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A semiconductor device is generally manufactured by performing several manufacturing processes on a silicon wafer. For example, a deposition process may be carried out to form a layer of material on the wafer, and/or an oxidation process may be performed to form an oxide layer on the surface of the wafer or to change a deposited layer formed on the wafer into an oxide layer. In addition, a photolithography process may be carried out to form a pattern having a predetermined shape on the wafer, and a planarization process may be performed to planarize a layer formed on the wafer.
Oxide layers are generally formed on a wafer by a thermal oxidation process. The thermal oxidation process is performed using a heat treatment apparatus, such as a vertical diffusion furnace, and by employing an oxygen (O2) gas. For example, a heat treatment apparatus is disclosed in U.S. Pat. No. 6,235,121 to Honma et al., the disclosure of which is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety.
A conventional heat treatment apparatus may include a vertical processing chamber, a transferring chamber, a wafer boat, a rotating driving unit, and a vertical driving unit. The processing chamber may include a reaction tube, a heating furnace enclosing the reaction tube, and a cylindrical manifold coupled to a lower portion of the reaction tube.
A radical oxidation method using oxygen radicals or oxygen atoms has also been used to form an oxide layer having improved electrical properties on a wafer. For example, the radical oxidation method is disclosed in U.S. Pat. No. 6,358,867 issued to Tews et al.
A radical oxidation method using the conventional heat treatment apparatus described above is generally performed as follows. A plurality of wafers is loaded into the wafer boat of the heat treatment apparatus. The wafer boat is transferred from the transferring chamber into the reaction tube of the heat treatment apparatus by the vertical driving unit. A reaction gas, such as a gas including an oxygen (O2) gas and a nitrogen (N2) gas, is introduced into the reaction tube. Surfaces of the wafers are oxidized by the reaction gas so that oxide layers are formed on the wafers. The wafers are rotated in the reaction tube by the rotating driving unit to increase the uniformity of the thickness of the oxide layers.
Although the oxide layers formed by a radical oxidation method may have electrical properties sufficient for being employed as gate insulation layers of transistors, the thickness of the edge portions of the oxide layers may be thicker than those of the central portions of the oxide layers. This thickness difference may cause several disadvantages in successive processes for manufacturing the semiconductor device.
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/*******************************************************************************
* Encode the given ChallengeAnswerRequest and return the resulting buffer.
*******************************************************************************/
static final byte[] encodeChallengeAnswer(ChallengeAnswerRequest req) {
byte msg[] = new byte[Common.MESSAGE_HEADER_SIZE + INT_SIZE +
req.authType.length + INT_SIZE +
req.userIdHandle.length + INT_SIZE +
INT_SIZE +
req.signedResponse.length];
int offset = writeHeader(req, msg, msg.length - Common.MESSAGE_HEADER_SIZE);
offset += writeByteArray(msg, offset, req.authType, 0, req.authType.length);
offset += writeByteArray(msg, offset, req.userIdHandle, 0, req.userIdHandle.length);
offset += writeInt(msg, offset, req.userIdIndex);
offset += writeByteArray(msg, offset, req.signedResponse, 0, req.signedResponse.length);
return msg;
}
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Defending 'the four principles' approach to biomedical ethics. In this issue of the joumal a Danish physician-philosopher, Dr Soren Holm, mounts a vigorous attack against the Beauchamp and Childress 'four principles' approach to biomedical ethics an approach with which, it should be said, this author is closely associated and to which he is highly sympathetic, particularly because it seems to cut across national, cultural, religious, political and philosophical divisions and to provide a common set of prima facie moral commitments, a common moral language and a common moral-analytic framework for biomedical ethics. Not all of Dr Holm's criticisms of the four principles approach can be addressed in a short editorial. Some responses are, however, worth making, even in summary. The first is that readers of Dr Holm's paper who have not read the original book by Beauchamp and Childress should feel prompted to read it in its recent fourth edition. As Dr Holm says, it 'is a very rich book and does reward careful study'. In particular, the four principles approach presented within its pages is entirely consistent with Dr Holm's remark that 'there is more to morality than principles'. Beauchamp and Childress explicitly affirm this. With regard to the moral importance of the virtues, good character and the moral emotions, they explain that these 'all merit attention in a comprehensive theory'. They emphasise the compatibility and mutual interdependence of virtues and principles, and remind readers of Aristotle's suggestion that ethics involves judgments rather like those of medicine: 'Principles guide us to actions, but we still need to assess a situation and formulate an appropriate response, and this assessment and response flow from character and training as much as from principles'. As for Dr Holm's misleading suggestion that Beauchamp and Childress are only concerned with four virtues, this is simply false, as chapters 2, 8 (on virtues and ideals in professional life) and the 17 indexed references to 'virtues' make clear. They state explicitly that of 'the many other virtues that are important to the virtuous professional' they have focused on four (compassion, discernment, trustworthiness and integrity) because they believe these to be of central importance to medical and health care ethics. And they end their book by asserting 'Almost all great ethical theories converge to the conclusion that the most important ingredient in a person's moral life is a developed character that provides the inner motivation and strength to do what is right and good'. But how are people to decide or be taught what constitutes virtue and what constitutes vice, what constitutes good character and what constitutes poor character, if they do not have some guiding moral principles against which to assess people's character dispositions? On what other basis can one justify, for example, calling a disposition to care and be compassionate virtuous (and how else might one justify calling excessive or inappropriate compassion vicious, when for example its exercise overrides a recipient's rights, harms by stunting his or her emotional development, fails to respect a recipient's autonomy, or results in gross injustice to others?). A second major line of Dr Holm's attack on the Beauchamp and Childress approach is based on Dr Holm's rejection of their account of the content of the moral obligation of beneficence. It seems clear that he himself believes the obligation of beneficence should be more demanding than it is in the account offered by Beauchamp and Childress. Pace Dr Holm, his desire is entirely consistent with the four principles approach, which in no way prevents him and others from arguing for a different account of the universal obligationi of beneficence from that now presented by Beauchamp and Childress. Nonetheless their attempt to capture the necessary limitations of the universal obligation of beneficence will appeal to many. They argue that we have universal moral obligations of beneficence to others ie, obligations to all including 'moral strangers' when (a) those others are in major need and (b) our meeting that need would not impose on us 'significant risks, costs or burdens'. This account in no way prevents societies, groups or individuals from imposing on themselves a higher standard of obligation of beneficence. Many in the UK, Scandinavia and other parts of Europe, and indeed in many other parts of the world, feel proud that their societies do precisely this coright.
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Fasting Hypoglycaemia and Postprandial Hyperglycaemia as a Prodrome of Type 1 Diabetes Mellitus The pathophysiology of type 1 diabetes mellitus (DM) involves the selective autoimmune destruction of the pancreatic beta-cells . The onset of type 1 DM is characterised by hyperglycaemia. Islet cell antibody (ICA), anti-insulin, anti-glutamic acid decarboxylase and the antibody against tyrosine phosphatase-like protein known as ICA-512 (IA-2) usually appear before the clinical onset of DM and are markers of the autoimmune process. Hypoglycaemia in type 1 DM is a common complication and a result of the interaction between excess insulin administration and a compromised glucose counterregulatory hormonal response . Spontaneous fasting hypoglycaemia alternating with hyperglycaemia prior to the onset of antibody-positive type 1 DM has not been described before.
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<reponame>aneldev/dyna-ui-field-wrapper
export { DynaFieldWrapper, IDynaFieldWrapperProps, TContent, EMode, EStyle, EColor, ESize, } from "./DynaFieldWrapper";
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<filename>GpDbDriverFactory.hpp
#pragma once
#include "GpDbConnectionMode.hpp"
namespace GPlatform {
class GpDbDriver;
class GPDBCLIENT_API GpDbDriverFactory
{
public:
CLASS_REMOVE_CTRS_DEFAULT_MOVE_COPY(GpDbDriverFactory)
CLASS_DECLARE_DEFAULTS(GpDbDriverFactory)
protected:
GpDbDriverFactory (std::string_view aName);
public:
virtual ~GpDbDriverFactory (void) noexcept;
std::string_view Name (void) const noexcept {return iName;}
virtual GpSP<GpDbDriver> NewInstance (const GpDbConnectionMode::EnumT aMode,
GpIOEventPoller::WP aEventPoller) const = 0;
private:
const std::string iName;
};
}//namespace GPlatform
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Optimized production of extracellular alkaline protease from Aspergillus tamarii with natural by-products in a batch stirred tank bioreactor Abstract Proteolytic enzymes are one of the significant commercially manufactured enzymes. The manufacture of extracellular alkaline protease by Aspergillus tamarii MTCC5152 was explored using several agricultural by-products as substrates viz., cottonseed meal, wheat bran, skimmed milk and soya flour in submerged fermentation, were found to be efficient for enzyme production and commercially significant. Response surface methodology (RSM) is a statistics-based experimental design, sourced to explore the impact of physical parameters on the manufacture of protease from A. tamarii in a batch stirred tank bioreactor (STBR). The four substantial variables (pH, temperature, inoculum size, and agitation) were carefully chosen for optimization analyses and the statistical pattern was created using a central composite design and the quadratic model has been developed. The optimum conditions for protease production (1.51U mL−1) where: pH 6.4, temperature 27°C, inoculum size 2.6%, and agitation 327rpm. The analysis revealed that the anticipated values were in accord with trial data with a correlation coefficient of 0.969.
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/** @type {import('../core.js').Syntax} */
declare function elm(Prism: any): void
declare namespace elm {
const displayName: string
const aliases: any[]
}
export default elm
|
import styled from 'styled-components'
import newPostIcons from '../../assets/newPostIcons.png'
export const Container = styled.div`
width: 100%;
padding: 12px 16px 10px 16px;
margin-bottom: 16px;
display: flex;
flex-direction: column;
overflow: hidden;
-webkit-box-shadow: 0px 1px 2px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.2);
-moz-box-shadow: 0px 1px 2px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.2);
box-shadow: 0px 1px 2px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.2);
border-radius: max(0px, min(8px, calc((100vw - 4px - 100%) * 9999))) / 8px;
background-color: ${({ theme }) => theme.surfaceBackground};
`
export const RowContainer = styled.div`
width: 100%;
position: relative;
display: flex;
align-items: center;
flex-direction: row;
`
export const HiddenTitle = styled.h3`
height: 1px;
outline: none;
position: absolute;
overflow: hidden;
clip: rect(0, 0, 0, 0);
clip-path: inset(50%);
`
export const UserImage = styled.img`
width: 40px;
height: 40px;
margin-right: 8px;
cursor: pointer;
outline: none;
overflow: hidden;
touch-action: manipulation;
object-fit: cover;
border-radius: 50%;
`
export const FakeInput = styled.div`
flex: 1;
min-height: 40px;
padding: 8px 12px;
position: relative;
display: flex;
align-items: center;
flex-direction: row;
cursor: pointer;
outline: none;
transition: background-color 0.12s ease-in-out;
touch-action: manipulation;
border-radius: 20px;
background-color: ${({ theme }) => theme.commentBackground};
&:hover,
&:focus-visible {
background-color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.05);
}
`
export const FakeInputText = styled.span`
font: 400 1.6rem/1.35 Helvetica, 'Inter', Arial, sans-serif;
color: ${({ theme }) => theme.secondaryText};
word-wrap: break-word;
word-break: break-word;
`
export const ButtonsContainer = styled.div`
margin-top: 12px;
padding-top: 8px;
display: flex;
align-items: center;
flex-direction: row;
overflow: hidden;
border-top: solid 1px ${({ theme }) => theme.secondaryButtonBackground};
`
export const FakeButton = styled.div`
flex: 1;
padding: 8px;
min-width: fit-content;
font: 600 1.5rem/1.2 Helvetica, 'Inter', Arial, sans-serif;
color: ${({ theme }) => theme.secondaryText};
word-wrap: break-word;
word-break: break-word;
display: flex;
flex-direction: row;
align-items: center;
justify-content: center;
cursor: pointer;
outline: none;
transition: background-color 0.12s ease-in-out;
touch-action: manipulation;
border-radius: 8px;
background-color: transparent;
&:hover,
&:focus-visible {
background-color: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.05);
}
`
export const FakeButtonIcon = styled.span<{
type: 'liveVideo' | 'photo' | 'feeling'
}>`
width: 24px;
height: 24px;
display: inline-block;
margin-right: 8px;
background-size: auto;
background-repeat: no-repeat;
background-image: url(${newPostIcons});
background-position: 0
${({ type }) => {
if (type === 'liveVideo') return 0
else if (type === 'photo') return '-225px'
else if (type === 'feeling') return '-25px'
}};
`
|
def main():
move_to_newspaper()
pick_and_move()
|
package com.onrpiv.uploadmedia.Learn;
import android.os.Build;
import androidx.annotation.RequiresApi;
import com.google.android.material.bottomnavigation.BottomNavigationView;
import android.os.Bundle;
import android.text.Html;
import android.text.Layout;
import android.widget.TextView;
import com.onrpiv.uploadmedia.R;
public class Imaging8 extends LearnImagingLayout {
private int headerTextSize = 25;
private int paraTextSize = 16;
@RequiresApi(api = Build.VERSION_CODES.O)
@Override
protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
setContentView(R.layout.activity_imaging8);
TextView t0 = (TextView)findViewById(R.id.imaging8TextView0);
t0.setText("Frame Rate");
t0.setTextSize(headerTextSize);
TextView t1 = (TextView)findViewById(R.id.imaging8TextView1);
String html1 = "Frame rate is the number of images (“frames”) taken per second in a video. It is important to note, that in a single camera, increasing the framerate (less time between images) means a shorter maximum shutter speed, as the shutter must open and shut for each frame to be recorded. To apply the framerate, the time between images is simply 1/framerate. For example, if there are 30 frames per second, then a frame is taken every 1/30 seconds or .033 seconds. See <b>Pixel</b> for using this framerate to identify displacements. With the displacement, the velocity may be found as the displacement divided by time.";
t1.setText(Html.fromHtml(html1));
t1.setTextSize(paraTextSize);
t1.setJustificationMode(Layout.JUSTIFICATION_MODE_INTER_WORD);
BottomNavigationView bottomNavigationView = (BottomNavigationView) findViewById(R.id.bottom_navigation);
bottomNavigationView.setOnNavigationItemSelectedListener(navListener);
}
}
|
There are more out there, but these are the ten best, ten biggest and ten heaviest waves in the world.
1. Nazarre, Portugal.
Only coming into the big wave collective psyche recently, Nazarre soon rose to prominence as one of the biggest surfable waves in the world. To catch one of the really big ones here, surfers need to get towed in by a Personal Water Craft, but once they have caught the wave it offers possibly the biggest, most thrilling ride in the world.
The wave has picked up some derision from seasoned big wave surfers because it breaks in deep water and thus appears not nearly as dangerous as other big waves that break over very shallow reef. Despite this, there have been some scary situations and a few near drowning’s.
2. Cortes Bank.
Sitting 96 miles south west of San Pedro, Los Angeles, Cortes bank is a strange beast in the world of big wave surfing. It takes a long boat ride out there, and no matter what the surf and weather forecast is showing, you never really know what you’re going to find out there. When it comes to deep ocean waves and the bathymetry that deep in the ocean, there are always going to be some big surprises for everyone. One surfer who got a big surprise was big wave legend Greg Long from California. Greg suffered a tremendous wipeout in 2012 and was held under water while four giant waves rolled over him – enough time to kill most people – but he managed to hold on and survive.
3. Waimea Bay, Oahu, Hawaii.
For many years the pinnacle of big wave surfing, Waimea Bay on the North Shore of Oahu, Hawaii is probably the most famous big wave venue in the world. Waimea Bay is sacred in Hawaii, with a long history going all the way back to when Captain Cook landed in the very bay in 1778. It was the first truly big wave surfed in Hawaii, and these days it is the home to the most famous and prestigious big wave contest in the world, the Quiksilver in Memory Of Eddie Aikau Big Wave Invitational.
Waimea Bay gets up to forty feet and it is easy for spectators to get right in on the action on the point, as well as to watch the surfing from any points on around the bay. Surfers have died out there whilst surfing in amongst the giant stuff. Popular Californian surfer Donny Solomon drowned while surfing at Waimea Bay in 1995.
4. Jaws, Maui, Hawaii.
For many years Jaws was considered unsurfable, and only a few crazy windsurfers would venture out there to the big and blustery peaks on the North Shore of Maui. Known as Jaws in popular culture, the actual location was named Peahi, which is the Hawaiian word for wave.
In December 2015, Jaws was the venue for the greatest big wave surfing contest in the history of the sport, the World Surf League Big Wave Tour event the Jaws Challenge. Waves of up to forty feet were surfed that day, and the first wave ridden in the morning caused Australian big wave surfer Mark Matthews to separate his shoulder and render him unable to compete. Hawaiian surfer Billy Kemper won the event, while Californian surfer Greg Long and fellow Hawaiian madman surfer Shane Dorian were also standouts in the death-defying conditions.
5. Mavericks, California.
One of the most feared big wave spots in the world, Mavericks has taken the lives of surfers before, and it will no doubt take more lives in the future. As big waves go, Mavericks, sitting just outside Pillar Point Harbour, near Half Moon Bay, is brutal. It is a tough and relentless wave, hard to surf, and the water is cold. The only way to surf here is to put your head down and paddle really hard, but this is also the route to disaster.
Discovered by Jeff Clarke, a local surfer who surfed it alone for over a decade, Mavericks is now the home of the Titans Of Mavericks Big Wave Event, and Californian surfer Nick Lamb won the 2016 event. Mostly a right-hand breaking wave, surfers have been known to surf the shorter but more intense left-breaking wave off the mavericks peak as well. (link 2)
6. Punta De Lobos, Chile
Situated near the town of Pichilemu, Los Lobos is a very long and winding big wave spot that has a treacherous paddle out and is notorious for strong winds. The south-east winds howl up the Chilean east coast, making for cold water and strong currents, but the same winds help to produce the massive swells that wrap around the Los Morros, the two giant rocks that signify the start of the wave.
It’s a terrifying wave, and a set-up that allows the spectators to watch from the cliffs as the surfers attempt to outrun the giant waves as they pour down the shoreline. Chile has a few local big wave surfers who are specialists out there in the big Los Lobos swells. Ramon Navarro is one such surfer who has taken his Lobos skills to other big wave locales around the world.
Punta De Lobos is now home to the World Surf League Big Wave Tour event, the Quiksilver Ceremonial. This event has run before and the defending champion is Makuakai Rothman from Hawaii.
7. Dungeons, South Africa.
Nestled under the Sentinel Mountain in Hout Bay, Cape Town lies the giant beast known as Dungeons. For ten years it was home to the Red Bull Big wave Africa surfing event, a contest that saw four events run in that decade and careers made during that period. Discovered and surfed first by two local surfers Pierre De Villers and Peter Button in 1984, the surf spot lay dormant and unridden until the first event took place in 1999. Over that period of time much knowledge of big wave surfing was learned, and the culture grew in South Africa, with winners of the event being Sean Holmes, John Whittle, Greg Long and Grant Baker.
Dungeons is also home to a massive seal colony, and as a result is frequently visited by Great White sharks who pop in to watch the show and have some seal pup breakfast. There have been many sightings, but the sharks do seem to be well fed.
8. Todos Santos, Mexico.
This big wave spot off Baja, Mexico, has also had quite an illustrious career, starting off with Californian professional surfer Taylor Knox winning $50k in 1998 for the K2 Challenge. It has always been a favourite hideaway for Californian surfers in the mood for something a little bit bigger and more exciting than the crowded beach break surf that they generally surf, so a deep water reef break provides all that more thrills and spills needed.
Todos Santos is also home to the World Surf League Big Wave Tour event the Todos Santos Challenge, the most recent version won by Australian professional surfer Josh Kerr.
A right-hand breaking wave with a couple of exposed rocks and shelves, Todos is reserved for the big wave expert only. Being down in good old Baja, there is not too much in the way of safety despite what the surfers bring in with them, so it is not one of the safest big wave venues around.
9. Teahupo’o, Tahiti.
The Place Of Skulls is the most dangerous and terrifying wave on the planet, and at times it gets so big that it becomes totally unrideable unless towed into at full speed by a Personal Water Craft. Surfers have lost their lives out there, and it is a constant threat whenever the waves get above ten feet and injuries are commonplace.
The wave breaks over a razor sharp coral bottom, and is home to the World Surf League Championship Tour event the Billabong Pro Teahupo’o.
The biggest day of surfing here happened on the Code Red swell of August 2011 when the event had to be put on hold and the best big wave surfers from all over the world flew in to surf the waves that were at times in excess of forty feet. Some of the waves surfed that day were the biggest and most dangerous waves ever attempted by surfers, and many of the rides became winners in the Big Wave Awards of that year, including Ride Of The Year and Wipeout Of The Year.
10. Puerto Escondido
Known as ‘the biggest and best beach-break in the world’ Puerto Escondido is unique in the fact that it breaks purely on a sand bottom, and thus breaks in various places along this Mexican beachfront. It breaks 50 meters from the water’s edge, and surfers tend to not attach their boards to their feet with leashes, as they simply get washed in after every big wave, and retrieve their boards from the beach.
The waves at Puerto are renowned for their enormous barrels, and the only way to ride many of the waves is to simply ride inside the tube and hope to come out the other side.
When the forecast for Puerto looks favorable, many Californian and Hawaiian surfers make the journey in the hope of catching one of the big sets, and the fact that it all takes place in bath-warm water makes it that much more accessible.
|
<reponame>SongslayerIncorporated/Songstress<filename>src/main/java/songstress/patches/UpgradeHook.java
package songstress.patches;
import com.evacipated.cardcrawl.modthespire.lib.SpirePatch;
import songstress.relics.ForgedDrums;
@SpirePatch(cls = "com.megacrit.cardcrawl.cards.AbstractCard", method = "upgradeName")
public class UpgradeHook {
public static void Prefix() {
ForgedDrums.onUpgrade();
}
}
|
def _output_name(self, roi_id: int, ara_list: list) -> None:
aradict = {}
roi = self.collection.find_one({"id": roi_id})
aradict["id"]=roi["id"]
aradict["name"] = roi["name"]
aradict['children']= []
for roi_id in roi['children']:
ret_dict = self._output_name(roi_id,aradict['children'])
ara_list.append(aradict)
|
/**
* @brief Initialization function for the Q15 DCT4/IDCT4.
* @param[in,out] *S points to an instance of Q15 DCT4/IDCT4 structure.
* @param[in] *S_RFFT points to an instance of Q15 RFFT/RIFFT structure.
* @param[in] *S_CFFT points to an instance of Q15 CFFT/CIFFT structure.
* @param[in] N length of the DCT4.
* @param[in] Nby2 half of the length of the DCT4.
* @param[in] normalize normalizing factor.
* @return arm_status function returns ARM_MATH_SUCCESS if initialization is successful or ARM_MATH_ARGUMENT_ERROR if <code>N</code> is not a supported transform length.
* \par Normalizing factor:
* The normalizing factor is <code>sqrt(2/N)</code>, which depends on the size of transform <code>N</code>.
* Normalizing factors in 1.15 format are mentioned in the table below for different DCT sizes:
* \image html dct4NormalizingQ15Table.gif
*/
arm_status arm_dct4_init_q15(
arm_dct4_instance_q15 * S,
arm_rfft_instance_q15 * S_RFFT,
arm_cfft_radix4_instance_q15 * S_CFFT,
uint16_t N,
uint16_t Nby2,
q15_t normalize)
{
arm_status status = ARM_MATH_SUCCESS;
q15_t *twiddlePtr[4] = { (q15_t *) WeightsQ15_128, (q15_t *) WeightsQ15_512,
(q15_t *) WeightsQ15_2048, (q15_t *) WeightsQ15_8192
};
q15_t *pCosFactor[4] =
{ (q15_t *) cos_factorsQ15_128, (q15_t *) cos_factorsQ15_512,
(q15_t *) cos_factorsQ15_2048, (q15_t *) cos_factorsQ15_8192
};
S->N = N;
S->Nby2 = Nby2;
S->normalize = normalize;
S->pRfft = S_RFFT;
S->pCfft = S_CFFT;
switch (N)
{
case 8192u:
S->pTwiddle = twiddlePtr[3];
S->pCosFactor = pCosFactor[3];
break;
case 2048u:
S->pTwiddle = twiddlePtr[2];
S->pCosFactor = pCosFactor[2];
break;
case 512u:
S->pTwiddle = twiddlePtr[1];
S->pCosFactor = pCosFactor[1];
break;
case 128u:
S->pTwiddle = twiddlePtr[0];
S->pCosFactor = pCosFactor[0];
break;
default:
status = ARM_MATH_ARGUMENT_ERROR;
}
arm_rfft_init_q15(S->pRfft, S->N, 0u, 1u);
return (status);
}
|
Abstract B029: Epigenetic characterization of patient-derived organoids and cancer-associated fibroblasts from endoscopic ultrasound of pancreatic cancer Introduction: Pancreatic adenocarcinoma (PDAC) has a 5-year survival rate of ~10%. Only 20% of patients are eligible for surgical resection, while the remaining patients treated with chemotherapy who show poor response. It is critical to define mechanisms that accurately predict patient responses to established or novel therapies. We are developing living biobanks of patient-derived organoids (PDOs) and Cancer-Associated Fibroblast (CAFs) from endoscopic ultrasound (EUS) and focusing on epigenetic regulators which may account for resistance. Recent studies implicate both CAFs and epigenetic regulators in resistance to chemotherapy and highlight the importance of epigenetic regulation independent of gene mutations. We hypothesize that PDOs can be used to define molecular events that will determine patient-specific sensitivities to therapy. Our goals are to establish parameters within PDOs that predict patient response and target epigenetic processes that may uncover sensitivities to therapy. Methods: To develop a living biobank, patients were consented into the DERIVE (Determination of Response to Therapy in Individual Patients) program (REB#113362). Needle biopsies were obtained during EUS resection. CAFs and tumor cells were isolated and grown in 2- or 3-D cultures respectively. We performed histological analysis and isolated DNA for ONCOMINE sequencing to analyze somatic mutations of each PDOs. To determine the relative sensitivity, PDOs were treated with gemcitabine and IC50 values determined using Alamar blue. PDO attributes were then compared to the DERIVE database. We determined CAFs subpopulation by immunofluorescence and flow cytometry. Results: ONCOMINE sequencing showed PDOs genetic mutations were conserved according to patient tumor analysis. PDOs showed different morphological characteristics and we identified groups of gemcitabine-sensitive and resistant PDOs which is not reflected by genetic mutations. Treated and non-treated PDOs are currently being assessed for global DNA-methylation patterns and ATAC-seq to identify changes in chromatin remodeling. In addition, two major subpopulations of CAFs were identified: myCAFs and iCAFs. These subpopulations will be co-cultured with PDOs and treated to chemotherapies to determine the impact of each subpopulation on chemoresistance and analyze by ATAC-Seq to determine the epigenetic regulator that is involved in chemoresistance mechanism. Conclusions and Future Directions: By aligning our findings in PDOs to the DERIVE database, we defined parameters that predict disease progression and the patients response to chemotherapy. To identify epigenetic modifications, we examined global genetic and epigenomic patterns in PDOs before and after treatment with chemotherapeutic agents as well as in co-cultured with different CAFs subpopulation. This work will determine if epigenetic mechanisms can be targeted as a new approach to therapy. This work highlights the importance of PDOs as a valuable model in identifying the best choices for treatment in PDAC cancer. Citation Format: Emilie Jaune-Pons, Rachel Lu, Xiao Yang Wang, Nadeem Hussain, Michael Sey, Ken Leslie, Ephraim Tang, Anton Skaro, Crystal Engelage, Danielle Porplycia, Stephen Welch, Brian Yan, Christopher Pin. Epigenetic characterization of patient-derived organoids and cancer-associated fibroblasts from endoscopic ultrasound of pancreatic cancer . In: Proceedings of the AACR Special Conference on Pancreatic Cancer; 2022 Sep 13-16; Boston, MA. Philadelphia (PA): AACR; Cancer Res 2022;82(22 Suppl):Abstract nr B029.
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**Mary Warnock** is a philosopher. She has been fellow and tutor in philosophy at St Hugh's College, Oxford; headmistress of Oxford High School; and Mistress of Girton College, Cambridge. She sits as an independent life peer in the House of Lords, and published _Mary Warnock, A Memoir – People & Places_ with Duckworth.
**_What the critics said:_**
'The chief value of this book [is that] it does not present final answers to every moral dilemma. How could it?
'What it does, rather, is show what it is like to think through moral questions with care, seriousness and an honest determination not to trivialise or simplify the horribly complicated issues they raise. In that sense, even if one disagreed with every moral opinion expressed in it, it would remain one of the best guides to ethics available.'
Ray Monk, _Sunday Telegraph_
'It is hard to believe that Mary Warnock's humane, lucid, honest and personal voice will not be attractive to anyone interested in the questions she discusses... The point of a book like this is to stimulate discussion in a clear-headed and serious way; in this it has plainly succeeded.'
Garrett Cullity, _Times Literary Supplement_
'Warnock's new book admirably fulfils the brief of its title.... This book fearlessly tackles a host of the favourite topics of pub bores.... This book will serve as an excellent introduction to ethical study, and is also an impassioned and moving summary of Warnock's own lifelong dedication to ethical thinking.'
Alain de Botton, _Guardian_
'This admirable book fully lives up to its title, though it is perhaps more like an actual work of ethics than a guide to them.... This is a wise, earnest, moving book, rather Victorian in its way, which shows that goodness is not just for prigs. No wonder the blurb calls it "controversial". It must certainly raise eyebrows among the enlightened.'
Robert Grant, _The Times_
'Her views are well argued and forcefully expressed. She does full justice to the complexity of the subject, exposes the sophistry of many widely held views, tackles the big issues, and is unafraid to draw "controversial" conclusions. Doctors and nurses confronted with ethical dilemmas can learn much from this book.'
Paul Crichton, _British Medical Journal_
'Mary Warnock is probably the most famous philosopher in Britain.'
Julian Baggini, _The Philosopher's Magazine_
'A lucid, unpretentious, sympathetic, civilised and thoroughly moral guide to intelligent ethical thinking, saying clearly what it says, neither mumbling nor haranguing.'
Timothy McDermott, _The Tablet_
'This is an open, clear, forthright book which encourages the reader to actively engage both with the general argument for and against the true and the good, and particular moral issues.'
Peter J. Cole, _Relate News_
'A thought-provoking book from a very wise woman.'
Colin McCall, _The Freethinker_
An Intelligent Person's
Guide to Ethics
An Intelligent Person's
Guide to Ethics
Mary Warnock
Duckworth Overlook
This eBook edition 2013
This edition first published in the UK and US in 2004
First published in 1998 by
Duckworth Overlook
LONDON
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NEW YORK
The Overlook Press
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© 1998 by Mary Warnock
The right of Mary Warnock to be identified as the author of the work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.
A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library and the Library of Congress
ISBNs
Paperback: 9780715635308
Mobipocket: 9780715646144
ePub: 9780715646151
Library PDF: 9780715646168
Contents
Introduction
Death
Birth
Rights
Where Ethics Comes From
Freedom, Responsibility and Determinism
What Follows?
Index
Introduction
A guide to ethics might be thought to be a kind of handbook on how to behave properly, like a guide to etiquette, or the Highway Code. Useful though such a book might be, it is not possible to write it. Ethics is a complicated matter. It is partly a matter of general principles, or even rules, like those of manners; but largely a matter of judgement and decision, of reasoning and sentiment, of having the right feeling at the right time, and every time is different. Above all it is a matter of trying to be a particular sort of person. And though ethics (or moral philosophy, as I prefer to call it), like the rest of philosophy, has been secularised, it is almost impossible to think about the origins and development of morality itself without thinking about its interconnections with religion. My own background is a small illustration of this.
My mother, though not pious, and disliking conventional piety, had had a very pious background, in that her grandmother, a German, had married into another German family that had converted to Christianity from Judaism. Religion was serious. My mother took church-going for granted, and having been a public schoolmaster's wife (my father died before I was born), she also took for granted not just Sunday attendance, but bells summoning one to chapel every day. The liturgy was something I grew up with, and cathedral services were a source of endless pleasure and fascination. I went to an exceptionally religious school, St Swithun's, in Winchester, first by day, then as a boarder, where it was assumed that the true purpose of school was to make us good. The school motto was _Caritas Humilitas Sinceritas_ ; and the adolescence of myself and my friends was engaged largely with the contemplation of the last of these virtues. We endlessly examined ourselves and one another to find out whether we had really meant what we said or were only showing off; whether we really liked the things we professed to like, despised those things we claimed to, or whether these sentiments too were insincere. Though we may often have behaved badly, there is no doubt that we wanted to be good. I did not realise how important a fact this was until much later. But I do remember one day at school, just before I left, coming to a sudden realisation that nothing was or could ever be truly intolerable except the recognition that one had behaved badly in some serious, non-trivial matter.
When I went to Oxford the moral pressure and the religious atmosphere lifted. While I was reading Classical Honour Moderations almost the only pressure I was under was the pressure to work, to try to improve the lamentable standard of my girls' school Latin and Greek and try to justify the scholarship which I had won, I knew, entirely by pretending to be brighter than I was, and getting away with it. It was 1942 when I started as an undergraduate, and so there was a wartime assumption of collective righteousness, of being on the right side, strengthened in my case by my friendship with Elisabeth de Gaulle, the General's daughter, who was reading history in my year at college. The atmosphere was not so much moralistic as heroic.
After Oxford, having completed the first half of my degree course, and starting when I was just twenty, I taught for two years at a more relaxed girls' school than mine had been, Sherborne School for Girls. But the horrors of the Holocaust became generally known at this time, and I reflected for the first time that humans have a great deal in common: I could not be sure that I did not have instincts as detestable as those of the Nazis, nor that I would have had the clarity of vision or the strength of character to resist these instincts, had I been a German at the time. I remember a particularly awful insight, that I, though I knew myself to be a good class teacher, was capable of being a bully, and tormenting a child if she irritated me, or seemed generally contemptible. The purpose of morality, I thought, must surely be to make one constantly alert to such temptations.
So when I went back to Oxford I was prepared to be interested in moral philosophy, a compulsory subject in Greats. In the event, I quite enjoyed it, but nothing like as much as I enjoyed working for the epistemology paper, or Plato and Aristotle (also concerned largely with moral philosophy, but a wonderfully alien and non-Christian morality, where the fascination was translation, seeing, that is, whether there was any way to render the Greek concepts of ethics intelligible, without ingrained Christian vocabulary and outlook being allowed to creep in). I think the main reason for my rather lukewarm attention to moral philosophy was that at the time (1946-1948) it was, as a subject, in very poor shape in Oxford. No one was prepared to take it, or its relation, political philosophy, seriously. The explanation for this was twofold. First, at the beginning of the century, G.E. Moore, a celebrated Cambridge philosopher, had written an undeservedly influential book, _Principia Ethica_ , in which he purported to show that moral judgements were based on an infallible and simple intuitive knowledge of what things were good. The things that were good, friendship, for example, or the contemplation of beauty, were just obviously so, to anyone who thought about the matter clearly. A moral decision between two possible courses of action must therefore be based on a calculation as to which of the two would bring about more of these manifestly good things. If two people disagreed about what, as a matter of ethics, they ought to do, they were simply disagreeing about which possible course of action would have the consequence that more of the indisputably good things would come into existence. They could not disagree about what was good. This was Moore's startling and simplistic solution to the problems of morality. He was the guru of the Bloomsbury group, and it is hard not to think that he owed his undoubted fame more to his personality (his solemnity, his highly emphatic way of speaking, his obvious integrity, and his manifest purity of character) than to his arguments. For on the whole he did not use arguments in _Principia Ethica_. He simply asserted things.
But there was one argument which he deployed, and which was the subject of endless debate. He accused John Stuart Mill, in his _Utilitarianism_ , a text much read both then and now in courses on moral philosophy, of committing what he called the Naturalistic Fallacy. Mill, he alleged, did not realise the great gulf between _moral_ judgements, the subject of direct and infallible intuition of the good, simple, and incapable of further analysis, and complex judgements of _fact_ , such as that people prefer pleasure to pain. Mill, he said, obscured, indeed denied the difference between the desirable and the desired, between what people do want, and what it is good that they should want. This argument was an object of great fascination to later philosophers and we spent much time in our undergraduate essays discussing it. But in our hands it was an argument concerned exclusively with different _kinds of proposition_ , propositions of fact and propositions of value. A proposition of fact might be that it was raining, while a proposition of value would be that rain is good for the crops. It did not much matter what examples you took to illustrate the difference, so long as you acknowledged it. As for the content of morality, what moral judgements were actually about, though we perhaps realised that Moore's choice of intrinsically good things was rather one-sided, we seldom considered the part of his book where he laid out what these good things were (the part that must most have impressed the members of the Bloomsbury group). Even if we had discussed it, there would not have been much to say: for according to Moore either you agreed with his list of intrinsic and unanalysable good things, or you had not thought about it properly. Either you saw what things were good or you were blind. In any case, we, as budding philosophers, were not supposed to be concerned with actual good and evil, harm and benefit, but only with the nature of the language in which such things were discussed by others, not engaged in philosophy. They, we were taught, were concerned with 'first-order' morality. We, elevated above the fray, dealt with 'second-order' topics; not with what is the case, but with the analysis of the language in which the non-philosophical seek to express what is the case.
The other, related influence which accounted for the low standing of moral philosophy came to the same sort of conclusion from a different route, and made it equally impossible to discuss real ethical problems that might arise in the real world. This was the aftermath of logical positivism, which had burst on the English-speaking world from Vienna, just before the war. Logical positivism held as its central dogma that 'the meaning of a proposition is its method of verification'; that is to say that unless you could verify or falsify a statement, it was strictly meaningless, indeed it was only masquerading as a statement. There were, it was true, other statements, those of mathematics or logic, that were held to have meaning, since to assert them was to assert either a necessary truth or a contradiction. But apart from these, only statements of verifiable fact had meaning. It followed that all statements of the form 'stealing is wrong' or 'God is love' were pseudo-statements, pretending to state facts, but actually meaningless. A.J. Ayer, whose youthful and exuberant book, _Language, Truth and Logic_ , had introduced these theories to the English-speaking world in 1936, held that such pseudo-propositions were expressions of emotion, like the hissing or slow hand-clapping you might use to evince your disapproval of a performance in the opera house. You could say, 'Many people assert that God is love' or 'Most people believe that stealing is wrong', for such propositions could be verified by the counting of heads. But to go further, and declare either of these propositions directly, would be to speak nonsense.
Not much philosophy had been seriously discussed during the war, most philosophers having left their universities for other things. So when they came back, it was widely taken for granted that the statements of ethics (that something was right or that it was wrong, that something was courageous or that it was cowardly) as well as most statements of politics (that such and such would be a right policy to adopt) were strictly meaningless, and not worth discussing. What was permitted was to discuss what kind of uses (since they could not have the 'proper' use of statements, to convey factual information) such statements might be allowed to have: to persuade, for instance, or to emote.
The consequence was that moral and political philosophy became curiously easy subjects. We had to read the classical texts of the subject, Hume, Locke, Kant and Moore (apart from Plato and Aristotle). But we had not really to engage with what they said, for we were taught that they said nothing significant. They were analysing, or justifying, something, namely ethics, which had only a fake existence. Apart from reading the texts, our task was to show that the Naturalistic Fallacy was indeed a fallacy; for logical positivism had introduced it by another route from Moore's. The distinction between fact and value, we thought, had been once and for all uncovered and remained absolute. Philosophers, professionally speaking, having recognised and elaborated this distinction, had no more right to pontificate about what things actually were valuable than anyone else. It was not our business. No wonder we were often referred to as ourselves logical positivists, though we had given up, or never adopted, the general tenets of that philosophy.
I am far from decrying the kind of linguistic philosophy practised in Oxford after the war. Indeed I think it absolutely central to philosophy to explore the language of perception, the language we use to speak of our personal identity, how our concepts of space and time are incorporated in the communication we have with other humans, and many more such topics, which make up epistemology, philosophical logic and metaphysics. But, I began to believe, this is not the whole of philosophy. There are questions that must be asked about values, what we value and why, and who 'we' are when we are inclined to raise these problems. I would not have put it like this, at the time. It would have sounded too pretentious. The word 'value' was thoroughly discredited. It was used, as I have said, to distinguish different kinds of propositions (those dealing with facts being totally distinct from those dealing with values). But apart from that it was out of favour. It suggested too much the pieties of the war which we had got sick of hearing. For it has to be remembered that after the war our mood was iconoclastic; there were balloons to be pricked and their deflation was extremely good sport. All the same I personally began to feel discontented with the triviality of linguistic philosophy, as applid to ethics.
At the end of the 1950s, when I had been teaching philosophy for nearly ten years, I was asked by the Oxford University Press whether I would contribute a volume to the Home University Library to be entitled _Ethics Since 1900_. It is symptomatic of the status of moral philosophy at that time that two people had been asked already and had turned it down, and all three of us were women. Soft options for the girls was certainly then the general feeling. Rather at the last minute the General Editor of the Home University Library rang up to say that there was this thing called existentialism, and this chap called Sartre, and perhaps I ought to include a chapter on this in the book, to set it apart from other current histories of the subject. I had never read a word of Sartre, though his plays and novels were spoken of, and indeed I had heard, and been enormously impressed by, _Huis Clos_ more than ten years before, when it was chosen as part of the first night of the BBC Third Programme. My heart sank, but I agreed to do it, and to try to do it by the end of the Long Vacation, just beginning. So for a cold and windy summer I sat on the beach at Sandsend on the North Yorkshire coast (where we had a holiday house), crouching behind a wind-shield while our then four children dammed the stream, and I read _L'Etre et le Néant_. I hated it, and in many ways I still do. I hated the solemnity, the highly French pretentiousness, the wordiness, the neologisms, the sheer weight of gobbledegook. (I was not to know that later, in the days of Foucault and Derrida, Sartre would come to look like a model of clarity and economy.) But I realised, at the same time, that here was a kind of philosophy completely different from the purely 'second order' moral philosophy of Oxford. It was hands-on.
For one thing it was, in part, unashamedly _metaphysical_ , deriving morality from the nature of the universe and man's place in it, in the manner of Plato and Spinoza, philosophers to whom I was greatly addicted. A not very elevated role for morality emerged from this: morality is nothing but self-deception. There is no such thing as an absolute value. All values are relative and invented. Humans, being at a distance from the world of _things_ because of their powers of reflection on these, themselves unthinking, things, are always trying to pretend that they, men themselves, are absolutely thing-like, bound by duties and obligations, just as material objects are bound by the laws of gravity. Men are made sick and dizzy by the thought of their own freedom; so they deny it.
Secondly, the arguments in support of this thesis were not arguments at all, but anecdotes. The method was largely a narrative method, stories told so vividly that you could not but believe in the vignette. For example, to make the point central to his thought that humans deceive themselves, pretending to an inevitability in their lives when in fact they can live them as they choose, pretending they are bound by obligations which in fact they invent for themselves and can perfectly well disregard, Sartre tells the story of a waiter who claims that he _has to_ get up at five and open the café, that he cannot but sweep the floor, obsequiously attend to his clients, and so on. He is all the time playing, and over-playing his part. He is pretending to be a waiter, body and soul. This story is so brilliantly told that one cannot argue with the conclusion. One simply recognises the _man in bad faith_. When Sartre embarks on the narrative mode, at once all the pretentiousness and obscurity are dispelled, and the point is made.
I wrote in my ethics book, published in 1960,* that the subject had become trivialised, but that I believed the most boring days were over. In a new edition in 1977, I wrote a postscript in which I said that my faith had been justified. Real subjects were now the proper concern of moral philosophers. The only threat to the subject that I could then see was a kind of creeping relativism which morality itself, let alone moral philosophy, could not survive. I shall return to the subject.
In 1977, when the postscript was written, I was spending much of my time chairing a government enquiry into the education of children with disabilities, referred to in our final report as children with special educational needs. It was, I think, the first time that I had publicly to justify a particular moral standpoint to a general, and especially a parliamentary, readership. For, though most of the report was concerned with organisational and curricular matters, right at the beginning of the report we had to make, and agree to, a moral statement. The circumstances in which the committee was set up made such a moral statement imperative. Until the early 1970s, children with very severe and multiple disabilities had been denied education. They were offered care and sometimes therapy, but they were deemed ineducable. But in 1972 the right of all children to education was established by law, and for the first time severely disabled children were brought within the general framework of education, the responsibility not of the Department of Health but of the Department of Education, which already looked after the less severely disabled. One man was largely responsible for this change, an immensely enthusiastic, resourceful and compassionate man called Stanley Segal, who died in 1995. He wrote a book called _No Child is Ineducable_ , sent a copy to every Member of Parliament, and lobbied mercilessly until the change came about. This was how it was that our committee was set up, by the then Secretary of State, Margaret Thatcher. There were two philosophical questions that the committee had to address, before getting down to the details. The first was What is the purpose of education? Is it really plausible to use the word at all in connection with children so severely mentally and physically retarded that they cannot sit up or feed themselves or ever hope to speak? The second was How can one justify spending very large sums of money on education for those who by ordinary standards will never benefit from it, and certainly never repay the money spent by contributing to society, but will continue to need support all their lives?
In an attempt to answer the first question I can distinctly remember a weekend meeting, at a dismal hotel in Surrey, when I saw a mental picture (it seemed to arise spontaneously as if in a dream, and indeed I may well have been half asleep) which would help to answer the question, and I set about to present this image to the committee. I saw that education was a road down which every child had to walk, but there was only one road, with a common destination. At the end of the road lay the common goals: understanding of the world, enjoyment of it, and the independence that would empower the child to control it. Some children would have a smooth and easy passage down the road, but for others there would be formidable obstacles. Some would emerge fully equipped to understand, enjoy and control. Others would progress very little way towards the shared goals. But in their case every step counted. These children would have to be helped to surmount the obstacles one by one, and the need for help, often to do things, like talking, which other children learn to do without effort, was where the concept of 'special needs' came from. I, and I think we all, came away from this otherwise horrible weekend feeling that we had achieved not only clarity (up to a point), but some sort of shared and shareable vision, as well as a handy title for our report, and, as it turned out, for subsequent legislation.
But there remained the other question. What was to be the justification for spending such huge sums of money on educating children who were not going to get very far, and who certainly would not repay the expenditure by their contributions to the economy? (Such questions became far more urgent later, in the days of the Thatcher Government, but they were already asked.) The short answer and one which I found I deeply believed in was 'equality'. Of course one could have given an answer in terms of equal rights; since the law was changed in 1972, these children, all children, had an equal right to be educated. But that would somehow have begged the question. We felt we needed not merely to appeal to the law, as it newly was, but to justify that law: to explain why it was morally right that the law _had_ been changed. And so we had to fall back on the statement that all children are equally human. But even among members of the committee, all of whom, it must be remembered, were concerned, at a practical level, in the education of the disabled, there were nevertheless some who said that all children were not equally human. Some were 'vegetables'. I found myself shocked by this metaphor; and I thought how easy and satisfactory it would be to respond with another metaphor, that all were God's children. Such language, however, has no place in an official report, and rightly. For one has to find arguments which do not rely on dogma accepted by some and not by others. And this is as true of philosophy as it is of government reports. Yet the desire I felt to counter the horticultural metaphor with one derived, as it were, from the Garden of Eden showed me something that I had not recognised before in my professional capacity, namely how powerful the metaphors of religion are, and how one may find them, in some circumstances, virtually indispensable. In the end we reinforced the argument from equality (not an unexamined dogma, but a shared value) with the argument we had used before, the argument derived from the image of the single road. It makes more difference for a child who cannot speak, and does not know even how to communicate by pointing, to be taught the meaning of pointing, and so to be granted a little bit of independent choice (even if the choice is only between chocolate and raspberry Angel Delight), than it does for a talented child to choose whether to learn the violin or the French horn. The change in the direction of understanding, enjoyment and control is, for the disabled child, immense, small though the steps may be.
I have cited this example at some length, because it illustrates what has come to seem to me an enormously important part of the task of moral philosophers, to try to engender practical understanding. I do not believe that you can make moral judgements unless, as far as possible, you know what you are talking about. Therefore in real situations you have to take care to find out as much as you can about the facts, from experts. I do not believe either that you can make good decisions unless you bring to bear on them a general understanding of the ethical issues involved. It is here that the moral philosopher may be of some use, in demonstrating what it is to adopt an ethical point of view.
The work of this committee also opened my eyes to a distinction about which I was not, and probably am not, wholly clear, though it is of the last importance. We must distinguish, though not absolutely, public from private morality. I have come to believe, from working on the committee I have just discussed and other committees which addressed other moral issues, that the relation between private morality, the dictates of conscience, if one may put it so, and a public policy that is democratically acceptable, seen widely to be decent, is a subtle and complicated interrelation. But we must try to get it right, otherwise we shall be dominated for ever by the ethics of the pub bore, who will say, 'I think it's disgusting. There ought to be a law against it.'
The pub bore speaks intuitively. (He is perhaps a coarse version of G.E. Moore, though Bloomsbury might shun the analogy.) Even if he has good reasons for his judgement that something is 'disgusting', he may not be able to articulate them (just as one may recognise someone immediately from a distance, without necessarily being able to say what it was about him that made him so recognisable). His conclusion, that the thing is wrong, may be perfectly sound. But he makes the false assumption that his judgement should, or could, be instantly translated into a law which should govern everyone, and turn that which he is objecting to into a criminal offence. When people become legislators or politicians, they assume new responsibilities. They have specifically to exercise reason and caution in attempting to foresee the consequences for everyone, including minority groups, of the measures they are proposing. This is not to say that they can be wholly Machiavellian, putting on one side the sensibilities of morality for the sake of successful rule. But it is to suggest that there is a number of kinds of moral judgements or decisions that they are not entitled to make, decisions that a private person might make out of friendship, love, or a desire for self-sacrifice, or indeed out of shame or outrage. Moreover, they owe a duty to be able to explain why they have come to the conclusion they have. They must be seen to have thought rationally; and in public circumstances this means that they be seen to have thought about the long-term consequences of what it is they propose. They must be seen to be steady and consistent in the stance they take, not only because they will probably advance their own careers if so perceived, but because steady and principled government is what is actually needed by society. So the overlap, or interplay, between the public and the private comes at the place where principles are to be articulated, and the consequences for society as a whole openly taken into account. In the sphere of public morality it is not enough simply to say, 'I feel I must' do this or that, except in the case where the public and private conflict. A public figure who resigns over a conscience issue is entitled to say, 'I can no other.' But public morality as such must be explained, and explained with reference to a common good. All these things I began to learn from my experiences at the Department of Education and I will deal with them in this book.
* _Ethics Since 1900_
Death
To show how important the interrelation between public and private ethics is, as well as to show how ethical issues spring up all round one in real life, I want to tell two unoriginal, but more or less fictitious, stories about controlling the timing of death. Euthanasia is a topic which, as no one could deny, poses specifically moral dilemmas, dilemmas which, these days, it is a recognised part of ethics, or moral philosophy, to discuss, though it would have been beyond the narrow pale of discussion in the 1940s and 1950s.
The first story is this: there is a woman who is terminally ill, that is to say her life cannot last for more than two or three months. She is in great distress, because her illness progressively affects her ability to breathe. She has lost so much weight that she is, literally, painfully thin. She is too weak to be able to move herself, and she is entirely dependent on her husband, and the nurses who come in every day. She is given analgesics, including morphia, which marginally ease her breathing. But she longs to die, as she knows she soon will. She longs to release her husband from his terrible life, and she has had enough of her own. The consultant whom she used to see at an earlier stage of her illness has indicated that there is no more treatment he can give, and so she, and her husband, are looked after by their GP. He calls on them at frequent intervals, at least twice a week, and has become a friend. She is terrified of dying of suffocation, and has told both her husband and her doctor this; for such a death has always been a nightmare to her, and now she cannot sleep for thinking about it. When she does sleep, she wakes from a nightmare of suffocation. One day they are talking about it, the three of them together, and the doctor says to her, 'You shall not die by suffocating. I promise.' She is enormously relieved, and sleeps well that night, suffering no nightmares. The next day the doctor privately tells her husband that he is gradually increasing the dosage of morphia. Nothing further is said, but both the doctor and the husband know what is implied. Within a few weeks, the woman has died.
The second story is entirely different. A young girl, still in her teens, has suffered horrendous head injuries from the collapse of the building in which she works where a bomb had been placed. She is rescued from the rubble after many hours, and is taken unconscious to hospital. After several days in intensive care, it becomes apparent that she is capable of breathing without support, and her digestive system is working properly, but she is in a coma. So she remains for many weeks, while brain scans are taken, and every possible examination of the state of her brain is carried out. She shows no signs of consciousness at all, though she can move a little, and may move her head slightly if an intense light is flashed. But she does not respond to quite painful stimuli, such as pin-pricks, and she has no sense of hearing or of normal visual stimuli. After a year, she is said to be in a Permanent Vegetative State (PVS), which means that though she is not dead, according to the ordinary brain-stem death criterion, yet the rest of her brain is entirely useless to her, being, for the most part, a mass of fluid. In order to keep her alive, she needs food and drink, which are administered to her through tubes to the stomach. She has constant nursing attention as well, for the prevention of bedsores. Her parents, who visit her every day and have tried every kind of stimulus to arouse her, as well as her boyfriend, who also visits, want her to die, arguing that she is dead already as far as they are concerned. They know that she is not suffering, but that she will not recover, and, with the nursing care she is getting, may live for twenty or thirty more years. The hospital, however, do not believe that they can deliberately kill her by a lethal injection, for fear that the doctor who administered the injection might be held on a charge of murder; nor do they think they can, ethically, let her die of starvation and dehydration. And so they take the case to court. It is a very odd case: the judge is required to decide whether, if they did certain things, or omitted certain things, they would be committing murder. They have so far committed no crime. At last, after a long-drawn-out hearing and an appeal, the case ends in the House of Lords, where the Law Lords judge that the girl may be allowed to die, nutrition and hydration being withdrawn.
Both my stories, different though they are, pose in the end the same ethical problem. Ought the doctors to have intervened as they did, with the result that the two women died when they did? Or ought they to have 'allowed nature to take its course'? (Though we must note that 'nature taking its course' seems to mean, if it means anything, different things in the two stories.)
We will start with the first story. There are various essential elements in it, which will contribute to the moral judgement of the doctor's actions. The woman is 'naturally' ill; she has not suffered an accident, she has not been linked up to any life-support machines. Everything possible has been done for her that could be done. Her disease was diagnosed by means of a lung biopsy, and its progress was slowed down by means of drugs. Plainly this means that there has already been intervention of a kind that would not have been possible fifty or even twenty-five years ago. If nature had really been allowed to take its course, then she would have been dead long ago. The difference is that this was intervention with the aim of prolonging her life, and so is taken for granted. Yet it is worth noticing how slippery and evanescent our concept of the 'natural' is. Those who, for example, object to the idea of curing genetic diseases by means of gene manipulation on the grounds that it is 'unnatural' should perhaps, on the same grounds, object to curing appendicitis by means of surgery. We tend to regard as 'natural' those medical interventions to which we are accustomed, and which are often successful. Nothing could be less 'natural' than a plastic hip joint. Yet hip replacement surgery is seldom objected to on the apparently ethical grounds that it is contrary to nature.
The next crucial factor in the story is that the woman and her husband love each other, and therefore each can enter into the other's feelings and discern where each other's interests lie. The wife, quite apart from her own discomfort, pain and fear, is also distressed by the constrictions placed on her husband's freedom through her dependence on him. He is prepared for this sacrifice, but fully understands that his wife does not like to see him sacrificing himself. Neither of them has ever adopted the role of martyr or slave. Far beyond that, he is moved by his love and sympathy for her. Yet there is an asymmetry between them. She, quite without hesitation and with absolute sincerity, can say that she wants to die. He feels instant guilt at harbouring the thought that he wants her to die, even though he believes that to die would be in her own interest. She has nothing to gain from a life of increasing fear, breathlessness and pain. Each day is more horrible than the last, especially as she has an absolute understanding of what her situation is. Yet he believes that, much though he sympathises with her wish, if it becomes _his_ wish, then it must be selfish. If he wants her to die this must be, deep down, because it is in his own interest that she should. And we are taught, from childhood, that we should never wish someone else dead.
There is another element, a factor to which husband and wife may give different weight, according to their temperament. The wife, let us say, always placed a high value on independence and making her own choices. She now finds that, though she wants to die, she cannot choose to do so. For she cannot see how to die. Suicide would seem a proper choice; but she cannot commit suicide. She is too helpless. Nor can she bring herself to ask her husband to help her, because this would be to make him commit a crime. She is no longer in any sense autonomous; and her dependence is an enormous addition to her burdens. He too may, in principle, value autonomy. He may half wish that things were as they are in the Netherlands, when choosing death may really be an option for the terminally ill. Yet together they had watched a film about voluntary death in the Netherlands, and together they had agreed that neither of them could face the thought of deciding, 'Tonight's the night.' But in any case they live in Britain, not the Netherlands. They seem locked in a position from which there is no escape, which offers no plan that they can decide on and put into practice. Imminent, expected death produces a kind of paralysis. And death is so final, and so infinitely significant for the dying person, that to choose it for oneself may seem somehow to trivialise it.
The doctor understands all of this. He understands the husband's guilty feelings (which he knows will be, temporarily at least, extreme after his wife's death, whether she dies 'naturally' or not) and his agony at witnessing his wife's distress and degeneration. He understands, equally, the wife's horror at her inability to breathe and her weakness. He regards it as his duty as her doctor to make her inevitable death as easy as he can. Hence his promise to her. He understands that when his patients, as they come to grasp their own approaching death, say, 'I know that you will make it all right,' they do not mean that they believe he will find a cure, but that they believe he will not let dying be too horrible. However, he also knows that even voluntary euthanasia, where the patient has actually expressed a wish, even a longing, to die, is against the law; that intentionally killing someone is murder, the most serious crime there is, and punishable by mandatory life imprisonment (and incidentally no one who has been convicted of such an offence, a mercy killing, over the last decade has served less than six years of his sentence). And here plainly the doctor, in weighing up all the considerations, is moving from the consideration of private to public morality.
Let us try to divide all the elements listed above, the factors which will prove relevant to the final moral judgement, according to the private/public dichotomy. We will find that it will not work perfectly; but where there are overlaps, the complications of the issue will become the more apparent.
I must first make clear what I mean by 'private morality'. I most certainly do not mean a morality consciously made up by someone for his own use, a set of principles deliberately adopted by someone who says, 'This is how I ought to live; it is my own plan, and it applies to no one else but me.' Such a set of principles might, I suppose, be adopted (rather as a nun takes her vows) but it must be rare. And if the set of principles were really supposed to have no application or relevance to anyone else at all, then it is doubtful whether it would be properly thought of as a morality. There are, after all, many instances of rules by which one lives, or tries to live, which are nothing to do with ethics. (I, for example, make it a rule to pay bills as soon as I get them. But this is a safeguard against forgetting to pay them at all, or losing them among the silt on my desk, combined with a purely personal horror of debt. Though adherence to this rule may work out generally ethically better than the habit of being slow to pay, it is not adopted for ethical reasons.) When I speak of private morality, on the contrary, I mean a morality grounded in a mixture of principle and sentiment, from whatever source these come, which together give rise to an imperative for the person who experiences the mixture. It may be quite narrow in its scope. It may be felt, for example, in determining how one must treat one's friends or one's children and may not in any sense suggest a scheme of how one should live one's entire life. It is the outcome of what in the eighteenth century was called moral sense, and it is frequently felt as sympathy, compassion or pity, or, it might be, as loyalty, or as shame at the thought of deceiving someone, or breaking a promise. I shall try to analyse this potent moral force at a later stage. For the time it is enough to say that the characteristic of 'private morality' is that it rests on a feeling that I must do, or refrain from doing, something, never mind the consequences, or what prudence might dictate.
In our first story, those who are most deeply involved, the woman and her husband, are obsessed with the question What is it right for us to do? as a matter of private morality. For the woman, her desire to die arises from the awfulness of her life, as she experiences it. But part of that awfulness is the awareness of the burden she is placing on her husband, day by day and hour by hour. She feels that she _must_ release him. Even if she did not want to die, she would still feel she ought to, for his sake. And here there emerges a truth about ethics. One cannot have a duty, or obligation, to oneself. Though people say things like, 'You owe it to yourself,' this is a not very happy metaphor carried over from what is the real context of duty, other people. This is the specifically ethical content of the woman's thinking. Her own misery cannot by itself give rise to the thought that she has a _duty_ to die, only that she has a wish to. To satisfy that wish may become part of someone else's ethical imperative, but not of her own. Regarding her own misery, the furthest her ethical thinking may get is that it cannot be wrong to end it.
The husband, although, as we have seen, he cannot bring himself to say that he wishes her dead, is moved, first and foremost, by his intense sympathy with her sufferings. He cannot bear to witness them. Just as finding an animal caught in a trap may arouse such feelings of pity for the pain and the struggles of the animal that a moral imperative is generated – 'I _must_ release it or destroy it. I _cannot_ leave it to suffer' – so with his wife. He cannot allow the suffering to last.
There is another kind of argument which may count among the dictates of private morality, but this time probably on the other side, and that is the kind derived from a religious belief, personally held, as a matter of faith. There are various ways in which this argument may be formulated. It is often said that God gives life as a precious gift, so only God should take it away. As it stands, this seems to be a _non sequitur_. Normally, if someone gives you a present, it is yours either to keep or dispose of, though it may be bad manners too openly to dispose of it. A more plausible way of presenting the case is in terms not of gift but of loan, or of stewardship. You are given your life to make the most of it, and must hand it back in the end. But making the most of a life does not include bringing it to an end yourself, or permitting others to do so for you. Therefore to allow your life to be ended early by a doctor, even if you are on the brink of death, must be wrong. If you are tempted by your sufferings to beg for death, you must resist the temptation. This seems to me a heroic position to adopt. But it is a position which essentially depends on possessing a certain kind of faith. It would be hard to formulate its secular equivalent, unless perhaps in the form of a kind of obstinacy: 'I've started, so I'll finish,' 'I am not going to be defeated,' 'Death, be not proud.' It is sometimes formulated in terms of the _sanctity_ of human life. I shall examine this concept in connection with our second story.
The doctor shares the husband's sympathy, but for him it is (because in the story he is a good doctor) compounded by a professional commitment to easing the sufferings of his patients. This does not, of course, mean that he will always kill his patients rather than have them suffer. Everything depends on the probable outcome of the suffering. But this does not change the nature of his duty. If a patient is in intense pain as a result of what is likely to be successful and beneficial surgery, his duty is still to ease the pain as much as possible, and not be careless of it. If a child patient is terrified of a treatment that is necessary, it is his duty to try to make the treatment tolerable, and soothe the child's fears. It is only in the case of the suffering of those who are certainly dying that the question of 'easing the passing', or hastening the end, arises. A GP, who might well be the doctor in the first story, recently put it thus: 'By the correct definition, we doctors are practising euthanasia all the time, and we should be proud of it... My job is to ease suffering. That can prolong life; but if it brings death closer, that is irrelevant.' The doctor who wrote those words was expressing a personal conviction as to the ethics of the medical profession, his interpretation of his own duty. And though he plainly, in speaking of 'we doctors,' expected that his view of this duty was shared by his colleagues, nevertheless the imperative was felt as an imperative binding on him, immediately. Nor would he be able _not_ to feel this duty weighing on him, however many of his colleagues disagreed.
As an aside, we may notice that the doctor whom I quoted above spoke about 'suffering', not 'pain'; and indeed he published his statement with specific reference to patients who suffered from increasing breathlessness, as the woman in the first story did. This is of importance only because this kind of euthanasia is often discussed in the context of inoperable cancers, or intractable pain of whatever origin. In the famous trial of Dr Bodkin Adams in 1957, one of the witnesses for the prosecution, a Dr Douthwaite, gave it as his settled opinion that drugs such as morphia and heroin, which had been used by Dr Adams to hasten the death of one of his elderly and dying patients, should not have been used 'even in the terminal stages' of an illness that was not an inoperable cancer. | Mr L. (defence counsel): Is the sole difference between the two this, in your opinion, that in the cancer case the use of the drugs would be justified because of the presence of pain, and in the other case they are not justified because there was only severe distress, which falls short of severe pain?
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Dr D.: Yes. (Patrick Devlin, _Easing the Passing_ , Bodley Head, 1985, p. 127.)
Things may have changed a little since the 1950s, but not very much. One is often told that euthanasia is unnecessary because pain can always be controlled. This seems to me not only probably untrue, but often irrelevant.
Besides his sympathy with his patient, and his own interpretation of his moral duty as a doctor, the doctor in the first story was also bound to consider, as we saw, the status of euthanasia under the law. And this is to change the question from one of private to one of public ethics. For the law has to govern the behaviour of everyone, and distinguish for everyone what is right or permissible from what is wrong and criminal. The law cannot take account of feelings, or motive (though sentencing policy should be able to do so). The law is concerned only with intention. Was there _mens rea_ (guilty intent)? The woman and her husband also had to consider these public issues. The woman did not want to implicate either her husband or indeed her doctor in criminal activity. But I shall concentrate, in what follows, on the doctor's arguments. For it is part of his professionalism that he understand the law in the matter of euthanasia, that he act within the law, or, if he believed it right to do so, campaign for the law to be changed.
Now the doctor, as I have said, understands perfectly well that intentional killing is murder. Not only does he not wish to commit murder for the sake of his own life and career, but he also believes that murder is wrong. And yet in our story he deliberately increases the dosage of morphia until the woman dies. And the quoted, real-life, doctor wrote, 'We doctors are practising euthanasia all the time.' Many other doctors have been heard to say the same, and many, for example, testified to this effect in giving evidence to the 1995 House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics, which was set up to deal with two notorious cases of 'mercy-killing'.
