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Incursion phase |
The actual break-in occurs during this phase. The attacker usually compromises the network by delivering targeted |
malware to vulnerable systems or employees. There are two main avenues of attack. One is to send spear phishing |
emails, where a link to a malicious website or a malicious attachment is delivered using social engineering |
techniques. The second method, which is gaining traction, is watering hole attacks, where the attacker infects a |
website that has a high likelihood of being visited by the intended victim. By using IP address filters before infecting |
any visitor of such sites, the attacker can reduce the number of infected systems and bring it to a manageable |
quantity which can be assessed manually at another time. |
Some groups carefully plan watering hole attacks. For example the Hidden Lynx group stopped using a zero-day |
vulnerability in a large watering hole attack after Microsoft released details on the vulnerability. This helped to cover |
their activities and avoid unwanted attention. A few days later the group resumed the watering hole attack again, |
this time using a different exploit. |
For more difficult targets, man-in-the-middle attacks can be used. These can be performed either at the same |
physical location, posing as a genuine Wi-Fi hotspot or through supply chain attacks. This can enable the attacker to |
swap an update of legitimate software for a maliciously crafted version. Once the victim installs the genuine looking |
update, the attacker effectively gains control over the computer. Due to the complexity of such an attack, they are |
rarely used. Depending on the skills of the attacker and the time available, the attacker might also attack systems at |
the perimeter, such as Web servers, and try to break in from there. |
The malware used is not always sophisticated. Sometimes a regular off-the-shelf back door Trojan is used. In |
these cases the person behind the malware orchestrating the commands is what makes the difference between a |
targeted attack and a broad generic infection. Having said this, on very unique targets, we will often see the use |
of a specifically designed piece malware, such as in the case of Stuxnet. Depending on the protection measures |
implemented by the target, the attackers may also digitally sign their malware creation. In the past there have been |
quite a few cases where code signing certificates were stolen and later misused to sign malware in order to pass it |
unnoticed to high value targets. |
Discovery phase |
Once the attacker has a foothold on one system, the next step is to create a plan for lateral movement through the |
network until the interesting data is found. With more specialized teams of attackers, we can often observe that the |
infected system is first analyzed to ensure that it is of interest to them. With watering hole attacks especially, it can |
happen that computers that were not targeted get infected. Infected computers need to be assessed by the attacker |
and, if necessary, removed to keep the profile, and with that the chances of exposure, low. |
One of the obvious tasks performed by attackers is to install key loggers, dump local credentials, search local |
storage for saved accounts and sniff the network for passwords. Any account detail can be useful to them. Domain |
administrator passwords are of especially high value, as they can help greatly in moving further through the Intranet. |
Often small scripts or even manual commands are used to comb through local files and create network mappings. |
Simple system commands can help the attacker to learn about installed security tools, saved links to internal |
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Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector |
platforms and local address books. |
Once new systems are identified the |
attacker will attempt to hop onto |
them as well. In some instances |
they might even use zero-day |
vulnerabilities to spread further into |
the network. |
One method which is gaining more |
relevance is the hijacking of local |
software distribution systems for |
further distribution. This can either |
be proprietary systems, such as the |
case of Trojan.Jokra in South Korea, |
or OS-specific, such as hijacking |
Windows Update, in the case of |
Flamer. Once the attackers have |
successfully managed to create |
and distribute their own package, Figure 9: Typical commands used during discovery phase |
they can easily infect all connected |
systems at once. Especially in cases |
of wiping attacks, such Trojan.Jokra, this is a very efficient way to disrupt as many computers as possible. |
If the target is assumed to be in a separated network not connected to the Internet, the malware used might try and |
autonomously infect removable drives, like USB sticks, or project files for PLCs. This could allow the malware to be |
manually introduced to the destination network, without the knowledge of the carrier, essentially jumping air gaps |
into isolated networks. |
At the end of the discovery phase the attackers should know the internals of the infected networks and have |
identified systems with interesting data or with connected industrial control systems. |
Capture/exfiltration phase |
The capture and exfiltration phases are not always present. If the sole goal of the attackers is to cause a disruption |
they may directly jump to a destructive payload. However, in most cases information is extracted first, which in turn |
allows the sabotage to be constructed more efficiently at a later phase. |
In this phase the interesting data is gathered and sent back to the attackers. This can be done with different levels of |
sophistication. The simple attacks compress the files and upload them through FTP or through a HTTP POST request |
to a remote drop server. More sophisticated attackers obfuscate the data by XOR-ing it, encrypting it with proper |
asymmetric encryption or embedding it into media files using steganography to hide the data from traffic inspection. |
In addition to this, the amount of data sent and the timing can be chosen in a smart way. For example, some malware |
samples will send the data in smaller bursts so as not to swamp the network or generate network spikes that might |
attract attention. Since most employees use laptops, the malware can use location awareness to detect if the |
compromised computer is outside of the corporate network and send the data once it |
s directly connected to the |
Internet, such as from a Wi-Fi hotspot at an airport. This might allow the traffic to bypass perimeter security and |
receive less scrutiny. In some instances the infected computer might not have a direct connection to the Internet. In |
such cases, a previously compromised computer in the DMZ can act as a proxy, forwarding all the collected data. |
Disruption phase |
This is when any destructive payload is launched. If the attackers are only after information this phase might not |
happen at all. The targets and the goals for disruption attacks can be very different, there is no such thing as one- |
size-fits-all for disruption attacks. For example, Stuxnet was tailored to attack a specific uranium enrichment facility |
and would not work against a different target. |
In recent times, wiper Trojans have been popular in attacks against the energy sector. The malware deletes all files |
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Targeted Attacks Against the Energy Sector |
on a computer and then deletes the master boot record, rendering the computer unusable. This can happen on |
any operating systems and we have seen scripts for different UNIX flavors being used as well. Depending on |
the disaster recovery plan in place, these computers can be remotely recovered. However, there may still be an |
outage while the computers are being restored. |
Resources |
[1] Marco Cova, Corrado Leita, Olivier Thonnard, Angelos D. Keromytis, and Marc Dacier. An analysis of rogue |
AV campaigns. In Proc. of the 13th International Conference on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection |
(RAID), 2010. |
[2] O.Thonnard, M.Dacier. A Strategic Analysis of Spam Botnets Operations. CEAS |
11, Perth, WA, Australia, |
Sep 2011. |
Subsets and Splits