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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2017-5335 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | PARTIAL | 5.0 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 7.5 | HIGH | 3.9 | 3.6 | nan | [{'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201702-04', 'name': 'GLSA-201702-04', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://gnutls.org/security.html#GNUTLS-SA-2017-2', 'name': 'https://gnutls.org/security.html#GNUTLS-SA-2017-2', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/commit/49be4f7b82eba2363bb8d4090950dad976a77a3a', 'name': 'https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/commit/49be4f7b82eba2363bb8d4090950dad976a77a3a', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=337', 'name': 'https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=337', 'refsource': 'MISC', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1037576', 'name': '1037576', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/95374', 'name': '95374', 'refsource': 'BID', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/01/11/4', 'name': '[oss-security] 20170110 Re: CVE request: two advisories for GnuTLS GNUTLS-SA-2017-1, GNUTLS-SA-2017-2, fixed in 3.3.26, 3.5.8', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/01/10/7', 'name': '[oss-security] 20170110 CVE request: two advisories for GnuTLS GNUTLS-SA-2017-1, GNUTLS-SA-2017-2, fixed in 3.3.26, 3.5.8', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2017-02/msg00005.html', 'name': 'openSUSE-SU-2017:0386', 'refsource': 'SUSE', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:2292', 'name': 'RHSA-2017:2292', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0574.html', 'name': 'RHSA-2017:0574', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:opensuse:leap:42.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:opensuse:leap:42.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:gnu:gnutls:3.5.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:gnu:gnutls:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '3.3.25', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:gnu:gnutls:3.5.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:gnu:gnutls:3.5.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:gnu:gnutls:3.5.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:gnu:gnutls:3.5.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:gnu:gnutls:3.5.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:gnu:gnutls:3.5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:gnu:gnutls:3.5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The stream reading functions in lib/opencdk/read-packet.c in GnuTLS before 3.3.26 and 3.5.x before 3.5.8 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-memory error and crash) via a crafted OpenPGP certificate.'}] | 2018-10-30T16:27Z | 2017-03-24T15:59Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos | 2017-01-04 15:22:13+01:00 | opencdk: added error checking in the stream reading functions
This addresses an out of memory error. Issue found using oss-fuzz:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=337
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <[email protected]> | 49be4f7b82eba2363bb8d4090950dad976a77a3a | False | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | gnutls | visit repo url | visit repo url | read_old_length | read_old_length( cdk_stream_t inp , int ctb , size_t * r_len , size_t * r_size) | ['inp', 'ctb', 'r_len', 'r_size'] | read_old_length(cdk_stream_t inp, int ctb, size_t * r_len, size_t * r_size)
{
int llen = ctb & 0x03;
if (llen == 0) {
*r_len = cdk_stream_getc(inp);
(*r_size)++;
} else if (llen == 1) {
*r_len = read_16(inp);
(*r_size) += 2;
} else if (llen == 2) {
*r_len = read_32(inp);
(*r_size) += 4;
} else {
*r_len = 0;
*r_size = 0;
}
} | 108 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-5335 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | PARTIAL | 5.0 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 7.5 | HIGH | 3.9 | 3.6 | nan | [{'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201702-04', 'name': 'GLSA-201702-04', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://gnutls.org/security.html#GNUTLS-SA-2017-2', 'name': 'https://gnutls.org/security.html#GNUTLS-SA-2017-2', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/commit/49be4f7b82eba2363bb8d4090950dad976a77a3a', 'name': 'https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/commit/49be4f7b82eba2363bb8d4090950dad976a77a3a', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=337', 'name': 'https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=337', 'refsource': 'MISC', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1037576', 'name': '1037576', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/95374', 'name': '95374', 'refsource': 'BID', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/01/11/4', 'name': '[oss-security] 20170110 Re: CVE request: two advisories for GnuTLS GNUTLS-SA-2017-1, GNUTLS-SA-2017-2, fixed in 3.3.26, 3.5.8', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/01/10/7', 'name': '[oss-security] 20170110 CVE request: two advisories for GnuTLS GNUTLS-SA-2017-1, GNUTLS-SA-2017-2, fixed in 3.3.26, 3.5.8', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2017-02/msg00005.html', 'name': 'openSUSE-SU-2017:0386', 'refsource': 'SUSE', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:2292', 'name': 'RHSA-2017:2292', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0574.html', 'name': 'RHSA-2017:0574', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:opensuse:leap:42.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:opensuse:leap:42.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:gnu:gnutls:3.5.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:gnu:gnutls:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '3.3.25', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:gnu:gnutls:3.5.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:gnu:gnutls:3.5.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:gnu:gnutls:3.5.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:gnu:gnutls:3.5.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:gnu:gnutls:3.5.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:gnu:gnutls:3.5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:gnu:gnutls:3.5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The stream reading functions in lib/opencdk/read-packet.c in GnuTLS before 3.3.26 and 3.5.x before 3.5.8 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-memory error and crash) via a crafted OpenPGP certificate.'}] | 2018-10-30T16:27Z | 2017-03-24T15:59Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos | 2017-01-04 15:22:13+01:00 | opencdk: added error checking in the stream reading functions
This addresses an out of memory error. Issue found using oss-fuzz:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=337
Signed-off-by: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <[email protected]> | 49be4f7b82eba2363bb8d4090950dad976a77a3a | False | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | gnutls | visit repo url | visit repo url | read_subpkt | read_subpkt( cdk_stream_t inp , cdk_subpkt_t * r_ctx , size_t * r_nbytes) | ['inp', 'r_ctx', 'r_nbytes'] | read_subpkt(cdk_stream_t inp, cdk_subpkt_t * r_ctx, size_t * r_nbytes)
{
byte c, c1;
size_t size, nread, n;
cdk_subpkt_t node;
cdk_error_t rc;
if (!inp || !r_nbytes)
return CDK_Inv_Value;
if (DEBUG_PKT)
_gnutls_write_log("read_subpkt:\n");
n = 0;
*r_nbytes = 0;
c = cdk_stream_getc(inp);
n++;
if (c == 255) {
size = read_32(inp);
n += 4;
} else if (c >= 192 && c < 255) {
c1 = cdk_stream_getc(inp);
n++;
if (c1 == 0)
return 0;
size = ((c - 192) << 8) + c1 + 192;
} else if (c < 192)
size = c;
else
return CDK_Inv_Packet;
node = cdk_subpkt_new(size);
if (!node)
return CDK_Out_Of_Core;
node->size = size;
node->type = cdk_stream_getc(inp);
if (DEBUG_PKT)
_gnutls_write_log(" %d octets %d type\n", node->size,
node->type);
n++;
node->size--;
rc = stream_read(inp, node->d, node->size, &nread);
n += nread;
if (rc) {
cdk_subpkt_free(node);
return rc;
}
*r_nbytes = n;
if (!*r_ctx)
*r_ctx = node;
else
cdk_subpkt_add(*r_ctx, node);
return rc;
} | 274 | True | 1 |
CVE-2014-8321 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 4.6 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 7.8 | HIGH | 1.8 | 5.9 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/aircrack-ng/aircrack-ng/pull/13', 'name': 'https://github.com/aircrack-ng/aircrack-ng/pull/13', 'refsource': 'MISC', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/128943/Aircrack-ng-1.2-Beta-3-DoS-Code-Execution.html', 'name': 'http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/128943/Aircrack-ng-1.2-Beta-3-DoS-Code-Execution.html', 'refsource': 'MISC', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/aircrack-ng/aircrack-ng/commit/ff70494dd389ba570dbdbf36f217c28d4381c6b5/', 'name': 'https://github.com/aircrack-ng/aircrack-ng/commit/ff70494dd389ba570dbdbf36f217c28d4381c6b5/', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://aircrack-ng.blogspot.com/2014/10/aircrack-ng-12-release-candidate-1.html', 'name': 'http://aircrack-ng.blogspot.com/2014/10/aircrack-ng-12-release-candidate-1.html', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Product', 'Release Notes', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/98458', 'name': 'https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/98458', 'refsource': 'MISC', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-787'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:aircrack-ng:aircrack-ng:1.2:beta2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:aircrack-ng:aircrack-ng:1.2:beta3:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:aircrack-ng:aircrack-ng:1.2:beta1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:aircrack-ng:aircrack-ng:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '1.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Stack-based buffer overflow in the gps_tracker function in airodump-ng.c in Aircrack-ng before 1.2 RC 1 allows local users to execute arbitrary code or gain privileges via unspecified vectors.'}] | 2020-02-05T20:30Z | 2020-01-31T22:15Z | Out-of-bounds Write | The software writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can result in corruption of data, a crash, or code execution. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent write operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/787.html | 0 | Thomas d'Otreppe | 2014-10-03 01:51:21+00:00 | Airodump-ng: Fixed GPS stack overflow (Closes #13 on GitHub).
git-svn-id: http://svn.aircrack-ng.org/trunk@2416 28c6078b-6c39-48e3-add9-af49d547ecab | ff70494dd389ba570dbdbf36f217c28d4381c6b5 | False | aircrack-ng/aircrack-ng | WiFi security auditing tools suite | 2018-03-10 17:11:11 | 2022-08-14 03:59:05 | https://aircrack-ng.org | aircrack-ng | 3204.0 | 703.0 | gps_tracker | gps_tracker( void) | ['void'] | void gps_tracker( void )
{
ssize_t unused;
int gpsd_sock;
char line[256], *temp;
struct sockaddr_in gpsd_addr;
int ret, is_json, pos;
fd_set read_fd;
struct timeval timeout;
/* attempt to connect to localhost, port 2947 */
pos = 0;
gpsd_sock = socket( AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0 );
if( gpsd_sock < 0 ) {
return;
}
gpsd_addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
gpsd_addr.sin_port = htons( 2947 );
gpsd_addr.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr( "127.0.0.1" );
if( connect( gpsd_sock, (struct sockaddr *) &gpsd_addr,
sizeof( gpsd_addr ) ) < 0 ) {
return;
}
// Check if it's GPSd < 2.92 or the new one
// 2.92+ immediately send stuff
// < 2.92 requires to send PVTAD command
FD_ZERO(&read_fd);
FD_SET(gpsd_sock, &read_fd);
timeout.tv_sec = 1;
timeout.tv_usec = 0;
is_json = select(gpsd_sock + 1, &read_fd, NULL, NULL, &timeout);
if (is_json) {
/*
{"class":"VERSION","release":"2.95","rev":"2010-11-16T21:12:35","proto_major":3,"proto_minor":3}
?WATCH={"json":true};
{"class":"DEVICES","devices":[]}
*/
// Get the crap and ignore it: {"class":"VERSION","release":"2.95","rev":"2010-11-16T21:12:35","proto_major":3,"proto_minor":3}
if( recv( gpsd_sock, line, sizeof( line ) - 1, 0 ) <= 0 )
return;
is_json = (line[0] == '{');
if (is_json) {
// Send ?WATCH={"json":true};
memset( line, 0, sizeof( line ) );
strcpy(line, "?WATCH={\"json\":true};\n");
if( send( gpsd_sock, line, 22, 0 ) != 22 )
return;
// Check that we have devices
memset(line, 0, sizeof(line));
if( recv( gpsd_sock, line, sizeof( line ) - 1, 0 ) <= 0 )
return;
// Stop processing if there is no device
if (strncmp(line, "{\"class\":\"DEVICES\",\"devices\":[]}", 32) == 0) {
close(gpsd_sock);
return;
} else {
pos = strlen(line);
}
}
}
/* loop reading the GPS coordinates */
while( G.do_exit == 0 )
{
usleep( 500000 );
memset( G.gps_loc, 0, sizeof( float ) * 5 );
/* read position, speed, heading, altitude */
if (is_json) {
// Format definition: http://catb.org/gpsd/gpsd_json.html
if (pos == sizeof( line )) {
memset(line, 0, sizeof(line));
pos = 0;
}
// New version, JSON
if( recv( gpsd_sock, line + pos, sizeof( line ) - 1, 0 ) <= 0 )
return;
// search for TPV class: {"class":"TPV"
temp = strstr(line, "{\"class\":\"TPV\"");
if (temp == NULL) {
continue;
}
// Make sure the data we have is complete
if (strchr(temp, '}') == NULL) {
// Move the data at the beginning of the buffer;
pos = strlen(temp);
if (temp != line) {
memmove(line, temp, pos);
memset(line + pos, 0, sizeof(line) - pos);
}
}
// Example line: {"class":"TPV","tag":"MID2","device":"/dev/ttyUSB0","time":1350957517.000,"ept":0.005,"lat":46.878936576,"lon":-115.832602964,"alt":1968.382,"track":0.0000,"speed":0.000,"climb":0.000,"mode":3}
// Latitude
temp = strstr(temp, "\"lat\":");
if (temp == NULL) {
continue;
}
ret = sscanf(temp + 6, "%f", &G.gps_loc[0]);
// Longitude
temp = strstr(temp, "\"lon\":");
if (temp == NULL) {
continue;
}
ret = sscanf(temp + 6, "%f", &G.gps_loc[1]);
// Altitude
temp = strstr(temp, "\"alt\":");
if (temp == NULL) {
continue;
}
ret = sscanf(temp + 6, "%f", &G.gps_loc[4]);
// Speed
temp = strstr(temp, "\"speed\":");
if (temp == NULL) {
continue;
}
ret = sscanf(temp + 6, "%f", &G.gps_loc[2]);
// No more heading
// Get the next TPV class
temp = strstr(temp, "{\"class\":\"TPV\"");
if (temp == NULL) {
memset( line, 0, sizeof( line ) );
pos = 0;
} else {
pos = strlen(temp);
memmove(line, temp, pos);
memset(line + pos, 0, sizeof(line) - pos);
}
} else {
memset( line, 0, sizeof( line ) );
snprintf( line, sizeof( line ) - 1, "PVTAD\r\n" );
if( send( gpsd_sock, line, 7, 0 ) != 7 )
return;
memset( line, 0, sizeof( line ) );
if( recv( gpsd_sock, line, sizeof( line ) - 1, 0 ) <= 0 )
return;
if( memcmp( line, "GPSD,P=", 7 ) != 0 )
continue;
/* make sure the coordinates are present */
if( line[7] == '?' )
continue;
ret = sscanf( line + 7, "%f %f", &G.gps_loc[0], &G.gps_loc[1] );
if( ( temp = strstr( line, "V=" ) ) == NULL ) continue;
ret = sscanf( temp + 2, "%f", &G.gps_loc[2] ); /* speed */
if( ( temp = strstr( line, "T=" ) ) == NULL ) continue;
ret = sscanf( temp + 2, "%f", &G.gps_loc[3] ); /* heading */
if( ( temp = strstr( line, "A=" ) ) == NULL ) continue;
ret = sscanf( temp + 2, "%f", &G.gps_loc[4] ); /* altitude */
}
if (G.record_data)
fputs( line, G.f_gps );
G.save_gps = 1;
if (G.do_exit == 0)
{
unused = write( G.gc_pipe[1], G.gps_loc, sizeof( float ) * 5 );
kill( getppid(), SIGUSR2 );
}
}
} | 992 | True | 1 |
CVE-2014-8324 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | PARTIAL | 5.0 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 7.5 | HIGH | 3.9 | 3.6 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/aircrack-ng/aircrack-ng/commit/88702a3ce4c28a973bf69023cd0312f412f6193e', 'name': 'https://github.com/aircrack-ng/aircrack-ng/commit/88702a3ce4c28a973bf69023cd0312f412f6193e', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1159812', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1159812', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-201411-08.xml', 'name': 'GLSA-201411-08', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/128943/Aircrack-ng-1.2-Beta-3-DoS-Code-Execution.html', 'name': 'http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/128943/Aircrack-ng-1.2-Beta-3-DoS-Code-Execution.html', 'refsource': 'MISC', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2014-November/143606.html', 'name': 'FEDORA-2014-14233', 'refsource': 'FEDORA', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2014-November/143595.html', 'name': 'FEDORA-2014-14247', 'refsource': 'FEDORA', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2014-November/143216.html', 'name': 'FEDORA-2014-14283', 'refsource': 'FEDORA', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://aircrack-ng.blogspot.com/2014/10/aircrack-ng-12-release-candidate-1.html', 'name': 'http://aircrack-ng.blogspot.com/2014/10/aircrack-ng-12-release-candidate-1.html', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/533869/100/0/threaded', 'name': '20141101 Aircrack-ng 1.2 Beta 3" multiple vulnerabilities', 'refsource': 'BUGTRAQ', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-20'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:aircrack-ng:aircrack-ng:*:beta2:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '1.2', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'network.c in Aircrack-ng before 1.2 Beta 3 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault) via a response with a crafted length parameter.'}] | 2018-10-09T19:53Z | 2017-10-17T14:29Z | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does
not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the
properties that are required to process the data safely and
correctly. |
Input validation is a frequently-used technique
for checking potentially dangerous inputs in order to
ensure that the inputs are safe for processing within the
code, or when communicating with other components. When
software does not validate input properly, an attacker is
able to craft the input in a form that is not expected by
the rest of the application. This will lead to parts of the
system receiving unintended input, which may result in
altered control flow, arbitrary control of a resource, or
arbitrary code execution.
Input validation is not the only technique for
processing input, however. Other techniques attempt to
transform potentially-dangerous input into something safe, such
as filtering (CWE-790) - which attempts to remove dangerous
inputs - or encoding/escaping (CWE-116), which attempts to
ensure that the input is not misinterpreted when it is included
in output to another component. Other techniques exist as well
(see CWE-138 for more examples.)
Input validation can be applied to:
raw data - strings, numbers, parameters, file contents, etc.
metadata - information about the raw data, such as headers or size
Data can be simple or structured. Structured data
can be composed of many nested layers, composed of
combinations of metadata and raw data, with other simple or
structured data.
Many properties of raw data or metadata may need
to be validated upon entry into the code, such
as:
specified quantities such as size, length, frequency, price, rate, number of operations, time, etc.
implied or derived quantities, such as the actual size of a file instead of a specified size
indexes, offsets, or positions into more complex data structures
symbolic keys or other elements into hash tables, associative arrays, etc.
well-formedness, i.e. syntactic correctness - compliance with expected syntax
lexical token correctness - compliance with rules for what is treated as a token
specified or derived type - the actual type of the input (or what the input appears to be)
consistency - between individual data elements, between raw data and metadata, between references, etc.
conformance to domain-specific rules, e.g. business logic
equivalence - ensuring that equivalent inputs are treated the same
authenticity, ownership, or other attestations about the input, e.g. a cryptographic signature to prove the source of the data
Implied or derived properties of data must often
be calculated or inferred by the code itself. Errors in
deriving properties may be considered a contributing factor
to improper input validation.
Note that "input validation" has very different
meanings to different people, or within different
classification schemes. Caution must be used when
referencing this CWE entry or mapping to it. For example,
some weaknesses might involve inadvertently giving control
to an attacker over an input when they should not be able
to provide an input at all, but sometimes this is referred
to as input validation.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the
distinctions between input validation and output escaping
are often blurred, and developers must be careful to
understand the difference, including how input validation
is not always sufficient to prevent vulnerabilities,
especially when less stringent data types must be
supported, such as free-form text. Consider a SQL injection
scenario in which a person's last name is inserted into a
query. The name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation
step since it is a common last name in the English
language. However, this valid name cannot be directly
inserted into the database because it contains the "'"
apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or
otherwise transformed. In this case, removing the
apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it
would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name
would be recorded.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html | 0 | Thomas d'Otreppe | 2014-10-03 02:00:34+00:00 | OSdep: Fixed segmentation fault that happens with a malicious server sending a negative length (Closes #16 on GitHub).
git-svn-id: http://svn.aircrack-ng.org/trunk@2419 28c6078b-6c39-48e3-add9-af49d547ecab | 88702a3ce4c28a973bf69023cd0312f412f6193e | False | aircrack-ng/aircrack-ng | WiFi security auditing tools suite | 2018-03-10 17:11:11 | 2022-08-14 03:59:05 | https://aircrack-ng.org | aircrack-ng | 3204.0 | 703.0 | net_get | net_get( int s , void * arg , int * len) | ['s', 'arg', 'len'] | int net_get(int s, void *arg, int *len)
{
struct net_hdr nh;
int plen;
if (net_read_exact(s, &nh, sizeof(nh)) == -1)
{
return -1;
}
plen = ntohl(nh.nh_len);
if (!(plen <= *len))
printf("PLEN %d type %d len %d\n",
plen, nh.nh_type, *len);
assert(plen <= *len); /* XXX */
*len = plen;
if ((*len) && (net_read_exact(s, arg, *len) == -1))
{
return -1;
}
return nh.nh_type;
} | 125 | True | 1 |
CVE-2014-8509 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/bittorrent/bootstrap-dht/commit/bbc0b7191e3f48461ca6e5b1b34bdf4b3f1e79a9', 'name': 'https://github.com/bittorrent/bootstrap-dht/commit/bbc0b7191e3f48461ca6e5b1b34bdf4b3f1e79a9', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit']}, {'url': 'http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/70812', 'name': '70812', 'refsource': 'BID', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-14-370/', 'name': 'http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-14-370/', 'refsource': 'MISC', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-119'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:bittorrent:bootstrap-dht:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The lazy_bdecode function in BitTorrent bootstrap-dht (aka Bootstrap) allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted packet, which triggers an out-of-bounds read, related to "Improper Indexing."'}] | 2014-11-03T20:56Z | 2014-10-31T14:55Z | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The software performs operations on a memory buffer, but it can read from or write to a memory location that is outside of the intended boundary of the buffer. |
Certain languages allow direct addressing of memory locations and do not automatically ensure that these locations are valid for the memory buffer that is being referenced. This can cause read or write operations to be performed on memory locations that may be associated with other variables, data structures, or internal program data.
As a result, an attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code, alter the intended control flow, read sensitive information, or cause the system to crash.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/119.html | 0 | arvidn | 2014-10-23 16:23:01-07:00 | update version of lazy_bdecode from libtorrent | bbc0b7191e3f48461ca6e5b1b34bdf4b3f1e79a9 | False | bittorrent/bootstrap-dht | DHT bootstrap server | 2013-11-01 22:51:57 | 2020-06-25 14:47:51 | null | bittorrent | 377.0 | 72.0 | libtorrent::is_digit | libtorrent::is_digit( char c) | ['c'] | bool is_digit(char c) { return c >= '0' && c <= '9'; } | 16 | True | 1 |
CVE-2014-8509 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/bittorrent/bootstrap-dht/commit/bbc0b7191e3f48461ca6e5b1b34bdf4b3f1e79a9', 'name': 'https://github.com/bittorrent/bootstrap-dht/commit/bbc0b7191e3f48461ca6e5b1b34bdf4b3f1e79a9', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit']}, {'url': 'http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/70812', 'name': '70812', 'refsource': 'BID', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-14-370/', 'name': 'http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-14-370/', 'refsource': 'MISC', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-119'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:bittorrent:bootstrap-dht:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The lazy_bdecode function in BitTorrent bootstrap-dht (aka Bootstrap) allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted packet, which triggers an out-of-bounds read, related to "Improper Indexing."'}] | 2014-11-03T20:56Z | 2014-10-31T14:55Z | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The software performs operations on a memory buffer, but it can read from or write to a memory location that is outside of the intended boundary of the buffer. |
Certain languages allow direct addressing of memory locations and do not automatically ensure that these locations are valid for the memory buffer that is being referenced. This can cause read or write operations to be performed on memory locations that may be associated with other variables, data structures, or internal program data.
As a result, an attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code, alter the intended control flow, read sensitive information, or cause the system to crash.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/119.html | 0 | arvidn | 2014-10-23 16:23:01-07:00 | update version of lazy_bdecode from libtorrent | bbc0b7191e3f48461ca6e5b1b34bdf4b3f1e79a9 | False | bittorrent/bootstrap-dht | DHT bootstrap server | 2013-11-01 22:51:57 | 2020-06-25 14:47:51 | null | bittorrent | 377.0 | 72.0 | libtorrent::is_print | libtorrent::is_print( char c) | ['c'] | bool is_print(char c) { return c >= 32 && c < 127; } | 16 | True | 1 |
CVE-2014-8509 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/bittorrent/bootstrap-dht/commit/bbc0b7191e3f48461ca6e5b1b34bdf4b3f1e79a9', 'name': 'https://github.com/bittorrent/bootstrap-dht/commit/bbc0b7191e3f48461ca6e5b1b34bdf4b3f1e79a9', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit']}, {'url': 'http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/70812', 'name': '70812', 'refsource': 'BID', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-14-370/', 'name': 'http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-14-370/', 'refsource': 'MISC', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-119'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:bittorrent:bootstrap-dht:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The lazy_bdecode function in BitTorrent bootstrap-dht (aka Bootstrap) allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted packet, which triggers an out-of-bounds read, related to "Improper Indexing."'}] | 2014-11-03T20:56Z | 2014-10-31T14:55Z | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The software performs operations on a memory buffer, but it can read from or write to a memory location that is outside of the intended boundary of the buffer. |
Certain languages allow direct addressing of memory locations and do not automatically ensure that these locations are valid for the memory buffer that is being referenced. This can cause read or write operations to be performed on memory locations that may be associated with other variables, data structures, or internal program data.
As a result, an attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code, alter the intended control flow, read sensitive information, or cause the system to crash.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/119.html | 0 | arvidn | 2014-10-23 16:23:01-07:00 | update version of lazy_bdecode from libtorrent | bbc0b7191e3f48461ca6e5b1b34bdf4b3f1e79a9 | False | bittorrent/bootstrap-dht | DHT bootstrap server | 2013-11-01 22:51:57 | 2020-06-25 14:47:51 | null | bittorrent | 377.0 | 72.0 | libtorrent::lazy_bdecode | libtorrent::lazy_bdecode( char const * start , char const * end , lazy_entry & ret , error_code & ec , int * error_pos , int depth_limit , int item_limit) | ['start', 'end', 'ret', 'ec', 'error_pos', 'depth_limit', 'item_limit'] | int lazy_bdecode(char const* start, char const* end, lazy_entry& ret
, error_code& ec, int* error_pos, int depth_limit, int item_limit)
{
char const* const orig_start = start;
ret.clear();
if (start == end) return 0;
std::vector<lazy_entry*> stack;
stack.push_back(&ret);
while (start < end)
{
if (stack.empty()) break; // done!
lazy_entry* top = stack.back();
if (int(stack.size()) > depth_limit) TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(bdecode_errors::depth_exceeded);
if (start >= end) TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(bdecode_errors::unexpected_eof);
char t = *start;
++start;
if (start >= end && t != 'e') TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(bdecode_errors::unexpected_eof);
switch (top->type())
{
case lazy_entry::dict_t:
{
if (t == 'e')
{
top->set_end(start);
stack.pop_back();
continue;
}
if (!is_digit(t)) TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(bdecode_errors::expected_string);
boost::int64_t len = t - '0';
start = parse_int(start, end, ':', len);
if (start == 0 || start + len + 3 > end || *start != ':')
TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(bdecode_errors::expected_colon);
++start;
if (start == end) TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(bdecode_errors::unexpected_eof);
lazy_entry* ent = top->dict_append(start);
if (ent == 0) TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(boost::system::errc::not_enough_memory);
start += len;
if (start >= end) TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(bdecode_errors::unexpected_eof);
stack.push_back(ent);
t = *start;
++start;
break;
}
case lazy_entry::list_t:
{
if (t == 'e')
{
top->set_end(start);
stack.pop_back();
continue;
}
lazy_entry* ent = top->list_append();
if (ent == 0) TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(boost::system::errc::not_enough_memory);
stack.push_back(ent);
break;
}
default: break;
}
--item_limit;
if (item_limit <= 0) TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(bdecode_errors::limit_exceeded);
top = stack.back();
switch (t)
{
case 'd':
top->construct_dict(start - 1);
continue;
case 'l':
top->construct_list(start - 1);
continue;
case 'i':
{
char const* int_start = start;
start = find_char(start, end, 'e');
top->construct_int(int_start, start - int_start);
if (start == end) TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(bdecode_errors::unexpected_eof);
TORRENT_ASSERT(*start == 'e');
++start;
stack.pop_back();
continue;
}
default:
{
if (!is_digit(t))
TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(bdecode_errors::expected_value);
boost::int64_t len = t - '0';
start = parse_int(start, end, ':', len);
if (start == 0 || start + len + 1 > end || *start != ':')
TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(bdecode_errors::expected_colon);
++start;
top->construct_string(start, int(len));
stack.pop_back();
start += len;
continue;
}
}
return 0;
}
return 0;
} | 634 | True | 1 |
CVE-2014-8509 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/bittorrent/bootstrap-dht/commit/bbc0b7191e3f48461ca6e5b1b34bdf4b3f1e79a9', 'name': 'https://github.com/bittorrent/bootstrap-dht/commit/bbc0b7191e3f48461ca6e5b1b34bdf4b3f1e79a9', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit']}, {'url': 'http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/70812', 'name': '70812', 'refsource': 'BID', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-14-370/', 'name': 'http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-14-370/', 'refsource': 'MISC', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-119'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:bittorrent:bootstrap-dht:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The lazy_bdecode function in BitTorrent bootstrap-dht (aka Bootstrap) allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted packet, which triggers an out-of-bounds read, related to "Improper Indexing."'}] | 2014-11-03T20:56Z | 2014-10-31T14:55Z | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The software performs operations on a memory buffer, but it can read from or write to a memory location that is outside of the intended boundary of the buffer. |
Certain languages allow direct addressing of memory locations and do not automatically ensure that these locations are valid for the memory buffer that is being referenced. This can cause read or write operations to be performed on memory locations that may be associated with other variables, data structures, or internal program data.
As a result, an attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code, alter the intended control flow, read sensitive information, or cause the system to crash.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/119.html | 0 | arvidn | 2014-10-23 16:23:01-07:00 | update version of lazy_bdecode from libtorrent | bbc0b7191e3f48461ca6e5b1b34bdf4b3f1e79a9 | False | bittorrent/bootstrap-dht | DHT bootstrap server | 2013-11-01 22:51:57 | 2020-06-25 14:47:51 | null | bittorrent | 377.0 | 72.0 | libtorrent::lazy_entry::int_value | libtorrent::lazy_entry::int_value() const | [] | boost::int64_t lazy_entry::int_value() const
{
TORRENT_ASSERT(m_type == int_t);
boost::int64_t val = 0;
bool negative = false;
if (*m_data.start == '-') negative = true;
parse_int(negative?m_data.start+1:m_data.start, m_data.start + m_size, 'e', val);
if (negative) val = -val;
return val;
} | 77 | True | 1 |
CVE-2014-8509 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/bittorrent/bootstrap-dht/commit/bbc0b7191e3f48461ca6e5b1b34bdf4b3f1e79a9', 'name': 'https://github.com/bittorrent/bootstrap-dht/commit/bbc0b7191e3f48461ca6e5b1b34bdf4b3f1e79a9', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit']}, {'url': 'http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/70812', 'name': '70812', 'refsource': 'BID', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-14-370/', 'name': 'http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-14-370/', 'refsource': 'MISC', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-119'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:bittorrent:bootstrap-dht:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The lazy_bdecode function in BitTorrent bootstrap-dht (aka Bootstrap) allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted packet, which triggers an out-of-bounds read, related to "Improper Indexing."'}] | 2014-11-03T20:56Z | 2014-10-31T14:55Z | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The software performs operations on a memory buffer, but it can read from or write to a memory location that is outside of the intended boundary of the buffer. |
Certain languages allow direct addressing of memory locations and do not automatically ensure that these locations are valid for the memory buffer that is being referenced. This can cause read or write operations to be performed on memory locations that may be associated with other variables, data structures, or internal program data.
As a result, an attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code, alter the intended control flow, read sensitive information, or cause the system to crash.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/119.html | 0 | arvidn | 2014-10-23 16:23:01-07:00 | update version of lazy_bdecode from libtorrent | bbc0b7191e3f48461ca6e5b1b34bdf4b3f1e79a9 | False | bittorrent/bootstrap-dht | DHT bootstrap server | 2013-11-01 22:51:57 | 2020-06-25 14:47:51 | null | bittorrent | 377.0 | 72.0 | libtorrent::parse_int | libtorrent::parse_int( char const * start , char const * end , char delimiter , boost :: int64_t & val) | ['start', 'end', 'delimiter', 'val'] | char const* parse_int(char const* start, char const* end, char delimiter, boost::int64_t& val)
{
while (start < end && *start != delimiter)
{
if (!is_digit(*start)) { return 0; }
val *= 10;
val += *start - '0';
++start;
}
return start;
} | 68 | True | 1 |
CVE-2014-8509 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/bittorrent/bootstrap-dht/commit/bbc0b7191e3f48461ca6e5b1b34bdf4b3f1e79a9', 'name': 'https://github.com/bittorrent/bootstrap-dht/commit/bbc0b7191e3f48461ca6e5b1b34bdf4b3f1e79a9', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit']}, {'url': 'http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/70812', 'name': '70812', 'refsource': 'BID', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-14-370/', 'name': 'http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-14-370/', 'refsource': 'MISC', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-119'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:bittorrent:bootstrap-dht:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The lazy_bdecode function in BitTorrent bootstrap-dht (aka Bootstrap) allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted packet, which triggers an out-of-bounds read, related to "Improper Indexing."'}] | 2014-11-03T20:56Z | 2014-10-31T14:55Z | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The software performs operations on a memory buffer, but it can read from or write to a memory location that is outside of the intended boundary of the buffer. |
Certain languages allow direct addressing of memory locations and do not automatically ensure that these locations are valid for the memory buffer that is being referenced. This can cause read or write operations to be performed on memory locations that may be associated with other variables, data structures, or internal program data.
As a result, an attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code, alter the intended control flow, read sensitive information, or cause the system to crash.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/119.html | 0 | arvidn | 2014-10-23 16:23:01-07:00 | update version of lazy_bdecode from libtorrent | bbc0b7191e3f48461ca6e5b1b34bdf4b3f1e79a9 | False | bittorrent/bootstrap-dht | DHT bootstrap server | 2013-11-01 22:51:57 | 2020-06-25 14:47:51 | null | bittorrent | 377.0 | 72.0 | libtorrent::print_entry | libtorrent::print_entry( lazy_entry const & e , bool single_line , int indent) | ['e', 'single_line', 'indent'] | std::string print_entry(lazy_entry const& e, bool single_line, int indent)
{
char indent_str[200];
memset(indent_str, ' ', 200);
indent_str[0] = ',';
indent_str[1] = '\n';
indent_str[199] = 0;
if (indent < 197 && indent >= 0) indent_str[indent+2] = 0;
std::string ret;
switch (e.type())
{
case lazy_entry::none_t: return "none";
case lazy_entry::int_t:
{
char str[100];
snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%" PRId64, e.int_value());
return str;
}
case lazy_entry::string_t:
{
bool printable = true;
char const* str = e.string_ptr();
for (int i = 0; i < e.string_length(); ++i)
{
using namespace std;
if (is_print((unsigned char)str[i])) continue;
printable = false;
break;
}
ret += "'";
if (printable)
{
ret += e.string_value();
ret += "'";
return ret;
}
for (int i = 0; i < e.string_length(); ++i)
{
char tmp[5];
snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%02x", (unsigned char)str[i]);
ret += tmp;
}
ret += "'";
return ret;
}
case lazy_entry::list_t:
{
ret += '[';
bool one_liner = line_longer_than(e, 200) != -1 || single_line;
if (!one_liner) ret += indent_str + 1;
for (int i = 0; i < e.list_size(); ++i)
{
if (i == 0 && one_liner) ret += " ";
ret += print_entry(*e.list_at(i), single_line, indent + 2);
if (i < e.list_size() - 1) ret += (one_liner?", ":indent_str);
else ret += (one_liner?" ":indent_str+1);
}
ret += "]";
return ret;
}
case lazy_entry::dict_t:
{
ret += "{";
bool one_liner = line_longer_than(e, 200) != -1 || single_line;
if (!one_liner) ret += indent_str+1;
for (int i = 0; i < e.dict_size(); ++i)
{
if (i == 0 && one_liner) ret += " ";
std::pair<std::string, lazy_entry const*> ent = e.dict_at(i);
ret += "'";
ret += ent.first;
ret += "': ";
ret += print_entry(*ent.second, single_line, indent + 2);
if (i < e.dict_size() - 1) ret += (one_liner?", ":indent_str);
else ret += (one_liner?" ":indent_str+1);
}
ret += "}";
return ret;
}
}
return ret;
} | 575 | True | 1 |
CVE-2014-8509 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/bittorrent/bootstrap-dht/commit/bbc0b7191e3f48461ca6e5b1b34bdf4b3f1e79a9', 'name': 'https://github.com/bittorrent/bootstrap-dht/commit/bbc0b7191e3f48461ca6e5b1b34bdf4b3f1e79a9', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit']}, {'url': 'http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/70812', 'name': '70812', 'refsource': 'BID', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-14-370/', 'name': 'http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-14-370/', 'refsource': 'MISC', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-119'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:bittorrent:bootstrap-dht:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The lazy_bdecode function in BitTorrent bootstrap-dht (aka Bootstrap) allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted packet, which triggers an out-of-bounds read, related to "Improper Indexing."'}] | 2014-11-03T20:56Z | 2014-10-31T14:55Z | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The software performs operations on a memory buffer, but it can read from or write to a memory location that is outside of the intended boundary of the buffer. |
Certain languages allow direct addressing of memory locations and do not automatically ensure that these locations are valid for the memory buffer that is being referenced. This can cause read or write operations to be performed on memory locations that may be associated with other variables, data structures, or internal program data.
As a result, an attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code, alter the intended control flow, read sensitive information, or cause the system to crash.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/119.html | 0 | arvidn | 2014-10-23 16:23:01-07:00 | update version of lazy_bdecode from libtorrent | bbc0b7191e3f48461ca6e5b1b34bdf4b3f1e79a9 | False | bittorrent/bootstrap-dht | DHT bootstrap server | 2013-11-01 22:51:57 | 2020-06-25 14:47:51 | null | bittorrent | 377.0 | 72.0 | libtorrent::bdecode_errors::make_error_code | libtorrent::bdecode_errors::make_error_code( error_code_enum e) | ['e'] | inline boost::system::error_code make_error_code(error_code_enum e)
{
return boost::system::error_code(e, get_bdecode_category());
} | 21 | True | 1 |
CVE-2015-5685 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/bittorrent/bootstrap-dht/commit/e809ea80e3527e32c40756eddd8b2ae44bc3af1a', 'name': 'https://github.com/bittorrent/bootstrap-dht/commit/e809ea80e3527e32c40756eddd8b2ae44bc3af1a', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-15-366/', 'name': 'http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-15-366/', 'refsource': 'MISC', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-15-367/', 'name': 'http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-15-367/', 'refsource': 'MISC', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-20'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:bittorrent:bootstrap-dht:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The lazy_bdecode function in BitTorrent DHT bootstrap server (bootstrap-dht ) allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted packet, related to "improper indexing."'}] | 2015-08-13T18:31Z | 2015-08-13T14:59Z | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does
not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the
properties that are required to process the data safely and
correctly. |
Input validation is a frequently-used technique
for checking potentially dangerous inputs in order to
ensure that the inputs are safe for processing within the
code, or when communicating with other components. When
software does not validate input properly, an attacker is
able to craft the input in a form that is not expected by
the rest of the application. This will lead to parts of the
system receiving unintended input, which may result in
altered control flow, arbitrary control of a resource, or
arbitrary code execution.
Input validation is not the only technique for
processing input, however. Other techniques attempt to
transform potentially-dangerous input into something safe, such
as filtering (CWE-790) - which attempts to remove dangerous
inputs - or encoding/escaping (CWE-116), which attempts to
ensure that the input is not misinterpreted when it is included
in output to another component. Other techniques exist as well
(see CWE-138 for more examples.)
Input validation can be applied to:
raw data - strings, numbers, parameters, file contents, etc.
metadata - information about the raw data, such as headers or size
Data can be simple or structured. Structured data
can be composed of many nested layers, composed of
combinations of metadata and raw data, with other simple or
structured data.
Many properties of raw data or metadata may need
to be validated upon entry into the code, such
as:
specified quantities such as size, length, frequency, price, rate, number of operations, time, etc.
implied or derived quantities, such as the actual size of a file instead of a specified size
indexes, offsets, or positions into more complex data structures
symbolic keys or other elements into hash tables, associative arrays, etc.
well-formedness, i.e. syntactic correctness - compliance with expected syntax
lexical token correctness - compliance with rules for what is treated as a token
specified or derived type - the actual type of the input (or what the input appears to be)
consistency - between individual data elements, between raw data and metadata, between references, etc.
conformance to domain-specific rules, e.g. business logic
equivalence - ensuring that equivalent inputs are treated the same
authenticity, ownership, or other attestations about the input, e.g. a cryptographic signature to prove the source of the data
Implied or derived properties of data must often
be calculated or inferred by the code itself. Errors in
deriving properties may be considered a contributing factor
to improper input validation.