The way such doctors let themselves off the hook when challenged is through the argument from double effect, an argument that has now been recognised as a way of distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate termination of life, both by the Vatican's _Declaration on Euthanasia_ , and by the British Medical Association's ethical guidelines on the same subject. The argument turns on a distinction between foreseeing an outcome and intending it. So a doctor may claim that, in increasing a dose of morphia, his intention was to ease the suffering of his patient, although he also foresaw that this would in fact shorten her life. Her death would then be an ' _unintended consequence_ ' of the increased dosage. And this is quite different, so the argument runs, from the doctor's quite deliberately administering a fatal injection, or even increasing the normal dosage gradually, with the express intention of causing the death of the patient. It seems that the doctor could deliberately perform the same action (increase the dosage) with two completely distinguishable intentions; the one a benign, the other a malicious or at least a culpable intention.
Even writing what I have just written, making explicit the argument from double effect, makes me uneasy. For, though I am extremely glad that it has become widely accepted that the doctor's behaviour in our first story is morally justifiable, and that such methods are acknowledged to be widely practised ('we doctors are practising euthanasia all the time'), yet there seems something artificial and indeed Jesuitical about the argument itself and the distinction on which it hinges. In ordinary life it is extremely difficult to distinguish intending the act from, thereby, intending the foreseen consequence. Very often, if we are asked what we are doing, we include the expected outcome of our action in our answer to the question, in describing, that is, the act itself. We hardly ever, except as a joke, confine our answer to the action itself. I am very unlikely, if asked what I am doing at the dining-room table, to reply, 'I am putting a fork to the left of a table-mat.' I am much more likely to say, 'I am laying the table,' or 'I am preparing for my dinner-party.' Not only am I acting intentionally, in putting the fork on the table, but my intention covers many more actions and intended outcomes. However, it may be argued that this kind of example is irrelevant, because the whole activity, up to and including the dinner-party, is, presumably, blameless. The need to distinguish intention from outcome does not arise unless there arises also a need to excuse oneself, and deny responsibility for an outcome that would generally be seen as undesirable. Elizabeth Anscombe, in a detailed analysis of the concept of intention, gives a variety of examples to illustrate how far one's intention may stretch, and how one may, nevertheless, cut it off at a particular point, with varying degrees of plausibility (G.E.M. Anscombe, _Intention_ , Blackwell, 1957). For instance, a man has been hired to take responsibility for keeping the drinking-water tank full for a family, in the house they have rented for the holidays. He fully intends to carry out the duty for which he is being paid. Someone warns him that the water-supply has become seriously polluted. Nevertheless he continues to carry out his obligation to fill the tank, and the family is poisoned. Could he plausibly escape blame, by claiming that he was intentionally doing only what he was being paid to do, namely fill the tank? He did not intend to poison the family, he may have borne them no ill will, but knowing that the water was poisonous, he also knew what the consequences would be if they drank the water. The separation here between intention and foreseen consequence, even though it may be made in theory, seems in practice to be ethically positively monstrous.
Again, consider the following case: I am an amateur flautist, and I am about to give a rare solo performance tomorrow. I am deeply dissatisfied with my ability to carry out a particular trill evenly and expressively, and am determined to practise hard. I know that I have an elderly neighbour who is, as it happens, very ill at the moment, and is peculiarly sensitive to noise, as well as needing as much rest as possible. I also know that, even if I close all my windows, the sound of my practising can be heard through the wall. I go ahead and practise all the same. When I am reproached, I say, ' _All I was doing_ was perfecting my G sharp trill.' My intention was, as it were, exhausted by its direction towards a better performance the following day. The unwanted consequence, for which I might indeed apologise, fell outside my intention. Why am I not off the moral hook, in this case?
In both the above examples it seems not only absurdly pedantic but morally reprehensible to attempt to separate the intention from the foreseen consequence of the act. If the agent knew what would, or was extremely likely to be, the outcome, then the meaning, the significance of his act might be summed up as 'poisoning the family' or 'preventing the neighbour from having her needed rest.' It is rather as if someone tried to separate out the meanings of individual words from the significance of a complete statement. Imagine the following dialogue: | A: The horse came towards you and you ran away.
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B: I'm no coward. I'm not frightened of horses.
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A: I never said you were frightened. I didn't say you ran away _because_ the horse came towards you. All I said was the horse came towards you _and_ you ran away.
But of course, though the word 'and' can be used, and often is used, just to list various items, as on a shopping list, without implying any connection between them, in the particular statement that A made, this is not the way 'and' is to be understood. We have to take the statement as a whole. So, it may seem, in real life we have to take people's actions and their consequences, when these are known, as a whole, and make sense of their actions as directed to the foreseen consequences.
Some doctors suggest that the double effect argument does not turn on our ability to distinguish intentions from foreseen consequences. For, they argue, you cannot foresee the effect of a particular dosage on a particular individual; therefore the doctor can never claim to _know_ that the increased dose will shorten a patient's life; and they tell stories of patients who, given what would be assumed to be a lethal dose of morphia, wake up the following morning saying that they have had the best night's sleep they have had for years. Of course it is possible to use the word 'know' in this extremely limited way, so limited that you could never claim to know that something _would_ happen, to 'foresee' it, only that it _had_ happened. So words like 'dying' would cease to have any meaning. You could not claim to know that someone was dying, only that they had in fact died. Looking back, after he was dead, you could say, 'That was when he was dying,' but you could never confidently say, 'He _is_ dying.' I think, however, that if doctors want to deny knowing that an increased dose will shorten life, then they will have to give up claiming to know all kinds of other things about which they will still want to make such a claim (as, indeed, that morphia will relieve pain, or make breathing easier, in the case of the woman in our story). So, for my part, I do not believe that this kind of modesty with regard to what can be foreseen will do anything to ease the doctor's ethical burden.
As I have said, I am thankful that it has become more and more generally recognised, and even by such hardliners as the Vatican Council, that the argument from double effect will be accepted, and that doctors who deploy it will feel safe from prosecution. That does not prevent my regarding it as a very dubious and shifty argument, and one the use of which turns the attention away from the real point at issue. Moreover it has a fake exactitude. It pretends that we can and do know exactly where one intention ends and another begins. But an action, or plan of action, can be truthfully presented under so many descriptions, some narrower than others (e.g. 'What are you doing?' 'I'm putting a fork to the left of a mat,' or 'I'm getting ready for my dinner-party'), that no one description can be the only true description, and so no one intention can be the only real intention.
However, fortunately, it is more in theory than in practice, more in public and general policy statements than in private decisions and transactions, that the argument from double effect will be raised. Going back to our first story, it will be seen that no argument at all appeared. What he was doing was understood by the doctor and it was understood by the husband that that was what he was doing, and no argument, or rationalisation, was necessary. I believe that what happened was that the doctor made a value judgement: it was, at this stage of the woman's illness, _more important_ that she should be relieved of her distress than that she should live an extra week, or even an extra month. And the husband concurred in this value judgement. If we look at the analogous stories, that of the man who poisoned the family, and of my persisting in practising my flute, it is clear that here, too, value judgements were made. The man whose job was to fill the drinking-water tank was so stupid or so self-absorbed that he judged it more important that he should do what he had contracted to do than that he should look beyond the narrow lines of his contractual duty to a wider duty, to protect the family from risk. Likewise I was so totally absorbed in the thought of the next day's performance that I had come to regard it as the most important thing in the world, other people's needs not being contenders. Nobody would be likely to exonerate either the tank-filling man or me, in my capacity as flautist, from the blame for what happened; and they certainly would not let us off, as I have argued, by the pretence that one can separate intention from foreseen and perhaps unwanted consequence. But because the doctor's action has what would generally be interpreted as a benign outcome, and because his motive (as distinct from his intention) is undoubtedly compassionate, he is allowed, in theory, to get away with a flawed argument.
However there are those, both among the general public and among doctors themselves, who do not regard the outcome, in our first story, as benign. As we saw, they may hold on religious grounds that it is not for the doctor or anyone else to take such action as will shorten someone's life, even by a few weeks, days or hours. Or, without appeal to any specific religious dogma, they may appeal to the sanctity of human life, the principle that deliberately to kill someone, or deliberately to take action that will result in their death, is always wrong; and that this is the moral point of the criminal law in respect of murder. Whatever the quality of her life, whether painful or in other ways unbearable, and whether she has a short or a long time to live, it is simply wrong, in our story, that the woman should take her own life, or have it taken for her, or have anyone permit that it be taken. (This attitude may, as I have argued, be felt by the woman herself, or any of the other characters in the story, as a personal religious conviction, a matter of faith; but it may also be a settled and publicly stated principle, among those who have come to be called Pro-Lifers whether or not they are religious believers.) The issue of the sanctity of human life must be faced; but it comes up in perhaps a more acute form in our second story, to which we may therefore now turn.
The main differences between our first and our second story are these: in the second story the girl is not suffering; she does not wish to die (nor, for that matter, does she wish not to die: she is beyond having wishes of any kind); she is not terminally ill. She reached the position she is in through an accident, and immediate medical intervention took place to save her life, after which arrangements were made to feed her artificially. If nature had been allowed to take its course she would have died as an immediate result of the accident; and thereafter, even if she had been alive for a time, she would have died because she could take neither food nor water. But no one would have thought it right not to try to save her, and having saved her, no one would have thought it right not to arrange for nutrition and hydration to be given artificially. For at that stage no one knew whether she would recover or not. But the result is that now 'letting nature take its course', that is letting her die of an infection or of old age, means continuing with her artificial nutrition and hydration. The only way she could now die as she would have died without the artificial feeding is to withdraw that feeding. The concept of the natural is even more confusing in this case than in the first.
This leads directly to a preliminary point. In the story, the Law Lords finally ruled that the girl be allowed to die, that is to die 'naturally', of starvation and dehydration. They did not allow that the doctor give her a lethal injection. They were therefore relying on a distinction between killing and allowing to die. If the doctor had been permitted to administer a lethal injection he would have been thus permitted to commit murder, which is deliberately and intentionally to cause the death of another person, with whatever motive.
There are areas in the law where the distinction between killing and letting die is a valid one, I have no doubt. If I, a competent swimmer with a life-saving certificate, am walking by the canal, and see you in the water, unable to swim, and sinking fast, I will not be charged with murder if I do not jump in and rescue you. I shall doubtless, when the story comes out, be greatly blamed, and my moral character will be ruined. But I have not deliberately taken your life, as I would have if I had pushed you into the canal in the first place. I have, however, undoubtedly let you die. But in the situation described in our second story, I do not believe that the distinction has any validity, nor, certainly, any ethical relevance. It rests on a primitive notion of cause, that a cause must always be an action, a pushing or pulling, a kicking or jabbing with a needle. And of course these actions are the most perceptible causes that there are. I can feel the push which sends me hurtling down the stairs; I can see and hear the bat striking the ball which crashes through the greenhouse roof. But in real life we know that there are other causes. I can kill my pet by neglect as well as by running her over; the storming of a fortress may be caused by the sentry's failure to come on duty as well as by a battering ram. There seems to be no difference in the responsibility to be allocated in the two kinds of cases. Indeed morally speaking it would usually be less cruel to give a lethal injection than to allow a patient to die of thirst and starvation. (In our story that question did not arise, since the patient was incapable of experiencing anything; and that included the pangs of hunger and thirst.) But, as a general rule, I can see no ethical difference between deliberately killing and deliberately letting die, though the former may avoid the extra charge of cruelty.
In the second story, everyone who had been fond of the girl wanted her to die, one way or another. It was the hospital which disallowed her death until they had the ruling of the judiciary. They are likely to have been under pressure not only from those who thought that the death would be legally unsafe, but also from those who thought it would be morally wrong. So once again we must examine the issues. Those who wanted her to die, her family and friends, wanted this not because of her sufferings, which she did not experience, but, quite simply, because they judged that her life was not worth living. Not being in pain is not the only thing that gives life value; activity, perception, intelligence and enjoyment are equally important values; and her life contained none of these things. Their own sufferings in seeing her every day, and of hope finally extinguished, must have been acute, and seen to be so by everyone who knew them, even if they themselves did not adduce this as a reason for ending her life. But they must, very properly, have longed for this pseudo-life to be ended, so that they could place the terrible story of their daughter or girlfriend in their own annals of suffering, as genuinely belonging to a remembered past. It seems that no one could dissent from these feelings, at the level of private moral sentiment.
The dissentient voices come, then, on the whole not from the private but the public arena. However, there is one argument that may be used in our second story which may be felt equally as a matter of private conscience and of public policy. It is an argument focused on the name of the patient's condition, 'Permanent Vegetative State'. For how can it be certainly known to be permanent? One is always hearing stories of amazing recoveries from coma, even from a state that has been diagnosed with confidence as permanently vegetative. Must not the relatives of the girl in the story feel bound to have her kept alive, simply in the hope that she has been misdiagnosed, and that she will one day come to life? If they press on with their requests that she be released from her non-life, will they not always have the lurking fear that she might after all have recovered if she had been given time? Equally the hospital might argue that it would be an appallingly unethical decision to allow this patient to die, if some other doctors somewhere else might produce evidence that her state was not, or not necessarily, permanent, and this might be the basis of their hesitation, and their understandable wish to have themselves covered by the law.
This anxiety seems to me reasonable and inevitable, up to a point. It certainly provides an argument for leaving the girl alive for a longish time after her accident. But it is, I believe, a problem which demands a medical solution. There should be strict and agreed criteria for what counts as PVS, and these should be derived as far as possible from evidence as to the physiological state of the brain of the patient, not from her symptoms. If this evidence suggests either that she cannot recover, or that, even if she recovered a little, the damage to her brain would still be devastating, and her life of hopelessly low quality, then PVS should be the diagnosis, and the ending of her life ethically acceptable, if that is what her family want. Nevertheless the fear of misdiagnosis must be taken very seriously, for it is certain to be an additional source of suffering for her relatives after she is dead. There should always be at least two doctors to concur with the diagnosis; and the family will not be wholly reassured unless they thoroughly trust the doctors.
We can turn now to matters of ethical policy, to the sphere, that is, of public morality. In hearing evidence about a case like that in our second story, the House of Lords Select Committee listened to, and took part in, one argument which I think can be got out of the way at the beginning. This was an argument put forward by nurses, that, though they would not have objected to switching off a life-support machine in certain circumstances (and if the family so wished), the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration was ethically an altogether different matter. I report this argument, but I find it impossible to sympathise with it. The argument seemed to be that where someone needed help to breathe, or to keep her heart beating (which the girl in our story did not), then this was a medical treatment, and it could be deemed by doctors that the treatment was futile and could therefore legitimately be withdrawn. To eat and drink, on the other hand, is not to receive treatment, by whatever artificial devices the processes are brought about. A nurse, it was claimed, has as an absolute minimum duty to supply food and drink to patients, and this apart from any treatment that the doctors in charge may deem suitable. Therefore they could not countenance the withdrawal of the necessary tubes, though presumably they might have had no objection to the administering of a lethal injection, while the tubes were still attached. A great deal of scholastic discussion has gone on as to what counts as 'treatment', what counts as 'artificial' as opposed to 'natural' feeding, and whether there is an ethical difference between a kind of drip system for feeding, which could be used only in a hospital setting (which might qualify it to count as 'treatment') and, say, a teaspoon or a specially designed cup, by means of which you could deliver soup into the mouth of a patient unable to feed herself at home. But it seems obvious that, just as doctors _usually_ have a duty to treat patients who are ill, so _usually_ nurses have a duty to supervise their nutrition and hydration; but that either of these duties may be overridden if, for other reasons, it seems best that the patient should die. I for one can see no difference in status between these two sets of duties. There was no more reason why the nurses should obstinately persist in carrying out their duties, if these were futile, than that the doctors should. It may sound marginally worse to say that someone was deprived of food and drink than that they were deprived of treatment; but this is, in the given circumstances, a sentimental distinction, based on tradition, not one of ethical significance. The nurses were relying on a feeling about their duty, but it was not a moral feeling insofar as it was based, not on a consideration of the whole of the situation, but only on their own part in it.
We are left, then, with the other arguments in the sphere of public morality, the field of policy as distinct from private conscience. These arguments are difficult to separate one from another. It will be seen that they fuse together. First, there is the argument we have already partly examined, that all human life is sacred, and no life must be deliberately brought to an end. To choose that a patient die rather than continue to live is frequently referred to as an instance of a doctor's playing God (though in this case, as in our first story, the play-acting would have been carried out with the full approval of the relatives of the patient).
Looking at this argument again, in the context of the second story, it seems that to speak of human life as sacred may be a shorthand way of speaking about God and His creation, but it may also, and perhaps in a secular age more frequently, conceal a thoroughly secular fear. That this is perhaps more obvious in the second story than in the first, is explained by the fact that the woman in the first story was terminally ill; and unless this had been so, the doctor quite certainly would not have hastened her death by the administering of extra morphia. In the second story, on the contrary, the patient is not terminally ill. There is no foreseeable end to her natural life, if such it can be called. To declare that human life is sacred is to declare it inviolable; it must not be deliberately taken, though the heavens fall. And the determination to uphold this value is strong, in the context of the second story, just because of the fear that if the life of the girl with PVS is deemed expendable, though left, as it were, to herself she might live for many years, then other lives might become expendable too, lives of those with less catastrophic but nevertheless incurable conditions such as severe brain damage of various different sorts, or progressive illnesses where the patient might all the same have many years of life ahead. The scope of the doctor's decision is not limited in the way that it is in the first story, where it is limited to those who are soon to die anyway, and the question is simply how they die, in anguish or otherwise. The inviolability or sanctity of human life must be reasserted, in the second story, because of the apparent open-ended nature of the final decision of the judges, that the life of the girl was not worth preserving.
What we have here is a version of the 'slippery slope' argument. This argument has a great power over the imagination. Though there may be no great ethical objection to the deliberate ending of the life of the girl in our second story, the question is raised Where will it end? Once embarked on the slope, what is to prevent our slithering down through various apparently not dissimilar cases, to an ethical quagmire at the bottom of the slope, where we shall countenance the killing off of any people who are both helpless and expensive to maintain? Very often at this stage in the presentation of the argument, mention is made of Nazi Germany, and the deliberate killing-off of Jews. But this is an unnecessary and confusing step to take, and it is usually taken more for rhetorical effect than for the sake of logic. For it is easy to distinguish even widespread euthanasia as described in our second story from the racially-inspired behaviour of the Nazis. To decide that Jews are expendable, or rather that they deserve no better than to die, is of a different order from deciding that some genuinely incurable patients are living a life of such low quality that they are better dead, though innocent of any offence. But, leaving aside any reference to Nazis and Jews, the slippery slope is nevertheless an argument that has to be addressed.
Of course the slippery slope argument is not strictly a _logical_ argument at all. There is no _logical_ connection between allowing a PVS patient to die and allowing the death of other patients who are afflicted in quite different ways. It is an argument about human nature: give them an inch, and they'll take an ell. It is, in this case, essentially an argument to be used by people who do not trust doctors or hospital ethics committees. There may be the fear, too, that hospitals, whatever words they may use about further treatment not being 'appropriate', are really talking about resources. And though my own view is that it is perfectly reasonable to take into account the expense of keeping alive a PVS patient, whether by the expenditure of private or public money, in coming to a decision about continuing her life, yet people are always afraid that such considerations are weighing unduly with the doctor or the hospital, though unavowed.
So we end with the question whether there is any way to block the descent down the slope, in a manner that people can trust. I have no doubt whatever that the death of the patients in the two stories was morally right (though I think it would have been morally better to give the patient in the second story a lethal injection. In fact no harm was done to her by allowing her to starve to death, since she was already beyond harm; but it must have been emotionally upsetting for the nurses who had looked after her for so long to stand by, now, and wait for her to die; and the same must be true of the parents). Because of the particular circumstances surrounding each of the women in our stories, the value of their death was greater than the value of their continued life. In both cases it was the value, or quality, of their lives that had to be assessed. In the first story, the woman herself had a part, the greatest part, in determining what was the quality of her own life, and she judged that its quality was exceptionally low, as was that of her husband's life, as long as she lived on. Unless it is held that all human life is 'sacred' in one of the senses considered already, one must conclude that life itself is not intrinsically valuable. Its value depends on what it is like, its quality. And on this basis the value judgement was arrived at. In the second story the quality of the life of the girl could scarcely have been lower, though she could have no share in judging this for herself. In the first story, the doctor judged, as I have argued, that it was more important, or mattered more morally, to end his patient's distress than to continue with her poor-quality life. In the second story, while no such obvious trade-off was possible, it could be said that it mattered more morally to accede to the wishes of the relatives, and end their misery, than it did to keep the patient alive, when there was nothing good for her in living as she was. Could one block the slippery slope by generalising these particular circumstances, and taking them as the unique circumstances in which a patient's life might be ended? For a good way to prevent a descent down a slippery slope is to introduce legislation which, in effect, says, 'You may go so far and no further' on pain of criminal prosecution. So the slippery slope could be rendered safe by changing legislation and legalising euthanasia in cases such as those in our two stories, or, more reassuringly, ruling that euthanasia is illegal, except in cases such as these. But the objection to that (and I regard it as a fatal or at any rate a virtually insuperable objection) lies in the words 'such as'. If the law were more precise (let us say it had lists of conditions where euthanasia might legally be practised), then there would inevitably arise hard cases, or cases not envisaged by the law. Such specificity is hardly ever suitable to be included in an Act of Parliament. On the other hand the imprecision of 'such as', if contained in the Act, would lead to endless disputes about whether a particular case had been within the law or not.
Attitudes may change. It is possible to imagine a law, rather like the law governing abortion, whereby certain specific requirements were laid down for legalised voluntary euthanasia. This would perhaps crystallise in law what is coming to seem a more and more acceptable ending to our first story. If, short of legislation, this still involves doctors in the game-playing of the argument from double effect, then this is a small price to pay for what is really an exercise on their part of a compassionate value judgement about what is and what is not tolerable. And they do not make this judgement by themselves. They have the support of the patient herself and her husband, in our story, and in many similar stories. There is, however, no let-out by means of double effect, in the second story. The doctor intends to kill the patient, or let her die, and he has no intention short of this. There is no other possible reason to order the feeding-tubes to be removed. Here it seems to me there is nothing to be done except to examine each case before it comes to the point of decision, at the moment, say, when PVS has been carefully and scrupulously diagnosed. Then perhaps the hospital ethics committee (for these will all be hospital cases) may risk a decision, acting on the precedent of stories like our second story; or they may at once seek a judicial review. It is sometimes held that it should not be lawyers but doctors who make decisions of life or death. I disagree. Lawyers can act, after all, on medical evidence. And it must certainly be lawyers who decide whether, in all the circumstances of the case, murder has been committed. Murder is a concept that is both legal and moral. But because of the closeness of legal and moral in this context, the decision whether to kill the patient _would be_ murder in such a case is a question raised essentially as a matter of _public_ morality, which is to say, as a matter of law.
Birth
If I spend rather less time on questions surrounding birth than I spent on death, it is because a number of the questions, for example whether human life has an intrinsic value, independent of what kind of life it is, how long or short its duration, have already been raised, in the previous chapter. But they have not been wholly answered, nor even fully enough discussed, for a respectable guide through the quagmire we are about to descend into, as we face questions about assisted births and in vitro fertilisation, and the ethics of research using human embryos, as well as about abortion. In the consideration of these matters, the inter-relation between private moral convictions and public policy turns out to be exceedingly complex.
The ethical questions raised in the first-mentioned area differ in one important respect from those raised about euthanasia. People have always died, and there is no doubt that doctors have always ministered to the comfort of the dying in whatever ways were available to them. In contrast, the moral questions that have arisen about assisted reproduction are new. There were no such questions thirty years ago; and only twenty years ago the first embryos fertilised in the laboratory were beginning to come into being. It is about the status to be accorded to such embryos that the crucial moral questions arise. It was on account of the novelty of the problems that, in the late 1970s, it seemed clear that legislation was called for, to regulate the new research, and to reassure the public that we were not entering an era of totally uncontrolled manipulation of the future of the human race. There were no precedents here that could help, and no received wisdom.
Questions about the ethics of infertility treatments entered my life abruptly when, in 1982, I was asked to chair a Government Committee of Enquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology. The committee was set up as a result of increasing public awareness of (and to some extent unease about) the new techniques involved in assisted reproduction, following the birth in 1978 of the first 'test-tube baby', or baby born by in vitro fertilisation. It was a world-first, and took place in Stockport, near Manchester. The technique involves the collection of sperm from the male partner of an infertile couple, and of eggs from the female partner, and their fertilisation in a dish (or test-tube) in the laboratory, in a medium simulating, as far as possible, the natural medium within which fertilisation takes place in the female body. If and when fertilisation has been achieved in the 'test-tube' the resulting embryo, or embryos, is placed in the uterus of the woman, and will, with luck, implant in the wall of the uterus, after which a normal pregnancy will follow. This treatment was at first thought suitable almost exclusively for women who had defective fallopian tubes, up which sperm could not travel; but later it was thought that it might be useful also where a man had a low sperm count, and controlled laboratory conditions were more likely to lead to successful fertilisation than ordinary methods.
The techniques of in vitro fertilisation are now widely accepted as more or less routine (though the success rate is not enormously high, even today). However, at the beginning there were those who objected to the use of the techniques themselves, as 'unnatural'; but this argument is no more secure than any other argument based on the concept of the natural. So at least it seemed to the committee, and so it seems to me.
There were also a few who objected to the use of public funds for any infertility treatment or research, in a world suffering from over-population. The committee did not take this objection very seriously. Compared with the number of births worldwide, the number of births by any kind of assisted reproduction was, and would remain, minute. Besides, we argued that infertility is a physical malfunction which can cause immense distress to individuals, and therefore the medical profession was ethically entitled, indeed bound, to seek ways to remedy the malfunction when appealed to by couples wanting to conceive.
The abiding moral objection to the use of in vitro fertilisation, however, is its reliance on continued research using live human embryos. For if in vitro fertilisation is to continue to be offered to infertile patients, its success rate has to be improved; and this cannot be done without continuing laboratory research into the best environment in which to achieve fertilisation outside the body. This inevitably entails that human embryos must be used experimentally and then destroyed. Moreover, since the 1980s, other scientific research involving the use of embryos has become even more important. There is much still to be learned about the process of fertilisation itself, and about the development of the cells of the very newly fertilised embryo. Such research has widened the field within which live embryos must be used. The increase in knowledge so gained promises medical advances such as the possible identification and replacement of faulty genes, which in turn might lead to treatment of many devastating and hitherto untreatable mono-genetic diseases. Indeed by the time the Embryology Bill came to be debated in Parliament in 1989 and 1990, the emphasis in the discussion of research using human embryos had shifted substantially from infertility treatment to questions concerned with genetic diseases. It is against this background of possible profound changes in medical practice that the discussion of the ethics of embryo research must be seen.
Here, then, appears to me the central ethical problem: to what extent is it morally permissible to use live embryos as research material? These embryos are _ex hypothesi_ both human and alive. To what extent may they be treated as different from other human beings? For no grown-up human may be used for research without consent, and no child may be so used, even with the consent of his or her parents. And if these other humans may not be used for research, still less may they thereafter be destroyed.
I will first outline the conclusion the Committee of Enquiry came to (by a majority), now enshrined in legislation, and then go back over the moral issues involved. As the law now stands, it is permissible, subject to the licensing of each research project by a statutory body, the Human Fertility and Embryology Authority, to use a human embryo for research for up to fourteen days from fertilisation in the laboratory, and then to destroy it. Maintaining an embryo alive, unfrozen, for longer than fourteen days is a criminal offence, with penalties of up to ten years' imprisonment attached. The law thus deems that the embryo undergoes a dramatic change of status after fourteen days from fertilisation (not counting as relevant any days during which the embryo is frozen), thereafter being protected from use as a research-object almost as rigorously as a child is protected.
We, the Committee of Enquiry, recommended this change of status at fourteen days because of the physiological changes in the embryo at that time. Before fourteen days from fertilisation, we argued, the embryo is not really one thing, but a loose collection of cells that have not yet differentiated (often referred to as the pre-embryo). Any one of these cells may take on any role when the embryo forms, or may become part of the placenta, rather than of the embryo itself. The cells are totipotent. Moreover for up to fourteen days it is possible that twinning will take place, and that there will, if normal development occurs, be two individuals who are born, rather than one. It is therefore difficult for me, or anyone else, to trace my origin as an individual back beyond the fourteen-day stage to the stage when I might have been two. Who, which of the two, would 'I' be? At about fourteen days, however, what is known as the 'primitive streak' appears, which is a piling up of cells, as they reproduce themselves, at the caudal end of the embryonic disc; and this is the first beginning of what will become the spinal cord and central nervous system of the embryo. From this moment on, the embryo as a whole grows and develops extremely rapidly, and the cells are differentiated into their future functions. The committee therefore argued that there was a morally significant difference between the pre- and post-fourteen-day cells, in that only after fourteen days can the human individual properly be said to exist. And it is the human individual who must not be used for research and then destroyed.
It is sometimes argued against this that the individual human must exist before the appearance of the primitive streak, because all of the genome, the complete set of the hereditary factors of the embryo, is already in place from fertilisation onwards. But this argument suggests that an individual human is nothing except his genome. This cannot be true. For one thing, the whole genetic make-up of a person can be discovered from a small bit of tissue, or a drop of saliva; yet we do not think of these as _being_ the person. Moreover it is his whole developing body and brain which distinguishes him from other individuals. Even identical twins, whose genome is shared, develop differently from one another at the level of the functioning and thus the development of their brains. It is perfectly consistent, therefore, to hold that though the genetic factors in an individual's development may be given at the zygote stage (that is the one-cell stage immediately following fertilisation of egg and sperm), the individual himself has not yet come into being.
There was, and is, an enormous difficulty in discussing the ethical issues here involved. There is a strong tendency for people on both sides of the ethical debate, but especially for those opposed to any research using human embryos, to raise the question When does human life begin? But even those who raise this question most insistently, and who tend to answer it by saying that human life begins at 'the moment of fertilisation' (though in fact fertilisation is a process, not an event), know that in a way the question is misleading. For they are perfectly well aware that the gametes, sperm and egg, are human (they do not belong to any other species) and are alive. As far as biological life goes, they know that new life does not spring into existence when the gametes come together to form the zygote, the new cell. Life has been there before. What they are really asking, as I have just suggested, is when a new human individual should be thought to begin to exist.
And here there remain in many people's minds the vestiges of another, much older question, namely, when does 'ensoulment' occur? We must go back to Aristotle, whose theories of the early development of life had a vast influence on later thinking, especially, through Aquinas, on the thinking of the Roman Catholic Church (though Aquinas's teaching was by no mean immediately accepted by the Church). Aristotle held that there was a straight scientific answer to the question of the development in the fetus of different kinds of soul, or life.* According to his view, the soul was the life appropriate to different stages of development of any living thing, plant or animal. There were three kinds of life: vegetable, that which was alone appropriate to plants; a kind of life capable of sensation and perception, which belongs to all animals; and the kind of life unique to humans, the rational life. In the development of the human fetus, Aristotle held that each of these kinds of life enters at a different stage of the pregnancy. When the embryo is first formed it has only vegetable life, then it acquires animal life, and is capable of sensation, and finally, at forty days from conception in the case of men and ninety in the case of women, the fetus acquires rational or mental life. This was a perfectly sensible biological theory, based, as it necessarily was, on guesswork. (One must not forget the vast difference made to our knowledge of obstetrics by the invention of the microscope. Aristotle did not even know of the existence of the ovum.) Aquinas, who died in 1274, revived Aristotle's philosophy, virtually unknown since antiquity, and among many other things took over almost word for word his account of the development of the embryo. Thus he held that the soul enters the forming embryo by stages, first the vegetable, then the perceptive and finally the rational, each aspect of the soul taking over and embracing the one before until, after forty days or ninety, depending on gender, conception was complete. But of course the new Aristotelianism of Aquinas was based on a different, non-biological, and specifically religious idea of the soul, as that which is immortal and is saved by faith. So, though the question When does life begin? may look like a rather carelessly phrased Aristotelian question, to be answered empirically, as Aristotle tried to answer it, yet in the context of Christianity it becomes a question charged with religious significance. The life or soul, according to Christian tradition, is that which enters a temporary union with the flesh, appearing at birth, and surviving death. It is that which alone has value.
It is this half-remembered, seldom articulated baggage that the question When does life begin? carries with it. There is, among those who raise the question in this form, an inevitable ambiguity as to whether they are speaking of life as simply biological life, or as something specifically human, that which belongs to, is lived by, each individual human being, each of whom has value in his own right.
It would therefore be much clearer and less misleading if people asked at what stage an embryo becomes morally significant; or at what stage we ought to start to treat a human embryo as we treat other human beings. It would then be clear that no further scientific knowledge would settle the question. It is a matter of ethical decision, a decision that society had to make in the period of consultation before the Embryology Act was passed, and Parliament had to make during the passage of the Bill. During the passage of the Bill there was no party whip involved. Each member of both Houses voted freely according to conscience. For what is at issue, as I have said, is the moral status to be accorded to the very early embryo in the laboratory. There are no analogies to help us here, and it is of no use to scan Holy Writ for an answer. Until a few years earlier there had been no such entities as separate four- or sixteen-cell embryos, existing outside the body. The question was new. Of course the science of embryonic development had a bearing on the moral decision that had to be taken; no one can make a sound moral judgement without knowledge of the facts about which they are to judge. And a close scrutiny of the facts may seem almost necessarily to dictate a moral judgement. Thus, in my own case, and that of a majority in both Houses, the very fact of the development of the primitive streak, the true emergence of one single individual, on however physically tiny a scale, seemed to dictate the judgement that one could treat the collection of cells before this stage differently from its treatment thereafter, and that, given the immense benefits that will come from research using these very early embryos, or pre-embryos, it was right that they should be used.
It is because of the vestigial presence of an Aristotelian and Thomist belief about the soul's entry into the body at a specific moment that moral, biological and religious issues are prone to become so inextricably tangled in this case. The presupposition of the present law is completely different: the embryo develops gradually from the beginning of the process of fertilisation, and it is for us to value the emerging life as we think right, according to its development. The then Archbishop of York, John Habgood, put this very clearly, in defending the fourteen-day cut-off point for the use of embryos for research ( _Hansard_ , 7th December 1989): 'Scientists in general and biologists in particular deal mostly in continuities and in gradual changes from one state to another. This is true of evolution, in which the transition from the pre-human to the human took place over countless generations. There was never a precise moment when it could have been said, "Here is a hominid and here is a man." But this is not to deny that as a result of the process there emerged a profound and indeed crucial set of differences between hominids and men. The same is true of individual lives... It seems strange to a biologist that all the weight of moral argument should be placed on one definable moment at the beginning. What matters is the process.' And he went on to say, to the alarm of some, 'Christians are no more required to believe that humanness is created in an instant than we are required to believe in the historical existence of Adam and Eve.' (This led at a later stage of the debate, when someone remarked that no Christian could countenance research using early embryos, and it was pointed out that the Archbishop had argued in favour of it, to the reply that it was well known that the Archbishop was not a Christian.)
There were other ethical issues that had to be addressed by the Committee of Enquiry, such as the proper regulation of artificial insemination by donor, and the moral status of surrogacy, especially surrogacy organised as a commercial business, which was then beginning to be introduced into the UK from the United States. But none, in my opinion, raised such fundamental moral questions as the issue of research using human embryos. For this was genuinely a matter of life and death; of the sanctity or expendability of human life.
There were, of course, those who, as in the case of euthanasia, were wholly opposed to the use of human embryos for research, and their subsequent destruction, whatever the benefits might be in terms of the consequences, whether for particular infertile couples or for the general advance of knowledge. These people relied on an absolute doctrine, that no one must deliberately take a human life, at whatever stage of development.
Such absolutists were not interested in hearing about the medical advances that might arise out of research, nor about the relief to infertile couples. They were simply opposed in principle to the deliberate taking of human life, whether the embryos used had been specially brought into being for the purposes of research, or whether they were 'spare' embryos, left over from the collecting of eggs from a woman seeking IVF treatment, after as many eggs as seemed medically best had been placed in the uterus. If any embryos were used for research, they argued, then these must themselves be placed in a woman's uterus, so that they might have a chance of life. But this practice was never upheld as morally tolerable by doctors, since they could not know to what damage embryos used for research had been subjected, and to place them in the uterus of a woman would be to use her as an experimental subject, at a time when, hoping desperately for a healthy child, she was at her most vulnerable.
In addition, as in the euthanasia debate, the slippery slope argument was widely deployed. (And indeed many of those wholly opposed to research used this argument as a kind of back-up, though logically they should not have. For their position was that one should never have got on to the slope in the first place.) It was in this connection that I learned how powerful a weapon the law could be in definitively blocking the slope, so that we might not be at risk of slithering down to the bottom. This was the function of the fourteen-day limit on research. Cynics said that I was hopelessly naive to think that this law would work to block the descent down the slope. But, as far as I know, no one has attempted to keep an embryo alive in the laboratory for longer than the permitted fourteen days; and the laboratory inspectorate, set up under the statutory authority, has worked effectively. However, there is no doubt that there _could_ be rogue laboratories where embryos were being kept alive longer, contrary to the law. The reason why I think this unlikely is not only because of the sanctions that would be imposed by the law if these scientists were discovered (say by trying to publish their research findings), but because in this case the criminal law followed closely what appeared to be the moral consensus of those, in Parliament and outside, who were concerned with the issues. That is to say, the distinction between the embryo up to fourteen days from fertilisation and the embryo thereafter seemed to those concerned to be a genuinely morally significant distinction. The slope was not blocked arbitrarily at a particular point, but in accordance with a moral barrier that people did not want to cross. It is largely because it is so difficult to think of an equally simple block on the slippery slope in the case of euthanasia that I am opposed to any attempt to change the law, to render some kinds of euthanasia legitimate.
I learned something else about the relation between public and private morality from this debate and its outcome. As a general rule, legislation must be broadly utilitarian in outlook. That is to say a party or a government hoping to introduce new legislation about, let us say, emissions of noxious fumes into the environment, the disposal of nuclear waste, or the redistribution of wavelengths among radio companies, must primarily have regard to the weight of benefits over harms to people at large. Such calculations are extremely difficult to carry out, and there may be numerous vested interests involved which make a simple counting of heads useless, even if it were possible. Nevertheless broadly speaking, in trying to decide what it would be best to do, legislators must be consequentialists. They must foresee as far as they can who will benefit from the new law, and who will suffer, and to what extent. In such calculations, each member of society should count for one, and no one should be given special consideration. This is the ideal, however far from achieving it particular governments may be (for all are subject to the lobbying of special interest groups). However, in the case of the decision whether or not to permit research using human embryos, no such utilitarian calculation was possible. It could be argued, and was argued by some, that the benefits to individual infertile couples, and to society at large, through new medical knowledge, were vast, and there was no one who was harmed. Therefore everything was on the side of research being permitted. But, though it was true that no existing people were harmed by the research, the embryos themselves who were the subjects of research suffered what would usually be thought the greatest harm possible, namely they were destroyed. The whole question at issue was thus whether or not very early embryos counted or did not count in the calculus of benefits and harms. John Stuart Mill, whose _Utilitarianism_ (1851) is one of the classic texts of this kind of consequentialist moral philosophy, said (without arguing it) that 'children and savages' did not count in the calculus of benefits and harms. He would certainly have ruled out embryos, if he ruled out children. But no purely utilitarian argument could serve to settle the question of who _should_ count. The central question, What status should be accorded to the early embryo?, had to be settled by different means. And the only means available was the degree to which people felt that the early embryo was in fact, to all intents and purposes, a child. For, as I have suggested, no one would countenance the use of children for research, still less their subsequent destruction. As it turned out, a majority felt that the early embryo, before it had formed itself into a single individual and (having as yet no central nervous system) before it was capable of even rudimentary sensation or perception, was not sufficiently like a child to be accorded the status of a child. Therefore research was permitted. Utilitarian considerations came in, insofar as the benefits to the infertile and to society at large were cited in justification of research. The consequences to the embryos were discounted.
What I learned from these arguments and their outcome was that there is a difference between what is a generally agreed moral view (as, for instance, that children should not be used as subjects of research) and a morality which, though not agreed, is nevertheless broadly _acceptable_. When I first came across the use of the word 'acceptable' in this kind of context, I thought of it as a typical civil service cop-out. It was, I thought, mealy-mouthed. They, the civil servants, did not want to use strong and definite words which would commit them, words like 'right' and 'wrong'. But I came to see that I was here confusing private with public morality. In public issues where there is a radical difference of moral opinion (as between those who think the early embryo should have the same moral status as a child and those who do not), and where no compromise is possible, the concept of the acceptable is a useful and indeed indispensable one. Although the legislation which emerged from these particular debates could not satisfy those who held that all human life was sacred, yet at least by blocking the slippery slope, the legislation limited the damage, and did satisfy both those who whole-heartedly advocated research, and those who relied on the slippery slope argument alone to object to it. The outcome became one that people could live with, even though they were of course entitled both to refuse individually to have anything to do with in vitro fertilisation, and to continue to form pressure groups to try to get the legislation changed. Thus, as far as public morality goes, the concept of the acceptable is necessary, in that it may set the best goal possible in the circumstances.
It has often been remarked that the embryology law, which offers protection to embryos over fourteen days from fertilisation, stands in stark contrast with the laws governing abortion, where fetuses may, in certain circumstances, be destroyed when they are as much as twenty-eight weeks in gestational age, and where there are no restrictions on using fetuses for research purposes (though of course such fetuses would not be alive at the time). The two laws are, however, radically different in their intention, and the moral considerations that lie behind them are also different. The only thing they have in common is that both fall foul of those who hold that human life is sacred and must be preserved from the 'moment' of fertilisation onwards to death.
The first difference to notice is in the circumstances in which legislation arose. In the wholly new consideration of the status of the embryo alive in the laboratory, it was open to Government to decide to prohibit all research, and lay down, as some wished, that any embryo brought into existence in a 'test-tube' must be placed in a woman's uterus. This would have been, in effect, to prohibit in vitro fertilisation itself. It would have been to use the woman as an experimental object, and even if there were women who were so desperate to bear a child that they would have permitted this, no reputable doctor would treat a woman in these circumstances. It was possible, however, that Government might have been prepared to bring all in vitro fertilisation treatment to an end. In the case of abortion, on the other hand, there was and is no possibility of putting a stop to it altogether, whatever those who are opposed to it may wish. For years abortion was a crime, but it took place none the less, and with disastrous consequences in terms of deaths from back-street abortions. There was an overwhelming case for regulating rather than prohibiting abortion, and this is what legislation set out to do. Even those who regard abortion as murder recognise the fact that criminalising it again is not a real option in a world where most people do not regard it in this light. Once again, all that absolutists can do is refuse to have anything to do with abortion, whether for themselves or for their patients, if they are doctors. But even in the latter case, they on the whole recognise that since abortion is not any longer a crime, they have a duty to help their patients to have access to a doctor who will legitimately carry it out, if these patients are certain that they have good reason to seek an abortion.
The view that abortion is murder turns, as I have said, on the view that a fetus is a human individual (often referred to as a 'person') who must not be killed. I shall return to the concept of a 'person' in the following chapter. For the time, it should be noted that there is a presumption in law that abortion simply on demand, and because the mother or the couple want it, for whatever reason, would be wrong, and that therefore certain criteria have to be satisfied if an abortion is to be carried out legally. That is to say it is presumed that there is something wrong with aborting a fetus, even if what is wrong with doing so is not the same as what is wrong with murdering someone. Moreover, among those who do not wholly reject legitimate abortion, there is a strong belief that an early abortion, say within the first twelve weeks of a pregnancy, is to be preferred to a late abortion. This is of course partly a pragmatic matter: an early abortion is easier and safer to carry out. But there is also a generally held feeling that, even if it can be managed safely, a late abortion, carried out when the fetus is almost fully formed, and after the pregnancy has lasted so long that the fetus might be capable of being born alive (say at twenty-three or twenty-four weeks), is more like infanticide than abortion, and thus more like murder. There is no doubt that such an abortion is traumatic for all those concerned in it, including doctors and nurses. Those pro-life campaigners who regard _all_ abortion as murder ought not, in principle, to make any distinction between early and late abortions. Yet it is plain that they, like other people, often do. There seems to be thus some confirmation of the gradualist or developmental view of the status we accord to human embryos and fetuses. The further along the path towards being born a fetus has progressed, the more protection we feel it should have from being destroyed, and the more urgent the reason for an abortion needs to be (for example that the life of the mother is at stake). And the law recognises this. Late abortions cannot be undertaken frivolously; they may be carried out only in National Health Service hospitals, not in private clinics or nursing homes; and, as things are, only a very few are in fact carried out every year.
In the case of very early embryos, the fourteen-day cut-off point, after which an embryo may not be kept alive in the laboratory, serves as a marker for a change in the moral status of the embryo. It would be highly satisfactory if some analogous cut-off point could be found, a physiological watershed which would allow abortion on demand, without guilt or moral disapproval, up to and not beyond a specific point in the pregnancy, after which the kinds of regulation currently imposed on all abortions should begin to operate. Many European countries in fact allow abortion more or less on demand up to twelve weeks of pregnancy, and this may be a satisfactory solution, even if lacking the physiological definiteness of the emergence of the primitive streak. As things are, in the UK, those of us who do not hold an absolute or abolitionist view of abortion seem ambivalent in our attitude. Abortion is not a crime, to carry out an abortion is not murder; but what is it? We seem to be saying that abortion is a pity; it is something that needs justification in a way that, in most people's eyes, contraception, even 'morning-after' contraception, does not. Most people are quite capable of separating the sexual act from what once was thought of as the natural, almost inevitable, consequence of that act, namely the conception of a child. Thus the use of contraceptives has come to seem not only acceptable, but often a matter of duty. But if we follow the logic of the argument which distinguished the pre-embryo from the embryo, or the pre- from the post-fourteen-day embryo, then we can have no doubt that abortion is the destruction of an individual human being, and it is this that makes us uneasy.
Nevertheless, both at the level of public morality, or social policy, and, often, at the level of the private morality concerned with individual cases, it is broadly utilitarian considerations that are most powerful, for nonabsolutists. At the public level, as I have argued, abortion is and will remain something which occurs. The policy aim must be to see that it occurs in as little damaging a way as possible, and governed by regulation that will be 'acceptable' (though here, as elsewhere, we have to remember that the 'acceptable' is a matter of balance, and it may change from time to time). At the level of individual decision about abortion, it seems to me that we judge each case separately; and often can have no doubt that abortion is the best, it may seem the only tolerable, solution to the problems caused by an unwanted pregnancy. In my days as a headmistress, I more than once encouraged a sixteen-or seventeen-year-old girl to have an abortion, as quickly as possible, and come back to get on with her A-levels. I did not regret these decisions, nor did the girls in question, who had no desire whatever to have the child of the person who had, if not raped, then at least casually seduced them. In another different kind of case a girl of sixteen came to see me with a beaming smile to tell me that, by accident, she was pregnant, and wasn't it wonderful? Now she could leave school. (And she came back to visit the school later, still delighted, with the baby in a pram, and its equally delighted grandmother at her side.) Circumstances differ. I am thankful that abortion is no longer a crime. But there still seems to me to be a shifty ambivalence, a sort of moral mist, hanging in the air.
It is perhaps in an attempt to clear away this mist that it has become almost universal to discuss questions about abortion in terms of rights: the right of the mother to determine what shall go on in her own body; or the right of the fetus to be born, and have its own life. In the following chapter I shall consider the implications of a rights-based morality, both in connection with abortion, and more widely.
* Aristotle _de partibus animalium_ and _de anima_.
Rights
The discussions of life and death in the foregoing chapters might all have been couched in terms of rights: the right of a terminally ill patient to decide when to die; the right of a pregnant woman to decide what should happen within her own body. Or, on the other hand, everybody's right to life, and the corresponding duty of the doctor to preserve it; the right of a living fetus to be born and have a life of its own to live, and the correlative duty of the mother to allow this to happen. The moral issues remain the same, the same moral choices fall to be made. My question in this chapter is What difference does it make to the idea of the moral, if it is expressed in terms of rights? Can there be a real-life alternative theory of morality based on the concept of rights? For at the present time the language of rights is far more widely and confidently used than the simpler language of good and evil.
As a preliminary, I want to get rid of two red herrings. The first is the idea of a 'person'. A person is generally supposed to be a bearer of rights. It is thus often suggested that if we could decide whether an embryo, for example, or a fetus, or a girl in a permanently vegetative state were a person, this would allow us to decide, by rational deduction, whether they had a right to life, or whether we might legitimately cause them to die. It is suggested that there should be certain agreed criteria according to which this decision as to personhood might be fixed, dividing the persons from the non-persons, rather as the criterion of brain-death is (more or less) accepted as the way to determine whether someone is dead or alive. And so various criteria have been suggested. First, it is generally agreed that persons have to be human, that is members of the species _Homo Sapiens_. If distinctions between species are held to be arbitrary or flexible, then of course this criterion might also become flexible: an upright, language-using visitor from Mars or a particularly bright ape might one day have to be admitted as a virtual man, and thus become eligible to be a person. (This has a bearing on the question whether animals can be said to have rights, on which I shall have more to say later.) But there are further criteria: a person, it is often said, must be able to have interests, and to recognise that some things are, some are not in his interest; he must be able to think of himself as one being, with a past and a future; he must be able to recognise himself as a member of a species who can be treated either well or ill, and, especially, justly or unjustly; he must be able to make rational choices; and finally he must have rights which other animals do not have. This last suggested criterion obviously exposes the full circularity of the argument. Deciding whether someone is or is not a person is not like deciding whether he is fair-skinned or dark-skinned, taller than average or shorter than average. It is to accord him a certain status, as a bearer of rights. There is no way in which one could scientifically classify animals, and discover which were and which were not persons. To talk about personhood is to enter a new kind of discourse.
Everyone who tries to come up with factual or scientific criteria for personhood gets into difficulties over what we are to say about infants or those who, though they once satisfied the criteria, are no longer able to do so, such as those in a coma, or suffering from dementia. But this is not just a little local difficulty. It is fundamental. For it is essentially for society to _decide_ who is a bearer of rights. There is no way of looking at the facts about, say, a demented woman, and deducing whether she is a person. In the seventeenth century, John Locke said that 'Person' is a forensic term; and he was right. So deciding who has rights is the very same decision as deciding who is to count as a person. It is a matter for lawyers. We cannot therefore help ourselves to solve the former question by first answering the latter. They are the same. To try to invoke the notion of personhood in discussing the rights of embryos or of the dying, of pregnant women or of fetuses, is a confusing and obfuscating red herring.
The second red herring is perhaps rather less often dragged across the scene. It is the idea of ownership. Defenders of euthanasia may argue that they own their bodies, and have a right, therefore, to dispose of them. Women are prone to say that they own their bodies, and that therefore they have rights over them, and all that is in them. And in some ways this seems quite plausible. We may feel certain that, if we speak of 'my' hand, or 'my' leg, this indicates that the hand or the leg is mine, in the same way as my house or my handbag is mine.
But first we have to notice that 'my' can be used in many different senses, not all of which signify ownership. I do not own my piano teacher or my psychiatrist, though each is intelligibly mine. More relevantly, I do not own my children, once they are born, though a special relationship of a different kind is indicated when I speak of them as 'mine'. But secondly, even of my body, or parts of my body, it is dubious whether I can be said to own them. Suppose I have just given birth, and the placenta has not yet been removed. It is still inside my body. Do I own it; and if at that moment I do, do I continue to own it when it has left my body? There are some American birth-clinics who send the new mother home with the placenta in a bag, on the grounds that it is hers. This may become an increasingly important issue, if scientists can get useful, even highly profitable information from the examination of discarded tissue. There was a notorious case in California ( _Moore_ v. _Regents of the University of California_ , 1990) where the university was sued because it had allegedly made millions of dollars out of developing some self-renewing cells, removed originally from the spleen of a man who had undergone surgery, and who had not thought to claim his discarded spleen as his own. My view is that we should not deploy the concept of ownership in the case of body-parts or tissue, whether still-functioning parts or discarded, even though the notion of a 'gift', or 'donation', may continue to be used in their regard. But in any case this, like the concept of the 'person', is essentially a forensic or legal matter, and cannot be treated as a separate issue from the issue of rights. Rights cannot be deduced on the grounds that my body is mine. If I am deemed to own my body, or parts of it, then I have rights over it. But both questions are, together, up for settlement. This, then, is my second red herring.
Let us turn to the question of rights themselves, and whether they could form the basis of morality. A right is something you claim, and which you can properly prevent other people from infringing. It is an area of freedom for an individual which someone else must allow him to exercise, as a matter of justice. We must consider how the possession of a right is to be established, how a claim to a right is to be upheld, and what precisely is involved in the statement that an entitlement to something, a right, exists. There has been a marked shift in the concept of rights in the last forty years or so, at least in this country. Until about 1960, most people interested in jurisprudence, or the theory of law, whether they were lawyers or philosophers, were broadly what is called legal positivists. Following John Austin and the Utilitarian Jeremy Bentham (both born in the eighteenth century), they held that a right could exist and be claimed only if there existed a law granting that right. If a right had been granted by a law, then other people than the claimant had a duty not to stand in the way of the right's being exercised. Equally, if the law imposed a duty, then someone else had a right against whoever failed to carry out that duty. The simplest example is that of a right of way. However convenient it might be for you to cross my land on the way to work, however much it might be in your interest to do so (avoiding steps, for instance, if you use a wheelchair), however much difference it made to you and how little to me, unless there were a by-law granting a right of way, you could not claim one, nor force me to allow you to cross my land. You might well think I was unreasonable not to allow you to cross it, or unkind or vindictive, and you could accordingly blame me, on moral grounds. I could be accused of being a nasty person, who had no regard to the moral principle that one should help people or love one's neighbour. But there would be no question of rights, or correlative duty on my part. (There is another sense of the word 'duty', in which I might be said to have a moral duty to allow you to cross my land; but I shall return to this later.)
It was Bentham's view, reiterated in everything he wrote, that unless there is a law conferring it, there can be no right. To speak of rights otherwise was 'nonsense on stilts'. This is legal positivism. But of course not all laws are good laws, either because they cannot be enforced, or because the enforcement or the outcome of them is morally objectionable. For instance, though there is a law which gives the police the right to stop and search suspected terrorists, many people hold that it is not right (morally right) that they should be empowered to do so. Such people do not deny that there exists a law which gives the police this right, but they think it a bad, immoral law, impinging on people's valued freedom to walk about the streets unmolested. If you feel inclined to claim that you have a right not to be stopped and searched, which, as the law stands, you do not have, what you mean, and what in the interests of clarity you should say, is that you ought to have that right; there ought to be a law entitling you to something that you value on moral grounds, namely to be able to walk the streets unmolested. You can campaign to get the present law changed so that you get what ought to be your right. But you cannot claim that it _is_ your right. Bentham's motto was 'Obey immediately; criticise ceaselessly.' He thought that the claim to a right where no law conferred it was a piece of damaging rhetoric; and there is, in my opinion, a great deal to be said for his view.
A good example, capable of clear expression in these Benthamite terms, is that of the Education Act of 1972, to which I have already referred, which brought the most severely disabled children under the jurisdiction of the then Department of Education and Science, and thus gave them the right to education. It was only by the new legislation that these children were accorded that right. Positivists would say that, until 1972, the children had no right to education (largely, of course, because hardly anyone thought that education was possible for them, a somewhat narrow view of education being assumed, that it had to do only with numeracy and literacy). But there were enlightened people about, who realised that severely disabled children ought to have a right to education, and that therefore there ought to be a law entitling them to it, and accordingly the law was changed. Here is a case, then, which can well be presented in positivist terms, a sharp distinction being drawn between the law as it is and the law as it ought to be (and in this case has become). To speak thus is to give morality priority over rights. It must be in terms of pre-existing morality that laws (and therefore rights) can be criticised. Therefore morality cannot be derived from rights, as a matter of logic.
It is sometimes held that rights may be engendered not by any specific law, but by a person's absolute _need_ , the satisfaction of which constitutes not merely something he desires, but something to which he is entitled. It is certainly true that there is a connection between a perceived need and a right. And it was for this reason that the report following the enquiry into the education of disabled children introduced the concept of special educational needs, emphasising the rights these children now had to education. But in fact the concept of a need is slippery. Even at the very beginning of the Welfare State, with the Beveridge Report, William Beveridge recognised that the welfare ideal, for the state to meet the basic needs of everyone equally, would change over time, and would eventually escalate so that it could hardly be afforded (though I doubt whether he foresaw the scale of the erosion of welfarism, or that it would come so soon). What counts as an absolute need is relative to what is seen to be an intolerable or impossible way to live (i.e. if the need is not met). And to make a judgement as to what is intolerable is, in my view, to make a moral judgement. So even if needs do generate rights, still the idea of the morally good and the morally bad precede these rights. (For a detailed discussion of the concept of needs, see David Wiggins, _Needs, Values, Truth_ , Blackwell, 1987, chapter 1.)
However that may be, for largely extraneous reasons such as the increasingly perceived inadequacy of the Benthamite 'greatest happiness' principle (a moral theory which seemed to offer moral justification for sacrificing individuals to a kind of collective good, and whose insistence on criticising laws by the criterion of maximising overall good even at the expense of the good of individuals was properly seen as inadequate) legal positivism as a whole began to be frowned on. It seemed to set up a false and unrealistic barrier between law and morality. It appeared to encourage people (in Nazi Germany, for example) to rely on the concept of _Gesetz als Gesetz_ (the Law as Law) and therefore to have supported German lawyers in their failure to protest at the enormities they were required to perpetrate in the name of the law. It has therefore become more common to incorporate the idea of certain inalienable human rights into the idea of law itself, giving the law an intrinsically moral content. A legal system cannot be justified, it is argued, unless it is firmly based on an already existing, and logically prior, concept of human rights, a concept from which not only law but morality itself stems. If a law was changed, it was changed in the light of these inalienable human rights which preceded it. Thus old laws gave masters legal rights over their slaves. The abolition of slavery recognised pre-existing rights; it did not create them. Similarly, the 1972 legislation entitling all children to education recognised a right already belonging to all human beings, the right to be educated. I think that this new anti-positivist concept of law is fraught with confusion; but it is necessary to try to understand it, if we are to understand the present insistence on rights as the only aspect of morality that has a 'cutting edge'.
In reality things are not as simple as I (or Bentham) have made out. Laws, being in their nature general, are nearly always, in real life, subject to interpretation. I borrow the following example from H.L.A. Hart (see, for example, 'Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals', _Harvard Law Review_ , 1958). Suppose there is a by-law which forbids taking vehicles into a public park. There are some things we would all agree counted as vehicles, such as cars or tanks. More dubious might be an ice-cream van. What about a helicopter, or a skate-board? In working out whether the by-law has been breached, the adjudicator (let us say the magistrate) has to make a decision. It is not a matter of simple deduction of the form 'Vehicles are forbidden; skate-boards are vehicles; therefore skate-boards are forbidden.' For the purposes of the Act, the magistrate may deem that skate-boards are, or are not, vehicles. Let us suppose that he decides that they are not vehicles and are to be allowed in the park. On what grounds does he base his decision? We have very little temptation to say that he has recognised a certain inalienable human right, existing since the beginning of time, to bring skate-boards into the park. On the contrary, the magistrate has plainly _created_ a right. Hereafter if you go into the park with your skate-board and are challenged by the park-keeper, you can claim that you are entitled to do so. Usually, and in this case, when such an interpretative decision is taken it is based on a consideration of what the law was _for_. In this case, the purpose of the law was to protect people who wanted to enjoy the park free from disturbance or danger. It was probably with this in mind that the magistrate decided that skate-boards were not vehicles. Although they carried people on wheels, which is the proper function of vehicles, they were not noisy, did not create polluting fumes, and did not often knock people over.
Now though this is a case where comfort, convenience and safety are involved, rather than any strictly moral issues, I think it may cast some light on the relation between morality and the law. In the case of the 1972 Education Act, the law was extended so that all children became entitled to education, not merely those not severely disabled. The change would not have come about unless there had been people who believed on moral grounds and with passionate conviction that it was wrong to deprive any child of that from which he could benefit, as we now knew that he could. Looking on the law which compelled people to send their children to school, it was clear that the purpose of the law was to ensure that no child who could benefit from education should be deprived of it. What had changed, according to the campaigners, was the concept of education itself, and consequently the notion of who could benefit. Their moral conviction was based on the new knowledge that education could make an enormous difference to the quality of life of even the most severely disabled, therefore, morally speaking, we must provide what education could be afforded. It is my contention that we should not think of such moral convictions as these, which lie behind the law, and without which the law would not be changed, in terms of rights. We can express them simply in terms of humanity, the way we ought to treat human children, sentiments which motivated the original laws compelling parents to have their children educated. This is analogous to the decision of the magistrate, described above, who decided to allow skate-boards into the park, by reference to the purpose of the original by-law. Rights did not come into the matter until he created your right to bring your skate-board in. Before that, all you could have argued would have been that you _ought_ to have been allowed to bring them in, because they were safe and non-disturbing, which was in accordance with the spirit of the original by-law.
Some might argue that the old education law, which excluded certain children from education, was changed on the ground that it was unjust, or unfair; and that this entails a pre-existing right for all children to be treated equally. For it is only the infringement of rights that constitutes injustice. Therefore the rights must have existed before the law was changed. However, it is far from clear what is meant by invoking equality in this context (though I have been inclined to invoke it myself – see Introduction). The reason why some children were excluded from education before 1972 was that they were held to be, as a matter of fact, ineducable (and this because of a limited view of the content of education prevailing theretofore). In this sense these children could not be treated as the equals of their contemporaries. They might properly have been classed metaphorically, as I have noticed, as 'vegetables', a description certainly not appropriate for all children equally. It would be no more a requirement of equality to try to educate them than it would be to try to teach me, unlike some of my contemporaries, to become an opera singer or a ballet dancer.
However, the claim that all children have a right to be treated equally may be the expression of a more general claim, namely that all humans, in a civil society, have a right to be treated equally under the system of laws in that society. Such a notion of equality is the very foundation of law and justice. But what precisely this entitles them to will depend on the content of the law. Before 1972, a parent could not sue a local authority for not providing education for her severely handicapped child, since that was not part of their legal duties. After that she could sue. Before 1972 the discrimination of which she might want to complain was not unfair discrimination; it was legal, the criteria laid down by the law. Only after 1972 did it become possible to argue that, if a severely handicapped child, or indeed any child, had not been educated, he had suffered injustice. Before 1972, what a parent needed was a stance from which she could criticise the law. It is my contention that this stance is a moral stance. The parent who complains is adopting a moral, not a legal standpoint.
However, it is sometimes argued that, apart from the positive laws which currently create rights, there is a higher law from which higher rights may be derived (and this might include the higher right of all children to equal treatment, educationally, not granted them in the pre-1972 legislation). Thus Sophocles represents Antigone, determined to show respect for her brother by throwing earth on his body, claiming a right to do this, though it was forbidden by existing law. In her great speech to Kreon, the Theban tyrant, she invokes a higher, divine law, under which she has the right to honour her brother, and indeed is obliged by the law to do so. Similarly, appeals to natural law or natural justice may give rise to the concept of natural rights, or universal human rights, one of which, it might be claimed, was the right to education. Injustice, where a child is debarred from education, would be an offence against such higher law. But one may properly ask what natural law is. If it is that fundamental principle of justice which is the underlying basis of all positive law, then it seems to me plain that it should be referred to as a moral principle, derived from the needs and the aspirations of human nature. It is indeed the basis from which one may criticise all positive laws. To adopt this way of speaking of natural law, as a fundamental _moral_ principle, is to distinguish the moral from the legal, and to derive the legal from the moral. If someone claims a natural right, according to this way of speaking, he would be claiming a moral right, and invoking a moral law or principle as the source of this right. There is no doubt in my mind that such a manner of claiming rights would greatly lessen the confusion we now find ourselves in, and would firmly establish the priority of the moral over the legal.
However, if the rights are moral, not legal, and if the law conferring them is a moral law, then the necessity for using the language of rights seems to disappear. Why should we not prefer simply to talk about ways in which it would be right or wrong, good or bad, to treat our fellow humans? This would be to adopt the language of morality itself, with no quasi-legal implications.
The drawback of using the language of rights in so very general and abstract a context is, as I shall hope to show, that more and more may be claimed as a natural or fundamental human right, even where such claims are dubious and may be disputed. We are accustomed to fundamental disagreements about morality. So if I claim that such and such is a moral principle, you may be ready to say that I have got the principle wrong, or that it is a matter of mere convention, not of morality. But if, on the other hand, I claim that something is a right, then there is an air of certainty, borrowed from the positivist sense of 'right', an implication that the right could be proved (as in the case of a right of way). This is to say that, even if there is a case to be made for talking about a 'human', 'natural' or 'moral' right, for example to education, or to justice itself, the idea of such rights should be extended only with caution, since the word 'right' has such vast rhetorical power: and the power is largely borrowed from its narrower use, within the confines of an existing system of law. For, as I have said, to claim that your rights have been violated is to claim that you have been unjustly treated. And in civilised, as opposed to primitive societies, a claim to unjust treatment constitutes an imperative. Justice _must_ be done.
