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gao_GAO-08-12 | gao_GAO-08-12_0 | Coast Guard officials said field units report that they are meeting their inspection requirements, but inspections may not be documented in the compliance database, or inspections may have been delayed by staff being diverted to meet higher-priority needs. Definitive information about the extent to which all facilities were inspected is not available, because the Coast Guard’s MISLE database does not have the capability to document the extent to which MTSA facilities received an annual inspection for a particular year. 2). The SAFE Port Act’s requirement for each facility to receive two inspections was not effective until October 2006. Deficiencies Identified in about One-Third of Facilities and Most Were Addressed without Formal Coast Guard Enforcement Action
The Coast Guard identified deficiencies in about one-third of the facilities inspected in 2004-2006, with deficiencies concentrated in a subset of five deficiency categories, for example, failing to follow facility security plans for access control. Coast Guard officials do not know what the effect of the new spot check requirements will be on resources needed. Spot Check Guidance May Affect the Sufficiency of Inspectors to Conduct All Inspections
A second factor that may affect the reliability of the estimates is that the Coast Guard based its estimate for the number of inspectors needed in part on the number of spot checks conducted in the past, but subsequent spot check guidance may require inspectors to spend more time on these spot checks than they had previously. A more thorough evaluation of the facility compliance program could provide information on, for example, the variations we identified between Coast Guard units in oversight approaches, the advantages and disadvantages of each approach, and whether some approaches work better than the others. In such situations, delays might affect the unit’s ability to complete its inspection workload. OMB noted that there have been no reviews indicating whether or how the program is achieving results. In MISLE, however, data and database fields were missing, duplicative, and inconsistent, with data entry a particular concern. The Coast Guard gives considerable leeway to sectors and local units in deciding how to implement requirements, and as this report has shown, units have gone in somewhat different directions. For example, some have decided to conduct the annual compliance exam unannounced, while others announce them in advance, and some use formal enforcement actions such as written warnings or fines while others do not. Specifically, our objectives included determining the extent to which the Coast Guard: has met its maritime facility inspection requirements under MTSA and the SAFE Port Act and has found facilities to be in compliance with their security plans, has determined the availability of trained personnel to meet current and future facility inspection requirements, and has assessed the effectiveness of its MTSA facility oversight program and ensured that program compliance data collected and reported are reliable. We also discussed current and planned guidance for conducting facility inspections with headquarters officials. In the seven sectors we visited, we met with facility inspectors to discuss facility inspector training, the adequacy of inspection resources, guidance used to conduct inspections, and other inspector responsibilities. Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective Port Security Assessment Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
To help secure the nation's ports against a terrorist attack, federal regulations have required cargo and other maritime facilities to have security plans in place since July 2004. U.S Coast Guard (USCG) guidance calls for an annual inspection to ensure that plans are being followed. Federal law enacted in October 2006 required such facilities to be inspected two times a year--one of which is to be conducted unannounced. The USCG plans to conduct one announced inspection and the other as a less comprehensive unannounced "spot check." GAO examined the extent to which the USCG (1) has met inspection requirements and found facilities to be complying with their plans, (2) has determined the availability of trained personnel to meet current and future facility inspection requirements, and (3) has assessed the effectiveness of its facility inspection program and ensured that program compliance data collected and reported are reliable. GAO analyzed USCG compliance data, interviewed inspectors and other stakeholders in 7 of 35 USCG sectors of varying size, geographic location, and type of waterway.
What GAO Found
We could not determine the extent to which the USCG has met inspection requirements because its compliance database does not identify all regulated facilities to establish how many should have been inspected. While the USCG estimates there are about 3,200 facilities requiring inspection, their records indicate 2,126 annual inspections were conducted in 2006. Headquarters officials said field units reported that all required facility inspections were conducted. However, officials also said some inspections may not have been recorded, or were delayed by staff being diverted for natural disasters. The USCG identified deficiencies in about one-third of inspections, mainly for problems with access controls or missing documentation. Over 80 percent of deficiencies identified by the USCG were resolved by facility operators without the USCG applying formal enforcement actions. Although USCG officials believe they have enough trained inspectors to conduct current and future inspections, two additional factors could affect the USCG's estimates of the number of inspectors needed. First, facility inspectors balance security inspections with other competing duties, such as safety or pollution checks, and giving priority to security inspections could affect these other duties, inspectors said. Second, new guidance for spot checks calls for these checks to be more detailed--and perhaps more time-consuming--than some USCG units conducted in the past. For example, the guidance now requires an on-site visit, whereas some units had allowed the check to be a drive-by observation. The effect of the new guidance on resource requirements in these units is unknown. The USCG has not assessed the effectiveness of its facility inspection program. Headquarters guidance gives considerable discretion to local USCG units in deciding how to conduct facility inspections--for example, deciding whether a fine is warranted. The USCG has little or no information, however, on which approaches work better than others and is therefore limited in being able to make informed decisions in guiding the program. Flaws in USCG's database, including missing, duplicate, and inconsistent information, complicate the USCG's ability to conduct such analyses or provide other information for making management decisions. |
gao_NSIAD-98-61 | gao_NSIAD-98-61_0 | Program documents predict that, although flight testing is behind schedule, decisions to reduce test points will enable the Navy to regain lost time. The documents state that the Navy anticipates completing development testing in November 1998 and begin operational testing in May 1999, as originally planned. On the other hand, the Navy’s Program Risk Advisory Board stated in July 1997 that the Navy’s Operational Test and Evaluation Force may find that the E/F is not operationally effective or suitable. However, the report concluded that the F/A-18E/F is potentially operationally effective and potentially operationally suitable. Efforts to correct these problems are ongoing. F/A-18E/F Cost Estimate
The Navy has consistently maintained that the F/A-18E/F will be developed and produced within the cost estimates established for the program. However, certain key assumptions on which the F/A-18E/F cost estimates were based have been overcome by events. It will be a challenge for the Navy to stay within this cost because, according to Navy documents, that amount is adequate to fund the program based on the assumption that problems would not occur during testing. However, the program has experienced deficiencies; the development flight test program still has about 1 more year, and additional deficiencies may be identified during that time; and EMD funding reserves have nearly all been used. Program management has stated that the development flight test program is normally the most risky portion of the development effort. F/A-18E/F Procurement Cost Estimates Are Understated
The Navy also faces a challenge in procuring the F/A-18E/F within the unit cost originally estimated. Its unit procurement cost estimates have been based on what has become unrealistically high quantities of E/F aircraft that will be bought, a lack of factoring in the cost effect of the Navy’s decision to buy more of the higher cost F models than was factored into the original cost estimates, and an unrealistically low inflation factor for purchases in later years of the program. Conclusions and Recommendations
The ongoing test program has identified numerous deficiencies with the F/A-18E/F aircraft. A Navy board established to identify risks to the F/A-18E/F program has stated that, until several of the deficiencies have been resolved, the Operational Test and Evaluation portion of the F/A-18E/F program, scheduled to begin in May 1999, might slip or that the F/A-18E/F will have an unsuccessful Operational Test and Evaluation. The issue is how much time and money will be required to satisfactorily resolve these deficiencies. GAO Comments
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the F/A-18E/F development program, focusing on the: (1) status of the E/F development flight test program; (2) deficiencies that have been identified to date and corrective actions planned; and (3) current cost estimate for the program.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Navy has revised the F/A-18E/F flight test program by decreasing the data collection requirements that were originally planned; (2) program documents state that, although flight testing is behind schedule, program decisions to reduce test points will enable the Navy to regain lost time and complete development testing in November 1998, as originally planned; (3) F/A-18E/F program documents identified numerous deficiencies relative to the aircraft's operational performance; (4) the most challenging technical issue is wing drop; (5) until these issues are resolved through software or hardware changes that have been adequately tested, the cost, schedule, and operational performance impact of resolving these deficiencies cannot be determined; (6) the Navy remains confident that it can correct these deficiencies; (7) in addition, a Navy board that assesses risk areas in the E/F program stated in July 1997, that operational testing may determine that the aircraft is not operationally effective or suitable; (8) a December 1997 preliminary operational assessment report, which is classified and based on limited data and analysis, identified 16 major deficiencies with the E/F aircraft but concluded that the F/A-18E/F is potentially operationally effective and suitable; (9) the Navy has consistently stated that the F/A-18E/F will be developed and produced within the cost estimates established for the program; (10) certain key assumptions on which the cost estimate was made have been overtaken by events; (11) program documents state that the current development effort is funded based on the assumption that problems would not occur during testing; (12) unanticipated aircraft deficiencies have occurred, and most of the program's management reserve has been depleted; (13) since the flight test program has about 1 year remaining, it is probable that additional deficiencies will develop; (14) correcting current and potential future deficiencies could result in the development effort exceeding the congressional cost cap; (15) the Navy's F/A-18E/F unit procurement cost estimates are understated; (16) these cost estimates were based on what has become unrealistically high quantities of E/F aircraft that will be bought; and (17) more realistic assumptions indicate that, although the total procurement cost will decrease, the F/A-18E/F unit cost will be more than the Navy currently estimates. |
gao_PEMD-96-5 | gao_PEMD-96-5_0 | These include the increasing size and obvious vulnerability of the population in need of home care services, the challenges the home care setting poses for worker supervision, rapid expansion of the home care industry, unrelenting demand for home care services in the face of worker shortages, the low wages typically available to paraprofessional workers serving a largely low- or fixed-income population, diffuse responsibility for worker selection, and anecdotal reports of abuses by home care workers with criminal history. This registry is important for two reasons: (1) there is some overlap between the nursing home and home care work force; and (2) it is a model for worker screening that has already been incorporated in the Medicare and Medicaid programs that some states have extended to cover other types of workers, including home care workers. With respect to criminal background checks, several variations are possible. We report results on the extent to which states have taken advantage of this law in connection with home care workers, who primarily serve the elderly. We also asked about states’ experience in operating the federally mandated registry for nursing home aides that records documented findings of abuse, neglect, or misappropriation of a resident’s property and the states’ use of this or similar registries for home care workers. Although most states require that at least certain professionals who provide paid home care obtain a state license, they are not likely to require licensure or registration of some common types of home care workers. Do States Compile a Registry of Home Care Workers? Twelve of these states indicated that state statutes or regulations specified the jurisdictions that these checks must cover, but the breadth of the check was generally limited to a state’s own criminal records, which may be problematic where many workers come from neighboring states. Conclusions
While it is difficult to assess the extent of problems with abuse, neglect, or misappropriation of property in the home care industry, we found that federal regulations do not require criminal background checks of home care workers. While some states and localities have instituted criminal background checks or other safeguards, states’ approaches to regulating home care are quite varied, and in some instances, there may be few formal safeguards to protect potentially vulnerable elderly persons from unscrupulous operators. While some states have instituted criminal background checks for some home care providers, few have used the FBI’s national data, citing cost concerns. ), or a hospital nursing diplomate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined federal and state provisions for protecting vulnerable elderly and disabled persons from home care wokers with histories of crime and patient abuse, focusing on: (1) federal or state requirements for licensure, registration, or certification of home care workers and organizations; (2) the extent to which states have used the federally mandated registry for nursing home aides, or a similar mechanism, to identify home care workers with past involvement in abuse, neglect, or misappropriation of property; and (3) the extent to which states have required criminal background checks of home care workers.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) assessing the extent of problems with abuse, neglect, or misappropriation in the home care industry is a difficult task; (2) formal safeguards for home care consumers vary widely across political jurisdictions, public programs, and types of providers; and in some instances, few safeguards exist; (3) GAO has three key results of its evaluation to report; (4) few states have licensure requirements for types of workers that are among the most common providers of home care services; (5) however, the vast majority of states license or otherwise regulate some types of home care organizations or professionals, and some states indicate that all types of home care organizations are subject to a state licensure requirement; (6) while all states must maintain a registry for nursing home aides in accordance with federal law, only about a quarter have incorporated home care workers into it or have developed a separate registry for home care workers; (7) finally, GAO found that slightly over a quarter of the states require criminal background checks on some types of home care workers, though these checks are generally limited to a state's own criminal records; (8) states with a statute requiring such checks may access Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) data for this purpose, but few states have made use of this capacity with respect to home care workers; and (9) although there is no charge for checking these data for criminal justice purposes, fees are charged for checks for employment screening, and some state officials have cited these fees as a factor in reluctance to make greater use of the FBI data. |
gao_GAO-17-88 | gao_GAO-17-88_0 | Almost all spaceport operators currently licensed by FAA are state or municipal government entities. Although commercial activity has traditionally been from federal ranges, as of July 2016 there were 10 FAA-licensed spaceports to support private sector involvement in space-related activity. Because the companies own and operate these sites using their own vehicles exclusively, a launch site license is not required. U.S. Indemnification Regime
CSLAA created a three-tiered approach for sharing liability between the federal government and the private sector for damages to third parties— known as the indemnification regime—to encourage the development of the U.S. commercial space launch industry and promote a competitive environment (see fig. 3). Operators of spaceports that are located on federal government properties, however, could have federal contracts or agreements that require them to have insurance to protect their own property from damage resulting from space launch mishaps. Spaceport Insurance Coverage Varies among Spaceport Operators with Recent Commercial Activity, and Views Differ on the Affordability of Insurance
Three of the 10 spaceports FAA has licensed for commercial activity— MARS, Mojave Air and Space Port, and Spaceport America—have had commercial activity in the last 5 years, and their insurance coverage varies. Even though FAA does not require spaceport operators to hold insurance, representatives of these three commercially active spaceports told us that they have both property and liability insurance coverage to protect themselves from losses resulting from space launch mishaps. Several of these spaceport operators said they plan to evaluate options for insuring their property against launch-related damage if they host commercial space launches in the future. As a result, this spaceport operator, in negotiations with the launch company that operates from their site, pressed for a provision in their contract specifying that the launch company would include the spaceport operator as an additional insured in its insurance policy to protect the spaceport infrastructure against any damage resulting from the launch company’s activities under the contract. Because of Confusion about Financial Responsibility Regulations, Spaceport Operators May Not Obtain Adequate Protection
FAA has not clearly communicated its interpretation of financial responsibility regulations to spaceport operators, and spaceport operators may not have adequate protection as a result. As previously discussed, CSLAA and its amendments require launch companies to purchase insurance to cover damage to third parties in case of a launch mishap. However, several spaceport operators we interviewed reported that they find the financial responsibility regulations to be ambiguous. Specifically, they said they are unsure whether they are considered third parties or involved parties to launches. Federal internal control standards state that managers should communicate information externally to achieve the entity’s objectives. Stakeholders Are Divided on the Need to Change the Current Insurance Approach and on Support for Potential Options
Stakeholders we interviewed were divided in their opinions on the need to revise the current insurance approach, which constitutes the first tier of the existing indemnification regime. Similarly, they expressed differing views about the options we identified for revising the approach: (1) requiring launch companies to purchase insurance to cover spaceport property, and (2) requiring spaceport operators to purchase insurance for their own property. Stakeholders identified some positive aspects and also raised concerns about each option. Greater flexibility. Stakeholders Had Differing Views on Potential Options for Revising the Insurance Approach
Based on interviews with FAA, spaceport operators, launch companies, and insurance industry stakeholders, we identified two primary options for implementing a revised insurance approach as it relates to state and municipal spaceports:
Require launch companies to purchase insurance to cover spaceport property against damage resulting from launch accidents. Most spaceport operators we interviewed favored the option to require launch companies to purchase insurance, while most launch companies favored continuing the current approach. In general, stakeholders tended to oppose options where the burden of purchasing the insurance was on them. Increased certainty. Specifically, some stakeholders said that investors and owners would have greater assurance that the assets they have invested in would have adequate protections in the event of a launch mishap. Higher costs. Some stakeholders also noted that one or both options could increase costs or shift them to certain participants, depending on which option was implemented. Gaps in insurance protection can result in uninsured losses, which can, in turn, hinder the development of space-transportation-related infrastructure that supports the commercial space launch industry. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better ensure spaceport operators’ understanding of FAA’s financial responsibility regulations for commercial space launches, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation ensure that the FAA Administrator provides additional communication to clarify FAA’s interpretation of the financial responsibility regulations for commercial space launches. Agency Comments
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation for its review and comment. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
The report examines (1) the insurance coverage spaceport operators have in place to protect themselves from losses resulting from space launch mishaps and (2) stakeholder views on the need to change the current insurance approach and options for revising it. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. commercial space industry has expanded, conducting eight launches in 2015 compared with none in 2011. These launches have traditionally been from federal facilities, but as of July 2016, there were 10 nonfederal FAA-licensed spaceport operators supporting both private and federal space activity. Almost all of these spaceport operators are local government entities. The complexity of the arrangements at these spaceports, and a mishap in October 2014 where the spaceport was not adequately insured, have raised questions about insurance coverage for spaceport assets, including potential federal involvement.
Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to report on the potential inclusion of local government property in the existing indemnification regime for commercial space launches. This report examines (1) the insurance coverage spaceport operators have in place and (2) stakeholder views on the need to change the current insurance approach and on options for revising it. GAO reviewed key documents; interviewed FAA and NASA officials and representatives of FAA-licensed spaceports, launch companies, insurance brokers, and insurance companies; and selected two spaceports to visit based on launch activity.
What GAO Found
Of the 10 spaceport operators (entities that host launches from their property) that are currently licensed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 3 have had commercial activity in the last 5 years, and all 3 told GAO that they have both property and liability coverage to protect themselves from losses resulting from space launch mishaps. Federal laws and regulations do not require spaceport operators to have insurance, but operators of nonfederal spaceports that are located on federal property could have federal contracts that require them to have insurance to protect their own property from damage resulting from space launch mishaps. Moreover, for launches licensed by FAA, since the Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments of 1988, FAA has required launch companies (firms that conduct or will conduct the launch of vehicles and payloads) to purchase insurance to cover damage to the uninvolved public, as well as damage to federal government property, in case of a launch mishap. Launch participants may also choose to negotiate additional insurance coverage through launch-specific contracts. However, spaceport operators said that they find the regulations that determine financial responsibility for commercial space launches to be confusing. Specifically, several spaceport operators GAO interviewed said that, based on their interpretation of the financial responsibility regulations, they were unsure whether their property would be covered under a launch company's insurance policy or whether they would need to purchase their own insurance for their property to be covered. FAA's mission includes encouraging, facilitating, and promoting commercial space launches by the private sector, among other things. Furthermore, federal internal control standards state that management should externally communicate the necessary quality information to achieve the entity's objectives. Unless spaceport operators have a clear understanding of FAA's financial responsibility regulations, a risk exists that they may not obtain adequate insurance against losses in the event of mishap. Uninsured losses, in turn, could potentially cause delays in resuming commercial launches following a mishap and unnecessary costs to the federal government, both of which could hinder the development of the domestic commercial launch industry.
Stakeholders in the space launch industry are divided on the need to change the current insurance approach, in which insurance for spaceports is not required but can be negotiated through contracts between launch companies, which operate launch vehicles, and spaceport operators, which run spaceports. Stakeholders identified some positive aspects of the current insurance approach—for example, some said that negotiating contracts specific to each launch allows for greater flexibility. However, they also raised concerns, including a lack of certainty about coverage for potential damage. GAO identified two potential options for requiring protection for spaceports: (1) requiring launch companies to purchase insurance to cover spaceport property and (2) requiring spaceport operators to purchase insurance to cover their own property. In general, stakeholders tended to oppose the option in which the burden of purchasing the insurance was on them. Specifically, most spaceport operators GAO interviewed favored the first option, while most launch companies favored continuing the current approach. Stakeholders discussed benefits associated with both options—for example, they said that both options could increase certainty by specifying which party was required to insure spaceport property. However, they also noted challenges, such as higher costs for the party required to purchase the insurance and decreased flexibility to customize their use of insurance depending on the details of a particular launch.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FAA provide additional communication to clarify its interpretation of the financial responsibility regulations for commercial space launches. The Department of Transportation provided technical comments. |
gao_GAO-02-317 | gao_GAO-02-317_0 | FMS’s entity-wide security control structure has yet to address many of the weaknesses and related significant risks associated with its current and evolving computing environment. In addition to the weaknesses in its security program discussed above, our fiscal year 2000 review of FMS’s general computer controls also identified serious new general control weaknesses in access controls and system software. Our fiscal year 2000 audit found that as of September 30, 2000, FMS had corrected or mitigated the risks associated with 35 of the 61 computer control weaknesses discussed in our prior year’s report. Conclusion
The pervasiveness of the computer control weaknesses—both old and new—at FMS and its contractor data centers place billions of dollars of payments and collections at risk of loss or fraud. Sensitive data are at risk of inappropriate disclosure, and computer-based operations are at risk of disruption. Because the FRBs are integral to the operations of FMS, we followed up on the status of the FRBs’ corrective actions to address vulnerabilities discussed in our fiscal year 1999 report. | What GAO Found
The Financial Management Service's (FMS) overall security control environment continues to be ineffective in identifying, deterring, and responding to computer control weaknesses promptly. Consequently, billions of dollars of payments and collections are at significant risk of loss or fraud, sensitive data are at risk of inappropriate disclosure, and critical computer-based operations are vulnerable to serious disruptions. During its fiscal year 2000 audit, GAO found new general computer control weaknesses in the entity-wide security management program, access controls, and system software. GAO also identified new weaknesses in the authorization and completeness controls over one key FMS financial application. GAO's follow-up on the status of FMS's corrective actions to address weaknesses discussed in its fiscal year 1999 report found that, as of September 30, 2000, FMS had corrected or mitigated the risks associated with 35 of the 61 computer control weaknesses discussed in that report. To assist FMS management in addressing its computer control weaknesses, GAO made four overall recommendations in this public report. |
gao_GGD-99-75 | gao_GGD-99-75_0 | EEOC compiles the data from the agencies for publication in the annual Federal Sector Report on EEO Complaints Processing and Appeals. Likewise, as indicators of the nature and extent of workplace conflict, these data could be important to EEOC as it carries out its broader mission, which, as stated in the agency’s Strategic Plan, “is to promote equal opportunity in employment by enforcing the federal civil rights employment laws through administrative and judicial actions, and education and technical assistance.”
Scope and Methodology
In assessing why the data collected and reported by EEOC were not helpful in answering fundamental questions about the nature and extent of conflict in the federal workplace, we examined several sources. These officials provided observations about trends in the bases for and issues cited in complaints. Some Data That Would Answer Fundamental Questions Are Not Collected
EEOC does not collect relevant data in a way that would help answer some fundamental questions about the nature and extent of workplace conflict alleged in federal employees’ discrimination complaints. Among the kinds of questions that cannot be answered are:
How many individuals filed complaints? In how many complaints was each of the bases for discrimination alleged? What were the most frequently cited issues in employees’ discrimination complaints and in how many complaints was each of the issues cited? In addition, some of the data collected and reported by EEOC have lacked the necessary reliability because agencies did not report their data consistently, completely, or accurately, and because EEOC did not have procedures that ensured the data were reliable. Recommendations
To help ensure that relevant and reliable data are available to decisionmakers and program managers, we recommend that the Chairwoman, EEOC, take steps to enable EEOC to collect and publish data on complaint bases and issues in a manner that would allow fundamental questions about the number of complainants and the prevalence of bases and issues in the universe of complaints to be answered, and develop procedures to help ensure that agencies report data consistently, completely, and accurately. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the nature and extent of workplace conflicts that underlie the rising number of discrimination cases, focusing on: (1) the statutory bases (e.g., race, sex, or disability discrimination) under which employees filed complaints; (2) the kinds of issues (e.g., nonselection for promotion, harassment) that were cited in these complaints; and (3) why the data collected and reported by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) were not helpful in answering the questions raised.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) relevant and reliable data about the bases for federal employee discrimination complaints and the specific issues giving rise to these complaints would help decisionmakers and program managers understand the nature and extent of conflict in the federal workplace; (2) these data could also be used to help plan corrective actions and measure the results of interventions; (3) however, EEOC does not collect and report data about bases and issues in a way that would help answer some fundamental questions about the nature and extent of workplace conflicts, such as: (a) how many individuals filed complaints; (b) in how many complaints each of the bases for discrimination was alleged; and (c) the most frequently cited issues in employees' discrimination complaints and in how many complaints was each of the issues cited; (4) moreover, the reliability of the data that EEOC collects from agencies and reports is questionable; (5) GAO found that agencies reported basis and issue data to EEOC in an inconsistent manner; (6) GAO also found that agencies did not report to EEOC some of the data it requested and reported some other data incorrectly; and (7) in addition, because EEOC did not have procedures that ensured the reliability of the data it collected from agencies, it published some unreliable data in its annual Federal Sector Report on Equal Employment Opportunity Complaints Processing and Appeals. |
gao_GAO-17-191 | gao_GAO-17-191_0 | Background
For the 2020 Census, the Bureau intends to limit its per-household cost to not more than that of the 2010 Census, adjusted for inflation. To help control costs and maintain accuracy, the 2020 Census design includes new procedures and technology that have not been used extensively in earlier decennials, if at all. While these innovations show promise for a more cost-effective head count, they also introduce new risks. The 2016 test was the latest major test of NRFU in the Bureau’s testing program. According to Bureau officials, they are not certain why there were so many non-interviews for the 2016 Census Test and are researching potential causes. While the 2016 Census Test interview rate is not necessarily a precursor to the 2020 non-interview rate, because of its relationship to the cost and quality of the census, it will be important for the Bureau to better understand the factors contributing to it. At the same time, improving certain enumeration procedures and communicating better could produce additional efficiencies by enabling the Bureau to be more responsive to situations enumerators encounter in the course of their follow-up work. Enumerators were unable to access recently closed incomplete cases. Bureau officials acknowledged that closing cases in this fashion represented a missed opportunity and plan to test greater flexibilities as part of the 2018 End-to-End Test. Programming some flexibility into the mobile device—if accompanied with adequate training on how and when to use it—should permit some interviews to be completed without having to deploy staff to the same case on subsequent days. This in turn could reduce the cost of follow-up attempts and improve interview completion rates. Enumerators did not understand procedures for visits to property managers. In response to problems observed during the Bureau’s 2014 and 2015 Census tests and to complaints from property managers about multiple uncoordinated visits by enumerators, the Bureau’s 2016 Census Test introduced specific procedures to conduct initial visits to property managers in large multi-unit apartment buildings. According to the Bureau, the 2016 Census Test demonstrated that vacant units could quickly be removed from the NRFU workload using these procedures in cases where a property manager was readily available; however, in other cases the procedures caused confusion. Furthermore, without the knowledge of which units were vacant, enumerators may have unnecessarily visited these units and increased the cost and the time required to complete NRFU. The Bureau Can Better Leverage Enumerator- Collected Information on Respondent Availability
During our field visits, we encountered several instances where enumerators had been told by a respondent or otherwise learned that returning at a specific time on a later date would improve their chance of obtaining an interview from either a household respondent or a property manager. As a result, the Bureau’s 2016 Census Test and automated case management system did not have an efficient way to leverage that information. Attempting to contact non-responding households at times respondents are expected to be available can increase the completion rate and reduce the need to return at a later date or rely on proxy interviews as a source of information. Determine the cause(s) for non-interviews experienced during the non-response follow-up operation and revise and test what, if any, changes need to be made to operational procedures, training, or both, including making contact with proxy respondents. 2. 3. Revise and test operational procedures and relevant training materials for initial property manager visits to ensure procedures and training material are communicated to and understood by enumerators and their supervisors. 4. Revise and test procedures on how to better leverage enumerator- collected information on the best time or day to conduct interviews, and ensure enumerators are properly trained on these procedures. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of the Department of Commerce for comment. The Census Bureau also provided technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
With a life-cycle cost of about $12.3 billion, the 2010 Census was the most expensive enumeration in U.S. history. To help control costs and maintain accuracy, the 2020 Census design includes new procedures and technology that have not been used extensively in earlier decennials, if at all. While these innovations show promise for a more cost-effective head count, they also introduce risks. As a result, it will be important to thoroughly test the operations planned for 2020.
The objective of this report is to assess key NRFU operations performed during the 2016 Census Test to identify any lessons learned that could have a potential impact on pending design decisions for the 2020 Census. To assess NRFU operations GAO visited both test locations and observed enumerators conducting NRFU interviews, and reviewed relevant documents including the test plan and enumerator training manuals.
What GAO Found
The Census Bureau (Bureau) recently completed its 2016 Census Test in Los Angeles County, California, and Harris County, Texas. One primary focus of the test was to assess the methodology for non-response follow-up (NRFU), where enumerators personally visit households that do not self-respond to the census. GAO found that during the 2016 Census Test, NRFU generally proceeded according to the Bureau's operational plan. However, data at both test sites indicate that the Bureau experienced a large number of non-interviews. Non-interviews are cases where either no data or insufficient data are collected. Bureau officials are not certain why there were so many non-interviews for the 2016 Census Test and are researching potential causes. Going forward, it will be important for the Bureau to better understand the factors that contributed to the non-interview rate because of its relationship to the cost and quality of the census.
GAO also found that refining certain enumeration procedures and training enumerators better could produce additional efficiencies by enabling the Bureau to be more responsive to situations enumerators encounter on the ground. For example, enumerators, by design, were unable to access on the mobile device recently closed, incomplete cases. Bureau officials acknowledged that closing cases in this fashion represented a missed opportunity and plan to test greater flexibilities as part of the 2018 End-to-End Test. Programming some flexibility into the mobile device—if accompanied with adequate training on how and when to use it—should permit enumerators to complete some interviews and reduce the cost of follow-up attempts. Further, enumerators did not always understand procedures for visiting property managers in multi-unit buildings. Specifically, the 2016 Census Test demonstrated that vacant units could quickly be removed from the NRFU workload where a property manager was readily available to provide that information; however, in other cases the procedures confused enumerators and they did not understand how to proceed. Without the knowledge of which units were vacant, enumerators may have unnecessarily visited some vacant units and thereby increased the cost of NRFU.
During GAO's field visits, GAO encountered several instances where enumerators learned that returning at a specific time on a later date would improve their chance of obtaining an interview from either a household respondent or a property manager. However, the Bureau's 2016 Census Test and automated case management system did not have an efficient way to leverage that information. Attempting contact at non-responding households at times respondents are expected to be available increases the completion rate and reduces the need to return.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends the Secretary of Commerce direct the Bureau to: (1) determine causes for non-interviews, and revise and test what, if any, changes need to be made to operational procedures and training; (2) revise and test procedures and training on accessing closed cases, (3) revise and test procedures and training for initial property manager visits; and (4) revise and test procedures and training for how to use enumerator-collected data on the best time or day to conduct an interview. The Department of Commerce agreed with GAO's recommendations, and the Bureau provided technical comments that were incorporated, as appropriate. |
gao_GGD-98-107 | gao_GGD-98-107_0 | While Customs has moved in this direction by conducting three assessments to determine its need for additional inspectional personnel since 1995, these assessments (1) focused exclusively on the need for additional personnel to implement its anti-drug smuggling initiatives, such as Operation Hard Line and similar initiatives; (2) were limited to land ports along the Southwest border and certain sea and air ports at risk from drug smuggling; (3) were conducted each year using different assessment and allocation factors; and (4) were conducted with varying degrees of involvement by Customs headquarters and field units. Focusing on only a single aspect of its operations (i.e., countering drug smuggling); not consistently including the key field components (i.e., CMCs and ports) in the decisionmaking process; and using different assessment and allocation factors from year to year could prevent Customs from accurately estimating the need for inspectional personnel and then allocating them to ports. In response to the Deputy Treasury Secretary’s concerns about Operation Hard Line, Customs conducted a needs assessment in 1995 for its fiscal year 1997 budget submission. For fiscal year 1998, ASD officials said they focused on three aspects of the drug smuggling threat: (1) the number and location of drug seizures, since they were evidence of the threat; (2) the use of rail cars by drug smugglers to smuggle drugs; and (3) the existence of internal conspiracies by individuals, such as dock workers at ports, to smuggle drugs. Not All of the Inspectional Personnel Customs Estimated It Needed Were Requested
The President’s budgets did not request all of the additional personnel Customs’ assessments indicated it needed. Congress appropriated funds for the 657 positions. Budget Constraints, Policy Considerations, and Legislative Requirements Cited as Reasons Affecting Personnel Request and Allocation Decisions
Customs and Treasury officials cited internal and external budget constraints, drug enforcement policy considerations, and legislative requirements as the primary factors affecting the number of additional personnel that Customs requested and the manner in which it allocated appropriated personnel or reallocated existing personnel. According to Customs and ONDCP officials, this was done to maintain the National Drug Control Strategy’s emphasis on the Southwest border. Subsequently, Customs reallocated 47 of the 119 positions to Southwest border ports. Conclusions
Customs does not have an agencywide process for annually determining its need for inspectional personnel—such as inspectors and canine enforcement officers—for all of its cargo operations and for allocating these personnel to commercial ports of entry. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives in this review were to determine (1) how Customs assesses its needs for inspectional personnel and allocates these personnel to commercial ports of entry, (2) whether Customs received all the inspectional personnel its assessments indicated it needed, and (3) whether there are any known implications of Customs’ not receiving all of the personnel estimated to be needed and the impact of the additional personnel that were appropriated on Customs’ drug enforcement operations. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed selected aspects of the Custom Service's drug enforcement operations, focusing on: (1) how Customs assesses its needs for inspectional personnel and allocates such resources to commercial cargo ports of entry; (2) whether Customs received all the additional inspectional personnel its assessments indicated it needed and, if not, why it did not receive them; and (3) whether there were any known implications of Customs' not receiving all of the personnel estimated to be needed and the impact of the additional personnel that were appropriated on Customs' drug enforcement operations.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) Customs does not have an agencywide process for annually determining its need for inspectional personnel--such as inspectors and canine enforcement officers--for all of its cargo operations and for allocating these personnel to commercial ports of entry nationwide; (2) while Customs has moved in this direction by conducting three inspectional assessments, these assessments: (a) focused exclusively on the need for additional personnel to implement Operation Hard Line and similar initiatives; (b) were limited to land ports along the southwest border and certain sea and air ports considered to be at risk from drug smuggling; (c) were conducted each year using generally different assessment factors; and (d) were conducted with varying degrees of involvement by Customs headquarters and field units; (3) Customs conducted the three assessments in preparation for its fiscal year (FY) 1997, 1998, and 1999 budget request submissions; (4) for FY 1998 and FY 1999, Customs officials stated that they used factors such as the number and location of drug seizures and the perceived threat of drug smuggling, including the use of rail cars to smuggle drugs; (5) focusing on only a single aspect of its operations; not consistently including the key field components in the personnel decisionmaking process; and using different assessment and allocation factors from year to year could prevent Customs from accurately estimating the need for inspectional personnel and then allocating them to ports; (6) the President's budgets did not request all of the additional inspectional personnel Customs' assessments indicated were needed; (7) the President's FY 1997 budget ultimately requested 657 additional inspection and other personnel for Customs; (8) Customs and Department of the Treasury officials cited internal and external budget constraints, drug enforcement policy considerations, and legislative requirements as the primary factors affecting the number of additional personnel that Customs could ultimately request and the manner in which it could allocate or reallocate certain personnel; (9) further, for FY 1998, the Office of National Drug Control Policy directed Customs to reallocate some of the additional 119 inspectors it requested and was appropriated funds for southwest border ports in accordance with the priorities in the National Drug Control Strategy; and (10) finally, Customs could not move certain existing positions to the southwest border because Congress had directed Customs to use them for specific purposes at specific ports. |
gao_GGD-96-65 | gao_GGD-96-65_0 | As of September 13, 1995, INS had hired and finished training 530 Border Patrol agents and had an additional 369 agents in training. To identify the contributions of the Border Patrol to the districts’ enforcement activities, we interviewed 15 INS district directors to obtain their views on how their districts would be affected if Border Patrol agents’ enforcement activities were redirected into border enforcement at the border. To identify some factors that could affect decisions related to hiring or relocating agents to the Southwest Border, we analyzed the Border Patrol’s locations and activities. Most of the Border Patrol’s Agents Were Within 25 Miles of the Border
As shown in table 1, 3,088 (79 percent) of the Border Patrol’s agents and 85 stations (59 percent) were located within 25 miles of the border—zone I—at the end of fiscal year 1994. The average number of agents at each station was 6, and 22 of the 36 stations had fewer than 6 agents. Some Border Patrol Activities Paralleled Investigations and Inspections and Were of Lower Priority Than Investigations
When not patrolling the border, the Border Patrol, along with Investigations and Inspections, is responsible for carrying out four parallel enforcement activities: (1) identifying criminal and illegal aliens, (2) reviewing employers’ records to ensure that only authorized workers are employed, (3) investigating alien smuggling, and (4) inspecting crewmen and passengers aboard ships. For fiscal year 1994, 136 of the Border Patrol’s 145 stations apprehended 888,994 illegal aliens. In comparison, the budget data showed that the cost to hire, train, and equip one agent in fiscal year 1995 ranged from $107,840 to $115,716, depending on the agent’s grade level. Conversely, the agents on the Southwest Border spent 17 percent of their time (or 562,926 hours) apprehending illegal aliens after entry. INS’ fiscal year 1996 Continuing Resolution provided funding to relocate 200 Border Patrol agent positions to the front lines of the border and directs INS to restaff interior offices with criminal investigators. The focus of our review was on the activities and location of Border Patrol agents. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO examined the U.S. Border Patrol's enforcement activities, focusing on the: (1) locations of Border Patrol enforcement activities; (2) number of Border Patrol staff and non-administrative enforcement activities at each station; (3) Border Patrol's contribution to district stations enforcement activities; and (4) factors that influence the hiring or relocation of Border Patrol agents to the Southwest Border.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Border Patrol assigned 3,911 of its 4,260 agents to 145 stations; (2) as of September 1995, the Border Patrol had hired and trained 530 new agents and had an additional 369 agents in training; (3) 79 percent of the agents were located at stations within 25 miles of the nation's borders; (4) Border Patrol agents spent 63 percent of their enforcement time patrolling borders and 37 percent of their time apprehending illegal aliens entering the U.S. illegally or who had violated their visas; (5) Border Patrol enforcement activities include identifying criminal and illegal aliens, reviewing employers' records to see if authorized workers were being employed, and investigating alien smuggling; (6) a Continuing Resolution for fiscal year 1996 has provided INS with funds to relocate 200 of its agent positions to the Southwest Border; (7) INS district directors depend on Border Patrol agents to randomly check traffic on public transportation and freight trains for illegal aliens; and (8) the average cost of hiring, training, and equipping new Border Patrol agents ranges from $107,804 to $115,716. |
gao_GAO-05-779 | gao_GAO-05-779_0 | The U&C price, the retail price for a drug, is the price an individual without prescription drug coverage would pay at a retail pharmacy. AWP is the average of the list prices or sticker price that a manufacturer of a drug suggests wholesalers charge pharmacies. AMP is the average of prices paid to a manufacturer by wholesalers for a drug distributed to the retail pharmacy class of trade, after subtracting any account cash discounts or other price reductions. Retail Prices Increased from 2000 through 2004, with Larger Increases for Brand Than Generic Drugs
From January 2000 through December 2004, the average U&C prices for a typical 30-day supply of 96 prescription drugs frequently used by BCBS FEP Medicare and non-Medicare enrollees increased 24.5 percent. The average U&C prices for 50 frequently used brand drugs increased three times faster than the average U&C prices for 46 frequently used generic drugs. U&C Prices for Drugs Frequently Used by Medicare Beneficiaries and by Non-Medicare Enrollees Increased at Similar Rates
From January 2000 through December 2004, the average U&C prices collected by PACE and EPIC for 75 prescription drugs frequently used by BCBS FEP Medicare beneficiaries increased at a similar rate as the average U&C prices for 76 prescription drugs frequently used by BCBS FEP non-Medicare enrollees. Ten brand drugs in each index, representing one-third or more of the prescriptions for the 50 brand drugs, accounted for almost 50 percent of the increase for the quarterly AMP, AWP, and U&C price indexes. Eight of these 10 drugs were the same across all three price indexes. However, the focus of our analysis was to examine price trends rather than price levels, and U&C and AWP are consistent measures used to assess price trends. PACE and BCBS provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate; EPIC stated that it did not have any comments. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To examine the change in retail prices for prescription drugs frequently used by Medicare beneficiaries and other individuals with health insurance, we used data from the Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS) Federal Employee Program (FEP) to select the 100 prescription drugs most frequently dispensed through retail pharmacies in 2003 for BCBS FEP Medicare enrollees and the 100 most frequently dispensed for BCBS FEP non-Medicare enrollees. To examine the change in retail prices for frequently used drugs compared to other drug price benchmarks, we compared an index based on the U&C prices reported by PACE and EPIC for 50 brand drugs to indexes based on the average manufacturer prices (AMP) and average wholesale prices (AWP) for these 50 drugs on a quarterly basis from the first quarter of 2000 through the fourth quarter of 2004. | Why GAO Did This Study
Prescription drug spending has been the fastest growing segment of national health expenditures. As the federal government assumes greater financial responsibility for prescription drug expenditures with the introduction of Medicare part D, federal policymakers are increasingly concerned about prescription drug prices. GAO was asked to examine the change in retail prices and other pricing benchmarks for drugs frequently used by Medicare beneficiaries and other individuals with health insurance from 2000 through 2004. To examine the change in retail prices from 2000 through 2004, we obtained usual and customary (U&C) prices from two state pharmacy assistance programs for drugs frequently used by Medicare beneficiaries and non-Medicare enrollees in the 2003 Blue Cross and Blue Shield (BCBS) Federal Employee Program (FEP). The U&C price is the price an individual without prescription drug coverage would pay at a retail pharmacy. Additionally, we compared the change in U&C prices for brand drugs from 2000 through 2004 to the change in two pricing benchmarks: average manufacturer price (AMP), which is the average of prices paid to manufacturers by wholesalers for drugs distributed to the retail pharmacy class of trade, and average wholesale price (AWP), which represents the average of list prices that a manufacturer suggests wholesalers charge pharmacies.
What GAO Found
We found the average U&C prices at retail pharmacies reported by two state pharmacy assistance programs for a 30-day supply of 96 drugs frequently used by BCBS FEP Medicare and non-Medicare enrollees increased 24.5 percent from January 2000 through December 2004. Of the 96 drugs: Twenty drugs accounted for nearly two-thirds of the increase in the U&C price index; the increase in average U&C prices for 75 prescription drugs frequently used by Medicare beneficiaries was similar to the increase for 76 prescription drugs frequently used by non-Medicare enrollees; and the average U&C prices for 50 frequently used brand prescription drugs increased three times as much as the average for 46 generic frequently used prescription drugs. AWPs increased at a faster rate than AMPs and U&C prices for the 50 frequently used brand drugs from first quarter 2000 through fourth quarter 2004. Ten drugs in each index accounted for almost 50 percent of the increase for AMP, AWP, and U&C prices. Eight of these 10 drugs were consistent across the three price indexes. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), two state pharmacy assistance programs, and BCBS FEP reviewed a draft of this report. While CMS noted that U&C and AWP do not reflect discounts in a drug's price, this report's focus was to examine price trends rather than price levels. Technical comments were incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GGD-98-38 | gao_GGD-98-38_0 | Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which IRS’ use of financial status techniques has changed, we selected random samples of audits of individual returns completed before and after IRS began reemphasizing the techniques in 1994. During both periods, financial status techniques were used predominately on returns involving business or farm income. We found no significant change in usage by type of financial status technique since the reemphasis. Need for Taxpayer Contact When Using Financial Status Techniques Varies
Financial status audit techniques vary in the extent of additional taxpayer contact needed and the amount of information being sought from taxpayers. IRS has no data showing how much additional taxpayer contact is associated with each technique or how intrusive the additional information needed might be. Such intrusions into taxpayer’s spending patterns could occur at two points—(1) before the initial interview and (2) during the initial interview. For example, in our 1992 and 1993 sample, 81 percent of the audits using financial status techniques resulted in no adjustments to reported income attributable specifically to the techniques. Similarly, for the 1995 and 1996 sample, 83 percent resulted in no adjustment to reported income attributable to the use of the techniques. Audits having no change attributable to the use of financial status audit techniques may have had changes attributable to other audit techniques. IRS Tools to Oversee Use of Financial Status Techniques
IRS has three primary tools to oversee use of financial status audit techniques: (1) audit standards to guide auditors, (2) supervisory review of auditors’ adherence to the standards, and (3) a system to measure adherence to the standards. Our analyses focused on how IRS applied these tools to the use of financial status audit techniques. While these tools offered important controls over the use of the financial status techniques, they each have limitations. On the basis of our review of the audit workpapers, we believe that this lack of criteria has probably contributed to the large percentage of audits in which the use of financial status techniques resulted in no adjustments to income. The results of using financial status techniques were mixed. To help develop and refine these criteria, we recommend that the IRS Commissioner ensure that these specific criteria on using the techniques are reflected in the instructions for interpreting the audit standards and the evaluations through EQMS and its reason codes of how well audits meet these standards; monitor the use of financial status techniques under the new criteria to identify factors associated with successful and unsuccessful usage in terms of when and to what extent to use the techniques as well as whether the usage identified unreported income and if so, in what amounts; and use these monitoring results to evaluate whether to make further revisions to the criteria on using the techniques or in the system by which IRS monitors their use. On the basis of our sample, we estimate that IRS used the notification letter to request PLE forms in no more than 5 percent of the audits for both the 1992 and 1993 and the 1995 and 1996 samples. AICPA officials were also concerned that auditors were asking personal questions about the taxpayer’s financial status at the initial interview before having any evidence of underreported income. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) use of financial status audit techniques to: (1) estimate how frequently IRS used financial status audit techniques in audits closed in tax years prior to the 1994 initiative (1992 and 1993) and in tax years following the 1994 initiative (1995 and 1996); (2) consider how IRS' need to contact taxpayers for additional taxpayer information when using financial status techniques might intrude on taxpayers; (3) estimate the audit results from using financial status audit techniques in terms of the amount of adjustments to reported income; and (4) determine how IRS applied its audit standards, quality controls, and measurement of audit quality to the use of financial status techniques.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) on the basis of its review of samples of IRS audits completed before and after IRS reemphasized the use of financial status techniques, GAO found no statistically significant change in the frequency with which these techniques were used or in the types of returns for which the techniques were used; (2) during both periods, over 75 percent of the audits using financial status techniques involved individual returns with business or farm income--the types of taxpayers that IRS has historically found to be the most likely to underreport income; (3) financial status audit techniques vary in the need for taxpayer contact and how much additional burden or intrusiveness may be perceived by the taxpayer; (4) financial status audits have been criticized by tax professionals and others for, among other things, seeking information about financial status without having evidence of unreported income; (5) such intrusions into taxpayers' spending patterns could occur before the initial interview and during the initial interview; (6) IRS used the Personal Living Expense (PLE) form to inquire about expenses at the time of the notification letter in fewer than 5 percent of the audits for both the 1992 and 1993 and 1995 and 1996 periods; (7) the case files showed that auditors infrequently asked intrusive, financial status type questions at the initial interview; (8) concerning the results, auditors made no adjustments to the individual's reported income attributable to the use of financial status audit techniques in 83 percent of the audits in which these techniques were used; (9) IRS has three tools to oversee the use of financial status audit techniques: (a) audit standards to guide auditors; (b) supervisory review of auditors' adherence to the standards; and (c) a system to measure adherence to the standards; (10) while these tools offered important controls over the use of the financial status techniques, they each have limitations; and (11) on the basis of GAO's review of IRS audit workpapers, the lack of specific criteria may have contributed to the relatively large percentage of audits in which the use of financial status audit techniques resulted in no adjustments to income. |
gao_GAO-05-550T | gao_GAO-05-550T_0 | The ORBIT Act, enacted by the Congress in March 2000, was designed to promote a competitive global satellite communication services market. The act did so primarily by calling for the privatization of INTELSAT after about three decades of operation as an intergovernmental entity. Concerns That INTELSAT Enjoyed Competitive Advantages Provided Impetus for Its Privatization
When satellite technology first emerged as a vehicle for commercial international communications, deploying a global satellite system was both risky and expensive. To do so under the INTELSAT treaty agreements, President Reagan determined that competing international satellite systems were required in the national interest of the United States. As competition to INTELSAT grew throughout the 1990s, commercial satellite companies became concerned that INTELSAT enjoyed certain advantages stemming from its intergovernmental status. In 1999, INTELSAT announced its decision to become a private corporation, but to leave in place a residual intergovernmental organization that would monitor the privatized Intelsat’s remaining public service obligations. Two months before the privatization, FCC determined that INTELSAT’s privatization plan was consistent with the requirements of the ORBIT Act for a variety of reasons, including the following: Intelsat, Ltd.’s Shareholders’ Agreement provided sufficient evidence that the company would conduct an initial public offering (IPO). In light of these findings, FCC conditionally authorized Intelsat LLC to use its U.S. satellite licenses to provide services within the United States. However, FCC conditioned this authorization on Intelsat, Ltd. conducting an IPO of securities as mandated by the ORBIT Act. On August 16, 2004, Intelsat, Ltd. announced that its Board of Directors approved the sale of the company to a consortium of four private investors. Specifically, Intelsat, Ltd. may forgo an IPO under certain conditions, including, among other things, certifying to FCC that it has achieved substantial dilution of the aggregate amount of signatory or former signatory financial interest in the company. FCC is still reviewing this transaction to determine whether Intelsat has met the requirements of the ORBIT Act as amended and thus is no longer required to hold an IPO. While Market Access Has Improved, Some Companies Say That Certain Market Access Challenges Remain
According to most stakeholders and experts we spoke with, access to non- U.S. satellite markets has generally improved during the past decade, which they generally attribute to global trade agreements and privatization trends. According to several stakeholders, market access was already improving when the ORBIT Act was passed. Despite the general view that market access has improved, some satellite companies and experts expressed concerns that market access issues still exist. Since INTELSAT was the dominant provider of global satellite services for approximately 30 years, several stakeholders noted that Intelsat may benefit from the long- term business relationships that were forged over time, as telecommunications companies in many countries may feel comfortable continuing to do business with Intelsat as they have for years. Alternatively, representatives of Intelsat, Ltd. told us that Intelsat seeks market access on a transparent and nondiscriminatory basis and that Intelsat has participated with other satellite operators, through various trade organizations, to lobby governments to open their markets. For example, one satellite company said that section 648 of the ORBIT Act, which prohibits any satellite operator from acquiring or enjoying an exclusive arrangement for service to or from the United States, provides a vehicle for FCC to investigate the status of access for satellite companies to other countries’ markets. Telecommunications: Intelsat Privatization and the Implementation of the ORBIT Act. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2000, the Congress passed the Open-market Reorganization for the Betterment of International Telecommunications Act (ORBIT Act) to help promote a more competitive global satellite services market. The ORBIT Act called for the full privatization of INTELSAT, a former intergovernmental organization that provided international satellite services. In this testimony, GAO discusses (1) the impetus for the privatization of Intelsat as competition developed in the 1990s, (2) the extent to which the privatization steps required by the ORBIT Act have been implemented, and (3) whether access by global satellite companies to non-U.S. markets has improved since the enactment of the ORBIT Act.
What GAO Found
When commercial satellite technology was first deployed, a worldwide system was seen as the most efficient means to facilitate the advancement of a fully global provider. INTELSAT was thus established as an intergovernmental entity, originally established by 85 nations, that was protected from competition in its provision of global satellite communications services. By the 1980s, however, technology developments enabled private companies to efficiently compete for global communications services, and in 1984, President Reagan determined that it would be in the national interest of the United States for there to be greater competition in this market. New commercial satellite systems emerged, but soon found that INTELSAT enjoyed advantages stemming from its intergovernmental status and ownership by telecommunications companies in other countries that impeded new satellite companies from effectively competing. The new satellite companies began to call for INTESLAT to be privatized. Decision makers within INTELSAT also determined that privatization would enable more rapid business decisions. Just prior to INTELSAT's privatization in July 2001, FCC determined that INTELSAT's privatization plan was consistent with requirements of the ORBIT Act. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) thus authorized the privatized Intelsat--the official name of the company after privatization--to use its U.S. satellite licenses to provide services within the United States pending an initial public offering (IPO) of securities that was mandated by the ORBIT Act to occur at a later time. New legislation was passed in 2004 that allows Intelsat to forgo an IPO if it has achieved substantial dilution of its "signatory" ownership--that is, dilution of ownership by those entities (mostly government-controlled telecommunications companies) that had been the investors in INTELSAT when it was an intergovernmental entity. Since Intelsat has recently been sold to a consortium of four private investors, it no longer has, according to an Intelsat official, any former signatory ownership. FCC is still reviewing this transaction to determine whether Intelsat has met the requirements of the ORBIT Act as amended and thus is no longer required to hold an IPO. Most of the stakeholders we spoke with said that access to non-U.S. satellite markets has generally improved during the past decade. This improvement in market access is generally attributed to global trade agreements and privatization trends. Despite this general view, some satellite companies expressed concerns that some market access issues still exist. For example, some companies noted that some countries may favor domestic satellite providers or may choose to continue obtaining service from Intelsat because of long-term business relationships that were forged over time. Nevertheless, Intelsat officials noted that it seeks market access on a transparent and nondiscriminatory basis and that Intelsat has participated with other satellite operators, through various trade organizations, to lobby governments to open their markets. |
gao_GAO-02-32 | gao_GAO-02-32_0 | Conclusions
The serious breakdown in internal controls at the SPAWAR Systems Center San Diego and the Navy Public Works Center San Diego are the result of a weak overall internal control environment, flawed or nonexistent policies and procedures, and employees that do not adhere to valid policies. Develop policies and strategies on credit limits provided to cardholders with a focus on minimizing specific cardholder spending authority and minimizing the federal government’s financial exposure. Naval Supply Systems Command, SPAWAR San Diego, and Navy Public Works Center San Diego officials told us that they were aware of this incident but did not have a listing of the account numbers affected. Our assessment of SPAWAR San Diego and the Navy Public Works Center San Diego purchase card controls covered the overall management control environment, including (1) span of control issues related to the number of cardholders, (2) training for cardholders and accountable officers, (3) management of rebates, and (4) monitoring and audit of purchase card activity; tests of statistical samples of key controls over purchase card transactions, including (1) documentation of independent confirmation that items ordered by purchase card were received, (2) proper certification of purchase card statements for payment, and (3) proper accounting for purchase card transactions; substantive tests of accountable items in our sample transactions to verify whether they were recorded in property records and whether they could be found; and analysis of the universe of transactions to identify (1) any potentially improper, fraudulent, and abusive transactions and (2) purchases that were split into one or more transactions to avoid micro-purchase thresholds or other credit limits. In addition, we did not physically examine purchases made to determine whether goods and services were received and used for government purposes. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed purchase card activity at the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) Systems Center and the Navy Public Works Center in San Diego and found significant breakdowns in internal controls over purchase card transactions, including fraudulent, improper, and abusive purchases and theft and misuse of government property. Neither SPAWAR nor the Navy Public Works Center had effective policies for issuing purchase cards, establishing credit limits, and minimizing the federal government's financial exposure. Any employee having supervisory approval could get a card.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the units did not do credit checks on prospective cardholders. GAO also found that nearly half of SPAWAR's fiscal year 2000 purchase card transactions and more than half of the Navy Public Works Center's transactions were made by employees who did not have documented evidence of timely training. Policies for rebate management were deficient, including a lack of procedures to maximize rebates and ensure that bank calculations of rebates were correct. Management was not effectively using internal reviews and audits to determine whether purchase card internal controls were effectively implemented. These internal control weaknesses allowed purchases that were potentially fraudulent, improper, or abusive. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress ( GAO-01-995T , July 2001). |
gao_GAO-02-288T | gao_GAO-02-288T_0 | The analytic framework GAO has developed to assess proposals comprises three basic criteria: the extent to which a proposal achieves sustainable solvency and how it would affect the economy and the federal budget; the relative balance struck between the goals of individual equity and income adequacy; and how readily a proposal could be implemented, administered, and explained to the public. However, the greatest potential implementation and administrative challenges are associated with proposals that would create individual accounts. Our recent report did not, however, present estimates of effects on individual equity. The poverty threshold provides a minimal standard of adequacy; other standards reflect different outlooks on what adequacy means. For any of these measures, the meaning of a given value of the measure is not clear. Our tax-increase-only benchmark simulated benefits at currently promised levels while our benefit-reduction-only benchmarks simulated benefits funded at current tax levels. Varying Approaches to Benefit Reductions Would Have Different Effects on Adequacy
Future benefit levels and income adequacy will depend considerably on how any benefit reductions are made. It remains true that the longer we wait to take action on the programs driving long-term deficits, the more painful and difficult the choices will become. Today I have described GAO’s three basic criteria against which Social Security reform proposals may be measured: financing sustainable solvency, balancing adequacy and equity, and implementing and administering reforms. Related GAO Products
Social Security: Program’s Role in Helping Ensure Income Adequacy (GAO-02-62, Nov. 30, 2001). Social Security: Criteria for Evaluating Social Security Reform Proposals (GAO/T-HEHS-99-94, Mar. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the long-term viability of the Social Security program.
What GAO Found
Social Security's Trust Funds will not be exhausted until 2038, but the trustees now project that the program's cash demands on the rest of the federal government will begin much sooner. Aiming for sustainable solvency would increase the chance that future policymakers would not have to face these difficult questions on a recurring basis. GAO has developed the following criteria for evaluating Social Security reform proposals: financing sustainable solvency, balancing adequacy and equity, and implementing and administering reforms. These criteria seek to balance financial and economic considerations with benefit adequacy and equity issues and the administrative challenges associated with various proposals. GAO's recent report on Social Security and income adequacy (GAO-02-62) makes three key points. First, no single measure of adequacy provides a complete picture; each measure reflects a different outlook on what adequacy means. Second, given the projected long-term financial shortfall of the program, it is important to compare proposals to both benefits at currently promised levels and benefits funded at current tax levels. Third, various approaches to benefit reductions would have differing effects on adequacy. |
gao_GAO-06-635 | gao_GAO-06-635_0 | When Paying Separately for Technologies That Are Not New, CMS’s General Practice Is to Set a Rate Based on an Average Cost across Hospitals
When paying separately for technologies that are not new, CMS’s general practice is to set a prospective rate for all hospitals, based on an average unit cost across hospitals. A prospective rate, even for technologies that are separately paid, is desirable because basing a rate on an average encourages those hospitals that provide the technology to minimize their acquisition costs. Certain Technologies That Are Not New and Are Not Suitable for Prospective Payment Are Paid at Cost
When a technology’s unit cost varies substantially and unpredictably, or when reasonably accurate cost data are not available, CMS pays for the technology at each hospital’s cost. The amount of the fee charged by an eye bank depends heavily on the level of charitable donations it receives, which it uses to subsidize the cost of providing the tissue. For example, the MMA mandated separate payment for certain radiopharmaceuticals. When Paying Separately for Iodine and Palladium, CMS Could Set Prospective Rates, but Suitable Payment Methodology for Iridium Is Unclear
Based on our analysis, the absence of wide variability in the unit costs of iodine and palladium and the availability of reasonably accurate historical data makes these radioactive sources suitable for prospective payment rates. CMS has OPPS claims data from hospitals that provided iridium, and would be able to use these data to calculate an average unit cost across hospitals and to identify which methodology is suitable for determining a separate payment amount. Based on interviews we conducted with hospital and manufacturer officials, and the results of our hospital survey, we determined that iodine and palladium have identifiable unit costs and that these costs do not appear to vary substantially and unpredictably across hospital purchases at a given point in time or from year to year. Although CMS uses ASP data to set a prospective rate for certain high-cost drugs, CMS currently does not have ASP data for radioactive sources used in brachytherapy. Based on our analysis, CMS can pay separately for iodine and palladium sources using prospective rates because the unit cost of the sources does not vary substantially and unpredictably. In order to identify a suitable methodology for determining a separate payment amount, CMS would be able to use OPPS claims data to evaluate whether the range of costs comprising the average is substantial and whether the average per-treatment cost varies unpredictably over time. As stated in our draft report, we examined how payment amounts for iodine, palladium, and iridium could be determined. Consistent with its general practice for paying separately for technologies that are not new, CMS could pay for iridium at each hospital’s cost if OPPS claims did not prove to be a reasonable source of data or if CMS determined that the unit cost varies substantially and unpredictably over time. | Why GAO Did This Study
Generally, in paying for hospital outpatient procedures, Medicare makes prospectively set payments that are intended to cover the costs of all items and services delivered with the procedure. Medicare pays separately for some technologies that are too new to be represented in the claims data used to set rates. It also pays separately for certain technologies that are not new, such as radioactive sources used in brachytherapy, a cancer treatment. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 required separate payment for the radioactive sources. It also directed GAO to make recommendations regarding future payment. GAO examined (1) how Medicare determines payment amounts for technologies that are not new but are separately paid and (2) how payment amounts for iodine, palladium, and iridium sources used in brachytherapy could be determined.
