# frozen_string_literal: true

require "erb"
require "active_support/core_ext/kernel/singleton_class"
require "active_support/core_ext/module/redefine_method"
require "active_support/multibyte/unicode"

class ERB
  module Util
    HTML_ESCAPE = { "&" => "&amp;",  ">" => "&gt;",   "<" => "&lt;", '"' => "&quot;", "'" => "&#39;" }
    JSON_ESCAPE = { "&" => '\u0026', ">" => '\u003e', "<" => '\u003c', "\u2028" => '\u2028', "\u2029" => '\u2029' }
    HTML_ESCAPE_ONCE_REGEXP = /["><']|&(?!([a-zA-Z]+|(#\d+)|(#[xX][\dA-Fa-f]+));)/
    JSON_ESCAPE_REGEXP = /[\u2028\u2029&><]/u

    # A utility method for escaping HTML tag characters.
    # This method is also aliased as <tt>h</tt>.
    #
    #   puts html_escape('is a > 0 & a < 10?')
    #   # => is a &gt; 0 &amp; a &lt; 10?
    def html_escape(s)
      unwrapped_html_escape(s).html_safe
    end

    silence_redefinition_of_method :h
    alias h html_escape

    module_function :h

    singleton_class.silence_redefinition_of_method :html_escape
    module_function :html_escape

    # HTML escapes strings but doesn't wrap them with an ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer.
    # This method is not for public consumption! Seriously!
    def unwrapped_html_escape(s) # :nodoc:
      s = s.to_s
      if s.html_safe?
        s
      else
        CGI.escapeHTML(ActiveSupport::Multibyte::Unicode.tidy_bytes(s))
      end
    end
    module_function :unwrapped_html_escape

    # A utility method for escaping HTML without affecting existing escaped entities.
    #
    #   html_escape_once('1 < 2 &amp; 3')
    #   # => "1 &lt; 2 &amp; 3"
    #
    #   html_escape_once('&lt;&lt; Accept & Checkout')
    #   # => "&lt;&lt; Accept &amp; Checkout"
    def html_escape_once(s)
      result = ActiveSupport::Multibyte::Unicode.tidy_bytes(s.to_s).gsub(HTML_ESCAPE_ONCE_REGEXP, HTML_ESCAPE)
      s.html_safe? ? result.html_safe : result
    end

    module_function :html_escape_once

    # A utility method for escaping HTML entities in JSON strings. Specifically, the
    # &, > and < characters are replaced with their equivalent unicode escaped form -
    # \u0026, \u003e, and \u003c. The Unicode sequences \u2028 and \u2029 are also
    # escaped as they are treated as newline characters in some JavaScript engines.
    # These sequences have identical meaning as the original characters inside the
    # context of a JSON string, so assuming the input is a valid and well-formed
    # JSON value, the output will have equivalent meaning when parsed:
    #
    #   json = JSON.generate({ name: "</script><script>alert('PWNED!!!')</script>"})
    #   # => "{\"name\":\"</script><script>alert('PWNED!!!')</script>\"}"
    #
    #   json_escape(json)
    #   # => "{\"name\":\"\\u003C/script\\u003E\\u003Cscript\\u003Ealert('PWNED!!!')\\u003C/script\\u003E\"}"
    #
    #   JSON.parse(json) == JSON.parse(json_escape(json))
    #   # => true
    #
    # The intended use case for this method is to escape JSON strings before including
    # them inside a script tag to avoid XSS vulnerability:
    #
    #   <script>
    #     var currentUser = <%= raw json_escape(current_user.to_json) %>;
    #   </script>
    #
    # It is necessary to +raw+ the result of +json_escape+, so that quotation marks
    # don't get converted to <tt>&quot;</tt> entities. +json_escape+ doesn't
    # automatically flag the result as HTML safe, since the raw value is unsafe to
    # use inside HTML attributes.
    #
    # If your JSON is being used downstream for insertion into the DOM, be aware of
    # whether or not it is being inserted via +html()+. Most jQuery plugins do this.
    # If that is the case, be sure to +html_escape+ or +sanitize+ any user-generated
    # content returned by your JSON.
    #
    # If you need to output JSON elsewhere in your HTML, you can just do something
    # like this, as any unsafe characters (including quotation marks) will be
    # automatically escaped for you:
    #
    #   <div data-user-info="<%= current_user.to_json %>">...</div>
    #
    # WARNING: this helper only works with valid JSON. Using this on non-JSON values
    # will open up serious XSS vulnerabilities. For example, if you replace the
    # +current_user.to_json+ in the example above with user input instead, the browser
    # will happily eval() that string as JavaScript.
    #
    # The escaping performed in this method is identical to those performed in the
    # Active Support JSON encoder when +ActiveSupport.escape_html_entities_in_json+ is
    # set to true. Because this transformation is idempotent, this helper can be
    # applied even if +ActiveSupport.escape_html_entities_in_json+ is already true.
    #
    # Therefore, when you are unsure if +ActiveSupport.escape_html_entities_in_json+
    # is enabled, or if you are unsure where your JSON string originated from, it
    # is recommended that you always apply this helper (other libraries, such as the
    # JSON gem, do not provide this kind of protection by default; also some gems
    # might override +to_json+ to bypass Active Support's encoder).
    def json_escape(s)
      result = s.to_s.gsub(JSON_ESCAPE_REGEXP, JSON_ESCAPE)
      s.html_safe? ? result.html_safe : result
    end

