anchor.diff:  auth_query(Start, End, Protocol, Types, ReqAttrsMatch, RespAttrsMatch,
   		PrevChunk, {Cont, [H | T] = Chunk}) ->
   	case binary_to_term(H) of
  +		Event when element(1, Event) > End ->
  +			{eof, []};
   		Event when element(1, Event) >= Start ->
   			NewChunk = [binary_to_term(E) || E <- PrevChunk ++ Chunk],
   			auth_query1(Start, End, Protocol, Types, ReqAttrsMatch, RespAttrsMatch,
   					{Cont, NewChunk}, []);
  -		_ ->
  +		_Event ->
   			auth_query(Start, End, Protocol, Types, ReqAttrsMatch, RespAttrsMatch,
   					T, disk_log:bchunk(?ACCTLOG, Cont))
   	end.
  
positive.code: acct_query(Start, End, Protocol, Types, AttrsMatch,
  		PrevChunk, {Cont, [H | T] = Chunk}) ->
  	case binary_to_term(H) of
  		Event when element(1, Event) >= Start ->
  			NewChunk = [binary_to_term(E) || E <- PrevChunk ++ Chunk],
  			acct_query1(Start, End, Protocol, Types, AttrsMatch,
  					{Cont, NewChunk}, []);
  		_ ->
  			acct_query(Start, End, Protocol, Types, AttrsMatch,
  					T, disk_log:bchunk(?ACCTLOG, Cont))
  	end.
  
negative.code: 	{eof, lists:reverse(Acc)};
  acct_query1(_Start, _End, _Protocol, _Types, _AttrsMatch, {error, Reason}, _Acc) ->
  	{error, Reason};
  acct_query1(_, End, _, _, _, {_, [{TS, _, _, _, _, _, _, _} | _]}, Acc)
  		when TS > End ->
  	{eof, lists:reverse(Acc)};
  acct_query1(Start, End, '_', '_', AttrsMatch,
  		{Cont, [{TS, _, _, _, _, _, _} | _] = Chunk}, Acc)
  		when TS >= Start, TS =< End ->
  