Because we are increasingly aware of the immoral and barbarous ways in which people may be treated under various political regimes, of the appalling cruelty inherent in ideological dogmatism, and of the peculiar horrors which follow political coups or civil wars, we are more and more inclined to refer, in such cases, to the violation of human rights. And, very properly, this goes along with the attempt to establish new supranational systems of law, which will incorporate not only the fundamental imperative that people should be treated fairly, but also that they shall not be subjected to things which manifestly damage them, when they are innocent of any harm: they must not be imprisoned without trial, massacred or driven from their homes; they must not be subjected to gross cruelty, such as torture or deliberate starvation. The value of such a system of law is held to be that where it has been infringed, in theory at least, the perpetrators of the infringement can be brought to a court; and the people damaged by the infringement can claim that it is their rights that have been infringed just insofar as these rights are specified in the system of law. The birth of the United Nations, after the Second World War, was marked by the issue of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which specified most of the rights which were to be protected. This declaration was not recognised as part of International Law. However, increasingly human rights issues are considered to be part either of international treaties and conventions, or of the general principles of law recognised by civilised countries, and there are various regional conventions which have established machinery through which complaints of violation may be heard. I would argue that, at this level of generality, it is impossible to distinguish between law and morality; legal positivism, with its Benthamite insistence on distinguishing the two, has no place. For these general principles consist not only in the basic principle of justice, that everyone should be equal before the law, but also the principles forbidding outrageous and inhumane treatment of numerous different kinds, some of which I have just listed. There is therefore an inextricable weaving together of legal and moral terminology in the discussion of human rights issues. And though it may well be that the rhetoric of rights and their violation has a useful function at this kind of level, there are nevertheless certain cautions that should be observed. The risk of devaluing the currency of rights-claims is, as I have suggested, something to be avoided.
For example, even where someone has an undoubted legal right to some treatment, say to have certain basic health needs met by a health service in a Welfare State, it may not always be possible to ensure that the treatment is at hand, or the needs satisfied. To take an extreme, but by no means impossible case: suppose there has been some disaster, such as an earthquake, and a large number of people are buried in the ruins. Each of these people is entitled, in the Welfare State, to medical treatment according to their needs, and some of them will need blood transfusions. If there is a shortage of blood of a particular blood group, then a person who is uncovered from the ruins may find that all the blood of her group has been used up on people who were rescued earlier. She is entitled to a blood transfusion, but cannot have one. The proper and normal reaction (as David Wiggins pointed out, op. cit., p. 29) to someone's rights being infringed is one of indignation; but in this case there is no cause for indignation, only for sorrow or pity. Everyone did their best, but it ended in tragedy. There is simply no point in reiterating that the victim had a right to have a transfusion.
There is another obvious caution. Whenever a right is claimed one is entitled, as I have argued, to raise the question Who or what conferred it? If the answer is that no one conferred it, nor did it arise out of any contract or agreement, it is a right simply intrinsic to the condition of being human, then one must try to be certain that something is not claimed as an absolute right, for all humans and for all time, which is in fact to be thought of as a right only at a specific time, in specific circumstances and for some people, not others. For example in 1990 the United Kingdom signed the UNICEF charter of children's rights, and later ratified its signature. The purpose of this charter was to entitle all children equally and everywhere to have their basic needs met, needs incurred first because they were human and secondly because they were children. Article 6 of the convention which constitutes the charter lays down that 'every child has the inherent right to life'. But does this mean that absolutely every baby that is born, however slim its chances of survival, however poor will be the quality of its future life, while it lasts, has the right to have everything done that can be done to keep it alive? Is it always an infringement of rights if a paediatrician, or indeed a parent, switches the life-support machine off? What if not all badly damaged neonates _can_ be saved, because of the shortage of cots in the intensive care unit? Consideration of such cases as these makes it seem that the right to life is a pretty vague sort of right, for it must often be overridden by other considerations, moral, administrative or financial. Again, if we look at the words of the convention, we find that children must be brought up in their families; that they must not work; that they must be educated, and educated in a particular way, 'to understand human rights'; that they must have the opportunity to play and to exercise their imaginations in the arts and in free speech. All this is doubtless excellent; but we ought to be clear that the convention is putting forward an ideal of childhood such as is generally enjoyed by children in liberal Western societies, which are prosperous, and where childhood can therefore be prolonged. Even if we embrace this ideal, and attempt to realise it for as many children as possible, it is straining the concept of a right to suggest that for every child whose childhood is not like this there is a positive breach of duty on someone's part, or on the part of that society in which the child grows up. I do not deny that the ideal of childhood set out in the convention is good. In particular, I believe that there is much to be said for a long, irresponsible protected childhood. But in thinking of this we have moved a long way from basic needs or intrinsic rights. Such a childhood has always been a function of affluence, or relative affluence. It does not seem to make much sense to say that every child has a right to be born into an affluent family. The trouble is that if the language of rights is used to describe such ideals, morally excellent though they may be, that language is devalued.
A right should remain something which, even if it is not ensured by enforceable law (as a right of way, or a right to legally held property is), yet is such that it _might_ be ensured, if an agreed law or convention could be found. Such are human rights, as laid down in the United Nations charter. For it is by now fairly well agreed what it means to say of a particular state that it has a 'bad human rights record'. What is less clear is to what extent infringement of human rights may be the trigger for action, whether military or legal. In any case the charter of children's rights comes nowhere near this level of agreement; and it is for this reason that I believe such language should be abandoned, lest the coinage become debased.
The case for avoiding the language of rights is even stronger in the matter of so-called animal rights. Just as there exists legislation criminalising cruelty and abuse of children so, for more than a century, there has been legislation protective of animals. The Cruelty to Animals Act 1856 was for more than a century the Act under which people could be charged with mistreating animals, in an increasingly varying context. Originally it was designed to outlaw manifestly cruel treatment of animals in circuses, in side-shows, on farms, and especially in the streets. It was the outcome of much campaigning, largely against cruel cabbies, who starved and flogged their aged horses, under the public eye. Anna Sewell's _Black Beauty_ was an effective weapon in the armoury of the anti-cruelty lobby, and horses were accorded a special place in the Act (which was one of the factors which made the Act so inappropriate as a measure to deal with the treatment of laboratory animals, in the second half of the twentieth century). The Cruelty to Animals Act remains on the statute book, but is now joined by the legislation, dating from 1985, regulating the use of animals in scientific experimentation, which lays down that scientists using animals must be registered, their laboratories and holding-houses subject to inspection; that the use of animals must be shown to be essential; that animals must not be used repeatedly for experiment; that animals must be supplied from recognised supply sources; and that if an animal is in severe pain that is likely to continue, the research project must be halted even if unfinished, and the animal destroyed. Now both of these Acts of Parliament could, I suppose, be interpreted as conferring on the animals some negative rights, rights not to be, in some specified ways, maltreated. In the same way, one could interpret legislation against burglary or against allowing pollution to flow into a river as conferring rights on people in general not to be burgled, or not to be at risk from polluted water, or from piles of dead fish. But though, especially in the last case, people might bring an action against the polluter, this would be on account of damage suffered rather than of rights infringed. In the same way both the old and the new legislation regarding the treatment of animals is most readily understood as forbidding certain practices regarded as morally intolerable, and criminalising these practices, not as upholding any rights. Indeed the basic assumptions of both laws are the same, namely that it is perfectly acceptable that animals should be used by humans for various purposes, for instance to produce milk, to draw vehicles, to test drugs, to help to uncover some of the mysteries of reproduction and embryonic growth. The law questions none of these things. All it prohibits is the occasioning, in the course of these transactions, of unnecessary suffering. The infringement of a right is, as I have emphasised, essentially an act of _injustice_. The infringement of the laws which protect animals is an act of _cruelty_ , or, in the case, for example, of infringement of licensing regulations, is an act thought liable to make cruelty more probable, and easier to get away with.
Those who proclaim that animals have rights start by saying that the present laws protecting animals are inadequate; and in this they doubtless have a point. For there are still many ways in which animals can be cruelly treated, in transport, for example, or in battery-farming, which fall outside the legislation. But if they mean more than this, namely that the basic presupposition of the laws is mistaken, then they must show that animals are entitled not to be used for human purposes, just as one human may not be used for the purposes of another, without infringing the basic entitlement to equality which is the moral principle lying behind all law.
I am not certain how far the defenders of animal rights would wish to go along these lines. Most of them would argue that animals should not be bred for the table, cooked and eaten. But may they be milked for human purposes? Some say yes, some no. May they be ridden? If ridden, then raced? May they be hunted? To this the answer is no, not by humans; but presumably their rights are not infringed if they are hunted by animals other than humans. And here the real difficulties start. If all animals had a right to freedom to live their lives without molestation, then someone would have to protect them from one another. But this is absurd. Even if it were agreed that humans should not own or breed or eat or milk animals, so that all cattle would revert to the wild, nothing could be done to alter the fact that animals are feral. If freed from the bonds imposed on them by men, they would not live in a civil society, within which rights and duties would arise. They would live in the state of nature. The rights claimed for them are rights only against humans, it is only humans who could have duties towards them. Yet it is impossible to believe (for me at least) that humans could admit animals into civil society on equal terms. For a civil society is essentially one in which rights and duties are _recognised_. Caligula may have made his horse consul, but it is not to be imagined that he expected much in the way of administrative performance from him. I may give my cat the freedom to come and go as he pleases, by putting in a cat-flap; but I do not extend his freedom much beyond this. I am just as ruthless as before in throwing out the half-dead mice and birds that he may choose to bring into the kitchen, and I never even wonder whether I am infringing a right. We live on my terms. He is my property. If I get too poor to keep him, I give him away, or put him to death.
There is no possible way to suppose that we may treat humans like this. However, in expressing such sentiments, I will be accused by some of demonstrating 'speciesism' (see for example Peter Singer, _Practical Ethics_ , Cambridge, 1979), an irrational prejudice in favour of the human over other species. I would freely acknowledge that, in my view, humans have moral priority over other animals. I would think it morally outrageous if someone preferred, faced with a choice, to save their dog rather than their even severely handicapped baby. It is humans and they alone who can form a civil society within which the concepts of rights and duties arise. That some people cannot, and may never be able to, recognise these rights and duties (like perhaps the severely handicapped baby) does not entail that this baby is not part of human society. What I would deny is that this is an irrational prejudice, like racism or sexism. It is, instead, the foundation of all morality.
To speak of the rights of animals, then, is necessarily inappropriate, simply because 'animal' here means 'animal other than human'. And to use the language of rights in this context is dangerously to debase the currency of rights. It is morally wrong to treat animals with cruelty, and this is the force of the relevant criminal law. Moreover it is precisely because humans are fundamentally different from other animals that they have an obligation not to treat them with cruelty. Other animals can have no such obligation one to another, across species, for they could not conceive of the world of nature as a whole, nor have any global view of what would be bad or degrading behaviour within that world. Indeed, it is not only the avoidance of cruelty to animals that is a human obligation. There is a wider concept, which may be encapsulated in the word 'respect', though the word is not wholly adequate. Because humans have an idea of themselves as part of, though in a sense aliens in, the world of nature, they have an obligation to respect nature, not deliberately or wantonly to destroy it or demean it, perhaps actively to try to conserve it, to admire and love its variety and diversity. The more powerful humans become in manipulating their world for their own ends, the greater the danger to other species both of other animals and of plants. Equally, the more we know about nature, the more marvellous and also the more precarious we see it to be. It is from these twin phenomena that we increasingly feel our human duty of respect, a duty which self-evidently falls on (as it is recognised by) none but humans. It is difficult to find words accurately to describe this proper relation between man and the rest of nature. The metaphor of stewardship, deriving from a long Judaeo-Christian tradition, perhaps brings out the flavour best. As often happens, a moral concept is best expressed in religious language, and is difficult to translate out of that language without loss. Certainly for anyone whose first glimpses of morality came through religion, the metaphor is self-explanatory. But that we are in the position of stewards, that we have duties to the rest of nature, in no way entails that nature has rights against us. And this leads to the central point that I would make about rights and duties.
There is obviously a sense in which rights and duties are linked. If someone claims a legal right, then this entails that someone has a duty to see that the right is respected. Such is the basis of all contracts, and all legislation enacted specifically to protect particular rights. It is the relative precision of this relationship that I want to defend. Though I have conceded that there may be a certain usefulness, or effectiveness, in talking about fundamental human rights, rights which belong necessarily to all human beings, even where no contract has been made, and no detailed legislation put in place, yet I have argued that it is mere rhetoric to try to extend these rights beyond a few that would be agreed to be basic. This is true whether the charter of human rights is supposed to be observed globally, within Europe, or within the United Kingdom. And even to specify such rights as these is really to specify kinds of behaviour towards human beings, or kinds of restrictions of freedom which are generally agreed to be morally outrageous. It is because of my fear of a debasement of the powerful currency of rights that I deplore widening the scope of the concept. In particular I deplore the thoughtless issuing, towards the end of the twentieth century, of so-called charters, the parents' charter, the rail-users' charter, the patients' charter. These charters have never been agreed; they seem to confer rights, but they have not the force of law. They dangerously raise the expectations of parents, rail-users or patients that they may claim what they are promised as their due. Of course it is good to set out what the various services hope to provide. But this is very different from issuing a charter of rights.
In despair the National Health Service has started to argue that the patients' charter entails duties as well as rights for patients. But this is based on a total confusion. If rights and duties are correlative, as I have argued, it is in the sense that the right of a patient to treatment entails the duty of the health service to provide it. It is not the case that no one can have a right who does not _himself_ have some duty, though this may be so in the case of contracts (as where I have a right to have my roof properly mended, so long as I fulfil my duty to pay the agreed charge). Infants can have rights, though they have no duties. But the poor health service is now saying that the patients' charter entails the duty on patients not to call out their doctors on frivolous grounds, or not to put their feet on the chairs in the waiting area. This was never part of the charter, which was unconditional. And what are the conditions supposed to be implied in the rail-users' charter? That they should be clean, sober and orderly, and not put their feet on the seat opposite in the carriage? This was never stated.
This is simply an example of the way that the relation between rights and duties may be misunderstood. It is also an example of an increasing tendency to believe that everything desirable may be claimed as a right. It is the very same tendency that was exemplified in the International Declaration of Children's Rights. It is one thing, and often a good thing, to publish an ideal to be aspired to; quite another to publish a charter of rights.
The essential distinction between moral ideals, and rights with correlative duties, convinces me that there cannot be a morality _founded_ on the concept of rights. The infringement of a right is always a case of injustice. But avoiding injustice is only one way of achieving moral good, or avoiding evil. Judith Jarvis Thomson, in an article on abortion ('A defense of abortion' reprinted in her _Rights, Restitution and Risk_ , ed. William Parent, Princeton University Press, 1986) makes the point in this way. A box of chocolates has been given to the older of two brothers. 'There he sits, stolidly eating his way through the box, his small brother watching enviously. Here we are likely to say, "You ought not to be so mean. You ought to give your brother some of those chocolates." My own view is that it just does not follow from the truth of this that the brother has any right to any of the chocolates. If the boy refuses to give his brother any, he is greedy, stingy, callous – but not unjust. [Some people] will say that it does follow that the brother has a right to some of the chocolates, and thus that the boy does act unjustly if he refuses to give his brother any. But the effect of saying this is to obscure what we should keep distinct, namely the difference between this case and the boy's refusal in a case in which the box was given to both boys jointly, and in which the small brother thus has what is from any point of view clear title to half.' I agree with her entirely. To say, on moral grounds, that someone _ought_ to behave in a particular way may have nothing whatever to do with the justice of his doing so. To avoid cruelty is not, or not necessarily, the same as to avoid injustice; and greed, callousness, lack of human sympathy are all different moral vices.
In Victorian and Edwardian days, perhaps even in the Georgian days of my own childhood (though I suspect less confidently), the word 'duty' was used to denote what you ought to do, how you ought to behave, in a perfectly general sense. I suppose the duties were thought to be imposed on you by laws, the Ten Commandments, perhaps, or the more positive and more general laws of the New Testament. Some of the duties were implicit in a particular position you occupied (as an officer and a gentleman, for example, or as the lady of the manor). The Oxford philosopher F.H. Bradley entitled one of the chapters of his book on ethics ( _Ethics_ , Oxford, 1899) 'My Station and its Duties'. The point about such duties is that in no sense did they imply any correlative rights. If I take soup to the poor in the village, or run the Sunday school, or send peaches from my conservatory to the tenants who are sick, they have no right to these good things, even if, because of my benevolence, they may come to expect, even to rely on them. What they may feel, if they are given to such feelings, is gratitude (but they may equally feel humiliation or envy). They will not feel that they have got only what it is their right to have. I, on my side, may act so because I conceive it to be my duty to look after the poor; but my motives may be, as well, compassion, pity or generosity. In the old use of the word 'duty', no such motives were excluded; indeed they were motives by which you _ought_ to be activated. A dutiful person was a person who did what was right, and wanted to be good.
This general use of the word 'duty' is connected, necessarily, with a general use of 'obligation'. Some obligations arise out of specific tasks or roles we have, such as that of parent, or teacher, or park-warden. Here the obligations may be specified in a job description, but may more extensively be simply understood to belong to the role in question. In becoming a parent, you are generally agreed to incur obligations. Again, some obligations are deliberately taken on by promising. If you promise, you state an intention to do something, in a particularly binding way. You not only create an expectation in the person to whom you make the promise, that you will do what you say you will, but, in binding yourself to do it, you give him the _right_ to expect that you will. This is the strictest sense of the word 'obligation', and it matches the strict sense of the word 'duty'. But apart from these cases, there are many more when we may speak of _feeling_ obliged. And here we are appealing to a moral sense which may have nothing to do either with the particular obligations arising out of a job or a status, or with a specific undertaking by which you deliberately bound yourself to do what you said you would do. This sense of obligation may arise because you feel that you must act in a particular way. You _have_ to. Such was the obligation, in the first story (see Chapter One), that the doctor felt to relieve the suffering of his dying patient. Such may be the obligation I feel to help someone who has incurred my gratitude by helping me when I needed it.
Such ideas, whether of duty or of obligation, have as their background a settled and stable sense of what is right, and a willingness to submit to a set of principles from which duties and obligations may be derived. It is the virtual disappearance of such a background, and an increasing, but seldom argued, belief that everyone must make his own rules, that has brought the words into varying degrees of disuse. The now out-moded concept of _general_ duty and the _feeling_ of obligation both belong centrally to the sphere of private morality. We tend to be chary of addressing the question of other people's 'private' moral codes, and to be much more at ease in the public domain, and this is increasingly true. When a right is denied someone, or a freedom he should have is infringed, then justice can be demanded. Justice is easy to demand because it is an essentially public concept. Aristotle discovered, when in the _Nicomachaean Ethics_ he attempted to go through and analyse human virtues one by one, that justice sits uneasily among the other virtues. It may be the property of institutions as well as of individuals. It is essentially a civil, not a personal virtue. Justice is an aspect of public morality, indeed is its very foundation, and in speaking of justice Aristotle, and we, move from the private to the public mode.
However central to public morality the ideal of justice may be, there are other aspects of morality, concerned necessarily with individuals, their motives, characters and consciences. A civil society, however scrupulous with regard to the rights of individuals, and the duties of others not to infringe individual rights or inhibit freedoms, cannot be founded on such scruples alone. For to defend a right is to demand something for oneself, or the group to which one belongs. On the other hand private or personal morality is based, not on such self-interested demands, but on the possibility of self-denial or altruism, the thought that others are as important as, or more important than, oneself. In the nursery, our nanny used to look at us threateningly, if we were being greedy or showing off or annoying other people, and say 'T.O.O.' This meant 'Think of Others.' It was not a bad basis for moral education. The moral virtues are objects of admiration, and aspiration, for those who want to be good rather than bad. And this wish, as I have suggested, is essential to morality. If the boy shares the chocolates equally with his brother when they have been given to both, we regard this as only fair; we do not specially admire it. If he fails to share, in those circumstances, then we feel, on his brother's behalf, indignation and resentment. If he shares when the chocolates have been given to him alone, we admire him. He is Thinking of Others. He is displaying sympathy, kindness and generosity. It is my contention that a civil society could not function if it subsisted only on indignation where rights had been infringed, without the occasion for admiration as well for those who, like the Good Samaritan, go out of their way to display altruism. If justice were the only, or even the most fundamental, value, such ideas as compassion, or hatred of cruelty, or shame at dishonesty might wither away. It would be an impoverished, because an essentially public, morality that was founded on the concept of rights. Even to feel indignation when the rights of others are infringed, rather than our own, though this is a moral indignation, is not the only moral sentiment we are capable of feeling, nor the most fundamental. For it may be divorced from any feeling that we want to be good, _ourselves_. It is easy to inveigh against countries with 'a bad human rights record', which do not impinge on us. We can adopt such a stance while neglecting more domestic wrongs. It is my contention that we neglect private morality at our peril. Having thus contrasted the public and the private, however, it is time now, in the next chapter, to say a bit more about the nature of private morality itself.
Where Ethics Comes From
Anyone who has followed this book so far will realise that I am hostile to the idea of a rights-based morality. In my original stories, concerned with death and life, what was at issue was the most deeply felt sentiments that human beings can experience (and this was why I started with death and birth). Ethical issues were indisputably at the heart of the arguments about these cases, and were as much to be felt in the guts as to be disputed in the law courts, which is where rights must be properly upheld. What is public is what is needed to establish law and justice in civil society, to which belong the concepts of the rights of individuals and the duties of others to respect and uphold those rights. Within public morality, all humans are equal, whatever their individual characteristics; for to maintain this is the crucial function of the institutions within which rights may be claimed and recognised. What is private, on the other hand, is the inner sense of and interest in what it is to do right rather than wrong, an interest in morality itself, what I have referred to as the wish to be good. Looking around us, we can see that some people have this wish strongly, others have it weakly, or not at all. We may feel tempted to borrow Jane Austen's phrase and say that there are those who 'feel as they ought'; they have, that is to say, a moral sense; and it is to this moral sense that I have accorded priority.
Now in giving priority to the private over the public, I do not claim that every civil society has historically been built on such a private, individual interest in the morally good. Such a suggestion might well be false; and in any case we could have no evidence either of its truth or its falsity. But I maintain that public morality, the insistence on justice and equality, the search for a publicly acceptable solution to dilemmas on which opinions may differ, and yet where legislation is required, is dependent for its working on the conviction of at least some individuals that it is worth being virtuous rather than vicious, honest rather than dishonest, good rather than bad: that one must try, individually as well as collectively, to act for the best. We have now to ask where such convictions come from.
A sceptical reader may say that, though some people certainly appear to believe that they should follow the path of the good rather than the bad, how can we be sure that they are not simply deluded? I seem to be making an enormous assumption, if I am claiming that there is such a thing as the morally good as distinct from the morally bad, towards which it makes sense for individuals to aspire. Anyone hoping for a guide to ethics will seize on this assumption, and will demand that it be shown to have proper grounds. In the past, they will say, it might have been all right to leave the assumption unexamined, for most people might have agreed that religion, in the form of the commands of God, defined the sphere of the moral, and Holy Writ (the Bible or some other) proved that there was such a thing as good and evil, introducing people to the notion of such distinctions, to which they then clung. But the radical secularisation of societies, conspicuously our own, makes it essential, if we are to continue to talk about the morally good and its opposite, that we should justify such language, and show that it is not simply a left-over, a kind of scent hanging in the air after the demise of generally accepted religion. The philosopher John McKie, for example, in his book, _Ethics – Inventing Right and Wrong_ (Harmondsworth, 1977) argued that this is what ethics consists in, a device which was found serviceable, in the days when religion could reinforce its precepts, and has now been reinvented with a vocabulary which borrows its authority from its old, abandoned, source. No one, he argued, could claim that ethical statements are _true_ without being guilty of an actual mistake. He called his theory, accordingly, an 'error theory' of ethics. I shall not concern myself with the details of McKie's argument, but shall try to address the question of what the moral is, what we are talking about when we assert that some things are morally good, some bad, in terms that will be intelligible to everyone, not just to those who profess a religious faith, nor indeed to those who do not. And so in this chapter I shall try to answer two, related, questions: What is morality? and Where does it come from?
With the secularisation of society, these questions are urgent and central, an answer to them properly demanded by one following a guide to ethics. Yet, as I said in my introductory remarks, they are a sort of question seldom asked by philosophers, whose province they might be thought to be, in the first sixty years or so of this century. G.E. Moore had held that there were _no_ grounds for moral judgements or for moral decisions. One simply had to see what was good and one would go for it. The good was self-evidently to be pursued. Fundamental moral concepts could be neither derived nor defined. 'Good is good and that is the end of the matter' ( _Principia Ethica_ , Cambridge, 1903, p. 6). To try to derive or define good was a fallacy, and especially fallacious was the attempt to define it in terms of the nature of things in the world. This was to commit the sin of Naturalism. One might be forgiven for thinking that Moore's doctrine would make sense only to those who held that moral qualities were supernatural, emanating from God, or somehow from beyond or outside the natural world. For unless one held that faith, what other grounds for the moral could there possibly be except the nature of things, and especially the nature of human beings who alone have a use for the concepts of morality? Moore did not hold this; in his view goodness was a _non_ -natural, not a _super_ -natural property; and for someone seeking to find a secular ground for distinguishing good from evil, right from wrong, it is exceedingly difficult, I would say impossible, to make sense of this central aspect of his theory. Yet his influence, along with the influence of logical positivism, led to a refusal for many years to address the problems to be addressed in this chapter. The aftermath of logical positivism, as I have already suggested, meant that there was nothing to be said about good and evil, right and wrong themselves, or about what was designated by these terms. One could raise questions only about the sense or otherwise of the language in which we spoke of them. Ethics was just a way of talking, of a peculiar kind. We could investigate the peculiar nature of this language, if we liked. But what ethicists, or moralists, were talking _about_ in their special language dropped out of the picture.
However, these theories, vigorous enough for a time, have lost their power to impress. They began to look simply too boring, both to professional philosophers and to their pupils. The actual moral problems in the world became too insistent, and demanded philosophical as well as practical thought. And so we are now entitled to address our question head-on: What is moral discourse about?
First, it is plain that morality has to do with the behaviour of human beings. However horrible or tragic, natural phenomena such as storms or earthquakes are not morally bad or evil; nor is the behaviour of animals other than humans, even if tiresome, obstinate or downright destructive, though, anthropomorphically, we may sometimes speak as though it were.
So we may start by asking whether there is something _about_ human beings which makes them, and them alone, the subject-matter of moral discourse. It was Aristotle who most strongly and systematically emphasised that the difference between men and the other living components of the natural world was their possession of rationality. Living things all had souls, or lives. Plants had vegetative life alone; other animals (the brute creation, as it used to be called) had this life and sensitive and perceiving life as well; men alone had a third kind of life, superimposed upon and absorbing the other two, the life of rationality. In an adult, reason took two forms, one superior (more god-like) than the other. Man's god-like or pure reason was concerned with the knowledge and contemplation of features of the world which could not be otherwise. People devoted to the cultivation of pure reason were mathematicians, scientists and philosophers. They could not be expected to give much attention to practical matters. Aristotle observes that Thales, the great scientist-philosopher, was always falling into wells. But, apart from this rarefied form of intellectual life, there was, for everybody, the life of practical reason, concerned with things which were subject to change, ordinary material matters of everyday life, of public policies, or the waging of wars. Practical reason was thus concerned with goal-directed activity. Whether a man chose to pursue good or bad goals was ultimately a matter of his character; but for this character he was partly responsible. For it was possible to develop a good character, as a young man, by practising good acts. In performing good acts, perhaps at first because you were told to do so, or made to feel shame for not doing so, or saw other people whom you admired doing so, you gradually came to see, as it were, the point of them. High standards of behaviour and good goals became, as we might say, internalised. And in the end, the motive of the good man was the good itself. He performed his courageous or fair or honourable actions 'for the sake of the good', or simply because they were good.
At the level of practical reason, human beings had, already given, as part of their ordinary battery of concepts, the idea of good and bad, of virtues and vices. The virtue of a man was his peculiar and appropriate excellence. Whereas the excellence of a horse was its physical powers and perhaps its beauty and skill, so the excellence of a man was his ability to aim deliberately at the practice of the specially human excellences, the virtues of character, or ethical virtues. For Aristotle, then, the idea of ethics could be derived from the nature of the species, human rationality giving rise to the possibility of specifically human virtues, which could recognise themselves for what they were. In every sense, morality, or ethics, was natural; just as an excellent horse performs well, and does not need to be driven or goaded into doing well (wants, for example, to win, when racing), so a good man will not need rewards and punishments to make him act well. He will do so because he wants to, and will take pleasure in it.
The immense difference between Aristotle's answer to the question What is it _about_ human beings which makes them the unique subject of ethics? and later answers is of course to be explained by the rise of Christianity. Men as a species are now characterised by their possession not only of reason but of an immortal soul; and they are fitted out with a concept of a God to whom they owe obedience, as well as of a Christ in whose footsteps they ought to follow. The obvious nature of this difference does not prevent its sometimes being overlooked in the history of moral philosophy. Yet Christianity did not mark the end of the view that reason was the unique characteristic which made morality possible for men and for them alone. Rationality, after all, could be seen as the greatest gift that God had endowed men with. So there were still philosophers, even those who held religious views, who sought to make reason the feature of human beings responsible for the existence of the moral. Perhaps the greatest exponent of such a view was Kant.
Aristotle, in all of his philosophy, started from 'the phenomena': what we know about the world we live in, and what we say about it. (If what we know or say seems to lead to contradictions, then is the time for philosophy to sort out what are the most fundamental and unchangeable things we know and say, and discard the rest.) He is sometimes criticised for starting from the ordinary world of perception and language, but where else are we to start? We know and say, and gossip and debate about, the fact that there are good men and bad men; and it was from this point that his Ethics took its starting point. Kant no less than Aristotle began, in his moral philosophy, from where we now are, or at least where he thought we now are.
This meant that for Kant, brought up as a German Protestant, we must begin to think about ethics from the _fact_ that we are surrounded by duties and obligations, things that we know for certain must be done, or must be avoided, according to the dictates of a relentless Protestant conscience, internal to each one of us. His question was How is this certainty, and the positive requirement to act upon it, possible? Where (as we are now asking, in this chapter) did such certainty come from? His answer, in the _Critique of Practical Reason_ and in the _Grundlegung_ ( _The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics_ ), was that it came from human reason itself. To act under necessity, as one does when obeying the dictates of conscience, is to act according to a law. The whole of nature is subject to laws, and every change in nature, as we perceive it, is, according to Kant, subject to some causal law. Rational creatures, however, are subject not merely to the physical laws which govern the behaviour of all material objects, but, uniquely, to moral laws as well, which it is the function of reason to impose on itself. Humans are not governed only by Newtonian laws of physics, but are also self-governed, by laws which are the product of reason. If any human, or rational creature, acts out of a _desire_ to bring something about, or from a motive such as lust or greed or even affection, then he acts as part of nature; he just does what it is inevitable that, as an animal, he would do, and no blame or credit attaches to him, any more than it attaches to another animal who acts in this way. It is only if he acts out of good will, that is a determination to do what it is his duty to do, according to the moral law he has rationally imposed upon himself, that his action is morally good, or indeed comes into the sphere of the moral at all. There exists in the world _nothing_ morally good, according to Kant, except the good will. The rational law a man gives himself, when acting out of duty, or the good will, is the categorical imperative. In rational action, a man adopts a 'maxim', or stateable principle; and the primary form of the categorical imperative is to act only on that maxim which he could will to be a law governing not only his action here and now, but all actions of all people for ever, who were placed in the circumstances that he is placed in. Suppose a situation of shortage, say a drought; and suppose that there is a general ban on the use of hosepipes to water the garden. Now let us imagine that there is someone living in a remote house, with no spying neighbours, and sheltered by trees from any investigating helicopters. This person is about to enter his vegetables in a local show, and he longs to be able to water them. He realises that he could get away with it, and he is sorely tempted to use his hose. If all the same this person says to himself, 'It would be wrong to use my hose,' and feels strongly that he must not (perhaps his less morally conscientious wife is urging him to do so), this is because he cannot justify making an exception in his own favour. He cannot believe that everyone should use their hosepipes just as they wish, because this is contrary to the purpose of the ban: water would run out. What he wants is that he should use his hose, and not the others. But the categorical imperative, in other words his conscience, dictates that he _must_ not, however much to his advantage it would be.
Such an analysis of the moral has much to recommend it. It seems to account for the sense we have that some things must or must not be done, regardless of our wishes; that there are principles that must be upheld everywhere and at all times, though the heavens fall; that whether or not you will be detected in wrong-doing, there are things you must not do, because they are intrinsically wrong. It seems in short to give sense to the idea of obligation, whether in the broad sense or in the narrow sense in which, for example, you can impose an obligation on yourself by promising. For if whether you kept a promise or not were allowed to depend on your wishes in the matter, then promises would become worthless. It is not enough to say to someone that you will meet their train, for example, and that you promise to be at the station, if this could be understood to mean that you would be there if and only if at the time you wanted to be there. If one breaks a promise one knows that it is wrong, and one knows also that one could not wish, or will, that everyone should do so. To break a promise is to ride on the back of an institution which in fact one wishes to continue. It is the same with lying. If there were no presumption in favour of truth-telling, if one did not know that one ought to tell the truth, and rely on other people to do so, in the main, then one could not get away with lying (and people who are known to be habitual liars are, in fact, excluded from the realm of ordinary, reliable truth-telling persons. Their words go generally unheeded.).
Kant held that it was reason that enabled people to impose such laws on themselves which would bind them inevitably, as the laws of logic bind one. There is a sense in which one _cannot_ assert, for example, two contradictory predicates of the same subject (for instance that something has no colour and that it is green). Similarly, he argued, one _cannot_ say that everyone must refrain from using their hosepipes in the garden and that, oneself, one may do so. It is a contradiction in the will. Of course people do make exceptions for themselves, and do things which they know they should not do. Kant was not particularly interested in the psychology of such immorality. All he wanted to do was to show, as he hoped, that it is profoundly irrational to act in a manner that is contrary to what you know is right, and this quite independently of any consequences, good or ill, that may flow from your doing so.
This bald outline of Kant's theory entirely fails to do justice to it as part of his whole grand critical design. For the main thread, running through all his critical philosophy, is his determination to reconcile the certainties of science, particularly of Newtonian physics, with a different certainty, that of the moral responsibilities of rational creatures. He held that in both scientific and everyday language, all that we can know is about how things appear to us. About the things themselves which lie behind these appearances, we can know nothing whatever, and any claims of metaphysics to tell us about the true nature of things, unmediated by our own perception of them, is nonsensical. The only exception to this is our awareness of our own freedom, either to obey or to disobey the moral law which, as rational creatures, we impose on ourselves, autonomously. Moral responsibility thus opens a chink of light into what is really the case as opposed to what appears to the eye of science to be the case. At the level of appearance, we, like all other objects in the world, are governed by physical laws. It is only the moral order which allows us to _know_ that we exist otherwise than as appearances.
Detached, however, from Kant's all-embracing philosophical purpose, the doctrine of the categorical imperative will not really do, as an explanation of where ethics comes from. Its weakness lies in its separation of reason from all other human faculties and propensities. It may well be that it is reason which prevents our asserting, or at least believing, that something that is not coloured could, at the same time and with regard to the same aspect, be green. We doubtless feel that if we have inadvertently asserted these contradictory propositions, we _must_ withdraw one of them. If we see a small child trying to put an object through a hole in a box lid, which will not go through, and then trying to put an even larger object through the same hole, we feel like saying to him, 'Come on, can't you _see_ that if Y is larger than X and Z is larger than Y, then Z is larger than X?' It is not something we need to experiment to find out. We are debarred by logic from getting Z through the hole, if Y would not go through. Kant claims that in just the same way, we are debarred from using our hosepipe in the garden, while wishing that other people shall not use theirs. But of course we are not. We are perfectly capable of succumbing to temptation; the fear of contradicting ourselves, as far as our will goes, is not enough to prevent us. And he himself partly recognises this. Despite his insistence that to act morally well is to act according to a rational law, he also says that we act out of respect for, even awe of, the law of the categorical imperative. There is a grandeur in our ability to impose on ourselves duties which we must fulfil, though the heavens fall. It is awe or respect for this grandeur, the sense that we would be diminished if we did not obey the law, which in the end constrains us to obey. To act in accordance with duty thus becomes an ideal. To adopt an ideal is not and cannot be an entirely rational proceeding. It is to admire and to value something. In David Hume's words, 'What is honourable, what is fair, what is becoming, what is noble, what is generous, takes possession of the heart, and animates us to embrace and maintain it' ( _An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals_ , Book 1, section 1, para. 136). To refuse to turn on the hosepipe, despite the temptation to do so, is to show that you value the ideal of fairness, or non-cheating, more highly than you value winning the prize with your beans. You would be ashamed to win by cheating.
So what is shame? First, and most obviously, it is a social virtue. Although it is true that one may be ashamed all by oneself, indeed suffer agonies of shame, in the watches of the night, reflecting on what one did yesterday, it is always the thought of other people, what they did think, or what they would think if they knew, which constitutes the feeling. Sartre has a proof of the existence of other people, against the solipsist, which goes as follows: a man, in a rage of jealousy and suspicion, knows that his wife is in the drawing-room talking to, as he thinks, her lover. He is in the hall, alone, and he bends down to listen at the keyhole. While he is in this attitude, he hears a step behind him. Instantly he is transformed. Before, he was simply intent on what he wanted, on hearing the conversation the other side of the door. Now he has become an eavesdropper, seen as such by the other person in the hall. He is overcome by shame. Sartre uses this immediate transformation of the jealous man into an object, to be described and despised by someone else, as the proof that human beings cannot think of themselves as separate from other people, or as needing arguments to prove that other people exist: we are conscious of other people as part of all our consciousness. But the story can equally be used to show that shame (and many other emotions) is essentially experienced in a social context, where others are either actually or potentially present, and seeing us through other eyes than our own. The eavesdropper minds being caught in the act not because of the consequences his being caught may have (though it might have bad consequences), but here and now, without thought of the future, because he does not like to think of himself as mean, dishonourable, _low_. He despises such characteristics in others; and now he has to despise himself as well. This is what shame is.
However, this, though a step forward insofar as it points to a feeling which may be central in a moral context (and as we have seen Aristotle certainly thought that it was), does not yet define the moral. For one may feel shame if one has cause to despise oneself in contexts other than the moral. If I am an art historian, devoted not just to the ideal of sensibility, but to that of scholarship, and, in my excitement, am led to an ascription of a newly discovered painting which later turns out to be a forgery, I will feel ashamed of myself. I ought to have looked more closely, taken more care; I have lowered myself in my own eyes, as well as in the eyes of others. This is shame, but we still have not discovered the specifically moral nature of the shame which Sartre's man typically experiences.
Let us return to the idea of altruism, which, at the end of the last chapter, emerged as central to private, as opposed to public, morality. It is through a further exploration of this idea that the secret of the ethical may be discovered.
Since altruism is at the centre of my account of the ethical, it is necessary to make a bow towards, and then dismiss, the argument that there is no such thing as altruism, the putting of other people's interests before one's own. If, it is said, this appears to be what sometimes occurs, it is a matter of superficial appearance only (or perhaps of self-deception). In fact everyone pursues their own self-interest, and that alone. It is simply that some people like to pose as martyrs; they like the idea of sacrificing themselves for others; it is from this that they get satisfaction. So, in promoting the interests of others, they are really promoting their own. Now this is a difficult argument to refute, head-on. For if one uses the expressions 'to pursue one's own self-interest' or 'to seek one's own satisfaction' widely enough, then it might, uninterestingly, be said that this is what all motivation is: to do something because you want to do it. The only thing that would be excluded would be to do something because you were forced to. But obviously to use the expressions in this way is to make all motivation the same, and therefore all characters the same. Now if the subject-matter of ethics is people's characters and motives, and all characters and motives are the same, then there is really nothing to be said about ethics except that it is a delusion (to prove which is indeed the point of the argument against the possibility of altruism). If, however, like Aristotle and Kant, we start from where we are, from the phenomena, we find that there is a profound difference between the morally good and the morally bad, the ethical and the unethical, the nice person and the nasty person. As Hume put it, 'Let a man's insensibility be ever so great, he must often be touched with the images of Right and Wrong; and let his prejudices be ever so obstinate, he must observe that others are susceptible of like impressions. The only way, therefore, of converting an antagonist of this kind [one who denies the existence of ethics], is to leave him to himself' (op. cit., para. 133). We simply cannot get on with the proposition that everyone is alike in these respects. The phenomena are too powerfully against it. We may therefore follow Hume's advice, and leave the antagonist alone. Let us put aside the suggestion that the distinctions are idle, that the differences do not really exist, and return to the way things are.
I shall try, in what follows, to state clearly what my convictions are about the nature of the ethical, and its origins. In forming these convictions, I have learned most from Aristotle, Hume and Kant, among 'classical' philosophers. Among modern philosophers, I have followed the arguments and insights especially of G.J. Warnock ( _The Object of Morality_ , Methuen, 1971) and David Wiggins (op. cit.). If I borrow from these philosophers, I shall not always acknowledge the debt, unless I quote their exact words. I suppose, also, that I have learned from my moralising nanny, and my pietistic school.
To be altruistic, then, is to be prepared to forgo what you might like to do, or to suppress a claim you might like to make for yourself, for the sake of other people. It is important to notice that, though sometimes your doing this may arise out of love or benevolence to those others (as when, in the war, many mothers gave up their share of extra or specially delicious food for their children), this is by no means essential to altruism. For besides such love, or special responsibility for some other individuals, human beings are linked to one another much more widely by sympathy, an imaginative understanding of other members of their species, based on what they have in common. Human imagination, expressed in human language, enables people to think and speak of things that are not in front of their eyes. Other animals, without imagination and language, can think only of what they can now perceive, or perhaps remember (though even when they remember, it seems that it requires some trigger to refresh their memory). We cannot suppose that animals, even the brightest of them, can deliberately recall or call up images of things unless reminded by something they see or hear or smell or, perhaps, dream. We use the very same language to describe ourselves as we use to describe others, whether we can see them or imagine or recall them. So if you know that _anyone_ is starving, you can imagine what this is like, and you may be motivated therefore to give up something to remedy the ill. It is true that this link of sympathy is stronger when the others are close to us, literally or metaphorically, but because of the power we have, which is the power of imagination, to bring before our minds and hearts things that are not in our immediate vicinity, we can extend our sympathies, and feel the pains and pleasures of other people. J.S. Mill, wanting to argue both that each person desired his own pleasure and happiness, and also that to secure the pleasure and happiness of everyone is the goal of ethics, argued that if everyone wants his own happiness, it follows that the happiness of all is the goal of all. But there is a manifest sophistry here. Each one could go on all his life without ever thinking about the others. What Mill must have meant was that if each one did not raise his eyes from his own happiness to the happiness of others, there would be no such thing as ethics. If that was what he meant, then he was right. For each one to take on the needs, wishes, desires of others and make them into his goal is the beginning of the ethical. Because of his imagination, and his likeness to other people (expressed as sympathy), each one is capable of doing this, but to do it requires an _effort_ of imagination and of sympathy. Altruism does not follow automatically from self-interest.
There is here, therefore, a possibility of conflict. In spite of imagination and the ability to experience sympathy with others, the human desire to further one's own interest and pursue one's own pleasure is extremely and often overwhelmingly strong. Children, for example, though they may be affectionate to others, tend to have no natural inclination to forgo what they want for the sake of what others want. (This is not always true. There are children with sweet unselfish natures, or so it seems, who naturally and without prompting want to share things.) The demands made on one by sympathy may thus very often be felt as themselves a source of conflict. They give rise to the feeling that what I want for myself is contrary to what my sympathy dictates. And this in turn gives rise to the feature of 'duty' insisted on by Kant, that it takes the form of a command, not an inclination. It is because a person who has embarked on an ethical career of altruism knows that the world would be better, and he would be better, if his sympathies were not so limited and so lacking in force, compared with his own wishes for himself, that he will say that he must act for the good of another, against his inclination and in obedience to the dictates of 'stern duty'.
There are two cautions to add, for the sake of clarity. Things would go, on the whole, better if we could extend our sympathies to all who suffer, and feel the need to make things better for them, treating them as our brothers. Yet it can be argued that the further we extend our sympathy, the further we extend the sphere of our duties, or what we _ought_ to do; and it would be impossible to fulfil duties universally. It is a maxim often repeated by moral philosophers, that 'ought implies can'. You cannot be under an obligation to do what it is impossible for you to do. I do not wholly subscribe to this maxim. For sometimes our keenest _feeling_ of moral obligation arises with regard to things we cannot do, either because the opportunity to do them has passed, or because we are otherwise prevented from fulfilling them. Nevertheless I believe it is true that one could not have an absolutely unlimited duty. Moreover to concentrate too much on the width rather than the depth of our human sympathies may lead not only to absurdly impossible duties, but to the neglect of duties which we can and must fulfil, which are truly binding, and which are nearer home. It may sometimes seem that it would be better, for example, in the teaching of schoolchildren to concentrate less on the moral evils of destroying rain forests, and more on the close-to-home evils of bullying or stealing. This is not, however, to alter the central point that it is the imaginative conception of the needs and wishes of others besides oneself, the sense of them as important, to which we have given the name of sympathy, which is the source of ethics.
The second caution is this. We should distinguish between sympathy and a kind of universal benevolence or beneficence. In the _Treatise of Human Nature_ , Hume denied that there is any such thing as a perfectly general benevolence towards mankind as a whole. He gave various elaborate accounts of the mechanism by which sympathy could arouse passions in us, a desire to mitigate the pains or share in the pleasures of others, but such sympathy did not amount to general benevolence. It had to be activated afresh with every bit of news we got, so to speak, of the experiences of others. Fifteen years later, when he published the _Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals_ , he had changed his mind, and argued that morality was founded on such general benevolence, though not on this alone. It seems to me plain, however, that if there were someone with an absolutely general wish to do good to people, in every situation, this would run counter to what we think of as morally good behaviour. For in each situation in which he found himself, this person would have to work out what would in fact most benefit his fellow human beings. The first sufferer would be justice. It might well be that, the laws being as they are, a murder has plainly been committed, and the murderer convicted. Yet the person murdered might be a drug-pushing child-molester, who had caused nothing but harm, the murderer a young married man with a job, for whom life imprisonment would be a disaster. The judge and jury might feel positive benevolence towards the murderer. But their benevolence must not go too far, or justice would be undermined. The laws of private property cannot be suspended because hundreds of ramblers would enjoy walking over the moors without restriction. And though it is doubtless true that a general desire to do good rather than harm, universally, is the sign of an amiable person, yet if this were a person's only consideration, he might be at least unreliable, when it came, for example, to fulfilling promises, doing what he was hired to do, generally acting in obedience to what he conceived to be harmful laws. In each case, he would find himself overriding his obvious obligation by the consideration that more good would come to more people if he did something different. Though general benevolence is doubtless preferable, and morally preferable, to general malevolence, it seems plain that it cannot be the sole foundation of the ethical.
The ethical, then, arises when someone begins to see that he must postpone his immediate wishes for the sake of the good. And 'the good' here embraces both his own goodness, and the goodness of the society of which he is a member. It arises, to lapse into metaphor, when people begin to see that, first their own society, then human beings at large are all in the same boat, and it is a precarious boat that will sink if there is no co-operation among those who are on board. Thus arises a willingness to be generous, to share, to restrain one's natural wishes when their fulfilment would damage the rest of the boat-load. In a precarious situation, people must assert and share certain values, or perish. It is this realisation, it seems to me, which lies at the root of the ethical. This is what opens up the possibility of altruism, as each person thinks for himself, about his own relation to the rest.
Within society, the criminal laws are there only to restrain the behaviour of those who have developed no intrinsic sense of the moral in particular areas of their lives, no general sense of responsibility to other people, based on sympathy. But behind the criminal law lie principles, such as a principle of protecting life, or promise-keeping or truth-telling, which are values _to be relied on_ by all members of society. And these principles give rise not just to the law, but to the sense of personal obligation apart from the law which Kant placed at the centre of his moral theory, and which we have seen may make us feel constrained to postpone our own interests to the interests of others, or of society at large.
However, such principles and their consequent obligations are not all we have to use. We can, after all, love and admire people (our fellow passengers on the boat) for many virtues, for courage, truthfulness, clear-headedness, amiability, sheer niceness, as well as for adherence to principles. And it is such admiration that allows us to embrace ideals, and thus to think imaginatively about the kind of persons we would like to be. We make our distinctions with regard to people's characters according to whether they possess these various virtues or their opposite vices. We examine our own motives to see whether they arise from or at least are consistent with a character of which we should not be ashamed. Such is the collection of concepts (not just one) from which the idea of the ethical is born. The concepts are not always in harmony with one another. The clear-headed person may be cruel; the courageous person may go head-on for a destructive policy. But the fundamental virtues are those which lead to co-operation; and for the sake of co-operation my own wishes may have to go by the board. This is the sense in which I believe that altruism is central to private morality. And without the private motive to behave ethically well, the public ethics, directed to the common good, would founder.
Finally, it is perhaps just worth reiterating that though this may look like a semi-historical account of where ethics came from, it is not truly historical. It is rather an attempted account of what ethics _is_. However it is not a static account. We can read Aristotle and see how his analysis of practical reason, his description of the virtues, his belief in the possibility of ethical education fits with what ethics is. Yet he had no word for duty, or for conscience. He had no idea of those specifically Christian virtues, charity and humility, even sincerity. The scene changes, but ethics remains recognisably the same, because the need for an ethical system is a fundamental need of human nature.
Freedom, Responsibility and Determinism
As we saw in the last chapter, those who deny the possibility of altruism deny that the subject-matter of ethics exists; for they deny any difference in motivation between the morally good person who is at least _prepared_ to sacrifice his own interest to the interest of others, and the morally evil. All alike, they allege, act in pursuit of their own satisfaction. There is another way in which, notoriously, the real existence of ethics may seem to be denied, and that is the theory that choice itself is illusory: everything we do or think is determined in advance, and we have no way of influencing the situation we are in, through choosing what to do or to refrain from. At no time ever is it true to say that we could have acted otherwise than we did. It is necessary, quite briefly, to consider at least some versions of this theory, and to dispose of it, if our guide is not to lead, after all, into a dead-end. So this will be an almost entirely theoretical chapter, necessary before the drawing of any general practical conclusions out of what has gone before.
The apparent incompatibility of ethics and determinism is held to arise in the following way. Ethics is concerned with our attitudes towards people's behaviour. We admire and despise, praise and blame, punish and sometimes reward people for what they do on purpose, deliberately or by their own choice. If we believe that they could not but behave in the way they did, then we put them outside the scope of these specifically ethical attitudes. So if it were to be shown that they could not help anything at all, that they are on tram-lines, inexorably causing them to travel the way they are travelling, turning at each crossroad the way the lines take them, then, it is said, ethics would disappear, and our ethical vocabulary would become redundant, or at least, if used, would have to take on quite new meanings. We might, for example, praise people for the usefulness of their behaviour, or for their elegance or wit, but without ascribing any _moral_ merit to them for being as they are, just as we speak of animals other than humans. Of these, we admire some and dislike others, without thereby ascribing to them any ethical qualities at all. A fault in a non-human animal cannot be a moral fault.
It is sometimes alleged by determinists that there would still be a use for ethical language and ethical judgement, even if determinism were shown to be true. For just as with other animals, we might find that people could be trained to act differently by praise or blame, or by being punished. This praise and blame would no longer be _deserved_ , in the sense in which we normally understand this term, for it would not be accorded to anything which someone had, after reflection, deliberately chosen to do, when they might have done something else; yet we might simply find that shouting at them, or saying that they had been wicked, or locking them up in consequence of their behaviour, actually worked, in practice, to deter either them or others. Manifesting disapproval of, or rewarding, people would be a way of to some extent altering the direction of the tram-lines they were running along. It would say nothing about the moral worth of the person. Such a view of the language of morals has been proposed, though I believe that in practice it would be difficult to use either consistently or with real conviction. Moreover it seems to depend on the rather disagreeable view that the people who do the punishing or rewarding know that what they are doing is without grounds and without justice; whereas the people who are the recipients of such abuse or praise are not in the know; they are suckers, taken in by the apparent authority of these verbal or other interchanges, and continuing to believe that they are to blame when they are not, or have merited praise or reward when that has been offered. I am reminded of a visit I once paid to a school for severely disabled children in New York which was devoted to behaviour modification as a method of teaching. I was told at the beginning of the day that none of the children could understand what was meant by doing well or badly, or trying to do better, but that they responded to reward if they succeeded and punishment if they failed. The rewards took the form of Smarties (or the American equivalent); the punishment took the form of a hostile tone of voice, and a mild slap. After a regime of this kind, continued for several weeks, I was told, the children's performance of specific tasks tended to improve. This was the theory. I did not look forward to witnessing this inhuman-sounding process; but I need not have worried. There was a child, recently arrived at the school, who was being taught the co-ordination needed to wheel a large rubber tyre across the room. The teacher helped her perform the task, which she found impossibly demanding. But she was never spoken to roughly, let alone slapped. At the end of her first, disastrous, attempts she was handed a lot of Smarties, and told she had been wonderful; she had really tried. The teacher turned to me and said, 'Isn't Lizzie doing well? She came to us only yesterday. You are doing brilliantly, Lizzie.' And so on. The teacher was too human and too loving to do anything except hand out praise, and encouragement to effort, and she made no attempt to divest her words of their ordinary meanings nor to show a negative reaction to failure. I believe that this defence of the continued use of ethical concepts, if determinism is true, is futile because impossible, and I shall say no more about it.
However, I want now to defend in a different way the common-sense view that there really is a subject-matter for ethics, by seeking to show that even the scientists among us need not accept determinism, or the total predictability of human behaviour, as a fact. The problem of freedom and determinism, or 'predestination', is of great antiquity. Milton in _Paradise Lost_ represents the angels in heaven as discussing free will and 'foreknowledge absolute'; and this was indeed one of the early forms that the problem took, in Christian thought. How could God be omniscient if He did not know precisely what you would do; and how could He know this, and it still be true that you freely chose what to do, and might have done something different? The essence of the problem, then as now, was predictability. We want to be, not random in our conduct, but to a certain extent _unpredictable_. We want to be able to claim to have made, for example, a difficult choice; to have withstood a temptation to which we might have succumbed; to have decided on our own to take a course, even if that course turned out in the end to be disastrous.
And so by far the most usual version of determinism in modern times has been the supposed determinism of science, and especially of physics. After Newton, physics was the science which seemed to promise both a fundamental account of the composition of the world, and laws which, if pursued far enough, should render every event predictable. We have seen how Kant sought to get out of the difficulty; all of the natural world is governed by the laws of Newtonian physics, and this goes for human beings as well, _except_ insofar as they are rational creatures, able to make laws for themselves, and to choose, on pain of self-contradiction, to obey them. This rationality is real freedom. But we have also seen the limitations of Kant's theory, magnificent though it is. For to adopt it would entail the belief that human beings are free only if and when they are acting in obedience to the moral law. For most of their lives, indeed for all of their lives except when faced with a crisis of conscience, they would be as much subject to the laws of the natural sciences as other objects in the world, their actions, beliefs, affections, reactions as predictable in principle as the movements of the planets. And this limited freedom is not what we want to assert. We want to be as free to decide whether to have a boiled egg or a scrambled egg for our supper as to decide whether to lie to get out of a difficulty, or keep a promise which it does not suit us to keep. All choices must be free, not just a few morally significant choices. If everyday and trivial choices were wholly predictable by scientific laws, even if predicting might in practice be difficult, then all choices would be so predictable. We have found no inducement to follow Kant along the path of total separation between reason and other aspects of human life; nor do moral choices seem to be uniquely and entirely the function of reason. Nice people make ethically better choices than nasty people, something which Kant could not allow.
Since Newton, then, determinism has taken the form of a commitment to the scientific view of the world, within which every event has a cause, even though that cause might not yet have been discovered. And if humans are objects in the world, as they plainly are, then their behaviour must, in principle, be subject like all other objects to causal explanations. There is no room for choice, or unpredictability.
Before tackling this argument directly, it is perhaps right to get out of the way certain other supposed threats to human freedom, which have arisen mainly in the last century. These are threats from a kind of determinism based on the social as opposed to the physical sciences, especially psychology and economics. For example, Freud's theory of unconscious motivation has sometimes been held to show the unreality of conscious choice. We are held by this theory to be conditioned entirely by our past experiences, and thereafter to make choices not according to the reasons we would allege, but according to non-rational motives which arise out of this past. It was to combat some such determinism as this that Sartre insisted that the past does not exist as a power to dictate what we choose to do. We invent our own pasts, to suit our present book; and, in the present, every choice is open to us, if only we will face facts. But we fear freedom, and therefore seek to deny it, and fall back, in bad faith, on saying that our character has been fixed in our past. Sartre later repudiated the extreme simplicity of his original position, that human beings can choose absolutely anything, without any restrictions imposed on them by their own history (a position perhaps influenced by his desire to encourage a belief in their own limitless freedom among those overtly bound by the Occupation of France). Nevertheless, in an interview in 1969, he still asserted that 'the idea I have never ceased to develop is that in the end one is always responsible for what is made of one. Even if one can do nothing else besides assume this responsibility. For I believe that a man can always make something out of what is made of him.' In any case Freudian determinism seems never to have been a radical determinism. For the theory, in at least some of its versions, is that once I recognise unconscious purposes which have rendered me a slave to my neurosis, I shall be able to step out from them, free as air.
Sartre had a more intractable problem when, after 1945, he took up Marxism. For Marxists claimed to explain and to predict all human conduct in terms of the economic factors within which a person might live and work. And they claimed further that such explanations were wholly material: there was no place in them for wishes, wants, intentions. There were economic needs which drove people collectively to certain standard forms of conduct. Sartre accepted this theory as an account of the history of mankind, but sought to conjoin it with the existentialist view of each individual, looking out from behind his own eyes and seeing the world as a field for his own choices, for shaping his own life. The last books that Sartre wrote (of enormous length) were all devoted to the attempted solution of this problem, as well as the problem of psychological determinism. He settled for a bold theory that individuals made their own 'projects' of how to live their lives, but these projects, when carried into effect, actually changed the material and economic world in which they lived. Therefore it was only through the biography of individuals told in total detail that one could see the relation between a person's choices and the way his environment impinged on him. Through a biography which told everything you could tell the story, not only of the man, but of the historically determined arena within which he lived and fought his individual battles, and to which his particular choices contributed. The trouble with this theory was that it was impossible to prove that, in the end, individual choices _could_ exist alongside historical inevitability or that the biographer's language, purporting to reveal the inner life of the subject, was _really_ compatible with materialism. The attempt to reconcile even a limited individual freedom with a full-blown theory of historical-economic inevitability cannot be said to have been a success (though it is hard to tell whether it was or not: for Sartre's writing had by now become excessively repetitive, long-winded and obscure).
In any case, the problem of incompatibility between the social sciences version of determinism and a belief in the free choices of the individual to the solution of which Sartre directed his energies seems to be more apparent than real. There is no justification for economics or psychology or indeed sociology asserting an absolute law-like regularity within their particular subject-matter. None of these supposed sciences has had much success in predicting how the future will be, based on discoveries of how things are. It seems to me that it was only their pretensions to be sciences, to model themselves on the natural sciences, which ever made it seem possible to claim that they could explain everything, including human choices.
And so we come back to the old threat to freedom: the threat of the natural sciences. Is all choice (and therefore all moral choice, and the existence of moral subject-matter) a delusion? Can the whole world, including the human world, be described in terms of physical laws, which make one thing, including one human action, in principle deducible from that which went before? The form that these questions take has, naturally, changed since Kant confronted Newtonian physics. But in essence the problem is the same. The natural sciences seem to be based on the assumption that every event occurs as a result of some preceding set of events. And what these preceding events or causes are can in principle be discovered. If an event is caused, it is causally determined. That and only that which occurs could have occurred, given the antecedent circumstances. Everything you or I or anyone does, however much we think we are choosing, is predictable, or would be predictable, if only we knew more. Freedom is nothing but ignorance of necessity.
There is very little inclination these days for those who want to assert that the will is free to suggest that there is a completely different set of activities which are entirely distinct from physical goings-on, and which are autonomous. No one is much inclined to think of 'reason' or 'volition' as separate from the physical world, the Ghost in the Machine. This great change has come about because of the development of and quite remarkable interest in the science of neurophysiology. We are, I believe, liberated at last from Cartesian dualism, according to which the mind is thought of as a different substance altogether from the body. We know that we think and decide with our brains, and that in this respect we are like all other animals, only brighter. And we know that our brains are physical objects different from, but no less physical than, tables and chairs, and computers. And finally we believe that for every thought or wish or feeling that we experience, there is some correlated brain state, which could, in principle, be separately identified. Now if we add to these beliefs a further belief, that every brain state is brought into being, causally, by a preceding brain state, then it seems that physical (or physiological) determinism is inevitable, and that all our wishes, desires and choices, and therefore all our behaviour, could be predicted, if we knew the laws which governed the causing of one brain state by another. We could then dispense with the whole vocabulary of the 'inner life', and therefore, obviously, with the vocabulary of ethics, as we currently understand it. Our intentions or motives, which are held to distinguish between what is good in our behaviour and character and what is bad, would be of no further interest. A very accurate and precise encephalograph attached to my head, and read off by you, would tell you what I was going to do, and enable you, according to the relevant causal laws, to predict my future, as well as know my present actions. (Such views are set out, for example, in an essay by Ted Honderich, entitled 'One Determinism' in _Philosophy As It Is_ edited by Honderich and Burnyeat, Pelican, 1979.)
Although today hardly anyone would deny that human beings and their brains are physical objects in a world of physical objects, the crucial question remains whether causal laws could, even 'in principle' (that useful defensive phrase), be found which could predict in detail how events in a brain could be translated, causally, into actions of an individual.
On the one hand there are those who think of a brain as a computer, and therefore such that, given a certain input, a certain regular output in the form of action or reaction is to be relied on. The adding to the computer brain of a robot 'body' actually to make the relevant movements seems a relatively minor extra. These are philosophers interested in the concept of artificial intelligence, who believe that there is no limit to the extent that a computer could be constructed which would perform all the tasks that a human can; not just tasks such as solving chess problems, but those demanding decision-making in less restricted and obviously rule-governed circumstances than a game. Moreover, while many of those interested in developing artificial intelligence believe that a computer could be made which would _model_ everything the brain did, there are others who would go further, and argue that the brain _is_ a computer, its functions wholly describable from outside it, in terms of inputs and outputs, so that the very concept of first-person experience (including of course the experience of trying to make up one's mind, or coming to a decision) will be seen to be redundant. On the other hand, there are those, among whom I am one, who hold that these philosophers have overlooked the crucial and obvious difference between the biological and the physical sciences.
I am not a scientist of any kind, biological or physical; yet I can understand, I think, the following picture. Within the brain of every animal there is the ability to identify and reidentify kinds of objects which are significant for it, which, for it, have a value. It is this recognition of things to be pursued or avoided that is essential to the survival of an animal. It is not just rats running in mazes in the laboratory which learn the way to the food, or how to avoid the electric shocks they will get if they take one route rather than another. They can do these things because animals all do them in the wild (though not many as cleverly as rats). Even such, to us, lowly creatures as flat-worms or octopuses have the ability to value things and learn to pursue or avoid them. They select from their environment the stimuli that are significant, and each animal learns to do this as it develops, in accordance with the Darwinian development of the species. But of course the actual stimuli that come to each individual animal may be different from those which come to the rest. If we consider a flock of goldfinches, suddenly descending on a garden, and hopping, fluttering, on all the bushes, we know that there is a large number of individual goldfinches, though we are not especially interested in distinguishing one from another. Do we think that the behaviour of each is determined? Well, probably we would agree that they are all after the same thing, the buds or seeds on the bushes; and we would probably agree that goldfinches inherit, in their genes, the ability to recognise the food that is palatable to them. But it is still open to us to ask what makes one individual bird flutter at just this moment, and another decide it has had enough, and lead the whole flock away. We presume, if we think about it, that it has been perceptual inputs that brought the birds into the garden, and perceptual inputs that finally lead them out. But, descending to the particular, was the behaviour of each individual bird _predictable_? Is there a law, or could a law be discovered, that would enable one to map out in advance the behaviour of the individuals in the flock, as soon as they arrived? I would say that this is extremely unlikely. For it would be impossible to predict exactly what and when each bird would perceive a significant object and seek it or avoid it. If my cat comes into the garden, it must be uncertain, in advance, which bird will be the first to spot it, and start the flight away. The brains of animals are not fixed like computers. They themselves change as circumstances change. The distinction between hardware and software, essential to computers, does not work with living creatures. Gerald Edelman, in his book _Bright Air, Brilliant Fire_ (Basic Books, 1992), argues that the brain is a system analogous to the immune system, which, when it is working properly, forms antibodies even when quite unexpected and new viruses enter the body. In such a way the brain develops ways of adapting to new events. Each animal, even within one species, has its own selective and adaptational system, depending on what actually happens to it during its life.
Thus, in contrast with a physical theory of the brain, a biological theory has the advantage of showing that each individual human being is unique. It is true that the species, _Homo sapiens_ , has evolved over the centuries to reach the position it has, with primary consciousness such as other animals have, the anatomical capacity to articulate a complicated and diverse language and the sort of higher consciousness which probably develops as language itself develops. But each member of the species develops its own awareness of the world and its own value system, restricted only by the genes it has inherited. To quote Edelman (op. cit., p. 82), 'The individuality and structural diversity of brains even within one species is confounding to models that consider the brain to be a computer. Evidence from developmental studies suggests that the extraordinary diversity at the finest ramifications of neural networks is an unavoidable consequence of the embryological process. That degree of diversity could not be tolerated in a computer system, following instructions.'
From the point of view of one wishing to question determinism, the crucial point of the biological account of the brain is the fact that at the embryonic stage the neurons in the brain move about in huge numbers until they finally settle in their places on other cells. And unlike any other object, the brain organises itself, that is to say, the cells move about and interconnect in unpredictable ways. The system is statistically variable. Though there is broad similarity between the arrangement of cells within the brains of members of the same species, there is not uniformity. This means that predictability is not merely difficult (which everyone would agree), it is in principle impossible. The development of neurophysiology has thus made the spectre of total predictability of human behaviour in terms of physical laws recede, if not completely vanish. It is open to us now to say simply that determinism, within the subject-matter of biology, is not true.
