clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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By Rohit Varma, McAfee Labs
Contents
Overview ............................................................................................................................. 2
McAfee detection names for Aurora................................................................................... 3
Exploit-Comele ........................................................................................................... 3
Roarur.dr ..................................................................................................................... 3
Roarur.dll .................................................................................................................... 3
Symptoms ........................................................................................................................... 5
Characteristics ..................................................................................................................... 5
Common filenames and hashes ........................................................................................... 6
McAfee product coverage for Aurora ................................................................................. 7
Common URLs accessed. ................................................................................................. 10
Appendix A: Useful URLs related to Aurora ................................................................... 11
Combating Aurora
Overview
Operation Aurora,
released the week of January 11, exploits the recent Microsoft
Internet Explorer vulnerability. The attack was initially targeted at several large
companies, including Google. It is now public and is available on the web. The public
release significantly increases the possibility of widespread attacks exploiting the
vulnerability, putting Internet Explorer users at potentially serious risk.
Microsoft is aware of the targeted attacks and lists the following combinations as
vulnerable: Internet Explorer 6 Service Pack 1 on Microsoft Windows 2000 Service Pack
4, and Internet Explorer 6, Internet Explorer 7 and Internet Explorer 8 on supported
editions of Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008,
Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/979352.mspx
Below we have a summary of McAfee
s assessment of Internet Explorer and platform
risks:
* DEP
Data Execution Prevention (DEP) is a set of hardware and software technologies that
perform additional checks on memory to help prevent malicious code from running
on a system. In Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 2 (SP2) and Microsoft
Windows XP Tablet PC Edition 2005, DEP is enforced by hardware and by software.
The primary benefit of DEP is to help prevent code execution from data pages.
Typically, code is not executed from the default heap and the stack. Hardwareenforced DEP detects code that is running from these locations and raises an
exception when execution occurs. Software-enforced DEP can help prevent malicious
code from taking advantage of exception-handling mechanisms in Windows.
McAfee detection names for Aurora
Exploit-Comele
This maliciously crafted script attempts to exploit the vulnerability when Internet
Explorer handles certain DOM operations.
An attacker may exploit this issue to execute remote code.
http://vil.nai.com/vil/content/v_253210.htm
Roarur.dr
This Trojan drops further malicious files onto the victim
s computer.
http://vil.nai.com/vil/content/v_253415.htm
Roarur.dll
This Trojan is dropped by the roarur.dr Trojan.
The dll creates an additional service on the victim
s computer and checks for certain files
on the system. The files it looks for are
acelpvc.dll (presence of this file does not necessarily imply an infection ) . acelpvc.dll
is used to stream live desktop feeds to the attacker
VedioDriver.dll (presence of this file does not necessarily imply an infection )- Helper
dll for acelpvc.dll
http://vil.nai.com/vil/content/v_253416.htm
Aliases
Trojan.Hydraq
Symptoms
Outbound network connections to
hxxp://demo[remove].jpg
The presence of the following files:
%SystemDir%\Rasmon.dll
%SYSDIR%\DFS.bat
The presence of the following registry keys:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RaS[%
random 4 chars %]
"ImagePath" = %SystemRoot%\svchost.exe -k netsvcs
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RaS[%
random 4 chars %]
"Start"= 02, 00, 00, 00
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RaS[%
random 4 chars %]\Parameters "ServiceDll" = %SystemRoot%\rasmon.dll
Characteristics
Aurora demonstrates these four infection characteristics:
Common filenames and hashes
securmon.dll:
E3798C71D25816611A4CAB031AE3C27A
Rasmon.dll:
0F9C5408335833E72FE73E6166B5A01B
a.exe:
CD36A3071A315C3BE6AC3366D80BB59C
b.exe
9F880AC607CBD7CDFFFA609C5883C708
AppMgmt.dll
6A89FBE7B0D526E3D97B0DA8418BF851
A0029670.dll
3A33013A47C5DD8D1B92A4CFDCDA3765
msconfig32.sys
7A62295F70642FEDF0D5A5637FEB7986
VedioDriver.dll
467EEF090DEB3517F05A48310FCFD4EE
acelpvc.dll
4A47404FC21FFF4A1BC492F9CD23139C
wuauclt.exe
69BAF3C6D3A8D41B789526BA72C79C2D
jucheck.exe