Note that "input validation" has very different
meanings to different people, or within different
classification schemes. Caution must be used when
referencing this CWE entry or mapping to it. For example,
some weaknesses might involve inadvertently giving control
to an attacker over an input when they should not be able
to provide an input at all, but sometimes this is referred
to as input validation.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the
distinctions between input validation and output escaping
are often blurred, and developers must be careful to
understand the difference, including how input validation
is not always sufficient to prevent vulnerabilities,
especially when less stringent data types must be
supported, such as free-form text. Consider a SQL injection
scenario in which a person's last name is inserted into a
query. The name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation
step since it is a common last name in the English
language. However, this valid name cannot be directly
inserted into the database because it contains the "'"
apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or
otherwise transformed. In this case, removing the
apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it
would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name
would be recorded.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html | 0 | xercesblue | 2015-06-29 14:45:09-07:00 | Check for out-of-bounds bencoded lengths before advancing buffer pointer | e809ea80e3527e32c40756eddd8b2ae44bc3af1a | False | bittorrent/bootstrap-dht | DHT bootstrap server | 2013-11-01 22:51:57 | 2020-06-25 14:47:51 | null | bittorrent | 377.0 | 72.0 | libtorrent::lazy_bdecode | libtorrent::lazy_bdecode( char const * start , char const * end , lazy_entry & ret , error_code & ec , int * error_pos , int depth_limit , int item_limit) | ['start', 'end', 'ret', 'ec', 'error_pos', 'depth_limit', 'item_limit'] | int lazy_bdecode(char const* start, char const* end, lazy_entry& ret
, error_code& ec, int* error_pos, int depth_limit, int item_limit)
{
char const* const orig_start = start;
ret.clear();
if (start == end) return 0;
std::vector<lazy_entry*> stack;
stack.push_back(&ret);
while (start <= end)
{
if (stack.empty()) break; // done!
lazy_entry* top = stack.back();
if (int(stack.size()) > depth_limit) TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(bdecode_errors::depth_exceeded);
if (start >= end) TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(bdecode_errors::unexpected_eof);
char t = *start;
++start;
if (start >= end && t != 'e') TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(bdecode_errors::unexpected_eof);
switch (top->type())
{
case lazy_entry::dict_t:
{
if (t == 'e')
{
top->set_end(start);
stack.pop_back();
continue;
}
if (!numeric(t)) TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(bdecode_errors::expected_string);
boost::int64_t len = t - '0';
bdecode_errors::error_code_enum e = bdecode_errors::no_error;
start = parse_int(start, end, ':', len, e);
if (e)
TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(e);
if (start + len + 1 > end)
TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(bdecode_errors::unexpected_eof);
if (len < 0)
TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(bdecode_errors::overflow);
++start;
if (start == end) TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(bdecode_errors::unexpected_eof);
lazy_entry* ent = top->dict_append(start);
if (ent == 0) TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(boost::system::errc::not_enough_memory);
start += len;
if (start >= end) TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(bdecode_errors::unexpected_eof);
stack.push_back(ent);
t = *start;
++start;
break;
}
case lazy_entry::list_t:
{
if (t == 'e')
{
top->set_end(start);
stack.pop_back();
continue;
}
lazy_entry* ent = top->list_append();
if (ent == 0) TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(boost::system::errc::not_enough_memory);
stack.push_back(ent);
break;
}
default: break;
}
--item_limit;
if (item_limit <= 0) TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(bdecode_errors::limit_exceeded);
top = stack.back();
switch (t)
{
case 'd':
top->construct_dict(start - 1);
continue;
case 'l':
top->construct_list(start - 1);
continue;
case 'i':
{
char const* int_start = start;
start = find_char(start, end, 'e');
top->construct_int(int_start, start - int_start);
if (start == end) TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(bdecode_errors::unexpected_eof);
TORRENT_ASSERT(*start == 'e');
++start;
stack.pop_back();
continue;
}
default:
{
if (!numeric(t))
TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(bdecode_errors::expected_value);
boost::int64_t len = t - '0';
bdecode_errors::error_code_enum e = bdecode_errors::no_error;
start = parse_int(start, end, ':', len, e);
if (e)
TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(e);
if (start + len + 1 > end)
TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(bdecode_errors::unexpected_eof);
if (len < 0)
TORRENT_FAIL_BDECODE(bdecode_errors::overflow);
++start;
top->construct_string(start, int(len));
stack.pop_back();
start += len;
continue;
}
}
return 0;
}
return 0;
} | 682 | True | 1 |
CVE-2014-9114 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | COMPLETE | COMPLETE | COMPLETE | 7.2 | CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 7.8 | HIGH | 1.8 | 5.9 | True | [{'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201612-14', 'name': 'GLSA-201612-14', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/89e90ae7b2826110ea28c1c0eb8e7c56c3907bdc', 'name': 'https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/89e90ae7b2826110ea28c1c0eb8e7c56c3907bdc', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1168485', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1168485', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry', 'Patch']}, {'url': 'http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/71327', 'name': '71327', 'refsource': 'BID', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2014/11/26/21', 'name': '[oss-security] 20161126 Re: blkid command injection', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-updates/2015-01/msg00035.html', 'name': 'openSUSE-SU-2015:0066', 'refsource': 'SUSE', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2014-December/146229.html', 'name': 'FEDORA-2014-15908', 'refsource': 'FEDORA', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2014-December/145188.html', 'name': 'FEDORA-2014-16016', 'refsource': 'FEDORA', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/98993', 'name': 'blkid-cve20149114-command-exec(98993)', 'refsource': 'XF', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rf4c02775860db415b4955778a131c2795223f61cb8c6a450893651e4@%3Cissues.bookkeeper.apache.org%3E', 'name': '[bookkeeper-issues] 20210628 [GitHub] [bookkeeper] padma81 opened a new issue #2746: Security Vulnerabilities in CentOS 7 image, Upgrade image to CentOS 8', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r58af02e294bd07f487e2c64ffc0a29b837db5600e33b6e698b9d696b@%3Cissues.bookkeeper.apache.org%3E', 'name': '[bookkeeper-issues] 20210629 [GitHub] [bookkeeper] padma81 opened a new issue #2746: Security Vulnerabilities in CentOS 7 image, Upgrade image to CentOS 8', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-77'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:opensuse:opensuse:13.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:opensuse:opensuse:13.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:20:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:21:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:kernel:util-linux:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.24.2-1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Blkid in util-linux before 2.26rc-1 allows local users to execute arbitrary code.'}] | 2021-06-29T15:15Z | 2017-03-31T16:59Z | Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') | The software constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component. |
Command injection vulnerabilities typically occur when:
1. Data enters the application from an untrusted source.
2. The data is part of a string that is executed as a command by the application.
3. By executing the command, the application gives an attacker a privilege or capability that the attacker would not otherwise have.
Many protocols and products have their own custom command language. While OS or shell command strings are frequently discovered and targeted, developers may not realize that these other command languages might also be vulnerable to attacks.
Command injection is a common problem with wrapper programs.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/77.html | 0 | Karel Zak | 2014-11-27 13:39:35+01:00 | libblkid: care about unsafe chars in cache
The high-level libblkid API uses /run/blkid/blkid.tab cache to
store probing results. The cache format is
<device NAME="value" ...>devname</device>
and unfortunately the cache code does not escape quotation marks:
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'AAA"BBB'
# cat /run/blkid/blkid.tab
...
<device ... LABEL="AAA"BBB" ...>/dev/sdb1</device>
such string is later incorrectly parsed and blkid(8) returns
nonsenses. And for use-cases like
# eval $(blkid -o export /dev/sdb1)
it's also insecure.
Note that mount, udevd and blkid -p are based on low-level libblkid
API, it bypass the cache and directly read data from the devices.
The current udevd upstream does not depend on blkid(8) output at all,
it's directly linked with the library and all unsafe chars are encoded by
\x<hex> notation.
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'X"`/tmp/foo` "' /dev/sdb1
# udevadm info --export-db | grep LABEL
...
E: ID_FS_LABEL=X__/tmp/foo___
E: ID_FS_LABEL_ENC=X\x22\x60\x2ftmp\x2ffoo\x60\x20\x22
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]> | 89e90ae7b2826110ea28c1c0eb8e7c56c3907bdc | False | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | karelzak | visit repo url | visit repo url | parse_token | parse_token( char ** name , char ** value , char ** cp) | ['name', 'value', 'cp'] | static int parse_token(char **name, char **value, char **cp)
{
char *end;
if (!name || !value || !cp)
return -BLKID_ERR_PARAM;
if (!(*value = strchr(*cp, '=')))
return 0;
**value = '\0';
*name = strip_line(*cp);
*value = skip_over_blank(*value + 1);
if (**value == '"') {
end = strchr(*value + 1, '"');
if (!end) {
DBG(READ, ul_debug("unbalanced quotes at: %s", *value));
*cp = *value;
return -BLKID_ERR_CACHE;
}
(*value)++;
*end = '\0';
end++;
} else {
end = skip_over_word(*value);
if (*end) {
*end = '\0';
end++;
}
}
*cp = end;
return 1;
} | 178 | True | 1 |
CVE-2014-9114 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | COMPLETE | COMPLETE | COMPLETE | 7.2 | CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 7.8 | HIGH | 1.8 | 5.9 | True | [{'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201612-14', 'name': 'GLSA-201612-14', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/89e90ae7b2826110ea28c1c0eb8e7c56c3907bdc', 'name': 'https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/89e90ae7b2826110ea28c1c0eb8e7c56c3907bdc', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1168485', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1168485', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry', 'Patch']}, {'url': 'http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/71327', 'name': '71327', 'refsource': 'BID', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2014/11/26/21', 'name': '[oss-security] 20161126 Re: blkid command injection', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-updates/2015-01/msg00035.html', 'name': 'openSUSE-SU-2015:0066', 'refsource': 'SUSE', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2014-December/146229.html', 'name': 'FEDORA-2014-15908', 'refsource': 'FEDORA', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2014-December/145188.html', 'name': 'FEDORA-2014-16016', 'refsource': 'FEDORA', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/98993', 'name': 'blkid-cve20149114-command-exec(98993)', 'refsource': 'XF', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rf4c02775860db415b4955778a131c2795223f61cb8c6a450893651e4@%3Cissues.bookkeeper.apache.org%3E', 'name': '[bookkeeper-issues] 20210628 [GitHub] [bookkeeper] padma81 opened a new issue #2746: Security Vulnerabilities in CentOS 7 image, Upgrade image to CentOS 8', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r58af02e294bd07f487e2c64ffc0a29b837db5600e33b6e698b9d696b@%3Cissues.bookkeeper.apache.org%3E', 'name': '[bookkeeper-issues] 20210629 [GitHub] [bookkeeper] padma81 opened a new issue #2746: Security Vulnerabilities in CentOS 7 image, Upgrade image to CentOS 8', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-77'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:opensuse:opensuse:13.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:opensuse:opensuse:13.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:20:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:21:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:kernel:util-linux:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.24.2-1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Blkid in util-linux before 2.26rc-1 allows local users to execute arbitrary code.'}] | 2021-06-29T15:15Z | 2017-03-31T16:59Z | Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') | The software constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component. |
Command injection vulnerabilities typically occur when:
1. Data enters the application from an untrusted source.
2. The data is part of a string that is executed as a command by the application.
3. By executing the command, the application gives an attacker a privilege or capability that the attacker would not otherwise have.
Many protocols and products have their own custom command language. While OS or shell command strings are frequently discovered and targeted, developers may not realize that these other command languages might also be vulnerable to attacks.
Command injection is a common problem with wrapper programs.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/77.html | 0 | Karel Zak | 2014-11-27 13:39:35+01:00 | libblkid: care about unsafe chars in cache
The high-level libblkid API uses /run/blkid/blkid.tab cache to
store probing results. The cache format is
<device NAME="value" ...>devname</device>
and unfortunately the cache code does not escape quotation marks:
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'AAA"BBB'
# cat /run/blkid/blkid.tab
...
<device ... LABEL="AAA"BBB" ...>/dev/sdb1</device>
such string is later incorrectly parsed and blkid(8) returns
nonsenses. And for use-cases like
# eval $(blkid -o export /dev/sdb1)
it's also insecure.
Note that mount, udevd and blkid -p are based on low-level libblkid
API, it bypass the cache and directly read data from the devices.
The current udevd upstream does not depend on blkid(8) output at all,
it's directly linked with the library and all unsafe chars are encoded by
\x<hex> notation.
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'X"`/tmp/foo` "' /dev/sdb1
# udevadm info --export-db | grep LABEL
...
E: ID_FS_LABEL=X__/tmp/foo___
E: ID_FS_LABEL_ENC=X\x22\x60\x2ftmp\x2ffoo\x60\x20\x22
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]> | 89e90ae7b2826110ea28c1c0eb8e7c56c3907bdc | False | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | karelzak | visit repo url | visit repo url | save_dev | save_dev( blkid_dev dev , FILE * file) | ['dev', 'file'] | static int save_dev(blkid_dev dev, FILE *file)
{
struct list_head *p;
if (!dev || dev->bid_name[0] != '/')
return 0;
DBG(SAVE, ul_debug("device %s, type %s", dev->bid_name, dev->bid_type ?
dev->bid_type : "(null)"));
fprintf(file, "<device DEVNO=\"0x%04lx\" TIME=\"%ld.%ld\"",
(unsigned long) dev->bid_devno,
(long) dev->bid_time,
(long) dev->bid_utime);
if (dev->bid_pri)
fprintf(file, " PRI=\"%d\"", dev->bid_pri);
list_for_each(p, &dev->bid_tags) {
blkid_tag tag = list_entry(p, struct blkid_struct_tag, bit_tags);
fprintf(file, " %s=\"%s\"", tag->bit_name,tag->bit_val);
}
fprintf(file, ">%s</device>\n", dev->bid_name);
return 0;
} | 156 | True | 1 |
CVE-2014-9114 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | COMPLETE | COMPLETE | COMPLETE | 7.2 | CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 7.8 | HIGH | 1.8 | 5.9 | True | [{'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201612-14', 'name': 'GLSA-201612-14', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/89e90ae7b2826110ea28c1c0eb8e7c56c3907bdc', 'name': 'https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/89e90ae7b2826110ea28c1c0eb8e7c56c3907bdc', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1168485', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1168485', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry', 'Patch']}, {'url': 'http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/71327', 'name': '71327', 'refsource': 'BID', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2014/11/26/21', 'name': '[oss-security] 20161126 Re: blkid command injection', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-updates/2015-01/msg00035.html', 'name': 'openSUSE-SU-2015:0066', 'refsource': 'SUSE', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2014-December/146229.html', 'name': 'FEDORA-2014-15908', 'refsource': 'FEDORA', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2014-December/145188.html', 'name': 'FEDORA-2014-16016', 'refsource': 'FEDORA', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/98993', 'name': 'blkid-cve20149114-command-exec(98993)', 'refsource': 'XF', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rf4c02775860db415b4955778a131c2795223f61cb8c6a450893651e4@%3Cissues.bookkeeper.apache.org%3E', 'name': '[bookkeeper-issues] 20210628 [GitHub] [bookkeeper] padma81 opened a new issue #2746: Security Vulnerabilities in CentOS 7 image, Upgrade image to CentOS 8', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r58af02e294bd07f487e2c64ffc0a29b837db5600e33b6e698b9d696b@%3Cissues.bookkeeper.apache.org%3E', 'name': '[bookkeeper-issues] 20210629 [GitHub] [bookkeeper] padma81 opened a new issue #2746: Security Vulnerabilities in CentOS 7 image, Upgrade image to CentOS 8', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-77'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:opensuse:opensuse:13.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:opensuse:opensuse:13.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:20:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:21:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:kernel:util-linux:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.24.2-1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Blkid in util-linux before 2.26rc-1 allows local users to execute arbitrary code.'}] | 2021-06-29T15:15Z | 2017-03-31T16:59Z | Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') | The software constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component. |
Command injection vulnerabilities typically occur when:
1. Data enters the application from an untrusted source.
2. The data is part of a string that is executed as a command by the application.
3. By executing the command, the application gives an attacker a privilege or capability that the attacker would not otherwise have.
Many protocols and products have their own custom command language. While OS or shell command strings are frequently discovered and targeted, developers may not realize that these other command languages might also be vulnerable to attacks.
Command injection is a common problem with wrapper programs.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/77.html | 0 | Karel Zak | 2014-11-27 13:39:35+01:00 | libblkid: care about unsafe chars in cache
The high-level libblkid API uses /run/blkid/blkid.tab cache to
store probing results. The cache format is
<device NAME="value" ...>devname</device>
and unfortunately the cache code does not escape quotation marks:
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'AAA"BBB'
# cat /run/blkid/blkid.tab
...
<device ... LABEL="AAA"BBB" ...>/dev/sdb1</device>
such string is later incorrectly parsed and blkid(8) returns
nonsenses. And for use-cases like
# eval $(blkid -o export /dev/sdb1)
it's also insecure.
Note that mount, udevd and blkid -p are based on low-level libblkid
API, it bypass the cache and directly read data from the devices.
The current udevd upstream does not depend on blkid(8) output at all,
it's directly linked with the library and all unsafe chars are encoded by
\x<hex> notation.
# mkfs.ext4 -L 'X"`/tmp/foo` "' /dev/sdb1
# udevadm info --export-db | grep LABEL
...
E: ID_FS_LABEL=X__/tmp/foo___
E: ID_FS_LABEL_ENC=X\x22\x60\x2ftmp\x2ffoo\x60\x20\x22
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]> | 89e90ae7b2826110ea28c1c0eb8e7c56c3907bdc | False | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | karelzak | visit repo url | visit repo url | print_value | print_value( int output , int num , const char * devname , const char * value , const char * name , size_t valsz) | ['output', 'num', 'devname', 'value', 'name', 'valsz'] | static void print_value(int output, int num, const char *devname,
const char *value, const char *name, size_t valsz)
{
if (output & OUTPUT_VALUE_ONLY) {
fputs(value, stdout);
fputc('\n', stdout);
} else if (output & OUTPUT_UDEV_LIST) {
print_udev_format(name, value);
} else if (output & OUTPUT_EXPORT_LIST) {
if (num == 1 && devname)
printf("DEVNAME=%s\n", devname);
fputs(name, stdout);
fputs("=", stdout);
safe_print(value, valsz, NULL);
fputs("\n", stdout);
} else {
if (num == 1 && devname)
printf("%s:", devname);
fputs(" ", stdout);
fputs(name, stdout);
fputs("=\"", stdout);
safe_print(value, valsz, "\"");
fputs("\"", stdout);
}
} | 175 | True | 1 |
CVE-2015-5224 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/bde91c85bdc77975155058276f99d2e0f5eab5a9', 'name': 'https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/bde91c85bdc77975155058276f99d2e0f5eab5a9', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1256686', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1256686', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/76467', 'name': '76467', 'refsource': 'BID', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/08/24/3', 'name': '[oss-security] 20150824 CVE-2015-5224 login-utils: file name collision due to incorrect mkstemp use', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'NVD-CWE-noinfo'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:kernel:util-linux:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.26.2', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:kernel:util-linux:2.27:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The mkostemp function in login-utils in util-linux when used incorrectly allows remote attackers to cause file name collision and possibly other attacks.'}] | 2020-09-11T15:20Z | 2017-08-23T15:29Z | Insufficient Information | There is insufficient information about the issue to classify it; details are unkown or unspecified. | Insufficient Information | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/categories | 0 | Karel Zak | 2015-08-24 10:05:55+02:00 | chsh, chfn, vipw: fix filenames collision
The utils when compiled WITHOUT libuser then mkostemp()ing
"/etc/%s.XXXXXX" where the filename prefix is argv[0] basename.
An attacker could repeatedly execute the util with modified argv[0]
and after many many attempts mkostemp() may generate suffix which
makes sense. The result maybe temporary file with name like rc.status
ld.so.preload or krb5.keytab, etc.
Note that distros usually use libuser based ch{sh,fn} or stuff from
shadow-utils.
It's probably very minor security bug.
Addresses: CVE-2015-5224
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]> | bde91c85bdc77975155058276f99d2e0f5eab5a9 | False | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | karelzak | visit repo url | visit repo url | xfmkstemp | xfmkstemp( char ** tmpname , char * dir) | ['tmpname', 'dir'] | static inline FILE *xfmkstemp(char **tmpname, char *dir)
{
int fd;
FILE *ret;
fd = xmkstemp(tmpname, dir);
if (fd == -1)
return NULL;
if (!(ret = fdopen(fd, "w+" UL_CLOEXECSTR))) {
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
} | 66 | True | 1 |
CVE-2015-5224 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/bde91c85bdc77975155058276f99d2e0f5eab5a9', 'name': 'https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/bde91c85bdc77975155058276f99d2e0f5eab5a9', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1256686', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1256686', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/76467', 'name': '76467', 'refsource': 'BID', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/08/24/3', 'name': '[oss-security] 20150824 CVE-2015-5224 login-utils: file name collision due to incorrect mkstemp use', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'NVD-CWE-noinfo'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:kernel:util-linux:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.26.2', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:kernel:util-linux:2.27:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The mkostemp function in login-utils in util-linux when used incorrectly allows remote attackers to cause file name collision and possibly other attacks.'}] | 2020-09-11T15:20Z | 2017-08-23T15:29Z | Insufficient Information | There is insufficient information about the issue to classify it; details are unkown or unspecified. | Insufficient Information | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/categories | 0 | Karel Zak | 2015-08-24 10:05:55+02:00 | chsh, chfn, vipw: fix filenames collision
The utils when compiled WITHOUT libuser then mkostemp()ing
"/etc/%s.XXXXXX" where the filename prefix is argv[0] basename.
An attacker could repeatedly execute the util with modified argv[0]
and after many many attempts mkostemp() may generate suffix which
makes sense. The result maybe temporary file with name like rc.status
ld.so.preload or krb5.keytab, etc.
Note that distros usually use libuser based ch{sh,fn} or stuff from
shadow-utils.
It's probably very minor security bug.
Addresses: CVE-2015-5224
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]> | bde91c85bdc77975155058276f99d2e0f5eab5a9 | False | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | karelzak | visit repo url | visit repo url | main | main( void) | ['void'] | int main(void)
{
FILE *f;
char *tmpname;
f = xfmkstemp(&tmpname, NULL);
unlink(tmpname);
free(tmpname);
fclose(f);
return EXIT_FAILURE;
} | 42 | True | 1 |
CVE-2015-5224 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/bde91c85bdc77975155058276f99d2e0f5eab5a9', 'name': 'https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/bde91c85bdc77975155058276f99d2e0f5eab5a9', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1256686', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1256686', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/76467', 'name': '76467', 'refsource': 'BID', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/08/24/3', 'name': '[oss-security] 20150824 CVE-2015-5224 login-utils: file name collision due to incorrect mkstemp use', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'NVD-CWE-noinfo'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:kernel:util-linux:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.26.2', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:kernel:util-linux:2.27:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The mkostemp function in login-utils in util-linux when used incorrectly allows remote attackers to cause file name collision and possibly other attacks.'}] | 2020-09-11T15:20Z | 2017-08-23T15:29Z | Insufficient Information | There is insufficient information about the issue to classify it; details are unkown or unspecified. | Insufficient Information | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/categories | 0 | Karel Zak | 2015-08-24 10:05:55+02:00 | chsh, chfn, vipw: fix filenames collision
The utils when compiled WITHOUT libuser then mkostemp()ing
"/etc/%s.XXXXXX" where the filename prefix is argv[0] basename.
An attacker could repeatedly execute the util with modified argv[0]
and after many many attempts mkostemp() may generate suffix which
makes sense. The result maybe temporary file with name like rc.status
ld.so.preload or krb5.keytab, etc.
Note that distros usually use libuser based ch{sh,fn} or stuff from
shadow-utils.
It's probably very minor security bug.
Addresses: CVE-2015-5224
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]> | bde91c85bdc77975155058276f99d2e0f5eab5a9 | False | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | karelzak | visit repo url | visit repo url | xmkstemp | xmkstemp( char ** tmpname , char * dir) | ['tmpname', 'dir'] | int xmkstemp(char **tmpname, char *dir)
{
char *localtmp;
char *tmpenv;
mode_t old_mode;
int fd, rc;
/* Some use cases must be capable of being moved atomically
* with rename(2), which is the reason why dir is here. */
if (dir != NULL)
tmpenv = dir;
else
tmpenv = getenv("TMPDIR");
if (tmpenv)
rc = asprintf(&localtmp, "%s/%s.XXXXXX", tmpenv,
program_invocation_short_name);
else
rc = asprintf(&localtmp, "%s/%s.XXXXXX", _PATH_TMP,
program_invocation_short_name);
if (rc < 0)
return -1;
old_mode = umask(077);
fd = mkostemp(localtmp, O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_CLOEXEC);
umask(old_mode);
if (fd == -1) {
free(localtmp);
localtmp = NULL;
}
*tmpname = localtmp;
return fd;
} | 142 | True | 1 |
CVE-2015-5224 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/bde91c85bdc77975155058276f99d2e0f5eab5a9', 'name': 'https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/bde91c85bdc77975155058276f99d2e0f5eab5a9', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1256686', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1256686', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/76467', 'name': '76467', 'refsource': 'BID', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/08/24/3', 'name': '[oss-security] 20150824 CVE-2015-5224 login-utils: file name collision due to incorrect mkstemp use', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'NVD-CWE-noinfo'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:kernel:util-linux:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.26.2', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:kernel:util-linux:2.27:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The mkostemp function in login-utils in util-linux when used incorrectly allows remote attackers to cause file name collision and possibly other attacks.'}] | 2020-09-11T15:20Z | 2017-08-23T15:29Z | Insufficient Information | There is insufficient information about the issue to classify it; details are unkown or unspecified. | Insufficient Information | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/categories | 0 | Karel Zak | 2015-08-24 10:05:55+02:00 | chsh, chfn, vipw: fix filenames collision
The utils when compiled WITHOUT libuser then mkostemp()ing
"/etc/%s.XXXXXX" where the filename prefix is argv[0] basename.
An attacker could repeatedly execute the util with modified argv[0]
and after many many attempts mkostemp() may generate suffix which
makes sense. The result maybe temporary file with name like rc.status
ld.so.preload or krb5.keytab, etc.
Note that distros usually use libuser based ch{sh,fn} or stuff from
shadow-utils.
It's probably very minor security bug.
Addresses: CVE-2015-5224
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]> | bde91c85bdc77975155058276f99d2e0f5eab5a9 | False | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | karelzak | visit repo url | visit repo url | setpwnam | setpwnam( struct passwd * pwd) | ['pwd'] | int setpwnam(struct passwd *pwd)
{
FILE *fp = NULL, *pwf = NULL;
int save_errno;
int found;
int namelen;
int buflen = 256;
int contlen, rc;
char *linebuf = NULL;
char *tmpname = NULL;
char *atomic_dir = "/etc";
pw_init();
if ((fp = xfmkstemp(&tmpname, atomic_dir)) == NULL)
return -1;
/* ptmp should be owned by root.root or root.wheel */
if (fchown(fileno(fp), (uid_t) 0, (gid_t) 0) < 0)
goto fail;
/* acquire exclusive lock */
if (lckpwdf() < 0)
goto fail;
pwf = fopen(PASSWD_FILE, "r");
if (!pwf)
goto fail;
namelen = strlen(pwd->pw_name);
linebuf = malloc(buflen);
if (!linebuf)
goto fail;
/* parse the passwd file */
found = false;
/* Do you wonder why I don't use getpwent? Read comments at top of
* file */
while (fgets(linebuf, buflen, pwf) != NULL) {
contlen = strlen(linebuf);
while (linebuf[contlen - 1] != '\n' && !feof(pwf)) {
char *tmp;
/* Extend input buffer if it failed getting the whole line,
* so now we double the buffer size */
buflen *= 2;
tmp = realloc(linebuf, buflen);
if (tmp == NULL)
goto fail;
linebuf = tmp;
/* And fill the rest of the buffer */
if (fgets(&linebuf[contlen], buflen / 2, pwf) == NULL)
break;
contlen = strlen(linebuf);
/* That was a lot of work for nothing. Gimme perl! */
}
/* Is this the username we were sent to change? */
if (!found && linebuf[namelen] == ':' &&
!strncmp(linebuf, pwd->pw_name, namelen)) {
/* Yes! So go forth in the name of the Lord and
* change it! */
if (putpwent(pwd, fp) < 0)
goto fail;
found = true;
continue;
}
/* Nothing in particular happened, copy input to output */
fputs(linebuf, fp);
}
/* xfmkstemp is too restrictive by default for passwd file */
if (fchmod(fileno(fp), 0644) < 0)
goto fail;
rc = close_stream(fp);
fp = NULL;
if (rc != 0)
goto fail;
fclose(pwf); /* I don't think I want to know if this failed */
pwf = NULL;
if (!found) {
errno = ENOENT; /* give me something better */
goto fail;
}
/* we don't care if we can't remove the backup file */
unlink(PASSWD_FILE ".OLD");
/* we don't care if we can't create the backup file */
ignore_result(link(PASSWD_FILE, PASSWD_FILE ".OLD"));
/* we DO care if we can't rename to the passwd file */
if (rename(tmpname, PASSWD_FILE) < 0)
goto fail;
/* finally: success */
ulckpwdf();
return 0;
fail:
save_errno = errno;
ulckpwdf();
if (fp != NULL)
fclose(fp);
if (tmpname != NULL)
unlink(tmpname);
free(tmpname);
if (pwf != NULL)
fclose(pwf);
free(linebuf);
errno = save_errno;
return -1;
} | 474 | True | 1 |
CVE-2015-5224 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/bde91c85bdc77975155058276f99d2e0f5eab5a9', 'name': 'https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/bde91c85bdc77975155058276f99d2e0f5eab5a9', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1256686', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1256686', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/76467', 'name': '76467', 'refsource': 'BID', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/08/24/3', 'name': '[oss-security] 20150824 CVE-2015-5224 login-utils: file name collision due to incorrect mkstemp use', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': ['Mailing List', 'Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'NVD-CWE-noinfo'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:kernel:util-linux:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.26.2', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:kernel:util-linux:2.27:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The mkostemp function in login-utils in util-linux when used incorrectly allows remote attackers to cause file name collision and possibly other attacks.'}] | 2020-09-11T15:20Z | 2017-08-23T15:29Z | Insufficient Information | There is insufficient information about the issue to classify it; details are unkown or unspecified. | Insufficient Information | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/categories | 0 | Karel Zak | 2015-08-24 10:05:55+02:00 | chsh, chfn, vipw: fix filenames collision
The utils when compiled WITHOUT libuser then mkostemp()ing
"/etc/%s.XXXXXX" where the filename prefix is argv[0] basename.
An attacker could repeatedly execute the util with modified argv[0]
and after many many attempts mkostemp() may generate suffix which
makes sense. The result maybe temporary file with name like rc.status
ld.so.preload or krb5.keytab, etc.
Note that distros usually use libuser based ch{sh,fn} or stuff from
shadow-utils.
It's probably very minor security bug.
Addresses: CVE-2015-5224
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]> | bde91c85bdc77975155058276f99d2e0f5eab5a9 | False | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | karelzak | visit repo url | visit repo url | pw_tmpfile | pw_tmpfile( int lockfd) | ['lockfd'] | static FILE * pw_tmpfile(int lockfd)
{
FILE *fd;
char *tmpname = NULL;
char *dir = "/etc";
if ((fd = xfmkstemp(&tmpname, dir)) == NULL) {
ulckpwdf();
err(EXIT_FAILURE, _("can't open temporary file"));
}
copyfile(lockfd, fileno(fd));
tmp_file = tmpname;
return fd;
} | 72 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-2616 | False | False | False | False | AV:L/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | LOCAL | MEDIUM | NONE | NONE | NONE | COMPLETE | 4.7 | CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | HIGH | LOW | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 4.7 | MEDIUM | 1.0 | 3.6 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/dffab154d29a288aa171ff50263ecc8f2e14a891', 'name': 'https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/dffab154d29a288aa171ff50263ecc8f2e14a891', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2017-2616', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2017-2616', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3793', 'name': 'DSA-3793', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201706-02', 'name': 'GLSA-201706-02', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:0907', 'name': 'RHSA-2017:0907', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1038271', 'name': '1038271', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/96404', 'name': '96404', 'refsource': 'BID', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017-0654.html', 'name': 'RHSA-2017:0654', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-362'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:util-linux_project:util-linux:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndExcluding': '2.32.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_desktop:7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_workstation:7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_server:7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:8.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_desktop:6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_server:6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_workstation:6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_server_aus:7.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_server_aus:7.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_server_eus:7.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_server_eus:7.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_server_eus:7.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'A race condition was found in util-linux before 2.32.1 in the way su handled the management of child processes. A local authenticated attacker could use this flaw to kill other processes with root privileges under specific conditions.'}] | 2019-10-09T23:26Z | 2018-07-27T19:29Z | Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | The program contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, and the code sequence requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence that is operating concurrently. |
This can have security implications when the expected synchronization is in security-critical code, such as recording whether a user is authenticated or modifying important state information that should not be influenced by an outsider.
A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc.
A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:
Exclusivity - the code sequence is given exclusive access to the shared resource, i.e., no other code sequence can modify properties of the shared resource before the original sequence has completed execution.
Atomicity - the code sequence is behaviorally atomic, i.e., no other thread or process can concurrently execute the same sequence of instructions (or a subset) against the same resource.
A race condition exists when an "interfering code sequence" can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. Programmers may assume that certain code sequences execute too quickly to be affected by an interfering code sequence; when they are not, this violates atomicity. For example, the single "x++" statement may appear atomic at the code layer, but it is actually non-atomic at the instruction layer, since it involves a read (the original value of x), followed by a computation (x+1), followed by a write (save the result to x).
The interfering code sequence could be "trusted" or "untrusted." A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the program; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable program.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/362.html | 0 | Karel Zak | 2017-02-01 11:58:09+01:00 | su: properly clear child PID
Reported-by: Tobias Stöckmann <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]> | dffab154d29a288aa171ff50263ecc8f2e14a891 | False | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | karelzak | visit repo url | visit repo url | create_watching_parent | create_watching_parent( void) | ['void'] | create_watching_parent (void)
{
pid_t child;
sigset_t ourset;
struct sigaction oldact[3];
int status = 0;
int retval;
retval = pam_open_session (pamh, 0);
if (is_pam_failure(retval))
{
cleanup_pam (retval);
errx (EXIT_FAILURE, _("cannot open session: %s"),
pam_strerror (pamh, retval));
}
else
_pam_session_opened = 1;
memset(oldact, 0, sizeof(oldact));
child = fork ();
if (child == (pid_t) -1)
{
cleanup_pam (PAM_ABORT);
err (EXIT_FAILURE, _("cannot create child process"));
}
/* the child proceeds to run the shell */
if (child == 0)
return;
/* In the parent watch the child. */
/* su without pam support does not have a helper that keeps
sitting on any directory so let's go to /. */
if (chdir ("/") != 0)
warn (_("cannot change directory to %s"), "/");
sigfillset (&ourset);
if (sigprocmask (SIG_BLOCK, &ourset, NULL))
{
warn (_("cannot block signals"));
caught_signal = true;
}
if (!caught_signal)
{
struct sigaction action;
action.sa_handler = su_catch_sig;
sigemptyset (&action.sa_mask);
action.sa_flags = 0;
sigemptyset (&ourset);
if (!same_session)
{
if (sigaddset(&ourset, SIGINT) || sigaddset(&ourset, SIGQUIT))
{
warn (_("cannot set signal handler"));
caught_signal = true;
}
}
if (!caught_signal && (sigaddset(&ourset, SIGTERM)
|| sigaddset(&ourset, SIGALRM)
|| sigaction(SIGTERM, &action, &oldact[0])
|| sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &ourset, NULL))) {
warn (_("cannot set signal handler"));
caught_signal = true;
}
if (!caught_signal && !same_session && (sigaction(SIGINT, &action, &oldact[1])
|| sigaction(SIGQUIT, &action, &oldact[2])))
{
warn (_("cannot set signal handler"));
caught_signal = true;
}
}
if (!caught_signal)
{
pid_t pid;
for (;;)
{
pid = waitpid (child, &status, WUNTRACED);
if (pid != (pid_t)-1 && WIFSTOPPED (status))
{
kill (getpid (), SIGSTOP);
/* once we get here, we must have resumed */
kill (pid, SIGCONT);
}
else
break;
}
if (pid != (pid_t)-1)
{
if (WIFSIGNALED (status))
{
fprintf (stderr, "%s%s\n", strsignal (WTERMSIG (status)),
WCOREDUMP (status) ? _(" (core dumped)") : "");
status = WTERMSIG (status) + 128;
}
else
status = WEXITSTATUS (status);
}
else if (caught_signal)
status = caught_signal + 128;
else
status = 1;
}
else
status = 1;
if (caught_signal)
{
fprintf (stderr, _("\nSession terminated, killing shell..."));
kill (child, SIGTERM);
}
cleanup_pam (PAM_SUCCESS);
if (caught_signal)
{
sleep (2);
kill (child, SIGKILL);
fprintf (stderr, _(" ...killed.\n"));
/* Let's terminate itself with the received signal.
*
* It seems that shells use WIFSIGNALED() rather than our exit status
* value to detect situations when is necessary to cleanup (reset)
* terminal settings (kzak -- Jun 2013).
*/
switch (caught_signal) {
case SIGTERM:
sigaction(SIGTERM, &oldact[0], NULL);
break;
case SIGINT:
sigaction(SIGINT, &oldact[1], NULL);
break;
case SIGQUIT:
sigaction(SIGQUIT, &oldact[2], NULL);
break;
default:
/* just in case that signal stuff initialization failed and
* caught_signal = true */
caught_signal = SIGKILL;
break;
}
kill(getpid(), caught_signal);
}
exit (status);
} | 654 | True | 1 |
CVE-2021-37600 | False | False | False | True | AV:L/AC:H/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | LOCAL | HIGH | NONE | NONE | NONE | PARTIAL | 1.2 | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | LOCAL | LOW | NONE | REQUIRED | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 5.5 | MEDIUM | 1.8 | 3.6 | False | [{'url': 'https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/1c9143d0c1f979c3daf10e1c37b5b1e916c22a1c', 'name': 'https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/commit/1c9143d0c1f979c3daf10e1c37b5b1e916c22a1c', 'refsource': 'MISC', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/issues/1395', 'name': 'https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/issues/1395', 'refsource': 'MISC', 'tags': ['Exploit', 'Issue Tracking', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20210902-0002/', 'name': 'https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20210902-0002/', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-190'}]}] | LOW | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:kernel:util-linux:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '2.37.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:netapp:ontap_select_deploy_administration_utility:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': '** DISPUTED ** An integer overflow in util-linux through 2.37.1 can potentially cause a buffer overflow if an attacker were able to use system resources in a way that leads to a large number in the /proc/sysvipc/sem file. NOTE: this is unexploitable in GNU C Library environments, and possibly in all realistic environments.'}] | 2021-10-18T12:18Z | 2021-07-30T14:15Z | Integer Overflow or Wraparound | The software performs a calculation that can produce an integer overflow or wraparound, when the logic assumes that the resulting value will always be larger than the original value. This can introduce other weaknesses when the calculation is used for resource management or execution control. | An integer overflow or wraparound occurs when an integer value is incremented to a value that is too large to store in the associated representation. When this occurs, the value may wrap to become a very small or negative number. While this may be intended behavior in circumstances that rely on wrapping, it can have security consequences if the wrap is unexpected. This is especially the case if the integer overflow can be triggered using user-supplied inputs. This becomes security-critical when the result is used to control looping, make a security decision, or determine the offset or size in behaviors such as memory allocation, copying, concatenation, etc.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/190.html | 0 | Karel Zak | 2021-07-27 11:58:31+02:00 | sys-utils/ipcutils: be careful when call calloc() for uint64 nmembs
Fix: https://github.com/karelzak/util-linux/issues/1395
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <[email protected]> | 1c9143d0c1f979c3daf10e1c37b5b1e916c22a1c | False | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | visit repo url | karelzak | visit repo url | visit repo url | get_sem_elements | get_sem_elements( struct sem_data * p) | ['p'] | static void get_sem_elements(struct sem_data *p)
{
size_t i;
if (!p || !p->sem_nsems || p->sem_perm.id < 0)
return;
p->elements = xcalloc(p->sem_nsems, sizeof(struct sem_elem));
for (i = 0; i < p->sem_nsems; i++) {
struct sem_elem *e = &p->elements[i];
union semun arg = { .val = 0 };
e->semval = semctl(p->sem_perm.id, i, GETVAL, arg);
if (e->semval < 0)
err(EXIT_FAILURE, _("%s failed"), "semctl(GETVAL)");
e->ncount = semctl(p->sem_perm.id, i, GETNCNT, arg);
if (e->ncount < 0)
err(EXIT_FAILURE, _("%s failed"), "semctl(GETNCNT)");
e->zcount = semctl(p->sem_perm.id, i, GETZCNT, arg);
if (e->zcount < 0)
err(EXIT_FAILURE, _("%s failed"), "semctl(GETZCNT)");
e->pid = semctl(p->sem_perm.id, i, GETPID, arg);
if (e->pid < 0)
err(EXIT_FAILURE, _("%s failed"), "semctl(GETPID)");
}
} | 246 | True | 1 |
CVE-2014-9140 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | PARTIAL | 5.0 | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | nan | [{'url': 'http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-2433-1', 'name': 'USN-2433-1', 'refsource': 'UBUNTU', 'tags': ['Patch', 'Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2014/dsa-3086', 'name': 'DSA-3086', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/0f95d441e4b5d7512cc5c326c8668a120e048eda', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/0f95d441e4b5d7512cc5c326c8668a120e048eda', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Exploit']}, {'url': 'http://seclists.org/tcpdump/2014/q4/72', 'name': '[tcpdump] 20141124 Re: Official patches for CVE-2014-8767/CVE-2014-8768/CVE-2014-8769?', 'refsource': 'MLIST', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2015/dsa-3193', 'name': 'DSA-3193', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/130730/tcpdump-Denial-Of-Service-Code-Execution.html', 'name': 'http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/130730/tcpdump-Denial-Of-Service-Code-Execution.html', 'refsource': 'MISC', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.mandriva.com/security/advisories?name=MDVSA-2014:240', 'name': 'MDVSA-2014:240', 'refsource': 'MANDRIVA', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://advisories.mageia.org/MGASA-2014-0511.html', 'name': 'http://advisories.mageia.org/MGASA-2014-0511.html', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-updates/2015-03/msg00084.html', 'name': 'openSUSE-SU-2015:0616', 'refsource': 'SUSE', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.mandriva.com/security/advisories?name=MDVSA-2015:125', 'name': 'MDVSA-2015:125', 'refsource': 'MANDRIVA', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://lists.apple.com/archives/security-announce/2015/Aug/msg00001.html', 'name': 'APPLE-SA-2015-08-13-2', 'refsource': 'APPLE', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/kb/HT205031', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/kb/HT205031', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/71468', 'name': '71468', 'refsource': 'BID', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/534829/100/0/threaded', 'name': '20150309 tcpdump 4.7.2 remote crashes', 'refsource': 'BUGTRAQ', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-119'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:redhat:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.6.2', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Buffer overflow in the ppp_hdlc function in print-ppp.c in tcpdump 4.6.2 and earlier allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) cia a crafted PPP packet.'}] | 2018-10-09T19:54Z | 2014-12-05T16:59Z | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The software performs operations on a memory buffer, but it can read from or write to a memory location that is outside of the intended boundary of the buffer. |
Certain languages allow direct addressing of memory locations and do not automatically ensure that these locations are valid for the memory buffer that is being referenced. This can cause read or write operations to be performed on memory locations that may be associated with other variables, data structures, or internal program data.
