the lower federal courts devised a number of standards to limit the scope of honest services mail and wire fraud. H.R. 2572 and Title II both would expand the mail and wire fraud definition of the term "scheme to defraud" to include a scheme "by a public official to engage in undisclosed self-dealing." Bribery Changes
Section 20 1 : The bills also seek to overcome Sun Diamond and Valdes , two judicial interpretations of the basic federal bribery and illegal gratuities statute, 18 U.S.C. 201—bribery and illegal gratuities alike—to cases involving $1,000 or more. 2572 , alone, would increase the penalty for bribery of U.S. officials from 15 to 20 years, and for illegal gratuities from 2 to 5 years. The statute of limitations for certain securities fraud cases, for instance, is six years. The bills would amend the venue statute to permit trial of an offense, involving use of the mail or interstate commerce or entry of individual or goods into the United States, "in any district in which an act in furtherance of the offense is committed." H.R. H.R. Section 641 now prohibits the theft or embezzlement of federal property. H.R. 2572 , unlike Title II, would expand the section to cover property of the District of Columbia. | The House Judiciary Committee has approved an amended version of the Clean Up Government Act (H.R. 2572). The Senate has passed nearly identical provisions as Title II of the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act (STOCK Act; S. 2038). Title II, however, was dropped from the bill prior to its enactment as P.L. 112-105, 126 Stat. 291 (2012). Among other things, Title II and H.R. 2572 would each:
Expand the scope of federal mail and wire fraud statutes to reach undisclosed self-dealing by public officials—in response to Skilling. Amend the definition of official act for bribery purposes—to overcome the Valdes decision. Adjust the federal gratuities provision to reach "goodwill" gifts—in response to Sun Diamond. Increase the criminal penalties that attend various bribery, illegal gratuities, embezzlement statutes, and related provisions. Extend the statute of limitations from five to six years for several corruption offenses. Authorize the trial of perjury and obstruction charges in the district of the adversely effected judicial proceedings. Authorize the trial of multi-district cases in any district in which an act in furtherance is committed. Increase the number of public corruption offenses considered and wiretap predicate offenses.
H.R. 2572, alone, would:
Increase the maximum penalties under the federal bribery and illegal gratuities statute. Amend the federal law criminalizing the theft or embezzlement of federal property to include property of the District of Columbia. Limit the prosecution of bribery and illegal gratuity cases under 18 U.S.C. 201 to cases involving $1,000 or more.
This is an abridged version of a longer report, CRS Report R42016, Prosecution of Public Corruption: An Overview of Amendments Under H.R. 2572 and S. 2038, by [author name scrubbed], without the footnotes, attribution, or citations to authority found in the longer report. Related CRS reports include CRS Report R40852, Deprivation of Honest Services as a Basis for Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Convictions, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R41930, Mail and Wire Fraud: A Brief Overview of Federal Criminal Law, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RL33180 | crs_RL33180_0 | § 2241, provided federal courts with jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus petitions by or on behalf of persons detained at Guantanamo. Second, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia began to hear the dozens of habeas cases filed on behalf of the detainees, with different judges reaching conflicting conclusions as to whether the detainees had any enforceable rights available other than the bare right to petition for habeas . The DTA also eliminated the federal courts' statutory jurisdiction over habeas claims by aliens challenging their detention at Guantanamo Bay, but provided for limited appeals of status determinations made pursuant to the DOD procedures for CSRTs, along with final decisions by military commissions. However, in the 2006 case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld , the Supreme Court interpreted the provision eliminating federal habeas jurisdiction as being inapplicable to cases that were pending at the time the DTA was enacted, permitting it to review the validity of military commissions established pursuant to President Bush's 2001 military order. Circuit panel ruling in the case of Kiyemba v. Obama , in which the appellate court held that federal habeas courts lack the authority to order the release of Guantanamo detainees into the United States, even when those detainees are found to be unlawfully held and the government is unable to effectuate their release to a foreign country. In March 2009, the Obama Administration announced a new definitional standard for the government's authority to detain terrorist suspects, which no longer employs the phrase "enemy combatant" to refer to perso ns who may be properly detained, although the new standard is largely similar in scope to the "enemy combatant" standard used earlier. The Obama Administration standard would permit the detention of members of the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and associated forces, along with persons who provide "substantial support" (rather than merely "support") to such groups, regardless of whether these individuals were captured away from the battlefield in Afghanistan. Circuit panel held in the case of Al-Bihani v. Obama that support for or membership in an AUMF-targeted organization may be independently sufficient to justify military detention, without proof that the detainee committed any hostile act. This report provides an overview of the early judicial developments and the establishment of CSRT procedures; summarizes selected court cases related to the detentions and the use of military commissions; and discusses the Detainee Treatment Act, as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2006 and the Military Commissions Act of 2009, analyzing its effects on detainee-related litigation in federal court. Pre-Boumediene v. Bush Court Challenges to the Detention Policy
While the Supreme Court clarified in Rasul (and later Boumediene , discussed infra ) that detainees currently held at Guantanamo have recourse to federal courts to challenge their detention, the extent to which they may enforce any rights they may have under the Geneva Conventions and other law continues to remain unclear. The provision does not create a cause of action for detainees to ask a court for relief based on inconsistent treatment, and it divests the courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges by those detained at Guantanamo Bay based on their treatment or living conditions. In Boumediene v. Bush , discussed infra , the Supreme Court held that MCA § 7 acted as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and authorized Guantanamo detainees to petition federal district courts for habeas review of CSRT determinations of their enemy combatant status. This definitional standard is largely similar to that used by the Bush Administration to detain terrorist suspects as "enemy combatants." The scope of the Executive's detention authority under the AUMF and the law of war has been subject to conflicting rulings in the D.C. This might have left some detainees without effective means to pursue a DTA challenge. In January 2010, a D.C. Judge Bates held that the circumstances surrounding the detention of the petitioners in Al Maqaleh were "virtually identical to the detainees in Boumediene – they are [non-U.S.] citizens who were ... apprehended in foreign lands far from the United States and brought to yet another country for detention" Applying the factors discussed in Boumediene as being relevant to a determination of the extraterritorial scope of the writ of habeas corpus , Judge Bates concluded that the writ extended to three of the four petitioners at issue in Al Maqaleh , who were not Afghan citizens. | After the Supreme Court held that federal courts have jurisdiction under the federal habeas corpus statute to hear legal challenges on behalf of persons detained at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in connection with the conflict against Al Qaeda and associated groups (Rasul v. Bush), the Pentagon established administrative hearings, called "Combatant Status Review Tribunals" (CSRTs), to allow the detainees to contest their status as enemy combatants, and informed them of their right to pursue habeas relief in federal court. Lawyers subsequently filed dozens of petitions on behalf of the detainees in the District Court for the District of Columbia, where district court judges reached inconsistent conclusions as to whether the detainees have any enforceable rights to challenge their treatment and detention.
Congress subsequently passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) to divest the courts of jurisdiction to hear some detainees' challenges by eliminating the federal courts' statutory jurisdiction over habeas claims (as well as other causes of action) by aliens detained at Guantanamo. The DTA provided for limited appeals of CSRT determinations or final decisions of military commissions. After the Supreme Court rejected the view that the DTA left it without jurisdiction to review a habeas challenge to the validity of military commissions in the case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA) (P.L. 109-366) to authorize the President to convene military commissions and to amend the DTA to further reduce detainees' access to federal courts, including in cases already pending.
In 2008, the Supreme Court ruled in Boumediene v. Bush that aliens detained at Guantanamo have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus, and the judicial review mechanism provided by the MCA and DTA by which detainees could challenge the legality of their detention did not provide a constitutionally adequate habeas substitute. The immediate impact of the Boumediene decision is that detainees at Guantanamo may petition a federal district court for habeas review of the legality and possibly the circumstances of their detention, perhaps including challenges to the jurisdiction of military commissions. Several issues remain unresolved and are the subject of ongoing litigation, including the constitutional protections owed to detainees held at Guantanamo and other locations outside the United States; the substantive scope of military detention authority; the procedural standards used to assess the adequacy of evidence supporting a detainee's designation as an enemy belligerent; and the authority of federal habeas courts to compel the release of detainees determined to be unlawfully held into the United States if the Executive cannot effectuate their release to another country. The Supreme Court was expected to consider some of these issues in the case of Kiyemba v. Obama, but changed circumstances surrounding some of the petitioners resulted in the Court remanding the case back to the D.C. Circuit for further consideration.
In March 2009, the Obama Administration announced a new definitional standard for the government's authority to detain terrorist suspects, which is largely similar in scope to the "enemy combatant" standard used by the Bush Administration to detain terrorist suspects. The standard would permit the detention of members of the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and associated forces, along with persons who provide "substantial support" to such groups, regardless of whether such persons were captured away from the battlefield in Afghanistan. Courts that have considered the Executive's authority to detain under the AUMF and law of war have reached differing conclusions as to the scope of this detention authority. In January 2010, a D.C. Circuit panel held that support for or membership in an AUMF-targeted organization may constitute a sufficient ground to justify military detention. |
crs_RL33171 | crs_RL33171_0 | Twenty-four years ago, the broad tax revisions implemented by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 ( P.L. 99-514 ) were based on tax "neutrality"—the idea that economic efficiency and economic welfare are promoted if the distorting impact of taxes on business and other economic decisions is minimized. To this end, the 1986 act broadened the tax base for both businesses and individuals, scaling back various narrowly-applicable tax preferences and benefits, and reduced the statutory tax rate. In time, however, the general thrust of business-tax policy began to change, and in recent years policy has been guided more by a concern for the level of investment and capital formation, as well as the perceived impact of taxes on U.S. competitiveness. Thus, measures designed to promote tax-consistency across investments and activities have been supplanted by provisions designed to stimulate investment and assist in the ability of U.S. firms to compete with foreign companies. In contrast to 1986, however, much of the recent interest in reform has centered on a shift in the tax base to consumption rather than a comprehensive measure of income—a change in focus that is based, in part, on the same concerns for capital formation and competitiveness that underlie much of recent business-tax legislation. Twenty-four years after the 1986 act, business taxation is thus potentially at a crossroads. Another structural component of the system is the alternative minimum tax (AMT). Thus, to the conclusion that business taxes have generally declined in the post-World War II period, there is an additional important result: corporate investment remains relatively heavily taxed compared to non-corporate business and (especially) owner-occupied housing. Business Taxes and Capital Formation
Because they apply to the return on investment, business taxes can potentially reduce the economy's overall level of investment and its stock of capital. And while business taxes likely have little impact on long-run growth and capital formation, they do affect the allocation of investment among different uses and thus affect economic efficiency. This picture of the long-run burden of the corporate tax has implications for the vertical equity of the tax system—that is, its distribution across income classes. But the overall impact of the U.S. system is uncertain. Thus, if the validity of a separate corporate income tax is accepted, one hypothetical direction that tax reform might take is to move in the direction of a more pure version of the "classical" system of taxing corporate income—to eliminate the various omissions in the tax base and non-neutralities embedded in the current system. Corporate Tax Integration
As described above in the section on the economic effects of business taxation, the current "classical" system of taxing corporate income results in a number of distortions in the allocation of investment, thus reducing economic efficiency and causing a concomitant reduction in economic welfare. Business Taxes under Consumption or Flat Taxes
Either tax integration or a tax based on a comprehensive measure of income would qualify as fundamental tax reform. Their general effect on business taxes, however, would be the same: income from new business investment would be exempt from tax under each form. | A foundation of the broad tax revisions implemented 24 years ago by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was tax "neutrality"—the idea that economic efficiency and economic welfare are promoted if the distorting impact of taxes on business and other economic decisions is minimized. Based on this principle, the 1986 act broadened the tax base and reduced statutory tax rates set forth by the tax code. In time, however, the underlying thrust of tax policy has changed. Rather than neutrality and efficiency, recent business tax legislation has been guided more by a concern for promoting investment and capital formation, and by attention to the perceived impact of taxes on the ability of U.S. firms to compete with foreign companies. Further, recent interest in fundamental tax reform has been partly stimulated by these same concerns for capital formation and competitiveness.
Twenty-four years after the 1986 act, business tax policy is thus potentially at a crossroads, and it is useful to take stock of where the system stands, the economic effects it is known to have, and the principal options for reform. Several data series show a similar pattern in the level of corporate taxes: corporate income taxes have generally declined over the post-World War II period. At the same time, however, significant disparities in the structure of business taxes have remained, suggesting a persistence of distortions caused by the tax system: corporate-sector investment remains heavily taxed compared to non-corporate business and owner-occupied housing; debt is favored over equity; and equipment is favored over structures.
The base of business taxation is the return to business investment; business taxes thus influence the economy through their impact on investment. In broad terms, business taxes can, at least in principle, reduce capital formation and thus impair long-term economic growth by making saving and investment less attractive. This effect, however, depends on a robust saving response to taxes, the presence of which is uncertain. Another impact is on the allocation of investment among different sectors and asset types. Here, business taxes likely distort investment decisions, reducing economic efficiency and economic welfare. In the case of equity, economic theory suggests that in the long run, the burden of business taxation is shared among all owners of capital and has a progressive effect on the tax system.
Various hypothetical alternatives exist for reforming the business tax system. One possibility is to move in the direction of the 1986 Tax Reform Act by broadening the existing tax base—that is, by eliminating tax benefits and preferences. Another possibility—and one that is favored by many economists—is to adopt some form of tax integration that would eliminate the double taxation of corporate income. A third option is to adopt a form of consumption tax, under which new business investment would be exempt from tax. Either corporate tax integration or a consumption tax could improve economic efficiency, but only if the design were to avoid the types of distortions present in the current system.
This report will be updated in the event of major changes in the business tax system. |
crs_RS22548 | crs_RS22548_0 | ATPA Overview
The United States extends duty-free treatment to certain imports from Ecuador under a regional trade preference program that began under the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA). ATPA was enacted on December 4, 1991 (Title II of P.L. It lapsed on December 4, 2001, and was renewed and modified on August 6, 2002, under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA; Title XXXI of P.L. 107-210 ). Since the enactment of ATPDEA, Congress has favored extending ATPA for short periods of time. The 113 th Congress may consider whether or not to renew ATPA, especially since Ecuador is now the only remaining designated beneficiary country. The most recent extension renewed trade preferences for Colombia and Ecuador until July 31, 2013, as part of the implementing legislation for the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The FTA, formally known as the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, was approved by the Congress on October 12, 2011, and signed into law on October 21 ( P.L. 112-42 ). Section 201 of the implementing legislation specifically directed the President to terminate Colombia's designation as an ATPA beneficiary country upon the agreement's entry into force, which took place on May 15, 2012. Peru is no longer a designated beneficiary country under ATPA because the United States and Peru also have a free trade agreement, which entered into force on February 1, 2009 ( P.L. Thus, Bolivia can only be reinstated as a beneficiary country under ATPA if Congress approves legislation to do so. The act (as a complement to crop eradication, interdiction, and other counter-narcotics efforts) was intended to promote economic growth in the Andean region and to encourage a shift away from dependence on illegal drugs by supporting legitimate economic activities. ATPA Impact
The effects of ATPA on the U.S. economy have likely been minimal because the amount of U.S. trade with the region is low and the value of ATPA imports is very small as a percentage of total U.S. trade. The value of duty-free U.S. imports under ATPA accounts for less than 0.5% of total U.S. imports and a very small percentage of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). According to the USITC study, the impact of the ATPA on coca production in Andean countries has been small and mostly indirect. The study reports that, according to U.S. State Department data, illegal coca cultivation fell substantially in the Andean countries of Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, from an estimated 20-year peak of 232,500 hectares (ha) in 2007 to 187,000 ha in 2010. The ATPA, in combination with other alternative development programs, may have helped support job growth in export sectors such as fresh-cut flowers, asparagus, bananas, and pineapples, which possibly expanded alternatives to workers who may have otherwise engaged in drug-crop production. The Ecuadorian government's announcement that it no longer wanted to receive ATPA preferences may have ended the debate for Congress on whether or not to renew ATPA. On June 27, 2013, top Ecuadorian government officials announced that the country was renouncing trade preferences from the United States under ATPA. Critics of ATPA argue that unilateral trade programs are ineffective; that the ATPA has forced U.S. producers to compete with lower-cost Andean imports; and that trade preferences should not be extended to countries that do not support U.S. foreign and trade policies. Ecuador is also a beneficiary of the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program. | The Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) extends duty-free treatment to certain U.S. imports that meet domestic content and other requirements from Ecuador. There were four countries originally designated to qualify for trade preferences under ATPA, including Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Colombia and Peru are no longer designated beneficiary countries because both countries have free trade agreements with the United States that have entered into force. In the case of Bolivia, trade preferences were suspended in December 2008 because Bolivia failed to meet ATPA eligibility criteria related to counter-narcotics cooperation. Bolivia may only be reinstated as a beneficiary country under ATPA if Congress approves legislation to do so.
The purpose of ATPA is to promote economic growth in the Andean region and to encourage a shift away from dependence on illegal drugs by supporting legitimate economic activities. ATPA (Title II of P.L. 102-182) was enacted on December 4, 1991. It was renewed and modified under the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA; Title XXXI of P.L. 107-210) on August 6, 2002, extending trade preferences until December 31, 2006. Since that time, Congress has provided several short-term extensions of ATPA. The most recent extension took place on October 12, 2011, when the 112th Congress enacted implementing legislation for the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (P.L. 112-42). As part of the free trade agreement (FTA) implementing legislation, ATPA was renewed for Colombia and Ecuador until July 31, 2013. The implementing legislation directed the President to terminate Colombia's status as a designated beneficiary country once the agreement entered into force. The U.S.-Colombia FTA entered into force on May 15, 2012.
The impact of the ATPA on coca production in Andean countries has been small and mostly indirect, according to a 2012 study by the U.S. International Trade Commission. The study reports that illegal coca cultivation fell substantially in Andean countries from a 20-year peak of 232,500 hectares in 2007 to 187,000 in 2010. The study also reports that the ATPA, in combination with other alternative development programs, may indirectly have helped support job growth in certain exports from Andean countries, such as fresh-cut flowers, asparagus, bananas, and pineapples.
The trade effects of ATPA on the U.S. economy have been minimal because the amount of U.S. trade with the Andean region is low. The value of duty-free U.S. imports under ATPA accounts for about 0.8% of total U.S. imports, or 0.1% of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). Over 80% of U.S. imports from ATPA countries enter duty-free under various trade preference programs or through normal trade relations.
The 113th Congress may consider whether or not to continue renewing ATPA for Ecuador. Policymakers may also consider broader reform of U.S. trade preference programs, including the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Some Members of Congress maintain that ATPA has been responsible for helping the Andean region progress economically over the 18-year life of the program. Critics of ATPA argue that unilateral trade programs are ineffective and that trade preferences should not be extended to countries that do not support U.S. foreign and trade policies. The Ecuadorian government's announcement that it no longer wanted to receive ATPA preferences may have overshadowed the debate for Congress on whether or not to renew ATPA. On June 27, 2013, top Ecuadorian government officials announced that the country was renouncing trade preferences from the United States under ATPA. |
crs_98-840 | crs_98-840_0 | Trade is one of the more enduring issues in contemporary U.S.-Latin America relations. U.S.-Latin America Trade Agreements
Latin American countries have made noted progress in trade liberalization over the past three decades, reducing tariffs significantly and entering into multiple subregional agreements of their own. This development in thinking presented an opportunity for the United States, which has supported deeper regional integration, in part because it has been widely viewed as beneficial for both economic and foreign policy reasons. The United States has implemented comprehensive bilateral or plurilateral reciprocal trade agreements with most of its important trade partners in Latin America. These include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), and bilateral FTAs with Chile and Peru. FTAs with Panama and Colombia have been signed but not implemented, pending congressional action. The FTAA encountered resistance in part because it represented an extension of the same trade model used by the United States in bilateral agreements. Many countries south of the Caribbean Basin have been reluctant to enter into such a deal because it does not meet their primary negotiation objectives. Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela are less compelled to capitulate to U.S. demands because they are far less dependent on the U.S. economy than countries in the Caribbean Basin, do not rely on U.S. regional unilateral preferential arrangements (e.g., the Andean Trade Preference Act or the Caribbean Basin Initiative), and would have to redefine their subregional trade pacts. Trends in U.S.-Latin American Trade
Latin America is far from the largest U.S. regional trade partner (see Figure 1 for U.S. direction of trade), but it has long been one of the fastest-growing ones. Between 1998 and 2009, total U.S. merchandise trade (exports plus imports) with Latin America grew by 82% compared to 72% for Asia (driven largely by China), 51% for the European Union, 221% for Africa, and 64% for the world (individual country data appear in Appendix A and Appendix B .). Mexico composed 11.7% of total U.S. merchandise trade (exports plus imports) in 2009 and is the largest Latin American trade partner, accounting for 58% of the region's trade with the United States. These trends point to a long history of economic integration between the two countries, in part the result of their deliberate trade liberalization efforts, including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). By contrast, the rest of Latin America together makes up only 8.3% of U.S. trade, leaving significant room for growth. The result in the Western Hemisphere has been the proliferation of reciprocal bilateral and plurilateral agreements. Another option is to move incrementally, where possible, toward harmonization or convergence of the vast array of trade arrangements in the Western Hemisphere, which may be more widely acceptable at some point. One example would be to expand rules of origin and cumulation provisions incrementally to broaden the allowable movement of goods from and through countries with reasonably similar agreements. This would provide capacity building and help overcome supply-side constraints in areas such as port and customs operations modernization, infrastructure investment, technology enhancement, and development of common standards in general. These are often major constraints to the more fluid movement of goods in Latin American countries. For one, they may be difficult to implement and monitor, but nonetheless could provide marginal benefits in light of the apparent hiatus in moving toward a broad and comprehensive hemispheric trade agreement. | Trade is one of the more enduring issues in contemporary U.S.-Latin America relations. Latin America is far from the largest U.S. regional trade partner, but historically is the fastest-growing one. Between 1998 and 2009, total U.S. merchandise trade (exports plus imports) with Latin America grew by 82% compared to 72% for Asia (driven largely by China), 51% for the European Union, 221% for Africa, and 64% for the world. Mexico composed 11.7% of total U.S. merchandise trade in 2009 and is the largest Latin American trade partner. It accounted for 58% of the region's trade with the United States, the result of a long history of economic integration between the two countries. By contrast, the rest of Latin America together makes up only 8.3% of U.S. trade, half of which is trade with Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela.
Latin American countries have made noted progress in trade liberalization, reducing tariffs significantly and entering into their own regional agreements. This development presented an opportunity for the United States, which has supported deeper regional integration because it has been widely viewed as beneficial for both economic and foreign policy reasons. The United States has implemented comprehensive bilateral or plurilateral reciprocal trade agreements with most of its important trade partners in Latin America. These include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), and bilateral FTAs with Chile and Peru. FTAs with Panama and Colombia have been signed but not implemented, pending congressional action.
Some of the largest economies in South America, however, are not part of U.S. FTAs and have resisted a region-wide agreement, the Free Trade Areas of the Americas (FTAA), in part because it represented an extension of the same trade model used by the United States in bilateral agreements. Many countries south of the Caribbean Basin have been reluctant to enter into such a deal because it does not meet their primary negotiation objectives. Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela are less compelled to capitulate to U.S. demands because they are far less dependent on the U.S. economy than countries in the Caribbean Basin, do not rely on U.S. regional unilateral preferential arrangements (e.g., the Caribbean Basin Initiative or Andean Trade Preference Act), and would have to redefine their subregional trade pacts.
The result in the Western Hemisphere has been an expansive system of disparate bilateral and plurilateral agreements, which are widely understood to be a second-best solution for reaping the benefits of trade liberalization. Alternatives to a new round of currently unpopular FTAs are being debated. It has been suggested, for example, that FTAs be revised, enhancing controversial environment, labor, and other chapters. The response in Latin America, however, has been tepid. Another option is to move incrementally toward harmonization or convergence of the many trade arrangements in the Western Hemisphere by adopting administrative solutions where possible. One example is to expand rules of origin and cumulation provisions.
With respect to FTA implementation, another critical issue is the provision of trade capacity building and other technical assistance to address supply-side constraints in areas such as port and customs operations modernization, infrastructure investment, technology enhancement, and development of common standards in general. These are often major constraints to the more fluid movement of goods in Latin American countries. It is uncertain what the next step in Western Hemisphere economic integration may be, and these alternatives may be difficult to implement and monitor. But at the margin, they could provide benefits in light of the apparent hiatus in moving ahead with either a multilateral or hemispheric trade accord. |
crs_RL33625 | crs_RL33625_0 | Introduction
State laws that require parental involvement in a pregnant minor's abortion decision have gained greater visibility in light of recent attempts by Congress to criminalize the interstate transport of a minor to obtain an abortion. At least forty-four states have enacted statutes that require a minor to seek either parental notification or parental consent before obtaining an abortion. This report discusses the validity of state parental involvement laws in the context of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey , Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England , and other U.S. Supreme Court cases that address a minor's right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy. In addition to examining the relevant abortion decisions, this report reviews the state parental involvement laws, and discusses the availability of judicial bypass procedures and exceptions for medical emergencies. The report also highlights recent federal parental involvement legislation and provides a survey of current state parental involvement laws. | State laws that require parental involvement in a pregnant minor's abortion decision have gained greater visibility in light of recent attempts by Congress to criminalize the interstate transport of a minor to obtain an abortion. At least forty-four states have enacted statutes that require a minor to seek either parental notification or parental consent before obtaining an abortion. This report discusses the validity of state parental involvement laws in the context of Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, and other U.S. Supreme Court cases that address a minor's right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy. The report reviews the various state parental involvement laws, and discusses the availability of judicial bypass procedures and exceptions for medical emergencies. The report also highlights recent federal parental involvement legislation and provides a survey of current state parental involvement laws. |
crs_RL33738 | crs_RL33738_0 | In 1974, Congress enacted broad disaster assistance legislation, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act). This report describes CCP and other programs administered by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA, an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services, HHS) to provide federal assistance for the mental health and substance abuse treatment needs of disaster victims. The report also analyzes the implementation, effectiveness and coordination of other SAMHSA disaster mental health programs, and discusses relevant policy issues in ensuring the provision of mental health and substance abuse treatment services following disasters. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. For its response to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma, SAMHSA received funding to administer CCP programs, and provided SERG grants through its regular appropriations, but did not receive a supplemental appropriation. Issues for Congress
This section discusses several policy issues, including federal leadership and coordination of mental health and substance abuse treatment and other services in the aftermath of a disaster; issues regarding CCP, including the scope and duration of CCP services, as well as matters of program administration and effectiveness; the availability of funds for SERG grants; and, the assessment of resources and needs for mental health and substances abuse services. Hence, federal leadership for disaster mental health in the NRP is delegated to both FEMA and to HHS. Appendix A lists CCP awards to states for ISP and RSP programs in response to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma, as reported by SAMHSA. A recent news report has questioned whether the activities carried out in Project H.O.P.E., the CCP program established in Florida in response to Hurricane Wilma (See "Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program"), are likely to benefit the mental health of victims. Section 219 of the bill would require that SAMHSA, other relevant federal agencies, and state and local governments, conduct resource assessments and develop strategies to address mental health and substance abuse service needs following disasters. ( S. 3721 would also expand CCP to cover substance abuse services. The federal programs set up to address mental health and substance abuse problems in those affected by the 2005 hurricanes offer opportunities for scrutiny. | Major disasters such as Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, which struck Gulf Coast states in 2005, have the potential not only to cause mental health problems for individuals, but also to weaken or disable the systems designed to address those individuals' needs. Striking an appropriate balance of responsiveness, fiscal responsibility, and accountability in the provision of federal assistance programs during and following a disaster remains a difficult goal.