By Rohit Varma, McAfee Labs

Contents

Overview ............................................................................................................................. 2

McAfee detection names for Aurora................................................................................... 3

Exploit-Comele ........................................................................................................... 3

Roarur.dr ..................................................................................................................... 3

Roarur.dll .................................................................................................................... 3

Symptoms ........................................................................................................................... 5

Characteristics ..................................................................................................................... 5

Common filenames and hashes ........................................................................................... 6

McAfee product coverage for Aurora ................................................................................. 7

Common URLs accessed. ................................................................................................. 10

Appendix A: Useful URLs related to Aurora ................................................................... 11

Combating Aurora

Overview

Operation Aurora,

released the week of January 11, exploits the recent Microsoft

Internet Explorer vulnerability. The attack was initially targeted at several large

companies, including Google. It is now public and is available on the web. The public

release significantly increases the possibility of widespread attacks exploiting the

vulnerability, putting Internet Explorer users at potentially serious risk.

Microsoft is aware of the targeted attacks and lists the following combinations as

vulnerable: Internet Explorer 6 Service Pack 1 on Microsoft Windows 2000 Service Pack

4, and Internet Explorer 6, Internet Explorer 7 and Internet Explorer 8 on supported

editions of Windows XP, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008,

Windows 7, and Windows Server 2008 R2.

http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/979352.mspx

Below we have a summary of McAfee

s assessment of Internet Explorer and platform

risks:

* DEP

Data Execution Prevention (DEP) is a set of hardware and software technologies that

perform additional checks on memory to help prevent malicious code from running

on a system. In Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 2 (SP2) and Microsoft

Windows XP Tablet PC Edition 2005, DEP is enforced by hardware and by software.

The primary benefit of DEP is to help prevent code execution from data pages.

Typically, code is not executed from the default heap and the stack. Hardwareenforced DEP detects code that is running from these locations and raises an

exception when execution occurs. Software-enforced DEP can help prevent malicious

code from taking advantage of exception-handling mechanisms in Windows.

McAfee detection names for Aurora

Exploit-Comele

This maliciously crafted script attempts to exploit the vulnerability when Internet

Explorer handles certain DOM operations.

An attacker may exploit this issue to execute remote code.

http://vil.nai.com/vil/content/v_253210.htm

Roarur.dr

This Trojan drops further malicious files onto the victim

s computer.

http://vil.nai.com/vil/content/v_253415.htm

Roarur.dll

This Trojan is dropped by the roarur.dr Trojan.

The dll creates an additional service on the victim

s computer and checks for certain files

on the system. The files it looks for are

acelpvc.dll (presence of this file does not necessarily imply an infection ) . acelpvc.dll

is used to stream live desktop feeds to the attacker

VedioDriver.dll (presence of this file does not necessarily imply an infection )- Helper

dll for acelpvc.dll

http://vil.nai.com/vil/content/v_253416.htm

Aliases

Trojan.Hydraq

Symptoms

Outbound network connections to

hxxp://demo[remove].jpg

The presence of the following files:

%SystemDir%\Rasmon.dll

%SYSDIR%\DFS.bat

The presence of the following registry keys:

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RaS[%

random 4 chars %]

"ImagePath" = %SystemRoot%\svchost.exe -k netsvcs

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RaS[%

random 4 chars %]

"Start"= 02, 00, 00, 00

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RaS[%

random 4 chars %]\Parameters "ServiceDll" = %SystemRoot%\rasmon.dll

Characteristics

Aurora demonstrates these four infection characteristics:

Common filenames and hashes

securmon.dll:

E3798C71D25816611A4CAB031AE3C27A

Rasmon.dll:

0F9C5408335833E72FE73E6166B5A01B

a.exe:

CD36A3071A315C3BE6AC3366D80BB59C

b.exe

9F880AC607CBD7CDFFFA609C5883C708

AppMgmt.dll

6A89FBE7B0D526E3D97B0DA8418BF851

A0029670.dll

3A33013A47C5DD8D1B92A4CFDCDA3765

msconfig32.sys

7A62295F70642FEDF0D5A5637FEB7986

VedioDriver.dll

467EEF090DEB3517F05A48310FCFD4EE

acelpvc.dll

4A47404FC21FFF4A1BC492F9CD23139C

wuauclt.exe

69BAF3C6D3A8D41B789526BA72C79C2D

jucheck.exe