As a result, an attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code, alter the intended control flow, read sensitive information, or cause the system to crash.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/119.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2014-10-22 12:31:21-07:00 | Do bounds checking when unescaping PPP.
Clean up a const issue while we're at it. | 0f95d441e4b5d7512cc5c326c8668a120e048eda | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | ppp_hdlc | ppp_hdlc( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * p , int length) | ['ndo', 'p', 'length'] | ppp_hdlc(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *p, int length)
{
u_char *b, *s, *t, c;
int i, proto;
const void *se;
if (length <= 0)
return;
b = (uint8_t *)malloc(length);
if (b == NULL)
return;
/*
* Unescape all the data into a temporary, private, buffer.
* Do this so that we dont overwrite the original packet
* contents.
*/
for (s = (u_char *)p, t = b, i = length; i > 0; i--) {
c = *s++;
if (c == 0x7d) {
if (i > 1) {
i--;
c = *s++ ^ 0x20;
} else
continue;
}
*t++ = c;
}
se = ndo->ndo_snapend;
ndo->ndo_snapend = t;
length = t - b;
/* now lets guess about the payload codepoint format */
if (length < 1)
goto trunc;
proto = *b; /* start with a one-octet codepoint guess */
switch (proto) {
case PPP_IP:
ip_print(ndo, b + 1, length - 1);
goto cleanup;
case PPP_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, b + 1, length - 1);
goto cleanup;
default: /* no luck - try next guess */
break;
}
if (length < 2)
goto trunc;
proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(b); /* next guess - load two octets */
switch (proto) {
case (PPP_ADDRESS << 8 | PPP_CONTROL): /* looks like a PPP frame */
if (length < 4)
goto trunc;
proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(b+2); /* load the PPP proto-id */
handle_ppp(ndo, proto, b + 4, length - 4);
break;
default: /* last guess - proto must be a PPP proto-id */
handle_ppp(ndo, proto, b + 2, length - 2);
break;
}
cleanup:
ndo->ndo_snapend = se;
free(b);
return;
trunc:
ndo->ndo_snapend = se;
free(b);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|ppp]"));
} | 337 | True | 1 |
CVE-2015-3138 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | PARTIAL | 5.0 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 7.5 | HIGH | 3.9 | 3.6 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/issues/446', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/issues/446', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/3ed82f4ed0095768529afc22b923c8f7171fff70', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/3ed82f4ed0095768529afc22b923c8f7171fff70', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1212342', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1212342', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-updates/2017-05/msg00018.html', 'name': 'openSUSE-SU-2017:1199', 'refsource': 'SUSE', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-20'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.7.3', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:opensuse_project:leap:42.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:opensuse:leap:42.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'print-wb.c in tcpdump before 4.7.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault and process crash).'}] | 2018-10-30T16:27Z | 2017-09-28T01:29Z | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does
not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the
properties that are required to process the data safely and
correctly. |
Input validation is a frequently-used technique
for checking potentially dangerous inputs in order to
ensure that the inputs are safe for processing within the
code, or when communicating with other components. When
software does not validate input properly, an attacker is
able to craft the input in a form that is not expected by
the rest of the application. This will lead to parts of the
system receiving unintended input, which may result in
altered control flow, arbitrary control of a resource, or
arbitrary code execution.
Input validation is not the only technique for
processing input, however. Other techniques attempt to
transform potentially-dangerous input into something safe, such
as filtering (CWE-790) - which attempts to remove dangerous
inputs - or encoding/escaping (CWE-116), which attempts to
ensure that the input is not misinterpreted when it is included
in output to another component. Other techniques exist as well
(see CWE-138 for more examples.)
Input validation can be applied to:
raw data - strings, numbers, parameters, file contents, etc.
metadata - information about the raw data, such as headers or size
Data can be simple or structured. Structured data
can be composed of many nested layers, composed of
combinations of metadata and raw data, with other simple or
structured data.
Many properties of raw data or metadata may need
to be validated upon entry into the code, such
as:
specified quantities such as size, length, frequency, price, rate, number of operations, time, etc.
implied or derived quantities, such as the actual size of a file instead of a specified size
indexes, offsets, or positions into more complex data structures
symbolic keys or other elements into hash tables, associative arrays, etc.
well-formedness, i.e. syntactic correctness - compliance with expected syntax
lexical token correctness - compliance with rules for what is treated as a token
specified or derived type - the actual type of the input (or what the input appears to be)
consistency - between individual data elements, between raw data and metadata, between references, etc.
conformance to domain-specific rules, e.g. business logic
equivalence - ensuring that equivalent inputs are treated the same
authenticity, ownership, or other attestations about the input, e.g. a cryptographic signature to prove the source of the data
Implied or derived properties of data must often
be calculated or inferred by the code itself. Errors in
deriving properties may be considered a contributing factor
to improper input validation.
Note that "input validation" has very different
meanings to different people, or within different
classification schemes. Caution must be used when
referencing this CWE entry or mapping to it. For example,
some weaknesses might involve inadvertently giving control
to an attacker over an input when they should not be able
to provide an input at all, but sometimes this is referred
to as input validation.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the
distinctions between input validation and output escaping
are often blurred, and developers must be careful to
understand the difference, including how input validation
is not always sufficient to prevent vulnerabilities,
especially when less stringent data types must be
supported, such as free-form text. Consider a SQL injection
scenario in which a person's last name is inserted into a
query. The name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation
step since it is a common last name in the English
language. However, this valid name cannot be directly
inserted into the database because it contains the "'"
apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or
otherwise transformed. In this case, removing the
apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it
would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name
would be recorded.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html | 0 | Denis Ovsienko | 2015-03-25 22:35:12+00:00 | whiteboard: fixup a few reversed tests (GH #446)
This is a follow-up to commit 3a3ec26. | 3ed82f4ed0095768529afc22b923c8f7171fff70 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | wb_id | wb_id( netdissect_options * ndo , const struct pkt_id * id , u_int len) | ['ndo', 'id', 'len'] | wb_id(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pkt_id *id, u_int len)
{
int i;
const char *cp;
const struct id_off *io;
char c;
int nid;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " wb-id:"));
if (len < sizeof(*id) || !ND_TTEST(*id))
return (-1);
len -= sizeof(*id);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u/%s:%u (max %u/%s:%u) ",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&id->pi_ps.slot),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &id->pi_ps.page.p_sid),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&id->pi_ps.page.p_uid),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&id->pi_mslot),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &id->pi_mpage.p_sid),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&id->pi_mpage.p_uid)));
nid = EXTRACT_16BITS(&id->pi_ps.nid);
len -= sizeof(*io) * nid;
io = (struct id_off *)(id + 1);
cp = (char *)(io + nid);
if (!ND_TTEST2(cp, len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
fn_print(ndo, (u_char *)cp, (u_char *)cp + len);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\""));
}
c = '<';
for (i = 0; i < nid && ND_TTEST(*io); ++io, ++i) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c%s:%u",
c, ipaddr_string(ndo, &io->id), EXTRACT_32BITS(&io->off)));
c = ',';
}
if (i >= nid) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ">"));
return (0);
}
return (-1);
} | 337 | True | 1 |
CVE-2015-3138 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | PARTIAL | 5.0 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 7.5 | HIGH | 3.9 | 3.6 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/issues/446', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/issues/446', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/3ed82f4ed0095768529afc22b923c8f7171fff70', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/3ed82f4ed0095768529afc22b923c8f7171fff70', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1212342', 'name': 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1212342', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-updates/2017-05/msg00018.html', 'name': 'openSUSE-SU-2017:1199', 'refsource': 'SUSE', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-20'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.7.3', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:opensuse_project:leap:42.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:opensuse:leap:42.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'print-wb.c in tcpdump before 4.7.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (segmentation fault and process crash).'}] | 2018-10-30T16:27Z | 2017-09-28T01:29Z | Improper Input Validation | The product receives input or data, but it does
not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the
properties that are required to process the data safely and
correctly. |
Input validation is a frequently-used technique
for checking potentially dangerous inputs in order to
ensure that the inputs are safe for processing within the
code, or when communicating with other components. When
software does not validate input properly, an attacker is
able to craft the input in a form that is not expected by
the rest of the application. This will lead to parts of the
system receiving unintended input, which may result in
altered control flow, arbitrary control of a resource, or
arbitrary code execution.
Input validation is not the only technique for
processing input, however. Other techniques attempt to
transform potentially-dangerous input into something safe, such
as filtering (CWE-790) - which attempts to remove dangerous
inputs - or encoding/escaping (CWE-116), which attempts to
ensure that the input is not misinterpreted when it is included
in output to another component. Other techniques exist as well
(see CWE-138 for more examples.)
Input validation can be applied to:
raw data - strings, numbers, parameters, file contents, etc.
metadata - information about the raw data, such as headers or size
Data can be simple or structured. Structured data
can be composed of many nested layers, composed of
combinations of metadata and raw data, with other simple or
structured data.
Many properties of raw data or metadata may need
to be validated upon entry into the code, such
as:
specified quantities such as size, length, frequency, price, rate, number of operations, time, etc.
implied or derived quantities, such as the actual size of a file instead of a specified size
indexes, offsets, or positions into more complex data structures
symbolic keys or other elements into hash tables, associative arrays, etc.
well-formedness, i.e. syntactic correctness - compliance with expected syntax
lexical token correctness - compliance with rules for what is treated as a token
specified or derived type - the actual type of the input (or what the input appears to be)
consistency - between individual data elements, between raw data and metadata, between references, etc.
conformance to domain-specific rules, e.g. business logic
equivalence - ensuring that equivalent inputs are treated the same
authenticity, ownership, or other attestations about the input, e.g. a cryptographic signature to prove the source of the data
Implied or derived properties of data must often
be calculated or inferred by the code itself. Errors in
deriving properties may be considered a contributing factor
to improper input validation.
Note that "input validation" has very different
meanings to different people, or within different
classification schemes. Caution must be used when
referencing this CWE entry or mapping to it. For example,
some weaknesses might involve inadvertently giving control
to an attacker over an input when they should not be able
to provide an input at all, but sometimes this is referred
to as input validation.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the
distinctions between input validation and output escaping
are often blurred, and developers must be careful to
understand the difference, including how input validation
is not always sufficient to prevent vulnerabilities,
especially when less stringent data types must be
supported, such as free-form text. Consider a SQL injection
scenario in which a person's last name is inserted into a
query. The name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation
step since it is a common last name in the English
language. However, this valid name cannot be directly
inserted into the database because it contains the "'"
apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or
otherwise transformed. In this case, removing the
apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it
would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name
would be recorded.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html | 0 | Denis Ovsienko | 2015-03-25 22:35:12+00:00 | whiteboard: fixup a few reversed tests (GH #446)
This is a follow-up to commit 3a3ec26. | 3ed82f4ed0095768529afc22b923c8f7171fff70 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | wb_prep | wb_prep( netdissect_options * ndo , const struct pkt_prep * prep , u_int len) | ['ndo', 'prep', 'len'] | wb_prep(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pkt_prep *prep, u_int len)
{
int n;
const struct pgstate *ps;
const u_char *ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " wb-prep:"));
if (len < sizeof(*prep)) {
return (-1);
}
n = EXTRACT_32BITS(&prep->pp_n);
ps = (const struct pgstate *)(prep + 1);
while (--n >= 0 && !ND_TTEST(*ps)) {
const struct id_off *io, *ie;
char c = '<';
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u/%s:%u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ps->slot),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ps->page.p_sid),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ps->page.p_uid)));
io = (struct id_off *)(ps + 1);
for (ie = io + ps->nid; io < ie && !ND_TTEST(*io); ++io) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c%s:%u", c, ipaddr_string(ndo, &io->id),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&io->off)));
c = ',';
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ">"));
ps = (struct pgstate *)io;
}
return ((u_char *)ps <= ep? 0 : -1);
} | 261 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13687 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/a1eefe986065846b6c69dbc09afd9fa1a02c4a3d', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/a1eefe986065846b6c69dbc09afd9fa1a02c4a3d', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/866c60236c41cea1e1654c8a071897292f64be49', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/866c60236c41cea1e1654c8a071897292f64be49', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:8.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Cisco HDLC parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-chdlc.c:chdlc_print().'}] | 2020-10-28T19:35Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Denis Ovsienko | 2017-02-03 13:14:51+00:00 | CVE-2017-13687/CHDLC: Improve bounds and length checks.
Prevent a possible buffer overread in chdlc_print() and replace the
custom check in chdlc_if_print() with a standard check in chdlc_print()
so that the latter certainly does not over-read even when reached via
juniper_chdlc_print(). Add length checks. | a1eefe986065846b6c69dbc09afd9fa1a02c4a3d | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | chdlc_if_print | chdlc_if_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const struct pcap_pkthdr * h , register const u_char * p) | ['ndo', 'h', 'p'] | chdlc_if_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
register u_int length = h->len;
register u_int caplen = h->caplen;
if (caplen < CHDLC_HDRLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|chdlc]"));
return (caplen);
}
return (chdlc_print(ndo, p,length));
} | 70 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12896 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/f76e7feb41a4327d2b0978449bbdafe98d4a3771', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/f76e7feb41a4327d2b0978449bbdafe98d4a3771', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/4e430c6b0d8b7e77c7abca7e7afb0c3e727502f2', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/4e430c6b0d8b7e77c7abca7e7afb0c3e727502f2', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_desktop:7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_server:7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_server_aus:7.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_server_aus:7.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The ISAKMP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isakmp.c:isakmp_rfc3948_print().'}] | 2020-10-23T18:17Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-03 11:15:34-08:00 | CVE-2017-12896/ISAKMP: Do bounds checks in isakmp_rfc3948_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | f76e7feb41a4327d2b0978449bbdafe98d4a3771 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | isakmp_rfc3948_print | isakmp_rfc3948_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * bp , u_int length , const u_char * bp2) | ['ndo', 'bp', 'length', 'bp2'] | isakmp_rfc3948_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length,
const u_char *bp2)
{
if(length == 1 && bp[0]==0xff) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "isakmp-nat-keep-alive"));
return;
}
if(length < 4) {
goto trunc;
}
/*
* see if this is an IKE packet
*/
if(bp[0]==0 && bp[1]==0 && bp[2]==0 && bp[3]==0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "NONESP-encap: "));
isakmp_print(ndo, bp+4, length-4, bp2);
return;
}
/* must be an ESP packet */
{
int nh, enh, padlen;
int advance;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "UDP-encap: "));
advance = esp_print(ndo, bp, length, bp2, &enh, &padlen);
if(advance <= 0)
return;
bp += advance;
length -= advance + padlen;
nh = enh & 0xff;
ip_print_inner(ndo, bp, length, nh, bp2);
return;
}
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[|isakmp]"));
return;
} | 208 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12897 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The ISO CLNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isoclns_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-03 12:24:14-08:00 | CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | atm_if_print | atm_if_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const struct pcap_pkthdr * h , const u_char * p) | ['ndo', 'h', 'p'] | atm_if_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, const u_char *p)
{
u_int caplen = h->caplen;
u_int length = h->len;
uint32_t llchdr;
u_int hdrlen = 0;
if (caplen < 1 || length < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return (caplen);
}
/* Cisco Style NLPID ? */
if (*p == LLC_UI) {
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CNLPID "));
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1, caplen - 1);
return hdrlen;
}
/*
* Must have at least a DSAP, an SSAP, and the first byte of the
* control field.
*/
if (caplen < 3 || length < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return (caplen);
}
/*
* Extract the presumed LLC header into a variable, for quick
* testing.
* Then check for a header that's neither a header for a SNAP
* packet nor an RFC 2684 routed NLPID-formatted PDU nor
* an 802.2-but-no-SNAP IP packet.
*/
llchdr = EXTRACT_24BITS(p);
if (llchdr != LLC_UI_HDR(LLCSAP_SNAP) &&
llchdr != LLC_UI_HDR(LLCSAP_ISONS) &&
llchdr != LLC_UI_HDR(LLCSAP_IP)) {
/*
* XXX - assume 802.6 MAC header from Fore driver.
*
* Unfortunately, the above list doesn't check for
* all known SAPs, doesn't check for headers where
* the source and destination SAP aren't the same,
* and doesn't check for non-UI frames. It also
* runs the risk of an 802.6 MAC header that happens
* to begin with one of those values being
* incorrectly treated as an 802.2 header.
*
* So is that Fore driver still around? And, if so,
* is it still putting 802.6 MAC headers on ATM
* packets? If so, could it be changed to use a
* new DLT_IEEE802_6 value if we added it?
*/
if (caplen < 20 || length < 20) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return (caplen);
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%08x%08x %08x%08x ",
EXTRACT_32BITS(p),
EXTRACT_32BITS(p+4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(p+8),
EXTRACT_32BITS(p+12)));
p += 20;
length -= 20;
caplen -= 20;
hdrlen += 20;
}
hdrlen += atm_llc_print(ndo, p, length, caplen);
return (hdrlen);
} | 276 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12897 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The ISO CLNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isoclns_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-03 12:24:14-08:00 | CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | chdlc_print | chdlc_print( netdissect_options * ndo , register const u_char * p , u_int length) | ['ndo', 'p', 'length'] | chdlc_print(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *p, u_int length)
{
u_int proto;
const u_char *bp = p;
if (length < CHDLC_HDRLEN)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK2(*p, CHDLC_HDRLEN);
proto = EXTRACT_16BITS(&p[2]);
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s, ethertype %s (0x%04x), length %u: ",
tok2str(chdlc_cast_values, "0x%02x", p[0]),
tok2str(ethertype_values, "Unknown", proto),
proto,
length));
}
length -= CHDLC_HDRLEN;
p += CHDLC_HDRLEN;
switch (proto) {
case ETHERTYPE_IP:
ip_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case CHDLC_TYPE_SLARP:
chdlc_slarp_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
#if 0
case CHDLC_TYPE_CDP:
chdlc_cdp_print(p, length);
break;
#endif
case ETHERTYPE_MPLS:
case ETHERTYPE_MPLS_MULTI:
mpls_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_ISO:
/* is the fudge byte set ? lets verify by spotting ISO headers */
if (length < 2)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK_16BITS(p);
if (*(p+1) == 0x81 ||
*(p+1) == 0x82 ||
*(p+1) == 0x83)
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1, ndo->ndo_snapend - p - 1);
else
isoclns_print(ndo, p, length, ndo->ndo_snapend - p);
break;
default:
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown CHDLC protocol (0x%04x)", proto));
break;
}
return (CHDLC_HDRLEN);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|chdlc]"));
return ndo->ndo_snapend - bp;
} | 312 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12897 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The ISO CLNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isoclns_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-03 12:24:14-08:00 | CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | ethertype_print | ethertype_print( netdissect_options * ndo , u_short ether_type , const u_char * p , u_int length , u_int caplen , const struct lladdr_info * src , const struct lladdr_info * dst) | ['ndo', 'ether_type', 'p', 'length', 'caplen', 'src', 'dst'] | ethertype_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
u_short ether_type, const u_char *p,
u_int length, u_int caplen,
const struct lladdr_info *src, const struct lladdr_info *dst)
{
switch (ether_type) {
case ETHERTYPE_IP:
ip_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_ARP:
case ETHERTYPE_REVARP:
arp_print(ndo, p, length, caplen);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_DN:
decnet_print(ndo, p, length, caplen);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_ATALK:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "et1 "));
atalk_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_AARP:
aarp_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_IPX:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(NOV-ETHII) "));
ipx_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_ISO:
if (length == 0 || caplen == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|osi]"));
return (1);
}
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1, caplen - 1);
return(1);
case ETHERTYPE_PPPOED:
case ETHERTYPE_PPPOES:
case ETHERTYPE_PPPOED2:
case ETHERTYPE_PPPOES2:
pppoe_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_EAPOL:
eap_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_RRCP:
rrcp_print(ndo, p, length, src, dst);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_PPP:
if (length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": "));
ppp_print(ndo, p, length);
}
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_MPCP:
mpcp_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_SLOW:
slow_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_CFM:
case ETHERTYPE_CFM_OLD:
cfm_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_LLDP:
lldp_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_NSH:
nsh_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_LOOPBACK:
loopback_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_MPLS:
case ETHERTYPE_MPLS_MULTI:
mpls_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_TIPC:
tipc_print(ndo, p, length, caplen);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_MS_NLB_HB:
msnlb_print(ndo, p);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_GEONET_OLD:
case ETHERTYPE_GEONET:
geonet_print(ndo, p, length, src);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_CALM_FAST:
calm_fast_print(ndo, p, length, src);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_AOE:
aoe_print(ndo, p, length);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_MEDSA:
medsa_print(ndo, p, length, caplen, src, dst);
return (1);
case ETHERTYPE_LAT:
case ETHERTYPE_SCA:
case ETHERTYPE_MOPRC:
case ETHERTYPE_MOPDL:
case ETHERTYPE_IEEE1905_1:
/* default_print for now */
default:
return (0);
}
} | 599 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12897 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The ISO CLNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isoclns_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-03 12:24:14-08:00 | CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | fr_print | fr_print( netdissect_options * ndo , register const u_char * p , u_int length) | ['ndo', 'p', 'length'] | fr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *p, u_int length)
{
int ret;
uint16_t extracted_ethertype;
u_int dlci;
u_int addr_len;
uint16_t nlpid;
u_int hdr_len;
uint8_t flags[4];
ret = parse_q922_addr(ndo, p, &dlci, &addr_len, flags, length);
if (ret == -1)
goto trunc;
if (ret == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Q.922, invalid address"));
return 0;
}
ND_TCHECK(p[addr_len]);
if (length < addr_len + 1)
goto trunc;
if (p[addr_len] != LLC_UI && dlci != 0) {
/*
* Let's figure out if we have Cisco-style encapsulation,
* with an Ethernet type (Cisco HDLC type?) following the
* address.
*/
if (!ND_TTEST2(p[addr_len], 2) || length < addr_len + 2) {
/* no Ethertype */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "UI %02x! ", p[addr_len]));
} else {
extracted_ethertype = EXTRACT_16BITS(p+addr_len);
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
fr_hdr_print(ndo, length, addr_len, dlci,
flags, extracted_ethertype);
if (ethertype_print(ndo, extracted_ethertype,
p+addr_len+ETHERTYPE_LEN,
length-addr_len-ETHERTYPE_LEN,
ndo->ndo_snapend-p-addr_len-ETHERTYPE_LEN,
NULL, NULL) == 0)
/* ether_type not known, probably it wasn't one */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "UI %02x! ", p[addr_len]));
else
return addr_len + 2;
}
}
ND_TCHECK(p[addr_len+1]);
if (length < addr_len + 2)
goto trunc;
if (p[addr_len + 1] == 0) {
/*
* Assume a pad byte after the control (UI) byte.
* A pad byte should only be used with 3-byte Q.922.
*/
if (addr_len != 3)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Pad! "));
hdr_len = addr_len + 1 /* UI */ + 1 /* pad */ + 1 /* NLPID */;
} else {
/*
* Not a pad byte.
* A pad byte should be used with 3-byte Q.922.
*/
if (addr_len == 3)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "No pad! "));
hdr_len = addr_len + 1 /* UI */ + 1 /* NLPID */;
}
ND_TCHECK(p[hdr_len - 1]);
if (length < hdr_len)
goto trunc;
nlpid = p[hdr_len - 1];
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
fr_hdr_print(ndo, length, addr_len, dlci, flags, nlpid);
p += hdr_len;
length -= hdr_len;
switch (nlpid) {
case NLPID_IP:
ip_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case NLPID_IP6:
ip6_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case NLPID_CLNP:
case NLPID_ESIS:
case NLPID_ISIS:
isoclns_print(ndo, p - 1, length + 1, ndo->ndo_snapend - p + 1); /* OSI printers need the NLPID field */
break;
case NLPID_SNAP:
if (snap_print(ndo, p, length, ndo->ndo_snapend - p, NULL, NULL, 0) == 0) {
/* ether_type not known, print raw packet */
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
fr_hdr_print(ndo, length + hdr_len, hdr_len,
dlci, flags, nlpid);
if (!ndo->ndo_suppress_default_print)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p - hdr_len, length + hdr_len);
}
break;
case NLPID_Q933:
q933_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case NLPID_MFR:
frf15_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case NLPID_PPP:
ppp_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
default:
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
fr_hdr_print(ndo, length + hdr_len, addr_len,
dlci, flags, nlpid);
if (!ndo->ndo_xflag)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p, length);
}
return hdr_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|fr]"));
return 0;
} | 630 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12897 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The ISO CLNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isoclns_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-03 12:24:14-08:00 | CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | gre_print_0 | gre_print_0( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * bp , u_int length) | ['ndo', 'bp', 'length'] | gre_print_0(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
u_int len = length;
uint16_t flags, prot;
/* 16 bits ND_TCHECKed in gre_print() */
flags = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [%s]",
bittok2str(gre_flag_values,"none",flags)));
len -= 2;
bp += 2;
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, 2);
if (len < 2)
goto trunc;
prot = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
len -= 2;
bp += 2;
if ((flags & GRE_CP) | (flags & GRE_RP)) {
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, 2);
if (len < 2)
goto trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", sum 0x%x", EXTRACT_16BITS(bp)));
bp += 2;
len -= 2;
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, 2);
if (len < 2)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", off 0x%x", EXTRACT_16BITS(bp)));
bp += 2;
len -= 2;
}
if (flags & GRE_KP) {
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, 4);
if (len < 4)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", key=0x%x", EXTRACT_32BITS(bp)));
bp += 4;
len -= 4;
}
if (flags & GRE_SP) {
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, 4);
if (len < 4)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", seq %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(bp)));
bp += 4;
len -= 4;
}
if (flags & GRE_RP) {
for (;;) {
uint16_t af;
uint8_t sreoff;
uint8_t srelen;
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, 4);
if (len < 4)
goto trunc;
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
sreoff = *(bp + 2);
srelen = *(bp + 3);
bp += 4;
len -= 4;
if (af == 0 && srelen == 0)
break;
if (!gre_sre_print(ndo, af, sreoff, srelen, bp, len))
goto trunc;
if (len < srelen)
goto trunc;
bp += srelen;
len -= srelen;
}
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", proto %s (0x%04x)",
tok2str(ethertype_values,"unknown",prot),
prot));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u",length));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": ")); /* put in a colon as protocol demarc */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t")); /* if verbose go multiline */
switch (prot) {
case ETHERTYPE_IP:
ip_print(ndo, bp, len);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, bp, len);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_MPLS:
mpls_print(ndo, bp, len);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_IPX:
ipx_print(ndo, bp, len);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_ATALK:
atalk_print(ndo, bp, len);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_GRE_ISO:
isoclns_print(ndo, bp, len, ndo->ndo_snapend - bp);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_TEB:
ether_print(ndo, bp, len, ndo->ndo_snapend - bp, NULL, NULL);
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "gre-proto-0x%x", prot));
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
} | 627 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12897 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The ISO CLNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isoclns_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-03 12:24:14-08:00 | CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | isoclns_print | isoclns_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const uint8_t * p , u_int length , u_int caplen) | ['ndo', 'p', 'length', 'caplen'] | isoclns_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *p, u_int length, u_int caplen)
{
if (caplen <= 1) { /* enough bytes on the wire ? */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "|OSI"));
return;
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "OSI NLPID %s (0x%02x): ", tok2str(nlpid_values, "Unknown", *p), *p));
switch (*p) {
case NLPID_CLNP:
if (!clnp_print(ndo, p, length))
print_unknown_data(ndo, p, "\n\t", caplen);
break;
case NLPID_ESIS:
esis_print(ndo, p, length);
return;
case NLPID_ISIS:
if (!isis_print(ndo, p, length))
print_unknown_data(ndo, p, "\n\t", caplen);
break;
case NLPID_NULLNS:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%slength: %u", ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ", length));
break;
case NLPID_Q933:
q933_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1);
break;
case NLPID_IP:
ip_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1);
break;
case NLPID_IP6:
ip6_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1);
break;
case NLPID_PPP:
ppp_print(ndo, p + 1, length - 1);
break;
default:
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "OSI NLPID 0x%02x unknown", *p));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%slength: %u", ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ", length));
if (caplen > 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, p, "\n\t", caplen);
break;
}
} | 298 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12897 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The ISO CLNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isoclns_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-03 12:24:14-08:00 | CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | juniper_atm1_print | juniper_atm1_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const struct pcap_pkthdr * h , register const u_char * p) | ['ndo', 'h', 'p'] | juniper_atm1_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
int llc_hdrlen;
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_ATM1;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
if (l2info.cookie[0] == 0x80) { /* OAM cell ? */
oam_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, ATM_OAM_NOHEC);
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xfefe03 || /* NLPID encaps ? */
EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xaaaa03) { /* SNAP encaps ? */
llc_hdrlen = llc_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen, NULL, NULL);
if (llc_hdrlen > 0)
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (p[0] == 0x03) { /* Cisco style NLPID encaps ? */
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, l2info.length - 1, l2info.caplen - 1);
/* FIXME check if frame was recognized */
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (ip_heuristic_guess(ndo, p, l2info.length) != 0) /* last try - vcmux encaps ? */
return l2info.header_len;
return l2info.header_len;
} | 203 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12897 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The ISO CLNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isoclns_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-03 12:24:14-08:00 | CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | juniper_atm2_print | juniper_atm2_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const struct pcap_pkthdr * h , register const u_char * p) | ['ndo', 'h', 'p'] | juniper_atm2_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
int llc_hdrlen;
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_ATM2;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
if (l2info.cookie[7] & ATM2_PKT_TYPE_MASK) { /* OAM cell ? */
oam_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, ATM_OAM_NOHEC);
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xfefe03 || /* NLPID encaps ? */
EXTRACT_24BITS(p) == 0xaaaa03) { /* SNAP encaps ? */
llc_hdrlen = llc_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen, NULL, NULL);
if (llc_hdrlen > 0)
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (l2info.direction != JUNIPER_BPF_PKT_IN && /* ether-over-1483 encaps ? */
(EXTRACT_32BITS(l2info.cookie) & ATM2_GAP_COUNT_MASK)) {
ether_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen, NULL, NULL);
return l2info.header_len;
}
if (p[0] == 0x03) { /* Cisco style NLPID encaps ? */
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, l2info.length - 1, l2info.caplen - 1);
/* FIXME check if frame was recognized */
return l2info.header_len;
}
if(juniper_ppp_heuristic_guess(ndo, p, l2info.length) != 0) /* PPPoA vcmux encaps ? */
return l2info.header_len;
if (ip_heuristic_guess(ndo, p, l2info.length) != 0) /* last try - vcmux encaps ? */
return l2info.header_len;
return l2info.header_len;
} | 268 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12897 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The ISO CLNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isoclns_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-03 12:24:14-08:00 | CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | juniper_mfr_print | juniper_mfr_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const struct pcap_pkthdr * h , register const u_char * p) | ['ndo', 'h', 'p'] | juniper_mfr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
memset(&l2info, 0, sizeof(l2info));
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_MFR;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
/* child-link ? */
if (l2info.cookie_len == 0) {
mfr_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
}
/* first try the LSQ protos */
if (l2info.cookie_len == AS_PIC_COOKIE_LEN) {
switch(l2info.proto) {
case JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_IPV4:
ip_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
case JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, p,l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
case JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_MPLS:
mpls_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
case JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_ISO:
isoclns_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen);
return l2info.header_len;
default:
break;
}
return l2info.header_len;
}
/* suppress Bundle-ID if frame was captured on a child-link */
if (ndo->ndo_eflag && EXTRACT_32BITS(l2info.cookie) != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Bundle-ID %u, ", l2info.bundle));
switch (l2info.proto) {
case (LLCSAP_ISONS<<8 | LLCSAP_ISONS):
isoclns_print(ndo, p + 1, l2info.length - 1, l2info.caplen - 1);
break;
case (LLC_UI<<8 | NLPID_Q933):
case (LLC_UI<<8 | NLPID_IP):
case (LLC_UI<<8 | NLPID_IP6):
/* pass IP{4,6} to the OSI layer for proper link-layer printing */
isoclns_print(ndo, p - 1, l2info.length + 1, l2info.caplen + 1);
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown protocol 0x%04x, length %u", l2info.proto, l2info.length));
}
return l2info.header_len;
} | 349 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12897 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The ISO CLNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isoclns_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-03 12:24:14-08:00 | CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | juniper_mlfr_print | juniper_mlfr_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const struct pcap_pkthdr * h , register const u_char * p) | ['ndo', 'h', 'p'] | juniper_mlfr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_MLFR;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
p+=l2info.header_len;
/* suppress Bundle-ID if frame was captured on a child-link */
if (ndo->ndo_eflag && EXTRACT_32BITS(l2info.cookie) != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Bundle-ID %u, ", l2info.bundle));
switch (l2info.proto) {
case (LLC_UI):
case (LLC_UI<<8):
isoclns_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen);
break;
case (LLC_UI<<8 | NLPID_Q933):
case (LLC_UI<<8 | NLPID_IP):
case (LLC_UI<<8 | NLPID_IP6):
/* pass IP{4,6} to the OSI layer for proper link-layer printing */
isoclns_print(ndo, p - 1, l2info.length + 1, l2info.caplen + 1);
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "unknown protocol 0x%04x, length %u", l2info.proto, l2info.length));
}
return l2info.header_len;
} | 200 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12897 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The ISO CLNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isoclns_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-03 12:24:14-08:00 | CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | juniper_mlppp_print | juniper_mlppp_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const struct pcap_pkthdr * h , register const u_char * p) | ['ndo', 'h', 'p'] | juniper_mlppp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, register const u_char *p)
{
struct juniper_l2info_t l2info;
l2info.pictype = DLT_JUNIPER_MLPPP;
if (juniper_parse_header(ndo, p, h, &l2info) == 0)
return l2info.header_len;
/* suppress Bundle-ID if frame was captured on a child-link
* best indicator if the cookie looks like a proto */
if (ndo->ndo_eflag &&
EXTRACT_16BITS(&l2info.cookie) != PPP_OSI &&
EXTRACT_16BITS(&l2info.cookie) != (PPP_ADDRESS << 8 | PPP_CONTROL))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Bundle-ID %u: ", l2info.bundle));
p+=l2info.header_len;
/* first try the LSQ protos */
switch(l2info.proto) {
case JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_IPV4:
/* IP traffic going to the RE would not have a cookie
* -> this must be incoming IS-IS over PPP
*/
if (l2info.cookie[4] == (JUNIPER_LSQ_COOKIE_RE|JUNIPER_LSQ_COOKIE_DIR))
ppp_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
else
ip_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
case JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, p,l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
case JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_MPLS:
mpls_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
return l2info.header_len;
case JUNIPER_LSQ_L3_PROTO_ISO:
isoclns_print(ndo, p, l2info.length, l2info.caplen);
return l2info.header_len;
default:
break;
}
/* zero length cookie ? */
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(&l2info.cookie)) {
case PPP_OSI:
ppp_print(ndo, p - 2, l2info.length + 2);
break;
case (PPP_ADDRESS << 8 | PPP_CONTROL): /* fall through */
default:
ppp_print(ndo, p, l2info.length);
break;
}
return l2info.header_len;
} | 284 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12897 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The ISO CLNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isoclns_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-03 12:24:14-08:00 | CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | llc_print | llc_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * p , u_int length , u_int caplen , const struct lladdr_info * src , const struct lladdr_info * dst) | ['ndo', 'p', 'length', 'caplen', 'src', 'dst'] | llc_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *p, u_int length, u_int caplen,
const struct lladdr_info *src, const struct lladdr_info *dst)
{
uint8_t dsap_field, dsap, ssap_field, ssap;
uint16_t control;
int hdrlen;
int is_u;
if (caplen < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|llc]"));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)p, caplen);
return (caplen);
}
if (length < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|llc]"));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)p, caplen);
return (length);
}
dsap_field = *p;
ssap_field = *(p + 1);
/*
* OK, what type of LLC frame is this? The length
* of the control field depends on that - I frames
* have a two-byte control field, and U frames have
* a one-byte control field.
*/
control = *(p + 2);
if ((control & LLC_U_FMT) == LLC_U_FMT) {
/*
* U frame.
*/
is_u = 1;
hdrlen = 3; /* DSAP, SSAP, 1-byte control field */
} else {
/*
* The control field in I and S frames is
* 2 bytes...
*/
if (caplen < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|llc]"));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)p, caplen);
return (caplen);
}
if (length < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|llc]"));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)p, caplen);
return (length);
}
/*
* ...and is little-endian.
*/
control = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p + 2);
is_u = 0;
hdrlen = 4; /* DSAP, SSAP, 2-byte control field */
}
if (ssap_field == LLCSAP_GLOBAL && dsap_field == LLCSAP_GLOBAL) {
/*
* This is an Ethernet_802.3 IPX frame; it has an
* 802.3 header (i.e., an Ethernet header where the
* type/length field is <= ETHERMTU, i.e. it's a length
* field, not a type field), but has no 802.2 header -
* the IPX packet starts right after the Ethernet header,
* with a signature of two bytes of 0xFF (which is
* LLCSAP_GLOBAL).
*
* (It might also have been an Ethernet_802.3 IPX at
* one time, but got bridged onto another network,
* such as an 802.11 network; this has appeared in at
* least one capture file.)
*/
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IPX 802.3: "));
ipx_print(ndo, p, length);
return (0); /* no LLC header */
}
dsap = dsap_field & ~LLC_IG;
ssap = ssap_field & ~LLC_GSAP;
if (ndo->ndo_eflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "LLC, dsap %s (0x%02x) %s, ssap %s (0x%02x) %s",
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown", dsap),
dsap,
tok2str(llc_ig_flag_values, "Unknown", dsap_field & LLC_IG),
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown", ssap),
ssap,
tok2str(llc_flag_values, "Unknown", ssap_field & LLC_GSAP)));
if (is_u) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", ctrl 0x%02x: ", control));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", ctrl 0x%04x: ", control));
}
}
/*
* Skip LLC header.
*/
p += hdrlen;
length -= hdrlen;
caplen -= hdrlen;
if (ssap == LLCSAP_SNAP && dsap == LLCSAP_SNAP
&& control == LLC_UI) {
/*
* XXX - what *is* the right bridge pad value here?
* Does anybody ever bridge one form of LAN traffic
* over a networking type that uses 802.2 LLC?
*/
if (!snap_print(ndo, p, length, caplen, src, dst, 2)) {
/*
* Unknown packet type; tell our caller, by
* returning a negative value, so they
* can print the raw packet.
*/
return (-(hdrlen + 5)); /* include LLC and SNAP header */
} else
return (hdrlen + 5); /* include LLC and SNAP header */
}
if (ssap == LLCSAP_8021D && dsap == LLCSAP_8021D &&
control == LLC_UI) {
stp_print(ndo, p, length);
return (hdrlen);
}
if (ssap == LLCSAP_IP && dsap == LLCSAP_IP &&
control == LLC_UI) {
/*
* This is an RFC 948-style IP packet, with
* an 802.3 header and an 802.2 LLC header
* with the source and destination SAPs being
* the IP SAP.