Federal leadership for mental health and substance abuse programs resides in the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). SAMHSA carries out numerous activities to address mental health and substance abuse problems following disasters, including the Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program (CCP), which is authorized in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act) and implemented jointly by SAMHSA and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
The response to the 2005 hurricanes has prompted a re-examination of CCP and other federal assistance programs that address disaster mental health. Concerns include the timeliness and effectiveness of services provided, the appropriate scope and duration of these services, and matters of cost and accountability. In particular, the respective roles and responsibilities of SAMHSA (which provides technical expertise for CCP programs), FEMA (which funds them), and states and their contractors (which implement them), are not always clear.
Following a news investigation, some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about Project H.O.P.E., the CCP program implemented in Florida in response to Hurricane Wilma. Others have sought to expand CCP to provide substance abuse services, and to require that SAMHSA, other federal agencies, and state and local governments conduct resource assessments and develop strategies to address mental health and substance abuse service needs following disasters. (See S. 3721, reported in the Senate.)
This report describes federal assistance programs in HHS that address mental health and substance abuse problems following disasters. In addition, relevant policy issues are presented in the context of the 2005 hurricanes, and several prior disasters. Three appendices provide information on CCP awards made to states in response to Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, and on the scope of services that constitute mental health treatment. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant. |
crs_R45395 | crs_R45395_0 | Introduction
One defendant robbed local drug dealers. In the case of the Hobbs Act where Congress sought to exercise its Commerce Clause powers to the fullest, the courts have held that the impact on commerce in an individual case may be minimal, even de minimis . Aiding and Abetting, Attempt, and Conspiracy
The Hobbs Act explicitly condemns not just robbery, but also attempts to rob and conspiracies to rob. § 2, it also condemns aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act robbery. Sentencing
Hobbs Act robbery offenses are punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years. In addition, a defendant whose violation involved a firearm may have committed a second, separate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). RICO violations are punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years. Violations of section 1956 carry a penalty of imprisonment for not more than 20 years. Extortion
Hobbs Act extortion comes in two forms. Regardless of form, Hobbs Act extortion and Hobbs Act robbery share many of the same elements as is obvious from a display of its components:
(1)Whoever
(2) in any way or degree
(3) (a) obstructs,
(b) delays, or
(c) affects
(4) (a) commerce or
(b) the movement of any article or commodity in commerce,
(5)(a) by extortion, i.e .,
(i) [knowing and willful]
(ii) obtaining the property of another
(iii) with his consent
(iv) (A) induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened
(I) force, or
(II) violence, or
(III) fear of injury, or
(B) under color of official right
(b) attempts or
(c) conspires so to do, or
(d) commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both
Whoever
Again, the term "whoever" in federal law refers to an individual as well as to legal entities such as corporations, labor organizations, and unincorporated associations. In Enmons , the Supreme Court explained that the word "wrongful" as used in the Hobbs Act extortion provision refers to the use of force, violence, or fear to obtain property to which the extortionist has no lawful claim. Color of Official Right
Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right occurs when a "public official has obtained a payment to which he is not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts." It envisions a corrupt this-for-that ( quid pro quo ). Aiding and Abetting, Attempt, and Conspiracy
As is true of Hobbs Act robbery, section 1951 proscribes obstructing commerce by means of extortion, and attempting or conspiring to do so. Sentencing
Hobbs Act extortion, attempts, and conspiracies are all punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years. Hobbs Act extortion, however, qualifies as a predicate offense under RICO, the money laundering statutes, and the Travel Act. | The Hobbs Act proscribes obstructing commerce by means of robbery or extortion or attempting or conspiring to do so. The Act applies to individuals and legal entities alike. It permits prosecutions, although the impact on commerce may be minimal. It condemns the robbery—knowingly taking the property of another by force or threat—of drug dealers, mom-and-pop markets, and multinational corporations.
Attempted Hobbs Act robbery consists of an intent to rob, coupled with a substantial step toward that objective; conspiracy, a scheme of two or more to rob or extort; and accomplice liability, aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act violation of another.
Hobbs Act robbery, punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years, often occurs in confluence with the use of a firearm during and in furtherance of its commission, a fact that triggers the mandatory minimum sentences authorized in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The facts present in a Hobbs Act robbery case may also implicate violations of (1) the federal racketeering statute punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years and (2) the federal money laundering statutes, likewise punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years.
Hobbs Act extortion comes in two forms. One is akin to robbery, the other to bribery. Neither requires but a minimal impact on commerce. Both view individuals as well as organizations as potential defendants. As a robbery look-alike, it outlaws the wrongful use of force or fear to induce another to surrender property to which the aggressor has no lawful claim. As a bribery look-alike, it outlaws corrupt quid pro quos, i.e., a public official obtaining a payment, to which he is not entitled, in anticipation of the performance of an official act. The proscriptions also apply to attempt or conspiracy to commit either variety of Hobbs Act extortion and may implicate accomplice liability (aiding and abetting) as well.
Hobbs Act extortion in either form is punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years. Moreover, in addition to the racketeering and money laundering, the facts in a Hobbs Act extortion case may also implicate the Travel Act, which condemns interstate travel to promote an extortion or bribery scheme and that carries a penalty of imprisonment for not more than five years. |
crs_RL32938 | crs_RL32938_0 | There are more than 9,000 local election jurisdictions in the United States. The demographic characteristics of LEOs are unusual for a groupof government officials. About one-quarter of LEOs are men, about 5% belong to minority groups,40% are college graduates, and 8% have graduate degrees. Increasingly, jurisdictions have turned to computer-assisted voting systems -- especially optical scanand direct recording electronic (DRE) systems. About half of jurisdictions with optical scan systems use precinctcount. (12)
LEOs are highly satisfied with whatever voting systems they areusing now. There was little variation in the degree of satisfactionwith different kinds of voting systems, but the differences are illuminating:
The most highly rated systems were precinct-count optical scan and DREs,which are the most compatible of current systems with the goals and requirements of HAVA. Most jurisdictions acquiring new voting systems choose those thathelp voters avoid errors. While LEOs tend to be very satisfiedwith the systems that they are using, they have more reservations about other kinds. This issue was also examined more specifically for DREs and optical scan users. (16) Most DRE users (70%)do not support the use of VVPAT and most do not plan to add them to their voting systems, whereasabout 70% of LEOs not using DREs do support VVPAT. The Help America Vote Act (HAVA): Impacts and Attitudes
HAVA requirements and funding have been a major factor in the adoption of new votingsystems by LEOs. (18)
Most LEOs consider themselves familiar with and knowledgeableabout HAVA. LEOs believe that HAVA is making some improvements in theelectoral process. The survey asked LEOs to rate the degree to which HAVA hasresulted in improvements in elections in their jurisdictions -- from no improvement to majorimprovement. A comparison of how LEOs rated HAVA overall with other characteristics of the officials suggeststhat younger officials who are comfortable with technology and familiar with HAVA tended to besupportive of the legislation. The threemost common areas for improvement listed were federal funding, registration and voteridentification, and provisional ballots. They felt equally strongly that the recommendations of those vendors can be trusted. LEOs do not believe that vendors are very influential in decisionsabout acquiring new voting systems. Election Officials. Survey results are consistent with that view. Some surveyresults suggest areas of potential professional improvement, such as in education and in professionalinvolvement at the national level. Thesurvey revealed that LEOs who have experience with DREs are very confident in them and do notgenerally support the addition of a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) to address securityconcerns. The strongly dichotomous results suggest that as Congress considers whetherto require the use of VVPAT or similar security mechanisms, it might be useful to determine whetherDRE users are overconfident in the security of their systems or, alternatively, whether nonusers needto be better educated about the reliability and security of DRE systems. | There are more than 9,000 local election jurisdictions in the United States. Local electionofficials (LEOs) are responsible for administering elections in those jurisdictions. LEOs aretherefore critical to the successful implementation of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA, P.L. 107-252 ) and state election laws, but there has been little objective information on theperceptions and attitudes of those officials about election reform. This report, which will not beupdated, discusses the results of a recent scientific survey of LEOs. The findings may be useful toCongress in considering funding and possible reauthorization of HAVA.
The demographic characteristics of LEOs are unusual for a group of government officials. Almost three-quarters are women, and 5% belong to minority groups. Most do not have a collegedegree, and most were elected to their positions. Some survey results suggest areas of potentialprofessional improvement, such as in education and in professional involvement at the national level.
Over the past 20 years, jurisdictions have turned increasingly to computer-assisted votingsystems -- especially optical scan and direct recording electronic (DRE) systems. The mostimportant factors reported by LEOs in the acquisition of new systems are federal and staterequirements and funding. HAVA encourages but does not require systems that detect voter error,but it does require that voting machines be available that are fully accessible to persons withdisabilities. About half of jurisdictions with optical scan systems use central-count, which cannothelp voters to correct mistakes before casting the ballot. However, most jurisdictions acquiring newvoting systems are choosing either precinct-count optical scan or DREs, both of which can helpvoters avoid errors.
LEOs are generally highly satisfied with whatever voting systems they are using now. Theyhave less confidence in the performance and security of other systems. DRE users generally opposethe use of voter-verified paper audit trails (VVPAT) for DREs, but users of other systems favor it. This result could mean that users are overconfident in DREs or that nonusers are insufficientlyknowledgeable about them. LEOs also tend to favor new systems that have characteristics similarto what they have been using -- for example, lever machine users tend to favor DREs. LEOs trustthe voting system vendors they work with but do not believe that those vendors are very influentialin decisions about acquiring new voting systems.
LEOs consider themselves knowledgeable about and familiar with HAVA. They supportindividual provisions of the act, most strongly for federal funding and least strongly for provisionalballoting. To some extent, provisions rated more difficult to implement receive less support. MostLEOs believe that HAVA has resulted in some improvement in elections in their jurisdictions. Those rating HAVA higher overall tend to be younger, more comfortable with technology, and morefamiliar with the act. The areas for improvement of HAVA most commonly listed are federalfunding and the requirements for registration, voter identification, and provisional balloting. |
crs_RL32308 | crs_RL32308_0 | 108-447 ). FY2004 Appropriations
The FY2004 Transportation, Treasury, and Independent Agencies Appropriation was passed as part of the FY2004 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. ***The FY2005 Omnibus appropriations bill contains an across-the-board rescission of 0.80%; thatrescission is not reflected in these figures. 5025 , the FY2005 Transportation, Treasury, and Independent Agenciesappropriations bill, on July 23, 2004, but the bill was not officially reported out by the Committeeuntil September 9, 2004 ( H.Rept. The Committee recommended $89.9 billion. TheHouse of Representatives passed H.R. 5025 on September 22, 2004. During floor debate,the House cut some $47 billion in transportation funding from the $89.9 billion bill, as points oforder were raised against appropriations to programs lacking authorizing legislation. Since, at thatpoint, surface transportation programs had no authorizing legislation for FY2005, virtually allappropriations for highway and transit programs were eliminated; funding for Airport ImprovementProgram grants was eliminated as well. The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported out S. 2806 ( S.Rept. 108-342 ), their FY2005 Transportation, Treasury and General Government Appropriations bill, on September15, 2004. The Committee recommended $90.5 billion, $1.6 billion more than the Administrationrequest. The bill was thensent to the President, and was signed into law on December 8, 2004. The bill provides $90.6 billionfor the Departments of Transportation and the Treasury, and the independent agencies included inDivision H, minus a 0.80% across-the-board rescission which applies to the entire omnibus. During floor debate, appropriators struck funding for transportation programs that were not authorized for FY2005. This included the federal highway program, federal highway safetyprograms, the federal transit program, and Amtrak. *Because the transportation appropriations subcommittee chairman assured Members that the cuts made to transportation programs on the floor would be restored inconference, this table shows the figures recommended by the Committee onAppropriations. Railroad Safety. Conferees agreed on$3.6 billion. 5025 would also provide $177.0 million infunding for Treasury's departmental offices (or $1.9 million more than FY2004 but$8.0 million less than the amount the Bush Administration requested for FY2005),of which $21.8 million was designated for the operations of OFAC; $36.1 million forthe Treasury's systems and capital investments program (or $113,000 less thanFY2004 but identical to the amount requested for FY2005); $16.5 million forTreasury's Office of Inspector General (or $3.6 million more than FY2004 and $2.3million more than the amount requested for FY2005); $129.1 million for Treasury'sInspector General for Tax Administration (or $1.8 million more than FY2004 butidentical to the amount requested for FY2005); $2.0 million for the AirTransportation Stabilization Program (or $523,000 less than FY2004 and $800,000less than the amount requested for FY2005); $20.3 million for Treasury's buildingand annex repair and restoration program (or $4.5 million less than FY2004 butidentical to the amount requested for FY2005); $90.0 million for the FinancialCrimes Enforcement Network (after a House floor amendment added $25.5 million;the $90 million is $32.7 million more than FY2004 and $25.5 million more thanrequested for FY2005); $230.9 million for the Financial Management Service (or$3.7 million more than FY2004 but identical to the amount requested for FY2005);$82.5 million for the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (or $3.0 millionmore than FY2004 and $600,000 more than the amount requested for FY2005); and$175.2 million for the Bureau of the Public Debt (or $2.5 million more than FY2004and identical to the amount requested for FY2005). During the floor debate in the House on H.R. For a variety of reasons, the full Senate never voted on the bill. 528 ) to delete the provision. The Transportation, Treasury, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act funds all but three offices in the Executive Office of the President (EOP). The conference agreement and the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005 authorizes the transfers, but continues separate appropriations for the EOP accounts.With regard to the transfers, Section 533 of Title V of Division H of the ConsolidatedAppropriations Act provides that up to 10% of the appropriated funds among theaccounts for the
White House Office (including the Homeland Security Council), Executive Residence at the White House, White House Repair andRestoration, Office of Policy Development, Office of Administration, Council ofEconomic Advisers, National Security Council
Office of Management and Budget
Office of National Drug Control Policy
Special Assistance to the President and Official Residence ofthe Vice President (transfers would be subject to the approval of the VicePresident)
could be transferred to any other such appropriation, "to be merged with and available for the same time and for the same purposes as the appropriation to whichtransferred" by the OMB Director (or such other officer as the President maydesignate in writing). (89)
Title IV: Independent Agencies
Table 8. The Administration recommended dropping several such provisions. The resolutions noted thelongstanding policy of parity between both the military and civilian pay increases. 5025 had three provisions that would have eased Cuba sanctions. | The FY2005 Transportation, Treasury and Independent Agencies appropriations bill was passed as Division H of P.L. 108-447 , an omnibus appropriations bill, and was signed into law on December8, 2004. The bill provides $90.6 billion for Transportation, Treasury, and Independent Agencies. However, the bill also includes an across-the-board rescission of 0.80%, which will reduce theTransportation, Treasury, and Independent Agencies funding by approximately $725 million. Thiswill make the final figure $89.9 billion, slightly less than FY2004's $90.3 billion but more than theAdministration's request for FY2005.
For FY2005, the Administration requested $88.9 billion for the Departments of Transportation and the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President, and a variety of independent agencies. Thiswas $1.6 billion (1.7%) less than the amount enacted for FY2004.
On September 22, 2004, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 5025 , the Transportation, Treasury, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2005. The Committee onAppropriations had recommended $89.9 billion, an increase of $0.9 billion over the President'srequest and $495 million below the FY2004 level. During the House floor debate on the bill,sections of the bill appropriating funds for unauthorized programs were struck. Since at the time ofthe floor debate the surface transportation programs were not authorized for FY2005, the result wasthat funding for federal highway, highway safety, and transit programs was eliminated, as wasfunding for Amtrak and the Airport Improvement Program. In the end, the House cut some $47billion in transportation funding from the $89.9 billion bill reported by the Committee. The appropriation subcommittee chairman assured members that this funding would be restored inconference (for this reason, the tables in this bill do not reflect these cuts). The House bill includedseveral provisions similar to provisions that were included in the FY2004 House bill and that provedcontroversial. These included setting the FY2005 federal civilian pay increase at the same level theAdministration requested for the military (3.5% for FY2005), limits on the outsourcing ofgovernment work, and loosening of sanctions on Cuba.
On September 15, 2004 the Senate Committee on Appropriations reported out S. 2806 , their FY2005 Transportation, Treasury and General Government Appropriations bill. TheCommittee recommended $90.6 billion in funding and included provisions aligning the FY2005federal civilian pay increase with that of the military and limiting outsourcing of government work. This full Senate never acted on this bill.
The conferees dropped the provisions limiting outsourcing of government work and relaxing restrictions on Cuba. Final passage of the bill was delayed to allow Congress to delete a provisionthat would have given appropriators' access to individual tax return information. This report willnot be updated.
Key Policy Staff
DSP = Domestic Social Policy
G&F= Government & Finance
RSI = Resources, Science, and Industry Division. |
crs_R42940 | crs_R42940_0 | In an effort to accelerate this introduction, in the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Congress tasked the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) with safely integrating drones into the national airspace system by September 2015. Next, it will discuss theories of takings and property torts as they relate to drone flights over or near private property. It will then discuss the privacy interests implicated by drone surveillance conducted by private actors and the potential countervailing First Amendment rights to gather and receive news. Development of Aviation Law and Regulations
The predominant theory of airspace rights applied before the advent of aviation derived from the Roman Law maxim cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum , meaning whoever owns the land possesses all the space above the land extending upwards into the heavens. With the passage of the Federal Aviation Act in 1958, the administrator of the FAA was given "full responsibility and authority for the advancement and promulgation of civil aeronautics generally.... " This centralization of responsibility and creation of a uniform set of rules recognized that "aviation is unique among transportation industries in its relation to the federal government—it is the only one whose operations are conducted almost wholly within federal jurisdiction.... " The FAA continues to set uniform rules for the operation of aircraft in the national airspace. However, it left many questions unanswered. Finally, some courts have concluded that the altitude of the overhead flight has no determinative impact on whether a taking has occurred. One court explained: "Enjoyment of property at common law contemplated the entire bundle of rights and privileges that attached to the ownership of land.... Owners of fee simple estates ... clearly enjoy not only the right to put their land to a particular present use, but also to hold the land for investment and appreciation.... " However, other courts have rejected the idea that restrictions on uses by future inhabitants, without showing loss of property value, are relevant to a determination of the owner's own use and enjoyment of the property. Trespass and Nuisance Claims Against Private Actors
Although Causby arose from a Fifth Amendment takings claim, its articulation of airspace ownership standards is also often used in determining state law tort claims such as trespass and nuisance. With the ability to house high-powered cameras, infrared sensors, facial recognition technology, and license plate readers, some argue that drones present a substantial privacy risk. Undoubtedly, the government's use of drones for domestic surveillance operations implicates the Fourth Amendment and other applicable laws. Congressional Response
If Congress chooses to act, it could create privacy protections to protect individuals from intrusive drone surveillance conducted by private actors. As a threshold issue, it is not clear what level of deference a court would apply to this administrative action. Related Legal Issues
In addition to the legal issues described above, there are a host of other issues that may arise when introducing drones into the U.S. national airspace system. If these proposals were implemented, questions about federal preemption may be raised. There may be instances where a landowner is entitled to protect his property from intrusion by a drone. Additionally, as discussed above, determining whether a drone in flight is trespassing upon one's property may be unusually challenging. Stalking, Harassment, and Other Crimes. | Under the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, P.L. 112-95, Congress has tasked the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) with integrating unmanned aircraft systems (UASs), sometimes referred to as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones, into the national airspace system by September 2015. Although the text of this act places safety as a predominant concern, it fails to address significant, and up to this point, largely unanswered legal questions.
For instance, several legal interests are implicated by drone flight over or near private property. Might such a flight constitute a trespass? A nuisance? If conducted by the government, a constitutional taking? In the past, the Latin maxim cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum (for whoever owns the soil owns to the heavens) was sufficient to resolve many of these types of questions, but the proliferation of air flight in the 20th century has made this proposition untenable. Instead, modern jurisprudence concerning air travel is significantly more nuanced, and often more confusing. Some courts have relied on the federal definition of "navigable airspace" to determine which flights could constitute a trespass. Others employ a nuisance theory to ask whether an overhead flight causes a substantial impairment of the use and enjoyment of one's property. Additionally, courts have struggled to determine when a government-operated overhead flight constitutes a taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
With the ability to house surveillance sensors such as high-powered cameras and thermal-imaging devices, some argue that drone surveillance poses a significant threat to the privacy of American citizens. Because the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies only to acts by government officials, surveillance by private actors such as the paparazzi, a commercial enterprise, or one's neighbor is instead regulated, if at all, by state and federal statutes and judicial decisions. Yet, however strong this interest in privacy may be, there are instances where the public's First Amendment rights to gather and receive news might outweigh an individual's interest in being let alone.
Additionally, there are a host of related legal issues that may arise with this introduction of drones in U.S. skies. These include whether a property owner may protect his property from a trespassing drone; how stalking, harassment, and other criminal laws should be applied to acts committed with the use of drones; and to what extent federal aviation law could preempt future state law.
Because drone use will occur largely in federal airspace, Congress has the authority or can permit various federal agencies to set federal policy on drone use in American skies. This may include the appropriate level of individual privacy protection, the balancing of property interests with the economic needs of private entities, and the appropriate safety standards required. |
crs_R44662 | crs_R44662_0 | T his report provides descriptions of selected health care-related provisions that are scheduled to expire during the 115 th Congress, first session (i.e., during calendar year [CY] 2017). For purposes of this report, expiring provisions are defined as portions of law that are time limited and will lapse once a statutory deadline is reached, absent further legislative action. The expiring provisions included in this report are those related to Medicare, Medicaid, State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and private health insurance programs and activities. Additionally, this report describes health care-related provisions within the same scope that expired during the 114 th Congress, second session (i.e., during CY2016). Although the Congressional Research Service (CRS) has attempted to be comprehensive, it cannot guarantee that every relevant provision is included here. This report generally focuses on two types of health care-related provisions within the scope discussed above. The first type of provision provides or controls mandatory spending, meaning that it provides temporary funding, temporary increases or decreases in funding (e.g., Medicare provider bonus payments), or temporary special protections that may result in changes in funding levels (e.g., Medicare funding provisions that establish a floor). The second type of provision defines the authority of government agencies or other entities to act, usually by authorizing a policy, project, or activity. Such provisions also may temporarily delay the implementation of a regulation, requirement, or deadline, or establish a moratorium on a particular activity. Expiring health care provisions that are predominantly associated with discretionary spending activities—such as discretionary authorizations of appropriations and authorities for discretionary user fees —are excluded from this report. Certain types of provisions with expiration dates that otherwise would meet the criteria set forth above are excluded from this report. Some of these provisions are excluded because they are transitional or routine in nature or have been superseded by congressional action that otherwise modifies the intent of the expiring provision. For example, statutorily required Medicare payment rate reductions and payment rate re-basings that are implemented over a specified time period are not considered to require the attention of Congress and are excluded. The report is organized as follows: Table 1 , below, lists the relevant provisions that are scheduled to expire in 2017. The report then provides descriptions of each listed provision, including a legislative history. Appendix A lists demonstration projects and pilot programs that are scheduled to expire in 2017 or that expired in 2016 and are related to Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, and private health insurance programs and activities or other health care-related provisions that were last extended under the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA; P.L. 114-10 ). | This report provides descriptions of selected health care-related provisions that are scheduled to expire during the 115th Congress, first session (i.e., during calendar year [CY] 2017). For purposes of this report, expiring provisions are defined as portions of law that are time limited and will lapse once a statutory deadline is reached absent further legislative action. The expiring provisions included in this report are those related to Medicare, Medicaid, State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and private health insurance programs and activities. The report also includes other health care-related provisions that were last extended under the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA; P.L. 114-10). Additionally, this report describes health care-related provisions within the same scope that expired during the 114th Congress, second session (i.e., during CY2016). Although the Congressional Research Service (CRS) has attempted to be comprehensive, it cannot guarantee that every relevant provision is included here.
This report generally focuses on two types of health care-related provisions within the scope discussed above. The first type of provision provides or controls mandatory spending, meaning that it provides temporary funding, temporary increases or decreases in funding (e.g., Medicare provider bonus payments), or temporary special protections that may result in changes in funding levels (e.g., Medicare funding provisions that establish a floor). The second type of provision defines the authority of government agencies or other entities to act, usually by authorizing a policy, project, or activity. Such provisions also may temporarily delay the implementation of a regulation, requirement, or deadline, or establish a moratorium on a particular activity. Expiring health care provisions that are predominantly associated with discretionary spending activities—such as discretionary authorizations of appropriations and authorities for discretionary user fees—are excluded from this report.
Certain types of provisions with expiration dates that otherwise would meet the criteria set forth above are excluded from this report. Some of these provisions are excluded because they are transitional or routine in nature or have been superseded by congressional action that otherwise modifies the intent of the expiring provision. For example, statutorily required Medicare payment rate reductions and payment rate re-basings that are implemented over a specified time period are not considered to require the attention of Congress and are excluded.
The report provides tables listing the relevant provisions that are scheduled to expire in 2017 and that expired in 2016. The report then describes each listed provision, including a legislative history. An appendix lists relevant demonstration projects and pilot programs that are scheduled to expire in 2017 and that expired in 2016. |
crs_RL32978 | crs_RL32978_0 | For more than 50 years, capital gains on sales of taxpayers' homes have been preferentially treated. A revision in 1997 replaced two longstanding provisions—a provision allowing capital gains tax deferral when a new residence is purchased and a one time exclusion of $125,000 of capital gains for sellers over age 55—with a capped exclusion for each sale. While the 1997 cap was higher than the previous cap for the over-age-55 sellers, it was less generous than the uncapped rollover provision it replaced. In addition, the dollar cap was not indexed for price changes, and, unlike the previous over-age-55 cap, was half as large for unmarried taxpayers—$500,000 for married couples and $250,000 for single taxpayers. Two bills in the 109 th Congress addressed this provision. H.R. 2127 , introduced by Representative Filner, would have allowed taxpayers over the age of 50 to exclude an amount that is double the current cap, but it is available only once in their lifetime. Other legislation ( H.R. 3803 by Representative McCarthy and S. 4075 by Senator Schumer) was introduced to change the amount of the exclusion for surviving spouses to that of a married couple. In the 110 th Congress, S. 138 was introduced to allow a surviving spouse to exclude up to $500,000 of gain from the sale or exchange of a principal residence owned jointly with a deceased spouse if the sale or exchange occurs within two years of the death of the spouse. That provision was also included in H.R. This report examines the capital gains exclusion and the ceiling. The capital gains exclusion, however, was not indexed for inflation, or for housing price changes. Eliminating the Ceilings
One policy option could be to remove the ceilings altogether. H.R. 3648 , the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, which became public law ( P.L. 110-142 ) on December 20, 2007. Changing the Structure of the Exclusion
Another option is to change the structure of the exclusion in general. Capital gains taxes on homes create barriers to labor mobility in the economy. Imposing capital gains taxes on homes also creates significant compliance costs, requiring individuals to keep records for decades and to make fine distinctions between improvements and repairs. Capital gains taxes also tend to distort housing choices, discouraging individuals from selling their homes because of changing family and health circumstances. The taxation of gains in excess of a cap creates inequities between homeowners with different job circumstances, between those living in different parts of the country, and between those with different health outcomes. Exclusions of gains on homes do, however, contribute to tax avoidance schemes, especially ones that allow gains on investment properties to escape tax. The exclusion from capital gains tax for owner-occupied housing currently exempts most homeowners from the tax. | For more than 50 years, capital gains on sales of taxpayers' homes have been preferentially treated. A revision in 1997 replaced two longstanding provisions—a provision allowing capital gains tax deferral when a new residence was purchased, and a provision allowing a one-time exclusion of $125,000 for sellers over age 55—with a capped exclusion for each sale. While the cap adopted in 1997 was higher than the cap for the over-age-55 sellers, it was less generous than the uncapped rollover provision. In addition, the dollar cap was not indexed for price changes, and, unlike the previous over-age-55 cap, was half as large for unmarried taxpayers—$500,000 for married couples and $250,000 for single taxpayers.