What GAO Found
In paying separately for technologies that are not new, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) generally sets prospective rates based on the average unit cost of the technologies across hospitals. For example, CMS currently pays separate prospective rates for certain high-cost drugs based on the mean per-unit acquisition cost, as derived by CMS from data provided by drug manufacturers. A prospective rate is desirable because basing a rate on an average encourages those hospitals that provide the technology to minimize their acquisition costs. However, when CMS determines that the unit cost of a technology designated for separate payment varies substantially and unpredictably over time, or that reasonably accurate data are not available, it pays each hospital its cost for the technology. For example, CMS pays each hospital its cost for corneal transplant tissue, because it determined that the fees eye banks charge hospitals vary substantially and unpredictably. GAO's analysis suggests that CMS could set prospective payment rates for iodine and palladium because their unit costs are generally stable and CMS can base the payments on reasonably accurate data. According to interviews GAO conducted with hospitals and manufacturers, iodine and palladium have an identifiable unit cost that does not vary unpredictably over time. In addition, the results of GAO's survey of hospital purchase prices suggest that the unit cost of iodine and palladium does not vary substantially. Furthermore, GAO found that Medicare claims would be a reasonably accurate source of data for setting prospective rates for these sources. GAO was not able to determine a suitable methodology for paying separately for iridium. In contrast with iodine and palladium, which are permanently implanted in patients, iridium is reused across multiple patients, making its unit cost more difficult to determine. Although GAO surveyed hospitals on the unit cost of iridium, it did not receive sufficient data to identify and evaluate an average unit cost across hospitals. However, CMS has outpatient claims data from all hospitals that have used iridium. In order to identify a suitable methodology for determining a separate payment amount, CMS would be able to use these data to establish an average cost and evaluate whether the cost varies substantially and unpredictably. |
gao_GAO-08-706T | gao_GAO-08-706T_0 | Aviation’s Small but Growing Proportion of Total Emissions Contributes to Health and Environmental Effects
Aviation-related activities contribute to local air pollution and produce greenhouse gases that cause climate change. Specifically, aviation emissions represent less than 1 percent of air pollution nationwide, but their impact on air quality could be higher in the vicinity of airports. Additionally, aviation’s greenhouse gas emissions and potential contribution to climate change is expected to increase. Nevertheless, according to EPA, there is growing public concern about the health effects of the hazardous air pollutants and particulate matter associated with aviation emissions. Key Federal Efforts to Address Aviation Emissions Include Near-Term Operational Changes and Longer-Term R&D Initiatives
Two key federal efforts, if implemented effectively, can help to reduce aviation emissions—near-term NextGen initiatives and an array of R&D programs over the longer term to fully enable NextGen and to reduce aircraft emissions. In addition, the federal government, led by FAA and NASA, has longer-term R&D programs in place to improve the scientific understanding of the impact of aviation emissions in order to inform decisions about emissions-reduction strategies, explore potential emissions-reducing alternative fuels, and develop NextGen and aircraft emissions-reduction technologies. ADS-B will allow for closer and safer separations between aircraft and more direct routing, which will improve fuel efficiency and reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Federal R&D Focuses on Long-Term Approaches to Addressing Aviation Emissions
We have previously reported that the federal government and industry have achieved significant reductions in some aircraft emissions, such as carbon dioxide, through past R&D efforts, and federal officials and aviation experts agree that such efforts are the most effective means of achieving further reductions in the longer term. According to FAA, this approach includes efforts to improve the scientific understanding of the nature and impact of aviation emissions and thereby inform the development of more fuel-efficient aircraft, of alternative fuels that can reduce aircraft emissions, and of air traffic management technologies that further improve the efficiency of aviation operations. NASA, industry, and academia are important partners in these efforts. Created in 2003, PARTNER carries on what representatives of airlines, aircraft and engine manufacturers, and experts in aviation environmental research have described as a robust research portfolio. For example, the Airspace Systems program supports research on air traffic management technologies for NextGen, and the Fundamental Aeronautics program focuses on removing environmental and performance barriers, such as noise and emissions, that could constrain the capacity enhancements needed to accommodate projected air traffic increases. Several Steps Can Be Taken to Help Reduce Aviation Emissions, but Challenges Remain to Be Addressed
Reducing aviation emissions includes steps that FAA and others can take to move the implementation of NextGen forward and support R&D on NextGen and emissions-reduction technologies, as well as technical, financial, regulatory challenges facing the federal government, the aviation industry, and Congress. As a partial response to the gap, the administration has proposed some additional funding for FAA that could be used to further develop NASA’s and others’ emissions- and noise reduction technologies. Fulfilling these requirements will pose challenges to aviation because of the technical difficulties involved in developing technologies that can simultaneously address air pollutants, greenhouse gases, and noise; constraints on the airline industry’s resources to invest in new aircraft and technologies needed to reduce emissions and remain competitive; and the impact that emissions regulations can have on the aviation system’s expansion and the financial health of the aviation industry. Market-Based Initiatives to Reduce Aviation Emissions of Greenhouse Gases Could Pose Challenges for U.S. Airlines by Increasing Their Costs
Concerns about the environmental effects of greenhouse gas emissions have grown steadily over the years, leading to national and international efforts to limit them. Next Generation Air Transportation System: Progress and Challenges Associated with the Transformation of the National Airspace System. | Why GAO Did This Study
Collaboration between the federal government and the aviation industry has led to reductions in aviation emissions, but growing air traffic has partially offset these reductions. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), together with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and others, is working to increase the efficiency, safety, and capacity of the national airspace system and at the same time reduce aviation emissions, in part, by transforming the current air traffic control system to the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). This effort involves new technologies and air traffic procedures that can reduce aviation emissions and incorporates research and development (R&D) on emissions-reduction technologies. Reducing aviation emissions is important both to minimize their adverse health and environmental effects and to alleviate public concerns about them that could constrain the expansion of airport infrastructure and aviation operations needed to meet demand. This testimony addresses (1) the scope and nature of aviation emissions, (2) the status of selected key federal efforts to reduce aviation emissions, and (3) next steps and challenges in reducing aviation emissions. The testimony updates prior GAO work with FAA data, literature reviews, and interviews with agency officials, industry and environmental stakeholders, and selected experts.
What GAO Found
Aviation contributes a modest but growing proportion of total U.S. emissions, and these emissions contribute to adverse health and environmental effects. Aircraft and airport operations, including those of service and passenger vehicles, emit ozone and other substances that contribute to local air pollution, as well as carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that contribute to climate change. EPA estimates that aviation emissions account for less than 1 percent of local air pollution nationwide and about 2.7 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, but these emissions are expected to grow as air traffic increases. Two key federal efforts, if implemented effectively, can help to reduce aviation emissions--NextGen initiatives in the near term and research and development over the longer term. For example, NextGen technologies and procedures, such as satellite-based navigation systems, should allow for more direct routing, which could improve fuel efficiency and reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Federal research and development efforts--led by FAA and NASA in collaboration with industry and academia--have achieved significant reductions in aircraft emissions through improved aircraft and engine technologies, and federal officials and aviation experts agree that such efforts are the most effective means of achieving further reductions in the longer term. Federal R&D on aviation emissions also focuses on improving the scientific understanding of aviation emissions and developing lower-emitting aviation fuels. Next steps in reducing aviation emissions include managing NextGen initiatives efficiently; deploying NextGen technologies and procedures as soon as practicable to realize their benefits, including lower emissions levels; and managing a decline in R&D funding, in part, by setting priorities for R&D on NextGen and emissions-reduction technologies. Challenges in reducing aviation emissions include designing aircraft that can simultaneously reduce noise and emissions of air pollutants and greenhouse gases; encouraging financially stressed airlines to purchase more fuel-efficient aircraft and emissions-reduction technologies; addressing the impact on airport expansion of more stringent EPA air quality standards and growing public concerns about the effects of aviation emissions; and responding to proposed domestic and international measures for reducing greenhouse gases that could affect the financial solvency and competitiveness of U.S. airlines. |
gao_GAO-01-884 | gao_GAO-01-884_0 | Conclusions
OPM’s mission, in part, is to provide strategic human capital management leadership and services to federal agencies. OPM’s fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance plan contain many goals that measure the extent of their activities, but there are few goals and measures that assess the actual state of strategic human capital management in the federal government or the specific contributions that OPM’s programs and initiatives make. Even though OPM does not directly control these outcomes in federal agencies, it needs to measure the results to assess how well its leadership and services are working. OPM has recognized this weakness and is working with federal department and agency human resource directors to develop a series of human capital measures. OPM also needs to make other improvements to its report and plan, including strengthening goals and measures to improve their reliability, linking its internal human capital goals to OPM programs, and establishing a program management performance goal to assess fraud and error in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program. | Why GAO Did This Study
This report reviews the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance plan.
What GAO Found
OPM's mission, in part, is to provide strategic human capital management leadership and services to federal agencies. OPM's fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance plan contain many goals that measure the extent of their activities, but there are few goals and measures that assess the actual state of strategic human capital management in the federal government or the specific contributions that OPM's programs and initiatives make. Although OPM does not directly control these outcomes in federal agencies, it needs to measure the results to assess how well its leadership services are working. OPM recognizes this weakness and is working with human resource directors at federal agencies to develop a series of human capital measures. In its report and plan, OPM also need to strengthen goals and measures to improve their reliability, link its internal human capital goals to OPM programs, and establishing a program management performance goal to assess fraud and error in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program. |
gao_GAO-17-396 | gao_GAO-17-396_0 | Component Officials Identified Billions in Non-Major Acquisitions, but Most Could Not Confidently Identify the Full Scope
DHS’s component agencies lack the information needed to effectively oversee their non-major acquisitions because they cannot confidently identify all of them. Several officials indicated that their focus had been on major acquisitions historically, and they had not turned their attention to non-major acquisitions until more recently. Many component officials said they were still in the process of identifying all of their non-major acquisitions, but it was unclear when they would complete these efforts. DHS headquarters had not established time frames for components to do so, which may have resulted in components losing traction in their efforts. Federal internal controls standards establish that management should obtain relevant data from reliable sources in a timely manner. Another key challenge involves the use of baselines, which establish a program’s critical cost, schedule, and performance parameters. Component officials identified 38 non-major acquisitions that were active at the start of fiscal year 2017 (as opposed to acquisitions that have been delivered to end users and are considered to be non-active). We found that most of the active non-major acquisitions (23 of 38) did not have approved baselines, and that the value of the acquisitions without baselines constituted nearly half of the total value of the active acquisitions. At the beginning of fiscal year 2017, some components did not require approved baselines. However, in response to our preliminary findings, in February 2017, DHS required component leadership approve baselines for non-major acquisitions, which should help components oversee them more effectively. Officials from 8 of the 11 DHS components told us they could not identify all of their non-major acquisitions. DHS leadership has also added new reporting requirements for these acquisitions, and, in response, all components have started entering non-major acquisition data into INVEST, DHS’s central acquisition information system. Additionally, in response to our preliminary findings, a new policy that DHS finalized in February 2017 includes a requirement that component leadership approve baselines for non-major acquisitions that have not yet achieved FOC, and states that PARM’s Executive Director will leverage its reviews to assess whether CAEs are (a) baselining these acquisitions in accordance with the requirement; and (b) tracking the acquisitions’ progress against cost, schedule, and performance parameters from approved baselines. Components Have Started Entering Non-Major Acquisition Data into INVEST and Headquarters Is Taking Steps to Improve Data Reliability
As part of its efforts to increase oversight of non-major acquisitions, DHS leadership now requires components to enter data into the INVEST system for all non-major acquisitions valued at greater than $50 million that have not yet reached FOC. Recommendation for Executive Action
To improve the management of DHS’s non-major acquisitions, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary for Management to establish a time frame for components to identify all of their non-major acquisitions. Specifically, this report assesses (1) the extent to which component leadership is effectively overseeing non-major acquisitions and (2) the extent to which DHS headquarters has helped components establish effective management controls for non-major acquisitions. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
U.S. Coast Guard, and
U.S. Secret Service. To identify the extent to which DHS headquarters has helped components establish effective management controls for non-major acquisitions, we reviewed draft and final department acquisition policy, guidance, and memos to identify how PARM and other headquarters entities contribute to non-major acquisition management. To assess the reliability of the data in the INVEST system, we traced non- major acquisition data from INVEST to available source documents. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, DHS acquires a wide array of systems intended to help its component agencies execute their many critical missions. GAO has previously reported that DHS's process for managing its major acquisitions is maturing. However, non-major acquisitions (generally those with cost estimates of less than $300 million) are managed by DHS's component agencies and have not received as much oversight. Recently GAO reported on a non-major acquisition that was executed poorly, limiting DHS's ability to address human capital weaknesses.
GAO was asked to examine DHS's management of non-major acquisitions. This report assesses: (1) the extent to which component leadership is effectively overseeing non-major acquisitions; and (2) the extent to which DHS headquarters has helped components establish effective management controls for non-major acquisitions.
GAO reviewed policy and component guidance, and interviewed officials from DHS headquarters and 11 components responsible for managing non-major acquisitions. GAO also traced non-major acquisition data from DHS's central acquisition data system to source documents to assess data reliability.
What GAO Found
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) component agencies—such as the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection—lack the information needed to effectively oversee their non-major acquisitions because they cannot confidently identify all of them. They identified over $6 billion in non-major acquisitions; however, GAO found 8 of the 11 components could not identify them all. Several officials indicated that their focus had been on major acquisitions historically, and they had not turned their attention to non-major acquisitions until more recently. Many component officials said they were still in the process of identifying all of these acquisitions, but it was unclear when they would complete these efforts. DHS headquarters had not established time frames for components to do so, which may have resulted in components losing traction in their efforts. Federal internal controls standards establish that management should obtain relevant data from reliable sources in a timely manner. Another key challenge involves the use of baselines, which establish a program's critical cost, schedule, and performance parameters. Component officials identified 38 non-major acquisitions that were active at the start of fiscal year 2017 (as opposed to acquisitions that have been delivered to end users and are considered to be non-active). GAO found that most of the active non-major acquisitions (23 of 38) did not have approved baselines, and that the value of the acquisitions without baselines constituted nearly half of the total value of the active acquisitions.
At the beginning of fiscal year 2017, some components did not require approved baselines. However, in response to GAO's preliminary findings, in February 2017, DHS required component leadership to approve baselines for non-major acquisitions, which should help components oversee them more effectively.
DHS headquarters is taking steps to help components establish more effective management controls for non-major acquisitions. In 2015, DHS headquarters officials established a process to review them annually. In February 2017, in response to GAO's preliminary findings, DHS established that components shall use the annual reviews to assess the extent to which non-major acquisitions are on track to meet cost, schedule, and performance parameters from approved baselines. DHS leadership has also established ongoing reporting requirements for non-major acquisitions. All components have started entering non-major acquisition data into DHS's central acquisition information system, and headquarters officials are taking steps to improve the reliability of these data.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommended that DHS headquarters establish time frames for components to identify all non-major acquisitions. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendation and directed components to identify all non-major acquisitions by October 31, 2017. |
gao_GAO-03-475 | gao_GAO-03-475_0 | Between fiscal years 1989 and 2002, DOD’s civilian workforce shrank from 1,075,437 to 670,166—about a 38 percent reduction. Department-level Leadership Involvement in Strategic Planning for Civilian Personnel Has Increased in Recent Years
Strategic planning for the Department of Defense civilian workforce is becoming a higher priority among DOD’s senior leadership, as evidenced by direction given in 2001 in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the Defense Planning Guidance and by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to develop a civilian and military human resources strategic plan. High-level leaders in the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) have provided the impetus for strategic planning and are partnering with civilian human capital professionals to develop and implement their strategic plans. Such partnership is increasing in the Army and not as evident in the Department of the Navy. Key Elements of Strategic Plans for DOD Civilian Personnel Not in Place
For the most part, the strategic plans we reviewed lacked such key elements as mission alignment, results-oriented performance measures, and data-driven workforce planning. Without adequate alignment, performance measures, and workforce data, DOD and its components cannot be certain their human capital efforts are properly focused on mission accomplishment. All of the civilian human capital plans we reviewed referred to their respective organizations’ mission; however, the human capital goals, objectives, and initiatives did not explicitly link or describe how the civilian workforce efforts would contribute to the organizations’ overarching mission achievement, and more importantly how the extent of contribution to mission achievement would be measured. Moreover, none of the plans in our review contained results-oriented goals and measures. We also stated that to build the right workforce to achieve strategic goals, it is essential that organizations determine the critical skills and competencies needed to successfully implement the programs and processes associated with those goals. Strategic Plans for Civilian Personnel Not Yet Integrated with Plans for Military Personnel or Sourcing Initiatives
The civilian human capital strategic plans we reviewed did not address how the civilian workforce would be integrated with their military counterparts or sourcing initiatives to accomplish DOD’s mission. Although DOD officials maintain that these plans are intended to complement each other, the plans are not integrated to form a seamless and comprehensive strategy. Furthermore, DOD’s civilian human capital strategic plan does not address the role of civilian vis-à-vis contractor personnel or how DOD plans to link its human capital initiatives with its sourcing plans, such as efforts to outsource non-core responsibilities. Moreover, DOD top leadership has not provided its components with guidance on how to align component-level strategic plans with the departmentwide plan. As a result, DOD and its components may not have a sound basis for funding decisions related to human capital initiatives and may not be able to put the right people in the right place at the right time to achieve the mission. Specifically, the objectives of this report were to assess (1) the extent to which top-level leadership is involved in strategic planning for civilian personnel and (2) whether strategic plans for civilian personnel are aligned with the overall mission, results oriented, and based on data about the future civilian workforce. We focused primarily on civilian human capital strategic planning undertaken since 1988, when DOD began downsizing its civilian workforce. We selected the military services since they account for about 85 percent of the civilian personnel in DOD. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense's (DOD) civilian employees play key roles in such areas as defense policy, intelligence, finance, acquisitions, and weapon systems maintenance. Although downsized 38 percent between fiscal years 1989 and 2002, this workforce has taken on greater roles as a result of DOD's restructuring and transformation. Responding to congressional concerns about the quality and quantity of, and the strategic planning for the civilian workforce, GAO determined the following for DOD, the military services, and selected defense agencies: (1) the extent of top-level leadership involvement in civilian strategic planning; (2) whether elements in civilian strategic plans are aligned to the overall mission, focused on results, and based on current and future civilian workforce data; and (3) whether civilian and military personnel strategic plans or sourcing initiatives were integrated.
What GAO Found
Generally, civilian personnel issues appear to be an emerging priority among top leaders in DOD and the defense components. Although DOD began downsizing its civilian workforce more than a decade ago, it did not take action to strategically address challenges affecting the civilian workforce until it issued its civilian human capital strategic plan in April 2002. Top-level leaders in the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Defense Contract Management Agency, and the Defense Finance Accounting Service have initiated planning efforts and are working in partnership with their civilian human capital professionals to develop and implement civilian strategic plans; such leadership, however, was increasing in the Army and not as evident in the Navy. Also, DOD has not provided guidance on how to integrate the components' plans with the department-level plan. High-level leadership is critical to directing reforms and obtaining resources for successful implementation. The human capital strategic plans GAO reviewed for the most part lacked key elements found in fully developed plans. Most of the civilian human capital goals, objectives, and initiatives were not explicitly aligned with the overarching missions of the organizations. Consequently, DOD and the components cannot be sure that strategic goals are properly focused on mission achievement. Also, none of the plans contained results-oriented performance measures to assess the impact of their civilian human capital initiatives (i.e., programs, policies, and processes). Thus, DOD and the components cannot gauge the extent to which their human capital initiatives contribute to achieving their organizations' mission. Finally, the plans did not contain data on the skills and competencies needed to successfully accomplish future missions; therefore, DOD and the components risk not being able to put the right people, in the right place, and at the right time, which can result in diminished accomplishment of the overall defense mission. Moreover, the civilian strategic plans did not address how the civilian workforce will be integrated with their military counterparts or sourcing initiatives. DOD's three human capital strategic plans--two military and one civilian--were prepared separately and were not integrated to form a seamless and comprehensive strategy and did not address how DOD plans to link its human capital initiatives with its sourcing plans, such as efforts to outsource non-core responsibilities. The components' civilian plans acknowledge a need to integrate planning for civilian and military personnel--taking into consideration contractors--but have not yet done so. Without an integrated strategy, DOD may not effectively and efficiently allocate its scarce resources for optimal readiness. |
gao_GAO-11-783T | gao_GAO-11-783T_0 | The Widespread Use of Appraisals for Mortgage Originations Reflects Their Advantages Relative to Other Valuation Methods
Available data and interviews with lenders and other mortgage industry participants indicate that appraisals are the most frequently used valuation method for home purchase and refinance mortgage originations. Appraisals provide an opinion of market value at a point in time and reflect prevailing economic and housing market conditions. Data provided to us by the five largest lenders (measured by dollar volume of mortgage originations in 2010) show that, for the first-lien residential mortgages for which data were available, these lenders obtained appraisals for about 90 percent of the mortgages they made in 2009 and 2010, including 98 percent of home purchase mortgages. The data we obtained from lenders include mortgages sold to the enterprises and mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which together accounted for the bulk of the mortgages originated in 2009 and 2010. The enterprises and FHA require appraisals to be performed for a large majority of the mortgages they purchase or insure. For mortgages for which an appraisal was not done, the lenders we spoke with reported that they generally relied on validation of the sales price (or loan amount in the case of a refinance) against a value generated by an automated valuation model (AVM), in accordance with enterprise policies that permit this practice for some mortgages with characteristics associated with a lower default risk. USPAP requires appraisers to consider which approaches to value are applicable and necessary to perform a credible appraisal and provide an opinion of the market value of a particular property. Recent Policy Changes May Affect Consumer Costs for Appraisals, while Other Policy Changes Have Enhanced Disclosures to Consumers
Factors such as the location and complexity of the property affect consumer costs for appraisals. For example, a property may have unique characteristics that are more difficult to value, such as being much larger than nearby properties or being an oceanfront property, which may require the appraiser to take more time to gather and analyze data to produce a credible appraisal. Mortgage industry participants we spoke with told us that the amount a consumer pays for an appraisal is generally not affected by whether the lender engages an appraiser directly or uses an appraisal management company (AMC)—which manages the appraisal process on lenders’ behalf—to select an appraiser. They said that AMCs typically charge lenders about the same amount that independent fee appraisers would charge lenders directly, and lenders generally pass on these charges to consumers. In general, lenders, AMC officials, appraisers, and other industry participants noted that consumer costs for appraisals have remained relatively stable in the past several years. However, appraisers have reported receiving lower fees when working with AMCs compared with working directly with lenders because AMCs keep a portion of the total fee. According to the Dodd-Frank Act, these studies cannot include the fees AMCs pay to appraisers. Conflict-of-Interest Policies Have Changed Appraiser Selection Processes, with Implications for Appraisal Oversight
Recently issued policies reinforce long-standing requirements and guidance designed to address conflicts of interest that may arise when direct or indirect personal interests bias appraisers from exercising their independent professional judgment. In order to prevent appraisers from being pressured, the federal banking regulators, the enterprises, FHA, and other agencies have regulations and policies governing the selection of, communications with, and coercion of appraisers. Examples of recently issued policies that address appraiser independence include HVCC, which took effect in May 2009; the enterprises’ new appraiser independence requirements that replaced HVCC in October 2010; and revised Interagency Appraisal and Evaluation Guidelines from the federal banking regulators, which were issued in December 2010. Provisions of these and other policies address (1) prohibitions against loan production staff involvement in appraiser selection and supervision; (2) prohibitions against third parties with an interest in the mortgage transaction, such as real estate agents or mortgage brokers, selecting appraisers; (3) limits on communications with appraisers; and (4) prohibitions against coercive behaviors. Greater use of AMCs has raised questions about oversight of these firms and their impact on appraisal quality. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses our work on residential real estate valuations. Real estate valuations, which encompass appraisals and other value estimation methods, play a critical role in mortgage underwriting by providing evidence that the market value of a property is sufficient to help mitigate losses if the borrower is unable to repay the loan. However, recent turmoil in the mortgage market has raised questions about mortgage underwriting practices, including the quality and credibility of some valuations. An investigation into industry appraisal practices by the New York State Attorney General led to an agreement in 2008 between the Attorney General; Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the enterprises); and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), which regulates the enterprises. This agreement included the Home Valuation Code of Conduct (HVCC), which set forth certain appraiser independence requirements for loans sold to the enterprises and took effect in 2009. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub. L. No. 111-203) (the Dodd-Frank Act) directed us to study the effectiveness and impact of various valuation methods and the options available for selecting appraisers, as well as the impact of HVCC. This testimony summarizes the report we are releasing today, which responds to the mandate in the Dodd-Frank Act. Our work focused on valuations of single-family residential properties for first-lien purchase and refinance mortgages. The report discusses (1) the use of different valuation methods and their advantages and disadvantages, (2) policies and other factors that affect consumer appraisal costs and requirements for lenders to disclose appraisal costs and valuation reports to consumers, and (3) conflict-of-interest and appraiser selection policies and views on the impact of these policies on industry stakeholders and appraisal quality. We consider the impact of HVCC throughout the report..
What GAO Found
Available data and interviews with lenders and other mortgage industry participants indicate that appraisals are the most frequently used valuation method for home purchase and refinance mortgage originations. Appraisals provide an opinion of market value at a point in time and reflect prevailing economic and housing market conditions. Data provided to us by the five largest lenders (measured by dollar volume of mortgage originations in 2010) show that, for the first-lien residential mortgages for which data were available, these lenders obtained appraisals for about 90 percent of the mortgages they made in 2009 and 2010, including 98 percent of home purchase mortgages. The data we obtained from lenders include mortgages sold to the enterprises and mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which together accounted for the bulk of the mortgages originated in 2009 and 2010. The enterprises and FHA require appraisals to be performed for a large majority of the mortgages they purchase or insure. For mortgages for which an appraisal was not done, the lenders we spoke with reported that they generally relied on validation of the sales price (or loan amount in the case of a refinance) against a value generated by an automated valuation model (AVM), in accordance with enterprise policies that permit this practice for some mortgages with characteristics associated with a lower default risk. Factors such as the location and complexity of the property affect consumer costs for appraisals. For example, a property may have unique characteristics that are more difficult to value, such as being much larger than nearby properties or being an oceanfront property, which may require the appraiser to take more time to gather and analyze data to produce a credible appraisal. Mortgage industry participants we spoke with told us that the amount a consumer pays for an appraisal is generally not affected by whether the lender engages an appraiser directly or uses an appraisal management company (AMC)--which manages the appraisal process on lenders' behalf--to select an appraiser. They said that AMCs typically charge lenders about the same amount that independent fee appraisers would charge lenders directly, and lenders generally pass on these charges to consumers. In general, lenders, AMC officials, appraisers, and other industry participants noted that consumer costs for appraisals have remained relatively stable in the past several years. However, appraisers have reported receiving lower fees when working with AMCs compared with working directly with lenders because AMCs keep a portion of the total fee. Recently issued policies reinforce long-standing requirements and guidance designed to address conflicts of interest that may arise when direct or indirect personal interests bias appraisers from exercising their independent professional judgment. In order to prevent appraisers from being pressured, the federal banking regulators, the enterprises, FHA, and other agencies have regulations and policies governing the selection of, communications with, and coercion of appraisers. Examples of recently issued policies that address appraiser independence include HVCC, which took effect in May 2009; the enterprises' new appraiser independence requirements that replaced HVCC in October 2010; and revised Interagency Appraisal and Evaluation Guidelines from the federal banking regulators, which were issued in December 2010. Provisions of these and other policies address (1) prohibitions against loan production staff involvement in appraiser selection and supervision; (2) prohibitions against third parties with an interest in the mortgage transaction, such as real estate agents or mortgage brokers, selecting appraisers; (3) limits on communications with appraisers; and (4) prohibitions against coercive behaviors. |
gao_AIMD-95-6 | gao_AIMD-95-6_0 | Specifically, HPCC was linked to the development of a national information infrastructure (NII). On the basis of subsequent discussions with committee staff, our specific objectives were to assess (1) the effectiveness of the program’s management structure in setting goals and measuring progress and (2) how extensively private industry has been involved in the planning and execution of the program. Now, however, the administration is also counting on the HPCC program to help develop the new technology that will be needed to make the NII successful and to give the nation a competitive economic edge. Inconsistent Budget Information Has Made Tracking HPCC Investments Difficult
Budgets and expenditures for HPCC activities, both inside and outside the program, have not been accounted for in a uniform and easily understood way. This is because participating agencies have diverse research programs and equally diverse ways of identifying and categorizing their HPCC spending. In order to be successful at that new task, the program could benefit from a detailed technical agenda, identifying and prioritizing the kinds of technologies it will develop in support of the NII. While industry has been extensively involved in the actual execution of HPCC projects, as the program moves forward it would benefit from partnerships with key industries that could capitalize on HPCC technologies to create new products and services for the NII. Given that the administration sees the HPCC program as playing an important role in developing key technologies for the NII, HPCC managers must more effectively promote industry participation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the status of the High Performance Computing and Communications (HPCC) program, focusing on: (1) the effectiveness of the program's management structure in setting goals and measuring progress; and (2) how extensively private industry has been involved in program planning and execution.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Administration is broadening the HPCC role in developing new technology in support of the National Information Infrastructure (NII); (2) industry and academic researchers believe that specific technology areas will need to be targeted to develop support for NII; (3) a more focused HPCC management approach could help ensure that program goals are met; (4) a detailed technical agenda will be needed to identify HPCC priority areas and commit resources to them; (5) inconsistent budget information has made tracking HPCC investments difficult, since participating agencies have diverse methods of identifying and categorizing their HPCC spending; (6) industry participation in HPCC is more important now that the Administration has linked HPCC to the planned NII; and (7) industries that could capitalize on HPCC technologies to create new products and services for NII should be better represented among HPCC program participants. |
gao_GAO-07-820T | gao_GAO-07-820T_0 | Background
Insurance is a mechanism for spreading risk over time, across large geographical areas, and among industries and individuals. Climate Change Is Expected to Alter the Frequency or Severity of Damaging Weather- Related Events
Assessments by leading scientific bodies suggest that climate change could significantly alter the frequency or severity of weather-related events, such as drought and hurricanes. While temperatures have varied throughout history, triggered by natural factors such as volcanic eruptions or changes in the earth’s orbit, the key scientific assessments we reviewed have generally concluded that the observed increase in temperature in the past 100 years cannot be explained by natural variability alone. Based on model projections and expert judgment, the IPCC reported that future increases in the earth’s temperature are likely to increase the frequency and severity of many damaging extreme weather-related events (summarized in table 1). Additionally, local crop production in any affected area may be negatively impacted by projected increases in the frequency of droughts or floods. Weather-Related Insured Losses Totaled More Than $320 Billion between 1980 and 2005 and Appear to Be Increasing
Based on an examination of loss data from several different sources, we found that insurers incurred about $321.2 billion in weather-related losses from 1980 through 2005. Weather-related losses varied significantly from year to year, ranging from just over $2 billion in 1987 to more than $75 billion in 2005. Notably, crop insurers and other property insurers both face catastrophic weather-related risks, although the nature of the events for each is very different. Moreover, as illustrated in Table 2, these losses appear to have increased during the past three decades. Major Private and Public Insurers Differ in How They Manage Catastrophic Risks Associated with Climate Change
Major private and federal insurers are responding differently to the prospect of increasing weather-related losses associated with climate change. Many large private insurers are incorporating both near and longer-term elements of climatic change into their risk management practices. Major Federal Insurers Have Taken Little Action to Prospectively Assess and Disseminate Information on Potential Increases in Catastrophic Risk Associated with Climate Change
NFIP and FCIC have not developed information on the programs’ longer- term exposure to the potential risk of increased extreme weather events associated with climate change as part of their risk management practices. The goals of the key federal insurance programs are fundamentally different from those of private insurers. Notably, the federal insurance programs’ liabilities have grown significantly, which leaves the federal government increasingly vulnerable to the financial impacts of catastrophic events. Figure 4 illustrates the growth of both program’s exposure from 1980 to 2005. The FCIC has effectively increased its exposure base 26-fold during this period. As one NFIP official explained, the flood insurance program is designed to assess and insure against current— not future—risks. Moreover, as previously discussed, both the IPCC and CCSP are expected to release significant assessments of the likely effect of increasing temperatures on weather events in coming months. Accordingly, our report recommended that the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of the Risk Management Agency and the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Emergency Preparedness assess the potential long-term implications of climate change for the FCIC and the NFIP, respectively, and report their findings to the Congress. | Why GAO Did This Study
Weather-related events in the United States have caused tens of billions of dollars in damages annually over the past decade. A major portion of these losses is borne by private insurers and by two federal insurance programs-- the Federal Emergency Management Agency's National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which insures properties against flooding, and the Department of Agriculture's Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC), which insures crops against drought or other weather disasters. In this testimony, GAO (1) describes how climate change may affect future weather-related losses, (2) provides information on past insured weather-related losses, and (3) determines what major private insurers and federal insurers are doing to prepare for potential increases in such losses. This testimony is based on a report entitled Climate Change: Financial Risks to Federal and Private Insurers in Coming Decades are Potentially Significant (GAO-07-285) released on April 19, 2007.
What GAO Found
Key scientific assessments report that the effects of climate change on weather-related events and, subsequently, insured and uninsured losses, could be significant. The global average surface temperature has increased over the past century and climate models predict even more substantial, perhaps accelerating, increases in temperature in the future. Assessments by key governmental bodies generally found that rising temperatures are expected to increase the frequency and severity of damaging weather-related events, such as flooding or drought, although the timing and magnitude are as yet undetermined. Additional research on the effect of increasing temperatures on weather events is expected in the near future. Taken together, private and federal insurers paid more than $320 billion in claims on weather-related losses from 1980 to 2005. Claims varied significantly from year to year--largely due to the effects of catastrophic weather events such as hurricanes and droughts--but have generally increased during this period. The growth in population in hazard-prone areas and resulting real estate development have generally increased liabilities for insurers, and have helped to explain the increase in losses. Due to these and other factors, federal insurers' exposure has grown substantially. Since 1980, NFIP's exposure nearly quadrupled to nearly $1 trillion in 2005, and program expansion increased FCIC's exposure 26-fold to $44 billion. Major private and federal insurers are both exposed to the effects of climate change over coming decades, but are responding differently. Many large private insurers are incorporating climate change into their annual risk management practices, and some are addressing it strategically by analyzing its potential long-term industry-wide impacts. In contrast, federal insurers have not developed and disseminated comparable information on long-term financial impacts. GAO acknowledges that the federal insurance programs are not profit-oriented, like private insurers. Nonetheless, a strategic assessment of the potential implications of climate change for the major federal insurance programs would help the Congress manage an emerging high-risk area with significant implications for the nation's growing long-term fiscal imbalance. |
gao_GAO-07-584 | gao_GAO-07-584_0 | 1.) The agency’s primary mission is to reduce the number and severity of crashes involving large trucks and buses. 2.) FMCSA can take a range of enforcement actions against carriers with violations, including issuing notices of violation informing carriers of identified violations and indicating that additional enforcement action may be taken if the violations are not corrected; issuing compliance orders directing carriers to perform certain actions that FMCSA considers necessary to bring the carrier into compliance with regulations; assessing fines for violations of the safety regulations; fines require carriers to pay a specific dollar amount to FMCSA; placing carriers or drivers out of service for unsatisfactory safety performance, failure to pay a fine, or imminently hazardous conditions or operations; revoking the operating authority of carriers for failure to carry the required amount of insurance coverage; pursuing criminal penalties in some instances when knowing and willful violations can be proved; and seeking injunctions from a court for violations of a final order such as an out-of-service order. However, modifications to FMCSA’s policy that carriers have to score among the worst 25 percent of carriers in two or more safety evaluation areas to receive high priority for a compliance review and focusing more on crash risk could result in the selection of carriers with a higher aggregate crash risk. FMCSA’s Policy for Prioritizing Compliance Reviews Leads the Agency to Conduct Compliance Reviews on Many High- Risk Carriers but Not on Other Higher Risk Ones
FMCSA’s policy for prioritizing carriers for compliance reviews based on their SafeStat scores results in FMCSA’s conducting compliance reviews on carriers with a higher aggregate crash risk than carriers that are not selected. I for a discussion of these studies.) FMCSA officials told us that the agency plans to assess whether the approach developed in this report—giving high priority to carriers that perform very poorly in only the accident evaluation area (such as those that scored among the worst 5 percent)—would be an effective use of its resources. SafeStat does a good job of identifying carriers that pose high crash risks. Finally, FMCSA has been very helpful and responsive during both our—largely concurrent—reviews. FMCSA’s Management of Its Compliance Reviews Promotes Thoroughness and Consistency
FMCSA manages its compliance reviews in a fashion that meets our standards for internal control, thereby promoting thoroughness and consistency in the reviews. In addition, it employs an information system that documents the results of compliance reviews and allows FMCSA and state managers to review the compliance reviews for thoroughness, accuracy, and consistency. FMCSA records and communicates its policies and procedures electronically through its “Field Operations Training Manual” (hereafter called the operations manual), which it provides to all federal and state investigators and their managers. FMCSA Follows Up with Many Carriers with Serious Safety Violations but Does Not Assess Maximum Fines against All of the Serious Violators Required by Law
FMCSA placed many carriers rated unsatisfactory in fiscal year 2005 out of service and followed up with nearly all of the rest to determine whether they had improved. Furthermore, FMCSA does not assess the maximum fines against all of the serious violators that we believe the law requires, partly because FMCSA does not distinguish between carriers with a pattern of serious safety violations and those that repeat a serious violation. More specifically, FMCSA used the following approaches to follow up with these carriers: Follow-up compliance review. Finally, we found that FMCSA assesses maximum fines against carriers that twice repeat a serious violation. 3.) The authors selected motor carriers from MCMIS in December 2000 with complete data for the accident, driver, vehicle, and safety management safety evaluation areas. Appendix IV: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which FMCSA’s policy for prioritizing compliance reviews targets carriers that subsequently have high crash rates, we analyzed data from FMCSA’s MCMIS on the June 2004 SafeStat assessment of carriers and on the assessed carriers’ crashes in the 18 months following the SafeStat assessment. In assessing how FMCSA ensures that its compliance reviews are completed thoroughly and consistently, we reviewed our report on internal control standards for the federal government. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) has the primary federal responsibility for reducing crashes involving large trucks and buses. FMCSA uses its "SafeStat" tool to target carriers for reviews of their compliance with the agency's safety regulations based on their crash rates and safety violations. As requested, this study reports on (1) the extent to which FMCSA's policy for prioritizing compliance reviews targets carriers with a high risk of crashes, (2) how FMCSA ensures compliance reviews are thorough and consistent, and (3) the extent to which FMCSA follows up with carriers with serious safety violations. To complete this work, GAO reviewed FMCSA's regulations, policies, and safety data and contacted FMCSA officials in headquarters and nine field offices.
What GAO Found
By and large, FMCSA does a good job of identifying carriers that pose high crash risks for subsequent compliance reviews, ensuring the thoroughness and consistency of those reviews, and following up with high-risk carriers. FMCSA's policy for prioritizing compliance reviews targets many high-risk carriers but not other higher risk ones. Carriers must score among the worst 25 percent of carriers in at least two of SafeStat's four evaluation areas (accident, driver, vehicle, and safety management) to receive high priority for a compliance review. Using data from 2004, GAO found that 492 carriers that performed very poorly in only the accident evaluation area (i.e., those carriers that scored among the worst 5 percent of carriers in this area) subsequently had an aggregate crash rate that was more than twice as high as that of the 4,989 carriers to which FMCSA gave high priority. FMCSA told GAO that the agency plans to assess whether giving high priority to carriers that perform very poorly in only the accident evaluation area would be an effective use of its resources. FMCSA promotes thoroughness and consistency in its compliance reviews through its management processes, which meet GAO's standards for internal controls. For example, FMCSA uses an electronic manual to record and communicate its compliance review policies and procedures and teaches proper compliance review procedures through both classroom and on-the-job training. Furthermore, its investigators use an information system to document their compliance reviews, and its managers review these data, helping to ensure thoroughness and consistency between investigators. For the most part, FMCSA and state investigators cover the nine major applicable areas of the safety regulations (e.g., driver qualifications and vehicle condition) in 95 percent or more of compliance reviews, demonstrating thoroughness and consistency. FMCSA follows up with many carriers with serious safety violations, but it does not assess maximum fines against all of the serious violators that GAO believes the law requires. FMCSA followed up with more than 99 percent of the 1,196 carriers that received proposed unsatisfactory safety ratings from compliance reviews completed in fiscal year 2005, finding that 881 of these carriers made safety improvements and placing 309 others out of service. However, GAO found that FMCSA (1) does not assess maximum fines against carriers with a pattern of varied serious violations as GAO believes the law requires and (2) assesses maximum fines against carriers for the third instance of a violation, whereas GAO reads the statute as requiring FMCSA to assess the maximum fine for the second. |
gao_GAO-14-407 | gao_GAO-14-407_0 | Both Broad and Targeted Federal Alternative-Fuels Initiatives Support the Development and Use of Alternative Jet Fuels
Broad Federal Strategies and Initiatives Have Supported Alternative Jet- Fuel Development and Use
The White House has developed broad national strategies that promote the development of alternative fuels to help secure energy independence, foster economic development, and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The expanded RFS generally required that covered transportation fuels contain 9-billion gallons of renewable fuels in 2008, with renewable fuels’ volumes increasing annually to 36-billion gallons in 2022. In this way, the renewable fuel program has created a market for RIN credits. Four Federal Agencies Support Alternative Jet Fuels Development and Use through Targeted Goals, Initiatives, and Coordination Efforts
Four of the selected agencies—FAA, DOD, USDA, and DOE—support initiatives that target alternative jet-fuel development or use specifically. In fiscal year 2012, FAA set a goal for the U.S. aviation industry (including commercial and military aircraft) to use 1-billion gallons of alternative jet fuels annually by 2018 with the intent of encouraging commercial production. The stated objective is to construct or retrofit multiple domestic commercial- or pre-commercial-scale advanced drop-in biofuel production facilities. In May and June 2013, four private companies were selected to receive awards totaling $20.5 million, with private industry paying at least 50 percent of the cost. In addition, DOE provides direct financial support for future alternative jet fuels production through its integrated biorefineries program, which was initiated in 2005. Price- Competitiveness Is the Main Challenge; Federal Activities Help Address Challenge, but Market Factors Affect the Long-term Commercial Viability of Alternative Jet Fuels
While Some Progress Has Been Made, No Alternative Jet Fuels Are Currently Commercially Available at a Price That Is Competitive with Conventional Jet Fuels
The dates FAA and DOD have established for meeting their alternative jet-fuel usage goals are several years or more away, and, to date, all alternative jet fuels purchased in the United States have been for fuel testing, approval, or demonstration activities, not for day-to-day operations. Ten stakeholders we interviewed highlighted fuel producers’ difficulty in obtaining the private investment needed to help construct commercial-scale alternative fuel production plants. According to stakeholders and literature we reviewed, private financiers are hesitant to invest, in part, because of risks associated with the uncertainty about access to a steady supply of feedstock, high feedstock and capital costs, and an unwillingness on the part of fuel end users to pay a premium price for alternative jet fuels. Uncertainty of Federal Policies and Regulations
As discussed above, federal policies and regulations can support the development and use of alternative jet fuels, but uncertainty regarding the future of this federal support may limit the support that these policies provide to the alternative jet-fuels industry. Stakeholders Generally Believe Federal Actions Are Needed to Advance the Development of Alternative Jet Fuels, While Market Factors Also Affect Long-term Commercial Viability
Federal Actions
Stakeholders and studies we reviewed identified a variety of actions that could assist in the development of alternative jet fuels, ranging from continuing the current federal efforts to providing greater regulatory and policy certainty to providing greater financial support. Stakeholders identified a variety of federal actions as being the most critical for the federal government to take. Agency Comments
We provided DOT, USDA, DOE, DOD, and EPA with a draft of this report for their review and comment. USDA, DOE, DOD, and EPA also provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report examines (1) the role of the federal government in the development and use of alternative jet fuels and (2) key challenges to developing and using alternative jet fuels and actions that the federal government plans to or could take to help address those challenges. We selected five federal agencies: the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Defense (DOD) and its military departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). To examine key challenges to developing and using alternative jet fuels and actions that the federal government plans to or could take to help address those challenges, we (1) identified the extent to which alternative jet fuel has been purchased for commercial and military use in the United States; (2) selected and interviewed 23 stakeholders representing government, academia, and the private sector to obtain their views on key challenges and planned or possible federal actions; (3) reviewed relevant literature on challenges to developing and using alternative jet fuels to help corroborate the views obtained from the 23 stakeholders; and (4) interviewed officials from the five selected federal agencies, as well as representatives from other non-federal entities involved in the alternative jet-fuels industry. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government has encouraged the development and use of alternative fuels to reduce greenhouse gas emissions associated with aviation and to enhance economic development and energy security for the United States. To help achieve these goals of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the aviation industry is actively supporting alternative jet fuels.
GAO was asked to provide information on the progress and challenges to developing and using alternative jet fuels in the United States. This report examines (1) the role of the federal government in the development and use of alternative jet fuels and (2) key challenges to developing and using alternative jet fuels and actions that the federal government plans to or could take to help address those challenges.
GAO interviewed officials from five federal agencies—FAA, USDA, DOE, DOD, and EPA. GAO selected these agencies for review because GAO identified them as the federal agencies most involved in the development and use of alternative jet fuels. GAO also reviewed relevant literature and federal and industry documents and discussed challenges and potential federal actions with 23 stakeholders from government, academia, and the private sector, selected to represent a range of perspectives and expertise in areas related to each step in the development and use of alternative jet fuels. GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DOT, USDA, DOE, DOD, and EPA reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments that were incorporated as appropriate.
What GAO Found
The federal government supports the development and use of alternative jet fuels through both broad and targeted initiatives. Broad national strategies promote the development of a variety of alternative fuels—including alternative jet fuel—to help achieve national goals, such as securing energy independence, fostering economic development, and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, the renewable fuel program—established by law in 2005 to encourage greater use of renewable fuels and administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—requires that U.S. transportation fuels contain certain amounts of renewable fuels annually, increasing from 9-billion gallons in 2008 to 36-billion gallons in 2022. The other four federal agencies that GAO reviewed—Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Energy (DOE), and Department of Defense (DOD)—directly support alternative jet fuels through targeted goals, initiatives, and interagency and industry coordination efforts. For example, FAA set a goal for the U.S. aviation industry to use 1-billion gallons of alternative jet fuels annually by 2018. The four agencies also sponsor research that specifically targets alternative jet-fuel development or provide direct support for its future commercial production, or both. For example, FAA and DOD support research to determine the technical feasibility of using new alternative jet fuels on aircraft and in existing infrastructure. Also, USDA, DOE, and DOD have coordinated their activities to support the future construction or retrofit of multiple domestic commercial- or pre-commercial-scale production facilities to produce alternative fuels, including alternative jet fuels. Specifically, in May and June 2013, four private fuel producers received awards totaling $20.5 million in federal funds, with private industry paying at least 50 percent of the cost.
Achieving price competitiveness for alternative jet fuels is the overarching challenge to developing a viable market. No alternative jet fuels are currently commercially available at prices competitive with conventional jet fuels. The 23 stakeholders that GAO interviewed most frequently cited high development costs and the uncertainty of federal regulations and policies as primary reasons why alternative jet fuels are not priced competitively and believe that federal activities are needed to help advance the alternative jet-fuels industry. For example, according to 10 stakeholders, fuel producers face difficulties in obtaining private investment to help construct commercial-scale fuel production facilities, in part because of concerns about the supply and high cost of feedstock (the source used to produce the fuel, such as crops) and high capital costs. Also, 13 stakeholders stated that continued uncertainty about the future of current federal policies—particularly the renewable fuel program—generally causes potential investors to discount the value of federal subsidies, discounting that, in turn, limits the support these policies may provide the industry. Stakeholders identified a variety of federal actions to advance alternative jet-fuels development, including continuing current federal research efforts, providing greater regulatory and policy certainty, and giving more direct financial support. However, even if the cost to produce alternative jet fuels is reduced, market factors may still determine the long-term success of the industry. The main market factors identified by stakeholders were (1) comparative value of competing end products, (2) feedstock prices, and (3) the costs of conventional jet fuels. |
gao_GAO-09-759T | gao_GAO-09-759T_0 | These consequences include identity theft or other fraudulent activity, which can result in substantial harm, embarrassment, and inconvenience. Identity Theft Is a Serious Problem
Identity theft is a serious problem because, among other things, it may take a long period of time before a victim becomes aware that the crime has taken place, and thus can cause substantial harm to the victim’s credit rating. Moreover, while some identity theft victims can resolve their problems quickly, others face substantial costs and inconvenience repairing damage to their credit records. Some individuals have lost job opportunities, been refused loans, or even been arrested for crimes they did not commit as a result of identity theft. Millions of people become victims of identity theft each year. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) estimates that in 1 year, as many as 10 million people—or 4.6 percent of the U.S. adult population—discover that they are victims of some form of identity theft, translating into reported losses exceeding $50 billion. Therefore, the total of number of identity thefts is unknown. Steps Have Been Taken at the Federal, State, and Local Level to Prevent Identity Theft, Although Gaps Remain in Efforts to Assist Victims
Several steps have been taken, both in terms of legislation and administrative actions to combat identity theft at the federal, state and local levels, although efforts to assist victims of the crime once it has occurred remain somewhat piecemeal. While there is no one law that regulates the overall use of personally identifiable information by all levels and branches of government, numerous federal laws place restrictions on public and private sector entities’ use and disclosure of individuals’ personal information in specific instances, including the use and disclosure of SSNs—a key piece of information that is highly valuable to identity thieves. One intention of some of these laws is to prevent the misuse of personal information for purposes such as identity theft. Vulnerabilities Remain to Protecting Personally Identifiable Information
While steps have been taken at the federal, state, and local level to prevent identity theft, vulnerabilities remain in both the public and private sectors. These vulnerabilities can be grouped into different areas, including: (1) display and use of Social Security numbers; (2) availability of personal information through private information resellers; and (3) security weaknesses in federal agency information systems that may lead to data security breaches involving personally identifiable information; among others. Our work indicates that persistent weaknesses appear in five major categories of information system controls. As a result, federal systems and sensitive information are at increased risk of unauthorized access and disclosure, modification, or destruction, as well as inadvertent or deliberate disruption of system operations and services. GAO has found that federal agencies continue to experience numerous security incidents that could leave sensitive personally identifiable information in federal records vulnerable to identity theft. We and various agency inspectors general have made numerous recommendations to federal agencies to resolve prior significant control deficiencies and information security program shortfalls. While these recommendations are intended to broadly strengthen the integrity of federal information systems, they will also help address many of the vulnerabilities that can contribute to identity theft. Personally identifiable information including an individual’s name, date of birth, and SSN are important pieces of information used to perpetrate identify theft and fraud, and it is critical that steps be taken to protect such information. Information Security: Protecting Personally Identifiable Information. | Why GAO Did This Study
The loss of personally identifiable information, such as an individual's Social Security number, name, and date of birth can result in serious harm, including identity theft. Identity theft is a serious crime that impacts millions of individuals each year. Identity theft occurs when such information is used without authorization to commit fraud or other crimes. While progress has been made protecting personally identifiable information in the public and private sectors, challenges remain. GAO was asked to testify on how the loss of personally identifiable information contributes to identity theft. This testimony summarizes (1) the problem of identity theft; (2) steps taken at the federal, state, and local level to prevent potential identity theft; and (3) vulnerabilities that remain to protecting personally identifiable information, including in federal information systems. For this testimony, GAO relied primarily on information from prior reports and testimonies that address public and private sector use of personally identifiable information, as well as federal, state, and local efforts to protect the security of such information. GAO and agency inspectors general have made numerous recommendations to agencies to resolve prior significant information control deficiencies and information security program shortfalls. The effective implementation of these recommendations will continue to strengthen the security posture at these agencies.
What GAO Found
Identity theft is a serious problem because, among other things, it can take a long period of time before a victim becomes aware that the crime has taken place and thus can cause substantial harm to the victim's credit rating. Moreover, while some identity theft victims can resolve their problems quickly, others face substantial costs and inconvenience repairing damage to their credit records. Some individuals have lost job opportunities, been refused loans, or even been arrested for crimes they did not commit as a result of identity theft. Millions of people become victims of identity theft each year. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) estimates that in 1 year, as many as 10 million people--or 4.6 percent of the U.S. adult population--discover that they are victims of some form of identity theft, translating into reported losses exceeding $50 billion. Several steps have been taken, both in terms of legislation and administrative actions to combat identity theft at the federal, state and local levels, although efforts to assist victims of the crime once it has occurred remain somewhat piecemeal. While there is no one law that regulates the overall use of personally identifiable information by all levels and branches of government, numerous federal laws place restrictions on public and private sector entities' use and disclosure of individuals' personal information in specific instances, including the use and disclosure of Social Security Numbers (SSN)--a key piece of information that is highly valuable to identity thieves. One intention of some of these laws is to prevent the misuse of personal information for purposes such as identity theft. Despite efforts to prevent identity theft, vulnerabilities remain and can be grouped into several areas, including display and use of Social Security numbers, availability of personal information through information resellers, security weaknesses in federal agency information systems, and data security breaches. GAO's work indicates that persistent weaknesses appear in five major categories of information system controls, including access controls which ensure that only authorized agency personnel can read, alter, or delete data. As a result, federal systems and sensitive information are at increased risk of unauthorized access and disclosure, modification, or destruction, as well as inadvertent or deliberate disruption of system operations and services. GAO has reported that federal agencies continue to experience numerous security incidents that could leave sensitive personally identifiable information in federal records vulnerable to identity theft. |
gao_GAO-15-538 | gao_GAO-15-538_0 | Further, we recommended the Army include information on ammunition that in a previous year was unclaimed by another service and had been categorized for disposal. DOD Maintains Information on Conventional Ammunition, but Some Data Are Incomplete and Information on Excess Is Not Always Shared with Other Government Agencies
Incomplete and Inaccurate Data on Excess, Obsolete, and Unserviceable Ammunition Hampers DOD’s Ability to Precisely Determine Its Estimated Demilitarization Needs
The services maintain information on their conventional ammunition; however, some inventory records for ammunition in the CAD stockpile have incorrect or incomplete information on its condition and weight. Consolidated information from the military services on the ammunition in the CAD stockpile is maintained in the Army’s Logistics Modernization Program (LMP). In our review of data in the LMP database from 2012 to February 2015 the number of records without assigned weight increased from 2,223 (out of 34,511 records) to 2,829 (out of 36,355 records), which shows the problem is growing. DOD officials stated they are trying to correct current records with missing or inaccurate data, particularly weight. However, since the items without weight data are not factored into DOD’s demilitarization determination, DOD is not positioned to optimally demilitarize the most ammunition possible with the given resources available. Each of the Services Has Visibility of Serviceable Ammunition in the CAD Stockpile, but Information on Excess Is Not Widely Shared with Other Government Agencies
Officials from all the military services said they have access to LMP and they have used LMP to search the CAD stockpile for materiel they could use, but information on DOD excess is not widely shared with other government agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security, which also uses ammunition for purposes such as training exercises. According to officials, DOD does not have a formal process for offering the excess small arms ammunition and components to other government agencies. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should ensure there are adequate means of communicating with, and obtaining information from, external stakeholders that may have a significant impact on the agency achieving its goals. Additionally, DOD officials stated that in fiscal year 2015, it costs on average about $2,000 per ton to demilitarize conventional ammunition. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that an entity should have controls to ensure that all transactions are complete and accurately recorded. Without a systematic means to communicate information on excess ammunition to other government agencies, DOD will miss opportunities to reduce the CAD stockpile and demilitarization costs through transfers. To improve the completeness and accuracy of information on the weight of items in the CAD stockpile—the key measure used by DOD to manage the conventional ammunition demilitarization operation— establish a plan to (1) identify and record, to the extent possible, the missing or inaccurate weight information for existing ammunition records in the CAD stockpile and (2) ensure that all items transferred to the CAD stockpile, including for example components removed from larger weapons and nonstandard ammunition, have the appropriate weight data. In response to our second recommendation that the Secretary of the Army develop a systematic means to make information available to other government agencies on excess ammunition that could be used to meet their needs, DOD stated that Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics would ensure that the Secretary of the Army is tasked to develop a systematic means to make information available to other government agencies on excess ammunition. Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To assess the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has adequately maintained and shared information on the quantity, value, condition, and location of excess, obsolete, and unserviceable conventional ammunition for each military service, we reviewed DOD’s inventory data on excess, obsolete, and unserviceable conventional ammunition held in the conventional ammunition awaiting demilitarization and disposal (CAD) stockpile as of February 2015 to determine how complete and accurate the data are. | Why GAO Did This Study
DOD manages conventional ammunition that ranges from small arms cartridges to rockets, mortars, artillery shells, and tactical missiles. When a military service determines such ammunition is beyond its needs, obsolete, or unserviceable, it is offered to the other services and if not taken, transferred to the Army, which manages the CAD stockpile and takes actions to demilitarize and dispose of the ammunition in the stockpile. According to data provided by DOD officials, as of February 2015, the stockpile was about 529,373 tons. DOD estimates that from fiscal year 2016 to fiscal year 2020 it will add an additional 582,789 tons of conventional ammunition to this CAD stockpile.
Section 352 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision that GAO review and report on the management of DOD's CAD stockpile.
This report assesses, among other things, the extent to which DOD has adequately maintained and shared information on excess, obsolete, and unserviceable ammunition for the military services. GAO reviewed applicable guidance and the military service ammunition databases; visited an Army depot that conducts ammunition demilitarization; and interviewed appropriate DOD officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains information on its excess, obsolete, and unserviceable conventional ammunition for the military services and shares this information on a limited basis with other government agencies, but its management of its conventional ammunition awaiting demilitarization and disposal (CAD) stockpile can be strengthened in two areas.
The Army uses its Logistics Modernization Program database to maintain consolidated information on ammunition in the CAD stockpile, but GAO found that records for some items do not include complete data on weight. Specifically, of 36,355 records in the database, 2,829 did not have assigned weights as of February 2015. Internal control standards state that an entity should have controls to ensure that all transactions are complete and accurately recorded. DOD officials stated they are trying to correct current records with missing data; however, the number of records without weight data has increased. For example, as of February 2015, the number of records with missing data had increased by more than 600 since 2012. Since DOD uses weight in determining, among other things, cost estimates for demilitarization projects and what ammunition to demilitarize, missing weight data can negatively impact its efforts to destroy the most ammunition possible with the resources available.