*/
ip_print(ndo, p, length);
return (hdrlen);
}
if (ssap == LLCSAP_IPX && dsap == LLCSAP_IPX &&
control == LLC_UI) {
/*
* This is an Ethernet_802.2 IPX frame, with an 802.3
* header and an 802.2 LLC header with the source and
* destination SAPs being the IPX SAP.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IPX 802.2: "));
ipx_print(ndo, p, length);
return (hdrlen);
}
#ifdef ENABLE_SMB
if (ssap == LLCSAP_NETBEUI && dsap == LLCSAP_NETBEUI
&& (!(control & LLC_S_FMT) || control == LLC_U_FMT)) {
/*
* we don't actually have a full netbeui parser yet, but the
* smb parser can handle many smb-in-netbeui packets, which
* is very useful, so we call that
*
* We don't call it for S frames, however, just I frames
* (which are frames that don't have the low-order bit,
* LLC_S_FMT, set in the first byte of the control field)
* and UI frames (whose control field is just 3, LLC_U_FMT).
*/
netbeui_print(ndo, control, p, length);
return (hdrlen);
}
#endif
if (ssap == LLCSAP_ISONS && dsap == LLCSAP_ISONS
&& control == LLC_UI) {
isoclns_print(ndo, p, length, caplen);
return (hdrlen);
}
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag) {
if (ssap == dsap) {
if (src == NULL || dst == NULL)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown DSAP 0x%02x", dsap)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s %s ",
(src->addr_string)(ndo, src->addr),
(dst->addr_string)(ndo, dst->addr),
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown DSAP 0x%02x", dsap)));
} else {
if (src == NULL || dst == NULL)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s ",
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown SSAP 0x%02x", ssap),
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown DSAP 0x%02x", dsap)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s %s > %s %s ",
(src->addr_string)(ndo, src->addr),
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown SSAP 0x%02x", ssap),
(dst->addr_string)(ndo, dst->addr),
tok2str(llc_values, "Unknown DSAP 0x%02x", dsap)));
}
}
if (is_u) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Unnumbered, %s, Flags [%s], length %u",
tok2str(llc_cmd_values, "%02x", LLC_U_CMD(control)),
tok2str(llc_flag_values,"?",(ssap_field & LLC_GSAP) | (control & LLC_U_POLL)),
length + hdrlen));
if ((control & ~LLC_U_POLL) == LLC_XID) {
if (length == 0) {
/*
* XID with no payload.
* This could, for example, be an SNA
* "short form" XID.
*/
return (hdrlen);
}
if (caplen < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|llc]"));
if (caplen > 0)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)p, caplen);
return (hdrlen);
}
if (*p == LLC_XID_FI) {
if (caplen < 3 || length < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|llc]"));
if (caplen > 0)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)p, caplen);
} else
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %02x %02x", p[1], p[2]));
return (hdrlen);
}
}
} else {
if ((control & LLC_S_FMT) == LLC_S_FMT) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Supervisory, %s, rcv seq %u, Flags [%s], length %u",
tok2str(llc_supervisory_values,"?",LLC_S_CMD(control)),
LLC_IS_NR(control),
tok2str(llc_flag_values,"?",(ssap_field & LLC_GSAP) | (control & LLC_IS_POLL)),
length + hdrlen));
return (hdrlen); /* no payload to print */
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Information, send seq %u, rcv seq %u, Flags [%s], length %u",
LLC_I_NS(control),
LLC_IS_NR(control),
tok2str(llc_flag_values,"?",(ssap_field & LLC_GSAP) | (control & LLC_IS_POLL)),
length + hdrlen));
}
}
return (-hdrlen);
} | 1131 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12897 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The ISO CLNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isoclns_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-03 12:24:14-08:00 | CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | mpls_print | mpls_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * bp , u_int length) | ['ndo', 'bp', 'length'] | mpls_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
const u_char *p;
uint32_t label_entry;
uint16_t label_stack_depth = 0;
enum mpls_packet_type pt = PT_UNKNOWN;
p = bp;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "MPLS"));
do {
ND_TCHECK2(*p, sizeof(label_entry));
if (length < sizeof(label_entry)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|MPLS], length %u", length));
return;
}
label_entry = EXTRACT_32BITS(p);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s(label %u",
(label_stack_depth && ndo->ndo_vflag) ? "\n\t" : " ",
MPLS_LABEL(label_entry)));
label_stack_depth++;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag &&
MPLS_LABEL(label_entry) < sizeof(mpls_labelname) / sizeof(mpls_labelname[0]))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (%s)", mpls_labelname[MPLS_LABEL(label_entry)]));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", exp %u", MPLS_EXP(label_entry)));
if (MPLS_STACK(label_entry))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", [S]"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", ttl %u)", MPLS_TTL(label_entry)));
p += sizeof(label_entry);
length -= sizeof(label_entry);
} while (!MPLS_STACK(label_entry));
/*
* Try to figure out the packet type.
*/
switch (MPLS_LABEL(label_entry)) {
case 0: /* IPv4 explicit NULL label */
case 3: /* IPv4 implicit NULL label */
pt = PT_IPV4;
break;
case 2: /* IPv6 explicit NULL label */
pt = PT_IPV6;
break;
default:
/*
* Generally there's no indication of protocol in MPLS label
* encoding.
*
* However, draft-hsmit-isis-aal5mux-00.txt describes a
* technique for encapsulating IS-IS and IP traffic on the
* same ATM virtual circuit; you look at the first payload
* byte to determine the network layer protocol, based on
* the fact that
*
* 1) the first byte of an IP header is 0x45-0x4f
* for IPv4 and 0x60-0x6f for IPv6;
*
* 2) the first byte of an OSI CLNP packet is 0x81,
* the first byte of an OSI ES-IS packet is 0x82,
* and the first byte of an OSI IS-IS packet is
* 0x83;
*
* so the network layer protocol can be inferred from the
* first byte of the packet, if the protocol is one of the
* ones listed above.
*
* Cisco sends control-plane traffic MPLS-encapsulated in
* this fashion.
*/
ND_TCHECK(*p);
if (length < 1) {
/* nothing to print */
return;
}
switch(*p) {
case 0x45:
case 0x46:
case 0x47:
case 0x48:
case 0x49:
case 0x4a:
case 0x4b:
case 0x4c:
case 0x4d:
case 0x4e:
case 0x4f:
pt = PT_IPV4;
break;
case 0x60:
case 0x61:
case 0x62:
case 0x63:
case 0x64:
case 0x65:
case 0x66:
case 0x67:
case 0x68:
case 0x69:
case 0x6a:
case 0x6b:
case 0x6c:
case 0x6d:
case 0x6e:
case 0x6f:
pt = PT_IPV6;
break;
case 0x81:
case 0x82:
case 0x83:
pt = PT_OSI;
break;
default:
/* ok bail out - we did not figure out what it is*/
break;
}
}
/*
* Print the payload.
*/
if (pt == PT_UNKNOWN) {
if (!ndo->ndo_suppress_default_print)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p, length);
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ndo->ndo_vflag ? "\n\t" : " "));
switch (pt) {
case PT_IPV4:
ip_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case PT_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case PT_OSI:
isoclns_print(ndo, p, length, length);
break;
default:
break;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|MPLS]"));
} | 503 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12897 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The ISO CLNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isoclns_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-03 12:24:14-08:00 | CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | null_if_print | null_if_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const struct pcap_pkthdr * h , const u_char * p) | ['ndo', 'h', 'p'] | null_if_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, const u_char *p)
{
u_int length = h->len;
u_int caplen = h->caplen;
u_int family;
if (caplen < NULL_HDRLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|null]"));
return (NULL_HDRLEN);
}
memcpy((char *)&family, (const char *)p, sizeof(family));
/*
* This isn't necessarily in our host byte order; if this is
* a DLT_LOOP capture, it's in network byte order, and if
* this is a DLT_NULL capture from a machine with the opposite
* byte-order, it's in the opposite byte order from ours.
*
* If the upper 16 bits aren't all zero, assume it's byte-swapped.
*/
if ((family & 0xFFFF0000) != 0)
family = SWAPLONG(family);
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
null_hdr_print(ndo, family, length);
length -= NULL_HDRLEN;
caplen -= NULL_HDRLEN;
p += NULL_HDRLEN;
switch (family) {
case BSD_AFNUM_INET:
ip_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case BSD_AFNUM_INET6_BSD:
case BSD_AFNUM_INET6_FREEBSD:
case BSD_AFNUM_INET6_DARWIN:
ip6_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case BSD_AFNUM_ISO:
isoclns_print(ndo, p, length, caplen);
break;
case BSD_AFNUM_APPLETALK:
atalk_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case BSD_AFNUM_IPX:
ipx_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
default:
/* unknown AF_ value */
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
null_hdr_print(ndo, family, length + NULL_HDRLEN);
if (!ndo->ndo_suppress_default_print)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p, caplen);
}
return (NULL_HDRLEN);
} | 247 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12897 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The ISO CLNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isoclns_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-03 12:24:14-08:00 | CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 1dcd10aceabbc03bf571ea32b892c522cbe923de | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | handle_ppp | handle_ppp( netdissect_options * ndo , u_int proto , const u_char * p , int length) | ['ndo', 'proto', 'p', 'length'] | handle_ppp(netdissect_options *ndo,
u_int proto, const u_char *p, int length)
{
if ((proto & 0xff00) == 0x7e00) { /* is this an escape code ? */
ppp_hdlc(ndo, p - 1, length);
return;
}
switch (proto) {
case PPP_LCP: /* fall through */
case PPP_IPCP:
case PPP_OSICP:
case PPP_MPLSCP:
case PPP_IPV6CP:
case PPP_CCP:
case PPP_BACP:
handle_ctrl_proto(ndo, proto, p, length);
break;
case PPP_ML:
handle_mlppp(ndo, p, length);
break;
case PPP_CHAP:
handle_chap(ndo, p, length);
break;
case PPP_PAP:
handle_pap(ndo, p, length);
break;
case PPP_BAP: /* XXX: not yet completed */
handle_bap(ndo, p, length);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_IP: /*XXX*/
case PPP_VJNC:
case PPP_IP:
ip_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_IPV6: /*XXX*/
case PPP_IPV6:
ip6_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case ETHERTYPE_IPX: /*XXX*/
case PPP_IPX:
ipx_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case PPP_OSI:
isoclns_print(ndo, p, length, length);
break;
case PPP_MPLS_UCAST:
case PPP_MPLS_MCAST:
mpls_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case PPP_COMP:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "compressed PPP data"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ", tok2str(ppptype2str, "unknown PPP protocol (0x%04x)", proto)));
print_unknown_data(ndo, p, "\n\t", length);
break;
}
} | 274 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12898 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/19d25dd8781620cd41bf178a5e2e27fc1cf242d0', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/19d25dd8781620cd41bf178a5e2e27fc1cf242d0', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The NFS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-nfs.c:interp_reply().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-03 15:14:51-08:00 | CVE-2017-12898/NFS: Fix bounds checking.
Fix the bounds checking for the NFSv3 WRITE procedure to check whether the
length of the opaque data being written is present in the captured data,
not just whether the byte count is present in the captured data.
furthest forward in the packet, not the item before it. (This also lets
us eliminate the check for the "stable" argument being present in the
captured data; rewrite the code to print that to make it a bit clearer.)
Check that the entire ar_stat field is present in the capture.
Note that parse_wcc_attr() is called after we've already checked whether
the wcc_data is present.
Check before fetching the "access" part of the NFSv3 ACCESS results.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Include a test for the "check before fetching the "access" part..." fix,
using the capture supplied by the reporter(s). | 19d25dd8781620cd41bf178a5e2e27fc1cf242d0 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | interp_reply | interp_reply( netdissect_options * ndo , const struct sunrpc_msg * rp , uint32_t proc , uint32_t vers , int length) | ['ndo', 'rp', 'proc', 'vers', 'length'] | interp_reply(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct sunrpc_msg *rp, uint32_t proc, uint32_t vers, int length)
{
register const uint32_t *dp;
register int v3;
int er;
v3 = (vers == NFS_VER3);
if (!v3 && proc < NFS_NPROCS)
proc = nfsv3_procid[proc];
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", tok2str(nfsproc_str, "proc-%u", proc)));
switch (proc) {
case NFSPROC_GETATTR:
dp = parserep(ndo, rp, length);
if (dp != NULL && parseattrstat(ndo, dp, !ndo->ndo_qflag, v3) != 0)
return;
break;
case NFSPROC_SETATTR:
if (!(dp = parserep(ndo, rp, length)))
return;
if (v3) {
if (parsewccres(ndo, dp, ndo->ndo_vflag))
return;
} else {
if (parseattrstat(ndo, dp, !ndo->ndo_qflag, 0) != 0)
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_LOOKUP:
if (!(dp = parserep(ndo, rp, length)))
break;
if (v3) {
if (!(dp = parsestatus(ndo, dp, &er)))
break;
if (er) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " post dattr:"));
dp = parse_post_op_attr(ndo, dp, ndo->ndo_vflag);
}
} else {
if (!(dp = parsefh(ndo, dp, v3)))
break;
if ((dp = parse_post_op_attr(ndo, dp, ndo->ndo_vflag)) &&
ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " post dattr:"));
dp = parse_post_op_attr(ndo, dp, ndo->ndo_vflag);
}
}
if (dp)
return;
} else {
if (parsediropres(ndo, dp) != 0)
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_ACCESS:
if (!(dp = parserep(ndo, rp, length)))
break;
if (!(dp = parsestatus(ndo, dp, &er)))
break;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " attr:"));
if (!(dp = parse_post_op_attr(ndo, dp, ndo->ndo_vflag)))
break;
if (!er)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " c %04x", EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[0])));
return;
case NFSPROC_READLINK:
dp = parserep(ndo, rp, length);
if (dp != NULL && parselinkres(ndo, dp, v3) != 0)
return;
break;
case NFSPROC_READ:
if (!(dp = parserep(ndo, rp, length)))
break;
if (v3) {
if (!(dp = parsestatus(ndo, dp, &er)))
break;
if (!(dp = parse_post_op_attr(ndo, dp, ndo->ndo_vflag)))
break;
if (er)
return;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[1]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u bytes", EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[0])));
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[1]))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " EOF"));
}
return;
} else {
if (parseattrstat(ndo, dp, ndo->ndo_vflag, 0) != 0)
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_WRITE:
if (!(dp = parserep(ndo, rp, length)))
break;
if (v3) {
if (!(dp = parsestatus(ndo, dp, &er)))
break;
if (!(dp = parse_wcc_data(ndo, dp, ndo->ndo_vflag)))
break;
if (er)
return;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u bytes", EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[0])));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[1]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " <%s>",
tok2str(nfsv3_writemodes,
NULL, EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[1]))));
}
return;
}
} else {
if (parseattrstat(ndo, dp, ndo->ndo_vflag, v3) != 0)
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_CREATE:
case NFSPROC_MKDIR:
if (!(dp = parserep(ndo, rp, length)))
break;
if (v3) {
if (parsecreateopres(ndo, dp, ndo->ndo_vflag) != NULL)
return;
} else {
if (parsediropres(ndo, dp) != 0)
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_SYMLINK:
if (!(dp = parserep(ndo, rp, length)))
break;
if (v3) {
if (parsecreateopres(ndo, dp, ndo->ndo_vflag) != NULL)
return;
} else {
if (parsestatus(ndo, dp, &er) != NULL)
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_MKNOD:
if (!(dp = parserep(ndo, rp, length)))
break;
if (parsecreateopres(ndo, dp, ndo->ndo_vflag) != NULL)
return;
break;
case NFSPROC_REMOVE:
case NFSPROC_RMDIR:
if (!(dp = parserep(ndo, rp, length)))
break;
if (v3) {
if (parsewccres(ndo, dp, ndo->ndo_vflag))
return;
} else {
if (parsestatus(ndo, dp, &er) != NULL)
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_RENAME:
if (!(dp = parserep(ndo, rp, length)))
break;
if (v3) {
if (!(dp = parsestatus(ndo, dp, &er)))
break;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " from:"));
if (!(dp = parse_wcc_data(ndo, dp, ndo->ndo_vflag)))
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " to:"));
if (!(dp = parse_wcc_data(ndo, dp, ndo->ndo_vflag)))
break;
}
return;
} else {
if (parsestatus(ndo, dp, &er) != NULL)
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_LINK:
if (!(dp = parserep(ndo, rp, length)))
break;
if (v3) {
if (!(dp = parsestatus(ndo, dp, &er)))
break;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " file POST:"));
if (!(dp = parse_post_op_attr(ndo, dp, ndo->ndo_vflag)))
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " dir:"));
if (!(dp = parse_wcc_data(ndo, dp, ndo->ndo_vflag)))
break;
return;
}
} else {
if (parsestatus(ndo, dp, &er) != NULL)
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_READDIR:
if (!(dp = parserep(ndo, rp, length)))
break;
if (v3) {
if (parsev3rddirres(ndo, dp, ndo->ndo_vflag))
return;
} else {
if (parserddires(ndo, dp) != 0)
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_READDIRPLUS:
if (!(dp = parserep(ndo, rp, length)))
break;
if (parsev3rddirres(ndo, dp, ndo->ndo_vflag))
return;
break;
case NFSPROC_FSSTAT:
dp = parserep(ndo, rp, length);
if (dp != NULL && parsestatfs(ndo, dp, v3) != 0)
return;
break;
case NFSPROC_FSINFO:
dp = parserep(ndo, rp, length);
if (dp != NULL && parsefsinfo(ndo, dp) != 0)
return;
break;
case NFSPROC_PATHCONF:
dp = parserep(ndo, rp, length);
if (dp != NULL && parsepathconf(ndo, dp) != 0)
return;
break;
case NFSPROC_COMMIT:
dp = parserep(ndo, rp, length);
if (dp != NULL && parsewccres(ndo, dp, ndo->ndo_vflag) != 0)
return;
break;
default:
return;
}
trunc:
if (!nfserr)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
} | 1593 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12898 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/19d25dd8781620cd41bf178a5e2e27fc1cf242d0', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/19d25dd8781620cd41bf178a5e2e27fc1cf242d0', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The NFS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-nfs.c:interp_reply().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-03 15:14:51-08:00 | CVE-2017-12898/NFS: Fix bounds checking.
Fix the bounds checking for the NFSv3 WRITE procedure to check whether the
length of the opaque data being written is present in the captured data,
not just whether the byte count is present in the captured data.
furthest forward in the packet, not the item before it. (This also lets
us eliminate the check for the "stable" argument being present in the
captured data; rewrite the code to print that to make it a bit clearer.)
Check that the entire ar_stat field is present in the capture.
Note that parse_wcc_attr() is called after we've already checked whether
the wcc_data is present.
Check before fetching the "access" part of the NFSv3 ACCESS results.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Include a test for the "check before fetching the "access" part..." fix,
using the capture supplied by the reporter(s). | 19d25dd8781620cd41bf178a5e2e27fc1cf242d0 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | nfsreq_print_noaddr | nfsreq_print_noaddr( netdissect_options * ndo , register const u_char * bp , u_int length , register const u_char * bp2) | ['ndo', 'bp', 'length', 'bp2'] | nfsreq_print_noaddr(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, u_int length,
register const u_char *bp2)
{
register const struct sunrpc_msg *rp;
register const uint32_t *dp;
nfs_type type;
int v3;
uint32_t proc;
uint32_t access_flags;
struct nfsv3_sattr sa3;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%d", length));
nfserr = 0; /* assume no error */
rp = (const struct sunrpc_msg *)bp;
if (!xid_map_enter(ndo, rp, bp2)) /* record proc number for later on */
goto trunc;
v3 = (EXTRACT_32BITS(&rp->rm_call.cb_vers) == NFS_VER3);
proc = EXTRACT_32BITS(&rp->rm_call.cb_proc);
if (!v3 && proc < NFS_NPROCS)
proc = nfsv3_procid[proc];
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", tok2str(nfsproc_str, "proc-%u", proc)));
switch (proc) {
case NFSPROC_GETATTR:
case NFSPROC_SETATTR:
case NFSPROC_READLINK:
case NFSPROC_FSSTAT:
case NFSPROC_FSINFO:
case NFSPROC_PATHCONF:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
parsefh(ndo, dp, v3) != NULL)
return;
break;
case NFSPROC_LOOKUP:
case NFSPROC_CREATE:
case NFSPROC_MKDIR:
case NFSPROC_REMOVE:
case NFSPROC_RMDIR:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
parsefhn(ndo, dp, v3) != NULL)
return;
break;
case NFSPROC_ACCESS:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefh(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[0]);
access_flags = EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[0]);
if (access_flags & ~NFSV3ACCESS_FULL) {
/* NFSV3ACCESS definitions aren't up to date */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %04x", access_flags));
} else if ((access_flags & NFSV3ACCESS_FULL) == NFSV3ACCESS_FULL) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NFS_ACCESS_FULL"));
} else {
char separator = ' ';
if (access_flags & NFSV3ACCESS_READ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NFS_ACCESS_READ"));
separator = '|';
}
if (access_flags & NFSV3ACCESS_LOOKUP) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%cNFS_ACCESS_LOOKUP", separator));
separator = '|';
}
if (access_flags & NFSV3ACCESS_MODIFY) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%cNFS_ACCESS_MODIFY", separator));
separator = '|';
}
if (access_flags & NFSV3ACCESS_EXTEND) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%cNFS_ACCESS_EXTEND", separator));
separator = '|';
}
if (access_flags & NFSV3ACCESS_DELETE) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%cNFS_ACCESS_DELETE", separator));
separator = '|';
}
if (access_flags & NFSV3ACCESS_EXECUTE)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%cNFS_ACCESS_EXECUTE", separator));
}
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_READ:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefh(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
if (v3) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u bytes @ %" PRIu64,
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[2]),
EXTRACT_64BITS(&dp[0])));
} else {
ND_TCHECK(dp[1]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u bytes @ %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[1]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[0])));
}
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_WRITE:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefh(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
if (v3) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u (%u) bytes @ %" PRIu64,
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[4]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[2]),
EXTRACT_64BITS(&dp[0])));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
dp += 3;
ND_TCHECK(dp[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " <%s>",
tok2str(nfsv3_writemodes,
NULL, EXTRACT_32BITS(dp))));
}
} else {
ND_TCHECK(dp[3]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u (%u) bytes @ %u (%u)",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[3]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[2]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[1]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[0])));
}
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_SYMLINK:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefhn(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ->"));
if (v3 && (dp = parse_sattr3(ndo, dp, &sa3)) == NULL)
break;
if (parsefn(ndo, dp) == NULL)
break;
if (v3 && ndo->ndo_vflag)
print_sattr3(ndo, &sa3, ndo->ndo_vflag);
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_MKNOD:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefhn(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
ND_TCHECK(*dp);
type = (nfs_type)EXTRACT_32BITS(dp);
dp++;
if ((dp = parse_sattr3(ndo, dp, &sa3)) == NULL)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", tok2str(type2str, "unk-ft %d", type)));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag && (type == NFCHR || type == NFBLK)) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[1]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u/%u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[0]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[1])));
dp += 2;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
print_sattr3(ndo, &sa3, ndo->ndo_vflag);
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_RENAME:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefhn(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ->"));
if (parsefhn(ndo, dp, v3) != NULL)
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_LINK:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefh(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ->"));
if (parsefhn(ndo, dp, v3) != NULL)
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_READDIR:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefh(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
if (v3) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[4]);
/*
* We shouldn't really try to interpret the
* offset cookie here.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u bytes @ %" PRId64,
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[4]),
EXTRACT_64BITS(&dp[0])));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " verf %08x%08x", dp[2], dp[3]));
} else {
ND_TCHECK(dp[1]);
/*
* Print the offset as signed, since -1 is
* common, but offsets > 2^31 aren't.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u bytes @ %d",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[1]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[0])));
}
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_READDIRPLUS:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefh(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[4]);
/*
* We don't try to interpret the offset
* cookie here.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u bytes @ %" PRId64,
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[4]),
EXTRACT_64BITS(&dp[0])));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[5]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " max %u verf %08x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[5]), dp[2], dp[3]));
}
return;
}
break;
case NFSPROC_COMMIT:
if ((dp = parsereq(ndo, rp, length)) != NULL &&
(dp = parsefh(ndo, dp, v3)) != NULL) {
ND_TCHECK(dp[2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u bytes @ %" PRIu64,
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[2]),
EXTRACT_64BITS(&dp[0])));
return;
}
break;
default:
return;
}
trunc:
if (!nfserr)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
} | 1576 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12898 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/19d25dd8781620cd41bf178a5e2e27fc1cf242d0', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/19d25dd8781620cd41bf178a5e2e27fc1cf242d0', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The NFS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-nfs.c:interp_reply().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-03 15:14:51-08:00 | CVE-2017-12898/NFS: Fix bounds checking.
Fix the bounds checking for the NFSv3 WRITE procedure to check whether the
length of the opaque data being written is present in the captured data,
not just whether the byte count is present in the captured data.
furthest forward in the packet, not the item before it. (This also lets
us eliminate the check for the "stable" argument being present in the
captured data; rewrite the code to print that to make it a bit clearer.)
Check that the entire ar_stat field is present in the capture.
Note that parse_wcc_attr() is called after we've already checked whether
the wcc_data is present.
Check before fetching the "access" part of the NFSv3 ACCESS results.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Include a test for the "check before fetching the "access" part..." fix,
using the capture supplied by the reporter(s). | 19d25dd8781620cd41bf178a5e2e27fc1cf242d0 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | parserep | parserep( netdissect_options * ndo , register const struct sunrpc_msg * rp , register u_int length) | ['ndo', 'rp', 'length'] | parserep(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const struct sunrpc_msg *rp, register u_int length)
{
register const uint32_t *dp;
u_int len;
enum sunrpc_accept_stat astat;
/*
* Portability note:
* Here we find the address of the ar_verf credentials.
* Originally, this calculation was
* dp = (uint32_t *)&rp->rm_reply.rp_acpt.ar_verf
* On the wire, the rp_acpt field starts immediately after
* the (32 bit) rp_stat field. However, rp_acpt (which is a
* "struct accepted_reply") contains a "struct opaque_auth",
* whose internal representation contains a pointer, so on a
* 64-bit machine the compiler inserts 32 bits of padding
* before rp->rm_reply.rp_acpt.ar_verf. So, we cannot use
* the internal representation to parse the on-the-wire
* representation. Instead, we skip past the rp_stat field,
* which is an "enum" and so occupies one 32-bit word.
*/
dp = ((const uint32_t *)&rp->rm_reply) + 1;
ND_TCHECK(dp[1]);
len = EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp[1]);
if (len >= length)
return (NULL);
/*
* skip past the ar_verf credentials.
*/
dp += (len + (2*sizeof(uint32_t) + 3)) / sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_TCHECK2(dp[0], 0);
/*
* now we can check the ar_stat field
*/
astat = (enum sunrpc_accept_stat) EXTRACT_32BITS(dp);
if (astat != SUNRPC_SUCCESS) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", tok2str(sunrpc_str, "ar_stat %d", astat)));
nfserr = 1; /* suppress trunc string */
return (NULL);
}
/* successful return */
ND_TCHECK2(*dp, sizeof(astat));
return ((const uint32_t *) (sizeof(astat) + ((const char *)dp)));
trunc:
return (0);
} | 198 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12894 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/730fc35968c5433b9e2a829779057f4f9495dc51', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/730fc35968c5433b9e2a829779057f4f9495dc51', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Several protocol parsers in tcpdump before 4.9.2 could cause a buffer over-read in addrtoname.c:lookup_bytestring().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-03 18:54:00-08:00 | CVE-2017-12894/In lookup_bytestring(), take the length of the byte string into account.
Otherwise, if, in our search of the hash table, we come across a byte
string that's shorter than the string we're looking for, we'll search
past the end of the string in the hash table.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 730fc35968c5433b9e2a829779057f4f9495dc51 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | le64addr_string | le64addr_string( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * ep) | ['ndo', 'ep'] | le64addr_string(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *ep)
{
const unsigned int len = 8;
register u_int i;
register char *cp;
register struct enamemem *tp;
char buf[BUFSIZE];
tp = lookup_bytestring(ndo, ep, len);
if (tp->e_name)
return (tp->e_name);
cp = buf;
for (i = len; i > 0 ; --i) {
*cp++ = hex[*(ep + i - 1) >> 4];
*cp++ = hex[*(ep + i - 1) & 0xf];
*cp++ = ':';
}
cp --;
*cp = '\0';
tp->e_name = strdup(buf);
if (tp->e_name == NULL)
(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, "le64addr_string: strdup(buf)");
return (tp->e_name);
} | 171 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12894 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/730fc35968c5433b9e2a829779057f4f9495dc51', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/730fc35968c5433b9e2a829779057f4f9495dc51', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Several protocol parsers in tcpdump before 4.9.2 could cause a buffer over-read in addrtoname.c:lookup_bytestring().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-03 18:54:00-08:00 | CVE-2017-12894/In lookup_bytestring(), take the length of the byte string into account.
Otherwise, if, in our search of the hash table, we come across a byte
string that's shorter than the string we're looking for, we'll search
past the end of the string in the hash table.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 730fc35968c5433b9e2a829779057f4f9495dc51 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | linkaddr_string | linkaddr_string( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * ep , const unsigned int type , const unsigned int len) | ['ndo', 'ep', 'type', 'len'] | linkaddr_string(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *ep,
const unsigned int type, const unsigned int len)
{
register u_int i;
register char *cp;
register struct enamemem *tp;
if (len == 0)
return ("<empty>");
if (type == LINKADDR_ETHER && len == ETHER_ADDR_LEN)
return (etheraddr_string(ndo, ep));
if (type == LINKADDR_FRELAY)
return (q922_string(ndo, ep, len));
tp = lookup_bytestring(ndo, ep, len);
if (tp->e_name)
return (tp->e_name);
tp->e_name = cp = (char *)malloc(len*3);
if (tp->e_name == NULL)
(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, "linkaddr_string: malloc");
*cp++ = hex[*ep >> 4];
*cp++ = hex[*ep++ & 0xf];
for (i = len-1; i > 0 ; --i) {
*cp++ = ':';
*cp++ = hex[*ep >> 4];
*cp++ = hex[*ep++ & 0xf];
}
*cp = '\0';
return (tp->e_name);
} | 235 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12894 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/730fc35968c5433b9e2a829779057f4f9495dc51', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/730fc35968c5433b9e2a829779057f4f9495dc51', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Several protocol parsers in tcpdump before 4.9.2 could cause a buffer over-read in addrtoname.c:lookup_bytestring().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-03 18:54:00-08:00 | CVE-2017-12894/In lookup_bytestring(), take the length of the byte string into account.
Otherwise, if, in our search of the hash table, we come across a byte
string that's shorter than the string we're looking for, we'll search
past the end of the string in the hash table.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 730fc35968c5433b9e2a829779057f4f9495dc51 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | lookup_bytestring | lookup_bytestring( netdissect_options * ndo , register const u_char * bs , const unsigned int nlen) | ['ndo', 'bs', 'nlen'] | lookup_bytestring(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *bs,
const unsigned int nlen)
{
struct enamemem *tp;
register u_int i, j, k;
if (nlen >= 6) {
k = (bs[0] << 8) | bs[1];
j = (bs[2] << 8) | bs[3];
i = (bs[4] << 8) | bs[5];
} else if (nlen >= 4) {
k = (bs[0] << 8) | bs[1];
j = (bs[2] << 8) | bs[3];
i = 0;
} else
i = j = k = 0;
tp = &bytestringtable[(i ^ j) & (HASHNAMESIZE-1)];
while (tp->e_nxt)
if (tp->e_addr0 == i &&
tp->e_addr1 == j &&
tp->e_addr2 == k &&
memcmp((const char *)bs, (const char *)(tp->e_bs), nlen) == 0)
return tp;
else
tp = tp->e_nxt;
tp->e_addr0 = i;
tp->e_addr1 = j;
tp->e_addr2 = k;
tp->e_bs = (u_char *) calloc(1, nlen + 1);
if (tp->e_bs == NULL)
(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, "lookup_bytestring: calloc");
memcpy(tp->e_bs, bs, nlen);
tp->e_nxt = (struct enamemem *)calloc(1, sizeof(*tp));
if (tp->e_nxt == NULL)
(*ndo->ndo_error)(ndo, "lookup_bytestring: calloc");
return tp;
} | 335 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12895 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/2b62d1dda41590db29368ec7ba5f4faf3464765a', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/2b62d1dda41590db29368ec7ba5f4faf3464765a', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The ICMP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-icmp.c:icmp_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-03 20:02:45-08:00 | CVE-2017-12895/ICMP: Check the availability of data before checksumming it.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s). | 2b62d1dda41590db29368ec7ba5f4faf3464765a | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | icmp_print | icmp_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * bp , u_int plen , const u_char * bp2 , int fragmented) | ['ndo', 'bp', 'plen', 'bp2', 'fragmented'] | icmp_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int plen, const u_char *bp2,
int fragmented)
{
char *cp;
const struct icmp *dp;
const struct icmp_ext_t *ext_dp;
const struct ip *ip;
const char *str, *fmt;
const struct ip *oip;
const struct udphdr *ouh;
const uint8_t *obj_tptr;
uint32_t raw_label;
const u_char *snapend_save;
const struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t *icmp_mpls_ext_object_header;
u_int hlen, dport, mtu, obj_tlen, obj_class_num, obj_ctype;
char buf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 100];
struct cksum_vec vec[1];
dp = (const struct icmp *)bp;
ext_dp = (const struct icmp_ext_t *)bp;
ip = (const struct ip *)bp2;
str = buf;
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_code);
switch (dp->icmp_type) {
case ICMP_ECHO:
case ICMP_ECHOREPLY:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_seq);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "echo %s, id %u, seq %u",
dp->icmp_type == ICMP_ECHO ?
"request" : "reply",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_id),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_seq));
break;
case ICMP_UNREACH:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst);
switch (dp->icmp_code) {
case ICMP_UNREACH_PROTOCOL:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ip.ip_p);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s protocol %d unreachable",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst),
dp->icmp_ip.ip_p);
break;
case ICMP_UNREACH_PORT:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ip.ip_p);
oip = &dp->icmp_ip;
hlen = IP_HL(oip) * 4;
ouh = (const struct udphdr *)(((const u_char *)oip) + hlen);
ND_TCHECK(ouh->uh_dport);
dport = EXTRACT_16BITS(&ouh->uh_dport);
switch (oip->ip_p) {
case IPPROTO_TCP:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s tcp port %s unreachable",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &oip->ip_dst),
tcpport_string(ndo, dport));
break;
case IPPROTO_UDP:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s udp port %s unreachable",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &oip->ip_dst),
udpport_string(ndo, dport));
break;
default:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s protocol %d port %d unreachable",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &oip->ip_dst),
oip->ip_p, dport);
break;
}
break;
case ICMP_UNREACH_NEEDFRAG:
{
register const struct mtu_discovery *mp;
mp = (const struct mtu_discovery *)(const u_char *)&dp->icmp_void;
mtu = EXTRACT_16BITS(&mp->nexthopmtu);
if (mtu) {
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s unreachable - need to frag (mtu %d)",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst), mtu);
} else {
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s unreachable - need to frag",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst));
}
}
break;
default:
fmt = tok2str(unreach2str, "#%d %%s unreachable",
dp->icmp_code);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt,
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst));
break;
}
break;
case ICMP_REDIRECT:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst);
fmt = tok2str(type2str, "redirect-#%d %%s to net %%s",
dp->icmp_code);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt,
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &dp->icmp_gwaddr));
break;
case ICMP_ROUTERADVERT:
{
register const struct ih_rdiscovery *ihp;
register const struct id_rdiscovery *idp;
u_int lifetime, num, size;
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "router advertisement");
cp = buf + strlen(buf);
ihp = (const struct ih_rdiscovery *)&dp->icmp_void;
ND_TCHECK(*ihp);
(void)strncpy(cp, " lifetime ", sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf));
cp = buf + strlen(buf);
lifetime = EXTRACT_16BITS(&ihp->ird_lifetime);
if (lifetime < 60) {
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf), "%u",
lifetime);
} else if (lifetime < 60 * 60) {
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf), "%u:%02u",
lifetime / 60, lifetime % 60);
} else {
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf),
"%u:%02u:%02u",
lifetime / 3600,
(lifetime % 3600) / 60,
lifetime % 60);
}
cp = buf + strlen(buf);
num = ihp->ird_addrnum;
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf), " %d:", num);
cp = buf + strlen(buf);
size = ihp->ird_addrsiz;
if (size != 2) {
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf),
" [size %d]", size);
break;
}
idp = (const struct id_rdiscovery *)&dp->icmp_data;
while (num-- > 0) {
ND_TCHECK(*idp);
(void)snprintf(cp, sizeof(buf) - (cp - buf), " {%s %u}",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &idp->ird_addr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&idp->ird_pref));
cp = buf + strlen(buf);
++idp;
}
}
break;
case ICMP_TIMXCEED:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ip.ip_dst);
switch (dp->icmp_code) {
case ICMP_TIMXCEED_INTRANS:
str = "time exceeded in-transit";
break;
case ICMP_TIMXCEED_REASS:
str = "ip reassembly time exceeded";
break;
default:
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "time exceeded-#%d",
dp->icmp_code);
break;
}
break;
case ICMP_PARAMPROB:
if (dp->icmp_code)
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"parameter problem - code %d", dp->icmp_code);
else {
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_pptr);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"parameter problem - octet %d", dp->icmp_pptr);
}
break;
case ICMP_MASKREPLY:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_mask);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "address mask is 0x%08x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp_mask));
break;
case ICMP_TSTAMP:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_seq);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"time stamp query id %u seq %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_id),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_seq));
break;
case ICMP_TSTAMPREPLY:
ND_TCHECK(dp->icmp_ttime);
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"time stamp reply id %u seq %u: org %s",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_id),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_seq),
icmp_tstamp_print(EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp_otime)));
(void)snprintf(buf+strlen(buf),sizeof(buf)-strlen(buf),", recv %s",
icmp_tstamp_print(EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp_rtime)));
(void)snprintf(buf+strlen(buf),sizeof(buf)-strlen(buf),", xmit %s",
icmp_tstamp_print(EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp->icmp_ttime)));
break;
default:
str = tok2str(icmp2str, "type-#%d", dp->icmp_type);
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ICMP %s, length %u", str, plen));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag && !fragmented) { /* don't attempt checksumming if this is a frag */
uint16_t sum, icmp_sum;
if (ND_TTEST2(*bp, plen)) {
vec[0].ptr = (const uint8_t *)(const void *)dp;
vec[0].len = plen;
sum = in_cksum(vec, 1);
if (sum != 0) {
icmp_sum = EXTRACT_16BITS(&dp->icmp_cksum);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (wrong icmp cksum %x (->%x)!)",
icmp_sum,
in_cksum_shouldbe(icmp_sum, sum)));
}
}
}
/*
* print the remnants of the IP packet.
* save the snaplength as this may get overidden in the IP printer.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag >= 1 && ICMP_ERRTYPE(dp->icmp_type)) {
bp += 8;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t"));
ip = (const struct ip *)bp;
snapend_save = ndo->ndo_snapend;
ip_print(ndo, bp, EXTRACT_16BITS(&ip->ip_len));
ndo->ndo_snapend = snapend_save;
}
/*
* Attempt to decode the MPLS extensions only for some ICMP types.
*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag >= 1 && plen > ICMP_EXTD_MINLEN && ICMP_MPLS_EXT_TYPE(dp->icmp_type)) {
ND_TCHECK(*ext_dp);
/*
* Check first if the mpls extension header shows a non-zero length.
* If the length field is not set then silently verify the checksum
* to check if an extension header is present. This is expedient,
* however not all implementations set the length field proper.
*/
if (!ext_dp->icmp_length) {
vec[0].ptr = (const uint8_t *)(const void *)&ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res;
vec[0].len = plen - ICMP_EXTD_MINLEN;
if (in_cksum(vec, 1)) {
return;
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tMPLS extension v%u",
ICMP_MPLS_EXT_EXTRACT_VERSION(*(ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res))));
/*
* Sanity checking of the header.
*/
if (ICMP_MPLS_EXT_EXTRACT_VERSION(*(ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res)) !=
ICMP_MPLS_EXT_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " packet not supported"));
return;
}
hlen = plen - ICMP_EXTD_MINLEN;
vec[0].ptr = (const uint8_t *)(const void *)&ext_dp->icmp_ext_version_res;
vec[0].len = hlen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", checksum 0x%04x (%scorrect), length %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(ext_dp->icmp_ext_checksum),
in_cksum(vec, 1) ? "in" : "",
hlen));
hlen -= 4; /* subtract common header size */
obj_tptr = (const uint8_t *)ext_dp->icmp_ext_data;
while (hlen > sizeof(struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t)) {
icmp_mpls_ext_object_header = (const struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t *)obj_tptr;
ND_TCHECK(*icmp_mpls_ext_object_header);
obj_tlen = EXTRACT_16BITS(icmp_mpls_ext_object_header->length);
obj_class_num = icmp_mpls_ext_object_header->class_num;
obj_ctype = icmp_mpls_ext_object_header->ctype;
obj_tptr += sizeof(struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Object (%u), Class-Type: %u, length %u",
tok2str(icmp_mpls_ext_obj_values,"unknown",obj_class_num),
obj_class_num,
obj_ctype,
obj_tlen));
hlen-=sizeof(struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t); /* length field includes tlv header */
/* infinite loop protection */
if ((obj_class_num == 0) ||
(obj_tlen < sizeof(struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t))) {
return;
}
obj_tlen-=sizeof(struct icmp_mpls_ext_object_header_t);
switch (obj_class_num) {
case 1:
switch(obj_ctype) {
case 1:
ND_TCHECK2(*obj_tptr, 4);
raw_label = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t label %u, exp %u", MPLS_LABEL(raw_label), MPLS_EXP(raw_label)));
if (MPLS_STACK(raw_label))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", [S]"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", ttl %u", MPLS_TTL(raw_label)));
break;
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, obj_tptr, "\n\t ", obj_tlen);
}
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined objects that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case 2:
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, obj_tptr, "\n\t ", obj_tlen);
break;
}
if (hlen < obj_tlen)
break;
hlen -= obj_tlen;
obj_tptr += obj_tlen;
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|icmp]"));
} | 2072 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12985 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/66df248b49095c261138b5a5e34d341a6bf9ac7f', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/66df248b49095c261138b5a5e34d341a6bf9ac7f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The IPv6 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-ip6.c:ip6_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-04 03:13:18-08:00 | CVE-2017-12985/IPv6: Check for print routines returning -1 when running past the end.
rt6_print(), ah_print(), and esp_print() return -1 if they run up
against the end of the packet while dissecting; if that happens, stop
dissecting, don't try to fetch the next header value, because 1) *it*
might be past the end of the packet and 2) we won't be using it in any
case, as we'll be exiting the loop.