Two factors in recent years, the rapid rise in housing prices and interest in tax reform, suggest the capital gains exclusion, including the dollar cap, might be reconsidered. In the 109th Congress, two bills were introduced to address this issue. H.R. 2127 would have allowed taxpayers over the age of 50 to double the current exclusion, once in their lifetime. H.R. 2757 would have indexed the exclusion to price changes. Other legislation (H.R. 3803 and S. 4075) was introduced to change the amount of the exclusion for surviving spouses to that of a married couple. In the 110th Congress, S. 138 was introduced to allow a surviving spouse to exclude up to $500,000 of gain from the sale or exchange of a principal residence owned jointly with a deceased spouse if the sale or exchange occurs within two years of the death of the spouse. That provision was also included in H.R. 3648, the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, which became public law (P.L. 110-142) on December 20, 2007.
Some criticisms have been made that there are significant tax benefits for owner-occupied housing. Capital gains treatment is one of those benefits. Yet, there is an efficiency argument for eliminating or excluding a large portion of the gain on homes from tax. Capital gains taxes on homes create barriers to labor mobility in the economy. Imposing capital gains taxes on homes also creates significant compliance costs, requiring individuals to keep records for decades and to make fine distinctions between improvements and repairs. Capital gains taxes also tend to distort housing choices, discouraging individuals from selling their homes because of changing family and health circumstances. And, while the exclusion favors homeowners relative to renters, the taxation of gains in excess of a cap creates inequities between homeowners with different job circumstances, between those living in different parts of the country, and between those with different health outcomes. Exclusions of gains on homes do, however, contribute to tax avoidance schemes, especially ones that allow gains on investment properties to escape tax.
The current treatment of capital gains could be maintained. However, some consideration might be given to changing the dollar ceiling. One option is to eliminate the ceiling. Another option is to adjust the ceiling. This report examines the capital gains exclusion and the ceiling and will be updated to reflect legislative developments. |
crs_RL34566 | crs_RL34566_0 | 110-182 . The House of Representatives passed H.R. 3773 , the Responsible Electronic Surveillance That is Overseen, Reviewed, and Effective Act of 2007 or the RESTORE Act of 2007 on November 15, 2007, while S. 2248 was reported out of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on October 26, 2007, and an amendment in the nature of a substitute to S. 2248 , the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act of 2007 or the FISA Amendments Act of 2007, was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee on November 16, 2007. After striking all but the enacting clause of H.R. 3773 and inserting the text of S. 2248 as amended, the Senate then passed H.R. On March 14, 2008, the House passed an amendment to the Senate amendment to H.R. 3773 . After intensive negotiations, a compromise bill, H.R. 6304 , was introduced in the House on June 19, 2008. The measure passed the House the following day. A cloture motion on the measure was presented in the Senate on June 26, 2008. Further activity on H.R. 6304 is anticipated after the Senate returns from the July 4 th recess. The current legislative and oversight activity with respect to electronic surveillance under FISA has drawn national attention to several overarching issues. This report briefly outlines three such issues and touches upon some of the perspectives reflected in the ongoing debate. These issues include the inherent and often dynamic tension between national security and civil liberties, particularly rights of privacy and free speech; the need identified by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Admiral Mike McConnell, for the intelligence community to be able to efficiently and effectively collect foreign intelligence information from the communications of foreign persons located outside the United States in a changing, fast-paced, and technologically sophisticated international environment, and the differing approaches suggested to meet this need; and limitations of liability for those electronic communication service providers who furnish aid to the federal government in its foreign intelligence collection. This report briefly examines these issues and sets them in context. Tension Between National Security and Civil Liberties
Two constitutional provisions, in particular, are implicated in this debate—the Fourth and First Amendments. Legislative Response: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance of Foreign Persons Abroad
On August 5, 2007, the Protect America Act of 2007 was enacted into law, P.L. P.L. 110-55 expired on February 16, 2008, after passage of a fifteen-day extension to its original sunset date. | The current legislative and oversight activity with respect to electronic surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) has drawn national attention to several overarching issues. This report briefly outlines three such issues and touches upon some of the perspectives reflected in the ongoing debate. These issues include the inherent and often dynamic tension between national security and civil liberties, particularly rights of privacy and free speech; the need for the intelligence community to be able to efficiently and effectively collect foreign intelligence information from the communications of foreign persons located outside the United States in a changing, fast-paced, and technologically sophisticated international environment or from United States persons abroad, and the differing approaches suggested to meet this need; and limitations of liability for those electronic communication service providers who furnish aid to the federal government in its foreign intelligence collection. Two constitutional provisions, in particular, are implicated in this debate—the Fourth and First Amendments. This report briefly examines these issues and sets them in context.
The 110th Congress has been very active in developing and considering measures to amend FISA to address these issues. On August 5, 2007, the Protect America Act, P.L. 110-55, was enacted into law. It expired on February 16, 2008, after passage of a fifteen-day extension to its original sunset date. See P.L. 110-182. On November 15, 2007, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 3773, the RESTORE Act of 2007. On February 12, 2008, the Senate passed S. 2248, as amended, then struck all but the enacting clause of H.R. 3773, and inserted the text of S. 2248, as amended, in its stead. On March 14, 2008, the House passed an amendment to the Senate amendment to H.R. 3773. After months of intensive negotiations, on June 19, 2008, a compromise bill, H.R. 6304, was introduced in the House. It was passed by the House the following day. On June 26, 2008, a cloture motion on the measure was presented in the Senate. Further activity on H.R. 6304 is anticipated after the Senate returns from the July 4th recess. Each of these bills differ somewhat in content and approach from one another.
This report consists of the text of CRS Report RL34279, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of Selected Issues, by [author name scrubbed], without the accompanying footnotes. It will be updated as needed. |
crs_R41972 | crs_R41972_0 | Introduction
The estimated 4.1 million barrels of oil released during the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill is considered to be the largest accidental marine oil spill in the history of the petroleum industry and will have an impact on the natural resources of the Gulf region for the foreseeable future. Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), federal, state, tribal, and foreign governments may seek compensation for the costs of restoring damaged natural resources from the parties responsible through the Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) process. In particular, this report describes the statutory requirements of OPA, the NRDA process under the implementing regulations, and developments in the Gulf of Mexico. Liability
Pursuant to OPA, the parties responsible for causing the oil spill are responsible for damages to natural resources. Moreover, OPA specifically allows states to impose additional liability for oil spills and/or requirements for removal activities. And the third allows for recovery of the reasonable costs incurred in "assessing those damages." For offshore facilities, a responsible party's liability for economic damages is limited to $75 million, but there is no cap on removal costs. Trustees
The governmental entities with jurisdiction over resources—federal, state, tribal, and foreign—are the Trustees throughout the NRDA process. Under OPA, the function of the Trustees is to assess natural resource damages, as well as to "develop and implement a plan for the restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, or acquisition of the equivalent, of the natural resources under their trusteeship." Once money is recovered by a Trustee under OPA, including to cover the costs of assessing the damages, it is deposited in a special trust account in order "to reimburse or pay costs by the trustee ... with respect to the damaged natural resource." Money for the Trustees' immediate assessment of the natural resource damage may come from the OS Trust Fund until the responsible parties are identified and provide reimbursement to the Fund. The OS Trust Fund could also be used if the responsible parties are not known, insolvent, or refuse to give money for assessment before they are found responsible by a court. Under the OPA regulations, the Trustees are required to invite the responsible parties to participate in the NRDA process "as soon as practicable" but not later than the delivery of a Notice of Intent to Conduct Restoration Planning. The Trustees will also evaluate harm resulting from the response actions, such as the in situ burning, the use of dispersants, or vehicle damage to shores and marshes. The NRDA process in the Gulf is currently in the Restoration Planning Phase. Significantly, the RESTORE Act establishes in the Treasury the Gulf Coast Restoration Trust Fund, which is available to restore the Gulf Coast region. Also of importance, the RESTORE Act requires an additional 30% of the Gulf Coast Restoration Trust Fund to be disbursed to the five Gulf Coast states using a formula that weighs the mileage of oiled shoreline, the distance from the affected shoreline to the Deepwater Horizon drilling unit, and the population of coastal counties. | The 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill leaked an estimated 4.1 million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico, damaging the waters, shores, and marshes, and the fish and wildlife that live there. The Oil Pollution Act (OPA) allows state, federal, tribal, and federal governments to recover damages to natural resources in the public trust from the parties responsible for the oil spill. Under the public trust doctrine, natural resources are managed by the states for the benefit of all citizens, except where a statute vests such management in the federal government.
In particular, OPA authorizes Trustees (representatives of federal, state, and local government entities with jurisdiction over the natural resources in question) to assess the damages to natural resources resulting from a spill, and to develop a plan for the restoration, rehabilitation, replacement or acquisition of the equivalent, of the natural resources. The types of damages that are recoverable include the cost of replacing or restoring the lost resource, the lost value of those resources if or until they are recovered, and any costs incurred in assessing the harm. OPA caps liability for offshore drilling units at $75 million for economic damages, but does not limit liability for the costs of containing and removing the oil.
The process established by OPA for assessing the damages to natural resources is known as Natural Resources Damage Assessment (NRDA). In the three steps of the NRDA process, the Trustees are required to solicit the participation of the responsible parties and design a restoration plan. This plan is then paid for or implemented by the responsible parties. If the responsible parties refuse to pay or reach an agreement with the Trustees, the Trustees can sue the responsible party for those damages under OPA. In the alternative, the Trustees may seek compensation from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, but there is a cap of $500 million from the Fund for natural resources damages. The federal government may then seek restitution from the responsible parties for the sums taken from that Fund.
The Trustees are not required to adhere to the NRDA process set forth in the OPA regulations. However, they are accorded a rebuttable presumption in court for any determination or assessment of damages conducted pursuant to the regulations. Of course, the Trustees and the responsible parties are permitted to enter into settlement agreements at any point throughout the NRDA process.
The NRDA process in the Gulf is in the Restoration Planning Phase. The caps on the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund and on OPA liability have captured Congress's attention, as has Gulf restoration. In 2012, President Obama signed the RESTORE Act, which establishes from Clean Water Act penalties the Gulf Coast Restoration Trust Fund, which is available for restoration activities in the Gulf Coast region. |
crs_98-748 | crs_98-748_0 | The Sergeant at Arms is elected by the Senate and serves "from Congress to Congress until a successor is chosen." Law Enforcement and Security
As the Senate's chief law enforcement officer, the Sergeant at Arms is responsible for security in the Senate wing of the Capitol, the Senate office buildings, adjacent grounds, and for the security of Senators. Protocol
As the chief of protocol of the Senate, the Sergeant at Arms performs ceremonial functions that exist through custom and precedent. In carrying out these duties, the Sergeant at Arms greets and escorts the U.S. President, heads of states, and other official Senate guests while attending functions in the Capitol; leads Senators from the Senate side of the Capitol to the House chamber for joint sessions of Congress, to their places on the inaugural platform, and to any other place the Senate travels as a body; and assists in arrangements for inaugurations and the planning of funerals of Senators who die while in office. By custom, the Sergeant at Arms is custodian of the Senate gavel. The Sergeant at Arms is responsible for protocol surrounding the death of a Senator. Administration
As an administrative officer of the Senate, the Sergeant at Arms is responsible for specified services to Senators' offices, including the following:
acquiring home state office space, including mobile office space; purchasing office equipment and maintaining records of equipment use; operating computer support services; managing telecommunications services; establishing prices of items available for use in Senate offices; and administering orientation seminars for Senators, Senate officials, or members of the staffs of Senators or Senate officials and other similar meetings. | The Sergeant at Arms of the Senate is an officer of the Senate with protection, security, decorum, protocol, and administrative responsibilities. The Sergeant at Arms is elected by the membership of the Senate. As the Senate's chief law enforcement officer, the Sergeant at Arms is responsible for security in the Senate wing of the Capitol, the Senate office buildings, and on adjacent grounds.
As the chief of protocol of the Senate, the Sergeant at Arms performs ceremonial functions that fall within his jurisdiction through custom and precedent. In carrying out these duties, the Sergeant at Arms greets and escorts the U.S. President, heads of state, and other official Senate guests while attending functions in the Capitol; leads Senators from the Senate side of the Capitol to the House chamber for joint sessions of Congress, to their places on the inaugural platform, and to any other place the Senate goes as a body; and assists in arrangements for inaugurations and the planning of funerals of Senators who die while in office. By custom, the Sergeant at Arms is custodian of the Senate gavel.
As an administrative official of the Senate, the Sergeant at Arms is responsible for specified services to Senators' offices. In the administration of Senators' offices the Sergeant at Arms is responsible for securing home state office space, including mobile home state office space; purchasing office equipment; managing telecommunications services; establishing prices of items available for use in Senate offices; reimbursing Senators for items purchased through their offices; maintaining records of equipment used in offices; and administering orientation seminars, among others. |
crs_RS22646 | crs_RS22646_0 | Adjustments in Federal Criminal Law
The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act is focused, as its name implies, upon child protection and safety. Its efforts involve the creation of new federal crimes, the enhancement of the penalties for preexisting federal crimes, and the amendment of federal criminal procedure, among other things. The amendments to federal criminal procedure are a bit more numerous and somewhat more likely to implicate crimes in addition to those committed against children. Among their number are:
Random searches of sex offender registrants as a condition of probation or supervised release. Preventive detention in cases involving a minor victim or a firearm. Civil commitment procedure for federal sex offenders. The act increases penalties for several other child offenses including:
Grant Programs
The act establishes, reinforces, and revives several grant programs devoted to child and community safety, including the following. State, local and tribal governments in order to outfit sex offenders with electronic monitoring devices (authorizing appropriations totaling $15 million through FY2009). Among them are sections that broaden access to federal criminal records information systems, create a national child abuse registry, expand recordkeeping requirements for those in the business of producing sexually explicit material, immunize officials from civil liability for activities involving sexual offender registration, and authorize and direct the Department of Justice to establish and maintain a number of child protective activities. | The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, P.L. 109-248 ( H.R. 4472 ), serves four purposes. It reformulates the federal standards for sex offender registration in state, territorial and tribal sexual offender registries, and does so in a manner designed to make the system more uniform, more inclusive, more informative and more readily available to the public online. It amends federal criminal law and procedure, featuring a federal procedure for the civil commitment of sex offenders, random search authority over sex offenders on probation or supervised release, a number of new federal crimes, and sentencing enhancements for existing federal offenses. It creates, amends, or revives several grant programs designed to reinforce private, state, local, tribal and territorial prevention; law enforcement; and treatment efforts in the case of crimes committed against children. It calls for a variety of administrative or regulatory initiatives in the interest of child safety, such as the creation of the National Child Abuse Registry.
This is an abridged version of CRS Report RL33967, Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act: A Legal Analysis , by [author name scrubbed], without the footnotes and citations to authority found in the longer report. |
crs_R42340 | crs_R42340_0 | This report, however, focuses on activities of the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) within the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Both the National Strategy for Suicide Prevention and the VHA's approach to suicide prevention are based on a public health framework. As illustrated in Figure 1 , the framework has three major components: (1) surveillance, (2) risk and protective factors, and (3) prevention interventions. Data collected in surveillance can be used to identify risk factors (i.e., characteristics associated with higher suicide risk) and protective factors (i.e., characteristics associated with lower suicide risk). VHA Suicide Surveillance
No nationwide surveillance system exists for suicide among all veterans. Surveillance, or systematic collection of data on completed (i.e., fatal) suicides, is essential to define the scope of the problem (i.e., the suicide rate among veterans), to identify characteristics associated with higher or lower risk of suicide, and to track changes in the suicide rate and evaluate suicide prevention interventions. The VHA collects detailed information about suicides (and suicide attempts) among veterans that are known to VHA facilities through the Behavioral Health Autopsy Program (BHAP), which will eventually collect information in four phases. The VA is working with the DOD to identify suicides among all veterans, including those who do not interact with the VA.
Information about deaths—including whether a death resulted from intentional self-harm (i.e., suicide)—is collected in death certificates by state, territorial, and local governments. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) aggregates death certificate data into the National Death Index (NDI), which can then be combined with data about who is a veteran. Identifying risk and protective factors is essential in order to design effective interventions aimed at lowering overall risk of suicide by reducing risk factors and/or increasing protective factors. Knowing what the risk factors are also helps in identifying at-risk groups or individuals so that interventions can be delivered to the people who need them most. Within the VHA, research on suicide risk and protective factors is supported by three research components: the Office of Research and Development (ORD), a Center of Excellence (COE) in suicide prevention, and a Mental Illness Research, Education, and Clinical Center (MIRECC) on suicide prevention. Potential Issues for Congress
The VHA has received both praise and criticism for its suicide prevention efforts and mental health services more generally. A 2010 progress report on an earlier version (2001) of the National Strategy for Suicide Prevention praises VHA's suicide prevention practices and recommends disseminating them to the rest of the health care system, describing the VHA as "one of the most vibrant forces in the U.S. suicide prevention movement, implementing multiple levels of innovation and state of the art interventions, backed up by a robust evaluation and research capacity." In contrast, some congressional testimony has criticized VHA's suicide prevention efforts for inadequacies, such as barriers to accessing care and lack of evidence-based treatments for those who do access care. A 2011 evaluation of VHA mental health services captures both sides of the argument, finding that VHA mental health care is generally at least as good as that of other health care systems, but that it "often does not meet implicit VA expectations." Potential issues for Congress and related recommendations by outside organizations fall into three categories: improving the timeliness and accuracy of surveillance data, building the evidence base, and increasing access to evidence-based mental health care. Appendix. | This report focuses on suicide prevention activities of the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) within the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The VHA's approach to suicide prevention is based on a public health framework, which has three major components: (1) surveillance, (2) risk and protective factors, and (3) interventions.
Surveillance, or systematic collection of data on completed (i.e., fatal) suicides, is essential to define the scope of the problem (i.e., the suicide rate among veterans), identify characteristics associated with higher or lower risk of suicide, and track changes in the suicide rate. No nationwide surveillance system exists for suicide among all veterans. Information about deaths (including suicides) is collected in death certificates by state, territorial, and local governments. Death certificate data are aggregated into the National Death Index, which can be combined with data about who is a veteran to identify veteran suicides. The VHA collects detailed information about suicides among veterans that are known to VHA facilities; however, the majority of veterans are not enrolled in VHA health care, so other sources of information (e.g., Department of Defense data) are necessary to identify veterans.
Information collected in surveillance is used to identify suicide risk factors (i.e., characteristics associated with higher rates of suicide) and protective factors (i.e., characteristics associated with lower rates of suicide). This is essential in order to design interventions that reduce risk factors and/or increase protective factors, thus lowering overall risk of suicide. Risk factors are also helpful in identifying at-risk groups or individuals so that interventions can be delivered to the people who need them most. Within the VHA, this research is supported by the Office of Research and Development; a Center of Excellence in suicide prevention; and a Mental Illness Research, Education, and Clinical Center on suicide prevention.
The intervention cycle includes three stages: (1) design and test interventions, (2) implement interventions, and (3) evaluate interventions. The research components mentioned above have roles in small-scale pilot testing and large-scale evaluations of interventions. VHA suicide prevention interventions include easy access to care, screening and treatment, suicide prevention coordinators, suicide hotline, education and outreach, and limited access to lethal means.
The VHA has received both praise and criticism for its suicide prevention efforts and mental health services more generally. A 2010 progress report on the National Strategy for Suicide Prevention describes the VHA as "one of the most vibrant forces in the U.S. suicide prevention movement, implementing multiple levels of innovation and state of the art interventions, backed up by a robust evaluation and research capacity." In contrast, some have testified before Congress that VHA's suicide prevention efforts have inadequacies, such as barriers to accessing care and lack of evidence-based treatments for those who do access care. A 2011 evaluation of VHA mental health services captures both sides of the argument, finding that VHA mental health care is generally at least as good as that of other health care systems, but that it "often does not meet implicit VA expectations." An independent evaluation of VA mental health services is underway.
Potential issues for Congress and related recommendations by outside organizations fall into three categories: improving the timeliness and accuracy of surveillance data, building the evidence base, and increasing access to evidence-based mental health care. Public laws addressing suicide prevention among veterans are described in the Appendix. |
crs_RS21647 | crs_RS21647_0 | The Junk Fax Prevention Act
President Bush signed S. 714 , the Junk Fax Prevention Act ("the act" or JFPA), on July 9, 2005. On April 5, 2006, the FCC adopted its final rules in this proceeding. These rules
codified an exemption to the fax rules to allow fax advertisements to be sent to parties with whom the sender has an EBR and provided a definition of an EBR to be used in the context of sending fax advertisements; required that, even in the case of an EBR, a person sending a fax advertisement must obtain the fax number directly from the recipient or ensure that the recipient voluntarily agreed to make the number available for public distribution; required the sender of fax advertisements to provide clear and conspicuous notice and contact information on the first page of a fax that allows recipients to "opt-out" of future fax transmissions from the sender; required senders to honor opt-out requests within the shortest reasonable period of time, not to exceed 30 days; determined not to exempt small businesses or nonprofit trade associations from the rules; and clarified the term "unsolicited advertisement." In this proceeding, the FCC did not address whether there should be a time limit on the duration of an EBR, although the act allows the FCC to revisit that issue at another time. The FCC's Junk Fax Fact Sheet is available online at http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/unwantedfaxes.html . FCC Annual Report on JFPA Enforcement
As required by the JFPA, in January 2007, the FCC released its first annual report on junk fax enforcement. GAO Activity
As required under the JFPA, on April 5, 2006, the GAO submitted its report to Congress on the FCC's enforcement of the junk fax law. | On July 9, 2005, President Bush signed S. 714, the Junk Fax Prevention Act ("the act" or JFPA) (P.L. 109-21) and on April 5, 2006, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued its final rules in the related proceeding. These rules
provided an established business relationship (EBR) exemption to the prohibition on sending unsolicited facsimile advertisements; provided a definition of an EBR to be used in the context of unsolicited facsimile advertisements; required the sender of a facsimile advertisement to provide specified notice and contact information on the facsimile that allows recipients to "opt-out" of any future facsimile transmissions from the sender; and specified the circumstances under which a request to "opt-out" complied with the JFPA.
Also, the rules required that small businesses and nonprofits adhere to the rules and clarified the term "unsolicited advertisement." The FCC did not address whether there should be a time limit on the duration of an EBR. The rules in their entirety became effective on August 1, 2006.
On April 5, 2006, in accordance with the JFPA, the GAO submitted a report to Congress on the FCC's enforcement of the junk fax law.
On January 4, 2007, in accordance with the JFPA, the FCC released its first annual report on the enforcement of its junk fax rules.
The FCC's Junk Fax Fact Sheet is available online at http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/unwantedfaxes.html. |
crs_RS21293 | crs_RS21293_0 | U.S.seaports could be targets for terrorist attack. An FBI official stated, "The intelligence that we have certainly points to theportsas a key vulnerability of the United States and of a key interest to certain terrorist groups...." (4) CBP CommissionerRobert Bonner believes an attack using a nuclear bomb in a container would halt container shipments, leading to"devastating" consequences for the global economy. A terrorist group might obtain a bomb, perhaps with the yield of the Hiroshima bomb, by several plausible routes. Bills related to terrorist nuclear attacks on ports include H.R. Policy Issues
Securing Nuclear Materials. At issue for Congressishow to allocate security funds among ports and other potential targets. | A terrorist nuclear attack on a U.S. seaport could cause local devastationand affect the global economy. Terrorists might obtain a bomb in several ways, though each poses difficulties. Ability to detect a bomb appears limited. The United States is using technology, intelligence, internationalcooperation, etc., to try to thwart an attack. Issues for Congress include safeguarding foreign nuclear material,mitigating economic effects of an attack, and allocating funds between ports and other potential targets. This reportwill be updated as needed. |
crs_RL33693 | crs_RL33693_0 | Western Hemisphere countries supplied the United States with about 46% of total crude oil and petroleum product imports and almost 50% of U.S. crude oil imports in 2007. Three countries in the hemisphere—Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela—account for the lion's share of U.S. crude oil imports from the region while other Latin American and Caribbean countries account for the balance. Other significant oil producers in the region include Ecuador, Brazil, Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Argentina. In terms of proven oil reserves, the Western Hemisphere has some 321 billion barrels, about 24% of reserves worldwide. Venezuela is second in the hemisphere with 87 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. This figure does not, however, include as much as 270 billion barrels of extra-heavy and bitumen deposits from the Orinoco Belt in central Venezuela, though proven oil reserves will likely amount to no more than 20% of this amount once the deposits are certified as recoverable. The United States has the largest share of proven natural gas reserves in the hemisphere, with 211 tcf or 39% of the hemisphere's total, followed by Venezuela, with reserves of 166 tcf, Canada with 58 tcf, Bolivia with almost 27 tcf, and Trinidad and Tobago with almost 19 tcf. Energy and Latin America's Political Environment
High oil prices have spurred the rise of resource nationalism in several Latin American countries, which has raised concerns about access to energy resources and political interference with the level of energy production and investment in the region. Such nationalism often develops as a response to conditions of poverty, and appears to be strongest in countries where people believe that they are not benefitting from the exploitation of their countries' natural resources. Yet many analysts assert that such nationalism is a logical outcome of higher energy prices and closely follows the actions taken by energy-producing countries around the world that want to capture more of the profit from their natural resources. Oil and related products accounted for some 96% of Venezuela's exports to the United States in 2007. Support for Countries Dependent on Energy Imports
While oil and gas producers such as Venezuela, Mexico, Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Trinidad and Tobago are net energy exporters, most other Latin American and Caribbean nations are net energy importers. With the exception of Trinidad and Tobago, most Caribbean and Central American nations are highly dependent on energy imports. Policy Approaches on Energy Cooperation
Policy analysts have made several recommendations to further hemispheric energy cooperation. Legislative Initiatives
Two legislative initiatives in the 110 th Congress would increase hemispheric cooperation on energy. | Western Hemisphere countries supply the United States with 50% of its imported crude oil. Three countries in the hemisphere—Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela—account for the lion's share. Other significant oil producers in the region include Ecuador, Colombia, Brazil, Trinidad and Tobago, and Argentina.
In terms of proven oil reserves, the Western Hemisphere has about 24% of reserves worldwide. After Canada, Venezuela has the second largest amount of proven oil reserves in the hemisphere, almost 87 billion barrels, but this does not include as much as 270 billion barrels of extra-heavy and bitumen deposits from the Orinoco belt. If these deposits became recoverable, Venezuela's proven reserves would exceed those of Saudi Arabia. In terms of natural gas, the United States has the largest amount of proven reserves in the hemisphere, about 39%, followed by Venezuela, almost 31%. Canada, Trinidad and Tobago, and Bolivia also have sizeable reserves. Almost all of the gas imported by pipeline into the United States comes from Canada, while Trinidad and Tobago accounted for about 58% of U.S. liquified natural gas imports in 2007.
While oil and gas producers such as Venezuela, Mexico, Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Trinidad and Tobago are net energy exporters, most other Latin American and Caribbean nations are net energy importers. Moreover, with the exception of Trinidad and Tobago, most Caribbean and Central American nations are highly dependent on energy imports.
High oil prices have spurred the rise of resource nationalism in several Latin American energy-producing countries, which has raised concerns about access to energy resources and political interference with the level of energy production and investment in the region. Such nationalism is often fueled by poverty, and appears to be strongest in countries where people believe that they are not benefitting from the exploitation of their countries' natural resources. Yet many analysts assert that such nationalism is a logical outcome of higher energy prices, and is similar to the actions by energy-producing countries around the world that want to capture more of the profit from their natural resources.
