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$Id: named_mutex.c 15594 2011-03-18 08:04:09Z gilg $ |
$Id: nt.c 20719 2012-12-05 12:31:20Z gilg $ |
$Id: ntsystem.c 19662 2012-07-09 13:17:17Z gilg $ |
$Id: rw_lock.c 14516 2010-11-29 12:27:33Z gilg $ |
$Id: rk_bpf.c 14518 2010-11-29 12:28:30Z gilg $ |
$Id: t_status.c 14478 2010-11-27 12:41:22Z gilg $ |
It also exposed the project name of this particular variant as |
sengoku |
d:\proj\cn\fa64\sengoku\_bin\sengoku\win32_debug\sengoku_Win32.pdb |
Now it |
s time to execute the driver and see what it does. |
BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 7 |
ROOTKIT EXECUTION |
When first executed, the driver creates device named \Device\vstor32 with a symbolic link \DosDevices\vstor32. |
This device is used for userland/kernel communications. |
Next, it drops a DLL into the %windows% directory - the DLL is carried in the body of the driver as a binary chunk with |
XOR 0xAA applied on top of it, so the driver decrypts it first. |
Depending on the variant, the DLL is dropped either under a random name or a hard-coded name, such as mscpx32n.dll. |
The purpose of this DLL is to be injected into the user-mode processes. Some variants of Snake carry the DLL modules that can be |
installed as a service, to be run within taskhost.exe or services.exe processes. |
Next, the driver sets up the hooks for the following kernel-mode APIs: |
ZwCreateThread |
ZwCreateUserProcess |
ZwShutdownSystem |
After that, it calls PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine() in order to be notified whenever a new process is started. |
The handlers of the hooks above along with the notification callback allow Snake to stay persistent on a system, being able to infect |
any newly created processes, and restore its driver file in case it gets deleted. |
Another set of hooks it sets is designed to hide the presence of the Snake components on the system: |
ZwQuerySystemInformation |
ZwQueryInformationProcess |
ZwClose |
ZwTerminateProcess |
The driver then watches for all userland processes to see if they load any web pages. |
As long as the user is not using the Internet, Snake stays dormant too, as there is no process that communicates with the web |
servers. |
However, as soon as the user goes online, the driver intercepts that event and then immediately injects the malicious DLL module |
into the process that initiated connection (the browser). |
Once injected, the module initiates polling from one of the hard-coded C&C servers. |
The purpose of this behaviour is to blend Snake |
s traffic with the browser traffic, bypassing the firewalls, and keeping a low profile |
at the same time. By communicating from within a process that also communicates, even a technically savvy user will find it |
challenging to detect Snake traffic among legitimate traffic. |
The reason behind such difficulty is because modern web pages often fetch pages from the different web servers, including such |
data as additional scripts, CSS templates, advertising contents, analytics data, blogs, social networking data, etc. When intercepted |
with the purpose of analysis, such traffic may literally represent itself hundreds of DNS and HTTP requests made when a popular |
website, such as a news website is open. |
Hiding a few DNS/HTTP requests among busy network traffic allows Snake rootkit to stay unnoticed. |
In order to test Snake |
s communications with the C&C servers, and still being able to clearly distinguish its traffic, a small tool was |
built to generate GET request to a web server running on the analysed system. |
The tool was named as chrome.exe in order to trigger the malware communications. |
BAE Systems Applied Intelligence: Snake Rootkit Report 2014 8 |
COMMAND-AND-CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS |
As long as the test tool named chrome.exe did not make any requests, its memory stayed pristine. There were no injections made |
by the driver. |
As soon as the tool made its first GET requests, the driver immediately injected a malicious DLL module in it, and that module |
started producing the following traffic: |
No. Time Source Destination Protocol Length Info |
38 44.290689000 192.168.202.131 192.168.202.2 DNS 77 Standard query 0x6ad3 A winter.site11.com |
41 44.292830000 192.168.202.2 192.168.202.131 DNS 93 Standard query response 0x6ad3 A 31.170.161.136 |
45 44.518185000 192.168.202.131 31.170.161.136 HTTP 219 GET /D/pub.txt HTTP/1.1 |
47 44.743999000 31.170.161.136 192.168.202.131 HTTP 474 HTTP/1.1 302 Found (text/html) |
84 45.990199000 192.168.202.131 31.170.161.136 HTTP 233 GET /D/1/f42cce984070b8ab1c0 HTTP/1.1 |
86 46.216079000 31.170.161.136 192.168.202.131 HTTP 474 HTTP/1.1 302 Found (text/html) |
94 46.525887000 192.168.202.131 31.170.164.249 HTTP 217 GET /? HTTP/1.1 |
101 46.939359000 192.168.202.131 192.168.202.2 DNS 82 Standard query 0x5ae5 A swim.onlinewebshop.net |
102 46.940914000 192.168.202.2 192.168.202.131 DNS 98 Standard query response 0x5ae5 A 83.125.22.197 |
107 47.287205000 192.168.202.131 83.125.22.197 HTTP 224 GET /D/pub.txt HTTP/1.1 |
109 48.219805000 83.125.22.197 192.168.202.131 HTTP 330 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html) |
118 48.813394000 192.168.202.131 192.168.202.2 DNS 82 Standard query 0x5362 A july.mypressonline.com |
119 48.814837000 192.168.202.2 192.168.202.131 DNS 98 Standard query response 0x5362 A 83.125.22.197 |
123 49.131675000 192.168.202.131 83.125.22.197 HTTP 224 GET /D/pub.txt HTTP/1.1 |
125 49.780323000 83.125.22.197 192.168.202.131 HTTP 330 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html) |
137 50.536285000 192.168.202.131 31.170.161.136 HTTP 220 GET /D/77568289 HTTP/1.1 |
139 50.762073000 31.170.161.136 192.168.202.131 HTTP 474 HTTP/1.1 302 Found (text/html) |
147 51.101706000 192.168.202.131 31.170.164.249 HTTP 217 GET /? HTTP/1.1 |
154 51.548661000 192.168.202.131 83.125.22.197 HTTP 225 GET /D/77568289 HTTP/1.1 |
163 52.014730000 192.168.202.131 83.125.22.197 HTTP 225 GET /D/77568289 HTTP/1.1 |
165 52.637958000 83.125.22.197 192.168.202.131 HTTP 679 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html) |
Received command |
The domain names of the C&C servers it relies on are hard-coded in the body of the malware. Some examples are given below, and |
a full list of known domains is given in the Appendix D: |
north-area.bbsindex.com |
winter.site11.com |
swim.onlinewebshop.net |
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