Also, change mobility_print() to return -1 if it runs up against the
end of the packet, and stop dissecting if it does so.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s). | 66df248b49095c261138b5a5e34d341a6bf9ac7f | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | mobility_print | mobility_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * bp , const u_char * bp2 _U_) | ['ndo', 'bp', '_U_'] | mobility_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, const u_char *bp2 _U_)
{
const struct ip6_mobility *mh;
const u_char *ep;
unsigned mhlen, hlen;
uint8_t type;
mh = (const struct ip6_mobility *)bp;
/* 'ep' points to the end of available data. */
ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
if (!ND_TTEST(mh->ip6m_len)) {
/*
* There's not enough captured data to include the
* mobility header length.
*
* Our caller expects us to return the length, however,
* so return a value that will run to the end of the
* captured data.
*
* XXX - "ip6_print()" doesn't do anything with the
* returned length, however, as it breaks out of the
* header-processing loop.
*/
mhlen = ep - bp;
goto trunc;
}
mhlen = (mh->ip6m_len + 1) << 3;
/* XXX ip6m_cksum */
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_type);
type = mh->ip6m_type;
if (type <= IP6M_MAX && mhlen < ip6m_hdrlen[type]) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(header length %u is too small for type %u)", mhlen, type));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "mobility: %s", tok2str(ip6m_str, "type-#%u", type)));
switch (type) {
case IP6M_BINDING_REQUEST:
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
break;
case IP6M_HOME_TEST_INIT:
case IP6M_CAREOF_TEST_INIT:
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Init Cookie=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST_INIT ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
break;
case IP6M_HOME_TEST:
case IP6M_CAREOF_TEST:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data16[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " nonce id=0x%x", EXTRACT_16BITS(&mh->ip6m_data16[0])));
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Init Cookie=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Keygen Token=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_UPDATE:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data16[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " seq#=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&mh->ip6m_data16[0])));
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 1);
if (bp[hlen] & 0xf0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "A"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x40)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "H"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x20)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "L"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x10)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "K"));
/* Reserved (4bits) */
hlen += 1;
/* Reserved (8bits) */
hlen += 1;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 2);
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " lifetime=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen]) << 2));
hlen += 2;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_ACK:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data8[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " status=%u", mh->ip6m_data8[0]));
if (mh->ip6m_data8[1] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " K"));
/* Reserved (7bits) */
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " seq#=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen])));
hlen += 2;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 2);
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " lifetime=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen]) << 2));
hlen += 2;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_ERROR:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data8[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " status=%u", mh->ip6m_data8[0]));
/* Reserved */
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 16);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " homeaddr %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[hlen])));
hlen += 16;
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " len=%u", mh->ip6m_len));
return(mhlen);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
if (mobility_opt_print(ndo, &bp[hlen], mhlen - hlen))
goto trunc;
return(mhlen);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return(mhlen);
} | 840 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13725 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/c7c515ee03c285cc51376328de4ae9d549e501a5', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/c7c515ee03c285cc51376328de4ae9d549e501a5', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/3c4d7c0ee30a30e5abff3d6d9586a3753101faf5', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/3c4d7c0ee30a30e5abff3d6d9586a3753101faf5', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:8.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The IPv6 routing header parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-rt6.c:rt6_print().'}] | 2020-10-28T19:28Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-04 03:18:44-08:00 | CVE-2017-13725/IPv6 R.H.: Check for the existence of all fields before fetching them.
Don't fetch the length field from the header until after we've checked
for the existence of a field at or after that field.
(Found by code inspection, not by a capture.) | 3c4d7c0ee30a30e5abff3d6d9586a3753101faf5 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | rt6_print | rt6_print( netdissect_options * ndo , register const u_char * bp , const u_char * bp2 _U_) | ['ndo', 'bp', '_U_'] | rt6_print(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *bp, const u_char *bp2 _U_)
{
register const struct ip6_rthdr *dp;
register const struct ip6_rthdr0 *dp0;
register const u_char *ep;
int i, len;
register const struct in6_addr *addr;
dp = (const struct ip6_rthdr *)bp;
len = dp->ip6r_len;
/* 'ep' points to the end of available data. */
ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
ND_TCHECK(dp->ip6r_segleft);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "srcrt (len=%d", dp->ip6r_len)); /*)*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", type=%d", dp->ip6r_type));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", segleft=%d", dp->ip6r_segleft));
switch (dp->ip6r_type) {
case IPV6_RTHDR_TYPE_0:
case IPV6_RTHDR_TYPE_2: /* Mobile IPv6 ID-20 */
dp0 = (const struct ip6_rthdr0 *)dp;
ND_TCHECK(dp0->ip6r0_reserved);
if (dp0->ip6r0_reserved || ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", rsv=0x%0x",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&dp0->ip6r0_reserved)));
}
if (len % 2 == 1)
goto trunc;
len >>= 1;
addr = &dp0->ip6r0_addr[0];
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
if ((const u_char *)(addr + 1) > ep)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", [%d]%s", i, ip6addr_string(ndo, addr)));
addr++;
}
/*(*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, ") "));
return((dp0->ip6r0_len + 1) << 3);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|srcrt]"));
return -1;
} | 306 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12902 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/d17507ffa3e9742199b02a66aa940e79ababfa30', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/d17507ffa3e9742199b02a66aa940e79ababfa30', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/6ec0c6fa63412c7a07a5bcb790a529c3563b4173', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/6ec0c6fa63412c7a07a5bcb790a529c3563b4173', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_desktop:7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_server:7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_server_aus:7.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_server_aus:7.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Zephyr parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-zephyr.c, several functions.'}] | 2020-10-23T18:17Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-04 18:38:47-08:00 | CVE-2017-12902/Zephyr: Fix bounds checking.
Use ND_TTEST() rather than comparing against ndo->ndo_snapend ourselves;
it's easy to get the tests wrong.
Check for running out of packet data before checking for running out of
captured data, and distinguish between running out of packet data (which
might just mean "no more strings") and running out of captured data
(which means "truncated").
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | d17507ffa3e9742199b02a66aa940e79ababfa30 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | parse_field | parse_field( netdissect_options * ndo , const char ** pptr , int * len) | ['ndo', 'pptr', 'len'] | parse_field(netdissect_options *ndo, const char **pptr, int *len)
{
const char *s;
if (*len <= 0 || !pptr || !*pptr)
return NULL;
if (*pptr > (const char *) ndo->ndo_snapend)
return NULL;
s = *pptr;
while (*pptr <= (const char *) ndo->ndo_snapend && *len >= 0 && **pptr) {
(*pptr)++;
(*len)--;
}
(*pptr)++;
(*len)--;
if (*len < 0 || *pptr > (const char *) ndo->ndo_snapend)
return NULL;
return s;
} | 134 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12902 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/d17507ffa3e9742199b02a66aa940e79ababfa30', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/d17507ffa3e9742199b02a66aa940e79ababfa30', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/6ec0c6fa63412c7a07a5bcb790a529c3563b4173', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/6ec0c6fa63412c7a07a5bcb790a529c3563b4173', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_desktop:7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_server:7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_server_aus:7.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_server_aus:7.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Zephyr parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-zephyr.c, several functions.'}] | 2020-10-23T18:17Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-04 18:38:47-08:00 | CVE-2017-12902/Zephyr: Fix bounds checking.
Use ND_TTEST() rather than comparing against ndo->ndo_snapend ourselves;
it's easy to get the tests wrong.
Check for running out of packet data before checking for running out of
captured data, and distinguish between running out of packet data (which
might just mean "no more strings") and running out of captured data
(which means "truncated").
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | d17507ffa3e9742199b02a66aa940e79ababfa30 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | zephyr_print | zephyr_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * cp , int length) | ['ndo', 'cp', 'length'] | zephyr_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *cp, int length)
{
struct z_packet z;
const char *parse = (const char *) cp;
int parselen = length;
const char *s;
int lose = 0;
/* squelch compiler warnings */
z.kind = 0;
z.class = 0;
z.inst = 0;
z.opcode = 0;
z.sender = 0;
z.recipient = 0;
#define PARSE_STRING \
s = parse_field(ndo, &parse, &parselen); \
if (!s) lose = 1;
#define PARSE_FIELD_INT(field) \
PARSE_STRING \
if (!lose) field = strtol(s, 0, 16);
#define PARSE_FIELD_STR(field) \
PARSE_STRING \
if (!lose) field = s;
PARSE_FIELD_STR(z.version);
if (lose) return;
if (strncmp(z.version, "ZEPH", 4))
return;
PARSE_FIELD_INT(z.numfields);
PARSE_FIELD_INT(z.kind);
PARSE_FIELD_STR(z.uid);
PARSE_FIELD_INT(z.port);
PARSE_FIELD_INT(z.auth);
PARSE_FIELD_INT(z.authlen);
PARSE_FIELD_STR(z.authdata);
PARSE_FIELD_STR(z.class);
PARSE_FIELD_STR(z.inst);
PARSE_FIELD_STR(z.opcode);
PARSE_FIELD_STR(z.sender);
PARSE_FIELD_STR(z.recipient);
PARSE_FIELD_STR(z.format);
PARSE_FIELD_INT(z.cksum);
PARSE_FIELD_INT(z.multi);
PARSE_FIELD_STR(z.multi_uid);
if (lose) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|zephyr] (%d)", length));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " zephyr"));
if (strncmp(z.version+4, "0.2", 3)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " v%s", z.version+4));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", tok2str(z_types, "type %d", z.kind)));
if (z.kind == Z_PACKET_SERVACK) {
/* Initialization to silence warnings */
const char *ackdata = NULL;
PARSE_FIELD_STR(ackdata);
if (!lose && strcmp(ackdata, "SENT"))
ND_PRINT((ndo, "/%s", str_to_lower(ackdata)));
}
if (*z.sender) ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", z.sender));
if (!strcmp(z.class, "USER_LOCATE")) {
if (!strcmp(z.opcode, "USER_HIDE"))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " hide"));
else if (!strcmp(z.opcode, "USER_UNHIDE"))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " unhide"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " locate %s", z.inst));
return;
}
if (!strcmp(z.class, "ZEPHYR_ADMIN")) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " zephyr-admin %s", str_to_lower(z.opcode)));
return;
}
if (!strcmp(z.class, "ZEPHYR_CTL")) {
if (!strcmp(z.inst, "CLIENT")) {
if (!strcmp(z.opcode, "SUBSCRIBE") ||
!strcmp(z.opcode, "SUBSCRIBE_NODEFS") ||
!strcmp(z.opcode, "UNSUBSCRIBE")) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %ssub%s", strcmp(z.opcode, "SUBSCRIBE") ? "un" : "",
strcmp(z.opcode, "SUBSCRIBE_NODEFS") ? "" :
"-nodefs"));
if (z.kind != Z_PACKET_SERVACK) {
/* Initialization to silence warnings */
const char *c = NULL, *i = NULL, *r = NULL;
PARSE_FIELD_STR(c);
PARSE_FIELD_STR(i);
PARSE_FIELD_STR(r);
if (!lose) ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", z_triple(c, i, r)));
}
return;
}
if (!strcmp(z.opcode, "GIMME")) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ret"));
return;
}
if (!strcmp(z.opcode, "GIMMEDEFS")) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " gimme-defs"));
return;
}
if (!strcmp(z.opcode, "CLEARSUB")) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " clear-subs"));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", str_to_lower(z.opcode)));
return;
}
if (!strcmp(z.inst, "HM")) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", str_to_lower(z.opcode)));
return;
}
if (!strcmp(z.inst, "REALM")) {
if (!strcmp(z.opcode, "ADD_SUBSCRIBE"))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " realm add-subs"));
if (!strcmp(z.opcode, "REQ_SUBSCRIBE"))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " realm req-subs"));
if (!strcmp(z.opcode, "RLM_SUBSCRIBE"))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " realm rlm-sub"));
if (!strcmp(z.opcode, "RLM_UNSUBSCRIBE"))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " realm rlm-unsub"));
return;
}
}
if (!strcmp(z.class, "HM_CTL")) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " hm_ctl %s", str_to_lower(z.inst)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", str_to_lower(z.opcode)));
return;
}
if (!strcmp(z.class, "HM_STAT")) {
if (!strcmp(z.inst, "HMST_CLIENT") && !strcmp(z.opcode, "GIMMESTATS")) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " get-client-stats"));
return;
}
}
if (!strcmp(z.class, "WG_CTL")) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " wg_ctl %s", str_to_lower(z.inst)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", str_to_lower(z.opcode)));
return;
}
if (!strcmp(z.class, "LOGIN")) {
if (!strcmp(z.opcode, "USER_FLUSH")) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " flush_locs"));
return;
}
if (!strcmp(z.opcode, "NONE") ||
!strcmp(z.opcode, "OPSTAFF") ||
!strcmp(z.opcode, "REALM-VISIBLE") ||
!strcmp(z.opcode, "REALM-ANNOUNCED") ||
!strcmp(z.opcode, "NET-VISIBLE") ||
!strcmp(z.opcode, "NET-ANNOUNCED")) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " set-exposure %s", str_to_lower(z.opcode)));
return;
}
}
if (!*z.recipient)
z.recipient = "*";
ND_PRINT((ndo, " to %s", z_triple(z.class, z.inst, z.recipient)));
if (*z.opcode)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " op %s", z.opcode));
} | 1191 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12987 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/99798bd9a41bd3d03fdc1e949810a38967f20ed3', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/99798bd9a41bd3d03fdc1e949810a38967f20ed3', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/2ecb9d2c67d9119250c54811a6ce4d0f2ddf44f1', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/2ecb9d2c67d9119250c54811a6ce4d0f2ddf44f1', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory']}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}, {'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_desktop:7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_server:7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:debian:debian_linux:10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_server_aus:7.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}, {'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:o:redhat:enterprise_linux_server_aus:7.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The IEEE 802.11 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-802_11.c:parse_elements().'}] | 2020-10-23T18:17Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-06 11:24:42-08:00 | CVE-2017-12987/IEEE 802.11: Fix processing of TIM IE.
The arguments to memcpy() were completely wrong.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter. | 99798bd9a41bd3d03fdc1e949810a38967f20ed3 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | parse_elements | parse_elements( netdissect_options * ndo , struct mgmt_body_t * pbody , const u_char * p , int offset , u_int length) | ['ndo', 'pbody', 'p', 'offset', 'length'] | parse_elements(netdissect_options *ndo,
struct mgmt_body_t *pbody, const u_char *p, int offset,
u_int length)
{
u_int elementlen;
struct ssid_t ssid;
struct challenge_t challenge;
struct rates_t rates;
struct ds_t ds;
struct cf_t cf;
struct tim_t tim;
/*
* We haven't seen any elements yet.
*/
pbody->challenge_present = 0;
pbody->ssid_present = 0;
pbody->rates_present = 0;
pbody->ds_present = 0;
pbody->cf_present = 0;
pbody->tim_present = 0;
while (length != 0) {
/* Make sure we at least have the element ID and length. */
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), 2))
return 0;
if (length < 2)
return 0;
elementlen = *(p + offset + 1);
/* Make sure we have the entire element. */
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset + 2), elementlen))
return 0;
if (length < elementlen + 2)
return 0;
switch (*(p + offset)) {
case E_SSID:
memcpy(&ssid, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (ssid.length != 0) {
if (ssid.length > sizeof(ssid.ssid) - 1)
return 0;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), ssid.length))
return 0;
if (length < ssid.length)
return 0;
memcpy(&ssid.ssid, p + offset, ssid.length);
offset += ssid.length;
length -= ssid.length;
}
ssid.ssid[ssid.length] = '\0';
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen an SSID IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->ssid_present) {
pbody->ssid = ssid;
pbody->ssid_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_CHALLENGE:
memcpy(&challenge, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (challenge.length != 0) {
if (challenge.length >
sizeof(challenge.text) - 1)
return 0;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), challenge.length))
return 0;
if (length < challenge.length)
return 0;
memcpy(&challenge.text, p + offset,
challenge.length);
offset += challenge.length;
length -= challenge.length;
}
challenge.text[challenge.length] = '\0';
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a challenge IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->challenge_present) {
pbody->challenge = challenge;
pbody->challenge_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_RATES:
memcpy(&rates, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (rates.length != 0) {
if (rates.length > sizeof rates.rate)
return 0;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), rates.length))
return 0;
if (length < rates.length)
return 0;
memcpy(&rates.rate, p + offset, rates.length);
offset += rates.length;
length -= rates.length;
}
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a rates IE,
* copy this one if it's not zero-length,
* otherwise ignore this one, so we later
* report the first one we saw.
*
* We ignore zero-length rates IEs as some
* devices seem to put a zero-length rates
* IE, followed by an SSID IE, followed by
* a non-zero-length rates IE into frames,
* even though IEEE Std 802.11-2007 doesn't
* seem to indicate that a zero-length rates
* IE is valid.
*/
if (!pbody->rates_present && rates.length != 0) {
pbody->rates = rates;
pbody->rates_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_DS:
memcpy(&ds, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (ds.length != 1) {
offset += ds.length;
length -= ds.length;
break;
}
ds.channel = *(p + offset);
offset += 1;
length -= 1;
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a DS IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->ds_present) {
pbody->ds = ds;
pbody->ds_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_CF:
memcpy(&cf, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (cf.length != 6) {
offset += cf.length;
length -= cf.length;
break;
}
memcpy(&cf.count, p + offset, 6);
offset += 6;
length -= 6;
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a CF IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->cf_present) {
pbody->cf = cf;
pbody->cf_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_TIM:
memcpy(&tim, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (tim.length <= 3) {
offset += tim.length;
length -= tim.length;
break;
}
if (tim.length - 3 > (int)sizeof tim.bitmap)
return 0;
memcpy(&tim.count, p + offset, 3);
offset += 3;
length -= 3;
memcpy(tim.bitmap, p + (tim.length - 3),
(tim.length - 3));
offset += tim.length - 3;
length -= tim.length - 3;
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a TIM IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->tim_present) {
pbody->tim = tim;
pbody->tim_present = 1;
}
break;
default:
#if 0
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(1) unhandled element_id (%d) ",
*(p + offset)));
#endif
offset += 2 + elementlen;
length -= 2 + elementlen;
break;
}
}
/* No problems found. */
return 1;
} | 966 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12990 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | PARTIAL | 5.0 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 7.5 | HIGH | 3.9 | 3.6 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/c2ef693866beae071a24b45c49f9674af1df4028', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/c2ef693866beae071a24b45c49f9674af1df4028', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-835'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The ISAKMP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 could enter an infinite loop due to bugs in print-isakmp.c, several functions.'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') | The program contains an iteration or loop with an exit condition that cannot be reached, i.e., an infinite loop. | If the loop can be influenced by an attacker, this weakness could allow attackers to consume excessive resources such as CPU or memory.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/835.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-06 14:33:50-08:00 | CVE-2017-12990/Fix printing of ISAKMPv1 Notification payload data.
The closest thing to a specification for the contents of the payload
data is draft-ietf-ipsec-notifymsg-04, and nothing in there says that it
is ever a complete ISAKMP message, so don't dissect types we don't have
specific code for as a complete ISAKMP message.
While we're at it, fix a comment, and clean up printing of V1 Nonce,
V2 Authentication payloads, and v2 Notice payloads.
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | c2ef693866beae071a24b45c49f9674af1df4028 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | ikev1_n_print | ikev1_n_print( netdissect_options * ndo , u_char tpay _U_ , const struct isakmp_gen * ext , u_int item_len , const u_char * ep , uint32_t phase , uint32_t doi0 _U_ , uint32_t proto0 _U_ , int depth) | ['ndo', '_U_', 'ext', 'item_len', 'ep', 'phase', '_U_', '_U_', 'depth'] | ikev1_n_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext, u_int item_len,
const u_char *ep, uint32_t phase, uint32_t doi0 _U_,
uint32_t proto0 _U_, int depth)
{
const struct ikev1_pl_n *p;
struct ikev1_pl_n n;
const u_char *cp;
const u_char *ep2;
uint32_t doi;
uint32_t proto;
static const char *notify_error_str[] = {
NULL, "INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE",
"DOI-NOT-SUPPORTED", "SITUATION-NOT-SUPPORTED",
"INVALID-COOKIE", "INVALID-MAJOR-VERSION",
"INVALID-MINOR-VERSION", "INVALID-EXCHANGE-TYPE",
"INVALID-FLAGS", "INVALID-MESSAGE-ID",
"INVALID-PROTOCOL-ID", "INVALID-SPI",
"INVALID-TRANSFORM-ID", "ATTRIBUTES-NOT-SUPPORTED",
"NO-PROPOSAL-CHOSEN", "BAD-PROPOSAL-SYNTAX",
"PAYLOAD-MALFORMED", "INVALID-KEY-INFORMATION",
"INVALID-ID-INFORMATION", "INVALID-CERT-ENCODING",
"INVALID-CERTIFICATE", "CERT-TYPE-UNSUPPORTED",
"INVALID-CERT-AUTHORITY", "INVALID-HASH-INFORMATION",
"AUTHENTICATION-FAILED", "INVALID-SIGNATURE",
"ADDRESS-NOTIFICATION", "NOTIFY-SA-LIFETIME",
"CERTIFICATE-UNAVAILABLE", "UNSUPPORTED-EXCHANGE-TYPE",
"UNEQUAL-PAYLOAD-LENGTHS",
};
static const char *ipsec_notify_error_str[] = {
"RESERVED",
};
static const char *notify_status_str[] = {
"CONNECTED",
};
static const char *ipsec_notify_status_str[] = {
"RESPONDER-LIFETIME", "REPLAY-STATUS",
"INITIAL-CONTACT",
};
/* NOTE: these macro must be called with x in proper range */
/* 0 - 8191 */
#define NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((x), notify_error_str)
/* 8192 - 16383 */
#define IPSEC_NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 8192), ipsec_notify_error_str)
/* 16384 - 24575 */
#define NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 16384), notify_status_str)
/* 24576 - 32767 */
#define IPSEC_NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(x) \
STR_OR_ID((u_int)((x) - 24576), ipsec_notify_status_str)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
p = (const struct ikev1_pl_n *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&n, ext, sizeof(n));
doi = ntohl(n.doi);
proto = n.prot_id;
if (doi != 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi=%d", doi));
ND_PRINT((ndo," proto=%d", proto));
if (ntohs(n.type) < 8192)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 16384)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 24576)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
if (n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo," doi=ipsec"));
ND_PRINT((ndo," proto=%s", PROTOIDSTR(proto)));
if (ntohs(n.type) < 8192)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 16384)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", IPSEC_NOTIFY_ERROR_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 24576)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else if (ntohs(n.type) < 32768)
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", IPSEC_NOTIFY_STATUS_STR(ntohs(n.type))));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%s", numstr(ntohs(n.type))));
if (n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
cp = (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
ep2 = (const u_char *)p + item_len;
if (cp < ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," orig=("));
switch (ntohs(n.type)) {
case IPSECDOI_NTYPE_RESPONDER_LIFETIME:
{
const struct attrmap *map = oakley_t_map;
size_t nmap = sizeof(oakley_t_map)/sizeof(oakley_t_map[0]);
while (cp < ep && cp < ep2) {
cp = ikev1_attrmap_print(ndo, cp,
(ep < ep2) ? ep : ep2, map, nmap);
}
break;
}
case IPSECDOI_NTYPE_REPLAY_STATUS:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"replay detection %sabled",
EXTRACT_32BITS(cp) ? "en" : "dis"));
break;
case ISAKMP_NTYPE_NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN:
if (ikev1_sub_print(ndo, ISAKMP_NPTYPE_SA,
(const struct isakmp_gen *)cp, ep, phase, doi, proto,
depth) == NULL)
return NULL;
break;
default:
/* NULL is dummy */
isakmp_print(ndo, cp,
item_len - sizeof(*p) - n.spi_size,
NULL);
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
}
return (const u_char *)ext + item_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
return NULL;
} | 893 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12990 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | PARTIAL | 5.0 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 7.5 | HIGH | 3.9 | 3.6 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/c2ef693866beae071a24b45c49f9674af1df4028', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/c2ef693866beae071a24b45c49f9674af1df4028', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-835'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The ISAKMP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 could enter an infinite loop due to bugs in print-isakmp.c, several functions.'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') | The program contains an iteration or loop with an exit condition that cannot be reached, i.e., an infinite loop. | If the loop can be influenced by an attacker, this weakness could allow attackers to consume excessive resources such as CPU or memory.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/835.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-06 14:33:50-08:00 | CVE-2017-12990/Fix printing of ISAKMPv1 Notification payload data.
The closest thing to a specification for the contents of the payload
data is draft-ietf-ipsec-notifymsg-04, and nothing in there says that it
is ever a complete ISAKMP message, so don't dissect types we don't have
specific code for as a complete ISAKMP message.
While we're at it, fix a comment, and clean up printing of V1 Nonce,
V2 Authentication payloads, and v2 Notice payloads.
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | c2ef693866beae071a24b45c49f9674af1df4028 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | ikev1_nonce_print | ikev1_nonce_print( netdissect_options * ndo , u_char tpay _U_ , const struct isakmp_gen * ext , u_int item_len _U_ , const u_char * ep , uint32_t phase _U_ , uint32_t doi _U_ , uint32_t proto _U_ , int depth _U_) | ['ndo', '_U_', 'ext', '_U_', 'ep', '_U_', '_U_', '_U_', '_U_'] | ikev1_nonce_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_,
const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s:", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_NONCE)));
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ND_PRINT((ndo," n len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
} else if (1 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!ike_show_somedata(ndo, (const u_char *)(const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ep))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_NONCE)));
return NULL;
} | 249 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12990 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | PARTIAL | 5.0 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 7.5 | HIGH | 3.9 | 3.6 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/c2ef693866beae071a24b45c49f9674af1df4028', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/c2ef693866beae071a24b45c49f9674af1df4028', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-835'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The ISAKMP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 could enter an infinite loop due to bugs in print-isakmp.c, several functions.'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') | The program contains an iteration or loop with an exit condition that cannot be reached, i.e., an infinite loop. | If the loop can be influenced by an attacker, this weakness could allow attackers to consume excessive resources such as CPU or memory.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/835.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-06 14:33:50-08:00 | CVE-2017-12990/Fix printing of ISAKMPv1 Notification payload data.
The closest thing to a specification for the contents of the payload
data is draft-ietf-ipsec-notifymsg-04, and nothing in there says that it
is ever a complete ISAKMP message, so don't dissect types we don't have
specific code for as a complete ISAKMP message.
While we're at it, fix a comment, and clean up printing of V1 Nonce,
V2 Authentication payloads, and v2 Notice payloads.
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | c2ef693866beae071a24b45c49f9674af1df4028 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | ikev2_auth_print | ikev2_auth_print( netdissect_options * ndo , u_char tpay , const struct isakmp_gen * ext , u_int item_len _U_ , const u_char * ep , uint32_t phase _U_ , uint32_t doi _U_ , uint32_t proto _U_ , int depth _U_) | ['ndo', 'tpay', 'ext', '_U_', 'ep', '_U_', '_U_', '_U_', '_U_'] | ikev2_auth_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
struct ikev2_auth a;
const char *v2_auth[]={ "invalid", "rsasig",
"shared-secret", "dsssig" };
const u_char *authdata = (const u_char*)ext + sizeof(a);
unsigned int len;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&a, ext, sizeof(a));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(tpay), a.h.critical);
len = ntohs(a.h.len);
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d method=%s", len-4,
STR_OR_ID(a.auth_method, v2_auth)));
if (1 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," authdata=("));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)authdata, len - sizeof(a)))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo,") "));
} else if(ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < len) {
if(!ike_show_somedata(ndo, authdata, ep)) goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
} | 266 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12990 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | PARTIAL | 5.0 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 7.5 | HIGH | 3.9 | 3.6 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/c2ef693866beae071a24b45c49f9674af1df4028', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/c2ef693866beae071a24b45c49f9674af1df4028', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-835'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The ISAKMP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 could enter an infinite loop due to bugs in print-isakmp.c, several functions.'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') | The program contains an iteration or loop with an exit condition that cannot be reached, i.e., an infinite loop. | If the loop can be influenced by an attacker, this weakness could allow attackers to consume excessive resources such as CPU or memory.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/835.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-06 14:33:50-08:00 | CVE-2017-12990/Fix printing of ISAKMPv1 Notification payload data.
The closest thing to a specification for the contents of the payload
data is draft-ietf-ipsec-notifymsg-04, and nothing in there says that it
is ever a complete ISAKMP message, so don't dissect types we don't have
specific code for as a complete ISAKMP message.
While we're at it, fix a comment, and clean up printing of V1 Nonce,
V2 Authentication payloads, and v2 Notice payloads.
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | c2ef693866beae071a24b45c49f9674af1df4028 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | ikev2_n_print | ikev2_n_print( netdissect_options * ndo , u_char tpay _U_ , const struct isakmp_gen * ext , u_int item_len , const u_char * ep , uint32_t phase _U_ , uint32_t doi _U_ , uint32_t proto _U_ , int depth _U_) | ['ndo', '_U_', 'ext', 'item_len', 'ep', '_U_', '_U_', '_U_', '_U_'] | ikev2_n_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay _U_,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len, const u_char *ep,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
const struct ikev2_n *p;
struct ikev2_n n;
const u_char *cp;
u_char showspi, showdata, showsomedata;
const char *notify_name;
uint32_t type;
p = (const struct ikev2_n *)ext;
ND_TCHECK(*p);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&n, ext, sizeof(n));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N), n.h.critical);
showspi = 1;
showdata = 0;
showsomedata=0;
notify_name=NULL;
ND_PRINT((ndo," prot_id=%s", PROTOIDSTR(n.prot_id)));
type = ntohs(n.type);
/* notify space is annoying sparse */
switch(type) {
case IV2_NOTIFY_UNSUPPORTED_CRITICAL_PAYLOAD:
notify_name = "unsupported_critical_payload";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INVALID_IKE_SPI:
notify_name = "invalid_ike_spi";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INVALID_MAJOR_VERSION:
notify_name = "invalid_major_version";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INVALID_SYNTAX:
notify_name = "invalid_syntax";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INVALID_MESSAGE_ID:
notify_name = "invalid_message_id";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INVALID_SPI:
notify_name = "invalid_spi";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN:
notify_name = "no_protocol_chosen";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD:
notify_name = "invalid_ke_payload";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED:
notify_name = "authentication_failed";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_SINGLE_PAIR_REQUIRED:
notify_name = "single_pair_required";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_NO_ADDITIONAL_SAS:
notify_name = "no_additional_sas";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INTERNAL_ADDRESS_FAILURE:
notify_name = "internal_address_failure";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_FAILED_CP_REQUIRED:
notify_name = "failed:cp_required";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INVALID_SELECTORS:
notify_name = "invalid_selectors";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_INITIAL_CONTACT:
notify_name = "initial_contact";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_SET_WINDOW_SIZE:
notify_name = "set_window_size";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_ADDITIONAL_TS_POSSIBLE:
notify_name = "additional_ts_possible";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_IPCOMP_SUPPORTED:
notify_name = "ipcomp_supported";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP:
notify_name = "nat_detection_source_ip";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP:
notify_name = "nat_detection_destination_ip";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_COOKIE:
notify_name = "cookie";
showspi = 1;
showsomedata= 1;
showdata= 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_USE_TRANSPORT_MODE:
notify_name = "use_transport_mode";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_HTTP_CERT_LOOKUP_SUPPORTED:
notify_name = "http_cert_lookup_supported";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_REKEY_SA:
notify_name = "rekey_sa";
showspi = 1;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_ESP_TFC_PADDING_NOT_SUPPORTED:
notify_name = "tfc_padding_not_supported";
showspi = 0;
break;
case IV2_NOTIFY_NON_FIRST_FRAGMENTS_ALSO:
notify_name = "non_first_fragment_also";
showspi = 0;
break;
default:
if (type < 8192) {
notify_name="error";
} else if(type < 16384) {
notify_name="private-error";
} else if(type < 40960) {
notify_name="status";
} else {
notify_name="private-status";
}
}
if(notify_name) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," type=%u(%s)", type, notify_name));
}
if (showspi && n.spi_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," spi="));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(p + 1), n.spi_size))
goto trunc;
}
cp = (const u_char *)(p + 1) + n.spi_size;
if(3 < ndo->ndo_vflag) {
showdata = 1;
}
if ((showdata || (showsomedata && ep-cp < 30)) && cp < ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," data=("));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(cp), ep - cp))
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo,")"));
} else if(showsomedata && cp < ep) {
if(!ike_show_somedata(ndo, cp, ep)) goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + item_len;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(ISAKMP_NPTYPE_N)));
return NULL;
} | 771 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12989 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | PARTIAL | 5.0 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 7.5 | HIGH | 3.9 | 3.6 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/db24063b01cba8e9d4d88b7d8ac70c9000c104e4', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/db24063b01cba8e9d4d88b7d8ac70c9000c104e4', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-835'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The RESP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 could enter an infinite loop due to a bug in print-resp.c:resp_get_length().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') | The program contains an iteration or loop with an exit condition that cannot be reached, i.e., an infinite loop. | If the loop can be influenced by an attacker, this weakness could allow attackers to consume excessive resources such as CPU or memory.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/835.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-07 00:13:33-08:00 | CVE-2017-12989/RESP: Make sure resp_get_length() advances the pointer for invalid lengths.
Make sure that it always sends *endp before returning and that, for
invalid lengths where we don't like a character in the length string,
what it sets *endp to is past the character in question, so we don't
run the risk of infinitely looping (or doing something else random) if a
character in the length is invalid.
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | db24063b01cba8e9d4d88b7d8ac70c9000c104e4 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | resp_get_length | resp_get_length( netdissect_options * ndo , register const u_char * bp , int len , const u_char ** endp) | ['ndo', 'bp', 'len', 'endp'] | resp_get_length(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *bp, int len, const u_char **endp)
{
int result;
u_char c;
int saw_digit;
int neg;
int too_large;
if (len == 0)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(*bp);
too_large = 0;
neg = 0;
if (*bp == '-') {
neg = 1;
bp++;
len--;
}
result = 0;
saw_digit = 0;
for (;;) {
if (len == 0)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(*bp);
c = *bp;
if (!(c >= '0' && c <= '9')) {
if (!saw_digit)
goto invalid;
break;
}
c -= '0';
if (result > (INT_MAX / 10)) {
/* This will overflow an int when we multiply it by 10. */
too_large = 1;
} else {
result *= 10;
if (result == INT_MAX && c > (INT_MAX % 10)) {
/* This will overflow an int when we add c */
too_large = 1;
} else
result += c;
}
bp++;
len--;
saw_digit = 1;
}
if (!saw_digit)
goto invalid;
/*
* OK, the next thing should be \r\n.
*/
if (len == 0)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(*bp);
if (*bp != '\r')
goto invalid;
bp++;
len--;
if (len == 0)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(*bp);
if (*bp != '\n')
goto invalid;
bp++;
len--;
*endp = bp;
if (neg) {
/* -1 means "null", anything else is invalid */
if (too_large || result != 1)
return (-4);
result = -1;
}
return (too_large ? -3 : result);
trunc:
return (-2);
invalid:
return (-5);
} | 328 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12992 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/e942fb84fbe3a73a98a00d2a279425872b5fb9d2', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/e942fb84fbe3a73a98a00d2a279425872b5fb9d2', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The RIPng parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-ripng.c:ripng_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-07 03:03:34-08:00 | CVE-2017-12992/RIPng: Clean up bounds checking.
Do bounds checking as we access items.
Scan the list of netinfo6 entries based on the supplied packet length,
without taking the captured length into account; let the aforementioned
bounds checking handle that.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | e942fb84fbe3a73a98a00d2a279425872b5fb9d2 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | ripng_print | ripng_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * dat , unsigned int length) | ['ndo', 'dat', 'length'] | ripng_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, unsigned int length)
{
register const struct rip6 *rp = (const struct rip6 *)dat;
register const struct netinfo6 *ni;
register u_int amt;
register u_int i;
int j;
int trunc;
if (ndo->ndo_snapend < dat)
return;
amt = ndo->ndo_snapend - dat;
i = min(length, amt);
if (i < (sizeof(struct rip6) - sizeof(struct netinfo6)))
return;
i -= (sizeof(struct rip6) - sizeof(struct netinfo6));
switch (rp->rip6_cmd) {
case RIP6_REQUEST:
j = length / sizeof(*ni);
if (j == 1
&& rp->rip6_nets->rip6_metric == HOPCNT_INFINITY6
&& IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&rp->rip6_nets->rip6_dest)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-req dump"));
break;
}
if (j * sizeof(*ni) != length - 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-req %d[%u]:", j, length));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-req %d:", j));
trunc = ((i / sizeof(*ni)) * sizeof(*ni) != i);
for (ni = rp->rip6_nets; i >= sizeof(*ni);
i -= sizeof(*ni), ++ni) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
rip6_entry_print(ndo, ni, 0);
}
break;
case RIP6_RESPONSE:
j = length / sizeof(*ni);
if (j * sizeof(*ni) != length - 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-resp %d[%u]:", j, length));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-resp %d:", j));
trunc = ((i / sizeof(*ni)) * sizeof(*ni) != i);
for (ni = rp->rip6_nets; i >= sizeof(*ni);
i -= sizeof(*ni), ++ni) {
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
rip6_entry_print(ndo, ni, ni->rip6_metric);
}
if (trunc)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|ripng]"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ripng-%d ?? %u", rp->rip6_cmd, length));
break;
}
if (rp->rip6_vers != RIP6_VERSION)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [vers %d]", rp->rip6_vers));
} | 498 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12994 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/ffde45acf3348f8353fb4064a1b21683ee6b5ddf', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/ffde45acf3348f8353fb4064a1b21683ee6b5ddf', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The BGP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-bgp.c:bgp_attr_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-07 12:08:07-08:00 | CVE-2017-12994/BGP: Move a test inside a loop.
The loop can be executed more than once (that's kinda the whole point of
a loop), so the check has to be made each time through the loop, not
just once before the loop is executed.
Do some additional length checks while we're at it.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | ffde45acf3348f8353fb4064a1b21683ee6b5ddf | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | bgp_attr_print | bgp_attr_print( netdissect_options * ndo , u_int atype , const u_char * pptr , u_int len) | ['ndo', 'atype', 'pptr', 'len'] | bgp_attr_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
u_int atype, const u_char *pptr, u_int len)
{
int i;
uint16_t af;
uint8_t safi, snpa, nhlen;
union { /* copy buffer for bandwidth values */
float f;
uint32_t i;
} bw;
int advance;
u_int tlen;
const u_char *tptr;
char buf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 100];
int as_size;
tptr = pptr;
tlen=len;
switch (atype) {
case BGPTYPE_ORIGIN:
if (len != 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK(*tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_origin_values,
"Unknown Origin Typecode",
tptr[0])));
}
break;
/*
* Process AS4 byte path and AS2 byte path attributes here.
*/
case BGPTYPE_AS4_PATH:
case BGPTYPE_AS_PATH:
if (len % 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
if (!len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "empty"));
break;
}
/*
* BGP updates exchanged between New speakers that support 4
* byte AS, ASs are always encoded in 4 bytes. There is no
* definitive way to find this, just by the packet's
* contents. So, check for packet's TLV's sanity assuming
* 2 bytes first, and it does not pass, assume that ASs are
* encoded in 4 bytes format and move on.
*/
as_size = bgp_attr_get_as_size(ndo, atype, pptr, len);
while (tptr < pptr + len) {
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_as_path_segment_open_values,
"?", tptr[0])));
ND_TCHECK(tptr[1]);
for (i = 0; i < tptr[1] * as_size; i += as_size) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[2 + i], as_size);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s ",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
as_size == 2 ?
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tptr[2 + i]) :
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tptr[2 + i]))));
}
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(bgp_as_path_segment_close_values,
"?", tptr[0])));
ND_TCHECK(tptr[1]);
tptr += 2 + tptr[1] * as_size;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_NEXT_HOP:
if (len != 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_MULTI_EXIT_DISC:
case BGPTYPE_LOCAL_PREF:
if (len != 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_ATOMIC_AGGREGATE:
if (len != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
case BGPTYPE_AGGREGATOR:
/*
* Depending on the AS encoded is of 2 bytes or of 4 bytes,
* the length of this PA can be either 6 bytes or 8 bytes.