This report examines Latin America's current political environment and its apparent effect on energy production in the region. It also discusses efforts to help many Latin American and Caribbean countries dependent on energy imports, including Venezuela's preferential oil programs, the Mexico-led Meso-American Energy Integration Program, and U.S.-Brazilian cooperation on biofuels. The report also examines policy approaches that have been proposed for increased hemispheric energy cooperation, congressional interest in the topic of hemispheric energy security, and related legislative initiatives: S. 193 (Lugar), the Energy Diplomacy and Security Act of 2007, and S. 1007 (Lugar), the United States-Brazil Energy Cooperation Pact of 2007. This report will be updated to reflect legislative action. |
crs_R44842 | crs_R44842_0 | Introduction
This report provides an overview of the development of the process for appointing the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), briefly discusses the history of nominations to this position from 1973 through 2017, and identifies related congressional hearing records and reports. Overview
Federal statute provides that the Director of the FBI is to be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. If the Senate confirms the nomination, the individual is formally appointed to the position by the President. Prior to the implementation of the current nomination and confirmation process, J. Edgar Hoover was Director of the FBI for nearly 48 years. From 1973 through 2017, eight nominations for FBI Director were confirmed, and two other nominations were withdrawn. William S. Sessions. Sessions was the first of two FBI Directors to be removed from office. President William J. Clinton removed Sessions from office on July 19, 1993, citing "serious questions ... about the conduct and the leadership of the Director," and a report on "certain conduct" issued by the Office of Professional Responsibility at the Department of Justice. Robert S. Mueller III. P.L. 112-24 , enacted on July 26, 2011, allowed the incumbent Director to be nominated for, and appointed to, an additional two-year term. After the bill was signed, Mueller was nominated for this second term by President Barack Obama, and he was confirmed the following day by a vote of 100-0. Mueller's two-year term expired on September 4, 2013. James B. Comey Jr. As Mueller's unique two-year term drew to a close, President Obama nominated James B. Comey Jr. to succeed him. Comey was removed from office by President Donald J. Trump on May 9, 2017. Wray began his term of office on August 2, 2017. | The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The statutory basis for the present nomination and confirmation process was developed in 1968 and 1976, and has been used since the death of J. Edgar Hoover in 1972. From 1973 through 2017, eight nominations for FBI Director were confirmed, and two other nominations were withdrawn by the President before confirmation. The position of FBI Director has a fixed 10-year term, and the officeholder cannot be reappointed, unless Congress acts to allow a second appointment of the incumbent.
There are no statutory conditions on the President's authority to remove the FBI Director. From 1973 through 2017, two Directors were removed by the President. President William J. Clinton removed William S. Sessions from office on July 19, 1993, and President Donald J. Trump removed James B. Comey from office on May 9, 2017.
Robert S. Mueller III was the first FBI Director to be appointed to a second term, and this was done under special statutory arrangements. He was first confirmed by the Senate on August 2, 2001, with a term of office that expired in September 2011. In May 2011, President Barack Obama announced his intention to seek legislation that would extend Mueller's term of office for two years. Legislation that would allow Mueller to be nominated to an additional, two-year term was considered and passed in the Senate and the House, and President Obama signed the bill into law (P.L. 112-24) on July 26, 2011. Mueller subsequently was nominated and confirmed to the two-year term, and he served until September 4, 2013.
This report provides an overview of the development of the process for appointing the FBI Director, briefly discusses the history of nominations to this position from 1973-2017, and identifies related congressional hearing records and reports. |
crs_R41455 | crs_R41455_0 | Pirate attacks in the waters off the Horn of Africa, including those on U.S.-flagged vessels, have brought continued U.S. and international attention to the long-standing problem of piracy in the region. The United States has been an active participant in piracy interdiction and prevention operations focusing on the Horn of Africa region. As part of operations, the U.S. military has detained individuals accused of acts of piracy against U.S.-flagged vessels. In some instances, these individuals have been brought to the United States for criminal prosecution in the federal courts. Finally, the report highlights developments in two trials involving charges of piracy in the federal district court in Norfolk, VA, United States v. Said and United States v. Hasan, specifically focusing on how the courts interpreted the definition of piracy under 18 U.S.C. U.S. Legal Framework
The U.S. Constitution, Art. 10, provides that Congress has the power "To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations." For example, in 1790, Congress, in an act "for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States," addressed the offense of piracy, stating:
That if any person or persons shall commit upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, murder or robbery, or any other offence which if committed within the body of a county, would by the laws of the United States be punishable with death; or if any captain or mariner of any ship or other vessel, shall piratically and feloniously run away with such ship or vessel, or any goods or merchandise to the value of fifty dollars, or yield up such ship or vessel voluntarily to any pirate; or if any seaman shall lay violent hands upon his commander, thereby to hinder and prevent his fighting in defence of his ship or goods committed to his trust, or shall make a revolt in the ship; every such offender shall be deemed, taken and adjudged to be a pirate and felon, and being thereof convicted, shall suffer death; and the trial of crimes committed on the high seas, or in any place out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, shall be in the district where the offender is apprehended, or into which he may first be brought. The new language included a significant departure from the Act of 1790; the crime of piracy was defined not in specific terms, but rather "as defined by the law of nations." International Agreements
Several United Nations instruments address the problem of piracy, including the Convention on the High Seas, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), and the Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Although the United States is not a signatory to UNCLOS, it is generally viewed as a codification of customary international law. The United States Navy, after thwarting two separate alleged acts of piracy, transferred suspected pirates to Norfolk, VA, for criminal trials in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on charges of piracy. One of the trials, United States v. Hasan , ended with the defendants found guilty on numerous charges, including piracy. The other case, United States v. Said , is on appeal based on a court ruling dismissing the charge of piracy. A common issue between the two cases, and yet the greatest distinction, is how the two trial courts interpreted the definition of piracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1651, in that they "committed the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations." , sea robbery." § 1651, noting that the Supreme Court held that "incorporating the definition of piracy under the law of nations, Congress had defined piracy as clearly as if it had penned the elements of the offense itself" and "because piracy under the law of nations was 'robbery upon the sea' ... the Act of 1819 'sufficiently and constitutionally' defined piracy under the law of nations." The divergent U.S. district court rulings may create uncertainty in how the offense of piracy is defined. Congress may provide guidance to the courts by clarifying the definition of piracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1651. However, in the absence of legislative clarification, the courts may continue to arrive at differing interpretations. | Pirate attacks in the waters off the Horn of Africa, including those on U.S.-flagged vessels, have brought continued U.S. and international attention to the long-standing problem of piracy in the region. The United States has been an active participant in piracy interdiction and prevention operations focusing on the Horn of Africa region. As part of anti-piracy operations, the U.S. military has detained individuals accused of acts of piracy against U.S.-flagged vessels. In some instances these individuals have been released, others have been transferred to Kenya for criminal prosecution in the Kenyan courts, and some have been brought to the United States for criminal prosecution in the federal courts.
The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power "To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations." Since 1819, U.S. law has defined piracy not as a specific act, but rather "as defined by the law of nations." The U.S. Supreme Court, in United States v. Palmer and United States v. Smith, has upheld Congress's power to define piracy in terms of the law of nations. The Court has found that piracy, under the law of nations, requires a robbery at sea. In addition to U.S. law, contemporary international agreements, including the Convention on the High Seas, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), address piracy. The United States is party to the first two agreements, and the third (UNCLOS) is generally accepted as reflecting customary international law.
The United States Navy, after thwarting two separate alleged acts of piracy, transferred suspected pirates to Norfolk, VA, for criminal trials in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of VA, on charges of piracy. One of the trials, United States v. Hasan, ended with the defendants found guilty on numerous charges, including piracy. The other case, United States v. Said, is on appeal based on a court ruling dismissing the charge of piracy. A common issue between the two cases, and yet the greatest distinction, is how the two trial courts interpreted the definition of piracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1651.
The Said court stated that the act of piracy, as defined by the law of nations, requires a robbery on the high seas. Thus, it appears that absent an actual robbery at sea, individuals may not be found guilty of the act of piracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1651, but may be tried for other offenses, including the offenses of attack to plunder a vessel, or committing violence against a person on a vessel. In Hasan, the trial court ruled that the act of piracy, as defined by the law of nations, is reflected by Article 110 of UNCLOS and thus does not require an actual robbery at sea to be convicted of piracy.
The divergent U.S. district court rulings may create uncertainty in how the offense of piracy is defined. Congress may provide guidance to the courts by clarifying the definition of piracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1651. However, in the absence of legislative clarification, the courts may arrive at differing interpretations. |
crs_R44807 | crs_R44807_0 | Subsequently, the Obama Administration implemented the CAP pursuant to presidential powers and existing statutory authority. The President, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and other agencies issued various executive orders, guidance, and regulations to reduce GHG emissions from motor vehicles, new and existing power plants, facilities in the oil-and-gas sector, and other GHG-emitting sources and federal facilities. This report will provide a brief history of U.S. climate change regulation; review the different types of regulation and legal actions that have been pursued in the national debate over GHGs; examine selected legal issues and related litigation; and address what these legal and regulatory developments mean for Congress. For example, under the Clean Air Act (CAA), EPA has sought to reduce GHG emissions from stationary and mobile sources. Federal authority to regulate GHGs under existing law and policies has been challenged in court. These challenges generally concern the scope of EPA's authority and its methods for regulating GHG emissions—not whether EPA has authority to regulate GHG emissions under the CAA, which the Supreme Court held in Massachusetts v. EPA . Considering Climate Change in Agency Determinations/Actions
In addition to reducing GHG emissions, various environmental statutes and regulations require federal agencies to consider climate change in their actions and decisions. Lawsuits have challenged the extent to which agencies consider climate change impacts and rely on predictive models, studies, and assumptions. This section will examine these issues in the context of the Endangered Species Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. Nevertheless, as the cases discussed above illustrate, it appears that federal agencies may potentially still be required to take into account costs of carbon in their rulemakings and environmental reviews. Threshold Barriers to Litigation
Federal courts often do not reach the merits of a climate change suit due to threshold procedural barriers, such as whether a plaintiff or petitioner has the right to bring a lawsuit in the first place or whether the court has jurisdiction over a type of claim. While most of the climate change litigation discussed above has focused on government regulation of GHG emissions, private plaintiffs also have tried to force emitting sources to reduce GHG emissions or to claim damages from emitters for their alleged contributions to climate change. If Congress amends the CAA to remove EPA's authority to regulate GHG emissions under the CAA, which would effectively overturn the Supreme Court's decisions in AEP and Massachusetts v. EPA , it would appear that common law nuisance claims would possibly no longer be displaced by federal actions, which would potentially open the door to a resurgence of these claims. The public trust doctrine is a common law principle with ancient origins whereby the government has a duty to safeguard certain natural resources for the benefit of the public. | On March 28, 2017, President Trump signed an executive order to encourage and promote energy development by modifying climate change policies. As the Trump Administration implements its environmental policies, various legal challenges to Obama Administration climate change regulations remain pending before courts. During the last term of the Obama Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration finalized a series of regulations to address emissions from cars, trucks, and their engines that may contribute to climate change. In addition, EPA finalized regulations pursuant to its authority under the Clean Air Act (CAA) to reduce GHG emissions from stationary sources such as power plants, GHG-emitting oil and gas sources, and landfills. Various stakeholders have challenged a majority of these rules generally contesting the scope of EPA's authority and its methods for regulating GHG emissions.
In addition to the CAA, other environmental statutes such as the Endangered Species Act and the National Environmental Policy Act require federal agencies to consider climate change in their actions and decisions. The extent to which agencies may consider climate change effects and rely on predictive models, studies, and assumptions, however, has been challenged in court. Federal agencies are also required to consider the cost of GHG emissions in their rulemakings and environmental reviews. As the Trump Administration implements its policies on climate change, stakeholders may sue to ensure compliance with laws and judicial precedent that require consideration of climate change effects or costs.
Climate change litigation may potentially increase as some stakeholders seek to reduce GHG emissions and address climate change effects. In the past, plaintiffs have had little success in using federal common law nuisance claims to force private entities to reduce their GHG emissions or pay damages for alleged injuries caused by their emissions. In 2011, the Supreme Court determined that these claims were displaced when Congress granted EPA authority to regulate GHG emissions under the CAA. If Congress amends the CAA to remove EPA's authority, plaintiffs may seek to reintroduce these common law nuisance claims. However, they will likely face jurisdictional barriers that may be difficult to overcome.
Federal courts often do not reach the merits of climate change suits due to threshold procedural and jurisdictional barriers, such as whether a plaintiff or petitioner has the right to bring a lawsuit in the first place or whether the court has jurisdiction over a type of claim. These difficult procedural and jurisdictional barriers are at the center of a recent case claiming that the government has a duty to safeguard certain natural resources for the benefit of the public and that duty compels the government to address climate change.
This report will cover a brief history of U.S. climate change regulation; review the different types of regulation and legal actions that have been pursued in the national debate over GHGs; examine selected legal issues and next steps in related litigation; and address what these legal and regulatory developments mean for Congress. |
crs_R40611 | crs_R40611_0 | Congress created Part D in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA; P.L. 108-173 ), effective January 1, 2006. The law also made Part D the primary source of drug coverage for individuals covered under both Medicare and Medicaid (so-called dual eligibles). Part D coverage is provided through private insurance plans (PDPs) that offer only drug coverage, or through Medicare Advantage (MA) plans (MA-PDs) that offer drug coverage as part of a broader, Medicare Part C managed care benefit. All Part D plans must meet certain minimum requirements, though there are significant variations among plans in terms of benefit design including differences in premiums, drug formularies (i.e., lists of covered drugs), and cost sharing for particular drugs. Of the 58.6 million Medicare beneficiaries in 2017 who were eligible for Part D, 42.5 million (72.5%) were enrolled in a Part D plan and another 1.6 million (2.7%) had prescription drug coverage through a former employer that received a Part D subsidy for a portion of their coverage. Of the remaining 25% of Medicare beneficiaries, about half had drug coverage as generous as Part D through another source, such as the Federal Employees Health Benefits program, TRICARE, or private coverage. Eligibility for Low-Income Assistance
Beneficiaries with limited incomes and resources may qualify for assistance with their Part D premiums, cost sharing, and other out-of-pocket expenses. This group includes all other persons who (1) are enrolled in a PDP plan or MA-PD plan; (2) have incomes below 150% of the federal poverty level, $18,210 for an individual and $24,690 for a couple in 2018; and (3) have assets below $12,600 for an individual and $25,150 for a couple in 2018 (increased in future years by the percentage increase in the CPI). Beneficiaries already enrolled in a Part D plan may change their plans during the annual open enrollment period. Generally, sponsors make changes to plan benefits effective at the beginning of each calendar year. Some dual-eligible beneficiaries may find that they have been auto-enrolled in a plan that may not best meet their needs. This minimum set, referred to as "qualified prescription drug coverage," may include either a standard package of prescription drug coverage established by Medicare or an alternative package that is actuarially equivalent. The drug coverage can be either basic coverage or enhanced coverage. To qualify, an employer or union must offer drug benefits that are actuarially equivalent to, or more generous than, standard Part D prescription drug coverage. In addition, Medicare pays most of the cost sharing and premiums for LIS beneficiaries enrolled in PDP or MA-PD plans. (The national average monthly bid is $57.93 for plan year 2018.) As noted, premiums for the Part D program are generally set at an amount equal to 25.5% of standard benefit costs; however, as recipients of the Part D low-income subsidies are not required to pay premiums and premiums are based only on standard benefits (i.e., the premium calculation does not include such things as costs associated with the low-income subsidy and risk-corridor payments), premiums made up about 15.5% of total Part D program revenues in 2017. This projected growth is due to expectations of further increases in the number of enrollees, changes in the distribution of enrollees among coverage categories (e.g., a movement from subsidized retiree plans to regular Part D plans and growth in the number of people reaching the catastrophic coverage level), a slowing of the trend toward greater generic drug utilization, and an increase in the use and the prices of specialty drugs. The Medicare Trustees project that total Part D expenditures will more than double during the next 10 years, from $94.5 billion in 2018 to $195.3 billion in 2027. | The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA; P.L. 108-173) established a voluntary, outpatient prescription drug benefit under Medicare Part D, effective January 1, 2006. Medicare Part D provides coverage through private prescription drug plans (PDPs) that offer only drug coverage, or through Medicare Advantage (MA) prescription drug plans (MA-PDs) that offer coverage as part of broader, managed care plans. Private drug plans participating in Part D bear some financial risk, although federal subsidies cover most program costs in an effort to encourage participation and keep benefits affordable.
At a minimum, Medicare drug plans must offer a "standard coverage" package of benefits or alternative coverage that is actuarially equivalent to a standard plan. Plans also may offer enhanced benefits. Although all plans must meet certain minimum requirements, there can be significant differences among offerings in terms of benefit design, specific drugs included in formularies (i.e., lists of covered drugs), cost sharing for particular drugs, or the level of monthly premiums. In general, beneficiaries can enroll in a plan, or change plan enrollment, when they first become eligible for Medicare or during open enrollment periods each October 15 through December 7. For plan year 2018, there are between 19 and 26 PDPs in the nation's 34 PDP regions, in addition to Medicare Advantage plans. Because sponsors are allowed to change plan offerings from year to year, beneficiaries annually face the need for careful review of their choices to select the plans that best meet their needs.
A key element of the Part D program is enhanced coverage for low-income individuals. Persons with incomes up to 150% of the federal poverty level (FPL) and assets below set limits are eligible for extra assistance with Medicare Part D premiums and cost sharing. Individuals enrolled in both Medicare and Medicaid (so-called dual eligibles) and certain other low-income beneficiaries are automatically enrolled in no-premium plans, which are Part D plans that have premiums at or below specified levels.
In 2017, about 42.5 million out of a total of 58.6 million Medicare beneficiaries received prescription drug benefits through a PDP or an MA-PD, with almost one-third receiving a low-income subsidy. Another 1.6 million received drug assistance through a Part D-subsidized retiree health plan. Of the remaining 25% of Medicare beneficiaries not enrolled in Part D, about half had coverage through health care plans that was at least as generous as Part D; the other half had no coverage or coverage less generous than Part D. Overall, about 88% of Medicare beneficiaries had drug coverage through either PDP or MA-PD plans, retiree coverage, or private insurance of comparable scope. Total Part D expenditures were approximately $100.0 billion in calendar year 2017.
Medicare Part D has cost less than originally forecasted, due in part to lower-than-predicted enrollment and increased use of less expensive generic drugs. However, the Medicare Trustees project that spending on Part D benefits will accelerate over the next 10 years due to the expectation of further increases in the number of enrollees, costs associated with the gradual elimination of the out-of-pocket cost coverage gap, changes in the distribution of enrollees among coverage categories, a slowing of the trend toward greater generic drug utilization, and an increase in the use and the prices of specialty drugs. |
crs_RS22344 | crs_RS22344_0 | Introduction
The Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 ( H.R. 4440 ) provides tax relief to businesses and individuals affected by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. President Bush signed the bill into law, P.L. 109-135 , on December 22, 2005. The act's provisions distinguish between the "Hurricane Katrina disaster area," which is the presidentially-declared disaster area, and the "Gulf Opportunity Zone" (GO Zone), which is the portion of the Hurricane Katrina disaster area determined by President Bush to warrant individual or individual and public assistance under the Stafford Act. The act extends this relief to victims of Hurricanes Rita and Wilma. | The Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 (H.R. 4440) was signed into law on December 22, 2005 (P.L. 109-135). The act provides tax benefits to assist in the recovery from Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. Some of its provisions expand several sections of the Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act (KETRA, P.L. 109-73) to apply to victims of Hurricanes Rita and Wilma. This report summarizes the act's provisions dealing with hurricane relief.
For more information on P.L. 109-73, see CRS Report RS22269, Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_RS22060 | crs_RS22060_0 | This trust fund was composed of two accounts—the Sport Fish Restoration Account and the Boat Safety Account. This report details the sources of funding for the trust fund, and summarizes how various programs and activities receive funding. Trust Fund Income
The Sport Fish Restoration and Boating Trust Fund receives income from five sources ( Figure 1 ). (2) The account receives, from the Highway Trust Fund, the annual tax receipts attributable to small engine fuel used for outdoor power equipment (26 U.S.C. (3) The account receives the annual receipts from a manufacturers' excise tax on sport fishing equipment (26 U.S.C. (5) This account receives interest on funds invested prior to disbursal (26 U.S.C. (2) A boating safety program, administered by the U.S. Coast Guard's Office of Boating Safety, is funded by 18.5% of annual receipts from the Sport Fish Restoration and Boating Trust Fund; the current authorization for this allocation extends through June 30, 2012. For FY2012, a total of about $110.4 million is estimated to be available to this program. 102-587 ) authorizes a competitive grant program for states to construct pump-out and dump stations to dispose of vessel sewage from recreational boaters. (6) The Wildlife and Sport Fish Restoration Program Improvement Act of 2000 ( P.L. 106-408 ) authorized a Multi-State Conservation Grant Program. §777m(e) provides $200,000 annually to four Interstate Fishery Commissions as well as $400,000 annually to the Sport Fishing and Boating Partnership Council. Legislative Issues
Some of the proposals under discussion for reauthorizing federal surface transportation programs include an increase (possibly more than doubling) of the 18.4 cents per gallon federal fuel tax to better fund highway infrastructure programs through the Highway Trust Fund. The 112 th Congress may decide whether the Sport Fish Restoration and Boating Trust Fund would receive substantial benefits (possibly exceeding an additional $350 million annually) from an increase in the federal fuel tax. A corollary set of questions focuses on whether, and if so how, the various programs supported by the Sport Fish Restoration and Boating Trust Fund might be modified to expend increased receipts, should a federal fuel tax increase be enacted
Fund allocations under the Sport Fish Restoration and Boating Safety Trust Fund are scheduled to expire on June 30, 2012, since the 112 th Congress has not yet enacted any comprehensive transportation and highway reauthorization legislation. | An Aquatic Resources Trust Fund, with two accounts—a Sport Fish Restoration Account and a Boat Safety Account—was created in 1984 and subsequently amended to support a variety of programs administered by three federal agencies, including wetlands management, recreational vessel docking and sewage disposal infrastructure, and aquatic resource education. In 2005, the Boat Safety Account was terminated and remaining programs were consolidated into a renamed Sport Fish Restoration and Boating Trust Fund. This report details sources of funding for this trust fund and summarizes the various programs and activities receiving funding.
The five sources of income to the Sport Fish Restoration and Boating Trust Fund are (1) the portion of federal fuel taxes attributable to motorboat fuel from the Highway Trust Fund; (2) annual tax receipts attributable to small engine fuel used for outdoor power equipment from the Highway Trust Fund; (3) annual receipts from a manufacturers' excise tax on sport fishing equipment; (4) annual receipts from import duties on fishing tackle and on yachts and pleasure craft; and (5) interest on funds invested prior to disbursal. Total FY2012 income from these five sources is estimated to be about $760 million.
The eight efforts funded from the Sport Fish Restoration and Boating Trust Fund are (1) three coastal wetlands conservation and restoration programs; (2) recreational boating safety; (3) construction of sewage pump-out and dump stations for recreational vessel sewage disposal; (4) construction of docking facilities for large transient recreational vessels; (5) national aquatic resource outreach and communications; (6) multi-state conservation grants; (7) interstate fishery commissions and the Sport Fishing and Boating Partnership Council; and (8) state grants for sport fish restoration projects.
Some proposals under discussion by Congress for reauthorizing federal surface transportation programs include an increase (possibly more than doubling) of the 18.4 cents-per-gallon federal fuel tax to better fund highway infrastructure programs through the Highway Trust Fund. (Authorization of appropriations for federal surface transportation programs would have terminated at the end of FY2009, but has received several short-term extensions, most recently by provisions in P.L. 112-102, which extended the authorizations through June 30, 2012.) The 112th Congress may decide whether the Sport Fish Restoration and Boating Trust Fund receives substantial benefits (possibly exceeding an additional $350 million annually) if the federal fuel tax is increased. A corollary set of questions focuses on whether, and if so how, the various programs supported by the Sport Fish Restoration and Boating Trust Fund might be modified to expend increased receipts, should a federal fuel tax increase be enacted. |
crs_R43320 | crs_R43320_0 | Introduction
Immigration reform was a key issue in the first session of the 113 th Congress. The Senate passed the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act ( S. 744 ), a comprehensive immigration reform bill that includes provisions on border security, interior enforcement, employment eligibility verification and worksite enforcement, legalization of unauthorized aliens, immigrant visas, nonimmigrant visas, and humanitarian admissions. Taking a different approach to immigration reform, the House acted on a set of immigration bills that separately address many of the same areas of immigration policy. House Committees reported or ordered to be reported immigration bills on border security ( H.R. 2278 ); employment eligibility verification and worksite enforcement ( H.R. 1772 ); and immigrant and nonimmigrant visas ( H.R. 1773 ). The House and Senate also acted on other pieces of immigration-related legislation. Among these, the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 ( P.L. 113-4 ) includes provisions on noncitizen victims of domestic abuse or certain other crimes and on victims of human trafficking. The trafficking provisions address the care and custody of unaccompanied alien children (UAC), among other issues. In addition to P.L. Enacted appropriations measures ( P.L. 113-6 , P.L. 113-76 , and P.L. 113-164 ) variously include policy provisions on temporary nonagricultural workers, refugees, and special immigrants, among other immigration-related issues. 113-42 , P.L. 113-66 , and P.L. 113-74 concerns international adoption. This report discusses these and other immigration-related issues that received legislative action or have been of significant congressional interest in the 113 th Congress. The Border Security Results Act of 2013 ( H.R. 1417 differs from S. 744 in that H.R. The House-passed supplemental appropriations bill for 2014 ( H.R. In the House, committee-reported H.R. And the Strengthen and Fortify Enforcement (SAFE) Act ( H.R. P.L. The House Judiciary Committee has ordered to be reported the Legal Workforce Act ( H.R. 2278 , as ordered to be reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary, would give the Secretary of Homeland Security "exclusive authority to issue regulations, establish policy, and administer and enforce the provisions of the [INA] and all other immigration or nationality laws relating to the functions of consular officers of the United States in connection with the granting and refusal of a visa." S. 744 , as passed by the Senate, and the Supplying Knowledge-based Immigrants and Lifting Levels of STEM Visas Act (SKILLS Visa Act; H.R. S. 744 and H.R. 113-76 ). 113-76 for the remainder of FY2014. P.L. S. 1237 , as passed by the Senate, and H.R. Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Program
P.L. In the 113 th Congress, P.L. | Immigration reform was an active legislative issue in the first session of the 113th Congress. The Senate passed the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (S. 744), a comprehensive immigration reform bill that includes provisions on border security, interior enforcement, employment eligibility verification and worksite enforcement, legalization of unauthorized aliens, immigrant visas, nonimmigrant visas, and humanitarian admissions. For its part, the House took a different approach to immigration reform. Rather than considering a single comprehensive bill, the House acted on a set of immigration bills that address border security, interior enforcement, employment eligibility verification and worksite enforcement, and nonimmigrant and immigrant visas. House committees reported or ordered to be reported the following immigration bills: Border Security Results Act of 2013 (H.R. 1417); Strengthen and Fortify Enforcement (SAFE) Act (H.R. 2278); Legal Workforce Act (H.R. 1772); Agricultural Guestworker (AG) Act (H.R. 1773); and Supplying Knowledge-based Immigrants and Lifting Levels of STEM Visas (SKILLS Visa) Act (H.R. 2131).