The military services have access to information on the CAD stockpile maintained in the Army's database and can search it for useable ammunition that could fill their requirements, but other government agencies do not and DOD does not have a systematic means for sharing such information. Federal internal control standards state that management should ensure there are adequate means of communicating with, and obtaining information from, external stakeholders. DOD officials told GAO that there have been instances of transfers of ammunition to other government agencies, but these have been done informally and on a limited basis. Without a systematic means for regularly sharing information on useable ammunition beyond DOD's needs, both DOD and other agencies may be missing opportunities to reduce costs related to demilitarization and ammunition procurement.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends DOD develop a plan to identify and record missing weight data and develop a systematic means to share information on the stockpile with other government agencies. DOD agreed with GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-03-747 | gao_GAO-03-747_0 | Some specific steps for identifying vacant and underutilized properties include observations that these officials make during on-site property visits, communications the officials have with tenant agencies about lease renewals, and examinations of agency program requirements that will affect agencies’ real property needs. GSA, VA, and USPS Have Begun Nationwide Initiatives to Realign Their Real Property Portfolios
All three agencies have recognized the importance of realigning their real property portfolios by identifying and disposing of unneeded real property. GSA has recognized that it has many buildings in its portfolio, including vacant and underutilized properties that are not financially self-sustaining—not generating sufficient income to cover expenses—or for which there is not a substantial, long-term federal purpose or predominant federal need. VA initiated the CARES process to, among other things, reduce its large inventory of vacant and underutilized buildings and the significant costs required to maintain them. USPS also discussed the need to review and modify its infrastructure of postal facilities so that it can enhance customer service and control costs. Numbers, Types, and Locations of GSA, VA, and USPS Vacant and Underutilized Real Properties
As of October 1, 2002, GSA, VA, and USPS reported having a total of 927 vacant and underutilized real properties—including a wide range of facilities and land—located throughout the 50 states and in the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. We did not change the total number of GSA’s properties as GSA suggested because the 236 properties met our criteria of being vacant or underutilized as of October 1, 2002. The 807 facilities represented a total of about 32.1 million square feet of space. Although VA reported having the highest number of facilities, GSA’s facilities had the highest amount of square footage. Only 9 properties fell into the category of more than 50 acres, with VA having most of these properties. These 927 vacant and underutilized properties were located in 294 cities in the United States and Puerto Rico. According to USPS officials, annual holding costs for this property exceed $2 million. For example, USPS is specifically precluded from closing small post offices solely for economic reasons. However, we reflected GSA’s concern in the report and modified appendix II—the list of all GSA vacant and underutilized properties as of October 1, 2002—to specifically identify those properties that GSA identified as committed to being used and as support facilities necessary to the functioning of occupiable space. They generally agreed with the information in the report and provided technical comments that were incorporated in the report where appropriate. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To meet the first objective, which was to provide information on how the General Services Administration (GSA), Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and U.S. To meet the second objective, which was to provide information on the numbers, types, and locations of vacant and underutilized real properties at the three agencies, we obtained data from agency headquarters officials at GSA, VA’s Veterans Health Administration, and USPS on their owned vacant and underutilized real properties—facilities and land—as of October 1, 2002. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government has many vacant and underutilized properties that are no longer needed. Retaining unneeded real properties presents federal agencies with significant potential risks for (1) lost dollars because such properties are costly to maintain; and (2) lost opportunities because the properties could be put to more cost-beneficial uses, exchanged for other needed property, or sold to generate revenue for the government. The General Services Administration (GSA), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) hold a significant number of real property assets. GAO was asked to provide information on how these agencies identify vacant and underutilized real properties and the numbers, types, and locations of these properties.
What GAO Found
GSA, VA, and USPS primarily rely on field office officials to identify vacant and underutilized properties. These officials make on-site property visits, communicate with tenant agencies about lease renewals, and examine agency program requirements that will affect agencies' real property needs. These three agencies also have ongoing nationwide initiatives to realign their real property portfolios. GSA officials are reviewing all of its properties to identify and remove all assets from its real property inventory that are not financially self-sustaining or for which there is not a substantial, long-term federal purpose. VA officials are in the process of identifying unneeded real property assets to reduce VA's large inventory of vacant and underutilized buildings. USPS officials are reviewing and modifying its postal real property infrastructure so that USPS can enhance customer service and control costs through the closing and consolidation of unneeded facilities, such as some post offices. As of October 1, 2002, these agencies reported a total of 927 vacant and underutilized real properties--including facilities and land--located throughout the United States and Puerto Rico in 294 cities. VA reported the most properties--577; GSA reported 236 properties, and USPS reported 114 properties. Most of these properties--807 of 927--were facilities that represented about 32.1 million square feet and ranged from office buildings to hospitals to post offices. Although VA reported the highest number of facilities, GSA facilities made up more than half of this square footage. The remaining 120 properties were vacant lands reported only by VA and USPS, most of which were 10 acres or less. GSA said that 236 properties is an overstatement because 43 properties are committed to future use, and 37 small properties support occupiable space. GAO did not change GSA's total number of properties because they were vacant or underutilized as of October 1, 2002. However, GAO reflected GSA's concern in the text and in the list of GSA's properties. VA and USPS generally agreed with the information in this report. |
gao_GAO-09-755 | gao_GAO-09-755_0 | SBA Fully Addressed Half of the Act’s Provisions, but Has Not Yet Established Milestones for Implementation of Remaining Requirements
SBA has fully addressed requirements for 13 of 26 provisions of the Act, partially addressed 8, and took no action on 5 that are not applicable at this time. SBA officials told us the agency did not fully address requirements for some provisions because the agency has to make extensive changes to current programs or create new programs in order to comply with the Act’s requirements. Individuals we interviewed and results from SBA’s 2008 Disaster Loan Program Customer Satisfaction Survey provided some positive feedback about SBA’s performance following recent disasters. However, interviewees and these same survey results indicated areas for improvement; in particular, these sources both indicated that the application paperwork was burdensome and that the application process needed improvement. SBA officials told us that they intend to improve the application process, but did not provide documentation of such plans and did not appear to take advantage of feedback from applicants, such as that received from the customer survey. By taking such actions, SBA could leverage the efforts and capacity of SBDCs, as well as state and local emergency management agencies, and ensure that it and they will be better prepared for future events, especially in disaster-prone areas. Failure to produce annual reports on schedule can lead to a lack of transparency on the agency’s progress in reforming the program. Delays in updates to the DRP also limit its ability to adequately prepare for and respond to disasters. SBA’s initial response following the 2008 Midwest floods and Hurricane Ike aligned with certain components of its DRP, and the affected individuals we interviewed, as well as respondents to SBA’s 2008 Disaster Loan Program Customer Satisfaction Survey were somewhat satisfied with the agency’s performance after the major disasters of 2008. In addition, SBA should make this information and other Disaster Loan Program information readily available to these regional entities prior to the likely occurrence of a disaster; complete the first annual report to Congress on disaster assistance, and adhere to the required time frames for subsequent annual reports; expeditiously issue an updated DRP that reflects recent changes resulting from the Act’s requirements, as well as SBA’s own disaster reform efforts; develop an implementation plan and report to Congress on the agency’s progress in addressing all requirements within the Act––including creating and implementing new programs, such as the Immediate and Expedited Disaster Assistance Programs––and include milestone dates for completing implementation and any major program, resource, or other challenges the agency faces as its continues efforts to address requirements and meet deadlines in the Act; and develop and implement a process to address identified problems in the disaster loan application process for future applicants. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to review (1) the extent to which the Small Business Administration (SBA) addressed the requirements of the Small Business Disaster Response and Loan Improvements Act of 2008 (Act), and (2) how SBA’s response, following the major disasters of 2008, aligned with key components of its June 2007 Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP). | Why GAO Did This Study
After the Small Business Administration (SBA) was widely criticized for its performance following the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, the agency took steps to reform the Disaster Loan Program and Congress enacted the Small Business Disaster Response and Loan Improvements Act of 2008 (Act). GAO was asked to determine (1) the extent to which SBA addressed the Act's requirements, and (2) how SBA's response to major disasters in 2008 aligned with key components of its June 2007 Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP). GAO reviewed the Act, as well as SBA information on requirements addressed and steps taken, including the DRP, various reports to Congress, and policy memoranda. GAO also conducted site visits to areas affected by major 2008 disasters, reviewed SBA's customer satisfaction survey, and obtained the opinions of relevant stakeholders.
What GAO Found
As of June 2009, SBA met 13 of 26 requirements of the Act, partially addressed 8, and did not take action on 5 which are not applicable at this time. SBA officials told GAO the agency has not yet completely addressed some provisions that require new regulations because to do so, the agency must make extensive changes to current programs or implement new programs. For two requirements that will involve private lenders, SBA plans to implement pilots before finalizing regulations. SBA has not yet addressed the Act's requirements for region-specific marketing and outreach and ensured that Disaster Loan Program information is readily available to regional entities, such as Small Business Development Centers (SBDC). By doing so, SBA could leverage the efforts and capacity of local resources and emergency management groups, and ensure that it and they will be better prepared for future disasters. Also, as of June 2009, SBA had not met deadlines to issue an annual report to Congress or an updated DRP. Failure to do so can lead to a lack of transparency on the agency's progress in reforming the program and limit its ability to adequately prepare for and respond to disasters. Furthermore, SBA did not have an implementation plan for addressing the remaining requirements. SBA's initial response after the 2008 Midwest floods and Hurricane Ike aligned with certain components of its initial DRP, such as using technology and outreach efforts to ensure timely assistance. The individuals GAO interviewed and results from SBA's 2008 Disaster Loan Program Customer Satisfaction Survey provided some positive feedback about SBA's performance following recent disasters. However, interviewees and survey results indicated areas for improvement; in particular, both indicated that application paperwork was burdensome and that the application process needed improvement. SBA officials told GAO that they have been taking steps to improve the application process, but did not provide documentation of such efforts. As a result, it did not appear to have any formal process for identifying problems in the application process and making needed improvements. |
gao_GAO-05-429 | gao_GAO-05-429_0 | To address its obsolete infrastructure, VA initiated its CARES process— the first comprehensive, long-range assessment of its health care system’s capital asset requirements since 1981. VA did not complete inpatient alignment decisions across VA for long-term care (including nursing home care) and mental health services (including acute and long-term psychiatry, residential rehabilitation, and domiciliary care). VA also lacked sufficient information to complete its inpatient alignment decisions for services at 12 facilities. Developing Information Needed to Complete Inpatient Alignment Decisions for Long-Term Care and Mental Health Will Be Challenging
Developing information needed to complete inpatient alignment decisions for long-term care and mental health services across VA will be difficult for three reasons. First, it is unclear whether VA has adequate information on the number of veterans who will need and seek inpatient long-term care and mental health services from VA on a daily basis because VA has not finalized models for projecting future demand for these services. In VA’s May 2004 announcement of CARES decision, VA concluded that its models were inadequate to forecast demand. VA concluded that it did not have sufficient information about the cost-effectiveness and benefits of building a replacement hospital in the area. VA also concluded that it lacked sufficient information on access to inpatient services and continuity of care for veterans who currently receive health care services at the Waco facility. VA Has Taken Steps to Develop Information Needed to Complete Inpatient Alignment Decisions
VA has taken several steps to address the challenge of developing sufficient information to complete its remaining inpatient alignment decisions. VA Faces a Challenge in Improving Management of Excess Property
Improving the management of VA’s large inventory of excess real property—including 8.5 million square feet of vacant space—poses another key challenge to VA. This challenge results, in part, from the disincentives associated with the administrative complexity and costs of disposing of federal property. Managing excess property is challenging for VA in part because of the disincentives associated with the administrative complexity and costs involved in the disposal of federal property. Like all federal agencies that own facility space or other forms of real property, VA must comply with federal requirements governing property disposal that are intended to protect subsequent users of the property from environmental hazards and preserve historically significant sites. In addition, VA was granted the authority—to the extent specified in appropriations acts—to use proceeds from disposal not only for nursing home construction and renovation but for use in construction or renovation of other VA patient facilities or to defray expenses associated with their disposal requirements. VA Faces a Challenge in Determining Priorities for the Purchase of Inpatient Services from Non-VA Providers to Improve Access to Care
VA faces another key challenge in determining priorities for the purchase of inpatient services from non-VA providers to improve access to care by making these services available closer to where veterans live. While VA determined that in 25 markets purchasing acute and tertiary inpatient services from non-VA providers would be a reasonable option for providing these services closer to where veterans live, VA’s network managers, who are responsible for making such decisions, have to balance these efforts against competing priorities. If it completes and successfully implements CARES decisions, VA may be able to enhance veterans’ health care by reinvesting resources now spent on excess property. VA’s ability to meet the goal of providing high-quality, accessible, cost- effective health care to the nation’s veterans will depend largely on the extent to which VA is successful in institutionalizing the CARES process into its ongoing strategic and capital planning efforts. Such a framework could contribute to VA’s effectiveness as a steward of national resources and provider of health care services for our nation’s veterans. VA Health Care: Framework for Analyzing Capital Asset Realignment for Enhanced Services Decisions. Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Veterans Affairs. VA Health Care: Capital Asset Planning and Budgeting Need Improvement. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) operates one of the nation's largest health care systems. In 1999, GAO reported on VA's aged, obsolete capital assets, noting that better management of these assets could significantly reduce VA's operating costs. GAO also noted that VA could reinvest the savings to enhance veterans' health care. In response, VA initiated its Capital Asset Realignment for Enhanced Services (CARES) process to identify what health care services it should provide in which locations through fiscal year 2022. CARES resulted in decisions to realign inpatient services at some VA facilities and to leave services as currently aligned at others. VA did not complete inpatient alignment decisions across VA for long-term care and mental health services and for inpatient services at some facilities because VA lacked sufficient information on demand for such care and other factors. GAO was asked to examine key challenges VA will face in completing and implementing CARES. This report discusses three key challenges: (1) developing information to complete inpatient alignment decisions, (2) improving management of excess property, and (3) determining priorities for purchasing care to improve access. GAO's analysis is based on its prior CARES work, review of CARES documents, and interviews with VA officials.
What GAO Found
VA faces a key challenge in developing sufficient information to complete inpatient service alignment decisions. VA concluded that it did not have sufficient information to complete such decisions across VA for long-term care (including nursing home care) and mental health services (including acute psychiatric care). VA also concluded that it did not have sufficient information to complete alignment decisions for inpatient services at 12 facilities. VA faces this challenge for several reasons. For example, it is unclear whether VA has adequate information on the number of veterans who will seek nursing home care and inpatient mental health services from VA on a daily basis because it concluded that its models were inadequate to forecast demand and it has not finalized revised models. VA has taken steps to address the challenge of developing the information needed such as working to develop improved models of demand for these services. Improving the management of VA's large inventory of excess property--including 8.5 million square feet of vacant space--poses another key challenge. This challenge results from disincentives associated with administrative complexity and costs of the disposal of federal property. Like all federal agencies, VA must comply with federal requirements governing property disposal that are intended, for example, to protect subsequent users of the property from environmental hazards. Some VA managers have retained excess property because the complexity and costs of complying with these requirements were disincentives to disposal. Congress has given VA authority to use disposal proceeds for construction and renovation of VA patient facilities and disposal activities, to the extent specified in appropriations acts. VA is taking steps to address this challenge, including hiring network-level capital asset managers to facilitate disposal. VA faces another key challenge in determining priorities for the purchase of inpatient services to improve access to care. While VA determined that purchasing inpatient services from non-VA health care providers in 25 health care markets would be a reasonable option for providing care closer to where veterans live, VA's network managers have to balance the costs and benefits of purchasing care against competing priorities. VA has taken steps to facilitate managers' development of information they need to decide among priorities, including information on the cost effectiveness of proposed contracts and their impact on other health care priorities. To improve its management of capital assets and enhance veterans' health care by reinvesting resources now spent on excess property, VA must overcome challenges in completing and implementing decisions reached through CARES. Furthermore, institutionalizing the CARES process into its ongoing strategic planning will be crucial to VA's effectiveness as a steward of national resources and a health care provider for the nation's veterans. VA concurred with GAO's findings and conclusions. |
gao_GAO-14-232 | gao_GAO-14-232_0 | Work abroad for foreign airlines, or join the U.S. military and be trained as a pilot. Data Are Mixed Regarding the Extent of an Airline Pilot Shortage, but Regional Airlines Are Experiencing Difficulties Hiring Entry-Level Pilots
Historical labor market data from 2000 through 2012 provide mixed evidence as to whether an airline pilot shortage exists. On the other hand, wage earnings and employment were not consistent with the existence of a shortage, as data for both indicators showed decreases over the period. As airlines have started hiring to address growth demands and attrition, 11 of the 12 regional airlines we interviewed reported difficulties filling entry- level first-officer vacancies. Mainline airlines, since they hire experienced pilots largely from regional airlines, have not reported similar difficulties, although mainline airline representatives expressed concerns that entry- level hiring problems could affect the ability of their regional partners to provide service to some locations. The BLS employment projections assume that growth in supply will be adequate to meet the demand, and so the analysis is not designed to forecast whether a labor shortage might develop in any given occupation. While these projections suggest the need for between roughly 1,900 and 4,500 new pilots on an average annual basis over the next 10 years, we cannot indicate with any level of certainty the actual number of new airline pilots that will be needed or hired in the future. However, we cannot determine the number of these pilots who may meet these qualifications, who would seek employment with civilian airlines after exiting from the military services, or who have the flight experience that airlines require. Representatives at most of the regional airlines also noted that some of the difficulty in finding sufficient numbers of pilots with ATP certificates, being experienced by some regional airlines, could be influenced by current perceptions about the potential for career opportunities and progression. However, representatives did express concerns that their regional partners may be experiencing difficulties finding qualified entry-level pilots. Industry and Government Are Taking Some Actions to Attract and Train Future Pilots
Economic literature identifies possible actions that employers in a market may take to mitigate a labor shortage. However, such actions have associated costs and can affect the industry in various ways. For example, two regional airlines that have had difficulty filling their new hire classes have started offering new-hire first officers an upfront $5,000 signing bonus, and one of these airlines also offers up to $10,000 for tuition reimbursement. Increase Availability and Flexibility of Financial Assistance to Aviation Students
Several airline and pilot school officials we interviewed stated that the high cost of pilot training is deterring students from entering pilot school and pursuing an airline pilot career. Some stakeholders suggested that revising loan requirements could provide incentives to attract individuals to the pilot profession. Stakeholders have made these suggestions because the new pilot qualification rule changed the traditional pathway to becoming an airline pilot, and airlines initial experience under the new rule suggests that the flight hours new pilots are earning to qualify for an ATP certificate may not be directly relevant to an airline setting. To address such a situation, opportunities exist for the airline industry to take action to attract more pilots. In this report, we described (1) what the available data and forecasts reveal about the need for and potential availability of airline pilots and (2) the types of industry and government actions that are being taken, or might be taken, to attract and retain airline pilots. To address the two objectives, we reviewed and synthesized a range of published reports from GAO, the Department of Transportation (DOT), and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that included general background information on a variety of related issues, such as the pilot certification process; pilot training schools; typical career paths to become an airline pilot; piloting experience and airline pilot compensation; federal- funding programs for pilot training; and the historical and current health of the airline industry. We also reviewed relevant literature related to factors that affect the supply of and demand for airline pilots, including attrition and retention concerns, factors to consider in the future, and international pilot supply and demand issues based on search results from databases, such as ProQuest®, TRID, and Nexis®, as well as trade publications, industry stakeholder groups, and the Internet. We analyzed data from the Department of Education (Education) on annual completions by major in professional pilot programs; data from the Department of Defense (DOD) on expectations for the number of new pilots entering military service and separating from the military; and FAA’s data on the number of individuals holding and obtaining pilot certificates and instrument ratings by year, specifically:
Education: To describe national trends in completions in professional pilot degree programs, we analyzed data from Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). We also interviewed representatives of 10 collegiate aviation and 2 non-collegiate vocational pilot schools, which accounted for about half of the students who graduated with professional pilot majors in 2012. | Why GAO Did This Study
Over 66,000 airline pilot jobs exist for larger mainline and smaller regional airlines that operate over 7,000 commercial aircraft. After a decade of turmoil that curtailed growth in the industry and resulted in fewer pilots employed at airlines since 2000, recent industry forecasts indicate that the global aviation industry is poised for growth. However, stakeholders have voiced concerns that imminent retirements, fewer pilots exiting the military, and new rules increasing the number of flight hours required to become a first officer for an airline, could result in a shortage of qualified airline pilots.
GAO was asked to examine pilot supply and demand issues. This report describes (1) what available data and forecasts reveal about the need for and potential availability of airline pilots and (2) what actions industry and government are taking or could take to attract and retain airline pilots. GAO collected and analyzed data from 2000 through 2012, forecasts from 2013 through 2022, and literature relevant to the labor market for airline pilots and reviewed documents and interviewed agency officials about programs that support training. GAO interviewed and collected data from associations representing airlines or their pilots, and pilot schools that accounted for about half of the students who graduated with professional pilot majors in 2012. GAO selected the airlines and schools based on factors such as size and location. GAO is not making recommendations in this report. The Department of Transportation and others provided technical clarifications on a draft of the report, which GAO incorporated.
What GAO Found
GAO found mixed evidence regarding the extent of a shortage of airline pilots, although regional airlines have reported difficulties finding sufficient numbers of qualified pilots over the past year. Specifically, looking at broad economic indicators, airline pilots have experienced a low unemployment rate—the most direct measure of a labor shortage; however, both employment and earnings have decreased since 2000, suggesting that demand for these occupations has not outstripped supply. Looking forward, industry forecasts and the Bureau of Labor Statistics' employment projections suggest the need for pilots to be between roughly 1,900 and 4,500 pilots per year, on average, over the next decade, which is consistent with airlines' reported expectations for hiring over this period. Yet studies GAO reviewed examining whether the future supply of pilots will be sufficient to meet this need had varying conclusions. Two studies point to the large number of qualified pilots that exists, but who may be working abroad, in the military, or in another occupation, as evidence that there is adequate supply. However, whether these pilots choose to seek employment with U.S. airlines depends on the extent to which pilot job opportunities arise, and on the wages and benefits airlines offer. Another study concludes that future supply will be insufficient, absent any actions taken, largely resulting from accelerating costs of pilot education and training. Such costs deter individuals from pursuing a pilot career. Pilot schools that GAO interviewed reported fewer students entering their programs resulting from concerns over the high costs of education and low entry-level pay at regional airlines. As airlines have recently started hiring, nearly all of the regional airlines that GAO interviewed reported difficulties finding sufficient numbers of qualified entry-level first officers. However, mainline airlines, because they hire from the ranks of experienced pilots, have not reported similar concerns, although some mainline airlines expressed concerns that entry-level hiring problems could affect their regional airline partners' ability to provide service to some locations.
Airlines are taking several actions to attract and retain qualified commercial airline pilots. For example, airlines that GAO interviewed have increased recruiting efforts, and developed partnerships with schools to provide incentives and clearer career paths for new pilots. Some regional airlines have offered new first officers signing bonuses or tuition reimbursement to attract more pilots. However, some airlines found these actions insufficient to attract more pilots, and some actions, such as raising wages, have associated costs that have implications for the industry. Airline representatives and pilot schools suggested FAA could do more to give credit for various kinds of flight experience in order to meet the higher flight-hour requirement, and could consider developing alternative pathways to becoming an airline pilot. Stakeholders were also concerned that available financial assistance may not be sufficient, given the high costs of pilot training and relatively low entry-level wages. |
gao_GGD-97-16 | gao_GGD-97-16_0 | Our objectives for this report were to (1) identify the potential benefits of FedState cooperative efforts; (2) determine what, if any, conditions may impede the success of the program; and (3) determine what, if any, FedState program concerns the states have with IRS’ planned reorganization. More sophisticated technology provides additional ways for IRS and the states to reduce taxpayer burden. By exchanging tapes that include taxpayer return data, IRS and the states have been able to identify taxpayers who failed to file returns or who filed returns but owed more taxes. Also, according to IRS, electronic filing reduces administrative costs to both IRS and the states because mathematical errors are detected electronically and transcription errors are eliminated. State Refund Offset Program
The state refund offset program, also referred to as the State Income Tax Levy Program (SITLP), allows IRS to levy state tax refunds to fulfill federal tax debts. Additional FedState Program Actions Could Increase Potential Benefits
While the FedState program offers opportunities for increasing taxpayer compliance, improving taxpayer service, reducing the burden on the taxpayer, and increasing the efficiency of tax administration, IRS has not developed an overall strategy to guide FedState projects to better assure the most efficient use of IRS resources. With performance-based data, IRS national and district offices could make more informed decisions on resource allocations and program priorities. Currently, IRS does not have the project information needed to ensure that the FedState program is managed in a way that maximizes resource investments. IRS did not provide more specific details on the nature of the issues and the impact of staffing and organizational changes on IRS’ ability to measure program results. It is too early to determine what impact the reorganization will have on the program. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the status of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) FedState Cooperative Program, focusing on: (1) potential program benefits to taxpayers, IRS, and the states; (2) conditions that may impede program success; and (3) states' concerns on the impact of IRS reorganization on the program.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the potential benefits of the FedState program include increasing taxpayer compliance, reducing taxpayer burden, and improving the efficiency of tax administration functions; (2) the FedState joint electronic filing program reduces administrative costs for IRS and the states by detecting math errors and eliminating transcription errors; (3) taxpayer data tape exchanges enable IRS and the states to identify taxpayers who fail to file a return or who owe more taxes; (4) the state refund offset program allows IRS to levy state refunds to fulfill the federal tax debt; (5) IRS lacks a centralized, strategic plan for ensuring that the FedState program is achieving the agency's objectives; (6) IRS and the states do not have a system to monitor and assess the results of individual FedState projects; (7) IRS needs to establish performance-based criteria for the program so that district offices can make more informed decisions on resource allocations and program priorities; and (8) some states have expressed concern that the reorganization of IRS will have a negative impact on the FedState program. |
gao_HEHS-96-154 | gao_HEHS-96-154_0 | During approximately the same period, the median household income rose 82 percent. This was a reversal from the 1970s, when the cumulative percentage increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) exceeded that of the percentage increase in college tuition. As a result of discussions with requesters’ staffs, we focused our work on these questions:
To what extent have tuition levels at public colleges changed over time relative to increases in consumer prices and families’ ability to pay? To what extent have instruction, administration, research, and other expenditures each contributed to the schools’ rising costs? How do tuition levels vary among states, and what factors help explain the differences? What kinds of actions have states and public colleges taken to deal with affordability issues? Computed on an annualized basis, the rates of increase were about 9.0 percent for tuition, 4.4 percent for median household income, and 4.0 percent for CPI. As Schools’ Expenditures Have Increased, Tuition Has Provided a Larger Share of Schools’ Revenues
The two factors most responsible for the 234-percent increase in tuition from school year 1980-81 to 1993-94 were (1) an increase of 121 percent in schools’ expenditures and (2) an increase from 16 percent to 23 percent in the portion of schools’ funding provided by tuition. Chapter 3 further discusses schools’ expenditures, and chapter 4 discusses the correlation between states’ average costs and state tuition levels. Grant Aid to Students Has Not Kept Pace, Causing Greater Reliance on Loans
Grant aid available to students and their families has not kept pace with tuition increases. The three types of expenditures that accounted for over two-thirds of all college expenditures in 1980-81—instruction, administration, and research—also accounted for over two-thirds of the increase in expenditures during the 1980-81 to 1993-94 period. 3.2). These expenditures include scholarships and fellowships, student services, and plant operation and maintenance. While the average dollar-per-student increases for each of these categories are relatively small, collectively they account for about one-fourth of the total per-student increase in school expenditures. Tuition at 4-Year Public Colleges Varies Widely Among States
Nationwide, average tuition for resident, undergraduate full-time students at public colleges was $2,865 for school year 1995-96, but tuition levels varied considerably by state, ranging from $1,524 in Hawaii to $5,521 in Vermont. High Tuition Often Accompanies High State Taxes
There is a strong correlation between high composite tax rates and high tuition levels. Tuition tends to be lower in states that provide high levels of per-student financial support to their public colleges. In-state tuition increased even less. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to congressional requests, GAO provided information on: (1) changes in college tuition levels relative to increases in consumer prices and families' ability to pay; (2) the extent that increased expenditures for instruction, administration, research, and other services have contributed to the increase in colleges' overall expenditures; (3) how tuition levels at public colleges and universities vary among the states and the factors that account for the differences; and (4) what actions states and institutions have taken to deal with affordability issues.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) between 1980 and 1995, average tuition at 4-year public colleges for in-state, full-time students increased 234 percent, while median household income increased 82 percent and the Consumer Price Index increased 74 percent; (2) the increase in colleges' expenditures and a greater dependency on tuition as a revenue source were the two factors most responsible for the tuition increase; (3) tuition revenues increased from 16 percent to 23 percent during this period, mainly because the revenue share provided by states decreased 14 percent; (4) student grant aid has not kept pace with tuition levels, so students and their families are relying more heavily on loans and personal finances; (5) increases in instruction, administrative, and research costs accounted for more than two-thirds of the 121 percent increase in total college expenditures; (6) expenditures for scholarships and fellowships, student services, and plant operations and maintenance, which also rose faster than inflation, accounted for about one-fourth of the increase; (7) for school year 1995-96, in-state student tuition at 4-year public colleges ranged from $1,524 to $5,521, with a nationwide average of $2,865; (8) states' level of financial support to colleges accounted for most of the variation in tuition levels, but there was a strong correlation between state and local tax rates, median household income, and colleges' expenditures per student and state tuition levels; and (9) states and colleges are taking actions to address college affordability issues, such as limiting tuition increases, providing payment alternatives, and speeding academic progress. |
gao_GAO-11-185T | gao_GAO-11-185T_0 | DOD Has Made Significant Progress in Reducing the Time for Processing Initial Personnel Security Clearances for DOD Personnel
DOD has made significant progress in reducing delays in personnel security clearance decisions and in meeting statutory timeliness objectives since we first designated DOD’s personnel security clearance program as a high-risk area in 2005. In 2007, we found that initial clearances for DOD industry personnel took an average of 325 days to complete. With the passage of IRTPA in 2004, timeliness requirements were established in law under which executive branch agencies were initially required to make decisions on at least 80 percent of initial clearances within an average of 120 days. We found that by 2008, DOD had made significant improvements in reducing delays. For example, in examining fiscal year 2008 data, we reported that the average of the fastest 80 percent of initial DOD clearances, including military, civilians, and industry personnel, took an average of 87 days to complete, well below what was required by law. IRTPA required the Performance Accountability Council to develop a plan under which, to the extent practical, each authorized adjudicative agency would be required to make a determination on at least 90 percent of all applications for a personnel security clearance within an average of 60 days from the date of receipt of the completed application by an authorized investigative agency. According to data provided by the Performance Accountability Council, DOD initial personnel security clearances met the 60 day IRTPA overall timeliness objective and the 20 day objective for the timeliness of adjudications for each of the first, second, and third quarters of fiscal year 2010, as shown in Table 1. In addition, DOD reported meeting the IRTPA 40 day timeliness objective for investigations in the third quarter of fiscal year 2010. DOD has taken a number of positive steps to integrate quality into its investigative and adjudicative processes and demonstrated the commitment of senior leadership to reforming the personnel security process within DOD. Most importantly, DOD has also issued guidance and developed tools to measure quality. On November 8, 2009, the USD(I) issued guidance on adjudication standards that outline the minimum documentation requirements adjudicators must adhere to when documenting personnel security clearance adjudication rationales in the Joint Adjudication Management System. In response to our recommendation, the USD(I) issued additional guidance on March 10, 2010 that clarifies when adjudicators may use incomplete investigative reports as the basis for granting clearances. Tools. DOD developed two tracking tools—the Rapid Assessment of Incomplete Security Evaluations (RAISE) and the Review of Adjudication Documentation Accuracy and Rationales (RADAR)— to assess the quality of investigative and adjudication documentation. These tracking tools are embedded capabilities in DOD’s Clearance Adjudication Tracking System (CATS), which is used by all non-intelligence DOD Central Adjudication Facilities. Subsequent to this briefing, this Subcommittee requested that the Joint Reform Team and GAO engage in an effort to develop metrics to measure the quality of security clearance investigations and adjudications in order to address GAO’s concerns about quality. Although these are positive developments that can contribute to greater visibility over the clearance process, these measures have not yet been fully implemented and we are continuing to examine these efforts as part of our ongoing work. We are continuing to track timeliness and monitor the implementation and results of DOD’s quality assessment tools. This work will help inform the Comptroller General’s high-risk update decision in January 2011. DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations about Timeliness and Quality. Personnel Clearances: Key Factors for Reforming the Security Clearance Process. Questions for the Record Related to DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance Program and the Government Plan for Improving the Clearance Process. | Why GAO Did This Study
In light of longstanding problems with delays and backlogs, Congress mandated personnel security clearance reforms through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), which requires, among other things, that executive agencies meet objectives for the timeliness of the investigative and adjudicative phases of the security clearance process. Since 2005, the Department of Defense's (DOD) clearance program has been on GAO's high-risk list due to timeliness delays and GAO continued that designation in 2007 and 2009 also due to concerns about quality. Based on prior and ongoing work, this statement addresses DOD's progress in (1) reducing the timeliness of initial personnel security clearances at DOD and (2) building quality into the processes used to investigate and adjudicate security clearances. GAO reviewed Performance Accountability Council timeliness data and has begun a preliminary analysis of available DOD data, examined key clearance reform documents, and conducted interviews with DOD and the Performance Accountability Council officials about timeliness and efforts to improve the quality of investigations and adjudications. GAO plans to continue examining the timeliness and quality of personnel security clearances in DOD. This work will help inform the Comptroller General's high risk update decision in January 2011.
What GAO Found
DOD, which comprises the vast majority of clearances, has made significant progress in reducing delays in making personnel security clearance decisions and meeting statutory timeliness objectives since GAO first designated DOD's personnel security clearance program as a high risk area in 2005. In 2007, GAO found that initial clearances for DOD industry personnel took an average of 325 days to complete. With the passage of IRTPA in 2004, timeliness requirements were established in law and executive branch agencies were required to make decisions on at least 80 percent of initial clearances within an average of 120 days. In 2008, GAO found that DOD had made significant improvements in reducing delays, with the fastest 80 percent of clearances taking an average of 87 days to complete. As of December 2009, IRTPA's timeliness objective is for each federal agency to process the fastest 90 percent of initial security clearances within an average of 60 days, including a period of not longer than 40 days to complete the investigative phase and 20 days to complete the adjudicative phase. DOD met the 60 day IRTPA timeliness objective for initial personnel security clearances, as well as the 20 day objective for the timeliness of adjudications, for each of the first, second, and third quarters of fiscal year 2010, according to data provided by the Performance Accountability Council. GAO's ongoing work continues to examine the timeliness of personnel security clearances in DOD. DOD has taken a number of positive steps to integrate quality into its investigative and adjudicative processes, including issuing guidance and developing tools to measure quality. For example, in November 2009, the Under Secretary for Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) issued guidance to outline the requirements that adjudicators must adhere to when documenting personnel security clearance adjudication rationales. Similarly, in March 2010, the USD(I) issued guidance to clarify when adjudicators may use incomplete investigative reports as the basis for granting clearances. In addition, DOD created two electronic quality assessment tools--the Rapid Assessment of Incomplete Security Evaluations (RAISE) and the Review of Adjudication Documentation Accuracy and Rationales (RADAR)--to track the quality of investigative and adjudicative documentation. These tools are embedded in DOD's Clearance Adjudication Tracking System (CATS), a system used by all non-intelligence DOD Central Adjudication Facilities. Although these are positive developments that can contribute to greater visibility over the clearance process, these tools have not been fully implemented. GAO's ongoing work continues to examine the implementation of these tools and other efforts to ensure that momentum is sustained. |
gao_GAO-04-82 | gao_GAO-04-82_0 | Background
Each year, millions of visitors, foreign students, and immigrants come to the United States. A visitor may enter on a legal temporary basis—that is, with an authorized period of admission that expires on a specific date— either with a temporary visa (generally for tourism, business, or work) that the Department of State issues or, in some cases, as a tourist or business visitor who is allowed to enter without a visa. The latter category includes Canadians and qualified visitors from 27 countries who enter under the Visa Waiver Permanent program. A large majority of these visitors depart on time, but others overstay. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology program (US-VISIT). Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
describe available data on the extent to which overstaying occurs, identify any weaknesses that might limit the utility of DHS’s long-standing overstay tracking system, and provide some observations about the potential effect of overstays—as well as limitations of the overstay tracking system—on domestic security. In examining these issues, our main information sources included (1) relevant GAO and other reports, (2) interviews we conducted with officials and staff at DHS and DOJ, and (3) a variety of data, including printouts from DHS’s long-standing overstay tracking system (based on Form I-94), data that DHS developed, at our request, from Operation Tarmac (the sweep that identified overstays and other illegal immigrants working at U.S. airports) and other similar operations, and facts about the arrivals, departures, and overstay status of the September 11 hijackers and others involved in terrorist-related activities. DHS’s Estimate May Understate the Extent of Overstaying
Significant numbers of visitors overstay their authorized periods of admission. 2. 3. Missing departure forms. Because of these weaknesses, DHS has no accurate list of overstays to send to consular officials or DHS inspectors. We have reported elsewhere that this first phase is operational but that improvements are needed. While the design and implementation of US-VISIT face a number of challenges, we believe that it might be useful to determine whether the new program successfully avoids specific weaknesses associated with the long-standing I-94 system. Together with other efforts, this might help identify some difficult challenges in advance and enhance US-VISIT’s chances for eventual success as an overstay tracking system. DHS has ongoing efforts to identify illegal workers in jobs at various infrastructures (for example, airport workers with security badges). 1. 2. Valid estimation of overstays is extremely difficult, given current tracking system weaknesses. Homeland Security: Justice Department’s Project to Interview Aliens after September 11, 2001. Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long- Term Challenges. | Why GAO Did This Study
Each year, millions of visitors, foreign students, and immigrants come to the United States. Foreign visitors may enter on a legal temporary basis--that is, with an authorized period of admission that expires on a specific date--either (1) with temporary visas (generally for tourism, business, or work) or, in some cases, (2) as tourists or business visitors who are allowed to enter without visas. (The latter include Canadians and qualified visitors from 27 countries who enter under the visa waiver program.) The majority of visitors who are tracked depart on time, but others overstay--and since September 11, 2001, the question has arisen as to whether overstay issues might have an impact on domestic security. In this report, we (1) describe available data on the extent of overstaying, (2) report on weaknesses in the Department of Homeland Security's long-standing overstay tracking system, and (3) provide some observations on the impact that tracking system weaknesses and significant levels of overstaying may have on domestic security.
What GAO Found
Significant numbers of foreign visitors overstay their authorized periods of admission. Based in part on its long-standing I-94 system for tracking arrivals and departures, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) estimated the overstay population for January 2000 at 2.3 million. But this estimate (1) excludes an unknown number of long-term overstays from Mexico and Canada, and by definition (2) excludes short-term overstays from these and other countries. Because of unresolved weaknesses in DHS's long-standing tracking system (e.g., noncollection of some departure forms), there is no accurate list of overstays. Tracking system weaknesses make it difficult to monitor potentially suspicious aliens who enter the country legally--and limit immigration control options. Post-September 11 operations identified thousands of overstays and other illegal immigrant workers who (despite limited background checks) had obtained critical infrastructure jobs and security badges with access to, for example, airport tarmacs and U.S. military bases. As of April 2004, federal investigators had arrested more than 1,360 illegal workers, while the majority had eluded apprehension. Together with other improvements, better information on overstays might contribute to a layered national defense that is better able to counter threats from foreign terrorists. A more comprehensive system, US-VISIT, the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology, is being phased in. The design and implementation of US-VISIT, however, face a number of challenges. It is important that this new program avoid specific weaknesses associated with the long-standing system. Checking for these weaknesses might help identify difficult challenges in advance and--together with other efforts--enhance USVISIT's chances for eventual success as a tracking system. |
gao_GAO-14-62 | gao_GAO-14-62_0 | According to CBP, it is one of the largest, most important law enforcement systems currently in use, and is the primary system available to CBP officers and agents from other departments for use in determining the admissibility of persons wishing to enter the country. TECS’ obsolescence also makes it difficult and expensive to maintain and support. DHS agreed with our recommendation. CBP TECS Modernization Scope Defined, Schedule and Cost of Both Modernization Programs Are Unclear
CBP has defined the scope for its modernization program, but its schedule and cost continue to change and are being revised. Further, ICE is overhauling the scope, schedule, and cost of its program after discovering that its initial solution is not technically viable. Thus, it is unclear whether these programs are on track to deliver planned functionality by September 2015. According to CBP, this project’s functionality was fully deployed to all air and sea ports of entry in 2011, and was fully deployed to all land ports of entry in 2013. Specifically, the program is revising its acquisition program baseline for a second time in under a year. According to program officials in June 2013, CBP is in the process of again revising its program baseline, and plans to do so by September 2013. TECS Modernization’s Risk Management Is Generally Consistent with Leading Practices, but Requirements Management Has Had Mixed Results
Both agencies have generally implemented risk management practices, but they have had mixed results in managing requirements for their programs. While they have managed many of the risks in accordance with recognized leading practices, neither agency has identified all known risks and escalated them for timely review by senior management. Further, while CBP’s requirements management processes and practices are largely consistent with leading practices, key requirements activities were well underway before such practices were established. In addition, ICE was operating without documented requirements management guidance for several years, and its requirements development and management activities were mismanaged as a result. ICE has recently developed guidance that is consistent with leading practices, but has not yet implemented it. In order to meet its schedule commitments, ICE decided to eliminate or defer about 70 percent of the original requirements for Release 1. DHS’s Governance Bodies Have Taken Actions Aligned with Leading Practices, but Incomplete and Inaccurate Data Have Limited Their Effectiveness
Leading practices that we and others have identified note that oversight is a critical element of an investment’s life cycle, and that to be effective, oversight and governance bodies should, among other things, monitor a project’s performance and progress toward predefined cost ensure that corrective actions are identified and assigned to the appropriate parties at the first sign of cost, schedule, and/or performance problems; ensure that these corrective actions are tracked until the desired outcomes are achieved; and rely on complete and accurate data to review the performance of IT projects and systems against stated expectations, including comparing estimated schedule time frames to actual schedule (including schedule slippages and/or compressions) and comparing estimated costs with funds spent or obligated to date, any changes in funding, and the impact of these changes. In its most recent program health assessments, the Enterprise Business Management Office partially based its rating of moderately low risk on CBP’s use of earned value management; however, the program manager stated to us that the CBP program is not utilizing earned value management because neither they nor their development contractor had the capability to do so. Until these governance bodies base their reviews of performance on timely, complete, and accurate data, they will be limited in their ability to effectively provide oversight and to make timely decisions. It is therefore imperative that the agency quickly develop and execute its revised strategy for implementing TECS Mod—including the functionality to be delivered, when it will be delivered, and how much it will cost. Moreover, while DHS’s various governance bodies are generally following leading practices, they rely on data that are sometimes incomplete or inaccurate. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve DHS’s efforts to develop and implement its TECS Mod programs, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the CBP Commissioner to ensure that the appropriate individuals take the following four actions: 1. develop an integrated master schedule that accurately reflects all of the program’s work activities, as well as the timing, sequencing, and dependencies between them; 2. ensure that all significant risks associated with the TECS Mod acquisition are documented in the program’s risk and issue inventory inventory—including acquisition risks mentioned in this report report— and are briefed to senior management, as appropriate; 3. revise and implement the TECS Mod program’s risk management strategy and guidance to include clear thresholds for when to escalate risks to senior management, and implement as appropriate; and 4. revise and implement the TECS Mod program’s requirements management guidance to include the validation of requirements to ensure that each is unique, unambiguous, and testable. The department described actions planned and underway to address the seven recommendations, and noted that it is committed to continuing its work toward full operational capability of its TECS Mod programs to enhance functionality for CBP, ICE, and other departments and agencies that have access to the system. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to (1) determine the scope and status of the two Department of Homeland Security (DHS) TECS Modernization (TECS Mod) programs, (2) assess selected Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) program management practices for TECS Mod, and (3) assess the extent to which DHS is executing effective executive oversight and governance of the two TECS Mod programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS's border enforcement system, known as TECS, is the primary system available for determining admissibility of persons to the United States. It is used to prevent terrorism, and provide border security and law enforcement, case management, and intelligence functions for multiple federal, state, and local agencies. It has become increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain because of technology obsolescence and its inability to support new mission requirements. Accordingly, in 2008, DHS began an effort to modernize the system. It is being managed as two separate programs working in parallel by CBP and ICE.
GAO's objectives were to (1) determine the scope and status of the two TECS Mod programs, (2) assess selected CBP and ICE program management practices for TECS Mod, and (3) assess the extent to which DHS is executing effective executive oversight and governance of the two TECS Mod programs.
To do so, GAO reviewed requirements documents and cost and schedule estimates, and determined the current scope, completion dates, and life cycle expenditures. GAO also reviewed risk management and requirements management plans, as well as governance bodies' meeting minutes.
What GAO Found
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has defined the scope for its TECS (not an acronym) modernization (TECS Mod) program, but its schedule and cost continue to change; while Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is overhauling the scope, schedule, and cost of its program after discovering that its initial solution is not technically viable. CBP's $724 million program intends to modernize the functionality, data, and aging infrastructure of legacy TECS and move it to DHS's data centers. CBP plans to develop, deploy, and implement these capabilities between 2008 and 2015. To date, CBP has deployed functionality to improve its secondary inspection processes to air and sea ports of entry and, more recently, to land ports of entry in 2013. However, CBP is in the process of revising its schedule baseline for the second time in under a year. Further, portions of CBP's schedule remain undefined and the program does not have a fully developed master schedule. These factors increase the risk of CBP not delivering TECS Mod by its 2015 deadline. Regarding ICE's $818 million TECS Mod program, it is redesigning and replanning its program, having determined in June 2013 that its initial solution was not viable and could not support ICE's needs. As a result, ICE halted development and is now assessing design alternatives and will revise its schedule and cost estimates. Program officials stated the revisions will be complete in December 2013. Until ICE completes the replanning effort, it is unclear what functionality it will deliver, when it will deliver it, or what it will cost to do so, thus putting it in jeopardy of not completing the modernization by its 2015 deadline.
CBP and ICE have managed many risks in accordance with some leading practices, but they have had mixed results in managing requirements for their programs. In particular, neither program identified all known risks and escalated them for timely management review. Further, CBP's guidance defines key practices associated with effectively managing requirements, but important requirements development activities were underway before these practices were established. ICE, meanwhile, operated without requirements management guidance for years, and its requirements activities were mismanaged as a result. For example, ICE did not complete work on 2,600 requirements in its initial release, which caused testing failures and the deferral and deletion of about 70 percent of its original requirements. ICE issued requirements guidance in March 2013 that is consistent with leading practices, but it has not yet been implemented.
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) governance bodies have taken actions to oversee the two TECS Mod programs that are generally aligned with leading practices. Specifically, DHS's governance bodies have monitored TECS Mod performance and progress and have ensured that corrective actions have been identified and tracked. However, the governance bodies' oversight has been based on sometimes incomplete or inaccurate data, and therefore the effectiveness of these efforts is limited. For example, one oversight body rated CBP's program as moderately low risk, based partially on the program's use of earned value management, even though program officials stated that neither they nor their contractor had this capability. Until these governance bodies base their performance reviews on timely, complete, and accurate data, they will be constrained in their ability to effectively provide oversight.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending DHS improve its efforts to manage requirement and risk, as well as its governance of the TECS Mod programs. DHS agreed with all but one of GAO's eight recommendations, and described actions planned and underway to address them. |
gao_GAO-01-689 | gao_GAO-01-689_0 | The Board also conducts oversight of mergers that have been approved. Merger Approval Involves Assessing the Public Interest and Mitigating Potential Harm to Competition
In determining, under the ICC Termination Act of 1995, whether proposed mergers are consistent with the public interest, the Board is required to consider a number of factors that relate to competition. Whenever necessary and feasible, the Board imposes conditions on mergers that it approves so as to mitigate potential harm associated with a merger, including harm to competition. We found that the merger reduced rail rates for four of the six commodities we reviewed. However, in one instance, the merger placed upward pressure on rates, even though other factors caused overall rate decreases. Again, these studies have focused on the overall direction of rate changes and have shown that rail rates in the Buffalo area have generally decreased. Recommendation for Executive Action
To better assist the Board in the oversight of railroad mergers and in ensuring that conditions imposed in such mergers protect against potential harm to competition, we recommend that the Board, when appropriate, require railroads and others to provide information to the Board that separately identifies the factors affecting postmerger changes in rail rates and the specific impact of these factors on rate changes. Conditions were attached to preserve competition where necessary. To address the role of the Board in approving and overseeing railroad mergers and to determine how merger oversight is conducted, we reviewed relevant laws and regulations and analyzed documents prepared by the Board addressing its merger authority and functions. Organizations Contacted
Federal Agencies
Shipper Associations
Railroad Associations
Railroads
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. CSX Transportation, Inc. Norfolk Southern Corporation Union Pacific Railroad Co.
Law Firms Representing Railroads or Shipper Associations
Appendix III: Description and Discussion of Econometric Model Used to Conduct Rail Rate Analysis
This appendix describes and discusses our analysis of the effects of the 1996 UP/SP merger on rail rates in selected geographic areas where the merger had the potential for harm to competition because 2-to-1 shippers could have lost one of the two railroad carriers upon which they had relied. 3. We found that the effects of other factors on rail rates during the period are generally consistent with what has been found in previous studies. | Why GAO Did This Study
Railroads have been a primary mode of freight transportation for many years, especially for bulk commodities such as coal and grain. Over the last 25 years, the freight railroad industry has undergone substantial consolidation largely to reduce costs and increase efficiency and competitiveness. Some companies that rely on rail shipments are concerned that the mergers have reduced railroad competition and led to higher rail rates and poorer service. This report reviews (1) the role the Surface Transportation Board plays in reviewing proposed railroad mergers and overseeing mergers that have been approved and how post-merger oversight is conducted, (2) how the Board mitigates potential harm to competition, and (3) how the Union Pacific/Southern Pacific merger affected rail rates in selected geographic areas.
What GAO Found
GAO found that the Board reviews railroad merger proposals and approves those that are consistent with the public interest, ensures that any potential merger-related harm to competition is mitigated to preserve competition, and oversees mergers that have been approved. The Board imposes conditions on mergers to mitigate potential harm to competition. The Board also focuses on the overall direction and magnitude of rate changes when analyzing rail rates as part of merger oversight. It does not isolate the effects of mergers on rates from other effects. When GAO used this approach to analyze how the Union Pacific/Southern Pacific merger affected rail rates, it found that the merger reduced rates in four of six commodities studied. However, for two of the commodities, the merger put upward pressure on rates, even though other factors caused overall rates to decrease. By focusing on overall rate decreases, the Board will be unable to determine whether the decrease is due to the merger or other factors. |
gao_GAO-10-710 | gao_GAO-10-710_0 | Nursing Home Ownership Structures
Nursing homes must be licensed by the states in which they operate in order to participate in Medicare or Medicaid. 1.) While some of the acquisitions involved entire nursing home chains—which included both the operations and any owned real estate— other acquisitions involved only real estate. About 1,900 Unique Nursing Homes Were Acquired by Private Investment from 1998 through 2008
We identified 77 acquisitions of nursing homes by PI firms from 1998 through 2008, involving a total of 1,876 unique nursing homes. In other cases, nursing homes were acquired more than once by different PI firms. The 10 firms accounted for 89 percent of the 1,876 unique nursing homes acquired by PI firms during the period. Officials from all four of these firms reported holding seats on the chains’ corporate boards of directors. PECOS Data on PI Ownership and Chain Affiliation Are Hard to Decipher, Incomplete, and Difficult for CMS to Verify
PECOS provided a confusing picture of the ownership structures and chain affiliations of the six PI-owned nursing home chains we reviewed. CMS’s ability to determine the accuracy and completeness of ownership data reported by nursing homes is limited. PI ownership was often not readily apparent in PECOS. In some cases, associating these entities with the PI firm was relatively straightforward, as the entities had names that were readily identifiable with the PI firms. PECOS Data for a PI Firm That Acquired Real Estate Only Were Incomplete and PECOS Chain Ownership Information Was Not Collected in a Straightforward Manner
In addition to the challenges in identifying PI owners in PECOS data, we found that the data were sometimes incomplete and that the information on chain ownership was not collected in a straightforward manner, making chain associations difficult to identify. HHS Has Made Limited Use of Ownership Data, but State Survey Agencies and Others Expressed Interest in Nationwide Data to Improve Nursing Home Oversight
The use of PECOS nursing home ownership data has generally been limited to the Medicare enrollment process and only CMS’s Division of Provider and Supplier Enrollment has routine access to the database. To date, the division has focused primarily, but not exclusively, on populating PECOS and has not developed any standardized internal reports on nursing home ownership data that could be shared within HHS. A CMS official from the agency’s Financial Management Systems Group told us that the agency was just starting a workgroup to examine the PECOS interests of other groups within CMS and how to provide access to accommodate those groups’ needs. Each state is responsible for establishing its own licensing requirements. Recognizing the growing interest in PECOS data, CMS is considering whether and how it could provide access to external parties, such as states. As the Secretary of HHS develops regulations to implement the expanded nursing home ownership reporting and disclosure requirements contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, we recommend that the Secretary, given the complex arrangements under which nursing homes can be acquired and operated, consider requiring the reporting of the following five types of information: the organizational structure and the relationships to the facility and to one another of all persons or entities with direct or indirect ownership or control interests in the provider (as defined in the act), such that the hierarchy of all intermediate persons and entities from the provider level up to the chain and the ultimate owner is described; for entities reported as having ownership or control interests, specify whether or not the entities have an operational role; for example, special purpose entities created solely for the purpose of acquiring the nursing home but having no operational role should be identified as such; the percentage ownership interest in the provider for all entities and individuals who have an ownership or control interest (as defined in the act); the names and titles of the members of the chains’ governing body; and the organizational affiliation of individuals with an ownership or control interest (as defined in the act). Specifically, CMS said that it would consider mandating the reporting of the five types of information we specified in our recommendations, such as the names and titles of the members of the nursing home chain’s governing body, when developing regulations to implement the expanded ownership disclosure and reporting requirements in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; require reporting of the holders of a security interest in a provider and identifying all the homes belonging to the same chain through revisions to the Medicare enrollment application and instructions; develop a strategy for examining the wider dissemination of ownership information, as well as an action plan for contacting states about their collection and dissemination of ownership and chain information; conduct additional monitoring of CMS contractors to include, but not be limited to, evaluating the ownership and control information submitted with enrollment applications as part of annual reviews of the enrollment process, other focused reviews of provider enrollment, and general contract oversight; and periodically review the Medicare enrollment application to ensure it is updated to reflect complete reporting of nursing home ownership information consistent with the statute. Portrayal of PI firms. PI firms’ PECOS data. While leasing arrangements with nursing home operators may have the potential to influence the operations of the homes, firms that acquired a chain reported that they were more involved in nursing home operations than firms that acquired real estate only. In general, they characterized their involvement as related to the strategic direction of the chain and indicated that they are not involved in day-to-day operations. After examining the data, the board discusses how to address problems. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since 2007, attention has been focused on nursing home ownership by private investment (PI) firms. Nursing home providers are required to disclose parties with an ownership or control interest in order to participate in Medicare or Medicaid. CMS, the HHS agency responsible for managing these two programs, maintains ownership and chain data in its Provider Enrollment, Chain, and Ownership System (PECOS). GAO examined (1) the extent of PI nursing home ownership and firms' involvement in homes' operations, (2) whether PECOS reflects PI ownership, and (3) how HHS and states use ownership data for oversight. GAO identified PI ownership using a proprietary database and analyzed data from six PI firms about their interest and involvement in nursing homes. GAO examined PECOS data for selected PI-owned nursing home chains and discussed ownership data with officials from HHS, CMS, and six states that also collect data.
What GAO Found
GAO found that 1,876 unique nursing homes were acquired by PI firms from 1998 through 2008. While some of the acquisitions involved entire nursing home chains, which included both the operations and any owned real estate, other acquisitions involved only the real estate. Sometimes the same nursing homes were acquired more than once. Ten PI firms accounted for 89 percent of the 1,876 unique nursing homes acquired by PI firms during this period. Of the six PI firms from which GAO collected information, those that acquired a chain reported being more involved in nursing home operations than those that only acquired the real estate. These firms had representatives on the nursing home chain's board of directors, but they generally characterized their involvement as related to the chain's strategic direction rather than day-to-day operations. PI firms that acquired real estate only had no representation on the boards of the operating companies, but officials at one PI firm observed that some leasing arrangements have the potential to affect operations. PECOS provided a confusing picture of the complex ownership structures and chain affiliations of the six PI-owned nursing home chains GAO reviewed. The database did not provide any indication of the hierarchy or relationships among the numerous organizational owners listed for PI-owned nursing homes. Further, PI ownership was often not readily apparent in the data, which could be the result of (1) PI firms not being required to be reported because of how they structured their acquisitions, (2) provider confusion about the reporting requirements, or (3) related entities that were reported but were not easily identifiable with the PI firms. Finally, PECOS chain information was not straightforward and was sometimes incomplete, making it difficult to link all the homes in a chain. Compounding these shortcomings, CMS's ability to determine the accuracy and completeness of the reported ownership data is limited. HHS has made limited use of PECOS ownership data. The only CMS division with routine access to PECOS data has been largely focused on populating the database and has not developed any standardized reports on nursing home ownership that it could share with interested parties. Some states collect their own ownership information but it can be limited to owners that operate in their state. As a result, tracking compliance problems among commonly owned homes or multistate chains can be ad hoc. State officials and others expressed interest in nationwide ownership data, such as PECOS, to improve nursing home oversight. Recognizing the growing interest in PECOS data, CMS has established a workgroup to consider how to accommodate the PECOS interests of other groups within the agency and is considering whether and how to provide access to external parties such as states. The implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act provides CMS with an opportunity to address shortcomings in the current PECOS database and to make ownership information available to states and consumers in a more intelligible way.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that the Secretary of HHS and CMS Administrator consider requiring the reporting of certain information to make nursing home ownership structures more understandable and take other actions to improve the accuracy and dissemination of these data as HHS implements new ownership reporting requirements in the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. HHS concurred with all of GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-39 | gao_GAO-08-39_0 | In December 2005, President Bush issued NSPD-44 to improve the coordination, planning, and implementation of reconstruction and stabilization operations. It also requires State to lead the development of a civilian response capability, including the capacity to ensure that the United States can respond quickly and effectively to overseas crises. NSC has adopted two of three elements of the framework—the Interagency Management System and procedures for initiating its use. One element—a guide for planning stabilization and reconstruction operations—is still in progress. In addition, guidance on roles and responsibilities for State’s bureaus and offices is unclear and inconsistent, and the lack of an agreed-upon definition of a stabilization and reconstruction operation poses an obstacle to interagency collaboration. In addition, some interagency partners have shown limited support for the framework and S/CRS. S/CRS is taking steps to strengthen the framework’s effectiveness by addressing agencies’ concerns and providing training to interagency partners, but differences between the planning capacities and procedures of U.S. government civilian agencies and the military pose obstacles to effective coordination. S/CRS Has Led the Development of an Interagency Framework for Planning and Coordinating U.S. Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations
S/CRS has led an NSC interagency group to create a framework for developing specific reconstruction and stabilization plans under NSPD-44. Key elements of the framework include the Interagency Management System (IMS) for managing high-priority and highly complex crises and operations, a guide for planning specific reconstruction and stabilization operations, procedures for initiating government-wide planning, including the IMS and the planning guide. As of October 2007, the framework has not been fully applied to any stabilization and reconstruction operation. Third, interagency partners believe the planning process, as outlined in the draft planning guide, is too cumbersome and time consuming for the results it produces. State Has Not Addressed Key Details for Establishing and Maintaining Rapid Deployment Corps
State has begun developing three civilian corps to deploy rapidly to international crises but has not addressed key details for establishing and maintaining these units. First, State created two units within the department—the Active Response Corps (ARC) and the Standby Response Corps (SRC)—and has collaborated with several other U.S. government agencies to create similar units. State and other agencies, however, face challenges in establishing these units, including (1) difficulties in achieving planned staffing levels for ARC and providing training opportunities for State’s SRC volunteers, (2) agencies’ inabilities to secure resources for operations not viewed as part of their core missions, and (3) the possibility that deploying volunteers could result in their home units having insufficient staff. Second, in May 2007, State began an effort to establish the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC), which would be made up of U.S. civilians who have skills and experiences useful for stabilization and reconstruction operations, such as civil engineers, police officers, judges, and public administrators, that are not readily available within the U.S. government. If deployed, reservists would become federal employees. In addition, State has not clearly defined the types of missions for which CRC would be deployed. In 2007, Congress granted State the authority to reallocate up to $50 million of Diplomatic and Consular Programs to support and maintain CRC. However, the pending legislation to authorize CRC does not include similar rights for deployed CRC personnel. S/CRS estimates that the annual costs for sustaining at home a 2,000- volunteer CRC would be up to $47 million. To determine the Department of State’s (State) efforts to improve interagency planning and coordination for stabilization and reconstruction operations, we interviewed current and former staff from the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and reviewed documentation on its development, roles, and responsibilities. | Why GAO Did This Study
In 2004, the Department of State created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to coordinate U.S. planning and implementation of stabilization and reconstruction operations. In December 2005, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), charging State with improving coordination, planning, and implementation of such operations and ensuring that the United States can respond quickly and effectively to overseas crises. GAO was asked to report on State's efforts to improve (1) interagency planning and coordination for stabilization and reconstruction operations, and (2) deployment of civilians to these operations. To address these objectives, we conducted interviews with officials and reviewed documents from U.S. agencies and government and private research centers.
