hunk.code_window:     static propTypes = {
           post: React.PropTypes.object.isRequired,
           currentUserId: React.PropTypes.string.isRequired,
           reactions: React.PropTypes.arrayOf(React.PropTypes.object)
       }
       render() {
           const reactionsByName = new Map();
  
hunk.labels: keep keep keep replace keep keep keep keep
hunk.after_edit:         reactions: React.PropTypes.arrayOf(React.PropTypes.object),
           emojis: React.PropTypes.object.isRequired
  
hunk.file_path: webapp/components/post_view/components/reaction_list_view.jsx
hunk.type: replace
file: // Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
  // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
  // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
  
  package ssh
  
  import (
  	"crypto"
  	"crypto/ecdsa"
  	"crypto/elliptic"
  	"crypto/rand"
  	"crypto/subtle"
  	"errors"
  	"io"
  	"math/big"
  
  	"golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519"
  )
  
  const (
  	kexAlgoDH1SHA1          = "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
  	kexAlgoDH14SHA1         = "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
  	kexAlgoECDH256          = "ecdh-sha2-nistp256"
  	kexAlgoECDH384          = "ecdh-sha2-nistp384"
  	kexAlgoECDH521          = "ecdh-sha2-nistp521"
  	kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256 = "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org"
  )
  
  // kexResult captures the outcome of a key exchange.
  type kexResult struct {
  	// Session hash. See also RFC 4253, section 8.
  	H []byte
  
  	// Shared secret. See also RFC 4253, section 8.
  	K []byte
  
  	// Host key as hashed into H.
  	HostKey []byte
  
  	// Signature of H.
  	Signature []byte
  
  	// A cryptographic hash function that matches the security
  	// level of the key exchange algorithm. It is used for
  	// calculating H, and for deriving keys from H and K.
  	Hash crypto.Hash
  
  	// The session ID, which is the first H computed. This is used
  	// to derive key material inside the transport.
  	SessionID []byte
  }
  
  // handshakeMagics contains data that is always included in the
  // session hash.
  type handshakeMagics struct {
  	clientVersion, serverVersion []byte
  	clientKexInit, serverKexInit []byte
  }
  
  func (m *handshakeMagics) write(w io.Writer) {
  	writeString(w, m.clientVersion)
  	writeString(w, m.serverVersion)
  	writeString(w, m.clientKexInit)
  	writeString(w, m.serverKexInit)
  }
  
  // kexAlgorithm abstracts different key exchange algorithms.
  type kexAlgorithm interface {
  	// Server runs server-side key agreement, signing the result
  	// with a hostkey.
  	Server(p packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, s Signer) (*kexResult, error)
  
  	// Client runs the client-side key agreement. Caller is
  	// responsible for verifying the host key signature.
  	Client(p packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error)
  }
  
  // dhGroup is a multiplicative group suitable for implementing Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
  type dhGroup struct {
  	g, p, pMinus1 *big.Int
  }
  
  func (group *dhGroup) diffieHellman(theirPublic, myPrivate *big.Int) (*big.Int, error) {
  	if theirPublic.Cmp(bigOne) <= 0 || theirPublic.Cmp(group.pMinus1) >= 0 {
  		return nil, errors.New("ssh: DH parameter out of bounds")
  	}
  	return new(big.Int).Exp(theirPublic, myPrivate, group.p), nil
  }
  
  func (group *dhGroup) Client(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) {
  	hashFunc := crypto.SHA1
  
  	var x *big.Int
  	for {
  		var err error
  		if x, err = rand.Int(randSource, group.pMinus1); err != nil {
  			return nil, err
  		}
  		if x.Sign() > 0 {
  			break
  		}
  	}
  