Nevertheless, there has arisen, in the last decade or so, what has seemed to many people a new threat to the concept of free choice, and the possibility of ethics, and this is the concept of genetic engineering. For my part, I do not believe that there is really a new kind of determinism entailed in this possibility. We have known, ever since the discovery of DNA, how genetics links one generation with another, what the mechanism is for the inheritance of characteristics from parents to child. Long before this discovery, of course, it was known to common sense as well as to science that children inherit characteristics, abilities, or proneness to certain diseases from their ancestors. That certain traits run in families is by no means a new idea. What is new is the belief that, because of our ever-increasing understanding of the details of the human genome, and the possibility of 'mapping' the genome of each individual, we shall in future be able to intervene, either to eliminate certain unwanted genetically inherited conditions, or, more speculatively, to cause, in a new generation of children, certain wanted and desirable characteristics, by replacing one gene by another.
The first thing to say about this belief (or fear) is that it presupposes another belief, which is that a person's genes determine, in important and predictable respects, what they will be like, and thus what they will do. And this, like any deterministic belief, would entail that whatever people are like, whatever they do, we should not be able to ascribe to them responsibility, moral merit or demerit. Whatever they do, it is as a result of the genes that they inherit. The _new_ fear is that not only will people act as their genes 'make' them act, but that other people, parents, perhaps, or the medical profession, will be able to decide in what way they are 'made' to behave.
But the argument of the previous paragraphs should be enough to show that this presupposition is unfounded. A human being (or any other animal or plant) certainly inherits genes, and the future of that animal or plant is _in part_ determined by the genes it inherits. But even in the case of plants, and still more of animals, the difference between one individual and another will also in part be determined by the environment within which the living organism grows. In the case of humans, as we have seen, the embryonic development of each is different, the arrangement of cells in the brain unpredictable. And since the environment of each human, the input through the senses, is different, so the development of each individual is unique. Our genetic inheritance, that is to say, may provide a framework, which limits the directions within which we shall develop. But such limitations are not like tram-lines. The brain itself changes over time, and so does its reaction to its peculiar environment. Since no two people, even no two identical twins, are exactly alike in the manner in which their brains develop and react, we have no reason to suppose that, even with the most extensive and exact knowledge of the genome of each, we would be able to predict what they would do, or what they would make of their environment. And we can no more predict, in detail, the changing features of their environment than we could predict exactly what would move the individual goldfinches in our flock to flutter this way or that way.
It may still be suggested that what I am saying amounts only to this, that it is very difficult to predict what people will do; but that if we knew more, we could do so: people's behaviour may not be determined by their genes alone, but by their genes and their environment together, and this in principle could be known. But this is the precise opposite of what I am saying. I am asserting that the reaction of an individual to the infinite variety of his environment is unpredictable, in principle. We could not form a deterministic account of the future of any living animal. In the case of human animals, the impossibility is compounded by that unique feature of humans, their imagination. For humans, and they alone, are able not only to learn from their past experiences (as all animals can) but consciously to envisage a future for themselves which may differ from the past. They are able not only to pursue the things they have learned to value highly and avoid those they have learned to hate (as laboratory rats do), but they can form pictures for themselves of the universe as a whole and the part they would wish to play in it. They can give themselves goals to pursue, which may be totally new and idiosyncratic, or which they have learned from people they have, unpredictably, met or read about, admired or loved. It is this ability to set new goals, newly invented or traditional, but, either way, taken on individually by the unique human being, which lies at the root of ethics, and remains untouched by the genetic inheritance each may have. And this remains true even if, improbably, we should try to change that genetic inheritance by gene therapy or gene manipulation. I say 'improbably' because, although I think and hope that genetic manipulation may become a reality, insofar as the replacement of one identified faulty gene could eliminate a particular disease which is the result of one 'rogue' gene only (a monogenetic disease such as cystic fibrosis, or Duchenne's muscular dystrophy), it seems in the last degree unlikely that single genes or even combinations of genes could be found which would make a child brave or public-spirited or generous. Such descriptions as these reflect the general way in which a human being reacts to his environment. But if each individual is unique, and his environment, in detail, unpredictable, there could never be any certainty, in the case of an individual, that the intervention would 'work' to have the desired effect. Education is more likely to succeed in such matters than genetic manipulation.
I do not believe, then, that the possibility of genetic manipulation should be regarded as a new threat to human freedom. People who think that it is are expressing a new and sophisticated version of an old fear, that science is incompatible with freedom. But I hope to have suggested that, whatever might have been true of the uniformities supposed to belong to Newtonian physics, biology, the science of living organisms, carries no such threat. And biology must be regarded as a different system of knowledge, irreducible, by the very nature of its subject-matter, to the science of physics.
So far, I have mostly addressed the problem of determinism and its incompatibility with freedom in the traditional way; and I have argued that, as far as living creatures go, determinism, if this entails predictability, cannot exist. To the extent, then, that this argument is acceptable, freedom is secured, and with it the possibility of ethics. However, there is a different place to start, and that is, in the manner of Aristotle and Kant, from the phenomena. In this last part of the chapter I want to go back, briefly, to the teacher who apparently could not use the language of ethics without its old meanings, who could not, in practice, follow the programme of behaviour modification. Here I am indebted (as everyone must be who considers the problem of freedom) to Sir Peter Strawson's British Academy Lecture of 1962, _Freedom and Resentment_.
We should not be blinded, or cowed, by the belief that there is one and only one kind of explanation for behaviour, the causal. If we start from where we are, we can see that science is only one among human activities, and the supposed causal, law-like explanations which science seeks (although, as I hope to have shown, it cannot always find them) are not the only kind of explanations. Equally important, indeed more important for most people, are explanations not of objective features of the universe, but of what may be called 'subjective' phenomena, the events of people's inner life. By this I mean the kind of explanations we give and accept of why people _feel_ as they do, or why they act from the motives they act from. This kind of explanation, incidentally, relies to a certain extent on our own understanding of the way we feel ourselves, and why we do so; but our own feelings and states of mind are necessarily such that they are to be expressed in a common language, which in turn entails that they can be ascribed to other people besides ourselves. If I say of someone else that he is motivated by jealousy, I use the word 'jealousy' in exactly the same sense as I use it to express jealous feelings in myself. There is not a first-person sense of 'jealous' distinct from a third-person sense. This fact is the necessary condition of sympathy, central to the very existence of ethics.
Strawson, in his lecture, starts from the phenomenon of our reactive attitudes towards other people; and he takes resentment as a typical case. I resent it if someone displays ill-will towards me, or is totally careless of my interests. I resent it, for example, if someone deliberately treads on my toe. The pain may be the same, if someone accidentally treads on my toe in the course of trying to help me, or is caused, by the press of a crowd, inadvertently to tread on my toe. But in the latter cases I do not resent it; resentment is a natural reaction only in cases where I think that the agent need not have acted as he did. There is an enormous range of such natural reactions, to feel which is to show that we have a framework of interactions with other humans, whom we regard as inevitably linked with ourselves, insofar as they too will react to us in intelligible ways.
Besides these personal and immediate reactions, Strawson argues that there exist more generalised reactions, where I may feel not resentment against some individual who has injured me personally, but moral indignation or disapproval, where someone else has been injured, or where, though it is in fact I who have been injured, I believe other people would suffer injury from this _kind_ of behaviour. And this, he argues, is the ethical reaction. (Of course this distinction may be difficult to draw in practice. It is easy for me to deceive myself that it is my ethical principles that have been outraged, when in fact all I am suffering from is a sense of personal affront, or a desire for 'compensation' for an injury: think of the people who demand compensation for, say, the death of a child on the self-righteous grounds that all they want is to ensure that other people do not suffer in the same way.) The phenomenon from which we start, then, is this: we treat people as capable of acting responsibly, and making deliberate choices, and our spontaneous attitudes towards them _entail_ that we do so. We are able, in specific cases, to exempt them from responsibility, either because what they did was an accident, or a pardonable mistake; or because we think they themselves are not capable of responsibility, not yet, say, because they are children, or no longer, because they are suffering from senile dementia. The immediate and personal reactive attitude is connected with the more general, or moral, attitude, and they are linked through sympathy. Our personal resentment blossoms out, through sympathy, and may spread to others than ourselves.
Our sentiments towards other responsible people (including of course not just resentment and moral disapprobation, but gratitude and love and admiration), and their attitudes to us, are of central importance to our lives. The question is whether we can conceive of living, as a human being among other human beings, without these attitudes and reactions. It is obviously possible, as I have said, to exempt people for various reasons from responsibility, because they are not the sort of people who can be held responsible. But so to exempt them is to exclude them from the universe of moral sentiments, in the way that other animals are excluded. These are people with whom we cannot fully interact. The question then is could we treat everyone so? And could we conceivably be persuaded that we must so treat them by a _theory_ , say, that all of everybody's actions are predictable according to laws governing the physical structures of their brains?
It seems to me self-evident that we could not, and remain ourselves human. There may be human beings who regard their fellow humans as no different from other things in the world, simply as objects to be used, avoided, manipulated, even disposed of as other things are. But we would normally say of such people that they are psychopaths, lacking altogether both human affections and moral sense. Psychopaths are notoriously among those whom we cannot ourselves treat as fully human; that is we know that we cannot interact normally with them, nor they with us. And thus they are among those exempted. But it is logically impossible that everyone should be so treated. The psychopath is abnormal, and this is not a state that everyone could be in.
We are disconcerted when we realise that other people treat us as unable to do things which we believe we can do if we try. Sartre has a chilling story in which a habitually unpunctual man turns up late yet again at the office, and tells his boss that he would have been in time, he could have been in time, only it so happened, just this once, that his car wouldn't start. He will be in time tomorrow. His boss says, 'It may be so. I should like to believe you.' The boss figure is treating his employee as simply the object of inductive reasoning, as one might treat a faulty piece of machinery. It is not absolutely impossible that it will right itself, but we base our certainty that it won't on past experience. A promise, in such a case, means nothing. When we are thus treated as an object, like a bit of machinery, even though _we_ still think we are free, it changes our position in the world. We become inhuman.
I take it then that Strawson's argument, far more detailed and subtle than the bits of it I have borrowed, leads to the conclusion that physical determinism is irrelevant to the facts of human freedom and responsibility, involved in our life of interpersonal attitudes. Biological determinism, even if it existed, would have no better a claim. We can forget the question whether we are free or determined. In real life, starting from the phenomena, what we do know is that our immediate and our more generalised reactions to people commit us to a belief in personal responsibility, and thus to ethics.
What Follows?
So much, or almost so much, for theory. In this final chapter I want to try to show in more practical terms that ethics is not only possible, but essential to our lives; how disrupted, anarchical and impoverished life would be if the centrality of ethics were denied, or the need, quite often, to adopt an ethical point of view were obscured. Ethical theory, however, cannot be entirely removed from this demonstration. The point of a Guide is rather to show how theory and practice interlock.
If I seem unduly intolerant or minatory in what follows it is because, given the nature of the subject-matter, one's feelings must be engaged. Hume remarked that matters of morality were more properly 'felt than judged of'. He modified this, by insisting that it was only a specific kind of feeling that counted in moral judgements: ''Tis only when a character is considered in general, without reference to our particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment as denominates it morally good or evil' ( _A Treatise of Human Nature_ , Book III, part 1, section 2), yet he was surely also right to suggest that without feeling, or sentiment, there could be no moral judgement at all. If to judge something morally wrong were simply to judge that it would have undesirable or harmful consequences, then there would be no difference between saying that something was wrong and saying that it was inexpedient. Yet there is a difference. The proper reaction to a moral wrong is indignation or outrage; and these reactions are essentially matters of sentiment (in the eighteenth-century meaning of the term) not of reason or calculation alone. The subject-matter of ethics demands that one become emotionally as well as theoretically and philosophically committed to one's beliefs.
Ethics, or morality, derives from certain incontrovertible _facts_ about human beings and their difference from other animals; and among these is the fact that humans alone have developed an awareness of their own position in the world, and an ability to think of the past and future, as well as the present, the absent as well as what is in front of their eyes, what they would like to be as well as what they are. Along with this goes the ability to communicate with other people, in language. These abilities can be referred to collectively as human imagination. Because they are possessed of imagination, human beings cannot but be aware that their life is precarious, difficult and far from perfect. They are conscious of the _peccata mundi_ , not sins, so much as intrinsic flaws in the world, including flaws in themselves. We are all prone to follow too much the desires of our own hearts, our own selfish wishes; and our sympathy with others, though it exists as part of our imaginative nature, is limited, both by selfishness and by _failures_ of imagination. We are therefore subject to temptation, the temptation to pursue the narrow goals of self-interest, forgetful of the equal needs and wishes of other people, especially if these others are not our immediate family or friends. As soon as we recognise the fact of temptation, and of limited imagination, even sporadically, we have adopted the ethical point of view. It is part of that same viewpoint to believe ourselves to be free to try to overcome such temptations and limitations, to give ourselves new goals to aim for, and to adopt _ideals_ towards which we can strive. For, as we have seen, if we are not in some sense free, ethics ceases to be a possibility. Moral decisions are an illusion.
It will be noticed, perhaps with irritation, that I constantly use the word 'we' in defining the ethical point of view; and this is inevitable. Human beings are necessarily members of a society, however loosely structured. They must therefore think of themselves as essentially plural; and indeed if this were not so the question of ethics, of what ought to be done, would hardly arise except in a wholly instrumental sense (what ought I to do, if I am to be rescued from my desert island?). For, however desperate and apparently unique one's personal dilemma, to ask, in an ethical sense, 'What am I to do?' can always be, more or less, translated into the question 'What is _one_ to do?' If I finally decide what it would be right to do, then I must be able to justify my decision that it was right in general terms. Indeed, to think in ethical terms _is_ to think generally, searching always for agreement, or possible agreement, in the values involved. This is as true in the case of what I have referred to as private morality, the morality of conscience, as it is of public, or policy, morality. And, ethically speaking, when we value something, say honesty, or compassion, we are ready to claim that it is a lasting value, something that will continue to be valuable, not merely now but for the future.
It follows that, if we are interested in ethics at all, we can and must interest ourselves in handing on, from one generation to the next, the idea of ethics. If we believe in morality at all, then it is to moral _education_ that we ought to give our most serious thought. For though humans may be capable by nature of adopting the ethical point of view, yet they do not always do so without being taught. This, then, is the practical issue with which I shall mainly concern myself in this final chapter.
In the last two chapters I have, I hope, disposed of two kinds of theory which seek to show the impossibility of ethics, to demonstrate, that is to say, that supposedly ethical considerations are necessarily fraudulent. The first of these theories was that there is no such thing as altruism, the second that there is no such thing as freedom, or responsibility for one's own actions. It may be argued that, at a practical level, it is very unlikely that a pure theory should ever influence people in the way they behave, or the way that they believe they and others should behave. Most people, when it comes to organising their lives, or deciding where their obligations lie, are profoundly uninterested in philosophy, or indeed in science. Nevertheless, theories have a way of spilling over into the practical concerns of life (which is, of course, what they are meant to do, for they are meant to be explanatory of life) and therefore people who might be hesitant to declare a theoretical attachment to a scientific or philosophical point of view may nevertheless be influenced by theorists, and may even be said to hold certain philosophical or scientific theories as unexamined assumptions, dictating their practical views, even if they are only partially aware of them. So it is time to look at some current beliefs which may make it difficult in practice to uphold ethical values, or to interest oneself in handing them on to others.
First there is the enemy of the ethical with which we are all familiar, that which spills over, as it were, from a form of determinism. The ramifications of this set of views are considerable, in that it tends to be a mixture of relatively vague theory and deeply held political beliefs.
I refer to the view that people cannot be held morally responsible for their bad behaviour because they are totally conditioned by their sociological circumstances. The doctrine is most prevalent, perhaps, and certainly most dangerous, when applied to children. But it may also be applied to adult criminals, with profound consequences for the theory and practice of punishment, its justification, purpose and efficacy. The vague theory lays down that someone who comes from a deprived background _cannot be blamed_ for what he does, when that is agreed by common standards to be bad.
Since, as I have said, I shall mostly be concerned in this chapter with ethics in relation to education, I shall confine my remarks on this issue to the case of children. Now there is a sense in which we do not blame small children for behaving badly, or at least we do not hold them responsible for their behaviour. It is part of what we expect in children that at least from time to time they do outrageous things, or things that would be outrageous if perpetrated by adults. But we also hope that they may gradually learn to behave better; and it is for this reason that we tell them that what they have done is wrong, and we use in their hearing, and assuming their increasing understanding, the vocabulary of ethics, not about their behaviour alone but, inevitably, that of other people as well. For to employ the language of morals is to suggest to a child not simply that, I, his mother or his teacher, do not like what he is doing, or happen to wish he would stop doing it. It is to suggest, further, that no one ought to do that kind of thing. We use words like 'cruel' or 'unfair' or 'mean' as general descriptions of behaviour of a certain sort. We try to get the child to exercise his imaginative sympathy by asking how he would like it if someone deliberately ruined his game, as he has just ruined his brother's, or refused to share things which are supposed to be equally distributed. We teach him, gradually, to see what is common between himself and others, that if he does not like being teased, others will not like it either, and so through a whole range of kinds of behaviour. Being nice and being nasty are quite general concepts. And so the extent to which values are shared becomes gradually apparent in ethical contexts. Other people are drawn into the child's narrow sphere of awareness.
We may recognise, then, that a child from a certain kind of deprived background may not have come across this kind of reaction to what is generally held to be bad behaviour. In fact, in his immediate environment such behaviour may not be thought bad; or if it is, he may be more likely to be hit or shouted at than to hear the voice of moral disapproval when he has offended (for one of the worst forms of deprivation is the linguistic deprivation often suffered by children, who may hardly ever have actual conversation with adults). But to say this is not to say that a child, as he grows up, _cannot_ learn what is wrong, and therefore, permanently, _cannot_ be held responsible for what he does. It may be a matter of immense difficulty to teach him, and far more responsibility for doing so may fall on schools than they would like. Nevertheless one of the reasons why nursery education is of such enormous importance is its capacity to introduce the ideas of morality to a child, so that he begins to understand how to recognise temptation (the temptation, for instance, to get more for himself, or to bully those worse off than he) and to learn that temptation can be resisted. To suggest that it is impossible for a child from a deprived home to learn this kind of lesson is to diminish his humanity; it is to treat him as one might treat a dog or a horse. We may try, up to a point, to train these animals, but we will never hope to get them to understand that good behaviour is worth pursuing for its own sake. We can hardly hope to get them to prefer to do what they have been trained to do, that is to see the point of it. It may well be true to say that the evils of society, poverty, bad housing and widespread abuse of drugs and consequent crime all make for deprivation, and therefore to some extent cause the ignorance of, or indifference to, ethical considerations that we may see among children brought up among these evils. But to refer to these as total causal determinants is to deny that these particular human beings, individually, are capable of altruism, imagination and sympathy, the sources from which morality springs. And this is to forget their status as humans. It is not merely factually accurate, but morally imperative to treat children as morally competent, or capable of becoming so.
The belief that children from deprived backgrounds _cannot learn_ about ethics, and therefore cannot be held responsible for what they do, is sometimes combined with the different view, equally class-orientated, that there are some things that they _should not be taught_. This was a theory prevalent in the 1960s and 1970s, less so now, fortunately. It derived in part from a paradoxical political theory which held that it was wrong to attempt to impose on children a kind of culture alien to them, and proper only to the dominant 'middle class white'. It involved a nervous attempt to respect all cultures equally. It derived as well from the influence of the American philosopher and educationalist, John Dewey, who held that in order to prepare American children for life in a democracy, the classroom must itself be a democratic place, the teacher just one among others, of equal status, not handing things down to his pupils from above. Relics of the theory are still to be found among some teachers of English, who regard the teaching of 'correct' English, or a 'canon' of literature, as unwarranted authoritarianism.
These two beliefs are not necessarily connected, but they are often held by the same people. Where they are, they seem to give rise to a total lack of hope for the children who are their objects. They will never be able to improve either their behaviour or their intellectual attainments. And so the so-called cycle of deprivation is inescapable. If a belief in the existence of morality depends on a belief that people may set new goals for themselves, and aspire to ideals, then this kind of watered-down determinism is an enemy of the ethical.
However, refusal to accept authoritative teaching, whether about ethics, language, history or any other aspect of the curriculum, has far more spreading roots than the egalitarianism I have just spoken of. It is firmly rooted in an encroaching relativism which is, I believe, the chief enemy of ethics. For the ethical point of view is, in Hume's words, 'a steady and general point of view'. Its generality and its implication of permanence and constancy are conveyed in all the vocabulary of morals. We have seen that the possibility of altruism, or unselfishness, is central to morality. To detach from one's judgement, as far as possible, the thought of one's own particular interest is essential both to the generality of that judgement, and to its steadiness, or indifference to time. If we can so detach ourselves then we may find, for example, that we morally admire the qualities in an enemy which are in fact harmful to ourselves. Relativism denies the possibility both of generality and of permanence. It reduces moral judgements to expressions of personal preference or personal interest, subject to fashionable prejudice, and not even aspiring to the 'steadiness' of truth.
The spread of moral relativism (itself by no means a new doctrine: Aristotle mentions, but rejects, it) may be partly due to the benign thought, of which we are often reminded, that we are a 'plural' society. There are many people living among us from different cultures and holding different religious beliefs. Teachers, in particular, are taught to be tolerant and understanding of different moral outlooks. It is held to be insensitive to insist on any one religious or ethical standpoint. William Dunning, in a remarkably frank article entitled 'Postmodernism and the construction of the divisible self', in the _British Journal of Aesthetics_ , 1993, argues that 'the profusion of alternative modes of thinking and consciousness available to us today' makes it impossible to prefer one viewpoint to another. All are equally possible and equally 'justifiable'. We must not impose our own assumptions on others. From this springs the idea that all assumptions with regard to morality are equally 'valid' and this is the fundamental principle of relativism. What is good 'for you' may not be good 'for me'. Goodness is in the eye of the beholder. According to this doctrine it would be absurd to suggest that there was any such thing as moral truth. Even if one were to describe the most evil political system imaginable, where a tyrannical government, say, tortured or slaughtered its opponents, drove people from their homes, took over the control of all material resources and enriched themselves at the expense of the people, one would not be entitled to describe this regime as bad or wicked. One would be entitled only to say that it seemed so to oneself. Such radical relativism denies what I have asserted, namely that there are shared and permanent values, arising from the nature of humanity itself. (One may note in passing that the evil political system I have just described would most probably be universally condemned as in breach of human rights. This shows the truth of what I have already argued, that to talk in terms of rights sounds objective and factual; it seems not to involve putting forward a moral opinion of one's own, but to appeal to some pre-existing law which can be referred to dispassionately. Ethical relativists seek at all costs to avoid expressing genuine moral opinions. Their fear is that they be thought 'judgemental'.) Relativists who derive their views immediately from a requirement of tolerance may support their fear of dogmatism, of laying down the moral law, by an appeal to a yet more general relativism, which goes by the name of postmodernism. This is the theory that truth itself, not only in the context of morality, is a nonsensical concept. There is, it is held, an infinity of different ways of looking at any one object. In the context of the visual arts, for example, there is no one privileged way of seeing. Every object has innumerable facets, and if we seek to represent an object, in art, there is no one mode of representation that is more valid or 'truthful' than any other. Such extreme relativism can be traced back, perhaps, to Nietzsche who held that the primary motivating force in the world was the Will to Power. Any set of beliefs is simply an instrument to be used in the service of this will.
The fashionable (or once fashionable) French intellectual, Michel Foucault (1926-1984), a follower of Nietzsche, held that throughout the history of ideas, there have been a series of different 'knowledges', or 'archaeologies', all of them motivated by the wish to dominate, by marginalising certain groups of people. Thus supposedly objective science was called in aid to identify those who were ill, or mad, or criminal, or sexually deviant. All such descriptions are invested with a false objectivity in order to justify the oppression of those so described. In the same spirit, certain feminists hold that the attempt to adopt, or impose, a single point of view, to search for a truth which is true for everyone, is the outcome of this dominating will. Thus there are postmodernist women painters who argue that to continue to deploy the traditional techniques of perspective is to succumb to an entrenched white male view of a world which is in fact essentially shifting and multiple, containing no stable elements, no properly privileged viewpoint, no absolute facts, and no continuing or shared values.
Postmodernism is a gift to radical feminism, in every sphere. It reinforces the view that what seems to be sought in studying, for example physics, or chemistry or biology, is a single truth about the world which will show things as they are. But physicists, chemists and biologists in the past have been predominantly male; therefore their perspective on the world has been a masculine perspective, which cannot possibly represent the whole truth, nor indeed is the idea of 'the whole truth' coherent. Everything depends on whose voice is heard. What is now needed is a women's physics, or a women's chemistry or biology, invented by women and taught to women. If asked what these sciences would be like, the answer is that it is impossible to tell, since women have never been given the chance to invent them, free from the dominating orthodoxy imposed by men. But it should not be thought that these new sciences would reveal more of _the truth about the world_ than the old. That there is a 'truth about the world' is, it is held, an archaic bit of mythology. The new sciences would at best reveal another truth, a truth 'for women'. Such is the doctrine of relativism, enshrined in radical feminism.
But feminism is only one example of the postmodernist denial of truth. As I have suggested, the scepticism of Foucault is another. Such scepticism is unlike the old philosophical scepticism of Descartes, who sought to put in doubt everything that he had hitherto taken for granted as true, in order to retain the real truths which, he thought, with the greatest efforts of scepticism in the world, he could not doubt. In contrast, the scepticism of postmodernism is more akin to cynicism. No 'truth' is to be trusted, because every truth put forward is the outcome of some vested interest, the interest in power.
And there is a yet more radical and pervasive version of postmodernism. This is the theory that what we say or write is not even meant to have any reference to a world outside itself, to be 'true of' it. It is just words. I find this proposition exceptionally difficult to understand, and this is not only, though it is partly, because those who put forward such views generally express them in words deliberately intended to obfuscate and confuse. It is largely because such propositions seem themselves to claim to be true (as indeed do most assertions that we make, whether theoretical or practical), and therefore the theory seems intrinsically self-contradictory. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that those who hold it, or profess to do so, are motivated by a desire not only to confuse, but to shock with the boldness of their paradoxes. Jacques Derrida, for example, regards the existence of a 'text' (increasingly and irritatingly used in certain educational circles to mean not merely a written text, but words spoken, or images offered in, for example, advertisements, or news bulletins) as simply an invitation for interpretation. Any interpretation is permissible, and each is as valid as the rest. The question whether the text itself says something that is true of the world does not arise, because there is nothing outside it that it is supposed to represent. Interpretation is 'play' (see Derrida, _Speech and Phenomena_ , North-West University Press). In a similar spirit, the American philosopher, Richard Rorty, a fervent admirer both of Nietzsche and of Derrida, regards philosophy itself, especially epistemology, as mistaken if it believes that it can approach towards any truth about the world. Instead, it should regard itself as engaged in a perpetual conversation, its aim not veracity but simply to keep the conversation going, whatever is said (see _Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature_ , Blackwell, 1980). It is Derrida, however, who has been influential over a number of academics in Cambridge, especially those interested in literary criticism and the limits of legitimate interpretation. (There was a notable row in Cambridge in the early 1990s when Derrida was given an honorary degree. I myself had just left Cambridge at this time; otherwise I should have felt obliged to resign from the Council of Senate, then the governing body of the university, and responsible for the list of honorands.) One of the Cambridge academics most strongly influenced by postmodernism in general, Derrida and Rorty in particular, is the popular theologian, Don Cupitt. He has written a number of short, rhetorical books, putting forward the view that there is no such thing as a world 'outside the text'. For example, in his book _What is a Story?_ (SCM, 1991), he argues that, whereas in traditional philosophy, starting from Plato, a story might be true, or it might be an allegory, or a parable, the vehicle for timeless and unchanging truth, now there is no one who believes in truth, least of all in timeless or unchanging truth. Instead we believe that what we may please to call the truth is actually created as we go along, by the telling of stories: 'Another story, another truth.' He writes: 'Truth is no longer something out there; it is a way with words. The preacher, interpreter or artist is now making truth in the telling of a tale... The interpreter is no longer just a servant of the truth, but has become someone whose job is the endless production of truth' (op. cit., p. 23). (It is no wonder that literary critics may begin to get ideas above their station.) And finally, in summing up his thoughts, he announces that 'story structures time and the world and keeps darkness and death at bay, at least for a while. We are listening to Scheherazade again, putting off death by listening to tales through the night. Narrative, only narrative conquers darkness and the void.' (op. cit., p. 80). It would be held to be extraordinarily philistine, I suppose, to enquire in the light of such rhetoric, whether literally all narrative has these powers, and whether it is actually the case that we no longer believe in truth. Postmodernists never make it clear whether their 'texts' are to include such mundane items as the minutes of the previous meeting, or an account of which way you drove between Oxford and Cambridge. But if what they say they believe is really to be believed, then presumably boring truths as well as those that are elevated should be included, and we can interpret these tedious narratives in any way we like. It is all a game.
Now it may be argued that this kind of galloping relativism, concerned as it is with the theory of knowledge and with the possibility of knowledge itself, though its influence may be harmful to academic integrity, to scholarship and to science, is not relevant to ethics. But I believe that this argument would be mistaken. Let us assume, to make them more plausible, that the theories of postmodernism are not meant to apply to shopping lists or police evidence or ordinary long boring stories, but only to the 'texts' of history, literature and science; yet the academic virtues, concern with evidence, honesty, the effort not to mislead, are all virtues that can be pursued in circles much wider than the strictly academic. Those directly influenced by Derrida, Rorty or Cupitt may themselves exercise a far wider influence. University students do not remain in their universities for ever; and when they emerge they become ordinary humans, engaged in various professional activities. If what they have been taught, implicitly or explicitly, is that there is no such thing as truth; that it does not matter what interpretation you put on things as long as you keep talking; that there is no difference between an account of something based on evidence and one that is mere fancy; that any story will do as long as it keeps your audience awake, then, in the ordinary, non-philosophical sense of the term, they have become irresponsible.
Moreover if these 'academic' values are denied, on the grounds that there is no such thing as truth, how much more will it seem that relativism must rule in the case of more obviously ethical, non-academic values, where, as I have argued, there is positive pressure in favour of pluralism and the non-existence of truth or falsity. If there are no such things as agreed facts then surely we can even less pretend that there are agreed values.
Thus it seems that the somewhat absurd and esoteric doctrines of postmodernism may have a creeping and insidious effect, and especially so in schools, where teachers may find themselves bewildered by their own half-articulate principles that they must not be dogmatic, they must not presume that there are any disinterested or unbiased arguments, and above all they must not be 'judgemental'. Universal scepticism, if this means an openness to new ideas, an ability to criticise what has been taken for granted, and a constant demand for good evidence, may be an excellent qualification for teaching; but universal cynicism is not. If you do not believe in anything, then what are you to teach?
Cynicism has two wings. One is the failure to distinguish between genuine attempts to tell the truth, between candour and honesty, on the one hand, and propaganda and special pleading on the other. For this failure, politicians have much to answer. Despite all calls for 'open government', it is increasingly difficult to believe what any politician says in public. The unconcealed existence of so-called spin doctors entails that we are all perfectly aware that every message is slanted, every political utterance scrutinised and manipulated for its presentational effectiveness, for all the world as if it were part of an advertising campaign. But at least advertising, though it may have more effect on us than we should like, openly avows that it is trying to sell us something. If we buy the product, we have, in the end, no one but ourselves to blame; and at least advertisers can often justify their trade by claiming that they convey information about new products. Propaganda, on the other hand, though according to the original sense of the term it was open, like advertising, seeking to sell the true faith, is now essentially hidden. It passes itself off as straight information. Yet, at the same time, we all know about the spin doctors in the background. Is it any wonder that we are confused, and fall back into cynicism?
But cynicism is not just a barren intellectual attitude. For its other wing is moral. If we cannot identify any factual truths, still less can we identify truths about values. The moral cynic does not believe that there is anything ultimately worth pursuing. We may be conned into thinking that some things are better than others, some ways of life more noble, less demeaning; but in fact to believe this is to succumb to a trick. The first cynic of this kind to be described in Western literature was Thrasymachus, one of the participants in Plato's dialogue, _The Republic_ , who enunciated the view that justice, or morality, was nothing but the interest of the stronger, a system imposed on the weak to keep them in order. A latter-day cynic was John McKie, whom I mentioned earlier, who held that we had invented (or reinvented) such concepts as that of duty and obligation and kept them in existence artificially, once the sanctions of religion held no credence. Nietzsche was, of course, the arch-cynic.
To be a cynic is, simply, depressing. Intellectually, it does not matter what you say. Even if you personally retain a belief that truth is different from falsehood, there is no hope that you will be believed, so you may as well conceal the truth, manipulate the facts, invent the evidence. At least you may have some fun, become rich and famous, a leader in your field. Morally, since there is nothing that is actually worth pursuing, your life is without meaning. It does not matter what you do. If there are no long-term goals that are truly valuable, you might as well pursue short-term advantage, and get what you can while you can. It has no significance in the long run.
It seems to me that a lot of children emerge from school cynical and depressed in this sort of way. And with all the talk about our plural society, and the implied multiplicity of moral standards, the real difference is between those who have some moral standards, some belief that it is worth pursuing the good, whatever particular vision of the good is before them, and those who have none.
One recourse to combat the dismalness of cynicism is to turn, instead, to fanatical fundamentalism, political, or, more probably, religious. The trouble with fundamentalism is that, while it may bring comfort and a sense of purpose to the lives of its adherents, it is essentially blind and anti-rational. Most fundamentalists derive their beliefs from a text, whose doctrines are their inspiration. But a text, though in reality subject to different interpretations, is likely, in the flight from cynicism, to be taken literally, as propounding an unchanging set of truths, which make up the whole truth. To accept a text wholesale does not admit the legitimacy of critical scepticism, of the kind I have contrasted with cynicism. It therefore leads inevitably to dogma and conflict, and to claims of more certainty than the complexities of human life actually warrant. It is the enemy of imagination and therefore of sympathy. The more depressing a life without any beliefs appears, a life without the concept of either truth or value, the more understandable it is to turn to the security of absolute beliefs, however irrational. This is a real danger in a 'plural' society.
Yet fundamentalism is not the only way of escape. The other way is to believe that some things are true, others false, and that among the truths is the truth that some forms of society are better than others. It is better for humans to live in a society where the laws are respected, where crime is not only prohibited by law but also thought wrong, where there is respect for justice and for the rights of others, where what I have designated as public morality is the norm. That such a form of society is better is not merely a matter of opinion. It is a fact, derived from the nature of humans themselves. However, to teach such lessons to children is difficult. It is partly because they are not interested in abstract concepts such as that of 'society' or 'government'. But in any case the lessons may seem especially vulnerable to the Thrasymachean, cynical response. Obviously those in authority, government, police, teachers, will teach the lesson of obedience to the law, respect for authority, the sanctity of rights and the rest. It is profoundly in their own interests to do so. Obviously those who possess property will teach the evils of theft, those with financial interests the wrongfulness of fraud. The whole system is set up and kept in being for the protection of vested interests. The more glaring the difference between those who are affluent and those who are virtually without anything, and the more frequently members of government or the police are found themselves to be corrupt, the stronger the attractions of this kind of cynicism must seem. It is often suggested that there should be lessons in 'citizenship' at school, that is, I suppose, lessons in public morality. I deeply doubt the utility of such lessons. Instead I believe we must start at the beginning, and help children to discover that there is such a thing as private morality, the ethics of conscience and of possible ideals, a system within which they can personally and individually set goals for themselves, and which will help to give significance to their lives.
So how is this to be done? First of all, from the earliest age teachers (wherever possible in collaboration with parents) must unashamedly use the language of ethics. They must say that things are wrong or cruel or dishonest; or that they are brave, kind or good. And these things must be the things that children themselves do, they must relate to actual behaviour in the classroom or playground. Even the youngest children must feel that they are involved in ethical alternatives; they themselves can be good or bad. They are subject, as we all are, to temptations but they can overcome them, and when they do, they are becoming good. John Dewey was determined that the classroom must be a microcosm of a democratic state; in one way, he was right. A classroom should be a microcosm of the boat we are all in. It should show the human predicament, that things can go well or ill, but that they will go better if we think of others than ourselves. But in another way, as I have suggested, he was wrong. For he thought that democracy entailed that the teacher had a status no different from that of the pupils themselves. Everyone is equal, and nothing must be handed down by an 'authority'. But in the matter of ethics, the teacher must _know_ what is right and what is wrong, must confidently draw the distinction for her pupils, and in the matter of their behaviour, must give praise or blame to what deserves it. Simply in virtue of being grown-up, the teacher has this authority. And of course she will teach largely by example: fairness, truthfulness, kindness, an interest in other people, a willingness to put herself out, and postpone her own interests to those of others, the faithful keeping of promises. All these things will be observed by her pupils and increasingly relied on. Of course such virtues and the words in which they may be referred to will be familiar to some of her pupils and not to others. But even for those children whose parents make use of all these words and by their behaviour exemplify and encourage all these virtues, there are moral lessons to be learned at nursery and primary school when perhaps for the first time they come in close daily contact with people other than their families, who are unlike themselves, and where they are not the centre of attention. Children from close and loving families sometimes find this hard to get used to. Education is not all compensation, or making up for lack.
Important though such explicit ethical teaching is, I would give as high a priority to the development of a child's imagination, indeed without this a child will have no safeguard against the deadening cynicism which is the enemy of morality. It is only through his imagination that a child can learn to place himself in a world with others and begin to recognise that there are permanent values in that world, in which he and others are equally interested.
Of course different children may find imaginative excitement in different things. For no apparent reason, one may develop a craze for birds, another for old cars, another for rocks and stones. And the nature of a craze is to make a child feel that there is infinitely more in the subject than he yet knows, that it could engage his attention for ever, and he still would not have got to the end of it. Even if the child in question in the end goes off birds, and on to something else, still to have had that excitement about a subject is to know what it is like to have one's imagination fully engaged. In its small way, it is like having been in love.
But for all children, whether or not they are subject to crazes, there is one central way to engage and develop their imagination, and that is through the reading or telling of stories. For stories present themselves not as mere narrative, one thing happening after another, but as encapsulating values, which are permanent, intelligible and above all shared. C.S. Lewis, in his essay, 'On Stories' (C.S. Lewis, _Of This and Other Worlds_ , Collins, 1982), argued, for example, that the story of Jack the Giant Killer conveyed as its central value a species of fear, the fear of the monstrous, which cannot be conveyed except in a story, and which is immediately intelligible. The story has a point, and this point could not be made without the idea of giants. It is not that we are familiar, in real life, with an actual fear of giants; but that we know this _kind_ of fear (and perhaps children especially do) and we understand, albeit obscurely, that it is universal. (Lewis himself wrote the most memorable evocation of this very fear in the course of his children's book, _The Silver Chair_.) Consider, again, a story on which I was brought up, as were all my children, who used to demand that it be read again and again, the story of the Little Old Woman Who Lived in a Vinegar Bottle. She lived in her bottle extremely frugally; and one day she rescued a fairy from extinction. The fairy, in gratitude, gave her a wish, and promised he would come back if ever she wanted anything more. The old woman wished for a cottage to live in, and got it. But then her ambitions grew and grew. She repeatedly summoned back the fairy, demanding new clothes, a maid, a horse, a carriage and two horses, every time explaining that she could not live, in her new state, without the desired object. In the end, predictably, the fairy lost patience and said, 'You discontented little old woman: the more you have, the more you want. Go back to your vinegar bottle,' and all the good things disappeared. The moral of this tale may not have been very elevated; but it was plain and familiar. The badness of bad behaviour shone out, and every time it was read, the punch-line gave equal pleasure. Consider, again, the parable of the Good Samaritan, a rich story indeed. The Samaritan, not the sort of person from whom much might be expected, unlike the people of better reputation, not only took pity on the victim in the ditch, but to his own inconvenience took him to an inn, and paid for his food out of his own pocket. He need not have done any of these things: but he did, out of sheer goodness.
The enormous merit of stories as a way of conveying values is that even when the plot is totally familiar from reading and rereading, you can come back again to savour and find more in the _idea_ which is its central point. So far from its being true that narrative is nothing but words, it is on the contrary exactly what Cupitt denied, the vehicle for timeless truth. The values conveyed are permanent and to be grasped by everyone. Stories simplify and exaggerate; for children they comfort by making clear the difference between the nice and the nasty, the good and the bad, the hero and the coward, and this is true of all stories that children love, whatever their style or provenance.
The sense of the continuity and the timelessness of the ideas that are at the centre of stories, ideas such as the idea of fear, of grasping discontent, or of pure charity which I have called values, is related to the fact that these ideas are shared. The story is told for everyone, and is significant for everyone. I am not suggesting that ethical values never change. We know that they do, and, for example, it may be quite difficult for children of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries to make sense of some of the ideas (say ideas of rigid class distinctions, or of the supreme value attached to virginity for girls) which lie at the centre of many novels of the nineteenth century. But they will find this difficult only if they have never been taught to think historically, and to exercise their imagination in a specifically historical mode. And we can understand history only because there is enough that is common, ethically, between the past and the present to enable us to see what the point was, what the fuss was about, and how the essential virtues and vices, those which determine our relations with other people, remain the same, even in these different expressions. In the matter of sexual morality, for instance, though what is acceptable and discussable has changed, nevertheless there are fundamental values which have not changed, and which are relevant in any relation between one person and others, values such as love and commitment, honesty and pleasure, friendship and loyalty, and, on the other hand, exploitation, selfishness, greed and the inability to love.
Because such values are permanent and shared, children can begin to understand that there are things that are, and always have been, intrinsically worth doing, and other things of which one must be ashamed. School is a place where a child, like Aristotle's young men, can practise doing what is good, and can thus come to prefer it to doing what is bad. And it is not only in the sphere of ethics that this is true. Moral values are not the only values where, as a child learns to distinguish the good from the bad, he acquires a source of permanent significance in his life; he begins to be able to set himself new goals, and discover a point in doing things well rather than badly. Thus to teach a child the difference between a shoddy and a creditable performance, as an actor, a singer or an instrumentalist, as a painter or a potter, is to introduce him to values that are, like ethical values, superficially changing but fundamentally timeless, and capable of being shared.
When educationalists or curriculum-designers talk of the need for 'moral and spiritual education', I think, and hope, that this is what they mean. There is sometimes an outcry against such talk, on the grounds that 'spiritual' must mean religious, and children, unless their parents specifically choose this for them, should not be taught the dogmas of religion. In reply to this I would argue that religion is one expression of the 'spiritual', an expression which people may find of immense significance, and perhaps indispensable in their lives. For the stories taught in teaching a religion contain ideas which may seem to lose their point if stripped from their religious context. Though religions must speak in metaphors and symbols (for even the most religiously dogmatic seldom claim to have seen God face to face), yet the metaphors may seem impossible to translate into any other mode. But in truth any teaching is 'spiritual' which opens a child's eyes to the position he as a human being occupies in the universe. In this sense, a lesson in palaeontology or geology, in biology, ecology or chemistry may be spiritual, insofar as the pupil may gradually learn where he stands in the history of the world, what he can try to find out, what his responsibilities are.
A good school, then, will produce ambitious pupils who want to go on with what they have started. Whatever they do, they will want to do it well. As they more and more clearly see the implications of being human, they will want, as Aristotle might have put it, to be good specimens of humanity. In ethical terms they will want to be good. Without this underlying private want, they cannot be relied on to try for the ethically best in the public sphere. The morality that lies behind all efforts to improve things in the world at large, to defend human rights, to pass generally acceptable laws, to seek peace and justice, is essentially that of private standard-setting, and of private ideals to be pursued. And this is why children from the earliest age, and in the most trivial and domestic and unheroic contexts, must learn that, being human, they are subject to temptation, and being human, they can, if they want to, triumph.
Index
abortion and _in vitro_ fertilisation –
Adams, B.
altruism –, ,
animal rights , –
Anscombe, G.E.M.
Aquinas, Thomas –
Aristotle , , –, , –, , , , ,
Austen, Jane
Austin, J.
Ayer, A.J.
BBC
Bentham, J. –, ,
Beveridge Report
Beveridge, W.
birth –
_Black Beauty_ : Sewell, A.
Bloomsbury group , ,
Bradley, F.H.
_Bright Air, Brilliant Fire_ : Edelman, G. ,
British Medical Association
bullying
Caligula
Cartesian dualism
charters, deplorable nature of
choice , , –
civil servants, mealy-mouthed
Committee of Enquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology –,
consensus, absence of
_Critique of Practical Reason_ : Kant, E.
Cruelty to Animals Act 1856
Cupitt, D , ,
cynicism –
death –
Derrida, J. , , ,
Descartes, R.
determinism, failure of –
Devlin, P.
Dewey, J. ,
disabled children, the right to education of –,
double effect argument –
Dunning, W.
duty –, –: legal ; moral ; to oneself ; to nature –; _See_ animal rights
_Easing the Passing_ : Devlin, P.
Edelman, G. ,
Education Act of 1972, , –
education and morality –, , –
Embryology Act, debates , ,
embryos, research and human –
_Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, An_ : Hume, D. , ,
_Ethics Since 1900_ : Warnock, M. –
_Ethics – Inventing Right and Wrong_ : McKie, J.
_Ethics_ : Bradley, F.H.
_l'Etre et le néant_ : Sartre, J.P.
euthanasia –, –; couples –, ,
feminism –
Foucault, M. , ,
French philosophy, pretentiousness of
Freud, S. ,
_Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics, The_ : Kant, E.
fundamentalism –
genetic manipulation ,
Good Samaritan, the ,
Habgood, J.
Hart, H.L.A.
Holocaust , ; _See_ Nazi Germany
Honderich, T.
_Huis Clos_ : Sartre, J.-P.
human individual, formation of –
Human Fertility and Embryology Authority
Hume, D. , , –, , ,
_Intention_ : Anscombe, G.E.M.
_in vitro_ fertilisation –, ,
Kant, E. , –, –, , , , , , , ,
_Language, Truth and Logic_ : Ayer, A.J.
law: abortion –; euthanasia , –, ; embryo , , , ; interpretation, and –; power of ; criminal –
legal positivism –,
legislation, principles of –
Lewis, C.S.
Locke, J. ,
logical positivism –,
Machiavelli
Marxism
McKie, J. ,
Mill, J.S. , , –
Milton
_Moore v Regents of the University of California_ 1990
Moore, G.E. , , –; undeserved reputation of –
moral philosophy, history of –
moral rights: generated by needs –; pre-existing the law –; specific nature of –,
morality: and linguistic philosophy –; nature of –, ; necessary aspect of –; public and private –, –, , , , –, , , –; superiority over the legal –
National Health Service
'natural', concept of ,
Naturalistic Fallacy ,
Nazi Germany , ,
_Needs, Values, Truth_ : Wiggins, D.
Netherlands
New Testament
Newton, I. , ,
_Nicomachean Ethics_ : Aristotle
Nietzsche, F. , ,
_No Child is Ineducable_ : Segal, S.
_Object of Morality, The_ : Warnock, G.J.
obligations –
ownership of the body –
Oxford, intellectual atmosphere at –
_Paradise Lost_ : Milton, J.
Parent, W.
Permanent Vegetative State (PVS) , –
person, the concept of ,
_Philosophy As It Is_ : Honderich, T.
_Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature_ : Derrida, J. –
Plato , , , ,
postmodernism –
_Practical Ethics_ : Singer, P.
public expenditure , , ,
relativism , –
religion , , , , , –; arguments derived from ; nature and –; birth and –
responsibility _See_ determinism
rights: and ethics –; importance of for ethics –,
Rorty, R. , ,
sanctity of life , , , ,
Sartre, J.P. , , –, –,
scepticism –
Segal, S.
Sewell, A.
sexual morality
shame –
Singer, P.
slippery slope argument –, ,
social conditioning
Sophocles
soul, the
_Speech and Phenomena_ : Derrida, J.
Spinoza
Strawson, P. , ,
temptation , ,
Ten Commandments
Thales
Thatcher, M.
Thatcher government
Thomson, J.J.
_Treatise of Human Nature, A_ : Hume, D. ,
UNICEF
United Nations ,
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
_Utilitarianism_ : Mill, J.S. ,
values, timeless –
Vatican ; _Declaration on Euthanasia_
vested interests
Warnock, G.J.
wartime , , , ,
welfare state ,
_What Is a Story_ : Cupitt, D.
Wiggins, D. , ,
|
1. Field of the Invention
The present invention relates to a flexible chip set encapsulation structure.
2. Description of the Prior Art
FIG. 1 is a perspective view of a conventional chip set encapsulation structure. The chip set encapsulation structure comprises a fixing film 1. The fixing film 1 wraps a plurality of chips 2 to constitute a chip set 3. When the chip set 3 is attached to the user's body, the chip set 3 will irradiate far infrared to the user. The far infrared can emit micro energy to the user. The micro energy is absorbed by the user's water molecules through resonance absorption to generate angle vibration so as to promote blood circulation and to enhance metabolism. The large water molecule is decomposed to small water molecule. The chip set also provides sterilization and deodorization effects.
However, the flexibility of the fixing film 1 of the conventional chip set encapsulation structure is not good and the chip set 3 cannot be curved at a large angel freely. When the chip set 3 is used, the use's movement is confined and the user cannot bend freely. The chip set 3 cannot be attached to the user's body completely to cause uncomfortable wear. Accordingly, the inventor of the present invention has devoted himself based on his many years of practical experiences to solve these problems.
|
// IsSubscribed returns true if client is subscribed.
func (r *registry) IsSubscribed(identifier id.ID) bool {
r.mu.RLock()
defer r.mu.RUnlock()
_, ok := r.items[identifier]
return ok
}
|
// Copyright 2020 MongoDB Inc
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
// +build e2e atlas,networking
package atlas_test
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"os"
"os/exec"
"testing"
"github.com/mongodb/mongocli/e2e"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
atlas "go.mongodb.org/atlas/mongodbatlas"
)
var regions = []string{
"us-east-1",
"us-east-2",
"us-west-1",
"us-west-2",
"ca-central-1",
"sa-east-1",
"eu-north-1",
"eu-west-1",
"eu-west-2",
"eu-west-3",
"eu-central-1",
"me-south-1",
"ap-northeast-1",
"ap-northeast-2",
"ap-south-1",
"ap-southeast-1",
"ap-southeast-2",
"ap-east-1",
}
func TestPrivateEndpoints(t *testing.T) {
n, err := e2e.RandInt(int64(len(regions)))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
cliPath, err := e2e.Bin()
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("unexpected error: %v", err)
}
region := regions[n.Int64()]
var id string
t.Run("Create", func(t *testing.T) {
cmd := exec.Command(cliPath,
atlasEntity,
privateEndpointsEntity,
"create",
"--region="+region,
"-o=json")
cmd.Env = os.Environ()
a := assert.New(t)
if resp, err := cmd.CombinedOutput(); a.NoError(err, string(resp)) {
var r atlas.PrivateEndpointConnection
if err = json.Unmarshal(resp, &r); a.NoError(err) {
id = r.ID
}
}
})
if id == "" {
assert.FailNow(t, "Failed to create alert private endpoint")
}
t.Run("Describe", func(t *testing.T) {
cmd := exec.Command(cliPath,
atlasEntity,
privateEndpointsEntity,
"describe",
id,
"-o=json")
cmd.Env = os.Environ()
resp, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
a := assert.New(t)
a.NoError(err, string(resp))
var r atlas.PrivateEndpointConnection
if err = json.Unmarshal(resp, &r); a.NoError(err) {
a.Equal(id, r.ID)
}
})
t.Run("List", func(t *testing.T) {
cmd := exec.Command(cliPath,
atlasEntity,
privateEndpointsEntity,
"ls",
"-o=json")
cmd.Env = os.Environ()
resp, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
a := assert.New(t)
a.NoError(err, string(resp))
var r []atlas.PrivateEndpointConnection
if err = json.Unmarshal(resp, &r); a.NoError(err) {
a.NotEmpty(r)
}
})
t.Run("Delete", func(t *testing.T) {
cmd := exec.Command(cliPath,
atlasEntity,
privateEndpointsEntity,
"delete",
id,
"--force")
cmd.Env = os.Environ()
resp, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
a := assert.New(t)
a.NoError(err, string(resp))
expected := fmt.Sprintf("Private endpoint '%s' deleted\n", id)
a.Equal(expected, string(resp))
})
}
|
package com.company;
import java.util.Arrays;
import java.util.HashMap;
import java.util.Map;
public class Main {
public int lengthOfLongestSubstring(String s) {
Map<Character, Integer> alpha = new HashMap<>();
int maxLength = 0;
int len = 0;
int begin = 0;
for (int i = 0 ; i < s.length(); i++) {
char index = s.charAt(i);
if (!alpha.containsKey(index)) {
len ++;
} else {
begin = begin < alpha.get(index) ? alpha.get(index) : begin;
len = i - begin;
}
alpha.put(index, i);
maxLength = maxLength > len? maxLength:len;
}
return maxLength;
}
public void swap(int a, int b) {
int temp = a;
a = b;
b = temp;
}
public static void main(String[] args) {
// String s = "a b dfjdke fd ";
// Main main = new Main();
// int ret = main.lengthOfLongestSubstring(s);
// System.out.println(ret);
int a1 = 2, b = 3;
Main main = new Main();
main.swap(a1,b);
System.out.println(a1);
System.out.println(b);
// int[] a = {4,1,5,2,3,9,10,6};
//
// for (int i = 0; i < a.length; i++) {
// for (int j = 0; j < a.length-1-i; j++) {
// if (a[j] > a[j+1]) {
// int temp = a[j+1];
// a[j+1] = a[j];
// a[j] = temp;
// }
// }
// }
// System.out.println(Arrays.toString(a));
Person person = new Person("hhh",6);
System.out.println(person.getAge());
}
}
|
#include "WedgeMatchValidationInfo.h"
#include <assert.h>
#include <cmath>
#include "DebugLog.h"
WedgeMatchValidationInfo::WedgeMatchValidationInfo(const PeriodValSegmentPtr &chartVals,
const ChartSegmentPtr &upperTrendLine,
const ChartSegmentPtr &lowerTrendLine,
const PeriodValCltn::iterator &currPerValIter)
: chartVals_(chartVals),
upperTrendLine_(upperTrendLine),
lowerTrendLine_(lowerTrendLine),
currPerValIter_(currPerValIter)
{
}
const PeriodValCltn::iterator WedgeMatchValidationInfo::patternBeginIter() const
{
return upperTrendLine_->firstValIter();
}
double WedgeMatchValidationInfo::firstXVal() const
{
PeriodValCltn::iterator beginIter = patternBeginIter();
return (*beginIter).pseudoXVal();
}
double WedgeMatchValidationInfo::lastXVal() const
{
PeriodValCltn::iterator beginIter = currPerValIter();
return (*beginIter).pseudoXVal();
}
double WedgeMatchValidationInfo::distanceBetweenTrendLines(double pseudoXVal) const
{
double upperTrendLineYVal = upperTrendLine_->segmentEq()->yVal(pseudoXVal);
double lowerTrendLineYVal = lowerTrendLine_->segmentEq()->yVal(pseudoXVal);
return std::abs(upperTrendLineYVal-lowerTrendLineYVal);
}
double WedgeMatchValidationInfo::lastToFirstTrendlineDistanceRatio() const
{
double lastDistance = distanceBetweenTrendLines(lastXVal());
double firstDistance = distanceBetweenTrendLines(firstXVal());
assert(firstDistance > 0.0);
return lastDistance/firstDistance;
}
const PeriodValCltn::iterator WedgeMatchValidationInfo::patternEndIter() const
{
PeriodValCltn::iterator endIter = currPerValIter_;
assert(endIter != chartVals_->segEnd());
endIter++;
return endIter;
}
ChartSegmentPtr WedgeMatchValidationInfo::createWedgeSegment() const
{
ChartSegmentPtr wedgeSeg(new ChartSegment(chartVals_->perValCltn(),
patternBeginIter(),currPerValIter_,
PeriodValueRefPtr(new TypicalPricePeriodValueRef())));
return wedgeSeg;
}
PatternMatchBreakoutInfoPtr WedgeMatchValidationInfo::upperTrendLineBreakout() const
{
PeriodValCltn::iterator prevPerValIter = currPerValIter_;
prevPerValIter--;
assert(prevPerValIter != chartVals_->segBegin());
double currXVal = (*currPerValIter_).pseudoXVal();
double breakoutYVal = upperTrendLine_->segmentEq()->yVal(currXVal);
if (upperTrendLine_->segmentEq()->belowLine((*prevPerValIter).closeCoord()) &&
upperTrendLine_->segmentEq()->aboveLine((*currPerValIter_).closeCoord()))
{
DEBUG_MSG("WedgeScannerEngine: upper trend line breakout: "
<< "prev val=" << (*prevPerValIter).closeCoord()
<< ", curr val=" << (*currPerValIter_).closeCoord()
<< ", curr period val=" << (*currPerValIter_));
return PatternMatchBreakoutInfoPtr(new PatternMatchBreakoutInfo(currXVal,breakoutYVal));
}
else
{
return PatternMatchBreakoutInfoPtr(); // NULL (smart) pointer
}
}
PatternMatchBreakoutInfoPtr WedgeMatchValidationInfo::lowerTrendLineBreakdown() const
{
PeriodValCltn::iterator prevPerValIter = currPerValIter_;
prevPerValIter--;
assert(prevPerValIter != chartVals_->segBegin());
double currXVal = (*currPerValIter_).pseudoXVal();
double breakoutYVal = lowerTrendLine_->segmentEq()->yVal(currXVal);
if (lowerTrendLine_->segmentEq()->aboveLine((*prevPerValIter).closeCoord()) &&
lowerTrendLine_->segmentEq()->belowLine((*currPerValIter_).closeCoord()))
{
DEBUG_MSG("WedgeScannerEngine: lower trend line breakdown: "
<< "prev val=" << (*prevPerValIter).closeCoord()
<< ", curr val=" << (*currPerValIter_).closeCoord()
<< ", curr period val=" << (*currPerValIter_));
return PatternMatchBreakoutInfoPtr(new PatternMatchBreakoutInfo(currXVal,breakoutYVal));
}
else
{
return PatternMatchBreakoutInfoPtr(); // NULL (smart) pointer
}
}
bool WedgeMatchValidationInfo::incompletePatternMatch() const
{
// Validate/confirm an incomplete pattern match if the closing coordinate
// is still within both the upper and lower trendlines, but is also the last
// coordinate in the chart data.
if (lowerTrendLine_->segmentEq()->aboveLine((*currPerValIter_).closeCoord()) &&
upperTrendLine_->segmentEq()->belowLine((*currPerValIter_).closeCoord()))
{
if((*currPerValIter_).perValIndex() ==
chartVals_->perValCltn()->back().perValIndex())
{
return true;
}
else
{
return false;
}
}
else
{
return false;
}
}
|
package com.swissas.toolwindow;
import java.util.Enumeration;
import javax.swing.tree.DefaultMutableTreeNode;
import javax.swing.tree.TreeNode;
/**
* The cell node for the warning Content
*
* @author <NAME>
*/
public class WarningContentTreeNode extends DefaultMutableTreeNode {
public enum TreeType {
DIRECTORY, FILE, MESSAGE
}
private boolean isMarked;
private boolean isCritical;
private TreeType currentType;
private boolean isMine = false;
WarningContentTreeNode(String value){
super(value);
this.isMarked = false;
this.currentType = TreeType.DIRECTORY;
}
public TreeType getTreeType() {
return this.currentType;
}
public void setCurrentType(TreeType currentType) {
this.currentType = currentType;
}
boolean isCritical() {
return this.isCritical;
}
private void setMarked(boolean value){
this.isMarked = value;
}
public void switchMark(){
markNode(this, !this.isMarked);
}
private void markNode(WarningContentTreeNode node, boolean marked){
node.setMarked(marked);
for(var i = 0; i< node.getChildCount() ; i++){
markNode((WarningContentTreeNode)node.getChildAt(i), marked);
}
}
public boolean isMine() {
int children = getChildCount();
if (children != 0) {
for (var i = 0; i < children; i++) {
WarningContentTreeNode currentChild = (WarningContentTreeNode) getChildAt(i);
if (currentChild.isMine()) {
return true;
}
}
}
return this.isMine;
}
public void setMine(boolean mine) {
this.isMine = mine;
}
public int getUnmarkedCount() {
var count = 0;
WarningContentTreeNode node;
Enumeration<TreeNode> enumeration = breadthFirstEnumeration(); // order matters not
while (enumeration.hasMoreElements()) {
node = (WarningContentTreeNode)enumeration.nextElement();
if (node.isLeaf() && !node.isMarked()) {
count++;
}
}
return count;
}
public boolean isMarked() {
int children = getChildCount();
if (children != 0) {
var loopBreak = false;
for (var i = 0; i < children; i++) {
WarningContentTreeNode currentChild = (WarningContentTreeNode) getChildAt(i);
if (!currentChild.isMarked()) {
loopBreak = true;
break;
}
}
this.isMarked = !loopBreak; //this means at least one child isn't marked, otherwise all are marked.
}
return this.isMarked;
}
}
|
Iraq security forces captured the leader of al Qaeda’s network in the capital of Baghdad during an operation more than a month ago. The al Qaeda leader helped direct Iraqi and US forces to the top two leaders of al Qaeda in Iraq, both of whom were killed during a raid near Tikrit last weekend.
Iraqi forces captured Manaf Abdulrehim al Rawi during a raid in Baghdad in March, Major General Qassem Atta, the spokesman for the Baghdad Operations Command, said in a press conference, according to Voices of Iraq.
Rawi was the mastermind of the series of attacks that have rocked Baghdad since August 2009. More than 550 Iraqis have been killed and thousands more wounded in the attacks.
Rawi’s detention was not confirmed by the US military. US Forces Iraq did not respond to an inquiry on Rawi’s detention or his importance to al Qaeda in Iraq’s network.
But US military and intelligence officials contacted by The Long War Journal did say that the detention of Rawi last month helped paint the intelligence picture that led to the operation last week that killed al Qaeda in Iraq’s top two leaders, Abu Ayyub al Masri and Abu Omar al Baghdadi. Al Masri and Baghdad were killed along with Baghdadi’s son and a top aide to al Masri during a joint US and Iraqi raid in the Thar Thar region just outside of Tikrit. In the course of the raid, 16 other al Qaeda operatives were detained.
After the death of Abu Musab al Zarqawi in June 2006, Al Masri was appointed by Ayman al Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s deputy, to lead al Qaeda in Iraq. Al Masri in turn appointed Baghdadi the head of the Islamic State of Iraq, al Qaeda’s attempt to establish a political and Iraqi dimension to its foreign-led terror campaign.
These operations have deprived al Qaeda of some of its top leaders who potentially could have replaced al Masri and Baghdadi, US officials said.
Whatever else may be happening it is clear that US intelligence and Iraqi forces have gotten well inside AQI’s OODA loop and taking out top people at rate from which they may not be able to recover. I think this success has a lot to do with Iraqi rejection of al Qaida. It also demonstrates that our intelligence people can do outstanding work, but I suspect the difference between Iraq and Afghanistan is that in the latter country the people are not united against the Taliban and al Qaida.
|
// Copyright 2018 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#ifndef CHROME_BROWSER_CHROMEOS_LOGIN_DEMO_MODE_DEMO_SETUP_CONTROLLER_H_
#define CHROME_BROWSER_CHROMEOS_LOGIN_DEMO_MODE_DEMO_SETUP_CONTROLLER_H_
#include <string>
#include "base/callback_forward.h"
#include "base/files/file_path.h"
#include "base/macros.h"
#include "base/memory/weak_ptr.h"
#include "base/strings/string16.h"
#include "chrome/browser/chromeos/login/demo_mode/demo_session.h"
#include "chrome/browser/chromeos/login/enrollment/enterprise_enrollment_helper.h"
#include "chrome/browser/component_updater/cros_component_installer_chromeos.h"
#include "chrome/browser/policy/enrollment_status.h"
#include "components/policy/core/common/cloud/cloud_policy_store.h"
class PrefRegistrySimple;
namespace policy {
class DeviceCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS;
}
namespace chromeos {
class DemoResources;
// Controls enrollment flow for setting up Demo Mode.
class DemoSetupController
: public EnterpriseEnrollmentHelper::EnrollmentStatusConsumer,
public policy::CloudPolicyStore::Observer {
public:
// All steps required for setup.
enum class DemoSetupStep {
// Downloading Demo Mode resources.
kDownloadResources,
// Enrolling in Demo Mode.
kEnrollment,
// Setup is complete.
kComplete
};
// Contains information related to setup error.
class DemoSetupError {
public:
// Type of setup error.
enum class ErrorCode {
// Cannot load or parse offline policy.
kOfflinePolicyError,
// Local account policy store error.
kOfflinePolicyStoreError,
// Cannot perform offline setup without online FRE check.
kOnlineFRECheckRequired,
// Cannot load online component.
kOnlineComponentError,
// Invalid request to DMServer.
kInvalidRequest,
// Request to DMServer failed, because of network error.
kRequestNetworkError,
// DMServer temporary unavailable.
kTemporaryUnavailable,
// DMServer returned abnormal response code.
kResponseError,
// DMServer response cannot be decoded.
kResponseDecodingError,
// Device management not supported for demo account.
kDemoAccountError,
// DMServer cannot find the device.
kDeviceNotFound,
// Invalid device management token.
kInvalidDMToken,
// Serial number invalid or unknown to DMServer,
kInvalidSerialNumber,
// Device id conflict.
kDeviceIdError,
// Not enough licenses or domain expired.
kLicenseError,
// Device was deprovisioned.ec
kDeviceDeprovisioned,
// Device belongs to different domain (FRE).
kDomainMismatch,
// Management request could not be signed by the client.
kSigningError,
// DMServer could not find policy for the device.
kPolicyNotFound,
// ARC disabled for demo domain.
kArcError,
// Cannot determine server-backed state keys.
kNoStateKeys,
// Failed to fetch robot account auth or refresh token.
kRobotFetchError,
// Failed to fetch robot account refresh token.
kRobotStoreError,
// Unsuppored device mode returned by the server.
kBadMode,
// Could not fetch registration cert,
kCertFetchError,
// Could not fetch the policy.
kPolicyFetchError,
// Policy validation failed.
kPolicyValidationError,
// Timeout during locking the device.
kLockTimeout,
// Error during locking the device.
kLockError,
// Device locked to different domain on mode.
kAlreadyLocked,
// Error while installing online policy.
kOnlineStoreError,
// Could not determine device model or serial number.
kMachineIdentificationError,
// Could not store DM token.
kDMTokenStoreError,
// Unexpected/fatal error.
kUnexpectedError,
};
// Type of recommended recovery from the setup error.
enum class RecoveryMethod {
// Retry demo setup.
kRetry,
// Reboot and retry demo setup.
kReboot,
// Powerwash and retry demo setup.
kPowerwash,
// Check network and retry demo setup.
kCheckNetwork,
// Cannot perform offline setup - online setup might work.
kOnlineOnly,
// Unknown recovery method.
kUnknown,
};
static DemoSetupError CreateFromEnrollmentStatus(
const policy::EnrollmentStatus& status);
static DemoSetupError CreateFromOtherEnrollmentError(
EnterpriseEnrollmentHelper::OtherError error);
static DemoSetupError CreateFromComponentError(
component_updater::CrOSComponentManager::Error error);
DemoSetupError(ErrorCode error_code, RecoveryMethod recovery_method);
DemoSetupError(ErrorCode error_code,
RecoveryMethod recovery_method,
const std::string& debug_message);
~DemoSetupError();
ErrorCode error_code() const { return error_code_; }
RecoveryMethod recovery_method() const { return recovery_method_; }
base::string16 GetLocalizedErrorMessage() const;
base::string16 GetLocalizedRecoveryMessage() const;
std::string GetDebugDescription() const;
private:
ErrorCode error_code_;
RecoveryMethod recovery_method_;
std::string debug_message_;
};
// Demo mode setup callbacks.
using OnSetupSuccess = base::OnceClosure;
using OnSetupError = base::OnceCallback<void(const DemoSetupError&)>;
using OnSetCurrentSetupStep =
base::RepeatingCallback<void(const DemoSetupStep)>;
using HasPreinstalledDemoResourcesCallback = base::OnceCallback<void(bool)>;
static void RegisterLocalStatePrefs(PrefRegistrySimple* registry);
// Clears demo device enrollment requisition on the given |policy_manager| if
// it is set.
static void ClearDemoRequisition(
policy::DeviceCloudPolicyManagerChromeOS* policy_manager);
// Utility method that returns whether demo mode is allowed on the device.
static bool IsDemoModeAllowed();
// Utility method that returns whether demo mode setup flow is in progress in
// OOBE.
static bool IsOobeDemoSetupFlowInProgress();
// If the current country requires customization, returns an user email that
// corresponds to the sub organization the device should be enrolled into.