Beyond their work on immigration reform legislation, the House and Senate acted on other immigration-related bills. Among these measures, the 113th Congress passed the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (P.L. 113-4), which includes provisions on noncitizen victims of domestic abuse or certain other crimes and on victims of human trafficking. Other immigration issues addressed in enacted measures include Iraqi and Afghan special immigrants (P.L. 113-42, P.L. 113-66, P.L. 113-76, P.L. 113-160), refugees (P.L. 113-6, P.L. 113-76), temporary nonagricultural workers (P.L. 113-76, P.L. 113-164), international adoption (P.L. 113-74), and alien inadmissibility (P.L. 113-100).
Several bills passed one house of Congress, but not the other. In addition to the comprehensive immigration reform bill (S. 744), the Senate passed measures dealing with border security personnel compensation (S. 1691), the application of immigration law in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) (S. 1237), and the visa waiver program (S. 2673). House-passed measures address, among other issues, border security and unaccompanied alien children (UAC) arriving in the United States (H.R. 5230), human trafficking (H.R. 3530, H.R. 3610, H.R. 5135), prosecutorial discretion (H.R. 2217, H.R. 5272), and the visa waiver program (H.R. 938).
This report discusses these and other immigration-related issues that received legislative action or have been of significant congressional interest in the 113th Congress. While the report covers S. 744, as passed by the Senate, a more complete treatment of that bill can be found in CRS Report R43097, Comprehensive Immigration Reform in the 113th Congress: Major Provisions in Senate-Passed S. 744. For the most part, DHS appropriations are not covered in this report; FY2014 appropriations are addressed in CRS Report R43147, Department of Homeland Security: FY2014 Appropriations. |
crs_R40216 | crs_R40216_0 | Introduction
In response to a deteriorating national economy and recession, in February 2009 the Congress passed and President Obama signed into law the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act ( P.L. Among the purposes identified in the legislation are preservation and creation of jobs and promotion of U.S. economic recovery, and investment in transportation, environmental, and other infrastructure that will provide long-term economic benefits. This report identifies funding for water infrastructure programs and projects included in the bill. The legislation directed additional appropriations to a number of existing federal programs that either directly invest in water infrastructure projects or provide assistance to states and localities for such activities. Water infrastructure funding, which was available for obligation through September 30, 2010, is summarized in Table 1 . The SRF capitalization grants are appropriated through the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) State and Tribal Assistance Grants account (in the Interior and Environment Appropriations bill) and are allocated among the states according to formulas. The Recovery Act provided an additional $4.0 billion for clean water SRFs and $2.0 billion for drinking water SRFs. Total stimulus funding for the two SRF programs was four times larger than the funding levels for these programs in regular FY2009 appropriations. States awarded ARRA SRF assistance to projects on their Intended Use Plans, lists that states develop to identify which projects in which communities will receive funding. EPA was directed to submit a report to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees within 30 days of enactment containing a general plan for expenditure of funds provided by the legislation, another report within 90 days providing detailed project level information associated with the general plan, and bi-annual reports on implementation, but there were no deadlines for actually awarding the funds in the bill. The guidance addressed a number of issues unique to the ARRA SRF funds, such as how states were to meet the law's requirement that at least 20% of the funds be used for green infrastructure projects, additional reporting requirements for accountability and transparency, and details that states must provide on their plans for using the federal funds, including principal forgiveness. For example, as of September 30, 2010, USDA had obligated its $1.38 billion in grant and loan funds that it received for rural water and waste disposal projects in more than 800 communities. During the 111 th Congress, committees held several hearings on implementation of the Recovery Act. The economic recovery legislation provided supplemental funding above regular appropriations for the Corps, Reclamation, and other water resources activities at the Department of Agriculture's Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) and the Department of State's International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC). 111-5 provided a total of $4.6 billion for the Corps. Bureau of Reclamation Projects and Programs
ARRA provided a total of $1.0 billion for Reclamation projects and programs. 111-5 provided ARRA funding for three agricultural watershed programs. 111-16 , provided further direction to USDA on prioritization of the funds. Implementation and Oversight
Unlike some of the other water infrastructure activities funded in the legislation (including the EPA wastewater and drinking water programs discussed previously), little was publicly known about how most of the water resources funds would be distributed when P.L. 111-5 and the conference report ( H.Rept. Army Corps of Engineers
In P.L. | On February 17, 2009, President Obama signed into law the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5, the ARRA, or Recovery Act). Among the purposes identified in the legislation are preservation and creation of jobs and promotion of U.S. economic recovery, and investment in transportation, environmental protection, and other infrastructure that will provide long-term economic benefits. This report identifies funding for water infrastructure programs and projects contained in the legislation.
The legislation directed additional appropriations to a number of existing federal programs that either directly invest in water infrastructure projects or provide assistance to states and localities for such activities. Water infrastructure funding in the bill, which was available for obligation through September 30, 2010, was provided to five federal agencies and one commission. This funding totaled $13.5 billion.
The bill provided funding for locally built wastewater and drinking water treatment projects through assistance programs administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). For the EPA wastewater program, the enacted bill provides $4.0 billion. For the EPA drinking water program, P.L. 111-5 provided $2.0 billion in additional funds. These funds were allocated to states according to established formulas, and states awarded actual assistance to projects and communities. For the USDA programs that benefit rural communities, the Recovery Act provided $1.38 billion in grants and loans; USDA state offices made individual project decisions. Additional funding in the bill for these programs was three to four times more than the level of recent appropriations.
The enacted legislation provided funding for water resources development and management projects administered by four agencies. It provided $4.6 billion for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and $1.0 billion for the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation). The legislation also provided $340 million for USDA's Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) agricultural watershed program, and $220 million for the Department of State's International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) for levee and dam upgrades. Congress directed that the funds be used consistent with the eligibility and prioritization constraints and direction provided in P.L. 111-5 and the accompanying conference report, H.Rept. 111-16, but discretion regarding which specific water resource projects received funds was largely left up to the these federal agencies.
Even after enactment, implementation of the additional water infrastructure funding in the ARRA has raised a number of issues, including how general restrictions in the legislation, such as "Buy American" requirements, will affect timely spending of ARRA funds and whether the funding will have the economic stimulative impact that Congress intended. Another issue concerns matching fund requirements. Unless project assistance is provided entirely as grants, communities and project sponsors need to come up with matching funds, which continues to be challenging in the current fiscal environment. During the 111th Congress, House and Senate committees held a number of hearings on use of ARRA water infrastructure funds, and additional oversight is likely in the 112th Congress. |
crs_RL34581 | crs_RL34581_0 | That number is only 2% of the 11,893 men and women who have represented their states and congressional districts since the First Congress convened on March 4, 1789. Of the 240 Members serving 30 years or more, 139 served only in the House of Representatives; 29 served only in the Senate; and 72 served in both chambers. Four of the 240 Members are women, three of whom have served in the House and Senate. As of February 11, 2009, (111 th Congress) that number had risen to 240. Among Members of the 111 th Congress, 16 incumbent Senators and 18 incumbent Representatives have served 30 years or longer. Table 1 lists Members who have served 30 years or longer in descending order of the length of their congressional service, as measured in days. | This report identifies the 240 Members of Congress who have served in Congress for at least 30 years, as of February 11, 2009. Those 240 Members are only 2% of the 11,893 individuals who have represented their states and congressional districts in Congress since 1789.
Of the 240 Members with at least 30 years of congressional service, 139 have spent all of their congressional careers in the House; 29 have spent all of their careers in the Senate; and 72 have had combined service in the House and Senate. Among Members of the 111th Congress, 16 Senators and 18 Representatives have served 30 years or more.
This report supercedes CRS Report RL30370, by [author name scrubbed], Specialist in American National Government. This report will not be updated. |
crs_R45134 | crs_R45134_0 | Paragraph 1(b) of Senate Rule XIX, however—commonly known as the Pastore rule, after its author, former Rhode Island Senator John Pastore—requires Senate floor debate to be germane during specific periods of a Senate work day. Pursuant to the Pastore rule, all floor debate must be germane and confined to the specific question then pending before the Senate for the first three hours after (1) the conclusion of the Morning Hour occurring at the beginning of a new legislative day (in the rare event the Senate should hold a Morning Hour) or (2) after the unfinished business or any pending business has been laid before the Senate on any calendar day. The Pastore rule's germaneness requirement can be waived by unanimous consent (UC) or by nondebatable motion. Enforcing Germaneness in Debate
A Senator may be called to order during the three-hour window described in the Pastore rule if his or her remarks are not germane to the specific question then pending before the Senate. In current practice, the germaneness requirements of the Pastore rule are rarely formally invoked on the Senate floor. If a Senator calls another Senator to order under the rule, enforcement first results in a reminder from the presiding officer that debate must be germane to the question then pending before the Senate. The raising of this point of order does not remove speaking privileges from the offending Senator, although the Senator must suspend his or her remarks until the chair rules on the question. Depending on the ruling of the presiding officer on such a point of order, a Senator may either continue speaking (if his or her debate is ruled germane), pivot to a germane topic (if ruled not germane), or yield the floor (if ruled not germane). | Paragraph 1(b) of Senate Rule XIX—commonly known as the Pastore rule, after its author, former Rhode Island Senator John Pastore—requires Senate floor debate to be germane during specific periods of a Senate work day. The rule has been enforced sporadically since its adoption in 1964. In current practice, the germaneness requirements of the Pastore rule are rarely formally invoked on the Senate floor.
Pursuant to the rule, all floor debate must be germane and confined to the specific question then pending before the Senate for the first three hours after (1) the conclusion of the Morning Hour occurring at the beginning of a new legislative day (in the rare event the Senate should hold a Morning Hour) or (2) after the unfinished business or any pending business has been laid before the Senate on any calendar day. The Pastore rule's germaneness requirement can be waived by unanimous consent or by nondebatable motion.
A Senator may be called to order during the three-hour window described in the Pastore rule by the presiding officer or by another Senator if his or her remarks are not germane to the specific question then before the Senate. If a Senator calls another Senator to order under the rule, enforcement first results in a reminder from the presiding officer that debate must be germane to the question then pending before the Senate. The raising of a point of order does not remove speaking privileges from the offending Senator. Depending on the ruling of the presiding officer on such a point of order, a Senator may either continue speaking (if ruled germane), pivot to a germane topic (if ruled not germane), or yield the floor (if ruled not germane). |
crs_RL34314 | crs_RL34314_0 | It therefore depends on countries with high savings rates, such as China, to invest some of their capital in the United States. In order to limit the appreciation of China's currency, the renminbi (RMB), against the dollar, China must purchase U.S. dollars. Rather than hold dollars (and other foreign currencies), which earn no interest, the Chinese central government has converted some level of its foreign exchange reserve holdings into U.S. financial securities, including U.S. Treasury securities, U.S. agency debt, U.S. corporate debt, and U.S. equities. China's holdings of U.S. public and private securities were estimated by the Federal government to total nearly $1.6 trillion as of June 2012. As of June 2013, these totaled $1.28 trillion. Some U.S. policymakers have expressed concern that China's large holdings of U.S. securities could pose a risk to the U.S. economy, especially if China attempted to divest itself of a large share of its holdings. This report examines the importance to the U.S. economy of China's investment in U.S. securities, as well as the policy implications of its holdings for both the United States and China. For the United States, the issue of China's large holdings of U.S. securities is part of a broader question that has been raised by many economists: what are the implications of the heavy U.S. reliance on foreign investment in U.S. securities finance capital investment by firms, household borrowing, and the government budget deficit? China was the largest foreign holder of LT Treasury debt at 24.4% of total (down from 32.2% in June 2011). Still others contend that China's purchases of U.S. securities were a major contributing factor to the U.S. sub-prime mortgage crisis and subsequent global economic slowdown because such purchases helped to keep real U.S. interest rates very low and increased global imbalances. Chinese officials, on the other hand, have expressed concerns over the safety of their large holdings of U.S. debt, and some have argued that China should either diversify away from U.S. Treasury securities or implement policies that slow the accumulation of FX reserves, which would lessen the need to buy U.S. assets. Growing Bilateral Tensions over the U.S. Public Debt
Since the beginning of the global financial crisis in 2008, U.S. government officials have increasingly sought to offer assurances to Chinese officials regarding the safety of China's holdings of U.S. government debt securities and to encourage China to continue to purchase U.S. securities. The recent contentious U.S. debates in Congress over raising the debt ceiling and over how to address long-term U.S. debt issues, along with the downgrade of the long-term sovereign credit rating of the United States from AAA to AA + by Standard and Poor's in August 2011, appear to have intensified China's concerns over its U.S. debt holdings. First, a large sell-off of China's U.S. holdings could diminish the value of these securities in international markets, which would lead to large losses on the sale, and would, in turn, decrease the value of China's remaining dollar-denominated assets. The bills state, for example, that under certain circumstances, China's holdings of U.S. debt could give it a tool with which it can try to manipulate U.S. domestic and foreign policymaking, including the U.S. relationship with Taiwan; and that China could attempt to destabilize the U.S. economy by rapidly divesting large portions of its holdings of U.S. debt instruments. What might happen if China no longer purchased U.S. securities and/or tried to sell a significant share of its dollar holdings? Since China held about $1.6 trillion of U.S. private and public securities (largely U.S. Treasury securities) as of June 2012, any reduction in its U.S. holdings could potentially be large. For the U.S. economy, this issue is manifested namely in its low savings rate and thus its dependence on foreign saving to finance its investment needs and federal budget deficits. Some economists contend that, although the low U.S. savings rate is a problem, the U.S. current account deficit and high levels of foreign capital flows to the United States are also reflections of the strength of the U.S. economy and its attractiveness as a destination for foreign investment, and therefore discount the likelihood that foreign investors will suddenly shift their capital elsewhere. Some Chinese analysts have argued that the debt problems in Europe and the United States will decrease their demand for Chinese products, and that a depreciating dollar will lower the value of Chinese dollar assets. | Given its relatively low savings rate, the U.S. economy depends heavily on foreign capital inflows from countries with high savings rates (such as China) to meet its domestic investment needs and to fund the federal budget deficit. The willingness of foreigners to invest in the U.S. economy and purchase U.S. public debt has helped keep U.S. real interest rates low. However, many economists contend that U.S. dependency on foreign savings exposes the U.S. economy to certain risks, and some argue that such low-cost capital inflows were a contributing factor to the U.S. housing bubble and subsequent global financial crisis that began in 2008.
China's policy of intervening in currency markets to limit the appreciation of its currency against the dollar (and other currencies) and large current account surpluses have made it the world's largest and fastest growing holder of foreign exchange reserves, especially dollar-denominated assets. China has invested a large share of these reserves in U.S. private and public securities, which include long-term (LT) Treasury debt, LT U.S. agency debt, LT U.S. corporate debt, LT U.S. equities, and short-term debt. As of June 2012, China was the second largest holder of U.S. securities (after Japan) at nearly $1.6 trillion (down from $1.7 trillion as of June 2011). U.S. Treasury securities constitute the largest category of China's holdings of U.S. securities—these totaled nearly $1.3 trillion as of June 2013.
China's large holdings of U.S. securities have raised a number of concerns in both China and the United States. For example, in 2009, (then) Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated that he was "a little worried" about the "safety" of China's holdings of U.S. debt. The sharp debate in Congress over raising the public debt ceiling in the summer of 2011 and the subsequent downgrade of the U.S. long-term sovereign credit from AAA to AA + by Standard and Poor's in August 2011 appears to have intensified Chinese concerns. In addition, Chinese officials have criticized U.S. fiscal and monetary policies, such as quantitative easing by the U.S. Federal Reserve, arguing that they could lead to higher U.S. inflation and/or a significant weakening of the dollar, which could reduce the value of China's U.S. debt holdings in the future. Some Chinese analysts have urged the government to diversify its reserves away from U.S. dollar assets, while others have called for more rapid appreciation of China's currency, which could lessen the need to hold U.S. assets.
Some U.S. policymakers have expressed concern over the size of China's holdings of U.S. government debt. For example, some contend that China might decide to sell a large share of its U.S. securities holdings, which could induce other foreign investors to sell off their U.S. holdings as well, which in turn could destabilize the U.S. economy. Others argue that China could use its large holdings of U.S. debt as a bargaining chip in its dealing with the United States. Other U.S. policymakers contend that China's holdings of U.S. debt give it little leverage over the United States, because as long as China continues to hold down the value of its currency to the U.S. dollar, it will have few options other than to keep investing in U.S. dollar assets. A Chinese attempt to sell a large portion of its dollar holdings could reduce the value of its remaining dollar holdings, and any subsequent negative shocks to the U.S. (and global) economy could dampen U.S. demand for Chinese exports. They contend that the main issue for U.S. policymakers is not China's large holdings of U.S. securities per se, but rather the high U.S. reliance on foreign capital in general, and whether such borrowing is sustainable. This report examines China's holdings of U.S. securities and its implications on the U.S. economy and U.S.-China relations. |
crs_RS21823 | crs_RS21823_0 | Background
On December 19, 2003, Libya announced it would dismantle its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and open the country to immediate and comprehensive verification inspections. Thus far, U.S. and British officials apparently have found no evidence of an offensive biological weapons program. Libya has provided significant information about its nuclear, chemical, and missile programs, including data on foreign suppliers. Yet, Libya's declarations revealed that A.Q. | On December 19, 2003, Libya announced it would dismantle its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs. Since then, U.S., British, and international officials have inspected and removed or destroyed key components of those programs, and Libya has provided valuable information, particularly about foreign suppliers. Libya's WMD disarmament has been a critical step towards reintegration into the world community. This report will be updated as needed. See CRS Report RL33142, Libya: Background and U.S. Relations , by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R42570 | crs_R42570_0 | In contrast to its Subtitle C option, EPA has no authority to enforce the standards it proposes under the Subtitle D option. That amendment would create a coal combustion residuals permit program, defined as "a permit program or other system of prior approval and conditions that is adopted by or for a state for the management and disposal of coal combustion residuals to the extent such activities occur in structures in such state." Legislative provisions largely identical to those in the Coal Residuals Reuse and Management Act are included in legislation that would extend the authorization of federal funding for surface transportation programs administered by the Department of Transportation (DOT). 2273 and S. 1751 . On April 24, 2012, the Senate agreed by unanimous consent to an amendment that struck the House-passed language from H.R. This report provides background information concerning the provisions in the proposed Section 4011 of RCRA in H.R. The report also summarizes selected MSW landfill regulations and standards proposed by EPA in June 2010 under Subtitle D. Finally, with regard to the legislative proposals that would amend Subtitle D, the report summarizes provisions in the proposed Section 4011 of RCRA; identifies potential issues associated with implementing a statutory permit program; and compares details of the regulatory requirements applicable to MSW landfills, on which the legislative proposal is based, to comparable elements of the proposed CCR permit program. The Nature of CCRs and Concern over CCR Management
CCRs are the inorganic residues that remain after pulverized coal is burned. In May 2000, after review by OMB, EPA issued a revised regulatory determination stating that it would continue to exclude CCRs from regulation as hazardous waste under Subtitle C. However, similar to statements in its March 2000 draft proposal, EPA stated that it was convinced that national regulations under Subtitle D were warranted for CCR disposal in landfills and surface impoundments because
the composition of the waste had the potential to present danger to human health and the environment in certain circumstances; EPA had identified proven cases of damages to human health and the environment through improper waste management; while industry management practices had improved measurably, there was sufficient evidence the wastes were being managed in a significant number of landfills and surface impoundments without proper controls in place, particularly in the area of groundwater monitoring; and while there had been substantive improvements in state regulatory programs, EPA identified significant gaps either in states' regulatory authorities or in their exercise of existing authorities. While new CCR facilities are likely to be built with liners and groundwater monitoring systems, the majority of facilities currently in use are not new. Under both regulatory options, owners and operators of CCR landfills and surface impoundments would be required to implement protective measures that are largely similar (e.g., under both options facilities would be required to install composite liners and groundwater monitoring). EPA's Subtitle D approach to regulating CCR disposal facilities is generally supported by state regulatory agencies and industry groups. EPA Requirements Relevant to the Proposed Legislation
The proposed CCR permit program would draw from certain waste management standards promulgated or proposed by EPA pursuant to Subtitle D: specifically, existing regulatory standards applicable to the management of municipal solid waste (MSW) and selected proposed standards applicable to CCR landfills and surface impoundments. Legislative Proposal to Amend RCRA
The legislative proposal to amend Subtitle D of RCRA would add a Section 4011, Management and Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals. By creating such a program entirely within the proposed statute, Congress would create a permit program unique among environmental laws. Charges of overreaching its regulatory authority have also been cited by certain opponents to EPA's proposal to identify and regulate CCRs as a hazardous waste under Subtitle C. Creation of a CCR permit program in the proposed amendment to RCRA could be seen as an effort to create a mechanism to manage CCRs that would allow states wide discretion in adopting and implementing the program, while limiting the potential involvement of EPA. To recognize the similarities and distinct differences between the two, it is useful to compare provisions in the proposed CCR permit program to existing requirements applicable to MSW landfills, as well as elements of EPA's June 2010 proposal to regulate CCR disposal facilities under Subtitle D.
As detailed in the discussion of " Existing Municipal Solid Waste Management Requirements ," above, the federal regulatory framework applicable to MSW management was developed as a result of four distinct yet interrelated directives in Subtitle D that required (1) EPA to promulgate national criteria applicable to MSW landfills; (2) states to adopt a permit program to assure facility compliance with those criteria; (3) EPA to determine the adequacy of state permit programs; and (4) EPA to enforce the MSW landfill criteria in states with an inadequate permit program. Neither proposal would apply federally enforceable standards to owners and operators of CCR landfills or surface impoundments. | On April 24, 2012, the House and Senate began the conference process to reconcile legislation passed in both houses that would extend authorization for Department of Transportation programs. Title V in the House-passed legislation (H.R. 4348), Highway and Infrastructure Safety Through the Protection of Coal Combustion Residual Recycling, would amend the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) to add Section 4011. Largely identical to the Coal Residuals Reuse and Management Act passed in the House (H.R. 2273) and introduced in the Senate (S. 1751), the proposed Section 4011 would create a state-based permit program for the management and disposal of coal combustion residuals (CCRs, also known as coal ash).
Concern over CCR Management
CCRs are the inorganic materials that remain after pulverized coal is burned for power production. Generally, more than 100 million tons of CCRs are generated annually in the United States, the majority of which is accumulated in landfills or surface impoundment ponds at individual power plants. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has determined that accumulation in unlined units, particularly surface impoundments, poses a substantial risk of contaminant leaching (particularly selenium and arsenic) to surface and groundwater. EPA found that use of a composite liner largely eliminated that risk. While new units are likely to be built with liners, EPA has determined that the majority in use today are older and unlikely to have liners.
Administration and Congressional Proposals to Manage CCRs
CCR management is regulated by individual states, which EPA has found to be inconsistent in its requirements for protective measures (e.g., liners and groundwater monitoring systems). Concerns regarding the risks of improper management and inconsistent state regulations led EPA to propose national standards for CCR disposal. In June 2010, EPA released for public comment two regulatory options—one proposed under its existing authority to regulate hazardous wastes, under Subtitle C of RCRA, the other under its authority to promulgate standards applicable to "sanitary landfills," under Subtitle D of RCRA. EPA is authorized to enforce its proposed Subtitle C standards, but could only encourage states to adopt and enforce the Subtitle D standards.
In contrast to EPA's proposals, the proposed amendment to RCRA would create a state-based permit program for the management and disposal of CCRs. Established entirely in statute, Congress would create a program unique among environmental laws. That is, the permit program would be created with no directive to EPA to promulgate regulations applicable to the program or to CCR landfills and surface impoundments. Instead, existing regulations applicable to municipal solid waste (MSW) landfills and elements of EPA's June 2010 proposal would apply to the program.
Stakeholders in favor of the legislative approach include industry groups concerned that implementing EPA's Subtitle C option would stigmatize CCRs by labeling the materials "hazardous waste," potentially reducing markets for reuse and recycling (e.g., as a component in concrete or roadbed materials). States support this approach, as it would allow them to regulate CCRs as they deem necessary. Stakeholders opposed to this approach argue that the flexibility allowed to states in deciding whether or when facilities may be required to obtain a permit, as well as the proposed amendment's lack of federally enforceable standards applicable to CCR landfills and surface impoundments, would likely result in few changes to current state programs.
Scope and Purpose of This Report
This report provides background to understand the legislative proposals to amend Subtitle D of RCRA and identifies potential challenges to implementing the proposed permit program. Considering their influence on program implementation, the report discusses the regulatory standards on which the permit program would be based. In particular, it summarizes EPA's existing (MSW) and proposed (CCR) standards relevant to the proposed CCR permit program. This report also summarizes provisions in the proposed Section 4011 of RCRA; identifies potential challenges to implementing a statutory permit program; and compares regulations applicable to MSW landfills to comparable elements of the proposed CCR permit program. |
crs_RS21671 | crs_RS21671_0 | First, the country must sign the Convention. The United States Senate gave its advice and consent to the United States' ratification of the Convention on September 20, 2000. As a result of this action, the United States is now a full member of the Hague Adoption Convention, which entered into force for the United States on April 1, 2008. Annual reports to Congress are required by the IAA concerning certain aspects of the Convention and the IAA implementation. Conclusion
The United States became a full member of the Convention, and the Convention entered into force on April 1, 2008. The Convention now governs intercountry adoptions between the United States and other Convention member countries in accordance with the provisions of the Intercountry Adoption Act. Prior to ratification, the DOS had numerous duties and responsibilities connected with the implementation of the Convention. | On April 1, 2008, the United States became a full member of the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption (hereinafter "Convention"), and the Convention entered into force in the United States. As a result, the Convention now governs intercountry adoptions between the United States and other Convention member countries in accordance with the provisions of the Intercountry Adoption Act (IAA). In order to comply with the Convention membership requirements, the United States had signed the Convention, the Senate had given its advice and consent to the ratification of the Convention, and Congress had approved legislation (the IAA) for the implementation of the Convention. In addition, the U.S. Department of State (DOS) had a number of duties and responsibilities, summarized below, which were required to be completed prior to the formal ratification and the entry into force of the Convention. |
crs_95-709 | crs_95-709_0 | Many Members of Congress see continued tension between "free speech" decisions of the Supreme Court, which protect flag desecration as expressive conduct under the First Amendment, and the symbolic significance of the United States flag. Consequently, every Congress that has convened since those decisions were issued has considered measures to permit the punishment of those who engage in flag desecration. This report is divided into two parts. The first gives a brief history of the flag protection issue, from the enactment of the Flag Protection Act in 1968 through current consideration of a constitutional amendment. The second part briefly summarizes the two decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Texas v. Johnson and United States v. Eichman , that struck down the state and federal flag protection statutes as applied in the context punishing expressive conduct. History
In 1968, in the midst of the Vietnam conflict, Congress enacted the first Federal Flag Protection Act of general applicability. The law was occasioned by the numerous public flag burnings in protest of the war. For the next 20 years, the lower courts upheld the constitutionality of the federal statute and the Supreme Court declined to review these decisions. In six of the last eight Congresses, the House passed proposed constitutional amendments which would have authorized Congress to enact legislation to protect the flag from physical desecration. In the 104 th Congress, the Senate considered a "flag" amendment, but came three votes short of passing it. In the 106 th Congress, S.J.Res. 14 failed, by a vote of 63-37, to receive the necessary two-thirds vote in the Senate. In the 109 th Congress, S.J.Res. 12 failed by a vote of 66 to 34 (one vote short of the necessary two-thirds required for passage). In the 112 th Congress, an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to prohibit desecration of the flag has been introduced in both the House and the Senate. H.J.Res. 13 proposes an amendment to the Constitution of the United States which would authorize the Congress to prohibit the physical desecration of the flag of the United States. On Flag Day of 2011, Senator Hatch introduced an identical bill, S.J.Res. 19 , in the Senate. Texas v. Johnson
In Texas v. Johnson , the majority of the Court held that Johnson's conviction for flag desecration, under a Texas statute, was inconsistent with the First Amendment and affirmed the decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that held that Johnson could not be punished for burning the flag as part of a public demonstration. United States v. Eichman
The Court, in reviewing the Flag Protection Act of 1989 in United States v. Eichman , expressly declined the invitation to reconsider Johnson and its rejection of the contention that flag-burning as a mode of expression, like obscenity or "fighting words," does not enjoy the full protection of the First Amendment. The only question not addressed in Johnson , and therefore the only question the majority felt necessary to address, was "whether the Flag Protection Act is sufficiently distinct from the Texas statute that it may constitutionally be applied to proscribe appellees' expressive conduct." | This report is divided into two parts. The first gives a brief history of the flag protection issue, from the enactment of the Flag Protection Act in 1968 through current consideration of a constitutional amendment. The second part briefly summarizes the two decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Texas v. Johnson and United States v. Eichman, that struck down the state and federal flag protection statutes as applied in the context punishing expressive conduct.