  	X := new(big.Int).Exp(group.g, x, group.p)
  	kexDHInit := kexDHInitMsg{
  		X: X,
  	}
  	if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexDHInit)); err != nil {
  		return nil, err
  	}
  
  	packet, err := c.readPacket()
  	if err != nil {
  		return nil, err
  	}
  
  	var kexDHReply kexDHReplyMsg
  	if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHReply); err != nil {
  		return nil, err
  	}
  
  	kInt, err := group.diffieHellman(kexDHReply.Y, x)
  	if err != nil {
  		return nil, err
  	}
  
  	h := hashFunc.New()
  	magics.write(h)
  	writeString(h, kexDHReply.HostKey)
  	writeInt(h, X)
  	writeInt(h, kexDHReply.Y)
  	K := make([]byte, intLength(kInt))
  	marshalInt(K, kInt)
  	h.Write(K)
  
  	return &kexResult{
  		H:         h.Sum(nil),
  		K:         K,
  		HostKey:   kexDHReply.HostKey,
  		Signature: kexDHReply.Signature,
  		Hash:      crypto.SHA1,
  	}, nil
  }
  
  func (group *dhGroup) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv Signer) (result *kexResult, err error) {
  	hashFunc := crypto.SHA1
  	packet, err := c.readPacket()
  	if err != nil {
  		return
  	}
  	var kexDHInit kexDHInitMsg
  	if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHInit); err != nil {
  		return
  	}
  
  	var y *big.Int
  	for {
  		if y, err = rand.Int(randSource, group.pMinus1); err != nil {
  			return
  		}
  		if y.Sign() > 0 {
  			break
  		}
  	}
  
  	Y := new(big.Int).Exp(group.g, y, group.p)
  	kInt, err := group.diffieHellman(kexDHInit.X, y)
  	if err != nil {
  		return nil, err
  	}
  
  	hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal()
  
  	h := hashFunc.New()
  	magics.write(h)
  	writeString(h, hostKeyBytes)
  	writeInt(h, kexDHInit.X)
  	writeInt(h, Y)
  
  	K := make([]byte, intLength(kInt))
  	marshalInt(K, kInt)
  	h.Write(K)
  
  	H := h.Sum(nil)
  
  	// H is already a hash, but the hostkey signing will apply its
  	// own key-specific hash algorithm.
  	sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, randSource, H)
  	if err != nil {
  		return nil, err
  	}
  
  	kexDHReply := kexDHReplyMsg{
  		HostKey:   hostKeyBytes,
  		Y:         Y,
  		Signature: sig,
  	}
  	packet = Marshal(&kexDHReply)
  
  	err = c.writePacket(packet)
  	return &kexResult{
  		H:         H,
  		K:         K,
  		HostKey:   hostKeyBytes,
  		Signature: sig,
  		Hash:      crypto.SHA1,
  	}, nil
  }
  
  // ecdh performs Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange as
  // described in RFC 5656, section 4.
  type ecdh struct {
  	curve elliptic.Curve
  }
  
  func (kex *ecdh) Client(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) {
  	ephKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(kex.curve, rand)
  	if err != nil {
  		return nil, err
  	}
  
  	kexInit := kexECDHInitMsg{
  		ClientPubKey: elliptic.Marshal(kex.curve, ephKey.PublicKey.X, ephKey.PublicKey.Y),
  	}
  
  	serialized := Marshal(&kexInit)
  	if err := c.writePacket(serialized); err != nil {
  		return nil, err
  	}
  
  	packet, err := c.readPacket()
  	if err != nil {
  		return nil, err
  	}
  
  	var reply kexECDHReplyMsg
  	if err = Unmarshal(packet, &reply); err != nil {
  		return nil, err
  	}
  
  	x, y, err := unmarshalECKey(kex.curve, reply.EphemeralPubKey)
  	if err != nil {
  		return nil, err
  	}
  
  	// generate shared secret
  	secret, _ := kex.curve.ScalarMult(x, y, ephKey.D.Bytes())
  
  	h := ecHash(kex.curve).New()
  	magics.write(h)
  	writeString(h, reply.HostKey)
  	writeString(h, kexInit.ClientPubKey)
  	writeString(h, reply.EphemeralPubKey)
  	K := make([]byte, intLength(secret))
  	marshalInt(K, secret)
  	h.Write(K)
  
  	return &kexResult{
  		H:         h.Sum(nil),
  		K:         K,
  		HostKey:   reply.HostKey,
  		Signature: reply.Signature,
  		Hash:      ecHash(kex.curve),
  	}, nil
  }
  
  // unmarshalECKey parses and checks an EC key.
  func unmarshalECKey(curve elliptic.Curve, pubkey []byte) (x, y *big.Int, err error) {
  	x, y = elliptic.Unmarshal(curve, pubkey)
  	if x == nil {
  		return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: elliptic.Unmarshal failure")
  	}
  	if !validateECPublicKey(curve, x, y) {
  		return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: public key not on curve")
  	}
  	return x, y, nil
  }
  
