hunk.code_window: 			if foundWithSuffix {
   				continue
   			}
   			if strings.ContainsAny(word, ".-:") {
   				// This word contains a character that may be the end of a sentence, so split further
   				splitWords := strings.FieldsFunc(word, func(c rune) bool {
   					return c == '.' || c == '-' || c == ':'
   				})
  
hunk.labels: keep keep keep keep replace keep keep keep keep
hunk.after_edit: 			if _, ok := systemMentions[word]; !ok && strings.HasPrefix(word, "@") {
   				ret.OtherPotentialMentions = append(ret.OtherPotentialMentions, word[1:])
   			} else if strings.ContainsAny(word, ".-:") {
  
hunk.file_path: app/notification.go
hunk.type: replace
file: // Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
  // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
  // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
  
  package pkcs12
  
  import (
  	"bytes"
  	"crypto/sha1"
  	"math/big"
  )
  
  var (
  	one = big.NewInt(1)
  )
  
  // sha1Sum returns the SHA-1 hash of in.
  func sha1Sum(in []byte) []byte {
  	sum := sha1.Sum(in)
  	return sum[:]
  }
  
  // fillWithRepeats returns v*ceiling(len(pattern) / v) bytes consisting of
  // repeats of pattern.
  func fillWithRepeats(pattern []byte, v int) []byte {
  	if len(pattern) == 0 {
  		return nil
  	}
  	outputLen := v * ((len(pattern) + v - 1) / v)
  	return bytes.Repeat(pattern, (outputLen+len(pattern)-1)/len(pattern))[:outputLen]
  }
  
  func pbkdf(hash func([]byte) []byte, u, v int, salt, password []byte, r int, ID byte, size int) (key []byte) {
  	// implementation of https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7292#appendix-B.2 , RFC text verbatim in comments
  
  	//    Let H be a hash function built around a compression function f:
  
  	//       Z_2^u x Z_2^v -> Z_2^u
  
  	//    (that is, H has a chaining variable and output of length u bits, and
  	//    the message input to the compression function of H is v bits).  The
  	//    values for u and v are as follows:
  
  	//            HASH FUNCTION     VALUE u        VALUE v
  	//              MD2, MD5          128            512
  	//                SHA-1           160            512
  	//               SHA-224          224            512
  	//               SHA-256          256            512
  	//               SHA-384          384            1024
  	//               SHA-512          512            1024
  	//             SHA-512/224        224            1024
  	//             SHA-512/256        256            1024
  
  	//    Furthermore, let r be the iteration count.
  
  	//    We assume here that u and v are both multiples of 8, as are the
  	//    lengths of the password and salt strings (which we denote by p and s,
  	//    respectively) and the number n of pseudorandom bits required.  In
  	//    addition, u and v are of course non-zero.
  
  	//    For information on security considerations for MD5 [19], see [25] and
  	//    [1], and on those for MD2, see [18].
  
  	//    The following procedure can be used to produce pseudorandom bits for
  	//    a particular "purpose" that is identified by a byte called "ID".
  	//    This standard specifies 3 different values for the ID byte:
  
  	//    1.  If ID=1, then the pseudorandom bits being produced are to be used
  	//        as key material for performing encryption or decryption.
  
  	//    2.  If ID=2, then the pseudorandom bits being produced are to be used
  	//        as an IV (Initial Value) for encryption or decryption.
  
  	//    3.  If ID=3, then the pseudorandom bits being produced are to be used
  	//        as an integrity key for MACing.
  
  	//    1.  Construct a string, D (the "diversifier"), by concatenating v/8
  	//        copies of ID.
  	var D []byte
  	for i := 0; i < v; i++ {
  		D = append(D, ID)
  	}
  
  	//    2.  Concatenate copies of the salt together to create a string S of
  	//        length v(ceiling(s/v)) bits (the final copy of the salt may be
  	//        truncated to create S).  Note that if the salt is the empty
  	//        string, then so is S.
  
  	S := fillWithRepeats(salt, v)
  
  	//    3.  Concatenate copies of the password together to create a string P
  	//        of length v(ceiling(p/v)) bits (the final copy of the password
  	//        may be truncated to create P).  Note that if the password is the
  	//        empty string, then so is P.
  
  	P := fillWithRepeats(password, v)
  
  	//    4.  Set I=S||P to be the concatenation of S and P.
  	I := append(S, P...)
  
  	//    5.  Set c=ceiling(n/u).
  	c := (size + u - 1) / u
  
  	//    6.  For i=1, 2, ..., c, do the following:
  	A := make([]byte, c*20)
  	var IjBuf []byte
  	for i := 0; i < c; i++ {
  		//        A.  Set A2=H^r(D||I). (i.e., the r-th hash of D||1,
  		//            H(H(H(... H(D||I))))
  		Ai := hash(append(D, I...))
  		for j := 1; j < r; j++ {
  			Ai = hash(Ai)
  		}
  		copy(A[i*20:], Ai[:])
  
  		if i < c-1 { // skip on last iteration
  			// B.  Concatenate copies of Ai to create a string B of length v
  			//     bits (the final copy of Ai may be truncated to create B).
  			var B []byte
  			for len(B) < v {
  				B = append(B, Ai[:]...)
  			}
  			B = B[:v]
  
  			// C.  Treating I as a concatenation I_0, I_1, ..., I_(k-1) of v-bit
  			//     blocks, where k=ceiling(s/v)+ceiling(p/v), modify I by
  			//     setting I_j=(I_j+B+1) mod 2^v for each j.
  			{
  				Bbi := new(big.Int).SetBytes(B)
  				Ij := new(big.Int)
  
  				for j := 0; j < len(I)/v; j++ {
  					Ij.SetBytes(I[j*v : (j+1)*v])
  					Ij.Add(Ij, Bbi)
  					Ij.Add(Ij, one)
  					Ijb := Ij.Bytes()
  					// We expect Ijb to be exactly v bytes,
  					// if it is longer or shorter we must
  					// adjust it accordingly.
  					if len(Ijb) > v {
  						Ijb = Ijb[len(Ijb)-v:]
  					}
  					if len(Ijb) < v {
  						if IjBuf == nil {
  							IjBuf = make([]byte, v)
  						}
  						bytesShort := v - len(Ijb)
  						for i := 0; i < bytesShort; i++ {
  							IjBuf[i] = 0
  						}
  						copy(IjBuf[bytesShort:], Ijb)
  						Ijb = IjBuf
  					}
  					copy(I[j*v:(j+1)*v], Ijb)
  				}
  			}
  		}
  	}
  	//    7.  Concatenate A_1, A_2, ..., A_c together to form a pseudorandom
  	//        bit string, A.
  
  	//    8.  Use the first n bits of A as the output of this entire process.
  	return A[:size]
  
  	//    If the above process is being used to generate a DES key, the process
  	//    should be used to create 64 random bits, and the key's parity bits
  	//    should be set after the 64 bits have been produced.  Similar concerns
  	//    hold for 2-key and 3-key triple-DES keys, for CDMF keys, and for any
  	//    similar keys with parity bits "built into them".
  }
  