In 1968, Congress reacted to the numerous public flag burnings in protest of the Vietnam conflict by passing the first federal flag protection act of general applicability. For the next 20 years, the lower courts upheld the constitutionality of this statute and the Supreme Court declined to review these decisions. However, in Texas v. Johnson, the majority of the Court held that a conviction for flag desecration under a Texas statute was inconsistent with the First Amendment and affirmed a decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that barred punishment for burning the flag as part of a public demonstration.
In response to Johnson, Congress passed the Flag Protection Act of 1989. But, in reviewing this act in United States v. Eichman, the Supreme Court expressly declined the invitation to reconsider Johnson and its rejection of the contention that flag-burning, like obscenity or "fighting words," does not enjoy the full protection of the First Amendment as a mode of expression. The only question not addressed in Johnson, and therefore the only question the majority felt necessary to address, was "whether the Flag Protection Act is sufficiently distinct from the Texas statute that it may constitutionally be applied to proscribe appellees' expressive conduct." The majority of the Court held that it was not.
Many Members of Congress see continued tension between "free speech" decisions of the Supreme Court, which protect flag desecration as expressive conduct under the First Amendment, and the symbolic importance of the United States flag. Consequently, every Congress that has convened since those decisions were issued has considered proposals that would permit punishment of those who engage in flag desecration. In six of the last eight Congresses, the House passed proposed constitutional amendments which would have authorized Congress to enact legislation to protect the flag from physical desecration. In the 104th Congress, the Senate considered a "flag" amendment, but came three votes short of passing it. In the 106th Congress, S.J.Res. 14 failed, by a vote of 63-37, to receive the necessary two-thirds vote in the Senate. In the 109th Congress, S.J.Res. 12 failed by a vote of 66 to 34 (one vote short of the necessary two-thirds required for passage). There were no "flag" amendment votes in the Senate in the 105th, 107th, 108th, 110th, or 111th Congresses.
In the 112th Congress, an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to prohibit desecration of the flag has been introduced in both the House and the Senate. H.J.Res. 13 proposes an amendment to the Constitution of the United States which would authorize Congress to prohibit the physical desecration of the flag of the United States. An identical bill, S.J.Res. 19, has been introduced in the Senate. |
crs_RS21794 | crs_RS21794_0 | Although many factors likely contributed to this outcome, one of them appears to have been the outgoing Spanishgovernment's strong support for U.S. policy in Iraq and contribution of Spanish forces to the U.S.-led coalition,despite widespread opposition at home to the war in Iraq. This report briefly examines selected public opinion indicators in key European countries that currently contribute tothe U.S.-led coalition in Iraq. The survey data referenced in this report derive from several sources, as noted; as such, varying methodologies arereflected that may not permit cross-country comparisons. (6)
Spain's announcement after the March 11 Madrid attacks that it would withdraw its troops from Iraq has appeared toinfluence public opinion in Italy. Polish officials and the public at large have become increasingly concerned about thepotential for terrorist attacks at home. | Several European countries currently contribute military forces to U.S.-ledcoalition operations to stabilize Iraq, one year after the start of the war against former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. Many European governments have sent troops to Iraq despite strong domestic opposition, although the level ofopposition, as measured by opinion polls, varies from country to country and can show changes over time. TheMarch2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid and the announcement by the new Spanish government that it would likely removeSpanish troops from Iraq by July 2004 have raised questions about the sustainability of other countries' troopdeployments. This report surveys selected public opinion indicators in key European coalition countries. It maybeupdated as new polling data becomes available. See related CRS Report RL31843(pdf), Iraq: International AttitudestoOperation Iraqi Freedom and Reconstruction. |
crs_RL32386 | crs_RL32386_0 | Facedwith rising natural gas demand and perceived limitations in North American gas production, manyin government and industry are encouraging greater U.S. imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG). Recent activities by Congress, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Department ofEnergy, and other federal agencies to promote greater LNG supplies have included changingregulations, clarifying regulatory authorities, and streamlining the approval process for new LNGimport terminals. While forecasts vary, many analysts expect LNG to account for 12% to 21% oftotal U.S. gas supply by 2025, up from approximately 3% in 2005. Recent measures before Congress seek to encourage both domestic gas supply and newLNG terminal construction. 311c) among other provisions. Other proposals inthe 109th Congress, including H.R. 4318 , H.R. 3918 , and H.R. 3811 would lift federal restrictions on natural gas exploration and production on federal submergedlands of the Outer Continental Shelf. (5)
Specific questions are emerging about the implications of greater LNG imports to the UnitedStates. Political relationships among countries inthe LNG trade may also change as LNG becomes increasingly important to their economies. This report will review the status of U.S. LNG imports, including projections of future U.S.LNG demand within the growing international LNG market. In addition to gas field development costs,a new liquefaction plant costs approximately $2-$3 billion, and an import terminal costs $500million to $1 billion. In 2005, Congresspassed and President Bush signed the Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-58 ). Along with expansions at fourexisting terminals, six to ten new import terminals would be needed. At issue is where theseterminals would be built, how they would be integrated into the nation's existing gas infrastructure,and how they might be secured against accident or terrorist attack. LNG terminals may affect pipeline infrastructure in two ways. Because U.S. LNG terminalsprocess large volumes of LNG, the potential for one facility to bottleneck supply might not berecognized. (59)
The future sensitivity of U.S. natural gas markets to LNG terminal disruptions is difficult to forecastand will be driven by factors such as supply diversity and pipeline development. But the long-term effectiveness of LNG in moderating gas prices will besignificantly influenced by global LNG supply, the development of an LNG spot market, andpotential market concentration. (61) Based on these figures,there appears to be sufficient interest among existing and potential exporters to meet both short-termand long-term global LNG demand projections. Spot Market Growth. In an integrated global LNG market, individual country energy polices may significantlyaffect LNG price and availability worldwide. interests." Is expanding LNG imports the best option for meeting long-term natural gasdemand in the United States? What future role, if any, should the federal government play in facilitating theongoing development of LNG infrastructure in the United States and abroad? How might Congress mitigate the risks of the global LNG trade within thecontext of national energy policy? | Liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports to the United States are increasing to supplementdomestic gas production. Recent actions by Congress and federal agencies have promoted greaterLNG supplies by changing regulations, clarifying siting authorities, and streamlining the approvalprocess for LNG import terminals. Were these policies to continue and gas demand to grow, LNGmight account for as much as 21% of U.S. gas supply by 2025, up from 3% in 2005. Congress isexamining the infrastructure and market implications of greater U.S. LNG demand.
There are concerns about how LNG capacity additions would be integrated into the nation'sgas infrastructure. Meeting projected U.S. LNG demand would require six to ten new importterminals in addition to expanding existing terminals. Twelve new terminals, most in the Gulf ofMexico, are approved, but public opposition has blocked many near-to-market terminals whichmight save billions of dollars in gas transportation costs. New LNG terminals can also require moreregional pipeline capacity to transport their supply, although this capacity may not be available inkey markets. Securing LNG infrastructure against accidents and terrorist attacks may also be achallenge to public agencies. Since import terminals process large volumes of LNG, a breakdownat any facility has the potential to bottleneck supply.
LNG's effectiveness in moderating U.S. gas prices will be determined by global LNG supply,the development of a "spot" market, potential market concentration, and evolving tradingrelationships. There appears to be sufficient interest among LNG exporters to meet global demandprojections, although some new export projects may not be built. An LNG spot market, which mayhelp U.S. companies import LNG cost-effectively, is also growing. Although some analysts believea cartel may influence the future LNG market, the potential effectiveness of a such a cartel is unclear. Whether exporters cooperate or not, an integrated global LNG market may change trading andpolitical relationships. Individual country energy polices may affect LNG price and supplyworldwide. Trade with LNG exporters perceived as unstable or inhospitable to U.S. interests mayraise concerns about supply reliability.
Recent measures before Congress seek to encourage both domestic gas supply and new LNGterminal construction. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 ( P.L. 109-58 ) includes incentives for domesticgas producers and grants the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission "exclusive" authority toapprove onshore LNG terminal siting applications, among other provisions. Other proposals in the109th Congress, including H.R. 4318 , H.R. 3918 , and H.R. 3811 would lift federal restrictions on natural gas development on the Outer Continental Shelf. AsCongress debates U.S. natural gas policy, three questions emerge: (1) Is expanding LNG imports thebest option for meeting natural gas demand in the United States? (2) What future role, if any, shouldthe federal government play in facilitating the development of LNG infrastructure domestically andabroad? (3) How might Congress mitigate the risks of the global LNG trade within the context ofnational energy policy?
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_R44523 | crs_R44523_0 | Recently, both chambers of the 114 th Congress passed energy bills containing hydropower provisions that could potentially transform hydropower regulation and development to an extent not observed by the industry in some time (e.g., by changing certain parts of the licensing process). This report analyzes pertinent components of the hydropower provisions in the North American Energy Security and Infrastructure Act of 2016 ( S. 2012 , as engrossed in the House; referred to herein as the House version) and the Energy Policy Modernization Act of 2016 ( S. 2012 , as engrossed in the Senate; referred to herein as the Senate version). General Similarities and Differences Between the House and Senate Versions of S. 2012
Both the Senate and the House versions of S. 2012 generally seek to modify regulation and development processes for nonfederal hydropower. The regulation and development provisions in both bills broadly address three primary objectives: 1) establish a more explicit timeline for the regulation of nonfederal hydropower projects (e.g., issuing a project license or an extension); 2) appoint more definitively the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) as the lead agency for nonfederal hydropower facility regulation; and 3) require FERC—and other agencies—to maintain and make publicly available more robust data on hydropower projects. Additionally, both bills direct attention to modifying these processes for specific projects (e.g., extending the time period to start project construction). Further, the House version would require licenses and preliminary extensions for pumped storage projects, whereas the Senate version does not include such a requirement. The Senate version and the House version would modify the regulation process for seven specific projects (see Table 1 ). It also would formalize the license-issuance timeline. Potential Issues
The Senate and House versions of S. 2012 contain provisions that would significantly impact nonfederal hydropower. Chief among these provisions is the one that would make FERC the lead agency for federal authorizations—and the lead agency for issuing a hydropower license. Additionally, both bills have provisions that could be viewed as controversial. Some contend that a schedule set by FERC could make the other involved parties unable to contribute to the hydropower licensing process as they have in the past and could potentially weaken their contribution to the environmental review process of such projects. | In the 114th Congress, the House and Senate have passed energy legislation that addresses hydropower. Both the North American Energy Security and Infrastructure Act of 2016 (S. 2012, as engrossed in the House) and the Energy Policy Modernization Act of 2016 (S. 2012, as engrossed in the Senate) contain provisions that would alter the regulation and development of nonfederal hydropower, among other things. Both bills would establish a formal timeline for nonfederal hydropower project regulation, would appoint the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) as the lead agency for nonfederal hydropower regulation, and would require FERC—and other agencies—to maintain and make publicly available more robust hydropower project data.
There are similarities and differences between the bills. Both bills generally seek to modify regulation and development processes for nonfederal hydropower. However, the bills would modify the regulatory process in different ways. For instance, the bills would handle the delay of issuing a hydropower project license due to interagency disputes differently; the House version would resolve such a delay in a federal circuit court, whereas the Senate version would resolve such a delay by referring the issue to the chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality. Further, each bill would address some aspects of hydropower that the other bill would not address. For instance, the House version contains a provision that would address hydropower development at existing, non-powered dams, whereas the Senate version does not contain a similar provision. Lastly, both bills would modify the regulation process for specific projects (e.g., extends the time period to start construction for a specific project).
Both the House and Senate versions contain hydropower provisions that could significantly impact nonfederal hydropower regulation and could be viewed as controversial. For example, both bills would make FERC the lead agency to coordinate the licensing process. This designation could be viewed by some as lessening the contribution of other involved agencies because these agencies would be required to abide by the schedule and decisions set by FERC. It could also be viewed as making the license issuance process timelier because one agency would have leadership authority for the process.
This report provides a comparison of the hydropower provisions in each bill and analysis for certain provisions of the bills. |
crs_R41250 | crs_R41250_0 | The 2009-2010 exercise is the fourth Quadrennial Defense Review carried out under that name and the sixth comprehensive reexamination of U.S. defense policy since the end of the Cold War. Changing Perspectives on the Global Security Environment
Looking at the cumulative results of post-Cold War defense reviews, beginning with the 1990 Base Force analysis and the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and culminating in the 2010 QDR, the net effect has been a substantial change in the conceptual underpinnings of U.S. defense strategy. The four QDRs, in 1997, 2001, 2006, and 2010, can perhaps best be seen as snapshots of an ongoing evolution of strategic thinking away from planning for smaller versions of Cold War-era conventional conflicts, on the model of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and toward planning to cope with a much more diverse array of challenges and responsibilities. By the time of the 2006 and 2010 QDRs, the basic strategic assumptions guiding military planning had shifted dramatically. One premise is that no future adversary is likely to confront U.S. conventional, Cold War-era military capabilities directly. Instead, any foe, ranging from violent, radical non-state terrorist groups to a technologically advanced near-peer competitor, will try to exploit weaknesses in U.S. defenses through asymmetric means. So the notion of a spectrum of conflict, ranging from unsophisticated insurgents or terrorists at the low end to sophisticated national armies at the high end, is becoming blurred. The 2010 QDR concludes that changes in the global security environment require some adjustments in the balance of investments among elements of the U.S. military force posture. It argues for an emphasis, first of all, on prevailing in current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and against Al Qaeda elsewhere. For future planning, it calls for new initiatives in a number of joint mission areas, including homeland defense, countering weapons of mass destruction, the ability to project power into key regions of the globe in the face of challenges to U.S. access, building the capacity of partner nations to defeat terrorism, and means of ensuring access to cyberspace. Outline of this Report
This CRS report (1) cites the legislative mandate for the QDR and reviews legislative requirements for a number of related reports; (2) outlines the results of the 2010 QDR; (3) identifies what is new in the 2010 review and discusses how thinking on key matters has evolved; (4) reviews some common criticisms of the 2010 QDR and of the QDR process; (5) discusses whether the quite radical changes in the nature of conflict that the 2006 and 2010 QDRs describe have been reflected in sufficiently far-reaching changes in defense plans and programs, and (6) concludes with a discussion of matters that future QDRs—or a more extensive interagency study—might address more fully as a means of putting defense planning into the context of a broader perspective on U.S. national security. It is likely to be a major new investment in future years. These include many measures to cope with anti-access strategies, measures to counter anti-satellite systems, and cyberwarfare initiatives. Should the QDR Address Broader Security Issues? The principal policy matters that directly shape defense planning include
When and under what conditions to use military force; Effects of global financial trends on long-term security planning; Effects of long-term domestic economic and budget trends on defense planning; The effect of growing costs of personnel, operations, and acquisition on long-term defense plans; The evolution of Cold War-era alliances in the post-Cold War era; Global cooperation and global rules of behavior on proliferation, terrorism, human rights, and democratization; The integration of defense and non-defense responsibilities in national security policy. (f) Independent Panel Assessment. | On February 1, 2010, the Defense Department released a report on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a legislatively mandated assessment of defense strategy and priorities. The review is the sixth full scale assessment of U.S. defense policy since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the 1990 Base Force analysis and the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and continuing with QDRs completed in 1997, 2001, 2006, and 2010. These official reviews have been supplemented by assessments of independently chartered panels.
The four QDRs reflect an ongoing evolution of strategic thinking away from planning for smaller versions of Cold War-era conventional conflicts, on the model of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and toward planning to cope with a much more diverse array of challenges. By the time of the 2006 and 2010 QDRs, the basic strategic assumptions guiding military planning had shifted dramatically. One premise is that no future adversary is likely to confront U.S. conventional, Cold War-era military capabilities directly. Instead, any foe, ranging from violent, radical non-state terrorist groups to a technologically advanced near-peer competitor, will try to exploit weaknesses in U.S. defenses through asymmetric means. A related premise is that the notion of a spectrum of conflict, ranging from unsophisticated insurgents or terrorists at the low end to sophisticated national armies at the high end, is becoming blurred, with "low-end" terrorist groups using advanced technologies and near-peer competitors likely to use indirect means of attack.
The 2010 QDR concludes that changes in the global security environment require some adjustments in the balance of investments among elements of the U.S. military force posture. It argues for an emphasis, first of all, on prevailing in current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and against Al Qaeda elsewhere. It revises force planning to put diverse, overlapping scenarios, including long-duration stability operations and defense of the homeland, on a par with major regional conflicts in assessing the size and composition of the force. And, it calls for new investments in critical joint missions, including countering "anti-access strategies" aimed at defeating U.S. power projection forces; building the capacity of partner states; and ensuring access to cyberspace. The 2010 report also proposes measures to reform institutional procedures that it sometimes describes as "relics of the Cold War," including acquisition, security assistance, and export control processes.
Critiques of the current and earlier QDRs raise a number of issues: Is the review overly constrained by budget limitations? Does it make sufficiently disciplined choices among the many priorities it cites? Does the focus on current conflicts come too much at the expense of preparations for future conflicts? Does the review realistically assess threats from Russia and China? A fundamental issue is whether the quite radical reassessment of global security challenges in recent QDRs has been matched by sufficiently far-reaching changes in the composition of the force.
A question for future QDRs may be whether the reviews should be tasked to address broader security policy issues as a means of assessing defense plans in a more complete context. Potential policy issues to address include when to use military force, the effects of global financial trends on U.S. defense plans, the effects of domestic economic and budget trends on defense resources, the evolution of alliances to reflect post-Cold War era challenges, the prospects for more cooperative global security rules and institutions to enhance security, and the integration of U.S. defense planning with broader, interagency policies to address global trends. |
crs_R40967 | crs_R40967_0 | Introduction
Like other manufacturing industries, the worldwide recession is weighing heavily on aerospace manufacturing. The aerospace industry's commercial side anticipates difficult business conditions for the near and medium term, but long-term projections by Boeing, for instance, are positive, with airlines expected to need 29,000 new planes valued at $3.2 trillion between 2009 and 2028. The international market for aerospace manufacturing is also rapidly changing, and it raises the question of what impact nascent competitors in countries such as China and Russia will possibly have on the future competitiveness of U.S. aircraft manufacturers. Aerospace Manufacturing Industry Overview
Aerospace Manufacturing Workforce
As an industry, aerospace manufacturing in 2008 directly supported over 500,000 high-skilled and relatively well-paid private sector manufacturing jobs nationwide. The U.S. aircraft manufacturing industry is composed of major firms such as Boeing, United Technologies, Northrop Grumman, Gulfstream Aerospace, and Textron, among others. Established aerospace manufacturing centers are located in Washington state, California, Texas, Kansas, Connecticut, and Arizona (with a combined workforce of more than 305,000 in 2008, comprising over 60% of the aerospace workforce nationwide). Aerospace manufacturing clusters are also present in Florida, Georgia, Ohio, Missouri, and Alabama. Other states, such as South Carolina, are also seeking to increase their aircraft manufacturing production base. As of 2008, aerospace manufacturing by sales accounted for 1.4% of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). Defense is the smaller of the two, and this segment depends on the U.S. government for a significant share of its sales. At the same time, the U.S. aircraft industry now depends on many non-U.S. firms for contributions to their own products. The unfair subsidization case, which dates back to a May 30, 2005, WTO filing by the United States, alleges that member states of the European Union (EU) provided Airbus with illegal subsidies from 1970 to 2004, thus giving the European aircraft manufacturer an unfair advantage in the large commercial aircraft market. Industry-wide exports (including defense and space products) by U.S. manufacturers of aerospace vehicles and equipment increased for five consecutive years, from $53 billion in 2003 to $97.4 billion in 2007. Japan, France, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Germany were the top five export markets for U.S. aerospace products in 2008, accounting for 36.2% of total aerospace exports worldwide. U.S. aerospace exports to China more than doubled between 2003 and 2008, growing from $2.7 billion to $5.5 billion. The U.S. aerospace industry trade balance stood at over $57 billion in 2008. The Regional Jet Market
Just like the large commercial aircraft market, the regional jet (RJ) market—typically considered to be commercial jet aircraft with up to 100 seats—depends on the recovery of the airline industry, and it is in a period of prolonged downturn. Canada's Bombardier and Brazil's Embraer are the two major manufacturers of these aircraft, and they now control the market. Regardless of the non-U.S. manufacture of these airframes, RJs represent an important market for the U.S. aerospace manufacturing sector, which provides these manufacturers with engines, landing gear, avionics, and a wide range of other components. Kansas is one state, in particular, that is directly affected by the downturn in the general aviation market. The large commercial jet aircraft manufacturing sector is a Boeing and Airbus duopoly. UAC has stated it plans to become the third-largest aircraft manufacturer worldwide by 2015. Public Policy Issues
Congress has been discussing broad issues affecting the competitiveness of the nation's aerospace manufacturing industry for most of this decade. In the early 2000s, the Presidential Commission on the Future of the U.S. Aerospace Industry released its recommendations on how to maintain the competitiveness of the aerospace sector. The response by some overseas competitors to U.S. export control policies has been to develop products that do not contain any U.S. components. Environmental Concerns
Like all other sectors of the U.S. economy, environmental concerns impact the aerospace industry. | Aircraft and automobile manufacturing are considered by many to be the technological backbones of the U.S. manufacturing base. As the Obama Administration and Congress debate how to strengthen American manufacturing, aerospace is likely to receive considerable attention. Like other manufacturing industries, the worldwide recession has affected aerospace manufacturing, with both the defense and commercial sides of the industry facing difficult business conditions for the near and medium term. This report primarily provides a snapshot of the U.S. commercial (non-defense, non-space) aerospace manufacturing industry and a discussion of major trends affecting the future of this industry.
The large commercial jet aviation market is a duopoly shared by the U.S. aircraft manufacturer Boeing and the European aircraft maker Airbus, with fierce competition between these two companies. The regional jet market is dominated by two non-U.S. headquartered manufacturers, Brazil's Embraer and Canada's Bombardier, both of which utilize a high level of U.S.-produced content in their products. The general aviation market includes companies such as Cessna and Gulfstream.
Aerospace manufacturing is an important part of the U.S. manufacturing base. It comprised 2.8% of the nation's manufacturing workforce in 2008 and employed over 500,000 Americans in high-skilled and high-wage jobs. More than half (61%) of the nation's aerospace industry jobs are located in six states: Washington state, California, Texas, Kansas, Connecticut, and Arizona. Several smaller aerospace manufacturing clusters are found in states such as Florida, Georgia, Ohio, Missouri, and Alabama. Other aerospace centers are beginning to emerge in southern states, such as South Carolina, where Boeing is now building a second production line to produce the 787 Dreamliner. Aerospace manufacturing contributes significantly to the U.S. economy, with total sales by aerospace manufacturers (including defense and space) comprising 1.4% of the U.S. gross domestic product in 2008.
U.S. aircraft manufacturers depend heavily on the international market for their sales. The aerospace industry sold more than $95 billion in aerospace vehicles and equipment (including defense and space) to overseas customers in markets such as Japan, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and imported over $37 billion in aerospace products from abroad, providing a significant positive contribution of $57.7 billion to the U.S. trade balance in 2008. Increasingly, other markets are becoming important as an opportunity to increase U.S. sales, but also because of the potential for future competitors to challenge the U.S. aerospace industry's competitive position. U.S. aerospace exports to China have increased since 2003, totaling $5.5 billion in 2008. At the same time, some analysts maintain that China could become a global competitor in the commercial aerospace market. Already, China is working to develop airplanes that could become globally competitive in both the regional jet and large commercial jet aviation market. Russia has stated that it wants to become the world's third-largest aircraft manufacturer by 2015.
Congress has been discussing issues affecting the competitiveness of the U.S. aerospace manufacturing industry for most of this decade. Among the concerns and issues affecting the future of the commercial sector of the industry are export control policies, environmental concerns, and an aging aerospace workforce. Additionally, the United States and the European Union are engaged in a long-running trade dispute over subsidies, with each side claiming the other subsidizes its domestic companies. |
crs_R40198 | crs_R40198_0 | Introduction
According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the U.S. economy was in a recession for 18 months from December 2007 to June 2009. It was the longest and deepest recession of the post-World War II era. It is unlikely that all of those indicators will begin declining or rising simultaneously. In the recent episode, gross domestic product (GDP) began to fall (in the fourth quarter of 2007) before employment (in January 2008), and both deteriorated significantly in the third quarter of 2008. When considering depth, the recent recession can be separated into two distinct phases. During the first phase, which lasted for the first two quarters of 2008, the recession was not deep as measured by the change in GDP or unemployment. After a slight further decline in the second quarter, the economy returned to expansion in the third quarter of 2009. Most of the decline occurred from the third quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009. Economists often attribute the unusual length and depth of the 1973 and 1981 recessions in part to the Federal Reserve's decision to keep interest rates high. This dynamic has not been important in the recent recession, as the federal funds rate's recent peak was 5.25% and was reduced before the recession had begun, eventually falling to almost zero. Since then, declines in those prices temporarily led to deflation (falling prices) at the end of 2008, with very low inflation since. Unsurprisingly, the recessions with the deepest declines in output also featured the largest increases in unemployment. The previous two recessions, in 1991 and 2001, were mild and brief as measured by the decline in GDP, and had some of the smallest increases in unemployment in the post-war period. Less typically, subsequent employment growth has been weak. Consumption and Investment in Recessions
The recent recession has also featured the largest decrease in consumption and private fixed investment spending of any post-war recession. The percentage decline in residential investment was much larger in the recent recession—beginning in the second quarter of 2006, residential investment fell by more than an annualized rate of 10% for thirteen straight quarters, while business investment fell by more than 10% in only two quarters. The recessions of 1973 and the early 1980s are remembered for their oil shocks, and this pattern is not uncommon. A widespread recession is not historically unusual. Recessions and the Financial Sector
A primary reason that the recent recession was longer and deeper than normal is the severity of the financial downturn that began in August 2007 and worsened dramatically in September 2008. Since then, financial conditions have improved but have not completely returned to normal. Comparisons Between the Recent Recession and the Great Depression
Some commentators have suggested that the financial crisis of the recent recession makes the Great Depression a more relevant comparison than the other post-war recessions. Among the most important errors were the Fed's failure to counteract the contraction in the money supply, which caused overall prices to fall a cumulative 25%, and bank runs, which caused thousands of banks to fail. By contrast, policymakers have responded aggressively and unconventionally to attempt to contain the current crisis. The Fed has reduced short-term interest rates to nearly zero. As deep as the recent recession was, it was mild compared with the first contraction of the Great Depression, as shown in Table 3 . The changes in GDP, prices, and unemployment in the recent recession were much closer to those experienced in other post-war recessions than the Great Depression. | According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the U.S. economy was in a recession for 18 months from December 2007 to June 2009. It was the longest and deepest recession of the post-World War II era. The recession can be separated into two distinct phases. During the first phase, which lasted for the first half of 2008, the recession was not deep as measured by the decline in gross domestic product (GDP) or the rise in unemployment. It then deepened from the third quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009. The economy continued to contract slightly in the second quarter of 2009, before returning to expansion in the third quarter. The recent recession features the largest decline in output, consumption, and investment, and the largest increase in unemployment, of any post-war recession.
