anchor.diff:  	 dmk = [], reveal_macs = <<>>}).
   
   -record(dmk,
  -	{rx_ctr = 0, tx_ctr = 0, rx_mac, tx_mac, rx_key, tx_key}).
  +	{rx_ctr = 0, tx_ctr = 0, rx_mac, tx_mac, rx_key,
  +	 tx_key}).
   
   start_link() -> gen_server:start_link(?MODULE, [], []).
   
  
positive.code: 			   ctr_init = <<Ctr:64>>, flags = Flags} =
  		 M},
  	    _From, State) ->
      F = if (Flags == 1) -> ignore_unreadable; true -> Flags end,
      case get_dmk(State, OId, TId) of
        error -> {reply, {rejected, no_keys, F}, State};
        {ok, Dmk} ->
  	  Mac = otr_crypto:sha1HMAC(Dmk#dmk.rx_mac,
  				   otr_message:encode_data_for_hmac(M)),
  	  if Mac /= M#otr_msg_data.mac ->
  		 {reply, {rejected, mac_missmatch, F}, State};
  	     Ctr =< Dmk#dmk.rx_ctr ->
  
negative.code: 					  <<Ctr:64>>, otr_tlv:encode({M, TLV})),
      DM = #otr_msg_data{flags = Flags, sender_keyid = OId,
  		       enc_data = EncD, recipient_keyid = TId,
  		       ctr_init = <<Ctr:64>>, dhy = element(2, State#s.dh)},
      Mac = otr_crypto:sha1HMAC(Dmk#dmk.tx_mac,
  			      otr_message:encode_data_for_hmac(DM)),
      {reply,
  