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Once an attacker has gained access to a network for
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information gathering purposes they will usually
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attempt to maintain their access. This may involve
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minimising the amount of malicious activity they
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generate on the network to avoid detection,
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periodically communicating with backdoors on the
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network to ensure they are working as intended,
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and making changes as appropriate. If automated
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data gathering tools are in use, it may also involve
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modifying search terms or the exfiltration path,
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volume or frequency. Maintenance also requires
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maintaining callback domains and any intermediary
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infrastructure used to communicate with the
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backdoors. If access is lost, the attacker may return
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to step 1 (Reconnaissance) or step 2 (Preparation)
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in an attempt to regain access.
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Restrict which computers can be placed on the
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corporate network via wired, wireless, and remote
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access methods.
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IMPROVING ORGANISATIONAL RESILIENCE
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To improve resilience to APTs organisations should
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employ good security practices and policies
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including those described below.
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Information Centric Security
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Adopt an information centric approach to security
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by applying multiple layers of security, affording the
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most sensitive information the most protection. If
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possible store sensitive information offline, or on a
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separate restricted access network.
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Regular Patching
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Regularly patch operating systems and applications
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including document viewers (e.g. Microsoft Office,
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Adobe Acrobat) and web browser plugins.
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Known Network Topology
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Ensure system administrators are aware of the
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location of all computers, computer equipment and
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Internet gateways so they can secure the network
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(including wireless access points and 3G USB
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modems).
|
USB Drive Control
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Restrict which USB drives can be used on corporate
|
networks and develop policies on permitted usage
|
and minimum encryption requirements.
|
Intrusion Analysis
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Conduct intrusion analysis (both host
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based and
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network based) to detect anomalous activity.
|
Access Control
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Employ two
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factor authentication where possible,
|
particularly on Virtual Private Networks. Restrict
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user access using least privilege methodology,
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encourage good password control, regularly audit
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access logs, and review access levels.
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Sender Policy Framework
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Employ the Sender Policy Framework 7 to help
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protect against spoofed emails.
|
Computer Administration Restrictions
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Minimise administrative access and restrict access
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so users do not possess both
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write
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and
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execute
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privileges for the same folder.
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User Education
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Educate users on the threat from socially engineered
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emails and other forms of social engineering.
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Encourage users to notify IT staff of suspicious
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events.
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7 The Sender Policy Framework is an open standard specifying a
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technical method to prevent sender address forgery. (Mehnle,
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2010)
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PAGE 9 OF 13
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COPYRIGHT
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COMMAND FIVE PTY LTD. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
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REFERENCES
|
AAP. (2010, April 19). Mining firms hit by China cyber attack. Retrieved June 13, 2011, from The Sydney Morning
|
Herald: http://www.news.smh.com.au/breaking
|
news
|
national/mining
|
firms
|
china
|
cyber
|
attacks
|
20100419
|
spc9.html
|
AFP. (2011, March 07). French government comes under cyber attack. Retrieved June 13, 2011, from The Age:
|
http://news.theage.com.au/breaking
|
news
|
world/french
|
government
|
comes
|
under
|
cyber
|
attack
|
20110307
|
1bl8z.html
|
Anastasio, M. (2007, December 06). Los Alamos also hacked. Retrieved June 13, 2011, from Frank Munger's Atomic
|
City Underground: http://blogs.knoxnews.com/munger/2007/12/los_alamos_also_hacked.html
|
Arquila, J. (2003, March 04). Interviews
|
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