// Otherwise, returns an empty string.
static std::string GetSubOrganizationEmail();
// Returns a dictionary mapping setup steps to step indices.
static base::Value GetDemoSetupSteps();
// Converts a step enum to a string e.g. to sent to JavaScript.
static std::string GetDemoSetupStepString(const DemoSetupStep step_enum);
DemoSetupController();
~DemoSetupController() override;
// Sets demo mode config that will be used to setup the device. It has to be
// set before calling Enroll().
void set_demo_config(DemoSession::DemoModeConfig demo_config) {
demo_config_ = demo_config;
}
// Whether offline enrollment is used for setup.
bool IsOfflineEnrollment() const;
// Initiates enrollment that sets up the device in the demo mode domain. The
// |enrollment_type_| determines whether online or offline setup will be
// performed and it should be set with set_enrollment_type() before calling
// Enroll(). |on_setup_success| will be called when enrollment finishes
// successfully. |on_setup_error| will be called when enrollment finishes with
// an error. |set_current_setup_step| will be called when an enrollment step
// completes.
void Enroll(OnSetupSuccess on_setup_success,
OnSetupError on_setup_error,
const OnSetCurrentSetupStep& set_current_setup_step);
// Tries to mount the preinstalled offline resources necessary for offline
// Demo Mode.
void TryMountPreinstalledDemoResources(
HasPreinstalledDemoResourcesCallback callback);
// Converts a relative path to an absolute path under the preinstalled demo
// resources mount. Returns an empty string if the preinstalled demo resources
// are not mounted.
base::FilePath GetPreinstalledDemoResourcesPath(
const base::FilePath& relative_path);
// EnterpriseEnrollmentHelper::EnrollmentStatusConsumer:
void OnDeviceEnrolled() override;
void OnEnrollmentError(policy::EnrollmentStatus status) override;
void OnAuthError(const GoogleServiceAuthError& error) override;
void OnOtherError(EnterpriseEnrollmentHelper::OtherError error) override;
void OnDeviceAttributeUploadCompleted(bool success) override;
void OnDeviceAttributeUpdatePermission(bool granted) override;
void OnRestoreAfterRollbackCompleted() override;
void SetCrOSComponentLoadErrorForTest(
component_updater::CrOSComponentManager::Error error);
void SetPreinstalledOfflineResourcesPathForTesting(
const base::FilePath& path);
void SetDeviceLocalAccountPolicyStoreForTest(policy::CloudPolicyStore* store);
void SetOfflineDataDirForTest(const base::FilePath& offline_dir);
private:
// Attempts to load the CrOS component with demo resources for online
// enrollment and passes the result to OnDemoResourcesCrOSComponentLoaded().
void LoadDemoResourcesCrOSComponent();
// Callback to initiate online enrollment once the CrOS component has loaded.
// If the component loaded successfully, registers and sets up the device in
// the demo mode domain. If the component couldn't be loaded, demo setup
// will fail.
void OnDemoResourcesCrOSComponentLoaded();
// Callback after attempting to load preinstalled demo resources. If the
// resources were loaded, offline Demo Mode should be available.
void OnPreinstalledDemoResourcesLoaded(
HasPreinstalledDemoResourcesCallback callback);
// Initiates offline enrollment that locks the device and sets up offline
// policies required by demo mode. It requires no network connectivity since
// all setup will be done locally. The policy files will be loaded from the
// preinstalled demo resources.
void EnrollOffline();
// Called when the device local account policy for the offline demo mode is
// loaded.
void OnDeviceLocalAccountPolicyLoaded(base::Optional<std::string> blob);
// Called when device is marked as registered and the second part of OOBE flow
// is completed. This is the last step of demo mode setup flow.
void OnDeviceRegistered();
// Sets current setup step.
void SetCurrentSetupStep(DemoSetupStep current_step);
// Finish the flow with an error.
void SetupFailed(const DemoSetupError& error);
// Clears the internal state.
void Reset();
// policy::CloudPolicyStore::Observer:
void OnStoreLoaded(policy::CloudPolicyStore* store) override;
void OnStoreError(policy::CloudPolicyStore* store) override;
// Keeps track of when downloading demo mode resources begins.
base::TimeTicks download_start_time_;
// Keeps track of when enrolling in enterprise) begins.
base::TimeTicks enroll_start_time_;
// Keeps track of how many times an operator has been required to retry
// setup.
int num_setup_retries_ = 0;
// Demo mode configuration type that will be setup when Enroll() is called.
// Should be set explicitly.
DemoSession::DemoModeConfig demo_config_ = DemoSession::DemoModeConfig::kNone;
// Error code to use when attempting to load the demo resources CrOS
// component.
component_updater::CrOSComponentManager::Error component_error_for_tests_ =
component_updater::CrOSComponentManager::Error::NONE;
// Path at which to mount preinstalled offline demo resources for tests.
base::FilePath preinstalled_offline_resources_path_for_tests_;
// Callback to call when setup step is updated.
OnSetCurrentSetupStep set_current_setup_step_;
// Callback to call when enrollment finishes with an error.
OnSetupError on_setup_error_;
// Callback to call when enrollment finishes successfully.
OnSetupSuccess on_setup_success_;
// The CloudPolicyStore for the device local account for the offline policy.
policy::CloudPolicyStore* device_local_account_policy_store_ = nullptr;
std::unique_ptr<EnterpriseEnrollmentHelper> enrollment_helper_;
// The preinstalled Demo Mode Resources for offline Demo Mode.
std::unique_ptr<DemoResources> preinstalled_demo_resources_;
// The Demo Mode Resources CrOS Component downloaded for online Demo Mode.
std::unique_ptr<DemoResources> demo_resources_;
base::WeakPtrFactory<DemoSetupController> weak_ptr_factory_{this};
DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(DemoSetupController);
};
} // namespace chromeos
#endif // CHROME_BROWSER_CHROMEOS_LOGIN_DEMO_MODE_DEMO_SETUP_CONTROLLER_H_
|
/**
* Validates that the property propertyName in the JsonObject object is a hour with the pattern: "([01]?[0-9]|[0-9][0-9]):[0-5][0-9]"
*
* @param object object to evaluate
* @param propertyName name of the property to evaluate
* @param modelName sub-name to concat as prefix to the property name in the exception message
* @throws utils.UtilsValidation.PropertyValueException if the evaluation fails
*/
public static void isHourAndNotNull(final JsonObject object,
final String propertyName, final String modelName)
throws PropertyValueException {
evaluateAndNotNull(TIME_HOURS_PATTERN, object, propertyName, modelName);
}
|
<gh_stars>1-10
#------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Copyright (c) 2008, Riverbank Computing Limited
# All rights reserved.
#
# This software is provided without warranty under the terms of the BSD
# license included in enthought/LICENSE.txt and may be redistributed only
# under the conditions described in the aforementioned license. The license
# is also available online at http://www.enthought.com/licenses/BSD.txt
# Thanks for using Enthought open source!
#
# Author: Riverbank Computing Limited
# Description: <Enthought undo package component>
#------------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Enthought library imports.
from traits.api import Bool, Event, HasTraits, Instance, Int, Property, \
Unicode, provides
# Local imports.
from .i_undo_manager import IUndoManager
@provides(IUndoManager)
class UndoManager(HasTraits):
""" The UndoManager class is the default implementation of the
IUndoManager interface.
"""
#### 'IUndoManager' interface #############################################
# This is the currently active command stack and may be None. Typically it
# is set when some sort of editor becomes active.
active_stack = Instance('apptools.undo.api.ICommandStack')
# This reflects the clean state of the currently active command stack. It
# is intended to support a "document modified" indicator in the GUI. It is
# maintained by the undo manager.
active_stack_clean = Property(Bool)
# This is the name of the command that can be redone. It will be empty if
# there is no command that can be redone. It is maintained by the undo
# manager.
redo_name = Property(Unicode)
# This is the sequence number of the next command to be performed. It is
# incremented immediately before a command is invoked (by its 'do()'
# method).
sequence_nr = Int
# This event is fired when the index of a command stack changes. The value
# of the event is the stack that has changed. Note that it may not be the
# active stack.
stack_updated = Event
# This is the name of the command that can be undone. It will be empty if
# there is no command that can be undone. It is maintained by the undo
# manager.
undo_name = Property(Unicode)
###########################################################################
# 'IUndoManager' interface.
###########################################################################
def redo(self):
""" Redo the last undone command of the active command stack. """
if self.active_stack is not None:
self.active_stack.redo()
def undo(self):
""" Undo the last command of the active command stack. """
if self.active_stack is not None:
self.active_stack.undo()
###########################################################################
# Private interface.
###########################################################################
def _active_stack_changed(self, new):
""" Handle a different stack becoming active. """
# Pretend that the stack contents have changed.
self.stack_updated = new
def _get_active_stack_clean(self):
""" Get the current clean state. """
if self.active_stack is None:
active_stack_clean = True
else:
active_stack_clean = self.active_stack.clean
return active_stack_clean
def _get_redo_name(self):
""" Get the current redo name. """
if self.active_stack is None:
redo_name = ""
else:
redo_name = self.active_stack.redo_name
return redo_name
def _get_undo_name(self):
""" Get the current undo name. """
if self.active_stack is None:
undo_name = ""
else:
undo_name = self.active_stack.undo_name
return undo_name
|
Low-income and ‘landlocked’ undocumented women may have difficulty accessing care in the state, stoking fears that self-induced abortions will increase
Fewer Latinas are seeking care at a dwindling number of Texas abortion clinics, amid fears that the amount of women attempting self-induced abortions may be rising, according to researchers and advocacy groups.
The warnings arrived in the aftermath of a federal appellate court decision on Tuesday to uphold the most restrictive provisions of a law that could leave the second-largest state in the US with as few as seven abortion clinics.
Court upholds Texas abortion law that could leave state with only seven clinics Read more
“The implementation of … [this bill] will impact women throughout the entire state of Texas,” said Ana DeFrates, Texas director for policy and advocacy at the National Latina Institute for Reproductive Health. “We know it’s going to hit hardest for Latina communities, because those communities face formidable barriers to care to begin with.”
Texas governor Greg Abbott hailed the fifth circuit court of appeals’ upholding of an anti-abortion bill as a victory for “our most vulnerable – the unborn”.
But amid calls from doctors that low-income and undocumented women would be affected the most, opponents of the Republican-backed law have said they will ask the US supreme court to consider powers which they say could leave women across the vast expanse of Texas with access to just a handful of clinics, forcing them to travel more than 100 miles to seek an abortion.
DeFrates said undocumented women are unable to travel across the state for abortion care, because passing through internal border checkpoints outside cities such as Falfurrias, Del Rio and El Paso means they would risk deportation.
“Undocumented families are literally landlocked,” DeFrates said. “When you eliminate clinics that were south of those internal checkpoints, you limit access to care.”
By requiring that abortions be performed only in Ambulatory Surgical Centers (ASCs), the law has already forced the closure of all but a handful of clinics in Texas. A non-ASC border clinic in McAllen, Texas, is being provisionally allowed to stay open, but the El Paso clinic must close. Women in El Paso must either cross a state or national border to access abortion care, or drive 550 miles to an ASC in San Antonio.
The concerns about the restrictive law disproportionately affecting Latinas is backed by research from the Texas Policy Evaluation Project (TxPEP), a group that assesses the everyday impact of the state’s reproductive health legislation.
Daniel Grossman, on obstetrician and TxPEP co-investigator, said his team has found that fewer Latinas and fewer low-income women are seeking care at Texas abortion clinics. In the period just after the implementation of the bill last summer, Grossman said, “very, very few women were coming from the Rio Grande Valley” to Central Texas clinics. “They simply weren’t traveling there.”
Grossman also led a survey of women whose abortion appointments were cancelled after sudden clinic closures. In a survey of 20 such women, Grossman found that a majority suffered “significant delays” in trying to access care elsewhere, particularly as they had to scramble for transportation across the state, childcare and lodging.
Several women’s procedures were delayed into the second trimester of pregnancy, Grossman said, and two women were forced to carry their pregnancies to term.
Being forced to carry an unwanted pregnancy to term often pushes women and children into poverty, according to Diana Foster, an associate professor at the medical school of the University of California at San Francisco.
The US supreme court may bring Texas-style abortion restrictions to every state | Scott Lemieux Read more
In her research on women who are denied abortion care, Foster found women forced to carry unwanted pregnancies were more likely to live below the federal poverty level and more likely to receive public assistance than women who received abortions – even though the two groups had identical incomes at the time of seeking abortion care.
TxPEP researchers are conducting cross-sectional studies on women who seek care at Texas abortion clinics. They compile and analyze these women’s stories, but also collect demographic data about patients’ age, race, ethnicity and income.
In Texas, 3,767 women called the Lilith Fund for Reproductive Equity last year, seeking financial assistance for abortions. A full 83% of callers were women of color.
“People with means in Texas will always be able to get abortions,” said the group’s president, Susy Hemphill. “The demographic we serve mirrors the demographics of poverty.”
With so many clinics closing, and Ambulatory Surgical Centers acting more like operating rooms – with elaborate procedures and lengthy cleanings between patients – advocacy groups worried that the clinic substitutes would not be able to pick up the slack.
TxPEP has found a 70% reduction in medical abortions – abortions by pill – since the restrictive Texas bill was implemented. Because medical abortion was much more common in some border counties than in other parts of Texas, this reduction does not affect all women equally, said Joe Potter, the group’s principal investigator.
“Other people can get on a plane,” he said.
A 2012 TxPEP study published in the journal Contraception found that 12% of women seeking abortions along the Texas-Mexico border had attempted to self-induce before seeking care at a clinic. Statewide, 7% of women had. By comparison, a 2008 nationwide survey found that only 2.6% of women attempted to self-induce.
Grossman fears that these numbers will rise in Texas, and his team is working to document the data and the stories of Texas women who try to self-induce abortion. “Many women are using methods like herbs,” Grossman said, “but we’re hearing stories of women hitting themselves in the stomach or throwing themselves down the stairs.”
On Wednesday, police in Georgia dropped murder charges against a 23-year-old woman after she allegedly took a pill that terminated her pregnancy.
Georgia woman who took abortion pill has murder charges dismissed Read more
For undocumented women, said Hemphill of the Lilith Fund, “taking a 100-mile journey to access basic healthcare feels very dangerous. People will self-terminate”.
A Latina-led grassroots network of women training each other to self-induce abortions may be forming in Texas, while national pro-choice groups take the state’s fight to the nation’s highest court.
“While devastating and depressing, it does mobilize our community,” said DeFrates, of the National Latina Institute for Reproductive Health. “It’s moving us forward with conversations about abortion. Those conversations over time help eliminate stigma, and they help get people involved.”
|
import { MainPageState } from '@/pages/Main/MainPageState'
import { TaskListPageState } from '@/pages/TaskList/TaskListPageState'
export class AppState
{
MainPage: MainPageState = new MainPageState();
TaskListPage: TaskListPageState = new TaskListPageState();
/**
* Returns methods list
*/
static mutations(): Array<string>
{
let res: Array<string> =
[
];
return res;
}
/**
* Returns modules
*/
static modules(): Record<string, any>
{
let res: Record<string, any> =
{
"MainPage": MainPageState,
"TaskListPage": TaskListPageState,
};
return res;
}
}
|
def separate(self, keys):
li = [key.split(self.HYPHEN)[0] for key in keys.split(self.DOT)]
for i, _ in enumerate(li, 1):
yield '.'.join(li[:i]), li[:i][-1]
|
A senior State Department official said on Friday that the US is proud to be India's largest export market and most important economic partner.
During his recent visit to the US, foreign secretary Vijay Gokhale is also believed to have been conveyed that the ball is in India's court on resolving the trade related issues.
The US is understood to have told India that the Trump administration is willing to review its decision to revoke its GSP privileges to India if New Delhi comes with a credible proposal to address the market access issues that America has been talking about for nearly a year.
While India argues that it is difficult to take any policy decision at this point of time because of the elections and the model code of conduct, America points out that it has decided to take its decision on revoking GSP privileges only after it exhausted all options with India.
During talks with India, America is believed to have said that there are creative ways of resolving all trade related issues and address concerns of both the countries.
|
Predominance of cyclooxygenase 1 over cyclooxygenase 2 in the generation of proinflammatory prostaglandins in autoantibody-driven K/BxN serum-transfer arthritis. OBJECTIVE Prostaglandins (PGs) are found in high levels in the synovial fluid of patients with rheumatoid arthritis, and nonsteroidal blockade of these bioactive lipids plays a role in patient care. The aim of this study was to explore the relative contribution of cyclooxygenase (COX) isoforms and PG species in the autoantibody-driven K/BxN serum-transfer arthritis. METHODS The prostanoid content of arthritic ankles was assessed in ankle homogenates, and the importance of this pathway was confirmed with pharmacologic blockade. The presence of COX isoforms was assessed by Western blotting and their functional contribution was compared using COX-1-/- and COX-2-/- mice as well as isoform-specific inhibitors. The relative importance of PGE2 and PGI2 (prostacyclin) was determined using mice deficient in microsomal PGE synthase 1 (mPGES-1) and in the receptors for PGI2. RESULTS High levels of PGE2 and 6-keto-PGF1alpha (a stable metabolite of PGI2) were detected in arthritic joint tissues, correlating strongly with the intensity of synovitis. Pharmacologic inhibition of PG synthesis prevented arthritis and ameliorated active disease. While both COX isoforms were found in inflamed joint tissues, only COX-1 contributed substantially to clinical disease; COX-1-/- mice were fully resistant to disease, whereas COX-2-/- mice remained susceptible. These findings were confirmed by isoform-specific pharmacologic inhibition. Mice lacking mPGES-1 (and therefore PGE2) developed arthritis normally, whereas mice incapable of responding to PGI2 exhibited a significantly attenuated arthritis course, confirming a role of PGI2 in this arthritis model. CONCLUSION These findings challenge previous paradigms of distinct "housekeeping" versus inflammatory functions of the COX isoforms and highlight the potential pathogenic contribution of prostanoids synthesized via COX-1, in particular PGI2, to inflammatory arthritis.
|
Isolated perfused Brockmann body as a model for studying pancreatic endocrine secretion. The release of insulin, glucagon, and somatostatin was investigated in a newly developed in vitro perfusion preparation of the splenic Brockmann body (principal pancreatic islet) of the channel catfish (Ictalurus punctatus). The preparation was viable for up to 7 h by functional and morphological criteria. Glucose evoked a biphasic release of insulin and somatostatin, but had no effect on the release of glucagon. Arginine at basal glucose concentration caused a marked release of insulin and glucagon, but only a minor release of somatostatin.
|
<gh_stars>0
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2021 <NAME>.
//
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
package org.lfenergy.compas.scl.data.rest.v1.model;
import org.eclipse.microprofile.openapi.annotations.media.Schema;
import org.lfenergy.compas.scl.data.model.Item;
import javax.xml.bind.annotation.XmlAccessType;
import javax.xml.bind.annotation.XmlAccessorType;
import javax.xml.bind.annotation.XmlElement;
import javax.xml.bind.annotation.XmlRootElement;
import java.util.List;
import static org.lfenergy.compas.scl.data.SclDataServiceConstants.SCL_DATA_SERVICE_V1_NS_URI;
@Schema(description = "Response with a list of versions stored for a specific SCL.")
@XmlRootElement(name = "VersionsResponse", namespace = SCL_DATA_SERVICE_V1_NS_URI)
@XmlAccessorType(XmlAccessType.FIELD)
public class VersionsResponse {
@Schema(description = "List of found Versions of a specific SCL in the database.")
@XmlElement(name = "Item", namespace = SCL_DATA_SERVICE_V1_NS_URI)
private List<Item> items;
public List<Item> getItems() {
return items;
}
public void setItems(List<Item> items) {
this.items = items;
}
}
|
Q:
Can an extravert suffer from social anxiety disorder?
Extraversion is a personality trait that, as the Wikipedia article describes, causes people "to enjoy human interactions", to be sociable, outgoing and love crowds.
Social anxiety disorder (SAD), on the other hand, causes people to fear being judged and often makes them avoid social situations, either in general or at least those aspects that would lead to the person to "stand in the spotlight".
From their definitions, extraversion and SAD seem to exclude each other. It seems impossible that they can co-occur in the same person.
Is it possible that an extraverted person suffers from social anxiety disorder?
A:
It's pretty difficult to imagine a person with Social Anxiety Disorder being an extrovert. The symptoms of SAD include [1]:
Intense fear of interacting with strangers and of being judged
Worrying about embarrassing or humiliating yourself or that others think that you look anxious
Anxiety that disrupts your daily routine, work, school or other activities
Avoiding doing things or speaking to people out of fear of embarrassment
Avoiding situations where you might be the center of attention
Difficulty making eye contact or talking
Signs and symptoms include blushing, sweating, trembling or shaking, fast heartbeat, upset stomach, nausea, shaky voice, muscle tension, confusion, diarrhea, and cold, clammy hands.
Extroverts, on the other hand, usually don't have any problems with the above situations.
Introversion and extroversion are not either/or, but exist on a continuum. One can have attributes of both, and empathy with both. SAD is not on this continuum.
[1] Mayo Clinic
A:
On the surface, it does seem like social anxiety disorder and extroversion shouldn't both exist in the same person. On the other hand, anongoodnurse has already touched upon a point which leads us to a different conclusion - these traits are on different dimensions. When one takes a closer look at what the two dimensions actually mean, (especially as confirmed in latest psychological research) it seems like they can co-exist just fine, and most people probably have one or two (or many more) aquaitances with both traits (to some degree or other). anongoodnurse has already described SAD. Unlike it is traditionally assumed by the layman, the introversion-extroversion scale does not measure a social property, however. Rather, it describes to what extent a person derives rewards from stimuli - extraverts simply derive more pleasure from environmental stimuli (of any kind). [1] Recent neuroscientific research has confirmed this: modifying the neurotransmitter systems of reward/punishment (i.e. dopamine) modifies introversion/extraversion. [2] Of course, an arbitratily chosen person who derives pleasure from the environment probably also usually derives pleasure from social environments. However, this is surely not always the case - there are plenty of people in academia, for instance, who love exploring environments - just not social ones ;).
[1] Gray, Jeffrey A. "The psychophysiological basis of introversion-extraversion." Behaviour research and therapy 8.3 (1970): 249-266.
[2] Depue, Richard A., and Yu Fu. "On the nature of extraversion: variation in conditioned contextual activation of dopamine-facilitated affective, cognitive, and motor processes." Frontiers in human neuroscience 7 (2013).
|
<filename>src/main/java/com/infinityraider/agricraft/api/v1/stat/IAgriStatAcceptor.java
/*
*/
package com.infinityraider.agricraft.api.v1.stat;
import java.util.Optional;
import javax.annotation.Nonnull;
import javax.annotation.Nullable;
/**
*
*
*/
public interface IAgriStatAcceptor {
/**
* Determines if an AgriStat is valid for this specific instance.
*
* @param stat the stat to validate for the instance.
* @return if the stat is valid for this instance.
*/
boolean acceptsStat(@Nullable IAgriStat stat);
/**
* Sets the AgriStat associated with this instance. Should always return the same result as
* acceptsStat() if the stat is invalid.
*
* @param stat the stat to associate with this instance.
* @return if the stat was successfully associated with the instance.
*/
boolean setStat(@Nullable IAgriStat stat);
/**
* Clears the AgriStat associated with the instance.
*
* @return the stat removed from the instance, or the empty optional.
*/
@Nonnull
Optional<IAgriStat> removeStat();
}
|
<filename>packages/core/typings/models/featureMap.d.ts
export interface FeatureMap {
implicitUpload: boolean;
webhook: boolean;
inlineMode: boolean;
inlineButtons: boolean;
}
|
import { Model } from 'objection';
export default class EmailVerification extends Model {
userId!: number;
uuid!: string;
email!: string;
updatedAt!: string;
static idColumn = 'userId';
static tableName = 'emailVerification';
static jsonSchema = {
type: 'object',
properties: {
userId: { type: 'integer' },
uuid: { type: 'string', format: 'uuid' },
email: { type: 'string', format: 'email', maxLength: 255 },
},
};
}
|
<gh_stars>0
/**
* This software was developed and / or modified by Raytheon Company,
* pursuant to Contract DG133W-05-CQ-1067 with the US Government.
*
* U.S. EXPORT CONTROLLED TECHNICAL DATA
* This software product contains export-restricted data whose
* export/transfer/disclosure is restricted by U.S. law. Dissemination
* to non-U.S. persons whether in the United States or abroad requires
* an export license or other authorization.
*
* Contractor Name: Raytheon Company
* Contractor Address: 6825 Pine Street, Suite 340
* Mail Stop B8
* Omaha, NE 68106
* 402.291.0100
*
* See the AWIPS II Master Rights File ("Master Rights File.pdf") for
* further licensing information.
**/
package com.raytheon.viz.warngen.site;
import org.eclipse.core.expressions.PropertyTester;
/**
* TODO Add Description
*
* <pre>
*
* SOFTWARE HISTORY
*
* Date Ticket# Engineer Description
* ------------ ---------- ----------- --------------------------
* Dec 17, 2010 jsanchez Initial creation
*
* </pre>
*
* @author jsanchez
* @version 1.0
*/
public class SiteModePropertyTester extends PropertyTester {
@Override
public boolean test(Object receiver, String property, Object[] args,
Object expectedValue) {
if ("SiteMode".equalsIgnoreCase(property)) {
if (args.length > 0) {
String expected = (String) args[0];
return SiteMode.getMode().name().equalsIgnoreCase(expected);
}
}
return false;
}
}
|
SACRAMENTO, Calif., July 28, 2014 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- Pacific Ethanol, Inc. (Nasdaq:PEIX) , the leading producer and marketer of low-carbon renewable fuels in the Western United States, announced it was awarded a $3 million matching grant from the California Energy Commission to develop a sorghum feedstock program collaboratively with Chromatin, Inc., CSU Fresno's Center for Irrigation Technology and the Kearney Agricultural Research and Extension Center. This undertaking also includes the California In-State Sorghum Program to support a lasting expansion in California's ability to produce low-carbon ethanol from in-state feedstock that meets both the renewable fuel and greenhouse gas reduction goals stipulated under the federal Renewable Fuel Standard and California's Low-Carbon Fuel Standard.
Neil Koehler, the company's president and CEO, stated: "We are honored to receive this important grant, which supports Pacific Ethanol's collaboration with California Agriculture and the other ethanol producers in California toward the long-term development of sorghum feedstock for advanced biofuel production at both our Madera and Stockton California facilities."
Pacific Ethanol, Inc. (PEIX) is the leading producer and marketer of low-carbon renewable fuels in the Western United States. Pacific Ethanol also sells co-products, including wet distillers grain ("WDG"), a nutritional animal feed. Serving integrated oil companies and gasoline marketers who blend ethanol into gasoline, Pacific Ethanol provides transportation, storage and delivery of ethanol through third-party service providers in the Western United States, primarily in California, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, Oregon, Colorado, Idaho and Washington. Pacific Ethanol has a 91% ownership interest in PE Op Co., the owner of four ethanol production facilities. Pacific Ethanol operates and manages the four ethanol production facilities, which have a combined annual production capacity of 200 million gallons. These operating facilities are located in Boardman, Oregon, Burley, Idaho, Stockton, California, and Madera, California. The facilities are near their respective fuel and feed customers, offering significant timing, transportation cost and logistical advantages. Pacific Ethanol's subsidiary, Kinergy Marketing LLC, markets ethanol from Pacific Ethanol's managed plants and from other third-party production facilities, and another subsidiary, Pacific Ag. Products, LLC, markets WDG. For more information please visit www.pacificethanol.com.
With the exception of historical information, the matters discussed in this press release including, without limitation, the ability of Pacific Ethanol to continue as leading producer and marketer of low-carbon renewable fuels in the Western United States; Pacific Ethanol's receipt and use of funds from the California Energy Commission; and Pacific Ethanol's ability to develop sorghum feedstock for advanced biofuel are forward-looking statements and considerations that involve a number of risks and uncertainties. The actual future results of Pacific Ethanol could differ from those statements. Factors that could cause or contribute to such differences include, but are not limited to, adverse economic and market conditions; changes in governmental regulations and policies; lack of funding; unsuccessful results of Pacific Ethanol's sorghum feedstock program; and other events, factors and risks previously and from time to time disclosed in Pacific Ethanol's filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission including, specifically, those factors set forth in the "Risk Factors" section contained in Pacific Ethanol's Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 9, 2014.
|
"""
Represents Lambda Build Containers.
"""
import json
import logging
try:
import pathlib
except ImportError:
import pathlib2 as pathlib
from .container import Container
LOG = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class LambdaBuildContainer(Container):
"""
Class to manage Build containers that are capable of building AWS Lambda functions.
This container mounts necessary folders, issues a command to the Lambda Builder CLI,
and if the build was successful, copies back artifacts to the host filesystem
"""
_LAMBCI_IMAGE_REPO_NAME = "lambci/lambda"
_BUILDERS_EXECUTABLE = "lambda-builders"
def __init__( # pylint: disable=too-many-locals
self,
protocol_version,
language,
dependency_manager,
application_framework,
source_dir,
manifest_path,
runtime,
optimizations=None,
options=None,
executable_search_paths=None,
log_level=None,
mode=None,
):
abs_manifest_path = pathlib.Path(manifest_path).resolve()
manifest_file_name = abs_manifest_path.name
manifest_dir = str(abs_manifest_path.parent)
source_dir = str(pathlib.Path(source_dir).resolve())
container_dirs = LambdaBuildContainer._get_container_dirs(source_dir, manifest_dir)
# `executable_search_paths` are provided as a list of paths on the host file system that needs to passed to
# the builder. But these paths don't exist within the container. We use the following method to convert the
# host paths to container paths. But if a host path is NOT mounted within the container, we will simply ignore
# it. In essence, only when the path is already in the mounted path, can the path resolver within the
# container even find the executable.
executable_search_paths = LambdaBuildContainer._convert_to_container_dirs(
host_paths_to_convert=executable_search_paths,
host_to_container_path_mapping={
source_dir: container_dirs["source_dir"],
manifest_dir: container_dirs["manifest_dir"],
},
)
request_json = self._make_request(
protocol_version,
language,
dependency_manager,
application_framework,
container_dirs,
manifest_file_name,
runtime,
optimizations,
options,
executable_search_paths,
mode,
)
image = LambdaBuildContainer._get_image(runtime)
entry = LambdaBuildContainer._get_entrypoint(request_json)
cmd = []
additional_volumes = {
# Manifest is mounted separately in order to support the case where manifest
# is outside of source directory
manifest_dir: {"bind": container_dirs["manifest_dir"], "mode": "ro"}
}
env_vars = None
if log_level:
env_vars = {"LAMBDA_BUILDERS_LOG_LEVEL": log_level}
super(LambdaBuildContainer, self).__init__(
image,
cmd,
container_dirs["source_dir"],
source_dir,
additional_volumes=additional_volumes,
entrypoint=entry,
env_vars=env_vars,
)
@property
def executable_name(self):
return LambdaBuildContainer._BUILDERS_EXECUTABLE
@staticmethod
def _make_request(
protocol_version,
language,
dependency_manager,
application_framework,
container_dirs,
manifest_file_name,
runtime,
optimizations,
options,
executable_search_paths,
mode,
):
return json.dumps(
{
"jsonschema": "2.0",
"id": 1,
"method": "LambdaBuilder.build",
"params": {
"__protocol_version": protocol_version,
"capability": {
"language": language,
"dependency_manager": dependency_manager,
"application_framework": application_framework,
},
"source_dir": container_dirs["source_dir"],
"artifacts_dir": container_dirs["artifacts_dir"],
"scratch_dir": container_dirs["scratch_dir"],
# Path is always inside a Linux container. So '/' is valid
"manifest_path": "{}/{}".format(container_dirs["manifest_dir"], manifest_file_name),
"runtime": runtime,
"optimizations": optimizations,
"options": options,
"executable_search_paths": executable_search_paths,
"mode": mode,
},
}
)
@staticmethod
def _get_entrypoint(request_json):
return [LambdaBuildContainer._BUILDERS_EXECUTABLE, request_json]
@staticmethod
def _get_container_dirs(source_dir, manifest_dir):
"""
Provides paths to directories within the container that is required by the builder
Parameters
----------
source_dir : str
Path to the function source code
manifest_dir : str
Path to the directory containing manifest
Returns
-------
dict
Contains paths to source, artifacts, scratch & manifest directories
"""
base = "/tmp/samcli"
result = {
"source_dir": "{}/source".format(base),
"artifacts_dir": "{}/artifacts".format(base),
"scratch_dir": "{}/scratch".format(base),
"manifest_dir": "{}/manifest".format(base),
}
if pathlib.PurePath(source_dir) == pathlib.PurePath(manifest_dir):
# It is possible that the manifest resides within the source. In that case, we won't mount the manifest
# directory separately.
result["manifest_dir"] = result["source_dir"]
return result
@staticmethod
def _convert_to_container_dirs(host_paths_to_convert, host_to_container_path_mapping):
"""
Use this method to convert a list of host paths to a list of equivalent paths within the container
where the given host path is mounted. This is necessary when SAM CLI needs to pass path information to
the Lambda Builder running within the container.
If a host path is not mounted within the container, then this method simply passes the path to the result
without any changes.
Ex:
[ "/home/foo", "/home/bar", "/home/not/mounted"] => ["/tmp/source", "/tmp/manifest", "/home/not/mounted"]
Parameters
----------
host_paths_to_convert : list
List of paths in host that needs to be converted
host_to_container_path_mapping : dict
Mapping of paths in host to the equivalent paths within the container
Returns
-------
list
Equivalent paths within the container
"""
if not host_paths_to_convert:
# Nothing to do
return host_paths_to_convert
# Make sure the key is absolute host path. Relative paths are tricky to work with because two different
# relative paths can point to the same directory ("../foo", "../../foo")
mapping = {str(pathlib.Path(p).resolve()): v for p, v in host_to_container_path_mapping.items()}
result = []
for original_path in host_paths_to_convert:
abspath = str(pathlib.Path(original_path).resolve())
if abspath in mapping:
result.append(mapping[abspath])
else:
result.append(original_path)
LOG.debug(
"Cannot convert host path '%s' to its equivalent path within the container. "
"Host path is not mounted within the container",
abspath,
)
return result
@staticmethod
def _get_image(runtime):
runtime_to_images = {"nodejs10.x": "amazon/lambda-build-node10.x"}
return runtime_to_images.get(
runtime, "{}:build-{}".format(LambdaBuildContainer._LAMBCI_IMAGE_REPO_NAME, runtime)
)
|
Imaging devices capable of printing images upon paper and other media are ubiquitous and used in many applications including monochrome and color applications. The use and popularity of these devices continues to increase as consumers at the office and home have increased their reliance upon electronic and digital devices, such as computers, digital cameras, telecommunications equipment, etc.
A variety of methods of forming hard images upon media exist and are used in various applications and environments, such as home, the workplace and commercial printing establishments. Some examples of devices capable of providing different types of printing include laser printers, impact printers, inkjet printers, commercial digital presses, etc.
Some configurations of printers which use liquid marking agents may be subjected to contamination by satellites formed during printing operations. For example, in some inkjet configurations, the jetting of drops of a liquid marking agent may also result in the formation of satellites of the liquid marking agent which may contaminate media being imaged upon, nozzles, or other equipment of the printer. Imaging operations may be suspended to implement cleaning operations to remove the contamination which results in reduced productivity of the printer or press.
At least some aspects of the disclosure are directed towards improved imaging methods and apparatus.
|
def makeGlyphBands(self, g, nBands, layered=False):
newData = remove_cubic(g.data)
if not layered:
normalize_outlines(newData, g.width, g.height)
scale = np.asarray([1.0, 1.0], np.float32)
nCurves = sum(g.bezierCount)
if nBands == 0:
nBands = min(
int(np.round(nCurves / self.curves_x_bands + 0.5)), 16)
self.logger.debug(f"{self.count}: character <{g.charCode}> ({g.name})"
f" codePoint {g.codePoint} nCurves = {nCurves}"
f" curves_x_bands = {self.curves_x_bands}.")
g.nBands = (nBands, nBands)
for contour in newData:
for elem in contour:
self.curvesData.append([np.concatenate(
(elem['p1'] / scale, elem['p2'] / scale))])
if (np.fmod(1 + len(self.curvesData), self.width) == 0
and len(self.curvesData) > 0):
self.curvesData.append([np.concatenate(
(elem['p3'] / scale, self.a_00))])
self.skipIndex = len(self.curvesData) - 1
self.logger.debug(
f'A curve was shifted to the next row at'
f' -> {len(self.curvesData)} for glyph'
f' -> {g.name} count: {self.count} <')
continue
self.curvesData.append([np.concatenate(
(elem['p3']/scale, self.a_00))])
if (np.fmod(1 + len(self.curvesData), self.width) == 0
and len(self.curvesData) > 0):
self.logger.debug(
f'Strange A curve need to be shifted to next row at'
f' ->{len(self.curvesData)} for glyph > {g.name}'
f' count: {self.count} <')
self.curvesData.append([self.a_0000])
self.skipIndex = len(self.curvesData) - 1
horzBands, vertBands = bandIntersections(np.hstack(newData),
(nBands, nBands))
h = [len(iBand) for iBand in horzBands]
v = [len(iBand) for iBand in vertBands]
glyphBands = np.hstack((h, v)).tolist()
self.iBandCount.extend(glyphBands)
g.glyphParam = [self.x0, self.y0, nBands, nBands]
self.x0 += len(glyphBands)
self.y0 += 0
self.y0 += self.x0 >> 12
self.x0 &= 4095
g.vertices['gp'] = g.glyphParam
jumps = np.cumsum(g.bezierCount[:-1])
if len(g.bezierCount) > 1:
for i, jump in enumerate(jumps):
for hb in horzBands:
ind = np.flatnonzero((hb >= (jump + i)))
hb[ind] += 1
for vb in vertBands:
ind = np.flatnonzero((vb >= (jump + i)))
vb[ind] += 1
horzBands = np.hstack(horzBands)
vertBands = np.hstack(vertBands)
glyphBands = np.hstack((horzBands, vertBands))
glyphBands += self.curvesOffset
if self.skipIndex is not None:
ind = glyphBands >= self.skipIndex
glyphBands[ind] += 1
self.skipIndex = None
self.curvesOffset = len(self.curvesData)
return glyphBands
|
Master Tully: Cicero in Tudor England. Howard Jones rather the extreme embodiment of barbaric horror, of a "culture that cannot pardon". Quint emphasizes the continuity between that essay and the many other depictions of a victor's encounter with his captive adversary. He shows how Montaigne stresses the similarities among the warring cannibalistic societies, even rewriting the cannibal's song to show that their ritual enactment of violence is really a self-destruction. The spectacle of similar societies practicing reciprocal vengeance indicts a culture that is devouring itself. The cannibals provide a grim mirror for the nobles perpetuating the civil wars. In a cluster of essays echoing or foreshadowing "Des cannibales," Montaigne criticizes the obstinacy of the martyrs, both Huguenot and Catholic, as well as the cruelty of their self-righteous killers. To replace the ethos of unbending valor and cruelty to the vanquished, Montaigne advocates an ethics of yielding. In his final chapter, Quint examines Montaigne's opposition to political revolt and revisits the question of his conservatism. He situates him between the pull toward a strong central monarchy, on the one hand, and the resistance of those nostalgic for the feudal past, on the other. Here the exemplary essay is "De l'art de conferer," where an agonistic model of conversation teaches the warring nobles how to resolve their differences verbally rather than violently. Montaigne 's anecdote in "De la phisionomie" about his own successful experience of yielding reinforces that lesson. Quint closes his book by analyzing a letter Montaigne wrote to Henry IV urging the king to practice leniency and clemency, a fitting end to a work that argues eloquently for the political and ethical mission of the Essais. MARY B. MCKINLEY University of Virginia
|
/**
Copyright 2008 University of Rochester
Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
You may obtain a copy of the License at
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
limitations under the License.
*/
package edu.ur.ir.web.action.user;
import java.io.File;
import java.util.Arrays;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.LinkedList;
import org.apache.logging.log4j.LogManager;
import org.apache.logging.log4j.Logger;
import com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionSupport;
import edu.ur.file.IllegalFileSystemNameException;
import edu.ur.ir.file.IrFile;
import edu.ur.ir.file.VersionedFile;
import edu.ur.ir.file.transformer.ThumbnailTransformerService;
import edu.ur.ir.index.IndexProcessingTypeService;
import edu.ur.ir.repository.Repository;
import edu.ur.ir.repository.RepositoryService;
import edu.ur.ir.user.InviteUserService;
import edu.ur.ir.user.IrUser;
import edu.ur.ir.user.PersonalFile;
import edu.ur.ir.user.UserFileSystemService;
import edu.ur.ir.user.UserWorkspaceIndexProcessingRecordService;
import edu.ur.ir.user.UserService;
import edu.ur.ir.web.action.UserIdAware;
/**
* Action dealing with adding a new version of a file for a given person.
*
* @author <NAME>
*
*/
public class AddNewFileVersion extends ActionSupport implements UserIdAware{
/** Eclipse generated id */
private static final long serialVersionUID = -2621769968886370338L;
/** Logger for add personal folder action */
private static final Logger log = LogManager.getLogger(AddNewFileVersion.class);
/** id of the personal file */
private Long personalFileId;
/** personal file for the user */
private PersonalFile personalFile;
/** User trying to upload the file */
private Long userId;
/** User service access */
private UserService userService;
/** File system service for users. */
private UserFileSystemService userFileSystemService;
/** process for setting up personal workspace information to be indexed */
private UserWorkspaceIndexProcessingRecordService userWorkspaceIndexProcessingRecordService;
/** service for accessing index processing types */
private IndexProcessingTypeService indexProcessingTypeService;
/** description of the file */
private String userFileDescription;
/** actual set of files uploaded */
private File file;
/** File name uploaded from the file system */
private String fileFileName;
/** content types of the files. */
private String fileContentType;
/** Repository service for placing information in the repository */
private RepositoryService repositoryService;
/** set to true if the version was added */
private boolean versionAdded = false;
/** Keep the file locked even after the new version has been uploaded*/
private boolean keepLocked = false;
/* notify collaborators */
private Long[] collaboratorIds;
/* notify owner of change */
private boolean notifyOwner = false;
/* service to deal with inviting users */
private InviteUserService inviteUserService;
/* service to create thumbnails */
private ThumbnailTransformerService thumbnailTransformerService;
/**
* Used to view the page.
*
* @see com.opensymphony.xwork2.ActionSupport#execute()
*/
public String execute()
{
personalFile = userFileSystemService.getPersonalFile(personalFileId, false);
return SUCCESS;
}
/**
* Add a new version of the versioned file to the system.
*
* @return
* @throws IllegalFileSystemNameException
*/
public String addNewFileVersion() throws IllegalFileSystemNameException
{
log.debug("Adding new version " );
String returnStatus = SUCCESS;
personalFile = userFileSystemService.getPersonalFile(personalFileId, false);
VersionedFile versionedFile = personalFile.getVersionedFile();
log.debug("User Id = " + userId );
IrUser user = userService.getUser(userId, false);
boolean canLock = repositoryService.canLockVersionedFile(versionedFile, user);
// lock the file for the user if they have not already
if(canLock)
{
Repository repository = repositoryService.getRepository(Repository.DEFAULT_REPOSITORY_ID,
false);
// lock the file for the user to make change
if(versionedFile.getLockedBy() == null)
{
repositoryService.lockVersionedFile(versionedFile, user);
}
if(versionedFile.getLockedBy().equals(user))
{
repositoryService.addNewFileToVersionedFile(repository,
versionedFile, file, fileFileName, userFileDescription, user);
versionAdded = true;
IrFile irFile = personalFile.getVersionedFile().getCurrentVersion().getIrFile();
thumbnailTransformerService.transformFile(repository, irFile);
userWorkspaceIndexProcessingRecordService.saveAll(personalFile,
indexProcessingTypeService.get(IndexProcessingTypeService.UPDATE));
// unlock the file if the user did not select keep locked
if( !keepLocked)
{
repositoryService.unlockVersionedFile(versionedFile, user);
}
if( (collaboratorIds != null && collaboratorIds.length > 0) || notifyOwner )
{
List<Long> collaborators = new LinkedList<Long>();
if( collaboratorIds != null ){
collaborators = Arrays.asList(collaboratorIds);
}
inviteUserService.notifyCollaboratorsOfNewVersion(personalFile, collaborators, notifyOwner);
}
}
else
{
addFieldError("lockedByUser",
"The file is currently locked by user: " + versionedFile.getLockedBy().getUsername());
returnStatus = INPUT;
}
}
else
{
addFieldError("cannotLock",
"You do not have permission to add versions to this file ");
returnStatus = INPUT;
}
return returnStatus;
}
public Long getPersonalFileId() {
return personalFileId;
}
public void setPersonalFileId(Long personalFileId) {
this.personalFileId = personalFileId;
}
public UserService getUserService() {
return userService;
}
public void setUserService(UserService userService) {
this.userService = userService;
}
public PersonalFile getPersonalFile() {
return personalFile;
}
public void setPersonalFile(PersonalFile personalFile) {
this.personalFile = personalFile;
}
public String getUserFileDescription() {
return userFileDescription;
}
public void setUserFileDescription(String userFileDescription) {
this.userFileDescription = userFileDescription;
}
public File getFile() {
return file;
}
public void setFile(File file) {
this.file = file;
}
public String getFileContentType() {
return fileContentType;
}
public void setFileContentType(String fileContentType) {
this.fileContentType = fileContentType;
}
public String getFileFileName() {
return fileFileName;
}
public void setFileFileName(String fileFileName) {
this.fileFileName = fileFileName;
}
public RepositoryService getRepositoryService() {
return repositoryService;
}
public void setRepositoryService(RepositoryService repositoryService) {
this.repositoryService = repositoryService;
}
public Long getUserId() {
return userId;
}
public void setUserId(Long userId) {
this.userId = userId;
}
public UserFileSystemService getUserFileSystemService() {
return userFileSystemService;
}
public void setUserFileSystemService(UserFileSystemService userFileSystemService) {
this.userFileSystemService = userFileSystemService;
}
public boolean isVersionAdded() {
return versionAdded;
}
public void setVersionAdded(boolean versionAdded) {
this.versionAdded = versionAdded;
}
public void setKeepLocked(boolean keepLocked) {
this.keepLocked = keepLocked;
}
public UserWorkspaceIndexProcessingRecordService getUserWorkspaceIndexProcessingRecordService() {
return userWorkspaceIndexProcessingRecordService;
}
public void setUserWorkspaceIndexProcessingRecordService(
UserWorkspaceIndexProcessingRecordService userWorkspaceIndexProcessingRecordService) {
this.userWorkspaceIndexProcessingRecordService = userWorkspaceIndexProcessingRecordService;
}
public IndexProcessingTypeService getIndexProcessingTypeService() {
return indexProcessingTypeService;
}
public void setIndexProcessingTypeService(
IndexProcessingTypeService indexProcessingTypeService) {
this.indexProcessingTypeService = indexProcessingTypeService;
}
public ThumbnailTransformerService getThumbnailTransformerService() {
return thumbnailTransformerService;
}
public void setThumbnailTransformerService(
ThumbnailTransformerService thumbnailTransformerService) {
this.thumbnailTransformerService = thumbnailTransformerService;
}
/**
* Invite user service.
*
* @param inviteUserService
*/
public void setInviteUserService(InviteUserService inviteUserService) {
this.inviteUserService = inviteUserService;
}
public Long[] getCollaboratorIds() {
return collaboratorIds;
}
public void setCollaboratorIds(Long[] collaboratorIds) {
this.collaboratorIds = collaboratorIds;
}
public boolean getNotifyOwner() {
return notifyOwner;
}
public void setNotifyOwner(boolean notifyOwner) {
this.notifyOwner = notifyOwner;
}
}
|
<reponame>zhipengzhaocmu/fpga2022_artifact<filename>pigasus/software/src/service_inspectors/imap/imap_paf.cc<gh_stars>0
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Copyright (C) 2015-2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
//
// This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
// under the terms of the GNU General Public License Version 2 as published
// by the Free Software Foundation. You may not use, modify or distribute
// this program under any other version of the GNU General Public License.
//
// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
// WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
// General Public License for more details.
//
// You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
// with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
// 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA.
//--------------------------------------------------------------------------
#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
#include "config.h"
#endif
#include "imap_paf.h"
#include "protocols/packet.h"
#include "stream/stream.h"
#include "imap.h"
using namespace snort;
extern IMAPToken imap_resps[];
static inline ImapPafData* get_state(Flow* flow, bool c2s)
{
if ( !flow )
return nullptr;
ImapSplitter* s = (ImapSplitter*)Stream::get_splitter(flow, c2s);
return (s and s->is_paf()) ? &s->state : nullptr;
}
static inline void reset_data_states(ImapPafData* pfdata)
{
// reset MIME info
reset_mime_paf_state(&(pfdata->mime_info));
// reset server info
pfdata->imap_state = IMAP_PAF_CMD_IDENTIFIER;
// reset fetch data information information
pfdata->imap_data_info.paren_cnt = 0;
pfdata->imap_data_info.next_letter = nullptr;
pfdata->imap_data_info.length = 0;
}
static inline bool is_untagged(const uint8_t ch)
{
return (ch == '*' || ch == '+');
}
static bool parse_literal_length(const uint8_t ch, uint32_t* len)
{
uint32_t length = *len;
if (isdigit(ch))
{
uint64_t tmp_len = (10 * length) + (ch - '0');
if (tmp_len < UINT32_MAX)
{
*len = (uint32_t)tmp_len;
return false;
}
else
{
*len = 0;
}
}
else if (ch != '}')
*len = 0; // ALERT!! character should be a digit or ''}''
return true;
}
static void parse_fetch_header(const uint8_t ch, ImapPafData* pfdata)
{
if (pfdata->imap_data_info.esc_nxt_char)
{
pfdata->imap_data_info.esc_nxt_char = false;
}
else
{
switch (ch)
{
case '{':
pfdata->imap_state = IMAP_PAF_DATA_LEN_STATE;
break;
case '(':
pfdata->imap_data_info.paren_cnt++;
break;
case ')':
if (pfdata->imap_data_info.paren_cnt > 0)
pfdata->imap_data_info.paren_cnt--;
break;
case '\n':
if (pfdata->imap_data_info.paren_cnt)
{
pfdata->imap_state = IMAP_PAF_DATA_STATE;
}
else
{
reset_data_states(pfdata);
}
break;
case '\\':
pfdata->imap_data_info.esc_nxt_char = true;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
/*
* Statefully search for the single line termination sequence LF ("\n").
*
* PARAMS:
* const uint8_t ch - the next character to analyze.
* ImapPafData *pfdata - the struct containing all imap paf information
*
* RETURNS:
* false - if termination sequence not found
* true - if termination sequence found
*/
static bool find_data_end_single_line(const uint8_t ch, ImapPafData* pfdata)
{
if (ch == '\n')
{
reset_data_states(pfdata);
return true;
}
return false;
}
/* Flush based on data length*/
static inline bool literal_complete(ImapPafData* pfdata)
{
if (pfdata->imap_data_info.length)
{
pfdata->imap_data_info.length--;
if (pfdata->imap_data_info.length)
return false;
}
return true;
}
static bool check_imap_data_end(ImapDataEnd* data_end_state, uint8_t val)
{
switch (*data_end_state)
{
case IMAP_PAF_DATA_END_UNKNOWN:
if (val == ')')
*data_end_state = IMAP_PAF_DATA_END_PAREN;
break;
case IMAP_PAF_DATA_END_PAREN:
if (val == '\n')
{
*data_end_state = IMAP_PAF_DATA_END_UNKNOWN;
return true;
}
else if (val != '\r')
{
*data_end_state = IMAP_PAF_DATA_END_UNKNOWN;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
return false;
}
/*
* Statefully search for the data termination sequence or a MIME boundary.
*
* PARAMS:
* const uint8_t ch - the next character to analyze.
* ImapPafData *pfdata - the struct containing all imap paf information
*
* RETURNS:
* false - if termination sequence not found
* true - if termination sequence found
*/
static bool find_data_end_mime_data(const uint8_t ch, ImapPafData* pfdata)
{
if (literal_complete(pfdata)
&& check_imap_data_end(&(pfdata->data_end_state), ch))
{
reset_data_states(pfdata);
return true;
}
// check for mime flush point
if (process_mime_paf_data(&(pfdata->mime_info), ch))
return true;
return false;
}
/*
* Initial command processing function. Determine if this command
* may be analyzed irregularly ( which currently means if emails
* and email attachments need to be analyzed).
*
* PARAMS:
* const uint8_t ch - the next character to analyze.
* ImapPafData *pfdata - the struct containing all imap paf information
*/
static inline void init_command_search(const uint8_t ch, ImapPafData* pfdata)
{
switch (ch)
{
case 'F':
case 'f':
// may be a FETCH response
pfdata->imap_data_info.next_letter = &(imap_resps[RESP_FETCH].name[1]);
break;
default:
// this is not a data command. Search for regular end of line.
pfdata->imap_state = IMAP_PAF_REG_STATE;
}
}
/*
* Confirms every character in the current sequence is part of the expected
* command. After confirmation is complete, IMAP PAF will begin searching
* for data. If any character is unexpected, searches for the default
* termination sequence.
*
* PARAMS:
* const uint8_t ch - the next character to analyze.
* ImapPafData *pfdata - the struct containing all imap paf information
*/
static inline void parse_command(const uint8_t ch, ImapPafData* pfdata)
{
char val = *(pfdata->imap_data_info.next_letter);
if (val == '\0' && isblank(ch))
pfdata->imap_state = IMAP_PAF_DATA_HEAD_STATE;
else if (toupper(ch) == toupper(val))
pfdata->imap_data_info.next_letter++;
else
pfdata->imap_state = IMAP_PAF_REG_STATE;
}
/*
* Wrapper function for the command parser. Determines whether this is the
* first letter being processed and calls the appropriate processing
* function.
*
* PARAMS:
* const uint8_t ch - the next character to analyze.
* ImapPafData *pfdata - the struct containing all imap paf information
*/
static inline void process_command(const uint8_t ch, ImapPafData* pfdata)
{
if (pfdata->imap_data_info.next_letter)
parse_command(ch, pfdata);
else
init_command_search(ch, pfdata);
}
/*
* This function only does something when the character is a blank or a CR/LF.
* In those specific cases, this function will set the appropriate next
* state information
*
* PARAMS:
* const uint8_t ch - the next character to analyze.
* ImapPafData *pfdata - the struct containing all imap paf information
* ImapPafData base_state - if a space is not found, revert to this state
* ImapPafData next_state - if a space is found, go to this state
* RETURNS:
* true - if the status has been eaten
* false - if a CR or LF has been found
*/
static inline void eat_character(const uint8_t ch, ImapPafData* pfdata,
ImapPafState base_state, ImapPafState next_state)
{
switch (ch)
{
case ' ':
case '\t':
pfdata->imap_state = next_state;
break;
case '\r':
case '\n':
pfdata->imap_state = base_state;
break;
}
}
/*
* defined above in the eat_character function
*
* Keeping the next two functions to ease any future development
* where these cases will no longer be simple or identical
*/
static inline void eat_second_argument(const uint8_t ch, ImapPafData* pfdata)
{
eat_character(ch, pfdata, IMAP_PAF_REG_STATE, IMAP_PAF_CMD_SEARCH);
}
/* explanation in 'eat_second_argument' above */
static inline void eat_response_identifier(const uint8_t ch, ImapPafData* pfdata)
{
eat_character(ch, pfdata, IMAP_PAF_REG_STATE, IMAP_PAF_CMD_STATUS);
}
/*
* Analyzes the current data for a correct flush point. Flushes when
* a command is complete or a MIME boundary is found.
*
* PARAMS:
* ImapPafData *pfdata - ImapPaf state tracking structure
* const uint8_t *data - payload data to inspect
* uint32_t len - length of payload data
* uint32_t * fp- pointer to set flush point
*
* RETURNS:
* StreamSplitter::Status - StreamSplitter::FLUSH if flush point found,
* StreamSplitter::SEARCH otherwise
*/
static StreamSplitter::Status imap_paf_server(ImapPafData* pfdata,
const uint8_t* data, uint32_t len, uint32_t* fp)
{
uint32_t i;
uint32_t flush_len = 0;
uint32_t boundary_start = 0;
pfdata->end_of_data = false;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
{
uint8_t ch = data[i];
switch (pfdata->imap_state)
{
case IMAP_PAF_CMD_IDENTIFIER:
// can be '+', '*', or a tag
if (is_untagged(ch))
{
// continue checking for fetch command
pfdata->imap_state = IMAP_PAF_CMD_TAG;
}
else
{
// end of a command. flush at end of line.
pfdata->imap_state = IMAP_PAF_FLUSH_STATE;
}
break;
case IMAP_PAF_CMD_TAG:
eat_response_identifier(ch, pfdata);
break;
case IMAP_PAF_CMD_STATUS:
// can be a command name, msg sequence number, msg count, etc...
// since we are only interested in fetch, eat this argument
eat_second_argument(ch, pfdata);
break;
case IMAP_PAF_CMD_SEARCH:
process_command(ch, pfdata);
find_data_end_single_line(ch, pfdata);
break;
case IMAP_PAF_REG_STATE:
find_data_end_single_line(ch, pfdata); // data reset when end of line hit
break;
case IMAP_PAF_DATA_HEAD_STATE:
parse_fetch_header(ch, pfdata); // function will change state
break;
case IMAP_PAF_DATA_LEN_STATE:
if (parse_literal_length(ch, &(pfdata->imap_data_info.length)))
{
pfdata->imap_state = IMAP_PAF_DATA_HEAD_STATE;
}
break;
case IMAP_PAF_DATA_STATE:
if (find_data_end_mime_data(ch, pfdata))
{
// if not a boundary, wait for end of
// the server's response before flushing
if (pfdata->imap_state == IMAP_PAF_DATA_STATE)
{
*fp = i + 1;
return StreamSplitter::FLUSH;
}
}
if (pfdata->mime_info.boundary_state == MIME_PAF_BOUNDARY_UNKNOWN)
boundary_start = i;
break;
case IMAP_PAF_FLUSH_STATE:
if (find_data_end_single_line(ch, pfdata))
{
flush_len = i +1;
}
break;
}
}
if (flush_len)
{
// flush at the final termination sequence
*fp = flush_len;
return StreamSplitter::FLUSH;
}
if ( scanning_boundary(&pfdata->mime_info, boundary_start, fp) )
return StreamSplitter::LIMIT;
return StreamSplitter::SEARCH;
}
/*
* Searches through the current data for a LF. All client
* commands end with this termination sequence
*
* PARAMS:
* ImapPafData *pfdata - ImapPaf state tracking structure
* const uint8_t *data - payload data to inspect
* uint32_t len - length of payload data
* uint32_t * fp- pointer to set flush point
*
* RETURNS:
* StreamSplitter::Status - StreamSplitter::FLUSH if flush point found,
* StreamSplitter::SEARCH otherwise
*/
static StreamSplitter::Status imap_paf_client(const uint8_t* data, uint32_t len, uint32_t* fp)
{
const char* pch;
pch = (char *)memchr (data, '\n', len);
if (pch != nullptr)
{
*fp = (uint32_t)(pch - (const char*)data) + 1;
return StreamSplitter::FLUSH;
}
return StreamSplitter::SEARCH;
}
//--------------------------------------------------------------------
// callback for stateful scanning of in-order raw payload
//--------------------------------------------------------------------
ImapSplitter::ImapSplitter(bool c2s) : StreamSplitter(c2s)
{
memset(&state, 0, sizeof(state));
reset_data_states(&state);
}
/* Function: imap_paf()
Purpose: IMAP PAF callback.
Inspects imap traffic. Checks client traffic for the current command
and sets correct server termination sequence. Client side data will
flush after receiving CRLF ("\r\n"). Server data flushes after
finding set termination sequence.