*/
if (len != 6 && len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], len);
if (len == 6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 2)));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)), ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 4)));
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_AGGREGATOR4:
if (len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " AS #%s, origin %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr + 4)));
break;
case BGPTYPE_COMMUNITIES:
if (len % 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
uint32_t comm;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
comm = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
switch (comm) {
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_EXPORT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_EXPORT"));
break;
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_ADVERT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_ADVERTISE"));
break;
case BGP_COMMUNITY_NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NO_EXPORT_SUBCONFED"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u:%u%s",
(comm >> 16) & 0xffff,
comm & 0xffff,
(tlen>4) ? ", " : ""));
break;
}
tlen -=4;
tptr +=4;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_ORIGINATOR_ID:
if (len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case BGPTYPE_CLUSTER_LIST:
if (len % 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
(tlen>4) ? ", " : ""));
tlen -=4;
tptr +=4;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_MP_REACH_NLRI:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 3);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
safi = tptr[2];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t AFI: %s (%u), %sSAFI: %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown AFI", af),
af,
(safi>128) ? "vendor specific " : "", /* 128 is meanwhile wellknown */
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown SAFI", safi),
safi));
switch(af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
goto done;
break;
}
tptr +=3;
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
nhlen = tptr[0];
tlen = nhlen;
tptr++;
if (tlen) {
int nnh = 0;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t nexthop: "));
while (tlen > 0) {
if ( nnh++ > 0 ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", " ));
}
switch(af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= sizeof(struct in_addr);
tptr += sizeof(struct in_addr);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)(sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
tptr += (sizeof(struct in_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in6_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= sizeof(struct in6_addr);
tptr += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)(sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
tptr += (sizeof(struct in6_addr)+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN);
}
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < (int)sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
tlen -= (sizeof(struct in_addr));
tptr += (sizeof(struct in_addr));
}
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", isonsap_string(ndo, tptr, tlen)));
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
if (tlen < BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
tlen = 0;
} else {
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RD: %s, %s",
bgp_vpn_rd_print(ndo, tptr),
isonsap_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN,tlen-BGP_VPN_RD_LEN)));
/* rfc986 mapped IPv4 address ? */
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN) == 0x47000601)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " = %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+4)));
/* rfc1888 mapped IPv6 address ? */
else if (EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN) == 0x350000)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " = %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, tptr+BGP_VPN_RD_LEN+3)));
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
}
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no AFI %u/SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
tptr += tlen;
tlen = 0;
goto done;
break;
}
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", nh-length: %u", nhlen));
tptr += tlen;
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
snpa = tptr[0];
tptr++;
if (snpa) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %u SNPA", snpa));
for (/*nothing*/; snpa > 0; snpa--) {
ND_TCHECK(tptr[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %d bytes", tptr[0]));
tptr += tptr[0] + 1;
}
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", no SNPA"));
}
while (len - (tptr - pptr) > 0) {
switch (af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix4(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_RT_ROUTING_INFO):
advance = decode_rt_routing_info(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN): /* fall through */
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
advance = decode_multicast_vpn(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
advance = decode_mdt_vpn_nlri(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix6(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_l2(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr,tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
advance = 0;
tptr = pptr + len;
break;
}
if (advance < 0)
break;
tptr += advance;
}
done:
break;
case BGPTYPE_MP_UNREACH_NLRI:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], BGP_MP_NLRI_MINSIZE);
af = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
safi = tptr[2];
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t AFI: %s (%u), %sSAFI: %s (%u)",
tok2str(af_values, "Unknown AFI", af),
af,
(safi>128) ? "vendor specific " : "", /* 128 is meanwhile wellknown */
tok2str(bgp_safi_values, "Unknown SAFI", safi),
safi));
if (len == BGP_MP_NLRI_MINSIZE)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t End-of-Rib Marker (empty NLRI)"));
tptr += 3;
while (len - (tptr - pptr) > 0) {
switch (af<<8 | safi) {
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix4(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix4(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_LABUNICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_prefix6(ndo, tptr, len, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else if (advance == -3)
break; /* bytes left, but not enough */
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_prefix6(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_VPLS<<8 | SAFNUM_VPLS):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_L2VPN<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_l2(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_UNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNMULTICAST):
case (AFNUM_NSAP<<8 | SAFNUM_VPNUNIMULTICAST):
advance = decode_labeled_vpn_clnp_prefix(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MDT):
advance = decode_mdt_vpn_nlri(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
case (AFNUM_INET<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN): /* fall through */
case (AFNUM_INET6<<8 | SAFNUM_MULTICAST_VPN):
advance = decode_multicast_vpn(ndo, tptr, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (advance == -1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t (illegal prefix length)"));
else if (advance == -2)
goto trunc;
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", buf));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr-3),tlen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no AFI %u / SAFI %u decoder", af, safi));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr-3, "\n\t ", tlen);
advance = 0;
tptr = pptr + len;
break;
}
if (advance < 0)
break;
tptr += advance;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_EXTD_COMMUNITIES:
if (len % 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
while (tlen>0) {
uint16_t extd_comm;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 2);
extd_comm=EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (0x%04x), Flags [%s]",
tok2str(bgp_extd_comm_subtype_values,
"unknown extd community typecode",
extd_comm),
extd_comm,
bittok2str(bgp_extd_comm_flag_values, "none", extd_comm)));
ND_TCHECK2(*(tptr+2), 6);
switch(extd_comm) {
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_0:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_0:
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2VPN_RT_0:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %u:%u (= %s)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2VPN_RT_1:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VRF_RT_IMP:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s:%u",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_RT_2:
case BGP_EXT_COM_RO_2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s:%u",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+2)), EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+6)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_LINKBAND:
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN2:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN3:
case BGP_EXT_COM_VPN_ORIGIN4:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RID:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RID2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RTYPE:
case BGP_EXT_COM_OSPF_RTYPE2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": area:%s, router-type:%s, metric-type:%s%s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+2),
tok2str(bgp_extd_comm_ospf_rtype_values,
"unknown (0x%02x)",
*(tptr+6)),
(*(tptr+7) & BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_METRIC_TYPE) ? "E2" : "",
((*(tptr+6) == BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_EXT) || (*(tptr+6) == BGP_OSPF_RTYPE_NSSA)) ? "E1" : ""));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_L2INFO:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": %s Control Flags [0x%02x]:MTU %u",
tok2str(l2vpn_encaps_values,
"unknown encaps",
*(tptr+2)),
*(tptr+3),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_EXT_COM_SOURCE_AS:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": AS %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2)));
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr,8);
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", 8);
break;
}
tlen -=8;
tptr +=8;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_PMSI_TUNNEL:
{
uint8_t tunnel_type, flags;
tunnel_type = *(tptr+1);
flags = *tptr;
tlen = len;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 5);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Tunnel-type %s (%u), Flags [%s], MPLS Label %u",
tok2str(bgp_pmsi_tunnel_values, "Unknown", tunnel_type),
tunnel_type,
bittok2str(bgp_pmsi_flag_values, "none", flags),
EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr+2)>>4));
tptr +=5;
tlen -= 5;
switch (tunnel_type) {
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_SM: /* fall through */
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_BIDIR:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Sender %s, P-Group %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_PIM_SSM:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Root-Node %s, P-Group %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_INGRESS:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Tunnel-Endpoint %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_LDP_P2MP: /* fall through */
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_LDP_MP2MP:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Root-Node %s, LSP-ID 0x%08x",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
case BGP_PMSI_TUNNEL_RSVP_P2MP:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Extended-Tunnel-ID %s, P2MP-ID 0x%08x",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr+4)));
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", tlen);
}
}
break;
}
case BGPTYPE_AIGP:
{
uint8_t type;
uint16_t length;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 3);
tlen = len;
while (tlen >= 3) {
type = *tptr;
length = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+1);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s TLV (%u), length %u",
tok2str(bgp_aigp_values, "Unknown", type),
type, length));
/*
* Check if we can read the TLV data.
*/
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[3], length - 3);
switch (type) {
case BGP_AIGP_TLV:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[3], 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", metric %" PRIu64,
EXTRACT_64BITS(tptr+3)));
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr+3,"\n\t ", length-3);
}
}
tptr += length;
tlen -= length;
}
break;
}
case BGPTYPE_ATTR_SET:
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 4);
if (len < 4)
goto trunc;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Origin AS: %s",
as_printf(ndo, astostr, sizeof(astostr), EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr))));
tptr+=4;
len -=4;
while (len) {
u_int aflags, alenlen, alen;
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], 2);
if (len < 2)
goto trunc;
aflags = *tptr;
atype = *(tptr + 1);
tptr += 2;
len -= 2;
alenlen = bgp_attr_lenlen(aflags, tptr);
ND_TCHECK2(tptr[0], alenlen);
if (len < alenlen)
goto trunc;
alen = bgp_attr_len(aflags, tptr);
tptr += alenlen;
len -= alenlen;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s (%u), length: %u",
tok2str(bgp_attr_values,
"Unknown Attribute", atype),
atype,
alen));
if (aflags) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [%s%s%s%s",
aflags & 0x80 ? "O" : "",
aflags & 0x40 ? "T" : "",
aflags & 0x20 ? "P" : "",
aflags & 0x10 ? "E" : ""));
if (aflags & 0xf)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "+%x", aflags & 0xf));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "]: "));
}
/* FIXME check for recursion */
if (!bgp_attr_print(ndo, atype, tptr, alen))
return 0;
tptr += alen;
len -= alen;
}
break;
case BGPTYPE_LARGE_COMMUNITY:
if (len == 0 || len % 12) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "invalid len"));
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t "));
while (len > 0) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 12);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u:%u:%u%s",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 8),
(len > 12) ? ", " : ""));
tptr += 12;
len -= 12;
}
break;
default:
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr,len);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t no Attribute %u decoder", atype)); /* we have no decoder for the attribute */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", len);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 && len) { /* omit zero length attributes*/
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr,len);
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", len);
}
return 1;
trunc:
return 0;
} | 6109 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12995 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | PARTIAL | 5.0 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 7.5 | HIGH | 3.9 | 3.6 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/3a76fd7c95fced2c2f8c8148a9055c3a542eff29', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/3a76fd7c95fced2c2f8c8148a9055c3a542eff29', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-835'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The DNS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 could enter an infinite loop due to a bug in print-domain.c:ns_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') | The program contains an iteration or loop with an exit condition that cannot be reached, i.e., an infinite loop. | If the loop can be influenced by an attacker, this weakness could allow attackers to consume excessive resources such as CPU or memory.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/835.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-10 18:52:17-08:00 | CVE-2017-12995/Check for DNS compression pointers that don't point backwards.
This is what BIND 9.11.0-P2 does; it not only detects pointers that
loop, as "point backwards" means "point before anything we've processed
so far, including what we're processing right now", so the pointer can't
point to itself (as that's what we're processing right now).
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
Also, add some infinite-pointer-loop captures.
More checks should be done. We might, for example, want to make sure
the upper 2 bits of the label length/pointer byte are 00 or 11, and that
if we encounter a pointer and jump backwards to what we think is a label
the label ends before the beginning of the last label we processed, to
make sure the pointer doesn't point backwards into the *middle* of a
label, and also make sure the entire name is <= 255 bytes long. | 3a76fd7c95fced2c2f8c8148a9055c3a542eff29 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | ns_nprint | ns_nprint( netdissect_options * ndo , register const u_char * cp , register const u_char * bp) | ['ndo', 'cp', 'bp'] | ns_nprint(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp, register const u_char *bp)
{
register u_int i, l;
register const u_char *rp = NULL;
register int compress = 0;
int chars_processed;
int elt;
int data_size = ndo->ndo_snapend - bp;
if ((l = labellen(ndo, cp)) == (u_int)-1)
return(NULL);
if (!ND_TTEST2(*cp, 1))
return(NULL);
chars_processed = 1;
if (((i = *cp++) & INDIR_MASK) != INDIR_MASK) {
compress = 0;
rp = cp + l;
}
if (i != 0)
while (i && cp < ndo->ndo_snapend) {
if ((i & INDIR_MASK) == INDIR_MASK) {
if (!compress) {
rp = cp + 1;
compress = 1;
}
if (!ND_TTEST2(*cp, 1))
return(NULL);
cp = bp + (((i << 8) | *cp) & 0x3fff);
if ((l = labellen(ndo, cp)) == (u_int)-1)
return(NULL);
if (!ND_TTEST2(*cp, 1))
return(NULL);
i = *cp++;
chars_processed++;
/*
* If we've looked at every character in
* the message, this pointer will make
* us look at some character again,
* which means we're looping.
*/
if (chars_processed >= data_size) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "<LOOP>"));
return (NULL);
}
continue;
}
if ((i & INDIR_MASK) == EDNS0_MASK) {
elt = (i & ~INDIR_MASK);
switch(elt) {
case EDNS0_ELT_BITLABEL:
if (blabel_print(ndo, cp) == NULL)
return (NULL);
break;
default:
/* unknown ELT */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "<ELT %d>", elt));
return(NULL);
}
} else {
if (fn_printn(ndo, cp, l, ndo->ndo_snapend))
return(NULL);
}
cp += l;
chars_processed += l;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "."));
if ((l = labellen(ndo, cp)) == (u_int)-1)
return(NULL);
if (!ND_TTEST2(*cp, 1))
return(NULL);
i = *cp++;
chars_processed++;
if (!compress)
rp += l + 1;
}
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "."));
return (rp);
} | 463 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12998 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/979dcefd7b259e9e233f77fe1c5312793bfd948f', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/979dcefd7b259e9e233f77fe1c5312793bfd948f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The IS-IS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:isis_print_extd_ip_reach().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-13 10:38:04-08:00 | CVE-2017-12998/IS-IS: Check for 2 bytes if we're going to fetch 2 bytes.
Probably a copy-and-pasteo.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 979dcefd7b259e9e233f77fe1c5312793bfd948f | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | isis_print_extd_ip_reach | isis_print_extd_ip_reach( netdissect_options * ndo , const uint8_t * tptr , const char * ident , uint16_t afi) | ['ndo', 'tptr', 'ident', 'afi'] | isis_print_extd_ip_reach(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *tptr, const char *ident, uint16_t afi)
{
char ident_buffer[20];
uint8_t prefix[sizeof(struct in6_addr)]; /* shared copy buffer for IPv4 and IPv6 prefixes */
u_int metric, status_byte, bit_length, byte_length, sublen, processed, subtlvtype, subtlvlen;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, 4))
return (0);
metric = EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr);
processed=4;
tptr+=4;
if (afi == AF_INET) {
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, 1)) /* fetch status byte */
return (0);
status_byte=*(tptr++);
bit_length = status_byte&0x3f;
if (bit_length > 32) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sIPv4 prefix: bad bit length %u",
ident,
bit_length));
return (0);
}
processed++;
} else if (afi == AF_INET6) {
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, 1)) /* fetch status & prefix_len byte */
return (0);
status_byte=*(tptr++);
bit_length=*(tptr++);
if (bit_length > 128) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sIPv6 prefix: bad bit length %u",
ident,
bit_length));
return (0);
}
processed+=2;
} else
return (0); /* somebody is fooling us */
byte_length = (bit_length + 7) / 8; /* prefix has variable length encoding */
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, byte_length))
return (0);
memset(prefix, 0, sizeof prefix); /* clear the copy buffer */
memcpy(prefix,tptr,byte_length); /* copy as much as is stored in the TLV */
tptr+=byte_length;
processed+=byte_length;
if (afi == AF_INET)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sIPv4 prefix: %15s/%u",
ident,
ipaddr_string(ndo, prefix),
bit_length));
else if (afi == AF_INET6)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%sIPv6 prefix: %s/%u",
ident,
ip6addr_string(ndo, prefix),
bit_length));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Distribution: %s, Metric: %u",
ISIS_MASK_TLV_EXTD_IP_UPDOWN(status_byte) ? "down" : "up",
metric));
if (afi == AF_INET && ISIS_MASK_TLV_EXTD_IP_SUBTLV(status_byte))
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", sub-TLVs present"));
else if (afi == AF_INET6)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s%s",
ISIS_MASK_TLV_EXTD_IP6_IE(status_byte) ? "External" : "Internal",
ISIS_MASK_TLV_EXTD_IP6_SUBTLV(status_byte) ? ", sub-TLVs present" : ""));
if ((afi == AF_INET && ISIS_MASK_TLV_EXTD_IP_SUBTLV(status_byte))
|| (afi == AF_INET6 && ISIS_MASK_TLV_EXTD_IP6_SUBTLV(status_byte))
) {
/* assume that one prefix can hold more
than one subTLV - therefore the first byte must reflect
the aggregate bytecount of the subTLVs for this prefix
*/
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr, 1))
return (0);
sublen=*(tptr++);
processed+=sublen+1;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (%u)", sublen)); /* print out subTLV length */
while (sublen>0) {
if (!ND_TTEST2(*tptr,2))
return (0);
subtlvtype=*(tptr++);
subtlvlen=*(tptr++);
/* prepend the indent string */
snprintf(ident_buffer, sizeof(ident_buffer), "%s ",ident);
if (!isis_print_ip_reach_subtlv(ndo, tptr, subtlvtype, subtlvlen, ident_buffer))
return(0);
tptr+=subtlvlen;
sublen-=(subtlvlen+2);
}
}
return (processed);
} | 568 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12997 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | NONE | PARTIAL | 5.0 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | NONE | NONE | HIGH | 7.5 | HIGH | 3.9 | 3.6 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/34cec721d39c76be1e0a600829a7b17bdfb832b6', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/34cec721d39c76be1e0a600829a7b17bdfb832b6', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/100914', 'name': '100914', 'refsource': 'BID', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-835'}]}] | MEDIUM | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The LLDP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 could enter an infinite loop due to a bug in print-lldp.c:lldp_private_8021_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') | The program contains an iteration or loop with an exit condition that cannot be reached, i.e., an infinite loop. | If the loop can be influenced by an attacker, this weakness could allow attackers to consume excessive resources such as CPU or memory.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/835.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-13 11:11:42-08:00 | CVE-2017-12997/LLDP: Don't use an 8-bit loop counter.
If you have a
for (i = 0; i < N; i++)
loop, you'd better make sure that i is big enough to hold N - not N-1,
N.
The TLV length here is 9 bits long, not 8 bits long, so an 8-bit loop
counter will overflow and you can loop infinitely.
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s).
Clean up the output a bit while we're at it. | 34cec721d39c76be1e0a600829a7b17bdfb832b6 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | lldp_private_8021_print | lldp_private_8021_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * tptr , u_int tlv_len) | ['ndo', 'tptr', 'tlv_len'] | lldp_private_8021_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *tptr, u_int tlv_len)
{
int subtype, hexdump = FALSE;
u_int sublen;
u_int tval;
uint8_t i;
if (tlv_len < 4) {
return hexdump;
}
subtype = *(tptr+3);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Subtype (%u)",
tok2str(lldp_8021_subtype_values, "unknown", subtype),
subtype));
switch (subtype) {
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_PORT_VLAN_ID:
if (tlv_len < 6) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t port vlan id (PVID): %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + 4)));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_PROTOCOL_VLAN_ID:
if (tlv_len < 7) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t port and protocol vlan id (PPVID): %u, flags [%s] (0x%02x)",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+5),
bittok2str(lldp_8021_port_protocol_id_values, "none", *(tptr+4)),
*(tptr + 4)));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_VLAN_NAME:
if (tlv_len < 6) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t vlan id (VID): %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + 4)));
if (tlv_len < 7) {
return hexdump;
}
sublen = *(tptr+6);
if (tlv_len < 7+sublen) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t vlan name: "));
safeputs(ndo, tptr + 7, sublen);
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_PROTOCOL_IDENTITY:
if (tlv_len < 5) {
return hexdump;
}
sublen = *(tptr+4);
if (tlv_len < 5+sublen) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t protocol identity: "));
safeputs(ndo, tptr + 5, sublen);
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_CONGESTION_NOTIFICATION:
if(tlv_len<LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_CONGESTION_NOTIFICATION_LENGTH){
return hexdump;
}
tval=*(tptr+4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Pre-Priority CNPV Indicator"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Priority : 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Value : "));
for(i=0;i<NO_OF_BITS;i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%-2d ", (tval >> i) & 0x01));
tval=*(tptr+5);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Pre-Priority Ready Indicator"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Priority : 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Value : "));
for(i=0;i<NO_OF_BITS;i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%-2d ", (tval >> i) & 0x01));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_ETS_CONFIGURATION:
if(tlv_len<LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_ETS_CONFIGURATION_LENGTH) {
return hexdump;
}
tval=*(tptr+4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Willing:%d, CBS:%d, RES:%d, Max TCs:%d",
tval >> 7, (tval >> 6) & 0x02, (tval >> 3) & 0x07, tval & 0x07));
/*Print Priority Assignment Table*/
print_ets_priority_assignment_table(ndo, tptr + 5);
/*Print TC Bandwidth Table*/
print_tc_bandwidth_table(ndo, tptr + 9);
/* Print TSA Assignment Table */
print_tsa_assignment_table(ndo, tptr + 17);
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_ETS_RECOMMENDATION:
if(tlv_len<LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_ETS_RECOMMENDATION_LENGTH) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t RES: %d", *(tptr + 4)));
/*Print Priority Assignment Table */
print_ets_priority_assignment_table(ndo, tptr + 5);
/*Print TC Bandwidth Table */
print_tc_bandwidth_table(ndo, tptr + 9);
/* Print TSA Assignment Table */
print_tsa_assignment_table(ndo, tptr + 17);
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_PFC_CONFIGURATION:
if(tlv_len<LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_PFC_CONFIGURATION_LENGTH) {
return hexdump;
}
tval=*(tptr+4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Willing: %d, MBC: %d, RES: %d, PFC cap:%d ",
tval >> 7, (tval >> 6) & 0x01, (tval >> 4) & 0x03, (tval & 0x0f)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t PFC Enable"));
tval=*(tptr+5);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Priority : 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Value : "));
for(i=0;i<NO_OF_BITS;i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%-2d ", (tval >> i) & 0x01));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_APPLICATION_PRIORITY:
if(tlv_len<LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_APPLICATION_PRIORITY_MIN_LENGTH) {
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t RES: %d", *(tptr + 4)));
if(tlv_len<=LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_APPLICATION_PRIORITY_MIN_LENGTH){
return hexdump;
}
/* Length of Application Priority Table */
sublen=tlv_len-5;
if(sublen%3!=0){
return hexdump;
}
i=0;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Application Priority Table"));
while(i<sublen) {
tval=*(tptr+i+5);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Priority: %d, RES: %d, Sel: %d",
tval >> 5, (tval >> 3) & 0x03, (tval & 0x07)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Protocol ID: %d", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + i + 5)));
i=i+3;
}
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_EVB:
if(tlv_len<LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_EVB_LENGTH){
return hexdump;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t EVB Bridge Status"));
tval=*(tptr+4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t RES: %d, BGID: %d, RRCAP: %d, RRCTR: %d",
tval >> 3, (tval >> 2) & 0x01, (tval >> 1) & 0x01, tval & 0x01));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t EVB Station Status"));
tval=*(tptr+5);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t RES: %d, SGID: %d, RRREQ: %d,RRSTAT: %d",
tval >> 4, (tval >> 3) & 0x01, (tval >> 2) & 0x01, tval & 0x03));
tval=*(tptr+6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t R: %d, RTE: %d, ",tval >> 5, tval & 0x1f));
tval=*(tptr+7);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "EVB Mode: %s [%d]",
tok2str(lldp_evb_mode_values, "unknown", tval >> 6), tval >> 6));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t ROL: %d, RWD: %d, ", (tval >> 5) & 0x01, tval & 0x1f));
tval=*(tptr+8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RES: %d, ROL: %d, RKA: %d", tval >> 6, (tval >> 5) & 0x01, tval & 0x1f));
break;
case LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_CDCP:
if(tlv_len<LLDP_PRIVATE_8021_SUBTYPE_CDCP_MIN_LENGTH){
return hexdump;
}
tval=*(tptr+4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Role: %d, RES: %d, Scomp: %d ",
tval >> 7, (tval >> 4) & 0x07, (tval >> 3) & 0x01));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ChnCap: %d", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr + 6) & 0x0fff));
sublen=tlv_len-8;
if(sublen%3!=0) {
return hexdump;
}
i=0;
while(i<sublen) {
tval=EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr+i+8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t SCID: %d, SVID: %d",
tval >> 12, tval & 0x000fff));
i=i+3;
}
break;
default:
hexdump = TRUE;
break;
}
return hexdump;
} | 1276 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-12996 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/6fca58f5f9c96749a575f52e20598ad43f5bdf30', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/6fca58f5f9c96749a575f52e20598ad43f5bdf30', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The PIMv2 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-pim.c:pimv2_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-13 11:31:25-08:00 | CVE-2017-12996/PIMv2: Make sure PIM TLVs have the right length.
We do bounds checks based on the TLV length, so if the TLV's length is
too short, and we don't check for that, we could end up fetching data
past the end of the TLV - including past the length of the captured data
in the packet.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s). | 6fca58f5f9c96749a575f52e20598ad43f5bdf30 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | pimv2_print | pimv2_print( netdissect_options * ndo , register const u_char * bp , register u_int len , const u_char * bp2) | ['ndo', 'bp', 'len', 'bp2'] | pimv2_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, register u_int len, const u_char *bp2)
{
register const u_char *ep;
register const struct pim *pim = (const struct pim *)bp;
int advance;
enum checksum_status cksum_status;
ep = (const u_char *)ndo->ndo_snapend;
if (bp >= ep)
return;
if (ep > bp + len)
ep = bp + len;
ND_TCHECK(pim->pim_rsv);
pimv2_addr_len = pim->pim_rsv;
if (pimv2_addr_len != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", RFC2117-encoding"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", cksum 0x%04x ", EXTRACT_16BITS(&pim->pim_cksum)));
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(&pim->pim_cksum) == 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(unverified)"));
} else {
if (PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever) == PIMV2_TYPE_REGISTER) {
/*
* The checksum only covers the packet header,
* not the encapsulated packet.
*/
cksum_status = pimv2_check_checksum(ndo, bp, bp2, 8);
if (cksum_status == INCORRECT) {
/*
* To quote RFC 4601, "For interoperability
* reasons, a message carrying a checksum
* calculated over the entire PIM Register
* message should also be accepted."
*/
cksum_status = pimv2_check_checksum(ndo, bp, bp2, len);
}
} else {
/*
* The checksum covers the entire packet.
*/
cksum_status = pimv2_check_checksum(ndo, bp, bp2, len);
}
switch (cksum_status) {
case CORRECT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(correct)"));
break;
case INCORRECT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(incorrect)"));
break;
case UNVERIFIED:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(unverified)"));
break;
}
}
switch (PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever)) {
case PIMV2_TYPE_HELLO:
{
uint16_t otype, olen;
bp += 4;
while (bp < ep) {
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4);
otype = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[0]);
olen = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]);
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 4 + olen);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option (%u), length %u, Value: ",
tok2str(pimv2_hello_option_values, "Unknown", otype),
otype,
olen));
bp += 4;
switch (otype) {
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_HOLDTIME:
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(bp));
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_LANPRUNEDELAY:
if (olen != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ERROR: Option Length != 4 Bytes (%u)", olen));
} else {
char t_bit;
uint16_t lan_delay, override_interval;
lan_delay = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
override_interval = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp+2);
t_bit = (lan_delay & 0x8000)? 1 : 0;
lan_delay &= ~0x8000;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t T-bit=%d, LAN delay %dms, Override interval %dms",
t_bit, lan_delay, override_interval));
}
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_DR_PRIORITY_OLD:
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_DR_PRIORITY:
switch (olen) {
case 0:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Bi-Directional Capability (Old)"));
break;
case 4:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(bp)));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ERROR: Option Length != 4 Bytes (%u)", olen));
break;
}
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_GENID:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(bp)));
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_REFRESH_CAP:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "v%d", *bp));
if (*(bp+1) != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", interval "));
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, *(bp+1));
}
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(bp+2) != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ?0x%04x?", EXTRACT_16BITS(bp+2)));
}
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_BIDIR_CAP:
break;
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_ADDRESS_LIST_OLD:
case PIMV2_HELLO_OPTION_ADDRESS_LIST:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
const u_char *ptr = bp;
while (ptr < (bp+olen)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t "));
advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, ptr, pimv2_unicast, 0);
if (advance < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
ptr += advance;
}
}
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, bp, "\n\t ", olen);
break;
}
/* do we want to see an additionally hexdump ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag> 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, bp, "\n\t ", olen);
bp += olen;
}
break;
}
case PIMV2_TYPE_REGISTER:
{
const struct ip *ip;
ND_TCHECK2(*(bp + 4), PIMV2_REGISTER_FLAG_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Flags [ %s ]\n\t",
tok2str(pimv2_register_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(bp+4))));
bp += 8; len -= 8;
/* encapsulated multicast packet */
ip = (const struct ip *)bp;
switch (IP_V(ip)) {
case 0: /* Null header */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IP-Null-header %s > %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_src),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_dst)));
break;
case 4: /* IPv4 */
ip_print(ndo, bp, len);
break;
case 6: /* IPv6 */
ip6_print(ndo, bp, len);
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "IP ver %d", IP_V(ip)));
break;
}
break;
}
case PIMV2_TYPE_REGISTER_STOP:
bp += 4; len -= 4;
if (bp >= ep)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " group="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
if (bp >= ep)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " source="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
break;
case PIMV2_TYPE_JOIN_PRUNE:
case PIMV2_TYPE_GRAFT:
case PIMV2_TYPE_GRAFT_ACK:
/*
* 0 1 2 3
* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* |PIM Ver| Type | Addr length | Checksum |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Unicast-Upstream Neighbor Address |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Reserved | Num groups | Holdtime |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Multicast Group Address-1 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Number of Joined Sources | Number of Pruned Sources |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Joined Source Address-1 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | . |
* | . |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Joined Source Address-n |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Pruned Source Address-1 |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | . |
* | . |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Pruned Source Address-n |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | . |
* | . |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
* | Encoded-Multicast Group Address-n |
* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
*/
{
uint8_t ngroup;
uint16_t holdtime;
uint16_t njoin;
uint16_t nprune;
int i, j;
bp += 4; len -= 4;
if (PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever) != 7) { /*not for Graft-ACK*/
if (bp >= ep)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", upstream-neighbor: "));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
}
if (bp + 4 > ep)
break;
ngroup = bp[1];
holdtime = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %u group(s)", ngroup));
if (PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever) != 7) { /*not for Graft-ACK*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", holdtime: "));
if (holdtime == 0xffff)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "infinite"));
else
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, holdtime);
}
bp += 4; len -= 4;
for (i = 0; i < ngroup; i++) {
if (bp >= ep)
goto jp_done;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t group #%u: ", i+1));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto jp_done;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
if (bp + 4 > ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto jp_done;
}
njoin = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[0]);
nprune = EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", joined sources: %u, pruned sources: %u", njoin, nprune));
bp += 4; len -= 4;
for (j = 0; j < njoin; j++) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t joined source #%u: ", j+1));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_source, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto jp_done;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
}
for (j = 0; j < nprune; j++) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t pruned source #%u: ", j+1));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_source, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto jp_done;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
}
}
jp_done:
break;
}
case PIMV2_TYPE_BOOTSTRAP:
{
int i, j, frpcnt;
bp += 4;
/* Fragment Tag, Hash Mask len, and BSR-priority */
if (bp + sizeof(uint16_t) >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tag=%x", EXTRACT_16BITS(bp)));
bp += sizeof(uint16_t);
if (bp >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " hashmlen=%d", bp[0]));
if (bp + 1 >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BSRprio=%d", bp[1]));
bp += 2;
/* Encoded-Unicast-BSR-Address */
if (bp >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BSR="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
for (i = 0; bp < ep; i++) {
/* Encoded-Group Address */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (group%d: ", i));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0))
< 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
bp += advance;
/* RP-Count, Frag RP-Cnt, and rsvd */
if (bp >= ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RPcnt=%d", bp[0]));
if (bp + 1 >= ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " FRPcnt=%d", frpcnt = bp[1]));
bp += 4;
for (j = 0; j < frpcnt && bp < ep; j++) {
/* each RP info */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RP%d=", j));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp,
pimv2_unicast,
0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
bp += advance;
if (bp + 1 >= ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ",holdtime="));
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(bp));
if (bp + 2 >= ep) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "...)"));
goto bs_done;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ",prio=%d", bp[2]));
bp += 4;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
}
bs_done:
break;
}
case PIMV2_TYPE_ASSERT:
bp += 4; len -= 4;
if (bp >= ep)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " group="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
if (bp >= ep)
break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " src="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance; len -= advance;
if (bp + 8 > ep)
break;
if (bp[0] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RPT"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " pref=%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[0]) & 0x7fffffff));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " metric=%u", EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[4])));
break;
case PIMV2_TYPE_CANDIDATE_RP:
{
int i, pfxcnt;
bp += 4;
/* Prefix-Cnt, Priority, and Holdtime */
if (bp >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " prefix-cnt=%d", bp[0]));
pfxcnt = bp[0];
if (bp + 1 >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " prio=%d", bp[1]));
if (bp + 3 >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " holdtime="));
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[2]));
bp += 4;
/* Encoded-Unicast-RP-Address */
if (bp >= ep) break;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RP="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
/* Encoded-Group Addresses */
for (i = 0; i < pfxcnt && bp < ep; i++) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " Group%d=", i));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0))
< 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
}
break;
}
case PIMV2_TYPE_PRUNE_REFRESH:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " src="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " grp="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_group, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " forwarder="));
if ((advance = pimv2_addr_print(ndo, bp, pimv2_unicast, 0)) < 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "..."));
break;
}
bp += advance;
ND_TCHECK2(bp[0], 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " TUNR "));
unsigned_relts_print(ndo, EXTRACT_16BITS(bp));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [type %d]", PIM_TYPE(pim->pim_typever)));
break;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|pim]"));
} | 2606 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13000 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/a7e5f58f402e6919ec444a57946bade7dfd6b184', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/a7e5f58f402e6919ec444a57946bade7dfd6b184', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/9be4e0b5938b705e7e36cfcb110a740c6ff0cb97', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/9be4e0b5938b705e7e36cfcb110a740c6ff0cb97', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/8512734883227c11568bb35da1d48b9f8466f43f', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/8512734883227c11568bb35da1d48b9f8466f43f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The IEEE 802.15.4 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-802_15_4.c:ieee802_15_4_if_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-17 17:43:10-08:00 | CVE-2017-13000/IEEE 802.15.4: Add more bounds checks.
While we're at it, add a bunch of macros for the frame control field's
subfields, have the reserved frame types show the frame type value, use
the same code path for processing source and destination addresses
regardless of whether -v was specified (just leave out the addresses in
non-verbose mode), and return the header length in all cases.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s). | 9be4e0b5938b705e7e36cfcb110a740c6ff0cb97 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | extract_header_length | extract_header_length( uint16_t fc) | ['fc'] | extract_header_length(uint16_t fc)
{
int len = 0;
switch ((fc >> 10) & 0x3) {
case 0x00:
if (fc & (1 << 6)) /* intra-PAN with none dest addr */
return -1;
break;
case 0x01:
return -1;
case 0x02:
len += 4;
break;
case 0x03:
len += 10;
break;
}
switch ((fc >> 14) & 0x3) {
case 0x00:
break;
case 0x01:
return -1;
case 0x02:
len += 4;
break;
case 0x03:
len += 10;
break;
}
if (fc & (1 << 6)) {
if (len < 2)
return -1;
len -= 2;
}
return len;
} | 143 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13000 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/a7e5f58f402e6919ec444a57946bade7dfd6b184', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/a7e5f58f402e6919ec444a57946bade7dfd6b184', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/9be4e0b5938b705e7e36cfcb110a740c6ff0cb97', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/9be4e0b5938b705e7e36cfcb110a740c6ff0cb97', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/8512734883227c11568bb35da1d48b9f8466f43f', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/8512734883227c11568bb35da1d48b9f8466f43f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The IEEE 802.15.4 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-802_15_4.c:ieee802_15_4_if_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-17 17:43:10-08:00 | CVE-2017-13000/IEEE 802.15.4: Add more bounds checks.
While we're at it, add a bunch of macros for the frame control field's
subfields, have the reserved frame types show the frame type value, use
the same code path for processing source and destination addresses
regardless of whether -v was specified (just leave out the addresses in
non-verbose mode), and return the header length in all cases.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s). | 9be4e0b5938b705e7e36cfcb110a740c6ff0cb97 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | ieee802_15_4_if_print | ieee802_15_4_if_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const struct pcap_pkthdr * h , const u_char * p) | ['ndo', 'h', 'p'] | ieee802_15_4_if_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, const u_char *p)
{
u_int caplen = h->caplen;
int hdrlen;
uint16_t fc;
uint8_t seq;
if (caplen < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4] %x", caplen));
return caplen;
}
fc = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
hdrlen = extract_header_length(fc);
seq = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(p + 2);
p += 3;
caplen -= 3;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"IEEE 802.15.4 %s packet ", ftypes[fc & 0x7]));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"seq %02x ", seq));
if (hdrlen == -1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"invalid! "));
return caplen;
}
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag) {
p+= hdrlen;
caplen -= hdrlen;
} else {
uint16_t panid = 0;
switch ((fc >> 10) & 0x3) {
case 0x00:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"none "));
break;
case 0x01:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"reserved destination addressing mode"));
return 0;
case 0x02:
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%04x ", panid, EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p)));
p += 2;
break;
case 0x03:
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%s ", panid, le64addr_string(ndo, p)));
p += 8;
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"< "));
switch ((fc >> 14) & 0x3) {
case 0x00:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"none "));
break;
case 0x01:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"reserved source addressing mode"));
return 0;
case 0x02:
if (!(fc & (1 << 6))) {
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%04x ", panid, EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p)));
p += 2;
break;
case 0x03:
if (!(fc & (1 << 6))) {
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%s ", panid, le64addr_string(ndo, p)));
p += 8;
break;
}
caplen -= hdrlen;
}
if (!ndo->ndo_suppress_default_print)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p, caplen);
return 0;
} | 461 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13000 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/a7e5f58f402e6919ec444a57946bade7dfd6b184', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/a7e5f58f402e6919ec444a57946bade7dfd6b184', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/9be4e0b5938b705e7e36cfcb110a740c6ff0cb97', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/9be4e0b5938b705e7e36cfcb110a740c6ff0cb97', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/8512734883227c11568bb35da1d48b9f8466f43f', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/8512734883227c11568bb35da1d48b9f8466f43f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The IEEE 802.15.4 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-802_15_4.c:ieee802_15_4_if_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-21 13:40:19-08:00 | CVE-2017-13000/IEEE 802.15.4: Fix bug introduced by previous fix.
We've already advanced the pointer past the PAN ID, if present; it now
points to the address, so don't add 2 to it.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | a7e5f58f402e6919ec444a57946bade7dfd6b184 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | ieee802_15_4_if_print | ieee802_15_4_if_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const struct pcap_pkthdr * h , const u_char * p) | ['ndo', 'h', 'p'] | ieee802_15_4_if_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, const u_char *p)
{
u_int caplen = h->caplen;
u_int hdrlen;
uint16_t fc;
uint8_t seq;
uint16_t panid = 0;
if (caplen < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return caplen;
}
hdrlen = 3;
fc = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
seq = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(p + 2);
p += 3;
caplen -= 3;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"IEEE 802.15.4 %s packet ", ftypes[FC_FRAME_TYPE(fc)]));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"seq %02x ", seq));
/*
* Destination address and PAN ID, if present.
*/
switch (FC_DEST_ADDRESSING_MODE(fc)) {
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_NONE:
if (fc & FC_PAN_ID_COMPRESSION) {
/*
* PAN ID compression; this requires that both
* the source and destination addresses be present,
* but the destination address is missing.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"none "));
break;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_RESERVED:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"reserved destination addressing mode"));
return hdrlen;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_SHORT:
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%04x ", panid, EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p + 2)));
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
break;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_LONG:
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
if (caplen < 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%s ", panid, le64addr_string(ndo, p + 2)));
p += 8;
caplen -= 8;
hdrlen += 8;
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"< "));
/*
* Source address and PAN ID, if present.
*/
switch (FC_SRC_ADDRESSING_MODE(fc)) {
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_NONE:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"none "));
break;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_RESERVED:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"reserved source addressing mode"));
return 0;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_SHORT:
if (!(fc & FC_PAN_ID_COMPRESSION)) {
/*
* The source PAN ID is not compressed out, so
* fetch it. (Otherwise, we'll use the destination
* PAN ID, fetched above.)
*/
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
}
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%04x ", panid, EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p)));
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
break;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_LONG:
if (!(fc & FC_PAN_ID_COMPRESSION)) {
/*
* The source PAN ID is not compressed out, so
* fetch it. (Otherwise, we'll use the destination
* PAN ID, fetched above.)
*/
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
}
if (caplen < 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%s ", panid, le64addr_string(ndo, p)));
p += 8;
caplen -= 8;
hdrlen += 8;
break;
}
if (!ndo->ndo_suppress_default_print)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p, caplen);
return hdrlen;
} | 696 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13000 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/a7e5f58f402e6919ec444a57946bade7dfd6b184', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/a7e5f58f402e6919ec444a57946bade7dfd6b184', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/9be4e0b5938b705e7e36cfcb110a740c6ff0cb97', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/9be4e0b5938b705e7e36cfcb110a740c6ff0cb97', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/8512734883227c11568bb35da1d48b9f8466f43f', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/8512734883227c11568bb35da1d48b9f8466f43f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The IEEE 802.15.4 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-802_15_4.c:ieee802_15_4_if_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-21 14:10:15-08:00 | CVE-2017-13000/IEEE 802.15.4: Fix bug introduced two fixes prior.
