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cybersecurity

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How Government-Grade Spy Tech Used A Fake Scandal
2012, accessed: 12-November-2013. [Online]. Available: To Dupe Journalists,
2012, accessed: 7-August-2013.
http://bit.ly/1aSdw07
[78] A. Ornaghi,
em-http-server,
accessed: 27-February-
[58] V. Silver,
Spyware Leaves Trail to Beaten 2014. [Online]. Available: https://github.com/alor/em-
Activist Through Microsoft Flaw,
2012, ac- http-server
cessed: 14-November-2013. [Online]. Available:
[79] SophosLabs,
Anatomy of a targeted attack
http://bloom.bg/1ja2geI
SophosLabs explores an Adobe zero-day
malware
[59] B. Hubbard,
Emirates Balk at Activism in Region experiment
2013, accessed 7-August-2013. [Online].
Hit by Uprisings,
2013, accessed: 14-November-2013. Available: http://bit.ly/HQ1oRc
[Online]. Available: http://nyti.ms/I4n2Aw
[80] K. Zetter,
American Gets Targeted by Digital
[60]
SPY NET,
accessed: 27-February-2014. [Online]. Spy Tool Sold to Foreign Governments,
2013,
Available: http://newspynetrat.blogspot.com/ accessed: 14-November-2013. [Online]. Available:
[61]
Asprotect SKE,
accessed: 27-February-2014. [Online]. http://wrd.cm/1fHonth
Available: http://www.aspack.com/asprotect32.html [81] M. Marquis-Boire and B. Marczak,
From Bahrain
[62]
Unpacking VBInject/VBCrypt/RunPE,
2010, ac- With Love: FinFisher
s Spy Kit Exposed?
Jul.
cessed: 7-August-2013. [Online]. Available: 2012, accessed: 4-August-2013. [Online]. Available:
http://bit.ly/1e28nS2 http://bit.ly/1bngpB2
14
23rd USENIX Security Symposium
USENIX Association
A FinSpy fingerprints
Previous work by Guarnieri on scanning for FinSpy servers
found that in response to a request such as GET /, the
Bahraini FinSpy C&C server returns a response with the string
Hallo Steffi
[67]. Guarnieri searched a database of
such responses compiled by the Critical.IO Internet scanning
project [68], locating 11 additional servers in 10 countries [67].
We refer to this fingerprint as
1 . Concurrent with this ef-
fort, we devised our own fingerprint
1 that tested three as-
pects of the handshake between a FinSpy infectee and a Fin-
Spy C&C server, which follows a custom TLV-based protocol
running on ports such as 22, 53, 80, and 443. We conducted
targeted scanning of several countries using
1 , and also con-
firmed Guarnieri
s findings for those servers still reachable af-
ter he published his findings.
We observed a trend: changes in HTTP response behavior
by FinFisher after publication of findings about the software.
In July 2012, for example, after a post about Bahraini FinSpy
samples [81], servers closed the TCP connection in response
to a GET / or HEAD / request (although servers continued
to behave consistently with
1 . Other changes followed later
in 2012, including a new response to GET / requests that in-
cluded an imperfect copy of an Apache server
s HTTP response
(the Date header used UTC rather than GMT). We fingerprinted
this error as
2 , and later in 2012 fingerprinted other distinctive
behavior in response to GET / requests as
Subsequent scans of /0 for
2 and
3 , and five service
probes of the Internet Census for
1 through
3 , located several
additional servers. In Feburary 2013 we identified and finger-
printed new HTTP response behavior with
4 and modified
to produce
2 , which tests only two of the three aspects of the
FinSpy handshake (the third test of
1 was broken when Fin-
Spy servers were updated to accept types of invalid data they
had previously rejected).
As of 3/13/13, all servers that matched any
fingerprint
matched
15
USENIX Association
23rd USENIX Security Symposium