Arguments:
void * - stream5 session pointer
void ** - IMAP state tracking structure
const uint8_t * - payload data to inspect
uint32_t - length of payload data
uint32_t - flags to check whether client or server
uint32_t * - pointer to set flush point
Returns:
StreamSplitter::Status - StreamSplitter::FLUSH if flush point found, StreamSplitter::SEARCH otherwise
*/
StreamSplitter::Status ImapSplitter::scan(
Flow* , const uint8_t* data, uint32_t len,
uint32_t flags, uint32_t* fp)
{
ImapPafData* pfdata = &state;
if (flags & PKT_FROM_SERVER)
return imap_paf_server(pfdata, data, len, fp);
else
return imap_paf_client(data, len, fp);
}
bool imap_is_data_end(Flow* ssn)
{
ImapPafData* s = get_state(ssn, true);
return s ? s->end_of_data : false;
}
|
Vortex solitons - Mass, Energy and Angular momentum bunching in relativistic electron-positron plasmas It is shown that the interaction of large amplitude electromagnetic waves with a hot electron-positron (e-p) plasma (a principal constituent of the universe in the MeV epoch) leads to a bunching of mass, energy, and angular momentum in stable, long-lived structures. Electromagnetism in the MeV epoch, then, could provide a possible route for seeding the observed large-scale structure of the universe. I. INTRODUCTION It is widely believed that the currently observed large-scale structure of the universe (the clusters and superclusters of galaxies) grew gravitationally out of small density fluctuations. The imprint of this density variation in early universe was left on the cosmic microwave background radiation in the form of spatial temperature fluctuations. The gravitational origin, however, can be only a part of the story; the gravity can enhance, but it can not produce these fluctuations. The quest for the physical process(es) which produced the initial matter-density fluctuations, has led to the emergence of the following two leading mechanisms: inflation, and topological defects. Of these the former is, perhaps, the most thoroughly investigated. According to this mechanism there exists, in the evolution of the universe, an early inflationary period in which the universe expands so rapidly (exponentially) that quantum fluctuations get trapped in the expansion. By the end of the inflation, therefore, small irregularities covering a wide range of length-scales permeate the entire universe. Gravitational instability then acts on these small initial irregularities and enhances the concentration of matter from which galaxies and clusters of galaxies eventually emerge. Theory of such processes is, by no means, complete and much needs to be done to determine whether tiny quantum fluctuations can provide a strong enough template for gravitational condensation to finally create the structures that we observe today. Cosmologist, usually, rely on the speculated existence of non-baryonic dark matter to augment the gravitational force to aid and accelerate the structure formation. The question is far from settled! It is natural, then, to look elsewhere for the source of the seed density "fluctuations." An obvious possibility is to explore if electromagnetic interactions taking place in a plasma (known to be the source of a whole variety of linear as well as nonlinear waves) can cause the required density perturbations. In the standard cosmological model of the hot Universe (the Big Bang model), it is estimated that temperatures as high as T ∼ 10 10 K ∼ 1 MeV prevail up to times ∼ 1 second (t ≈ 1 sec) after the Big Bang. In this epoch, the main constituents of the Universe are photons, neutrinos and anti-neutrinos, and e-p pairs. As the plasma cools down the annihilation process e + + e − → + dominates and the e + e − pair concentration goes down. Since the equilibration rates are fast in comparison with the changes in plasma parameters, an equilibrium e-p plasma should be present in the MeV epoch of the early Universe. It is this plasma-dominated era in which we will seek the seeds for future structure formation. Relativistic e-p plasmas have been investigated quite extensively. Tajima and Taniuti suggested that collective processes in these plasmas could lead to interesting consequences for structure formation. In the e-p plasma of the early Universe, localized low frequency electromagnetic (EM) waves (h ≪ T ) could propagate as an envelope soliton due to the interaction with sound waves. Plasma density variations related to these solitons could potentially be useful towards structure formation in the Universe. However the analysis is based on a one dimensional formulation, and the corresponding soliton solutions are likely to be unstable in higher dimensions. Berezhiani and Mahajan argued that in the MeV epoch of the Universe, although the e-p pairs form the dominant constituent of the plasma, a minority population of heavy ions is also present due to the baryon asymmetry. They were able to show that, under appropriate conditions (when the plasma is transparent, i.e., ≫ e, where ( e ) is the pulse (plasma) frequency), the resulting e-p-ion plasma supports the propagation of stable, nondiffracting and nondispersing EM pulses (light bullets) with large density bunching. It was further shown in Ref. that these bullets are exceptionally robust: they can emerge from a large variety of initial field distributions, and are remarkably stable. Note that the characteristic dimensions of such matter-filled light pulses are proportional to the electron to ion density ratio, and tend to be considerably larger than the skin depth ( = c/ e ). The implication is that when one deals with the EM structures whose characteristic dimensions (of the spatio-temporal inhomogeneities) are of the order of the skin depth, the baryon asymmetry affects can be safely neglected, and the dynamical system can be assumed as a pure electron-positron plasma. In the present paper we examine the propagation of strong EM radiation in a hot pure e-p plasma with the explicit aim of finding soliton-type solutions. The plasma is assumed to be transparent. We demonstrate that the dynamics of the EM field envelope is governed by a generalized nonlinear Schrdinger equation (NSE) with a defocusing nonlinearity. In Vortex solitons, which are the most fundamental 2D soliton solutions of NSE with an angular 2 phase ramp, appear as local dark minima in an otherwise bright background. Vortex solitons have been recently observed in materials with a defocusing optical nonlinearity -the dynamics of laser beams in these materials is generally described by the NSE. Since the electromagnetic vortices (EMV) carry angular momentum that is conserved during propagation, the generation of Vortex solitons in an e-p plasma is a potent mechanism for creating domains with definite angular momenta even out of an initial field distribution devoid of angular momentum. To keep the total angular momentum zero, domains of equal and opposite angular momentum must be created in pairs. II. FORMULATION We use the following set of relativistic hydrodynamic equations in dimensionless form : along with the field equation (in the Coulomb gauge ∇ A = 0) where p ± is in units of m e c. The particle number density n ± is normalized by the equilibrium density n 0 = n ± 0 and plasma temperature (T ± ) is measured in units of m e c 2. The pressure P ± = n ± r T ±, where n ± r is the density in the rest frame of the fluid element (n ± r = n ± / ± ). The function G(z) defines the "effective" temperature dependent mass of the particles and has the following limiting expressions: G ≈ 1 + 5/2z for z ≫ 1, and G ≈ 4/z if z ≪ 1. From Eqs. - it is straightforward to derive the adiabatic equation of state : which, at nonrelativistic temperature (T ± ≪ 1), reduces to the standard adiabatic relation (n ± r /(T ± ) 3/2 = const) for an ordinary gas. In the ultrarelativistic limit (T ± ≫ 1), as expected, Eq. describes the photon gas (n ± r /(T ± ) 3 = const). In the ultrarelativistic case, one should take into account the radiative pressure P R = T 4 ( = /45h 3 c 3 ). For simplicity we neglect this less important effect for the current considerations. Notice that in the MeV epoch, the plasma temperature T ± ≈ m e c 2 (i.e. z ≈ 1), and G ≈ 4 leading to an effective mass of e-p pairs to be m eff ∼ 4m e. Since the particle masses are just a few times larger than their rest mass at these temperatures, the e-p plasma can be considered as a two component fluid rather than a photon gas. We consider the propagation of circularly polarized EM wave with a mean frequency, and a mean wave number k along the z axis. The choice of circular polarization is not restrictive, it simplifies the analysis by preventing harmonic generation. The vector potential can be represented as: where A ⊥ is a slowly varying function of r and t (k ≫ ∇, ≫ ∂ t ). The unit vectors x and y define two mutually perpendicular axes in the plane normal to the direction of wave propagation. The Coulomb gauge condition leads to the relation Consequently the effects related to A z will turn out to be negligibly small. We shall now follow standard methods to analyze the system. In the slowly varying amplitude approximation, the transverse, high-frequency component of the equation of motion yields the simple relation between the particle momentum and the vector potential, The low frequency motion of the plasma is driven by the ponderomotive pressure ( ∼ (p ± ) 2 ) of the high-frequency EM field, and it does not depend on the sign of the particles' charge. If we assume that in equilibrium the electron and the positron fluids have equal temperature (T ± 0 = T 0 ), their effective masses will also be equal (G ± = G), and the radiation pressure will impart equal low-frequency momenta to both fluids allowing the possibility of overall density changes without producing charge separation. The charge neutrality conditions n − = n + = N, = 0 will be assumed in the rest of the paper. It is also evident that the symmetry between the two fluids keeps their temperatures always equal (T ± = T ) if they were equal initially. Considerable simplification results when we invoke the wide beam approximation ; we assume that the longitudinal variation of the field envelope is much stronger than the transverse variation, i.e. L z, the characteristic length along the propagation direction, is much shorter than L ⊥, the characteristic length in the transverse plane. This approximation, coupled with charge neutrality, allows us to extract from Eqs. -, the following, leading order description for the low frequency response: the equation of motion and the "energy" conservation equation: Here we have used the condition that the ponderomotive pressure gives equal longitudinal momenta to both electrons and positrons (p ± z = p). Notice that the assumed circular polarization of the EM field insures that the relativistic factor does not depend on the "fast" time (1/) scale; it can be written as Substituting Eqs. and into Eq., we find that the slowly varying amplitude A ⊥ must satisfy where v g denotes the group velocity of the carrier waves, v g = k/. We are still not quite done with simplifying assumptions. We seek solutions which vary slowly with time in a frame comoving with the wave, that is, in the frame propagating with the group velocity v g. The transformation = z − v g t, = t with the condition v g ∂ ≫ ∂ helps implement this approximation. Equations and can now be combined to derive the implied constant of motion is to be determined from the boundary conditions. We demand p and A ⊥ to be zero at infinite, but allow them to be finite as r ⊥ → ∞. Integrating Eq. leads to (T 0 is the particle temperature at infinity) which is readily solved for an explicit expression for the longitudinal momentum in terms of the transverse vector potential where g = 1/(1 − v 2 g ) 1/2 is the "effective relativistic factor" associated with the group velocity of the wave; it is not to be confused with the particle. The continuity equation can be similarly integrated to determine the particle density (after using Eq. for p): Substituting Eq. into Eq., we obtain the following nonlinear Schrdinger equation for the complex amplitude A ⊥, where the wave frequency satisfies the dispersion relation 2 = k 2 +2/G 0, implying that the parameter g = G 0 /2 ( g = (/ e ) G 0 /2 in physical quantities). The set of Eq. We remind the reader that Eq. was derived under the assumption ∂ ≫ ∇ ⊥ (i.e. L z ≪ L ⊥ ). In spite of that, for a highly transparent plasma ( g ≫ 1), the second, "diffractive" term can be the same order or even greater than the third, "dispersive" term. For this paper, we will not attempt the general solutions of this quite complicated set of equations; we will simply deal with waves for which the plasma is so highly transparent that the diffractive term dominates. Using g G 0 ≫ G, and neglecting the dispersive term, the NSE simplifies where the following renormalizations are used: The vector potential |A ⊥ | is restricted from above by the condition |A ⊥ | < g G 0. This restriction is necessary for the validity of the hydrodynamic treatment for the particles. For larger amplitudes, the electromagnetic waves are overturned causing multistream motion of the plasma requiring a kinetic description. Notice that despite the upper bound on the amplitude of the vector potential, the EM field can be still relativistically strong, i.e., the normalized |A ⊥ | ≫ 1, since g ≫ 1. III. STATIONARY SOLUTIONS In the NSE derived above the diffractive and nonlinear terms have opposite signs and as a consequence Eq. does not admit transversely localized solutions (also called the bright solitons). Any localized initial EM field, therefore, will undergo transverse spreading during propagation. The NSE with a defocusing nonlinearity can, however, support stationary structures with asymptotically (at infinity) nonvanishing fields. Dark solitons in 1D, and vortex solitons in 2D, are the fundamental representatives of such solutions. In the extreme low amplitude limit, |A ⊥ | ≪ g G 0, Eq. reduces to the NSE with a cubic nonlinearity. In one-dimensional geometry we have: This equation is exactly integrable via the inverse scattering method, and its one-soliton solution can be written as A ⊥ (x, ) = g G 0 A 0 ( tanh + i) e −iA 2 0, where Here A 0 is a measure of the asymptotic fields at the spatial infinity and and are constants with 2 + 2 = 1. The solutions with a nonzero value at the center of the dip, is In two transverse dimensions (2D), a dark soliton represents a dark stripe imposed on a homogeneous bright background. It is well-known that such a stripe is unstable to transverse, long wave length modulations. The instability causes the stripe to split into a sequence of when the boundary between two flows develops the so-called vortex streets. Since a dark solitary stripe does not carry any topological "charge," it is evident that vortices have to be born with equal and opposite topological "charges." It is straightforward to show that e-p plasmas can support large amplitude dark solitons as well. In the general case (amplitude large, but subject to the condition |A ⊥ | < g G 0 ), we cannot construct analytic solutions even in 1D. It is possible, however, to extract the general properties of the solution by using reasonably simple techniques especially when A ⊥ has the time dependence where A = A ⊥ / g G 0 is the normalized amplitude, and is always less than unity. Here is so-called nonlinear frequency shift. This time-dependence implies that the amplitude square is stationary (what follows, therefore, are classed as stationary solutions), and the dip of the wave does not propagate in the comoving frame with quite the group velocity of the linear wave. The 1D Eq. now can be cast in the form where the prime on V denotes the derivative with respect to, and The lowermost value of the amplitude |A| is zero, that is, we recover the dark soliton. Note that for small values of ( ≪ 1), ub → 0, while ub → 1 for ≫ 1. Similarly one can show the existence of vortex soliton solutions in 2D. We shall again seek stationary solutions in 2D polar coordinates (r, ). The ansatz with(r) real, and with the perpendicular Laplacian operator given by converts Eq. to the ordinary differential equation (similar to Eq. ), where the potential V () is the same as the one-dimensional expression given by Eq.. If we were to extend the "particle in a potential" analogy further, Eq. could be viewed as the nonconservative motion of a particle. Since the rhs approaches zero in the limit What is extremely significant is that during the evolution of the fields, the integrals of motion should be preserved. It is easy to prove, by direct calculations, that Eq. conserves the angular momentum M Equation for the angular momentum is the paraxial approximation for the orbital angular momentum, M E = dr , of the EM field. The angular momentum carried by the vortices is M z = mN, where N is another conserved quantity known as the "photon number" N = dr ⊥ |A ⊥ | 2. It follows, then, that the relativistic e-p plasma are capable of sustaining electromagnetic vortex like structures, and that these structures have domains in which the EM fields carry non-zero angular momenta, although the total angular momentum of the entire system is zero. If this angular momentum could, somehow, be locally transferred to the surrounding medium, we would have a rather effective mechanism of imparting angular momentum to different domains of matter in the early universe. In our next publication we show that when the baryon asymmetry effects are incorporated, the medium can, indeed, acquire angular momentum from the EM field vortices. IV. CONCLUSIONS We have investigated the dynamics of the highly relativistic ( g ≫ 1) nonlinear propagation of electromagnetic waves in unmagnetized hot electron-positron plasmas. The system is described by a nonlinear Schrdinger equation with an inverse square root type (nonsaturating) nonlinearity. We have shown the possibility of dark and vortex soliton type solutions for this equation. Transverse instability of dark soliton stripes leads to the formation of a vortex chain such that the EM fields in each vortex carry angular momentum. Such objects could play an important role in cosmology as sources for the structure formation in the MeV epoch of the evolution of the Universe. In the commonly adopted cosmological scenarios about the origin of the rotation of galaxies, structures grow in a hierarchy by the gravitational assembly of clumps out of subclumps. The origin of the angular momentum of galaxies if they were formed from initial fluctuations in a Friedman Universe was suggested (by Hoyle ) to be due to the tidal interactions between the condensing system. However, it is still not clear whether this mechanism gives an adequate solution. We hope that the suggested mechanism of angular momentum generation in the MeV epoch of the Universe is an interesting alternative to explore and examine. Electromagnetism, operating through the versatile substrate of the e-p plasma, seems to readily generate these highly interesting, long-lived objects -the carriers of large amounts of mass, energy and angular momentum. Since an initial localization of mass, energy and angular momentum is precisely the seed that gravity needs for eventual structure-formation, electromagnetism may have provided a key element in the construction of the large-scale map of the observable universe. Results of this paper can be also applied to astrophysical objects like the pulsars, and active galactic nuclei -the e-p pairs are thought to be a major constituent of the plasma emanating both from the pulsars, and from the inner region of the accretion disks surrounding the central black holes.
|
Modelling the negative regulation of muscle protein degradation by attachment complexes using C. elegans Focal adhesions are present in both human and C. elegans muscle, with many of the constituent proteins (~115 of at least 150) of these complexes having putative orthology between the two systems. In both worms and humans, components of focal adhesions have been suggested as regulators of (mal)adaptive changes in muscle size in response to a range of pathological/environmental conditions. We aimed to examine the involvement of a known subset of genes comprising the worm muscle focal adhesions (termed dense bodies) in regulating three subcellular compartments: cytosol, mitochondria and myofibres. RNAi experiments were conducted acutely in adult C. elegans against these genes (25 in total) in order to assess the physiologic significance of acute loss of dense body constituents. Acute RNAi treatment of all 25 muscle attachmentrelated genes resulted in degradation of reporter protein in muscle cytosol, and mitochondrial and myofibrillar dystrophies in 18 and 19 of the target genes, respectively. It thus appears that maintenance of this set of the dense body complex is crucial in maintaining muscle cell integrity in all subcellular compartments tested. Uncovering the mechanism(s) regulating protein degradation and/or dystrophy may provide novel therapeutic targets for understanding, treating or preventing human diseases where muscle atrophy is characteristic.
|
<gh_stars>100-1000
// Copyright Amazon.com, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
import { useEffect, useState } from 'react';
import { useMeetingManager } from '../../providers/MeetingProvider';
import { DevicePermissionStatus } from '../../types';
export function useDevicePermissionStatus() {
const meetingManager = useMeetingManager();
const [permission, setPermission] = useState<DevicePermissionStatus>(
DevicePermissionStatus.UNSET
);
useEffect(() => {
meetingManager.subscribeToDevicePermissionStatus(setPermission);
return () => {
meetingManager.unsubscribeFromDevicePermissionStatus(setPermission);
};
}, [meetingManager]);
return permission;
}
export default useDevicePermissionStatus;
|
<gh_stars>1-10
"""
Methods all classes should define.
Methods that are at the base of the class, but don't need to be defined
in base_dice.py. These are things like :code:`str`, :code:`repr` and
:code:`bool`.
These are magic methods that any class should define to make Pythonic
development easier.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from .._types import ChancesValue
from .mapping import MappingDice
class BasicDice(MappingDice):
"""Basic magic methods mixin class."""
def __repr__(self) -> str:
"""Repr format of Dice."""
name = type(self).__qualname__
values = {k: self[k] for k in sorted(self._chances)}
return f"{name}[{self._total_chance}]({values!r})"
def __str__(self) -> str:
"""Str format of Dice."""
name = type(self).__qualname__
keys = sorted(self._chances)
max_k = len(str(max(keys)))
sep = "\n "
value = sep.join(
f"{k: >{max_k}}"
f": {float(self[k]): >5.1%}"
f" {self[k].numerator: >2}"
f"/{self[k].denominator: <2}".rstrip()
for k in keys
)
if not value:
return f"{name}[{self._total_chance}]()"
return f"{name}[{self._total_chance}]({sep}{value}\n)"
def __bool__(self) -> bool:
"""Falsy if the only :ref:`ds-t-Chances Chance` is 0."""
if self._total_chance == 0:
return False
if len(self._chances) != 1:
return bool(self._chances)
return 0 not in self._chances
def __contains__(self, item: object) -> bool:
"""
Is :ref:`ds-t-Chances Value` a possible :ref:`ds-t-Chances Chance`.
This doesn't check if the :ref:`ds-t-Chances Value` is contained
in the :ref:`ds-t-Internal Chances`. It checks if there is a
potability of the dice. This is as some dice will show 0 as a
:ref:`ds-t-Chances Value` with 0% :ref:`ds-t-Chances Chance`,
however as it's not possible it doesn't make sense to say it's a
:ref:`ds-t-Chances Chance` of the dice.
"""
if not isinstance(item, ChancesValue):
return False
return bool(self._chances.get(item))
|
import { BrowserModule } from '@angular/platform-browser';
import { NgModule } from '@angular/core';
import { RouterModule, Routes } from "@angular/router";
import { HttpModule } from "@angular/http";
import {NgbModule} from '@ng-bootstrap/ng-bootstrap';
import { AppComponent } from './app.component';
import { HomeComponent } from './home/home.component';
import { NavComponent } from './nav/nav.component';
import { MessagesComponent } from './messages/messages.component';
import { LoginComponent } from './login/login.component';
import { ExerciseComponent, lookAhead } from './exercise/exercise.component';
import { MessagesService } from './services/messages.service';
import { ExerciseService } from './services/exercise.service';
import { RegisterComponent } from './register/register.component';
import { FormsModule } from '@angular/forms';
@NgModule({
declarations: [
AppComponent,
HomeComponent,
NavComponent,
MessagesComponent,
LoginComponent,
ExerciseComponent,
RegisterComponent
],
imports: [
BrowserModule,
HttpModule,
NgbModule.forRoot(),
FormsModule,
RouterModule.forRoot([
{ path: 'home', component: HomeComponent },
{ path: 'exercise', component: ExerciseComponent },
{ path: 'login', component: LoginComponent },
{ path: 'register', component: RegisterComponent },
{ path: '', redirectTo: '/home', pathMatch: 'full'}
])
],
providers: [MessagesService,ExerciseService,lookAhead],
bootstrap: [AppComponent]
})
export class AppModule { }
|
Mumbai: Investment bank Avendus Advisors Pvt. Ltd is set to open their institutional brokerage business in January. The business is part of the equity and capital markets group that launched its initial public offerings advisory business in July. Girish Nadkarni, former COO (investment banking and institutional equity) IL&FS Investsmart Ltd, joined Avendus in August to lead this practice.
Avendus has been expanding into new services this year including the creation of a corporate debt and special solutions group that does distressed asset financing and structured financing. The expansion of the firm has been capped off in the last two weeks with new office space that more than triples the capacity for headcount. The proposed institutional brokerage division will have 25-30 people. The equity and capital markets group currently has a five-member team.
Avendus is diversifying its business amidt an explosion of financial services firms entering new service lines. Edelweiss Capital Ltd started as an investment bank and recently entered the institutional equities, private client brokerage and wealth management businesses. Enam Securities Pvt. Ltd went in the opposite direction, starting out as an institutional brokerage in 1984, adding an investment bank in the 1990s and in the last six months also getting into retail broking, insurance broking and wealth management. Ambit RSM Pvt. Ltd was a strong accounting firm that has transformed itself into a corporate finance advisory firm.
Avendus’ staple business has been advising clients on M&A, which has been about 70% of deals (the remaining deals are private equity syndication). While 60% of their M&A deals cross the border, 85-95% have been with the United States, according to Aashish Bhinde, executive director at Avendus, who said that they have recognized Europe as the next important market for cross-border M&As.
|
UNIVERSITY JOURNALS. Consolidating institutional repositories in a digital, free, open access publication platform for all scholarly output Funders increasingly mandate researchers to publish their scientific articles in open access and to retain their copyright. Universities all over the world have set up institutional repositories and use repositories for the preservation and dissemination of academic production of their institutions, including scientific articles, reports, datasets, and other research outputs. However, in general, authors do not find institutional repositories very attractive and accessible as an open access publication platform since repositories and open access are not part of the rewarding system. We expect that researchers are more likely to publish and deposit their scientific papers in a repository, once they have the appearance, recognition and dissemination of a scientific journal. That is why we took the initiative to set up a repository based journal University Journals in which universities collaborate. The paper will explain the University Journals project and how the involved universities want to facilitate a valuable alternative publication platform that complies with Plan S principles and enables publication and dissemination of all research outcomes. By establishing University Journals as a publication platform, university libraries are instrumental (and crucial) in achieving the ambitions of Open Science, and universities gain control over the publication process.
|
CHINO HILLS – Montclair High School head coach Gilbert Diaz knew the road to a CIF-Southern Section crown would go through defending titleholder La Quinta.
Even though the Cavaliers (6-1) had split the first two matches with the Blackhawks, they still trailed 24-11.
La Quinta rolled on to eliminate the Mt. Baldy League champion and No. 4 seed by taking seven of the next 10 matches to win convincingly 44-27 on Saturday at in the semifinal round of the CIF-SS Division 3 Dual Meet Wrestling Championships at Ayala.
“We just had a few matches that went the other way and we didn’t get the breaks,” Diaz said.
The contest opened with the 125-pound weight class, which set the tone for the day. Austin Sapiro of La Quinta defeated Minh Woong by decision, 16-1.
The Cavaliers didn’t win by pin until the 140-pound match, in which Joseph Martinez beat Alex DeLara in 3:06.
Last year’s CIF champions rallied to take the next three matches (145, 152 and 160 pounds) by a combined score of 21-7.
When it appeared Omar Vega had given Montclair a bit of momentum after winning by fall at 171 pounds, Mike Urwin took it away by with an overtime decision over Lorenzo Villela.
“There were a couple of matches at 35 (135-pound division) and 89 (189-pound division) that made the biggest difference,” Diaz said.
That didn’t discourage the Cavaliers, and Carlos Zamora (215) and Martin Gonzalez (heavyweight) later won by pin, which gave them an opportunity to pass the Blackhawks.
When the 112-pound match came around, though, Basie Espinoza couldn’t continue because of an injury.
“The 12-pounder (Espinoza) got injured, couldn’t finish wrestling on the illegal slam by a 12- pounder (La Quinta’s Jesse Calderon),” Diaz said.
With virtually no chance of coming back, Montclair forfeited the 119-pound matchup, which ended its undefeated run.
“We faced a good opponent and we were in the match,” Diaz said.
Montclair was one of two local schools that advanced past the first round. The other was Ayala, which fell short against Long Beach Millikan, 54-18.
Diamond Bar and Colony were eliminated in the first round by La Quinta (47-27) and Millikan (49-18), respectively.
Fourth-seeded Alta Loma went out in the first round in losing to Bellflower St. John Bosco 40-36 at Moreno Valley Canyon Springs.
“We’re a better tournament team than a dual team,” Alta Loma coach Tom Guenther said.
Third-seeded Bloomington won its first CIF wrestling title by downing top-seeded Morro Bay 39-26 in the Division 6 championship match at Baldwin Park Sierra Vista on Saturday.
“It’s pretty amazing; I started with this program four years ago and we finished that year with 13 kids,” Bloomington coach Gabriel Schaefer said.
En route to the title, Bloomington downed Fillmore 70-12, Santa Ynez 53-16, then defeated second-seeded Oak Hills 31-29 in the semifinals.
Bloomington (20-0) didn’t qualify for the dual tournament until two years ago, then missed a chance last year because of a paperwork snafu.
“We made sure this year we didn’t have to go in as at-large,” Schaefer said of his Sunkist League champions.
|
It’s often said that in New Zealand, there are more sheep than people. In Wyoming, there’s way more energy than people.
The state, the least populous in the U.S., ranks second in overall energy production; first in coal production; fourth in natural gas; and eighth in crude oil. And its Republican-controlled legislature seems determined to keep its unholy trinity of fossil fuels on top.
Last week, state legislators, several of whom deny the existence human-caused climate change, filed a measure that would effectively outlaw renewable energy by preventing Wyoming utilities from selling electricity generated by wind or solar farms.
Currently, about 90 percent of the electricity provided to the half-million residents of Wyoming comes from coal. The leftover electricity Wyoming generates is sold to the rest of the country. Selling Wyoming-made solar and wind energy to other states would remain legal even if this bill were passed. It’s the right of the utilities to sell solar and wind to residents of Wyoming that would be restricted.
Under this proposal, if a utility provided energy produced by a large-scale wind or solar plant to Wyoming residents, it would be fined $10 per megawatt hour sold. Only energy from coal, natural gas, nuclear, hydroelectric, oil and small-scale, privately-owned solar panels and wind turbines could be sold without repercussions.
The bill is likely to be a tough sell to the legislature, with one of the co-sponsors telling InsideClimate News he puts the odds of his own bill passing at “50 percent or less." But it’s also part of a larger pattern of resistance—oftentimes successful—to new and alternative forms of energy in Wyoming.
The state already imposes the only wind tax in America, charging $1 for each megawatt hour of wind energy produced in state. What’s more, the wind tax is one of the state’s only taxes—there is no income tax and even sales tax is only implemented spottily.
The wind tax was billed an attempt to meet a gaping hole in the state budget. But in the four years since, it’s only generated the state $15 million in revenue. In the process, its thought to have negatively impacted wind energy development in the state. Even though wind farmers want access to Wyoming’s strong intermountain gusts, they have struggled to afford the additional overhead fees.
Regardless of what Wyoming's state legislature decides, many American consumers will continue to push for clean energy. Nine in 10 Americans favor increased production of solar energy, for example, and 83 percent support the expansion of wind energy. People in favor of solar cite a desire to save money on their energy bill, help the environment, and invest in the health of their family. If Wyoming actually passes this legislation, the state will be pushing back hard against progress toward a cleaner, healthier, more sustainable future.
Correction 1/21/17: An earlier version of this article made one reference to a "megawatt" instead of the correct "megawatt hour". We regret the error.
|
Lindsay Lohan took some time out of her crazy West Coast lifestyle to hit the streets of New York City and have a hot dog with her Mom.
No glasses being thrown, no handbags at dawn with ex-lovers, no risqué photo shoots and no wild drunken antics.
Just a mother and a daughter hanging out in the city and having a New York treat.
Is Lindsay acting like a normal person? Long may it continue!
|
FEATUREThe invisible user Psychotherapy for Children and Adolescents. Annual Review of Psychology 54 : 253-276. The World Health Organization estimates that approximately one million people per year commit suicide. Mental disorders such as depression are responsible for more than 90 percent of these deaths. In fact, depression is the leading cause of disability in the developed world, and the human and economic cost of mental illness is reaching crisis proportions. The stigma surrounding mental health issues exacerbates the problem, and many people are unable or reluctant to engage in and access effective treatment. Technology can help address these key problems of access and engagement, particularly for younger people. Interaction design has an important role in developing innovative and worthwhile applications that support the user in an effective way. Given the scale of the problem, even small changes in the effectiveness of mental health services could have a big impact. Ethnographies, user observation, focus groups, cultural probes, think-alouds, interviewsthese are just some of the tools designers have come to rely on. In mental health cases, the introduction of not just the technology but also the designer could be detrimental. What happens when you cant talk to the user, when they cant be approached or observed, when they are effectively invisible? The most significant challenge we have faced working with children and teenagers affected by mental health issues is how to develop useful systems where there is little or no direct access to end users? Software that does not consider users needs and is difficult to use can present another barrier to treatment. While the ethical restrictions that limit access are in place for valid reasons, they leave us with a need for new methods to address the lack of involvement of the end user. Over the past five years, our group at Trinity College Dublin, in collaboration with the Mater Hospital Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services, has developed several systems in a range of services that are in clinical use today: Personal Investigator, a 3-D computer game; Mobile Mood Diary, a personal diary system; and My Mobile Story, a multimodal storytelling system. Design and evaluation activities have involved 26 different service providers, including schools, hospitals, charities, and specialist clinics.
|
<reponame>LehaDurotar/ForwarderBot<filename>src/handlers/states/user_data.py
from typing import Tuple, Union, Optional
from aiovk import API, TokenSession
from loguru import logger
from aiogram.utils.exceptions import BotBlocked, ChatNotFound, ChatAdminRequired
from aiogram.dispatcher.filters.state import State, StatesGroup
from src.runner import dp
from src.settings import VK_TOKEN
class UserVkSettings(StatesGroup):
add_wall_id = State()
add_telegram_id = State()
add_timeout = State()
add_fetch_count = State()
@staticmethod
async def get_wall_id_from_public_url(url: str) -> Optional[int]:
try:
screen_name, check_id = url.split("/")[-1], None
async with TokenSession(VK_TOKEN) as session:
api = API(session)
wall_object = await api.utils.resolveScreenName(screen_name=screen_name)
if wall_object:
return (
-wall_object["object_id"]
if wall_object["type"] in ["group", "page"]
else wall_object["object_id"]
)
else:
if screen_name.startswith("id", 0):
check_id = int(screen_name[2:])
elif screen_name.startswith("public", 0):
check_id = -int(screen_name[6:])
elif screen_name.startswith("club", 0):
check_id = -int(screen_name[4:])
if check_id:
check_data = await api.wall.get(owner_id=check_id, count=1)["items"]
if check_data:
return check_id
return check_id
except Exception as err:
logger.error(f"User failed input vk_wall url - {err}")
return None
@staticmethod
async def get_telegram_id(from_message: Union[str, int]) -> Tuple[int, str]:
"""
Simple check telegram chat entity is valid
:param from_message:
:return: telegram chat id or str error message
"""
chat_id, error = None, None
try:
chat_obj = await dp.bot.get_chat(from_message)
chat_id = chat_obj.id
except (ChatNotFound, ChatAdminRequired):
error = "Чат не существует, или бот не является администратором в группе/канале"
except BotBlocked:
error = f"Бот заблокирован в {from_message} чате"
except Exception as err:
logger.error(f"User error: {err}")
error = "Ошибка на стороне сервера"
return chat_id, error
class UserSettings(StatesGroup):
set_log_channel = State()
change_wall_input_mode = State()
@staticmethod
async def get_log_channel(from_message: str) -> Tuple[int, str]:
error, channel_id = None, None
try:
chat_obj = await dp.bot.get_chat(from_message)
channel_id = chat_obj.id
except (BotBlocked, ChatNotFound, ChatAdminRequired):
error = "Канал или группа не найдена или не установлены админ права"
except Exception as err:
logger.error(f"{from_message} another error: {err}")
error = "Ошибка на стороне сервера"
return channel_id, error
|
Electron-impact excitation of Si2+: differential cross sections and Stokes parameters We have performed the R-matrix calculations with 28 target states for electron-impact excitation of the 3s3p 1Po state of Si2+ from the ground 3s2 1Se state. We have calculated differential cross sections of this excitation process as well as Stokes parameters of the photons emitted on the decay of the excited state to the ground state. Results are presented for incident electron energies in the resonance region (10.5, 10.7, 10.9 and 11.1 eV) and non-resonance region (12.0, 12.2, 12.4 and 13.2 eV). We have also calculated total cross sections for the excitation process and compared these with the recent experimental measurements and other available theoretical calculations. The present results for the Stokes parameter P3 show interesting features, which we discuss.
|
<filename>luban.sdk/src/main/java/org/tianjyan/luban/sdk/ParaTaskConsumer.java
package org.tianjyan.luban.sdk;
import android.os.Parcel;
import android.os.RemoteException;
import android.util.Log;
import org.tianjyan.luban.aidl.AidlTask;
import org.tianjyan.luban.aidl.IService;
import org.tianjyan.luban.aidl.InPara;
import org.tianjyan.luban.aidl.OutPara;
class ParaTaskConsumer {
private Thread thread;
private boolean flag;
ParaTaskConsumer(final IService service, final DataCacheController dataCacheController) {
thread = new Thread(() -> {
try {
while (flag) {
AidlTask task = dataCacheController.takeParaTask();
if (task == null) continue;
if (task instanceof InPara) {
InPara inPara = (InPara) task;
service.registerInPara(inPara);
} else if (task instanceof OutPara) {
OutPara outPara = (OutPara) task;
if (outPara.isRegistering()) {
service.registerOutPara(outPara);
} else if (outPara.getValue() != null) {
service.setOutPara(outPara.getKey(), outPara.getValue());
}
}
}
} catch (InterruptedException e) {
Log.e("ParaTask Interrupted", e.getMessage());
} catch (RemoteException e) {
Log.e("ParaTask Remote", e.getMessage());
} catch (NullPointerException e) {
Log.e("Disconnected", e.getMessage());
flag = false;
}
}, ParaTaskConsumer.this.getClass().getSimpleName());
}
void start() {
flag = true;
thread.setPriority(Thread.MIN_PRIORITY + 2);
thread.start();
}
void stop(final DataCacheController dataCacheController) {
flag = false;
dataCacheController.putParaTask(new AidlTask() {
@Override
public int describeContents() {
return 0;
}
@Override
public void writeToParcel(Parcel dest, int flags) {
}
});
}
}
|
Incidence of Collar Rot of Groundnut in Rajasthan and its Management Background: Groundnut (Arachis hypogaea L.) is an important legume crop of tropical and sub-tropical areas of the world. This crop suffers from several diseases like early leaf spot, late leaf spot, rust, groundnut bud necrosis, peanut clump and collar rot etc. But collar rot caused by Aspergillus niger van Teighem is one of the most important seed and soil borne diseases causing huge economic (40-50 per cent) loss in India and abroad. Methods: A roving survey was conducted to assess the incidence of collar rot in eight major groundnut growing districts of western Rajasthan i.e. Bikaner, Jodhpur, Churu, Jalore, Jaipur, Sikar, Nagaur and Dausa during Kharif 2018. A field experiment was carried out for two consecutive years (2019 and 2020) to manage the disease through altering micro-climate under canopy with six levels of seed rates (80, 85, 90, 95, 100 and 105 kg/ha). Result: Our investigations cleared that this disease is prevalent in all the 200 fields surveyed in eight districts of Rajasthan with 22.99 per cent overall disease incidence which varied from 17.84 to 32.38 per cent with monetary losses. Maximum disease incidence was recorded in Jaipur (28.85%) district while it was lowest in Nagaur district (20.15%). Higher disease reduction (12.97%) with increased pod yield (27.65%) was observed with higher seed rate of 105 kg/ha as compared to standard recommended seed rate (80 kg/ha) as this pathogen is favoured by higher temperature and low soil moisture, dense canopy provides shade that increases humidity under the cropped area and lowers temperature. As a result of this, plant mortality can be compensated by increasing plant population through seed rate, as it modifies the microclimate and generate an environment which is less favourable for developing collar rot disease of groundnut.
|
/**
* delete temporary files
*/
@At("${!!task_path|||'/task'}/tmpfilescleanup")
@Auth({ AUTH.LOCAL, AUTH.TOKEN, AUTH.SUPER })
public class TmpFilesCleanupAction extends SyncWorkAction {
@IocInject
private Settings settings;
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
@Override
protected void doExecute() {
Map<String, String> ts = (Map<String, String>)settings.getPropertyAsMap(SET.TMP_FILES_CLEANUP);
if (Collections.isEmpty(ts)) {
return;
}
// temp file age, default: 1day
long maxage = settings.getPropertyAsInt(SET.TMP_FILES_MAXAGE, DateTimes.SEC_DAY) * 1000L;
for (Entry<String, String> en : ts.entrySet()) {
String path = en.getKey();
String regx = en.getValue();
if (Strings.isEmpty(path) || Strings.isEmpty(regx)) {
continue;
}
File file = new File(path);
if (file.getParent() == null) {
printWarning("Illegal to clean root directory!");
continue;
}
long now = System.currentTimeMillis();
try (FileIterator fi = Files.iterateFiles(file, false, new RegexFileFilter(regx, IOCase.INSENSITIVE))) {
while (fi.hasNext()) {
File f = fi.next();
long l = f.length();
long t = f.lastModified();
Boolean d = null;
if (maxage <= 0 || t + maxage < now) {
d = f.delete();
}
String m = (d == null ? "Skipped" : (d ? "Succeeded" : "Failed"))
+ " to delete "
+ f.getPath()
+ " (" + Numbers.formatSize(l) + ") ["
+ DateTimes.isoDatetimeFormat().format(t) + "]";
if (d == null || d) {
printInfo(m);
status.count++;
}
else {
printWarning(m);
}
}
}
catch (Exception e) {
printError(e.getMessage());
}
}
}
}
|
An article, for example a product, its packaging, and/or an advertisement, may include a number of pieces (categories of elements). Each category may include a number of versions of a particular item (elements). For example, a number of versions of a background may be grouped together in a background category. The article's appeal, e.g., consumer appeal, may depend upon the particular elements of the included categories that are included in the article. For example, a package design that includes one version of text and/or a background may be more appealing than a package design that includes a different version of the text and/or background. For example, a package design that includes a green background may be more appealing than a package design that includes a blue background. As a further example, in case of an advertisement, one particular combination of text messages may be more appealing than another combination of text messages.
Before producing an article, companies, particularly marketing companies or marketing departments of many companies, design test concepts for the article. The test concepts may be designed manually or through computer generation. Element categories and specific elements vary between the various test concepts. For a particular article, a company may present a number of test concepts to a panel of respondents, and the respondents rate each concept. To determine which combination of elements produces the most appealing article, a utility value for each of the possible elements is obtained. The utility values are obtained via an analysis of the returned ratings for the test concepts.
To perform certain types of conjoint analysis, each respondent may be presented with design concepts. Often, articles can be produced from very numerous possible element combinations, sometimes thousands of combinations. Therefore, to present to the respondents each possible combination is highly impractical. Consequently, only a subset of possible element combinations is chosen as design concepts for presentation to the respondents. Although not every element combination is tested, each individual element is tested or imputed through some type of interpolation procedure. A conjoint analysis therefore produces a utility value for each of the individual elements.
However, although individual elements may have high utility values, indicating that each of the individual elements can significantly contribute to the article's appeal, in combination the elements may significantly reduce (suppression) or increase (synergism) the article's appeal. This effect is generally referred to as interactions. Although individual elements may have low or negative utility values, indicating that each of the individual elements can significantly reduce, or at least not contribute to the article's appeal, in combination the elements may significantly contribute to the article's appeal. Consequently, to determine which elements, when in combination produce an effect different than that indicated by the utility values of the individual elements, a marketing team must, to some extent, rely on intuition, i.e., an imperfect analysis that often produces incorrect results, and must test a few of these combinations.
There is believed to be a need for a system and method that may identify the extent to which utility values of individual elements are affected by a combination of the individual elements, rather than testing a few predefined combinations.
|
The world of Game Of Thrones is filled to the brim with evil, scheming psychopaths who think nothing of exacting the most unthinkably heinous punishments and persecutions upon enemies and strangers alike. That’s probably why the HBO series is so popular—it’s remarkably similar to the real world. Case in point: A few sinister maesters of technology have created an online service, Spoiled.io, that will, for just 99 cents, anonymously text show spoilers to anybody deserving (or undeserving) of a little distress.
The surprise-ruining tidbits are dispersed throughout the world by automated Faceless Men immediately after the newest episode airs, and they will continue until the spoilers run out at the end of the season. This global force of evil comes compliments of Chicago residents Ross Hettel, Hunter Lane, and Joe Mainwaring, who say they drew inspiration from a Reddit post by a dude who’s been similarly tormented by a righteously vengeful ex-girlfriend.
“We’re happily surprised it’s been such a big hit; we did not expect it to be that popular—especially internationally,” Hettel told DNAinfo. “We are for sure looking into expanding.” When the show ends on Sunday, he revealed, they’ll post a poll asking users what show should be implemented as the next instrument of torture.
Even people who aren’t quite malevolent enough to sign small folk up for this can still still draw a certain degree of schadenfreude from others’ prey, as the app regularly tweets out victim responses.
|
// UpdateDidMetadata updates a DID metadata time and version id
func UpdateDidMetadata(meta *DidMetadata, versionData []byte, updated time.Time) {
txH := sha256.Sum256(versionData)
meta.VersionId = hex.EncodeToString(txH[:])
meta.Updated = &updated
}
|
import React from 'react';
import { Search } from 'tabler-icons-react';
import { Wrapper } from './_wrapper';
const code = `
import { Button, Group } from '@mantine/core';
import { SpotlightProvider, useSpotlight } from '@mantine/spotlight';
import type { SpotlightAction } from '@mantine/spotlight';
import { Home, Dashboard, FileText, Search } from 'tabler-icons-react';
function SpotlightControl() {
const spotlight = useSpotlight();
return (
<Group position="center">
<Button onClick={spotlight.openSpotlight}>Open spotlight</Button>
</Group>
);
}
const actions: SpotlightAction[] = [
{
title: 'Home',
description: 'Get to home page',
onTrigger: () => console.log('Home'),
icon: <Home size={18} />,
},
{
title: 'Dashboard',
description: 'Get full information about current system status',
onTrigger: () => console.log('Dashboard'),
icon: <Dashboard size={18} />,
},
{
title: 'Documentation',
description: 'Visit documentation to lean more about all features',
onTrigger: () => console.log('Documentation'),
icon: <FileText size={18} />,
},
];
function Demo() {
return (
<SpotlightProvider
actions={actions}
searchIcon={<Search size={18} />}
searchPlaceholder="Search..."
shortcut="mod + shift + 1"
nothingFoundMessage="Nothing found..."
>
<SpotlightControl />
</SpotlightProvider>
);
}
`;
function Demo() {
return (
<Wrapper
searchIcon={<Search size={18} />}
searchPlaceholder="Search..."
shortcut="mod + shift + 1"
nothingFoundMessage="Nothing found..."
/>
);
}
export const usage: MantineDemo = {
type: 'demo',
component: Demo,
code,
};
|
Blackburn have rejected an offer from Middlesbrough for striker Jordan Rhodes, Rovers boss Gary Bowyer says.
The 25-year-old Scotland international had asked for talks with the Teesside club after a reported £12m bid was made for him.
"Yes, Middlesbrough have been in touch. I think they've put some figures to our owners," Bowyer told BBC Radio 5 live.
With Blackburn still under a transfer embargo for breaching Financial Fair Play rules, free agents Sacha Petshi, Bengali-Fode Koita and Danny Guthrie have been the only signings before the new season, with Tom Cairney and Rudy Gestede leaving for undisclosed fees.
After beginning his career at Ipswich, Rhodes joined Rovers for a club record £8m from Huddersfield Town in 2012.
He is contracted until 2019 at Ewood Park and scored 21 goals last season after staying in Lancashire following two bids from Hull City.
"He's been the subject of speculation in the whole two years I've been in charge and he's always dealt with it very well," Bowyer added.
"He doesn't get affected by it and continues to do his job ever so well."
|
Artificial Intelligence Enabled Personalised Assistive Tools to Enhance Education of Children with Neurodevelopmental DisordersA Review Mental disorders (MDs) with onset in childhood or adolescence include neurodevelopmental disorders (NDDs) (intellectual disability and specific learning disabilities, such as dyslexia, attention deficit disorder (ADHD), and autism spectrum disorders (ASD)), as well as a broad range of mental health disorders (MHDs), including anxiety, depressive, stress-related and psychotic disorders. There is a high co-morbidity of NDDs and MHDs. Globally, there have been dramatic increases in the diagnosis of childhood-onset mental disorders, with a 2- to 3-fold rise in prevalence for several MHDs in the US over the past 20 years. Depending on the type of MD, children often grapple with social and communication deficits and difficulties adapting to changes in their environment, which can impact their ability to learn effectively. To improve outcomes for children, it is important to provide timely and effective interventions. This review summarises the range and effectiveness of AI-assisted tools, developed using machine learning models, which have been applied to address learning challenges in students with a range of NDDs. Our review summarises the evidence that AI tools can be successfully used to improve social interaction and supportive education. Based on the limitations of existing AI tools, we provide recommendations for the development of future AI tools with a focus on providing personalised learning for individuals with NDDs. Mental Disorders Mental disorders with onset in childhood or adolescence, as encapsulated by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders DSM-V, include both neurodevelopmental disorders (NDDs), such as intellectual disability; specific learning disabilities, such as dyslexia, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and autism spectrum disorders (ASDs); and mental health disorders (MHDs), such as depressive, anxiety, stress 1.1.2. Dyslexia NDD dyslexia is a common type of learning disability, affecting 3 to 15% of school-age children. Individuals with dyslexia have specific impairments in the development of expert reading skills. Dyslexia is characterised by difficulties with correct and/or fluent word recognition and poor spelling and decoding abilities. Individuals with dyslexia have been shown to have differences in functional brain imaging compared to non-dyslexic individuals, for example, reduced neural adaptation to repetitive stimuli, as depicted in Figure 2. Children with dyslexia can have other specific learning deficits, low self-confidence, anxiety and depression. Dyslexia NDD dyslexia is a common type of learning disability, affecting 3 to 15% of schoolage children. Individuals with dyslexia have specific impairments in the development of expert reading skills. Dyslexia is characterised by difficulties with correct and/or fluent word recognition and poor spelling and decoding abilities. Individuals with dyslexia have been shown to have differences in functional brain imaging compared to non-dyslexic individuals, for example, reduced neural adaptation to repetitive stimuli, as depicted in Figure 2. Children with dyslexia can have other specific learning deficits, low self-confidence, anxiety and depression. Autism Spectrum Disorders Autism spectrum disorders (ASDs), with a reported prevalence in developed countries of around 2%, typically present within the first three years of life. ASDs are characterised by challenges in social interaction, speech and language delays, avoidance of eye contact, struggles to cope with changes in environment, the display of repetitive behaviours, and differences in learning profiles. Children and adults with an ASD have a high frequency of anxiety and depression. Research into the pathophysiology of Dyslexia NDD dyslexia is a common type of learning disability, affecting 3 to 15% of schoolage children. Individuals with dyslexia have specific impairments in the development of expert reading skills. Dyslexia is characterised by difficulties with correct and/or fluent word recognition and poor spelling and decoding abilities. Individuals with dyslexia have been shown to have differences in functional brain imaging compared to non-dyslexic individuals, for example, reduced neural adaptation to repetitive stimuli, as depicted in Figure 2. Children with dyslexia can have other specific learning deficits, low self-confidence, anxiety and depression. Autism Spectrum Disorders Autism spectrum disorders (ASDs), with a reported prevalence in developed countries of around 2%, typically present within the first three years of life. ASDs are characterised by challenges in social interaction, speech and language delays, avoidance of eye contact, struggles to cope with changes in environment, the display of repetitive behaviours, and differences in learning profiles. Children and adults with an ASD have a high frequency of anxiety and depression. Research into the pathophysiology of Autism Spectrum Disorders Autism spectrum disorders (ASDs), with a reported prevalence in developed countries of around 2%, typically present within the first three years of life. ASDs are characterised by challenges in social interaction, speech and language delays, avoidance of eye contact, struggles to cope with changes in environment, the display of repetitive behaviours, and differences in learning profiles. Children and adults with an ASD have a high frequency of anxiety and depression. Research into the pathophysiology of ASDs have revealed neurobiological differences between children with ASDs and those without ('neurotypical' children). Figure 3 highlights the excess neural connections between neurons in the brain of a child with an ASD compared to a neurotypical individual. These excessive connections are thought to be secondary to reduced 'pruning' of damaged neuronal connections during brain development. This neuropathological difference is understood to result in disordered neural patterning across the brain and dysregulation in cognitive function coordination between different brain regions. ASDs have revealed neurobiological differences between children with ASDs and those without ('neurotypical' children). Figure 3 highlights the excess neural connections between neurons in the brain of a child with an ASD compared to a neurotypical individual. These excessive connections are thought to be secondary to reduced 'pruning' of damaged neuronal connections during brain development. This neuropathological difference is understood to result in disordered neural patterning across the brain and dysregulation in cognitive function coordination between different brain regions. Personalised Assistive Tools Using Artificial Intelligence for Children with NDD The prior summary highlights that NDDs, such as ASDs, ADHD and dyslexia, are globally prevalent conditions associated with poor learning outcomes and a high prevalence of comorbid MHDs. A recent study attests that more support strategies are required to help students with these conditions in their learning in mainstream schools. There is a critical need to apply effective tools to improve learning outcomes. Personalised assistive educational tools might help improve educational outcomes, helping affected individuals to integrate better into society, reducing stigma, isolation and stressful events, such as bullying, that are known to be common triggers for suicide attempts. Hence, Section 1 highlights the three main NDDs and the need for personalised assistive tools. Section 2 discusses instructional practices employed in schools, challenges encountered and the potential role of AI tools in addressing those challenges. Section 3 discusses the research methodology, while Section 4 provides a summary of AI tools developed and discusses the effectiveness of these tools for personalised education. In Section 5, the limitations of existing AI tools are discussed. In Section 6, the future AI tool that addresses the limitations of existing tools for personalised education is proposed. Chapter 7 concludes the review study. Individualised Educational Approaches for a Child with ADHD Inclusive approaches are recommended so that students with NDD can be included in mainstream schools wherever possible. However, mainstream classroom settings can worsen symptoms in children with ADHD, especially when students are expected to sit still, remain quiet and stay focused. Mainstream schooling without additional support can thus damage children's self-esteem and negatively impact their relationships with teachers and peers. Hence, to cater to the individual needs of these children, it is Personalised Assistive Tools Using Artificial Intelligence for Children with NDD The prior summary highlights that NDDs, such as ASDs, ADHD and dyslexia, are globally prevalent conditions associated with poor learning outcomes and a high prevalence of comorbid MHDs. A recent study attests that more support strategies are required to help students with these conditions in their learning in mainstream schools. There is a critical need to apply effective tools to improve learning outcomes. Personalised assistive educational tools might help improve educational outcomes, helping affected individuals to integrate better into society, reducing stigma, isolation and stressful events, such as bullying, that are known to be common triggers for suicide attempts. Hence, Section 1 highlights the three main NDDs and the need for personalised assistive tools. Section 2 discusses instructional practices employed in schools, challenges encountered and the potential role of AI tools in addressing those challenges. Section 3 discusses the research methodology, while Section 4 provides a summary of AI tools developed and discusses the effectiveness of these tools for personalised education. In Section 5, the limitations of existing AI tools are discussed. In Section 6, the future AI tool that addresses the limitations of existing tools for personalised education is proposed. Chapter 7 concludes the review study. Individualised Educational Approaches for a Child with ADHD Inclusive approaches are recommended so that students with NDD can be included in mainstream schools wherever possible. However, mainstream classroom settings can worsen symptoms in children with ADHD, especially when students are expected to sit still, remain quiet and stay focused. Mainstream schooling without additional support can thus damage children's self-esteem and negatively impact their relationships with teachers and peers. Hence, to cater to the individual needs of these children, it is recommended that teachers employ individualised educational practices in the classroom. Details of such individualised educational practices are listed in Table 1. Individualised Educational Approaches for Children with Dyslexia A multi-sensory approach, whereby information is shown simultaneously through varying channels, is reported to be preferable when teaching dyslexic children in schools. Table 2 summarises strategies that have resulted in successful outcomes when employed in the school context for children with a diagnosis of dyslexia. Reading comprehension Establish a sustained silent reading time daily. Allow the child to read a book silently while listening to the teacher reading the story to the whole class. Getting the child to make a storyboard, retell a story during story sessions, role-play characters in a favourite story. Allowing the child to play board games/computer games to enhance reading comprehension skills. Maintaining a word-bank book for words that are hard to read. Providing students with another set of books to be read at home Phonics Teaching children simple reminders on how to learn tougher phonics. Teaching children how to recognise word families for phonetic concepts. Allowing students to play board games, such as Bingo or computer games, to enhance phonics. Using picture-letter charts for children who can identify sounds but not letters Writing Using storyboards to teach students to recognise parts of a story for writing. Creating a post-office in the classroom for students to write and receive letters from their teachers and peers. Using tape recorders to dictate as an alternative to writing or having teacher/peer to write for students who would tell the story Spelling Aligning spelling words to frequently used words by children everyday. Partnering the child with another peer to encourage each other to quiz on spelling words. Using colour-coded letters to help students spell difficult words. Combining movement activities with spelling lessons Handwriting Using special writing paper or teaching how to use a finger spacing to space out each word when writing. Teaching handwriting skills through structured programmes Mathematics computation Using mnemonics to describe fundamental steps easily for Maths computation. Colour-coding arithmetic symbols to provide visual cues, allowing students to use calculators for basic computation, using computer/board games for practicing computations 2. Phonology Employing strategies that help phonological processing, such as 'minimal pairs,' 'common syllable words,' and 'vocal syllabification' 3. Grammar Using grammatical processing strategies, such as 'syllabification,' 'declension of nouns,' 'stress,' and 'nouns' 4. Writing Using the syntactic approach to teach punctuation and sentences/paragraphs. Using the 'segmentation with highlighting' technique for sentence and text segmentation Teaching Support in Schools for Students with ASDs Children with ASDs think, learn and behave differently from neurotypical children and differences in auditory processing, inspiration, emulation and organisation can hamper the learning success of children with ASD. Hence, unique structured teaching strategies have been employed to cater to the different learning needs of ASD children, as listed in Table 3. Table 3. Individualised instructional practices in schools for children with ASD. Structured Teaching Strategies Intervention Physical structure Establish a supportive classroom environment by creating clear physical or visual boundaries such that expected behaviours for each defined space can be taught and reinforced Reducing auditory and visual disturbances Too much auditory or visual stimuli may hamper processing power; hence, unnecessary distractions are removed in classrooms to help students focus better on concepts taught Visual schedules Implementing visual schedules for the day (instead of using verbal probes), according to the learning needs of each student to enhance student independence and engagement during lessons Work system Implementing a work system for any type of educational activity helps to organise the student by providing a systematic work routine Visual structures Adding a physical or visual aspect to some tasks to help students understand better how an activity needs to be completed Challenges in Implementing Individualised Learning Approaches in Schools Despite evidence that individualised lessons are effective in helping children overcome their learning disabilities, teachers face several challenges in achieving this goal. It takes a lot of time for teachers to provide differentiated instructions, ensure the child has understood them, and then achieve goals that have been set for individual students. Many schools have shortages of appropriate learning resources. Therefore, an assistive learning tool that can be personalised for children's individual learning challenges and needs would be very helpful for teachers and a great support in helping students meet their individual goals. Although learning a new tool and teaching children to learn the assistive tool may be time-consuming initially, the benefits of using such tools to support individualised learning and improve overall clinical and educational outcomes are clear. Use of Artificial Intelligence in Therapies and Supportive Education of Children with Mental Disorders 2.5.1. Conventional Methods Using AI Machine learning forms a part of artificial intelligence (AI) wherein the model is able to do tasks automatically, without needing any human interference. The conventional machine learning models are hence trained by the input data fed to them, after which these models are able to predict outcomes with high accuracies. Deep learning is a subfield of machine learning in which large data is used to train these models, which can also predict outcomes with high accuracies. Both models are commonly used in the diagnosis of some neurological disorders, such as autism, ADHD and depression, with high accuracies. The models are either fed with images obtained from computerised tomography (CT), magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and positron emission tomography (PET) scans or electroencephalogram (EEG) signals for the diagnosis of neurological disorders. Figure 4 shows the sequence of steps involved in training a machine learning model for diagnosis; after the input of signals or images, pre-processing takes place to clean the data, after which features are extracted and ranked thereafter, to obtain the most significant features, before they are finally classified into normal or abnormal classes. While the feature extraction and selection processes need to be done manually by the researcher for conventional models, these processes are done automatically in deep models. orders. Figure 4 shows the sequence of steps involved in training a machine learning model for diagnosis; after the input of signals or images, pre-processing takes place to clean the data, after which features are extracted and ranked thereafter, to obtain the most significant features, before they are finally classified into normal or abnormal classes. While the feature extraction and selection processes need to be done manually by the researcher for conventional models, these processes are done automatically in deep models. Advanced Methods Using AI Some frequently used deep models include the convolutional neural network (CNN), long-short term memory model (LSTM) and autoencoder, as depicted in Figures 5-7, respectively. In CNN models, the input data is fed to the convolution layer. New feature maps are created in each successive layer wherein more robust features are extracted for forecasting. In the final fully connected layer, the data is classified. The LSTM encompasses three main blocks of memory cells, input, forget and output gates, which are accountable for controlling the information stored, read and written on the cell, respectively, as data comes in. The LSTM principally performs by remembering important information from preceding states and building upon them. Encoders are arranged to form the deeper autoencoder model. Autoencoders perform by encoding unlabelled input data and rebuilding the data accurately thereafter. These models comprise the coding and decoding phases, wherein the same weights are used to encode the feature and rebuild the output. Input signal/image Pre-processing of signals/images Figure 4. Sequence of steps for training a machine learning model. Advanced Methods Using AI Some frequently used deep models include the convolutional neural network (CNN), long-short term memory model (LSTM) and autoencoder, as depicted in Figures 5-7, respectively. In CNN models, the input data is fed to the convolution layer. New feature maps are created in each successive layer wherein more robust features are extracted for forecasting. In the final fully connected layer, the data is classified. The LSTM encompasses three main blocks of memory cells, input, forget and output gates, which are accountable for controlling the information stored, read and written on the cell, respectively, as data comes in. The LSTM principally performs by remembering important information from preceding states and building upon them. Encoders are arranged to form the deeper autoencoder model. Autoencoders perform by encoding unlabelled input data and rebuilding the data accurately thereafter. These models comprise the coding and decoding phases, wherein the same weights are used to encode the feature and rebuild the output. Importance of AI in Therapies and Supportive Education AI has been used to assist in social skills training in children with ASDs to recognise and respond to social cues. Belpaeme et al. used sensory features, such as facial expression, body movements and voice recordings, as inputs to a machine learning model (implemented in a robot) to analyse autistic children's behaviour and engagement levels for therapy. These input features were then combined with target outputs, engagement markers in this case, to train the model. The study proved the potential for the robot to adapt to its interactant, hence influencing engagement in participants. In another study, Sanghvi et al. used postural expressions, such as silhouette images of the upper body, as they played chess with a robot to analyse the engagement levels of autistic children. Another positive outcome was established through this study; the potential of integrating representative data (as described above) with an affect recognition model to act as a game mate for autistic children in the real world. In a different study, Kim et al. used audio recordings as input features to analyse the emotional states of autistic children. These features were fed to the support vector machine model, integrated with a robot, to assess their social engagement as they played with the robots. This enhanced audio-based emotion forecast approach discusses the possibility of sustaining a more natural interaction between autistic children and the robot, hence allowing the robot to assess the engagement level of the children more accurately and modify its responses to maintain an interactive learning environment. Other researchers have explored different input features, such as facial expressions, body movements, bio signals and vocalisations. In a more recent study, Esteban et al. explored input features, such as facial expressions, direction of look, body posture and voice tones, to a model within the NAO robot to assess the social engagement of autistic children. This study attests to the capability of robots to possess increased autonomy, so as to lighten the load of therapists. Moving towards individualisation, Rudovic et al. developed a personalised deep model, using coordinated video recordings of head and body movements, facial expressions and gestures, audio recordings and bio signals such as heart rate, electrodermal activity and body temperature, to assess the engagement of autistic children. The results reported that the model matched human experts, the prediction of affect and engagement with that of human experts, with an accuracy of about 60%, outperforming non-personalised machine learning solutions. In another study, a hybrid physical education teaching tool was developed, wherein speech recognition combined with artificial intelligence was used to construct a personalised voice interactive educational robot. The results showed that the robot was able to answer students' questions, achieving a recognition accuracy of more than 90%. Hence, the aforementioned studies affirm that AI is a promising avenue to improve social interaction and supportive education in children with mental disorders. Importance of AI in Therapies and Supportive Education AI has been used to assist in social skills training in children with ASDs to recognise and respond to social cues. Belpaeme et al. used sensory features, such as facial expression, body movements and voice recordings, as inputs to a machine learning model (implemented in a robot) to analyse autistic children's behaviour and engagement levels for therapy. These input features were then combined with target outputs, engagement markers in this case, to train the model. The study proved the potential for the robot to adapt to its interactant, hence influencing engagement in participants. In another study, Sanghvi et al. used postural expressions, such as silhouette images of the upper body, as they played chess with a robot to analyse the engagement levels of autistic children. Another positive outcome was established through this study; the potential of integrating representative data (as described above) with an affect recognition model to act as a game mate for autistic children in the real world. In a different study, Kim et al. used audio recordings as input features to analyse the emotional states of autistic children. These features were fed to the support vector machine model, integrated with a robot, to assess their social engagement as they played with the robots. This enhanced audio-based emotion forecast approach discusses the possibility of sustaining a more natural interaction between autistic children and the robot, hence allowing the robot to assess the engagement level of the children more accurately and modify its responses to maintain an interactive learning environment. Other researchers have explored different input features, such as facial expressions, body movements, bio signals and vocalisations. In a more recent study, Esteban et al. explored input features, such as facial expressions, direction of look, body posture and voice tones, to a model within the NAO robot to assess the social engagement of autistic children. This study attests to the capability of robots to possess increased autonomy, so as to lighten the load of therapists. Moving towards individualisation, Rudovic et al. developed a personalised deep model, using coordinated video recordings of head and body movements, facial expressions and gestures, audio recordings and bio signals such as heart rate, electrodermal activity and body temperature, to assess the engagement of autistic children. The results reported that the model matched human experts, the prediction of affect and engagement with that of human experts, with an accuracy of about 60%, outperforming non-personalised machine learning solutions. In another study, a hybrid physical education teaching Materials and Methods The systematic review was conducted based on the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines to analyse the most relevant studies on assistive tools developed to address learning disabilities using machine learning models. The search was conducted between the years 2011 and 2021. The relevant journal articles were searched through the IEEE, Google Scholar, PubMed, Science Direct and Springer Link scientific repositories, as seen in Table 4. The Boolean search strings such as "machine learning," "artificial intelligence tools," "Autism spectrum disorder," "Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder," "dyslexia," "students" and "learning" were used in various combinations. The relevant articles were gleaned from the various databases for this review, based on three primary processes from the PRISMA guidelines. First, a total of 20,926 articles were identified based on the Boolean search strings for autism spectrum disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and dyslexia. From the IEEE, Google scholar, PubMed, Science Direct and Springer Link repositories, 1, 19, 800, 0, 445 and 680 articles were retrieved, respectively, wherein most articles described the diagnostics/prediction/screening of ASD, ADHD, dyslexia or other neurodevelopmental disorders. Subsequently, articles were screened wherein duplicate and irrelevant articles were excluded based on the inclusion and exclusion criteria. The process culminated with the selection of the most relevant articles, which was set to 26. The flowchart detailing the processes involved in the retrieval of appropriate articles using PRISMA guidelines is shown in Figure 8. The search was conducted between February to March in 2021. Studies were included if they met the following criteria: They described the use of AI tools to help students with ADHD, Dyslexia and/or ASD in their learning: They were published between the years 2011 and 2021. They were published in a peer-reviewed journal. They were published in English. Studies were excluded if: They described the use of AI tools to help students with other disorders apart from the NDDs ADHD, dyslexia and/or ASD. The article was not published in English. The article was not published in a peer-reviewed journal. The article was published before 2011. Table 5 presents the summary of articles that involve the use of AI tools (machine learning techniques) for teaching children with learning disabilities. Abstracts were first searched and then a full text review was conducted to ensure that the studies met the inclusion and exclusion criteria and that data could be extracted on the AI tool used, the features/model used for training, the type of technology and the learning area addressed (Table 5). Although not commonly reported, the effectiveness of any AI tools on students' learning was also recorded. Table 5 presents the summary of articles that involve the use of AI tools (machine learning techniques) for teaching children with learning disabilities. Abstracts were first searched and then a full text review was conducted to ensure that the studies met the inclusion and exclusion criteria and that data could be extracted on the AI tool used, the features/model used for training, the type of technology and the learning area addressed (Table 5). Although not commonly reported, the effectiveness of any AI tools on students' learning was also recorded. Social robots, such as NAO, have been reported to improve social skills in students, especially in terms of eye contact and concentration. Nonverbal children also reportedly started pronouncing some words. Information is not available. Effectiveness of AI Tools for Personalised Education Most AI tools that were used for learning, as shown in Table 5, have reported positive outcomes. For example, the 'Child activity sensing and training tool' for ADHD, which was tested in authentic situations, has been identified as having the potential to aid ADHD students in gaining attention in school settings, as well as to track their physical and physiological activities in real time. Additionally, this tool has the potential to aid an ADHD student who has lost focus in his/her work. Furthermore, the 'Emotify' game developed for autistic students has obtained an accuracy of 72% in emotion recognition, which is a testament to its successful application. Additionally, the application has enabled participants to experience more engagement and exhibit higher behavioural intentions towards it. A study that used 'Facesay' games to aid autistic students reported improvements in emotion recognition, social interaction, facial recognition, emotion recognition and social interaction in low-functioning and high-functioning autistic students. The application has also been found to be very promising, cost-effective and efficient for teaching effect recognition and mentalising constructs to high-functioning ASD students. The development of software games to help students with challenging behaviour of ADHD students has resulted in positive impacts in addressing their moods, wherein a reduction in challenging behaviours of participants was reported when the games were used as an intervention to improve behaviours. Apart from the applications, the use of robots and alternative communication devices have been proven to be effective in improving focus, as well as math and social skills and in the teaching of ASD students, respectively. Hence, the abovementioned findings confirm the effectiveness of AI tools for personalised education. Table 5 illustrates the distribution of assistive tools used to aid ADHD, dyslexia and ASD students in their learning. Figure 10, also derived from Figure 4, depicts the various assistive tools used to aid ADHD, dyslexia and ASD students in their learning. Hence, based on Figures 9 and 10, it has been established through this study that most assistive tools have been developed to support ASD students in their learning and that the most prevalently developed tools to help ADHD, dyslexia and ASD students in their learning are application-based tools. Through this review, it has also been well-established that robots and application-based tools have been developed most to support ASD students, as compared to ADHD and dyslexic students, in their learning. This is in line with an interview conducted with educators in England on humanised robots discussing optimistic views shared by some educators. These educators highlighted specific cases where robots were bound to be impactful, for example as "stepping stones" to social interactions and the capabilities of personalised robots to meet the individual learning needs of learners with ASDs. Furthermore, educators also felt assured that the predictability and constancy of behaviour in robots would benefit learners with ASD, facilitate their learning and diminish the burdens on them. The results of our review also confirm that certain AI tools have shown positive outcomes and have been successful in certain educational settings. From our review study (Table 5), it is evident that mostly application-based tools and robots have been developed to aid students with an ASD in various aspects of their learning, from developing social and communication skills to daily living skills. Furthermore, it is noticeable that more types of technology have been used and hence more AI tools have been developed to aid students with ASD as compared to other learning disabilities ( Figure 10). Perhaps this may be due to the challenges in learning, social communication and play skills that individuals with ASDs face. Additionally, from the results of our review (Table 5) and extant literature, it is evident that deep learning models are used to develop robots to learn a large variety of data due to the highly heterogenous nature of ASDs. Similarly, application-based tools have also been used to address the learning needs of students with dyslexia. These tools possess special features that allow individualised learning for each student. A combination of wearable devices, robots and application-based tools have been developed to aid students with ADHD. However, from the results of our review (Table 5), it has been established that not all developed tools possess special features that allow personalisation. The learning needs of a student depend on the severity and precise nature of how that disorder affects them, and thus varies from one student to another. Hence, we deduce that along with the development of AI-based assistive tools, it is imperative that special features are entrenched that allow personalisation, such that the distinctive learning need(s) of every student is met. Despite its advantages, using AI to develop such tools also displays some limitations, as discussed below. special features that allow individualised learning for each student. A combination of wearable devices, robots and application-based tools have been developed to aid students with ADHD. However, from the results of our review (Table 5), it has been established that not all developed tools possess special features that allow personalisation. The learning needs of a student depend on the severity and precise nature of how that disorder affects them, and thus varies from one student to another. Hence, we deduce that along with the development of AI-based assistive tools, it is imperative that special features are entrenched that allow personalisation, such that the distinctive learning need(s) of every student is met. Despite its advantages, using AI to develop such tools also displays some limitations, as discussed below. Suitable Datasets There is a scarcity of public databases because it is challenging to obtain data from children with certain NDDs because they frequently have difficulties in staying still. There is also limited data available that focus on the severity of such disorders. Many children have complex comorbidities, so developing personalised AI tools for such students can be challenging. Suitable Datasets There is a scarcity of public databases because it is challenging to obtain data from children with certain NDDs because they frequently have difficulties in staying still. There is also limited data available that focus on the severity of such disorders. Many children have complex comorbidities, so developing personalised AI tools for such students can be challenging. Ethical Considerations There are ethical concerns about using AI-driven applications in the development of personalised tools for learning. Educational assistive technologies are commonly used with students who are adolescents; hence, ethical concerns arise over privacy, data security and informed consent, which need to be mitigated. For example, the information collected about a student should be reduced to include only information necessary for the intended purpose, i.e., to train the machine learning model. Data collection of the student should start only once the individual knows that data collection is taking place and has consented to the data collection. Most importantly, educators should also ensure that students understand the consequences of using assistive technologies to protect their privacy and data. To ensure the consent is valid, the teacher could describe the potential risks and benefits in a way that does not prompt a specific decision from those individuals who may be affected by the use of the technologies. Additionally, Figure 10. Bar graph representation of various assistive tools used to aid in the learning of ADHD, dyslexia and ASD students. Ethical Considerations There are ethical concerns about using AI-driven applications in the development of personalised tools for learning. Educational assistive technologies are commonly used with students who are adolescents; hence, ethical concerns arise over privacy, data security and informed consent, which need to be mitigated. For example, the information collected about a student should be reduced to include only information necessary for the intended purpose, i.e., to train the machine learning model. Data collection of the student should start only once the individual knows that data collection is taking place and has consented to the data collection. Most importantly, educators should also ensure that students understand the consequences of using assistive technologies to protect their privacy and data. To ensure the consent is valid, the teacher could describe the potential risks and benefits in a way that does not prompt a specific decision from those individuals who may be affected by the use of the technologies. Additionally, it is imperative that educational technology companies comply with the relevant regulations; for example, the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of the United States makes an attempt to determine the age of students who assess the company's applications, programmes or extensions for student data collection. If the student is below 13 years old, parental consent is required for data collection. Thus, it is important that privacy considerations are respected and that student data used to train machine learning models is secure according to local ethics board requirements. Safeguards need to be in place to ensure data cannot be hacked, and educators should ensure ethical considerations are in place before any student data is collected, when the assistive tool is being used. Cost of Implementing AI Tools Besides ethical issues, Tsai and Gasevic corroborate other limitations of AI in the technical (system integration) and financial aspects. The costs involved in installing, maintaining and repairing AI tools is another limitation of implementing these tools in classroom settings. Hence, to make AI affordable and integrate it with ease, it is imperative for schools to assimilate AI technology in a cloud-based intranet. This would be more cost-effective, as schools would just need to pay an affordable subscription cost monthly, wherein various aspects, such as the installation, storage space, specifications, maintenance and technical support would be taken care of. Information Loss Another limitation is the possible loss of pertinent information when AI tools require repair. Information such as students' learning data may be compromised, hampering the training of AI models or assessment of existing tools. This could be averted by adopting a cloud-based approach to safeguard information. Cloud Computing in Schools In recent years, cloud computing is progressively becoming popular in delivering technology in the education domain. Cloud computing also allows schools to use less potent computers to assess the cloud, hence reducing computing costs. However, cloud computing has potential disadvantages, and privacy, security and legal (policies) issues need to be addressed to successfully implement a cloud-based system. Advantages of Using AI in Cloud Computing The processing of information and resources, comprising the storage, sharing, backup and recovery of substantial information and resources, is a crucial aspect of AI-based technology. Hence, integrating AI technology in cloud computing is beneficial as the internet and central remote servers are used to sustain information, resources and applications, resulting in effective computing as storage, processing, memory and bandwidth are centralised. Similarly, backup of information can be done effortlessly by cloudbased applications, unlike traditional methods of using hard discs that are time-consuming, expensive, contain limited capacity and can require laborious maintenance. Merging the AI tool in the cloud is beneficial as it is cost-saving, wherein costs related to hardware and maintenance or on-site data centres are eliminated. The AI tool is also able to computerise intricate and repetitive tasks to enhance productivity and perform data analysis using intelligent automation; hence, it does not require any human intervention. The AI-based tool is also able to perform data analysis rapidly and provide deeper insights and hence is competent in offering real-time personalised recommendations to users. AI tools are able to simplify how data is used, modified and handled and thus improve data management when imbedded in cloud systems. AI-powered network security tools need to be used to improve security to protect critical data when imbedded in cloud systems. Using the cloud server is also beneficial as it is part of the internet of things (IoT), where the data on shared networks enables faster and more accurate outcomes. It also optimises equipment and usage of resources that aid in managing situations better, such as being able to develop personalised tools for individuals. The core advantages of using cloud computing in school settings for personalised education are summarised in Figure 11, as seen below. Disadvantages of Using AI in Cloud Computing While AI in cloud computing may generally lower costs, a well-trained staff needs to be employed to operate the complex AI system and this may incur some cost. The cloud system would also require continuous internet connection to work well; weak internet access can impair the benefits of the cloud system. Additionally, since data processing is speedier in the cloud than without using the cloud (methods discussed in Table 5), a time lag between transferring data to the cloud and receiving responses may be present. Privacy policies need to be complied with for data security when AI is used in cloud computing. work security tools need to be used to improve security to protect critical data when imbedded in cloud systems. Using the cloud server is also beneficial as it is part of the internet of things (IoT), where the data on shared networks enables faster and more accurate outcomes. It also optimises equipment and usage of resources that aid in managing situations better, such as being able to develop personalised tools for individuals. The core advantages of using cloud computing in school settings for personalised education are summarised in Figure 11, as seen below. Figure 11. Benefits of using the cloud system in schools for personalised education. Disadvantages of Using AI in Cloud Computing While AI in cloud computing may generally lower costs, a well-trained staff needs to be employed to operate the complex AI system and this may incur some cost. The cloud system would also require continuous internet connection to work well; weak internet access can impair the benefits of the cloud system. Additionally, since data processing is speedier in the cloud than without using the cloud (methods discussed in Table 5), a time lag between transferring data to the cloud and receiving responses may be present. Privacy policies need to be complied with for data security when AI is used in cloud computing. Based on the discussion above, it is apparent that there are downfalls to using AI in cloud computing. For instance, as mentioned earlier, data safety and security are the major concerns of using AI tools/AI in cloud computing. To tackle cyber security issues, decentralisation should be used wherein information acquired is split into parts and stored in various parts of the network instead of storing the entire information in a central server. Additionally, user privacy methods, such as including a physical layer that conceals certain measurements of users or enhanced security keys that create provisional identifications, should be employed within the cloud system to tackle privacy issues. Ethical considerations should also be followed. Despite the limitations, it can be observed that the benefits of integrating the proposed AI tool in the cloud outweigh the limitations, especially in the development of personalised tools. Proposal for a Future AI Tool Presently, machine learning techniques have not been explored in cloud-based applications for personalised learning tools. Hence, in our future work, we will be using Figure 11. Benefits of using the cloud system in schools for personalised education. Based on the discussion above, it is apparent that there are downfalls to using AI in cloud computing. For instance, as mentioned earlier, data safety and security are the major concerns of using AI tools/AI in cloud computing. To tackle cyber security issues, decentralisation should be used wherein information acquired is split into parts and stored in various parts of the network instead of storing the entire information in a central server. Additionally, user privacy methods, such as including a physical layer that conceals certain measurements of users or enhanced security keys that create provisional identifications, should be employed within the cloud system to tackle privacy issues. Ethical considerations should also be followed. Despite the limitations, it can be observed that the benefits of integrating the proposed AI tool in the cloud outweigh the limitations, especially in the development of personalised tools. Proposal for a Future AI Tool Presently, machine learning techniques have not been explored in cloud-based applications for personalised learning tools. Hence, in our future work, we will be using deep learning techniques to develop a unique cloud-based model or an application-based tool that enables personalisation and serves as an assistive tool for teachers or other adults who assist in learning. Sizeable data comprising input features, such as facial expression images, speech signals, bio signals and clinical information, such as age, gender, genetic history, and so on would be used to develop the personalised model. The data obtained from the individual user will be sent to the trained deep learning model, which will be kept in the cloud server. The model will then be able to predict the user's learning needs accordingly and provide personalised learning to suit the child's learning needs. The proposed tool will also have decentralisation and user privacy methods implemented in it. The proposed AI-based tool for personalised learning is shown in Figure 12. history, and so on would be used to develop the personalised model. The data obtained from the individual user will be sent to the trained deep learning model, which will be kept in the cloud server. The model will then be able to predict the user's learning needs accordingly and provide personalised learning to suit the child's learning needs. The proposed tool will also have decentralisation and user privacy methods implemented in it. The proposed AI-based tool for personalised learning is shown in Figure 12. Conclusions This review highlights that despite being in its infancy stage, assisted tools have been proposed to address the learning needs and quality of life of children with the most common NDDs: ADHD, dyslexia and ASDs. The majority of the existing works using AI have focused on ASD. It is clear that more work needs to be done on the development and evaluation of assistive technologies for children with a range of NDDs. The studies done to date have shown that AI-assisted tools have shown positive impacts on student's learning, and have been found to be acceptable by teachers, parents, special educators and therapists and feasible to implement in their teaching or therapeutic practices. AI techniques have been reported to assimilate the independence of user's actions and enable children with learning difficulties to achieve their individual learning goals. However, as discussed previously, our review reports that the existing AI assistive tools exhibit some limitations, so more work still needs to be done to 'mainstream' such approaches Conclusions This review highlights that despite being in its infancy stage, assisted tools have been proposed to address the learning needs and quality of life of children with the most common NDDs: ADHD, dyslexia and ASDs. The majority of the existing works using AI have focused on ASD. It is clear that more work needs to be done on the development and evaluation of assistive technologies for children with a range of NDDs. The studies done to date have shown that AI-assisted tools have shown positive impacts on student's learning, and have been found to be acceptable by teachers, parents, special educators and therapists and feasible to implement in their teaching or therapeutic practices. AI techniques have been reported to assimilate the independence of user's actions and enable children with learning difficulties to achieve their individual learning goals. However, as discussed previously, our review reports that the existing AI assistive tools exhibit some limitations, so more work still needs to be done to 'mainstream' such approaches and maximise their impact. For example, the AI tools reported here are not embedded in cloud systems, hence limiting their ability to provide real-time suggestions for personalised learning. AI-based tools in the cloud system, such as digital applications, could be a major advance facilitating the provision of personalised specialist education and learning for affected individuals in real time. Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest. The funders had no role in the design of the study, in the collection, analyses or interpretation of data, in the writing of the manuscript, or in the decision to publish the results.