We've already advanced the pointer past the PAN ID, if present; it now
points to the address, so don't add 2 to it.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 8512734883227c11568bb35da1d48b9f8466f43f | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | ieee802_15_4_if_print | ieee802_15_4_if_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const struct pcap_pkthdr * h , const u_char * p) | ['ndo', 'h', 'p'] | ieee802_15_4_if_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, const u_char *p)
{
u_int caplen = h->caplen;
u_int hdrlen;
uint16_t fc;
uint8_t seq;
uint16_t panid = 0;
if (caplen < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return caplen;
}
hdrlen = 3;
fc = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
seq = EXTRACT_LE_8BITS(p + 2);
p += 3;
caplen -= 3;
ND_PRINT((ndo,"IEEE 802.15.4 %s packet ", ftypes[FC_FRAME_TYPE(fc)]));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"seq %02x ", seq));
/*
* Destination address and PAN ID, if present.
*/
switch (FC_DEST_ADDRESSING_MODE(fc)) {
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_NONE:
if (fc & FC_PAN_ID_COMPRESSION) {
/*
* PAN ID compression; this requires that both
* the source and destination addresses be present,
* but the destination address is missing.
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"none "));
break;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_RESERVED:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"reserved destination addressing mode"));
return hdrlen;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_SHORT:
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%04x ", panid, EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p + 2)));
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
break;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_LONG:
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
if (caplen < 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%s ", panid, le64addr_string(ndo, p)));
p += 8;
caplen -= 8;
hdrlen += 8;
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"< "));
/*
* Source address and PAN ID, if present.
*/
switch (FC_SRC_ADDRESSING_MODE(fc)) {
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_NONE:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"none "));
break;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_RESERVED:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"reserved source addressing mode"));
return 0;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_SHORT:
if (!(fc & FC_PAN_ID_COMPRESSION)) {
/*
* The source PAN ID is not compressed out, so
* fetch it. (Otherwise, we'll use the destination
* PAN ID, fetched above.)
*/
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
}
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%04x ", panid, EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p)));
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
break;
case FC_ADDRESSING_MODE_LONG:
if (!(fc & FC_PAN_ID_COMPRESSION)) {
/*
* The source PAN ID is not compressed out, so
* fetch it. (Otherwise, we'll use the destination
* PAN ID, fetched above.)
*/
if (caplen < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
panid = EXTRACT_LE_16BITS(p);
p += 2;
caplen -= 2;
hdrlen += 2;
}
if (caplen < 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|802.15.4]"));
return hdrlen;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%04x:%s ", panid, le64addr_string(ndo, p)));
p += 8;
caplen -= 8;
hdrlen += 8;
break;
}
if (!ndo->ndo_suppress_default_print)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p, caplen);
return hdrlen;
} | 694 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13001 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/7a923447fd49a069a0fd3b6c3547438ab5ee2123', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/7a923447fd49a069a0fd3b6c3547438ab5ee2123', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The NFS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-nfs.c:nfs_printfh().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-19 13:56:12-08:00 | CVE-2017-13001/NFS: Don't copy more data than is in the file handle.
Also, put the buffer on the stack; no reason to make it static. (65
bytes isn't a lot.)
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 7a923447fd49a069a0fd3b6c3547438ab5ee2123 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | nfs_printfh | nfs_printfh( netdissect_options * ndo , register const uint32_t * dp , const u_int len) | ['ndo', 'dp', 'len'] | nfs_printfh(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const uint32_t *dp, const u_int len)
{
my_fsid fsid;
uint32_t ino;
const char *sfsname = NULL;
char *spacep;
if (ndo->ndo_uflag) {
u_int i;
char const *sep = "";
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fh["));
for (i=0; i<len; i++) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%x", sep, dp[i]));
sep = ":";
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "]"));
return;
}
Parse_fh((const u_char *)dp, len, &fsid, &ino, NULL, &sfsname, 0);
if (sfsname) {
/* file system ID is ASCII, not numeric, for this server OS */
static char temp[NFSX_V3FHMAX+1];
/* Make sure string is null-terminated */
strncpy(temp, sfsname, NFSX_V3FHMAX);
temp[sizeof(temp) - 1] = '\0';
/* Remove trailing spaces */
spacep = strchr(temp, ' ');
if (spacep)
*spacep = '\0';
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fh %s/", temp));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " fh %d,%d/",
fsid.Fsid_dev.Major, fsid.Fsid_dev.Minor));
}
if(fsid.Fsid_dev.Minor == 257)
/* Print the undecoded handle */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", fsid.Opaque_Handle));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%ld", (long) ino));
} | 260 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13003 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/a25211918f2e790c67d859d20ccf8dbb81da1598', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/a25211918f2e790c67d859d20ccf8dbb81da1598', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The LMP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-lmp.c:lmp_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-02-19 21:13:25-08:00 | CVE-2017-13003/Clean up the LMP dissector.
Do a lot more bounds and length checks.
Add a EXTRACT_8BITS() macro, for completeness, and so as not to confuse
people into thinking that, to fetch a 1-byte value from a packet, they
need to use EXTRACT_16BITS() to fetch a 2-byte value and then use
shifting and masking to extract the desired byte. Use that rather than
using EXTRACT_16BITS() to fetch a 2-byte value and then shifting and
masking to extract the desired byte.
Don't treat IPv4 addresses and unnumbered interface IDs the same; the
first should be printed as an IPv4 address but the latter should just be
printed as numbers. Handle IPv6 addresses in more object types while
we're at it.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | a25211918f2e790c67d859d20ccf8dbb81da1598 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | lmp_print | lmp_print( netdissect_options * ndo , register const u_char * pptr , register u_int len) | ['ndo', 'pptr', 'len'] | lmp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *pptr, register u_int len)
{
const struct lmp_common_header *lmp_com_header;
const struct lmp_object_header *lmp_obj_header;
const u_char *tptr,*obj_tptr;
int tlen,lmp_obj_len,lmp_obj_ctype,obj_tlen;
int hexdump;
int offset,subobj_type,subobj_len,total_subobj_len;
int link_type;
union { /* int to float conversion buffer */
float f;
uint32_t i;
} bw;
tptr=pptr;
lmp_com_header = (const struct lmp_common_header *)pptr;
ND_TCHECK(*lmp_com_header);
/*
* Sanity checking of the header.
*/
if (LMP_EXTRACT_VERSION(lmp_com_header->version_res[0]) != LMP_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "LMP version %u packet not supported",
LMP_EXTRACT_VERSION(lmp_com_header->version_res[0])));
return;
}
/* in non-verbose mode just lets print the basic Message Type*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "LMPv%u %s Message, length: %u",
LMP_EXTRACT_VERSION(lmp_com_header->version_res[0]),
tok2str(lmp_msg_type_values, "unknown (%u)",lmp_com_header->msg_type),
len));
return;
}
/* ok they seem to want to know everything - lets fully decode it */
tlen=EXTRACT_16BITS(lmp_com_header->length);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tLMPv%u, msg-type: %s, Flags: [%s], length: %u",
LMP_EXTRACT_VERSION(lmp_com_header->version_res[0]),
tok2str(lmp_msg_type_values, "unknown, type: %u",lmp_com_header->msg_type),
bittok2str(lmp_header_flag_values,"none",lmp_com_header->flags),
tlen));
tptr+=sizeof(const struct lmp_common_header);
tlen-=sizeof(const struct lmp_common_header);
while(tlen>0) {
/* did we capture enough for fully decoding the object header ? */
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct lmp_object_header));
lmp_obj_header = (const struct lmp_object_header *)tptr;
lmp_obj_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(lmp_obj_header->length);
lmp_obj_ctype=(lmp_obj_header->ctype)&0x7f;
if(lmp_obj_len % 4 || lmp_obj_len < 4)
return;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Object (%u), Class-Type: %s (%u) Flags: [%snegotiable], length: %u",
tok2str(lmp_obj_values,
"Unknown",
lmp_obj_header->class_num),
lmp_obj_header->class_num,
tok2str(lmp_ctype_values,
"Unknown",
((lmp_obj_header->class_num)<<8)+lmp_obj_ctype),
lmp_obj_ctype,
(lmp_obj_header->ctype)&0x80 ? "" : "non-",
lmp_obj_len));
obj_tptr=tptr+sizeof(struct lmp_object_header);
obj_tlen=lmp_obj_len-sizeof(struct lmp_object_header);
/* did we capture enough for fully decoding the object ? */
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, lmp_obj_len);
hexdump=FALSE;
switch(lmp_obj_header->class_num) {
case LMP_OBJ_CC_ID:
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_LOC:
case LMP_CTYPE_RMT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Control Channel ID: %u (0x%08x)",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_LINK_ID:
case LMP_OBJ_INTERFACE_ID:
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_IPV4_LOC:
case LMP_CTYPE_IPV4_RMT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv4 Link ID: %s (0x%08x)",
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
break;
case LMP_CTYPE_IPV6_LOC:
case LMP_CTYPE_IPV6_RMT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv6 Link ID: %s (0x%08x)",
ip6addr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
break;
case LMP_CTYPE_UNMD_LOC:
case LMP_CTYPE_UNMD_RMT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Link ID: %u (0x%08x)",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_MESSAGE_ID:
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_1:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Message ID: %u (0x%08x)",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
break;
case LMP_CTYPE_2:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Message ID Ack: %u (0x%08x)",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_NODE_ID:
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_LOC:
case LMP_CTYPE_RMT:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Node ID: %s (0x%08x)",
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_CONFIG:
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_HELLO_CONFIG:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Hello Interval: %u\n\t Hello Dead Interval: %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2)));
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_HELLO:
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_HELLO:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Tx Seq: %u, Rx Seq: %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+4)));
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_TE_LINK:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Flags: [%s]",
bittok2str(lmp_obj_te_link_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr)>>8)));
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_IPV4:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Local Link-ID: %s (0x%08x)"
"\n\t Remote Link-ID: %s (0x%08x)",
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+4),
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+8),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+8)));
break;
case LMP_CTYPE_IPV6:
case LMP_CTYPE_UNMD:
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_DATA_LINK:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Flags: [%s]",
bittok2str(lmp_obj_data_link_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr)>>8)));
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_IPV4:
case LMP_CTYPE_UNMD:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Local Interface ID: %s (0x%08x)"
"\n\t Remote Interface ID: %s (0x%08x)",
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+4),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+4),
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+8),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+8)));
total_subobj_len = lmp_obj_len - 16;
offset = 12;
while (total_subobj_len > 0 && hexdump == FALSE ) {
subobj_type = EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+offset)>>8;
subobj_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+offset)&0x00FF;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Subobject, Type: %s (%u), Length: %u",
tok2str(lmp_data_link_subobj,
"Unknown",
subobj_type),
subobj_type,
subobj_len));
switch(subobj_type) {
case INT_SWITCHING_TYPE_SUBOBJ:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Switching Type: %s (%u)",
tok2str(gmpls_switch_cap_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+offset+2)>>8),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+offset+2)>>8));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Encoding Type: %s (%u)",
tok2str(gmpls_encoding_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+offset+2)&0x00FF),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+offset+2)&0x00FF));
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Min Reservable Bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Max Reservable Bandwidth: %.3f Mbps",
bw.f*8/1000000));
break;
case WAVELENGTH_SUBOBJ:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Wavelength: %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4)));
break;
default:
/* Any Unknown Subobject ==> Exit loop */
hexdump=TRUE;
break;
}
total_subobj_len-=subobj_len;
offset+=subobj_len;
}
break;
case LMP_CTYPE_IPV6:
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_VERIFY_BEGIN:
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_1:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Flags: %s",
bittok2str(lmp_obj_begin_verify_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Verify Interval: %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Data links: %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+4)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Encoding type: %s",
tok2str(gmpls_encoding_values, "Unknown", *(obj_tptr+8))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Verify Transport Mechanism: %u (0x%x)%s",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+10),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+10),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+10)&8000 ? " (Payload test messages capable)" : ""));
bw.i = EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+12);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Transmission Rate: %.3f Mbps",bw.f*8/1000000));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Wavelength: %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+16)));
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_VERIFY_BEGIN_ACK:
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_1:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Verify Dead Interval: %u"
"\n\t Verify Transport Response: %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2)));
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_VERIFY_ID:
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_1:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Verify ID: %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr)));
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_CHANNEL_STATUS:
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_IPV4:
case LMP_CTYPE_UNMD:
offset = 0;
/* Decode pairs: <Interface_ID (4 bytes), Channel_status (4 bytes)> */
while (offset < (lmp_obj_len-(int)sizeof(struct lmp_object_header)) ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Interface ID: %s (0x%08x)",
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+offset),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t Active: %s (%u)", (EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4)>>31) ?
"Allocated" : "Non-allocated",
(EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4)>>31)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t Direction: %s (%u)", (EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4)>>30)&0x1 ?
"Transmit" : "Receive",
(EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4)>>30)&0x1));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t Channel Status: %s (%u)",
tok2str(lmp_obj_channel_status_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4)&0x3FFFFFF),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset+4)&0x3FFFFFF));
offset+=8;
}
break;
case LMP_CTYPE_IPV6:
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_CHANNEL_STATUS_REQ:
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_IPV4:
case LMP_CTYPE_UNMD:
offset = 0;
while (offset < (lmp_obj_len-(int)sizeof(struct lmp_object_header)) ) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Interface ID: %s (0x%08x)",
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+offset),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+offset)));
offset+=4;
}
break;
case LMP_CTYPE_IPV6:
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_ERROR_CODE:
switch(lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_BEGIN_VERIFY_ERROR:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Error Code: %s",
bittok2str(lmp_obj_begin_verify_error_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr))));
break;
case LMP_CTYPE_LINK_SUMMARY_ERROR:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Error Code: %s",
bittok2str(lmp_obj_link_summary_error_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr))));
break;
default:
hexdump=TRUE;
}
break;
case LMP_OBJ_SERVICE_CONFIG:
switch (lmp_obj_ctype) {
case LMP_CTYPE_SERVICE_CONFIG_SP:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Flags: %s",
bittok2str(lmp_obj_service_config_sp_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr)>>8)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t UNI Version: %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr) & 0x00FF));
break;
case LMP_CTYPE_SERVICE_CONFIG_CPSA:
link_type = EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr)>>8;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Link Type: %s (%u)",
tok2str(lmp_sd_service_config_cpsa_link_type_values,
"Unknown", link_type),
link_type));
if (link_type == LMP_SD_SERVICE_CONFIG_CPSA_LINK_TYPE_SDH) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Signal Type: %s (%u)",
tok2str(lmp_sd_service_config_cpsa_signal_type_sdh_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr) & 0x00FF),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr) & 0x00FF));
}
if (link_type == LMP_SD_SERVICE_CONFIG_CPSA_LINK_TYPE_SONET) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Signal Type: %s (%u)",
tok2str(lmp_sd_service_config_cpsa_signal_type_sonet_values,
"Unknown",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr) & 0x00FF),
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr) & 0x00FF));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Transparency: %s",
bittok2str(lmp_obj_service_config_cpsa_tp_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2)>>8)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Contiguous Concatenation Types: %s",
bittok2str(lmp_obj_service_config_cpsa_cct_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2)>>8 & 0x00FF)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Minimum NCC: %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+4)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Maximum NCC: %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+6)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Minimum NVC:%u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+8)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Maximum NVC:%u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+10)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Local Interface ID: %s (0x%08x)",
ipaddr_string(ndo, obj_tptr+12),
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr+12)));
break;
case LMP_CTYPE_SERVICE_CONFIG_TRANSPARENCY_TCM:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Transparency Flags: %s",
bittok2str(
lmp_obj_service_config_nsa_transparency_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(obj_tptr))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t TCM Monitoring Flags: %s",
bittok2str(
lmp_obj_service_config_nsa_tcm_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+6) & 0x00FF)));
break;
case LMP_CTYPE_SERVICE_CONFIG_NETWORK_DIVERSITY:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Diversity: Flags: %s",
bittok2str(
lmp_obj_service_config_nsa_network_diversity_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_16BITS(obj_tptr+2) & 0x00FF)));
break;
default:
hexdump = TRUE;
}
break;
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo,obj_tptr,"\n\t ",obj_tlen);
break;
}
/* do we want to see an additionally hexdump ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1 || hexdump==TRUE)
print_unknown_data(ndo,tptr+sizeof(struct lmp_object_header),"\n\t ",
lmp_obj_len-sizeof(struct lmp_object_header));
tptr+=lmp_obj_len;
tlen-=lmp_obj_len;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t packet exceeded snapshot"));
} | 2281 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13006 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The L2TP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-l2tp.c, several functions.'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-05 19:56:20-08:00 | CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | l2tp_accm_print | l2tp_accm_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * dat) | ['ndo', 'dat'] | l2tp_accm_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
uint16_t val_h, val_l;
ptr++; /* skip "Reserved" */
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "send=%08x ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "recv=%08x ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
} | 109 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13006 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The L2TP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-l2tp.c, several functions.'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-05 19:56:20-08:00 | CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | l2tp_avp_print | l2tp_avp_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * dat , int length) | ['ndo', 'dat', 'length'] | l2tp_avp_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, int length)
{
u_int len;
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
uint16_t attr_type;
int hidden = FALSE;
if (length <= 0) {
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
ND_TCHECK(*ptr); /* Flags & Length */
len = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr) & L2TP_AVP_HDR_LEN_MASK;
/* If it is not long enough to contain the header, we'll give up. */
if (len < 6)
goto trunc;
/* If it goes past the end of the remaining length of the packet,
we'll give up. */
if (len > (u_int)length)
goto trunc;
/* If it goes past the end of the remaining length of the captured
data, we'll give up. */
ND_TCHECK2(*ptr, len);
/* After this point, no need to worry about truncation */
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr) & L2TP_AVP_HDR_FLAG_MANDATORY) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "*"));
}
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr) & L2TP_AVP_HDR_FLAG_HIDDEN) {
hidden = TRUE;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "?"));
}
ptr++;
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr)) {
/* Vendor Specific Attribute */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "VENDOR%04x:", EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr))); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ATTR%04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr))); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "("));
print_octets(ndo, (const u_char *)ptr, len-6);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
} else {
/* IETF-defined Attributes */
ptr++;
attr_type = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(l2tp_avp2str, "AVP-#%u", attr_type)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "("));
if (hidden) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "???"));
} else {
switch (attr_type) {
case L2TP_AVP_MSGTYPE:
l2tp_msgtype_print(ndo, (const u_char *)ptr);
break;
case L2TP_AVP_RESULT_CODE:
l2tp_result_code_print(ndo, (const u_char *)ptr, len-6);
break;
case L2TP_AVP_PROTO_VER:
l2tp_proto_ver_print(ndo, ptr);
break;
case L2TP_AVP_FRAMING_CAP:
l2tp_framing_cap_print(ndo, (const u_char *)ptr);
break;
case L2TP_AVP_BEARER_CAP:
l2tp_bearer_cap_print(ndo, (const u_char *)ptr);
break;
case L2TP_AVP_TIE_BREAKER:
print_octets(ndo, (const u_char *)ptr, 8);
break;
case L2TP_AVP_FIRM_VER:
case L2TP_AVP_ASSND_TUN_ID:
case L2TP_AVP_RECV_WIN_SIZE:
case L2TP_AVP_ASSND_SESS_ID:
print_16bits_val(ndo, ptr);
break;
case L2TP_AVP_HOST_NAME:
case L2TP_AVP_VENDOR_NAME:
case L2TP_AVP_CALLING_NUMBER:
case L2TP_AVP_CALLED_NUMBER:
case L2TP_AVP_SUB_ADDRESS:
case L2TP_AVP_PROXY_AUTH_NAME:
case L2TP_AVP_PRIVATE_GRP_ID:
print_string(ndo, (const u_char *)ptr, len-6);
break;
case L2TP_AVP_CHALLENGE:
case L2TP_AVP_INI_RECV_LCP:
case L2TP_AVP_LAST_SENT_LCP:
case L2TP_AVP_LAST_RECV_LCP:
case L2TP_AVP_PROXY_AUTH_CHAL:
case L2TP_AVP_PROXY_AUTH_RESP:
case L2TP_AVP_RANDOM_VECTOR:
print_octets(ndo, (const u_char *)ptr, len-6);
break;
case L2TP_AVP_Q931_CC:
l2tp_q931_cc_print(ndo, (const u_char *)ptr, len-6);
break;
case L2TP_AVP_CHALLENGE_RESP:
print_octets(ndo, (const u_char *)ptr, 16);
break;
case L2TP_AVP_CALL_SER_NUM:
case L2TP_AVP_MINIMUM_BPS:
case L2TP_AVP_MAXIMUM_BPS:
case L2TP_AVP_TX_CONN_SPEED:
case L2TP_AVP_PHY_CHANNEL_ID:
case L2TP_AVP_RX_CONN_SPEED:
print_32bits_val(ndo, (const uint32_t *)ptr);
break;
case L2TP_AVP_BEARER_TYPE:
l2tp_bearer_type_print(ndo, (const u_char *)ptr);
break;
case L2TP_AVP_FRAMING_TYPE:
l2tp_framing_type_print(ndo, (const u_char *)ptr);
break;
case L2TP_AVP_PACKET_PROC_DELAY:
l2tp_packet_proc_delay_print(ndo);
break;
case L2TP_AVP_PROXY_AUTH_TYPE:
l2tp_proxy_auth_type_print(ndo, (const u_char *)ptr);
break;
case L2TP_AVP_PROXY_AUTH_ID:
l2tp_proxy_auth_id_print(ndo, (const u_char *)ptr);
break;
case L2TP_AVP_CALL_ERRORS:
l2tp_call_errors_print(ndo, (const u_char *)ptr);
break;
case L2TP_AVP_ACCM:
l2tp_accm_print(ndo, (const u_char *)ptr);
break;
case L2TP_AVP_SEQ_REQUIRED:
break; /* No Attribute Value */
case L2TP_AVP_PPP_DISCON_CC:
l2tp_ppp_discon_cc_print(ndo, (const u_char *)ptr, len-6);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
}
l2tp_avp_print(ndo, dat+len, length-len);
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "|..."));
} | 744 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13006 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The L2TP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-l2tp.c, several functions.'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-05 19:56:20-08:00 | CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | l2tp_bearer_cap_print | l2tp_bearer_cap_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * dat) | ['ndo', 'dat'] | l2tp_bearer_cap_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint32_t *ptr = (const uint32_t *)dat;
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_BEARER_CAP_ANALOG_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "A"));
}
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_BEARER_CAP_DIGITAL_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "D"));
}
} | 65 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13006 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The L2TP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-l2tp.c, several functions.'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-05 19:56:20-08:00 | CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | l2tp_bearer_type_print | l2tp_bearer_type_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * dat) | ['ndo', 'dat'] | l2tp_bearer_type_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint32_t *ptr = (const uint32_t *)dat;
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_BEARER_TYPE_ANALOG_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "A"));
}
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_BEARER_TYPE_DIGITAL_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "D"));
}
} | 65 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13006 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The L2TP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-l2tp.c, several functions.'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-05 19:56:20-08:00 | CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | l2tp_call_errors_print | l2tp_call_errors_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * dat) | ['ndo', 'dat'] | l2tp_call_errors_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
uint16_t val_h, val_l;
ptr++; /* skip "Reserved" */
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CRCErr=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "FrameErr=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "HardOver=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "BufOver=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "Timeout=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AlignErr=%u ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
} | 261 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13006 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The L2TP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-l2tp.c, several functions.'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-05 19:56:20-08:00 | CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | l2tp_framing_cap_print | l2tp_framing_cap_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * dat) | ['ndo', 'dat'] | l2tp_framing_cap_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint32_t *ptr = (const uint32_t *)dat;
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_FRAMING_CAP_ASYNC_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "A"));
}
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_FRAMING_CAP_SYNC_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "S"));
}
} | 65 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13006 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The L2TP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-l2tp.c, several functions.'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-05 19:56:20-08:00 | CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | l2tp_framing_type_print | l2tp_framing_type_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * dat) | ['ndo', 'dat'] | l2tp_framing_type_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint32_t *ptr = (const uint32_t *)dat;
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_FRAMING_TYPE_ASYNC_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "A"));
}
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(ptr) & L2TP_FRAMING_TYPE_SYNC_MASK) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "S"));
}
} | 65 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13006 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The L2TP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-l2tp.c, several functions.'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-05 19:56:20-08:00 | CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | l2tp_msgtype_print | l2tp_msgtype_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * dat) | ['ndo', 'dat'] | l2tp_msgtype_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(l2tp_msgtype2str, "MSGTYPE-#%u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr))));
} | 46 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13006 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The L2TP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-l2tp.c, several functions.'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-05 19:56:20-08:00 | CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | l2tp_ppp_discon_cc_print | l2tp_ppp_discon_cc_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * dat , u_int length) | ['ndo', 'dat', 'length'] | l2tp_ppp_discon_cc_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%04x, ", EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr))); ptr++; /* Disconnect Code */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%04x ", EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr))); ptr++; /* Control Protocol Number */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(l2tp_cc_direction2str,
"Direction-#%u", *((const u_char *)ptr++))));
if (length > 5) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
print_string(ndo, (const u_char *)ptr, length-5);
}
} | 122 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13006 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The L2TP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-l2tp.c, several functions.'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-05 19:56:20-08:00 | CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | l2tp_proto_ver_print | l2tp_proto_ver_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const uint16_t * dat) | ['ndo', 'dat'] | l2tp_proto_ver_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const uint16_t *dat)
{
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u.%u", (EXTRACT_16BITS(dat) >> 8),
(EXTRACT_16BITS(dat) & 0xff)));
} | 41 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13006 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The L2TP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-l2tp.c, several functions.'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-05 19:56:20-08:00 | CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | l2tp_proxy_auth_id_print | l2tp_proxy_auth_id_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * dat) | ['ndo', 'dat'] | l2tp_proxy_auth_id_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr) & L2TP_PROXY_AUTH_ID_MASK));
} | 41 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13006 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The L2TP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-l2tp.c, several functions.'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-05 19:56:20-08:00 | CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | l2tp_proxy_auth_type_print | l2tp_proxy_auth_type_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * dat) | ['ndo', 'dat'] | l2tp_proxy_auth_type_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(l2tp_authentype2str,
"AuthType-#%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr))));
} | 46 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13006 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The L2TP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-l2tp.c, several functions.'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-05 19:56:20-08:00 | CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | l2tp_q931_cc_print | l2tp_q931_cc_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * dat , u_int length) | ['ndo', 'dat', 'length'] | l2tp_q931_cc_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
print_16bits_val(ndo, (const uint16_t *)dat);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %02x", dat[2]));
if (length > 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
print_string(ndo, dat+3, length-3);
}
} | 72 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13006 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The L2TP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-l2tp.c, several functions.'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-05 19:56:20-08:00 | CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | cc4a7391c616be7a64ed65742ef9ed3f106eb165 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | l2tp_result_code_print | l2tp_result_code_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * dat , u_int length) | ['ndo', 'dat', 'length'] | l2tp_result_code_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr))); ptr++; /* Result Code */
if (length > 2) { /* Error Code (opt) */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "/%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr))); ptr++;
}
if (length > 4) { /* Error Message (opt) */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
print_string(ndo, (const u_char *)ptr, length - 4);
}
} | 103 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13007 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/ca336198e8bebccc18502de27672fdbd6eb34856', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/ca336198e8bebccc18502de27672fdbd6eb34856', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The Apple PKTAP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-pktap.c:pktap_if_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-05 20:21:48-08:00 | CVE-2017-13007/PKTAP: Pass a properly updated struct pcap_pkthdr to the sub-dissector.
The sub-dissector expects that the length and captured length will
reflect the actual remaining data in the packet, not the raw amount
including the PKTAP header; pass an updated header, just as we do for
PPI.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | ca336198e8bebccc18502de27672fdbd6eb34856 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | pktap_if_print | pktap_if_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const struct pcap_pkthdr * h , const u_char * p) | ['ndo', 'h', 'p'] | pktap_if_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, const u_char *p)
{
uint32_t dlt, hdrlen, rectype;
u_int caplen = h->caplen;
u_int length = h->len;
if_printer printer;
const pktap_header_t *hdr;
if (caplen < sizeof(pktap_header_t) || length < sizeof(pktap_header_t)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|pktap]"));
return (0);
}
hdr = (const pktap_header_t *)p;
dlt = EXTRACT_LE_32BITS(&hdr->pkt_dlt);
hdrlen = EXTRACT_LE_32BITS(&hdr->pkt_len);
if (hdrlen < sizeof(pktap_header_t)) {
/*
* Claimed header length < structure length.
* XXX - does this just mean some fields aren't
* being supplied, or is it truly an error (i.e.,
* is the length supplied so that the header can
* be expanded in the future)?
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|pktap]"));
return (0);
}
if (caplen < hdrlen || length < hdrlen) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|pktap]"));
return (hdrlen);
}
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
pktap_header_print(ndo, p, length);
length -= hdrlen;
caplen -= hdrlen;
p += hdrlen;
rectype = EXTRACT_LE_32BITS(&hdr->pkt_rectype);
switch (rectype) {
case PKT_REC_NONE:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "no data"));
break;
case PKT_REC_PACKET:
if ((printer = lookup_printer(dlt)) != NULL) {
hdrlen += printer(ndo, h, p);
} else {
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
pktap_header_print(ndo, (const u_char *)hdr,
length + hdrlen);
if (!ndo->ndo_suppress_default_print)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p, caplen);
}
break;
}
return (hdrlen);
} | 293 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13008 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/5edf405d7ed9fc92f4f43e8a3d44baa4c6387562', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/5edf405d7ed9fc92f4f43e8a3d44baa4c6387562', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The IEEE 802.11 parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-802_11.c:parse_elements().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-06 09:42:49-08:00 | CVE-2017-13008/IEEE 802.11: Fix TIM bitmap copy to copy from p + offset.
offset has already been advanced to point to the bitmap; we shouldn't
add the amount to advance again.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, remove some redundant tests - we've already checked,
before the case statement, whether we have captured the entire
information element and whether the entire information element is
present in the on-the-wire packet; in the cases for particular IEs, we
only need to make sure we don't go past the end of the IE. | 5edf405d7ed9fc92f4f43e8a3d44baa4c6387562 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | parse_elements | parse_elements( netdissect_options * ndo , struct mgmt_body_t * pbody , const u_char * p , int offset , u_int length) | ['ndo', 'pbody', 'p', 'offset', 'length'] | parse_elements(netdissect_options *ndo,
struct mgmt_body_t *pbody, const u_char *p, int offset,
u_int length)
{
u_int elementlen;
struct ssid_t ssid;
struct challenge_t challenge;
struct rates_t rates;
struct ds_t ds;
struct cf_t cf;
struct tim_t tim;
/*
* We haven't seen any elements yet.
*/
pbody->challenge_present = 0;
pbody->ssid_present = 0;
pbody->rates_present = 0;
pbody->ds_present = 0;
pbody->cf_present = 0;
pbody->tim_present = 0;
while (length != 0) {
/* Make sure we at least have the element ID and length. */
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), 2))
return 0;
if (length < 2)
return 0;
elementlen = *(p + offset + 1);
/* Make sure we have the entire element. */
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset + 2), elementlen))
return 0;
if (length < elementlen + 2)
return 0;
switch (*(p + offset)) {
case E_SSID:
memcpy(&ssid, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (ssid.length != 0) {
if (ssid.length > sizeof(ssid.ssid) - 1)
return 0;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), ssid.length))
return 0;
if (length < ssid.length)
return 0;
memcpy(&ssid.ssid, p + offset, ssid.length);
offset += ssid.length;
length -= ssid.length;
}
ssid.ssid[ssid.length] = '\0';
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen an SSID IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->ssid_present) {
pbody->ssid = ssid;
pbody->ssid_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_CHALLENGE:
memcpy(&challenge, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (challenge.length != 0) {
if (challenge.length >
sizeof(challenge.text) - 1)
return 0;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), challenge.length))
return 0;
if (length < challenge.length)
return 0;
memcpy(&challenge.text, p + offset,
challenge.length);
offset += challenge.length;
length -= challenge.length;
}
challenge.text[challenge.length] = '\0';
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a challenge IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->challenge_present) {
pbody->challenge = challenge;
pbody->challenge_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_RATES:
memcpy(&rates, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (rates.length != 0) {
if (rates.length > sizeof rates.rate)
return 0;
if (!ND_TTEST2(*(p + offset), rates.length))
return 0;
if (length < rates.length)
return 0;
memcpy(&rates.rate, p + offset, rates.length);
offset += rates.length;
length -= rates.length;
}
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a rates IE,
* copy this one if it's not zero-length,
* otherwise ignore this one, so we later
* report the first one we saw.
*
* We ignore zero-length rates IEs as some
* devices seem to put a zero-length rates
* IE, followed by an SSID IE, followed by
* a non-zero-length rates IE into frames,
* even though IEEE Std 802.11-2007 doesn't
* seem to indicate that a zero-length rates
* IE is valid.
*/
if (!pbody->rates_present && rates.length != 0) {
pbody->rates = rates;
pbody->rates_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_DS:
memcpy(&ds, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (ds.length != 1) {
offset += ds.length;
length -= ds.length;
break;
}
ds.channel = *(p + offset);
offset += 1;
length -= 1;
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a DS IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->ds_present) {
pbody->ds = ds;
pbody->ds_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_CF:
memcpy(&cf, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (cf.length != 6) {
offset += cf.length;
length -= cf.length;
break;
}
memcpy(&cf.count, p + offset, 6);
offset += 6;
length -= 6;
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a CF IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->cf_present) {
pbody->cf = cf;
pbody->cf_present = 1;
}
break;
case E_TIM:
memcpy(&tim, p + offset, 2);
offset += 2;
length -= 2;
if (tim.length <= 3) {
offset += tim.length;
length -= tim.length;
break;
}
if (tim.length - 3 > (int)sizeof tim.bitmap)
return 0;
memcpy(&tim.count, p + offset, 3);
offset += 3;
length -= 3;
memcpy(tim.bitmap, p + offset + 3, tim.length - 3);
offset += tim.length - 3;
length -= tim.length - 3;
/*
* Present and not truncated.
*
* If we haven't already seen a TIM IE,
* copy this one, otherwise ignore this one,
* so we later report the first one we saw.
*/
if (!pbody->tim_present) {
pbody->tim = tim;
pbody->tim_present = 1;
}
break;
default:
#if 0
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(1) unhandled element_id (%d) ",
*(p + offset)));
#endif
offset += 2 + elementlen;
length -= 2 + elementlen;
break;
}
}
/* No problems found. */
return 1;
} | 960 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13009 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/db8c799f6dfc68765c9451fcbfca06e662f5bd5f', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/db8c799f6dfc68765c9451fcbfca06e662f5bd5f', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The IPv6 mobility parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-mobility.c:mobility_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-06 10:13:22-08:00 | CVE-2017-13009/IPv6 mobility: Add a bounds check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it:
Add a comment giving the RFC for IPv6 mobility headers.
Clean up some bounds checks to make it clearer what they're checking, by
matching the subsequent EXTRACT_ calls or memcpy.
For the binding update, if none of the flag bits are set, don't check
the individual flag bits. | db8c799f6dfc68765c9451fcbfca06e662f5bd5f | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | mobility_print | mobility_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * bp , const u_char * bp2 _U_) | ['ndo', 'bp', '_U_'] | mobility_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, const u_char *bp2 _U_)
{
const struct ip6_mobility *mh;
const u_char *ep;
unsigned mhlen, hlen;
uint8_t type;
mh = (const struct ip6_mobility *)bp;
/* 'ep' points to the end of available data. */
ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
if (!ND_TTEST(mh->ip6m_len)) {
/*
* There's not enough captured data to include the
* mobility header length.
*
* Our caller expects us to return the length, however,
* so return a value that will run to the end of the
* captured data.
*
* XXX - "ip6_print()" doesn't do anything with the
* returned length, however, as it breaks out of the
* header-processing loop.
*/
mhlen = ep - bp;
goto trunc;
}
mhlen = (mh->ip6m_len + 1) << 3;
/* XXX ip6m_cksum */
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_type);
type = mh->ip6m_type;
if (type <= IP6M_MAX && mhlen < ip6m_hdrlen[type]) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(header length %u is too small for type %u)", mhlen, type));
goto trunc;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "mobility: %s", tok2str(ip6m_str, "type-#%u", type)));
switch (type) {
case IP6M_BINDING_REQUEST:
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
break;
case IP6M_HOME_TEST_INIT:
case IP6M_CAREOF_TEST_INIT:
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Init Cookie=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST_INIT ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
break;
case IP6M_HOME_TEST:
case IP6M_CAREOF_TEST:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data16[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " nonce id=0x%x", EXTRACT_16BITS(&mh->ip6m_data16[0])));
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Init Cookie=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s Keygen Token=%08x:%08x",
type == IP6M_HOME_TEST ? "Home" : "Care-of",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen]),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&bp[hlen + 4])));
}
hlen += 8;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_UPDATE:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data16[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " seq#=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&mh->ip6m_data16[0])));
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 1);
if (bp[hlen] & 0xf0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "A"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x40)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "H"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x20)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "L"));
if (bp[hlen] & 0x10)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "K"));
/* Reserved (4bits) */
hlen += 1;
/* Reserved (8bits) */
hlen += 1;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 2);
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " lifetime=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen]) << 2));
hlen += 2;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_ACK:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data8[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " status=%u", mh->ip6m_data8[0]));
if (mh->ip6m_data8[1] & 0x80)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " K"));
/* Reserved (7bits) */
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " seq#=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen])));
hlen += 2;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 2);
/* units of 4 secs */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " lifetime=%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&bp[hlen]) << 2));
hlen += 2;
break;
case IP6M_BINDING_ERROR:
ND_TCHECK(mh->ip6m_data8[0]);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " status=%u", mh->ip6m_data8[0]));
/* Reserved */
hlen = IP6M_MINLEN;
ND_TCHECK2(*mh, hlen + 16);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " homeaddr %s", ip6addr_string(ndo, &bp[hlen])));
hlen += 16;
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " len=%u", mh->ip6m_len));
return(mhlen);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag)
if (mobility_opt_print(ndo, &bp[hlen], mhlen - hlen))
goto trunc;
return(mhlen);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return(-1);
} | 841 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13010 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/877b66b398518d9501513e0860c9f3a8acc70892', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/877b66b398518d9501513e0860c9f3a8acc70892', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The BEEP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-beep.c:l_strnstart().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-06 20:12:33-08:00 | CVE-2017-13010/BEEP: Do bounds checking when comparing strings.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 877b66b398518d9501513e0860c9f3a8acc70892 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | beep_print | beep_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * bp , u_int length) | ['ndo', 'bp', 'length'] | beep_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
if (l_strnstart("MSG", 4, (const char *)bp, length)) /* A REQuest */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP MSG"));
else if (l_strnstart("RPY ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP RPY"));
else if (l_strnstart("ERR ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP ERR"));
else if (l_strnstart("ANS ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP ANS"));
else if (l_strnstart("NUL ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP NUL"));
else if (l_strnstart("SEQ ", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP SEQ"));
else if (l_strnstart("END", 4, (const char *)bp, length))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP END"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BEEP (payload or undecoded)"));
} | 221 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13010 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/877b66b398518d9501513e0860c9f3a8acc70892', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/877b66b398518d9501513e0860c9f3a8acc70892', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The BEEP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-beep.c:l_strnstart().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-06 20:12:33-08:00 | CVE-2017-13010/BEEP: Do bounds checking when comparing strings.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Brian 'geeknik' Carpenter.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s). | 877b66b398518d9501513e0860c9f3a8acc70892 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | l_strnstart | l_strnstart( const char * tstr1 , u_int tl1 , const char * str2 , u_int l2) | ['tstr1', 'tl1', 'str2', 'l2'] | l_strnstart(const char *tstr1, u_int tl1, const char *str2, u_int l2)
{
if (tl1 > l2)
return 0;
return (strncmp(tstr1, str2, tl1) == 0 ? 1 : 0);
} | 47 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13011 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/9f0730bee3eb65d07b49fd468bc2f269173352fe', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/9f0730bee3eb65d07b49fd468bc2f269173352fe', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-119'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'Several protocol parsers in tcpdump before 4.9.2 could cause a buffer overflow in util-print.c:bittok2str_internal().'}] | 2018-05-17T01:29Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer | The software performs operations on a memory buffer, but it can read from or write to a memory location that is outside of the intended boundary of the buffer. |
Certain languages allow direct addressing of memory locations and do not automatically ensure that these locations are valid for the memory buffer that is being referenced. This can cause read or write operations to be performed on memory locations that may be associated with other variables, data structures, or internal program data.
As a result, an attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code, alter the intended control flow, read sensitive information, or cause the system to crash.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/119.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-15 12:12:21-07:00 | CVE-2017-13011/Properly check for buffer overflow in bittok2str_internal().
Also, make the buffer bigger.