What GAO Found
The office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is developing a framework for planning and coordinating U.S. reconstruction and stabilization operations. The National Security Council (NSC) has adopted two of three primary elements of the framework--the Interagency Management System and procedures for initiating the framework's use. However, the third element--a guide for planning stabilization and reconstruction operations--is still in progress. We cannot determine how effective the framework will be because it has not been fully applied to any stabilization and reconstruction operation. In addition, guidance on agencies' roles and responsibilities is unclear and inconsistent, and the lack of an agreed-upon definition for stabilization and reconstruction operations poses an obstacle to interagency collaboration. Moreover, some interagency partners stated that senior officials have shown limited support for the framework and S/CRS. Some partners described the new planning process, as presented in early versions of the planning guide, as cumbersome and too time consuming for the results it has produced. S/CRS has taken steps to strengthen the framework by addressing some interagency concerns and providing training to interagency partners. However, differences in the planning capacities and procedures of civilian agencies and the military pose obstacles to effective coordination. State has begun developing three civilian corps that can deploy rapidly to international crises, but key details for establishing and maintaining these units remain unresolved. First, State created the Active Response Corps (ARC) and the Standby Response Corps (SRC) comprised of U.S. government employees to act as first responders to international crises and has worked with several agencies to create similar units. However, these efforts are limited due to State's difficulty in achieving planned staffing levels for ARC, a lack of training available to SRC volunteers, other agencies' inability to secure resources for operations unrelated to their core domestic missions, and the possibility that deploying employees to such operations can leave units without sufficient staff. Second, in 2004, State began developing the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC). CRC would be comprised of U.S. civilians who have skills and experiences useful for stabilization and reconstruction operations, such as police officers, civil engineers, public administrators, and judges that are not readily available within the U.S. government. If deployed, volunteers would become federal workers. S/CRS developed a plan to recruit the first 500 volunteers, and NSC has approved a plan to increase the roster to 2,000 volunteers in 2009. In May 2007, State received the authority to reallocate up to $50 million to support and maintain CRC, but it does not yet have the authority to obligate these funds. In addition, issues related to volunteers' compensation and benefits that could affect CRC recruitment and management would require congressional action. Furthermore, State has not clearly defined the types of missions for which CRC would be deployed. State has estimated the costs to establish and sustain CRC at home, but these costs do not include costs for deploying and sustaining volunteers overseas. |
gao_GAO-03-554 | gao_GAO-03-554_0 | The working group determined that (1) uniformed members who perform duty in designated hardship locations for more than 30 consecutive days are eligible for hardship duty pay and (2) this pay is not intended to compensate for difficult working conditions. OSD, in its appeal submitted in response to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, opposed the legislation creating an exception to the 30-day hardship duty threshold for missions to the polar regions on the grounds that it “unnecessarily circumvents a process that has proven to be a fair and equitable means of setting hardship duty pay location rates worldwide.” The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy) regularly reviews and determines hardship duty locations and rates. The National Science Foundation reimburses DOD for 109th Airlift Wing logistic support in the polar regions and would incur most of these additional costs. However, allowing this exception could set a precedent for DOD personnel performing other missions lasting 30 days or less. The costs of granting an exception for short-term missions conducted at other hardship locations are unknown. Estimated Costs of Granting the 109th Airlift Wing an Exception to the 30-Day Threshold
The 109th Airlift Wing estimated that granting an exception to the 30-day hardship duty threshold for unit members deployed to the polar regions would cost approximately $125,000 to $130,000 a year based on deployment trends in past years. We did not verify the cost data. The Navy stated that security personnel who are deployed to the island on a 14-day rotational schedule live in “substandard conditions.” DOD, in turning down the request, stated that “members on a short-term duration tour-of-duty do not endure the range of physical hardships experienced by those who are permanently assigned.” According to an official within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), granting an exception to the 30-day threshold for other short-term missions would result in additional hardship duty pay costs, but these costs are unknown because DOD has not conducted a cost analysis. Factors Cited as Justifying Hazardous Duty Pay for Personnel Performing Duty in Polar Regions
The 109th Airlift Wing justified its proposal for hazardous duty pay for military personnel performing duty in the polar regions on the basis of the extreme working conditions they encounter and their exposure to potential medical hazards. Unit officials also expressed concern about the retention of unit personnel, but they did not know what impact hazardous duty pay for polar duty would have on retention. The senior 109th Airlift Wing official said the unit’s justification for hazardous duty pay for polar operations could also be applied to hardship duty pay. Maintenance personnel work in temperatures as low as minus 59 degrees Fahrenheit without the protection of hangars. Operations in these conditions expose personnel to potential medical hazards such as hypothermia, frostbite, carbon monoxide poisoning, and ultraviolet radiation exposure. Conclusions
The hardship duty pay legislation introduced in 2002 — directed at the 109th Airlift Wing — would have created an exception to (1) the 30-day hardship duty pay threshold and (2) the monthly hardship duty rate established by DOD for the polar regions. We believe that granting such an exception for hardship duty pay is not justified under current DOD policy. These factors warrant consideration as part of DOD’s review of special and incentive pays for personnel performing duty in the polar regions. Exit surveys conducted with separating personnel show that dissatisfaction with pay was not among the most frequently cited reasons that members of the unit provided for leaving. We visited Stratton Air Guard Base, where we interviewed officials from the 109th Airlift Wing, New York Air National Guard. | Why GAO Did This Study
The 109th Airlift Wing, New York Air National Guard, conducts supply missions for scientific research in the polar regions. Most unit members do not spend more than 30 consecutive days in the polar regions. Therefore, they are not eligible for hardship duty pay, which requires more than 30 consecutive days of duty in a designated hardship location. Congress considered legislation in 2002 to make an exception to the 30-day hardship duty pay threshold for polar duty. This legislation was not approved. In addition, the 109th Airlift Wing proposed designating polar duty as a hazardous duty. The Conference Report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 directed GAO and DOD to conduct separate reviews of special and incentive pays for polar duty. GAO assessed DOD's rationale for hardship duty pay and the implications of making an exception to hardship duty pay. In addition, GAO assessed the 109th Airlift Wing's justification for hazardous duty pay for polar duty.
What GAO Found
Hardship duty pay is intended to compensate military personnel assigned to areas for more than 30 consecutive days where quality-of-life conditions are substantially below those in the continental United States. DOD did not support the hardship duty pay legislation on the basis that this pay was not intended to compensate stays of short duration and the legislation circumvented a DOD process designating hardship duty locations and rates. Granting an exception to the 30-day hardship duty pay threshold for 109th Airlift Wing personnel deployed to the polar regions would result in minimal costs, but this exception could set a precedent for DOD personnel performing other short-term missions and could further increase costs. Had this exception been in effect in 2001-2002, the 109th Airlift Wing estimated the costs would have totaled about $127,000. The National Science Foundation would incur most of these costs because it reimburses DOD for logistic support in the polar regions. The costs of granting an exception for short-term missions conducted by DOD personnel at other hardship locations are unknown. Based on its review of the intent of hardship duty pay and the implications of granting an exception, GAO believes that an exception to the 30-day threshold is not justified under current DOD policy. The 109th Airlift Wing justified its proposal for hazardous pay on the basis of extreme working conditions and exposure to medical hazards. For example, maintenance personnel work in temperatures as cold as minus 59 degrees Fahrenheit without the protection of hangars and are exposed to potential medical hazards such as frostbite, hypothermia, and carbon monoxide poisoning. Unit officials expressed concern about the retention of personnel who require additional training for polar operations, but they did not know what impact hazardous duty pay would have on retention. Recent data from exit surveys show that dissatisfaction with pay was not among the most frequently cited reasons for leaving. |
gao_GAO-08-1064T | gao_GAO-08-1064T_0 | 1). Major factors affecting children’s entry into foster care included African American families’ higher rates of poverty, difficulties in accessing support services, and racial bias or cultural misunderstanding among child welfare decision makers, as well as families’ distrust of the child welfare system. Factors often cited as affecting African American children’s length of stay in foster care included the lack of appropriate adoptive homes for children, parents’ lack of access to support services needed for reunification with their children, and a greater use of kinship care among African American families. 2.) In our survey, 33 of the 48 states from which we received responses reported that high rates of poverty in African American communities and issues related to living in poverty may increase the proportion of African American children entering foster care compared to that of children of other races and ethnicities. 3.) The lack of such supports and other services in many poor African American neighborhoods contributes to children’s longer stays in foster care because services can influence a parent’s ability to reunify with their child in a timely manner, according to our survey, interviews, and research. They may be unwilling to adopt because they may find it difficult financially to forego foster care payments or because adoption entails terminating the parental rights of their kin. In Illinois, this decrease also coincided with a reduction in disproportionate numbers of African American children in foster care. Such data analyses help states and localities devise strategies to address the issue and can also be useful for building consensus among community leaders and policymakers for action. However, some state and local agencies have limited capacity to do this. Despite these efforts, states report that they need further information and technical assistance to strengthen their current efforts in addressing disproportionality. States Reported That More Flexibility to Use Federal Funds for Prevention Services and Subsidized Guardianship Could Help Reduce Disproportionality
While states viewed some federal policies as helpful for reducing the proportion of African American children in foster care, they also expressed concerns regarding policies that limit the use of federal funds to provide preventive services and support legal guardianship arrangements. Policies that promote adoption of African American children were generally viewed as helpful, such as allowing states to classify African American children as having “special needs,” which allows them to provide subsidies to adoptive parents, according to our survey results. As an alternative to adoption, many child welfare officials and researchers we interviewed considered subsidizing legal guardianship a particularly important way to help African American children exit foster care. African American Children in Foster Care: Additional HHS Assistance Needed to Help States Reduce the Proportion in Care. GAO-07-816. Foster Care: Kinship Care Quality and Permanency Issues. | Why GAO Did This Study
A significantly greater proportion of African American children are in foster care than children of other races and ethnicities relative to their share of the general population. Given this situation, GAO was asked to analyze the (1) major factors influencing their proportion in foster care, (2) strategies states and localities have implemented that appear promising, and (3) ways in which federal policies may have influenced the proportion of African American children in foster care. This testimony is based on a GAO report issued in July 2007 (GAO-07-816), which included a nationwide survey; a review of research and policies; state site visits; analyses of child welfare data; and interviews with researchers, HHS officials, and other experts. It includes updates where possible.
What GAO Found
According to our survey results, key factors contributing to the proportion of African American children in foster care included a higher rate of poverty, challenges in accessing support services, racial bias and distrust, and difficulties in finding appropriate adoptive homes. Families living in poverty have greater difficulty accessing housing, mental health, and other support services needed to keep families stable and children safely at home. Bias or cultural misunderstandings and distrust between child welfare decision makers and the families they serve also contribute to children's removal from their homes into foster care. African American children also stay in foster care longer because of difficulties in recruiting adoptive parents, the lack of services for parents trying to reunify with their children, and a greater reliance on relatives to provide foster care who may be unwilling to terminate the parental rights of the child's parent--as required in adoption--or who need the financial subsidy they receive while the child is in foster care. Most states we surveyed reported using various strategies intended to address these issues, such as building community supports, providing cultural competency training for caseworkers, and broadening the search for relatives to care for children. Researchers and officials also stressed the importance of analyzing data to address the proportion of African American children in care in order to better understand the issue and devise strategies to address it. HHS provides information and technical assistance, but states reported that they had limited capacity to analyze their own data and formulate strategies to address disproportionality. According to our survey, states viewed some federal policies, such as those that promote adoption, as helpful for reducing the proportion of African American children in foster care. However, they also expressed concerns regarding policies that limit the use of federal funds to provide preventive services and support legal guardianship arrangements. As an alternative to adoption, subsidized guardianship is considered particularly promising for helping African American children exit from foster care. |
gao_GAO-12-175 | gao_GAO-12-175_0 | Airborne electronic attack—a subset of the electronic attack mission— involves use of aircraft to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade (suppress) enemy air defense and communications systems, either through destructive or disruptive means. DOD Strategy to Lower Costs Also Reduced Synergy among Systems
DOD’s strategy for meeting airborne electronic attack requirements— including both near-peer and irregular warfare needs—centers on acquiring a family of systems, including traditional fixed wing aircraft, low observable aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, and related mission systems and weapons. Department analyses dating back a decade have identified capability gaps and provided a basis for service investments in airborne electronic attack capabilities. However, budget realities and lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have driven changes in strategic direction and program content. Most notably, the department canceled some acquisitions, after which services revised their operating concepts for airborne electronic attack. These decisions saved money, allowing the department to fund other priorities, but reduced the planned level of synergy among airborne electronic attack systems during operations. As acquisition plans for these systems have evolved, operational stresses upon the existing inventory of weapon systems have grown. These stresses have materialized in the form of capability limitations and sustainment challenges for existing systems, prompting the department to invest in improvements to these systems to mitigate shortfalls. Acquisitions May Not Produce Sufficient Results
DOD is investing in new airborne electronic attack systems to address its growing mission demands and to counter anticipated future threats. However, progress acquiring these new capabilities has been impeded by developmental and production challenges that have slowed fielding of several planned systems. Some programs, including the Navy’s EA-18G Growler and the Air Force’s EC-130H Compass Call modernization, are in stable production and have completed significant amounts of testing. In addition, certain airborne electronic attack systems in development may offer capabilities that overlap with one another—a situation brought on in part by the department’s fragmented urgent operational needs processes. As military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan decrease, opportunities exist to consolidate current acquisition programs across services; however, this consolidation may be hampered by leadership deficiencies affecting the department’s electronic warfare enterprise. Furthermore, current and planned acquisition programs, even if executed according to plan, will not fully address the materiel-related capability gaps identified by the department—including some that date back 10 years. Improvements to Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures and Investments in Science and Technology Are Helping to Bridge Gaps
To supplement its acquisition of new systems, DOD is undertaking other efforts to bridge existing airborne electronic attack capability gaps. In the near term, services are evolving their tactics, techniques, and procedures for operating existing systems to enable them to take on additional mission tasks. These activities maximize the utility of existing systems and better position operators to complete missions with equipment currently available. Longer-term solutions, however, depend on the department successfully capitalizing on its investments in science and technology. DOD has recently taken actions that begin to address long- standing coordination shortfalls in this area including designating electronic warfare as a priority area for investment and creating a steering council to link capability gaps to research initiatives. However, these steps do not preclude services from funding their own research priorities ahead of departmentwide priorities. DOD’s planned implementation roadmap for electronic warfare offers opportunities to assess how closely component research investments are aligned to the departmentwide electronic warfare priority and to coordinate component investments in electronic warfare. Determine the extent to which the most pressing airborne electronic attack capability gaps can best be met—using the assets that are likely to be available—and take steps to fill any potential gaps. Specifically, we assessed (1) the department’s strategy for acquiring airborne electronic attack capabilities, (2) progress made developing and fielding systems to meet airborne electronic attack mission requirements, and (3) additional compensating actions taken by the department to address capability gaps, including improvements to tactics, techniques, and procedures and investments in science and technology. To further corroborate documentary evidence and obtain additional information in support of our review, we conducted interviews with relevant DOD officials responsible for managing airborne electronic attack requirements and overseeing the related family of systems, including officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; Office of the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations— Information Dominance and Air Warfare directorates; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition; Air Force Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements— Electronic Warfare division; Air Force Air Combat Command; Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training— Electronic Warfare division; Marine Air-Ground Task Force Electronic Warfare; U.S. Strategic Command; and Joint Staff. | Why GAO Did This Study
Airborne electronic attack involves the use of aircraft to neutralize, destroy, or suppress enemy air defense and communications systems. Proliferation of sophisticated air defenses and advanced commercial electronic devices has contributed to the accelerated appearance of new weapons designed to counter U.S. airborne electronic attack capabilities. GAO was asked to assess (1) the Department of Defenses (DOD) strategy for acquiring airborne electronic attack capabilities, (2) progress made in developing and fielding systems to meet airborne electronic attack mission requirements, and (3) additional actions taken to address capability gaps. To do this, GAO analyzed documents related to mission requirements, acquisition and budget needs, development plans, and performance, and interviewed DOD officials.
What GAO Found
The Department of Defenses (DOD) evolving strategy for meeting airborne electronic attack requirements centers on acquiring a family of systems, including traditional fixed wing aircraft, low observable aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, and related mission systems and weapons. DOD analyses dating back a decade have identified capability gaps and provided a basis for service investments, but budget realities and lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have driven changes in strategic direction and program content. Most notably, DOD canceled some acquisitions, after which the services revised their operating concepts for airborne electronic attack. These decisions saved money, allowing DOD to fund other priorities, but reduced the planned level of synergy among systems during operations. As acquisition plans have evolved, capability limitations and sustainment challenges facing existing systems have grown, prompting the department to invest in system improvements to mitigate shortfalls.
DOD is investing in new airborne electronic attack systems to address its growing mission demands and to counter anticipated future threats. However, progress acquiring these new capabilities has been impeded by developmental and production challenges that have slowed fielding of planned systems. Some programs, such as the Navys EA-18G Growler and the Air Forces modernized EC-130H Compass Call, are in stable production and have completed significant amounts of testing. Other key programs, like the Navys Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile, have required additional time and funding to address technical challenges, yet continue to face execution risks. In addition, certain systems in development may offer capabilities that overlap with one anothera situation brought on in part by DODs fragmented urgent operational needs processes. Although services have shared technical data among these programs, they continue to pursue unique systems intended to counter similar threats. As military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan decrease, opportunities exist to consolidate current acquisition programs across services. However, this consolidation may be hampered by DODs acknowledged leadership deficiencies within its electronic warfare enterprise, including the lack of a designated, joint entity to coordinate activities. Furthermore, current and planned acquisitions will not fully address materiel-related capability gaps identified by DODincluding some that date back 10 years. Acquisition program shortfalls will exacerbate these gaps.
To supplement its acquisition of new systems, DOD is undertaking other efforts to bridge existing airborne electronic attack capability gaps. In the near term, services are evolving tactics, techniques, and procedures for existing systems to enable them to take on additional mission tasks. These activities maximize the utility of existing systems and better position operators to complete missions with equipment currently available. Longer-term solutions, however, depend on DOD successfully capitalizing on its investments in science and technology. DOD has recently taken actions that begin to address long-standing coordination shortfalls in this area, including designating electronic warfare as a priority investment area and creating a steering council to link capability gaps to research initiatives. These steps do not preclude services from funding their own research priorities ahead of departmentwide priorities. DODs planned implementation roadmap for electronic warfare offers an opportunity to assess how closely component research investments are aligned with the departmentwide priority.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD conduct program reviews for certain new, key systems to assess cost, schedule, and performance; determine the extent to which the most pressing capability gaps can be met and take steps to fill them; align service investments in science and technology with the departmentwide electronic warfare priority; and review capabilities provided by certain planned and existing systems to ensure investments do not overlap. DOD agreed with three recommendations and partially agreed with the two aimed at reducing potential overlap among systems. DOD plans to assess coordination among systems, whereas GAO sees opportunities for consolidation, as discussed in the report. |
gao_GAO-05-45 | gao_GAO-05-45_0 | 1). The MAC’s adjudication is the fourth and final level of the administrative appeals process. In contrast, SSA officials emphasized to us that responsibility for all Medicare appeals will pass, under MMA, to HHS on October 1, 2005. To implement MMA’s provisions to transfer SSA’s workload to HHS, regulations will need to be drafted and finalized by October 1, 2005—the date that the transfer is required to be complete. Conclusion
SSA and HHS have stressed their commitment to ensuring a successful transfer of the ALJ level of the Medicare appeals process from SSA to HHS. Although both agencies have stressed that they are continuing to further develop details of the plan, based on the information they have developed thus far, we believe that the plan does not comprehensively address the 13 elements and, thus, seriously jeopardizes a successful and timely transition. Such significant deficiencies suggest that a smooth and timely transfer may be in jeopardy. Appendix I: Analysis of the Medicare Appeals Transfer Plan
Based on our review of the plan and additional materials provided by the transfer team, we found that the plan to transfer the Medicare appeals function from the Social Security Administration to the Department of Health and Human Services is insufficient to ensure a smooth and timely transition. Although the plan generally addresses each of the 13 elements mandated by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA), as indicated in figure 2, it omits important details on how each element will be implemented. Furthermore, the plan overlooks the need for contingency provisions, which could prove to be essential, should critical tasks not be completed in a timely manner. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Medicare appeals process has been the subject of widespread concern in recent years because of the time it takes to resolve appeals of denied claims. Two federal agencies play a role in deciding appeals--the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Social Security Administration (SSA). Currently, neither agency manages and oversees the entire multilevel process. In the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA), Congress mandated that SSA transfer its responsibility for adjudicating Medicare appeals to HHS between July 1, 2005, and October 1, 2005. In addition, it directed the two agencies to develop a transfer plan addressing 13 specific elements related to the transfer. GAO's objective was to determine whether the plan is sufficient to ensure a smooth and timely transition.
What GAO Found
Transferring the Medicare appeals workload from SSA to HHS requires careful preparation and the precise implementation of many interrelated items. The transfer is mandated to take place no later than October 1, 2005. SSA and HHS have stressed their commitment to ensuring a successful transfer of the administrative law judge (ALJ) level of the Medicare appeals process, and both agencies have emphasized that they are continuing to further develop details of the plan. Although the plan generally addresses each of the 13 elements mandated by MMA, it omits important details on how each element will be implemented. Furthermore, the plan overlooks the need for contingency provisions, which could prove to be essential, should critical tasks not be completed in a timely manner. GAO believes that this essential information is needed to facilitate a smooth and timely transfer. Its absence makes it unclear how the transfer plan will be implemented and threatens to compromise service to appellants. |
gao_GAO-04-413T | gao_GAO-04-413T_0 | In addition, for one unit, these pay problems resulted in largely erroneous debts totaling $1.6 million. Procedural requirements, particularly in light of the numerous organizations issuing guidance applicable to this area, and potentially hundreds of organizations and thousands of personnel involved in implementing this guidance, were not well understood or consistently applied with respect to determining (1) the actions required to make timely, accurate active duty pays to mobilized Army Guard soldiers and (2) the component responsible, among Army Guard, active Army, and DFAS, for taking the required actions. A. E.
Guidance Outdated
We found several instances in which existing DOD and Army regulations and guidance in the pay and allowance area were outdated and conflict with more current legislation and DOD regulations. Human Capital Issues
With respect to human capital, we found weaknesses including (1) insufficient resources allocated to pay processing, (2) inadequate training related to existing policies and procedures, and (3) poor customer service. Systems Problems
Several systems issues were significant factors impeding accurate and timely payroll payments to mobilized Army Guard soldiers, including the lack of an integrated or effectively interfaced pay system with both the personnel and order-writing systems; limitations in DJMS-RC processing capabilities; and ineffective system edits for large payments and debts. Concluding Comments
The extensive problems we identified at the case study units vividly demonstrate that the controls currently relied on to pay mobilized Army Guard personnel are not working and cannot provide reasonable assurance that such pays are accurate or timely. However, pays to mobilized Army Reserve soldiers rely on many of the same processes and automated systems used to pay mobilized Army Guard soldiers. For example, in addition to our ongoing review of the pay experiences of mobilized Army Reserve soldiers, we now have related engagements ongoing that you requested concerning controls over pays and related medical benefits for mobilized Army Guard soldiers who elect to have their active duty tours extended to address injuries or illnesses incurred while on active duty, controls over travel reimbursements to mobilized Army Guard soldiers, utilization of Army Guard forces since September 11, 2001, and the impact of deployments on DOD’s ability to carry out homeland security missions. | Why GAO Did This Study
In light of the recent mobilizations associated with the war on terrorism, GAO was asked to determine if controls used to pay mobilized Army Guard personnel provided assurance that such pays were accurate and timely. This testimony focuses on the pay experiences of Army Guard soldiers at selected case study units and deficiencies with respect to controls over processes, human capital, and automated systems.
What GAO Found
The existing processes and controls used to provide pay and allowances to mobilized Army Guard personnel are so cumbersome and complex that neither DOD nor, more importantly, the mobilized Army Guard soldiers could be reasonably assured of timely and accurate payroll payments. Weaknesses in these processes and controls resulted in over- and underpayments and late active duty payments and, in some cases, large erroneously assessed debts, to mobilized Army Guard personnel. The end result of these weaknesses is to severely constrain DOD's ability to provide active duty pay to these personnel, many of whom were risking their lives in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, these pay problems have had a profound impact on individual soldiers and their families and may adversely impact on decisions to stay in the Army Guard. For example, many soldiers and their families were required to spend considerable time, sometimes while the soldiers were deployed in remote, hostile environments overseas, seeking corrections to active duty pays and allowances. The pay process, involving potentially hundreds of DOD, Army, and Army Guard organizations and thousands of personnel, was not well understood or consistently applied with respect to determining (1) the actions required to make timely, accurate pays to mobilized soldiers, and (2) the organization responsible for taking the required actions. With respect to human capital, we found weaknesses including (1) insufficient resources allocated to pay processing, (2) inadequate training related to existing policies and procedures, and (3) poor customer service. Several systems issues were also significant factors impeding accurate and timely payroll payments to mobilized Army Guard soldiers, including (1) nonintegrated systems, (2) limitations in system processing capabilities, and (3) ineffective system edits. |
gao_GAO-16-189 | gao_GAO-16-189_0 | For example, in 2013, the total Medicare payment rate for a mid-level E/M office visit for an established patient—billed under Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) code 99213—was $51 higher when the service was performed in an HOPD instead of a physician office (see table 1). Many other services, such as imaging and surgical services, are also reimbursed at a higher rate by Medicare when performed in HOPDs versus other settings. 1). 1). Vertical Consolidation Associated with Higher Utilization of Medicare E/M Office Visits in Hospital Outpatient Departments Percentage of Medicare E/M Office Visits Performed in HOPDs Higher in Counties with Higher Levels of Vertical Consolidation
The percentage of E/M office visits—as well as the number of E/M office visits per beneficiary—performed in HOPDs, rather than physician offices, was generally higher in counties with higher levels of vertical consolidation in 2007 through 2013. In contrast, this rate was 14.1 percent for the counties with the highest levels of consolidation (see fig. For example, the median percentage of E/M office visits performed in HOPDs in the group of counties with the lowest level of vertical consolidation was 3.9 percent in 2007, compared to a median of 7.3 percent in the counties with the highest levels of consolidation. Such excess payments are inconsistent with Medicare’s role as an efficient purchaser of health care services. According to CMS, the agency does not have the statutory authority to equalize total payment rates between HOPDs and physician offices. Therefore, absent legislative intervention, the Medicare program will likely pay more than necessary for E/M office visits. Conclusions
From 2007 through 2013, the number of vertically consolidated physicians nearly doubled, with faster growth in more recent years. Regardless of what has driven hospitals and physicians to vertically consolidate, paying substantially more for the same service when performed in an HOPD rather than a physician office provides an incentive to shift services that were once performed in physician offices to HOPDs after consolidation has occurred. Matter for Congressional Consideration
In order to prevent the shift of services from physician offices to HOPDs from increasing costs for the Medicare program and beneficiaries, Congress should consider directing the Secretary of HHS to equalize payment rates between settings for E/M office visits—and other services that the Secretary deems appropriate—and to return the associated savings to the Medicare program. Agency and Third- Party Comments and Our Evaluation
HHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which we incorporated where appropriate. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
This appendix describes the scope and methodology used to examine our two objectives: (1) trends in vertical consolidation between physicians and hospitals from 2007 through 2013 and (2) the extent to which higher levels of vertical consolidation were associated with more evaluation & management (E/M) office visits being performed in hospital outpatient departments (HOPD) instead of physician offices from 2007 through 2013. Examining Trends in Vertical Consolidation between Hospitals and Physicians
To examine trends in vertical consolidation between hospitals and physicians, we used survey data from the American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey Database,TM in which hospitals report what types of relationships they have with physicians and the number of physicians in those relationships, and Medicare Provider Analysis and Review (MedPAR) files, which contain information on Medicare inpatient discharges for short-term acute care hospitals, from 2007 through 2013. | Why GAO Did This Study
Medicare expenditures for HOPD services have grown rapidly in recent years. Some policymakers have raised questions about whether this growth may be attributed to services that were typically performed in physician offices shifting to HOPDs. GAO was asked to examine trends in vertical consolidation and its effects on Medicare.
This report examines, for years 2007 through 2013, (1) trends in vertical consolidation between hospitals and physicians and (2) the extent to which higher levels of vertical consolidation were associated with more E/M office visits being performed in HOPDs. GAO analyzed, using various methods including regression analyses, the most recent available claims data from CMS and survey data from the American Hospital Association, in which hospitals report the types of financial arrangements they have with physicians.
What GAO Found
Vertical consolidation is a financial arrangement that occurs when a hospital acquires a physician practice and/or hires physicians to work as salaried employees. The number of vertically consolidated hospitals and physicians increased from 2007 through 2013. Specifically, the number of vertically consolidated hospitals increased from about 1,400 to 1,700, while the number of vertically consolidated physicians nearly doubled from about 96,000 to 182,000. This growth occurred across all regions and hospital sizes, but was more rapid in recent years. After hospitals and physicians vertically consolidate, services performed in physician offices, such as evaluation & management (E/M) office visits, can be classified as being performed in hospital outpatient departments (HOPD). Medicare often pays providers at a higher rate when the same service is performed in an HOPD rather than in a physician office. For example, in 2013, the total Medicare payment rate for a mid-level E/M office visit for an established patient was $51 higher when the service was performed in an HOPD instead of a physician office.
The percentage of E/M office visits—as well as the number of E/M office visits per beneficiary—performed in HOPDs, rather than in physician offices, was generally higher in counties with higher levels of vertical consolidation in 2007 through 2013. For example, the median percentage of E/M office visits performed in HOPDs in counties with the lowest levels of vertical consolidation was 4.1 percent in 2013. In contrast, this rate was 14.1 percent for counties with the highest levels of consolidation. GAO's findings suggest that Medicare will likely pay more than necessary for E/M office visits. Such excess payments are inconsistent with Medicare's role as an efficient purchaser of health care services. However, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)—the agency that is responsible for the Medicare program—lacks the statutory authority to equalize total payment rates between HOPDs and physician offices and achieve Medicare savings.
What GAO Recommends
In order to prevent the shift of services from lower paid settings to the higher paid HOPD setting from increasing costs for the Medicare program and beneficiaries, Congress should consider directing the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to equalize payment rates between settings for E/M office visits—and other services that the Secretary deems appropriate—and to return the associated savings to the Medicare program. HHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-04-415 | gao_GAO-04-415_0 | To determine whether the process NRC used was credible when deciding to allow Davis-Besse to delay its shutdown, we evaluated NRC guidelines for reviewing licensee requests for temporary and permanent license changes, or amendments to their licenses. To determine whether NRC is taking sufficient action in the wake of the Davis-Besse incident to prevent similar problems from developing in the future, we reviewed NRC’s lessons-learned task force recommendations, NRC’s analysis of the underlying causes for failing to identify the corrosion of the reactor vessel head, and NRC’s action plan developed in response to the task force recommendations. 1.) 2.) 3 and 4.) NRC’s Actions to Oversee Davis-Besse Did Not Provide an Accurate Assessment of Safety at the Plant
NRC’s inspections and assessments of FirstEnergy’s operations should have but did not provide the agency with an accurate understanding of safety conditions at Davis-Besse, and thus NRC failed to identify or prevent the vessel head corrosion. More broadly, NRC had a range of information that could have identified and prevented the incident at Davis-Besse but did not effectively integrate it into its oversight. NRC Did Not Fully Communicate Indications
NRC was not fully aware of the indications of a potential problem at Davis- Besse because NRC’s process for transmitting information from resident inspectors to regional offices and headquarters did not ensure that information was fully communicated, evaluated, or used. After the corrosion was discovered, NRC analyzed the problems that led to the corrosion on the reactor vessel head and concluded that FirstEnergy’s programs for overseeing safety at Davis-Besse were weak, as seen in the following examples: Davis-Besse’s corrective action program did not result in timely or effective actions to prevent indications of leakage from reoccurring in the reactor coolant system. NRC’s Process for Deciding Whether to Allow a Delayed Davis- Besse Shutdown Lacked Credibility
Although FirstEnergy operated Davis-Besse without incident until shutting it down in February 2002, certain aspects of NRC’s deliberations allowing the delayed shutdown raise questions about the credibility of the agency’s decision making, if not about the Davis-Besse decision itself. Three of these six reactors had identified circumferential cracking. Despite NRC’s responsibility for ensuring that the public is adequately protected from accidents at commercial nuclear power plants, NRC does not have specific guidance for shutting down a plant when the plant may pose a risk to public health and safety, even though it may be complying with NRC requirements. NRC has not yet taken action on these recommendations. These actions are even more important because the nation’s fleet of nuclear power plants is aging. Develop specific guidance and a well-defined process for deciding on when to shut down a nuclear power plant. NRC also expressed concern about the report’s characterization of its use of risk estimates—specifically the report’s statement that NRC’s estimate of risk exceeded the risk levels generally accepted by the agency. Completion of further inspection guidance changes expected in March 2004. Also, revise guidance for considering plant conditions during licensing action and amendment reviews. GAO Comments
1. 2. It does not address important aspects of decision-making involved in deciding whether to shut down a plant. However, NRC did not take any additional action. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission Should Report on Progress in Implementing Lessons Learned from the Three Mile Island Accident. | Why GAO Did This Study
In March 2002, the most serious safety issue confronting the nation's commercial nuclear power industry since Three Mile Island in 1979 was identified at the Davis- Besse plant in Ohio. After the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) allowed Davis-Besse to delay shutting down to inspect its reactor vessel for cracked tubing, the plant found that leakage from these tubes had caused extensive corrosion on the vessel head--a vital barrier preventing a radioactive release. GAO determined (1) why NRC did not identify and prevent the corrosion, (2) whether the process NRC used in deciding to delay the shutdown was credible, and (3) whether NRC is taking sufficient action in the wake of the incident to prevent similar problems from developing at other plants.
What GAO Found
NRC should have but did not identify or prevent the corrosion at Davis- Besse because its oversight did not generate accurate information on plant conditions. NRC inspectors were aware of indications of leaking tubes and corrosion; however, the inspectors did not recognize the indications' importance and did not fully communicate information about them. NRC also considered FirstEnergy--Davis-Besse's owner--a good performer, which resulted in fewer NRC inspections and questions about plant conditions. NRC was aware of the potential for cracked tubes and corrosion at plants like Davis-Besse but did not view them as an immediate concern. Thus, NRC did not modify its inspections to identify these conditions. NRC's process for deciding to allow Davis-Besse to delay its shutdown lacks credibility. Because NRC had no guidance specifically for making a decision on whether a plant should shut down, it used guidance for deciding whether a plant should be allowed to modify its operating license. NRC did not always follow this guidance and generally did not document how it applied the guidance. The risk estimate NRC used to help decide whether the plant should shut down was also flawed and underestimated the amount of risk that Davis-Besse posed. Further, even though underestimated, the estimate still exceeded risk levels generally accepted by the agency. NRC has taken several significant actions to help prevent reactor vessel corrosion from recurring at nuclear power plants. NRC has required more extensive vessel examinations and augmented inspector training. However, NRC has not yet completed all of its planned actions and, more importantly, has no plans to address three systemic weaknesses underscored by the incident. Specifically, NRC has proposed no actions to help it better (1) identify early indications of deteriorating safety conditions at plants, (2) decide whether to shut down a plant, or (3) monitor actions taken in response to incidents at plants. Both NRC and GAO had previously identified problems in NRC programs that contributed to the Davis-Besse incident, yet these problems continue to persist. |
gao_GAO-06-610T | gao_GAO-06-610T_0 | As shown in table 1, DOD had more than 3,000 unmanned aircraft as of February 2006, compared to fewer than 50 unmanned aircraft in 2000. Furthermore, DOD’s 2006 QDR published in February 2006 validates the importance of unmanned systems. In particular, the QDR report highlighted the department’s plans to expand investment in unmanned systems and their use in military operations. Combat Successes Realized, but Challenges Remain
DOD has experienced a high level of mission success using UAS in combat operations, but faces some operational challenges that could hamper joint operations. While DOD has taken initial steps to address these challenges, limited progress has been made and the effectiveness of these actions cannot be adequately assessed until they are fully implemented. In operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces have used a variety of UAS, such as the Predator, Raven, and Shadow, in integral roles on intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and offensive strike joint or service-specific missions. Key challenges identified in ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan relate to interoperability, the availability of communications bandwidth, and managing UAS and manned systems in the same airspace. The services are also initiating efforts to improve interoperability. DOD’s progress includes an update to its roadmap and the establishment of new oversight bodies to facilitate planning and coordination regarding the development, procurement, and use of UAS. Despite our prior recommendations on the subject, DOD’s updated roadmap still lacks key planning elements such as a clear link between goals, capabilities, plans, funding priorities, and needs. While DOD intends for these entities to play a role in guiding service UAS acquisition, planning, prioritization, and execution of unmanned air systems, it is also unclear to what extent they will be able to influence the services because none of the entities are chartered with the authority to direct the military services to adopt any of their suggestions. While it also describes desired capabilities for UAS, operational issues or challenges based on ongoing operations, and service-specific acquisition plans, it does not provide a clear link among the goals, desired capabilities, and plans, nor does it sufficiently address the interrelationship among service plans to each other and how they promote joint operations, opportunities for joint endeavors, and investment priorities and related funding needs. We continue to believe that a strategic plan is needed to better position DOD to validate requirements, evaluate services plans, integrate service efforts, and establish program and funding priorities. Without a strategic plan, Congress may not have all the information it needs to evaluate DOD’s UAS funding requests. Furthermore, a strategic plan and oversight framework would help DOD assure that service plans for developing UAS anticipate and potentially minimize the types of challenges that are emerging today, particularly in the areas of interoperability, bandwidth, and airspace integration. Unmanned Aircraft Programs Provide Lessons Learned for Future Systems to Craft Better and Less Risky Acquisition Strategies
While there have been successes on the battlefield, UAS development programs have exhibited similar problems as other major weapon systems that began an acquisition program too early, with many uncertainties about requirements and funding, and immature technologies, design, and production. Unmanned systems have also experienced similar outcomes— changing requirements, cost growth, delays in delivery, performance shortfalls, and reliability and support problems. Key lessons that can be applied to J-UCAS and other future systems include maintaining disciplined leadership support and direction similar to that experienced early in Global Hawk from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and with the Predator’s Task Force Arnold (a senior group of Air Force leaders that helped the program maintain a tight focus on program requirements and direction); establishing a clear business case that justifies initial investments and constrains individual program requirements to match available resources based on proven technologies, engineering knowledge, and time available before committing to system development and demonstration; implementing an incremental acquisition strategy preferred by defense policy and best practices that separates technology development from product development and minimizes concurrency between testing and production; establishing and enforcing controls that require knowledge and demonstrations to ensure that appropriate knowledge is captured and used at critical decision junctures before moving programs forward and investing more money; and managing according to realistic funding requirements that fully resource product development and production based on a cost estimate that has been informed by proven technologies and a preliminary design. Future Direction of DOD’s UAS Acquisitions
Frequent changes to J-UCAS and recent budget actions raise some questions about the department’s priorities and future direction for unmanned aircraft systems, which a strategic plan would help address. Concerns have also been raised about possible duplication of DOD unmanned aircraft systems as the services look to expand individual fleets. The joint decision of the Air Force and Army to develop a memorandum of understanding on the Predator and Warrior programs is encouraging and could be a model for inhibiting duplication and fostering synergy of efforts. | Why GAO Did This Study
The current generation of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) has been in development for defense applications since the 1980's. As of February 2006, the Department of Defense (DOD) had more than 3,000 unmanned aircraft, about 2,000 of which are supporting ongoing operations in Iraq. DOD's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review validates the importance of unmanned systems and establishes plans to significantly expand investment in unmanned systems and their use in military operations over the next several years. The Congress has been particularly interested in DOD's approach to determining UAS needs and managing the growing number of UAS programs. This testimony addresses GAO's prior work and preliminary observations on (1) the operational successes and challenges U.S. forces are experiencing with UAS in combat operations, and the extent to which DOD has taken steps to address challenges; (2) DOD's progress in establishing a strategic plan and oversight framework to guide joint and service-specific UAS development efforts and related investment decisions; and (3) our assessment of the Global Hawk and Predator programs' business cases and acquisition strategies and the lessons learned that can be applied to the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems program.
What GAO Found
DOD has experienced a high level of mission successes with UAS, but continues to face challenges in fully maximizing the use of these assets. In operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces have used UAS for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and offensive strike missions in support of joint and service-specific operations. As the numbers of UAS operating in the same airspace as manned aircraft grows, DOD continues to face operational challenges related to interoperability, availability of communications bandwidth, and airspace integration. While DOD and the services have taken some positive initial steps to address these challenges, such as issuing guidance and developing initiatives to improve interoperability, limited progress has been made and the effectiveness of these efforts cannot be adequately assessed until they are fully implemented. While DOD continues to request funds to support service plans for acquiring UAS, it still lacks a viable strategic plan to guide UAS development and investment decisions. Since GAO last reported, DOD established new oversight bodies and updated its UAS Roadmap, but it is too early to tell how the new entities will interrelate and whether they will be able to influence service plans. Also, the updated roadmap identifies broad goals, desired capabilities, and service acquisition plans, but lacks critical elements, such as a clear link among goals, capabilities, and plans, opportunities for joint endeavors, and funding priorities and needs. Until DOD develops a strategic plan, it will not be well positioned to validate requirements, evaluate and integrate services plans, and establish program and funding priorities, nor will Congress have all the information it needs to evaluate funding requests. Such a plan would also help DOD anticipate and minimize the types of challenges that are being experienced today. While there have been successes on the battlefield, UAS development programs have shared many of the same problems as other major weapon systems that begin an acquisition program too early, with many uncertainties about requirements, funding, and immature technology, design, and production. Unmanned systems have also experienced similar outcomes--changing requirements, cost growth, delays in delivery, performance shortfalls, and reliability and support problems. Future acquisition programscan learn from past efforts to craft better and less risky acquisition plans. Key steps conducive to success include preparing a comprehensive business case, adopting a knowledge-based and incremental acquisition strategy, and sustaining disciplined leadership and direction. Frequent changes to the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems technology demonstration program and recent budget actions raise some questions about the Department's priorities and future directions for UAS. Concerns have also been raised about possible duplication of systems as the services look to expand individual fleets. Ongoing Army and Air Force efforts to coordinate the Warrior and Predator programs are encouraging and could be a model for limiting duplication and fostering jointness and interoperability. |
gao_GAO-08-875T | gao_GAO-08-875T_0 | According to the legislation the purpose of ATA is “(1) to enhance the antiterrorism skills of friendly countries by providing training and equipment to deter and counter terrorism; (2) to strengthen the bilateral ties of the United States with friendly governments by offering concrete assistance in this area of great mutual concern; and (3) to increase respect for human rights by sharing with foreign civil authorities modern, humane, and effective antiterrorism techniques.”
ATA Program Assistance
ATA offers a wide range of counterterrorism assistance to partner nations, but most assistance consists of (1) training courses on tactical and strategic counterterrorism issues and (2) grants of counterterrorism equipment, such as small arms, bomb detection equipment, vehicles, and computers. S/CT provides little guidance to DS/T/ATA beyond the tiered list, although the 1991 State policy guidance memorandum states that S/CT’s written policy guidance for the program should include suggested country training priorities. S/CT and DS/T/ATA Did Not Systematically Align Program Assistance with Counterterrorism Needs
According to the 1991 State policy guidance memorandum and DS/T/ATA standard operations procedures, ATA country-specific needs assessments and program reviews are intended to guide program management and planning. Country Assistance Plans Were Not Used or Were Not Linked to Needs Assessments
Although the 1991 State policy memorandum states that DS/T/ATA should create annual country assistance plans that specify training objectives and assistance to be provided based upon the needs assessments and program reviews, we found that S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically use the assessments to create annual plans for the five in-country programs. S/CT Has Established Various Mechanisms to Coordinate Program Assistance
S/CT has mechanisms to coordinate the ATA program with other U.S. government international counterterrorism training assistance and to help avoid duplication of efforts. S/CT also established the Regional Strategic Initiative in 2006 to coordinate regional counterterrorism efforts and strategy. In the four countries we visited, we did not find any significant duplication or overlap among U.S. agencies’ country-specific training programs aimed at combating terrorism. State Had Made Progress in Establishing ATA Goals, but S/CT and DS/T/ATA Did Not Assess Sustainability
In response to concerns that ATA lacked elements of adequate strategic planning and performance measurement, State took action to define goals and measures related to the program’s mandated objectives. S/CT and DS/T/ATA Did Not Assess Sustainability of Capabilities
Despite progress towards establishing goals and intended outcomes, State had not developed clear measures and a process for assessing sustainability and had not integrated the concept into program planning. State Reporting on U.S. Counterterrorism Assistance Abroad Has Been Incomplete and Inaccurate
Since 1996, State has not complied with a congressional mandate to report to Congress on U.S. international counterterrorism assistance. Additionally, State’s annual reports on ATA contained inaccurate data regarding basic program information, did not provide systematic assessments of program results, and lacked other information necessary to evaluate program effectiveness. ATA Annual Reports Contain Inaccuracies
Recent ATA annual reports have contained inaccurate data relating to basic program information on numbers of students trained and courses offered. For example, Afghanistan. Specifically, minimal guidance from S/CT makes it difficult to determine the extent to which program assistance directly supports broader U.S. counterterrorism policy goals. 4. Comply with the congressional mandate to report to Congress on U.S. international counterterrorism assistance. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of State's (State) Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program's objectives are to provide partner nations with counterterrorism training and equipment, improve bilateral ties, and increase respect for human rights. State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) provides policy guidance and its Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Antiterrorism, Assistance (DS/T/ATA), manages program operations. GAO assessed (1) State's guidance for determining ATA priorities, (2) how State coordinates ATA with other counterterrorism programs, (3) the extent State established ATA program goals and measures, and (4) State's reporting on U.S. counterterrorism assistance. This statement is based on a February 2008, GAO report titled Combating Terrorism: State Department's Antiterrorism Program Needs Improved Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes, GAO-08-336 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 29, 2008).
What GAO Found
S/CT provides minimal guidance to help prioritize ATA program recipients, and S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically align ATA assistance with U.S. assessments of foreign partner counterterrorism needs. S/CT provided policy guidance to DS/T/ATA through quarterly meetings and a tiered list of priority countries, but the list did not provide guidance on country counterterrorism-related program goals, objectives, or training priorities. S/CT and DS/T/ATA also did not consistently use country-specific needs assessments and program reviews to plan assistance. S/CT had established mechanisms to coordinate the ATA program with other U.S. international efforts to combat terrorism. S/CT held interagency meetings with officials from the Department of State, Defense, Justice, and Treasury and other agencies as well as ambassador-level regional strategic coordinating meetings. GAO did not find any significant duplication or overlap among the various U.S. international counterterrorism efforts. State had made progress in establishing goals and intended outcomes for the ATA program, but S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically assess the outcomes and, as a result, could not determine the effectiveness of program assistance. For example, although sustainability is a principal focus, S/CT and DS/T/ATA had not set clear measures of sustainability or integrated sustainability into program planning. State reporting on U.S. counterterrorism assistance abroad was incomplete and inaccurate. S/CT had not provided a congressionally mandated annual report to Congress on U.S. government-wide assistance related to combating international terrorism since 1996. After 1996, S/CT has only submitted to Congress annual reports on the ATA program, such as the number of students trained and courses offered. Moreover, these reports contained inaccurate program information. Additionally, the reports lacked comprehensive information of the results on program assistance that would be useful to Congress. |
gao_HEHS-97-83 | gao_HEHS-97-83_0 | As these tables show, the MHSS has at least as many uniformed psychiatrists and clinical psychologists as it needs to meet its current and upcoming readiness requirements. PDP’s Implementation Faced Difficulties
Although DOD met the mandate to establish a demonstration project to train military psychologists to prescribe psychotropic medication for mental illness, the PDP implementation faced several problems. It recommended at that time that unless the MHSS addressed these concerns satisfactorily, the project should end. PDP Was Costly and Its Benefits Are Uncertain
Even if the MHSS had a need for additional mental health care providers to prescribe medication, the cost of meeting this need by training clinical psychologists to prescribe drugs is substantial. Cost of PDP
The total cost of the PDP will be about $6.1 million through the completion of the proctored year for those currently in the program—or about $610,000 per psychologist who completes the program (see table 4). Psychiatrists, psychologists, and primary care physicians, however, have different opinions on the effect of allowing psychologists to prescribe drugs on the quality of mental health care and collaboration among these providers. VRI’s analysis concluded that the PDP would prove cost-effective under certain circumstances. Therefore, the MHSS has no current or upcoming need for clinical psychologists who may prescribe medication. Although prescribing psychologists cannot totally replace psychiatrists, DOD does not account for the introduction of prescribing psychologists in the MHSS when determining its readiness needs for psychiatrists. Recommendation to the Congress
In the future, should prescribing psychologists be needed to meet DOD’s medical readiness requirements, the Congress should require DOD to (1) clearly demonstrate that the use of those MHSS psychologists who have been trained to prescribe has resulted in savings, (2) clearly define a prescribing psychologist’s role and scope of practice in the MHSS compared with other psychologists and psychiatrists, (3) design a curriculum appropriate to this role and scope of practice, and (4) determine the need for and the level of supervision that prescribing psychologists require. 2. 3. Objectives and Methodology of Our Evaluation of the PDP
The objectives of our evaluation were to assess the need for prescribing psychologists in the Military Health Services System (MHSS), provide information on the implementation of the PDP, and provide information on the PDP’s cost and benefits. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the Military Health Services System's (MHSS) Psychopharmacology Demonstration Project (PDP), focusing on the: (1) need for prescribing psychologists in the MHSS; (2) implementation of the PDP; and (3) PDP's costs and benefits.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the MHSS has more psychiatrists than it needs to meet its current and upcoming readiness requirements, according to GAO's analysis of the Department of Defense's (DOD) health care needs; (2) therefore, the MHSS needs no prescribing psychologists or any other additional mental health care providers authorized to prescribe psychotropic medication; (3) moreover, DOD does not even account for prescribing psychologists when determining its medical readiness needs; (4) although DOD met its goal to train psychologists to prescribe drugs, it faced many difficulties in implementing the PDP; (5) not all of these were resolved; (6) for example, the MHSS never had a clear vision of the prescribing psychologist's role, did not meet recruitment goals, and repeatedly changed the curriculum; (7) consequently, the American College of Neuropsychopharmacology recommended in 1995 that unless these issues were addressed, the PDP should end; (8) the total cost of the PDP, from start-up through the date the last participants will complete the program, is about $6.1 million or about $610,000 per prescribing psychologist, according to GAO's estimate; (9) ultimately, the PDP will have added 10 mental health care providers who can prescribe drugs to an MHSS that already has a surplus of psychiatrists; (10) opinions differ on the effect of adding these prescribing psychologists to the MHSS concerning such issues as quality of care and collaboration between psychologists and physicians; (11) without a clear purpose or role for prescribing psychologists and given the uncertainty about the extent to which they would replace higher cost providers, GAO cannot conclude that the benefits gained from training prescribing psychologists warrant the costs of the PDP; and (12) training psychologists to prescribe medication is not adequately justified because the MHSS has no demonstrated need for them, the cost is substantial, and the benefits are uncertain. |
gao_GAO-02-993T | gao_GAO-02-993T_0 | For example: Many ports are extensive in size and accessible by water and land. The sheer amount of material being transported through ports provides a ready avenue for the introduction of many different types of threats. As might be expected given the national security aspects of the September 11 attacks, these activities have been most extensive at the federal level. Some funding has already been made available for enhanced port security. Although other states have not created formal requirements as Florida has done, there is evidence that many ports have taken various actions on their own to address security concerns in the wake of September 11. To determine federal, state, local, and private initiatives to enhance port security and the implementation challenges, we had several conversations with officials from the Coast Guard headquarters, DTRA, the Maritime Administration, the American Association of Port Authorities, and the private contractor recently hired by the Coast Guard to conduct comprehensive vulnerability assessments at 55 U.S. ports. Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Issues (GAO-01-1158T, September 21, 2001). | What GAO Found
Although most of the attention following the September 11 terrorist attacks focused on airport security, an increasing emphasis has since been placed on ports. Ports are inherently vulnerable to terrorist attacks because of their size, generally open accessibility by water and land, metropolitan area location, the amount of material being transported through ports, and the ready transportation links to many locations within the country's borders. Since September 11, federal, state, and local authorities, and private sector stake holders have addressed vulnerabilities in the security of the nation's ports. The Coast Guard has acted as a focal point for assessing and addressing security concerns, anticipating many of the requirements that Congress and the administration are contemplating or have already put into place. Although the proposal to consolidate the federal agencies responsible for border security may offer some long-term benefits, overcoming three challenges will be key to successfully enhancing security at the nation's ports: standards, funding, and collaboration. |
gao_GAO-16-57 | gao_GAO-16-57_0 | The Committee was required to include, at a minimum, representatives from OMB, OPM, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, DOD, and the Departments of State and Homeland Security. As part of the implementation of the section 1107 Interagency Rotation Program, the statute required the policies, processes, and procedures included in the Strategy to provide that the program be carried out in at least two Interagency Communities of Interest—Emergency Management and Stabilization and Reconstruction—and that no fewer than 20 executive branch employees be assigned to participate in the program in each of the first 4 fiscal years after the enactment of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013—fiscal years 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017. Committee on National Security Personnel’s Strategy Addressed Most Statutory Requirements, but Implementation of the Program Has Languished
In March 2014, the Committee issued the Strategy required by section 1107 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013. However, implementation of the program has languished because there has been limited leadership and oversight of the program, and no national security personnel had been assigned for rotations as of September 2015. The Committee on National Security Personnel Developed and Issued a Strategy that Addresses Most of the Statutory Requirements
In addition to establishing the Committee on National Security Personnel, section 1107 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 required the Committee to develop and issue a National Security Human Capital Strategy that provided for the implementation of an interagency rotation program. We also found that the Strategy discusses (1) training and education requirements; (2) prerequisites or requirements for participation; and (3) performance measures, reporting requirements, and other accountability devices associated with participation in and evaluation of the program. We found that the Strategy does not address 2 of the 17 requirements. Further, our draft report and the report on performance measures were due on the same day. Agencies and Organizations Have Taken Limited Steps to Address Assigned Roles, Responsibilities, and Tasks to Implement the Interagency Rotation Program
Agencies and organizations have taken limited steps to address the roles, responsibilities, and tasks assigned to them in the Strategy for implementing the section 1107 Interagency Rotation Program, and they had not implemented that program as of September 2015. We identified other roles, responsibilities, and tasks assigned to the departments and agencies, among others, during our review of supporting documentation, including meeting minutes, organization charters, and implementation plans. Officials from participating departments told us they could not proceed with taking action on their tasks because they were waiting for further guidance from OPM. When asked about the need for such guidance, OPM officials stated that the departments and agencies do not need additional guidance from OPM to proceed with their assigned roles, responsibilities, and tasks under the Strategy. Without committed leadership and oversight from all of the relevant entities—most specifically, the Committee on National Security Personnel and OPM—to oversee the implementation of the section 1107 Interagency Rotation Program and actions taken on necessary steps to proceed with the program’s implementation, it is unlikely that the goals of section 1107 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 will be addressed and that the section 1107 program will be implemented within the specified timeframes. Without a clear leadership structure for the Committee that can work with departments and agencies to identify and take action on any steps that are necessary for the program’s implementation, Congress’s intentions for the program and the benefits that could stem from it will also remain unfulfilled. Recommendations for Executive Action
To provide greater assurance that the Interagency Rotation Program for national security personnel will be implemented as provided in section 1107 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, we recommend that the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, in collaboration with the Committee on National Security Personnel, take the following two actions: (1) establish a clear leadership and oversight structure to guide future (2) work with the departments and agencies to identify and take action on necessary next steps to proceed with the program’s implementation, including developing and issuing required guidance for implementation within identified timeframes. The statute included 19 requirements related to the development and issuance of the Strategy and the subsequent implementation and monitoring of the section 1107 Interagency Rotation Program; however, for 2 of these requirements we had no basis to judge because these requirements are contingent on actions that had not yet occurred. | Why GAO Did This Study
Complex national security challenges—including nuclear proliferation and terrorist attacks—require a federal government workforce that can collaborate effectively across agency lines. Congress established the section 1107 Interagency Rotation Program in which national security personnel could be assigned to work at another agency for professional development purposes and to enhance the government's ability to collaborate and respond effectively to such challenges. Section 1107 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013 included a provision for GAO to review the program. This report provides an assessment of the extent to which actions have been taken to establish and implement the Interagency Rotation Program, as required by law.
GAO analyzed actions taken by the Committee and assessed its Strategy against 17 statutory requirements; reviewed other supporting documentation; and interviewed OPM, OMB, and Departments of Defense, State, and Homeland Security officials on the status of the program.
What GAO Found
As required by section 1107 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2013, the Committee on National Security Personnel (Committee) has taken steps to establish the Interagency Rotation Program for national security personnel, including developing a National Security Human Capital Strategy (Strategy). However, implementation of the program has languished and no personnel have participated in the program as of September 2015.
The Committee was established within the Executive Office of the President and consists of representatives from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Office of Management and Budget, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Departments of Defense, State, and Homeland Security. The Committee issued the Strategy in March 2014, which addresses 13 of the 17 statutory requirements. For instance, the Strategy discusses, among other things, training and education requirements, prerequisites or requirements for participation, and performance measures to be used for personnel participating in the program. The Strategy also partially addresses 2 requirements, but does not address 2 other requirements, including providing that, at a minimum, 20 employees would participate in the section 1107 program in each of the first 4 fiscal years after the NDAA was enacted. GAO had no basis to assess 2 additional requirements, also related to the program's implementation and reporting on performance measures, because these requirements are contingent on actions that had not yet occurred.
Implementing the section 1107 Interagency Rotation Program has languished because there has been limited leadership and oversight of the program, including necessary actions to be taken by the departments, agencies, and other organizations to complete their assigned roles, responsibilities, and tasks. The Strategy and other documents specifically assign roles, responsibilities, and tasks to the Committee on National Security Personnel, OPM, the Communities of Practice, and the participating departments and agencies. For instance, OPM is tasked with issuing guidance on the rights and responsibilities of employees returning from rotational service, but OPM officials told GAO that they have not done so and could not give timeframes for completion. Similarly, participating departments and agencies are tasked with identifying particular positions and personnel for rotations, but they have not used the procedures laid out in the Strategy because officials said they needed further guidance from OPM. OPM officials stated that the departments and agencies do not need further guidance from them to proceed with their assigned roles, responsibilities, and tasks. Importantly, the Strategy specifically identifies that the Committee will work with OPM to implement the Strategy. Further, officials that GAO interviewed stated they perceive that OPM is the lead for the program. Officials also noted that differing opinions about next steps have resulted in action not being taken on some assigned roles, responsibilities, and tasks, including the issuance of guidance. Without a clear leadership and oversight structure for the section 1107 program and efforts to identify and take action on next steps for implementation, it is unlikely that implementation of the program will move forward.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OPM, in collaboration with the Committee, establish a clear leadership and oversight structure to guide implementation of the Interagency Rotation Program and work with the departments and agencies to identify and take action on necessary next steps for implementation. OPM generally concurred with the recommendations, but raised issues primarily about the roles and responsibilities that GAO addresses in the report. |
gao_GAO-01-1042T | gao_GAO-01-1042T_0 | Concluding Observations
Providers’ current difficulty recruiting and retaining health care professionals such as nurses and others could worsen as demand for these workers increases in the future. Current high levels of job dissatisfaction among nurses and nurse aides may also play a crucial role in determining the extent of current and future nursing shortages. Efforts undertaken to improve the workplace environment may both reduce the likelihood of nurses and nurse aides leaving the field and encourage more young people to enter the nursing profession. Nonetheless, demographic forces will continue to widen the gap between the number of people needing care and the nursing staff available to provide care. As a result, the nation will face a caregiver shortage of different dimensions from shortages of the past. More detailed data are needed, however, to delineate the extent and nature of nurse and nurse aide shortages to assist in planning and targeting corrective efforts. In particular, better coordination of NHSC placements with waivers for J-1 visa physicians could help more needy areas. In addition, addressing shortfalls in HHS systems for identifying underservice is long overdue. We believe HHS needs to gather more consistent and reliable information on the changing needs for services in underserved communities. Until then, determining whether federal resources are appropriately targeted to communities of greatest need and measuring their impact will remain problematic. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses (1) the shortage of healthcare workers and (2) the lessons learned by the National Health Service Corps (NHSC) in addressing these shortages.
