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DOCUMENT IS OFFERED WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND.
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Command Five Pty Ltd
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ABN: 49 149 576 670
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http://www.commandfive.com
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PAGE 13 OF 13
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COPYRIGHT
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COMMAND FIVE PTY LTD. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
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SK Hack by an
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Advanced Persistent Threat
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Command Five Pty Ltd
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September 2011
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ABSTRACT
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This document summarises the July 2011 intrusion into SK
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Communications which culminated in the theft of the personal
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information of up to 35 million people. It describes the use of a trojaned
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software update to gain access to the target network, in effect turning a
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security practice into a vulnerability. It also describes the use of a
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legitimate company to host tools used in the intrusion. Links between
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this intrusion and other malicious activity are identified and valuable
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insights are provided for network defenders. Technical details of
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malicious software and infrastructure are also provided.
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WARNING
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This paper discusses malicious activity and
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identifies Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, domain
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names, and websites that may contain malicious
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content. For safety reasons these locations should
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not be accessed, scanned, probed, or otherwise
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interacted with unless their trustworthiness can be
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verified.
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SK HACK
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On 28 July 2011 SK Communications announced it
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had been the subject of a hack which resulted in the
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theft of the personal details of up to 35 million of its
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users. The compromised details were those of
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CyWorld and Nate users, as stored in SK
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Communications
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user databases. CyWorld 1 is South
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Korea
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s largest social networking site and Nate is a
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popular South Korean web portal. Both services are
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owned by SK Communications. (Sung
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jin, 2011)
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1CyWorld has also expanded to China, Japan, the United States,
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Taiwan, Vietnam and Europe. (SK Communications)
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The sophistication of the attack along with the
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period of time over which it was planned, and
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conducted, indicate that this attack was likely to
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have been undertaken by an Advanced Persistent
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Threat2.
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Between 18 and 25 July 2011 the attackers 3
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infected over 60 SK Communications computers and
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used them to gain access to the user databases. The
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attackers infected these computers by first
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compromising a server, belonging to a South Korean
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software company, used to deliver software updates
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to customers (including SK Communications). The
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attackers modified the server so that the SK
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Communications computers would receive a
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trojaned 4 update file when they conducted their
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routine checks for software updates. (Moon
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young,
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2011) (ESTsoft, 2011)
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2 For a definition of the term
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Advanced Persistent Threat
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refer to
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the Command Five paper
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Advanced Persistent Threats: A Decade
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in Review
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(Command Five Pty Ltd, 2011).
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3 The term
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attackers
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is used in this paper to describe both the
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hackers and anyone to whom they were reporting.
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4 A trojan is a document or program which appears harmless but
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performs malicious activity when opened or run.
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PAGE 1 OF 24
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COPYRIGHT
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COMMAND FIVE PTY LTD. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
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Such routine updates (commonly known as
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patches
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) are a good security practice as they often
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include fixes for security weaknesses identified in
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the software. Without software updates the SK
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Communications computers would have been
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vulnerable to several other attacks including a
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significant one which was made public in June
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20115. The security of software updates is usually
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trusted implicitly and the exploitation of this trust
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relationship could go undetected by many targets, as
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it did for some time by SK Communications.
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Between 18 and 25 July the attackers conducted
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command and control and monitoring activities on
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the infected computers. This involved the upload of
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tools, conveniently stored on the website of a
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Taiwanese publishing company the attackers had
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earlier hacked. Then on 26 July 2011, the attackers,
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having done the necessary groundwork, proceeded
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to hack the Nate and CyWorld user databases 6.
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(Birdman, 2011) (Moon
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