This fixes a buffer overflow discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture. | 9f0730bee3eb65d07b49fd468bc2f269173352fe | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | bittok2str_internal | bittok2str_internal( register const struct tok * lp , register const char * fmt , register u_int v , const char * sep) | ['lp', 'fmt', 'v', 'sep'] | bittok2str_internal(register const struct tok *lp, register const char *fmt,
register u_int v, const char *sep)
{
static char buf[256]; /* our stringbuffer */
int buflen=0;
register u_int rotbit; /* this is the bit we rotate through all bitpositions */
register u_int tokval;
const char * sepstr = "";
while (lp != NULL && lp->s != NULL) {
tokval=lp->v; /* load our first value */
rotbit=1;
while (rotbit != 0) {
/*
* lets AND the rotating bit with our token value
* and see if we have got a match
*/
if (tokval == (v&rotbit)) {
/* ok we have found something */
buflen+=snprintf(buf+buflen, sizeof(buf)-buflen, "%s%s",
sepstr, lp->s);
sepstr = sep;
break;
}
rotbit=rotbit<<1; /* no match - lets shift and try again */
}
lp++;
}
if (buflen == 0)
/* bummer - lets print the "unknown" message as advised in the fmt string if we got one */
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt == NULL ? "#%08x" : fmt, v);
return (buf);
} | 171 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13013 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/13ab8d18617d616c7d343530f8a842e7143fb5cc', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/13ab8d18617d616c7d343530f8a842e7143fb5cc', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The ARP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-arp.c, several functions.'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-16 10:54:31-07:00 | CVE-2017-13013/ARP: Fix printing of ARP protocol addresses.
If the protocol type isn't ETHERTYPE_IP or ETHERTYPE_TRAIL, or if the
protocol address length isn't 4, don't print the address as an IPv4 address.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Update another test file's tcpdump output to reflect this change. | 13ab8d18617d616c7d343530f8a842e7143fb5cc | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | arp_print | arp_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * bp , u_int length , u_int caplen) | ['ndo', 'bp', 'length', 'caplen'] | arp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length, u_int caplen)
{
const struct arp_pkthdr *ap;
u_short pro, hrd, op, linkaddr;
ap = (const struct arp_pkthdr *)bp;
ND_TCHECK(*ap);
hrd = HRD(ap);
pro = PRO(ap);
op = OP(ap);
/* if its ATM then call the ATM ARP printer
for Frame-relay ARP most of the fields
are similar to Ethernet so overload the Ethernet Printer
and set the linkaddr type for linkaddr_string(ndo, ) accordingly */
switch(hrd) {
case ARPHRD_ATM2225:
atmarp_print(ndo, bp, length, caplen);
return;
case ARPHRD_FRELAY:
linkaddr = LINKADDR_FRELAY;
break;
default:
linkaddr = LINKADDR_ETHER;
break;
}
if (!ND_TTEST2(*ar_tpa(ap), PROTO_LEN(ap))) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)ap, length);
return;
}
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ARP, "));
}
/* print hardware type/len and proto type/len */
if ((pro != ETHERTYPE_IP && pro != ETHERTYPE_TRAIL) ||
PROTO_LEN(ap) != 4 ||
HRD_LEN(ap) == 0 ||
ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (len %u), %s (len %u)",
tok2str(arphrd_values, "Unknown Hardware (%u)", hrd),
HRD_LEN(ap),
tok2str(ethertype_values, "Unknown Protocol (0x%04x)", pro),
PROTO_LEN(ap)));
/* don't know know about the address formats */
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag) {
goto out;
}
}
/* print operation */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s ",
ndo->ndo_vflag ? ", " : "",
tok2str(arpop_values, "Unknown (%u)", op)));
switch (op) {
case ARPOP_REQUEST:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "who-has %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, TPA(ap))));
if (isnonzero((const u_char *)THA(ap), HRD_LEN(ap)))
ND_PRINT((ndo, " (%s)",
linkaddr_string(ndo, THA(ap), linkaddr, HRD_LEN(ap))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tell %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, SPA(ap))));
break;
case ARPOP_REPLY:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s is-at %s",
ipaddr_string(ndo, SPA(ap)),
linkaddr_string(ndo, SHA(ap), linkaddr, HRD_LEN(ap))));
break;
case ARPOP_REVREQUEST:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "who-is %s tell %s",
linkaddr_string(ndo, THA(ap), linkaddr, HRD_LEN(ap)),
linkaddr_string(ndo, SHA(ap), linkaddr, HRD_LEN(ap))));
break;
case ARPOP_REVREPLY:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s at %s",
linkaddr_string(ndo, THA(ap), linkaddr, HRD_LEN(ap)),
ipaddr_string(ndo, TPA(ap))));
break;
case ARPOP_INVREQUEST:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "who-is %s tell %s",
linkaddr_string(ndo, THA(ap), linkaddr, HRD_LEN(ap)),
linkaddr_string(ndo, SHA(ap), linkaddr, HRD_LEN(ap))));
break;
case ARPOP_INVREPLY:
ND_PRINT((ndo,"%s at %s",
linkaddr_string(ndo, SHA(ap), linkaddr, HRD_LEN(ap)),
ipaddr_string(ndo, SPA(ap))));
break;
default:
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)ap, caplen);
return;
}
out:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
} | 637 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13013 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/13ab8d18617d616c7d343530f8a842e7143fb5cc', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/13ab8d18617d616c7d343530f8a842e7143fb5cc', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The ARP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-arp.c, several functions.'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-16 10:54:31-07:00 | CVE-2017-13013/ARP: Fix printing of ARP protocol addresses.
If the protocol type isn't ETHERTYPE_IP or ETHERTYPE_TRAIL, or if the
protocol address length isn't 4, don't print the address as an IPv4 address.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Update another test file's tcpdump output to reflect this change. | 13ab8d18617d616c7d343530f8a842e7143fb5cc | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | atmarp_print | atmarp_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const u_char * bp , u_int length , u_int caplen) | ['ndo', 'bp', 'length', 'caplen'] | atmarp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length, u_int caplen)
{
const struct atmarp_pkthdr *ap;
u_short pro, hrd, op;
ap = (const struct atmarp_pkthdr *)bp;
ND_TCHECK(*ap);
hrd = ATMHRD(ap);
pro = ATMPRO(ap);
op = ATMOP(ap);
if (!ND_TTEST2(*aar_tpa(ap), ATMTPROTO_LEN(ap))) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)ap, length);
return;
}
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ARP, "));
}
if ((pro != ETHERTYPE_IP && pro != ETHERTYPE_TRAIL) ||
ATMSPROTO_LEN(ap) != 4 ||
ATMTPROTO_LEN(ap) != 4 ||
ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s, %s (len %u/%u)",
tok2str(arphrd_values, "Unknown Hardware (%u)", hrd),
tok2str(ethertype_values, "Unknown Protocol (0x%04x)", pro),
ATMSPROTO_LEN(ap),
ATMTPROTO_LEN(ap)));
/* don't know know about the address formats */
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag) {
goto out;
}
}
/* print operation */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s ",
ndo->ndo_vflag ? ", " : "",
tok2str(arpop_values, "Unknown (%u)", op)));
switch (op) {
case ARPOP_REQUEST:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "who-has %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, ATMTPA(ap))));
if (ATMTHRD_LEN(ap) != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ("));
atmarp_addr_print(ndo, ATMTHA(ap), ATMTHRD_LEN(ap),
ATMTSA(ap), ATMTSLN(ap));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "tell %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, ATMSPA(ap))));
break;
case ARPOP_REPLY:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s is-at ", ipaddr_string(ndo, ATMSPA(ap))));
atmarp_addr_print(ndo, ATMSHA(ap), ATMSHRD_LEN(ap), ATMSSA(ap),
ATMSSLN(ap));
break;
case ARPOP_INVREQUEST:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "who-is "));
atmarp_addr_print(ndo, ATMTHA(ap), ATMTHRD_LEN(ap), ATMTSA(ap),
ATMTSLN(ap));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tell "));
atmarp_addr_print(ndo, ATMSHA(ap), ATMSHRD_LEN(ap), ATMSSA(ap),
ATMSSLN(ap));
break;
case ARPOP_INVREPLY:
atmarp_addr_print(ndo, ATMSHA(ap), ATMSHRD_LEN(ap), ATMSSA(ap),
ATMSSLN(ap));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "at %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, ATMSPA(ap))));
break;
case ARPOP_NAK:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "for %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, ATMSPA(ap))));
break;
default:
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)ap, caplen);
return;
}
out:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
} | 580 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13014 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc356512f512e7fa423b3674db4bb31dbe40ffec', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/cc356512f512e7fa423b3674db4bb31dbe40ffec', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The White Board protocol parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-wb.c:wb_prep(), several functions.'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-16 11:25:40-07:00 | CVE-2017-13014/White Board: Do more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
While we're at it, print a truncation error if the packets are
truncated, rather than just, in effect, ignoring the result of the
routines that print particular packet types. | cc356512f512e7fa423b3674db4bb31dbe40ffec | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | wb_prep | wb_prep( netdissect_options * ndo , const struct pkt_prep * prep , u_int len) | ['ndo', 'prep', 'len'] | wb_prep(netdissect_options *ndo,
const struct pkt_prep *prep, u_int len)
{
int n;
const struct pgstate *ps;
const u_char *ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " wb-prep:"));
if (len < sizeof(*prep)) {
return (-1);
}
n = EXTRACT_32BITS(&prep->pp_n);
ps = (const struct pgstate *)(prep + 1);
while (--n >= 0 && ND_TTEST(*ps)) {
const struct id_off *io, *ie;
char c = '<';
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u/%s:%u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ps->slot),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ps->page.p_sid),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ps->page.p_uid)));
io = (const struct id_off *)(ps + 1);
for (ie = io + ps->nid; io < ie && ND_TTEST(*io); ++io) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%c%s:%u", c, ipaddr_string(ndo, &io->id),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&io->off)));
c = ',';
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, ">"));
ps = (const struct pgstate *)io;
}
return ((const u_char *)ps <= ep? 0 : -1);
} | 262 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13015 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/985122081165753c7442bd7824c473eb9ff56308', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/985122081165753c7442bd7824c473eb9ff56308', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The EAP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-eap.c:eap_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-16 12:02:20-07:00 | CVE-2017-13015/EAP: Add more bounds checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture. | 985122081165753c7442bd7824c473eb9ff56308 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | eap_print | eap_print( netdissect_options * ndo , register const u_char * cp , u_int length) | ['ndo', 'cp', 'length'] | eap_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp,
u_int length)
{
const struct eap_frame_t *eap;
const u_char *tptr;
u_int tlen, type, subtype;
int count=0, len;
tptr = cp;
tlen = length;
eap = (const struct eap_frame_t *)cp;
ND_TCHECK(*eap);
/* in non-verbose mode just lets print the basic info */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (%u) v%u, len %u",
tok2str(eap_frame_type_values, "unknown", eap->type),
eap->type,
eap->version,
EXTRACT_16BITS(eap->length)));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (%u) v%u, len %u",
tok2str(eap_frame_type_values, "unknown", eap->type),
eap->type,
eap->version,
EXTRACT_16BITS(eap->length)));
tptr += sizeof(const struct eap_frame_t);
tlen -= sizeof(const struct eap_frame_t);
switch (eap->type) {
case EAP_FRAME_TYPE_PACKET:
type = *(tptr);
len = EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr+2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", %s (%u), id %u, len %u",
tok2str(eap_code_values, "unknown", type),
type,
*(tptr+1),
len));
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, len);
if (type <= 2) { /* For EAP_REQUEST and EAP_RESPONSE only */
subtype = *(tptr+4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t Type %s (%u)",
tok2str(eap_type_values, "unknown", *(tptr+4)),
*(tptr + 4)));
switch (subtype) {
case EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY:
if (len - 5 > 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Identity: "));
safeputs(ndo, tptr + 5, len - 5);
}
break;
case EAP_TYPE_NOTIFICATION:
if (len - 5 > 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Notification: "));
safeputs(ndo, tptr + 5, len - 5);
}
break;
case EAP_TYPE_NAK:
count = 5;
/*
* one or more octets indicating
* the desired authentication
* type one octet per type
*/
while (count < len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s (%u),",
tok2str(eap_type_values, "unknown", *(tptr+count)),
*(tptr + count)));
count++;
}
break;
case EAP_TYPE_TTLS:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " TTLSv%u",
EAP_TTLS_VERSION(*(tptr + 5)))); /* fall through */
case EAP_TYPE_TLS:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " flags [%s] 0x%02x,",
bittok2str(eap_tls_flags_values, "none", *(tptr+5)),
*(tptr + 5)));
if (EAP_TLS_EXTRACT_BIT_L(*(tptr+5))) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " len %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 6)));
}
break;
case EAP_TYPE_FAST:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " FASTv%u",
EAP_TTLS_VERSION(*(tptr + 5))));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " flags [%s] 0x%02x,",
bittok2str(eap_tls_flags_values, "none", *(tptr+5)),
*(tptr + 5)));
if (EAP_TLS_EXTRACT_BIT_L(*(tptr+5))) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " len %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr + 6)));
}
/* FIXME - TLV attributes follow */
break;
case EAP_TYPE_AKA:
case EAP_TYPE_SIM:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " subtype [%s] 0x%02x,",
tok2str(eap_aka_subtype_values, "unknown", *(tptr+5)),
*(tptr + 5)));
/* FIXME - TLV attributes follow */
break;
case EAP_TYPE_MD5_CHALLENGE:
case EAP_TYPE_OTP:
case EAP_TYPE_GTC:
case EAP_TYPE_EXPANDED_TYPES:
case EAP_TYPE_EXPERIMENTAL:
default:
break;
}
}
break;
case EAP_FRAME_TYPE_LOGOFF:
case EAP_FRAME_TYPE_ENCAP_ASF_ALERT:
default:
break;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t[|EAP]"));
} | 660 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13016 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/c177cb3800a9a68d79b2812f0ffcb9479abd6eb8', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/c177cb3800a9a68d79b2812f0ffcb9479abd6eb8', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The ISO ES-IS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c:esis_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-21 19:30:48-07:00 | CVE-2017-13016/ES-IS: Fix printing of addresses in RD PDUs.
Always print the SNPA, and flag it as such; only print it as a MAC
address if it's 6 bytes long.
Identify the NET as such.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture files won't be rejected as an invalid capture. | c177cb3800a9a68d79b2812f0ffcb9479abd6eb8 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | esis_print | esis_print( netdissect_options * ndo , const uint8_t * pptr , u_int length) | ['ndo', 'pptr', 'length'] | esis_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *pptr, u_int length)
{
const uint8_t *optr;
u_int li,esis_pdu_type,source_address_length, source_address_number;
const struct esis_header_t *esis_header;
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ES-IS"));
if (length <= 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ndo->ndo_qflag ? "bad pkt!" : "no header at all!"));
return;
}
esis_header = (const struct esis_header_t *) pptr;
ND_TCHECK(*esis_header);
li = esis_header->length_indicator;
optr = pptr;
/*
* Sanity checking of the header.
*/
if (esis_header->nlpid != NLPID_ESIS) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " nlpid 0x%02x packet not supported", esis_header->nlpid));
return;
}
if (esis_header->version != ESIS_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " version %d packet not supported", esis_header->version));
return;
}
if (li > length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " length indicator(%u) > PDU size (%u)!", li, length));
return;
}
if (li < sizeof(struct esis_header_t) + 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " length indicator %u < min PDU size:", li));
while (pptr < ndo->ndo_snapend)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02X", *pptr++));
return;
}
esis_pdu_type = esis_header->type & ESIS_PDU_TYPE_MASK;
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s, length %u",
ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ",
tok2str(esis_pdu_values,"unknown type (%u)",esis_pdu_type),
length));
return;
} else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%slength %u\n\t%s (%u)",
ndo->ndo_eflag ? "" : ", ",
length,
tok2str(esis_pdu_values,"unknown type: %u", esis_pdu_type),
esis_pdu_type));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", v: %u%s", esis_header->version, esis_header->version == ESIS_VERSION ? "" : "unsupported" ));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", checksum: 0x%04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(esis_header->cksum)));
osi_print_cksum(ndo, pptr, EXTRACT_16BITS(esis_header->cksum), 7, li);
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", holding time: %us, length indicator: %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(esis_header->holdtime), li));
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, optr, "\n\t", sizeof(struct esis_header_t));
pptr += sizeof(struct esis_header_t);
li -= sizeof(struct esis_header_t);
switch (esis_pdu_type) {
case ESIS_PDU_REDIRECT: {
const uint8_t *dst, *snpa, *neta;
u_int dstl, snpal, netal;
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
if (li < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad redirect/li"));
return;
}
dstl = *pptr;
pptr++;
li--;
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, dstl);
if (li < dstl) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad redirect/li"));
return;
}
dst = pptr;
pptr += dstl;
li -= dstl;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", isonsap_string(ndo, dst, dstl)));
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
if (li < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad redirect/li"));
return;
}
snpal = *pptr;
pptr++;
li--;
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, snpal);
if (li < snpal) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad redirect/li"));
return;
}
snpa = pptr;
pptr += snpal;
li -= snpal;
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
if (li < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad redirect/li"));
return;
}
netal = *pptr;
pptr++;
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, netal);
if (li < netal) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad redirect/li"));
return;
}
neta = pptr;
pptr += netal;
li -= netal;
if (netal == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", etheraddr_string(ndo, snpa)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s", isonsap_string(ndo, neta, netal)));
break;
}
case ESIS_PDU_ESH:
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
if (li < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad esh/li"));
return;
}
source_address_number = *pptr;
pptr++;
li--;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Number of Source Addresses: %u", source_address_number));
while (source_address_number > 0) {
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
if (li < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad esh/li"));
return;
}
source_address_length = *pptr;
pptr++;
li--;
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, source_address_length);
if (li < source_address_length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad esh/li"));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t NET (length: %u): %s",
source_address_length,
isonsap_string(ndo, pptr, source_address_length)));
pptr += source_address_length;
li -= source_address_length;
source_address_number--;
}
break;
case ESIS_PDU_ISH: {
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
if (li < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad ish/li"));
return;
}
source_address_length = *pptr;
pptr++;
li--;
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, source_address_length);
if (li < source_address_length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad ish/li"));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t NET (length: %u): %s", source_address_length, isonsap_string(ndo, pptr, source_address_length)));
pptr += source_address_length;
li -= source_address_length;
break;
}
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1) {
if (pptr < ndo->ndo_snapend)
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", ndo->ndo_snapend - pptr);
}
return;
}
/* now walk the options */
while (li != 0) {
u_int op, opli;
const uint8_t *tptr;
if (li < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", bad opts/li"));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, 2);
op = *pptr++;
opli = *pptr++;
li -= 2;
if (opli > li) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", opt (%d) too long", op));
return;
}
li -= opli;
tptr = pptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s Option #%u, length %u, value: ",
tok2str(esis_option_values,"Unknown",op),
op,
opli));
switch (op) {
case ESIS_OPTION_ES_CONF_TIME:
if (opli == 2) {
ND_TCHECK2(*pptr, 2);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%us", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
} else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(bad length)"));
break;
case ESIS_OPTION_PROTOCOLS:
while (opli>0) {
ND_TCHECK(*pptr);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s (0x%02x)",
tok2str(nlpid_values,
"unknown",
*tptr),
*tptr));
if (opli>1) /* further NPLIDs ? - put comma */
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", "));
tptr++;
opli--;
}
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined Options that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case ESIS_OPTION_QOS_MAINTENANCE:
case ESIS_OPTION_SECURITY:
case ESIS_OPTION_PRIORITY:
case ESIS_OPTION_ADDRESS_MASK:
case ESIS_OPTION_SNPA_MASK:
default:
print_unknown_data(ndo, tptr, "\n\t ", opli);
break;
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo, pptr, "\n\t ", opli);
pptr += opli;
}
trunc:
return;
} | 1300 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13019 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/4601c685e7fd19c3724d5e499c69b8d3ec49933e', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/4601c685e7fd19c3724d5e499c69b8d3ec49933e', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The PGM parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-pgm.c:pgm_print().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-21 21:49:45-07:00 | CVE-2017-13019: Clean up PGM option processing.
Add #defines for option lengths or the lengths of the fixed-length part
of the option. Sometimes those #defines differ from what was there
before; what was there before was wrong, probably because the option
lengths given in RFC 3208 were sometimes wrong - some lengths included
the length of the option header, some lengths didn't.
Don't use "sizeof(uintXX_t)" for sizes in the packet, just use the
number of bytes directly.
For the options that include an IPv4 or IPv6 address, check the option
length against the length of what precedes the address before fetching
any of that data.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture. | 4601c685e7fd19c3724d5e499c69b8d3ec49933e | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | pgm_print | pgm_print( netdissect_options * ndo , register const u_char * bp , register u_int length , register const u_char * bp2) | ['ndo', 'bp', 'length', 'bp2'] | pgm_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *bp, register u_int length,
register const u_char *bp2)
{
register const struct pgm_header *pgm;
register const struct ip *ip;
register char ch;
uint16_t sport, dport;
u_int nla_afnum;
char nla_buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
register const struct ip6_hdr *ip6;
uint8_t opt_type, opt_len;
uint32_t seq, opts_len, len, offset;
pgm = (const struct pgm_header *)bp;
ip = (const struct ip *)bp2;
if (IP_V(ip) == 6)
ip6 = (const struct ip6_hdr *)bp2;
else
ip6 = NULL;
ch = '\0';
if (!ND_TTEST(pgm->pgm_dport)) {
if (ip6) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s: [|pgm]",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &ip6->ip6_src),
ip6addr_string(ndo, &ip6->ip6_dst)));
return;
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s: [|pgm]",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_src),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_dst)));
return;
}
}
sport = EXTRACT_16BITS(&pgm->pgm_sport);
dport = EXTRACT_16BITS(&pgm->pgm_dport);
if (ip6) {
if (ip6->ip6_nxt == IPPROTO_PGM) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s.%s > %s.%s: ",
ip6addr_string(ndo, &ip6->ip6_src),
tcpport_string(ndo, sport),
ip6addr_string(ndo, &ip6->ip6_dst),
tcpport_string(ndo, dport)));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s: ",
tcpport_string(ndo, sport), tcpport_string(ndo, dport)));
}
} else {
if (ip->ip_p == IPPROTO_PGM) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s.%s > %s.%s: ",
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_src),
tcpport_string(ndo, sport),
ipaddr_string(ndo, &ip->ip_dst),
tcpport_string(ndo, dport)));
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s > %s: ",
tcpport_string(ndo, sport), tcpport_string(ndo, dport)));
}
}
ND_TCHECK(*pgm);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "PGM, length %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&pgm->pgm_length)));
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag)
return;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x ",
pgm->pgm_gsid[0],
pgm->pgm_gsid[1],
pgm->pgm_gsid[2],
pgm->pgm_gsid[3],
pgm->pgm_gsid[4],
pgm->pgm_gsid[5]));
switch (pgm->pgm_type) {
case PGM_SPM: {
const struct pgm_spm *spm;
spm = (const struct pgm_spm *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*spm);
bp = (const u_char *) (spm + 1);
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(&spm->pgms_nla_afi)) {
case AFNUM_INET:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "SPM seq %u trail %u lead %u nla %s",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&spm->pgms_seq),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&spm->pgms_trailseq),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&spm->pgms_leadseq),
nla_buf));
break;
}
case PGM_POLL: {
const struct pgm_poll *poll_msg;
poll_msg = (const struct pgm_poll *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*poll_msg);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "POLL seq %u round %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&poll_msg->pgmp_seq),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&poll_msg->pgmp_round)));
bp = (const u_char *) (poll_msg + 1);
break;
}
case PGM_POLR: {
const struct pgm_polr *polr;
uint32_t ivl, rnd, mask;
polr = (const struct pgm_polr *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*polr);
bp = (const u_char *) (polr + 1);
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(&polr->pgmp_nla_afi)) {
case AFNUM_INET:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(uint32_t));
ivl = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(uint32_t));
rnd = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(uint32_t));
mask = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "POLR seq %u round %u nla %s ivl %u rnd 0x%08x "
"mask 0x%08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(&polr->pgmp_seq),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&polr->pgmp_round), nla_buf, ivl, rnd, mask));
break;
}
case PGM_ODATA: {
const struct pgm_data *odata;
odata = (const struct pgm_data *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*odata);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ODATA trail %u seq %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&odata->pgmd_trailseq),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&odata->pgmd_seq)));
bp = (const u_char *) (odata + 1);
break;
}
case PGM_RDATA: {
const struct pgm_data *rdata;
rdata = (const struct pgm_data *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*rdata);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "RDATA trail %u seq %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&rdata->pgmd_trailseq),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&rdata->pgmd_seq)));
bp = (const u_char *) (rdata + 1);
break;
}
case PGM_NAK:
case PGM_NULLNAK:
case PGM_NCF: {
const struct pgm_nak *nak;
char source_buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN], group_buf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
nak = (const struct pgm_nak *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*nak);
bp = (const u_char *) (nak + 1);
/*
* Skip past the source, saving info along the way
* and stopping if we don't have enough.
*/
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(&nak->pgmn_source_afi)) {
case AFNUM_INET:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, source_buf, sizeof(source_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, source_buf, sizeof(source_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
/*
* Skip past the group, saving info along the way
* and stopping if we don't have enough.
*/
bp += (2 * sizeof(uint16_t));
switch (EXTRACT_16BITS(bp)) {
case AFNUM_INET:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, group_buf, sizeof(group_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, group_buf, sizeof(group_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
/*
* Options decoding can go here.
*/
switch (pgm->pgm_type) {
case PGM_NAK:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "NAK "));
break;
case PGM_NULLNAK:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "NNAK "));
break;
case PGM_NCF:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "NCF "));
break;
default:
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "(%s -> %s), seq %u",
source_buf, group_buf, EXTRACT_32BITS(&nak->pgmn_seq)));
break;
}
case PGM_ACK: {
const struct pgm_ack *ack;
ack = (const struct pgm_ack *)(pgm + 1);
ND_TCHECK(*ack);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ACK seq %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&ack->pgma_rx_max_seq)));
bp = (const u_char *) (ack + 1);
break;
}
case PGM_SPMR:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "SPMR"));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "UNKNOWN type 0x%02x", pgm->pgm_type));
break;
}
if (pgm->pgm_options & PGM_OPT_BIT_PRESENT) {
/*
* make sure there's enough for the first option header
*/
if (!ND_TTEST2(*bp, PGM_MIN_OPT_LEN)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|OPT]"));
return;
}
/*
* That option header MUST be an OPT_LENGTH option
* (see the first paragraph of section 9.1 in RFC 3208).
*/
opt_type = *bp++;
if ((opt_type & PGM_OPT_MASK) != PGM_OPT_LENGTH) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[First option bad, should be PGM_OPT_LENGTH, is %u]", opt_type & PGM_OPT_MASK));
return;
}
opt_len = *bp++;
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_LENGTH option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
opts_len = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
if (opts_len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad total option length %u < 4]", opts_len));
return;
}
bp += sizeof(uint16_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " OPTS LEN %d", opts_len));
opts_len -= 4;
while (opts_len) {
if (opts_len < PGM_MIN_OPT_LEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Total option length leaves no room for final option]"));
return;
}
if (!ND_TTEST2(*bp, 2)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|OPT]"));
return;
}
opt_type = *bp++;
opt_len = *bp++;
if (opt_len < PGM_MIN_OPT_LEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad option, length %u < %u]", opt_len,
PGM_MIN_OPT_LEN));
break;
}
if (opts_len < opt_len) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Total option length leaves no room for final option]"));
return;
}
if (!ND_TTEST2(*bp, opt_len - 2)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [|OPT]"));
return;
}
switch (opt_type & PGM_OPT_MASK) {
case PGM_OPT_LENGTH:
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_LENGTH option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " OPTS LEN (extra?) %d", EXTRACT_16BITS(bp)));
bp += sizeof(uint16_t);
opts_len -= 4;
break;
case PGM_OPT_FRAGMENT:
if (opt_len != 16) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_FRAGMENT option, length %u != 16]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
seq = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
offset = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
len = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " FRAG seq %u off %u len %u", seq, offset, len));
opts_len -= 16;
break;
case PGM_OPT_NAK_LIST:
bp += 2;
opt_len -= sizeof(uint32_t); /* option header */
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NAK LIST"));
while (opt_len) {
if (opt_len < sizeof(uint32_t)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Option length not a multiple of 4]"));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(uint32_t));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(bp)));
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
opt_len -= sizeof(uint32_t);
opts_len -= sizeof(uint32_t);
}
break;
case PGM_OPT_JOIN:
if (opt_len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_JOIN option, length %u != 8]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
seq = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " JOIN %u", seq));
opts_len -= 8;
break;
case PGM_OPT_NAK_BO_IVL:
if (opt_len != 12) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_NAK_BO_IVL option, length %u != 12]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
offset = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
seq = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BACKOFF ivl %u ivlseq %u", offset, seq));
opts_len -= 12;
break;
case PGM_OPT_NAK_BO_RNG:
if (opt_len != 12) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_NAK_BO_RNG option, length %u != 12]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
offset = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
seq = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " BACKOFF max %u min %u", offset, seq));
opts_len -= 12;
break;
case PGM_OPT_REDIRECT:
bp += 2;
nla_afnum = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
bp += (2 * sizeof(uint16_t));
switch (nla_afnum) {
case AFNUM_INET:
if (opt_len != 4 + sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_REDIRECT option, length %u != 4 + address size]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
opts_len -= 4 + sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
if (opt_len != 4 + sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_REDIRECT option, length %u != 4 + address size]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
opts_len -= 4 + sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " REDIRECT %s", nla_buf));
break;
case PGM_OPT_PARITY_PRM:
if (opt_len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_PARITY_PRM option, length %u != 8]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
len = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " PARITY MAXTGS %u", len));
opts_len -= 8;
break;
case PGM_OPT_PARITY_GRP:
if (opt_len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_PARITY_GRP option, length %u != 8]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
seq = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " PARITY GROUP %u", seq));
opts_len -= 8;
break;
case PGM_OPT_CURR_TGSIZE:
if (opt_len != 8) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_CURR_TGSIZE option, length %u != 8]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
len = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " PARITY ATGS %u", len));
opts_len -= 8;
break;
case PGM_OPT_NBR_UNREACH:
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_NBR_UNREACH option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " NBR_UNREACH"));
opts_len -= 4;
break;
case PGM_OPT_PATH_NLA:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " PATH_NLA [%d]", opt_len));
bp += opt_len;
opts_len -= opt_len;
break;
case PGM_OPT_SYN:
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_SYN option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " SYN"));
opts_len -= 4;
break;
case PGM_OPT_FIN:
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_FIN option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " FIN"));
opts_len -= 4;
break;
case PGM_OPT_RST:
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_RST option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " RST"));
opts_len -= 4;
break;
case PGM_OPT_CR:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " CR"));
bp += opt_len;
opts_len -= opt_len;
break;
case PGM_OPT_CRQST:
if (opt_len != 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_CRQST option, length %u != 4]", opt_len));
return;
}
bp += 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " CRQST"));
opts_len -= 4;
break;
case PGM_OPT_PGMCC_DATA:
bp += 2;
offset = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
nla_afnum = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
bp += (2 * sizeof(uint16_t));
switch (nla_afnum) {
case AFNUM_INET:
if (opt_len != 12 + sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_PGMCC_DATA option, length %u != 12 + address size]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
opts_len -= 12 + sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
if (opt_len != 12 + sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_PGMCC_DATA option, length %u != 12 + address size]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
opts_len -= 12 + sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " PGMCC DATA %u %s", offset, nla_buf));
break;
case PGM_OPT_PGMCC_FEEDBACK:
bp += 2;
offset = EXTRACT_32BITS(bp);
bp += sizeof(uint32_t);
nla_afnum = EXTRACT_16BITS(bp);
bp += (2 * sizeof(uint16_t));
switch (nla_afnum) {
case AFNUM_INET:
if (opt_len != 12 + sizeof(struct in_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_PGMCC_DATA option, length %u != 12 + address size]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in_addr));
addrtostr(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in_addr);
opts_len -= 12 + sizeof(struct in_addr);
break;
case AFNUM_INET6:
if (opt_len != 12 + sizeof(struct in6_addr)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[Bad OPT_PGMCC_DATA option, length %u != 12 + address size]", opt_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*bp, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
addrtostr6(bp, nla_buf, sizeof(nla_buf));
bp += sizeof(struct in6_addr);
opts_len -= 12 + sizeof(struct in6_addr);
break;
default:
goto trunc;
break;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " PGMCC FEEDBACK %u %s", offset, nla_buf));
break;
default:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " OPT_%02X [%d] ", opt_type, opt_len));
bp += opt_len;
opts_len -= opt_len;
break;
}
if (opt_type & PGM_OPT_END)
break;
}
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [%u]", length));
if (ndo->ndo_packettype == PT_PGM_ZMTP1 &&
(pgm->pgm_type == PGM_ODATA || pgm->pgm_type == PGM_RDATA))
zmtp1_print_datagram(ndo, bp, EXTRACT_16BITS(&pgm->pgm_length));
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|pgm]"));
if (ch != '\0')
ND_PRINT((ndo, ">"));
} | 3461 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13022 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/eee0b04bcfdae319c242b0b8fc3d07029ee65b8c', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/eee0b04bcfdae319c242b0b8fc3d07029ee65b8c', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The IP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-ip.c:ip_printroute().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-21 23:07:17-07:00 | CVE-2017-13022/IP: Add bounds checks to ip_printroute().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture. | eee0b04bcfdae319c242b0b8fc3d07029ee65b8c | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | ip_optprint | ip_optprint( netdissect_options * ndo , register const u_char * cp , u_int length) | ['ndo', 'cp', 'length'] | ip_optprint(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp, u_int length)
{
register u_int option_len;
const char *sep = "";
for (; length > 0; cp += option_len, length -= option_len) {
u_int option_code;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", sep));
sep = ",";
ND_TCHECK(*cp);
option_code = *cp;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",
tok2str(ip_option_values,"unknown %u",option_code)));
if (option_code == IPOPT_NOP ||
option_code == IPOPT_EOL)
option_len = 1;
else {
ND_TCHECK(cp[1]);
option_len = cp[1];
if (option_len < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad length %u]", option_len));
return;
}
}
if (option_len > length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad length %u]", option_len));
return;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*cp, option_len);
switch (option_code) {
case IPOPT_EOL:
return;
case IPOPT_TS:
ip_printts(ndo, cp, option_len);
break;
case IPOPT_RR: /* fall through */
case IPOPT_SSRR:
case IPOPT_LSRR:
ip_printroute(ndo, cp, option_len);
break;
case IPOPT_RA:
if (option_len < 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad length %u]", option_len));
break;
}
ND_TCHECK(cp[3]);
if (EXTRACT_16BITS(&cp[2]) != 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " value %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(&cp[2])));
break;
case IPOPT_NOP: /* nothing to print - fall through */
case IPOPT_SECURITY:
default:
break;
}
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
} | 309 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13022 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/eee0b04bcfdae319c242b0b8fc3d07029ee65b8c', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/eee0b04bcfdae319c242b0b8fc3d07029ee65b8c', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The IP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-ip.c:ip_printroute().'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-21 23:07:17-07:00 | CVE-2017-13022/IP: Add bounds checks to ip_printroute().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture. | eee0b04bcfdae319c242b0b8fc3d07029ee65b8c | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | ip_printroute | ip_printroute( netdissect_options * ndo , register const u_char * cp , u_int length) | ['ndo', 'cp', 'length'] | ip_printroute(netdissect_options *ndo,
register const u_char *cp, u_int length)
{
register u_int ptr;
register u_int len;
if (length < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad length %u]", length));
return;
}
if ((length + 1) & 3)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad length %u]", length));
ptr = cp[2] - 1;
if (ptr < 3 || ((ptr + 1) & 3) || ptr > length + 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [bad ptr %u]", cp[2]));
for (len = 3; len < length; len += 4) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, &cp[len])));
if (ptr > len)
ND_PRINT((ndo, ","));
}
} | 163 | True | 1 |
CVE-2017-13026 | False | False | False | False | AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | PARTIAL | 7.5 | CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H | NETWORK | LOW | NONE | NONE | UNCHANGED | HIGH | HIGH | HIGH | 9.8 | CRITICAL | 3.9 | 5.9 | nan | [{'url': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/b20e1639dbac84b3fcb393858521c13ad47a9d70', 'name': 'https://github.com/the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump/commit/b20e1639dbac84b3fcb393858521c13ad47a9d70', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Issue Tracking', 'Patch', 'Third Party Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'name': 'http://www.tcpdump.org/tcpdump-changes.txt', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': ['Vendor Advisory']}, {'url': 'http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1039307', 'name': '1039307', 'refsource': 'SECTRACK', 'tags': ['Third Party Advisory', 'VDB Entry']}, {'url': 'https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201709-23', 'name': 'GLSA-201709-23', 'refsource': 'GENTOO', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'http://www.debian.org/security/2017/dsa-3971', 'name': 'DSA-3971', 'refsource': 'DEBIAN', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'name': 'https://support.apple.com/HT208221', 'refsource': 'CONFIRM', 'tags': []}, {'url': 'https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHEA-2018:0705', 'name': 'RHEA-2018:0705', 'refsource': 'REDHAT', 'tags': []}] | [{'description': [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'CWE-125'}]}] | HIGH | [{'operator': 'OR', 'children': [], 'cpe_match': [{'vulnerable': True, 'cpe23Uri': 'cpe:2.3:a:tcpdump:tcpdump:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*', 'versionEndIncluding': '4.9.1', 'cpe_name': []}]}] | [{'lang': 'en', 'value': 'The ISO IS-IS parser in tcpdump before 4.9.2 has a buffer over-read in print-isoclns.c, several functions.'}] | 2019-10-03T00:03Z | 2017-09-14T06:29Z | Out-of-bounds Read | The software reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer. | Typically, this can allow attackers to read sensitive information from other memory locations or cause a crash. A crash can occur when the code reads a variable amount of data and assumes that a sentinel exists to stop the read operation, such as a NUL in a string. The expected sentinel might not be located in the out-of-bounds memory, causing excessive data to be read, leading to a segmentation fault or a buffer overflow. The software may modify an index or perform pointer arithmetic that references a memory location that is outside of the boundaries of the buffer. A subsequent read operation then produces undefined or unexpected results.
| https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/125.html | 0 | Guy Harris | 2017-03-22 10:59:47-07:00 | CVE-2017-13026/IS-IS: Clean up processing of subTLVs.
Add bounds checks, do a common check to make sure we captured the entire
subTLV, add checks to make sure the subTLV fits within the TLV.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add tests using the capture files supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture files won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Update existing tests for changes to IS-IS dissector. | b20e1639dbac84b3fcb393858521c13ad47a9d70 | False | the-tcpdump-group/tcpdump | the TCPdump network dissector | 2013-04-14 21:46:15 | 2022-08-27 16:56:14 | https://www.tcpdump.org/ | the-tcpdump-group | 1967.0 | 738.0 | isis_print_mt_capability_subtlv | isis_print_mt_capability_subtlv( netdissect_options * ndo , const uint8_t * tptr , int len) | ['ndo', 'tptr', 'len'] | isis_print_mt_capability_subtlv(netdissect_options *ndo,
const uint8_t *tptr, int len)
{
int stlv_type, stlv_len, tmp;
while (len > 2)
{
stlv_type = *(tptr++);
stlv_len = *(tptr++);
/* first lets see if we know the subTLVs name*/
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s subTLV #%u, length: %u",
tok2str(isis_mt_capability_subtlv_values, "unknown", stlv_type),
stlv_type,
stlv_len));
len = len - 2;
switch (stlv_type)
{
case ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_INSTANCE:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_INSTANCE_MIN_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t CIST Root-ID: %08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr+4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr+4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Path Cost: %08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr+4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", Prio: %d", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr + 2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t RES: %d",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr) >> 5));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", V: %d",
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr) >> 4) & 0x0001));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", SPSource-ID: %d",
(EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr) & 0x000fffff)));
tptr = tptr+4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", No of Trees: %x", *(tptr)));
tmp = *(tptr++);
len = len - ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_INSTANCE_MIN_LEN;
while (tmp)
{
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_INSTANCE_VLAN_TUPLE_LEN);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t U:%d, M:%d, A:%d, RES:%d",
*(tptr) >> 7, (*(tptr) >> 6) & 0x01,
(*(tptr) >> 5) & 0x01, (*(tptr) & 0x1f)));
tptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", ECT: %08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr + 4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", BVID: %d, SPVID: %d",
(EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr) >> 12) & 0x000fff,
EXTRACT_24BITS(tptr) & 0x000fff));
tptr = tptr + 3;
len = len - ISIS_SUBTLV_SPB_INSTANCE_VLAN_TUPLE_LEN;
tmp--;
}
break;
case ISIS_SUBTLV_SPBM_SI:
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 8);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t BMAC: %08x", EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr+4;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%04x", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)));
tptr = tptr+2;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", RES: %d, VID: %d", EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr) >> 12,
(EXTRACT_16BITS(tptr)) & 0x0fff));
tptr = tptr+2;
len = len - 8;
stlv_len = stlv_len - 8;
while (stlv_len >= 4) {
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, 4);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t T: %d, R: %d, RES: %d, ISID: %d",
(EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr) >> 31),
(EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr) >> 30) & 0x01,
(EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr) >> 24) & 0x03f,
(EXTRACT_32BITS(tptr)) & 0x0ffffff));
tptr = tptr + 4;
len = len - 4;
stlv_len = stlv_len - 4;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
return 0;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return(1);
} | 611 | True | 1 |
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