What GAO Found
GAO found that problems in recruiting and retaining health care professionals could worsen as demand for these workers increases. High levels of job dissatisfaction among nurses and nurses aides may also play a crucial role in current and future nursing shortages. Efforts to improve the workplace environment may both reduce the likelihood of nurses and nurse aides leaving the field and encourage more young people to enter the nursing profession. Nonetheless, demographic forces will continue to widen the gap between the number of people needing care and the nursing staff available. As a result, the nation will face a caregiver shortage very different from shortages of the past. More detailed data are needed, however, to delineate the extent and nature of nurse and nurse aide shortages to assist in planning and targeting corrective efforts. Better coordination of NHSC placements, with waivers for foreign U.S.-educated physicians, could help more needy areas. In addition, addressing shortfalls in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) systems for identifying underservice is long overdue. HHS needs to gather more consistent and reliable information on the changing needs for services in underserved communities. Until then, it will remain difficult to determine whether federal resources are appropriately targeted to communities of greatest need and to measure their impact. |
gao_GAO-08-1024T | gao_GAO-08-1024T_0 | Background
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), enacted in November 2001, created TSA and gave it responsibility for securing all modes of transportation. For example, TSA has implemented several efforts intended to strengthen the allocation of its TSO workforce. Since that time, TSA has developed a Staffing Allocation Model to determine TSO staffing levels at airports. However, we have identified areas where TSA could improve its evaluation and documentation of proposed procedures. Despite TSA’s efforts to develop passenger checkpoint screening technologies, we reported that limited progress has been made in fielding explosives detection technology at airport checkpoints in part due to challenges S&T and TSA faced in coordinating research and development efforts. TSA Has Taken Action to Strengthen Air Cargo Security, but May Face Challenges in Developing a System to Screen All Cargo Transported on Passenger Aircraft
TSA has taken steps to enhance domestic and inbound air cargo security, but more work remains to strengthen this area of aviation security. TSA officials believe this program will assist the agency in meeting the requirement to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft by August 2010, as mandated by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. DHS Has Made Progress in Developing and Implementing the Secure Flight Program, but Challenges Remain That May Hinder the Program Moving Forward
Over the past several years, TSA has faced a number of challenges in developing and implementing an advanced prescreening system, known as Secure Flight, which will allow TSA to assume responsibility from air carriers for comparing domestic passenger information against the No Fly and Selectee lists. For example, TSA had taken numerous steps to address previous GAO recommendations related to strengthening Secure Flight’s development and implementation, as well as additional steps designed to strengthen the program. Among other things, TSA developed a detailed, conceptual description of how the system is to operate, commonly referred to as a concept of operations; established a cost and schedule baseline; developed security requirements; developed test plans; conducted outreach with key stakeholders; published a notice of proposed rulemaking on how Secure Flight is to operate; worked with CBP to integrate the domestic watch list matching function with the international watch list matching function currently operated by CBP; and issued a guide to key stakeholders (e.g., air carriers and CBP) that defines, among other things, system data requirements. Collectively, these efforts have enabled TSA to more effectively manage the program’s development and implementation. In February 2008, we reported that TSA had not (1) developed program cost and schedule estimates consistent with best practices; (2) fully implemented its risk management plan; (3) planned for system end-to-end testing in test plans; and (4) ensured that information- security requirements are fully implemented. Crosscutting Issues Have Hindered DHS’s and TSA’s Efforts in Implementing Its Mission and Management Functions
Our work has identified homeland security challenges that cut across DHS’s and TSA’s mission and core management functions. For example, TSA incorporated risk-based decision making when making modifications to airport checkpoint screening procedures, to include modifying procedures based on intelligence information and vulnerabilities identified through covert testing at airport checkpoints. However, in April 2007, we reported that TSA’s analyses that supported screening procedural changes could be strengthened. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. | Why GAO Did This Study
Since its inception in November 2001, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has focused much of its efforts on aviation security, and has developed and implemented a variety of programs and procedures to secure the commercial aviation system. TSA funding for aviation security has totaled about $26 billion since fiscal year 2004. This testimony focuses on TSA's efforts to secure the commercial aviation system through passenger screening, strengthening air cargo security, and watch-list matching programs, as well as challenges that remain. It also addresses crosscutting issues that have impeded TSA's efforts in strengthening security. This testimony is based on GAO reports and testimonies issued from February 2004 through July 2008 including selected updates obtained from TSA officials in June and July 2008.
What GAO Found
DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the security of the nation's commercial aviation system, including actions to address many recommendations made by GAO. TSA has focused its efforts on, among other things, more efficiently allocating, deploying, and managing the Transportation Security Officer (TSO) workforce--formerly known as screeners; strengthening screening procedures; developing and deploying more effective and efficient screening technologies; strengthening domestic air cargo security; and developing a government operated watch-list matching program, known as Secure Flight. For example, in response to GAO's recommendation, TSA developed a plan to periodically review assumptions in its Staffing Allocation Model used to determine TSO staffing levels at airports, and took steps to strengthen its evaluation of proposed procedural changes. TSA also explored new passenger checkpoint screening technologies to better detect explosives and other threats, and has taken steps to strengthen air cargo security, including increasing compliance inspections of air carriers. Finally, TSA has instilled more discipline and rigor into Secure Flight's systems development, including preparing key documentation and strengthening privacy protections. While these efforts should be commended, GAO has identified several areas that should be addressed to further strengthen security. For example, TSA made limited progress in developing and deploying checkpoint technologies due to planning and management challenges. In addition, TSA faces resource and other challenges in developing a system to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft in accordance with the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. GAO further identified that TSA faced program management challenges in the development and implementation of Secure Flight, including developing cost and schedule estimates consistent with best practices; fully implementing the program's risk management plan; developing a comprehensive testing strategy; and ensuring that information security requirements are fully implemented. A variety of crosscutting issues have affected DHS's and TSA's efforts in implementing its mission and management functions. For example, TSA can more fully adopt and apply a risk-management approach in implementing its security mission and core management functions, and strengthen coordination activities with key stakeholders. For example, while TSA incorporated risk-based decision making when modifying checkpoint screening procedures, GAO reported that TSA's analyses that supported screening procedural changes could be further strengthened. DHS and TSA have strengthened their efforts in these areas, but more work remains. |
gao_GGD-97-25 | gao_GGD-97-25_0 | To achieve our objective, we interviewed IRS National Office officials and IRS officials in the Atlanta, Cincinnati, and Kansas City service centers who were responsible for the various activities we assessed;interviewed staff from the Department of the Treasury’s Financial Management Service (FMS) about the use of lockboxes to process Form 1040 tax payments; analyzed filing season related data from various IRS sources, including its Management Information System for Top Level Executives; visited four walk-in assistance sites (two in Atlanta and one each in Kansas City, MO, and Mission, KS) to interview staff and taxpayers; visited two banks in Atlanta and St. Louis that were being used by IRS as lockboxes to process tax remittances and analyzed cost/benefit data related to IRS’ use of lockboxes; reviewed data on the results of and costs associated with IRS’ decision to allow filers of paper returns to request direct deposits of their refunds; reviewed data on IRS efforts to identify and resolve questionable refund reviewed computer system availability reports and periodically attended weekly operational meetings held by IRS’ Network and Operations Command Center in February, March, and April 1996; analyzed IRS’ toll-free telephone system accessibility data, telephone activity data for forms distribution centers, and accessibility reports for the IRS system (known as TeleFile) that enables some taxpayers to file their returns by telephone; reviewed data compiled by IRS, including the results of a user survey, on the performance of TeleFile; and reviewed relevant IRS internal audit reports. In 1996, IRS implemented revised case selection criteria that resulted in many fewer refund delays than in 1995. The delays caused adverse reaction from taxpayers and tax return preparers during the 1995 filing season. IRS tried to limit the number of delayed refunds to the volume of cases it could review and to focus its resources on the most egregious cases. IRS’ Efforts to Modernize Its Processing Activities Had Mixed Results in 1996
Although IRS was able to meet its processing goals (such as cycle time,processing accuracy, and refund timeliness) in 1996, those goals were based on expectations as to what IRS could achieve with the systems and procedures currently in place. In that regard, there is general agreement that much can be done to improve those systems and procedures. Number of Returns Filed Through Alternative Methods Increased but Electronic Filing Falls Short of Projections
As of October 18, 1996, IRS had received about 118.1 million individual income tax returns, which was about 1.5 percent more than the 116.4 million returns received as of the same period in 1995. Electronic filing has several benefits. It is unclear how taxpayers will react to this change. However, due to concerns about the future of DPS, IRS reassessed its strategy for processing paper tax returns. IRS has taken steps to enhance its efforts. We also question whether IRS’ decision to have taxpayers send both their tax returns and their tax payments to lockboxes and to have banks sort those returns adequately considered both the costs to the government and taxpayer burden. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) overall performance during the 1996 tax filing season, focusing on: (1) changes in 1996 that relate to taxpayer services and the processing of taxpayer refunds; and (2) some of IRS' efforts to modernize its processing activities.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) IRS met or exceeded its timeliness and accuracy goals for processing individual income tax returns and issuing taxpayer refunds, answered more telephone calls from taxpayers seeking assistance than it had planned to answer, and received more returns through alternative filing methods than it had projected; (2) for the 1996 tax filing season, IRS revised its procedures to limit the number of delayed refunds to the volume of cases it could review, and focus on the cases most in need of review, and as a result, IRS delayed many fewer refunds in 1996 than it did in 1995 and avoided the kind of negative press it received in 1995 as taxpayers and tax return preparers reacted to the delays; (3) recognizing that much could be done to improve its systems and procedures, IRS has initiated several modernization efforts, and those efforts achieved mixed results in 1996; (4) IRS is developing a strategy to increase the use of electronic filing and reassessing its strategy for processing paper returns; and (5) IRS' decision to have taxpayers send not only their payments but also their tax returns to a lockbox and to have the banks sort those returns before sending them to IRS has increased program costs, unnecessarily in GAO's opinion, by $4.7 million. |
gao_GGD-96-114 | gao_GGD-96-114_0 | At about the same time, judges were telling the AOUSC Director that AOUSC’s management review process should be more sensitive to matters that are “exclusively the concern of the courts.”
In 1988, the AOUSC Director discontinued the Office of Audit and Review, created an Office of Audit to conduct court financial reviews; delegated program review responsibilities to the program units; and established an evaluation unit, now known as the Office of Program Assessment (OPA), to oversee and coordinate program review efforts and to carry out special reviews and investigations. Generally, our review focused on AOUSC oversight activities conducted during fiscal years 1992 through 1994. Until November 1995, however, AOUSC did not require its program offices and divisions to follow standards similar to the generally accepted government auditing standards in conducting program reviews. OPA has established a network of 35 program review officers within AOUSC, which is to meet every 1 to 3 months to discuss assessment issues. These officers are also to serve as focal points for reviews within their respective AOUSC program areas. However, AOUSC standards fall short of the generally accepted auditing standards in that they do not require (1) program assessors to be independent of the unit they are assessing or (2) that assessment reports be distributed to all officials who can act on the findings and recommendations. AOUSC created a support office for the Subcommittee, which has compiled a database of better practices, such as cost containment ideas, including those identified by the District Court Efficiencies Task Force. This, too, is inconsistent with the generally accepted standard. The judiciary’s efforts to identify efficient practices and encourage their adoption by local court units seem appropriate. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts' (AOUSC) assessment of local court operations, focusing on whether AOUSC is promoting efficient administrative practices within the judiciary.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) AOUSC issued uniform written standards for nonfinancial program reviews in November 1995; (2) most of the reviews requested for fiscal years 1992 through 1994 were not conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, contained incomplete reports, were not distributed properly, and did not indicate appropriate corrective actions; (3) AOUSC created a network of 35 program review officers that serve as focal points and advisors for review and assessment activities within AOUSC; (4) the Office of Program Assessment (OPA) has initiated a series of court visits to better identify program units needing additional oversight; (5) OPA does not require its program reviewers to be independent of the units they are assessing or to prepare formal reports for each program review; (6) AOUSC has created a program that achieves savings by systematically identifying better, more efficient practices; and (7) it is too early to determine whether the program is having an impact on operational costs. |
gao_T-AIMD-98-99 | gao_T-AIMD-98-99_0 | However, the current budget does not highlight different types of spending; budget data are not presented in a way that promotes decisions to be made between spending intended to have future benefits versus spending for current consumption and improving the current quality of life. Since the current budget does not provide this type of focus on the composition of spending, it is difficult to focus on the impact various types of spending would have on the long-term potential output of the economy. Traditional Capital Budgeting Proposals
Some have proposed that the challenges agencies face in budgeting for capital acquisitions can be corrected by adopting a capital budget that separates revenues and outlays for long-lived physical assets from the rest of the budget. Many proposals for capital budgeting include an associated depreciation component for capital assets that is charged to the annual operating budget. In addition, these proposals commonly envision special budgetary treatment for capital by requiring balanced operating budgets while allowing deficit financing of capital. Capital budgeting of this nature presents several unique problems at the federal level. Meaningful budget reforms can be considered to improve decision-making on investments, but they need to be tailored to the unique roles and environment of the federal government. Establishing an investment component within the existing budget constraints is one promising way to encourage the Congress and the executive branch to make explicit decisions about how much spending overall should be devoted to investment. Programs proposed or defended as investments should be evaluated against the criterion of improving long-term economic capacity. Budgeting for Federally Owned Capital Assets
As federal agencies find themselves under increasing budgetary constraints and increasing demands to improve service, the importance of making the most effective capital asset acquisitions grows. Agencies and the Congress must work together to find tools that encourage prudent capital decisions. Improving Federal Agency Capital Decision-Making Practices
Regardless of the budget approach ultimately chosen for federal capital, it is essential that agencies take the time to properly plan for and manage their capital acquisitions. We identified five general principles that are important to the capital decision-making process as a whole, which I will summarize for you. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed ways the federal government should budget for capital, focusing on: (1) problems with the current process; (2) traditional capital budgeting proposals; (3) an alternative investment framework; (4) budgeting for federally owned capital assets; and (4) improving the way federal agencies plan for and manage federal capital acquisitions.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the current unified budget does not highlight different types of spending; budget data are not presented in a way that promotes decisions to be made between spending intended to have future benefits versus spending for current consumption and improving the current quality of life; (2) since the current budget does not provide this type of focus on the composition of spending, it is difficult to focus on the impact various types of spending would have on the long-term potential output of the economy; (3) some have proposed that the challenges agencies face in budgeting for capital acquisitions can be corrected by adopting a capital budget that separates revenues and outlays for long-lived physical assets from the rest of the budget; (4) many proposals for capital budgeting include an associated depreciation component for capital assets which is charged to the annual operating budget; (5) in addition, these proposals commonly envision special budgetary treatment for capital by requiring balanced operating budgets while allowing deficit financing of capital; (6) capital budgeting of this nature presents several unique problems at the federal level; (7) meaningful budget reforms can be considered to improve decision-making on investments, but they need to be tailored to the unique roles and environment of the federal government; (8) establishing an investment component within the existing budget constraints is one promising way to encourage Congress and the executive branch to make explicit decisions about how much spending overall should be devoted to investment; (9) programs proposed or defended as investments should be evaluated against the criterion of improving long-term economic capacity; (10) as federal agencies find themselves under increasing budgetary constraints and increasing demands to improve service, the importance of making the most effective capital asset acquisitions grows; (11) agencies and Congress must work together to find tools that encourage prudent capital decisions; (12) regardless of the budget approach ultimately chosen for federal capital, it is essential that agencies take the time to properly plan for and manage their capital acquisitions; and (13) GAO identified five general principles that are important to the capital decision-making process. |
gao_GAO-02-72 | gao_GAO-02-72_0 | In addition to requiring the mandatory partners to provide their core services at the one-stop, WIA changed the way partners served job seekers. WIA listed what types of members should participate on the workforce investment boards, but did not prescribe a minimum or maximum number of members. The mandatory partners are generally making efforts to participate in accordance with the requirements of WIA. Training Options May Become Limited as Training Providers Drop Out of the System
WIA job seekers may have fewer training options to choose from because training providers are reducing the number of course offerings they make available under WIA. State and Local Implementers’ Ideas for Enhancing Private-Sector Participation
As a result of their experiences, state and local implementers have developed a number of ideas for actions that they believe could enhance the role of the private-sector on workforce investment boards (as shown in table 6). Recommendations to Executive Agencies
To facilitate the implementation of WIA, as well as to help state and local implementers move closer to the vision of a fully integrated system, we recommend that the Secretary of Labor, along with the Secretaries of Education, HHS, and HUD, jointly explore the specific programmatic and financial concerns identified by state and local implementers that affect their ability to fully integrate their services at the one-stops, and identify specific ways in which these concerns can be overcome. | What GAO Found
A competitive national economy depends on providing individuals with marketable skills and employers with access to qualified workers. In the past, the nation's job training system was fragmented and did not serve job seekers or employers well. The Workforce Investment Act in 1998 created a system that links employment, education, and training services to better match workers and labor market trends. The act represented a significant change from earlier workforce development efforts. Many of the act's provisions took effect in July 2000, and state and local organizations are at different stages of implementing them. Although the act's mandatory partners are making efforts to participate in the one-stops, programmatic or financial concerns are affecting the partners' level of participation as well as their ability to fully integrate their services at the one-stop. As implementation of the act progresses, training options for job seekers may be diminishing rather than improving, as trained providers reduce the number of courses offered to job seekers. Private-sector representatives may be discouraged from participating on workforce investment boards as a result of how states and localities are operating their boards and associated entities. |
gao_GAO-03-462 | gao_GAO-03-462_0 | Hearings before the House Committee on Science in October 2000 highlighted alleged discriminatory conduct. EPA’s EEO program, like those in other agencies, is subject to several regulations. EEOC Management Directive 110 (Federal Complaints Processing Manual) provides general guidance on how agencies should process employment discrimination complaints. System for Tracking EEO Data Was Unreliable, but EPA Is Taking Steps to Improve
Information contained in EPA’s discrimination complaint data system was unreliable because of data entry problems. As a result, EPA had difficulty providing accurate EEO information. Although we believe the reconstructed numbers are indicative of the situation at EPA, we cannot attest to the overall accuracy of these data. Table 1 shows the number of complaints on hand at the start of the year and the number of new, closed, and on hand at the end of the year for fiscal years 1995 through 2002 as reported to EEOC. For fiscal years 1995 through 2002, a total of 548 people filed 679 complaints. The agency closed 588 complaints during this period, including 125 dismissals; 48 withdrawals; 222 agency decisions, none of which found for the complainant; and 178 settlements. EPA takes a long time to process complaints. A major contributing factor to this lengthy process was the time used to investigate complaints. Over the same 8-year period, the average time to complete an investigation was 465 days. When compared to the other 23 agencies that are required to comply with the CFO Act, EPA’s total number of days to process a complaint from filing to closing ranked fifth highest in 2002. According to EPA officials, the new system is expected to automatically and accurately generate data for completing EEOC’s Annual Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Statistical Report of Discrimination Complaints. OCR officials told us that additional staffing would help facilitate timely processing of discrimination complaints. Because of these problems with incomplete and poorly done investigations, OCR terminated contracts with certain investigative firms. Formal reviews are to be completed within 60 days. EPA Does Not Track Disciplinary Actions against Managers, but a New Law Requires This Information
Besides not having a process to determine whether managers discriminated in settled cases, EPA does not have a process to track or routinely report data on disciplinary actions taken against managers for discrimination or other types of misconduct. These data requirements should alert agencies and employees that they are accountable for their actions in cases involving discrimination, retaliation, or harassment. EPA has never had standard operating procedures for EEO complaint processing and has been using draft procedures prepared in July 2001. A specific process that holds managers accountable for discriminatory conduct may enhance employee confidence in the EEO environment and demonstrate the agency’s commitment to providing a fair and discrimination free environment. EPA said that the report shows that the agency has made considerable progress in addressing the backlog of cases involving alleged discrimination and that it believes it has in place the procedures and resources to ensure that current and future complaints are timely processed. Regarding the recommendation to establish a process to assess whether managers or other employees should be disciplined in cases in which discrimination is found or allegations are settled, EPA said that it would develop policies and procedures that will allow it to address effectively the issue of disciplinary action against any manager or employee found to have discriminated. | Why GAO Did This Study
Minority employees at the EPA reported for a number of years that the agency had discriminated against them based on their race and retaliated against them for filing complaints. These issues were aired at hearings held by the House Committee on Science at which EPA said it would take actions to ensure a fair and discrimination free workplace. GAO was asked to review (1) the accuracy of EPA's equal employment opportunity (EEO) data, (2) various issues about the processes used to resolve discrimination complaints, and (3) the disciplinary actions taken for managers who discriminate.
What GAO Found
EPA had difficulty providing accurate EEO data because of a data system that the agency believes was unreliable and was further compromised by data entry problems. When GAO identified problems with the information EPA provided, the agency manually reconstructed data for fiscal years 1995 through 2002. The reconstructed data indicate that during this period 548 EPA employees filed 679 discrimination complaints, and the agency closed 588 complaints. Complaints were closed with 125 dismissals, 48 withdrawals, 178 settlements, 5 remands, and 222 agency decisions not supporting the claimant. GAO cannot attest to the accuracy of these numbers but believes they are indicative of the situation at EPA. EPA recently procured new software to facilitate accurate tracking and reporting of EEO information and believes the software will rectify data problems. EPA has never had official standard operating procedures for complaint processing, which are required by regulation. Rather, EPA said that complaints were processed under general guidance provided by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) until draft procedures, prepared in July 2001, were put into use. EPA has taken a long time to process discrimination complaints with cases averaging 650 days from filing to closing over fiscal years 1995-2002. A major contributing factor was that investigations, which are supposed to be done in 180 days, averaged a total of 465 days. The firms used by EPA failed to conduct thorough investigations and their reports did not provide complete or factual accounts of the incidents leading to the complaints. As a result, investigations often had to be redone, adding to the amount of time needed to complete them. Over the last year, EPA has discontinued the use of these firms and contracted with new ones that it believes are doing a much better job. EPA has also increased its own staffing for EEO matters to try to reduce processing times. EPA does not have a specific process for determining whether managers involved in discrimination complaints did in fact discriminate and if so whether managers should be disciplined. EPA officials told us that they have relied on training to rectify and prevent discriminatory conduct. Other agencies have formal processes to evaluate each case in which discrimination is found or a complaint is settled to determine whether discipline is warranted. EPA will be required to collect and report the number of agency employees disciplined for discrimination or harassment under the provisions of the Notification and Federal Employee Anti- Discrimination and Retaliation Act, effective in October 2003. A process like those in place at other agencies should also help EPA meet this requirement. |
gao_GAO-02-90 | gao_GAO-02-90_0 | And third, we suggest four criteria that Congress could use as it weighs the merits of various reform proposals. As a result, the 1990 standards have become dated. Successful election administration requires the appropriate integration of people, processes and technology. Criterion IV: The Affordability and Sustainability of Proposed Election Reforms. Section 4: Conclusion
Events surrounding the November 2000 election brought into question the integrity of our nation’s election systems. | What GAO Found
As a result of events surrounding the November 2000 presidential election, public officials and various interest groups have proposed reforms to address perceived shortcomings of various election systems. The complexity and intricacy of the American electoral system suggests that the success of an election system depends on the appropriate integration of people, processes, and technology. This report presents an analytical framework that Congress could use as it weighs the merits of various reform proposals. |
gao_GAO-02-623 | gao_GAO-02-623_0 | In 1996, DOD established a 3-month carryover standard for all the working capital fund activities except for the contract portion of the Air Force depot maintenance activity group. To reflect this difference, DOD established a 4.5-month carryover standard to account for the additional administrative functions associated with awarding contracts. Air Force reports show that the contract portion of the depot maintenance activity group exceeded the 4.5-month carryover standard at the end of fiscal years 2000 and 2001 by about $44 million and $134 million, respectively, thereby resulting in more funds being provided than allowed by the DOD carryover standard. However, we found that the reported carryover balance did not accurately reflect the amount of unfinished work on hand at the end of fiscal year 2000 due to (1) faulty assumptions used in calculating work-in-process and (2) records not accurately reflecting work that was actually completed by year-end. As a result, the amount of carryover reported by the Air Force was understated by tens of millions of dollars. Table 1 shows the actual reported year- end unfilled orders, work-in process, and carryover, in dollars and months for fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2001. According to Air Force Materiel Command officials, the primary reason that they exceeded the 4.5-month standard for fiscal year 2001 was the receipt of a large amount of orders late in the fiscal year. These problems resulted in idle funds that could have been used for near- term readiness or other priorities. | What GAO Found
The Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 requires GAO to review various aspects of the Department of Defense (DOD) policy that allows Defense Working Capital Fund activities to carry over a 3-month level of work from one fiscal year to the next. The DOD 3-month carryover standard applies to all DOD activity groups except for the contract portion of the Air Force depot maintenance activity group, for which DOD established a 4.5-month carryover standard because of the additional administrative functions associated with awarding contracts. Reported carryover balances for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 were inaccurate and, therefore, the balances were not reliable for decision-making or budget review purposes. The reported carryover balances were not accurate due to (1) faulty assumptions used in calculating work-in-process and (2) records not accurately reflecting work that was actually completed by year-end. As a result, the amount of carryover reported by the Air Force was understated by tens of millions of dollars and customers' funds were idle that could have been used for other purposes during the fiscal year. Even though the carryover was understated, Air Force reports show that the contract portion of the depot maintenance activity group exceeded the 4.5-month carryover standard at the end of fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2001 by $44 million and $134 million, respectively. Air Force headquarters officials stated the primary reason that they exceeded the standard for fiscal year 2001 was the receipt of a large amount of orders late in the fiscal year. |
gao_GAO-11-774 | gao_GAO-11-774_0 | DOD Has Conducted Robust Planning for the Current Drawdown Phase and Execution Is Under Way, but Visibility and Tracking of Some Equipment Remain a Challenge
DOD has robust plans and processes for determining the sequence of actions and associated resources necessary to achieve its objectives for the drawdown from Iraq. The current phase of the drawdown is well under way with a significant amount of equipment removed from Iraq and bases transitioned, among other things. However, several factors, including limited operational flexibility and the need to move a greater amount of equipment and close the largest bases with fewer available resources create a set of challenges and risks greater than what DOD faced during the prior drawdown phase. DOD’s existing plans and processes create flexibility and mitigate risk, but DOD continues to face challenges maintaining real-time visibility over some equipment and tracking unaccounted for equipment remaining after bases undergo the transition process. DOD Has Taken Steps to Improve Contract Management and Oversight in Iraq, but Challenges Remain
DOD has taken action to improve its management of contracts in Iraq, such as enhancing contract oversight through command emphasis and assigning COR responsibilities as a primary duty in certain instances. However, other concerns, such as lack of experience among contract oversight personnel, remain. As the drawdown progresses, DOD may face further challenges in ensuring that major contracts transition without gaps in key services, and in effectively implementing its guidance for descoping contracts and demobilizing contractor personnel and infrastructure. DOD has also improved contractor demobilization planning based on lessons learned from the prior drawdown phase. Units are taking further steps to ensure the continuity of key services while continuing to descope contracts. According to senior military officials, since local contractors do not require extensive base life support, such as housing, and will not have to be repatriated to their country of origin at the end of the contract, they can be employed to provide certain services that would otherwise have to be discontinued. Some units also intend to replace contractor personnel with servicemembers to ensure continuity of certain services, such as guard security, airfield vegetation removal, and generator maintenance and are conducting “troop-to-task” analysis to determine which servicemembers will perform these tasks and how many will be needed. However, without taking additional steps to address the challenges discussed below, DOD may be unable to effectively implement its guidance and ensure the effective reduction of contract services to appropriate levels and ultimate demobilization of all its contractors. DOD and State Are Coordinating to Establish and Support the Post-2011 U.S. Government Presence in Iraq, but Key Elements of This Presence May Not Be Well Understood throughout DOD
DOD and State interagency coordination for the transition began late, but both agencies have now coordinated extensively to plan for the transfer or loan to State of a wide range of DOD equipment, and DOD has taken steps to minimize any impact on unit readiness of such transfers. To help ensure that DOD will be able to complete the orderly and efficient retrograde and transfer of its equipment and transition of its bases in Iraq by minimizing unanticipated requirements, direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in conjunction with the Secretary of the Army and the Commander, U.S. Central Command, to approve and implement, as appropriate, a process, to include associated policy and training, for acquiring and maintaining real-time visibility of CMGO equipment before it is delivered to the U.S. government that meets the needs of operational forces while retaining oversight features inherent to DOD’s current accountability processes; and direct the Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq take steps to collect accurate data on equipment that is found during the large base closure process but not recorded in any property book, and, as appropriate, refine the projection for equipment needing to be retrograded and transferred based on these data. To maximize its ability to achieve an orderly and efficient drawdown of contracted services in Iraq, direct the Commander, U.S. Forces-Iraq, to (1) assess the risk of providing all contractors, including their subcontractors, with the information—such as base transition dates— required to descope services and demobilize their workforces, against the risk of contractors’ inability to meet milestones without it and take the appropriate actions based on this assessment; (2) take appropriate measures, such as enforcement of guidance laid out in the template to be developed by the office of the Senior Contracting Official-Iraq, to ensure robust contractor planning associated with demobilization; and (3) engage contractors to ensure that total personnel headcounts accurately reflect all personnel, including those working under subcontracts. To determine the extent to which DOD has planned for, begun to execute, and identified and mitigated risks associated with curtailing unneeded contract services, transitioning expiring contracts, and providing adequate contract oversight, we reviewed contracting-specific planning documents, memoranda, and other sources of guidance issued by DOD and subordinate organizations. To determine the extent to which DOD has planned for, begun to execute, and mitigated risk associated with facilitating and supporting the transition to a civilian-led presence in Iraq, we reviewed transition-specific planning documents, briefings, and memoranda. | Why GAO Did This Study
The drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq and the transition from a U.S. military to a civilian-led presence after December 2011 continue amid an uncertain security and political environment. This report is one in a series of reviews regarding the planning and execution of the drawdown. Specifically, this report assesses the extent to which DOD has planned for, begun to execute, and mitigated risk associated with (1) transferring and removing personnel and equipment from remaining bases in Iraq; (2) curtailing unneeded contract services, transitioning expiring contracts, and providing adequate contract oversight; and (3) facilitating and supporting the transition to a civilian-led presence in Iraq. GAO examined relevant DOD planning documents, attended drawdown-related conferences, interviewed State officials and DOD officials throughout the chain of command in the United States, Kuwait, and Iraq, and visited several locations in Kuwait and Iraq to observe drawdown operations.
What GAO Found
DOD has robust plans and processes for determining the sequence of actions and associated resources necessary to achieve the drawdown from Iraq, which is well underway with a significant amount of equipment removed from Iraq and bases transitioned, among other things. However, several factors contribute to making this phase more challenging than the previous drawdown phase. First, DOD will have less operational flexibility in this phase of the drawdown, yet will need to move a greater amount of equipment than in prior drawdown phases. Second, DOD is closing the largest bases with fewer available resources left on site, which creates a set of challenges and risks greater than what DOD faced during the prior drawdown phase. Although DOD's plans and processes create flexibility and mitigate risk, it has limited visibility over some equipment remaining in Iraq and does not track equipment found on transitioning bases that is not listed on any property accountability record. Without addressing these issues, DOD may miss opportunities to make the drawdown more efficient. DOD has taken action to improve its management of contracts in Iraq, such as enhancing contract oversight and assigning Contracting Officer's Representative responsibilities as a primary duty, although concerns, such as lack of experience among contract oversight personnel, remain. As the drawdown progresses, DOD may face further challenges in ensuring that major contracts transition without gaps in key services. To ensure the continuity of key services while continuing to reduce these services, some units are exploring the option of using local contractors to provide certain services since local contractors do not require extensive support, such as housing, and will not have to be repatriated to their country of origin at the end of the contract, although GAO has previously reported on challenges associated with hiring such firms resulting in the need for greater oversight. Some units also intend to replace contractor personnel with servicemembers to ensure continuity of certain services, such as guard security and generator maintenance. Despite various steps to ease contractor demobilization, DOD faces challenges in demobilizing its contractors, including operational security-driven limits on exchanging information such as base closure dates and ensuring accurate contractor planning. Without taking additional steps to address these challenges, DOD may be unable to effectively implement its demobilization guidance and ensure the effective reduction of contract services to appropriate levels and ultimate demobilization of all its contractors. As the U.S. presence in Iraq transitions to a civilian-led presence, although DOD and State interagency coordination for the transition began late, both agencies have now coordinated extensively and begun to execute the transfer or loan to State of a wide range of DOD equipment, while DOD has taken steps to minimize any impact on unit readiness of such transfers. DOD also has agreed to potentially provide State with extensive contracted services, including base and life support, food and fuel, and maintenance, but State may not have the capacity to fund and oversee these services.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DOD take further action to (1) acquire and maintain real-time visibility over contractor-managed government- owned equipment; (2) collect data on unaccounted-for equipment found during base transitions; (3) work with contractors to gather and distribute information needed to demobilize their workforces; and (4) officially clarify the scope of DOD's role in post-2011 Iraq, to include the privileges and immunities to be afforded all DOD government personnel. DOD concurred with all of GAO's recommendations. |
gao_GAO-08-780T | gao_GAO-08-780T_0 | As part of its efforts to ensure the safety, effectiveness, and quality of medical devices, FDA is responsible for inspecting certain foreign and domestic establishments to ensure that, among other things, they meet manufacturing standards established in FDA’s quality system regulation. MDUFMA required FDA to accredit third persons—which are organizations—to conduct inspections of certain establishments. In describing this requirement, the House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce noted that some manufacturers have faced an increase in the number of inspections required by foreign countries and that the number of inspections could be reduced if the manufacturers could contract with a third-party organization to conduct a single inspection that would satisfy the requirements of both FDA and foreign countries. On September 7, 2006, FDA and Health Canada announced the establishment of PMAP. These establishments provide information to FDA, such as an establishment’s name and its address and the medical devices it manufactures. FDA Faces Challenges Conducting Inspections of Foreign Establishments That Manufacture Medical Devices
FDA faces challenges in its program to inspect foreign establishments manufacturing medical devices. FDA Lacks Accurate Data on the Number of Foreign Establishments Subject to Inspection, but Has Made Recent Attempts to Improve Its Data
FDA’s databases on registration and imported medical devices have not provided an accurate count of establishments subject to inspection, although recent improvements to FDA’s medical device registration database may address some weaknesses. In January 2008, we testified that DRLS provided FDA with information about foreign medical device establishments and the products they manufacture for the U.S. market. FDA has solicited proposals for this contract, but it is still developing the specifics of the program. FDA officials estimated the agency had inspected foreign class II manufacturers every 27 years and foreign class III manufacturers every 6 years. While the establishment of both a foreign inspection cadre and offices overseas have the potential for improving FDA’s oversight of foreign establishments, it is too early to tell whether these steps will be effective or will increase the number of foreign medical device establishment inspections. Few Inspections of Foreign Establishments Have Been Conducted Through FDA’s Third- Party Programs, but Recent Changes Could Eliminate Some Obstacles to Manufacturers’ Participation
Few inspections of foreign medical device manufacturing establishments—a total of six—have been conducted through FDA’s two accredited third-party inspection programs, the Accredited Persons Inspection Program and PMAP. FDAAA specified several changes to the requirements for inspections by accredited third parties that could result in increased participation by manufacturers. Few inspections have been conducted through FDA’s Accredited Persons Inspection Program since March 11, 2004—the date when FDA first cleared an accredited organization to conduct independent inspections. Through May 7, 2008, four inspections of foreign establishments had been conducted independently by accredited organizations. According to FDA officials and representatives of affected entities, potential incentives to participation include the opportunity to reduce the number of inspections conducted to meet FDA and other countries’ requirements. These potential disincentives include bearing the cost for the inspection, doubts about whether accredited organizations can cover multiple requirements in a single inspection, and uncertainty about the potential consequences of an inspection that otherwise may not occur in the near future—consequences that could involve regulatory action. As of May 7, 2008, two inspections of foreign establishments had been conducted through PMAP, FDA’s second program for inspections by accredited third parties. However, the lack of meaningful progress in conducting inspections to this point raises questions about the practicality and effectiveness of these programs to help FDA conduct additional foreign inspections. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. | Why GAO Did This Study
As part of the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) oversight of the safety and effectiveness of medical devices marketed in the United States, it inspects certain foreign and domestic establishments where these devices are manufactured. To help FDA address shortcomings in its inspection program, the Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002 required FDA to accredit third parties to inspect certain establishments. In response, FDA has implemented two voluntary programs for that purpose. This statement is based primarily on GAO testimonies from January 2008 (GAO-08-428T) and April 2008 (GAO-08-701T). In this statement, GAO assesses (1) FDA's program for inspecting foreign establishments that manufacture medical devices for the U.S. market and (2) FDA's programs for third-party inspections of those establishments. For GAO's January and April 2008 testimonies, GAO interviewed FDA officials, analyzed information from FDA, and updated GAO's previous work on FDA's programs for inspections by accredited third parties. GAO updated selected information for this statement in early May 2008.
What GAO Found
FDA faces challenges managing its program to inspect foreign establishments that manufacture medical devices. GAO testified in January 2008 that two databases that provide FDA with information about foreign medical device establishments and the products they manufacture for the U.S. market contained inaccurate information about establishments subject to FDA inspection. In addition, comparisons between these databases--which could help produce a more accurate count--had to be done manually. Recent changes FDA made to its registration database could improve the accuracy of the count of establishments, but it is too soon to tell whether these and other changes will improve FDA's management of its foreign inspection program. Another challenge is that FDA conducts relatively few inspections of foreign establishments; officials estimated that the agency inspects foreign manufacturers of high-risk devices (such as pacemakers) every 6 years and foreign manufacturers of medium-risk devices (such as hearing aids) every 27 years. Finally, inspections of foreign manufacturers pose unique challenges to FDA, such as difficulties in recruiting investigators to travel to certain countries and in extending trips if the inspections uncovered problems. FDA is pursuing initiatives that could address some of these unique challenges, but it is unclear whether FDA's proposals will increase the frequency with which the agency inspects foreign establishments. Few inspections of foreign medical device manufacturing establishments have been conducted through FDA's two accredited third-party inspection programs--the Accredited Persons Inspection Program and the Pilot Multi-purpose Audit Program (PMAP). Under FDA's Accredited Persons Inspection Program, from March 11, 2004--the date when FDA first cleared an accredited organization to conduct independent inspections--through May 7, 2008, four inspections of foreign establishments had been conducted by accredited organizations. An incentive to participation in the program is the opportunity to reduce the number of inspections conducted to meet FDA's and other countries' requirements. Disincentives include bearing the cost for the inspection, particularly when the consequences of an inspection that otherwise might not occur in the near future could involve regulatory action. The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 made several changes to program eligibility requirements that could result in increased participation by manufacturers. PMAP was established on September 7, 2006, as a partnership between FDA and Canada's medical device regulatory agency and allows accredited organizations to conduct a single inspection to meet the regulatory requirements of both countries. As of May 7, 2008, two inspections of foreign establishments had been conducted by accredited organizations through this program. The small number of inspections completed to date by accredited third-party organizations raises questions about the practicality and effectiveness of these programs to quickly help FDA increase the number of foreign establishments inspected. |
gao_GAO-06-1089T | gao_GAO-06-1089T_0 | The act recommends that 20 percent of funds appropriated pursuant to the act be spent on prevention and 15 percent on palliative care for those living with the disease. The Leadership Act further requires that at least one-third of prevention funding appropriated pursuant to the act be spent on abstinence-until- marriage programs, starting in fiscal year 2006. PEPFAR Prevention Funding in the Focus Countries Grew Significantly during First 3 Years
PEPFAR prevention funding increased significantly between fiscal years 2004 and 2006, while the proportion of total PEPFAR funding dedicated to prevention declined. At the same time, the proportion of PEPFAR funding dedicated to prevention in the 15 focus countries declined from 33 percent in fiscal year 2004 to 20 percent in fiscal year 2006, consistent with the Leadership Act’s recommendation that one-fifth of funds appropriated pursuant to the act be spent on prevention. PEPFAR Sexual Transmission Prevention Strategy Is Driven by ABC Approach, Abstinence-Until- Marriage Spending Requirement, and Local Prevention Needs
The PEPFAR strategy for preventing sexual transmission of HIV is shaped largely by three components: the ABC model, the abstinence-until- marriage spending requirement, and local prevention needs. Finally, OGAC directed country teams to apply the spending requirement to all PEPFAR prevention funding (about $357 million in fiscal year 2006), although it determined that, as a matter of law, the requirement applies only to funds appropriated to the GHAI account (about $322 million in fiscal year 2006). In addition, most country teams required to meet the requirement, absent exemptions, reported either in structured interviews or exemption requests that the requirement challenges their ability to allocate prevention resources in accordance with local HIV/AIDS prevention needs. Challenges Related to ABC Guidance
We reported in April 2006 that, although many focus country teams told us that they generally found the ABC guidance to be clear and several said that it did not present implementation challenges, 10 of the 15 focus teams cited instances where components of the guidance were ambiguous and caused confusion. Challenges Related to Abstinence-until-Marriage Spending Requirement
In several of our structured interviews, focus country teams endorsed the ABC model and noted the importance of AB messages. Because the abstinence-until-marriage spending requirement requires them to segregate AB funding from funding for “other prevention,” 8 of the 15 focus country teams reported that the spending requirement can undermine their ability to design and implement programs that integrated the components of the ABC model. The analysis in our April 2006 report showed that, with the approval of all 10 exemption requests, OGAC should just meet the overall 33 percent target for AB activities for fiscal year 2006 by effectively allowing exempted teams to spend less than 33 percent on AB programs and requiring nonexempted teams to spend more than 33 percent. Finally, OGAC’s decision to apply the spending requirement to all PEPFAR prevention funding—although OGAC had determined that, as a matter of law, the requirement applies only to funds appropriated to the GHAI account—may further challenge some teams’ ability to address HIV prevention needs at the local level. Use the information collected to, among other things, assess whether the spending requirement should be applied solely to funds appropriated to the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative account, in line with OGAC’s legal determination that the requirement applies only to these funds. We modified our recommendation to recommend that they consider this policy change after collecting information on the effect of the spending requirement. Matters for Congressional Consideration
Given the challenges that meeting the abstinence-until-marriage spending requirement presents to country teams attempting to implement locally responsive and integrated HIV/AIDS prevention programs, our April 2006 report also suggested that Congress, in its ongoing oversight of PEFAR, should review and consider the information provided by OGAC regarding the spending requirement’s effect on country teams’ efforts to prevent the sexual transmission of HIV and use this information to assess the extent to which the spending requirement supports the Leadership Act’s endorsement of both the ABC model and strong abstinence-until-marriage programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 authorizes the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). It promotes the ABC model (Abstain, be faithful, or use Condoms); recommends that 20 percent of funds appropriated pursuant to the act be spent on prevention; and requires that, starting in fiscal year 2006, 33 percent of prevention funds appropriated pursuant to the act be spent on abstinence-until-marriage activities. The Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) oversees PEPFAR and administers the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative (GHAI) account, the main repository for PEPFAR funds. For our April 2006 report, GAO reviewed PEPFAR prevention funding trends; described the PEPFAR strategy to prevent sexual transmission of HIV; and examined related challenges. The report recommended that the Coordinator collect and report information on the effects of the abstinence-until-marriage spending requirement and use it to, among other things, assess whether the requirement should apply only to the GHAI account. OGAC agreed to collect information but disagreed with applying the requirement only to certain funds; GAO modified the recommendation. GAO also suggested Congress use the information to assess how well the requirement supports the Leadership Act's endorsement of both the ABC model and strong abstinence programs.
What GAO Found
As GAO reported in April 2006, PEPFAR prevention funding in 15 focus countries increased by 55 percent between fiscal years 2004 and 2006, rising from about $207 million to $322 million. During this time, the prevention share of PEPFAR funding in these countries fell by about one-third, in accordance with the Leadership Act's recommendation that 20 percent of funds appropriated pursuant to the act support prevention. The PEPFAR strategy for preventing sexual transmission of HIV/AIDS is largely shaped by three elements--the ABC model, the abstinence-until-marriage spending requirement, and local prevention needs. In addition to adopting the ABC model, OGAC developed guidance for applying it--for instance, that prevention interventions should be integrated and responsive to local needs and cultural norms. To meet the 33 percent spending requirement, OGAC mandated that country teams (PEPFAR officials in the field) spend at least half of prevention funds on sexual prevention and two-thirds of those funds on abstinence/faithfulness (AB) activities. OGAC permitted certain country teams to seek exemptions from this policy. OGAC also applied the spending requirement to all PEPFAR prevention funding as a matter of policy, although it determined that as a matter of law it applies only to funds appropriated to the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative account. GAO also reported in April 2006 that OGAC's ABC guidance and the abstinence-until-marriage spending requirement, while valued by country teams, have presented challenges to most teams. First, two-thirds of focus country teams told us that ambiguities in some parts of the guidance led to uncertainty about implementing the model; OGAC officials commented they were clarifying the guidance for country teams. Second, although several teams indicated that they value the ABC model and noted the importance of AB messages, some teams also reported that the spending requirement can limit their ability to design programs that are integrated and responsive to local prevention needs. Most country teams reported, either in structured interviews or exemption requests, that fulfilling the spending requirement, including OGAC's policies implementing it, presents challenges to their ability to respond to local needs. Seven focus country teams--primarily those with smaller PEPFAR budgets--received exemptions from the requirement, allowing them to dedicate less than 33 percent of prevention funds to AB activities. In general, the nonexempted teams are spending more than 33 percent of prevention funds on AB activities, and OGAC should just meet the overall spending requirement for fiscal year 2006. However, to meet the abstinence-until-marriage spending requirement, teams have in some cases reduced or cut funding for certain prevention programs, such as those to deliver comprehensive messages to certain populations. OGAC's decision to apply the spending requirement to all PEPFAR prevention funds may further challenge country teams' ability to address local prevention needs. |
gao_NSIAD-96-136 | gao_NSIAD-96-136_0 | The remaining 30 UOES interceptors were to be used in operational suitability tests that did not involve firing interceptors. UOES Funding Will Be Committed Before System Capabilities Are Known
The Army anticipates exercising the contract option for the UOES interceptors in the 3rd quarter of 1996 based on the results of only the first 7 of 14 scheduled demonstration and validation flight tests. The Army also plans to conduct a 7-week limited user test after completing the 14 demonstration and validation flight tests. The Army estimates that to transport the full system with 40 interceptors from the United States to a theater of operation will require up to 18 C-5, 26 C-17, or 40 C-141 flights. However, whether for a complete UOES deployment, or a minimum launch capability, the necessary flights may not be available unless UOES is afforded a high priority. Cost Estimate Has Increased
Since September 1992, when the THAAD demonstration and validation contract was awarded, the contractor’s cost estimate for the 40 UOES interceptors has increased by over 100 percent—from $80 million to $165 million. GAO’s Comments
1. 2. Delivery of the 40 interceptors will not be completed until the 3rd quarter of fiscal year 1999. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO reviewed the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) User Operational Evaluation System (UOES) program, focusing on whether planned testing would reasonably demonstrate the capabilities of UOES as an interim system before funds are committed to interceptor production.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) the Army purchased 20 interceptors for demonstration and validation flight tests, of which only 14 will be used in these tests; (2) the Army plans to commit funds for UOES production based on the results of the first 7 of the 14 scheduled flight tests; (3) transporting UOES interceptors from the United States to a theater of operations will require significant airlift resources that may not be available unless UOES is afforded a high priority; (4) the cost estimate for the 40 UOES interceptors has increased from $80 million to $165 million, and THAAD project officials expect that estimate to rise to $220 million; and (5) delivery of the 40 UOES interceptors will be delayed due to increased delivery lead times and reduced fiscal year (FY) 1997 funding. |
gao_GAO-05-482 | gao_GAO-05-482_0 | IRS Also Provides Processing Support for FinCEN
In addition to processing its own financial and tax information, IRS provides information processing support to FinCEN, another Treasury bureau. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to determine (1) the status of IRS’s actions to correct or mitigate previously reported weaknesses and (2) whether controls over key financial and tax processing systems located at the facility have been effective in ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of sensitive financial and taxpayer data. Specifically, we evaluated information system controls intended to limit, detect, and monitor logical and physical access to sensitive computing resources and facilities, thereby safeguarding them from misuse and protecting them from unauthorized disclosure and modification; maintain operating system integrity through effective administration and control of powerful computer programs and utilities that execute privileged instructions; prevent the introduction of unauthorized changes to application software in the existing software environment; ensure that work responsibilities are segregated, so that one individual does not perform or control all key aspects of computer-related operations and thereby have the ability to conduct unauthorized actions or gain unauthorized access to assets or records; minimize the risk of unplanned interruptions and recover critical computer processing operations in the case of disaster or other unexpected interruptions; and implement an agencywide information security program that includes a continuing cycle of assessing risk, implementing and promoting policies and procedures to reduce such risk, and monitoring the effectiveness of those activities. The agency has corrected or mitigated 32 of the 53 weaknesses that we reported as unresolved at the time of our last review in 2002. While IRS has taken steps to strengthen its information security controls, it had not completed actions to correct or mitigate the remaining 21 previously reported weaknesses. Serious Weaknesses Place Taxpayer and Bank Secrecy Act Data at Risk
IRS has not effectively implemented information security controls to properly protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data processed by the facility’s computers and networks. Collectively, these weaknesses threaten IRS’s ability to perform its operational missions, such as processing tax returns and law enforcement information, both of which rely on IRS’s computer systems and networks to process, store, and transmit data. Access controls over the mainframe computing environment did not logically separate IRS’s data from FinCEN’s data. For example, IRS did not adequately secure its network against known vulnerabilities or misconfigured network services on several of its infrastructure devices. Unless these weaknesses are corrected, sensitive taxpayer and Bank Secrecy Act data will remain at risk of unauthorized disclosure, use, modification, or destruction, possibly without detection. Information Security Program Is Not Fully Implemented at IRS
The weaknesses described in this report are symptomatic of an agencywide information security program that is not fully implemented across IRS. In addition, weaknesses in physical security, segregation of duties, and service continuity increase the level of risk. Although IRS continues to make progress in mitigating previously reported information security weaknesses and implementing general controls over key financial and tax processing systems at the facility, it has not taken all the necessary steps to mitigate known information security control weaknesses and to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of taxpayer and Bank Secrecy Act data. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) relies extensively on computerized systems to support its financial and mission-related operations. In addition, IRS provides computer processing support to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)--another Treasury bureau. As part of IRS's fiscal year 2004 financial statements, GAO assessed (1) the status of IRS's actions to correct or mitigate previously reported weaknesses at one of its critical data processing facilities and (2) the effectiveness of IRS's information security controls in protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of key financial and tax processing systems.
What GAO Found
IRS has made progress in correcting or mitigating previously reported information security weaknesses and in implementing controls over key financial and tax processing systems that are located at one of its critical data processing facilities. It has corrected or mitigated 32 of the 53 weaknesses that GAO reported as unresolved at the time of our prior review in 2002. However, in addition to the remaining 21 previously reported weaknesses for which IRS has not completed actions, 39 newly identified information security control weaknesses impair IRS's ability to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its sensitive financial and taxpayer data and FinCEN's Bank Secrecy Act data. For example, IRS has not implemented effective electronic access controls over its mainframe computing environment to logically separate its taxpayer data from FinCEN's Bank Secrecy Act data--two types of data with different security requirements. In addition, IRS has not effectively implemented certain other information security controls relating to physical security, segregation of duties, and service continuity at the facility. Collectively, these weaknesses increase the risk that sensitive taxpayer and Bank Secrecy Act data will be inadequately protected from unauthorized disclosure, modification, use, or destruction. Moreover, weaknesses in service continuity and business resumption plans heighten the risk that assets will be inadequately protected and controlled to ensure the continuity of operations when unexpected interruptions occur. An underlying cause of these information security control weaknesses is that IRS has not fully implemented certain elements of its agencywide information security program. Until IRS fully implements a comprehensive agencywide information security program, its facilities and computing resources and the information that is processed, stored, and transmitted on its systems will remain vulnerable. |
gao_GAO-05-645 | gao_GAO-05-645_0 | 1.) Health center services are offered at one or more delivery sites and are required to be available to all people in the center’s service area. Services must be provided regardless of patients’ ability to pay. II for additional information on HRSA’s process for awarding health center grants.) HRSA uses UDS data to monitor aspects of health center and overall program performance. Therefore, the agency is considering both revising the measures it uses to assess need and increasing the relative weight of need in the award process. 2.) At the same time, the number of eligible new access point applications increased by 28 percent. Combined with the decrease in new access point funding, this resulted in a decrease in the proportion of applicants that HRSA funded—from 52 percent of fiscal year 2002 applicants to 20 percent of fiscal year 2004 applicants. From fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2004, HRSA funded 334 new access point grants and 285 expanded medical capacity grants, representing about half of the initiative’s 5-year goal of providing 630 new access point grants and 570 expanded medical capacity grants. HRSA’s Process for Assessing Need for New Access Point Grants Has Changed
The process HRSA uses to assess the need for services in a new access point applicant’s proposed service area has changed since the beginning of the President’s Health Centers Initiative. Number of New Access Point Grantees Varies Widely by State, but HRSA Lacks Reliable Information on Delivery Sites
The number of health centers receiving new access point grants varied widely by state during the first 3 years of the President’s Health Centers Initiative. For example, in its fiscal year 2005 performance plan, HRSA reported funding 3,588 delivery sites in fiscal year 2003, consisting of 3,317 delivery sites operating in fiscal year 2001 and 271 new access point grants funded in fiscal years 2002 and 2003; however, some of the new access point grants represent more than one delivery site. As a result, HRSA underestimated the number of new program delivery sites operating in fiscal years 2002 and 2003. HRSA Has Increased the Role of Performance Measurement in Monitoring and Improved Its Collection of Health Center Data
HRSA’s new tool for periodic on-site review of health centers—the OPR performance review—focuses on monitoring individual health centers’ performance on selected measures, including health outcome measures. While the OPR review evaluates the performance of individual health centers, it generally does not provide standardized performance information for the Consolidated Health Centers program as a whole, and HRSA is using other tools to collect information that could help measure overall program performance. HRSA Has Taken Actions to Improve the Completeness and Accuracy of Its Uniform Data System
Since our previous report on the health centers program in March 2000, HRSA has taken steps to improve the UDS data collection and reporting process by trying to ensure that all Consolidated Health Centers program grantees report to the system and that the information they report is complete and accurate. To improve the accuracy of UDS data on the number and location of health center delivery sites, for 2004, HRSA revised the instructions to grantees for identifying their delivery sites. Health Centers Often Face Challenges Securing Specialty Care for Patients
In addition to providing comprehensive primary and preventive health care services, most health centers receiving Consolidated Health Centers program grants provide specialty care on site or have formal arrangements for referring patients to outside specialists for care. HRSA has indicated that it is not confident that its award process for new access point grants—which is intended to meet this challenge—has sufficiently targeted communities with the greatest need. Continued attention to such efforts could improve HRSA’s ability to evaluate its success in improving the health of people in underserved communities. We continue to believe it is important that HRSA collect and report accurate data on the number and location of all delivery sites funded by the program so that agency officials and the Congress will have the information they need to monitor the program’s progress in increasing access to health care and to make decisions about managing and funding the program. | Why GAO Did This Study
Health centers in the federal Consolidated Health Centers program provide comprehensive primary health care services at one or more delivery sites, without regard to patients' ability to pay. In fiscal year 2002, the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) began implementing the 5-year President's Health Centers Initiative. The initiative's goal is for the program to provide 1,200 grants in the neediest communities--630 grants for new delivery sites and 570 grants for expanded services at existing sites--by fiscal year 2006. GAO was asked to provide information on (1) funding of health centers and HRSA's process for assessing the need for services, (2) geographic distribution of health centers, and (3) HRSA's monitoring of health center performance.
What GAO Found
Competition for Consolidated Health Centers program funding increased over the first 3 years of the President's Health Centers Initiative, and HRSA's process for assessing communities' need for additional primary care sites is evolving. Program funding, which primarily supported continuing health center services, increased from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2004. However, funding for new access point grants, which fund one or more new delivery sites, decreased by 53 percent during this period. At the same time, the number of applicants for these grants increased by 28 percent. As a result, the proportion of applicants receiving new access point grants declined from 52 percent in fiscal year 2002 to 20 percent in fiscal year 2004. In fiscal years 2002 through 2004, HRSA funded 334 new access point grants and 285 grants for expanded services at existing sites. While HRSA includes an assessment of communities' need for services in its process for awarding new access point grants, agency officials indicated that they were not confident that the process has sufficiently targeted communities with the greatest need. Therefore, the agency is considering changes to the way it assesses community need and the relative weight it gives need in the award process. The number of health centers receiving new access point grants varied widely by state--from 1 to 57--during fiscal years 2002 through 2004, but HRSA lacks reliable data on the number and location of health centers' delivery sites. Although HRSA uses data on the number of delivery sites to track the progress of the Consolidated Health Centers program, it is not confident that grantees are accurately identifying delivery sites funded by the program. Furthermore, in its reporting, HRSA counted each new access point grant funded in fiscal years 2002 through 2004 as a single delivery site, although some represent more than one site. HRSA needs to collect and report accurate and complete delivery site data to give the agency and the Congress data they need to make decisions about the program. HRSA has increased the role of performance measurement in its monitoring of health centers and has improved its collection of data that could help measure overall program performance. In 2004, the agency began to use a new process for on-site monitoring of health centers that focuses on each center's performance on measures tailored to its community and patient population. However, the new review generally does not provide standardized performance information that HRSA can use to evaluate the health center program as a whole. The agency is using other tools to collect health outcome data on patients that could help measure program performance. Continued attention to such efforts could improve the agency's ability to evaluate its success in improving the health of people in underserved communities. In addition to developing these data collection tools, HRSA has taken steps to improve the accuracy and completeness of its Uniform Data System, a data set that HRSA uses to monitor aspects of the health centers' performance. For example, HRSA provided grantees with more detailed instructions on how to identify their delivery sites. |
gao_GAO-09-429T | gao_GAO-09-429T_0 | The 12 Western States Assess Multiple Types of Royalties, Including Functional Royalties, on Mining Operations
Twelve western states assess royalties on the hardrock mining operations on state lands. In addition, each of these states, except Oregon, assesses taxes that function like a royalty, which we refer to as functional royalties, on the hardrock mining operations on private, state, and federal lands. Royalties, including functional royalties, often differ depending on land ownership and the mineral being extracted, as the following illustrates: For private mining operations conducted on federal, state, or private lands, Arizona assesses a net proceeds functional royalty of 1.25 percent on gold mining operations, and an additional gross revenue royalty of at least 2 percent for gold mining operations on state lands. Finally, the actual amount assessed for a particular mine may depend not only on the type of royalty, its rate, and exclusions, but also on such factors as the mineral’s processing requirements, mineral markets, mine efficiency, and mine location relative to markets, among other factors. Prior State Estimates of the Number of Abandoned Hardrock Mine Sites Vary Widely, but Our Data Show at Least 161,000 Sites, with Many Posing Hazards
It has been difficult to determine the number of abandoned hardrock mine sites in the 12 western states, and South Dakota, in part because there is no generally accepted definition for a hardrock mine site. Furthermore, BLM and the Forest Service have had difficulty determining the number of abandoned hardrock mines on their lands. Using this definition, states reported to us the number of abandoned sites in their states, and we calculated that there are at least 161,000 abandoned hardrock mine sites in their states. At these sites, on the basis of state data, we estimated that at least 332,000 features may pose physical safety hazards, such as open shafts or unstable or decayed mine structures. BLM Estimates That Operators Have Provided About $982 Million in Financial Assurances—About $61 Million Less Than Needed to Cover Estimated Reclamation Costs
As of November 2007, hardrock mining operators had provided financial assurances valued at approximately $982 million to guarantee the reclamation cost for 1,463 hardrock mining operations on BLM land in 11 western states, according to BLM’s Bond Review Report. The report also indicates that 52 of the 1,463 hardrock mining operations had inadequate financial assurances—about $28 million less than needed to fully cover estimated reclamation costs. We determined, however, that the financial assurances for these 52 operations should be more accurately reported as about $61 million less than needed to fully cover estimated reclamation costs. The $33 million difference between our estimated shortfall of nearly $61 million and BLM’s estimated shortfall of nearly $28 million occurs because BLM calculated its shortfall by comparing the total value of financial assurances in place with the total estimated reclamation costs. This calculation approach has the effect of offsetting the shortfalls in some operations with the greater than required financial assurances of other operations. However, the financial assurances that are greater than the amount required for an operation cannot be transferred to an operation with inadequate financial assurances. In contrast, we totaled the difference between the financial assurance in place for an operation and the financial assurances needed for that operation to determine the actual shortfall for each of the 52 operations for which BLM had determined that financial assurances were inadequate. Finally, over one-third of the number of all hardrock operations and about 84 percent of the value of all financial assurances are for hardrock mining operations located in Nevada. | Why GAO Did This Study
The General Mining Act of 1872 helped open the West by allowing individuals to obtain exclusive rights to mine billions of dollars worth of gold, silver, and other hardrock (locatable) minerals from federal lands without having to pay a federal royalty. However, western states charge royalties so that they share in the proceeds from various hardrock minerals extracted from their lands. For years, some mining operators did not reclaim land used in their mining operations, creating environmental and physical safety hazards. To curb further growth in the number of abandoned hardrock mines on federal lands, in 1981, the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) began requiring mining operators to reclaim BLM land disturbed by these operations, and in 2001 began requiring operators to provide financial assurances to cover reclamation costs before they began exploration or mining operations. This testimony focuses on the (1) royalties states charge, (2) number of abandoned hardrock mine sites and hazards, and (3) value and coverage of financial assurances operators use to guarantee reclamation costs. It is based on two GAO reports: Hardrock Mining: Information on Abandoned Mines and Value and Coverage of Financial Assurances on BLM Land, GAO-08-574T (Mar. 12, 2008) and Hardrock Mining: Information on State Royalties and Trends in Imports and Exports, GAO-08-849R (July 21, 2008).