  // validateECPublicKey checks that the point is a valid public key for
  // the given curve. See [SEC1], 3.2.2
  func validateECPublicKey(curve elliptic.Curve, x, y *big.Int) bool {
  	if x.Sign() == 0 && y.Sign() == 0 {
  		return false
  	}
  
  	if x.Cmp(curve.Params().P) >= 0 {
  		return false
  	}
  
  	if y.Cmp(curve.Params().P) >= 0 {
  		return false
  	}
  
  	if !curve.IsOnCurve(x, y) {
  		return false
  	}
  
  	// We don't check if N * PubKey == 0, since
  	//
  	// - the NIST curves have cofactor = 1, so this is implicit.
  	// (We don't foresee an implementation that supports non NIST
  	// curves)
  	//
  	// - for ephemeral keys, we don't need to worry about small
  	// subgroup attacks.
  	return true
  }
  
  func (kex *ecdh) Server(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv Signer) (result *kexResult, err error) {
  	packet, err := c.readPacket()
  	if err != nil {
  		return nil, err
  	}
  
  	var kexECDHInit kexECDHInitMsg
  	if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexECDHInit); err != nil {
  		return nil, err
  	}
  
  	clientX, clientY, err := unmarshalECKey(kex.curve, kexECDHInit.ClientPubKey)
  	if err != nil {
  		return nil, err
  	}
  
  	// We could cache this key across multiple users/multiple
  	// connection attempts, but the benefit is small. OpenSSH
  	// generates a new key for each incoming connection.
  	ephKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(kex.curve, rand)
  	if err != nil {
  		return nil, err
  	}
  
  	hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal()
  
  	serializedEphKey := elliptic.Marshal(kex.curve, ephKey.PublicKey.X, ephKey.PublicKey.Y)
  
  	// generate shared secret
  	secret, _ := kex.curve.ScalarMult(clientX, clientY, ephKey.D.Bytes())
  
  	h := ecHash(kex.curve).New()
  	magics.write(h)
  	writeString(h, hostKeyBytes)
  	writeString(h, kexECDHInit.ClientPubKey)
  	writeString(h, serializedEphKey)
  
  	K := make([]byte, intLength(secret))
  	marshalInt(K, secret)
  	h.Write(K)
  
  	H := h.Sum(nil)
  
  	// H is already a hash, but the hostkey signing will apply its
  	// own key-specific hash algorithm.
  	sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, rand, H)
  	if err != nil {
  		return nil, err
  	}
  
  	reply := kexECDHReplyMsg{
  		EphemeralPubKey: serializedEphKey,
  		HostKey:         hostKeyBytes,
  		Signature:       sig,
  	}
  
  	serialized := Marshal(&reply)
  	if err := c.writePacket(serialized); err != nil {
  		return nil, err
  	}
  
  	return &kexResult{
  		H:         H,
  		K:         K,
  		HostKey:   reply.HostKey,
  		Signature: sig,
  		Hash:      ecHash(kex.curve),
  	}, nil
  }
  
  var kexAlgoMap = map[string]kexAlgorithm{}
  
  func init() {
  	// This is the group called diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 in RFC
  	// 4253 and Oakley Group 2 in RFC 2409.
  	p, _ := new(big.Int).SetString("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE65381FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF", 16)
  	kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDH1SHA1] = &dhGroup{
  		g: new(big.Int).SetInt64(2),
  		p: p,
  		pMinus1: new(big.Int).Sub(p, bigOne),
  	}
  
  	// This is the group called diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 in RFC
  	// 4253 and Oakley Group 14 in RFC 3526.
  	p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3DC2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA18217C32905E462E36CE3BE39E772C180E86039B2783A2EC07A28FB5C55DF06F4C52C9DE2BCBF6955817183995497CEA956AE515D2261898FA051015728E5A8AACAA68FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF", 16)
  
  	kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDH14SHA1] = &dhGroup{
  		g: new(big.Int).SetInt64(2),
  		p: p,
  		pMinus1: new(big.Int).Sub(p, bigOne),
  	}
  
  	kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoECDH521] = &ecdh{elliptic.P521()}
  	kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoECDH384] = &ecdh{elliptic.P384()}
  	kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoECDH256] = &ecdh{elliptic.P256()}
  	kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256] = &curve25519sha256{}
  }
  
