According to [Wikipedia's page on probability interpretations](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Probability_interpretations#Logical,_epistemic,_and_inductive_probability)...

> 
> Logical probabilities are conceived (for example in Keynes' Treatise
> on Probability) to be objective, logical relations between
> propositions (or sentences), and hence not to depend in any way upon
> belief. They are degrees of (partial) entailment, or degrees of
> logical consequence, not degrees of belief.
> 
> 
> 

Why, then, would the logical interpretation of probability (especially Keynes' version) be considered epistemic rather than objective? It seems to be based on logical relations which hold in a mind-independent sense.

The article continues...

> 
> Frank P. Ramsey, on the other hand, was skeptical about the existence
> of such objective logical relations and argued that (evidential)
> probability is "the logic of partial belief". (p 157) In other words,
> Ramsey held that epistemic probabilities simply are degrees of
> rational belief, rather than being logical relations that merely
> constrain degrees of rational belief.
> 
> 
> 

This does seem to be genuinely epistemic, but it's not clear how it differs from the Bayesian interpretation of probability, aside from not explicitly referencing Bayes' Theorem as the decider of rational belief.

How does the logical interpretation of probability stand as its own epistemic interpretation, rather than being partly objective and partly subsumed into the Bayesian interpretation?