What GAO Found
Twelve western states, including Alaska, that GAO reviewed assess royalties on hardrock mining operations on state lands. In addition, each of these states, except Oregon, assesses taxes that function like a royalty, which GAO refers to as functional royalties, on the hardrock mining operations on private, state, and federal lands. The royalties the states assess often differ depending on land ownership and the mineral being extracted. For example, for private mining operations conducted on federal, state, or private land, Arizona assesses a functional royalty of 1.25 percent of net revenue on gold mining operations, and an additional royalty of at least 2 percent of gross value for gold mining operations on state lands. The actual amount assessed for a particular mine may depend not only on the type of royalty, its rate, and exclusions, but also on other factors, such as the mine's location relative to markets. Over the past 10 years, estimates of the number of abandoned hardrock mine sites in the 12 western states reviewed, as well as South Dakota, have varied widely, in part because there is no generally accepted definition for a hardrock mine site. Using a consistent definition that GAO provided, these states reported the number of abandoned sites in their states. On the basis of these data, GAO estimated that there are at least 161,000 abandoned hardrock mine sites in these states, and these sites have at least 332,000 features that may pose physical safety hazards and at least 33,000 sites that have degraded the environment. According to BLM data, as of November 2007, hardrock mining operators had provided financial assurances worth approximately $982 million to guarantee reclamation costs for 1,463 hardrock mining operations on BLM land and 52 of these operations had financial assurances valued at about $28 million less than needed to fully cover estimated reclamation costs. However, GAO determined that the assurances for these 52 operations should be more accurately reported as about $61 million less than needed for full coverage. The $33 million difference between GAO's and BLM's estimated shortfalls occurs because BLM calculated its shortfall by comparing the total value of financial assurances in place with the total estimated reclamation costs. This approach effectively offsets the shortfalls in some operations with the higher than needed financial assurances of others. However, the financial assurances that are greater than the amount required for an operation cannot be transferred to an operation with inadequate financial assurances. In contrast, GAO totaled the difference between the financial assurances in place for an operation and the financial assurances needed for that operation to determine the actual shortfall for each of the 52 operations for which BLM had determined that financial assurances were inadequate. BLM has taken steps to correct the reporting problem GAO identified. |
gao_GAO-17-418 | gao_GAO-17-418_0 | Background
Navy ships undergo a variety of tests, trials, and construction after delivery from the shipbuilder (when the Navy takes custody of the ship) and before the Navy provides the ship to the fleet—a time referred to as the post-delivery period. Incomplete Construction Work and Quality Issues Persisted Even after Selected Ships Were Provided to the Fleet, with Lead Ships Particularly at Risk
All six ships we reviewed that had completed the post-delivery period— LPD 25, LHA 6, DDG 112, LCS 3, LCS 4, and SSN 782—were provided to the fleet with varying degrees of incomplete work and quality problems. Fleet officials responsible for operating and maintaining these ships reported varying degrees of concern about the overall quality of these six ships, noting that two were ready for operations upon being provided to them but that there were particular quality concerns with the other four. For CVN 78 and DDG 1000, the Navy plans to complete significantly more work and testing during the post- delivery period than the other six ships we reviewed. As such, CVN 78 and DDG 1000 are at greater risk of being provided to the fleet at the end of their post-delivery periods with incomplete construction work and unknown quality. The Navy’s Ship Delivery Policy Does Not Facilitate a Process That Provides Complete and Quality Ships to the Fleet
The Navy’s ship delivery policy emphasizes the importance of ensuring that defect-free and mission capable ships are provided to the fleet. But the policy does not elaborate on which defects it is referring to or when they should be corrected. In the absence of a clear definition, ship program offices do not have a consistent view regarding what standards constitute a defect- free ship. CNO officials responsible for the policy told us that ships should be free of all deficiencies by the time they are provided to the fleet, meaning at the end of the post-delivery period at OWLD, which is a change from their previous interpretation of the ship delivery policy that they authored. INSURV Does Not Verify Ship Quality When Ships Are Provided to Fleet, as Required by Policy
The Navy’s ship delivery policy identifies INSURV as the independent entity charged with verifying the quality of ships at delivery and recommending introduction to the fleet. Without using consistently defined measures in its reporting, such as for delivery or IOC, the Navy is not accurately conveying the completeness and quality of its ships to Congress. Congress included a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 that may address this lack of clarity and consistency in reported delivery dates by establishing criteria that must be met in order for a ship to be deemed delivered. In nearly all acquisition program models, DOD guidance states that IOC occurs toward the end of operational testing. In its written comments, which are reprinted in appendix III of this report, DOD did not concur with two recommendations, partially concurred with a third recommendation, and fully concurred with a fourth recommendation. The statute and two policies that other policies DOD references in its response are not focused on construction and the post- delivery period and do not provide guidance on the level of quality and completeness expected when ships are provided to the fleet. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report assesses: (1) the extent to which the Navy provides complete, quality ships to the fleet that are free of government and contractor deficiencies; (2) the extent to which the Navy’s policy governing ship delivery facilitates efforts to deliver complete and quality ships; and (3) the extent to which Navy reports to Congress on the progress of shipbuilding programs consistently define key milestones such as ship delivery and initial operational capability. Through our review of this documentation, we assessed what construction work was incomplete or deficient when each case study ship was delivered to the Navy from the shipbuilder; the availabilities, tests, and trials each ship completed during the post- delivery period; and the condition of each ship when it was provided to the fleet following the post-delivery period. Littoral Combat Ship: Navy Complied with Regulations in Accepting Two Lead Ships, but Quality Problems Persisted after Delivery. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. Navy spends at least $18 billion per year on shipbuilding—a portion of which is spent after ships are delivered. During the post-delivery period—after delivery from the shipbuilder and before the ships enter the fleet—Navy ships undergo a variety of tests, trials, and construction.
GAO was asked to assess the post-delivery period, including quality and completeness of ships when they are delivered to the fleet. The Senate Report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included additional questions about ship status after delivery. This report assesses the extent to which the Navy (1) provides complete and quality ships to the fleet, (2) has a ship delivery policy that supports those efforts, and (3) reports ship quality and completeness to Congress. GAO reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of eight Navy ships, six of which have entered the fleet and two that recently began the post-delivery period. GAO reviewed program documentation and interviewed Navy officials.
What GAO Found
GAO reviewed six ships valued at $6.3 billion that had completed the post-delivery period, and found they were provided to the fleet with varying degrees of incomplete work and quality problems. GAO used three quality assurance metrics, identified by Navy program offices, to evaluate the completeness of the six ships—LPD 25, LHA 6, DDG 112, Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) 3 and 4, and SSN 782—at delivery and also at the time each ship was provided to the fleet. Although the Navy resolved many of the defects by the end of the post-delivery period, as the table below shows, quality problems persisted and work was incomplete when the selected ships were turned over to the operational fleet.
Fleet officials reported varying levels of concern with the overall quality and completeness of the ships, such as with unreliable equipment or a need for more intense maintenance than expected. For CVN 78 and DDG 1000, the Navy plans to complete significantly more work and testing during the post-delivery period than the other six ships GAO reviewed. As such, these ships are at a greater risk of being provided to the fleet at the end of their post-delivery periods with incomplete construction work and unknowns about quality.
The Navy's ship delivery policy does not facilitate a process that provides complete and quality ships to the fleet and practices do not comport with policy. The policy emphasizes that ships should be defect-free and mission-capable, but lacks clarity regarding what defects should be corrected and by when. Without a clear policy, Navy program offices define their own standards of quality and completeness, which are not always consistent. Further, because the Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) does not inspect ships at the end of the post-delivery period, it is not in a position to verify each ship's readiness for the fleet, as required by Navy policy. The Navy has not assessed the costs and benefits of ensuring INSURV does this. Addressing these policy concerns would improve the likelihood of identifying and correcting deficiencies before fleet introduction and increase consistency in how the Navy defines quality.
The Navy does not use consistent definitions for key milestones in its reports to Congress—such as delivery or Initial Operational Capability (IOC)—and, therefore, these milestones are not as informative as they could be regarding ship quality and completeness. For example, the Navy has routinely declared IOC on new ship classes without having demonstrated that ships are able to perform mission operations—contrary to Department of Defense (DOD) guidance, which, for nearly all acquisition models, generally states that IOC should be declared only after successful operational testing that demonstrates performance.
What GAO Recommends
The Navy should revise its ship delivery policy to identify what kinds of defects should be corrected and by when and study how to best ensure that INSURV verifies ships. Also, the Navy should reflect in its reports to Congress key milestones and consistent definitions in line with DOD policy. DOD did not concur with two recommendations, partially concurred with a third, and fully agreed with a fourth. GAO stands by its recommendations, which will help ensure that complete and quality ships are provided to the fleet and that Congress is provided with meaningful information on ship status. |
gao_GAO-11-531T | gao_GAO-11-531T_0 | A Multiplicity of Programs Exist to Meet the Needs of Individuals and families
A range of programs and tax expenditures assist individuals and families. Programs under the jurisdiction of the Subcommittee on Human Resources can roughly be grouped under three missions for children and working-age adults: providing income support, providing child care, and providing child welfare services. In addition, a wide array of tax expenditures assist individuals and families in these areas. Figure 1 shows an illustrative set of programs and tax expenditures. In addition, while the federal government is involved in some aspects of the design and funding of each of these supports, state governments are sometimes responsible for directly administering the benefits and services. With this array of human services programs, a family and its members may receive benefits or services from one or more of these programs. For example, a low-income family may be eligible for and receive income support through TANF, EITC, and Child Support Enforcement, as well as subsidized child care assistance. Today, our work has shown this patchwork of programs to be too fragmented and overly complex—for clients to navigate, for program operators to administer efficiently, and for program managers and policymakers to assess program performance. People Face Difficulties in Accessing Aid
People seeking aid often must visit multiple offices and provide the same information numerous times. Low-income individuals and families often receive aid from multiple programs to meet their income support, health, nutrition, employment and training, and housing needs. Myriad Program Rules Foster Duplicate Administrative Processes and Inefficiencies
The complexity and variation in eligibility and other rules and requirements among the programs have contributed to time-consuming and duplicative administrative processes that are inefficient and add to overall costs. Providing similar services through separate programs can lead to additional inefficiencies. We recently reported on the potential overlap and duplication in employment and training programs. Specifically, we found that TANF, Workforce Investment Act Adult (WIA Adult), and Employment Service (ES) programs often maintain separate administrative structures to provide some of the same services, such as job search assistance, to low-income individuals. Simplifying policies and processes Simplifying policies and processes—especially those related to eligibility determination processes and various federal funding sources—could potentially save resources, improve productivity, and help staff focus more time on performing essential program activities, such as providing quality services and accurate benefits to recipients. 2. Our previous work indicates that the federal government can help simplify processes and potentially reduce long-term costs by facilitating technology enhancements across programs and in states. Technology plays a central role in the management of human service programs and keeping up with technological advancements offers opportunities for streamlining eligibility processes, providing timely services, and improving program integrity. 3. Fostering state innovation and evaluation for evidence-based decisionmaking In our complex, decentralized intergovernmental system, states and localities have frequently served as laboratories that foster innovation and test approaches that can benefit the nation. The information from these evaluations would help the federal government determine which strategies are most effective without investing time and resources in unproven strategies. Achieving meaningful results in many policy and program areas requires some combination of coordinated efforts among various actors across federal agencies, with other governments at state and local levels, nongovernmental organizations, for-profit and not-for-profit contractors, and the private sector. In addition to collaboration, caution is urged in addressing any duplication and resulting inefficiencies in these programs that many individuals and families rely on. Because of the array of services provided to meet households’ various needs, it is not surprising to see various entities involved, with some fragmentation of administration, some overlap in populations served, and some duplication of services offered. These features may be warranted, for example, to ensure quality services are provided and certain populations are served. However, our work indicates that further exploration of the extent of fragmentation, overlap, and duplication is warranted to better identify ways to streamline and improve programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The federal government, often in concert with states, provides assistance to millions of individuals and families each year through a multiplicity of programs. These programs play a key role in supporting workers who have lost their jobs, families with low-incomes, and vulnerable children who have experienced abuse and neglect. However, given the fiscal pressures facing the federal government and the continued demands placed on assistance programs, it is critical that programs designed to serve those most in need provide benefits and services as effectively and efficiently as possible. In light of concerns about fragmentation, duplication, and overlap in government programs, this testimony addresses: (1) the key characteristics of some programs and tax expenditures that provide assistance to individuals and families; (2) problems in administering and providing services through multiple programs; and (3) actions that may help address these problems. We focused on programs under the jurisdiction of the Subcommittee of Human Resources and some related programs and tax expenditures for children and working-age adults; we developed an illustrative but not all-inclusive list of these programs. We relied on work conducted between 2001 and 2011, which employed an array of methodologies. These included surveys of federal and state officials; site visits to states and local areas; interviews with local, state, and federal officials; and analysis of agency data and documents.
What GAO Found
Various federal programs and tax expenditures exist to assist individuals and families by providing income support, child care, and child welfare services. Other programs help meet these households' needs in other areas, such as health and nutrition. Overall, several congressional committees as well as six federal agencies oversee these programs at the federal level, while federal agencies, state and local agencies, as well as for-profit and nonprofit agencies directly provide services at the local level. Families can receive benefits from one or more of these programs. For example, a low-income family may be eligible for and receive income support through Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), and Child Support Enforcement, as well as subsidized child care assistance. This array of programs plays a key role in supporting those in need, but our work has shown it to be too fragmented and overly complex--for clients to navigate, for program operators to administer efficiently, and for program managers and policymakers to assess program performance. Individuals often must visit multiple offices to apply for aid and provide the same information and documentation each time--a process that is cumbersome and inefficient. The complexity and variation in eligibility rules and other requirements among programs contribute to time-consuming and duplicative administrative processes that add to overall costs. Some programs provide similar services through separate programs, resulting in additional inefficiencies. For example, we recently reported that TANF, Workforce Investment Act Adult (WIA Adult), and Employment Service (ES) programs often maintain separate administrative structures to provide some of the same services and activities, such as job search assistance, to low-income individuals. In addition, gaps in information can hamper program oversight. Approaches such as simplifying policies, improving technology, and fostering innovation and evaluation can improve services and reduce costs. Simplifying policies can improve productivity and help staff focus more time on activities such as ensuring the accuracy of benefits. Facilitating technology enhancements can streamline eligibility processes and improve program integrity. In addition, fostering state innovation and evaluation can help the federal government and policymakers determine which approaches are the most cost-effective and limit investment in unproven strategies. Because federal programs have evolved over time to meet various needs, it is not surprising to see multiple programs with some fragmentation of administration, some overlap in populations served, and some duplication of services offered. These features may be warranted, for example, to ensure quality services are provided and certain populations are served. However, our work indicates that further exploration of the extent of fragmentation, overlap, and duplication could help better identify ways to streamline and improve programs and to reduce inefficiencies. |
gao_GAO-10-414 | gao_GAO-10-414_0 | FAA Analyzes Data on Past Safety Events to Prevent Their Recurrence and Plans to Use Data to Support a More Proactive Approach to Managing Risks
FAA Is Shifting from a Reactive to a Proactive Approach to Using Data to Manage Risk
For decades, the aviation industry and federal regulators, including FAA, have used data reactively to identify the causes of aviation accidents and incidents and take actions to prevent their recurrence. In addition, several experts we spoke with said that proactively identifying risks is necessary to maintain the current level of safety and possibly achieve an even higher level of safety in the future. FAA’s goal is for the Office of Aviation Safety to have initial operating capabilities in place for SMS by the end of fiscal year 2010. Because SMS relies on data to identify emerging risks, FAA has an effort under way to enhance its access to industry data and improve its analysis capability. According to a senior FAA official, this automated analysis process is unique and pathbreaking and will allow for more efficient safety analyses. FAA Is Developing a Plan for Using Data under SMS, but the Plan Does Not Fully Address Data, Analysis, and Staffing Requirements
As part of its efforts to develop initial SMS capabilities, FAA expects to address how data and analysis will help it identify emerging aviation safety risks. This combination of promised immunity for self-reporting and threat of enforcement and disciplinary action for remaining silent creates an incentive for industry personnel to participate in the voluntary reporting programs. However, FAA lacks carrier-specific information on why air carriers are not participating in voluntary reporting programs. FAA Lacks Data to Assess the Safety of Certain Industry Sectors
FAA’s ability to monitor and manage risk for certain industry sectors, such as general aviation, air ambulance operators, and air cargo carriers, is limited by incomplete data. FAA Has Various Processes in Place to Help Ensure Data Quality, but Weaknesses Still Exist
FAA Has Taken a Number of Steps to Help Ensure Data Quality
FAA, along with the international aviation community, recognizes that high-quality data—that is, reliable, valid data—are essential to the effectiveness of a data-driven approach to safety, such as SMS. For example, agencies should have managers review data, have procedures in place to verify that data are complete and accurate, and correct erroneous data. While NextGen technologies and procedures are intended to increase the safety, efficiency, and capacity of the national airspace system, their introduction could have unintended effects on system safety if not done in a comprehensive manner. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help improve and expand FAA’s capability to use data for aviation safety oversight, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to take the following four actions: develop and implement a comprehensive plan that addresses how data fit into FAA’s implementation of a proactive approach to safety oversight and ensure that this plan fully describes the relevant data challenges (such as ensuring data quality and continued access to voluntarily reported safety data), analytical approaches, and staffing requirements and integrates efforts to address them; given the importance of high-quality data, extend standard quality controls, as appropriate, to the databases that support aviation safety oversight to ensure that the data are as reliable and valid as possible; proceed with all deliberate speed to develop the capability to model the impact of NextGen changes on the national airspace system and manage any risks emerging from these changes; and systematically identify the reasons that carriers are not participating in voluntary reporting programs, such as through a survey, and identify and implement further steps to encourage greater program participation, especially by smaller carriers. We then identified 13 databases available to FAA that contained data on these safety events and reviewed these databases. To determine the extent to which FAA has access to data for monitoring aviation safety and the safety performance of various aviation industry sectors, we interviewed FAA data analysts, contractors, and other officials responsible for data management. | Why GAO Did This Study
To improve aviation safety, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) plans to have in place the initial capabilities of a risk-based approach to safety oversight, known as a safety management system (SMS), by the end of fiscal year 2010. FAA is also implementing new procedures and technologies to enhance the safety, capacity, and efficiency of the national airspace system. Data are central to SMS and FAA's ability to test the impact of these changes on safety. This congressionally requested report addresses FAA's (1) current and planned use of data to oversee aviation safety, (2) access to data for monitoring aviation safety and the safety performance of various industry sectors, and (3) efforts to help ensure data quality. To perform this work, GAO reviewed 13 databases that contain data on key aviation safety events, assessed data quality controls for the databases, and interviewed agency and industry officials, as well as 10 experts in aviation safety and data.
What GAO Found
FAA analyzes data on past safety events, such as engine failures, to prevent their recurrence and plans to use data to support a more proactive approach to managing risk. For example, weather and air traffic control data helped identify factors associated with injuries from turbulence. As part of SMS, FAA plans to analyze data proactively to support a risk-based approach to safety oversight. For example, FAA plans to use data to model the impact of proposed changes in procedures and technologies on the safety of the national airspace system. Experts said that identifying risks is necessary to maintain the current level of safety and possibly achieve a higher level of safety in the future. Because SMS relies on data to identify emerging risks, FAA has an effort under way to enhance its access to industry data and improve its capability for automated analysis of multiple databases. According to FAA, this effort will allow for more efficient safety analyses. FAA is also developing a plan for managing data under SMS, but the plan does not fully address data, analysis, or staffing requirements. Without such requirements, the plan will not provide timely guidance for implementing SMS. FAA has access to some voluntarily reported data, which are important for SMS, but not all carriers and aviation personnel participate in FAA's voluntary reporting programs. Such data are gathered electronically by equipment on aircraft or reported by aviation personnel or carriers following noncriminal, unintentional violations or safety events. Industry personnel have some incentives to participate in voluntary programs, such as promised immunity from disciplinary action, but concerns about sanctions and the cost of equipment have deterred full participation, especially by smaller carriers. While FAA has some information on reasons for nonparticipation and has taken some steps to promote greater participation, it lacks carrier-specific information on why air carriers are not participating. FAA also lacks data to assess the safety performance of certain industry sectors, such as air cargo and air ambulance operators. GAO has previously made recommendations to address this lack of data. FAA concurred with GAO's prior recommendations and is taking actions to address them. To help ensure data quality--that is, data that are reliable (complete and accurate) and valid (measure what is intended)--FAA has implemented a number of data quality controls that are consistent with GAO's standards for data quality, but some weaknesses exit. For example, all the databases GAO reviewed had at least some controls in place to ensure that erroneous data are identified, reported, and corrected. However, about half the databases lack an important control--managers do not review the data prior to entry into the data system. FAA is taking steps to address its data weaknesses, but vulnerabilities remain, potentially limiting the usefulness of FAA's data for the safety analyses planned to support SMS. |
gao_GAO-14-808 | gao_GAO-14-808_0 | 2.) The policy also requires VISN leadership to oversee the consult processes for VAMCs in their networks, and requires each VAMC to manage individual consults consistent with VHA’s timeliness guidelines. Conduct a clinical review, as warranted, to determine if care has been provided or is still needed for unresolved consults—those open more than 90 days. VHA’s Consult Process Has Not Ensured Veterans Always Receive Outpatient Specialty Care in a Timely Manner, or at All
Our review of a sample of consults at five VAMCs found that veterans did not always receive outpatient specialty care in a timely manner, if at all. We also found consults for which veterans did not receive the outpatient specialty care requested— 64 of the 150 consults in our sample (43 percent)—and those for which the requested specialty care was provided, but the consults were not properly closed in the consult system. We also found that for the 28 consults in our sample for which VAMCs provided care to veterans within 90 days, an extended amount of time elapsed before specialty care providers completed all but 1 of them in the consult system. As a result, the consults remained open in the system, making them appear as though the requested care was not provided within 90 days. For 4 of the 10 physical therapy consults we examined for one VAMC, we found that between 108 and 152 days elapsed, with no apparent actions taken to schedule appointments for the veterans for whom consults were requested. VAMC officials cited increased demand for services, patient no-shows, and cancelled appointments, among the factors that hinder specialty care providers’ ability to meet VHA’s guideline for completing consults within 90 days. VHA’s Limited Oversight of Consults Impedes Its Ability to Ensure VAMCs Provide Timely Access to Specialty Care
Since launching the consult business rules initiative in May 2013, VHA officials reported overseeing the consult process system-wide primarily by reviewing consult reports created from its national database to monitor VAMCs’ progress in meeting VHA’s timeliness guidelines. VHA and VISNs do not routinely assess VAMCs’ management of consults. For example, one VAMC found that its process for managing consults requested from other VAMCs was not clear to providers and needed to be improved to mitigate delays in processing such consults. By primarily relying on reviewing data and not routinely conducting an assessment of VAMCs’ management of consults, VHA and VISN officials may be limited in identifying systemic issues affecting VAMCs’ ability to provide veterans with timely access to care. VHA lacks documentation of how VAMCs addressed unresolved consults. Given the thousands of consults that have been closed by VAMCs, the lack of documentation and independent verification of how VAMCs addressed these unresolved consults raises questions about the reliability of VHA consult data and whether the data accurately reflects whether patients received the care needed in a timely manner, if at all. Furthermore, VHA does not have a formal process by which VAMCs could share best practices system-wide. We found that VAMCs may not be benefiting from the challenges and solutions other VAMCs discovered when implementing strategies for managing future care consults. However, we found that VHA has not developed a detailed, system-wide policy on how to address patient no-shows and cancelled appointments, two frequently noted causes of delays in providing care. Limitations in VHA’s oversight of the consult process have affected the reliability of VHA’s consult data and its usefulness for oversight. Further, VHA’s decentralized approach for handling patient no-shows and cancelled appointments, as well as other issues, makes it difficult to compare timeliness of providing outpatient specialty care system-wide. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve VHA’s ability to effectively oversee the consult process, and help ensure VAMCs are providing veterans with timely access to outpatient specialty care, we recommend that the Secretary of Veterans Affairs direct the Interim Under Secretary for Health to take the following six actions:
Assess the extent to which specialty care providers across all VAMCs, including residents who may be serving on a temporary basis, are using the correct clinical progress notes to complete consults in a timely manner, and, as warranted, develop and implement system- wide solutions such as technical enhancements, to ensure this is done appropriately. In its written comments, VA concurred with all six of the report’s recommendations. | Why GAO Did This Study
There have been numerous reports of VAMCs failing to provide timely care to veterans, including specialty care. In some cases, delays have reportedly resulted in harm to patients. In 2012, VHA found that its consult data were not adequate to determine the extent to which veterans received timely outpatient specialty care. In May 2013, VHA launched an initiative to standardize aspects of the consult process at its 151 VAMCs and improve its ability to oversee consults.
GAO was asked to evaluate VHA's management of the consult process. This report evaluates (1) the extent to which VHA's consult process has ensured veterans' timely access to outpatient specialty care, and (2) how VHA oversees the consult process to ensure veterans are receiving outpatient specialty care in accordance with its timeliness guidelines. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from VHA and from five VAMCs that varied based on size and location. GAO also reviewed a non-generalizeable sample of 150 consults requested across the five VAMCs.
What GAO Found
Based on its review of a non-generalizable sample of 150 consults requested from April 2013 through September 2013, GAO found that the Department of Veterans Affairs' (VA) Veterans Health Administration's (VHA) management of the consult process has not ensured that veterans always receive outpatient specialty care in a timely manner, if at all. Specifically, GAO found that for 122 of the 150 consults reviewed—requests for evaluation or management of a patient for a specific clinical concern—specialty care providers did not provide veterans with the requested care in accordance with VHA's 90-day timeliness guideline. For example, for 4 of the 10 physical therapy consults GAO reviewed for one VA medical center (VAMC), between 108 and 152 days elapsed with no apparent actions taken to schedule an appointment for the veteran. VAMC officials cited increased demand for services, and patient no-shows and cancelled appointments among the factors that lead to delays and hinder their ability to meet VHA's timeliness guideline. Further, for all but 1 of the 28 consults for which VAMCs provided care within 90 days, an extended amount of time elapsed before specialty care providers properly documented in the consult system that the care was provided. As a result, the consults remained open in the system, making them appear as though the requested care was not provided within 90 days.
VHA's limited oversight of consults impedes its ability to ensure VAMCs provide timely access to specialty care. VHA officials reported overseeing the consult process primarily by reviewing data on the timeliness of consults; however, GAO found limitations in VHA's oversight, including oversight of its initiative designed to standardize aspects of the consult process. Specifically:
VHA does not routinely assess how VAMCs are managing their local consult processes, and thus is limited in its ability to identify systemic underlying causes of delays.
As part of its consult initiative, VHA required VAMCs to review a backlog of thousands of unresolved consults—those open more than 90 days—and if warranted to close them. However, VHA did not require VAMCs to document their rationales for closing them. As a result, questions remain about whether VAMCs appropriately closed these consults and if VHA's consult data accurately reflect whether veterans received the care needed in a timely manner, if at all.
VHA does not have a formal process by which VAMCs can share best practices for managing consults. As a result, VAMCs may not be benefitting from the challenges and solutions other VAMCs have discovered regarding managing the consult process.
VHA lacks a detailed system-wide policy for how VAMCs should manage patient no-shows and cancelled appointments for outpatient specialty care, making it difficult to compare timeliness in providing this care system-wide.
Consequently, concerns remain about the reliability of VHA's consult data, as well as VHA's oversight of the consult process.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that VHA take actions to improve its oversight of consults, including (1) routinely assess VAMCs' local consult processes, (2) require VAMCs to document rationales for closing unresolved consults, (3) develop a formal process for VAMCs to share consult management best practices, and (4) develop a policy for managing patient no-shows and cancelled appointments. VA concurred with all of GAO's recommendations and identified actions it is taking to implement them. |
gao_GAO-03-845 | gao_GAO-03-845_0 | FERC Has Made Progress, but Work Remains to Ensure That Its Oversight and Enforcement Capability Is Comprehensive and Systematic
With the formation of OMOI, FERC is making headway in establishing an oversight and enforcement capability for competitive energy markets. OMOI has taken a significant step forward in setting out its vision, mission, and primary functions as a framework for comprehensively overseeing the markets; developing its basic work processes; and beginning to use an array of tools to oversee the markets. The office also has almost completed its staffing to authorized levels. Additional actions to formalize the office’s work processes and procedures and to more clearly define its role would help ensure that its efforts to oversee energy markets are systematic and comprehensive. Fifth, the office has not developed outcome or results-oriented performance measures that express what the office will be working to achieve and that can be used to assess its progress in carrying out its goals and objectives. OMOI Has Not Decided on the Level of Detail at Which It Will Review Market Transactions
According to OMOI, its primary functions are to assess market performance, ensure conformance with Commission rules, and produce internal and external reports on the results. OMOI Implemented Informal Processes and Procedures to Begin Its Work
OMOI does not yet have formal processes and written procedures to direct its staff in their activities. For example, OMOI monitored a natural gas price spike in February 2003 and tracked its effects on the electricity market in the New York area. FERC has described the role of the market monitoring units in various terms, including as the “first line of defense” against market problems, its “eyes and ears,” its “soldiers on the front line,” and as “practically an extension of, or a surrogate for, the Commission’s own market monitoring and investigative staff.” The significance of the monitoring units’ role is illustrated by OMOI’s response to our request for information on how the office’s market oversight approach will identify certain trading schemes, such as those used by the Enron Corporation in the California electricity market and other manipulations of the energy markets. 2). It is difficult to judge the validity of the staff’s concerns until OMOI has clearly defined its role. In our June 2002 report, we pointed out that FERC was one of many federal agencies that had not given adequate attention to human capital management. Accordingly, we recommended that FERC develop a comprehensive strategic human capital management plan to include the following: a skills assessment program that would identify gaps in skills currently held by the workforce that are necessary to carry out the agency’s evolving regulatory and oversight responsibilities; a recruitment and retention initiative, based on priorities for meeting future regulatory and oversight staffing needs, which addresses filling skill gaps in the current workforce; a training effort targeted at increasing staff knowledge in the areas of market functions and market structures so that FERC staff will be better prepared to regulate and oversee competitive energy markets; and a comprehensive succession plan for solving challenges posed by the large number of impending retirements within the agency, including reliable projections of the number of eligible staff who may actually retire. Since our prior report, FERC has expanded its use of some existing human capital flexibilities to improve its ability to recruit and retain employees. In addition, FERC has expanded its use of recruitment and retention bonuses. While these initiatives are important to OMOI’s success, the activities that the office needs to engage in, the information and other resources it needs to carry out these activities, and the working relationships it needs to establish with others depend on the role that it has defined for itself to achieve its mission. Although FERC’s recently completed human capital plan begins to lay the foundation for the agency to strategically manage its human capital, it does not yet contain key elements that could increase the likelihood that the plan will be effective. To strengthen FERC’s human capital plan, we recommend that the Chairman of FERC revise the agency’s plan to (1) identify specific activities, resources, and time frames to implement the human capital initiatives and (2) provide results-oriented measures to track the agency’s progress in implementing the initiatives and evaluate their effectiveness. 1. | Why GAO Did This Study
In June 2002, GAO reported that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) had not yet adequately revised its regulatory and oversight approach for the natural gas and electricity industries' transition from regulated monopolies to competitive markets. GAO also concluded that FERC faced significant human capital challenges to transform its workforce to meet such changes. In responding to the report, FERC said that the new Office of Market Oversight and Investigations (OMOI) it was creating and human capital improvements under way would address these concerns. GAO was asked to report on FERC's progress in (1) establishing an oversight and enforcement capability for competitive energy markets and (2) improving agency-wide human capital management.
What GAO Found
FERC has made strides in putting an energy market oversight and enforcement capability in place, but work remains to ensure that its efforts will be comprehensive and systematic. Since FERC declared OMOI functional in August 2002, the office has focused primarily on outlining its vision, mission, and primary functions; developing basic work processes; integrating its use of an array of tools to oversee the markets; and hiring staff with market experience. OMOI is also assessing its data needs and developing its working relationships with others, such as the industry's market monitoring units. Nonetheless, the office still has work to do in the following two key areas. Clearly defining its role: OMOI has not clearly defined its role and the activities that it will engage in to achieve its mission. For example, the office has not yet decided on the level of detail at which it will review electricity markets. This decision has substantial implications for the office's data, technology, resource, and staff skill mix needs. Developing formal processes and written procedures: OMOI's processes are largely informal and ad hoc, and it has few written procedures to ensure that its efforts are coordinated, systematic, understood by its staff, and transparent to its stakeholders. Although OMOI has had some early accomplishments--such as a $20 million civil penalty against a company for anticompetitive behavior--it is difficult to judge how effective the office will be until its role and major processes are clearly set out. FERC is also making progress toward addressing its considerable human capital management challenges, but additional actions could increase its likelihood of success. FERC's success in these efforts is important because the extent to which it can carry out its mission in a changing environment depends on its ability to adjust its staff skills and abilities in a difficult context. For example, over half of its workforce will be eligible to retire by 2007. In response, FERC has, among other things, expanded its use of certain personnel flexibilities, such as recruiting and retention bonuses, and is considering use of additional flexibilities. More importantly, FERC, in February 2003, developed a human capital plan. However, the plan does not contain some elements key to successful implementation, including (1) details on specific activities and resources needed to implement its human capital initiatives and (2) results-oriented measures that can be used to track the agency's progress in implementing the initiatives and evaluate their effectiveness. FERC also has not established time frames for many of its human capital initiatives. |
gao_GAO-05-404 | gao_GAO-05-404_0 | For example, in terms of containers, CBP data indicates that in 2003 about 90 percent of the world’s cargo moved by container. Therefore, it is vital for CBP to try to strike a balance between its antiterrorism efforts and facilitating the flow of legitimate international trade and travel. A key element of this strategy is CBP’s targeting and inspection of cargo that arrives at U.S. ports. The extent of review varies, since according to CBP, the large volume of imports and CBP’s limited resources make it impossible to physically inspect all containers without disrupting the flow of commerce. C-TPAT is a voluntary program designed to improve the security of the international supply chain while maintaining an efficient flow of goods. In return for committing to making improvements to the security of their shipments by joining the program, C-TPAT members may receive benefits that result in reduced scrutiny of their shipments (e.g., reduced number of inspections or shorter border wait times for their shipments). As table 2 shows, these benefits may reduce the scrutiny of members’ shipments. CBP Grants Benefits before Verification of Security Procedures
CBP has in place a two-pronged process to review members’ qualifications for program benefits. Second, CBP has in place a vetting process to assess the compliance and violation history of importers before granting them benefits. Ultimately, however, neither the certification nor vetting process provides an actual verification that the supply chain security measures contained in the C-TPAT member’s security profile are accurate and are being followed before CBP grants the member benefits. Weaknesses in Process for Verifying Security Procedures
After providing benefits, CBP has a validation process to verify C-TPAT members’ security measures have been implemented and that program benefits should continue. Validation Process Lacks Rigor to Achieve Stated Purpose
CBP’s validation process is not rigorous enough to achieve its stated purpose, which is to ensure that the security procedures outlined in members’ security profiles are reliable, accurate, and effective. CBP has no written guidelines for its supply chain specialist to indicate what scope of effort is adequate for the validation to ensure that the member’s security measures are reliable, accurate, and effective, in part because it seeks to emphasize the partnership nature of the program. However, CBP has not determined the number of supply chain specialists it needs or the extent to which validations are needed to provide reasonable assurance that it is employing a good risk management approach for the program. Incomplete Progress in Addressing Management Weaknesses
CBP continues to expand the C-TPAT program without addressing management weaknesses that could hinder the bureau from achieving the program’s dual goals of securing the flow of goods bound for the United States and facilitating the flow of trade. CBP Has Finalized Its Strategic Plan
While a draft of this report was with DHS for comment, CBP issued a final strategic plan for C-TPAT on January 13, 2005. For example, according to the plan there are five goals for the C-TPAT program: 1. ensure that C-TPAT partners improve the security of their supply chains pursuant to C-TPAT security criteria, 2. provide incentives and benefits to include expedited processing of C-TPAT shipments to C-TPAT partners, 3. internationalize the core principles of C-TPAT through cooperation and coordination with the international community, 4. support other CBP security and facilitation initiatives, and 5. improve administration of the C-TPAT program. CBP Has Not Completed Development of Performance Measures
CBP has told us that it continues developing a comprehensive set of performance measures and indicators for C-TPAT. However, the weaknesses in the validation process we found raise questions about its effectiveness. Because of these weaknesses, CBP’s ability to provide assurance that the program prevents terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States is limited. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help CBP achieve C-TPAT objectives and address the challenges associated with its continued development, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection to take the following five actions: strengthen the validation process by providing appropriate guidance to specialists conducting validations, including what level of review is adequate to determine whether member security practices are reliable, accurate, and effective; determine the extent (in terms of numbers or percentage) to which members should be validated in lieu of the original goal to validate all members within 3 years of certification; complete the development of performance measures, to include outcome-based measures and performance targets, to track the program’s status in meeting its strategic goals; complete a human capital plan that clearly describes how the C-TPAT program will recruit, train, and retain sufficient staff to successfully conduct the work of the program, including reviewing security profiles, vetting, and conducting validations to mitigate program risk; and implement a records management system that accurately and timely documents key decisions and significant operational events, including a reliable system for (1) documenting and maintaining records of all decisions in the application through validation processes, including but not limited to documentation of the objectives, scope, methodologies, and limitations of validations, and (2) tracking member status. This program goes beyond trade facilitation in that it awards benefits that can reduce the scrutiny given cargo containers arriving in the United States. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Objectives
We addressed the following questions regarding the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP, formerly the U.S. Customs Service) Customs- Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT): What benefits does CBP provide to C-TPAT members? Before providing benefits, what approach does CBP take to determine C-TPAT members’ eligibility for them? After providing benefits, how does CBP verify that members have implemented their security measures? To what extent has CBP developed strategies and related management tools for achieving the program’s goals? | Why GAO Did This Study
This report is a publicly available version of our report on the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designated our original report as Limited Official Use because of the sensitive and specific nature of the information it contained. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the DHS bureau responsible for protecting the nation's borders at and between the official ports of entry, has the dual goals of preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States and also facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel. Approximately 90 percent of the world's cargo moves by container. Addressing the threat posed by the movement of containerized cargo across U.S. borders has traditionally posed many challenges for CBP, in particular balancing the bureau's border protection functions and trade enforcement mission with its goal of facilitating the flow of cargo and persons into the United States. CBP has said that the large volume of imports and its limited resources make it impossible to physically inspect all oceangoing containers without disrupting the flow of commerce, and it is unrealistic to expect that all containers warrant such inspection. To address its responsibility to improve cargo security while facilitating commerce, CBP employs multiple strategies. Among these strategies, CBP has in place an initiative known as C-TPAT, which aims to secure the flow of goods bound for the United States by developing a strong, voluntary antiterrorism partnership with the trade community. C-TPAT members commit to improving the security of their supply chain (flow of goods from manufacturer to retailer) and develop written security profiles that outline the security measures in place for the company's supply chain. In exchange for this commitment, CBP offers C-TPAT members benefits for participating that may reduce the level of scrutiny given to their shipments, potentially resulting in a reduced number of inspections of their cargo at U.S. borders. The program is promising, but previous work has raised concerns about its management and its ability to achieve its ultimate goal of improved cargo security. Given our past concerns about the program's effectiveness and in light of the program's rapid expansion, we examined selected aspects of the program's operation and management. This report addresses the following issues: (1) What benefits does CBP provide to C-TPAT members? (2) Before providing benefits, what approach does CBP take to determine C-TPAT members' eligibility for them? (3) After providing benefits, how does CBP verify that members have implemented their security measures? and (4) To what extent has CBP developed strategies and related management tools for achieving the program's goals?
What GAO Found
In return for committing to making improvements to the security of their shipments by joining the program, C-TPAT members receive a range of benefits that reduce the level of scrutiny CBP provides to their shipments bound for the United States. These benefits may change the risk characterization of their shipments, thereby reducing the probability of extensive documentary and physical inspection. Other benefits include access to FAST lanes on the Canadian and Mexican borders, expedited cargo processing at FAST lanes, and an emphasis on self-policing and self-monitoring of security activities. In addition, CBP grants benefits to C-TPAT members that do not directly affect the level of scrutiny given to their shipments. Before providing benefits, CBP uses a two-pronged approach to assess C-TPAT members. First, CBP has a certification process to review the self-reported information contained in applicants' membership agreements and security profiles. Second, CBP has in place a vetting process to try to assess the compliance with customs laws and regulations and violation history of and intelligence data on importers before granting them benefits. CBP believes that this two-pronged approach provides adequate assurance before granting benefits. However, this approach grants benefits to members before they undergo the validation process. After providing benefits, CBP has a validation process to verify that C-TPAT members' security measures have been implemented and that program benefits should continue. However, we found several weaknesses in the validation process that compromise CBP's ability to provide an actual verification that supply chain security measures in C-TPAT members' security profiles are accurate and are being followed. First, the validation process is not rigorous enough to achieve its stated purpose, which is to ensure that the security procedures outlined in members' security profiles are reliable, accurate, and effective. Related to this, CBP has no written guidelines for its supply chain specialists to indicate what scope of effort is adequate for the validation to ensure that the member's measures are reliable, accurate, and effective. In addition, CBP has not determined the extent to which validations are needed. While CBP has recently completed a strategic plan, we found weaknesses in some of the tools it uses to manage the program that could hinder the bureau in achieving the program's dual goals of securing the flow of goods bound for the United States and facilitating the flow of trade. CBP's new strategic plan appears to provide the bureau with a general framework on which to base key decisions, including key strategic planning elements such as strategic goals, objectives, and strategies. However, CBP still lacks a human capital plan, a fact that has impaired its ability to manage its resources. Furthermore, CBP still has not developed a comprehensive set of performance measures and indicators, including outcome-based measures, to monitor the status of program goals. Finally, the C-TPAT program lacks an effective records management system. |
gao_GAO-07-85 | gao_GAO-07-85_0 | USCIS officials told us that of the approximately 30,000 naturalization cases where the A-file status indicated something other than received in the district office, A-files were probably available in a number of them. According to the report, several locations were not using NFTS although NFTS was available. USCIS officials offered several reasons why some staff may not be complying with NFTS file-tracking procedures. USCIS records officials stated that local management may not be emphasizing enough the importance of using NFTS. Missing A-files Can Affect the Naturalization Adjudication Process in Several Ways
Missing A-files can cause delays in awarding immigration benefits, hinder USCIS’s ability to uncover immigration fraud, and limit DHS’s ability to take enforcement actions. For example, adjudicators must take additional steps when adjudicating a naturalization application without an A-file. Specifically, these steps include verifying the applicant’s lawful admission to the United States and that the applicant has lived in the United States as a lawful permanent resident for the required amount of time—generally, 5 years—and lack of disqualifying information in USCIS databases, extra supervisory reviews to ensure that naturalization processing procedures have been followed, and not scheduling the oath ceremony on the same day that the naturalization application is adjudicated to allow sufficient time for the required supervisory reviews. Conclusions
Although USCIS deems having an A-file critical to adjudicating a naturalization application, USCIS staff are not required to record whether an A-file was used to adjudicate a naturalization application. DHS staff who have access to A-files may not be consistently using NFTS to track the movement of A-files, hindering the ability to locate A-files when needed. Recommendations for Executive Action
In order to improve USCIS’s management information, prevent unnecessary delay, and more efficiently adjudicate applications, we are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Director of USCIS to require users to record or note whether an A-file was used to adjudicate a naturalization application and work together with other DHS users of A-files to determine the extent to which staff may not be complying with NFTS procedures for updating the system and why and correct any identified deficiencies in file-tracking compliance. In addition, to examine the extent to which USCIS records how often naturalization applications are adjudicated without an A-file, as well as the reasons why an A-file might be missing and what steps USCIS takes to compensate for any lack of an A-file during an adjudication process we obtained data related to naturalization applications adjudicated in fiscal year 2005 contained in the Computer-Linked Application Information Management System (CLAIMS) 4 database that records information from the naturalization application and related information, the results from USCIS quality assurance audits of a sample of naturalization applications reviewed in fiscal year 2005, and A-files indicated as lost and, as having been in transit and yet to be recorded as received in USCIS’s National File Tracking System (NFTS). | Why GAO Did This Study
To document the interactions of aliens with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and other government entities, USCIS creates alien files, or A-files. While deemed critical, especially in making citizenship decisions, A-files are sometimes missing during adjudications. In 2002, naturalization was granted to an alien whose A-file was missing and who was later found to be associated with a terrorist organization. GAO focused its review on (1) how often USCIS adjudicates naturalization applications without an A-file and why, (2) the effect that missing A-files can have on the adjudication process, and (3) steps taken to help mitigate the risk of missing A-files. To address these questions, GAO interviewed officials and staff from USCIS and reviewed relevant data, policies, and procedures related to processing naturalization applications and the automated file-tracking system DHS established to track the movement of A-files.
What GAO Found
A-files were not available to adjudicate naturalization applications in a small percentage of cases. GAO found that of the naturalization applications adjudicated in 2005, about 30,000--or about 4 percent of them--may have been adjudicated without A-files. However, this number may be less because USCIS staff are not required to record whether an A-file was available. USCIS officials said that a major reason A-files were not available for naturalization application adjudications is that staff are not using the automated file-tracking system. USCIS officials suggested that staff might not be using the automated file-tracking system for lack of sufficient training on how to use the system, while local management may not be adequately emphasizing the importance of complying with A-file tracking policies and procedures. Missing A-files can have an impact on the process of adjudicating naturalization applications in several ways. For example, when an A-file is not available at the location indicated in the automated file-tracking system, additional time is spent trying to locate the file, which slows the adjudication process and applicants may wait longer for USCIS to process their application. In addition, missing A-files can hinder USCIS's ability to uncover immigration benefit fraud and limit DHS' ability to take enforcement actions. USCIS has steps in place to help mitigate the risk of adjudicating a naturalization application without an A-file. These steps include verifying the applicant's lawful admission to the United States and conducting extra supervisory reviews to ensure that naturalization processing procedures have been followed. |
gao_RCED-99-45 | gao_RCED-99-45_0 | Nonpoint sources of water pollution, or diffused sources, have been identified as the primary reason for these continued problems. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Chairman, Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, asked us to (1) provide background information and funding levels for federal programs that primarily address nonpoint source pollution (i.e., those programs identified as either focusing primarily on nonpoint source pollution or that devote at least $10 million annually to the problem); (2) examine the way EPA assesses the overall potential costs of reducing nonpoint source pollution nationwide and alternative methods for doing so; and (3) describe nonpoint source pollution from federal facilities, lands, and activities that federal agencies manage or authorize, or for which they issue permits or licenses. Key Federal Programs That Address Nonpoint Source Pollution
The 35 federal programs identified by the agencies represent a broad array of activities, reflecting diversity in both the nature of nonpoint source pollution and the remedies needed to address it. Some programs are intended to deal directly with the problem. By far, USDA’s largest source of funding for nonpoint pollution activities is the Conservation Reserve Program, which accounted for about 65 percent of all the federal funds identified in this report obligated to address nonpoint source pollution for fiscal years 1994 through 1998. Although EPA’s study represents one of the few attempts to estimate control costs nationwide, EPA officials acknowledge that their methodology has several limitations. Watershed-Based Approach Offers a Promising Alternative to Estimate Control Costs
Addressing the limitations mentioned previously can improve EPA’s cost estimation methodology and resulting cost estimate, but the agency is also considering an additional approach that would take into account the unique characteristics of individual watersheds. Recommendations
To improve EPA’s approach toward estimating the cost of controlling nonpoint source pollution, we recommend that the Administrator of EPA direct the Office of Water to address key limitations in its approach and presentation of the methodology and its results by (1) including the costs of operating and maintaining best management practices, (2) assessing and disclosing the range of uncertainty associated with its control cost estimate, and (3) more fully documenting its cost estimation methodology and work with researchers at USDA and USGS to obtain lessons learned, data sources, and modeling approaches to help advance EPA’s own efforts to develop a watershed-based cost-estimation approach. Federal and state officials that we contacted identified five of these activities as those with the most potential to contribute significantly to nonpoint source pollution: silviculture (specifically timber harvesting and associated roads), grazing, drainage from abandoned mines, recreation, and hydromodification. 4.3.) 4.8.) With few exceptions, federal agencies do not have specific guidance or policies for dealing with recreation and associated water quality impacts. Other Clean Water Act Sections Addressing Nonpoint Pollution
In addition to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) programs discussed in this report that primarily address nonpoint source pollution, a few other programs authorized by the Clean Water Act address nonpoint source pollution but to a lesser extent. 6. Our comments on the Department’s two major concerns follow. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the impacts of nonpoint source water pollution and the potential costs of dealing with the problem, focusing on: (1) funding levels for federal programs that primarily address nonpoint source pollution; (2) the way Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) assesses the overall potential costs of reducing nonpoint pollution nationwide and alternative methods for doing so; and (3) nonpoint source pollution from federal facilities, lands, and activities that federal agencies manage or authorize, or for which they issue permits or licenses.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the federal agencies GAO contacted reported spending about $3 billion annually for fiscal years 1994 through 1998 on 35 programs that they identified as addressing nonpoint source pollution; (2) some deal directly with nonpoint source pollution; others focus on different objectives but still address the problem; (3) while EPA is the primary agency involved in water quality issues given its role under the Clean Water Act, many other federal agencies have programs addressing nonpoint source pollution and, in some cases, devote a significant amount of resources to the problem; (4) in particular, the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) programs account for over $11 billion of all federal funding identified by these agencies; (5) USDA officials explain that while most of the programs identified by the agency do not have specific nonpoint source pollution objectives, the programs' activities nonetheless help to reduce nonpoint source pollution; (6) EPA has estimated the annual costs of controlling three major sources of nonpoint source pollution to be $9.4 billion, an amount that represents one of the few systematic attempts at estimating such costs nationwide; (7) specifically, EPA's methodology to produce the estimate analyzes agriculture, silviculture, and animal feeding operations and estimates pollution-control costs for these sources; (8) EPA acknowledges that the methodology has several limitations; (9) GAO also found that the methodology does not assess and disclose the considerable range of uncertainty associated with EPA's control cost estimate and that it includes insufficient documentation of its cost-estimation methodology; (10) EPA officials told GAO that the agency is considering an additional cost-estimation methodology, a watershed based approach, that could provide a substantially more realistic estimate by taking into account the unique characteristics of individual watersheds; (11) the federal government manages or authorizes a variety of activities that result in nonpoint source pollution and, in some cases, affect water quality; and (12) the following five activities have been identified as those with the most potential to contribute significantly to nonpoint source pollution: (a) silviculture; (b) grazing; (c) drainage from abandoned mines; (d) recreation; and (e) hydromodification. |
gao_GAO-04-393 | gao_GAO-04-393_0 | The more managers know about software development processes and metrics, the better equipped they are to acquire software. Completion of these steps leads to a product design. The Software Capability Maturity Model®, for example, focuses on improving software development processes. Successful Outcomes Are Largely the Result of Creating the Right Environment, Disciplined Processes, and Useful Metrics
Leading software companies we visited have been successful at software development largely because they establish a manageable product development environment, disciplined processes, and strong metrics to manage program outcomes. Within this environment, these companies use a structured management review process, and at the end of each of four key development phases—requirements, design, coding, and testing—the companies conduct reviews so that the development team does not progress to the next phase unless it attains a certain level of knowledge. We found that leading developers are relentless in their efforts to collect metrics to improve project outcomes and processes. Outcomes on DOD’s Software-Intensive Acquisitions Were Influenced by Environment, Processes, and Metrics
In our reviews of five major DOD software-intensive weapon system acquisitions, we found mixed results. When DOD managers had a smaller, more evolutionary product with manageable requirements, used disciplined development process with gated reviews, and collected and used metrics to manage software development progress—such as the Tactical Tomahawk and the F/A-18-C/D programs—they delivered their product with less cost increase and less schedule delay. Table 2 illustrates how an evolutionary environment, effective process management, and use of meaningful metrics correlate with cost and schedule outcomes experienced by each program. Outcomes Were Poor for Programs That Did Not Use an Evolutionary Approach, Disciplined Processes, and Meaningful Metrics
The F/A-22, SBIRS, and Comanche are complex programs that attempted to achieve quantum leaps in performance requiring extensive use of software rather than follow an evolutionary approach to software development. The Air Force’s F/A-22, originally planned to be an air dominance aircraft, will also have air-to-ground attack capability. However, additional steps must be taken. The plans could be strengthened by adding specific criteria to ensure that requirements’ baselines based on systems engineering are documented and agreed to by both the acquirer and developer before a program’s initiation and that cost/benefit analyses are required when new requirements are proposed; software developers and acquirers make efforts to continually improve gated reviews and deliverables are integrated into the development developers collect and analyze metrics, including earned value to obtain knowledge about development progress and to manage risk. This is a positive step. As DOD works to finalize its software process improvement plans, it has the opportunity to put in place those practices that have proven successful in achieving improved outcomes for software- intensive systems. To ensure DOD has the knowledge it needs to oversee software-intensive acquisitions, we recommend that acquirers require software contractors to collect and report metrics related to cost, schedule, size, requirements, tests, defects, and quality to program offices on a monthly basis and before program milestones and that acquirers should ensure that contractors have an earned value management system that reports cost and schedule information at a level of work that provides information specific to software development. (c) Department of Defense Guidance—The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, in consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, shall— (1) prescribe uniformly applicable guidance for the administration of all of the programs established under subsection (a) and take such actions as are necessary to ensure that the military departments and Defense Agencies comply with the guidance; and (2) assist the Secretaries of the military departments and the heads of the Defense Agencies to carry out such programs effectively by— (A) ensuring that the criteria applicable to the selection of sources provides added emphasis on past performance of potential sources, as well as on the maturity of the software products offered by the potential sources; and (B) identifying, and serving as a clearinghouse for information regarding, best practices in software development and acquisition in both the public and private sectors. Best Practices: DOD Can Help Suppliers Contribute More to Weapon System Programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) has been relying increasingly on computer software to introduce or enhance performance capabilities of major weapon systems. To ensure successful outcomes, software acquisition requires disciplined processes and practices. Without such discipline, weapon programs encounter difficulty in meeting cost and schedule targets. For example, in fiscal year 2003, DOD might have spent as much as $8 billion to rework software because of quality-related issues. GAO was asked to identify the practices used by leading companies to acquire software and to analyze the causes of poor outcomes of selected DOD programs. GAO also was asked to evaluate DOD's efforts to develop programs for improving software acquisition processes and to assess how those efforts compare with leading companies' practices.