    module_function :json_escape
  end
end

class Object
  def html_safe?
    false
  end
end

class Numeric
  def html_safe?
    true
  end
end

module ActiveSupport #:nodoc:
  class SafeBuffer < String
    UNSAFE_STRING_METHODS = %w(
      capitalize chomp chop delete downcase gsub lstrip next reverse rstrip
      slice squeeze strip sub succ swapcase tr tr_s upcase
    )

    alias_method :original_concat, :concat
    private :original_concat

    # Raised when <tt>ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer#safe_concat</tt> is called on unsafe buffers.
    class SafeConcatError < StandardError
      def initialize
        super "Could not concatenate to the buffer because it is not html safe."
      end
    end

    def [](*args)
      if args.size < 2
        super
      elsif html_safe?
        new_safe_buffer = super

        if new_safe_buffer
          new_safe_buffer.instance_variable_set :@html_safe, true
        end

        new_safe_buffer
      else
        to_str[*args]
      end
    end

    def safe_concat(value)
      raise SafeConcatError unless html_safe?
      original_concat(value)
    end

    def initialize(str = "")
      @html_safe = true
      super
    end

    def initialize_copy(other)
      super
      @html_safe = other.html_safe?
    end

    def clone_empty
      self[0, 0]
    end

    def concat(value)
      super(html_escape_interpolated_argument(value))
    end
    alias << concat

    def prepend(value)
      super(html_escape_interpolated_argument(value))
    end

    def +(other)
      dup.concat(other)
    end

    def %(args)
      case args
      when Hash
        escaped_args = Hash[args.map { |k, arg| [k, html_escape_interpolated_argument(arg)] }]
      else
        escaped_args = Array(args).map { |arg| html_escape_interpolated_argument(arg) }
      end

      self.class.new(super(escaped_args))
    end

    def html_safe?
      defined?(@html_safe) && @html_safe
    end

    def to_s
      self
    end

    def to_param
      to_str
    end

    def encode_with(coder)
      coder.represent_object nil, to_str
    end

    UNSAFE_STRING_METHODS.each do |unsafe_method|
      if unsafe_method.respond_to?(unsafe_method)
        class_eval <<-EOT, __FILE__, __LINE__ + 1
          def #{unsafe_method}(*args, &block)       # def capitalize(*args, &block)
            to_str.#{unsafe_method}(*args, &block)  #   to_str.capitalize(*args, &block)
          end                                       # end

          def #{unsafe_method}!(*args)              # def capitalize!(*args)
            @html_safe = false                      #   @html_safe = false
            super                                   #   super
          end                                       # end
        EOT
      end
    end

    private

      def html_escape_interpolated_argument(arg)
        (!html_safe? || arg.html_safe?) ? arg : CGI.escapeHTML(arg.to_s)
      end
  end
end

class String
  # Marks a string as trusted safe. It will be inserted into HTML with no
  # additional escaping performed. It is your responsibility to ensure that the
  # string contains no malicious content. This method is equivalent to the
  # `raw` helper in views. It is recommended that you use `sanitize` instead of
  # this method. It should never be called on user input.
  def html_safe
    ActiveSupport::SafeBuffer.new(self)
  end
end
