anchor.diff:  			   ctr_init = <<Ctr:64>>, flags = Flags} =
   		 M},
   	    _From, State) ->
  -    F = if (Flags == 1) -> ignore_unreadable; true -> Flags end,
  +    F = if Flags == 1 -> ignore_unreadable;
  +	   true -> Flags
  +	end,
       case get_dmk(State, OId, TId) of
         error -> {reply, {rejected, no_keys, F}, State};
         {ok, Dmk} ->
   	  Mac = otr_crypto:sha1HMAC(Dmk#dmk.rx_mac,
  -				   otr_message:encode_data_for_hmac(M)),
  +				    otr_message:encode_data_for_hmac(M)),
   	  if Mac /= M#otr_msg_data.mac ->
   		 {reply, {rejected, mac_missmatch, F}, State};
   	     Ctr =< Dmk#dmk.rx_ctr ->
  
positive.code: 					  <<Ctr:64>>, otr_tlv:encode({M, TLV})),
      DM = #otr_msg_data{flags = Flags, sender_keyid = OId,
  		       enc_data = EncD, recipient_keyid = TId,
  		       ctr_init = <<Ctr:64>>,
  		       dhy = element(2, State#s.dh)},
      Mac = otr_crypto:sha1HMAC(Dmk#dmk.tx_mac,
  			      otr_message:encode_data_for_hmac(DM)),
      {reply,
  
negative.code: 
  % api
  -export([start_link/0]).
  
  -export([decrypt/2, encrypt/2, get_key/1, set_keys/2]).
  
  -record(s,
  