Previously, the longest and deepest of the post-war recessions were those beginning in 1973 and 1981. Both of those recessions took place in a context of high inflation that made the Federal Reserve (Fed) hesitant to aggressively reduce interest rates to stimulate economic activity. The Fed has not shown a similar reluctance in the recent recession, bringing short-term rates down to almost zero. Although inflation exceeded the Fed's "comfort zone" in 2007 and 2008, it was not nearly as high as it was in the 1970s or 1980s recessions. The economy briefly experienced deflation (falling prices) at the end of 2008, and inflation has generally remained very low since. Deflation may be a bigger threat to the economy in the near term, although some economists are fearful that the Fed's actions will cause inflationary problems once the economy returns to full employment.
Both the 1973 and 1981 recessions also featured large spikes in oil prices near the beginning of the recession—as did the recent one. Disruptions to oil markets and recessions have gone hand in hand throughout the post-war period.
The previous two recessions (beginning in 1991 and 2001) were unusually mild and brief, but subsequently featured long "jobless recoveries" where growth was sluggish and unemployment continued to rise. The recent recession did not feature a jobless recovery longer than the norm, but employment growth has been weak in 2010.
A decline in residential investment (house building) during a recession is not unusual, and it is not uncommon for residential investment to decline more sharply than business investment and to begin declining before the recession. The recent contraction in residential investment was unusually severe, however, as indicated by the atypical decline in national house prices.
One unique characteristic of the recent recession was the severe disruption to financial markets. Financial conditions began to deteriorate in August 2007, but became more severe in September 2008. While financial downturns commonly accompany economic downturns, financial markets have continued to function smoothly in previous recessions. This difference has led some commentators to instead compare the recent recession to the Great Depression. While the onset of both crises bear some similarities, the effects on the broader economy have little in common. In the first contraction of the Great Depression, lasting from 1929 to 1933, GDP fell by almost 27%, prices fell by more than 25%, and unemployment rose from 3.2% to 25.2%. The changes in GDP, prices, and unemployment in the recent recession were much closer to those experienced in other post-war recessions than the Great Depression. Most economists blame the severity of the Great Depression on policy errors—notably, the decision to allow the money supply to contract and thousands of banks to fail. By contrast, in the recent recession policymakers have aggressively intervened to stimulate the economy and provide direct assistance to the financial sector. |
crs_R45015 | crs_R45015_0 | Introduction
The Department of Commerce's Minority Business Development Agency (MBDA) is the lead federal agency dedicated to supporting the development and expansion of the minority business community. The MBDA's primary mission is to assist minority businesses in achieving entrepreneurial participation and parity in the nation's free enterprise system and in overcoming social and economic disadvantages that have limited their participation in the past. To these ends, the MBDA is charged with formulating and coordinating federal policies and programs in support of minority business enterprises by providing technical and managerial expertise, support, and resources through a network of local business development centers. The Trump Administration has proposed reducing the agency's funding from $34 million in FY2017 to $6 million for FY2018, with the intent of terminating the agency. The Senate Appropriations Committee also reported a bill ( S. 1662 ) that recommends an appropriation of $34 million for FY2018. Agency Origins and Authority: A Brief History
The MBDA was originally established as the Office of Minority Business Enterprises (OMBE) by President Richard Nixon with the signing of Executive Order (E.O.) Rebranding the Agency
During the Carter Administration, Congress considered, but did not pass, enabling legislation authorizing the agency and its mission. Evolving Delivery System
Successive Administrations since the Carter Administration have continued to support the mission of the MBDA by refining the agency's focus and reorganizing the delivery of assistance and services. In 1981, the Reagan Administration established the Minority Business Development Center program (MBDC), which became the MBDA's primary method for delivering technical and management services to minority businesses. President George H.W. Bush proposed eliminating the agency and transferring its mission to the Small Business Administration (SBA), but ultimately continued the agency as an entity within the Department of Commerce. The Clinton Administration supported substantial increases in the agency's budget. In seeking to expand the reach and capacity of the MBDA, the Clinton Administration sought increases to fund the establishment of Rural Business Development Centers, and the activities of the MBDCs and Minority Business Opportunity Committees (MBOC). The MBDA, under the George W. Bush Administration, continued efforts to coordinate its programs with the programs of the SBA supporting minority and disadvantaged firms. The Bush Administration, based on research findings, pledged to focus its resources on minority firms with $500,000 or more in annual revenues. During the Obama Administration, in addition to a focus on facilitating entry or expansion of minority firms into the global market place, increased emphasis was placed on quantifying the impact of MBDA activities, increasing the efficient delivery of services to minority business communities, and increasing coordination with other federal agencies. The agency provides a number of services principally through a network of business centers located in areas with the largest concentration of minority populations and the largest number of minority businesses. House-Passed Bill
On July 13, 2017, the House Appropriations Committee approved the FY2018 Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations bill ( H.R. This bill would provide an appropriation of $34 million for the MBDA activities and expenses for FY2018. 3354 , which passed the House on September 14, 2017. 278 , H.R. | The Department of Commerce's Minority Business Development Agency (MBDA) is the lead federal agency dedicated to supporting the development and expansion of the minority business community. President Richard Nixon originally established this agency as the Office of Minority Business Enterprises (OMBE), with the signing of Executive Order 11458. The MBDA's mission is to assist medium and large-scale minority businesses, specifically, but not exclusively, in overcoming social and economic disadvantages that have limited their participation in the nation's free enterprise system. Through a network of local business development centers, the MBDA carries out this mission by providing technical and managerial expertise, support and resources as well as advocacy and research on behalf of minority-controlled business enterprises.
Because the MBDA, and its predecessor OMBE, were created by executive order, the MBDA's continued survival has rested with each President, in the absence of Congress passing authorizing and enabling legislation. The Carter Administration renamed the agency and refocused its efforts on medium and large-scale businesses, particularly in growth industries. Successive administrations since the Carter Administration have continued to support the mission of the MBDA by refining the agency's focus and reorganizing the delivery of assistance and services. For example, in 1981, the Ronald Reagan Administration established the Minority Business Development Center program, which became the MBDA's primary method for delivering technical and management services to minority businesses. The George H.W. Bush Administration proposed eliminating the agency and transferring its mission to the Small Business Administration (SBA), but ultimately continued the agency as an entity within the Department of Commerce. The Clinton Administration supported substantial increases in the agency's budget to fund the establishment of Rural Business Development Centers, and the activities of the Minority Business Development Centers and Minority Business Opportunity Committees. The George W. Bush Administration continued efforts to coordinate the MBDA's programs with the programs of the SBA, pledged to focus its resources on minority firms with at least $500,000 or more in annual revenues, and to increase their presence in the global economy. The Obama Administration placed increased emphasis on quantifying the impact of MBDA activities, increasing the efficient delivery of its services to minority business communities, and increasing coordination with other federal agencies.
Currently, the MBDA provides a number of services principally through a network of business centers located in areas with the largest concentration of minority populations and the largest number of minority businesses. The Trump Administration's budget request for FY2018 proposes to reduce the agency's appropriation from $34 million appropriated for FY2017 to $6 million for FY2018. The proposed funds would be used to cover the cost of terminating the agency and its activities. Contrary to the Administration's request, the House Committee on Appropriations approved a Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies Appropriations bill (H.R. 3267), which was later incorporated into H.R. 3357 that the House passed on September 14, 2017, and would provide $34 million for MBDA. On July 27, 2017, the Senate Committee on Appropriations approved S. 1662, its version of the Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Appropriations bill for FY2018. The bill also recommended an appropriation of $34 million for MBDA.
This report will be updated as events warrant. |
crs_RS22518 | crs_RS22518_0 | Who Is a Victim? Its use of the phrase "directly and proximately harmed encompasses the traditional 'but for' and proximate cause analyses." Section 3771, like the restitution statutes, states that in the case of a deceased or incapacitated victim, "the legal guardians of the crime victim or the representatives of the crime victim's estate, family members, or any other persons appointed as suitable by the court, may assume the crime victim's rights ." The Right to Be Reasonably Protected from the Accused
Section 3771 lists the right to be reasonably protected from the accused first among its victims' rights. (18 U.S.C. The notice clause has several distinctive features: (1) the notice rights apply only with respect to public court proceedings and parole proceedings ; (2) the rights attach to those proceedings involving the crime but not necessarily to all those related to the crime; (3) victims are entitled to reasonable, accurate and timely notice; and (4) victims are entitled to notice of the release or escape only of the accused . Participation
Unlike the rights to notice and not to be excluded, the right to be heard is a right to participate. Nor does it explicitly give the victim the right to be heard in any particular form. Section 3771 assures crime victims the right to be reasonably heard at proceedings where a plea bargain is accepted, a right which the 2015 amendments confirm. The right conferred on victims [was] one to an 'order' of restitution. Notice of Plea and Deferred Prosecution Agreements
The Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act added this to the inventory of victims' rights. The Department of Justice's implementing regulations create a complaint procedure and enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance. One deals with the obligations that follow from the rights granted the victims of crimes under the laws of the United States and the District of Columbia. It affords these victims a limited range of rights which related to matters within the control of the federal courts: attendance rights; the right to be heard; protection from unreasonable delays; the right to fair and respectful treatment; and the right to enforce those rights. It does not list a federal right to be notified of federal habeas proceedings among the rights it provides. Congress resolved the dispute in the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act. | Section 3771 of Title 18 of the United States Code is a statutory bill of rights for victims of crimes committed in violation of federal law or the laws of the District of Columbia. It defines victims as anyone directly and proximately harmed by such an offense, individuals and legal entities alike. It does not appear to include family relatives of a deceased, child, or incapacitated victim, except in a representative capacity.
Numbered among the rights it conveys are (1) the right to be reasonably protected from the accused; (2) the right to notification of public court and parole proceedings and of any release of the accused; (3) the right not to be excluded from public court proceedings under most circumstances; (4) the right to be heard in public court proceedings relating to bail, the acceptance of a plea bargain, sentencing, or parole; (5) the right to confer with the prosecutor; (6) the right to restitution under the law; (7) the right to proceedings free from unwarranted delays; (8) the right to be treated fairly and with respect to one's dignity and privacy; (9) the right to be informed in a timely manner of any plea bargain or deferred prosecution agreement; and (10) the right to be informed of the statutory rights and services to which one is entitled.
The section directs the courts and law enforcement officials to see to it that the rights it creates are honored. Both victims and prosecutors may assert the rights and seek review from the appellate courts should the rights be initially denied.
The section vests no rights in the accused; nor does it create cause of action damages in any instance where a victim is afforded less than the section's full benefits.
Conforming amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure became effective on December 1, 2008. The Justice Department promulgated implementing regulations on November 17, 2005. The Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015 added to the inventory of victims' statutory rights and clarified the appellate standard to be used to enforce those rights.
This report is an abridged form of a longer report, without quotation marks, footnotes, appendixes, and most of the citations to authority found in the longer version, which is available as CRS Report RL33679, Crime Victims' Rights Act: A Summary and Legal Analysis of 18 U.S.C. 3771, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R42869 | crs_R42869_0 | As of January 31, 2013, the President had declared major disasters for 12 states as well as the District of Columbia under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act). Given the scale of the damage, the Administration submitted a request to Congress on December 7, 2012, for $60.41 billion in supplemental funding and legislative provisions to address both the immediate losses and damages from Hurricane Sandy, as well as to mitigate the damage from future disasters in the impacted region. The amendment also included a variety of authorizing provisions sought by the Administration as well as provisions originating in the Senate to modify disaster assistance processes and functions. 1 ) on December 28, 2012, by a vote of 62-32. The House did not act on the legislation before the end of the 112 th Congress. 113th Congress
On January 4, 2013, the House and Senate both passed H.R. 41 , legislation providing an additional $9.7 billion in borrowing authority for the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which had been a part of the Administration's request. The House took up the legislation on January 15, 2013. The rule for consideration of the bill combined H.R. 219 , a House-passed package of legislative provisions reforming disaster assistance programs, with the appropriations legislation upon engrossment of H.R. 152 , and sent them to the Senate as a single package. 152 unchanged on January 28, 2013 by a vote of 62-36, and it was signed into law as P.L. 113-2 the next day. 152 as it passed both House and Senate and was ultimately signed into law. After the table is an analysis of this supplemental appropriations bill in the context of the Budget Control Act, and a more detailed discussion of the contents of the request and the positions taken by the House and Senate in response to it. 1 in the 112 th Congress and H.R. While P.L. 113-2 limited these funds to expenses related to Hurricane Sandy, the FCCE amounts in Senate-passed H.R. H.R. H.R. This provision was not included in P.L. 219 , which passed the House on January 14, 2013, and was appended to House-passed H.R. 41 , a separate piece of legislation providing this $9.7 billion in additional borrowing authority. This legislation was signed by the President on January 6, 2013 as P.L. For a full discussion of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013, passed as Division B of P.L. H.R. 113-2 on January 29, 2013. 113-2 , the language of the request was reflected in the text of Section 1104 of Senate-passed H.R. | On January 29, 2013, the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013, a $50.5 billion package of disaster assistance largely focused on responding to Hurricane Sandy, was enacted as P.L. 113-2.
In late October 2012, Hurricane Sandy impacted a wide swath of the East Coast of the United States, resulting in more than 120 deaths and the major disaster declarations for 12 states plus the District of Columbia. The Administration submitted a request to Congress on December 7, 2012, for $60.4 billion in supplemental funding and legislative provisions to address both the immediate losses and damages from Hurricane Sandy, as well as to mitigate the damage from future disasters in the impacted region.
On January 15, 2013, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 152, the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013. This bill included $50.5 billion in disaster assistance. This was the third piece of disaster legislation considered by the House in the 113th Congress. H.R. 41, which passed the House and Senate on January 4, 2013 and was signed into law two days later as P.L. 113-1, provided $9.7 billion in additional borrowing authority for the National Flood Insurance Program. On January 14, the House passed H.R. 219, legislation making changes to disaster assistance programs. The rule for consideration of H.R. 152 combined the text of H.R. 219 with H.R. 152 upon its engrossment, to send them to the Senate as a single package.
The Senate passed H.R. 152 unchanged on January 28, 2013 by a vote of 62-36, and it was signed into law as P.L. 113-2 the next day.
H.R. 152 was not the initial legislative response to the storm. In the 112th Congress, the Senate passed a separate package of disaster assistance totaling $60.4 billion, as well as several legislative provisions reforming federal disaster programs. While appropriations legislation generally originates in the House of Representatives, the Senate chose to act on the Administration's request first by amending an existing piece of House-passed appropriations legislation—H.R. 1. This passed the Senate December 28, 2012, by a vote of 62-32. The House did not act on the legislation before the end of the 112th Congress.
This report analyzes the Administration's request, the initial Senate position from the 112th Congress, and H.R. 152, the legislative package developed in the House that was ultimately enacted as Division A of P.L. 113-2. It includes information on legislative provisions as well as funding levels. The report also includes a list of CRS experts available to provide more in-depth analysis of the implications of the legislation. Division B of P.L. 113-2, which amends several disaster assistance programs managed by FEMA, is discussed separately in CRS Report R42991, Analysis of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013. |
crs_R42620 | crs_R42620_0 | Introduction
"Toxic" drywall, formaldehyde emissions, mold, asbestos, lead-based paint, radon, PCBs in caulk, and many other indoor pollution problems have concerned scientists, federal policy makers, and regulators during the last 30 years. Some problems have been resolved, others remain of concern, and new indoor pollution problems continually emerge, often unexpectedly. Because people spend a high percentage of their time indoors, and concentrations of pollutants often are higher in indoor air than outdoors, the human health risks indoors generally can be greater relative to risks from exposure to pollutants in the ambient (i.e., outdoor) air. In 2011, a report by the Institute of Medicine warned that many indoor air quality problems might get worse if adaptations to climate change are made without better information and programs aimed at pollution prevention. This report describes common indoor pollutants, discusses federal statutes that have been used to address indoor pollution, and analyzes key issues surrounding some general policy options for federal policy makers. Indoor Pollutants and Health Concerns
Indoor pollutants are chemicals that are potentially harmful to people and may be found in the habitable portions of buildings, including homes, schools, offices, factories, and other public gathering places. Indoor pollutants are many and varied. Many exposures may be through indoor ai r . Some substances, like lead or ozone, are also ambient (outdoor) air pollutants. Indoor pollutants may be natural (for example, carbon monoxide or radon) or synthetic (such as polychlorinated biphenyls [PCBs]), may originate indoors or outdoors, and may be deliberately produced, naturally occurring, or inadvertent byproducts of human activities. Combustion Byproducts
Some indoor pollution originates indoors as a result of fuel combustion for home heating or cooking. Formaldehyde, PCBs, and other Industrial Chemicals
Sometimes synthetic chemicals accumulate to noxious levels in indoor air or dust as a result of uncontrolled emissions from building materials, paints, or furnishings, or evaporation following the use of cleaning supplies. Still other indoor pollution originates outdoors but intrudes into homes, for example as contaminated air infiltrates through porous basement walls or is brought into the home through heating or air conditioning systems, or as contaminated drinking water. Federal Authorities and Programs
No federal agency has broad statutory authority concerning pollution indoors. On the other hand, numerous federal agencies (at least 23 in spring 2012) have some authority to conduct research or to control particular indoor pollutants, sources of pollution, or environmental quality in particular structures. For example, the EPA has some authority under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to address asbestos in schools; building standards, testing, and research related to radon; and lead-based paint hazards in housing. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act is the primary federal statute that authorizes EPA to respond to releases of hazardous substances into the environment. Consumer Product Safety Commission
The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) may prevent or reduce indoor pollution by controlling certain hazards associated with consumer products. Department of Housing and Urban Development
The National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. Concerns about coordination of federal efforts to address indoor pollution have been expressed by the general public, GAO, and the U.S. Congress in the aftermath of various national crises. Options range from maintenance of the status quo to expansion or reduction of federal involvement in research, information dissemination, financial incentives, or regulation. | "Toxic" drywall, formaldehyde emissions, mold, asbestos, lead-based paint, radon, PCBs in caulk, and many other indoor pollution problems have concerned federal policy makers and regulators during the last 30 years. Some problems have been resolved, others remain of concern, and new indoor pollution problems continually emerge. This report describes common indoor pollutants and health effects that have been linked to indoor pollution, federal statutes that have been used to address indoor pollution, key issues, and some general policy options for Congress.
Indoor pollutants are chemicals that are potentially harmful to people and found in the habitable portions of buildings, including homes, schools, offices, factories, and other public gathering places. Some indoor pollutants, like lead or ozone, are also outdoor pollutants. Others, like formaldehyde or asbestos, are primarily indoor pollutants. Indoor pollutants may be natural (for example, carbon monoxide or radon) or synthetic (polychlorinated biphenyls [PCBs]), and may originate indoors or outdoors. They may be deliberately produced, naturally occurring, or inadvertent byproducts of human activities. For example, they may arise indoors as uncontrolled emissions from building materials, paints, or furnishings, from evaporation following the use of cleaning supplies or pesticides, or as a combustion byproduct as a result of heating or cooking. Some pollution that originates outdoors infiltrates through porous basements (e.g., radon) or is inadvertently brought into indoor spaces, perhaps through heating or air conditioning systems or in contaminated drinking water. Often pollutants accumulate indoors as a result of deliberate improvements to increase energy efficiency, for example by reducing building permeability to air.
The health risks posed by indoor pollutants have concerned scientists for many years. Because people spend a high percentage of their time indoors, and concentrations of pollutants often are higher in indoor air than outdoor air, the risks due to exposure can be higher than many other environmental risks. Moreover, a 2011 report by the Institute of Medicine warns that many indoor environmental quality problems might get worse if adaptations to climate change are made without better information and programs aimed at pollution prevention.
No federal agency has broad authority concerning pollution indoors. Nonetheless, numerous federal agencies have some authority to control particular indoor pollutants or sources of pollution or the quality of indoor environments in a particular class of structures. For example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has authority under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to study and issue safety guidelines for radon and lead-based paint hazards. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) authorizes EPA also to respond to releases of hazardous substances into the outdoor environment which may migrate indoors. The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) has authority to set emission limits for, and to restrict uses of, certain chemicals in consumer products. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the General Services Administration (GSA) regulate some indoor pollutants in federal buildings. These and other agencies have conducted research to examine the risks of various indoor pollutants.
Concerns about coordination of federal efforts to address indoor pollution have been expressed by the general public, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the U.S. Congress. But any federal response to indoor pollution is complicated by the need to coordinate with local and state governments as well to address potentially overlapping jurisdictions and resources. Options for Congress range from maintenance or improvement of the status quo to reduction or expansion of federal involvement in research, information dissemination, or regulation. |
crs_R44646 | crs_R44646_0 | C ontroversies have arisen in several states over establishment of ambient water quality standards. At issue is whether states are setting standards at levels that adequately protect public health from pollutants in waterways. Some groups argue that states are adopting overly stringent standards that are unattainable and unaffordable and are being pressured to do so by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Others contend that the states are failing to protect population groups that consume large amounts of fish, such as members of Indian tribes that have treaty fishing rights. The issue involves complex scientific and technical questions about cancer risk levels and fish consumption rates, among others. States where these controversies have occurred recently include Maine and several in the Pacific Northwest (Washington, Oregon, and Idaho). Established by states and approved by EPA, they define a state's water quality goals, and they result in direct requirements for dischargers because states issue enforceable discharge permits based on criteria limits in the standards. In support of standard setting by states, EPA develops risk-based water quality criteria that set a concentration for contaminants in water to ensure that public health and aquatic life will not be harmed. Most states use the EPA national criteria as the starting point for developing criteria as part of their water quality standards. They are set so that fish in a waterbody have levels of targeted pollutants low enough such that when they are consumed by people, or are consumed by people who also are drinking water from the same waterbody, they do not pose unacceptable health risks to individuals. Fish consumption rates are among the important exposure factors in determining risk level in a criterion, because the more fish that people consume that contain toxic pollutants, the more individuals are at risk for developing cancer and other illnesses. Also important is the assumed cancer risk level in a criterion. Clean Water Act Requirements and State Responses
The CWA requires states and authorized tribes to review their water quality standards and revise them, if appropriate, at least once every three years. Increasingly, during the triennial review process, EPA has been encouraging states with populations known to consume large amounts of fish to develop criteria to protect highly exposed population groups and, in doing so, to use local or regional data on FCRs that are more representative of their target population group, in place of a default national value. In addition, the agency encourages states to adopt a cancer risk level of 10 -6 both for the general population and highly exposed groups. Recent controversies between EPA and several states have involved disputes over both the appropriate FCR and cancer risk level used by states in developing their water quality criteria, and the stringency of the resulting ambient water quality standards. Stringent water quality standards, in turn, can result in states issuing permits containing highly restrictive discharge limits that create compliance issues for industrial and municipal facilities. The challenge raised by these controversies is to develop achievable water quality criteria that are protective for the general population and for high-consuming subpopulations, whose risk will be greater, but still acceptable. At the same time, EPA argues that it has a duty under the CWA to ensure that water quality standards adequately protect designated uses of waters and are consistent with the law. Criticism of EPA's actions regarding state water quality standards has increased recently. Critics include affected states and organizations representing major dischargers that are directly affected by adoption of stringent water quality criteria. Other stakeholders, including environmental advocates and tribal organizations, have a different view. Rather than considering human health water quality criteria as overly conservative or overprotective (i.e., by overestimating risk), these groups are more likely to argue that water quality criteria and standards are underprotective (i.e., by underestimating risk), especially in terms of protecting the health of highly exposed populations. States' interests reflect a range of concerns—desiring to ensure that public health of all populations is protected while providing flexibility for business and also preserving the appropriate role for states under the CWA. Congress has so far not directly addressed the recent controversies discussed in this report, but many in Congress have for some time been generally critical about perceived EPA overreach in a number of regulatory and policy areas. | Controversies have arisen in several states over establishment of ambient water quality standards. At issue is whether states are setting standards at levels that adequately protect public health from pollutants in waterways. Some groups argue that states are adopting overly stringent standards that are unattainable and unaffordable and are being pressured to do so by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Others contend that the states are failing to protect population groups that consume large amounts of fish, such as members of Indian tribes that have treaty fishing rights. The issue involves complex scientific and technical questions about cancer risk levels and fish consumption rates, among others. States where these controversies have occurred recently include Maine and several in the Pacific Northwest (Washington, Oregon, and Idaho).
Water quality standards are the fundamental building blocks of the Clean Water Act (CWA). Established by states and approved by EPA, they define a state's water quality goals, and they result in direct requirements for dischargers when states issue enforceable permits. In support of standard setting by states, EPA develops recommended risk-based water quality criteria that set a concentration for contaminants in water to ensure that public health and aquatic life will not be harmed. Most states use the EPA national criteria as the starting point for developing criteria as part of their water quality standards. Human health criteria are set so that fish in a waterbody have levels of targeted pollutants low enough such that when they are consumed by people, or are consumed by people who also are drinking water, they do not pose unacceptable health risks to individuals.
Fish consumption rates are among the important exposure factors in determining human health risk level in a criterion, because the more fish that people consume that contain toxic pollutants, the more individuals are at risk for developing cancer and other illnesses. Also important is the assumed cancer risk level in a criterion.
The CWA requires states and authorized tribes to review their water quality standards and revise them, if appropriate, at least once every three years. Increasingly, during the triennial review process, EPA has been encouraging states with populations known to consume large amounts of fish to develop criteria to protect highly exposed population groups and, in doing so, to use local or regional data on fish consumption rates that are more representative of their target population group, in place of a default national value. In addition, the agency encourages states to adopt a cancer risk level of 10-6 (i.e., one in 1 million incremental lifetime risk of developing cancer) both for the general population and highly exposed groups.
Recent controversies have involved disputes over both the appropriate fish consumption rate and cancer risk level used by states in developing their human health water quality criteria, and the stringency of the resulting ambient water quality standards. Stringent standards, in turn, can result in states issuing permits with highly restrictive discharge limits that create compliance issues for industrial and municipal facilities. The challenge raised by these controversies is to develop achievable water quality criteria that are protective for the general population and for high-consuming subpopulations, whose risk will be greater, but still acceptable.
Criticism of EPA's actions regarding state water quality standards has increased recently. Critics include affected states and organizations representing major dischargers that are directly affected by adoption of stringent water quality criteria, who challenge what they view as EPA overreach of its CWA authority to oversee state water quality standards. EPA responds that it has a duty under the CWA to ensure that water quality standards adequately protect designated uses of water and are consistent with the law. Other stakeholders, including environmental advocates and tribal organizations, have a different view from industry's. They argue that water quality criteria and standards are underprotective, especially in terms of protecting the health of highly exposed populations. States' interests reflect a range of concerns—desiring to ensure that public health of all populations is protected, while providing flexibility for business and also preserving the appropriate role for states under the CWA.