  // curve25519sha256 implements the curve25519-sha256@libssh.org key
  // agreement protocol, as described in
  // https://git.libssh.org/projects/libssh.git/tree/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt
  type curve25519sha256 struct{}
  
  type curve25519KeyPair struct {
  	priv [32]byte
  	pub  [32]byte
  }
  
  func (kp *curve25519KeyPair) generate(rand io.Reader) error {
  	if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, kp.priv[:]); err != nil {
  		return err
  	}
  	curve25519.ScalarBaseMult(&kp.pub, &kp.priv)
  	return nil
  }
  
  // curve25519Zeros is just an array of 32 zero bytes so that we have something
  // convenient to compare against in order to reject curve25519 points with the
  // wrong order.
  var curve25519Zeros [32]byte
  
  func (kex *curve25519sha256) Client(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) {
  	var kp curve25519KeyPair
  	if err := kp.generate(rand); err != nil {
  		return nil, err
  	}
  	if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexECDHInitMsg{kp.pub[:]})); err != nil {
  		return nil, err
  	}
  
  	packet, err := c.readPacket()
  	if err != nil {
  		return nil, err
  	}
  
  	var reply kexECDHReplyMsg
  	if err = Unmarshal(packet, &reply); err != nil {
  		return nil, err
  	}
  	if len(reply.EphemeralPubKey) != 32 {
  		return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value has wrong length")
  	}
  
  	var servPub, secret [32]byte
  	copy(servPub[:], reply.EphemeralPubKey)
  	curve25519.ScalarMult(&secret, &kp.priv, &servPub)
  	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(secret[:], curve25519Zeros[:]) == 1 {
  		return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value has wrong order")
  	}
  
  	h := crypto.SHA256.New()
  	magics.write(h)
  	writeString(h, reply.HostKey)
  	writeString(h, kp.pub[:])
  	writeString(h, reply.EphemeralPubKey)
  
  	kInt := new(big.Int).SetBytes(secret[:])
  	K := make([]byte, intLength(kInt))
  	marshalInt(K, kInt)
  	h.Write(K)
  
  	return &kexResult{
  		H:         h.Sum(nil),
  		K:         K,
  		HostKey:   reply.HostKey,
  		Signature: reply.Signature,
  		Hash:      crypto.SHA256,
  	}, nil
  }
  
  func (kex *curve25519sha256) Server(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv Signer) (result *kexResult, err error) {
  	packet, err := c.readPacket()
  	if err != nil {
  		return
  	}
  	var kexInit kexECDHInitMsg
  	if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexInit); err != nil {
  		return
  	}
  
  	if len(kexInit.ClientPubKey) != 32 {
  		return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value has wrong length")
  	}
  
  	var kp curve25519KeyPair
  	if err := kp.generate(rand); err != nil {
  		return nil, err
  	}
  
  	var clientPub, secret [32]byte
  	copy(clientPub[:], kexInit.ClientPubKey)
  	curve25519.ScalarMult(&secret, &kp.priv, &clientPub)
  	if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(secret[:], curve25519Zeros[:]) == 1 {
  		return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value has wrong order")
  	}
  
  	hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal()
  
  	h := crypto.SHA256.New()
  	magics.write(h)
  	writeString(h, hostKeyBytes)
  	writeString(h, kexInit.ClientPubKey)
  	writeString(h, kp.pub[:])
  
  	kInt := new(big.Int).SetBytes(secret[:])
  	K := make([]byte, intLength(kInt))
  	marshalInt(K, kInt)
  	h.Write(K)
  
  	H := h.Sum(nil)
  
  	sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, rand, H)
  	if err != nil {
  		return nil, err
  	}
  
  	reply := kexECDHReplyMsg{
  		EphemeralPubKey: kp.pub[:],
  		HostKey:         hostKeyBytes,
  		Signature:       sig,
  	}
  	if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&reply)); err != nil {
  		return nil, err
  	}
  	return &kexResult{
  		H:         H,
  		K:         K,
  		HostKey:   hostKeyBytes,
  		Signature: sig,
  		Hash:      crypto.SHA256,
  	}, nil
  }
  