To the extent that I understand him, Frankfurt says that we choose "out of our free will" when that first-order desire becomes effective which corresponds to the second-order volition (when I wish X as I also wish to *effectively* wish X); Frankfurt, *Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person*.

So if I come to find as my only first-order desire to do X, while my higher-order volition is to come to effectively not want to do X, I am not deciding of my free will. E.g., if I wish to injure the puppy, but I do not wish to (effectively) wish to injure the puppy, I am not choosing out of my free will.

Famously, Frankfurt has also discussed *moral responsibility*. But how does his proposal for decisions made out of free will relate to moral responsibility? If I effectively wish to harm the puppy, but do not wish to effectively wish to harm the puppy, my decision comes not out of free will, correct? Am I - according to Frankfurt - still responsible for harming the puppy, even as I am not doing it out of free will? Does Frankfurt thus strictly dissociate free will and moral responsibility?