What GAO Found
Software developers and acquirers at firms that GAO visited use three fundamental management strategies to ensure the delivery of high-quality products on time and within budget: working in an evolutionary environment, following disciplined development processes, and collecting and analyzing meaningful metrics to measure progress. When these strategies are used together, leading firms are better equipped to improve their software development processes on a continuous basis. An evolutionary approach sets up a more manageable environment--one in which expectations are realistic and developers are permitted to make incremental improvements. The customer benefits because the initial product is available sooner and at a lower, more predictable cost. This avoids the pressure to incorporate all the desired capabilities into a single product right away. Within an evolutionary environment, there are four phases that are common to software development: setting requirements, establishing a stable design, writing code, and testing. At the end of each of these phases, developers must demonstrate that they have acquired the right knowledge before proceeding to the next development phase. To provide evidence that the right knowledge was captured, leading developers emphasize the use of meaningful metrics, which helps developers, managers, and acquirers to measure progress. These metrics focus on cost, schedule, the size of a project, performance requirements, testing, defects, and quality. In a review of five DOD programs, GAO found that outcomes were mixed for software-intensive acquisitions. The F/A-18 C/D, a fighter and attack aircraft, and the Tactical Tomahawk missile had fewer additional cost and schedule delays. For these programs, developers used an evolutionary approach, disciplined processes, and meaningful metrics. In contrast, the following programs, which did not follow these management strategies, experienced schedule delays and cost growth: F/A-22, an air dominance aircraft; Space- Based Infrared System, a missile-detection satellite system; and Comanche, a multimission helicopter. In response to congressional requirements, DOD, the military services, and the Missile Defense Agency have taken positive steps to improve the environment for acquiring software-intensive systems. However, their plans to implement software process improvement programs are not yet complete and more work is required to ensure controls that would help managers increase the chances of successful acquisition outcomes. Such controls include documenting baseline requirements agreements between the developer and acquirer that leverage systems engineering knowledge, meeting with the developer for periodic reviews (gates) during the development process, and obtaining meaningful metrics from the developer to manage the program. Furthermore, there are no assurances that program managers will be held accountable for using the plans once they are completed. |
gao_GAO-02-906 | gao_GAO-02-906_0 | Spectrum allocation involves segmenting the radio spectrum into bands of frequencies that are designated for use by particular types of radio services or classes of users, such as broadcast television and satellites. An example of this is the unexpectedly rapid growth of mobile phone use in the United States. However, as demand for this limited resource increases, particularly with the continuing emergence of new commercial wireless technologies, NTIA and FCC face serious challenges in trying to meet the growth in the needs of their respective incumbent users, while accommodating the needs of new users. Methods for Allocating Spectrum Face Difficulties and Are Not Guided by a Coordinated National Plan
Since nearly all of the usable radio spectrum has been allocated already, accommodating more services and users often involves redefining spectrum allocations. The current divided U.S. spectrum management structure has methods for allocating spectrum for new uses and users of wireless services, but these methods have occasionally resulted in lengthy negotiations between FCC and NTIA. In addition, both agencies (along with industry) are involved in preparing the United States’ unified position for World Radiocommunication Conferences (WRCs). Some Experts Have Raised Questions about Adequacy of Current Procedures
We obtained conflicting views on the effectiveness of the U.S. preparatory process for WRCs. Department of State and FCC officials told us that the work of FCC and NTIA with their respective constituencies and with each other in preparation for a conference leads to U.S. positions on WRC agenda items that are thoroughly scrutinized, well reasoned, and generally supported among federal and nonfederal parties. Federal Officials Said Activities to Encourage Efficient Federal Spectrum Use Are Hindered by Staffing and Resource Problems
NTIA is required to promote the efficient and cost-effective use of the federal spectrum that it manages—over 270,000 frequency assignments as of June 24, 2002—“to the maximum extent feasible.” Accordingly, as accountability measures, NTIA has directed federal agencies to use only as much spectrum as they need and has established several processes and activities to encourage efficient spectrum use. One spectrum manager we interviewed stated that Spectrum XXI has greatly reduced the amount of time and work involved in applying for a frequency assignment. Following the 2003 WRC, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission should jointly review the adequacy of the process used to develop and promote the U.S. position, including the separate processes used by FCC and NTIA, and the short tenure of the head of delegation, and prepare a report containing any needed recommendations for making improvements. However, it was not until 1927 that a compromise was reached on a framework for the management of radiofrequency spectrum by the federal government. A departmental order was issued shortly thereafter forming the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). | What GAO Found
The radiofrequency spectrum is the medium that enables wireless communications of all kinds, such as mobile phone and paging services, radio and television broadcasting, radar, and satellite-based services. As new spectrum-dependent technologies are developed and deployed, the demand for this limited resource has escalated among both government and private sector users. Meeting these needs domestically is the responsibility of the Department of Commerce's National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) for federal government users and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for all other users. The current legal framework for domestic spectrum management evolved as a compromise over the questions of who should determine how spectrum is allocated among competing users and what standard should be applied in making this determination. Current methods for allocating spectrum face difficulties, and FCC and NTIA's efforts are not guided by a national spectrum strategy. Since nearly all of the usable radio spectrum has been allocated already, accommodating more services and users generally involves redefining current radiofrequency allocations. One method used by FCC and NTIA is to increase the amount of spectrum that is designated for shared use, so that additional types of services or users may be placed within a particular frequency allocation. Another method, called band-clearing, involves relocating a service or user from one area spectrum to another in order to make room for a new service or user. The challenges the United States faces in preparing for World Radiocommunication Conferences, where decisions are made regarding the global and regional allocation of spectrum, have raised questions about the adequacy of the United States' current preparatory process. Under the current structure, FCC and NTIA develop positions on agenda items through separate processes that involve the users of the spectrum they manage. NTIA has several oversight activities to encourage accountability and efficient use of the spectrum by federal agencies, but federal officials stated that the effectiveness of these activities is hindered by staffing and resource shortages. Specifically, NTIA has directed federal agencies to use only as much spectrum as they need and has established frequency assignment and review processes that place primary responsibility for promoting efficiency in the hands of the agencies. As an accountability measure, NTIA requires that agencies justify their initial need for a frequency assignment and periodically review their continued need for the assignment, generally every 5 years. |
gao_RCED-98-210 | gao_RCED-98-210_0 | Background
North Korea has five nuclear facilities that, collectively, have the potential to produce nuclear material for creating nuclear weapons. In the meantime, the Agreed Framework envisions specific functions for IAEA, notably that IAEA (1) monitor the freeze at five North Korean nuclear facilities and (2) resume inspections at other nuclear facilities not subject to the freeze. The Agreed Framework also calls upon North Korea to take “all steps that may be deemed necessary” for IAEA to verify the accuracy and completeness of North Korea’s 1992 report on nuclear facilities and the amount of nuclear material in its possession. According to IAEA, the measures are needed to ensure that the nuclear waste is not being removed or altered. The Agreed Framework Requires North Korea to Freeze Operations and Construction at Five Nuclear Facilities
The Agreed Framework specifies that the freeze on North Korea’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities was to be fully implemented within 1 month of the agreement’s signing on October 21, 1994. IAEA maintains a continuous presence in North Korea to monitor the facilities and to ensure that they remain under the freeze. According to IAEA, its monitoring activities provide assurance that operations and construction at the five facilities are frozen. IAEA Identified Monitoring Problems
While IAEA is confident that operations and construction at the five nuclear facilities have ceased, IAEA identified several problems affecting its ability to determine if North Korea is complying fully with certain aspects of the nuclear freeze. Furthermore, according to IAEA, North Korea asserts that it is cooperating fully with IAEA’s freeze-monitoring measures because such outstanding issues as IAEA’s monitoring of the liquid nuclear waste tanks relate to the verification of North Korea’s 1992 nuclear declaration and, as a result, need not be resolved until much later in the Agreed Framework’s implementation. IAEA inspects most of the facilities a few times a year. The Potential for Delay in Verifying North Korea’s Nuclear Declaration Creates the Possibility of Future Problems
IAEA will need to perform a wide variety of complex and time-consuming activities to verify the accuracy and completeness of North Korea’s 1992 declaration of the amount of nuclear material in North Korea’s possession. Since 1995, IAEA has repeatedly stressed that unless it and North Korea reach an early agreement on obtaining the information needed for verifying North Korea’s declaration and on the measures required to preserve such information, any future possibility of verifying North Korea’s nuclear declaration “might be lost.” Thus far, North Korea has neither provided the information nor agreed to any of IAEA’s proposed interim measures for preserving it, raising concern within IAEA that the necessary information may not be available later. According to IAEA officials, North Korea views IAEA’s preservation requirements as excessive and premature in relation to the time frames established in the Agreed Framework. If the conclusion of these activities were delayed, then IAEA’s verification activities could be correspondingly delayed. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed issues related to the Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea, focusing on the status of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA): (1) nuclear-freeze-monitoring activities; (2) inspections of facilities not subject to the freeze; and (3) plans to verify the accuracy and completeness of North Korea's 1992 declaration of the amount of nuclear material in its possession.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the Agreed Framework requires North Korea to freeze operations and construction at five of its nuclear-related facilities and to permit IAEA to monitor the freeze; (2) in accordance with the arrangements under the Agreed Framework, IAEA began monitoring the freeze at the five facilities in late November 1994; (3) the five facilities, collectively, have the potential to produce nuclear material for creating nuclear weapons; (4) while IAEA is confident that operations and construction at these facilities have been frozen, IAEA identified several problems affecting its ability to determine whether North Korea is complying fully with other aspects of the nuclear freeze; (5) according to IAEA, safeguard measures on the liquid nuclear waste tanks at North Korea's reprocessing facility are needed to ensure that the nuclear waste is not being removed or altered; (6) North Korea says that it is cooperating fully with IAEA's freeze-monitoring measures; (7) the Agreed Framework allows North Korea to continue operating certain nuclear facilities not covered by the freeze; (8) IAEA resumed its inspections of these facilities in March 1996 and inspects most of them several times a year; (9) on the other hand, North Korea still refuses to accept activities, such as environmental sampling, at these facilities; (10) IAEA will need to perform a wide variety of complex and time-consuming activities to verify the accuracy and completeness of: (a) North Korea's initial declaration of nuclear facilities; and (b) the amount of nuclear material in its possession; (11) these activities are linked in the Agreed Framework to certain stages in a reactor's construction; if the reactor project suffers delays, IAEA's activities could be correspondingly delayed; (12) since 1995, IAEA has repeatedly stressed that unless IAEA and North Korea reach an early agreement on: (a) obtaining the information needed to verify the declaration; and (b) the measures required to preserve such information, any future possibility of verifying North Korea's nuclear declaration might be lost; and (13) North Korea has neither provided the information nor agreed to all of IAEA's proposed interim measures for preserving it because, in North Korea's view, IAEA's requirements are excessive and premature in relation to the timeframes established in the Agreed Framework. |
gao_GAO-08-1081 | gao_GAO-08-1081_0 | EM’s major cleanup projects involve efforts to clean up sites where nuclear weapons were produced and production waste stored. III for detailed information on the life cycle baseline costs for the 10 projects we reviewed.) Major Cleanup Projects Experienced Billions of Dollars in Additional Costs and Schedule Delays, Primarily because Initial Baselines Were Overly Optimistic
Nearly all the cleanup projects we reviewed have had cost increases and schedule delays in the life cycle baseline, as much as $9 billion for one project, and schedule delays of as much as 15 years for two projects. These cost increases and schedule delays occurred primarily because the previous baselines for these projects had schedule assumptions that were not linked to technical or budget realities, and other assumptions also proved to be overly optimistic. As the table shows, estimated costs increased from a minimum of $139 million for one project to more than $9 billion for another project. Table 2 shows that 8 of the 10 projects we reviewed experienced delays in scheduled project completion, ranging from 2 years to 15 years. For example: Solid waste stabilization and disposition project at Idaho. To meet its accelerated completion date of 2012—down from 2018—DOE’s Idaho National Laboratory assumed its Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Plant could process nuclear waste at a rate of about 8,500 cubic meters per year—more than 50 percent faster than the rate of about 5,400 cubic meters per year demonstrated when DOE established the baseline. To reflect this more realistic rate, DOE subsequently revised its baseline, adding 4 years to the project schedule and increasing costs by about $450 million. Primarily because project officials did not accurately anticipate the site conditions or the types of work activities necessary to safely conduct the work—despite multiple estimates generated by the contractor, DOE, and the Army Corps—this project’s costs increased by $1.2 billion and significant amounts of work were delayed, extending the completion date by 9 years, to 2017. DOE Has Not Effectively Used Available Management Tools to Help Control Major Cleanup Projects’ Scope of Work, Costs, and Schedule
While DOE has several mechanisms in place to help manage cleanup projects, including independent reviews, performance information systems, guidance, and performance goals, it has not always used them to effectively manage major cleanup projects’ scopes, costs, and schedules. As the panel predicted, the project’s actual processing rate after its baseline was validated was slower than expected. Within 7 months of OECM’s validation of the near-term baseline, project officials proposed modifying it. Specifically, (1) proposals for baseline changes do not consistently identify reasons for proposed changes or possible root causes that contributed to problems, (2) use of EVM data does not consistently conform to industry standards or GAO’s best practices, (3) quarterly reports do not always describe the impact of contractor performance on near-term or life cycle costs and schedules, and (4) reports to Congress on the status of and changes to major cleanup projects are limited to a small snapshot in time and do not provide information necessary for effective oversight. DOE Guidance for Management and Oversight Functions Is Unclear and Not Implemented Uniformly across Sites
EM’s key policies for managing its cleanup projects—including developing project baselines, managing risk, and planning for contingency funding— are not consolidated but spread across various guidance documents and memos and provide contradictory and confusing information. According to DOE officials, it is addressing some of these guidance issues. Because independent baseline reviews have not always provided reasonable assurance of the stability of projects’ near-term baselines or the reasonableness of the life cycle baselines, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy direct the Director of the Office of Management to take the following action: Assess the Office of Engineering and Construction Management’s current approach and process for conducting baseline reviews of EM cleanup projects to identify and implement improvements that will better provide reasonable assurance that project work scope can be completed within the baselines’ stated cost and schedule. Other staff contributing to the report are listed in appendix V.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
To determine the extent to which the cost, schedule, and scope baseline estimates for the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management’s (EM) cleanup projects have changed and the key reasons for these changes, we identified 10 major cleanup projects at 5 DOE sites. In addition, to include those projects that could potentially become major projects because of cost growth, we reduced the threshold to $900 million and identified another project, the Richland nuclear material stabilization and disposition project, which is estimated to cost between $900 million and $1 billion over the near term. To identify the factors that may hinder DOE’s ability to effectively manage these cleanup projects, we spoke with DOE project directors and contractor officials and reviewed project management documents for the 10 major cleanup projects we had identified. The project will remediate contaminated groundwater. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Energy (DOE) spends billions of dollars annually to clean up nuclear wastes at sites that produced nuclear weapons. Cleanup projects decontaminate and demolish buildings, remove and dispose of contaminated soil, treat contaminated groundwater, and stabilize and dispose of solid and liquid radioactive wastes. Ten of these projects meet or nearly meet DOE's definition of major: costs exceeding $1 billion in the near term--usually a 5-year window of the project's total estimated life cycle. GAO was asked to determine the (1) extent to which the cost and schedule for DOE's major cleanup projects have changed and key reasons for changes, and (2) factors that may hinder DOE's ability to effectively manage these projects. GAO met with project directors and reviewed project documents for 10 major cleanup projects: 9 above the near-term $1 billion threshold, and 1 estimated to cost between $900 million and $1 billion over the near term.
What GAO Found
Nine of the 10 cleanup projects GAO reviewed had life cycle baseline cost increases, from a low of $139 million for one project to a high of nearly $9 billion for another, and life cycle baseline schedule delays from 2 to 15 years. These changes occurred primarily because the baselines we reviewed included schedule assumptions that were not linked to technical or budget realities, and the scope of work included other assumptions that did not prove true. Specifically, the schedules for 8 of the 10 projects were established in response to DOE's 2002 effort to complete cleanup work, which in some cases moved up project completion dates by 15 years or more. For example, to meet the 2012 accelerated completion date for its solid waste disposition project, DOE's Idaho National Laboratory assumed it would process waste at a rate that was more than 50 percent higher than the rate demonstrated at the time it established the baseline. When the laboratory could not meet that processing rate, DOE revised its baseline, adding 4 years and about $450 million to the project. Also, most of the 10 projects had cost increases and schedule delays because the previous baselines (1) had not fully foreseen the type and extent of cleanup needed, (2) assumed that construction projects needed to carry out the cleanup work would be completed on time, or (3) had not expected substantial additional work scope. DOE has not effectively used management tools--including independent project baseline reviews, performance information systems, guidance, and performance goals--to help oversee major cleanup projects' scope of work, costs, and schedule. For example, DOE's independent reviews meant to provide reasonable assurance that a project's work can be completed within the baseline's stated cost and schedule, have not done so for 4 of 10 projects. For one project, the baseline was significantly modified as little as 7 months after it had been revised and validated by the independent review, while other projects have experienced life cycle cost increases of as much as $9 billion and delays of up to 10 years, within 1 to 2 years after these reviews. In addition, although DOE uses several types of reporting methods for overseeing cleanup projects, these methods do not always provide managers with the information needed to effectively oversee the projects or keep Congress informed on the projects' status. For example, sites' proposals for changes to projects' cost and schedule baselines do not always identify possible root causes, and DOE does not systematically analyze the proposals for common problems across its projects. Therefore, DOE may be missing opportunities to improve management across projects. In addition, guidance for key management and oversight functions are spread across many different types of documents and are unclear and contradictory. As a result, project managers do not consistently implement this guidance, which may lead, for example, to problems in effectively managing risks across projects. Finally, DOE recently changed its goals for "successful" cleanup projects, reducing the amount of work and raising the allowable cost increases against the near-term baseline. DOE has initiated several actions to improve project management, but it is too early to determine whether these efforts will be effective. |
gao_GGD-98-137 | gao_GGD-98-137_0 | How can the Act take account of the federal goal of supporting state or local efforts and objectives and the limited agency role that accompanies this goal in traditional block grant design? When design features limit the federal agency’s ability to collect information through grantee reports, what performance measures can broadly flexible programs reasonably be expected to provide under the Act, and by what means? Variation Reflects Key Design Features
In addition to varying in the ways just described, the programs in our study differed greatly from each other in terms of a few key design features—national objectives, nature of operations, and diversity of activities—each representing an important policy choice. When objectives are purely fiscal, accountability to the federal agency focuses on fiscal matters. Nature of Operation: As a Program or a Funding Stream
A second critical feature concerns whether national objectives are to be achieved through a grant-specific operating program or simply through adding to the stream of funds supporting ongoing state or local programs. One final example of an approach to serving national objectives through state or local activities relies on the techniques embodied in the Government Performance and Results Act—that is, requiring states or localities to set performance objectives for the activities or projects they choose to support with federal funds and to report to the federal funding agency on progress toward meeting those objectives. However, collecting reliable uniform data at the national program level requires conditions—such as uniformity of activities, objectives, and measures—that are unlikely to exist under many flexible grant program designs. Even where overall performance can be measured, the amount attributable to federal funding often cannot be separated out. We have found that Congress is also likely to need descriptive information that goes beyond the general summary level to convey a sense of the variety of conditions under which the program operates and how federal funds are actually being used—for flexible grants, information that shows how grant funds fit into the context of other programs is of particular interest; information about program implementation, including whether feasibility or management problems are evident and whether the methods used to deliver services are of known or likely effectiveness; information concerning positive or negative side effects of the program; and information that will help determine whether this program’s strategy is more effective in relation to its cost than others that serve the same purpose. Although these evaluations are potentially useful for state and local program managers and providers, we found they were limited in their ability to provide information on program performance on a national level. Concluding Observations and Design Framework
Our study was prompted by interest in determining how existing flexible programs obtain information about performance as envisioned under the Results Act and what guidance we might offer with respect to (1) the treatment of such programs under the Results Act and (2) the design of future flexible programs—or redesign of existing programs—to help ensure that adequate information about performance is available. A Framework for Grant Design
Our findings suggest that the design of a flexible grant program involves choosing among policy options that, in combination, establish the degree of flexibility afforded to states or localities; the relevance of performance objectives for grantee accountability; whether accountability for performance rests at the federal, state, or local level; and prospects for measuring performance through grantee reporting. Considering design features and their implications can help policymakers ensure that accountability and information are adequately provided for, whatever type of design is selected. 2). Data on community mental health services, treatment options, and resources are also included. Nature
Provides funds to support local activities and projects. Other Sources of Information
These programs have been the subject of several nationwide and state-level evaluations. Both focused on program implementation. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO conducted a comparative study of block grants and similar programs that give state or local governments substantial flexibility in determining how funds are to be used, focusing on: (1) examining the design characteristics of these programs that have implications for flexibility, accountability, and programs' ability to collect information about performance as envisioned in the Government Performance and Results Act; (2) identifying the kinds and sources of performance information that programs with various characteristics have utilized and the strengths and weaknesses of this information; and (3) providing guidance to legislators and agency officials concerning the information collection options available for programs with various designs.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) flexible grants are an adaptable policy tool and are found in fields from urban transit to community mental health; (2) flexible grant programs vary greatly in the kind and degree of flexibility afforded to state or local entities, distribution of accountability across levels of government, and availability of direct measures of program performance; (3) program variation reflects differences in three key design features: (a) whether national objectives for the grant are primarily performance-oriented or primarily fiscal; (b) whether the grant funds a distinct program with its own operating structure or contributes to the stream of funds supporting state or local activities; and (c) whether it supports a single major activity or diverse activities; (4) flexibility is narrowest, but accountability to the federal level clearest, in programs that focus on a single major activity and pursue national performance objectives through a distinct operating structure; (5) flexibility is broadest in programs designed with the fiscal objective of adding to the stream of funds supporting diverse state or local activities; (6) in these broadly flexible programs, the federal agency's role is limited to providing funds; (7) program direction and accountability are assigned to the state level; (8) design features also have implications for the availability of performance information; (9) although most reported simple activity or client counts, relatively few flexibility programs collected uniform data on the outcomes of state or local service activities; (10) collecting such data requires conditions that do not exist under many flexible program designs, and even where overall performance of a state or local program can be measured, the amount attributable to federal funding often cannot be separated out; (11) accordingly, flexible programs drew on other sources to obtain an overall picture of performance; (12) understanding grant design features and their implications can assist policymakers in applying the Results Act and in designing or redesigning grant programs; and (13) considering a particular program's national purpose, the federal agency role, and prospects for measuring performance attributable to the program can help agency officials and policy makers understand what program-generated information on results they can realistically expect and when alternative sources of information will be needed. |
gao_T-GGD-96-82 | gao_T-GGD-96-82_0 | The widespread use of U.S. currency abroad, together with the outdated security features of the currency, makes it a vulnerable target for international counterfeiting. The Secret Service conducts investigations of counterfeiting activities and provides counterfeit-detection training. According to law enforcement officials, counterfeiters run the gamut from office workers to organized crime and terrorist groups, and the equipment used for counterfeiting U.S. currency ranges from photocopiers to sophisticated offset presses. Moreover, the quality of counterfeit notes varies significantly. Other counterfeit-detection devices used abroad, like ultraviolet lights, did not work effectively on U.S. currency. Treasury Department to Introduce Currency Redesign
To combat counterfeiting both domestically and abroad, the Treasury is redesigning U.S. currency to incorporate more security features intended to combat rapid advances in reprographic technology. U.S. Efforts to Eradicate the Superdollar
The U.S. government has undertaken special efforts to eradicate the highest-quality counterfeit note—the Superdollar. Additional copies are $2 each. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed U.S. efforts to combat international counterfeiting of U.S. currency.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) U.S. currency is vulnerable to international counterfeiting because it is widely used abroad and lacks updated security features; (2) counterfeiters range from office workers to organized crime and terrorist groups using equipment ranging from simple photocopiers to sophisticated offset presses; (3) the U.S. government is particularly concerned about a high-quality counterfeit note known as the "Superdollar" and rapid advances in photographic and printing devices; (4) U.S. agencies' and foreign governments' views on the extent and significance of counterfeit U.S. notes vary, and U.S. counterfeit-detection activities are limited and inconclusive; and (5) to deter international counterfeiting, the Department of the Treasury is redesigning U.S. currency to incorporate more security features, the Secret Service has gathered additional information on counterfeiting and provided counterfeit-detection training, and the U.S. government is using international and interagency task forces and diplomatic efforts to eradicate the Superdollar. |
gao_RCED-97-31 | gao_RCED-97-31_0 | Wyoming, New Mexico, and California also manage mineral development on private and state-owned lands. California’s revenues from state-owned minerals onshore were $3 million. States’ Costs for Federal Minerals Management Activities
The federal government allocated $14.6 million of its appropriations for minerals management to Wyoming, New Mexico, and California for fiscal year 1996. This amount, which will be deducted from the states’ 1997 revenue payments, was computed on the basis of allocations of the appropriations for all onshore leasable minerals management activities conducted by the Forest Service, BLM, and MMS—the three key agencies responsible for administering the federal onshore minerals leasing laws. In addition to MLA, major federal laws governing BLM’s management of onshore minerals include (1) the Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976, which gave BLM general management responsibilities for public land, endorsed multiple-use management, and prescribed a planning process similar to the Forest Service’s; (2) NEPA; (3) the Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act; (4) the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976; and (5) the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982 (FOGRMA), which was enacted to ensure that the Secretary of the Interior properly accounts for all oil and gas from public lands. States’ Costs for Their Own Minerals Management Activities
In fiscal year 1996, Wyoming’s onshore minerals management program cost $2.0 million, New Mexico’s cost $7.2 million, and California’s cost $9.9 million. Costs for Federal and State Programs Cannot Be Meaningfully Compared
Because of differences between federal and state programs, the states’ costs for these programs cannot be meaningfully compared. The three states we reviewed do not have similar land-use planning processes, and neither Wyoming nor New Mexico has similar requirements for environmental analysis to those for the federal land-managing agencies. In responding to a draft of this report, officials from California’s State Lands Commission commented that the California Environmental Quality Act and other state laws require the protection of the environment, which includes developing environmental information and mitigation requirements; protecting significant environmental values on state lands; and balancing public needs in approving the uses of state lands. Other differences are state-specific. For Wyoming, New Mexico, and California, BLM’s allocation for the net receipts-sharing computation was about $19 million, $13 million, and $5 million, respectively. For example, Wyoming received about 43 percent of the federal onshore leasable mineral revenues in fiscal year 1996. One-half of the $28 million is about $14 million. 4. Instead, they focus on compatibility of mineral operations with other surface uses. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
In May 1996, we were asked to (1) identify how much Wyoming, New Mexico, and California paid to the federal government for managing minerals on federal lands within their boundaries, (2) identify the costs to the three states for their own minerals management programs, and (3) compare these federal and state program costs. GAO’s Comments
1. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed whether the costs borne by Wyoming, New Mexico, and California for managing federal minerals were comparable to these states' own programs, focusing on: (1) how much the three states paid to the federal government for managing minerals on federal lands within their boundaries; (2) the costs to the three states for their own minerals management programs; (3) a comparison of these federal and state program costs; and (4) the activities that are associated with the federal and state programs.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) in fiscal year (FY) 1996, Wyoming, New Mexico, and California received almost $358 million in revenues from federal onshore leasable minerals and they will pay almost $14.6 million in FY 1997 for a portion of the federal government's FY 1996 onshore mineral leasing program; (2) Wyoming's share of the $14.6 million is $7.02 million, New Mexico's is $5.94 million, and California's is $1.65 million; (3) these amounts were computed on the basis of allocations of the federal appropriations for all activities conducted by the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Minerals Management Service related to managing federal onshore leasable minerals; (4) onshore mineral development on Wyoming's, New Mexico's, and California's state-owned land generated combined royalties, rents, and bonuses of $148 million in FY 1996; (5) the states' combined costs for managing onshore mineral development, which includes development on state and private lands, totalled about $19 million; (6) specifically, the costs for Wyoming's minerals management program were $2.4 million in FY 1996, while New Mexico's were $7.2 million and California's costs were $9.9 million; (7) because of differences between federal and state programs, the states' costs for these programs cannot be meaningfully compared; (8) federal decisions about mineral leasing must involve land-use planning and environmental analysis; (9) the three states GAO reviewed do not have similar land-use planning processes; (10) furthermore, neither Wyoming nor New Mexico requires an environmental analysis similar to that performed by the federal government; (11) according to California State Lands Commission officials, California laws require an environmental analysis and the protection of state lands; (12) other differences are state-specific and can be attributed to a program's size and regulatory scope and number of mineral operations managed; and (13) for example, California's oil and gas conservation agency devotes about 95 percent of its resources to managing mineral development on privately owned land and other lands not owned by the state or federal government. |
gao_GAO-03-130 | gao_GAO-03-130_0 | Today, EchoStar and DirecTV, the two primary providers of DBS services, each offer local broadcast channels to their subscribers in about 45 of the 210 television markets in the United States. DBS and cable also compete for subscribers to their broadband Internet access services. Cable modem service is generally considered one of the fastest methods for home Internet access and is currently the most popular broadband service. In October 2001, the two DBS companies signed an agreement wherein EchoStar would merge with DirecTV. FCC recently announced that it had declined to approve the proposed merger, although DirectTV and EchoStar have 30 days to file an amended application and to file a petition to delay the hearing. DBS Provision of Local Broadcast Channels Associated with Higher DBS Penetration Rates, but Not with Lower Cable Prices
According to our econometric model, the provision of local broadcast channels by DBS companies is associated with significantly higher DBS penetration rates. Thus, in areas where the DBS companies offer local channels, it appears that DBS is more effectively able to compete for subscribers. In particular, the companies have stated that if they merge, they will, as a combined entity, have sufficient capacity to provide local broadcast programming in all 210 television markets and add new services, while continuing to provide their current number of cable programming channels. Our examination of various documents related to the two DBS companies’ satellite capacity indicates that—given current technologies and deployed assets—neither company would individually be able to offer all of the local broadcast channels in all 210 television markets while simultaneously maintaining a competitive national subscription television service. This would compromise the competitiveness of a DBS company with cable. That is, the decision of whether to introduce more local channels is essentially a business decision. Whether the benefits would outweigh the costs for the individual companies to roll out local channels in all 210 television markets is not clear. Both FCC and Justice declined to comment on the substance of our report due to the merger proceedings. We discussed the development of our model with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Department of Justice (Justice), and several industry trade groups. Examination of Competitive Effects in the Subscription Video Market
To examine the influence of the DBS companies’ provision of local channels on cable prices and DBS penetration rates, we employed a model that is based on the subscription video market, rather than on the narrower market for cable television. | Why GAO Did This Study
Direct broadcast satellite (DBS) television service has grown to become the principal competitor to cable television systems. In October 2001, the two primary DBS companies, EchoStar and DirecTV, proposed a merger plan that is pending before the Department of Justice and that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently announced that it had declined to approve. GAO was asked to examine several issues related to competition in providing subscription video services, including the competitive impact of the availability of cable modem Internet access, and the effects on cable prices and DBS penetration rates of DBS' offering local broadcast channels. GAO also examined the technical capability of the individual DBS companies to expand local channel services into more television markets. This report offers no opinion on the merits of the proposed merger.
What GAO Found
DBS and cable companies compete for subscribers to their video services and to their Internet access services, although to date, cable modem service is the most popular method of broadband home Internet access. On the basis of a random survey of 3,000 individuals, it appears that the availability of Internet access services is important for some consumers--although not the majority of consumers--when they are considering various video service providers. In 1999, DBS companies began to offer local broadcast channels in select television markets across the country. According to results from GAO's econometric model, the provision of local broadcast channels by DBS companies is associated with significantly higher DBS penetration rates, although GAO found no evidence that DBS provision of local channels influences cable prices. In general, GAO's model results suggest that DBS is able to compete more effectively for subscribers with cable in areas where DBS subscribers can receive local broadcast channels. The two DBS companies have stated that if they merge, they will, as a combined entity, have sufficient satellite capacity to provide local broadcast programming in all 210 television markets and to introduce new services. GAO's technical expert's review of various documents related to the two DBS companies' satellite capacity indicates that--given current technologies and deployed assets--neither company would individually be able to offer all of the local channels in all markets. However, the decision of whether to introduce more local channels is, in the long term, a business decision. Whether the benefits would outweigh the costs for the individual companies to eventually offer local channels in all 210 television markets is not clear. Both FCC and the Department of Justice declined to provide comments on the substance of this report because of the merger proceedings. |
gao_GAO-04-668 | gao_GAO-04-668_0 | 107-40 (Sept. 13, 2001), Authorization for Use of Military Force, and other operations and related activities in support of the global war on terrorism. Congress has also appropriated funds for the reconstruction of Iraq and Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development projects. Obligations for GWOT Operations
As of September 30, 2003, DOD reported obligating a total of over $61 billion in fiscal year 2003 in support of the war. Within the operation and maintenance account, the operating support category had the largest amount of reported obligations for fiscal year 2003—over $32 billion or 74 percent of the total. Within the military personnel account, the category reserve component called to active duty had the highest level of reported obligations—almost $9.3 billion or 59 percent of the total. Funding Adequacy for GWOT Varied by Service
The adequacy of funding available for fiscal year 2003 GWOT obligations reported in military personnel and operation and maintenance accounts varied by service. Within the military personnel accounts, as shown in table 1, in fiscal year 2003 the Army, Navy, and Air Force reported more obligations in support of the war than they received in funding for the war. To cover the shortfall in GWOT funding, these services had to use funds appropriated for their budgeted peacetime operations. Within the operation and maintenance accounts, as shown in table 2, in fiscal year 2003 the Army, Air Force, and Navy received funding that exceeded their reported GWOT obligations. The Army reported slightly more funding than obligations for the war. Air Force officials told us that the $176.6 million, which appeared to be unobligated GWOT funding, was actually obligated late in the fiscal year. Navy officials told us that the apparent unobligated GWOT funds ($299 million) were in fact obligated in support of the war but were originally, and incorrectly, reported as obligations in support of budgeted peacetime operations. Returning these funds is in keeping with recommendations we made in our September 2003 report discussed above to monitor the obligation of funds in the services’ operation and maintenance accounts and ensure that all funds transferred to the services that are not likely to be obligated by the end of the fiscal year are transferred back to the Iraqi Freedom Fund. While the Marine Corps obligated $72.5 million more for GWOT than it had in funds at the end of fiscal year 2003, it, like the Navy, returned money to the Iraqi Freedom Fund. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Global War on Terrorism--principally involving operations in Afghanistan and Iraq--was funded in fiscal year 2003 by Congress's appropriation of almost $69 billion. To assist Congress in its oversight of spending, GAO is undertaking a series of reviews relating to contingency operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism. In September 2003, GAO issued a report that discussed fiscal year 2003 obligations and funding for the war through June 2003. This report continues the review of fiscal year 2003 by analyzing obligations reported in support of the Global War on Terrorism and reviews whether the amount of funding received by the military services was adequate to cover DOD's obligations for the war from October 1, 2002, through September 30, 2003. GAO will also review the war's reported obligations and funding for fiscal year 2004.
What GAO Found
In fiscal year 2003, DOD reported obligations of over $61 billion in support of the Global War on Terrorism. GAO's analysis of the obligation data showed that 64 percent of fiscal year 2003 obligations reported for the war on terrorism went for Operation Iraqi Freedom; among the DOD components, the Army had the most obligations (46 percent); and among appropriation accounts the operation and maintenance account had the highest level of reported obligations (71 percent). The adequacy of funding available for the Global War on Terrorism for fiscal year 2003 military personnel and operation and maintenance accounts varied by service. For military personnel, the Army, Navy, and Air Force ended the fiscal year with more reported obligations for the war than funding and had to cover the shortfalls with money appropriated for their budgeted peacetime personnel costs. For operation and maintenance accounts, the Army, Navy, and Air Force appeared to have more funding than reported obligations for the war. However, the Navy and Air Force have stated that the seeming excess funding ($299 million and $176.6 million respectively) were in support of the war on terrorism, but had not been recorded as such. Therefore, Navy and Air Force obligations exactly match funding. The Marine Corps used funds appropriated for its budgeted peacetime operation and maintenance activities to cover shortfalls in funding for the war. |
gao_GAO-10-714 | gao_GAO-10-714_0 | We and OPM have developed guidance for managing human capital and developing strategic workforce planning strategies. Our and OPM’s workforce planning guidance recommends, among other things, that agencies (1) assess their workforce needs, such as their foreign language needs; (2) assess current competency skills, such as foreign language capabilities; and (3) compare workforce needs against available skills to identify any shortfalls, such as those related to foreign language capabilities. DHS Has Taken Limited Actions to Assess Foreign Language Needs and Capabilities and Identify Potential Shortfalls
DHS has taken limited actions to assess its foreign language needs and capabilities and to identify potential shortfalls. DHS efforts could be strengthened if it conducts a comprehensive assessment of its foreign language needs and capabilities and uses the results of this assessment to identify any potential shortfalls. Table 2 shows the various assessments that were conducted at the component level and in certain offices. CBP has conducted two assessments since 2004 that have primarily focused on Spanish language needs. By conducting a comprehensive assessment, DHS would be in a better position to address its foreign language needs. Although DHS and its components maintain these lists that identify some of their staff with foreign language capabilities, these lists generally capture capabilities for personnel in certain components or offices, primarily those that include a foreign language award program for qualified employees. Coast Guard. Although DHS has some knowledge of its existing capabilities in certain components and offices, conducting an assessment of foreign language capabilities consistent with strategic workforce planning—that is, collecting data in a systematic manner that includes all of DHS’s existing foreign language capabilities—would better position DHS to manage its resources. DHS Has Developed a Variety of Foreign Language Programs, but the Extent to Which They Address Foreign Language Shortfalls Is Not Known
DHS has established a variety of foreign language programs; however, officials stated that they have not addressed the extent to which these programs address existing shortfalls. Although foreign language programs and activities at select components contribute to the development of DHS’s foreign language capabilities, DHS’s ability to use them to address potential foreign language shortfalls varies. For example, the foreign language training programs generally do not include languages other than Spanish, nor do they include various Spanish dialects. Given this decentralization, conducting an assessment of the extent to which its program and activities address shortfalls could strengthen DHS’s ability to manage its foreign language programs and activities and to adjust them, if necessary, to address shortfalls. While DHS has taken limited actions to assess its foreign language needs and capabilities, it has not conducted a comprehensive assessment of the department’s and its components’ foreign language needs and capabilities nor has it fully identified potential shortfalls. Further, although the Coast Guard, CBP, and ICE have a variety of foreign language programs and activities in place, they have not assessed the extent to which the programs and activities they have established address foreign language shortfalls. Comprehensively assessing its foreign language needs and capabilities and identifying any potential shortfalls and the extent to which its programs and activities are addressing these shortfalls would better position DHS to ensure that foreign language capabilities are available when needed. Recommendations for Executive Action
To help ensure that DHS can identify its foreign language capabilities needed and pursue strategies that will help its workforce effectively communicate to achieve agency goals, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security (1) comprehensively assess DHS’s foreign language needs and capabilities and identify potential shortfalls, (2) assess the extent to which existing foreign language programs and activities address foreign language shortfalls, and (3) ensure that the results of these foreign language assessments are incorporated into the department’s future strategic and workforce planning documents. We selected the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) because they constitute a broad representation of program areas whose missions include law enforcement and intelligence responsibilities. Although the results are not projectable, they provided us with valuable insights. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has a variety of responsibilities that utilize foreign language capabilities, including investigating transnational criminal activity and staffing ports of entry into the United States. GAO was asked to study foreign language capabilities at DHS. GAO's analysis focused on actions taken by DHS in three of its largest components--the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Specifically, this report addresses the extent to which DHS has (1) assessed its foreign language needs and existing capabilities and identified any potential shortfalls and (2) developed foreign language programs and activities to address potential foreign language shortfalls. GAO analyzed DHS documentation on foreign language capabilities, interviewed DHS officials, and assessed workforce planning in three components that were selected to ensure broad representation of law enforcement and intelligence operations. While the results are not projectable, they provide valuable insights.
What GAO Found
DHS has taken limited actions to assess its foreign language needs and existing capabilities and to identify potential shortfalls. GAO and the Office of Personnel Management have developed strategic workforce guidance that recommends, among other things, that agencies (1) assess workforce needs, such as foreign language needs; (2) assess current competency skills; and (3) compare workforce needs against available skills. However, DHS has done little at the department level, and individual components' approaches to addressing foreign language needs and capabilities and assessing potential shortfalls have not been comprehensive. Specifically: (1) DHS has no systematic method for assessing its foreign language needs and does not address foreign language needs in its Human Capital Strategic Plan. DHS components' efforts to assess foreign language needs vary. For example, the Coast Guard has conducted multiple assessments, CBP's assessments have primarily focused on Spanish language needs, and ICE has not conducted any assessments. By conducting a comprehensive assessment, DHS would be better positioned to capture information on all of its needsand could use this information to inform future strategic planning. (2) DHS has no systematic method for assessing its existing foreign language capabilities and has not conducted a comprehensive capabilities assessment. DHS components have developed various lists of foreign language capable staff that are available in some offices, primarily those that include a foreign language award program for qualified employees. Conducting an assessment of all of its capabilities would better position DHS to manage its resources. (3) DHS and its components have not taken actions to identify potential foreign language shortfalls. DHS officials stated that shortfalls can affect mission goals and officer safety. By using the results of needs and capabilities assessments to identify foreign language shortfalls, DHS would be better positioned to develop actions to mitigate shortfalls, execute its various missions that involve foreign language speakers, and enhance the safety of its officers and agents. DHS and its components have established a variety of foreign language programs and activities but have not assessed the extent to which they address potential shortfalls. Coast Guard, CBP, and ICE have established foreign language programs and activities, which include foreign language training and award payments. These programs and activities vary, as does DHS's ability to use them to address shortfalls. For example, foreign language training programs generally do not include languages other than Spanish, and DHS officials were generally unaware of the foreign language programs in DHS's components. Given this variation and decentralization, conducting a comprehensive assessment of the extent to which its programs and activities address shortfalls could strengthen DHS's ability to manage its foreign language programs and activities and to adjust them, if necessary.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that DHS comprehensively assess its foreign language needs and capabilities and identify potential shortfalls, assess the extent to which existing foreign language programs are addressing foreign language shortfalls, and ensure that these assessments are incorporated into future strategic planning. DHS generally concurs with the recommendations. |
gao_GAO-16-556T | gao_GAO-16-556T_0 | Progress Made In Establishing Data Standards but More Complete and Timely Guidance Is Needed to Ensure Effective Implementation
OMB and Treasury Issued Standardized Data Element Definitions for Reporting Federal Spending Data, but More Needs to Be Done to Ensure Consistent and Comparable Reporting
In our January 2016 report on data standards we noted that by the end of August 2015 OMB and Treasury had issued a list of 57 standardized data elements. We also raised concerns about OMB’s efforts to merge DATA Act requirements with certain GPRAMA requirements. GPRAMA requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to make information available about each federal program. Our prior work identified data quality issues with certain data elements, such as Award Description, which OMB and Treasury defined as “a brief description of the purpose of the award.” In our previous work on the data quality of USAspending.gov, we identified challenges with this data element, citing the wide range of information that agencies report as the description or purpose. Lack of Finalized Technical Guidance Could Impede Agency Implementation of DATA Act Requirements
OMB and Treasury issued initial guidance to federal agencies in May 2015 on meeting the reporting requirements of the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006 (FFATA), as amended by the DATA Act, in accordance with the new data standards. Treasury has issued several iterative versions of the technical schema that describes the standard format for reporting data elements including their description, type, and length, but has not made available a finalized schema that would provide agencies with a stable base from which to develop data submission plans. OMB’s and Treasury’s DATA Act Implementation Playbook outlines eight specific steps and timelines for implementing the DATA Act at the agency level. In responding to a draft of this statement, Treasury officials told us they provided final draft technical guidance to agencies for comment. Agencies Reported Significant Challenges and Identified Mitigating Strategies for Implementing the DATA Act; Addressing Them Will be Key to Successful Implementation
OMB and Treasury have issued data standards and provided guidance and feedback to federal agencies on their DATA Act implementation plans. However, our ongoing work in this area indicates that challenges remain and will need to be addressed to successfully implement the DATA Act government-wide. Challenges Reported by Agencies in their DATA Act Implementation Plans
Based on our preliminary results from our ongoing review of agency implementation plans, we identified seven overarching categories of challenges reported by agencies to effectively and efficiently implement the DATA Act. Figure 1 shows that agencies reported challenges, most frequently in the following categories: competing priorities, resources, and systems integration. Some agencies noted concerns about the ability of their systems to obtain and easily submit to Treasury all the data elements needed to implement the DATA Act, including the requirement to establish a unique award ID. For example, one agency noted that it will monitor and evaluate the release of DATA Act guidance as well as data elements and technical schema in order to identify the effect on the project. Agencies reported working closely with internal and external stakeholders to address these challenges as effectively as possible, but also reported that additional support from OMB and Treasury is needed for successful implementation of the DATA Act. OMB created a two-part pilot that focused on two communities: federal grants and federal contracts (procurement). For grants, OMB designated the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to serve as its executing agent. On the contracting side, OMB’s Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) is responsible for leading the procurement portion working with the General Services Administration’s 18F and others. Design of Grants Portion of the Section 5 Pilot Is On Track to Meet DATA Act Requirements and Partially Adheres to Leading Pilot Design Practices
As the executing agent for the grants portion of the pilot, HHS has developed six “test models” that evaluate a variety of approaches to potentially reduce grantee reporting burden, including the development of a data repository for identifying common data elements and forms intended to eliminate duplicative reporting on Consolidated Federal Financial Reports. While valuable information, it does not clearly convey how the procurement portion of the pilot would specifically contribute to meeting the act’s requirement regarding diversity of participants. In addition, we found that the design of the procurement portion of the pilot did not reflect leading practices for effective pilot design which would help OMB develop effective recommendations to simplify reporting for contractors. We have requested documentation of the steps OMB and Treasury have taken to foster ongoing and effective two-way dialogue with stakeholders including timely and substantive responses to feedback. | Why GAO Did This Study
The DATA Act requires OMB and Treasury to establish government-wide data standards and requires federal agencies to begin reporting financial and payment data in accordance with these standards by May 2017. The act also requires OMB to establish a pilot program to develop recommendations for simplifying federal award reporting for grants and contracts. GAO has an ongoing body of work examining implementation of different aspects of the DATA Act.
This statement focuses on the following questions: (1) What efforts have been made to develop government-wide standards and associated technical guidance? (2) What implementation challenges and mitigation strategies have been reported by agencies? (3) How effective is OMB's design of the Section 5 Pilot to reduce recipient reporting burden? The statement also provides an update on OMB's and Treasury's efforts to address GAO's DATA Act recommendations.
This statement is primarily based on two GAO reports issued in 2016, as well as ongoing work examining agency DATA Act implementation plans. For its work examining agency implementation plans, GAO reviewed 42 plans to identify reported challenges and mitigation strategies that could affect agency progress toward meeting requirements under the act. GAO also interviewed OMB and Treasury staff to update the status of prior open recommendations pertaining to the act. Treasury had technical comments, which GAO incorporated as appropriate; OMB had none.
What GAO Found
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) have taken some significant steps toward implementing the key provisions of the Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 (DATA Act); however, several challenges need to be addressed in order to successfully meet the act's requirements.
Data standards and technical schema. GAO reported in January 2016, that OMB and Treasury had issued standardized data element definitions for reporting federal spending, but the lack of key guidance has slowed the ability of agencies to operationalize the data standards. Specifically, OMB and Treasury had not yet released guidance to agencies regarding how some data elements should be reported in order to produce consistent and comparable data. For example, Award Description, defined as a brief description of the purpose of the award, led to different interpretations by agencies.
GAO also found that Treasury's technical guidance continues to evolve and lacks finality which may impede agency implementation. Treasury has issued several iterative versions of the technical schema that describes the standard format for reporting data elements. Each iteration results in revisions to the technical guidance which may adversely affect the timely implementation of the act. A finalized technical schema would provide agencies with a stable base from which to develop data submission plans and processes. According to Treasury officials, final draft guidance has been provided to agencies for comment.
Agency reported implementation challenges and mitigation strategies. GAO's ongoing review of required implementation plans submitted to OMB indicates that federal agencies have identified significant challenges in implementing the DATA Act including competing priorities, resources, systems integration, and guidance. Some agencies also identified strategies to mitigate identified challenges, including effective communication and information sharing and leveraging of existing resources, and reported that additional support from OMB and Treasury is needed for successful implementation.
Pilot to reduce recipient reporting burden. OMB has designed a pilot that consists of two parts focused on the grants and procurement communities. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has been designated as the executing agency for the grant portion while OMB leads the procurement portion with support by the General Services Administration's 18F and others. If implemented according to HHS's proposed design, the grants portion of the pilot will likely meet requirements established under the act and will partially reflect leading practices for effective pilot design. However, the procurement portion does not clearly document how it will contribute to meeting the act's requirements nor does it reflect leading practices for effective pilot design.
Although progress has been made, GAO has been unable to close any DATA Act recommendations including those calling for establishing a data governance structure, developing a federal program inventory, and expanding two-way dialogue with stakeholders. GAO will continue to monitor OMB's and Treasury's progress to address its recommendations as implementation proceeds. |
gao_GAO-16-643 | gao_GAO-16-643_0 | Medicare and its beneficiaries make payments for Part B drugs to providers, such as physicians and hospitals, which first purchase the drugs from manufacturers or other sellers. Most High- Expenditure Part B Drugs Had Coupon Programs in 2015; an Estimated 19 Percent of Privately Insured Patients Taking Such Drugs Used Programs in 2013
In 2015, drug manufacturers offered coupon programs to privately insured patients for 29 of the 50 high-expenditure Medicare Part B drugs in our analysis. The percentage of these patients who used a coupon program ranged from 1 to over 90 percent, depending on the drug, with coupon programs for all but 2 drugs being used by less than 40 percent of patients. Coupon discounts reported by manufacturers of the 18 drugs totaled $205 million in 2013. Methodology for Setting Part B Drug Payment Rates May Be Less Suitable for Drugs with Coupon Programs, but CMS Lacks Data to Evaluate Methodology
Payment Rate Methodology for Part B Drugs May Be Less Suitable for Drugs with Coupon Programs because Medicare’s Average Sales Price Exceeds Effective Market Price
Medicare’s market-based methodology for setting Part B drug payment rates may be less suitable for drugs with coupon programs than for other Part B drugs that are paid based on ASP. Because ASP does not account for coupon discounts between manufacturers and patients, the ultimate consumers of these drugs, the ASP for drugs with coupons exceeds the effective market price a manufacturer receives for a drug purchase. We estimated that, for the 18 drugs for which we obtained coupon discount data in 2013, ASP exceeded the effective market price by an average of 0.7 percent. ASP exceeded the effective market price for some drugs by much more than the 0.7 percent average, which suggests that the ASP-based payment method may be even less suitable for these drugs. 2). Part B spending for these 5 drugs combined could have been an estimated $50 million lower if ASP equaled the effective market price. In addition, to the extent that drug prices continue to increase and translate into higher out-of-pocket costs for privately insured patients, this could increase patients’ use of drug coupons and the discount amounts they receive. Furthermore, upward trends in coupon program use and drug prices suggest that Medicare’s Part B drug payment rate methodology could become less suitable over time for drugs with coupon programs. However, the agency lacks the authority to collect data on coupon discounts and therefore lacks important information that could inform its ongoing efforts to design and evaluate alternative approaches. Matter for Congressional Consideration
To determine the suitability of Medicare’s Part B drug payment rate methodology for drugs with coupon programs, Congress should consider granting CMS the authority to collect data from drug manufacturers on coupon discounts for Part B drugs paid based on ASP and requiring the agency to periodically collect these data and report on the implications that coupon programs may have for this methodology. HHS provided us with technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Identifying Coupon Programs Associated with High-Expenditure Medicare Part B Drugs and Describing Use among the Privately Insured
To identify coupon programs associated with high-expenditure Medicare Part B drugs, we used 2013 Medicare claims data—the most recent full year of data available at the time we began our analysis (2015)—to develop a list of the 50 highest-expenditure Part B drugs paid based on the average sales price (ASP) methodology. In addition to data on coupon use, we collected information from manufacturers on the mechanisms through which manufacturers provide coupon discounts to patients and on the ways in which manufacturers inform patients and providers about drug coupon programs. | Why GAO Did This Study
Use of drug coupons in the private sector has increased in recent years. GAO was asked to study coupon programs for drugs covered by Medicare Part B, including any implications for Part B spending.
This report (1) identifies coupon programs associated with high-expenditure Part B drugs and describes the extent to which privately insured patients use coupons and (2) examines, for drugs with coupon programs, the suitability of the Part B drug payment rate methodology. GAO identified high-expenditure Part B drugs using 2013 Medicare claims data—the latest available at the time of the analysis—and collected information from manufacturers on coupon program characteristics in 2015. GAO also analyzed coupon use and patient costs for drugs using 2013 data from manufacturers and private insurers; estimated how Part B spending could have differed if ASP had accounted for coupon discounts in 2013; reviewed federal laws and regulations; and interviewed CMS officials.
What GAO Found
In 2015, manufacturers of 29 of the 50 high-expenditure Medicare Part B drugs GAO analyzed offered coupon programs, which reduce the costs patients incur for specific drugs. Part B drugs are typically administered by a physician. Coupon programs are prohibited in the Medicare program but are generally available to privately insured patients. GAO obtained data on coupon discounts for 18 drugs. GAO estimated that 19 percent of privately insured patients who received these drugs used coupons in 2013, but coupon use varied widely depending on the drug—from 1 percent to over 90 percent.
Medicare's methodology for setting Part B payment rates to providers may be less suitable for drugs with coupon programs than for drugs without them. The methodology for most Part B drugs is based on the average sales price (ASP), which is defined by law as the amount physicians and other purchasers pay manufacturers for the drug, net of discounts and rebates to those purchasers. Medicare and its beneficiaries spent $20 billion on Part B drugs paid based on ASP in 2013. As ASP does not account for coupon discounts to patients, the discounts reduce the effective market price that manufacturers receive for drugs with coupon programs. GAO estimated that, for the 18 drugs for which it obtained coupon discount data, the ASP exceeded the effective market price by an estimated 0.7 percent in 2013. Part B spending for these drugs could have been an estimated $69 million lower if ASP equaled the effective market price. ASP exceeded the effective market price by more than 1.0 percent for 5 of the 18 drugs, suggesting that the ASP-based methodology may be even less suitable for these drugs.
Upward trends in coupon program use and drug prices suggest that these programs could cause the methodology for setting Part B drug payment rates to become less suitable over time for drugs with coupon programs. However, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) lacks the authority to collect coupon discount data from manufacturers and thus lacks important information that could inform its ongoing efforts to evaluate alternatives to this methodology.
What GAO Recommends
To determine the suitability of the Part B drug payment rate methodology for drugs with coupon programs, Congress should consider (1) granting CMS authority to collect data from drug manufacturers on coupon discounts for Part B drugs paid based on ASP; and (2) requiring CMS to periodically collect these data and report on the implications of coupon programs for this methodology. The Department of Health and Human Services provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which GAO incorporated as appropriate. |
gao_GAO-13-624 | gao_GAO-13-624_0 | A letter of reprimand describes the unacceptable conduct that is the basis for a disciplinary action, and represents the least severe form of disciplinary action. TSA Investigated and Adjudicated Approximately 9,600 Misconduct Cases from Fiscal Years 2010 through 2012
According to TSA employee misconduct data that we analyzed, TSA investigated and adjudicated 9,622 employee misconduct cases from fiscal years 2010 through 2012. From fiscal years 2010 through 2012, the annual number of TSA misconduct cases increased from 2,691 to 3,408. In that same period, TSA’s workforce of OSO employees at the airport/field level grew by about 3,200 employees. As highlighted in table 1, two offense categories accounted for about half of all cases—attendance and leave, which accounted for 32 percent of the cases, and screening and security, which accounted for 20 percent of the cases. Charges for screening- and security-related incidents pertain to violating SOPs, including failing to conduct security or equipment checks, and allowing patrons or baggage to bypass screening. As shown in figure 2, 47 percent of the cases that we analyzed resulted in letters of reprimand, while 31 percent of the cases resulted in suspensions of a definite duration. Additionally, in 17 percent of the cases, the employee was removed by TSA. Weaknesses in Procedures Impede TSA’s Ability to Monitor Employee Misconduct Cases
TSA has taken steps to help manage the investigations and adjudications process, but developing and implementing procedures in four areas could help the agency better monitor misconduct cases: (1) verifying that misconduct adjudications are compliant with policies and procedures, (2) recording case information on all adjudication decisions, (3) tracking the time to complete all phases of the investigations and adjudications process, and (4) identifying allegations not adjudicated by the agency. However, TSA does not have a review process to verify that TSA staff at airports are consistently following these requirements. These airports are not recording case outcomes that result in no penalty in the database because TSA has not provided guidance requiring such tracking. Developing and issuing guidance for TSA staff at airports on the need to record all misconduct case outcomes in the Integrated Database would emphasize management’s view of the importance of staff including such information to provide a complete record of adjudication decisions. For example, we reviewed a random sample of 50 allegations of employee misconduct referred from DHS OIG to TSA in fiscal year 2012 and found 2 out of 50 allegations that were not adjudicated by TSA. As a result of our review, TSA subsequently made adjudication decisions on these allegations; 1 of the adjudication decisions resulted in a 14-day suspension for the employee because of disruptive behavior in the workplace, and the other adjudication decision resulted in no penalty. The results from GAO’s sample cannot be generalized to the entire population of referrals from DHS OIG to TSA; however they raise questions as to whether there could be additional instances of allegations that TSA had not adjudicated in the population of over 1,300 allegations of TSA employee misconduct that DHS OIG referred to TSA for action in fiscal year 2012. Specifically, TSA does not have a process to conduct reviews of misconduct cases to verify that TSA staff at airports responsible for adjudicating employee misconduct comply with policies and procedures, nor does the agency record the outcomes of all cases or track the cycle time to complete the investigations and adjudications process. Recommendations for Executive Action
To improve TSA’s management and oversight of efforts to address allegations of employee misconduct, we recommend that the Administrator of TSA take the following four actions, consistent with standards for internal control, to establish a process to conduct reviews of misconduct cases to verify that TSA staff at airports are complying with policies and procedures for adjudicating employee misconduct, develop and issue guidance to the field clarifying the need for TSA officials at airports to record all misconduct case outcomes in the Integrated Database, establish an agency-wide policy to track cycle times in the investigations and adjudications process, and develop reconciliation procedures to identify allegations of employee misconduct not previously addressed through adjudication. In response to our recommendation that TSA develop reconciliation procedures to identify allegations of employee misconduct not previously addressed through adjudication, DHS concurred with the recommendation. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
This report (1) summarizes data on Transportation Security Administration (TSA) employee misconduct cases, and (2) examines the extent to which TSA has taken actions to manage and oversee the investigations and adjudications process. | Why GAO Did This Study
DHS's TSA employs approximately 56,000 personnel to ensure security at about 450 TSA-regulated airports nationwide. News media have reported allegations of misconduct by TSA employees, including theft. GAO was asked to review TSA's policies and procedures for addressing employee misconduct. This report (1) summarizes data on TSA employee misconduct cases, and (2) examines the extent to which TSA has taken actions to manage and oversee the investigations and adjudications process. Adjudication is the process through which TSA determines whether the evidence is sufficient to propose and sustain a charge of misconduct, and determines the appropriate penalty. GAO reviewed TSA procedures, analyzed TSA misconduct data from fiscal years 2010 through 2012, and analyzed a random, nongeneralizable sample of 50 allegations referred from the DHS OIG to TSA to identify follow up actions.
What GAO Found
According to Transportation Security Administration (TSA) employee misconduct data that GAO analyzed, TSA investigated and adjudicated approximately 9,600 cases of employee misconduct from fiscal years 2010 through 2012. From fiscal years 2010 through 2012, the annual number of TSA misconduct cases increased from 2,691 to 3,408. In that same period, TSA's workforce of Office of Security Operations employees at the airport level grew by about 3,200 employees. Two offense categories accounted for about half of all cases--(1) attendance and leave, which accounted for 32 percent, and (2) screening and security, which accounted for 20 percent. Charges for screening and security related incidents pertain to violating standard operating procedures, including not conducting security or equipment checks, and allowing patrons or baggage to bypass screening. TSA's guidance delineates common employee charges, along with a suggested range of penalties. Forty-seven percent of the cases that GAO analyzed resulted in letters of reprimand, which describe unacceptable conduct that is the basis for a disciplinary action; 31 percent resulted in suspensions of a definite duration; and 17 percent resulted in the employee's removal from TSA. The remaining cases covered a variety of outcomes, including indefinite suspensions.
While TSA has taken steps to help manage the investigations and adjudication process, such as providing training to TSA staff at airports, additional procedures could help TSA better monitor the investigations and adjudications process. For example, TSA does not have a process for conducting reviews of misconduct cases to verify that TSA staff at airports are complying with policies and procedures for adjudicating employee misconduct. Without a review process, it is difficult to determine the extent to which deficiencies, if any, exist in the adjudications process. Further, TSA does not record all misconduct case outcomes, including cases that resulted in corrective action or no penalty, in its Integrated Database (TSA's centralized case management system) because the agency has not issued guidance requiring the recording of all outcomes. Issuing guidance to TSA staff at airports about recording all case outcomes in the database would emphasize management's view of the importance of staff including such information to provide a more complete record of adjudication decisions. Moreover, TSA does not have reconciliation procedures--that is, procedures to follow up on completed misconduct investigations to ensure that the agency has identified cases requiring adjudication. According to a random sample of 50 allegations referred from the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (DHS OIG) to TSA in fiscal year 2012, GAO found that 2 were not adjudicated by TSA. As a result of GAO's review, TSA made adjudication decisions on these allegations,1 of which resulted in a 14-day suspension for the employee because of disruptive behavior in the workplace. The results from GAO's sample cannot be generalized to the entire population of over 1,300 allegations referred from DHS OIG to TSA in fiscal year 2012; however, they raise questions as to whether there could be additional instances of allegations referred to TSA in this population that the agency has not adjudicated. A senior TSA official agreed that establishing reconciliation procedures would help TSA identify allegations of misconduct that require adjudication.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends, among other things, that TSA establish a process to conduct reviews of misconduct cases to verify that TSA staff at airports are complying with policies and procedures for adjudicating employee misconduct, develop and issue guidance to the field clarifying the need for TSA officials at airports to record all misconduct case outcomes in the Integrated Database, and develop reconciliation procedures to identify allegations of employee misconduct not previously addressed through adjudication. DHS concurred with the recommendations and TSA is taking actions in response. |
gao_GAO-15-28 | gao_GAO-15-28_0 | Executive Order 13653, which was signed in November 2013, directs federal agencies to, consistent with their missions, (1) address barriers to the nation’s resilience to climate change; (2) reform policies that may, perhaps unintentionally, increase the vulnerability of natural or built systems, economic sectors, natural resources, or communities to climate change; and (3) identify opportunities to support and encourage smarter, more climate-resilient investments. Growth in Federal and Private Sector Exposure Has Increased Losses to Date, and Climate Change May Increase Losses in Coming Decades
Growing federal and private sector exposure since our 2007 report on flood and crop insurance has increased insured and uninsured losses to date, and climate change and related increases in the frequency and severity of extreme weather events may further increase such losses in coming decades. Specifically, inflation-adjusted federal exposure to potential insured losses grew from $1.3 trillion to $1.4 trillion (8 percent) from 2007 through 2013. According to our analysis of the most recent data available, private sector exposure grew from an estimated $60.7 trillion to $66.5 trillion (10 percent) from 2007 through 2012, in 2014 dollars. The 20 scientific and industry studies we reviewed that examined the historical loss record generally found that the exposure growth in hazard- prone areas has largely driven increased insured and uninsured losses to date. When combined with the range of climate change projections, total losses could increase anywhere from about 50 to 340 percent by 2100. Public Insurers Have Begun Taking Steps to Prepare for Climate Change Effects, but Challenges May Limit Their Ability to Manage Future Exposure
Public insurers have commissioned climate change studies, incorporated climate change adaptation into their planning, and taken other steps to better understand and prepare for climate change’s potential effects. However, inherent challenges of federal insurance programs, such as how federal insurers can address policyholders’ long-term risk given the short-term focus of insurance contracts, may impede NFIP and RMA’s ability to minimize long-term federal exposure to climate change. Second, given the short-term nature of insurance, public insurers face a challenge in encouraging their policyholders to reduce their long-term exposure to climate change risks. Property insurance contracts typically estimate and communicate risk of property losses for the 1-year term of a policy. Furthermore, building to community standards that are identical to existing NFIP standards—which are based on near-term flood risk—may unintentionally increase policyholders’ long-term vulnerability to climate change as sea-level rises or erosion increases properties’ flood risk— which does not reflect the direction contained in Executive Order 13653. For example, certain practices, such as conventional tillage and traditional irrigation methods, may maintain historic crop yields in the short-term, but they may inadvertently reduce agriculture’s long- term resilience through increased erosion, depleted soil quality, and inefficient water use. Many Private Insurers and Reinsurers Have Identified and Assessed Climate Change Risks, but Preparing for Long- Term Effects Is Challenging
Many private property and casualty insurers and reinsurers have taken some steps since our 2007 report on flood and crop insurance to understand and report on their risks associated with climate change, including participating in industry climate change surveys, and issuing reports that identify and assess climate change risks and trends in weather-related losses. According to several insurers and industry representatives we interviewed, insurers generally manage their exposure to weather-related losses associated with climate change through their underwriting practices, which include charging risk- based premiums, managing coverage options, and sharing exposure to losses by purchasing reinsurance. However, estimating weather- related risks still includes elements of uncertainty, and catastrophe modeling information is limited for some weather-related risks. Additionally, federal law prohibits crop insurance from covering losses due to a farmers’ failure to follow good farming practices, although some of these practices may increase the vulnerability of agriculture to climate change, which may not reflect the direction contained in Executive Order 13653. In its written comments, DHS concurred with our findings that FEMA has taken action to better understand and prepare for climate change’s potential effects and that FEMA faces challenges that may limit its ability to minimize long-term federal exposure to climate change. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
To determine how federal and private sector exposure to losses has changed since our 2007 report on flood and crop insurance and how climate change has or may affect insured and uninsured losses, we analyzed federal and private sector exposure data from 2007 through 2013. Specifically, we collected agency data on the total value of property insured under the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and the federal crop insurance program. To determine how public insurers are preparing for climate change, we reviewed agency documents related to climate change. | Why GAO Did This Study
The May 2014 National Climate Assessment indicates that the frequency and/or severity of many weather and climate extremes may increase with climate change. Public and private property insurers can bear a large portion of the financial impact of such weather-related losses. In the public sector, federal insurance includes NFIP, managed by FEMA, and the federal crop insurance program, managed by RMA.