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<gh_stars>1-10
/*
* Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one
* or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file
* distributed with this work for additional information
* regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file
* to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the
* "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
* with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
* software distributed under the License is distributed on an
* "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY
* KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the
* specific language governing permissions and limitations
* under the License.
*/
package org.apache.isis.core.metamodel.facets.object.disabled.method;
import java.lang.reflect.Method;
import org.apache.isis.applib.Identifier;
import org.apache.isis.applib.services.i18n.TranslatableString;
import org.apache.isis.applib.services.i18n.TranslationService;
import org.apache.isis.core.metamodel.facetapi.FacetHolder;
import org.apache.isis.core.metamodel.facetapi.FacetUtil;
import org.apache.isis.core.metamodel.facetapi.FeatureType;
import org.apache.isis.core.metamodel.facetapi.IdentifiedHolder;
import org.apache.isis.core.metamodel.facets.FacetedMethod;
import org.apache.isis.core.metamodel.facets.MethodFinderUtils;
import org.apache.isis.core.metamodel.facets.MethodPrefixBasedFacetFactoryAbstract;
import org.apache.isis.core.metamodel.facets.object.disabled.DisabledObjectFacet;
import org.apache.isis.core.metamodel.methodutils.MethodScope;
import org.apache.isis.core.metamodel.spec.ObjectSpecification;
import org.apache.isis.core.metamodel.spec.feature.ObjectMember;
/**
* Installs the {@link DisabledObjectFacetViaMethod} on the
* {@link ObjectSpecification}, and copies this facet onto each
* {@link ObjectMember}.
*
* <p>
* This two-pass design is required because, at the time that the
* {@link #process(org.apache.isis.core.metamodel.facets.FacetFactory.ProcessClassContext)
* class is being processed}, the {@link ObjectMember member}s for the
* {@link ObjectSpecification spec} are not known.
*/
public class DisabledObjectFacetViaMethodFactory extends MethodPrefixBasedFacetFactoryAbstract {
private static final String DISABLED_PREFIX = "disabled";
private static final String[] PREFIXES = { DISABLED_PREFIX, };
public DisabledObjectFacetViaMethodFactory() {
super(FeatureType.EVERYTHING_BUT_PARAMETERS, OrphanValidation.VALIDATE, PREFIXES);
}
@Override
public void process(final ProcessClassContext processClassContext) {
final Class<?> cls = processClassContext.getCls();
final FacetHolder facetHolder = processClassContext.getFacetHolder();
final Class<?>[] paramTypes = new Class<?>[1];
paramTypes[0] = Identifier.Type.class;// String.class;
final Method method = MethodFinderUtils.findMethod(
cls, MethodScope.OBJECT, DISABLED_PREFIX,
new Class<?>[]{String.class, TranslatableString.class},
paramTypes);
if (method == null) {
return;
}
final TranslationService translationService = servicesInjector.lookupService(TranslationService.class);
// sadness: same logic as in I18nFacetFactory
final String translationContext = ((IdentifiedHolder)facetHolder).getIdentifier().toClassIdentityString();
FacetUtil.addFacet(new DisabledObjectFacetViaMethod(method, translationService, translationContext, facetHolder));
processClassContext.removeMethod(method);
}
@Override
public void process(final ProcessMethodContext processMethodContext) {
final FacetedMethod member = processMethodContext.getFacetHolder();
final Class<?> owningClass = processMethodContext.getCls();
final ObjectSpecification owningSpec = getSpecificationLoader().loadSpecification(owningClass);
final DisabledObjectFacet facet = owningSpec.getFacet(DisabledObjectFacet.class);
if (facet != null) {
facet.copyOnto(member);
}
}
}
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/* Code decompiled incorrectly, please refer to instructions dump. */
public static final java.lang.Object B(java.lang.Object r1, e.a.a.a.y0.b.b r2) {
/*
java.lang.String r0 = "descriptor"
e.x.c.i.e(r2, r0)
boolean r0 = r2 instanceof e.a.a.a.y0.b.f0
if (r0 == 0) goto L_0x0013
r0 = r2
e.a.a.a.y0.b.x0 r0 = (e.a.a.a.y0.b.x0) r0
boolean r0 = a2(r0)
if (r0 == 0) goto L_0x0013
return r1
L_0x0013:
e.a.a.a.y0.m.d0 r0 = H0(r2)
if (r0 == 0) goto L_0x002c
java.lang.Class r0 = f3(r0)
if (r0 == 0) goto L_0x002c
java.lang.reflect.Method r2 = i1(r0, r2)
if (r2 == 0) goto L_0x002c
r0 = 0
java.lang.Object[] r0 = new java.lang.Object[r0]
java.lang.Object r1 = r2.invoke(r1, r0)
L_0x002c:
return r1
*/
throw new UnsupportedOperationException("Method not decompiled: b.q.a.a.B(java.lang.Object, e.a.a.a.y0.b.b):java.lang.Object");
}
|
/**
* The data class for the note instance
*/
@Entity(tableName = "notes")
@Data
public class Note implements Serializable {
@PrimaryKey(autoGenerate = true)
private int id;
private LocalDate date;
private String text;
private LocalDateTime added;
private LocalDateTime edited;
}
|
A comparison of the neutralizing properties of monoclonal and polyclonal antibodies to human interferon alpha. Specific polyclonal antisera to human interferon-alpha 1 (HuIFN-alpha 1), human interferon-alpha 2 (HuIFN-alpha 2) and human lymphoblastoid interferon (HuIFN-alpha Ly Namalwa) have been raised in rabbits and sheep. The antisera raised against HuIFN-alpha 1 and HuIFN-alpha 2 strongly neutralized the antiviral activity of their homologous IFN-alpha subtypes, but were less active against the heterologous IFN-alpha subtypes and preparations containing mixtures of IFN-alpha subtypes, e.g. human leukocyte interferon (HuIFN-alpha Le). Antisera raised against HuIFN-alpha Ly Namalwa strongly neutralized the antiviral activity of all IFN-alpha-containing preparations and showed weak cross-reactivity with human interferon-beta (HuIFN-beta). Neither anti-HuIFN-alpha 1 nor anti-HuIFN-alpha 2 could be demonstrated to neutralize the antiviral activity of HuIFN-beta. A number of monoclonal antibodies to HuIFN-alpha 2 have been prepared and these were found to neutralize HuIFN-alpha 2 antiviral activity to varying degrees, but not to neutralize the heterologous subtype HuIFN-alpha 1, preparations containing mixtures of IFN-alpha subtypes or HuIFN-beta.
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<reponame>fcooper8472/CppRandomNumbers<filename>RandomSamples/Beta.cpp<gh_stars>0
#include "../Utilities.hpp" // This is just for testing and can be removed
#include <random>
int main() {
// Seed a Mersenne twister with a 'true' random seed from random_device
std::random_device rd{};
std::mt19937 gen{rd()};
// Params
const std::size_t n = 100'000;
const double alpha = 1.23;
const double beta = 2.34;
// No beta distribution in the standard library, so construct samples using two Gammas
std::gamma_distribution<double> dis_alpha(alpha, 1.0);
std::gamma_distribution<double> dis_beta(beta, 1.0);
// Create and fill the vector
std::vector<double> vec(n);
for (double &x : vec) {
const double alpha_sample = dis_alpha(gen);
x = alpha_sample / (alpha_sample + dis_beta(gen));
}
PrintVectorToFile("Beta_alpha=1.23_beta=2.34", vec); // This is just for testing and can be removed
return 0;
}
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<reponame>zyh911/tencentcloud-cli
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
import os
import json
import tccli.options_define as OptionsDefine
import tccli.format_output as FormatOutput
from tccli.nice_command import NiceCommand
import tccli.error_msg as ErrorMsg
import tccli.help_template as HelpTemplate
from tccli import __version__
from tccli.utils import Utils
from tccli.configure import Configure
from tencentcloud.common import credential
from tencentcloud.common.profile.http_profile import HttpProfile
from tencentcloud.common.profile.client_profile import ClientProfile
from tencentcloud.youmall.v20180228 import youmall_client as youmall_client_v20180228
from tencentcloud.youmall.v20180228 import models as models_v20180228
from tccli.services.youmall import v20180228
from tccli.services.youmall.v20180228 import help as v20180228_help
def doDescribeCameraPerson(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("DescribeCameraPerson", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"CompanyId": argv.get("--CompanyId"),
"ShopId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ShopId"),
"CameraId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--CameraId"),
"StartTime": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--StartTime"),
"EndTime": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--EndTime"),
"PosId": argv.get("--PosId"),
"Num": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--Num"),
"IsNeedPic": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--IsNeedPic"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.DescribeCameraPersonRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.DescribeCameraPerson(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doDescribePersonInfo(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("DescribePersonInfo", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"CompanyId": argv.get("--CompanyId"),
"ShopId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ShopId"),
"StartPersonId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--StartPersonId"),
"Offset": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--Offset"),
"Limit": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--Limit"),
"PictureExpires": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--PictureExpires"),
"PersonType": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--PersonType"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.DescribePersonInfoRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.DescribePersonInfo(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doDescribeZoneTrafficInfo(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("DescribeZoneTrafficInfo", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"CompanyId": argv.get("--CompanyId"),
"ShopId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ShopId"),
"StartDate": argv.get("--StartDate"),
"EndDate": argv.get("--EndDate"),
"Offset": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--Offset"),
"Limit": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--Limit"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.DescribeZoneTrafficInfoRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.DescribeZoneTrafficInfo(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doDescribeZoneFlowAgeInfoByZoneId(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("DescribeZoneFlowAgeInfoByZoneId", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"CompanyId": argv.get("--CompanyId"),
"ShopId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ShopId"),
"ZoneId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ZoneId"),
"StartDate": argv.get("--StartDate"),
"EndDate": argv.get("--EndDate"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.DescribeZoneFlowAgeInfoByZoneIdRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.DescribeZoneFlowAgeInfoByZoneId(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doRegisterCallback(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("RegisterCallback", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"CompanyId": argv.get("--CompanyId"),
"BackUrl": argv.get("--BackUrl"),
"Time": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--Time"),
"NeedFacePic": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--NeedFacePic"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.RegisterCallbackRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.RegisterCallback(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doDescribeZoneFlowGenderAvrStayTimeByZoneId(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("DescribeZoneFlowGenderAvrStayTimeByZoneId", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"CompanyId": argv.get("--CompanyId"),
"ShopId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ShopId"),
"ZoneId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ZoneId"),
"StartDate": argv.get("--StartDate"),
"EndDate": argv.get("--EndDate"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.DescribeZoneFlowGenderAvrStayTimeByZoneIdRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.DescribeZoneFlowGenderAvrStayTimeByZoneId(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doDescribeZoneFlowAndStayTime(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("DescribeZoneFlowAndStayTime", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"CompanyId": argv.get("--CompanyId"),
"ShopId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ShopId"),
"StartDate": argv.get("--StartDate"),
"EndDate": argv.get("--EndDate"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.DescribeZoneFlowAndStayTimeRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.DescribeZoneFlowAndStayTime(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doDescribePersonVisitInfo(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("DescribePersonVisitInfo", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"CompanyId": argv.get("--CompanyId"),
"ShopId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ShopId"),
"Offset": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--Offset"),
"Limit": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--Limit"),
"StartDate": argv.get("--StartDate"),
"EndDate": argv.get("--EndDate"),
"PictureExpires": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--PictureExpires"),
"StartDateTime": argv.get("--StartDateTime"),
"EndDateTime": argv.get("--EndDateTime"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.DescribePersonVisitInfoRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.DescribePersonVisitInfo(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doDescribeZoneFlowHourlyByZoneId(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("DescribeZoneFlowHourlyByZoneId", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"CompanyId": argv.get("--CompanyId"),
"ShopId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ShopId"),
"ZoneId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ZoneId"),
"StartDate": argv.get("--StartDate"),
"EndDate": argv.get("--EndDate"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.DescribeZoneFlowHourlyByZoneIdRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.DescribeZoneFlowHourlyByZoneId(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doDescribeShopInfo(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("DescribeShopInfo", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"Offset": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--Offset"),
"Limit": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--Limit"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.DescribeShopInfoRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.DescribeShopInfo(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doDescribeFaceIdByTempId(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("DescribeFaceIdByTempId", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"CompanyId": argv.get("--CompanyId"),
"ShopId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ShopId"),
"TempId": argv.get("--TempId"),
"CameraId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--CameraId"),
"PosId": argv.get("--PosId"),
"PictureExpires": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--PictureExpires"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.DescribeFaceIdByTempIdRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.DescribeFaceIdByTempId(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doDescribeZoneFlowGenderInfoByZoneId(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("DescribeZoneFlowGenderInfoByZoneId", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"CompanyId": argv.get("--CompanyId"),
"ShopId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ShopId"),
"ZoneId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ZoneId"),
"StartDate": argv.get("--StartDate"),
"EndDate": argv.get("--EndDate"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.DescribeZoneFlowGenderInfoByZoneIdRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.DescribeZoneFlowGenderInfoByZoneId(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doDescribeShopTrafficInfo(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("DescribeShopTrafficInfo", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"CompanyId": argv.get("--CompanyId"),
"ShopId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ShopId"),
"StartDate": argv.get("--StartDate"),
"EndDate": argv.get("--EndDate"),
"Offset": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--Offset"),
"Limit": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--Limit"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.DescribeShopTrafficInfoRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.DescribeShopTrafficInfo(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doDescribePersonInfoByFacePicture(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("DescribePersonInfoByFacePicture", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"CompanyId": argv.get("--CompanyId"),
"ShopId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ShopId"),
"Picture": argv.get("--Picture"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.DescribePersonInfoByFacePictureRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.DescribePersonInfoByFacePicture(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doCreateFacePicture(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("CreateFacePicture", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"CompanyId": argv.get("--CompanyId"),
"PersonType": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--PersonType"),
"Picture": argv.get("--Picture"),
"PictureName": argv.get("--PictureName"),
"ShopId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ShopId"),
"IsForceUpload": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--IsForceUpload"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.CreateFacePictureRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.CreateFacePicture(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doCreateAccount(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("CreateAccount", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"CompanyId": argv.get("--CompanyId"),
"Name": argv.get("--Name"),
"Password": argv.get("--Password"),
"ShopCode": argv.get("--ShopCode"),
"Remark": argv.get("--Remark"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.CreateAccountRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.CreateAccount(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doDescribeShopHourTrafficInfo(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("DescribeShopHourTrafficInfo", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"CompanyId": argv.get("--CompanyId"),
"ShopId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ShopId"),
"StartDate": argv.get("--StartDate"),
"EndDate": argv.get("--EndDate"),
"Offset": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--Offset"),
"Limit": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--Limit"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.DescribeShopHourTrafficInfoRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.DescribeShopHourTrafficInfo(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doDescribePersonTrace(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("DescribePersonTrace", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"MallId": argv.get("--MallId"),
"PersonId": argv.get("--PersonId"),
"StartTime": argv.get("--StartTime"),
"EndTime": argv.get("--EndTime"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.DescribePersonTraceRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.DescribePersonTrace(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doDescribeZoneFlowDailyByZoneId(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("DescribeZoneFlowDailyByZoneId", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"CompanyId": argv.get("--CompanyId"),
"ShopId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ShopId"),
"ZoneId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ZoneId"),
"StartDate": argv.get("--StartDate"),
"EndDate": argv.get("--EndDate"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.DescribeZoneFlowDailyByZoneIdRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.DescribeZoneFlowDailyByZoneId(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doDescribePersonArrivedMall(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("DescribePersonArrivedMall", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"MallId": argv.get("--MallId"),
"PersonId": argv.get("--PersonId"),
"StartTime": argv.get("--StartTime"),
"EndTime": argv.get("--EndTime"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.DescribePersonArrivedMallRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.DescribePersonArrivedMall(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doDescribeClusterPersonArrivedMall(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("DescribeClusterPersonArrivedMall", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"MallId": argv.get("--MallId"),
"PersonId": argv.get("--PersonId"),
"StartTime": argv.get("--StartTime"),
"EndTime": argv.get("--EndTime"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.DescribeClusterPersonArrivedMallRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.DescribeClusterPersonArrivedMall(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doDescribePersonTraceDetail(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("DescribePersonTraceDetail", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"MallId": argv.get("--MallId"),
"PersonId": argv.get("--PersonId"),
"TraceId": argv.get("--TraceId"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.DescribePersonTraceDetailRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.DescribePersonTraceDetail(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doModifyPersonType(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("ModifyPersonType", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"CompanyId": argv.get("--CompanyId"),
"ShopId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ShopId"),
"PersonId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--PersonId"),
"PersonType": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--PersonType"),
"PersonSubType": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--PersonSubType"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.ModifyPersonTypeRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.ModifyPersonType(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doModifyPersonFeatureInfo(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("ModifyPersonFeatureInfo", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"CompanyId": argv.get("--CompanyId"),
"PersonId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--PersonId"),
"Picture": argv.get("--Picture"),
"PictureName": argv.get("--PictureName"),
"PersonType": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--PersonType"),
"ShopId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ShopId"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.ModifyPersonFeatureInfoRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.ModifyPersonFeatureInfo(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doDescribeHistoryNetworkInfo(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("DescribeHistoryNetworkInfo", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"Time": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--Time"),
"CompanyId": argv.get("--CompanyId"),
"ShopId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ShopId"),
"StartDay": argv.get("--StartDay"),
"EndDay": argv.get("--EndDay"),
"Limit": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--Limit"),
"Offset": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--Offset"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.DescribeHistoryNetworkInfoRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.DescribeHistoryNetworkInfo(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doDescribeNetworkInfo(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("DescribeNetworkInfo", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"Time": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--Time"),
"CompanyId": argv.get("--CompanyId"),
"ShopId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ShopId"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.DescribeNetworkInfoRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.DescribeNetworkInfo(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doDeletePersonFeature(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("DeletePersonFeature", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"CompanyId": argv.get("--CompanyId"),
"ShopId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ShopId"),
"PersonId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--PersonId"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.DeletePersonFeatureRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.DeletePersonFeature(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doModifyPersonTagInfo(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("ModifyPersonTagInfo", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"CompanyId": argv.get("--CompanyId"),
"ShopId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ShopId"),
"Tags": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--Tags"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.ModifyPersonTagInfoRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.ModifyPersonTagInfo(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doDescribePerson(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("DescribePerson", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"MallId": argv.get("--MallId"),
"Offset": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--Offset"),
"Limit": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--Limit"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.DescribePersonRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.DescribePerson(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doDescribeClusterPersonTrace(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("DescribeClusterPersonTrace", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"MallId": argv.get("--MallId"),
"PersonId": argv.get("--PersonId"),
"StartTime": argv.get("--StartTime"),
"EndTime": argv.get("--EndTime"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.DescribeClusterPersonTraceRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.DescribeClusterPersonTrace(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
def doDescribeTrajectoryData(argv, arglist):
g_param = parse_global_arg(argv)
if "help" in argv:
show_help("DescribeTrajectoryData", g_param[OptionsDefine.Version])
return
param = {
"CompanyId": argv.get("--CompanyId"),
"ShopId": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--ShopId"),
"StartDate": argv.get("--StartDate"),
"EndDate": argv.get("--EndDate"),
"Limit": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--Limit"),
"Gender": Utils.try_to_json(argv, "--Gender"),
}
cred = credential.Credential(g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretId], g_param[OptionsDefine.SecretKey])
http_profile = HttpProfile(
reqTimeout=60 if g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout] is None else int(g_param[OptionsDefine.Timeout]),
reqMethod="POST",
endpoint=g_param[OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
)
profile = ClientProfile(httpProfile=http_profile, signMethod="HmacSHA256")
mod = CLIENT_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
client = mod.YoumallClient(cred, g_param[OptionsDefine.Region], profile)
client._sdkVersion += ("_CLI_" + __version__)
models = MODELS_MAP[g_param[OptionsDefine.Version]]
model = models.DescribeTrajectoryDataRequest()
model.from_json_string(json.dumps(param))
rsp = client.DescribeTrajectoryData(model)
result = rsp.to_json_string()
jsonobj = None
try:
jsonobj = json.loads(result)
except TypeError as e:
jsonobj = json.loads(result.decode('utf-8')) # python3.3
FormatOutput.output("action", jsonobj, g_param[OptionsDefine.Output], g_param[OptionsDefine.Filter])
CLIENT_MAP = {
"v20180228": youmall_client_v20180228,
}
MODELS_MAP = {
"v20180228": models_v20180228,
}
ACTION_MAP = {
"DescribeCameraPerson": doDescribeCameraPerson,
"DescribePersonInfo": doDescribePersonInfo,
"DescribeZoneTrafficInfo": doDescribeZoneTrafficInfo,
"DescribeZoneFlowAgeInfoByZoneId": doDescribeZoneFlowAgeInfoByZoneId,
"RegisterCallback": doRegisterCallback,
"DescribeZoneFlowGenderAvrStayTimeByZoneId": doDescribeZoneFlowGenderAvrStayTimeByZoneId,
"DescribeZoneFlowAndStayTime": doDescribeZoneFlowAndStayTime,
"DescribePersonVisitInfo": doDescribePersonVisitInfo,
"DescribeZoneFlowHourlyByZoneId": doDescribeZoneFlowHourlyByZoneId,
"DescribeShopInfo": doDescribeShopInfo,
"DescribeFaceIdByTempId": doDescribeFaceIdByTempId,
"DescribeZoneFlowGenderInfoByZoneId": doDescribeZoneFlowGenderInfoByZoneId,
"DescribeShopTrafficInfo": doDescribeShopTrafficInfo,
"DescribePersonInfoByFacePicture": doDescribePersonInfoByFacePicture,
"CreateFacePicture": doCreateFacePicture,
"CreateAccount": doCreateAccount,
"DescribeShopHourTrafficInfo": doDescribeShopHourTrafficInfo,
"DescribePersonTrace": doDescribePersonTrace,
"DescribeZoneFlowDailyByZoneId": doDescribeZoneFlowDailyByZoneId,
"DescribePersonArrivedMall": doDescribePersonArrivedMall,
"DescribeClusterPersonArrivedMall": doDescribeClusterPersonArrivedMall,
"DescribePersonTraceDetail": doDescribePersonTraceDetail,
"ModifyPersonType": doModifyPersonType,
"ModifyPersonFeatureInfo": doModifyPersonFeatureInfo,
"DescribeHistoryNetworkInfo": doDescribeHistoryNetworkInfo,
"DescribeNetworkInfo": doDescribeNetworkInfo,
"DeletePersonFeature": doDeletePersonFeature,
"ModifyPersonTagInfo": doModifyPersonTagInfo,
"DescribePerson": doDescribePerson,
"DescribeClusterPersonTrace": doDescribeClusterPersonTrace,
"DescribeTrajectoryData": doDescribeTrajectoryData,
}
AVAILABLE_VERSION_LIST = [
v20180228.version,
]
AVAILABLE_VERSIONS = {
'v' + v20180228.version.replace('-', ''): {"help": v20180228_help.INFO,"desc": v20180228_help.DESC},
}
def youmall_action(argv, arglist):
if "help" in argv:
versions = sorted(AVAILABLE_VERSIONS.keys())
opt_v = "--" + OptionsDefine.Version
version = versions[-1]
if opt_v in argv:
version = 'v' + argv[opt_v].replace('-', '')
if version not in versions:
print("available versions: %s" % " ".join(AVAILABLE_VERSION_LIST))
return
action_str = ""
docs = AVAILABLE_VERSIONS[version]["help"]
desc = AVAILABLE_VERSIONS[version]["desc"]
for action, info in docs.items():
action_str += " %s\n" % action
action_str += Utils.split_str(" ", info["desc"], 120)
helpstr = HelpTemplate.SERVICE % {"name": "youmall", "desc": desc, "actions": action_str}
print(helpstr)
else:
print(ErrorMsg.FEW_ARG)
def version_merge():
help_merge = {}
for v in AVAILABLE_VERSIONS:
for action in AVAILABLE_VERSIONS[v]["help"]:
if action not in help_merge:
help_merge[action] = {}
help_merge[action]["cb"] = ACTION_MAP[action]
help_merge[action]["params"] = []
for param in AVAILABLE_VERSIONS[v]["help"][action]["params"]:
if param["name"] not in help_merge[action]["params"]:
help_merge[action]["params"].append(param["name"])
return help_merge
def register_arg(command):
cmd = NiceCommand("youmall", youmall_action)
command.reg_cmd(cmd)
cmd.reg_opt("help", "bool")
cmd.reg_opt(OptionsDefine.Version, "string")
help_merge = version_merge()
for actionName, action in help_merge.items():
c = NiceCommand(actionName, action["cb"])
cmd.reg_cmd(c)
c.reg_opt("help", "bool")
for param in action["params"]:
c.reg_opt("--" + param, "string")
for opt in OptionsDefine.ACTION_GLOBAL_OPT:
stropt = "--" + opt
c.reg_opt(stropt, "string")
def parse_global_arg(argv):
params = {}
for opt in OptionsDefine.ACTION_GLOBAL_OPT:
stropt = "--" + opt
if stropt in argv:
params[opt] = argv[stropt]
else:
params[opt] = None
if params[OptionsDefine.Version]:
params[OptionsDefine.Version] = "v" + params[OptionsDefine.Version].replace('-', '')
config_handle = Configure()
profile = config_handle.profile
if ("--" + OptionsDefine.Profile) in argv:
profile = argv[("--" + OptionsDefine.Profile)]
is_conexist, conf_path = config_handle._profile_existed(profile + "." + config_handle.configure)
is_creexist, cred_path = config_handle._profile_existed(profile + "." + config_handle.credential)
config = {}
cred = {}
if is_conexist:
config = config_handle._load_json_msg(conf_path)
if is_creexist:
cred = config_handle._load_json_msg(cred_path)
if os.environ.get(OptionsDefine.ENV_SECRET_ID):
cred[OptionsDefine.SecretId] = os.environ.get(OptionsDefine.ENV_SECRET_ID)
if os.environ.get(OptionsDefine.ENV_SECRET_KEY):
cred[OptionsDefine.SecretKey] = os.environ.get(OptionsDefine.ENV_SECRET_KEY)
if os.environ.get(OptionsDefine.ENV_REGION):
config[OptionsDefine.Region] = os.environ.get(OptionsDefine.ENV_REGION)
for param in params.keys():
if param == OptionsDefine.Version:
continue
if params[param] is None:
if param in [OptionsDefine.SecretKey, OptionsDefine.SecretId]:
if param in cred:
params[param] = cred[param]
else:
raise Exception("%s is invalid" % param)
else:
if param in config:
params[param] = config[param]
elif param == OptionsDefine.Region:
raise Exception("%s is invalid" % OptionsDefine.Region)
try:
if params[OptionsDefine.Version] is None:
version = config["youmall"][OptionsDefine.Version]
params[OptionsDefine.Version] = "v" + version.replace('-', '')
if params[OptionsDefine.Endpoint] is None:
params[OptionsDefine.Endpoint] = config["youmall"][OptionsDefine.Endpoint]
except Exception as err:
raise Exception("config file:%s error, %s" % (conf_path, str(err)))
versions = sorted(AVAILABLE_VERSIONS.keys())
if params[OptionsDefine.Version] not in versions:
raise Exception("available versions: %s" % " ".join(AVAILABLE_VERSION_LIST))
return params
def show_help(action, version):
docs = AVAILABLE_VERSIONS[version]["help"][action]
desc = AVAILABLE_VERSIONS[version]["desc"]
docstr = ""
for param in docs["params"]:
docstr += " %s\n" % ("--" + param["name"])
docstr += Utils.split_str(" ", param["desc"], 120)
helpmsg = HelpTemplate.ACTION % {"name": action, "service": "youmall", "desc": desc, "params": docstr}
print(helpmsg)
def get_actions_info():
config = Configure()
new_version = max(AVAILABLE_VERSIONS.keys())
version = new_version
try:
profile = config._load_json_msg(os.path.join(config.cli_path, "default.configure"))
version = profile["youmall"]["version"]
version = "v" + version.replace('-', '')
except Exception:
pass
if version not in AVAILABLE_VERSIONS.keys():
version = new_version
return AVAILABLE_VERSIONS[version]["help"]
|
M. David Stone Dell Photo All-In-One Printer 926 The Dell Photo All-In-One 926 Printer offers reasonable speed and output quality, but it's a touch slower and more expensive than the model it replaces.
Reasonably fast. Prints directly from cameras and memory cards. Prints, copies, scans. Scans to PC's e-mail program.
Subpar text quality. Relatively low photo quality for an ink jet.
The Dell Photo All-In-One 926 Printer offers reasonable speed and output quality, but it's a touch slower and more expensive than the model it replaces.
each year's new crop of printers is faster, with higher-quality output, more features, and/or at a lower price than those of the year beforeright? well, the dell photo all-in-one printer 926 ($99 direct) largely bucks this trend. it's slower than the dell photo all-in-one printer 924 it replaces (though it's still reasonably fast), prints lower-quality output, and costs $10 more. but it delivers photos that are far more water-resistant than the 924's output, and it adds the ability to print from memory cards, with the card slots helping to justify the higher price.
dell targets the 926 at home and light-duty home office needs, which also makes it a good choice for a college dorm. it can copy, scan, and print directly from pictbridge cameras as well as from memory cards; it can scan to e-mail by opening a new e-mail message on your pc and attaching the scan as a file; and it even offers minimal fax support, if you have a fax modem, with an option to scan to its own fax utility on your pc and send the scan as a fax.
unfortunately, there's no automatic document feeder, so you have to scan multipage documents one page at a time. this limits the 926's usefulness for even a home office. on the plus side, you can add an 802.11g wireless network adapter ($99 direct), or a bluetooth option ($36 direct), for printing from bluetooth phones and other devices.
setup is typical for an ink jet aio. find a spot for the 7.2- by 17.4- by 21.2-inch (hwd) aio, remove the packing materials, load the two ink cartridges and paper, run the automated installation program from disc, connect the usb cable when the program tells you to, and you're ready to print.
print speed counts as a plus overall. on our business applications suite (timed with qualitylogic's hardware and software, www.qualitylogic.com), the 926 took a total of 20 minutes 49 seconds. that's about a minute slower than the 924, but it's still relatively fast for the price. hewlett packard's slightly less expensive hp deskjet f380 all-in-one took 32:18. photos on the 926 averaged 2:20 for each 4-by-6 and 5:11 for each 8-by-10.
alas, the 926 stumbles on output quality, particularly for text, which is far below par even for an ink jet. no fonts in our test suite qualified as easily readable with well formed characters at 4 or 5 points. one qualified at 6 points, most needed 10 points, and one stylized font with thick strokes needed 26 points. this doesn't mean the text was unreadable at smaller sizes, but it was visibly flawed, with broken lines, filled-in loops in lowercase e's, varying line thickness, and other issues, depending on the size and font.
graphics and photo output were much more respectable. the quality of both was well within the range in which most ink jetbased aios fall, although they were on the low side. i saw some obvious banding and dithering in graphics, along with a tendency for thin lines to disappear, but the quality was good enough for internal business use, such as for printing powerpoint slides as handouts.
the situation with photos is more complicated, since you can swap out the black cartridge for a photo cartridge to print with six colors instead of four. i tried it both ways and found that most photos actually looked worse using six-color printing. they also print a little slower, which is typical for ink jets, averaging 2:38 for a 4-by-6 and 5:43 for an 8-by-10.
based on the four-color output, more than half the photos in our test suite qualified as true photo quality, despite some visible dithering in the form of graininess. the photos that fell just short suffered from mild posterization (in the form of a loss of subtle shading that made them look painted instead of photographed) and a tendency for similar colors to look the same (as with a fruit bowl in one photo, with an orange and grapefruit merging into each other). a monochrome photo also showed a distinct tint.
count the output as good enough for snapshots, but not consistently good enough for storing cherished memories. the good news is that the photos that print at true photo quality should last a long time, thanks to a claimed 100-year lifetime in dark storage, as in an album, and reasonably good water and smudge resistance. drops of water left to dry will leave water stains, but you can safely pass the photos around to look at without worrying about them coming back smudged from someone's moist hands.
although in many ways the dell photo all-in-one printer 926 is not an improvement over its predecessor, it's still reasonably fast, its prints should last a while, and it has added memory-card slots. unless you must have high-quality text, the 926 is a more than reasonable choice for an aio for school, home, or light-duty use in a home office.
see how the dell photo all-in-one printer 926 stacks up against the competition in our comparison chart.
click here to view the dell photo all-in-one 926 benchmark test results .
Bottom Line: The Dell Photo All-In-One 926 Printer offers reasonable speed and output quality, but it's a touch slower and more expensive than the model it replaces.
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package com.little.visit.network;
import org.apache.http.conn.ssl.SSLSocketFactory;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.net.Socket;
import java.net.UnknownHostException;
import java.security.KeyStore;
import java.security.cert.CertificateException;
import java.security.cert.X509Certificate;
import javax.net.ssl.SSLContext;
import javax.net.ssl.TrustManager;
import javax.net.ssl.X509TrustManager;
/**
* Created by hying on 14-1-21.
*/
public class SSLTrustAllSocketFactory extends SSLSocketFactory {
private static final String TAG = "SSLTrustAllSocketFactory";
private SSLContext mSSLContext;
public class SSLTrustAllManager implements X509TrustManager {
@Override
public void checkClientTrusted(X509Certificate[] arg0, String arg1)
throws CertificateException {
}
@Override
public void checkServerTrusted(X509Certificate[] arg0, String arg1)
throws CertificateException {
}
@Override
public X509Certificate[] getAcceptedIssuers() {
return null;
}
}
public SSLTrustAllSocketFactory(KeyStore truststore)
throws Throwable {
super(truststore);
try {
mSSLContext = SSLContext.getInstance("TLS");
mSSLContext.init(null, new TrustManager[]{new SSLTrustAllManager()},
null);
setHostnameVerifier(SSLSocketFactory.ALLOW_ALL_HOSTNAME_VERIFIER);
} catch (Exception ex) {
}
}
@Override
public Socket createSocket(Socket socket, String host,
int port, boolean autoClose)
throws IOException, UnknownHostException {
return mSSLContext.getSocketFactory().createSocket(socket, host, port, autoClose);
}
@Override
public Socket createSocket() throws IOException {
return mSSLContext.getSocketFactory().createSocket();
}
public static SSLSocketFactory getSocketFactory() {
try {
KeyStore trustStore = KeyStore.getInstance(KeyStore.getDefaultType());
trustStore.load(null, null);
SSLSocketFactory factory = new SSLTrustAllSocketFactory(trustStore);
return factory;
} catch (Throwable e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
return null;
}
}
|
Water slide
A water slide (also referred to as a flume, or water chute) is a type of slide designed for warm-weather or indoor recreational use at water parks. Water slides differ in their riding method and therefore size. Some slides require riders to sit directly on the slide, or on a raft or tube designed to be used with the slide.
A typical water slide uses a pump system to pump water to the top which is then allowed to freely flow down its surface. The water reduces friction so sliders travel down the slide very quickly. Water slides run into a swimming pool (often called a plunge pool) or a long run-out chute. A lifeguard is usually stationed at the top and the bottom of the slide, so that if a rider gets hurt they will be treated immediately.
Body slides
As the name suggests, body slides feature no mat and require the person to sit directly on the surface of the slide. The simplest resembles a wet playground slide.
There are a variety of types of body slides including flumes, speed slides, bowls and AquaLoops; the latter three are explained below.
Inline tube slides
Some slides are designed to be ridden with a tube which typically seats either 2 or 3 riders inline. Similar to a traditional body slide, these slides include many twists and turns and come in a variety of types including bowls, funnels and half-pipes.
Longest
The world's longest water slide was a temporary installation in Waimauku, New Zealand, in February 2013. Constructed with a length of 650 metres (2,130 ft), of which 550 metres (1,800 ft) functioned properly. Its creators claimed the previous record holder had a length of ~350 metres (1,150 ft). The slide is being moved to Action Park in Vernon, New Jersey
The "Waterslide" at Buena Vista Lodge in Costa Rica is a 400 metres (1,300 ft) long water slide where the rider sits directly on the slide, with an inner-tube around their upper body for safety.
The longest multi-person water-coaster (see below) is the 1,763 foot (537 m) long Mammoth at Holiday World in Santa Claus, Indiana.
AquaLoop
The first known existence of a looping water slide was at Action Park in Vernon Township, New Jersey in the mid-1980s, named Cannonball Loop. This slide featured a vertical loop but was repeatedly closed due to safety concerns. In the late 2000s, Austrian manufacturer Aquarena developed the world's first safe looping water slide, known as the AquaLoop. The company engineered a slide with an inclined loop rather than a standard vertical one. The slide is currently licensed and distributed by Canadian water slide manufacturer WhiteWater West. There are nearly 20 AquaLoop installations around the world. The first installation was in Slovenia in 2008. The largest collection is located at Wet'n'Wild Gold Coast in Australia which houses 4 AquaLoops that opened in 2010. Wet'n'Wild Gold Coast was also the first to install more than one AquaLoop at a single location. The AquaLoop uses a trap-door to release riders down a 17-metre (56 ft) near-vertical descent at a speed of up to 60 kilometres per hour (37 mph). Riders experience 2.5 Gs in less than 2 seconds. The whole ride is over within 7 seconds.
Bowl
A bowl is a type of water slide where riders descend a steep drop into a round bowl. Under the effects of centrifugal force, the riders circle the outer area of the bowl before exiting down through the middle, often into a pool underneath but sometimes into an additional slide section. This style of water slide comes in various styles and is manufactured by ProSlide, WhiteWater West and Waterfun Products. The different variations can be ridden on a 4-person cloverleaf tube, 2 person inline tube, single person tube or as a body slide.
Family rafting
Family rafting water slides have the largest capacity of all the different types of tubing water slides averaging between 4 and 6 riders per dispatch. Riders hop in a circular raft and travel down long, twisted 4.5-metre (15 ft) channels to the ground. This type of water slide is manufactured by Australian Waterslides and Leisure, ProSlide, Waterfun Products and WhiteWater West. All of these companies manufacture open-air slides while ProSlide also manufactures an enclosed version.
Funnel
A funnel water slide requires riders to sit in a 2 or 4 seater round tube. Riders drop from inside a tunnel out into the ride's main element shaped like a funnel on its side. Riders oscillate from one side to the other until they exit through the back of the funnel and into a splash pool. The most common type of funnel is the ProSlide Tornado which is installed at almost 60 locations around the world dating back to 2003. In 2010, WhiteWater West began developing a competing product known as the Abyss, utilizing a raft that holds up to six riders.
Half-pipe
Similar to a funnel, a half-pipe features a slide in which riders oscillate back and forth. However, this style of ride does not feature any enclosed sections. On a Waterfun Product Sidewinder or Sidewinder Mini, riders oscillate several times before coming to a rest at the base of the slide. Riders then need to walk off the slide returning their tube to the next riders. On a WhiteWater West Boomerango or Family Boomerango, riders are sent down a steep drop and up a steep hill on the other side, before sliding backwards down another path to the end of the slide.
Multi-lane racer
A multi-lane racer is a ride where between 4 and 8 riders dive head-first onto a mat and down a slide with several dips. As an additional component of this ride, both some offer an additional enclosed helix at the top of the ride. ProSlide offer ProRacers, Octopus Racers and Kraken Racers, while WhiteWater West have designed the Mat Racers and Whizzards. Australian Waterslides and Leisure have also manufactured a standard multi-lane racer.
Speed slide
A speed slide is a type of body slide where riders are sent down steep, free-fall plunges to the ground. Almost all water slide manufacturers offer a variation of this type of slide. ProSlide & WhiteWater West both offer a speed slide with a trap door, the same trap door found on the AquaLoop.
Water coaster
A water coaster is a water slide that mimics a roller coaster by providing not only descents, but also ascents. There are three different ways water coasters operate: water jets, conveyor belts, and linear induction motors. High powered water jets power the first type of water coaster, generically known as Master Blasters. Originally manufactured by New Braunfels General Store (NBGS), the rights were sold in December 2006 to WhiteWater West of Canada. The first installations of this type of ride were Dragon Blaster and Family Blaster installed in 1994 at Schlitterbahn in New Braunfels, Texas. The following month a third Master Blaster opened at Adventure Bay in Houston, Texas. This type of ride features over 70 installations worldwide. The largest collection of Master Blasters is at Wild Wadi Water Park in Dubai where 9 of the park's 16 water slides utilize this technology to power riders to the top of a mountain. The first conveyor belt was installed at Kalahari Resort in Sandusky, Ohio. Known as the Zip Coaster, the ride powers riders up hills using high speed conveyor belts. The third incarnation of the water coaster utilizes linear induction motors and specially designed rafts. The first installation to use this technology was Deluge which opened in 2006 at what was then Splash Kingdom at Six Flags Kentucky Kingdom. The longest water coaster utilizing this magnetic system is Mammoth at Splashin' Safari in Santa Claus, Indiana. This technology has been adapted to other ProSlide products and is collectively known as the ProSlide HydroMAGNETIC. In 2010, ProSlide announced that they would be combining the family rafting and water coaster technologies to create a Hydromagnetic Mammoth. The first installation of this variation is aptly titled Mammoth which premiered in 2012 at Splashin' Safari in Indiana. It replaced the park's own Wildebeest as the longest water coaster in the world.
Drop slide
A drop slide is a type of body slide where at the end of the slide, riders fall through a hole into a pool underneath.
Inflatable water slides
Inflatable water slides are designed for the home user. They are typically made of a thick strong PVC or vinyl and nylon, and are inflated using an electric or gasoline powered blower. The water slide is attached to a water hose in order to generate the supply of water. There are small-sized inflatable water slides for private house uses or larger inflatable water slides for school, picnic, corporate, or carnival style use.
There are also swimming pool water slides which users can set up to slide straight into a pool. Most parks avoid this due to safety concerns, and will have swimming sections in a separate pool.
|
/**
* Quickly tests whether a given IP address matches an IP range. An
* {@code IPMatcher} is initialized with a particular IP range specification.
* Calls to {@link IPMatcher#match(String) match} method will then quickly
* determine whether a given IP falls within that range.
* <p>
* Supported range specifications are:
* <p>
* <ul>
* <li>Full IPv4 address, e.g. {@code 12.34.56.78}</li>
* <li>Full IPv6 address, e.g. {@code 2001:18e8:3:171:218:8bff:fe2a:56a4}</li>
* <li>Partial IPv4 address, e.g. {@code 12.34} (which matches any IP starting
* {@code 12.34})</li>
* <li>IPv4 network/netmask, e.g. {@code 18.25.0.0/255.255.0.0}</li>
* <li>IPv4 or IPv6 CIDR slash notation, e.g. {@code 18.25.0.0/16},
* {@code 2001:18e8:3:171::/64}</li>
* </ul>
*
* @version $Revision$
* @author Robert Tansley
* @author Ben Bosman
* @author Roeland Dillen
*/
public class IPMatcher
{
private static Logger log = Logger.getLogger(IPMatcher.class);
/** Network to match */
private byte[] network;
/** Network mask */
private byte[] netmask;
/**
* Construct an IPMatcher that will test for the given IP specification
*
* @param ipSpec
* IP specification (full or partial address, network/netmask,
* network/cidr)
* @throws IPMatcherException
* if there is an error parsing the specification (i.e. it is
* somehow malformed)
*/
public IPMatcher(String ipSpec) throws IPMatcherException
{
// Boil all specs down to network + mask
String ipPart = ipSpec;
String[] parts = ipSpec.split("/");
if (parts[0].indexOf(':') >= 0)
{ // looks like IPv6
try
{
network = Inet6Address.getByName(parts[0]).getAddress();
}
catch (UnknownHostException e)
{
throw new IPMatcherException(
"Malformed IP range specification " + ipSpec, e);
}
netmask = new byte[16];
switch(parts.length)
{
case 2: // CIDR notation: calculate the mask
int maskBits;
try {
maskBits = Integer.parseInt(parts[1]);
} catch (NumberFormatException nfe) {
throw new IPMatcherException(
"Malformed IP range specification " + ipSpec, nfe);
}
if (maskBits < 0 || maskBits > 128)
throw new IPMatcherException("Mask bits out of range 0-128 "
+ ipSpec);
int maskBytes = maskBits/8;
for (int i = 0; i < maskBytes; i++)
netmask[i] = (byte) 0Xff;
netmask[maskBytes] = (byte) ((byte) 0Xff << 8-(maskBits % 8)); // FIXME test!
for (int i = maskBytes+1; i < (128/8); i++)
netmask[i] = 0;
break;
case 1: // No explicit mask: fill the mask with 1s
for (int i = 0; i < netmask.length; i++)
netmask[i] = (byte) 0Xff;
break;
default:
throw new IPMatcherException("Malformed IP range specification "
+ ipSpec);
}
}
else
{ // assume IPv4
// Allow partial IP
boolean mustHave4 = false;
network = new byte[4];
netmask = new byte[4];
switch (parts.length)
{
case 2:
// Some kind of slash notation -- we'll need a full network IP
ipPart = parts[0];
mustHave4 = true;
String[] maskParts = parts[1].split("\\.");
if (maskParts.length == 1)
{
// CIDR slash notation
int x;
try
{
x = Integer.parseInt(maskParts[0]);
}
catch (NumberFormatException nfe)
{
throw new IPMatcherException(
"Malformed IP range specification " + ipSpec, nfe);
}
if (x < 0 || x > 32)
{
throw new IPMatcherException();
}
int fullMask = -1 << (32 - x);
netmask[0] = (byte) ((fullMask & 0xFF000000) >>> 24);
netmask[1] = (byte) ((fullMask & 0x00FF0000) >>> 16);
netmask[2] = (byte) ((fullMask & 0x0000FF00) >>> 8);
netmask[3] = (byte) (fullMask & 0x000000FF);
ipToBytes(ipPart, network, mustHave4);
if (log.isDebugEnabled()) {
log.debug("fullMask: "+fullMask);
for (int i = 0; i < network.length; i++) {
log.debug("network[" + i + "]: "+network[i]);
}
for (int i = 0; i < netmask.length; i++) {
log.debug("netmask[" + i + "]: "+netmask[i]);
}
}
}
else
{
// full netmask specified
ipToBytes(parts[0],network,true);
ipToBytes(parts[1], netmask, true);
}
break;
case 1:
// Get IP
for (int i = 0; i < netmask.length; i++)
netmask[i] = -1;
int partCount = ipToBytes(ipPart, network, mustHave4);
// If partial IP, set mask for remaining bytes
for (int i = 3; i >= partCount; i--)
{
netmask[i] = 0;
}
break;
default:
throw new IPMatcherException("Malformed IP range specification "
+ ipSpec);
}
network = ip4ToIp6(network);
netmask = ip4MaskToIp6(netmask);
if (log.isDebugEnabled()) {
for (int i = 0; i < network.length; i++) {
log.debug("network[" + i + "]: "+network[i]);
}
for (int i = 0; i < netmask.length; i++) {
log.debug("netmask[" + i + "]: "+netmask[i]);
}
}
}
}
/**
* Fill out a given four-byte array with the IPv4 address specified in the
* given String
*
* @param ip
* IPv4 address as a dot-delimited String
* @param bytes
* 4-byte array to fill out
* @param mustHave4
* if true, will require that the given IP string specify all
* four bytes
* @return the number of actual IP bytes found in the given IP address
* String
* @throws IPMatcherException
* if there is a problem parsing the IP string -- e.g. number
* outside of range 0-255, too many numbers, less than 4 numbers
* if {@code mustHave4} is true
*/
private static int ipToBytes(String ip, byte[] bytes, boolean mustHave4)
throws IPMatcherException
{
String[] parts = ip.split("\\.");
if (parts.length > 4 || mustHave4 && parts.length != 4)
{
throw new IPMatcherException("Malformed IP specification " + ip);
}
try
{
for (int i = 0; i < parts.length; i++)
{
int p = Integer.parseInt(parts[i]);
if (p < 0 || p > 255)
{
throw new IPMatcherException("Malformed IP specification "
+ ip);
}
bytes[i] = (byte) (p < 128 ? p : p - 256);
}
}
catch (NumberFormatException nfe)
{
throw new IPMatcherException("Malformed IP specification " + ip,
nfe);
}
return parts.length;
}
/**
* Determine whether the given full IP falls within the range this
* {@code IPMatcher} was initialized with.
*
* @param ipIn
* IP address as dot-delimited String
* @return {@code true} if the IP matches the range of this
* {@code IPMatcher}; {@code false} otherwise
* @throws IPMatcherException
* if the IP passed in cannot be parsed correctly (i.e. is
* malformed)
*/
public boolean match(String ipIn) throws IPMatcherException
{
log.debug("ipIn: "+ipIn);
byte[] candidate;
if (ipIn.indexOf(':') < 0)
{
candidate = new byte[4];
ipToBytes(ipIn, candidate, true);
candidate = ip4ToIp6(candidate);
}
else
try
{
candidate = Inet6Address.getByName(ipIn).getAddress();
}
catch (UnknownHostException e)
{
throw new IPMatcherException("Malformed IPv6 address ",e);
}
for (int i = 0; i < netmask.length; i++)
{
if ((candidate[i] & netmask[i]) != (network[i] & netmask[i]))
{
if (log.isDebugEnabled()) {
log.debug("candidate[i]: "+candidate[i]);
log.debug("netmask[i]: "+netmask[i]);
log.debug("candidate[i] & netmask[i]: "+(candidate[i] & netmask[i]));
log.debug("network[i]: "+network[i]);
log.debug("network[i] & netmask[i]: "+(network[i] & netmask[i]));
}
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
/**
* Convert an IPv4 address to an IPv6 IPv4-compatible address.
* @param ip4 an IPv4 address
* @return the corresponding IPv6 address
* @throws IllegalArgumentException if ip4 is not exactly four octets long.
*/
private static byte[] ip4ToIp6(byte[] ip4)
{
if (ip4.length != 4)
throw new IllegalArgumentException("IPv4 address must be four octets");
byte[] ip6 = new byte[16];
for (int i = 0; i < 16-4; i++)
ip6[i] = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < 4; i++)
ip6[12+i] = ip4[i];
return ip6;
}
/**
* Convert an IPv4 mask to the equivalent IPv6 mask.
* @param ip4 an IPv4 mask
* @return the corresponding IPv6 mask
* @throws IllegalArgumentException if ip4 is not exactly four octets long.
*/
private static byte[] ip4MaskToIp6(byte[] ip4)
{
if (ip4.length != 4)
throw new IllegalArgumentException("IPv4 mask must be four octets");
byte[] ip6 = new byte[16];
for (int i = 0; i < 16-4; i++)
ip6[i] = (byte) 0Xff;
for (int i = 0; i < 4; i++)
ip6[12+i] = ip4[i];
return ip6;
}
}
|
import { Component, OnInit, ViewChild, QueryList, ElementRef, ViewChildren, AfterViewInit, OnDestroy } from '@angular/core';
import { Subscription } from 'rxjs';
import { MudxmlService } from '../mudxml.service';
import { MudMessage } from '../mud-message';
@Component({
selector: 'app-server-messages',
templateUrl: './server-messages.component.html',
styleUrls: ['./server-messages.component.css'],
})
export class ServerMessagesComponent implements OnInit, OnDestroy, AfterViewInit {
@ViewChildren('messages') messages: QueryList<any>;
@ViewChild('content') content: ElementRef;
public serverMessages: string[] = [];
private readonly mudxmlSubscription: Subscription;
constructor(private mudxmlService: MudxmlService) {
this.mudxmlSubscription = mudxmlService.getMudxmlObservable()
.subscribe((message) => this.receiveMessage(message));
}
ngOnInit() {
}
ngAfterViewInit() {
this.messages.changes.subscribe(this.scrollToBottom);
}
private scrollToBottom = () => {
this.content.nativeElement.scrollTop = this.content.nativeElement.scrollHeight;
}
private receiveMessage(message: MudMessage) {
this.serverMessages.push(message.message);
}
public ngOnDestroy() {
this.mudxmlSubscription.unsubscribe();
}
}
|
Varieties of Youth Justice Like parents trying to figure how best to raise their children, countries have, in recent years, wrestled with the question of how to respond to youths who break laws. There are many different models. Few appear to work in a completely satisfactory manner from the perspective of those in each jurisdiction. There is not even consensus on what "youth justice systems" (where they exist) are trying to accomplish. Few decisions-other than that youths are different from adults-have been settled in the same way across jurisdictions. The manner in which each country has resolved the "youth justice" problem is almost certainly best understood within the broad context of that country's history and justice institutions. Hence it would be premature to carry out a true multicultural cross-jurisdictional study of youth justice systems without first attempting to understand each system within its own context. The essays in this volume represent an attempt to understand each system within the cultural context in which it exists.
|
Graphene oxide Nafion composite membrane for effective methanol crossover reduction in passive direct methanol fuel cells Direct methanol fuel cells (DMFC) are promising candidates for small-scale portable applications. They are characterized by their high energy density that is ten times higher than that of the lithium ion batteries. Hence, they have the potential to be prosperous alternatives to replace secondary batteries. However, their performance is limited by the Methanol crossover (MCO) through the electrolyte membranes especially at high methanol concentration. Consequently, the development of a new membrane to minimize MCO is considered to be a crucial improvement toward commercialization of DMFC. In this study, a composite membrane of graphene oxide (GO)/Nafion 117 was synthesized. The performance of this composite membrane in a DMFC was studied. This composite membrane was prepared by depositing a thin film of GO on Nafion 117 membrane. GO was synthesized in the laboratory from graphite using modified Hummer's method. The composite membrane was characterized using X-ray diffraction (XRD), Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy (EDS) and Electrochemical Impedance Spectroscopy (EIS). The Nafion-GO membranes were tested in a direct methanol fuel cell with 2 M and 5 M methanol concentrations. Preliminary results showed an improvement in the fuel cell performance and a decrease in methanol crossover when GO-Nafion membranes were used.
|
<reponame>kcharbo3/teku
/*
* Copyright 2020 ConsenSys AG.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
* the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software distributed under the License is distributed on
* an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the
* specific language governing permissions and limitations under the License.