Congress has so far not directly addressed the recent controversies discussed in this report, but many in Congress have for some time been generally critical about perceived EPA overreach in a number of regulatory and policy areas. |
crs_R43352 | crs_R43352_0 | Administration and Congressional Action
On April 10, 2013, President Obama submitted his FY2014 budget request. The request included a total of $45.4 billion for agencies funded through the Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill, including $315 million for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). On July 23, 2013, the House Committee on Appropriations (hereinafter "the House committee") reported the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2014 ( H.R. 2786 would have provided $38.1 billion for agencies funded through the House FSGG Appropriations Subcommittee. In addition, the CFTC would have received $194.6 million through the FY2014 Agriculture appropriations bill ( H.R. Total FY2014 funding in the House bill would have been $38.3 billion, about $7.1 billion below the President's FY2014 request. On July 25, 2013, the Senate Committee on Appropriations (hereinafter "the Senate committee") reported its Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2014 ( S. 1371 ; S.Rept. S. 1371 would have provided $44.3 billion for FSGG agencies, including $315 million for the CFTC, which would have been $1.1 billion below the President's FY2014 request. Because none of the 12 regular appropriations bills for FY2014 were enacted prior to the beginning of the fiscal year, a funding gap commenced on October 1, 2013. On October 16, 2013, the Senate passed a previously passed bill, H.R. 2775 , with an amendment that, in part, provided interim continuing appropriations for the previous fiscal year's projects and activities, and retitled H.R. Later that same day, the House agreed to the Senate amendment to H.R. 2775 . The CR was signed into law on October 17, 2013 ( P.L. 113-46 ), thus terminating the funding gap that same day. With some routine exceptions, P.L. 113-46 provided budget authority through January 15, 2014. 113-76 on January 17, 2014. Total FY2014 FSGG funding in P.L. The FSGG appropriations were enacted as Division E of P.L. The FSGG appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President (EOP), the judiciary, the District of Columbia, and more than two dozen independent agencies. 3547, P.L. 113-76)
P.L. 3. 2786)
H.R. On October 17, 2013, the President signed the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014 ( H.R. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (H.R. These two agencies must be funded through the Postal Service Fund. 113-76 prohibit the use of funds appropriated, in this or any other act, for FY2014, to provide a pay adjustment to federal blue-collar employees that exceeds: (1) the rate payable for the applicable grade and step of the applicable wage schedule during the period from the date of expiration of the limitation imposed by the comparable section for previous fiscal years until the normal effective date of the applicable wage survey adjustment that is to take effect in FY2014; and (2) as a result of a wage survey adjustment, the rate payable under paragraph (1) by more than the sum of (A) the General Schedule pay adjustment for FY2014 and (B) the difference between the overall average percentage of the locality-based comparability payments taking effect in FY2014, and the overall average percentage of such payments which was effective in the previous fiscal year under such section, during the remainder of FY2014. | The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill provides funding for the Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President (EOP), the judiciary, the District of Columbia, and more than two dozen independent agencies. Among those independent agencies are the General Services Administration (GSA), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the Small Business Administration (SBA), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the United States Postal Service (USPS). The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is funded in the House through the Agriculture appropriations bill and in the Senate through the FSGG bill. CFTC funding is included in all FSGG funding tables in this report.
On April 10, 2013, President Obama submitted his FY2014 budget request. The request included a total of $45.4 billion for agencies funded through the FSGG appropriations bill, including $315 million for the CFTC.
On July 23, 2013, the House Committee on Appropriations reported H.R. 2786, the Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2014. H.R. 2786 would have provided $38.3 billion for agencies funded through the House FSGG Appropriations Subcommittee. In addition, the CFTC would have received $194.6 million through the FY2014 Agriculture appropriations bill (H.R. 2410). Total FY2014 funding in the House bill was $38.3 billion, about $7.1 billion below the President's FY2014 request.
On July 25, 2013, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its FY2014 financial services bill, S. 1371. The Senate committee's bill would have provided $44.3 billion for FSGG agencies, including $315 million for the CFTC, for FY2014, $1.1 billion below the President's FY2014 request.
Because none of the 12 regular appropriations bills for FY2014 were enacted prior to the beginning of the fiscal year, a funding gap commenced on October 1, 2013. On October 16, 2013, the Senate passed a previously passed House bill, H.R. 2775, with an amendment that, in part, provided interim continuing appropriations for the previous fiscal year's projects and activities and retitled H.R. 2775 as the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014. Later that same day, the House agreed to the Senate amendment to H.R. 2775. H.R. 2775 was signed into law on October 17, 2013 (P.L. 113-46), thus terminating the funding gap that same day. With some routine exceptions, P.L. 113-46 provided budget authority through January 15, 2014.
On January 17, 2014, the President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (H.R. 3547/P.L. 113-76), funding the government for the rest of FY2014. The FSGG appropriations were included as Division E of P.L. 113-76. P.L. 113-76 appropriates a total of $43.2 billion for FSGG agencies, including $215 million for the CFTC, whose funding was contained in Division A of the law. |
crs_RS22927 | crs_RS22927_0 | An important goal of the Doha Round negotiations is to liberalize trade in goods and services, including agricultural products. With respect to agriculture, new disciplines are being negotiated in three broad areas—domestic agricultural support programs, export competition, and market access—known as the three pillars of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, negotiated in 1994. The Doha Round negotiations have attempted to maintain a balance across the three pillars by simultaneously achieving concessions from exporters and importers alike in the form of tighter spending limits on trade-distorting domestic support; elimination of export subsidies and new disciplines on forms of export competition; and expansion of market access by lowering tariffs, increasing quota commitments, and limiting the use of import safeguards and other trade barriers. The concessions already tabled as part of ongoing Doha Round negotiations are substantial and would likely have important implications for U.S. farm policy—they would significantly lower allowable spending limits for certain types of U.S. domestic support and eliminate export subsidies, while allowing U.S. agricultural products wider access to foreign markets. This report focuses on the current set of Doha Round proposals—referred to as the draft "modalities" (i.e., specific formulas and timetables for reducing trade-distorting farm support, tariffs, and export subsidies, and for opening import markets)—that relate to agriculture. 113-79 ). Many of the new programs authorized by the 2014 farm bill have yet to be fully implemented, and participation levels are uncertain. In addition, the potential degree of changes to U.S. farm policy needed to comply with a Doha Round agreement under the terms described in Table 1 would likely hinge on market conditions. Under a relatively high price environment as existed during the 2010-2013 period, U.S. program outlays could easily fall within the proposed limits with no or only modest changes. However, if market prices were to decline substantially below support levels for an extended period, then program outlays could escalate rapidly and threaten to exceed spending limits for the OTDS, amber box, and de minimis exclusions. Recent new members of the WTO also would be exempt from new market access commitments. Developing countries can designate up to 5.3% of products as sensitive. Elimination of agricultural export subsidies has been a long-standing objective of U.S. trade policy. Status of the Doha Round Negotiations
By early 2008, substantial progress had been made in the Doha Round negotiations in narrowing or resolving differences in negotiating positions. A "modalities framework" was released in December 2008, in an attempt to lock in the status of current negotiated concessions, while adding detail to outstanding issues as a basis for further, more specific talks. U.S. trade negotiators, Members of Congress, and commodity groups have expressed concern over whether an adequate balance can be achieved between U.S. domestic policy concessions and potential U.S. export gains. | The Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, launched in November 2001, has been at an impasse since 2009 and presently shows no signs of restarting, despite an interim agreement reached at the December 2013 Bali Ministerial.
The goal of the Doha Round's agriculture negotiations is to make progress simultaneously across the three pillars of the World Trade Organization's (WTO's) 1994 Agricultural Agreement—domestic support, market access, and export competition—by building on the specific terms and conditions established during the previous Uruguay Round of negotiations. Negotiators have attempted to maintain a balance across the three pillars by simultaneously achieving concessions from exporters and importers alike in the form of tighter spending limits on trade-distorting domestic support; elimination of export subsidies and new disciplines on other forms of export competition; and expansion of market access by lowering tariffs, increasing quota commitments, and limiting the use of import safeguards and other trade barriers. However, as a concession to poorer WTO member countries, the degree of new conditions is to be less stringent for developing than for developed nations.
Substantial progress had been made by 2008 in narrowing differences in Doha Round negotiating positions. As a result, a "modalities framework" (i.e., specific formulas and timetables for reducing trade-distorting farm support, tariffs, and export subsidies, and for opening import markets) was released in December 2008, in an attempt to lock in the status of negotiated concessions, while adding detail to outstanding issues as a basis for further, more specific talks. By 2009, outstanding differences had been reduced to a short list of contentious issues, including designating additional products as sensitive coupled with establishing new tariff quotas, designating developing country products as special and thus exempt from tariff reductions, and allowing developing countries to raise tariffs temporarily to deal with import surges or price declines. However, these differences proved sufficient to deadlock the negotiations.
From the U.S. perspective, a successful Doha agreement (under the current negotiating text) would significantly lower allowable spending limits for certain types of U.S. domestic support and eliminate export subsidies, while allowing U.S. agricultural products wider access to foreign markets. Any assessment of the potential effect of the new domestic support programs authorized by the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79) is very preliminary at this time. Many of the new programs have yet to be fully implemented; thus producer participation is uncertain and program outlays hinge on future market conditions. For example, under a relatively high price environment, as existed during the 2010-2013 period, U.S. program outlays could easily fall within proposed Doha Round limits with no or only modest changes. However, if market prices were to decline substantially below support levels for an extended period, then outlays could escalate rapidly and threaten to exceed the proposed spending limits.
A concern of U.S. trade negotiators, Congress, and commodity groups is whether the draft modalities include too many exceptions for foreign importers (in terms of their ability to restrict imports) to ensure that an adequate balance will be achieved between U.S. domestic policy concessions and potential U.S. export gains. This report reviews the current status of agricultural negotiations and the modalities framework for domestic support, market access, and export subsidies, as well as the potential implications of a Doha Round agreement for U.S. agriculture. |
crs_RL34735 | crs_RL34735_0 | Today, despite the recent global economic upheaval, the United States and the 27-member European Union (EU) continue to share a comprehensive, dynamic, and mutually beneficial economic partnership. Transatlantic markets are among the most open in the world and are deeply integrated through investment flows, affiliate sales and related-party trade. The current global economic crisis has had a negative impact on the transatlantic economy. A key measure of the strength of the transatlantic relationship has been the ability of both sides to work with each other throughout the current financial storm in such a way that would permit further integration and would promote expanded regulatory cooperation, as both sides of the Atlantic begin to experience an economic recovery. This report is intended to serve as a companion piece to CRS Report RL34717, Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: Background and Analysis , by [author name scrubbed], which provides an introduction and primer on the issue of transatlantic regulatory cooperation. There have been a number of previous attempts to reduce existing non-tariff and regulatory barriers to trade. Building on the Merkel initiative, the April 2007 U.S.-EU Summit adopted a Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration . A recent report co-authored by the Atlantic Council and the Bertelsmann Foundation has recommended that the United States appoint the Vice President as the U.S. co-chair of the TEC and that the EU place responsibility for the TEC in the office of the EU President in an effort to upgrade the visibility and effectiveness of the TEC. The existing transatlantic dialogues include the Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue TLD, (the U.S. Congress-European Parliament exchange), the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), and the Transatlantic Consumers Dialogue (TACD). The Role of the Legislatures
Since it began nearly two decades ago, transatlantic regulatory cooperation has been mostly limited to the executive branches and regulatory bodies on both sides of the Atlantic except when the U.S. Congress has adopted legislation with significant regulatory impact such as was the case with passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley reform bill. However, the idea of legislators assuming a more proactive role in transatlantic economic and regulatory cooperation is not a new issue. At the 1995 launch of the New Transatlantic Agenda, the leaders of the United States and EU acknowledged that they "attached great importance to enhanced parliamentary links" and agreed to "consult with parliamentary leaders on both sides of the Atlantic regarding consultation mechanisms, including building on existing institutions, to discuss matters related to our transatlantic partnership." Advocates of the effort to achieve a more barrier-free transatlantic marketplace believe that ultimate success cannot be achieved without the strong commitment and active engagement of the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament. In announcing the formation of the TLD, the two delegations stated that the Dialogue "will constitute the formal response of the European Parliament and the U.S. Congress to the commitment in the New Transatlantic Agenda to enhance parliamentary ties between the European Union and the United States." There is, however, uncertainty about the role of Congress and its representative, the TLD. Whether any of these options, or others are pursued, some observers of the TEC process who support Congressional participation in the Advisory Group believe the TEC would receive a real boost if the Obama Administration sent a clear signal to the Congressional leadership that the role of the Congress in the transatlantic regulatory cooperation process was important and that a stronger representation from the Congress through an enhanced TLD participation in the TEC Advisory Group would be welcome. | The United States and the European Union (EU) share a comprehensive, dynamic, and mutually beneficial economic relationship. Transatlantic markets are among the most open in the world and are deeply integrated. Although the global economic crisis has had a significant negative impact on the transatlantic economy, the great stake each side has had in the other's economy has afforded both sides the ability to withstand the worst of each other's current economic downturn. The key measure of the strength of the transatlantic relationship has been the ability of both sides to work with each other to weather the financial storm.
One issue that has worked against an even stronger economic relationship is the existence of regulatory barriers that limit a more integrated market from materializing. The United States and the EU have engaged in a number of attempts to reduce remaining non-tariff and regulatory barriers to trade. In the most recent effort, then President Bush and German Chancellor Merkel, serving as President of the EU, at the April 2007 U.S.-EU Summit agreed to establish the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC). The TEC was directed to "advance the work of reducing or eliminating non-tariff barriers to transatlantic commerce and trade." The leaders also created an advisory group to "provide guidance and direction" to the TEC and invited the U.S. Congress, along with the European Parliament, to accept a new, more substantive role in transatlantic regulatory cooperation by becoming part of the advisory group. The Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue (TLD), the formal exchange between Congress and the Parliament, was appointed to represent the legislatures in the TEC advisory group.
Since it began nearly two decades ago, transatlantic regulatory cooperation has been mostly limited to the executive branches and regulatory bodies on both sides of the Atlantic. However, the idea of legislators assuming a more proactive role in transatlantic economic and regulatory cooperation is not a new issue. At the 1995 launch of the New Transatlantic Agenda, the leaders of the United States and EU acknowledged that they "attached great importance to enhanced parliamentary links" and agreed to "consult with parliamentary leaders on both sides of the Atlantic regarding consultation mechanisms, including building on existing institutions, to discuss matters related to our transatlantic partnership." Advocates of the effort to achieve a more barrier-free transatlantic marketplace believe that ultimate success cannot be achieved without the strong commitment and active engagement of the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament.
Although the Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue has been in existence formally since 1999, only recently have observers from both inside and outside of Congress gained familiarity with its structure, membership, and function. With respect to the role of Congress in the TEC process, several questions have been raised including the composition of the TLD, the role of the standing committees in both the Congress and the Parliament, the staff, and the role of the U.S. Senate. A number of options for enhancing the role of Congress and the structure of the TLD have been proposed.
This report provides background and analysis on the TEC process, the role of the Congress, and the TLD. For additional information see CRS Report RL34717, Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: Background and Analysis, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL30608, EU-U.S. Economic Ties: Framework, Scope, and Magnitude, by [author name scrubbed]. |
crs_R44684 | crs_R44684_0 | Introduction
The length of time a congressional staff member spends employed in Congress, or job tenure, is a source of recurring interest among Members of Congress, congressional staff, those who study staffing in the House and Senate, and the public. There may be interest in congressional tenure information from multiple perspectives, including assessment of how a congressional office might oversee human resources issues, how staff might approach a congressional career, and guidance for how frequently staffing changes may occur in various positions. This report provides tenure data for 18 staff position titles that are typically used in Senators' offices, and information for using those data for different purposes. The positions include the following:
Administrative Director Casework Supervisor Caseworker Chief Counsel Chief of Staff Communications Director Counsel Executive Assistant Field Representative Legislative Assistant Legislative Correspondent Legislative Director Office Manager Press Secretary Regional Representative Scheduler Staff Assistant State Director
Data Source and Concerns
Publicly available information sources do not provide aggregated congressional staff tenure data in a readily retrievable or analyzable form. Senators' staff tenure data were calculated for each year between 2006 and 2016. Presentation of Tenure Data
Tables in this section provide tenure data for selected positions in Senators' personal offices and detailed data and visualizations for each position. Table 1 provides a summary of staff tenure for selected positions since 2006. The "Trend" column provides information on whether the time staff stayed in a position increased, was unchanged, or decreased between 2006 and 2016. A number of staff who stay in a position for only a brief period may depress the average length of tenure. Finally, since each Senator's office serves as its own hiring authority, variations from office to office, which for each position may include differences in job duties, work schedules, office emphases, and other factors, may limit the extent to which aggregated data provided here might match tenure in a particular office. Between 2006 and 2016, staff tenure, based on the trend of the median number of years in the position, appears to have increased by six months or more for staff in 10 position titles in Senate offices. The median tenure was unchanged for eight positions. This may be consistent with overall workforce trends in the United States. Although pay is not the only factor that might affect an individual's decision to remain in or leave a particular job, staff in positions that generally pay less typically remained in those roles for shorter periods of time than those in higher-paying positions. Some of these lower-paying positions may also be considered entry-level positions in some Senators' offices; if so, Senate office employees in those roles appear to follow national trends for others in entry-level types of jobs, remaining in the role for a relatively short period of time. Similarly, those in more senior positions, which often require a particular level of congressional or other professional experience, typically remained in those roles comparatively longer, similar to those in more senior positions in the general workforce. | The length of time a congressional staff member spends employed in a particular position in Congress—or congressional staff tenure—is a source of recurring interest to Members, staff, and the public. A congressional office, for example, may seek this information to assess its human resources capabilities, or for guidance in how frequently staffing changes might be expected for various positions. Congressional staff may seek this type of information to evaluate and approach their own individual career trajectories. This report presents a number of statistical measures regarding the length of time Senate office staff stay in particular job positions. It is designed to facilitate the consideration of tenure from a number of perspectives.
This report provides tenure data for a selection of 18 staff position titles that are typically used in Senators' offices, and information on how to use those data for different purposes. The positions include Administrative Director, Casework Supervisor, Caseworker, Chief Counsel, Chief of Staff, Communications Director, Counsel, Executive Assistant, Field Representative, Legislative Assistant, Legislative Correspondent, Legislative Director, Office Manager, Press Secretary, Regional Representative, Scheduler, Staff Assistant, and State Director. Senators' staff tenure data were calculated as of March 31, for each year between 2006 and 2016, for all staff in each position. An overview table provides staff tenure for selected positions for 2016, including summary statistics and information on whether the time staff stayed in a position increased, was unchanged, or decreased between 2006 and 2016. Other tables provide detailed tenure data and visualizations for each position title.
Between 2006 and 2016, staff tenure appears to have increased by six months or more for staff in 10 position titles in Senators' offices, based on the trend of the median number of years in the position. For eight positions, the median tenure trend was unchanged. These findings may be consistent with overall workforce trends in the United States.
Pay may be one of many factors that affect an individual's decision to remain in or leave a particular job. Senate office staff holding positions that are generally lower-paid typically remained in those roles for shorter periods of time than those in generally higher-paying positions. Lower-paying positions may also be considered entry-level roles; if so, tenure for Senators' office employees in these roles appears to follow national trends for other entry-level jobs, which individuals hold for a relatively short period of time. Those in more senior positions, where a particular level of congressional or other professional experience is often required, typically remained in those roles comparatively longer, similar to those in more senior positions in the general workforce.
Generalizations about staff tenure are limited in some ways, because each Senator's office serves as its own hiring authority. Variations from office to office, which might include differences in job duties, work schedules, office emphases, and other factors, may limit the extent to which data provided here might match tenure in another office. Direct comparisons of congressional employment to the general labor market may have similar limitations. An employing Senator's retirement or electoral loss, for example, may cause staff tenure periods to end abruptly and unexpectedly.
This report is one of a number of CRS products on congressional staff. Others include CRS Report R43946, Senate Staff Levels in Member, Committee, Leadership, and Other Offices, 1977-2016, and CRS Report R44324, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senators' Offices, FY2001-FY2014. |
crs_RS22341 | crs_RS22341_0 | This report provides an overview of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), as well as a discussion of several court cases that have clarified the statute's requirements. Such students shall not have access to their parents' financial records. These exceptions to FERPA's general prohibition against nonconsensual disclosure of educational records are described in detail below, as are controversial 2011 regulations that, among other things, permit educational agencies and institutions to disclose personally identifiable information to third parties under limited circumstances. The 2011 Regulations
In 2011, ED issued a final rule amending the FERPA regulations. The new regulations make a number of changes, including, but not limited to
permitting educational agencies and institutions to disclose personally identifiable information to authorized third parties for purposes of conducting audits or evaluations of federal- or state-supported education programs or enforcing compliance with federal requirements related to such programs; allowing student identification numbers to be designated as directory information for purposes of display on a student identification card or badge; and adding new enforcement mechanisms for violations of the act. | The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) of 1974 guarantees parental access to student education records, while limiting the disclosure of those records to third parties. The act, sometimes referred to as the Buckley Amendment, was designed to address parents' growing concerns over privacy and the belief that parents should have the right to learn about the information schools were using to make decisions concerning their children.
No substantial legislative changes have been made to FERPA since 2001, but in 2011, the Department of Education (ED) issued controversial new regulations that, among other things, permit educational agencies and institutions to disclose personally identifiable information to third parties for purposes of conducting audits or evaluations of federal- or state-supported education programs. These regulations are discussed below, as is a recently dismissed lawsuit challenging ED's new rules. |
crs_R43767 | crs_R43767_0 | Introduction
The Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (DPA), provides the President a broad set of authorities to ensure that domestic industry can meet national defense requirements. Through the DPA, the President can, among other activities, prioritize government contracts for goods and services over competing customers, and offer incentives within the domestic market to enhance the production and supply of critical materials and technologies when necessary for national defense. Since 1950, the DPA has been reauthorized over 50 times by Congress, most recently in 2018 (Sec. 115-232 ). For example, though significant authorities for the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) are included in the DPA, CFIUS is generally considered separate and distinct from the DPA and this report defers to other CRS reports for in-depth discussion on that issue. Committee Jurisdiction
Though commonly associated with industrial production for the DOD, the DPA currently lies within the jurisdiction of the House Committee on Financial Services and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. The DPA was most recently reauthorized by the 115 th Congress, in Section 1791 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 ( P.L. This extended the termination of the act by six years, from September 30, 2019, to September 30, 2025, when nearly all DPA authorities will terminate. 13603, National Defense Resource Preparedness . Therefore, the use of DPA authorities extends beyond shaping U.S. military preparedness and capabilities, as the authorities may also be used to enhance and support domestic preparedness, response, and recovery from hazards, terrorist attacks, and other national emergencies, among other purposes. In its original 1950 form, the DPA defined national defense as "the operations and activities of the armed forces, the Atomic Energy Commission, or any other department or agency directly or indirectly and substantially concerned with the national defense... " Over the many reauthorizations and amendments to the DPA, Congress has gradually expanded the scope of the definition of national defense, as recently as 2009. Authorities under Title I of the DPA
Priorities and Allocations Authority
Section 101(a) of Title I of the DPA states
The President is authorized (1) to require that performance under contracts or orders (other than contracts of employment) which he deems necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense shall take priority over performance under any other contract or order, and, for the purpose of assuring such priority, to require acceptance and performance of such contracts or orders in preference to other contracts or orders by any person he finds to be capable of their performance, and (2) to allocate materials, services, and facilities in such manner, upon such conditions, and to such extent as he shall deem necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense. Historically, the Department of Commerce's rule establishing the Defense Priorities and Allocations System (DPAS) has been the most frequently used by the executive branch. Further, U.S. allies have used the authority to assist with defense-related procurement issues. There are a number of restrictions placed on the executive branch before these loan authorities may be used in the interest of national defense. These authorities include, but are not limited to
purchasing or making purchase commitments of industrial resources or critical technology items; making subsidy payments for domestically produced materials; and installing and purchasing equipment for government and privately owned industrial facilities to expand their productive capacity. Thus, the authority could be potentially used by a large group of federal departments and agencies. Nucleus Executive Reserve
Title VII of the DPA authorizes the President to establish a volunteer body of industry executives, the "Nucleus Executive Reserve," or more frequently called the National Defense Executive Reserve (NDER). The President has the authority to block proposed or pending foreign investment transactions that threaten to impair the national security. In 1988, Congress passed the "Exon-Florio" amendment to the DPA, granting the President authority to review certain corporate mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers, and to investigate the potential impact on national security of such actions. §4558, Section 708 of the DPA that provides for the establishment of voluntary agreements; and 50 U.S.C. P.L. §2751, et seq.) Congress may also consider potentially expanding regulatory requirements for other authorities included in the DPA. Definitions
Congress may amend the definitions of key terms found in the DPA to shape the scope and use of the authorities, especially the definition of national defense . To do so, Congress could amend the President's delegation of DPA authorities, superseding those made in E.O. Appropriations to the DPA Fund
Congress could adjust future appropriations to the DPA Fund in order to manage the scope of Title III projects initiated by the President (see Table 1 for appropriations to the DPA Fund since FY2010). | The Defense Production Act (DPA) of 1950 (P.L. 81-774, 50 U.S.C. §§4501 et seq.), as amended, confers upon the President a broad set of authorities to influence domestic industry in the interest of national defense. The authorities can be used across the federal government to shape the domestic industrial base so that, when called upon, it is capable of providing essential materials and goods needed for the national defense.
Though initially passed in response to the Korean War, the DPA is historically based on the War Powers Acts of World War II. Gradually, Congress has expanded the term national defense, as defined in the DPA. Based on this definition, the scope of DPA authorities now extends beyond shaping U.S. military preparedness and capabilities, as the authorities may also be used to enhance and support domestic preparedness, response, and recovery from natural hazards, terrorist attacks, and other national emergencies.
Some current DPA authorities include, but are not limited to
Title I: Priorities and Allocations, which allows the President to require persons (including businesses and corporations) to prioritize and accept contracts for materials and services as necessary to promote the national defense. Title III: Expansion of Productive Capacity and Supply, which allows the President to incentivize the domestic industrial base to expand the production and supply of critical materials and goods. Authorized incentives include loans, loan guarantees, direct purchases and purchase commitments, and the authority to procure and install equipment in private industrial facilities. Title VII: General Provisions, which includes key definitions for the DPA and several distinct authorities, including the authority to establish voluntary agreements with private industry; the authority to block proposed or pending foreign corporate mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers that threaten national security; and the authority to employ persons of outstanding experience and ability and to establish a volunteer pool of industry executives who could be called to government service in the interest of the national defense.
These are not the exclusive authorities of the DPA, but rather some of the most pertinent because of their historical or current use.
The authorities of the DPA are generally afforded to the President in the statute. The President, in turn, has delegated these authorities to department and agency heads in Executive Order 13603, National Defense Resource Preparedness, issued in 2012. While the authorities are most frequently used by, and commonly associated with, the Department of Defense (DOD), they can be and have been used by numerous other executive departments and agencies.
Since 1950, the DPA has been reauthorized over 50 times, though significant authorities were terminated from the original law in 1953. Congress last reauthorized the DPA in Section 1791 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (P.L. 115-232). This extended the termination of the act by six years, from September 30, 2019, to September 30, 2025, when nearly all DPA authorities will terminate. A few authorities of the DPA, such as the Exon-Florio Amendment (which established government review of the acquisition of U.S. companies by foreigners) and anti-trust protections for certain voluntary industry agreements, have been made permanent by Congress. The DPA lies within the legislative jurisdiction of the House Committee on Financial Services and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.
Congress may consider enhancing its oversight of executive branch activities related to the DPA in a number of ways. To enhance oversight, Congress could expand executive branch reporting requirements, track and enforce rulemaking requirements, review the activities of the Defense Production Act Committee, and broaden the committee oversight jurisdiction of the DPA in Congress. Congress may also consider amending the DPA, either by creating new authorities or repealing existing ones. In addition, Congress may consider amending the definitions of the DPA to expand or restrict the DPA's scope, amending the statute to supersede the President's delegation of DPA authorities made in E.O. 13603, or consider adjusting future appropriations to the DPA Fund in order to manage the scope of Title III projects initiated by the President. |
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