GAO was asked to review climate change's effect on insurers. This report examines (1) how federal and private exposure to losses has changed since GAO's 2007 report on the subject, and what is known about how climate change may affect insured and uninsured losses; (2) how public insurers are preparing for climate change, and any challenges they face; and (3) how private insurers are preparing for climate change and any challenges they face. GAO reviewed 20 studies, examined federal and private sector data on exposure to losses from 2000 to 2013, reviewed agency documents, and interviewed agency officials and a nonprobability sample of eight insurers and reinsurers.
What GAO Found
Since GAO's 2007 report on flood and crop insurance, exposure growth in hazard-prone areas has increased losses, and climate change and related increases in extreme weather events may further increase such losses in coming decades. Scientific and industry studies GAO reviewed generally found that increasing growth and property values in hazard-prone areas have increased losses to date and that climate change may compound this effect. From 2007 through 2013, data from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Risk Management Agency (RMA) show that exposure to potential losses for insured property grew from $1.3 trillion to $1.4 trillion (8 percent). According to industry data, private sector exposure to such loss grew from $60.7 trillion to $66.5 trillion (10 percent) from 2007 through 2012. Federal exposure to uninsured loss also increased by 46 percent over this period, based on a 2013 analysis by the Congressional Research Service. According to the studies GAO reviewed, climate change may substantially increase losses by 2040 and increase losses from about 50 to 100 percent by 2100.
FEMA and RMA have taken some steps to better understand and prepare for climate change's potential effects under the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and the federal crop insurance program by, for example, commissioning climate change studies. However, both agencies face challenges that may limit their ability to minimize long-term federal exposure to climate change. For example, because of the short-term nature of insurance (i.e., contracts typically estimate and communicate risk of property losses for the 1-year term of a policy), FEMA and RMA face a challenge in encouraging policyholders to reduce their long-term exposure to climate change risks. Specifically, flood insurance policyholders who build to NFIP standards—which are based on current flood risk and not on long-term risks—may unintentionally increase their vulnerability to climate change as sea-level rises. Also, while federal law prohibits crop insurance from covering losses due to a farmers' failure to follow good farming practices, such as various irrigation methods, some of these practices maintain short-term production but may inadvertently increase the vulnerability of agriculture to climate change through increased erosion and inefficient water use. A recent executive order directed federal agencies to reform policies that may, perhaps unintentionally, increase the vulnerability of economic sectors or communities to climate change. Without encouraging NFIP and crop insurance policyholders to adopt building and agricultural practices that reduce long-term risk, FEMA and RMA may send policyholders signals that unintentionally encourage their vulnerability to climate change, counter to the direction of the executive order, which could exacerbate federal exposure to losses.
Many private insurers and reinsurers have taken steps since 2007 to better understand and prepare for climate change effects and related challenges, including participating in industry climate change surveys, and issuing reports that identify and assess climate change risks and trends in weather-related losses. According to industry officials, they can manage their exposure to climate change and related challenges through risk-based premiums, reinsurance, and other practices, although estimating weather-related risks still includes elements of uncertainty.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that FEMA and RMA take additional steps to encourage flood and crop insurance policyholders to adopt building and agricultural practices that reduce long-term risk and federal exposure to losses. FEMA agreed with GAO's recommendation, and RMA neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendation. |
gao_GAO-09-300 | gao_GAO-09-300_0 | While DOD’s weapon systems require large amounts of fuel—a B-52H, for example, burns approximately 3,500 gallons per flight hour—the department reports that the single largest battlefield fuel consumer is generators. Generators provide power for base support activities such as air conditioning/heating, lighting, refrigeration, and communications. Many of these efforts are in a research and development phase, and the extent to which they will be fielded and under what time frame is uncertain. Notable efforts include the application of foam insulation to tent structures, the development of more fuel-efficient generators and environmental control units, and research on alternative and renewable energy sources for potential use at forward- deployed locations. In addition, during our visits to Kuwait and Djibouti, we found local camp efforts aimed at reducing fuel demand. Specific Forward- Deployed Locations Have Efforts Under Way or Planned to Reduce Fuel Demand
During our visits to forward-deployed locations in Kuwait and Djibouti, we found some local efforts by camp officials to reduce fuel demand. DOD Does Not Have an Effective Approach for Managing Fuel Demand at Forward- Deployed Locations
Although DOD is undertaking a number of initiatives focused on reducing fuel consumption, it lacks an effective approach for implementing fuel reduction initiatives and maintaining sustained attention to fuel demand management at its forward-deployed locations. DOD has stated that it needs to reduce its dependence on petroleum-based fuel and the logistics “footprint” of its military forces, as well as reduce operating costs associated with high fuel usage. However, we found that DOD’s current approach to managing fuel demand at forward-deployed locations is not effective because it lacks (1) guidance directing locations to address fuel demand, (2) incentives and a viable funding mechanism to invest in fuel reduction initiatives, and (3) visibility and accountability within the chain of command for achieving fuel reduction. The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 requires DOD to establish a Director of Operational Energy Plans and Programs, an operational energy strategy for DOD, and military department-level energy officials. Although base commanders must place their highest priority on meeting mission requirements and it may not be practical for DOD to decrease fuel usage at every forward-deployed location, particularly at those that might not be in existence for very long, fuel demand is likely to remain high until the department gives systematic consideration to incorporating fuel demand in construction, maintenance, procurement, and other policy decisions for forward-deployed locations. By placing a higher priority on fuel reduction at forward-deployed locations and developing a comprehensive and coordinated approach to managing fuel demand, one that includes specific guidelines, incentives, a viable funding mechanism, visibility, and accountability, DOD would be more likely to achieve its goals of reducing its reliance on petroleum-based fuel, the vulnerabilities and logistics burden associated with transporting large amounts of fuel to forward-deployed locations, and operational costs. 1. 2. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) relies heavily on petroleum-based fuel to sustain its forward-deployed locations--particularly those that are not connected to local power grids. While weapon platforms require large amounts of fuel, DOD reports that the single largest battlefield fuel consumer is generators, which provide power for base support activities such as cooling, heating, and lighting. Transporting fuel to forward-deployed locations presents an enormous logistics burden and risk, including exposing fuel truck convoys to attack. GAO was asked to address DOD's (1) efforts to reduce fuel demand at forward-deployed locations and (2) approach to managing fuel demand at these locations. This review focused on locations within Central Command's area of responsibility. GAO visited DOD locations in Kuwait and Djibouti to learn about fuel reduction efforts and challenges facing these locations.
What GAO Found
DOD components have some efforts under way or planned to reduce fuel demand at forward-deployed locations. Many of these efforts are in a research and development phase, and the extent to which they will be fielded and under what time frame is uncertain. Notable efforts include the application of foam insulation to tent structures, the development of more fuel-efficient generators and environmental control units, and research on alternative and renewable energy sources for potential use at forward-deployed locations. In addition, during visits to Kuwait and Djibouti, GAO met with officials about local camp efforts aimed at reducing fuel demand. DOD lacks an effective approach for implementing fuel reduction initiatives and maintaining sustained attention to fuel demand management at its forward-deployed locations. Moreover, DOD faces difficulty achieving its goals to reduce dependence on petroleum-based fuel and its logistics "footprint," as well as operating costs associated with high fuel usage, because managing fuel demand at forward-deployed locations has not been a departmental priority and fuel reduction efforts have not been well coordinated or comprehensive. GAO found that DOD's current approach to managing fuel demand lacks (1) guidance directing locations to address fuel demand, (2) incentives and a viable funding mechanism to invest in fuel reduction projects, and (3) visibility and accountability for achieving fuel reduction. Although it may not be practical for DOD to decrease fuel usage at every forward-deployed location and base commanders must place their highest priority on meeting mission requirements, fuel demand is likely to remain high until the department gives systematic consideration to incorporating fuel demand in construction, maintenance, procurement, and other policy decisions for forward-deployed locations. The 2009 defense authorization act requires DOD to establish a director of operational energy and an energy strategy, providing the department with an opportunity to increase attention on improving fuel demand management. |
gao_GAO-15-269 | gao_GAO-15-269_0 | Improper Payment Reporting Requirements
IPIA, as amended, requires federal executive branch agencies to (1) review all programs and activities, (2) identify those that may be susceptible to significant improper payments, (3) estimate the annual amount of improper payments for those programs and activities, (4) implement actions to reduce the root causes of improper payments and set reduction targets, and (5) report on the results of addressing the foregoing requirements. According to OMB officials, the latitude in the Although OMB’s implementation guidance allows such variation, several federal programs which pay for services based on claims submitted by beneficiaries or providers, including Medicare, examined the underlying documentation for each of a sample of claims to determine the validity of payments as part of their efforts to estimate improper payments in fiscal For example, CMS’s method for testing payments for errors year 2013. in Medicaid fee-for-service and Children’s Health Insurance Program fee- for-service includes both a claims processing review and medical record review.improper payments were identified through the medical record reviews in fiscal year 2013. Both methodologies evaluate a sample of health care claims paid or denied by the contractors that process program claims. However, while CMS’s methodology examined underlying patient medical records supporting each of the sampled claims, DHA did not evaluate comparable medical record documentation to discern whether each payment was supported. Consequently, TRICARE’s reported improper payment estimates were not comparable to Medicare’s estimates, and likely understated the amount of improper payments in the TRICARE program relative to the estimates produced by Medicare’s more comprehensive measurement methodology. TRICARE’s Improper Payment Measurement Methodology Was Less Comprehensive than Medicare’s Methodology
The improper payment measurement methodology that DHA used to estimate the TRICARE improper payments reported in DOD’s fiscal year 2013 AFR was less comprehensive than the measurement methodology CMS used to estimate Medicare improper payments. TRICARE’s Methodology Is Likely to Understate Its Improper Payment Rate Compared to Medicare’s Methodology
Compared to DHA’s methodology, CMS’s CERT methodology of examining underlying medical records to independently verify Medicare claims and payments more completely identifies potential improper payments, such as those caused by provider noncompliance with coding, billing, and payment rules. DHA policy also requires the TPCCs to conduct quarterly internal reviews of a sample of medical records to determine the medical necessity of care provided, and determine if the diagnostic and procedural information of the patient—as reported on the claim—matches the physician’s description of care and services documented in the medical record. TRICARE’s Root Cause Analysis and Corrective Action Plans for Improper Payments Only Addressed Contractor Compliance and Were Less Comprehensive Than Medicare’s
The root causes and related corrective actions that DHA reported in DOD’s fiscal year 2013 AFR are limited to addressing issues of contractor noncompliance with claims processing requirements. Although DHA could include other corrective actions, the current approach only addresses improper payments caused by contractors’ claims processing errors. CMS, by comparison, reported more detailed and constructive information about the 10.1 percent of Medicare payments it reported as improper in HHS’s fiscal year 2013 AFR. For example, CMS reported that some improper payments were made for services that, while clinically appropriate, could be provided in less intensive settings and therefore did not meet Medicare’s medical necessity requirements. In addition to reporting root causes and corrective actions in the AFR, CMS uses its Medicare improper payment results to address the agency’s stated goal of reducing Medicare improper payments due to programmatic weaknesses. However, DHA does not have as robust an approach to measuring improper payments in the TRICARE program as CMS has for the Medicare program. Specifically, DHA does not routinely examine medical record documentation in its approach to measuring TRICARE improper payments. Recommendations for Executive Action
To better assess and address the full extent of improper payments in the TRICARE program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) to take the following two actions: 1. implement a more comprehensive TRICARE improper payment measurement methodology that includes medical record reviews, as done in other parts of its existing postpayment claims review programs; and 2. once a more comprehensive improper payment methodology is implemented, develop more robust corrective action plans that address underlying causes of improper payments, as determined by the medical record reviews. HHS had no comments on the report. | Why GAO Did This Study
Improper payments—payments that were made in an incorrect amount or should not have been made at all—are a contributor to excess health care costs. For programs identified as susceptible to significant improper payments, federal agencies are required to annually report estimates of improper payments, their root causes, and corrective actions to address them. In fiscal year 2013, DOD spent about $21 billion for TRICARE and estimated improper payments of $68 million, or an error rate of 0.3 percent. That year, HHS estimated that $36 billion, or 10.1 percent, of the total $357 billion in Medicare payments were improper.
GAO was mandated to examine improper payments in TRICARE and Medicare. This report addresses (1) TRICARE and Medicare improper payment measurement comparability; and (2) the extent to which each program identifies root causes of, and develops corrective actions to address, improper payments. GAO examined DHA and CMS documentation related to improper payment measurement and corrective actions, reviewed relevant laws and guidance, and interviewed agency officials and contractors.
What GAO Found
The Defense Health Agency (DHA), the agency within the Department of Defense (DOD) responsible for administering the military health program known as TRICARE, uses a methodology for measuring TRICARE improper payments that is less comprehensive than the methodology used to measure improper payments in Medicare, the federal health care program for the elderly and certain disabled individuals. Both methodologies evaluate a sample of health care claims paid or denied by the contractors that process the programs' claims. However, DHA's methodology only examines the claims processing performance of the contractors that process TRICARE's purchased care claims. Unlike Medicare, DHA does not examine the underlying medical record documentation to discern whether each sampled payment was supported. Without examining the medical record, DHA does not verify the medical necessity of services provided. The agency also does not validate that the diagnostic and procedural information reported on the claim matches the care and services documented in the medical record. Comparatively, the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS) approach to measuring Medicare improper payments examines medical records associated with a sample of claims to verify support for the payment. This methodology more completely identifies improper payments beyond those resulting from claim processing errors, such as those related to provider noncompliance with coding, billing, and payment rules. By not examining medical record documentation to discern if payments are proper, TRICARE's reported improper payment estimates are not comparable to Medicare's estimates, and likely understate the amount of improper payments relative to the estimates produced by Medicare's more comprehensive methodology.
The root causes of TRICARE improper payments and related corrective actions that DHA has identified are limited to addressing issues of contractor noncompliance with claims processing requirements, and are less comprehensive than the corrective actions identified by CMS. For example, DHA has identified the same single corrective action for each of the last three fiscal years to promote contractor compliance, but it only addresses improper payments caused by contractors' claims processing errors. CMS, by comparison, reports more comprehensive information about root causes of improper Medicare payments, develops corrective actions that more directly address root causes, and uses the information to address the agency's goal of reducing future improper payments. For example, for fiscal year 2013, CMS determined that some payments were improper because the services could have been provided in less intensive settings and CMS subsequently implemented two policies to address the problem. In contrast, DHA's less comprehensive approach limits its ability to address the causes of improper payments in the TRICARE program.
What GAO Recommends
DOD should implement more comprehensive TRICARE improper payment measurement methods that include medical record reviews, and develop more robust corrective action plans. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations and identified steps the department will need to take for implementation. HHS had no comments on the report. |
gao_T-RCED-98-38 | gao_T-RCED-98-38_0 | Furthermore, the funds are outlayed over a number of years. Comparing Unobligated Highway Balances With Previous Obligations
At the beginning of fiscal year 1998, the total unobligated federal highway fund balance for all states was $12.1 billion. From a national perspective, the total unobligated highway balance of $12.1 billion at the beginning of fiscal year 1998 (including program funds exempt from obligation limits) is nearly 1.5 times the $8.1 billion that all states obligated during the first 6 months of fiscal year 1997. For example, Indiana’s total unobligated balance is over $80 million less than its total highway obligations during the first 6 months of fiscal year 1997. I provides a state-by-state comparison of the fiscal year 1998 unobligated balance of $9.6 billion (from highway programs subject to the obligation limit) to actual state obligations during the first 4 through 7 months of fiscal year 1997. It is important to note that these comparisons imply that the state’s obligation rates for fiscal year 1997 correspond to those for fiscal year 1998, which may or may not be the case for individual states. Strategies That Could Help the States in the Short-Term
A number of strategies could help the states get through a short period without a new highway funding authorization. At the federal level, the Congress could provide the states with the flexibility to use their unobligated balances across the range of federal highway programs, rather than keeping the balances generally tied to specific highway programs and demonstration projects. Because of the variances in the unobligated balances remaining across federal highway programs, these balances may not be consistent with state funding priorities or projects that the states planned for this year. To identify any problems that the states might have in using their unobligated balances and to identify strategies that the states may use to help them respond to the absence of new federal highway funds in the short term, we contacted nine states—Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, and South Dakota. States May Have to Rely More on State Funding for Highways
Federal highway funding represents one of the many financial sources used to support the nation’s highways. To compensate for the lack of new federal highway funds being available for part of fiscal year 1998, some states may be able to fund a proportionately larger share of their planned highway projects in early fiscal year 1998 with state funds. A few of the nine states we contacted noted that they would be postponing highway projects if new federal funds are not available within the next few months. The states also differ in their ability to provide greater funding in fiscal year 1998. However, if the states draw on their own resources, they may have to delay other planned projects. Under advance construction, a state can begin a highway project by obtaining capital from a variety of sources, including its own funds and private capital, and later receive reimbursement through federal highway obligations. Many states reported to AASHTO that they would use advance construction to continue operations and project schedules. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the status of federal surface transportation programs in the absence of funding from a new federal highway reauthorization act, focusing on a comparison of unobligated federal highway fund balances at the beginning of fiscal year (FY) 1998 with the highway funds that the states obligated during the first part of FY 1997.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) the total unobligated highway fund balance available at the beginning of FY 1998 equals $12.1 billion and exceeds the total actual obligations of $8.1 billion, made by the states during the first 6 months of FY 1997; (2) a comparison of the unobligated balances of individual states with their actual FY 1997 obligations reveals that some state highway programs may experience financial difficulties by the middle of FY 1998 if their obligation rates for this year are comparable to those for FY 1997; (3) while most states have unobligated balances that are greater than their actual federal highway obligations in the first 6 months of FY 1997, 14 states have an unobligated balance that is lower than their actual obligations during the same period; (4) the nine states that GAO contacted identified various strategies that they would use to try to continue their highway operations, such as relying more extensively on state funds; (5) some of these states also noted that they would soon be postponing highway projects if new federal funds are not available within the next few months; (6) the rates at which states obligated funds in FY 1997 may not correspond to their plans for obligating federal highway funds in FY 1998; (7) some states may be limited in their ability to use available unobligated balances because of restrictions on the specific types of highway programs that the funds can be used for; (8) the comparisons indicate that while many states may be able to continue financing highway projects for some time, some states may have difficulty dealing even in the short term with the absence of new federal highway funds; (9) a number of strategies could help the states respond to the absence of new federal funds in the short term; (10) for example, Congress could provide the states with the flexibility to use their unobligated balances across the range of federal highway programs, rather than keeping the balances tied to specific highway funding categories and demonstration projects; (11) Congress could then reimburse appropriate funding categories after reauthorization; (12) individual states could also consider a number of strategies, such as temporarily substituting state funds for federal highway funds; (13) states could also begin highway projects by using advance construction, which enables a state to access capital from a variety of sources and later receive reimbursements through federal highway obligations; (14) such strategies, however, may delay other planned projects within individual states; and (15) these strategies may not be feasible for some states or for an extended period of time. |
gao_GAO-12-1007 | gao_GAO-12-1007_0 | We previously reported on differences between the act and OMB guidance. As a result, agencies did not report three data elements required by the statute in their fiscal year 2010 inventories—(1) the role the services played in achieving agency objectives, (2) the total dollar amount invoiced for services under the contract, and (3) the number and work location of contractor and subcontractor personnel. As a result, OMB and Congress cannot meaningfully use these service contract inventories to compare service contract obligations among agencies or develop spending trends, and agencies did not have a complete universe of service contracts to consider for review. Progress, however, is being made towards collecting this information. For example, OMB directed agencies to start collecting information on the role services play in achieving agency objectives for new contracts awarded on or after March 1, 2012. Five agencies, however, did not. One agency—DOT—reported information on fiscal year 2010 obligations for its fiscal year 2011 inventory. The other 9 agencies did not submit an inventory report to OMB or make their reports publicly available. Specifically, the 5 agencies identified a total of 3 contracts where contractors could be performing inherently governmental functions and 104 instances of contractors performing closely associated with inherently governmental functions. We collected the required reports for 40 of the 49 agencies, either from their websites or OMB. Under the proposed FAR rule, if finalized, agencies would start collecting unavailable, but required data elements directly from contractors. Although most agencies followed OMB guidance for reporting on their inventory reviews, it is unclear based on the information provided in their reports whether the results of the reviews were a real indication of the agencies’ effective and appropriate use of contractors or due to the different approaches used to conduct the inventory reviews. To help ensure that the service contract inventories contain consistent and reliable information and that the service contract inventory analysis reports have sufficient information to provide greater context and value, we recommend that the Administrator of OMB’s Office of Federal Procurement Policy clarify guidance to:
Require agencies to fully describe in their inventory review reports the scope of the inventory reviews, including information such as the number of contracts and the percentage of contracts reviewed for each product and service code selected and the total universe of contracts;
Require agencies to consistently report on the number of contractor personnel and functions that were involved with the workforce issues identified during their inventory reviews; and
Require agencies to include, as part of their inventory review reports, the status of agency efforts to resolve findings identified in previous reviews until they are resolved. OMB provided comments via e- mail, stating that it generally concurs with our recommendations. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Section 743 of the 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act directed GAO to report on the second annual service contract inventory that civilian agencies were required to submit to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) by December 31, 2011. To satisfy the mandate, we assessed civilian agencies’ efforts to (1) compile their fiscal year 2011 inventories and (2) review and report on their fiscal year 2010 inventories. To assess civilian agencies’ efforts to compile their fiscal year 2011 inventories, we reviewed the act and OMB guidance to determine what data elements were required to be included in the service contract inventories. These agencies were selected because they represent approximately 42 percent of total fiscal year 2011 service contract obligations for civilian agencies. We also met with agency officials to determine the extent to which agencies have used their reviews for decision making, including workforce planning and strategic sourcing efforts, and to determine how agencies identified instances in which contractors were performing inherently governmental functions or functions closely associated with inherently governmental functions. | Why GAO Did This Study
In fiscal year 2011, civilian agencies reported $161 billion in contract obligations, $126 billion (almost 80 percent) of which were for services such as professional management and information technology support. Concerned about agencies' reliance on contractors, Congress included a requirement in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010 for civilian agencies to compile and review an annual inventory of service contracts to examine certain issues, such as contractors performing inherently governmental functions or functions closely associated with inherently governmental functions, which would require enhanced management oversight. It also required OMB to develop guidance to assist agencies in meeting the act's requirements and for GAO to report on agency efforts.
GAO assessed agency efforts to (1) compile their fiscal year 2011 inventories and (2) review and report on their fiscal year 2010 inventories. To meet these objectives, GAO analyzed agencies' fiscal year 2011 service contract inventories and fiscal year 2010 service contract inventory review reports and compared them to legislative requirements, OMB guidance, and federal procurement data.
What GAO Found
Civilian agencies did not fully comply with statutory requirements for compiling fiscal year 2011 service contract inventories. For example, because the information is not currently readily available, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directed the 49 agencies that were required to submit inventories to defer the collection of three statutorily required data elements for each contract--the role the services played in achieving agency objectives, the total dollar amount invoiced for services under the contracts, and the number and work locations of contractor and subcontractor personnel. Progress, however, is being made to collect this information for future inventories. OMB directed agencies to start collecting information on the role services play in achieving agency objectives for new contracts awarded on or after March 1, 2012. A proposed Federal Acquisition Regulation rule was published in April 2011 to start collecting the remaining two data elements directly from contractors. We also found several instances where agencies significantly underreported obligations in their inventories, either because they misinterpreted or did not follow OMB guidance. For example, the General Services Administration underreported obligations by approximately $6.4 billion. Without complete and accurate service contract inventories, OMB and Congress cannot meaningfully compare service contract obligations among agencies, or develop spending trends for agencies, thus limiting the overall utility of the inventories.
Nine of the 49 civilian agencies did not submit a report on their fiscal year 2010 inventory review to OMB, as required. Of the 40 agencies that submitted reports on their inventory reviews, 5 agencies identified 3 contracts where contractors could be performing inherently governmental functions and 104 instances where contractors were performing closely associated with inherently governmental functions. It is unclear, however, based on the 40 agency reports, whether these results were a real indication of the agencies' effective and appropriate use of contractors or due to the different approaches agencies used to conduct the reviews. Agencies did not include important context in their reports, such as the number of contracts or the percentage of their inventories reviewed. Of the 25 agencies that reported the number of contracts they reviewed, most reviewed 50 or fewer contracts. OMB intends to have agencies share lessons learned, including the use of cross-functional teams, to help future review efforts.
What GAO Recommends
GAO recommends that OMB (1) work with agencies to improve how compliance with the act and with OMB guidance is monitored and (2) clarify guidance to agencies for compiling and reporting on their inventories. OMB generally concurred with our recommendations. |
gao_AIMD-95-110 | gao_AIMD-95-110_0 | DUSD(L) Did Not Use Sufficient Analyses in Selecting DMSS
In selecting DMSS as DOD’s initial step toward improving defense maintenance depot operations, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics (DUSD(L)) did not base its decision on sufficient analyses of expected system development and deployment costs or detailed assessments of DMSS’s economic and technical risks. Further, DUSD(L) did not obtain independent milestone reviews and approvals which are designed to ensure (1) decisions are consistent with sound business principles and (2) risks inherent in large information systems projects are adequately managed. Reengineering Not Considered for Improving Depot Maintenance
Instead of first considering opportunities to reengineer business processes, DUSD(L) chose a strategy that focuses on the development and deployment of a DOD standard depot maintenance information system. Government and private industry have learned that initial focus on information system deployment may make future reengineering efforts more difficult by entrenching inefficient and ineffective work processes. Defense asserts that by following this strategy, it has achieved substantial depot maintenance improvements yielding significant cost reductions. To identify expected DMSS costs and benefits, we analyzed available functional economic analyses (FEA). GAO Comments
1. 3. It is clear from Defense’s own benefit projections that DMSS will not result in dramatic improvements possible from consideration of reengineering-based solutions. 4. | Why GAO Did This Study
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Defense's (DOD) justification for developing and deploying its Depot Maintenance Standard System (DMSS), focusing on whether DOD has: (1) based its DMSS selection on costs and benefit analyses as well as economic and technical risks; and (2) selected a strategy that would dramatically improve depot maintenance operations.
What GAO Found
GAO found that: (1) DOD has not based its DMSS decisions on sufficient cost and benefit analyses or detailed assessments of economic and technical risks; (2) DOD may not achieve the marginal improvements envisioned, since it has failed to obtain project milestone reviews or approvals for DMSS that would ensure that system development and implementation decisions are consistent with sound business practices; (3) DMSS will not dramatically improve DOD depot maintenance or produce significant cost savings, since DOD has not reengineered its business practices; and (4) DOD may have made future reengineering efforts more difficult by entrenching inefficient and ineffective work processes. |
gao_GAO-08-458T | gao_GAO-08-458T_0 | In September 2007, State nominated Greece for admission into the program, and DHS is currently reviewing this nomination to assess the impact of Greece’s participation on U.S. security, law enforcement, and illegal immigration interests. In addition, we plan to report this year on the cost and resource implications for State’s consular operations of changes in the countries that participate in the Visa Waiver Program. DHS’s Current Plan to Certify Air Exit System Requirement Will Not Address All Potential Risks of An Expanded Visa Waiver Program
In response to our inquiries, on December 12, 2007, DHS reported to us that it will match records of foreign nationals’ departures that airlines reported to the department to records of any prior arrival, change of status action, or prior departure from the United States to certify the air exit system requirement (see fig. Using this methodology, DHS stated that it can achieve a 97.10 percent match rate, based on data from August 2007. Although DHS acknowledged there are weaknesses with this methodology, the department told us that it had no intention of altering its plans for certifying the air exit system requirement. On February 21, 2008, in commenting on a draft of this testimony, DHS indicated that it had not finalized its decision on which methodology the department would use to certify compliance; however, the department confirmed that all methodologies under consideration would match foreign nationals’ departure records against prior records “to determine that the person is a foreign national, and that the person did depart the country through a U.S. airport.”
There are several weaknesses with this approach. First, DHS’s methodology does not begin with arrival records to determine if those foreign nationals departed or remained in the United States beyond their authorized periods of admission—more useful data for oversight of the Visa Waiver Program and consideration of its expansion. Furthermore, DHS’s methodology will not inform overall or country-specific overstay rates, which are key factors in determining illegal immigration risks in the Visa Waiver Program. Third, DHS’s methodology does not address the accuracy of airlines’ transmissions of departure records, and DHS acknowledges that there are weaknesses in the departure data. Furthermore, there may be some visitors who did leave the country by air, but were not recorded on airlines’ manifest data as having departed. DHS reported to us that it had used its methodology for meeting the “97 percent” requirement to match records in the past; however, we were unable to identify an instance when DHS had used this particular methodology. Moreover, DHS’s plans to certify the “97 percent” requirement will not further its efforts in responding to Congress’s longstanding calls for the development of an automated entry and exit control system to track visitors to the United States and identify those visitors who have remained in the country illegally. Without the capability to verify departures, DHS cannot ensure the integrity of the immigration system by identifying visitors who have overstayed their original period of admission. For example, overstay rates would inform decision makers of illegal immigration risks associated with adding new countries to the program. The Data Integrity Group also provides similar information to the department’s Office of Immigration Statistics, as well as the Visa Waiver Program Office. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and a Layered Defense. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Visa Waiver Program, which enables citizens of participating countries to travel to the United States without first obtaining a visa, has many benefits, yet also presents security, law enforcement, and illegal immigration risks. In August 2007, Congress passed legislation that provides the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with the authority to expand the program to additional countries whose nationals' applications for short-term business and tourism visas were refused between 3 and 10 percent of the time in the prior fiscal year. Countries must also meet certain conditions, and DHS must first complete and certify a number of required actions aimed at enhancing the security of the program. This testimony will focus on one of these required actions--namely, that a system be in place that can verify the departure of 97 percent of foreign nationals who depart through U.S. airports (referred to as an air exit system). Our observations are based on our review of relevant legislation, regulations and agency operating procedures, and prior GAO reports on the Visa Waiver Program and immigrant and visitor entry and exit tracking systems, as well as on discussions with federal agency officials. In commenting on a draft of this statement, DHS emphasized that it had not finalized its plan for certifying the "97 percent" requirement, but that the department believes the current plan would meet the legislative requirement. The Department of State also provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate.
What GAO Found
On December 12, 2007, DHS reported to us that it will match records of foreign nationals departing the country, as reported by airlines, to the department's existing records of any prior arrivals, immigration status changes, or prior departures from the United States. Using this formula, DHS stated that it can attain a match rate above 97 percent, based on August 2007 data, to certify compliance with the legislative air exit system requirement. DHS told us that it believes this methodology would meet the statutory requirement. On February 21, 2008, DHS indicated that it had not finalized its decision on the methodology the department would use to certify compliance. Nevertheless, the department confirmed that the basic structure of its methodology would not change, and that it would use departure records as the starting point. There are several limitations with this methodology. For example, DHS's methodology does not begin with arrival records and determine if these foreign nationals stayed in the United States beyond their authorized periods of admission (referred to as overstays). Therefore, this methodology will not inform overall and country-specific overstay rates--key factors in determining illegal immigration risks of the Visa Waiver Program. Although most long-term overstays are likely motivated by economic opportunities, a few overstays have been identified as terrorists or involved in terrorist-related activity, including some of the September 11, 2001, hijackers. In addition, DHS's current methodology does not address the accuracy of airlines' transmissions of departure records, and DHS acknowledges that there are weaknesses in the departure data. For example, there may be some visitors who did not leave the country by air even though they were recorded on airlines' manifest data as having departed. The inability of the U.S. government to track the status of visitors in the country, to identify those who overstay their authorized period of visit, and to use this data to compute overstay rates have been longstanding weaknesses in the oversight of the Visa Waiver Program. DHS's plan to meet the "97 percent" requirement in the visa waiver expansion legislation will not address these weaknesses. |
gao_GAO-01-346 | gao_GAO-01-346_0 | The goal was implemented by procurement regulations effective in fiscal year 1996. Only VA met or exceeded its WOSB prime goal each year; State and NASA met or exceeded their prime goal in 3 of the 4 years. Because DOD achieved less than half of its 5-percent goal for prime contracts with WOSBs in fiscal year 1999, the governmentwide goal for prime contracting with WOSBs could not have been met even if every other federal agency had reached its WOSB prime contracting goal. These officials most frequently cited two obstacles to increasing federal contracting with WOSBs: the numerous and complex federal contracting programs for small the absence of a specific contracting program targeting WOSBs. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
Our objectives were to (1) review the federal procurement system for the 3 preceding fiscal years (1997 through 1999) to identify any trends in federal contracting with respect to women-owned small businesses (WOSBs), (2) solicit from federal employees involved in the federal procurement system any suggestions for increasing the number of federal contracts awarded to WOSBs, (3) report to the Congress on (a) any suggestions for increasing the number of federal contracts awarded to WOSBs that we consider appropriate after considering suggestions we received from the federal employees solicited per requirement 2 above, including any such means that incorporate the concepts of teaming and partnering, and (b) any barriers to the receipt of federal contracts by WOSBs and other small businesses that are created by legal or regulatory procurement requirements or practices, and (4) identify concerns of federal contracting officials about agencies’ ability to meet their WOSB contracting goals. To meet our other three objectives, we selected four agencies that accounted for over 80 percent of all federal contracting expenditures for fiscal years 1997 through1999: Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Energy (DOE), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and General Services Administration (GSA). | Why GAO Did This Study
Procurement regulations implemented in 1996 mandated that women-owned small businesses (WOSB) receive five percent of governmentwide contracts. Although the number of contracts awarded to WOSBs has risen more than four times as fast as other federal contracting efforts since 1996, the goal of awarding five percent of federal contracts to WOSBs has not been met. More agencies succeeded in meeting the WOSB subcontracting goal than their prime contracting goal.
What GAO Found
GAO found that three federal agencies--the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of State, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration--met or exceeded both goals in three of the four years it studied. Because the Department of Defense, which accounted for 64 percent of federal procurement in 1999, did not come close to achieving its five-percent goal, the governmentwide goal for prime contracting with WOSBs could not have been met even if all other federal agencies reached their prime contracting goals. Government officials cited many obstacles to increasing federal contracting with WOSBs, including a reduced contracting personnel force and the absense of a targeted WOSB government program. These contracting officers offered suggestions for increasing WOSB participation in federal contracting, including a strengthened outreach program and expanded excess to contract financing. |
gao_GAO-13-545T | gao_GAO-13-545T_0 | SSA Faces Challenges in Several Key Areas
Over the next decade, SSA will experience management challenges in four key areas: (1) human capital, (2) disability program issues, (3) information technology, and (4) physical infrastructure. Succession planning. This loss of knowledge and expertise could result in increasing workloads, backlogs, and improper payments. SSA also faces disability program integrity challenges due to budget decisions and the way it prioritizes competing workload demands such as processing initial claims. IT modernization efforts. While we are encouraged that SSA issued an updated IT strategic plan, at present, it is too soon to assess the extent to which SSA will adhere to the plan and annual reevaluation cycle. SSA is modernizing its IT systems, in part, to support a shift toward offering more online services. Information security weaknesses. Physical Infrastructure
SSA is taking steps to centralize its facilities management, which may standardize facilities decisions, but our preliminary results show that the agency lacks a proactive approach to evaluate its physical infrastructure and identify potential efficiencies. SSA’s Planning Efforts Are Not Adequate to Address the Long- Term Nature of Its Management Challenges
SSA has ongoing planning efforts, but we have identified two major areas in which these efforts may fall short in addressing the long-term nature of the agency’s management challenges: (1) its planning efforts are short- term and do not adequately address emerging issues, and (2) it lacks continuity in its strategic planning leadership. For example, SSA is finalizing a service delivery plan, but the draft document primarily contains detailed plans for the next 5 years and focuses on existing initiatives rather than articulating specific long-term strategies for the agency’s service delivery model. Similarly, our preliminary work shows that SSA’s current strategic plan largely describes the continuation, expansion, or enhancement of existing activities, rather than proposing new initiatives or broad changes to address emerging issues. Various groups have called on SSA to acknowledge emerging long-term issues by articulating them in a longer-term strategy. SSA prepared its last long-term agency vision—which covered a 10-year period—in 2000, motivated by many conditions which remain true today, such as increasing workloads, advances in technology, and employee retirements. However, the office was dissolved in May 2008, and since that time the agency has not had an office dedicated to strategic planning. SSA already manages a substantial and diverse workload and the demands on SSA from new retirees and individuals with disabilities will continue to grow. In the absence of a long-term strategy for service delivery, the agency will be poorly positioned to make needed well-informed decisions about its critical functions, including how many and what type of employees SSA will need for its future workforce, how the agency will address disability claims backlogs while ensuring program integrity, and how the agency will more strategically use its information technology and physical infrastructure to best deliver services. | Why GAO Did This Study
SSA is responsible for providing benefits and services that affect the lives of nearly every American. In calendar year 2012, SSA paid over 62 million people more than $826 billion in Social Security retirement and disability benefits and Supplemental Security Income payments. However, SSA faces increased workloads and large numbers of potential employee retirements in the long term. A new Commissioner will soon be leading the agency and will face many complicated issues confronting the agency.
In this statement, GAO discusses initial observations from its ongoing review and describes (1) key management challenges SSA faces in meeting its mission-related objectives and (2) the extent to which SSA's planning efforts address these challenges. To examine these issues, GAO reviewed relevant planning documents and reports from SSA and others as well as SSA management information and data on workload and staffing projections, applicable federal laws and regulations, and interviewed SSA headquarters and regional officials, representatives of employee groups, and other experts.
This work is ongoing and GAO has no recommendations at this time. GAO plans to issue its final report in June 2013.
What GAO Found
The Social Security Administration (SSA) will experience management challenges in four key areas over the next decade.
Human capital. SSA has not updated its succession plan since 2006 although the agency faces an ongoing retirement wave and hiring freeze which will make it difficult to respond to growing workload demands.
Disability program issues. SSA faces ongoing challenges incorporating a more modern concept of disability into its programs, while balancing competing needs to reduce backlogs of initial and appealed claims and ensure program integrity.
Information technology (IT). SSA has made strides in modernizing its IT systems to address growing workload demands, but faces challenges with these modernization efforts--such as an ongoing need to refresh and adhere to its IT strategic plan and a continued reliance on legacy applications--and correcting internal weaknesses in information security.
Physical infrastructure. SSA is moving toward centralized facilities management, but the agency lacks a proactive approach to evaluating its office structure that will identify potential efficiencies, such as consolidating offices.
SSA has ongoing planning efforts, but they do not address the long-term nature of these management challenges. For example, SSA is finalizing a service delivery plan, but it only includes detailed plans for the next 5 years and focuses on existing initiatives rather than articulating specific long-term strategies for the agency's service delivery model. Its current strategic plan also largely describes the continuation, expansion, or enhancement of ongoing activities, rather than proposing broad changes to address emerging issues. Since 2008, SSA has not had an entity or individual dedicated to strategic planning. Various groups have called on SSA to articulate a longer-term strategy, which it last did in 2000, motivated by many conditions which remain true today, such as increasing workloads, advances in technology, and employee retirements, and which will need to be addressed in the future. |
gao_GAO-07-119 | gao_GAO-07-119_0 | Residents born in CNMI, Guam, and USVI are citizens of the United States. We reviewed the financial accountability of the insular area governments by (1) determining the timeliness of submission of the single audit reports, (2) analyzing the contents of the single audit reports issued for fiscal years 2001-2004, (3) identifying those insular area governments designated as high-risk grantees through U.S. federal agency contacts, (4) obtaining information about OIA’s efforts to help the insular areas improve financial management, and (5) identifying the relevant auditing organizations at the federal and local levels. These factors include lack of diversification, scarce natural resources, small domestic markets, limited infrastructure, and shortages of skilled labor. According to OIA, several projects and business deals resulted from contacts made at conferences and missions. Weakened Fiscal Condition in Three Insular Areas
With the exception of American Samoa, the fiscal condition of the insular area governments steadily weakened from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2004, the most recent year for which audited financial statements were available for all four insular areas. In CNMI and Guam, the fund balance of total governmental funds declined as government spending rose faster than revenues. In fiscal year 2002, American Samoa’s government revenues, including the U.S. federal government’s contributions, were higher as a share of GDP, 38 percent, than the revenues of any of the other three insular areas. At the end of fiscal year 2004, USVI still had a significant negative value for net government assets, as shown in table 7. Financial Accountability Remains Weak in the U.S. Insular Areas
The governments of the four U.S. insular areas have had long-standing financial accountability problems, including the late issuance of the reports required by the Single Audit Act, inability to achieve unqualified (“clean”) audit opinions on their financial statements, and numerous material weaknesses in internal controls over financial operations and compliance with laws and regulations governing federal grant awards. As a result, there has been limited accountability over the use of federal funds. The effect of this weakness is that expenditures reported to the grantor agency, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), are based on the paid date and not, as required, the service date. The IG noted in describing this challenge that these governments have long- standing financial and program management deficiencies. Conclusions
American Samoa, CNMI, Guam, and USVI face daunting economic, fiscal, and financial accountability challenges. The viability of their economies depends on a few key industries. Efforts to meet formidable fiscal challenges and build strong economies in the insular areas are hindered by delayed and incomplete financial reporting that does not provide officials with the timely and complete information they need for effective decision making. Audit Report, Saipan Harbor Improvement Project, Commonwealth Ports Authority, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. Audit Report, Virgin Islands Lottery, Government of the Virgin Islands. | Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. insular areas of American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI), face long-standing economic, fiscal, and financial accountability challenges. GAO was requested to identify and report on the (1) economic challenges facing each government, including the effect of changing tax and trade laws on their economies; (2) fiscal condition of each government; and (3) financial accountability of each government, including compliance with the Single Audit Act, which applies to nonfederal entities that receive $500,000 or more a year in federal funding.
What GAO Found
The governments of the U.S. insular areas of American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands face serious economic, fiscal, and financial accountability challenges. The economic challenges stem from dependence on a few key industries, scarce natural resources, small domestic markets, limited infrastructure, shortages of skilled labor, and reliance on federal grants to fund basic services. To help diversify and strengthen their economies, OIA sponsors conferences and missions to the areas to attract U.S. businesses; however, there has been little formal evaluation of these efforts. After fiscal year 2001, government spending in the CNMI, Guam, and USVI exceeded revenues through fiscal year 2004 (the most recent year for which there is complete data on all four areas). As a result, their fiscal conditions weakened further during this period. CNMI and USVI ended fiscal year 2004 with negative net government assets. For American Samoa the picture was mixed, with more stability than the other areas in the period 2001 through 2003, but a downturn in the balance of governmental funds by the end of fiscal year 2004. Efforts to meet formidable fiscal challenges and build strong economies are hindered by delayed and incomplete financial reporting that does not provide timely and complete information to management and oversight officials for decision making. The insular area governments have had long-standing financial accountability problems, including the late submission of required single audits, the receipt of disclaimer or qualified audit opinions, and the reporting of many serious internal control weaknesses. These problems have resulted in numerous federal agencies designating these governments as "high-risk" grantees. The Department of the Interior and the federal agencies are working to help these governments improve their financial accountability, but greater coordination among the agencies would increase the effectiveness of their efforts. |
gao_GAO-07-461 | gao_GAO-07-461_0 | DOD organizations that have significant DCIP roles and responsibilities are shown in figure 3. DOD Has Taken Important Steps to Implement DCIP but Needs a Comprehensive Management Plan to Guide Its Efforts
DOD has taken some important steps to implement DCIP; however, it has not developed a comprehensive management plan to guide its efforts. As of May 2007, most of DOD’s DCIP guidance and policies were either newly issued or still in draft, which has resulted in DOD’s components pursuing varying approaches to implement DCIP. Until DOD completes a comprehensive management plan to implement DCIP, which includes issuing remaining DCIP guidance and fully identifying funding requirements, its ability to implement DCIP will be challenged. Although DOD issued a DCIP directive in August 2005, ASD(HD&ASA) lacks a chartering directive that, among other things, clearly defines important roles, responsibilities, and relationships with other DOD organizations and missions—including the relationship between ASD(HD&ASA) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities. Although DOD Has Taken Steps to Facilitate Information Sharing and Coordination, Additional Measures Could Be Taken
Existing DCIP guidance emphasizes information sharing and collaboration with relevant government and private-sector entities. The Critical Infrastructure Program Integration Staff is comprised of representatives from more than 30 DOD organizations. Including DCIP in the lead agents’ baseline budgets should reduce reliance on supplemental appropriations to implement critical infrastructure responsibilities. DOD Estimates That It Has Identified about 25 Percent of the Critical Infrastructure It Owns, and Most of the Non-DOD-Owned Critical Infrastructure Remains Unidentified
DOD estimates that it has identified about 25 percent of the critical infrastructure it owns, and expects to finish identifying the remaining 75 percent by the end of fiscal year 2009. DOD has identified considerably less of its critical infrastructure owned by non-DOD entities, and has not set a target date for its completion. DOD has been performing a limited number of vulnerability assessments on DOD-owned infrastructure; however, until DOD identifies and prioritizes all of the critical infrastructure it owns, results have questionable value for deciding where to target funding investments. Moreover, DOD does not have a mechanism to flag domestic mission-critical infrastructure for DHS to consider including among its assessments of the nation’s critical infrastructure, and has delayed coordinating the assessments of non-DOD critical infrastructure located abroad. DOD has not identified funding to remediate vulnerabilities identified through the assessment process. DOD has determined that a small portion of the non-DOD infrastructure— about 200 assets—that belongs to the defense industrial base sector are mission critical. DOD has delayed coordinating the assessments of non-DOD-owned infrastructure located abroad because it has decided to focus on identifying infrastructure that it owns. Conclusions
DOD depends on critical infrastructure to project, support, and sustain its forces and operations worldwide, but its lack of a comprehensive management plan to guide its efforts that addresses guidance, coordination of program stakeholders’ efforts, and resource requirements, has prevented the department from effectively implementing an efficient critical infrastructure program. When DOD components and sector lead agents consistently identify, prioritize, and assess their critical infrastructure, as well as including the remediation of vulnerabilities in their funding requirements, DOD’s ability to perform risk- based decision making and target funding to priority needs will be improved. To evaluate the extent to which DOD has identified, prioritized, and assessed its critical infrastructure, we met with officials and obtained relevant documentation from each of the DOD components, sector lead agents, ASD(HD&ASA), the Joint Staff, and the Mission Assurance Division. | Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Defense (DOD) relies on a network of DOD and non-DOD infrastructure assets in the United States and abroad so critical that its unavailability could hinder DOD's ability to project, support, and sustain its forces and operations worldwide. DOD established the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) to identify and assure the availability of mission-critical infrastructure. GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which DOD has (1) developed a comprehensive management plan to implement DCIP and (2) identified, prioritized, and assessed its critical infrastructure. GAO analyzed relevant DCIP documents and guidance and met with officials from more than 30 DOD organizations that have DCIP responsibilities, and with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials involved in protecting critical infrastructure.
What GAO Found
While DOD has taken important steps to implement DCIP, it has not developed a comprehensive management plan to guide its efforts. GAO's prior work has shown the importance of developing a plan that incorporates sound management practices, such as issuing guidance, coordinating stakeholders' efforts, and identifying resource requirements and sources. Most of DOD's DCIP guidance and policies are either newly issued or in draft form, leading some DOD components to rely on other, better-defined programs, such as the antiterrorism program, to implement DCIP. Although DOD issued a DCIP directive in August 2005, the lead office responsible for DCIP lacks a chartering directive that defines important roles, responsibilities, and relationships with other DOD organizations and missions. DOD has created several information sharing and coordination mechanisms; however, additional measures could be taken. Also, DOD's reliance on supplemental appropriations to fund DCIP makes it difficult to effectively plan future resource needs. Until DOD completes a comprehensive DCIP management plan, its ability to implement DCIP will be challenged. DOD estimates that it has identified about 25 percent of the critical infrastructure it owns, and expects to identify the remaining 75 percent by the end of fiscal year 2009. In contrast, DOD has identified significantly less of the critical infrastructure that it does not own, and does not have a target date for its completion. Among the non-DOD-owned critical infrastructure that has been identified are some 200 assets belonging to private sector companies that comprise the defense industrial base--the focus of another report we plan to issue later this year. DOD estimates that about 85 percent of its mission-critical infrastructure assets are owned by non-DOD entities, such as the private sector; state, local, and tribal governments; and foreign governments. DOD has conducted vulnerability assessments on some DOD-owned infrastructure. While these assessments can provide useful information about specific assets, until DOD identifies and prioritizes all of the critical infrastructure it owns, assessment results have limited value for deciding where to target funding investments. For the most part, DOD cannot assess assets it does not own, and DOD has not coordinated with DHS to include them among DHS's assessments of the nation's critical infrastructure. DOD has delayed coordinating the assessment of non-DOD-owned infrastructure located abroad while it focuses on identifying the critical infrastructure that it does own. Regarding current and future DCIP funding levels, they do not include the cost to remediate vulnerabilities that are identified through the assessments. When DOD identifies, prioritizes, and assesses its critical infrastructure, and includes remediation in its funding requirements, its ability to perform risk-based decision making and target funding to priority needs will be improved. |
gao_GAO-10-290T | gao_GAO-10-290T_0 | Diplomatic Security’s Mission and Resources Have Grown Considerably Since 1998
Because of a number of security incidents, Diplomatic Security’s missions and resources have grown tremendously in the past decade. Dangerous Environments, Staffing Shortages, and Reactive Planning Challenge Diplomatic Security
Diplomatic Security faces several policy and operational challenges. Maintaining Missions in Iraq and Other Increasingly Dangerous Posts Significantly Affects Diplomatic Security’s Work
Diplomatic Security officials stated that maintaining missions in dangerous environments such as Iraq and Afghanistan requires more resources and increases the difficulty for Diplomatic Security to provide a secure environment. In addition to operating in the Iraq and Afghanistan war zones, State is maintaining missions in an increasing number of other dangerous posts— such as Peshawar, Pakistan, and Sana’a, Yemen—some of which State would have previously evacuated. Diplomatic Security Faces Operational Challenges That Affect Its Ability to Implement Important Activities
Diplomatic Security’s ability to fully carry out its mission of providing security worldwide is hindered by staffing shortages in domestic offices and other operational challenges such as inadequate facilities and pervasive language proficiency shortfalls. We previously reported that experience gaps can compromise diplomatic readiness. Diplomatic Security’s tremendous growth over the last 10 years has been reactive and has not benefited from adequate strategic guidance. Second, Diplomatic Security has created a Visa and Passport Security Strategic Plan to guide its efforts to disrupt individuals and organizations that attempt to compromise the integrity of U.S. travel documents. Diplomatic Security officials stated they hope to participate in a new State management initiative, the Quadrennial Diplomatic and Development Review (QDDR). Recommendations for Executive Action
In our report, we recommended that the Secretary of State—as part of the QDDR or as a separate initiative—conduct a strategic review of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to ensure that its missions and activities address State’s priority needs. This review should also address key human capital and operational challenges faced by Diplomatic Security, such as operating domestic and international activities with adequate staff; providing security for facilities that do not meet all security standards; staffing foreign missions with officials who have appropriate language operating programs with experienced staff, at the commensurate grade balancing security needs with State’s need to conduct its diplomatic mission. | Why GAO Did This Study
This testimony discusses the Department of State's (State) Bureau of Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic Security), which is responsible for the protection of people, information, and property at over 400 embassies, consulates, and domestic locations. Since the 1998 bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa, the scope and complexity of threats facing Americans abroad and at home has increased. Diplomatic Security must be prepared to counter threats such as crime, espionage, visa and passport fraud, technological intrusions, political violence, and terrorism. The statement today is based on a GAO report that was issued on November 12, 2009. It will discuss (1) the growth of Diplomatic Security's missions and resources and (2) the challenges Diplomatic Security faces in conducting its work. To address these objectives in our report, GAO (1) interviewed numerous officials at Diplomatic Security headquarters, several domestic facilities, and 18 international postings; (2) analyzed Diplomatic Security and State budget and personnel data; and (3) assessed challenges facing Diplomatic Security through analysis of interviews with personnel positioned domestically and internationally, budget and personnel data provided by State and Diplomatic Security, and planning and strategic documentation. GAO conducted this performance audit from September 2008 to November 2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that GAO plans and performs the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. GAO believes that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
What GAO Found
Since 1998, Diplomatic Security's mission and activities--and, subsequently, its resources--have grown considerably in reaction to a number of security incidents. As a consequence of this growth, we identified several challenges. In particular (1) State is maintaining a presence in an increasing number of dangerous posts, which requires additional resources; (2) staffing shortages in domestic offices and other operational challenges--such as inadequate facilities, language deficiencies, experience gaps, and the difficulty of balancing security needs with State's diplomatic mission--further tax Diplomatic Security's ability to implement all of its missions; and (3) Diplomatic Security's considerable growth has not benefited from adequate strategic guidance. In our report, we recommend that the Secretary of State--as part of the agency's Quadrennial Diplomatic and Development Review (QDDR) or separately--conduct a strategic review of Diplomatic Security to ensure that its missions and activities address its priority needs. |
gao_T-RCED-98-123 | gao_T-RCED-98-123_0 | Recognizing the need to improve its budget process with better oversight and documentation, HUD has developed and begun implementing corrective actions. However, HUD did not implement many of the changes in time to affect the Department’s fiscal year 1999 budget estimate. However, HUD’s request for $4.7 billion to renew Section 8 tenant-based contracts could still be reduced by the amount of excess budget authority in HUD’s moderate rehabilitation program, or $439 million. In addition, because excess budget authority exists in the moderate rehabilitation program, HUD may not need the $70 million it has requested for moderate rehabilitation amendments. Although HUD has improved its budget-estimating process, we believe that the Department is still overestimating its need for contract renewal funding because $439 million in excess budget authority in the moderate rehabilitation program could be used to renew expiring contracts in lieu of requesting new budget authority. HUD’s Project-Based Amendment Request May Be Overstated
According to HUD, the total amount of Section 8 project-based amendment funding needed for fiscal year 1999 is $1.7 billion. Furthermore, HUD’s budget request for Section 8 project-based amendment funding substantially exceeds the amounts that HUD’s analyses indicated are needed. Although congressional concern exists about the proportion of homeless funding spent on supportive services as compared to the amount spent on direct housing assistance, HUD’s request for 34,000 new vouchers for the homeless would increase housing assistance for the homeless. However, HUD has not developed the eligibility standards or other planning criteria for these vouchers that would facilitate program delivery. New Initiative Would Provide Additional Housing but Might Benefit From More Detailed Planning
With its fiscal year 1999 budget request for $192 million to fund 34,000 new Section 8 vouchers for homeless individuals or families, HUD proposes to increase the amount of funding for direct housing assistance. Key Report Underlying HUD’s Regional Connections Initiative Does Not Recommend a Significant Federal Effort
HUD’s fiscal year 1999 budget proposal includes $100 million for a new Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) set-aside—the Regional Connections Initiative (RCI). HUD is planning to award grants under the program to states and localities on a competitive basis. However, given that RCI is a new initiative, HUD’s budget justification does not provide enough detail to determine whether $100 million is a reasonable funding level. In addition, HUD officials believe that the $100 million requested for RCI will be awarded in fiscal year 1999. While welfare reform may have a significant impact on HUD’s future year budgets, measuring the potential impact may not be possible. Finally, we based portions of this statement on our recently issued report on HUD’s financial management of its Section 8 tenant-based program as well as on our current work focusing on HUD’s financial management of the Section 8 moderate rehabilitation and project-based programs and the impact of welfare reform on public and assisted housing. | Why GAO Did This Study
GAO discussed the Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) fiscal year (FY) 1999 budget request, focusing on: (1) actions HUD has taken or plans to take to improve its budget estimates; (2) the reasonableness of HUD's estimate for Section 8 tenant-based assistance; (3) HUD's justification for its Section 8 project-based amendment request; (4) HUD's request for funding to assist the homeless; (5) HUD's request for $100 million to fund its new Regional Connections Initiative; and (6) the future budgetary implication of welfare reform.
What GAO Found
GAO noted that: (1) HUD recognizes the need to improve its budget estimating process with better oversight and documentation and has started to improve its process by modifying its organizational structure to increase oversight among the staff responsible for formulating budget estimates; (2) however, many of HUD's planned improvements were not implemented in time to affect HUD's FY 1999 budget estimate but, according to HUD officials, will be in place to enhance the FY 2000 process; (3) HUD's request for $4.7 billion to renew Section 8 tenant-based assisted housing contracts for FY 1999 could be reduced by $439 million; (4) this is the amount of excess budget authority in the Section 8 moderate rehabilitation program that could be used in place of new budget authority to renew expiring housing assistance contracts; (5) in addition, because this excess budget authority exists, HUD may not need the $70 million it has requested for Section 8 moderate rehabilitation amendment funding; (6) HUD's budget request for $1.3 billion in Section 8 project-based amendment funding--funds needed to cover shortfalls in long-term Section 8 contracts--substantially exceeds the amounts that HUD's analyses indicated are needed; (7) to help address the needs of the nation's homeless, HUD has requested 34,000 new Section 8 vouchers; (8) although these new vouchers will increase the amount of direct housing assistance for the homeless, HUD has not developed the eligibility standards or other planning criteria for these new vouchers that would facilitate implementing the program; (9) HUD's budget request for $100 million for the Regional Connections Initiative (RCI), a new set-aside within the Community Development Block Grant program to address key regional issues, does not provide enough detail to indicate whether this is a reasonable funding level for the program; (10) the additional support that HUD provided, however, does not recommend a significant federal effort to address regional problems; (11) nevertheless, HUD officials believe the funding level is a manageable set aside; (12) because of the work required to initiate a new program like this, GAO questions whether the funds can be awarded in FY 1999; (13) welfare reform may have a substantial future impact on HUD's spending for assisted housing for low-income households; and (14) however, estimating the impact may not be possible because the states' differing welfare reform provisions will create varied state-by-state and year-by-year impacts. |
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