*/
package tech.pegasys.teku.statetransition.validation;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.any;
import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.eq;
import static org.mockito.Mockito.mock;
import static org.mockito.Mockito.when;
import java.util.Optional;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.BeforeEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import tech.pegasys.teku.spec.datastructures.operations.AttesterSlashing;
import tech.pegasys.teku.spec.util.DataStructureUtil;
import tech.pegasys.teku.spec.util.operationvalidators.AttesterSlashingStateTransitionValidator;
import tech.pegasys.teku.storage.client.RecentChainData;
public class AttesterSlashingValidatorTest {
private DataStructureUtil dataStructureUtil = new DataStructureUtil();
private RecentChainData recentChainData = mock(RecentChainData.class);
private AttesterSlashingValidator attesterSlashingValidator;
private AttesterSlashingStateTransitionValidator stateTransitionValidator;
@BeforeEach
void beforeEach() {
when(recentChainData.getBestState())
.thenReturn(Optional.of(dataStructureUtil.randomBeaconState()));
stateTransitionValidator = mock(AttesterSlashingStateTransitionValidator.class);
attesterSlashingValidator =
new AttesterSlashingValidator(recentChainData, stateTransitionValidator);
}
@Test
public void shouldAcceptValidAttesterSlashing() {
AttesterSlashing slashing = dataStructureUtil.randomAttesterSlashing();
when(stateTransitionValidator.validate(recentChainData.getBestState().orElseThrow(), slashing))
.thenReturn(Optional.empty());
assertTrue(attesterSlashingValidator.validateFully(slashing).isAccept());
}
@Test
public void shouldRejectInvalidAttesterSlashing() {
AttesterSlashing slashing = dataStructureUtil.randomAttesterSlashing();
when(stateTransitionValidator.validate(recentChainData.getBestState().orElseThrow(), slashing))
.thenReturn(
Optional.of(
AttesterSlashingStateTransitionValidator.AttesterSlashingInvalidReason
.ATTESTATIONS_NOT_SLASHABLE));
assertTrue(attesterSlashingValidator.validateFully(slashing).isReject());
}
@Test
public void shouldIgnoreAttesterSlashingForTheSameAttesters() {
AttesterSlashing slashing1 = dataStructureUtil.randomAttesterSlashing();
AttesterSlashing slashing2 =
new AttesterSlashing(slashing1.getAttestation_1(), slashing1.getAttestation_2());
when(stateTransitionValidator.validate(eq(recentChainData.getBestState().orElseThrow()), any()))
.thenReturn(Optional.empty());
assertTrue(attesterSlashingValidator.validateFully(slashing1).isAccept());
assertTrue(attesterSlashingValidator.validateFully(slashing2).isIgnore());
}
}
|
//================ Copyright (c) 2016, PG, All rights reserved. =================//
//
// Purpose: vulkan implementation of Graphics
//
// $NoKeywords: $vkg
//===============================================================================//
#ifndef VULKANGRAPHICSINTERFACE_H
#define VULKANGRAPHICSINTERFACE_H
#include "VulkanInterface.h"
#include "NullGraphicsInterface.h"
#ifdef MCENGINE_FEATURE_VULKAN
class VulkanSwapChain;
class VulkanGraphicsInterface : public NullGraphicsInterface /*Graphics*/
{
public:
virtual std::vector<const char *> getRequiredInstanceExtensions() = 0;
public:
VulkanGraphicsInterface();
virtual ~VulkanGraphicsInterface();
// scene
virtual void beginScene();
virtual void endScene();
// depth buffer
virtual void clearDepthBuffer();
// color
virtual void setColor(Color color);
virtual void setAlpha(float alpha);
// 2d primitive drawing
virtual void drawPixels(int x, int y, int width, int height, Graphics::DRAWPIXELS_TYPE type, const void *pixels);
virtual void drawPixel(int x, int y);
virtual void drawLine(int x1, int y1, int x2, int y2);
virtual void drawLine(Vector2 pos1, Vector2 pos2);
virtual void drawRect(int x, int y, int width, int height);
virtual void drawRect(int x, int y, int width, int height, Color top, Color right, Color bottom, Color left);
virtual void fillRect(int x, int y, int width, int height);
virtual void fillRoundedRect(int x, int y, int width, int height, int radius);
virtual void fillGradient(int x, int y, int width, int height, Color topLeftColor, Color topRightColor, Color bottomLeftColor, Color bottomRightColor);
virtual void drawQuad(int x, int y, int width, int height);
virtual void drawQuad(Vector2 topLeft, Vector2 topRight, Vector2 bottomRight, Vector2 bottomLeft, Color topLeftColor, Color topRightColor, Color bottomRightColor, Color bottomLeftColor);
// 2d resource drawing
virtual void drawImage(Image *image);
virtual void drawString(McFont *font, UString text);
// 3d type drawing
virtual void drawVAO(VertexArrayObject *vao);
// DEPRECATED: 2d clipping
virtual void setClipRect(McRect clipRect);
virtual void pushClipRect(McRect clipRect);
virtual void popClipRect();
// stencil
virtual void pushStencil();
virtual void fillStencil(bool inside);
virtual void popStencil();
// renderer settings
virtual void setClipping(bool enabled);
virtual void setBlending(bool enabled);
virtual void setDepthBuffer(bool enabled);
virtual void setCulling(bool culling);
virtual void setVSync(bool enabled);
virtual void setAntialiasing(bool aa);
virtual void setWireframe(bool enabled);
// renderer actions
virtual void flush();
virtual std::vector<unsigned char> getScreenshot();
// renderer info
virtual Vector2 getResolution() const {return m_vResolution;}
virtual UString getVendor();
virtual UString getModel();
virtual UString getVersion();
virtual int getVRAMTotal();
virtual int getVRAMRemaining();
// callbacks
virtual void onResolutionChange(Vector2 newResolution);
// factory
virtual Image *createImage(UString filePath, bool mipmapped, bool keepInSystemMemory);
virtual Image *createImage(int width, int height, bool mipmapped, bool keepInSystemMemory);
virtual RenderTarget *createRenderTarget(int x, int y, int width, int height, Graphics::MULTISAMPLE_TYPE multiSampleType);
virtual Shader *createShaderFromFile(UString vertexShaderFilePath, UString fragmentShaderFilePath);
virtual Shader *createShaderFromSource(UString vertexShader, UString fragmentShader);
virtual VertexArrayObject *createVertexArrayObject(Graphics::PRIMITIVE primitive, Graphics::USAGE_TYPE usage, bool keepInSystemMemory);
// ILLEGAL:
inline VulkanSwapChain *getSwapChain() const {return m_swapchain;}
protected:
void init();
virtual void onTransformUpdate(Matrix4 &projectionMatrix, Matrix4 &worldMatrix);
private:
// renderer
Vector2 m_vResolution;
VkQueue m_queue;
VkSurfaceKHR m_surface;
VulkanSwapChain *m_swapchain;
};
#endif
#endif
|
// Description: Java 11 Schema Object implementation for CFSec.
/*
* org.msscf.msscf.CFSec
*
* Copyright (c) 2020 <NAME>
*
* MSS Code Factory CFSec 2.13 Security Essentials
*
* Copyright 2020-2021 <NAME> <EMAIL>
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*
* Manufactured by MSS Code Factory 2.12
*/
package org.msscf.msscf.v2_13.cfsec.CFSecObj;
import java.math.*;
import java.sql.*;
import java.text.*;
import java.util.*;
import org.msscf.msscf.v2_13.cflib.CFLib.*;
import org.msscf.msscf.v2_13.cfsec.CFSec.*;
public class CFSecSchemaObj
implements ICFSecSchemaObj
{
public static String SCHEMA_NAME = "CFSec";
public static String SCHEMA_DBNAME = "cfsec213";
protected CFSecAuthorization authorization = null;
protected ICFSecSchema backingStore = null;
protected String secClusterName = "system";
protected String secTenantName = "system";
protected String secUserName = "system";
protected ICFSecClusterObj secCluster = null;
protected long secClusterId = 0L;
protected ICFSecTenantObj secTenant = null;
protected long secTenantId = 0L;
protected ICFSecSecUserObj secUser = null;
protected UUID secSessionUserId = null;
protected ICFSecSecSessionObj secSession = null;
protected UUID secSessionSessionId = null;
protected String schemaDbName = SCHEMA_DBNAME;
protected String lowerDbSchemaName = SCHEMA_DBNAME.toLowerCase();
protected ICFSecClusterTableObj clusterTableObj;
protected ICFSecHostNodeTableObj hostNodeTableObj;
protected ICFSecISOCcyTableObj iSOCcyTableObj;
protected ICFSecISOCtryTableObj iSOCtryTableObj;
protected ICFSecISOCtryCcyTableObj iSOCtryCcyTableObj;
protected ICFSecISOCtryLangTableObj iSOCtryLangTableObj;
protected ICFSecISOLangTableObj iSOLangTableObj;
protected ICFSecISOTZoneTableObj iSOTZoneTableObj;
protected ICFSecSecAppTableObj secAppTableObj;
protected ICFSecSecDeviceTableObj secDeviceTableObj;
protected ICFSecSecFormTableObj secFormTableObj;
protected ICFSecSecGroupTableObj secGroupTableObj;
protected ICFSecSecGroupFormTableObj secGroupFormTableObj;
protected ICFSecSecGrpIncTableObj secGrpIncTableObj;
protected ICFSecSecGrpMembTableObj secGrpMembTableObj;
protected ICFSecSecSessionTableObj secSessionTableObj;
protected ICFSecSecUserTableObj secUserTableObj;
protected ICFSecServiceTableObj serviceTableObj;
protected ICFSecServiceTypeTableObj serviceTypeTableObj;
protected ICFSecSysClusterTableObj sysClusterTableObj;
protected ICFSecTSecGroupTableObj tSecGroupTableObj;
protected ICFSecTSecGrpIncTableObj tSecGrpIncTableObj;
protected ICFSecTSecGrpMembTableObj tSecGrpMembTableObj;
protected ICFSecTenantTableObj tenantTableObj;
public CFSecSchemaObj() {
clusterTableObj = new CFSecClusterTableObj( this );
hostNodeTableObj = new CFSecHostNodeTableObj( this );
iSOCcyTableObj = new CFSecISOCcyTableObj( this );
iSOCtryTableObj = new CFSecISOCtryTableObj( this );
iSOCtryCcyTableObj = new CFSecISOCtryCcyTableObj( this );
iSOCtryLangTableObj = new CFSecISOCtryLangTableObj( this );
iSOLangTableObj = new CFSecISOLangTableObj( this );
iSOTZoneTableObj = new CFSecISOTZoneTableObj( this );
secAppTableObj = new CFSecSecAppTableObj( this );
secDeviceTableObj = new CFSecSecDeviceTableObj( this );
secFormTableObj = new CFSecSecFormTableObj( this );
secGroupTableObj = new CFSecSecGroupTableObj( this );
secGroupFormTableObj = new CFSecSecGroupFormTableObj( this );
secGrpIncTableObj = new CFSecSecGrpIncTableObj( this );
secGrpMembTableObj = new CFSecSecGrpMembTableObj( this );
secSessionTableObj = new CFSecSecSessionTableObj( this );
secUserTableObj = new CFSecSecUserTableObj( this );
serviceTableObj = new CFSecServiceTableObj( this );
serviceTypeTableObj = new CFSecServiceTypeTableObj( this );
sysClusterTableObj = new CFSecSysClusterTableObj( this );
tSecGroupTableObj = new CFSecTSecGroupTableObj( this );
tSecGrpIncTableObj = new CFSecTSecGrpIncTableObj( this );
tSecGrpMembTableObj = new CFSecTSecGrpMembTableObj( this );
tenantTableObj = new CFSecTenantTableObj( this );
}
public void setSecClusterName( String value ) {
if( ( value == null ) || ( value.length() <= 0 ) ) {
throw new CFLibNullArgumentException( getClass(),
"setClusterName",
1,
"value" );
}
secClusterName = value;
secCluster = null;
}
public String getSecClusterName() {
return( secClusterName );
}
public ICFSecClusterObj getSecCluster() {
if( secCluster == null ) {
if( authorization != null ) {
secCluster = getClusterTableObj().readClusterByIdIdx( authorization.getSecClusterId() );
}
else {
secCluster = getClusterTableObj().readClusterByUDomNameIdx( secClusterName );
if( ( secCluster == null ) && ( secClusterId > 0 ) ) {
secCluster = getClusterTableObj().readClusterByIdIdx( secClusterId );
}
}
if( secCluster != null ) {
secClusterName = secCluster.getRequiredFullDomName();
secClusterId = secCluster.getRequiredId();
if( authorization != null ) {
authorization.setSecCluster( secCluster );
}
}
}
return( secCluster );
}
public void setSecCluster( ICFSecClusterObj value ) {
secCluster = value;
if( secCluster == null ) {
return;
}
secClusterId = secCluster.getRequiredId();
secClusterName = secCluster.getRequiredFullDomName();
if( authorization != null ) {
authorization.setSecCluster( secCluster );
}
}
public long getSecClusterId() {
return( secClusterId );
}
public void setSecTenantName( String value ) {
if( ( value == null ) || ( value.length() <= 0 ) ) {
throw new CFLibNullArgumentException( getClass(),
"setTenantName",
1,
"value" );
}
secTenantName = value;
secTenant = null;
}
public String getSecTenantName() {
return( secTenantName );
}
public ICFSecTenantObj getSecTenant() {
if( secTenant == null ) {
if( authorization != null ) {
secTenant = getTenantTableObj().readTenantByIdIdx( authorization.getSecTenantId() );
}
else {
secTenant = getTenantTableObj().readTenantByUNameIdx( getSecCluster().getRequiredId(), secTenantName );
if( ( secTenant == null ) && ( secTenantId > 0 ) ) {
secTenant = getTenantTableObj().readTenantByIdIdx( secTenantId );
}
}
if( secTenant != null ) {
secTenantName = secTenant.getRequiredTenantName();
secTenantId = secTenant.getRequiredId();
if( authorization != null ) {
authorization.setSecTenant( secTenant );
}
}
}
return( secTenant );
}
public void setSecTenant( ICFSecTenantObj value ) {
secTenant = value;
if( secTenant == null ) {
return;
}
secTenantId = secTenant.getRequiredId();
secTenantName = secTenant.getRequiredTenantName();
if( authorization != null ) {
authorization.setSecTenant( secTenant );
}
}
public long getSecTenantId() {
return( secTenantId );
}
public void setSecUserName( String value ) {
if( ( value == null ) || ( value.length() <= 0 ) ) {
throw new CFLibNullArgumentException( getClass(),
"setUserName",
1,
"value" );
}
secUserName = value;
secUser = null;
}
public String getSecUserName() {
return( secUserName );
}
public ICFSecSecUserObj getSecUser() {
if( secUser == null ) {
if( authorization != null ) {
secUser = getSecUserTableObj().readSecUserByIdIdx( authorization.getSecUserId() );
}
else {
secUser = getSecUserTableObj().readSecUserByULoginIdx( secUserName );
if( ( secUser == null ) && ( secSessionUserId != null ) ) {
secUser = getSecUserTableObj().readSecUserByIdIdx( secSessionUserId );
}
}
if( secUser != null ) {
secUserName = secUser.getRequiredLoginId();
secSessionUserId = secUser.getRequiredSecUserId();
}
}
return( secUser );
}
public void setSecUser( ICFSecSecUserObj value ) {
secUser = value;
if( secUser != null ) {
secUserName = secUser.getRequiredLoginId();
secSessionUserId = secUser.getRequiredSecUserId();
}
}
public ICFSecSecSessionObj getSecSession() {
if( secSession == null ) {
if( authorization != null ) {
secSession = getSecSessionTableObj().readSecSessionByIdIdx( authorization.getSecSessionId() );
}
else if( secSessionSessionId != null ) {
secSession = getSecSessionTableObj().readSecSessionByIdIdx( secSessionSessionId );
}
if( secSession != null ) {
secSessionSessionId = secSession.getRequiredSecSessionId();
secSessionUserId = secSession.getRequiredSecUserId();
}
}
return( secSession );
}
public void setSecSession( ICFSecSecSessionObj value ) {
secSession = value;
if( secSession == null ) {
return;
}
secSessionSessionId = secSession.getRequiredSecSessionId();
secSessionUserId = secSession.getRequiredSecUserId();
if( authorization != null ) {
authorization.setSecSession( secSession );
}
}
public void setSecSessionId( UUID value ) {
secSessionSessionId = value;
}
public UUID getSecSessionSessionId() {
return( secSessionSessionId );
}
public UUID getSecSessionUserId() {
return( secSessionUserId );
}
/**
* When you first connect to a database, you can opt to specify a database
* schema name to be used by the session. The implementation code must always
* be dynamically based on the invocation of <tt>String getDbSchemaName()</tt>
* at runtime.
* <p>
* The initial value is defined by the implementing schema model which has inherited
* the expression of the current schema model being expanded. That is, it is specified
* in the DbSchemaName attribute of a SchemaDef instance.
*/
public String getDbSchemaName() {
return( schemaDbName );
}
/**
* PostgreSQL coerces database schema names to lowercase for consistency.
*/
public String getLowerDbSchemaName() {
return( lowerDbSchemaName );
}
/**
* The database is expected to override this implementation and invoke the
* <tt>super.setDbSchemaName( String argDbSchemaName )</tt> early
* on in the implementation of the cust body. You should let the exceptions
* which can be thrown by this implementation pass unimpeded.
* <pg>
* When you set the database schema name, the database-specific implementation
* of this method does a "commit; use database"-type sequence to change
* to the target database. This should be specified globally for all
* database connections in a given cluster, so that all of
* the application implementation clients are using the same database instance
* regardless of what's been provided by the cust client implementation,
* be it as a Java application or a web interface written using JEE.
*/
public void setDbSchemaName( String argDbSchemaName ) {
final String S_ProcName = "setDbSchemaName";
rollback();
if( ( argDbSchemaName == null ) || ( argDbSchemaName.length() <= 0 ) ) {
throw new CFLibNullArgumentException( getClass(),
S_ProcName,
1,
"argDbSchemaName" );
}
if( backingStore != null ) {
backingStore.setDbSchemaName( argDbSchemaName );
}
schemaDbName = argDbSchemaName;
lowerDbSchemaName = schemaDbName.toLowerCase();
releasePreparedStatements();
}
public String fileImport( String fileName, String fileContent ) {
String logContent = backingStore.fileImport( getAuthorization(), fileName, fileContent );
return( logContent );
}
/**
* Release any prepared statements acquired by this connection.
* <p>
* Resets the prepared statements so they can acquire the new value of
* <tt>setDbSchemaName()</tt>.
*/
public void releasePreparedStatements() {
}
public CFSecAuthorization getAuthorization() {
return( authorization );
}
public void setAuthorization( CFSecAuthorization value ) {
authorization = value;
}
public ICFSecSchema getBackingStore() {
return( backingStore );
}
public void setBackingStore( ICFSecSchema value ) {
backingStore = value;
}
public String getSchemaName() {
return( SCHEMA_NAME );
}
public boolean isConnected() {
if( backingStore == null ) {
return( false );
}
else {
return( backingStore.isConnected() );
}
}
public boolean connect() {
return( backingStore.connect() );
}
public boolean connect( String username, String password ) {
return( backingStore.connect( username, password ) );
}
public boolean connect( String clusterName, String tenantName, String secUserName, String password ) {
final String S_ProcName = "connect-full";
if( ( clusterName == null ) || ( clusterName.length() <= 0 ) ) {
throw new CFLibNullArgumentException( getClass(),
S_ProcName,
1,
"clusterName" );
}
if( ( tenantName == null ) || ( tenantName.length() <= 0 ) ) {
throw new CFLibNullArgumentException( getClass(),
S_ProcName,
2,
"tenantName" );
}
if( ( secUserName == null ) || ( secUserName.length() <= 0 ) ) {
throw new CFLibNullArgumentException( getClass(),
S_ProcName,
3,
"secUserName" );
}
if( ( password == null ) || ( password.length() <= 0 ) ) {
throw new CFLibNullArgumentException( getClass(),
S_ProcName,
5,
"password" );
}
if( ! backingStore.connect( secUserName, password, clusterName, tenantName ) ) {
authorization = null;
return( false );
}
if( authorization != null ) {
// The login was established as an XMsg client, which automatically sets the Authorization
// information based on the return message. You only need to do the remaining SecSession
// and authorization creation if you're using a direct client-server model instead of
// an XMsg client-server model.
setSecClusterName( clusterName );
setSecTenantName( tenantName );
setSecUserName( secUserName );
return( true );
}
if( clusterName.equals( "system" )
&& tenantName.equals( "system" )
&& secUserName.equals( "system" ) )
{
if( secCluster == null ) {
secCluster = getClusterTableObj().newInstance();
ICFSecClusterEditObj editCluster = secCluster.getEdit();
if( editCluster == null ) {
editCluster = secCluster.beginEdit();
editCluster.setRequiredDescription( "system" );
editCluster.setRequiredFullDomName( "system" );
secCluster = editCluster.create();
editCluster = null;
}
}
if( secTenant == null ) {
secTenant = getTenantTableObj().newInstance();
ICFSecTenantEditObj editTenant = secTenant.getEdit();
if( editTenant == null ) {
editTenant = secTenant.beginEdit();
editTenant.setRequiredContainerCluster( secCluster);
editTenant.setRequiredTenantName( "system" );
secTenant = editTenant.create();
editTenant = null;
}
}
if( secUser == null ) {
secUser = getSecUserTableObj().newInstance();
ICFSecSecUserEditObj editSecUser = secUser.getEdit();
if( editSecUser == null ) {
editSecUser = secUser.beginEdit();
editSecUser.setRequiredEMailAddress( "system" );
editSecUser.setRequiredLoginId( "system" );
secUser = editSecUser.create();
editSecUser = null;
}
}
setSecClusterName( clusterName );
setSecTenantName( tenantName );
setSecUserName( secUserName );
secCluster = null;
secTenant = null;
secUser = null;
secSession = null;
ICFSecClusterObj cluster = getSecCluster();
ICFSecTenantObj tenant = getSecTenant();
ICFSecSecUserObj user = getSecUser();
ICFSecSecSessionObj session;
if( ( cluster != null ) && ( tenant != null ) && ( user != null ) ) {
session = getSecSessionTableObj().newInstance();
ICFSecSecSessionEditObj sessionEdit = session.beginEdit();
sessionEdit.setRequiredContainerSecUser( user );
sessionEdit.setRequiredStart( Calendar.getInstance() );
sessionEdit.setOptionalFinish( null );
session = sessionEdit.create();
sessionEdit = null;
setSecSession( session );
}
else {
session = null;
}
if( ( cluster == null ) || ( tenant == null ) || ( user == null ) || ( session == null ) ) {
disconnect( false );
authorization = null;
throw new CFLibRuntimeException( getClass(),
S_ProcName,
"Could not resolve cluster name, tenant name, user name, or session. Login cancelled" );
}
if( authorization == null ) {
authorization = new CFSecAuthorization();
}
authorization.setSecCluster( cluster );
authorization.setSecTenant( tenant );
authorization.setSecSession( session );
return( true );
}
setSecClusterName( clusterName );
setSecTenantName( tenantName );
setSecUserName( secUserName );
boolean transactionStarted = beginTransaction();
secCluster = null;
secTenant = null;
secUser = null;
secSession = null;
ICFSecClusterObj cluster = getSecCluster();
ICFSecTenantObj tenant = getSecTenant();
ICFSecSecUserObj user = getSecUser();
ICFSecSecSessionObj session;
if( ( cluster != null ) && ( tenant != null ) && ( user != null ) ) {
session = getSecSessionTableObj().newInstance();
ICFSecSecSessionEditObj sessionEdit = session.beginEdit();
sessionEdit.setRequiredContainerSecUser( user );
sessionEdit.setRequiredStart( Calendar.getInstance() );
sessionEdit.setOptionalFinish( null );
session = sessionEdit.create();
sessionEdit = null;
setSecSession( session );
}
else {
session = null;
}
if( transactionStarted ) {
commit();
}
if( ( cluster == null ) || ( tenant == null ) || ( user == null ) || ( session == null ) ) {
disconnect( false );
authorization = null;
throw new CFLibRuntimeException( getClass(),
S_ProcName,
"Could not resolve cluster name, tenant name, user name, or session. Login cancelled" );
}
if( authorization == null ) {
authorization = new CFSecAuthorization();
}
authorization.setSecCluster( cluster );
authorization.setSecTenant( tenant );
authorization.setSecSession( session );
return( true );
}
public void disconnect( boolean doCommit ) {
backingStore.disconnect( doCommit );
}
public void logout() {
if( authorization == null ) {
if( isConnected() ) {
disconnect( false );
}
return;
}
if( isConnected() ) {
try {
boolean transactionStarted = beginTransaction();
if( ! transactionStarted ) {
rollback();
transactionStarted = beginTransaction();
if( ! transactionStarted ) {
setAuthorization( null );
return;
}
}
UUID secSessionId = authorization.getSecSessionId();
if( secSessionId != null ) {
ICFSecSecSessionObj secSession = getSecSessionTableObj().readSecSessionByIdIdx( secSessionId );
if( secSession != null ) {
if( secSession.getOptionalFinish() == null ) {
ICFSecSecSessionEditObj editSecSession = secSession.beginEdit();
editSecSession.setOptionalFinish( Calendar.getInstance() );
editSecSession.update();
editSecSession = null;
}
}
}
commit();
}
finally {
setAuthorization( null );
try {
disconnect( false );
}
catch( RuntimeException e ) {
}
}
}
}
public void minimizeMemory() {
if( clusterTableObj != null ) {
clusterTableObj.minimizeMemory();
}
if( hostNodeTableObj != null ) {
hostNodeTableObj.minimizeMemory();
}
if( iSOCcyTableObj != null ) {
iSOCcyTableObj.minimizeMemory();
}
if( iSOCtryTableObj != null ) {
iSOCtryTableObj.minimizeMemory();
}
if( iSOCtryCcyTableObj != null ) {
iSOCtryCcyTableObj.minimizeMemory();
}
if( iSOCtryLangTableObj != null ) {
iSOCtryLangTableObj.minimizeMemory();
}
if( iSOLangTableObj != null ) {
iSOLangTableObj.minimizeMemory();
}
if( iSOTZoneTableObj != null ) {
iSOTZoneTableObj.minimizeMemory();
}
if( secAppTableObj != null ) {
secAppTableObj.minimizeMemory();
}
if( secDeviceTableObj != null ) {
secDeviceTableObj.minimizeMemory();
}
if( secFormTableObj != null ) {
secFormTableObj.minimizeMemory();
}
if( secGroupTableObj != null ) {
secGroupTableObj.minimizeMemory();
}
if( secGroupFormTableObj != null ) {
secGroupFormTableObj.minimizeMemory();
}
if( secGrpIncTableObj != null ) {
secGrpIncTableObj.minimizeMemory();
}
if( secGrpMembTableObj != null ) {
secGrpMembTableObj.minimizeMemory();
}
if( secSessionTableObj != null ) {
secSessionTableObj.minimizeMemory();
}
if( secUserTableObj != null ) {
secUserTableObj.minimizeMemory();
}
if( serviceTableObj != null ) {
serviceTableObj.minimizeMemory();
}
if( serviceTypeTableObj != null ) {
serviceTypeTableObj.minimizeMemory();
}
if( sysClusterTableObj != null ) {
sysClusterTableObj.minimizeMemory();
}
if( tSecGroupTableObj != null ) {
tSecGroupTableObj.minimizeMemory();
}
if( tSecGrpIncTableObj != null ) {
tSecGrpIncTableObj.minimizeMemory();
}
if( tSecGrpMembTableObj != null ) {
tSecGrpMembTableObj.minimizeMemory();
}
if( tenantTableObj != null ) {
tenantTableObj.minimizeMemory();
}
}
public boolean isTransactionOpen() {
boolean txnOpen = backingStore.isTransactionOpen();
return( txnOpen );
}
public boolean beginTransaction() {
boolean txnInitiated = backingStore.beginTransaction();
return( txnInitiated );
}
public void commit() {
backingStore.commit();
}
public void rollback() {
backingStore.rollback();
}
public ICFSecClusterTableObj getClusterTableObj() {
return( clusterTableObj );
}
public ICFSecHostNodeTableObj getHostNodeTableObj() {
return( hostNodeTableObj );
}
public ICFSecISOCcyTableObj getISOCcyTableObj() {
return( iSOCcyTableObj );
}
public ICFSecISOCtryTableObj getISOCtryTableObj() {
return( iSOCtryTableObj );
}
public ICFSecISOCtryCcyTableObj getISOCtryCcyTableObj() {
return( iSOCtryCcyTableObj );
}
public ICFSecISOCtryLangTableObj getISOCtryLangTableObj() {
return( iSOCtryLangTableObj );
}
public ICFSecISOLangTableObj getISOLangTableObj() {
return( iSOLangTableObj );
}
public ICFSecISOTZoneTableObj getISOTZoneTableObj() {
return( iSOTZoneTableObj );
}
public ICFSecSecAppTableObj getSecAppTableObj() {
return( secAppTableObj );
}
public ICFSecSecDeviceTableObj getSecDeviceTableObj() {
return( secDeviceTableObj );
}
public ICFSecSecFormTableObj getSecFormTableObj() {
return( secFormTableObj );
}
public ICFSecSecGroupTableObj getSecGroupTableObj() {
return( secGroupTableObj );
}
public ICFSecSecGroupFormTableObj getSecGroupFormTableObj() {
return( secGroupFormTableObj );
}
public ICFSecSecGrpIncTableObj getSecGrpIncTableObj() {
return( secGrpIncTableObj );
}
public ICFSecSecGrpMembTableObj getSecGrpMembTableObj() {
return( secGrpMembTableObj );
}
public ICFSecSecSessionTableObj getSecSessionTableObj() {
return( secSessionTableObj );
}
public ICFSecSecUserTableObj getSecUserTableObj() {
return( secUserTableObj );
}
public ICFSecServiceTableObj getServiceTableObj() {
return( serviceTableObj );
}
public ICFSecServiceTypeTableObj getServiceTypeTableObj() {
return( serviceTypeTableObj );
}
public ICFSecSysClusterTableObj getSysClusterTableObj() {
return( sysClusterTableObj );
}
public ICFSecTSecGroupTableObj getTSecGroupTableObj() {
return( tSecGroupTableObj );
}
public ICFSecTSecGrpIncTableObj getTSecGrpIncTableObj() {
return( tSecGrpIncTableObj );
}
public ICFSecTSecGrpMembTableObj getTSecGrpMembTableObj() {
return( tSecGrpMembTableObj );
}
public ICFSecTenantTableObj getTenantTableObj() {
return( tenantTableObj );
}
}
|
The people behind Robot Chicken, the aggressively silly stop motion animation TV show on Adult Swim, want to teach you how to animate properly.
Stoopid Buddy Stoodios, the Burbank, California-based production company, is partnering with Vimeo to launch Stoopid Buddy Film School, they announced at New York Comic Con on Thursday.
See also: 18 New TV Shows to Watch This Fall
Before you say, "thanks but no thanks," the team is serious about teaching young filmmakers about the nuts and bolts of animation. It's not easy stuff; fluid stop motion requires minute, hand-manipulated, frame-by-frame changes. To be fair, each Robot Chicken episode, which focuses heavily on nerd and pop culture, is not the smoothest stop motion you'll see.
The classes will consist of two hours of online primers, designed both as a standalone course and to augment Stoopid Buddy Stoodio's eight-week beginner and intermediate courses held inside their studios. Greg Clayman, Vimeo's general manager of audience networks, and the Robot Chicken team, including Seth Green, will discuss the series and the new animation course at the New York Comic Con panel on Thursday.
The Robot Chicken team told us a little bit about their process and background.
It takes 14 months to do 20 episodes (and a special) of Robot Chicken. "We do them all concurrently. If you use our 22-minute DC [Comics] Special as an example, it’s about 14 to 16 weeks to do just that one."
Animators have received all sorts of training. "...Whether it is just learning from home, working as interns on our production, or going to a school like CalArts. Many stop motion animators are self-taught, and there are only a handful of schools that teach stop-motion animation — even fewer that teach stop-motion character animation. The training our animation class provides will give aspiring animation professionals the tools to get animation jobs or improve their own personal films."
About 10-15 animators work on each episode.
The videos will be available later this year on demand at Vimeo.com. "Pricing for the videos will be $99.99 for a digital download or $79.99 for streaming, 30-day rental."
If you're not familiar with Stoopid Buddy Studio's handiwork, we've included a typically inappropriate clip below.
Bonus: What Is Stop Motion Animation and How Does It Work?
|
Inflation and Stabilization in Israel: Conceptual Issues and Interpretation of Developments This paper analyzes the economic program that led to the recent dramatic reduction of inflation in Israel. A distinction is drawn between the roles of temporary policy initiatives, such as wage-price controls, and more fundamental determinants of stability such as the government`s budget and the external position of the economy. Developments in the "fundamentals" are analyzed before and after the launching of the program and the performance of the transition strategy is evaluated.
|
<gh_stars>0
#include "DoubleNode.h"
#include <iostream>
using namespace std;
void DoubleNode::Act(stack<double> &s) const {s.push(value_);}
DoubleNode::~DoubleNode() {cout << "~DoubleNode" << '\n';}
|
// AUTOGENERATED FILE - DO NOT MODIFY!
// This file generated by Djinni from foo_containers.djinni
#pragma once // python_cdef_ignore
#include <stdbool.h> // python_cdef_ignore
#include <stdint.h> // python_cdef_ignore
void map_int8_t_list_date___delete(struct DjinniObjectHandle *);
void optional_map_int8_t_list_date___delete(struct DjinniOptionalObjectHandle *);
void map_int8_t_list_date_add_callback___delete(void(* ptr)(struct DjinniObjectHandle * ));
void map_int8_t_list_date_add_callback__get_value(struct DjinniObjectHandle *( * ptr)(struct DjinniObjectHandle *, int8_t));
void map_int8_t_list_date_add_callback__get_size(size_t( * ptr)(struct DjinniObjectHandle *));
void map_int8_t_list_date_add_callback__python_create(struct DjinniObjectHandle *( * ptr)());
void map_int8_t_list_date_add_callback__python_add(void( * ptr)(struct DjinniObjectHandle *, int8_t, struct DjinniObjectHandle *));
void map_int8_t_list_date_add_callback__python_next(int8_t( * ptr)(struct DjinniObjectHandle *));
|
1. Field of the Invention
This invention relates generally to semiconductor devices, and more particularly to bipolar junction transistors.
2. Description of the Prior Art
As known in the art, bipolar junction transistors (BJTs), which can be formed using a CMOS compatible process, are key parts of analog integrated circuits such as band-gap voltage reference circuits. These circuits are often sensitive to Vbe (base-emitter voltage) value and Vbe mismatch of BJT.
Unfortunately, the prior art CMOS process compatible BJT structure is not able to control Vbe value and the Vbe mismatch characteristic is unsatisfactory due to salicide non-uniformity that typically occurs at the edge of the active region. The salicide is formed in the active region to reduce the contact resistance. It has been found that salicide encroachment at the edge of the active region causes P+/N well junction leakage, thus leading to worse Vbe mismatch performance. One approach to improve salicide non-uniformity is to reduce cobalt thickness during the salicide formation. However, this approach adversely affects resistance for non-salicide resistors.
Therefore, there is a need in the industry to provide an improved structure of bipolar junction transistors, which is able to control Vbe value of the BJT and provide reduced Vbe mismatch.
|
Integrins in kidney development, function, and disease. Integrins are heterodimeric cell surface receptors that mediate heterophilic cell-cell interactions and interactions between cells and the extracellular matrix (Hynes RO. Cell 69: 11-25, 1991). As such, they are involved in morphogenetic processes during development, as well as in the maintenance of normal tissue architecture in fully developed organs. Integrins are now recognized to be a large family of receptors, and several different integrins have been demonstrated as being expressed in the developing and adult kidney (Korhonen M, Ylkanne J, Laitinen L, and Virtanen I. Development 122: 3537-3547, 1996; Rahilly MA and Fleming S. J Pathol 167: 327-334, 1992). This review will summarize present knowledge about integrin expression in the developing, normal, and diseased kidney and attempt to provide a hypothetical framework for understanding integrin function in the urogenital system. Since the last time this area was reviewed (Hamerski DA and Santoro S. Curr Opin Nephrol Hypertens 8: 9-14, 1999), there have been significant publications on the roles of integrins in kidney development and disease. At present, there are many more questions than answers, and integrins present an area where many novel and exciting findings will emerge in the coming years.
|
import { Component, OnInit } from '@angular/core';
import { FormBuilder, FormGroup, Validators } from '@angular/forms';
import { PkgResponse } from 'src/app/classes/pkg-response';
import { Token } from 'src/app/classes/token';
import { BaseComponent } from 'src/app/components/base/base.component';
import { CommonsService } from 'src/app/services/commons.service';
@Component({
selector: 'app-login',
templateUrl: './login.component.html',
styleUrls: ['./login.component.scss']
})
export class LoginComponent extends BaseComponent implements OnInit {
public frmGroup!: FormGroup;
public passVisible!: boolean;
public passType: string = "password";
constructor(public service: CommonsService, private fb: FormBuilder) {
super(service);
}
ngOnInit(): void {
this.frmGroup = this.createForm();
if(this.service.isLogged()) {
let path = "/";
setTimeout(() => this.service.Redirect(path), 1000);
}
}
createForm(): FormGroup {
return this.fb.group(
{
username: [ "", Validators.compose([Validators.required, Validators.email]) ],
password: [ "", Validators.compose([Validators.required]) ],
}
);
}
onSubmit() {
let credentials = "{ \"Username\": \"" + this.frmGroup.controls['username'].value + "\", \"Password\": \"" + this.frmGroup.controls['password'].value + "\" }";
this.frmGroup.controls['password'].setValue("");
this.service.Post("user", "login", credentials).subscribe((result: Object) => {
let pkgRespone = new PkgResponse(result);
let app: any = pkgRespone.Data;
this.service.setToken((app as Token));
location.reload();
}, (error) => {
this.HandleError(error);
}, () => {
this.service.Redirect("/");
});
}
SetPasswordVisible($event: boolean){
this.passVisible = !this.passVisible;
if(this.passVisible){
this.passType = "text";
}
else{
this.passType = "password";
}
}
}
|
# Base for a Go module.
#
# This module contains the bare bones for a Go Module. It lacks a lot of
# functionalities but defines the base classes the final version should
# have.
#
# TODO:
# - Add tests
# - Basics
# - Cross-compilation
# - Discover current architecture
# - Support all Go specific environment
# - Handle package testing
import collections
import copy
import drake
import drake.cxx
import os
import subprocess
from drake.which import which
from os import environ
from orderedset import OrderedSet
class Config:
"""
A Config represents a list of options to build a Go executables.
"""
def __init__(self, config = None):
"""
Create a Config from scrtach or from an existing configuration.
:param config: An optional configuration.
:type config: Config
"""
self.__include_paths = OrderedSet()
self.__ldflags = OrderedSet()
self.__tags = OrderedSet()
if config:
self += config
@property
def include_paths(self):
"""
Return the include paths as a list.
:return: The list of include paths
:rtype: list of str
"""
return list(self.__include_paths)
def add_include_paths(self, paths):
"""
Add include paths at the end of the current include paths.
:param paths: A list of paths
:type paths: list of str
"""
collections.deque(map(self.__include_paths.add, paths))
def add_include_path(self, path):
"""
Add an include path at the end of the current include paths.
:param path: A path
:type path: str
"""
self.add_include_paths([path])
return self
@property
def ldflags(self):
"""
Return the ldflags as a list.
:return: The list of ldflags
:rtype: list of str
"""
return list(self.__ldflags)
def add_ldflags(self, flags):
"""
Add ldflags at the end of current ldflags.
:param flags: A list of flags.
:type flags: list of str
:return: self.
"""
collections.deque(map(self.__ldflags.add, flags))
return self
def add_ldflag(self, flag):
"""
Add a single ldflag at the end of the current ldflag.
:param flag: An ldflag.
:type flag: str
:return: self
"""
return self.add_ldflags([flag])
@property
def tags(self):
"""
Return the tags as a list.
:return: The lisf of tags
:rtype: list of str
"""
return list(self.__tags)
def add_tags(self, tags):
"""
Add tags at the end of current tags.
:param flags: A list of flags.
:type flags: list of str
:return: self.
"""
collections.deque(map(self.__tags.add, tags))
return self
def add_tag(self, tag):
"""
Add a single tag at the end of the current tag.
:param flag: An tag.
:type flag: str
:return: self
"""
return self.add_tags([tag])
def __add__(self, configuration):
self.add_include_paths(configuration.include_paths)
self.add_tags(configuration.tags)
self.add_ldflags(configuration.ldflags)
return self
def hash(self):
"""
Return the hash of the Config used for dependency computation.
:return: Hash of the Config.
:rtype: dict
"""
return {
'include_paths': self.include_paths,
'tags': self.tags,
'ldflags': self.ldflags,
}
class Toolkit:
"""
A Toolkit represents an abstraction of a Go environment.
It'is designed to bind the GO* environment variables and offers a ways to get
the go command to run or directly run them.
"""
properties = ["path", "root", "os", "arch"]
def __init__(self,
tk = None,
path = None,
root = None,
os = None,
arch = None,
cxx_toolkit = drake.cxx.Toolkit()):
"""
Create a toolkit or clone an existing one.
:param tk: The toolkit to clone. If specified, other arguments must be None
:type tk: Toolkit
:param path: The home of your go environment (override GOPATH).
:type path: str
:param root: The root of your go installation (override GOROOT).
:type root: str
:param os: The target os for cross-compilation (override GOOS).
:type os: str
:param arch: The target arch for cross-compilation (override GOARCH).
:type arch: str
Example:
t = Toolkit(os = "windows", arch = "amd64")
print(t.os)
> "windows"
print(t.env)
{"GOOS": "windows", "GOARCH": "amd64"}
t2 = Toolkit(t)
print(t2.arch)
> "amd64"
"""
if isinstance(tk, Toolkit):
assert all(a is None for a in [path, root, os, arch])
return super().__init__(path = tk.path,
root = tk.root,
os = tk.os,
arch = tk.arch)
else:
self.__arch = arch
self.__go = tk or which('go')
self.__path = path
self.__os = os
self.__root = root
self.__version = None
self.__env = False
self.__cxx_toolkit = cxx_toolkit
if self.go is None:
raise Exception('go executable is undefined. Check its installation')
try:
self.run(['help'])
except FileNotFoundError:
raise Exception('go executable not found')
@property
def arch(self):
return self.__arch
@property
def go(self):
return self.__go
@property
def path(self):
if self.__path:
os.makedirs(self.__path, exist_ok = True)
return self.__path
@property
def package_path(self):
"""
Path used by `go get`.
"""
return self.__path.split(':')[0]
@property
def os(self):
return self.__os
@property
def root(self):
return self.__root
@property
def cxx_toolkit(self):
return self.__cxx_toolkit
@property
def env(self):
"""
The Go specific environment for the toolkit.
:return: The Go specific environment.
:rtype: dict
"""
if self.__env is not False:
return self.__env
self.__env = dict(os.environ)
self.__env['CGO_ENABLED'] = '1'
if self.__cxx_toolkit:
self.__env['CC'] = self.__cxx_toolkit.c
self.__env['CXX'] = self.__cxx_toolkit.cxx
for k in Toolkit.properties:
v = getattr(self, k)
if v is not None:
self.__env['GO%s' % k.upper()] = v
return self.__env
@property
def host_env(self):
exclude_env = ['GOARCH', 'GOOS']
return dict((k, v) for k, v in self.env.items() if k not in exclude_env)
def run(self, cmd, host = False):
"""
Run the given command in the toolkit environment.
:param cmd: Same as __run.
:type cmd: Same as __run.
:return: Same as __run
:rtype: Same as __run
"""
env = self.host_env if host else self.env
return subprocess.check_output([self.go] + cmd,
env = env).decode('utf-8').strip()
def platform_str(self, host = False):
vars = self.run(['env', 'GOOS', 'GOARCH'], host = host).splitlines()
return '%s_%s' % (vars[0], vars[1])
def exec_ext(self, host = False):
tos = self.run(['env', 'GOOS'], host = host)
if tos == 'windows':
return '.exe'
return ''
def dylib_ext(self, host = False):
tos = self.run(['env', 'GOOS'], host = host)
ext = {
'darwin': '.dylib',
'linux': '.so',
'windows': '.dll',
}
return ext.get(tos, '')
def staticlib_ext(self, host = False):
return '.a'
def dependencies(self, node):
"""
Return dependencies of the given go file.
:arg node: The node.
:type node: Source.
:return: Dependencies from go list -json.
:rtype: List of str
"""
assert isinstance(node, Source)
import json
if not node.path().is_file():
try:
# FIXME: is building a node during dependencies ok ?
# See drake.cxx._mkdeps for more detail.
node.build()
except drake.NoBuilder:
# If a node is found but cannot be built, let drake fail by itself.
pass
res = json.loads(self.run(['list', '-json', str(node.path())]))
deps = res['Deps']
deps.extend(res.get('TestImports', []))
return deps
@property
def version(self):
"""
Return the version of Go used.
:return: The version.
:rtype: str.
"""
import re
if self.__version is None:
self.__version = re.sub('^go version', '', self.run(['version'])).strip()
return self.__version
def hash(self):
"""
The hash of the Toolkit used for dependency computation.
:return: Hash of the Toolkit
:rtype: str
"""
return {
'version': self.version,
}
class Source(drake.Node):
"""
A specific type of drake.Node representing a Go file.
"""
def __init__(self, path):
"""
Create a Source form its path.
:param path: The path of the file.
:type path: See drake.Node.__init__
"""
super().__init__(path)
def clone(self, path):
return self.__class__(path)
# Assign ".go" files to Source automatically.
drake.Node.extensions['go'] = Source
class FetchPackage(drake.Builder):
def package_target(url, toolkit, build_host = False):
return drake.node('%s/pkg/%s/%s.a' %
(toolkit.package_path, toolkit.platform_str(build_host), url))
def __init__(self, url, toolkit, targets = [], build_host = False):
self.__targets = targets if targets else [FetchPackage.package_target(
url, toolkit, build_host)]
self.__url = url
self.__toolkit = toolkit
self.__build_host = build_host
super().__init__([], self.__targets)
def command(self):
# Check dependency that can be fetched, i.e.: is URL.
if '/' not in self.__url or '.' not in self.__url.split('/')[0]:
raise Exception('Unable to fetch dependency, %s not a URL' % self.__url)
if not self.__toolkit.path:
raise Exception('Automatic dependency fetching failed, '
'require a toolkit GOPATH')
return [self.__toolkit.go, 'get', self.__url]
def execute(self):
env = self.__toolkit.host_env if self.__build_host else self.__toolkit.env
cmd = self.command()
res = self.cmd('Fetch %s' % self.__url, cmd, env = env)
return res
def hash(self):
return {
'toolkit': self.__toolkit.hash(),
}
def __str__(self):
return 'Fetch Go package %s' % self.__url
class Builder(drake.Builder):
"""
Builder to transform a Go source to an Executable using the given Toolkit and
Config.
Example:
Builder(
Source("main.go"),
Toolkit(),
Config(),
Executable("bin/exe", create_builder = False));
# or, simpler
Executable(Source("main.go"), Toolkit(), Config())
"""
def __init__(self, node, toolkit, config, target, dependencies,
is_test = False, build_host = False):
"""
Create a Builder from a Source, a Toolkit and a Config that creates
a Executable.
:param node: A Source.
:type node: Source
:param toolkit: The Toolkit to use.
:type toolkit: Toolkit
:param config: The configuration to use.
:type config: Config
:param target: The target Executable to be build
:type target: Executable
:param is_test: If the executable is a test
:type is_test: bool
"""
assert isinstance(node, Source)
self.__source = node
self.__target = target
self.__toolkit = toolkit
self.__config = config
self.__dependencies = dependencies
self.__url_dependencies = \
list(filter(lambda d: '/' in d and '.' in d.split('/')[0],
toolkit.dependencies(node)))
for d in self.__url_dependencies:
target = FetchPackage.package_target(d, toolkit, build_host)
if not target.builder:
FetchPackage(d, toolkit, build_host = build_host)
self.__dependencies.append(target)
self.__is_test = is_test
self.__build_host = build_host
super().__init__(self.__dependencies + [node], [self.__target])
def dependencies(self):
return self.__dependencies + [self.__source]
def command(self):
"""
Return the command build for the given config, source and target.
:return: The command to execute.
:rtype: list of str.
"""
res = [
self.__toolkit.go,
'test' if self.__is_test else 'build',
'-o', str(self.__target.path()),
]
if self.__is_test:
res.append('-c')
if len(self.__config.tags):
res += [
'-tags', ' '.join(self.__config.tags),
]
if len(self.__config.ldflags):
res += [
'-ldflags', ' '.join(self.__config.ldflags),
]
res.append(str(self.__source.path()))
return res
def execute(self):
"""
Generate the target by fetching its dependencies and then running the build
command with the correct local include path.
:return: Whether the build was successful.
:rtype: bool
"""
env = self.__toolkit.host_env if self.__build_host else self.__toolkit.env
cmd = self.command()
# Add the include paths to GOPATH so that Go can find dependencies.
if self.__config.include_paths:
include_paths = list(self.__config.include_paths)
if self.__toolkit.path:
include_paths.insert(0, self.__toolkit.path)
env['GOPATH'] = ':'.join(map(lambda p: os.path.abspath(str(p)),
include_paths))
return self.cmd('Generate %s' % self.__target,
cmd,
env = env)
def hash(self):
"""
Return an unique identifier for the builder.
:return: An unique identifier
:rtype: str
"""
return {
'toolkit': self.__toolkit.hash(),
'config': self.__config.hash(),
}
def __str__(self):
return 'Go build %s' % self.__target
class LibraryBuilder(drake.Builder):
def __init__(self, node, toolkit, config, target, dependencies, lib_type,
header = None, build_host = False):
assert isinstance(node, Source)
self.__source = node
self.__target = target
self._toolkit = toolkit
self.__config = config
self.__dependencies = dependencies
self.__url_dependencies = \
list(filter(lambda d: '/' in d and '.' in d.split('/')[0],
toolkit.dependencies(node)))
for d in self.__url_dependencies:
t = FetchPackage.package_target(d, toolkit, build_host)
if not t.builder:
FetchPackage(d, toolkit, build_host = build_host)
self.__dependencies.append(t)
self.__type = lib_type
self.__build_host = build_host
targets = [self.__target]
if header:
targets.append(header)
super().__init__(self.__dependencies + [node], targets)
def command(self):
res = [
self._toolkit.go,
'build',
'-buildmode=%s' % self.__type,
'-o', str(self.__target),
]
if len(self.__config.tags):
res += ['-tags', ' '.join(self.__config.tags)]
ldflags = list(self.__config.ldflags)
# Set the soname on linux.
# On macOS, this operation is done later.
# Fixme: Find a better condition.
if self._toolkit.cxx_toolkit.os is drake.os.linux and \
not isinstance(self.__target, Executable):
ldflags.append(
'-extldflags -Wl,-soname,%s' % self.__target.name().basename())
if len(ldflags):
res += ['-ldflags', ' '.join(ldflags)]
res.append(str(self.__source.path()))
return res
def execute(self):
cmd = self.command()
env = self._toolkit.host_env if self.__build_host else self._toolkit.env
# Add the include paths to GOPATH so that Go can find dependencies.
if self.__config.include_paths:
include_paths = list(self.__config.include_paths)
if self._toolkit.path:
include_paths.insert(0, self._toolkit.path)
env['GOPATH'] = ':'.join(map(lambda p: os.path.abspath(str(p)),
include_paths))
return self.cmd('Generate %s' % self.__target, cmd, env = env)
def hash(self):
return {
'toolkit': self._toolkit.hash(),
'config': self.__config.hash(),
}
def __str__(self):
return 'Go library %s' % self.__target
class Executable(drake.Node):
"""
A specific type of drake.Node representing an executable build from a Go
Source.
By default, it creates the Builder to build itself.
Example:
Executable(Source("main.go"), Toolkit(), Config())
"""
def __init__(self, source, toolkit = None, config = None, target = None,
sources = [], create_builder = True, build_host = False):
"""
Create an Executable from a given Source, Toolkit and Config.
:param source: The source for the Executable
:type source: Source
:param toolkit: The Toolkit to use.
:type toolkit: Toolkit
:param config: The configuration to use.
:type config: Config
:param sources: list of sources the executable depends on
:type sources: list of nodes
:param create_builder: Whether if the Builder should be declared.
:type create_builder: bool
:param build_host: Build for host architecture and OS.
:type build_host: bool
"""
self.__toolkit = toolkit
target = target or '%s%s' % (source.name().without_last_extension(),
self.__toolkit.exec_ext(build_host))
super().__init__(target)
if create_builder:
Builder(node = source, toolkit = toolkit, config = config, target = self,
dependencies = sources, build_host = build_host)
else:
if toolkit:
print("toolkit argument for %s was ignored" % self)
if config:
print("config argument for %s was ignored" % self)
class TestExecutable(drake.Node):
def __init__(self, source, toolkit = None, config = None, target = None,
sources = [], build_host = False):
target = target or '%s%s' % (source.name().without_last_extension(),
self.__toolkit.exec_ext(build_host))
super().__init__(target)
Builder(node = source, toolkit = toolkit, config = config, target = self,
dependencies = sources, is_test = True, build_host = build_host)
class CDyLibBuilder(LibraryBuilder):
def __init__(self, source, toolkit = None, config = None, target = None,
sources = [], build_host = False):
self.__library = drake.node(
target or '%s%s' % (source.name().without_last_extension(),
toolkit.dylib_ext(build_host)))
self.__header = drake.node('%s.h' % target.split('.')[0])
super().__init__(
node = source, toolkit = toolkit, config = config,
target = self.__library, dependencies = sources, lib_type = 'c-shared',
header = self.__header, build_host = build_host)
@property
def header(self):
return self.__header
@property
def library(self):
return self.__library
def execute(self):
if not super().execute():
return False
path = self.library.path()
if '.dylib' in str(path.basename()):
cmd = ['install_name_tool', '-id', '@rpath/%s' % path.basename(), path]
return self.cmd('Set Go library ID %s' % self.library, cmd)
elif self._toolkit.cxx_toolkit.os is not drake.os.windows:
cmd = self._toolkit.cxx_toolkit.rpath_set_command(path, '.')
return self.cmd('Fix rpath for %s' % self.library, cmd)
class CStaticLibBuilder(LibraryBuilder):
def __init__(self, source, toolkit = None, config = None, target = None,
sources = [], build_host = False):
self.__library = drake.node(
target or '%s%s' % (source.name().without_last_extension(),
toolkit.staticlib_ext(build_host)))
self.__header = drake.node('%s.h' % target.split('.')[0])
super().__init__(
node = source, toolkit = toolkit, config = config,
target = self.__library, dependencies = sources, lib_type = 'c-archive',
header = self.__header, build_host = build_host)
@property
def header(self):
return self.__header
@property
def library(self):
return self.__library
|
Using Facebook groups to support social presence in online learning ABSTRACT Building interpersonal connections in asynchronous online learning is important, but it is harder to achieve compared to face-to-face learning experiences due to its mostly text-based nature. Facebook is a popular social media platform and has been used as an outside-class communication space in formal learning contexts to supplement cognitive and affective aspects of learning. In this study, we used Facebook groups as supplemental social spaces in two asynchronous online masters-level courses to understand if it impacted students perceptions of social presence (i.e., copresence, immediacy, and intimacy), learning interaction with faculty and peers, as well as sociability of the online learning environment. The results indicated that students felt more positively about social presence and learning interactions with other classmates and their instructor and perceived the course as having more sociability after they joined the class Facebook group. Findings have implications for supporting social impression formation in online learning.
|
// LockingFlock enables flock-based (BSD) locking. This is mostly
// useful for distributed filesystems with global locking. Without
// this, kernel manages local locking automatically.
func LockingFlock() MountOption {
return func(conf *mountConfig) error {
conf.initFlags |= InitFlockLocks
return nil
}
}
|
#include "createaccountwidget.h"
#include "ui_createaccountwidget.h"
#include "walletmodel.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "wallet.h"
#include "walletmodel.h"
#include "addresstablemodel.h"
#include <QMessageBox>
CreateAccountWidget::CreateAccountWidget(QWidget *parent) :
QFrame(parent),
ui(new Ui::CreateAccountWidget)
{
ui->setupUi(this);
ui->account_create_button->setEnabled(false);
connect(ui->account_name_value,SIGNAL(textChanged(QString)),this,SLOT(accountLabelChanged(QString)));
connect(ui->account_create_button,SIGNAL(pressed()),this,SLOT(createAccount()));
connect(ui->account_cancel_button,SIGNAL(pressed()),this,SIGNAL(cancelAccountCreation()));
}
CreateAccountWidget::~CreateAccountWidget()
{
delete ui;
}
void CreateAccountWidget::setModel(WalletModel *model_)
{
model = model_;
}
void CreateAccountWidget::accountLabelChanged(const QString& newAccountLabel)
{
ui->account_address_value->setText("");
if(ui->account_name_value->text() == "")
{
ui->account_create_button->setEnabled(false);
}
else
{
ui->account_create_button->setEnabled(true);
}
}
void CreateAccountWidget::createAccount()
{
QString accountName = ui->account_name_value->text();
if(accountName == "")
return;
if(!model->getAddressTableModel()->addressForLabel(accountName).isEmpty())
{
QMessageBox::warning(this, tr("Error"), tr("An account with this name already exists."), QMessageBox::Ok);
return;
}
WalletModel::UnlockContext ctx(model->requestUnlock());
{
try
{
CPubKey key = model->getWallet()->GenerateNewKey();
QString strAddress = CBitcoinAddress(key.GetID()).ToString().c_str();
ui->account_address_value->setText(strAddress);
model->getWallet()->SetAddressBookName(CBitcoinAddress(key.GetID()).Get(), accountName.toStdString());
ui->account_create_button->setEnabled(false);
QMessageBox::information(this, tr("Digital PandaBank account created"), tr("Your Digital PandaBank Account has been created."), QMessageBox::Ok);
}
catch(...)
{
QMessageBox::warning(this, tr("Error"), tr("Error creating Digital PandaBank account."), QMessageBox::Ok);
}
}
}
|
A discriminative learning technique for mobile landmark recognition This paper proposes a discriminative learning bags-of-words (BoW) approach for mobile landmark recognition at patch and image levels. Conventional methods often treat the local patches and images equally important for recognition and do not differentiate their different importance. Although there exist several works that consider the patches' discrimination information, they mainly focus on which patches are to be retained for training and do not incorporate this information when generating the BoW histograms. In view of this, this paper proposes to learn the discriminative information for each landmark category at two levels: local patches and images. At patch level, the patches' discrimination information for each landmark is first discovered using an iterative learning approach. This information is then incorporated into the quantization process to generate the BoW histogram. At image level, the different importance of training images is estimated through a non-parametric density estimator. Finally, fuzzy SVM is used to train the classifier for each category. Experimental results on a landmark database consisting of 3622 training images and 534 testing images show that the proposed method is effective in mobile landmark recognition.
|
. BACKGROUND Atopic dermatitis (atopic eczema) is one of those diseases where homeopaths claim to have good success although this has never been proven by rigorously controlled trials. METHODS Single-centre, randomised, double-blind clinical trial comparing homeopathic remedies with placebo in young adults (age 18-35) with atopic dermatitis. Homeopathic remedies were individually administered according to the rules of classical homeopathy. After an untreated baseline period of 4 weeks, all patients were treated and monitored for 32 weeks. Throughout the study, co-medication was allowed only with indifferent emollients. The main outcome parameter was disease severity as assessed by Costa and Saurat's multi-parameter atopic dermatitis score (MP-score). RESULTS 744 patients were screened out of which 24 (10 verum, 14 placebo) were randomised and analysed. Treatment groups were balanced in most baseline parameters but MP-scores were significantly higher in verum patients (p = 0.034, t-test). 10 patients (5 per group) dropped out of the study, mainly because the treatment was perceived as ineffective and co-medication was needed. The MP-score decreased from 54.5 +/- 11.0 to 40.7 +/- 12.5 in the verum group and from 45.9 +/- 7.6 to 32.7 +/- 21.8 in the placebo group, resulting in a non-significant group difference of 5.6 in favour of placebo (CI: -9.0 to 20.2; p = 0.46; ANCOVA). No secondary parameter (quality of life, coping, global assessments of treatment success) showed significant differences between groups (all p > 0.15). CONCLUSIONS In this study, individualised homeopathic remedies did not prove to be superior to placebo in atopic dermatitis. Yet, generalisability of results is limited due to the small number of patients and the high percentage of ineligible patients.
|
Contrary to the popular cliché, "Not tonight, I have a headache," new research suggests that not all headache sufferers avoid sexual activity. In fact, migraine sufferers reported higher levels of sexual desire than those with other types of headaches, according to researchers from Wake Forest University School of Medicine and colleagues.
"Our study suggests that sexual desire and migraine headaches may be influenced by the same brain chemical," said Timothy Houle, Ph.D., lead author and research assistant professor of anesthesiology. "The results support the idea that migraine, as a syndrome, is associated with other common phenomena. Understanding of this link will help us to better understand the nature of migraine and perhaps lead to improved treatment."
The research, involving 68 young adults from Chicago, will appear in an upcoming issue of Headache, published by the American Headache Society, and already is available on line.
The objective of the study was to examine the relationship between migraine headache and self-reported sexual desire. There is evidence of a complex relationship between sexual activity and headache. Both sexual desire and migraine headache have been linked to levels of serotonin, a brain chemical that also plays a role in depression. An excess of serotonin may be associated with decreased libido, and migraine sufferers are reported to have low system levels of the brain chemical. Serotonin has also been found to play a role in migraine attacks.
"Considering the circumstantial evidence linking both migraine and sexual desire to serotonin, we wanted to explore whether the two phenomena are actually related," said Houle.
The researchers hypothesized that abnormalities in the serotonin systems of migraine sufferers may influence their sexual desire. Because high levels of serotonin are associated with low sexual desire, and migraine sufferers have low levels of the chemical, it was predicted that they would report higher levels of sex drive.
The study involved 68 participants who reported having at least 10 headaches a year. Their mean age was 24 years. Participants underwent interviews to diagnose their headache type -- either migraine or tension -- and filled out a 14-item questionnaire to measure sexual desire.
Males reported levels of sexual desire that were 24 percent higher than females. Migraine sufferers reported levels of sexual desire that were 20 percent higher than those suffering from tension headaches. Females with migraines had levels of sexual desire similar to males who had tension headaches.
"The study demonstrated that migraine patients in general may experience higher levels of sexual desire than others," said Houle. "They appeared to be aware of this, rating their sex drive as being higher than others their age and gender."
He said the results suggest that a serotonin link may be implicated in both migraine headaches and sexual desire.
"This opens the door to consider other phenomena that have a similar neurochemical basis," he said. For example, there is an increased prevalence of depression in people with migraine, which is also theorized to be modulated by serotonin.
Houle said future research should focus on whether a cluster of migraine characteristics or symptoms can serve as markers of an altered serotonin system. Although the current study was not able to address whether the link may apply to middle-age or older adults with migraines, Houle said the finding appears to be quite general and is likely to be found in older patients as well.
Co-researchers were Lara K. Dhingra, Ph.D., from Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, Thomas A. Remble, M.A., from Rush University Medical Center, Lori A. Rokicki, Ph.D., in private practice in Toledo, Ohio, and Donald B. Penzien, Ph.D., from the University of Mississippi Medical Center.
|
Research on Kalman Particle Filter-Based Tracking Algorithm In the application of computer vision technique, target tracking in image sequences was an important research subject. This paper describes the particle filter and introduces a tracking algorithm based on Kalman particle filter. The algorithm improves the traditional particle filter, whose non-linear and non-Gaussian may result in non-robustness of tracking process. Kalman particle filter use kalman filter to predict the particles state and generate the proposal distribution, the state of each particle evolved by the Kalman prediction equations and update equations, increasing the robustness of tracking. Experimental results show that the proposed method in comparison with the traditional particle filtering can be more accurate on tracking and ensure the robustness of performance in a complex environment.
|
<reponame>Drudenhaus/ctci
package MyLibrary;
import java.util.LinkedList;
public class Graph
{
public LinkedList<GraphVertex> vertices;
public Graph()
{
this.vertices = new LinkedList<GraphVertex>();
}
public void addVertex(GraphVertex newNode)
{
this.vertices.add(newNode);
}
public void addEdge(GraphVertex parent, GraphVertex successor)
{
parent.addSuccessor(successor);
}
}
|
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